

70-6956

CURTIS, Gerald Leon, 1940-  
MOBILIZING ELECTORAL SUPPORT: A  
STUDY OF A LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC  
PARTY CANDIDATE'S CAMPAIGN  
STRATEGIES IN THE 1967 LOWER  
HOUSE ELECTION IN JAPAN.

Columbia University, Ph.D., 1969  
Political Science, international law and relations  
University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan

© GERALD LEON CURTIS 1970

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

7

**MOBILIZING ELECTORAL SUPPORT:  
A STUDY OF A LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY CANDIDATE'S  
CAMPAIGN STRATEGIES IN THE 1967 LOWER HOUSE  
ELECTION IN JAPAN**

by  
Gerald L. Curtis

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements  
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy,  
in the Faculty of Political Science,  
Columbia University

1969

ABSTRACT

MOBILIZING ELECTORAL SUPPORT:  
A STUDY OF A LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY CANDIDATE'S  
CAMPAIGN STRATEGIES IN THE 1967 LOWER HOUSE  
ELECTION IN JAPAN

by

Gerald L. Curtis

This study examines the strategies of support mobilization utilized by a candidate for election to the Lower House of the Japanese Diet in the election held in January 1967. The candidate, Sato Bunsei, ran as a member of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) from the Second District of Oita Prefecture in Kyushu. The study is based on material gathered by the author over a period of fifteen months of living in the home of the candidate and observing the campaign.

The study deals with the following major issues: the process of receiving LDP endorsement as an official Party candidate; the differing structures of campaign organization in rural and urban sectors of the constituency; the organization and function of a kōenkai, a "supporters' organization"; the role played in Sato's campaign by interest groups and other voluntary associations; and the conduct of both the unofficial and official campaign.

The general conceptual framework for this study is as follows. In every system of representative democracy,

candidates must cope with the problem of mobilizing support sufficient to insure election and must decide upon strategies which can successfully meet this problem. Candidates operate within a certain structure provided by the political system and this structure limits the range of alternative strategies available to them. Campaign strategies can be understood only in relation to the opportunities presented by the relevant structure. Candidates operating under different opportunity structures will be presented with different alternatives of rational campaign strategies.

Formulating strategies within the structure of opportunity presented him, Sato emerged with four fundamental approaches to campaign strategy.

One basic approach is to rely on an organization of local community elites, particularly local politicians, to organize and deliver the vote. Reliance on such elites was Sato's basic approach to mobilizing the support of the rural electorate. Elite supporters were to deliver a certain vote on the basis of their personal influence over the electorate and candidate activities aimed at mobilizing support directly among the rural voters were of minimal importance.

Activities intended to organize support directly among the electorate at large were concentrated in the large cities of the District. Here Sato emphasized the use of a kōenkai, a mass membership "supporters' organization." This informal membership organization sponsored a broad variety of activities

intended to bring large numbers of voters into contact with the candidate and instill among them a sense of conscious commitment to the candidate's success.

A third approach was to enlist the support on behalf of his campaign of various interest groups and other voluntary associations active in the District. Although Sato approached a score of such organizations, meaningful support was minimal. Because of the Election Law's multi-member district, single entry balloting system, LDP candidates fight mainly among each other for the vote. Consequently LDP supporting organizations as a rule refrain from supporting any candidate in order to avoid antagonizing the others.

A fourth major approach was to move beyond organization and conduct a direct appeal to an anonymous electorate during the three week official campaign period. Because of the many legal restrictions on campaign practices as well as the short campaign period, this approach was of less importance than it is to candidates in many other countries.

These four approaches result from a coincidence of historical developments, economic characteristics of the District, institutional factors, other environmental factors and candidate perception. In analyzing them, the changing techniques of support mobilization are revealed and insights into the opportunity structure and the nature of the larger political system gained.

## PREFACE

This case study of campaign strategy in Japan is the product of over fifteen months of personal experience as a participant-observer in the campaign of a forty-eight year old member of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) named Sato Bunsei. The election at issue is the tenth postwar election of members to the Lower House (the House of Representatives) of the National Diet held on January 29, 1967. In this election, Sato ran as a non-incumbent candidate of the LDP from the second district of Oita prefecture which is on the northeastern coast of Kyushu, the southernmost of Japan's four main islands.

In order to conduct the research for this study I moved into the home of Mr. Sato and his family in June of 1966 and lived there continuously for the next nine months. I visited the district again during the spring of 1967 and lived there during July and August of that year. In the course of the months I spent in the district, I had the opportunity to intensively interview most people involved in Sato's campaign. Interviewing, observation and participation were the major research methods employed. In addition to my own field research, I have used various kinds of materials in compiling this study. These include primary materials relating to the political and economic characteristics of Oita prefecture, books and articles relevant to questions raised in this study

and public opinion polls conducted by the Tokyo based Fair Elections League (Komei Senkyo Renmei) and the Election Management Committee (Senkyo Kanri Iinkai) of the Oita prefectural government. A complete listing of these sources is found in the bibliography.

A word should be mentioned about my reasons for choosing Sato as the subject of this study. It is first important to stress that I did not look for nor did I find in Sato the "typical" candidate. There is obviously no more any one typical Japanese candidate for the Lower House than there is a typical American candidate for the U.S. House of Representatives. Sato did, however, possess the characteristics I was hoping to find in the candidate whose campaign I would investigate. He was a member of the Liberal Democratic Party; he was a non-incumbent; and he was from a district that has both rural and urban sectors.

The LDP is the majority party in the Diet, a position it has held since its formation in 1955. Except for one brief period during the American Occupation, the LDP and its direct predecessors have held an absolute majority of Diet seats and have formed every government in postwar Japan. While an examination of opposition party campaign strategies would be of value, I felt most would be gained by studying the campaign strategies of a candidate of the party with the longest history of electoral successes and governmental experience. Furthermore the LDP, because it runs the largest number of candidates

in Lower House elections, most fully suffers from the intra-party competition fostered by Japan's multi-member district single-entry balloting system. I felt it was important to choose a candidate whose campaign fully reflected this intra-party rivalry.

The purpose of studying the campaign of a non-incumbent was to gain insights into the process by which strategies for organizing support are formulated and implemented. I expected that long time incumbent members of the House would have fairly well established organizations and that they would not be as involved in the process of initiating and developing a campaign organization as would the non-incumbent or the candidate that had been elected only once or twice.

I assumed in undertaking this study that strategies would differ in rural and urban areas. Ideally I would have hoped for a district that comprised both highly urban metropolitan areas and rural mountain villages. Unfortunately for such hopes, the small size of Japanese electoral districts makes most of them fairly homogeneous units. Urban districts tend to be almost exclusively urban and rural ones almost entirely rural. Forced to make a choice, I opted for a district that was predominantly, but not entirely, rural. It is in rural areas that the LDP has its greatest electoral support and it is in such areas that conservative candidate campaigns have their longest and strongest traditions. The second district of Oita prefecture, while predominantly rural,



provides a relatively wide spectrum in terms of the economic characteristics of its subdivisions. Though not possessing any significant heavy industry or areas of population density comparable to the large metropolitan cities in Japan, the district does contain both isolated villages and the resort city of Beppu. The differences in the characteristics of the district's component areas were broad enough to have a significant influence on the candidate's formulation of campaign strategy.

A number of other considerations affected my choice of candidate. I looked for one fairly young and one from a part of the country where the local dialect was not incomprehensible to a foreigner with a modest knowledge of standard Japanese. I also looked for a candidate who felt he had a difficult battle to be elected. Finally, it is hardly necessary to add, I looked for a candidate who would be agreeable to having an American student scrutinize his campaign and impose upon his hospitality for a period of several months.

After discussing with people in Tokyo the possibilities of observing the campaign of a number of candidates, I was introduced to Sato Bunsei by former cabinet minister and member of the Diet Nakasone Yasuhiro. Sato had run for the Diet for the first time in the election of 1963 and was defeated. He was preparing to run for the second time as a member of the LDP, was forty-eight at the time of the election in 1967, was from a district that possessed both rural and

urban areas, and was willing to accept into his home and confidence a foreign student of Japanese politics.

The last point is particularly important. It is only because of Sato's extraordinary generosity and the equally generous cooperation of his staff that this study was possible. I was given access to all and any information I desired about Sato's campaign. Living in his home provided opportunities for long hours of discussion and probing of points with which I was particularly concerned. My warm relationship with Sato, his family and immediate staff resulted in a unique, enjoyable and extremely valuable experience for a student of Japanese politics and society.

All Japanese names used in the text are given in the Japanese style, that is, family name first. For purposes of consistency, the ages of people given are, unless otherwise noted, their ages as of January, 1967. In the transliteration of Japanese terms I have indicated long sounds whenever appropriate except for names of people and places. References to national and regional newspapers (the Asahi, Mainichi, Yomiuri and Nishi Nihon Shinbun) refer to the Oita prefecture edition. The back pages of these newspapers are devoted to local news from the area in which they are printed. Unless otherwise noted, references to newspapers that have both morning and evening editions, are to the morning edition.

Except for Chapter I, the chapter divisions of this study need little in the way of preliminary explanation. "The

Politics of Party Endorsement" while not directly related to strategy of support mobilization serves two purposes in this study. One is to introduce in a meaningful way the cast of characters central to the study. The second is to describe how a candidate goes about obtaining the endorsement of the LDP as an official party candidate for the Lower House and thus put himself in the position of having to deal with problems of mobilizing electoral support. Chapters II and III treat Sato's campaign strategies in the rural areas of the district while Chapters IV and V examine campaign strategy in the district's urban areas and particularly in Sato's hometown of Beppu. Chapter VI examines Sato's activities in the months preceding the official election campaign and gives particular attention to an analysis of his efforts in building an organization of women supporters. Chapter VII analyzes the relationship between Sato's campaign and a variety of interest groups in the district. Chapter VIII is a discussion of the candidate's campaign during the official campaign period. A summary and conclusions are found in Chapter IX.

It is inevitable that any attempt to acknowledge the help of people who have made this study possible would both omit the names of people whose help was crucial and would fail to give satisfactory expression to my indebtedness to those people cited. Scores of politicians, campaign workers, newspaper reporters and voters in Oita prefecture gave me their time, their wisdom and their encouragement. To all I express my

sincere gratitude. A few people must be singled out for special thanks. Most of all, I wish to thank Sato Bunsei for his truly extraordinary generosity in allowing me to observe his campaign and live in his home. To Mrs. Sato and Mr. and Mrs. Sato's three sons, Kazuo, Masami and Haruo, I also acknowledge my deepest gratitude and affection. Also my thanks go out to Saita Matato, Sato's campaign manager and, more than anyone else, my sensei on campaign techniques. Without his help this study would not have been possible. Finally I wish to thank my professors at Columbia University for encouraging me to undertake this study and for giving me support and advice during the period of its writing.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
PREFACE . . . . .	ii
INTRODUCTION . . . . .	1
Chapter	
I. THE POLITICS OF PARTY ENDORSEMENT . . . . .	9
II. CAMPAIGN ORGANIZATION IN RURAL AREAS . . . . .	63
III. CAMPAIGN ORGANIZATION IN RURAL AREAS: TWO CASE STUDIES . . . . .	102
IV. CAMPAIGN ORGANIZATION IN BEPPU: UTILIZING THE NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATIONS . . . . .	136
V. THE <u>KŌENKAI</u> . . . . .	195
VI. THE <u>KŌENKAI</u> AND THE "NON-CAMPAIGN" . . . . .	231
VII. THE "ORGANIZATIONAL STRATEGY" . . . . .	270
VIII. THE OFFICIAL CAMPAIGN . . . . .	322
IX. CONCLUSIONS . . . . .	366
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . .	391

LIST OF TABLES

Table	Page
1. Percentage of Seats Won by Independents and Candidates of Minor Parties . . . . .	10
2. Occupational Backgrounds of LDP Members Elected to the Diet in the 1967 Election . . . . .	10
3. Educational Backgrounds of LDP Members Elected to the Diet in 1967 Election . . . . .	11
4. LDP Performance in General Elections 1958-1967 . . . . .	61
5. Selected Population Figures for Oita's Second District . . . . .	65
6. Competition Rate in Town and Village Assembly Elections . . . . .	125
7. Geographical Concentration of Support of Noyori, Ayabe and Nishimura . . . . .	137
8. Distribution of Primary Support for the Four LDP Candidates . . . . .	140
9. Popular Vote in Elections in Oita Prefecture in 1963 . . . . .	141
10. Reasons Cited Most Important by the Beppu Electorate in Deciding Which Candidate to Vote For . . . . .	143
11. Influence of National, Local and Occupational Concerns on Voting in Diet Elections . . . . .	145
12. Party Support of Voters in 1967 Diet Election . . . . .	155
13. Beppu's Population by School Districts . . . . .	164
14. Political Participation of Beppu Electorate According to Types of Meeting Places . . . . .	170
15. Sketch of the <u>Chōnai</u> of Ueno . . . . .	184
16. <u>Kōenkai</u> Membership . . . . .	206

LIST OF TABLES (continued)

Table	Page
17. <u>Kōenkai</u> Membership Fee . . . . .	208
18. Results of the 1967 Diet Election in Oita's Second District . . . . .	367
19. Results of the 1963 Diet Election in Oita's Second District . . . . .	369

## INTRODUCTION

Voting behavior may be seen as representing one side of a coin in the electoral process. The reverse side is candidate behavior, the ways in which candidates for public office approach the problem of getting voters to vote for them. Students of the electoral process in Japan have been primarily concerned with one side of this coin, i.e. the analysis of voting patterns among the electorate. In their studies they have been basically asking the electorate, "why do you vote the way you do?" and they have sought answers to this question largely through the analysis of voter survey data.<sup>1</sup> There is also need for studies of candidate behavior; studies to ask the question "what campaign strategies do you employ to get voters to vote for you?" The further questions this suggests are: why do candidates adopt the strategies they do and what do campaign strategies imply about the nature of political systems.

Political theorists have long argued that under systems of representative government, the recruitment of political elites is largely accomplished by means of a competitive struggle for

---

<sup>1</sup>In Japanese there are two important studies to be noted: Royama Masamichi et al., Sōsenkyo No Jittai (Tokyo, 1955) and Miyaka Ichiro et al., Kotonaru Reberu No Senkyo Ni Okeru Tōhyō Kōdō No Kenkyū (Tokyo, 1967).



the votes of a mainly passive electorate.<sup>2</sup> Yet scholarly studies of the actors in the electoral process, i.e. political parties and individual candidates, have been few compared to the numerous studies of voting behavior. Furthermore, scholarly studies that do deal with parties and candidates have not paid as much attention to the question of how parties mobilize support as how electoral systems (proportional representation, simple plurality and their variations) affect party systems.<sup>3</sup> The purpose of this study is to examine in depth the strategies of support mobilization employed by one conservative party candidate in his campaign for election to the Lower House of the Japanese Diet.

The general conceptual framework for this study is as follows. In every system of representative democracy, candidates must cope with the problem of mobilizing support sufficient to insure election and must decide upon strategies which can successfully meet this problem. Campaign strategies do not exist in the abstract, providing the candidate an unrestricted freedom of choice. Candidates operate within a

---

<sup>2</sup>See, on this point, Seymour Martin Lipset, "Party Systems and the Representation of Social Groups," Political Parties, Contemporary Trends and Ideas, ed. Roy C. Macridis (New York, 1967), p. 41.

<sup>3</sup>The most recent systematic study of the relationship of electoral and party systems is Douglas Rae, The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws (New Haven, 1967).

certain structure provided by the political system and this structure limits the range of alternative strategies available to them. The institutional framework, laws concerning the electoral system and campaign practices, historical traditions, cultural norms, economic characteristics of the candidate's constituency and other variables combine to form a certain structure of opportunity. Campaign strategies can be understood only in relation to the opportunities presented by the relevant structure. Because each political system represents a different mix of variables, the opportunities available to a candidate in one system may be unavailable, or unavailing, to a candidate in another. Candidates operating under different "opportunity structures" will be presented with different alternatives of rational campaign strategies.

Certain strategies employed by a candidate running for office in a single-member constituency, for example, may be totally inappropriate for a candidate who must seek support in a multi-member district. Strategies that aim at extensive exposure to the public through advertisements in newspapers and on radio or television are obviously of little relevance to a candidate in a system where literacy is low or where few people have radios or where laws prohibit or severely restrict campaigning through the mass media. The opportunities for support mobilization available to a candidate operating in a district that has a strong party organization will predictably be different from the candidate whose constituency has no

effective party organization. The problems of strategy faced by a candidate in a predominantly urban district are different from those of the candidate trying to gain the support of a rural electorate. A candidate whose district has both urban and rural components may find the structure of opportunity so different as to require fundamentally different strategies in the two sectors.

Cultural norms and historical traditions are also crucial elements of the structure within which candidates formulate strategy. What may be socially acceptable behavior in one country may provide opportunities for campaign styles that are intolerable in another. Customs prevalent in rural villages of a particular country may allow for the use of strategies inconceivable in other areas. Particular historical traditions may provide opportunities for mobilizing support that do not exist in other systems and at the same time inhibit the use of techniques perfectly acceptable in systems with different traditions. Kissing babies and sponsoring picnic lunches may be popular campaign techniques in one country and unheard of in another. In other words campaign styles, as is true of campaign strategies in general, are comprehensible only within their environmental context.

The opportunity structures within which candidates create strategies are not only unique to particular political systems. They are also in some degree unique to each candidate because part of the limitations on his choice of strategy

is his own perception of the opportunities provided him. Certain variables allow for no difference in perception among candidates. A candidate cannot, for example, perceive a multi-member district to be a single-member constituency. Regardless of what strategies he may adopt, he must formulate them within the context of a particular type of electoral system. The impact on strategy of other variables, however, may be significantly affected by individual judgment. One candidate may perceive the effects of certain historical traditions on the behavior, say, of rural Japanese voters in quite a different manner from another. The way in which he interprets this behavior becomes an integral part of the structure within which he seeks to create rational strategies. The candidate is inevitably to some degree the prisoner of his own perception. The structure that he sees constraining his choice of campaign strategies may be in crucially important respects the creation of his own judgment of his environment.

There is a modest literature in English dealing with Japanese politics that makes partial generalizations about certain variables of the structure within which candidates endeavor to mobilize electoral support.<sup>4</sup> No attempts have been made, however, to systematically analyze the relationship of

---

<sup>4</sup>See, for example, Ike Nobutaka, Japanese Politics (New York, 1957); Frank Langdon, Politics in Japan (Boston, 1967); John Maki, Government and Politics in Japan (New York, 1962); Robert Ward, Japan's Political System (New Jersey, 1967); and Yanaga Chitoshi, Japanese People and Politics (New York, 1956).

such structural factors to candidate campaign strategies. Accordingly, the effects of such variables on strategies of support mobilization have often been treated in a manner that is vague and that fails to reveal the dynamic interaction between structural factors as inputs of the political system and campaign strategies as outputs. Several writers have, for instance, indicated that the Japanese system of combining multi-member districts with single-entry ballots contributes to intra-party competition. None has attempted to investigate how this unique system affects strategies of support mobilization. Sociologists and political scientists concerned with Japan have long demonstrated an intense concern with the role of cultural norms in conditioning political behavior, a concern justified by Japan's position as a non-western parliamentary democracy. Yet no one has investigated how a non-western historical tradition and distinctive norms of social and individual behavior have been manifested in one of the most crucial aspects of representative government, i.e. the techniques by which politicians endeavor to be elected to public office. My study is an attempt to take a first step in investigating issues such as these. It is undertaken with the assumption that the value of the case-study approach lies precisely in its ability to move beyond abstract generalization to a depth analysis of the relationship of structure and strategy.

A study such as this obviously suggests many questions

about the comparative analysis of political systems. If one particular opportunity structure allows for certain alternative strategies, what would be the alternatives under different structures? What are the significant differences in the structure of opportunity faced by a man running for the Lower House from a rural district in southern Japan and one running for the U.S. House of Representatives from a rural district in Tennessee? What are the factors that impel a candidate to employ certain organizational techniques in one country and make similar techniques ineffective, or even unthought of, in others? In raising such questions this study hopes to contribute to the development of a conceptual framework within which problems of mobilizing support in systems of representative government can be analyzed in a comparative context.

Although this study is concerned with problems of support mobilization, it is, almost inadvertently in a sense, a study of political leadership. By focusing on the campaign strategies of one candidate for the Lower House, it draws a profile of one type of political leader in Japan, the type defined in the following chapter as the locality oriented professional politician. Although the whole issue of political leadership is receiving increasing attention by political scientists generally,<sup>5</sup> studies of political leaders and

---

<sup>5</sup>For a collection of recent articles on problems of political leadership and an annotated bibliography of other materials, see Lewis J. Edinger, ed., Political Leadership in Industrialized Societies (New York, 1967).

leadership styles in postwar Japan are rare.<sup>6</sup> It is hoped that this study will make a contribution to the general literature on political leadership and that it will add in particular to our understanding of Japanese political leadership and the Japanese political process.

---

<sup>6</sup>One of the few studies of an individual leader in postwar Japan is Dan Kurzman, Kishi and Japan (New York, 1960). A valuable article dealing with Japanese leadership styles is Bradley M. Richardson, "Japanese Local Politics: Support Mobilization and Leadership Styles," Asian Survey, VII (December, 1967), 860-875.

## CHAPTER I


### THE POLITICS OF PARTY ENDORSEMENT

In the nine general elections from 1947 to 1967 virtually all successful candidates have run with the official endorsement of one of the major political parties of the country. Except for the immediate postwar election of 1946, independents have accounted for an insignificant proportion of candidates elected to the Lower House. In the 1967 election, for instance, only 1.8 per cent of the seats, as the following chart indicates, were won by candidates running without party endorsement. For a man with the ambition of becoming a member of the Diet the endorsement of a party is essential.

Within the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) the majority of those elected to the Diet in 1967 came from two distinct occupational backgrounds. The largest single group (see Table 2) is composed of men who have made their careers in the bureaucracy and first entered elective politics after reaching a fairly high level within the bureaucratic hierarchy. Among the 283 members of the LDP elected in the 1967 general elections, 87 (31 per cent) were of such bureaucratic background. The second largest group among LDP Diet members is composed of men who have had careers in local politics; men who worked their way up through city and prefectural assemblies



TABLE 1

PERCENTAGE OF SEATS WON BY INDEPENDENTS AND CANDIDATES  
OF MINOR PARTIES

Adapted from: Taguchi Fukuji, Gendai Seiji to Ideorogii (Tokyo, 1967), p. 212.

TABLE 2

OCCUPATIONAL BACKGROUNDS OF LDP MEMBERS ELECTED  
TO THE DIET IN THE 1967 ELECTION

	Number	Per Cent
Bureaucrat	87	30.7
Local Politician	69	24.3
Businessman; representative of economic organization	43	15.1
Journalist	32	11.4
Lawyer, Doctor	15	5.3
Other (e.g. secretary to former Diet member, son of former Diet member)	37	13.2
Total	283	100.0

Adapted from: Sugimori Yasuji, "Jimintō Zengiin No Keireki Bunseki," Jiyū, X (May, 1968), p. 38.

and finally achieved success in being elected to the Diet. In the same 1967 election 69 (24 per cent) of the LDP candidates elected came from this group.

In terms of educational background the overwhelming majority of former bureaucrats are graduates of public national universities. The number of former local politicians who graduated university is smaller than is the case with the ex-bureaucrats and, among those who did, most went to private rather than public schools (see Table 3).

TABLE 3  
EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUNDS OF LDP MEMBERS ELECTED TO  
THE DIET IN 1967 ELECTION

	Public Univ.	Private Univ.	Old Tech.	Old Middle; New High	Other
Bureaucrat	79	3	5	-	-
Local Politician	11	28	13	4	13
Businessman	16	17	6	3	1
Journalist	12	19	1	-	-
Lawyer, Doctor	8	6	1	-	-
Other	9	18	6	1	2
Total	135	91	32	8	16

Adapted from: Sugimori Yasuji, "Jimintō Zengiin No Keireki Bunseki," Jiyū, X (May, 1968), 56.

The bureaucrats and the local politicians combined represent more than half the number of LDP members elected to the Diet in the 1967 election. The rest of the elected members come from a variety of occupational backgrounds which have in the above tables been divided into four major categories. For purposes of understanding certain problems relating to

party endorsement it is useful to divide all LDP members of the Diet into two groups.<sup>1</sup> The first group of which the ex-bureaucrat is the dominant element may be referred to as the nationally-oriented type. Included within this group, in addition to ex-bureaucrats, are people with such occupational backgrounds as journalists for national newspapers, owners of large enterprises and representatives of national interest groups. All are "nationally-oriented" in that their careers were made in Tokyo and their political ties and influence are concentrated in the nation's capital. "Men in this group," writes one author, "use their influence on the national level as the base for becoming politicians."<sup>2</sup> The other group of which the local politician is the dominant element is the locality-oriented type. Among LDP Diet members included in this category are owners of small and medium-sized businesses, representatives of local interest groups and owners of local newspapers. Because they have all been engaged in occupations on a local level their political connections and influence are concentrated within their respective localities. Ties with the political world at the national level tend to be minimal and indirect and members of this group "advance to becoming Diet members on the basis of the influence they command within their localities."<sup>3</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup>This classification scheme is adapted from Sugimori Yasuji, "Jimintō Zengjin No Keireki Bunseki," Jiyū, X (May, 1968), p. 40.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., pp. 40-41.

This nationally oriented, locality-oriented division has particular relevance to the issue of party endorsement. Within the LDP, endorsement of Diet candidates is determined by the national party organization after receiving recommendations from its prefectural chapters. Prefectural chapters do not have the power over endorsements that are commanded, for instance, by the Conservative or Labour Party constituency associations in Britain.<sup>4</sup> Neither does the national organization determine endorsements with the degree of control exercised, for example, by the national party organs of political parties in Israel.<sup>5</sup> Both national and prefectural party organs play important roles in the nomination process and the extent to which a candidate concentrates his efforts for endorsement at the different levels of party organization is directly related to his placing within the two-group division discussed above.

The general pattern for those who have made their careers at the national level is to seek the endorsement of the party by exploiting ties with national party leaders and relying on this leadership to secure the support of the relevant prefectural party chapter. For the locality-oriented

---

<sup>4</sup>See R.T. McKenzie, British Political Parties (New York, 1966), pp. 241ff.; Richard Rose, Politics in England (Boston, 1964), p. 148.

<sup>5</sup>See Leon D. Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies (New York, 1967), p. 226.

type the pattern is reversed. Major emphasis is placed on obtaining the support of the leadership of the local party chapter and, through this leadership, pressing one's case for the endorsement of the national organization. The nature of a Diet hopeful's political orientation, whether national or local, is a major determinant of the strategies he will employ to obtain his party's endorsement.

The subject of this study, Sato Bunsei, belongs to the group I have designated the locality-oriented type. Elected in 1951 to the Oita prefectural assembly, his adult life has been spent in local politics. The strategies he employed to obtain LDP endorsement and, indeed the strategies he employed in his campaign to be elected to the Diet, are intimately related to his background as a professional politician.

Sato was born in 1918, the eldest son of an owner of a small inn in a hot springs resort area on the western fringe of the city of Beppu in Oita prefecture. After attending local public schools he entered the department of politics at Meiji University, a large private university in Tokyo. Graduation was followed by World War II during which Sato served as a captain in the Imperial Army. He returned to Beppu at the end of the war, twenty-seven years old, married and the father of a new born baby. Settling in the central part of the city, he took a job as a car salesman for a firm located in neighboring Oita city.

In Beppu and Oita prefecture as in the country

generally, the immediate postwar years witnessed severe economic distress and a highly unstable political situation. In addition to the unsettling conditions that were the natural result of the war and its disastrous conclusion, policies undertaken by the American Occupation to destroy the remnants of Japanese militarism and lay the base for a democratic political system had the immediate effect of contributing to the general political instability. The Occupation-sponsored purge of people who had held elective office during the war-time years was so thorough that it practically wiped the slate clean of politicians throughout most of Japan.<sup>6</sup> Political parties formed and dissolved with maddening rapidity. New politicians fought for office, some on their own initiative, others at the behest of purged politicians. In Oita prefecture the situation was no less confused than in other parts of the country. In the 1946 Diet elections, forty-nine candidates ran for the seven seats. Thirteen ran as independents and the remaining thirty-six as members of eighteen different political parties.<sup>7</sup> Throughout the country traditional voting patterns were being upset and in 1947 the Socialist Party won a plurality of seats in the Diet and formed the first Socialist-led government in the history of

---

<sup>6</sup>For an analysis of the Occupation sponsored purge, see Hans Baerwald, The Purge of Japanese Leaders Under the Occupation (Berkeley, 1959).

<sup>7</sup>Figures taken from Oita Ken Senkyo Kanri Iinkai, Senkyo No Kiroku 1946-1961, II (Oita, 1962), 3.

parliamentary government in Japan.

It was at this time that Sato Bunsei became active in politics. In Sato's view these years were characterized by an appalling growth of leftist and particularly communist influence and by Occupation policies which, whether by intent or not, fostered such growth. He believed that the wide-reaching reforms undertaken by the Occupation in pursuit of its objective of democratization had, in effect, created a dangerous political vacuum into which the communists would step unless young men, reaffirming their belief in conservatism ("maintaining the good in Japanese tradition" in Sato's definition) became politically active and revitalized the parties of the right. Sato began to involve himself in the politics of the city, campaigning for conservative candidates in various elections and looking for the opportunity to enter the political world himself.

Sato's family had no history of direct involvement in politics and one problem Sato faced in entering into a career that he hoped would someday see him elected to the national Diet was a lack of close connections with the leading politicians of Beppu. Three years after the war and his return to Oita prefecture, Sato's entree into the local political world was given a considerable boost when his younger sister married the son of the then Speaker of the Oita prefectural assembly, Aragane Keiji.

In the first postwar prefectural assembly election in

April, 1947 Aragane was one of the three candidates elected from the Beppu constituency. Because of the purge's application to most of the wartime prefectural assemblymen, almost all those elected to the assembly in the 1947 election were non-incumbents. Aragane, though himself a first-term member of the assembly was made Speaker, as he was the only member to have served as Speaker of a city (Beppu) assembly. As his term of office drew to a close Aragane decided that he would not stand again for election to the Assembly but would contest the mayoral race in Beppu. He asked one of his associates to run for the Assembly seat but shortly before the campaign was to begin this man fell ill and Aragane was forced to look elsewhere for a successor. He found him in the energetic and ambitious brother of his daughter-in-law. And Sato, at the age of thirty-one, found himself a candidate for election to the Oita Prefectural Assembly. Sato won in that election in 1951 and in the two succeeding elections. After twelve years service he left the Assembly to run for election to the Lower House of the Diet. Aragane Keiji also won his bid for Mayor of Beppu in the election of 1951 and has been reelected in each succeeding election up to and including that of April, 1967.

When Sato entered the Prefectural Assembly there were two main conservative parties active in Oita Prefecture as well as on the national level. In the first years following the war, Sato campaigned for candidates of one of these parties,



the Minshutō (Democratic Party) of which Aragane was a leading member. When he ran for election to the Assembly, however, Sato switched his allegiance to the other major conservative party, the Jiyutō (Liberal Party) and ran as an official candidate of that party. Until 1955 the Liberal Party was the strongest political party in Oita Prefecture as indeed it was nationally as well.<sup>8</sup> In that year occurred the merger of the Liberal and Democratic Parties and what had formerly been separate prefectural chapters of the two parties combined to form the Oita chapter of the Liberal Democratic Party.

The leadership of the main-current faction in the prefectural chapter<sup>9</sup> has since the creation of the LDP chapter been made up of former Liberal Party members and the anti-main current has been led by the leaders of the former Democratic Party. From 1947 to the present two men have dominated conservative party politics in Oita Prefecture, first

---

<sup>8</sup>The postwar political history of Oita Prefecture as it relates to the Diet elections is provided in three newspaper series. One is a twenty-one part series appearing under the title "Sōsenkyō" ("General Elections") in the evening edition of the Oita Gōdō Shinbun beginning on October 1, 1963. Other more recent ones appeared in serial form in the Oita Shinbun and the Yomiuri Shinbun during January, 1967. On the national level the Liberal Party held a majority of seats in the Diet from 1949 to 1955. Its president, Yoshida Shigeru, was Prime Minister five times.

<sup>9</sup>The terms main current (shūryū) and anti-main current (han shūryū) are used to identify factional alignments both on national and local levels. The use of the terms here refer to local factions, not to LDP main current and anti-main current factions at the national level.

as leaders of the Liberal Party and, after 1955, as leaders of the LDP chapter. Sato's rise from a thirty-one year old Prefectural Assembly candidate to a forty-three year old LDP endorsed candidate for the Diet when he first stood for election in 1963 is largely the consequence of his relationship with these two men.

Iwasaki Masaji<sup>10</sup> has been involved in Oita politics for over fifty years. He was born in 1894 in the town of Tsukumi, a mountainous and cement-producing area in the south-eastern part of the Prefecture, the son of a local politician and owner of a large cement manufacturing company. In 1933 he was elected to the Tsukumi Town Assembly and served for three consecutive terms. In 1947 he was elected to the Oita Prefectural Assembly and following his reelection in 1951, the year in which Sato entered the Assembly, he was made Speaker, succeeding the above mentioned Aragane Keiji. Iwasaki became president of the Oita chapter of the Liberal Party in the same year and with the conservative party merger in 1955 became the chairman of the LDP chapter in the prefecture. Since 1951 Iwasaki has been at the head of the most powerful political party in the Prefecture. Though two humiliating defeats to "independent progressive" Kinoshita Kaoru in the Prefecture's

---

<sup>10</sup> Biographical information on Iwasaki is taken from Hasegawa Ryūichi, Oita Ken No Seijika, (Oita, 1966), pp. 42-49.

Governor's race have lessened his prestige<sup>11</sup> and though he has held no public elective office since 1959, Iwasaki stands in control of the prefectural party. In June of 1967 he was elected president of the LDP chapter for the ninth consecutive time.<sup>12</sup>

Sato's basic strategy for obtaining the endorsement of the LDP as a Diet candidate was decided in the early 1950's. It was to attach himself to Iwasaki and rely on him to champion his cause at the opportune moment. As Sato readily admits, it is to Iwasaki that he owes his political life. Iwasaki's support proved vital in a number of ways. For Sato, a party man or "pure politician"<sup>13</sup> without a career outside of politics itself, the financial support provided by the party chapter's president proved crucial not only in the campaign but through the twelve years Sato spent in the prefectural assembly. Iwasaki is an independently wealthy man and has intimate

---

<sup>11</sup>An interesting discussion of Iwasaki and the Oita LDP chapter is included in Usami Sho, "Nōson No Tōshika," Asahi Janaru, VIII (December 11, 1966), 20-25.

<sup>12</sup>Yomiuri Shinbun, June 13, 1967, p. 16.

<sup>13</sup>The term "pure politician" is the translation for tōjin given by Scalapino and Masumi in their book Parties and Politics in Contemporary Japan (Berkeley, 1962). "Party man" or "party politician" is used here because, though narrower in meaning than Scalapino and Masumi's "pure politician" which includes all non-bureaucratic politicians, it better conveys the meaning of the term as used by Sato and his associates. They are the men who have come up in the political world "working for the party." That this usually means working for a politician or a certain faction rather than for the party organization as such would not appear unusual to anyone familiar with party organization in the United States.

relations with the important businessmen in the prefecture. He has considerable control over the collection and dispersal of party funds in the prefecture because of his position as chapter president and it is this substantial financial power which largely accounts for his continued rule. Sato's campaign funds came almost entirely from Iwasaki and men who were brought into Sato's campaign by Iwasaki. In regard to the specific problem of party endorsement Iwasaki's support for Sato was of the utmost importance because his leadership of the chapter's main current faction gave him considerable power in determining the recommendations of the chapter for the endorsement of Diet candidates by the national party organization. Iwasaki's support also proved vital in providing the link between Sato, a locality-oriented politician with weak ties at the national level, and the national party organization. The person who was to perform the function of championing Sato's cause in Tokyo was Iwasaki's close ally within the prefectural chapter, LDP faction leader Murakami Isamu.

Born in Oita prefecture in 1903 Murakami was long the president of a very large and wealthy construction company in the prefecture.<sup>14</sup> He was elected to the Diet in the first postwar election in 1946 and has been reelected in every election since then. In that same year he established the

---

<sup>14</sup> For biographical information about Murakami, see Hasegawa, p. 171.

Oita branch of the Liberal Party, formally became its president in 1947 and remained in that position until 1951 when he was succeeded by Iwasaki. Murakami was a member of the LDP faction of Ono Bamboku until 1965 when Ono's death split the faction in two. One part came under the leadership of former Speaker of the Lower House, Funada Naka and the other under the leadership of Murakami Isamu. Though his faction is small, Murakami is the only leader of a national LDP faction in Oita prefecture and one of only two faction leaders from Kyushu. In his years in the Diet Murakami has served as transportation minister, construction minister and Director General of the Hokkaido Development Commission.

The support Murakami gave Sato was crucial not simply because it provided a necessary channel for Sato to the national party organization. Sato could have associated himself with any one of a number of people in the prefecture for this purpose. The association with Murakami was valuable because it enabled Sato to avoid establishing close ties with incumbent Diet members from his own district. This latter point is important because of the intra-party rivalry fostered by Japan's electoral law. The effects of the system of multi-member districts with single entry ballots on Sato's choice of campaign strategies is a subject returned to time and again in the course of this study. In regard to party endorsement, the electoral law is responsible for producing the greatest obstacle to party endorsement: the virtually inevitable

opposition of LDP incumbents from the district in which the new candidate hopes to run.

The Japanese election law divides the country into 123 election districts which elect the 486 members of the Lower House. Each of these districts elects from three to five members<sup>15</sup> with each voter voting for only one candidate. In a five-member district, for instance, the five candidates who poll the highest votes are declared winners.

This electoral system gives rise to problems of party organization and campaign strategy that do not exist in systems where elections are held in single member constituencies or by a form of proportional representation. The combination of multi-member districts with single entry ballots has a divisive effect on political parties as each candidate vies with the other candidates of his own party for the vote. The intensity of intra-party rivalry may be best compared to that of a hotly contested Democratic primary in a one-party southern state. Because of the electoral system there is a general tendency for LDP incumbents in any district to oppose the entrance of any additional LDP candidates into the race in their district. The common sense assumption is that the candidacy of an additional LDP candidate will reduce the vote of the other candidates of the party. Except for those

---

<sup>15</sup> There is one exception. The island of Amami Oshima elects only one member.

situations where the death of an incumbent or some other atypical situation leaves little doubt about the possibilities of success for the incumbents and a new candidate, the incumbents feel their position threatened and endeavor to keep the district safe by keeping any in-party challengers out of the race.

In all stable political systems incumbents are at a great advantage. One study that analyzed the Congressional elections in the United States in 1954, 1956, 1958 and 1960 points out that over 90 per cent of those elected were incumbent members of Congress.<sup>16</sup> In the United States, however, a new politician can often challenge an incumbent of his party by entering a primary. In Japan, as is typical of most parliamentary systems, party endorsement is officially determined by a small party oligarchy.<sup>17</sup> Where an incumbent opposed to the entrance in the race of a new candidate is not himself in a decision-making position in the party hierarchy he calls upon his faction leader to oppose the endorsement of the new challenger. Since it is in their interest to keep loyal faction members in office, faction leaders are usually anxious to insure the reelection of their supporting incumbents.

For the man who wants to become a member of the Diet,

---

<sup>16</sup> Charles O. Jones, "The Role of the Campaign in Congressional Politics," in The Electoral Process, ed. M. Kent Jennings and L. Harmon Zeigler (New Jersey, 1966), p. 24.

<sup>17</sup> For a detailed discussion of the endorsement process in Western Europe see Epstein, pp. 201-232.

there are three basic strategic options. One is to gain the favor of an incumbent from his district and inherit his support base when the incumbent vacates his seat. This strategy is known to have made an old man out of many a prefectural assemblyman. In Oita Prefecture, local politicians involve themselves in intimate relationships with others higher up in the political hierarchy. Diet members direct slices of the national pork barrel to areas where they have strong support and aid local politicians financially at election time. The local politician in turn campaigns for a particular Diet member and becomes associated with his faction in the local political divisions within the conservative camp. Elective offices in Japan form a pyramid of prestige and power with the Diet member sitting at the apex. The local politician enters into a close association with a Diet member in order to maximize his own position lower down in the structure (by becoming the "pipe" as Japanese term it, via the Diet member, between the national government and his local constituency). By so doing, his own chances of ever entering the Diet become dependent on the good will, or the bad health, of the Diet member with whom he has associated. The avoidance of such ties with Diet members in his own district was one of Sato's major concerns during his years in the prefectural assembly.

The second strategic alternative is to run as an independent and, if elected, present one's own incumbency as reason for endorsement in the next election. Almost all of



those elected to the Diet as independents are, in fact, LDP members who opted for this strategy. As we have seen above, however, fewer and fewer independents are having success at the polls in Diet elections. It is a drastic strategy both because of the odds against success and the strong possibility that if a man were to run against the wishes of the party and be defeated his political career would come to an abrupt if martyred halt.

The third alternative is for the fledgling candidate to align himself with party politicians strong enough to overcome the opposition of the incumbents in his district. This is the strategic option most fully used by the nationally-oriented and particularly the ex-bureaucrat type of candidate who can utilize his close association with men at the top of the party structure to overcome incumbent opposition. Unlike the local politician, the bureaucrat is not usually in the position of having had to develop an intimate and compromising relationship with an incumbent from the district in which he plans to run. For such a candidate the strategy is to apply pressure from the top down: to gain support within the national party organization first and then utilize this support to bring the relevant prefectural chapter into line.

This third alternative was the strategy adopted by Sato but, because of his local rather than national orientation, the pattern was reversed. Sato's strategy was to first gain support on the local level sufficient to insure his

recommendation by the prefectural chapter of the Party in spite of incumbent opposition. He sought to apply pressure from the bottom up: to overcome the opposition of the incumbents on the prefectural level first and then bring the battle to Tokyo.

Oita Prefecture is made up of two electoral districts. The larger, first district, with the prefectural capital of Oita city, elects four members to the Diet. Both Iwasaki Masaji and Murakami Isamu have made their political careers in this district. The Prefecture's second district is a three-member constituency within which Beppu is the largest city. With his support and loyalties lying with men across the bay in party headquarters in Oita city, Sato sought to challenge the incumbents in the second district.

During his years in the Prefectural Assembly Sato campaigned for nearly every conservative politician that has run for the Diet from the second district. Sato never, however, agreed to work directly for any of these candidates. Sato's obligations were to Iwasaki and whatever he did on behalf of candidates in his own district were presented as being the work of a "party man" taking orders from the President of the Prefectural Party chapter. Faithfully doing as Iwasaki requested, and generously supported in return, Sato expanded his local political influence while avoiding a direct relationship with any of the Diet incumbents from the second district.

The first advice Iwasaki gave Sato as a freshman Prefectural Assemblyman, Sato once remarked, was that if he had hopes of ever entering the Diet, he should under no conditions and for no matter what purpose directly accept money from any politician in the second district. Sato's advantage over other politicians who were as cognizant as he of the sagacity of this advice was that Iwasaki's financial support enabled Sato to resist the temptation. In any particular Diet election Sato would run the Beppu campaign for whomever Iwasaki designated. Sato refused to accept campaign funds directly from the candidate but had him give the funds to the Party (i.e. Iwasaki) which would then turn them over to Sato. This "one cushion" between himself and the Diet candidate, as the Japanese phrase has it, not only saved Sato from ties that could have interfered with his plans; it allowed him to appear magnanimous about his support at the same time. He could present his activities on behalf of the candidates as being in the best interests of the Party, helping out the candidate who seemed most in danger of losing. The gratitude of these politicians for the support provided, it was hoped, would be reflected in their attitudes when Iwasaki gave Sato permission to run for the Diet and the problem of party endorsement arose.

Since 1947 when the first postwar Lower House elections

under the present electoral system<sup>18</sup> were held, two conservatives and one Socialist have been elected in Oita's second district in every election save one. Only in 1953 were three conservatives (two members of the Yoshida faction Liberal Party and one of the Progressive Party, a temporary successor to the Democratic Party) elected. Such a political history gave support to those who were pessimistic about the possibility of a victory of three conservative candidates in the district. Their pessimism was reinforced by statistics of elections in other districts which show Oita second's history to be anything but unique. At the time of the 1963 elections there were in the country forty constituencies that were three-member districts. In that election only four of these districts elected three conservatives (including LDP and conservative independents) while thirty of the districts, like Oita's second, elected two conservatives and one progressive. The

---

<sup>18</sup> Japan has experimented with a variety of electoral systems. The first elections under the Meiji constitution were held under a single member constituency system. In 1900 the law was revised to provide for large districts (electing up to 13 members) with single entry ballots. In 1919 this system was abolished and the single member constituency adopted once again. In 1925 the present day system of medium sized districts (electing three to five members) with single entry ballot voting was adopted for the first time. There were at that time 122 districts. The first postwar election of April 10, 1946 was held under the old large district system first adopted in 1900. The revision of the Election Law in 1947 reinstated the system first adopted in 1925 and this has continued essentially unchanged to the present day.

For a concise history of the Japanese districting system, see Yomiuri Shinbun Seijibu, Seitō (Tokyo, 1966), pp. 230ff.

other six districts elected two progressives and one conservative.<sup>19</sup> To Oita's second district incumbents, Nishimura Eiichi and Ayabe Kentaro, the meaning of the statistics was crystal clear: there was no room in the district for another LDP candidate.

Nishimura Eiichi<sup>20</sup> was born in 1898 on the island of Himeshima, a small fishing village off the tip of the Kunisaki peninsula in the Second District of Oita. Graduating the Engineering Department of Tohoku University, he entered the prewar Ministry of Transportation and Communication and rose to the position of Division Chief (kyokuchō) before resigning in 1948. In that year he returned to Himeshima and in the Diet election of the following year ran as a member of the Liberal Party and won. Nishimura has competed in every succeeding election and has lost once in 1955. In his Diet career he has served in many posts in the government and became Welfare Minister in the second Ikeda Cabinet. A member of the Sato Eisaku faction of the LDP, he was made Construction Minister in Sato's cabinet reshuffle immediately preceding House dissolution in December of 1966.

Iwasaki, Murakami as well as Sato all fit into the category I have labeled the locality-oriented type. Nishimura,

---

<sup>19</sup>Data taken from Fujiwara Hirotatsu and Tomita Nobuo, Seijiaku Eho Haisen (Tokyo, 1967), pp. 212-213.

<sup>20</sup>For biographical data see Hasagawa, p. 168.

on the other hand, is an ex-bureaucrat and belongs to the group referred to as nationally-oriented. The former Liberal Party was, more than the Democratic Party, regarded as the bureaucrat's party.<sup>21</sup> Within the LDP a significant degree of exclusiveness between ex-bureaucrat and non-bureaucrat types is a clearly evident phenomenon. Most factions, for instance, tend to be predominantly of either ex-bureaucrats or local politicians.<sup>22</sup> Those members of the Diet with backgrounds as local politicians tend to regard the ex-bureaucrat politician as haughty and removed from the people and themselves as seasoned professionals in political matters and most in tune with the views of the electorate. The ex-bureaucrat group tends to see the local politician type as crude in manner, inferior in intelligence and ill prepared for leading the nation. They view themselves as an elite group of highly skilled and seasoned administrators best qualified to deal with the complex problems of governing a large nation.

The conflict between bureaucrat and local politician is never far below the surface. Sato Bunsei attributes every ill

---

<sup>21</sup>See Scalapino and Masumi, p. 56. The domination of the Oita Liberal Party by the professional politician rather than the bureaucratic type is perhaps something of an exception to the general pattern. It would seem likely, however, that Liberal Party prefectural chapters on the whole should have had a higher proportion of local politician types among its leadership than the national organization for the simple reason that the activities of bureaucrats and ex-bureaucrat politicians would be concentrated in Tokyo.

<sup>22</sup>See Sugimori, p. 44.

of the LDP to its "dominance by inflexible bureaucrats." Murakami Isamu, when Sato was finally elected to the Diet, congratulated his supporters for "electing another anti-bureaucrat party man." The antipathy between these two dominant types of conservative politician has always been a factor in the relationship between Nishimura and the other leaders of Oita's Liberal Party and later of the LDP chapter. Apparently the one thing that prevented for so long a split between Nishimura and the other Liberal Party leaders was the greater hostility of all of them towards the leaders of the Democratic Party than toward each other. However the fragile bonds that tied Nishimura with the other leaders of the prefectural chapter were rent asunder when Iwasaki and Murakami, in spite of Nishimura's opposition, decided to sponsor Sato's candidacy for the Diet.

The other LDP incumbent Diet man from the district, Ayabe Kentaro, was born in 1890 outside of the district in the city of Takamatsu on the island of Shikoku.<sup>23</sup> He came at a very young age to the town of Kitsuki in Oita's second district as the adopted son of a locally prominent family. Ayabe graduated from the Usa middle school in the northern part of the district and went to Kyoto University's law department. He was elected to the Diet in 1932 as a member of the Seiyūkai and served during the war as Parliamentary Vice Minister of

---

<sup>23</sup>Hasegawa, p. 157.

Naval Affairs. In 1946 he was purged but reappeared on the political scene soon after the signing of the peace treaty and the lifting of the purge restrictions. In 1952 he gave his support in the Diet election to his close friend, former foreign minister Shigemitsu Mamoru. Shigemitsu, the signer of the Japanese surrender at the end of World War II, had also been purged by the occupation authorities and spent two years in Sugamo prison as a war criminal.<sup>24</sup> Depurged, he reentered politics, became president of the Progressive Party, a temporary successor to the Democratic Party, and ran for election to the Diet in 1952. Oita prefecture's most illustrious politician, Shigemitsu's appeal to the voters of the district led to a landslide victory. He received over 66,000 votes while the second highest, Nishimura, received but 27,000 votes and the third-placed Socialist candidate, 25,000. Shigemitsu won reelection in 1953 and again in 1955. In the midst of his last term, in 1957, he suddenly died and Ayabe Kentaro decided to run for the Diet after a retirement of nearly twenty years. Ayabe won in the following election in 1958 and was reelected in 1960 and 1963. In the second and third Ikeda cabinets he served as transportation minister. Though a member of the faction of Fujiyama Ichiro, Prime Minister Sato Eisaku's main antagonist in the party presidential election in December of 1966, Ayabe was considered a moderate in

---

<sup>24</sup> During this time he wrote his memoirs, Japan and Her Destiny; My Struggle for Peace (New York, 1958)..



the intra-party conflict. On December 3, 1966 he was appointed Speaker of the Lower House, only the second politician from Oita prefecture to have had the honor of that position.

Ayabe Kentaro, though from a non-bureaucratic background as were Iwasaki and Murakami, was the main antagonist of these two leaders of the prefecture's LDP chapter. While the bureaucrat-local politician split affected relations between the LDP leadership and Nishimura, the relationship between the leadership and Ayabe, a relationship hardly cordial even on the surface, was the legacy of the bitter fighting between the Liberal and Democratic parties in the postwar period up to their merger in 1955. After being depurged Ayabe served as president of the prefectural chapter of Shigemitsu's Progressive Party and then of the Democratic Party. After the merger of the conservative parties, Ayabe's support continued to center around these former Democratic politicians. To an astounding degree Oita politics are still dominated by battles between the Liberals and the Democrats of the Liberal-Democratic Party.

In the May, 1958 elections Sato, working through the "one cushion" of Iwasaki, ran the Beppu campaign for Nishimura Eiichi. Iwasaki had agreed that Sato should run for the Diet in the next election and supporting Nishimura was intended to lessen Nishimura's opposition to Sato's endorsement when that problem arose. Sato began preparation for his Diet campaign but was stopped by Iwasaki. When the House was dissolved

in 1960 Ayabe, it is alleged, told Iwasaki that if reelected he would surely be made a cabinet minister and with that dream fulfilled would no longer oppose Sato entering the race. Iwasaki agreed and told Sato to wait for one more election and to give support to Ayabe in the November 1960 race. In the following election, Iwasaki assured him, Sato would run regardless of what the other candidates might say. Sato's failure to support Nishimura in 1960 is said to have almost completely destroyed any goodwill earned by his activities for Nishimura in the previous election. Sato, however, hoped that his impartial work "on behalf of the party" would be rewarded when the question of his endorsement arose at the time of the next election. That time came in October of 1963 when the House was dissolved and Iwasaki agreed to support Sato's candidacy. Contrary to Sato's hopes, however, both Ayabe and Nishimura vehemently opposed Sato's endorsement and used as their major argument the candidacy in the election of another conservative, independent Noyori Hideichi.

Noyori Hideichi was born in the city of Nakatsu, the childhood home of the great Meiji personality, Fukuzawa Yukichi, and the second largest city in Oita's Second District.<sup>25</sup> He started to study at Keio University but left before graduation and proceeded to amass considerable wealth through the

---

<sup>25</sup> Biographical information on Noyori is taken from Jinji Kōshinsho, Jinji Kōshinroku, 23rd edition (Tokyo, 1966).

publication of a daily newspaper in Tokyo, the Teitō Nichinichi Shinbun and a magazine, Jitsugyō No Sekai. Noyori, before the war, was a zealous propagator of Buddhism, led several Buddhist organizations and wrote numerous popular works on Buddhism. In the prewar period he served one term, from 1932, in the Diet. Following the war he became concerned with the reforms being sponsored by the Occupation authorities and reentered the political arena, well on the right. Religion and politics blended into one for him; good politics required a "spiritual recovery" that Buddhism, which Noyori saw as a kind of nostalgic nationalism, could provide. For several years in the period immediately following the defeat, Noyori, it is reported, "travelled from Hokkaido to Kyushu giving more than a hundred lectures, mainly at temples, on the nation's [need for] a spiritual recovery."<sup>26</sup>

He did more than lecture. In 1952 he returned to Oita and ran for the Diet for the first time in twenty years. Unlike many other politicians, Noyori was frank in expressing his opinions and policies. In his campaign speeches he called Japan's participation in the Second World War "a holy war to save the Asian race,"<sup>27</sup> and argued for constitutional revision to allow for Japanese rearmament and to restore the Emperor to his former position.<sup>28</sup>

---

<sup>26</sup> Ibid.

<sup>27</sup> Oita Gōdō Shinbun, November 13, 1963, p. 1.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid., November 6, 1963, p. 3.

In the 1952 election Noyori placed sixth among nine candidates with 21,380 votes and lost again in the following election in 1953, this time placing fifth among eight candidates with 23,282 votes. In the first election he ran as a member of the Liberal Party. In the second he ran as an independent. In the following election, in February of 1955, he ran as a member of the Democratic Party and for the first time in twenty-three years was elected to the Diet with an astounding\* vote of 65,412, the highest among the candidates. But Noyori went out with a bang. This was his one and only successful election to the postwar Diet. After being defeated in 1963 he retired, at the age of seventy-eight, from active politics.

Noyori was opposed to and opposed by nearly every other major conservative party leader in the district. He headed what is known as the "prefecture's northern LDP" (Kenboku Jimintō), an isolated and personal political machine in the Nakatsu area. As an incumbent conservative, Noyori received the endorsement of the LDP in the first post merger election in 1958, but after losing in that election he was denied not only endorsement but even a certificate of membership in the Party.<sup>29</sup>

Though clearly not likely to win a seat, incumbents Nishimura and Ayabe could argue with some persuasiveness that

---

<sup>29</sup>"Sōsenkyo Kaiko," Oita Gōdō Shinbun, February 9, 1967, p. 1.

Noyori's candidacy would drain enough of the conservative vote away to make the election of three LDP members in this three-member district very risky. In the 1960 election Noyori received 42,330 votes, less than a thousand votes behind the third-place winner. Sato must wait, the incumbents argued, until Noyori retires from politics.

While the incumbents emphasized Noyori's candidacy in their arguments against Sato's endorsement, Sato emphasized the weakness of the incumbent who had won all his elections in the third spot on the ticket, seldom more than a few hundred votes ahead of the runner-up.

Komatsu Kan has been the Socialist Party's candidate in Oita's second district since 1952. Born in 1914 in the town of Hiji in Hayami county, a town that borders the city of Kitsuki where Ayabe Kentaro makes his home, Komatsu attended Oita Teachers College and from 1939 to 1952 was a middle-school teacher in Usa county in the Second District.<sup>30</sup> Like many Socialists, particularly in heavily conservative rural areas,<sup>31</sup> Komatsu has built his support around the Japan Teachers' Union (Nikkyōsō) affiliated union of elementary and middle school teachers. Although the district is predominantly one of farmers,

---

<sup>30</sup>Hasegawa, p. 161.

<sup>31</sup>Cf. the chapter written by Ronald Dore, "The Socialist Party and the Farmers" in Allan Cole, George Totten and Cecil Uehara, Socialist Parties in Postwar Japan (New Haven, 1966), particularly p. 0, -414.

Komatsu has no significant organized support among the farmers and has made little attempt to organize them.<sup>32</sup> He rose to power in the Prefecture's Socialist Party through his activities in the Teachers' Union. In 1946 he was the Union's Hayami County Chairman; in 1947 he became Vice-Chairman of the Union's prefectural organization and a member of the Executive Board of the national Nikkyōsō. The following year he rose to the position of Vice-Secretary of the national federation. In 1952 Komatsu became Chairman of the Oita Prefecture General Council of Labor Unions (Kenrōhyō) and was elected to the Diet in that year, barely squeezing into the third spot. His 25,780 votes were only 197 votes more than those received by the runner-up. Komatsu, however, hardly had time to furnish his new Diet office before Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru suddenly dissolved the House in the famous "damn-fool dissolution" (baka yarō kaisan) and called new elections only six months after the previous ones. In this April 1953 election, Komatsu, running as a member of the Socialist Party-Left Wing, suffered a crushing defeat, coming in 11,000 votes behind the third-place winner. He made a comeback in the following election in 1955, once again winning in third place, 4,099 votes ahead of the fourth-place candidate. He was reelected in 1958 and 1960 as a candidate of the merged Socialist Party. As in all his elections, Komatsu received the lowest vote among

---

<sup>32</sup> Interview with Komatsu Kan, July 7, 1967.

the winning candidates. In 1960 he received only 718 votes more than runner-up Noyori.

Komatsu has consistently been the weakest of the winning candidates but he, nonetheless, has been a consistent winner. The incumbent conservatives in the District emphasized the latter. The District, they argued, has a tradition of electing one Socialist and there is no possibility for all three conservatives to get more votes than he, particularly as long as Noyori is in the race and taking votes that would otherwise go to the LDP candidates. Thus Sato should not be allowed to run. Sato, of course, emphasized Komatsu's weakness. Ayabe and Nishimura have strong and stabilized support and their victory could not be in doubt. Therefore his candidacy would be for the purpose of eliminating the Socialist and electing three LDP members to the Diet. The Party should not deny itself the opportunity to elect a full slate of Party members, Sato argued.

The conflict between Sato plus his backers, Iwasaki and Murakami, and the Second District incumbents, Nishimura and Ayabe and their supporters erupted into an open political struggle in October of 1963 when the Lower House was dissolved and new elections called.

The dissolution of the House had been expected for several months and a meeting of the prefectural chapter was to have been held in mid-September to determine the chapter's recommendations for endorsement of LDP candidates. For weeks

Iwasaki postponed the meeting hoping to secure the agreement of the Second District incumbents to Sato's candidacy and thereby obtain a show of unanimity in the chapter's meeting. Iwasaki's efforts proved fruitless and knowing he had majority support for Sato's endorsement, he finally called a meeting of the chapter's general executive board (sōmukai) for October 8.

The recommendations of the Oita Prefecture LDP chapter for the endorsement of Party Diet candidates are determined by an executive board of approximately one hundred members comprised of LDP prefectural assemblymen, the heads of the Party's youth and women's groups and the chairmen of the branch organizations in the cities, towns and villages of the Prefecture. Because of Iwasaki's inability to settle the problem of Sato's endorsement in private negotiations with Nishimura and Ayabe, the meeting of the Executive Board saw a full-scale debate between the opposing sides in the conflict.

The attack against Sato's endorsement was led by Utsunomiya Hidetsuna, a Prefectural Assemblyman from the Beppu constituency and the presumed successor to Ayabe.<sup>33</sup> Utsunomiya argued that the LDP officials from the Second District alone should determine the candidates to be recommended for LDP endorsement in the District. He maintained that "having people

---

<sup>33</sup>The October 8 meeting and the problem of endorsements in the Prefecture's districts are discussed in an article in the Oita Gōdō Shinbun, October 19, 1963, p. 2.



from the First District decide the candidates to be endorsed [in the Second] is like having Oita Prefecture determine endorsements in Fukuoka."<sup>34</sup> Since the Nishimura and Ayabe factions had an overwhelming majority of support among Party officials in the Second District, the consequence for Sato of Utsunomiya's suggested method of recommending candidates could hardly be in doubt. Utsunomiya also harped on the effect of Noyori's candidacy on the conservative vote and maintained that "the election of three endorsed candidates is not possible and the candidacy of three will not help Party expansion."<sup>35</sup> Sato's candidacy would only imperil the chances for reelecting the incumbents, men whose long years of service in the Diet had achieved for them positions of influence that were of great and direct benefit to Oita Prefecture. Their reelection should not be endangered by the hopeless attempt to elect three LDP candidates.

Sato's supporters replied that Utsunomiya was proposing a "Second District Monroe Doctrine" and that the entire chapter should decide whom the chapter recommends for endorsement. They argued that the election of three LDP members was possible and that the incumbents, serving at the time as Ministers of Welfare and Transportation, were in no danger of being defeated. If it refused to recommend the endorsement of Sato, his

---

<sup>34</sup> Ibid.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid.

supporters argued, the Party would be denying itself a clear opportunity to expand its strength.

It was the political distribution of power in the chapter rather than the virtues of the arguments of the debate that was crucial in determining Sato's fate; and that distribution tipped the scales heavily in Sato's favor. By faithfully following Iwasaki's lead for the previous twelve years, Sato could now reap the benefits of having the support of the leader of the main current faction in the Party chapter. After acrimonious debate, the Executive Board recommended, by a majority vote, that Sato as well as Ayabe and Nishimura be endorsed as official Party candidates from the Second District of Oita Prefecture.<sup>36</sup> Nishimura and Ayabe were not yet, however, defeated in their fight to keep Sato out of the race. The battle now moved to the Election Policy Committee (senkyo taisaku iinkai) of the national Party organization where the incumbents hoped to be more successful in impressing the Party leaders with the soundness of their position than they had been on the prefectural level. Sato, as a locality-oriented politician, had minuscule support on the national level compared with that commanded by cabinet ministers Ayabe and Nishimura and it was here that his quest for endorsement faced the greatest challenge.

The endorsement of Party candidates is determined by

---

<sup>36</sup> Ibid.

the Election Policy Committee of the national LDP organization. The Committee consists of fifteen members: the President and Vice-President of the Party, the Secretary-General and twelve members chosen by the Party President.<sup>37</sup>

The general principles governing Party endorsement were defined in a document entitled "The Main Principles of Election Policy" adopted in February, 1960.<sup>38</sup> The Committee was to be guided by five broad principles. The first is that only those candidates whose victory appears certain are to be endorsed. The second is that under no conditions are more candidates to be endorsed in any one district than the number of seats the district holds. In other words, in a four-member district, the Committee could endorse a maximum of four candidates. A third and crucial point is that endorsement should be based upon the "incumbent first" principle: the principle of working for incumbent reelection. There is of course nothing unusual about a policy that aims at the reelection of incumbents. The point to be noted is that in the context of the Japanese electoral system, it becomes a basic principle for determining how many, if any, additional candidates are to be endorsed as candidates from a particular district. The burden rests upon the non-incumbent to convince the Party that his candidacy

---

<sup>37</sup> LDP Party Law, Article 51.

<sup>38</sup> Jiyūminshutō, "Senkyo Taisaku Yōryō," Jiyūminshutō Jyūnen no Ayumi (Tokyo, 1966), p. 266.

would not threaten the incumbent's reelection. A fourth principle is that no person being prosecuted for a criminal offense is to be endorsed, with the exception of cases which involve an appeal from a lower-court decision which has found the defendant innocent. Finally the Committee was to be guided in its actions by the principle that it should give serious consideration to the prefectural Party chapters' recommendations for endorsement.

Sato had the recommendation of the prefectural Party chapter but it was clear that without strong political support at Party headquarters, incumbents Ayabe and Nishimura would block his endorsement. It was largely for this reason that in 1963 Sato joined the LDP faction of Ono Bamboku.

The role the politics of Party endorsement play in determining factional alignments of new candidates can hardly be overestimated. Though the reasons for factional shifts among Diet men are multifarious, the first commitment to join a faction is often related to the endorsement problem. For the aspiring Diet candidate the only way to effectively plead his case within the national Party organization is to obtain the support of a faction leader. The LDP is in an important sense a coalition of factions with each faction leader anxious to maintain and expand his power. In almost all cases, an incumbent can be assured that his faction leader, in order to insure the reelection of the incumbent and thereby maintain the faction's strength, will oppose the entrance into the race

of a new candidate who might pose a challenge to his re-election. The strategy for "a new candidate who has hopes of entering the political world [is to] attach himself to a faction leader and with his aid try to get the Party's endorsement."<sup>39</sup> It is because of this relationship between Party endorsement and factional alignments that there are, as a rule, no two members of the same faction from any one district. A new candidate seeking endorsement will solicit the support of a faction leader who does not yet have a member of his faction in the district in which he wants to run. In 1966, among the 117 election districts in the country, only fourteen had two or more Diet members from the same faction.<sup>40</sup>

For Sato there was little question as to which faction he would enter. Because of his ties with Iwasaki and Murakami he had to join the faction of Ono Bamboku in which Murakami was a top lieutenant. Sato's struggle for Party endorsement now became but a small part of the larger struggle for power among the faction leaders. The question was whether Ono could overcome the opposition of Fujiyama Ichiro (Ayabe's faction leader) and Sato Eisaku (Nishimura's faction leader) and obtain the endorsement of the Party for Sato.

It is the practice of the LDP to announce its list of

---

<sup>39</sup>Fujiwara and Tomita, p. 77.

<sup>40</sup>Ibid., pp. 77-80.

endorsed candidates in groups. The "first endorsement" (daiichi kōnin) are those easiest to decide: cases of incumbents and others which raise no serious problems. Later on the "second endorsements" are announced and, finally, the most difficult cases are decided in a group of "third endorsements."

On October 16 the LDP announced its list of first endorsements. Sato was not included.<sup>41</sup> Several days later the list of "second endorsements" was announced. Again Sato's name was absent. Iwasaki at this point sent several people from the prefectural chapter to Tokyo to plead Sato's case but the Party leaders were still unable to reach agreement.<sup>42</sup> Finally, on October 26, in its third set of endorsements the Party gave Sato its official approval as candidate.<sup>43</sup>

Although Sato finally succeeded in obtaining Party endorsement, the suspicions of the incumbents proved correct. The District failed to elect the three LDP candidates. It was Sato, however, and not one of the incumbents that lost to Socialist Komatsu. For Sato the problem of Party endorsement would have to be faced again when new elections were called.

In the 1963 election Ayabe Kentaro received 51,373 votes, highest among the candidates. Nishimura was second with 47,695

---

<sup>41</sup>Oita Gōdō Shinbun, October 19, 1963, p. 2.

<sup>42</sup>Ibid., October 24, 1963, p. 1.

<sup>43</sup>Ibid., October 26, 1963, evening edition, p. 1.

and Komatsu/Kan, as in his four previous successful campaigns, took the third spot, this time with 46,287 votes. For Komatsu it was another narrow victory and for Sato a bitter defeat. Sato was runner-up,<sup>44</sup> 1,657 votes behind Komatsu. Noyori Hideichi was fifth with 35,532 votes and the Communist party candidate, Tsuru Tadahisa, amassed a grand total of 3,270 votes.<sup>45</sup> One significant result of the election was Noyori's decision to finally retire from active politics.

It is an indication of the insecurity fostered by the multi-member districting system that, in spite of Noyori's retirement, incumbents Ayabe and Nishimura bitterly opposed Sato's endorsement when the House was dissolved in December of 1966 and new elections called for January 29, 1967. Though Sato's case for endorsement appeared much stronger in 1966 than it had in 1963, the weeks preceding the announcements of endorsed candidates were for Sato weeks plagued by uncertainty, constant phone calls to and from supporters in Tokyo, and strategy meetings to discuss steps to be taken to insure endorsement.

Sato did not expect any serious problems to arise at the prefectural chapter level. He had already received the

---

<sup>44</sup> Runner-up (jiten) is of special significance in Japanese Diet elections because of an Election Law provision that if a Diet member should vacate his seat within three months of election, the runner-up shall automatically succeed to it. See Election Law, Article 97.

<sup>45</sup> Oita Ken Senkyo Kanri Iinkai, Senkyo No Kiroku, Shūgin Giin Sōsenkyo, November 21, 1963 election (Oita, 1963).

recommendation of the chapter once before, Noyori was out of the picture and the Iwasaki group was still in control of the Party's executive posts. If the opposition of the incumbents in the end proved futile in 1963 it was hardly likely to be successful now. The only problem Sato faced within the prefectural chapter related to the entrance into the race of a new candidate in the Prefecture's First District, Hadano Chumon.

The First District elects, as mentioned, four members to the Diet. There were three LDP incumbents and one Socialist incumbent in the District when the question of endorsement came up in 1966. Hadano, a Prefectural Assemblyman and lawyer, decided to run. His case is illustrative of the strategy many local politicians aspiring to enter the Diet adopt and the predicament in which it often puts them. Hadano had associated himself with one of the First District's incumbents, former Finance Minister Ichimada Naoto, expecting to succeed Ichimada in the Diet. Like many an ambitious local politician, Hadano found his ambition thwarted rather than advanced by the Diet man with whom he was associated and who would neither retire nor agree to his protege entering the race before he did retire. In 1966 Hadano decided to run in spite of Ichimada's objection and to run as a independent if the Party refused, as was expected, to endorse his candidacy. Hadano's decision incurred the opposition not only of Ichimada but of all the incumbent conservatives of the District. Entering the race before Ichimada's retirement was a flagrant violation of



political etiquette and a challenge to a system in which the Diet member's position at the top of a pyramid of politicians is maintained by a bedrock of loyal politicians filling out the lower levels of the structure.

Hadano's main argument for endorsement was that if three men were endorsed in the three-member Second District, there was no reason not to endorse four men in the four-member First District. Sato's only fear was that the question of his endorsement would get tied up in this controversy over Hadano and the argument that the LDP chapter should adopt a consistent policy in both of the Prefecture's districts; if three candidates were to be endorsed in the Second District, four should be endorsed to run in the First.

In response to this argument, Sato's strategy was for his supporters to argue that Hadano's case should be considered on its own merits because it was his first attempt to get endorsement while Sato had received it before; that Noyori's retirement from active politics created an unusually favorable opportunity for the victory of three conservatives in the Second District, while in the First District the Socialist Party decision to run two candidates for the first time made that a much more difficult race; that the election showed that the Second District incumbents were strong and that Sato's victory would mean the defeat of Socialist Komatsu; and, further, that a failure for Sato to run would result in an uncontested and thereby "undemocratic" election.

On December 27 the House was dissolved and the Executive Board of the LDP chapter met to determine recommendations for Party endorsement.<sup>46</sup> As expected the only problem of endorsement revolved around Hadano. Hadano used arguments uncomfortably reminiscent of Sato's in 1963: that the incumbents were strong and his victory would mean the defeat of the Socialists; that the Party should endorse as many people as there were seats in the District; that by keeping the number of official candidates below the number the District could support the Party was preventing its own expansion. Hadano, however, lacked the political power to back up his case. His opponents accused him of preparing to run without consulting the Party and of entering the race "without using reason" (rikutsunuki, i.e. running while his benefactor was still in the race), and of thus violating Party policy. A resolution was submitted that in the Second District recommendations for endorsement be given to Ayabe, Nishimura and Sato and that recommendations for endorsement in the First District be awarded the three incumbent Diet members. Iwasaki was given the authority to decide in consultation with other Party leaders on Hadano's case after further deliberation. Unlike 1963 when Sato could muster only majority support, the resolution carried unanimously and Sato's fight for endorsement

---

<sup>46</sup>For an account of the meeting see Oita Gōdō Shinbun, December 28, 1966, p. 1.

moved to Tokyo.<sup>47</sup>

In 1955 the two conservative parties endorsed 537 people as official Party candidates. In the first post-merger elections, in 1958, the LDP endorsed 413 candidates. In 1960 the number of endorsed candidates fell to 399 and in 1963 to 359.<sup>48</sup> With the calling of elections for January, 1967 the LDP again had to decide on the endorsement of candidates. Although no figures are available as to how many candidates were considered for endorsement, it is known that at least 430 cases were expected to come before the national organization.<sup>49</sup> The Secretary-General of the Party, Fukuda Takeo, asserted that the number of endorsed candidates would be kept down to below 350,<sup>50</sup> even though the number of Diet seats had increased by nineteen since the previous election. Fukuda's intention to strictly limit endorsements to those assured of victory was reflected in his somewhat colorful statement that "We will limit endorsements to an extreme degree. We are not going to give endorsements just because a district has so many seats but we will limit them even if it

---

<sup>47</sup>Hadano never did receive Party endorsement. He ran as an independent and lost.

<sup>48</sup>Figure for 1955 taken from Lawrence Olson, Dimensions of Japan (New York, 1963), p. 87; figures from 1958-1963 taken from Jiyūminshutō, p. 275.

<sup>49</sup>Oita Gōdō Shinbun, December 23, 1966, p. 1.

<sup>50</sup>Asahi Shinbun, December 22, 1966, p. 1.

be said we have neither blood nor tears [i.e. a lack of compassion]."<sup>51</sup>

On December 21 Prime Minister Sato told a meeting of LDP Diet members that "the stage has been reached where we must seriously consider dissolution of the House"<sup>52</sup> and on the following day a meeting of the LDP Executive Committee was held to determine the standards for Party endorsement. These were formally adopted at a general Executive Board meeting the next day.<sup>53</sup> The standards were somewhat stricter than those applied in previous elections particularly in extending the prohibition against persons under prosecution for criminal offense to include violators of the Election Law and also prohibiting the endorsement of Party members "whose activities constitute a violation of the Party rules or Party platform."<sup>54</sup>

On December 29 the Election Policy Committee met and decided on the "first endorsements."<sup>55</sup> Three hundred twelve candidates were named. This included all but seven LDP incumbents who planned to run. The seven not granted endorsement included four caught up in scandals involving corruption

---

<sup>51</sup> Mainichi Shinbun, December 25, 1966, p. 13.

<sup>52</sup> Asahi Shinbun, December 22, 1966, p. 1.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid., December 23, 1966, p. 2.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid., p. 2.

<sup>55</sup> Mainichi Shinbun, December 29, 1966, p. 1.

in the LDP<sup>56</sup> and three who ran afoul of the Party principle prohibiting endorsement of anyone currently under prosecution for Election Law violation. The 312 endorsed candidates included 260 incumbents, 31 who had never been elected to the Diet and 21 former Diet members.

The second endorsements were given on December 30 to seven candidates of whom six were new and one a former Diet member.<sup>57</sup> A final session of the Election Policy Committee on December 31 to decide the fates of candidates in eleven particularly difficult districts resulted in another eight candidates, two former Diet members and six new candidates, being endorsed.<sup>58</sup> The LDP thereby endorsed for the election 319 candidates, the smallest number of endorsed candidates in its history. Two hundred sixty were incumbents, 24 were former Diet men and 43 were hoping to be elected for the first time.

Following his battle in 1963 Sato Bunsei's fight for endorsement in 1967 looked mild by comparison. Two developments however, threatened Sato. On December 3, Ayabe Kentaro was appointed Speaker of the Lower House. It is customary for the Speaker to be on the Election Policy Committee and Ayabe, whose opposition to Sato's endorsement was unabating, thereby had

---

<sup>56</sup>Shigemasa, Yamaguchi, Arafune, Kambayashiyama. The party did not actually have to refuse them endorsement because each sent a letter to the committee asking not to be considered for endorsement. They all ran as independents and won.

<sup>57</sup>Asahi Shinbun, December 31, 1966, p. 2.

<sup>58</sup>Oita Gōdō Shinbun, January 1, 1967, p. 2.

the opportunity to press his case at the highest decision-making level. The second development was the violent anti-Sato (Eisaku) position adopted by a group of anti-main current faction leaders and Sato Bunsei's close relationship with one of them, Nakasone Yasuhiro.

Nakasone, former Cabinet Minister and, as of January 1967, leader of his own faction in the Diet, is one of the leading exponents of the so-called "New Right" movement within the LDP, a movement which, though vague in policy proposals, is clear in its goal of wrenching power from the old oligarchy that has controlled the Party and turn it over to a group of younger conservatives.<sup>59</sup> Sato came to know Nakasone through the introduction of a well known political commentator, Mitarai Tatsuo, a native of Oita Prefecture, a close friend of Iwasaki and Murakami on the prefectural level and confidante of many LDP leaders at the national level. Mitarai began to take an interest in Sato's political career in the early fifties and introduced him to Nakasone who was another of his favored young politicians. Since that time Sato has identified his views on national questions largely with those expounded by Nakasone and for a time accepted the responsibility for propagating in Kyushu the policy of which Nakasone is the leading if not the sole exponent: constitutional revision to

---

<sup>59</sup> The views of Nakasone and his faction members are expressed in the first issue of his faction's magazine, the "New Politics." Shinseidōshikai, Shinsei (August, 1967).

permit the direct election of the Prime Minister.<sup>60</sup>

It is a striking indication of the crucial role party endorsement plays in determining factional alignments that Sato joined the Murakami faction rather than Nakasone's faction. In 1963 this meant joining the Ono faction of which Murakami was a member rather than the Kono Ichiro faction to which Nakasone belonged. In fact, according to Sato, Kono offered just before the 1963 election to finance Sato's campaign in its entirety if he would join the Kono group. In spite of this lure and his close friendship with Nakasone, Sato had no choice but to stay aligned with Murakami and join the Ono faction if he were to have any hope of gaining the endorsement of the Party.

Although Sato's membership in the Murakami faction was well known, his friendship with Nakasone was equally known and in December of 1966 the supporters of Prime Minister Sato were not well disposed to anyone friendly with Nakasone.

In the months preceding the House dissolution a series of scandals rocked the LDP.<sup>61</sup> The opposition parties demanded

---

<sup>60</sup>In the final report of the Government's Committee on the Constitution, only two of the Committee's 38 members favored the adoption of the Nakasone Plan for the direct popular election of a prime minister. See Robert Ward, "The Commission on the Constitution and Prospects for Constitutional Change in Japan," The Journal of Asian Studies, XXIV (May, 1965), p. 414.

<sup>61</sup>These scandals received almost daily front-page coverage in all major newspapers from the end of August, 1966 to election day in January, 1967. The men involved and the situation in their districts are discussed in a series of articles in the Yomiuri Shinbun, "Mondai No Nitō-Sono Senkyoku," December 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 1966.

new elections in which the voters could demonstrate their disillusionment with the corrupt ruling conservatives, and a group of anti-Sato Diet members in the LDP formed a "party reformation league" (shukutō renmei) calling for a change in leadership. The demands for new elections finally became too vociferous to ignore and led to the so-called "black mist dissolution" (kuroi kiri kaisan) on December 27.<sup>62</sup> The demands for new Party leadership reached a climax in the Party's presidential election held earlier in the same month. The anti-Sato factions for the most part centered their support on Fujiyama Ichiro but could not muster enough support to topple Sato. They did, however, greatly embarrass him and obtained for themselves an image of political purity that was to dominate the campaign speeches of many candidates including Sato Bunsei. "Elect us, conservatives untainted by the ruling faction's black mist," the anti-Sato candidates pleaded, "and clean up the LDP."

It was this "civil war" in the Party, as one newspaper article characterized it,<sup>63</sup> that most seriously threatened Sato Bunsei's chances for official endorsement. Sato feared that he would suffer the same fate as the majority of new candidates in the Nakasone faction. Only three of eighteen

---

<sup>62</sup>All House dissolutions in postwar Japan have nicknames that identify the immediate causes for the dissolutions. These are conveniently located in Tsuji Kiyooki, ed., Seiji, Vol. I of Sengo Nijyūnenkan (Tokyo, 1966), pp. 204-205.

<sup>63</sup>Asahi Evening News, January 20, 1967, p. 1.



members of Nakasone's group received the Party's endorsement.<sup>64</sup> The incumbents from Sato's district are said to have stressed his disloyalty to the Party as a major reason for denying him endorsement. Nishimura, it is to be remembered, is a member of the Sato Eisaku faction and was a member of the Sato Cabinet at the time of dissolution. Nishimura and Speaker of the Lower House Ayabe Kentaro, having access to the high councils of the Party, pressed their case against "new rightist" Sato Bunsei.

On his side, Sato had the support of two influential men, his faction boss Murakami and political commentator Mitarai. Murakami was a close friend and member of the cabinet of Sato Eisaku's elder brother, former Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke. This gave him some influence with the Party President and with the Secretary-General, Fukuda Takeo who took over leadership of the former Kishi faction in the Diet. Unfortunately for Murakami, but in a sense fortunately for Sato, the Murakami faction failed to have any faction member appointed to a cabinet post in either of Prime Minister Sato's two cabinet reshuffles preceding the December dissolution. Though disgruntled, Murakami supported Sato Eisaku in the presidential election but insisted on endorsement for all his faction's candidates, including Sato Bunsei, as a price for his support. Murakami's power was augmented by his relationship

---

<sup>64</sup>Asahi Shinbun, December 31, 1966, p. 2.

with Iwasaki who controlled the prefectural chapter's vote in the presidential election. This also was put into the scales to tilt them in Sato's favor.

In addition to Murakami, Sato received significant personal support from commentator Mitarai.<sup>65</sup> Indeed, Sato attributes the relative ease with which he obtained the Party's endorsement in the 1967 election to the influence of Mitarai with several people in the party leadership. Mitarai met with the Party President on one occasion during which he discussed Sato Bunsei's endorsement and on at least two occasions discussed it with Secretary-General Fukuda.

Fukuda repeated to Mitarai the arguments of Ayabe and Nishimura that Sato was making anti-Party statements and was a "de facto member" of the Nakasone faction. Mitarai replied that he had known Sato for over fifteen years and could vouch for his party loyalty. As a native of Oita Prefecture and a man knowledgeable about its politics, Mitarai urged, Fukuda should take his advice on questions concerning that prefecture. After the second of these meetings Mitarai called Sato in Beppu to tell him his endorsement was assured.

On the evening of December 29 Sato returned home from a campaign strategy meeting to find a telegram from the Secretary-General asking him to appear at Party headquarters the following

---

<sup>65</sup>The author was introduced to Mitarai by Sato Bunsei in the fall of 1966. Thereafter, Mitarai, with his intimate knowledge of LDP politics in both Oita Prefecture and Tokyo, proved to be an invaluable source of information.

morning at eleven o'clock to receive his certificate of endorsement and the three million yen in campaign funds that went with it. Taking the first plane to Tokyo early the next morning, Sato arrived at party headquarters a few minutes before eleven. When handed his certificate of endorsement by Sato Eisaku, he was told by the Party President: "A lot has passed but now that you have been endorsed you are to abstain from making anti-party speeches and you are to campaign in harmony with your elders from the District, Ayabe and Nishimura." Sato Bunsei returned to Beppu saying the Party President's attitude made him feel he was being awarded a kindergarten graduation diploma. The fight for endorsement, however, was now history and Sato could concentrate on the fight for election victory.

A crucial theme in the politics of endorsement in the LDP is the inherent conflict in the Party's desire to assure the reelection of incumbents (the "incumbent first" policy) and the desire to increase strength by bringing new candidates into the race. For the incumbent there is the constant fear that the appearance of a new candidate from the same party in his constituency can result in his own defeat regardless of the total LDP vote received by the candidates in the district. For the Party there is the fear that in-fighting among its candidates can so scatter the LDP vote that opposition parties will elect more candidates than is commensurate with their percentage of the popular vote.

Keeping in mind what has been said about the conflicts generated by the multi-member single-entry ballot system, it is instructive to look again at the figures concerning LDP endorsement policy with the other data included in the following chart.

TABLE 4  
LDP PERFORMANCE IN GENERAL ELECTIONS 1958-1967

	<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>E</u>
	Number of endorsed candidates	Number of successful candidates	$\frac{B}{A}$	% of seats in Diet	% of popular vote
1958	413	287	69.4%	61.5%	57.8%
1960	399	296	74.1	63.4	57.6
1963	359	283	78.8	60.6	54.7
1967	319	277	86.8	57.0	48.8

The above chart indicates not merely LDP endorsement policy but what is perhaps the most basic dilemma facing the Party. In the four general elections since 1958 the percentage of the popular vote received by the LDP has consistently declined (column E). As a result the Party has endorsed fewer candidates with each succeeding election in the hope of maximizing popular support and insuring the reelection of its incumbents (column A). The result has been that the percentage of endorsed candidates elected has dramatically risen (from 69.4 per cent in 1958 to 86.8 per cent in 1967) while the

percentage of total seats in the Diet won by Party candidates has decreased since 1960 (columns C,D). This is the dilemma posed by the multi-member district. As popular support declines, the Party runs fewer candidates to insure the re-election of its incumbents, thereby increasing the percentage of successful candidates while losing seats in the Diet at the same time. A projection of current trends would indicate that within another two elections or so the LDP will be electing nearly 90 per cent of its endorsed candidates who will be almost entirely incumbents and will command at the best a bare majority of seats in the Diet. The problems posed by the multi-member districting system appear largely insoluble without a change in the system itself. The fears of incumbents of losing an election because of the entrance into the race of a new candidate of the same party are as often as not realized. In 1966 Ayabe Kentaro opposed Sato's endorsement with good reason. Ayabe was to lose the election.

## CHAPTER II

### CAMPAIGN ORGANIZATION IN RURAL AREAS

In certain systems of representative government the official endorsement of a major political party can be the crucial factor in determining a candidate's chances of electoral success. In certain southern states in the United States, for instance, the nomination of the Democratic Party in effect means success at the polls. In the single-member constituencies of Britain, candidate fortunes are highly dependent on shifts in political party popularity.<sup>1</sup> In Japan, because of the effects of the multi-member districting system, the relationship between political party strength and individual candidate success are not as direct as in some other countries. A district with strong LDP support will still see a vigorous battle between the LDP candidates for the conservative vote and declines in party popularity will only exacerbate the intra-party conflict as the candidates fight among themselves for the anticipated smaller conservative vote. One consequence of the intra-party conflict generated by the electoral system is that candidates must rely on personal campaign organizations in their endeavor to mobilize support sufficient to insure

---

<sup>1</sup>See, for instance, Richard Rose, Politics in England (Boston, 1964), pp. 147-150.

election.

The Second District of Oita Prefecture consists of four cities; seventeen towns and three villages. The towns and villages are grouped into five counties (gun). The two cities of Beppu and Nakatsu, with 42 per cent of the district's electorate, represent the urban component of the constituency. The other two cities are typical of the "rural cities" that have resulted from postwar amalgamations of towns and villages. The city of Kitsuki has over 60 per cent of its labor force engaged in the primary sector of the economy and Bungo Takada 56 per cent of its labor force. Taken together, these two cities and five counties represent the rural component of Oita's Second Electoral District. They have a population of 282,794, 62 per cent of the total population of the District, and their labor force accounts for 60 per cent of the District's total. The accompanying chart indicates the high proportion of the labor force engaged in the primary sector of the economy which in Oita's Second District means almost exclusively agriculture.<sup>2</sup> Of the District's 278,584 voters, 162,250 or 58 per cent live in these areas.

It is almost axiomatic to say that a candidate for public office organizes his campaign in line with what he perceives to be the most rational behavior for obtaining the

---

<sup>2</sup>62.4 per cent in agriculture; 0.5 per cent in forestry and hunting; 2.6 per cent in fishing. Figures compiled from Oita Ken, Shōwa 40 nen Kokusei Chosa, Oita Ken Shūkei Kekkahyō (Oita, 1967).

TABLE 5

## SELECTED POPULATION FIGURES FOR OITA'S SECOND DISTRICT

Area	Population	Voters	Employed Persons	Percentage of Employed Persons in		
				Primary <sup>a</sup> Sector	Secondary <sup>b</sup> Sector	Tertiary <sup>c</sup> Sector
Oita Prefecture	1,187,474	738,951	555,703	42.1	17.9	40.0
Beppu	118,938	78,071	56,863	7.3	19.1	73.6
Nakatsu	58,371	38,263	27,312	28.6	23.9	47.5
Bungo Takada	25,138	15,377	12,953	56.4	11.7	31.9
Kitsuki	25,248	15,853	12,070	60.8	8.2	31.0
City Total	227,695	147,564	109,198	38.3	15.7	46.0
<u>Nishi Kunisaki County</u>						
Ota	3,756	2,285	1,933	82.8	2.2	15.0
Matama	6,291	3,966	3,348	73.9	7.9	18.2
Kagachi	6,382	3,783	3,132	63.9	13.1	23.0
County Total	16,429	10,034	8,403	73.5	7.7	18.8
<u>Higashi Kunisaki County</u>						
Kunimi	9,641	5,992	5,026	70.1	8.3	21.6
Himeshima	3,865	2,257	2,056	58.9	13.4	27.6
Kunisaki	21,932	13,746	11,473	65.6	7.8	26.6
Musashi	6,684	4,080	3,560	78.7	3.8	17.5
Aki	13,759	8,424	7,158	74.1	6.2	19.6
County Total	55,881	34,499	29,273	69.5	7.9	22.6
<u>Hayami County</u>						
Hiji	20,120	12,729	9,576	55.9	12.6	31.5
Yamaga	13,612	8,108	6,776	65.9	11.1	23.0
County Total	33,732	20,837	16,352	60.9	11.9	27.2



TABLE 5 (continued)

Area	Population	Voters	Employed Persons	Percentage of Employed Persons in		
				Primary <sup>a</sup> Sector	Secondary <sup>b</sup> Sector	Tertiary <sup>c</sup> Sector
<b>Shimoge County</b>						
Sanko	6,581	4,043	3,604	70.2	8.6	21.2
Honyabakei	6,484	4,085	3,296	65.9	9.7	24.3
Yabakei	9,486	5,533	4,694	71.0	8.9	20.1
Yamaguni	6,789	4,041	3,030	62.5	13.0	24.6
County Total	29,340	17,702	14,624	67.4	10.1	22.5
<b>Usa County</b>						
Innai	8,615	5,224	4,321	75.5	6.8	17.7
Ajimu	13,040	8,113	6,668	77.1	3.5	19.4
Ekisen	6,897	4,291	3,602	62.3	11.0	26.7
Yokkaichi	22,475	14,166	11,437	60.6	10.4	29.0
Nagasu	17,621	10,922	8,089	46.3	17.7	35.9
Usa	8,377	5,232	4,011	54.8	14.0	31.2
County Total	77,025	47,948	38,128	62.7	10.7	26.6
District Total	440,102	278,584	215,978	62.1	10.7	27.2

<sup>a</sup> Agriculture, forestry and hunting, fisheries and agriculture

<sup>b</sup> mining, construction, manufacturing

<sup>c</sup> wholesale and retail trades, finance, insurance and real estate, transportation and communication, electricity, gas and water supply, services, government.

Compiled on the basis of data in: Oita Ken, Shōwa 40 nen Kokusei Chōsa, Oita Ken Shūkei Kekkahyō (Oita, 1965); Sorifu Tōkeikyoku, Oita Ken No Jinko (Tokyo, 1967); Oita Ken Senkyo Kanri Iinkai, Senkyo No Kiroku, Shūgin Giin Sōsenkyo, January 29, 1967 election (Oita, 1967). 9

support of the electorate. The axiom is somewhat misleading in that a person is never completely free to act in accord with his rational judgments. An election law, for instance, might prohibit certain activities a candidate perceives as rational. Social psychologists have long pointed out that individual perception is not merely a response to stimuli in the environment but is dependent in part on assumptions the individual brings to a particular situation. "This implies that the meanings and significances we assign to things, to symbols, to people and to events are the meanings and significances we have built up through our past experience, and are not inherent or intrinsic in the 'stimuli' itself."<sup>3</sup>

The first experiences of Japan with parliamentary elections occurred when the country was dominated by an agricultural economy and a predominantly rural society. Strategies of support mobilization in rural areas were developed over a long period of time and to a considerable degree became formalized. Though Japan is no longer a predominantly rural society, the strategies developed in an earlier period are still utilized and are naturally employed with the greatest frequency in those areas of the country that are still highly rural. The conservative politician who enters into the competition of Diet elections approaches the problem of creating rational strategies of support mobilization with a perception

---

<sup>3</sup>Hadley Cantril, "Perception and Interpersonal Relations," in Current Perspectives in Social Psychology, ed. Edwin P. Hollander and Raymond G. Hunt (New York, 1967), p. 284.

conditioned by decades of previous conservative politician experience. Sato, a professional politician trained by older professional politicians in one of Japan's rural prefectures, perceived the challenges of the rural electorate with a number of assumptions that are no longer, as Cantril writes, necessarily "inherent or intrinsic in the 'stimuli' itself" but no less real for this reason. The rural hamlet, or buraku, in his view, 'is highly integrative, cohesive, and hierarchical, a pattern Japanese sociologists characterize by the generic term kyōdōtai. The existence of such "traditional" communities made imperative certain campaign styles and strategies not rational in more urban areas. In a specifically political sense, Sato's perception of the rural electorate was dominated by two concepts: that of the "hard vote" and its corollary, the "gathered vote."

The term "hard vote" (koteihyō) is common to both popular and academic writings on politics in Japan but few scholars have attempted systematically to analyze its meaning. One group of scholars dismissed the problem by defining the hard vote as one "difficult to move."<sup>4</sup> A "hard vote" means specifically a vote that goes consistently and repeatedly to a particular person as a consequence of personal ties (en or enko). These ties may be direct (between the candidate for

---

<sup>4</sup> Kobayashi Naoki, Shinohara Hajime and Soma Masao, Senkyo (Tokyo, 1960), p. 91.

political office and the voter) or indirect (between the supporter of a candidate for political office and the voter). In discussing the concept of the hard vote, Japanese lay great stress on the role of giri or obligation in the political system. A voter will cast his vote for a certain candidate in order to return a favor received from that person or to repay an obligation to a third party who is supporting the candidate. Votes become "hard" for the politician who reaches the voter through a web of personal relationships. A Diet member who continues to serve year after year gradually builds up personal relationships with a large number of voters in his district and with local politicians, business leaders and others who in turn have intimate ties with numbers of the electorate. At election time the persons brought into this web of personal relationships are expected to vote for the politician at the web's center.

Implicit in much of the discussion of the "hard vote" is the idea that such behavior is somehow uniquely Japanese. On the whole Japanese tend to be very self-conscious about the influence a supposed "feudalistic" sense of obligation has on voting behavior. In the 1963 local elections, for example, one of the slogans used by the Oita Prefecture Election Management Committee was "My vote will not be sold for a bribe or given away because of a sense of traditional obligation" (baishu ya giri jya urenai kono ippyo) the implication being that bribes and obligations are equally "undemocratic." While

the particular form obligation takes in Japan may originate in traditional Japanese values, the phenomenon itself is universal. This is what the German sociologist Robert Michels meant when he spoke of the "masses' sentiment for gratitude" in reference to the perpetuation of oligarchies in political parties.<sup>5</sup> The "norm of reciprocity" ("people should help those who have helped them") is universal.<sup>6</sup> What is unique about Japan is not the existence of the norm but the extent to which it has been encouraged by traditional patterns of social organization and institutionalized and articulated in terms of specific modes of social behavior.

The concept of the hard vote has certain obvious consequences for campaign strategy. If the rural voter votes in accordance with demands placed upon him by personal relationships, the candidate for political office can hardly hope to obtain support by the attraction of his political ideas or the power of his campaign oratory. Sato saw little point in going to the countryside to make speeches. "Speaking tours in rural areas are a futile and expensive exercise," he often pointed out. His time, he felt, would be better spent in the urban areas of Beppu and Nakatsu, where direct appeals to the electorate would have greater effect than in the hard vote rural areas of the District. The most rational strategy for

---

<sup>5</sup> Robert Michels, Political Parties (New York, 1962), p. 92.

<sup>6</sup> Alvin W. Gouldner, "The Norm of Reciprocity: A Preliminary Statement," in Social Psychology, p. 278.

mobilizing rural support was the building of an organization of men who held positions in local society that involved them in the kind of personal relationships necessary to reach the voter, men who had the power to "gather the vote" (hyō o matomeru).

The concept of the gathered vote flows inexorably from that of the hard vote. Votes are hard because of a personal relationship that impels the voter to vote a certain way. This relationship is often not with the candidate himself but with one of his campaigners. The concept of gathering the vote is predicated (as is that of the hard vote) on the perception of the hamlet as a cohesive community. The ability of a hamlet to function in harmony is often referred to with the phrase matomari gi ii; the buraku, in Dore's apt translation, "hangs together."<sup>7</sup> Within such a community there is assumed to be a nucleus of decision makers, a political elite that leads the community as a unit. There are no works that deal explicitly and at length with decision-making in local communities in Japan that are on the order of such studies as Dahl's study of New Haven<sup>8</sup> or Hunter's study of "Regional City."<sup>9</sup> But the works that do deal with the subject of

---

<sup>7</sup>Ronald P. Dore, Land Reform in Japan (London, 1959), p. 386.

<sup>8</sup>Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs, Democracy and Power in an American City (New Haven, 1961).

<sup>9</sup>Floyd Hunter, Community Power Structure, A Study of Decision Makers (New York, 1963).

community power structure invariably indicate that decisions are made by a "power elite" in the Hunter use of the term rather than by a pluralistic leadership such as Dahl describes in New Haven. The emphasis on matomari<sup>10</sup> itself implies a greater degree of unity in the making of a broad range of community decisions than one would expect to find in more pluralistic societies.

When this concept of matomari is applied to the specific issue of voting, we are referring specifically to the ability of the community leaders to influence voting behavior, to "gather" the vote for a chosen politician. The personality or platform of the candidate is at best peripheral to whether the vote is gathered or not. The person who can gather the vote is regarded as being capable of delivering it to whomever he wishes. The use of campaigners who can gather votes by the power of their own personal connections is a common technique and has led to the use of the term "election broker." As Ronald Dore remarks, it is a technique very much used by rural-based Socialist Diet members, a view my own observations of Socialist politicians in Oita would corroborate.<sup>11</sup>

For a politician like Sato who approached the problem

---

<sup>10</sup> Matomeru is a transitive verb form meaning to gather, to collect, to arrange. Matomari is the noun form usually translated as unity, consensus, arrangement, agreement.

<sup>11</sup> Ronald P. Dore, "The Socialist Party and the Farmers," in Socialist Parties in Postwar Japan, Allan B. Cole, George O. Totten, Cecil H. Uyehara (New Haven, 1966), pp. 414-415.

of mobilizing the support of rural voters within a perception grid dominated by concepts of the hard and gathered vote, the crucial strategic problem was the recruitment of men capable of gathering significant numbers of votes. It was this endeavor, rather than any direct appeal to the voters, that dominated Sato's activities in the rural areas of the District.

Reliance on men politically influential in local communities to mobilize electoral support is the traditional strategy used by conservative politicians. From the beginning of Japan's parliamentary system to the dissolution of the political parties in the wartime years it was to the landlord class that conservative politicians turned to mobilize the vote of the rural electorate. As one of Japan's most eminent rural sociologists, Fukutake Tadashi, has written, "[I]t would be little exaggeration to say that in Japanese villages before the war only landlords played any part in national politics."<sup>12</sup> Until 1925, when universal manhood suffrage was granted, the mass of farmers did not even have the right to vote. After being granted suffrage a great number of them voted in accordance with the wishes of local landlords with whom they were related. In the prewar period "if the landlord would support you, the votes of the farmers within his domain would, as a matter of course, come with his support. There was no need to

---

<sup>12</sup> Fukutake Tadashi, Japanese Rural Society, transl. Ronald P. Dore (Tokyo, 1967), p. 189.



deal directly with the individual farmers. . . . [V]otes could easily be gathered."<sup>13</sup> The modeling of landlord-tenant relations on the pattern of family organization with its emphasis on deference, obedience and loyalty to the head of the family, gave the landlord extraordinary power to control the voting behavior of his tenants and, because of his high status in the community, significant influence over the voting behavior of less wealthy farmers. "[The farmer] simply voted for the [Diet] candidate supported by the landlord with whom he had the closest connections. As for parliamentary politicians, they had no need to make any direct appeal to the farmers as such; it was enough for their election if they could mobilize the support of landlords."<sup>14</sup>

In the postwar period various Occupation sponsored reforms effected drastic changes throughout Japan. In particular the extensive land reform dispossessed the class that had been the major support of the conservative party in rural areas. No longer, writes Fukutake, would you hear a farmer say "That landlord in my village is supporting Dietman A so, of course, I too naturally. . . ." <sup>15</sup> The consequences of this development for the strategies of candidates for public office were

---

<sup>13</sup>Fukutake Tadashi, "'Jiminto Rieki,' O Seiritsu Saseru Mono," Interview with Ishikawa Hideo, Asahi Janaru, IX (February 26, 1967), 95.

<sup>14</sup>Fukutake, Japanese Rural Society, p. 190.

<sup>15</sup>Fukutake, Asahi Janaru, p. 95.

obviously far reaching. Either the politician would have to reject the strategy of relying on men to gather the vote as being irrational in the absence of a powerful landlord class or else he would have to find another group to replace the landlord in performing this electoral function. In fact the politician did both. On the one hand he created new strategies for reaching the voter. The mass membership kōenkai which is discussed in a later chapter, is the most striking example of this. On the other hand, he turned to a different group to perform the function of the landlord: the locally elected politician. In Sato's case at least it was reliance on this group in the rural communities of the District rather than the utilization of other campaign techniques that dominated his campaign strategy.

There are obviously tremendous differences in the power of a landlord over a tenant and that of an elected official over his constituents. Nonetheless, the similarities in the political role performed by these groups in rural areas are used both by political scientists in explaining in part the reasons for continued conservative dominance and by conservative politicians in rationalizing a strategy of using local elected politicians to gather the vote.

Political scientist Matsushita Keiichi forwards the thesis that the landlord has been replaced in postwar Japan by a new "ruling class," the yakushokusha or the officials' class. Although the great majority of these officials--mayors,

assemblymen, heads of agricultural cooperatives and so on--"are formally chosen through democratic elections, they should be regarded as forming the new ruling class in the countryside."<sup>16</sup> Local political bosses, able to exert pressures on the residents of a community similar to those formerly exerted by the landlords, now function as the support base of conservative party candidates. The reasons for conservative party success in elections, argues Tokyo University Professor Ishida Takeshi, "is, in brief, because of its use of an obviously apolitical (hiseijiteki) traditional order which has the local bosses at its summit. . . . In short, the conservative party does not gain votes by heightening the political interest of the electorate and organizing this from below, but on the contrary receives its votes through the cohesive order's power to inhibit heightened political interest on the part of the people."<sup>17</sup>

The reasons for thinking that local politicians can perform the functions of gathering the vote for Diet candidates are all predicated on a view of the rural community, of the buraku, as being in fact a "cohesive order" (kyōdōtai) in Ishida's term. Within such a community and in the vacuum created by the expropriation of the landlords, the locally elected politician has become the person most strategically situated to do favors for the community's inhabitants and to

---

<sup>16</sup> Matsushita Keiichi, Gendai Nihon No Seijiteki Kōsei (Tokyo, 1964), p. 132.

<sup>17</sup> Ishida Takeshi, Sengo Nihon No Seiji Taisei (Tokyo, 1961), pp. 87-88.

expect in return the acceptance of his political leadership.

In the towns and villages of Oita's Second District a candidate for the local assembly often needs no more than two or three hundred votes to be elected. Such politicians usually have their support concentrated in one section of the town and have extensive ties of friendship, kinship and obligation with their supporters. An assemblyman elected repeatedly over a number of years builds up a stable group of supporters who become his "hard votes." When that politician lends his support to a candidate for the Diet, he attempts to "gather" his own hard votes for the politician with whom he is associated.

The local politician functions to gather the vote by basically two methods. The first is to ask voters to support a particular Diet candidate as a favor to him, the local politician. Such an appeal can be effective for a variety of reasons. A local politician, because of the great dependence of local municipalities on the national government for subsidies and grants-in-aid, must have good relations with a member of the Diet if he is to provide valuable services to his own constituents. He needs to demonstrate to the Diet member his effectiveness as a supporter to insure a continuation of benefits for his constituents and to secure the Diet member's financial aid for his own local assembly election. Thus he can argue with his own supporters that support for a particular Diet candidate is essential for his own continuation and effectiveness in office. Most commonly, however, the local politician, much as the prewar landlord, requests a vote for a certain Diet

candidate as a repayment of obligation owed to him by the voters. It is quite common in Japan for people to feel that the politician who has managed to get, for example, a desired road built in their hamlet did them a favor rather than carried out his duty as the representative of the constituency. They accept the notion that they are obligated to him much as they assume that the politician himself has incurred an obligation to someone higher up in the political hierarchy in order to have the road built. The politician can cash in, in a sense, on these obligations to achieve his goal of gathering votes for the Diet candidate. There are innumerable incidents like the one I witnessed while walking down a village street with a town assemblyman supporting Sato. As we were walking an elderly farmer approached from the other direction and greeted the assemblyman. The politician returned the greeting and reminded the man that he was supporting Sato in the election and hoped the farmer would too. "Why, of course," responded the farmer spontaneously, "I am so indebted to you, sure I'll vote for Sato."

If the first method by which the local politician can gain votes for the Diet candidate is his own personal appeal to numbers of his constituents, the second is the similar appeal possessed by the staff of his own political machine. Like the Diet candidate himself, the local politician has a group of supporters who run his election campaign. In the case of a town or village assemblyman this "staff" may not number more

than a few people but mayors, prefectural assemblymen and powerful leaders in local assemblies often have highly developed personal organizations that extend down through the local assemblies to the hamlets and comprise large numbers of people.

The relationship between the leader and the followers of these political organizations, particularly in rural areas but generally through the society at large, is characterized by patterns of organization and the prevalence of values associated with the family system. The extension of familism to nonfamily groups in the society takes the generic form called oyabun-kobun. "In such groupings, organization and authority follow closely the models of the family, whether of the individual household or of the extended 'house.' The head is the oyabun, or oyakata (literally, 'father role') and the subordinates are kobun, or kokata (literally, 'child role')."<sup>18</sup> "Persons of authority assume obligations and manifest attitudes toward their subordinates much as if they were foster parents, and conversely the subordinates behave dutifully and hold feelings of great personal loyalty toward their superiors."<sup>19</sup> "Characteristically, the head is the benevolent father, the subordinates are loyal and obedient children; and the relation between them is not only functional, specific, and economic,

---

<sup>18</sup> Herbert Passin, "Japanese Society," International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (New York, 1968), p. 243.

<sup>19</sup> John W. Bennett and Iwao Ishino, Paternalism in the Japanese Economy (Minneapolis, 1963), p. 40: quoted in Passin, p. 243.

but personal and diffuse as well."<sup>20</sup>

The oyabun, a prefectural assemblyman for instance, provides a variety of services and benefits to his kobun. He may, for example, be their source of funds for campaigns to local assemblies. He may, like Iwasaki did with Sato, groom a kobun for high political office. In return the leader is the recipient of obedience and loyalty from his followers. When he decides to throw his support behind a particular candidate for the Diet, his organization of followers becomes, as a matter of course, part of the candidate's campaign organization. The support of one powerful politician in any particular area can result in the support of a network that extends through the entire town or village. Sato's organization in Bungo Takada, described in the following chapter, is an example of this type of campaign organization. In the "ideal model," so to speak, of a campaign organization, the local politician in one's support will have considerable influence to gather the vote of numbers of the electorate and his organized followers, often being lesser politicians themselves, will have a similar influence over other members of the constituency. This power to gather the vote is not limited exclusively to the local politician. Heads of agricultural cooperatives, presidents of organizations such as the Chamber of Commerce, men of high social standing such as dentists and

---

<sup>20</sup>Passin, p. 244.

doctors are also utilized in election campaigns for similar purposes.<sup>21</sup> It is the group of local elected politicians, however, that is most extensively utilized in the campaign organization of Diet candidates.

It is essential to stress that the assemblyman's support is largely an empty promise without the active participation of his personal organization. This is one point many commentators fail to take into consideration when they criticize Diet candidates for the large amount of money they give local politicians for their support. The effective assemblyman usually keeps only a small amount of campaign funds for himself and directs the rest down among his staff.<sup>22</sup> The ineffective assemblyman who does pocket the money is usually not given the opportunity to be ineffective more than once. These local politicians can of course demand a good price for their support because the Diet candidate is so very much dependent on them. To successfully fulfill his function, however, the local politician has to allow a considerable portion of the money received to filter down through his own personal organization of supporters.

The use of local politicians to gather the vote has not been continued without some recognition of the social changes

---

<sup>21</sup>The role of a variety of voluntary associations in the campaign is discussed in Chapter VII.

<sup>22</sup>The uses of campaign funds distributed to local politicians is discussed further in Chapter VIII.



that have occurred in rural areas since the end of the war and the demise of the landlords. Although Sato's strategy in rural areas is dominated by assumptions about voting behavior and techniques of support mobilization formulated in an earlier period, it gives some recognition to a breakdown in traditional social patterns. His perception of the rural electorate is neither simple nor unambiguous. While it has not altered to the extent that he could consider it rational to forego reliance on local leaders to gather the vote for other strategies, his strategy does recognize that not all the people who vote consistently for a local politician (that are that politician's "hard votes") will vote for a Diet candidate in accordance with that politician's wishes.

Sato, as a rule of thumb in estimating his support in any particular rural area, calculates that the local politician in his support would provide roughly between one-fifth and one-third the number of votes received in his own election. Some of his supporters will simply dislike the Diet candidate; others will be obligated to another Diet candidate or his supporter; still others will not be interested enough to vote. Allowing for all these contingencies, Sato calculates that a mayor, for example, who has been reelected several times with a stable vote of say five thousand, will provide between 1,200 and 1,400 votes to the Diet candidate he is supporting. Thus, the more support the Diet candidate has from prefectural, city and town assemblymen, mayors and other elected officials the

more votes he can expect to receive.

Such a concept is not unique to Sato. One newspaper wrote of the role of local politicians in Diet campaigns in the same terms of delivering a percentage of their own vote to the candidate but set the figure higher. "A prefectural assemblyman with 10,000 votes in his own election can deliver half or 5,000 votes in a Diet election. The same rule applies to city assemblymen. If the candidate can win over city, town, village and prefectural assemblymen who are involved in everyday activities, votes can easily be predicted. That is why it is said that the battle to win a Diet seat is settled in the battle for local assemblymen support in the year preceding the election."<sup>23</sup> While the Dietmen the author is familiar with would be overjoyed at finding local politicians who could provide 30 per cent of their vote, much less 50, the "rule" the newspaper relates indicates the widespread acceptance of the concept of the local politician being able to deliver a fairly high percentage of his personal "hard" vote.

The concept of a Diet candidate's support being based on the vote that is delivered by political machines of other politicians makes understandable certain usages of the term jiban, usually translated as support base or bailiwick. It is common to hear talk of the "transferring" of a jiba, or of

---

<sup>23</sup> "Kono Ippyō De Kiri O Harae" (5), Mainichi Shinbun, January 6, 1967, p. 1; quoted in Soma Masao, Nihon No Senkyo (Tokyo, 1967), p. 124.

"receiving" a jiban, Inukai Tsuyoshi, one of Japan's prewar political leaders and the holder of a so-called "iron jiban" in Okayama Prefecture, wrote to a follower in 1902 that "I gave half of my jiban to Nishimura Tanjiro. I am holding the other half, plus two gun in the Bizen area."<sup>24</sup> When Inukai died his son "inherited" his jiban. Despite the changes that have occurred in Japanese society the same quote could be made today without any one thinking strangely of it. When Sato entered the Prefectural Assembly he "inherited" the jiban of Aragane Keiji and when he left he "transferred" it to his chosen successor Shuto Kenji. Where Inukai asked landlords supporting him in part of the District to support Nishimura Tanjiro, Sato had the men in his organization go to work for Shuto. Implicit in such procedures is that the supporters of a politician have a loyalty to that politician that takes precedence over personal feelings toward the new candidate they are being asked to support and that they will be able to deliver their "hard votes" to the candidate of their choice.

The fight for votes in Oita's Second District's rural areas was in large part a fight among the conservative candidates--Ayabe, Nishimura and Sato--for support of local politicians. In this fight Sato was in the least advantageous position. Being the only non-incumbent candidate, he was faced with a situation in which most of the District's political

---

<sup>24</sup> Quoted in Richard K. Beardsley, John W. Hall and Robert E. Ward, Village Japan (Chicago, 1959), p. 425.

leaders were already supporters of one or the other of the two conservative incumbents.

Oita's Second District has fifteen Prefectural Assemblymen, all of whom are associated with particular Diet candidates. Of this number Sato had, at the time of the 1967 election, the open support of only one (his successor in the Assembly, Shuto Kenji). He had the partial, unpublicized support of one other and the support of one former Assemblyman. The case of the "shadow" support of the one Assemblyman is interesting in reflecting the practice of dividing one's jiban much as Inukai Tsuyoshi did sixty years ago. This Prefectural Assemblyman, from the City of Nakatsu, was a close ally of Iwasaki and through that connection was brought into Sato's campaign. Being a member of the former Liberal Party, he and the members of his organization had long supported Nishimura who, as has been mentioned, was also a member of this party. Afraid of alienating Nishimura because of the importance of his support in his own Prefectural-Assembly election and required to do something for Sato because of his close relationship with Iwasaki, the Assemblyman took an ostensibly "neutral" position in the Diet race. Quietly he delegated members of his organization, "divided his jiban" in the Japanese phraseology, to work for the two candidates. Three of his kobun, all members of the Nakatsu Assembly, were "given" to Sato.

The District also elects twenty-four city, town and village mayors. Sato had the open support of only the Mayor

of Yamaguni in the northwestern corner of the District and indirect support from two others. The same pattern applies to speakers of local assemblies, another position considered a seat of political power. Sato had the full support of only one speaker in the District, the partial support of one other and the support of one former speaker.

Sato, therefore, was in the position of having to try to "eat into" the jiban (Jiban ni kuikomu) of the incumbents. His very limited success in this effort was almost entirely due to LDP leader Iwasaki's influence over many politicians in the District. As a non-incumbent, Sato lacked the power to do favors for local politicians on a scale that could compete with the power of the incumbents. His defeat in the 1963 election made many politicians wary of switching support to a candidate who might well lose the election and leave them without any pipeline to the Diet. Some Assemblymen who had supported him in 1963 refused to do so in 1967 and many others made clear that they could not continue to support him in another election if he were defeated again in 1967. Sato's relative and close friend, Kitsuki Assemblyman Nakayama, confided at one point just before the election that he could not possibly continue to support Sato past this campaign if he lost. Since 1963 when he supported Sato in his first attempt to be elected to the Diet he had been blackballed by the Kitsuki Assembly and Mayor. Kitsuki is Ayabe Kentaro's hometown and Ayabe receives almost unanimous support from the elected

officials of the city. Nakayama lamented that since 1963 he had not been able to get "even one road built" in his part of the city and that with his own election coming up in a few months, he had to show the voters what his election would mean for them. If he continued his support for a defeated Sato (which of necessity meant a victorious Ayabe) his own election chances would be thrown into great jeopardy. Nakayama's dilemma was one shared by many of Sato's supporters.

One newcomer to Diet campaigning when asked how he tried to organize his support responded by saying that "I asked help of my relatives, friends and former classmates and started out building an organization."<sup>25</sup> Sato's organization was built in much the same way. In some areas such as Kitsuki and part of Higashi Kunisaki County, former classmates of the Kitsuki Middle School dominated the campaign effort. Kitsuki, mentioned above as a typical "rural city" with over 60 per cent of its labor force of 12,000 engaged in the primary sector of the economy, is an amalgamation of seven villages. There was one man in each of these villages responsible for Sato's campaign. Overall responsibility was in the hands of the above-mentioned Nakayama Makoto, forty-one years old, a twice elected member of the City Assembly, graduate of the city's middle school and a relative of Sato. Of the six other campaign managers four were Sato's classmates at the school. Another was his senior

---

<sup>25</sup> "Uchiyabure, Sanban No Hencho" (1), Asahi Shinbun, January 11, 1967, p. 1.

at the school by one year. The sixth man, sixty-one years old, is from the village where Sato's mother was born and is a long-time friend of the Sato family. The extraordinary degree of attention Sato gave to maintaining his school ties, attending alumni meetings, contributing generously to the alumni fund and to special projects and in other ways maintaining his association with the group are indications of the high value he placed upon his former schoolmates as a source of electoral support.

In other places relatives were important organizers of support and, in many of the towns, friends associated with the LDP prefectural youth group led the organization. As a Prefectural Assemblyman, Sato's own political machine was limited largely to Beppu, the constituency from which he was elected. During his years in the Assembly he served as president of the Party's youth group in the Prefecture and it was the membership of this group that provided the basis for building the type of district-wide machine possessed by longtime Diet members. Sato was succeeded as youth group president by Kiyohara Fumio who runs Sato's campaign in Bungo Takada and Kiyohara was in turn succeeded by Shuto Kenji, the man Sato designated as successor to his seat in the Prefectural Assembly. Members and former members of this group proved to be the crucial and sometimes only organizers of support for Sato in several of the towns of the District.

The only place where Sato had no organization at all was the island village of Himeshima, the birthplace of Nishimura.

In the 1967 election 98 per cent of the island's electorate of 2,257 went to the polls and 97 per cent of those voting faithfully cast their ballot for Nishimura. Nishimura received 2,140 votes, Socialist Komatsu was second with 54 votes, Ayabe third with 6 and Sato and the Communist Party candidate each received 3 votes.<sup>26</sup>

In each of the other twenty-one cities, towns and villages that comprise the rural sector of the Second District, Sato engaged in an organized campaign effort. The majority of men at the head of these area organizations were local Assemblymen or former Assemblymen at the time of the 1967 election. Twelve were members of the local Assemblies while three had been former members. The six non-office holding campaign managers included three medical doctors, one dentist, one veterinarian and one merchant who was president of the local association of merchants. Among this group of twenty-one supporters, two were in the thirty-year old age group, fourteen were in their forties, and five were over the age of fifty-five. Among the Assemblymen the average age was forty-three, somewhat younger than Sato himself.

Sato's campaign organizations in the District's rural cities, towns and villages followed a general pattern. His support, as is typical of the traditional organizational

---

<sup>26</sup>As an ironic note to the Japanese Government's campaign for high voting rates, the walls of the office of Himeshima's Mayor (who has always been elected uncontested) are covered with plaques won in the competition for the highest voting rates and lauding the high level of political consciousness of the island's electorate.



structure employed by conservative politicians, is organized on a chiiki or geographical basis. Each city, town and village has a campaign organization that deals directly with the candidate and his headquarters and is independent of the organizations in the other cities, towns and villages. This is the so-called "vertical" approach to campaign organization--the creating of independent support groups in each administrative area. It is in contrast with the organization of Socialist party politicians who, because of the support of labor unions, are seen as using a "horizontal" approach. The labor unions which are used as the candidate's campaign organization have a membership which fans out over the district cutting across chiiki lines.

Every town in the district is the result of amalgamations of smaller towns and villages, most of these amalgamations taking place in the period of the so-called "amalgamation boom" following the passage of the Law For The Promotion Of Amalgamation Of Towns And Villages in 1953. The amalgamated areas, which are referred to as "former villages" (kyūmura) remain significant administrative and social units and form an important level for Sato's campaign organization. Below the former villages are the buraku, the hamlets which form the basic level for the organization of campaign support. Sato's support group in any of the towns in the District is organized along the lines of these basic administrative and social divisions: the town, the former village and the buraku.

At the head of the organization in a town is the town sekininsha, Sato's campaign manager for that particular area. As his title (the "responsible person") implies, the sekininsha is responsible for organizing the campaign and delivering the vote. In general he is the only person in the town organization accountable directly to the candidate and he is also the only one whose degree of success can be judged by the candidate with some measure of accuracy. While each town has several polling centers, votes are counted only at the town level. Thus the candidate cannot know, for instance, how many votes he received in a particular former village.<sup>27</sup> The candidate sets a goal for the town and the sekininsha is responsible for delivering the agreed upon number of votes. Commonly there is only one person in a town who holds this position in Sato's organization. Partly this is due to a desire to clearly define the lines of accountability and in part a desire to keep the number of men who deal directly with the candidate's headquarters as few as possible so as to minimize the risks of the headquarter staff or the candidate himself being implicated in an Election Law violation. Particularly after the official

---

<sup>27</sup> It is often said that candidates do in fact know how many and even which individuals voted for them in each buraku. Campaigners may "station themselves near polling booths and watch the facial expressions of voters as they come and go. Those who have not obeyed instructions are likely to give themselves away when so confronted." See Kyogoku Junichi and Ike Nobutake, "Urban-Rural Differences in Voting Behavior in Postwar Japan," Economic Development and Cultural Change, IX, Part 3 (October 1960), p. 173. The reliability of this and other similar techniques is questionable and the campaigner is likely to exaggerate his success in the delivering the vote when he reports to the candidate's headquarters. The only reliable information at the candidate's command is the records of voting statistics for the entire vote counting area.

campaign has begun, the sekininsha is the only campaigner from a town to deal with the candidate and receive campaign funds directly from his headquarters. He in turn is responsible for distributing campaign funds to the other men in the town organization.

Below the sekininsha are the "former-village" campaign managers. In a town that is, for instance, the amalgamation of four villages there will usually be four former-village campaign managers owing responsibility directly to the town sekininsha. In some areas, such as the town of Kunisaki, which is discussed in the following chapter, several people are placed at this level of the organization. Only in a few cases do campaigners on this level or below deal directly with the candidate's headquarters. In consultation with the town sekininsha, the former-village level campaign managers develop the organization in their areas and are given a vote quota to be filled. These former-village managers, in turn, are responsible for organizing the campaigners in the buraku within their respective villages. Ideally a former-village campaign manager will have subordinate buraku campaign managers in each buraku responsible for recruiting campaigners and delivering a set vote to him. In Sato's case, while some towns had such buraku managers, the more usual practice was for all buraku campaigners to deal directly with the former-village level campaign managers.

The structure of the typical town organization, accordingly, is that of a pyramid with commands passing down

from the candidate's headquarters to the town sekininsha, from him to the former-village campaign managers and from them to the campaigners in the buraku. Each level of organization sets quotas to be filled by the level immediately below. Through this process the candidate's quota for the town is so divided that at the bottommost buraku level a campaigner may be responsible for obtaining four or five votes. This structure, with minor variations, is representative of those used by conservative party Diet politicians. The town, former-village and buraku are as fundamental to Japanese political organization as are the county and ward to political organization in the United States.

The structuring of a campaign organization in this fashion has certain consequences for the mobilization of electoral support. For one thing the channeling of communications in the structure through vertical lines that become increasingly narrow as they approach the candidate's headquarters makes it extremely difficult for the candidate at the top of the structure to gain reliable information about the organization on its lower levels. In some areas the candidate is not familiar with anyone but the town sekininsha. In almost all areas knowledge of campaigners is confined to those on the sekininsha and former-village campaign manager levels. The men campaigning in the buraku are an unknown quantity. As a consequence the candidate, particularly a new candidate first building an organization, cannot accurately judge the strength of his organization or identify its weak points. The election

results, as remarked above, only describe the candidate's strength in the entire town. They do not indicate which areas within the town are weak and which are strong.

The local politician who leads a town organization has a vested interest in keeping the candidate ignorant of his supporters on the lower levels. The value of the local politician, as has been noted, is the personal organization he commands in his local area. A well developed organization reaches down into each of the former villages and into nearly every buraku. The politician at the head of such a structure is, as a rule, reluctant to share detailed information with the Diet candidate he supports as to who comprises the campaign organization. By keeping the membership rolls secret he insures the candidate's dependence on his continued support. By divulging information on the buraku campaigners, the position of Sato's sekininsha would be endangered not particularly in the imminent election but in the long run as Sato approaches the buraku campaigners with New Year cards, presents for various occasions and so on in an attempt to obtain their support directly and to lessen the chances of a local politician changing his support to another candidate and taking everybody that had previously campaigned for Sato with him.

In December of 1966 in a futile effort to gain some information on his organized strength in the countryside, Sato held a meeting in Beppu attended by the sekininsha from each town and village in the district. For each of the areas

Sato's staff had drawn up charts listing the names of the amalgamated towns and villages in the particular area, the names of the buraku in each of these subdivisions and then leaving space under the name of each buraku for the sekininsha to fill in the names of the men campaigners, the women campaigners, campaigners among young voters and those, such as dentists, barbers and the like, having ties with various organized groups. The opposition of the sekininsha to filling in the charts was unmistakable. Most said they would need time to get complete information and agreed to fill in the charts within a week or two. In many cases the sekininsha himself does not know but a small portion of the supporters on the lower levels. The man in charge of the campaign at the former-village level who is an assemblyman has his own organization of supporters that he guards from the town sekininsha for the same reasons the latter keeps his supporters secret from the Diet candidate. Most of the charts were never completed and even those which were gave little idea of the extent of Sato's organizational strength.

One consequence of this is that the Diet candidate's campaign organizations in the several towns become largely autonomous units, not only from the organizations in other towns, but from the candidate himself. The relationship between the candidate and his town organization becomes one not so much of a delegation of authority as a total relegation of responsibility. The candidate attempts no control

over campaign methods or strategy within the particular area. These problems are left to the town sekininsha and the other leaders of the town organization. The candidate's main responsibility is to set the quota of votes for the town in consultation with the sekininsha and provide the campaign funds. The way his supporters campaign is their own business; there is plenty of room for differences in "style". Violations of the election law do not involve the candidate because he plays no direct part in the illegal activity. The candidate does not know how his organization gets the vote and often he does not want to know.

One interesting consequence of this relationship is that the candidate's image in the various towns of the district varies considerably with the type of person that leads his organization in any one area. Particularly because of restrictions on the use of mass media,<sup>28</sup> restrictions which affect the new candidate more than the incumbent Diet man, it is extremely difficult to project one's personality, policies and the like to the electorate at large. Add to this Sato's reluctance to spend the time and money necessary to become known in the countryside, his assumption that the most rational strategy for obtaining the rural vote is reliance on the support of local political leaders and his supporters' interest in keeping him at a distance and the candidate becomes little

---

<sup>28</sup>See Chapter VIII.

more than what his local campaigners are. Sato's sekininsha are a varied lot. Many types of politicians and many styles of politics are represented by the men in his organization. The result is that in one town one may hear the candidate spoken of as idealistic, a "new type," liberal and a "clean" politician. In the town right next to this the same candidate may have a reputation expressed in diametrically opposed adjectives: "old-fashioned," "dirty," and the like.

The vertical pattern of organization has another serious consequence for campaign strategy in that it tends to cluster support within highly restricted areas of a particular town. Even in those few areas where Sato had extensive organization with the support of a substantial number of local politicians he did not necessarily have a strong organization.

The town of Honyabakei in Shimoge County had an electorate at the time of the 1967 election of 4,085. Sato's sekininsha in Honyabakei is forty-year old Sakamoto Tosuke, Town Assemblyman and head of the Shimoge County LDP youth group. Like many of Sato's supporters, Sakamoto became friendly with Sato while the latter was serving as chairman of the Prefectural youth organization. In the 1963 election Sato received 554 votes in Honyabakei, fourth among the five contenders. Following that election the organization was made considerably stronger. Sakamoto brought into it the Chairman of the Shimoge County LDP women's group and four other Town Assemblymen as well as several former Town Assemblymen and people active in an



informal way in the town's politics. This expanded organization plus the retirement of Noyori Hideichi who had received 1,039 votes in the town in 1963 led Sato to set a goal of 1,200 votes from Honyabakei in the 1967 election. The result of the election, however, was that Sato received 784 votes, third among the four candidates. Sato's failure to achieve his goal is intimately related to the practice of local politicians of having their own supporters clustered in highly restricted geographical areas of the town.

Honyabakei, which became a town in 1959, is an amalgamation of four villages. One of these villages has an electorate of approximately 700 and another, 600 voters. The electorate in the third village numbers 1,300 and there are 1,400 voters in the fourth. Almost all of Sato's supporters are concentrated in the village of 1,300 voters. The youth group and women's group chairmen, the most active supporting Assemblymen and the great majority of the other supporters all live within the eighteen buraku of this one amalgamated village. It was in these eighteen buraku that the "hard votes" of Sato's supporters were clustered. Sato's organization was in fact not an organization of the town of Honyabakei as much as it was an organization of one of the town's "former villages." It is probable, if Sato's organization was effective at all, that the great majority of his 700 votes came from the 1,300 voters of that one area. The failure of his organization to have influence in the other villages, particularly the largest

one with over 1,400 voters, was a consequence of the support base of the local politicians that staffed it.

The chiiki or area-based campaign organization used by Sato has an interesting and important effect of militating against its own expansion because of what may be termed its "inward-looking" nature. The men who make up the organization are local people intimately familiar with the voters in their areas. A local politician can drive around his area and point out house by house who votes for whom in local Assembly, mayoral, Prefectural Assembly and Diet elections. There is a strong tendency to identify the Sato supporters and mark everyone else off as the "hard votes" of other candidates. Those who are known to have supported Ayabe or Nishimura or important campaigners of either of the two incumbents are considered inaccessible to Sato and there is consequently little attempt made to bring such voters over to his support. One of Sato's major problems in recruiting participants for a large women's meeting<sup>29</sup> was that those whom the sekininsha invited were invariably those already known to be Sato supporters. This tendency of the organization to turn in upon itself is quite probably a significant factor in accounting for the stability of the votes of incumbent Diet members in rural areas. The supporters of each candidate are identified and regarded as unapproachable by the campaigners of another candidate. It

---

<sup>29</sup>See Chapter VI.

is, in fact, often regarded as less than polite to try to "steal" them.<sup>30</sup> Without immigration into Oita's rural areas the population is largely one of longtime residents whose political allegiances are well known to the local politicians. Since these are the men who control the Diet candidate's campaign organization little attempt is made to obtain the support of voters whose allegiances are to the campaigners of a different candidate.

A further important consequence of such reliance on local politicians operating within the pyramid structure described is to involve the Diet candidate intricately in factional disputes and divisions existing on the local level. Any town in the district will have at least two and often more factions among its politicians. If the leader of one of these factions becomes Sato's sekininsha for the town the other people recruited into the organization will also generally be of the same faction. It is difficult to imagine a member of one local faction serving as a campaign manager on the former-village level in a structure where he has to work through an opposing faction leader acting as sekininsha in order to deal with the Diet candidate. In some cases Sato attempted to build a multi-headed organization with separate channels for different

---

<sup>30</sup> Paul Dull relates how when he asked a local campaigner if he ever visited voters in buraku and villages not part of his jiban to solicit votes for the candidate he was supporting, he "looked shocked and said no. When asked why, he said because he had self-respect." Paul S. Dull, "The Senkyoya System in Rural Japanese Communities," Occasional Papers, No. 4, Center for Japanese Studies (Ann Arbor, 1953), p. 36.

factions but this most often got him into trouble with one faction or another. The Diet candidate usually has to take sides in factional disputes in the towns and consequently limits himself to the support of only one element in the local conservative power structure. This relationship between the Diet candidate and local factions, though limiting in some ways, is also responsible for Sato having been able to obtain support among some local politicians. In places where incumbents Ayabe and Nishimura had the support of the main local factions Sato was able to draw the support of politicians opposed to the leadership of the major factions and as a consequence opposed to the Diet candidates supported by them.

The description provided above of rural campaign organization is abstracted and simplified for the purpose of analysis. An amplification of some of the points discussed and an indication of something of the complexity of the organization and the variations that occur on the theme sketched above may perhaps best be provided by a description of two of Sato's campaign organizations that represent polar extremes within the general pattern. These two organizations form the subject of the discussion of the following chapter.

### CHAPTER III

#### CAMPAIGN ORGANIZATION IN RURAL AREAS: TWO CASE STUDIES

The city of Bungo Takada is, as mentioned earlier, one of Oita Second District's rural cities, the result of an amalgamation of eleven towns and villages. Bungo Takada's population, as is true of all the rural areas in the District, has been decreasing at a geometric rate since 1950.<sup>1</sup> In 1965 it stood at 25,138. Of a labor force of 12,953, 56.4 per cent is engaged in the primary sector of the economy. There are only 1,522 people engaged in the secondary, industrial and manufacturing sector, and labor union strength stands at 1,421 members. Bungo Takada's eligible voters numbered 15,377 in January, 1967.<sup>2</sup>

In the nine postwar Diet elections (i.e. from the election of April, 1946, through that of November, 1960) Bungo Takada, as Takada Town through the 1953 election and Bungo Takada City thereafter, invariably gave its three top votes to two conservatives and one progressive candidate. In the

---

<sup>1</sup>2.8 per cent decrease between 1950-1955; 7.6 per cent between 1955-1960; and 11.1 per cent decrease between 1960-1965. Oita Ken, Kokusei Chōsa Ni Yoru Shi-chō-son Betsu Jinko No Trend, mimeo. (Oita, 1967).

<sup>2</sup>Data obtained from: Oita Ken, Shōwa 40 nen Kokusei Chōsa, Oita Ken Shūkei Kekka Hyō (Oita, 1967); Sorifu, Oita Ken No Jinko (Tokyo, 1967); Oita Ken Shōkō Rōdōbu Rōseika, Rōdō Kumiai Meikan (Oita, 1966); Oita Ken Senkyo Kanri Iinkai, Senkyo No Kiroku, January 29, 1967 election (Oita, 1967).

elections of 1952, 1953 and 1955 Shigemitsu Mamoru received the top vote. Socialist Komatsu Kan placed second in his first race in 1952, and third in the following two elections. In 1958 Komatsu fell to fourth place but another progressive candidate, a right wing Socialist who is a native of Takada took the second highest vote though he lost the election. The same pattern of two conservatives and one progressive among the top three vote getters occurred again in 1960. In 1963, for the first time in the postwar period, the conservative candidates took all three top positions in the Diet race in Bungo Takada. Ayabe and Nishimura received an almost equal number of votes and Sato was third in the city with eighty-one more votes than Socialist Komatsu and twenty-two votes less than Nishimura.<sup>3</sup> In the next election in 1967 Sato emerged with the top vote in the city.

In the three years from his defeat in the 1963 election to the calling of the Diet election for January 1967 Sato did not make any speeches in Bungo Takada nor make any other significant attempt to directly attract the votes of the electorate of that city. He did not have to. In 1963 Sato set a goal of 3,000 votes for Bungo Takada and was delivered 2,993; in 1967 he set a goal of 3,500 votes and received 3,564. The man responsible for delivering this vote to Sato is Kiyohara

---

<sup>3</sup>The votes were Ayabe - 3,217; Nishimura - 3,015; Sato - 2,993; Komatsu - 2,912.

Fumio.

Kiyohara, forty-three years old, former City Assemblyman, Sato's successor as Chairman of the Prefectural LDP Youth Group, and a member of the Iwasaki faction in the Oita LDP, rules over a powerful and highly developed political machine in Bungo Takada. Although young and not a holder of elective office since 1963, Kiyohara is generally regarded as a powerful local boss in the city. What is commonly referred to and what Kiyohara himself proudly calls the "Kiyohara taisei" (the Kiyohara regime or structure) is one of the major political forces in Bungo Takada. Sato's strategy in the city was to rely entirely upon the ability of Kiyohara and his organization to deliver the city's vote to him.

In 1954 Kiyohara's father, who had served for twenty years as a member of the Takada Town Assembly, retired from politics. His thirty-year old son, with the help of his father's supporters, was elected to the Assembly in the following election. With the aid of his father's former supporters, he expanded his influence and after success in two City Assembly elections (in 1955 and 1959) he prepared to run for the Prefectural Assembly in the following election in 1963.

In 1963 it was expected that the incumbent Governor, Kinoshita Kaoru, would not stand for re-election and that LDP Chapter President Iwasaki would win in an uncontested race. As the election approached, Kinoshita announced his intention to run again and the LDP found itself with a difficult fight

against this immensely popular "independent progressive" who had been Governor since 1955. Like Sato Bunsei, Kiyohara owed his rise in the political world of the Prefecture to LDP Chapter President Iwasaki. It was with Iwasaki's support that he decided to enter the race for the Prefectural Assembly and it was Iwasaki's campaign difficulties that forced him to withdraw. The election for the Prefectural Assembly and Governor are held on the same day. If Kiyohara ran for the Assembly he would have been forced to stay in Bungo Takada campaigning for his own election and would have been able to do little for his mentor Iwasaki. The success of Iwasaki being the most important consideration, Kiyohara withdrew from the Assembly race and campaigned throughout the Prefecture on behalf of the LDP Chapter President in his position of Chairman of the Youth Group.

As in his one previous encounter with Kinoshita, Iwasaki proved unable to topple the popular incumbent. While a disaster for Iwasaki, the election in some ways proved beneficial to Kiyohara. In talking about the election, Kiyohara stresses only the enormity of his sacrifice for his political boss Iwasaki. Nonetheless he did win a seat for the third time in the City Assembly, the two weeks following the Governor's election being sufficient time to campaign for the 589 votes that elected him. Furthermore, Kiyohara's withdrawal from the Prefectural Assembly race in order to support Iwasaki further ingratiated him with the President, a point that cannot be overemphasized because of Iwasaki's power to aid favored



subordinates financially.)

When Kiyohara's close friend and predecessor as Chairman of the LDP Youth Group, Sato Bunsei, ran for the Diet in 1963, Kiyohara took control of the Bungo Takada campaign. The chance to work as sekininsha for a Diet campaign was of considerable value for Kiyohara in preparing for the next Prefectural Assembly race in 1967. Sato's goal of 3,000 votes was more than five times as great as Kiyohara's vote in the City Assembly. The campaign for Sato allowed him to activate the machine he was building on a scale the City Assembly election did not require or permit. In a sense the campaign for Sato served as a dress rehearsal for his own coming Prefectural Assembly campaign.

In the Diet election Kiyohara supported Sato; in the Governor's race he worked for Iwasaki; and in Bungo Takada's mayoral election in 1963 he was the man who "made the mayor" (shichō o tsukutta). When he was a member of the City Assembly Kiyohara was part of a local political faction led by the then Mayor Sakai. When he resigned before the 1963 election, Sakai gave his support to a man named Mizunoe in the mayoral race and the Kiyohara organization, much as in Sato's Diet race, took control of Mizunoe's campaign.<sup>4</sup> Kiyohara is a big man, nearly six feet tall, broad shouldered with a large, expansive

---

<sup>4</sup>The discussion of Bungo Takada is based largely on a long interview with Kiyohara and several of his supporters at Kiyohara's home in Bungo Takada in May of 1967.

face. We sat in his house in Bungo Takada seated across from each other on the matted floor, our legs crossed in front of us talking about the campaign for the mayoral election. About six of his supporters were in the room listening. Suddenly Kiyohara moved into the formal Japanese sitting position, on his knees with his feet tucked under him. He stared at me, an expression of absolute doom on his face. Clenching his fist he slowly began moving his hand across his stomach, saying as he did so, "And then I committed seppuku." There was an absolute silence as I stared in disbelief half expecting he would open his shirt to display the scars of this unsuccessful attempt at ritual suicide. Much to my relief and before I had a chance to respond to the demonstration Kiyohara explained that his suicide was political.

The greatest fear of a candidate in any election is that an arrest for an Election Law violation will start a chain reaction. The man on the lowest level of the organization will tell who he received money from, that man will be arrested and pressured into telling who further up in the structure gave him his campaign funds and if somebody does not stop the process the violation eventually reaches up to the candidate. In the Bungo Takada mayoral election in 1963 large numbers of Mizunoe's supporters were arrested for Election Law violations. After the election ended with Mizunoe's victory the police continued to make arrests, pushing further and further up in the organizational structure until they reached Kiyohara,

Mizunoe's sekininsha for the campaign. Kiyohara's suicide consisted of bringing a halt to the snowballing of the violations. He refused to tell who gave him the money he distributed among the campaigners. He was subsequently convicted of violating the Election Law, was forced to vacate his seat in the Assembly and had his voting rights suspended for five years. Thus he was disqualified from running in the Prefectural Assembly election four years hence. In the 1963 Governor's election Kiyohara sacrificed his own Prefectural Assembly race to support Iwasaki and in the city's mayoral election he committed political suicide by protecting the victorious candidate from being disqualified. Kiyohara's suicide, although he described it as the ultimate tragedy, was only temporary. He is waiting and building for the 1971 Prefectural Assembly election, eight years behind his original schedule for winning a Prefectural Assembly seat.

At the heart of Kiyohara's organization in Bungo Takada is a group of sixteen men, all young, all influential politically and all owing political allegiance to Kiyohara. One element in Kiyohara's machine is the group of older men whose support he inherited from his father. The other is this group of younger men whose support Kiyohara has cultivated during his nearly fifteen years of activity in Bungo Takada politics. The group includes the eldest sons of the Mayor and the former Mayor, two City Assemblymen, the city's Deputy Mayor (joyaku), five city office Division Chiefs (kachō) and the Chairman of

the city's Agricultural Cooperative Union who, as a man yet in his thirties, is the youngest man in such a position in the Prefecture.

The Agricultural Cooperative Chief along with five other members of this group were present the day I visited Kiyohara's home. While we were talking about their activities on behalf of Sato's Diet campaign the union chief made it a point to emphasize, in Kiyohara's presence, that the support they gave Sato had nothing to do with their attitude toward Sato personally. "We support Sato and brought others into the campaign on Sato's behalf because we thought Sato's success would be of benefit to Kiyohara's political future." If Kiyohara were to support somebody else for the Diet, I was told, they would all support that new candidate immediately. "Don't make any mistake about it. Sato gets the vote here not because any of us care about Sato but because we all care about Kiyohara."

In addition to building an organization of young politicians intensely loyal to him personally, Kiyohara has been very solicitous of the older politicians of Bungo Takada who were closely associated with his father. Formally at the head of his organization in each of ten of the eleven former towns and villages of the city is an older man who has the title of Kiyohara's sekininsha for the area. Kiyohara himself heads the organization in the eleventh village. These ten men are seventy year old Fujiyama, Deputy Mayor of a "former village" and former City Assemblyman; sixty-eight year old Sato, former

City Assemblyman and principal of a high school; fifty-three year old Hirohata, former Assemblyman and former Chief of the local Agricultural Cooperative, the immediate predecessor to the present thirty-six year old union chief; fifty-four year old Sakai, Vice-Speaker of the Takada City Assembly; sixty-three year old Ogata, relative of Kiyohara; two other former City Assemblymen (aged sixty-three and sixty-five); two incumbent Assemblymen (aged seventy-six and sixty-three); and the Mayor, Mizunoe.

Under these men the organization fans out in the manner described in the previous chapter with campaign managers and campaigners in each of the buraku. Brought into the Sato campaign by the Kiyohara organization, in addition to the group of sixteen young men and the ten elderly sekininsha, were ten other City Assemblymen, twelve women that Kiyohara sent to Sato's women's meeting in Beppu<sup>5</sup> and an unknown number of men in the buraku who did the campaigning--Bungo Takada style.

Sato does not have an organization of supporters in Bungo Takada. He has one supporter, Kiyohara. He relies on him to mobilize his own personal supporters in Bungo Takada and to deliver the vote. Such a relationship allows Sato to view the campaign there as though he were an outsider to the whole process. Sato describes the campaign methods and

---

<sup>5</sup> See Chapter VI.

organization in the city as rare (mezurashii), outrageous (hidoi), and old fashioned (furui) indicating not so much criticism as amazement and admiration for Kiyohara's ability to play the political game in Bungo Takada so successfully. Sato's own impression is that buying of votes is probably greater in Bungo Takada than anywhere else in the District. There is a story local Takada politicians tell of how on the last nights before an election you can know who has not been paid for their vote by driving around the city after eleven o'clock at night (when farmers are usually already asleep). Those who still had their lights on were waiting for a visit from a campaigner. One of Kiyohara's supporters, who owns a small dry-goods store, remarked that he can always tell the going rate for a vote in any election by the cost of the extra things his steady customers buy at election time.

Old time politicians still talk of "reading the vote" (hyō o yomu), meaning to predict the vote. In the folklore of Japanese campaigning a candidate is able to work out on the abacus a few days before the election the vote he will receive with almost perfect accuracy. In Sato's case the only place where such "reading" of the vote was accurate was in Bungo Takada. In both the 1963 and the 1967 election there was less than a seventy vote discrepancy between the vote read and the vote delivered. Because the vote can be accurately predicted the campaign in Bungo Takada cost somewhat less per vote than in many other areas in the district. The major problem of

strategy was deciding how many votes to aim for. Both Kiyohara and Sato agree that Sato could have gotten 4,000 votes in 1967 if he had asked Kiyohara to deliver that amount rather than the 3,500 votes he did ask for. The price per vote rises geometrically, however, as the vote goal is pushed higher and, in the end, it was decided that the extra 500 votes could not be afforded.

Without Kiyohara's support Sato, in his own estimation, would have received the lowest vote among the Diet candidates in the city. With Kiyohara's support he received the highest. Whether the cause and effect relationship between Kiyohara's support and Sato's vote is as direct as both Sato and Kiyohara believe is not demonstrable. Sato is convinced of such a relationship, however, and this conviction reinforces his belief in the soundness of his basic campaign strategy: rely on powerful local politicians to deliver the vote in rural areas and concentrate campaign activities directed at the general electorate in the more urban sectors of the District.

In Bungo Takada the same personal political organization runs the campaigns for City Assemblymen, Mayor, Diet candidate and, if Kiyohara does not again commit seppuku in the next few years, for the Prefectural Assembly candidate in 1971.

Bungo Takada is one of the few areas in the District where Sato's campaign is run by a highly developed political machine. In most areas he had to rely on the weakest elements among local conservative politicians to organize his campaign.

The county of Higashi Kunisaki neighboring Bungo Takada is the stronghold of LDP incumbent Nishimura Eiichi. It consists of four towns and one village, the island of Himeshima where Nishimura was born. As was mentioned in the preceding chapter, Himeshima votes overwhelmingly for Nishimura, some 97 per cent of those voting writing the name of the famed native son on the ballot in the 1967 election. Within the County, Nishimura's vote declines the further one moves away from Himeshima but, for the County as a whole, with an electorate of 34,499 and a voting rate of 87.21 per cent in the 1967 election, Nishimura receives nearly one out of every two votes cast. Higashi Kunisaki is, in short, Nishimura territory and it was within this framework of political realities that Sato had to develop his own organization of supporters.

The largest town in Higashi Kunisaki County is Kunisaki with an electorate in 1967 of 13,746. In his Diet elections Nishimura has always received the top vote in Kunisaki. In the elections of both 1963 and 1967 he received 46 per cent of the total vote in the town.

In the elections of 1958, 1960 and 1963 Ayabe Kentaro received the second highest vote. In the 1963 election 22 per cent of those voting cast their ballots for Ayabe. In 1967 his vote decreased substantially, from 2,721 in the previous race to 2,038, 17 per cent of the 11,778 votes cast. Together Nishimura and Ayabe have obtained between 63 and 74 per cent of the total vote in Kunisaki in the four general elections



since 1958.

Socialist Komatsu Kan, until the 1967 election, had received the third highest vote in Kunisaki and his percentage of the vote has increased steadily over the years. In 1958 he received 10 per cent of the vote; in 1960 this increased to 14 per cent; in 1963 he received 15 per cent; and in 1967 he replaced Ayabe as the second highest vote getter in the town, polling 20 per cent. of the votes cast. Why Komatsu's vote should have increased so significantly in this heavily agricultural and politically conservative area is beyond the scope of this paper or the competence of the author to discuss. For the purposes of this study it is sufficient to note that such Socialist strength was not perceived by Sato as a challenge to his assumptions about the rural electorate. On the contrary, he attributes such success largely to Komatsu's ability to mobilize support in much the same manner as the conservatives, relying on local people who could request support for Komatsu as a favor to themselves. Komatsu himself, in discussing the question of his rural support, gives primary credit to the ability of members of the Japan Teachers Union (Nikkyōso) to "gather" the vote of people in their communities.<sup>6</sup> Next in importance, he believes, was his ability, because of fifteen years in the Diet, to gradually dissociate himself from the image of the Socialist Party as being "red." "I don't like the

---

<sup>6</sup>Interview with Komatsu Kan, July 7, 1967.

Socialist Party but Komatsu is a good guy" is Komatsu's own explanation of his increasing support among generally conservative farmers. He largely dismisses the idea that his vote represents any significant support for the Socialist Party or dissatisfaction with the LDP.

Last among the contending candidates<sup>7</sup> in both the 1963 and 1967 elections in Kunisaki was Sato. In the 1963 election he received 1,571 votes. In 1967 this increased to 1,789, 15 per cent of the total vote. Sato's weakness in Kunisaki is representative of his general performance in the rural areas of the district. Bungo Takada represents the exception. It was one of only three areas in the rural sector of the District to give Sato the top vote. By contrast Sato placed fourth in eight towns.

In terms of its economy, Kunisaki is much like the other agricultural towns that spread out to the north and west of the main city of Beppu. 63.2 per cent of its labor force is engaged in farming. The secondary sector accounts for only 7.8 per cent with the remaining labor force in the tertiary sector of the economy. In terms of campaign organization, Kunisaki is also representative of Sato's support through much of the district. Although each town has its unique characteristics, an understanding of the Kunisaki organization provides

---

<sup>7</sup> Communist Party candidate Tsuru received 157 votes in 1967 in Kunisaki and nowhere in the District received enough of the vote to be considered a serious contender in the election.

a general view of Sato's rural campaign organization.

Sato's sekininsha for Kunisaki is thirty-six year old Kiyonari Fumito.<sup>8</sup> Kiyonari was for several years active in the national organization of local area youth groups (the Japan Seinendan Council) and serves as a part-time secretary to Sato's faction boss, Murakami Isamu. In 1966 he was elected for the first time to the Kunisaki Town Assembly in a by-election called to fill a seat vacated by the death of one of the Assemblymen. Like Sato and Kiyohara in Bungo Takada, Kiyonari is deeply indebted to and closely associated with LDP Chapter President Iwasaki and is one of the leading young conservatives in the Second District opposed to the factions of Nishimura and Ayabe.

Kiyonari's position as sekininsha for Kunisaki is in itself an indication of Sato's weakness in this area. Where other candidates placed Prefectural Assemblymen, Mayors or other men politically powerful in this position, Sato had to rely on a young freshman of the Town Assembly.

As in all the other towns of the District, Sato's campaign organization in Kunisaki is a pyramid structure

---

<sup>8</sup> Kunisaki is an area in the district where I spent a considerable amount of time. In August of 1966 I lived for several days at the home of Kiyonari and met and interviewed most of Sato's supporters in Kunisaki. A close friendship with Kiyonari greatly facilitated my research. Following the Diet election Kiyonari undertook to gather data at my request on the nature of the town organization. The discussion of the Kunisaki town organization is based on the taped interviews made while living in the town and the detailed information Kiyonari compiled and presented in written form under the title "Shūin Senkyo Soshiki Taisei - Kunisaki Machi ("The Organizational Structure For the Lower House Election - Kunisaki Town").

spreading out from the town to the "former village" to the buraku. Unlike the organization in Bungo Takada there was no one in the Kunisaki organization with a developed political machine such as possessed by Kiyohara. Consequently the organization is much more complex and much less integrated than the Bungo Takada one. Kiyonari could not simply delegate an already established machine to go to work for Sato. He had to actively recruit campaigners throughout the town. In Kiyonari's case as well as in Kiyohara's the position of sekininsha in a Diet campaign was valuable precisely because of the opportunity it provided to expand one's own political power. Kiyohara, as we saw, used the 1963 Diet campaign as a means to activate his machine to a degree not allowed by City Assembly elections. Kiyonari, similarly, was planning to challenge the two conservative Prefectural Assemblymen from the County (one a supporter of Nishimura and the other a backer of Ayabe) in the April 1967 local elections. Running Sato's campaign gave him the chance to expand his organized strength throughout the town in preparation for the Prefectural Assembly campaign.

In the Kunisaki organization three other Sato supporters in addition to Kiyonari were placed on the sekininsha level of organization. This was partly due to their being men of considerable stature in the community whose influence extends not only to their respective buraku or village but through the entire town and partly because Kiyonari's youth and lack of high position made it awkward, in terms of hierarchical

sensibilities, to have them work under Kiyonari in order to campaign for Sato. Unlike the commanding position of Kiyohara in the Bungo Takada organization, Kiyonari's main function was to act as liaison between Sato's headquarters and the other major campaigners in the town. The other three men are fifty-three year old Takami, owner of a construction company, former supporter of Ayabe and the only incumbent Assemblyman in addition to Kiyonari among Sato's supporters; Ota, Chairman of the Kunisaki chapter of the Prefecture's bamboo association, sixty-two years old and formerly a Nishimura supporter; and Kuribayashi, Vice-President of the Oita Prefecture Dental Association, fifty-six years old and also a former Nishimura supporter. Ota and Kuribayashi are responsible for the so-called "horizontal strategy" in Kunisaki town, organizing support for Sato not only in their own buraku but among the members of their organizations throughout the town. Ota and Kuribayashi as well as Kiyonari supported Sato in both 1963 and 1967. Takami first supported him in 1967. Thus at the top town level of the organization there are four sekininsha with Kiyonari acting as liaison between the town and Sato's headquarters.

In 1954 six towns and villages amalgamated to form the town of Kunisaki. These six amalgamated areas form the next level for organizing Sato's supporters.

One of these "former villages" is that of Miura. Sato's campaign in this village is in the hands of two men. One,

thirty-six years old, is a farmer and president of the local tobacco producers union. A former supporter of Nishimura, he switched support to Sato in 1963 at the request of his close friend and former classmate Kiyonari. The other village manager is also a former Nishimura supporter, fifty-nine years old and a distant relative of Sato.

Miura Village contains seven buraku<sup>9</sup> in each of which are one or more men responsible for organizing the campaign on this lowest level of organization. Five of the seven buraku have two such campaign managers each; one has three and one has one manager. Seven of these fourteen men are in their thirties, three in their late twenties, one is fifty-five and three are in their early sixties. The average age is forty-three. One man is a former supporter of Noyori and all the

---

<sup>9</sup> There is a problem of classification regarding this bottom level of campaign organization. In the Tokugawa period the buraku were for the most part independent village units and were generally called villages (mura) by the inhabitants. In 1888 these buraku were combined into larger administrative units known as mura and the buraku became a sub-district of the new administrative villages. In some cases these sub-units (in Japanese referred to as gyōseiku or administrative wards) combined several small buraku. What are referred to as buraku in our discussion are in fact these administrative wards of the Meiji period. Though they contain up to eight separate agricultural settlements they are generally regarded as single buraku. Therefore, in agreement with Fukutake Tadashi, the buraku as a physical settlement and basic social unit and the buraku as an administrative ward of the mura (which in Kunisaki are today the six amalgamated villages) are considered as being "by and large identical." Fukutake Tadashi, Nihon Nōson Shakairon, (Tokyo, 1966), pp. 95-98. This book has been translated into English by Ronald P. Dore as Japanese Rural Society (London, 1967). See pp. 87-89. For another useful discussion of the use of terms buraku and mura see Kida Minoru, Nippon Buraku (Tokyo, 1967), esp. pp. 8-10.

others previously campaigned for Nishimura.

Each of these fourteen buraku campaign managers is responsible for recruiting a group of people in his buraku to campaign for Sato. There are nineteen men who actively campaigned (in addition to the town, village and buraku managers) and fifteen of them are concentrated in four of the seven buraku. Their average age is thirty-nine. All are farmers. Only one had formerly actively campaigned for another candidate, Ayabe Kentaro in this case. Miura Village has 1,958 voters and it is estimated by Kiyonari that 300 voted for Sato in the 1967 election.

It has been mentioned in the previous chapter that there is often a great imbalance in the strength of Sato's organized support among the "former villages" of a particular town. In Kunisaki this imbalance is quite evident. The village of Tomi, for instance, with its 2,544 voters, has practically no organization of Sato supporters. On the village level the campaign is conducted by a close friend and former classmate of Kiyonari named Imamura, a former supporter of Noyori, and by fifty-five year old Ichii, a friend of Imamura and Kiyonari who had not actively supported any candidate before Sato entered the race. Both men supported Sato for the first time in 1967. Tomi consists of eleven buraku. In six of these there are no organized Sato supporters. Imamura is the only active campaigner in his own buraku and Ichii has the aid of two men, aged thirty-three and thirty-five in his buraku.

One other buraku has two campaigners aged fifty and sixty, both members of the dental association and brought into the campaign by association vice president Kuribayashi. The two remaining buraku have one campaigner each, farmers aged forty-one and forty-two. According to Kiyonari, both Nishimura and Ayabe's campaign managers for the county are from this village and there is no room for Sato to move in. In Kiyonari's estimation Sato received no more than 100 to 150 votes from Tomi's 2,544 voters in the 1967 election.

The village of Kamikunisaki with its 1,113 voters is the home of Takami Takashi, the only incumbent Assemblyman beside Kiyonari to support Sato in the town. Takami ran for the first time for the Town Assembly in the April, 1963 election and won with the highest vote (741 votes) among the twenty-eight candidates. In the immediate Diet election thereafter, in November of the same year, he lent his support to Ayabe Kentaro. Takami developed a close friendship with Kiyonari in the Town Assembly; a friendship bolstered by their both being "anti-establishment" (i.e. anti-Nishimura) freshman Assemblymen. Through Kiyonari, Takami was brought into contact with Sato. The two men met several times and at a dinner in Beppu in September of 1966 hosted by Sato with Kiyonari, Takami and six of Takami's staff attending, Takami's support for Sato in the coming election was obtained.

In the previous chapter it was mentioned that local politicians generally attempt to keep the Diet candidate



ignorant of their own support base and away from their constituencies in the hope of assuring their continued value to the campaign. In Bungo Takada Kiyohara was typical of this type of strategy. When asked if Sato had come to the city to give speeches his response was "What for? There's no need for him to come. I'm here." Takami's approach was different. As a first term member of the Assembly, not yet in control of a machine like Kiyohara's, more was to be gained than lost by having a Diet candidate come to meet his constituents. The meeting would serve as valuable publicity for the local politician. People who had not supported Takami would come to a meeting in which Sato was to speak simply because of the change in pace from routine farm life this occasion represented. Takami would gain exposure to voters he had not been able to attract before--and all at the financial expense of Sato. Takami consequently urged Sato to come to Kamikunisaki. On two occasions in the months preceding the election Sato spoke at parties in the village arranged by the assemblyman.

Takami is listed on the organizational charts as one of the town sekininsha for Sato's campaign and there are five other campaign managers on the Kamikunisaki "former village" level responsible for organizing support in the buraku. Four of the five had campaigned for Kiyonari in his Assembly election and were brought into Sato's organization mainly through this connection. The fifth is a relative of Sato. Two were formerly supporters of Ayabe and two of Nishimura and

one had not worked on behalf of any other candidate before Sato entered the race. Three of the five supported Sato for the first time in 1967. Two are in their thirties, two in their forties and one is sixty years old. Their average age is forty-six.

Kamikunisaki Village has three buraku. There are one or more campaign managers in each of these responsible to one of the campaign managers on the "former village" level. In Naributsu buraku there are four men who lead the buraku organization, the most important being a sixty-five year old former Nishimura supporter and Mayor of Kamikunisaki Village before it amalgamated. There is one other former Nishimura supporter and the other two men were formerly campaigners for Ayabe. Under these men are a group of eleven buraku campaigners. The eldest is eighty and president of the elderly people's club and the youngest is twenty-six and president of the local youth club. Three are women, two of whom have served as womens' club president. The average age of the campaigners is forty-four.

The buraku of Michi has two campaign managers, one a sixty-year old former supporter of Nishimura and the other thirty-nine years old and a former campaigner for Ayabe. Below these two men on the organizational chart are eight buraku campaigners, all male and, excepting an eighty-year old elderly people's club president, with an average age of thirty-four.

It is a common practice in rural areas in Japan for a buraku or a couple of buraku to put forth one candidate for the local Assembly as the buraku representative. The small competition rate in local Assembly election is due to this practice of having buraku "delegates" chosen by a "buraku recommendation" (buraku suisen) before the election is held. The data in Table 6 indicate the low competition rate for election to Second District town and village Assemblies in the April 1967 elections. In the thirteen towns and villages that held elections at that time 266 candidates vied for 215 seats, a ratio of 1.24 candidates to each seat.

Town Assemblyman Takami is the "delegate" of Nakada buraku in Kamikunisaki Village. Takami lives in Nakada and his organized supporters are in this buraku. Unlike Kiyohara whose political influence spreads throughout the city of Bungo Takada, Takami's influence is largely confined to Nakada. Here it is overwhelming. Sato's support organization in the buraku is the organization of Takami.

Kamikunisaki Village provided Sato with his greatest support in the town. In addition to the support given by Takami, it was in this village that Sato met with the electorate at Takami's request, one purpose being the expansion of Takami's influence into the other two buraku of the village. The combination of Assemblyman support and direct exposure to the electorate gave Sato an estimated 300 votes in the 1967 election, nearly one-third of the total votes cast in the

village assuming that 87 per cent (the voting rate in the town as a whole) of the village's 1,113 voters went to the polls.

TABLE 6

## COMPETITION RATE IN TOWN AND VILLAGE ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS

Town or Village	Number of Seats	Number of Candidates
Himeshima	12	13
Kunisaki	22	28
Musashi	16	17
Aki	20	24
Hiji	22	32
Yamaga	20	28
Ota	12	15
Matama	16	18
Kagachi	14	16
Sanko	16	21
Honyabakei	16	17
Yabakei	15	20
Yamaguni	14	17
Total	215	266
Ratio	1	1.24

Data obtained from: Oita Ken Senkyo Kanri Iinkai, Senkyo No Kiroku, Oita Kengikai Giin Senkyo, April 15, 1967 election, Shi-chō-son Gikai Giin Senkyo, April 28, 1967 (Oita, 1967).

The village of Toyosaki with an electorate of 1,223 is the only one of the six villages of the town in which Sato has the active support of a former campaigner for Socialist Komatsu Kan. A friend of Kiyonari and a self-proclaimed liberal conservative who supported Komatsu because of the lack of a young and modern conservative candidate, forty-year old Yoshitake switched support to Sato at the time of the 1963

election. A farmer and seller of fertilizer rather than a labor union member, Yoshitake's support meant little in providing an inroad to Socialist supporters. Along with Yoshitake are three other managers at the village level, one former Ayabe and two former Nishimura supporters.

Toyosaki village consists of four buraku. There is at least one Sato campaign manager in each of them and a total of nine men on this level of organization. Five are former Nishimura supporters, four formerly worked for Ayabe and their average age is forty.

The buraku campaigners consist of thirty-one people, including two women. Supporters range in age from twenty-nine to sixty-three with the average age being thirty-nine. Nineteen were former campaigners for Nishimura, seven for Ayabe and two for Komatsu. Three had not been involved in another candidate's campaign.

Sato's vote in this village is estimated at 250 or nearly 25 per cent of the total estimated vote. Kiyonari's explanation for Sato's relative strength here is an interesting one: "Sato has benefitted by the reaction of many people to the growth of bossism (bosuka) among Nishimura's managers in the village." Sato was able to gain considerable support because of the voters wanting to put the bosses "in their place" by not voting for Nishimura.<sup>10</sup>

---

<sup>10</sup>Kiyonari, "Shūin Senkyo Soshiki Taisei - Kunisaki Machi."

One of the six areas that amalgamated to form the present day town of Kunisaki was the area that before amalgamation was called Kunisaki Town. This is the largest of the six amalgamated areas and accounts for nearly half of the electorate with its 5,926 voters. It is the urban nucleus of the town of Kunisaki and is an area where Sato has few active supporters. Sato's campaign managers for the "former town" include two men mentioned at the beginning of the discussion, the representatives of the bamboo and dental associations. Three others are the owner of a gasoline station, the owner of a newspaper delivery service and one of his workers. Four of the five formerly supported Nishimura and campaigned for Sato in both 1963 and 1967. The fifth supported Sato for the first time in 1967 and was formerly a campaigner for Ayabe.

The former town consists of four administrative subdivisions and there are nine men at this level of the organization. Six were formerly Nishimura and three Ayabe supporters. They are all farmers, none hold elective office of any kind and their average age is forty-five.

Under these managers are a group of forty-one campaigners. The number includes four women. The average age is forty-two. Thirteen had formerly campaigned for Nishimura and one had supported Ayabe. The rest had not actively taken part in the Diet campaign before supporting Sato. Occupationally, twenty-eight are farmers, two are dentists, seven retail merchants, two fishermen, one a producer of bamboo and another is in the construction business.

These fifty-five people are spread out very thinly among the area's nearly 6,000 voters and, with 70 per cent of their number being farmers, are particularly weak among the salaried and non-agricultural class in this, the center of town and heart of its limited secondary and tertiary sectors of the economy. Traditionally conservative party-supporting merchants, to the extent that they are organized, are almost entirely in support of Nishimura. The small number of unionized laborers are mobilized on behalf of the campaign of Komatsu. The consequence is that Sato receives exceedingly little support. Kiyonari estimates Sato's vote among the 6,000 voters in the area at no more than 550.

The sixth village is that of Asahi, the home of Kiyonari and the smallest of the amalgamated areas with an electorate of 1,036. There are three campaign managers on the village level and twenty campaigners in the village's three buraku. All of these twenty men and two women supporters are supporters of Sato by way of being supporters of Kiyonari. All are farmers. The two women are fifty-four and fifty-five years old and the average age of the men is thirty-six, precisely the same age as Kiyonari. This statistic is not coincidental. It emphasizes the nature of Sato's Asahi village support as being the friends and supporters of Kiyonari. Fourteen of the campaigners formerly worked for Nishimura's campaign, two for Ayabe and the remaining seven had not campaigned for any other candidate. Nishimura is considered to have the support of the

older voters and Sato's support is centered around a group of young men aligned with Kiyonari. An estimated 250 Asahi voters or approximately 27 per cent of the estimated number of votes cast went to Sato in the 1967 election.

Several aspects of Sato's Kunisaki campaign organization are of relevance to the general issue of campaign strategy in rural areas. For one thing the organization of the campaign reflects the difficulty of a new LDP candidate moving into areas dominated by the supporters of an incumbent candidate of the Party. Kiyonari, when asked to note down what he considered to be important features of Sato's campaign in Kunisaki wrote the following as being of the most significance. "Because the area is Nishimura's homeground as well as a base of support for Ayabe, Sato supporters are treated as heretics in spite of Sato's endorsement by the Party. Because of this there are extremely few supporters holding public office. There are few supporters who are long-time members of the [Conservative] Party."<sup>11</sup> The lack of elected public officials among Sato's supporters is striking. Kiyonari and Takami were the only campaigners to hold public office. Sato had no support among former or incumbent Assemblymen except for these two, no support among local LDP officials nor among officers of the Agricultural Cooperatives in this predominantly agricultural area. Several things account for this absence of officials

---

<sup>11</sup>Kiyonari, "Shūin Senkyo Soshiki Taisei-Kunisaki Machi."



from the campaign. When Sato entered the race most of the officials were already associated with Nishimura or Ayabe and there was little Sato could offer to lure them into his own camp. Furthermore, those officials who wanted to support Sato could be, and in several cases clearly were, inhibited or stopped from doing so by the enormous pressures Nishimura supporters could bring to bear on these isolated mavericks.

The data concerning Sato's campaign organization in Kunisaki illustrate the extent to which the struggle for organized support is an intra-party struggle among the LDP candidates. The fight for the support of elected officials was but one element in this larger struggle. For the 118 people who had switched support from another candidate to campaign for Sato, 84 had formerly supported Nishimura, 29 Ayabe, 2 Noyori and 3 had supported Komatsu. In other words, only 3 of 118 supporters had formerly campaigned for a progressive candidate.

There is a high correlation between former Nishimura supporters and those who campaigned for Sato in both 1963 and 1967 and Ayabe supporters and those who first joined the Sato campaign in 1967. Sato and Nishimura were both members, as has been discussed, of the Iwasaki led Liberal Party before the conservative merger. When Sato entered the 1963 race most of those who supported him were former Liberal Party members closely associated with Iwasaki and supporting Nishimura in the Diet as the Liberal Party candidate. Among Liberal Party

Nishimura supporters, those who could be brought over to support Sato were recruited in 1963. Sato's town sekininsha in Kunisaki in the 1963 election, Kiyonari, Kuribayashi, and Ota, had all been Nishimura supporters before Sato entered the race. Because the campaign organization is built up at the lower levels by those higher in the local organization it was to be expected that in 1963 the great majority of Sato supporters recruited by his three top sekininsha in Kunisaki should also have been former Nishimura supporters. The case of Ayabe's supporters is, however, significantly different. Ayabe had his support centered around members of the former Democratic Party and there was little opportunity for Iwasaki to bring these men into Sato's campaign or for Sato to appeal directly to them. Sato's own ties during the years he spent in the prefectural assembly were largely with former Liberal Party members. Very few of Sato's supporters in Kunisaki in 1963 were brought over from the Ayabe camp. By 1967 the situation was significantly changed. There was a general feeling that Ayabe had had his day and some people like Assemblyman Takami who had supported him in 1963 decided to jump off what they saw as a rapidly sinking boat and support another candidate. Interestingly, in Kunisaki, Sato was in a good position to benefit from this movement of support away from Ayabe. Those people who had supported Ayabe in this Nishimura stronghold had become what can be called anti-establishment in that they were opposed to the ruling faction that backed Nishimura.

Their enemies were Nishimura supporters and their change of support, accordingly, largely went to Sato by virtue of his being the other anti-establishment LDP candidate.

An analysis of the reasons why the men in Sato's organization decided to support him discloses the highly indirect nature of his support on the village and buraku levels. It is connections with other men in the organization, particularly with Kiyonari, that resulted in their support for Sato. When asked why they were campaigning for Sato the response of nearly everyone invariably involved a relationship with another of the men in the organization: because he was a classmate of Kiyonari or a member of the Takami group or because his friend Kuribayashi had asked him to take part. The reasons given for the support of sixteen "former village" level campaign managers divided as follows. Five because they were close friends with Kiyonari; two because they were Kiyonari's classmates; two because they had supported Kiyonari in the Town Assembly election; one (Matsumoto) because he is a relative of Sato and a friend of Kiyonari; two others because they were asked to do so by Matsumoto; two more because they were asked to do so by one of the men who had been recruited by Matsumoto; one who was related to one of Sato's uncles and was asked to campaign by him; and one because of the help Sato had given him with a particular business problem when Sato was still in the Prefectural Assembly.

When one brings this down to the buraku level the reasons for people joining the campaign become even more remote from the candidate. One example will suffice. One of the campaign managers for the "former town" of Kunisaki is a thirty-six year old former classmate of Kiyonari named Hatano. He attributes his support for Sato to being Kiyonari's classmate and a member of the Prefectural Table Tennis Association of which Sato is President. In the buraku where he lives there were seven main campaigners. The reasons for their participation in the campaign are as follows. One because he is a classmate of Hatano and Kiyonari; one because he is a close friend of another campaign manager in the former town; one for having graduated the same middle school as Sato; and four because of their membership in the local buraku Volunteer Fire Brigade of which Hatano is Chief (danchō).

In spite of overwhelming evidence of the indirect relationship between the Diet candidate and his local campaigners there is an intriguing aspect to Sato's organizational support on the buraku level that cautions against overemphasizing the lack of direct ties between candidate and supporter. On the town and village manager levels, almost all of Sato's supporters previously campaigned for other candidates. On the level of buraku campaigners, however, few had previously taken an active part in another candidate's campaign. One possible explanation is that when asked by a man higher in the pyramid to support Nishimura or Ayabe, they complied with their vote

but when asked by the same man to support Sato they complied with their active support. There is a subtle fugue being played between personal relationships on the local level and the appeal of individual candidates.

The data also indicate that Sato's supporters were chiefly middle-aged men. One hundred forty-five of the 209 supporters are in the 30-49 year-old age bracket. There are eleven supporters in their twenties and thirteen past sixty. Thirty supporters are in their fifties. The average age of the supporters is forty-three and eleven are women. The data for Kunisaki support a general impression in the district as a whole that the age of the candidate's support group correlates closely with the age of the candidate. The data for Kunisaki lend support to the results of an NHK public opinion survey which indicated that men between the ages of 30-49 favored Sato.<sup>12</sup>

In terms of occupation the overwhelming majority of Sato's supporters are farmers. Although farmers account for 63.2 per cent of Kunisaki's labor force, farmers make up 81 per cent of Sato's organized supporters (170 out of 209 campaigners). Small retail and wholesale merchants, another traditional source of conservative support, account for sixteen of the remaining thirty-nine supporters. Members of the dental and bamboo associations, the two most important groups among

---

<sup>12</sup>The results of an unpublished NHK public opinion poll were made available to the author by Kudo Takashi, editorial writer for the NHK Oita Broadcasting System.

those voluntary associations supporting Sato,<sup>13</sup> account for twelve supporters (five dentists and seven bamboo growers). The remaining eleven include two fishermen, four people in the construction business, two owners of manufacturing enterprises (one of house furniture, the other of sake), the wife of a priest, a village postmaster and a local town office official. Sato had no organized support among salaried workers, unionized or not. Although he received the official recommendation of various occupational groups,<sup>14</sup> no members of these groups are found among his supporters except the above-mentioned bamboo growers and dentists.

To Sato the way to mobilize the support of the rural electorate was to rely on locally powerful politicians to gather and deliver the votes. Sato's inability to gain the support of this element in Kunisaki and in most other areas did not cause him to consider alternative strategies for obtaining votes in such places. It forced him instead to put his major effort into gaining the support of the electorate living in the more urban sectors of the district. For Sato the rural areas were made up of voters largely "hard" for the incumbent candidates. In order to win he would have to maximize his support in other areas and particularly in his hometown--the resort city of Beppu.

---

<sup>13</sup> See Chapter VII.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid.

## CHAPTER IV

### CAMPAIGN ORGANIZATION IN BEPPU: UTILIZING THE NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATIONS

An LDP Diet member often has support in his district concentrated in a limited geographical area of which his hometown is the center. In Oita's Second District this division of conservative strength is strikingly evident. Table 7 shows the percentage of the vote received by Nishimura, Noyori and Ayabe in each city and county in the 1963 election. Around 60 per cent of the total vote of each candidate was obtained in areas surrounding his hometown and there is little overlap in areas of major support. Noyori, for example, received 66 per cent of his total vote from his hometown city of Nakatsu and the adjacent counties of Shimoge and Usa while Nishimura received 59 per cent of his vote from the counties of Higashi and Nishi Kunisaki and Usa and the city of Bungo Takada. The support of all three candidates overlap in Usa largely because there was no candidate from the county in the race. Even within the counties there is a tendency for the vote to decrease the further the town from the candidate's native town or village. In Higashi Kunisaki County, for instance, Nishimura obtained in 1963 97 per cent of the votes of Himeshima. In the town nearest to Himeshima he received 64 per cent of the vote. This decreased to 46 per cent in the next town, 44 per

TABLE 7  
GEOGRAPHICAL CONCENTRATION OF SUPPORT OF  
NOYORI, AYABE AND NISHIMURA (a)








TABLE 7 (continued)




<sup>a</sup>Black line indicates percentage of vote in each city and county received by candidate. Area marked by dotted line is the percentage of the candidate's total vote received in that area. Red line indicates the percentage of the district's electorate in each area.

cent in the following one and 41 per cent in the town furthest from his birthplace. When the data for all the candidates are combined this concentration of support in separate sections of the district surrounding the candidates' hometowns is placed in striking relief. For purposes of contrast Table 8 combines Sato's vote in the 1967 election with the votes of the other three conservatives in the 1963 election.

There are several reasons for conservative politicians having a high concentration of votes in narrow geographical areas. For one thing, in rural areas particularly, there is a great deal of pride taken in the "local boy who made good" and there is a strong feeling that one should vote for the local candidate precisely because he is a native son. Furthermore, in an electoral system where the voter is faced with several candidates from the same party, the location of the homes or the birthplaces of the candidates become meaningful criteria for choosing among them. It seems "natural" if you are going to vote for an LDP candidate to vote for the one who is from the same area as you. Thirdly, the use of separate area organizations in the several towns and villages to deliver the vote through a web of interpersonal ties leads conservative politicians to concentrate their activities in their home areas because of the already existing ties they can build upon. Thus these areas see the greatest effort to get out the vote for the candidate. A fourth reason is that the concentration of support reflects a strong strain of localism in the Japanese

TABLE 8


DISTRIBUTION OF PRIMARY SUPPORT FOR THE FOUR LDP CANDIDATES



electorate. There is a variety of data to show that Japanese on the whole show a greater interest in and a greater concern about local than national elections, a consequence probably both of a greater interest in local problems and, in the rural areas, "the strong village solidarity and the idea that voting is regarded as an obligation to the community."<sup>1</sup> Table 9 indicates the differences in voting rates in national and local elections in Oita Prefecture in 1963.

TABLE 9

## POPULAR VOTE IN ELECTIONS IN OITA PREFECTURE IN 1963



More relevant than voting rates to the question of localism is the literature of survey data which suggests that large numbers of Japanese consider the "benefit of their

<sup>1</sup>Joji Watanuki, "Patterns of Politics in Present Day Japan," in Party Systems and Voter Alignments, Cross-National Perspectives, ed. Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan (New York, 1967), p. 462.

locality" (jimoto rieki) the major consideration in choosing the Diet candidate they vote for. A poll conducted in 1965 in Sato's home city of Beppu asked voters to choose from a list the one reason they felt most important in deciding for whom they voted in elections. (See Table 10. The type of election was not specified.) The largest single group (27.3 per cent) chose as the most important reason "Because he is a person who will work for the development of the city." A significantly higher proportion of supporters of the Conservative Party and supporters of no party (which usually indicates supporters of conservative party candidates) chose this reason than did supporters of progressive parties.

In another poll Beppu voters were asked whether they were mainly interested in city, prefectural or national politics. Fifty-five per cent said city politics were the most important. When asked what was the second most important to them the largest number (49.6 per cent) said prefectural politics. Asked which of the three was of least concern, 64.9 per cent indicated national politics.<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup>Complete responses were as follows: Most important: city politics - 55%, national politics - 25.4%, prefectural politics - 4.4%, other - 15.2%; Second most important: Prefectural politics - 64.9%, city politics - 10.2%, national politics - 9.7%, other - 15.2%; Third most important: national politics - 49.6%, city politics - 19.6%, prefectural politics - 15.5%, other - 15.2%. Oita Ken Senkyo Kanri Iinkai, Oita Ken Akaruku Tadashii Senkyo Suishin Kyogikai, Moderu Chiku Ni Okeru Akaruku Tadashii Senkyo Undō No Jittai - Yōron Chōsa No Gaiyō (Oita, March 1965), p. 63.

TABLE 10

REASONS CITED MOST IMPORTANT BY THE BEPPU ELECTORATE IN  
DECIDING WHICH CANDIDATE TO VOTE FOR

	Total (N-433)	Conservative Party Supporters (N-130)	Support No Party (N-215)	Progressive Party Supporters (N-56)	Won't Say Which Party They Support (N-32)
A	0.7%)	0.8%	0.9%	0.0%	3.1%
B	1.8	3.1	1.9	0.0	0.0
C	0.9	0.0	0.5	1.8	6.3
D	20.4	32.3	8.4	35.7	28.1
E	2.1	1.5	1.9	3.6	3.1
F	4.6	2.3	6.6	3.6	3.1
G	27.3	21.5	34.4	14.3	21.9
H	19.2	17.7	22.8	8.9	18.8
I	19.2	11.5	9.3	5.4	6.3
J	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
K	4.6	1.5	3.3	16.1	6.3
L	1.2	0.8	1.4	0.0	3.1
M	6.9	6.7	7.4	8.9	0.0
N	0.7	0.0	0.9	1.8	0.0

Code

- A - Because he is a relative or friend  
 B - Because he has the recommendation of my buraku (buraku suisen)  
 C - Because he has a high education  
 D - Because I support his party  
 E - Because he often does favors for me  
 F - Because everyone says he is a good person  
 G - Because he is a person who will work for the development  
 of the city  
 H - Because he has an attractive personality  
 I - Because he has ability  
 J - Because he is of a good family  
 K - Because he is a representative of my place of business or  
 my occupation  
 L - Because I was asked to by a powerful person (Yūryokusha)  
 or by a friend  
 M - Miscellaneous  
 N - No Answer

Source: Oita Ken Senkyo Kanri Iinkai, Moderu Chiku Ni Okeru  
 Akaruku Tadashii Senkyo Undō No Jittai - Yōron Chosa No Gaiyo  
 (Oita, March, 1965), pp. 53-55.

A nationwide poll conducted after the 1967 election also suggests a significant degree of localism among the Japanese electorate. The survey asked voters whether they chose the candidate they voted for chiefly because of what he could do for their home area or for their particular occupation or mainly because of what he could do for the entire nation.) Unfortunately for our purposes, the poll combines both occupational and local interests. Nonetheless the responses are worth considering (see Table 11). In spite of the fact that the question was loaded (in that it strongly hinted that in a national election the good of the entire nation is the "right" answer), some 30.4 per cent of the sample considered local or occupational interests more important than national concerns in deciding which candidate to vote for. 40.9 per cent said national concerns were paramount. Another 18.5 per cent said both were important and when asked to make a choice the majority of these said non-national concerns were most crucial. Among those who voted for LDP candidates, 36 per cent thought local or occupational issues most important while only 24.4 per cent of those who voted for the opposition parties thought so. While those in the large metropolitan cities expressed an overriding concern with national issues (63.6 per cent), a much smaller percentage of people in small and medium-sized cities (39.5 per cent) and in rural areas (31.0 per cent) were concerned with such issues. Among occupational groups farmers were the most influenced by

TABLE 11

INFLUENCE OF NATIONAL, LOCAL AND OCCUPATIONAL CONCERNS  
ON VOTING IN DIET ELECTIONS

"When you voted for a candidate in this past election, were you mainly concerned with choosing a candidate who would work hard for the benefit of your local area or for the benefit of people who work in the same occupation as you, or were you mainly concerned with choosing the candidate who would work hard for the benefit . . . of the entire nation of Japan?"

For those who answer "both": "If you have to choose between them, which one is most important?"

	<u>Consider Both</u>					
	A	B	C	D	E	F
Total (N = 2163)	30.4	40.9	9.4	6.8	2.3	10.2
7 metropolitan cities	17.1	63.6	4.6	6.3	1.1	7.3
small & medium size cities	31.1	39.5	10.0	7.8	1.8	9.8
towns and villages	36.1	31.0	11.1	5.6	3.7	12.4
Age:						
20-29	33.9	38.3	9.4	6.8	2.9	8.7
30-39	29.2	43.4	10.1	6.6	2.2	8.6
40-49	30.6	43.9	8.8	7.0	1.2	8.4
50-59	26.5	42.4	11.4	7.1	2.3	10.4
60-over	32.6	33.4	7.0	6.5	3.5	17.0
Education:						
primary	38.6	25.6	7.3	3.2	2.2	23.1
old high primary; new junior h.	34.3	35.7	10.9	7.5	1.8	9.8
old middle; new high school	24.1	50.1	9.1	7.6	2.6	6.4
old higher & technical; new univ.	16.4	63.2	5.3	6.6	4.6	3.9
Occupation:						
self employed:						
agriculture; forestry; fishing	45.6	24.2	15.8	2.8	3.7	7.9
merchant, service trades	28.3	39.4	11.8	10.2	3.1	7.1
other self employment	20.0	50.0	16.7	6.7	3.3	3.3
Employed:						
total	25.9	51.8	8.6	6.9	1.4	5.4
administrators, managers	10.0	70.0	10.0	7.5	-	2.5
technical; white collar	22.0	58.5	8.3	6.5	1.4	3.2
laborers	31.4	43.4	8.7	7.1	1.6	7.8
family workers:						
agriculture; forestry; fishing	41.8	20.6	9.8	5.7	2.1	20.1
merchant, service, others	33.0	36.4	6.8	4.5	4.5	14.8
housewives	26.8	43.4	8.0	8.4	1.7	11.7
others, unemployed	30.2	39.6	5.5	3.8	3.3	17.6



TABLE 11 (continued)

	A	B	Consider Both		E	F
			C	D		
Political Party:						
LDP	36.0	33.7	10.5	7.2	2.9	9.6
JSP-DSP-JCP-Komeito	24.4	52.5	8.7	6.1	1.3	7.1
JSP	26.4	49.6	8.8	6.7	1.5	7.0
DSP	19.1	55.9	9.6	7.4	1.5	6.6
JCP	12.5	75.0	9.4	-	-	3.1
Komeito	21.7	60.9	5.8	1.4	-	10.1
Independent) & Minor Parties	26.9	34.6	15.4	11.5	-	11.5
Others	-	60.0	20.0	-	-	20.0
Don't Know	26.5	30.5	5.5	7.0	4.0	26.5

## Code:

A - considered the benefit of my locality or occupation

B - considered the benefit of the entire nation

C - If I must choose I considered the benefit of locality or occupation

D - If I must choose I considered the benefit of the nation

E - If I must choose I don't know

F - Don't know

Source: Kōmei Senkyo Renmei, Shūgiin Giin Sōsenkyo No Jittai, (Tokyo, March 1967), pp. 18-19.

non-national issues, some 46 per cent saying their vote was determined by local or occupational concerns. In contrast, only 24 per cent believed national interests determined their vote.

The dominant position of his conservative opponents in separate areas of the district and the tendency of the electorate to favor local candidates and be concerned with local issues were two of the most important factors in determining Sato's general campaign strategy. Both Nishimura and Ayabe had strong support in "hard vote" rural areas and there was little Sato could do to move in on that support. To win the election he would have to maximize his support in those areas outside the strongholds of the incumbents. Of these the most populous were the two largest cities in the district, Beppu and Nakatsu.

Nakatsu, with a population of 58,371 is famous as the childhood home of Fukuzawa Yukichi.<sup>3</sup> When Fukuzawa left Nakatsu in 1854 it was a rural castle town that watched over endless acres of lush forest to the west and rice paddies to the east and south stretching all the way down the Tokugawa fief of Bungo to the area of hot springs that was later to be known as Beppu. One hundred years later, Nakatsu was the second largest

---

<sup>3</sup> Fukuzawa, much to the dismay of Nakatsu residents, attributed the journey to Nagasaki which embarked him on a career that was to make him one of the most famous personalities of the Meiji period as being due to "nothing more than to get away from Nakatsu." Fukuzawa Yukichi, The Autobiography of Fukuzawa Yukichi, trans, Eiichi Kiyooka (Tokyo, 1960), p. 22.

city in the district, fourth largest among the Prefecture's ten cities and sixth among the cities of Oita Prefecture in productive income.<sup>4</sup> The primary sector of its economy accounts for something less than a third of its labor force (29 per cent). Its secondary sector, largely engaged in the manufacture of textiles and lumber, accounts for almost one-quarter (24 per cent) with the rest of its labor force in the tertiary sector. But what Fukuzawa referred to as a "secluded town on the coast of Kyushu"<sup>5</sup> was in the 1960's as secluded in a political sense as it had been in the waning years of the Tokugawa Shogunate. For as long as most people care to remember the politics of Nakatsu had been controlled by Noyori Hideichi who was born in Nakatsu when Fukuzawa was forty-eight years old. In the postwar Diet elections, Noyori always received the highest vote in the city, obtaining nearly one of every two votes cast by the city's electorate. In his last unsuccessful Diet campaign in 1963 he received 12,261 of the 29,305 votes cast in Nakatsu.

With his retirement following that election, all the candidates rushed in to try to obtain as large a share as possible of the vote of the 40 per cent of the Nakatsu electorate that had voted for Noyori in 1963. Sato's own hopes for Nakatsu

---

<sup>4</sup>Oita Ken, Chiiki Betsu Kenmin Shotoku (Seisan Shotoku) (Oita, 1967).

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., p. 2.

were fairly conservative. In 1963 he received 3,000 votes in the city. In the 1967 election he aimed at doing a little better than doubling that vote, hoping to obtain between 6,500-7,000 votes. Nakatsu is at the other end of the District from Sato's hometown of Beppu and he was little known among the city's inhabitants. Most of the local political leaders who had supported Noyori went over to Ayabe and Nishimura. Nakatsu was the only area besides Beppu where Sato made a concerted personal effort to cultivate support. He visited the city several times a month to meet with his supporters, discuss the campaign and try to attract new support. The 25 per cent of the Nakatsu vote aimed for was calculated to provide 10 per cent of his total vote. Another 40 per cent, in Sato's strategy, had to be obtained from his jimoto, his own home area, the city of Beppu.

In 1889 with the promulgation of the city-town-village system, a small area of gushing mineral springs and hot sands that stretch out into the inland Sea on the northeastern tip of Kyushu Island became the village of Beppu. Five years later its status was changed to that of a town. In 1907 occurred the first amalgamation between Beppu and a neighboring village and in 1924 Beppu city was created. Further amalgamations with neighboring towns and villages in 1935 and 1936 brought Beppu to its present size of 136.48 square kilometers. In the first national census in 1920 Beppu was recorded to have 6,339 households and a population of 28,647 people. By 1935 the

population had risen past 62,000. The city was spared bombing during the Second World War and its population in the period from 1940 to 1947 jumped from 67,000 to 97,000. All the cities, towns and villages in rural Oita prefecture witnessed a population increase in this period<sup>6</sup> but only in Beppu and Oita city did the population continue to rise after the post-war readjustment.) With a population of 121,359 in 1966, Beppu is the home of one out of every four people in the District and of 28 per cent of the District's electorate.

Several characteristics of Beppu's population set the city apart from all the other areas of the district. One characteristic, indicated above, is Beppu's increasing population. In twenty years, from 1947 to 1967, the population of the city increased by nearly 30,000. The other twenty-three cities, towns and villages of the district have all been experiencing rapid population decline at least since 1955. A second characteristic of the population is a relatively large number of youth. Because it is one of Kyushu's major resort areas, Beppu attracts young people from the surrounding rural areas. Compared to the 9,463 people between the ages of ten and fourteen, there are 13,331 people in the fifteen to nineteen-year old age group.<sup>7</sup> Nakatsu is the only other area in the

---

<sup>6</sup>Between 1940 and 1950 the prefecture's population rose from 972,975 to 1,222,999. Data on population trends are taken from Oita Ken, Kokusei Chōsa Ni Yoru Shi-chō-son Betsu Jinkō No Trend (Oita, 1965).

<sup>7</sup>Oita Ken, Shōwa 40nen Kokusei Chōsa, Oita Ken Shūkei Kekka Hyō (Oita, 1965).

District to show this demographic pattern.<sup>8</sup> The other two cities and the five counties of the District are all experiencing population decline rather than increase in the 15-19 year old age group. Another population characteristic of note is the large female population. Beppu has 67,781 women and 53,578 men. The city's ratio of 80.3 males per 100 females is the lowest in the Prefecture.

Economically, Beppu is overwhelmingly service-trade oriented.<sup>9</sup> Most of the city's workers engage in occupations that cater to the seven to eight million people who visit the city annually.

The primary sector of Beppu's economy engages 7.2 per cent of the city's working population of 56,940 persons fifteen years old and over. Fewer people are involved in the production of primary goods in Beppu's economy than in the economies of any of the other cities and counties of the District or Prefecture.<sup>10</sup> The rate of decrease of farm households in Beppu as the following chart indicates is the highest in the Prefecture. This, it should be noted, indicates a decrease of households, not population. Population decrease is much greater in the rural areas but decrease in houses

---

<sup>8</sup>6,004 in the 10-14 group; 7,219 in the 15-19 group.

<sup>9</sup>Data concerning Beppu's economy obtained from Beppu Shiyakusho Kikakushitsu, Beppu-shi Tōkeisho (Beppu, 1967).

<sup>10</sup>Sorifu Tōkeikyoku, Oita Ken No Jinkō (Tokyo, 1967).

tends to be low because the family maintains the farm while some of its members leave to work in the cities.<sup>11</sup> In a sense decrease of farm households is a better index of urbanization than decrease of farm population because giving up the house indicates a decision to permanently give up farming as a livelihood. While some of the outlying parts of Beppu are agricultural, the city is a non-rural, non-agricultural area.

	Number of farm households <u>1960</u>	Number of farm households <u>1965</u>	<u>Decrease</u>	<u>Rate of Decrease</u>
Beppu	2,117	1,750	367	17.3%
Oita Pref.	128,683	117,939	10,744	8.3
Counties	79,906	73,804	6,102	7.6
Cities	48,777	44,135	4,642	9.5
Oita City	14,822	13,178	1,644	11.0
Nakatsu	4,540	3,800	261	5.7

Secondary industries in the city employ 19.2 per cent of the labor force. The construction industry, like all industry in Beppu, is composed predominantly of small firms. Of 302 firms employing 3,539 people, there are only five firms of over 100 workers and none that employ over 300. There are only 645 workers in firms employing between 50 and 99 workers and the majority of workers are in firms that employ less than

---

<sup>11</sup>This is a pattern that has led to the coining of the phrase the "three chan" ("sanchan"). The farm is run by the grandfather (ojiichan), grandmother (obaachan) and the young wife (Okaachan) while her husband is away working in the city.

thirty people each. Manufacturing industries employ 4,690 people or 10.07 per cent of the labor force. There are only 847 people employed in firms of more than fifty people. Sixty-two per cent of the people employed in this sector are engaged in the production of foodstuffs and bamboo products. The bamboo industry is of particular note because it accounts for 22 per cent of the workers in manufacturing industries. It is a highly traditional industry with few large firms and with many of the artisans working at their homes and being paid by the piece rather than with fixed wages. Beppu, although it does not have a rural economy, does not have an industrial one either. The secondary sector is characterized by small firms employing few workers and engaged in construction and small scale manufacturing.

Nearly three out of every four workers in Beppu are engaged in the tertiary sector of the economy, primarily to serve the needs of tourists. Thus, there are 16,906 people working in hotels, dance halls, movie theatres, bars and other similar occupations that go by the name "water trades." There are 15,004 people working in wholesale and retail trades. The tertiary sector, like the industrial sector of the economy, is characterized by a large number of small firms each employing small numbers of workers. The fifteen thousand workers in wholesale and retail trades, for example, work in over 3,000 firms for a ratio of less than five people per firm. The service trades have a ratio of less than eight people to each



of the 2,308 places of business.

Figures for all sectors of the economy combined show that there are 44,999 people employed in 7,357 places of work. 5,404 (73 per cent) of these firms employ less than five people each and 6,417 (90 per cent) of the total employ less than ten people apiece. There are only four places employing over 300 people. Eighty-seven per cent of these workers (1,257 or 1,558 people) are employed by Beppu's three large hospitals. Nearly 10,000 people in the labor force are employers or work in family businesses. Beppu, in standard Japanese classification, is a medium-sized city with a labor force employed in small and medium-sized enterprises that engage primarily in service trades.

These characteristics of the population and the economic structure of the city had important consequences for Sato's campaign strategy.

For one thing, the small-firm nature of the economy, the large number of self-employed and family workers and the lack of a significant industrial sector and large scale enterprises provided a solid base of support for conservative party politicians. As Table 12 indicates, LDP candidates generally throughout the country gain more votes the more rural the area (36 per cent in metropolitan areas, 49 per cent in small and medium-sized cities, 60 per cent in rural areas) and have greater support among self-employed people, employers and family workers than among employed white collar and blue collar

TABLE 12

## PARTY SUPPORT OF VOTERS IN 1967 DIET ELECTION

"What party does the person you voted for [in the 1967 general elections] belong to?"

	LDP	JSP	DSP	JCP	Komei- to	Ind. & Others Minor	Others	Don't Know
Total	50.0	28.3	6.3	1.5	3.2	1.2	0.2	9.2
7 metropolitan cities	36.1	29.3	12.8	4.6	7.6	0.5	0.5	8.4
small & medium size cities	48.6	32.1	5.5	1.2	3.0	1.1	0.2	8.3
towns and villages	59.6	21.9	4.1	0.3	1.1	1.7	0.1	11.1
Age:								
20-29	42.5	34.9	7.1	2.4	2.9	2.1	0.5	7.6
30-39	41.0	38.4	5.9	2.2	2.7	0.9	0.2	8.8
40-49	49.1	31.4	6.2	0.2	4.1	1.4	0.4	7.2
50-59	60.9	17.4	6.6	1.8	3.3	0.8	-	9.3
60-over	61.9	12.9	5.9	0.9	2.9	0.9	-	14.7
Education:								
primary	57.9	13.6	4.7	1.9	3.2	1.6	-	17.1
old high primary; new junior high	52.9	25.7	4.9	1.3	3.2	1.1	0.2	10.6
old middle; new high school	46.1	33.0	8.0	1.4	3.1	1.6	0.1	6.6
old higher & technical; new univ.	42.8	28.9	10.5	3.3	3.3	0.7	0.7	9.9
Occupation:								
self employed:								
agriculture; forestry; fishing	70.2	14.4	3.7	0.5	0.9	2.3	-	7.9
merchant, service trades	66.5	15.7	5.9	0.8	4.3	0.4	-	6.3
other self employment	63.3	13.3	10.0	-	3.3	-	-	10.0

TABLE 12 (continued)

	LDP	JSP	DSP	JCP	Komei- to	Ind.& Minor	Others	Don't Know
<b>Employed:</b>								
total	35.3	41.4	7.2	2.4	4.0	1.0	0.5	8.3
administrators, managers	55.0	17.5	12.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	-	7.5
technical; white collar	32.5	44.4	8.3	1.4	2.2	1.4	0.7	9.0
laborers	35.3	41.7	5.5	3.2	5.8	0.3	0.3	7.8
family workers:								
agriculture; forestry; fishing	64.4	13.9	3.6	1.0	1.5	2.6	-	12.9
merchant, service others	55.7	22.7	6.8	1.1	1.1	1.1	-	11.4

Source: Komei Senkyo Renmei, Shūgin Giin Sōsekyo No Jittai, pp. 36-37.

workers. Although the data in this poll do not break down responses of workers according to size of enterprise, LDP support is greater among workers in small and medium-sized firms, such as predominate in Beppu, than among those in large-scale enterprises.<sup>12</sup>

Data on the results of various elections held in Beppu indicate the overwhelming support for conservatives in the city. Beppu has had one mayor, independent conservative Aragane Keiji, since 1951. Nearly all of the city's assemblymen are conservatives. In the 1963 assembly elections Beppu elected twenty-seven candidates of the LDP and three independent conservatives to fill thirty of the assembly's thirty-six seats.<sup>13</sup> In the Diet election of the same year 77 per cent of those voting in Beppu voted for conservative candidates. On the other hand, labor unions, the major source of organized Socialist support, are weak. Fifty-nine unions exist in the city with a total membership of 9,232.<sup>14</sup>

This conservative dominance had one obvious implication for Sato's strategy: the campaign in Beppu would have to be largely a family fight. The challenge was not so much one of taking votes away from the only Socialist candidate as it was one of getting a big piece of the conservative pie.

---

<sup>12</sup>Watanuki, p. 452.

<sup>13</sup>The six others included three members of the Komeito (then the Kōmei Seiji Renmei), two Socialists and one Communist.

<sup>14</sup>Oita Ken Shōkō Rōdōbu Rōseika, Rōdō Kumiai Meikan, (Oita, 1966).

In addition to the electorate voting predominantly conservative, the service trade economy and the growth, mobility and large female composition of Beppu's population are responsible for the presence of a large number of what are generally referred to as "floating votes" (fudōhyō).

To grasp the full import of the concept of the floating vote in the Japanese context it is important to realize that the term carries with it an implicit comparison with traditional voting behavior in rural areas; an implicit comparison with the "hard vote." The concept of the hard vote, as has been discussed, reflects traditional modes of social behavior, an emphasis on consensus and hierarchy. In contrast to this, the "floating voter" is the person who leads an urban existence away from the communal pressures of village life. Cutting himself free from the cohesive society of rural areas, he lives alone or with only his immediate, rather than extended family, in an apartment in a city. He has little sense of attachment to the area he is living in, no deep personal ties (enko) with leaders of his new and perhaps transient community and, consequently little sense of obligation to vote in accordance with the wishes of local community leaders. The floating voter is the unattached voter, the anonymous urban dweller to whom appeals in terms of obligation, community consensus and the like are unavailing.

Because the hard vote represents the traditional norm in Japan, the concept of the floating vote has a fundamentally

disparaging tone. Contrary to being regarded as the vote of the independent voter who is politically aware and values his ballot, the term floating vote "carries with it the nuance that it is the vote of people whose political consciousness is low; a vote that will be cast indiscriminately."<sup>15</sup> Here one has an interesting example of the influence of traditional values on the use of universal political concepts. Within the traditional Japanese cultural milieu the hard voter was the man to be respected, a man who showed proper concern for the norms of community consensus and village harmony. The floating voter is a maverick, a product of the divisive effects of urbanization and the breakdown of traditional standards of correct social conduct. Deploing the prevalence of this view, the Asahi newspaper article quoted above goes on to implore its readers to "recognize, however, that within the floating vote there are votes of criticism . . . and votes arrived at by independent thought. These are rather the floating votes of people who have opinions."

In Western societies, the use of the term floating vote or independent vote is reserved for those "who do not make the same [party] choice at two successive elections."<sup>16</sup> In Britain or the United States the floating voter is the man who is free

---

<sup>15</sup> Asahi Shinbun, January 28, 1967, p. 1. See article entitled "Fudō-Hihanhyō in "Konnichi No Mondai."

<sup>16</sup> H. Daudt, Floating Voters and the Floating Vote, A Critical Analysis of American and British Election Studies (Leiden, 1961), p. 7.

of party attachments; in Japan it is the person who is free of certain kinds of personal attachments. Consequently, there is no contradiction involved in talking of "conservative party floating voters" in Japan. The major problem posed by the floating voter is not that you cannot appeal to party loyalties but that you cannot reach him through a web of traditional, established networks of personal relationships. The great majority of Beppu's electorate votes for LDP candidates in Diet elections. For Sato the problem was adopting a campaign strategy that could reach these conservative floating voters and bring them into his support.

The concepts of the hard vote and the floating vote form the fundamental inputs in Sato's perception of rational campaign strategies. If the problem in the rural areas was to build an organization of men who could "gather the hard vote," the challenge presented by Beppu's nearly 80,000 voters was to create strategies for "catching the floating vote."

The basic problem faced by Sato in Beppu was how to appeal to a largely anonymous electorate. There are several alternative strategies one can envision a candidate adopting to meet this problem. One, probably the first to come to the mind of Americans, is for the candidate to appeal directly to the voters through the mass media, political rallies and the like. In Japan the prohibition of pre-election campaigning and severe restrictions on the type of campaigning allowed during the official campaign period severely inhibits the use

of such an approach.<sup>17</sup> A second possible strategy is to employ the same type of organization as used in rural areas, relying on local leaders to gather and deliver the vote. Obviously in Beppu the electorate was too large, the economic structure too urban and patterns of social intercourse that rationalize such an approach too minimal for such a strategy to be effective. The rural campaign organization was for gathering hard votes, not for mobilizing the support of the floating voters. A third strategy, used in some election campaigns in other countries, would be to rely on the political party organization to mobilize the vote. This strategy could not even be entertained by an LDP candidate running in a district where other men of the Party were also candidates and where the Party organization, to the extent that it existed, was split among the several official candidates.

With these alternatives largely eliminated Sato's approach to the problem of mobilizing the support of the Beppu electorate was in the form of what may be analyzed as three general strategic responses.

One was to appeal directly to the voters during the short official campaign period within the limits of the election law. The conduct of this appeal is discussed below in Chapter VIII.

The second strategy was to create a personal city-wide

---

<sup>17</sup> See Chapters VI and VIII.



organization of supporters with basically three functions. The first of these was to gather and deliver the vote of the small percentage of the electorate susceptible to such appeals. This sector was envisaged as being made up of old and long-time residents of the city, relatives, close friends and people indebted to the members of the organization. The second function was to provide a city-wide network of campaigners that would appeal for votes, not on the basis of any particular personal relationships, but simply with the idea that a voter, particularly the floating voter whose "political consciousness is low" and who will cast his vote "indiscriminately," to quote again from the Asahi article, will tend to vote for the candidate he has been asked to vote for. The third function was to provide a means of access for the candidate himself to meet the voters, not through publicized rallies or other activities that would be flagrant violations of the election law's ban on pre-election campaigning but through small neighborhood meetings arranged by the members of the organization.

This last function of the machine is the bridge with the third major strategic approach adopted by Sato: the creation of a mass membership organization that would provide various activities for large numbers of the electorate and bring them into direct contact with the candidate. This use of a kōenkai or supporters' organization is discussed in the following chapter.

The present-day city of Beppu, as mentioned above,

resulted from repeated amalgamations between an area known as Beppu village and neighboring villages and towns. The boundaries of these areas are largely the boundaries of the eleven school districts (kōku) into which the city is divided. In a general way these school districts correspond to the villages amalgamated in rural towns. While the sense of identification with these formerly independent areas has to a great extent dissipated with the passage of time and the entrance of outsiders, the school districts still maintain some degree of social identity and cohesiveness. For a Prefectural Assembly or Diet or mayoral candidate, i.e., a candidate that campaigns throughout the city,<sup>18</sup> they form convenient subdivisions of the city for the organization of campaign activities.

The school districts are, however, large units as Table 13 shows. Only three districts, all on the outskirts of the city, have a population of less than 10,000. For purposes of campaign organization, Sato concentrated his activities within the smaller units of which the school districts are composed, the chōnai or neighborhoods.

Each of the school districts, as indicated in the last column of the table, is comprised of a number of chōnai.

---

<sup>18</sup> Although city assembly elections are officially city-wide, practically all candidates limit their campaigning to a small section of the city, usually encompassing several contiguous chōnai. Rarely does a city assembly candidate make a significant effort to gain votes in more than one school district.

TABLE 13  
 BEPPU'S POPULATION BY SCHOOL DISTRICTS

School District	Number of Households	Population	Male	Female	Number of Chōnai
Noguchi	4,503	14,808	6,559	8,249	9
Kita	2,953	11,118	4,203	6,915	14
Aoyama	2,798	10,785	5,289	5,496	7
Minami	3,499	11,440	4,955	6,485	12
Nishi	3,566	12,327	5,531	6,796	9
Hasuda	3,953	13,705	6,320	7,385	20
Ishitake	3,627	13,312	6,084	7,228	10
Asahi	2,182	8,549	3,788	4,761	17
Kamegawa	3,848	14,731	6,634	8,097	13
Minami Takeshi	1,562	6,901	3,004	3,897	5
Higashiyama	232	1,262	592	670	5
Beppu Total	32,709	118,938	52,977	65,961	121

These are areas which have long histories as units of social organization, many having been the buraku of Beppu's amalgamated villages. In each of the city's 121 chōnai is a chōnaikai or neighborhood association. In Sato's building of a city-wide organization the neighborhoods and the neighborhood associations played a central role.

In the pre-war period and particularly during the war years Oita Prefecture is alleged to have had developed one of the country's most thorough systems of neighborhood associations and their subdivision, the tonarigumi.<sup>19</sup> During those years the neighborhood association served as an instrument for

<sup>19</sup>Usami Sho, "Nōson No Tōshika," Asahi Janaru, VIII (December 11, 1966), 20.

imposing the control and demands of the central government on the populace. Until the American Occupation following Japan's defeat in World War II, neighborhood associations were active throughout the country although they had never been established in law except for a short period following a revision of the Local Government Law in 1943.<sup>20</sup> In 1947, as part of the decentralization and general democratization policies of the Occupation, the neighborhood association and the tonarigumi were banned.<sup>21</sup> The system could not easily be destroyed and "continued to exist, sometimes in altered form, despite the 1947 government ordinance banning them. With the lapse of the ordinance in 1951 they reappeared quickly and became very active in local elections at that time."<sup>22</sup> According to one source, even during the period when they were banned by government ordinance, neighborhood associations were active in 86 per cent of the country's cities, towns and villages. As of August, 1956 such associations were functioning in 98 per cent of these areas.<sup>23</sup>

In Beppu the chōnaikai system was officially reconstituted in 1953 under a new name, the Jichikai or Self-Governing

---

<sup>20</sup> Matsushita Keiichi, Gendai Nihon No Seijiteki Kōsei (Tokyo, 1964), p. 224.

<sup>21</sup> Kobayashi Naoki, Shinohara Hajime and Soma Masao, Senkyo (Tokyo, 1960), p. 80.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., p. 80.

<sup>23</sup> Gendai Nihon No Seiji Katei, ed. Oka Yoshitake (Tokyo, 1966), pp. 348-349.

Councils.<sup>24</sup> Officially the chōnaikai are not established in law and coexist with the self-governing councils which are legally part of the city's administrative structure. In fact, however, they are identical. The terms chōnaikai and jichikai, chōnaikaichō (neighborhood association president) and jichiin are used interchangeably. The law establishing Beppu's system of Self-Governing Councils declared their purpose to be to "promote cooperation in the management of local affairs and foster mutual friendship." In 1963 and 1965 the law was partially amended in an attempt to make the tasks of the councils somewhat more specific. The mayor, however, retains great discretion as to what activities the councils shall engage in. Article one declares the purpose of the councils to be to aid in the effective management of city affairs. Article six defines these activities as "cooperation in city affairs," keeping up to date the register of chōnai residents and carrying out tasks assigned by the mayor.

The 121 Jichiin, the presidents of the councils, are appointed by the mayor from the names of three candidates submitted by the neighborhood association. The recommendations are decided by a general meeting of the association or by its kumichō, the leaders of the subdivision of the association (kumi) that correspond to the old tonarigumi. The largest

---

<sup>24</sup>The discussion of Beppu's Jichiin system is based on documents provided the author by the Beppu city office: Beppu Shiyakusho, Jichiin Setchi Kisoku, mimeo. (Beppu, ?); Jyūmin Gyōsei Soshiki No Chōsa, mimeo. (Beppu, October 1, 1965).

number of households.<sup>25</sup> under the supervision of any one council head (i.e. the largest number of households in any one chōnai) is 950 and the smallest is 23.<sup>26</sup> There are an average of thirteen kumi in each chōnai and there are 1,593 kumichō in the 121 neighborhoods.<sup>27</sup>

The system of self-governing councils is the old neighborhood association in new clothing. Organized among the 32,709 households of the city, its formal and legal purpose is to serve as an arm of the city's administrative structure; its traditional and overriding purpose is to serve as the common social organization of the neighborhood's residents.

In all the areas of the Second District outside Beppu, Sato's organized support is no older than the campaign preceding his first Diet race in 1963. As a Prefectural Assemblyman Sato needed an organization only in the city, which elected him to three consecutive terms in the Assembly. Although he

---

<sup>25</sup>The members of the neighborhood associations are households not individuals.

<sup>26</sup>The term of office of the association presidents is two years and the salary a nominal 25,000 yen annually. In addition, they receive administrative funds of 120 yen per household up to 200 households and 70 yen for each household over 200. The average number of households in a neighborhood is 256 which provides 31,920 yen in administrative funds.

<sup>27</sup>Above the chōnai, in each of the city's eleven school districts, are three officers of the association of self-governing councils, a district captain (shibuchō) and two assistant captains (fukushibuchō). These thirty-three officers in turn elect the President (kaichō) and five Vice-Presidents (fukukaichō) of the association. The Beppu association is further federated with those of the ten other cities of the prefecture in the Oita Prefecture Federation of Self-Governing Councils (Oita Ken Jichi Rengokai) created in 1963.

endeavored to expand this organization when he entered the Diet race, the enormous problem faced in the rest of the District of recruiting supporters was not faced in anything near the same magnitude in his home city. The Beppu organization that ran Sato's campaign for the Diet in the elections of 1963 and 1967 was the same organization that had been responsible for three campaigns to the Prefectural Assembly.

The men who comprise Sato's organization in Beppu all have one thing in common: they are all, without exception, active members of their neighborhood associations. Chōnaikai in Beppu and, according to the limited data available, throughout the country are dominated by supporters of the conservative party. This includes both the association leadership and the type of people that most actively participate in the association's activities.

The control supporters of the LDP hold over local neighborhood associations has led one author to write that it is the neighborhood associations "that carry the load of the LDP organization at its extremities."<sup>28</sup> While this perhaps gives the LDP more credit than it deserves for having any kind of organization on the grass roots level, it does reflect the extraordinary degree to which the leadership of neighborhood associations is in the hands of conservatives. In Beppu

---

<sup>28</sup>Matsushita, Gendai Nihon, p. 219.

the chōnaikai are not organs of the LDP as such. Rather they are organizations of people generally sympathetic to conservative policies and conservative party politicians; organizations that can conveniently be used by LDP politicians in mobilizing electoral support.

The results of a poll conducted in Beppu gives some indication of the type of people that are particularly involved in the city's neighborhood associations. The poll, both because of the size of its sample and the indirect relationship between the question asked and the issue of participation in the chōnaikai is cited as representing only the most general tendencies among certain groups in regard to participation in the chōnaikai. The survey asked voters if they had ever taken part in any meeting that discussed the clean election movement. Those who answered yes (122 out of 433) were then asked where such discussion took place. The responses to this question are reproduced in Table 14. The results of the poll suggest that the chōnaikai is an important association predominantly for those people of the city who are long time residents, over the age of fifty, of primary and middle school education and supporters of the conservative party or of no party (which as already mentioned, usually indicates supporters of conservative party candidates.) The "no particular occupation" category of workers can probably be interpreted as referring to retired men and housewives. Except for the rather small percentage of women participants indicated in the poll, the profile of active chōnaikai members that



TABLE 14

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION OF BEPPU ELECTORATE ACCORDING TO  
TYPES OF MEETING PLACES"At what type of meeting did you hear about, or take part  
in a discussion of, kōmei senkyo (fair elections)?"

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	DK-NA
Total (N=122)	24.6	23.0	0.8	4.9	2.5	17.2	1.6	13.9	10.7	0.8
men	30.0	20.9	1.5	-	-	17.9	-	19.4	10.5	1.8
women	18.2	25.5	-	10.9	5.5	16.4	3.6	7.3	10.9	1.8
Age:										
20-29	12.0	44.0				4.0		12.0	24.0	
30-39	20.0	36.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	12.0		8.0	12.0	4.0
40-59	18.8	12.5			3.1	21.9	6.3	21.9		
50-59	42.1	15.8		15.6	5.3	31.6		5.3		
60-over	38.1	4.8				19.0		19.0	19.0	
Education:										
primary	54.5	9.1			9.1	9.1		9.1	9.1	
middle	35.0	12.5	2.5	7.5		25.0	5.0	7.5	5.0	
high	13.5	28.8		5.8	3.8	17.3	17.3	11.5	1.9	
university	15.8	36.8				5.3		21.1	21.1	
Occupation:										
agriculture; fishing	50.0		7.1	21.4		21.4				
manufacture and service	17.2	31.3		1.6	1.6	18.8		17.2	12.5	
transportation and communication										
no particular occupation	34.6	3.8		3.8	7.7	19.2	3.8	11.5	15.4	
other	15.4	30.8		7.7		7.7	7.7	15.4	7.7	7.7
Political Party Support:										
Conservative	27.9	4.7	2.3	2.3		27.9	2.3	18.6	14.0	
Progressive	10.5	63.2			5.3	15.8			5.3	
Won't Say	7.7	15.4		15.4		15.4		15.4	23.1	8.0
None	31.9	25.5		6.4	4.3	8.5	2.1	14.9	6.4	

TABLE 14 (continued)

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	DK-NA
Length of Residence:										
less than one year	(1)					(1)		(2)		
1-2 years		(2)			(1)			(2)		
2-5 years	(2)	(3)				(1)			(1)	
5-10 years	23.5	41.2		11.8	3.9	11.8			5.9	
over 10 years	15.8	23.7		7.9	2.6	18.4	5.3	15.8	10.5	
from before the war	28.7	11.8	1.7	1.7		16.9		11.8	11.8	1.7

## Code:

- 1 - Neighborhood association meeting
- 2 - Meeting at place of employment
- 3 - Meeting of neighborhood youth association
- 4 - Meeting of neighborhood women's club
- 5 - PTA meeting
- 6 - Meeting held at a local public hall
- 7 - Meeting of women's group
- 8 - Meeting sponsored by the Fair Election Movement
- 9 - Other

DK-NA - Don't Know; No Answer

Figures in parenthesis are absolute numbers, given where respondents were too few to make percentages significant.

Source: Oita Ken Senkyo Kanri Iinkai, Oita Ken Akaruku Tadashii Senkyo Suishin Kyōgikai, Akaruku Tadashii Senkyo Undō No Jittai, Yōron Chōsa No Gaiyō (Oita, March 1965), p. 40.

emerges corresponds with that observed by the author in the course of numerous chōnaikai meetings attended over a period of a year.

The percentage of conservative party supporting voters active in the chōnaikai is undoubtedly much greater than is indicated by the poll. A couple of months before the election I spent several days with the chairman of the international Bureau of the Socialist Party, Matsumoto Shichiro, in his home district in Fukuoka prefecture, a heavily industrial area in which progressive party candidates win a majority of the popular vote in Diet elections. In discussing the organization of his campaign Matsumoto remarked that he could not "get into" the chōnaikai because they were conservative party supporting associations. He rather had to concentrate on local labor unions to approach the electorate. In Beppu as well the chōnaikai are social clubs that mainly attract the active conservative sector of the electorate.

For the conservative candidate the chōnaikai provides an ideal base upon which to build a campaign organization. There he could find politically interested and conservatively inclined voters, people intimately familiar with their local neighborhoods who could appeal for the support of friends and acquaintances, and men who could provide, through their leadership positions in the associations, opportunities for the candidate to meet with large numbers of conservative voters in the city.

It is important to note that in Sato's perception, and commonly among Japanese, the electorate is divided into two camps: the conservative (hoshu jin'ei) and the progressive (kakushin jin'ei). Sato saw little merit in a strategy that would involve a considerable amount of his time in appealing to progressive camp voters. Thus the lack of any attempt to address labor unions or in other ways to attempt to attract the support of the identifiably progressive sector. Beppu votes overwhelmingly conservative and for a conservative party politician the problem was to maximize support within the conservative camp. That access to the electorate provided by the chōnaikai leaders would mean largely access only to conservative voters was accordingly not a cause for concern. It was the support of this group Sato was most interested in attracting.

Sato has organized support in each of the city's 121 neighborhoods. In each one there is a small group of men who are responsible for recruiting other campaigners and directing the campaign. As with the leaders of the town organizations, the sekininsha, there are similarly one or two men, generally referred to as sewanin, who lead these neighborhood organizations. At the time of the 1967 campaign there were 235 such sewanin in Sato's organization. Approximately 215, according to the estimate of Sato's secretary, had served in that position for at least ten years and some since Sato first ran for the prefectural assembly in 1951. At the time of the

election thirty-eight of the city's neighborhood association presidents, again according to Sato's secretary, were part of his personal organization. Less than twenty others were known to support the other LDP candidates and the rest were considered neutral in the election. The term of office of neighborhood association presidents is two years and many of Sato's sewanin not holding that position at the time of the election had held it at one time or another in previous years. All of his sewanin had served as kumichō, leaders of the small units of houses that together comprise the neighborhood associations.

In addition to the neighborhood sewanin there was established a group of school district coordinators responsible mainly for relaying information and distributing campaign funds to the neighborhood sewanin during the campaign and for keeping the candidate informed on developments within the school districts. This group was referred to as Sato's "youth group" although all eleven members were in their late thirties or early forties. These men were "youth" when they supported Sato in his first prefectural assembly campaign and the name has stuck with them. Most of Sato's supporters in Beppu, as mentioned, have been his active campaigners for at least ten years. They are predominantly middle-aged and elderly men. The members of his "youth group" represent his youngest organized supporters. This is one of the major differences between Sato's organization in Beppu and in other areas of the district. In rural areas where he had to build a completely

new organization his appeal was mainly to younger politicians. In Beppu his political machine was fairly old and displayed many traits common to long established personal political organizations: a tendency for the members to become entrenched in their positions, jealous of their prerogatives and indifferent to the problem of infusing new blood.

The men who were recruited to serve as Sato's sewanin in the neighborhoods of the city divide broadly into two groups. One is the group that dates its support back to Sato's first Prefectural Assembly race. Except for Sato's "youth group" all of this group are elderly men who were involved in the process of Sato inheriting the jiban of Aragane Keiji. These men were all part of Aragane's political machine and were delegated by him to organize Sato's first election campaign. Over the years they have come to support Sato directly rather than at the request of Aragane. Although the passage of time has worked a natural attrition on this group of supporters, they still form a sizeable portion of Sato's sewanin. The second group is a heterogeneous mix of personal friends, relatives and people active in the neighborhood associations who want a native son of the city in the Diet. Sato has few supporters who can strictly be referred to as his kobun. He has such a relationship with Shuto Kenji who succeeded him in the prefectural assembly and with a few other of his younger supporters who have ambitions of entering elective politics. The lack of such intimate familial ties reflects the fact that the members of Sato's neighborhood organization are not

professional politicians or men with the ambition of becoming politicians. For the great majority of them campaigning is a kind of sport; interesting and, because of the extreme restrictions on campaign practices embodied in the election law, often adventurous work that requires relatively little of the supporters' time.

The sewanin have only limited functions to perform. Unlike the head of a town organization with the responsibility for gathering and delivering the vote, the neighborhood sewanin serves mainly as a channel of communication between the candidate's headquarters and the neighborhood's residents. During the few weeks of the actual campaign they are expected to actively seek votes but outside of the official campaign period they function primarily to keep Sato's headquarters informed on developments in the chōnai: occasions of births, marriages and deaths, for instance, so Sato can send a suitable gift or greeting. Through daily intercourse the sewanin learn who in their chōnai are favorable to Sato and so inform his headquarters staff in order that their names be added to the candidate's mailing lists. Most importantly they keep Sato informed on meetings within the chōnai, those of the chōnaikai, its women's club or elderly people's club and so forth where Sato or one of his staff may make an appearance or send a gift. For a year preceding the 1967 election a major responsibility of the sewanin was to arrange for special meetings between Sato and the neighborhoods' residents.<sup>29</sup>

---

<sup>29</sup> See below, pp. 187-194.

Because Sato's neighborhood supporters are not elected politicians responsible to a constituency, the rewards they demand for supporting Sato are of a much different order and more easily fulfilled than those demanded by local elected officials. Small material benefits are constantly being provided by Sato's headquarter staff. His staff is always ready to help the sewanin with any problem from getting the fine for a speeding ticket reduced to getting their children into high school. The sewanin are constant recipients of greeting cards of one sort or another that Sato sends out periodically and each receives in August a mid-year gift (chūgen) and in December a year-end present (seibō). More important than such material rewards is the abstract reward of being treated as the central members of a team responsible for getting a man elected to the Diet. The title of sewanin, the private confidential conferences, the right to talk to third parties of "Bunchan" (a diminutive formed from Sato's first name, Bunsei) in the familiar form of speech rather than the honorific, the responsibility, the prestige and for many the fun and adventure their role in the organization provides would appear to be the most significant rewards for their activities on Sato's behalf.

Rewards of this kind are sufficient to maintain the support of people for whom serving in Sato's neighborhood organization is done as a hobby or a favor or for very limited personal benefit but they were not sufficient to obtain the



support of Beppu's elected officials. Despite the fact that Beppu was his home town, Sato had as little success in obtaining the support of local politicians in the city as he did in other areas. While many politicians could see Sato's election as beneficial to Beppu in the long run, few could afford to break their ties with those already in the Diet. As of January 17, 1967, one week before election day, Diet candidate support among the thirty-five members of the Beppu city assembly divided as follows: Ayage Kentaro--seventeen; Nishimura Eiichi--seven; Sato Bunsei--four; Komatsu Kan--three; Tsuru Tadahisa (Communist)--one.<sup>30</sup> A striking example of the general inability of new candidates, particularly the locality oriented type with little influence in Tokyo, to gain the support of elected officials was Sato's failure to gain the open support of his original mentor, Mayor Aragane Keiji. Aragane did not support Sato either in 1963 or 1967. As Aragane remarked to the author,<sup>31</sup> support for Sato would have resulted in his being unable to function effectively as Mayor. So much of the economic development of the city is dependent on grants and subsidies from the national government that good relations with the District's Diet members are a prerequisite

---

<sup>30</sup> Three other members of the assembly belong to the Komeito and did not support any of the Diet candidates. Beppu Yūkan, January 17, 1967.

<sup>31</sup> Interview, August 10, 1967.

for a mayor.<sup>32</sup> By supporting Sato, Aragane would have incurred the animosity of the district's incumbent LDP Diet members. In 1963 this was particularly important because Aragane was trying to get a national subsidy for the building of a new railroad station in Beppu. Refraining from participation in Sato's campaign was allegedly a key factor in the successful completion of the project.

Sato along with his predecessor and his successor in the prefectural assembly, Aragane and Shuto, form what is referred to as a "line" (sen) of political association that had important consequences for the recruitment of supporters. Both of the LDP Diet members from the district, Ayabe and Nishimura, also have their own factional affiliations, their own "lines" that cut down through the local political structure. In Beppu, Ayabe Kentaro in particular had a strong faction led by prefectural assemblyman Utsunomiya Hidetsuna, Ayabe's assumed successor to the Diet. Sato and Utsunomiya had long been political enemies because they served concurrently in the

---

<sup>32</sup>"Local government . . . is supported by equalization tax rebates and subsidies from prefectural and central governments. Similarly, local government loans cannot be floated at will; permission is necessary and for the most part these loans depend on central government funds. . . . The size of the grants or subsidies received determines the funds available for industrial and economic development. Without loan issues it is difficult to go ahead with the building of schools and municipal offices. For these reasons Mayors and influential members of the Council must maintain close connections with members of the prefectural assembly and the latter's ultimate patrons, members of the national Diet. And it goes without saying that these Diet members have to be members of the government party if they are to have any influence." Fukutake Tadashi, Japanese Rural Society, trans. Ronald P. Dore (London, 1967), pp. 191-192.

prefectural assembly which meant they battled each other in elections for the Beppu vote. When Sato entered the Diet race it was assumed that because of the Ayabe-Utsunomiya "line" Utsunomiya supporters would be Ayabe supporters. Indeed, for Sato and his staff, Utsunomiya and Ayabe were virtually synonyms and little attempt was made to bring Utsunomiya supporters into the campaign on Sato's behalf. When someone voluntarily "crossed a line" as did the head of the Beppu LDP women's group to support Utsunomiya for the prefectural assembly and Sato for the Diet,<sup>33</sup> it was greeted with felicitous surprise and an uneasy anxiety that the hereticism of the action would be recognized and the support lost. For the well-heeled politician, people who did something as incredible as crossing lines were mockingly referred to as shirōto, "amateurs" not familiar with the most elemental rules of politics.

The role that these factional alignments between Diet, prefecture and city politicians play in the recruitment of supporters often is of considerable importance. The fact that chōnaikai leadership is conservative indicates nothing of what candidate among the several conservative contenders will receive support. That is partly a consequence of highly involved personal relationships and factional alignments on the local level. One example may help illustrate the role of these factional ties.

---

<sup>33</sup> See Chapter VI.

Gyogaku is one of the twenty chōnai of Hasuda school district. With a population of 947, it is one of Beppu's former red light districts where the anti-prostitution law has changed the houses of prostitution into the small, inexpensive inns that line the narrow streets of the chōnai. The owner of one of these inns and Gyogaku's most illustrious citizen is sixty-two year old Nagai Tadashi, city assemblyman and a former speaker of the city assembly, secretary-general of the Beppu chapter of the LDP and Nishimura Eiichi's campaign manager in Beppu. The owner of another inn in Gyogaku is Tomonaga Moto, forty-two years old and one of Gyogaku's kumicho. Tomonaga had been Sato's sewanin in Gyogaku since his second prefectural assembly election in 1955. He has also been closely aligned with Nagai in local affairs. The two associations first came into conflict when Sato entered the Diet race. Unlike Ayabe, Nishimura had no supporter among the prefectural assemblymen elected from Beppu. His most important supporter was city assemblyman Nagai. As long as Sato ran for the prefectural assembly Tomonaga's support for him did not affect his relations with Nagai. On the contrary, it only solidified them. The neighborhood association president of Gyogaku was Ayabe's sewanin and up until the 1963 election the chōnaikai's leadership split between those backing Ayabe and those supporting Nishimura. Both Nagai and Tomonaga were in the latter camp and it was logical that in prefectural assembly elections Nishimura supporters should support former Liberal

Party man Sato rather than Utsunomiya Hidetsuna who was the leading supporter of former Democratic Party leader Ayabe. In 1963 when Sato entered the Diet race Tomonaga's position became untenable. He had to choose between supporting Sato and thereby breaking with Nagai because of the latter's support of Nishimura or curtailing activities on behalf of Sato in order to maintain good relations with the powerful city assemblyman. In this case Tomonaga had little choice but to side with Nagai because of the latter's overwhelming influence in matters concerning the chōnai. While not forced to sever his ties with Sato completely, Tomonaga thought it would be, as he termed it, imprudent to campaign for Sato under the circumstances.

In the discussion of Sato's organization in rural areas it was noted that, because of the geographic concentration of the support base of local politicians there was a tendency for Diet candidate support to cluster in narrow geographic areas of a particular town or village. In Beppu, the use of chōnaikai leadership often restricts the influence of the Diet candidate to only that element of the conservative sector in the neighborhood with which the leadership is closely associated. Sato's organization in the neighborhood of Ueno illustrates this point.


Ueno consists of 239 households and has a population of 815 divided among the chōnai's eleven kumi. Sato's sewanin in the neighborhood, Doi Takeshi, is one of the few men of the sewanin group not to have been a supporter of Sato when he was


in the prefectural assembly. Thirty-six years old, Doi supported Sato for the first time in 1963, joined the LDP in 1964 and became vice-president of its youth group in Oita Prefecture. He acts as liaison between Sato's headquarters and a group of Ueno supporters that has campaigned for Sato through many elections. It includes fifty-six year old Hida Kiyoshi, the present neighborhood president; seventy-six year old Tomonaga Ranpei, Hida's predecessor as neighborhood association president and a supporter of Sato from his first prefectural assembly election; Tomonaga Sunao, sixty-eight years old and president of Ueno's elderly people's club; Tomonaga Fumio, wife of Sunao and president of Ueno's women's club at the time of the 1967 election; Shinoda Hiku, Mrs. Tomonaga's predecessor as women's club president and Sasaki Shizuko, Mrs. Tomonaga's successor as president of the women's club. In short, Sato had the support of almost the entire leadership of Ueno's neighborhood association.

Ueno, as the rough sketch in Table 15 shows, is divided into eleven kumi. Sato's supporters, indicated by the mark (x), are concentrated in three connecting kumi, the second (Hida), sixth (Doi, Tomonaga S., Sasaki) and the seventh (Tomonaga R.). There is one woman supporter in the eighth kumi (Shimoda) and one in the twelfth (Hori). Sato had had a supporter in the first kumi but he was convicted of an election law violation in the 1963 election and could not openly take part in the campaign. In the rest of the kumi Sato is unrepresented by any

TABLE 15

SKETCH OF THE CHŌNAI OF UENO





Gyogyaku-Machi

Higashinaka-Machi

Higashi-Machi

Yamaga-Machi

文  
Hamawaki Junior  
High School

卍  
Chokokoji Temple

卍  
Sotokoji Temple

8 kumi

2 kumi

1 kumi

To Higashi Beppeu  
Station

HAMAMACHI  
Park

6 kumi



member of his Ueno organization. Others who took part in the campaign did so at the request of those mentioned above and were from the same kumi.

The following chart shows the number of houses in each kumi and divides the heads of houses according to very rough occupational categories.

<u>Kumi</u>	<u>No. of Houses</u>	<u>Public Workers</u>	<u>Merchants</u>	<u>White Collar</u>	<u>Laborers</u>	<u>Others</u>
1	20	2	11	3	3	1
2	20	2	66	5	3	4
3	16	2	1	6	1	6
5	8	1	0	2	2	3
6	44	4	10	11	5	14
7	44	4	4	18	5	13
8	6	0	1	0	1	4
9	41	4	4	10	18	5
10	18	2	0	5	7	4
11	6	1	1	1	3	0
12	16	3	1	3	6	3
Total	239	25	39	64	54	57

Data obtained from house registers in possession of the neighborhood association president. These registers list the occupation only of the head of the house. There is no number four kumi because of the superstition that four, which in Japanese has the same pronunciation as the word for death (shi) is an unlucky number.

Because the categories are very broad and the figures apply to heads of houses rather than working population, the data are of limited usefulness. What conclusions can be safely drawn are that for one, the kumi in which Sato's support is mainly located, the sixth and seventh, are the most populous in terms of number of houses. They are in fact the commercial center of the neighborhood. What is also apparent is that the four kumi on the east side of the railroad tracks where Sato

has his least support (9,10,11,12) are the only ones in which the number of laborers outnumber each of the other categories of workers. Particularly in the populous ninth kumi where Sato has no acknowledged supporter, the heads of eighteen of the forty-one houses are laborers. This area is truly the other side of the tracks of Ueno. It is a poor section that houses many people who work on the railroads. These kumi are socially isolated as well as physically separated from the western part of the chōnai which continually provides the leaders of the neighborhood association. In the western part Sato's lack of support in the fifth and third kumi is said to be due to the presence of a kumichō in the fifth who is an important supporter of Utsunomiya. Since prefectural assembly election days Sato has not been able to break Utsunomiya's (and accordingly Ayabe's) support in these two kumi. Sato's organized support in Ueno is in effect limited to three of eleven kumi in which the chōnaikai leadership is located. It is not present in those kumi where the leadership supports a different "line" in the local conservative politician factional divisions or in those populated by people engaged in occupations customarily regarded as sources of support for progressive parties. Whether this clustering of support means a similar clustering of votes is a moot question. At the least it means that the people invited to hear Sato speak in the chōnai, the people that receive Sato's greeting cards, newsletters and invitations to political rallies; in short, the

voters that are the object of the activities of Sato and his Ueno organization are concentrated in the few kumi where the chōnaikai leadership in his support is located.

In contrast to his perception of rational strategy in rural areas Sato saw little alternative in Beppu but to adopt a strategy that would provide opportunities to make a direct appeal to large numbers of the electorate. His sewanin in the neighborhoods were to deliver a small vote and campaign throughout their neighborhoods for him, but the organization could not by itself mobilize enough support for Sato's victory. As part of a strategy of obtaining the support of the general electorate as distinct from obtaining the support of a small number of community leaders Sato engaged in a systematic round of the 121 neighborhoods in the city addressing meetings of the local residents arranged by his neighborhood sewanin. The neighborhood speeches were begun late in 1965 but it was mainly in the eight to ten months preceding the January, 1967 election that Sato engaged, on the average of three speeches a week, in the Political Study Session approach to building support. Political Study Session, a free translation of Seiji Kyōshitsu, is a euphemism made necessary by the legal prohibition on all campaigning outside of a short specified period. By the time the House was dissolved and new elections called in December, 1966 Sato had succeeded in speaking at more than 100 of the city's 121 neighborhood associations.

In organizing his neighborhood speeches, Sato attempted

to cover one school district at a time, systematically going through the several chōnai in a district and then moving on to the next area. The first step in preparing for these speeches was to hold a dinner party at his brother-in-law's hotel for the sewanin from one of the school districts. Two or three men from each neighborhood in the district would be invited to these parties, all of which followed the same pattern. The sewanin sat in a semi-circle behind tables on the tatami floor with Sato at the open end of the semicircle. When everyone had arrived Sato opened the meeting by humbly expressing his indebtedness to these supporters and asking for their continued support. He then gave a short speech in which he outlined the talk he would give in their neighborhoods. He usually shared some interesting "inside" story of the campaign or of national politics to demonstrate the special position of confidence he wanted these men to feel they held in his organization. This pre-dinner formal talk usually lasted no more than half an hour. Following dinner Sato went around the semi-circle stopping in front of each guest, accepting a drink of sake from the guest's cup and sharing a few private words.

All together the dinner parties Sato held to organize meetings in the neighborhoods involved about 220 people. Attendance at the parties reaffirmed the sewanin's involvement in Sato's campaign and the responsibility placed upon them to arrange neighborhood meetings tested their enthusiasm and abilities. There is always a danger in an organization that exists largely by virtue of personal relationships of atrophy if these ties are not continuously reaffirmed and maintained.

The dinner parties gave Sato an opportunity to reaffirm those ties and to identify and begin to reconstitute those parts of the organization that had become atrophied.

Within a few days of these parties, Sato's secretary would visit each of those in attendance to arrange a time and place for a meeting in the neighborhoods. These neighborhood speeches were informal affairs lasting about two hours and with between twenty-five and forty people in attendance. Sometimes posters would be displayed in the neighborhood in advance of the meeting or the sewanin would, in the hours preceding the talk, walk down the narrow streets that wind through Beppu with a megaphone announcing the meeting. More often the sewanin, because of his knowledge of and involvement in neighborhood association affairs, would time the meeting to coincide with that of the women's club or the elderly people's club or some other chōnaikai meeting. Sato's audiences were always at least half female and the average age over fifty-five. The meetings were held in the home of the sewanin or in the neighborhood's public hall (kōminkan) if it had one. Before the meeting began Sato's staff would tack up large posters around the room with slogans such as "Food Prices Must Be Lowered" or "The Need For Structural Reform Of The LDP" and other posters that listed subjects such as "Religion And Politics," "Education and Politics," "Women And Politics," "Science And Politics," and "History And Politics." The guests were to choose one of these for Sato to talk about. After a little experimenting, Sato continued to display the posters but gave

a more or less standard speech in the neighborhoods dealing with all these topics and more.

Sitting in front of the thirty people or so who had come to listen to the sensei,<sup>34</sup> Sato would talk for an hour or two without notes. He would move from one anecdotal story to another, adeptly using the local dialect, interspersing his stories with humorous sidelights and entertaining his audiences with his intimate and engaging conversational style. Being in a place as far removed from the political and intellectual center of the country as Beppu is from Tokyo, Sato was aware and self-conscious of his lack of detailed knowledge of national questions, and believed that, as a new candidate, he could contribute little to a discussion of particular problems facing the Diet. Consequently he concentrated his talks on such broad topics as the spiritual malaise in postwar Japan, the need for a rejuvenation of the LDP, the importance of Japanese tradition and, his major theme, the need for renewed confidence in Japan's greatness. He appealed to a nostalgic affection for a bygone age and had his elderly audiences nodding their heads in agreement with his assertions of the uniqueness and greatness of the country that had produced the

---

<sup>34</sup> Political Study Session does not do justice to the Japanese term Seiji Kyōshitsu. Kyōshitsu literally translated is a classroom. The use of this term was to further the image of Sato as a teacher (sensei) who was holding a class in politics for the local residents. A speech Sato gave at another Political Study Session, one for a group of 500 women from the district, was representative of the speeches he gave in Beppu's neighborhoods. Sections of it are translated and discussed in Chapter VI.

tea ceremony, flower arranging, Zen Buddhism, and an extraordinary "spiritual culture" during a "reign of Emperors unbroken for ages eternal." His speeches put the accent on resurrection rather than reform, tradition rather than innovation and hardly reflected his self-proclaimed "new right" liberalism. This was largely due to the type of audiences Sato faced in his neighborhood speeches. Those who attended the Study Sessions tended to be conservatives politically active in the chōnaikai, elderly people with the free time to spend an evening listening to Sato and women active in the local women's club. As a conservative addressing conservatives and hoping to take votes away from other conservative candidates, Sato found it difficult to discuss issues on which his position was at the same time different from the other LDP candidates and appealing to his audience. Differences in policy with the incumbents were at the best differences of nuance and he was not anxious to stress these to the generally elderly groups he met in the neighborhoods. The only issue, if it could be called such, that set Sato apart from all the other candidates was the issue of getting younger conservatives into the Diet to rejuvenate the national party organization and the government. With the series of scandals that hit the LDP in the last months of 1966 this issue was given added relevance because of the call for "cleaning up" the conservative party. Sato, at forty-seven, was the youngest among the candidates and he made the most of his appeal as an energetic, handsome, studious and

sufficiently tradition-minded conservative untainted by corruption.

The major issue Sato harped upon in appealing to his audience was not one of policy but of geography. In addressing his neighborhood audiences, he constantly came back to emphasize that he was the only candidate from Beppu. He appealed to the sympathy and pride of the local residents to "get one of their own" into the Diet. He began every speech by thanking the people for the support they gave him in the previous Diet election and recollecting the "narrow margin" (wazuka na sa) by which he had lost. In addition to this attempt to pick up the "sympathy vote" (dōjōhyō), he also appealed to considerations of material interest, stressing the benefits eventually to be derived from having a Beppu man representing them at the highest level of government. As Sato invariably told his audiences, after twelve years in the prefectural assembly, he decided that "for the development of Beppu," he wanted to enter the "national political arena." "Entering the arena" is another euphemism made necessary by the election law. In his round of the neighborhoods Sato was giving "political" speeches, not campaign speeches. He never mentioned in so many words that he was going to run for the Diet nor did he ever directly ask the voters to vote for him in the election. This need to work around the prohibitions of the law contributed in part to making his speeches general, vague and unconcerned with specific policy questions.



Following his speech, Sato provided "recreation" for the audience, a term the Japanese have adopted to mean entertainment. What was extraordinary about this "recreation" was that it was a film supplied by the United States Information Agency about the war in Vietnam. Sato never mentioned to his audiences that it was an American film and just said that he had managed to get hold of a newsfilm of the "real war" in Vietnam. He never took any position on the war in talking to his audiences except for an anything but committal statement that everyone hates war and the Japanese should do whatever possible to bring this one to a speedy end. The main purpose of the film which was sixteen millimeter, in color and replete with gory scenes of Vietcong atrocities, was not to raise interest in the war, something Sato did not try to do, but rather to give the participants some entertainment which, if only by its shock value, would make Sato's Political Study Session a memorable occasion.<sup>35</sup> Following the movie Sato sat around with the guests for a few minutes over light refreshments. Held in the evenings and starting around 7:30 the Political Study Sessions usually ended by ten o'clock.

Through these neighborhood speeches Sato was able to speak to somewhat over 2,500 people. With their two pronged

---

<sup>35</sup>It is also interesting to note that the USIA film had apparently little effect in creating support for the American position in Vietnam among the people who watched it. The main effect of stressing Vietcong atrocities was judging from the comments of the viewers, to strengthen a strong pacifist emotion that drew little distinction between the agonies caused by the actions of the movie's alleged "good" side and those perpetrated by the enemy.

purpose of activating and testing the leadership of the neighborhood organization through the dinner parties and the arrangements for the neighborhood meetings and of bringing Sato into direct contact with the city's voters, the neighborhood speeches represent a connecting rod between a strategy of relying on a small organization of supporters to mobilize the vote and one that aims at directly organizing support among the general electorate. While Sato would be talking to his neighborhood association audiences, his secretary would be going around taking down the names and addresses of everyone in attendance. These formed the crucial meibo or name list for the neighborhood; the lists of people who would be sent New Year cards and copies of Sato's newsletter and who would be encouraged to become members of the Fusetsukai, Sato's "supporters' organization," the subject of the following chapter.

## CHAPTER V

### THE KŌENKAI

When Japan's adventure in empire building ended on August 15, 1945, the country lay in a state of physical collapse and spiritual despair. Largely blaming their own leaders for Japan's precipitous descent into chaos, many people questioned not only the virtues of those who had led them into disaster but the social and political system that had produced such leaders. With an Occupation philosophy that saw the sources of Japanese aggression in the nation's social structure and internal political system, demokurashii became the cherished ideal and all that could fall under the rubric of "feudalism" the disease to be eradicated. For the first time the primacy of the individual over the group was given legitimacy in the official ideology and a new constitution that reflected Western concepts of the rights of man adopted. The Occupation authorities undertook a program of directed social change that reached into nearly every nook and cranny of Japanese life. With a two-pronged objective of demilitarization and democratization, they pushed the adoption of various measures intended to shake the nation's rulers out of their seats of power and to provide a firm foundation for the development of democratic practices. Soon after the Occupation began, the voting age was lowered from twenty-five to twenty and women

within which campaign strategies operate. One Japanese political scientist in this connection has referred to the kōenkai as a "modern" form of political organization: "the typical Liberal Democratic Party member's kōenkai is a Japanese form of a "modern" political organization. This is an organization that first appeared in the postwar period with the expansion of the electorate and the fall from grace of the local bosses. It is a substitute for a formal party organization. It is not at all feudalistic but, on the contrary, is a technique which inevitably arose as a response to the destruction of the feudalistic order."<sup>2</sup>

There is some disagreement, however, about what it is about the kōenkai that makes it significantly "modern." Scholars such as Matsushita Keiichi maintain that the kōenkai is most importantly the organization of the "new ruling class," the local elected officials who have replaced the dispossessed landlords as the support base for conservative politicians.<sup>3</sup> The thesis forwarded by Matsushita and others is that the demise of the landlords forced the Diet candidate to expand his campaign organization to include a whole array of local officials in order to have the organization successfully

---

<sup>2</sup> Matsushita Keiichi, Sengo Minshu Shugi No Tenbō (Tokyo, 1965), p. 231; Cf. Soma Masao, Nihon No Senkyo Seiji (Tokyo, 1963), p. 121: "The building of individual candidate kōenkai is a phenomenon of the postwar period and is a reflection of changes that have occurred in community social structure."

<sup>3</sup> See Matsushita Keiichi, Gendai Nihon No Seijiteki Kōsei (Tokyo, 1964); chapters VI and VII and his Sengo Minshu Shugi No Tenbō, p. 150.

function in gathering the vote. Sociologist Fukutake Tadashi writes that "A Diet member builds his kōenkai around influential community leaders and spreads its net to include men of lesser influence. . . . At election time these big bosses (daibosu) and little bosses (kobosu) go to work on his behalf."<sup>4</sup>

Analyses such as these which emphasize the role of community leaders fail to give adequate attention to what is significantly modern about the kōenkai: the use of a mass membership organization with the function of organizing large numbers of the general electorate on behalf of a particular Diet candidate.

The use of local elected officials to perform functions provided by landlords in the prewar period was, as has been discussed in an earlier chapter, part of the response of Diet candidates to changes that occurred following the war. This strategy, however, represented only a limited change in techniques of support mobilization insofar as the ability of local politicians to deliver the vote was predicated on the same assumptions of community consensus and traditional hierarchical modes of social intercourse as had made landlords effective supporters before the war. What is significant about the use of such a campaign strategy in the postwar period is the change in the composition of the local elite and the lack of change in the functions the organization of such leaders is expected to

---

<sup>4</sup>Fukutake Tadashi, Nihon Nōson Shakai Ron (Tokyo, 1966), pp. 222-223.

perform.

The kōenkai, contrary to what the analyses of many Japanese scholars imply, represents more than a mere change in ruling personnel. It represents an innovation in campaign strategies and is to be contrasted with a strategy of reliance on local politicians and other community leaders. The kōenkai emerged as politicians tried to compensate for an inability of such elites to adequately perform their intended function: to gather enough votes to insure election. While relying on local leaders to deliver the vote to the extent possible, Diet candidates have in addition created kōenkai for the purpose of organizing support directly among the electorate. In terms of their functions and historical development, organizations of local leaders and organizations of the general electorate in the kōenkai represent distinct approaches to campaign strategy. One approach seeks to use an organization of restricted membership to provide extensive functions of delivering the vote while the other aims for an organization of mass membership with the more limited function of giving some degree of stability to a politician's support among the general electorate.

While no Japanese scholar has explicitly developed this thesis of the kōenkai being the organization of the general electorate as distinct from an organization of community leaders, some accept it implicitly. Thus, Tokyo professor Watanuki Jyoji, indicating his own drawing of a distinction between the support of the "ruling class" and that of members of the kōenkai, reports that "In the case of [the 1967] Diet

election, there was already talk of dissolution in the spring [of 1966] and a number of candidates, expending a great deal of money and energy, held meetings with the members of their kōenkai and with the local bosses. . . ."5

One reason for confusion about the nature of kōenkai is the quite common practice of Diet candidates to formally incorporate their supporters among local politicians within the kōenkai structure. The common pattern is for local politicians to be made "officers" of a kōenkai. One kōenkai in Saitama Prefecture, for instance, has thirty-eight kōenkai branches, spread over the district's three cities and six counties and counts among its leadership one-fifth of all Prefectural Assemblymen and half of the Assemblymen in several towns in the district.<sup>6</sup> Having such members is not what makes the kōenkai a "modern" political organization, however. Having an estimated membership of 40,000 is. Nakasone Yasuhiro has divided his constituency into seven federations and has his supporters at the Prefectural Assembly level serve as the "federation chiefs" of his kōenkai. Local Assemblymen are the presidents of the kōenkai chapters in the several towns and villages.<sup>7</sup> While such titles as "federation chief" may be

---

<sup>5</sup>Watanuki Jyōji, Nihon No Seiji Shakai (Tokyo, 1967), p. 222.

<sup>6</sup>Asahi Shinbun, January 4, 1967, p. 14.

<sup>7</sup>See the unpublished dissertation (Columbia, 1966) by Nathaniel Thayer, "How the Conservatives Rule Japan: A Study of Personality and Institution in the Liberal Democratic Party," pp. 114-115.

impressive, more significant is that there are somewhere around 50,000 members in Nakasone's kōenkai.

There are several reasons for incorporating local politicians into the kōenkai structure. For one, there is a greater air of "democracy" in a mass membership supporters' organization of which local community leaders are a part than in an organization purely of "bosses" who deliver the vote. By disguising in a sense their support among the bosses in the robes of the kōenkai, the Diet politician can to some extent avoid the criticism of being an old style or "feudalistic" type politician. For another, institutionalizing the support of local politicians in a kōenkai, with the feeling of self importance that attaches to such titles as "federation chief," makes it somewhat more difficult for the local politician to switch support to another candidate. Thirdly, the incorporation of local politicians into the kōenkai in some cases reflects their changing functions in the Diet campaign. Some Diet members see the function of the local politician not to be the gathering of votes by techniques they consider effective in only the most rural communities but rather the more limited one of adding prestige, providing opportunities for the candidate to meet with voters and recruit members for his kōenkai and influencing the electorate in terms of explaining to his own constituents the benefits to be gained from voting for the Diet candidate he supports. Such a limited role is opposed by the local politicians themselves because they obviously have the most to gain the more their support is believed to be



crucial to the candidate's success. The kōenkai is not only not the organization of the local politicians; it is the most serious challenge to the continuation of a dominant role for such leaders in Diet campaign strategy.

The membership of kōenkai of LDP Diet members is in some cases of almost staggering proportions. One kōenkai in Saitama Prefecture has already been mentioned as having a membership of 40,000. Another in Osaka's Third District is reported to have over 30,000 members.<sup>8</sup> In one district in Gumma Prefecture, Fukuda Takeo has 50,000 people in his kōenkai and Nakasone Yasuhiro has another 50,000 in his. Perhaps the most mammoth was that of the late Ono Bamboku whose Bokuyūkai (the Friends of [Bam]boku Club) is alleged to have had a membership of as many as 150,000 people.<sup>9</sup> In all it is estimated that kōenkai of LDP Diet members have a total membership of somewhere around ten million.<sup>10</sup>

Kōenkai usually consist of several divisions: a women's group, a youth group and so on. One Diet member's kōenkai consists of a youth friendship club (seinen dōshikai), a women's club, a "blue cloud" club (Seiunkai, the term "blue cloud" being used to refer to those who harbor lofty ambitions) and a Hotokukai, a term referring to Buddhist moral principles and

---

<sup>8</sup> Asahi Shinbun, January 3, 1966, p. 14.

<sup>9</sup> Ishida Takeshi, Gendai Soshiki Ron (Tokyo, 1965), p. 81.

<sup>10</sup> Watanuki Jyōji, Seiji Shakai, p. 67.

used as a euphemism for an elderly people's club.<sup>11</sup> The kōenkai of Nakasone Yasuhiro, in addition to having groups similar to these, also has been trying to develop a separate division for young ladies.

Although the "supporters' organization" is in fact created and financed by the politician it is to support, the fiction is maintained that the kōenkai is created by the will of the people to advance the political career of a particular person. The politician at the head of a kōenkai constantly endeavors to expand the organization's membership in order to foster an image of mass support which in turn is used to attract new support. The members participate vicariously in the politician's political career and are encouraged to see themselves as the backbone of his support. The hoped for result is some stability in support and a group of enthusiastic campaigners.

Despite the emphasis that is placed on recruitment, kōenkai membership is generally of an informal sort. Politicians tend to avoid putting the voter in a situation where he must make a conscious choice between joining or not joining a support organization. Rather, through his kōenkai, the politician sponsors various activities which serve to give him publicity and contact with large numbers of the electorate. Through such activities and through the followup of greeting

---

<sup>11</sup> Asahi Shinbun, January 4, 1967, p. 14.

cards, kōenkai newspapers and the like, the participants are gradually made to feel a sense of identification with the politician and a commitment to his political success. In many kōenkai, membership is largely the name lists of people who have participated in kōenkai activities. This is particularly true of non-incumbent or new members of the Diet who have not had sufficient time to build up their organizations.

Few kōenkai apparently collect membership dues though many officially have a nominal membership fee, usually of one hundred yen or so per year. Even where dues are collected, the kōenkai member is more than reimbursed by the activities he enjoys at kōenkai expense. These activities have been the source for considerable strident criticism, particularly in the mass media. Just before the 1967 Diet election, several national newspapers ran series on the kōenkai. The title of the Asahi Shinbun<sup>12</sup> series is typical of the tone of the reporting: "The Kōenkai - Background to the Black Mist," the black mist being the term given to corruption exposed in the months preceding the election. These articles invariably stressed the party-like atmosphere of kōenkai meetings, the provision at ridiculously low cost or at no cost at all of trips to hot springs, sightseeing tours of the Diet building, records, fans, towels and other souvenirs of the Diet member and in general an emphasis upon entertaining the participants

---

<sup>12</sup> See series "Kōenkai - Kuroi Kiri No Haikai," Asahi Shinbun, January 1-8, 1967.

lest they start thinking about politics. The value of the meals, the souvenirs and the other things the membership enjoys at kōenkai expense far exceed the amount of money they are requested to pay. As one scholar lamented: "In the United States a hundred-dollar-a-plate dinner is held with the money remaining after the costs of the dinner being used for the politician's campaign. In Japan, the kōenkai method is to give the members a vacation at a hot springs for a hundred yen membership fee."<sup>13</sup>

Following the 1967 Diet elections, the Fair Elections Federation conducted the first nationwide poll to question voters about the kōenkai. Voters were asked the question, "Are you a member of a kōenkai that give support to a particular candidate?" For those who answered "No" or "Don't Know" the pollsters asked if the respondent had ever been asked to join a kōenkai or had been a member of one in the past two to three years. The responses are found in Table 16. Most striking is the small percentage of people who said they were members of a kōenkai (5.8 per cent), a much smaller percentage of the electorate than is estimated by both scholars and politicians to be kōenkai members. Over 80 per cent maintained they had never been a member nor had they ever been asked to join a kōenkai. Only 1.5 per cent of the respondents said they pay a kōenkai membership fee (see Table 17). Kōenkai

---

<sup>13</sup> Tsuji Kiyooki, "Mūdo to Jitsueki No Tatakai," Asahi Janaru, IX (February 12, 1967), 14.

TABLE 16

## KŌENKAI MEMBERSHIP

"Are you a member of a kōenkai that gives support to a candidate?" For those who answer No or Don't Know: "Have you ever been asked in the past two or three years to join a kōenkai?"

	Not a Member; Don't Know			
	Yes	Have been asked	Am not now a member but have been a member in the past 2-3 years	Have not been asked; don't know
Total (N = 2,484)	5.8	11.4	1.8	81.0
7 metropolitan cities	4.2	18.1	2.4	75.3
small & medium size cities	6.4	11.0	1.9	80.6
(medium size)	7.3	14.2	2.0	76.4
(small size)	5.3	6.9	1.8	85.9
towns and villages	5.8	8.0	1.3	84.9
Age:				
20-29	3.3	8.4	0.8	87.5
30-39	5.7	12.8	1.7	79.7
40-49	6.7	13.5	2.4	77.4
50-59	6.8	12.9	2.6	77.7
60-over	7.0	8.0	1.5	83.4
Age:Male				
20-29	5.4	11.4	-	83.2
30-39	8.5	18.8	1.5	71.2
40-49	9.3	18.7	3.1	68.9
50-59	9.9	18.0	4.1	68.0
60-over	10.8	11.3	2.0	76.0
total	8.9	16.0	2.2	73.0
Age:Female				
20-29	2.0	6.6	1.3	90.1
30-39	3.6	8.3	1.9	83.5
40-49	4.7	9.8	1.9	83.5
50-59	3.4	7.4	1.0	88.2
60-over	3.1	4.6	1.0	91.2
total	3.4	7.6	1.5	87.4
Education:				
primary	3.9	5.2	1.0	89.8
old high primary; new jun. hi.	5.9	11.0	1.9	81.2
old middle; new high school	6.2	13.6	2.3	77.9
old higher&technical; new un.	6.5	17.3	1.1	75.1

TABLE 16 (continued)

D	Not a Member; Don't Know			
	Yes	Have been asked	Am not now a member but have been a member in the past 2-3 years	Have not been asked; don't know
<b>Occupation:</b>				
<b>self employed:</b>				
agriculture; forestry; fishing	9.5	13.9	2.2	74.5
merchant, service trades	10.8	20.2	2.9	66.1
other self employment	17.1	5.7	8.6	68.6
<b>employed:</b>				
total	4.9	13.2	1.3	80.7
administrators, managers	9.5	38.1	-	52.4
technical; white collar	5.7	13.9	0.9	79.5
laborers	3.6	9.7	1.7	85.0
<b>family workers:</b>				
agriculture; forestry; fishing	2.9	2.9	1.4	92.8
merchant, service, other	8.1	10.1	1.0	80.8
housewives	3.9	9.6	2.1	84.4
others, unemployed	4.8	6.8	0.8	87.6
<b>Political Party Supporters:</b>				
(in 1967 Diet election)	6.4	12.0	1.8	79.8
LDP	7.9	13.3	1.7	77.2
JSP-DSP-JCP-Komeito	6.0	11.9	2.0	80.1
JSP	4.6	10.6	1.8	83.0
DSP	6.6	14.0	3.7	75.7
JCP	9.4	21.9	-	68.8
Komeito	15.9	14.5	1.4	68.1
Independ. & Minor Parties	3.8	11.5	-	84.5
Others	-	-	-	100.0
Don't Know	1.0	5.5	1.5	92.0
Non-voters	6.8	10.9	1.6	80.8

Source: Kōmei Senkyo Renmei, Shūgiin Giin Sōsenkyo No Jittai, pp. 77-78.

TABLE 17

## KŌENKAI MEMBERSHIP FEE

"Do you pay a kōenkai membership fee?"

	Kōenkai Members	Pay	Do Not Pay	Don't Know
Total (N=2,484)	5.8	1.5	4.2	0.1
7 metropolitan cities	4.2	0.9	3.3	-
small & medium size cities	6.4	1.3	5.0	0.2
towns and villages	5.8	2.2	3.6	0.1

Source: Kōmei Senkyo Renmei, Shūgin Giin Sōsenkyo No Jittai, p. 81.

membership is almost certainly somewhat greater than this response would indicate but the low affirmative response perhaps reflects the informality of much kōenkai membership.

Looked at from a somewhat different perspective, even this small percentage of people who said they were members of a kōenkai, if projected to the entire electorate, represents a substantial number. In the 1967 Diet election 63 million people were eligible to vote. If the sample of the poll is representative some 3-1/2 to 4 million voters considered themselves to be members of kōenkai and a total of some 12 million had in one way or another had contact with these supporters' organizations.

Other data in the poll concerning the types of people that are kōenkai members suggest that kōenkai are more popular with older than younger voters and more with men than with women. Kōenkai have more members among the self-employed and

management level employees than among blue and white collar workers. This is due to kōenkai being formed mainly by politicians within the LDP which has greater support among employer and management classes than among others. The poll's breakdown of kōenkai members in terms of party support, however, is inconclusive and reflects a general confusion and misunderstanding about the meaning of the term itself. The 30 per cent of those who voted for the Communist party that allegedly are members of kōenkai or have been asked to become members are probably referring to a request to join the Party, not a personal support organization.

Kōenkai may have another important characteristic that is not reflected in the polls in figures statistically significant. This is that kōenkai appear to be most prevalent in small and medium-sized cities and less so in both rural and metropolitan areas. The tentative hypothesis forwarded here in this regard is that in highly rural areas reliance on local leaders to mobilize support is the dominant campaign strategy and the need for kōenkai not perceived as crucial by the candidate. The small or medium-sized city, by way of contrast, is large enough to make politicians aware of a breakdown in modes of social behavior that rationalize reliance on community leaders to deliver the vote while at the same time is of a size small enough to make rational a strategy that aims ultimately at bringing into an organization a large proportion of the people who vote for them. Heavily populated urban areas,



on the other hand, may make unrealistic such an attempt at organizing the general voter since extremely large numbers of votes are needed for election. When I asked Kono Yohei,<sup>14</sup> a young Diet member from a district in Kanagawa Prefecture near Tokyo about his kōenkai, he replied that he did not give it much attention because in his district, one of the areas referred to as Tokyo's "bedroom," a residential heavily populated area from which people commute to work in the nation's capitol, there are too many floating votes. His belief is that it would be impossible to organize enough voters into a kōenkai to make the endeavor worthwhile. In his district he had no choice but to put major emphasis on a strategy that provided maximum personal exposure to the voters through speeches and whatever coverage could be obtained in the mass media. Thus, further research into the kōenkai and future developments in Japanese campaign strategies may mark the kōenkai as being something of a mid-point on a rural-urban continuum.

What can be said about kōenkai on the basis of information presently available is that they are organizations of politicians created by them for the purpose of expanding and to some extent institutionalizing their support among the general electorate. They aim for mass membership in order to build a broad base of support among the average voters as an alternative or addition to a campaign strategy that gives local

---

<sup>14</sup> Interview, July 1967.

politicians and other community notables the responsibility of gathering and delivering a substantial vote.

The development of mass membership organizations to support particular LDP politicians has been paralleled by a concerted effort on the part of the LDP to make more effective the party's regional organizations. As part of that effort, the LDP has attempted to incorporate the kōenkai into the party structure with a view to eventually dissolving these personal organizations and making election campaigning party oriented and party directed. This attempt has been notably unsuccessful and has exposed the fundamental conflict between the kōenkai and the party.

Yamanashi Prefecture has been a particular target for LDP organizational efforts and a serious attempt has been made there to bring the kōenkai into the Party's organizational structure. The inability of the Party organization to gain any control over these personal organizations and the obstacle to the Party's organizational development that the kōenkai present was given graphic expression in the February 16, 1960 report of the Secretary-General and Chairman of the Organization Committee of the Yamanashi Prefecture LDP Chapter.

Each Diet member before committing himself to the regeneration of the prefecture chapter's "living organization" works at forming, with a large monetary investment, his personal kōenkai in each town and village in the prefecture in order to secure his own support. Particularly when rumors of Diet dissolution arise, each Diet member tends to become absorbed solely in this effort. As a serious obstacle to [party] organization, [the kōenkai] is a source of constant despair. . . . The personal kōenkai disintegrates the party's basic organization

in the prefecture. As long as stern measures are not taken against the personal kōenkai, all the splendid plans party headquarters may make for the consolidation of the party organization are similar to the hope that fish can be had from wood.<sup>15</sup>

The fundamental reason for this conflict between the kōenkai and the party is the fear of individual candidates that in the single entry ballot multi-member districting system, party control would in fact work to the benefit of some candidates and to the disadvantage of others depending on the degree of support commanded by these individuals among the chapter's leaders. The authors of a study called Senkyo (Elections) have written in regard to this point that "In addition to the fact [that the] organizational base of political parties is weak], when attempts are made to organize, they are blocked by the personal kōenkai . . . the reason being that if Diet members and candidates turned over to the party the meibo (name lists) of their own kōenkai there would be considerable likelihood that other candidates would use it to cut into their personal support. Politicians, therefore, oppose bringing their own supporters into the party organization."<sup>16</sup> The same instinct for self-preservation that keeps local politicians from sharing the name lists of their supporters with the Diet candidate they support works on the Diet candidate to keep his supporters secret from possible opponents and, thus, secret

---

<sup>15</sup>Quoted in Matsushita, Gendai Nihon No Seijiteki Kōsei, p. 150.

<sup>16</sup>Kobayashi Naoki, Shinohara Hajime and Soma Masao, Senkyo (Tokyo, 1960), p. 91.

from the party organization.

The LDP Chapter in Oita Prefecture has also attempted to effect some kind of communication between the Party organization and the kōenkai of the several Diet members in the Prefecture. In the Chapter's 1961 report on planned party activities, the Committee on Election Strategy indicated as one of the Party's prime goals the "development of close communication and cooperation between the [Party] organization and the kōenkai."<sup>17</sup> The Committee envisaged the creation of a group of liaison men which would establish ties between the Chapter organization and the individual kōenkai and which would provide information necessary for the Party to coordinate the campaign activities of its candidates. In preparation for the Upper House election in 1962, the chapter prepared a document entitled "The Establishment of a Campaign Organization Structure."<sup>18</sup> A major point of this document was that "Only those kōenkai . . . activities which are conducted within the framework of the chapter organization's activities will be allowed. Kōenkai activities will be conducted in close cooperation with the chapter and under the unified command of the chapter's election strategy committee. . . ." It was expected that once the party chapter, through the system of liaison men, had established some sort of direction over

---

<sup>17</sup> Jiyūminshutō Oita Kenren, Katsudō Hōshin (Oita, 1961), p. 28.

<sup>18</sup> Jiyūminshutō Oita Kenren, Senkyo Soshiki Taisei No Kakuritsu (Oita, 1962).

kōenkai activities, it would be possible to then dissolve the kōenkai by bringing their members into the party organization and having the party conduct the election campaigns of its candidates. The plan never got off the ground. The liaison men were regarded as spies by the kōenkai with which they were supposed to communicate and the fear that any information given the party would serve the interests of a competing politician caused the entire project to collapse.

By 1966 the chapter had given up any attempt to gain influence over the campaign activities of its candidates. The chapter's new position was that as long as the present electoral system continued to exist, the chapter could play no effective role in the election campaign beyond making recommendations for party endorsement. People who were primarily concerned with the fortunes of individual candidates should be encouraged to join kōenkai while the party's efforts should be concentrated on developing a group of dedicated party workers. Reversing itself completely from its position five years earlier, the chapter decided that rather than try to regulate the campaigns of its endorsed candidates, it would be best to let the party's candidates fight each other freely. The fiercer the battle, the more the candidates would attempt to increase their votes and, in the aggregate, the greater the total number of votes the party would receive. One of the candidates who built up his kōenkai for such a battle in this Prefecture was Sato Bunsei.

Organizations which are clearly for the purpose of supporting a politician are defined as political groups (seiji dantai) in the Political Funds Regulation Law<sup>19</sup> and are required to register with the Autonomy Ministry or its local election management commission within seven days of formation.<sup>20</sup> Such political groups must submit annual accounts of all income and expenditures to the Ministry.<sup>21</sup> Few kōenkai, however, are registered. The common practice is for politicians to establish the organization as a so-called "cultural club" (bunka dantai) that ostensibly has a broad range of interests and usually consists of several divisions for women, youth, mountain climbers, music lovers and the like but which in fact has the one function of mobilizing support for a particular politician. The use of such cultural clubs avoids the necessity of submitting financial accounts and, because of its wide range of activities, allows for an appeal to a broad sector of the electorate without forcing a conscious decision on whether or not to join a political club. One of the few academics to analyze the kōenkai writes that there are "two major groups [of kōenkai]: those which are clearly for the purpose of supporting and backing a particular Diet member or Diet candidate . . . and those which are ostensibly cultural clubs . . . with the Diet member or candidate as president and which serve

---

<sup>19</sup> Seiji Shikin Kisei Hō, Article 3.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., Article 6.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid., Article 12.

as campaign organizations when the president is a candidate for office."<sup>22</sup> Even more common for incumbent Diet members is to have both types of organizations. One, duly registered with the Local Autonomy Ministry, is usually located in Tokyo and is for the financial backers of the politician. The other "cultural club" is organized in the election district and is the politician's general membership organization among the electorate. In general use the term kōenkai refers to the organization among the voters in the politician's district.

"In 1957 the cultural club, the Fusetsukai, was born as an organ of friendship bringing together our elders, friends, and juniors."<sup>23</sup> This "Wind and Snow Society" is Sato's kōenkai. The Fusetsukai organization is fairly typical of the LDP kōenkai. It was modeled after the Seiunkai or Blue Cloud Society of Nakasone Yasuhiro who was the guest speaker at the Fusetsukai's gala inaugural meeting. Sato's kōenkai has several divisions. There is a reading club, a mountain climbing club, a club for travelling, a youth organization, a women's division and a division "for the study of politics and economics." The Fusetsukai has a headquarters, the Fusetsukaikan, built as an annex to Sato's home in Beppu. Unlike the imposing structures that house the kōenkai of some incumbent Diet members, the Fusetsukaikan is a small two-story

---

<sup>22</sup>Yoshimura Tadashi, Nihon Seiji No Shindan (Tokyo, 1965), p. 223.

<sup>23</sup>Fusetsu Kaihō, March 1, 1964.

building with an office downstairs and one large room on the second floor that can accommodate twenty to twenty-five people. It is here that Sato's staff, officially the Fusetsukai staff, works. The permanent staff is small, consisting of a director, a secretary and two clerical workers. Also on the staff is Saita Matato, forty-nine years old, the owner of a small inn in Beppu, and Sato's unofficial sanbōchō, a military term meaning the head of the general staff and used by politicians to refer to their campaign manager.<sup>24</sup>

After his defeat in the 1963 election, Sato writing in his kōenkai newspaper, the Fusetsu Kaihō, told his readers that "the flame of our ideals has not been extinguished" and appealed for new Fusetsukai members to help carry that flame forward.<sup>25</sup> At the time of the January, 1967 election, the Fusetsukai claimed a membership of about 8,000 people, almost all of whom lived in Beppu.

"Membership" in the Fusetsukai, as in kōenkai generally, is largely informal. Particularly for a non-incumbent candidate like Sato whose kōenkai is still in the formative stages, the membership is largely the name lists of people known to support him or people with whom he has come into direct contact, such as audiences at the neighborhood speeches, and those who have taken part in some kōenkai activity. Building

---

<sup>24</sup> Like Americans, Japanese use a great deal of military terminology in regard to elections.

<sup>25</sup> Fusetsu Kaihō, March 1, 1964.



kōenkai membership is largely a matter of meticulously building up these name lists, bombarding the people on them with a constant stream of correspondence and inviting them to Fusetsukai functions, all of course at the expense of the politician who is being supported by the kōenkai. Membership dues of one hundred yen a year are accepted if proffered by a voter but are not systematically collected. While there is a small percentage of members who acknowledge their membership, faithfully pay dues and wear a Fusetsukai badge in their lapel, membership for the great majority is informal.

The Fusetsukai is organized almost exclusively in Beppu. Only here did Sato have an already established base of broad support as a result of his prefectural assembly elections and only here could he appeal as the hometown candidate to the voters to band together to get a native son into the Diet. In addition to these factors, the concentration of kōenkai activities in Beppu was the result of Sato's basic perception of the differences between floating and hard votes and their implications for strategy. The kōenkai is for the purpose of organizing the floating vote and accordingly it was a technique used mainly in those areas where floating votes were seen as most prevalent. In rural areas Sato's kōenkai activities were of a tentative, almost wary sort as if he were hesitantly jabbing at the structure of his own perception of hard votes and the inaccessibility of the rural electorate. In the few places where he was urged by local politicians who supported

him to meet with the electorate he established "chapters" of the Fusetsukai. Kunisaki town assemblyman Takami, as discussed in Chapter III, urged Sato to speak in his village. At one of these meetings the Kunisaki town, Kamikunisaki village chapter of the Fusetsukai was dedicated with Assemblyman Takami being made chapter president (shibuchō). Chapters were established in a few other places as well but these represented a very limited attempt at introducing new strategies into the rural sectors of the district and were never considered as an alternative to a strategy of reliance on local politicians. Sato drew a clear distinction between his elitist supporters and the functions they were to perform and the kōenkai. Even when the former, as in the case of Takami, were given positions in the kōenkai, they were considered responsible for performing functions of gathering the vote distinctly separate from functions related to kōenkai membership.

Sato's perception of rural and non-rural voting behavior not only inhibited him from attempting to extensively use the kōenkai approach in rural areas but led him to largely discount the impact of the rural voters that were brought into the kōenkai in areas such as Takami's village in Kunisaki. In Sato's strategy a member of the Fusetsukai in Beppu is calculated to provide him with five votes. The presence of floating voters generally indifferent to the various candidates and not susceptible to the pressures of local community leaders means

that any supporter should be able to obtain the votes of at least two or three people outside his own family. An energetic campaigner without any particular influence in his community should be able to obtain the support of ten or so voters for the candidate he supports. Thus 5,000 Beppu members of the Fusetsukai should provide close to 25,000 votes. In rural areas, in contrast, such non-elite voters were calculated to provide no more than three votes apiece. Here Sato's view was that even if he obtained the enthusiastic support of a farmer somewhere in the district, everyone around him would have ties with particular candidates or their influential supporters. In a rural area there are no floating votes to whom the average voter can appeal to vote for the candidate he supports and consequently his influence is limited to his own immediate family. In formulating his campaign strategy Sato not only considered attempts at building kōenkai membership in rural areas largely futile but felt that even if some members could be recruited their influence in convincing others to vote for him were almost nil. Consequently, Sato's kōenkai activities were limited almost entirely to Beppu and the second largest city of Nakatsu.

Despite the various divisions of the Fusetsukai and the large number of functions this cultural club ostensibly engages in, the activities of the kōenkai are directed exclusively to organizing support for Sato. The Fusetsukai publishes at irregular intervals the Fusetsu Kaihō which gives accounts of

Sato's activities and occasionally publishes pamphlets or books by or about Sato. Members are the objects of an almost unbroken stream of correspondence: copies of the Fusetsu Kaiho, New Year and Mid-Summer cards and other materials that keep them informed of the latest developments in Sato's political career. When Sato gives a speech it is "sponsored" by the Fusetsukai and Sato appears as the guest sensei. Having the kōenkai sponsor a meeting is a useful technique not only for the image of grass roots support it gives the "invited" sensei, but because it provides a convenient means for getting around the legal ban on pre-election campaigning. Sato in his speeches before the beginning of the official campaign period was merely discussing political matters with members of the club for the study of politics and economics that is one of the divisions of the Fusetsukai.

Like many other politicians Sato uses his kōenkai as the ostensible sponsor for virtually all his activities. As a result, the Fusetsukai operates very much like a small political party. People identify with it and turn to it for various favors and services much as Americans turned to the urban party machine in its heyday earlier in the century. It is this doing of a great variety of favors for the electorate that imposes the greatest demands on the kōenkai staff's time and on the politician's purse.

The reasons for the considerable emphasis Sato places on the doing of favors can be analyzed in terms of political

dynamics applicable to any system of representative democracy. The Japanese politician is not unique in seeing the benefits to be derived from doing favors for the people who go to the polls. It is important to note, however, that the doing of favors, for Sato and other LDP politicians, is not only for the purpose of obtaining the vote of the recipient of the favor in the relevant election, but is a specific means for recruiting kōenkai members. Once in the Fusetsukai the voter who had been the recipient of a favor from Sato would be the object of Fusetsukai correspondence and would in the candidate's strategy be expected to campaign for other votes on his behalf. Doing favors is intended to produce a sense of indebtedness to and a feeling of identification not with a political party but with a particular politician and his kōenkai.

A visit to the Fusetsukai headquarters on almost any day reveals the central role the doing of favors plays in the daily activities of Sato and his staff. A culling of entries from a diary I kept while living in Sato's home gives an idea of the atmosphere in the headquarters: "At 9:00 this morning when I went down to the office there was already a man waiting for Sato's secretary to arrive. When he did the visitor said that he was from Nishi school district and was told by Sato's sewanin in a neighborhood in the district that the Fusetsukai could help him find a job for his son in one of Beppu's hotels. The secretary immediately got on the phone to arrange for an interview for the son at a nearby hotel. Just as he was

leaving, the octogenarian president of the elderly people's club in Sato's own neighborhood came in to ask if Sato would contribute a couple of bottles of sake for the meeting the club was holding that evening. . . . Sato's secretary spent the afternoon today driving around Hasuda school district inviting the sewanin to a dinner party in preparation for the neighborhood speeches Sato wants to begin there next month. While he was out several people dropped by to have a cup of tea and pass on the latest gossip about so-and-so switching support from Nishimura to Ayabe and some former supporter of Noyori who has 'at least a hundred votes he'll give to Sato if Sato pays him a personal courtesy call.' One very diffident woman whose son had failed a high school entrance exam came in to ask if there was anything Sato could do to have him admitted to the school anyway. . . . Sato spent the afternoon at a wedding in which he was acting as official middleman. This is the third wedding he has had to officiate at this week. . . ." There is an almost unceasing stream of visitors to the Fusetsukai office that gives it the atmosphere of being a combination employment agency, school placement service, marriage counseling center and a kind of social club where people may drop in, have a cup of tea and talk of elections and politics.<sup>26</sup> From early

---

<sup>26</sup>This atmosphere is reminiscent of that of political clubs in the fabled heyday of the urban party machine in the United States: "[It] offered . . . a range of services that made it, in contemporary terms, a combination of employment agency, legal aid society, social worker, domestic relations counselor, and community social center." See Frank J. Sorauf, Political Parties in the American System (Boston, 1964), p. 4.

in the morning to late at night Sato worked to do favors for the voters. The "agony of the three kai (sankai no kurushimi) is the expression Sato has coined to describe his daily life: interviews (menkai), introductions (shōkai) and dinner parties (enkai).

The combination of being a non-incumbent candidate and a locality-oriented politician lent a highly local color to Sato's activities and the nature of the favors and services he could provide the constituents. Heading the list of favors Sato does for the voters is help in getting jobs and in school placement. In 1966 the Fusetsukai was asked to help nearly 100 people to get into high school. In 1967 seventy-three such requests were received. Sato has close ties with several high school principals in Beppu who are strong supporters of the LDP in contrast to the teachers on their staffs who are members of the Japan Teachers Union (Nikkyōsō) which supports the Socialist Party. He prevails upon these friends to admit border line cases and his staff is in constant contact with the child's parents, keeping them informed of Sato's efforts. Where unsuccessful Sato tries to get the student into a less difficult high school. In March and April, graduation time in Japan, school entrance is practically the sole concern of the Fusetsukai staff. There are also attempts to help students get into college but here Sato cannot exert the influence he has with the high school principals. Similarly there are 100 to 150 requests yearly for aid in finding desired employment.

There is one hotel in Beppu in which virtually the entire staff was hired through Sato and Murakami Isamu, his faction boss. In the case of incumbent Diet members the number of requests such as these goes much higher.<sup>27</sup> In Sato's case these activities were limited almost entirely to Beppu.

A considerable portion of Sato's time and daily expenses are involved in the favors he does in connection with what is called in Japanese kankonsōsai, literally the occasions of coming of age, marriage and death, a term used to refer generally to all ceremonious occasions. In the Fusetsukai office there is, for example, a large file of miai shashin, pictures of eligible young ladies whose parents have asked Sato's help in finding a suitable suitor. In addition to this matchmaking role, Sato and his wife act as the official matchmaker (i.e. for the ceremony only) at weddings on the average of once or twice a month. In the marriage seasons of the fall and spring, attending weddings becomes an almost daily activity.

One of the kankonsōsai activities which entails a

---

<sup>27</sup> Newspapers, particularly around election time, provide a wealth of information on the services Diet men provide their constituents. See, for examples Asahi Shinbun, January 4, 1967, p. 14 and Mainichi Shinbun, January 3, 1967, p. 1. Though activities of the Diet politicians in their home districts are generally neglected in academic writings, there are brief discussions in Fujiwara Hirotsu and Tomita Nobuo, Seijiaku e no haisen (Tokyo, 1967), pp. 31ff., Yomiuri Shinbun Seijibu Hen, Seitō (Tokyo, 1966), pp. 21ff., and Ishii Kinichiro and Yamada Hiroshi, Gendai Nihon No Seiji (Tokyo, 1967), pp. 79-88.



constant and considerable expense is the sending of wreaths to funerals in the district. In Beppu alone Sato sends an average of fifteen each month, large round wreaths of artificial flowers with the donor's name in big characters in the center. He sends an additional ten a month to funerals in areas outside of the city. His sewanin in the neighborhoods inform his office of any deaths in the area and whether the occasion necessitates a wreath, the presence of Sato or a staff member or merely a telegram of condolence.

The Japanese year is dotted with an almost continuous series of religious and social celebrations that the politician utilizes for sending greetings and presents to constituents. At the beginning of the year Sato sends New Year cards and in the middle of the year Mid-Summer greeting cards to approximately 20,000 voters in the district. He also occasionally sends early summer or late summer cards. At the time of the Bon festival in honor of the spirits of the deceased, presents and greetings are sent for hatsubon, for people who have lost a relative within the year since the previous Bon festival. In 1967, for instance, Sato's wife and three members of Sato's staff travelled over the whole district personally delivering 300 packages of incense to those observing the hatsubon. Sympathy cards were sent to many others.

Through these types of activities and an innumerable variety of others, the politician expresses his interest in

and his concern for the people of his constituency and strives for the reputation most sought by politicians, that of sewazuki--a person who likes to do favors.<sup>28</sup>

Contributions (kifu) require a special note because of the great expense they entail for the politician in his home district. From a couple of bottles of sake for an elderly people's club party to several thousand yen for the building of a bridge or a public hall or for a religious group, the politician, particularly a Diet member or Diet candidate, is called upon to make contributions for a variety of groups and purposes. The goshugi, the gratuity or congratulatory gift that Sato brings to every function he is invited to as a guest or, when he cannot attend; delivers through the local liquor store in the form of sake, is a small but constant expense. In addition to these are large contributions, ones that hit hard at the politician's pocketbook but which show that he is "looking after" his district. In the months I lived with Sato there were contributions of considerable sums for the building of a new roof for a Buddhist temple in Usa county, for the

---

<sup>28</sup>The reputation sought by the Diet member or candidate received fitting expression in the following statement by a supporter of an incumbent member of the Diet: "Thanks to the sensei, bridges were built, roads were made wider. Whenever there was a fire he always kindly sent a condolence gift. He was generous whenever asked to make a contribution and he invited us to take trips at very little expense. In finding jobs or helping out with school entrance he was always there, a man thick in giri ninjō." See Mainichi Shinbun, January 3, 1967, p. 1.

building of two public halls in Beppu, for the building of a bridge in Kitsuki, for the erection of a statue in honor of a famous Meiji period dentist in Nakatsu and a sizeable donation to a religious group in Beppu that was supporting Sato. The financial burden such contributions place on Diet politicians has become a matter of national concern and the Fifth Electoral System Study Council has recommended that they be prohibited by law.<sup>29</sup> The giving of such contributions is, however, so much a part of social custom that the politician is in constant fear of getting a reputation for being stingy or disdainful of the customs of the common people if he refuses to make them.

The above-mentioned activities, it need hardly be stressed, entail a considerable financial burden. The cost of various greeting cards and presents alone is well over one million yen annually. In addition there is a minimum expense of 600,000 to 700,000 yen a month. This does not include campaign expenses or the cost of special projects nor does it include personal family expenses. In one typical month, for example, Sato spent 680,000 yen. This included 250,000 yen in office expenses and 280,000 in contributions. The latter were for the construction of three public halls, the refurbishing of a shrine, donations for two shrine festivals and another

---

<sup>29</sup> See Yomiuri News, April 4, 1967, p. 1.

toward the building of a bridge. During the month Sato sent twenty funeral wreaths and spent 30,000 yen in telegrams of condolence. Another 100,000 yen was spent for dinner parties and entertainment.<sup>30</sup>

The supporters' organization, as mentioned earlier, does not, despite its name, provide financial support. For his daily expenses Sato relied on three sources of income.<sup>31</sup> The most important was the salary he received as Board Chairman (kaicho) of an electrical engineering company with offices in Oita City. The position of Board Chairman is an honorary one, the real control of the firm being in the hands of its shacho (company president). A second source of funds is the stipend received from serving as advisor (komon) to several business firms in the Prefecture. Sato is officially advisor to four firms and unofficially receives a monthly stipend from three others. The most important source of support in this group is one of Oita's largest construction companies. The Vice-President of that company (the son of the President) and the owner of the electrical supply company are both closely associated with Sato's third source of funds, the local LDP

---

<sup>30</sup> Sato's expenses are apparently much less than those of incumbent Diet men. One million yen is generally reported to be the minimum monthly expense for any member of the Diet. One source sets the minimum at one and a-half million yen (Yomiuri Shinbun, January 7, 1967, p. 15) and another contends that two million yen is the figure for the average monthly expenditures of Diet members (Asahi Shinbun, October 4, 1966), p. 1.

<sup>31</sup> These are not to be confused with the sources that financed the official campaign, a question to be discussed in Chapter VIII.

Chapter, or more accurately, Sato's political benefactors, Iwasaki and Murakami. Sato receives mid-year (chūgen) and year-end (seibō) presents of considerable sums from these two LDP leaders and it is they who play the central role in collecting contributions from businessmen for the campaign at election time. Together these three sources provided the Fuetsukai with an average of between six and seven hundred thousand yen a month, just enough to meet minimum expenses.

In addition to these minimum monthly expenses were the costs involved in special Fuetsukai activities and the costs of the actual campaign itself. The Fuetsukai was the sponsor of periodic meetings, rallies and parties. The conduct of these activities has certain peculiar characteristics that result from the nature of the kōenkai organization and the provision of the election law prohibiting pre-election campaigning. This provision has resulted in what may be called the strategy of the "non-campaign." This strategy and the role of the kōenkai in it are the subject of the following chapter.

## CHAPTER VI

### THE KOENKAI AND THE "NON-CAMPAIGN"

In the 1934 revision of the Lower House Election Law an entirely new provision, inserted as Article 7, paragraph 4, stated that "Election campaigning . . . may be engaged in only after the registration of candidacy is completed."<sup>1</sup> Before that time there was no official campaign period in law, though campaigning before the registration of candidacy was restricted by the police on the basis of "campaigning without qualifications" (mushikaku undō).<sup>2</sup> With the new provision, jizen undō or pre-election campaigning was explicitly made illegal. In the Public Offices Election Law of 1950 the "prohibition of pre-election campaigning," as the above provision came to be known, was incorporated in almost identical language as Article 129. As yet unamended, the article reads: "Election campaigning for each election shall be engaged in only during the period from the day candidacy is registered to the day preceding the date of the election concerned."<sup>3</sup> Registration of candidacy begins on the day the elections are

---

<sup>1</sup>Senkyo Seido Nanajyūnen Kinenkai, Senkyohō No Enkaku (Tokyo, 1959), p. 14.

<sup>2</sup>Hayashida Kazuhiro, Senkyo Hō, in Hōritsu Zenshū, V (Tokyo, 1958), p. 168.

<sup>3</sup>Election Law, Article 129.

officially announced (kōji) which is at least twenty days before Election Day. Elections must be held within forty days of the dissolution of the Lower House.

The prohibition of pre-election campaigning is a particularly important element of the opportunity structure within which Sato created strategies of support mobilization. To appreciate the significance of the strategy of the "non-campaign," an understanding of Article 129 is essential.

While Article 129 prohibits pre-election campaigning there is no article in any law which defines election campaigning; in other words, which defines what is to be prohibited.<sup>4</sup> Consequently, the question of what actions constitute jizen undō has become a matter of legal interpretation.

A history of court decisions and a consensus of scholarly opinion have resulted in a definition of election campaigning as being "those activities that are for the purpose of influencing voters to vote for a particular candidate in a particular election."<sup>5</sup> The three parts of the definition have resulted in what is called the "three essentials of election campaigning": (1) the action has to be for the purpose of soliciting votes. This includes what is called direct action, meaning action to obtain votes for a particular

---

<sup>4</sup>Jichisho Senkyo Kyokuhon, Sōsenkyo No Tebiki (Tokyo, 1967), p. 4.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., p. 5; Court decisions and scholarly opinions are cited in Hayashida, pp. 167ff.

candidate, and indirect action, meaning activities to prevent votes from going to a particular candidate;<sup>6</sup> (2) the action has to concern a particular candidate. This includes not only people who have declared their candidacy but anyone who may be planning to become a candidate in the future.<sup>7</sup> Political activities that are not for the purpose of electing a particular candidate are, consequently, not election campaigning even if such action is in relation to a particular election. Thus, for instance, a speech by an official of the Liberal Democratic Party explaining the policies of the Party and asking support for the Party rather than for any particular candidate is not election campaigning;<sup>8</sup> (3) the action has to concern a particular election. As Lower and Supreme Court decisions have made clear, this provision does not mean that the action has to be at the time of the election but that it merely has to be in relation to a particular election. Conceivably activities as much as a year or two before an election could be election campaigning if they were intended to obtain votes for a particular candidate in that particular election.<sup>9</sup> Conversely, activities by candidates are not considered as being election campaigning if they are not intended to get

---

<sup>6</sup>Hayashida, p. 167.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., p. 167.

<sup>8</sup>Gakuyō Shobō Henshūbu, Senkyo Undo (Tokyo, 1967), p. 8; Jichisho, p. 5.

<sup>9</sup>Gakuyō Shobō Henshūbu, p. 7; Hayashida, p. 167.



votes in a particular election.<sup>10</sup>

In law and in practice a distinction is made between election campaigning (senkyo undō) and political activities (seiji katsudō), the latter being defined as "activities of political parties and other political groups for the purpose of publicizing their policies, developing the party or increasing political education. They are not activities that are directly intended to elect a particular candidate in a particular election."<sup>11</sup> Accordingly, no politician ever engages in pre-election campaigning but all are very busy with "political activities." As Diet dissolution appears to get closer such political activities increase at a frantic tempo.

Besides the opportunities this distinction between "political activities" and "election campaigning" provides for getting around Article 129, there are two types of activities that lie outside the scope of the pre-election campaigning ban. One is composed of activities necessary to prepare for the campaign. This covers mainly routine matters such as printing posters, renting a campaign office, obtaining a transcript of the family register, arranging for a campaign car, loudspeakers and halls for speeches, and making the deposit of 150,000 yen required of all candidates. Also included, however, are activities such as obtaining the

---

<sup>10</sup>Jichishō, pp. 1-2, 5.

<sup>11</sup>Hayashida, p. 168.

endorsement of a political party, procuring campaign funds, requesting recommendations of people to be included on campaign postcards and arranging for an accountant and for campaigners.<sup>12</sup> The other type of activity permitted is that called sebumi kōi. Sebumi means wading into water to test its depth and is figuratively used to mean a trial balloon or a feeler. Kōi means "action," or "activities." Such "trial balloon activities" are intended to let the candidate "learn the views of the electorate for the purpose of deciding whether to run or not. . . ." <sup>13</sup> He can make speeches, hold discussion meetings with voters and in general try to "feel out" the voters "without violating the election law so long as the purpose of such activities is not to obtain votes."<sup>14</sup>

The various legal interpretations of Article 129 have obviously done little to remove its ambiguity. If the ambiguity had made the article a deadletter, it would obviously be of little interest. But the Government does attempt, however unsuccessfully, to enforce the prohibition on pre-election campaigning and candidates plan and organize their campaigns with Article 129 in mind.

For the candidate who hopes to discover the permissible scope of activities allowed outside the official election

---

<sup>12</sup> Jichisho, p. 15; Naikaku Hōseikyoku Daisanbu, Senkyo Jitsumu Roppo (Tokyo, 1966), p. 324.

<sup>13</sup> Jichishō, p. 1.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., p. 2.

campaign period, the Government is of very little help. In its official guide for candidates in Lower House elections, the Local Autonomy Ministry suggests that, in commonsense terms, it is natural to consider all of a politician's activities as being intended to obtain votes. Lest the candidate feel he can therefore do virtually nothing until the official campaign begins, the Ministry goes on to suggest that activities such as reporting to constituents on the work of the current Diet session or the holding of discussion meetings, kōenkai meetings and the like are not, in themselves, violations of Article 129.<sup>15</sup> But, adds the Ministry ominously, "even these types of activities are in many cases adjudged to be election campaigning. . . ." <sup>16</sup> "The line separating election campaigning and political activity is a very vague one. One wrong step can result in a violation."<sup>17</sup>

According to the Election Law, the maximum penalty for pre-election campaigning is one year in jail or a fine of 15,000 yen.<sup>18</sup> In fact, though, almost all cases of violations of the ban result in nothing more than a warning (keikoku)

---

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., p. 6ff; Gakuyō Shobō Henshūbu, p. 14.

<sup>16</sup> Jichishō, p. 5.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., p. 6; The Government also publishes a handbook that discusses in considerable detail permissible political activities for political parties and other political groups in connection with Lower House elections. See Jichishō Senkyōkyoku, Shugiin Senkyo Ni Okeru Seito, Seiji Dantai No Seiji Katsudo No Tebiki (Tokyo, 1967).

<sup>18</sup> Election Law, Article 129.

from the police. The great majority of warnings issued deal with the distribution and posting of written materials, i.e., postcards, newspaper advertisements, posters, handbills and so forth. In the months preceding the calling of elections for January 1967, numbers of such warnings were made throughout the country. One warning, for example, was issued to a Diet hopeful who sent out a large number of postcards in his constituency announcing his retirement from the bureaucracy; another to a Diet member who sent out calendars with his picture engraved on the cover; and one to a conscientious owner of an electrical appliance firm who thought he had an ingenious way to get around the prohibition by putting an ad in a local newspaper saying that "I request your understanding if I do not have the time to provide repair service during the campaign period because I have decided to run in the coming general elections."<sup>19</sup>

By December 27, 1966, the day before the House was dissolved, the police had issued 348 warnings for violations of Article 129, 102 more than had been issued in the comparable period preceding the previous Lower House election in 1963.<sup>20</sup> From the day of dissolution to January 7, the day on which candidates could register and campaigning for registered candidates could officially begin, the number of warnings rose

---

<sup>19</sup>Yomiuri Shinbun, December 6, 1966.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid., December 27, 1966, p. 13.

at an ever increasing rate. By January 4, 999 warnings had been issued throughout the country and two days later the number had doubled to 1,939 of which 1,685 were for distribution of written materials.<sup>21</sup> For the entire period preceding koji, the official start of the campaign, 2,504 warnings, the National Police Agency disclosed, had been issued. Ninety per cent of these were for distribution of written materials. The fight against pre-election campaigning concluded without any arrests being made.<sup>22</sup>

The prohibition of pre-election campaigning though ambiguous in what it actually prohibits and largely unenforced, nonetheless creates an important element of the framework within which Diet candidates formulate campaign strategies. It may be said with a certain degree of truth that "the routinization and generalization of . . . pre-election campaign activities have made complete nonsense out of the election law's restricted campaign period provision."<sup>23</sup> Obviously candidates do not allow the prohibition to prevent them from engaging in activities intended to mobilize support. Importantly, however, the "routinization" of pre-election campaign activities has been influenced by considerations for getting around the Article's prohibition. Because of the

---

<sup>21</sup> Nishi Nihon Shinbun, January 6, 1967, p. 12.

<sup>22</sup> Asahi Evening News, January 13, 1967, p. 3.

<sup>23</sup> Fujiwara Hirotatsu and Tomita Nobuo, Seijiaku Eno Haisen (Tokyo, 1967), p. 31.

legal ban, candidates are careful to cover up their campaign activities in such a way as to qualify them for classification as "political activity" rather than election campaigning. The Diet candidate cannot allow that any of his activities prior to the calling of the official campaign are intended to garner him votes in a particular election. In their speeches candidates avoid mention of their intention to run in the coming election. They tend to talk in terms general if not vague, particularly since they cannot say that if elected they will do this or that. For one unaware of the art of the "non-campaign," listening to speeches of politicians more than three weeks before election day would fail to indicate that there might be any candidates.

The need to work around Article 129 is one reason politicians use kōenkai. Within a kōenkai, the discussion of political matters is simply one of the organization's many activities and to have the politician who heads the supporters' organization address the membership simply means to keep the members informed on political developments. So long as the politician uses a minimum of subtlety in making "recruitment of members" and kōenkai meetings opportunities for campaigning for votes, the kōenkai can function quite smoothly as a front for campaign activities.

As part of his "non-campaign" Sato held several large kōenkai meetings. The most elaborate of these was a two-day meeting of women from the entire district held in Beppu three

months before the election. The meeting illustrates several important aspects of Sato's campaign: the different characteristics of his supporting groups in Beppu and in rural areas, the relationship between LDP party organs and the individual candidate, the techniques for building up kōenkai membership, the way in which a kōenkai meeting is conducted, and the type of appeal Sato made to the voters in his non-campaign speeches.

In Oita's Second District there are 156,017 female and 122,567 male voters. Women outnumber men in both the cities (83,928 female voters to 63,636 male) and the counties (72,089 women and 58,931 male voters).<sup>24</sup> In Beppu, with its hotels, bars, and tourist industry, the 45,100 female voters account for 58 per cent of the city's voting population. In the Prefecture as a whole women make up 54 per cent of the electorate.

Sato placed particular emphasis on attracting the support of women. One way to solicit such support was simply to get public exposure in the hope that the female "floating vote" would find him the most attractive of the candidates in terms of age and looks as much as in terms of policy. This effort, concentrated mainly in Beppu, involved little active participation in the campaign on the part of women voters. Another aspect of the appeal to the women was the creation of an organization of female supporters throughout the District

---

<sup>24</sup>Data taken from Senkyo Kanri Iinkai, Senkyo No Kiroku, Shūgin Giin Sōsenkyo, January 29, 1967 election (Oita, 1967).

that would bring a large number of women into active participation in Sato's campaign. Sato's efforts in this direction culminated in the holding of "The First Sato Bunsei Women's Political Study Session" (Dai Ikkai Sato Bunsei Seiji Kyōshitsu Fujin No Tsudoi), a two-day affair held on August 24 and 25, 1966 at one of Beppu's largest hotels.

Throughout the first six months of 1966 Sato was considering the idea of holding a large meeting of women in an attempt to give some direction and organization to his support among the District's numerous women voters. In July, with House dissolution appearing ever closer, Sato and his staff began to make plans for the meeting. Without any previous experience to build upon, everything from means of recruitment to writing of the program for the meeting presented new problems.

The first problem was one of timing. In order to capitalize on the participants' enthusiasm Sato wanted to hold the meeting as close to dissolution as possible but was afraid of trouble arising from the prohibition of pre-election campaigning if held too close to the calling of elections. It was finally decided to hold the meeting at the end of August. Postponing it further would increase the dangers of being caught by a sudden dissolution of the House and, since the autumn months are both the tourist season in Beppu and the rice harvesting season in the rest of the District, recruitment of participants would become difficult if held later in the year.



The greatest problem facing Sato was choosing the women to be invited. In Beppu recruitment was based, as all other Sato activities in the city, on the city's eleven school districts and 121 neighborhoods. A figure of 150 participants from Beppu was established with the idea that one woman from each neighborhood and two or three from a few neighborhoods would be invited. Originally it was planned to have the sewanin in each neighborhood recommend a neighborhood representative to attend the meeting. The method for recruiting the participants from Beppu quickly changed, however, because of the new support given Sato by the executives of the LDP women's group in Beppu.

There are two women's organizations in Beppu that became involved in Sato's campaign. One is the organization of neighborhood women clubs. The city-wide organization is known as the Federation of Beppu Women Clubs (Beppu-shi Fujin Dantai Rengōkai) and it is associated with one of the largest nationwide organizations, the Chifuren (Zenkoku Chiiki Fujin Dantai Renraku Kyōgikai).<sup>25</sup> Women clubs in Beppu are organized in 102 of the 121 neighborhoods and the association has a total membership of 4,850. Membership in the organization requires the payment of dues in the amount of thirty yen annually. These neighborhood women clubs are overwhelmingly

---

<sup>25</sup>For a discussion of Chifuren, see Asahi Janaru Hen, Nihon No Kyodai Soshiki (Tokyo, 1966), pp. 36-52.

conservative-party supporting<sup>26</sup> and there is a considerable overlap in membership between them and the second group of women to play a role in Sato's campaign, the LDP women's division in Beppu.<sup>27</sup> The executives of the latter are all active in the local clubs. The President of the Beppu association of local women clubs, Ikezaki Chiyo, has served in that position for the past six years and is concurrently Vice-President of the Beppu Branch of the LDP Women's Organization. Preceding her as president of the neighborhood club association was Mrs. Kawamura Muga, the present President of the LDP Women's Organization in Beppu.

The LDP Women's Division in Beppu (Beppu-shi Jimintō Fujinbu) was first formed in 1964<sup>28</sup> and had a membership of 100 in that year. In 1965 its membership increased to 860 and is said to have passed the 1,000 mark in 1966. The women's division in Beppu is organized on three levels. Basic is the neighborhood organization with a section leader in each of the

---

<sup>26</sup> Ibid., pp. 47-48; Another group of authors assert that these local women's groups serve as "an essential element in the building of the conservative base of support." See Kobayashi Naoki, Shinohara Hajime and Soma Masao, Senkyo (Tokyo, 1960), p. 82; Another author maintains further that "they are used by the LDP as local branches of the party organization." See Matsushita Keiichi, Sengo Minshu Shugi No Tenbo (Tokyo, 1965), p. 173.

<sup>27</sup> Information concerning neighborhood women clubs based on interview with Mrs. Ikezaki Chiyo, August 9, 1967.

<sup>28</sup> Information concerning the LDP women's division based on an interview with Mrs. Kawamura on December 8, 1966.

neighborhoods. These neighborhood groups, following a familiar pattern, are organized into eleven school district organizations with a chairman and vice-chairman in each. At the top of the structure is the president of the city's division. From its inception, the organization's president has been Mrs. Kawamura, sixty-five years old, a former teacher and a person long active in conservative party politics in Beppu. The vice-president of the division, as has been mentioned, is the president of the Beppu association of local women clubs, Mrs. Ikezaki.

Sato did not have the support of Mrs. Kawamura in the 1963 election and her support in 1967 was considered a considerable boon by the Sato camp. In Prefectural Assembly elections Mrs. Kawamura has long been an active supporter of Utsunomiya Hidetsuna who, it is to be remembered from the discussion of party endorsement, is Ayabe's leading supporter in Beppu. In line with her support for Utsunomiya, Mrs. Kawamura has campaigned for Ayabe in Diet elections. In the 1963 election there was some talk of the women's group supporting Sato but Mrs. Kawamura and the other executives of the LDP organization continued to back Ayabe. The reason for their failure to support Sato in 1963 was, in Mrs. Kawamura's explanation of the situation, due to a belief that Sato would not receive the party's endorsement. It is to be remembered that in that election Sato obtained LDP endorsement only in the last issuance of names of endorsed candidates which was

but a few days before the start of the official campaign. By this time Mrs. Kawamura and the other leaders of the organization were already committed to Ayabe. It was also felt that Sato did not stand a chance of winning and that the race was a trial run for him; one in which he would build up his support for the next election. The result of the 1963 election, accordingly, came as a great shock to Kawamura. If she and her organization had supported Sato, she believes, he would have received the 1,600 votes by which he lost to the Socialist and the LDP would have taken all three seats in the district. In 1967 Mrs. Kawamura's position was clear. As she told a meeting of the leadership of the Beppu women's division: "Kunisaki is Nishimura's and Ayabe has a base of support running from Kitsuki to Usa county. Therefore, Sato's hometown, Beppu, has to make a special effort to get him elected."<sup>29</sup> While from Mrs. Kawamura's point of view, support for Sato was to help him get elected to the Diet along with the other two LDP candidates, from Sato's perspective her support was seen as strengthening his own chances of victory at the expense of formerly supported Ayabe.

Mrs. Kawamura's support for Sato was greeted by the Sato camp with surprise if not a degree of bewilderment due to the fact that she was continuing to support Utsunomiya. While

---

<sup>29</sup>In a meeting with Sato and the executives of the LDP women's division on December 8, 1966.

welcoming her support, Sato was somewhat pessimistic about the extent to which the backing of the president of the LDP women's division in Beppu would be translated into active campaigning. Nonetheless, in planning for the women's meeting, he decided to have his wife pay a formal call on Mrs. Kawamura to inform her of the planned meeting and ask for her cooperation. Much to his surprise and delight, Mrs. Kawamura not only agreed to participate but expressed a willingness to play an active role in recruiting participants and in acting as chairman for the meeting. From this point on responsibility for recruiting participants from Beppu was taken by the executives of the LDP women's division in Beppu.

Mrs. Kawamura suggested that rather than try to directly invite women from each of the neighborhoods, Sato should meet with a group of women representing each of the eleven school districts and delegate to them the responsibility for inviting women from the neighborhoods within their respective districts. Mrs. Kawamura took the responsibility for inviting the school district representatives to a meeting with Sato and his wife held on August fifth. These women became the core group of activists among Sato's women campaigners in Beppu. They are all elderly and active in various organizations in the city. All are executives of the LDP women's division and are active in their local neighborhood women's clubs. Of the twenty-two school district chairmen and vice-chairmen, only one, according to Mrs. Kawamura, did not go along with her in supporting Sato.

This was due to long and close relations between her family and Nishimura. In other words, Sato managed to enlist the Beppu women's division of the LDP organization in support of his campaign and his alone.

At the August fifth meeting it was agreed that Mrs. Kawamura and her group would take the responsibility for inviting suitable women from each of the neighborhoods. From that meeting until the day of the conference the major problem was the impossibility of keeping the number of invitees down to the originally planned number of 150. There was no neighborhood in which inviting only one woman would not have had the effect of insulting others to the point where some basically friendly to Sato would consider the lack of an invitation sufficient reason to refuse to campaign for him in the election. As a result the guest list rose daily. Two hundred forty-eight women were in the end invited of which number 239 attended the meeting. Even so there were complaints of having been snubbed by Sato. Furthermore, because control over recruitment was left in the hands of Mrs. Kawamura, the women invited were largely those associated with the so-called Kawamura faction in the politics of the women's organizations in the city. Those opposed to this so-called main current faction were largely left uninvited by Kawamura and the school district representatives. This was compensated for to some extent by Mrs. Sato personally inviting fifteen women who had not been asked to attend by the Kawamura group. On the other

hand, Sato was able to emphasize to those who complained of not being invited that he was helpless to do anything because the LDP (meaning Mrs. Kawamura) had control of recruitment.

Outside of Beppu, recruiting participants was the responsibility of Sato's sekininsha. During the last week of July, letters were sent to these campaign managers informing them of the planned meeting. They were told that they had sole responsibility for selecting participants and were requested to inform the Fusetsukai office by August fifth of the names and addresses of those who would attend. Each sekininsha was given a quota to fill. In general, the quota provided for fifteen participants from Nakatsu, ten from the other two cities, Kitsuki and Bungo Takada, six to seven from the seventeen towns and five each from the two villages of Ota and Sanko providing a total of approximately 150 participants, the thought being that an equal number would be invited from Beppu and from the rest of the district.

The question of whom within the quota should be invited proved to be a problem of major proportion in most of the areas. As in Beppu, inviting one group of women inevitably resulted in the dissatisfaction of others. None of the sekininsha was able to comply with the August fifth deadline and in the first week of August a second letter was sent out giving the sekininsha further guidelines on how to choose the participants. They were in this letter given the authority to select one to two women from each of the amalgamated villages in their areas.

Inviting representatives from each of these subdivisions meant, of course, that the quota of 150 could no more be maintained in the countryside than it could in Beppu. Other problems, the consequence of the nature of the support organization also arose in regard to recruitment. For one thing, the wives of the sekininsha and the former village level campaign managers were invited to the conference. From the wives point of view they should attend because they were important supporters of Sato. From the candidate's perspective, the expense of such a conference could hardly be justified if participants were women whose support was already assured. For two reasons, though, the presence of many of Sato's supporters' wives at the conference was not considered wholly unfortunate. For one thing, because the conference provided what amounted to a two-day vacation at a Beppu hotel at virtually no expense, it was a way for Sato to express his appreciation to his supporters for the time and effort spent on his behalf over the year. Secondly, in Mrs. Sato's view, many of the supporters' wives probably voted for Sato because their husbands campaigned for him but not all of them necessarily joined in the campaign. It was hoped that their presence at the conference would inspire them to work actively on Sato's behalf among the women voters in their areas, thus opening up channels of support the husbands were not familiar with.

Another problem was that in those places where Sato had several top level supporters, each had to be allowed to invite



one or two people. In one small town, for instance, this problem resulted in the original quota of six participants being increased to thirteen. In Nakatsu the original quota of fifteen was almost immediately realized to be inadequate. Sato's several independent "lines" of support in the city each wanted to invite a sizeable number of women and it was decided to allow each a quota of ten. In addition to these, Mrs. Sato personally invited seven women and a total of forty-eight attended the conference from the city.

Finally, the problem of the most severe proportions resulted from what has been referred to as the inward looking nature of the support organization. The sekininsha naturally tended to invite women with whom they were friendly and whom they knew to support Sato and not others who could play an important role in Sato's campaign if approached. This is why the question of refusals to attend the meeting did not arise. Women who might refuse were not the women who were issued invitations.

Outside of Beppu, only the town of Kunimi and the neighboring offshore village of Himeshima were unrepresented at the meeting. As discussed previously, these two areas are in the heart of Nishimura's stronghold of Higashi Kunisaki county and Sato had little organized support of significance in either place. In Beppu, four of the 121 neighborhoods were unrepresented. These are all areas on the outskirts of the city where Sato has been weak since his first days in the

Prefectural Assembly.

Sato's problem relating to recruitment was, however, anything but one of having too few participants. Day by day the number of invitees rose past the original figure of 300 and on the eve of the conference 514 people had indicated their intention to attend. At this point Sato, worried about seating, feeding and sleeping all these women, was almost hoping that the typhoon then threatening Kyushu would make it to Beppu in time to keep some of the guests away.

Besides the question of recruitment there were a whole array of matters from printing the program to buying souvenirs for the participants that kept Sato and his staff occupied in somewhat frenetic activity for weeks preceding the conference. One of the major problems dealt with in the last days before the meeting, and one that is indicative of the meeting's tone, was the question of how to sleep over 500 women, the meeting being planned to begin on the afternoon of one day and end after breakfast on the next. The easiest method was to assign each woman a room with three to four others. Most of Sato's staff favored such a procedure but Sato was adamantly opposed. A complicated system that surprised everyone by not causing bedlam was worked out by which localities, the towns and villages in the case of the counties and the school districts in the cities, were allocated a block of rooms and the women themselves were to decide how to divide up. Sato's main concern was that the guests should enjoy their stay and he feared

that by arbitrarily assigning rooms, some women who disliked each other would have to spend the night together. Such a disagreeable experience could make the whole event an unhappy one and Sato was determined to do all he could to insure that nobody went home unhappy.

On the morning of August 24, women began arriving at the Hakuunsanso hotel for the meeting. The choice of Hakuunsanso, one of Beppu's most luxurious hotels, as the site for the meeting was not based solely on its ability to host a meeting of 500 people. The hotel is owned by Murakami Haruzo, member of the Upper House of the Diet and younger brother of Sato's faction leader, Murakami Isamu. For Sato this meant that the facilities of the hotel were offered him at a minimum cost.

Though the meeting was scheduled to begin at 2:00 in the afternoon, the first women participants began arriving at the hotel at nine in the morning. As they entered the lobby they were directed along a line of tables where they were registered by Sato's staff. At the first reception desk they were asked to write their names and addresses and indicate whether they were staying overnight. With this document duly stamped they moved on to the next table to pay the conference fee. For those who planned to only stay the day the cost of participating in the study session, including the cost of lunch and dinner, was 300 yen. For those who stayed overnight the fee was 500 yen including breakfast the following morning.

It was expected that while participants from the countryside would spend the night, the women from Beppu would mostly return home after dinner. Not many women, however, passed up the opportunity to spend a night at one of Beppu's largest hotels for what amounted to 200 yen (about fifty-five cents). Four hundred three of the 486 women that registered paid the 500 yen fee. At the following table the participants got back most and in some cases more money than they had just paid out in conference fees. Each participant was reimbursed for the round-trip transportation cost entailed in attending the meeting. In the case of participants from Shimoge county this came to over 1,000 yen. Approximately 230,000 yen was taken in in conference fees and 350,000 yen paid out in transportation costs. After receiving her transportation expenses, the registrant moved on to the next table to receive a name badge and lunch ticket (for those checking in before one o'clock) and a chart showing what rooms were allocated to her locality. Finally at the last table in the line, the participant received a souvenir of the meeting, a Fusetsukai towel engraved with Sato's calligraphy, and an envelope containing the following: a copy of Sato's book, published in 1963 by the Fusetsukai, Oita Ken O Kangaeru (Thinking about Oita Prefecture); a four-page pamphlet entitled "Sato Bunsei No Subete" ("All about Sato Bunsei") outlining his career; the jacket for the record "Bunchan No Uta" ("The Bunchan Song") with a large picture of Sato on a yacht on the front, pictures of Sato with theatrical

and political luminaries on the back and the words and music for the song on the inside; a copy of the latest Fusetsukai newspaper made up especially for the occasion; a two-page mimeographed sheet explaining the types of activities on behalf of a candidate that could be engaged in without violating the legal prohibition against pre-election campaigning and the types of activities the voter could engage in during the official campaign period; a program of the evening's entertainment including a map explaining how to get to a nearby hotel where there was to be a show of Okinawan dancing free for the participants in the meeting; and a printed program of the meeting and a notebook and pencil so that the ladies could take notes at the study session.

At two o'clock the nearly 500 women, now mostly dressed in the hotel-provided yukata, began assembling in the large straw mat conference room that was to be the scene for the study session. At first glance the conference looked like one of the LDP women's division. Chairing the meeting was Mrs. Kawamura and sitting next to Sato at the guest's table was the chairman of the Oita Prefecture LDP women's division. Also at the table with Sato were Mrs. Ikezaki, vice-president of the Beppu chapter and four other executives of the LDP organization. Though the meeting was ostensibly a study session, "studying" which meant listening to speeches by Sato and two guest speakers, was scheduled to last no more than two hours.

The printed program for this first general meeting of

the Fuetsukai's women's club defined its purpose to be to "make clear the difference between conservatism and progressivism" and, because most of the participants were mothers, "to give particularly deep thought to the problem of the wholesome education of the young."

In these twenty postwar years, through our diligence, we have certainly made great economic progress. The recent consumer boom and leisure boom are certainly remarkable. But, on the other hand, what is the situation in regard to our spiritual recuperation? Right before our eyes can be seen an overflow of inferior culture, satanic crimes and a frightening increase in traffic accidents. As mothers we must give particularly deep thought to the problem of the wholesome education of the young. It must be the work of we mothers to awaken in our children in the correct way a sense of racial pride.

The program went on to suggest that

For the organization and advancement of women it is important to have mutually close relations. For this purpose everyone will strive to become core activists in building mutual friendship and trust in community life under the leadership of Sato Bunsei.

With its theme thus set, the meeting was opened by Mrs. Kawamura who, after thanking everyone for attending, introduced Sato as the first speaker. Sato's speech, which lasted for about forty-five minutes was virtually identical with those he had been giving all year in his tour of the neighborhood associations in Beppu. The main difference was more emphasis on light talk intended to amuse the women and on the unique "spiritual" aspects of Japanese culture, including a fifteen-minute discourse on the tea ceremony, flower arrangement, the Japanese dance and such concepts as wabi, sabi and mono no aware.

In 1951 the present mayor of Beppu, Mayor Aragane, resigned from the prefectural assembly. He chose me as his successor and I was elected to the assembly. Thereafter, for twelve consecutive years, three terms in office, I was under continual indebtedness to the people of Beppu whose support permitted me to lead a life in politics. In 1963, three years ago, with twelve years of political experience in the prefectural assembly behind me, I decided that I wanted to participate in some way in national politics; that I wanted to create a more affluent Oita prefecture--an Oita prefecture which would provide a good environment for a good life; an Oita prefecture in which children would have a good education; an environment in which to create a splendid Oita prefecture. With these thoughts in mind and with twelve years experience in the prefectural assembly, I declared my candidacy in the 1963 election for the Lower House. At that time I became greatly indebted not only to the people of Beppu but to everyone from the entire district. However, because of just a narrow margin, I have spent these past years in political study outside of the [political] arena.

Sato continued this theme of his defeat by a narrow margin in 1963 and the need for him to get inside the political arena with a few of his favorite stories:

In a zoo you can see a young monkey lose his balance and fall down from a tree. No matter how many times he falls he still remains a monkey. However, for the person who devotes his life to politics--who participates in national politics, who tries to have politics realize the aspirations of all of you, who tries to create a finer society for everyone to live in--being outside the political arena for a long time or falling [losing] in an election threatens him with the loss of what it is to be a politician. That is why I must exert all my energies to getting into the political arena--this is what I am constantly told by my elders. <sup>31</sup>

---

<sup>31</sup> This story is based on a popular expression attributed by some to Ono Bamboku and others to Miki Bukichi. It is a play on the word ochiru which can mean to fall or to lose. "Saru ga ki kara ochite mo saru da ga daigishi ga ochitara daigishi de nakunaru." ("If a monkey falls from a tree it is still a monkey but if a Diet man falls [i.e. loses an election] he is no longer a Diet man.")

In the last election I was unable, due to a narrow margin, to get into the political arena. But over these past years I have studied well. A week after the last election, together with the President of this hotel, Upper House member Murakami Haruzo, I went to Tokyo to pay a visit on Ono Bamboku who was then still in good health. Murakami, in introducing me to Bamboku sensei, said "I am very sorry. We let Sato lose by a narrow margin." I don't know what got into Bamboku sensei that day--he must have been in a bad mood--but he turned on Upper House member Murakami saying "You're a fool." Now of course, Ono Bamboku sensei calling Upper House member Murakami sensei a fool really shocked me. I just lowered my head but Ono continued. "A narrow margin! What do you mean by that? Elections are something you lose by only one vote. From here on value highly each single person." That was all he said and I learned a good lesson, a very good lesson. Highly valuing each person in politics is what democratic politics means. Wartime fascist politics dealt with large numbers of people, making the individuals only victims--that is fascist politics. Since I, like others, have had the bitter experience of that period, I was deeply struck with the meaning of Ono sensei's blunt command to highly value every single person.

In my own experience I have known the importance of what Ono sensei was talking about. In 1963, before the election, I went to Ekisen [in Usa county] to give a speech. For a week we had posters up announcing the talk which was held in the Ekisen middle school. When we got there nobody was at the meeting place. So we waited. Still nobody came. We waited some more. Finally an old man came in. We waited for other people to come but nobody did and I was afraid the old man would leave. So I just sat myself down in front of that old farmer, the head of a local agricultural co-operative, and for two hours talked just to him--just the two of us in that large hall for two hours. He fidgeted around a little and I thought he might walk out on me but he sat through right to the end of my speech. As a result, the people of Ekisen gave me 480 votes. Talking to one person resulted in the support of 480 people. Recollecting these experiences I have been constantly thinking, in three years of study outside the arena, of how democracy means highly valuing each person.

One of the major themes of Sato's speeches and one that came increasingly to dominate his talks as the election drew nearer



was the question of reforming the LDP, of establishing "pure" politics. Sato usually entered into this topic, as he did at the women's meeting, with a story of meeting a young policeman from the prefecture in Tokyo.

I know a young fellow from Hayami county named Kudo who is in Tokyo. His elder brother is a high school teacher in Oita. The younger Kudo decided that when he graduated high school he would not go to college but would become a policeman. The reason he decided to do that was that the demonstrations you see on television of zengakuren just struck him as being all wrong. Those students take money from their mothers and fathers, go to Tokyo and then, instead of studying, spend their time taking part in demonstrations. Because of that Kudo decided he would go to Tokyo, become a policeman and fight against the zengakuren demonstrators. Being a good student he passed the exams right away and entered the police department's mobile force. Then, last year, for the first time in five years, I met Kudo in Tokyo. I had not seen him in a long time. He looked tired. He was pale. When I asked him what was wrong he said, "Sato sensei, please, I have to talk to you." [Sato took him to a restaurant and] . . . after eating, he looked at me and asked, "Mr. Sato, are you a member of the LDP?" I immediately replied, "Yes, I am" and he then said that he was disillusioned with the LDP. Ladies! Do you know the only force that could overthrow the Japanese government? The Socialists could not do it. The Communists, even if they attempted a revolution could not do it. The only way the government can be overthrown is for the police and the self defense forces who have the military power to join together to do it. If people like Kudo become disillusioned with the ruling LDP what may happen? I was terribly worried and asked Kudo why he was saying bad things about the LDP.

[Sato then described at length Kudo's shock at the revelation of corruption within the LDP.]

Seeing all this, Kudo who had given up going to college to enter the police department, decided to quit his job and go back to Oita.

When I listened to how this policeman was disenchanted with the LDP I was shocked. Because the LDP has held the reigns of power for so long all kinds of problems have arisen, all kinds of unfortunate things have happened. In order to build a really

fine conservative party it is necessary to create a political movement in which the women, in which the young men join together to build a really fine Japan, a truly fine Oita prefecture. When I listened to that policeman's story I realized that what was most essential for Japan's politics was pure politics. The need for pure politics is something I have really come to think about this past year or so. If that movement for pure politics is not undertaken, political power at some point may pass into the hands of the progressives. The conservative party is the best party because it is dedicated to preserving Japan's traditions but I think we must have a movement within the conservative party for pure politics. Pure politics, correct politics--the need for a movement to achieve these goals was something that impressed me very deeply when I talked with Kudo.

This theme led into the major theme of Sato's talk before the assembled ladies: the spiritual malaise of postwar Japan and a failure to recognize the glory of Japan's history and tradition, a history of Japanese uniqueness. This part of the speech went on for almost twenty minutes and only a few excerpts are given here.

In Beppu's high schools in the past few years there has been a tremendous increase of delinquents--an increase in students who take drugs, students who smoke cigarettes. The number of arrests of students that I personally know of exceeds twenty. Why indeed has this happened? Why? There's going to be no good served by covering up its real cause. Those people born within the last twenty years, those postwar babies, have suffered from the confusion of the postwar years. They suffered because you, because I, because all of us had no confidence. What should the family teach the children? How should young people be led in society? I believe it's this loss of confidence that is the cause for the delinquency among young people today. . . . Young people--what do they want? They want strong leadership. In the home the mother's strong leadership; at school, the teachers' strong leadership; in society they want the strong leadership of their elders, the leadership of us, the prewar and wartime groups. They want to ask their mothers what is the pride and glory of their people--that's what children want to ask. Those things, though, the mothers of our generation

forgot with the end of the war. That is why children became perplexed.

The tradition of fighting against all adversity is Japanese history; that strength which was born in our people is Japanese history. That strength of our people is not something developed in the postwar period. That strength is Japanese history from the Emperor Jimmu and it is that history that I wish everyone to seriously think about today. . . . The first bequest of our ancestors, one we should clearly acknowledge here today, is the pride of our race developed through the long years which we passed under a line of Emperors unbroken for ages eternal. Like the history of no other country in the world, Japan through three thousand years was under the guidance of the Emperor and with that guidance its course of development became defined. The only people in the world who have led a life under such guidance are the Japanese. . . .

What is the second bequest of our ancestors? When you think about that question, everyone, you think about that wonderful culture seen in the dance, in the tea ceremony, in flower arranging, in Noh. Things like the tea ceremony or flower arranging are things that neither Americans nor Englishmen nor anyone else have. They are things born out of the extraordinary, unique spiritual culture of Japan. Words like mono no aware, sabi, wabi exist in the language of no other people in the world. They are unique to Japan. . . .

To have confidence built on the history of this wonderful Japan--strong politics, strong family education, strong leadership--the realization that these things are necessary in present day Japan is the broad objective of today's political study session.

By this point in his speech Sato had been talking for more than forty minutes. Unlike his speeches in the neighborhoods of Beppu where he spoke for upwards of an hour, Sato wanted to keep his speech at the women's meeting short so as to allow sufficient time to the guest speakers. He concluded with some comments about Oita prefecture.

Finally I want to make a few remarks about Oita prefecture which is at present in a very bad state.<sup>32</sup> I have been given the opportunity to study Oita

---

<sup>32</sup>It is to be remembered that the governor of the prefecture is an independent who defeated Oita LDP chairman Iwasaki.

prefecture's politics for more than a decade. You may all believe that your lives are somewhat better now than during the war. However, this Oita prefecture of ours, this Beppu city of ours, this Shimoge county of ours--this prefecture of Oita that belongs to all of us is in a state of decline. In 1955 Oita prefecture ranked number 32 in per capita income. Today we are number 41. In the country as a whole an average of thirty children in a thousand die at birth; in Oita 36. . . . That's an indication of Oita's backwardness. In all ways Oita is falling behind as other prefectures make economic progress and I, in some way, want to work to stop this decline in Oita's prosperity. Since this cannot be done by one alone, I want to join with all of you here today in discussing how to build a more prosperous Oita prefecture; an Oita prefecture few in crimes, an Oita prefecture in which children don't die at birth; an Oita prefecture in which old people live long. The discussion of the means by which these goals can be achieved is a major objective of today's political study session. Please, to the end, listen to the speeches of the sensei, ask questions and return home from this political study session with the dedication and confidence necessary for creating clean, just politics in Japan.

Following Sato's speech was a reading of congratulatory telegrams from several Diet members of the Murakami faction, from Nakasone Yasuhiro and from Iwasaki.

This was followed by a short speech by the chairman of the prefecture's LDP women's division, Sato Tei. The main theme of Mrs. Sato's speech was expressed in the following concluding remarks which included perhaps one of the most ingenious ways to ask the women to campaign for Sato without once mentioning the election or his candidacy.

We have heard from Sato Bunsei sensei a talk dealing with many things. Sato is a truly rare person. Politics, sports, Buddhism, the tea ceremony, so many interests, so many things he's studied. It is almost too much for the average person to really appreciate. As an egg of a politician this is a golden egg. . . . We would wish that this kind of political study session

could be held very often but, of course since it cannot, please, today, study a lot; yes, study a lot and then, lastly, I have one favor to ask of you--Help hatch this golden egg.

A short recess followed and then the two guest speakers addressed the assemblage. Tada Shinsuke is a professor of politics at Keio University. He gave a talk entitled "What is Conservatism." In his exposition of the view that the conservatives are really the progressives because they adopt new policies in line with the changing times while preserving what is good in tradition, the professor seemed to be doing his best to heed Sato's request to aim at the belly button rather than the head. The second speaker was Omata Hideaki, a lecturer at Oita University and a well-known political commentator in Oita prefecture. Omata is perhaps known not as much for the nature of his political comments as for the words he chooses to express them--a humorous and, to many residents of the prefecture, a now exotic use of the local dialect. Omata is from Kitsuki and was a classmate of Sato in middle school. His speech, which dealt in a humorous way with the progress of women's rights in the postwar years, proved the hit of the day because it kept most of the women laughing for the entire half hour he spoke. While neither Tada nor Omata mentioned Sato's intention to run in the coming Diet election, they both praised Sato as one of the young, forward looking conservatives who should be given a chance to help modernize the conservative party. As Omata put it, "In the world at large and in Japan almost everything is changing at a rapid

pace. The only thing that doesn't change in Japan are the faces of the men elected to the Diet."

The speeches were to be followed by an extended discussion period but the lack of time forced this part of the program to be kept down to ten minutes. In its entirety the study part of the political study session took a little over two and a half hours and at five o'clock the meeting was recessed so the ladies could enjoy a hot springs bath before dinner.

With the closing of the afternoon meeting, the study session came to an end and the vacation began. The evening saw a program of singing and dancing led by local entertainers who were friends of Sato. Everyone joined in the show by singing the "Bunchan Song"<sup>33</sup> and the fun went on until ten o'clock uninterrupted by any talk of politics. The next morning Sato briefly addressed the participants at breakfast, thanked them for coming and closed the First Sato Bunsei Women's Political Study Session.

The women's meeting was conceived of as a step in the process of organizing the women voters, not the achievement of that goal. Therefore, the follow-up to the meeting was of the utmost importance. A few weeks after the meeting, a new

---

<sup>33</sup>It has become popular for politicians to have songs written from them, some of which are recorded by leading vocalists. See Ishii Kenichiro and Yamada Hiroshi, Gendai Nihon No Seiji (Tokyo, 1967), pp. 84-85. Sato commissioned a writer to compose a song but then felt he could not afford to have it recorded. The end result was that he had the record jackets without the records printed.

issue of the Fusetsukai newspaper was printed and sent to each of the women who attended the meeting. With the newspaper went a self-addressed stamped envelope with a letter asking the women to submit the names of ten women from their locality for membership in the Fusetsukai. Through this process, the "women's division" of the Fusetsukai jumped within a month to over 2,500 members. The intention was then to repeat the process vis-a-vis the women whose names were submitted, asking each of them to submit ten more names. By this time, however, the end of September, it was considered too dangerous, in light of the prohibition against pre-election campaigning and a seemingly impending dissolution, to send so many newspapers through the mails. Furthermore the mailing costs were becoming prohibitive. In a few areas the newspapers without the stamped envelopes were given to the local sekininsha for distribution to the women whose names had been submitted by the participants. In all, by the time of the dissolution of the House, the women's meeting had resulted in somewhat over 3,500 names being added to Sato's mailing list.

In Beppu an attempt was made to keep Mrs. Kawamura and her group actively involved on an almost daily basis in Sato's campaign. Mrs. Kawamura was constantly consulted on matters relating to the campaign and in the few months remaining before the official campaign, several meetings were held between Sato and Mrs. Kawamura and her group from the LDP. The last such meeting before the election was held on December eighth to

discuss a city-wide rally Sato was planning for Beppu on December 17 and to discuss the final strategy for the campaign. By this point, the Kawamura group had been thoroughly integrated into Sato's campaign organization. Seventeen women, all executives of the LDP women's division, attended this meeting, a luncheon held at Sato's brother-in-law's hotel.

Sato's talk, as usual extemporaneous, lasted for about an hour. It emphasized the need for a great increase in his Beppu vote if he was to win and, because he was addressing a group of LDP officials, emphasized that the fight was between himself and Socialist Komatsu.

My three years of work since losing in the last election is now complete and I have a solid organization throughout the district. . . . The other day I called my sekininsha in each village and town. They all report that the situation is good. Because of the positions they have received [Speaker of the House and Construction Minister] and the publicity they have gotten in the newspapers, Ayabe and Nishimura are certain to pick up a lot of floating votes. . . . Komatsu Kan cannot hope to expand his organizational vote very much further because of the lack of large labor unions in the district but he may well pick up 5,000 anti-LDP votes because of the recent scandals. To be sure of winning over Komatsu I need to increase my vote by almost 10,000 over my 1963 vote. Not much of an increase can be expected from the countryside. The votes there are hard; everyone has long associations with particular candidates and it's known who is supporting whom, I won't lose any votes in the countryside and may possibly get as much as a 10 per cent increase but that will not be enough to win. In any case, it's safest to figure that my countryside vote will be about the same as last time. That means that it is going to be in Nakatsu and Beppu that I win or lose this race. In Nakatsu I should increase my vote by about 4,000 and in Beppu I think I now have about 21,000 votes, a 3,000 vote increase over last time. The problem is getting the three to four thousand more votes I need to win over Komatsu. The only place I can hope to get those votes is in my hometown Beppu.



I'm setting my goal at 25,000 votes from my hometown in the coming contest. . . .

On December 17, I'm going to be giving a speech at the International Tourist Hall. This is not a campaign speech which would violate the election law but an individual policy pronouncement (kojin seisaku happyō kai). The essential thing is to build up a mood in Beppu behind me. That's the main purpose of this speech. We have to fill at least the lower level of the lecture hall which means a minimum of 1,200 people. Even Shigemitsu [Mamoru] was never able to get more than 500 people to a speech in Beppu. Filling up a large hall like that is an almost impossible task but we have to succeed. If only five or six hundred people show up everyone will say that Sato doesn't have the enthusiastic support even of the people in his own hometown. The important thing to remember, though, is that this speech is not election campaigning. This speech will be political activity (seiji katsudō) not election campaigning (senkyo undō).

Sato was followed by Mrs. Kawamura who said that Nishimura and Ayabe had their strongholds in different parts of the district and if Sato was going to win, his hometown would have to make a special effort. She then asked Sato's secretary to read off the quota of participants in the December 17th meeting from the women's group in each school district. The rest of the meeting was devoted to discussing and adjusting these quotas.

In December, 1966 pressures on the Sato (Eisaku) government for a new election rose to such a high pitch that Sato (Bunsei) decided he would gamble on a late December or early January dissolution of the House and arranged to hold on December 17 a final city-wide rally. One purpose of the rally was to bring Sato into contact with more of the voters. But this was a minor purpose. The major aim of the rally was to get the entire Beppu organization activated to provide a kind

of final dress rehearsal before the official campaign began. To be successful, Sato felt the rally had to draw at least 1,300 people and to achieve that number he set a goal of 3,000 participants for his organization to recruit. Recruitment was conducted through four main groups: the 235 neighborhood sewanin were responsible for recruiting 1,800 participants; the 260 women who had attended the women's conference from Beppu were to bring three women each to the meeting for a total of somewhat over 700; thirty-three voluntary organizations within which Sato had support were to supply a total of 300 participants; and Sato's successor to the Prefectural Assembly, Shuto Kenji, was to recruit 200 voters. To help the machine work efficiently funds were supplied sufficient enough to pay the transportation costs for everyone attending.

A couple of days before the speech, 1,000 posters announcing the rally were posted around the city and a large sign hung outside the hall in which the session was to be held. On the day preceding and the morning of the speech, Sato had members of his staff drive around the city in a loudspeaker-equipped car publicizing the speech.

On December 17 what was to be Sato's last political study session before the dissolution of the House opened with an estimated 1,500 people in attendance. Once the hall was nearly full and the session begun, the rest was somewhat anti-climatic. Speeches were made by Sato and by the president of the Ken-seikai, a conservative youth organization. The

guests enjoyed box lunches compliments of the Fusetsukai and each received a Fusetsukai towel as a souvenir of the meeting. But the major objective of the meeting was achieved when the session was called to order. The organization had proved fairly efficient in providing what was allegedly the largest audience ever assembled in Beppu for a political speech; the organizers had the name lists of all those in attendance; and Sato was now ready to move from the "non-campaign" into the hectic three weeks of official campaigning.

is finished if the only method it uses in vote getting is reliance on the gentlemen in haori, the local bosses. In [the LDP's] case too, without organization. . . ." <sup>1</sup> As Ishida points out, by "organization" (soshiki) this assemblyman was not referring to his own personal campaign organization but to the utilization of established organizations in the society. Similarly when Sato talks of his "organizational strategy" (soshiki sakusen) he is referring to a strategy for gaining the support of various existing voluntary associations.

While never clearly articulated, Sato's "organizational strategy" was premised on the assumption that a significant number of voters feel a greater identity with the interests voiced by the leaders of organizations to which they belong than with the interests expressed by traditional leaders in their local communities. In most rural areas Sato had been unable, as discussed in previous chapters, to obtain the support of any but the weakest elements among the community leadership. By hanging on to the coattails of a great variety of voluntary associations he hoped to get into these areas through the backdoor of group interest, so to speak, rather than, or more accurately as a supplement to, the more traditionally used front door of an organization of local politicians. In places like Beppu and Nakatsu, organizations were

---

<sup>1</sup>Ishida Takeshi, Sengo Nihon No Seiji Taisei (Tokyo, 1961), p. 166.

to play a somewhat different but not any less important role than in rural areas. Here where the electorate was "floating," the support of various organizations would help the candidate reach down to individual voters largely indifferent to the desires of such people as the neighborhood association leaders but often very conscious of an identity of interest with particular associations to which they belong.

The extent to which Sato relied on an "organizational strategy" was very limited however. He was convinced that the vertical approach was the best technique for mobilizing the support of the conservative-party supporting sector of the electorate. The support of voluntary associations was never perceived as a substitute for such an approach but rather as a subsidiary strategy of limited usefulness. Sato was also aware of one of the most important effects of the Election Law on the role of voluntary associations in Diet campaigns: that, as a rule, the greater the identification of an association with the LDP, the less able it is to give effective support to LDP candidates in Lower House elections. Because of the multi-member district single-entry balloting system, unless a district has only one LDP candidate, support for one man means that an organization's efforts will incur the animosity of the other candidates of the Party. Support for all LDP candidates means nothing to any one of them because it does not affect the ability of one to get votes that might otherwise go to another candidate of the Party. To maintain good relations with all

LDP candidates the usual policy, at least in Oita Prefecture, is for organizations to give official endorsement to all the LDP candidates or to none and to avoid becoming involved in the campaign on any one candidate's behalf. Exceptions to this pattern are discussed within the following survey of voluntary associations that figured in Sato's organizational strategy.

Economic organizations in Oita provide a typical example of how important LDP-supporting organizations eschew commitment to the campaign of any one candidate. Six economic associations were approached by Sato in a search for electoral support. With one exception he failed to receive the effective support of any. They either gave a pro forma endorsement to all the LDP candidates or to none. The six organizations are (1) the Association of Local Merchants and Manufacturers; (2) the Chamber of Commerce; (3) the Merchant Block Association; (4) the Federation of Business Owners; (5) the Association of Small and Medium-Size Enterprises; and (6) the Junior Chamber of Commerce.

The Oita Prefecture Federation of Local Merchant and Manufacturer Associations (Oita Ken Shōkōkai Rengōkai) was founded in 1957. The Shōkōkai, as it is called, is organized in the forty-eight towns and villages of Oita Prefecture and in the city of Kitsuki. There are an estimated 17,024 merchants and manufacturers in the areas organized by the Shōkōkai and 9,102 of these are members of the Association. In the Second

District there are 8,738 people who qualify for membership in the organization of which number 4,738 are members.<sup>2</sup>

The officers of the prefectural Shōkōkai organization have the responsibility to determine the Association's recommendation for candidates in prefectural and national elections. The prefectural Association usually recommends candidates in national elections but except in cases where one of its own officers or one of a similar organization like the Chamber of Commerce stands for election (as in the national constituency of the Upper House), it generally supports all LDP-endorsed candidates.<sup>3</sup> In the 1967 Diet election, official recommendations were given to the six LDP candidates in the Prefecture and the members were asked to campaign for any of these candidates. The Shōkōkai gives no money to recommended candidates. For Sato the endorsement, along with Nishimura and Ayabe, of the Shōkōkai was considered of no significance. To the extent that the organization actively supported candidates, it apparently divided along the lines of indigenous candidate strength in particular areas, i.e. Nishimura getting support in his stronghold of Higashi Kunisaki County and Ayabe being supported by the members in Kitsuki.

---

<sup>2</sup>Oita Ken Shōkō Rengōkai, Oita Ken Shōkō Yōran (Oita,

<sup>3</sup>This discussion of the Oita Prefecture Shōkōkai's election policy is based on an interview with the organization's business manager, Miyanaga Tamahiki, May 24, 1967.

In the cities of the Prefecture, the functions of the Shōkōkai are largely assumed by the Chamber of Commerce. Chambers of Commerce are organized in Oita Prefecture's ten major cities with Chamber organizations in the Second District in Beppu, Bungo Takada and Nakatsu. The ten Chambers of Commerce are associated in the Oita Prefecture Federation of Chambers of Commerce. The prefectural organization formally gives recommendations to candidates in the Lower House elections. In the second district recommendations of the organization in the 1967 election went to all official LDP candidates.<sup>4</sup> Aside from giving its formal recommendation, the Chamber played no active part as an organization in the campaign. According to its vice-president,<sup>5</sup> it took a hands-off position, not giving active support or financial assistance to any of the candidates. Individual members of course played a significant role in the election, largely on behalf of incumbent candidates. In Beppu, for example, Construction Minister Nishimura had the support of the former president of the Beppu organization.<sup>6</sup> For Sato, the Chamber's recommendation meant little if anything in terms of real support.

The Oita Prefecture Association of Small and Medium-Size Enterprises (Oita Ken Chūshō Kigyō Dantai) consists of

---

<sup>4</sup> Interview with business manager of the organization, Sato Shozo, May 24, 1967.

<sup>5</sup> Interview with Vice-President Ichimaru Gohei, May 24, 1967.

<sup>6</sup> Mainichi Shinbun, January 18, 1967, p. 14.



500 cooperative unions (kyōdō kumiai) organized on an industry basis.<sup>7</sup> At the time of the Lower House election, 340 of these unions were active. The prefectural association as a rule plays an active role in an election only when an association representative is running. The individual cooperative unions are free to give recommendations to candidates but it is not a common practice. Usually, if any action is taken at all in regard to Lower House elections it is to endorse all LDP candidates and leave the choice of which candidate to support up to each individual member. In the 1967 election no recommendations were given.<sup>8</sup>

The Oita Prefecture Federation of Business Managers (Oita Ken Keieisha Kyōkai) is the Oita branch of a mammoth national organization, the Nihon Keieisha Dantai Renmei or Nikkeiren for short, founded in 1948 for the purpose of consolidating management's power in the face of organized labor's increased strength.<sup>9</sup> The Oita association consists of the managers of 172 business enterprises in the prefecture and represents the most powerful elements in Oita's economic world. The prefectural organization plays no active role in the Lower House election. It gave no recommendations or financial

---

<sup>7</sup>Oita Ken Chūshō Kigyō Dantai Chūōkai, Oita Ken Chūshō Kigyō Dantai Meibo (Oita, June 1965).

<sup>8</sup>Interviews with Kondo Takayuki and Teshima Tsugio, May 25, 1967.

<sup>9</sup>For a discussion of the national Nikkeiren organization see Asahi Janaru Hen, Nihon No Kyodai Soshiki (Tokyo, 1966), pp. 70-89. For the membership of the Oita branch see Oita Ken Keieisha Kyōkai, Oita Ken Keieisha Kyōkai Yōran (Oita, 1966).

contributions to any of the candidates.<sup>10</sup> Sato attempted to get the support of individual members of the association but was largely unsuccessful. Sato's own background, his lack of office and political power on the national level, and the prevalence of small merchants in the Beppu economy combined to make him the least attractive of the three conservative candidates to the big businessmen of the District and inclined him towards championing the cause of the small entrepreneur rather than the wealthy capitalist.

The type of businessmen to which Sato aimed his appeal was represented by such organizations as the Oita Prefecture Federation of Merchant Block Associations (Oita Ken Shōtengai Rengōkai). The merchant block associations are organized in the same ten cities as the Chamber of Commerce. These associations are concerned with the blocks in which small merchant stores are congregated. Each block association has a president, the kumiaichō. All the block associations in a city are organized into a city federation and the city federations compose the prefectural organization. While informal merchant block associations have long been in existence, the national association was first formed in 1953 and the Oita prefecture federation in 1960.<sup>11</sup> It is a weak organization and in Oita prefecture less than half of the stores in the various merchant

---

<sup>10</sup> Interview with Taguchi Akira, May 25, 1967.

<sup>11</sup> Interview with Miyanari Yoshimi, May 25, 1967.

blocks are enrolled in the association.

The prefectural federation often makes recommendations for prefectural assembly elections but takes no official action in regard to Lower House elections. In the popular folklore of Japanese election practices, however, the merchant block associations, particularly the kumiaichō of the separate associations, are alleged to play an important role in campaigns. With the support of the kumiaichō, so the story goes, the candidate can corner the votes of, literally, blocks of voters. There is no evidence that such practices actually prevail. At the least there are no cases of such support for Sato known to his headquarters. In Beppu there was only one case known to the Sato staff of a block association giving him its recommendation and this was not one of merchants but of bar owners in one of Beppu's popular nighttime sections.

Sato tried to project an image of being the representative of the small businessman and conversely imply that the other conservative candidates represented only the interests of big business. He was unable however to obtain support from any association representing these lower strata of the business community and whatever support he did receive from such businessmen was achieved through means other than the backing of economic organizations in the district to which they belong.

The role of the economic associations so far discussed may be summarized as general support for all LDP candidates with no specific, active support for any particular candidate.

The recommendations of such associations, when given, were considered of virtually no significance by Sato because they did nothing to help him attract votes away from the other conservative candidates. The only economic association that did give Sato significant support was the Junior Chamber of Commerce.

In Oita Prefecture's Second District there are two Junior Chamber of Commerce organizations, one for Beppu-Oita and the other in Nakatsu. The Beppu-Oita chapter has seventy-four members of which thirty-four are from Beppu.<sup>12</sup> Of this number 15-16 are said to have worked actively and openly for Sato, 3-4 were supporters of other candidates and the rest refrained from open support for any of the candidates. There is also an organization of senior members of the Junior Chamber--Jaycee members who have passed the age of forty. In the Beppu-Oita chapter this group has twenty-four members. Fifteen of these men were active supporters of Sato both in campaigning for the vote and making a joint financial contribution of 250,000 yen to his campaign.<sup>13</sup>

Sato had received the official recommendation of the executive board of the Beppu-Oita Junior Chamber in 1963 but in 1967, with his chances for victory looking much improved

---

<sup>12</sup>Beppu-Oita Seinenkaigisho, Beppu-Oita Seinenkaigisho Meibo (Beppu, 1967).

<sup>13</sup>This discussion is based on an interview with the president of the Beppu-Oita Junior Chamber of Commerce, Kanda Yasugi in May, 1967.

over the situation three years earlier, the group played a much more direct and enthusiastic role in the campaign than it did at the time of the previous election. Sato received the official recommendation of a meeting of the general membership and a majority of the members, a third of whom are hotel presidents or vice-presidents (the latter indicating in every case the sons of the presidents) actively campaigned on Sato's behalf.

Like much of the story of the sources of Sato's support, his intimate relationship with the members of the Junior Chamber of Commerce dates from his days in the Prefectural Assembly. Sato was one of the first members of the Junior Chamber when it formed in 1953 in Beppu and Oita. He played an active role in the organization and was responsible for establishing a sister relationship with the Hongkong Jaycees. Sato became active in the international Junior Chamber and on reaching the age of forty became a senator of the international organization and a senior member of the Beppu-Oita group.

The most active support Sato received was from the group of senior members of the Jaycees, men who were active in the organization with Sato during its early years and, as his peer group, form a close circle of personal friends. These senior members are all prosperous businessmen and many are engaged in the hotel business. It is also part of the folklore surrounding election campaigns that someone like a hotel owner acts as parentis in loco to the young people from the countryside who

make up his staff and can "order" his workers to vote a certain way. The workers, out of gratitude to, respect for, and fear of their employer will do as commanded. Though a stereotype of dubious accuracy there is no doubt such supporters were perceived as possessing very significant influence over considerable numbers of voters and as such were highly valued by Sato and his staff.

The present regular members of the Jaycees entered the organization after Sato became a senior member and thus do not have the same ties with him as do the senior members. Sato, however, was the youngest of the candidates, the only one from Beppu and the sole candidate in the Prefecture to have been a member of the Junior Chamber of Commerce. Though some members of the organization refused to take part in the campaign, the entire leadership and the majority of members did campaign on Sato's behalf. Both organizationally, in giving its recommendation to only one candidate and individually in giving active support, the members and senior members of the Jaycees formed an effective and significant campaign group.

The importance that Sato's close personal ties with the membership of the Beppu-Oita Junior Chamber and his status as the only candidate from Beppu played in getting the backing of that organization was emphasized by the failure of the other Jaycee organization in the Second District, that of Nakatsu, to give Sato its recommendation. Nakatsu's Junior Chamber of Commerce has forty members of whom only eight are known to have

actively worked on Sato's behalf. Because of differences among the members, no recommendation was given to any of the candidates. Though Sato had cultivated support through periodic speeches before the group, he lacked the intimate relationship with the Nakatsu group that he had with the members of the organization in Beppu and the fact of his being a member of the organization was not sufficient to obtain the group's recommendation.

The Junior Chamber of Commerce in Beppu was the only one of the several economic interest groups active in the Prefecture to give significant support to Sato but economic groups were only a small portion of the associations approached by Sato in his organizational strategy. Medical associations, agricultural groups, religious organizations, sports clubs and a variety of other voluntary associations were also approached.

The Oita Prefecture Medical Association (Oita Ken Ishikai) is made up of seventeen city and county branches with 1,083 members. In the Second Electoral District there were 455 doctors in the Association.<sup>14</sup> The recommendation of the prefectural association for candidates for the Lower House is decided by a conference of the chairmen of the seventeen city and county organizations.<sup>15</sup> In the 1967 election this

---

<sup>14</sup>Oita Ken Ishikai, Kaiin Meibo (Oita, July 1966).

<sup>15</sup>This discussion of the election policies of the medical association is based upon an interview with its president, Kato Shin, on May 27, 1967.

recommendation went to all the LDP candidates in both districts plus an independent conservative candidate in the First District. The recommendation for all the conservative candidates represented a significant change in the organization's election policy from the previous campaign.

The Medical Association in Oita has long looked to two of the Prefecture's politicians to promote its goals on the national political level. These two are Murakami Isamu in the First District and Nishimura Eiichi in the Second. The Association's ties with Nishimura were particularly strong because of Nishimura's former position as Welfare Minister. In 1963, because of this cabinet position, Nishimura received the sole recommendation of the Association in the Second District. The Association's President, Kato Shin, travelled the entire District campaigning for him and the members carried out a systematic campaign effort on Nishimura's behalf. In 1967, however, Nishimura was no longer Welfare Minister and he could not command the sole support of the Association. Though he continued to command much support among the members, there was now enough support for other candidates to render a recommendation for only one candidate unobtainable. Thus in this election, according to the Association's President, the group adopted a neutral policy, providing neither financial backing nor coordinated campaigning for any of the candidates.

Sato had little hope of getting much support from the doctors outside of Beppu and little effort was made to solicit



such support. In Beppu, Sato's staff approached a select number of doctors on an individual basis (rather than try to work through the city Medical Association). Similarly in Nakatsu approaches were made to a few medical men whom it was thought might be favorable to Sato. Association President Kato maintains that Sato received the support of most of the members in these two cities but only a handful of doctors were actually known to Sato's headquarters to have been active supporters. For Sato, the Medical Association was valuable precisely because it did not limit its recommendation to only one candidate as it had in 1963. In light of its close relationship with Nishimura, the Association was regarded as a hostile organization by the Sato forces. Its endorsement of all the conservative candidates was considered a defeat for Nishimura because it formally freed the members to vote for whichever conservative candidate they wished and Sato felt sure that in Beppu at least this would redound to his benefit.

In direct contrast to the neutral policy adopted by the Medical Association was the policy of the prefecture's Dental Association; a policy of support for only one candidate in each district. The Oita Prefecture Dental Association (Oita Ken Shikaishikai) provided the only truly organized support and coordinated campaigning among all the groups that nominally gave Sato their support in the form of official recommendations.

Sato serves in an advisory position to many organizations in the Prefecture. Positions as adviser (komon) are sought by

the politician because they give him an inside track to the membership of the organization that would otherwise not be available. Such positions usually carry no salary and involve little of the politician's time. Because of his long career in the Prefectural Assembly and his close relationship with the Prefecture LDP leadership, Sato has been able to obtain the position of adviser to several groups, one of the most important of which was the position of "political adviser" (seiji komon) to the Prefecture's Dental Association.

The Dental Association has a policy of giving support to its advisers when they run for public office and in both the Diet elections of 1963 and 1967 Sato has been the only candidate in the Second District to receive the recommendation and active support of the organization.<sup>16</sup>

The official recommendation of an organization has little meaning if the membership does not involve itself in the campaign of the recommended candidate. Building upon the entree the position of adviser gave him, Sato diligently cultivated his relationships with the Association's members.

Dentists, like teachers and doctors, hold a respected position in local society. Because of their sparse number and the nature of their profession they are regarded as being less inhibited by local pressures and more conscious of their

---

<sup>16</sup>Information on the role of the dental association was obtained from many sources. Most important was an interview in May 1967 with Baba Takashi.

organizational interests than people in many other occupations. In rural areas in particular, Sato eagerly sought the support of dentists because of their high status and their familiarity with the people in their communities. Of the 195 dentists in the second district, 102 are in Beppu and Nakatsu.<sup>17</sup> With only 95 dentists to take care of the population of the other two cities and all the towns and villages of the District, it is not surprising that they have considerable status in local society. In many rural areas where local political pressures have prohibited Sato from obtaining support among local politicians, support was often limited to the area's dentists. His organization in Aki Town in Nishimura's stronghold of Higashi Kunisaki County was largely centered around three dentists, one the President of the Higashi Kunisaki County Dental Association. In Kunisaki Town, one of the four men on the sekininsha level of his organization is Vice-President of the Prefectural Dental Association.<sup>18</sup> Particularly in areas such as Higashi Kunisaki County which are so strongly the domain of other conservative Diet politicians, members of the Dental Association provided support that could not be obtained through the more traditional method of relying on local politicians.

The Oita Prefecture Dental Association has city and

---

<sup>17</sup>Oita Ken Shikaishikai, Kaiin Meibo (Oita, 1966).

<sup>18</sup>See above, p. 118.

county subdivisions and, with the calling of the general elections, these groups set up election strategy committees (senkyo taisaku iinkai) to coordinate campaign activities on behalf of the recommended candidates. The election activities of the Beppu Association were organized by an election strategy committee headed by two of Sato's most enthusiastic supporters, Baba Takashi and Nonaka Toshihide. Under their leadership were eleven district leaders responsible for the campaign in each of Beppu's eleven school districts. The members of the Association were divided into the eleven groups according to the area where they practiced.

Considerable pressure was put on all the members of the Association to campaign for Sato. Those who would not take part in the campaign had to explain their reasons for not supporting Sato to the election committee and receive the committee's approval to abstain. No one was allowed to campaign for any other candidate. Of the sixty-three dentists in the Beppu Association, two were permitted to refrain from campaigning for Sato. One was a relative of Ayabe and the other a relation of Komatsu. They both agreed not to campaign for other candidates. Three dentists were sick at the time of the campaign and five others, being brothers or husband and wife teams, were considered as one unit, thus bringing the number of Sato campaigners in the Association to fifty-three. In addition, fifteen laboratory workers and eight dealers in dental supplies were brought into the campaign organization.

The Beppu Association set a goal of 20,000 votes to be obtained for Sato by the dentists of the city. Each school district was to provide a certain number of votes in accord with its population and its number of dentists. The eleven school district campaign managers divided the quota for their area among the dentists in their particular group. Campaign headquarters were established in the home of Association president Nonaka and one entire wall of the house was covered with a graph showing the number of votes each dentist had obtained for Sato.

Between January 15 and January 28 the Association's election committee met six times. At each meeting the school district managers would announce the number of promised votes obtained for Sato by each dentist in their district. This would be recorded on the chart over the name of the particular dentist concerned and then recorded on the column that gave the particular district's total. Vote getting was made into a competitive sport with both the individual dentists vying for the tallest line on the graph and with the district leaders fighting to obtain the highest district total. Those dentists who were failing to maintain the pace were subjected to minute questioning on why they could not obtain more votes and were encouraged to try harder. The district chiefs were given the responsibility of making sure all the dentists in their areas actively campaigned and they had to give detailed explanations of the reasons for the poor performance of any dentists within

their districts. The wives of the dentists, particularly in the last days of the campaign, were also brought actively into the organization, soliciting votes in the daytime while their husbands campaigned in the evening. As with the dentists themselves it was a violation of Association policy for any of the wives to support another candidate and those who had special reasons for not campaigning for Sato had to present their case to the election committee.

The election committee met<sup>19</sup> for the first time on January 15 at which time quotas were established for each district and questions of campaign techniques were discussed. The dentists were urged to stress two slogans in asking for support for Sato: "elect the hometown candidate" and "rejuvenate the conservative party." In the following weeks several meetings were held to tally the votes obtained by the dentists and to discuss the progress of the campaign. At the first such meeting on January 20, a total of 3,800 votes toward the 20,000 vote goal were recorded on the graph. At the next meeting on January 24, the total had risen to 8,558 votes. On January 26 and 27 the dentists started a "human wave tactic" (jintai sakusen). These two days were to be the final push with each dentist required to campaign for a minimum of two and a half hours each of the two days and with their wives

---

<sup>19</sup>I attended two of these meetings. Information on the others was obtained from Baba Takashi.

campaigning during office hours. Dentists were urged to take a day off from work if possible to campaign for Sato. On January 28th, election eve, the Dental Association's election committee met in its final session. The number of promised votes was tallied for each district and for Beppu as a whole with the grand total coming to 15,688 votes.

Throughout the cities and counties of the district, members of the Dental Association campaigned for Sato though the organizational effort was on a much smaller scale and without the coordination and unanimity that characterized the Beppu effort. In Kitsuki and Hayami county the Association obtained the promise of votes for Sato from 1,502 voters; for Bungo Takada and Nishi Kunisaki county, the number was 1,375; 1,037 promises of voter support for Sato were obtained by Association members in Higashi Kunisaki county; 1,313 in Usa county; and 3,572 in the city of Nakatsu and Shimoge county. The total number of votes for all the areas outside of Beppu was 8,799.

The Dental Association's role in Sato's campaign came closest to the ideal type of organizational support sought by Lower House candidates. Its effectiveness was due to its recommendation of only one candidate and the pressures placed on the membership to actively support the recommended candidate.

The support of the Dental Association for Sato resulted from no rational consideration of the organization's interests. When Sato was in the Prefectural Assembly his position as

"political adviser" had real meaning for the Association because of his influence within the prefectural government. Support for him in the Diet election was a consequence of his holding of this position and not a consequence of any role he was expected to be able to perform on the national level on behalf of the Association's interests.

Activities on the local level to give effective support to a particular candidate may hinder the realization of an organization's goals by alienating the other candidates of the party and their supporters. The complete identification of the Dental Association with Sato's campaign created anything but a feeling of good will toward it on the part of the other LDP candidates. This was particularly significant because the two LDP candidates the Association did not support were both incumbents of considerable tenure in the Diet who, if re-elected, might be expected to be less than anxious to do favors for the Association. Whatever the consequences, the Dental Association's effective support for Sato meant its effective opposition to the other LDP candidates in the District and it was precisely for this reason that its support was deemed of great significance by Sato.

In prefectures with large rural populations like Oita, agricultural cooperative unions (nōgyō kyōdō kumiai) are large and powerful organizations. The 106 cooperative unions in Oita prefecture have 103,000 members.<sup>20</sup> Because the membership

---

<sup>20</sup> Oita Ken Nōgyō Kyōdō Kumiai Chuōkai, Oita Ken Nōgyō Kyōdō Kumiai Tōkeihyo (Oita, 1967).



of these cooperatives is so large, the support of cooperative union leaders can be of significant value to a candidate in providing a channel to the rural voter. It is an indication of his urban orientation that Sato had the support of no cooperative union leaders except for one from the Nakatsu area.

All the local unions are organized into a prefectural organization which can make recommendations for candidates in prefectural assembly, Lower and Upper House Diet elections. In the 1967 election the prefectural association itself did not make any recommendations for candidates but its conference of union chiefs (kumiaiichōkai) sent "telegrams of encouragement" (gekirei) to two LDP incumbents in the first district and to Ayabe and Nishimura in the second.<sup>21</sup> The telegrams of encouragement are indicative of two points. First they reflect the support that Ayabe and Nishimura, with their rural orientations, commanded among the local union chiefs (the members of the conference of union chiefs) and second, they reflected the inability of the prefectural organization to officially back any one candidate.

Like many interest groups, the agricultural cooperative union organization functions most effectively in support of Upper House candidates in the national constituency elections who run with the backing of the national organization and in support of candidates to local Assemblies. In the April 1967

---

<sup>21</sup>Interview with Yoshitake Masayoshi, May 22, 1967.

local elections, twelve Prefectural Assembly candidates received the recommendation of the prefectural organization. The Assembly has an "agricultural cooperative group" (Kenqikai Nōkyō Giin Dan) which had nine members following the April election. All are officers of agricultural cooperative unions. Four are independent conservatives/ members of an informal group known as the Nōsei Kurabu, three are members of the LDP and two belong to the Socialist Party.<sup>22</sup> No such close ties between candidates and the agricultural cooperative unions existed on the Lower House level. Individual cooperative union leaders were brought into campaign organizations, and apparently provided many of the active campaigners for Ayabe and Nishimura, but none of the candidates was able to convince the union that its interests would best be served by uniting its support behind only one candidate.

There were a variety of other agricultural associations Sato approached for support but with no significant success. Rather than get the support of the association as such, efforts were concentrated on gaining the backing of a few association leaders. These organizations included the association of livestock owners (chikusangyō rengōkai), the union of tobacco growers (tabako kosaku kumiai), and the association of veterinarians (jūishikai).

The island of Kyushu produces the greater part of Japan's

---

<sup>22</sup>Oita Gōdō Shinbun, May 17, 1967, p. 1.

bamboo. Oita, with its 18,046 hectares of bamboo forests and its skilled artisans in Beppu and other areas has the largest income of all prefectures in the country from the combined sale of bamboo and bamboo products.<sup>23</sup> To the people involved in Oita's bamboo industry, Sato is the take daigishi, the "bamboo Diet man."

Sato has long taken an active part in attempts to improve the bamboo industry in the prefecture. In trips abroad he wore bamboo hats and gave presents of bamboo products to publicize the prefecture's industry. Following his election to the Diet he furnished his office in the Diet building entirely with bamboo products from the Prefecture and even listed the stores that provided them, and the prices so people could order similar items through Sato's office. Most importantly, he helped create in 1959 the Oita Prefecture Federation of Bamboo Industries (Oita Ken Take Sangyō Rengōkai) and has served as the organization's president since its inception.

The organization of the producers of bamboo and bamboo products was created in an attempt to revitalize the then sagging bamboo industry in the Prefecture. The Federation's 429 members represent only a fraction of the people involved in the industry but they are the people who own the largest bamboo forests and the largest factories that process bamboo. Seventy-five per cent of the members are owners of cultivated (as

---

<sup>23</sup>Oita Ken, Oita Ken Tōkei Nenpan (Oita, 1966).

distinguished from wild) bamboo forests. The remainder are owners of factories that cut and glaze the bamboo and a few are owners of firms that produce finished products. Two hundred fifty-three of the Federation's members are in the second electoral district.<sup>24</sup>

Sato's relationship with the members of the Bamboo Federation were similar to those with the members of the Dental Association. He had intimate personal friendships with the leaders of the group and his position as President provided many opportunities to personally meet the general Membership. The Vice-President of the Federation is the plant manager of the Nagata Bamboo Company, the largest producer of treated bamboo in the Prefecture and was one of the handful of men involved at the top level of Sato's campaign. The Bamboo Federation decided at a general meeting of its membership before the 1967 election to endorse its President for election to the Lower House. No other candidates in the District were endorsed.<sup>25</sup> Unlike the Dental Association, most of the members of the Bamboo Federation live outside of Beppu and felt more keenly the pressures to support the local candidate. There was no coordinated campaigning among the membership on behalf of Sato and there were apparently only a small number of

---

<sup>24</sup>Oita Ken Take Sangyō Rengōkai, Kain Meibo (Oita, 1966).

<sup>25</sup>Interview with Federation business manager Ishikawa on May 23, 1967.

members who actively and openly campaigned for him.<sup>26</sup> The main significance of Sato's support by the Federation appears to have been to inhibit members from campaigning for other candidates. Like the Dental Association, the Bamboo Federation demanded of its members that they give support to Sato or explain to the Federation why they could not do so. Several members, pressured to campaign for another candidate, used the organization's recommendation for Sato as an excuse for abstaining from the campaign. Active support for any candidate but Sato, they argued, would threaten their membership in the organization. To the Federation, on the other hand, they argued that active support for Sato would threaten their position in local society. With a few important exceptions, local community pressures apparently were sufficient to prevent open campaigning on Sato's behalf. The support of the organization created pressures of its own sufficient enough, however, to keep members from campaigning for other candidates and to encourage some to quietly support, if not openly campaign for Sato. Furthermore, the activities of the top leadership of the organization were important in gaining Sato support

---

<sup>26</sup>One was the owner of a large bamboo processing plant in Bungo Takada who is an opponent of Sato's main supporter there, Kiyohara. His is the only case Sato's headquarters knows about of support coming from that city that was not organized by the Kiyohara machine. Kiyohara readily admits that Sato would not have gotten the support of this plant owner were it not for Sato's relation with the bamboo organization. "He's opposed to Mizunoe [the man Kiyohara "made" mayor] in Takada politics," Kiyohara once remarked to me, "so I never would have approached him to support Sato." Cf. above,

among the several thousand unorganized owners of bamboo forests and producers of bamboo products.<sup>27</sup> The appeal to people in the industry to elect a "bamboo Diet man" was aided by newspaper articles which pictured Sato as the representative and promoter of Oita bamboo.<sup>28</sup>

Among the organizations discussed so far, the Junior Chamber of Commerce, the Dental Association and the Bamboo Industry Federation alone limited their recommendations for candidates in the Second District to Sato. There are two other organizations, as diverse in their interests as the above three, that endorsed only Sato. One is an organization of fruit and vegetable dealers and, the other one of Japan's "new religions."

In 1963, the President of the Oita Prefecture Chapter of the LDP, Iwasaki, resigned his position as President of the Oita Prefecture Federation of Green Goods Retailers' Unions (Oita Ken Seika Kouri Kumiai Rengōkai). Iwasaki's resignation followed immediately upon the Diet election of that year and the LDP chief recommended as the new President for the Union, defeated Diet candidate Sato. Thus in late 1963 Sato became the President of an organization that includes both the retail

---

<sup>27</sup> There are no figures on the total number of people involved in the bamboo industry in Oita Prefecture. The estimate of the Federation's business manager is that there are nearly 20,000 people involved in the industry full and part time. Interview May 23, 1967.

<sup>28</sup> See, for instance, Asahi Shinbun, January 18, 1967, p. 14; Nishi Nihon Shinbun, January 11, 1967, p. 9.

and wholesale fruit and vegetable dealers in Oita Prefecture, an organization that has approximately 350 members in Beppu and 700 in the Second District as a whole.<sup>29</sup>

The position of president of the vegetable dealers' union entails few duties and the actual running of the organization is in the hands of the business manager, a position held by the same man since the union's inception in 1957. Business manager Mieno is the owner of a fruit and vegetable store in Oita city and is a large wholesaler of green goods, trucking them to dealers in isolated areas. He is an active supporter of Sato and, in the months preceding the election, arranged for Sato to address several meetings of local unions in the Second District. The exposure these meetings provided Sato was one of the most important aspects of the union's support. Mieno would inform Sato of the date of the meeting of one of the local unions and Sato would drop in unannounced to "say hello" to the group. When elections were called, the

---

<sup>29</sup> Though the union is called one of retail dealers it includes the wholesalers (nakagainin) as well. Unions of wholesalers exist only in areas that have central markets. Such central markets, built with public monies, are in cities with populations over 150,000. Oita city with a population of 170,000 has been allocated funds for the building of a central market that is expected to be completed in 1970. At that time a wholesale dealers union will be formed. For the present all dealers are in the retailers union. The unions are organized at the several markets where the dealers buy their merchandise. In the Second District there are thirteen such markets: three in Beppu, five in Nakatsu, two in Bungo Takada, two in the town of Nagasu and one in the town of Usa.

Federation, which is made up of the union chiefs of the several local unions, formally recommended its president for election to the Lower House. No other candidates in either district received the Federation's recommendation. Mieno and three other officers of the Federation formed the nucleus of the group's campaign effort, soliciting support for Sato throughout the district and calling on members in the First District to ask relatives and friends in the Second to vote for him. According to Mieno's estimates the most extensive support for Sato was in the cities of Nakatsu, Bungo Takada and Beppu. In those areas which were the strongholds of Nishimura and Ayabe support was minimal. Mieno conservatively estimates the union vote for Sato at 900 to 1,000: half of the membership plus their families.<sup>30</sup>

The rapid growth of Sōka Gakkai and the electoral successes of its political arm, the Kōmeitō, have perhaps obscured the fact that direct political activity, in the sense of putting forth or recommending candidates for office, is a practice engaged in by many religious groups in Japan. Many of the so-called new religions play an active role in politics and elections, recommending candidates for various offices and often putting forth their own candidates for election to the Upper House in the national constituency.

The social landscape of Oita Prefecture is dotted with

---

<sup>30</sup>Interview, May 23, 1967.



a large number of religious organizations and Sato approached nearly all in his search for group support. While unable to obtain the official recommendation or complete support of any but one such organization, Sato made a concerted effort to get supporters in each of the following large religious organizations and a score of small religious groups in Beppu: Risshō Kōseikai, PL Kyōdan, Tenrikyō, Shingonshū, Konkōkyō and Sōka Gakkai. While Sato did manage to gain support from some people who were active in these groups, he was unable to get significant group support. The Sōka Gakkai officially decided to give no support to any of the candidates and to give complete freedom to its members in deciding whom to support. The attention of the organization was focused on the April local elections and in helping Komeito Diet candidates in neighboring Fukuoka Prefecture.<sup>31</sup> Sato made no attempt to get the official recommendation of any of these groups but, rather to get as much support as possible among the leadership of these organizations. These activities were limited almost entirely to Beppu. In addition, Sato's eldest son, during the official campaign period, was busy attending meetings of a number of obscure local religious clubs in Beppu spreading the word of his father's deep religious convictions.

Sato did get the official recommendation and active support of one of the new religions and one that takes an

---

<sup>31</sup>Oita Gōdō Shinbun, January 6, 1967, p. 1.

active part in politics, mainly on behalf of right-wing causes, Seichō No Ie (the House of Growth).<sup>32</sup> Sato, like many a politician, shows great ideological flexibility when it comes to seeking votes. While a "new right" conservative when talking with certain groups, he more often than not turned to an old-right concern with Japan's spiritual health and the decadence plaguing the postwar generation when speaking before audiences in his district--particularly if they were old. His talk of the Emperor, the family system, and the wabi and sabi uniqueness of Japan had considerable appeal for the members of Seichō No Ie if the thinking of the President of the Beppu branch of that association is at all representative.<sup>33</sup> Koguchi Hiroshi describes the group's political goals as revision of the Constitution to return sovereignty to the Emperor, recognition of the central role of the family (rather than the individual) in Japanese life and, in general, sweeping measures to eliminate most of postwar Japanese reforms and supposedly put the country on a road of progress directed by its own traditions rather than by the alien ideas of Westerners. While Sato has never come out in favor of any of the measures the group supports, he has not come out in opposition to any of them either. The tone of his speeches could be expected to

---

<sup>32</sup>For a description of Seichō No Ie and a brief discussion of its advocacy of a "religious political movement" see Harry Thomsen, The New Religions of Japan (Tokyo, 1963), pp. 153-172.

<sup>33</sup>Interview with Koguchi Hiroshi, May 24, 1967.

satisfy a member of Seichō No Ie like Koguchi that he had a sympathetic associate in Sato Bunsei. The fact that Sato did not refuse to have himself and his wife become members of the organization,<sup>34</sup> a necessary condition for receiving the group's recommendation according to Koguchi, further allayed any fears that Sato's thinking might not be in line with that of the organization.

Seichō No Ie has been active in Oita Prefecture for nearly twenty years but its membership is quite small. The organization claims 400 members in Beppu and 900 to 1,000 in the Second District as a whole. Even this figure, however, appears somewhat inflated. Sato believes the support of the organization may have helped in obtaining a few hundred votes in Beppu and had no effect anywhere else. Koguchi, with true missionary confidence in the benefits to be derived from joining the organization, claimed the membership gave Sato 5,000 votes.

Seichō No Ie, as well as all the other associations discussed above are identified with the Conservative Party and brought Sato into conflict with his fellow LDP candidates rather than with the opposition. As a self-proclaimed adherent of the "new right" of the LDP, Sato might be expected to have had some appeal to Democratic Socialist Party supporters, particularly since no member of that party was running for office.

---

<sup>34</sup>Sato's wife expressed ignorance of such membership and obviously neither she nor the candidate took it very seriously.

Whatever appeal he did have was on an individual basis since the Democratic Socialist Party and its supporting Dōmei-affiliated unions avoided direct involvement in the campaign and left their members free to decide for themselves among the candidates.<sup>35</sup> Sato made some efforts to get the support of the Beppu shinkokurō, the Dōmei affiliated union of railroad workers and he did obtain the promise of limited support from a few of the union's leaders. The support was to be limited in the sense that the leaders would not openly support Sato but would quietly seek support among the union's members. Similar support came from the DSP-elected Prefectural Assemblyman from Beppu, a childhood friend of Sato. An air of conspiracy surrounded all of Sato's efforts to get DSP support. Meetings were held in utter secrecy. Sato operated on the assumption that the only support obtainable was that of particular leaders who would covertly "order" their subordinates (who would in turn order their subordinates) to support him. A consequence of this approach is that a considerable amount of money is spent to "move the organization" while the benefits that would be gained by a public endorsement are not realized.

Sato's hesitation to energetically seek the support of progressive party affiliated organizations was of course even greater in regard to Socialist Party supporting groups, particularly with a JSP candidate in the district. None of the

---

<sup>35</sup>Oita Gōdō Shinbun, January 6, 1967, p. 1.

JSP supporting unions were approached. There was only one organization that became a battleground for a confrontation between Sato and Socialist candidate Komatsu in the fight for group support. The organization at issue is the Oita Prefecture Public High School Teachers' Union (Oita Ken Kōkōgakkō Kyōshokuin Kumiai, known as Kōkyōsō).

Seventy-eight per cent of Japan's 180,784 high school teachers are organized in labor unions. Of this number Nikkyōsō (Nihon Kyōshokuin Kumiai) accounts for 38.6 per cent or 69,688 teachers and Nikkōsō (Nihon Kōkōgakkō Kyōshokuin Kumiai) for 34.2 per cent or 61,918 members. Twenty-two per cent are unorganized and the remaining 5.2 per cent are in a variety of small unions.<sup>36</sup> In Oita Prefecture virtually all public high school teachers (98 per cent) are members of the Oita Prefecture Public High School Teachers' Union (Kōkyōsō) which is affiliated with Nikkōsō. While Nikkyōsō is an important supporter of the Socialist Party, Nikkōsō is split into right- and left-wing factions. According to figures published by the Education Ministry the unions in fifteen prefectures are controlled by the right-wing faction and account for 23,900 of the organization's 61,918 members. Oita's Nikkōsō affiliated union is listed among these right-wing factions, a position confirmed by the leaders of the Oita union.<sup>37</sup>

<sup>36</sup>As of June 1, 1966 according to Ministry of Education figures. A copy of the Ministry's document was provided the author by the president of Kōkyōsō, Asada Hiroaki.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid.; Interview with Asada Hiroaki, May 1967.

Labor unions, like the other organizations discussed in this chapter, often make recommendations for candidates in public elections. In 1967 the national headquarters of Nikkōsō, however, did not issue a list of endorsed candidates and left the decision on which candidates to be recommended up to the prefectural unions. The leadership of Oita's union is conservative in orientation. It supported Sato but the union is officially on record as having recommended only Socialist Komatsu Kan for election to the Lower House. Part of the reason for this anomaly is Kōkyōsō's affiliation with the Oita Ken Rōdō Kumiai Hyōgikai (Kenrōhyō).

Oita Prefecture is estimated to have 240,000 laborers of whom 86,430 are organized in 688 labor unions. The majority of union members are in the First Electoral District. The Second District has 188 unions with a membership of 23,249.<sup>38</sup>

As on the national level, labor unions in the Prefecture are divided into several federations. Some are affiliated with Sōhyō, the General Council of Trade Unions of Japan, the largest national labor federation and the most important backer of the Socialist Party. Others are associated with Domei, the smaller federation that backs the Democratic Socialist Party. Many others are affiliated with no prefectural or national organization. On the prefectural level there are three associations of labor unions, the largest being Kenrōhyō with a

---

<sup>38</sup> Information on Oita labor unions based on an interview with Murai Hisao, Oita Prefecture's Division of Commerce, Industry and Labor, Labor Affairs Section Chief in May 1967 and on the detailed materials in Oita Ken Shōkō Rōdōbu Rōseika, Rōdō Kumiai Meikan (Oita, 1966).

membership of 53,245 people in eighty-two unions. Kenrōhyō's membership consists largely of workers in publicly-owned enterprises and public servants.<sup>39</sup> It is affiliated with Sōhyō on the national level. The other two are Oita Dōmei (Zen Nihon Rōdō Sōdōmei Oita Chihō Dōmei) with 10,966 members and a small federation of 4,544 workers in small enterprises (Oita Ken Chūshō Kigyō Rōdō Kumiai Rengōkai). These three prefectural organizations account for 68,755 of the 86,430 organized workers. The remainder are in the many small unions existing in the various cities and counties of the prefecture. These local unions (chikurō) are also for the most part affiliated with Sōhyō or Dōmei through the Chikurōdō Kumiai Sōgikai (Sōhyō) and the Chiku Dōmei (Dōmei).

Though as a general rule unions in the Prefecture affiliated with Kenrohyo are also affiliated with Sōhyō and vice-versa, the realities of union development in the Prefecture are much more complicated than the organizational charts would indicate. There are, for instance, some unions which are members of Sōhyō but are not in Kenrōhyō and some, like the high school teachers union, which are in Kenrōhyō but are not affiliated with Sōhyō.

Kenrōhyō recommends candidates for Diet and local elections. The member unions vote on the candidates to be

---

<sup>39</sup> 37,780 such workers compared to 18,465 workers in private industry.

recommended and the endorsed candidates then become the recommended candidates of all Kenrōhyō affiliated unions. In the 1967 Diet election Kenrōhyō endorsed Socialist Komatsu Kan. Though the top level leadership of the high school teachers union is opposed to Komatsu the need to maintain their position in Kenrōhyō and to avoid a serious split among the membership of their own union led the leaders to acquiesce in the Kenrōhyō endorsement and covertly campaign for Sato.

In the immediate postwar period all public school teachers were in one union in Oita (Kenkyōsō) which was affiliated with the national Nikkyōsō organization. In the mid-1950's a dispute on the political activities of the union led the high-school teachers to break away from Kenkyōsō and form their own union. The present president of the high school teachers union, Asada Hiroaki, asserts that Komatsu was involved in the fight that led to the split and that, consequently, "Among teachers over forty-five those opposed to Komatsu are in the overwhelming majority and their support has gone to [Sato] Bunsei."<sup>40</sup> Komatsu relates that he was an officer of Kenkyōsō at the time of the split and attempted to mediate between the opposing factions. When his efforts failed and the high school teachers' group decided to leave the union, Komatsu, who was a junior high school teacher at the time,

---

<sup>40</sup>In a letter to the author of June 21, 1967. All quotes attributed to Mr. Asada are taken from this letter.



could do nothing more than accept the high school teachers decision and remain in his executive position in Kenkyōsō. He agrees that this earned him the animosity of the leaders of the high school teachers group at the time and that those people (those Asada refers to as being over forty-five) have kept a tight grip on the union's executive positions.<sup>41</sup>

Sato was able to capitalize on opposition to Komatsu largely because of his position as Chairman of the Prefectural Assembly's Education Committee. This position allowed him to present himself to his constituents and to the teachers as a man deeply concerned with, and influential in matters concerning, the education of their children. In his speeches he would often remark that he refused positions of influence on such politically valuable committees as construction or agriculture in order to devote his full energies to solving the problems of the education of the young. Because he was Chairman of the Committee, Sato had the power to do favors for many people. A request to a friend in the prefectural bureaucracy could get a desired transfer for a teacher; a call from Sato to a high school principal might help obtain a position for the son of a constituent just out of college. Many of Sato's closest friends are the bureaucrats in the educational section of the prefectural government and the principals of high schools, particularly those in Beppu. His

---

<sup>41</sup>Interview with Komatsu Kan, July 7, 1967.

position on the Education Committee allowed Sato to develop personal friendships with the high school teachers and after leaving the Assembly he continued to maintain these ties.

There are several other reasons alleged to account for leadership support for Sato. One is their political conservatism. The leaders of Oita's high school teachers' union take marked exception to being labelled laborers. The president of the union believes that "The character of the high school union is unlike that of labor unions and teachers unlike laborers. This causes opposition to labor unions and consequently to the Socialist Party. The union maintains a posture of non-alignment in regard to political parties." President Asada and his group consider themselves political moderates and "Sato's modern sense appeals to the high school teachers. The contents of his speeches stand above conservatism or progressivism and offer a new approach. His liberalism is an important reason for his appeal among the high school teachers."

The elementary and junior high school teachers' union (kenkyōsō) with its approximately 2,700 members in the Second District<sup>42</sup> provides the core campaign organization for Komatsu. One important reason for the failure of any candidate to get the united support of the high school teachers, in addition to those cited above, is indicated by President Asada in his statement that "the majority of the members of Komatsu's major

---

<sup>42</sup>Oita Ken Shōkō Rōdōbu Rōseika, Rōdō Kumiai Meikan, pp. 17-19.

supporter, Kenkyōsō, are alumni of Oita University and possess a strong sense of familial (dōzoku) consciousness. In the case of the high school teachers, the colleges graduated from are diverse. Furthermore many have become teachers only after the War. It is impossible to match the unanimity of Kenkyōsō in deciding on support for a candidate in the general election."

The high school teachers union in Oita has 2,856 members. Of these, 1,215 are in the Second District. With the union officially supporting Komatsu and the union leadership supporting Sato, estimates as to the degree of support for the candidates vary greatly with the person being asked. The union leadership implies in discussing the matter that support for Sato is limited pretty much to the old guard, the over forty-five group of teachers who have memories of the fight that led to the split with Kenkyōsō. President Asada talks of Sato having "pockets" of strength in the district with the greatest support naturally being in Beppu. Sato talks of commanding the support not only of the union's leaders but of the majority of the general membership as well. He takes every opportunity to stress his support among the teachers (never mentioning that the union's recommendation went to Komatsu) as an example of his appeal to the left. He considers himself unique among conservative politicians in having broad support among a "progressive" group like the high school teachers union. Komatsu naturally deprecates Sato's support among the teachers. He argues that even though the union's leadership is conservative, the politics of the union and of Kenrōhyō force the

leadership to keep their campaign activities for Sato circumspect while the union endorses Komatsu publicly. Komatsu believes he gets 70 per cent of the union support, Sato gets 20 per cent and the remaining members support other candidates.<sup>43</sup>

More important than the question of how many of the teachers' votes Sato receives is the fact that the support given him by the union leadership effectively prevented a coordinated campaign effort by the union on behalf of an opposing candidate. Individual teachers may vote for and even campaign for Komatsu but he was unable to incorporate the union itself into his campaign organization. With the support of the leadership, union campaign activities, like those of the elementary and middle school teachers' union, can be rationally organized. The organizational structure of the union with its capacity for coordinating a joint effort can be mobilized; enthusiasm for the campaign effort can be instilled through the sense of participation and commitment to the group effort; and through the union's hierarchy of influence and power pressure can be applied to insure a certain minimum of membership participation. Without such leadership support, the efforts of the union members, even if they are generally in favor of one particular candidate become, in a favorite word of Japanese politicians, barabara - "scattered." Coordination becomes difficult. The union, as a campaign organization is rendered impotent. For Sato this is the major

---

<sup>43</sup>Interview, July 7, 1967.

beneficial consequence of the support of the teacher union's leadership. An organization, the membership of which is regarded as generally progressive by conservative politicians, was neutralized. The question of positive support for Sato is of less crucial note than his having been able, through a combination of fortuitous circumstances, to deny the Socialist candidate the support of the union. In an exaggeration both of the extent of his support among the union membership and of the facts of politics in other prefectures, Sato talked of himself as being the "only man" running for election as a conservative to have the support of the "progressive" high school teachers' union. This union did represent the sole battlefield on which conservative met progressive in a search for organized support. That Sato tended to exaggerate his support among this group was largely the result of the heady effect created by the rarified atmosphere of an inter-party battle.

In late August of 1966 Sato had several hundred large posters printed. They contained Sato's picture, his "late summer greetings" to the constituents and his announcement, in his position as President of the Oita Prefecture Yachting Club that the Crown Prince and Princess would be visiting Beppu on September 18th on the occasion of the national athletic meet. Displaying these posters around Beppu and other parts of the district was just one of the ways Sato was able to get around the ban on pre-election campaigning and obtain

publicity, support and votes through his activities in various sport organizations.

Sato serves as president or advisor to no less than six sports organizations. He is president of the Oita Prefecture Weightlifting Association, Yacht Club, Softball Association and Table Tennis Club. He heads Beppu's Kendō (fencing) Federation and is advisor to its Rugby-Soccer Club. Sato is a member of the Prefecture's Association for Physical Education and makes more speeches at sporting events than at political rallies. Sato, the sportsman politician--young, healthy, vigorous, handsome and interested in young people--was the picture Sato hoped his activities would implant in the minds of the voters of the Second District. Such image building and a healthy dose of needed publicity were provided by what was, for Sato, the extraordinarily good timing of the national athletic meet of 1966.

In the late summer and fall of every year there is a national athletic meet in which amateur teams from all the prefectures compete. It is an important event for the prefecture that acts as host and each prefecture gets that chance only twice in a century. In 1966 Oita Prefecture was the host and for weeks Sato, in his blue blazer and white cap, was on a seemingly endless round of attendance at sporting meets. All of Sato's efforts to gain publicity through sports seemed to culminate in a resounding crescendo as he appeared on television as guide to the Crown Prince and his popular wife Michiko

in his position as president of the Yachting Club; as the newspapers pictured him throwing out the first ball for, and extolling to another member of the Imperial Family the virtues of, the Beppu's girls' softball team; and as the communication media covered his presentation of awards to winners in the weightlifting competition. The national athletic meet, climaxing long years of participation in the activities of numerous sport organizations, gave Sato publicity, a "sportsman's" image and the enthusiastic support of members of sports organizations with which he was involved.

In addition to the organizations discussed above, there were more than a score of organizations approached by Sato. A listing of some of these indicates the broad range of groups that came within his "organizational strategy."

One group was composed of associations of former teachers and public officials including the association of former high school principals (taishoku kōchōkai) and the federation of former public officials (taishoku kōmuin renōkai). Another category was that of veteran associations, the large gunonrenmei and smaller local groups. Sato was often speaking before one veteran group or another and on several occasions before the Taiyūkai, the Friends of the Self Defense Forces. Beppu's self defense force base provided an alluring concentration of votes and through his friends in the Taiyūkai and his own position as adviser to the prefectural Taiyūkai organization, Sato tried to meet and talk with as many defense personnel as possible. A related group is the large Izokukai, the

organization of bereaved families of the war dead. Sato was unable to get support from the organization but had his son make courtesy calls on several members from Beppu during the campaign in the hope that a few members might offer to campaign for him.

Most of the other groups approached were in Beppu and Nakatsu. They include the barbers' union, the beauticians' union, the association of hotel owners, the bartenders' association, the association of midwives and the association of masseurs to name a few. Also in Beppu was an intriguing group called the Bunchōkai. The Bunchōkai (the Bun is taken from Sato's name, Bunsei) is an organization of cooks in hotels in Beppu created for the purpose of supporting Sato's campaign. The Bunchōkai is interesting, if not of demonstrable importance, because it brings Sato's campaign into Beppu's underworld of gangsters, prostitutes and other unheralded voters. The adviser (komon) to the Hotel Chefs Union (itaba kumiai) is an ex-convict and former cook. Beppu was at one time notorious for its criminal gangs and the adviser to the Union was active in one of these. He currently works for one of Beppu's local newspapers and it was through the editor of the paper that he met Sato. Early one fall evening in 1966 the editor and his reformed assistant came by Sato's house and Sato invited them to join him and myself for dinner. Throughout the meal the editor's assistant kept on repeating how unbelievable it was that he, a lowly ex-convict, was sitting at the same table as



Sato Bunsei. After that sukiyaki dinner he devoted himself with an almost fanatic zeal to organizing support for Sato. Establishing the Bunchōkai, he organized most of the 450 men in the Cooks' Union, many of whom have similar histories in Beppu's underworld, on Sato's behalf and urged them to spread the word for Sato to all the waitresses in the places they worked and to use their influence with friends and acquaintances in Beppu's less respectable bars and other varied places of entertainment.

Another group with a role of sorts in the campaign was that of Beppu's over one hundred geisha. Geisha in a small city like Beppu were of considerable value as a source of information. Entertaining local businessmen and politicians, the geisha, particularly as election time approached, hear many conversations about the candidates and the election. On several occasions geisha were instrumental in Sato obtaining important support by informing him of conversations overheard in the course of their work.

Virtually every group with a title was at least approached by Sato in the search for organization support. The Oita Prefecture Abacus Association of which Sato serves as advisor, the Beppu Minyō Kenkyūkai (folksong club) and the Beppu Seigakukai (the mountain climbing club) were all included within Sato's "organizational strategy."

Of all the groups involved in one way or another in Sato's campaign, only one, the prefectural Dental Association,

provided full and effective support. Only four others, the bamboo growers, the Beppu Junior Chamber of Commerce, the vegetable dealers union and the Beppu branch of Seichō No Ie gave Sato their sole endorsement. The general pattern for voluntary associations that are supporters of the LDP was to make no recommendations for candidates in the election or to officially endorse all the LDP candidates. By not urging their membership to vote for a particular candidate, LDP supporting associations left the endorsed LDP candidate with precisely the same problem he had before endorsement: how to convince voters to vote for him rather than for another of the party's candidates. Association activities to provide meaningful support to a particular LDP candidate, on the other hand, were certain to incur the opposition of the other candidates of the party in the district. Thus an LDP supporting organization is in the unhappy predicament of being effective by supporting only one candidate and inviting the hostility of unsupported LDP candidates or being ineffective by endorsing all LDP candidates and earning the gratitude of none.

From the candidate's perspective, the support of an organization is valuable when it provides a horizontal cover to his campaign strategy; when it fans out across the district, breaking through chiiki lines and providing support-his area based organization cannot recruit. Whether the candidate receives the sole recommendation of the organization or whether he is only one of several endorsed candidates, the crucial

issue is the extent to which his support permeates down through the organization's membership across the district. As a consequence, the organizational strategy of LDP candidates is often a strategy for obtaining the support of particular sub-leaders within the organizations. This results in the phenomenon of the candidate paying, in effect, the interest group for its support rather than the interest group paying the candidate for his support of the group's policies. An LDP candidate who has received the recommendation along with the other candidates of the party of a particular organization will try to find out which sub-leaders (such as the chairmen of the town or county organization) are favorable to him and then give campaign funds to these leaders to distribute to members of the organization within their particular area of influence. This sometimes amounts to little else than bribery. Since all LDP candidates have received the organization's endorsement, the issue of which one is to be supported may be determined by a contest to see which one offers the largest amount of so-called campaign funds to the largest number of organization leaders. Even where one candidate has received the sole recommendation of an organization, the tendency is for him to distribute campaign funds to sub-leaders of the group in order to insure their support and avoid what one writer (for somewhat different reasons) has termed "executive campaigns," support that does not reach beyond the top level of the

organization leadership.<sup>44</sup>

The amount of campaign funds offered by candidates is not, however, the sole or even major factor in determining which sub-leaders will support which candidates. More often than not such decisions are determined by geography. There is a strong tendency for organizations that have endorsed all party candidates to break up in effective support along the lines of indigenous candidate strength. Thus one finds many organizations giving Sato support in Beppu, Ayabe support in Kitsuki and Nishimura support in Higashi Kunisaki. LDP supporting organizations show a tendency in supporting LDP candidates to back the native son candidate where there is no specific organizational policy to do otherwise.

Such dynamics of the political process on the local level suggest that a sharp distinction should be drawn between the relationship of powerful national interest groups with the Party and with particular powerful party leaders and the relationship of local branches of such groups with the larger number of backbenchers and new candidates. While the national organizations of various interest groups have an intimate relationship with the LDP in providing financial support and influencing policy, the component organizations on the prefectural level are for the most part infinitely weaker and have only the most tenuous ties with the LDP. It is the prefectural

---

<sup>44</sup>Matsushita Keiichi, Gendai Nihon No Seijiteki Kōsei (Tokyo, 1964), p. 137.

organization, however, that is mainly concerned with Lower House election campaigns.<sup>45</sup> In isolated cases a national interest group will give meaningful support to individual Diet candidates, such as the Medical Association did for Nishimura in the 1963 election, but such action is the exception rather than the rule. In Sato's case there was no instance of support from the national organization of any interest group and, even on the local level, as has been seen, meaningful organizational support was minimal. Where such direct support occurred it was the consequence of purely local and largely personal factors (his long held position as advisor to the Dental Association for instance) rather than the result of the organization's conscious consideration of the benefits support for him would provide. There is a great difference in the role interest groups play in providing financial support for top LDP leaders and a body of voters who will vote for LDP candidates and their role in providing effective support for individual candidates. Glossing over this difference can lead to unrealistically inflated estimates of the role such groups play in Diet campaigns and the degree of influence they have over individual Diet members. For the large number of LDP Diet members, ties with various interest groups would appear to be generally indirect, through faction leaders and the

---

<sup>45</sup> On the predominant role of local chapters of national associations in Lower House election campaigns see Taguchi Fukuji, Nihon Seiji No Doko To Tenbo (Tokyo, 1966), p. 174.

party leadership.

Perhaps the major importance of Sato's efforts to gain the support of various groups was, as one reporter observed, its largely intangible effect of building the "Sato mood": "For three years, since losing in the last election by a narrow margin, Sato has been engaged in a minute organization of various groups: the bamboo growers, the vegetable dealers, hotel cooks, hotel owners and even masseurs. At barber shops, beauty parlors and sushi counters 'Bunsei' is an often-heard word. As the word passes back and forth from the lips of waitresses and housewives the Sato mood is building up. . . ."46

---

<sup>46</sup>Asahi Shinbun, January 8, 1967, p. 14.

## CHAPTER VIII

### THE OFFICIAL CAMPAIGN

On December 27, 1966, the Prime Minister, under the pressures of a Socialist boycott of the Diet and an incessant public demand for new elections, dissolved the Lower House and set January 29th as the day the nation's voters would elect a new House of 486 members. Under the law, candidacy must be registered within four days of the day of the official notification of the election (kōji).<sup>1</sup> This was set for January 8th. Since campaigning is allowed only during the period that extends from the day candidacy is registered to the day preceding the election,<sup>2</sup> the official campaign period for candidates who registered on January 8th was twenty-one days, January 8th through the 28th.

The candidate for public office in Japan is not only limited in time in conducting his official campaign but must operate within the framework of an election law that sets extraordinary limitations on the types of campaign activities allowed.

Before 1950 separate laws governed elections for various offices in Japan. In the early Lower House election laws,

---

<sup>1</sup>Election Law, Article 86.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., Article 129.

those of 1889, 1890, 1900 and 1919, there were no restrictions on campaign activities except for a prohibition of campaigning in the polling places themselves. There was no limitation on the amount of money that might be spent on the campaign.<sup>3</sup> Revisions of the election law after 1919 have imposed increasingly severe limitations on permissible campaign practices and have provided for a very considerable degree of government management of campaign activities. This trend has continued in the postwar period having been interrupted only temporarily in the early period of the American Occupation.

In 1925 a full-scale revision of the Lower House Election Law imposed for the first time a great number of restrictions on campaign practices. These included a prohibition of house-to-house calls (kobetsu hōmon), restrictions on the distribution of campaign literature and a limitation on the amount of money that could be spent in the campaign. The revised Law also included strict disciplinary provisions providing punishments for violators.

The articles of the 1925 law dealing with campaign practices were largely modeled after the British Corrupt and Illegal Practices Prevention Act of 1883<sup>4</sup> and to some extent reflected a desire to eradicate corrupt election practices.

---

<sup>3</sup>Hayashida Kazuhiro, "Development of Election Law in Japan," Hosei Kenkyū, XXXIV (July, 1967), 38; For the laws see Senkyo Seido Nanajūnen Kinenkai, Senkyohō No Enkaku (Tokyo, 1959).

<sup>4</sup>Hayashida, "Development of Election Law," p. 38.



In the year 1925 Japan also adopted universal manhood suffrage. Fears on the part of the Government of the possible consequences of the new suffrage resulted in the adoption in the same year of the repressive Peace Preservation Law which gave the Government broad powers to control political activities. The legal restrictions on campaign practices were more in accord with the spirit of this latter law than with the democratic implications of universal manhood suffrage. They are said to have been so complicated and severe that they allowed the Government in power to effectively intimidate candidates, campaigners and electors and provided a serious "obstacle to a free and unrestricted expression of the popular will."<sup>5</sup>

As the Government became more repressive, restrictions on campaign activities were expanded. In the revision of the Election Law in 1934, the prohibition of pre-election campaigning was introduced for the first time. Other restrictions on campaign practices were also incorporated and penalties for violations made more severe. This revision also introduced a greatly expanded government involvement in elections, providing for government management of campaign speech meetings, government printing of campaign brochures and government control over various other aspects of the campaign.

Almost all of the provisions regarding campaign practices adopted in these prewar laws are in effect at the present time.

---

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., p. 39.

Only in the election of 1946 were candidates, campaigning under a new House of Representatives Election Law adopted in 1945 under U.S. Occupation auspices, free of many of the earlier restrictions on campaign activities. From 1947 on restrictions were steadily reimposed. The Public Offices Election Law of 1950 incorporated many of the prewar restrictions on campaign practices and revision of that Law in 1952 marked a return to the 1934 Law in terms of the limitations it places on campaign activities.<sup>6</sup> A candidate for the Lower House campaigns within a legal strait-jacket. His every campaign activity, from the number of speeches he may make to the size of the one-paper lantern he may hang outside his campaign headquarters, is regulated by law.

Certain campaign practices familiar in other countries are prohibited in Japan. Canvassing from house to house for votes, whether done by the candidate, his staff or people acting on their own volition in support of a candidate, is prohibited (138(1)).<sup>7</sup> Signature campaigns are similarly prohibited (138(2)) and no one is allowed to publish popularity polls (138(3)). The serving of food and refreshments as part of the campaign is forbidden (139) and no activities are allowed which are intended to "raise ardor," (140) "such as

---

<sup>6</sup>Kobayashi Naoki, Shinohara Hajime and Soma Masao, Senkyo (Tokyo, 1960), p. 57; cf. Soma Masao, Nihon No Senkyo Seiji (Tokyo, 1963), p. 30.

<sup>7</sup>Numbers in parenthesis refer to the relevant article in the Election Law.

running a procession of cars, marching a large group of people, using a siren, employing a band or making a clamor for the purpose of attracting the attention of voters."<sup>8</sup>

In addition to such outright prohibitions are a multitude of restrictions. Sidewalk speeches cannot be made later than nine in the evening (164(6)) and "repeated calling activities" (renkōkōi, "the constant repetition of a fixed phrase in a short period of time"<sup>9</sup>) are prohibited except at a hall where the candidate is giving a private speech, while he is giving a sidewalk speech or from the campaign car and only between the hours of seven in the morning and eight in the evening (140(2)).

Each candidate's campaign is permitted only one campaign car which has to fit certain specifications and must be registered with the Government. It must be within a certain size; it cannot be a truck, convertible or other open car; and its number of occupants and the size and number of signs that may be placed upon it are defined in the Law (141).

Each candidate may have only one campaign headquarters in the district (131(1)) and the number and size of posters and signboards used in the headquarters are circumscribed (143). If the candidate wants to move the headquarters to another location he must file a formal request to do so with the

---

<sup>8</sup>Jichishō Senkyo Kyokuhēn, Sōsenkyo No Tebiki (Tokyo, 1967), p. 75.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., p. 67.

Government's Election Management Office. When the headquarters is moved all activity in the former headquarters must cease and all signboards visible from outside the former headquarters must be removed (130(2)).

The Election Law also places extensive restrictions on the types and quantity of written materials that may be displayed and distributed. All written campaign materials except those expressly permitted by the Law are prohibited. The only materials the Law allows displayed are signs, restricted in number and size, at the campaign headquarters, on the campaign car and at a hall during the course of a candidate's private speech meeting and campaign posters displayed along with those of the other candidates on official poster boards at specified locations throughout the district. The only material the candidate may distribute to the electorate are 25,000 campaign postcards. The Government's Election Management Committee in addition distributes to all voters an election brochure (senkyo kōhō) that contains statements of 2,000 characters each by the candidates along with their pictures. Candidates and their supporters are prohibited from displaying or distributing any other written campaign materials to the constituents. Not only does this include posters, signs, handbills, buttons and all the other paraphernalia familiar to American political campaigns but extends to noncampaign materials that might have the effect of influencing a voter's choice at the polls. Thus, "during the period of election campaigning, the

distribution of greeting cards, New Year cards, winter greetings, summer greetings, and the like by a candidate or by supporters using the candidate's name is a violation of the law regardless of whether such distribution is for the purpose of campaigning or not. . . ."<sup>10</sup>

The speech-making activities the candidate may engage in are also defined by the Election Law. Candidate speeches during the official campaign period are restricted to three kinds: sidewalk speeches, joint speech meetings and private speech meetings.

The candidate may give sidewalk speeches but he "must be stationary. He cannot give speeches while walking or while riding on top of a car."<sup>11</sup> Of course he cannot use any posters or signs or distribute any materials while giving such a speech. He cannot have more than fifteen campaigners with him and each must wear an armband distributed by the Election Management Committee.

The major speech-making activity of the Diet candidate is participation in the joint speech meetings (tachiai enzetsukai) conducted by the Election Management Committee of the Local Autonomy Ministry. Most districts have an average of thirty-five such meetings, participated in by six to seven candidates with speeches lasting twenty minutes.<sup>12</sup> In Oita's

---

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., p. 80.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., p. 104.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., p. 104.

Second District in the 1967 election campaign there were twenty-five meetings, participated in by five candidates with speeches lasting thirty minutes.<sup>13</sup> Participation in these meetings is not compulsory in law but in fact it is rare for a candidate not to take part. For one thing the Law prohibits him from doing anything else while a joint speech meeting is in session. The large number of joint speech meetings means in effect that for most of the official campaign period the candidates' itineraries are determined by the Election Management Committee. The usual pattern is for a candidate to arrive in the morning in the part of the district where the joint speech meeting is to be held, spend the day riding around in a closed campaign car getting out occasionally to give sidewalk speeches and appearing at the joint speech meeting to give his twenty or thirty-minute speech.

The candidate can also hold private speech meetings (kojin enzetsukai). Each candidate is allowed sixty such speeches which must be registered in advance with the Election Management Committee. Such speeches may not be scheduled during the hours when a joint speech meeting is in progress and they are subject to several other legal restrictions (161-164). It is not permissible, for instance, to display signs outside the hall in which a private speech meeting is being held. In Oita's Second District none of the candidates held private

---

<sup>13</sup> Oita Ken Senkyo Kanri Iinkai, Senkyo No Kiroku, Shugiin Giin Sosenkyo, January 29, 1967 election (Oita, 1967), p. 29.

speech meetings.

With one exception every industrially advanced country that has a system of representative government has experienced a revolution in campaign strategies as a result of the advent of television and the more general expansion and sophistication of communication media. The exception in Japan. No candidate for public office in Japan is allowed to buy time on television or radio or buy space for advertisements in newspapers.

Candidates for the Lower House are allowed to make, free of charge, three radio broadcasts of five minutes each. No provision is made for the use of television. The candidate may also submit a short biographical statement for broadcast by station personnel three times on television and ten times on the radio. He can also place five newspaper advertisements of determined length. The costs for all candidate advertising in the mass media are assumed by the government (149-151). This is the total extent to which candidates can use the mass media in their campaigns. Obviously the problems of strategy, and finance, relating to the use of communication media that face the American candidate are non-existent in Japan.

Over and above these and many other restrictions and prohibitions too numerous to discuss, the candidate in his campaign is allowed to spend only a limited amount of money and must account for all expenditures to the Election Management Committee. Japanese law does not provide the loophole present in United States laws that limitations on campaign expenditures do not apply to expenditures of committees independent of the

candidate. In Japan the candidate is responsible for all expenses on behalf of his campaign. There is no way to create a "Citizens For Sato" committee to get around the law.

The formula used for determining the amount of money a candidate may legally spend is to multiply the number of registered voters in the district by 10.5 yen, divide the total by the number of candidates and add 1,200,000 yen. A consequence of this formula is that the amount of money each candidate may spend decreases as the number of candidates increases. In Oita's Second District the formula resulted in a maximum legal expenditure of 2,182,400 yen per candidate which is a little more than 6,000 dollars in U.S. currency. The highest figure was in Tokyo's Seventh District with 4,022,700 yen and the lowest was in Hyogo's Fifth District with 2,003,500 yen. The nationwide average was 2,573,800 yen, approximately 7,200 dollars.<sup>14</sup>

The purpose of the restrictions on campaign practices incorporated in the Public Offices Election Law is ostensibly to insure inexpensive and fair elections where no candidate because of political power or economic wealth has an advantage over another in appealing to the electorate for support. Defenders of the law also maintain that restrictions on campaign practices are necessary because of the presence of modes of behavior in Japan antithetical to democratic practice. Prohibitions of house-to-house calls, the serving of refreshments,

---

<sup>14</sup>Yomiuri Shinbun, January 6, 1967, p. 2.



and even the prohibition of calling on supporters after the election to thank them for their help are necessary, so the argument goes, to insure a minimum interference in the electoral process of "feudalistic" customs and mores.

In fact the Law does little to realize such goals and has other undesirable effects.<sup>15</sup> The various restrictions have not made elections inexpensive. They have simply made most expenses illegal. The Japanese politician, as is discussed later in this chapter, expends considerable amounts of money on his campaign but, because of the Law, has developed ways to keep such expenditures hidden from public view. Furthermore, the restrictions on the use of the mass media, on the distribution of written materials and on speech making has forced the politician to use other means of support mobilization less in accord with democratic ideals than the expensive but public appeal to the electorate utilization of communications media provides.

The most important consequence of the Election Law's provisions is to greatly enhance the strength of incumbents in elections. The Law "works to the benefit of those already elected, incumbents and former Diet members, whose names are known to the electorate. . . . [T]he law is clearly to the disadvantage of new men."<sup>16</sup> The various restrictions on

---

<sup>15</sup>I have discussed some of these effects and other aspects of campaigning in "Nihon No Kyōikumamateki Senkyo," Bungei Shunju, XV (June, 1967), 174-180.

<sup>16</sup>Kajiyama Toshiyuki, "Kane to Kōyaku No Matsuir Sōsenkyo," Hōseki (February, 1967), p. 54; cf. Soma Masao, Senkyo Seiji, p.35.

campaign activities function largely to keep new candidates away from the public eye. The prohibition of pre-election campaigning, restrictions on the distribution of written materials and on the use of the mass media and other seemingly minor things such as the prohibition of the use of convertibles or other open cars work their greatest hardship against the new unknown candidate. The incumbent who receives constant publicity in his constituency through his activities in the Diet has all to gain by maintaining a law that effectively prevents new candidates from gaining public exposure. It is for this reason that efforts to revise the election law have been doomed. Once a man becomes a member of the Diet he has all to gain by maintaining and extending the restrictions on campaign practices.

The law has another important and deplorable effect. It makes the general voter a mere observer of the campaign. By effectively preventing popular participation in campaigns it inhibits if not actually works counter to the political socialization of the electorate that should be a major function of election campaigns. The election law's ideal campaign is much like a beauty contest. When the official campaign period begins the contestants, supposedly having had no pre-contest opportunity for influencing the judges, walk out on the stage and go through a rigorously supervised series of performances that gives each an exactly equal opportunity to demonstrate his attributes to the judges. They then all leave the stage for the judges to make their decision. The voters are in the

position of passive judges. They can read posters and listen to speeches but can take almost no direct part in the contest. Not only does this make an election campaign unbearably dull for the average voter. It makes a fundamental function of systems of representative government frightening to the politically concerned electorate because of the fear that efforts in support of a candidate may result in a violation of the election law. It is only in very recent years that political parties have come out with pamphlets explaining the activities "third parties" (daisansha) may engage in in support of candidates for public office.<sup>17</sup> The law itself is mainly an exhaustive listing of the things voters may not do. In restricting the activities of the general electorate in the electoral process, the present-day election law is a direct descendent of the law of 1925 which first introduced these provisions in an attempt to prevent universal suffrage from leading to mass movements which would threaten the continuation of conservative dominance.<sup>18</sup> A non-incumbent candidate such as Sato must attempt to gain support within the framework of an election law that limits to an extraordinary degree the campaign activities he may engage in and the activities that his supporters may undertake on his behalf. Inhibited by these

---

<sup>17</sup>See, for example, Jiyūminshutō, Dare Demo Dekiru Senkyo Undo (Tokyo, 1967).

<sup>18</sup>For an excellent analysis of the effects on political participation of the election law's campaign practices provisions see Matsushita Keiichi, Sengo Minshu Shugi No Tenbo (Tokyo, 1965), pp. 195-202, 231.

restraints Sato entered into the official campaign and the final three weeks of his struggle for election to the Lower House.

The three weeks of Sato's official campaign divide into three periods. The first encompassed the opening five days of the campaign. The second was the period of joint speech meetings that ran from January 13th to the 26th. The final two days of the campaign mark the third period.

As the discussion in the previous pages has indicated, the election law so restricts campaign practices that there is little opportunity for a candidate to employ imaginative or innovative campaign techniques. In Oita's second district all the candidates went through the same uninspired routine of driving around in a campaign car with a loudspeaker constantly repeating the candidate's name and asking for votes, stopping occasionally for short sidewalk speeches and taking part in the joint speech sessions.

Sato spent the first two days of the campaign in Beppu. Taking one school district at a time his official campaign car weaved in and out of the city streets, its loudspeaker droning out over and over again the monotonous phrase, "Sato Bunsei de gozaimasu. Jimintō kōnin Sato Bunsei de gozaimasu. Dōzo yoroshiku onegai shimasu." ("This is Sato Bunsei. This is LDP endorsed Sato Bunsei. I ask for your support".) A schedule giving the times he planned to pass through each neighborhood was issued to the neighborhood sewanin who tried

to round up groups of people to greet Sato as he came by. Whenever a group appeared the car stopped and Sato made a short sidewalk speech. Throughout Beppu these five-minute speeches all emphasized the same points. Sato is the native son candidate, the only candidate from Beppu. The LDP old guard is corrupt and the party must be reformed from within. Only young politicians like Sato, the youngest candidate in the district, could rejuvenate the party. Then back in the car and again the monotonous repeating: "Sato Bunsei de gozaimasu. Jimintō kōnin Sato Bunsei. . . ." Toward dusk Sato returned to the center of town and walked through its arcades with a megaphone, speaking to small circles of people and hitting at the same points: elect the native son candidate, rejuvenate the LDP and create a Conservative Party that is "loved by young people and women." At nine o'clock in the evening campaigning for the day came to an end.

This same procedure was followed throughout the first week of the campaign, that is until the beginning of the joint speech sessions. On the third day of the campaign Sato moved north to Nakatsu and Shimoge county, then cut down through the central part of the district the next day and spent the fifth day campaigning on the Kunisaki peninsula.

In Beppu Sato appealed to local pride and constituent self-interest in getting "one of their own" into the Diet. He presented himself as Beppu's candidate with the strong suggestion that it was both proper and in the voters interest to

support the native son rather than some "outsider." Throughout the district, Sato's strategy as it evolved in these first days of the campaign was to take the offensive in attacking corruption in the LDP and stress the importance of getting young uncorrupted conservatives into the Diet. In other words, in his official campaign as in his activities in the period preceding the campaign, Sato's major efforts were directed at maximizing support within the conservative party supporting sector of the electorate. In the short sidewalk speeches Sato was able to completely avoid dealing with political issues other than the issue of political corruption. The only aspect of his appeal that was aimed at obtaining votes that might go to Socialist Komatsu was his argument that regardless of how poorly the LDP did in the election, it would still be the majority party in the new Diet. Therefore voters who were disgusted with the LDP should not "throw away" their vote by voting for an opposition party candidate but should vote for Sato so he could work from within the party to reform it.

In this first period of the official campaign, newspaper estimates of candidate strength pointed to a close contest between Sato and Komatsu for the third spot on the winners' ticket. Komatsu was generally pictured as the underdog because the votes of Conservative Independent Noyori Hideichi were expected to go to the other Conservative candidates in this first election following Noyori's retirement. As one reporter wrote, "the votes the Conservatives will pick up from

Noyori supporters make it look like a bitter battle for Komatsu."<sup>19</sup>

The appointments of Nishimura as construction minister in Prime Minister Sato's third cabinet reshuffle immediately preceding the election and of Ayabe as Speaker of the Lower House were seen as insuring the reelection of the incumbents. Both received a great deal of valuable publicity in the local papers<sup>20</sup> and the generally assumed implication of their appointments was indicated by a Mainichi newspaper reporter when he wrote that "Ayabe and Nishimura were facing a bitter fight because of the candidacy of Sato but with their appointments as Speaker and Construction Minister they have breathed a sigh of relief."<sup>21</sup> Their appointments, echoed another newspaper, meant that "their election victory can be considered a certainty."<sup>22</sup>

The incumbents themselves exhibited a new confidence. As Nishimura remarked in a television appearance with Ayabe

---

<sup>19</sup> Nishi Nihon Shinbun, December 6, 1967, p. 10. The same view was expressed in articles in Oita Gōdō Shinbun, January 1, 1967, p. 3; Oita Nichinichi Shinbun, January 13, 1967; Higashi Kyushu Shinbun, January 11, 1967; Mainichi Shinbun, December 25, 1966, p. 14; and Oita Shinbun, December 28, 1966, p. 1.

<sup>20</sup> Typical of the coverage were articles in Oita Gōdō Shinbun, December 4, 1966, p. 2, December 5, p. 1, December 24, p. 3, December 28, p. 8; Asahi Shinbun, December 3, p. 1; and Oita Shinbun, December 4, p. 1.

<sup>21</sup> Mainichi Shinbun, December 23, 1966, p. 14.

<sup>22</sup> Beppu Yukan, December 27, 1966.

following their appointments, "it would have been a difficult election if only one of us had received an appointment but, well, it has turned out very well."<sup>23</sup>

Though Komatsu was expected to suffer from Noyori's retirement, newspaper analyses recognized that he had overcome comparable odds in previous elections and that he could expect a significant number of votes from people upset with the "black mist" that enveloped the LDP. Thus the mass media was unanimous in its analysis. "Common sense," concluded one reporter, "shows that it is a fight between Komatsu and Sato for the third seat."<sup>24</sup>

Opinion among Sato's staff in the first days of the campaign was much that expressed in the newspapers. The appointment of Ayabe came as a particularly heavy blow. First reactions were that the appointment indeed gave new life to Ayabe's campaign and meant that Sato could only hope for a narrow victory over Komatsu. As the campaign continued, opinion within the Sato camp began to turn more optimistic. The speakership, it appeared to Sato's supporters, may well have doomed Ayabe. It is a post without power easily translatable to the constituents in terms of benefits and there seemed to be a growing mood that his appointment was the climax

---

<sup>23</sup>Oita Gōdō Shinbun, December 25, 1966, p. 1.

<sup>24</sup>Beppu Yukan, December 27, 1967. Other articles making similar predictions may be found in Oita Shinbun, December 28, 1968, p. 1; Nishi Nihon Shinbun, December 30, 1966, p. 5 and January 11, 1967, p. 3; Mainichi Shinbun, December 25, 1966, p. 14.



to a long career and that Ayabe should now step aside, or be pushed aside, for a new generation. With the beginning of the joint speech meetings Sato's campaign began to gain new momentum.

Between January 13th and January 26th the candidates took part in a series of twenty-five government-sponsored joint speech meetings (tachiai enzetsukai). During this period there were two speeches a day, one at one o'clock in the afternoon and another at 6:30 in the evening on all but two days when the candidates had to give only one speech. Of the district's twenty-three cities, towns and villages all but the island of Himeshima hosted one joint speech session each with the two largest cities of the district, Beppu and Nakatsu, each being host to two sessions.

Because of the demands of the joint speech meetings, all the candidates followed almost exactly the same route in the standardized routine of constantly repeating the candidate's name over the car loudspeaker, making sidewalk speeches and speaking at the joint speech meetings. The strategy of concentrating support in restricted geographical areas, though crucial to the campaigns of all the conservative candidates, was reflected to only a very limited degree in the official campaign period because of the demands of the joint speech meetings. Only in the opening five and closing two days of the campaign could the candidates spend the entire day in the areas they considered most important for their election.

The joint speech meetings along with the officially distributed election brochure, the sidewalk speeches and the limited advertisement allowed in the mass media, represented the sole methods by which the candidates publicly expressed their views to the electorate during the period of the official campaign. Of these the joint speech meetings, which allowed each candidate to talk for thirty minutes, provided the most ample opportunity for the candidates to address the electorate.

In the joint speech meetings Sato was faced with the problem of convincing voters who generally vote conservative to vote for him rather than for one of the other two LDP candidates. In terms of policy all three LDP candidates were committed to supporting the party platform. An analysis of the statements of the three in the joint speech meetings and in the election brochure reveals no significant differences in policy. All advocated lower taxes, increased productivity, better housing, stabilized prices, better education and increased welfare state legislation. There was no policy that one of the LDP candidates supported that another opposed. The differences between the candidates, where they existed, were largely differences of emphasis. Nishimura, for instance, emphasized the need for improving roads and reducing the high number of traffic accidents. As Minister of Construction he would be in a position, he modestly suggested, to do something about such problems. Ayabe was particularly concerned with the need to quickly settle the question of compensation for victims

of the Second World War (bereaved families, wounded soldiers, repatriates) and establish government aid for the Yasukuni shrine. Sato, to the extent that his policy pronouncements differed in emphasis from those of his Conservative opponents, stressed the LDP's concern with the "little man," with increased welfare legislation to protect the young, the elderly and the mute" and with legislation that would improve the position of the worker and the small businessman. On foreign policy he stressed the need for Japan to increase its own defense capabilities and for the Self Defense Forces to gradually replace U.S. forces as defenders of the nation. In making this point in his speeches, Sato was able to give play to his concern that Japan exhibit greater "pride" in itself. It was an insult to the nation's history, he told the voters, that Japan had to rely on foreigners for its security.

Important questions of policy, either domestic or foreign, were not of major concern in the election of January, 1967. The House was dissolved because of a public outcry over incidents of corruption by Diet members and the campaign, both in Oita's Second District and nationally, was dominated by the issue of corruption and reform.

In their platforms all the political parties had a plank dealing with "political morality." In Oita's Second District all the candidates dealt at great length with the question. It was given more attention in their speeches in the joint speech meetings than any other issue and accounted for more

space in their statements in the official election brochure than any other single issue.

The LDP incumbents were at the greatest disadvantage in dealing with the issue of corruption. They both argued that only a few politicians were corrupt and that it was wrong to condemn the entire LDP. They maintained that they themselves were righteous politicians and were as concerned with eliminating corruption in the party as anyone else.

Ayabe was the most defensive. He argued that he had faithfully represented the people of the district and that the LDP had faithfully served the people of the nation. A few isolated incidents of corruption should not be allowed to blacken the name of the party and its great majority of members. Ayabe almost pleaded with his listeners: "I am an honest politician, a politician that does not tell lies. There has been a lot of talk of a black mist but I have been clean and honest. Please, reelect an honest politician."<sup>25</sup>

Nishimura also made a point to disassociate himself from corruption in the LDP in his speeches and tried to take the offensive by attacking the Socialists for "undemocratic" actions, particularly their boycott of the Diet just before dissolution. He told his audiences that such action was threatening the development of parliamentary democracy and "the future of parliamentary democracy is at stake in this coming

---

<sup>25</sup> Oita Ken Dai Niku Shūgiin Giin Kōhōsha Senkyo Kōhō  
(Oita, 1967).

election."<sup>26</sup> "Insure parliamentary democracy" was the official slogan of the LDP in the election. Nishimura turned the black mist controversy into a call for support for the revision of the election law to provide for single member constituencies. This would allegedly allow for inexpensive election and thus remove the major source of corruption.

Only for Sato among the LDP candidates could the political morality issue be used to advantage. He was able to almost entirely avoid discussion of specific policy issues by concentrating on the issue of LDP corruption and the need for a "rejuvenation" and "cleansing" of the party. Because the joint speech sessions allowed the candidates only thirty minutes each, Sato was able to deliver a rather fast-moving speech that dealt almost exclusively with the issue of corruption and reform. While Nishimura and Ayabe stressed their history of service in the Diet and the powers they had to do favors for the constituents, Sato emphasized his purity. He tried to turn being a new candidate to advantage by presenting himself as the somewhat virginal alternative to the incumbents. He wrote in his election brochure statement that his basic desire was "to become a virtuous politician, to keep my associations with others honorable, to effect a rejuvenation and reform of the political world, to clearly separate public and private matters. . . ." He added that "within the LDP

---

<sup>26</sup>Quoted in Nishi Nihon Shinbun, January 13, 1967, p. 10.

corruption and errors have arisen. It is essential for the nation that well intentioned representatives be elected who will be pioneers in cleaning up and reforming the LDP. As one of the progressives of the LDP I will reform the political world and effect a rejuvenation of the nation." In his speeches Sato hit at the same point. "In the next Diet the LDP will still have power and that makes it essential to change the old politics and create a new LDP."<sup>27</sup>

Sato's remarks on political morality were echoed by new LDP candidates all over the country. As one nationwide newspaper put it, "When scandals occur, new candidates profit' is election common sense. . . . Formerly candidates used to criticize the policies of the other parties but now the case is entirely different. First to be attacked is the new candidate's own party. . . . The new candidate stands forward as the young politician who will conduct 'undirtied' politics."<sup>28</sup> While incumbent conservatives could appeal for support on the basis of deeds done, the new candidates, through a fortuitous turn of circumstances, could appeal for votes because of deeds not done. Sato, in emphasizing his purity, was to repeat time and time again to his audiences "I was born in the year of the sheep. This is also the year of the sheep and it is only the white sheep that can clear away the black mist."<sup>29</sup>

---

<sup>27</sup> Joint speech meeting in Nakatsu, January 23, 1967.

<sup>28</sup> Yomiuri Shinbun, December 11, 1966, p. 1.

<sup>29</sup> Quoted in Asahi Shinbun, January 9, 1967, p. 14.

On January 26 the last joint speech meeting was held in Beppu. The size of the audience testified to the heightened interest in the campaign as it came to a close. While an estimated 1,500 people had attended the first meeting in Beppu on January 13th, an overflowing crowd of 2,700 tried to cram into Beppu's largest auditorium on the evening of this last day of the joint speech sessions.<sup>30</sup> Sato once again asked for the support of "everyone of my hometown." The other candidates made their pleas for support and with the closing of the meeting by the chairman of the election management committee the middle phase of the campaign came to an end.

During the period of the joint speech meetings, newspaper estimates of candidate strength changed dramatically from earlier predictions of a battle between Sato and Komatsu for the third spot. The reelection of the incumbent conservatives was no longer seen as being a foregone conclusion and Sato appeared to demonstrate increasing strength. On January 18th the Mainichi newspaper summed up the changed estimate with its statement that "At the present moment Nishimura has a small lead. Sato is second and Ayabe and Komatsu appear to be heading for the goal line neck and neck."<sup>31</sup> No candidate, however, was

---

<sup>30</sup> This was 1,200 more than had attended the closing meeting in Beppu in the same hall in the previous election. In the district as a whole, by contrast, attendance in 1967 (16,326 people) was less than in 1963 (20,613). Greater interest in Sato's 1967 campaign than in his 1963 race was probably responsible for the large turnout in his hometown.

<sup>31</sup> Mainichi Shinbun, January 18, 1967, p. 1. The same view was expressed in articles in Nishi Nihon Shinbun, January 19, p. 11; Higashi Kyushu Shinbun, January 19; Bunshu Gode, January 19.

seen as commanding overwhelming support and in the final week of the joint speech meetings all the newspapers forecast an extremely close race. Newspapers are prohibited by Article 138(3) of the Election Law from publishing the data of polls taken to judge the popularity of the candidates. The prohibition applies only to the publication of the data, not to the conduct of polls or the use of their results in articles. During this middle period of the campaign the Japan Broadcasting Company took a poll of 800 voters in the district which resulted in an estimate that, though Sato and Nishimura were apparently strongest, differences in projected votes for the four candidates were not significant enough to allow any predictions.<sup>32</sup> At the same time (January 21-22) the Oita Godō newspaper ran a survey of its own, interviewing 1,598 voters. To the astonishment of the entire editorial staff the results showed the highest vote going to Sato and the second highest to Socialist Komatsu while Ayabe and Nishimura were fighting for the third spot. In the poll, in fact, Nishimura received 800 votes less than third placed Ayabe.<sup>33</sup> Two other newspapers ran public opinion polls and the results of all of these led the editors to the same conclusion. "It is," wrote the Yomiuri correspondent, "anybody's guess who will lose."<sup>34</sup>

---

<sup>32</sup>The results of the NHK poll were provided by the editor of the news desk, Kudo Takashi.

<sup>33</sup>Data concerning this poll were provided by the editors of the Oita Godō Shinbun.

<sup>34</sup>Yomiuri Shinbun, January 20, 1967, p. 14.



The candidate's campaign in the official campaign period has two dimensions. One is the public dimension in which the candidate appeals for voter support through speeches, posters, and the other limited means of publicity and exposure allowed him. There is also a private dimension in which the candidate's campaign boss and a few top level supporters maintain communication with the members of the candidate's organization throughout the district and make vital decisions concerning campaign finances.

Campaign funds are of crucial importance in Japanese election campaigns as they are of course in the United States and other countries. But unlike his counterpart in the United States, the Japanese candidate spends no money whatsoever for advertising in the mass media. The limited advertising allowed, as discussed above, is paid for by the government. The election law's provisions regarding television, radio and newspaper advertising combined with the other articles in the law that restrict campaign activities might lead one to expect campaigns in Japan to be rather inexpensive. On the contrary, however, campaigning is on the whole an extraordinarily expensive proposition.

The cost of campaigns for the Diet are estimated to run anywhere from ten million yen for a very strong incumbent in a safe district to one hundred million yen for a new candidate fighting a difficult battle.<sup>35</sup> These figures represent the

---

<sup>35</sup>For one LDP Diet member's account of the actual amount and uses of campaign funds see Ikeda Masanosuke, "Seijika Ga Tsukau Bōdai Na Urugane," Gendai, July, 1967, pp. 54-61.

extremes. It is probable that the cost of most Diet election campaigns for conservative candidates falls somewhere in the range of fifteen to thirty million yen or approximately between forty and eighty thousand dollars. What makes these figures especially formidable is that they refer to money spent between the day of dissolution of the House and election day, a maximum of forty days. They do not include the rather substantial non-campaign expenses incurred in the months preceding the official campaign.

The legal maximum campaign expenditure, it is to be remembered, averages about two and a-half million yen. There has never been a case of a candidate being convicted for spending more than the legal limit<sup>36</sup> and accounts of expenditures submitted to the election management committees by the candidates show that nationwide they spend 20 to 30 per cent less than the statutory limit.<sup>37</sup> Yet it is an open secret that the great majority of candidates do not stay within the legal limits.

Japanese campaign expenses fall into two broad categories. One is headquarter or administrative expenses. Included here are salaries for office workers, the costs of renting a campaign car and campaign office, printing posters and postcards and the like. These expenses generally consume

---

<sup>36</sup> Asahi Shinbun, December 7, 1966, p. 8.

<sup>37</sup> Japan Times, January 26, 1967, p. 16.

most of the money the candidate is legally allowed to spend. They account for only a fraction of the money actually spent in the election however. The second category is what might be called organizational expenses--funds expended to mobilize the candidate's district-wide organization. In some cases 80 or 90 per cent of a candidate's total campaign expenses will go to providing campaign funds to the men who run the campaign in the district's cities, towns and villages and in the neighborhoods and hamlets of all these areas.

It is apparently common practice for campaign funds to be distributed to campaigners in three installments. The first follows immediately upon House dissolution and is intended to set the candidate's machine in operation. It is a kind of down payment given to the leaders of the local town and village organizations in order that they get the campaign under way. The second installment is the largest and comes in the first days of the official campaign, the days immediately following kōji, the official notification of the election. In two or three days a campaign headquarters may be divested of ten or fifteen million yen, given out largely in 100, 500, and 1,000 yen notes. One by one the leaders of the city, town and village organizations come to the campaign headquarters to discuss the situation in their area with the candidate's campaign boss. Because all this activity is a violation of the election law, the candidate himself never takes part directly in the discussions. His campaign boss discusses with the local

leader a vote quota for the area and gives him funds to be taken back and distributed to the campaigners in the local organization. The third installment of funds is distributed in the last days of the campaign. These funds are dispersed in order to strike at new targets of opportunity, to respond to demands of local supporters and in part for no other reason than that the money is there to be spent. In a close race the fear of the candidate and his financial backers that all the sizeable resources already committed to the campaign might be lost in a narrow defeat leads them, in a spasm of fear, to divest the campaign headquarters of whatever money is remaining. A file cabinet that thirty days before had twenty million yen may be completely empty by election day.

The sources for campaign funds for an LDP candidate for the Diet fall into four groups: the party, the faction, the business community and the candidate's own resources.

It is customary in Japan for political parties to give party endorsed Diet candidates a set sum of money for their campaigns. In the 1920's the conservative parties are reported by one author to have contributed about 10,000 yen in terms of today's currency values, to their candidates' campaign chests.<sup>38</sup> In the Diet campaign of 1967 the LDP gave each of its candidates three million yen in campaign funds. This alone is more than the candidate may legally spend in even the largest

---

<sup>38</sup>Takahashi Makoto, "Seiji to Kane no Akuen," Asahi Janaru, VIII (December 11, 1966), p. 13.

district in the country. The LDP maintained that the money was to help cover expenses that are legal but not included in the law-designated expenses. Despite its explanations, the party came under immediate attack in the highly "black mist" conscious mass media.<sup>39</sup> In spite of the temporary uproar the LDP Diet candidate had three million yen in his campaign chest.

The largest single source of funds is the candidate's faction leader. A faction leader's strength largely depends on his ability to aid financially Diet members and non-incumbent candidates who would join his faction upon entering the Diet. The amount of money a candidate receives from his faction leader varies in particular cases but five million yen is generally considered to be the average.<sup>40</sup> In some cases a Diet candidate may receive support from politicians other than his faction leader. This might be a local powerful politician who is committed to the candidate's success or another faction leader who sees a long term benefit to be derived from contributing to the campaign and thus strengthening his personal ties with the candidate.

A third major source of funds is the business community. Here it is almost impossible to generalize because of the tremendous variations in the nature of the support provided by

---

<sup>39</sup>See, for instance, Asahi Shinbun, December 30, 1966, p. 10; Asahi Evening News, December 30, 1966, p. 1.

<sup>40</sup>This is the figure cited, for instance, in Watanuki Jyoji, Nihon No Seiji Shakai (Tokyo, 1967), p. 62.

businessmen to Diet candidates.<sup>41</sup> Perhaps one partial generalization that can be safely made is that the non-incumbent locality oriented candidate relies for support on local businessmen rather than support from large corporations in Tokyo. The candidate usually has close connections with a small number of firms in the district or prefecture that provide him with a steady income outside the official campaign period to finance his daily political activities. Such firms, having made a sizeable contribution by the time the election comes around, are anxious to protect their investment by insuring the reelection or election of the candidate they are sponsoring. Such firms consequently contribute large sums to their candidate's campaign, the amount of their investment often being comparable to the sum given by the candidate's faction leader.

In addition to large contributions from such select firms, the candidate appeals for small donations from a large number of local businesses. Contributions of from 5,000 to 50,000 yen from tens, or in some cases even hundreds of firms,<sup>42</sup> is a major source of funds for many candidates.

Finally a fourth source of campaign funds is a candidate's own resources. In prewar Japan it was common to talk of "well and fence politicians" (idobei seijika). What was

---

<sup>41</sup>An effort at such generalization is made by Fujiwara Hirotsu and Tomita Nobuo, Seijiaku E No Haisen (Tokyo, 1967), pp. 56-58.

<sup>42</sup>Ibid., p. 58.

originally the object of the phrase was the landlord who entered politics and in so doing spent so much money that he lost everything but his well and the fence surrounding his house. It is a phrase that has come to be used to refer to anyone who spends his own resources in election campaigning. It is often said that in the postwar period candidates have learned how to run for office with other people's money and that there are no idobei seijika left.<sup>43</sup> While there are perhaps fewer politicians that rely as much on personal resources for their campaign funds as did politicians in the prewar period, some degree of personal financial investment in the campaign appears to be the rule rather than the exception among LDP candidates.

The party, the candidate's faction leader and other powerful politicians supporting his candidacy, the business community and the candidate's own resources are the major sources of campaign funds. Within this general pattern variations are enormous depending on the particular candidate's financial connections, his length of service and his influence in the Diet and partly, obviously, by the amount of money he thinks is necessary to run a successful campaign.

The question of how a candidate employs campaign funds is a more difficult one to deal with than the issue of the sources of his funds. The secrecy surrounding the expenditure

---

<sup>43</sup> See, for example, Okano Kaoru, "Daigishi To Senkyoku," Ushio No. 77 (November 1966), 180.

of funds renders most analyses elaborate cases of guesswork. In general writers who have dealt with the issue have argued that most campaign expenses, over and above what is allowed in law, are for the purpose of bribing voters and buying the support of local politicians who in turn bribe the voters within their sphere of influence. There is also general agreement that there is somewhat less bribery in Diet elections than in local contests. Unlike the town assembly candidate, for instance, who has to deal with a relatively few number of voters, the Diet candidate must have a fairly extensive organization of supporters to reach enough voters in the district. Consequently a thousand yen note intended to buy a vote has to pass through the hands of so many people on its journey from campaign headquarters to voter that by the time it hits bottom there is hardly enough to pay the campaigner much less bribe the voter. As one study remarks, "it is usual for most of the money intended to buy votes to end up in the pockets of the big bosses, the middle bosses and the little bosses."<sup>44</sup> Combining these themes, writers usually emerge with the worst of all possible worlds. The candidate illegally distributes something like ten times the legal maximum amount of campaign funds to local bosses who pocket a large share of the money, pass the rest down to smaller bosses who keep a healthy share for themselves and who then hand out the remaining money to the

---

<sup>44</sup>Yomiuri Shinbun Seijibu, Seitō (Tokyo, 1965), p. 21; cf. Watanuki Jyoji, Seiji Shakai, p. 222.



politically ignorant peasants for their votes.

Such analyses contain a modicum of truth but are at best exaggerated caricatures of campaign practices. The great bulk of a candidate's campaign funds is usually spent illegally. But the money expended is neither simply to buy votes nor to buy off local politicians. While some amount of money is almost certainly used for such purposes, most of the funds function to compensate the candidate's campaigners and, in part, to fulfill the demands of custom.

In the Japanese setting monetary compensation for campaigners of conservative candidates plays an extremely important role in holding a campaign organization together. Loyalties to the party, even where they exist, have little relevance to the decision to support a particular candidate because of the multi-member districting system; loyalty to the candidate is not pervasive for, as has been seen, campaigners largely owe loyalties to other campaigners in the organizational hierarchy rather than to the Diet candidate himself; patronage is of little significance in the Japanese political system because of a highly developed merit civil service and is of no meaning to the anonymous buraku campaigner. While the reasons for a man offering to campaign are diverse, a small "thank you" present reimburses the campaigner for any expenses incurred in his activities and makes him cognizant of the candidate's recognition and gratitude. Unlike elections in the prewar period when one powerful landlord could deliver the votes of virtually an entire village, campaigns today depend

on an extensive organization with supporters on all levels down to each buraku. Even a small monetary reward to all these campaigners represents an enormous expense.

Not only for the buraku campaigner but for the leaders of the village or town organizations as well, money given in the campaign is more often a recompense for support long given than a bribe to obtain support. Most of the men who organize the campaign in local areas for the Diet candidate are associated with and work for that candidate long before elections are called. While there are cases of a candidate buying the support of local bosses at the last minute, the more usual pattern is for the candidate to have obtained his elitist support well in advance of the official campaign. The politically unavoidable if legally illegitimate need to compensate these supporters for their efforts on the candidate's behalf puts the greatest demands on the candidate's financial resources during the campaign period.

This is not to argue that the element of bribery is absent from this picture. Often top level supporters demand sums for the campaign that cannot be justified either as equitable compensation for their work or as necessary for the campaign. The candidate often has no alternative but to pay the amount requested because he is so completely dependent on the support of the local leader and his organization. He often sees his choices as one of paying an exorbitant amount for the votes the local supporter is believed capable of delivering or taking the chance of not getting anywhere near the

number of votes needed. More often than not the candidate will opt for the former alternative. Even here, however, there are countervailing pressures against local leaders making exorbitant demands on the candidate. A supporter who takes too much advantage of his position of strength in demanding funds will force the candidate to seek other locally powerful people to organize his campaign. This is one reason the campaign expenses of new candidates are generally much higher than those of incumbents. It takes a few elections to find out which supporters are functioning effectively and at reasonable cost. The incumbent Diet member gradually weeds out of his organization many of those who are obviously not mobilizing votes commensurate with the monetary demands they place on the candidate. It is the new candidate who most often has to accept support proffered and at the price demanded.

On the buraku level the question of what is a fair recompense for a campaigner and what is a bribe for a voter is often extremely difficult to distinguish. The Japanese language itself clouds this distinction. Seldom is a voter clearly offered a bribe. When given money for his vote, the phrases used express appreciation to the voter for his support of the candidate in such a way as to make him feel like a campaigner.<sup>45</sup> It sometimes becomes a difficult matter to

---

<sup>45</sup>Translated freely, a typical approach goes something like "Look I know this doesn't amount to very much but I'd really appreciate it if you could see what you can do to get some votes for X. We need every vote we can get so as long as I know that I can count on your's I'm really grateful."

decide whether a man given 500 yen to campaign for a candidate has been simply compensated for his work or bribed when the "campaign" amounts to asking the members of his family and a neighbor to vote for a certain candidate.

It is problems such as this that raise the issue of custom in determining campaign styles and in affecting the amount and uses of campaign funds. In a sense the provisions of the election law in what they prohibit regarding campaign practices provide a concise description of Japanese social customs. The prohibition of many activities commonly accepted as proper social behavior was predicated on the assumption that such behavior, though common, is in contradiction with democratic practices. Accordingly, many campaign activities that are illegal are engaged in, particularly in local elections and in rural areas, because the candidate feels more constrained to respect cultural norms than legal rules. The prohibition of house to house calls is a case in point. The prohibition apparently resulted from a concern with the political effects of certain "feudalistic" attitudes concerning obligation. Besides providing opportunities for outright bribery, house to house calls would make it difficult for a voter who was visited by a campaigner and asked for support to refuse. It would be embarrassing to say no and the voter would feel an obligation to vote as requested to do in such a face to face confrontation, particularly if he had in any way incurred a debt to the person making the request. Activities such as house to house calls

were made illegal in order to prevent the input into the political system of customs that violate assumed tenets of democratic practice. In fact, however, the making of house to house calls is a widely employed campaign technique. All the law has done is force candidate and campaigner to be somewhat discreet in conducting this and other similarly prohibited activities. It has in no sense eliminated the practice itself.

Another aspect of this problem is the serving of food and refreshments as part of the campaign, a practice Japanese call kyōō. There are clearly instances where such practices are consciously intended to buy support. One campaigner I know of brought in groups of fifteen to twenty people every evening for a period of two weeks to a certain restaurant (where he made an agreement with the owner that no records be kept that could fall into the hands of the police) in order to get the support of an entire buraku for the candidate he was supporting. There was no question here but that the campaigner was attempting to buy support for the candidate. Under some circumstances, however, social custom makes the practice of kyōō imperative. The candidate and campaigner must decide between observing the law or observing social custom. The tendency is to side with the latter as much as is strategically possible without incurring the penalties of violating the law.<sup>46</sup>

---

<sup>46</sup>The legal prohibition of the serving of food and refreshments as part of a campaign is but one manifestation of an almost obsessive concern with the assumed incompatibility of traditional social practices and the requirements of democratic

Certain social practices can of course provide opportunities for a considerable degree of corruption and it is sometimes impossible to distinguish between campaign styles made imperative by social custom and styles that simply take advantage of custom in order to buy support. It is apparently very common, for instance, for voters in rural areas to receive, as a matter of course, extremely small sums (100 yen seems a popular denomination) as an advance "thank you" present (orei) for voting for a particular candidate. One campaigner I had the opportunity to know estimates that "almost all" of the people in his town that voted for the candidate he supported, close to 2,000 voters, received such 100-yen presents. Such a practice cannot simply be dismissed as bribery. The

---

practice. In the United States no one has proposed a legal ban on campaign barbecues or picnics or on the serving of coca-cola in campaign headquarters. In Japan such practices are violations of the law. There are several dangers inherent in such severe restrictions on campaign practices. They can, for one thing, be so unrealistic as to result in flagrant violations and a consequent disrespect for the law. For another, the all too apparent inconsistency between legal provisions and actual campaign practices encourages among many Japanese a feeling that Japanese are still motivated by undemocratic, feudal values. It perpetuates the belief that the Japanese political system is less "democratic" than the parliamentary democracies of the West and undermines public confidence and pride in the nation's political institutions. The prohibition of the serving of food and of other activities creates the false impression that candidates for office in western parliamentary systems do not engage in such practices and sets for the Japanese a standard of conduct probably impossible to achieve and, at any rate, observed by candidates in no other country. Finally, the greatest danger inherent in the law is the effect of its successful application. The law so thoroughly constrains candidate and voter alike in permissible campaign activities, that its strict enforcement would result in an almost total lack of direct contact between the candidates and the electorate.

sum of money by itself is insufficient, even in most rural areas, to buy votes. This 100-yen orei is intimately related to the concept of the hard vote. The voter who is known as the supporter of a particular politician need not be bribed to vote for that politician or for the candidate supported by that politician. In rural areas, a Diet election provides such a politician not as much the chance to bribe the voter as the opportunity to express in a small but tangible way his gratitude to the voter for his continued support. In giving the voter the envelope with the 100 yen, the campaigner expresses his apologies for not being able to more fully demonstrate his appreciation for the support the voter has given him and implores the voter to take the 100-yen note as simply a token of his gratitude. Once the voter accepts, his continued support, and most importantly his vote in the imminent election, is considered assured. To argue that this is not bribery is not to assert that it may not be an insidious technique for mobilizing support. Such practices, however, find their rationale deep within the fabric of society and many politicians, being more concerned in the short run with winning an election than with leading a revolution in social mores, spend a considerable amount of campaign funds in engaging in them.

The relationship between the hard vote and the small monetary present is in contrast to the floating vote and the outright bribe. Bribery, contrary to the popular conception of the politically apathetic farmer being the object, apparently

prevails in urban areas where the voter does not feel a particular attachment to any one candidate and is therefore more likely to make his vote available to the highest bidder. In urban areas it is common to pay 500, 1,000 or even as much as 2,000 yen per vote. In a district that contains both rural and urban components, outright bribery in the final days of the campaign appears to invariably be concentrated in the urban sector.

These aspects of the campaign, because of the election law's restrictions, are kept the closely guarded secrets of a few top level members of a candidate's staff. They form a current that flows beneath the surface and though of great importance for the candidate's success or failure are of necessity kept hidden. The public dimension of the campaign, the candidate's public campaign activities, form a current of its own that grows more frantic and frenetic as the final days of the campaign approach.

With the last joint speech meeting in Beppu on January 26, the candidates had two final days free to campaign. Sato spent the last three days entirely in Beppu and in a paroxysm of walking. From seven in the morning until eight or nine in the evening Sato walked. Through the narrow neon-lighted streets lined on both sides by bars, coffee houses and pachinko parlors, through the former red-light districts now dominated by small inns, through the cramped backstreets of the downtown area that house many of the service trade workers whose votes would



largely determine Sato's future, he walked and talked and shook hands. Shaking hands is not a common practice in Japanese campaigning, at least not outside of large metropolitan areas. Perhaps the major effect of having a foreigner living with him was to encourage Sato to adopt two campaign techniques not used by other candidates in the district or by himself in previous elections. One was to undertake a telephone campaign. There are no restrictions in the law on campaigning by telephone. Adopting and adapting a suggestion about telephone campaigning, Sato delegated two members of his staff to use the telephone directory to make calls to unknown voters to ask for support. Interestingly, he decided that using the equivalent of the "Yellow Pages" would be more effective than the regular directory since this would increase the chances of contacting conservative party supporting voters. The other technique he adopted was shaking hands. Sato was impressed with a story he heard of how John Kennedy had shaken so many hands in his campaign for President that towards the end of the campaign he needed to have injections to lessen the pain. Sato set himself a goal of shaking 9,000 hands in Beppu in the last three days of the campaign. At six in the morning on each of those days he was at one of the three fruit and vegetable markets in Beppu shaking hands with the dealers he represents as president of the green grocers' union. By the evening of the final day of the campaign Sato was able to show somewhat proudly a raw and swollen right hand.

Sato's efforts in the last days of the campaign created a ground swell of enthusiasm. Sensing this the largest newspaper in the prefecture, the Oita Gōdō, carried an analysis of candidate strength under the headline "Sato-Top."<sup>47</sup> The major Kyushu newspaper, Nishi Nihon, predicted in its edition on the last day of the campaign that Sato would receive 59,000 votes, highest among the candidates.<sup>48</sup> Several papers saw the fight for the top vote as one between Sato and Nishimura<sup>49</sup> but the Oita Gōdō predicted that Socialist Komatsu might take the second highest vote.<sup>50</sup> What was clear in all the predictions was that Ayabe Kentaro was most in danger of losing. On the last day of the campaign eighty-year old Ayabe, the last of the prewar politicians from the prefecture still involved in national politics, dragged his legs through the main streets of Beppu in a pathetic attempt to "walk the city" like Sato. Oita Prefecture has only had two men chosen to serve as Speaker of the Lower House. The first, Motoda Hajime, lost the election following his appointment. It seemed very likely as the campaign came to an end on the evening of January 28 that history was about to repeat itself.

---

<sup>47</sup>Oita Gōdō Shinbun, January 26, 1967, p. 1.

<sup>48</sup>Nishi Nihon Shinbun, January 28, 1967, p. 1.

<sup>49</sup>Mainichi Shinbun, January 27, 1967, p. 7; Konnichi Shinbun, January 28, 1967; Yomiuri Shinbun, January 27, 1967, p. 14.

<sup>50</sup>Oita Gōdō Shinbun, January 26, 1967, p. 1.

## CHAPTER IX

### CONCLUSIONS

For Sato Bunsei the results of the January, 1967 election were all that had been hoped for. From a narrow defeat in 1963, he succeeded four years later in not only winning election to the Lower House but winning with the highest vote among all the candidates.

The results of the election are to be found in Table 18. For purposes of comparison, the 1963 election results are included in Table 19.) Sato's vote throughout the district corresponded very closely to the vote he had anticipated. The Beppu vote was a little higher and the Nakatsu vote a little lower than he had predicted but his general performance was well within the boundaries of his expectations. Forty-two per cent of his total vote was received in his home city of Beppu. He was first among the candidates in the combined vote for the four cities of the district, receiving 63 per cent of his vote in these areas which contain 50 per cent of the district's electorate. He was last among the candidates in the combined vote for the towns and villages of the district. Two-thirds of his over 15,000 vote increase from the 1963 election was accounted for in the two cities of Beppu and Nakatsu.

TABLE 18

## RESULTS OF THE 1967 DIET ELECTION IN OITA'S SECOND DISTRICT

	Sato	Nishimura	Ayabe	Komatsu	Tsuru	No. of Voters Voting	Per Cent	No. of Eligible Voters
Beppu	25,076	9,237	9,968	15,927	1,359	61,567	80.21	78,071
Nakatsu	5,912	5,714	6,158	9,685	1,136	28,599	75.95	38,263
Bungo Takada	3,564	2,906	3,009	3,144	131	12,754	84.12	15,377
Kitsuki	3,339	913	5,554	3,291	135	13,232	84.25	15,853
City Total	37,891	18,770	24,689	32,047	2,755	116,152	79.95	147,564
Kunimi	391	3,428	5,673	808	96	5,290	88.84	5,992
Himeshima	3	2,140	6	54	3	2,206	97.96	2,257
Kunisaki	1,789	5,435	2,038	2,359	157	11,778	86.61	13,746
Musashi	654	1,494	612	598	53	3,411	84.22	4,080
Aki	1,910	1,946	1,706	1,486	47	7,095	85.59	8,424
Higashi Kunisaki County Total	4,747	14,443	4,929	5,305	356	29,780	87.21	24,499
Hiji	2,191	1,049	3,139	3,993	118	10,490	83.33	12,729
Yamaga	1,749	1,242	1,322	2,391	99	6,803	84.58	8,108
Hayami County Total	3,940	2,291	4,461	6,384	217	17,293	83.82	20,837
Ota	727	589	252	373	9	1,950	85.65	2,285
Matama	608	1,000	1,089	640	70	3,407	86.41	3,966
Kagachi	522	1,818	372	510	38	3,260	86.94	3,783
Nishi Kunisaki County Total	1,857	3,407	1,713	1,523	117	8,617	86.44	1,003
Sanko	781	855	868	993	65	3,562	89.61	4,043
Honyabakei	784	1,211	854	727	39	3,615	89.28	4,085
Yabakei	639	1,506	1,275	1,169	309	4,898	89.26	5,533
Yamaguni	1,169	635	713	851	37	3,405	86.69	4,041
Shimoge County Total	3,373	4,207	3,710	3,740	450	15,480	88.76	12,202

TABLE 18 (continued)

	Sato	Nishimura	Ayabe	Komatsu	Tsuru	No. of Voters Voting	Per Cent	No. of Eligible Voters
Innai	1,127	827	1,278	1,104	35	4,371	84.75	5,224
Ajimu	1,343	1,071	1,641	2,092	71	6,218	77.79	8,113
Ekisen	690	829	1,018	956	81	3,574	83.97	4,291
Yokkaichi	2,054	2,700	3,248	3,306	256	1,156	82.35	14,166
Nagasu	2,321	2,657	1,531	2,313	288	9,110	84.61	10,922
Usa	950	613	1,329	1,149	429	4,470	86.18	5,232
Usa County Total	8,485	8,697	10,045	10,920	1,160	39,307	82.92	47,948
Town-Village Total	22,402	33,045	24,858	27,872	2,300	110,477	85.25	131,020
District Total	60,293	51,815	49,547	59,919	5,055	226,629	82.44	278,584

TABLE 19

## RESULTS OF THE 1963 DIET ELECTION IN OITA'S SECOND DISTRICT

	Sato	Nishimura	Ayabe	Noyori	Komatsu	Tsuru	No. of Voters	Per Cent	No. of Eligible Voters
Beppu	17,611	8,538	10,939	5,938	11,940	978	55,944	77.22	73,476
Nakatsu	2,948	4,176	2,973	12,261	6,318	629	29,305	80.28	36,915
Bungo Takada	2,993	3,015	3,217	996	2,912	80	13,213	81.39	16,476
Kitsuki	2,815	1,297	5,535	465	3,244	68	13,424	80.73	16,706
City Total	26,367	17,026	22,664	19,660	24,414	1,755	111,886		
Kunimi	422	3,073	1,107	293	606	116	5,617	90.88	6,218
Himeshima	15	2,135	8	5	56	2	2,221	97.64	2,284
Kunisaki	1,571	5,382	2,721	843	1,784	136	12,437	86.47	14,533
Musashi	379	1,592	975	263	482	18	3,709	88.46	4,228
Aki	1,722	2,169	2,310	282	1,130	24	7,637	66.43	8,930
Higashi Kunisaki County Total	4,109	14,351	7,121	1,686	4,058	296	31,621	88.16	36,195
Hiji	2,211	1,019	3,405	316	3,403	59	10,413	81.23	12,983
Yamaga	1,589	1,122	1,785	392	2,223	37	7,142	83.48	8,646
Hayami County Total	3,800	2,141	5,190	708	5,626	96	17,561	82.13	21,629
Ota	694	550	365	164	361	9	2,143	87.83	2,466
Matama	527	805	1,366	477	482	29	3,686	89.04	4,160
Kagachi	402	2,100	481	162	461	21	3,627	90.34	4,047
Nishi Kunisaki County Total	1,623	3,455	2,212	803	1,304	59	9,456	89.25	10,673

TABLE 19 (continued)

	Sato	Nishimura	Ayabe	Noyori	Komatsu	Tsuru	No. of Voters Voting	No. of Per Eligible Cent Voters	
Sanko	435	661	454	1,651	693	28	3,922	90.80	4,358
Honyabakei	553	1,057	495	1,039	582	20	3,746	87.06	4,336
Yabakei	554	978	1,257	1,163	892	253	5,097	86.32	5,961
Yamaguni	720	627	700	993	635	21	3,696	86.67	4,322
Shimoge County Total	2,262	3,323	2,906	4,846	2,802	322	16,461	87.60	18,967
Innai	822	578	1,630	1,000	789	25	4,844	86.99	5,626
Ajimu	1,137	806	1,687	1,720	1,495	50	6,895	85.93	8,093
Ekisen	480	818	1,065	736	673	53	3,825	87.07	4,423
Yokkaichi	1,484	2,091	3,623	2,511	2,384	146	12,239	84.04	14,755
Nagasu	1,592	2,730	1,824	1,184	1,896	174	9,400	81.07	11,803
Usa	954	376	1,451	678	846	294	4,599	86.04	5,374
Usa County Total	6,469	7,399	11,280	7,829	8,003	742	41,802	84.46	50,074
Town-Village Total	18,263	30,669	28,709	15,872	21,873	1,515	116,901		
District Total	44,630	47,695	51,373	35,532	46,287	3,270	228,787		280,588

The big surprises of the election were Socialist Komatsu's extraordinary increase in votes from 46,000 in 1963 to nearly 60,000 in 1967 and Nishimura's very poor showing in taking the third spot, 8,000 votes behind Komatsu and only 2,000 ahead of Ayabe. Ayabe Kentaro suffered the fate many had predicted for him. He went down to defeat, receiving fewer votes than in the previous election even though Noyori was no longer in the race.

Various hypotheses could be forwarded in explanation of the election results but within the limited concerns of this study it is necessary only to note that the results were interpreted by Sato, most of his staff and many other Conservative Party politicians in the district in such a manner as to leave unchallenged their basic orientations toward campaign strategy. Despite the rather radical change in voting patterns that characterized the election there was only a very limited reappraisal of basic premises of rational campaign strategy.

To the professional politician, Komatsu's victory, coming within 400 votes of being first among the candidates, was seen as the consequence generally of three factors. One reason, and the one generally regarded as of least significance, was that Komatsu benefitted from anti-LDP sentiment that arose with the public exposure of corruption within the party. A second factor considered by many to largely account for his success was that Komatsu's organization "overworked" itself. Because the odds seemed to be overwhelmingly against Komatsu,



Socialist party supporting unions in the district campaigned harder than ever before. Hoping to insure Komatsu's position as the third place candidate they engaged in an unprecedented effort and consequently mobilized more support than even they had expected. The third factor professionals adduced as resulting in Komatsu's victory was that Komatsu and Sato were the two candidates best suited to succeed to the support of voters who had formerly supported conservative independent Noyori Hideichi. An ideology far to the right of either of these candidates and particularly of Komatsu was not the important factor in Noyori's support. His was overwhelmingly a personal vote and the people who had supported him through the years could not bring themselves to support either of the men identified as Noyori's prime enemies, Ayabe and Nishimura. Noyori had been ostracized by the LDP and his election campaigns were largely a struggle for votes against the endorsed LDP candidates. Since Noyori reentered elective politics in the post-war period these candidates had been Nishimura, Shigemitsu and Shigemitsu's successor, Ayabe. Thus Ayabe and Nishimura were associated in the minds of Noyori supporters with the anti-Noyori forces in the LDP. In the first election following his retirement, Noyori supporters, rather than vote for either of the two LDP incumbents, voted either for Sato who was a new candidate not directly associated in the public mind with the LDP fight against Noyori or for Komatsu who had been most clearly uninvolved in Noyori's political career.

While Sato and his staff were somewhat surprised at the degree of Komatsu's increase in votes over the previous election, they were able to explain his success within the context of these three factors.

For professional politicians it was more difficult, in a sense, to explain Nishimura's poor showing than Komatsu's strength. Nishimura, in their analyses, had everything necessary for an easy election victory. He was well endowed with what Japanese characterize as the "three ban" (sanban). He had sufficient financial resources (kaban). His position as Minister of Construction gave him an impressive title and a reputation as an influential politician (kanban) and he had strong organized support (jiban) in Kunisaki and other areas of the district. Everything would indicate that Nishimura should receive the top vote and this indeed was the prediction of many politicians, newspaper editors and Sato himself, at least until the very last days of the campaign. His failure to do as well as expected did not produce, however, very much questioning about the effectiveness of time honored techniques of support mobilization. The explanation for Nishimura's poor performance at the polls given by professional politicians went something as follows. Nishimura's defeat was due to the close proximity of local elections. Elections for most local offices in the Prefecture were to be held in April. Nishimura's campaign depended heavily on the support of local politicians. Unlike Sato his strength lay in the rural areas of the district

and not in Beppu and he had not developed a large supporters' organization to stabilize his support. His strong support among local politicians would insure easy victory in most elections but in 1967 the local politicians who supported him campaigned only half heartedly if at all. With their own elections coming up in the very near future there was a tendency for local politicians to keep money intended to finance the Diet campaign for their own election. For another thing, the black mist scandals had raised such an uproar about corruption that the police were being stricter than ever before in investigating violations of the Election Law. Because of their generally recognized role in Diet campaigns, local politicians were prime suspects for the police and they were not willing to take inordinate risks of being caught for a violation with their own election so near. Thirdly, where local politicians might try to pressure people to vote for their candidate in Diet elections held at other times, their major concern in January was to insure support in their own election. Thus they used the Diet campaign more for building their own support than for urging support for the Diet candidate with whom they were associated. If a voter expressed preference for one of the other Diet candidates, the local politician hesitated to try to change his mind and threaten his own support in the process. The proximity of the local elections thus neutralized many local politicians who under other circumstances would have worked much harder for the Diet

candidate they were supporting. Such a situation could only work to the benefit of Komatsu who relied mainly on union strength rather than on local politicians and Sato whose support among local officials was weak to begin with and whose major effort was concentrated in the cities.

Such an interpretation of the election results was generally subscribed to by professional politicians in the district. Although the results came as something of a surprise, they were not perceived as discrediting time tried strategies of support mobilization. At the most they had a subtle effect on politicians such as Sato, pushing them in certain directions but not precipitating a conscious reevaluation of strategy.

The strategies Sato employed were the product of an intricate interplay of a number of historical, cultural and legal factors and Sato's particular judgments and assumptions. While different men would respond somewhat differently to similar environmental factors than Sato did, the opportunity structure within which Sato formulated strategy is of general application. Concepts of the hard and the floating vote, traditional techniques of structuring campaign organizations, imperatives of the election law's numerous restrictions on campaign practices and the consequences of its voting and districting system, acceptable modes of social intercourse and culturally sanctioned forms of public behavior combine to form an opportunity structure that allows candidates only a limited

number of alternative strategies.

Formulating strategies within the structure of opportunity presented him, Sato emerged with four fundamental approaches to campaign strategy. Although different candidates emphasize each approach in varying degrees, these four basic approaches are evident in the campaign strategies of all the conservative candidates with whose campaign organizations I am familiar.

One basic approach is to rely on an organization of local community elites, particularly local politicians, to organize and deliver the vote. In adopting such an approach, Sato was acting in accordance with a long tradition in Japanese campaigning. Concepts of the hard vote and of gathering the vote that are crucial to Sato's perception of the rural electorate are concepts which found their genesis in the activities of landlords on behalf of the campaigns of Diet candidates in the period before World War II. With the demise of the landlords in the early postwar years, local politicians came to play the central role in organizing support for conservative party Diet candidates. While no one maintains that the ability of local politicians to influence the electorate is of the same scale as that of the prewar landlords, Diet candidates such as Sato do assume that such local leaders have considerable personal influence over a significant number of voters analogous to the influence exerted by landlords and that such leaders can deliver large numbers of votes to the

candidate of their choice. Whether support came from the personal machine of one powerful local leader such as Kiyohara in Bungo Takada or from a less integrated group such as the organization in Kunisaki, the function of elite supporters was one; i.e. to deliver to the candidate a certain vote on the basis of their personal influence over the electorate.

Because local politicians are of such central importance to the campaign strategy of conservative party Diet candidates, the fight for support in the rural areas of Oita's Second District was largely a fight among the LDP candidates for support of local politicians who could deliver their own "hard" votes to the Diet candidate. The fact that Sato was at a disadvantage in this struggle because of his non-incumbent status and his inability to provide rewards to local politicians on as great a scale as the incumbent LDP candidates did not cause him to develop to any great degree other approaches for mobilizing support among the rural electorate. He hoped to win enough support in other areas of the district to win election and thus, as an incumbent, be in a position in future elections to effectively appeal for the support of local politicians presently denied him. Activities aimed at organizing support directly among the general electorate were of minimal importance in rural areas. Such activities were almost entirely concentrated in the two large cities of the district; Sato's home city of Beppu and the smaller city of Nakatsu. It was here that Sato emphasized his second fundamental approach, the

creation of a mass membership supporters' organization, the kōenkai.

A significant degree of localism in voting patterns is a conspicuous feature of Japanese Diet elections. Candidates tend to get a disproportionate percentage of their vote from their home areas in the district, their jimoto in the Japanese terminology.<sup>1</sup> Consideration for the appeal of the "native son candidate" (jimoto kōhōsha) combined with a perceived inability to obtain significant support in rural areas were of basic importance in Sato's determination to concentrate his campaign activities in Beppu. He believed that victory could only be achieved by maximizing support among the voters of his home city and by increasing his vote substantially in Nakatsu, where the retirement from politics of conservative independent Noyori Hideichi presented new opportunities for gaining support. In campaigning in these cities Sato placed primary emphasis on the use of the kōenkai.

As reliance on local politicians to mobilize support is intimately related to the concept of the hard vote, so is the kōenkai related to the concept of the floating vote. In Beppu the number of voters susceptible to the influence of local community leaders was perceived as minimal. The only way to organize large numbers of the city's electorate was to create

---

<sup>1</sup>In the two districts of Oita Prefecture and the other non-metropolitan districts with which I am familiar, this appears equally true for the ex-bureaucrat and the professional politician.

one dimension intended to serve the same functions as his rural organization. But more significant than their ability to deliver votes was the sewanin's utility in providing a channel of communication between Sato and the city's residents. In Beppu the support of local leaders was most important strategically for providing the contact necessary for Sato to organize his kōenkai.

Relying on local politicians represents an attempt to gain support indirectly through the local leaders' influence over the electorate. Creating a kōenkai is an attempt to organize support on the basis of the personal appeal of the candidate. Sato also undertook a third fundamental approach to campaign strategy. This was to enlist the support on behalf of his campaign of various interest groups and other voluntary associations active in the district.

The attempt to obtain the effective support of voluntary associations is in part an effort to break out of the confines of the chiiki or geographical area approach to campaign organization. The so-called vertical approach of organizing support separately in the several cities, towns and villages of the district and their subdivisions often results in support being concentrated in narrow geographical areas. Even Sato's most powerful supporters had influence that extends only to the boundaries of their own communities. The support of voluntary associations was valued because it can provide a kind of horizontal cover to a candidate's vertical strategies. A group



with district-wide membership can provide support that flows out across the district, cutting across chiiki lines and extending the candidate's support into areas he might not otherwise reach.

An effort to gain the support of voluntary associations was the consequence of a realization on the part of the candidate of an identification of a significant number of voters with the policies of functional organizations to which they belong. Sato's search for support among various groups was due to his own unstated conviction that some voters would be more susceptible to the views of the leadership of functional organizations to which they belong than to the views of local leaders; and that other voters who could be reached neither through the organization of local politicians nor through the kōenkai structure could be brought in to his support through allegiance to association policy. In rural areas this meant that the support of organizations such as the Dental Association or the Federation of Bamboo Industries could gain Sato support from voters who could not be reached by local politicians in his support. Where local politicians supported the other two LDP candidates, Sato's most important backers were often leaders of interest groups that had given him their endorsement. In cities with large populations like Beppu and Nakatsu, support of organizations could help Sato appeal to voters not reached through the organization of neighborhood sewanin and outside the web of his kōenkai.

The Election Law's multi-member district single-entry ballot system made it extremely difficult for voluntary associations to play an effective role in the campaign. It was often impossible for any one of the LDP candidates to gain the support of an LDP supporting organization because of the hostility such action would generate among the other party candidates. Although Sato approached a score of associations in the district, effective support was extremely limited. The Dental Association was the only important group to undertake a concerted campaign effort on his behalf.

Sato's strategy for gaining the support of voluntary associations was aimed almost solely at organizations generally regarded as supporting the LDP. Support for Sato meant in effect support at the expense of the other candidates of the party. The only organization of importance to Sato's campaign that brought him into competition with Socialist candidate Komatsu was the High School Teachers' Union. But the support Sato received from the leadership of the union was countered by support for Komatsu among many of the union's general members and by the union's membership in the Socialist Party-supporting prefectural federation of labor unions (Kenrōhyō). The limited support Sato had in the union served at best to neutralize what otherwise might have been an important element in the Socialist candidate's campaign effort.

These three fundamental approaches--reliance on local politicians, formation of a kōenkai, and the use of voluntary

associations--all represent efforts at organizing support. Sato's fourth major approach was aimed at moving beyond organization, at conducting a direct appeal to an anonymous electorate.

The frenetic, exhausting activities of the three weeks of official campaigning were not for the purpose, as were the activities of the kōenkai, of making the voter a member of a support organization and nurturing in him a conscious commitment to support the candidate. They were rather an appeal to an anonymous electorate for its vote on the basis of the candidate's policies, youth, experience, vitality or any of the other multitude of factors that comprise a politician's appeal. The provisions of the Election Law concerning campaign practices severely inhibit a candidate's conduct of this appeal for votes but within these limits Sato tried to reach those voters whose support had not been obtained by other means.

Although originating at different times and in response to different environmental factors, these four fundamental approaches to campaign strategy are not mutually exclusive. They coexist and in their coexistence is mirrored the dynamic quality of structural change itself.

Developments in campaign strategy in Japan have moved along identifiable lines that can be drawn out on an historical and a rural-urban continuum. The direction and the speed of these changes in campaign strategies reflect the changing

opportunities available to candidates for mobilizing support.

The development of campaign strategy in Japan in part has been in response to the particular demands of the Japanese historical experience. The development of the kōenkai, for example, was largely the result of the expropriation of the landlord in the early postwar years and the consequent destruction of his political power. Strategy in Japan also has had to respond to environmental factors which are more universal and which have led strategy in many parliamentary systems to develop along similar lines. The effects of the mass media on campaign strategy is the most impressive example of these.

Drawn out on an historical continuum there is an identifiable progression in Japan from reliance on community leaders (the landlords in the prewar period) to the emergence of the kōenkai in the early postwar years, to an increasing effort to enlist the support of voluntary associations as they multiplied later in the postwar period, to an increasing emphasis on maximizing the possibilities for appealing directly to the electorate for votes.

Drawn out on a rural-urban continuum, a parallel pattern emerges. Reliance on local leaders is most prevalent in rural areas while the kōenkai is a particularly popular technique in fairly small cities. In the large metropolitan areas, major emphasis is placed on gaining the support of already organized voluntary associations and on direct appeals to the electorate.

The direction of change appears unmistakable.

Increasing reliance on enlisting the support of voluntary associations and utilizing the mass media are paralleled by a decreasing reliance on local politicians. Even the kōenkai, which a few years ago was embraced by almost every politician as the most effective means for mobilizing support is now being downgraded in many candidates' strategies. There can be little doubt that over time campaign strategy in Japan, as in the United States and Western Europe, will emphasize more and more associational rather than community interests and appeals to the electorate through wide exposure and skillful use of the media rather than through the recruiting of voters into personal support organizations. In this sense Japan is well within the mainstream of developments in other parliamentary systems. The main question is the speed rather than the direction of change. In reviewing Sato's strategy, three factors stand out as particularly crucial in this regard.

One is the multi-member district single entry ballot electoral system. It need hardly be stressed at this point that this system has the most far-reaching effects on campaign strategy. In a district in which several members of the same party are running for election it forces each to rely on personal campaign organizations, makes the campaign a largely intra-party struggle and either renders the party impotent or splits it asunder. The effect of the system is not only to inhibit certain organizational developments. Most importantly it renders voter identification with the party largely irrelevant

to individual candidate campaigns. In a single-member constituency system the political party's position as an effective reference group for a significant portion of the electorate has the effect in most circumstances of providing a large base of votes for the party's candidates.<sup>2</sup> In Japan voter identification with a political party alone is not sufficient to determine which candidate will receive the vote. On the contrary, the portion of the electorate that is generally regarded as supporting the LDP is taken to mark the boundaries within which LDP candidates formulate strategy to mobilize support. Sato's basic strategic problem was to obtain the votes of as many LDP supporters as possible (at the expense of the other candidates) of the party) rather than gain support of voters who might otherwise vote for an opposition party candidate.

One change in campaign strategy and general political organization that is considered essential and, indeed, the essence of modern political organization by a large number of both conservatives and Socialists is the development of mass membership parties to conduct party oriented and party directed campaigns. But because of the intra-party struggle generated by the electoral system, party oriented and party directed campaigns have remained unfulfilled desires. We have seen how attempts to incorporate individual candidate support organizations

---

<sup>2</sup>On this point see Robert E. Lane, Political Life (New York, 1966), pp. 299-301.

into the party in Yamanashi and Oita Prefectures resulted in total failure. Nonetheless Japanese politicians are committed to the development of mass parties and this is one reason for the conservatives' long campaign to reform the law to provide for single-member constituencies.<sup>3</sup> The considerable frustration exhibited by the Japanese politician over the inability to effect desired change in campaign strategy and political organization because of the imperatives of the electoral system is a conspicuous and important feature of the current political scene.

A second crucial factor inhibiting change in campaign strategy is the election law's provisions on campaign practices. By its almost total prohibition of the use of the mass media in campaigning, the law has inhibited the development of new political techniques similar to those that are causing a revolution in the United States and Western Europe. As Leon Epstein has written,

[these] new techniques involve increasing use, and increasingly skilled use, of the mass media for political and other kinds of communication. Their use is advanced by material developments, especially in television, and by behavioral research in popular responses. Moreover, increased formal education and a pervasive home-centered middle-class life style make for a large audience that is responsive to direct appeals about politics as about everything

---

<sup>3</sup>The other reason is that they expect that a single-member constituency system would destroy all minor parties and that a skillful carving of districts will result in an overwhelming victory for LDP candidates. It is because they agree with such forecasts that the Socialists and other opposition parties have all strenuously opposed any change in the system.

else. An organizational apparatus intervening between candidates and voters may be less necessary, or at any rate less efficient, as a vote-getting device.<sup>4</sup>

One reason Sato placed so much emphasis on organization in his campaign was his inability fully to use the new techniques of communication with the electorate at which his counterparts in other countries have become so skillful. The law's provision on campaign practices inhibit use of the mass media and work particular hardships on new candidates who usually do not have the same opportunities as incumbents to appear on television news shows and in newspaper articles and the like. There is no doubt that a removal of the restrictions on the use of the mass media in election campaigning would affect campaign strategy in Japan as greatly as the media has affected strategy in other countries.<sup>5</sup>

---

<sup>4</sup>Epstein, p. 233.

<sup>5</sup>It is interesting to note the essential contradiction between the Japanese desire for mass membership parties and the effects on political organization of a highly developed communications network. The "counter-organizational tendencies" that Epstein sees affecting party structures in the United States and Europe may well have a similar influence in Japan if the election law is ever changed. Even under the present law, the degree of political communication that has been facilitated by the mass media renders obsolete a major reason for mass membership parties. In Europe parties have experienced these counter-organizational tendencies after having had developed mass membership parties. In Japan, the counter-organizational tendencies of the mass media are occurring at a time when mass party structures represent an ideal yet to be achieved. One of the interesting problems of future party development in Japan is how currently cherished models of party organization will be rationalized with an environment that makes such models already somewhat out of date.



A third crucial factor inhibiting change in campaign strategy may be characterized as a lag in feedback. Most candidates for public office have the primary goal of being elected. In creating strategies they are likely to employ tried and proven techniques, particularly if like Sato they are professional politicians with long experience in local politics. Major changes in strategy come slowly as the environment changes and the candidate becomes aware of the new opportunities presented. While environmental circumstances in some cases demand an immediate response in strategy (a change in the law, for example, prohibiting a previously legitimate campaign practice), much of the development of campaign strategy is the consequence of a complex fuge being played between changing environmental circumstances and candidate perception of such changes. For most candidates there is almost inevitably a time lag between change in the field, individual perception of those changes and the manifestation of changed perception in strategy. This delayed reaction to an evolving structure is one reason for the coexistence in Sato's campaign of approaches, such as reliance on local elites and use of a kōenkai, that are rationalized by a differential perception of different parts of the electorate.

There is a dynamic tension between time sanctioned strategies and the elements of the environment that lend support to the rationality of such strategies on the one hand, and new developments in strategy and the variables in the

environment that give rise to them on the other. In this tension exists much of the meaning and the fascination of election campaigning in Japan.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

Note: The following lists only those sources that are cited in the text. Dates are given for interviews in cases where I interviewed the person only one time. Most of the people who are cited were interviewed numerous times during the period from June, 1966 to August, 1967. In such cases only the location is noted.

## I. Interviews

Aragane Keiji (Beppu).  
 Asada Hiroaki (Beppu), May 1967.  
 Baba Takashi (Beppu).  
 Doi Takeshi (Beppu).  
 Ichimaru Gohei (Beppu), May 1967.  
 Ikezaki Chiyo (Beppu), August 1967.  
 Ishikawa ? (Oita), May 1967.  
 Iwasaki Masaji (Oita).  
 Kanda Yasugi (Beppu), May 1967.  
 Kato Shin (Oita), May 1967.  
 Kawamura Muga (Beppu).  
 Kiyohara Fumio (Beppu, Bungo Takada).  
 Kiyonari Fumito (Beppu, Kunisaki).  
 Koguchi Hiroshi (Beppu), May 1967.  
 Komatsu Kan (Tokyo), July 1967.  
 Kondo Takayuki (Oita), May 1967.  
 Kono Yohei (Beppu), July 1967.  
 Mieno ? (Oita), May 1967.  
 Mitarai Tatsuo (Tokyo).  
 Murakami Isamu (Oita, Tokyo).  
 Nakasone Yasuhiro (Tokyo).  
 Nakayama Makoto (Beppu, Kitsuki).  
 Saita Matato (Beppu).  
 Sakamoto Tosuke (Beppu, Honyabakei).  
 Sato Bunsei (Beppu).  
 Sato Shozo (Oita), May 1967.  
 Shuto Kenji (Beppu).  
 Taguchi Akira (Oita), May 1967.  
 Takami Takashi (Beppu, Kunisaki).  
 Teshima Tsugio (Oita), May 1967.  
 Tomonaga Moto (Beppu).  
 Yoshitake Masayoshi (Oita), May 1967.

## II. Private Reports and Letters

Asada Hiroaki. Letter Concerning High School Teachers' Union.  
June 21, 1967.

Kiyonari Fumito. Shūinsen Soshiki Taisei, Kunisaki Machi.  
Report prepared for private circulation, 1967.

## III. Public Opinion Polls

Beppu-shi Senkyo Kanri Iinkai, Beppu-shi Akaruku Tadashii  
Senkyo Suishin Kyogikai. Moderu Chiku Ni Okeru Akaruku  
Tadashii Senkyo Undō No Jittai - Yōron Chōsa No Gaiyō.  
Beppu, 1966.

Komei Senkyo Renmei. Shūgin Giin Sōsenkyo No Jittai - Yōron  
Chōsa Kekka No Shūkei. Tokyo, 1967.

Oita Ken Senkyo Kanri Iinkai, Oita Ken Akaruku Tadashii Senkyo  
Suishin Kyogikai. Moderu Chiku Ni Okeru Akaruku Tadashii  
Senkyo Undō No Jittai - Yōron Chōsa No Gaiyō. Oita,  
March 1965.

Japan Broadcasting Company (NHK). Shūgin Giin Sōsenkyo -  
Yōron Chōsa. Unpublished voter survey conducted during  
January, 1967.

Oita Godo Shinbun. Shūgin Giin Sōsenkyo - Yōron Chōsa.  
Unpublished voter survey conducted January 21-22, 1967.

## IV. Government Publications, Party Publications, Organizational Manuals and Membership Lists

Beppu-Oita Seinenkaigisho. Beppu-Oita Seinenkaigisho Meibo.  
Beppu, 1967.

Beppu Shiyakusho. Jichiin Setchi Kisoku. Beppu, undated.  
(Mimeo.)

\_\_\_\_\_. Jyūmin Gyōsei Soshiki No Chōsa. Beppu, October 1,  
1965. (Mimeo.)

Beppu Shiyakusho Kikakushitsu. Tōkeisho. Beppu, 1967.

Jichisho Senkyokyoku. Shūgin Giin Sōsenkyo No Tebiki. Tokyo,  
1967.

\_\_\_\_\_. Shūgin Senkyo Ni Okeru Seitō, Seiji Dantai No  
Katsudō No Tebiki. Tokyo, 1967.

- Jiyūminshutō. Dare Demo Dekiru Senkyo Undō. Tokyo, 1967.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Jiyūminshutō Jyūnen No Ayumi. Tokyo, 1966.
- Jiyūminshutō Oita Kenren. Senkyo Soshiki Taisei No Kakuritsu. Oita, 1962. (Mimeo.)
- \_\_\_\_\_. Katsudō Hōshin. Oita, 1961. (Mimeo.)
- Naikaku Hōseikyoku Daisanbu. Senkyo Jitsumu Roppō. Tokyo, 1966.
- Oita Keizai Dōyūkai. Oita Keizai Dōyūkai Yōran. Oita, 1966.
- Oita Ken. Chiiki Betsu Kenmin Shotoku (Seisan Shotoku). Oita, 1967.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Kokusei Chōsa Ni Yoru Shi-cho-son Betsu Jinko No TREND. Oita, 1967. (Mimeo.)
- \_\_\_\_\_. Oita Ken Tōkei Nenpan. Oita, 1966.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Shōwa 40nen Kokusei Chōsa, Oita Ken Shūkei Kekkahyō. Oita, 1965.
- Oita Ken Chūshō Kigyōka, Oita Ken Shōkōkai Rengōkai. Oita Ken Shōkō Yōran. Oita, 1967.
- Oita Ken Ishikai. Kaiin Meibo. Oita, 1966.
- Oita Ken Keieisha Kyōkai. Oita Ken Keieisha Kyōkai Yōran. Oita, 1966.
- Oita Ken Nōgyō Kyōdō Kumiai Chuōkai. Oita Ken Nōgyō Kyōdō Kumiai Tōkeihyō. Oita, 1965.
- Oita Ken Senkyo Kanri Iinkai. Oita Ken Dai Niku Shūgiin Giin Kōhōsha Senkyo Kōhō. Oita, 1967.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Senkyo No Kiroku 1946-1961. 2 vols. Oita, 1962.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Senkyo No Kiroku, Oita Kengikai Giin Senkyo (April 17, 1963), Shi-cho-son Gikai Giin Senkyo (April 30, 1963). Oita, 1963.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Senkyo No Kiroku, Shūgiin Giin Sōsenkyo. November 21, 1963.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Senkyo No Kiroku, Shūgiin Giin Sōsenkyo. January 29, 1967.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Senkyo No Kiroku, Oita Kengikai Giin Senkyo (April 15, 1967), Shi-cho-son Gikai Giin Senkyo (April 28, 1967). Oita, 1967.

Oita Ken Shikaisikai. Kaiin Meibo. Oita, 1966.

Oita Ken Shōkō Rōdōbu Chūsho Kigyōka. Oita Ken Chūsho Kigyō Dantai Meibo. Oita, 1965.

Oita Ken Shōkō Rōdōbu Rōseika. Rōdō Kumiai Meikan. Oita, 1966.

Oita Ken Take Sangyō Rengōkai. Kaiin Meibo. Oita, 1966.

Public Offices Election Law. Tokyo, 1958.

Seiji Shikin Kiseihō. Roppō Zensho. Tokyo, 1966.

Senkyohō. Roppō Zensho. Tokyo, 1966.

Sorifu Tōkeikyoku. Oita Ken No Jinko. Tokyo, 1967.

#### V. Newspapers

Asahi Evening News (Tokyo).

Asahi Shinbun (Oita edition).

Beppu Yukan (Beppu).

Bunshū Gōdō (Nakatsu).

Fusetsu Kaihō (Beppu).

Higashi Kyushu (Beppu).

Japan Times (Tokyo).

Kanko Puresu (Beppu).

Konnichi (Beppu).

Mainichi Shinbun (Oita edition).

Nishi Nihon Shinbun (Oita edition).

Oita Gōdō Shinbun (Oita).

Oita Nichinichi (Oita).

Oita Shinbun (Oita).

Yomiuri News (Tokyo).

Yomiuri Shinbun (Oita edition).

## VI. Books and Articles

- Asahi Janaru Hen.. Nihon No Kyodai Soshiki. Tokyo, 1966.
- Baerwald, Hans. The Purge of Japanese Leaders Under the Occupation. Berkeley, 1959.
- Beardsley, Richard, Hall, John and Ward, Robert. Village Japan. Chicago, 1959.
- Bennett, John W. and Ishino Iwao. Paternalism in the Japanese Economy. Minneapolis, 1963.
- Cantril, Hadley. "Perception and Interpersonal Relations." Current Perspectives in Social Psychology. Ed. Edwin P. Hollander and Raymond G. Hunt. New York, 1967.
- Cole, Allan B., Totten, George O. and Uyehara, Cecil H. Socialist Parties in Postwar Japan. New Haven, 1966.
- Curtis, Gerald L. "Nihon No Kyōikumamateki Senkyo." Bungei Shunju, XV (June, 1967), 174-180.
- Dahl, Robert. Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City. New Haven, 1961.
- Daudt, H. Floating Voters and the Floating Vote, A Critical Analysis of American and British Election Studies. Leiden, 1961.
- Dore, Ronald P. Land Reform in Japan. London, 1959.
- Dull, Paul S. "The Senkyoka System in Rural Japanese Communities." Occasional Papers No. 4. Center for Japanese Studies. Ann Arbor, 1953.
- Edinger, Lewis J., ed. Political Leadership in Industrialized Societies. New York, 1967.
- Epstein, Leon D. Political Parties in Western Democracies. New York, 1967.
- Fujiwara Hirotsu and Tomita Nobuo. Seijiaku E No Haisen. Tokyo, 1967.
- Fukutake Tadashi. Japanese Rural Society. Trans. Ronald Dore. Tokyo, 1967.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "'Jimintō Rieki' O Seiritsu Saseru Mono." Interview with Ishikawa Hideo. Asahi Janaru, IX (February 26, 1967), 94-101.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Nihon Nōson Shakai Ron. Tokyo, 1966.

- Fukuzawa Yukichi. The Autobiography of Fukuzawa Yukichi.  
Trans. Eiichi Kiyooka. Tokyo, 1960.
- Gakuyō Shobō Henshūbu. Senkyo Undō. Doko Kara Ihan Ka.  
Tokyo, 1967.
- Gouldner, Alvin W. "The Norm of Reciprocity: A Preliminary  
Statement." Current Perspectives in Social Psychology.  
Ed. Edwin P. Hollander and Raymond G. Hunt. New York,  
1967.
- Hasegawa Ryuichi. Oita Ken No Seijika. Oita, 1966.
- Hayashida Kazuhiro. "Development of Election Law in Japan."  
Hosei Kenkyu, XXXIV (July, 1967), 1-54.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Senkyohō. Vol. V of Horitsugaku Zenshu.  
Tokyo, 1966.
- Hunter, Floyd. Community Power Structure. A Study of Decision  
Makers. New York, 1963.
- Ike Nobutaka. Japanese Politics. New York, 1957.
- Ikeda Masanosuke. "Seijika Ga Tsukau Bōdai Na Uragane."  
Gendai, July, 1967, pp. 54-61.
- Ishida Takeshi. Gendai Soshiki Ron. Tokyo, 1965.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Sengo Nihon No Seiji Taisei. Tokyo, 1961.
- Jinji Kōshinsho. Jinji Kōshinroku. 23rd edition. Tokyo, 1966.
- Jones, Charles O. "The Role of the Campaign in Congressional  
Politics." The Electoral Process. Ed. M. Kent Jennings  
and L. Harmon Zeigler. New Jersey, 1966.
- Kajiyama Toshiyuki. "Kane To Kōyaku No Matsuri, Sōsenkyo."  
Hoseki, February, 1967, pp. 51-67.
- Kida Minoru. Nippon Buraku. Tokyo, 1967.
- Kobayashi Naoki, Shinohara Hajime, Soma Masao. Senkyo. Tokyo,  
1960.
- Kurzman, Dan. Kishi and Japan. New York, 1960.
- Kyogoku Junichi and Ike Nobutaka. "Urban-Rural Differences in  
Voting and Behavior in Postwar Japan." Economic De-  
velopment and Cultural Change, IX, Part 2 (October 1960),  
167-185.
- Lane, Robert E. Political Life. New York, 1959.



- Langdon, Frank. Politics in Japan. Boston, 1967.
- Lipset, Seymour Martin. "Party Systems and the Representation of Social Groups." Political Parties, Contemporary Trends and Ideas. Ed. Roy C. Macridis. New York, 1967.
- McKenzie, R.T. British Political Parties. New York, 1964.
- Maki, John. Government and Politics in Japan. New York, 1962.
- Matsushita Keiichi. Gendai Nihon No Seijiteki Kōsei. Tokyo, 1964.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Sengo Minshu Shugi No Tenbō. Tokyo, 1965.
- Michels, Robert. Political Parties. New York, 1962.
- Miyake, Ichiro et al. Kotonaru Reberu No Senkyo Ni Okeru Tōhyō Kōdō No Kenkyū. Tokyo, 1967.
- Oka Yoshitake, ed. Gendai Nihon No Seiji Katei. Tokyo, 1966.
- Okano Kaoru. "Daigishi To Senkyoku." Ushio, January, 1966, pp. 177-185.
- Olson, Lawrence. Dimensions of Japan. New York, 1963.
- Passin, Herbert. "Japanese Society." International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. New York, 1968.
- Rae, Douglas. The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws. New Haven, 1967.
- Richardson, Bradley M. "Japanese Local Politics: Support Mobilization and Leadership Styles." Asian Survey, VII (December 1967), 860-875.
- Rose, Richard. Politics in England. Boston, 1964.
- Royama Masamichi et al. Sōsenkyo No Jittai. Tokyo, 1955.
- Sato Bunsei. Oita Ken O Kangaeru. Beppu, 1963.
- Scalapino, Robert A. and Masumi Junnosuke. Parties and Politics in Contemporary Japan. Berkeley, 1962.
- Shigemitsu Mamoru. Japan and Her Destiny; My Struggle for Peace. New York, 1958.
- Shinsei Dōshikai. Shinsei. Tokyo, August 1967.
- Soma Masao. Nihon No Senkyo Seiji. Tokyo, 1963.

- \_\_\_\_\_. Nihon No Senkyo. Tokyo, 1967.
- Sorauf, Frank J. Political Parties in the American System. Boston, 1964.
- Sugimori Yasuji. "Jimintō Zengiin No Keireki Bunseki." Jiyū, X (May, 1968), 36-57.
- Taguchi Fukuji. Gendai Seiji To Ideorojii. Tokyo, 1967.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Nihon Seiji No Dōkō To Tenbō. Tokyo, 1966.
- Takahashi Makoto. "Seiji To Kane No Akuen." Asahi Janaru, VIII (December 11, 1966), 12-19.
- Thayer, Nathaniel. "How the Conservatives Rule Japan: A Study of Personality and Institution in the Liberal Democratic Party." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. Columbia University, 1968.
- Thomsen, Harry. The New Religions of Japan. Tokyo, 1963.
- Tsuji Kiyooki. "Mūdo To Jitsueki No Tatakai." Asahi Janaru, IX (February 12, 1967), 12-14.
- \_\_\_\_\_, ed. Seiji. Vol. I of Shiryō Senjō Niijūnenshi. 5 vols. Tokyo, 1966.
- Usami Sho. "Nōson No Tōshika." Asahi Janaru, VIII (December 11, 1966), 20-25.
- Ward, Robert. "The Commission on the Constitution and Prospects for Constitutional Change in Japan." The Journal of Asian Studies, XXIV (May, 1965).
- Watanuki, Jyoji. Nihon No Seiji Shakai. Tokyo, 1967.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Patterns of Politics in Present Day Japan." Party Systems and Voter Alignments, Cross-National Perspectives. Ed. Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan. New York, 1967.
- Yamada Hiroshi and Ishii Kinichiro. Gendai Nihon No Seiji. Tokyo, 1967.
- Yanaga Chitoshi. Japanese People and Politics. New York, 1956.
- Yomiuri Shinbun Seijibu. Seitō, Sono Soshiki To Habatsu No Jittai. Tokyo, 1966.
- Yoshimura Tadashi. Nihon Seiji No Shindan. Tokyo, 1965.