A LINGUISTIC STUDY OF METAPHOR

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

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Preface and Acknowledgements

Max Muller considered all language metaphoric; I.A.Richards has called metaphor the omnipresent principle in language. From time to time such far-reaching claims have been made by prominent students of language, and yet for most of us metaphor remains a rhetorical technique, something casually picked up at school, half-understood, and seldom developed. Metaphor has remained in the shadows.

For some years I have been interested in the nature of metaphor, but only recently has there been an opportunity to investigate the shadows with proper care and under the right guidance.

In developing a linguistic approach to metaphor, I have divided my study into four distinct areas: firstly, a historical review (parts 1 and 2); secondly, a theoretical analysis (3 and 4); thirdly, wider applications of this theory; and, finally, a specimen graded course in developing an awareness of metaphor. It is hoped that, in addition to suggesting that lexical transfer in general is worth further serious investigation, the exposition given here contains material and techniques which are useful to teachers of English (and perhaps some other languages), literature tutors, critics and any professional users of the English

language.

I would like to express my gratitude to S. Pit Corder, Director of Applied Linguistics at Edinburgh University, for making it possible in the first place for me to undertake this study, and to my supervisor, Paul van Buren, for his considerate and incisive guidance from start to finish. Thanks are also due to J.P.B. Allen, for his thoughtful help in the important early stages of the theory, and to members of staff, colleagues and friends too numerous to mention here, for their sympathy and interest. Additionally, I would like to acknowledge my debt to Francis Boyle, Headmaster of St Augustine's Secondary School, Edinburgh, for allowing me free use of school time to obtain (via questionnaires) relevant information from 108 of his senior pupils and those members of his staff concerned in language teaching. I am grateful to all those (teachers, students and surprised friends) who submitted to various tests and questions which, though not all used directly in the main study, have helped greatly in its formation.

Edinburgh,
4 May 1970

T. McA.

1 The Traditional Theory of Metaphor.

1.1 The Aristotelian View.

1.1.1 The Transfer of the 'Alien'.

Any attempt at an objective assessment of Aristotle's theory of language must avoid two pitfalls. The first of these is concerned with his distance from us in time, and with the extent to which his theories and terminology have become common intellectual coinage. Because more than a thousand years have passed, these theories and technical terms have been adapted and sometimes very subtly altered in passing from language to language and in the growth of academic knowledge. It becomes deceptively easy to suppose that his term metaphora is 'really' pretty much what we mean by our term metaphor.

Secondly, there is sometimes an unwillingness to accept Aristotle for what he was, a pioneer working within the limits of his time. Consequently we measure him by our own yardstick, and his work is distorted into a kind of failure. One cannot help making comparisons in our favour, and in detecting inconsistencies, but it has to be borne constantly in mind that Aristotle and his contemporaries took their theories from the abyss and made the foundation on which we

stand.

The works of Aristotle with which this study is concerned are the Poetics and the Rhetoric. In both treatises considerable space is given to describing the metaphoric process and in defending its position as the supreme stylistic device whose effective use is the mark of genius.

In the Poetics Aristotle offers a formal description of 'speech' (lexis), observing that it consists of eight parts. These eight 'parts of speech' are not however the eight which the Roman grammarian Priscian handed down to us, nor do they easily equate with grammatical terms in modern use. Hamilton-Fyfe (1927) makes the equation and translates the parts as 'letter, syllable, conjunction, joint, noun, verb, case, phrase,' a list in which all but 'joint' (arthron) are current, but I shall follow the example of Dinneen (1967) and leave the terms untranslated.

The Aristotelian parts of speech are of interest in this study because they precede his definition of metaphora. To help introduce and assess this definition we need concern ourselves with only three of his categories: onoma, rhema and logos. These he defines as:

onoma 'A composite meaningful sound, without a time reference, no part of which is meaningful on its own' *
(P.XX:8). In general language onoma was a 'name', in grammar apparently a term covering what we call noun, adjective, article and pronoun, while in logic it was the subject of a statement. Pl. onomata.

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* This and all subsequent translations my own.

<u>rhema</u> 'A composite meaningful sound, with a time reference, no part of which is meaningful on its own' (<u>P</u>.XX:9). It expressed action. As a general term it could represent anything spoken, the verb as opposed to the noun, and apparently the adjective when part of the predicate, and also in logic the whole predicate of a statement. Pl. <u>rhemata</u>.

<u>logos</u> 'A composite meaningful sound, some parts of which have meaning on their own' (<u>P</u>.XX:11). This term had a very wide area of application: statement, sentence, phrase, description, definition, oration etc. In logic it was the statement as opposed to the <u>onoma</u> or main term. Pl. <u>logoi</u>.

Onoma and rhema are constituents of the logos, but are classified along with it and also with <u>stoikheia</u> or 'indivisible' sounds which have something of the nature of modern phonemes. It would be easy to inveigh against this as a confused classification but it would be a futile pastime, as we can see with the mutually contradictory examples of Wheelwright (1954) asserting that Aristotle concerned himself too much with syntax and form, and Brooke-Rose (1958) maintaining that Aristotle concerned himself too much with semantics. He concerned himself with neither, but used a pragmatic division of phenomena in language in order to make the teaching of rhetoric and literary appreciation easier. His set of terms and his subsequent theory have their own inconsistencies, but not in relation to linguistic levels established in the twentieth century.

Having outlined these parts of speech, Aristotle subdivides some of them in various ways. The onoma can be

sub-categorised formally, for simple and compound, and also on what appear to be stylistic grounds into the following list:

1. Normal
2. Special
3. Transfers (<u>metaphorai</u>)
4. Ornaments
5. Inventions
6. Elongations
7. Abbreviations
8. Alterations

Aristotle adds: 'I call "normal" (<u>kurios</u>) what everyone uses, and "special" (<u>glotta</u>) what only a few use: so that it is clearly possible to be both normal and special, but not for the same people... "Transfer" (<u>metaphora</u>) is the carrying over of an alien onoma, either from the generic level to the specific, from the specific level to the generic, from the specific to the specific, or by proportion (<u>analogon</u>)' (<u>P</u>.XXI).

Two of the expressions used in the original Greek have come through into modern English: <u>metaphora</u> and <u>analogon</u>. Whereas it was preferable to keep the original Greek term <u>onoma</u> because a modern term such as 'noun' is not an adequate translation equivalent, on this occasion the reverse applies. It is better ~~to~~ render the originals as 'transfer' and 'proportion' simply because our words <u>metaphor</u> and <u>analogy</u> have implications which Aristotle's terms did not possess, and it might be safe to suppose that the modern terms do not (for most people) carry with them any connotation of transference

and proportion. Consequently to translate the Greek terms as 'metaphor' and 'analogy' would pre-judge the issue in favour of the present-day English words.

According to the definition just given, 'transfer' (*metaphora*) describes the movement of an onoma, presumably from one context to another. Such contexts must have been logoi, but Aristotle does not refer to logoi when discussing the phenomenon. It is not a process primarily involving statements or sentences, but apparently entirely centred on onomata. We get a fair picture of *what* is transferred, but not of what it transfers *from* or *to*. If we look at the original defining statement we may note the pivotal position of the onoma:

μεταφορὰ δε ἐστιν ὀνόματος ἀλλοτρίου ἐπιφορὰ
= metaphora de estin onomatos allotriou epiphora
= transfer then is of-an-onoma alien a-carrying-over
= 'Transfer' is the carrying-over of an alien onoma

It will be noted that *metaphora* = *epiphora* (of a certain kind). The items have a common stem *-phora*, the nominal derivative of the verb *pherein*, cognate with Latin *ferre* and English *bear*. It translates quite well as 'to carry', and *-phora* then is a 'carrying'. The prefixes *meta-* and *epi-* are very similar in both compounds, having the meaning of 'across, over, on to'. It becomes difficult therefore to avoid the conclusion that Aristotle is saying that a transfer is a transfer (a carrying-over is a carrying-over). The im-

portant defining term therefore is allotrios, which has the sense of 'alien, strange, belonging elsewhere or to another'.

It is not clear from this definition whether metaphora refers to the process of transferring the onoma, or whether it refers to the onoma which suffers the transfer. Is it, in other words, a process or a product? This question has some importance because the confusion exists to this day, where it is possible to hear one person say 'X is a metaphor' (=product), while another will say 'X is an example of metaphor' (=process). Aristotle's classification does not appear to have distinguished between process and product, so that the alien onoma is both itself and what happens to it. That he was aware of the double nature of the problem becomes clear in such passages as his description of riddles and jargon:

> 'That [kind of speech] which uses novel expressions is both dignified and distinct from conventional usage. By 'novel' I mean a special word (glotta), a transfer (metaphora), an elongation, and anything else away from the normal (kurios). But if one were to work entirely with these things, then one's speech would become either a riddle or jargon: if made up of transfers, a riddle; and if made up of special words, jargon. The essential point about a riddle is description through an impossible combination of words. This cannot be done just by a combination of onomata, but rather by transfer' (P.XXII:3)

This separation of metaphoric transfer from the actual onomata in terms of which it was initially defined can be regarded as a defect in the Aristotelian theory. One may also note that, whereas Aristotle began by listing eight varieties of onoma, he now establishes a contrast between the first

and presumably the other seven:



It would appear also that 'special' becomes a generic term subsuming the others. In doing this Aristotle makes a division which has had repercussions down the centuries, assigning metaphora permanently to a non-normal area of language usage. But there is a curious statement which not only vitiates the idea that special forms have special excellence, but also attacks the cardinal term in his original definition of metaphora. Having discussed the excellence of antithetical statements, he adds: 'As regards onomata, they are popular if they contain a transfer, as long as it is neither alien (allotrios), which causes difficulty in understanding, nor superficial, which makes no impression' (R III:x:6).

Not only is metaphoric transfer now represented as a process acting upon onomata, it should occur without being 'alien'.

The most serious discrepancy in his presentation, however, resides in the definitions but in the array of examples which he gives to clarify the definitions. We need examine only one example here, the very first used in the Poetics. It was intended as the illustrative material for generic-specific

transfer, the first of the four types of metaphora. The example is 'my ship stands here', instead of 'my ship is anchored here'. The examples are logoi, and Aristotle argues that is anchored is a species of the genus stands, so that a generic substitution has taken place. This may or may not be a valid description of the relationship between the two items, but the puzzling point is that they are not onomata. They are rhemata: what we would call verbs. They possess a time reference and action. The basic requirement of the definition is destroyed, and not only in this example but also in a number of others.

We may conclude then that three inconsistencies emerge in the Aristotelian theory, judged on its own terms. All have had an influence on later theorising, and are:

(1) Lack of distinction between process and product.
(2) In the definition, the 'alienness' of the transfer is important, but later Aristotle warns against alienness in metaphora.
(3) Having set out to define the phenomenon in terms of onomata, he provides examples which are rhemata.

While these inconsistencies exist, they should not obscure the positive side of Aristotle's work, which we can summarise as:

(1) The recognition that a certain kind of substitution occurs in language and that this can be called 'transfer'.
(2) In setting up a contrast between the normal and the special, and in conceding that what is normal for one may be special for another, he points to the

importance of expectation and predictability in the choice of items in language.

(3) In describing metaphora as consisting of four types, he draws attention to classes (genus-species) and relationships (proportion) which might account for the transfers.

We shall now examine the third of these positive points.

1.1.2. Genus, Species and Proportion.

In the Poetics, as we have seen, Aristotle states unequivocally that there are four ways of creating a metaphoric transfer. Three of these ways are concerned with transfer within genus and species, while the fourth is proportional. Presumably he did not envisage more than these four processes, or he would have said so. At various points in the Rhetoric, however, he states equally firmly that the term metaphora includes simile, antithesis, hyperbole and proverbs. The precise statements are:

simile (i) R III:iv:1 'The simile (eikon) is also a metaphora: there is very little difference'.

(ii) R III:x:3 'For simile, as we have said before, is metaphora differing through the addition of a word'.

(iii) R III:xi:11 'Similes also, as we have said above, are always in a way approved metaphoras, since they always derive from two terms, like the proportional metaphora'.

antithesis R III:xi:10 'The more special qualities an expression has, the cleverer it seems, as when the onomata contain a metaphora, and the metaphora is of a special kind, such as antithesis,

balance and vividness'.

<u>hyperbole</u>	<u>R</u> III:xi:15 'Approved hyperboles are also metaphoras'.
<u>proverbs</u>	<u>R</u> III:xi:14 'Proverbs are also metaphoras, from the specific to the specific'.

This identification of certain other rhetorical devices with metaphora presumably means (as is suggested by his saying that simile is based on proportion and proverbs on specific transfer) that Aristotle is implicitly making the distinction between process and product. These devices are the products of the four processes, but the term metaphora covers everything.

Although there are four processes in his definition, it is not a distortion of his theory to propose that his types of metaphora fall into two broad categories, one of which is then further divided into three sub-categories, something as follows:



This arrangement helps to redress the imbalance in Aristotle's giving too much space in the definition to the generic-specific type, while giving too much attention in the examples to the proportional type.

Aristotle does not say in the <u>Poetics</u> what he means by genus (<u>genos</u>) and species (<u>eidos</u>) when the terms refer to language, but their relationship is similar to their use in modern biology. The species is a particular manifestation among a number of possible manifestations, while conversely the genus is an exclusive category which may or may not have a manifestation of its own. We may draw certain conclusions about what Aristotle had in mind by these terms (2.10), but he provides very little material to work on. That material consists of one example for each kind of metaphora:

(1) <u>generic to specific</u> In 'my ship stands here', he considers that the generic or inclusive term <u>stands</u> (from <u>histanai</u>) has been transferred to supplant the specific term <u>is anchored</u> (from <u>hormein</u>). The one may be more comprehensive than the other, but neither can in that case be very 'alien' when used in the other's contexts.

(2) <u>specific to generic</u> In 'truly Odysseus did a myriad noble deeds' Aristotle sees the specific term <u>myriad</u> (<u>murias</u>) substituting for the generic term <u>many</u> (<u>polus</u>). This is a lexical transfer of some kind, but again 'alienness' is hard to detect.

(3) <u>specific to specific</u> In 'drawing off his life with the bronze' and 'severing with the tireless bronze', he sees <u>drawing off</u> (from <u>aruein</u>) and <u>sever</u> (from <u>temnein</u>) as substituting for each other, both being species of an unstated generic term <u>remove</u> (from <u>aphairein</u>). In this situation 'alienness' seems somewhat incongruous, because some kind of synonymy appears to be involved.

It becomes tolerably clear that, although in the initial definition 'alien' bulks large, in the general exposition it is the metaphora = epiphora equation that matters, indicating that Aristotle was discussing lexical transfer in the widest possible sense under the name 'metaphora', and that this wide sense has not survived to our times.

Of more immediate concern is proportional metaphora. Whereas his examples of generic-specific relationships are meagre, Aristotle's illustrations of proportional relationships are profuse: twenty-six in the Rhetoric alone. He maintains (R III:x:7) that this varietyeis the most popular and effective, and that it succeeds somehow in 'bringing things before the eyes' (R III:xi:1). In the Poetics (XXI:11) he gives a full description of the analogical process which produces the supreme effect, the effect which he considered could not be taught:

> 'I call it "proportion" (analogon) when the Second is to the First as the Fourth is to the Third. Then one can say the Fourth instead of the Second, or the Second instead of the Fourth... For example, just as a cup is to Dionysus, so a shield is to Ares. So one may call the cup "the shield of Dionysus" and the shield "the cup of Ares". Or old age is to life as evening is to day. One may accordingly call evening "day's old age"... and old age "the evening of life" or "life's sunset".

Proportion or analogy depends, according to Aristotle, upon an ability to see resemblances between conditions which are not normally in close association. In other words, it requires the juxtaposition of items which are normally

'alien' to each other. His argument rests upon a strict ratio:

1 : 2 :: 3 : 4

becoming

1 : 4 :: 3 : 2

Equivalence in the ratio permits an exchange of terms or items.

Aristotle, Plato and Euclid were all interested in this kind of analogical reasoning, whether for mathematical, logical or literary purposes. The idea of strict proportion is best illustrated by Euclid's _Elements_ Bks V-VI, where deductions are made as follows:

If 2 : 4 :: 4 : x

then, as 4 is twice 2, x must be twice 4 = 8

Aristotle's use of the _analogon_ is equally strict, but differs from this Euclidean example in having no shared element. The interchangeability of the second and fourth items in his metaphoric proportion do however resemble algebraic equations, a point we can take up later (3.3). Although we are offered no mechanical procedure by which a generic or specific term can change places with another generic or specific term, we are offered here a basis of equivalence for the transfer of items analogically. The system implicitly asserts: Apply the proportion, swop items, and a metaphoric transfer will result. The surprising thi.

is that no one ever developed the idea.

One drawback to his formula that Aristotle foresaw was the possibility that all four terms of the proportion might not be available. He says (R XXI.14): 'Sometimes there is no onoma for some terms of the proportion, but it can be used all the same and is in no way inferior'. This means of course that if there is a term missing we must, like Euclid, supply an x:

1 : 2 :: 3 : x

Aristotle gives no example of what he means by this, although he pleads that it is in no way inferior to the full statement of the proportion. We can therefore leave it for the moment, but it is an important point, and we shall return to it (3.7). In the meantime we have from his examples of old age and day a clear picture of the general principle, which can be shown diagrammatically as follows:

'life's old age' set against 'day's evening'

1 : 2 :: 3 : 4



= 'life's evening' set against 'day's old age'

This presentation demonstrates that Aristotle's concept of 'transfer' implies qualities in language which can be called substitutability and choice. Innumerable choices

and substitutions made by innumerable people can set up frequencies of occurrence, and these affect the 'normalness' or 'specialness' of the items used.

In this brief examination of his theory both positive elements like these and negative elements such as we described above can be detected. We may now examine how they progressed down the centuries, but we may also observe how some of the implications which we have just touched on were not developed — possibly for no better reason than that Aristotle himself warned all later generations that the supreme stylistic device could not be learned from teachers.

I.2. Greco-Roman Theories.

1.2.1. Demetrius and the Active Metaphor.

In his 'prolegomena' to a linguistic theory of metaphor, Bickerton (1969) observes that Aristotle's classification was an attempt to describe the formal aspects of metaphor. He adds, significantly: 'But Roman and Renaissance scholars, instead of trying to elucidate and develop this [Aristotle's] rather cryptic definition by clarifying "strange" [our alien], "genus" and "analogy", treated metaphor mainly as an ornament of rhetoric".

This is a fair observation. We can illustrate this diversion away from Aristotle's line of investigation while the theory was still being discussed by Greek

rhetoricians. Demetrius (Ist century A.D.) in his treatise On Style admits his dependence on Aristotle, but interprets the Aristotelian position as follows:

> "Speech of this high type [under discussion] should be out of the normal range, transformed and somewhat unfamiliar. It will consequently carry weight, while normal and familiar words, though clear enough, will be plain fare and easily disdained... To Aristotle the best kind of metaphora was the so-called "active" one, where non-living things are introduced in an active way, as though alive, as with dart in:
>
> "Sharp-tipped the angry dart flies at the crowd".
>
> "...Usage is our teacher in all these matters and particularly with metaphoras. Usage in fact transfers almost everything without being noticed, and makes the transfer securely, calling a sound "silvery", a man "sharp", a character "rugged", a speaker "long" and so on, transferring many things so elegantly that they appear at one with normal expressions... In some cases usage is so altered that we no longer need the normal expressions at all'. (On Style II:77-87)

We may extract from Demetrius the following points:

(1) Metaphoric transfer employs unfamiliar expressions.
(2) Such expressions (through usage) often become normal.
(3) Transfer is happening all the time on a large scale.
(4) Aristotle considered the enlivening of non-living things to be the best kind of transfer.

Demetrius adds to Aristotle by supposing some kind of continuum of usage, so that the special can progressively become the normal. He seems not to consider transfers simply

the concern of rhetoricians, but in attributing certain attitudes to Aristotle he makes no mention of what we have found so noteworthy: the proportional exchange.

Let us refer back to what Aristotle said about 'active' metaphora. It occurs in the Rhetoric, a few lines after his assertion that clever sayings are produced from proportional metaphora and whatever brings things 'before the eyes'. He goes on to say that 'bringing things before the eyes' refers to those things which 'have activity' (energounta) giving as an example a quotation from Isocrates describing someone as a freely wandering animal. He then refers to Homer's use of metaphora, where Homer speaks of non-living things as though they were living, and proceeds, among others, to quote the line about the angry dart which Demetrius also quotes. He observes that Homer's popularity lies in this ability to activate the non-living, concluding that Homer 'has achieved this by means of proportional metaphora' (R III:xi:1-3).

Demetrius, whatever his reason, diverts attention from Aristotle's concern with how Homer achieved his effect to what the effect was. Both aspects are important to Aristotle, but only one survives with Demetrius. This is particularly interesting, because his contemporary, the Roman Quintilian, adopts the same position as Demetrius, without any reference whatsoever to Aristotle.

1.2.2. Quintilian's 'Change of Meaning'.

The Latin grammarians borrowed their language theory and much of their terminology from the Greeks, and like their mentors were primarily concerned with rhetorical and literary effect. Quintilian discusses metaphora in the eighth book of his authoritative Institutio Oratoria:

> 'The Greek term tropos refers to the change of a word (verbum) or phrase (sermo) from its proper meaning to another meaning... Some tropes are used for the sake of emphasis, some for purposes of adornment, some occur in their proper words (verba) and others in transfers (tralatis = translatis)...
>
> 'Let us begin then with that one which is the commonest and by far the most beautiful: translatio, which is called metaphora in Greek. This is certainly so natural to us that even the uneducated unthinkingly use it a great deal. It is so agreeable and refined that in any discourse (oratio) whatsoever it shines out with its own light...
>
> 'On the whole metaphora is a shorter comparison (similitudo), and differs from it because, when a thing is compared to something else that we want to describe, the one is said instead of the other. It is a comparison when I say that a man did something "like a lion", but it is a translatio when I say the man "is a lion".' (IO VIII:vi:1,2,4,8 and 9)

Quintilian then proceeds to divide translation-cum-metaphor into four types, but they are far removed from the four processes which Aristotle suggested. The new four are:

(1) The transfer from the living (animalis) to some other living expression, as in replacing 'rider' with 'steersman' in: The steersman turned his horse with great force.

(2) The transfer from the non-living (inanimalis) to some other non-living expression, as in: He gave his fleet the reins.

(3) The transfer from non-living to living, as in: The walls of Greece fell down through steel.

(4) The transfer from the living to the non-living, as in: A sound from the head of a high mountain.

Where Aristotle talked about metaphora as an all-inclusive term for 'transfers', Quintilian talks about tropes as working 'changes' of meaning. For Quintilian metaphora is only one such trope, although it is the commonest. Additionally, the trope can work among 'words and phrases' and not just upon onomata, which is a distinct advance upon the formal approach in the Poetics. Quintilian reverses one Aristotelian assumption, however: where Aristotle considered simile a longer version of metaphora, Quintilian considers metaphora a truncated simile. Both however use the same copular statement about man = lion.

All this is interesting, but becomes insignificant before the new living/non-living classification. Quintilian has gone far beyond Demetrius and, having decided upon the limits of metaphora, arranges a simple grid:

Cases			
(1)	+	to	+
(2)	-	to	-
(3)	-	to	+
(4)	+	to	-

This suggests some kind of generic-specific transfer, where animalis to animalis is within the genus between species, while animalis to inanimalis is from genus to genus, probably with the species of one genus to the species of another. ~~His fault is however that he only proposes two genera:~~ living and non-living. It is a logical expansion of what was an aspect of Aristotle's theory and the main part of the theory presented by Demetrius, but it assumes that if metaphora can 'activate' the non-living, it can also work the reverse process and 'de-animate' the living, as suggested in Case 3 walls (of Greece), which presumably replaces soldiers or defenders.

Generic-specific exchange may be implied here, but Quintilian does not appear to have reckoned it a significant aspect of metaphora, just as he makes no comment upon the proportional or analogical relationship. He affirms the separate identities of metaphora and synecdoche, but allows them to share the qualities of 'stirring the mind, giving meaningfulness to things and placing things before the eyes'. This last is reminiscent of Aristotle, but Quintilian appears to wish to narrow metaphora deliberately, because he defines synecdoche as distinguishing 'the many from the one,

the part from the whole, the species from the genus, what comes after from what went before, and vice versa'. This categorial arrangement adds weight to the traditional assumption that Aristotle 'really' meant synecdoche and metonymy when he was discussing generic-specific metaphora, and certainly from Quintilian onwards the division into metaphor on the one hand and metonymy-synecdohe on the other is clearly made.

Quintilian's greatest explicit achievement however is his decision that transfer does not involve words as such, but involves 'changes of meaning'. His interpretation is quite distinctly set against -- or offered as equivalent to -- the standard definition of his time, in his ninth book:

> 'A trope is a phrase (sermo) transferred from a natural and principal meaning to another meaning, for the sake of decorating a discourse (oratio), or, as most grammarians define it, an utterance (dictio) transferred from the place in which it is proper, to one in which it is not proper.' (IO IX:i:4)

The two definitions are not necessarily equivalent, because the first talks of a phrase moving from meaning to meaning, while the second talks of a phrase moving from context to context, which is a more satisfactory definition from the formal point of view. Quintilian's pronouncement, however, has been the more influential down the ages.

1.2.3. Tropes, Figures and Parts.

While attempting his typology of tropes, Quintilian did try to make distinctions between various 'special' or stylistic devices in language. Having stated what he meant by a trope (including metaphora), he went on state what he understood by the term figura:

> 'A figure (figura), as is suggested by the name itself, is a certain form of discourse (oratio) removed from the general and current usage. Accordingly, in tropes some words (verba) are substituted for others, as in metaphora, metonymia, antonomasia, metalepsis, synecdoche, catachresis, allegory and, usually, hyperbole... Nothing like this happens among figures, for a figures can occur with words which are proper and ordinarily arranged.' (IO IX:i:4,5 and 7)

He does not labour the distinction, but accepts (a) that many students confuse the two, and (b) that in some instances it is difficult to separate figures and tropes. That he considered it worth doing, however, is indicated by a casual and deprecating reference to one C. Artorius Proculus, evidently guilty of the crime of wilfully confusing them. Tropes for Quintilian involve substitution or replacement, while Figures are the artful arrangement of normal words, as happens in periphrasis, epithet, digression, answering one's own questions etc. At that date the term figura had an adjective figuratus, but was later to obtain figurativus as a special adjective in rhetorical circles.

The Latin expression <u>figura orationis</u> is a direct translation of the Greek <u>skhema tes lexeos</u>, but whereas the Greek expression does not correspond with a modern English 'figure of speech', the Latin expression (despite Quintilian's strictures) was already in the state of flux which would allow the adjective <u>figurativus</u> to cover metaphoric transfers.

In Aristotle's treatises there is no association or link between the special uses of onomata as parts of speech and his <u>skemata</u> or figures, which are prayers, commands, questions, threats etc. It is an illuminating indication of historical drift that these supposedly distinct areas of language study have shifted completely round in their relations with each other, so that we can represent the change as:

Let P = Parts of Speech
F = Figures of Speech
T = Tropes or Transfers

<u>Aristotle</u>



<u>Quintilian</u>



<u>Modern</u>



We may conclude from this that Quintilian considered

two distinctions worth making: (i) between Trope and Figure; (ii) between the leading Trope, Metaphora, and others such as metonymia and Synecdoche. Additionally, he specified that the metaphoric trope was concerned with a binary relationship of animate to inanimate, concerned a replacement of words but alsox acted as a condensed simile or comparison. This assumption means that simile in its extended form must also be concerned exclusively with the animate-inanimate relationship. He made no attempt to examine the proportional relationship between two terms which would provide for the transfer, and so diverted attention away from Aristotle's attempt to outline the system of equivalences by which metaphora might be accounted for.

1.2.4. The Diplomacy of Donatus and Diomedes.

Aristotle and Quintilian were the two greatest influences upon the development of any theory of rhetoric and 'special' language in the centuries after the fall of Rome, but they were passed on to future generations by two grammarians of the 4th century who handled their subject with great tact. Consider this from Diomedes:

> 'A trope (according to Scaurus) is a way of ornamenting speech and is the transfer of an utterance (dictio) from its proper meaning to one which is not proper to it, for the sake of ornament or necessity or refinement or emphasis. Quintilian defines it as follows: A trope is a phrase (sermo) transferred from its main and natural meaning to another, for the sake of decorating a discourse (oratio).
>
> 'The common trope among all these just listed is

'The common trope among these just listed is metaphora. All the others appear to be its species.

'Metaphora is a transfer of objects and words (verba) from their proper meaning to one which is not proper to them, on account of similarity (similitudo) and for the sake of ornament or necessity or refinement or emphasis. There are four types: From the animate to the animate, from the animate to the inanimate, from the inanimate to the animate, from the inanimate to the inanimate' (giving examples of each)

He has done honour to both trope and metaphora, obliquely stating that they are the same. One can see in this quiet compromise between Aristotle and Quintilian fertile grounds for later teachers and critics to treat metaphor both as the supreme stylistic device and as a species of itself. But otherwise Diomedes follows Quintilian almost verbatim, and accepts the concept of a transfer of words from proper meanings.

Donatus repeats much the same material, accepts the transfer of words from meanings and also the four animate-inanimate relationships proposed by Quintilian. Almost coyly however he makes an observation of some importance:

'We should also realise that some metaphoras are reciprocal, while others are of a unitary nature. They are reciprocal in such cases as: altum mare, profundum coelum, when we are able to switch them to altum coelum, profundum mare (i.e. deep sea, high heaven = deep heaven, high sea). Again,

herbae florent (plants flower) and iuvenes pubent (youth matures), so that we can say herbae pubent (plants mature) and iuvenes florent (youth flowers). The unitary kind occur in such instances as segetes fluctuant (cornfields wave) and vites germinant (vines sprout).'

Here, under the apt title of reciprocal metaphora, we have a succinct expression of Aristotle's ratio, proportion or analogy, but quite without any reference to the Greek provenance of the analysis. He contrasts this swopping technique however with a supposedly different transfer, where the noun cornfields collocates with a verb wave which belongs to another type of discourse. It can be argued of course that the transfer is still achieved analogically, but that is not important at this stage. It is sufficient to indicate the way in which both Diomedes and Donatus, briefly but diplomatically, passed on fragments of the ancient theoretical positions to posterity.

Fragmentation would seem to be inherent in the study of metaphor. The material quoted from the various ancient authorities is almost the sum-total of their comments on the supreme stylistic device. The Western world's stock of metaphoric theory is, as we shall see, little more than we have here, and great ramparts of criticism have been raised upon this flimsy foundation. It says a great deal for what Quintilian called its naturalness, so that 'even the uneducated unthinkingly use it a great deal'. It would appear to be part of our language competence, and as such quite secure with or without

detailed analysis of how it comes about. In any event, these pithy and axiomatic statements, from Aristotle to Donatus, were handed down unchanged and unchallenged for over a thousand years. We shall now see how they were polished and made ready for use within our own linguistic and literary tradition.

1.3. 'Of purpose to deceiue the eare' — George Puttenham.

> 'I haue come to the Lord Kepper Sir Nicholas Bacon & found him sitting in his gallery alone with the works of Quintilian before him, in deede he was a most eloquent man, and of rare learning and wisdome, as euer I knew England to breed, and one that ioyed as much in learned men and men of good witte.'

This observation was published in 1589, in a work called The Arte of English Poesie. It highlights the undiminished importance of Quintilian 1500 years afte the appearance of his Institutio Oratoria, and is particularly interesting because of the originality of the treatise in which it appears. The author, George Puttenham, was concerned with establishing the English language as a serious literary medium. He wanted to make it clear that the Greek figures and tropes were as applicable to English poetry as to Classical literature, and wanted also to make the devices of the great rhetoricians easily available to the educated English. This was not a pipedream: the spotting of figures in poetry was a passion of the time. Puttenham believed however that the various complex terms used by the Greeks and Romans could be translated into the vernacular and so become more popular still,

since it was 'more laudable to vse our owne naturall, if they be well chosen, and of proper signification, than to borrow theirs'.

And so Puttenham took 119 Greek rhetorical terms and defined them in the third part of his treatise, giving each a homely English name. Willcock and Walker (1936) consider that Puttenham was a great influence on writers, historians and critics for over a century afterwards, that wholesale borrowings were made from his work, and yet 'though much handled, it seems to have made little impression on the whole'. The translation of terms proved a brave but futile undertaking, and for better or for worse English lost a colourful technical vocabulary, that offered to call irony 'the drie mock' and labelled an obscure device called asteismus 'the merry scoffe'.

One thing emerges from his many definitions. For Puttenham Quintilian's warning about confusing trope and figure was of no importance. Although 'scheme', 'trope' and 'figure' were all in use in the English of that time, Puttenham gives the title 'figure' to every one of the devices described, and it is safe to assume that he played an important part in the process which has led to the equation of the expressions figurative and metaphorical, although he does not use them. He also belonged to that school of thought which saw figures as ornamental rather than normal, for he says:

> 'As figures be the instruments of ornament in euery language, so be they also in a sort abuses or rather trespasses in speach, because they passe the ordinary

limits of common vtterance, and be occupied of purpose to deceiue the eare and also the minde, drawing it from plainnesse and simplicitie to a certain doublenesse, whereby our talk is the more guileful and abusing, for what else is your Metaphor but an inuersion of sence by transport; your allegorie by a duplicitie of meaning or dissimulation vnder covert and dark intendments?'

The sinister side of rhetoric is lightened a little in his definition of metaphor:

'And first, single words haue their sence and vnderstanding altered and figured many wayes, to wit, by transport, abuse, crosse-naming, new naming, change of name. This will seeme very darke to you, vnlesse it be otherwise explaned more particularly: and first of Transport. There is a kinde of wresting of a single word from his own right signification, to another not so naturall, but yet of some affinitie or conueniencie with it, as to say, I cannot digest your unkinde words, for I cannot take them in good part: or as the man of law said, I feele you not, for I vnderstand not your case, because he had not his fee in his hand. Or as another said to a mouthy aduocate, why barkest thou at me so sore?'

These and other observations that Puttenham makes, despite their originality of phrasing, reveal their origins clearly. Like all mediaeval and Renaissance scholars he owed too great a debt to Classical Rome for him to make any independent additions, except in giving examples. We may take his definition of metaphor as a 'kind of wresting of a single word' along with one offered in 1553 by Wilson in his Arte of Rhetorique, and then comment upon them both:

'A metaphor is an alteration of a woorde from the proper and naturall meanynge, to that whiche is not proper, & yet agreeth thervnto, by some lykenes that appeareth to be in it.'

Both Elizabethans share the following views:

(1) The Position which Quintilian adopted: that metaphor involves the alteration of a word from its proper to a non-proper meaning. They appear to share the view that words have meanings by some inherent right or naturalness and that any change in this is a kind of tinkering with nature. This attitude dates back to one of the earliest Greek controversies about language: whether the relation between words and meaning is a natural or a conventional one. Most of the commentators upon metaphor would probably have subscribed to the conventionalist position that language is a system of arbitrary agreements made by men, but here in their analyses of metaphor they revert to the untenable position of suggesting a 'proper', 'natural' or fixed relationship between an item and its meaning. We shall take up the question of meaning more fully later (2.1-7) but it suffices at this point to discount the widely held notion that 'meanings' can flit from item to item, or conversely that an item can move and leave its meaning behind.

(2) The Aristotelian argument, however vaguely expressed, that analogy — likeness, affinity, conveniency — is the principle which governs this movement of words.

The Elizabethans bequeathed to posterity virtually unchanged the heritage which they had received.

1.4. The Problem of 'Natural' Deviation.

In 1711 Greenwood produced An Essay towards a Practical English Grammar. It is interesting for us because of the minute amount of space given to metaphor, and also because within that limited space he uses several expressions still current in literary criticism. He says:

> 'The Syntax, or the Construction of Words into Sentences, may be distinguish'd into two Kinds:
> 1. That which is Natural and Regular; or
> 2. That which is Customary or Figurative. That Syntax may be called Regular, which is according to the Natural Sense and Order of the Words. Customary or Figurative Syntax, is that which is used in the Forms of Speech, peculiar to several Languages; wherein Words are put together according to a Metaphorical or borrowed Sense of them: As, To break a Fest, to be brought to Bed, to take ones Heels & fly away etc.'

Greenwood was a professional schoolmaster. His book, like Aristotle's and Quintilian's, was a practical teaching manual. In it we see the first equation in English (or one of the first) of 'metaphorical' and 'figurative', and an indication that both adjectives were now firmly established. We also see the use of the metaphoric 'borrow' to cover the idea of the transfer of the alien. Greenwood's willingness to discuss the question of metaphor on the level of syntax is refreshing, but unfortunately he says no more about it, and, having equated metaphor and figure, passes on

to a discussion of those alterations in standard word order which Quintilian <u>did</u> originally label 'figures of speech'.

The tendencies evident in the brief remarks of the English schoolmaster become more apparent in the fuller observations of a Scots rhetorician. The Reverend Hugh Blair in 1784 published his <u>Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres</u>, and both confused and clarified the situation a little more. Quintilian in his treatise kept trope and figure quite apart, and then divided figures alone into Figures of Words and Figures of Thought, the first of these having demonstrable arrangements of word order for special effect, while the second adhieved special effects without any change in word order. He was indicating such forms as rhetorical question on the one hand and innuendo on the other, where the words may follow a normal pattern. Blair however took figures as his major classification, and claimed that 'rhetoricians commonly divide' them into Figures of Words, or Tropes, and Figures of Thought. He then defined Figures of Words or Tropes as consisting in 'a word's being employed to signify something that is different from its original and primitive meaning; so that if you alter the word, you destroy the Figure'. He redeems himself somewhat by commenting at the end that 'this distinction, however, is of no great use; as nothing can be built on it in practice; neither is it always very clear'. It is not surprising however that the term 'trope' has never flourished since then in the English language and universally today we talk of 'figures of speech'.

Blair considers metaphor to be based on resemblances, and 'hence is much allied to Simile and Comparison; and is indeed no other than a comparison, expressed in an abridged form'. He gives the example of a man compared to a pillar supporting the state, then becoming by abridgement the pillar of the state. 'The comparison betwixt the Minister and a Pillar, is made in the mind; but it is expressed without any of the words that denote comparison. The comparison is only insinuated, not expressed'. He adds:

> 'Though all metaphor imports comparison, and, therefore, is, in that respect, a figure of thought, yet, as the words in a Metaphor are not taken literally, but changed from their proper to a Figurative sense, the Metaphor is commonly ranked among Tropes or Figures of words. But, provided the nature of it be well understood, it signifies very little whether we call it a Figure or a Trope.'

Aside from the confused terminology, we can find here the last of the forms which Aristotle's kurios and glotta were to take: Blair contrasts Figurative on the one side with Literal on the other, with interpretation according to the 'letter', an orthographic twist to the fallacy of interpretation according to the 'natural' and the 'proper'.

While making these observations, he also notes that something of the Aristotelian tradition still survives: 'I must remark,however, that the word Metaphor is sometimes used in a looser and more extended sense; for the application of the term in any figurative signification, whether the figure be found on resemblance, or on some other relation,

which the objects bear to one another'. He illustrates the point by observing that what is generally called Metonymy is sometimes classed as Metaphor, adding that even Aristotle in his Poetics used Metaphor in this extended sense, whether as whole for part, or species for genus or genus for species.

Finally, Blair takes up the problem of whether the whole business of figures is natural or not:

> 'But, though Figures imply a deviation from what may be reckoned the most simple form of Speech, we are not thence to conclude, that they imply anything uncommon, or unnatural.'

This is the devil that rode on the backs of the rhetoricians. A century later, in his Practical Elements of Rhetoric in 1893, the American John F. Genung felt required to say:

> 'A figure of speech is an intentional deviation from the plain and ordinary mode of speaking, for the sake of greater effect. The fact that figurative language deviates from ordinary expression is not to be taken as an argument against its naturalness.'

But until one clarifies the basis on which 'naturalness' rests, 'deviation' must tend towards the 'unnatural'. The rhetoricians were well aware that nothing is more naturally part of language — if we can use the adverb carelessly — than the very devices they labelled deviant. Quintilian himself had said so, when he admitted that the uneducated 'unthinkingly' used metaphor.

Genung in his handbook follows the path trod by his

predecessors, observing at the very start that 'a book on so old a subject as rhetoric can scareely hope to give the world much that is new'. His figures that promote clearness by association are an avatar of Quintilian's tropes and Aristotle's metaphora, while figures that promote emphasis are simply the figurae and skhemata of old. The only changes are the occasional reshuffle which, for example, classes hyperbole as a member of the second group whereas Aristotle included it in the first. His typology only stresses the salient point that not only has there been a perennial difficulty in rhetoric in agreeing on the generic terms, but there has been equal disagreement about where to subtend the species.

1.5. The Classical Fallacy: A Conclusion.

There is something inbred about the history of rhetoric and men's comments upon metaphor. The same scant speculations are juggled and switched down the centuries until Genung can say that one can scarcely hope to add anything new. He set himself the same task that Donatus had set himself: re-stating the elements of a hallowed tradition.

Rhetoric as an art, science or discipline (whatever title one chooses to give it) has been subject at times to great scorn, at times to bouts of popularity. It flourishes today in a variety of forms, but mainly in manuals of 'word-power' and 'style', with the same commercial incentive that originally activated the sophists. It has been particularly prone to what Lyons (1968) calls the Classical Fallacy, which

he sees as taking two related forms:

(1) The assumption that certain illustrious periods in a nation's (or a civilisation's) social and linguistic history can be taken as models of purity and correctness. Athens of the 4th century B.C. and Augustan Rome of the first century B.C. have served as such models. This assumption presupposes that later generations are doing well if they simply maintain a good standard of copying, and should strive to prevent change (or 'adulteration') in certain traditions, especially the language.

(2) The parallel assumption that the written language of such a hallowed period is sacrosanct, partly because it is the means by which records of that age and specimens of its grandeur are passed on, and partly because the written form of any language is less volatile than the spoken form. It is easier to develop canons of good writing and transfer them to speech than vice versa. 'Grammar' as such was concerned, as the name indicates, with the canons of writing (=*gramma*).

The operation of such a classical fallacy in the minds of successive generations looking back to their golden ages has been to make rhetoric and its canons a specially favoured subject, precisely because it contains these two assumptions in a very strong form:

(1) The great rhetoricians dated from the great periods: Classical Athens and Rome at or near their respective heights. To question such sources was to question the absolutes on which civilisation rested.

(2) Rhetoric was, with grammar, the study of those perfect languages themselves, showing why they were perfect and just how the finest authorities achieved the stylistic

skill that made them the finest authorities. The deference that the Roman authorities showed towards the preceding Greek authorities only heightened the effect.

This potent compound shows just how revolutionary Puttenham was when he suggested that English poetry (if no other part of the language) could be subject as a vernacular to the same canons that governed Classical Latin and Greek; and it also shows why his attempt at carrying the classical terms over into English was a complete failure. We can be glad however that actual writers like Shakespeare were not unduly influenced by the Classical Fallacy and went their own way — although, of course, they in turn have been enshrined from time to time in a special golden age of their own, with a sacrosanct language style best exemplified by the veneration given to the King James Authorised version of the Bible. Puttenham was unfortunate in not being able to participate in the sanctification. Elsewhere in the world one sees the same assumptions at work, especially with Classical Arabic in the middle east and Classical Sanskrit in India.

The consequence of this ultra-respectful attitude has been to restrict serious inquiry into the nature of the 'figures of speech'. The basic assumptions of the great rhetoricians have hardly been examined, their insights hardly developed, their inconsistencies left unaltered. Modern linguists, interested in phonology and syntax, wary of semantics, have left rhetoric alone until very recently, and like literary critics have considered its application to be restricted largely to poetry.

Any modern inquiry, however, having assessed the historical situation, must start on the elementary premiss that the devices listed in rhetoric are linguistic phenomena as standard as those labelled 'phoneme', 'lexical item' and 'sentence', and not ornaments and deviations tacked on for sophisticated reasons.

If this essential pre-requisite is not accepted, then metaphor remains a luxury, an addendum for the diversion of orators and poets. Whether or not rhetoricians in the past have admitted, with Quintilian, that metaphor is a universal phenomenon, they have proceeded as though it were a refinement upon language that they alone were competent to pronounce upon. The only difference in our time is the decline of the rhetorician and the rise of the literary critic, who treats 'figurative language' as his own province.

Suffice it at this point however to accept that a phenomenon exists in language, called metaphor by common consent, and that the phenomenon is no better understood today than it was in the Athens of the 4th century B.C.

2 Normal and Special Language.

2.1. Authoritative Statements on Metaphor.

A casual inquirer, seeking some definitive statement about metaphor and unable to pursue a historical survey such as we have just undertaken, would probably turn to a well-established encyclopaedia or a leading dictionary. They would be standard twentieth century reference works and he could reasonably expect them to provide him with an authoritative synopsis in line with current linguistic and critical theory. Here are two examples of what he would find:

The Oxford English Dictionary (1933) — 'Metaphor, the figure of speech in which a name or descriptive term is transferred to some object different from, but analogous to, that to which it is properly applicable.'

The Encyclopaedia Britannica (1966 edn) — 'Metaphor, a figure of speech, which consists in the transference to one object of an attribute or name that strictly and literally is not applicable to it, but only figuratively and by analogy.'

These definitions have the virtue of similarity: they are consistent one with the other, and their observations are now familiar to us from Aristotle, Quintilian, Donatus, Puttenham and Blair, so that one may analyse both statements into six elements:

1. Metaphor is a figure of speech.
2. It concerns names and attributes.
3. The name or attribute is transferred.
4. It is transferred to an object.
5. It is transferred from its proper and literal application.
6. The transfer is based on analogy.

Having separated out these elements in the definitions, we may take them one by one and consider them in linguistic terms:

1. Metaphor is a figure of speech. We have already noted that down the centuries confusion has existed over the terms figure, trope and metaphor. We should also note that separately the contributor to the Encyclopaedia Britannica on 'figures of speech' refers to the expression as 'a broad term for a large variety of uses of words, phrases, clauses, and sentences to achieve desired effects in meaning, sound and style. Traditionally it is defined as deviation in the use of words from the literal sense or from simple and common practice, and includes figures of rhetoric, syntax, etymology and orthography'. To state therefore that metaphor is a figure of speech is to provide very little serious information. It can be interpreted either as meaning 'metaphor is an occurrence in language', which is a valid introductory remark, or as 'metaphor is one of a number of deviations from literal or common usage'm, which is questionable in several ways, primarily by demanding clarification of deviation, literal and common. The term 'figure of speech' is therefore a confusing and opaque catch-all, too indeterminate to be of much further value in this study.

2. It concerns names and attributes. The use of these terms is distinctly Aristotelian: the term onomata covered both names and attributes

(nouns and adjectives), and we found that in Aristotle's own examples he broke the confining rule and included rhemata (verb forms) among his metaphors. A definition limiting itself strictly to 'names and attributes' prevents a discussion of metaphor in all the other word-classes, at the phrase and sentence level, and at the discourse level, with regard to allegorical writing and even — as we shall see — to those nouns which do not specifically 'name' anything.

3. The name or attribute is transferred. No indication is given of how such a transfer is achieved, and the presentation suggests that a label is removed from one 'object' and attached to another, so that the word-to-thing relationship is more important than the relationship of the word or lexical item to its language context.

4. It is transferred to an object. The word-to-thing connection is strengthened and we are committed to dealing with 'real objects in the world', on an assumption that words have a 1:1 relationship with such objects, as part of the natural order of things. This raises difficulties in considering metaphor as concerned also with non-objects, as in He has a mountain of work on his hands or Jones had tons of fun or even Quit monkeying about with my Jaguar. This last sentences would already have been ruled out by our definitions, because monkeying is a verb, and now it is ruled out because it does not refer to an object, and yet some transfer has occurred and an analogical comparison has been made.

5. It is transferred from its proper and literal application. Like Quintilian's definitions, this view presupposes a primary and natural meaning for any item of language, a meaning 'proper' to a word and in turn 'proper' to an object, as in the case of the much-quoted farmer who looked at some animals and said,

'Rightly is they called pigs'. Such a supposition means that hand is 'proper' to a part of the human body and inalienably related to it. Is it then similarly related to part of a clock? Is hands of the clock a proper and literal or a non-proper and metaphorical usage? What happens in secondhand, upper hand and all hands on deck? We have here the ancient fallacy of fixed association between word and object, fixed meaning for a set of spoken or written signals. We have seen how this assumption caused the rhetoricians to state that 'deviation' does not mean 'unnaturalness', when all the implications of their theory were that it must mean 'unnaturalness'.

6. The transfer is based on analogy. Analogy is treated in the definitions as an extraneous factor working to move the name from its proper application to a figurative one, which means little more than that some kind of transfer has occurred. Neither the means nor the problem of analogical equivalence has been discussed in rhetoric since Aristotle's original and fascinating suggestions. We may assume however that if an analogical process is at work, it is entirely neutral as to whether the transferred items are proper in one setting but non-proper in another. It must be the essential prerequisite for an analogy that some kind of equivalence — however temporary — is achieved between the terms of the analogy, and for that purpose the terms are acceptable and 'proper'.

This examination of the six elements in the authoritative definitions leaves us with a relatively simple kernel: metaphor is a transfer by analogy.

This must be the starting-point for a linguistic theory. It represents the irreducible minimum of agreement

down the centuries together with acceptability in terms of modern attitudes to the nature of language. It is however embedded in an area of considerable confusion that must in some way be resolved before a study of mechanisms and processes can begin. That area is best indicated by summarising the views of most authorities that metaphor is intimately linked with two 'kinds' of language:

Authority	First Kind	Second Kind
Aristotle	normal	special; alien
Quintilian	proper	non-proper
Puttenham	right signification; ordinary	not so natural
Greenwood	regular; natural	customary; figurative
Blair	original; proper; literal; primitive	figurative
Genung	plain; ordinary	figurative; deviating
OED	proper	metaphorical; figurative
Encyclopaedia Britannica	literal	metaphorical; figurative

No one has questioned this approach; none of the well-known rhetoricians or critics has opted out of considering metaphor and tropes generally as acting upon the first

kind of language to produce the second kind. This is so much the case that in the mid-twentieth century we can talk of 'literal' usage on the one hand and 'figurative' usage on the other as though they were part of a primordial structure, and as though we all knew exactly what we meant by the terms.

2.2. Meaning and Reference.

One of the first areas in which we can examine the established assumption that processes act upon one kind of language to produce a second less normal kind is in the purely semantic question of referential meaning.

Lyons (1968) in developing a theory of structural semantics that is neutral towards the question of how language relates to thought and just what the nature of concepts may be, accepts that simple reference is 'essential to the construction of any satisfactory theory of semantics', because at least some words in the vocabularies of all languages correspond with 'features' of the physical world. This does not, however, mean that 'reference is the semantic relationship to which all others can be reduced; nor does it imply that all the items in the vocabulary of a language have reference'. He allows three areas in which reference is possible:

(1) When a word (or any other item that has meaning) refers to an object or objects which we know from experience exist.

(2) By extension, words referring to fictional objects such as unicorns and goblins.

(3) By similar extension, words referring to theoretical constructs as <u>atoms</u> and <u>genes</u>.

He observes that referents (specific objects) are difficult to find for such items as <u>intelligent</u> or <u>good</u>, although they may be given referents as part of a psychological theory. What matters more is the classificatory system that a language offers, and not any natural classes to which objects may or may not belong. 'It is frequently the case that the "referential boundaries" of lexical items are indeterminate. For example, the precise point at which one draws the line between the reference of <u>hill</u> and <u>mountain</u>, of <u>chicken</u> and hen, of <u>green</u> and <u>blue</u>, and so on, cannot be specified'.

We may now both exemplify some of Lyons' points and also add to the difficulty by introducing usage of the 'second kind' — figurative, metaphorical etc. Consider the possible referents of the items <u>hill</u> and <u>mountain</u> in these sentences:

1. The mountains of Scotland are mole-hills compared with the Alps.

2. The nearest mountains to Patiala are the Siwalik Hills.

3. Prendergast went on holiday, leaving behind a mountain of work.

4. John Anderson, my jo, John,
   We clamb the hill thegither,
   And monie a canty day, John,
   We've had wi' ane anither.

5. If the mountain won't come to Mahomet, then Mahomet will go to the mountain.

Here the whole range of referential indeterminacy is exhibited. There is neither a 1:1 relationship between the items and any physical objects when such a link can be established, nor is there any need linguistically for such a referential relationship to be present at all — without in any way impairing our understanding of the information communicated. Additionally, we see the danger in isolating items, and trying to talk about the individual reference and/or sense relations of items. In sentences 1, 4 and 5 there are implications behind the string of items — implications sometimes called allusions — which had considerable influence on the formation of the sentences if not upon the interpretation anyone cares to place upon them. Are we justified however in arguing that in these sentences such items as mole-hills, mountain (of work), and (clamb the) hill are classifiable as a 'second kind' of usage, whatever name we may give to it?

Let us consider the problems of reference, meaning and usage in this sentence:

6. When he heard the news, Prendergast blew his top, and was irritable for hours afterwards.

This sentences is sufficiently part of standard usage for us to handle ~~it~~ without such useful little disclaimers as 'so to speak' and 'as it were'. To help a foreigner, we might add: 'Of course, he didn't literally blow his top off: it means he was angry. It's just an expression we use'. But what we are saying is that blow and top have in this instance

no reference. This is demonstrable by considering the sentence without these items, each removed individually:

7. When he heard the news, Prendergast blew his _____, and was irritable for hours afterwards.

Clearly blew his nose, blew his whistle or blew his trumpet are not as likely as blew his top.

8. When he heard the news, Prendergast ______ his top, and was irritable for hours afterwards.

Again, spun his top, lost his top, kicked his top would not be acceptable. There is something about blew his top which is unitary, which demands its complete and unabridged use, and this phrasal unity has thereference that the individual items lack. It is a common phenomenon: burst his sides, was in stitches, got to the root of, flew into a rage etc. Harris and Jarrett (1956) point to this kind of phrasal unit of reference, indicating the original analogy and suggesting that the whole thing has become normalised in some way:

> 'Probably few of us now think of the accumulation of pressure to the point of explosion when we say or hear 'He blew his top!' but we merely use this saying as a rather flat and usual way of indicating a violent expression of anger.'

The analogy is there, suggesting metaphor; the alien items are there, without their 'proper' signification or reference — but are we justified in talking of a 'second kind' of usage? Or do we have to suppose that there was a time when blew his top belonged in this second area but that it

has normalised itself back into the first area?

It may be argued however that there are occasions when specific reference is sufficiently clear for us to decide whether a 'literal' or a 'figurative' usage is involved. This is the first of Lyons' justifications for the term reference, and it deals with items which refer to objects that we know exist. Consider the following sentences:

9. Farmer Jones breeds pigs.
10. Smith went hunting for black panthers.
11. Black panthers hate pigs.

We may agree that the referents in 9 and 10 are not the same for pigs and black panthers as in 11, but that no ambiguity exists in assigning items to referents if one knows the discourse or situational context from which the sentence comes. One may justifiably accept that naive definitions of metaphor have sprung from an examination of simple language stretches like these, but that even here the simple transfer of pig and black panther from previous referent to new referent, by analogy, is not a deviant condition, insofar as one has merely altered the convention by which item referred to object. It means that polysemy has taken place, with this result:



(b) previously: black panther —— feline carnivore

now: black panther < feline carnivore / American negro militant

The problem here resolves itself into: How normal is the equation pig = policeman, so that one no longer assumes that pig = porcine mammal? This is reminiscent of a process at work in British English in connection with the compound noun bird-watching, where a questioner will ask: What kind of bird are you referring to? Here the possibilities are: bird = feathered animal and bird = young woman. The dilemma serves to illustrate the metaphoric paradox which Ullmann has called 'double vision', which Samuel Johnson in his day called two ideas for one, and which Wheelwright calls 'mental tension'. We shall return to this problem of duality later (3.6), but at this stage must note that, if for metaphor there is a special condition apart from 'normal language', it does not reside in the singleness or multiplicity of referents that a lexical item may have, but rather resides in the range of contexts — discourse or situational — in which that item occurs, so that a clearly analogical situation may operate. Without the distinctiveness of two separate contexts, analogy is impossible, and without specific contexts, items can have no referential value, whether 'literal' or 'figurative'.

Before continuing with this line of investigation, let us summarise the essential points about reference:

(1) Items which have specific referential relationships with existing objects or with actions are relatively few.

(2) Many items relate to their referents as part of a continuum, and the division of that continuum into segments governed by 'words' need not have any objective reality.

(3) Items can be transferred to new referential relations, or to abstract situations where reference is difficult to decide upon.

(4) Abstract referents are difficult to establish.

(5) In certain phrasal usages the referential links of individual items are broken and a new phrasal reference established.

(6) Only when an item moves context can it alter any referential relationship it may have; and for analogical purposes it may possess two, sometimes contradictory, referents at the same time. At a later stage however the item in its newer context may become in some sense 'normalised' again.

2.3. The Indeterminacy of Literalness.

The sixth point at the close of the last section raises once more the amorphousness of these two kinds of language or usage which rhetoricians have postulated. A number of the items exemplified above may have, in diachronic terms, a semantic path which takes them from 'normal' into 'special' and then back to 'normal', but only at the cost of 'normalising' a whole new contextual range. Even though traditional theorists

have laid great store by this dichotomy, the matter would not be so important if recent theorists such as Nowottny (1962) and Leech (1969) were not still pre-occupied with it. Leech depends wholly upon the separability of literal from figurative in his statement of the nature and analysis of metaphor:

> "Metaphor is associated with a particular rule of transference which we may simply call the 'Metaphoric Rule', and which we may formulate: F = 'like L'. That is, the figurative meaning F is derived from the literal meaning L in having the sense 'like L', or perhaps 'it is as if L'."

This 'formulation' is a simplistic presentation of the only point about metaphor that most theorists have agreed upon: its basis of similarity or analogy. By proposing an area L, however, and a parallel area F, Leech perpetuates the view that such distinctions are readily recognisable not only by the expert but by the majority of people. (An amusing sidelight on this improbability is the increasing use of literally for purposes of emphasis, so that we can get sentences like: Prendergast literally blew his top yesterday). We may challenge the view quite simply by asking whether even the experts can make this fundamental distinction sufficiently well for it to be the basis for a theory of metaphor.

Thirty practising language teachers were invited, as part of a questionnaire related to this study, to give their opinions on sixteen sentences. They were asked to mark a sentence L if it appeared to them to convey a literal meaning; F if it were figurative/metaphorical; X if they were


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unwilling to commit themselves. The sentences were a mixture of those which might be amenable to an analogical interpretation, although the analogy might have been made several centuries ago, and those which appear to have no analogical basis. Even in compiling the sentences difficulties arose, because other elements enter into the interpretation, such as alternatives uses for prepositions, metonymic associations, the back-forming of a verb (stage in 8) from a noun, and the range of implications of the verb make. However, the results are presented here in the order in which they appeared in the questionnaire, but with either analogous or non-analogous added alongside the breakdown in order to provide some guide as to the compiler's assumptions about analogical bases.

(1) I'm looking forward to seeing you all next May.

F : 12 L : 17 X : 1 (analogous)

(2) He painted the room a deep shade of blue.

F : 8 L : 22 X : 0 (analogous)

(3) We racked our brains for hours trying to solve that equation.

F : 24 L : 6 X : 0 (analogous)

(4) When he tried to get up, spots began to dance before his eyes.

F : 25 L : 4 X : 1 (analogous)

(5) The AA man started off by lifting the bonnet of the car and looking at the engine.

F : 7 L : 23 X : 0 (analogous)

(6) The Post Office officials were eager to get to the root of the trouble over the missing parcels.

F : 26 L : 3 X : 0 (analogous)

(7) I will make you a table.

F : 0 L : 22 X : 8 (non-analogous)

(8) The protesters staged a mammoth rally in the square.

F : 22 L : 6 X : 2 (analogous)

(9) The weather forecaster said that the glass was high to the southwest.

F : 17 L : 9 X : 3 (analogous) + (metonymic)

(10) He waited in the hall for three hours.

F : 0 L : 29 X : 1 (non-analogous)

(11) The old fellow flew into a rage when he heard about it.

F : 24 L : 6 X : 0 (analogous)

(12) The man said he would make her a star.

F : 17 L : 12 X : 1 (analogous)

(13) There was more in that funny business than met the eye.

F : 23 L : 6 X : 1 (analogous)

(14) Light waves travel at 186,000 miles per second.

F : 7 L : 22 X : 1 (analogous)

(15) It was a lovely night and the moon was floating in a clear sky.

F : 26 L : 3 X : 1 (analogous)

(16) He said that he would make her an offer.

F : 2 L : 26 X : 2 (non-analogous)

The results are hardly encouraging either for Leech's metaphoric rule or for a guarded but nevertheless over-optimistic proposal made by Nowottny:

> "Metaphor, unlike simile, does not demand the use of extra words or explicit comparisons; it conveys a relation between two things by using a word (or words) figuratively instead of literally. But the terms 'figurative(ly)' and 'literal(ly)' are themselves in need of clarification. It is a commonplace to students of semantic change that a language extends its range by using words in transferred senses, linking what is new in men's environment, and in their thinking, to words already available in the language, using them in a way at first figurative but in course of time becoming well-established as the usual way of referring to something, so that the usage is then thought of as merely literal. One may give as examples the 'bonnet' of a car, or its 'hood'.... It is, therefore, difficult to fix the meaning of the terms 'figurative' and 'literal' except by reference to general usage in the state of a language at a particular time.... However difficult it may be to give a precise definition of the term, I think we can hardly, in practice, go far wrong if in any particular case we settle the question of whether a use is or is not 'figurative' by reference to our own impression of it; if it strikes us as 'normal' (another shifty word, but meaningful enough for our purpose) we can call it literal."

Apparently, if the results of the test are at all

representative of informed opinion, we may go very far wrong indeed. Nowottny opens up wide horizons of subjective choice, while Leech has actually attempted to formalise a rule on foundations which appear to shift very easily. Let us consider only two of the analogies behind the test sentences, those behind No 5 and No 14:

(a) Just as a person can wear a bonnet on the head, so a car has a comparable device on the front. (Noting also that Nowottny mentions this example and the parallel American usahe hood)

(b) Just as water travels in ripples called waves, so light travels in something which we can also call waves, because of similarity in motion. (Noting that this analogy is historically established as the choice of the Dutch physicist Huyghens in the 17th century)

The interesting thing about these historically verifiable analogies is that they drew in each case only seven figurative choices.

2.4. The Deficiencies of 'Literal' and 'Figurative'.

Aware that both traditional and current theorists have leaned heavily on the literal-figurative dichotomy, we are forced nevertheless to conclude that it is an inefficient system of classification, and our grounds for this conclusion can be summarised as follows:

(1) The term literal, like its concomitants proper and natural, suggests a fixed or constant relationship

between lexical items and their referents, if they have any, and encourages the assumption that natural language of an undefined kind has an inherent quality of reflecting the real world of things as they 'actually' are. While this assumption may be a handy procedure for ad hoc explanations where Item A is found to be labelling Referent B rather than Referent A, it is inadequate for purposes of linguistic analysis.

(2) The term literal, although it begins by implying the conditions described under (1) above, is regularly used to cover erstwhile non-literal expressions which have become accepted in the language at large. This situation is well-known, attested by Nowottny and by our questionnaire to teachers of language. It suggests that, whereas literalness was assumed originally to be the proper or natural condition in language, it is actually by some ill-defined means capable of absorbing the non-proper and non-natural. Such a process has been called 'literalising' a figurative term, and is widely accepted as such, but as provided for in this system is a contradiction in terms.

(3) The term literal, if bereft of its traditional association with fixity of meaning or naturalness of function, becomes simply an opaque synonym for normal, standard, conventional or some such other term. As such, it has no intrinsic merit over those terms, while it also has the historical and morphological overtones of orthography (litterae; literature; letter of the law; literal translation etc.).

(4) The term figurative has a confused history and currently both includes and equals the term metaphorical. If it is simply as equivalent of metaphoric(al), then it is redundant as a useful term in a theory of metaphor. If however it covers a wider area, including distinct language processes other than metaphor, then it may serve a useful purpose, if delineated. As deriving from figure of speech, however, a

catch-all covering processes of widely different provenance, it is unlikely to be useful and may well be replaceable by some other term or terms (see 2.9).

Henceforth in this study the distinction between what is or is not metaphor can be adequately stated by using the terms metaphoric and non-metaphoric. When the products of the metaphoric process (or any other special process) are contrasted with language material which does not share their characteristics or provenance, then they shall be compared with *normal* language. By *normal* we shall understand (a) that the special distinguishing qualities of metaphor or any other process under discussion are not present, and (b) that the language described in this way conforms in synchronic terms to all or either of the phonological, syntactic and semantic norms of the standard dialect. This is a stricter delineation of what Nowottny meant by 'general usage in the state of a language at a particular time', but has the advantages of ruling out 'normalised' metaphor (because the metaphoric element will be identified), of neutralising the problems of historical or diachronic drift and of accepting that 'norms' rather than absolutes dictate general language behaviour, however difficult it may be at times to delimit specific norms or usages.

None of this means that either 'literal' or 'figur - ative' as everyday rules-of-thumb will vanish from the English language, at the wave of a linguistic wand. They will no doubt continue to dominate discussions on special language

processes. We have accepted the principle of 'normalness' and 'specialness' which lies behind them, without accepting the absolutism which they also imply. We may now go on to examine just how old norm and new norm obtain in language, and what part metaphor and special processes like metaphor play in the general flux.

2.5. The Acceptability of Sentences.

What criteria may we use to estabbish the 'normalness' of items of language, or of the sentences in which they occur? When a sentence of English or any of its constituents is labelled 'not normal to me' what is being violated, and what factor in language makes it possible to predict that many 'violating' 'non-normal' bits of language today will be among the norms of tomorrow? And, finally, where does metaphor fit into the puzzle?

We may discuss acceptability of this kind on the three language levels: (1) items must be phonologically acceptable, so that they sound right, a matter of no immediate concern here; (2) they must be grammatically acceptable, internally (in their morphology or structure) and externally (in their syntactic relationships), a matter of some importance to us; and (3) they must be semantically acceptable, conveying a quota of information. Consider these three sentences:

1. Milk drinks bandersnatches.
2. Bandersnatches milk drinks.

3. Bandersnatches drink milk.

These are hardly 'normal': are they nonsense? In a broad sense the sentences are grammatically acceptable, because they conform syntactically to a subject-verb-object arrangement which is predictable in English. In a narrower grammatical sense they are not necessarily so acceptable, because we cannot accept a string of items which collocates, for examples, the verb milk with an object noun from an inanimate and non-animal class. This unacceptability shades us into the question of semantic unacceptability, because until we are sure of the referent or special sense relations of bandersnatch, we cannot pronounce definitely on even Sentence 3, which is the most likely of the set. If however we learn from a wider discourse or situational context that Bandersnatches are goat-herding nomads, we can accept the sentence as analogous to a wide variety of others, and could make a generalised table for them:

4. Scotsmen
children
calves
Bandersnatches } drink milk,

We could also amend Sentence 2 to read:

5. Bandersnatches milk goats.

The conditions under which lexical items come together are therefore stricter than one might suppose. Norms of a syntactic and then of a semantic nature can be established for a given synchrony in any language's drift through time. There

is a sense in which such an item as bandersnatch is special without being in any way metaphoric or metonymic or anything else. It is special due to rarity of occurrence, a purely statistical matter which is not by any means irrelevant at this stage in our inquiry. It is so rare that it might be metaphoric. As it transpires, however, the items belongs, despite its rarity, to a set of animate human nouns which acceptably collocate with the verb drink in one context and the verb milk in another.

Lyons discusses this situation in his statement of general semantic principles, noting that the grammatical rules of a language create certain sets of elements which can occur together and be grammatically acceptable, as in:

6. John drinks milk.
7. John eats milk.

But, although grammatically acceptable, Sentence 7 is not semantically acceptable, and Lyons observes: 'The sets of elements which can occur and have meaning as the verb and object of these sentences are far smaller sub-sets of the elements whose occurrence is permitted by the rules of grammar'. Syntactic acceptability is therefore far more generous than semantic acceptability. We may see the problems that this raises when we consider the following two sentences in isolation:

9. John drinks alligators.
10. John eats love.

Apparently unacceptable, these sentences can however be provided with discourse contexts in which they function acceptably:

11. In the town of Seminole Springs, in the Florida Everglades, a particularly potent cocktail is produced. Its bite is so powerful that residents have dubbed it an 'alligator'. Our friend *John drinks alligators*.

12. John is a pretty selfish sort of fellow. He likes attention and the more attention he gets, especially from girls, the more he likes it. But they shouldn't expect too much in return. It's all take and no give. *John* just *eats love*.

Analogy is lurking in the background here. A transfer has occurred in each case, where *alligators* and *love* have moved in from other contexts, other discourses, and mapped themselves on to sets to which they do not normally belong. This procedure, whatever its mechanism, allows these nouns to adopt the special features of the set which normally provides nouns in that slot of the sentences. This is usually called *re-categorisation*, and we can say that *alligators*, erstwhile with the feature of <+animate> has now the necessary feature of <-animate> , in order to follow *drinks*, while *love* had the feature <-concrete> and now has the feature <+concrete> in order to follow *eats*. The reality or otherwise of alligator cocktails and a love-hungry John does not enter into the matter.

To the average speaker of English, Sentences 9 and

10 in isolation are unacceptable because they are highly unlikely. They violate his expectations. When told about the wider discourse in which they occur, he might remark that he wasn't to know that, and to safeguard himself in future he would begin to ask for the context before committing himself. Certainly John drinks alligators may be highly likely in Seminole Springs, Florida, but it is wildly improbable in Auchendinny, Scotland. As Aristotle observed, what is normal for one may be special for another, and Bickerton (1969) makes a cogent comment which is invaluable at this point:

> 'When we say we have "understood the meaning of an utterance", what in fact are we saying? That in the light of our linguistic competence, plus co-text and context (if any), we have given it an interpretation. In many cases, our interpretations will differ little, if at all, from those of others, which nourishes this illusion of 'meaning'; sometimes, however, it will not. Then our only appeal is to consensus; grammars and dictionaries are merely this consensus at a farther, more depersonalised remove. Moreover, should the consensus change, the right will be wrong, and vice versa. To a Colombian, le provoca un tinto? "means" quiere Vd un cafe?, "would you like a cup of coffee?", but to a Spaniard it means le hace pelear una copita?, "does a glass of wine make you fight?" Which is right? The question is ridiculous.'

Bickerton's consensus and our requirement of a 'likelihood' are complementary: If the number of Colombians greatly outweighs the number of Spaniards in a given situation, then the 'meaning' of le provoca un tinto? will be explic-

able in Colombian terms. This will apply even if a Spaniard spoke the words, and he might have to re-phrase his remark in order to put across the message he originally intended. Individual Colombian interpretation and general Colombian consensus would be against whatever the Spaniard thought he was saying.

The Spaniard, however, chose the remark in accordance with the norms to which he was accustomed; his action reminds us of Lyons' contention that meaning implies choice. In selecting items, the speaker recognises the existence of alternatives, which, because of the systemic nature of language, are arranged in sets. Innumerable choices form a system of statistical relationships, so that some are more highly predictable in given contexts than others, and their probability of occurrence will affect the ease with which the listener interprets the message. We may present this view of 'meaning' diagrammatically:



This schema applies both to language at large and to

the special processes among which we count metaphor. It is a system of encoding and decoding abetted when it falters by such devices as <u>What I meant...</u> <u>What does he mean...</u> <u>Is that what he means...</u> and <u>We think he means...</u>

Bickerton improves upon his initial assertion about interpretation by pointing out that we need not refer directly to situational context when considering special usages, because 'situation plus role plus topic' produce their own rule-bound mode of discourse formally distinguishable on one or all of the three language levels. 'If we say that the language, or rather sublanguage, of scientific journals differs, and differs formally in a rule predictable manner, from that of, say, hippies, we can say that <u>the theory of relativity is blue</u> is an unacceptable utterance in the first, but an acceptable (almost, on account of an LSD trip, a predictable) one in the second. This merely means that our linguistic expectations adjust themselves to the mode of discourse we are receiving'.

This observation moves us from a simple consideration of acceptability and meaningfulness to a more complex area: the appropriateness and the effectiveness of an utterance. Choice and interpretation are the two sides of this coin, because as the speaker makes his special choice — which could be analogical and metaphoric — the listener has to operate the system so that he can interpret and evaluate the message.

2.6. <u>Frequency and Predictability</u>.

The basic principles of information theory become useful at this point, because we have entered into the domain of

statistical frequencies, probability and information content as opposed to simple meaning.

Let us suppose a context C. We find that two items, x and y, are equally probable in that context. They carry the same amount of information, whatever it may be, and each therefore can be said to have a probability of $\frac{1}{2}$. If x were alone, however, the only probability, then it would be 1, and its status would be <u>certainty</u>. Conversely, the total absence of y in C would give it a probability of 0. The more probable an item is, however, the less information it carries, because it is moving towards <u>redundancy</u> as it moves towards 1. An example of this total redundancy is the ritualistic reply of a bride when she says 'I will'.

Unequal probabilities are of more interest in language. If x occurs in C twice as frequently as y, then we can say that x has a probability of 2/3 while y has a probability of 1/3. The crucial point is that x is twice as probable as y and therefore half as meaningful. Such a relation of inverse proportion is fundamental to information theory and highly suggestive concerning language in general and 'special' language in particular.

Lyons makes a brief comment while describing information theory which great interest in our study, although he does not follow it up: 'This principle is in accord with the commonly-expressed view of writers on style, that cliches (or "hackneyed expressions" and "dead metaphors") are less effective than more "original" turns of phrase'. The sug-

gestion here is that effectiveness of metaphor is not only related to the analogy behind it, but also to the low probability of its occurrence. It is unpredictable.

Such (un)predictability is a diachronic matter, in that it depends upon the length of time and frequency of recurrence of any item. Combination and re-combination of items over a long period of time will affect the strictly synchronic 'rules' or 'norms' governing a language at a given time, and certainly create the phenomenon known as semantic change (6.4), as well no doubt as syntactic change.

Leech (1969) specifically relates this aspect of information theory to literature. For him the context C becomes a poem, and x a highly original phrase:

> '"Information" in this sense can be equated with the communicative weight of each linguistic choice, independent of *what* meaning is conveyed. The amount of 'information' in a piece of language is related to the predictability of one linguistic choice from another.... An actual violation of a rule of language, however, belongs to a dimension of choice for which information theory makes no provision. By the standards of the accepted linguistic code, any selection which is not one of the selections allowed by the rules has a null probability: in other words, its occurrence within the language is impossible. But for a poet, the question of whether to obey the rules of the language or not is itself a matter of choice. This is shown visually in the "special paradigm" of fig. (b) below as opposed to the "normal paradigm" of fig. (a), which illustrates the set of possibilities regularly available in the language. The example is

a famous case of linguistic deviation in poetry, Dylan Thomas's phrase 'a grief ago':

Fig. (a) NORMAL PARADIGM

a	minute day year etc.	ago

Fig. (b) SPECIAL PARADIGM

<table>
<tr><td rowspan="2">a</td><td>minute
day
year
etc.</td><td>NORMAL</td><td rowspan="2">ago</td></tr>
<tr><td>grief</td><td>DEVIANT</td></tr>
</table>

'The poet in this phrase has gone beyond the normal range of choice represented in fig. (a) and has established, for the occasion, the paradigm represented by fig. (b). The word <u>grief</u>, being placed in a position normally reserved for nouns of time-measurement, has to be construed as if it were a noun of time-measurement.'

Leech demonstrates how an alien item has been mapped on to a set of items with which it is not in normal paradigmatic contrast. A transfer has taken place and in synchronic terms the effect is considerable and the collocation very 'special' indeed.

2.7. Extrinsic Influences upon Metaphorised Language.

So far we have found useful pointers towards the nature of metaphor in the following areas:

(1) The concept of analogical transfer.
(2) Normal and special situations in language contexts.
(3) The normalising of special usages through their frequency of occurrence.
(4) The apparent re-categorisation of transferred items.
(5) Unpredictability heightening the effectiveness of the transferred item.
(6) The transferred item mapping itself from one paradigmatic set to another.

In making full use of these pointers, and particularly in accepting the insights offered by Bickerton and Leech, we must move carefully on several points:

(7) item, phrase and sentence. We should recall that one of the inconsistencies of the earliest of all metaphoric theories was Aristotle's confusion of onoma and rhema and his neglect of the logos. Both Bickerton and Leech work with metaphor and transfer on the item and phrase level rather than within the sentence frame. Since the sentence offers the most viable stretch of language known to linguists, we shall consider metaphor only at this level in the hierarchy.

(8) violation and deviation. Leech, like a number of others engaged upon a linguistic analysis of literature and style in general, works outwards from the assumption that at any given time a language is a closed system or finite set of systems, and that any alteration in

'the standard code' is a violation or a deviation. This is an echo of the rhetoricians' contradiction that metaphor was a natural thing yet broke the natural and proper order. We shall examine the whole problem of mapping or set transfer and analogical processes at work in language from the standpoint that (a) since it happens regularly it is not a violation, and (b) that the sets involved have a quality of 'open-endedness' which permits not only temporary mapping on to but also permanent membership in new sets.

(9) <u>confusion of process and product</u>. We should be careful to distinguish between metaphoric sentences and the process by which they are created, that is, between the product and the means of production. Items in a sentence may therefore be metaphoric or metaphorised, but metaphor as a term is best reserved for the whole phenomenon.

Having said this we may now attempt to assess the importance in metaphor of such things as predictability, frequency of occurrence, normalisation and discourse context. We may say, for example, that the basic condition for any item or utterance being classed as 'normal' is that it should either be itself statistically frequent in the experience of the listener, or should belong to a syntactic or semantic pattern which is statistically frequent. This factor, clearly, is immensely important in the everyday performance of language skills, but is not directly related to the actual competence of any user in either creating or interpreting 'special' items.

The mechanism is quite divorced from any frequency count, however large or small, and therefore we must reject any argument which insists that metaphor — in order to be accepted as metaphor — <u>must</u> be vivid and fresh. Its vividness and freshness will be affected by statistical considerations, but not its mechanism. This then is the first important extrinsic factor.

We may go on from there to observe that unpredictability will no doubt heighten an effect already likely to be interesting because of the analogical force or <u>load</u> behind metaphor, but that diachronically — and especially if the metaphor is successful — increasing repetition will tend towards the normalisation of the metaphoric items. This will lead to what we call 'dead' or 'faded' or 'decayed' metaphors. Again, however, none of this affects the original mechanism nor indeed the impact the device may have on new learners of the language or young people or speakers from other parts of the world. We must consequently reject any argument which insists that such a dead metaphor is no longer a metaphor — unless of course the items involved have moved away wholly from any setting which would indicate the original analogy. Effectiveness of this kind is important, but it is not essential, and so should ~~be~~ classed as the second important but extrinsic factor.

It should be noted however at this point that normalisation may of course be the intention of the creator of a particular metaphor — simply because he wants a new term for

a new purpose, as with the Dutch physicist and his light waves. This highlights the third important but extrinsic factor, that the mechanism of metaphor provides a means for extending the range and resources of a language.

Discourse, however, is not extrinsic. It is the setting and perhaps in part the motivation for analogy. Because many metaphoric results are in isolation unacceptable (as we have seen), we must assume that the process and its end-product are discourse-bound rather than discourse-free, and that this is what we mean when we say that a metaphor is particularly 'appropriate'.

We have cleared the ground for a strictly linguistic analysis of both the process and the product, but before we can proceed to it one important modern tendency remains to be examined, a tendency which has often moved a discussion of the subject away from language into philosophy.

2.8. Metaphor Conceived as 'Image'.

What might be called a tendency to confuse process with by-product has led to a comparatively modern habit of equating metaphor with 'images'. This habit may well have been reinforced by the morphological and semantic relationship between image and imagination, so that commentators have assumed that, since metaphor is found abundantly in works of imagination, its products or occurrence are therefore specially imagistic. Wheelwright (1954) is a modern critic with

strong imagist inclinations:

> 'In both the Archetypal and Metaphoric Imagination a certain blending and semantic fusion takes place. In the one, the Archetypal, the fusion is between Image and Idea, between concrete and general, individual and type-form. In the other, Metaphoric, the fusion is between two or more concrete images, each perhaps carrying certain emotive and ideational associations....
>
> 'What is metaphor? The familiar textbook definition, descended from Aristotle and Quintilian, is based upon syntactical, not semantic considerations. Both these masters of rhetorical theory regarded metaphor as little else than abbreviated simile... The essence of metaphor consists in the nature of the tension which is maintained among the heterogeneous elements brought together in one commanding image or expression.'

Wheelwright belongs firmly in that field of criticism which considers aesthetic effect primary and the language by which it is achieved secondary: he is philosophising about ideas and images rather than discussing stretches of language. We must however carefully consider his contention that metaphor is essentially <u>image + image</u> = <u>commanding image</u>. That he considers this more than just analogy becomes clear in:

> 'The same (intellectual recognition by analogy) may be said of many tropes which have the grammatical form of metaphor, as when Aeschylus calls a harbour the stepmother of ships. This minor piece of wit is not metaphor in the essential and semantic sense of the

word, for it makes its connection by analysis and labored comparison rather than by the "sudden perception of an objective relation". One might perhaps call it tabloid simile.'

In this comment we see the dangers of introspective evaluation, of an attempt to establish subjective rather than objective criteria for judging and defining a phenomenon. The result is an unhinging even of 'the grammatical form of metaphor', followed swiftly by a new application of the term simile. Nothing is safe, and if a grammatically identifiable metaphor does not fit into a private conception of essence and semantics, then it is simply not a metaphor at all, despite appearances.

What however of the 'commanding image'? We know very little of the individual's capacity for pictorial thought in relation to language. Caricature, cartoon and farce are likely to emerge as a result of 'semantic fusion' such as Wheelwright suggests, just as easily as high drama, great art and private aesthetic stimulation. What commanding images might not emerge from? —

1. John drinks alligators.
2. Hamlet took up arms against a sea of troubles.
3. Smith fought on in the teeth of the gale.
4. The head came down the stairs and invited us to dinner.
5. Morning in the Bowl of Night has flung the Stone that put the Stars to Flight.

Imagery there is, and it may be entertaining or

edifying or appalling or quaint, depending upon our tastes and predilections, but none of it affects the metaphoric process. The use of the term 'image' is an unhappy one, because it leads us away from language before we have even begun to analyse the medium in which metaphor occurs, and makes the perilous assertion that language items are at one with the mental pictures they evoke, which is only another avatar of the old fallacy that items have a 'natural' link with the things they are considered to represent. The pull of the image is a strong one, however, and it affects even semanticists like Ullmann (1964):

> 'The high esteem in which the image is held by most writers is matched by the prominent place it occupies in stylistic research... There are three questions in particular which have important implications for the aims and methods of research in this field: the form of the image; its inner structure; lastly, its function within the wider context of an entire literary work....
>
> 'What is an image? The term "image" has several meanings which must be carefully distinguished from each other. There is in particular a certain danger of confusion between "image" in the sense of "mental representation" and "image" in the sense of "figure of speech expressing some similarity or analogy".'

He admits the difficulty of maintaining this distinction, but not the dubiety of creating the problem by using the term to mean 'figure of speech', an expression already subject to considerable confusion. His own special definition

however is confounded when he allows metonymy into the gallery of images, stating that relations of contiguity as well as analogy must be included. 'Image' is then an associative matter, additionally obscured by an odd situation: that 'there are many metaphors and comparisons which cannot be regarded as images'. He offers certain criteria which 'in a very rough way' help to distinguish between genuine imagery and other analogical expressions, and these are:

(1) 'there can be no question of an image unless the resemblance iteexpresses has a concrete and sensuous quality';

(2) 'there must be something striking and unexpected in every image';

(3) they must produce an effect of 'double vision';

(4) they must have 'a certain freshness and novelty'.

With the exception of (3), which is analogical, we may note that these requirements refer (as we discussed in the last section) to performance, personal interpretation and frequency of occurrence rather than to the competence which allows the process to occur. Like Wheelwright's comments, they are too subjective and vague to be of much value in systematising our understanding of metaphor, metonymy or even the nature of pictorial thought, which slips into the discussion however much one may be warned against relating 'image' to 'picture in the mind'.

Fortunately the tendency towards replacing linguistic terms (however indeterminate they be) with such words

as 'image' does not have universal support. Richards (1936) inveighed against it in a comment that has considerable relevance here:

> 'The words "figure" and "image" are especially and additionally misleading here. They both sometimes stand for the whole double unit and sometimes for one member of it, the vehicle, as opposed to the other. But in addition they bring in a confusion with the sense in which an image is a copy or revival of a sense-perception of some sort, and so have made rhetoricians think that a figure of speech, an image, or imaginative comparison, must have something to do with the presence of images, in this other sense, in the mind's eye or the mind's ear. But, of course, it need not. No images of this sort need come in at any point.'

Richards considers that 'whole schools of rhetoric' have wandered off in pursuit of this red herring, and his observation seems well supported by the earlier quotations, which suggest that the wanderers have not yet returned. The term 'image' cannot escape the sense of representational or pictorial thought, and serves a pernicious purpose if at one moment it is the 'double unit' (in Richards' expressive phrase) and at another it represents his 'vehicle', the analogous items brought into the normal discourse. Little harm might be done if 'image' had been retained for those pictorial associations likely to arise referentially from the use of analogous material, but it has been carried over to include the double unit, and so has produced Wheelwright's

'commanding image'. The whole subject is a red herring, and we may safely leave the last word on it to Brooke-Rose (1958), when she observes:

> 'There is no objection to the use of the word 'image' in the wide sense of all pictures evoked (as in C.Day Lewis' The Poetic Image, where it includes metaphor, comparison, myth and literal description), providing it is not used interchangeably with metaphor.'

2.9. Lexical Transfer and Neologism.

At this stage it is legitimate to observe that, whatever the status of 'pictures evoked', no problem of fusion or blending or commanding or evoking would arise if Aristotle's primary condition of transfer was not fulfilled: an alien lexical item in a normal context. We saw this happen in such sentences as John drinks alligators and in such phrases as a grief ago. The lexical items transfer from sets to which they normally belong (speaking synchronically) to new sets of which they are not normally members, and of which they may or may not become normal members (speaking diachronically). We can call this situation lexical transfer, and from this point onward use the phrase as a strict term in our theory.

Its foremost attribute in performance terms is its unpredictability, but it is by no means the only process of word-formation and word-adaptation that can be called unpredictable. Ullmann (1964) has pointed to three main areas in which the motivation of new expressions may occur. The first of these neologising processes is the phonological, where

the process traditionally known as *onomatopoeia* or *echoism* has its origin and is wholly or partly responsible for items like: *taradiddle*, *flibbertigibbet*, *cock-a-hoop*, *kersplat* and *zing*. The second area is morphological, where compounding and derivation can produce items like: *snowscape*, *breeder-reactor*, *Vietnamisation* and *de-escalate*. The third is semantic, and it is here that the transfers reign supreme. One may note however that interplay is highly likely among these areas, even to the extent of each providing one or more connotation for a word in a specific context:

> He accused the Prime Minister of embarking on an expensive and meticulously organised Snark-hunt.

Here we can find:

a) *echoism* (phonological): snark — bark — hark
snarl — snort — sniff

b) *compounding* (morphological): snark + hunt

c) *analogy* (semantic)

(i) snark = snake + shark

(ii) snark-hunt = snake-hunt
shark-hunt

(iii) Prime Minister = leader in Carroll's *The Hunting of the Snark*

(iv) A metaphoric relationship between *snark-hunt* and whatever item it might have supplanted in a more predictable discourse (e.g. *fiasco*, *scheme*, *undertaking*). This is of course a question of set membership and is lexical transfer.

This example helps us to recall that, while we may separate the threads in language, we shall always find data afterwards which consists of new and interesting entanglements. We may however formalise the neologising process (by which I mean that process through which special usage may occur as well as specific new coinage) as follows:



(NOTE: This presentation may not exhaust the possibilities, particularly in the semantic area. Certain forms of special usage such as oxymoron, paradoxical juxtaposition, punning and zeugma do not appear to fit, but may be amenable after due consideration and amendment)

Lexical transfer and its inclusive term neologism between them cover much of the territory traditionally assigned to 'figures of speech' and 'figurative language', in addition to the more mundane morphological procedures. They have the advantage of greater precision, and are applicable whether the neologism or the transfer is temporary or permanent, random or planned. Lexical transfer is also a transparent term clearly indicating its own function, and subsumes such well-established devices, processes or products as: metaphor, metonymy, synec-

doche, hypallage or transferred epithet, hyperbole, personification, allegory, antonomasia, euphemism and certain jokes and ironic substitutions. It does not include simile, because of the explicit and syntactically distinct nature of the form, and this is an important point in establishing the distinctness of metaphor and simile, while accepting that they have a common principle behind them. The range of lexical transfer is wide, and it is an area of great richness and complexity. This study is only concerned with identifying sufficient aspects of lexical transfer as will distinguish metaphor from types of transfer most likely to be confused with or related to it. It is not an exhaustive study of the whole phenomenon, and much will remain to be said no doubt on metaphor in particular but certainly on transfer in general.

2.10. Contiguity and Similarity.

Once we accept the existence of a widespread phenomenon in language called lexical transfer we are in a position to separate out some of its important constituents, which might otherwise have remained difficult to identify. We may immediately say that when Aristotle talked of metaphora he was discussing 'transfer' in all its possible forms, but that later analysts limited the term to one particular type, and often contrasted it with another type called metonymy. Traditional textbooks such as Barclay, Knox and Ballantyne (1938) could therefore list their figures of speech under — among others — the heads: Figures of Resemblance, with

metaphor as the prime form; and Figures of Contiguity, with metonymy and synecdoche as the leading forms.

Ullmann (1957) takes up the question of resemblance and contiguity from the standpoint of semantics and literary criticism, observing:

> 'Such associations may, as we already know, work either by similarity or by contiguity. We speak of the bonnet of a car because we perceive some resemblance between the two objects. But when we talk of "the cloth" in the sense of "clergy", or of "town and gown" in the sense of "town and university", there is no resemblance between the two ideas: they are part of the same complex experience, and the association works by contiguity.'

He discusses the two types of expression as 'images' and therefore diverts our attention away from language processes as such. I would like to suggest that metaphor and metonymy as technical terms should be confined to language, and when reference is made (and rightly) to non-linguistic situations, then similarity or analogy can be used on the one hand and contiguity on the other, while association can be retained as a generic term for them both. This may then be formalised diagrammatically as:



This enables us to distinguish between associations and transpositions of all kinds in the phenomenal world — in symbolism; art; religion; magic; myth; science etc. — and those occurring specifically in language. It also allows us to re-align Aristotle's two main types of metaphora with analogy on the one hand (=proportional metaphora), and with contiguity on the other hand (=generic-specific transfer). His original examples of genus and species are not very helpful in allowing us to make this equation with complete confidence, but a traditional assumption that he 'meant' metonymy (see 1.2.2; 1.4) and synecdoche when he talked of genera and species, backed by the specific contention of Brooke-Rose and Nowottny that he lumped them all into one, makes it possible for us to simplify the whole complicated historical problem in this way. The work of Jakobson and Halle (1956) however adds the linguistic weight and insight which confirms this inclination and turns it into a valuable conceptual tool.

In analysing the nature of the disease known as aphasia, these writers conclude that the language defects exhibited by its victims fall into two broad and distinct types: similarity disorder and contiguity disorder. Sufferers from the first of these have difficulty in producing and appreciating selectional, substitutional or paradigmatic processes in language; sufferers from the second disorder have difficulty in producing and appreciating combinational or syntagmatic processes in language. This crucial discovery

highlights the particular 'axis' in language towards which similarity and contiguity tend to move:



where P = the paradigmatic relationship
and S = the syntagmatic relationship

Of this axial relationship, Lyons says:

> 'By virtue of its potentiality of occurrence in a certain context a linguistic unit enters into relations of two different kinds. It enters into paradigmatic relations with all the units which can also occur in the same context... and it enters into syntagmatic relations with the other units of the same level with which it occurs and which constitute its context.'

Aware of the importance of these relationships in any study of the language of both aphasics and normal speakers, Jakobson and Halle developed the logical implications of their thesis:

> 'The development of a discourse may take place along two different semantic lines: one topic may lead to another either through their similarity or their contiguity. The metaphoric way would be the most appropriate term for the first case and the metonymic way for the second, since they find their most condensed expression in metaphor and metonymy respectively...

> In normal verbal behavior both processes are continually operative, but careful observation will reveal that under the influence of a cultural pattern, personality, and verbal style, preference is given to one of the two processes over the other.'

Although the authors use metaphoric and metonymic in a very wide sense here, they accept that the terms belong in an area of 'condensed expression', that area which we specifically identify as a process of lexical transfer. To use an example which they provide, we may say that a response to the stimulus of a particular lexical item may be either paradigmatic or syntagmatic. If we offer the item hut out of context to a variety of native language speakers we may get, as Jakobson and Halle demonstrate, such responses as den and burnt out. From this it is possible for us to create a simple table:

		P	
		den	
S	the	hut	was burnt out

The argument here, when developed, is that if (i) the sentence the hut was burnt out occurs in a discourse concerning humans and their habitations, then it is a normal sentence, and if (ii) the sentence the den was burnt out occurs in a discourse concerning animals and their habitations, then it is also a normal sentence, but if (iii) the sentence the den was burnt out occurs in a human discourse,

it is metaphoric, because den has been paradigmatically selected to replace hut, but is likely to be anomalous in a human context. It is nonetheless obtained through a relationship of similarity between den and hut and between their referents. The interesting assumption which the writers make however is that some people incline towards this kind of association while others — selecting items like burnt out — incline towards the syntagm. The development of a distinct case of metonymy or synecdoche however would need an initial enlarging of our syntagm, and then a deletion of redundant items:

S	The	den hut	with its walls leaning together was burnt out
		P	
⇒ S	The	lean-to was burnt out	

The effect on the original paradigmatic position of hut is striking, as is the syncopation and nominalisation of with its walls leaning together, but the result is metonymic transfer and a complete absence of analogy.

As this present study deals with metaphor, I do not propose to examine any further the mechanics of the metonymic process, although the subject is worth investigation. We have progressed far enough even so, however, for us to be able to use this technique to help distinguish between

special uses of the same lexical item, as for instance with *hands*:

(a) *metaphoric extension* (analogical)

the hands of the	clock children	S
⇒ the hands of the	clock	S
	P	

(b) *metonymic extension* (contiguous)

the	men were working with their hands	S
⇒ the	hands were working	S
P		

Two distinct forms of extension, multiple meaning or polysemy can be accounted for by this contrastive method. If their detailed mechanics are not fully *explained*, then at least their fundamental typological difference is clearly *described*. For the moment that is suffieient. Having established the importance of such a concept as lexical transfer, having outlined the paradigmatic and syntagmatic nature respectively of the two most important forms which lexical transfer takes, we may now proceed to the central aim of this study: the elucidation of the paradigmatic mechanism by which 'condensed' analogy becomes possible in language.

3 Metaphor: A Transformational Process.

3.1. The Problem of the Double Unit.

Richards (1936) has made a contribution towards metaphoric theory which not only attempts an analysis of how the process works but also provides critics and teachers with a useful conceptual tool when discussing metaphor together or with students. The analysis however is not a linguistic one, but hovers in a limbo between language, philosophy and psychology. Richards accepts this, when he observes that metaphor is not just a 'verbal matter, a shifting and displacement of words' but 'a borrowing between and intercourse of thoughts, a transaction between contexts. Thought is metaphoric, and proceeds by comparison, and the metaphors of language derive therefrom'.

Richards sees metaphor as identical with analogy, a supra-linguistic phenomenon that should not be tied down to mere words. Consequently, aware of this, we can approach his work in the hope of obtaining some useful insight but not with any expectation of precise, formalised techniques. With Richards we can move from the sublime and unsubstantiated levels of philosophy to verbal matters:

> 'It is time to come down from these high speculations to consider some simple steps in analysis which may make the translation of our skill with metaphor into explicit science easier. A first step is to introduce

two technical terms to assist us in distinguishing from one another what Dr Johnson called the two ideas that any metaphor, at its simplest, gives us. Let me call them the tenor and the vehicle. One of the oddest of the many odd things about the whole topic is that we have no agreed distinguishing terms for these two halves of a metaphor — in spite of the immense convenience, almost the necessity, of such terms if we are to make any analyses without confusion.'

So Richards presents the theory that the single event called metaphor is made up of 'two members', which have till that point been graced with such vague labels as 'the original idea' (=the tenor) and 'the borrowed idea' (=the vehicle). In presenting these new terms, Richards makes the perennially valid point that metaphor is sometimes seen as the totality of the two (tenor + vehicle) and sometimes as the vehicle only.

It is interesting that such a confusing use of the term 'metaphor' occurs in an able critique of Richards' position. Brooke-Rose (1958) considers the theory of tenor and vehicle a destructively over-emphatic approach:

'This concern with domains of thought and senses has led ... to an over-emphasis of the separateness of metaphor. Dr I.A.Richards' now famous division of metaphor into "tenor" (the real or prose meaning) and "vehicle" (the way of saying it), is the logical conclusion of such an emphasis. It seems to me perfectly obvious that a metaphor consists of two terms, the metaphoric term and the proper term which it replaces. But the result is a new entity, more or less success-

> fully fused according to how it is expressed ... Professor Richards is not specifically concerned with the domain of thought from which the "vehicle" is "smuggled in", and in the later book he is certainly at pains to stress the unity of metaphor and the "interaction" of tenor and vehicle, yet the very terms destroy it.'

We can see the inconsistency of part of Brooke-Rose's observations by a simple diagram of the metaphoric form that seems to her perfectly obvious:



It is possible to ask how a replaced term can exist if the only item present in the text is the metaphoric term, and how metaphor can consist of a metaphoric term and something which is not considered metaphoric. Nevertheless, Brooke-Rose emphasises the unitary nature of metaphor and provides a useful counter-weight to Richards' emphasis of the dual nature of metaphor. The essence of her proposition is that 'the result is a new entity', and this entity is neither the tenor nor the vehicle which came together as its parents.

What matters most with the theory which Richards presents is the covert nature of the tenor in relation to the overtness of the vehicle. The tenor or 'original idea' must be assumed because of the relationship of the material to the

context in which it occurs, whereas the vehicle that has been 'smuggled in' is open to direct inspection. In some way the tenor is considered to lie beneath or behind it, to have been supplanted or suppressed, and this supplanting is part of the metaphoric process. It is difficult however to discuss tenor and vehicle in terms of specific language items, because they are philosophical terms rather than procedures for identifying stretches of language. We are on safer ground when we examine Nowottny's delineation (1962) where she discusses sentences in which metaphor occurs and at the same time considers the 'two terms' which Richards and Brooke-Rose agree upon:

> 'In a metaphor, the usual syntactical frame of a sentence is at some point filled up with a figurative word or phrase. The resulting impression must be complex, since two sentences are implied. The sentence "The ship ploughs the waves" implies The ship does something to the waves and The plough ploughs the soil... I have said that these two sentences are "implied", because of course neither of them is actually written when the metaphor is used. These implicit or unwritten sentences function simultaneously to provide a parallel action or reflected image.'

Nowottny's observation is valuable because she introduces a discussion of syntax into what has tended to be an amorphous debate upon ideas, and from her standpoint it becomes possible to consider the mechanics of the process and not just the elements which may or may not contribute to it. It is, I think, particularly noteworthy that she talks

of 'implied sentences' as having a function although they are not actually written, and also that she speaks of them as 'parallel' in some way. This approach highlights the doubleness and yet the singleness in metaphor, and gives that relationship a structural description — or at least the possibility of a structural description — that it has not previously received, so that Nowottny offers us something like:



The whole three-fold relationship is set in a known discourse, so that presumably one of the implied sentences is a 'natural' part of that discourse, while the other has been 'smuggled in', as Richards put it. We may now ask just how this is done.

3.2. Deep and Surface Structure.

In the previous section we arrived at a point where we could talk usefully about an explicit metaphoric sentence resting upon two implicit non-metaphoric sentences. In such a statement we understood 'explicit' to mean the actual audible or visible sentence, the string of language items chosen by the speaker-writer and offered for interpretation to the listener-reader. Nowottny has noted that the 'implied' sentences are not actually used, not observable, and yet in some way they

function and contribute to both the production and the interpretation of the metaphoric sentence. Can we justifiably postulate the existence of such underlying sentences? If so, in what sense do they 'exist'? For our purposes in this study the psychological validity of such sentences may be a matter too complex for discussion; but we may be satisfied if we can demonstrate the need for such sentences to account for the structure of known metaphors and the creation of others not already known. If such a condition were satisfied, it would be some indication of the value of the theory in stating the necessary conditions for metaphor to occur.

To help us understand how such an implicit-explicit relationship may be conceived and described we can turn to modern linguistic theories of transformational-generative grammar and the attendant concept of deep and surface structure, the foremost exponent of which is Chomsky (1957;1965). Dinneen (1967) offers a succinct statement of the deep-surface relationship:

> 'It is assumed that sentences are understood in terms of (1) their lexical items and (2) the grammatical relations among the lexical items, not merely in the surface presentation of an utterance but especially through the processes by which the surface sentence has been formed; this formational process, operating on lexical items and the syntactic relations into which they enter, is referred to as the "deep structure". To illustrate, Chomsky notes the distinction that the Port Royal logicians made between "what we

think" and "what we say". Citing their example, we can say "The invisible God created the visible world", but we understand this sentence because we have made the following judgments: (1) God created the world, (2) God is invisible, and (3) the world is visible.'

We may say that any sentence is the realisation or end-product of a sequence of processes deriving it from a highly abstract 'base' form. Such processes are ordered 'transformation' leading to the surface forms with which we are familiar: active, passive, reflexive, interrogative etc. Lyons (1968) provides an example of such a transformational process which is useful to us here:

> 'The Latin phrase amor Dei, like its English translation, is ambiguous (out of context). Traditional grammars of Latin would say that the word Dei ("of God") is either a subjective or objective "genitive". This is a transformational explanation of the ambiguity: it implies that the phrase amor Dei is related to, and indeed in some sense derivable from, two sentences: (i) a sentence in which Deus ... is the subject of the verb amare ("to love"); (ii) a sentence in which Deum ... is the object of the verb amare ... Similarly, the love of God is related to two sentences in English: (i) a sentence in which God is the subject of the verb love (cf. God loves mankind); (ii) a sentence in which God is the object of the verb love (cf. Mankind loves God).'

We can express this relationship by considering the following sentences:

(1) The love of God sustained them.

This ambiguous surface sentence can be viewed, according to Lyons, as resting upon one or other of two deep relationships expressible as two sentences:

(2) <u>as having an 'objective genitive'</u>



(3) <u>as having a 'subjective genitive'</u>



Each of these examples proposes two underlying sentences offered as an explanation of one surface sentence. In some sense they 'pre-exist' the surface sentence, and that surface sentence in some sense 'derives' from them. They represent part at least of its deep structure. The transformational processes which allow the realisation are subject to obligatory and optional additions, deletions and rearrangements — including substitution — until the chosen surface sentence emerges. This surface sentence will carry that amount of syntactic and semantic information which the user considers mecessary for communication, and in all

likelihood will be a compact statement of factors existing in the deep structure. Any ambiguities, synonymy, representation of one lexical item by another (e.g. nouns by pronouns), deletion of otherwise necessary items will depend upon the discourse context and the assumptions the user makes about the interpretation his listener will place upon the sentence. This means that the speaker has assessed the 'interpretability' of his statement, or, in other words, that the implications of his surface sentence, in ideal conditions, are apparent to his audience.

An examination of metaphor does not fit snugly into the theory so far presented. Chomsky's model deals with the derivation of a representative sentence in language from all the deep levels which contribute syntactically to its existence. Metaphor, however, is in this sense <u>post-derivational</u>, because if any implicit sentences pre-exist or lie beneath the explicit metaphoric sentence, they are already as capable of surface realisation as their metaphoric offspring. We shall examine this in more detail shortly, but at this point it is necessary to make it clear that the mechanics of metaphor, though post-derivational, are no less transformational than anything which is considered as occurring within the framework so far described. A comment by Lyons is helpful here;

> 'The term "transformational" has unfortunately engendered a good deal of unnecessary controversy and

confusion in the recent literature of linguistics. If we use the term in a general and rather informal sense, rather than in the particular sense in which it is defined in any one theory, we can say, quite reasonably, that the "deeper connexions" between sentences which "cut across" the surface grammar" ... are transformational relationships.'

It is hoped that we can show here that the process which produces a metaphoric sentence occurs by means of a transformation of two other sentences which, for this particular occasion, serve as the structural index, while the metaphoric sentence serves as the resultant structural change, or in other words it is the transformational product which could not have been acceptably formed in any other way.

3.3. Matrix and Analogue.

Consider Blake's well-known lines:

Tiger, Tiger, burning bright
In the forests of the night

For analytical purposes we may extract from this complex verse form a relatively simple sentence:

A tiger burns in the forest(s)

The syntactic structure of this sentence can be expressed as:

NP V_{intr} Prep Phrase

In this there is nothing remarkable, but we should generally agree that the combination tiger + burn

is worth remarking upon, because that combination violates the selectional restrictions normally placed upon both items, whether we judge such restrictions from a syntactic or a semantic standpoint. The violation can be highlighted by separating the items:

A tiger _________ in the forest (s)

A _______ burns in the forest(s)

Since the Prep Phrase remains neutral in both cases we can regard it as dispensable, and are left with:

A tiger _________

A _______ burns

Having creating two co-texts in this way, it is possible for us to consider a range of lexical items paradigmatically related to each other, which could serve acceptably in the slots which have appeared in our syntagms. The sets of such items are extensive, but we may complete our two sentences somewhat as follows:

A tiger prowls

A fire burns

From one metaphoric sentence we have worked backwards to obtain two acceptable 'normal' sentences, i.e. sentences which would not be considered metaphoric. If we were to suppose that they in some sense pre-existed the metaphor, that they were necessary for its occurrence, then we might postulate

two conditions:

(1) that for sentences of this type (at least) the two underlying sentences must be syntactically equivalent.

(2) that a 'splicing' transformation extracts lexical items from each sentence in order to create a metaphor.

This splicing process might crudely be represented as:

1. a tiger prowls
2. a fire | burns ⇒ 3. a tiger burns

The process operates along the 'cuts' of the immediate constituents of the sentences, and this allows us to re-express the actual lexical items as abstract letters:



or simply:



the only drawback being, as Richards observed regarding his own needs, that no terms exist for the two sentences now represented by AB and XY. We cannot refer to them as 'tenor' and 'vehicle', because they are not 'original idea' and 'borrowed idea'. They are hypothetical sentences, one of which is presumably closely

related to the general discourse, while the other has been brought in from elsewhere. Since Blake's discourse concerns the topic tiger, we may assume, in the example we have chosen, that our sentence AB is discourse-linked, in consequence of which I shall call it the Matrix Sentence, insofar as it represents a combination that might have acceptably occurred in the discourse. What however best describes the second sentence?

Aristotle can help us here. In terms of his theory of metaphora, we can express the relationship between the sentences very succinctly as:

$$A : B :: X : Y$$
$$= A : Y :: X : B$$

i.e. a tiger : prowls :: a fire : burns

= a tiger : burns :: a fire : prowls

This relationship is the original analogon or proportion that we discussed above (1.1.2) and virtually identical with the reciprocal metaphor proposed by Donatus (1.2.4.). It is capable not only of formulation in terms of an Aristotelian ratio, but also in terms of algebraic equation:

$$\frac{A}{B} = \frac{X}{Y}$$

$$\frac{A}{Y} = \frac{X}{B}$$

In linguistic terms, this algebraic equation

emphasises the paradigmatic interchangeability of the matrix and the analogous items. Because of the syntactic equivalence of the sentences the immediate constituents enter into a condition of identical distribution: they are equated, or analogous, for the occasion of the metaphor at least. Free exchange becomes possible and the phenomenon traditionally labelled 'transfer' is achieved. It should be noted that the ratio requires a splicing not only of AY but also of XB (= a fire prowls), a product which might, under certain discourse conditions, be called metaphor. That only one splicing process is permissible however only serves to emphasise the importance of the discourse context in which any metaphor occurs.

This temporary equation or analogy is demonstrable in another and very traditional way. Rhetoricians have often talked of metaphor as condensed simile or of simile as expanded metaphor. If a metaphoric procedure such as the one we have just discussed is analogical, we may test it by relating the two sentences by means of those connectives which normally link explicit analogies:

1. <u>Just as</u> a fire burns, <u>so</u> a tiger prowls.
2. A tiger prowls <u>like</u> a fire burns.
3. A tiger prowls <u>as</u> a fire burns.
4. A tiger prowls <u>like</u> a fire burning.
5. A tiger prowls <u>like</u> a burning fire.

Here we see simile as one means of realisation in language for the analogical process, and metaphor as another distinct means. We shall consider later (4.5.) occasions on

which a simple 1:1 relationship cannot however always be demonstrated between the two processes.

The most important point to emerge however is equation, analogy or comparability between the two sentences, and for this reason I propose to refer to the second sentence as the Analogue Sentence. This sentence is conceived as being drawn from a hypothetical discourse in which it would normally occur, but we shall until later any discussion of the reason for the two sentences entering into this special relationship (6.1-2). At this point we are concerned primarily with accounting for the strict mechanics of the process.

We now have a statement of the structural index underlying such a metaphoric sentence as a tiger burns, and the pre-conditions for this proportional transformation are:

1. a matrix sentence
2. an analogue sentence
3. syntactic equivalence between 1 and 2 .

The diagrammatic representation of the process can now be:

			type
S_{matrix}	a tiger	prowls	A B
$S_{analogue}$	a fire	burns	X Y
$S_{metaphor}$	a tiger	burns	A Y

The process so far described deals only with the structure NP V_{intr} . We must see whether it can serve

with other sentences.

3.4. Generative Potential.

It is often difficult to trace the growth of proverbial and idiomatic usages, whether those usages may be considered metaphoric or not. The next example in this study has been more fortunate than most, because we know that in 1548 an Englishman called Udall observed:

1. Familiaritie bringeth contempte.

And this remark may be compared with Minsheu's in 1599:

2. Much familiaritie oftentimes breedes contempt.

And with Evelyn's observation in 1667:

*3. Familiarity creates contempt.

We can re-express this rather trite observation in a compact form which allows us to indicate the distributional equivalence of the three transitive verbs:

4. Familiarity $\left\{\begin{array}{l}\text{brings}\\\text{breeds}\\\text{creates}\end{array}\right\}$ contempt

Some kind of synonymy exists among these verbs, and yet it would be reckless to state that they were either (a) strictly synonymous in these examples, or (b) generally

interchangeable in a wider range of possible contexts. The most fundamental difference between the verbs can be seen in the following sentences:

5. The north wind brings snow.
   The north wind breeds snow.
   The north wind creates snow.

6. Farmer Jones breeds pigs.
   Farmer Jones brings pigs.
   Farmer Jones creates pigs.

7. A playwright creates characters.
   A playwright breeds characters.
   A playwright brings characters.

Examinations of sentences like these have led commentators to argue that metaphor is virtually universal in language, but this is an area into which I do not at present wish to enter. Sufficient to suppose that out of the above possibilities only these sentences are entirely free from the suspicion of metaphor:

8. Farmer Jones breeds pigs.
   Farmer Jones brings pigs.
   A playwright creates characters.

We can say certain things about these sentences, certain things which indicate our expectations, such as that breeds takes an animate human noun subject, that it is a causative verb and requires an animate noun object which can be (preferably) animal but also human. So we can accept pigs breed as one, intransitive form and Farmer Jones breeds pigs

as another, causative and transitive form. We do not feel so happy with contempts breed or contempt breeds in the same intransitive form, and yet we are quite willing to accept — through long acquaintance — the sentence familiarity breeds contempt. We know from the historical specimens above (all taken from The Oxford English Dictionary) that alternatives have been presented, but that this form became universal, idiomatic and banal, so that the collocational oddness has ceased to affect us. What we have however is abstract noun subject and object. We may separate the anomalous items in much the same way as we did for a tiger burns:

familiarity ______ contempt

______ breeds ______

The slots can be filled up as before in some acceptable selection from the range of possible items:

Familiarity causes contempt

Farmer Jones breeds pigs

Again, the 'splicing' process can be roughly shown as:



or, in the stricter terms of matrix and analogue sentences:

	A familiarity	B causes	C contempt
S_{matrix}			
$S_{analogue}$	Farmer Jones X	breeds Y	pigs Z
$\Rightarrow S_{metaphor}$	A familiarity	breeds Y	C contempt

The proportion or analogy in Aristotelian terms is now a three-fold one, operating as before along the 'cuts' of the constituents of the sentence type NP V NP:

$$A : B : C :: X : Y : Z$$

The algebraic treatment of such a ratio or equation is to resolve it into simpler binary relationships:

$$A : B = X : Y$$
$$= B : C = Y : Z$$

which, using the lexical items, is:

familiarity : causes = Farmer Jones : breeds
= causes : contempt = breeds : pigs

If we make the same algebraic transformations as before, we get:

$$A : Y = X : B$$
$$= B : Z = Y : C$$

realised lexically as:

familiarity : breeds = Farmer Jones : causes

= causes : pigs = breeds : contempt

and this gives (as one of its outcomes);

A : Y = Y : C

familiarity : breeds = breeds : contempt

The inference here is that the splicing transformation rests upon either a single set of binary relationships, or on a number of overlapping binary relationships. While for general purposes one would not need to specify the whole range of equations (because they would possess one common element) it is nevertheless valuable to note that the repetition of a common element indicates where the transformation might or might not occur. We can propose two legitimate transformations:

(1) familiarity : breeds = breeds : contempt
(2) Farmer Jones : causes = causes : pigs

but not

(3) familiarity : breeds = causes : pigs
(4) Farmer Jones : causes = breeds : contempt

because acceptable sentences cannot be formed from equations which do not have a shared element. Having noted this, however, we may simplify matters by considering the transformational process for NP V NP sentences as resting upon a three-fold formula rather than a two-fold one, as long as we bear in mind that the three-fold formula is a syncopation. The

only other point of importance is that we are required to accept as a potential metaphor the sentence Farmer Jones causes pigs, because it is produced by the same process as our initial metaphor. We have no dicourse context for it, and therefore it is functionless, a metaphor in isolation but a metaphor nevertheless.

It may be argued that such a process would generate any sentence if we only brought together parent sentences fulfilling the simple requirement of syntactic equivalence. Certainly something would emerge, because we would be treating the parent sentences as though they were matrix and analogue sentences. This however is a criticism which ignores the prime importance of a pre-existing discourse in which the metaphor may occur and also the creator's choice and motivation when seeking out an analogue (see 6.1-2).

There is little doubt however that if a mechanical process of this kind underlies metaphor, and can be considered as part of the language competence of native speakers, then it does provide a generative framework for (a) the analysis of metaphor occurring in literature, and (b) the development of a controlled and explicit teaching technique for making students aware of the whole phenomenon.

3.5. Set Interpretation.

One objection likely to be raised against the foregoing theory is that we have no way of knowing the exact form of the analogue sentence in the structural index for metaphor, and that

we do not even have any guarantee of the constituents of the matrix sentence. By the very procedure for developing this theory we have leaned heavily on the supposition that vacant slots could be filled by certain items simply on an assumption of predictability. If such an assumption is permissible, then all the rest may indeed follow, but can one permit the initial assumption?

The reason so far advanced for separating out the items in a metaphoric sentence has been that the combinations in some sense violate our expectations, or the selectional restraints placed upon certain nouns, verbs etc. This might justify the separation of the items, but what justifies the insertion of others, apart from intuitive preferences? The answer here would appear to be that any intuitive preference must still occur within certain paradigmatic limitations — that is, in attempting to 'work back' from the metaphor to some other structure we can only select items which belong to a finite set possessing distributional equivalence. The scope for selection is limited. Let us consider for example our attempt to reconstruct the analogue from:

__________ breeds __________

What we actually do is supply a set identity to the slot preceding and the slot following <u>breeds</u>:

<u>set X</u> breeds <u>set Z</u>

Each set is then characterised by certain features

which delimit the items which belong to that set, as for example:

Let <u>set X</u> be <+concrete><+animate><+human><+agent>
Let <u>set Z</u> be <+concrete><+animate><+animal><+domestic>

This may be restated for the whole sentence as:



These features successfully delimit the possibilities to such an extent that we cannot accept such sentences as:

1. The ship breeds guns.
2. The squirrel breeds flowers.
3. The baby breeds aardvaarks.
4. Farmer Jones breeds fences.

etc,

We can however accept such sentences as:

5. Mankind breeds livestock.
6. Farmers breed cattle.
7. Farmer Jones breeds pigs.
8. Scientists breed white rats.
9. Enthusiasts breed certain species.
10. Prendergast breeds aardvaarks.

Even Sentence 10 is permissible, if we assume that for the situational context <u>aardvaarks</u> is rendered <+domestic> because of a special condition operating for <u>Prendergast</u>.

From these examples we see that the selection of an analogue sentence is not as capricious as it seemed at first

glance. Purely as a test of such a proposition we can relate our original matrix sentence to these six sentences by means of <u>just as — so</u>:

11. <u>Just as</u> { 5 / 6 / 7 / 8 / 9 / 10 } <u>so</u> familiarity causes contempt.

(If the appropriate sentence is inserted in its paradigmatic slot in turn, it will be seen that they are analogically acceptable. Some are more acceptable than others.)

Basically the analogy will hold good between the nouns of the matrix and the sets of nouns possible in the analogue, and it is only necessary to select one specimen in order to illustrate this. Such analogues are implicit in the contextual features, in this instance of the verb <u>breeds</u>. The result however is of the first importance. What this process of set interpretation means is that the metaphoric process permits the mapping of one set on to another; the transfer of one item from its predictable set membership to a new membership, either for the limited occasion of the metaphor, or — through adoption and frequency of occurrence — as a permanent phenomenon. The process therefore accounts for the traditional semantic areas known as <u>extension</u> and <u>polysemy</u>, at least as far as analogy is concerned. This process can be demonstrated schematically by paradigm tables for the example we have been discussing:

(a) matrix sentence range

familiarity	causes brings creates produces leads to	contempt

(b) analogue sentence range

mankind farmers Farmer Jones scientists enthusiasts Prendergast	breed(s)	livestock cattle pigs white rats certain species aardvaarks

When, however, we are given the metaphor familiarity breeds contempt we get the mapping or transfer that Leech was discussing (above, 2.6) for the phrase a grief ago, and we see the mechanism which permits its occurrence:

(a) <u>new range arising from matrix side of metaphor</u>:

<table>
<tr><td rowspan="2">familiarity</td><td>causes
brings
creates
produces
leads to</td><td rowspan="2">contempt</td></tr>
<tr><td>breeds</td></tr>
</table>

(b) <u>new range arising from analogue side of metaphor</u>:

<table>
<tr><td>mankind
farmers
Farmer Jones
scientists
enthusiasts
Prendergast</td><td rowspan="2">breed(s)</td><td>livestock
cattle
pigs
white rats
certain species
aardvaarks</td></tr>
<tr><td>familiarity</td><td>contempt</td></tr>
</table>

The implications of this process may not be immediately apparent, because of the example we have been using. The application, however, of this analysis to other metaphoric situations helps to explain the otherwise inexplicable presence of 'alien' items far from their 'normal' contexts and still providing information, and how such alien items may become so 'normalised' that they are automatically interpreted as though they were 'really' the items they original-

ly supplanted, as in:

(1) Prendergast blew his top
(2) She pulled my leg on the telephone
etc.

There is nevertheless a great degree of complexity left unexplained by the theory at this stage. One of its interesting by-products is however the possibility of a grid by which individual lexical items can be assessed in terms of extension or polysemy, at least as far as metaphoric-analogical transfers are concerned. This grid suggests certain conditions operating on words and phrases and offers a re-interpretation of the whole question of 'normal' and 'special':

	current or 'normal' set membership	'special' or metaphorised set membership
1	+	+
2	+	-
3	-	+
4	-	-

The grid can be interpreted as:

1. Lexical items exist which have membership in both areas, e.g. <u>bonnet</u> (<u>of car</u> and <u>of lady</u>).
2. Lexical items exist which have not been metaphorised or at least not persistently metaphorised.
3. Lexical items exist which are only used in metaphoric contexts. Synchronically this would

be unimportant, but it would indicate the well-known condition of words so well transferred that their original contexts have been forgotten.

4. Lexical items which do not *currently* exist. This category is not as inane as it sounds, particularly in synchronic terms, because it covers archaisms, certain kinds of likely neologisms and possible foreign items moving into English.

3.6. *Dual Categorisation.*

We must consider the matter of set transfer somewhat more closely than simply assuming that two distinct relationships exist. This assumption is already implicit in the concept of *re-categorisation*, to which we have already referred (2.5). It was suggested that a lexical item can change one or more of its features, as in the case of *alligators* in the sentence *John drinks alligators*, where the item was presumably re-categorised from ⟨+animate⟩ to ⟨-animate⟩. This assumption is the idea of set transfer in its purest form (as with Grid No. 3 in the last section), where the item abandons all connection with previous sets and contexts and becomes wholly absorbed into new ones. This assumption may however be both simplistic and premature, and~~, as~~ I have suggested, largely a diachronic matter.

Let us consider our last specimen once more: *familiarity breeds contempt*. We may state the matrix and the analogue, each equipped this time with its most important noun features:

matrix	familiarity	causes	contempt
	<-concrete>		<-concrete>
analogue	Farmer Jones	breeds	pigs
	{ <+concrete> <+human> }		{ <+concrete> <+animal> }

If, as we have averred, the two sentences are implicit in the metaphor and essential to its structure, then we must accept that the features are also implicit and essential to its interpretation. This means that a contradiction or paradox is created, because all the features co-occur:

metaphor	familiarity	breeds	contempt
	{ <-concrete> [+concrete +human] }		{ <-concrete> [+concrete +animal] }

The opposing features do not cancel each other out, nor does one dominate the other. They co-exist, and probably account for what Wheelwright has called the 'mental tension' inherent in the phenomenon. Without inquiring too far into the nature of 'mental' or 'tension' we may agree that we are aware of both the old set relationships and of new set relationships which the syntagm demands. The nouns are re-categorised only in the sense that they are double categorised, and for the occasion of the metaphor have the feature (in this specific instance) of <+ and -concrete>. This contradiction may force us to place an analogical interpretation on the sentence. In newly created metaphors the paradox will be

sharp and insistent, but in well-established or 'normalised' metaphors it may have lost much of its force.

We may test this proposition by examining a metaphoric sentence which is less well-known:

I will make you toys out of starlight

If we supply the predictable features to the nouns, we get:

I will make you	toys	out of	starlight
	<+concrete>		<-concrete>

Simple re-categorisation would require starlight to be given the new feature <+concrete>, which is intuitively unsatisfying and achieves no special semantic effect. The poet's intentions however may be better served in:

I will make you	toys	out of	starlight
	[+concrete -concrete]		[-concrete +concrete]

Here the referents and sense relations of both toys and starlight are affected in mutual contradiction, without however impairing the message ~~that~~ Stevenson probably wished to convey in a poem entitled Romance, the message of a fantastic offer, a promised land where the familiar and the unfamiliar blend in strange harmonies:

'I will make you brooches and toys for your delight
Of bird-song at morning and star-shine at night.
I will make a palace fit for you and me,
Of green days in forests and blue days at sea.'

There is a distinct possibility that a number of nouns in English exist in an indeterminate condition, perhaps caught between the features of one set and another, perhaps for some other non-linguistic reason. I am thinking of nouns which are known to occur in a number of 'normal' and metaphorised collocations connected with + or -animacy . flame is typical of the group, occurring in such phrases as the flames danced, the flames flickered hungrily, leaping flames, flaming rage, inflamed passions etc. My own assumption about this item is that it would be permanently -animate , judged referentially on some biological criterion. I arranged however for 108 boys and girls of an Edinburgh school (age range 15/16) to state their preferences for the 'aliveness' or 'not-aliveness' of 15 such items. The results are given here, and compare very well with similar results now given to a number of other groups, both adult and children, both British and foreign. I shall however only give the findings for this one group:

	Item	<+animate>	<-animate>	
1.	flame	58	50	
2.	fish	106	2	
3.	electricity	70	38	
4.	wind	35	73	
5.	thunder	36	72	
6.	oyster	89	19	
7.	roses	84	24	
8.	river	39	69	
9.	radio	30	77	+1 (undecided)
10.	time	32	76	

11.	rain	18	90
12.	man	107	1
13.	shadows	28	80
14.	fountain	35	73
15.	eggs	55	53

When confronted with the findings afterwards, many people in the tested groups would debate vigorously the animacy or otherwise of particular nouns, and express disbelief that others could hold a different opinion, and apparently thinking always of phenomenal objects or occurrences rather than 'words' as such. In many cases, however, although a person might have put one noun in a <+animate> position, he could appreciate why it might be re-calssified as <-animate>. Sometimes collocations of a metaphoric nature would be cited as 'proofs' or 'explanations', while at others mobility in the referent appeared to be what mattered for animacy. Many people proved on reflection to be unsure just how to categorise a word, and this leads one to suppose that the most accurate statistical expression for these nouns would be:

1. <u>flame</u> [+animate / -animate] 8. <u>radio</u> [+animate / -animate] etc.

Whatever the reason(s) behind this phenomenon, it is similar to the state of dual categorisation which we have outlined as part of the metaphoric process. It is doubtful whether at this point we have exhausted by any means what can be said about either re-categorisation or dual categorisation

in metaphor, but this survey, brief as it is, should be sufficient to indicate the importance of the feature element in the whole process.

3.7. Dummy Elements in the Matrix.

Nowottny revives an Aristotelian observation and also makes a very significant point when she says:

> 'The poet is not ... wholly free to go to any area of experience when he is in search of a metaphor; he can choose only from areas which provide language resources capable of meeting all the technical necessities of his poem.
>
> 'However, even with these restrictions on his scope in using metaphor, the poet will find it the best means for using language to cover the unusual situation and the unnamed phenomenon, for the simple reason that metaphor frees him from the necessity of referring via conventions of reference; i.e. via the names already established in common language. Metaphor permits him to use, if not any, then almost any area of the whole system of our language.'

Nowottny's 'unusual situation and unnamed phenomenon' are Aristotle's 'missing onoma' in one part of his proportional metaphora (1.1.2). He did not specify, but he argued that an X in the ratio in no way invalidated the metaphora. We may add that an X in the ratio is not only a problem for poets, but also for scientists, engineers and every other person ever at a loss for a new term to cover a new area of experience. It is natural for a new term to be sought analogically from

terms already in existence, and we must see how we can accommodate this neologising process within the matrix-analogue theory.

Huyghens, a 17th century Dutch physician, first made the analogical association between the movement of light and sound on the one hand and the movement of the sea on the other. Until he made the analogy, the movement of light and sound had been undescribed, but physicists could now say:

Light travels in waves

If we separate this sentence into matrix and analogue, we get:

$S_{\underline{matrix}}$	Light	travels	in	$\emptyset$
$S_{\underline{analogue}}$	Water	moves	in	waves
$S_{\underline{metaphor}}$	Light	travels	in	waves

The item <u>waves</u> has been metaphorised into a 'vacuum', represented here by the zero token $\emptyset$. We could express the ratio fully by including the verb, but for convenience let us express it as follows:

$$\text{light} : \emptyset = \text{water} : \text{waves}$$
$$= \text{light} : \text{waves} = \text{water} : \emptyset$$

We may ask however what exactly the $\emptyset$ represents in terms of language. It is not a full zero or vacuum, but rather the token of a set of indeterminate or <u>relatively empty</u> items, such as we may list paradigmatically in this table:

matrix range

Light travels in	something a movement this manner a certain way = ∅

These NPs are 'dummies' insofar as they lack specific independent reference, unlike the analogue waves. For later generations of physicists the analogy might well have ceased to have any importance — or we might say that the metaphor no longer carried a significant analogical load — but it is interesting that the physicist Sullivan in the nineteen-thirties could say:

> 'We are no longer confident that we know the difference between a wave and a particle — or even whether there is any difference. In our modern laboratories we have particles that behave like waves, and waves that behave like particles. And light behaves like both.'

Sullivan accepts the analogical basis of his technical term waves (although we may not then suppose that he has the sea in mind when using the term) but moves beyond the analogy of Huyghens, aware that it is not a final description. We could however quote innumerable writers using waves in discussing the electromagnetic area of physics and accept that the transfer has been a very useful one indeed.

3.8. Summary.

In moving from a consideration of the definitions offered by

The Oxford English Dictionary and *The Encyclopaedia Britannica* through to a linguistic theory of metaphor I have developed and adapted a range of converging viewpoints, expressed by Jakobson and Halle, Richards, Leech and Nowottny. The Aristotelian foundation is inescapable but particular stress is laid upon the modern linguistic concepts of paradigm and syntagm, and the analogous deep-to-surface models employed by Chomsky et al.

Underlying the surface realisation which we call a metaphor, which is best considered within a sentence framework, are two distinct syntagms, one of which is the matrix and the other the analogue. The matrix and analogue are functions imposed upon two sentences which could occur in their own discourse contexts as fully realised language strings. The matrix sentence could legitimately occur in the dicourse to which the metaphor belongs, while the analogue is drawn from a distinct discourse because of a deliberate choice made by the speaker-writer. His motivation for this choice is yet to be discussed. Matrix and analogue can underlie the realised metaphor (i.e. they can permit the creation of a metaphor) only if they are syntactically equivalent. Because of this syntactic equivalence they permit their constituents to enter into special paradigmatic reltionships, so that free exchange can occur. This free exchange occurs in terms of a strict ratio, proportion or analogy which can be expressed

as an algebraic equation. The result is to permit collocation between lexical items which do not normally combine, producing a phenomenon best described as dual categorisation, closely related to the transfer of items from one paradigmatic set to another, and leading to an impression of mutual contradiction, which Ullmann has called 'double vision' and Wheelwright 'mental tension'. It is argued here that without this initial matrix-analogue exchange no metaphoric transfer can occur, and that the process provides the basis for a variety of further, 'secondary' transformations which can be specifically considered 'stylistic'.

4

Stylistic Variations.

4.1. Secondary Transformations.

The foregoing theory is intended as a statement of the basic mechanism by which metaphoric usage occurs in the English language; it was developed with a full awareness that it could not directly account for a wide range of metaphors occurring in general and in the repertoires of writers and poets. We must account for as many varieties as possible but we shall attempt to move towards them from the initial premisses of the theory rather than work back from specimens. The assumption made is that stylistic variations in metaphor derive transformationally from the initial transformation, and are therefore secondary embellishments, much in the way a nominalisation like <u>baldness</u> derives from such a base as <u>X is bald and Y is also bald...</u>

We must therefore re-examine the basic materials in our possession in order to see how secondary transformations may be set up. We have:

(1) a matrix sentence
(2) an analogue sentence
(3) syntactic equivalence between (1) and (2)
(4) special paradigmatic relationships caused by (3)
~~(5) paradigmatic exchange based upon the re-expression of a ratio~~
(6) a new entity, the metaphoric sentence

A recollection of the way in which the actual

splicing transformation occurred however reveals that we also possess a 7th factor: the unexpressed remnants of matrix and analogue. We showed how, if it were necessary, a second isolated metaphor could be created as the reverse of the one actually used. In fact, by manipulating the analogies expressed as equations we could create many more metaphors than we have so far attempted to do, but that is not so important as the simple 'existence' of extra material that was not overtly required. Certainly, some of the features of the suppressed nouns have entered into the new dual categorisation of the expressed nouns, but like Richards' tenor the unexpressed material remains out of sight. But perhaps not out of mind. I should like to suggest that the suppressed material — particularly that of the analogue — is of immense potential and importance.

4.2. Allegory.

Let us consider the following Bunyanesque sentence:

1. Giant Despair attacked the pilgrim Christian.

Allegory is usually defined as the presentation of one topic as though it were another, or some blend of two topics so that a straightforward tale is told and yet a less explicit homily is delivered at the same time. Allegory is also usually seen as a form of metaphor, insofar as — in Johnson's words — we get two ideas expressed as one. This is the double unit once more, and we are justified in —

separating out the parts of this simple allegorical sentence into two distinct levels or flows of information:

2. *Plot*: A giant attacks a pilgrim
3. *Homily*: Despair troubles a Christian.

There is already a similarity here to the matrix and analogue situation, because we have had to insert a new item (the verb *troubles*) into the V slot of the homily sentence. Again, this postulated verb serves as the representative of a set of possible verbs likely to collocate with the preceding and following nouns. At the same time we may agree that there is an analogical relationship between the two topics, expressible as:

4. Just as a giant attacks a pilgrim, so despair troubles a Christian.

5. A : B : C = X : Y : Z

The allegorical sentence can therefore be interpreted as the result of a metaphoric splicing, but it contains more lexical material than the examples we have so far examined. In fact it contains all but the analogue verb:

S_{matrix}	ABC	a giant	attacks	a pilgrim
$S_{analogue}$	XYZ	despair	troubles	a Christian

The splicing gives us a crude sentence: *A giant despair attacks a pilgrim a Christian*. The analogue nouns enter into the final metaphoric sentence as nouns in apposition to

the matrix nouns. Transformational refinements delete unnecessary indefinite articles, the general discourse context providing definiteness and characterisation. The effect upon features is however very interesting, because dual categorisation comes fully to the surface in syntagmatic form:

6. Giant $\langle +\text{human} \rangle$ Despair $\langle -\text{human} \rangle$ attacks the pilgrim Christian

whereas in the following more predictable metaphor the dual categorisation is paradigmatic:

7. Despair $\begin{bmatrix} -\text{human} \\ +\text{human} \end{bmatrix}$ attacked the pilgrim

This suggests that one of the necessary conditions for allegory is a secondary transformation (whether occurring immediately after the first or in some sense simultaneously is not important at this point) bringing appositional nouns out of the analogue. This is of course syntactically acceptable. Just as we may have a phrase such as *Jones the farmer* or *Smith the apothecary*, so we can have *the giant Despair* or *Despair the giant*, each paradigmatically expressed as:

8. $\left.\begin{matrix} \text{Jones} \\ \text{The farmer} \end{matrix}\right\}$ ploughed his fields

9. $\left.\begin{matrix} \text{Smith} \\ \text{The apothecary} \end{matrix}\right\}$ closed his shop

10. $\left.\begin{matrix} \text{The giant} \\ \text{Despair} \end{matrix}\right\}$ attacked the pilgrim

In formulaic terms, this allegorical transformation

is:

$$\left\{\begin{array}{ll} \underline{S_{matrix}} & A\ B\ C \\ \underline{S_{analogue}} & X\ Y\ Z \end{array}\right.$$

$$\Rightarrow \quad \underline{S_{allegory}} \quad (AX)\ B\ (CZ)$$

(Note that this ordering is specifically offered for the sentence we have been considering. It is possible however that the appositional arrangement might be reversed, with (XA) and (ZC), so that the analogue noun precedes the matrix noun. A total of four variations would appear to be possible for such a sentence.)

We may test this supposition by applying it to our previous example familiarity breeds contempt. Without stating all the stages, we may simply arrange to 'appositionalise' the suppressed nouns, and obtain such a crude form as:

11. Familiarity the farmer breeds contempt pigs.

OR

12. The farmer familiarity breeds pigs contempt.

Allegory, as we have seen above, possesses certain contextual requirements such as definiteness and characterisation, so that we may refine the sentence(s) transformationally to:

13. Familiarity the farmer breeds the pig Contempt.

AND

14. Farmer Familiarity breeds the pig Contempt.

Given the specific requirements of an allegorical discourse, this kind of appositional transformation is virtually

obligatory. In the two specimens we have studied it is a double transformation, because it operates upon both the NPs. In more widespread and less allegorical expressions of this kind, however, the appositional transformation is usually a single occurrence. Consider:

15. That whirlwind Prendergast blew through the office.

The structural index for this sentence is:

$S_{\underline{matrix}}$	ABC	Prendergast	rushed	through the office
$S_{\underline{analogue}}$	XYZ	A whirlwind	blew	through the air

where we assume (i) that rushed represents a verb set B, (ii) that we can treat a Prep Phrase as a unitary constituent, when the preposition is likely to identical in both matrix and analogue. None of these assumptions affects the argument, but each has its own interesting implications. We assume however that an initial splicing transformation occurs as follows:

⇒	$S_{\underline{metaphor}}$	AYC	Prendergast	blew	through the office

followed by a secondary appositional transformation drawing the constituent X from the analogue:

16. Prendergast a whirlwind blew through the office.

The possibilities at this stage are very interesting. Firstly, this order need not necessarily be the way in which the

transformations are realised. The initial metaphor may have been XYC, giving:

17. A whirlwind Prendergast blew through the office.

In either case a definite determiner must be added to emphasise the analogy, so that we get such forms as:

18. Prendergast, that whirlwind, blew through the office.
19. That whirlwind Prendergast blew through the office.

It seems possible, however, that the appositional relationship can be realised in another and rather surprising way: camouflaged as a simile. By the insertion of the connective <u>like</u> into Sentence 16, and an optional permutation, we can get these sentences:

20. Prendergast like a whirlwind blew through the office.
21. Prendergast blew through the office like a whirlwind.

The effects of such a possibility upon any discussion of simile are of course considerable, because they indicate that many sentences which appear to be similes are in fact metaphors in a secondary stage.

4.3. <u>Further Appositional Variations</u>.

One of the features of allegory, as we have indicated, is the characterisation of abstractions: Giant Despair, Mr Valiant-after-Truth, the Demon Drink, Death the Grim Reaper etc. Of course, allegory exists in forms where actual apposition of character + abstraction does not occur overtly, as for ex-

ample the roles in which the animals are cast in *Animal Farm* (see 5.5.3) and the function of the boys in *Lord of the Flies*, but even there we have the occasional lapse into the mediaeval taste for such juxtaposition and suggestion, as with Napoleon Pig (= the pig Napoleon, with the abstract qualities implied), in the one, and the boy Piggy in the other. Characterisation of the allegorical kind (sometimes referred to simply as personification) seems to be only one of a pair of alternatives by which writers have made their analogies. The other method can be called representation or depiction, because the feature of <+animacy> is missing, as with: The Slough of Despond, the Apple of Discord, the Seeds of Time, the Horn of Plenty, the Wine of Astonishment etc. The feature <-animacy> seems to dictate the particle *of*, which expresses a genitive relationship which is not expecially possessive. Compare the following:

1. The Giant of Despair attacked the pilgrim of Christian.
2. The Slough Despond (*or* Despond the Slough) endangered the pilgrim Christian.
3. The farmer of familiarity breeds the pig of contempt.
4. The goddess threw the Discord apple into the banqueting hall.

None of these is acceptable, suggesting that <+animacy> requires a simple appositional transformation, while <-animacy> demands the insertion of the particle *of*. The mechanism however appears to be the same for the actual formation of the metaphor. Such metaphors are common in

Arabic, Persian and the north Indian languages, with sufficient influence upon Kipling for the following to occur in Kim:

5. Kim muddied the well of inquiry with the stick of precaution.

The structural index for this sentence would appear to be:

S_{matrix}	ABCD	Kim confused	the inquiry	with his precautions
$S_{analogue}$	XYZO	A man muddied	the well	with his stick

(Here the rather empty a man and the verb confused, representing a verb set B, are the only constituents left unexpressed)

What we get initially is the crude form:

6. Kim muddied the well inquiry with his stick precautions

One again, however, refining occurs according to the rules of the discourse, and Sentence 5 emerges. This double form is not common in English, any more than the double form for animate noun appositions was common outside allegory, but — again like the earlier examples — the single form is very common indeed, as illustrated by this metaphor adapted from a speech by the British prime minister Harold Macmillan:

7. A wind of change is blowing through Africa.

This metaphor is separable into:

S_{matrix}	ABC	Changes	are occurring	through/in Africa
$S_{analogue}$	XYZ	A wind	is blowing	through the trees

where are occurring and the trees represent sets B and Z respectively, and where the prepositions occurring in matrix and analogue are sufficiently close semantically to be considered the same. What actual items could have occurred there may be known only to Macmillan, but, as I suspect, in many cases remain unspecified and exist quite acceptably in set form when the metaphor is being created. The basic conditions are fulfilled for a ⟨-animate⟩ transformation, and we get as our metaphor, with refinements appropriate to a political discourse, the sentence in No 7 above. This can be compared with Sentences 4.2.18/19, where the noun Prendergast is ⟨+animate⟩ in relation to the noun whirlwind, resulting in an appositional and not a genitive form. Both the following would be quite unacceptable:

8. That whirlwind of Prendergast blew through the office.
9. A wind change is blowing through Africa.

Not all metaphors using of need necessarily be the products of this particular process, but many of them appear to be amenable to this analysis, and certainly the mechanism, under the right pre-conditions of discourse and selection, can generate such metaphors. We gave allegorical examples above of this kind of genitive transformation, but the common language abounds in such virtually idiomatic phrases as: the

ship of state, a pillar of wisdom, a light of learning, a picture of misery etc. Significantly, these phrases are not normally re-formed with the possessive apostrophe: the state's ship, wisdom's pillar, learning's light, misery's picture, which implies too great a degree of characterisation. This would bear out the non-possessive nature of the *of* connective, and emphasise the feature of <-animacy> which they share, since the apostrophe is usually a token of <+animacy>.

Like all good rules, this one appears to have its exceptions, reminding us that metaphor is a subtle and intricate web. It is not surprising either that the exception should be in poetic form, when Swinburne says:

> 'When the hounds of spring are on winter's traces,
> The mother of months in meadow or plain,
> Fills the shadows and windy places
> With lisp of leaves and ripple of rain...'

The metaphor has an additional complexity here because the poetic discourse concerns a hunting theme, and the items *hounds* and *traces* normally collocate with animate possessive nouns, which in *Atalanta* might be:

The hounds of Atalanta are on the boar's traces

Consequently the apostrophe form is acceptable. In addition, however, to the parallelism of such a non-metaphoric sentence, we have a matrix-analogue index as follows:

S_{matrix}	Spring	comes after	winter
$S_{analogue}$	The hounds	follow	the traces

$\Rightarrow$ $S_{metaphor}$ (i) The spring hounds follow the winter traces

OR

The hounds spring follow the traces winter

(ii) The hounds of spring follow the traces of winter

(iii) The hounds of spring follow winter's traces

(For poetic purposes or as part of a hunting discourse, such a verb as follow will be re-lexicalised as be on.)

The matrix-analogue associations of the second part of the stanza are extremely difficult to work out, partly because of the complex syntax, partly because of the metonymic material (e.g. lisp) that also appears to be involved. Instead of giving the relationship as a ratio or a transformation, one may separate the apparent matrix from the apparent analogue as follows:

matrix material	analogue material
months	mother
meadow/plain	
fill(s)	
shadows/windy places	
leaves/rain	lisp/ripple

If one is right in interpreting lisp and ripple as having a metonymic assodation with children, so that lisp = children's voices while ripple = children's laughter, then an analogy emerges:

Just as	a mother fills her home with the voices and laughter of children
so	the months fill the shadows and windy places with leaves and falling rain

Such a relationship could be sifted until the essential matrices and analogues could be paired off, but the effort would be self-defeating, as the analogical basis seems to be sufficiently clear as it stands, once the metonymy is accepted. The important point here is that we can now see the process by which <u>mother of months</u>, <u>lisp of leaves</u> and <u>ripple of rain</u> can come into existence as viable phrases within their context.

4.4. <u>Mapping: Noun to Verb</u>.

The suppressed area of the analogue appears to be a rich source of stylistic variations. It may be invoked to explain a metaphoric form that initially seems far removed from the matrix-analogue process so far described. Consider:

1. Misfortune dogs that family.

A traditional approach to this sentence would be to expand it into:

2. Misfortune follows that family like a dog.
3. Misfortune follows that family much as a dog would.
4. Just as a dog follows somebody, so Misfortune follows (<u>or</u> misfortunes follow) that family.

An analogical ratio emerges of ABC : XYZ, and this can be expressed as:

S_{matrix}	misfortune(s)	happen(s) to	that family
$S_{analogue}$	a dog	follows	somebody

The initial metaphoric splicing is:

5. Misfortune(s) follow(s) that family.

Misfortune is characterised however as a singular dog in the allegorical vein and is therefore refined into:

6. Misfortune follows that family.

Depending upon the discourse or situational requirement the following appositional and genitive secondary transformations can occur:

7. Misfortune the Dog follows that family.
8. The dog Misfortune follows that family.
9. The dog of misfortune follows that family.
10. Misfortune's dog follows that family.
11. Misfortune like a dog follows that family.
12. Misfortune follows that family like a dog.

I suggest that there is a tertiary process possible, by which the noun dog is not used (terminally) as genitive or appositional or with like. Instead it is mapped on to the verb set to which follow belongs, taking on the tense, aspect and other attributes of the verb. The relatively isolative and uninflected nature of the English language facilitates such a transfer, and the motivation is probably a stylistic intensification of the verb set. The result is Sentence No 1:

Misfortune dogs that family.

This verbalising transformation helps to explain the large number of verbs in English which are simply metaphorised nouns: hounded, badgered, needled, foxed, shadowed, fired etc. They pass into general usage, where they may no longer rest upon a matrix-analogue base. Some highly sophisticated metaphors can be created by this procedure, whether they verb is formed 'forward' from the subject noun or 'backward' from the object noun, as in:

14. The moths meccaed towards the flame.

This sentence rests upon:

S_{matrix}	The moths	flew towards	the flame
$S_{analogue}$	Muslims	turn towards travel towards	Mecca

→ $S_{metaphor}$ (i) The moths flew towards (their) Mecca

(ii) The moths flew towards (their) Mecca the flame

(iii) The moths meccaed towards the flame

This metaphor has an additional subtlety in that moth + flame + sacrifice is a common Islamic representation of the devoted follower. Again, turning to entirely different area, it is possible to create a somewhat Joycean metaphor by applying this tertiary process to a sentence which we have already examined:

15. Prendergast, that whirlwind, blew through the office.

By harmonising the noun wind with the verb wind, we can produce a verb which possesses the implications of both, in an eccentric play on words:

16. Prendergast whirlwound through the office.

It should be noted that all these secondary and tertiary transformations are possible in metaphor because they already occur in non-metaphoric areas, where no matrix-analogue juxtaposition is involved. One need only think of the relationship between they formed a club and they clubbed together in order to see this. Metaphor consequently only uses the linguistic material already available to it, as part of the resources of the English language (and probably language in general), but it uses the material in its own peculiar circumstances to achieve very special effects. This can be seen particularly with the forming of metaphoric nouns and adjectives.

4.5. Nominalisation and Adjectivisation.

Consider these sentences:

1. His insight into the matter astonished us.
2. Our enlightenment followed.

The nominalisations insight and enlightenment are metaphorically based, deriving from some such sentences as

he sees in and he sees the light. It would seem reasonable to suppose lines of development somewhat as follows:

(1) insight

{ S_{matrix}		He	understands	the matter
{ $S_{analogue}$		A man	sees into	a room (etc.)
⇒ $S_{metaphor}$	(i)	He	sees into	the matter
	(ii)	He	has a sight into	the matter
	(iii)	He has (an) insight into the matter		

(2) enlightenment

{ S_{matrix}		The thinker	ø	the solution
{ $S_{analogue}$		The man	saw	the light
⇒ $S_{metaphor}$	(i)	The thinker	saw	the light
	(ii)	The thinker was enlightened		
	(iii)	The thinker gained enlightenment		

These tables are not perfect, because they over-simplify a variety of complex phenomena, but for the moment they may serve as guidelines to the process. Consider the following sentences with metaphor-based adjectives:

3. You've lost a golden opportunity.
4. Dictators are usually power-hungry.
5. John drinks alligators (=alligator cocktails)

Each is representative of a different kind of noun-modification: golden is simple; power-hungry is compound;

alligators is a noun at first modifying another noun cocktails and then subsuming the syntactic markers of cocktails. They may be analysed as follows:

(3) golden

{ S_{matrix} — the opportunity — is excellent
{ $S_{analogue}$ — the ripe corn (etc.) — is golden

⇒ $S_{metaphor}$ (i) the opportunity is golden
(ii) the golden opportunity...

(4) power-hungry

{ S_{matrix} — the dictator — is eager for — power
{ $S_{analogue}$ — the beast — is hungry for — meat

⇒ $S_{metaphor}$ (i) the dictator is hungry for power
(ii) the dictator is power-hungry
(iii) the power-hungry dictator...

(5) alligators

{ S_{matrix} — that cocktail — has an effect
{ $S_{analogue}$ — that alligator — has a bite

⇒ $S_{metaphor}$ (i) that cocktail has a bite
(ii) that alligator cocktail has a bite
(iii) alligator cocktails...
(iv) alligators...

Once the original metaphor has been created from the

matrix and analogue and is followed by the appropriate transformations, the new collocations can break free from their original relationships and perform independently, often losing much of their analogical load in the process, as for instance when we talk of a Jaguar car and then Smith drives a Jaguar, without relating the new referent to the old, until we finally produce such sentences as Stop monkeying about with my Jaguar. The phenomena appear however to be formed by some such process as this, which in the case of examples 3 and 4 are permutational, while 5 is basically the appositional transformation that we have already discussed in detail.

4.6. The Status of the Simile.

It has usually been agreed down the centuries that there are two kinds of overt comparison in language: the 'literal' comparison on the one hand, and the simile on the other. It was then easy to proceed from simile to metaphor by saying that metaphor is a condensed form of simile.

Logicians have been able to separate simile from 'literal' comparison by examining the things compared. The succinct statement which Harris and Jarrett make concerning analogy in general holds good for simile:

> 'Normally however we do not use the word "analogy" for that resemblance between objects or events that lumps them together as members of a single class, but reserve the word for the resemblance in certain attributes or relations between things which are

> quite definitely different in kind, as when we work out an analogy between wisdom and light or between life and a journey or between sub-atomic structure and the solar system.'

The word normally is important here, because there is nothing to stop us making analogical relationships between members of the same class or set. The following observation by Margolis (1957) while discussing the logic of simile, metaphor and analogy inadvertently makes it clear that the dividing line between what is conveniently understood as simile and as analogy is not drawn with any degree of clarity anywhere:

> 'The relationship between a figurative analogy and a literal analogy is essentially the same thing, therefore, as that between a simile and a literal comparison. As the crucial terms in the comparison converge towards the same class, the comparison becomes literal.'

Omitting any further consideration of literal and figurative, we may express Margolis' position in this way:

a figurative analogy	=	a simile
a literal analogy	=	a literal comparison

This tells us very little. The most important point to emerge from both statements is the matter of closeness or distance between the classes to which the compared objects belong. We have established some time ago that we are only concerned here with classes or sets to which lexical items

belong, and not with 'real' objects in the world, and luckily we have another traditional approach to simile which simply says: simile is an imaginative comparison introduced by <u>like</u>, <u>as</u> or <u>so</u>. We are referred to lexical items and so an element of formal description strengthens this definition. The introduction however of the imaginative faculty takes us into an uncharted area, although of immense importance. We may begin with this formal description and consider three sentences:

1. Jones works like a fiend.
2. Jones wriggled like a worm.
3. Jones erupted like a volcano.

Each of these would be accepted as a simile, whatever meaning we may attach to each and whatever set membership we decide upon for the constituents. It is worthwhile to ask however how the NPs relate to one another: Is their relationship a syntagmatic or a paradigmatic one? Or, in other words, is the verb common to both or is it related only to the first NP, while the verb of the second NP has been deleted? Are the following acceptable? —

4. {Jones / A fiend} works
5. {Jones / A worm} wriggles
6. {Jones / A volcano} erupted

They appear to be related paradigmatically. If

however we express the simile in <u>just as — so</u> terms, we have a new problem: do we repeat the verb and so make it common to both sides of the proportion, or do we place the verb with the NP with which we might expect it to collocate and attempt to supply another verb where necessary? —

7. Just as a fiend ________, so Jones works.
8. Just as a worm wriggles, so Jones ______.
9. Just as a volcano erupts, so Jones ______.

It will be noted that the 'vacant' slot need not be in the same part of the analogy each time, which suggests an interesting element of choice. If nevertheless we can supply acceptable verbs in the empty slots we may conclude that the NPs are syntagmatically related:

10. Just as a fiend behaves, so Jones works.
11. Just as a worm wriggles, so Jones squirmed.
12. Just as a volcano erupts, so Jones became angry.

These explicit analogies are based upon a common formula of A : B :: X : Y. We know however that such a ratio expresses the matrix-analogue relationship in metaphor. We know that the matrix-analogue is paradigmatic, and so we are required to conclude that an analogical relationship in language can be expressed either syntagmatically or paradigmatically, something which we would probably have been willing to accept quite early in the argument. 'Simile' is an adequate title for the one, while 'metaphor' serves for the other. This would permit us to refer to 'analogy' as the principle

behind them both:



By this stage in the study this is almost a truism, but the point worth stressing is that each type of linguistic analogy has a tendency towards the other. Metaphoric realisations of analogy incline towards extending the syntagm by bringing more analogue material into the surface string, through appositional, genitive or other transformations, At the same time analogy expressed as simile shows a tendency towards the paradigm, by omitting part of one of its constituents, usually the analogue verb (but not always). There does however appear to be, as indicated above (4.2.20/21), a metaphoric secondary or tertiary transformation which introduces <u>like</u> as a kind of truncated or pseudo simile, but with the verb already metaphorised. Our present example No 3 would appear to be such a metaphor:

3. Jones erupted like a volcano

derived from:

$\underline{S_{matrix}}$	Jones	became angry
$\underline{S_{analogue}}$	The volcano	erupted

⇒ <u>$S_{metaphor}$</u> (i) Jones erupted

(ii) Jones, a volcano, erupted

(iii) EITHER

Jones erupted like a volcano

OR

That volcano Jones erupted

If the second alternative for (iii) seems unlikely, one should recall that such statements are often hedged in with certain socially valuable extra items, to emerge finally as:

14. That old volcano Jones was erupting again last night.

Whether the simile in (iii) is a derivative of the matrix-analogue process, or can be equally well obtained from an overt syntagmatic statement by means of permutation and deletion is not important. In the latter case one would still have to explain the process which permitted the permutational device, and the process would still be intimately linked to the syntactic equivalence of the overt sentences in the simile. This would mean a paradigmatic relationship and so we would be very close once more to a matrix-analogue index. We can see from this how closely associated the forms are, and how, within limits, metaphor may be regarded as a condensed form of simile or simile as an expanded form of metaphor. One should not forget however that transformations are possible in metaphor which are not available to simile, and that

these transformations may move lexical items away from any 1:1 relationship with items in overt simile. Consider:

15. The head came down the stairs.

Our discourse context tells us that head is paradigmatically equivalent to principal teacher. It would not however serve the original analogy behind the metaphor very well if we attempted an expansion into simile such as:

16. The principal teacher came down the stairs like a head.

How the original analogy may be expressed in metaphor is a matter of opinion, but it can be shown as:

	A		B		X		Y
	principal	:	school	::	head	:	body
=	principal	:	body	::	head	:	school
	A		Y		X		B

giving us:

17. metaphor: the principal is the head of the school
18. simile: the principal of a school is like the head on a body.

These observations may help to clarify the syntactic differences between the two realisations of analogy within the sentence frame. Metaphor is the more complex form, and it is probably safer to categorise simile in terms of metaphor. Consequently I should like to amend our earlier diagram in this section to the following:



It only remains in this section to point out that the difference between 'literal' and 'figurative' analogies is not only a matter of the closeness and distance between sets but also a matter primarily related to the nature of analogy rather than the nature of either metaphor or simile. These two processes are specific means of incarnating analog y in language. Each process has its basic mechanism and secondary forms. The 'gap' between sets is related to Aristotle's 'eye for resemblances' and therefore to the choice of the speaker-writer and the interpretation of the listener-reader. As such — why set X is used and not set Q — is irrelevant to the mechanics of the processes, although it is highly relevant to the whole issue of interpretation. (see 6.1-2).

We can however at this stage distinguish between two very significant forms of analogy necessary for both metaphor and simile to occur. These may be called <u>syntactic analogy</u> and <u>semantic analogy</u>. So far we have spoken only of

the syntactic equivalence of the matrix sentence and the analogue sentence in metaphor. This equivalence, however, is nothing other than the analogous relationships between the syntactic categories of Sentence 1 and Sentence 2, the kind of analogy that Harris and Jarrett said was not 'normally' drawn, because the classes of 'objects' were too close. The equivalence can be shown as:

19. $NP_1 : V_1 :: NP_2 : V_2$ (intransitive)

20. $NP_1 : V_1 : NP_1 :: NP_2 : V_2 : NP_2$ (transitive)

Only wheh this basic syntactic analogy is present can exchange occur. All the sentences contributing to pattern 19 or pattern 20 are analogues one of the other, with their formualaic representation (or 'rule') as a <u>master analogue</u>. If we reduced them all to a simple Subject + Predicate pattern we might argue that functionally they are only variations of one essential sentence analogy.

Beyond that however comes <u>semantic analogy</u>, where the selection and interpretability of items limits the range of equivalence possible. It is on the level of semantic analogy that any attempt to account for the <u>why</u> of metaphor must be made, but should only be made once we have fully satisfied ourselves of the extent to which metaphoric phenomena permeate language. And that requires that we should look beyond the sentence.

5 Metaphor Beyond the Sentence.

5.1. Analogue Penetration.

So far we have regarded metaphor as occurring within a single sentence, and not even a sentence with any complexities of subordination or embedding. From Aristotle onwards attention has readily been given to short metaphoric events of this type, but very little time has been devoted to what has sometimes been called 'extended metaphor', where matrix and analogue material might presumably be spliced over considerable stretches of language.

The term 'extended metaphor' has one important defect: it implies that the metaphoric norm is a short area in which splicing can occur, and that this area is enlarged deliberately, so that discourse metaphoric phenomena are in some sense derived from sentence phenomena. There is no reason to suppose this. It has been convenient in the past to discuss short metaphors, and in this study it has also been methodologically convenient to work within the sentence frame; this however does not imply any primacy for sentence metaphor, but simply that sentences are convenient language units within which to work.

At the same time, while working with the sentence, and proposing a structural index of two underlying sentences, we have acted as though matrix and analogue were in some sense parallel and equal. It is now necessary to ask whether there

is any sense in which one might be said to dominate the other. In seeking an answer to this question, we may also find an answer to the point raised just above about the real or likely nature of 'extended' metaphor. Three points should be considered:

(1) Matrix material is part of the greater discourse in which the metaphor occurs. Part of the matrix is suppressed, although the whole could have occurred meaningfully in the discourse. It was suppressed presumably because the speaker-writer considered that a metaphoric sentence would carry a greater load of information (part of which we have labelled the <u>analogical load</u>). This suggests that, since the full matrix sentence was more probable in the discourse and therefore less meaningful, it is <u>weak</u> in relation to the analogue sentence.

(2) Analogue material brings additional implications with it, whether emerging through the splicing transformation as one or as a number of lexical items. Since the matrix material is assimilable to the discourse at large, and the analogue material is alien or transferred, we may say that the analogue items <u>penetrate</u> the discourse by means of the metaphoric process, and can penetrate it at one or more than one point. This would reinforce the conclusion that the analogue is <u>strong</u> while the matrix is <u>weak</u>.

(3) If we accept that analogue penetration is an inalienable attribute of metaphor, and that this penetration can occur at more than one point in the simple sentence, then it is reasonable to suppose that complex sentences and the discourse generally can be penetrated in the same way, and that analogous material might penetrate in sentence form or in sentence-group form and dominate the discourse at some length. Such a consideration will form the basis of our study of metaphor beyond the sentence.

From these points we should conclude that, as a metaphoric stretch of language carries as a rule a heavier load of information than its fully realised matrix would, and as this greater load is achieved by an analogical element, then the analogue is strong while the matrix is weak. We may, looking only to the possibilities suggested by the logic of the theory, conclude also that a hierarchy of metaphor exists, related to the extent to which analogue penetration dominates at sub-sentential level, at sentential level, at supra-sentential level, and at discourse level itself. This suggests that the analogue material could so dominate the discourse as to make matrix items minimal, and reader-listeners would be required to look beyond the discourse itself to something in their situational context which would enable them to make a suitable interpretation.

This likelihood, I would suggest, is fulfilled by oral and literary genres which have traditionally gone under

such names as <u>parable</u> (as in <u>The New Testament</u>), <u>fable</u> (as with <u>Aesop</u>), <u>allegory</u> (as with <u>Animal Farm</u>) and certain forms of <u>myth</u>, <u>drama</u> and <u>novel</u>.

5.2. Non-metaphoric Analogy in the Discourse.

We have already considered the relationship between simile and metaphor as incarnations of analogy in language. We saw that the simile was essentially a syntagmatic presentation while metaphor was a paradigmatic presentation, and that each had certain tendencies towards the other, simile by deletion and metaphor by addition. There should be a corresponding situation in larger areas of the discourse. Speakers and writers are able to make their analogies in a great variety of ways, overtly or covertly, with or without exegesis, but a full syntagmatic presentation, using connectives in the same way as with sentence simile, is a popular procedure. The speaker or writer states specifically that he is going to make a comparison, makes it, and then says that he has made it, and may go on to explain why. The following excerpt from Wood's (1965) discussion of the use of analogy is useful in demonstrating this procedure. The analogical material is here presented in italics so that its relationship to the rest of the excerpt is clearly seen:

'An analogy is a comparison, or parallel, used for purposes of illustration. In the First Epistle to the Corinthians St Paul compares the Christian Church and its members to the human body and its members (ie. the limbs and organs). Just as there can be no body apart from the various members that compose it, so it is with the Christian Church and the individuals of whom it is composed. In the human body each limb or member has its particular function to perform; none is superfluous and none can do the work of the others. If all are healthy and perform their function properly, the whole body will be healthy: but if one member is diseased or useless it will affect the whole body. The body is to that extent poorer and its life and activity are impaired. So, again, it is with the Church.'

The characteristics of the fully explicit analogy are clear: a direct syntagmatic presentation of matrix and analogue material alternately, with suitable connectives. At no point are the two discourses spliced in any way. We may say however that already a kind of dual categorisation exists, based upon a simple equation:

individual people = individual parts
church = body

which in turn resolves into the proportion:

people : church :: parts : body

This provides, incidentally, the origin of the ancient metaphor members of the Church (Latin, membrum, a

limb) but it also implies:

(a) when reading body understand Church
(b) when reading Church understand body
(c) when reading people understand parts
(d) when reading parts understand people

This leads to such a potential dual categorisation as:



The extensiveness of the material produces this effect, which is probably minimal in sentence simile. It suggests that interchangeability of items at the sentence level may be facilitated by the juxtaposition of what amounts to matrix discourse and analogue discourse within the greater whole, and it is not surprising that such analogies are often followed in the subsequent text by actual splicing. This duality of categorisation is not the specific mapping of features which occurs in the metaphoric transformation, but it is in some sense a preliminary form.

The explicit discourse analogy sets the stage for subsequent metaphor, and the particular analogy Wood gives to illustrate his point has, as we suggested with the item

members, been highly productive. One need only think of such established metaphors as the following, some of which occur in what are no recognisable secondary forms: members one of another; the body of the Kirk; a limb of Satan; membership; body politic (by extension); in a body; the members of this august body; a fine body of men etc. We move into an area of extension which can only be called a 'metaphoric network', a topic to be raised again in due course (6.5).

5.3. Homogeneous Analogue Material.

It is reasonable to ask at this point whether we can find specimens of metaphoric material comparable to the analogy of Church and body, similarly homogeneous and conveying analogy without the use of connectives. What we would be looking for is a massive penetration by the analogue material, probably in sentence-group form, while the whole metaphoric setting would be a unit at the next stage beyond the sentence. Although such a unit is difficult to establish in speech, we have the convention in writing of the paragraph, and so I propose to call such a phenomenon paragraph metaphor.

The three following passages represent just such a situation, where extensiveness and homogeneity of analogue material is the outstanding characteristic. Each passage has the matrix realisations in roman script and the analogue realisations in italics.

(1) From 'The Black Death', Philip Ziegler, 1969.

'Mediaeval man, in sober fact, had more than enough
to worry about. Now his imagination ran riot. Per-
haps the factor which contributed most towards his
demoralisation was his almost total ignorance of the
5 workings of his world. Severe though the limitations
may be on modern man's ability to control his destiny
he now has a rudimentary understanding of the way
in which the forces which dominate him achieve their
irresistible effect. Once a danger is understood
10 then half its terrors are gone. From the tiny patch
of fitful light which played within the circle of
their comprehension our forefathers stared aghast
into the darkness. Strange shapes were moving, but
what they were they did not know and hardly dared to
15 speculate ; strange sounds were heard but who could
say from where they came? Everything was mysterious,
everything potentially dangerous; to stay still might
be perilous, to move fatal. The debauchery and in-
temperance of which we have spoken was the protect-
20 ive device of frightened men who drank to keep their
spirits up, who whistled in the dark.'

Here the analogue material is so compact that it is very close to a fully explicit analogy, with the one interesting metaphoric feature, the genitive transformation in the circle of their comprehension (lines 11/12). The matter in lines 16-18 is indeterminate, insofar as it may belong in either matrix or analogue or be common to both. Additionally, the material in line 21 may not belong to the s e analogue group but to a small metonymically related group of its own with the contiguous association of dark.

(2) From S.E. Rasmussen, 'Experiencing Architecture', 1959.

'The architect remains anonymously in the background.
Here again he resembles the theatrical producer. His
drawings are not an end in themselves, a work of art,
but simply a set of instructions, an aid to the crafts-
5 men who construct his buildings. He delivers a number
of completely impersonal plan drawings and typewritten
specifications. They must be so unequivocal that there
will be no doubt about the construction. He composes
the music which others will play. Furthermore, in
10 order to understand architecture fully, it must be re-
membered that the people who play it are not sensitive
musicians interpreting another's score — giving it
special phrasing, accentuating one thing or another
in the work. On the contrary, they are a multitude
15 of ordinary people.

Here the change from matrix to analogue material is sharp, achieved anaphorically through the pronoun he (line 8), so that the whole subsequent sentence is analogue. The penetration occurs in one complete sentence and then appears again two lines later, with another anaphoric use, in the pronoun it in line 11 and line 12, while the final noun of the analogue (work) could belong in either area. We are left however with a basic set of metaphors: (i) An architect composes music, and (ii) Some people play archi-tecture, in both of which the splicing is graphically de-monstrated and the logical inter-dependence of the two points of penetration vividly displayed.

(3) From 'US Publishers Book into Britain', in The Sunday Times of 9 November 1969.

'(In book sales) it is the fiction and the general books that provide the jam. But it is almost certainly the dictionaries, textbooks and reference books — the bread and butter end of Cassell — that has attracted Crowell Collier, whose output of general books and fiction in the States is tiny — no more than 4 per cent. of its turnover.'

Here the analogue material has penetrated minimally into the commercial discourse, but at important points in the paragraph and in each case operating within a sentence so that we have two sentence metaphors deriving from the same analogue discourse on food. This variety is apparently very different from the massive penetration in Example (1), but it shares the important factor of homogeneity. There is no doubt in each of these examples that only one strict analogue discourse is involved. This is not true of the next set of examples.

5.4. Heterogeneous Analogue Material.

In the next four examples, we are forced to move away from the simple assumption that only one analogue can penetrate a discourse through the metaphoric process.

(1) From 'The Hero with a Thousand Faces', Joseph Campbell, 1949.

'Throughout the inhabited world, in all times and under every circumstance, the myths of man have flourished; and they have been the living inspiration of whatever

else may have appeared out of the activities of the
5 human body and mind. It would not be too much to say
that myth is the secret opening through which the inexhaustible energies of the cosmos pour into human cultural manifestation. Religions, philosophies, arts, the social forms of primitive and historic man, prime dis-
10 coveries in science and technology, the very dreams that blister sleep, boil up from the basic, magic ring of myth.'

The analogue material has penetrated at scattered points in the paragraph but is not as homogeneous as bread, butter and jam, which belong in the same semantic field. Items like secret opening, pour into, blister, boil up and ring are not regularly in collocation and so are unlikely to have identical analogue sources, but at the same time they are not alien to each other. A kind of shifting from one analogue in one sentence metaphor to a contiguous analogue for the next, and so on, would account for the movement from pour through an opening to boil up from a ring, indicative of a geyser or a volcanic subject matter. If this shift is, as I have suggested, contiguous, then we have a metonymic relationship between analogues, expressible as:

Let A = analogue material
C = contiguous, metonymic links



(2) From 'My Fair Lady', by Alan Jay Lerner, 1956.

HIGGINS: (Calling for help) Mother! Mother!
(Mrs Higgins enters)
MRS HIGGINS: What is it, Henry? What has happened?
HIGGINS: (more to himself) She's gone!
MRS HIGGINS: (gently) Of course, dear. What did you expect?
HIGGINS: (bewildered) What am I to do?
MRS HIGGINS: Do without, I suppose.
HIGGINS: (with sudden defiance) And so I shall! If the Higgins oxygen burns up her little lungs, let her seek some stuffiness that suits her. She's an owl sickened by a few days of my sunshine! Very well, let her go! I can do without her! I can do without anybody! I have my own soul! My own spark of divine fire! (he marches off)
MRS HIGGINS: (applauding) Bravo, Eliza! (she smiles)

The heterogeneity is so pronounced in this passage that we must accept the existence of several distinct analogues each operating within its own sentence area. The metonymic nature of the association between analogues is sharply delineated. The analogues are not different in kind and are easy to understand, carry an analogical load that is shared among them. We may speak quite confidently of metonymised metaphor in this passage.

(3) From 'History in English Words', by Owen Barfield, 1962.

> 'These are some of the ways in which words can be made <u>to disgorge</u> the past <u>that is bottled up inside them</u>, as coal and wine, when we kindle or drink them, <u>yield up their bottled sunshine</u>.'

The material here is very condensed and complex. <u>Yield up</u> and <u>disgorge</u> are contiguous, but not in any sense synonymous in relation to <u>bottle</u> (insofar as we are unlikely to predict <u>The bottle disgorged the wine</u>). We should also be surprised by <u>Coal bottles sunshine</u>, a sentence strongly implied in the passage. The metaphor is intricate, and we may separate out the following elements:

(a) Words bottle up the past
(b) Words can be made to disgorge the past
(c) Coal and wine bottle sunshine

OR

Sunshine is bottled in coal and wine
(d) Coal and wine yield up the sunshine bottled in them.

Additionally, there is an explicit analogy between the first two and the last two lines, expressible as:

words : disgorge : past :: coal/wine : yield up : sunshine

while both <u>past</u> and <u>sunshine</u> are modified by <u>bottled</u>.

From this we can see that two metaphors are linked together proportionally, while each has a third (identical) metaphor buried within it. That embedded metaphor is:

words : bottle : past :: coal/wine : bottle : sunshine

This complexity can be resolved as follows:

(i) bottling

S_{matrix}	men	bottle	liquor
$S_{analogue}$	coal / wine	have	energy (=sunshine, metonymically)
> $S_{metaphor}$	coal / wine	bottle	sunshine

leading to

(ii) yielding up

S_{matrix}	coal / wine	emit	bottled sunshine
$S_{analogue}$	people	yield up	their treasures
> $S_{metaphor}$	coal / wine	yield up	bottled sunshine

The collocation of bottled + sunshine may be achieved transformationally before the creation of the second metaphor, or may be a syncopation of Coal and wine bottled sunshine and then yielded that sunshine. The example, however, shows the nature of metaphor in depth, with metonymic associations.

(4) From '£1m to come as Hodge pulls down his Pyramid', in The Sunday Times of 13 July 1969.

'When the Hodge Group made that £7 million bid for the "outside" shares in Anglo Auto Finance on Tuesday

evening, neatly concertinaing the company pyramid
that Cardiff financier Julian Hodge had so pains-
5 takingly erected, the event was greeted by a rather
muted fanfare on the City of London trumpet. It was
a sensible move, somewhat overdue and nothing to make
a fuss about as Hodge already had the bulk of his
post-1966 profits recovery under his corporate belt.
10 Such was the general concensus (sic) of opinion.
And like much hastily-concensed opinion, it was way
off beam. For Hodge still had around £1 million
worth of recovery to come.'

The heterogeneity of analogues in this passage is so great that one can find indications of something like nine sentence metaphors. No uniform analogue discourse is discernible, and re-constructed metaphors like He heartly concertinaed the pyramid (with or without company) in line 3 suggest a parallel simile of He did something to the pyramid much as he would squeeze a concertina. This is of course as a passage an example of what has been called 'mixed metaphor', a phenomenon in its own right. Aesthetic considerations apart, it would seem that some analogue items have moved away through frequent use from their original analogical load, while others such as concertinaed the company pyramid, trumpet fanfare, corporate belt and way off beam derive from analogues which have either no metonymic association or a very minimal one. It is reminiscent of the line in which Hamlet 'takes up arms against a sea of troubles'. The speaker-writer may have elected to use such disparate analogues, accepting that proximity of analogy is a useful stylistic device,

whether or not the analogies are capable of association analogically or contiguously. Such a genre as business journalism may well demand such a style, often characterised as 'racy'. The emotive term 'mixed' (like 'dead' and 'faded') is better avoided, and I would suggest multiple metaphor as a more objective label for the phenomenon.

5.5 Discourse Metaphor.

5.5.1. Analogical Load in the Novel.

So far we have seen analogue penetration occurring on a substantial scale either as a sentence-group penetrating en bloc, or as a number of sentence analogues, sometimes metonymically related and sometimes without apparent plan. It is impossible to quantify the analogical load of such material, but we may consider whether there is any direct relationship between the degree of penetration and the load borne by the metaphor. In other words, is a metaphor more effective if there is more analogue material present in realised discourse?

Such a question is perplexing at sentence and paragraph level, because in both cases the factor of personal aesthetic response is also involved — 'I do/don't like this analogy in this place'. This provides us therefore with a good occasion for extending our discussion to the full discourse metaphor, where we can consider a single unified piece of work which contains throughout its length the matrix-analogue situation. Since the problem is primarily in the analogue area, I have chosen two subjects which represent extreme

forms: minimal analogue penetration in a novel, and maximum analogue penetration in a novel.

5.5.2. Minimum Analogue Penetration.

The example to be studied here provides us with minimum analogue penetration, and we have to ask ourselves whether this also means minimum analogical load carried by the metaphor running throughout the discourse. The novel in question is Agatha Christie's The Rose and the Yew Tree (1947). Once we have read the novel, we realise that the title does not relate directly to the plot, which concerns neither roses nor yew trees, and if we examine the discourse we shall find only two references of a very oblique nature to roses and a yew tree. There is however an additional and crucial quotation at the very beginning, before the story starts, and technically outside the discourse but inside the frame of the novel. It is from T.S. Eliot and runs: 'The moment of the rose and the moment of the yew tree are of equal duration'. The reader must therefore seek an interpretation of the novel which allows the title and the quotation and the oblique references to equate in some way with the events and characters portrayed. The expectations derived from title and quotation may heighten the effectiveness of certain aspects of the plot.

The plot itself concerns Isabella, a beautiful and unself-conscious girl belonging to the old Cornish family of the St Loos. She enjoys life immensely but does not speculate about it or analyse her reasons for loving it. An ugly but

sexually attractive man from a lower social background, John Gabriel, is chosen as the Conservative candidate for the local constituency in the general election following the second world war, mainly on account of his excellent war record. Gabriel has every chance of winning the election, but he perversely prefers to challenge the serenity of the girl, who belongs to a class that he envies, emulates and seeks to enter. She should marry her cousin Rupert St Loo, but, without reflecting on her behaviour, prefers Gabriel, and leaves with him. They leave Britain. The narrator of the tale, a semi-invalid, meets them later in central Europe, in circumstances which lead to Isabella's death. He hates Gabriel for what he has brought upon the girl, and yet has to accept that Isabella loved Gabriel and died because of it, accepting everything. Years later the narrator discovers that she had a profound effect upon the cynical Gabriel and that he unexpectedly devoted the rest of his life to a remarkable series of refugee projects, where his personal courage and understanding of human failings turn him into a kind of 'saint'. The narrator however only discovers this when he is brought against his will to Gabriel's death-bed.

We may make the following equations:

(a) rose = Isabella
(b) yew = Gabriel
(c) the moment of the rose = Isabella's short life
(d) the moment of the yew = Gabriel's long life
(e) (c) = (d) (equal duration)

This interpretation is fully borne out by an examination of the oblique references to yew tree and roses in the text:

(i) beginning, chapter eight.

> The weather remained fine. I (the invalid narrator) spent much of my time pushed out on to the sunny terrace. There were rose beds along it and a very old yew tree at one end of it. From there I could look across to the sea and the battlements of St Loo Castle, and I could see Isabella walking across the fields from the Castle to Polnorth House.
>
> (Note. Polnorth House is the location of the terrace and garden)

(ii) end, chapter eighteen.

> 'You've got a lazy mind, Isabella,' I said. 'You know perfectly well if only you'd take the trouble to think.' (narrator speaking)
>
> 'Would I? Very well, then. I will think.'
>
> She sat there, upright and serious, thinking...
>
> (And that, when I remember Isabella, is how I see her — and always shall see her to the end of time. Sitting in the sunlight on the upright carved stone seat, her head proud and erect, her long narrow hands folded peacefully on her lap and her face serious, thinking of flowers.)
>
> She said at last, 'I think it is because they all look as though they would be lovely to touch — rich — like velvet... And because they have a lovely smell. Roses don't look right growing — they grow in an ugly way. A rose wants to be by itself, in a glass — then it's beautiful — but only for a very

short time — and then it droops and dies. Aspirin and burning the stems and all those things don't do any good — not to red roses — they're all right for the others. But nothing keeps big dark roses long — I wish they didn't die.'

It was quite the longest speech Isabella had ever made to me. She was more interested in talking about roses than she had been in talking about Gabriel.

The metaphoric scope of the novel is interesting precisely because of the tenuousness of the analogue material, which hardly impinges on the discourse at all. It can be argued that the rose is symbolic of Isabella and the yew tree of Gabriel, but this symbolism is achieved analogically: the lives of the plants are analogous to the lives of the two people unfolded in the discourse. The penetration is minimal, but the analogical load is great, because of the conclusion one must draw: that Isabella achieves the same in her short life as Gabriel achieves in his long one.

5.5.3. Maximum Analogue Penetration.

Certain forms of parable are, strictly speaking, similes or overt analogies rather than metaphor, as for example the parables of Christ in the New Testament. The Kingdom of Heaven is 'like a grain of mustard-seed — less than any seed on earth, wheh it is sown on earth; but once sown it springs up to be larger than any plant' (Moffat). It was evidently difficult for Christ's listeners to appreciate the

analogical load of his parables, because he had to explain them even to his disciples. Other parables or fables, such as Aesop's or the Buddhist Jatakas are less overt, but may end with a moral such as: 'This tale teaches one the way of practising forgiveness', which is the conclusion of the Jataka which reveals how Buddha, in a previous existence, went as King of Ducks to teach his doctrines in the city of Benares. In the tale the duck forgives the fowler who traps it, and refuses release.

This kind of fable relates to the situational context as well as to any larger discourse in which it might occur. Certain modern allegorical novels work in a similar way, and Animal Farm by George Orwell (1945) is probably the best example. Nothing in this book, despite its political matrix language, accounts for his particular choice of characters, events and settings. All his analogue material is however known to be expressive of his opinion of Communism, although the term is never mentioned. The following short excerpt is complete enough in itself to allow the metaphoric situation to establish itself:

> Though not yet full-grown, they were huge dogs, and as fierce-looking as wolves. They kept close to Napoleon. It was noticed that they wagged their tails to him in the same way as the other dogs had been used to do to Mr Jones.
>
> Napoleon, with the dogs following him, now mounted on to the raised portion of the floor where Major had previously stood to deliver his speech. He announced

that from now on the Sunday morning Meetings would come to an end. They were unnecessary, he said, and wasted time. In future all questions relating to the working of the farm would be settled by a special committee of pigs, presided over by himself. These would meet in private and afterwards communicate their decisions to the others. The animals would still assemble on Sunday mornings to salute the flag, sing "Beasts of England", and r eceive their orders for the week; but there would be no more debates.

In spite of the shock that Snowball's expulsion had given them, the animals were dismayed by this announcement. Several of them would have protested if they could have found the right arguments. Even Boxer was vaguely troubled. He set his ears back, shook his forelock several times, and tried hard to marshal his thoughts; but in the end he could not think of anything to say. Some of the pigs themselves, however, were more articulate. Four young porkers in the front row uttered shrill squeals of disapproval, and all four of them sprang to their feet and began speaking at once. But suddenly the dogs sitting round Napoleon let out deep, menacing growls, and the pigs fell silent and sat down again. Then the sheep broke out into a tremendous bleating of "Four legs good, two legs bad!" which went on for nearly a quarter of an hour and put an end to any chance of discussion.'

One may list the characters mentioned in this passage and give them highly likely politico-historical interpretations (= matrix equivalents):

Napoleon	=	Lenin/Stalin
Major	=	Marx
Snowball	=	Trotsky
Mr Jones	=	Tsar Nicholas

The Dogs	=	the secret police
The Farm	=	the Soviet Union
England	=	the world
Boxer	=	the faithful (duped) workers
The Pigs	=	the Communist Party members
The Sheep	=	sycophants; the mob

The identification is outwith the text; the universalism of the allegory also allows, instead of these matrix figures, any other appropriate politico-historical figures, although the strictly allegorical characterisations (Boxer, the Sheep) remain the same. Matrix material still occurs in the text: to deliver a speech; all questions relating to the working of; a special committee; communicate their decisions; to salute the flag etc. These indicate a discourse setting of human politics and history.

Johnson's 'two ideas for one' and Ullmann's 'double vision' are graphically demonstrated by this type of discourse metaphor, and a comparison between Christie's novel and Orwell's allegory shows that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to relate the amount of analogue penetration to the strength of the analogical load. As with The Rose and the Yew Tree, even this political fable rests upon a very simple equation:

pig	=	Communist party member
animals	=	human beings

and in consequence dual categorisation exists of this type:

pig

$$\left\{ \begin{matrix} \left(\begin{matrix} \text{+animal} \\ \text{-human} \end{matrix} \right) \\ \langle \text{+human} \rangle \end{matrix} \right\}$$

5.6. Conclusion.

Aware now that metaphor beyond the sentence is a devious and subtle force, we may conclude our observations as follows:

(1) Matrix material is weak in relation to analogue material.

(2) Analogue material may penetrate the discourse at one or more than one point, for greater or lesser stretches.

(3) There is a hierarchy of metaphor, from sub-sentential to complete discourse level.

(4) Dual categorisation of a kind exists in the implications of <u>For X read Y.</u>

(5) Analogue material may be unfform and homogeneous or may be heterogeneous and extremely disparate, as in the case of multiple ('mixed') metaphors.

(6) Heterogeneous analogue material may be related metonymically.

(7) Depth metaphor can occur where one metaphor is set within another, and analogies can be drawn between metaphors.

(8) Analogue penetration of a discourse ranges from minimal to maximal, but this continuum appears to have no connection with the analogical load carried by any constituent metaphor.

(9) Certain forms of discourse — fable and allegory — may have virtually no matrix material, and the matrix must be sought in the situational context.

(10) As with Orwell's Animal Farm, no statement whatsoever need occur in the discourse metaphor to indicate the essential nature of the analogy. The reader must be aware already or equipped culturally so that he can deduce the analogical load of the novel.

We have now travelled through five stages in this study: the historical survey, the current review, the statement of a linguistic theory to account for the basic mechanism of metaphor, a consideration of secondary transformations, and now an analysis of metaphor functioning throughout various discourses. Such a study would be incomplete if it omitted a consideration of men's motives when setting the process in motion.

6 An Eye for Resemblances.

6.1. Ground, Link and Motive.

To present a theory of the linguistic process by which analogy is incarnated in language is hardly to exhaust the subject. So many observers have discussed metaphor and analogy in terms other than linguistic that it is necessary to move from the strictly syntactic and semantic out towards those other areas where the why of metaphor lurks. A satisfactory study of the mechanics of the thing should however make it possible to discuss the reasons for employing it with a little more confidence than one might otherwise have had.

When Richards made his essentially philosophical study of metaphor and analysed it into tenor and vehicle, he also considered it necessary to discuss the ground for its occurrence, by which he meant the reason for bringing tenor and vehicle together. He says:

> 'Let me begin now with the simplest, most familiar case of verbal metaphor — the leg of a table for example. We call it dead but it comes to life very readily. Now how does it differ from a plain or literal use of the word, in the leg of a horse, say? The obvious difference is that the leg of a table has only some of the characteristics of the leg of the horse. A table does not walk with its legs; they only hold it up and so on. In such a case we call the common characteristics the ground of the metaphor. Here we can easily find the ground, but

very often we cannot. A metaphor may work admirably without our being able with any confidence to say how it works or what is the ground of the shift. Consider some of the metaphors of abuse and endearment. If we call someone a pig or a duck, for example, it is little use looking for some actual resemblance to a pig or a duck as the ground.'

This quotation from Richards helps indicate the problem, but also helps indicate how far we have gone towards solving it by elucidating the mechanics of metaphor. We may read his observation and as we go through it adjust and dispose of: (1) his 'verbal metaphor' as tautological, (2) his 'dead' as concerned with frequency of occurrence, (3) his 'literal' as meaning non-metaphoric, (4) his discussion of objects as a problem of reference, (5) his equation of 'how it works' with 'the ground' as confusing mechanism with motivation. The value of his remark lies however in two areas: (a) the discussion of 'common characteristics', and (b) in the consideration of whether or not we can always 'find the ground'.

Nowottny chose to call the ground by another name: the <u>link</u>. This she describes as 'what makes the connection plausible' between tenor and vehicle, and she tries to handle the question of 'distance' between the terms of a metaphor by talking of their <u>extremes</u>, so that the metaphor has a literal extreme and a figurative extreme and these are linked together. She then observes:

'In conclusion, it seems proper to remark that the vast power of metaphor in poetry (and the fashionable belief that metaphor is <u>the</u> language of poetry) should be set in relation with simple linguistic facts. One reason why metaphor is common in poetry is that metaphor vastly extends the language at the poet's disposal.... A poet who wants to write about object X but finds its terminology defective or resistant to manipulation, can simply move over into the terminology of Y. By using Y-terminology to describe X, he opens to himself the linguistic resources available in connection with Y.'

The link in that case would be more than just a link: it is a door. Nowottny appears to accept this, adding that 'the importance os this bare linguistic fact is inexhaustible'. (An evidence of its importance is that we are discussing metaphor 'meta-linguistically' by means of metaphoric material like 'link', 'ground' and now 'door')

Where the poet goes, logicians may however not be willing to follow. Wood (1965) states that 'there is always a point beyond which an analogy cannot be pressed. It asserts a resemblance between two things <u>in certain respects only</u>: there are other respects in which they differ, and unless we realise this the very device which should help to clarify things for us may lead us astray and land us in illogical methods of thinking or reasoning.'

Having however established that a hierarchy of metaphor exists, we may suppose that (a) with brief, sentence-type metaphors the analogy is unlikely to go beyond an initial and

simple 'link', butthat with (b) longer paragraph or discourse metaphors, the situations which Nowottny and Wood foresee (with different reactions) are likely to occur. We can also suppose that Writer B may take up Writer A's metaphor and extend the analogy in a way which A never intended: a common occurrence in rhetoric, in political discourse and on those occasions when a second author takes up the allegory which a first had effectively manipulated.

It is necessary however for us to go back slightly before we can tackle this problem. In an earlier section of this study (2.5) we discussed meaning in terms of choice, interpretation and consensus, and we may apply the simple model evolved there to help us with Richards' observation that we do not always know the ground for the metaphor. Few writers in fact provide an explicit statement of why they have chosen certain metaphors and not others, but we can assume the existence of an <u>unstated motive</u> behind their <u>choice</u>, just as there must be some kind of motive behind whatever they say. Few readers can ask a writer just what his motive was (in the way the disciples could ask Jesus why he adopted a particular parable), and yet each reader is compelled by the metaphor and its dual categorisation of items to make a reconstruction of the writer's motive. Reader A makes his, Reader B makes another and Reader C makes a third, and if we are lucky there will be a consensus about the <u>reconstructed motive</u> but little opportunity to test their interpretations. The consensus

may cover certain areas but not others; it may be minimal, optimal or quite unsatisfactory, and so we will complain at last, 'But what does he mean by saying "the swan of dissolution"?'

6.2. Shared Attributes.

Bickerton, in his assessment of phrasal metaphor such as iron determination, considers that items of language possess culturally important 'specific attributes' which lend them to particular metaphoric use, as for example when English uses iron and Spanish prefers steel (acero) for semantically cognate metaphors. His theory of the specific attribute is referential, so that iron derives from its referent the attribute hardness. 'Natural as this may seem, it is in fact a fairly arbitrary process; hardness is only one of the attributes which iron may be supposed to possess (durability, weight, dark colour etc.) and it possesses it to a lesser extent than many other substances, such as diamond, or, for that matter, steel itself. But to diamond has been attached the attribute "value", perhaps also "brightness".'

Three points require clarification here:

(1) If we believe certain cultures and/or languages assign specific attributes to items, we cannot assume that this assignment preceded metaphoric use: it may just as easily be the result of metaphoric use.

(2) It is always perilous to assume that the reason for any linguistic assignment resides in the referent for any

item which has a referent. As Richards suggests, it may be difficult to find in the referents of 'pig' and 'duck' the exact reasons why we use them for derogatory or complimentary purposes.

(3) It is difficult to work with material on the phrase level, as Bickerton does, and also dangerous to assume that <u>iron</u> collocates with <u>determination</u> because of an attribute 'hardness', because <u>hard determination</u> would also be metaphoric and would presumably need another attribute to account for it, while <u>determination</u> presumably has some kind of attribute of its own which allows it to link up with <u>iron</u> or <u>hard</u>.

Bickerton's argument is useful in pointing the way to a resolution of the problem of what resides in matrix and analogue that allows — not the metaphor as a process — but the analogy that brings them together for the process to operate. Items in the matrix and analogue may be said to possess in common (as far as the creator is concerned) at least one specific attribute which has no necessary relationship with any referent. For the occasion and duration of that metaphor this <u>shared attribute</u> is dominant over any other attributes matrix and analogue may have. If the matrix sentence M possesses three attributes 1, 2 and 3, while the analogue sentence A possesses three attributes 3, 4 and 5, we may say that they have come into this relationship because their creator has detected the shared attribute which we have designated 3. That is, without 3, A could not havebbeen aligned with M. Discovery of this shared and now dominant attribute 3 is what Aristotle meant by 'an eye for resemblances':

Taking up Richards on the question of <u>pig</u>, we may examine either the metaphor where American radicals call policemen 'pigs', or the Orwellian metaphor where the members of the Russian Communist Party are 'pigs'. If, when asked why he employs such a metaphor, an American student says: 'Well, I equate pigs and policemen because they both have the same facial expression', we have an explicit statement of <u>motive</u>, and a dominant shared attribute 'facial expression', which in this instance is referential. If another protester said: 'I call policemen pigs because hogs and the fuzz have the same kinda effect on me: I don't like them', then we have another explicitly stated motive and another dominant shared attribute, 'undesirable to me', which is not referential but subjective in some sense. Additionally, we see the complexity of the problem, because the first student can appreciate the analogy for a different reason from the second, and both be acceptable. This suggests that attribution of this kind is a set situation, rather than a wholly or permanently specific situation. This need not surprise us, as we have found that some analogue sentences require set interpretation (3.5). That there is some kind of generic relationship of attribution is suggested by the probability that 'facial expression' and 'undesirable to me' are compatible in the metaphoric event discussed above.

With Orwell however we get an entirely different shared attribute or shared attribute set. He is believed to have chosen <u>pig</u> because this species of animal was the nearest to human in the farmyard context. Here we produce a

reconstructed motive for Orwell's choice, and an attribute 'humanoid'. That 'undesirable to me' must be ruled out is evident from the situation of the pig Snowball, who is a 'ggodie' while the pig Napoleon is a 'baddie'. We have an additional problem because the sheep also represent something human, some condition of mindless submission, and so we must add to the pig's 'humanoid' attribute an additional sub-attribute 'clever'. This attributional range is very different from those we have assumed for the American students.

What we learn to avoid by taking this position is a simplistic assumption that policemen or Communist party members are called 'pigs' because 'they behave like pigs'. Even if such a nebulous motive and process of attribution were justifiable, it would be no guide as to what could then happen in the diachhonic drift of the metaphor. I took the motive 'facial expression' from a letter to Time magazine. I would now like to juxtapose that letter with another which appeared in the same magazine some weeks later:

(1) Letter of 24 October 1969

> 'Sir — I have never before felt comfortable with the word pig used to describe members of our police forces, but if the living caricature — nightstick and hippie in hand — shown with your article is an example, I now can accept that appellation.'

(2) Letter of 9 March 1970

> 'Sir — You aren't going to like this, but your favorite whipping boys, the Chicago police, now refer to each

other as PIG. The term is not used, however, in a derogatory sense since the three letters point up the motto awarded them by a grateful public: Pride, Integrity and Guts.'

Such adaptations or re-applications of derogatory expressions are not unknown in history, but this one illustrates our thesis well. Having found the metaphor and its implications unsatisfactory, someone sought out a satisfactory attribute. This attribute, which must be shared by policeman and pig primarily as linguistic items, could not be found in the animal referent, but could be found neologistically (2.9) by the phonological process apocope in three terms arranged for the occasion. The result is an acronym produced by a kind of back-formation, allowing a new and more satisfying referential relationship for pig. Three attributes assigned to policeman are passed across to the lexical item pig.

Finally we may consider Nowottny's point about the poet passing over from X-terminology to Y-terminology. Orwell's work illustrates this well. In order to discuss the actions of the Communist Party in Russia, he passed from the X-terminology of politics and history to the Y-terminology of farming. If we take only the passage quoted above (5.5.3) we may note that dogs = secret police, and that in line 3 we have the string they wagged their tails, representative for Orwell of the sycophantic behaviour of the secret police towards their superiors, while as the other dogs has been used to do for Mr Jones indicates that the Communist secret police are just

the same in this respect as their predecessors the Czarist secret police. This and other equivalences are only possible however because of an over-riding equivalence of farm = state, because of a shared dominant attribute which we may label 'type of organisation'.

6.3. The Fatherhood of God: A Study in Changing Attributes.

Bickerton has attempted to analyse his specific attributes as (a) elemental, and (b) arranged in binary oppositions. This technique rests upon the originally phonological procedure of 'distinctive features' and is identical to the binary oppositions already used in this study for discussing re-categorisation and dual categorisation (2.5; 3.6). Thus Bickerton suggests 'some kind of multi-dimensional grid, with no fixed rank-ordering of categories' so that such categories or attributes operate a system of binary oppositions, such as ⟨+/-animate⟩ or ⟨+/-evaluative⟩.

While it is possible and useful to propose a syntactic-cum-semantic arrangement of binary oppositions to cover the 'features' of such lexical items as nouns, so that we can talk purposefully of a noun snake being predictably ⟨+animate⟩, it is doubtful whether, in the case of shared attributes, we can purposefully operate in this way. Firstly, not all attributes are reducible to noun form — and presumably to noun form in relation to some context or set of contexts which permit their acquisition of features. Secondly, as Bickerton accepts, the range of such 'features' is immense, and verging on the ab-

surd. We would not be very happy producing a feature or binary opposition for *pig* which was presentable as <+facial expression>, related to <-evaluative>.

The elemental noun form is difficult to achieve and perhaps is not worth the effort, while at the same time the assumption of binary oppositions may be simplistic. If we are right in assuming that 'facial expression' and 'undesirable to me' and 'clever humanoid' are shared attributes allowing the metaphors on *pig* discussed above, can we then assume that these attributes are either (a) one side of a bi-polar opposition, or (b) even the best linguistic representation of the attributes? The unfortunate thing about such shared attributes is that they need not be expressed at all in language initially, and when finally given expression, may be sentential or phrasal rather than unitary.

In order to illustrate the difficulties in this area, and also to show how attribution may change through time, or, more arresting still, be very different for different people, I would like to consider the development of a well-established metaphor: the Fatherhood of God, as expressed, for example, in *Our Father which art in Heaven* or any of innumerable other examples. Let us take Wood's observation on this metaphor in its pure analogical form:

> 'For instance, in the Christian religion God is thought of as a father, and human beings as his children. The analogy suggests certain aspects of the relationship that the Christian believes exists between God and humanity.'

This may be said to be a reasonable twentieth century statement of Christian belief. If we pose a metaphor such as God the Father loves his children (or any other variation possible from the matrix-analogue index) then we find ourselves in an interesting and ambiguous area when we look for the shared attribute that can bring together A Father loves his children and God looks after mankind. Can the attribute be reduced to 'responsibility' or 'creator-sustainer' or 'natural relationship' or is it a set of these and still more?

That question is difficult to answer. It becomes even more difficult when we examine a short passage from the New Testament (The Gospel According to St John, 5:17) where the metaphor is used:

> 'The reply of Jesus was, "As my Father has continued working to this hour, so I work too.". But this only made the Jews more eager to kill him, because he not merely broke the sabbath but actually spoke of God as his own Father, thereby making himself equal to God.' (Moffat)

The shared attribute for the metaphor is very different here from Wood's — especially for the Jews. Their reaction was to reject the metaphor, the equation, out of hand, because God as Father was blasphemous, whether as an individual claim or as a community claim, simply because it represented to them 'thereby making himself equal to God' (like begetting like). The attribute emerges as 'biological equivalence', which enraged them, or perhaps

'essential equivalence', which was some kind of spiritual pride beyond their ability to accept.

St Paul used the same metaphor, accepting a special Father-Son relationship for Christ but altering it somewhat (Epistle to the Romans, 8:14):

> 'For the sons of God are those who are guided by the Spirit of God. You have received no slavish spirit that would make you relapse into fear; you have received the spirit of sonship. And when we cry, "Abba! Father!", it is this Spirit testifying along with our own spirit that we are children of God.'

St Paul means something distinct from what Christ is reported to have meant (or been assumed by the Jews to mean) and very distinct from what Wood assumes about modern Christian teaching. St Paul is stating an elitist case, an adoptive child-father situation 'received' by the new Christians. The shared attribute allowing the metaphor must be something of the kind: 'elite new spiritual relationship (with God)'.

None of these three conditions for permitting the metaphor (apart from any religious rights or wrongs) is easy to express, but each exists distinct from the other, and must arise from and in turn promote special psycho-social attitudes in the users and spectators. In this instance the assumptions behind the metaphors have produced the most diverse and dreadful human phenomena, as well as spiritual pinnacles. None however is as arresting as the contrast between Western Christianity and the Hindu use

of the metaphor. Initially, the representatives of East and West may assume that, if they are talking the same language, they are using the metaphor in the same way. Here for instance is a Hindu statement (from Juan Mascaro's translation of The Bhagavad Gita, 9:17):

> 'I am the Father of this universe, and even the source of the Father.'

Krishna's statement however is not comparable with the Christian one, because at another point he says (14:4):

> 'Wherever a being may be born, Arjuna, know that my Nature is his mother and that I am the Father who gave him life.'

The Motherhood of God is involved in the Hindu metaphor, alongside the Fatherhood, and as Danielou points out in Hindu Polytheism (1964) the relationship is a very simple one. First he quotes an original metaphor and then gives his comment:

> '"Like a mother and a father, principial Nature and the Supreme Person give birth to all forms. In the world men desirous of progeny fecundate women, and likewise the Supreme Being, desirous of progeny, of multiplicity, fecundates Nature" (Karapatri, Lingapasana-rahasya, p. 153).

> 'As we have seen with respect to the bull of Siva, it is the function, the organ, that is important and permanent. The individual carrying the organ is but its temporary servant. The tendency to replace the symbol that is the organ of procreation by the

figurative image of the father is a substitute which brings in unnecessary anthropomorphic elements and a lowering of the degree of abstraction of the deity represented.'

This accounts for the presence in certain Hindu temples both of an anthropomorphic father-figure and the simple stylised symbols of the male organ (the linga). God the Father is more properly God the Phallus, a view-point likely to oppress rather than charm Christian minds. The shared attribute emerges as 'procreative power', and the social relationship of father and children is secondary to this.

Here we have a clear example of the social and anthropological overtones that operate at this level of metaphoric interpretation. This can be strikingly illustrated by the way in which traditional assumptions may be attacked by wilfully altering the metaphor in a purely linguistic way, as in the cry attributed to Emmeline Pankhurst:

'Have faith in God — She will protect us!'

The proposition of the Motherhood of God was a startling one in Western Europe at the turn of the century, and has not had any permanent impact. Situation and discourse contexts however provided an excellent rallying cry for suffragettes, especially when set against a dominant male metaphor that, in their opinion, had militated against

women down the centuries. This question of short and long range sociological influence, like the parallel area of symbolism, still needs a great deal of study.

We may conclude however that once a metaphor is established as successfully as this one, the users may do with it much as they choose. The poet or logician may pose his analogy and explicitly state that the shared attribute is X, but as the analogy (particulary in metaphor form) spreads out into the world, others may aver or assume that the attribute is Y or insist that it should be Z. Others still may be happy to exist in a 'constellated' condition, allowing the metaphor to be justified first through X, then through XY and finally through XYZ.

6.4. Semantic Change through Analogy.

In noting the changes in motive and the differences in assumptions about the shared attribute in such a metaphor as the Fatherhood of God, we move towards the influence of metaphor on semantic change. In this instance we have dealt with an example of what etymologists call 'extension', where the use of an expression widens in scope, in this case from individual (Christ) through group (Paul's Christians) to mass (humanity). Many factors imfluence semantic change, but metaphor is an important one, and alteration in motive and shared attribute can be very effective. We can illustrate this by considering the following series:

(1) Surface   This item was already metaphoric when it came from Latin into English via French. It derives from the original super + facies ('onethe face'), much as we might say 'on the face of it'. It has become normal however to ignore the ancient metaphor so that the first of these sentences is not considered metaphoric while the second would be:

(a) The surface of the sea was smooth
(b) The face of the sea was smooth

When referring to the varieties of fish in the sea, a user of Englosh might say:

(c) The fish near the surface (OR the surface fish) are stream-lined, but those deeper down tend to be flattened.

The sense relation of antonymy exists here between surface and deep, whereas in other contexts such a relationship might be shallow and deep. A metaphoric sentence having the above sentence (c) as its analogue could be:

(d) That fellow appears on the surface to be very agreeable, but deeper down he's ruthless.

(2) Structure   This item has been used by builders and architects since the 15th century to signify something raised above ground. In recent decades the term has been transferred by language specialists to refer to the systemic nature of language, so that two phrases are now acceptable: the structure of the building and the structure of the language. In the initial stages of linguistic research the analogy satisfied the logician, because forms of language appeared to be built up in a comparable way to the erection of physical buildings. The shared attribute 'shape and system' was acceptable to all, so that the original analogy was not even very important (cf.

light waves). A structuralist approach in both language work and architecture was possible. A change in the theorising, however led to a departure from the position of the logician and an approach towards Nowottny's poet, as linguists moved over into the Y-terminology of some subject like marine biology.

(3) Deep and surface Structure   If language levels extended 'downwards' rather than 'upwards' then deep structure contrasted with surface structure. This new metaphor, derived from two distinct sources, remains at present the sole property of the linguists, as architects do not consider that their foundations rest upon ever deeper and more mysterious levels that they had constructed unawares.

The metaphoric extension is invaluable. It shows how human beings cope with highly abstract conditions and how what is apparently contradictory in terms of earlier collocations can be perfectly acceptable under new conditions. This suggests that Nowottny's supposition about passing from X to Y terminologies is a more accurate picture of what happens in language than the logicians strictures about whether or not such things should be done.

An additional advantage in studying this phrasal metaphor is that it shows semantic change at work on a level higher than the 'word'. Lexicographers by the very nature of their work have concentrated on change in individual items, but here we have an example of analogical influences at work on word-groupings. We have to note however that the milieu in which the changes could occur was the sentence.

6.5. Metaphoric Networks.

One of the implications of Nowottny's insight regarding X and Y terminologies arises from her comment that the poet can simply 'move over' from one to the other. This 'moving over' is just another way of saying 'transfer', but we can ask whether, when we have analysed sentence, paragraph and discourse metaphor we have exhausted all the existing forms. There is also, surely (as we have suggested by saying that Writer B may adopt the metaphors of Writer A) an associative extension whereby one metaphor used on one occasion may give rise to other metaphors on other occasions, by contiguous association.

This contiguous or metonymic association we may call <u>a metaphoric network</u>. One example already touched on (5.2) was the extensive use of <u>member/body/church</u> etc. until it was possible to apply the item <u>member</u> to any society, whether religious or secular. Another example, but confined to a single novel, is the farmyard and animal terms in <u>Animal Farm</u>, so that <u>dog/tail-wagging/master</u> belongs within the same network. So, presumably, outside Orwell, does <u>boot-licking, coming to heel, unleashed</u> etc. Such networks extend outward from specific discourses and situations into language at large, operating metonymically or in new metaphoric ways, or by the other neologising processes until they become culturally significant for a particular language. An example of this for English is the network called 'cricketing expressions', having as its generic or master metaphor 'Life is a game of cricket'.

The following list gives a range of examples, moving gradually from the more to the less apparent:

(1) His behaviour just wasn't cricket, my dear fellow.

(2) I was stumped by his attitude.

(3) Prendergast was clean bowled when he tried to argue with Jones.

(4) He was out for a duck as far as winning her was concerned.

(5) You see, he just couldn't bowl a maiden over.

(6) Smith umpired the dispute between Prendergast and Jones.

(7) Smith knocked 'em for six in the school debate.

(8) The Prime Minister whent in to bat at three p.m., confident that his side would lick the Opposition.

(9) Prendergast was caught out soon enough, when the money was counted.

(10) Jones won the prize for pedigree pigs. It's all the more remarkable really, because he did it all off his own bat.

(11) The old chap's done well. It's his birthday next week. He always said he'd manage to knock up his century.

(12) Prendergast tried to slip in through that little door at the side, but it turned out to be a sticky wicket. They turfed him out.

(13) The English may well be perturbed one day to discover that God does not play cricket after all.

(14) They fielded the best team at the Conference — and discovered that the other side had scratched at the last minute.

(15) The old general said that he hoped, when they thought about him after death, they'd say he always played the game according to the rules, and had a good innings.

Such networks are common: Life is a game (of cricket)(of golf)(of chess); life is a race, a battle, a competition, a gamble. Whatever form the first metaphor might have taken (generic or specific), it allows a move from

a wide range of X terminologies to a specialised Y terminology, which is registral by definition. The register or sub-language is implicit when we talk about 'political metaphors', 'Legal English', 'a military comparison' or 'medical analogies'. One of the best examples in current English is a transfer from the register of medicine to that of politics, so that Members of Parliament hold 'surgeries' (presumably for their 'patients').

Such items and collocations can occur so frequently that the original analogy loses its load, and the metaphor (from such a source as, say, the military) can co-occur with one from another source (say, sport) and produce: We must march forward shoulder to shoulder towards our common goal. This 'mixed' or multiple metaphor derives from two indices and, whatever one's aesthetic responses, is apparently a valid form in itself (see 5.4.(4)).

There is ample evidence to indicate that such networks are tokens of a community's historical development, whether they are 'fossilised' or still active. The Latin of the Empire possessed (and passed on to English) many metaphoric expressions derived from agricultural origins: our promulgate was formed from a phrase 'to squeeze every drop of milk from the udder', while emolument was 'a quantity of ground flour'. English in turn abounds in shipping and sporting metaphors. As with our consideration of the Fatherhood of God, we find ourselves moving once again into the sociological significance of metaphor.

6.6. Conclusion: Metaphor in Society.

Weller-Embler (1954) remarks: 'Grammarians have often busied themselves defining what a metaphor is. But it is more meaningful in our day to find out what a metaphor does.' He argues that 'a whole philosophy of life is often implicit in the metaphors of creative writers, the philosophy of an entire generation, indeed, even of an entire civilisation'. He gives the example of Steinbeck's metaphors of men = insects, and the Darwin-Tennyson view of 'nature red in tooth and claw' as opposed to the Wordsworthian position of 'let nature be your teacher'. More recently, he suggests, come the Spenglerian equation of civilisations and seasons, and the Freudian equivalence between the unconscious (or 'sub'-conscious) mind and the cellar of a house.

In coming (almost inevitably) to a discussion of the potency of metaphor we have arrived on the ground already trodden by generations of literary and social critics, but arrive with, it is hoped, some fresh insights drawn from a formal study of metaphor. Only one additional point requires making, because of the very interesting coincidence in terminology, and that point not only helps to close this study, but adds something worthwhile to the remarks of Weller-Embler. Kuhn (1962) has studied the 'structure' of scientific revolutions, as for instance from the Ptolemaean to the Copernican, or the Newtonian to the Einsteinian. He makes no reference to metaphor, and there is no apparent

reason why he should, but he considers science and scientists as moving from one old 'paradigm' to another new 'paradigm'. Additionally, the standard scientific assumptions of any historical period he calls the 'normal' science of the time, while the new paradigm is 'extraordinary', until — and this is the rub — it is in due course normalised. One cannot help seeing the close similarity of Kuhn's terminology and that which we have used here, and also may risk the suggestion that he is in fact talking about new metaphors or analogies for science to work with, comparable to what Weller-Embler mentions for Darwin and Freud.

Kuhn's old and new paradigms include all the philosophies, theories, methods and 'facts' connected with their own specific period of development. It is from our point of view a kind of master metaphor, generically dominating all the successive or contiguous metaphors of its network. In the case of science — as our logician might remind us — no analogy is absolute, and so dissatisfaction with a particular paradigm sets in and it is discarded or enlarged. We may recall in this instance the <u>light wave</u> analogy which we discussed (3.7) as beginning with Huyghens in the 17th century and being adapted in the 1930s by men like Sullivan.

These brief but important observations serve to indicate not only the way in which metaphoric splicing by means of a shared attribute is the 'door' to whole new linguistic possibilities and cultural assumptions, but mark

the culmination of this study. It does not mean that many areas cannot be more fully sketched and analysed than we have managed here, but it suggests that further elucidation may well have to take place in the sphere of inter-disciplinary research. Whatever the next stage, we may safely conclude here that Aristotle's supreme stylistic device has not deserved the cavalier neglect which it has received down the centuries, and whether or not it is, as Richards argues, the omnipresent principle of language, its operation is a dominant colour throughout the fabric.

7 Teaching Materials: An Application of the Theory.

7.1. Introduction.

We have, in the course of this study, examined various attitudes which have coloured both the theoretical and the pedagogical approach to metaphor. Some have been rejected and others reinforced in the course of developing a linguistic theory, with the result that the following provisos emerge in relation to the development of teaching materials:

(1) In providing materials to promote an awareness of the metaphoric process in language at large, no attempt will be made to relate lexical items to 'real objects in the world'.

(2) Although it is accepted that the expressions literal and figurative are widely used and are likely to continue, they will not be used as a means of describing metaphoric and non-metaphoric usage.

(3) The term metaphoric is preferred to the commoner metaphorical so as to narrow down the range of possible connotations in the adjective. It is hoped, for instance, that the shorter form does not have a ready antonymous relationship with literal; and it is used as a distinct linguistic term related only to the process described above.

(4) The teaching procedure of stating that a metaphor is a condensed simile or a simile an expanded metaphor will not be used, although (as Exercise 5 shows) certain full similes provide the matrix-analogue material for a metaphoric transformation. It is accepted that both metaphor and full

simile are distinct realisations in language of the analogical relationship, but caution is urged in making too facile a connection between them. Secondary transformations upon the basic metaphoric process may well have been performed, making it difficult for any student to 'convert' metaphor into simile, as with:

1. The head of the family came down the stairs.
2. The dictator was arrogant and power-hungry.
3. A wind of change blew through the office.

Note. Some textbooks which do invoke a facile relationship between simile and metaphor provide over-simple examples of copular statements in which like appears to have been omitted:

4. Simile: He was like a lion in the fight.
5. Metaphor: He was a lion in the fight.

Such direct equation is only one of many metaphoric forms.

(5) Any suggestion that metaphor is inherently good or poetic or literary will be avoided. Since bad metaphor is a matter of personal taste — since mixed metaphor is as likely in Hamlet's soliloquies as in a student's essays — and since the process is universal in language rather than a literary tool, all these assumptions may be considered as diverting the student's attention from the basic mechanism involved.

(6) This present study is restricted to metaphor and does not attempt any integrated course containing material on metonymy, synecdoche or any other process traditionally taught at about the same time as metaphor. If it is useful however it may prompt investigations of the other phenomena and the production of appropriate material.

Aware of these provisos, we may move on to consider the positive aspects of the proposed course-work:

(1) Metaphor is one way of presenting analogy through language. At some point in the course the analogical relationship has to be introduced, but need not be explicitly presented until somewhere towards the middle of the course (Exercise 5). The analogical relationship may emerge as a dominant condition in the material handled by the student, rather than in a bald initial statement of resemblances. This avoids dependence on such words as 'like' or '(just) as' in the early stages, essentially because these connectives occur in simile and are alternative expressions of analogy. This does not mean however that the students cannot in due course be reminded of alternative possibilities.

(2) The course-work will attempt to induce awareness of the phenomenon without depending upon a definition to be memorised or applied. The course should make the students aware of a process which they already use unconsciously.

(3) A balance is attempted between metaphoric material which is well-established in the English language and therefore highly predictable, and more original or restricted usage which requires an appreciation of the analogical load. The familiar material may prove useful in assisting the students in performing the early substitution exercises.

(4) The primary aim of the exercises is to lead the student towards an appreciation of the matrix-analogue relationship underlying all metaphoric occurrences, and that this occurrence is best handled at the sentence level. This does not preclude however the use of phrasal material rather than a constant use of sentences, because collocational relationships may be better handled at the phrase level.

(5) The methodological principle adopted is to move from production towards interpretation. This is not entirely arbitrary, because it assumes that analysis and subtle appreciation are too demanding in the initial stages, and also

that the making of metaphors is as worthwhile as their interpretation. An element of inductive interpretation is however present even in the earliest stages, which predominantly demand that the student actually do something.

(6) Although the theory is not overtly taught by means of the exercises provided here, this does not mean that a teacher cannot at some point after the half-way mark attempt a more abstract discussion with students able to appreciate the theory.

7.2. The System of Exercises.

Sufficient material is provided to permit either (a) a short, intensive course in metaphoric language, or (b) course-work in metaphor that can be interspersed in more conventional work. This means that it could be a matter of days, weeks or months, depending upon the needs of the students, the nature of the course and the facilities of the institution. The physical presentation of the exercises is entirely dependent on the circumstances of the teacher, but would probably be best handled as duplicated sheets available to every individual in the class. It is not considered that the grading used here should be regarded as in any way final, nor the inclusion of any exercise or set of exercises as absolute and fixed, or indeed that the quantities offered here as specimens are the optimum likely to be needed, either for (a) upper secondary native speakers, or (b) advanced learners of English as a second language. The amount of assistance, extra explanation, examples etc. which the teacher may feel required to provide in various types of institution are of course impossible to predict in advance.

7.3. A Specimen Graded Course in the Use of Metaphor.

7.3.1. Collocations.

Aim: These simple exercises are intended to give the student initial confidence in the course, while pairing words that are already quite familiar in collocation or at least highly acceptable. The jumbling approach is a well-known one. It should however be noted that these phrasal-collocational exercises may not be the best introduction for intermediate or early-advanced foreign learners, who might start at a later exercise and attempt these afterwards. Idiomatic confidence-builders might have the very opposite effect on non-native speakers.

Specimen Exercise.

(1) In these two lists the words are mixed up. Take words from the first list and put them in their correct places in the second list:

EXAMPLE mouth ________ of a river

= mouth of a river

1. foot ________ of a table
2. ribs ________ of the hill
3. eye ________ of rock
4. legs ________ of a clock
5. hands ________ of a needle

Now try these:

1. head ________ of a bottle
2. shoulder ________ of a gale
3. neck ________ of mist
4. teeth ________ of the queue
5. fingers ________ of a pass in the mountains

(2) In these two lists colours have to be matched with suitable words, as in the example. The first five are numbered twice in order to give you a good start. When you have completed the exercise make sure you know what the phrases mean.

EXAMPLE red ________ herring

= red herring

1. golden ________ mood
2. yellow ________ fingers (3)
3. green ________ lie
4. blue ________ heart
5. red ________ opportunity (1)
6. brown ________ blood (4)
7. grey ________ lining
8. black ________ mist (5)
9. silver ________ study
10. white ________ press (2)

(3) Now try these two lists, which bring bits of architecture into contact with words you might not normally expect to find them with. The first three are numbered twice.

EXAMPLE pillar ________ of wisdom

= pillar of wisdom

1. tower ________ of hope
2. wall ________ of heaven
3. bridge ________ of strength (1)
4. corridor ________ of mind
5. gates ________ of God
6. avenue ________ of time
7. structure ________ of honesty
8. frame ________ of fire (2)
9. façade ________ of language
10. city ________ of trust (3)

(4) Now that you have completed the lists, practise either orally or on paper forming sentences in which these phrases can be used.

7.3.2. Acceptability.

Aim: This type of exercise provides an opportunity for the student to reflect on the metaphoric or analogical nature of the collocations just completed, without too much conscious analysis. It suggests distinctions between the metaphoric and non-metaphoric, particularly necessary in some cases because of the familiarity of the material. Many of the sentences have special complexities that can give rise to useful discussion.

Specimen Exercise.

Some of the following sentences make reasonable sense, while others do not. Tick the acceptable ones like this (✓), the unacceptable ones like this (X) and the puzzling or odd ones like this (?). They are all connected in some way with the lists you have done previously.

(1)( ) His mother put the thread through the eye of the needle.

(2)( ) The dentist put two fillings in the teeth of the gale.

(3)( ) The clock's hands were dirty.

(4)( ) She provided him with some white shirts, socks and lies.

(5)( ) The quarrel put him in a bad frame of mind for some time.

(6)( ) That hut is built out of prefabricated frames, and so is his mind.

(7)( ) They chose a silver ring and a golden opportunity.

(8)( ) The pockets of his coat had silver linings.

(9)( ) The Pillar of Wisdom was erected outside the main parliamentary building.

(10)( ) Fingers of mist plucked at him as he crossed the bog.

7.3.3. Transfer.

Aim: This exercise provides an opportunity for the student to operate a simple transfer, from a given collocation of a non-metaphoric nature to a new metaphorised one. Most of the new collocations will be familiar, and the transfer is semantically from Concrete to Abstract.

Specimen Exercise.

In this exercise there are two lists. In the first list are adjectives + nouns, while in the second list are blanks followed by other nouns. Take the adjectives from the first list and insert them in the blanks on the right so that you get ten acceptable phrases. The nouns are jumbled and will need careful consideration. The first two are numbered twice to start things off.

EXAMPLE happy girl ________ coincidence
= happy coincidence

(1)	sad people	________	laughter
(2)	vicious wolves	________	stories
(3)	clean teeth	________	victories
(4)	forlorn children	________	departures (1)
(5)	empty boxes	________	opportunities
(6)	hollow trees	________	hopes
(7)	gripping claws	________	promises
(8)	resounding drums	________	circles (2)
(9)	beautiful women	________	break
(10)	lost orphans	________	experiences

Note There may be some differences of opinion on one or two of the phrases. You might want to support your own decisions by putting the phrases in sentences.

7.3.4. Splicing.

<u>Aim:</u> These exercises draw attention to the way in which lexical items are 'swopped' from one contextual range to another. The procedure is mechanical and provides a simple introduction to the matrix-analogue relationship, without recourse to mentioning it, or simile or analogy.

<u>Specimen Exercise.</u>

(1) Examine each of the following pairs joined together by brace brackets. Each phrase makes sense on its own, but you can make a third phrase from each and it will be what we call a <u>metaphor</u>. The example shows how it is done. Always start with the top line. You will notice that if you start with the bottom line and work the other way, the result will be unsatisfactory or uninteresting.

EXAMPLE { iron railings / great determination } = iron determination

(a) { bright light / clever child }

(b) { keen knife / eager student }

(c) { sharp instrument / alert mind }

(d) { solid wall / total opposition }

(e) { poisonous fumes / malicious gossip }

(f) { decayed vegetation / old ideas }

(g) { menacing weapons / bad news }

(h) { flexible wires / changeable opinions }

(i) { floating raft / uncertain vote }

(j) { steel blades / strong nerves }

(2) Now try these sentences in the same way, following the example:

EXAMPLE { Their hopes decreased / Their ship sank } after the battle

= Their hopes sank after the battle

(a) {Flames were moving rapidly / Men were racing} towards the village

(b) {The sky darkened / The man frowned} ominously

(c) {He steered the boat / He guided the group} back to safety

(d) {He weighed the sacks / He studied the situation} carefully

7.3.5. Analogy.

Aim: In these exercises the students move from simple splicing transformations to the purpose behind them: analogy. The analogical nature of metaphor and simile is clarified, and an effort is made to show how the essential material for metaphor can be contained in full similes. Lengthier initial help is needed from the teacher, who may choose his own way of explaining the nature of analogy if he wishes. If possible students should be made to realise that analogical comparisons occur outside of language: in geometric shapes, symbolism, art, science. Nevertheless, we should note that in language terms the analogical idea may be conveyed to students by:

(1) The use of Aristotelian proportion:

$$A : B :: C : D$$
$$\Rightarrow A : D :: C : B$$

(2) A propositional use of Just as ... so:

Just as a farmer weighs sacks carefully,
so the man studied the situation carefully.

(3) A discussion of the concept of resemblance between

disparate situations because of a single shared attribute, such as the *care* with which the farmer and the other man attend to their work in (2) above.

Whatever method is adopted, the teacher should avoid representing simile as the pre-ordained method of presenting analogy in language. It is one of a number of ways. In these exercises the explicit analogy is used as a point of departure for creating metaphor, but it could equally well be a means of developing the interpretation of a metaphor that already exists. The techniques are complementary. We may not, for instance, dispute that the proposition *Just as a farmer weighs sacks carefully, so the man studied the situation carefully* is also expressed competently and compactly as *He weighed the situation carefully*, where no illustrative reference to *farmer* or *sacks* is necessary.

Specimen Exercise.

All the sentences which follow are based upon analogies. In the first ten sentences the words *Just as - so* are used. Other words are however written in italics, and if you take these words and re-arrange them, making small changes such as the tense of the verb, you can produce metaphors which express the same analogies in a more economical way.

EXAMPLE Just as – so

Just as a farmer *weighs* sacks *carefully*, so *he* studied *the situation*

⇒ He weighed the situation carefully

(1) Just as a pilot *steers* a boat, so *the man* guided *the group to safety*.

(2) Just as Farmer Jones breeds pigs, so familiarity produces contempt.

(3) Just as a man frowns, so the sky darkened ominously.

(4) Just as a ship sinks, so their hope decreased.

(5) Just as they dug to the root of the tree, so they got to the nature of the problem.

(6) Just as a tree grows, so his prosperity increased.

(7) Just as a wolf devours sheep, so he reads books.

(8) Just as some plants wither slowly in bad conditions, so his originally hopeful attitude diminished.

(9) Just as a man yawns, so the graves of the cemetery lay open.

(10) Just as torches shine down a passage, so their learning continues down the centuries.

In the following five sentences the analogy is more economically expressed, by means of brace brackets. If you choose one level of the bracketed words, you will get a simple statement, but if you choose the other level, you will get a metaphor.

(11) The pain of their { wounds / separation } showed on their faces.

(12) He saw { prospects of profit / coils of wire } in the new machine.

(13) He dug into the { potato patch / problem } and unearthed a { turnip / solution }.

(14) The light of their { torches / learning } shone down the { passage / centuries }.

(15) There was some room left for { barrels / negotiation } in the { cellars / conference }.

7.3.6. Substitution and Insertion.

Aim: In this type of exercise the analogy is less explicit, but the change of lexical item may encourage an awareness of the dual categorisation essential to metaphor.

Specimen Exercise.

(1) Below is a list of words, followed by ten sentences. In each sentence one or more words is in italics. It is possible to replace these italicised words by others taken from the list, so that a metaphor is produced.

EXAMPLE He dug into the ground
(list word problem)
= He dug into the problem

OR

The gardener dug into the ground
(list word detective and problem)
= The detective dug into the problem

NOTE The first three sentences have matching letters in the list in order to start things off.

(a)	(b)	(c)
disaster	system	problem
inquiry	supplies	matter
election	politicians	brains
convention	solution	decision
tale	institutions	convictions

(a) He had to face up to the burglar whether he wanted to or not.
(b) Water flowed easily into the city.
(c) The fellow racked his victims ruthlessly.
(d) They could feel the strength of his arms when he set to work.
(e) The noise sounded eerie in that old house.
(f) The man got to the root of the plant after careful digging.
(g) The visitors stood uncertainly on the threshold of the hall.
(h) The hawk flew in the face of its assailant.

(i) He said that once they climbed over the last <u>ridge</u> they would see the <u>lake</u> just ahead.

(j) The <u>settlements</u> were destroyed and the entire <u>country</u> seriously weakened.

(2) Here is another list and set of ten sentences. This time however no substitution is required. Simply insert one word in each blank space and a metaphor will automatically be created. Only one arrangement of words suits the whole set of ten sentences. The first two have matching letters.

(a)	thoughts		ambitions
	pain		mountain
	success		discord
	xpropaganda	(b)	hopes
	prosperity		plague

(a) His ________ raced to find an answer.

(b) Their _______ died after their failure.

(c) The ________ stabbed through him.

(d) ________ gripped the whole city.

(e) His ________ grew when trade increased.

(f) He went on holiday and left behind a ________ of work.

(g) New __________ blossomed when he was offered the chance of starting a business of his own.

(h) He sowed the seeds of _________ at the very beginning of the dispute.

(i) They fed him with __________ until he was willing to join the conspiracy.

(j) The taste of ________ was pleasant after all those years of neglect.

(3) There is also a list in the following exercise. This time, however, the words in the list are usually nouns, but in the metaphoric sentences they are used as verbs, and may need suitable verb endings. The first two have matching letters.

dog
beetle
knife
bridge
tower

(b) nose
circle
shadow
branch
(a) needle

(a) She's the sharp kind of person who likes to ______ you.

(b) The submarine ______ inquisitively into the estuary.

(c) In the Antarctic the wind ______ through the thickest clothing.

(d) The politicians ______ the gap between the two sides by means of a revised statement of policy.

(e) Trouble ______ his heels wherever he went.

(f) He remembered with pride how his father had ______ above most other men.

(g) Two roads ______ off at that village; one goes to Dimwich and the other to Dulbury.

(h) Although it was a boring business, the detectives ______ their suspects with professional care.

(i) The hawk ______ over the moor, wings hardly moving.

(j) The little car ______ along very nicely at 55 m.p.h.

7.3.7. <u>Recognition</u>.

<u>Aim</u>: This set of sentences enables some kind of check to be made by student and/or teacher on the extent to which metaphoric material is now separable from non-metaphoric.

Additionally, it moves the examination of the whole problem out of general language into elements of literature, the later sentences being derived from well-known occurrences in poetry and prose but still interspersed with material which has no analogical basis.

Specimen Exercise.

Tick (✓) each sentence that you consider metaphoric, and cross out (X) those which do not have an analogy behind them. If you are doubtful about any sentence, mark it as doubtful (?)

(1)( ) The party waited at the base of the statue.
(2)( ) The men appeared at the foot of the hill.
(3)( ) The gardener dug briskly in the potato patch and found a bone.
(4)( ) The penetrated into the heart of the problem.
(5)( ) The man was monkeying about with his pal's car.
(6)( ) He walked towards the house like a man in a dream.
(7(( ) The people were drifting across the quadrangle like driven leaves.
(8)( ) He explained the matter in careful, measured tones.
(9)( ) The tailor measured his customer very carefully.
(10)( ) The prime minister measured the distance between the negotiators very carefully.
(11)( ) You can usually find tigers in the forests of Bengal.
(12)( ) One of the troublesome things about sightseeing is sore feet.
(13)( ) The cost of living soared frighteningly in 1822.
(14)( ) Life is a poor player, that struts and frets his hour upon the stage, and then is heard no more.
(15)( ) Patriotism is the last refuge of the scoundrel.
(16)( ) Patriotism may not be enough, but it will have to do.
(17)( ) Sing, O Muse, about the anger of Achilles, the anger that sent the souls of many heroes down to hell.
(18)( ) As far as I am concerned, Rome can melt in the Tiber, and the wide arch of the empire can fall in the dust.

7.3.8. Analysis.

Aim: These exercises move the student away from the type of metaphor with which he may already be familiar in general language and from metaphoric material which has in some instances become so normalised as to be virtually unrecognisable as metaphor. The later sentences in the last section were derived from literary sources, and the material now to be considered is entirely literary and unpredictable. This helps to introduce the problem of unpredictability and acceptability into the course and to make the student aware of highly original analogies conveyed in the metaphoric form.

Specimen Exercise.

(There are three stages to the work, each of which is carefully guided and supplemented where necessary by the teacher. He may wish, for example, to construct special paradigm tables on the blackboard)

Stage I

Look at the following five sentences. Each has a blank space where one word is missing. Your first job is to supply in each blank the word you think most likely to belong there. Your opinion may or may not be the same as anyone else's, and you may wish to make a list of possible likely words.

(1) I fled down the ________ in order to avoid him.
(2) Suddenly the ________ found itself bombarded with rapid machine-gun fire.
(3) Making sudden changes of gear, the ______ accelerated.
(4) The barge in which she sat ________ on the water.
(5) He flung the stone and chased the ________ away.

Stage II

Having considered possible words for the blanks, study these versions of the same sentences, in which five words have been inserted in the blanks. How acceptable are these sentences to you? Would you have expected them? Do they suggest any possible analogies to you?

(1) I fled down the nights in order to avoid him.

(2) Suddenly the ant found itself bombarded with rapid machine-gun fire.

(3) Making sudden changes of gear, the heat accelerated.

(4) The barge in which she sat burned on the water.

(5) He flung the stone and chased the stars away.

Stage III

Each of the sentences you have just examined is derived from a piece of writing by a well-known poet or author. Here are the passages in which they occur. You now have a better chance to judge whether the metaphor is effective and appropriate. Answer the questions that follow each.

(1) from Francis Thompson, The Hound of Heaven.

> 'I fled Him, down the nights and down the days;
> I fled Him, down the arches of the years;
> I fled Him, down the labyrinthine ways
> Of my own mind...'

(a) Who is the narrator fleeing from?

(b) Replace nights, days and years with analogous words from architecture.

(c) Is a labyrinth an acceptable analogue for mind?

(2) from Gerald Durrell's Birds, Beasts and Relatives.

> 'As soon as one of these avalanches had trickled down to the base of the cone, it would be the signal for the larva to come into action. Suddenly the ant would find itself bombarded with a rapid machine-gun fire of sand or earth, projected up from the bottom of the pit with incredible speed by the head of the larva. With the shifting ground under foot and bombarded with earth or sand, the ant would miss its

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foothold and roll ignominiously down to the bottom of the pit. Out of the sand, with the utmost speed, would appear the head of the ant-lion larva, a flattened, ant-like head, with a pair of enormous curved jaws, like sickles.'

(a) Replace <u>bombarded</u> and <u>machine-gun fire</u> with words which might have been more likely in such a description.

(b) Is it an acceptable analogy to relate the action of ant and ant-lion to human warfare? Give a reason for your answer.

(c) Find a word in the passage which suggests that the ant, like a human being, was ashamed of its misfortune.

(3) from E.M.Forster's <u>A Passage to India</u>.

> 'Making sudden changes of gear, the heat accelerated its advance after Mrs Moore's departure until existence had to be endured and crime punished with the thermometer at a hundred and twelve. Electric fans hummed and spat, water splashed on screens, ice clinked, and outside these defences, between a greyish sky and a yellowish earth, clouds of dust moved hesitatingly.'

(a) What does the car analogy suggest about the nature of heat in India?

(b) What word suggests that electric fans have a life of their own?

(c) Replace <u>gear</u> and <u>accelerated</u> with words which accurately describe the weather but have no analogy behind them.

(4) from Shakespeare's <u>Antony and Cleopatra</u>.

ENOBARBUS When she first met Mark Antony she pursed up his heart, upon the river of Cydnus.

AGRIPPA There she appeared indeed, or my reporter devised well for her.

ENOBARBUS I will tell you.
The barge she sat in, like a burnish'd
  throne,
Burn'd on the water: the poop was beaten
  gold,
Purple the sails, and so perfumed, that
The winds were love-sick with them.

(a) Can you suggest why the barge is described as burning on the water?

(b) There is a second metaphoric analogy in the passage. What is it?

(c) Can you suggest any reason why burn'd is especially effective when placed alongside water?

(5) from Edward Fitzgerald's Rubaiyat of Omar Khayyam.

'Awake! For Morning in the Bowl of Night
Has flung the Stone that puts the Stars
to Flight:
And lo! The Hunter of the East had caught
The Sultan's Turret in a Noose of Light.'

(a) What is being described in the first two lines?

(b) Who or what is the Hunter of the East?

(c) With what more likely word might Bowl be replaced?

7.3.9. Recognition of Paragraph Metaphor.

Aim: Whereas earlier exercises dealt in phrases and sentences containing lexical items, these exercises are concerned with paragraph settings in which whole sentences of analogue material occur. The technique used helps to establish how the analogue items 'penetrate' the discourse from an alien discourse to which, when isolated, they may be immediately assigned.

Specimen Exercise.

Stage I

Consider these two sentences, and then answer the questions which follow:

(1) He composes the music which others will play.

(3) One lot provided the jam and the others provided the bread and butter.

(a) Is the first sentence referring to a musical composer, an airline pilot or an architect?

(b) Which of these would be more likely to provide bread, butter and jam? — a publisher's books, a provision merchant or a racehorse.

(c) If the answers to these two questions turned out to be an airline pilot and a racehorse, would you consider the whole business absurd?

Stage II

Read these two extracts and then consider the sentences again.

(1) from S.E. Rasmussen, 'Experiencing Architecture', 1959.

'The architect remains anonymously in the background. Here again he resembles the theatrical producer. His drawings are not an end in themselves, a work of art, but simply a set of instructions, an aid to the craftsmen who construct his buildings. He delivers a number of completely impersonal plan drawings and typewritten specifications. They must be so unequivocal that there will be no doubt about the construction. He composes the music which others will play. Furthermore, in order to understand architecture fully, it must be remembered that the people who play it are not sensitive musicians interpreting another's score... On the contrary, they are a multitude of ordinary people.'

(2) from 'US Publishers Book into Britain', in The Sunday Times of 9 Nov 1969.

'(In book sales) it is the fiction and the general books that provide the jam. But it is almost certainly the dictionaries, textbooks and reference books — the bread and butter end of Cassell — that has attracted Crowell, Collier, whose output of general books and fiction in the States is tiny — no more than 4 per cent. of its turnover.'

7.3.10. An Essay in Interpretation.

Aim: This final specimen exercise is only one of a wide range of possible advanced procedures that can follow from the preceding nine techniques. It deals with the interpretation of a metaphoric network in a well-known poem and in places closely resembles the traditional method of talk-

ing in class about metaphor. The important difference is that this exercise comes as a culmination, not as perhaps the first attack upon metaphor after having provided a definition and some examples.

In interpreting the metaphoric material in The Tyger we need not concern ourselves with those other elements in the poem which are very important for general criticism: symbolism, mystical assumptions, Christian allusions or even the syntax of the poem. The teacher may discuss them at any point he wishes, while making use of the material presented here. Additionally, it should not be too difficult for these techniques to be adapted by the teacher for other poems and selections of prose.

Specimen Exercise.

Read the poem once or twice before considering the questions which follow it.

The Tyger William Blake (1757 - 1827)

Tyger, tyger, burning bright
In the forests of the night,
What immortal hand or eye
Could frame thy fearful symmetry?

In what distant deeps or skies 5
Burnt the fire of thine eyes?
On what wings dare he aspire?
What the hand dare seize the fire?

And what shoulder and what art
Could twist the sinews of thy heart? 10
And, when thy heart began to beat,
What dread hand and what dread feet?

What the hammer? What the chain?
In what furnace was thy brain?
What the anvil? What dread grasp 15
Dare its deadly terrors clasp?

When the stars threw down their spears,
And water'd heaven with their tears,
Did He smile His work to see?
Did He Who made the lamb make thee? 20

Tyger, tyger, burning bright
In the forests of the night,
What immortal hand or eye
Dare frame thy fearful symmetry?

(a) Decide what words you might reasonably expect in this context:

_________, _________, burning bright
In the _________ of the night

Would the words be (i) Fire, Fire, darkness
(ii) something similar
(iii) something quite different, such as Hope, Hope, vastness?

(b) Decide what words you might reasonably expect in this context (ignoring the problem of rhyme):

What the hammer? What the chain?
In what furnace was _____ _______?

(c) What kind of man works with : hammer; anvil; furnace; chain; fire?

(d) What do your answers to (b) and (c) suggest that the tiger was made of?

(e) What single word suggests that the tiger was built to exact specifications, like a machine?

(f) Can you think of a man-made monster, made in a laboratory, which later became a threat to its

creator? (It first occurred in a story written at much the same time as this poem)

(g) What animal is the tiger contrasted with?

(h) Who is considered to have made the other animal?

(i) Find two lines which indicate that the tiger was created at some time in the history of the world when strange things happened.

(j) What single word suggests strongly that the maker of the tiger is superhuman, in spite of his human characteristics of <u>hand</u>, <u>eye</u>, <u>feet</u>, <u>shoulder</u>?

(k) What other characteristic of the tiger's creator suggests that he was non-human as well as super-human? You should look for a word that normally occurs in connection with certain kinds of animal.

(l) If you combine that non-human characteristic with the human ones, what specific kind of being is suggested?

<u>Teaching Follow-Up</u>.

There should not be too much difficulty in drawing upon the students' answers to these questions in order to build up the metaphoric qualities of the poem. A presentation of the following kind can be made to show that the whole tiger and its various parts are analogically related to some indefinable thing made in a smithy:



Behind this network of items equating the animate tiger with inanimate metal and elemental fire lies some such metaphoric statement as: 'He hammered out the tiger on the anvil'. This can be resolved more explicitly into: 'Just as a blacksmith hammers out metal things on his anvil, so God/The Devil contrived the tiger'. Devil or God, he also used wings to reach the fire that was to be embodied in the tiger, whether or not it was to be manifest through its eyes or in any other way. The creator also plied his hammer when stars carried spears and wept. The fantasy element emerges clearly from a poem which may well be rather opaque to begin with.

The teacher may wish to show his students more specifically how metaphor is achieved by taking the material used in Question (a) and re-expressing it in matrix-analogue form, something as follows, with arrows indicating the manner in which the transformation occurs:

1	A tiger	walks in	the forests of	Bengal
2	A fire	burns in (bright)	the middle of	the night

This presentation over-simplifies two distinct metaphors, but can be excused on the grounds of pedagogic advantage and the need for a graphic means of demonstrating the double-single nature of the process.

7.4. Conclusion.

Should a teacher wish to go on to an overt statement of the theory, the kind of interpretation work just discussed would be a satisfactory point at which to begin. Such work could be followed by:

(1) A study of the passages of extended and multiple metaphor available in Metaphor Beyond the Sentence.

(2) And/or use of the material provided under An Eye for Resemblances.

(3) Other poems or short excerpts from certain types of prose which are amenable to the same type of question or analysis, sucha as Animal Farm.

Such a course, however it is rounded off or developed, should provide a useful introduction for the student to the complexities of metaphor, and a starting-off point from which he can begin to consider the innumerable stylistic and interpretational subtleties which the device allows.

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