NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY

TEN-HOUSE PARTY CELLS AND THEIR LEADERS: MICROPOLITICS IN PARE DISTRICT, TANZANIA

A DISSERTATION

SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS

for the degree

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Field of Political Science

by

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Evanston, Illinois

June 1970

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I acknowledge the generous assistance of the Council for Intersocietal Studies of Northwestern which supported me during an eighteen-month period of field research (June 1967-December 1968) and for a seven-month write-up period (January 1969-July 1969). I am also indebted to the Council for supporting the typing of this dissertation.

My graduate training at Northwestern was financed by several different organizations. The Woodrow Wilson Foundation supported my first year of graduate work (1964-65). Northwestern enabled me to continue in the second year as a University Fellow (1965-66). I was awarded a National Defense Foreign Language (NDFL) Fellowship in 1966-67 which provided the opportunity for me to study the Swahili language and to plan my field research. I sincerely appreciate the help all of these organizations have given.

Dr. Gwendolen M. Carter and Dr. Ronald Cohen, both of Northwestern, have had a profound impact on me as a scholar. Dr. Carter, Director of Northwestern's Program of African Studies, has been a congenial teacher and friend since I first entered the Program. Dr. Cohen has invested many hours and much effort in the research I report here. I wish to thank both of them for their interest and encouragement in the present project.

The research which is reported in the following pages was made possible by the many Tanzanians I have had the opportunity to know. I

am grateful to the government of Tanzania at all levels for their permission to work in Pare District. The University College, Dar es Salaam, granted me an appointment as a Research Associate for the period of fieldwork. This appointment opened many doors to me as a foreign scholar, including the use of the library and other resources of the University as well as the opportunity to exchange ideas and information with scholars also doing research in Tanzania. I gratefully acknowledge their assistance.

In particular, Dr. Isaria Kimambo, of University College's History Department, warmly encouraged me to work in Pare District, where he had previously worked on Pare political history. He and his wife, Mary, helped me in numerous ways throughout the project.

To the people of Pare District I owe an enormous debt of gratitude. I cannot mention by name here all the individuals of Usangi-Kighare and Mbaga-Mshewa who spent long hours in conversation with me--nor all the ten-house cell leaders, government officers, party workers, and community development people who patiently explained to me various aspects of politics and administration in Pare District.

A few individuals were of special assistance to me and I want to thank them here. Bw. Amiri Kipimo, a TANU Branch Secretary, instructed me in the ways and goals of the party. Bw. Omari Saidi Mbaga, my friend and assistant, helped me to understand what it means to be a citizen of Tanzania. Bw. Jacksoni Mrindoko Mchombu, my research assistant, took this project as his own and vigorously sought to make it a success. These three men, along with many other Pares, shared with me the conviction that if we could increase our understanding of how rural politics

in general and political development in particular were occurring, then we could increase the likelihood of bringing about desired changes in Tanzanian society. I hope the research reported here takes a small step in that direction.

I also appreciate the time and effort which Alfreda S. Kaplan expended in typing the final draft of this dissertation.

And finally, my greatest debt: I thank my husband, Mack, for his help and support in every stage of research and write-up. He has been a perceptive critic and a loyal colleague over the years--as well as the enthusiastic husband of an academic wife.

J. F. O'B.

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A NOTE ON THE USAGE OF AFRICAN WORDS

Of necessity, foreign words abound in the following pages. They have been kept to a minimum and included only when essential to an understanding of a particular problem. Since some of the words used are Swahili and others are Chasu (i.e., the Pare language), the following convention is used to distinguish between these two languages whenever confusion may arise as to which language a term belongs:

mfumwa (Ch.: chief)

mkoa (Sw.: region)

balozi (Sw.: literally, representative, leader of a ten-house cell)

"(Ch.)" refers to Chasu while "(Sw.)" means that the word or phrase is Swahili. Whenever the meaning is not clear from the text, as in the third example above, the translation is given within the parentheses. In general, Bantu prefixes are omitted. The only exceptions are (1) place names where I have tried to follow the conventions used by the government on maps and public documents (e.g., Usangi rather than Sangi) and (2) clan names where I use the man class prefix (e.g., Msangi clan rather than Sangi clan).

GLOSSARY

AC	Area Commissioner. Executive head of a district since independence.
ADEO	Assistant Divisional Executive Officer. Administrative official in charge of a ward.
Akida	Swahili. Administrative official appointed by German colonial administration. Responsible for tax collection and maintenance of peace and security.
Arusha Declaration	A statement by President Nyerere on the goals of Tanzanian society and how they will be achieved.
Branch	See tawi.
DEO	Divisional Executive Officer. Administrative official in charge of a division.
District	See wilaya.
Division	See tarafa.
DO	District Officer. Administrative head of a district under British colonial administration.
Jumbe	Swahili. Title given to Pare chiefs under German colonial administration.
Mchili	Chasu. Headman.
Mfumwa	Chasu. Chief.
Mkoa	Swahili. Region. Tanzania is made up of seventeen regions, or units of political administration.
Mlao	Chasu. Subchief.
Mnjama	Chasu. Advisor to the chief.
Mtaa	Swahili. Parish, quarter. In Pare District mtaa refers to an area covering several square miles that once belonged to a patrilineal clan.

Native Authority	Title given to chiefs under British colonial administration.
NEC	National Executive Committee. The highest policy-making body of TANU.
Ngwijo	Chasu. Assistant headman.
Pare Union	An association formed in the 1940's among the Pare people to protect their interests.
Region	See mkoa.
Siasa	Swahili. Politics.
TANU	Tanganyika African National Union. The ruling political party.
Tarafa	Swahili. Division, a unit of administration. Pare District is made up of six divisions.
Tawi	Swahili. Branch, a TANU unit of organization. There were seven branches in Pare District in 1968.
TYL	TANU Youth League, the youth branch of the party.
UWT	Umoja wa Wanawake wa Tanganyika, the Women's Union of Tanganyika, the women's branch of the party.
VDC	Village Development Committee. The representative council, composed of ten-house cell leaders and ward level party and government officials, given the responsibility for economic and social development, as well as overall supervision of community affairs, in the ward.
Ward	See wardi.
Wardi	Swahili. The smallest unit of political administration. Each division is divided into wards: in Pare District, Usangi Division has four wards; Mbaga Division also has four wards.
Wilaya	Swahili. District. In 1968 there were fifty-four districts in mainland Tanzania, grouped into seventeen regions for purposes of local administration.

MAP 1

THE REGIONS OF TANZANIA, SHOWING PARE DISTRICT[a]



[a] Dryden (1968:vii)

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Micropolitics: Political Development in Rural Areas

Since Tanzania[1] achieved political independence in 1961, its government has faced the task of reorganizing the administrative infrastructure which remained as a legacy from the colonial period. It has been necessary to reorganize the structures which were used to govern the former territory in order to fulfill the expectations of the independent state. Priorities of the colonial government were the collection of taxes and the maintenance of peace and security. The administrative infrastructure which was sufficient to achieve these ends is insufficient to carry out the myriad of new priorities set by the present government. The prime objective of the new government is political development, a syndrome of activities aimed at creating and maintaining an effectively functioning government whose goals are those of political equality and economic development.

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[1] Tanganyika became part of Tanzania in April 1964 when Tanganyika and Zanzibar were merged in political union. In the area of local government administration, each country continues to operate relatively autonomously. Therefore, although the new name Tanzania is used in this study, it should be understood as referring primarily to mainland Tanzania. When dealing with historical themes, Tanganyika is used to refer to the mainland of the contemporary Tanzania.

In the field of local administration, Tanzania has experimented with a number of structural innovations, all aimed at bringing people in rural areas into closer, more direct contact with district, regional, and national levels of the government and of the party. The goal of reorganizing the administrative agencies has been, on the one hand, the creation of a government which is more responsive to popular demands and, on the other, one which stimulates popular responses to government directives. The range of innovations undertaken by the government of Tanzania has been wide, including not only the creation of new departments whose duties were not undertaken by the colonial government but also the shifting of tasks from one department to another. As we shall see, no matter what the exact nature of these changes, the goals of these innovations has consistently been political development.

The term political development is used in a variety of ways. A large body of literature has grown up since political scientists first addressed themselves to questions arising from the emergence of nation-states in the non-Western world (Almond and Coleman 1960). This literature includes theoretical considerations of change as a generic phenomenon; large-scale quantitative studies of the factors correlated with political development; case studies of regions, nations, and sub-national units which have undergone varying degrees of political development--to cite a few major themes. One useful guide through this literature is New Nations: the Problem of Political Development (von Vorys 1965). In it, Lucien Pye synthesizes the themes of the political development literature as follows:

> We are, then, dealing with a special kind of process, one which is more specific than political change and one which

> is distinct from modernization. It is a process which has its origins in the disequilibrium of mounting anomic pressures, not in the equilibrium of traditional societies. It is a process whose goal is a political system which can provide for the functional requirements of long-term persistence, a system which will probably meet the tests of modernity, but which does not have to do so. It is a process which includes social and economic changes, but whose focus is the development of the governmental capacity to direct the course and the rate of social and economic change. It is a process which will rest largely upon social and economic accomplishments, but whose progress is measured by increments in the government's capacities to coerce and persuade. Above all, it is a political process which, in fact, will accomplish its political goal. It is a process which may well be described as political development (von Vorys 1965: 19; italics added).

Thus, as Pye points out, political development can be seen as both a means and an end. When political development is seen as a means, as a process of change, it is most often studied quantitatively. That is, the relative presence or absence of a set of variables in any given country or region is measured; such measurement determines the degree to which political development has occurred. These variables fall into what Pye called the development syndrome: equality, capacity, and differentiation. Equality means "that subjects should become active citizens . . . that laws should be of a universalistic nature . . . that recruitment to political office should reflect achievement standards of performance and not the ascriptive considerations of a traditional political system" (Pye 1966:46). Capacity is related to "the outputs of a political system and the extent to which the political system can affect the rest of the society and economy" (Pye 1966:46). Finally, differentiation is an aspect of political development which refers to the specialization of political structures resulting in "increased functional specificity of the various political roles within the system" as well as "the integration of complex structures and

processes" (Pye 1966:47).

When political development is seen as an end, when the goal of governmental policy is a condition called political development, it is more frequently studied in ideological terms. An analysis of "the good life" which is sought by African governments constitutes the study of political development in such cases.

Thus, the term political development is used both to describe the process by which new states are being created and the goals their governments are seeking. In the present study of ten-house cells and their leaders, political development is also used in both these ways. The cell system is seen as a means of political transformation in the rural areas as well as a desirable system of organization for local politics.

Many studies of political development deal with these phenomena at the level of the nation-state. Some recent studies shift the emphasis from the macro to the micro level. The trend to micro level analysis is related to a greater awareness by scholars that local level phenomena affect the course of national level political development.[2] This thinking has led, for example, to a reconsideration of the heretofore well-established proposition that the successes of nationalist movements were functions of the political ideas and activities of the

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[2]The work of scholars like L. Gray Cowan, J. Gus Liebenow, and Fred Burke, the publication of journals such as Rural Africana, and the presentation of panels on micropolitics at national meetings of groups like the African Studies Association all point to this development of a new field of interest in the study of African politics. Glickman (1969) points out the major developments in this shift to micro level analysis in a review article. On pp. 12-16 below I discuss four studies of Tanzanian micropolitics which influenced this study.

elites who directed them. Rather, it is now suggested that widespread unrest and social ferment among the "masses" motivated national elites and culminated in independence struggles. Whatever the result of this debate, the point is that the role of the rural masses in the countries of Africa increasingly assumes importance as an object of inquiry in studies of political development. Micro level analysis, then, contributes to an understanding of the operation of a political system because it expands inquiry to new organizational levels and thereby allows us to focus on the relationship between these levels.

The micro level studies undertaken to date generally have been concerned with some aspect of the center-periphery relationship. Such studies investigate, in a variety of ways, the nascent linkages between the capital and some region or group within the nation. Hydén's analysis of Tanzanian politics (1968) is a recent example of this approach.[3]

As will become apparent in the pages that follow, the present study is grounded in a concern with the general problem of political development at the micro level. This study employs the dual perspective that Pye suggests--seeing development as both a process and as a goal. This study is based on the conviction that a crucial aspect of understanding how political development occurs at the national level is to isolate and understand the factors which impede and facilitate it in the rural areas of the nation. Only insofar as it is first achieved in the rural areas can national political development occur.

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[3]This study is reviewed on p. 15.

The instance of political development analyzed in this study is a structural innovation in the organization of the political party and of the local government administrative apparatus, the ten-house cell. It is a study in micro level political development which focuses on the institutionalization of a new structure. In it, we attempt to understand the extent to which the structure has been assimilated in two different areas and what the consequences of this innovation are for the participants themselves, for the government, and for the party in those places.

The Cell System

In the present section, the cell system is introduced only briefly. The remainder of this study considers the ideas which led to the creation of cells and examines the manifold aspects of their functioning.

The cell is the basic organizational unit of the ruling political party, TANU (Tanganyika African National Union). A cell consists of ten contiguous households and is designated as a unit which has both government and party functions. Its leader is elected from the adult residents in the houses comprising the cell. Every party branch in the country is theoretically divided into cells.

In order to understand how cells operate, it is necessary to understand where they fit into the organization of local government and the party. Cells were created after independence as an adjunct to the party's hierarchy. Later, they were given local government functions.

Thus, cells are political structures which are a part of both the government's and the party's systems of organization.

Local government in Tanzania is organized on six levels (see Figure I-1). (1) At the national level, local government is the responsibility of a Minister in the President's office. (2) Under him, the country is divided into seventeen administrative regions (Sw.: mkoa). (3) These in turn are composed of districts (Sw.: wilaya), of which there are fifty-four in mainland Tanzania. (4) Each district consists of divisions (Sw.: matarafa). (5) Divisions in turn are divided into wards (Sw.: wardi). (6) Finally, wards are broken down into ten-house cells (Sw.: mashina).

The organizational hierarchy of the party differs somewhat. Like local government, TANU is headed by the President at the national level. Similarly, the party is also organized on the basis of regions and districts. At these three levels there is a degree of organizational merger in the two institutions because one individual heads both the government and the party hierarchies. That is, one appointee serves as the executive head of government and as party secretary in Tanzania's regions and districts. Thus the Area Commissioner is both the head of the local government machinery and the TANU Secretary for his district. However, at the sub-district level, party and local government organizations are separate. Within the district, TANU is organized by branches (Sw.: matawi), each headed by a party secretary. Branches in turn are composed of cells. A local government ward and a party branch are usually coterminous--thus, cells serve as the organizational units for both government and party institutions.

FIGURE I-1

LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND PARTY ORGANIZATION IN TANZANIA



Thus, to the Tanzanian government, the cell system is both a means to and an end of political development. Cells are a vehicle which can be used in mobilizing peoples in rural areas. They provide a mechanism by which people can communicate with fellow Tanzanians, with their government, and with the ruling party. Cells give people a means to articulate their demands as well as to implement those demands. And they provide a mechanism of political socialization and recruitment to government and party activities. But the cell system is also an end in itself. As envisioned by the Tanzanian government, it represents a way to order political life that insures effective and efficient government operation and party control.

The Data

This study is based on data collected during sixteen months of fieldwork from August 1967 to December 1968 in two wards (Usangi-Kighare and Mbaga-Mshewa)[4] of Pare District,[5] Tanzania. Three techniques of data collection were used--survey research, ethnography, and participant observation.[6] The survey research consisted of the adminis-

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[4]Usangi and Mbaga are two of the six divisions in Pare District. Kighare is one of the four wards in Usangi Division. Mshewa, likewise, is one of the four wards in the Division of Mbaga. Both Kighare and Mshewa are also party branches. The findings of this study apply specifically to these two places.

[5]The 1967 Census (Central Statistical Bureau 1967:9) classified eighty-five percent of the population of Pare District as members of the Pare or Asu tribe. Kimambo (1969) discusses the origins of the people of the Pare Mountains area.

[6]The techniques of data collection employed in this study are

tration of questionnaires to 100 cell leaders and to 164 cell members in the two wards. Questions covered socio-economic status, attitudes toward and information about both the purpose and operation of cells and cell leaders, as well as general information on political attitudes and behaviors. In addition to the survey questionnaires which I administered personally in each case, I used a small number of informants to help me understand traditional Pare culture, particularly aspects of it which are relevant to the study of politics. Finally, I lived in Pare District for sixteen months. I was able to observe firsthand some aspects of political life in Kighare and Mshewa as well as to attend many government and party events. These observations enriched my understanding of what I was told otherwise about how the cell system works.

By using ethnographic techniques in conjunction with survey research, I was able to gather more data than reliance on any single technique would have yielded. For example, in Mbaga, respondents were initially unwilling to share their attitudes and ideas with me, a stranger in their society. Rather than introducing survey research techniques at the beginning of my work, I started by intensively interviewing a few local men. Through our conversations, I became familiar with the local political situation. On the basis of this information, I was able to approach a larger set of individuals with survey questionnaires. My attempts were successful at this stage because I drew

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innovative in at least two respects. First, although I am trained as a political scientist, I used some anthropological methods to supplement the traditional disciplinary ones. Second, my husband, an anthropologist, and I conducted simultaneous research projects enabling us to benefit from a "team" approach in our work. Such a team approach meant that each of us continually utilized the insights and criticisms of another researcher through all stages of our projects.

MAP 2


PARE DISTRICT, SHOWING ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS, PRINCIPLE ROUTES OF TRANSPORTATION, AND MAJOR PLAINS SETTLEMENTS
Legend -
USANGI: division (Sw.: tarafa)
Mwanga: plains settlement
: highway
: railroad
UGWENO
USANGI
Mwanga
Kisangara
Lembeni
Same (District Headquarters)
MBAGA
Kisiwani
GONJA
Maore
Makanya
CHOME
Ndungu
Kihuri
Hedaru
MAMBA
N

both on the information I had gained from my initial informants and on the reputation I had established in my dealings with them. However, exclusive reliance on ethnographic techniques does not allow generalization to all the cell leaders of Usangi and Mbaga. In order to discuss with some degree of confidence the operation of the cell system in these two wards, I surveyed all of the people involved.[7] By supplementing one technique with the others, then, I had a more complete perspective on events and activities.

Swahili was the language of most interviews, in both structured and unstructured situations. There were some exceptions to this general procedure. Occasionally, I had the opportunity to converse with an English speaker. This occurred rarely, however, because people who have more than a standard eight education, and are therefore able to speak English, do not usually live in the rural areas. A few people whom I interviewed were not fluent in Swahili. In these cases, I used an assistant who spoke both Swahili and Chasu as my translator.

Previous Studies in Tanzanian Micropolitics

In this section I want to spell out the "fit" that I see between the present study and the studies of other political scientists working

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[7]Obviously, it is not necessary to interview everyone: one draws a sample when the population is large. In the case of Usangi and Mbaga, the population of cell leaders was small and I had the opportunity to interview all of them. Therefore, questions of sampling are not applicable to the present discussion.

in the field of Tanzanian micropolitics. In undertaking any new research project, previous studies condition both the problem that a scholar selects for investigation and the approach that he takes in researching it. The present study can be viewed as an extension of the work of primarily four political scientists, Roland Young, Henry Bienen, Göran Hydén, and Norman Miller. Their work had an impact on the present study, both before and during the course of fieldwork.

Roland Young and Henry Fosbrooke's Smoke in the Hills (1960) stands as the first analysis of micropolitics in Tanzania. Although it was published before Tanzania achieved independence, it accurately predicted many of the problems that were to plague the post-independent state. Smoke in the Hills deals with the problem of establishing political institutions that are efficient, stable, and integrated with the society they control. It considers the case of responses to a soil erosion program among the Luguru of Morogoro District. The authors show that the political riots which developed when the colonial government sponsored erosion programs stemmed from the challenge that the Native Authority system of administration posed to the legitimacy of indigenous political institutions.

Young's work was well known to me. He was my teacher at Northwestern University and I had the opportunity to discuss the case of the Luguru in depth with him. These discussions introduced me to the dynamics of Tanzanian politics. While Young was primarily concerned with understanding how Western political institutions were being modified as they were transplanted to Africa, I chose a somewhat different focus. Developments in the political climate of Tanzania since the time of

Young's research suggested my emphasis. Although the cell system has some Western origins (primarily in the Communist countries),[8] it is a distinctly Tanzanian idea. As such, I am not concerned with the problems inherent in the transfer of Western institutions so much as I am concerned with the reaction by one group of people in Tanzania to an "indigenous" political innovation.

Bienen's Tanzania: Party Transformation and Economic Development (1967) is a perceptive appraisal of the role which TANU plays in the actualization of economic development goals. Bienen's analysis is based on data which he gathered in interviews with government and party officials at regional and district levels throughout the country. On the basis of these data he assesses the party's achievements in building up effective political instruments through which information can be disseminated and cooperation encouraged. Ten-house cells are mentioned in a chapter on "TANU Tries to Reach the Villages." Because his research was conducted in 1963-64, at the time when cells were just being introduced in Dar es Salaam, he was unable to evaluate the functioning of the cell system. However, he interprets the creation of this new structure as TANU's groping for new forms by which it could extend its influence (Bienen 1967:359).

My research was begun more than two years after the cell struc-

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[8] I discuss the origins of the cell system in Chapter III. The policy-making organ of TANU which first announced cells did not explicitly acknowledge any intellectual source for the idea. Many people who are involved in Tanzanian politics feel that the policy makers drew their ideas from the experience of the Communist party in mobilizing people into political activity. Whatever link exists between the Communist model and Tanzanian experience is indirect. The cell system was and is publicized by its originators as a Tanzanian answer to Tanzanian problems.

ture was first introduced in Pare District. Therefore I had certain advantages over Bienen because of the time at which I worked. The fledgling system which Bienen had observed earlier was a dominant influence in local Pare politics by 1967. As the goals of the party and government filter down to the wards and branches of Tanzania's fifty-four districts, the success or failure of plans made at the national level reach their ultimate test--for political development is aimed primarily toward the people in Tanzania's rural areas.

A third type of political research that has been carried out in Tanzania concerns linkages, or the relationship between national center and rural hinterland.[9] This approach, particularly Hydén's TANU Yajenga Nchi: Political Development in Rural Tanzania (1968), influenced my research considerations. In TANU Yajenga Nchi, Hydén describes the emerging political culture of Tanzania and discusses the processes of nation-building among the Buhaya people of western Tanzania. His respondents are adult males drawn from the local tax lists and the government and party personnel of five villages in Buhaya District. He does not consider cells or cell leaders. It is possible that the ten-house cell system had not been introduced in Buhaya when he completed fieldwork at the end of 1967. In any case, his focus is not on the structure of party and government institutions at the local level as much as it is on the attitudes of rural people toward their nation and toward political development goals. Hydén attributes the positive attitudes which he found toward the nation to the successful linkages which the

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[9]Many of the political scientists who are trained at Syracuse University follow this approach. See Ingle (1969).

party and government have built up between the national center and the rural areas.

Hydén's contribution to the study of Tanzanian micropolitics is outstanding because he provides extensive data on the content of rural political culture. However, he does not deal with the mechanisms by which the linkages are sustained and the political culture generated. I intend this study as one which supplements a linkage inquiry like Hydén's. It is necessary to explain both the operation of politics at each level as well as the linkages between levels so that we have a more complete picture of local politics and their impact on the national scene.

Finally, the work of Norman Miller (1967) also influenced the present study. Miller (1965) compares village leadership in three districts in Tanzania. His results showed that the leadership of some villages was more "modern" than that of other villages. The difficulty in understanding why this is so is confounded by the number of factors which vary across the three districts. The present study follows Miller's comparative approach while at the same time trying to remedy some of the problems inherent in it. By comparing different villages within the same district, a large number of variables (particularly traditional culture and social organizational patterns) may be held constant, thus controlling many socio-cultural variables.

The Research Sites

The two sites within Pare District where research was conducted

differ in some important ways from each other. The primary differences between these sites which affect the functioning of the cell system are indigenous political organization, colonial experience, and exposure to modern communication networks.

Prior to European contact, Usangi was incorporated into an indigenous "state" structure. After German colonial control was imposed, Usangi experienced less intensive German contact than Mbaga did. Throughout colonial times, it was connected by commercial ties with the city of Moshi in the north. In addition, during the British period, the indigenous political authorities of Usangi battled with one another constantly over the right to hold Native Authority positions in local administration. At the present time, Usangi is linked by modern communications networks with areas outside the district.

Mbaga presents a contrasting picture indigenously. Mbaga was never incorporated into a large-scale political system in traditional times. It remained a series of autonomous local units each ruled by its own indigenous authority figure. Mbaga was subject to relatively more intensive German contact than Usangi. It was connected with the Usambaras in the south under the Germans and continued to look to that area after Pare was made one administrative district in 1928. The Native Authority office of chief was not an object of contest in Mbaga during the colonial period: one chief remained in power throughout the British period. Finally, today, Mbaga is more isolated than Usangi in terms of modern communications networks.

Organization of the Study

The study is organized as follows. Chapter II further describes the political characteristics of Pare District during traditional, colonial, and contemporary times; it also discusses changes in local administration since independence. Chapter III introduces cells, reviewing their origins on the national level and documenting their genesis in Usangi-Kighare and Mbaga-Mshewa. Cell leaders are the focus of Chapter IV. The leaders of Usangi are compared to those of Mbaga in terms of socio-economic variables. Chapter V looks at what cells do in each site, as reported by cell leaders and cell members. Chapter VI examines the operation of cells as well, but this time from a second perspective. Instead of comparing cells in Usangi to those in Mbaga, as is done up to this point, it looks at cells in terms of their leaders: Do educated leaders perform differently than uneducated ones? Do Muslim cell leaders undertake different activities than Christian ones do, etc.? The final chapter concludes the study by summarizing the results and suggesting future avenues of research.

The Theoretical Contributions of this Study

The theoretical contributions of an exploratory study like this one lie at what can be called the middle range of theory. This study explicates some of the factors involved in the success and failure of attempts at political development. The process by which political development is occurring in rural Tanzania is described in the following chapters; the ramifications of the process are considered in the final

chapter. Here, in the introduction, it is perhaps useful to mention some of the results that were obtained so these findings may serve as background themes to what follows. This is not meant to give the impression of deductive clarity to a study that is primarily inductive. Instead, these generalizations will help to guide the reader through the detail, giving him some notion of where he is going before he actually gets there.

Willingness on the part of people in the rural areas to change exceeds the ability of the government and/or party to direct and control these changes.

The lack of resources (personnel, materials, training facilities, etc.) which are available to the government and the party is a primary obstacle to change. The government and party abound in ideas and plans for political development. They are hampered when they attempt to actualize these ideas and plans because they lack the means, i.e., the resources, to do so. In this study we show the impact that adequate resources can have on the cell system. The cell leaders of Usangi are relatively more receptive to change than those of Mbaga. One factor which accounts for this greater receptivity is the availability of men, offices, and materials to initiate and direct political development efforts.

When rural peoples believe that they are economically impotent, they tend to feel politically ineffective as well.

The link between economics and politics is diffuse to rural people. Their evaluation of governmental effectiveness rests largely on their view of economic conditions in their area. From the govern-

ment's point of view, the primary goal of political development is to increase economic development. When the government advocates innovations in the political structure, it frequently justifies the changes in the name of economic development. But rural people often express the belief that economic forces are beyond their control. These people feel that world prices, their lack of training in advanced techniques of production, as well as limited opportunity in the economic domain, are all conditions which lie beyond their control. Therefore, they see themselves as economically impotent. They tend also to feel politically ineffective and view political innovations, advanced in the name of economic development, with skepticism.

Traditional leaders who now serve as cell leaders are both positive and negative factors in the institutionalization of cells.

The government explicitly recognizes that it must rely on traditional leaders in rural areas. That is, the government and party cannot ignore nor circumvent traditional leaders. The lack of trained personnel and limited financial resources mean that there are no substitutes to replace traditional figures. Equally important, the government recognizes that there is positive value in coopting traditional leaders into modern roles.

For whatever reason, the government chooses to work with traditional leaders. Many traditional figures were elected cell leaders. They perform only some of the tasks their jobs require. Traditional leaders in general tend not to be innovative. On the other hand, people who can be classified as modern leaders often have an innovative capacity, but they lack authority to implement and enforce their ideas. The

government and party recognize that the problem of transformation in rural areas is dependent on the mobilization of individual people. This has occurred to some extent in one area, Usangi, but not in the other, Mbaga. The Usangi case shows that traditional and modern roles can be effectively combined in one role, that of cell leader.

Political role differentiation and specialization lead to an overlap in expectations about the functions of the role incumbents. It has both positive and negative side effects.

Increasing political role specialization and differentiation are occurring in the rural areas where party men do certain things, local government men do another, the agricultural agent does yet a third, while community development people too have their own spheres of activity. All of the functions these people perform were once part of the chief's job. The multiple roles he fulfilled are still fused in the minds of both role incumbents and people in general. As the functions have increasingly been broken down into separate roles, the relationship between them has not always been clearly defined nor has integration into new patterns occurred smoothly. As a result, people play one role incumbent off against another. Doing this results in a waste of resources; but it can also prove an effective check against abuse of any single position. The diffuse nature of the functions of traditional leaders and the specific nature of the functions of contemporary office holders are qualitatively different phenomena. This is not widely understood. It leads to overlap and confusion in expectations about, and evaluations of, role players.

Elements in the traditional culture can effectively be used by the government and party to bring about changes.

An example in this study is the role imitation plays in traditional society. Imitating a peer who has succeeded in some way is a positive value in traditional Pare culture. If the government can get some individuals to change in accordance with their plans and if this change is seen as "success" in traditional terms, then the possibility exists that others will imitate the individual who changed. Imitation of this type has occurred in both Usangi and Mbaga and could be more extensively harnessed to accomplish government ends.

CHAPTER II

ADMINISTRATION AND POLITICS IN THE PARE MOUNTAINS AREA IN PRECOLONIAL, COLONIAL, AND CONTEMPORARY TIMES

Introduction

In this chapter I examine the notion that peoples' responses to the ten-house cell system are conditioned by their experience with former administrative systems. The people of the Pare Mountains area have lived under several systems of administration within the last one hundred years. These include their indigenous authority system, the German native administration, the British colonial administration, and the independent government of TANU. The system of administration and the pattern of politics imposed by each of these successive authorities had their own distinctive characteristics. For example, each administrative system drew its authority from a different base. Each organized the area differently. Each held its own set of expectations about appropriate political behavior. The political history of the Pare people has an impact on their contemporary political attitudes and behaviors. Their political history forms an important factor in our attempt to understand popular responses to the cell system. The way individuals react to requests from cell leaders, what they deem are appropriate cell activities, how effective they believe cells are in accomplishing political

ends are products not only of the cell system itself but of their previous experience.

This chapter is offered as background material for understanding how ten-house cells operate in two parts of Pare District, the wards of Usangi-Kighare and Mbaga-Mshewa. It is not meant to be an exhaustive account of political developments in the Pare Mountains area in the last one hundred years. That is a separate task worthwhile in itself but not the central thrust of this work.[1] Rather this chapter focuses on specific aspects of administration and politics in precolonial, colonial, and post-independence times which have an effect on peoples' reactions to the most recent innovation in administration, i.e., the cell system introduced during 1965.

I divide Pare political history into three periods for purposes of analysis--the precolonial, the colonial (both German and British), and the post-independence. The first of these periods, the precolonial, ended as German influence spread over the area. As we shall see, the Pare Mountains consisted of numerous local units which were ruled by traditional authority figures. In the north, in the area now called Usangi Division, a number of petty chiefdoms were incorporated into the neighboring Gweno state (kimambo 1967:62). Nothing of this sort occurred

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[1]The work of two other s cholars deals directly with aspects of traditional political organization. Kimambo (1967) wrote his Ph.D. thesis on the political history of the Pare people to 1900. His data are drawn from both written records and oral traditions. Kimambo discusses at length the peopling of the Pare Mountains, the relationships among the chiefdoms of the area, and the beginning of German contact. W. O'Barr (1970) collected ethnographic and survey questionnaire data on traditional Pare social structure, part of which are included in his Ph.D. thesis. I also used some of his unpublished materials in this account of traditional political organization.

in the south.

The second period in Pare political history which is discussed here is the colonial period. It began at the turn of the nineteenth century when the influence of the German East African Company spread over Tanganyika and continued throughout the time the German government controlled the territory. The Germans grouped the chiefdoms of the Pare Mountains under akidas, quasi-military African administrative officers. The imposition of akidas marked the first time the local units of Pare came under the hegemony of a non-indigenous form of administration.

At the end of World War I, the British government replaced the Germans as the colonial power in Tanganyika. British colonial rule continued until independence. The British designated the entire Pare Mountains area as a single administrative district for the first time. They restored local "chiefs" to power as Native Authorities under the system of indirect rule.

The final period of Pare political history which I consider, the post-independence period, began in 1961. During it, local administration was again altered as salaried bureaucrats replaced Native Authorities and the government of TANU undertook a myriad of new tasks.

This chapter looks at each period in Pare political history in terms of two sets of considerations:

1. What happened during that period? Who administered the area? How was it administered? What did the administration expect of the people under it?

2. How do people characterize in retrospect the administration

of each period and how does that characterization influence their present orientation to politics?

The Precolonial Period

Precolonial Administration in Mbaga and Usangi

The Pare Mountains area was originally inhabited by groups of hunters and gatherers (Kimambo 1967:34). Beginning in approximately the sixteenth century, these peoples were replaced by Bantu immigrants. The immigrants came primarily from the area of the Taita Mountains to the northeast in Kenya and from the Nguu Mountains to the south in Tanganyika. In the centuries that followed, cultural homogeneity developed among these peoples whose origins had been diverse.

When the people of the Pare Mountains area first came into contact with Europeans, those of the south and part of the north spoke a common language, Chasu. The people of the extreme northern end of the area spoke a separate and distinct language, Kigweno. The relationship between the Gweno speakers and the Chasu speakers is a complex one. It is not addressed directly in this study because fieldwork was not done in Gweno. Europeans called all the people of the Pare Mountains area "Wapare" in Swahili. Pare refers to a particular part of the southern highlands. Oral tradition holds that when a group of Europeans asked what the mountains that they saw ahead of them were called, informants said "Pare." The informants meant the particular peak then in view. The Europeans applied the name to the entire mountain range. Although there are other versions of why the entire area is called Pare

in spite of the fact that two groups of people who speak separate languages reside there, informants generally adhere to the version given here.

Prior to European contact the Pare Mountains area consisted of a series of petty chiefdoms. Some of these chiefdoms were more highly organized than others and from time to time incorporated large territorial areas. Yet in no sense were the peoples of the Pare Mountains ever politically unified until the British colonial government of Tanganyika merged what was administered by the Germans as parts of two provinces into a single "Pare" district. The British rationale for forming one district was that the people shared common cultural affinities and that these "tribal" characteristics should be formally recognized to facilitate the implementation of indirect rule.

Because I deal in this study with two different parts of the Pare Mountains area, I prefer describing the precolonial situation in each place separately rather than attempting to draw out of the diversity a single statement of traditional political organization. I do this because the variety which existed indigenously was not the product of local variation of a single administrative framework as much as it was the result of different, though sometimes interlinking, histories of the two places.

Mbaga

In precolonial times, the highland area of what is now called Mbaga Division consisted of a series of small-scale administrative units or petty chiefdoms. One former chiefdom, that of Marindi, is today an

mtaa[2] in the ward of Mbaga-Mshewa. At the present time, some seventy-five families live in the area that traditionally belonged to the chief of Marindi. In precolonial times, informants say that approximately twenty-five families lived together in Marindi under the authority of Righa, an Mbaga chief.

These local political units of the Mbaga highlands cooperated with each other for two purposes. Primarily, they were allied with each other through the exchange of women in marriage. Secondly, they cooperated with each other for mutual defense against raiders from outside the Pare Mountains area. Raiders came from neighboring Masailand or Shambala country in search of cattle and women. Although this type of limited cooperation existed among the local chiefdoms of Mbaga, they were not part of a centralized system of administration.

The system of organization characteristic of all these petty chiefdoms was similar--a similarity stemming from the cultural homogeneity of the people involved. For our purposes, we may describe Mbaga traditional political organization by discussing four authority positions, those of mfumwa, mlao, mchili and ngwijo.

Chief: Mfumwa

The petty chiefdoms of Mbaga were based in clan organization and headed by a clan elder or petty chief (Ch.: mfumwa). The position of the chief was an hereditary one, passing from father to eldest son. In his old age the chief customarily designated his heir apparent, taking into account the advice of his assistant chiefs. This general principle

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[2]Mtaa is a subdivision of a ward in Mbaga. I discuss mtaas on pp. 87-89.

of succession could be modified when unusual circumstances arose. For example, the incumbent chief and the elders of his clan might feel that the eldest son lacked some of the qualities of leadership (fairness in dispute settlement, personal integrity, etc.) which they thought were necessary for a chief to possess. In such cases, the first son might be passed over in favor of another son or male relative.

The chief of each petty chiefdom came from the local ruling clan. A clan became a ruling clan by distinguishing itself in war, in rain-making, or in medicine. Clans were based on agnatic descent and each clan had one or more territorial areas where most of its members resided. The clan's ritual shrines and its lands were located in these areas.

However, members of non-ruling clans also resided within each chiefdom. This situation arose primarily in two ways. On the one hand, individuals of different clans might come into an area, ask the local chief for land to farm, and settle there on the chief's land, subject to his authority. On the other hand, individuals of an area might invite members of a "foreign" ruling clan to come into their area, hoping to profit from the special attributes of the invited clan. As we shall see below, the people of Usangi invited members of the Mbaga clan to come to Usangi to help them surmount their difficulties. The Msangi clan of Usangi gave the Mbaga clan a sparsely populated area in which to live. Today that area of Usangi-Kighare is inhabited principally by descendants of the original Mbaga settlers. However, people of other clans, who lived there when the Mbagas came, continue to live there as well.

Subchief: Mlao

The title mlao is derived from the Chasu verb to eat, and refers to one who eats at the chief's table. The mlao's title suggests his relationship to the chief--he acted as the chief's administrative assistant to the people and was in turn supported by the chief. As the chief's principal assistant, the mlao administered part of the area under the chief. Although not necessary, an mlao could be of the chief's clan and often this was in fact the case. More important than consideration of his clan was the fact that he was drawn from the area where he acted as the chief's assistant. The mlao might not be of the chief's clan because within any chiefdom sections were inhabited by people of other clans. Thus, while on the one hand an mlao was a "local" man who was drawn from the area he administered, he was, on the other hand, dependent on the chief for his position and responsible to the chief in the performance of his duties.

Headman: Mchili

Another authority position was that of mchili. An mchili was designated by the chief and his mlaos to help each mlao in administering a segment of his territory. The position of mchili was that of headman. An mchili served as a link between the administrative hierarchy and the people. He was responsible for the settlement of minor disputes in his area and for the participation of his people in political activities such as communal projects. Like the mlao, it appears that the position of mchili could be filled either by members of the ruling clan or those of other clans, depending on the composition of the chiefdom. Obviously demography was an important factor in such

circumstances. The mlao and mchili came from the numerically dominant clans. The chief came from the ruling clan--which may or may not be numerically dominant in the chiefdom.

Like the mlao, the personal attributes of an mchili were of particular importance in his designation by the chief and his subchiefs: ideally, an mchili was thought by his political superiors and his people to be a man who possessed wisdom, intelligence, and the capacity to look after their affairs.

Subheadman: Ngwijo

At the bottom of the political hierarchy were the ngwijos. An ngwijo assisted the mchili in the administration of the mchili's territory. Ngwijo is a Chasu word which means support or supporting pole. It is the word used to describe the center pole in the hut which supports the roof. The ngwijo is the first pole driven into the ground when a new hut is being constructed and is considered to be the most important single foundation in the construction of a house. The administrative position of ngwijo was also considered to be the "first" or primary position in the local political unit. An ngwijo served as a filter between the people of his area and his administrative superiors: he advised people on what to do and whom to see in the political arena and he informed the mchili and mlao of political happenings in his neighborhood.

The positions of mlao, mchili, and ngwijo were not hereditary traditionally in the same way that the chief's position was. However, it was not unknown for a son to succeed his father as mlao, mchili, or ngwijo. It was said that a son (not necessarily the first) had observed

his father at work and thus knew the work intimately. The son was thought to be more qualified because he had personal working knowledge of the role as a result of his association with his father.

This traditional system of administration was characteristic of Mbaga in the precolonial period. The political organization of Usangi at that time was similar, with one important difference.

Usangi

In the precolonial period, the local units of Usangi were incorporated into a "state" political system while those of Mbaga were not. The chiefdom of Gweno in the north extended its authority over neighboring units and the area of Usangi was eventually drawn into this centralized "state." Participation by the people of Usangi in this larger-scale unit had important repercussions for Usangi.

First, the office of mnjama was more extensively used in Usangi in response to the need for administration at the "center." An mnjama was an advisor to the chief, typically selected from another clan. For example, in Usangi, where Mbaga chiefs predominated, the mnjamas were frequently drawn from the Mzarai clan. An mnjama acted as counsel and/or confidant to the chief. The mnjama was always present when the chief heard a case. As a member of the non-ruling clan, it was said that he could operate as an independent force for justice in disputes. Unlike the other administrative positions we described for Mbaga, an mnjama had no territorial jurisdiction. He performed his functions at the center, as counsel to the chief. The office of mnjama was known in Mbaga. Informants report that prior to the colonial period (when the mnjamas were employed as court assessors under the

Native Authority setup), the chiefdoms of Mbaga were so small that they did not require the services of mnjamas.

Second, the fact that the people of Usangi participated earlier than the people of Mbaga in a political organization which had incorporated formerly disparate local units has an important impact today. We shall see in the following chapters which look at the operation of the cell system in the two sites that the people of Usangi are more receptive to participate in large-scale units than the people of Mbaga. The people of Usangi point with pride to a long history of links with neighboring political units and stress the degree to which they believe it is necessary to think of themselves as members of a larger scaled series of administrative units. I suggest that this perspective developed out of a long history of participation in a relatively more complex administration system. Such is not the situation in Mbaga. People there did not experience, except in the colonial period, any degree of political centralization. At the present time, the primary unit of identification for them is still their local administrative one. In fact, we shall see in Chapter III and those that follow that the people of Mbaga continue to organize themselves in terms of their traditional local units and tend not to think of themselves as members of other administrative units.

4 Precolonial Administration in Retrospect

In both Usangi and Mbaga, people look back on the precolonial period as one in which there was a close articulation between people and the system of administration. They believe that ordinary people

were more influential in the decision-making processes during traditional times than they were under the two colonial regimes. People say that they were "close" to the political authorities then. By "close" they mean that communication with the authorities over them was easy. Such ease of communication was a result, first, of having numerous authorities physically present among them, so that any man could contact an official within a matter of minutes; and, second, of the fact that those who held administrative offices were similar to them in terms of background and beliefs. People in both the north and south now recall the period of indigenous administration as a time when they were able to influence their leaders because they were connected to them by ties of kinship and clan. As we shall see in the following chapters, this closeness to political authorities is one of the most attractive aspects of the contemporary cell system to the local people of both Usangi and Mbaga.

At the same time that people praise the traditional period for its intimate character, they admit that it was impossible to change the overall structure of political administration. They self-consciously point this out as a negative element of the precolonial situation. People say that traditionally when a man found fault with the individual in power or the course of political events in his community, his alternatives were few. He was relatively powerless to remove the individual from office or to change the course of events beyond the pressures he could bring to bear on the basis of kinship or clanship. Institutionalized alternatives, a prime characteristic of the contemporary political setup, were unknown in precolonial times. In contrast to the

present situation, a person simply had to go along with the situation. He had to wait for things to pass; and he believed that it was appropriate that he should do so.

This traditional belief in the necessity of waiting out disagreeable political events was reinforced in successive periods, but for different reasons. As we said, traditionally Pare people believed that because a man was relatively powerless to alter political events, he ought just to await their unfolding. However, Pare informants assert that in colonial times and since independence frequent and fundamental alternatives in the political arena were imposed upon them from the outside--so many in fact that again a man is better off just to wait them out than to try to understand them or do anything about them. Many people in both Usangi and Mbaga express this conviction. It has an impact on their responses to cells; if people believe that the cell structure, like other administrative arrangements of late, will pass at the government's whim, then some of them feel little responsibility to actively participate in cells and make them work. We return to this idea in Chapters V and VI, where we suggest that those cell leaders who believe that the cell system is another in a series of fads in local administration are reluctant to experiment with any aspects of the cell leaders' job. In such cases, the cell system languishes before it has actually been started.

In addition to certain similarities in attitudes toward the precolonial period which are held by both the people of Usangi and Mbaga, important differences exist as well. Two recollections of precolonial administration are particularly important vis-à-vis the

ten-house cell system. The first of these differences stems from the abolition of the chiefs after independence and the subsequent division of the chiefs' functions into separate offices. Traditionally, the roles of chiefs were economic, religious, and cultural as well as political. This arrangement continued through colonial times. Chiefs as Native Authorities had responsibility for a wide range of activities which included strictly political tasks (tax collections, for example) as well as economic and ceremonial ones (supervising planting schemes, conducting visitors through their chiefdoms, etc.). At independence, national legislation abolished the office of chief, and a series of new positions was created. Local government employees like the Divisional Executive Officer and his assistant took over the administrative aspects of the chiefs' job. Magistrates from the central judiciary replaced chiefs in the primary courts. Personnel of the agricultural and community development departments, among others, were extended; these new personnel supervised tasks that the chief had seen to by himself. TANU party workers also entered the political arena, assuming responsibility for organizational tasks previously carried out by the chiefs. As we shall see, Usangi received a larger number of specialized personnel than Mbaga. This meant, in effect, that in Usangi numerous individuals now perform the old chief's functions whereas in Mbaga the local government officer (who replaced the chief as political administrator) continues to supervise economic and cultural activities. The local government officer in Mbaga is forced into performing multiple roles because of the shortage of specialized personnel.

Today people in Mbaga recall the way in which the chief handled

his multifaceted role and say that the former chief did a better job of ruling them than the present local government officer. They tend to say that "things were better under the chief." They fail to take account of the fact that the local government officer is responsible for more complex and numerous activities than the former chief was. Many Mbaga people stress the belief that the local government officer should be more like the chief--without considering the different nature of the officer's responsibilities and how well he is fulfilling his new demands.

The people of Usangi do not look back on the precolonial period in this way. In retrospect they tend to say that it is not a good thing for one man to play so many roles. They say that "now things are better" because roles are differentiated and specialized. Now they believe people have a chance to benefit from the expertise of a number of officeholders. And now there is no concentration of authority in a single office, they point out.

A second difference exists between the recollections of the people of Usangi and Mbaga. This difference centers around what people say about "politics" in precolonial times.[3] People in Usangi say that they do not distinguish between "politics" under the different administrations. Politics and politicians, they say, are like life and people--sometimes "good," sometimes "bad." Mbaga people, however, often insist that there were no "politics" in the traditional period. How are we to understand this?

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[3]The Swahili word for politics is siasa. Informants report that there is no Chasu equivalent. When speaking Chasu, they employ the Swahili word.

The word used in both cases for politics is a Swahili one, siasa. Siasa, the people of Mbaga say, means "promising one thing and doing anotherone." The politician promises more schools and jobs, but never brings them to Mbaga. The listener in a political meeting promises to show up at communal work tomorrow, but never does. Siasa operates, people say, because everyone promises to do something today, knowing full well he will not do it tomorrow. In former times, they feel, both chiefs and their assistants lived up to their political commitments. The situation can perhaps be understood in terms of the specificity of former roles. Rights and obligations of both leaders and followers were more clearly defined in the traditional situation. Therefore, people and their leaders knew what to expect and how to behave. Promises, projections, and change were not part of the language of politics. Now that they are, traditional ideology and political relationships cannot handle them. The mutual distrust which stems from this interpretation of politics is important for cells: neither people nor administrative officials are committed to seeing the system function effectively, because none of them believe the others will fulfill their respective responsibilities.

In retrospect, then, for the people of Usangi and Mbaga, precolonial administration is remembered in a number of ways. Precolonial administration provided a means of close articulation between people and their leaders. In spite of the intimate nexus between the two, people believe that they were relatively ineffective in achieving fundamental change in former times. This belief has been reinforced in succeeding periods although for different reasons. The impact of a "wait and see" orientation to politics is that some people also prefer to

"wait and see" whether cells will work rather than attempting to make them work through their cooperation. In Mbaga people tend to remember the traditional period more favorably: they say chiefs performed their jobs better than local government officers perform them, and there were no politics long ago. These themes will be important in the following chapters when we interpret the attitudes and behaviors of cell leaders and their members.

The Colonial Period

Colonial Administration Under the Germans

Between 1850 and 1875 Europeans began making their way inland along the trade routes which had been laid down by the Arabs. One of these principal trade routes passed through the foothills of the Pare Mountains and provided the initial avenue by which colonial influence penetrated the Pare highlands.

The first Europeans were explorers who sought to discover the geographical outlines of the interior (Moffett 1958:40). But simultaneously, because most of the early explorers were in the service of mission societies at home, they acquired converts and filled in the map of Tanzania in one operation. For the people of the Pare Mountains area, the first contact with Europeans was a military expedition to Moshi. Prolonged exposure to these foreigners began in interaction with the missionaries who followed the first explorers. As we shall see, the impact of the mission on the people of the Pare Mountains area surpassed that of the German colonial government itself. Indeed, this

impact can be shown to have a bearing on the attitudes and behaviors of ten-house cell leaders.

By 1884, purely geographical expeditions were at an end, and a more politically oriented phase of events, the "scramble for Africa," had begun. Although the representatives of mission societies were not authorized agents of their home governments, they collected contracts of submission from local leaders. By signing these documents, the leaders agreed to be subjects of the German Imperial power. In particular, the German Colonization Society, whose overt objective was to acquire authority over East Africa, sent Karl Peters on an expedition to accomplish that end. Peters, without formal recognition of the German government, collected contracts from local leaders throughout Tanganyika. The German government yielded to public opinion and mercantile interests generated by Peters' adventures and issued a Charter of Protection to the Society (Moffett 1958:48-56). The charter placed the territory under the Society's suzerainty and granted them management of it, subject to government supervision and further regulation.

In the Pare Mountains area, the initial step in acquiring authority was not taken by German treaty negotiators as in other parts of Tanganyika. Rather, indigenous Pare chiefs from the highland area went to the German officials who had established posts on the nearby plains to seek recognition of their political claims (Kimambo 1967:283). Germans had established posts at Mazinde, south of Pare, and at Moshi, to the north, before 1891. The fact that Pare chiefs took initiative in this way is important. No colonial agent penetrated their highland homes and assumed control over them. Rather, these Pare chiefs, believ-

ing that there were benefits to be derived from alliance with these new strangers, sought them out.

In the 1880's many Europeans had passed through the Pare foothills on their way north to Moshi. In 1885 a treaty was signed with the Chief of Moshi and on the basis of this the Germans claimed the whole Pangani hinterland, part of which was the area which now includes Pare District. In 1866 the Germans and British agreed on the boundary between their respective spheres. In 1891 the German government took control over from the German East African Company, the successor to the German Colonization Society.

Early German rule was essentially a series of punitive reactions to local uprisings throughout the territory. Local administration meant obtaining effective control over troublesome areas. Military personnel occupied civilian administrative posts; they had neither the opportunity nor the inclination to see their administration do otherwise. Both the central supervisory authorities and the field officers under them were equally inexperienced in colonial administration.

Pare recollections of their initial contacts with the Germans emphasize their military character. Pare oral tradition says that the first European to come to their country was "Changoma," meaning literally one who enjoys the drum (kimambo 1967:283). This tradition refers to Major von Wissman, who led the first German military expedition into the hinterland in 1891. Major von Wissman passed through Pare en route to Kilimanjaro and Moshi to put down uprisings against the German station there. Other military expeditions through Pare followed in subsequent years.

German colonial administration assumed a slightly different character after 1906 (Austen 1968:183). The violent Maji-Maji uprising in the south of Tanganyika brought the shambles of the territory's condition into view. Public opinion in Germany forced the home government into reform in the colonial offices. However, even after the beginnings of reform, the administration's primary concern was not with the problems of African administration but the economic development of the territory in the strictest mercantile sense. This meant that German administrators expected absolute compliance with their requests (usually for labor and for taxes) and were not preoccupied with the benefits of colonial rule which might accrue to the local populations.

The reforms of 1906 meant that more German civilian personnel were taken into the colonial service, that military affairs were increasingly separated from the overall administration, and that an advisory council was created for the governor. As far as local administration was concerned, the territory was divided into twenty-one districts (plus three "residencies" under local leaders). Of these, two were under military governors. The remainder were placed under civilian District Officers, responsible to the governor for the maintenance of law and order and tax collection.

These District Officers adopted a system originally used by the Sultan of Zanzibar, leaving native affairs in the hands of quasi-military African officers known as akidas. An akida was usually not a member of the society over which he had authority. Rather, he was a member of a coastal Swahili society and traveled inland in the company of the Germans. He was vested with certain magisterial powers and held

responsible for law and order in a given territory. Subordinate to him were a number of village headmen or chiefs, designated as jumbes by the Germans. In 1906 the akida system of administration had been in operation for some time in parts of Tanganyika; akidas were responsible to the commanders of military stations throughout the territory. The 1906 reforms consolidated the akida system and formally acknowledged it as a type of administration.

Pare plains settlements flew German flags after Wissman's expedition passed them in 1891. The first akida in Pare was placed at Kihurio, a plains settlement, by Wissman in 1891. The akida there was a paid official of the German government and acted as an administrative liaison between the traditional chiefs in his territory and the German military station at Mazinde to the south. After 1906 he was responsible to the District Officer at Mazinde.

Throughout the 1890's traditional chiefs of Pare acquired jumbe certificates. These chiefs continued to perform their traditional duties and to help the akida with his administrative duties of labor recruitment and tax collection.

In 1897 the Germans established their first mission in Hedaru, a plains settlement in south Pare (see Map 2 on p. 11). Extensive mission activity in the Pare Mountains area by German Lutherans, Roman Catholics, and Seventh Day Adventists began thereafter. Unlike the colonial administrators, who established themselves only on the plains surrounding the Pare Mountains, the missionaries went directly to the highland areas, setting up stations in the center of population concentrations.

Colonial administration under the Germans, in summary, marks the first time the local chiefdoms of the Pare Mountains area were administered by non-local officials. It also marks the beginning of contact with Christian missions whose influence continues to the present time. Using the perspective of hindsight now available to us, we can say that German colonial administration provided an introduction for the people of the Pare Mountains area to all of the changes which were to follow in the next seventy years.

Contemporary Impact of German Administration

The Germans' colonial rule in the Pare Mountains lasted for a period of approximately twenty years. Incorporation into this new unit created a correlatively new set of political roles and responsibilities. People were now called upon to act in response to the demands of their traditional chiefs as they always had, but there were also pressures and new demands for labor, taxes, and the abolition of traditional wars.

The German period is remembered by the Pare as a militaristic one. In Usangi, German officers intervened in disputes between the Msangi and Mbaga clans on several occasions. On one occasion there, a German officer ordered a huge fire set at the mouth of a cave where he believed a large number of Mbaga clansmen were hiding. Although his purpose had been to smoke them out, no one emerged from the cave after the fire was set. When the flames died down, the officer discovered that only women, children, and livestock had been inside and that many had died. This episode is well remembered and often quoted as an example of the extent to which German administrators went in order to obtain compliance with their demands. The military tradition of German colonial administration

was reinforced by the fact that many Pare men served in the German campaign during World War I. These recruits returned home with further stories of German military discipline.

The German period marked the first time the disparate chiefdoms of South Pare began to be drawn into larger units as the numerous small autonomous communities were brought together under the alien akidas. However, identification with the territorial unit which later became the nation-state of Tanzania was largely unknown.

Similarly, feelings of tribal identity were not explicitly fostered until the British period. Under German rule, the southern half of the Pare Mountains area was administered with the Usambara Mountains to the south; the northern half became part of the administrative district of Moshi to the north. Not until 1928 under the British was the contemporary Pare District brought together as a single administrative unit.

Pare political experience with the Germans is remembered as a time when political obligations outweighed political rights. Administration was an extractive business under the Germans in Pare eyes. The government demanded that certain obligations be fulfilled--such as paying taxes and working on government projects--and the government restricted traditional political activities--such as warfare. The benefits of this arrangement are now seen by the Pares to have been indirect at best. What social welfare activities were carried on tended to be performed by the mission rather than the government.

A Lutheran station was built in 1908 in Mbaga in the center of the area that I researched. The impact of mission ideas and practices

on the contemporary workings of the cell system are numerous. The church viewed TANU as a rival for peoples' loyalties during the independence struggle, and still does to some extent. Disputes which are church based spill over into the political arena. A tendency on the part of people to wait for external authorities (i.e., German missionaries) to take the initiative rather than tackling problems themselves can also be seen vis-à-vis cells. People tend to think it is the government's responsibility rather than their own to make cells viable means of administration.

By way of contrast, in Usangi, the mission station was outside the area where I worked. Although approximately one-fourth of the Usangi cell leaders are Christian, the impact of the mission on politics is much less direct. More important in the Usangi context is the influence of the Islamic faith, to which three-quarters of the cell leader sample belongs. The ties between Islam and a national Swahili culture, as well as the influence of mosque based self-help societies, are discussed in Chapter IV. There we show that there appears to be an easier fit between both the structure and goals of Islam and the cell system than between Christianity (as practiced in Pare District) and ten-house cells.

The German period in Pare has been dealt with in some detail because it gave an initial character to "administration and politics" from the Pare point of view. While the Pare people can readily distinguish between an Mjermani, "a German," and an Mwingereza, "a Briton," their first impressions of an Mzungu, "a European," and all the changes associated with his coming began with the Germans. Furthermore, accounts of the subsequent British period in Tanganyika are more frequent in the literature and thus its consequences better understood than those of the brief but important German period.

British Native Administration

The British assumed responsibility for Tanganyika at the close of World War I under a mandate from the League of Nations. The fact that Britain bore an international responsibility for the territory meant that colonial policy labored continually under the necessity to put African affairs first. This did not mean that the British engaged in large-scale programs of social and economic development. But it did mean that the British never approached governing the colony with the strict mercantile outlook of the Germans. Britain was sensitive to international reactions to happenings in Tanganyika. Eventually, Tanganyika's status as a League of Nations Mandate meant she achieved a remarkably swift independence even in the heydey of African independence movements.

The first legislation regarding administration of local government was the Native Authority Ordinance of 1923. It provided for chiefs as recognized heads of local government, for native courts operating under them, and for native treasuries, whose revenue came from local poll taxes, financing them. The objective in Tanganyika, as it had been in Nigeria where the system of indirect rule was fashioned, was to provide a form of local administration that used traditional leaders who were both close to the people and familiar to them and who would encourage popular participation in government. The fact that the indigenous patterns of authority in most of the East African societies differed greatly from those of West Africa was not taken into account by the colonial administration at that point. Later, as nationalism swept the country, the consequences of having imposed a system of administration

which had relied on traditional elements exclusively while ignoring the emergent educated class became evident.

In Pare, the number of chiefs recognized as Native Authorities by the British was smaller than the number of leaders given jumbe certificates by the Germans. The British united North and South Pare into one district in 1928 and set up nine chiefdoms as administrative units. The chiefdoms corresponded generally to traditional authority patterns. However, in the interest of administrative efficiency, each chiefdom was an amalgamation of several smaller chiefdoms under one newly designated central chief. In the chiefdom of Usangi (which is now Usangi Division), seven chiefs who had been recognized as jumbes were consolidated under one Native Authority chief. The nine chiefs of Pare District met periodically in a tribal council to consider matters of importance to the district as a whole. Thus, the first administrative structure which centralized the Pare Mountains area into a single unit and thereby fostered a common identity was set up under British auspices.

Within each of the nine chiefdoms, the chiefs as Native Authorities were assisted by personnel drawn from the traditional system of political organization. Working in conjunction with the British District Officer in charge, each chief selected his own assistants, balancing traditional considerations with the requirements of the new role. The old terms were applied to the new roles. Mlaos were appointed as subchiefs to assist the chief in carrying out administrative orders and as aides to hear complaints and settle minor disputes. Similarly, mchilis and ngwijos were designated as headmen and subheadmen to mobilize the people of their areas for participation in government directed projects.

Mnjamas sat with the chiefs as advisors, both in and out of court. Under the Native Authority system, then, the chiefs and their traditionally legitimized assistants represented the people to the colonial government and spoke on their behalf. The Native Authority structure also required that the chiefs serve as the colonial administration's agents in the rural areas, seeing to it that people turned out for political activities--greeting visitors, implementing government projects, paying taxes, etc. Ultimate political control rested with the British, who backed up the chiefs' demands for law and order and who were the final arbitrators in any disputes over succession to title.

The British Period in Retrospect

The British period of native administration in Pare is remembered by the Pare for at least three things. First, traditional figures were restored to positions of authority in local administration. Whereas under the Germans local chiefs had been subordinated to non-local akidas, under the British chiefs were individually responsible for their chiefdoms and collectively responsible in council for the entire district. However, the fact that these local chiefs were ultimately supported by external British authority meant that the traditional system of political organization was fundamentally altered. Peoples' checks on the power of the chief and his assistants were no longer operative. Attempts to regain a check eventually led to a modification in the Native Authority system just prior to independence, as we shall see in the section of this chapter which deals with the independence movement in Pare District.

In general we can say that the Pare now look with favor on the

fact that traditional leaders were restored under British colonialism. They believe that modern social and economic development in Pare District occurred in part because people and their chiefs as Native Authorities were allowed to direct the course of events throughout this period. An example of this is the emphasis on building roads which was manifest in the district from the 1920's on. The chiefs of Ugweno and Usangi, the two northernmost chiefdoms, received reports from people who had traveled outside the Pare Mountains area and had seen the highland roads of neighboring peoples. They became convinced that the future development of their areas depended on access to the outside. At the chiefs' initiative, a road was begun. The two chiefdoms cooperated for the first seven miles, which they would use jointly; then each chiefdom worked on a six-mile branch for its own territory. The colonial government helped with supplies and some technical experts at a later stage in construction. In 1936 the first automobile, carrying the District Officer and other dignitaries, passed on the road as far as Usangi. The pride which the people of Usangi express in having constructed this road on their own and under their own leaders is a constant theme in their history. They believe, on the basis of this accomplishment, that they are able to do things themselves. This belief in their own efficacy has an impact on the cell system today. Cells, they say, are based in their own neighborhoods and on their own leaders. They are an institution which they can operate themselves, just as the road was a feat which they mastered themselves. It is a matter of considerable pride to many people in Usangi that they should make ten-house cells work well. Many of these people believe it is their responsibility to make the cell system operate.

Such a positive attitude contributes to the effective functioning of cells in some areas.

A second factor stemming from British times, as the Pare people remember them, has to do with the balance of rights and/or benefits and obligations which are owed to administering authorities. Under the British the purely extractive character which the Germans had given the administration was modified. Increased social amenities began to flow from the administration, particularly in terms of help with road building, medical services, and schools, and of sponsoring campaigns like the United Nations literacy scheme and agricultural and forestry projects. Requests for ever-increasing social services from the administration began under the British and continue to be characteristic of peoples' claims on ten-house cells. As we shall see in the following chapters, the creation of cells by the post-independence government was an attempt to channel these demands in a politically constructive way.

Many Pare people also believe that a degree of participation in the decision-making process occurred through Native Authority institutions. When the British began administering Usangi, they listened to rival claimants for the chieftaincy and finally settled on an Mbaga clan member, Sabuni. Sabuni was appointed chief of Usangi in 1924 and given authority over six other former jumbes. When the Msangi clan challenged this appointment, the British administrators said that the Msangi claim would be considered when the chieftaincy fell vacant again. In 1947, when Sabuni wanted to retire, the British sought to hold elections. The Msangi clan refused to participate, presumably because they realized they would not win. Sabuni's son William was therefore

appointed as his father's successor. Then ten years later, in 1957, the Msangi clan accused William of stealing tax receipts. William was tried and convicted, and the chieftaincy fell vacant. The nine chiefs of Pare in council, with the District Officer, agreed that elections should be held to determine the next chief. William's mnjama, a member of the Mzirai clan, was appointed acting chief for a year and the electoral arrangements got under way. In 1959 the election was held and an Msangi, Shabani, won; he ruled until the abolition of chiefs after independence.

As can be seen, tribal politics in British times were spirited in Usangi. Traditional rulers were restored. Over time new checks on them, such as elections, developed and increased the feeling of people that they had a voice in the decision-making process.

The situation in Mbaga was rather different. In Mbaga there was no contest over the chieftaincy throughout the British period. As a result, the feeling that people had a voice in determining how they were administered and by whom was not as widespread in Mbaga. When the British set up the Native Authorities in Mbaga, they chose an Mbaga clan member, Bonaza, as chief. A few years later people began to say that Mapande, also an Mbaga, was really their traditional leader. Mapande's claim was honored by the British. He was installed as chief and succeeded by his son Joseph. Joseph ruled until the abolition of chiefs, in 1963.

Finally, British native administration is remembered for the fact that it fostered large-scale political cooperation through the unification of the Pare Mountains area into a single administrative district. A degree of tribal identity, previously unknown, developed as

a result. We have seen how cooperation between the chiefdoms of Ugweno and Usangi led to the construction of roads in North Pare. When the achievements of these two chiefdoms became known in the district council, competition sprang up among the remaining chiefs. They returned to their chiefdoms and began to build roads. There was talk of how all Pare had to follow the lead of Ugweno and Usangi in preparing themselves for modern economic development through cooperation. Tribal identity was specifically fostered at this time by participation in such district-wide projects. People in Pare still talk about how they learned in British times to work together for mutual benefit. This they say was something new which came from the British: before the British people fought one another; peace meant only the absence of fighting; it did not involve sharing goals or working on projects together.

The impact of British colonial administration on Pare District thus was far-reaching. The British restored traditional rulers to administrative positions. From this, significant advances in social and economic development followed. Participation in some decision-making processes was allowed. All of these events took place for the first time within a district-wide framework, nurturing feelings of tribal identity which led directly to the development of the independence movement in Pare District.

Independence to the Present (1968)

The Independence Movement in Pare District

Widespread changes occurred in Pare District throughout the

1940's and 1950's. Men from the district went outside it in greater numbers--to work in nearby cities or on agricultural plantations and to serve in the army during World War II. People began to identify with supra-community groups through their membership in Christian churches and Muslim societies. A new class of educated and skilled men and women--clerks, teachers, artisans, shopkeepers, medical personnel--grew up as a result of the spread of education. People who had undergone any one of these new experiences shared some common perspectives on the way in which they were administered. They began to question the legitimacy of the Native Authority system of administration. In particular, they resented its essentially unrepresentative character because, they said, only traditional chiefs and their assistants held authority.

Resentment over the structure of local administration centered on taxes in the 1940's. The district council, composed of only the nine chiefs of the district, had voted to impose a new tax. The resulting revenue was to be used to finance development projects. In spite of agreement with the goals of the tax, many men were angered over the fact that the tax was to be collected in the form that had been used to collect chiefly tribute traditionally and that it was imposed without popular consultation. Their opposition to the tax proposal grew into an effective protest movement which culminated in riots at district headquarters. Eventually, the tax was abandoned.

Opposition to the tax spawned changes in the Native Authority system of administration. The district council was expanded to include non-traditional elements. Representatives were elected from each chiefdom on a popular basis; additional members were appointed to the council by

the District Officer. Popularly elected councils were started within each chiefdom to provide a mechanism for increased participation by new groups in the administrative decision-making process. The success of these chiefdom councils varied. Some, like that of Usangi, began early in the 1950's and functioned up to independence as a forum for local debate and a vehicle for local development efforts. Others, like that of Mbaga, never "got off the ground." The less successful councils tended to be dominated by the traditional chief or to lack representatives who had the requisite political know-how to make them effective instruments of administration.

In addition to bringing about changes in the Native Authority structure, the tax riots were the impetus to the founding of the Pare Union. Those who had opposed the tax saw that an effective force in politics required an organizational base. These men, drawn largely from the newly formed educated and commercial sectors, founded the Pare Union in 1946. They convinced people throughout the district to join with them in an organization whose goal was to promote the peoples' interests in matters such as taxes. The Pare Union sent representatives to the colonial administration to explain their opposition to the new taxes. These representatives of the Pare Union were the group that finally effected an end to the tax controversy.

After several years of locally oriented activity, the Pare Union merged with the nationalist movement, TANU. TANU in turn built on the base the Pare Union provided. When spokesmen for the nationalist movement approached local Pare political leaders, the nationalist organizers found them receptive to their ideas. Leaders of the Pare Union

agreed to broaden their coals to include those of territorial independence and to place national priorities ahead of local ones. TANU took over the local Pare Union groups by merging the objectives of the two groups, and by supporting the local leadership while at the same time leaving them in control of local affairs. For the people of Pare District, TANU symbolized the opportunity increasingly to direct their own affairs, eventually under an independent government.

TANU's growth in Pare District was further facilitated by resistance to an agricultural scheme of the colonial administration. Throughout the territory of Tanganyika during the economic depression of the 1930's, the colonial administration initiated a series of "plant more" campaigns, calling on local populations to increase the amount of acreage under cultivation and to diversify the type of crops planted. Different parts of the territory were assigned the crops thought to be most suited to them.

In Pare, the colonial administration ordered that the cultivation of coffee was not profitable and that any existing coffee trees should be destroyed. The administration's position was that coffee could be more profitably grown in neighboring districts and that scarce territorial resources were being wasted by trying to grow it in Pare. Many Pare people had, however, begun planting coffee by that time. Some farmers refused to follow government orders to cut down their trees. A number of resisters held out long enough to see a reversal of government policy come into effect. When the ban on growing coffee was lifted,[4]

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[4] I am at present unable to document these events from written

these men were ahead of their peers and soon numbered among the wealthiest of the coffee farmers. The tensions generated by this episode, coupled with the attitudes which emerged as a result of the tax riots, contributed to the early success of TANU in Pare District.

Throughout the 1940's and 1950's, then, increased demands were being placed on the administrative system by formerly non-politicized segments of the population. At first these demands were met by increased participation in the Native Authority system. Later that system of administration was bypassed. People turned instead to the solutions proposed by the nationalist movement and sought total independence.

Post-Independence Changes in Local Administration

Tanganyika acquired political independence in 1961. Between that time and the introduction of the ten-house cell system in 1965, a number of changes were made in local administration. The system of administration which evolved from this series of changes is the one within which cells operate today. As will be seen below, the contemporary character of local administration in Pare District results from an

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records. Pare informants are unanimous in their account of the episode. In addition, TANU workers and the Agricultural Extension Agent in Mbaga-Mshewa officially confirmed the episode. I therefore have a relatively high degree of confidence in the report. Pare District has always been in the "administrative" shadow of Kilimanjaro District or Usambara District. Both these districts are more populous, contain larger towns and European settlements, and have a larger cash cropping economy than Pare District. Most likely, the decision to eliminate coffee cultivation in Pare was based on the reasoning that coffee farming would be more profitable in Kilimanjaro. The decision probably did not take into account the extent to which coffee farming was established in Pare. However, faced with resistance from Pare farmers, the colonial administration appears to have taken the view that the ban was not worth the conflict which would ensue and retracted their original proposal.

interplay between the colonial legacy and the needs and desires of the post-independence movement.

The first set of changes in local administration which we can identify for purposes of discussion revolved around the position of District Officer. Before independence the District Officer, an expatriate, was the all-powerful political figure in his district: he was chief magistrate; he had final authority in financial matters; he formulated much of the policy for his district; and he was responsible to the central government for the execution of all policy within the district. At independence, Tanzanians were appointed as District Commissioners, replacing the District Officers, and assuming the same set of responsibilities that their colonial predecessors had had.

In 1962 the position of District Commissioner was abolished (Tordoff 1967:99). District Commissioners were asked to retire and political personalities, all well known to the public because of their roles in the independence movement, were appointed in their place. The districts were redesignated as areas. The responsibilities given to the new Area Commissioners capitalized on their public appeal. Area Commissioners were symbols of national development; the details of administration were transferred to civil servants in their offices. The Area Commissioner's task was "to preserve a sense of unity, to foster a national spirit and encourage the promotion of self-help schemes" (Warrell-Bowning 1963:193) by mobilizing people behind government plans and coordinating the activities of technical specialists who were to help people implement plans.

The possibility that an Area Commissioner would fulfill his new

responsibilities effectively was increased by the fact that he was made head of TANU at the district level. The appointment of a single individual as head of local administration and of the party at this level was an important step in the central government's attempt to bring about a close association between the nationalist party and administrative machinery. TANU, which had had little opposition during the struggle for independence, had progressively consolidated its position until Tanzania was declared a one-party state in 1965. Throughout this period the primary political concern had been to merge party and government institutions in a way which would be best suited to furthering the country's economic and social development.

The expansion of the Area Commissioner's role to include party affairs was balanced by a curtailment of his previous financial and judicial power. The supervision of finances was transferred to popularly elected district councils. The supervision of local courts and other juridical functions were transferred to a separate, and centrally administered judiciary department. Thus, the Area Commissioner was a generalist, a politician par excellence, rather than a specialist who was an expert in the technical matters of administration.

At the same time that the office of Area Commissioner was being created, fundamental changes were taking place at the sub-district level as well. Chiefs, who had administered as Native Authorities, were abolished in 1963 (Tordoff 1967:116). The nine chiefdoms of Pare were reorganized into six divisions (Sw.: tarafa). A Divisional Executive Officer (DEO) was appointed by the District Council as head of administration for each division. Each DEO was assisted by Assistant

Divisional Executive Officers (ADEO) in every ward (Sw.: wardi) within the division. DEOs and ADEOs are civil servants who have been approved by the Local Government Commission of the central government. Some former chiefs were appointed DEOs; in other cases, the positions were filled by party loyalists and locally prominent individuals. But in all cases, the men who filled the DEO and ADEO positions after the abolition of chiefs were local men, well-known to the people over whom they had authority.

Not only did the DEO and his assistants replace the chief vis-à-vis administration within the divisions, but a Primary Court Magistrate replaced the chief in the local courts as well. Primary Court Magistrates were appointed by the central government's judiciary department. One magistrate typically serves several divisions, touring and hearing cases in rotation. Unlike the DEO and ADEO, the Primary Court Magistrates in Pare District were often strangers to the areas they served.

Finally, a set of changes which took place in the composition of councils can be identified. Before independence, the chiefs of Pare District had regularly met in a district council to form policy. In the 1940's this tribal council had been expanded to include popularly elected members. With independence and the subsequent abolition of chiefs, a council consisting solely of popularly elected members was established. The new District Council became responsible for district finances and for the formulation and execution of economic and social development in Pare District.

Within the divisions of Pare District, a parallel development

in representative government took place. Prior to independence, some of the chiefdoms had experimented with popularly elected advisory councils to the local chief. These advisory councils were disbanded when the chiefs were abolished. In their place came the Village Development Committee (VDC) (Dryden 1968:111). The VDC is the primary decision-making mechanism in the rural area. It is the vehicle which receives directives from the central government and the specialized departments represented within the district. It is the place where people, through their representatives, decide on community goals and solve local problems. Originally, the VDC was composed of elected representatives, local influentials and government and party officials. Since 1966, ten-house cell leaders have replaced specially elected representatives as the basic members of the VDC.

As can be seen from the foregoing outline of changes, the colonial legacy and the nature of the party in Tanzania have given local administration in Pare District its basic outlines. A relatively larger element of popular representation is now present at the local level. Specialization and differentiation of political roles has taken place at the district and division levels of local administration. These two changes in the setup for local administration provide the basis for the people's current views on local administration.

Popular Views on Contemporary Local Administration

To the people of Pare District, the current administrative setup has both its positive and negative aspects. Throughout the remainder of this study, the comments of ten-house cell leaders and cell members on various aspects of local administration will be referred to.

Here mention is made of three of the most salient aspects in order to highlight the degree to which popular representation has increased and specialization of political roles has taken place.

The relationship between government and party in Tanzania is a focal point of much discussion among the people of Pare District. As the foregoing section showed, the two have moved progressively into closer association through the merger of certain administrative offices. However, separate hierarchies for party and government exist at the divisional and ward levels of local administration. During the time of my fieldwork, the questions constantly arose as to what the respective roles of party and government were, who was better to deal with, and why they split at the local levels if they really were the same thing at the district, regional and national levels (as suggested by the offices of Area Commissioner, Regional Commissioner, and President).

Confusion over the respective spheres of party and government was apparently not restricted to people of Pare District. Since 1968, the central government has announced plans to replace the DEO-ADEO setup.[5] Divisional Secretaries, who will be both head of government

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[5]The first public mention of the change in administrative setup was in the Tanganyika Standard of July 9, 1968. A brief article said that Mr. Muanka, Minister of State (Establishment), introduced estimates of expenditure for 1968/69 in the National Assembly and that they included "a new set-up in Regional Administration which will introduce divisional secretaries who will assist the Area Commissioner in his government work will be implemented all over the country in a three-year programme starting in the 1969/70 financial year."

The Tanganyika Standard of April 1, 1969, carried an advertisement for the position of Divisional Secretaries and said that successful candidates would be posted for duty in the regions of Mtwara, Ruvuma, Iringa, Mbeya, Singida and Dodoma. To the best of my knowledge, the plan has not yet been implemented in Pare District.

and party, will replace the DEOs. The Divisional Secretary will be assisted by tax collectors (to be called Ward Executive Officers and doing much what the ADEO now does) and party secretaries. This change has not yet been effected. The unclear picture in the minds of people in Pare District over what the party should do and what it means as opposed to what government is and should do is, I believe, a reflection of the kind of basic dilemmas that the national party is facing. The party is, in fact, yet in the process of defining its role. The fact that its members do not yet know its role is not a negative comment on its activity but rather a realistic reflection of the actual evolving situation.

A second salient feature of local administration in Pare District at the present time has to do with the incipient comparisons that are constantly being made between the chiefs and the officials who replaced them. People recognize very clearly that the "chief used to do lots of things and now his job is split up among many individuals." Many people view this specialization favorably: "no one person now has all the power," they say. Other people complain about the fact that bureaucratic red tape has increased and people do not know where to go when they have problems. They complain that nowadays they only get shuffled back and forth and never get their problems answered. "In the old days, a man went directly to the chief; the chief spoke his mind and the matter was immediately settled." The people of Pare District are working out their own modus vivendi with the new set of individuals who have authority over them. In the process of doing this they refer constantly back to what their chief was to them. Sometimes they view the past positively; at other times they emphasize the negative

aspects. But whenever they look backward they do it comparatively.

The way in which the central government has attempted to define the relationship between people and their administrative officials is another important consideration in understanding popular reactions to cells. In February, 1967, the Arusha Declaration was promulgated. The Arusha Declaration is Nyerere's personal statement on the goals of Tanzanian society and the way in which those goals are to be achieved. The primary goals concern the economic and social development of Tanzania through transformation of the rural areas (as opposed to industrial development). This transformation is to be achieved by self-reliance; by changing the individuals who inhabit the rural areas rather than by the massive infusion of financial and personnel resources from outside the country. President Nyerere urges peasant farmers to help themselves--by farming more, showing commercial initiative, becoming self-educated, etc. People, according to the Arusha Declaration, are in a mutual help situation with their new leaders. Each party--the people and their leaders--contributes what it has to make the nation progress.

This was not the image of administration conjured up by the Native Authority system. Under chiefs, people saw the chief as the funnel through which gifts from the colonial government came. Chiefs worked on behalf of their people before the colonial administration. The central government is trying to redefine the relationship between populace and officials. People are aware of this attempt, and, as we shall see, their comments on these changes reflect their adjustment to them.

CHAPTER III

TEN-HOUSE PARTY CELLS

Introduction

The decision to extend the party hierarchy by the addition of ten-house cells was made shortly after independence by TANU's highest decision-making body, the National Executive Council (NEC). In the years that have followed, ten-house cells have been introduced in all fifty-four administrative districts of mainland Tanzania. The actual operation of the cell system varies widely. Not only does the system vary from district to district and among divisions within a district, it even varies from ward to ward within a single division.

In this chapter we examine the rationale behind the NEC's decision to establish the cell system. We then detail the beginning of the cell system in two wards of Pare District, Usangi-Kighare and Mbaga-Mshewa. This comparative description illustrates the crucial role that local context plays in the implementation of a new idea. The way in which cells were set up--and their subsequent operation as we shall see in the following chapters--is conditioned by <u>where</u> they were set up. The differences between the wards of Usangi-Kighare and Mbaga-Mshewa are highlighted when we describe the varying strategies which the leaders of each employed as they went about implementing the national directive to begin the ten-house system. The theme

of the present chapter, then, is the impact of political history on the beginning of ten-house cells in Usangi and Mbaga.

Development of the Ten-House Cell Idea

The primary goal of TANU as a nationalist movement was the attainment of political independence. It successfully met that challenge by mobilizing people into political activity throughout the 1950's. When independence finally came, the leaders of TANU sought a new role for the party. In particular, they were concerned with the relationship between the government and the party in a de facto one-party state. This concern was worked out in the first years after independence and culminated in the report of the Presidential Commission on the Establishment of a Democratic One-Party State (1965). On the basis of the commission's report, the Interim Constitution of Tanzania was adopted in 1965. By this act, Tanzania officially became a one-party state in which TANU is responsible for overall policy formation and the government is responsible for the execution of general party directives.

On the local level, in particular, TANU now emphasizes the unfinished character of the independence struggle. Although political independence has been achieved, the Arusha Declaration claims total independence is yet to come, for the people of Tanzania do not yet enjoy social and economic independence. TANU sees itself as the agent which will continually mobilize people. TANU's self-defined task is twofold. First, it encourages people to participate in the myriad of new

activities their government is undertaking. Second, it acts as a check on any abuses committed by the government in the process of nation-building. To do these things, TANU needs to reach the people, to be in constant communication with them. One vehicle which helps accomplish this is the ten-house cell system. By extending the party hierarchy one step closer to the people, TANU brings itself into more immediate contact with them. It hopes both to influence people to act in accordance with party and government ideology as well as to receive feedback from them on the course of the rural transformation it is sponsoring.

The first official discussion of the cell idea was at the August 1963 meeting of the NEC. The NEC resolved that "in order to strengthen the leadership of TANU in the running of the affairs of our Republic, TANU cells should be established as an addendum to the existing Party machinery" (TANU, n.d.:10). The NEC defined a cell as ten TANU members, with one leader. The subsequent meeting of the NEC in April 1964 reaffirmed its intent and desire to begin immediately creating cells.[1]

In November of 1964 cells were discussed in a feature article in The Nationalist, the party paper. Dr. Wilbert Klerruu, the TANU

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[1] I am unable further to document the origins of the idea in the NEC. Primary sources for this account are (1) reports published in newspapers as the system was being introduced in 1964 and (2) the handbook used by cell leaders themselves to run their affairs (TANU n.d.). I do not know of any secondary sources which discuss the cell system, with the exception of Bienen (1968:356-60). The most recent work on local administration mentions cell leaders in passing (Dryden 1968:49). A civics textbook used in secondary schools and teachers' training colleges shows cells on a chart of the organs of TANU but does not consider them in the text (Meienberg 1966:13). A new civics text discusses them briefly, but does not give a history of their origins (Derksen 1969:81-7).

Publicity Secretary, who wrote the article, said that TANU cells would be instituted in order to

> (1) assess the strength of the party in Dar es Salaam and have an accurate and reliable record; (2) facilitate the easy and efficient collection of party dues and subscriptions; (3) make it cheaper and easier for party leaders to become acquainted with the morale, complaints, and feelings of the rank and file; and (4) help the Dar es Salaam city council, if need be, in its campaign against hooliganism, idleness, lawlessness, and delinquency (1964:8).

Party cells, then, were to be groups of members. By grouping its members into these new low level units, the few personnel which the party employed could be more effectively utilized. A secretary could contact a cell leader rather than ten people individually. In theory, people would feel freer to talk problems over with a familiar cell leader than with an unknown secretary.

One source of the idea for cells sprang from the party's experience in the city. There the difficulties of counting members and assessing the characteristics of that membership were particularly evident. As men and women came to live in Dar es Salaam, for example, social integration into urban life was only beginning. To facilitate it, the party needed to provide forms of organization.

There were negative aspects which spurred the establishment of cells as well. The influx of strangers to Dar es Salaam and the absence of traditional forms of social organization in the city meant that crime and detection of various wrongdoers often went uncontrolled. The party felt that many of these things could be handled by the creation of a party office in close contact with the urban population.

The idea of cells caught the imagination of party leaders on the NEC. They held that the advantages accruing to cells would apply outside

the cities as well. Discussion soon turned to the general applicability of the cell system. The NEC met in the middle of December 1964 and acknowledged that their desire to extend the party through cells was far from realized. Therefore, they issued a further resolution, calling for the creation of cells throughout the country:

> This meeting of the TANU National Executive Committee resolves that the TANU Cells, each consisting of all TANU members and a leader dwelling in ten houses grouped together for that purpose, should be established and consolidated all over the country; and that all Regions and Districts must improvise membership registers which should be utilized effectively to facilitate the monthly returns of membership from the Cell to the National Headquarters. In this way the reckoning of membership in each Cell, District, Region and the country as a whole can easily be carried out and that this resolution reaffirms the resolution passed in the previous meeting (TANU n.d.:10).

The first recorded instance of the cell structure being set up in the rural areas is noted by Bienen (1968:357-8). The week after the NEC meeting in December of 1964, a rural branch of Ujiji announced that it had established cells along the lines Dr. Klerruu outlined for Dar es Salaam in November (i.e., on the basis of TANU members) and not those announced the previous week by the NEC (i.e., on the basis of households).

The conflict between the earlier and subsequent resolutions vis-à-vis membership criteria was recognized at the next meeting of the NEC in March of 1965. At that meeting, the NEC opted to adhere to the later resolutions. Although it is not clear by what process the eventual decision to base cells on houses rather than individuals was reached, this decision paved the way for the creation of a low level party organ with diffuse functions. Had cells been based on individuals their functions would have been more specific and

doctrinaire. By basing cells on households, all individuals resident in them became participating members of the cell by definition. The requirement that the voting members of a cell were only its properly registered TANU members was retained. This decision to base cells on households, rather than on individuals, increased the likelihood that everyone in those households (whether or not they actually joined TANU) would be exposed to party activity and ideology.

Purposes of Cells

Cells were established to bring people into closer contact with the government and the party. The NEC felt that such contact would facilitate implementation of party tasks. The need for closer linkage between people and party is obvious when the pre-cell structure of TANU is considered.

At independence, the lowest level in TANU's organization was the branch.[2] Figures for that period are not available, but by projecting backwards from 1968, a picture of the situation that the party faced can be understood. Table III-1 shows the distribution of party branches and their resources in 1968. At independence, Pare District was divided into twenty-five TANU branches. The number has remained constant; no new branches have been set up, nor have any been amalgamated. The situation vis-à-vis party secretaries is different. In

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[2]"Branch" is a party unit. "Ward" is a local government unit. They are coterminous in Pare District and therefore the two terms are used interchangeably in this study.

TABLE III-1

DISTRIBUTION OF TANU BRANCHES IN PARE DISTRICT IN 1968

Local Government Division (Tarafa)[a]	No. of Party Branches (Matawi)	No. of Party Offices (Ofisi)	No. of Personnel Secretary (Sekeriteri)	Collector (Kolekta)
Usangi	4	6[b]	2	4
Ugweno	4	4	1	3
Same-Mbaga	4	5	2	3
Gonja	3	3	0[c]	3
Chome-Suji	5	5	1	4
Mamba	5	5	1	4
Total	25	28	7	21

[a]Swahili terms given in parentheses.

[b]Theoretically, there should be one office per branch. In fact, where a particularly strong group of TANU members exist, they often build their own office building. Although they have no salaried personnel to staff it, they continue in the hope that they will some day. Thus, in the division of Usangi, there is a second office near the sisal estate and trading center of Kisangara on the plains. And in Same-Mbaga division, there is one office each in Kisiwani, the largest settlement in the division, as well as one in the district capital of Same.

[c]There should be a party secretary in Gonja division, but the position was vacant during the period of fieldwork in 1968.

1963-64 informants report that there were probably only three or four full-time branch secretaries in the district. In 1968 there was a total of seven branch secretaries. Then, as now, branches lacking a secretary were assigned to neighboring branch secretaries for general supervision. In addition, in each branch without a secretary, the

responsibility for party affairs is assumed by a collector, a voluntary worker who receives a percentage of the monthly fees he collects throughout his branch. Thus, at the time the cell system was being introduced, each branch was responsible for approximately 6,000 adults, and only three or four of these branches were headed by full-time workers. This ratio was not one that allowed for close and continual linkage between party and people. Another level of party organization was obviously needed if people were to be in daily contact with the party.

A recognition of this need for closer linkage is embodied in the formal aims of cells, as stated in the handbook used by cell leaders (TANU n.d.). These four aims are listed in Table III-2. An emphasis on closer contact between party and government on the one hand and between both these and people on the other takes priority. The idea is that if the communication can be regularized through the channel of cells, then it will be both more efficient and more effective.

Up to 1965, the NEC announcements vis-à-vis cells were only about the party functions of these new units. Between that time and the publication of the handbook, their functions were broadened to include governmental duties as well. These are spelled out below in the list of the duties of the cell leader. This latter person was designated as a member of the Village Development Committee (VDC) starting in 1966.[3] The cell leader's duties include acting as both distributor and collector of party information; collecting party dues and selling membership cards;

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[3]A Government White Paper (Number 1 of 1966) announced that in the future all Village Development Committees shall be composed of all party cell leaders in the villages (Dryden 1968:49).

TABLE III-2

THE AIMS OF THE CELL SYSTEM ACCORDING TO THE TANU PUBLICATION MASHINA YA TANU (TANU n.d.)

Enable our people to express their views and opinions to TANU and its government; and at the same time the policies of TANU and Government will be communicated to the people more easily.

Consolidate our Unity and extend the leadership to the village level so that leaders can easily be accessible to the ordinary people. In this way, the close link between the leaders and the people will be maintained.

Obtain all sorts of information regarding social and economic development as it will be the duty of the leaders of the party cells to gather information and forward it to the branch organs of TANU.

Ensure the security and survival of the Party, Government and the Nation by seeing to it that all the laws and regulations are obeyed.

overseeing all Party affairs in the cell; and serving as a delegate to the Branch Conference. As a government representative, he distributes and collects information for the government, performs certain political functions, looks after tax collection, and represents his cell on the VDC. One function, Number 7 listed below, is not specific to either party or government--cooperation in development projects is a task of both. Duties of the cell leader are as follows:

1. To explain to the people the policies of TANU and government.

2. To articulate people's views and opinions and communicate them to TANU and the Government.

3. They shall be responsible for collection of Party dues.

4. To persuade people who are not members to become members of TANU.

5. To play their role in safeguarding the peace and security of this country by seeing to it that laws and regulations are obeyed.

6. To urge people to pay their taxes properly.

7. To foster strong cooperation amongst the members in the Party Cell.

8. To take overall charge of the affairs of the Party in that Cell.

9. The Cell Leader is the delegate of the cell to the Branch Annual Conference.

10. The Cell Leader is a member of the Village Development Committee (TANU n.d.: 14).

A cell leader, who is elected from the adults[4] resident in the households of a cell, serves primarily as a link. His function is reflected in the titles which are given to him. Although the Swahili terms used for cell leaders vary somewhat in different districts, in Pare District he is called a balozi (plural: mabalozi). According to Johnson's A Standard Swahili-English Dictionary, balozi means "consul" or "political agent." The Tanzanian national government uses the appellation balozi for its diplomat representatives abroad. In other districts, the cell leader is called mjumbe (plural: wajumbe), meaning "messenger," "delegate" or "representative." He may also be referred to as kumi-kumi, literally "ten-ten" but meaning "head of the ten houses." A cell leader is sometimes called kiongozi (plural: viongozi), "leader," or mkuu wa shina, "head of the cell." Why different terms have come to be used is not clear. There is general agreement

[4]TANU defines an adult as anyone over eighteen years of age.

among the people of Pare District that the word balozi was used from the beginning to describe the new leader by the leaders who introduced cells.

The cell itself is called shina (plural: mashina), which literally means "root of a tree," "stem of a branch." The next organizational level of the party is called tawi (plural: matawi), or "branch." The word tawi has been used for this level of party organization since the party's founding. Extending the party structure by adding a new hierarchical level and calling it the "stem" of the existing "branch" illustrates clearly the intended relationship between the two. Shina is used throughout Tanzania to refer to cells. It is the Swahili word used in official TANU publications.

In summary, as set up by the national leadership of TANU and the government, a cell is the basic organizational unit of TANU and of local government. A cell consists of ten contiguous households. It is headed by a leader, elected from the adults of the cell. It is constituted as a unit which performs both party and government functions. Figure III-1 shows the relationship of cells to the overall organization of TANU. As the diagram points out, cells represent a completely new level of party organization. In Figure III-2, the relationship between cells and local government machinery is outlined. The leader of each ten-house cell is the representative of his cell on the VDC, the lowest level representative institution of local government

Usangi: Division of a Branch into Cells

The first elections of cell leaders in Usangi took place in

FIGURE III-1

THE ORGANIZATION OF TANU[a]
(VIKAO VYA CHAMA CHA TANU)[b]



[a]Meienberg (1966:13)

[b]Swahili terms are given in parentheses.

Legend:

_____: making recommendations to

-----: giving directions to

-.-.-: responsible to

FIGURE III-2

THE ORGANIZATION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT WITHIN THE DISTRICT



June and July of 1965. The Chairman and Secretary[5] relied on instructions received in a meeting at district headquarters and in a small handbook Mashina ya TANU (TANU n.d.), for guidelines in introducing the new system.

Starting at the western border of the ward (the home neighborhood of the Chairman), the Chairman and Secretary walked through the ward, following the traditional footpaths, grouping what seemed to them "natural" clusters of neighbors into cells and assigning them numbers. Often they grouped the people who used a common pathway, or all those who used a common spring for household water, or those whose houses lay together in a highland valley. In other words, they sought to give formal recognition to informally functioning neighborhood clusters, following what seemed to them to be existing interaction networks rather than creating totally new ones. Absolute distance between houses was not the most important principle in the decision-making process. In the mountain terrain of Usangi, the house "next door" (but below on a slope) is often much more difficult to reach than the house parallel to it along the path which cuts the slope horizontally.

Frequently, there were only six or seven households that seemed to form "natural" units. To fulfill the TANU criterion of ten, they had to attach another cluster. This made some cells have more than ten households. Maps 3 and 4 illustrate the creation of two different cells.

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[5]The TANU members of each branch elect a Branch Chairman every two years. He serves voluntarily, chairing VDC meetings, hosting visitors, and generally overseeing party affairs. He works closely with the Branch Secretary, the salaried party official. The Secretary is responsible for running the Branch Office, supervising women's and youth affairs, recruiting new members, and collecting membership dues.

MAP 3

SKETCH MAP OF A TEN-HOUSE CELL IN THE WARD OF USANGI-KIGHARE WHICH FUNCTIONED AS A NEIGHBORHOOD UNIT PRIOR TO THE CREATION OF CELLS BECAUSE OF "NATURAL" ECOLOGICAL BOUNDARIES



Legend

═══: Main road
_____: Major footpath
.....: Minor footpath
------: Boundary of a ten house cell
X : Household
Ⓧ : Household of the cell leader

MAP 4

SKETCH MAP OF A TEN-HOUSE CELL IN THE WARD OF USANGI-KIGHARE IN WHICH TWO PREVIOUSLY SEPARATE HOUSEHOLD UNITS WERE DRAWN TOGETHER TO FORM A SINGLE TEN-HOUSE CELL



Legend

═══: Main road
_____: Major footpath
.....: Minor footpath
------: Boundary of a ten house cell
X : Household
Ⓧ : Household of cell leader

In the first case, Map 3, the cell was delineated without difficulty. That is, the houses formed a separate functional unit before the introduction of cells and continued as a single cell thereafter. In the second case, Map 4, two groups of houses were amalgamated to form a single cell. Separated as these two clusters were by the forest, they did not interact with each other frequently prior to being placed together in one cell. This is an example of how new units were constituted to serve as cells whereas the first example shows how old units were coopted for new purposes.

The Chairman and Secretary tried to acknowledge peoples' preferences in delineating cells. But at the same time, the two leaders report that they sought to create efficient units of administration and refused requests for groups of friends or kinsmen to be put together in one cell when that meant eliminating another contiguous house. There were very few changes in the groupings after the system was first established. In one instance, two houses refused to continue to acknowledge their cell leader and asked to be included in the cell of the neighboring leader. The people in the two houses were quarreling with their cell leader because they said he did not coop up his chickens and the chickens ate their crops. In addition, they said he was generally an ineffective cell leader who "never did anything." The TANU Secretary, acknowledging that this particular leader was not one of the most active, agreed to let the two houses attach themselves to another cell after repeated attempts to settle the quarrel over chickens failed.

The two leaders went to approximately ninety percent of the cells themselves. Occasionally, when the houses were very scattered in a dis-

tant area, they assigned them (with the help of closer neighbors) to cells without going to the area personally. For example, the cell closest to the plain (and hence furthest from the center of the ward) has twenty houses. The leader of that cell reports that all the houses from a certain point on were told to be in one cell. But since no one walked far enough to count them accurately, many more than ten houses are actually included in one cell.

The task of grouping houses into cells took about four weeks. After this was done, the Chairman and Secretary returned a second time to tour the ward, calling in each cell a meeting of all people over eighteen years of age resident in Usangi at that time. The procedure in the meeting was to determine who the TANU members were. For these purposes, a TANU member was anyone who had ever joined the party by buying a card and who at some time had paid his dues. In other words, they did not insist that a person's dues were currently paid up. They did, however, insist that the person chosen to be the cell's leader be a TANU member and be willing to pay his monthly dues and/or purchase a new card. Having discussed this, the Chairman and Secretary then explained the purposes of a cell and the duties of its leader. Nominations were invited for that position and all the people present at the meeting voted by a show of hands for their candidate, whether they were TANU members or not.

TANU Membership of Cell Leaders and Cell Members in Usangi

The way in which TANU officials in Usangi handled the party membership situation is a particularly important one. As we noted in the

preceding discussion, a prime concern of the party in creating cells was to strengthen existing membership and recruit new members. In order to do this, TANU wanted all cell leaders and cell members to be members of the party. However, the officials responsible for implementing the cell system did not find universal TANU membership. Nonetheless, they were enjoined to include all residents in cells as cell members. Party officials got around this impasse by ignoring the rule that voting cell members were supposed to be TANU members in good standing. By side-stepping this technical requirement at a critical point, they avoided alienating anyone and encouraged all people, whether TANU or non-TANU, members in good standing or not, to believe that the new cell leader was <u>their</u> leader, interested in working for Tanzania's development with them, irrespective of their lack of past party loyalty.

What actual situation did party leaders find when they instituted cells? What was the extent of party membership in Usangi? How active was that membership? Did party leaders encounter refusal to join the party? All of the cell leaders interviewed report being members of TANU. One of those sixty-six joined the party immediately after her election so that she might serve as cell leader. The remainder were members of longer standing. Eighty-one percent of the Usangi cell leaders had joined TANU before independence.

The interview schedule did not include questions about when leaders last paid dues because this issue never emerged as an important one in the course of fieldwork. Two leaders who had not paid were told by the TANU Secretary at the time of reelection in July 1967 that they were ineligible. But no one was elected to replace them by January 1968

when they were interviewed. Both said they were getting together the dues money to reinstate themselves. Other than these two examples, out of nearly seventy, leaders appear to pay their dues on a regular basis.

As the figures in Table III-3 show, more than three-fourths of the cell members did at some time join the party. These figures would be higher if the males who are outside Usangi for wage labor and who are almost all TANU members were included in the sample. Non-members tend to be old women to whom the party is of minimal relevance and very young women who have come of age since indepencence. These data also show that the problem of non-members as voting cell members was not acute in Usangi even though discussion of this issue at the district and national levels suggested this might be the case in rural areas.

TABLE III-3

TANU MEMBERSHIP OF USANGI CELL MEMBERS INTERVIEWED

	Yes	No
1. Purchased membership card at any time since party founded	78% (79)	22% (27)
2. Paid dues within one year of time interviewed: percentage of members	81.5% (62)	18.5% (14)
3. Paid dues within one year of time interviewed: percentage of total sample	60% (62)	40% (41)

But more significant than this breakdown is a consideration of how active the alleged TANU membership is. The party has sought since independence to change from a mass movement to a somewhat more "hard-core"

party. To do this, it has asked that cards be regularly renewed and dues paid. This has been a delicate task at the local level. Telling an old man that the card which he bought in 1956 and has proudly cherished since then is no longer a valid indication of his dedication to TANU works against party purposes. In spite of all the difficulties of getting people to update cards and pay dues, a very high proportion (eighty-one percent) of the members report having paid dues within a year of the interview date. This figure may be taken as a general indicator of the high level of party activity in Usangi.

It is further substantiated by branch office reports on dues collection. In two typical months at the beginning of 1968, the Branch Secretary of Kighare ward in Usangi reported receiving an average of one hundred and twenty-five shillings per month for the three wards under his jurisdiction. Assuming that each half-shilling represents the monthly dues of one individual, it can be seen that some five hundred people directly participated in one aspect of political life in a two-month period. While these sums seem petty in absolute terms,[6] they are highly significant in terms of what they indicate. Given the personnel shortages of the party and the distances involved in bringing dues to the branch office, a member who pays his dues is highly motivated to participate. The role of cell leaders enters here--the collection of party dues is an important one for cell leaders, as we shall see later on. These data provide concrete examples for discussions about how national mass parties are actually reaching the villages. As we shall

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[6]One shilling = fourteen U.S. cents.

see, the Usangi situation represents one end of a continuum of present-day party activity in rural Tanzania. The significance of this continuum will become clear when the Usangi situation is compared to that of Mbaga.

Mbaga: Division of Part of a Branch into Cells

The election of the first cell leaders in Mbaga presents a contrasting picture. Unlike the Usangi situation just described, where the TANU Secretary is stationed in the center of the ward, this same official who is responsible for overseeing affairs in the Mshewa ward of Mbaga is headquartered on the plains, a distance of five miles away. He came to the ward on this occasion, as he always does, as an "outsider." The Chairman in 1965 was a prominent politician at the district level. He lived at the far northern edge of the ward in an area that does not participate with other sections on a regular basis although they all belong officially to the same administrative ward. The Chairman was, however, well-known throughout the ward, both because he had been born at its southern edge and because of the various political positions he held since the 1930's.

The Mbaga Chairman and Secretary received the same instructions as their Usangi counterparts, but they proceeded to implement them differently. They set a day for their arrival in the ward and announced a series of meetings to be held throughout the ward. The announced purpose of the meetings was to organize cells and elect leaders, collapsing into one day what took two months in Usangi.

The branch, as was noted in Chapter I, is the smallest unit of the party with a salaried officeholder at its head. The ward, which is coterminous with the branch, is the smallest unit of local administration with a salaried head. Within the Mshewa branch/ward, various "villages" are found. The "villages" are of particular importance in Mbaga, because they still form the traditional folk units of identity and provide the basis for legitimacy on the local political scene. Whereas in Usangi people had experienced a degree of political centralization in the past and at the present time have increased the scale of their social and economic interactions to the point where they at least think of themselves as participants in the community of the ward (Kighare) or even the whole division (Usangi), Mbaga people do not recognize themselves as members of these larger units. They belong first and most importantly to their "village" or mtaa.

The mtaas of Mbaga are listed in Table III-4. Mtaa is a Swahili word and refers to a small area, containing dispersed households covering perhaps two to four square miles, which was administered under an mchili or headman in colonial times (see Map 5). In precolonial times an mtaa was the area of one patrilineal clan and was governed by the clan head or petty chief. Cell leaders in Mbaga act primarily in reference to their mtaa and only secondarily in reference to the larger political unit. The implications of this will become clear below when we discuss the fact that each mtaa in Mbaga elects its own Chairman. It is mentioned now so that we can see how the original introduction of cells reinforced and perpetuated existing loyalties.

TABLE III-4

THE MTAAS OF MBAGA

Name	Present Number of Cells	Leaders Interviewed
Goma	8	Yes
Ngua	12	Yes
Mshewa	8	Yes
Marindi	8	Yes
Kindi	9	No
Kibengele	11	No

The Chairman and Secretary arranged one meeting for the two mtaas of Goma and Ngua, a second meeting for the mtaas of Mshewa and Marindi. In the first site, the meeting was held on the grounds near the church. In the second, it was held on the grounds of the community center. These are the two public meeting places for the four mtaas.

Political meetings observed during the course of fieldwork were never well attended by either men or women, and it is suggested that the same would be true for that period. Informants report that the turnout was very small and represented not more than ten percent of the population of the ward.

The speakers told the assembled people that there was to be a new system of organization whereby each neighborhood would have its own leader to link them to government and party. They were told that they

MAP 5

SKETCH MAP SHOWING THE MTAAS OF THE WARD OF MABAGA-MSHEWA



Legend

=====: Main road on the plains
_____: Mountain road
-----: Boundary of the ward of Mbaga-Mshewa
Same : Plains settlement
Goma : mountain mtaa

were to elect the leaders from among themselves. After a brief explanation of the cell's purposes and the leader's duties, they asked the people to break up into small groups which they, the people, thought represented cells.[7] Reports indicate that this was a somewhat confusing affair because so many people were absent. However, having grouped themselves, each group elected a leader. There are several observations to be made at this point.

Political meetings, held at public grounds in Mbaga, are traditionally attended only by men. This meeting, advertised in routine fashion, was no exception. There were probably relatively few women present. This is in contrast to the situation in Usangi, where meetings, by being held in the neighborhood, were attended by a large number of women.

The cell system was not presented primarily as an organ of TANU. Membership in the party was alluded to, but not stressed, as a criterion of eligibility for leadership or for voting. This may be due to the fact that those conducting the meeting were well aware of how far this area had fallen behind in party activity. They therefore would see no feasible alternative (given that they wanted to introduce cells) and accept this issue, hoping that it would be straightened out locally as each cell leader became more effective among his neighbors.

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[7] This practice stems from an old colonial one used in voting for chiefs and representatives on the chiefdom councils. The candidates stood at two ends of the public grounds and the assembled voters lined up behind the candidate of their choice. Bates gives one account of this practice (1950:54).

TANU Membership of Cell Leaders and Cell Members in Mbaga

Mbaga leaders, like those of Usangi, all report having joined the party at one time or another. But they do not appear to participate to the same extent. Only twenty-eight percent of the cell leaders reported having paid dues within one year of the interview date, whereas it was suggested that the Usangi figure was closer to one hundred percent.

This lack of active party membership is evident from another example. At a meeting of the VDC in mid-1968, a letter from the TANU District Office was read. It said that all cell leaders must set an example and pay their dues and renew their membership cards. Those without current cards should be replaced as cell leaders. When asked to show their TANU cards, only five out of thirty were able to do so. Another group protested that they did not have their cards with them. But most accepted the fact that they had not had a current card for years. This issue took up the greater part of three VDC meetings spread over a period of months and was never resolved. Finally, it was simply dropped. The cell leaders continued to function as leaders in their own eyes and the eyes of the party, but without the qualifications the party required.

Eighty-nine percent of the Mbaga cell members interviewed for this study report having joined the party at one time. This figure is comparable to the eighty-one percent quoted for Usangi. However, the fact that most of the adult males are resident in Mbaga while their Usangi peers are not, means that the overall Mbaga figure would probably be lower if those who are presently outside for employment were included.

In Mbaga, it proved impossible to find out the last time people paid their dues. When asked, they usually replied "not for years." To force the issue into the open caused embarrassment in the interview situation. There is no TANU Secretary in charge of this branch, and it has had no functioning collector for some years. Thus, the number of people who pay is small indeed, both because there is no party apparatus to see that cell leaders perform this task and because the absence of any apparatus over a long period of time has made the relevance of the party recede even further. As we shall see below, the collection of party dues is rarely, if ever, mentioned by Mbaga cell leaders as one of the tasks they perform.

Mbaga: a Second Procedure of Electing Cell Leaders

The practice used in creating cells was not uniform throughout the whole ward of Mbaga-Mshewa. In the two northernmost mtaas, Kindi and Kibengele, another situation occurred.[8] Here the Chairman made a list of all houses, divided them into cells, appointed a leader, and announced his decisions. The result of this exercise was chaos.

When word of the new arrangement spread and people began to ask how and why they got placed in a certain cell, and what authority the new leader had over them, etc., their confusion led to further questioning. They heard from people in Mshewa and Marindi of how the cells

[8] While my sample of leaders does not extend to those from these two mtaas, they do fall within a single ward and I include this account here. The situation in these two mtaas shows the variety of ways a single directive from district headquarters was implemented, even by the same leaders within a single ward.

were introduced there, in contrast to their own situation. In addition, some of these people obtained a copy of the handbook (TANU n.d.) which explained how cells ought to be created. When the chairman was confronted with their findings, he said that it did not matter. He asserted that what mattered was that the cells be in existence and a leader functioning in each one.

The men, dissatisfied with the way things were handled by the chairman, kept up the agitation. Eventually the dispute reached the office of the Area Commissioner on appeal from this group of men. The Area Commissioner passed the word along to the Chairman that he was to see to it that all leaders were elected. A public meeting was called under the auspices of the local government head for the ward and a representative of the district TANU office. There they followed a procedure like the one in the other mtaas, grouping people and electing leaders in the course of the meeting. Informants claim that none of the twenty leaders appointed by the chairman were reelected by the people. The resolution of these difficulties took up a year, so that the cell leaders in these two mtaas have not yet stood for reelection, having, at the beginning of 1968, just completed their first two-year term of office.

The Impact of Locale

This chapter has shown how a decision taken by TANU at the national level was implemented in two wards of Pare District. After independence had been won, TANU decided to create a new channel of

communication between the party and the people by extending its organizational hierarchy through the ten-house cell system. The functions assigned to the cell system were later expanded to include governmental tasks as well. Thus, the cell system represents the lowest administrative level of both the political party and local government.

The wards of Usangi-Kighare and Mbaga-Mshewa reacted differently to the directive to establish cells. In Usangi, the Branch Chairman and the Branch Secretary toured the ward themselves, designating cell boundaries with the help of the people, seeing that cell leaders were elected, and generally sowing a positive orientation toward the new system among the people. The two leaders stressed the fact that the cell system was a vehicle for cooperation between people and their leaders. As such, they included both TANU and non-TANU people in cell activities. Both TANU membership and the general level of party activity is high in Usangi. Thus, since the creation of the cell system, non-TANU people too are continually being exposed to party activity and ideology.

In Mbaga a different situation obtained. Mtaas, the areas formerly covered by patrilineal clans, still form the basic unit of political identification, as they have ever since precolonial times. When the cell system was introduced, the Branch Chairman worked through the mtaa structure and thereby reinforced it. Rather than tour the ward personally, the Chairman asked people to congregate in large meetings. In those meetings, he explained the new system of organization and asked the people present to group themselves according to cells and to elect leaders. The question of TANU membership did not arise.

In another part of the ward of Mshewa, the Branch Chairman

proceeded differently. In this area, covered by two mtaas, he himself delineated the cells and appointed the cell leaders. However, he met with popular resistance. Because of the opposition which arose, his district superiors ordered him to begin again in those two mtaas, following the procedure he had used in the other parts of the ward.

The impact of locale on the beginning of the ten-house cell system is evident throughout the foregoing discussion. The leaders in Usangi who were responsible for implementing ten-house cells went about their task in such a way that people were positively oriented to participation in the new system. The cell system was introduced in a carefully worked out manner and a willingness on the part of many people to make it successful was evident from the beginning. In Mbaga, leaders reinforced prior negative attitudes toward changes in political administration by the method they selected for starting cells. They worked within the structural framework of mtaas. They went about organizing cells exactly as other leaders had gone about organizing previous political changes. They did not stress the benefits that were supposed to flow from the creation of ten-house cells. Nor did they actively seek peoples' cooperation in the project. As a result, many people in Mbaga did not identify with the cell system nor feel any commitment to make it operate successfully.

With this description of the genesis of the cell system as our background, we turn in the following chapters to the questions of who the cell leaders are and what they do.

CHAPTER IV

THE CELL LEADERS OF USANGI-KIGHARE AND MBAGA-MSHEWA

In this chapter, we describe the ten-house cell leaders of Usangi-Kighare and Mbaga-Mshewa in terms of several variables. These variables are sex, age, religion, degree of literacy and educational level, occupation, and kin and clan ties between cell leaders and cell members. We consider each variable in turn, describing the set of cell leaders in each ward in terms of each variable and then comparing the two sets to each other. Significant differences obtain between the Usangi and the Mbaga leaders along all of these lines. In addition, we examine factors which are related to the possibilities of an individual's being elected as a cell leader. We ask questions like the following: Is literacy a functional prerequisite for being a cell leader? Is it possible for Muslim women to be elected cell leaders? Are young men ever elected to head ten-house cells?

The purpose of this chapter then is to provide in some depth an understanding of <u>who the cell leaders are</u>. Such an understanding will facilitate our analysis of <u>what cell leaders do</u>, which is the subject of later chapters.

Sex

The most striking difference between the leaders of Usangi and Mbaga is with regard to sex. Women account for approximately one-fourth of Usangi cell leaders; there are no female cell leaders in Mbaga. Table IV-1 shows the distribution of leaders by sex in the two sites. In traditional times, politics was the preserve of men. The offices of chief and his assistants were always filled by men, both before and during the colonial period. The idea that women have legitimate authority in politics, to the point of being elected to represent other women and even men, is revolutionary.

TABLE IV-1

SEX OF CELL LEADERS

	Usangi	Mbaga
Male	77.3% (51)	100.0% (34)
Female	22.7% (15)	- (0)
Total	100.0% (66)	100.0% (34)

How have women in Usangi come to play political roles while women in Mbaga have not?[1] Answers can be sought in two situations. The first is the fact that since colonial times women in Usangi have

[1] The TANU District Office reports (personal conversation, 7 November 1968) that women have been elected as cell leaders in several of the 25 branches of the district. The percentage in Usangi was the highest for the district, they said. More typically, branches follow the Mbaga pattern.

participated successfully in politics while their counterparts in other areas of the district have not. In this sub-section we discuss the role of some Usangi women in the tax riots of the 1940's and the impact that this situation has on the cell system there. The second situation which is related to the large number of female cell leaders is the fact that Usangi men characteristically are outside their home areas for wage employment. This labor pattern creates vacancies in the potential pool of males who are available for leadership positions--vacancies that are often filled by women. We discuss the situation of labor migration and its effects on ten-house cells in the next sub-section.

Pare Tax Riots

The tax riots in Pare District in the 1940's illustrate the role Usangi women have played in politics. In most spheres of life, women in Usangi, as elsewhere, are set apart and treated differently. But at this particular time, they entered the political arena as activists and established a reputation for political competency which still remains with them.

The riots grew out of a Pare Council decision to levy a new tax. In 1942-43, the Pare Council which was composed of the nine chiefs, decided to institute a graduated income tax, following the advice of the British District Officer (DO). This tax was to be imposed in addition to the poll tax of seven and one-half shillings then in force. The revenue obtained from the tax was to be used solely for development projects in the district. The procedure for assessing the graduated rate was not clearly established. The confusion which arose from such imprecision led to speculation on the part of teachers,

clerks, and traders throughout the district that they might be taxed more heavily than people in more traditional occupations. The chiefs attempted to use a traditional basis for the tax in order to make it acceptable to the population. They adopted the name and form of a traditional harvest tribute called a kivali (Ch.). A kivali is six ears of corn tied together in two bunches of three ears each. It was assigned a monetary value and individuals were to be assessed in terms of kivalis. However, people were to pay in cash, rather than in produce as they had paid traditionally. Using a traditional tribute form for the new development tax brought out latent hostilities toward the entire structure of local government by Native Authorities.

Many people throughout the district questioned the new tax on two grounds: they demanded to know not only how the tax was to be assessed but also why it was to be assessed using a traditional form. Many Pare men became indignant when answers to their questions were not forthcoming. They took the position that people had a right to legitimate the authorities which governed them. They suggested that this was not the case under Native Authorities. And the chiefs, for their part, sensed that people were attacking their position and not simply their stand on the tax. When the chiefs realized the nature of the attacks, they increased their determination to impose the tax without modification, as evidence of the validity of their authority.

Pressure continued to build up as the chiefs toured the chiefdoms, explaining the goals and rationale for the new tax in open barazas (Sw.).[2] People still felt that the chiefs were largely unsuccessful

[2]A meeting held in the open and addressed by political leaders.

in justifying the traditional form of the tax or in responding to the charges that it was imposed without popular consent. Stymied in their discussions with the chiefs, people chose a more direct course of action. Early in 1945, thousands of men from throughout Pare District marched on Same, the district headquarters, and announced their intention to remain there until the tax was abolished.

When the demonstrators camped out in Same, the chiefs and their assistants moved to district headquarters as well. Meetings were held among representatives of the people, of the Native Authorities, and of the officers of the colonial government, but little progress was made in resolving their respective differences. The chiefs realized that their legitimacy was being questioned and became more adamant in their decision. Their assistants attempted to "sit on the fence," by never committing themselves as a group to either the chiefs or the people. This proved to be a wise move because many were able later to take up civil service positions in local government after independence, free of the stigma of having been aligned with the chiefs, and hence the colonial administration.

It was after the demonstration in Same was several months old and no progress had been achieved that some women from Usangi became politically mobilized. The wives, mothers, sisters, and daughters of the men who were demonstrating in Same decided to march on district headquarters themselves to show their support for the stand the men had taken. They presented themselves as a delegation to the DO, demanding that he impregnate them if he refused to effect a settlement and allow their men to return to their homes, their farms, and their jobs. The women claimed that the controversy over taxes had so disrupted the normal

life cycle that if Pare society were to continue they would have to follow their husbands to Same. That is, they would have to seek their husbands out in Same if they wanted to bear children. For them, the DO symbolized the deadlock between their husbands and the Native Authority structure. They argued that if the DO forced the men to abandon their wives and their work, then he should substitute for their husbands, even to the point of impregnating them.

At approximately the same time, the DO, who foresaw no easy resolution to the whole tax controversy, requested assistance from both the provincial and territorial governments. When officials from those offices arrived in Usangi in 1946, they were stoned by crowds of angry women.

Sensing that the situation had taken on new and uncontrollable dimensions, the chiefs relented. They consented to a new form of assessment, but remained firm that a tax should be levied. Still dissatisfied with this concession, over two thousand Pare taxpayers, out of a total of eight thousand, paid their 1946 tax in the neighboring district of Kilimanjaro at a higher rate than they would have had to pay in Pare District. Informants say that the taxpayers felt this action was positive evidence to the colonial government that they were willing to pay taxes. By paying their taxes outside Pare District, they demonstrated their unwillingness to pay--without consultation--taxes along the lines of traditional tribute. Thus, in 1947, the idea of a graduated tax was dropped, the poll tax rate raised to twelve shillings, and new procedures in local government introduced which provided for popular representation in district decision-making as we saw in Chapter II.

Women in Politics

Today, many people in Usangi recall the fact that Usangi women participated as political activists in a crucial episode and this recollection has an impact at the present time. Usangi people tend to use the women's mobilization as a symbol of female political ability. Both men and women point to it with a sense of pride and accomplishment. They say women helped men win one of the earliest political struggles known in the district and that Usangi women could be effectively mobilized again. As the figures in Table IV-1 indicate, men fill the majority of cell leader positions, just as men have always assumed political authority in Pare society. However, women in Usangi have also come to be considered desirable candidates for political tasks such as cell leaders because of the events we discussed above.

The tax controversy provoked Usangi women to support the position which their men had taken and to engage in special types of political activities. The political orientation of these women differs from that of women in other parts of the district where such a situation did not occur. In Mbaga today women do not play an active political role. VDC meetings, which are held in both Usangi and Mbaga, always include the head of the women's branch of the party, Umoja wa Wanawake wa Tanganyika (UWT). In Mbaga the UWT head is the only woman on the VDC, while in Usangi she is one among many women. Although the Mbaga UWT head is filling a contemporary political role by representing the women's organization, she assumes a thoroughly traditional role within the VDC. She speaks only when the VDC Chairman addresses a question to her, but never independently initiates any action.

When removed from the confines of the all-male VDC, however, she is a highly verbal and aggressive person. In other words, she is not retiring and submissive by nature--only when cast into a situation of role conflict.

In short, women in Mbaga continue to lack the background which women in Usangi have acquired and which helps to equip them to play modern political roles.

Cell Composition

Another situation which appears to be associated with the large number of female cell leaders in Usangi is a disbalance in the male-female ratio of cell composition. This disbalance results from the patterns of labor migration found in Pare District. The pattern is most pronounced in Usangi. Labor migration patterns have important consequences for the election of cell leaders.

Men in Usangi characteristically go outside their home areas in the mountains to earn wages. A young man who has completed primary school goes to a nearby city or agricultural estate to find a job. He is motivated by a desire to acquire cash for taxes and for bridewealth. But, equally important, going outside for wage labor for at least a few years presents a contemporary rite de passage in the successive stages of his social maturity. Many men who go outside in this way remain there in employment for ten or twenty years. Others return home after only a few years. Regardless of the amount of time spent outside, Usangi continues to be their home. Men marry their wives in Usangi, they build their houses in Usangi, and they rear their children in Usangi, thereby retaining strong ties to the home area (W. O'Barr 1970).

Data on labor migration are difficult to obtain because the patterns are both complex and fluid. One indicator that proved feasible to use in this study was to ask each cell leader to recall who, among his constituents, earned his livelihood in Usangi and who worked outside the ward. Table IV-2[3] summarizes the cell leaders' responses to this question. As can be seen, there is a vast difference between the composition of Usangi cells and those of Mbaga. The proportion of male household heads who are outside the ward for wage labor is over three-fourths in some fifteen percent of the Usangi cells. The contrast in the Mbaga

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[3]Table IV-2 presents the best information available on the practice of men going outside the home areas for employment. During the interview with each cell leader, I asked him to give me a list of all the people in his cell. I recorded the names of the household heads, the number of wives each male household head had, whether both wives lived in his cell or were divided between two cells, where each household head worked and what he did, and how each head was related to the cell leader. Although I was aware of the fact that the cell leader often did not know a man's exact job or location (was he a tailor in Moshi? or was it in Arusha? Did he work for the Health Department? or Comworks?), the cell leaders always knew whether or not that man lived and worked in Usangi or Mbaga.

Later, when I began to interview cell members, my assistant and I had to compile schedules for the interviews. We relied on the list the cell leader gave us. Of a total of 73 households in seven cells in Usangi, I found three errors in the original lists given by the cell leaders. Twice a man who had recently died and whose household was now disbanded was listed. Once a recently married son who now had built his own house was not listed. There is a margin of error then for the Usangi sample of approximately four percent in the cells in which I interviewed cell members. I have no reason to believe that the margin of error for all the cells is any larger.

In Mbaga, in compiling an interview schedule for members of three cells from the leader's lists, I found one error. A man popularly regarded as "cursed," who lived completely alone, was not mentioned by his cell leader. It later developed that although his house seemed to fit into the area encompassed by one cell, the leader of the neighboring cell took responsibility for him because the other leader did not. Again, out of 30 households, one was not listed, a margin of error of three percent, which I have no reason to believe would be appreciably greater for the ward as a whole.

situation is striking: there are no ten-house cells in Mbaga in which more than three-fourths of the male household heads are outside the ward for work. At the other end of the continuum, an equally impressive pattern is evident. In sixty-four percent of the Mbaga cells, less than one-fourth of the male household heads are outside. In only sixteen percent of the Usangi cells is this the case. Thus, as the data in Table IV-2 indicate, the proportion of male household heads who work outside their ward is very much higher in Usangi than it is in Mbaga.

TABLE IV-2

CELL COMPOSITION: PERCENTAGE OF CELLS IN USANGI AND MBAGA HAVING DIFFERENT PROPORTIONS OF MALE HOUSEHOLD HEADS RESIDING OUTSIDE THEIR WARDS

Proportion of Male Household Heads Outside	Usangi[a]	Mbaga
Over 3/4	15.4% (10)	- (0)
1/2 to 3/4	33.8% (22)	5.9% (2)
1/4 to 1/2	33.8% (22)	29.4% (10)
less than 1/4	16.9% (11)	64.7% (22)
Total	100.0% (65)	100.0% (34)

[a]Data on one Usangi cell missing.

I argued in the previous section that Usangi women established a precedent for political activism by their role in the tax riots which carries over into the present and creates a situation favoring their election as ten-house leaders. The pattern of labor migration

characteristic of Usangi further contributes to a situation favoring their election. Many Usangi men are outside their wards for extended periods of time. In their absence, political tasks are often assumed by women. Informants frequently expressed the belief that people have confidence in the ability of women to look after local affairs when their men are away.

It seems important at this point to ask whether the cells which elect female leaders are those with higher proportions of males residing outside. That is, do women elect each other to lead them when their husbands are away? Or are female cell leaders elected by both men and women, in cells where many of the men are at home in Usangi? We can see by inspection of Table IV-3 that the proportions of men outside are roughly equivalent in cells with female leaders and in those with male leaders. The data suggest that the proportion of males outside the cell is not related to the sex of the cell leader. This finding tends to strengthen the argument that women in Usangi are regarded by everyone (not just other women) as able for positions of political leadership.

We suggest, then, that the general position of all women in Usangi, coupled with a social system characterized by high labor migration, helps to explain the political role that women play there. Their role is in contrast to that played by other Pare women throughout the district. In Mbaga, not only do women lack a history of political activism but they also lack the impetus to assume political roles which results when large numbers of men are away. As the figures in Table IV-2 show, relatively few men leave Mbaga to work outside. (The reasons for this are suggested in the section of this chapter on occupation.) Thus, a woman in Mbaga is not considered a potential candidate for a ten-house

leader. Frequently informants emphasized how hypothetically they would have no objection to a female cell leader, but that they had never considered the possibility. The exclusion of women from the political arena, a practice which stems from traditional times, continues uninterrupted in Mbaga.

TABLE IV-3

CELL COMPOSITION BY SEX OF CELL LEADER: PERCENTAGE OF USANGI CELLS UNDER MALE AND FEMALE LEADERS HAVING DIFFERENT PROPORTIONS OF MALE HOUSEHOLD HEADS RESIDING OUTSIDE THEIR WARDS

Proportion of Male Household Heads Outside	Male Cell[a] Leaders	Female Cell Leaders
Over 3/4	14% (7)	20% (3)
1/2 to 3/4	32% (16)	40% (6)
1/4 to 1/2	38% (19)	20% (3)
Less than 1/4	16% (8)	20% (3)
Total	100% (50)	100% (15)

[a]Data on one Usangi cell missing.

Age

Age is a second variable which differentiates the two sets of leaders. A social, rather than a chronological, indicator of age is used in this study because obtaining accurate data on chronological age is impossible among people who place minimal importance on it. For example, frequently a Pare man does not know his birthdate. Instead, he would

know that he is older than two of his siblings, or that he was born before the railroad cut through the Pare foothills, or that when he was a boy an Mbaga chief was chosen to rule in Usangi. Because of the difficulties inherent in discovering peoples' chronological age, a measure of social age, the achievement of grandparent status, is used.

Achieving the status of a grandparent in Pare society represents a significant stage in an individual's social maturity. A man or woman of forty-five years of age who is a grandparent is socially a very different person from a forty-five-year-old who has only recently married. A grandparent has passed through many of the successive steps in the life cycle and now enjoys the authority that experience and dependents command.

As the data in Table IV-4 demonstrate, one-half of the Usangi ten-house cell leaders are grandparents while only one-fourth of the Mbaga leaders are. Thus, Usangi leaders tend to be older than their Mbaga counterparts. Let us consider some possible explanations for this difference between those who are selected as leaders in the two sites.

The most important differences which I am able to find between Usangi and Mbaga are the criteria which informants report using to select the ten-house cell leaders in the two sites. Usangi respondents say that emphasis was placed on choosing experienced persons, people whom others consider knowledgeable in the ways of meetings and of talking to people. Informants suggest that since these attributes are correlates of long-term experience and social maturity, older people were more likely candidates for these leadership positions.

TABLE IV-4

AGE OF CELL LEADERS

	Usangi	Mbaga
Is a grandparent	53.0% (35)	26.5% (9)
Is not a grandparent	47.0% (29)	73.5% (25)
Total	100.0% (64)	100.0% (34)

$X^2 = 6.42$, $p < .05$.

In Mbaga, people report that other criteria were used in choosing cell leaders. Informants say that those who came from district headquarters to introduce the cell system stressed the idea that people should choose the most "modern" persons among them as the leaders. Great emphasis was placed on the innovative role that cell leaders should play among their peers. "Modern" men tend to be younger men who have had opportunities for schooling which were not available long ago. Therefore, people in Mbaga tended to select younger men as their cell leaders--those among them who had the greater opportunities for education.

Another factor is involved in the Mbaga situation. Many people responded warily to the directive to establish cells when it was announced. Respondents expressed the belief that the successive changes in local administration which they had witnessed over the years had benefited them little. They felt that another change was not likely to benefit them either: it was just more politics, promises rather than

accomplishments.[4] Therefore, respondents claim that many people in Mbaga elected individuals as their cell leaders because they were thought not to be influential persons and hence would not be likely to bother those who chose them. In other words, people sought to comply with the directive to establish cells but they did not want to become actively involved in the ten-house cell system. Informants claim that many people sought to avoid involvement by electing individuals who would have little authority over them for other reasons. Young men who are without married sons, men who are still under the influence of their own fathers, have little freedom to think or act independently and do not command much respect from their fellows. Young men who lack an authority base in their own neighborhoods and among their own kinsmen and clansmen can be ignored more readily in the political arena than can older men and traditional elders. This is probably another reason why such relatively young men tended to be elected as cell leaders in Mbaga.

Thus, the differences which are easily noted between the ages of Usangi and Mbaga leaders appear to be related to the different criteria which were used to select leaders in the two sites. As we shall see in Chapter VI, these age differences in turn affect the performance of leaders' jobs.

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[4]Mbaga respondents report that before independence chiefs and people worked together on community wide projects. But they say there is no Kipare word for politics. Siasa since independence has a definite meaning: promising things which never materialize on the part of leaders, appearing to agree to decisions but never working for their implementation on the part of people. Cells were simply more siasa as far as the people of Mbaga were concerned and leaders elected with "tongue in cheek" according to some informants. See Chapter II for a further discussion of siasa.

Religion

Usangi cell leaders are seventy-five percent Muslim, while those of Mbaga are seventy-five percent Christian. A leader's religion is important, both for what it explains about him individually and for what it shows about the content of his political action. Differences in religion between the two sets of leaders is an important variable in explaining what cell leaders do, as we shall see in the chapters which follow.

Figures on the religious affiliation of cell leaders are shown in Table IV-5. A preponderance of Muslims is found among Usangi leaders. Non-Christians have not had the same opportunities as Christians for education and employment. When most cell leaders were of school age, education was generally mission controlled. Christians tended to acquire more education which equipped them for employment outside Usangi. Thus, in Usangi, the population of males who remain at home is more likely to be Muslim; a higher percentage of Muslims is in the potential population of cell leaders.

TABLE IV-5

RELIGION OF CELL LEADERS

	Usangi	Mbaga[a]
Christian[b]	27.3% (18)	78.6% (22)
Muslim	72.7% (48)	21.4% (6)
Total	100.0% (66)	100.0% (28)

$X^2 = 21.16$, $p < .001$.

[a]Three leaders practiced traditional religion and three said they had no religion. They are excluded from these calculations.

[b]The sample includes thirty-seven Lutherans and three Roman Catholics.

In contrast to the Usangi case, three-fourths of the Mbaga cell leaders are Christians. As was noted in the first section of this chapter, men in Mbaga do not tend to seek work outside their homes very frequently. Thus, a situation like that of Usangi does not occur. Rather, I suggest that Christian cell leaders are in a majority in Mbaga because the population of the ward is overwhelmingly Christian. The ward of Mbaga-Mshewa contains the mission nucleus for the entire division. As a result, mission proselytizing was more extensive in Mbaga-Mshewa than in neighboring areas and nearly all of the people in the ward consider themselves Christian.

Religion of Female Cell Leaders

A second charactistic of the data which we are discussing merits comment: there are statistically significant differences between male and female leaders in Usangi vis-à-vis religion. As the figures in Table IV-6 show, sixty-seven percent of the Usangi female leaders are Christian. For women, membership in Christian churches provides more opportunities for participation and leadership in the local religious group than does mosque membership. The experience gained there becomes a qualification for recognition and selection as a neighborhood leader. Informants often referred to a particular female cell leader as also being an important leader on the church farm or board of elders.

The proposition that there is a spill-over effect from activity in the religious group to political activity is valid only with reference to women. The situation for men is very different, as we shall see below. The Christian church, as organized by the Lutherans in Pare

District, emphasizes the role of women. Women manage a highly successful communal farm at the Usangi church. They hold numerous voluntary jobs within the church, serving as youth advisors, church elders, and guild members. Christian women are allowed to participate in decision-making within the church more than Muslim women are allowed to participate in decision-making within their own religious groups.

TABLE IV-6

RELIGION OF USANGI LEADERS BY SEX

	Males	Females
Christians	15.7% (8)	66.7% (10)
Muslims	84.3% (43)	33.3% (5)
Total	100.0% (51)	100.0% (15)

$X^2 = 15.19$, $p < .001$.

It might be asked at this point, if the above generalizations are true about the influence of Christianity on women, why there are no female cell leaders in a predominantly Christian area like Mbaga. The discussion in the first and second sections of this chapter suggested that Usangi women participated in politics because of an historical accident and the contemporary labor situation. The fact that women in Mbaga are largely Christian has not been a sufficient condition to alter their traditionally non-political, non-active role. Structurally, the Lutheran Church in both Usangi and Mbaga is identical. Both, for example,

require the election of female elders to represent the geographic areas from which church membership is drawn. In Mbaga, however, the women are only token representatives. They attend meetings, because they have been told to attend by the missionaries and by the African clergy which succeeded them, but they do not interact with the males on the board. They say that the making of decisions in such a context is a thing that men, not women, do. Understanding this attitude in greater depth is beyond the scope of the present study. Here, its prevalence is only acknowledged. The important point for the present inquiry is that the church was established in both Usangi and Mbaga at approximately the same time and in a similar fashion. Since that time, however, reception to the church in each of the two places has varied.

The Religious Homogeneity of Cells

Although more than one religious group is found in any single area of Pare District, there has been little conflict between the groups. Islam first came to the Pare Mountains at the end of the nineteenth century. It was brought by coastal Arabs who accompanied traders on caravan routes which passed through the Pare foothills. The German missionaries arrived just after the turn of the century and by 1910 were running several stations throughout the district. Each group tended to settle in religiously "unclaimed" territory. Because the groups of proselyters and their converts were separated, they interacted relatively infrequently. However, as each expanded, conflict occasionally occurred. Buffer zones have disappeared and some areas have become subject to multiple religious influences. In general it may be

said that up to the present time, each religious group has had sufficient room for expansion and the struggle for converts was never a highly competitive one which became politicized.

Descriptive statistics for the proposition that areas tend to be religiously homogeneous are found in Table IV-7, which shows the religion of ten cell leaders and the distribution of their cell members between the Christian and Muslim faiths. The data come from interviews with the cell members of ten cells in Usangi and Mbaga. Although these data cannot be read as representative of the wards in any way, they are included to illustrate the point that many neighborhoods, now divided into cells, tend to be homogeneous with regard to religion. This is a result of the fact that they were contacted by only one religious group initially and conversion has remained constant and without subsequent competition.

Christian Ethos and Muslim Ethos

Christians and Muslims each display a rather distinct ethos in the conduct of their daily activities. The Muslim ethos emphasizes accommodation while that of the Christians is more rigid and uncompromising. It is not suggested that these dispositions are the only ones which guide Muslim and Christian activities. Rather, each ethos is viewed as a factor which can help to explain what types of individuals the members of the two religious groups are when they assume the role of cell leader. A few examples will be illustrative. In the Lutheran churches of Pare District, when a man marries a second wife, a custom allowed in traditional Pare culture, he faces excommunication from the

church. The church's position is that he knows by marrying the second wife he has foreclosed for himself the possibilities of membership in the Christian community. His excommunication is always tried before the board of elders of the church, many of the members of which are also cell leaders. The necessity for the same individuals to play conflicting roles frequently creates difficulties for them in the conduct of both religious and political affairs.

TABLE IV-7

PERCENTAGE OF HOUSEHOLD HEADS BEING OF THE SAME RELIGION AS THEIR ELECTED LEADER

	Percent
Usangi	
Leader A (Muslim)	73
Leader B (Muslim)	80
Leader C (Muslim)	100
Leader D (Muslim)	100
Leader E (Christian)	75
Leader F (Christian)	80
Leader G (Christian)	94
Mbaga	
Leader A (Christian)	100
Leader B (Christian)	100
Leader C (Christian)	100

One such conflict which existed in Mbaga during the fieldwork period is the case of C. C, a cell leader, had been a prominent figure in the church until he married a second wife. The second wife was a young girl, a student who was boarding in C's home under church auspices. She became pregnant by C. He married her and was expelled from the local congregation. C is an ambitious man, a man with many ideas, who had had considerable influence over his peers because of his abilities to lead them. He was a founder of the Pare Union in Mbaga. He had a large coffee farm. Unable to operate in the religious arena after his expulsion, he turned to his role as cell leader and undertook his political duties with enthusiasm. But people, both in his cell and in the ward, continually rebuffed him. They claimed that his behavior vis-à-vis the young girl had shown his real personality. They said that such a man could no longer be a positive influence in politics. Many people refused to cooperate with him. Eventually he simply stopped being concerned with his cell. He and his cell members lapsed into a state of hostile inactivity. Much the same thing happened in C's relations with other cell leaders in the ward. Like his cell members, they believed his behavior had been disgraceful and withdrew the support they had once given him in the political arena. A conflict of this nature obviously impaired his operation as a cell leader, both with reference to his leadership of his own cell and to his ability to cooperate with other cells and their leaders.

The Muslim ethos emphasizes accommodation. Muslim practices do not require that people alter their traditional customs as drastically as Christian practices do. Muslims, for example, allow a man to take

several wives and thereby avoid one of the main sources of controversy between the local populace and the Christian church. In addition, Muslims appear to take a more lenient view of inter-faith marriage. They stress the fact that it is better for all people to live as Pare than to be divided along religious grounds.

One particularly well-known court case in Usangi appears to have solidified public opinion on this point. The daughter of Christian parents, trained as a nurse and therefore somewhat freer than her traditional counterparts to do as she pleased, announced her intention to marry a Muslim boy of Usangi. The parents were against it and tried to persuade her not to do so. She refused their advice and went ahead with the marriage. The Muslim boy then presented bridewealth to her father, hereby complying with both Pare custom and local law. The father accepted it, thereby giving his formal approval to the union. The girl's mother took her husband to court, saying that she would never approve the union of a Christian and a Muslim and that she would not accept the bridewealth. The court ruled that her husband, the girl's father, could accept the bridewealth if he wished and if he recognized what it symbolized. They ruled that the girl's mother did not have to accept the money or its meaning. She could simply continue to refuse to recognize the union, but she was to enjoy none of the benefits from the bridewealth.

Community opinion afterwards seemed to rest with the father; people say that they are learning to accept the inevitable, as surprising as it is nowadays. Many people feel that in situations like this one, accommodation to events, to change, is preferable to alienating one's own children. Many informants cite this attitude as more characteristic

of Muslims than Christians. They see it as proof of the greater flexibility of Muslims in comparison to Christians, the latter being generally more rigid in situations requiring accommodation to something new.

Christian and Muslim Organization and Supra-Local Linkages

A second factor, which is based in the differences in organization between the two religious groups, is related to who the cell leaders are. A Christian cell leader is an individual who has become accustomed through the organization of his church to a relatively isolated and provincial view of events. He has had little experience with supra-local linkages. A Muslim cell leader, however, has numerous links with other groups throughout the nation and generally tends to have a wider and more open perspective on men and events. A few examples will make these differences clear.

The Lutherans in both Mbaga and Usangi rely heavily on the clergy to make decisions and to represent the congregation outside the local area. This practice stems from the fact that until the 1950's European missionaries directed Lutheran Church affairs and always assumed organizational responsibilities of this nature. The African clergy who have replaced them have not altered the church's structure, although they express the desire to do so. Thus, it is the pastor, not an elected man or committee of men from the congregation, who represents the local parish at district and national meetings.[5] This practice tends to give

[5]There are exceptions to this practice. One member from each congregation is elected as a delegate to the annual conference, for example. But in general comparative terms, it is the pastor who assumes the responsibility of speaking for the congregation on a supra-local basis.

the local congregation a narrow perspective on their activities and does not further their awareness of belonging to and participating in a larger group, based today on the nation-state.

There was friction before independence between the Lutheran Church and TANU. The clergy never preached against TANU per se, but their sermons were filled with dire warnings about what the changes which were sweeping the country would mean in terms of lax moral standards and disruption of community order. The most widely discussed result of their stand was the prohibition by the church to the effect that Christian youths from Mbaga could not participate in a TANU Youth League rally in the district. The church took the position that whatever the benefits in political education which would come as a result of the two-day rally, the possibilities for trouble from mixing young people in such a "free" atmosphere were likely to be worse.

The Muslim faith is equipped structurally to deal with supra-local activity in a different manner than the Christians. The religious leaders of the mosque do not assume the same organizational responsibilities that their Christian counterparts do. Theirs is the theological sphere; day-to-day mosque affairs are in the hands of committees of members. Even in cases such as disciplinary actions, etc., the religious leader is called in to give advice of a technical nature; he does not assume the importance of the pastor in the debate. Muslims also have a practice of sending delegations of members around to the other mosques of the district and the region, to relay news, to make plans, to celebrate holidays, etc. This kind of participation by mosque members gives them an experience and predisposition to external ties which the

Christians lack.

The Christians have no equivalent of the East African Muslim Welfare Society. Although there has been controversy recently at the national level about the purposes and future direction of the society, its impact in the rural areas remains profound: Muslims in even the most remote areas identify with a national whole (Africa Report 1969:29-30).

Another local Muslim practice bears mention. Each neighborhood mosque has its own self-help society. The Christians have no counterpart of this. A self-help society collects small amounts of money from its members, perhaps a shilling or so to join and a shilling per year thereafter. The money is available to members in time of trouble either as a loan or as an outright gift. The conditions on which money is given are determined on an ad hoc basis by the society's central committee. If a man dies away from home, the society might pay the expenses of transporting his body home. A man can borrow certain sums from the treasury to tide him over when the mosque decides his need is great. The specific conditions vary from mosque to mosque. However, for every Muslim there is a society to which he can turn in time of trouble and this tends to solidify his bonds with fellow Muslims in a way the Christian church does not.

Finally, it must be pointed out that the Muslim faith is often considered synonymous with participation in a wider national and Swahili culture. Muslims use Swahili in their religious services, never Chasu, as the Lutherans do. The wearing of small Muslim caps is part of national "Swahili" dress. Much that was and is anti-colonial in terms of political ideology is also implicitly anti-Christian. Denial of white

superiority, emphasis on practical education, accommodation of diverse points of view, etc., are all important political banners today. Where some Pare are explicitly anti-neo-colonialist, they are often also implicitly anti-Christian. A strong current exists within the church to remove these remnants of the past. But the memory is there and has its effect. Nevertheless, the situation is a constantly changing one, and the church is a resilient institution.

The religion of a cell leader and the religious composition of his political arena affect the way in which he goes about his political tasks. Muslims tend to be more accommodating in their dealings with others. They lack the rigidness which has come to be associated with the Christian church in Pare District. Muslims also have had a longer history of participation in supra-local groups. They have developed an ability to identify with outsiders, which Christians have not. The differences in these religiously based orientations are related to differences in the way they perform their duties as cell leaders. As we shall see in Chapters V and VI, Muslim cell leaders engage in different activities than Christian ones do.

Degree of Literacy and Educational Level

The cell leaders of Mbaga tend to be more literate and to have reached a higher level of education than their Usangi counterparts. Data which substantiate these statements are found in Table IV-8 and Table IV-9. Table IV-8 is a breakdown of the degree of literacy of ten-house leaders. The proportion of Usangi cell leaders who are less than

functionally literate is high, twenty-four percent. In Mbaga the proportion is low--only eight percent of the cell leaders are less than functionally literate. Table IV-9 divides cell leaders by educational level. Similar proportions of cell leaders in each site reached Standards 3 and 4. However, thirty-nine percent of the Usangi leaders have less than a Standard 3 education whereas forty-one percent of the Mbaga leaders have an upper primary education.[6]

TABLE IV-8

DEGREE OF LITERACY OF CELL LEADERS

	Usangi	Mbaga
Functionally literate[a]	75.8% (50)	91.2% (31)
Less than functionally literate	24.2% (16)	8.8% (3)
Total	100.0% (66)	100.0% (34)

$X^2 = 3.47$, $p < .10$.

[a]Literacy is defined as claiming the ability to write one's name and to read simple notices.

The higher degree of literacy in Mbaga is a result of more intense mission activity there. From 1908 onward, German missionaries and their wives held schools in the mission house at Manka to introduce education and religion simultaneously to the local people. Many old people

[6]No difference was found between the male and female leaders of Usangi on the basis of literacy or education when chi-square tests were run.

in Mbaga tell stories about these early contacts. The theme running through their recollections is a great desire for education. A young man hears of how the strangers teach new ways to communicate. He goes to the mission station to learn these new things and acquires a new religion as well.

TABLE IV-9

EDUCATIONAL LEVEL OF CELL LEADERS[a]

	Usangi	Mbaga
Less than Standard 3	39.4% (26)	14.7% (5)
Standards 3 and 4	47.0% (31)	44.1% (15)
Upper Primary School	13.6% (9)	41.2% (14)
Total	100.0% (66)	100.0% (34)

$X^2 = 11.85$, $p < .01$.

[a]The Tanganyikan school system is divided in three levels: Lower Primary School (Standards 1 through 4), Upper Primary School (Standards 5 through 7; Standard 8 has been phased out); and Secondary School (Forms 1 through 4). Schools are financed by church, private, central government or local government agencies. All are under the supervision of the Ministry of Education.

In Usangi, on the other hand, the nucleus of mission activity was not in the ward of Kighare. While schools and education spread there early, the area was not as completely encompassed by the mission-education complex as the ward of Mshewa in Mbaga was. A paradoxical situation resulted: some of the remote areas of Kighare have no schools

at all although the center of the ward has a higher concentration of educational facilities than any other part in Pare District, including district headquarters. Today, students board in this core area of Usangi in order to avail themselves of these educational facilities. But these facilities do not extend to and include lower primary schools in remoter areas. In Mbaga, however, every area, no matter how remote, has at least a lower primary school, evidence of mission determination to reach a maximum number of people.

Differences in the levels of education reached by leaders is again linked to mission activity in the two sites. When a boy had finished his first four years at the local mission school, the mission helped him gain entrance into an upper primary school on another mission station. Later, upper primary schools were built on nearly every local mission complex. The opportunity for advanced education was greater the more intense the mission activity in an area. This hypothesis is clearly borne out by the differences shown in Table IV-9.

A second phenomenon is operating vis-à-vis literacy and education levels as well. Pare District was the scene of a large-scale United Nations sponsored literacy campaign in the early 1950's (Mason 1952:212-219). The campaign began in Usangi. There, thousands of men and women learned to read and write in literacy classes which were held in neighborhoods throughout the wards. The effort was so successful it moved into a second stage of community development, the teaching of improved agricultural methods, reforestation, road-building, cooking, sewing, etc. When the second stage had been reached in Usangi, development teams went into South Pare, where priorities were reversed.

In Mbaga priority was placed on community development tasks rather than on literacy. The percentage of illiterates was relatively low when the teams arrived. Other tasks, such as building a road to gain access to the area, assumed primacy. Interestingly, there is an increased emphasis on adult education in Mbaga at the present time. Classes, run by the community development staff, are being given for the benefit of those who have become functionally illiterate over the years due to failure to use the skills acquired in German schools.

Here we should ask whether literacy or a specific educational level is a prerequisite for being a cell leader. Is it necessary for an individual to be able to read and write in order for him to serve as a cell leader?

Local politics in rural Tanzania is primarily a verbal process. News comes into the area by word of mouth, either via the radio or from people who have traveled outside and now returned home. No newspapers are published in the district, nor do any enter on a regular basis. None are sold at the shops throughout the district, except at Same, district headquarters. The church and agricultural extension agents sell monthly house organs, but with little success. One agricultural agent reported he had not been able to sell his quota of five newspapers among five thousand farmers for two months.[7]

Although political meetings are often announced by a notice being tacked to a tree in a public gathering spot, someone who is able to read is always present and will tell others its message. Even in meetings of

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[7]Personal communication.

the VDC, literacy skills are not crucial for participation. Letters coming from district headquarters are read aloud to the VDC members; it is not necessary for each member to be able to read. And any letter that is read is always reinterpreted by those who had personal communication with its author.

As long as some people can serve as translators, the degree of literacy among leaders is of minimum importance. Politics is interpersonal interaction at this level and information as well as political ideology is spread verbally. The salience of literacy would be increased if the widespread use of information were dependent on the written word. Then presumably the literates (and the changed perspectives on the world they possess as a result of their literacy) would be in a position to receive and act in response to new stimuli in a way which would advantage them. But as the situation now stands, this does not occur. The result is that literacy is of minimal relevance in explaining the dynamics of politics at this local level.

Occupation

Thus far in Chapter IV we have examined four variables which differentiate the cell leaders of Usangi from those of Mbaga--the sex, age, religion, and education of the cell leaders. This section deals with a series of variables related to occupation--the farming and non-farming activities of cell leaders, the size and location of their farms, and the types of cash crops that they plant. A majority of cell leaders in both places are subsistence farmers. Land shortage is acute

in Usangi. As a result, Usangi cell leaders farm both on their mountain plots and on additional land located on the nearby plains. Land shortage is not as acute in Mbaga and we find that Mbaga cell leaders seldom cultivate farms on the plains surrounding their highland homes. In spite of the difference in the location of their farms, leaders in both places report having farms of similar size. The Usangi cell leaders who are farmers supplement their subsistence farming by petty commercial activities. The Mbaga cell leaders who are farmers supplement their subsistence farming by extensive cash cropping.

The economy of Usangi and of Mbaga is based on subsistence agriculture. The majority of cell leaders in each site are farmers, as the figures in Table IV-10 indicate. Some sixty percent of the Usangi leaders and seventy-six percent of the Mbaga leaders report that their primary occupation is farming.

The opportunities for non-farming employment are not great in either Usangi or Mbaga. However, because Usangi-Kighare is the headquarters for the divisional government office and the site of a large government hospital and many schools, it offers more institutional opportunities for cash employment than Mbaga does. As the data in Table IV-10 show, fifteen Usangi cell leaders work full time in semi-skilled positions. Only one Mbaga cell leader does this. All of the occupations listed in Table IV-10 enable a man to continue farming while he is working. He, his wives and children farm just as full-time farmers, their wives and children do. The orientation and outlook of full and part-time farmers is so similar that, as the following chapter shows, no differences in the cell leaders' performances are correlated with occupation.

TABLE IV-10

OCCUPATION OF CELL LEADERS

		Usangi[a]		Mbaga
Farmers		60.8% (31)		76.5% (27)
Non-Farmers		39.2% (20)		23.5% (7)
Unskilled				
Day laborer	1	1	1	3
"Boy"	0		2	
Semi-Skilled				
Carpenter	4	15	0	1
Mason, Builder	2		1	
Shop Assistant	1		0	
Timber Cutter	2		0	
Shoe Repairman	1		0	
Trader in Pots or Fish	5		0	
Skilled				
Shopkeeper	3	4	3	3
Schoolteacher	1		0	
	Total	100.0% (51)		100.0% (34)

[a]Female cell leaders are omitted from this table because occupational criteria apply only to men in Pare society. All the female cell leaders are farmers.

The cell leaders in both Usangi and Mbaga who report being full-time farmers usually supplement their subsistence activity with some

part-time job which will bring them cash income. In Usangi, where opportunities for employment exist and where land is scarce, people depend on unskilled and semi-skilled jobs to earn money for taxes, school fees, and day-to-day family needs. Many farmers work part-time as traders in fish and earthenware pots, as assistants in the building trades, or as day laborers on the farms of men who work outside. In Mbaga, where these opportunities for employment are lacking and where land remains relatively more plentiful, people cash crop to acquire income. As a result of these practices, there is no clear-cut division in Usangi and Mbaga between farmers and non-farmers. Full-time farmers frequently engage in non-farming activities to supplement their incomes and full-time wage earners (with the help of their families) continue in subsistence farming activities.

Cell leaders (whether they are full- or part-time farmers) in both sites report holding farms of the same size. However, the source of farm land for Usangi leaders and Mbaga leaders is significantly different. This difference is a function of differences in land scarcity between the two places. The Mbaga cell leaders have large farms close to their homes in the mountain highlands. The mean size of mountain farms among Mbaga leaders is 4.3 acres. No one reports having a farm of one acre or less. In contrast, the mean size of mountain farms among Usangi leaders is 3.1 acres, and seventeen percent of the leaders report having plots of only one acre.

Traditionally, a man's land is acquired through his patrilineal clan and is allocated on clan land near the patrilocal residence. As population pressure on the land has increased, people have been driven

to other land sources. One of these is the plains which surround the Pare Mountains and which are controlled by the government. Table IV-11 shows the extent to which Usangi leaders have been forced to this land source.[8] Two-thirds of the Usangi cell leaders use land on the plains in conjunction with their mountain farm plots. Only two out of thirty-four Mbaga leaders cultivate on the plains.

TABLE IV-11

FARMS ON THE PLAINS

	Usangi[a]	Mbaga
Yes	67% (43)	6 % (2)
No	33% (21)	94% (32)
Total	100% (64)	100% (34)

$X^2 = 33.52$, $p < .001$.

[a]Data are missing on two Usangi leaders.

[8]Here male and female leaders are included in the figures. Female cell leaders were asked to report farm holdings and cash cropping activities for their households as a unit. Men were asked to respond in this way as well, so that a man might report the holdings of his two wives, or a woman the total under control of her husband if she were one of two wives. The household, then, is the unit here, not the individual, as it was in the calculations about cell composition.

These represent peoples' estimates of their farm size and are in no way to be taken as reports of actual measurements. People have been told by the agricultural agents the size of their farms. The traditional way of measuring land, kivale (pl. vivale), which meant the land between two waterways, was reckoned to equal one acre. There is a large measure of error here, but I believe it to be consistent for all. These figures are only indications of data which are very difficult to obtain and should be read as such.

As a result of the practice of Usangi cell leaders supplementing their mountain holdings, cell leaders in both sites report very similar sizes for their total farm holdings. The mean total farm size of Usangi leaders is 4.3 acres and of Mbaga leaders 4.4 acres. Land holdings of this size appear typical of the holdings of most men in Pare District. The cell members who were interviewed in this study report having farms of comparable size. Usangi cell members have a mean total farm size of 3.7 acres and those of Mbaga have a mean total farm size of 4.1 acres. While no claim of representativeness is made for the figures on farm size of cell members, they seem to indicate what my own observations did. Cell leaders do not appear to differ from members in terms of farm size and therefore wealth. Land is not plentiful in Pare District today. Most men have managed to acquire sufficient land for their needs. Those who do not have sufficient land must either acquire usage rights in a traditional manner or avail themselves of government land on the plains. Those who have more land than they need must share with others. They do this both because of traditional obligations and the dictum of the Arusha Declaration which says that all land is the property of the government and belongs for a period to the man who uses it.

Usangi and Mbaga cell leaders use the farm land that they have in different ways. The frequency of cash cropping is shown in Table IV-12 and the types of cash crops planted are shown in Table IV-13. As these figures indicate, Mbaga cell leaders tend to plant cash crops more frequently than Usangi cell leaders. Nearly all of the Mbaga cell leaders (ninety-four percent) plant some cash crops, whereas

only half (fifty-three percent) of the Usangi leaders do. And among those who plant cash crops, there is again a great difference. Ninety-seven percent of the Mbaga ten-house leaders who cash crop plant coffee; only seventy-nine percent of the Usangi leaders who cash crop plant coffee. Differences in the type of cash crops planted are related to differences in the location of farms for the two sets of leaders: the plains are unsuitable for coffee cultivation, but highly suited to other kinds of cash crops. Thus, among the Usangi leaders who cash crop, there is a diversity in the types of crops planted which results from planting on the plains as well as on the mountain slopes.

TABLE IV-12

CASH CROPPING

	Usangi	Mbaga
Yes	53.0% (35)	94.1% (32)
No	47.0% (31)	5.9% (2)
Total	100.0% (66)	100.0% (34)

$X^2 = 17.13$, $p < .001$.

In both Usangi and Mbaga, the coffee farmer is a small-scale cash cropper. There is no difference between the leaders of the two places in terms of the amount of money they make from the crops they plant. For example, two or three sacks of coffee is the typical yield

of the average farmer. The amount he gets varies from year to year, depending both on climatic conditions and on the amount of care and attention the farmer gives his coffee. The price paid by the cooperative society which buys the coffee also varies from year to year. Typically, a farmer realizes not more than one hundred shillings per sack of coffee. The price paid for other cash crops is similar. No cell leader reported realizing more than two or three hundred shillings a year from all cash cropping endeavors.

TABLE IV-13

CASH CROPS PLANTED

	Usangi[a]	Mbaga
Coffee	79% (27)	97% (31)
Other[b]	21% (7)	3% (1)
Total	100% (34)	100% (34)

$X^2 = 4.72$, $p < .01$.

[a]Data missing on one Usangi cell leader.

[b]Other includes corn, beans, European fruits and vegetables, rice, and cotton.

The figures presented in this section suggest that while subsistence agriculture is the economic base of each area, there are important variations in the overall economic patterns of each. Mbaga leaders cash crop more frequently and engage in wage labor or petty

commercial activities less frequently. Usangi leaders rely less on cash cropping; instead they rely more on small-scale non-agricultural sources of income, such as crafts, trade, and commerce.

The fact that cell leaders in Usangi and Mbaga are predominantly farmers should not obscure the fact that to be a locally resident farmer in each place represents something quite different for that place. In the second section of this chapter we pointed out the significant difference between the two sites with regard to patterns of employment. In fifty percent of the Usangi cells, over one-half of the men reside outside, whereas in only six percent of the Mbaga cells are one-half of the males outside. Thus the cell leaders of Mbaga do not differ from the people that they represent--both sets are primarily farmers. However, the cell leaders of Usangi differ greatly from their constituents. This difference is a function of the requirements of the cell system: individuals must reside in Usangi on a full-time basis to be qualified for election as cell leaders.

Kin and Clan Relations Between Leaders and Members

Finally in this chapter, we consider two variables that are often alleged to be related to the cell leader's performance, his kin and clan ties to members of his cell. Both of these variables have been thought to influence political relations in rural African settings. It has been suggested, for example, that cell leaders will treat their kinsmen or clansmen in a special way, granting them favors or exempting them from political tasks. This does not appear to be the case for cell politics as they operate in Pare.

Table IV-14 shows the kin ties between leaders and members in the two wards. We find no difference on the basis of site: about fifty to sixty percent of the cell members can claim kin ties to their cell leader in each site. In both Usangi and Mbaga cells contain a majority, but not an overwhelming number, of people related to the cell leader. This situation is of course a result of patrilocal residence patterns.

TABLE IV-14

PERCENTAGE OF CELL MEMBERS LINKED TO THEIR CELL LEADER BY KIN TIES

	Usangi	Mbaga
Kin	54.7% (58)	62.3% (33)
Non-kin	45.3% (48)	37.7% (20)
Total	100.0%(106)	100.0% (53)

$X^2 = .75$, $p > .10$.

Table IV-15 shows the kin and clan ties between leaders and households in ten cells where intensive interviewing of cell members was conducted. Again a wide range of situations obtains, from cells which have an all-kin composition to those with less than twenty percent. We find cells made up only of clansmen, and cells in which no household is tied by clan lines to the leader.

Table IV-16 lists the clans of cell leaders. Fourteen clans are represented in Usangi, fifteen in Mbaga. Preponderance of Mbaga

clansmen in Usangi is explained on the basis of patrilocal residence patterns: the ward of Usangi-Kighare is an Mbaga clan one. The proposition that Mbaga clan cell leaders act differently than cell leaders belonging to other clans was tested by comparing the two groups on job performance. No significant differences were found between the two groups.

TABLE IV-15

PERCENTAGE OF HOUSEHOLD HEADS LINKED TO THEIR CELL LEADER BY KIN AND CLAN TIES

Cell Number	Number of Households	Linked by Kin Ties	Linked by Clan Ties
Usangi			
Cell 1	9	78% (7)	- (0)
Cell 2	10	70% (7)	70% (7)
Cell 3	10	70% (7)	n.d.
Cell 4	11	45% (5)	18% (2)
Cell 5	12	42% (5)	25% (4)
Cell 6	10	40% (4)	20% (2)
Cell 7	11	18% (2)	- (0)
Mbaga			
Cell 1	12	100% (12)	100% (12)
Cell 2	8	38% (3)	- (0)
Cell 3	7	43% (3)	- (0)

Tables IV-17 and IV-18 summarize data from cell members about their knowledge of and reported interactions with cell leaders. As the tables demonstrate, when cell members were divided on the basis of kin for the purposes of comparison, no differences were found in any interaction patterns. In brief, cell leaders do not appear to treat their kinsmen any differently than non-kinsmen when they are performing these cell leaders' tasks.

TABLE IV-16

CIANS OF CELL LEADERS

	Usangi	Mbaga
Mbaga	19	1
Mbwambo	1	7
Mchagga	2	-
Mndeme	9	7
Mruta	2	-
Msangi	8	-
Mshana	6	1
Msuyu	4	-
Mzava	4	4
Mzirai	4	1
Mugambo	1	-
Mvungi	2	-
Mfinanga	3	-
Mwanga	1	-
Mchani	-	1
Mchombu	-	2
Mduma	-	1
Mnjema	-	1
Mkiraweni	-	1
Mkumbwa	-	1
Mmpare	-	4
Mmweteni	-	1
Mkeni	-	1
Total	66 cell leaders representing 14 clans	34 cell leaders representing 15 clans

Conclusion

We see then that the cell leaders of Usangi and of Mbaga differ significantly from each other along several variables. Nearly a quarter of the Usangi cell leaders are women; there are no women cell leaders in Mbaga. The ward of Usangi-Kighare is characterized by a

TABLE IV-17

USANGI CELL MEMBERS' RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ON INFORMATION ABOUT AND INTERACTION WITH CELL LEADERS[a]

Questions	Responses	Percentages & Frequencies Kin	Non-Kin
1. How was your cell leader chosen?	elected by us	53.9% (41)	46.1% (35)
	appointed	50% (7)	50% (7)
	no idea	64.3% (9)	35.7% (5)
2. What kind of work does a cell leader do?	government work	73.7% (14)	26.3% (5)
	party work	41.9% (13)	58.1% (18)
	both	48.8% (21)	51.2% (22)
	no idea	80% (8)	20% (2)
3. When did your cell leader last come to see you (in his role as cell leader)?	this month	48% (36)	52% (39)
	since elected	62.5% (10)	37.5% (6)
	never came	75% (3)	25% (1)
4. Why did he come?	political	49% (24)	51% (25)
	social	53.5% (23)	46.5% (20)
5. Have you ever requested help of your cell leader?	yes	45% (9)	53.8% (42)
	no	55% (11)	46.2% (36)

[a]Frequencies and percentages are read across the rows.

TABLE IV-18

MBAGA CELL MEMBERS' RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ON INFORMATION ABOUT AND INTERACTION WITH CELL LEADERS [a]

Questions	Responses	Percentages & Frequencies Kin	Non-Kin
1. How was your cell leader chosen?	elected by us	62.9% (27)	37.2% (16)
	appointed	33.3% (2)	66.7% (4)
	no idea	- (0)	- (0)
2. What kind of work does a cell leader do?	government work	55% (11)	45% (9)
	party work	75% (6)	25% (2)
	both	57.9% (11)	42.1% (8)
	no idea	50% (1)	50% (1)
3. When did your cell leader last come to see you (in his role as cell leader)?	this month	57.1% (12)	42.9% (9)
	since elected	58.8% (10)	41.2% (7)
	never came	55.6% (5)	44.4% (4)
4. Why did he come?	political	50% (7)	50% (7)
	social	62.5% (15)	37.5% (9)
5. Have you ever requested help of your cell leader?	yes	11.1% (3)	30% (6)
	no	88.9% (24)	70% (14)

[a] Frequencies and percentages are read across the rows.

high rate of labor migration; this phenomenon occurs much less frequently in Mbaga. The fact that women in Usangi are elected to fill ten-house positions is related, we suggest, to the former political roles which women have played and to the absence of men from the local community.

Usangi cell leaders tend to be older than Mbaga cell leaders. Differences in age are linked to differences in the criteria which people employed when they were electing cell leaders.

There are also marked differences in the degree of literacy and the level of education between the two sets of leaders. Leaders in Mbaga have reached higher levels of education than those in Usangi because a large mission complex and the schools attached to it are found in the center of the ward of Mbaga-Mshewa.

Religion also differentiates between the two sets of leaders. Usangi leaders tend to be predominantly Muslim, while those of Mbaga tend to be Christian. The ethos characteristic of each religious community in turn has an impact on how leaders of each faith operate in the political arena.

A majority of leaders in both sites are subsistence farmers. Usangi cell leaders supplement their subsistence activities by petty commercial endeavors, while Mbaga cell leaders tend to plant cash crops to supplement their incomes.

Finally, kin and clan ties between cell leaders and their cell members were examined. We found that cell leaders do not appear to treat their kinsmen or clansmen any differently than non-kinsmen or non-clansmen when they are performing their cell leaders job.

CHAPTER V

CELLS AND CELL LEADERS IN OPERATION

Introduction

In Chapters I through IV of this thesis we have been dealing with two separate, but interconnected, subjects--Pare District and Tanzanian plans for political development. Data on Pare District in general and two wards within it in particular constitute the first subject. Usangi-Kighare and Mbaga-Mshewa, two wards within Pare District which exhibit both constants and variants in their political history and current administration, were described in depth. We did this by recounting some salient aspects of district political history up to the present time and by summarizing the contemporary characteristics of each ward in a comparative analysis of who its cell leaders are. The second subject dealt with in this thesis is the national government's and TANU's plans for political development in Tanzania. The national ideology of development was reviewed. One aspect of the over-all plans for development, ten-house cells, was described in depth. The rationale behind ten-house cells and their beginnings in Usangi and in Mbaga were examined.

The present chapter and the one that follows relate these two subjects, by testing two hypotheses. Given a new structure for implemen-

tation (ten-house cells) and locales (Usangi and Mbaga) which vary along certain dimensions, what happens when the structure is introduced in each place? What do cell leaders in the two places do? How do cells operate in each place? This chapter looks at the leaders of each site as a set and compares their performances with each other. The next chapter will take another perspective: given that differences between the two sets of cell leaders obtain, are there additional differences in the way cell leaders perform their duties which stem from sources other than site, such as the individual characteristics of the leaders themselves? We will find in Chapter VI that the characteristics of the leaders are in fact related to their job performances. For example, Muslim leaders tend to do some things which Christian leaders do not do; older leaders undertake certain taks which younger leaders do not, etc.

In this chapter we find that the cell leaders of Usangi and Mbaga perform their tasks quite differently. At first glance, it appears that both sets are actively functioning leaders of ten-house cells. But probing reveals that while the level of activity (measured in terms of frequencies of doing specified things) may be similar, the content and direction of those activities vary greatly. This chapter demonstrates how differences in the degree to which cells have been institutionalized in each site are related to differences inherent in the sites themselves.

At least two levels of analysis must be considered when we talk about the degree of institutionalization of cells. The first is at the individual level of analysis. As has become obvious in our discussion to this point, it is difficult to separate for analytic purposes cells and cell leaders. From the beginning, TANU talked about cells in terms

of the functions that the cell leader would perform for and with his cell. Therefore, it is important to understand the degree to which the cell leader, as an individual, has assumed a new role. The first level, then, relates to the leader as a role incumbent.

Secondly, the degree to which the people who make up the cell are now functioning as a unit, as a new interaction network, must be scrutinized. Theoretically, it is possible that ten-house cells have been institutionalized independently of any activity by cell leaders, possibly in response to other stimuli in the political environment. The data in this study suggest this is not so. They suggest instead that the degree to which the cell functions as a unit is a result of the leader's assumption of his new role. The second level, then, concerns the extent to which the cell functions as an interaction network and directs its activity toward new and nationally prescribed goals.

Two themes are pursued throughout this chapter: (a) the influences operative on the leader as a role incumbent and his view of cell activities; and (b) the activities taking place within the cell as an interactional unit. The data fall into three broad categories:

(1) Types of requests cell leaders receive from their cell members and what they do about them. This might be analytically considered the input aspect of the political process at the cell level.

(2) Contacts and activities that cell leaders initiate, either by themselves or in response to government and party directives. This is viewed as the output aspect of the cell system for purposes of analysis.

(3) Attitudes and behaviors of cell leaders, as role incumbents,

concerning their own functions and those of their cells. Here comparisons of past and present political experiences are brought together to demonstrate the degree to which cells as working political structures have taken root at the local level in Pare District.

Requests Which Cell Leaders Receive and How They Handle Them

An initial approach to the consideration of how cells operate is to look at the ways in which cell members and leaders interact and to examine the results of those interactions. Do cell members make use of their cell leaders? For what purposes? How frequently? What happens when they do?

Data used to answer these questions come from interviews with cell leaders. They are their report of what they did. In the interview situation, the leader occasionally sought to make a favorable impression on me by answering "correctly," i.e., in terms of what he perceived a "good" cell leader would do. This bias has been handled in two ways. The same points were covered by a variety of questions in the course of the interview. Multiple coverage of a single point is a good internal check on information. Frequently, a cell leader would contradict himself in the course of an interview, so that by the time we had completed our conversation a relatively accurate statement had been recorded.

Secondly, I was a participant in the political processes the cell leader was describing. I had an opportunity to observe some of the discrepancies which might exist between a cell leader's reported and his

actual behavior. A cell leader, for example, could not say he attended a VDC meeting when he knew I attended it and did not see him there. These two methods of checking on the data, which have been carefully employed throughout, have led me to place a fairly high level of confidence in the information presented here.

After a "warm up" conversation about the kinds of problems people in the cell had, the following questions were asked of each cell leader:

(1) Who was the last person to come to you as a cell leader?

(2) When did he come?

(3) What did he want?

(4) What did you do?

(5) If you could not help someone with a problem that they brought to you, whom else would you ask to help you?

(6) The last time you could not handle a request yourself, what did you do?

Responses to these questions provide detailed data on the inputs into the cell system, on what people request of their cell leaders and how cell leaders handle the peoples' requests.

People in both Usangi and Mbaga make requests of their cell leaders frequently, although there is a marked difference in the pattern of request-making. As Table V-1 shows, a higher percentage of Usangi leaders than Mbaga leaders report having handled a request within a month of the interview date. These figures suggest that the total number of interactions between cell leaders and members is higher in Usangi. That is, Usangi cell members appear to use their leaders more frequently than Mbaga cell members do their leaders.

TABLE V-1

LAST REQUEST FROM CELL MEMBER

	Usangi[a]	Mbaga
Within one month of interview	53.6% (30)	44.1% (15)
Within term of office	35.7% (20)	50.0% (17)
Never had cell member make request	10.7% (6)	5.9% (2)
Total	100.0% (56)	100.0% (34)

$X^2 = 11.58$, $p < .01$.

[a]Data are missing on five cell leaders in Usangi, reducing the n to 61. A further five cell leaders reported that no one had ever brought them a request, because they, as cell leaders, visited their households frequently and regularly, and handled problems before it was necessary for a cell member to come to them. These five were removed from the above calculation, leaving a total Usangi n of 56.

But there is an important change in this pattern at the lower end of the continuum. As the figures in Table V-1 indicate, some ten percent of the Usangi cell leaders report that no one ever came to them with a request. Only half that number, or approximately five percent of Mbaga leaders, report never handling a request. It appears that there are a higher proportion of Usangi leaders who are completely inactive, but that the ones who are active are more active than most of the Mbaga leaders. Thus, both Usangi and Mbaga cell leaders are consulted by their constituents, but there are some Usangi leaders who are consulted more frequently than most Mbaga leaders as

well as some Usangi leaders who are consulted less frequently than many Mbaga leaders.

What do cell members want when they contact their cell leaders? The subjects of the last requests which cell leaders handled are presented in Table V-2. The subjects fall primarily into three categories--disputes for settlement, requests about tax and school fees payments, and general inquiries.

Dispute Settlement

A majority of Usangi leaders report that the most frequent request they receive is to arbitrate a dispute. Mbaga leaders also receive requests to settle disputes but they receive them much less frequently. As Chapter III showed, one purpose of cells was to establish an efficient means of arbitration at the village level. Primary courts and the police have actively encouraged cell leaders to participate in dispute settlement. Often when a man wants to accuse another and enter his charges on the docket of the lowest primary court in the division, the court clerk will ask whether the cell leaders of those involved have sincerely tried to settle the matter out of court. If not, he sends them back to the cell leaders before accepting the case. In some cases, the Primary Court Magistrate hears the opening accusations and then refers the case back to the cell leaders. He feels that the case will be handled better by those who are more familiar than he is with the personalities and practices involved. The magistrate is also aware of the need to reduce the judicial work load at the divisional and district levels.

TABLE V-2

SUBJECT OF LAST REQUEST

	Usangi[a]		Mbaga	
Settlement of disputes	79.2% (38)		31.3% (10)	
domestic quarrel	(8)		(3)	
neighborhood quarrel	(21)		(3)	
quarrel over debt	(6)		(3)	
theft accusation	(2)		(1)	
witchcraft accusation	(1)		-	
Requests about payment of taxes, fees	12.5% (6)		46.9% (15)	
taxes	(3)		(15)	
school fees	(3)		-	
General inquiries	8.3% (4)		21.9% (7)	
of problems of famine, small crop yields	(1)		(6)	
of communal projects	(1)		-	
of general social nature	(2)		(1)	
Total	100% (48)		100.0% (32)	

$X^2 = 32.20$, $p < .01$.

[a]Data are missing in two Usangi cell leaders out of the fifty who reported handling a request.

Cell leaders arbitrate many different kinds of disputes. Typically, the disputes are those arising among neighbors over farm boundaries or the rights to irrigation channels. Accusations of stealing equipment from each other and of failing to keep livestock properly penned up are also common. Or disputes may involve members of the same household. A woman may accuse her husband of failing to provide her with enough money and supplies to run the household; a man may accuse his wife of not farming properly.

The fact that people in Usangi extensively utilize their ten-house cell leaders for dispute settlement suggests that cell leaders are popularly considered legitimate arbitrators there. This fact can be interpreted as evidence for the degree to which the role of cell leader is being institutionalized in Usangi. The situation in Mbaga stands in contrast to that of Usangi. Do Mbaga people have fewer disputes to settle or do they take their disputes to people other than cell leaders for arbitration?

My own observations of the legal process in Mbaga lead me to believe that there are in fact a very large number of disputes current most of the time, but that people take few of them to cell leaders to be judged. Instead, people tend to consult traditional elders, not cell leaders, when disputes arise. Occasionally when a cell leader is also a traditional elder, people will take cases to him but it appears more to be a result of his traditional status than his role as cell leader. At other times, a younger cell leader, who may realize that he does not possess authority in the eyes of the people vis-à-vis

litigation, calls together the traditional elders and tries to achieve a compromise between the peoples' desires and the demands of his job. He is encouraged to do this by TANU. The party suggests that cell leaders should work with, not against, traditional elders and incorporate the elders into the new political process.

Another important reason why people in Mbaga do not take many of their disputes to the cell leaders is that the disputes frequently involve witchcraft accusations. People and cell leaders are all aware of the fact that the cell leader is a "modern" institution and that the person who serves as cell leader should not have anything to do with witchcraft practices. In the course of my interviewing I was often candidly asked by cell leaders why this restriction was placed on them and what I thought of it. Many leaders told me they often took off the "cell leader hat" to judge cases involving accusations of witchcraft, but that they did not consider this part of their jobs as cell leaders. And they all remember being specifically warned by the officials who first introduced cells that cell leaders and witchcraft do not mix. If cell leaders did arbitrate witchcraft cases, they did not report them to me as examples of how they acted as ten-house cell leaders.

There is an additional aspect to this problem of dispute settlement. According to Pare tradition, the man who loses a legal case must brew sugar cane beer and give it to the elders who heard the case. In recent years, elders (especially those who do not drink even traditional beer for religious reasons) have accepted small sums of money

or tea, sugar and other commodities from the shops in lieu of the traditional beer. TANU aggressively tries to eliminate this practice. TANU emphasizes the fact that cell leaders serve voluntarily for the good of the whole community, not for their personal advantage. When people insist that payment of elders is a necessary symbol that a case is legitimately settled, party officials suggest substituting other items. For example, litigants can buy the cell leader a notebook, a pencil, a TANU flag for his house. Any article that furthers his "new" work is deemed acceptable. Informants claim that this entire practice appeared very strange to the people of Mbaga. Rather than follow TANU's suggestions, people simply avoid the issue and go to someone other than the cell leader to settle their disputes.

In Usangi, the practice of paying elders died out earlier, before the cell system was introduced. It probably was forgotten, because the local primary court is in the center of the ward of Kighare and people are quite accustomed to dealing with modern legal institutions. The issue of paying cell leaders rarely, if ever, arose in Usangi.

Requests About Taxes

A striking difference is also evident between Usangi and Mbaga on the second category of subjects that cell leaders report handling (see Table V-2). The Mbaga cell leaders spend almost half of their time dealing with people's complaints about and requests to be excused from taxes. This situation is much less frequent in Usangi, where

only twelve and one-half percent of cell leaders report that this was the subject of the last request which they handled. And then it is equally divided between those who wanted to be excused from school fees (usually orphaned or illegitimate children who have no one to pay their fees for them) and from local rate taxes. The frequency with which this occurred in Usangi might be considered a normal one for the population of the ward: that many people in Usangi-Kighare were unable, because of unfortunate circumstances, to pay taxes and school fees. This assertion is better understood by discussing the local tax rate and its collection.

The local rate in Pare District was shs. 60/- in 1967/68, the fieldwork period.[1] All males who earned less than shs. 1,000/- a year were required to pay the local rate. This means that virtually all of the males resident in the wards of Usangi-Kighare and Mbaga-Mshewa paid the local rate. Although the number of taxpayers is approximately the same in each ward, the rate of payment varies greatly. Mbaga is considered to be the most delinquent division in the district. It enjoys a district-wide reputation for its ability to complain about and avoid payment of the local rate.[2]

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[1]In 1969 national legislation abolished all local tax rates which were levied by the district councils and replaced the revenue collected by the local rate with a national sales tax. The results of this change in the tax base are not yet well known. The discussion presented here suggests some possible effects that the removal of local tax rates will have on local-level politics.

[2]Personal communication from the officials at the District Revenue Office.

The task of getting excused from taxes consumes much of the political energy of the people of Mbaga. The procedure a man must follow to be legally excused from taxes is not clearly spelled out in local government regulations. However, the way in which Mbaga men tackle this challenge can be outlined here. It is an example both of the ingenuity people can bring to politics and of the fact that many people believe the government is at best uninterested in them and is at worst hostile toward their economic plight.

A man can be excused from taxes either on a temporary or permanent basis. If he has been very ill and unable to work during the agricultural season in his coffee farm or as a day laborer for someone else, he might be excused for the year, or given an extension of the time limit to pay. If a man has suffered other misfortunes--for example, if his wife left him and he had to tend to the house and the children instead of his own farm work--and is unable to get together his tax money, he can be temporarily excused. A man can ask to be permanently excused when he reaches old age, when he is no longer able to work, or when he has infirmities or an illness which cannot be cured and will never allow him to work.

To get temporarily or permanently excused from taxes is a long and arduous procedure and explains why much of the Mbaga cell leaders' time is taken up with such matters. A man must first approach his cell leader, explain his plight to the leader, and ask that the cell leader take his request to be excused from taxes to the VDC. In theory, the cell leader, who has been in intimate contact with the man over a long period of time, is aware of the man's situation and has tried to help

the man find positive ways to collect money for taxes. This is not of course always the case. Often the cell leader himself is trying to get excused from taxes and is as perplexed as his cell members about how to acquire the necessary cash.

If the cell leader agrees with the man that he has a legitimate reason to be excused from taxes, the next step is for the cell leader to present the man's request to the VDC. This step often consumes a long time, since the VDC may not hold a meeting for several months. Or perhaps when it does meet, it lacks a quorum and is unable to make official decisions. Occasionally the VDC meets with sufficient members present to make decisions officially, but fails to consider all of the items on the agenda. Or, the VDC may consider the quest, but be unable to reach a conclusion about the proper course of action.

However, when all the necessary conditions are met, the VDC entertains the cell leader's plea on behalf of one of his cell members, the VDC then debates whether or not this man is a worthy case for tax exemption. The VDC questions both the man and his cell leader closely about what the man has tried to do to help himself and about the man's future ability to pay taxes. But in almost every case, the VDC decides that the man is poor, that he is unable to pay taxes, and that he should be excused, either temporarily or permanently. The cell leaders who constitute the VDC often see in such a man their own plight, that of poor farmers without means who are up against an insatiable government without pity.

If the VDC members approve the request, they ask the TANU Chairman, or whoever is in charge of the meeting that day, to write a letter

to the DEO and ADEO asking that the man be excused. The VDC also requests the DEO or ADEO to give the man a letter which is addressed to the district hospital in Same where he can go and be examined. Most cases of tax exemption are based on medical reasons and therefore require medical certification. However, many requests never make it beyond this point.

The hospital either cannot diagnose the cause of the man's complaint or they reject it, saying he is fit, although he continues to insist he is not. Very often a man has no specific illness. He is simply debilitated by long years of disease, overwork, and inadequate nourishment. Or when the man goes to the DEO to get the letter for the hospital, the DEO refuses to give it to him, saying that he is as able as anyone else and that hospital resources must not be wasted. Or politics may come in. The DEO or ADEO verbally tells the man that he will be exempted and that he need not go through the medical routine. Later, in fact, the DEO or ADEO insists that the man must pay and that he never told him such a thing.

Tax collection was a constant source of aggravation throughout Pare District, both because of the way in which it was organized and the poor economic base of the society which was being taxed. People are aware of the fact that the ADEOs, who were responsible for tax collection, were constantly being jailed for stealing tax revenues. During my fieldwork period, six tax collectors were jailed for theft. Even when a tax collector was honest, he was often untrained, receipts got lost, and the entire bookkeeping procedure was so complex that it was difficult to trace what actually happened and who paid what to whom.

The most common response in Mbaga to the problem of taxes was simply to run away when a tax collector came and to avoid public gatherings where he might appear. Because no government or party personnel are stationed in the ward of Mbaga-Mshewa, when an outsider comes he is suspected and news of his arrival spreads quickly. People who are avoiding taxes simply run into hiding. One cell leader in Mbaga resigned because he was living in an undisclosed place in the ward to avoid taxes. It was common for me to encounter difficulty in interviewing men in the more remote areas of the ward. People there thought the approrach of a white person, albeit female and seven years after independence, meant a tax collector.

Another aspect of this tax story bears on the relationship between the voluntary cell leaders and the paid government and party personnel who supervise them. One of the specific functions given by the national government to the cell leader (see Chapter III) is to urge the people in their cells to pay taxes. As Table V-3 shows, a majority of cell leaders in each site take this responsibility seriously. When asked whose responsibility it is to see that a man pays his taxes, sixty-five percent of the Usangi leaders and fifty-seven percent of the Mbaga leaders believe that it is their own task. However, many commented that it is almost impossible to assume this responsibility because the government personnel responsible for tax collection do not work with the cell leader.

Ideally, the cell leader should know who is and who is not able among his cell members to pay. On the basis of this information, he should advise the tax collectors. In fact, tax collection does not work out like this. When government personnel start a campaign to collect taxes, they do not contact cell leaders. Instead they go directly to

each potential taxpayer and demand that he pay immediately. This tactic leads to a great deal of resentment on the part of cell leaders. They feel the government ignores them and they are consequently being demeaned in peoples' eyes.

TABLE V-3

RESPONSIBILITY FOR COLLECTING TAXES

	Usangi[a]	Mbaga
Cell leader himself	65.0% (41)	57.6% (19)
Cell leader as an intermediary or in the VDC	17.5% (11)	3.0% (1)
Party or government personnel	17.5% (11)	39.4% (13)
Total	100.0% (63)	100.0% (33)

$X^2 = 7.97$, $p < .02$.

[a]Data missing on three Usangi cell leaders and on one Mbaga cell leader.

A case involving the relationship between a cell leader and the local government official vis-à-vis tax collection reached the primary court in Usangi. It was the first instance of a court ruling on the respective spheres of government personnel and cell leaders with regard to tax collection.[3] A female cell leader of Usangi went to one house in

[3]Personal communication from Usangi TANU Branch Secretary at the time the case was being tried.

her cell to inquire if the household head had paid his taxes. The cell leader said she did this on the basis of a warning from the DEO that the man was delinquent and was going to be jailed if he did not pay soon. She pictured herself as the DEO's aide and an intermediary on behalf of the government. The man was not at home when the cell leader arrived. The man's wife and the cell leader began to argue. Eventually the two women fought and the cell leader's clothes were ripped. Afterwards, the cell leader charged the man's wife with ripping her clothes. When the cell leader accused the woman before the DEO, he referred the case to the primary court. At the court hearing, old quarrels (centering around the failure of the cell leader properly to respect the women over ten years ago, when the cell leader refused to attend the woman's wedding) surfaced. The magistrate said two decisions were required in this case. The old quarrel which had occasioned the present controversy was a separate issue. The work of cell leaders was another matter. The magistrate claimed that cell leaders should urge people to pay their taxes. Actively to do this, as the cell leader in question had done, was carrying out government policy. Thus, the cell leader had the right to expect support from the DEO when she was assisting him--support she did not receive in this case. It was the cell leader's duty to inquire into tax matters and encourage people to pay. But, equally important, the magistrate said, it was the duty of government personnel to listen to cell leaders' opinions and to support them. Tax collection, in short, was a joint enterprise between cell leaders and government personnel.

However, as Table V-3 shows, cell leaders, especially in Mbaga,

do not see tax collection as a joint enterprise with government officials. Only three percent see themselves as working with the government in this domain. It appears that while the majority of leaders in each site believe it is their responsibility to help collect taxes, a significant portion (seventeen percent in Usangi, thirty-nine percent in Mbaga) have "washed their hands" of the whole affair. Tax collection to them is not a joint enterprise: government officials can have it.

The Handling of Requests

When the members of ten-house cells bring disputes for settlement and problems about taxes to their cell leaders, what happens? How do cell leaders handle peoples' requests? The subject of a request determines how a cell leader will handle it. We found in the previous sections of this chapter that the cell leaders of Usangi and Mbaga receive very different types of requests from their constituents. Thus we find also that the way in which the two sets of cell leaders handle requests is also very different.

When an Usangi cell member goes to his cell leader to discuss a topic, to ask for help in judging a dispute, etc., the cell leader himself reports that he was able to settle the member's request and consider the matter completed sixty percent of the time (see Table V-4). This results from the fact that most of the requests that the Usangi cell leader handles are answerable at the level of the cell. The requests deal with subjects that individual cell leaders can decide.

The Mbaga cell leader is in a different position: most of the requests he gets concern tax exemption and he is not in a position to excuse anyone from paying taxes. Thus, as the data in Table V-4

indicate, the Mbaga cell leader refers one-half of the requests he receives to someone else.

TABLE V-4

HOW REQUESTS ARE HANDLED

	Usangi[a]	Mbaga
Cell leader handled alone	60.4% (32)	28.1% (9)
Cell leader referred to someone else	22.6% (12)	50.0% (16)
Cell leader dealing with now, alone or with someone else	15.1% (8)	15.6% (5)
Cell leader reports doing nothing	1.9% (1)	6.3% (2)
Total	100.0% (53)	100.0% (32)

$X^2 = 9.2$, $p < .02$.

[a]Fifty Usangi cell leaders reported receiving a request within their term of office, as Table V-1 showed. In addition, five Usangi cell leaders said no one ever brought them a request because they went to visit their constituents on a regular basis and discovered problems before people had to come to them. Of these five leaders, three reported having found problems to handle. These three are included in the data for the above table, yielding an Usangi cell leader n of 53.

Where do the cell leaders of Usangi and Mbaga refer the problems which they cannot handle? Again, we find that where they refer requests is related to the subject of the request. Table V-5 presents a breakdown of cell leaders' responses to the following question: The last time you could not handle a request yourself, what did you do? As the figures show, the Mbaga cell leader referred his last request to the

VDC in sixty-four percent of the cases. He did this because his request was usually about taxes. The rest of the time, he took requests he could not handle to traditional elders, other cell leaders, and party and government personnel in approximately equal proportions.

The pattern of request referral by the Usangi cell leaders is quite different. As the data in Table V-5 show, nearly one-half of the time Usangi cell leaders refer to party and government personnel. Typically, they refer two kinds of situations: (1) those involving people from more than one cell or (2) those in which the cell leader has failed to get compliance on the basis of his authority alone. An example of the first kind of situation concerns a dispute over the joint ownership of a cow. A man and his friend jointly owned a cow. The man accused his friend of taking a calf recently born to their cow, with the intention of selling it and keeping the profits for himself. The man requested the help of his ten-house cell leader. Before intervening in the dispute, the man's leader went to the TANU Branch Secretary and asked how to proceed. The Secretary advised the man's leader to contact the friend's cell leader and to inform him of the dispute. Then the two cell leaders called the litigants together and successfully arbitrated the conflict.

An example of the second kind of situation, when a cell leader fails to resolve some difficulty himself and approaches government or party personnel for help, involved the implementation of the Arusha Declaration. One Usangi cell leader had two young men in his cell who refused to farm according to the tenets of the Arusha Declaration. Although he had tried to talk to the young men on several occasions about

the importance of people individually fulfilling the Arusha Declaration, he was unable to influence their behavior. The cell leader reported his impasse to the TANU Secretary and asked for his help. The Secretary called the two youths to the Branch Office, talked with them, and reportedly got from them a promise to participate in the cells' farming activities.[4]

TABLE V-5

WHERE REQUESTS ARE REFERRED

	Usangi	Mbaga
Traditional elders	7.7% (1)	11.8% (2)
Cell leaders or Branch Chairmen	38.5% (5)	5.9% (1)
Party or government personnel	46.1% (6)	16.6% (3)
VDC	7.7% (1)	64.7% (11)
Total	100.0% (13)	100.0% (17)

Usangi and Mbaga cell leaders, thus, report significantly different patterns in their handling of requests from cell members. Usangi leaders tend to handle problems alone. When they do in fact refer a problem they rely heavily on government and party personnel to help them. Mbaga cell leaders tend to refer a majority of the problems that

[4]These two examples are drawn from a diary kept by the Usangi Branch Secretary for me in 1967.

they receive and their referral is most often to the VDC. Both of these patterns are related to the subject of the requests cell leaders are receiving. Usangi cell leaders receive a large number of requests to settle disputes. These requests are usually amenable to resolution at the level of the cell. Most of the requests that Mbaga cell leaders receive are about exemption from taxes. Tax problems are not resolvable by the cell leader alone.

These findings reflect what cell leaders report that they have done. But what would they do hypothetically? In order to determine this, each cell leader was asked to name the person or place he felt that he could rely on for help with requests from members that he could not handle himself. The responses to this question are found in Table V-6. As can be seen, there is little difference between the leaders of Usangi and Mbaga in their choice of persons they believe would be helpful to them. Only a small percentage in each place say there is no one to help. Some leaders in each site feel that traditional elders are helpful. Cell leaders would apparently rely heavily on their peers, some thirty-six percent in Usangi and fifty-one percent in Mbaga. While Usangi leaders mention party and government personnel more frequently (some forty percent of the time), Mbaga leaders also mention them (some twenty-four percent of the time) in spite of the fact that these officials are not available to them. Leaders in both sites agree that the VDC is not the place for help, although Mbaga leaders have relied on it, as the figures in Table V-4 show.

TABLE V-6

PERSONS CELL LEADERS BELIEVE WOULD BE HELPFUL

	Usangi[a]		Mbaga	
There is no one	5.2% (3)		9.1% (3)	
Traditional elders	14.0% (8)		6.1% (2)	
Cell leaders	36.8% (21)		51.5% (17)	
other cell leaders	(21)		(4)	
Branch Chairmen	-		(13)	
Party or government personnel	40.5% (23)		24.2% (8)	
TANU Chairman	(10)		(6)	
TANU Secretary	(6)		-	
Mlao	(5)		-	
DEO	(2)		-	
Technical Agent, Court	-		(2)	
VDC	3.5% (2)		9.1% (3)	
Total	100.0% (57)		100.0% (33)	

[a]Data missing on nine Usangi leaders and one Mbaga leader.

Contacts Initiated by Cell Leaders

A second category of data on the activity of cells and cell leaders involves the kinds of contacts which cell leaders initiate with their cell members. Data on these output aspects of the cell leader's job were collected in response to the following questions:[5]

[5]The same checks were placed on these data as were placed on the data presented on pp. 145-146.

(1) When did you last go to see (i.e., contact) your cell members for any reason at all?

(2) Why? What did you see them (him) about?

(3) Did you visit every household or only some of them?

A pattern similar to the one which we identified for the input aspects of cells' operation emerges. Leaders in both Usangi and Mbaga visit their cell members with the same frequency, but their reasons for going and whom they actually contact varies significantly.

In both Usangi and Mbaga, approximately eighty percent of the cell leaders report having contacted their cell members within one month of the interview; a small percentage in each site have never initiated a contact. No significant difference obtains between the two sets of leaders on the basis of this behavior.[6] If a simple count of leader-initiated contacts is made, then, it appears that the cell leaders of both Usangi and Mbaga are active and functioning.

Significant differences between the two sets of ten-house leaders do occur, however, when the subject of the contacts they initiated is considered. Table V-7 gives a frequency distribution of the topics of the last leader-initiated interaction between leaders and members. In Usangi slightly over half of the contacts were of a politically relevant nature:

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[6] Chi-square values are not significant at the ten percent level. The following frequencies were obtained in response to the question "When was the last time you contacted your cell members?"

	Usangi	Mbaga
Within a month of interview	81.2% (39)	78.8% (26)
Within term of office	14.6% (7)	12.1% (4)
Never contacted cell members	4.2% (2)	9.1% (3)
Total	100.0% (48)	100.0% (33)

cell leaders asked a member to show up at communal work; they reminded people that there was a meeting at the public grounds; leaders informed cell members that visitors from district headquarters were coming, etc. In Mbaga, the percentage of politically relevant topics is less than twenty. The Mbaga cell is a diffuse social interaction network: over eighty percent of the cell leaders report that they went to see cell members just to see how things are, to visit, to congratulate the newborn and check on the sick. All of these activities are non-innovative. They are activities which predate the introduction of the cell system and which neighbors perform for each other irrespective of ten-house leaders.

TABLE V-7

REASONS THAT CELL LEADERS CONTACTED MEMBERS

	Usangi		Mbaga[a]
Politically relevant topic	54.4% (25)		17.9% (5)
settle quarrel	-	(1)	
ask member to do something	(19)	(4)	
collect TANU dues	(2)	-	
accompany census, veterinary man	(2)	-	
announce a meeting	(2)	-	
Social visit	45.6% (21)		82.1% (23)
visit sick, newborn	(7)	(6)	
general visit	(14)	(17)	
Total	100.0% (46)		100.0% (28)

$X^2 = 9.61$, $p < .01$.

[a]Data are missing on two of the Mbaga cell leaders who reported having contacted a member.

This non-innovative aspect of the cell system has been a cause for concern on the part of many government and party leaders throughout Tanzania. Many critics have charged that ten-house leaders simply replace traditional elders and that cells continue to perform only the functions that the elders performed. Tanzania, like many other new African countries, is in a difficult position. The national government explicitly realizes that they must rely on traditional authorities to some extent in order to have any contacts at all on the local level. National personnel resources are so minimal that the government and party must choose between trying to use existent local leadership or having no leadership at all. The party and government at the center also realize that potential benefits accrue to leaders who are familiar to the people compared with outsiders, drawn from other ethnic groups or areas of the country.

By choosing to rely on local traditional leaders to some extent, however, the center runs the risk of dealing with the people who are the most difficult to change, the very people with the greatest investment in the current arrangement of political forces. The Tanzanian approach to development emphasizes selecting a few individuals, attempting to socialize them into a new role set, and then relying on their ability to influence their peers. This approach rests on the assumption that the first man can in fact be changed. The first man in the rural areas is the cell leader. However, when rural inhabitants choose a cell leader who is not predisposed to change, the entire scheme fails. A situation of this nature is the case in Mbaga. Cell leaders seek to maintain the status quo; they do not attempt to innovate. One reason suggested for

this position is that the cell leaders see no benefit in changing, as we suggested in Chapter II.

Another reason that Mbaga cell leaders are non-innovative is the fact that they lack government and party personnel to direct them. The task of such personnel is to stimulate cell leaders to innovate--whether or not the cell leaders themselves are predisposed to change. The second section of this chapter showed how leaders in both Usangi and Mbaga were in agreement on who could help them in their jobs, although in fact there were very different patterns of actual use of these people. Much depends on the availability of personnel to whom problems can be referred. In Mbaga, no officials who can serve as political communicators reside within the ward. The level of centrally initiated political activity is very low--so low, in fact, that its salience is minimal. Cell leaders are not in contact with the ideas and events of the political arena outside their own ward. Thus, they do not react to it. Perhaps this seems obvious, but it is a point which is often overlooked in discussions about the character of political activity on the local level in developing countries.

This point is clearly illustrated by the data in Table V-8. Table V-8 shows who was contacted by Usangi and Mbaga cell leaders in the visit they reported on in Table V-7. In Usangi, we saw that the leader carried a general message that was hypothetically relevant to everyone in his cell. Thus, as shown in Table V-8, nearly eighty-five percent of the Usangi cell leaders make routine tours of each household in the cell, telling at least one member of each household some piece of news which comes from outside the cell. In Mbaga, in contrast, the

message which the cell leader bears is not of a general nature: he has no community-wide news to spread, both because he received none and because he probably does not possess the personal attributes which are conducive to initiating news. Half the time the Mbaga cell leader goes to only a few houses, to the house of a particularly sick man, to visit a newborn, etc. When he visits all the houses of his cell, he tends to visit them socially, checking up on how things in general are, commiserating with cell members over their problems, but not offering any particular help--because he knows of none.

TABLE V-8

WHOM CELL LEADERS CONTACTED

	Usangi[a]	Mbaga
Every house in the cell	84.1% (37)	51.7% (15)
Selected houses in the cell	15.9% (7)	48.3% (14)
Total	100.0% (44)	100.0% (29)

$X^2 = 8.93$, $p < .01$.

[a]Data missing on two cell leaders in Usangi and one in Mbaga.

Ten-House Cells as Interactional Units

In this chapter we have looked at the operation of the ten-house cell system in two ways. In the second section the kinds of requests that people brought to their cell leaders and what happened to their

problems thereafter were examined. The different character of politics in each site was noted. Usangi was characterized by a high frequency of cases for arbitration; Mbaga politics revolved around tax issues. In the third section we looked at the contacts which cell leaders initiate. Here again, differences between Usangi and Mbaga emerged. Usangi cell leaders tended to contact their constituents for political reasons and to contact all of them, whereas Mbaga cell leaders tended to contact their constituents for social reasons and to contact only a few people. In both the second and third sections it was argued that cell leaders were in potential agreement about what cells ought to do and how things could be done. We suggested that the discrepancy between actual and ideal behavior was a result of the lack of necessary conditions in the political environment, specifically the absence of government and party personnel to aid ten-house leaders in the operation of the cell system.

In the present section the perspective shifts from the leader as a role incumbent to that of the cell as an interactional unit. In this section the activities that are being performed under the auspices of the cells are analyzed. In this way we hope to suggest the degree to which the cell (rather than the cell leader) is being institutionalized. The data used in this section come from three questions which were asked of leaders in the interview schedule. Those questions are:

(1) Is the cell system a good way to govern? Why?

(2) Do you hold meetings in your cell? If so, when was the last one and what was it about?

(3) What is going on in your cell these days?

Cells as a System of Administration

An obvious way to understand the response which cells are generating is simply to ask those who are responsible for making them work what they think about cells as a system of administration. A majority of cell leaders in both Usangi and Mbaga agreed that ten-house cells were a "good" arrangement for administration. As Table V-9 shows, ninety-three percent of the Usangi leaders and seventy-nine percent of those in Mbaga responded affirmatively to the question "Is the cell system a good way to govern?" In interpreting these responses, it must be noted that cell leaders generally hesitated to say anything negative about government or party directives. Thus, they may have responded positively more out of a fear of appearing critical than out of a conviction about the positive attributes of cells as an administrative system. Even those who answered the question negatively said that cells were just the same as any other arrangement, no worse, no better.

TABLE V-9

CELLS AS AN ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM

	Usangi	Mbaga
Good	93.9% (62)	79.4% (27)
Not good; just the same as other systems	6.1% (4)	20.6% (7)
Total	100.0% (66)	100.0% (34)

$X^2 = 4.84$, $p < .05$.

What reasons do cell leaders who said the system was a "good" one give for their responses? Table V-10 lists the first reason of each cell leader who responded positively.[7]

TABLE V-10

REASONS GIVEN FOR CELLS BEING A "GOOD" ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM

	Usangi[a]	Mbaga
Close link between people and government; development goes quickly; you serve your country as a cell leader	57.4% (35)	23.1% (6)
Joins people into small groups; they can be self-reliant; no force is involved	29.6% (18)	26.9% (7)
Efficient method of dispute settlement	11.5% (7)	34.6% (9)
Government said so; people do not respect cell leaders; cell leaders need instruction	1.6% (1)	15.3% (4)
Total	100.0% (61)	100.0% (26)

[a]One Usangi leader and one Mbaga leader gave no reasons for their opinion.

The idea was expressed by many cell leaders (fifty-seven percent of the Usangi set, twenty-three percent of the Mbaga set) that cells represent a close link between people and government and party. They

[7]Most gave only one reason and then elaborated on it. Thus, for the purposes of Table V-10 only one reason per respondent was included.

said that when people and political authorities are in close communication with one another, the social and economic development that both seek is easier to achieve. Other leaders expressed the belief that cells represented a new opportunity to serve one's country because citizenship, defined as fulfillment of goals of the Arusha Declaration, included things like working hard on one's farm, cooperating with one's neighbors in communal efforts and, above all, making ten-house cells viable political structures. As Table V-10 shows, twice as many Usangi as Mbaga leaders gave this set of reasons for their attraction to the cell system. This suggests that cells are being institutionalized to a greater degree in Usangi than in Mbaga. In Usangi, cell leaders seem on reflection to look at the cell system and express positive feelings toward it. Cells, as we have seen, do not operate as effectively in Mbaga; hence, when asked to evaluate cells, fewer Mbaga cell leaders can cite positive evidence of benefits achieved through the cell system.

Approximately equal proportions of leaders in both wards (twenty-nine percent of the Usangi leaders and twenty-six percent of the Mbaga leaders) agree that cells join people into small groups. They feel that these small groups are of a workable size for getting projects done. Leaders in both sites feel that the smallness of cells means people can be self-reliant and free to do as they wish. They say that there is no force involved. By this they mean that there is no threat of external compulsion, a form of force often known in colonial days. The fact that cells give people a structure which they can manipulate and direct themselves without force is an important value for many leaders.

Interestingly, eleven percent of the Usangi cell leaders and thirty-four percent of the Mbaga ones feel cells are most valuable as a means for the settlement of disputes. We discussed in the second section the fact that much of the Usangi cell leader's time is spent in settling cases, whereas a relatively small amount of the Mbaga cell leader's time is spent that way. Yet here, in response to a question about why cells are a good method of administration, it is the Mbaga cell leaders who respond that it is because they represent an efficient method of arbitration. The Mbaga leader feels this way because this is the most innovative aspect of the cell system as it operates in Mbaga. That is, cells in Mbaga do not in general perform as wide a range of activities as do the cells in Usangi. One thing that they have begun to do, however, is settle disputes. The Mbaga cell leader sees this as a new, interesting, and in this case positive aspect of this system of administration. If cells in Mbaga had begun to tackle the problems of social and economic development to the same extent that those of Usangi have, his response might have been different. The Usangi cell leader, on the other hand, knows his cell is an effective unit for dispute settlement--but that is not its most exciting aspect and it is not the one he would mention first when he was saying why he liked cells.

Finally, a fourth set of responses to the question of why leaders like cells bears consideration. Only one leader in Usangi said that he liked cells because he was told to like cells. In contrast, fifteen percent (or four) of the Mbaga cell leaders gave this reason. They expressed the idea that the government and party told them cells were to be; that the system did not really work because people did not respect

cell leaders; and the cell leaders themselves did not know how to do their jobs. Such a high percentage of responses of this nature among Mbaga cell leaders points to the extent to which they are observers rather than participants in local politics. They were told to do something; they did it. They do not evidence a feeling of involvement with what they are doing nor concern for the outcome of their endeavors.

Cell Meetings

A second body of data on cells as interactional networks relates to cell meetings. These are gatherings of all cell members, called by the ten-house leader, to discuss subjects which have come to the leader's attention through party and government personnel or which have arisen within the cell itself. As the figures in Table V-11 show, there is a significant difference between the leaders of Usangi and Mbaga on the practice of holding cell meetings. Virtually all of Usangi's leaders hold meetings, whereas only one-fourth of Mbaga's do. Mbaga leaders frequently say that there is nothing to tell the people in a meeting, that they see their cell members in the normal course of affairs anyway, so that a special meeting is a waste of time even if there is some news to relay.

The Usangi leader, on the other hand, tends to emphasize the cell as an important political unit. He would be offended if it were suggested to him that there is no difference between the operation of cells and his day-to-day interactions with his neighbors. Even if he

could contact all of his cell members in casual conversation when he had news or ideas, the Usangi cell leader tends to prefer to call a cell meeting. The meeting's form and its proper organization symbolize his prestige. He feels that things are being done properly when meetings are called. The Usangi leader believes due importance is being paid to his office of cell leader when he presides at a cell meeting. This desire on the part of the Usangi cell leader to be recognized as an important political figure tends to make the cell function as a unit.

TABLE V-11

CELL MEETINGS

	Usangi[a]	Mbaga
Meetings held	90.6% (58)	25.0% (8)
Not held	9.4% (6)	75.0% (24)
Total	100.0% (64)	100.0% (32)

$X^2 = 42.76$, $p < .001$.

[a]Data missing on two Usangi and two Mbaga cell leaders.

What happens in cell meetings? Table V-12 provides a categorization of the subjects that cell leaders report were discussed in the last cell meeting which they held. While the total number of cases is too small to apply statistical tests of significance, it is nonetheless informative to look at the differences between the two

wards on the subjects covered.

TABLE V-12

SUBJECTS OF CELL MEETINGS

	Usangi[a]	Mbaga
Urging people to work hard on their farms	38.2% (21)	12.5% (1)
General discussions of cell problems	12.7% (7)	25.0% (2)
Specific discussion of cell project	16.4% (9)	25.0% (2)
Relay VDC news	10.9% (6)	25.0% (2)
Ask for taxes, TANU fees, contributions for guests	21.8% (12)	- (0)
No topic mentioned	- (0)	12.5% (1)
Total	100.0% (55)	100.0% (8)

[a]Data missing on three Usangi cell leaders.

The responses of the Mbaga cell leaders are relatively evenly distributed among the total set of topics. Interestingly, no Mbaga leader mentioned having held a meeting to collect TANU fees, urge tax payment or collect contributions for guests. The general absence of this type of activity in Mbaga ward is again obvious.

The Usangi cell leaders also meet for a variety of reasons. They mentioned with approximately equal frequency three topics: general discussions of cell problems, discussion of specific projects, and meetings to relay news they had obtained in the VDC. A large percentage of

them, some thirty-eight percent, had called meetings to urge people to work on their farms. Interviewing took place at a time when district officers from Same were touring the district, holding meetings in each ward, and urging the people to see the relationship between their individual contribution on their farms and the development of Tanzania, as called for in the Arusha Declaration. We can see, therefore, that many of the Usangi leaders who received information from the touring district officials served as communication links to the people below them: they urged their cell members to work hard as the district personnel had urged them. Finally, some twenty-one percent of the Usangi leaders mentioned that they called a meeting for the purposes of collecting TANU fees, urging tax payment, and collecting contributions for guests. We mentioned all of these activities in other chapters. Here they serve as additional evidence for the proposition that nationally oriented political activities are salient in the Usangi community to a greater extent than they are in Mbaga.

Cell Activities

Thirdly, each cell leader was asked during the interview to name the current activity in his cell. The information gained from this query can be used to further interpret the data he gave about cell meetings and what was discussed in them. Table V-13 lists the cell leaders' responses to the question "What is going on in your cell these days? An overwhelming majority of Mbaga cell leaders report that nothing is happening in their cells at the present time, that life is going on as usual, that the cell as a unit was not performing any special

activities that would separate it out from the old neighborhood in pre-cell days. Only twenty-two percent of the Usangi cell leaders responded in this way.

TABLE V-13

CELL ACTIVITIES

	Usangi[a]	Mbaga
Nothing	22.0% (11)	64.7% (22)
Traditional communal activity	16.0% (8)	17.7% (6)
New communal activity	38.0% (19)	8.8% (3)
Farming hard, encouraging development	24.0% (12)	8.8% (3)
Total	100.0% (50)	100.0% (34)

$X^2 = 18.62$, $p < .01$.

[a] I did not ask the first sixteen cell leaders I interviewed in Usangi what was going on in their cells. All of them, however, mentioned activities in the course of the interview. On the basis of their unsolicited comments I decided to include a question in the interview schedule. Thus, data are missing on sixteen leaders. My own recollections of the activities mentioned by these sixteen leaders are that they fit into the Usangi pattern reported by the other cell leaders. I have no reason to believe that inclusion of the responses of the sixteen would alter the Usangi pattern.

Approximately the same proportion (between sixteen and seventeen percent) in both wards reported that they were doing traditional communal activities: clearing grasses from the footpaths of the cell, helping some cell member build a new house, taking turns on the farm of a sick cell member. All of these activities are ones that Pare people have

traditionally performed for their neighbors. Party and government leaders have told cell leaders that they should continue to encourage people to do these things while instructing people to do new things as well.

Here an important difference obtains between the leaders of Usangi and Mbaga: over four times as many Usangi cell leaders report being engaged in some new type of communal endeavor. For example, the people may be digging drinking wells, making plans to request help from the Community Development Officer for materials or leadership in any number of projects, planting a communal garden the products of which will be sold and the money used for communal purposes, etc.

Finally, twenty-four percent of the Usangi leaders report that their prime activity at the present time is encouraging rural development by urging cell members to work hard on their farms. Working hard on their farms for the sake of development was mentioned by only eight percent of the Mbaga leaders. This difference in emphasis has already been noted in the discussion of the topics covered in cell meetings. The fact that Usangi cell leaders mention it so frequently here is additional evidence for the suggestion that the message of the touring district officials appears to have penetrated fully to a number of people in Usangi.

An Overview of Ten-House Cells and Their Leaders

An overall perspective on our discussion of how cells and cell leaders are currently operating in the Usangi-Kighare and Mbaga-Mshewa

wards of Pare District is found in an interpretation of cell leaders' responses to the following question: "Where do you get your ideas for doing your job [of cell leader]?"

Table V-14 lists cell leaders' responses to this question. Seventy percent of the Mbaga cell leaders report that they rely primarily on themselves, on their neighbors, and on the elders in their community. These men say that there is no other source of ideas available to them. They point out that they are rarely contacted by party or government personnel and that meetings of the VDC are not well attended either by cell leaders or by political officials. The men who say that they rely on themselves and their peers insist, on the other hand, that the cell leaders' jobs are very much like the mchilis' and the ngwijos' and that the best way to learn them is to ask knowledgeable men in the neighborhood who know how these things were done in the past. In contrast, only twelve percent of Usangi's cell leaders answered in this way.

The majority of Usangi cell leaders (fifty-six percent) say that they get their ideas in meetings. They cite the VDC, political rallies addressed by visiting political figures, and TANU party meetings at the Branch Office as some of the different types of meetings they attend. Again and again the Usangi cell leaders who cited meetings as their principal source reported that they think it was very important that they go to whatever meeting was being held, that they listen and learn what new ideas were being discussed, and that they later transmit these ideas and information to their cell members. Only one Mbaga cell leader (representing two percent of the sample) saw his principal source of ideas in meetings.

TABLE V-14

LEADERS' SOURCE OF IDEAS

	Usangi[a]	Mbaga
Oneself, neighbors, elders	12.3% (8)	70.6% (24)
Party and government personnel, other cell leaders	30.8% (20)	26.5% (9)
VDC meetings, TANU office	56.9% (37)	2.9% (1)
Total	100.0% (65)	100.0% (34)

$X^2 = 37.56$, $p < .001$.

[a]Data missing on one Usangi cell leader.

Finally, some cell leaders in both wards (thirty percent of the Usangi group, twenty-six percent of the Mbaga group) rely on government and party personnel as well as other cell leaders who may be more informed than they are for ideas and information.

The data presented in this chapter all point to rather striking differences between the activities of cell leaders and the operation of cells in Usangi on the one hand and Mbaga on the other. Both cell leaders as role incumbents and cells as interaction networks appear to have been institutionalized to a greater degree in Usangi than in Mbaga. Our interpretation in this chapter has rested on the differences inherent in each ward. Usangi, as a ward, exhibited certain characteristics prior to the introduction of cells which aided in the setting up and subsequent operation of cells in consonance with national objectives. In

contrast, Mbaga lacked many of these characteristics which facilited the setup and operation of the cell system. Consequently, we do not find as many cell leaders in Mbaga who have assumed new sets of behaviors, nor do we find cells superseding traditional neighborhoods as meaningful units for local politics.

CHAPTER VI

PATTERNS IN LEADERSHIP ACTIVITIES

Introduction

In this chapter I examine the cell system from a fundamentally different perspective than has been employed in the analysis up to the present time: patterns in leadership activities are identified among cell leaders without regard to the location of those leaders. In this section I review the argument which has been developed so far and outline the strategy that I follow in subsequent sections of this chapter.

At the beginning of this study, two hypotheses were suggested: does the political and social context of cells or the personal attributes of ten-house cell leaders determine the operation of the cell system? The hypothesis that context determines the operation of ten-house cells was examined first. The political and social conditions of two wards were used as the primary independent variables in our inquiry and I discussed in detail the ramifications of where cells are located on how they operate.

Chapter IV discussed the attributes of leaders as individuals and pointed out some differences between the cell leaders of Usangi and those of Mbaga. Usangi leaders include a high proportion of women;

they are older, less well educated, and are more likely to be Muslims. Although there is little difference between the two sets of leaders in economic status, we noted that the Usangi leaders generally have more difficulties acquiring farm land, that they tend to supplement their income by commercial endeavors rather than cash cropping, and that when they do cash crop, they do not rely exclusively on coffee. We compared the number of household heads who are away from each ward and found that a higher proportion of Usangi males are absent.

Chapter V discussed what cells and cell leaders actually do. We compared the two sets of leaders along a series of indicators of job performance. We saw that Usangi leaders receive more requests to arbitrate disputes than Mbaga leaders; the latter are sought out for advice on taxes more frequently than their Usangi counterparts. Usangi ten-house leaders contact their cell members for political reasons more frequently than Mbaga leaders do. When Usangi leaders make these contacts, they tend to contact all of the people in their cells rather than just a few. Usangi leaders also hold more meetings in their cells than is the practice among Mbaga leaders. A higher level of activity within the cell, greater reliance on government and party personnel for assistance in leading cells, and generally more positive evaluations of the cell system all characterize Usangi cell leaders as a group.

The proposition was put forward that these differences were functions of the location of the cell leader. We hypothesized that any innovation in political administration would work better in Usangi than in Mbaga. In Usangi, cells built on positive attitudes toward government and party and on a record of favorable experiences with political

changes in general. In Mbaga, cells did not have this political context to build on. Mbaga cells began in a hostile political climate. Lacking government and party leadership, which could theoretically change this orientation which is held by many people in Mbaga, the operation of cells was further retarded. When leaders as role incumbents and cells as units of interaction were considered, we suggested that cells were being institutionalized to a greater degree in Usangi.

Having demonstrated all this, we still must consider other possible explanations for the way cells and cell leaders operate: Irrespective of where leaders are located, who holds meetings? Who contacts his members for political reasons? And so forth. That is, do Muslims as cell leaders behave differently than Christians? Do educated cell leaders do things differently than uneducated ones? In this chapter, therefore, we want to consider structural variables (those attributes of the individual cell leader that we discussed in Chapter III) as the independent variables in our analysis and look at their relationship to job performance.

Table VI-1 is a matrix showing the structural variables which are significantly related to differences in the way cell leaders operate. The relationships in this matrix provide the basis for our discussion. Tables VI-2 through VI-7 contain more detailed data about a number of the relationships shown in the Table VI-2 matrix. Each indicator of job performance and the structural variables related to it are considered in turn in the following pages.

TABLE VI-1

MATRIX SHOWING LEVELS OF SIGNIFICANCE OF CHI-SQUARE (x^2) VALUES[a] BETWEEN INDICATORS OF CELL LEADER PERFORMANCE AND CERTAIN STRUCTURAL VARIABLES

	Sex	Achieved Grandparent Status	Religion	Literate	Educational Level	Cash Crops	Plants Coffee	Percentage Household Heads Outside
Subject of last request from member	-	.02	-	*[b]	.02	-	.10	.05
Result of this interaction	-	.01	-	-	-	-	-	-
Topic of last contact with member	.01	-	-	.05	.01	.02	.05	-
Scope of this contact	-	-	.10	-	.05	-	-	.001
Cell meetings	.05	.10	.02	-	-	-	.01	.01
Current cell activity	-	.001	.05	-	-	-	-	.10
Source of ideas	*[b]	-	.02	.05	-	.05	.01	.01

[a]Chi-squares values are given in Appendix III.

[b]Assumptions of X^2 are not met.

Cell Leaders as Experts Among Their Constituents

As we showed in Chapter V, cell members make a variety of requests of their cell leaders. Cell leaders were asked to recall the last such request they received; their responses were divided into three categories--disputes for settlement, requests about taxes and school fees, and other, more general requests (Table V-2). Table VI-2 shows the percentage of disputes, tax information, and general requests that various categories of cell leaders received. These data suggest that the individual qualifications of a cell leader are recognized by his cell members and that his advice is sought in the area of his "expertise." That is, cell leaders are perceived as experts by their peers in particular areas of endeavor. Age, education level, participation in coffee farming, and the composition of the cell are all correlated with the relative proportion of different types of requests that a cell leader receives and how he handles them.

Older cell leaders were asked to settle disputes more often, to handle requests about taxes less often, and to discuss general matters about as often as younger leaders. As the data in Table VI-2 show, when we look at all of the requests which older cell leaders receive from their constituents, we see that seventy-three percent of those requests were disputes, almost eleven percent were about taxes, and sixteen percent were about general matters. The data on younger cell leaders exhibit a different pattern. When the requests which younger leaders received are considered, we note that only forty-three percent were disputes, whereas thirty-five percent concerned tax mat-

ters and twenty-two percent concerned other matters.

TABLE VI-2

SUBJECT OF THE LAST REQUEST CELL LEADERS RECEIVED BY AGE, EDUCATIONAL LEVEL, COFFEE FARMING, AND CELL COMPOSITION

	Disputes	Taxes	General
AGE:			
old	73.0% (27)	10.8% (4)	16.2% (6)
young	42.8% (21)	35.4% (17)	21.8% (10)
EDUCATION:			
none	83.4% (20)	16.7% (4)	- (0)
some	45.0% (18)	30.0% (12)	25.0% (10)
COFFEE FARMING:			
yes	57.7% (30)	30.8% (16)	11.5% (6)
no	54.6% (18)	15.2% (5)	30.3% (10)
CELL COMPOSITION:			
more than half of males out	65.4% (17)	7.7% (2)	26.9% (7)
less than half of males out	51.7% (30)	32.8% (19)	15.5% (9)

Referring again to the data in Table VI-2, we see that leaders with the least amount of education are never asked questions of a general nature by their constituents; the requests these leaders receive

are mainly to settle disputes. The requests that coffee farmers receive tend to be about taxes while those that non-coffee farmers receive are not. And, finally, the leaders of cells in which more than one-half of the men are outside are rarely asked for advice on taxes and school fees. But, in cells where less than half of the males are absent, more than thirty percent of the requests that the cell leader receives deal with taxes and fees.

Cell leaders with certain kinds of "expertise" are approached by the people of their cells most frequently on topics related to that expertise--community status as an elder, experience gained from planting coffee, or knowledge imparted through formal school. For example, in traditional Pare society, norms required that a man consult elders, people who had passed through most of the recognizable stages in the life cycle and who had community respect and authority, when he was in conflict with his peers. Such an elder was thought to possess legitimate authority to resolve conflicts. Today, traditional elders are still considered legitimate decision-makers when a dispute arises. In practical terms, as well, older people are more likely to be knowledgeable and therefore useful in settling disputes. If two neighbors quarrel over the use of a traditional pathway, elders, men who have witnessed the usage of that pathway for many years, will be asked to settle the quarrel.

When an elder is elected cell leader, people tend to consult him as they always have. When another man, a younger man or a newcomer, is elected cell leader, and a dispute arises, people tend to by-pass him. When a younger cell leader is aware of what is happening,

he may attempt to call together elders and work with them as we suggested in Chapter V. But he knows that he does not possess authority in peoples' eyes to settle disputes alone.

The younger cell leader possesses a different type of expertise: he is usually a more educated man; he probably has young children in school; he has recently been engaged in wage labor; he probably plants coffee. Thus, his expertise is in financial matters and he is equipped because of it to help others. When the cell leader is a young man, he will tend to be consulted about such matters more readily.

Older leaders, leaders with little education, leaders who do not plant coffee are all men with relatively limited knowledge about how to acquire money and pay taxes. They themselves have not had recent experience in these fields; the members of their cells do not see them as people able to give them useful advice. Rather, such men represent a traditional type of leader whose main political task in former times was to hear cases; they continue to be used primarily for these purposes.

Two additional observations are in order. First, as the figures in Table VI-2 show, in cells where more than one-half of the men are working outside, requests made to those cells' leaders are rarely about taxes and school fees. Obviously, in such cells, the very men who are working outside are providing the money for expenses: no one needs advice on how to get money together nor on how to be excused from paying taxes.

Second, as can be seen by referring back to Table VI-1, age is the only structural variable which is significantly related to the

outcome of a cell member's request. As will be recalled from the discussion in Chapter V, cell leaders were asked to report how they had handled the last request they received. Their responses were categorized as "handled alone" or "referred to someone else." Older leaders handled the requests they received alone seventy-seven percent of the time whereas younger leaders handled them alone only forty-four percent of the time.

Such a difference in how leaders handle requests is based in the different nature of the requests themselves. A large proportion of the requests received by older men involve cases for arbitration. Such cases are amenable to resolution by individual leaders. They do not necessarily require the advice of government and party personnel, other than cell leaders or traditional elders, in order to effect an end to the situation. Older cell leaders may consult these other people in the process of decision-making; but ultimately they will see that the case is closed and probably consider themselves responsible for its resolution. This is not the situation with requests about taxes. Individual cell leaders can only make suggestions about how one of their members might get together the necessary money: they do not get it together for their constituents. Nor do individual cell leaders have the authority to exempt a man from taxes: structurally, the request must be referred in order to be answered. Thus, younger cell leaders who receive many more requests about taxes, report that they refer a high proportion of the requests.

Cell Leaders as Transmitters of Ideas and Information

In Chapter III, when we discussed the purpose of TANU's leaders in creating cells, we stressed the fact that the cell leader was to be a communications node. He was to bring peoples' problems to the attention of appropriate government and party officials and he was to transmit the ideas and information that he received from his political superiors to the members of his cell. One of the behaviors which we found distinguishing between the cell leaders of Usangi and Mbaga was the type of contacts they initiated with their constituents and whether they contacted all members of their cells or only a few of them. As the matrix in Table VI-1 shows, sex, educational level, cash cropping, and cell composition are all related to the type and scope of contacts initiated by cell leaders regardless of where the leaders are located. Table VI-3 gives the percentages of political and non-political contacts initiated by various categories of leaders. Table VI-4 shows the categories of cell leaders who tend to contact all and those who tend to contact only a few members.

When female cell leaders contact the members of their cell, they contact them for political reasons some eighty-one percent of the time. This is in contrast to the behavior of male cell leaders who report contacting constituents for political reasons only one-third of the time. In Chapter III we discussed the fact that female cell leaders are found only in Usangi and pointed out that both men and women in Usangi have a particular pride in the political roles women have played and continue to play there. We suggested that the fact

TABLE VI-3

TOPIC OF LAST CONTACT MADE BY CELL LEADERS BY SEX, EDUCATIONAL LEVEL, AND CASH CROPPING OF CELL LEADERS

	Political	Non-political
SEX:		
men	33.3% (21)	66.6% (42)
women	81.8% (9)	18.2% (2)
EDUCATIONAL LEVEL:		
none	69.2% (65)	30.8% (7)
some	28.0% (15)	72.0% (37)
CASH CROPPING:		
yes	22.7% (18)	77.3% (37)
no	63.2% (12)	36.8% (7)

that women play political roles at all is a revolutionary situation because politics in precolonial times was strictly a male domain. The data on women in Table VI-2 seem to suggest that women take their job of cell leader seriously and pursue it vigorously, reinforcing the political image they now have. Female cell leaders often told me that they tend to be "better" cell leaders than men because they take their responsibilities seriously. Men, these female cell leaders say, have always dealt with community affairs; men tend to take politics for granted. The women claim that when they were elected cell leaders they

saw many things they wanted to do in their community. "We intend to get them done," the women would say. "Just look at VDC meetings: women leaders have a better attendance record than men, don't we," they would ask. Usangi female cell leaders are a particularly conscientious group in fulfilling their responsibilities and intent on proving their worth--and thereby promoting the successful operation of cells.

TABLE VI-4

SCOPE OF LAST CONTACT BY RELIGION, EDUCATIONAL LEVEL, AND CELL COMPOSITION

	All Cell Members Were Visited	Selected Cell Members Were Visited
RELIGION:		
Christians	62.9% (22)	38.1% (13)
Muslims	81.8% (27)	18.2% (6)
EDUCATIONAL LEVEL:		
none	86.4% (19)	13.6% (3)
some	72.7% (24)	27.3% (9)
UPS	50.0% (9)	50.0% (9)
CELL COMPOSITION:		
more than half of males out	96.0% (24)	4.0% (1)
less than half of males out	57.4% (27)	42.6% (20)

Interestingly, of the contacts that less-educated cell leaders initiated, over two-thirds are politically oriented whereas among the

contacts initiated by more highly educated leaders politically oriented ones account for only one-fourth of the total. Put in another way, it appears that the less well-educated leaders are the transmitters of political ideas and information. My own observations during the period of fieldwork support this finding. The most politicized cell leaders were those without formal education, those whose education was obtained by participation in politics. These are the men who had first joined the Pare Union during the tax riots. They switched their loyalties to TANU when the party arrived in Pare District; they acquired their basic political ideas during the struggle for independence; they participated in the abolition of colonial rule and the institution of self-government. These people have never lost the political fervor they gained through their early political education. They continue to be the backbone of the party in rural areas.

In contrast, men who had some formal education in the 1940's and 1950's also had the opportunity to leave their home wards and find employment outside. Their interests and energies were absorbed in their work during the years their relatives who stayed behind organized the party at home. Now back in Usangi and Mbaga, these men who are educated also are elected cell leaders. But they lack the political passions of their peers who remained in Pare District during the crucial years when national political identifications were first formed.

The relationship between cell leaders' cash cropping activities and the type of contacts initiated is an equally interesting one. An understanding of it rests in the economic situation. The cell leader who cash crops tends to be wary of politics these days. He

sees a close nexus between his poor economic condition and changes in the political realm. "After all, it is true, is it not," he asks, "that the price of coffee has gone down every year since independence?" The logic of the relationship between world coffee prices and political independence in Tanzania is not of particular interest to him. He is immediately interested in what he perceives the relationship to be. A man who cash crops is respected by his peers for his endeavors; they elect him as their cell leader and he works at the tasks given to him. But he remains distant when it comes to performing the routine tasks of politics: asking people to show up at political rallies, to contribute money for food for politicians, to help out on a communal work project. He is involved in the political life of his community to a degree--but not totally, because he believes he is not getting fair treatment in the political arena.

Regardless of their reason for contacting cell members, whom do the various categories of cell leaders contact? Do all cell leaders uniformly go to everyone in their cells? What categories of cell leaders contact only a few? Cell leaders who are Muslims, who have no formal education, and whose cells are characterized by a high rate of male absenteeism are the ones who tend to contact all of their constituents. In Chapter III we suggested that the Christian and Muslim communities exhibited very different orientations to politics: emphasis in the Christian communities was constantly on excluding wrongdoers while the Muslim communities were characterized by a high degree of popular participation in decision-making and an emphasis on self-help activities. A similar orientation appears to be borne out here. It is

the Muslim cell leader who contacts all of the people in his cell. Whatever his task, he tends to include all within his jurisdiction, strengthening the feelings of identification which are beginning to grow up around the cell as a viable political unit.

Similarly, it is the cell leader without formal education, the cell leader whom we described above as having learned his politics during the growth of the nationalist movement in Pare District, who also contacts everyone in his cell. He comes across as a politician par excellence, the persistent party worker who constantly reminds all those under his authority of the cell system and what it should mean to them.

The fact that leaders of cells which have many of their males gone also tend to contact everyone in the cell is a carry-over of traditional practices into the modern political framework. Whenever men in traditional Pare society were called away, the relatives and neighbors they left behind saw to their affairs. Similarly today, when men are away from home, their cell leaders make a special effort to look after those households. In the course of many interviews, cell leaders and cell members both often pointed out that one of the most important things that cells did was to formalize this relationship, a relationship they had long known.

Cell Leaders as Political Innovators on the Rural Scene

In the last section of this chapter we examine three of the relationships between structural variables and indicators of job performance that are shown in the matrix in Table VI-1. The data are given

in Tables VI-5, VI-6, and VI-7.

TABLE VI-5

CELL MEETINGS BY SEX, AGE, RELIGION, COFFEE FARMING, AND CELL COMPOSITION

	Holds Meetings	Does not Hold Meetings
SEX:		
men	63.5% (54)	36.5% (31)
women	93.3% (14)	6.7% (1)
AGE:		
old	77.3% (34)	22.7% (10)
young	60.7% (34)	39.3% (22)
RELIGION:		
Christians	57.5% (23)	42.5% (17)
Muslims	81.5% (44)	18.5% (10)
COFFEE FARMING:		
yes	56.9% (33)	43.1% (25)
no	83.3% (35)	16.7% (7)
CELL COMPOSITION:		
more than half of males out	88.2% (30)	11.8% (4)
less than half of males out	56.9% (37)	43.1% (28)

TABLE VI-6

CURRENT CELL ACTIVITY BY AGE, RELIGION, AND CELL COMPOSITION

	Nothing	Traditional	New	Farming for Development
AGE:				
old	22.2% (8)	8.3% (3)	33.3% (12)	36.1% (13)
young	52.1% (25)	22.9% (11)	20.8% (10)	4.2% (2)
RELIGION:				
Christians	43.6% (17)	23.1% (9)	25.6% (10)	7.7% (3)
Muslims	28.2% (11)	10.3% (4)	30.8% (12)	30.8% (12)
CELL COMPOSITION:				
more than half of males out	21.4% (6)	25.0% (7)	35.7% (10)	17.9% (5)
less than half of males out	49.1% (27)	12.7% (7)	25.3% (11)	18.2% (10)

In Chapter I we pointed out that cells are both an end and a means in political development as envisioned by the leaders of the national government. Cells are a mechanism to get things done, but they are also an end, a way to order political life that government and party leaders deem is qualitatively better for Tanzania's rural people. In order to bring about that ordering of political life, cell leaders are to be innovators--they are to show people the way to conduct political affairs, they are to get people together to discuss their common problems. Party and government leaders hope that cell leaders will be

TABLE VI-7

SOURCE OF IDEAS FOR CELL LEADERS BY SEX, RELIGION, LITERACY, COFFEE FARMING, AND CELL COMPOSITION

	Self, Neighbors and Elders	Party and Government Officials	VDC, TANU Office Meetings
SEX:			
men	34.5% (29)	31.0% (26)	34.5% (29)
women	20.0% (3)	20.0% (3)	60.0% (9)
RELIGION:			
Christians	41.0% (16)	35.9% (14)	23.1% (9)
Muslims	20.4% (11)	27.8% (15)	51.9% (28)
LITERACY:			
literate	33.7% (27)	33.8% (27)	32.5% (26)
illiterate	26.3% (5)	10.5% (2)	63.2% (12)
COFFEE FARMING:			
yes	43.9% (25)	28.1% (16)	28.1% (16)
no	16.7% (7)	31.0% (13)	52.4% (22)
CELL COMPOSITION:			
more than half of males out	15.2% (5)	27.2% (9)	57.6% (19)
less than half of males out	41.5% (27)	30.7% (20)	27.7% (18)

the first individuals to be transformed in the rural areas. The national

leadership hopes that cell leaders in turn will motivate their constituents to change their behavior and attitudes according to the Arusha Declaration--to participate in both traditional and new communal activities within the interactional network of the ten-house cell. Cell leaders are supposed to be the examples to the people of how all Tanzanians can learn: people should supplement their present know-how with new ideas which come both from open exchange with their peers in meetings and from interaction with party and government personnel.

Who are the most innovative among the cell leaders of Usangi and Mbaga? The data in Tables VI-5, VI-6 and VI-7 show that women, older leaders, Muslims, leaders who do not cash crop, and leaders of cells in which many men are away tend to be the cell leaders who are the most innovative: they are the ones who hold meetings within their cells, who urge new communal activities and farming for development on their constituents, who seek out the advice of government and party personnel both individually and in meetings rather than relying exclusively on themselves and their traditional ways.

Explanations of all of these findings were set forth in the preceding chapters. Here we will summarize them to underscore the point we are making: the context in which cells operate and the individual characteristics of cell leaders must both be examined in order to fully understand the cell system. Thus, for example, the facts that (1) Muslims predominate among Usangi cell leaders and (2) Muslims tend to behave differently than Christians vis-à-vis the job of cell leader are <u>both</u> crucial to our interpretation of the dynamics of ten-house cells and their leaders.

The holding of meetings within the cell--to relay news and ideas, to discuss problems common to the members, and to encourage participation in development activities--is an important component of the cell leader's job. As the figures in Table VI-5 show, certain categories of cell leaders tend to hold meetings. Ninety-three percent of the women cell leaders report having held meetings, whereas only sixty-three percent of the male cell leaders report that this is their practice. More older cell leaders than younger ones hold meetings. Eighty-one percent of Muslim leaders--as compared to fifty-seven percent of Christian leaders--are innovative and hold cell meetings. Likewise, a high percentage of ten-house heads who do not plant coffee and a high percentage of cell leaders with many males absent from their cells hold meetings.

We review here some interpretations for these findings, all of which were given in the preceding pages. Women, as suggested in Chapters IV and V, are proud of their accomplishments in the political arena and self-consciously work to further cultivate their position. Female informants often express the belief that they try hard, harder than men, to see that cells become effective networks. One way that they accomplish this goal is to hold cell meetings and to channel activities into the ten-house networks.

Older leaders and leaders who do not plant coffee both belong to a political generation which was intimately involved in the independence struggle. They are the most highly politicized citizens in the rural areas and the ones who most consciously and unquestioningly follow party directives. Thus, when told to hold cell meetings, they attempt to comply with the demands of party leaders. In addition, as we

suggested in Chapter V, many leaders feel that meetings are an important symbol of their prestige. They derive self-satisfaction from this activity--while at the same time fulfill their commitment to the party and government.

The religious affiliation of leaders affects their political behavior as well. The ethos surrounding the Muslim faith, which we characterized as "accommodating," as well as the participation by Muslims in the direction of mosque affairs and in self-help societies, is among the factors which predispose leaders to hold meetings. Muslims are experienced in the techniques of collective action. When these are now innovative techniques in the political arena, they adopt them more readily than people who are inexperienced in the techniques. Such a fit between religious practice and political innovation does not occur to the same extent in the Christian community. Thus, we find a far smaller proportion of Christian leaders holding meetings.

The fact that the leaders whose cells have a majority of males outside are also the leaders who tend to hold meetings is understandable in terms of Pare custom. Men who are at home look after the households of those who are absent from the neighborhood. At the present time, cell leaders assume the role once taken by neighborhood elders and consider themselves responsible for the households of absent males. Thus, in the cells where a majority of males are temporarily gone, the need to keep a close watch on cell members is especially salient. Cell leaders of those cells engage in a variety of activities in order to do that. By calling meetings such cell leaders have the opportunity to check on the conditions in those households. They are in fact fulfilling both

a traditional and a modern function in one act.

The data in Table VI-6 show the categories of leaders who undertake a second type of innovative task, directing development activities in their cells. As the figures indicate, it is older leaders, Muslim leaders, and leaders whose male members are away who are engaged in new communal projects and in farming for development. Many of the reasons we cited for these same categories of cell leaders holding meetings are applicable here as well. What is particularly interesting about these figures is to note which cell leaders report that nothing is happening in their cells. Over one-half of the younger cell leaders say nothing is going on at the present time. Some forty-three percent of Christian leaders answer in this way. Almost half of the cell in which most of the males are at home also report this. These categories of leaders represent the least innovative individuals among cell leaders. As we suggested in Chapter IV, the Christian church is essentially a conservative force in Pare District. Church members do not tend to be predisposed to accept recent changes in the way that non-Christians are. The younger cell leaders, who did not fully participate in the nationalist movement because of their age, feel less intense identification with TANU at present than older party stalwarts. These younger men do not actively implement party goals as some of their elders do. And, finally, leaders of cells in which most males are at home tend to lack exposure to external ideas and activities. This isolation in turn affects their behavior. Cell leaders in this situation are not receiving new stimuli and are not therefore acting in response to new ideas or engaging in innovative behavior.

The final set of data we are considering in this section concerns which categories of cell leaders report what source of information for the ideas they use in their cell leader's job. Many of the patterns in leadership activity we have pointed out apply here as well. Women tend to rely on meetings for their ideas while men report that they gather their ideas equally from traditional elders and themselves, from party and government personnel, and from meetings. The ability of Muslims to react positively in a group situation is again borne out: fifty-one percent of the Muslims report that they find meetings the most valuable source of ideas, while only twenty-three percent of the Christians say this. Coffee farmers and those with only a few men out tend to rely on themselves more than on others. This reliance on themselves is a result of both their isolation from, and wariness of, government and party officials.

The relationship between literacy and idea source is an interesting one. As we suggested in Chapter IV, local-level politics is a verbal process in Tanzania. Literate individuals rely with relatively the same frequency on all three sources of ideas. No one mentions the written medium as a source of ideas. Among the illiterates, some sixty-three percent rely on meetings, on verbal exchange in a group context, for their ideas. These findings bear out our earlier assertion that the literacy of <u>all</u> cell leaders is not an important factor as long as <u>some</u> leaders are literate and serve as translators in the political arena.

As the data in this chapter indicate, <u>locale</u> is not the only explanation for the degree to which the cell system is being institutionalized. The character of the individuals who serve as ten-house

leaders is also related to the implementation of cells. Obviously, individuals are to some extent products of their locales. As we saw, the fact that Usangi leaders tend to be Muslim is related to factors in the Usangi labor situation. Nonetheless, for analytic purposes, we were able to isolate patterns in leadership activities by examining the relationship between structural variables and indicators of performance. We isolated three types of activities of cell leaders: experts among their constituents, transmitters of ideas and information, and political innovators. We found that certain categories of cell leaders engaged in these activities more than other categories. In particular, we found that women, older people, Muslims, less well-educated individuals, non-cash croppers, and those with many males absent from their cells were the cell leaders who were fulfilling their roles more completely. The ramifications of these findings are the subject of the final chapter.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

In this, the concluding chapter, I address the proverbial question generated by case studies such as the one presented here: So what? We must ask what a comparative study of ten-house cells in two wards of an administrative district in Tanzania tells us that is of general relevance to the problems of political development. In the preceding pages, I suggested explanations of why the cell system operates in the ways it does as well as interpretations for the consequences of its present functioning. Here, I consider the more general implications of these data. Primarily, I am concerned with how local conditions affect Tanzanian national plans for political development, with the local level phenomena that facilitate and restrain national plans. Secondly, I ask what future avenues of research are suggested by the present work.

In Chapter I, we defined political development as a syndrome of activities aimed at creating and maintaining an effectively functioning government whose goals are those of political equality and economic development. We noted that since independence Tanzania has been reorganizing its local administration in order to achieve political development in the rural areas. The specific goal of the party and the government has been the creation of institutions which are more responsive to

popular demands and which stimulate popular responses to party and government directives. In this study, we detailed one such attempt at political development, the creation of ten-house party cells.

The aim of this study has been an understanding of the extent to which cells are being institutionalized in two wards of Pare District and what the consequences of this innovation are for the participants themselves, for the government, and for the party in those places. Throughout, we dealt primarily with two issues. On the one hand, we were concerned with national plans for development in general and the cell system in particular. On the other, we sought to understand the political situation, both past and present, in Usangi-Kighare and Mbaga-Mshewa. In Chapters V and VI we related these two issues and showed in detail how ten-house cells and cell leaders operate. We explicated some of the factors involved in the process of institutionalizing the cell system. Here we want to consider the ramifications of this process by dealing with the study's findings which were foreshadowed in Chapter I. The data presented in this study indicate that the institutionalization of the cell system depends on at least five factors: (1) the availability of resources to introduce and direct events; (2) the economic prosperity of the areas in question; (3) the types of individuals serving as cell leaders; (4) the nature of expectations of role incumbents; and (5) valued aspects of traditional culture. I deal with each of these factors in turn.

1. <u>The availability of resources to introduce and direct events</u>. One factor which can act to restrain political development is a lack of resources on the local level. When resources, such as

personnel, materials, and training facilities are absent, then the task of implementing goals becomes extraordinarily difficult. The difference between the institutionalization of ten-house cells in Usangi and in Mbaga is ample evidence for the importance of this factor. The data presented in Chapter V show that the different patterns of activity among the cell leaders of Usangi and Mbaga are related to a large degree to the resources available in each place.

In Usangi, we saw that government and party offices, and the personnel attached to them, are located in the center of Kighare ward. The DEO, the ADEO, and TANU workers are all in daily communication with the cell leaders of Kighare ward. We discovered that those cell leaders do utilize these resources. Usangi cell leaders report going to discuss problems with these officials frequently. They claim that the main source of the ideas for their work comes from conversations with government and party officials individually and in meetings. As a result of these personal interactions, Usangi leaders also possess a high level of political information which they transmit to their constituents. Ten-house cells are being institutionalized in Usangi, in part, then, because the resources which facilitate that process of institutionalization are present.

The relative wealth of resources present in Usangi is obvious when we look at Mbaga. In Mbaga-Mshewa, there are no government offices or officials; there are no TANU buildings or workers. These institutions are located outside the ward. The people of Mbaga must travel far to avail themselves of the services offered by these institutions. Mbaga cell leaders do not tend to be as active TANU members as their

Usangi counterparts are. We saw that Mbaga cell leaders rarely interact with government and party officials. The one exception to this generalization is local taxes. However, when taxes are at issue many people in Mbaga try to avoid official contact rather than seek it out. And we noted that when Mbaga cell leaders contact their cell members, they rarely relay messages and news which come from the larger political arena--because they seldom receive any.

The contention that the lack of resources restrains the institutionalization of cells is further borne out by some interesting data on hypothetical sources of help for the cell leaders in each site. When the leaders of Usangi and Mbaga were asked where they could obtain assistance in performing their duties as cell leaders, those from both sites mentioned the same offices and individuals. Leaders in both sites might seek out the same offices and individuals, <u>if these offices and individuals were available</u>. This seems to me to be strong evidence for the fact that if more resources were available on the local level, the potential for changes in behavior, in this case, for the institutionalization of an innovation like the cell system, is greater than the present operation of the system in either place indicates. Certainly, a threshold exists for the number of resources which would have an impact. Given the infusion of vast resources, the cell system in Mbaga would probably still encounter more resistance than in Usangi. But the point is that the institutionalization of cells could be facilitated <u>in both places</u> by the increased availability of resources.

A conclusion of this nature supports the findings of other research in Tanzania, in particular those of Hydén among the Buhaya.

Hydén contends that the people of rural Buhaya are relatively more receptive to change than observers give them credit for being. Buhaya people, he shows, do identify with the nation; they are potentially primed for change. What they lack in part is direction and control. The same situation appears to apply to Pare District. Although a lack of resources is not a total explanation of the institutionalization of the cell system, it is one important factor in the process.

2. The economic prosperity of the areas in question. A second factor influencing the relationship between local conditions and national development plans is the link which people make between the economic prosperity of their area and the changes in administration and politics which they experience. In Chapter IV, we saw that all cell leaders are subsistence farmers, either on a full- or part-time basis. Those who farm most of the time supplement their incomes by cash employment, either in petty commerce or in cash cropping. Those who have full-time non-agricultural occupations continue to engage in subsistence activities. Thus, all cell leaders are involved to some extent in both subsistence agriculture and the modern economy.

Although Pare District is a relatively prosperous area by Tanzanian standards, people claim that the economic situation has been deteriorating since independence. They say that opportunities for cash employment are not great: school leaders have more difficulty getting jobs than they once did, the price paid for cash crops is dropping, and taxes have increased in recent years. They report that the land situation is equally tight: land is getting very scarce in the mountains; the land which is available is worn out from over-production.

Many people link this deterioration of economic conditions to changes in the political arena. As we pointed out in Chapter III, political innovations are often justified in terms of the increased economic benefits that they will bring. This is especially true of the introduction of ten-house cells. The government and party consider the cell system a vehicle for economic development. They continually stress how cells should undertake development projects and farm according to the tenets of the Arusha Declaration. Many cell leaders who feel that there is negligible economic progress reject the cell system on the grounds that it does nothing to alter their economic plight. As we saw in Chapter V, when asked what was going on in their cells nowadays, many leaders reported nothing or only traditional, pre-cell activities. Some leaders, then, are allowing cells to atrophy before they have been tried out.

The cell leaders who make this link between economics and politics and tend to reject political innovation because their experience with economic changes was not positive are the cell leaders who are involved in cash cropping. These are the cell leaders who are the least active, measured by the indicators of job performance used in Chapter VI. As we suggested in that chapter, the cell leaders who are not cash croppers are in fact the most innovative leaders in the cell system. Regardless of where they are found, the most active cell leaders, the ones who perform the tasks assigned to them such as transmitting information and undertaking community development projects, are those who do not cash crop. These leaders have relatively limited economic experience, either positive or negative. They have not known acute disillusionment in economic matters. Thus, for them, there is little

spillover between economics and politics. They have not yet been led to question their commitment to TANU or their wholehearted support of the post-independence government.

The link which exists between the economic prosperity of an area and its receptivity to political innovation is an unfortunate one for political development. The fact that individuals who are economically backward are the most politically progressive is a difficult one for government and party workers to handle. Perhaps only by effecting a change in national economic standards and having benefits filter down into the rural areas will those people who are negative toward ten-house cells change their attitudes and modify their behavior as cell leaders. In the meantime, economics places a severe limitation on the maneuverability of government and party officials in the political arena.

3. The types of individuals serving as cell leaders. A third factor which has a bearing on the impact that local conditions have on national plans is the position of traditional elders in the current political milieu. The data presented in this study suggest that there are at least two types of traditional elders: those who draw their authority from their kin and clan positions and those who are older, less educated, and less involved in the modern economy. The data shown in the preceding pages suggest that we need to be cautious in our treatment of the role that traditional elders play in rural political development. While elders drawn from the kin and clan networks may act to restrain the institutionalization of cells, elders of the second type facilitate the institutionalization of cells and in many cases are more effective leaders than younger, more educated, more economically progressive people.

If, when we speak of a traditional elder, we mean an individual who has authority over his peers by virtue of his position in the kin and clan networks and that he prefers to work within that framework rather than the cell system, then we can say that traditional elders frequently act to restrain the institutionalization of ten-house cells. This proposition is particularly valid for Mbaga. In Chapter IV we pointed out that many people in Mbaga do not view Mbaga cell leaders as legitimate authority figures and hence do not consult them when problems arise. We also said that when a traditional elder is elected cell leader, he is recognized as a legitimate authority--but that the recognition is based on traditional rather than modern criteria. Over time, however, we suggested that he might successfully merge the two roles which he plays. Usangi cell leaders have apparently done this. There, conflict between a traditional and a modern role is minimal.

If, however, when we say traditional elders we mean simply older men, men with limited education, men who do not engage in modern cash cropping, or men who come from places which have limited interaction with outside areas, then we must say that it is the traditional elder, more than anyone else, who is actively implementing ten-house cells. The data in Chapter VI suggest that these older, less educated, non-cash croppers are indeed the stalwarts among the cell leaders. These men appear to devote themselves more completely to doing a good job of being cell leaders. The independence struggle is old enough in Tanzania that the traditional elder (used in the second sense) and the party stalwart are often the same man. Younger people, educated people, people involved in cash cropping and in wage employment are the people

whose identity with the goals of Tanzania's rural revolution are more open to question. These individuals did not participate in TANU as a nationalist movement in the same way. Data on who among the cell leaders holds meetings, undertakes activities in line with national goals, and is responsive to TANU and government officials show that the older, less-educated, less economically advanced individuals are the ones who are fulfilling cell goals the best.

A finding of this nature poses questions for national development planners. When development projects are failures, blame is often put on traditional, non-innovative people. Such a blanket assertion is, I believe, false. Different types of traditional forces exist in Pare District and it is important to distinguish between these forces in order adequately to understand whether they are restraining or facilitating implementation of ten-house cells. Clearly, elders who recognize only traditionally based authority can obstruct ten-house cells. Elders who have participated in contemporary styled politics since their inception and are only "traditional" in the sense that they did not have the opportunity to acquire "modern" characteristics because of their age are equally clearly the mainstays of ten-house cells.

4. The nature of expectations of role incumbents. A fourth factor which can both impede and aid national development plans on the local level is the nature of expectations of TANU and government people which are held by ten-house cell leaders. As we suggested in Chapter III, the relationship between TANU and the national government is a complex one and one which is constantly changing. At the highest levels of organization, TANU and government are merged in the offices of President,

Regional Commissioners, and Area Commissioners. Again at the bottom of the organizational hierarchy, ten-house cell leaders perform both government and party functions. But at the levels of division, ward, and branch, the structures of each remain separate. As the data in Chapter V indicated, cell leaders tend to consult party officials rather more frequently than government officials. Cell leaders often express great concern over what the respective roles of each group are. Where, they say, do TANU and the government meet? Why are they separated? The very fact that the relationship between the party and the government it created is a source of concern to people is evidence for the evolving nature of the relationship.

Decision-makers in both party and government are keenly aware of the complexities in the relationship between the two and have sought since independence to define the respective spheres of activity. As we showed in Chapter III, ten-house cells are one step in that direction. The benefits which accrue to an organizational scheme which merges party and government are obvious in the cell system. Cell leaders respond to both government and party directives. By making cells units which perform both sets of functions, national political development is facilitated. The precious resources of each are not wasted by undertaking overlapping activities. People can respond to the stimuli coming from both party and government through one channel, cells, and they are not forced to distinguish between them.

However, peoples' expectations of both party and government can restrain national political development because people compare both sets of contemporary incumbents to previous officeholders. We dis-

cussed in Chapter IV the practice of comparing both government and party personnel to the former Native Authority officeholders. We said that people in Usangi expressed favorable attitudes toward the differentiation and specialization which had occurred since independence whereas people in Mbaga tended to be confused by it. People in Mbaga expect contemporary officeholders to be all things to all men as the chiefs and their assistants were. Obviously contemporary officeholders cannot fulfill popular expectations such as these. When they fail to do so there is often dissatisfaction with their operation. In addition, Mbaga people are not in close enough communication with these officeholders to receive the information necessary for them to change their expectations. Usangi cell leaders on the other hand appear to accept the differentiation and specialization which have occurred, to act positively thereto, and to have expectations which are more in line with the actual operation of the cell system.

The task of altering peoples' expectations will only be accomplished when channels of communication between people on the one hand and party and government on the other are regularized. Effective channels of communication have been operating in Usangi for some time. These channels were coopted by the cell system. The result is that the cell system itself now assumes responsibility for creating and fostering peoples' expectations in a form that the system can manage. In contrast, in Mbaga, pre-cell channels of communication were lacking. Thus, the cell system is the victim of its own greatest problem. The cell system in Mbaga labors under a false set of popular expectations which it appears unable to change.

5. Valued aspects of traditional culture. Finally, elements of traditional culture which are highly valued by Pare people are crucial to understanding the effect local conditions have on national development plans. We have pointed to many of these aspects throughout the thesis. Imitation and a competitive spirit are such aspects. As we showed in Chapter II, road building occurred in Pare District throughout the colonial period as a result of competition among the nine chiefs who were attempting to "out-develop" their peers. Pare people also take pride in activities which they initiate and control themselves. We suggested in Chapter III that the people of Usangi were committed to make the cell system function effectively because they believed that they were involved in setting it up and in managing it since its inception. The reverse was the case in Mbaga. There people view the cell system as yet another in a series of externally imposed changes; they do not regard ten-house cells as a viable arrangement--and as a result of this belief, cells are not.

Christianity and Islam, although not aspects of the indigenous social organization, have been important in Pare society for a long period of time and can, for analytic purposes, be considered aspects of the traditional culture. Throughout our discussion, the aspects of the Christian and Muslim faiths which both impede and facilitate the cell system were pointed out. As we suggested, where a structural fit exists between a religious practice and the political setup, the political situation is enhanced. A case of this is the fact that Muslims, trained in the mosque to direct their own affairs by committee organization, are the cell leaders who hold meetings and organize their cells for various

activities. Where religious practice and political dictates are in conflict, the implementation of national development plans is undercut. A case in point is the Lutheran practice of excommunicating men with two wives. Men who are forced to undergo this form of social ostracism are often similarly ostracized by their peers in the political arena.

Certain aspects then of traditional culture serve both to help and to hinder national development attempts. It is important to point out that the situation is not static: the potential for harnessing some aspects of traditional culture to fulfill national goals is great. A case in this study is the role of women in Usangi. Traditionally women had no political role; by historical accident, they assumed one in the 1940's; they continue today to be regarded as political leaders. In fact, women stand as a symbol of political competence and this symbol has become a valued aspect of Pare culture at the present time.

Future research. Finally, I want to mention what I think are important avenues of future research. The cases of Usangi and Mbaga represent two instances of micro level political development. In other wards of Tanzania, such as those around Mt. Kilimanjaro and Mt. Meru, more advanced stages of economic and political development are found. But, most wards throughout Tanzania are not as developed as those of Pare District. Within Pare District itself, Usangi represents the highest level of political development, while Mbaga exemplifies the least. As we showed, the reasons for the differences which obtained are to be sought both in the political history of the areas and in the character of the individuals who were chosen to lead ten-house cells. Obviously, many factors surrounding the institutionalization of ten-house cells

still require consideration. To do this, studies of the cell system in other areas of Tanzania are called for. Research is also needed on (1) cells from the point of view of members rather than leaders and (2) the linkages between micro level cells and ward/branch level personnel and between cells and district level agencies.

On a more general level, the significance of this study lies in the theme we have pursued throughout: namely, that in order to understand the contemporary political situation in rural Africa we need to know not only what has happened and how people recollect it, but what is happening and how they view contemporary local politics. The import of micro-political studies in Africa is the richness of data which they yield. Such studies allow us to grasp not only the political process itself but to understand the sentiments of those who play the roles in the drama of political development in Africa.

APPENDIX I

ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF QUESTIONNAIRE ITEMS USED IN ANALYSIS

ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF QUESTIONNAIRE ITEMS USED IN ANALYSIS

1. What do you understand a cell leader's work to be?

2. What kinds of problems do you handle in your cell?

3. How frequently do people from your cell come to you (as their cell leader)?

4. Who was the last person to come to you (as his cell leader)? When did he come? What did he want? What did you do?

5. From time to time, when you cannot handle a problem/request that someone has brought to you, do you ask someone else for help? Who is that?

6. Have you done that? Whom did you ask? Who had asked you for help? When? For what? What had you done first? What did _____ do? What happened?

7. Before the cell system was set up, where did people take their problems? For example, who handled the kinds of problems that cell leaders now handle? Do they still do it?

8. If you personally had a problem, whom would you ask for help?

9. What are you doing with your cell these days?

10. How often do you (as cell leader) visit the people of your cell?

11. When did you last do this? Why? Did you visit every household or only some of them? How many?

12. If you need help with your cell leader work, whom can you go and talk with?

13. Have you done this? Whom did you talk to? What did he say?

14. Do you hold meetings in your cell? When was the last meeting? Why did you call it? How many people attended? What happened as a result of the meeting?

15. How do you get your cell members to participate in communal work projects? Have you ever fined them? Have you ever threatened them? Have you ever tried to persuade them?

16. Among the different kinds of communal work projects that people do, which do they like best?

17. When a person does not do something he is supposed to, who tells him so? For example, if a person does not come to communal work? if he does not pay his tax? if he does not attend a meeting?

18. In addition to the communal work projects sponsored by the government, what kinds of things do people do communally?

19. Where do you get the ideas that you employ in your work (as cell leader)?

20. Is the work of a cell leader difficult? Why?

21. What do you think is the most important thing you have done as cell leader?

22. Do you think the ten-house cell system is a good one? Why?

23. Who was the last chief here? Who does the chief's work now? What difference is there between the way the chief did his work and the way _____ does his?

APPENDIX II

SWAHILI LANGUAGE VERSION OF QUESTIONNAIRE ITEMS USED IN ANALYSIS

SWAHILI LANGUAGE VERSION OF QUESTIONNAIRE ITEMS USED IN ANALYSIS

1. Unaelewaje kazi yako, kazi ya ubalozi?

2. Kuna shida gani ambazo unazipata mara kwa mara kutoka katika nyumba kumi zako?

3. Mara ngapi watu kutoka nyumba kumi zako wanafika kwako wewe ukiwa kama balozi?

4. Ni nani aliyekuwa mtu wa mwisho kufika kwako wewe ukiwa kama balozi?
   Jina lake?
   Lini?
   Alitaka nini?
   Ulifanya nini?

5. Mara nyingine kama huwezi kutoa msaada katika shida, unaomba msaada wa mtu mwingine, huyo ni nani?

6. Umeshafanya hivi? Ulikwenda kwa nani?
   Nani alileta shida?
   Lini?
   Alitaka nini?
   Ulifanya nini?
   Mtu mwingine alifanya nini?
   Sasa?

7. Kabla ya kuwa na mabalozi, mlikuwa mnapeleka shida zenu wapi? Kwa mfano, nani alipokea shida hizi?

   Wanafanya hivi bado?

8. Kama wewe mwenyewe/binafsi ukiwa na shida, unakwenda kwa nani?

9. Ni vitu gani unavyofanya pamoja na watu wako siku hizi?

10. Mara ngapi wewe ukiwa kama balozi unatembea kuona watu wako?

11. Mara ya mwisho ni lini?

    Kwa sababu gani ulikwenda?

    Ulifika kila nyumba au watu fulani tu?

    Ulifanyikiwa kiasi gani?

12. Kama unataka msaada wa kazi yako ya ubalozi, unakwenda kuonana au kuzungumza na nani?

13. Umeshafanya hivi? Ulikwenda kwa nani?

    Alisemaje?

14. Unafanya mkutano wa watu wako mara kwa mara?

    Mkutano wa mwisho ulikuwa lini?

    Kusudi lake?

    Watu wangapi walihudhuria?

    Matokeo ya mkutano yalikuwa nini?

15. Kwa njia gani unaweza kupata watu wako kufanya kazi ya msaragambo?

Kati ya vitu vifuatavyo ulifanya vipi kuwapata watu wako kufanya kazi hii:

Umewapambua?

Umewatisha?

Umezungumza nao kwa siasa?

16. Kuna kazi za msaragambo ambazo watu wanazipenda kuliko zingine kwa sababu wanafikiria zitawafaidi wenyewe zaidi?

17. Kama mtu fulani akikosa ni nani mtu wa kwanza kumwambia mtu huyu kuwa amefanya makosa? Kwa mfano, kama

Hajafika kwa kazi ya msaragambo?

Hajalipa kodi yake?

Hajahudhuria mkutano?

18. Kando ya kazi za kushirikiana zinazofanywa kwa serekali ni mambo gani mengine ambayo watu wanashirikiana kufanya?

19. Unapata mawazo ambayo unatumia katika kazi yako wapi?

20. Kazi ya ubalozi ni ngumu? Kwa nini?

21. Ni kitu gani ambacho unafikiria ni cha maana sana ulichofanya ukiwa kama balozi?

22. Unafikiria njia ya kutawala kwa mabalozi ni nzuri? Kwa nini?

23. Ni nani alikuwa mfumwa wa mwisho wa hapa Mbaga?

Ni nani anayefanya kazi yake sasa?

Kuna tofauti gani kati ya njia ambayo mfumwa aliendesha kazi hii na njia ya _____?

APPENDIX III

CHI-SQUARE VALUES FOR TABLE VI-1

APPENDIX III

MATRIX SHOWING CHI-SQUARE (X^2) VALUES OF RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN INDICATORS OF CELL LEADER PERFORMANCE AND CERTAIN STRUCTURAL VARIABLES[a]

	Sex	Achieved Grandparent Status	Religion	Literate	Educational Level	Cash Crops	Plants Coffee	Percentage Household Heads Outside
Subject of last request from member	-	8.52	-	*[b]	11.77	-	5.81	6.34
Result of this interaction	-	7.56	-	-	-	-	-	-
Topic of last contact with member	11.50	-	-	4.04	9.94	5.42	4.67	-
Scope of this contact	-	-	3.03	-	6.45	-	-	11.74
Cell meetings*	5.21	3.11	6.46	-	-	-	7.82	10.01
Current cell activity	-	20.28	8.79	-	-	-	-	7.04
Source of ideas	*[b]	-	8.52	6.85	-	7.02	9.32	9.94

[a]Levels of significance for these X^2 values are given in Table VI-1.

[b]Assumptions of X^2 not met.

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