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POLICY AND POLICY IMPLEMENTATION IN TRANSITIONAL SOCIETIES: THE CASE OF THE KENYA NATIONAL YOUTH SERVICE

by

RICHARD LEIGHTON COE

B.A., College of Wooster, Wooster, Ohio, 1962

DISSERTATION

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Approved Fred G. Burke

Date 6/27/69

To Diana

PREFACE

The people of the newly independent states of Asia and Africa are currently facing the tremendous challenge of nation building and socio-economic development. While the aspirations of the people and their leaders are often great, the prospects for rapid and successful attainment of the goals toward which they aspire are not necessarily encouraging. Most of these societies face a situation in which there are limited material and human resources currently available with which to meet rapidly escalating demands. In light of this situation two of the many questions confronting governing elites are: (1) what policies can be formulated which will meet the most critical demands of the society; and (2) what patterns of organization can be established which will enable successful implementation of the policy and will achieve the desired results? These questions are asked by governing elites throughout the world, but they are doubly significant in transitional societies where rapid progress is seen as a necessity and where resources for attaining such progress are in scarce supply.

The purpose of this dissertation is to explore certain selected problems of policy implementation in transitional societies through an intensive case study of one program, the Kenya National Youth Service, designed to meet certain social, political, and economic problems in one transitional society of Africa. In this work problems of policy implementation are viewed in terms of problems of development administration. While the conclusions drawn in this study are based upon the study of only one operating program in one transitional society, it is felt that the conditions in Kenya have been similar to those in many transitional societies and that the conclusions may have relevance for a broader context.

The factors which influenced the decision by the governing elite in Kenya to order the creation of the Kenya National Youth Service and the difficulties encountered by the administrators in formulating and implementing the plan of the service made the youth service a particularly good example of problems of development administration in a transitional society. However, utilization of this particular program as a source of research data was not without certain problems. It was and is a relatively delicate subject on which to do research. For example, during the initial years of operation the youth service was a significant political issue in Kenya. It

was formulated in part to incorporate into the nation building effort youth who were members of the youth wings. These youth wings were connected with the various political parties and political factions in Kenya. Given the sensitive political issues involved in a government organization dealing with youth of diverse political leanings, research into the origins and operations of the youth service was somewhat more difficult than might have been desired. Secondly, the whole matter of the relations between the United States Government and the youth service created certain problems. As related in the dissertation, although the service was largely financed by the United States Agency for International Development, neither the United States Government nor the Kenya Government desired an American physical presence in the youth service. One primary reason for this was the desire, given the highly nationalistic clientele of the service, to avoid overt American influence in the formation of policy for the service and in advising the day to day operations of the service. Although the writer was able to disassociate himself fully from the United States Government and was granted clearance for the project by the Kenya Government, not all potential sources of data were available. Interviews, for example, with members of the Kenya Parliament and with the rank and file members of the youth service could not be carried out. However, alternative sources to fill in many of the gaps

in data were found and it is felt that the difficulties encountered were not of a nature that seriously detracted from the validity of this study and its conclusions.

I wish to acknowledge my appreciation to the Government of Kenya for permission to carry out research on the Kenya National Youth Service, and to the leadership of that service, to officials in the Ministry of Labour, Republic of Kenya, and to officials of US/AID Kenya for their time and invaluable assistance. Without their cooperation this study could not have been completed.

Appreciation is also extended to the following publishers for permission to quote from the works mentioned: McGraw-Hill Book Company for material in Chapter One from John Montgomery and William Siffin, Approaches to Development: Politics, Administration and Change; Oxford University Press, Eastern Africa Branch, for material reproduced in Chapter Three from Jomo Kenyatta, Harambee!; and Little, Brown and Company for material quoted in Chapter Three from Tom Mboya, Freedom and After.

I would like gratefully to acknowledge the assistance of two individuals in helping bring this work to a conclusion. First, Professor Fred G. Burke for his invaluable comments and criticism on the various drafts of the dissertation. Secondly, thanks is expressed to my wife, Kathleen, for her assistance in proofreading and typing of the work, for her encouragement, and perhaps

most of all, for her patience and understanding. I am indebted also to professors and fellow graduate students at Syracuse University, too numerous to mention, for their advice and criticism of various ideas and problems of the dissertation.

Lastly, the generosity of the Inter-University Research Program in Institution Building, sponsored by the universities of Indiana, Pittsburgh, Michigan State, and Syracuse, is gratefully acknowledged for providing a grant which enabled me to undertake field research in Kenya in 1966. Responsibility for the material in this dissertation is, of course, my own.

Richard L. Coe

Richmond, Indiana
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

The first few months following the attainment of independence by Kenya in December 1963 were a time of political and economic instability. A bitter contest for political power between the two main African political parties, the Kenya African National Union and the Kenya African Democratic Union, had characterized the final three years of the struggle for independence. Conflict between supporters of the two parties continued into the independence period with factions within each party competing for leadership. Party affiliates, such as the youth wings, sought rewards for the active support they had provided during the political campaigns. The economy of the country was stagnating as a result of natural disasters and the emigration of large numbers of Europeans whose technical skills and capital formed the backbone of the monetary sector of the economy. A scarcity of jobs led to increasing dissatisfaction on the part of work seekers.

Viewing these conditions as a threat to its own position and the orderly economic and political development of Kenya, the KANU-led Government initiated a number

of programs designed to foster political stability and economic development. One program established an organization called the Kenya National Youth Service. This organization was to contribute to the economic development of the country through public works projects, and was designed to help relieve the unemployment problem among youth in Kenya. The youth service was to absorb primarily, though not entirely, unemployed members of the youth wings and other unemployed young political activists. Skilled in the techniques of revolution they had utilized during the independence period, the members of the youth wings were seen by the KANU Government as a potential source of disaffection and disruption. By means of the youth service, the Government sought to obtain a measure of control over the youth, to channel their energies into constructive enterprises, to alleviate their unemployment problem, and to provide them with vocational training.

Implementation of the youth service scheme was given top priority. American and British promises of aid were quickly forthcoming. The Government expressed the desire to have the service operational by April 1964 and to have inducted 10,000 youths by the end of 1965.

During the period from January 1964 to December 1966, when the research for this work was completed, many of the expectations of the governing elite were not

fulfilled by the service. Lengthy delays in the implementation of specific youth service programs were encountered. For example, it was not until July 1966 that the vocational training program was initiated. The service was subject to a great deal of unrest from the youth recruited into it. As a result of the unrest, emphasis on the recruiting of members of the youth wings and other politically active youth was phased out in favor of other unskilled, unemployed youth, the majority of whom were not political activists.

Research on the development of the youth service during the period 1964-1966 indicated that important factors contributing to the problems encountered by the service were in the planning and in the implementation of the youth service plan. Thus, this work is not only a study of an organization designed to meet the challenge of incorporating a potentially disruptive element of the population into the nation building effort in one developing country, but is also a case study in development administration. It is felt that the problems encountered in the program, established and implemented under crisis conditions with inadequate resources, are characteristic of those encountered by administrators in many developing countries. As such it is hoped that the work, studying selected aspects of development administration, will contribute to the body of data and knowledge on this subject.

The first section of this chapter presents some definitions of the term development administration and a brief survey of general approaches and strategies to the study of development administration. This is followed by a presentation of the theoretical framework utilized in the dissertation. The specific propositions of the dissertation are then set forth followed by a concluding section dealing with the techniques utilized for data gathering.

Development Administration

Definition of the Term

Fred Burke has recently called attention to the renewed interest on the part of scholars of African politics and government to the problems of administration. More significantly, he noted that the renewed concern for administration has adopted a different focus than was previously employed in the study of administration in Africa. Rather than focus on the analysis of static structures whose purpose is the maintenance of law and order, the new trend focuses on the "dynamic administration of development, the management of rapid change, and the evolution of new forms of bureaucratic behavior."[1]

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[1] Fred Burke, Public Administration in Africa: The Legacy of Inherited Colonial Institutions, paper presented to the World Congress of International Political Science Association, Brussels, September 18-25, 1967, p. 3. Burke notes that prior to the 1950's a policy-oriented scholarship was primarily directed at the study of structures

The above trend noted by Burke in the African context is illustrative of the fact that an increasingly large number of scholars interested in the developing areas of the world, and in an increasingly conscious manner, are beginning to adopt as a focus of research the study of development administration. Its adoption has become sufficiently widespread for at least one writer to speculate about the study of development administration as a potential subdiscipline.[1]

A number of definitions of development administration have been proposed. E. W. Weidner, for example, has defined the term as referring "to the processes of guiding an organization toward the achievement of progressive

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of administration--a classic example being Lord Hailey, An African Survey (London: Oxford University Press, 1938). During the 1950's and early 1960's the dominant concern was with the transfer of power and conflicts between traditional and modern political-economic institutions. While these concerns have not disappeared, Burke discerns a new trend focusing on problems of administration of development.

[1]Warren Ilchman, "Rising Expectations and the Revolution of Development Administration," Public Administration Review, XXV (December 1965), 315. Ilchman's article illustrates, among other things, the widespread use of development administration as a focus for studying administration in developing countries. See also Ferrel Heady, Bureaucracies in Developing Countries: Internal Roles and External Assistance, Occasional Paper, Comparative Administration Group, University of Michigan (Institute of Public Administration, 1966) and E. W. Weidner, "Development Administration: A New Focus for Research," Papers in Comparative Public Administration, ed. Ferrel Heady and Sybil Stokes (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, Institute of Public Administration, 1962).

political, economic and social objectives that are authoritatively determined in one manner or another."[1] For Warren Ilchman development administration is concerned with "increasing the capacity of the state to produce, and/or assist the private sector to produce goods and services to meet and induce changing and increasing demands."[2] A third definition, proposed by Merle Fainsod, defines development administration as:

> . . . a carrier of innovating values. It embraces the array of new functions assumed by developing countries embarking on the path of modernization and industrialization. Development administration ordinarily involves the establishment of machinery for planning economic growth and mobilizing and allocating resources to expand national income.[3]

The common core of these and other definitions of development administration is that it is administration which has as its objective the achievement of various developmental goals, and, in doing so, facilitates major, often rapid changes in the political, social, and economic

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[1]Weidner, op. cit., p. 98. In another work Weidner defines development administration as "the process of guiding an organization toward the achievement of development objectives. It is action oriented, and it places administration at the center in facilitating the attainment of development objectives." E. W. Weidner, Technical Assistance in Public Administration Overseas: The Case for Development Administration (Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1964), pp. 199-200.

[2]Ilchman, loc. cit.

[3]Merle Fainsod, "The Structure of Development Administration," Development Administration: Concepts and Problems, ed. Irving Swerdlow (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1963), p. 2.

behavior of the people residing within the territory controlled by a given unit of government.[1] It is this identifying aspect of development administration as a governmental process which scholars have utilized in distinguishing administration in most developing countries today from administration in the more highly developed countries.[2] Based upon this distinction, they

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[1]It is recognized that the term development has been given a number of definitions and may be subject to the charge that it lacks clarity. The use of the term is inescapable when discussing development administration. For the purposes of this dissertation the meaning of the term will be the broad meaning given it by E. W. Weidner. He describes development as involving a forward look, a desire to improve man's lot in the world. It may involve many aspects such as the increase in per capita income and the improvement of health standards. There need not be agreement on exactly what elements ideally go to make up development or on the means to achieve it. What is crucial for the study of development administration is that there be progressive political, economic and social development goals and that these be determined in some authoritative manner. Finally, he sees development as never being complete. It is relative, a "state of mind, a tendency, a direction. Rather than a fixed goal it is a rate of change in a particular direction." E. W. Weidner, in Heady and Stokes, op. cit., pp. 98-99.

[2]Fred Burke, Local Governance and Nation Building in East Africa: A Functional Analysis, Program of Eastern African Studies Occasional Paper, Syracuse University (Syracuse: Program of Eastern African Studies, 1964), p. 6. Burke argues that while administration in developing and highly developed countries both involve the legitimate communication of commands that something not previously done be done or that a previous activity cease, there is a major conceptual difference. This is that in contrast to the situation in the highly developed country where the communication process is required simply to inform persons to alter their activity in a way which is comprehensible and recognized as a rational alternative the process in a developing country involyes more than a slight change. It very often requires that something

have sought to demonstrate the utility of the concept of development administration. Irving Swerdlow has argued that the concept of development administration can be a useful one if it can be demonstrated that there are important, clearly recognizable differences between public administration in a developing country and public administration in a high income, highly developed country. These differences must be perceptible at operating levels to warrant the distinctive designation given in the concept of development administration. Swerdlow develops a line of reasoning to show that these differences may be present.[1]

Approaches to the Study of Development Administration

The increased utilization by scholars of development administration as a focus for research and writing has led to some preliminary attempts at classification of approaches to the subject. One of the first men to attempt such a classification is Warren Ilchman. His general findings are that while there is substantial agreement among scholars on the goals of development administration there are significant differences in their assumptions and theories about

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be done which has not been done or approximated before and which has not been perceived previously as a normal alternative form of behavior. Thus communication of command is not sufficient and any of a series of techniques and institutions must be brought into use in order to implement the command and carry out the desired change.

[1]Swerdlow, op. cit., pp. ix-xi.

social change. Utilizing these differences as a basis for classification Ilchman identifies two general approaches to development administration: the general administrative systems approach and the social systems approach. Within each of these general approaches he denotes two alternative strategies. Proponents of the general approach are grouped around one or the other of its strategies.[1]

The first approach which Ilchman discerns is the general administrative systems approach. Its advocates view the administrative system as an autonomous unit. Political, social and economic aspects of the society are seen as generally being outside of the area of immediate concern which essentially involves improving "administration." According to this view, specific administrative improvement will result in bettering the capacity of the system to achieve the developmental goals set for it from the outside.

This approach depends upon at least three underlying assumptions. The first is that some societies are

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[1]Warren Ilchman, op. cit., pp. 314-18. Unless otherwise cited the material found in this section of the dissertation is taken from this portion of Ilchman's article. Subsequently, Ferrel Heady, employing Ilchman's basic classification, has added his own contribution to this preliminary classification scheme. See Ferrel Heady, Bureaucracies in Developing Countries: Internal Roles and External Assistance, op. cit., pp. 8-16. Taken together, these articles present an excellent overview of the main approaches to development administration to date.

more capable than others in meeting changing demands of its people. A second assumption is that there is a causal relationship between forms of human technology and the capacities of governments to produce goods and services and meet demands. Finally, these forms of human technology can be transferred and learned. Thus what is needed to enable developing societies to achieve their developmental goals is an application of proven techniques of administration to the systems in the more backward societies.

Within this general administrative systems approach two alternative strategies are noted by Ilchman. The first he terms the "balanced administrative growth" strategy. Its proponents[1] feel that what is required to overcome tradition-bound administration in developing societies is a form of "across-the-board" strengthening of the administrative system through the introduction of new techniques. The purpose of this would be to develop

[1]Proponents of this strategy, according to Ilchman, include A. H. Emmerich, A Handbook of Public Administration (United Nations, 1961); Paul Appleby, Public Administration in India (Government of India, 1953); Bernard Gladieux, Reorientation of Pakistan Government for National Development (Planning Board of the Government of Pakistan, 1955) and "on balance" Saul Katz, A Systems Approach to Development Administration (Comparative Administration Group, 1965). Ferrel Heady adds Merle Fainsod to this list. See Merle Fainsod, "The Structure of Development Administration" in Swerdlow, op. cit., pp. 1-25.

what Ilchman calls:

> . . . extensive and complementary centers of productive rationality--personnel systems, budgetary and fiscal procedures, planning processes, organization and methods--which 'buy' each other's products and take advantage of each other's external economies.[1]

The alternative strategy within the first general approach model is the "unbalanced administrative growth" strategy. Arguing against those who hold to the balanced administrative system strategy, the proponents[2] of the unbalanced strategy state that if a society had the skills and resources to build a modern administrative system it would probably not be underdeveloped. Secondly, they feel that what is most lacking in developing societies is the capacity to make rational, productivity-oriented decisions. What is proposed is either a concentrated effort at increasing the rational capabilities of administrators in developing countries or a concentration on establishing high standards in key areas of the administrative system. An example of this would be establishing autonomous public

[1] Ilchman, op. cit., p. 316.

[2] Ilchman identifies A. H. Hanson, Public Enterprise and Economic Development (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1959) and Eugene Lee, Local Taxation in Tanganyika (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1965) as chief proponents of this strategy. Heady adds Jay Wescott and Albert Waterston. See Jay Wescott, "Governmental Organization and Methods in Developing Countries" in Swerdlow, op. cit., pp. 43-66 and Albert Waterston, Development Planning: Lessons of Experience (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1965).

corporations with their own personnel, management improvement and budgetary systems.

Ferrel Heady, while in basic agreement with Ilchman's alternative strategies, terms this general approach the "standard technical assistance approach." It rests on the basic assumption that administrative improvement is "ipso facto" desirable and that administrative reform is a condition or even a prerequisite to development.[1]

The second general approach in Ilchman's dual classification is that of the social systems. Its advocates hold certain assumptions in common with proponents of the administrative systems approach. There is agreement, for example, on the assumption that some societies are more capable than others of producing goods and services and meeting changing demands. However, there are differences in the two approaches as to the reasons for this differential capability. The key difference seems to be that advocates of the second general approach do not view the administrative system as autonomous and do not see the increased capability of some societies as due solely to the utilization of certain techniques of public administration. Instead, the source of higher productivity is found in an interaction of various elements in a given social system as

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[1]Heady, op. cit., pp. 8-9.

well as in the utilization of techniques of administration. Society is viewed as being composed of a number of interdependent subsystems which are collectively engaged in carrying out certain functions. Due to this interdependence, change brought about in one subsystem is seen as eventually bringing about changes in the whole social system.

Ilchman terms one strategy which has been formulated within the general social systems approach as the "balanced social growth" strategy. Its proponents[1] feel that in order for the administrative system to function effectively in achieving development goals, what is needed is a number of independent yet interrelated centers of power including economic, political and administrative systems within the total social system. This follows from the assumption that a society's productivity is based upon the interaction of various elements. These various systems provide resources for one another and a check on one another's activities. The other centers of power also contribute to effective administration and the

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[1]Ilchman includes as proponents of this strategy Joseph La Palombara (ed.), Bureaucracy and Political Development (Princeton University Press, 1963), chapters one and two, and S. N. Eisenstadt, "Problems of Emerging Bureaucracies in Developing Areas and New States," Industrialization and Society, eds. Bert F. Hoselitz and Wilbert Moore (UNESCO-Mouton, 1963). Heady adds Fred Riggs and Lucian Pye. See Fred Riggs, Administration in Developing Countries, The Theory of Prismatic Society (Houghton-Mifflin Company, 1964) and Lucian Pye, "The Political Context of National Development" in Swerdlow, op. cit., pp. 26-43.

achievement of developmental goals by the administrative system by carrying out such functions as interest articulation and interest aggregation. If a concentrated effort is made to develop the administrative system without a corresponding effort to develop other centers of power, according to proponents of the balanced social systems strategy, the administrative system will absorb the power and functions ordinarily carried out by other elements in the society with serious results for the development process. Thus the advocates of this strategy seek a balanced growth of a number of systems within the general social system.

The "unbalanced social growth" strategy provides the alternative within the general social systems approach. Its advocates[1] agree with those of the balanced social growth strategy in assuming the interrelationship of various systems, political, economic and administrative, in a society. They hold that an interaction of these systems is desirable if development goals are to be reached. However, they differ from the proponents of balanced social growth in giving priority to the

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[1]The chief proponents of this strategy, according to Ilchman, are Ralph Braibanti and Milton Esman. See Ralph Braibanti, "Reflections on Bureaucratic Reform in India," Administration and Economic Development in India (Durham: Duke University Press, 1963) and Milton Esman, "The Politics of Development Administration," Approaches to Development: Politics, Administration and Change eds. John Montgomery and William Siffin (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966).

administrative system. As Ferrel Heady points out, advocates of this strategy feel that the demands placed upon the administrative systems of developing countries are so great and so critical that bureaucratic capabilities must be improved as quickly as possible. To retard administrative improvement in order to allow other centers of power to develop would be to run serious political and economic risks. It is felt that one likely consequence of following the balanced social growth strategy would be "a progressively deteriorating administrative capability in the face of escalating conversion demands."[1]

Advocates of the unbalanced social growth strategy seek to discover situations in which bureaucratic capabilities can be strengthened to meet increasing demands while at the same time, and whenever feasible, developing autonomous centers of power which can aid the administrative system in achieving developmental goals. Situations are sought in which the bureaucracy can be a vital factor in developing and strengthening other sources of power.

> This perhaps is the key to understanding the strategy, that it emphasizes policy in order to determine the relationship between administration and changes in living patterns and political attitudes . . . Emphasis is placed upon political ideology and shifting political alignments, especially as they affect the administration's capacity to produce change in society at large. Unlike the balanced social systems strategy, this strategy is more empirical and tentative.[2]

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[1]Heady, op. cit., p. 15.

[2]Ilchman, op. cit., p. 318.

Of the four strategies outlined by Ilchman as being basic to the study of development administration to date, this writer has found the unbalanced social growth strategy most congenial to his own thinking. This strategy, while recognizing the importance of the interrelationship of various elements in a society in achieving developmental goals and while seeking to strengthen the various elements, is primarily concerned with strengthening the administrative system in order to meet the rising demands which are a critical reality in most developing societies. It is a relatively pragmatic strategy which examines the political, economic and social configurations in developing societies, analyzes the demands on the public sector and puts forth solutions designed to enable the administrative system to cope with these rising demands. In contrast to the balanced social growth strategy it offers the possibility of more immediate progress in meeting the numerous demands which emerge from the new polities. It also avoids what this writer believes to be the narrowness of the administrative systems approach which tends to focus solely on the administrative system and on administrative techniques.

Theoretical Framework

The work of Milton Esman best provides the broad theoretical framework for this dissertation. In his work

"The Politics of Development Administration" Esman presents what he terms a "task or action-oriented" theoretical model for development administration with the overriding goal of better relating administration to the process of social change. He begins by assuming that in the developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America or, as he terms them, the "transitional societies of the world" the major goals are nation building and socio-economic progress. These terms are defined as follows:

> Nation building is the deliberate fashioning of an integrated political community within fixed geographic boundaries in which the nation state is the dominant political institution. Socio-economic progress is the sustained and widely diffused improvement in material and social welfare.
> [1]

These goals constitute normative guides setting boundaries for official doctrine and, to varying degrees, influence the nature and direction of public policy. They establish a series of major tasks which are common to all regimes that espouse these overriding goals. These tasks include establishing and maintaining concensus on the legitimacy of the regime, integrating diverse ethnic,

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[1] Esman, op. cit., pp. 59-60. For the purposes of this dissertation the definitions of these terms presented by Esman will be utilized. Esman notes that governing elites may be motivated in part by other, often competing goals such as survival or enrichment in office. To the extent that this occurs his model loses its relevance. However, it is his assumption, based upon available evidence, that these two goals are in fact strong motivational goals in transitional societies. Ibid., p. 60.

religious, communal, and regional elements into a national political community and developing modernizing skills and institutions.[1]

Given these goals and tasks Esman asks " . . . what patterns of organization and action are most likely to move societies efficiently toward these twin goals?"[2] His response to this question is to develop his task or action-oriented model. The main components are:

1) a governing elite that moves and guides the modernizing process;

2) a doctrine which legitimizes in terms of programmed action the norms, priorities, instruments and strategies of the governing elite; and

3) a series of instruments through which two-way communication is facilitated, and through which commitments to action are translated into operating programs.[3]

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[1]Esman lists a series of twelve major tasks facing transitional societies. He notes that they are not unique to transitional societies, being inherent in the governing process. However, the emphasis on rapid and widespread change in transitional societies to which the political system must respond, distinguishes this list of tasks from those associated with institutional maintenance which takes precedence in more stable societies. Ibid., pp. 61-64.

[2]Ibid., p. 60.

[3]Ibid., pp. 71-72. He defines governing elite as those exercising major decision-making power in the national government. This includes not only those who occupy formal positions of responsibility but also those who exert important influence in decision-making but do not hold formal positions in the government. Ibid., p. 72. Doctrine is defined as "applied ideology--a set of intermediate-term priorities, norms, instruments and styles to mobilize support and regulate action. 'Programs' are applied doctrine--specific activities sponsored and directed by public authority." Ibid., pp. 74-75.

According to Esman there are four principal action instruments available to the governing elites: 1) political organization, 2) the administrative system, 3) associational interest groups and 4) the mass media. Esman contends that the changes involved in achieving the goals of nation building and socio-economic progress are so fundamental that they can be greatly facilitated by utilizing several or all of the action instruments. In many cases, he argues, action programs cannot be carried out by reliance upon one instrument alone.[1] Esman develops this argument into one of a series of propositions which he presents for testing; this dissertation seeks to test that particular proposition.

This action-oriented model provides the theoretical framework for this study. The basic assumptions of the model underlie the theoretical approach employed to study the Kenya National Youth Service. The events pertinent to the establishment and development of the service which are set forth in this work are viewed in terms of the main components of the action-oriented model.

The Propositions

Esman presents his action-oriented model as a deductive theory which he declares to be incomplete and yet to be proven. At the conclusion of his work he

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[1] Ibid., pp. 85-86.

formulates a number of potentially researchable but untested propositions which he states need to be tested against empirical data in an effort to determine the validity of the action-oriented model.[1]

One proposition which he presents deals with the use of the action instruments and it is this proposition which is tested in this dissertation. The proposition is stated as follows:

> The achievement of program objectives under conditions which prevail in transitional societies is enhanced by and frequently depends upon the availability and coordinated use of several action instruments. These establish and maintain two-way communication between governing elites and the community and carry out action programs. This proposition applies both to total development plans and programs and to individual operating activities. The principal instruments available to governing elites are political organization, the administrative system, associational interest groups, and the mass media.
>
> One possible contrary proposition holds that the achievement of programmed action is essentially a function of the administrative system.[2]

The testing of this proposition was carried out in an analysis of a selected action program in the developing country of Kenya. In order to test this particular proposition, the first two elements of Esman's model--the governing elite and the doctrine--are taken as givens, and are defined and identified according to

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[1] Ibid., pp. 106-07.

[2] Ibid., p. 110.

the manner set forth by Esman.[1] The argument presented is that the proposition is valid as far as it is stated but that a further conditional statement is required. Based upon a study of one action program in one transitional society, the argument is offered that the proposition needs to be refined in the following fashion.

> The achievement of program objectives under conditions which prevail in transitional societies is enhanced by and frequently depends upon the availability and coordinated use of several action instruments. These establish and maintain two-way communication between governing elites and the community and carry out action programs. The principal instruments available to governing elites are political organization, the administrative system, associational interest groups and the mass media. However, the achievement of program objectives, while enhanced by the use of other action instruments, is dependent more upon the extent to which the administrative system is able to translate the policies established by the political system into viable operating programs.

It has already been noted[2] that lengthy delays in operationalizing the programs of the youth service were encountered as was a great deal of unrest during 1965 among servicemen. The following proposition sets forth the argument of this work as to the primary

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[1] See above, pp. 18-19.

[2] See above, pp. 2-3.

factors relating to these problems.

The translation of policy directives of the Kenya Government calling for the National Youth Service into an operating action program and the achievement of program objectives was hindered by

(a) inadequate preparatory work prior to implementation of the action program; and

(b) administrative and procedural difficulties in obtaining required resources from foreign sources.

Data Gathering Techniques

The data gathering techniques utilized for obtaining information about the Kenya National Youth Service were three in number. The first was that of document analysis. Sources included various public documentary sources such as parliamentary debates and newspaper files. Access was also obtained by the writer to non-classified files both of the Kenya National Youth Service and of the United States Agency for International Development in Kenya. The latter source of information proved to be particularly useful.[1] The existence of the Official Secrets Act of Kenya under which a great many documents are placed as classified resulted in only limited access to documents of the youth service.

A second prime source of data was the interviews

[1]The writer was also able to examine certain restricted though not secret files pertaining to the NYS of AID/Kenya. These materials included copies of cables, letters and memorandums. They are not generally available for public use and have not been included in the Selected Bibliography at the end of this work.

carried on by this writer with the various administrators and advisers to the youth service, with US/AID personnel and with the public and private officials in Kenya who had contact with the youth service. A great deal of reliance was placed upon unstructured interviews which permitted a relatively extensive exploration of the aspects of the youth service with which the various interviewees were most acquainted, as well as obtaining the general impressions of each interviewee of the service and its activities.

The third source of data was that of personal observation. After having carried out extensive documentary analysis and having run a series of interviews with key NYS and US/AID personnel, the writer was able to visit most of the field units and many of the project camps of the NYS. This enabled him to confirm data obtained previously, as well as providing sources of new questions for a second round of interviews. The trips to field units also provided an opportunity to carry out discussions with middle and lower level leadership personnel of the youth service.

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This chapter has served to provide an introduction to the dissertation's general subject, development administration, and in so doing to present some definitions of the term and some strategies which have been proposed

as a means of studying development administration. Also presented was the theoretical framework employed in the dissertation and the specific propositions to be tested. The following chapter is concerned with general background information about Kenya for the purpose of orienting the reader to some elements of the environmental setting in which exists the specific organization under study.

CHAPTER TWO

KENYA AND ITS PEOPLES: A BRIEF SURVEY

On December 12, 1963 Kenya became the third of the British East African territories to receive its independence. Like Uganda and, to a slightly lesser extent, Tanzania, Kenya is faced with the task of creating a national polity out of a variety of traditional socio-political systems and of ethnic groups with widely differing cultural heritages. Within its boundaries are found four major African ethnic groupings plus small but economically important European, Asian and Arab communities. The resulting cultural pluralism[1] is a major obstacle to nation building in Kenya.

This chapter presents a general description of Kenya and its people. Its purpose is to underline certain political and economic facets of contemporary Kenya which provide the setting for the study of the Kenya National Youth Service.

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[1]Cultural pluralism is defined as "the existence within a state of solidarity patterns, based upon shared religion, language, ethnic identity, race, caste, or region, which command a loyalty rivaling, at least in some situations, that which the state itself is able to generate." Charles Anderson et. al., Issues of Political Development (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967), p. 17.

Geography and Climate

Kenya, located on the east coast of Africa at the equator, is a land of sharply contrasting natural conditions. Its total area is 224,960 square miles divided into three rather distinct geographic regions: a coastal lowland, a foreland plateau and the Kenya highlands.[1] The first, the coastal lowland, is a strip of land bordering on the Indian Ocean. It extends inland approximately twenty miles with an elevation of no more than 500 feet above sea level. The climate of the coastal lowland is hot and humid, the annual mean temperature being eighty degrees. Rainfall averages over forty inches. The coastal lowland is dominated either by high brush and wooded grassland or, near the rivers and the ocean, mangrove swamps and tropical rain forests.

Inland from the coastal lowland is an arid to semi-arid foreland plateau which in total area extends over much of Kenya.[2] In southeastern Kenya the distance

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[1]The terminology and data utilized in this section on the geography and climate of Kenya is taken from the following source: S.J.K. Baker, "The East African Environment," in History of East Africa, ed. Roland Oliver and Gervase Mathew (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), I, 1-22.

[2]Morgan and Shaffer characterize this area as the arid plains. According to their figures it accounts for 77 per cent of the total area of Kenya. W.T.W. Morgan and N. Manfred Shaffer, Population of Kenya (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 7.

between the coastal lowland and the beginning of the Kenya highlands is rather narrow. The plateau widens as it extends northward and is the dominant geographic feature of northern Kenya. With a few exceptions, such as the Taita Hills in southeastern Kenya, there is little break in the relief of the foreland plateau. Its elevation rises gradually from 500 feet at the edge of the coastal lowland to a point at which it merges into the beginnings of the Kenya highlands at roughly 5,000 feet above sea level. This extensive area has a hot, dry climate. Rainfall is slight, ranging from an average of ten inches a year in northern Kenya to twenty inches per year in the south near the Tanzanian border. The characteristic vegetation of the foreland plateau is acacia shrubs and short grass.

In southwestern Kenya are found the Kenya highlands and the Kenya Rift Valley. The Aberdare mountain range, rising in several places to more than 12,000 feet, forms much of the East Kenya highlands. Also located here is Mount Kenya (altitude 17,058). Separating the East Kenya highlands from the West Kenya highlands is the Kenya Rift Valley whose elevation ranges from about 6,000 feet in the central portion to as low as 1,230 in the north near Lake Rudolf. The land rises sharply from the floor of the valley to the West Kenya highlands with the dominant peak being Mount Elgon (altitude 14,178 feet).

In the extreme southwest the elevation of the land gradually drops to 3,500 feet at the edge of Lake Victoria.

Climatic conditions in the highlands vary with the altitude. In the area around the capital city of Nairobi, situated on the edge of the East Kenya highlands at 5,500 feet, rainfall averages thirty-four inches per year but has varied from as low as nineteen to as high as sixty-one inches. At elevations from 6,000 to 8,000 feet rainfall amounts to forty to fifty inches per year. Higher altitudes receive in excess of sixty inches. The mean annual temperature at 6,000 feet is sixty-four degrees. In the lands bordering on Lake Victoria the average mean temperature ranges from sixty-nine to seventy-two degrees with an average rainfall of over forty inches. The dominant flora pattern of the highlands is a combination of small forests, including evergreen forests, with wide expanses of savanna grassland. At the higher altitudes between nine and ten thousand feet are found bamboo rain forests. Given the geographic and climatic conditions described above, fertile land suitable for farming is found mainly in the highlands and the coastal strip.

Kenya: Its People

The people of Kenya are overwhelmingly African in origin. Out of a population of 8,636,263, 97 per cent

or 8,365,962 are African.[1] They are divided into four linguistically and culturally defined groups: Bantu, Nilotes, Nilo-Hamites and Hamites.[2] The Bantu-speaking peoples are the most numerous, comprising 65.44 per cent of the African population, followed by the Nilo-Hamites, 16.42 per cent; the Nilotes, 13.7 per cent; and the Hamites, 4.44 per cent.

An examination of the distribution of these ethnic groups shows a tendency for each of the various peoples to reside in certain locations. Primarily agriculturalist, concentrations of Bantu-speaking peoples are identifiable in three areas where land and climate are suited to farming. The Lacustrine Bantu, including the Luhya, Gusii and Kuria tribes, are found in the plateau country northeast of Lake Victoria. The largest aggregation is located in the area of the east wall of the Rift Valley. Bantu tribes settled in this location include the largest single tribe in Kenya, the Kikuyu,[3] and the Kamba and Meru. A third,

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[1]This figure is taken from the last official census (1962).

[2]For reading on the origins and classification of African peoples see G.W.B. Huntingford, "The Peopling of the Interior of East Africa by its Modern Inhabitants," in Oliver and Mathew, op. cit., pp. 59-93 and George Murdock, Africa: Its People and their Culture History (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959).

[3]The four largest tribes of Kenya are the Kikuyu 1,642,000; the Luo, 1,148,335; the Luhya, 1,086,409 and the Kamba, 933,219.

smaller grouping, composed of such tribes as the Mijikenda and the Taita, is situated near the coast.

The second largest tribe, the Luo, comprise the Nilotic element of Kenya's population. They are found primarily along the edge of Lake Victoria although sizable numbers are also located northeast of the lake in direct contact with the Lacustrine Bantu.[1] As is the case with most Nilotic peoples, the Luo engage in both agriculture and animal husbandry. The Luo are more strongly agricultural than the Nilotic peoples found in other areas of East Africa.[2]

The generally pastoral Nilo-Hamites are found in the south near the Tanzanian border and in the northwest near Lake Rudolf. Certain Nilo-Hamitic tribes, notably the Nandi and Kipsigis, settled on fertile land in the western highlands and turned to farming as a way of life. The Hamites, also a pastoral people, sparsely populate

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[1]Small concentrations of Luo are found in other areas of the country such as in Mombasa where many Luo work in the port complex. This is illustrative of a trend which is growing in the country. As the economy develops increasing numbers of Africans from all tribes are leaving the traditional homelands and traveling to other areas, especially the cities seeking wage paying work. This will intermix the population to an extent not previously found in Kenya. The migration of young African males from the rural to the urban areas is one of the conditions which has a bearing upon the formation and development of the Kenya National Youth Service.

[2]Huntingford, "The Peopling of the Interior of East Africa by its Modern Inhabitants," in Oliver and Mathew, op. cit., p. 75.

the vast northeastern region.

The remaining 3 per cent of Kenya's population is composed of three non-African communities: Asian, European and Arab.[1] They are predominantly urban, most dwelling in Nairobi and Mombasa. The Asian community, for example, is 91 per cent urban, of which 79 per cent are in the two cities mentioned.[2] The main occupations of the non-Africans are found in commercial and industrial sectors of the economy although a substantial number of the Europeans are engaged in agriculture.

The population density of Kenya averages 38 per square mile. However, this is a misleading figure. Examination of the density figures at the provincial and district levels illustrates a wide variation. In the large arid and semi-arid regions the density figures are low with the lowest being one per square mile for the Marasabit district of the old Northern Province. This figure can be contrasted with districts in southwestern Kenya. The Kisii district near Lake Victoria has an average of 690 per square mile while the Kiambu district in the East Kenya highlands has a density of 557.

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[1]The 1962 census divided Kenya's non-African population, totalling 270,321 as follows: Asian 176,613; European 55,759; Arab 34,148; and other 3,901.

[2]Morgan and Shafer, op. cit., p. 4.

TABLE 1

KENYA POPULATION (THOUSANDS) BY OLD PROVINCE[a]

Province	Total Population	African Population	Land Area (sq. mi.)	Density (Pop./sq.mi.)
Nairobi[b]	314.8	197	227	1,387
Central	1,925.4	1,909.7	11,046	174
Coast	727.9	642.8	25,928	28
Nyanza	3,012.5	2,992.8	11,064	272
Rift Valley	1,049	1,023	17,138	61
Southern	1,014	1,010	32,782	31
Northern	590.1	588.3	127,726	5

[a]Since the 1962 census, the provincial boundaries of Kenya have been revised.

[b]Extra-provincial District

SOURCE: Republic of Kenya, Statistical Abstract 1965, Ministry of Economic Planning and Development.

Over 80 per cent of the population (6.8 million) are located on 15 per cent of the land in the southwest section of the country. A further 600,000 are concentrated in the small coastal strip.[1] The primary reason for this high concentration of people in such a small area is that much of the land is not suitable for farming. Thus those people who pursue agricultural occupations

[1]Ibid.

--the Nilotes and the Bantu--are located on the relatively small portion of land where rainfall and soil conditions are suitable for farming. It is these two groups who form a large majority of the population.

As is indicated by the agricultural and pastoral occupations of the vast majority of the people, Kenya is a rural country. Only 7.8 per cent of the population is urbanized. Sixty per cent of this total resides in Nairobi and Mombasa. A small 5.3 per cent of the African population is classed as urban dwellers.[1]

Kenya: Its History

Because written language was not indigenous to the peoples of East Africa, historians have had to rely upon the oral traditions of the people supplemented by the findings of archeologists and their own speculations in reconstructing the history of this area. As a result, current knowledge of the history of Kenya is incomplete. Roland Oliver has observed:

> Even where the evidence is thickest, the information to be derived from it is painfully inadequate and imprecise about the most important matters. What emerges is the barest outline only, and much of that is still speculative.[2]

The present African population is the result of large scale migrations into Kenya beginning as early as

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Roland Oliver, "Discernible Developments in the Interior c. 1500-1840," in Oliver and Mathew, op. cit., p. 170.

the eighth and ninth centuries A.D. The incoming peoples removed or absorbed the early inhabitants, probably bushmanoid hunters and Hamitic pastoralists and cultivators. The initial intrusion was that of Bantu speaking peoples, generally held to have come from the Congo Basin. The Lacustrine Bantu of western Kenya migrated more directly east through the territory now known as Uganda while the Bantu of the coast and the highlands took a more southeasterly route through present day Tanzania to the coast and then northward. Upon the arrival of the Hamitic Galla in northeast Kenya, tentatively dated as A.D. 1300,[1] elements of the Bantu turned west migrating to the area of the east Kenya highlands. The Nilo-Hamitic peoples moved from the southern Sudan to the Lake Rudolf region and down the Rift Valley. The final and most recent major migration was that of the Nilotic Luo. The Nilotic migration began in the southern Sudan in the sixteenth century pushing southward into Uganda and western Kenya.

Each of these migrating peoples brought with them their own culture, religion and language. With one notable exception,[2] there was little mixing of

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[1]Huntingford, "The Peopling of the Interior of East Africa by its Modern Inhabitants," in Oliver and Mathew, op. cit., p. 89.

[2]This exception is the influence of the Nilo-Hamites upon neighboring Bantu-speaking peoples. Through

customs, language or people. The result is that Kenya in the mid-twentieth century is a land in which cultural differences are strong within its African population as well as among its African, Asian, European and Arab communities. This is a continuing source of difficulty to the leaders of modern Kenya in their quest to build a unified nation.

The period extending from roughly A.D. 1500 to 1840 has been termed the "age of tradition" for the people of the interior.[1] It was a time in which life patterns changed slowly, if at all, from one generation to the next. According to Oliver this age of tradition was the result of a number of factors. One was the physical environment which, owing to a lack of navigable rivers and the vast hot, dry areas, inhibited communication among the peoples of the interior and between these people and the African and non-African peoples of the coast. This deprived the interior of the intellectual stimulation which such contact could bring about. A second factor was the absence of the written word for

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this contact Bantu, especially those in the Kenya highlands, adopted such Nilo-Hamitic customs as age-grade organization, initiation rites and patrilineal inheritance. The Nilotic immigration into western Kenya did not have a similar impact upon the Lacustrine Bantu, propably because the length of contact between these two is considerably shorter than that between the highland Bantu and Nilo-Hamites. Oliver, "Discernible Developments in the Interior c. 1500-1840," in Oliver and Mathew, op. cit., p. 199.

[1] Ibid., p. 169.

use in trade and commerce and in recording the knowledge of the past. Without this, all transactions had to rely upon the spoken word. The result of these factors was "a terrible narrowness of mental horizons, a real poverty in the currency of human ideas and inventions."[1] It was not until the nineteenth century when first Arabs and then Europeans began extensive penetrations of the interior from the coast that the essentially static life patterns of the age of tradition began to change rapidly under the impact of new ideas and new tensions.[2]

While the interior was largely isolated from the non-African world until the mid-nineteenth century, the coastal strip experienced a far different history. Contacts between early coastal peoples and Greek traders have been documented as early as the second century A.D.[3] Negroid-Bantu peoples arrived at the coast in the eighth and ninth centuries to be met almost immediately by

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[1]Roland Oliver, "Epilogue," in Oliver and Mathew, op. cit., p. 455.

[2]This is not to suggest that the interior had no "history" during this period and that significant events were not taking place. For example, it is known that tribes rose and fell from pre-eminence in a fluid pattern. At the time of the Arab and European penetrations the power of the Masai was waning, being replaced by that of the Kikuyu and the Nandi.

[3]Gervase Mathew, "The East African Coast Until the Coming of the Portuguese," in Oliver and Mathew, op. cit., p. 94.

Muslim Arab traders. This initiated a lengthy period of Arab-African contact through which the dominant cultural, linguistic and religious character of the people of the coast became a mixture of those of the two peoples. By the thirteenth century the coast had become an integral part of the Islamic world.

The initial European incursion was made by the Portuguese, when Vasco da Gama landed at Malindi in 1498. For slightly less than a century the Portuguese exercised control over the coast and its trade. However, their presence on the coast was minimal. For example, the Portuguese population of Mombasa never exceeded 900 persons.[1] In 1698 Portuguese control of the coast was removed with the capture by Omani Arabs of the main symbol of Portuguese rule, Fort Jesus on the island of Mombasa.

The Arab leaders at Oman did not make a concerted attempt to establish centralized, effective political control over the coastal area of East Africa until the nineteenth century. Prior to that time local governors ruled with virtual autonomy. In the 1820's Said Iban Sultan of Oman began an effort to consolidate his authority over the coast. By 1840, ruling from Zanzibar, he had accomplished this task. The Sultan of Zanzibar held a pre-eminent position over the coast until the 1880's

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[1] G.S.P. Freeman-Grenville, "The Coast 1498-1840," in Oliver and Mathew, op. cit., p. 142.

when the more powerful British and Germans began their penetration of East Africa.

Throughout their tenure in East Africa, the Arabs were content to remain on the coast focusing their efforts on trade and commerce. There was little effort on their part to colonize or exert political control over the interior. Arab penetrations of the interior were largely confined to caravans in search of ivory and slaves.

> The character of the Arab penetration of the East African hinterland was essentially infiltrative and diffuse; it could scarcely be described as colonization. The number of Arabs in the interior cannot have exceeded a few hundred at most, . . . And at every point this thinly scattered community was interwoven with the indigenous political and social scene.[1]

As a result of their limited territorial expansion, Islamic Arab influence on the peoples of Kenya was largely confined to the coast. Two of their lasting contributions have been religious and linguistic, Swahili being a mixture of Bantu and Arabic. Although it has been proper to speak of the Islamic coast of Kenya, the character of the coast in the twentieth century has been undergoing change. This is due to the growth of Asian and European communities and of non-coastal African peoples who have migrated to Mombasa in search of work.

European penetration of the interior of East Africa began in the 1870's with the arrival of missionaries in

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[1]Alison Smith, "The Southern Section of the Interior 1840-84," in Oliver and Mathew, op. cit., p. 287.

Uganda. They were followed by private commercial interests organized in 1888 into the Imperial British East Africa Company. The company received a charter granting it the right to develop the British sphere of influence in East Africa. The goal of the religious and commercial interests was the opening up of Uganda. Little significance was attached to the apparently valueless and thinly populated territory between Uganda and the coast. It was looked upon as land which had to be crossed.

In 1893 a reluctant British Government assumed the responsibilities in Uganda of the nearly bankrupt Imperial British East Africa Company. A year later Uganda formally became a British protectorate. A similar process took place in 1895 in Kenya. Given the responsibilities already undertaken by those administering the Uganda Protectorate, the British decided to administer Kenya as a separate protectorate. Kenya, called the East African Protectorate until 1920, was the responsibility of the British Foreign Office until 1905 when control passed to the Colonial Office.

If extraordinary significance can be attached to any one event in molding the twentieth century history of Kenya, it was the completion of the railroad from Mombasa to Kisumu on Lake Victoria. The railroad was conceived and built as a means of solving the transportation and communications problems between the coast and Uganda.

It soon became apparent that the trade and commerce from Uganda alone would not cover the operating costs of the railroad. This necessitated the economic development of the East African Protectorate. A mineral survey carried out in 1902-03 confirmed previous suspicions that the land of the protectorate did not contain exploitable minerals of any consequence.[1] The temperate climate and fertile land of the southwest, especially the highlands, did afford the opportunity of European style agriculture for the purpose of producing cash crops for export. The policy of the Foreign Office, later adhered to by the Colonial Office, toward the East African Protectorate quickly became one of encouraging white settlement. As a result of this policy slightly more than 2,000 farmers were occupying land in Kenya by 1929.[2] The policy of encouraging settlement evolved into one of fostering and protecting the interests of the settlers once they had arrived. Despite inevitable conflicts, there was a close relationship between the settlers and the colonial administration during the first half of the twentieth century. Kenya, unlike Uganda and Tanganyika, experienced a

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[1] C.C. Wrigley, "Kenya: The Patterns of Economic Life 1902-45," in History of East Africa, ed. Vincent Harlow, E. M. Chilver and Alison Smith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), II, 211.

[2] Ibid., p. 241

rapid development of a sizable and politically influential white settler community who saw themselves as permanent residents.

The greater economic and political capital and the unquestioned technical superiority of the intruding whites gave them an initial advantage over the indigenous peoples. As discussed immediately below, these advantages were translated by the settlers into attempts to establish a white man's country in Kenya. This was not to be the case. Independence for Kenya as a black African nation came on December 12, 1963.

The British colonization of Kenya may be seen by future historians as a brief but significant interlude providing a catalyst for change in the life of the African peoples. It is undeniable that the life patterns of the Africans have changed dramatically in the past sixty years. Much of this is due to the interaction between the African peoples and the alien intruders whose presence was felt throughout the country.[1]

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[1]It would be impossible in the space allowed to categorize and explain the myriad interactions which contributed to the social, political and economic changes. See, for example: C.C. Wrigley,"Kenya: The Patterns of Economic Life 1902-45," and John Middleton, "Kenya: Administration and Changes in African Life 1912-45," in Harlow, Chilver and Smith, pp. 209-64 and pp. 333-92; Fred Burke, "Political Evolution in Kenya," in The Transformation of East Africa ed. Fred G. Burke and Stanley Diamond (New York: Basic Books, 1966), pp. 185-239; and Carl G. Rosberg, Jr. and John Nottingham, The Myth of Mau Mau (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966).

Kenya: Politics

Settler Politics: 1900-47

The white settler population possessed an initial political advantage over the African and Asian communities through organization and access to the Government. During the first decade of the twentieth century the settlers established a number of associations representing their economic and political interests. In 1910 the numerous settler associations came together to form the Convention of Associations which became a prime vehicle for the expression of settler political views and the application of settler political pressure. The first Asian and African political associations were not established until 1914 and 1920 respectively.

The political advantage of the settlers was enhanced by their access to the Government. The British and South African settlers were dealing with a British Colonial Government, the organization and procedures of which were familiar to them. This situation contrasted sharply with that of the Africans to whom the new Government was a distinct departure from his own political traditions. Certain of the early governors, Sir Charles Eliot (1901-04) being the best example, held views about the future development of Kenya quite close to those of the settlers. Finally, owing in part to settler pressure, the British Government in 1906 established a Legislative

Council in Kenya with a provision for nominated unofficial members. This gave the settlers a platform for their views within the Government itself.

Despite their initial political advantages the settlers were not able to obtain from the British Government the concessions necessary to lay the foundations for the achievement of their ultimate goal: an independent settler-governed state. An important setback occurred in 1923 in the form of a British Government White Paper known as the Devonshire Paper. It denied the settlers responsible government under their control. The Devonshire Paper is equally important for its proclamation of Kenya as a country in which African interests were to be paramount. While predominant settler influence in the colony was to continue into the post-World War II period, the policies set forth in the Devonshire Paper determined that politics in Kenya would not develop along the same lines as in South Africa or Rhodesia.[1]

[1]For an excellent overview of Kenya's political history during the colonial era see George Bennett, Kenya, A Political History: The Colonial Period (London: Oxford University Press, 1963). It is Bennett's contention that the settler effort to attain their ultimate goal was doomed by at least two factors. One was the European failure to build their numbers to a size proportionate with that found in South Africa. A second factor was the existence of a counter political force in Kenya. This was the Asian community which in 1914 formed their own political association. Backed by groups in India, they were able to exert pressure on London sufficient to check ultimate settler political ambitions.

African Politics: 1920-47

The Kikuyu led the emergence of Africans into modern Kenya politics. This was not surprising, since the Kikuyu had been in conflict with the settlers over land since the turn of the century.[1] In 1920 the Kikuyu Association composed primarily of chiefs was formed. This was followed in 1921 by the creation of the Young Kikuyu Association led by Harry Thuku. Reorganized a few years later under the name of the Kikuyu Central Association (KCA), it was to prove the more militant of the Kikuyu organizations of the pre-1947 era. One of the early members of the KCA was Jomo Kenyatta who served as its secretary in 1928. He left for England the following year.

Growth of comparable political associations among other tribes during the 1920's occurred only in western Kenya. Here an organization known as the Kavirondo

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[1]The British created what was in essence a white tribal reserve in the Kenya highlands. In so doing they alienated land from a number of tribes including the Masai and the Kikuyu. Of the alienation of Kikuyu land John Middleton has the following to say: "To say, as became general Kikuyu opinion, that the alienation of land led to overcrowding, erosion and the virtual destruction of the Kikuyu way of life was manifestly a convenient political myth. A more valid point was that the drawing of a boundary round the land occupied by the Kikuyu at the turn of the century . . . meant that there was no room to expand into the many almost unused areas to the west and the south." Middleton, "Kenya: Administration and Changes in African Life 1912-45," in Harlow, Chilver and Smith, op. cit., p. 340.

Taxpayers Association was established among the AbaLuyha and the Luo. During the late 1930's political associations were founded among other tribes including the Kamba and Taita. In the two cases mentioned, they were quickly allied to the KCA.

With the coming of the Second World War to East Africa in the form of the threat posed by the Italians in Ethiopia, African politics underwent a brief hiatus. The KCA and its allied associations were declared illegal on the grounds of subversion. This organization went underground, continuing its existence into the post-war period. In 1944 the Colonial Government, attempting to obtain the support of African nationalists, nominated an African, E.W. Mathu, to the Legislative Council. In that year Mathu, helped to organize a new political association, the Kenya African Study Organization. Two years later this organization became the Kenya African Union (KAU). In June of 1947 Jomo Kenyatta, who had returned from England during the previous year, became the first president of KAU. As Fred Burke observes: "It is possible to date to this point the emergence of the continuous, concentrated, political action which finally led to independence on December 12, 1963."[1]

An important characteristic of African politics

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[1]Burke, "Political Evolution in Kenya," in Burke and Diamond, op. cit., p. 209.

in this period was its fragmentation. Almost without exception the political associations were tribally-based. This was the case despite the fact that the associations developed in response to a number of similar grievances including alienation of land, taxes and the "kipande" system.[1] One attempt at transtribal organization, the Kavirondo Taxpayers Association, split apart into Luo and Abaluyha branches under the impact of traditional tribal differences.[2] Fragmentation was also apparent within the tribal associations. A moderate-radical division in the KCA, for example, led the moderate Harry Thuku to break away from that association in 1935 and establish the Kikuyu Provincial Association. This early pattern of tribally-oriented political organizations carried over into the post-war period and remains a characteristic of Kenya political organization.

The Independence Movement: 1947-63

The immediate post-war period witnessed a sharp increase of discontent among the Africans. The return

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[1]The 'kipande'system was an identification system in which Africans and only Africans were required to carry identity cards with fingerprints.

[2]The historical reasons causing the parochial and fragmented character of African politics were reinforced by British administrative policy for Africans. This policy limited African participation in representative institutions to local councils. The British also established the Tribal Reserve system which restricted land rights for Africans to their local areas.

home of tens of thousands of soldiers was a prime source of this increase. Their horizons had been broadened and their expectations raised by experiences abroad. They were not willing, as were the Europeans, to return to the status of the pre-war years. Unemployment in the cities and overcrowding of land on the reserves, both affecting the Kikuyu most severely,[1] also contributed to the discontent.

A fertile field was thus provided for political activity. The KAU grew rapidly, especially in the Central Province. Attempts were made to capitalize on the general discontent to establish the KAU as a nationwide political movement. A measure of success was achieved, notably among the Luo who were to become political allies of the Kikuyu. Oginga Odinga, a leading Luo politician and businessman, joined KAU. Subsequently he moved into positions of leadership. However, the leadership of the KAU remained predominantly Kikuyu as did its rank and file.

The demands of the Africans, channeled through such organizations as the KAU, began to change in nature. Not only were demands stemming from traditional grievances such as the "kipande" system, taxation and land

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[1]Bennett, op. cit., p. 112.

being voiced, but also new demands for large scale political reforms were heard. These reforms included increased representation of Africans at all levels of Government and for the election of those representatives.

The representations of the Africans went unheeded. The tragic result of this negligence was the Mau Mau era. One European, sympathetic to the African cause, states: "If its [KAU] reasonable demands had only been met in time, lawlessness and subversion would not have flourished beneath the surface."[1] The large scale violence of Mau Mau broke out in 1952. In October a state of emergency was declared. The KAU, as part of a general political ban, was declared illegal by the Government. Kenyatta was arrested, charged and convicted of leading Mau Mau. Before the violence ended thousands of people, mainly Kikuyu, were killed and massive relocations of the Kikuyu had taken place.

The ban on political activity proscribed all nationwide political organizations and almost all political activity among the Kikuyu. It permitted political organization in areas other than those of the Kikuyu and related Embu and Meru only at the district level. At a minimum this ban had a twofold influence on Kenya politics. It reinforced the fragmented, tribally-oriented and often

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[1]A. J. Hughes, East Africa: The Search for Unity (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1963), p. 115.

highly personalized politics of the pre-war era, and further resulted in the rise to political prominence of other tribes, notably the Luo, and of new African leadership.[1] One of the most important of the new leaders was a Luo, Tom Mboya. Mboya rose to power initially through leadership of the trade union movement. He subsequently developed a power base in a district of Nairobi.

In May 1957 occurred the first elections for the Legislative Council in which Africans voted for African representatives. The British, responding to the Emergency, the demands of Kenya Africans and the winds of change beginning to sweep the African continent, had initiated in 1954 the first of a series of constitutional changes which would mark the progress of Africans toward independence. The 1954 Lyttelton Constitution provided for the election of eight Africans to the Legislative Council and for one ministerial position to be occupied by an African. Subject to the ban on its political activity, the voting power of the Kikuyu tribe was weak. As a result of this, Mathu, the Kikuyu candidate, was defeated in the election for the legislative seat of the Central Province. The African leadership in the Legislative Council passed to Mboya.

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[1]Burke, "Political Evolution in Kenya," in Burke and Diamond, op. cit., p. 213.

Immediately after the elections the African elected members began demanding a further seven African seats. They refused to accept the one ministerial seat.[1]

A second constitutional change came in 1958 in the form of the Lennox Boyd Constitution. This provided for an additional six African seats, giving them parity with the Europeans, and an additional ministerial post. It also established twelve special seats, four for each racial group. The occupants were to be elected by the members of the Legislative Council. The African members, seeking African control of the Government, rejected the special seat arrangement and boycotted the elections. There were Africans willing to stand for these seats. They were denounced as traitors to the African cause by the African elected members.[2]

The momentum toward achieving independence which had been initiated in the 1954-58 period was furthered by the lifting of the ban on nationwide political parties in 1959. African political parties were not able to benefit from the strength of nationwide membership

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[1]As Susan Wood and Fred Burke point out, the 1954 Constitution was not directed particularly at creating a self-governing black African Kenya. The Africans were quick to realize this and immediately began agitating for further constitutional changes. Susan Wood, Kenya: The Tensions of Progress (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 36, and Burke, "Political Evolution in Kenya," in Burke and Diamond, op. cit., p. 214.

[2]Bennett, op. cit., p. 143.

and organization. Immediately after the ban was lifted, not one but two parties were formed. One was the multi-racial, primarily African and Asian, Kenya National Party. This party represented the more rural Africans and took a moderate approach to the issues surrounding the attaining of independence. Rejecting the moderate, multi-racial approach, the radical African politicians including Mboya and Odinga formed the Kenya Independence Movement. Characterizing the relations between moderate and radical Africans at the time, Anthony Hughes states:

> Among the Africans, a deep mutual suspicion prevailed between the rural, less progressive 'minority' tribes on the one hand and the radical, urbanized Kikuyu and Luo leaders on the other.[1]

The European community was itself split into two factions. In 1959 Michael Blundell organized the New Kenya Party. The party sought racial accommodation. It did not attract the support of African or Asian elected members. Its support among the European members was not total. Only half of them supported the party and most of them with reservations. The remaining European elected members supported Group Captain Briggs' Kenya United Party which took a far more racist position.

By the end of 1959 it was evident that European and Asian political power was on the wane as African nationalism grew stronger. An indication of the trend of

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[1]Hughes, op. cit., p. 126.

events occurred in late 1959 when Asians were asked to resign from the Kenya National Party's executive board. The decline in power was confirmed by the MacLeod Constitution.

The MacLeod Constitution of 1960 provided for an African majority in the Legislative Council and for an increase in the number of Africans holding ministerial positions. The breakdown of seats in the Legislative Council was as follows: thirty-three open seats and ten European, eight Asian and two Arab reserved seats. These would be elected on the basis of a common role. There were an additional twelve National Member seats, four for each racial group, to be elected by the Legislative Council. The Council of Ministers was composed of twelve members, four official and eight unofficial, selected by the Governor. Four of the eight unofficial seats were to be occupied by Africans, three by Europeans and one by an Asian.

With this constitution in hand, the Africans prepared for the 1961 election. Prior to the constitutional conference in London, the Kenya National Party and the Kenya Independence Movement had come together to present a united front. However, following the conference the traditional suspicions between the large and small tribes reasserted themselves. African politics once again was fragmented. Political conflict in Kenya

became as much a struggle among Africans to determine who would control an independent Kenya as between the Africans and the British Government or the settlers for independence.

In March 1960 African political leaders formed the Kenya African National Union (KANU) in an attempt to establish a single mass African party. Kenyatta, still in detention, was chosen as its president but the Kenya Government refused to accept this selection. Another Kikuyu, James Gichuru, was selected as acting president with the understanding that he would step down when Kenyatta was able to accept the post. Odinga was named vice president and Mboya secretary. A bitter struggle had arisen between Odinga and Mboya which caused internal dissension in KANU for the next five or six years.[1]

The leaders of the smaller tribes in Kenya did not entirely welcome the formation of KANU. More specifically they were unhappy at the domination of the party by the Kikuyu and Luo. In June representatives of five tribal-party associations[2] met and formed the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU). The purpose of this party, formed in response to KANU, was to assure that

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[1] See below, pp. 57-58.

[2] The five associations were the Masai United Front, the Coast African Political Union, the Kalenjin Political Alliance, the Somali National Association and the Kenya African People's Party. The last was the new name for the former multi-racial Kenya National Party.

the interests of the smaller tribes in Kenya would be represented.

Held in February 1961, the elections under the new constitution resulted in a victory for KANU. Although suffering a bitter internal fight in which Mboya's opposition in KANU sought unsuccessfully to oust him from his seat in the Legislative Council, KANU obtained 67 per cent of the vote. The KANU vote came primarily from the major Bantu tribes and the Luo. Strong showings for KADU occurred among the pastoralists and some of the coastal peoples. KANU received sixteen seats in the Council, KADU ten with the remaining non-reserved seats going to independents. Despite their victory KANU refused to accept the reins of Government. The statement was made that they would do so only after Kenyatta's release. KADU then proceeded to form a minority government.

Kenyatta's release in August 1961 and his assuming of the presidency of KANU initiated the last chapter in Kenya's struggle for independence. A constitutional conference was held in London in early 1962 to draw up a constitution which would provide the basis for Kenya's independent government. The two African political parties went to the conference with sharply different views of the nature of the constitution to be drawn up. KADU, recognizing its weak national electoral position, sought a federal constitution in which important powers would be

reserved to tribal regions. KANU proposed a centralized unitary state. The resulting document, not published until April 1963, was a compromise between the two positions.[1] Given KANU's seemingly powerful position, the number of concessions it made was surprising. However, as George Bennett states;

> KANU was prepared to act thus since independence was its objective; after the rapid constitutional changes of the past years they had little respect for constitutions, believing they could be destroyed as easily as they were made.[2]

In May 1963 KANU captured a majority of both houses of the legislature in a final pre-independence election. Led by Jomo Kenyatta, KANU accepted responsibility for the Government of Kenya.[3]

Post-Independence Politics: 1964-66

Kenya became a "de facto" one party state in December 1964. Kenyatta announced this as a political goal during a rally on July 26, 1964. Defections from KADU had begun shortly after the 1963 election. In

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[1]For an overview of the main provisions of this constitution, see below, pp. 60-62.

[2]Bennett, op. cit., p. 156.

[3]The suspicions and hostilities between tribes in Kenya in 1963 was great. On October 9, 1963, Daniel arap Moi, a leader of KADU announced that KADU had decided to establish a separate state comprising the Rift Valley, the Western and the Coastal Regions. The secession was not carried out but it served to illustrate the depth of feeling. Adding to the divisions in Kenya was the rise of secessionist movement in the northeastern part of the country among the Somali speaking peoples. They sought affiliation with Somalia.

September 1963 the African Peoples Party broke their alliance with KADU to unite with KANU. This was an important shift in Kenya politics. The African Peoples Party was essentially a Kamba party led by Kamba leader, Paul Ngei. By rejoining KANU,[1] Ngei and his party brought a major tribe of Kenya into support of the Government. Equally important is the fact that large numbers of Kamba are in the army and police. It was the political maneuvering surrounding the bill to make Kenya a republic reinforced by a general policy of national reconciliation followed by the Kenyatta Government which brought about the final demise of KADU. KADU leaders were confronted with a number of desertions from their ranks during the consideration of the bill in late 1964. These provided the Government with sufficient votes to obtain the 75 per cent required for passage in the Senate. Faced with this situation the KADU leader, Ronald Ngala, announced that KADU would voluntarily dissolve itself. This action left KANU as the only official party of Kenya. It is significant, however, that KANU made no attempt to remove legal provisions for an opposition and for establishing new parties.

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[1] In November 1962 Ngei, a KANU party leader, had quit KANU and organized the African Peoples Party among the Kamba, once again illustrating the tendency for tribally-oriented political organization in Kenya. In the 1963 election the African Peoples Party won eight House seats and two Senate seats.

The unity which Kenya seemed to have attained was illusory. As John Spencer states:

> Yet as the din of that tumultuous day (December 10, 1965) receded into the past, it became evident that the absorption of its opposition had weakened rather than strengthened KANU as a party. It was not only that the disappearance of KADU eliminated the pressure for rigid party discipline and organization: in the absence of genuine tribal harmony, Kenya had neither the historical nor the temperamental endowment required to mature into the kind of one-party state idealized in the literature of African socialism.[1]

The old division within KANU soon broke out into the open. In 1966 it reached the point where dissidents, led by Odinga, left the party to form a new party, the Kenya Peoples Union (KPU).

The 'split' in KANU can be traced to a number of causes. It was first of all another chapter in the bitter rivalry between Mboya and Odinga. Odinga, a respected elder and leader of the Luo tribe, has long resented the rise to political prominence of Mboya and the challenge which this young Luo posed to his leadership position in KANU. In addition, the two men hold contrasting ideological views. Mboya advocates a moderate socialist position with ties to the West while Odinga espouses a radical socialist line and seeks to strengthen Kenya's ties to the East. The ideological differences of Mboya and Odinga were but one example of a second basic cause of

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[1] John Spencer, "Kenyatta's Kenya," Africa Report, May 6, 1966, p. 6.

the split. This cause was ideological. Since independence the Kenyatta Government has held to a moderate form of African socialism. It also adopted a policy of reconciliation with former opponents within Kenya and abroad. These policies sharply contrasted to those in KANU holding a radical ideological position who sought a policy of scientific socialist and expropriation of European and Asian holdings. Finally elements of the competition between Kikuyu and Luo for political leadership in KANU were present.

The events of 1966 isolated the opposition to Kenyatta's Government. A KANU party conference in March 1966 culminated a series of defeats in KANU and in the Government for Odinga. He was removed from the vice-presidency of the party. Shortly thereafter, a number of representatives and legislators crossed the floor and established an opposition to the Government. Concomitant with this was the creation of KPU. Elections held in June resulted in a solid victory for KANU. Of the nineteen House of Representative seats for which elections were held, KANU won twelve. KANU also won eight of the ten contested Senate seats. KPU obtained overwhelming victories in western Kenya, the home area of the Luo, and won one House and one Senate seat in the Eastern Province, among the Kamba. Following the election the KANU-KPU breakdown in the legislature was as follows: House of

Representatives: KANU 122, KPU 7; Senate: KANU 39, KPU 2.

One result of Odinga's defection and the 1966 election was the solidification of a new power base for the Kenyatta Government. Formerly, the core of KANU strength came from the Kikuyu-Luo alliance. The new KANU coalition, a shift to which became apparent in 1965, is composed of the Kikuyu, other Bantu tribes and most of the former supporters of KADU. Indicative of the new coalition is the presence of Daniel arap Moi as vice president of Kenya and of the party. Moi is a member of one of the Nilo-Hamitic tribes of the Kalenjin group and a former leader of KADU.

A second result of the election was the indication of the degree of concensus among the political leaders and the people of Kenya as a nation and on the distribution of governmental powers. David Koff writes of Odinga's campaign:

> It is significant that Odinga did not link his regional political support with a demand for greater local autonomy. Kenya's administrative unity is stronger than personal or political differences, as President Kenyatta demonstrated by making an official visit to Central Nyanza a few days after the election.[1]

Within this basic unity, the political leaders of Kenya are seeking to lessen traditional suspicions and hostilities among the people and unite them for the tasks of nation building.

Characteristic of modern African politics in Kenya

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[1]David Koff, "Kenya's Little General Election," Africa Report, October 1966, p. 59.

is its shifting coalitions of tribally-based parties. The current coalition and the isolation of the opposition may provide Kenya with the political stability it needs to tackle the problems of economic development. Major problems facing Kenya are unemployment, education and land. If KANU is unable to solve these and other problems KPU provides an alternative. It has a strong base of support among the Luo and advocates policies of relief of unemployment, free primary education for all youth and nationalization of land and businesses which could have a trans-tribal appeal in times of economic difficulty.

Kenya: Its Government

The constitution established by the Lancaster House Conference of 1962 and subsequent meetings in 1962 and 1963 created a government for Kenya along the lines of the Westminister model. It also represented a compromise between the wishes of KADU for a federal form of government and those of KANU for a unitary, centralized state. Significant changes have taken place in the constitution since independence. These, combined with the strong residual powers left to the central government, have shifted the distribution of governmental power much closer to the centralized state sought by KANU.

Initially the Government was directed by a cabinet led by the prime minister. However, on December 12, 1964, one year after independence, Kenya became a republic

within the Commonwealth. Concomitant with this change, the position of the prime minister was abolished. It was replaced by the office of the President of Kenya which is now the highest executive office in the Government. The Cabinet remains responsible to Parliament.

Until late 1966 the National Assembly was bicameral. The House of Representatives consisted of 117 members from single-member constituencies and twelve members specially elected by the representatives sitting as an electoral college. The Senate was composed of forty-one members, one from each electoral district. The Senate had only powers of delay on ordinary legislation. Its important powers concerned amending the constitution, particularly on clauses dealing with individual rights and on the delineation of regional boundaries. KADU leaders held these clauses to be vital in the protection of the small tribes against any Kikuyu-Luo dominated central government. Constitutional amendment on these clauses required a 74 per cent vote in the lower house and a 90 per cent vote in the upper house. Other constitutional amendments could be passed by a 75 per cent majority in both houses.

Following the election of 1966 and the confirmation of the new shift in the base of political support of the KANU Government, a constitutional amendment was introduced for the purpose of merging the Senate and the House. The

amendment, opposed by KPU, was passed by the Senate on December 20, 1966 and by the House on December 22, 1966. Kenya now has a unicameral legislature with 158 regularly elected members and twelve specially elected members.

Governmental power is divided between the central and regional governments. The seven regions of Kenya are as follows: Coast, Eastern, Northeastern, Central, Rift Valley, Western and Nyanza. The regional governments, possessing unicameral legislatures, have responsibility for health, education, land policy and local government. The central government has strong powers of taxation and residual powers are left to it rather than to the regions. Although originally the constitution specified eight public service commissions, one for each region plus one for the central government, a final constitutional conference on October 1963 changed the provision. One Public Service Commission for assigning civil servants to central and regional governments was established, thus furthering the powers of the central government.

Kenya: Its Economy

Kenya is a typical example of a dual economy country. There is a monetary sector which contributes an estimated three-quarters of the value of total production. This sector, based on the specialized production of goods for cash, is dominated by a minority of the population, especially Europeans and Asians. The

character of economic life for a vast majority of the African population is still primarily the producing of goods for the immediate subsistence needs of the family and kin.[1]

There is not, however, a clear-cut distinction between the two sectors. Concomitant with the arrival of the European was the beginning of the African penetration into a money economy. Among the early reasons for this change was the need of Africans to earn money in order to pay European-imposed taxes. The penetration accelerated after the Second World War. Increasing numbers of Africans abandoned subsistence farming altogether to become wage and salary earners in the urban areas or on European farms or to establish small businesses in African areas. African smallhold farmers began devoting increased acreage to the production of cash crops. By 1961 the value of these cash crops accounted for £10 million out of the total value of marketed agricultural output of £46 million. It would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to find an African community in Kenya characterized by the purely subsistence economy of traditional society.

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[1]The dual character of the economy is the reason why per capita income figures for Kenya are misleading. Few Africans attain this figure while most, if not all of the non-Africans have a per capita income far above the published figure. The current per capita Gross Domestic Product figure is £31.

The general distinction between the two sectors and between the incomes of a majority of the Africans and the rest of the population remains an economic reality of modern Kenya. The removal of this distinction through programs aimed at bringing Africans into the monetary sector is an important objective of the post-independence Government of Kenya.

> Africanization of the modern sector alone is not an answer to this problem. It only means that a minority of Africans would become privileged members of the modern sector in the dual economy. To promote national unity and realize the targets of African Socialism it is imperative to break the barriers between the modern and traditional sectors and thus spread the benefits of development to the rural areas and enlist the participation of all people in the development process.[1]

The single most important sector of Kenya's economy is that of agriculture. During the decade 1954-64 total agricultural output accounted for almost 40 per cent of Kenya's total Gross Domestic Product (GDP), while accounting for 20-22 per cent of its monetary GDP. In 1964 raw or processed agricultural and livestock products provided 62.5 per cent of Kenya's total exports. An estimated 1.2 million of Kenya's 1.6 million families earn their living from agriculture and animal husbandry.

Kenya's principal crops are maize, wheat, coffee, tea, sisal and pyrethrum. Maize and wheat, along with potatoes, rice and sugar, are staples produced primarily

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[1]Republic of Kenya, Development Plan 1966-70 (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1966), p. 64. Unless otherwise cited, data in this section is taken from the Development Plan 1966-70.

for domestic consumption. Wheat, however, is also an important export of Kenya to Uganda and Tanzania. Coffee, tea, sisal and pyrethrum are Kenya's primary export crops.[1] This diversity gives Kenya something of an advantage over many developing countries which rely upon one export crop as their source of foreign exchange. However, like most countries who export primary products, Kenya's foreign exchange earnings fluctuate rapidly in response to changing prices on the international markets and to natural disasters at home such as drought.

During the colonial era Kenya's agricultural land was divided into the African and non-African areas, later called the Non-Scheduled and Scheduled Areas.[2] The Scheduled Areas were composed of 7.5 million acres of land reserved exclusively for European ownership. Two-thirds of this land is in the Rift Valley Province. The remainder is scattered in the Central, Eastern, Nyanza and Western Provinces and the Nairobi District. Over half the land, 4.1 million acres, is utilized for ranches and coffee, tea and sisal plantations. The remainder is devoted to mixed farming.

The existence of the Scheduled Areas was a

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[1]Coffee, tea and sisal alone account for 40 per cent of Kenya's exports.

[2]Since independence the terminology has again been changed. The designation is now large farm (the former Scheduled Areas) and small farm (the former Non-Scheduled Areas.)

particularly sensitive political issue to the Africans. In 1960, with the approach of independence, the Kenya Government initiated a settlement scheme for the purpose of enabling Africans to settle in the Scheduled Areas. The scheme later became the Million Acre Settlement Scheme implemented between 1962 and June 30, 1965. At the conclusion of this particular program 24,000 small-holders owned plots ranging from twenty-eight to thirty-five acres and 750 large farms were owned by Africans individually or in companies or partnerships.

While land transferral schemes help to settle problems of politics, over-population on land adjacent to the Scheduled Areas and unemployment, they have resulted in a problem of maintaining production levels on land whose pre-1963 production was a prime contributor to the monetary sector and to agricultural exports. This problem is one of the unfortunate legacies of a colonial situation in which monetary sector agriculture was primarily in the hands of non-indigenous peoples and in which little conscious effort was made to introduce Africans to modern farming methods.

In 1962, the last year before the initiation of large scale land transfers, agricultural output of the Scheduled Areas accounted for 78 per cent of the gross value of crop and livestock production of the monetary sector. Production on the mixed farm land, a third of

which was the land designated for transfer, contributed to the gross marketed output of crops and livestock 23 and 58 per cent respectively, This production also accounted for 23 per cent of the agricultural exports. While there is not reliable data available for total production on land transferred to Africans there are indications that production has dropped. In the words of the Development Plan; 1966-1970:

> . . . there is some evidence that transfer of over a million acres in less than four years has brought about a situation where 1964/65 output on this land was substantially less than the 1961/62 level. The Government is confident this decline will be reversed and that, once all the schemes in the million-acre programme have achieved maturity, more intensive land use will result in production levels substantially higher than in 1961/62. But in the meantime it is clear that this transitional period in the mixed farming areas is costing the national economy significant amounts of output, foreign exchange and personal income. The Government has therefore decided that the rate of land transfer in the mixed farming areas will be slowed down for a few years in order to permit consolidation of existing schemes and ensure steady progress in the mixed farming economy.[1]

The Development Plan, 1966-70 announced a shift in Governmental agricultural policy from emphasis on resettlement to one of concentration on agricultural development in the former African areas. These lands contain 80 per cent of Kenya's rural population and 80 per cent of its high potential agricultural land. Development programs are to include land consolidation, irrigation, land

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[1]Republic of Kenya, Development Plan 1966-1970, op.cit., p. 149.

reclamation, and the introduction of modern farming methods. It is in this area now characterized by primarily subsistence and inefficient farming as well as potentially arable unused land that planners see the hope of sizable advances in agricultural production.

Following a brief five-year period of turmoil in which many Europeans sold their large farms and left Kenya and in which large scale resettlement of Africans occurred, Kenya's agricultural sector now seems to have settled into a more stable transitional stage. Those Europeans wishing to leave will gradually be bought out but others will be encouraged to remain to help maintain production levels and contribute to economic development. The main thrust of Government policy will be aimed at upgrading the efficiency of African farmers and fully integrating them into the monetary sector of the economy.

Although small, Kenya's industrial sector compares favorably with its neighbors. In 1961 the output of manufacturing and repair in Kenya was £21.6 million as against £7.3 million for Tanzania and £5.9 for Uganda. The manufacturing sector contributed £29.4 million to Kenya's GDP in 1964, this figure being 13.8 per cent of the total monetary GDP and 10.4 per cent of the total GDP. Approximately 10 per cent of the total value of Kenya's exports to countries other than Uganda and Tanzania is accounted for by manufacturing exports.

The primary industries are those connected with food processing, beverages and tobacco. Others include metal products, wood, paper and pulp industries and textile and footwear industries. With the exception of the textile industry where internal expansion can replace imports and the food processing industry where new markets are opening up for Kenya goods in Europe, the Arabian Gulf and the Indian Ocean area, it is not likely that there will be substantial industrial expansion in the foreseeable future.

One industry which offers extremely good prospects for development in Kenya is that of tourism. In 1964 its gross foreign exchange earnings were estimated to be £ seven million. If domestic tourists are included, the total revenue derived from the tourist sector for 1964 was £ten million. The Development Plan forecasts at least a 15 per cent growth per year of gross foreign exchange from tourism in the period 1966-70.

The predominance of Asians and, to a lesser extent, Europeans in the commercial life of Kenya is another area of sensitivity in Kenyan economics and politics. One has only to walk through the retail sections of Mombasa and Nairobi to realize the almost total monopoly of non-Africans in this important sector of the economy. A source of hostility between Africans and Asians, the Kenya Government has recently taken steps to open up the

commercial sector to Africans. The Government has initiated the practice of not renewing work permits of non-citizens as it determines that there are unemployed, qualified Kenyan citizens who could occupy their jobs.[1] As most Asians opted for a British passport rather than Kenya citizenship at the time of independence, strict enforcement of this policy may bring about radical changes in the commercial life of Kenya.

Unemployment poses a major problem for the Kenya Government. Young people, especially school leavers, are abandoning agriculture as a means of earning a living, and migrating to the urban areas in search of wage paying work. At the present stage of industrial and commercial development, employment opportunities are simply not keeping pace with the demand. A recent report indicates that about 50,000 permanent jobs become available per year in Kenya. By 1968 the report estimates that a total of 263,000 individuals will be actively competing for these jobs. The job-seekers include 24,000 youths who have had education and job training beyond primary education; 39,000 other youths who have at best obtained a primary school certificate; 60,000 adult work seekers who have no means of support; and some 140,000 other adult work seekers who maintain some ties to land in

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[1] No data is available on the extent of change this policy has made in the Kenya economy.

rural areas.[1]

What to do with the unemployed and how to prevent unemployment from becoming a major political issue are immediate problems facing the Kenya Government. One solution lies in resettling Africans on land in the former Scheduled Areas and in introducing modern farming techniques. This would make farming more attractive and economically rewarding. Another solution, one examined in this dissertation, is the establishment of government institutions to relieve unemployment and to provide job training for the unskilled.

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Due to the historical factors set forth in this chapter the development of contemporary politics in Kenya has been one of fragmentation rather than of union. This is true whether one focuses on African, European and Asian political groupings as a whole or on African political groupings specifically. The basic unit of African politics in the period 1920-1963 was the tribally based party or association. The larger political units such as KANU or KADU were primarily coalitions of tribal parties. The fears, suspicions and hostilities among the various African peoples, manifested in the bitter power struggle between KANU and KADU, combined with the struggle for

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[1]Christian Council of Kenya and the Christian Churches Educational Association, After School What? (Nairobi: 1966), p. 27.

leadership among various personalities within KANU and KADU, presented a picture of political instability and disunity as Kenya obtained its independence. A major task for the leadership of the newly independent state was to overcome the heritage of the past and unite the people for the tasks of developing the country.

At the time of independence the leadership in Kenya also faced a problem of employment, especially of the youth. Although steps had been taken in the early 1960's, notably the resettlement schemes, to improve the prospects for African farmers, increasing numbers of African youth were rejecting farming as a way of life and migrating to the cities in search of wage paying employment. The small industrial and commercial sector was not able to generate sufficient jobs to employ these youths. A potential economic and political crisis concerning employment was a distinct possibility.

These factors--the political disunity and the unemployment situation--had a direct influence upon the Government's decision to establish the youth service and upon the decision as to what form the service would take. The following chapter examines the immediate origins of the Kenya National Youth Service.

CHAPTER THREE

ORIGINS OF THE KENYA NATIONAL YOUTH SERVICE

Bertram Gross in his work Managing of Organizations notes that organizations exist to satisfy the interests of various groups. The interests of groups related to an organization are often multiple, hard to identify and overlapping. They make it extremely difficult to identify a single or primary purpose of the organization.[1] Drawing upon this view of organizational purposes, the first portion of this chapter seeks to identify those groups which had an interest in the establishment of a youth service and to explain their primary concerns.

The second section presents data relating to the serious unemployment situation of early 1964 which forced the Government to move with great speed in setting up programs to meet the crisis. The next section is concerned with describing the organizations existing in early 1964 for meeting the needs of unemployed, often unskilled youth. The inability of existing organizations to meet the needs of unemployed members of the

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[1]Bertram Gross, The Managing of Organizations (London: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), II, 477.

youth wings was a prime reason for the decision to form the youth service. It is hoped that the first three sections illuminate the conditions which established the need for the National Youth Service and at the same time provide the necessary background to understand the various goals of the service. A listing of these goals is the subject of the concluding portion of the chapter.

The Interested

Three groups in Kenya are singled out in this work as having an interest in the establishment of a youth service. The first, the KANU youth wing, sought the establishment of an organization which would reward its members for services rendered during the independence struggle and would provide for its members' future. The second interested group, referred to here as the "pressured," actually consisted of two components: (1) party officials, trade unionists, and elected public officials subject to pressure from members of the youth wing; and (2) the expatriate commercial farming and business community subject to much of the disruptive activity of some of the members of the youth wing. Both were interested in seeing the Government establish an organization which would relieve the pressure on them and at the same time would provide for the needs of the youth. The final interested group treated here is the

governing elite, the decision-makers in the Government. This group sought a solution which would meet the needs of the youth wing and the pressured as well as contribute constructively to achieving the goals of nation building and socio-economic progress.

The KANU Youth Wing[1]

One of the common characteristics of many of the mass political parties which dominated the drive for independence in Asia and Africa is the presence of allied organizations which, although having a separate organizational framework of their own, are associated with, and aid the cause of, the mass party. These allied organizations may represent economic interests--farmers, traders, or marketwomen--or may signify the special place given to social groups within the population--youth, for example. One allied organization common to nearly all of the African parties is the youth wing. This type of group performs a variety of tasks including engaging in clashes with colonial authorities, organizing strikes and demonstrations, serving as stewards for party rallies

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[1]The KANU youth wing was the primary interest articulator of a great many unemployed "youth" ranging in age from fifteen to thirty-five who had worked in various capacities for KANU during the independence movement. This does not mean that it was the only interest articulator of the youth or that it was only KANU youth who were pressuring the Government for aid or rewards for past services rendered. However, in pressuring the KANU Government it was this youth wing which was most effective.

and competing with rival youth wings or other similar groups.[1]

In Kenya the largest and most active organization of this type was the KANU youth wing, a loosely organized group possessing a considerable degree of independence from the party leadership.[2] It engaged in a number of activities ranging from assisting in party rallies to physical violence against opponents of KANU. While not

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[1]Thomas Hodgkin, African Political Parties (London: Penguin Books, 1961), pp. 117-24.

[2]Richard Cox in his rather journalistic account of the events in Kenya from 1961 to 1964 provides insight into one of the reasons for the high degree of independence which the KANU youth wing was able to obtain. He quoted Harry Thuku, a Kenyan nationalist leader of an earlier period, as saying that "The mistake Kenyatta made was in letting the Youth Wing have its own Treasury." Once the youth were able to organize their own finances, they were able to break away from KANU's control. Richard Cox, Kenyatta's Country (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), p. 187. Fred Burke views the competitive youth wings in Kenya as a modern manifestation of earlier reliance upon age-grade organization. Providing the youth with special status and roles within a quasi-traditional framework enabled the leaders to maintain control over them. However, "in the cities . . . where customary control over the younger generation was impossible to exercise, the youth wings tended towards irresponsibility and often acted independently of, even in opposition to, the commands of the party elders." Fred Burke, "Political Evolution in Kenya," in Burke and Diamond, op. cit., p. 226. Burke also suggests a second reason for the loose organization of the KANU youth wing. KANU itself contained a number of factions which, though united in the cause of independence, were in competition with one another for political power. The youth wing reflected this tendency toward factionalism. "The split within KANU was reflected in, as well as augmented by a division within the KANU youth wing. Pitched battles between rival youth wings supporting one faction or another were common." Ibid.

all the youth wing members participated in the latter, there was a considerable element in the organization which tended toward militant action.

In the aftermath of the May 1963 KANU-won election, activities of some members of the KANU youth wing began to present a real problem for party leaders. Elements of the youth wing became increasingly independent, taking upon themselves responsibility for punishing those of all tribes who they felt had been offenders in the independence drive.[1] This was especially true in the Rift Valley. One government official has been quoted as stating in August 1963 that the "KANU youth wing virtually ruled the place."[2] In writing of the events which followed the 1963 elections, certain researchers have noted apparent connections such as duplicate membership and a revival of oath taking between the more radical and independent elements of the KANU youth wing and the Land Freedom Army--an organization similar in some respects to Mau Mau.[3]

As the date for independence approached, the youth wingers became more and more concerned about their own

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[1]Anthony Hughes, op. cit., pp. 240-41.

[2]East African Standard, August 14, 1963.

[3]Burke, "Political Evolution in Kenya," in Burke and Diamond, op. cit., p. 226. See also Hughes, op. cit., p. 241.

future in an independent Kenya. There was a realization that many of the activities in which they had been engaged would no longer be required or sanctioned. Most had only a few years of formal education and lacked the skills necessary to obtain wage paying employment. These factors, in light of the high unemployment in Kenya at the time, made the outlook for them not particularly promising.

The youth reacted to this situation in various ways. On the local level, and often with the tacit encouragement of local politicians, groups of KANU youth wingers attempted to take matters concerning their future welfare into their own hands. For example, in December 1963 it was reported that police in Kitale and the Trans Nzoia district in Western Kenya had been receiving reports daily that youth wingers intended to take over police duties and also planned to forcedly take over private farms following independence. The local assistant superintendent of police for that district stated that it was common knowledge that youth wingers were being told that they would become the police force on December 12, 1963. The officer went on to say that it did not "require much imagination to realize that this organized band of young men, most of them unemployed, will feel very disgruntled after Uhuru if the promises made to them are not fulfilled."[1]

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[1] EAS, December 3, 1963.

At both local and higher levels, the members of the youth wing through their leadership (local and national) began to pressure party leaders, trade unionists, and elected political officials for employment provisions to be made by an independent Kenya Government. During a tour of Nyanza in mid-July 1963, a message was given to Prime Minister Kenyatta by Kisumu youth wingers which included the following passage: "As the youth of this country, we have relentlessly and vigorously fought for independence for Kenya. We would like to know in what position the youth of Kenya will be in after independence?"[1] The message requested consideration of the position of youth wingers at the governmental level, recognition as a national force, and affiliation to international youth movements.

In late November members of the KANU youth wing in Nairobi sent a letter to the Prime Minister suggesting the formation of a single, non-party, nation-wide youth organization under one leader. The aim of the body would be to train Kenya youth to take up their responsibilities as citizens of Kenya and to cooperate with African youth movements. The letter stated that after helping KANU win the election, the members of the KANU youth wing had anticipated some type of rewards for their services and that they had not received what they expected. They felt

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[1] EAS, July 23, 1963.

ignored. Many were unemployed, hungry, and sleeping out of doors.[1]

A week after independence representatives of the KANU youth wing from all over Kenya met at KANU headquarters in Nairobi. Resulting from this meeting was a protest that a "general lack of respect" was being shown for youth leaders, along with a demand that members of Parliament and others right this state of affairs. The youth leaders also demanded that a national youth headquarters, distinct from the KANU head office, be established and that youths who had taken part in the independence movement be given educational opportunities in return for the sacrifices they had made for the party.[2]

Finally, on January 16, 1964 a KANU youth conference established a committee of twelve to formulate proposals to be put before the Prime Minister for the creation of youth brigades and a national builder's brigade. These brigades, it was maintained, would have the purpose of enabling youth to help in the task of nation building and defense of the nation.[3] A second result of this youth conference was an open letter on youth problems and organization which was sent to the

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[1] EAS, November 28, 1963.

[2] EAS, December 18, 1963.

[3] EAS, January 16, 1964.

Prime Minister. The letter included the following passages:

> Kenya became internally self-governing on June 1, 1963. The Youths expected the popularly elected Nationalist Government to launch within a few days in office, a dynamic plan and programme which would have an immediate, visible, beneficial effect not only on the Youths but also on the common people. Contrary to this expectation what does he see but trends whereby the Youths and others who suffered and sacrificed for freedom are neglected and even denied the opportunity to serve the Nation, the trends whereby the old enemies of African Nationalism are entrenched and assured of their old priviledged positions . . .
>
> He sees a tendency to perpetuate a situation whereby the rich get richer and the poor poorer, the unemployed remain unemployed and the landless remain landless. He sees trends which tend to perpetuate destitution and wretchedness among the masses of the common people amid the pomp and affluence of the rich and the priviledged few. Thus to him and the common man the trend of events has rendered the hard won 'Uhuru' meaningless . . .[1]

A second tactic employed by the KANU youth wing to bring pressure to bear on the Government was through the use of certain KANU parliamentary backbenchers who had direct connections with the youth wing. For example, on October 11, 1963 the member for Kiharu, Mr. Gachago,[2] apparently acting without the knowledge of the Government, introduced the following motion to the Kenya House of Representatives:

> That this House not without gratitude and admiration recognizes the great contribution made by the youth of this country in the struggle for Uhuru and urges

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[1]Open letter of the KANU Youth Conference held in January, 1964 to Prime Minister Kenyatta, quoted in the Kenya Weekly News, #1984, February 21, 1964, p. 12.

[2]In December 1963 Mr. Gachago was named one of two interim national leaders for the KANU youth wing.

> the Government to plan and assist immediately a National Program whereby the country's youth will be suitably and profitably occupied to ensure that they will play their full part in the development of Kenya.[1]

Commenting on his motion he referred to the destructive and constructive alternatives to which the energies of the youth who had participated in the independence struggle could be applied. He noted that while the creation of a sound youth movement and youth system would cost the Government money, so also would organizing and sending out forces to deal with the youth if, when left unaided, they began to cause trouble.[2]

The KANU youth wing was the principal interest articulator for the unemployed youth who had participated in the struggle for independence. While these unemployed youth were only a portion of the total unemployed in Kenya, they were an element who, owing to their previous activities and organization, could create difficult problems for the new Government.

The Pressured

A second group which had an interest in the establishment of a youth program in Kenya were those individuals and interests subject to pressure by the youth wing and by individual unemployed persons. As

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[1]Kenya Parliament, House of Representatives. Debates, October 11, 1963.

[2]Ibid.

previously mentioned this group had two components: the leaders of the party, trade unions, and Government, and the expatriate commercial farming and business community.

Party, Trade Union, and Government Leaders

This element of the "pressured" was comprised of local and national party leaders, primarily within KANU but also including those from other political parties; local and national elected officials--the members of the two house Kenya Parliament, the members of the cabinet and the Prime Minister; and trade union leaders. They did not form a distinct organized interest group in the sense of the KANU youth wing. However they have been grouped together here for purposes of analysis.[1]

Subject to much of the direct pressure applied by the youth wingers, these interested wanted some means by which they could satisfy demands. In one sense they sought a patronage system in the form of a youth organization sponsored by the Government which would enable them to dispense jobs to those who had participated in the independence movement and to whom many of the Government and party officials owed political debts. Such an organization, they hoped, would relieve the pressure on

[1]This was a situation of overlapping membership. The members of the cabinet and the Prime Minister are placed in two groups. They were subject to pressure from the youth and were members of the governing elite responsible for making decisions affecting the whole country.

themselves. They were anxious that something be done about the demands of the members of the youth wing before the frustration and unrest which was becoming apparent in late 1963 could become so serious as to threaten the regime.

Their interest in the establishment of a youth service was somewhat analogous to a similar situation which their counterparts in Ghana had faced. Peter Hodge in his work on the Ghana Workers Brigade, an organization similar in some respects to the Kenya National Youth Service, states that during the first half year of the existence of the Brigade:

> . . . it was clear that many difficult and discontented former and current supporters of the C.P.P. were deliberately inducted into its ranks for their removal from the political scene at street meetings and rallies in Accra and Kumasi, and for the peace of a few harassed ministers of the government whose verandahs became less cluttered with petitioners, job seekers and men needing money.[1]

The Expatriate Commercial Farming and Business Community

This group, consisting of expatriate whites, was subject to destructive activities carried out by elements of the KANU youth wing and by other unemployed, landless Kenyans in the period immediately preceding and following independence. Issues of the East African Standard, long referred to as the settler newspaper, and issues of the

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[1]Peter Hodge, "The Ghana Workers' Brigade: A Project for Unemployed Youth," British Journal of Sociology, XV, June, 1965, 116.

Kenya Weekly News, a periodical published in Nakuru which in the pre-independence period represented the opinion primarily of the white farmers in the Rift Valley and the white highlands, contained a number of references to such activities. For the purposes of this study, the feature articles and editorials of these two publications during late 1963 and early 1964 are seen as reflecting the interest of the commercial farming community as well as other largely white owned business interests. Their concern was primarily that of having the Government establish a program to channel the energies of the youth into new, potentially constructive outlets so as to at least mitigate the threat to order and property posed by large numbers of disaffected unemployed youth. The general approach taken by the East African Standard was one of recognizing the part the youth wings had played in the independence movement noting that as a result of certain activities the term "youth wing" in Kenya carried with it a bad connotation. The EAS editorialized frequently that something had to be done to channel the energies of these youths into constructive work or else the country faced the risk of social and political upheavals brought about by the irresponsible acts of idle and increasingly frustrated groups of former youth wingers. For practical solutions the editors looked toward the Government recognizing that only government

had the resources to formulate and carry out solutions to the problem. The youths' own lack of preparation for skilled employment plus the small size of the private commercial and industrial sector were also primary elements necessitating a solution by the Government. Suggestions for solutions included sending the youth wingers to the Northern Frontier District to deal with any possible threat from Somalia, creating a youth brigade for undertaking work on nation building projects and establishing a Ministry for Culture, National Guidance and Youth. In an editorial following the announcement that a youth service would be established, the Standard supported the Government's initiative. It has continued to support the NYS and to publicize its activities.[1]

The Kenya Weekly News took much the same position. It suggested that the "young limbs" of the pool of unemployed young men which existed in Kenya were just what Kenya needed in the course of nation building and indeed could not do without. What was needed was for the Government to find some way to immediately relieve the idleness of the young men. The fear was expressed that too long a waiting period would breed an explosive situation.[2]

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[1]For further information on the position of the EAS with regard to the youth question see EAS, July 23, 1963, October 10, 1963 and February 1, 1964.

[2]Kenya Weekly News, #1980, January 24, 1964.

Following the establishment of the NYS, some writers in the Kenya Weekly News tended to be somewhat critical of the organization both in terms of its small size in relation to the problems faced and over possible political implications. This view, however, has changed with the passage of time.[1]

The Governing Elite

The governing elite had multiple interests in considering the formation of a youth program. As members of the pressured they were interested in having a youth program established which would satisfy the needs of those instigating the pressure. As leaders of Kenya they were interested in averting any social, economic or political crisis which might arise from unheeded demands of the unemployed. They were also committed to the achievement of the goals of nation building and socio-economic progress and therefore were interested in formulating programs which would aid in the achievement of these goals.

Tom Mboya, a member of the governing elite, expresses succinctly some of the problems faced by the political leaders in considering the situation of

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[1] See, for example, Kenya Weekly News, #1984, February 21, 1964, #2001, June 19, 1964 and #2002, June 26, 1964. It should be noted that the editorial position of the Kenya Weekly News has changed considerably since the early days of 1964 and could not now be described as the paper of the white farmers.

unemployed youth wingers.

> Once the youth are organized, they have to be disciplined and--what is even more important--they have to be kept occupied, for otherwise discipline disappears. When they are on full time party work, they must be properly looked after. Otherwise, whenever there is a clash between leaders, the temptation to buy their services is great. There have been many allegations in Kenya that youths have been bought this way to do jobs for quarreling leaders, jobs which were not necessarily in the party's interests. Before independence it is difficult to give the youths constructive work on a day to day basis, because what work is available depends on the party's plan. But after independence, it is easier to employ them on useful projects. The way in which the Ghana Youth Pioneers are organized is an example of a good means of exploiting the full potential of the country's manpower; it can, it is true, be a dangerous weapon if it is misused and if the youths are not taught to believe in a certain type of discipline. . . . We cannot leave them entirely on their own to find jobs on the normal labor market, because in our newly developing countries there will not be enough ordinary employment for all of them, and they could become a liability to the nation.[1]

While the governing elite was confronted with a need to find a means of occupying youth wingers' time, it also felt that changes in the attitudes and perspectives of the youth toward their role in Kenya were imperative. The period of opposition and of destruction of the colonial order had been successfully completed. A period of construction to achieve the goals of nation building and socio-economic progress would require not disruptive and anti-regime activities but the hard work

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[1]Tom Mboya, Freedom and After (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1963), pp. 88-89.

of all citizens. The governing elite sought to employ the youth service as a device for incorporating the youth in a physical and emotional context into the tasks which faced Kenya and to project an image of the youth as an element of the population making an active and important contribution to the development of the nation.

In similar fashion the governing elite sought to encourage unity among the various tribes. Kenya's history of strong tribal loyalties was mentioned in Chapter Two. Also mentioned was the fact that in the period immediately prior to independence the tribal and political factions in Kenya tended to merge into two parties--KANU and KADU. The policy of regionalism pursued by KADU reflected the desire of the smaller tribes to protect themselves and their political integrity against what they apparently feared would be the domination of a centralized government controlled by the more numerous Kikuyu and Luo. Since 1963 the Kenyatta Government has sought to project its image as a truly national government which works for the benefit of and seeks the active support of all Kenya citizens. In considering the objectives of the youth service, the governing elite sought means by which the service could contribute to achieving the goal of national unity.

The first public indication that the governing

elite was considering establishment of a youth service was included in the reply of the Minister of Labour and Social Services, Mr. Mwendwa, on November 14, 1963 to the motion of Mr. Gachago which called for a Government-sponsored youth program.[1] Mr. Mwendwa's reply accepted the motion on behalf of the Government and announced that plans for a youth program were being developed at that time. In explaining the direction that the program would take, he indicated that special attention was being given to unemployed youth between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five. Tentative plans called for these youths to work on projects of national importance. He also stated that attempts to alleviate the problems of unemployed youth would not be confined to those youths who had supported KANU or to youth who came from tribes from which the KANU Government had drawn its electoral support; on the contrary, solutions would be planned on a nationwide basis and would include youths from all areas of the country and from all tribes.[2]

These two tentative proposals were subsequently incorporated as basic objectives of the youth service. They received one of their most concise enunciations in

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[1]See above, pp. 81-82.

[2]Kenya Parliament, House of Representatives, Debates, November 14, 1963.

a speech by the Prime Minister, Jomo Kenyatta, on the occasion of a passing-out parade of the youth service. He stated:

> I salute you in the knowledge that you represent our nation's most important asset. The development of Kenya depends largely on the enthusiasm, courage, and strength of our youth. Before these qualities can be used to the full, however, they must be strengthened with discipline and unity. The National Youth Service was formed to provide this. . . .
>
> As for unity, you have come from every part of Kenya. It makes me glad to see young representatives of every tribe and area standing shoulder to shoulder as brothers. This is an example to the country, and it must be followed in every aspect of our national life. You have been trained as Junior Leaders, and you are about to be entrusted with a share of responsibility for the guidance of those thousands of young people who will follow you into the National Youth Service. You have the great task in front of you of helping to build good citizens, and of channeling the zeal and energy of youth into true nation building.
>
> This task may take you into isolated parts of Kenya; it will mean hard work; there will be many difficulties that you must overcome. I know that I can rely on your courage and loyalty to overcome every obstacle, and that you will make the National Youth Service the spearhead of our struggle against ignorance, poverty and disease.[1]

In summary, members of the governing elite had multiple interests in the establishment of a youth service. As politicians elected to office they were interested in satisfying the needs of unemployed youth, especially those connected with the youth wing and in a position of potential political power and influence.

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[1] Jomo Kenyatta, Harambee!, ed. Anthony Cullen (Nairobi: East African Printers Ltd., 1964), p. 95. The speech was presented in Nairobi on October 13, 1964.

As national leaders they were interested in preventing any social disruption which might be initiated by the youth if their demands went unheeded. As national leaders they also intended not only to satisfy the needs of a specific group but further to enable the scarce resources of Kenya to be utilized in order to benefit the community in general.

The Unemployment Crisis

The origins of the Kenya National Youth Service are found, in part, in the pressures by the youth wing placed upon individuals in decision-making capacities in the political parties and the Government and in the reaction of the decision-makers to these pressures. However, the exact date when the governing elite formally committed itself to establishing the youth service was the result of potentially serious social and political unrest which occurred in Kenya in the early months of 1964. This situation dictated that the youth service be initiated as quickly as possible, although plans at that time were still incomplete and no attention had been given to developing an administrative framework or to obtaining relevant resources. The cause of this unrest was the acute unemployment situation in Kenya in general and in Nairobi in particular.

As was mentioned in Chapter Two, Kenya is a predominantly agricultural country with approximately four of every five persons currently living and working

in rural areas. While there is a commercial farming sector, much of this has been controlled by expatriate whites, whereas the African agricultural economy is characterized primarily by subsistence farming. In terms of manpower, Kenya's business and industrial sector, when compared with agriculture, is small. Out of a total population in 1964 of just under nine million people of whom about four million are considered adults of working age, the total reported wage-earning employment figure for the business, industrial, and public sectors was only 589,000.[1]

Beginning in 1960 Kenya underwent a period of economic stagnation reflecting the effect of uncertainty for the future of Kenya, felt by the European and Asian communities and by foreign investors. There was a marked reluctance to invest or to expand enterprises at a time when political instability was present and when fear of expropriation by an African government was widespread. The stagnation was also the result of prolonged severe weather conditions during 1960 and 1961. These included a drought followed by unusually heavy rainfall which together caused widespread crop failure.

One effect of the economic stagnation was the depression of an already small wage paying employment

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[1]Unless otherwise stated the figures found in this section are taken from the Republic of Kenya, Statistical Abstract 1965. The figure of four million of working age includes both male and female persons.

market. In the early 1960's employment opportunities were not becoming available for the previously unemployed or for the young work-seekers entering the job market for the first time. In fact, sizable numbers of previously employed persons lost their jobs, thus adding to the growing numbers of unemployed. Between 1960 and 1963 the reported wage employment figure dropped from 622,200 to 533,300. That Kenya's growing unemployment problem in the early 1960's did not lead to a crisis until after independence was due in part to the capacity of the independence movement to absorb the attention of the political leaders and of those who would otherwise have been idle. In addition, many young Africans were looking forward to "Uhuru" with the expectation that independence would bring jobs. Thus it is not surprising that there were not strong pressures placed upon either the colonial administration or the African governments in the period 1961-63 for programs to alleviate unemployment.

The day of independence came and went and, to the disillusionment of many Africans, there was no abrupt change in their lives. The jobs and wealth which many had expected to be concomitant with independence did not materialize. Beginning in mid-January 1964 and extending into March 1964 the frustration of the unemployed in Nairobi was manifested in a series of demonstrations, often involving hundreds of jobless. The first sizable demonstration occurred on

January 17 and was typical of those that followed. Just prior to noon about 500 unemployed persons gathered at the Labour Office and marched past the Prime Minister's Office toward the Parliament Building where they stopped and held a rally. One of the unemployed addressing the rally demanded that the Government take immediate action to solve the unemployment problem. Independence had come and gone, he stated, but arrests were still being made and those arrested were still being sent back to reserves against their will.[1] The Government was accused of doing nothing to create jobs for them. The speech was greeted with shouts of "Uhuru na Taabu" (freedom and suffering)[2] by other demonstrators.[3]

Research into reports and records of these demonstrations and interviews with people who were in Nairobi at

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[1]One of the methods by which the British administration handled the problem of the unemployed in the urban areas was to have the police take the jobless into custody and send them back to their home areas in the countryside.

[2]During the 1961 elections KANU's main electoral slogan was "Uhuru na Kenyatta," a slogan in swahili which associated the call for freedom and independence with a call for the release of Jomo Kenyatta. The shouts of "Uhuru na Taabu" indicated the depth of frustration and bitterness felt by these Kenyans. Their hard fought strugle for freedom had been won but no signs of its expected benefits had materialized. Life under the Kenyatta Government for them meant a continuation of the suffering and hardships of the colonial period.

[3]EAS, January 18, 1964.

the time and who were later associated with the youth service have indicated that a majority of these demonstrators were men under the age of thirty. One estimate placed the number of young men participating in the demonstrations as high as seventy-five per cent. They were characterized variously as being emigres from the rural areas, primary school dropouts and graduates and young activists from the resistance movement and the political youth wings.

It is difficult to state whether or not there were any political motivations behind the demonstrations. At the time there was a great deal of maneuvering for political power and position in Kenya. The general concensus of those interviewed was that the demonstrations were not directed by any group or groups using labor unrest for political ends. Rather, they were manifestations of post-independence frustration on the part of unemployed young men who hoped by their actions to call attention to their plight. While the demonstrations did not erupt into mob violence and do not seem to have been instigated for political ends, the potential for both was present and apparent to the governing elite.

A series of cabinet meetings was held in late January and early February to seek immediate means of alleviating the unemployment problem. Meetings were also held between a cabinet committee and representatives of

the Federation of Kenya Employers and of the Kenya Federation of Labour. As a result of these deliberations a short-term program was instituted to provide immediate relief for the unemployed. This program, designated as the Tri-Partite Agreement for the Relief of the Unemployed was signed on February 10, 1964. Private employers agreed to increase their labor force by 10 per cent with the Government agreeing to raise its labor force by 15 per cent, each for a period of one year. In return the unions agreed to end all wage demands and to ban strikes for one year. It was estimated that the agreement would cost private employers and extra wage bill of £2,500,000 and the Government an additional £2,000,000 while absorbing 40,000 to 50,000 of an estimated 100,000 unemployed.[1]

The implementation of the agreement revealed a tendency to underestimate the size of the unemployment problem and to overestimate the number for whom employment could be found. Approximately 205,100 men and 18,000 women registered as job-seekers in early 1964. In September 1965 the Government announced that 38,000 had obtained employment and that roughly 70 per cent of those employed had been retained in permanent positions. The breakdown by public and private sectors was as follows: 28,000 by private employers; 8,800 by the Kenya Government; and 1,500 by local governments.[2]

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[1] EAS, February 11, 1964.

[2] EAS, September 16, 1965.

While the results of the agreement did not reach early expectations, the agreement did accomplish much of what it set out to do for it provided a means of immediate relief for a fairly sizable proportion of the unemployed and thus helped to relieve the pressure of a potentially serious situation.

Another result of the demonstration by the unemployed in Nairobi was the decision by the governing elite to begin implementation of plans for a youth service as quickly as possible. This decision was influenced by the pressure for a youth program which had been building up since mid-1963 and by the presence among the demonstrators of many young political activists. On January 30, 1964 the Minister for Labour and Social Services announced that the Government of Kenya would establish the National Youth Service. This service would recruit unemployed men between the ages of fifteen and thirty from all racial and tribal groups for the purpose of working on projects of national and regional importance. Work on the establishment of this service was to given top priority by the Government.[1]

Existing Organizations for Education and Training of Unemployed Out-of-School Youth

A final factor influencing the decision of the governing elite to establish the youth service was the

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[1] EAS, January 31, 1964.

lack of existing alternatives for meeting the needs of the "older youth," especially the political activists. In early 1964 there were public and private organizations for education and training of unemployed, out-of-school youth but for a variety of reasons these were not adequate for the task required.

Public Organizations

The primary existing public organization was the Kenya Association of Youth Centers. The youth centers had originated in Nyeri District in 1957 and by 1962 there were 159 mainly rural centers. At these centers youth between the ages of nine and nineteen who were not at the time attending formal primary or secondary school were given academic and vocational training to help them find employment in agriculture or in industrial trades. The scheme was based upon the principle of self-help with the land for the center being donated by the local community, the buildings constructed by voluntary community effort and the staff salaries paid by the local authorities. The Central Government provided an Executive Officer for the Association and grants-in-aid. Other funds came from overseas philanthropic organizations.

By 1964 the youth centers had encountered difficulties. In that year the Central Government, which had previously provided the centers with financial

grants on a matching pound for pound basis, reduced its grant to a total for all centers of £1,000 a year. This placed the financial burden for supporting the youth centers on local governments who were often in poor financial shape. A combination of this lack of financing, a failure to engage instructors of adequate standards, and the absence of any clear rewards in terms of enhanced status or earning powers were key factors which led to a general deterioration of the centers and a decrease in membership.[1]

The youth centers as a separate organization into which could be channeled the older unemployed did not provide a feasible alternative. It is highly doubtful, given the low status of the youth centers and the general image they present of focusing on rural youth, that the older unemployed youth would have accepted the youth centers as an organization designed to meet their needs.

Private Organizations

There were also a number of private organizations which provided education and training for unemployed, out-of-school youth. Some of these such as the church-supported Christian Industrial Training Centre (CITC)

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[1]Christian Council of Kenya, op. cit., p. 59. For more information on the youth centers see G. W. Griffin, "The Development of Youth Centres in Kenya," International Labour Review, LXXXVIII (July, 1963).

are considered excellent institutions while others as noted below tend to perform a disservice to the youth. The problem with such organizations as the CITC is that, owing to limited finances, they can only aid a small number of youths. As of 1966, the CITC had an annual intake of only seventy-five youths a year.

Notorious among the organizations which tend to perform a disservice to the youth are many of the private commercial colleges. These colleges, whose standards are usually low, provide primary school leavers with courses in various commercial skills. All too often the training which the youths received in these colleges is of questionable quality and may be worthless in helping them to obtain employment.

Objectives

The decision to establish a youth service made by the governing elite in Kenya was the result of a combination of factors stemming from the general unemployment problem in Kenya and from the specific unemployment problem faced by certain youths who had been politically active in the independence movement. Primarily through the organization of the KANU youth wing and through personal contact with individual Members of Parliament, party politicians and trade unionists, the needs of the youth had been articulated to the decision makers in Kenya. The unrest in early January 1964

underlined the need for programs to relieve unemployment and influenced the governing elite to establish the youth service as one such program. From this point of view the youth service was a program designed to meet the needs of a specific group--youth who had been associated with the KANU youth wing or with the party in general. Whatever form the service was to take and whatever objectives it might be given, the needs of this group would have to be attended. A new organization was required as existing organizations functioning to aid unemployed youth were inadequate or unsuited to meet the specific needs of this group.

A second objective also stemmed from the unrest among the members of the youth wing. The governing elite saw in the youth wing a potentially disruptive group in the society. By means of recruiting youth wing members into the service and thus meeting their demands, and specifically, by giving many of them leadership roles, the Government sought to control this group through a policy of inclusion. The youth service would be an organization which recognized the role which the members of the youth wing had played and which utilized their talents. By providing an organization which would include youth wing members and by making the economic livelihood of these members dependent upon a Government-sponsored organization, the expectation was that the

youth service would provide a means of control over this politically important group.

The governing elite was subject to other influences and considerations in its decision about the form the service would take. In attempting to have the youth service contribute to attaining the goals of nation building and socio-economic progress, the governing elite sought to establish a youth service which would recruit not only unemployed KANU youth but also unemployed youth who had been associated with other political parties, and unemployed youth who had had no connections with political activities. It was also to be an organization which would set the youth to work on projects contributing to the economic development of the nation.

The general objectives of the youth service, formulated by the governing elite, which have served as a guide to planning and to operationalizing the service were stated in the 1966-70 Development Plan:

> The objectives of the National Youth Service are--
>
> (a) to put unemployed young people into an environment that will inculcate good citizenship and provide an opportunity to contribute to the social and economic development of the country;
>
> (b) to promote national unity by bringing together young persons from all areas of Kenya for training and work in projects of national importance;
>
> (c) to help alleviate unemployment and hardship among young persons by providing employment, education and training to prepare them for future productive employment after completion of their service; and

(d) to contribute to the economy of the country by helping to conserve, rehabilitate and develop Kenya's natural resources.[1]

To this official list of objectives is added two more based upon the research carried out on the origins of the National Youth Service: (1) the youth service is to provide an immediate means whereby the demands of at least a portion of the members of the youth wing could be met, and (2) the youth service is to provide the governing elite with one means of obtaining a degree of control over a potentially disruptive group in society.

There were at least two directions which the youth service could take based upon the above objectives and the circumstances which gave rise to them. First, a youth service program could be structured in such a way as to meet the demands of the youth wing while developing a non-political image and engaging in constructive nation building programs. This was the original intention of the governing elite. Secondly, it could develop into an adjunct of the KANU party and overtly serve the ends of the party. The second alternative, although a possibility, was not adopted during the initial years of the service. As will be noted in succeeding chapters, the youth service initially developed along the lines envisaged by the governing elite. However, owing to circumstances surrounding the planning and operationalization of the service the

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[1]Republic of Kenya, Development Plan 1966-1970, op. cit., pp. 328-29.

the emphasis on meeting the demands of the youth wing members was gradually phased out with the service increasingly becoming a relatively apolitical nation building and vocational training organization for Kenya youth.

CHAPTER FOUR

PLANNING OF THE KENYA NATIONAL YOUTH SERVICE

The final scheme which provided the framework for the youth service was the result of two separate and distinct planning efforts. One was undertaken at the initiative of the Government of Kenya and carried out under the sponsorship of the Ministry of Labour and Social Services. The man primarily responsible for this plan is a former British citizen, Mr. Geoffry Griffin. Mr. Griffin had begun his formal career in youth work in 1957 as youth adviser to the Kenya Association of Youth Centers as well as director of the privately operated Starehe Boys School. When the youth service began its operations, Griffin was named its first director.

A second planning effort was initiated independently by a US/AID Kenya staff member and was channeled into the planning process through the Ministry of Agriculture. The AID staff member, Mr. Leland Fallon, had previously worked with the United States Civilian Conservation Corps during the 1930's.

The organization described in the final plan which was the result of these two planning efforts was oriented

to work and vocational training. There were few indications of any "political" overtones to the proposed service. The only mention made of the youth wing was that the service would make use of the leadership abilities of the young, such as those in the youth wing, who had played a part in the independence movement. However, the recruitment system adopted for the service shortly after the plan was formulated indicated that many of the recruits would be political activists.[1]

The Kenya Government sought to obtain financial aid from the United States Government and advisers from the British Government. Positive responses to these requests were quickly forthcoming. However, active competition for aid and influence in the Kenya youth service came from the Israeli Government. Based upon their experience in youth work in Israel and in aiding other youth service type organizations in Africa, the Israelis held profoundly different views about what a youth service organization should emphasize from those represented in the Kenya youth service plan. The Israelis, after reviewing the plan for the NYS, submitted a memorandum to the Kenya Government proposing certain significant changes. Chief among these were the introduction of a strongly ideological component to the service. In the Israeli view, the success or failure

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[1]For information on the recruitment system of the NYS, see below, pp. 189-92.

of the proposed service depended upon the extent to which the service could impart to the youth a sense of national goals and their role in achieving these goals. Concomitant with this was a more conscious recognition of the relationship between the youth service, the KANU youth wing and the KANU party. Although these suggestions were not accepted, the Israeli alternative is important in that it represents a distinctly different approach to youth organization in developing countries than the one found in the plan drawn up by Griffin and Fallon and supported by the British, American, and Kenyan Governments.

This chapter describes the formulation of the plan for the NYS, the main components of the plan, the United States and British aid agreements with the Kenya Government, and the Israeli alternative proposal.

The Plan of the Ministry of Labour and Social Services

The initiation of a formal planning effort by the Ministry of Labour occurred sometime in late October or early November 1963 and coincided with the activity in Parliament concerning a youth service program.[1] It was the plan developed from this effort which the Government of Kenya had available to it when it announced on January 30, 1964 that a youth service would be established. The

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[1] See above, p. 90.

criteria upon which the plan was based were listed as follows:

(1) that the Organization shall be truly national, drawing together the youth of all racial and tribal groups;

(2) that it shall inculcate patriotism and provide a real opportunity of serving the country;

(3) that it shall make use of leadership abilities of young persons who have played a prominent part in political activities (such as Youth Wing activities) during the period leading up to independence;

(4) that it shall afford some relief to the present chronic unemployment and hardship among young persons in Kenya;

(5) that units of the Organization shall be capable of making a genuine economic contribution to the building up of the country;

(6) that maximum use shall be made of existing facilities, in order that the scheme may involve no more expense than is necessary;

(7) that the plan shall be based on actual needs as they exist in Kenya, and not merely be a copy of some other country's scheme.[1]

This plan placed the youth service under the direct control of the Kenya Government through an unspecified ministry. There would be a national headquarters in Nairobi which would have responsibility for coordinating and controlling all branches and units and for ensuring policy implementation. The training of leaders and the control of camps serving work projects of national importance was given to the national headquarters. Emphasis was placed on the training of leaders, especially for those

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[1]Kenya, Ministry of Labour and Social Services, Plan for a National Youth Service for Kenya, 1963, (mimeo.)

destined to be leaders of field units of 500 men. Consequently the plan recommended the establishment of a training camp for leaders. A six month course was envisaged with the primary purpose of training the men in leadership and administrative techniques. It was stated that "no trouble and expense should be spared in ensuring that training courses are run at the highest possible level under the direction of the finest staff obtainable."[1]

The plan was based on the premise that the service would have to rely solely upon resources in Kenya. Thus maximum use was to be made of existing facilities. The plan proposed to utilize some of the facilities of the Youth Centers as the base for developing field units. Instructors and training personnel were expected to be obtained from the Youth Centers, the Boy Scouts and other organizations which might have personnel with some training in youth work. Work projects were to be labor intensive utilizing hand tools.

There were three key provisions set forth in this Ministry's plan which would later be incorporated as features of the youth service. The first was the provision establishing a system enabling the youth to obtain education and vocational training as well as to work on various nation building projects. This was an alternating system whereby at any one time one-half of a field unit (250 youths)

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[1] Ibid.

would be receiving education and training while the other half would be engaged on work projects. The second provision established the principle of mixing the youths from different tribes on national work projects. Finally, provision was made for the role which the service would play in aiding the youth to find employment after completion of their period of service. The national headquarters would gather information regarding the qualities and employment potential of the youths in the service which would be supplied to the Ministry of Labour. It was hoped that all Government departments as well as private industry would refer to this information and would give serious consideration to filling their employment needs from youth who had been in the service. This indicated a realization on the part of the planners and the governing elite that the problem of employment after service was going to be an important one. It was also a recognition that neither the service nor the Government could guarantee the youths employment.

The youth in the service would work on a variety of local and national work projects such as bush clearing, building roads, building schools and clinics, and carrying out other community development projects. To accomplish this work each unit would be supplied with basic hand tools. In addition to participating in the work projects, the youths would receive instruction in English, civics,

and mathematics as well as in carpentry, metal work and other vocational skills. They would be given a small monthly allowance of shs. 15/- and free food and lodging. Enlistment in the service would be voluntary and for a period of one year.

The Plan of the Ministry of Agriculture

The second effort directed at formulating a plan for a youth service was initiated by the American AID official, Leland Fallon. In February 1964 Fallon occupied the position of US/AID Range Management Adviser to Kenya. This was his second tour of duty in Kenya, the first lasting from early 1961 to early 1963 when he occupied the position of Range Management Adviser to the Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Husbandry.

In May 1962 Fallon, based upon what he felt was then a need to develop a youth program in Kenya, had proposed a Civilian Conservation Corps type of program to be established for the relief of deprived unemployed youth in Kenya. However, at the time he presented this proposal conditions were not deemed critical enough either by the Kenya Government or AID and the proposal was not implemented.

Fallon did nothing further with his proposal for a youth program in Kenya until January 1964 when he heard that the Kenya Government planned to establish a youth

service. Thinking that possibly the Government had not yet developed a concrete plan for the service, Fallon "on impulse" prepared a brief document entitled "Proposal for Establishment of Kenya National Youth Camps." He discussed this proposal first with his superiors at AID/Kenya. On February 15, 1964 he presented it on an informal basis to the Director of the Department of Agriculture of the Kenya Ministry of Agriculture.[1]

The proposal which Fallon submitted drew upon his CCC experience. It had as its primary objective the creation of a uniformed, disciplined service which would provide youths with employment and training; develop Kenya's natural resources; and work on projects of national and local benefit. The general administration and co-ordination of the service was to be under a Director of Kenya National Youth Service. Included in his duties would be the determination of policies and procedures to govern the establishment and operation of the camps; approval of the establishment of camps; and the allocation of Central Government funds for their operation and development. However, the operation of the camps, including the appointment and supervision of the officers of the camps would be under the ministry having jurisdiction over the principal

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[1]Letter from Leland Fallon, AID/Brazil, April 7, 1967. Fallon's tour of duty in Kenya had ended before this writer arrived in Kenya. Upon this writer's return to the United States he sent Fallon a series of questions regarding the youth service. Fallon's reply was in the form of a twelve page letter dated April 7, 1967.

work project of the camp. For example, a camp established for range development would be under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Agriculture, while a camp established for national park development would be under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Natural Resources.

Fallon's plan proposed organizing the servicemen along military lines for the purpose of developing and maintaining discipline. Military drill would also be employed for this purpose. The suggested primary unit of the service was the company, to be composed of approximately fifty men subdivided into two platoons and each platoon into two or more squads. Platoon and squad leaders were to be taken from the ranks of the enlistees. Responsibility for the operation of the camp would be vested in an executive officer. In addition, a training officer was to be given responsibility for developing and executing training programs for the enlistees.

The service would work on both local and national projects. The criteria for selection of projects included proper planning, technical soundness and that they involve a high component of labor. Mechanical and hand tools necessary for the project would be supplied to the youth. In addition to this work, the servicemen would receive educational and vocational skills instruction.[1]

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[1]Leland Fallon, "Proposal for Establishment of Kenya National Youth Service Camps," (private document, mimeo.)

On or about March 1, 1964 Fallon received a call from the Ministry of Agriculture requesting his attendance at a meeting with the Minister of Agriculture, Mr. McKenzie. Mr. McKenzie had just returned from a trip to the United States where he had received some encouragement concerning United States aid to a youth program in Kenya. He had been given a copy of Fallon's proposal and thought it provided a feasible basis from which to work. Fallon was requested to draw up a second draft of the plan working in cooperation with an official of the Ministry of Agriculture. Fallon's original draft provided the basis for this second draft with the addition of some minor suggestions which had been proposed by the Minister of Agriculture.[1]

The Final Plan

A joint meeting for the discussion of the proposed youth service was held on March 9, 1964 attended by representatives of the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Labour and Social Services and the Ministry of Finance. Prior to the meeting it had been decided that the proposed youth service would be established under the Ministry of Labour and Social Services and that this Ministry would have jurisdiction over all the

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[1]Fallon, letter of April 7, 1967, loc. cit.

camps in general matters with only jurisdiction over the specific work projects remaining with other ministries. Also in attendance at the meeting were Mr. Fallon and Mr. Griffin--the first time the two men had met. Both plans were presented and discussed at considerable length. It was decided that the two plans should be integrated and Mr. Griffin and Mr. Fallon were instructed to carry out this consolidation. On March 13, 1964 the consolidated plan was presented to a joint meeting and was approved without change.

The youth service plan, in its final form, combined elements of both of the original schemes. On matters of the statement of objectives of the service, of control of the service and of powers and duties of its top leadership, the final plan incorporated the provisions set forth in the Ministry of Labour's plan. The criteria used in formulating that plan now became a statement of objectives of the service. One exception was the exclusion of the criterion which called for the maximum use of existing facilities in Kenya for the prospect of American financial aid had made this unnecessary. The service was placed under the direct control of the Kenya Government through the Ministry of Labour and Social Services. The organization of the recruits reflected the influence of the plan of the Ministry of Agriculture. In addition to a headquarters and a field unit in Nairobi, there was to

be one field unit in each of Kenya's regions. Each of these field units would have a number of project camps where the servicemen would proceed after initial training and where the actual work on projects would be carried out. A commandant would be in control of each field unit. The recruits were to be divided into sections (later to be called companies) of one hundred men each led by a section commander with each section divided into squads led by trainee assistants.

The servicemen were to work not less than thirty hours a week on actual work projects. Initially these work projects would be selected and financed by the Central Government but it was envisaged that as the service became established it would engage in projects selected and partially financed by regional and local authorities. The remainder of the recruits' time was to be devoted to educational classes, vocational training and recreation. The recruits would be given free food, lodging, uniforms, and medical treatment. They would also be given a monthly payment of shs. 25/-(later reduced to shs.20/-) of which shs. 10/- per month would be held in a savings account and paid to the servicemen at the termination of their service.

Manpower targets set forth in the plan called for the service to attain a maximum operating size by July 1, 1965. At that time it was expected that the service would

be handling a complement of 10,000 youths. As interim targets toward attaining this goal, it was proposed that the first training unit with an initial contingent of 150 recruits be operational by April 30, 1964. Following this initial step it was proposed that seven field units occupied by 2,300 recruits, and two project camps, manned by 200 recruits for a total of 2,500 youths be operating by August 31, 1964. The third interim target date was January 1, 1965 at which time the number of youths in the service was to be raised to 6,000.[1]

The involvement of Fallon in the planning process of the service was important in at least two respects. While matters of objectives, control of the service, and distribution of powers and duties for the leadership were decided solely by the governing elite, Fallon, drawing upon his experience with the Civilian Conservation Corps, was able to contribute substantively to decisions concerning organization of field units and to specific details of camp development. More importantly, Fallon's involvement in the planning process was a positive factor in enabling the Government of Kenya to obtain financial aid for the service from the United States. All available evidence indicates that, although exploratory discussions with the United States Government in Washington

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[1]Kenya, Ministry of Labour and Social Service, Plan for a National Youth Service (final draft), March 12, 1964. (mimeo.)

had already been undertaken by the Kenya Government concerning such aid, Fallon knew nothing of these talks and had proceeded on his own. The result of this initiative was to involve an American in the planning stage, albeit in an advisory role. American officials in Kenya who favored providing aid to the youth service were able to present this fact in their discussions with the United States Government officials, especially AID personnel in Washington. Some of these officials were initially reluctant to have American money supporting a program which included members of African youth wings, the name youth wing suggesting to them radical, undisciplined nationalists.

American and British Aid

American Assistance

The initial exploratory discussions on the possibility of American aid took place in Washington during a visit to the United States in late January and early February 1964 by two Government of Kenya Ministers--Mr. James Gichuru, the Minister of Finance, and Mr. Bruce McKenzie, the Minister of Agriculture. The result of these discussions was an indication by high American Government officials that, if a sound plan could be formulated, assistance for a Kenya youth program might be possible. On March 20, 1964, the United States

Ambassador to Kenya, Mr. William Attwood, returned to the United States from Kenya with the plan for a youth service which had been prepared by Griffin and Fallon. The plan and the proposed form of aid were discussed at top levels of the American Government.[1] The result was a decision to provide assistance to the Kenya National Youth Service.

One reason for the United States decision was that the United States Mission to Kenya viewed the demonstrations in Nairobi in early 1964 as posing a potentially serious threat to the stability of Kenya and the new Government. At a minimum United States support for the youth service was seen as helping the Kenya Government to buy time while it got its feet on the ground and could develop more comprehensive programs for alleviating unemployment.

A number of AID officials expressed the opinion that a second reason for the United States assistance stemmed from a general policy of the previous Kennedy Administration to aid youth programs in developing areas whenever there was a feasible opportunity. AID had participated in similar, but smaller programs in Malagasy and the Central African Republic. These provided precedents for the United States commitment in Kenya.

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[1] In his recent book Attwood relates the events surrounding the decision to provide aid to the youth service. He notes that at various times the plan was discussed with President Johnson, Dean Rusk, and Robert Kennedy. Kennedy was then Chairman of the Inter-Agency Youth Committee. William Attwood, The Reds and the Blacks (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), pp. 160-64.

A third reason for the decision was an apparent American belief that if United States aid was not forthcoming, certain Eastern Bloc countries would be willing to provide such assistance. In his book Attwood states that:

> We heard reports that both the Russians and the Chinese were prepared to finance this project in order to model it after their own Communist Youth Brigades, complete with indoctrination by hand-picked instructors.[1]

It cannot be determined whether or not these reports had basis in fact, and whether or not the Kenya Government would have turned to Eastern Bloc countries for aid. However, research indicates that considerations along these lines were involved in the final United States decision.

Both the United States Government and the Government of Kenya were in agreement that the United States aid would take the form of financial and material assistance rather than "talking" assistance. Neither government was anxious to have United States personnel physically involved in advising the youth service. The Kenya Government did not desire this for either internal or external political reasons. It was felt that an American presence in the youth service would cause problems with the more nationalist elements in KANU and in the KANU youth wing. The United States Government

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[1] Ibid., p. 160.

felt that to involve American personnel would be to provide the Eastern Bloc countries with the basis for a request to participate in the youth service.

The final agreement for American aid specified a sum of three million dollars to be provided through AID over a period of three years for the purchase of supplies and equipment ranging from uniforms, shoes, and belts to trucks, bulldozers, and roadgraders.[1] The three million dollar figure was based on the assumption that most of the supplies and equipment would be obtained through the United States 608 Excess Equipment Program, a scheme whereby countries desiring low cost equipment can obtain used American military equipment. The usual procedure is that the equipment is obtained free with the recipient paying 15 per cent of the original cost of the vehicle for rehabilitation. The United States also agreed to provide certain foodstuffs through the PL 480 program.

The size and form of the American aid enabled the youth service to engage in work projects above the hand tool level at which most youth service type programs in Africa have had to work.[2] As time went on, the youth

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[1] U.S., US/AID, Project Agreement Between the Agency for International Development (AID), An Agency of the Government of the United States of America, and the Government of Kenya, Project Number 615-11-990-123, Agreement number 123-1-414, June 16, 1964.

[2] A number of the advisers to the service who work directly with the youth noted the importance of the [illegible] mechanical equipment as an incentive to work. Getting

service leadership was able to foster an image of the service as an organization which enabled the youth of the country to engage in large scale work projects contributing to the development of the nation. The service eventually reached a point at which it was specifically stated that it would not engage in projects which could be handled by community development efforts such as building schools and clinics. By fostering this image of the youth service as providing a service to the community, the leadership hoped to secure a continuing position for the youth service in Kenya.[1]

British Assistance

Given the decision not to involve American personnel in an advisory capacity to the youth service, the Kenya Government requested a team of advisers from the British Government. The advisers were to be

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the youth to perform manual labor using hand tools, given the low pay of the service, was very difficult. The opportunity to obtain some training in operating a bulldozer or other piece of equipment proved to be an important work incentive.

[1]One potential drawback to the American aid is the fact that it resulted in the youth service being a highly mechanized organization. The youth service in 1966 had between 400 and 500 new and used American cars, trucks, and pieces of road building equipment. The costs of maintenance and replacement of these vehicles is high. As long as the American aid program was in effect the cost of the vehicles did not pose a major problem for the NYS. However, the American aid program was due to end in 1967. Officials in the Ministry related to this writer that they felt a serious financial problem concerning replacement of vehicles would begin to confront the NYS by late 1968. See below, pp. 146-48.

administrative and training officers in the youth service. Personnel from Britain were sought for their familiarity with the British administrative system from which the Kenyan administrative system is modeled. It was felt that the British advisers would be of immediate assistance while advisers from other countries would first have to familiarize themselves with the British administrative system.

The British Government, through its Ministry of Overseas Development, agreed to provide eight advisers to the youth service: one staff officer to assist in the headquarters operations and seven training officers (only six were actually recruited) to assist in the operations of the seven proposed field units.

Five of the seven British advisers had had previous experience in Africa, four in East Africa. Five of the seven had also had previous experience in youth work, although none in working with a youth service type organization. One had lived in Kenya most of his life and had been associated with Griffin in his work with Starehe and the Youth Centers. A second had been a military instructor of a junior leader company of the Kenya African Rifles, while a third had worked in community development in Uganda. The remaining two advisers with previous youth work experience had worked with youth in Britain, one associated with the Young Men's Christian

Association and the other as a community youth organizer.

The Israeli Alternative Proposal

The introduction of British advisers to the NYS posed a political problem for the Kenya Government. It placed expatriates from the country from which Kenya had just won its independence in an organization which would be serving a primarily radical nationalist clientele. To forestall any potential political embarrassment over this, additional advisers and a large number of technical personnel were sought from multi-lateral sources and from countries which were not closely identified with Western colonialism or with Russia or China. One such country from which additional advisers were sought was Israel.

The Israelis have had a considerable amount of experience in planning and developing youth service type organizations both in Israel and in African countries. Their own national youth organizations, the Gadna and the Nahal, serve as models for their advisory work abroad. The Gadna is a youth organization for post-elementary school youth. Its activities combine para-military training with educational and sports activities and work on public service projects. The latter activities include teaching in immigrant villages, road construction, and help in hospitals. The Nahal is an organization within the Israeli Army which combines military service with agricultural training and settlement pioneering. After

basic training Nahal units move to frontier areas near Arab countries where they establish, develop, and defend new Israeli agricultural settlements.[1]

There is a strong emphasis in both the Gadna and Nahal organizations upon developing the social and civic consciousness of the youth and in instilling in them a sense of national purpose.[2] This emphasis is in part due to the particular situation of the Israelis in which they face hostile neighboring countries. They feel that it is necessary to make a conscious effort to impart to their youth a sense of national purpose and to impress upon them their important role in building and defending the country. The Israeli experience has demonstrated to them that when this is done successfully the result is a youth organization whose members are highly motivated to carry out whatever tasks they are assigned.

The Israelis have helped to plan and have supplied advisers to youth service type organizations in a number of African countries including Tanzania, Malawi, Ghana, and the Central African Republic. Their approach in these youth services includes the stress on developing social

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[1]Mordechai Kreinin, Israel and Africa (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), pp. 98-99. See also C. Rossillion, "Economic and Social Work for Young People during Defence Service: the Israeli Formula", International Labour Review, Vol. 93, No. 1, January 1966.

[2]Kreinin, op. cit., p. 98.

and civic consciousness and instilling national purpose found in the Gadna and Nahal. For example, in late 1959 the Ghana Government requested that the Israelis send a team of advisers to reorganize and supervise the formerly British-advised Workers Brigade. In a preliminary study the team concluded that the primary problem of the Brigade was its lack of purpose.[1]

The Israeli approach to the proposed Kenya National Youth Service was another example of their views on youth services. The representatives sent to Kenya reviewed the final NYS plan and expressed serious reservations. They were particularly concerned that the planners had not recognized what the Israeli experience had shown to be the unique character of the youth service type organization. A youth service is a focal point of an effort to involve the youth in the nation's struggle for development. As such it is different from the Boy Scouts, the Youth Centers, or the Civilian Conservation Corps. The Israelis felt that the proposed NYS was an enlarged youth center or CCC organization and that it ommitted critical ideological and political components designed to involve the youth in the nation building effort.[2]

The Israeli representatives submitted to the Kenya

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[1] Ibid., p. 100.

[2] Anon., A National Youth Service in Kenya (memo from Israeli Governmental representatives to the Ministry of Labour and Social Services, Government of Kenya, 1964), (mimeo.)

Government an alternative proposal in which they set forth the changes which they felt needed to be made. The principal aims of the Kenya NYS, as proposed by the Israelis, were:

(1) Above all to imbue the youth of Kenya with a love for the whole country and not only for their own regions;

(2) To become a strong support for the Government and the Party;

(3) To be on call for the execution of various urgent national tasks.

To achieve the above mentioned objectives not only in theory but in practive, a Youth Movement must be conscious of its own importance in the task of Nation Building.[1]

As a first step toward achieving these objectives the Israelis proposed the establishment of youth leadership training courses prior to any further implementation of the youth service. It was felt that only on this foundation could there arise a unified and viable youth movement in Kenya.

> . . . The ultimate success of the Youth Movement will depend on the complete identification of all the members with the Movement, and the identification of the Youth Movement with National aims and objectives. While technical and vocational training are important, it must be stressed that the vital aspect of the course is the building up in the instructors of this spirit of identification and national purpose which they, in turn, will impart to all the members of the Youth Movement in their own Regions.[2]

The creation of a youth organization which has a

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid.

strong ideological component and one of the primary purposes of which is "to become a strong support for the Government and the Party" carries with it certain dangers. Such an organization, for example, can become a highly politically oriented, paramilitary arm of the dominant party and/or the government for the purposes of maintaining the position of the leaders of the party and government. The Israelis recognize this but apparently choose not to accept responsibility. Kreinin wrote of the situation in Ghana with the Workers Brigade: "A body of 12,000 disciplined people can, of course, be misused. But it is not for their use that the Israeli advisers are responsible."[1] Evidence indicates that in Kenya the Israelis expected the youth service would probably develop close ties to KANU and the KANU youth wing despite the apolitical theme of the plan and the nation building objectives established for the service by the governing elite. In the words of one Israeli connected with the Kenya youth service, "the NYS can't be apolitical in a one-party state. Sooner or later if things continue as they are it will be the executive branch of the KANU youth wing."[2]

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[1] Kreinin, op. cit., p. 101.

[2] Owing to the current and sometimes controversial nature of the data, many of the interviews carried out by the writer were done with the stipulation that the names of those interviewed would not be made public. A complete list of the interviewees is provided the doctoral committee.

The Israeli alternative was not adopted by the Kenya Government for at least two reasons. First, at the time that Government was seeking to unite the peoples of Kenya following the political and tribal divisions of the pre-independence period. It was projecting the youth service as a nation building organization which was open to youths of all tribes and to youth who supported KADU as well as those supporting KANU. To closely associate the objectives and work of the youth service with KANU and to stress ideology and politics might have impeded the reconciliation efforts of the Government. A second reason was that the Americans were not particularly pleased with the amount of influence the Israelis seemed to want given the fact that the Americans would still have to finance the project. Israeli aid to youth services is only in the form of personnel and advice. They cannot afford to finance such organizations. The recipient country must finance their service from internal or other external sources. In the Kenya situation the Americans were not interested in financing an organization which would be planned, advised,and therefore possibly run by the Israelis.

The Israelis were unwilling to commit a large number of advisers to a project which they believed was badly conceived but about which they could do little to

change. Only one adviser was actually supplied to the youth service by the Israelis. This was both a token gesture to help maintain friendly relations with Kenya and to maintain some contact with the youth service which might be useful in the future. After the completion of the two year contract of the one adviser, the Israelis did not supply any additional personnel.

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The plan for the Kenya National Youth Service was largely the result of the efforts of two men, Griffin and Fallon. Both of these men had had previous experience in youth work and were able to draw upon that experience in formulating the plan. The decision by the governing elite in Kenya to accept this plan and the British and American aid offers rather than the Israeli alternative was a critical one for the future direction of the service. This decision meant that the service, whatever was done to incorporate members of the youth wings, would tend to develop along the lines of a rather apolitical nation building organization. Political affiliations between the service and any particular political party would be played down, if not actively avoided. Had the Israeli alternative been adopted, affiliation between the youth service, the KANU youth wing and KANU itself might have become a predominant feature of the service.

The planning of the youth service was undertaken

under intense pressure from the unemployed youth and from the governing elite. The plan was therefore drawn up and approved in a relatively short period of time. As a general framework from which to work the plan was useful. It was not, however, based upon detailed feasibility studies nor was it enhanced by any detailed planning for specific elements of the youth service programs. The result of the omissions in the planning process was that the youth service was in a chaotic state for almost two years. Youth were recruited into a service which was not sufficiently developed to absorb them. This, in turn, resulted in a great deal of unrest and disillusionment among the servicemen. The following chapter presents data relating omissions in the planning process as well as delays encountered in obtaining resources through foreign aid programs to the problems of the youth service in implementing programs and attaining the goals established for it in the plan.

CHAPTER FIVE

IMPLEMENTING THE PLAN: PROBLEMS OF DELAY

It was desirable that the action program outlined in the NYS plan be implemented in as short a time as possible. The program not only was expected to provide long term nation building and socio-economic benefits to Kenya through training youth for future productive employment and working on development projects but also had the short term benefit of absorbing a large number of young, umemployed men, thereby relieving an immediate economic and political crisis.

The March 1964 plan projected a maximum manpower total of 10,000 youth in the NYS at any one time. The target date for reaching this figure was July 1, 1965. Interim targets included 150 servicemen by April 30, 1964, 2,500 by August 31, 1964, and 6,000 by January 1, 1965. To form the substance of the project three specific programs were to be established: a work project program for enabling the youth to contribute to the economic development of the nation; a vocational training program to enable the youth to learn job skills; and an academic

program to improve the literacy of the servicemen as well as to provide them with some general education. These programs would need to be operational some time between May and August 1964 if the youth service were to have constructive outlets to absorb the energy and time of the youth.

However, implementation of the over-all youth service project lagged far behind schedule. The work project program began on a very small scale in January 1965 and did not attain full operating status until mid-1965. The vocational training program was not initiated until August 1966. Although academic classes were held for the youth during most of 1965, the academic program suffered from a lack of concrete objectives and a permanent place in the daily routine of the servicemen. During the latter portion of 1966 the academic program was suspended so that a complete revision of the program could be carried out. Finally, the manpower targets were not even approximated; in late 1966 the service had enrolled slightly less than 3,500 youths in contrast to the 10,000 which was planned for this time.

The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the process of plan implementation to identify the major factors effecting the substantial delays in program development. The vast literature on planning outlines many potential obstacles to plan implementation, e.g.

resource deficiencies, human resistance, inadequate preparatory work and procedural delays.[1] It is argued in this work that inadequate preparatory work prior to operationalizing the service and procedural difficulties encountered in obtaining needed resources through foreign aid were main contributing factors in the delays in implementing the youth service project and in the inability of the service to obtain expected benefits during the initial years of its operations.

Inadequate Preparatory Work

Planning has been defined as "an organized, conscious and continual attempt to select the best available alternatives to achieve specific goals."[2] Embodied in this definition is the reason why men plan. They do so as an aid in attempting to achieve their goals in the most rational method available. In a recent work John Friedmann describes a widely accepted planning model. The model involves five separate steps as follows:

(1) Surveying total system resources to discover where the main effort is required, to estimate its cost, and to envisage the alternative courses of action.

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[1]For data relating to obstacles to plan implementation, see Waterston, op. cit., pp. 293-368, and Bertram M. Gross, "Activating National Plans," Action Under Planning, ed. Bertram M. Gross (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1967), pp. 186-232.

[2]Waterston, op. cit., p. 26.

(2) Taking a general decision between these alternatives.
(3) Drawing up the program.
(4) Executing the program.
(5) Adjusting the program to changing circumstances.[1]

If planning is going to help men achieve their goals in the most rational method available then steps one, two and three of the above model are critical to the planning process. It can be assumed that the more a plan is based upon carefully obtained information about alternatives, resources, costs and the general feasibility of the proposed plan and its specific aspects, the greater will be the probability that the plan will service as an adequate guide to action in achieving desired goals.[2] However, experience has shown that

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[1]John Friedmann, "The Institutional Context," in Gross, Action Under Planning, op. cit., p. 34. Friedmann goes on to suggest that at step five, the introduction of feedback, the plan "ceases to be a stable set of goals and priorities for use as decision criteria." From this initial point he proceeds to discuss the merging of plan formulation and plan implementation into a single process where "synoptic documents are eschewed in favor of fragmented decisions, they are no longer an essential part of deciding and acting, the whole of planning becomes an extremely fluid, ambiguous and indeterminate network of information flows." Ibid., p. 37. As this dissertation is concerned only with the original planning of an organization and the attempts to implement the plan, Friedmann's argument on planning in the later stages of implementation is not applicable.

[2]This chapter is written in full recognition of the fact that a master plan concept, a plan which can be strictly implemented, is not a feasible or even a desirable model. Unanticipated conditions must be expected and these will force changes in the plan and in plan implementation schedules. However, the chapter is written in the belief that the more detailed work which is put

all too often the reality of planning is far from ideal. Planning is often a haphazard process based on inadequate information and carried out in too short a period of time. As a result plans frequently serve as inadequate guides to action. Delays due to inadequate planning are frequent and expected program benefits often do not materialize.

This section of the dissertation examines the inadequate preparatory work which went into the formulation of the NYS plan as a contributing factor to delay in implementing the youth service project. Two major inadequacies are noted: the omission of feasibility studies and the lack of detailed planning for specific programs of the service.

Feasibility Studies

The Importance of Feasibility Studies

Albert Waterston in his book on planning in transitional societies states that a primary cause of failure by the public sector to carry out programs within reasonable time periods is the inadequate attention, or total lack of attention devoted to feasibility studies before a program is finalized. A sound feasibility study provides specific data on technical, financial, and organizational aspects of the proposed project. This data is necessary

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into the plan of an organization before the execution stage, the lesser will be the likelihood that there will be a large gap between desired and actual performance. In transitional societies where immediate action is required to cope with problems and where resources are limited, large gaps between desired and actual performance can be very costly.

in order to determine whether and how a project can be carried out in accordance with sound principles and at a cost which is justified by the benefits the project is expected to provide. If carried out, such studies provide the planners with such detailed information as estimates of a realistic scope for the program and of the financial requirements as well as enabling the planners to establish realistic schedules for the execution of the program.[1] Without such studies Waterston found that the actual costs, benefits, and construction time often deviate substantially from original estimates.

> In the absence of reliable data which carefully prepared studies produce, sponsors of public sector projects tend to overestimate the benefits and underestimate the costs and time needed to complete projects, with the result that the projects almost always look much better on paper than they are in reality.[2]

In seeking to explain the dearth of feasibility studies in transitional societies Waterston presents three reasons, the first of which is the time involved in carrying out such studies. Given the demands for action, planners and decision-makers often do not feel that programs can be held back while studies are carried out. A second reason is the lack of technicians and/or money in the countries to carry out feasibility studies. This, he states, is no longer an insurmountable impediment since many international

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[1] Waterston, op. cit., pp. 320-21.

[2] Ibid., p. 326.

and foreign lending and donor agencies are increasingly ready to provide assistance for such studies. A final reason is the fact that in many countries the need for feasibility studies is not fully appreciated. There is a belief in many countries that the time and money devoted to such studies is wasteful, serving only to delay and increase the cost of the project.[1]

The Omission of Feasibility Studies in the NYS Planning Process

A full or even partial feasibility study was not included as a component of the planning process of the Kenya National Youth Service. One reason for the omission of a feasibility study was the lack of time for planning in view of the demonstrations in Nairobi in January and February 1964. Immediate action was deemed by the governing elite in Kenya to be necessary to meet the potential crisis. Certainly, once AID became involved in the project, manpower and financial assistance to make a feasibility study could have been provided if the Government of Kenya and/or AID had felt that there was time to carry out a study. Whether or not the planners and decision-makers in Kenya actually appreciated the importance of feasibility studies cannot be conclusively stated although the evidence presented below indicates that it was not felt to be necessary. The drawing up of

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[1] Ibid., pp. 325-26.

the original plan of the Ministry of Labour in late 1963 was not carried out under the intense pressure of early 1964. A feasibility study could have been carried out at this time.

The plan of the Ministry of Labour which was drawn up in the period between October and December 1963 was the product of a part-time effort of a few individuals. It was not based upon, nor did it recommend a feasibility study.

> It is not recommended that time and money should be spent on a Survey. The general size of the problem is known from a comparison of the population and unemployment statistics, and is so vast that there is no danger of forming too many Units.[1]

Consequently, studies dealing with such aspects of the project as the costs of the proposed program, the financial resources which the Government could make available for the service, whether this program would be the most satisfactory method of dealing with the young unemployed and the unemployed youth wingers, and what the youth could be expected to do after service was not carried out.

The plan of the Ministry of Labour was the only one which the Government of Kenya had to draw upon until Fallon presented his plan through the Ministry of Agriculture. Fallon's scheme, however, had many of the same strengths and weaknesses as the Ministry of Labour's plan.

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[1]Kenya, Ministry of Labour and Social Services, Plan for a National Youth Service for Kenya, 1963,

It began in a similar fashion with some general assumptions about the existance of a youth employment problem. It recognized the need to find immediate work for the youth and to provide them with vocational training and education. Its strength, like that of the other plan, lay in the fact that its author had had experience in youth work and in youth camp activity. It was thus able to make significant organizational contributions. Its weakness was that it also was largely a highly general plan not based upon information that a feasibility study could provide.

As set forth in Chapter Four, it was these two plans which were combined in the space of a few weeks and under emergency conditions into the plan for a youth service. The plan was a general one, based largely upon the knowledge and experience of the authors rather than upon detailed information provided by a feasibility study. For example, as will be seen below, sufficient consideration was not given to long range financing and to the cost of the United States aid program to the National Youth Service in the long run. The Kenya Government was to be responsible for the recurrent expenditures of an organization of 10,000 young men. Were these funds available? Would the Kenya Government be in a position to take over the financing of supplies and equipment once the three-year American grant had ended?

In a similar vein, long range planning with regard

to the impact of the service on the youth involved was not fully explored. What is the relationship between the training received in the service and the situation a youth is likely to encounter after he leaves the service? To put a youth through two years of training and work, providing him with material security, and then to return him largely unaided to a labor market in which there is little chance of employment may be to create more problems than are solved. This problem of post-service activities is one which has troubled a number of people concerned with youth programs in Africa.[1] The treatment of the problem by the Kenya planners--one which in no way guaranteed employment to any youth--may have been realistic given the Kenya employment situation. However, it did not solve the long range employment problem confronting most of the youth recruited into the service.[2]

The Effect of the Omission of a Feasibility Study on the Development of the Youth Service

As previously mentioned, Albert Waterston states that in the absence of reliable data obtained from carefully prepared studies, sponsors of projects tend

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[1]See, for example, Archibald Callaway, "African School Leavers and their Employment Problem," Community Development Journal, Vol. I, no. 3, July, 1966; and Inter-African Labour Institute, Symposium on Unemployed Youth (proceedings and contributions), (London: Commission for Technical Co-operation in Africa, 1963).

[2]See below, pp. 208-13.

to overestimate the benefits and underestimate the costs. The experience of the youth service provides a good illustration of this situation. When the service was designed it was expected that an early tangible benefit would be the removal of 10,000 youths from the ranks of the unemployed by July 1, 1965. However, by that date the youth service had recruited slightly less than 3,000 youths, over 2,000 of whom had been recruited between January and July 1965. In July 1965 recruit intake was lowered from about 100 per week to 150 per month owing to financial difficulties. From then until the end of 1966 the intake figure was only slightly above the number of youth who left the service. As a result the total number of servicemen in the service at the end of 1966 was just under 3,500. Reliable sources connected with the NYS indicated at that time that the total manpower of the service would increase only slowly, if at all, over the next few years. The limited number of youth recruited has meant that the utility of the youth service in helping to solve the unemployment problem has been far below expectations.

The cause of the delay in meeting manpower targets was the unanticipated and unexpectedly high recurrent costs of the youth service combined with the limited financial resources that the Kenya Government is able to

make available to meet the expenses of the service.[1] The Ministry of Finance budgeted £285,499 for recurrent expenses of the NYS during FY 1964/65.[2] Originally it set aside £500,000 for FY 1965/66. However, this was reduced in May 1965 to £445,000 owing to general financial problems of the Government. With this reduction and facing high recurrent costs especially in regard to administrative expenses, staff salaries and maintenance of heavy equipment, the leadership of the NYS was forced to drastically reduce the number of youth recruited into the service.

Research into the planning of the youth service indicates that the target figure of 10,000 servicemen recruited into an organization operating large numbers of heavy road construction equipment was not derived from an assessment of the costs of such an organization compared with the youth service's potential resources.

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[1]Although the Kenya Government received financial aid from the United States for the service this aid did not meet all the expenses. The agreement for the US aid specified that the money was to be used for the purchase of foodstuffs and supplies and equipment. The Kenya Government was to be responsible for the expenditures involved in the preparation of field unit and project camp sites and for the recurrent expenditures of the project.

[2]The Kenya Fiscal Year runs from July 1 to June 30 of the following year. Thus Fiscal Year 1964/65 runs from July 1, 1964 to June 30, 1965. Data on the expenditures of the Kenya Government for the NYS was taken from the following source: Republic of Kenya, Estimates of Recurrent Expenditure and Revenue of the Government of Kenya (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1964-67 inclusive).

Rather it was a figure which the governing elite and the planners felt could be approximated and, if so, would contribute significantly to relieving the general unemployment problem and the problem of the youth wingers. As it happened, the costs of the service dictated that a substantially lower number of youth could be absorbed.

Two cost projections were drawn up in March 1964 to provide AID with a basis upon which to figure its aid commitment, (1) estimates for the development and first year operations of a sample field unit and a sample project camp; and (2) estimates for subsequent recurrent expenditures of the field unit and project camps.[1] These figures were not based upon data provided by a detailed feasibility study but were, in the words of one individual associated with the planning of the service, "generalized in broad estimates." At the time no one knew what sites would be obtained for the service and therefore had no substantial idea of the costs necessary to make them ready for occupation.

Without a feasibility study providing data on a wide range of development costs and recurrent expenditures, the planners had no basis upon which to project realistic targets. It was experience which demonstrated the actual

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[1]The cost estimates which were included in the plan are found in the Appendix, pp. 261-72.

costs of the service and thus how many unemployed youth the service could support.

The omission of a feasibility study on the proposed youth service not only had a short run effect of causing the sponsors of the youth service to overestimate a critical benefit but also may well have led the Government to establish a service which will prove rather costly to maintain in the long run. Specifically, a study was not carried out to determine the costs to Kenya of the US/AID program. The three-year, three million dollar grant enabled Kenya to establish a rather impressive youth service, well supplied with excess United States equipment ranging from uniforms and blankets to almost 500 cars, trucks and pieces of heavy equipment.[1] However, with the completion of the three-year time period the Kenya Government had to take over the replacement of all supplies and equipment as it became necessary to do so. This has resulted in sharply rising recurrent expenditures.

A specific example of the rising recurrent expenditures concomitant with the phasing out of the U.S. aid program is the item in the NYS budget for the purchase of small equipment, uniforms, and furniture. In FY 1966/67 budget the amount specified for this item was £20,000.

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[1] Most of the cars and trucks were bought new in the United States and shipped to Kenya. The construction equipment was bought at 15% of cost through the 608 Excess Equipment program in Europe and Japan and was sent to Kenya.

The AID grant paid for additional purchases made in this category during that year. Budget estimate for FY 1967/68, the year during which the AID grant was phased out, for this same item was £61,000. An official in the Ministry of Labour expected that the amount for this item would "probably be much more in FY 1968/69 budget."

A more general example of the long run cost of the United States aid program is provided by a comparison between the estimated gross recurrent expenditures for the service for FY 1966/67 and for FY 1967/68. The FY 1966/67 estimated recurrent figure was £477,180. Estimates for FY 1967/68 recurrent expenditure based upon the same number of servicemen (3,500) and with no new project undertaking was £528,000.

If the NYS attempted to maintain its current equipment and supply levels, it was expected that the real financial problem would come with the FY 1968/69 budget. It would be this budget that reflected the complete exhaustion of the backlog of foodstuffs and equipment from AID. Also expected during that year were the first large expenditures for replacement of heavy equipment.[1] It was expected large increases in

[1]It had been hoped that these would be replaced by charging them to the budgets of the development projects on which the service worked. This is now expected to be a device for replacing only a portion of the vehicles because of the limited budgets for these projects. Others will have to be replaced through direct Treasury appropriations to the youth service or simply not replaced at all.

recurrent expenditures from the phasing out of the U.S. aid program which caused the projections that the NYS leadership would further delay any large increases in the total number of youth in the service for an indefinite period beginning in 1967.

The Planning of Specific Programs

The Importance of Planning for Specific Programs

A plan such as the one drawn up for the National Youth Service project is for the purpose of providing an initial guide to action. Ideally, the planners have studied various alternatives to achieving the desired goals and have selected one which seems to be the best. In any event the plan which is drawn up outlines the expected general form of the project, indicating its specific elements and setting its goals.

The next step in the sequence of planning and plan implementation is the detailed planning of the specific elements mentioned in a general plan. It is these which form the substance of a project. They are the means to attaining the overall objectives. However, it is often found that ideas which seem sound and fruitful when originally introduced in the general plan prove to be quite complex when the attempt is made to translate them into operating elements of a project. A not unusual occurance is that this fact is uncovered only through the process of trial and error.

In the case of the youth service three programs form the substance of the project: (1) the work project program, (2) vocational training program, and (3) academic training program. Their combined purpose is to enable the youth service to contribute immediately to the economic development of Kenya and at the same time aid in solving the unemployment problem by providing the youth with the opportunity to obtain skills which will help them obtain employment after leaving the service.

The Lack of Planning for Specific Programs in the NYS Planning Process

The Government of Kenya was under much pressure from the youth wing and the unemployed in general to operationalize the various publicly announced employment programs of January-February 1964. The political and economic circumstances existing in Kenya at the time seemed to warrant the call for swift action. Immediately following the acceptance of the general plan by the decision makers, Geoffry Griffin, the director designate, and one of the NYS planners, with the aid of a few Kenyan and expatriate assistants, was called upon to undertake the task of establishing the basic framework for operationalizing the youth service. Their declared task was to reach or approximate the targets set forth in the plan, which hindsight has proved to be totally unrealistic.

From March until mid-August 1964, the time at

which the first unit of the NYS, the Nairobi Training Unit, was officially opened, the leadership of the service devoted itself to obtaining and developing the headquarters and initial field unit sites for the service, filling staff requirements, ordering supplies and equipment for the men, and establishing and implementing a recruitment system. These and other essential tasks were necessary simply to prepare the service to induct youth and to provide for their basic needs. Given these tasks, little time was available for detailed planning of the specific programs of the service. As a result numerous delays were encountered in operationalizing the programs. As will be seen,[1] some of these delays directly affected the relationship between the NYS and many of the servicemen.

The Effect of Lack of Planning for Specific Programs

Delay in the Work Project Program

The work project program was included as a component of the youth service in order to enable the servicemen to contribute their energies to the development of the country. However, the youth service did not initiate any work projects until January 1965. From January to June 1965 it engaged in a few small scale work projects in the national parks and built a minor access

[1]See below, pp. 192-96.

road to a park for the city of Nairobi. It was not until the second half of 1965 that the service began work on development projects on a scale that had been envisaged by the planners. The delay in implementing the work project program was in part the result of the inability of the youth service leadership to obtain work projects. A primary contributing factor to this inability to obtain projects was inadequate preparatory work in the planning of the work project program.

Two decisions which had a direct influence upon the work project program were made during the planning process. First, prior to the consolidation of the plans of the Ministry of Labour and of the Ministry of Agriculture, the decision was made to place the youth service under the control of the Ministry of Labour. This decision was made in view of the employment crisis with the NYS seen as one of several programs to relieve unemployment. As the decision concerned the work project program, it meant that the youth service was placed under a ministry which was not directly responsible for resource development. Consequently, work projects had to be sought from other ministries charged with responsibility for such projects. Had the youth service been placed under the control of the Ministry of Agriculture or the Ministry of Works, for example, the problem of obtaining work projects would not likely have arisen.

A second factor affecting the work project program was the decision to finance the work from the development budgets of the ministries which had responsibility for the respective projects. The planners believed that the youth service would meet its operating costs for work projects including the replacement of heavy vehicles by charging these costs to the ministry concerned. No provision was made for financing work projects from youth service sources either in the cost estimates or in the budget of the youth service.

No attempt was made during the planning process to specifically determine whether other ministries would cooperate in the work project program. Neither was any procedure established which would guarantee the youth service the opportunity to engage on work projects. As a result, unanticipated delays due to refusals by departments in a number of ministries to provide the youth service with funded projects were met by Griffin and Fallon in their attempts to obtain work projects.

At various times between May and October 1964 Griffin and Fallon held discussions with representatives of the Departments of National Parks, Land and Settlement, Veterinary, Agriculture, and Forestry as well as representatives of the Ministry of Works. These discussions did not result in the funding of any work projects. Among the specific reasons provided by those interviewed by

this writer for the lack of success in the attempt to obtain work projects are the following:

1) The Ministry of Agriculture, which had suggested a number of possible projects in its plan, rapidly lost interest in the service once it was placed under the Ministry of Labour. It quickly found other means of carrying out the suggested projects.

2) Most of the representatives of the departments contacted stated that it was the policy of their departments to build up their own equipment and manpower resources and utilize these on development projects or to have a work organization of proven ability such as the Ministry of Works carry out the work.

3) There seemed to be a general apprehension among the various department officials about having youth wingers involved in the work of their departments. For example, the Director of National Parks told Griffin and Fallon that he could not afford to have "undisciplined youth wingers" in the parks disrupting both the game and the visitors.[1]

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[1]This uneasiness about youth wingers was a widely held attitude. In early 1965 the director of the service, Griffin, through personal contacts with the manager of the Agricultural Society of Kenya (ASK), obtained for the service the job of having servicemen act as gate keepers, arena stewards, and general attendants for the Nairobi Show. (The Nairobi Show is the primary yearly agricultural exhibition sponsored by the ASK.) When it was first announced that

The only work projects which Griffin and Fallon could obtain were a few which the various departments wanted carried out but for which they did not have funds. However, the financial position of the youth service precluded its undertaking any projects which had to be financed from its own budget.

Faced with a dearth of projects, the leadership of the youth service and officials in the Ministry of Labour turned to the Ministry of Finance. In October 1964 a meeting was held attended by Griffin, officials of the Ministry of Labour, and of the Ministry of Finance to explore methods of obtaining work for the service. The result of this and subsequent meetings was that the Ministry of Finance made development funds totalling £6,000 (about $17,000), over and above the regular development budget, available to the National Parks Department for development projects with the condition that the work be done by the NYS.[1] This enabled the youth

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youth servicemen would serve in this capacity, the staff of the show were described as "throwing up their hands in horror" and as predicting that petty theft would lead to potentially large losses from the till and that a generally rowdy crowd of youth wingers would cause enormous problems for the show. The generally good job done by the servicemen at the 1965 and then the 1966 Nairobi Show changed the attitudes of many toward the service.

[1]It is interesting to note that this was done while the Director of National Parks who had been opposed to the youth service participating on park projects was on home leave. Upon his return to Kenya he was favorably impressed with the work done by the service ahd requested that the service continue to carry out projects in the parks.

service to engage on a number of small work projects from January to June 1965. The satisfactory manner in which these jobs were completed, combined with the establishment of a regular procedure for selecting youth service work projects discussed immediately below meant that during the latter half of 1965 the NYS could begin full-scale operation of its work project program.

The regular procedure for obtaining work projects which was adopted in early 1965 made use of the Ministry of Finance's role in allocating money for the development budgets of various ministries. Representatives of the Ministries of Finance and Planning, in consultation with the President's Office, review the list of proposed development projects for the coming fiscal year. They select a number of projects which they feel the youth service is equipped to handle and, after consultation with the ministries who would have responsibility for the projects, submit these to the youth service leadership. These are then reviewed by the leadership to determine whether or not the service can undertake the projects. If sufficient youth service manpower and equipment is available, the youth service leadership accepts the projects. The service is then designated by the Ministry of Finance as the agency for providing the labor and equipment to carry out the specific development project.[1]

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[1]The youth service pays the cost of food, clothing, and housing of the youth on the various work projects as well as providing most of the construction equipment. The

Had a study been undertaken during the planning process of the youth service to determine the feasibility of the proposed plan for the work project program, the resistance of other ministries to the youth service would have been revealed. Steps could have then been taken to resolve the difficulties before the youth service became operational and began recruiting youth. In any event, the problem was not uncovered during the planning process. The result was the delay of almost a year in operationalizing the work project program.

Delay in the Vocational Training Program

The vocational training program is as important to the success of the youth service as the work project program. It was realized by the governing elite and the planners that some form of "quid pro quo" relationship was necessary in the youth service programs. As a requirement of joining the NYS, youth were asked to contribute initially one and later two years of their lives to the development of the country. In return for this service, they would be offered vocational training which would help them obtain permanent skilled employment after completion of their service. Thus in one sense the vocational training was an incentive for motivating youth to work on nation building projects. In another sense, however, it was a requisite which the NYS had to provide to meet the demands of unemployed youth

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cost of operating the equipment as well as other expenses involved in the projects are charged to the development budgets of the various ministries concerned.

wingers.

The vocational training program did not commence until August 2, 1966, well over two years after the plan for the youth service had been finalized and almost two years after the first youth had been recruited. As will be seen, the lack of a vocational training program was a primary cause of unrest in the service during 1965.[1] There were two main reasons for the delay in starting a vocational training program. One, which will be discussed in a subsequent section of this chapter, was the dependence of the service on foreign sources for human and material resources needed for the program.[2] The second was the almost total lack of planning and preparation for a vocational training program undertaken by the planners and administrators of the service.[3]

In August 1964 a training specialist was sent to Kenya by the International Secretariat for Volunteer Services, the organization to which the youth service leadership and the Kenya Government had turned to obtain vocational training instructors. He was supplied to the youth service on a temporary six weeks basis to help plan

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[1]See below, pp. 192-96.

[2]See below, pp. 169-80.

[3]The term planners and administrators is used due to the fact that many of the same youth service personnel were deeply involved in both the planning and the administration of the service.

various training programs. When he arrived he was confronted with a situation in which he was able to formulate only a general vocational training program. He found that little had been done to develop background information regarding the focus and level of vocational training to be given and regarding the qualifications of the youth who would participate in the program. Similarly he found that no preparations had been made to prepare facilities to house the program. In his initial report to ISVS headquarters he stated:

> It is thus apparent that decisions concerning the trade or technical training to be given are not supported by known requirements but rather based upon general assumptions and judgments. . . . There are no technical instructors available, desks, chairs, blackboards, or training aids, . . . AID materials now expected late September, middle of October and early November. NYS has not prepared facilities during present period for the installation and use of machinery which has been procured. Construction of facilities will further delay the self-building program and specialized training (if wait until equipment is received).[1]

The ISVS training specialist devoted most of his six week stay in Kenya to assisting in the development of a basic training program as well as helping to establish the Nairobi Training Unit. His attempts to develop a plan for a vocational training program proved to be largely abortive. The leadership was able to present him only with some general guidelines, i.e., that the servicemen would devote approximately two-thirds of their time to work

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[1] First Report of ISVS Specialist to Kenya National Youth Service, A report to the International Secretariat for Volunteer Services, August 27, 1964, (typewritten).

projects with the remainder devoted to education, recreation, and vocational training. The vocational training was to be a combination of on-the-job training at the work projects balanced with classroom instruction and workshop training given at the field unit locations. Based upon these guidelines and data concerning the educational level and work background of the first recruits which the training specialist was able to obtain from personal interviews, a general vocational training program was drawn up. However, due to the lack of facilities, equipment, and instructors and the uncertainty about field unit and project camp locations, this plan proved at best a general guide from which could be developed more detailed plans. In his final report the training specialist stated:

> The establishment of a training program which can be continued during work projects at isolated locations and without fixed training equipment and facilities presents a complex training problem. It will require the assistance of training specialists in on-the-job training, programmed instruction and advanced technology of training. For this reason I strongly recommend that the ISVS provide from the USA a team to plan and implement such a program through one servicemen cycle with the stipulation that this team concurrently train the resident staff in the supervision and conduct of the program.
>
> The immediate manning of the expatriate training officer spaces (the 5 technicians and volunteers requested bilaterally by the Government of Kenya) by ISVS is a matter of the greatest urgency. Failure to move effectively and promptly in this area will probably be the critical factor in the success or failure of the whole program. No organization of this magnitude can be effective without an adequate well trained staff. The

leadership is outstanding but at present seriously handicapped by lack of staff.[1]

Following the departure of the ISVS training specialist no further planning for a vocational training program was carried out. As a result, when the few ISVS volunteers who had been recruited as vocational training instructors finally arrived in the spring and summer of 1965, there was no structured program available within which they could utilize their talents nor were there tools or facilities with which to work. Instead of working as vocational training instructors, they were committed piecemeal to various field units and project camps to assist in any manner they could.

As was demonstrated by the failure of the first effort to establish a vocational training program[2] and the subsequent effort in 1965/66, developing such a program requires extensive research, planning, and organization by planners and administrators both before and after the arrival of the training team. Such preparation is necessary in order to provide sufficient data and program goals necessary for the team to develop a detailed program which will meet the needs of the organization.

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[1]Final Report of ISVS Specialist on Six Week Assignment to Kenya National Youth Service, A report to the International Secretariat for Volunteer Services, (undated), typewritten.

[2]As mentioned previously, inadequate preparatory work was only one reason for the failure of this attempt to develop a vocational training rrogram. A second reason was the inability of ISVS to provide the personnel to operate the program.

Such supportive work was not accomplished by the youth service personnel during 1964.

Delay in the Academic Program

The academic program was included as a specific component of the NYS to achieve two general purposes. The first was to supplement the effort of the vocational training program to provide the youth with job skills. Specifically, the academic program would upgrade their reading and writing skills. Its second purpose was to broaden the youths' knowledge of their country, its history and government, through the inclusion of civics courses. Although academic courses were offered by early 1965, a unified academic program meeting the demands of the youth and possessing a clearly defined place in the routine of the service had not been implemented by the end of 1966. During the last three months of 1966 no academic courses at all were offered in the youth service.

A primary cause of the problems with the academic program was inadequate preparatory work. This resulted in a trial and error method of operation. In retrospect, planning and operating an academic program for individuals in the twenty to thirty age bracket who in the United States would be classified as hard core unemployed required a great deal of specialized knowledge, experience and planning. These factors were not present in the

case of the academic program of the youth service. What would have been helpful but was not done, for example, was an examination of the experience of similar organizations in other countries to see how they approached the problem of instituting an academic program.

There were three specific problems in the academic program during the first two years which hindered development of an effective program. The effects of each of these problems could have been reduced if more effective preparatory work had been undertaken into how to structure and operate the program. In the first place the program was not integrated into the daily routine of the servicemen in a fashion that facilitated the educational experience. The original guidelines for the NYS programs specified an approximate time ratio of 2:1--time spent on work projects to time spent on vocational training, education and recreation. As there was little or no vocational training during the first two years, the actual ratio was closer to 3:1--work projects to education and recreation. Initially a decentralized academic program was established at each field unit. The servicemen were given fourteen days of education and then were sent to the work camps for one and one-half months. At the close of that period they returned for another

two weeks of education. Experience proved this to be an unsatisfactory method. It was found that whatever had been taught during a two-week period was forgotten by many servicemen during the one and one-half months at the project camps.

To rectify this situation, the decision was made in mid-1966 to centralize all education at the Nairobi Training Unit. This was made simultaneously with other decisions centralizing all basic training at Gilgil Field Unit and all vocational training at the Mombasa Field Unit. The new plan provided for groups of servicemen to spend from one to two months at the Nairobi Training Unit taking various courses and then to spend six months on work projects. It was projected that later the intervals between periods of education would be reduced to four months. Whether or not this new plan has proven to be effective in providing the servicemen with a sufficient block of time to learn is not known. Immediately before the new plan was to be implemented a need arose for additional manpower on work projects. The result was that the academic program was suspended and during the final months of 1966 no formal education courses were provided.

The second problem was the lack of a goal for the academic program which was meaningful to the servicemen. The planners had envisaged the academic program as a

supplement to vocational training and as a method of providing some general education for the youth. However, experience quickly demonstrated that "education for education's sake" did not motivate the servicemen. Expatriates associated with the academic program and some of the African teachers related that most of the servicemen view education only in terms of exams to pass and certificates to be received. Without these, there is little motivation for the servicemen to study and to learn.

In an attempt to provide a meaningful and useful goal the youth service leadership sought to have servicemen stand for the KPE[1] and upon passing the exam to obtain a KPE Certificate. The attempt to connect education in the NYS to the regular school examination proved unsuccessful. At first, the Ministry of Education refused to allow servicemen to take the exam owing to the belief on the part of officials in that Ministry that academic standards and practices in the NYS deviated substantially from those set by the Ministry. Subsequently the Ministry relented but the internal administrative problems for the NYS of identifying those servicemen who were qualified to take the exam and of transporting them on a given date to test centers proved to be too difficult to surmount. After an initial effort

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[1]The KPE is the Kenya Primary School leaving examination.

to get the servicemen to the centers, the entire attempt to have servicemen take the exam was abandoned. Education in the NYS remains primarily "education for education's sake" with the accompanying motivational problems.

The third problem, one also contributing to the lack of motivation of the servicemen, was that of relating course material to the experience of the servicemen. Initially the NYS leadership turned to the Ministry of Education. As was previously mentioned, this Ministry was not particularly supportive of the academic effort of the youth service. It did, however, supply the NYS with extracts from its primary school syllabi for three levels of primary work. These levels corresponded roughly to Standards I, IV, and VII.[1] The material did not prove sufficient to develop an academic program. Given the general lack of interest shown by the Ministry, reliance for curriculum development and selection of course materials was then placed upon expatriate, but not necessarily "educational" personnel, and especially on a few Continental Europeans recruited through ISVS. These men had little familiarity with the British style educational system or with the type of educational materials utilized in Kenya. Instead of consulting with education experts in Kenya who were familiar with local conditions, they

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[1]Primary education in Kenya is composed of seven levels, Standard I through Standard VII which correspond roughly to the grade system in the United States.

set about planning the curriculum and obtaining material they felt would be useful. One example of the result of this endeavor was the purchase of civics textbooks written in Nigeria. The material in these textbooks had little relevance for East Africa or for the servicemen who could not relate their experience to the material presented in the books.

The experience of the youth service with the academic program during 1965 and early 1966 serves to illustrate, as does the experience of the work project and vocational training programs, the need for preparatory work prior to program implementation. Establishing an academic program for hard core unemployed and integrating it in a meaningful fashion with other aspects of the service was a task which required special planning and background work. This was not carried out for the academic program of the NYS with the resulting development of the program on a trial and error basis. In mid-1966 the failure of the program caused the leadership to seek its complete overhaul.

Administrative and Procedural Difficulties in Obtaining Resources

The initial plan of the Ministry of Labour prepared by Griffin in late 1963 was based upon the premise that Kenya would utilize its own resources to create the youth service. Emphasis was placed upon utilizing existing resources so as not to incur new demands upon Kenya's

limited finances. For example, extensive use was to be made of the existing physical plant of the Kenya Youth Centers. Similarly, instructors for vocational training could be drawn from the Youth Centers. The work of the service was to be oriented toward community development projects of a labor intensive, hand tool nature.

The introduction of American experience to the planning process and the possibility of sizable amounts of American aid brought about a radical shift in thinking toward the proposed service. An organization was now envisaged which would carry out large scale work projects utilizing heavy construction equipment and which would provide vocational training on a much more intensive and higher technical level than that provided by the Youth Centers. Concomitant with this shift in thinking concerning the nature of the NYS was a change in the source of resources. Rather than rely solely upon Kenyan resources, the planners sought to base the youth service to as great an extent as possible on resources provided by external sources. Supplies and equipment ranging from clothing and bedding to heavy construction equipment were to be purchased from American sources and paid for by the AID grant. Forty-three technical instructors and volunteers were sought from the International Secretariat for Volunteer Services, an international technical assistance agency. Administrative and training advisers

were requested from Britain and Israel.

While the decision to rely upon external sources for the resources of the NYS may have been beneficial to the financial position of Kenya, at least in the short run, and may have offered the possibility of establishing a much more comprehensive youth organization than that envisaged in the Ministry of Labour's plan, it meant that the youth service was dependent on foreign agencies for critical resources. This increased the likelihood that problems of delay would arise in the attempt to implement the NYS plan.

In a recent book on technical assistance, Sidney Sufrin notes the significance of administrative and procedural difficulties in implementing technical assistance agreements on projects in developing countries.

> The magnitude, timing and form of technical assistance have a great bearing on the effectiveness of a program. Failure often revolves around: (1) disagreements over priorities and strategies, (2) recruitment and utilization of personnel, (3) delays in commodity aid, and (4) budget-related procedures. Red-tape delays in getting approvals etc., are peculiar neither to the United States nor the host administration. These factors become repetitive and tend to appear in some form with great frequency in all administrations.[1]

Substantial delays were encountered in the process of translating signed aid agreements into resources available in Kenya for use by the service. The delays affected the implementation of the vocational training

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[1]Sidney C. Sufrin, Technical Assistance-Theory and Guidelines (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1966), pp. 47-8.

and the work project programs as well as slowing down the rate of recruitment in the early days of the service. The delays in the foreign aid program were largely administrative and procedural, affecting the recruitment of technical assistance personnel and the procurement and shipment of needed commodities.

This section of Chapter Five examines the difficulties experienced by the NYS leadership in attempting to obtain resources as a contributing factor to the delays in implementing the NYS project.

Technical Assistance Personnel

The Initial Attempt to Obtain Technical Assistance Personnel

Given the relatively small number of available qualified training personnel in Kenya and given the decision not to utilize the instructors who were associated with the Youth Centers, it was necessary to obtain vocational training instructors from foreign sources. The youth service leadership was also interested in obtaining personnel to supplement the efforts of Kenyan teachers in the academic program. As neither the Kenyan nor the American Government was interested in having the American personnel physically involved in the youth service, these positions had to be filled from non-American sources.

At the time of the formation of the Kenya National

Youth Service the Kenya Government did not possess a central agency to coordinate requests from its various ministries or departments for technical assistance personnel. It was the responsibility of each department or organization to obtain them without assistance through its own endeavors. Albert Waterston notes that this is not an unusual occurrence. He states that in transitional societies responsibility:

> . . . for engaging foreign personnel or acquiring technical assistance furnished by foreign governments and international volunteer or other agencies is frequently left with each operating ministry, department or agency in a recipient country. These organizations tend to consider themselves best able to ascertain and arrange for the procurement of their own technical assistance needs. This is sometimes true; often it is not. Even if true, it is nonetheless desirable the requests for foreign technical skills in a government which is importing a substantial amount of these skills be reviewed and co-ordinated at some point.[1]

The lack of a specialized organization for obtaining technical assistance personnel meant that the administrators responsible for implementing the NYS program, numbering not more than fifteen in the early months of 1964, and with little experience in obtaining foreign technical personnel, were responsible for recruiting such resources. As reviewed below the initial attempt by the NYS leadership to recruit needed technical personnel was unsuccessful. Technical personnel were requested from the International Secretariat for Volunteer Services, an

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[1]Waterston, op. cit., p. 396.

organization which, by itself, was unable to fulfill the agreement. It was later discovered that the request to this organization was only the first of a number of procedural steps which the NYS administrators would have to take if they were to obtain the personnel resources required. The NYS did not have the personnel nor the financial resources to take the necessary steps and to follow up its initial request.

Shortly after the announcement that there was to be a youth service in Kenya, the youth service leadership was approached by a representative of ISVS. ISVS was created in 1962 with a stated purpose of working "for and with governments that wish to establish, expand or exchange such programs."[1] This organization was established also to provide a means of coordinating requests for technical assistance personnel from developing countries with countries which are in a position to supply and financially support such personnel. Its operating expenses are financed primarily by the United States Government and a number of northern European countries which have or are developing programs for volunteer service abroad. The Secretariat is located in Washington, D.C. In early 1964 ISVS was just beginning to function as a working organization and its staff was particularly interested in involving the organization in a number

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[1]The International Secretariat for Volunteer Services, Informational Brochure (Washington: ISVS, 1965).

of projects in developing countries. In this way they hoped to establish a reputation for ISVS which would serve as the basis for future development.

There was, however, a difference of opinion between the staff of ISVS in Washington and the governments of most of the member countries as to the interpretation of the functions of ISVS. As listed in the ISVS brochure, the functions of ISVS are three: (1) documentation--collecting statistics and publishing material concerning volunteer programs; (2) sponsoring conferences and workshops on volunteer programs; and (3) technical assistance.[1] The difference of opinion arose over varying interpretations of the role of the ISVS headquarters staff in Washington in carrying out the third function. This was interpreted originally by that staff as giving them the power to commit ISVS to providing technical assistance experts to countries requesting assistance. However, most of the member governments were unwilling to give this power to the headquarters staff in Washington. As these governments were providing the personnel and the financial support for the volunteers, they wanted to retain the right to negotiate the actual aid agreements bilaterally with the country requesting aid. The role of ISVS and its staff, in the view of these governments, was limited to information gathering and clearing house services. Its role in technical assistance efforts was to be limited

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[1] Ibid.

to informing the member governments of the programs in developing countries which required technical assistance personnel. The crucial difference was the interpretation of the degree of participation of the ISVS staff in the actual process of obtaining the personnel. This problem of conflicting interpretation has now been solved in favor of the position of the member countries. One event which led to the resolution of this impass was the role which the staff of ISVS attempted to play in obtaining vocational training instructors and other volunteers for the Kenya National Youth Service.

Following a series of discussions involving representatives of ISVS, the youth service, and the Ministry of Labour, an agreement was reached which led to a formal request on June 30, 1964 by the Government of Kenya to ISVS for forty-three technical assistance personnel. It was the youth service leadership's understanding that with this agreement and request, ISVS would not only assume responsibility for recruiting but would also assume responsibility for arrangements for their financial support, transportation, and related matters. However, as noted above, ISVS did not have either the authority or the financial resources to make such commitments. It could only transmit information concerning the needs of the youth service to its member governments. Kenya would then have to engage in bilateral discussions with these

governments expressing interest in the project to determine if the governments would provide volunteers and under what conditions.

During the summer and early fall 1964, the leadership of the NYS operated under the assumption that ISVS would provide the forty-three technical assistance personnel. A more thorough investigation by those engaged in obtaining foreign technical personnel might have led to an awareness that the request to ISVS was only the first step in obtaining personnel and that this first step in no way assured the youth service that such volunteers would be forthcoming. The facts seem to indicate that the ISVS staff who approached the youth service were overly optimistic in their presentation of what ISVS was able to do. This led to specific verbal commitments which they did not have the power to fulfill.[1]

By early fall 1964 it had become apparent to the NYS leadership that ISVS by itself was not able to fulfill

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[1] As indicated in this paragraph the failure of the initial NYS effort to recruit technical personnel can be viewed as caused by inadequate preparatory work. This certainly was one cause of the failure. However, administrative and procedural difficulties also caused the failure. There was the administrative difficulty in Kenya that an agency for obtaining technical assistance personnel was not present thus placing responsibility for acquiring the resources in the hands of men with little or no knowledge of how to proceed. There were also procedural difficulties encountered with ISVS of first having to contact ISVS and then having to carry out bilateral negotiations with its member countries.

the agreement and that the NYS leadership would have to contact ISVS member governments bilaterally. The initial response of the governments to the request for personnel from the NYS which had been channeled through ISVS had not been promising. If technical personnel were to be obtained from these governments a concerted recruitment campaign would have to be undertaken by the NYS. However, the NYS had neither the personnel nor the financial resources available to undertake such an effort. Throughout the fall of 1964 they had to continue to rely upon the efforts of ISVS headquarters staff personnel to interest the member governments.

The efforts of ISVS staff to recruit personnel did have one tangible result. In October 1964 one Dane arrived in Kenya and was designated as the welfare and liaison officer for ISVS personnel. He was sent to Europe in December 1964--a trip financed by AID--as a youth service representative in an effort to interest European governments and private technical assistance organizations in the youth service. As a result of his efforts Denmark agreed to provide an additional six to eight volunteers, Sweden two, and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, a private West German technical assistance organization associated with the German Socialist Party--five. Bilateral negotiations between each of these and the Government of Kenya confirmed the commitments. The

Danes and Swedes arrived individually or in pairs between March and June 1965. The West Germans arrived in late summer 1965. These individuals were committed piecemeal to the various field units of the service and served in such capacities as farm managers and vehicle mechanics.[1]

The direct result of the failure of this effort to recruit necessary technical assistance personnel and in a reasonable period of time was a delay in the vocational training program. Given the previously mentioned lack of detailed planning for the program and given the lack of vocational training instructors, all hope of establishing a training program in 1964 and early 1965 was abandoned. As noted below, a totally new effort to obtain vocational training instructors and to establish a program was undertaken in early 1965. This effort was also hampered by administrative and procedural difficulties.

The Second Effort to Obtain Technical Assistance Personnel

In January 1965 the effort to recruit technical assistance personnel for a vocational training program through ISVS was recognized by the NYS leadership and by AID for what it was--a failure. Combined with this was the fact that a detailed plan for a vocational training.

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[1]Without a previously planned vocational training program within which they could work and without any coordination among the volunteers who did arrive, there was little else the youth service leadership could do with them.

program which any instructors recruited could operate did not exist. Owing to the need to establish a vocational training program it was decided that a new effort must be undertaken. In mid-January 1965 a member of the American mission to Kenya proposed to the Kenya Ministry of Labour that the Geneva based World Organization for Rehabilitation through Training (World ORT) be considered as an alternative organization for establishing a vocational training program for the youth service and for providing training personnel.

World ORT is a Jewish organization established in the late 1800's for the purpose of rehabilitating and training Jewish refugees. Recently the organization has expanded the scope of its activities to include establishing vocational training programs on a non-sectarian basis in developing areas of the world. World ORT had previously carried out a vocational training program for AID in West Africa. AID's successful relationship with World ORT in that venture induced the United States mission in Kenya to propose that World ORT take over the vocational training program.

After obtaining the permission of the Kenya Government to follow up on the proposal, US/AID brought the director of World ORT to Kenya for an examination of the NYS and to explore the possibilities of World ORT developing a vocational training program for the service. A

meeting held on February 25, 1965 and attended by representatives of the youth service, the Ministry of Labour, and US/AID, and by the director of World ORT resulted in a decision to have a World ORT team develop and implement a vocational training program. This agreement was subject to the formal approval of the Government of Kenya and World ORT headquarters and to the financing of almost the entire training program by US/AID. The target date for the arrival of the team in Kenya was July 1965. However, a series of procedural difficulties outlined below were subsequently encountered with the result that the full ORT team did not arrive until June 1966. The initial stage of the vocational training program did not begin until August 2, 1966.

Summarized briefly, the following procedural difficulties caused a delay of almost one year in the providing of a World ORT vocational training team:

(1) Owing to the established formal procedures of the Government of Kenya, which included sending the proposed request to a number of ministries for their consideration and approval, the formal request of the Government of Kenya to World ORT was not sent until April 20, 1965. This request was necessary before subsequent action could be taken. The AID/GOK agreement for funding the World ORT contract, which had previously been drawn up, was

signed a week later on April 27, 1965.

(2) A prolonged period of negotiations of approximately six months was required before a contract was signed between the Government of Kenya and World ORT. One of the reasons for this delay was the fact that World ORT's legal offices are in Washington, D.C. and its headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland. Documents concerning negotiations had to pass among three distant points: Nairobi, Washington and Geneva. A second reason included disputes over amenities and privileges to be provided team members by the Kenya Government. One such dispute concerned the length of time the team members would be allowed for importing such duty free goods as automobiles. Settling these disputes and writing them into the contracts took a considerable amount of time.

(3) World ORT did not undertake to recruit a team until after the contract was signed although they had been urged to do so by AID. The chief of party was not recruited until November 1965. The other five members of the team were not signed to contract until January and April 1966.

The designated head of the ORT team for the youth service arrived in Kenya in March 1966. By the end of May he had completed the detailed planning of a vocational

training program for the NYS. Operationalization of the program was delayed until August 1966 as a result of a lack of tools and equipment. On August 2, 1966, more than a year beyond the original target date set for beginning a World ORT-run vocational training program, a program was officially instituted. The delay had been caused almost entirely by procedural difficulties in the formal signing of agreements and in translating those agreements into resources available in Kenya.

Commodity Aid

The US/AID grant to Kenya for the youth service was "tied aid," that is, the money had to be used to purchase American equipment.[1] Exceptions to this could and were made, but only in "emergency" situations. Most of the money was utilized to buy American goods either directly from the United States or as military surplus from 608 Excess Centers in Germany, Spain, and Japan. The procedural difficulties encountered in the ordering and delivery of these goods caused delays in the development of the youth service.

The 608 Excess Program has both positive and negative features. It does enable developing countries to obtain a wide variety of surplus military equipment,

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[1]For a discussion of the positive and negative features of tied aid see I.M.D. Little and J.M. Clifford, International Aid (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1965) pp. 166-74.

excluding weaponry, at the standard rate of 15 per cent of cost plus shipping. This equipment ranges from such items as new but surplus boots, new or used blankets and hand tools to heavy construction equipment. There are, however, a number of negative features including the following four procedural ones.

First, in order to obtain the desired equipment it is necessary that the recipient send an agent to the centers to study the condition and availability of equipment. This is a costly procedure both in terms of financing the agent's trip and interms of time spent in the quest for equipment. However, there would seem to be no alternative, since:

(1) It is almost impossible for the operators of the 608 Excess Program to know in advance what equipment will be available. The Excess Centers are dependent for goods upon the decisions of the U.S. military as to what equipment is to be deemed surplus. Ordering from catalogs is risky and often results in placing orders for equipment that is not available and may not be available for some time.

(2) Ordering from catalogs without knowing that the equipment is available often results in personnel at 608 Centers placing substitutes in the order which the recipient does not want. Purchasing

agents for the youth service discovered that the attitude at the centers was "since it's free, send what we have and they'll be happy."

(3) A large number of organizations in many developing countries utilize this program. This results in a high degree of competition for equipment as it becomes available. An organization which is fortunate enough to have a representative at one of the 608 Centers when desired goods become available is more likely to obtain that equipment than those ordering by mail.[1]

Secondly, mechanical equipment such as that used for road construction, once ordered, must be reconditioned. The reconditioning is carried out by local firms in Frankfurt, Rota, Spain, and Tokyo, and delays of many months are not uncommon.

In the third place, the equipment must be crated and shipped to the recipient country. This procedure, as with the reconditioning of the equipment, can be a time consuming one.

Finally, NYS purchasing agents were not allowed to place orders for equipment while they were at the

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[1]The necessity for sending agents to the Excess Centers was discovered by the NYS through trial and error. Originally the ordering was done from catalogs and by mail. After a number of disappointments, the NYS adopted the practice of sending an agent. The first trip was undertaken in September 1965.

608 Centers. Under procedures established by AID and the Government of Kenya the agents were only empowered to have a "forty-day freeze for Kenya" tag placed on equipment which they felt the NYS required. They had to return to Kenya and consult with AID and NYS officials before filling out the proper order forms and submitting them through AID to the 608 Excess Centers. This procedure further added to the time necessary to obtain commodity aid.

Delays in obtaining needed commodities from 608 Excess had a direct effect upon the initial rate of recruitment of youth into the service and upon the implementation of specific programs. The NYS began recruiting youth in August 1964 concomitant with the opening of the Nairobi Training Unit. Recruitment in the period from August to December 1964 was held to a few hundred youth as the service awaited the receipt of clothing and bedding which had been ordered in the early summer. During October recruitment was suspended entirely owing to a lack of uniforms. These supplies arrived in quantity in late October and November. By January the NYS had sufficient supplies to begin recruiting youth at the rate of one hundred per week.

Early delays in receiving heavy construction equipment resulted in a lag in youth service participation on development projects. An initial shipment of fourteen

pieces of construction equipment, ordered in June 1964, arrived in Nairobi in January 1965. It was this equipment which the NYS was able to utilize in its work in the National Parks during 1965. A second shipment ordered in January 1965 arrived in June with other shipments arriving at intervals of a few weeks to a few months thereafter.[1] Although the NYS had been designated as the work force on two major road projects in May 1965, it was not able to begin actual work on one until August 1965 and on the other until September 1965, owing to a lack of sufficient heavy equipment.

A final example occurred with the effort to obtain equipment for the vocational training program. For almost two years there did not exist a detailed plan for a vocational training program nor were there personnel connected with the service who knew what equipment would be required. As a result NYS and AID personnel who ordered equipment from 608 Excess Centers had no guides as to what vocational training equipment would be needed. They were placed in the position of having to order equipment they thought, but did not know, might be useful. Consequently, when the World ORT team arrived in Kenya the NYS already possessed

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[1]The average time between ordering and receiving goods from 608 Excess Centers during the first three years was about one year with some orders taking up to eighteen months to be filled and delivered.

such large pieces of equipment as lathes and sheet metal cutters. That equipment might have been useful in the future but was of little utility in the basic technical courses planned by the ORT team and needed by the servicemen. What was required but not available were sufficient hand tools and similar relatively simple equipment vital to the program.

One of the first tasks of the chief of party of the ORT team after arriving in Kenya was to draw up a list of required equipment. In early May 1966 the equipment was ordered from 608 Excess. Although by June the program had been structured and the instructors were ready to begin operating the program, they lacked sufficient equipment. Thus the start of the program was further delayed. As there was no indication when the equipment orders would be filled, AID allotted an emergency fund of $1,000 to buy equipment locally and the program was finally operationalized on August 2, 1966. However, as late as November 1966 there was no indication as to when the tools ordered from 608 Excess Centers would be available. The ORT team had sufficient equipment to operate the program as planned until February 1967 when almost twice as many servicemen as previously were due to begin training. If the equipment had not arrived by that time, drastic reductions in the scope of the program were

anticipated.[1]

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The purpose of this chapter has been to examine the process of plan implementation to identify the major factors which contributed to delays in the development of the youth service project. One major contributing factor identified was inadequate preparatory work in planning the youth service. Important results stemming largely from the inadequate preparatory work were overestimation of the immediate benefits of the service, underestimation of the cost of the service to Kenya, and time consuming delays in operationalizing the specific programs of the youth service. A second factor identified was the administrative and procedural difficulties which were encountered in obtaining through foreign aid the resources necessary for the youth service. These difficulties were also a contributing factor to the delays experienced by the NYS leadership in implementing the youth service project. Using the data presented in this chapter on the problems of delay in implementing the plan for the youth service, Chapter Six assesses the extent

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[1]Additional equipment could not be bought locally because AID had allocated money for purchase of vocational training equipment on the basis of obtaining it from 608 Excess at 15 per cent of cost. To buy equipment in Kenya at full price would mean that the money allotment would quickly be used and the desired quantities of tools could not be purchased.

to which the service was able, during the period 1964 to 1966, to approximate the objectives for which it was established.

CHAPTER SIX

THE KENYA NATIONAL YOUTH SERVICE 1965-66

There were at least six objectives set for the NYS at the time it was planned.

(1) To put unemployed young people into an environment that will inculcate good citizenship and provide an opportunity to contribute to the social and economic development of the country;

(2) To promote national unity by bringing together young persons from all areas of Kenya for training and work in projects of national importance;

(3) To help alleviate unemployment and hardship among young persons by providing employment, education and training to prepare them for future productive employment after completion of their service;

(4) To contribute to the economy of the country by helping to conserve, rehabilitate and develop Kenya's natural resources;

(5) To provide an immediate means whereby the demands of at least a portion of the members of the youth wing could be met; and

(6) To provide the governing elite with one means of obtaining a degree of control over a potentially disruptive group in society.[1]

This chapter analyzes the NYS leadership's attempts during 1965 and 1966 to achieve these various objectives. For the purposes of analysis thes six objectives have been grouped under three headings. The first deals with the

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[1]See above, pp. 101-04.

servicemen. Its focus is on the attempt by the Government and the NYS leadership to utilize the NYS as a means of meeting the demands of the youth wingers and of obtaining, through a policy of inclusion, a degree of control over them. The second section deals with the role of the NYS in relieving the unemployment problem. The focus in this section is on the youth service as a means of enabling unemployed youth, regardless of background or political affiliation, to obtain job skills and employment. The final section is concerned with the role of the NYS in the struggle for nation building and socio-economic progress in Kenya. The focus here is placed on the service as a means of contributing to the economic development of the country and of fostering national unity.

The Servicemen

The Recruitment of Political Activists

The youth service was conceived in part to meet the demands of unemployed KANU youth wing members for some form of reward for the services they had rendered during the independence struggle. The youth applied intense pressure on the Government and on Parliament with the result that the elite deemed it necessary that something be done lest the youth become a serious political liability to them and an asset to various political groups maneuvering for power both within and

outside of KANU. By establishing the youth service with its proposed programs of vocational training, education and work projects the Government hoped to meet the needs of the youth and to attain a measure of control over them.

However, the KANU Government was confronted by other problems. In early 1964 the stability of the new government and, indeed, of the country was in doubt. For instance the strong force of tribalism was present and had been manifest in the struggle between KANU and KADU in the pre-independence period. Furthermore there were political factions within KANU competing with each other. A Government sponsored national youth service which would recruit only KANU youth wing members or only one faction within the KANU youth wing would have risked further disunity. The Government thus faced the dilemma of how to satisfy the demands of the politically powerful KANU youth wing and at the same time to use the NYS to foster national unity.

To cope with this dilemma the Government adopted a recruitment system utilizing the members of the lower House of the Kenya Parliament as recruiting agents whereby each MP was expected to select a number of youth from his district each time the NYS sought recruits. Although the total number each MP could recruit varied with each call-up, depending on how many the service could take, each MP had an equal number of vacancies to fill.

The recruitment system was supportive of the effort to attain the objectives of the NYS in a number of different ways. First of all, it was easily put into operation and was relatively inexpensive. Secondly, recruitment on the basis of youths from each district and by each MP meant that the various tribes, political parties, and factions within each party were represented on a reasonably equitable basis which contributed directly to the image of the youth service as a national organization. In the third place it enabled the youth service to secure the support of the MP's and through them local party leaders and branches of the youth wing. It established a patronage system whereby the MP's in consultation with party and youth wing leaders could provide youths in their districts with a reward for past services. Given the tribal and political suspicions and rivalries at the time, any other recruitment system could have led to criticism by KANU backbenchers and by the KADU opposition over such matters as tribalism and favoritism in recruitment. No doubt the recruitment system during the early days of the operation of the NYS contributed considerably to the almost total support it received from Parliament.

The initial recruitment system resulted in a high proportion of the servicemen being members of either the KANU or KADU youth wing or possessing other political

affiliations.[1] The MPs recruited largely on the basis of a political pay-off or for the purpose of removing from the ranks of petitioners young political activists who had been harrassing the MPs and local party officials. Reliable sources in the NYS indicated that many of the MPs selected individuals who were causing them the most trouble and sent them to the youth service. In addition many MPs ignored the guidelines for recruitment set down by the service. These guidelines specified that the recruits be between the ages of sixteen and thirty, unmarried and free from communicable diseases. Many recruits selected by the MPs were married and over thirty years of age. As noted below, the youth service encountered a number of problems with the youth recruited by the MPs.

Unrest Among the Servicemen

There is little doubt that most of the Kenyans who joined the NYS between August 1964 and June 1965 did so under the impression that it would be a steppingstone to permanent employment. Once in the service and with the discovery that it was primarily composed of drill and manual labor at low pay with no guarantee of employment,[2]

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[1]Given the extremely sensitive nature of this issue, official NYS data on the backgrounds of the servicemen could not be obtained. The assertion on the background of the youth is based upon extensive interviews with personnel associated with the service.

[2]The Director of the NYS related to this writer how on the occasion of the first intake of recruits in August 1964, he personally addressed them and emphasized that there

and no vocational training, many of the servicemen became disgruntled. They demonstrated their dissent in two ways.

First, they quickly learned to channel complaints to their MPs who, in turn, voiced these complaints and criticisms in Parliament. The complaints of the servicemen as voiced in Parliament were not only directed at the hard work and low pay but also at the lack of vocational training, for it was argued that their service in the NYS would not aid them significantly in finding future employment. The following examples are typical of remarks made by KANU backbenchers during late 1965 and early 1966.

(1) One MP, Mr. Barasa, referred to the fact that when the NYS had been introduced the MP's and youth had been told that the youth would receive industrial training so that they could obtain employment after service. The results of his conversations with servicemen led him to the conclusion that the training in the NYS consisted of woodcutting and bush clearing. He wanted to know what was being done to institute the promised training.[1]

(2) On January 28, 1966, another MP, Mr. Arap Too, quoted a disgruntled serviceman as stating the following:

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was no job guarantee from the NYS. This was stressed to all recruits upon entering the service.

[1]Kenya Parliament, House of Representatives, Debates, September 21, 1965.

'Well, I was taken to this National Youth Service. I have rendered my services, but I have been given a chit which says that this gentleman has been in our National Youth Service, he has been building bridges, he has been doing this and that; but Sir, does this help us at all? Sir, even the farmers in this country cannot employ people who have been building bridges.'[1]

(3) On the same day Mr. Anyieni issued a warning to his fellow MP's and the Government. He stated that unless the NYS was able to do something for the youth it was going to create more problems than it was solving.

So I want to say that in order to stop any problems which may arise, these youths when they are left in the constituencies or in Nairobi here, are not fools, they have been in politics for many years and know how to campaign against KANU and KADU and are politicians. You have been with them and know. The member may find when he goes home that these youths have mobilized the masses. When you go there to address a public meeting you will be stoned.[2]

(4) Finally, the following was expressed by a Mr. Mbogoh on February 10, 1966.

Mr. Speaker, Sir, the Youth Service when it was started was to deal with projects of nation building but when publicity of this service was given to the country, it was given in such a way that it almost induced the youth of this country to go to a service which they did not understand. When these youths entered the National Youth Service, they were not told within certain terms that 'you are not coming here for pay' or 'you are not coming here to further your knowledge, you are coming to uproot trees and to live under conditions which are more difficult than what

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[1] Ibid., January 28, 1966.

[2] Ibid.

> you are used to.' In fact, if they had been told that, some of those who left the jobs they were doing would not have left these jobs. They would have liked to continue with the jobs they were doing, at, let us say, the rate of Shs. 40 per month, instead of going to get Shs. 20 per month and dissatisfaction.[1]

A second channel for the expression of dissatisfaction was through the use of violent action. One such incident occurred at the Gilgil Field Unit on October 15, 1965 when a group of sixty servicemen demanding their release from the service surrounded the camp commandant's office. Insults were shouted at the Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Labour who was visiting the camp and stones were thrown at the police who were brought in to quell the disturbance.[2] Incidents such as this were not uncommon during 1965 and resulted in serious problems of discipline for the leadership as well as some unfortunate publicity.

With the realization that serious delays were going to be encountered in establishing the vocational training program under the auspices of World ORT and given the growing seriousness of the problem with servicemen dissatisfied over the lack of vocational training, the NYS leadership attempted to institute a crash vocational training program in the late months of 1965. But unfortunately it too proved to be abortive. The few ISVS personnel

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[1] Ibid., February 10, 1966.

[2] EAS, December 15, 1965.

brought in from the field to run the program had no overall plan to guide their efforts and little authority to take the necessary planning and implementation steps. There was also a serious shortage of equipment. In the welding course, for example, there was only one welder for a course attended by twenty-one servicemen. Finally, the servicemen designated to undergo training in this crash program were by and large the most vocal of the dissidents and often proved unmanageable. Faced with these problems, the attempt at a crash program was not successful and was quickly phased out.

A Changing Clientele

By April 1965 it had become apparent to the NYS leadership that the service, given the problems of program development noted in Chapter Five, was encountering serious difficulty in managing the politically-oriented, activist youth recruited by the MP's. In July 1965, concomitant with the previously mentioned sharp reduction in the numbers of youth recruited per month,[1] a new recruitment system was introduced. Primary responsibility for recruiting youth was taken out of the hands of MP's and given in part to civil servants at the district level and in part to the NYS leadership itself.[2]

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[1]See above, pp. 143-44.

[2]As might be expected many of the MP's did not support this change in responsibility for recruitment. It removed from their hands a source of patronage. This

Under the new system, which is currently employed, opportunities for induction into the NYS are publicized through the apparatus of the district administration. The youths fill out applications which are sent to the District Commissioner's Office. The next step is pre-selection in which candidates are considered by a board consisting of district officials acting with the advice of local party leaders. Those selected by the boards are then considered by a regular NYS recruiting team which travels throughout the country. Each district is allocated an equal number of vacancies during each call-up period.

The change in the recruitment system was dictated by necessity. To continue to recruit the type of youth

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was one of three main causes of a motion introduced by disgruntled MP's and debated in February 1966 to disband the youth service and to replace it with military service for all youth. A second cause was the growing unhappiness on the part of political activists with the NYS which was not meeting their expectations. In seeking a change in their situation they put pressure on the MP's who recruited them. A final cause of the motion to disband the service was the growing unrest among the backbenchers in the House which preceded the formation of the Kenya Peoples Union. However, neither all support for this motion nor for a motion presented in January 1966 expressing concern over alleged irregularities in the service and discrimination in selection of youths for permanent employment came from MP's who were to join KPU. The motion to disband the NYS was introduced by a KANU MP who did not subsequently cross the floor. This indicated that there were causes for the motion other than simply an early attempt by dissidents who would later join KPU to embarrass the Government. Neither motion was passed by the House.

inducted prior to July 1965 would have been to risk destroying the entire organization. In its rudimentary state of development and given the delays in program implementation, the youth service simply could not meet the demands of older, politically active youth who were seeking rewards in terms of permanent employment or, at a minimum, vocational training.

Accompanying the change in the recruitment system was an important shift of emphasis in the type of youth recruited. Previously emphasis in recruitment had been placed upon taking political activists who were seeking rewards for services rendered. Concomitant with the change in the recruiting system, emphasis on who was recruited shifted to unemployed youth in general and unemployed youth who were of a much younger age. Some political activists were still recruited but these were more carefully screened before induction and had to meet the requirements of age and be unmarried and unemployed.

Throughout 1965 most of the servicemen still fell in the political activist category and the service continued to have disciplinary problems. However, as these youths either quit the service or were discharged after completing their term of service, a different type of youth began to predominate. The youth recruited under the new system were younger and of a more manageable age, as well as unmarried and unemployed. The average age of

the servicemen dropped from twenty-five in the period prior to July 1965 to twenty by the end of 1966. Many of them had never been connected with political parties or with the youth wings. Finally, as illustrated in Table 2, they tended to be better educated.

TABLE 2

LEVEL OF EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT OF NYS RECRUITS[a]

Level	Old Recruitment System	New Recruitment System
A	14.2%	16.6%[b]
B	12.4%	4.1%
C	33.4%	15.0%
D	40.0%	46.0%
E	. .	18.3%
Total	100.0%	100.0%

[a]Key to educational levels is as follows:
A--illiterate
B--Standards I to III
C--Standards IV to V
D--Standards VI to VIII
E--KPE Certificate and attendance at secondary school

[b]The increase in the percentage of illiterates under the new system is accounted for by the fact that large numbers of Somali-speaking youths from the North-eastern Province were recruited into the NYS after July 1965. Almost all of these youths are illiterate. The special effort to recruit Somalis is part of a general Government effort to demonstrate to the Somali-speaking people that the Kenya Government is actively working to better their lives. Since independence the Northeastern Province had been the scene of a guerrilla war carried out by Somali-speaking people in Kenya who wanted their land to be included as part of Somalia rather than as part of Kenya.

Source: Kenya National Youth Service

Assessment

The attempt by the Government to utilize the NYS as a means for meeting the demands of the youth wingers and for obtaining a measure of control over them had proved to be both a success and a failure during the period 1965-66. It was a success in the sense that during the critical post-independence period it did provide the government with a means of temporary control over some of the youth wingers. The NYS absorbed a number of the most vocal political activists and, at least for a period of time, removed them as a threat to the stability of the government and of the country. It was a failure, in that it was unable, for reasons noted in Chapter Five, to meet the demands of the youth wingers for job training. Due to this and to the almost total emphasis on manual labor at low pay, the initial complement of youth became disillusioned with the service. Subsequent unrest forced the NYS to change its recruitment system with the result that the numbers of political activists was reduced. During the period 1964 to 1966 the NYS was unable to provide for the long range future of the political activists. Owing to this fact and to the change in the type of youth recruited, the extent to which the NYS helped the Government obtain control over the youth wingers was much less than anticipated.

The change in the recruitment system brought into the service younger personnel much more amenable to discipline. Together with the initiation of large scale work projects in late 1965 and the initiation of vocational training in late 1966, the change in recruitment proved to be a key factor in changing the outlook of the youth service leadership during 1966 from one of pessimism to one of guarded optimism.

The Role of the NYS in Relieving Unemployment

The attempt of the Kenya Government to help relieve the unemployment problem by means of the National Youth Service had three goals. In the first instance the recruitment of unemployed youth into the service served the immediate need of removing the youth from the ranks of the unemployed. The second goal and the one deemed most important was a combination of vocational training and academic programs designed to provide the youth with skills which would enhance the likelihood of their obtaining subsequent employment. Finally, the leadership of the NYS sought to obtain employment for the youth after service although no guarantee of employment was provided.

Numbers of Youth Recruited

In Chapter Five it was stated that the governing elite and the planners of the NYS hoped that the NYS would

be able to absorb 10,000 unemployed by mid-1965 and maintain that level thereafter. Owing to the unforeseen high recurrent costs of the NYS and the limited financial resources which the Kenya Government could make available for NYS expenses, this figure was not approximated. Between mid-August 1964 and December 1966 a total of 6,870 youths were recruited into the service. The maximum number in the NYS at any one time during that period was 3,500, reached in late 1966. In December of 1965 the original goal of 10,000 youths was revised downward to 7,000. Whether or not this figure would be approximated was dependent upon the financial resources of the service. As of late 1966 the leadership did not anticipate attaining this figure in the foreseeable future. The NYS has made a contribution to the immediate relief of unemployment but this contribution has been far less than was anticipated.

The experience of the NYS through 1966 indicates that, with its high recurrent costs, it is not the ideal vehicle for making a significant contribution to the immediate relief of the unemployed. That there is a need for immediate employment projects in Kenya is apparent.[1] However, given the large numbers of unemployed,

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[1]One instance of the kind of situation the NYS recruiting team faces is the following, which occurred in Nairobi during 1966. The recruiting team sought to recruit fifty youths from Nairobi. On the day of

(233,100 registered as work-seekers in early 1964),[1] the intake of 6,870 over a two and one half year period must be regarded as a minimal contribution to solving the problem. It would seem that if the NYS is to prove of continuing usefulness to Kenya it will have to be in the areas of training small numbers of young Africans to occupy positions as skilled and semi-skilled workers and craftsmen and of contributing to the nation building through its work projects program.

Job Training for the Servicemen

The plan of the youth service called for establishing a vocational training program, supplemented by an academic program, for the purpose of providing the youth with an opportunity to acquire job skills. The vocational training program, for reasons previously noted, was not implemented until August 1966 while the academic program had to be completely revised in the closing months of 1966 after the NYS leadership had experienced a number of problems. As a result, through the end of 1966, tangible results in terms of servicemen who has completed the envisaged vocational training and academic programs in the service had not been obtained.

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recruitment between 300 and 400 unemployed youths who had filled out applications were competing for the fifty openings. Similar situations have been encountered by the recruiting team in other areas of Kenya.

[1]See above, pp. 70-71.

The vocational training program which the World ORT team designed and which was initiated in August 1966 involved providing each serviceman in the program with three eleven-week courses with each course separated by eleven weeks of field training. This field training, in theory, would enable the servicemen to put into practice the knowledge obtained in the classroom and workshop. The progression of the vocational training program was designed as follows: one hundred servicemen would be involved in the initial introductory course. At the close of this course the group would return to field units and another group would begin the introductory course. Following the completion of the second eleven-week period, the first group would return for their intermediate course, the second group would be assigned to their units for field work and a third group would begin the introductory course. By the third eleven-week period there would be two hundred servicemen involved at the vocational training center and by the fifth period three hundred--one hundred for each of the three courses. It was hoped that eventually facilities would be established for training 500 to 1,000 servicemen at any one time.

The specific objective of the vocational training program was to provide the servicemen with the knowledge and skill necessary to pass the Kenya Grade Test II. The

Grade Test II is one of three exams established by the Ministry of Labour for the purpose of grading individuals who seek employment as craftsmen. Successful passage of any of the three examinations, Grade Test II being the intermediate exam, enables the individual to receive a Government certificate showing that he possesses job skills at the indicated level. Possession of a certificate proving one's qualifications greatly enhances the likelihood that the holder will obtain employment as a craftsman. This is especially true if one holds a certificate demonstrating that he has passed Grade Test I, the most demanding, or to a lesser extent, Grade Test II. Grade Test III is the basic exam, qualifying one primarily for semi-skilled work.[1]

As of late 1966 the first group of servicemen had completed the basic course in mechanics, carpentry, or masonry and had gone to various field units for eleven weeks of field training. A second group had begun the basic course. To a great extent the success of the program was dependent upon whether the World ORT team received the tools and other required equipment in sufficient quantities to support the projected increases in numbers of servicemen to be trained.

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[1]The Kenya Government Grade Test II for a fitter, for example, tests the use of precision instruments, elementary techniques for heat testing of metals and knowledge of different methods of lubrication.

The revised academic program was designed to be primarily, although not entirely, supportive of the vocational training program.[1] The science and math courses were to be oriented, as much as possible, to providing background knowledge for use in vocational training. The language course would be for the purpose of upgrading the servicemen's knowledge of English, the language utilized in the vocational training program. As the academic program could not be used for the purpose of enabling the servicemen to pass the KPE, it was hoped that by integrating the work to vocational training, the academic program would proved to be of more relevance to the servicemen than it had been previously.

The revised academic program proposed to divide the servicemen into five divisions as follows:[2]

A--illiterates only
B--Standards I and II
C--Standards II, IV, and V
D--Standards VI and VII
E--Post-KPE

Courses were designated as being offered at each level

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[1]The primary exception is the civics course which was to acquaint the youth with a knowledge of his country and was thus part of the stress upon the nation and national unity found in the NYS.

[2]Note that these five divisions are not identical to the educational levels shown in TABLE 2, which merely describes the distribution of recruits by educational attainment. The data here is given as it was used for the academic program as of late 1966. The levels here include Standard III in division "C" and eliminate Standard VIII.

in science, math, civics, and languages with the exception that science was not taught at the first two levels. The general content of the courses was as follows:

Science:
Stress was to be placed on introducing the servicemen to basic physical laws such as the principle of the lever and causes of shorts in electrical systems.

Mathematics:
A progressive course giving approved forms of mathematics as set forth in the KPE requirements.

Civics:
Primary stress was to be placed on exercises and descriptive material concerning Kenya society. This began with forms and functions of village councils and worked up to the national government. The youth would pay visits to institutions such as courts and local councils. There was also to be a certain amount of formal history and geography for the purpose of placing Kenya in its larger context.

Language:
English, with Swahili used in the first two levels as a supporting language for beginners in English.[1]

The job training effort of the NYS was vital to the success of the whole NYS project. If the effort proved a success the NYS would be able to claim that it was providing an important service to Kenya in giving job training to Africans who would otherwise be unable to obtain such training. If it was not successful then the NYS might encounter the same problems of unrest and frustration felt by servicemen during 1965 owing to an inability of the service to meet the needs of its clientele.

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[1]The description of the content of the educational courses was provided by H. E. H. Jensen, Welfare and Liaison Officer, Kenya National Youth Service.

Employment After Service

The third and final aspect of the attempt by the Kenya Government to help relieve the youth unemployment problem by means of the NYS was the effort put forth by the NYS leadership to find permanent employment for youth after service. For the unemployed youth, this was the ultimate test of the utility of joining the NYS. If, after spending two years of their lives in the youth service doing a great deal of manual labor at low pay ($2.80 per month plus subsistence), they were returned to the ranks of the unemployed with their future still as uncertain as before, then their efforts had been wasted and their hopes frustrated. If this situation was the norm, one could postulate that the establishment of the service may have created more problems than it solved.

It was the almost unanimous opinion of the foreign advisers to the NYS and of many of the indigenous leadership personnel that the NYS leadership must make a concerted effort to find employment for its servicemen, for experience with the servicemen conclusively demonstrated that the youth join the service with the hope of obtaining a job. The ISVS training specialist who worked with the NYS during August and September 1964 stated the problem facing the service in the following fashion:

> At present I see a very real requirement for planning for the post NYS service placement of recruits. Unless this is done the servicemen will return after one year

> to nothing! If these people pose a problem now, I predict they will be an even greater problem after they had been led for a year to expect their government to care for their needs.[1]

Since the formulation of the original plan for the NYS by Griffin under the sponsorship of the Ministry of Labour, the Kenya Government and the NYS leadership has taken the position that everything feasible will be done to find employment for the youth but that no guarantee of employment can be given. As a youth's term of service nears an end, his record is evaluated. Those who have shown ability, a willingness to work and a willingness to submit to discipline are placed on a list which is made available to public and private employers. One of the British advisers is in charge of contacting potential employers and informing them that recommended servicemen nearing completion of their service are seeking employment. Employers interested in hiring servicemen select youth from the list for the purpose of job interviews. If employment is obtained by the servicemen through this procedure, they are discharged immediately. Those servicemen who are unable to obtain employment prior to the completion of their service are given a discharge certificate which, it is hoped, can aid them in their own efforts to find employment.

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[1] Second Report of ISVS Specialist to the Kenya National Youth Service, September 11, 1964 (typewritten).

Three conditions existing in the period 1965-66 made the finding of permanent employment for the servicemen a difficult task. The first condition, one that remains a problem in Kenya, was the small employment market in the country. There were simply not enough wage paying jobs available for those desiring work.[1] Secondly, many of the youth which the NYS recruited during the period could be classed as unemployables when they entered the service, for few possessed job skills. Whatever skills or other marketable attributes they had to offer prospective employers had to come from their experience in the NYS. This, couple with the absence of job training in the NYS, meant that the NYS leadership was not able to offer prospective employers youth who had obtained job skills in such areas as carpentry, masonry and various sub-fields of general mechanics. They have had to rely on the prestige of the NYS, the discipline imparted to the youth in the service, support from the governing elite and the general record of each serviceman during his one or two years in the NYS. A few servicemen received training in vehicle driving and clerical work but a vast majority did not receive any job-oriented training.

As of November 1966 a total of 2,916 servicemen had either completed their term of service or had been discharged

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[1]See above, pp. 70-71.

as a condition of accepting outside employment. NYS figures list 927 or 32 per cent of those leaving the service as having obtained employment as a direct result of being in the NYS and of NYS leadership efforts in finding employment for them. A total of 408 had been recruited into the various disciplined services of Kenya--the armed forces, police, and prisons services, 239 had found employment in other Government services largely in clerical positions, and 280 had been hired by private employers--ninety-three as bus conductors and most of the remainder as vehicle drivers or clerical personnel.[1]

Despite the lack of vocational training, two factors helped the youth service leadership find employment for many youths. First was the pressure placed on employers in the public sector by the President's Office and second was the strong pressure exerted by Government, political parties and trade unions on the private sector

[1]Research indicated that no attempts had been made to determine the attitudes and activities of the servicemen who left the NYS without assurance of employment. The official NYS position was that many of them were able to obtain employment on the strength of their discharge papers although no figures were given. Similarly no follow-up attempt had been made on the roughly 500 youths who deserted the service within two to four months of joining. These ex-servicemen, with their background of political activism, could constitute a particularly acute problem for the government. Unless a radical change occurs in the numbers employed after service the body of ex-servicemen who are unable to obtain employment will continue to increase in size.

to hire more African employees. Given this situation, a number of employers who hired servicemen stated that they did so on the basis of the discipline the youth had received and on their good work record. This offered them an increased likelihood of obtaining dependable employees than if they had hired semi-skilled or unskilled employees directly from the labour exchange. How long this situation would last was open to question. An executive of the Federation of Kenya Employers stated that an increasing number of secondary school leavers were beginning to take positions formerly filled only by KPE holders, school leavers and the semi-skilled. It was jobs which fell within the capabilities of this group that the servicemen were currently filling. He felt that in the future, unless the servicemen are able to obtain more training, it would become increasingly difficult to find jobs for them.

Assessment

It is too early to draw any final conclusions on the success or failure of the NYS in helping to solve the unemployment problem in Kenya. The results to date have not been impressive. Until late 1966 there was no vocational training program. The ratio of those who have left the service without employment to those who have been able to obtain employment is over 2:1. Increased contribution of the NYS to solving

the problem depends to a large extent on the success of the vocational training program initiated by the World ORT team during the latter portion of 1966. If this program is able to develop the job skills of the servicemen to the point at which they are able to pass the Government Trade Test II, the NYS will have taken a major step toward meeting the needs of the youth. If this program is not successful, the NYS will offer the youth two years of temporary employment in the form of rather difficult manual labor on various work projects at low pay. It is difficult to perceive the NYS becoming an organization valued by the youth under these conditions.

The Role of the NYS in the Struggle for Nation Building and Socio-Economic Progress

Research into the experience of the youth service during 1965 and 1966 demonstrates that it has sought to contribute to the struggle for nation building and socio-economic progress in Kenya in two ways. First, it has engaged in work projects for the purpose of contributing substantively to the economic development of Kenya. Secondly, its demonstration effect value has been utilized by the governing elite in their attempt to develop among the people a spirit of nationhood, hard work, and sacrifice.

The Work Projects

Two factors contributed during the formulation of the final plan in March 1964 to the decision to concentrate

the work of the service on large scale development projects. (1) Large scale projects would not infringe on community development and self-help efforts which could be easily carried out by local citizens. (2) Large scale projects would enable the youth service to help pay its own way, for it was expected that the NYS could charge maintenance and replacement of equipment to the development project budgets. This would not be possible if the NYS carried out community development projects owing to the minimal funds for such projects.

The problems which the leadership of the youth service encountered in establishing the work project program are related in Chapter Five. These problems resulted both in delay in initiating the program and in the fact that initial projects were much smaller in scope than had been anticipated. During most of 1965 the NYS was engaged on such work projects as bush clearing, small dam and road construction in national parks, reforestation, and the building of several demonstration houses at a housing scheme outside Mombasa.

In late 1965 the NYS commenced work on two large scale work projects. In the area of the South Aberdares Forest not far from Nairobi the NYS began construction on a thirty-mile tarmac road. They also commenced construction of a seventy-mile road linking the towns of Thika and Kitui in the Eastern Province. In early 1966 a third

project, the building of a road from Archers Post northeast of Mt. Kenya to the Ethiopian border, which was expected to be a four year project, was initiated. During 1966 these three projects gradually became the focus of the NYS work effort. The smaller scale projects were gradually phased out.

Although it is admitted that these road projects could be built without the NYS, utilizing the youth service provided Kenya with certain economic savings. It freed heavy equipment of the Ministry of Works for use on other development projects and it meant that a more disciplined and dependable work force was available for the projects. The normal Ministry of Works procedure on road projects is to hire local unskilled and semi-skilled workers as manual laborers. These men are often undependable, appearing for work intermittently. The NYS, by establishing a base camp near the road project, has a constant supply of men ready as required. In addition the NYS is responsible for the food, lodging, clothing, and pay of the servicemen thus cutting down on the cost of the project to the Ministry of Works development budget.

However, the extent of the economic contribution which the service makes to Kenya is questioned by some of its advisory and leadership personnel as well as by individuals in other organizations who have contact with the service. Concern is expressed that the youth service

duplicates and competes with the Ministry of Works rather than providing new services and thus makes little economic contribution to the country. This concern is based on at least three factors affecting the current youth service work program. First, its heavy work equipment is almost entirely of the type used in road building projects. Secondly, the funding of the service projects comes primarily from the Ministry of Works development budget. The work projects of the service are largely those which the Ministry of Works would undertake if the NYS were not assigned to them. Finally, there is no additional money available to the Ministry of Works to carry out new additional development projects with the equipment and manpower freed by the use of the NYS. Thus utilizing the NYS on road projects does not mean that additional development projects can be carried out. It does mean that the Ministry of Works and the NYS are in competition for projects which the Ministry of Works would have carried out had the NYS not been created. Based solely on these economic considerations serious doubt is expressed by some as to whether the work of the service justifies the financial resources invested in the service.

As of the end of 1966 there were no plans to expand the number of large scale work projects. The three road projects on which the service was engaged, plus a few remaining small scale projects, were all that could be

handled by the service. Without a substantial increase in the numbers of youth in the service, no further major projects could be undertaken.

The Demonstration Effect of the NYS

At the close of almost every speech given by President Kenyatta one hears the slogan "harambee" which means "let us work together." This slogan symbolizes the ideal spirit which the President would like to see imbued in all the citizenry as Kenya struggles for nation building and socio-economic progress. The achievement of these goals will be a difficult task and will require a great deal of hard work, sacrifice, and the united effort of the people--hence, the slogan, "harambee."

During the years 1965-66 the governing elite and the leadership of the NYS sought to project in the press and in public speeches an image of the NYS as a nation building organization whose servicemen are working for Kenya in the spirit of "harambee." This endeavor was necessary to counteract the essentially negative image which many individuals in Kenya held of young political activists. A concerted public relations effort was undertaken in the press and in public speeches of the governing elite to separate the youth service from the youth wings and to emphasize the benefits to Kenya which the service provides. Concomitant with the effort to establish the nation building image is the effort to use the NYS as an example of the hard work

and national unity needed if Kenyans are to develop their country.[1] Thus the demonstration effect which is provided by the youth service and its work is a second and important contribution which the service makes to nation building in Kenya.

There are several aspects of the youth service which are stressed in projecting the nation building image of the service and which give it its demonstration effect value.

(1) A great deal of emphasis is placed upon the fact that the youth are voluntarily giving two years of their lives to work on development projects for the benefit of their country.

(2) Similar emphasis is placed on the role of the service in fostering a sense of national unity among the youth and hence in breaking down traditional tribally based hostilities.[2]

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[1]See, for example, "Youth Reward in Kind not in Cash," EAS, June 14, 1964; "7,000 Young Kenyans Joining the Fight Against the Three Enemies," EAS, December 12, 1964; "A Service with Kenya at Heart," EAS, August 20, 1965; "Tribute Paid to Men of the NYS," Daily Nation, August 24, 1966; and Jomo Kenyatta, Harambee, loc. cit.

[2]There are two NYS policies which have a direct bearing upon this aspect of nation building. First, the NYS attempts to have the percentage of its servicemen from each tribe of Kenya correspond to the percentage of the total population of each tribe. Thus if a tribe makes up fourteen per cent of the total population of Kenya, the number of youth from that tribe should approximate fourteen per cent of the total number of servicemen. Second, upon arrival at the basic training center the new recruits

(3) The NYS has located work projects in all but one of Kenya's provinces. The exception is the North-east Province where the guerilla war has been a primary factor preventing the establishment of an NYS work project. Having at least one youth service project, whether large or small, in each province enables the Government leaders to point to the NYS as an organization which enables youth from all over Kenya to work on projects which benefit the various areas of the country. It also enables people in the "bush" to see first hand the NYS in operation, to see this nation building organization carrying out work projects which will directly benefit their local areas.

Assessment

The NYS leadership was able to implement a program which enabled the servicemen to work on development projects. In this sense the NYS has made a contribution to the economic development of the country. However, the unforeseen small size of the service has limited the number of development projects on which the service can participate. As there is little likelihood that the leadership will increase the total number of youth in the service owing to financial limitations, the actual quantitative

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are formed into companies made up of youth from different tribes. The servicemen remain in their assigned heterogenous companies throughout their service period.

contribution of the NYS to economic development will remain minimal.

Given the minimal quantitative contribution, the demonstration effect of the NYS may be seen as of equal or greater importance to the nation building effort. It is particularly difficult to measure the importance of the demonstration effect of an organization. However, it is possible that national and local political leaders and community development and self-help organizers may be able to utilize the example of the NYS in their own endeavors to mobilize the people of Kenya in the struggle for nation building and socio-economic progress. As related above, on a national level the governing elite in Kenya has already sought to utilize the NYS in this regard.

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Of the three main sets of objectives set for the NYS by the governing elite and planners in early 1964 the NYS leadership was most successful in developing a program of work projects to achieve the objective of enabling the servicemen to contribute to the economic development of Kenya. Implementation of this program was delayed owing to a lack of detailed planning and to delays in receiving equipment. However, by mid-1965 the program had been established and the NYS has been able to engage on certain development projects of benefit to Kenya. Owing to the small size in terms of manpower of the service, the actual

number of work projects has been limited.

One objective of the NYS which has proved to be extremely difficult to approximate is that of relieving the unemployment problem of the youth. The actual numbers of unemployed youth which the service recruited through 1966 was far below early expectations. Of the youth who were recruited and have completed their service, less than one-third found employment as a result of being in the service. Serious problems stemming from lack of planning and delays in obtaining resources caused the implementation of the important vocational training program to be delayed almost two years. The result was that through the end of 1966 it had made little contribution to relieving the unemployment of the youth.

The lack of a vocational training program during 1965 and early 1966 also had serious ramifications for the attempt by the governing elite to meet the demands of young political activists and, by meeting their demands through the NYS, to obtain a measure of control over them. Without vocational training, and faced with the prospect of manual labor at low pay in the service, the political activists initially recruited into the service caused a great deal of unrest. The service was ill-prepared to cope with this problem. A change in the recruitment system greatly reduced the emphasis on recruiting of political activists and brought a younger, more manageable youth into the service. This,

accompanied by the vocational training initiated in 1966, solved the immediate problem of unrest in the service. However, the attempt by the governing elite to obtain control over the political activists by means of the service had proved to be largely unsuccessful. It was successful only to the extent that its establishment and initial recruitment efforts helped alleviate a political crisis in 1964.

At the end of 1966 the youth service had stabilized its size at about 3,500 servicemen. Its activities seemed to indicate that it was becoming an organization which would enable a limited number of unemployed youth to contribute two years of their lives to their country in exchange for vocational training. There remained, however, some doubt as to whether the vocational training program would fulfill expectations. Perhaps one of its most important benefits is the demonstration effect. The governing elite could point to the service as symbolic of the effort needed to develop Kenya. They could also point to the service as one example of their efforts to solve the youth employment problem.

Having related the development of the Kenya National Youth Service during the years 1964-66 as an action program in a developing country in Chapters Three through Six, it is now possible to re-examine the propositions stated in Chapter One and to set forth the implications of this study for future research.

CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSIONS

The Propositions Restated

An action-oriented model developed by Milton Esman is presented in Chapter One of this study. Esman formulated this model as a means of helping to improve the development capabilities of bureaucracies in transitional societies. In order to test the validity of the model Esman presented a series of propositions which he stated needed to be tested against empirical data. One of these propositions, concerning the use of action instruments, was selected for testing in this work.

> The achievement of program objectives under conditions which prevail in transitional societies is enhanced by and frequently depends upon the availability and coordinated use of several action instruments. These establish and maintain two-way communication between governing elites and the community and carry out action programs. This proposition applies both to total development plans and programs and to individual operating activities. The principal instruments available to governing elites are political organization, the administrative system, associational interest groups and the mass media.
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> One possible contrary proposition holds that the achievement of programmed action is essentially a function of the administrative system.[1]

The argument of this work, based upon the study

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[1] Esman, op. cit., p. 110.

of one action program in one transitional society, is that the proposition, while valid in pointing out the utility of the use of a combination of action instruments in achieving program objectives, needs to be refined to stress the greater importance of the administrative system. The proposition is revised in the following manner.

> The achievement of program objectives under conditions which prevail in transitional societies is enhanced by and frequently depends upon the availability and coordinated use of several action instruments. These establish and maintain two-way communication between governing elites and the community and carry out action programs. The principal instruments available to governing elites are political organization, the administrative system, associational interest groups and the mass media. However, the achievement of program objectives, while enhanced by the use of other action instruments, is dependent more upon the extent to which the administrative system is able to translate the policies established by the political system into viable operating programs.

In support of this revision in Esman's proposition, the following proposition relevant to the specific development of the Kenya National Youth Service is offered.

> The translation of policy directives of the Kenya Government calling for the National Youth Service into an operating action program and the achievement of program objectives was hindered by
>
> (a) inadequate preparatory work prior to implementation of the action program; and
>
> (b) administrative and procedural difficulties in obtaining required resources from foreign sources.

Achieving Program Objectives Through the Combined Use of Action Instruments: The Case of the NYS

Background to the NYS: A Review

The governing elite in Kenya in the early weeks of 1964 was faced with a difficult set of circumstances concerning the plight of the unemployed in Kenya in general and of unemployed members of the KANU youth wing in particular. Throughout the latter portion of 1963 and in January and February of 1964 leaders and unemployed members of the KANU youth wing pressured the governing elite, members of parliament and party leaders for the establishment of an organization which would reward youth wing members for their services to the party by providing for their economic future. The business and farming community was suffering economic loss stemming from the extra-legal acts of bands of youth who sought to take over farms and other establishments. Thus demands had also been expressed to the Government from this quarter that something be done about the unemployed youth wingers.

A source of pressure on the governing elite came from unemployed Kenyans in Nairobi during January and February 1964. The day of independence had come and gone but their circumstances had remained unchanged. This "post-independence let-down" was expressed in demonstrations in Nairobi by large numbers of unemployed which the Government feared would lead to a breakdown in order and

to increase political instability. These demonstrations were viewed by the governing elite as a potential threat to the stability of the Government. It was clear that programs to deal with the unemployment problem were necessary.

At the same time the governing elite, faced with growing problems of disunity, sought policies of reconciliation. One important goal was to reduce or eliminate the divisive aspects of tribalism, of which the most recent sign was the bitter struggle for political power between KANU and KADU. A second was to resolve the conflicts within KANU itself, conflicts which were exemplified by the struggle between Mboya and Odinga.

Finally, the governing elite was aware of the difficult task which lay ahead for the country in its attempt to achieve the declared goals of nation building and socio-economic progress. There was a need to reorient the attitudes of the people from one of opposition to and destruction of the colonial order to one of construction; of hard work and sacrifice in the development of Kenya.

These were the considerations which went into discussions of the governing elite concerning the crisis over unemployment and over the threat posed by the youth wingers. The question which they confronted was what kind of action program or programs could be devised which would provide maximum benefits given these circumstances

and what strategy could be developed to achieve the program objectives.

A Restatement of NYS Objectives

Ministerial discussions in early 1964 called for the creation of the Kenya National Youth Service. Although new to Kenya, this type of organization has been utilized in other countries to meet problems similar to those in Kenya. Such organizations in 1964, for example, could be found in Ghana, Malawi, and Tanzania. The U.S. Civilian Conservation Corps of the 1930's was in some ways similar to the proposed service as are the Gadna and Nahal organizations in Israel. There were, therefore, precedents for establishing this type of program to meet unemployment and nation building problems.

The guidelines for the proposed youth service set forth three general objectives. The first was that the youth service should be a truly national organization contributing to the effort to achieve the goals of nation building and socio-economic progress. The second was that the youth service should contribute to relieving the unemployment problem through absorbing young unemployed into the service and providing vocational training to enable them to acquire job skills. Finally the service, by incorporating unemployed youth wingers and meeting their demands for providing for their economic future, was to enable the Government to obtain a degree of control over

the youth wingers who were seen as a potential source of political dissidence.

The Use of Action Instruments

In the theory formulated by Milton Esman there are four main action instruments available to a governing elite which, when used in combination greatly facilitate the achievement of program objectives: 1) political organization, especially the mass political party, 2) the administrative system, 3) the mass media, and 4) associational interest groups.

Kenya's administrative system was given primary responsibility for translating the policy directives of the governing elite concerning the NYS into a viable operating program which would achieve the objectives set for the service. However, as discussed below, other action instruments were also employed by the governing elite as integral factors in the strategy to establish the service. The action instrument of political organization was utilized as a shield to protect the administrative system and as an instrument to aid the administrative system in achieving some objectives of the service. Minimal overt use was made of the associational interest groups representing the youth because of the sensitive political issues involved in the program. The mass media was used to publicize the service, projecting its nation building image.

Political Organization

There was an undeniably sensitive political issue involved in the decision to establish the NYS. On the one hand there was the need of the KANU Government to meet in some fashion the demands of the KANU youth wing that provision be made for unemployed youth wingers. On the other hand there was a need for policies and programs of national reconciliation designed to lessen political and tribal tensions rather than heighten them. For the KANU Government to sponsor and partially finance with Kenya Government funds a service which would serve only unemployed members of the KANU youth wing or possibly only one essentially tribal faction of that organization would have been tantamount to increasing tensions among competing political and tribal groups.

To cope with this dilemma the elite turned to political organization. The political parties of Kenya were employed in the recruitment process through the personages of the elected members of parliament as recruiting agents. Until July 1965, as noted in Chapter Six, recruiting of youth was carried out by MPs after consultation with party and youth wing leaders in their respective districts. Use of political organization in this fashion aided the administrative system in achieving the objectives of the service by recruiting youth from a number of different tribal and political groups. The organization became

inclusive rather than exclusive as MPs of KANU and KADU and from many different tribes recruited youth from their districts. In addition to helping the NYS achieve a broadly based clientele, use of political organization also enabled it to absorb unemployed members of the KANU youth wing. A majority of the MPs were members of KANU. The leaders of the KANU youth wing and some of its members were exerting pressure on their MPs to induce the Government to reward the youth. With the creation of the youth service the MPs had a means of meeting their demands. Many of the youth recruited by the MPs before July 1965 were members of the KANU youth wing.

By employing political organization to recruit the servicemen, the governing elite was able to utilize political organization as a shield for the service against criticism from potentially hostile groups. This shield was an extremely important factor in protecting the youth service during the unsettled months of late 1964 and early 1965. As elected members of the various political parties were the recruiting agents, criticism from the MPs and party and youth wing leaders concerning who was recruited was largely eliminated. The MPs and party and youth wing leaders found it difficult to criticize the recruiting of youth when they themselves were responsible for this task. As noted in Chapter Six, once responsibility for recruitment had been shifted to civil servants, attacks

on the youth service, including a motion in Parliament to disband the service, from these sources became quite frequent.

Associational Interest Groups:

The use of certain associational interest groups, the KANU youth wing and the smaller, less organized KADU youth wing, as an instrument for achieving the objectives of the youth service was kept to a minimum. These groups were deeply involved in politics and, given the desire on the part of the governing elite to develop the NYS along the lines of a national, nation building organization, connections between the youth service and the youth wings were not publicized. Indeed, available evidence indicates that from the first the governing elite and the leadership of the service made a distinct effort to separate the youth service from the youth wings especially in view of the fact that the youth wings had a rather negative image in Kenya. Thus communication between the youth wings and the NYS was largely maintained by means of the MPs as intermediaries.

The youth service leadership did actively seek to establish communication with and to obtain the assistance of associational interest groups, such as the Federation of Kenya Employers who were in a position to aid the NYS in achieving its objectives. The assistance of the Federation of Kenya Employers was sought in an effort to enlist aid in

finding employment for the youth upon termination of service.

The Mass Media

The task of publicizing the youth service and of developing a positive image of the service in the eyes of the general public was carried out through the mass media. As some of the activity of the youth wingers during the independence movement had given them a rather negative reputation in Kenya, there was a need to publicize the NYS, an organization which would be recruiting youth wing members, as a constructive organization if it was to gain the confidence of the people and obtain their support. Thus a substantial publicity campaign was carried out through the mass media projecting the NYS as a nation building organization. This campaign, combined with the visible achievements of the NYS on work projects seems to have established a positive reputation for the NYS in the eyes of the public. It will be recalled that once this was accomplished, the governing elite through the mass media sought to use the NYS as an example of the kind of effort needed if Kenya was to develop.

Assessment

While the use of political organization was successful in helping the youth service to obtain the objectives of recruiting members of the KANU youth wing and at the same time drawing clientele from a broader tribal and political base than that represented in the

KANU youth wing, the administrative system was unable to develop an organization which could meet the demands of the clientele it was designed to receive. Inadequate preparatory work as well as administrative and procedural difficulties encountered by the administrators of the service had resulted in lengthy delays in operationalizing the vocational training program. Frustrated by the lack of vocational training and by the prospect of a term in the service composed of manual labor at low pay, the youth recruited into the service in late 1964 and early1965 became restive. Problems of discipline for the leadership arose, as well as deteriorating relationships between the service and many MPs. Faced with a choice of continuing to recruit political activists, or of shifting recruiting emphasis to a younger unemployed who might prove more manageable in the youth service situation, the governing elite and the leadership of the service chose the latter. Primary responsibility for recruitment was shifted from politicians to administrative officials with the result that a new type of youth was recruited into the service after July 1965.

The change in recruitment policy signified the end of a primary effort by the Government to obtain control over members of the youth wing through recruitment into the NYS. This effort had been temporarily successful and undoubtedly helped alleviate a crisis situation in Kenya

in 1964. However, circumstances in 1965 in the NYS resulting from administrative problems were such that a continued attempt to recruit the political activists would jeopardize the whole NYS project. After July 1965 the objectives of the NYS increasingly became those of contributing to the efforts to achieve the goals of nation building and socio-economic progress and of relieving the general problem of youth unemployment. The effort to achieve the objective of dealing with the youth wingers received less and less attention.[1]

The decision to change the recruitment system also resulted in the near abandonment of the use of political organization to help achieve the program objectives of the service. Control of and responsibility for the NYS has been placed almost entirely in the hands of the administrative system supported by the publicity effort of the governing elite through the mass media. Indicative of the change is the great increase in the criticism of the NYS by MPs. Analysis of the debates in the lower house of the Kenya Parliament indicates that there was almost no criticism of the NYS prior to July 1965. After July 1965 the amount of criticism grew steadily, culminating in February 1966 in a motion to disband the NYS.

The problems encountered in the administrative

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[1]The ramifications of the abandonment of this objective could not be ascertained during this writer's stay in Kenya.

system stemming from inadequate preparatory work and administrative and procedural difficulties also had a bearing upon the achievement of another program objective. At the end of 1966 the contribution which the NYS had made to relieving the youth unemployment problem had been far less than anticipated. Inadequate preparatory work on the project led the governing elite and planners to expect that the youth service would be able to remove from the ranks of the unemployed many more youth than it actually did. The unforeseen high recurrent costs of operating the service was the prime factor in limiting the numbers of youth who could be recruited. The inadequate preparatory work and the administrative and procedural difficulties as factors contributing to delay in developing a vocational training program were significant not only in the failure to accommodate the youth wingers but also in a failure to provide job training for any of the servicemen. As of the end of 1966 no youth had left the service with job skills obtained through a vocational training program. A vocational training effort was operating by that time but there was still uncertainty as to whether it would be able to meet the needs of the service.

Only in the effort to achieve the program objective of having the NYS contribute to nation building and socio-economic progress had the administrators of the service been able to achieve success. Although as detailed in

Chapter Five implementation of the work project program had been delayed almost one year, by September 1965 the service was engaged in the type of large scale work projects envisaged by the planners and the leadership of the service.

The experience of the Kenya National Youth Service provides both an example of the potential utility of employing a variety of action instruments to achieve program objectives and an example of the critical role of the administrative system in the development process in transitional societies. Political organization and the mass media in Kenya were employed effectively in the quest to achieve the program objectives of the NYS. However difficulties were encountered in the attempt by officials in the administrative system to translate policy directives of the governing elite into a viable operating program. The results of these difficulties were a severe setback in achieving program objectives and the abandonment of the use of political organization as directly supportive of the NYS effort. Had the administrative system been able to develop a viable operating program by early 1965 greater progress would undoubtedly have been made toward the achievement of program objectives and the project would have proved to be a good example of the successful use of combined action instruments to achieve program objectives.

The data presented in this study supports the basic

thrust of the proposition of Milton Esman pointing to the advantages of a combined use of action instruments. It also supports the refinement made in that proposition which stresses the importance of the administrative system as an action instrument to achieve the program goals.

The Specific Obstacles Encountered in the NYS Project

Inadequate Preparatory Work

Chapter One proposed that the attempt by administrators in Kenya to translate policy directives calling for the establishment of a youth service into an operating program and to achieve the program objectives was hindered, in part, by inadequate preparatory work prior to implementation of the program. Data presented in this work demonstrated that the project suffered from the omission of feasibility studies and from the lack of detailed planning of the specific programs of the service. The omission of feasibility studies resulted in the governing elite directing administrators to plan and implement an organization whose costs were greatly underestimated and whose benefits, notably in terms of youth who could be taken off unemployment rolls through recruitment into the service, were substantially overestimated. The lack of detailed planning resulted in delays in implementation of the specific programs of the NYS with the most serious delay

occurring in the vocational training program. These delays hindered the achievement of program objectives.

The data on the youth service project indicates that a major reason for the inadequate preparatory work was the need of politicians for immediate action on policy directives. The demands upon governing elites in new nations to meet problems and provide services are great and this is recognized as a basic problem in development administration in transitional societies. A failure to act may result in the removal from power of the politicians currently in control. There is thus a tendancy, exemplified by the case of the youth service, for politicians to press administrators for immediate action. Unfortunately, such demands, backed by pressure from politicians, often do not allow time for adequate preparation of action programs.

A related situation, present in many states of the developing world, is that of the limited human and physical resources available to the administrative system. Given the fact of scarce resources there is a real need to maximize the benefits of programs into which the resources have been invested. The failure of programs to meet the problems for which they were designed not only contributes to a continuation of the problems but also is a resource drain that these countries can ill afford. Thus adequate time for preparatory work such as feasibility studies and the detailed planning of specific programs is necessary

in the attempt to ensure optimum use of scarce resources. Adequate preparatory work, of course, is not a guarantee of success for all projects encounter unforeseen and unanticipated circumstances which may delay a program and possibly contribute to its failure. Adequate preparatory work, however, can reduce the likelihood that major difficulties will be encountered and can be of tremendous value to politicians and administrators attempting to find solutions to the problems facing transitional societies. However, the urgency of the moment in many cases leads to programs being drawn up and implemented with little or no attention to feasibility analysis and the necessary preparatory work with the result that all too often failures occur which might have been avoided.

The evidence presented in this study suggests that a second reason for the inadequate preparatory work on the youth service project was the lack of appreciation on the part of administrators and politicians of the value of such work. It appears the administrators and governing elite felt that the problem was so great that the creation of a youth service type organization could not but help solve the problem. A feasibility study as to whether the youth service envisaged by the planners and governing elite was the optimum method of solving the unemployment problem confronting the Government was thought to be a waste of time and money. Thus, faced with the urgent need

for action, there was little inclination on the part of either administrators or members of the governing elite to press for adequate investigatory work prior to a final decision on the project.

A number of solutions to the problem of inadequate preparatory work have been suggested. For example, the Interplan Executive Committee proposes the creation of special educational seminars involving key administrative and political personnel in a given country which would focus on planning and implementing plans.[1] Included in such seminars could be consideration of the value of preparatory work and of methods of carrying out such work in as short a time as possible.

In addition Albert Waterston suggests that a solution lies in the commitment by governments in transitional societies:

> . . . to build up and maintain a 'stock' of well-prepared projects from which a suitable variety and number can be selected to provide a steady flow of new projects to be added to those already in process of execution.[2]

The availability of such prepared projects would substantially overcome the problem of lack of time, which is an important consideration in the establishment of projects in transitional societies. Waterston suggests that

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[1]Bertram Gross (ed.), Action Under Planning, op. cit., pp. 233-54.

[2]Waterston, op. cit., p. 354.

technical and financial assistance to transitional societies in building up a stock of prepared projects could be an extremely beneficial project for aid giving agencies.[1] Research is required to find additional methods of impressing upon politicians and administrators the value of preparatory work and to find methods of undertaking such work with a minimum of investment of time and money. Further studies might indicate that action instruments of political organization, the mass media, and associational interest groups can be useful in this area.

Administrative and Procedural Difficulties in Obtaining Resources

The argument of this study states that administrative and procedural difficulties in obtaining resources were a second factor hindering the implementation of the project and the achievement of its goals. As presented in this work administrative and procedural difficulties raising obstacles to obtaining resources for the NYS project were found both in the administrative system of the Government of Kenya and within the administration of foreign donor agencies.

The difficulties within the governmental administrative system in Kenya included the lack of administrative machinery and personnel specializing in obtaining resources

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[1] Ibid.

from abroad and diliatory procedures. The former resulted in the responsibility for obtaining resources, most notably technical assistance personnel, being placed in the hands of NYS leadership personnel. Their inexperience in such matters and their inability to obtain accurate information about potential donor organizations led them to agree to obtain required personnel through an organization which, by itself, did not have the power to fulfill the agreement. This mistake was a primary cause of the lack of a vocational training program in the NYS for almost two years. The dilatory procedures found in the administrative system of the Kenya Government had their most significant impact on the NYS project in the request to World ORT to provide a vocational training team and in the negotiations over the World ORT contract. Part of the responsibility for the considerable delay in bringing the World ORT team to Kenya to establish a vocational training program was due to the time it took for various Kenya Government Departments and Ministries to approve aspects of the initial request and subsequent contract.

Administrative and procedural difficulties affecting the obtainment of resources for the NYS project were not common to the Kenya Government alone. They also were encountered in the donor agencies involved in the project--AID, World ORT and ISVS. Specific examples cited in this

work include the complicated procedures necessary to obtain equipment from the United States 608 Excess Program, the procedural problems stemming from the fact that World ORT has its administrative headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland and its legal offices in Washington, D.C. and World ORT's insistence that the contract be finalized before it would recruit technical assistance personnel for the project.

There is little that is new in a conclusion that a primary cause of delay or failure in action programs in transitional societies is administrative and procedural difficulties prevalent in the administrative system of the recipient country or donor agency. This work can only add its voice to others which have preceded it in pointing out the need for reform to minimize such difficulties. However, it is, perhaps, important to stress this "nuts and bolts" administrative problem at a time when much current scholarship is stressing the political factor in development administration as a means of increasing the development capabilities of bureaucracies.

The Youth Service Scheme in Transitional Societies: Some Concluding Remarks

The Kenya National Youth Service studied in this work is an example of a type of organization which has become increasingly popular in Africa during the 1960's. Youth service type organizations are found, for example, in the Central African Republic, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi,

Mali, Niger, Senegal, Tanzania, and Zambia.[1] There is little doubt that there are multiple causes which result in the decision of a governing elite in Africa to initiate a youth service type organization. In addition to the evidence already presented relating to the origins of the Kenya NYS, the following quotation taken from a document submitted by the Government of the Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville) to a conference of the Inter-African Labour Institute is illustrative of this fact.

> It is obvious that, morally, the unemployed youth who needs money to enjoy the advantages the town has to offer is tempted to stray from the straight and narrow path and to obtain by stealing what he cannot obtain by working.
>
> The social danger is equally serious. The wage-earner is more or less obliged to share his wages with members of his family or race who are unemployed, and thus does not enjoy the full fruit of his work; this must mean uneasy circumstances for him. At the same time, if the total wage bill is divided not simply between the wage-earners but between them and an increasing number of unemployed, the general standard of living, far from rising, will constantly decline.
>
> From the economic aspect, it is inadmissible that an increasingly large mass of potential workers should leave the productive system, to become an increasingly heavy charge on the country. While the villages are emptying and the number of agricultural workers is constantly diminishing, the towns are filling with the unemployed and the idle who contribute nothing to the economic life of the country but whom the country must nevertheless feed. This growing disequilibrium between the productive and the non-productive population must be ended and the young unemployed must be reintegrated into productive work

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[1] For general information on youth services in Africa see First African Conference on National Service and Volunteer Programs (proceedings), (Washington, D.C.: International Secretariat for Volunteer Services, 1965).

as quickly as possible.

> Politically, the thousands of unemployed and idle young men, dissatisfied with their lot constitute an obvious prey for subversive propaganda. It is easy to persuade the workless that the Government does not care about them, is doing nothing to help them and has abandoned them to their fate. Political agitation can turn the young unemployed into potential shock troops for all manner of insurrectionary movements.[1]

It is the expectation that the youth service will provide a quick, inexpensive and multi-faceted solution to a number of immediate and critical economic and political problems stemming from unemployed youth that it has received such widespread adoption. However, certain observers who have had contact with youth service type organizations in Africa and are familiar with the problems with which these organizations are designed to help solve have expressed concern about the utility of this particular solution. It is the purpose of this concluding section of the dissertation to present some of these caveats, to examine them against the data available on the Kenya NYS, and to specify certain aspects of youth service organizations on which further research would be useful.

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[1] "Commission for Technical Co-operation in Africa Document: Emploi (62) 2 (c)," submitted to the CCTA by the Government of the Congo (Brazzaville), quoted by P.A.L. Chukwumah, Director, Inter-African Labour Institute, in "Introduction," Symposium on Unemployed Youth, Inter-African Labour Institute Publication No. 89 (London: CCTA/CSA Publications Bureau, 1962), pp. 12-13.

Youth Service Schemes and Political Activists

Dr. Peter Kuenstler has hypothesized that the objective of many youth services of incorporating large numbers of political activists is incompatible with other objectives of the services such as turning out youth with job skills and having the youth voluntarily giving of their time and energies for nation building projects.[1] Dr. Kuenstler has served in the capacity of youth adviser to the United Nations, and at the time interviewed had just returned from Zambia. The Zambian Youth Service leadership encountered serious problems of discipline and motivation with the political activists recruited into the service. During 1966 it underwent a radical revision of its program and objectives including changing the type of personnel recruited, much in the same fashion as occurred in Kenya. Based on his observations, Dr. Kuenstler concluded that the attitude of the

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[1] Interview, Dr. Peter Kuenstler, February 12, 1967. The political implications of the youth services in Africa have not received much publicity and to date available data on the political aspects is minimal. Documented evidence available to this writer demonstrates that at least four youth services, those of Kenya, Ghana, Malawi, and Zambia, have been initiated to meet the demands of political activists. In addition to this work on Kenya NYS see Peter Hodge, "The Ghana Workers' Brigade: A Project for Unemployed Youth," op. cit., and Youth in Malawi (Department of Information, Government of Malawi, 1965). Information on the Zambian Youth Service was obtained from an interview with Dr. Kuenstler and from field reports from ISVS representatives on that youth service available at ISVS headquarters, Washington, D.C.

political activists, most of whom were interested in receiving rewards in the form of good jobs for which they were not qualified, was a prime cause of the difficulties encountered by that service. The political activists were not interested in voluntary work programs on development projects and did not seem amenable to any training programs the Zambian Youth Service had to offer.[1]

The data presented in this work on the Kenya NYS neither conclusively supports nor rejects Dr. Kuenstler's hypothesis. The Kenya youth service did encounter serious difficulties with the political activists to the extent that recruiting of political activists had to be de-emphasized. However, the data indicates that a primary factor was the lack of vocational training programs which would give the youths the kind of skills that would help them in their quest for employment. An alternative hypothesis, based upon this work on the Kenya NYS, to the one offered by Dr. Kuenstler is that the problem encountered by youth services in dealing with political activists is one of planning and administering youth service programs. If a youth service can be planned and implemented so that it does offer a "quid pro quo"

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[1]Detailed information on the Zambian Youth Service training programs was not available. There were indications that the service had been hastily implemented and the leadership was inexperienced which may suggest that the training programs had not been well planned to meet the demands of the youth. Report of ISVS Observer to the Zambian Youth Service, Report to the International Secretariat for Volunteer Services, March 4, 1966.

arrangement--job training in return for voluntary work on nation building projects--the youth service type organization might become an effective device for meeting the demands of political activists and for obtaining a means of control over them. Additional research on youth service projects in Africa is required before any conclusion can be drawn on this matter.

A second subject for future research with implications for the utility of the youth service approach in dealing with political activists and, perhaps, with youth in general in transitional societies is an exploration of the strengths and weaknesses of the two alternative strategies of youth services suggested in this study of the Kenya youth service. One alternative is the American-British model which stresses vocational training and nation building projects while seeking to keep the services as apolitical as possible. The other is the Israeli model which places primary importance on an ideological component, seeking to instill in the youth a sense of their role in the nation building struggle, and on integrating the services into the political organization of the country. In this strategy, vocational training and work on nation building projects are secondary to the ideological and political elements. It is interesting to note that the Zambian Government, whose youth service originally relied upon British and Northern European

advisers and the Ghanaian Government whose Ghana Workers' Brigade was initially advised by British personnel both turned to the Israelis to reorganize the services once difficulties with their original programs and with the servicemen had been encountered. However, the Kenya youth service did not request Israeli assistance when difficulty developed with the service as originally planned. Research which compares the experience of youth services which have adopted one strategy or another is necessary to determine whether the Israeli model more closely meets the needs of transitional societies of Africa or whether local conditions are paramount in determining the success or failure of any given project no matter on which strategy it is based.

Youth Service Schemes: Costs

One of the major reasons for the popularity of the youth service schemes in Africa is the contention that they are a relatively inexpensive method of helping to solve the youth employment problem. This contention is based on at least two factors associated with the youth service schemes. The first is the aid which most services are able to obtain during initial development. This aid substantially reduces the initial costs of implementing the project. The second is the work programs which are seen as providing an economic justification for the public investment in the youth service. Observations have,

however, been made which suggest that in reality both of these factors may add to, rather than subtract from the costs of the services thus negating the contention that the approach is an inexpensive solution to the youth employment problem.

One caveat about the costs of the youth service schemes has been offered by Bernard Dumont. He states that one reason why these schemes are thought to be a low cost method of meeting the unemployment problem is that many of the resources they require are initially obtained free or at a minimum cost. These resources either come from internal sources such as the armed forces or a public works ministry or from external sources in the form of aid. This situation enables the government to institute a new program at a minimal cost. However, this support tends to be "one time only" support and as the initial resources have to be replaced, and as the costs of replacement have to be borne by the service, the costs of the service to the government mounts in a rapid and unforeseen fashion.[1]

Dumont suggests that if a youth service scheme is to be implemented it should be done on the basis of avoiding the creation of a spectacular but in the long run costly organization. This would involve keeping the

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[1]Bernard Dumont, "Civique Service Africain," Cooperation et Developpement, No. 5 (March/April, 1965), (translated copy provided by Peter Kuenstler).

work projects of the organization to the community development and self-help level which would minimize mechanization, making maximum use of local materials and designing a youth service so that participants would remain in their local areas thus reducing the transportation and maintenance costs. A service of this type would enable the money invested to be spent on recruiting and training more youths rather than being spent on maintenance and replacement of heavy equipment and extensive facilities.[1]

While the first two and one-half years of operation of an organization is too short a period of time to draw final conclusions, the experience of the Kenya NYS related in this work supports Dumont's observation. The US/AID assistance enabled the NYS to obtain many resources at minimal costs. However, by 1966 the leadership of the service as well as officials in the Ministry of Labour and of Finance were becoming aware that they faced a difficult problem in trying to finance the replacement of those resources given the limited financial resources in Kenya available to the youth service. As early as 1965 the costs of maintenance of the heavy equipment had contributed to unforeseen high recurrent costs. During 1965 and 1966 the NYS was able to keep its total

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[1] Ibid.

expenditure increases to acceptable levels but only by severely reducing the total numbers of youth recruited. The reduction ran counter to a main objective of the NYS, that of providing immediate relief to the young unemployed of Kenya.

An assessment of the role and contribution of the work project programs of the various youth services has proved to be an extremely difficult task.[1] Firm conclusions which prove or disprove the contention that the work projects provide an economic justification for the investment of public money in the schemes have not as yet appeared in the literature on youth services. Observations have been made which express some doubt about the contribution of the work projects and suggest that they may add to the total costs to the governments of operating youth services. Two examples of these observations are presented below.

Archibald Callaway offers the proposition that the cost of the work project may actually be increased by having the youth service type organizations provide the labor. He notes that the labor-intensive projects of the services are often those which could be done by established public works organizations. These organizations with their mechanization and experienced personnel can

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[1] A prime reason for this and one which confronted this researcher in Kenya is the lack of available statistical data on the work projects.

carry out these projects more cheaply and in less time than the youth services who utilize inexperienced personnel. On strictly economic grounds Callaway believes that utilization of the youth services on development projects is an additional cost rather than a saving to the governments concerned.[1]

A second observation is provided by E. Costa. He establishes an economic criterion for determining on what projects the youth services could engage which might prove to be economically beneficial. This criterion is that the project, when finished, would "lead to a foreseeable production surplus and, over the long term, create a large number of jobs."[2] Included in the type of work which might meet this criterion are land development such as reforestation, soil protection, land reclamation, and large or small scale irrigation works; small scale industries which can produce articles for local consumption; and nfra-structure development such as the building of major and minor roads. The primary condition which must be met, and which he feels

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[1]Archibald Callaway, "Unemployment Among African School Leavers," Education and Nation Building, eds. L. Gray Cowan, James O'Connell and David G. Scanlon (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965) p. 254; and Archibald Callaway, "African School Leavers and Their Employment Problem," Community Development Journal, I, No. 3, 1966, p. 17.

[2]E. Costa, "Practical Organisation of Manpower Mobilisation Schemes in Developing Countries," International Labour Review, XCIII, No. 3, 1966, p. 251.

often is not, is that preliminary investigation be carried out into economic and technical aspects to determine the feasibility of such schemes, the economic benefits to the area and the country vis-a-vis the costs and how the project fits into the long range planning for development. Failures in the past to carry out these preliminary surveys have resulted in costly setbacks for the schemes.[1]

While noting that, with proper planning, there do appear to be work projects which the youth services can carry out that would be economically beneficial, Costa expresses serious doubt that the schemes can achieve their aim of economic development. This is due to the basic financial problem present in most transitional societies. He states:

> Lack of money is the prime weakness of manpower mobilisation schemes, and the resulting stringency rules out any real prospect of achieving their aim of economic development. In fact, the great cost of facilities, equipment, materials, transport, staffing, food and(often) pay, as well as the research entailed by the schemes, is a heavy burden on the budgets of the departments handling them.[2]

While the data presented on the work project program of the Kenya youth service does not conclusively prove or disprove the contention that the work project program of the youth service provides an economic

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[1] Ibid., pp. 251-52.

[2] Ibid., p. 260.

justification for the government investment, it tends to support those who question the economic value of the work project programs. In Chapter Six it is noted that the work project program did provide certain economic savings to the Ministry of Works and did help to defray some of the operating expenses of the service. However, the equipment of the service largely duplicates that of the Ministry of Works and the projects which it carried out were those which would ordinarily be carried out by that ministry. They were funded from the development budget of the Ministry of Works. Owing to the limited finances of Kenya the Ministry of Works could not undertake any additional development projects. By 1966 the Kenya youth service had become a "second ministry of works," duplicating its machinery and competing with it for the same financial resources and projects. It is difficult to see how the creation of the youth service on strictly economic grounds is beneficial to Kenya.

Calculating the costs of the youth service schemes to the country and of the economic benefits of work projects are subjects on which much research needs to be undertaken. Indeed such research would seem to be a critical necessity for governments which are contemplating establishing a youth service or expanding an existing one. However, it must be remembered that youth services are not established primarily to make an economic

contribution. Some have been used as a means of coping with political activists while almost all of them have been implemented to meet the employment problem. Any calculation of the costs and benefits of a youth service must include a consideration of the extent to which it contributes to solving both of these problems.

The Youth Service Schemes: Post-Service Employment

Perhaps the most important aspect of the youth service scheme is the extent to which it is a method of solving the youth employment problem. There is little doubt that creation of a service provides at least the temporary relief from unemployment for those recruited into the service. The primary pay-off in solving the problem is not, however, in the temporary relief of unemployment but in enabling youth to obtain permanent employment. The critical question is whether the time spent in the youth service leads to permanent employment for the servicemen.

Archibald Callaway is particularly critical of the utility of youth service schemes in dealing with the long range youth employment problem although he admits that the schemes have not been in existence long enough to make final judgments. He views the youth service approach with its emphasis on public works as a short-term measure which may alleviate immediate pressures

but in a few years' time may serve only to aggravate the unemployment problem.[1]

> These projects tend to band young people together as if they were homogenous units possessing equal abilities and gaining equal rewards. From the point of view of the nation and of the individual, policies toward raising employment for school leavers must be regarded as long-term. There are no short-term solutions. The youths want an outlet for their ambitions, opportunities for self-improvement, recognition of the diversity of their talents. Clearly, policies that do not purposefully relate short-term experience to the expected employment scene later run counter to these individual goals.[2]

For Callaway the long term solution to the youth employment problem lies in the process of economic development. As the rate of economic growth increases, so will the number of employment opportunities.[3] As a method of dealing with the immediate problem, of contributing to economic development and of providing the youth with the skills and opportunity for permanent employment, Callaway offers an alternative to the youth service schemes through programs designed to channel the youths into agriculture. However, considering the increasing rejection of traditional patterns of agriculture on the part of African youth,

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[1] Callaway, "Unemployment Among African School Leavers," op. cit., p. 251.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Callaway, "African School Leavers and their Employment Problem," op. cit., p. 16.

he emphasizes that the effort to get the youths back to the land must be carefully planned in the direction of training in modern farming methods. To accomplish this on the broadest possible scale, Callaway prefers channeling government resources into low-cost, on-the-job agricultural training based on the self-help plan rather than into the youth service schemes.[1]

The planners of the Kenya NYS sought to meet the kind of criticism offered by Callaway through the vocational training program. For reasons previously examined this program proved extremely difficult to implement. This leads to the conclusion that planning and implementing a vocational training program in a youth service scheme for the unskilled is an extremely complex and difficult task, substantially more difficult than may be recognized by policy-makers when reviewing alternative programs to meet the unemployment problem. Given the lack of vocational training, the experience of the Kenya NYS as a means of aiding the youth to find permanent employment tends to support Callaway's warning. The activities of the servicemen on work projects were largely in the area of dam building, bush clearing and manual labor on road projects. Only a few were able to obtain training in vehicle operation or clerical work. As a result their experience in the youth service did not significantly

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[1] Ibid., p. 20.

develop their job skills. Only 32 per cent of those leaving the service are known to have obtained employment, most of these in jobs in the disciplined services of Kenya or in the relatively unskilled positions of bus conductors. The fate of the remainder is unknown as no follow-up on them has been undertaken.

Another caveat and this one based on the writer's own research, concerns the small number of employment possibilities in the skilled trades and in the industrial sector of most African countries. Most of these economies have not developed to the point at which large numbers of jobs in these areas are becoming available. Had the Kenya youth service been able to develop a vocational training program and been able to provide the servicemen with job skills, upon leaving the service they would still have been faced with the problem that they would be competing for a relatively small number of jobs. Thus, although they would possess job skills, many would still be unable to find the kind of employment they want. This observation tends to support Callaway's proposal that the sector of the African economies which is most able to absorb youth is the agricultural sector. Serious consideration needs to be given to whether it would be more realistic, given the existence of youth service schemes, to establish training programs geared to imparting modern agricultural

techniques rather than trade and industrial skills.

* * * * * *

As the nations of the developing world have attained independence, their governments have been confronted with a number of serious, often critical problems. Schemes--new, borrowed, or renovated--are devised to cope with these problems. One such situation concerns the widespread adoption of the youth service scheme to deal with problems of youth unemployment and potentially dissident young political activists. This study of the Kenya National Youth Service has attempted to show that although the youth service scheme does offer the possibility of providing a solution to the problems, implementing such schemes and obtaining the desired benefits is a complex and difficult process. Indeed, the evidence presented in this work and the findings of others suggests that the youth service schemes to date do not provide the comprehensive solutions to the problems that the nation builders and their advisers have anticipated. Further research into youth service schemes is necessary to determine whether such organizations do provide sufficient benefits to warrant their continued use, whether they can be better designed and implemented to solve the problems of youth, or whether alternative schemes need to be sought by the new governments.

APPENDIX

PLAN FOR A NATIONAL YOUTH SERVICE FOR KENYA
(March 12, 1964)

I. OBJECTIVES

The objectives used in formulating this plan are as follows:

1. That the Organisation shall be truly national, drawing together the youth of all racial and tribal groups.

2. That it shall inculcate patriotism, and provide a real opportunity of serving the country.

3. That it shall make use of leadership abilities of young persons who have played a prominent part in political activities (such as Youth Wing activities) during the period leading up to Independence.

4. That it shall afford some relief to the present chronic unemployment and hardship among young persons in Kenya, and prepare young men for National Service with the Army, Police, settlement on irrigation schemes, handicrafts, etc., and any other development organisation.

5. That units of the Organisation shall be capable of making a genuine economic contribution to the building up of the country, e.g. to help conserve, rehabilitate and develop Kenya's natural resources in such activities as the construction and improvement of access roads, dams, water supplies, irrigation cannals, bush and tsetse control, reforestation, restoration of abandoned farms, range fire control, and to assist with land surveys, housing developments, and other projects of national interest and benefit.

6. That the plan shall be based on actual needs as they exist in Kenya, and not be merely a copy of some other country's scheme.

II. Control

1. The Organisation shall come under the direct control of the Kenya Government, through the Ministry of Labour and Social Services. A National Headquarters is being established in Nairobi which will have responsibility for the co-ordination and control of all Branches and Units, and for ensuring that policy directives from the Government are properly implemented throughout the Organization.

2. The operation of the units and camps, including the appointment and supervising of the officers posted to them, and project approval, shall be under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Labour and Social Services. Jurisdiction over the principal project work for which the camp has been established will be under the Ministry responsible:-

Project Work	Ministry having jurisdiction
1) Agriculture, Irrigation and Range Resource development, other Agricultural projects.	Ministry of Agriculture.
2) National Park and Game Reserve Development, Reforestation and Forest Development.	Ministry of Natural Resources.
3) Housing projects, access roads, development, etc.	Ministry of Works and Communications.
4) Land clearing and preparation on Settlement schemes and restoration of abandoned farms.	Ministry of Settlement

3. A Headquarters Directorate of the Kenya National Youth Service is being established. The responsibilities of the Directorate shall include:-

1) Co-ordination and execution of policies of Kenya Government on the National Youth Service.

2) Establishment of camps, and the allocation of Central Government funds for their operation and development.

3) Development of training programmes for the various camps.

4) Inspection of the camps to ensure conformance with policies laid down by Government for the National Youth Service.

The National Youth Service shall be headed by a National Youth Leader, assisted by a Director.

III. QUALIFICATIONS AND STRUCTURE

1. Male citizens of Kenya, not less than sixteen years of age, nor more than thirty, shall be eligible for enlistment. Enlistment shall be for a minimum of one year. Not more than two re-enlistments shall be granted. Candidates for enlistment must be free from Communicable diseases and meet prescribed physical requirements. Each enlistee shall be required to sign a form of agreement to obey the orders of the Camp Commandant and abide by the regulations of the National Youth Service.

2. Allowances
Each recruit shall be entitled to free food, medical treatment, uniforms, bedding and a nominal payment of shs. 25/- per month, of which shs. 10/- should be held in a Savings Account, and be paid to the recruit at the termination of his service.

IV. FIELD UNITS AND PROJECT CAMPS

1. Field Units-
One field unit shall be established in each Region and in the Nairobi Area.

1) The Field Units shall have the following functions-

a) Reception of all recruits, their classification and initial training;

b) The inculcation of discipline, during the first stage of the recruits' training. Over the first 6 weeks to 2 months, the men will be:-

(i) Medically examined;
(ii) Organized into sections;
(iii) Taught to march and drill;
(iv) Be brought into good physical condition by adequate feeding and exercise;
(v) Prepared for assignment to project camps.

c) The selection of junior leaders from among the men to assist the staff in the operation and discipline of the Unit;

d) The starting of the educational programme. (Over the full year's service the object will be to totally eradicate illiteracy);

e) The inculcation of good work habits by using the men on projects in the vicinity of the Unit itself;

f) In brief, the objec' of the Field Unit is to receive the recruits, who may be undisciplined, disinclined to work, and possibly in poor physical shape, and, within two months' time translate them into a keen and well coordinated body of men in all ways ready to make an efficient contribution to national development.

2) There shall be an initial intake of 150 men into each Field Unit, of whom it is expected that 110 men will prove fit to move to Project Camps following basic training, while the remaining 40 will continue their service in the Field Unit, working on local projects, and in special training schemes within the Unit itself. The second intake of 150 men will enter the Unit and commence their training before their predecessors are transferred to Project Camps. In this way standards of smartness and discipline can be handed on through example. It is expected that -

a) A Field Unit will contain approximately 500 men at any one time when it has built up to full strength;

b) Each Unit will pass 600 - 1,000 men to Project Camps annually, the rate being governed by the needs of the latter.

2. <u>Project Camps</u>

Project camps will take a complement of approximately 250 young men and will be established in the vicinity of work projects selected as being of national importance and benefit. At a later stage, with the expansion of the Service, it will be possible for similar camps to serve purely Regional projects, with Regional financial participation. Work projects must be properly planned and approved for technical soundness to ensure efficiency of work.

Into each project camp will come intakes from the 7 Field Units, thus achieving within the camp a mixture of young men with varying regional and tribal backgrounds - intermingling on a truly National

basis. The first intake to arrive will initiate the building of the camp, making the fullest possible use of local materials.

In the Project Camps the recruits shall be subjected to a vigorous training programme to develop their abilities and talents to the maximum, while performing work on important development projects.

V. Staffing of Field Units and Project Camps.

1. Field Unit or Project Camp Commandants shall have overall authority and responsibility for the successful operation of the Unit or Camp in accordance with the procedure and regulations prescribed by the Director of the National Youth Service.

2. Training Officers shall be responsible for the classification of recruits by ability and interest and for the development and execution of training programmes.

3. Section Commanders.
There shall be one Section Commander for each 100 recruits, who shall be responsible to the Commandant for the discipline, welfare and work performance of his men. Within each section, junior leaders shall be appointed from among the recruits.

4. Foremen (Project Camps)
For each 50 recruits there shall be one Foreman, who shall be responsible for the work performance and discipline of his men while they are engaged on project work. Foremen will possess a degree of technical knowledge appropriate to the project being undertaken, and will be nominated to the Directorate by the Ministry having jurisdiction over the project.

5. (a) Accounts Clerk and (b) Storekeeper.
These administrative personnel will perform their duties in accordance with directions provided by the Accounting and Stores Section of the Ministry of Labour and Social Services.

6. Hospital Assistant
Shall be responsible for examining the recruits on admission and for the maintenance of their health, including the inspection of food and camp sanitation conditions. The provision of drugs and equipment and the supervision of the hospital

assistant shall be under the direction of the Ministry of Health.

7. Artisans, Cooks, Truck Drivers and Mechanics, etc.

1) Chief Cook
Responsible for organizing and directing food preparation and serving, and the training of selected trainees in the art of cooking.

2) Artisans and Skilled Personnel.
Such as stone masons, brick layers, carpenters, tailors and shoe repairmen will be employed as required and will train selected recruits.

3) Lorry, Landrover, and Tractor Drivers and Mechanics
In addition to their executive duties, these personnel will train limited numbers of recruits in their own skills.

VI. ORGANISATION OF RECRUITS

Each Field Unit and Camps will be organized along military lines, not for the purpose of military training, but to develop and maintain discipline. For this reason the enlistees will be assigned to sections of approximately 100 each. The Section Commander will have trainee assistants in charge of squads.

VII. GENERAL

1. Sites
Each Field Unit and Project Camp site should be large enough to contain its buildings, a playing field, and a small farm for growing vegetables. Unauthorised persons shall not be permitted within the site boundaries and recruits shall not be permitted outside the boundaries except when authorised and while on work details or on leave. Project Camp sites shall be centrally located to the work projects. Temporary spike camps may be established to reduce travel to subsidary projects.

2. Work, Training and Recreation.
In general, and once basic training has been completed, trainees will spend not less than 30 hours a week on actual work projects; the remainder of their time being given to educational classes, recreation, etc. Where possible, facilities shall

be provided for training mechanics, welders, plumbers, leather and metal workers, etc. Considerable attention must be paid to sports programmes. Competition between Units and Camps will be encouraged.

3. Uniforms
Each recruit shall be provided with a parade uniform, and with working dress suited to the climate in which his Unit or Camp is located. The design of the uniform, and insignia, shall be prescribed by the Directorate.

4. Religion
Offers of co-operation have been received from the Churches and it is hoped that these will result in coverage being given to the spiritual needs of the men.

5. Students and Young Workers.
At a later stage, provision will be made for the creation of special branches of the National Youth Service, whereby such youths may wear a form of uniform and participate in general activities on a leisure-time basis.

VIII. GOAL

1. By April 30th, 1964 - Nairobi Area Field Unit opened with first contingent of 150 recruits.

2. By August 31st, 1964

1) Seven Field Units operating (1 in each region, plus one in the Nairobi area) = 2,300 recruits.

2) Two Project Camps established with first contingent of 200 recruits.

3) Total recruits = 2,500

3. By January 1st, 1965

1) Seven Field Units in full operation with 3,500 recruits.

2) Ten Project Camps in operation - 2,500 men.

3) Total recruits = 6,000

4. By July 1st, 1965

1) Seven Field Units - 3,500 recruits

2) Twenty-five Project Camps - 6,500

3) Total = 10,000

Note: The speed of attaining the goal will be largely governed by:-

1) The availability of suitably trained and experienced staff, including Camp Commandants, and such specialists as engineering, medical, accounts and stores personnel. It may be necessary to seek to have such staff seconded immediately from other parts of Government.

2) The time taken by Regional Governments to examine their financial commitment to Field Units, their acceptance of the proposals, their choice of staff and sites, etc.

3) Possible delays in obtaining overseas staff as advisors, and in landing vehicles and other heavy equipment.

DETAILED COST ESTIMATES FOR FIELD UNIT AND ONE PROJECT CAMP

FIELD UNIT - 500 RECRUITS

	First Year		Recurrent	
	No.		No.	
PERSONAL EMOLUMENTS				
Commandant	1	1,200	1	1,200
Training Officer	1	1,000	1	1,000
Section Commanders	5	1,200	5	1,200
Instructors	5	1,200	5	1,200
Medical Assistant	1	300	1	300
Accounts Clerk	1	320	1	320
Storeman	1	312	1	312
Chief Cook	1	300	1	300
Drivers	2	300	2	300
Recruits 25/- per m	500	7,500	500	7,500
Incentive pay		700		700
	518	14,232	518	14,232
EQUIPMENT - PROJECT				
Lorries	2	2,000		
Van	1	700		
Handtools		500		300
Miscellaneous		500		300
		3,700		600

	First Year No.		Recurrent No.	
EQUIPMENT - Camp				
Kitchen equipment & Utensils		1,400		300
Lighting Plant		-		-
Training Aids & materials		1,000		300
Furniture (includes sleeping mats etc)		1,800		200
Bedding & uniforms		3,500		2,600
		7,700		3,400
MATERIALS & SUPPLIES				
Building materials		10,000		1,000
Project materials		1,000		1,000
		11,000		2,000
FOOD & FUEL				
Food (1/50 per day)		13,700		13,700
Fuel		350		350
		14,050		14,050
OPERATING EXPENSES				
Vehicles & tractors		1,500		1,500
Power, water & conservancy		750		750
Office expenses		300		300
Miscellaneous		1,500		1,500
		4,050		4,050
GRAND TOTAL		54,732		38,332

PROJECT CAMP - 250 RECRUITS

	First Year No.	First Year	Recurrent No.	Recurrent
PERSONAL EMOLUMENTS				
Commandant	1	1,200	1	1,200
Training Officer	1	1,000	1	1,000
Section Commanders	2	480	2	480
Foreman	5	1,800	5	1,800
Instructors	2	480	2	480
Medical Assistant	1	300	1	300
Accounts Clerk	1	320	1	320
Storeman	1	312	1	312
Artisans & skilled workman	4	1,800	4	1,800
Chief Cook	1	300	1	300
Drivers	2	300	2	300
Recruits 25/- p.m.	250	3,250	250	3,250
Incentive pay		350		350
	269	11,892	269	11,892
EQUIPMENT - PROJECT				
Lorries	3	4,200		
Tractors - wheel w/accessories	2	3,000		
Land rover	1	900		
Hand tools		300		200
Engineering & surveying equipment		200		50
Machine tools		400		50
Miscellaneous		300		200
		9,500		500
EQUIPMENT - CAMP				
Kitchen equipment & utensils		800		200
Lighting Plant		3,500		-
Training Aids & materials		600		200
Furniture (includes sleeping mats, etc)		900		200
Bedding & uniforms		1,800		1,000
		7,600		1,600

	First Year No.		Recurrent No.	
MATERIALS & SUPPLIES				
Building materials		5,000		600
Project materials		3,000		3,000
		8,000		3,600
FOOD AND FUEL				
Food (1/50 per day)		6,850		6,850
Fuel		350		350
		7,200		7,200
OPERATING EXPENSES				
Vehicles & tractors		3,500		3,500
Power, water & conservancy		300		300
Office expenses		150		150
Miscellaneous		1,050		1,050
		5,000		5,000
GRAND TOTAL:		49,192		29,792

Note:

The Project Camp estimate includes almost 3 times more equipment than the Field Unit estimate as well as provision for a light plant and increased amounts for project materials. It is estimated that Appropriation-in-Aid for project work accomplished should approximate or exceed 50 % of the annual recurrent cost of project camp operations.

NATIONAL YOUTH SERVICE OF KENYA

AGREEMENT TO BE READ ALOUD TO THE RECRUIT ON ENLISTMENT, AND TO BE SIGNED BY HIM

"I_____
being admitted to the National Youth Service of Kenya, do hereby:-

(i) Reaffirm my complete loyalty to the Prime Minister and Government of Kenya.

(ii) Undertake to serve for a period of one year in the National Youth Service of Kenya, during which time I will give unquestioning obedience to the orders of the Government as transmitted to me through my superior officers in the Service. I will work with all my strength at the Nation-building activities given to me; I will take full advantage of every opportunity given me to increase my own skills and education, and I will at all times behave in accordance with the law, and with the dignity of the Service to which I am now admitted.

Signed At_____this_____day of_____19___

_____
Signature of Recruit

Signiture and rank of Attesting Officer:-

_____

_____

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BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

Name: Richard Leighton Coe

Date and Place of Birth: June 29, 1940; Rochester, New York

Elementary School: Palmyra Elementary School, Palmyra, New York, Graduated 1954.

High School: Palmyra-Macedon Central School, Palmyra, New York, Graduated 1958.

College: College of Wooster, Wooster, Ohio, B.A. 1962

Graduate Work: Syracuse University, Syracuse, New York 1962--

Current Appointment: Assistant Professor of Political Science, Earlham College, Richmond, Indiana 1967--