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EMERGING PATTERNS OF POLITICAL CULTURE IN
JAPAN.

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POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION IN A NEW DEMOCRACY:
EMERGING PATTERNS OF POLITICAL CULTURE IN JAPAN

by

Joseph A. Massey

A Dissertation Presented
to the Faculty of the Graduate
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SUMMARY

This study examines the political learning process among contemporary Japanese teenagers. Two principal questions are addressed: (1) to what extent do Japanese teenagers develop political orientations that are supportive of the democratic political regime and orientations which encourage participation in the political process; (2) what factors account for the differences among the teenagers with respect to such orientations? The study is based primarily on the results of a survey of 942 eighth, tenth, and twelfth grade public school students and their parents in Tokyo and Tochigi prefectures.

The first section of the analysis took as its subject the development of diffuse support for the regime. The data revealed that Japanese children have no benevolent leader, and are generally negative toward institutions involved with the authoritative side of politics. But they are also relatively supportive of institutions and processes involved with popular input into politics, such as elections and parties. The analysis further found that the symbols of democracy and peace have become synthesized into a core of consensus in the political values of Japanese teenagers. The emphasis in their definitions of democracy was upon popular sovereignty and on consensus rather than simple majoritarianism.

The data revealed that nearly as many Japanese as American youngsters develop party identifications and from an equally early age, and that they also share their parents' partisanship to nearly as great a degree as American youngsters do theirs. It was also established that ideologically-based symbols, deriving from the prevalence of Marxist rhetoric in Japanese politics, play a significant role in the political learning process, one which is reinforced by partisan cleavage.

The final section of the analysis centered on influences affecting teenagers' political orientations. Age, sex, social cleavage, and psychological characteristics were shown to have different effects depending on the orientation involved. In particular, social cleavage factors have less impact on support for the input institutions of politics than on that for output institutions. Finally, the direct impact of the family on youngsters' political orientations was largely confined to partisanship; paternal and maternal influences are roughly equal and tend to increase with the child's age. The over-all finding of the thesis is that, judging by the values of contemporary youth, a significant change in Japanese political culture seems to be occurring away from deference to autonomy toward authority coupled with support for popular participation and the institutions and processes which sustain it.

PREFACE

The research reported in this study took place over the period 1967 through 1969, during which time Japan witnessed widespread turmoil and violence on the part of young Japanese. One college campus after another was shut down by student unrest and the conflict even found its way to many high school campuses. The turmoil soon reached Tokyo University where I was affiliated with the Department of Sociology, and I thus had a close-up view of the character of political alienation among an important segment of Japanese youth. It was against the background of this turmoil and in part as an attempt to place the alienation of the student activists into a framework in which it could be viewed and its significance evaluated relative to the broader patterns of political values and feelings of young Japanese as a whole that I conducted this study of the political learning process among Japanese teenagers.

Throughout the study I have followed the Japanese practice in writing Japanese names; that is, family name precedes surname. In the case of American authors of Japanese ancestry, however, the name is given in the Western style. I should also note that for the sake of simplicity I have omitted marking long vowels in Japanese words.

It is one of the great joys of scholarship that carrying out a large-scale study inevitably requires the assistance

and support of many kind people. I have accumulated a debt of gratitude to numerous colleagues and friends, both Japanese and American, that I can acknowledge but never hope to repay.

Throughout every stage in the process of research and writing I have been uniquely fortunate to have had the counsel and wisdom of Fred Greenstein. Teacher, adviser, friend, this study would have been impossible without him. His thorough reading of the entire manuscript and detailed suggestions for improvements are responsible for much of what is of value in the pages that follow.

To Chitoshi Yanaga, who introduced me to the joys and woes of the study of Japanese politics and who gave unceasingly of his guidance and encouragement, I am likewise profoundly indebted. Lewis Austen and Peter Busch have read the entire manuscript and contributed their insights and suggestions. Howard Erdman's comments on part of the manuscript have likewise been most helpful. I also benefited in diverse ways from the assistance of other American colleagues too numerous to mention here by name.

In Japan I was the beneficiary of a veritable cornucopia of kindness. Professor Watanuki Joji was instrumental in an enormous number of ways in making this study possible, beginning with sponsoring my affiliation with the Department of Sociology at Tokyo University. His incisive mind and sensitivity to the nuances of Japanese political culture were of

continuous help in every phase of the research project.

I am likewise deeply indebted to a fellow student of political socialization in Japan, Professor Okamura Tadao, for his great generosity in sharing his knowledge and scholarly resources in the area of our shared interest. Both Professors Watanuki and Okamura afforded me the privilege of participating in their seminars at Tokyo University and International Christian University respectively, as a result of which I not only learned a great deal about Japanese culture and politics but also met and made friends with students and other young scholars with interests similar to my own, who also helped me in many ways.

Professor Sato Nobuo of Utsunomiya University and his wife, Katsuko, a fellow member of Professor Watanuki's seminar, were of tremendous help in establishing contact with the schools in Tochigi prefecture where I carried out the survey. I am also grateful to Professor Matsubara Haruo of Tokyo University for his help in this regard as in many others. Professor Suzuki Hiro of Tokyo University of Education kindly shared with me some of his vast knowledge of Japanese student politics.

An important part of the validity of the findings reported here depends on the validity of the questionnaire. I was fortunate to have had the help of a large number of friends and colleagues in the drafting and polishing of the questionnaire. Professors Watanuki and Okamura played an especially

important role here, as did the students in their seminars. I should mention in particular the help of Iwase Yori in this regard. Kawakami Kunio, a close friend and a member of the Institute for Developing Economies, also read the questionnaire very thoroughly and made numerous suggestions on how it might be improved.

The great practical difficulties that beset a large-scale research project such as this one could not have been overcome without the efficient and unflinching help of my assistants. Yasue Akio, in particular, played a vital role, assisting both in the administration of the questionnaires and in the individual interviews. Sakogawa Yoshikazu and Mimoto Hiroko also contributed invaluable help in both the survey and the interviews. Maki Atsuko spent long hours transcribing the taped interviews. Takeuchi Etsuko took charge of the enormous task of coding the responses from the questionnaires, in which she was ably assisted by Inui Setsuko, Ishii Nobuko, Komatsu Hiroe, Munemasa Yasuko, Nagase Kumiko, Sato Yukimi, Shiohara Yumi, Ueno Naoko, Umezu Machiko, Yagi Tsutako, Yoshii Setsuko, and Yoshiaki Mayumi. Sato⁶ Fumiko did the exacting job of keypunching the more than six thousand IBM cards with speed, accuracy, and good spirits.

No group of people has been more important to this study than the teachers and principals of the schools who permitted me into their classrooms, and the children and the parents who are themselves the subjects of this study.

I am especially grateful to Ishigooka Jiro sensei of Bunkyo-Ku Dai-Reku Chugakko in Tokyo who gave a great deal of his time and his generosity in innumerable ways to this foreign scholar. I hope that he and the other teachers to whom I owe so much will find this study of some interest and some use in their own continuing study of Japanese youth.

Funding for various phases of the study has come from a variety of sources. The Department of Political Science of Yale University provided support for the initial analysis of the data. The bulk of the computer analysis of the data was carried out using the superb facilities of the Kiewit Computation Center at Dartmouth with support for the analysis generously provided by the College. I am grateful to my colleague Dennis Sullivan for his help in getting the data on the computer and to John Cunningham, John Lyons, and especially John Fry for assistance in programming. Dartmouth has also borne part of the cost of the typing of the manuscript.

Support for my field research in Japan, as well as during a period of some months prior to and following the field research, was provided by a fellowship granted by the Foreign Area Fellowship Program. Needless to say the conclusions, opinions and other statements herein are entirely my own responsibility not that of the Fellowship Program nor that of any other institution or individual.

The often frustrating job of typing the manuscript has been handled with gusto and aplomb by Mrs. Donna Musgrove. Mrs. Jann Dalton has seen to the reproduction and collation of the manuscript.

Finally, nothing I can say can adequately express my appreciation and admiration for the countless ways and selfless spirit in which my wife, Elizabeth Massey, has helped in bringing this study to realization. In addition to typing the early drafts of the entire manuscript, she has contributed much to the substance of the study, from translating the transcript of the interviews into colloquial English, making their analysis an infinitely easier task, to serving as a principal editor and critic of the manuscript. She has been a vital source of strength and encouragement as well as a sometime gadfly without whose gentle prodding the study might still be in the planning stage. Kimi no tame ni . . .

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CHAPTER I

POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION IN A NEW DEMOCRACY

Political Socialization and Political Regimes: The Case of Japan

The study of pre-adult political socialization takes as a principal premise that the political attitudes and values that develop in childhood and adolescence play a significant role in contributing to the psychological foundations of politics in a society. In many contemporary political systems the regime is likely to have been only recently established, with still fragile roots in the political culture. Indeed, postwar history has demonstrated with depressing regularity just how fragile young democracies, in particular, have been. Thus a central question of comparative politics becomes how a new regime—especially a democracy—develops strength and legitimacy in a political culture torn between competing values and loyalties, conflicting traditions and ideologies. This study of political socialization in just such a new democracy, Japan, focuses on both the strengths and the weaknesses in the psychological base of the polity.¹

It is paradoxical, though by no means surprising, that most of what we know about the development of regime support

¹For a discussion of the English and Japanese language literature on political opinions and behavior in Japan, see the introduction to the Select Bibliography at the end of this study.

comes from research not on societies with new regimes but on the United States, where a democratic regime has long been established and where (at least until the mid 1960s) basic orientations toward the institutions, norms, and values of political life have constituted a broad political cultural consensus in which ideological cleavage has been at a minimum. In contrast, Japan's democratic regime was externally imposed by a foreign occupation less than three decades ago.

The norms, values and beliefs, both social and political, associated with Japan's post-World War II regime in many cases run directly counter to others of older vintage which Japanese born and educated before 1945 had learned to hold dear. In addition, ever since the inception of the democratic regime, Japanese politics has been characterized by a profound cleavage along ideological lines. Confronting each other over a gulf of hostility and fundamental policy disagreement have been conservatives, who have continually dominated the government, and progressives² who, though in a position of near-permanent opposition and frustrated in almost all of their national policy and electoral objectives, enjoy the overwhelming support of Japan's intellectuals and teachers. Japan, in one sense, is thus a model of the new democracy confronted with challenges from both past and present. Given

²"Progressive" is used in this study as it is used in Japanese politics, to refer to the "progressive camp" in the Marxist sense, i.e., the Socialist and Communist parties and associated groups on the left.

the high mortality rate of the democracies established outside the West in the aftermath of World War II, the apparent durability and vitality of her young democratic regime inevitably attract the attention and excite the curiosity of the student of comparative politics.³

Socialization to Regime Support and Democratic Participation

This study focuses on the role played by the political socialization of Japanese adolescents in the development of two areas of attitudes and values associated with democratic politics: first, support for the democratic regime, its legitimizing values and principles, institutions, and decision processes and rules; second, orientations associated with participation in the democratic political process, attitudes that encourage involvement in political life, supported by feelings of political efficacy, interest, and partisanship.

In the analysis of the development of these orientations, several themes recur. One major theme is the effects of generational change: how do the political orientations of today's teenagers compare with those of their parents? Stemming directly from this is a related theme of the sources and agents of political learning and the political role of the family under circumstances of massive and profound discontinuity in social and political value systems.

³Focusing on a deviant case is more likely to yield new insights as to variables which should be included in a model of the multivariate causal factors associated with a phenomenon than would repeated study of cases in which the norm prevails.

The proposition that political systems depend for support, at least in part, on mass psychological foundations created as the result of pre-adult socialization is a relatively recent basis for political research but derives from a long established view. This view can be traced back to a formerly influential approach to the study of whole societies known under the rubric of "national character" or "psycho-cultural" analysis.⁴ Ultimately, this view derives from the classical commentators on politics—Plato and his successors.⁵ A more proximate source for the approach I take in this study can be found in the work of David Easton⁶ and his students, who have theorized about and done empirical studies of the role political socialization plays in creating support for political systems, and the writings of Gabriel Almond, Harold Lasswell, Robert Lane and others who have postulated that various psychological orientations toward politics are

See Seymour Martin Lipset, et al., Union Democracy (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1962), p. 469.

⁴An excellent discussion of the various schools of national character analysis and of the criticism directed against the approach can be found in H.C.T. Duijker and N.H. Frijda, National Character and National Stereotypes (Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing, 1960). On Japanese national character the classic work is Ruth Benedict, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1946). See also inter alia the various articles compiled in B.S. Silberman, ed., Japanese Character and Culture (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1962).

⁵On this point see Fred I. Greenstein, Children and Politics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), pp. 2-3.

⁶The most detailed discussion of Easton's theory can be found in the first three chapters of David Easton and Jack Dennis, Children in the Political System (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969). See also David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: Wiley, 1965).

necessary for the functioning of democracy.⁷

From Easton I borrow the formulation of "diffuse support for the political regime." Diffuse support refers to a relatively generalized affective attachment to political objects. Affect may manifest itself in the form of emotional ties, feelings of attachment, liking, respect, reverence, etc. The political regime, in Easton's use of the term (and the sense in which it is used in this study) refers broadly to the constitutional order of a polity; the values upon which the political system is founded; the norms specifying the procedures and rules of the game that are prescribed for the making of decisions and for participation in the political process; and the institutions or structures of authority.⁸ Thus one part of the focus of the study is on Japanese teenagers' feelings about democratic values and principles, such as liberty, equality, and popular sovereignty; democratic rules of the game, including majority rule; and the institutions of contemporary politics—the Prime Minister, Government, and Diet in the realm of governmental authority, and political parties, elections, and associated elements of the

⁷ See Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963). Harold D. Lasswell, The Political Writings of Harold D. Lasswell (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1951), especially the chapter on "Democratic Character," and Robert E. Lane, Political Ideology (New York: Free Press, 1962).

⁸ Easton, op. cit., pp. 193 ff.

process of popular politics.

The second part of the focus, that on teenagers' acquisition of orientations associated with participation in the political process, derives from the centrality of popular politics in democratic theory. Numerous writers have theorized about the kinds of cultural and attitudinal supports necessary for participation to be sufficiently widespread among the members of a political system for democracy to flourish.⁹ Typically, a democratic political culture is characterized as having a high proportion of citizens equipped with both cognitive and affective orientations that maximize their potential for effective participation in politics. The ideal democrat knows about the impact on his life of government and politics at all levels of the political process. He knows what his rights are and what he is entitled to do in seeking to influence government as well as how to go about it. He participates in the political process, at least to the extent of feeling involved and interested in what happens. He feels capable of exerting an influence on what does happen and he takes sides in the political process by becoming a partisan, a supporter of one or another of

⁹Probably the most extensive and best known formulation of these supports has been that of the democratic political culture set forth by Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba in The Civic Culture. For a more recent discussion with a different emphasis, see Carole Patman, Participation and Democratic Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), and Dennis F. Thompson, The Democratic Citizen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970).

the political parties between whom the conflict of democratic politics is played out. An interested, efficacious, and partisan community of participants describes the most important elements of a widely held view of the political culture of democracy.

Underlying and partly determining these aspects of the political self, it has been argued by Harold Lasswell, Robert Lane and others, are psychological characteristics that lie deeper within the personality and which in effect constitute the basic components of democratic personality or character. Prominent among these orientations are feelings of personal autonomy and competence as well as trust in other people which conflict with important elements of what has been asserted to be the traditional Japanese "national character." That national character as formed by traditional culture has played a central role in many descriptions and explanations of Japanese behavior and institutions.

The traditional culture now plays in effect the political role of a counterculture, a source of resistance and impedance to the values and beliefs that make up the democratic political culture. But challenge to the democratic regime and its culture also takes place from another counterculture, one based on ideology and the major sources of social and political cleavage in contemporary Japan. In discussing these two competitors to the democratic culture I shall for convenience sake refer to them respectively as the traditional and the oppositional political countercultures.

The Traditional Political Counterculture: Culture and Character as Impediments to Democracy.

A convenient way of summarizing the ingredients of the traditional counterculture is through a discussion of the literature on Japanese national character. The Pacific War spurred a large number of works on Japanese culture, nearly all of which aimed at explaining either Japan's aggressive foreign policy or her undemocratic politics by reference to her national character.¹⁰ While it would be beyond the scope of the present study to summarize all of these works, it is appropriate to take note of the major common characteristics of these analyses of the alleged psychocultural determinants of Japanese politics. The single most important element was the emphasis placed on the central role of the characteristic patterns of family interaction, especially patterns of authority, as a model for nearly all types of behavior and institutions in Japan, including the political system.

The first premise of the national character approach was that the learning that takes place as a result of the experiences of early childhood and infancy is of primary and enduring importance in determining the personality of the individual and in structuring all his subsequent learning. Consequently, since nearly all such early learning takes place within the family, the most important experiences in the life of the individual in so far as his adult attitudes

¹⁰See the works on Japanese national character cited in footnote 4.

behavior are concerned are those with his parents. The attitudes of the child toward his father and mother that result from those experiences will be the prototypes for his attitudes toward all people he subsequently encounters, particularly those who occupy positions of authority, such as his boss or even political authority figures. The wishes or drives the individual acquires as a result of his early training will, if they are shared by a majority of the population, work to produce social institutions or to modify existing institutions which themselves function as a means of satisfying drives. In its early formulations the concept of "national character" derived, then, from the premise that the members of a society will share a common set of psychological structures ("character") created as the result of early childhood training, which are linked more or less directly to their adult attitudes and behavior. Hence the social institutions including the political institutions in the society will reflect the central needs and drives in that character.¹¹

From these various assumptions and postulates, the early psychocultural or national character writers concluded that the state is essentially "the family writ large." Such a perspective is exemplified in the following remarks by Douglas Haring, one of the best-known analysts of Japanese national character:

¹¹ For a lucid and elegant exposition and discussion of these postulates and their broader theoretical background, see Geoffrey Gorer, "Themes in Japanese Culture," in Silberman, op. cit., pp. 309-310.

. . . one whose parents characteristically acted as equals motivated by affection and mutual respect subsequently may seek situations in which his associates hold each other in considerate, helpful regard. If, however, his father dominated the household, showed contempt for the mother, and dramatized the brutal aspects of living, the infant may grow up to create a household or to work for a political order that he can dominate in the mood of his father. Failing to achieve supreme command, he nevertheless feels at home under an authoritative ruler who enforces obedience. . . . Only by changing the patterns of social experience in infancy can a society undergo permanent reform, either toward democracy or toward autocracy. Nazism and Nipponism are possible in the long run only in populations where a majority of homes are patriarchal microcosms.¹²

While Haring here emphasizes the effects of paternal authoritarianism, other writers such as Geoffrey Gorer put special emphasis on the earliest experiences of childhood training, relating adult social and political attitudes and behavior to toilet training, weaning, and related child-rearing practices.

Despite the innovative insights which the psychoculturalists' emphasis on the early experiences of the individual brought to the analysis of Japanese and other societies, it became apparent that the national character approach was replete with problems of evidence and inference. In some cases great leaps of imagination were taken to span the distance between allegedly dominant or modal practices

¹²Douglas G. Haring, "Aspects of Personal Character in Japan," reprinted in Douglas G. Haring, ed., Personal Character and Cultural Milieu (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1956).

in such areas as toilet training, weaning, etc., and dominant institutions of the political system. This brought about a great deal of criticism of the approach on both methodological and epistemological grounds.¹³

To begin with, the critics pointed out, the national character writers rarely if ever made any attempt to establish empirically just how dominant or modal the child-rearing practices were; nor did they often marshal data on the distribution of the asserted national characteristics themselves. The usual practice was simply to assert their prevalence or modality on the basis of subjective impressions, or the observation of a small number of individuals, often individuals unlikely to be representative of the general population, existing under unusual circumstances, such as Japanese-Americans interned in relocation centers in the United States.

If the data were thus questionable, so too was the structure of inferences linking the family and other primary institutions with the disparate and much more complex institutions of the political system. In particular, criticism was directed at the simple analogy between family authority patterns and political authority patterns that so often lay at the heart of national character analysis. The critics pointed out that the structures and patterns of authority of the

¹³See Alex Inkeles, "National Character and Modern Political Systems," reprinted in Nelson Polsky, et al., eds., Politics and Social Life (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1963), pp. 172-192.

political system are highly formalized and often far from congruent with the informal system of "government" in the family.

As a result of such criticism a new focus emerged in later studies of national character in which the premise of a single character structure common to all members of a society was modified to one which recognized that a multiplicity of character or personality types was likely in a complex society. This later variety of national character analysis sought to establish empirical evidence as to the incidence of multiple varieties of character in a society and as to which variety, if any, could be determined to be the "modal personality" in that society.¹⁴

But there also emerged a further divergent perspective on the influence of pre-adult learning on the political adult, taken by those, like the political scientists mentioned earlier, who moved away from the concept of national character—or even modal personality—to that of political culture and from child rearing to political socialization. In this perspective the individual's politically relevant orientations are not presumed to have a basis in his character or personality. The potentially major effect of the family on

¹⁴Alex Inkeles and Daniel Levinson, "National Character: The Study of Modal Personality and Sociocultural Systems," in G. Lindzey, ed., Handbook of Social Psychology, v. 2 (Cambridge, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Press, 1954), pp. 977-1020.

an individual's political orientations is not denied, but the other pre-adult experiences of life are also considered to have effects, often independent effects. As the individual matures and approaches the age when he will take part in the political world he belongs to such other significant institutions as the school, the peer group, and voluntary associations and eventually the job. In these social situations the individual will learn, both directly and indirectly, political orientations which may supplement and reinforce those learned in the family; but the new orientations may also contradict or conflict with the family-induced ones. Moreover, the authority structures and decision-making patterns in the later institutions will be likely to approximate more closely those of the political system, in terms of the formality of the structures.¹⁵

In a sense, of course, the political culture-political socialization approach represents a continuation in a more refined and multidimensional version of the national character approach. This is equally true of the focus on the role of the "politically-relevant" learning experiences. The political culturalists view the experiences of childhood and adolescence in family, church, school, job, voluntary associations, etc., as experiences with pre-political authority and

¹⁵On this last point see Harry F. Eckstein, A Theory of Stable Democracy, Princeton University Center of International Studies Research Monograph No. 10, 1961.

decision systems on the basis of which the individual may generalize to the political sphere, expecting, for example, that he will (or will not) be able to participate in the making of decisions in the political system if he has (or has not) been able to participate in decisions in the family, school, job, etc. That it is not assumed that these pre-political experiences will all themselves be modeled on what happens in the family, and that those which happen later in the more formal, impersonal, and structured authority systems may override the impact of family experiences on the behavior and attitudes of the individual when he attains political majority, are significant departures from the national character tradition.

An additional major departure is that the political culturalists emphasize the importance of specifically political learning, as well as generalizable, politically relevant learning. Political man has attitudes with which he relates, and may act not simply to authority in some general sense but to specific political figures, institutions, and processes. These attitudes he learns throughout his life, from childhood through adolescence, into adulthood. The political socialization process, as opposed to child-rearing, imbues him with a many-faceted political self, so that by the time he enters into the adult political realm he comes equipped with political identifications, values, and beliefs that have potentially wide-ranging and important specific effects

on his political behavior and which link his pre-adult learning much more closely to the political system than his toilet training or weaning.

Granting the validity of the criticisms of the national character approach, for our purposes it is still possible and indeed important to take account of the various politically relevant and specifically political orientations associated with traditional-Japan. For regardless of the validity of the national character school's claims that the political values and attitudes of pre-1945 Japan were founded in character as molded by culturally determined patterns of childhood training, the values and attitudes themselves do appear to have constituted a major set of ingredients in the political culture of pre-1945 Japan. Indeed, it has been these various traditional values and beliefs that are most frequently identified as the prime obstacles to developing cultural roots for democracy in Japan. In the realm of those factors related to the self as a political actor, these traditional orientations include a submissiveness and acquiescence to authority that conflicts with the sense of political competence and assertiveness of one's rights that are ascribed to the democratic citizen; and subordination to and conformity with the group, a posture at odds with the democratic character's required ego-strength and personal competence. In some though not all formulations, it also includes suspicion and mistrust of strangers as a result of the exclusive nature

of group membership in which, it is alleged, the individual belongs to a single, primary group which has exclusive claims on his loyalties.

In terms of specifically political orientations, the traditional political counterculture includes allegiance to and adulation of the Emperor, and the belief that ultimate sovereignty derives from and rests with him rather than the people. It was characterized by fervent nationalism and national pride, a chauvinism based on the very existence in Japan of the Emperor. The norms of this ideology of the Emperor-system specified that the appropriate attitude of the common man toward the institutions of government was that of the "subject," obedience and implicit trust and support of authority. Toward the nongovernmental institutions of politics, especially those concerned with the representation of opposition and dissent, political parties and partisan elections, for example, traditional Japanese political culture was suspicious. Indeed, one of the most prominent elements of this culture was a stress on harmony and consensus and a consequent intolerance of dissent. It was therefore anti-majoritarian in character, seeking rule not by the majority but by unanimity, and requiring the passive and silent acquiescence of the minority.

These, then, are the cultural and ideological supports of Japan's ancien regime that students of contemporary Japan usually assert, to some greater or lesser degree, to be

continuing impediments to the emergence of a democratic political culture. They are commonly linked with those segments of Japanese society believed to be less affected by the modernizing and democratizing trends of the postwar; in particular, they are linked in the minds of many Japanese scholars with rural Japan, and, of course, with the older generations of adults. In this study, therefore, I have incorporated a focus on these values and beliefs and their persistence among urban and rural Japanese of both the younger and the older generations. Throughout the analysis the effects of these two factors will be a continuing concern.

The Oppositional Counterculture: Ideological Conflict and Its Impact on Regime Support and the Democratic Culture

While the traditional counterculture is the most frequently cited challenge to the contemporary democratic regime in Japan, there is another perhaps more explosive source of political cultural conflict, one with a different but potentially major kind of impact on the political socialization of Japanese teenagers. Japanese politics is riven with an ideological split between the ruling conservatives who have molded Japan's capitalist socioeconomic system into the engine of economic growth and an opposition with an intense antipathy toward that system based essentially on ideological principles derived from Marxian socialism.

The opposition challenges the established order along a broad spectrum. First it calls into question the democraticness

of Japan's present social and political system. In so doing the most influential members of the opposition camp, the Socialists, advance their own definition of democracy in which genuine democracy is equated with a socialist political and economic order.

Second, the members of the opposition, who range leftward from the socialists and communists to the most radical of student groups, cast themselves in the role of defenders of the democratic aspects of the present system—the protection of the Constitution, the defense of freedom of thought and of academic and educational liberty—against the predation of a government cloaked in the garb of democracy but which seeks to reimpose authoritarianism and militarism. Third, the opposition reserves the right to recourse by extraparliamentary action, including, for some, violence, against conservative parliamentary oppression of opposition, against the "tyranny of the majority." In brief, the progressives call into dispute the legitimacy of many of the bases of the regime and the social order.

The Marxist-based progressive critique of society and polity has been of great significance in the development of social and political thought in postwar Japan. It is accepted in part or in whole by most intellectuals and has monopolized respectable intellectual opposition to the conservatives. Two aspects of the spread of the ideology are worthy of special note. First is the fact that some of the most basic concepts

and terms of the ideology have become part of mass culture, used by Marxist and non-Marxist alike. Especially prevalent is the use of the term "capitalist" to describe Japan. The defining characteristic of contemporary Japan that, as we shall see, comes first to mind for many Japanese adults and teenagers is not "democracy" but rather "capitalism," a perspective that derives from the conceptual framework of Marxism and which has a decidedly different set of connotations and evaluations attached to it than those which accompany "democracy."

The second aspect of the spread of socialist ideology is its influence in education. Particularly important is the fact that the Japan Teachers Union, to which most of Japan's public school teachers belong, has been one of the most enthusiastic supporters of the left and a militant foe of government education policy. The union and the education ministry have been at bitter odds over the content of textbooks and of classroom instruction in the two subject fields most closely related to the political socialization process: the morals and social studies courses. The reinstatement of the teaching of morals in the curriculum by the ministry in 1958 was strenuously resisted by the union on the ground that the government would use the morals course to revive indoctrination in ultra-nationalism and other reactionary doctrines that had been the core of the pre-1945 ethics courses abolished by the Occupation. The continuing conflict over the teaching

of social studies has centered around what texts should be used, whether the government's policy of permitting only approved texts to be used amounts to political censorship, and whether the primary objective should be to instill acceptance and support of Japan's polity and society or to develop a social "problem consciousness" that focuses on the flaws and inequities of the society.

While most of the principal characteristics of the traditional counterculture discussed earlier appear to be in conflict with the elements of democratic political culture, the oppositional counterculture includes both elements that are potentially facilitative of democracy as well as those which are contradictory. On the positive side, the progressive culture and especially its ideological components may cause the individual to seek increased political information and knowledge, to be more deeply involved, psychologically, in political affairs, and to participate more widely and fully in political life. In addition, socialist ideology may increase the individual's social and political conscience, making him less apathetic and less complacent about social, economic, and political ills and inequities. Finally, the socialist emphasis on the "undemocratic" behavior of the government may cause the individual to develop deep-rooted support for democratic principles, especially the projection of the rights of the minority and of the individual to oppose and dissent.

It is also not hard to imagine how elements of the progressive counterculture might conflict with the formation of orientations which support democratic politics. The fact that the socioeconomic system is capitalist might outweigh the fact

that its political institutions are democratic, leading the individual to emphasize his society's faults and to minimize or ignore its virtues; such dissatisfaction might spill over into a loss of faith in democratic processes and institutions.

Like the traditional counterculture, the oppositional counterculture has potential effects on the political socialization of Japanese teenagers that must be taken into account in a study of the socialization sources of regime support. It is also usually linked with certain specific segments of Japanese society—the urbanites and intellectuals. And its well known and highly visible impact on the most politically active elements of young Japanese, especially in the student movement, certainly compels us to attend to the degree to which it has become a part of the more general political culture of Japanese youth.

Research Design and Methodology

The main source of data used in this study consists of the results of a set of surveys which I administered in the spring of 1969 to nearly a thousand Japanese teenagers and their parents. Supplementing this data are several additional data sources: the transcripts of loosely structured taped interviews with some forty of the students from the survey sample; compositions written for me by forty-three Tokyo eighth graders on their conceptions of ideal Japan; and the results of a 1968 nationwide survey of over five

thousand children in grades three through twelve conducted by Professor Okamura Tadao.¹⁶

In my own survey the instruments for both the students and the parents were questionnaires of the pencil and paper, self-completion variety. (The original Japanese versions and the English translations of both the student and the parent questionnaires can be found in the Appendix to this study, following chapter eight.) The teenage respondents in the survey were public school students in grades eight, ten and twelve (aged from thirteen to eighteen years). The students were surveyed under my direction or that of my assistant—a Japanese college student—in their classrooms during school hours.

The decisions to use self-completed questionnaires and to administer them to children in their classrooms were dictated both by economy and by the objectives of the study. One important objective was that the sample be broadly representative of Japanese families. The ideal way of assuring representativeness, drawing a national random sample of families, perhaps stratified by size of locality, was ruled out because the costs of administration of the questionnaire to a sufficiently large sample of families to enable statistical analysis of the results would have been far greater than my research budget would allow. I therefore constructed a sample whose principal demographic characteristics are roughly representative of the population at large.

¹⁶See footnote 8 of chapter two.

I did this by intentionally choosing as sample sites middle and high schools so located that the over-all sample that results had roughly the same proportion of families as the population in regard to urban-rural residence, income and education levels, and occupational types. The urban schools were located in the shitamachi (central city) and yamate (middle-class residential) sections of Tokyo; the rural schools were in two small cities, Kuroiso and Karasuyama, and two farming communities, Higashi-Nasuno and Kita-Takanezawa, in Tochigi Prefecture, about 100 miles north of Tokyo. Table I-1 presents a breakdown of the sample by number of respondents, by category and by the principal demographic characteristics. Strictly speaking, of course, since the sample was purposely rather than randomly selected, it is representative only of itself. Nevertheless, in view of its fairly close demographic similarity to the population and in view of the fact that this is essentially the same method of sample selection as has been used in most of the other socialization studies with which the results of the present study will be compared, I will treat the sample as representative of Japanese families generally.

One important consequence of conducting the survey in the schools was that it undoubtedly contributed to the high response rate of the parents. The procedure I employed in the parental survey was to ask the students to take home a sealed envelope containing two copies of the parental

TABLE I-1

BASIC DEMOGRAPHIC COMPOSITION OF THE SAMPLE

A. Totals

students	942
fathers	802
mothers	835
father-mother pairs	752

B. By grade for students

Grade 8	282
Grade 10	334
Grade 12	326

C. By sex for students

boys	492	(52.2%)
girls	450	(47.8%)

D. By place of residence for students

Tokyo: central city	260	(27.6%)
Tokyo: suburban	278	(29.5%)
Tochigi: rural	404	(42.9%)

E. By family occupation (father's report)

professional	45	(5.6%)
administrative	150	(18.7%)
owner of large firm	37	(4.6%)
owner of small business	131	(16.3%)
clerical	85	(10.6%)
skilled labor	122	(15.2%)
unskilled labor	12	(1.5%)
farm	184	(22.9%)
other and NR	36	(4.5%)

questionnaire, to have these completed by their parents, and to return them to the school within several days. The fathers and mothers were explicitly requested to complete their questionnaires individually and without conferring with one another; inspection of the returned questionnaires revealed few cases of obvious mutual parental consultation, all of which were subsequently discarded from the sample. Almost 90 percent of the parental questionnaires were in fact returned, but a fair number had been only partially completed. Nevertheless, the final response rate after I excluded from the sample any parent who answered fewer than 75 percent of the items was 85 percent (802) for the fathers and 89 percent (835) for the mothers. In 80 percent (752) of the cases, both parents responded. These are of course very high response rates, and it seems clear that they are due to the fact that the students were instructed to return their parents' questionnaires back to the school, which as an institution continues to occupy an influential and prestigious role in Japanese society.

A second major objective of the study is comparability. I shall be comparing the political and other related attitudes of Japanese teenagers both cross-nationally, with findings about American and other adolescents' political beliefs, and trans-generationally, with their parents' beliefs and values. In view of the broad aims of the study with regard to assaying political cultural change, the fixed-choice format of the

questionnaire was most appropriate, because it permitted the gathering of data on a wide variety of attitudinal measures that are unambiguously comparable within the context of the Japanese study itself, and whose cross-national comparability depends only on the semantic and linguistic comparability of the items used and the representativeness of the sample.

I have already discussed the representativeness issue. As to the question of semantic and linguistic comparability, I took every appropriate step to insure that those items in the questionnaire relevant to orientations in regard to which I intended to compare the Japanese teenagers with American or other youngsters were as similar in their Japanese wording to the meaning of the original English version as it was possible to make them. Some of these items were taken directly or almost directly from the questionnaires used in American studies, notably the Jennings and Niemi work on American high school seniors,¹⁷ and the various studies carried out by Dennis, Easton, Hess and their associates.¹⁸ The most important of these were the items used in the political efficacy, political interest, social trust, and ego-autonomy scales, which are discussed in detail in chapter six.

¹⁷ Student and Parent Questionnaires, High School Senior Study, Project 477, Survey Research Center, University of Michigan, Spring 1965.

¹⁸ See Robert D. Hess and Judith V. Torney, The Development of Basic Attitudes and Values Toward Government and Citizenship During the Elementary School Years, Part 1, Office of Education Cooperative Research Project No. 1078, Chicago, 1965, Appendix D; and Jack Dennis et al., Civic Concepts Survey Questionnaire, mimeo, n.d.

There are obviously great difficulties involved in capturing all of the connotations of a statement in English in as disparate and non-cognate a language as Japanese. Some colloquial English phrases or expressions are not directly translatable into Japanese. Okamura's survey, for example, included an item meant to be comparable to one asked in the Easton and Hess study of American children, asking whether they thought the President was "doing a good job." The literal translation of this expression in Japanese is not colloquial and the item which Okamura finally used, as the closest Japanese approximation, was literally whether the youngster thought the Prime Minister was "carrying out his responsibilities." To minimize this kind of difficulty I constructed my questionnaire via a lengthy series of steps. First, I myself wrote the original Japanese language version of the questions, giving a literal translation of all items taken from English language questionnaires. (Many of the questions were, of course, original and some were borrowed from Japanese surveys.) A native Japanese sociologist and a political scientist and their students read the questionnaire and revised all items into correct colloquial Japanese. I tested the linguistic clarity of this corrected version, as well as the level of cognitive difficulty of the questions, by discussing the meaning of each item, one by one, with a half a dozen thirteen to fifteen year old children in my Tokyo neighborhood. As a final preliminary step I administered the questionnaire to some ninety eighth graders at a middle school in Tokyo, as a pretest of the instrument. After examining the patterns of responses, in order to identify

problem items, I interviewed ten of the students who had taken the pretest questionnaire and discussed the format of the instrument and the individual questions with them. As a result of these pretest steps, a number of questions were reworded or in a few instances discarded entirely. In short, the questionnaire was thoroughly tested to guarantee that teenagers as young as thirteen would clearly understand each item as it was meant to be understood and be able to complete the questionnaire in a reasonable period of time. (The time averaged thirty-five to forty minutes, or slightly less than a full class period.)

Despite the advantages of the fixed choice questionnaire with respect to comparability, ease of answering for the respondent and of coding for the researcher as well as the variety of measures which could be included, there are obvious disadvantages. Most important, it does not permit the respondent to express his own ideas and images, and it thus may give a distorted picture, one more reflective of the researcher's interests than of the respondent's perspectives. In order to prevent that I also conducted, in addition to the questionnaire, a series of loosely structured, taped interviews with forty of the students in the sample. These interviews lasted from forty minutes to an hour. I myself did most of the interviewing, but because Japanese have a strong consciousness of the differences between themselves and foreigners I took several measures to reduce the impact

my foreign nationality had on the interview. First, I had several Japanese college students carry out a number of the interviews, the results of which could serve as a rough check on the effects of my presence versus that of a native interviewer. I also used this tactic in administering the questionnaires in the classrooms, where in half the classes I was present to explain the purposes and procedures of the survey and to answer any questions and in the other half my Japanese assistant was present. Viewing the results of both sets of interviews and questionnaire results later, it appeared that my presence had made no appreciable systematic difference in either case.

A second tactic I used in the interviews to diminish the alien atmosphere of my presence was to talk with two respondents in the same session. This had the disadvantage of some obvious contamination of responses, but had several advantages that made that a tolerable cost. The first was a lessening of the tension of the situation; for nearly all of the interviewees I was the first foreigner with whom they had ever spoken, and in at least one of the rural areas, the first foreigner ever seen in the flesh. The presence of two students meant that each could feel reassured and fortified, less vulnerable to the mild angst produced by the experience of being interviewed by an adult male foreigner. The second advantage was that it enabled me to stimulate, and then observe and record, interchanges between the teenagers with

respect to their images and beliefs about politics. This resulted in a more natural flow of discussion than would have been possible in the somewhat artificial setting of an individual interview. Often one student's reply or remark would lead to an interesting follow-up or counter reply from the other.

While the interviews were fairly loosely structured, I did attempt to focus them on the issues raised in the questionnaire. They thus served as a means for enriching the questionnaire results with the students' own perceptions and perspectives and as a check on the interpretations I have placed on those results. Without the interviews, much of the data from the questionnaires would be readily susceptible to misinterpretation. But the combination of the two sources of evidence provides a data base that is both more contextually reliable and more broadly useful in the analysis that follows than a single strategy study, relying either wholly on questionnaire data from a large sample, or wholly on intensive interviews with a small number of respondents, could have created.

One aspect of the research design requires special comment, namely the ages of the youngsters studied. I chose middle and high school students, teenagers from thirteen to seventeen or eighteen, for several reasons. First, I sought to assess the role of ideology, as it appears in the terms that youngsters learn to use about politics and society and

in their political belief systems, in the political socialization process. Informal investigation of younger children, coupled with recent work on cognitive development, indicated that prior to middle school, phrases and concepts such as "capitalism," "tyranny of the majority," "class," and the like, do not appear with any significant degree of frequency in either the speech or the perceptions of Japanese youngsters. Moreover, eighth grade (that is, second year in middle school) is the year just prior to that in which government and politics are given as specific subjects in the social studies curriculum. Hence, the orientations of eighth graders will be likely in many respects, especially the area of ideology, to reflect the influence of texts and teachers to a substantially lesser degree than those of older students.

Second, I wish to compare the orientations of youngsters with those of their parents. For the sake of minimizing problems of comparability and consequent problems of inference, it was desirable to employ items and measures for both the student and parent samples which are as similar as possible. This would not have been feasible in the case of elementary school children, but clearly was for middle and high school students. Fortunately, Okamura's survey provided data on the attitudes of younger children in a number of areas which paralleled my interests. Thus by focusing on adolescents I could maximize the information produced in my own study and at the same time make use of complementary data on the earlier

stages of the political socialization process.

The Structure of the Analysis

The study will proceed from an essentially descriptive initial section which emphasizes the over-all distributive patterns of support for the institutions and values of the democratic regime, through a middle section concerned with exploring the lines of partisan and ideological conflict and competition as they emerge in the socialization process, to a final section in which the bases of the political differences among the young are explored as are the sources and agencies of socialization.

The initial section of the study focuses on the patterns of support for the institutions and values of the democratic regime. At the outset (chapter two) I concentrate on the feelings of Japanese children from the early years of grade school toward political institutions. The principal emphasis is on the potential role of the major national political figures, particularly the Prime Minister, as benevolent leaders and sources of charismatic personal legitimation of the regime.

I then turn to the ways in which young Japanese deal with democracy, as a concept and as a value (chapter three). What do they conceive it to mean, and to what extent do they value it intrinsically and in comparison with other values? I focus particular attention on the ways in which democratic procedural rules, especially majoritarianism, interact in their values with traditional norms of consensus and unanimity.

I also examine democracy's potential role as a legitimizing ideology and symbol of national consensus in conjunction with the role played by peace in this context.

After considering sources of legitimacy and symbols of consensus I move to symbols of dissensus and conflict—the impact on the developing political orientations of Japanese youth of partisan and ideological cleavage. Here I begin by exploring the status of party affiliation among Japanese teenagers and their parents (chapter four). How extensively do Japanese youngsters form attachments to the political parties, in comparison with their parents and with adolescents in other societies? Does the extent of support for the party system among the two generations suggest that the party system has rooted itself in the political culture, as in Britain and the United States, or failed to do so as in France before the Fifth Republic? Related to this, I examine the contribution of the family to the continuity and stability of partisanship and the party system by investigating the degree to which teenagers inherit their party support from their parents. The discussion then turns to a consideration of the extent to which partisan cleavages among teenagers are grounded in the social cleavage of their society, in particular that between the supposedly traditional countryside and the progressive city.

The investigation of the impact of cleavage in the socialization process then changes to a focus on the ideological dimensions (chapter five). Ideology has been asserted to play

little role in the political lives of the mass of adults in democratic societies, let alone children or teenagers. Yet Japan is a society riven by ideological conflict and pervaded with the use of ideological symbols and labels. The discussion considers several perspectives on the impact of ideology in the socialization process. The first is the meaning to the youngsters of the principal ideological symbols, capitalism and socialism in particular, and the patterns of their affective responses to them. The second perspective emphasizes ideology as a style of thought and inquires as to the degree to which the hallmarks of that conceptual style, consistency and causal reasoning, characterize the ideology-related belief systems of Japanese teenagers. The latter concern leads to an investigation as well of the congruence between partisanship and ideology.

The final section of the analysis turns to an explicit consideration of the causal factors affecting the kinds of political orientations that teenagers do develop. The focus is, first, on a comparison of the effects of cultural factors with those of cleavage factors on the development of those orientations I have earlier referred to as components of the political self: political interest and political efficacy, as well as two varieties of political trust (chapter six). The analysis of the influences on these orientations takes into direct account the multiple linkages between the basic social sources of cleavage as well as the partisan and ideological elements, on the one hand, and the psychocultural characteristics associated with Japanese character on the other.

Throughout the study one major continuing concern will be with generational similarities and differences in political values and beliefs. The final part of the analysis (chapter seven) turns to a more direct focus on the role of the family in the creation of Japanese teenagers' political orientations. Various types of family political influence on the child are investigated, including the direct transmission of parental political orientations as well as indirect influence via the impact of family authority and affective patterns on the politically relevant aspects of the child's personality, and via the mechanism of generalization both in terms of correspondences in the youngsters' images of parents and political authority figures and in terms of correspondence between his feelings of personal influence within the family and in the political sphere.

The special attention to the role of the family stems from the widespread emphasis on the family as a paramount influence on the formation of political orientations. This assumption, recently challenged in studies of American children, has been particularly common in treatments of Japanese culture and "national character." Family life has been blamed for most of the "unmodern" and "undemocratic" aspects of the society and political culture: authoritarianism, hierarchy, individual subordination to the group, party factionalism, and so on. Despite this long-time emphasis

on the family, little empirical evidence has been accumulated concerning the effect of various aspects of family life on the development in Japanese youth of orientations toward politics. Is the usual portrayal of the Japanese family as the transmitter of traditional anti-democratic orientations accurate? Is the family dominated by an authoritarian father? Which parent is more influential in the transmission of political attitudes to the child? How do paternal and maternal political influence compare with the influence of friends and teachers? The adolescent years I have chosen to study are a time in which the youngster is increasingly exposed to other agencies of socialization, agencies which offer real challenges to parental influences and values. And it is a time in which the maturing individual becomes increasingly concerned with himself and his role in society, and in which stimuli from the wider world of politics and society become increasingly more numerous and more salient to his expanding social consciousness. Adolescence, that is to say, is the threshold of manhood, and the values and beliefs of today's adolescents are the components of tomorrow's culture. It is to the analysis of these values and beliefs in the

political realm, to the emerging patterns of political culture in Japan, that I now turn.

CHAPTER II

THE MISSING LEADER: JAPANESE YOUTHS' VIEW OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY

The apparent vitality of Japan's democratic regime seems something of an anomaly. How does a regime imposed by the force of arms of a foreign occupation, which violates tradition and history on the one hand while frustrating contemporary opposition on the other, secure its future? Among the most influential current theories of the sources of political legitimacy is the benevolent leader thesis, for which Japan provides both an exotic and an appropriate test.

The pioneering work of Greenstein¹ and Easton and Hess² on the political socialization of American children established that they develop their allegiance to the American political system through a process in which the President plays a central

¹See Fred I. Greenstein, "The Benevolent Leader: Children's Images of Political Authority," American Political Science Review, 54:2 (December, 1960), 934-943; and Children and Politics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965).

²See Robert D. Hess and David Easton, "The Child's Changing Image of the President," Public Opinion Quarterly, 114 (Winter, 1960), 632-644; David Easton and Jack Dennis, Children in the Political System (New York: McGraw Hill, 1969); and Robert D. Hess and Judith V. Torney, The Development of Political Attitudes in Children (New York: Anchor, 1967).

and vital role. From early in his political socialization the child develops his first, deepest, and most enduring political orientation—an image of the President as wise, generous, powerful, and benign. This image of the "benevolent leader" dominates the cognitive and affective dimensions of the young child's political world. Moreover, it shares much of the character of the child's relationship with his parents, and creates a link between the child and the leader which has a touch of the depth and strength of these basic human ties. This image thus serves as a major enduring source of support for the political system, onto which its affect overflows. While later research among children of an American rural subculture³ and among black children⁴ indicates that the benevolent leader syndrome is not a universal one, additional evidence from other nations including Britain and Holland⁵ suggests that

³Dean Jaros, Herbert Hirsch, and Frederic J. Fleron, Jr., "The Malevolent Leader: Political Socialization in an American Subculture," American Political Science Review, 52:2 (June, 1968), 564-575.

⁴Edward S. Greenburg, "Black Children and the Political System: A Study of Socialization to Support," paper delivered at the 1969 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association.

⁵Fred I. Greenstein, et al., "Queen and Prime Minister —The Child's Eye View," New Society, 23 (October, 1969), n.p., and "French, British, and American Children's Images of Government and Politics," paper delivered at the meeting of the Northeastern Political Science Association, 1970; Fred I. Greenstein and Sidney Tarrow, "Political Orientations of Children: The Use of a Semi-Projective Technique in Three Nations," Sage Professional Papers in Comparative Politics, Series 01-009, 1 (1970), pp. 479-588; Jack Dennis, Leon Lindberg, and Donald McCrone, "Support for Nation and Government among English Children," British Journal of Political Science, 1, 25-48; and Paul R. Abrahamson and Ronald Inglehart, "The Development of Systemic Support in Four Western Democracies," Comparative Political Studies, 2 (1970), 419-442.

it is sufficiently common to be considered as a principal way in which contemporary political systems, including democracies, create generalized political allegiance on the part of children.

One particular variation on the benevolent leader theme is of special relevance to the question of how Japan's democratic regime secures its support. The evidence of the benevolent leader syndrome coupled with other aspects of political socialization processes, including such phenomena as American children's tendencies to confuse religious and political symbols and images, has led some scholars (notably Sidney Verba) to argue that political systems may secure legitimacy by functioning in effect as religions.⁶ The role of the political leader becomes endowed with a sacred or religious quality and attachments to the system become couched in symbolism which both invokes and evokes religious imagery.

That such a process might be exceedingly effective in creating support for the regime has never been demonstrated more tellingly than in Japan in the period before 1945. The Emperor was explicitly a sacred leader; and in various ways, including State Shinto, the regime saw to it that political allegiance took on the character of religious commitment. In a very real sense, Japan's postwar regime was founded in explicit repudiation of that equation of religion and politics.

⁶Sidney Verba, "The Kennedy Assassination and the Nature of Political Commitment," in Bradley S. Greenberg and Edwin B. Parker, eds., The Kennedy Assassination and the American Public (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965), pp. 348-360. For a summary of many of the findings on which the argument rests as well as provocative criticism of the possible normative consequences of benevolent leadership, see Lewis Lipsitz, "If as Verba says, the State Functions as a Religion, What Are We to do to Save Our Souls?" American Political Science Review, 52:2 (June, 1968), 527-535.

Thus, a major question confronting a study of the socialization sources of support for the contemporary regime is to determine to what extent support is dependent upon the creation of a new Japanese version of the benevolent leader and upon the inculcation of implicit and unquestioning trust in political authority.

My first objective here, therefore, is to focus on the empirical question of whether a benevolent leader exists in the political imagery of today's Japanese children. At the outset I concentrate on a comparative analysis of younger children's images of possible contenders for the role: the Emperor, the Prime Minister (at the time of this study, Sato Eisaku), and the local leader—mayor or governor. The principal focus, however, is on the Prime Minister as the most important national political figure. The analysis considers the role of children's conceptions of politics as a factor affecting the national leader's image, and shows how that image is conditioned by certain important aspects of political reality, in particular the parliamentary political structure and the leadership style and personality of the national leader himself.

My second objective is to determine whether a spill-over of affect from the national leader to other important institutions of the political system takes place in later childhood. Accordingly, I compare the attitudes of older youngsters, in their teens, toward the Prime Minister with those toward other political institutions, along several dimensions of political trust. The teenagers' attitudes are, in each case, compared to those of their parents to assay the continuity or discontinuity of socialization.

Finally, I consider some of the causes and consequences of the presence or absence of a benevolent leader in a political system. Particular emphasis is placed on the historical roots of the benevolent leadership phenomenon to be found in most societies, but which are missing in Japan.

Much of the importance of the benevolent leader thesis derives from the generalization in the study of socialization that what is learned earliest is retained longest. It becomes essential, therefore, to determine if such an image of the leader does indeed develop in early childhood. Thus, the first part of this paper draws to a large extent upon data about Japanese grade school children's images of the Emperor, Prime Minister, and local leader kindly made available to me by Professor Okamura Tadao of Hosei University from his nationwide survey of over 5,000 children in grades three through twelve conducted in the fall of 1968.⁷

The Emperor: Peripheral Monarch

A principal and obvious difference between the American and Japanese political systems is the fact that the United States, as a presidential system, has the roles of head of government and head of state united in the office of the

⁷ Professor Okamura has published several articles in Japanese based on this data and one in English; see "The Child's Changing Image of the Prime Minister," The Developing Economies, 6:4 (December, 1968), 566-586. In Japanese, see "Gendai Nihon ni okeru Seijiteki Shakaika" (Political Socialization in Contemporary Japan), Neppo Seijigaku, 1970, and "Seijiteki Shakaika ni okeru 'Minshushugi' to 'Heiwa,'" ("Democracy" and "Peace" in Political Socialization), Shakai Kagaku Janaru, 1969.

President, while in Japan the roles are divided between the Emperor as head of state and the Prime Minister as head of government. There are thus two nationally prominent executive offices and figures. In an earlier time there would have been little doubt as to which of the two would be the more likely object of emotional attachment and respect on the part of Japanese, young and old alike.

Before defeat in the Pacific war so drastically changed the Japanese political system, the Emperor's place was supreme, legally and constitutionally, spiritually and politically. He was very nearly the sole legitimate object of political affection and esteem. His picture hung in every schoolroom and every school child was consciously taught to revere and love him above all others, including parents. This portrayal of the Emperor as a father to whom all owed ultimate filial piety was part of a broader view of Japanese society as a "family-state" under his benevolent, patriarchal guidance. There is no doubt that ordinary people were profoundly attached to this father figure. American researchers studying the morale of the Japanese army found that the soldiers' faith in the Emperor was extremely strong—so strong, in fact, that the researchers concluded that any propaganda attack on the Emperor would only cause increased determination to fight and would thus risk prolonging the war. Attempting to summarize for an American readership the relative importance to the Japanese of their faith in the Emperor, the researchers compared the Emperor to a single symbol representing in and of himself all that Americans

of the day held dear: "the flag, the Constitution, a religious ideal, and our feelings for the family. . . ." ⁸ The Emperor's place in the emotional and symbolic life of his subjects was, they concluded, profound and central:

The extent of the belief in the Emperor was found to be so wide as to constitute a non-logical, cultural type of faith strongly reinforced in any one individual by the sheer pressure of the whole society. It would be impossible for one to reject it without stepping outside almost all the ideas and value systems that are Japanese; . . . this would mean a kind of isolation that few human beings except psychotics and extreme mystics can endure.⁹

Even though the Occupation heeded the advice not to attack or destroy the Throne, it did make drastic changes in its role in the new Japan. The Emperor's spiritual status became that of mere mortal; his political status, that of mere symbol:

The Emperor shall be the symbol of the State and of the unity of the people, deriving his position from the will of the people with whom resides sovereign power.

--Article 1 of the Japanese Constitution

The Emperor shall perform only such acts in matters of state as are provided for in this Constitution and he shall not have powers related to government.

--Article 4 of the Japanese Constitution

What role, then, does the new Emperor play in the images of government held by today's Japanese children? The significance

⁸ Alexander Leighton and Morris Opler, "Psychological Warfare and the Japanese Emperor," in R. Hunt, ed., Personalities and Cultures (Garden City: The Natural History Press, 1972), p. 252.

⁹ Ibid., pp. 255-256.

of this question may best be understood by reference to some recent findings about English children's images of the Queen. In several independent studies researchers have found that the Queen dominates the political imagery and perception of youngsters over a wide range of ages. At younger age levels, many English children believe that the Queen is the most important person in England (and, for almost as many, the most important person in the world).¹⁰ Fully 72 percent of working class and 61 percent of middle-class British eight and nine-year olds in the same survey believed that "the Queen is more important than the Prime Minister in running Britain."¹¹ Even by age twelve, one-third of the middle-class children and fully two-thirds of the working-class group continued to assert the Queen's importance over the Prime Minister.¹² In another study, Greenstein found that 51 percent of English ten to twelve-year olds responding said that the Queen rules or governs while only 22 percent responded in those terms to a similar question about the Prime Minister, who was viewed primarily as her legislative helper.¹³ Dennis and his associates obtained similar results.¹⁴ In short, the Queen dominates young British children's images of government to a

¹⁰ Greenstein, et al., "Queen and Prime Minister--The Child's Eye View."

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Greenstein, "British, French and American Children's Images of Government and Politics," Table 3, p. 40.

¹³ Ibid., pp. 19 and 40.

¹⁴ Dennis, Lindberg, and McCrone. op. cit., p. 37.

remarkable degree. In a similar item, Okamura asked a nationwide sample of children, "Who is the most important in running politics in today's Japan?" Table 1 summarizes the results for those in grades 3 to 8.

It is evident from the table that the lesson of popular sovereignty has been well learned. At all age levels except the three youngest, "each citizen" has a substantial lead over the other responses. This is a most interesting finding, for it has been said by many of the critics of the new regime that only Imperial sovereignty suits the Japanese: "Popular sovereignty," says Kazuo Kawai, for example, "is completely alien to Japanese thought."¹⁵ Ardath Burks concurs: "From the sheer historical point of view, some restoration of [Imperial] theoretical authority, with popular controls . . . is almost inevitable."¹⁶ But only among the third and fourth graders do we find a sizable proportion of children who conceive of the Emperor as ruling as well as reigning, and in contrast to the British case, even among these youngest children the Emperor runs second to the Prime Minister. By fifth grade, the Emperor is picked less than any of the other responses including "each citizen." Although strict comparison between the English and Japanese data is not possible because of differences in the items, it does seem clear that the absolute level of attributions of power to the monarch is substantially lower among

¹⁵Kazuo Kawai, Japan's American Interlude (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), p. 57.

¹⁶Ardath Burks, The Government of Japan (New York: Crowell, 1961), p. 30.

TABLE II-1

PERCEPTIONS OF THE EMPEROR'S IMPORTANCE
(Percentages selecting each response by grade)

"Who is most important in running politics in today's Japan?"

<u>Grade</u>	<u>Em- peror</u>	<u>Prime Min.</u>	<u>Diet- men</u>	<u>Each Citizen</u>	<u>Other and Don't Know</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>(N)</u>
3	21	32	12	7	28	100	(630)
4	21	32	19	13	15	100	(626)
5	11	25	24	23	17	100	(631)
6	4	20	11	55	10	100	(631)
7	5	16	12	55	12	100	(654)
8	3	15	22	50	10	100	(732)

Source: Okamura, 1968 Survey

even the youngest Japanese respondents than among their English counterparts.

If power and rule are missing from the Japanese child's image of the Emperor, neither is his role as "symbol of the State" particularly prominent. Okamura also asked the children in his survey to choose the best symbol of Japan. The results are shown in Table 2. The table indicates quite clearly that among the various symbols, the Emperor is not a leading contender for any age level; indeed, even though he is picked more often than either the Prime Minister or the Constitution, he trails far behind the flag and Mount Fuji.

It is clear that the Emperor does not figure so centrally or importantly in the political life of the Japanese child as the Queen does in that of the British child. This may deprive Japan of one of the leading benefits of monarchy: the promotion through the socialization process of a sense of identification with the regime that does not waver even when partisan opponents control the elected offices. Abrahamson and Inglehart, in a comparative study of the role of the monarch, point out that "The presence of a monarchy reduces the chances that an individual's first political perception is that government is in the hands of the 'bad guys.'"¹⁷ They go on to note that the perception that government is controlled by the "bad guys" is likeliest to occur where partisan cleavage and hostility run deep. But for monarchy in Japan to bridge the partisan

¹⁷Abrahamson and Inglehart, op. cit., p. 432.

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gulf it would have to be the object of widespread affection among people of diverse political persuasions, and not itself a source of partisan division. The symbolic Emperor of post-war Japan gains acceptance and support from most adults, on the average about 70 percent as public opinion polls over the past two decades have shown.¹⁸ But for a minority, the present status of the Emperor is a source of partisan and ideological conflict. On the one hand, a small number of conservatives wish the Emperor restored to his former glory and authority; on the other, a few leftists would prefer that the throne be completely abolished.¹⁹ On the whole, however, the majority of the Japanese support the throne as it is, but with little apparent intensity. So for a minority the Emperor's role is a source of intense division and conflict; for an apathetic majority of adults, he is cognitively and emotionally non-salient. It is doubtful, therefore, that the Emperor could serve as a focal point in the cementing of the individual's allegiance to the political system in the face of control of the government by the "bad guys."

This lack of intense emotional investment in the throne on the part of Japanese adults is reflected in indifference and increasing ambivalence among the youngsters. In the mid-1950s, Tokyo high school students were asked to choose among several alternatives to describe their feelings when they saw

¹⁸ See, for example, Ishida Takeshi, "Popular Attitudes toward the Japanese Emperor," Asian Survey, 2 (February, 1962), 29-39.

¹⁹ Ibid.

or heard the word "Emperor." Positive responses far outdistanced negative ones; 52 percent chose "respect" or "affection" and only 8 percent "a foolish or unnecessary existence." But the low affective importance of the Emperor to many youngsters was illustrated by the high proportion—38 percent—who found it hard to say what their feelings were since the Emperor "is far removed from us."²⁰ About ten years later, in 1964, David Titus, Yoshida Yoshiaki, and their associates asked a similar question of residents in the city of Kofu and of students at Tokyo's Meiji University.²¹ Their data indicate an apparent decline over time in supportive affect and an increase in indifference. Among the college students and those Kofu residents under twenty whom they surveyed, only 29 percent and 39 percent respectively responded that they felt "affection," "reverence," or "adoration" toward the Emperor, and only 31 percent of the 20-29 age group of Kofu respondents chose these positive responses. For the great majority of the younger respondents, the researchers reported that the predominant attitude was affective uninvolvedness and indifference. Sixty percent of the students, 34 percent of the Kofu respondents in their teens, and 43

²⁰Harada Shigeru, "Atarashii Aikokushin To Wa Nani Ka" (What is the New Patriotism), Seinen Shinri, 7:2 (February, 1956), 32.

²¹See David A. Titus, "Emperor and Public Consciousness in Postwar Japan," The Japan Interpreter (Summer, 1970), pp. 189-190; also, Yoshida Yoshiaki, David Titus, and Agata Yukio, "Shocho Tennosei No Ishiki Kozo" (The Mentality of the Symbolic Emperor System), Meiji Daigaku Hosei Kenkyujo Kyo, n.d.

percent of those in their twenties felt neither affection nor dislike for the Imperial house.²²

There are, of course, obvious and profound reasons why the present Emperor is unable to play the role of benevolent leader. Historically, he is the very symbol of the old order that the new regime supplanted. Owing to that and to his own retiring personality and unprepossessing manner, he is much less popularly visible than other monarchs, making few public appearances. Moreover there is almost no color or pomp and ceremony remaining in the Imperial institution to delight the eyes and capture the affections of the young—no horse guard, no parades, no crown and imperial regalia. Those days are gone, probably forever. Unable to perform the kind of broad-gauge legitimation of the regime that was once his most important political function, the Emperor no longer stands at the symbolic and expressive center of the national political culture; he has faded into the periphery.

But before we dismiss the throne as a contender for the role of benevolent leader, we must recognize that it may emerge from its present eclipse with the accession of a new Emperor. One of the most pointed of Titus and Yoshida's

²²The generation gap in affect toward the Emperor is pointed up dramatically by the results of a nationwide poll conducted by the Mainichi Shinbun in January, 1972. Only 4 percent of the respondents in their teens responded that what made them conscious of being Japanese was being near the Emperor or the Imperial palace, as compared with 50 percent of those sixty years of age and older. That even today, one-half of the older group in the sample chose to identify the Emperor so clearly with their own sense of national identity gives us some idea of the impact his benevolent leadership once had. See Mainichi Shinbun, Jan. 1, 1972.

findings was that Japanese of all age levels would like to see the throne "popularized," with the Emperor made more a part of popular life and less a distant and aloof figure.²³ A decade ago, the marriage of the Crown Prince to the beautiful daughter of a commoner caused an outpouring of enthusiasm and affection from all segments of the people, especially from the young. This leads us to ask whether the feelings of today's youth toward the Crown Prince foreshadow any future popular affection for the throne. Once again, Okamura's 1968 survey provides data relevant to this additional aspect of the benevolent leader role in Japan. The children surveyed were asked to describe in their own words what sort of person they thought the Crown Prince was. Roughly 60 percent of the youngest children chose terms of respect and goodwill, while almost none used negative or derogatory words or phrases. The positive sentiment decreased steadily with age, so that by twelfth grade only 24 percent mentioned respect or affection while another 24 percent used words of antipathy or disdain. Significantly, however, the largest proportion of the twelfth graders were noncommittal: 13 percent made no comment, 14 percent said they didn't know much about the Crown Prince, and 25 percent made neutral or mixed comments. This prevalence of high positive affect among the youngest children, turning to a noncommittal position among the high school seniors, may indicate that there is a dormant affect that might be stimulated

²³See Titus, op. cit., p. 193.

by a new and more positive role in the national life for the Crown Prince. It thus seems plausible that should the present Emperor die while the Crown Prince is still young, the new Emperor and Imperial family might be able to rekindle much of the enthusiasm of the days of the Crown Prince's wedding. Whether that enthusiasm and affection endured would depend on the behavior of the new Emperor and his own attitude toward popularizing the throne. To some extent he and his wife Michiko appear to be moving toward a more visible and frequent role in popular life than the present Emperor and Empress. It is they who are seen most often at the homely sorts of public affairs, visiting hospitals and schools for disabled children, dedicating public memorials, and the like. For some time, the press has been following their life, especially the schooling of their children—who, it must be noted, are attending school with other children rather than being tutored at court as was the custom in the past. Moreover, the Crown Prince himself is a wholly contemporary figure, unburdened by the public's memories of the past and thus free of his father's historical impediment to popular affection.

In Japanese tradition, the passing of the old Emperor and the accession of the new brings a new calendar era. The Showa era will end with the death of a now peripheral monarch. The new era is likely to begin with the enthronement of a popular monarch, in the spirit if not quite the style of his European counterparts. The high proportion of young children who feel positively about him and the large proportion of

older children who profess neutrality suggests that there are resources of popular support and enthusiasm that a new and particularly a young Emperor might be able to tap.

The Prime Minister: Distant and Impersonal Leader

The change in the Japanese political regime that took place after 1945 removed the Emperor from the role of benevolent leader. Does the Prime Minister fill the void? Let us look first at children's perception of his importance.

We saw above that comparison with the British case revealed the Japanese Prime Minister to be apparently more generally perceived by children as important in running politics than the Emperor. This contrasted with the British case, where the Prime Minister was overshadowed by the Queen. Additional data on American children's perceptions of the President's importance in politics help to put the Japanese Prime Minister's image into comparative perspective. A very sizable majority of the American children surveyed by Hess and Torney (ranging from 86 percent of the second graders to 50 percent of the eighth graders), selected the President as the "one who does the most to run the country."²⁴ A second look at Table 1 reveals that the Prime Minister does not dominate Japanese children's perceptions of politics nearly so onesidedly. While the President's lead over Congress as most important drops to two-to-one only by eighth grade, the Prime Minister contends with the members of the Diet neck-to-

²⁴Hess and Torney, op. cit., p. 43.

neck from as early as fifth grade. In comparative terms, the Japanese Prime Minister seems to fall between his British counterpart and the American President in the degree of his importance and dominance in children's imagery of government.

A second, and perhaps more important, question has to do with young children's affect toward the Prime Minister. Table 3 summarizes Okamura's findings.

The most striking characteristic of these figures is the high proportion of children who chose the neutral responses, especially on the liking and competence items. The Prime Minister would not appear to be a highly salient figure for young children, particularly as an object of affection and trust. For those to whom he is salient, moreover, the table shows that his image is strikingly more negative than positive, from almost the earliest grade levels. On none of the items do we find an outright majority of favorable responses at all grades, and only for his competence at his job (a point I shall discuss below) do we find such a majority at most levels.

Consistent with findings about children's affect toward political figures in other societies, the figures in Table 3 show a marked tendency for positive affect to decrease with age and for negative affect to increase correspondingly. This is plainly evident across all three items. While this tendency does parallel findings from other societies, what is distinctive about the Japanese case is that the drop in supportive responses appears to happen earlier and to reach

TABLE II-3

YOUNGER CHILDREN'S ATTITUDES TOWARD THE PRIME MINISTER

(Percent positive, neutral, and negative responses by grade)

Grade	Competence ^a			Liking ^b			Honesty ^c		
	Pos	Neut	Neg	Pos	Neut	Neg	Pos	Neut	Neg
3	74	22	4	36	58	6	68	25	7
4	66	26	8	20	63	16	51	40	9
5	52	31	18	13	61	26	27	50	23
6	54	26	20	8	61	31	17	48	35
7	43	33	24	12	58	29	10	58	31
8	37	35	28	5	58	37	7	57	36

Source: Okamura, 1968 Survey; N's as in Table II-1

<u>Items</u>	<u>Positive Response</u>	<u>Neutral</u>	<u>Negative</u>
^a "Is the Prime Minister carrying out his responsibilities as Prime Minister?"	Very well + well	Can't say Don't know	Not very well + hardly at all
^b "Do you like the Prime Minister or dislike him?"	Like very much + like	Can't say Don't know	Dislike + dislike very much
^c "Is the Prime Minister honest or is he a liar?"	Very honest + honest	Can't say Don't know	Sometimes lies + always lies

a substantially lower level by eighth grade than is true, for example, in the United States. Indeed, favorable replies among eighth graders to the liking and trust items approached the vanishing point. Cross-national comparison helps to put these data into perspective and to point up the dramatically low level of Japanese children's affection for the Prime Minister. For example, Easton and Dennis report that in response to an item asking American children to choose whether they liked the President "more than anyone," "more than most," "more than some," "more than a few," or "less than anyone," 60 percent or more of the fourth through seventh graders and 56 percent of the eighth graders chose one of the three positive replies, while about a third of the fourth through seventh graders selected one of the two most positive. Only about 17 percent of any age level chose one of the two least favorable responses.²⁵

The contrast between the American and Japanese findings is vivid. For example, 25 percent of the American eighth graders professed to like the President more than anyone or more than most, while only 5 percent of the Japanese eighth graders claimed to like the Prime Minister or to like him very much. Though the items used differ in wording, making strict comparison impossible, independent evidence exists corroborating that many fewer Japanese than American children express a liking for their national political leader. Japan

²⁵Easton and Dennis, op. cit., Table 8-4, p. 179.

was one of six nations included in a study of the socialization of primary school children into "compliance" systems. With regard to liking for national leaders—in the Japanese case, the Prime Minister; in the American, the President—and belief that the national leader would help people who needed assistance, the proportion of youngsters giving positive responses to the identical items used was consistently lowest among the Japanese. The Japanese children were markedly less positive than their American, Indian, Italian, and Greek age-mates. Only the Danish children approached their low levels of affect for the political authority figure.²⁶

Turning to another dimension of affective evaluation, feelings about the truthfulness of the leader, we discover that here, too, Japanese children are more cynical than their age-mates in other lands. Easton and Dennis asked American children, while Abrahamson and Inglehart asked Dutch and French children, about how often the leader (Prime Minister, President, or Queen) keeps his or her promises. Okamura's item asked the children to say whether they thought the Prime Minister was honest or told lies. Though the differences in the items are thus sufficient for us to take note of them,

²⁶ Robert D. Hess, et al., Authority, Rules, and Aggression: A Cross-National Study of the Socialization of Children into Compliance Systems (Chicago: University of Chicago, March, 1969, for Bureau of Research, Office of Education, U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare), Part I, see "PART B, Chapter 5: Japanese Data" by Akira Hoshino, and "PART C: Cross-National Comparisons and Conclusions" by Maria Tenezakis, et al.

it seems useful nonetheless to pursue the comparison, in view of the basic similarity in theme.

Grade-by-grade comparisons between the United States and Japanese samples make the differences found in Table 4 even sharper. Favorable responses among American children ("always keeps promises" plus "usually keeps promises") never fall below 94 percent at any age level; as we saw in Table 3, favorable responses among Japanese children regarding the Prime Minister's honesty ("very honest" plus "honest") amounted to a majority only among the youngest children, and plummeted to merely 7 percent of the eighth graders, where fully 10 percent chose the most negative responses ("he always lies"). In an earlier study that asked small samples of both Japanese and American children identical questions about their respective leaders' honesty, similar findings were reported. Among second graders, 90 percent of the American children and 70 percent of the Japanese children chose favorable replies; while among eighth graders the proportions had dropped to 50 percent of the American and 5 percent of the Japanese.²⁷

One obvious possibility is that Japanese youngsters' lack of affection for the Prime Minister is reflective of a generally cooler view of him among Japanese adults than the

²⁷See Robert D. Hess, "The Socialization of Attitudes toward Political Authority: Some Cross-National Comparisons," International Social Science Journal, 15 (1963), 542-559; and Okamura Tadao, "Political Socialization of Upheavals: A Case in Japan," unpublished paper, Department of Political Science, University of Chicago, 1962.

TABLE II-4

CROSS-NATIONAL COMPARISON OF CHILDREN'S VIEW
OF POLITICAL LEADERS' HONESTY

(Percent selecting most favorable response)

Age	U.S.A. ^{1a}	Netherlands ^{2a}		France ^{2a}		Japan ^{3b}
	Pres.	Queen	Prem.	Pres.	Prem.	Prime Minister
8-11	42	65	36	48	36	15
12-14	23	71	33	30	16	1

Sources: ¹Easton and Dennis, op. cit., Table 8-43, p. 180.

²Abrahamson and Inglehart, op. cit., Table 4, p. 428.

³Okamura, 1968 Survey.

^a"Always keeps promises"

^b"Is very honest"

view American adults have of the President. Okamura found that few of the children in his study believed that the Prime Minister was popular with many people. Table 5 presents some supporting evidence, comparing the average percentage of popular support reported in major public opinion polls received by each postwar American President and the five major postwar Japanese Prime Ministers, as well as the highest and lowest levels of support received by each.

While again, item wording differences must be taken into account in making any comparison, there seems little room for doubt that adult popular support for the Japanese Prime Minister is a significant notch lower than that for the American President. Only one Prime Minister, Yoshida Shigeru, who held office during much of the occupation, has ever received more than 50 percent popular support,²⁸ while all of the American Presidents have enjoyed nearly 70 percent or more of approval at some point. And, except for Harry Truman, the average support for the American Presidents far outdistances that for the Japanese leaders.²⁹ In short, it

²⁸The major polls on Japan are conducted by the large national newspapers. The figures used here, as noted, are from the Mainichi Shinbun polls, while the positive percentages in the Asahi Shinbun polls occasionally run a little higher, so that the statement is true for the former but not necessarily the latter. Note also that the current Prime Minister is excluded from consideration, because he took office several years after the study being reported here was conducted. In the most recent Asahi poll, conducted after his trip to Peking, Tanaka achieved the highest popular support ever accorded any postwar Prime Minister—62 percent. See the Asahi Shinbun, September 18, 1972.

²⁹Similar polls of adult support for the French Premiers of the Fourth Republic show them to have been even less

TABLE II-5

ADULT POPULAR SUPPORT FOR JAPANESE AND
AMERICAN CHIEF EXECUTIVES

<u>Prime Minister</u>	Japanese Prime Minister (% supporting Cabinet)			<u>President</u>	American President (% app. handling of job)		
	<u>High</u>	<u>Low</u>	<u>Avg.</u>		<u>High</u>	<u>Low</u>	<u>Avg.</u>
Yoshida	54	31	41	Truman	87	23	46
Hatoyama	50	34	40	Eisenhower	79	49	66
Kishi	46	28	37	Kennedy	83	57	70
Ikeda	40	31	35	Johnson	80	35	54
Sato	46	23	33	Nixon	68	48	57
	Over-all average: 37%				Over-all average: 59%		

Source: Computed from Mainichi Shinbun, October 18, 1971

Source: Gallup Opinion Index, March, 1972, p. 2.

is clear that the cues that Japanese youngsters receive from adults about the Prime Minister are much less likely to be positive than those American children receive.

One final point needs to be made about the figures in Table 3: while Japanese children do not like or trust the Prime Minister, they apparently think he is doing a good job. The belief that he is carrying out his responsibilities as Prime Minister remains predominant throughout the grade school years. >

The following comments of a tenth grade Tokyo boy exemplify this mixture of respect and "dislike," and indicate that some children may begin with a naive, positive image of the Prime Minister that is soon overcome by the negative tone of adult discourse:

- I. Well, what about Prime Minister Sato—is he doing a good job?
- R. He stands for the whole country. . . . I think he does his best, and is right for the job.
- I. Saying he's right for the job means he's fulfilling his responsibilities, doesn't it?
- R. Yes, I think he's doing the best he can.
- I. Do you like him or dislike him?
- R. Like or dislike? Well, I've no real reason to dislike him, but somehow since everyone says they dislike him, I feel as if I do too.
- I. Does everyone say that? Who's everyone?

popular than their Japanese counterparts. De Gaulle, on the other hand, enjoyed about as high a level of support as the American Presidents. See Nishihira Shigeki, Nihonjin no Iken (The Opinions of the Japanese), Tokyo, 1963, Fig. II, p. 81.

R. Everyone's—well, often on television they say things like "Sato's bad." And the price of rice keeps going up.

I. They don't often say "Sato's good?"

R. I've never heard anyone say "Sato's good."

Over and above the obvious implications that the press may have a good deal to do with the Prime Minister's popularity, a point we shall return to, this admixture of respect and dislike may come out of the image of the Prime Minister's job which emphasizes its importance rather than its benevolence, an image that is one of the few distinct pictures that Japanese children seem to have of the Prime Minister. In that image, the kinds of qualities that would stimulate affective identification are noticeably lacking. Let us turn now to a discussion of that image.

The Prime Minister's Image: Some Insights from a Comparison with the Local Leader

What accounts for the remarkably low over-all level of affect that Japanese children show toward the Prime Minister? My interviews with some 40 teenagers made it apparent that underlying much of their feeling was the sense that the Prime Minister is a distant and remote figure. The Prime Minister, one fourteen year old Tekyo boy said, leads a "separate existence" from the ordinary people.³⁰ In that separate

³⁰This echoes a comment made by a sophisticated journalist in the Asahi Shinbun, July 9, 1971: ". . . it is a question of whether to call the government 'us' or 'them.' In Japan the government is always 'them,' and the Prime Minister sounds as if he is speaking in a different dimension from that of the people."

existence, other interviews make clear, the Prime Minister is concerned about the "big" things, not ordinary matters; about policies, not people.

I. What does the Prime Minister do?

R. I don't really know what he does—probably because he does things on a big scale. Nothing for me—rather, the nation's problems.

--Tokyo tenth-grade girl

I. Does the Prime Minister try to help the people?

R. He doesn't get around to the little things, but he does get around to the big problems like Okinawa.

--Rural eighth-grade boy

R. I think he tries to look after the big things rather than the little ones. Not so that people become individually better off, but so that Japan as a whole does . . . that's his responsibility.

--Rural eighth-grade girl

I. What sort of person do you think the Prime Minister is?

R. Sort of not too kind to the common people. I feel as if he does things that are far apart from us. I feel I'd like him to be closer to us.

--Tokyo tenth-grade girl

This feeling of distance and separation regarding the Prime Minister apparently stems, at least in part, from two sources.

First is the fact that the Prime Minister acts on the national level, from which Japanese youngsters feel far removed. Second, he is an impersonal figure, one whose image

~~for most Japanese youngsters does not include the kinds of~~

personal qualities which are so prominent in American

children's images of the President and which give the

President's image much the same kind of intimacy and familiarity that the image of their father has. These points are best illustrated by showing the stark contrast in the images children have of the Prime Minister with those they have of another significant authority figure, the local leader.

In the interviews there were frequent spontaneous and enthusiastic references from the Tokyo children to Minobe Ryokichi, the Governor of Tokyo. The following quote is symptomatic of his appeal to the young:

I. Is there a politician whom you like?

R. Mr. Minobe.

I. What's good about Mr. Minobe?

R. Like I said, his seeming like one of the people is good. So everyone feels friendly, and he thinks about everyone's problems—perhaps it's that. He's on television a lot. He listens to everyone's opinions and says, "If it can be done, I'll do it." I've seen that . . . and even if I don't know whether he really does it or not, I think even if he just says it, it's good.

--Tokyo tenth-grade girl

Minobe has been unusually popular among adults as well; opinion polls have shown that more than two-thirds of Tokyo adults support him. His popularity also crosses party lines to an extent that is rare in Japan: not only do an overwhelming majority of Democratic Socialists, Socialists, and Communists support him, so too do a majority of Liberal Democrats.³¹ Few politicians in postwar Japan have ever

³¹Asahi Shinbun, July 9, 1969.


enjoyed that kind of suprapartisan support, so his relative popularity with children is no surprise. What is a surprise, however, is that children in other areas accord a similar level of support to their local political leaders—mayors or village heads. This is the unexpected finding that emerges from Okamura's questions about local figures identical to those asked about the Prime Minister. Figure II-1 summarizes the comparative support for Prime Minister and local leader among children in grades three through eight. The numbers shown are the mean scores among children of each grade for each authority figure on each of the items, computed by scoring one point for the most negative response category up to five for the most positive.

As with the Prime Minister, the local leader is not highly salient to most children. But among those to whom the two figures are salient, we observe several notable differences. First, the Prime Minister enjoys a clear lead in support over the local leader only among the very youngest children, the third graders. By fifth grade, and to some extent already by fourth grade, the local leader enjoys more support. Second, whereas support for the Prime Minister declines grade by grade, support for the local leader remains fairly constant across all grade levels. Only evaluations of the local leaders' honesty show any really marked decline and that appears to cease after fifth grade. In other words, for all practical purposes, the local leader appears to be much less susceptible to the corrosive effects of age on

FIGURE II-1

MEAN SCORES BY GRADE FOR IMAGES OF THE PRIME MINISTER AND LOCAL LEADER

(solid line — = Prime Minister; dotted line — = local leader;
scores range from 1 = most negative to 5 = most positive)



Source: Okamura, 1968 Survey; N's as in Table II-1. The items are as given in Table II-3 and are identical for both Prime Minister and local leader.

support that plagues the Prime Minister's image. Why? Though firm evidence is lacking, it seems, from a variety of sources, especially my interviews with young teenagers, that the factors they identify as negative and repulsive in the political world—remoteness, corruption, and the placing of narrow partisan interests ahead of the public interest—are widely perceived to be operative at the national level but not at the local level. And that distinction begins with the very notion of "politics," which is itself perceived as a national-level phenomenon. "Politics," a tenth grade Tokyo boy told me, "is something big." Another Tokyo tenth grader, this time a girl, agreed: "When you talk about local autonomy, that's something which is very close to home. Politics seems to be on a bigger scale." If politics seem remote, the notion of "politician" seems somehow "sort of wicked" and "unclean" in the words of one rural high school senior.³² But for many youngsters, however, local leaders such as Governor Minobe, or the city mayor or village head, don't really seem like "politicians":³³

³² His words reflect the feeling of many youths. One sample of college students chose to describe politicians with the adjectives dark, dirty, cold, elderly, unintellectual, empty, closed, and conservative. See Nishihira Naoki, Gendai Seinen No Ishiki To Kodo 1 (The Attitudes and Behavior of Contemporary Youth: 1), Tokyo, 1970, p. 103.

³³ Kurt Steiner, in an analysis of citizen participation in local government, found that the term politician did not seem to apply at the level of the local assembly or mayoralty races. See his Local Government in Japan (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965), p. 426.

- I. So things that are right around you don't seem like politics? If that's the case, whom do you think of when I ask about politicians?
- R. The Prime Minister.
- I. What about Governor Minobe?
- R. He and some others have been on television a lot recently, making a fuss. . . . In a way, he's a politician too.
- I. But he's different from the Prime Minister?
- R. Yes, more like the working people.
- I. What do you mean by that? He feels closer to you?
- R. The things he does are basic, [sort of between doing] things for the country and for one's home.
- I. Things like garbage collection don't seem like politics?
- R. No.

Our teenager is hesitant about classifying the Governor as a politician. He is a politician only "in a way," but the sorts of things he does are different from those that the Prime Minister does. The interviewer in this case, herself a Japanese college girl, provides us with the clue to the image of the local leader's job: not politics but "things like garbage collection." "Local autonomy" is not politics at the local level, but local officials looking after the practical, earthy needs of the common citizens. This uncynical view of local affairs and local leaders fits in with evidence suggesting that alienation does not apply among adults either when it comes to the local scene. In all

areas of Japan, in the otherwise alienated city as well as in the country, consistently more people vote in local elections than in national ones. It may be because adults, like children, feel closer to the local leaders; Bradley Richardson, in a 1964 survey of rural and urban adults, found that both were more likely to attribute concern about the people's needs to local officials and politicians than to national ones.³⁴

Behind the apparently common tendency of youngsters and adults to view local level leaders as more benign than national ones, lies the fact that such leaders are expected to, and commonly do, run and serve as nonpartisans.³⁵ As a result, in contrast to national politics, in which party conflict and party interests occupy the limelight, at the local level the party label is widely de-emphasized. Most mayoral and gubernatorial candidates run either as independents or as supra-partisan-coalition candidates. Minobe, for instance, is supported by a Socialist-Communist coalition organization, popularly known as the Tokyo Citizens' Party (Tomino to). The nonpartisanship of local leaders has two important consequences for their support. First, it reflects and enhances community solidarity and harmony and

³⁴ Bradley M. Richardson, "Urbanization and Political Behavior, the Case of Japan," unpublished manuscript, Figure 6, p. 17.

³⁵ Scott C. Flanagan, "Voting Behavior in Japan," Comparative Political Studies, 1:3 (October, 1968), 406.

thus accords well with some long-time cultural emphases that are still potent, especially in rural Japan. Second, their nonpartisanship insures that they are less apt to incur critical treatment by the media, which operate, as Okamura has pointed out, on a principle of neutrality that permits the expression of positive support for nonpartisan figures only, reserving for partisan figures its negative comments.³⁶ Supra-partisan figures like Minobe receive generally positive treatment and of course nonpartisan local leaders often receive very little press attention at all. Meanwhile, the Prime Minister, as the most salient national partisan politician, is constantly criticized.

The local leader's job gets him out hobnobbing with the common people, worrying about the kinds of things they worry about, like garbage collection. How about the Prime Minister? What is the image youngsters have of him at his work? The chief executive of the United States, France, and Britain are all apparently perceived by the children in those lands as doing rather awe-inspiring things: "ruling" or "commanding," engaging in foreign affairs and other statesman-like enterprises.³⁷ No such aura of stately power and dominance characterizes Japanese teenagers'

³⁶ Okamura Tadao, "The Child's Changing Image of the Prime Minister," p. 581.

³⁷ Greenstein, "French, British, and American Children's Images of Government and Politics," Table 3, p. 40.

imagery of the Prime Minister's job. Rather, the common picture is that of one who "coordinates (matomeru) the government and the opinions of the people," as an eighth grader put it. The picture is neither an inspiring—nor intimidating—one like those of the Western leaders. Nor is it a familiar and ingratiating one like that of the local leader. In a generous interpretation, it might be seen as a rather idealistic picture of a representative leader seeking to harmonize government and people. A more negative interpretation might emphasize the power broker or bureaucratic manager, a component that may seem latent in the image. The latter interpretation would fit the personal style of Prime Minister Sato, who has been called a "model of the bureaucratic leader."³⁸ His personal appeal and identification with the common man were perhaps less than any of his postwar predecessors, save only Kishi Nobusuke, his brother.³⁹ In his book, Today Is the Day Before Tomorrow, published shortly before he assumed the premiership, Sato perceptively recognized his lack of personal appeal:

Some say great men seem unapproachable,
which others say is not so if you try
meeting and talking with them. . . .
Someone like me is by no means great,

³⁸Shinohara Hajime, quoted in Yomiuri Shinbun, October 13, 1970.

³⁹Kishi was adopted from the Sato family into the Kishi family, a common practice among traditional Japanese families who have no son to carry on their lineage.

but I still somehow seem unapproachable —my face is dark-complexioned and my eyes glare. Even putting aside what I look like, I have the fault of making people feel ill at ease.⁴⁰

Whether or not he was unapproachable, he was clearly distant so far as most youngsters were concerned, and he did little to reduce that distance. His wife and family were sequestered from public view, as were nearly all aspects of his private life. The kind of personal image-building that American Presidents undergo with the great attention focused by the press on their personal predilections, activities, and family life, has not been found in Japan. Partially, this is because to some extent the Imperial family has stimulated more public curiosity and therefore more press coverage of their private lives. "But it is also due in part to the aforementioned principle of neutrality under which the media operate, which in seeking to avoid favorable treatment of partisan figures downplays the personal aspects of the Prime Minister.

It is of course true that the psychic approachability and distance of the recent Prime Minister was related to his personality. Of all the major postwar Prime Ministers, Sato probably had the least popularly ingratiating personality. In these relatively infrequent instances in which he appeared on television, for example, he seemed stiff and formal, ill at ease even when trying not to be so. Minobe, who makes

⁴⁰Quoted in Yomiuri Shinbun, October 13, 1970.

frequent television appearances on popular talk shows, is always relaxed, full of smiles, witty, and has the ability to seem sincere and "folksy." The contrast is most vivid.

But Sato has not been the only postwar Prime Minister to have had this public personality problem. Indeed, it is noteworthy that in my interviews, the only positive reference to a Prime Minister's personal quality was directed at Yoshida Shigeru, the colorful conservative leader who self-consciously strove to create an image of himself as a Churchillesque, "one-man" leader. Of Yoshida, one boy said, "I think he called some newspaper reporter a damn fool, and I like people like that."

In any event, the rich personal imagery characteristic of American children's views of the President simply does not appear among Japanese children, whose reactions to Prime Minister Sato seemed curiously one-dimensional and policy-oriented rather than intimate. The following examples illustrate this:

Ever since Sato became Prime Minister,
prices have gone up and up.

--Tokyo tenth-grade girl

He is flurried by the Okinawa problem,
but he still hasn't made any clear
decision. I wish he'd pull himself
together.

--Rural eighth-grade boy

I don't like it much when a Prime Minister
goes on for so long. After all, in the
case of Prime Minister Sato, if you asked
all the people what sort of politics he
does, I think there would be few who could
say he does this or he does that, because
his way of doing things has not penetrated
down to the people.

--Rural tenth-grade boy

This lack of personal imagery in Japanese youth's views of the Prime Minister, which appears to be true also of French children's views of their President and Premier,⁴¹ while reflective of the psychic distance existing between children and the leader, is not necessarily detrimental to his over-all role. What it may imply, indeed, is that his image is less important than his performance as a means to generating support even among the young. If that is so, then the kind of support he receives may be a conditional kind that helps keep leaders responsible and responsive, rather than an uncritical support that fosters irresponsibility. The fact that many children see him as carrying out his responsibilities even while they do not like or trust him supports such an interpretation. And the probability that for many children "dislike" is no more than that—and not hostility or hatred—may help keep such a critical stance toward the Prime Minister from becoming bitterly cynical.

An additional factor probably responsible in part for the distant and impersonal image of the Prime Minister is the way he is chosen. The absence of direct popular election in the parliamentary system almost certainly diminishes the potential support and affection that the Prime Minister can generate. Popular identification is less easily created with a leader selected by a vote of

⁴¹Greenstein, "French, British, and American Children's Images of Government and Politics," p. 20.

the legislature than by one whose election is the culmination of a series of popular campaigns and personal appeals. The parliamentary system, that is to say, depersonalizes the leadership selection process; it lacks the drama of personal combat for popular esteem by two or more personalities who actively seek to create nationwide personal followerships. In the Japanese case the process of depopularization of the leadership selection process is accentuated by the fact of one-party dominance. The head of the largest faction of the ascendant Liberal Democratic Party assumes the Prime Ministership almost as an automatic consequence of his selection as party president—a process in which there is no direct popular involvement and which creates little popular excitement.

The contrast with the election of the local leader is again noteworthy, here as an instance of how a structural factor may contribute to both the distance of the Prime Minister and his impersonal quality. The local electoral process is one in which, as we have said, non-partisanship is the rule. De-emphasizing the party label of course results in emphasizing the personalities of the contestants.⁴² Moreover, the election is in fact head-to-head combat of two candidates who must use their personal appeal to gain followers.

⁴²Research in American electoral politics has shown that candidate appeal becomes more important in nonpartisan systems. See Fred I. Greenstein, The American Party System and the American People (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970), p. 67.

The young Japanese child's image of the Prime Minister may, then, be summarized as basically one of a distant and impersonal figure, one which inspires neither awe nor affection but rather mild dislike and mistrust. Comparison of the image with that of the local leader makes it clear that a number of cultural, structural, and personal factors conjoin to contribute to the erosion with age of the relatively positive evaluations of the Prime Minister that are held by the youngest children. But those factors do not operate to create the same kind of growth of negative feelings toward the local leader who, in an interesting twist, may serve to fulfill some of the expressive functions of leadership for Japanese children that the American President and British and Dutch Queens perform for children in those lands. It is clear, however, that the local leader is hardly a complete substitute for the missing national level benevolent leader. And it becomes necessary, therefore, to inquire as to whether any national level institution is able to generate broad-gauge support capable of contributing to the legitimacy of the structure of the regime. Or, on the other hand, does the negative character of feelings toward the Prime Minister spill over onto the rest of the political structure?

The Spillover of Affect: Support for Institutions
among Teenagers and Parents

Political cynicism, we are told, is a characteristic of adults, not of children. Fred Greenstein reported that

the most striking finding of his study of New Haven children was that

. . . the prevailing adult skepticism and distrust of politics and the politicians simply did not seem to be present. . . . [There] was no evidence even of a frame of reference which would make it possible to use questionnaire items tapping the dimension of political cynicism.⁴³

But of course we have seen that even young Japanese children do exhibit such skepticism and mistrust of the Prime Minister. Does that cynicism develop into a systematic aversion to all political institutions at the national level, as we might expect if the spillover thesis is valid? Do older Japanese youngsters, then, develop anything approximating adult political cynicism? These are the questions that flow from what we have seen so far and to which we now turn our attention.

An essential element in the notion of the benevolent leader, and in the wider concept of political trust, is that political authorities care about the people. Table 7 summarizes how Japanese teenagers and their parents feel about the Prime Minister and three other national political institutions with respect to their concern for ordinary peoples' problems.

The table makes clear the lack of any intense belief in the concern of the institutions among the teenagers. Especially noteworthy is the fact that fewer respondents

⁴³Greenstein, "The Benevolent Leader," p. 935.

TABLE II-7

COMPARISON OF POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS' CONCERN FOR ORDINARY PEOPLE

"How much does each of the following care about the problems in the daily lives of ordinary Japanese and try to help them?"

(Percent positive, neutral, and negative responses for students by grades and for parents as a whole)

Students	Prime Minister			Government			Diet			Pol. Parties			N
	Pos	Neut	Neg	Pos	Neut	Neg	Pos	Neut	Neg	Pos	Neut	Neg	
8	36	27	37	44	33	23	39	27	34	28	47	25	282
10	27	27	46	40	31	29	34	33	33	33	33	34	334
12	22	19	59	36	24	40	29	26	45	31	27	42	326
Parents	40	30	30	52	28	20	44	34	22	41	35	24	1637

Note: positive = very much + somewhat

neutral = can't say + don't know

negative = not much + hardly at all

believe the Prime Minister cares than believe that any of the other three institutions do. But no institution fares really well among the teenagers, and only the government gains consistent approval from a substantial—but not a majority—proportion of all age groups. We also note that the relationship between increasing age and increasing cynicism that we observed among children holds true for teenagers as well. What is more, it is plainly evident that as early as eighth grade they are more cynical about the concern of political institutions than are their parents. Indeed, more parents responded favorably than unfavorably regarding the concern of all four institutions, while twice as many parents were favorable about each institution than were the twelfth-grade children.

Another component of the concept of political trust is belief that political authority is responsive. The will of the people plays a large role in the democratic ideology and the widespread belief of Japanese youngsters in popular sovereignty underlies the importance of their being able to feel that the people are listened to. Table 8 shows teenagers' and parents' evaluations of the responsiveness of the four institutions compared in the preceding table, plus elections. It confirms a number of the same points seen in Table 7. Once again we observe that the students are more cynical than their parents and that in so far as the Prime Minister, government and Diet are concerned cynicism prevails over trust among the students. But only

TABLE II-8

COMPARISON OF POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS' RESPONSIVENESS

(Percent positive, neutral, and negative responses by grade for students and for parents as a whole)

Students Grade	Prime Minister			Government			Diet			Pol. Parties,			Elections		
	Pos	Neut	Neg	Pos	Neut	Neg	Pos	Neut	Neg	Pos	Neut	Neg	Pos	Neut	Neg
8	23	42	35	22	50	28	21	52	27	38	53	5	36	53	11
10	21	37	42	23	42	35	19	43	38	47	38	15	46	38	16
12	41	11	48	22	34	44	14	37	49	53	32	15	50	37	13
Parents	38	37	25	38	39	23	23	37	40	60	30	10	61	32	7

Note: N's are as in Table II-7. Respondents were asked to agree strongly, agree, disagree, or disagree strongly to individual items asserting that each institution either pays attention to the wishes of the people or makes the government pay attention. The items are:

<u>Institution</u>	<u>Item</u>	<u>Responses scored positive</u>
Prime Minister	"When the Prime Minister decides on a policy, he gives a great deal of consideration to what the people wish."	agree + agree strongly
Government	"Over the long run, the government gives a good deal of consideration to what the people want, when it decides on policy."	agree + agree strongly
Diet	"When it comes to deciding what to do in the Diet, most Diet members pay very little attention to the wishes of the voters who elected them."	disagree + disagree strongly
Parties	"The political parties play an important role in making the government pay attention to what the people think."	agree + agree strongly
Elections	"Elections make the government pay attention to what the people want."	agree + agree strongly

the Diet fails to get more positive than negative parental responses. A new note has been added, however, in that both parents and students exhibit markedly greater support for the responsiveness of the political parties and elections than for the Prime Minister, Diet and government. Moreover, there is a most significant reversal of the trend among teenagers toward increasing cynicism with age, belief in the responsiveness of these two institutions—that is, their ability to make the government pay attention actually increases with age. In this finding, we have the first evidence of what I believe to be an important source of support for the regime among Japanese teenagers: the belief that the input institutions of politics, those like parties and elections which mediate the political participation of the citizenry and convey their demands, are worthier of support than the institutions that represent authority, like the Prime Minister, government, and Diet. Parties and elections seem to some extent to be seen rather in the light of the peoples' allies against authority. If this is so, then the apparent alienation from the output institutions and particularly from the primary political authority figure, the Prime Minister, may represent not an undifferentiated cynicism toward the institutional structure of the regime but rather a skepticism toward authority among a generation of Japanese brought up and socialized in a society that has repudiated but not forgotten authoritarianism.

A dimension of political trust that is particularly relevant to a society like Japan, where partisanship, cleavage, and factions often overshadow the idea of the commonweal and the common interest, is that of the inclusiveness of political institutions. Do they represent all the people or are they beholden to narrow interest groups? Table 9 compares the institutions on this dimension of evaluation, but the items, it should be noted, all differ substantially from one another, sharing only the common theme of inclusion versus exclusion of the people.

The trends in the table are clearly like those in Tables 7 and 8 and need no detailed exposition save to note again that parties and elections, especially the former, receive more favorable evaluations on the whole than do the other institutions. The Diet suffers most, as indeed might be expected from the kinds of remarks made by the teenagers I interviewed. A particularly common complaint against the Diet was that its members often got there by means that were less than fair play, such as having a lot of money or being the son of a Diet member. While the interviews produced a persistent stream of this particular variety of comment, there were also a number of references to the Diet's corruption. One rural high school senior, for example, bemoaned not only the fact that "Diet members seem to have a lot of money"—and thus were unlike the common man—but also that "no matter how often they do something wrong [i.e., break Japan's strict election laws] they win time and again

TABLE II-9
COMPARISON OF POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS' INCLUSIVENESS

(Percent positive, neutral, and negative responses by grade for students and for parents as a whole)

Students Grade	Prime Minister			Government			Diet			Pol. Parties			Elections		
	Pos	Neut	Neg	Pos	Neut	Neg	Pos	Neut	Neg	Pos	Neut	Neg	Pos	Neut	Neg
8	29	35	36	38	30	32	22	33	45	39	37	24	27	41	32
10	14	39	47	30	38	32	17	29	54	40	40	20	37	26	37
12	24	32	44	21	34	45	18	18	64	34	37	29	33	39	38
Parents	35	35	30	32	29	39	18	25	57	33	34	33	34	24	42

Note: N's are as in Table II-7. Respondents were asked to agree strong, agree, disagree, or disagree strongly to individual items asserting that each institution was more or less inclusive. The items are:

<u>Institution</u>	<u>Item</u>	<u>Responses scored positive</u>
Prime Minister	"The Prime Minister truly works hard for the sake of all the people not just for himself or his party."	agree + agree strongly
Government	"The government's policies are increasing the gap between rich and poor, and work only for the benefit of the rich."	disagree + disagree strongly
Diet	"In the Diet, the majority ignores the rights of the minority, and the minority impedes majority decisions, so I don't think it is carrying out its responsibility to the people."	disagree + disagree strongly
Parties	"The political parties are all nothing more than groups of factions and influential men who think only of their own interests."	disagree + disagree strongly
Elections	"Since the same one party always wins, general election results don't really represent the will of the people."	disagree + disagree strongly

Responses scored positive were those which supported the belief that the institution works for all the people.

in the elections." But there were also some teenagers who felt that the Diet is not all bad:

Altogether, with the upper and lower houses there are close to 700 people, and among them maybe one person is corrupt. Then the ordinary person says that with even just one such person the Diet is bad. I think you shouldn't decide from one out of 700.

--Tokyo eighth-grade boy

This same kind of argument was made for politicians in general by several of the interviewees, including one Tokyo girl who pointed out that "if there weren't any politicians then politics in Japan wouldn't get along very well." Nevertheless, however, the issue of graft in the government and among Diet members, which has been a recurring thorn in the side of Japanese politics, especially since the "black mist" scandals of the mid-1960s, has made its mark on Japanese youngsters as well as their parents, as Table 10 indicates.

The interviews revealed no clear-cut pattern about where teenagers believed corruption was greatest, although some had a feeling that, as one twelfth-grade Tokyo boy expressed it, "People in the government are more in the shadows, and so I think they are more dishonest." This feeling of hidden corruption was not confined to the government, however. Similar comments were made by a few interviewees about the parties, although only one comment specifically linked graft to the Liberal Democratic Party. This is somewhat surprising in view of the fact that the Liberal Democratic Party is widely identified with the government in the

TABLE II-10

CORRUPTION IN THE GOVERNMENT AND DIET

(Percent positive, neutral, and negative responses by grade for students and for parents as a whole)

<u>Grade</u>	<u>Government</u>			<u>Diet</u>		
	<u>Pos.</u>	<u>Neut</u>	<u>Neg.</u>	<u>Pos.</u>	<u>Neut</u>	<u>Neg.</u>
8	17	35	48	28	32	40
10	14	25	61	9	33	58
12	9	13	78	7	21	72
Parents	19	26	55	22	37	41

Note: N's as in Table II-7.

<u>Institution</u>	<u>Item</u>	<u>Responses scored positive</u>
Government	"A good many people in the government are dishonest and involved in corruption."	disagree + disagree + strongly
Diet	"Most Diet members are trustworthy, honest men, who do not get involved in things like graft."	agree + agree + strongly

press (it is common for the two to be made a single word—seifu jiyuminshuto, or Government Liberal-Democratic Party), and that a few of the students themselves made this identification as well.

In discussing attitudes toward the responsiveness of the institutions we remarked that elections and parties seemed, at least in the context of the questions asked in the survey and in the interviews, to be viewed with much less suspicion and skepticism than the other institutions. We drew from this the implication that they elicit more support because of their character as input institutions and that they thus might serve as important legitimizing agents for the structure of the democratic regime. Table 11 presents some additional evidence relevant to this hypothesis.

The items in the table share the common theme of tension between diversified popular involvement in the political process and centralized authority. We note immediately that in contrast to the preceding tables it is now the parents who are more negative about the institutions. Few teenagers, far fewer than parents, are willing to leave the people out of politics and leave politics to the leaders. Few would abandon elections and the multiple party system in favor of more harmonious and authoritarian modes of politics.

The other evidence that is available on this point is on the whole supportive. Okamura's data, for instance, included an item asking what would be the best thing for people to do to get their views reflected in politics. Among the

TABLE II-11

WILLINGNESS TO ABANDON POPULAR INPUT INTO POLITICS

(Percent agree, neutral, and disagree by grade for students and for parents as a whole)

Students.	Leave everything to leaders			Abandon elections			Single party would be better		
	Agree	Neut	Disagree	Agree	Neut	Disagree	Agree	Neut	Disagree
8	16	19	66	24	28	48	53	24	23
10	9	15	76	20	25	55	32	19	49
12	8	11	81	24	28	48	28	16	56
Parents	36	18	46	31	27	42	34	22	44

Note: N's as in Table II-7.

Items:

"If we get good leaders, the best way to improve the country is for the people to leave everything to them rather than for the people to discuss things among themselves."

"It would be better if instead of all the present political parties there were only one political party which represented all the people and really did its best for the country."

"Since there are always so many election law violations, it would be better if our representatives were chosen by some other means such as competitive examinations, instead of elections."

high school students in the sample, voting in elections led the way followed by writing to the newspaper and supporting the party of one's choice. Appealing to the Diet or the Prime Minister were chosen by few of the teenagers.⁴⁴

It would, of course, be blindness to deny that Japanese youth is on the whole quite cynical about politics. The opinion polls show time and again that in Japan the young are more skeptical and distrusting of politics and politicians than are older people. Nevertheless, it seems evident that much of that cynicism, in so far at least as adolescents are concerned, is grounded in idealism, in widespread belief among the young in the validity and legitimacy of the essential structural principle of democratic politics: rule by the people. But that idealism is accompanied by a skepticism about reality, a belief that government in a once anti-democratic system remains uncommitted to democracy.

The authoritative institutions of government in this regard may suffer particularly from being linked with the past. In the new regime not only are the names of the institutions the same—which is not true for the parties and is irrelevant for elections and newspapers—but so are many of the faces, or at least many Japanese so believe. For instance, Prime Minister Kishi was not only a high-ranking civil servant in Manchuria under the old regime, but was tried and convicted as a war criminal. Prime Minister Sato

⁴⁴Okamura, 1968 Survey, unpublished data.

was also a bureaucrat and thus a government official in Imperial Japan. (Governor Minebe, on the other hand, has a link with the past too, but a most decidedly "democratic" link. His father was the author of the famous "Organ Theory," which characterized the Emperor as simply one of several organs of the state, for which he was found guilty of lese majeste. The Governor thus is a personal symbol repudiating the past.)

It follows, I have argued, that for Japanese youth only those institutions that represent not authority but rather the people's levers against authority can secure the kind of support that gives a grounding in institutional legitimacy to democratic politics in Japan. The benevolent leader is not the answer, for which history is in large part responsible.

The Missing Leader and the Missing Hero:
Some Speculations on the Role of History

As in every nation the political regime of contemporary Japan is rooted, symbolically as well as institutionally, in a particular set of historical events. The events that define the contemporary Japanese polity are the defeat in World War II and the subsequent American Occupation of the country from 1945 to 1952. It is this historical definition of the contemporary political regime that is in large part responsible for the absence of a benevolent leader in Japan.

Among the most common and effective ways in which political regimes seek to create allegiance is by sanctification of their historical roots. In the days when monarchs ruled as well as reigned the history of the monarchy played this role and the monarch was the benevolent leader as a matter of course. But throughout the contemporary political world there has taken place another pattern common to many societies—the emergence of new political orders. The broad outlines of this new pattern are roughly the same. The new order is portrayed as growing out of a great victory which is almost invariably depicted as a popular, national victory. It may be a nationalist revolution, a victory over a colonial occupation, as in the case of the many new nations that have emerged from among the former European colonies in Africa, India, Southeast Asia, and Latin America, as well, of course, as the United States. Or the victory may be a popular defeat of the ancien regime, as in the cases of China, Russia, and France, among others. Whichever the case may be, the pattern is for the new regime to be the product of a revolution, in the broadest and commonest sense of the term.

The profound changes that were effected by the Occupation in the social, cultural, political and institutional life of Japan certainly qualify as one kind of revolution. But it was a revolution without a victory, not the culmination of a heroic struggle of patriots against the old order but the result of a defeat at the hands of a

foreign conqueror. As a result the new political regime has lacked many of the means available to other regimes to create psychological bonds of allegiance among their members. The events of the origin of the democratic regime are not a source of national pride; there is little in them to serve as the catalyst for political emotions; no storming of the Bastille, no Long March, no Valley Forge to stimulate the patriotic urge and tie the new regime to the national identity. Thus, although Japan is a land of festivals, there is no real celebration of the democracy's founding. Constitution Memorial Day, May 3rd, is an almost entirely formal occasion with little or none of the power to kindle popular pride in the historical event and the regime it created that characterizes such days in other countries. Similarly, the flag and the national anthem are unrelated to, and therefore not directly supportive of, the new regime; they remain as holdovers from the ancien regime, as does that regime's foremost symbol, the Emperor.

In creating a new political regime, the Occupation was inevitably limited in the means it could muster to legitimize that regime. It was able to create support for the new regime among some Japanese by reason of their belief in either its ideological or its structural legitimacy (to use David Easton's terms⁴⁵), their conviction, that

⁴⁵David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: 1965), pp. 286 ff.

is, that the moral and political principles of the new regime were right and proper for Japan or that the new institutions and norms were inherently worthy of acceptance.

But for most people, it is not principles or institutions that catalyze political affection and create legitimacy for a new order. Rather, it is a leader. Thus we come to the second and perhaps most important characteristic of the founding of Japan's new regime: it was a revolution without a hero. It was perforce a profound change of political regimes; but it was accomplished without a leader to embody the new values and to personify the new institutions.⁴⁶ The mission and purpose of the Occupation was of course not to create a regime based on such personal legitimacy. It was to destroy one—the Emperor-system of Imperial Japan. As a result, not only did no new Japanese leader arise to serve as the personification of the new order; indeed, the popular identification of any prominent Japanese figure as the hero of the revolution and the creator of the new order was rendered impossible by the American authorship of the regime. There was no Washington, Lenin, Mao or Nehru to create for his successors

⁴⁶In his discussion of means for creating legitimacy, David Easton points out that abstract ideologies and ideas per se are usually ineffective in eliciting mass support. Rather, he says, "Typically, this has been achieved in part by the emergence of vigorous and trusted leaders who . . . embody the ideals and stand for the promise of their fulfillment. They are the personal bridges acting as ties to the new norms and structures of authority." Ibid., pp. 304-305.

the mantle and aura of personal legitimacy that characterizes the institutionalized leadership roles of many contemporary political systems. Today's Japan is, in short, a nation without a pantheon of political heroes.

A comparison of pre and postwar children's heroes will serve to underscore this important point. In 1905 and 1915, children asked to name the "greatest man in Japan" overwhelmingly chose the Emperor, who was followed by a small number of national military leaders and famous warriors—Admiral Togo, General Negi, Saigo Takamori, and the fourteenth century warrior, Kusunoki Masashige.⁴⁷ Postwar grade school children, in 1958 and 1960, were asked a similar question—to name those whom they thought were great men. No single figure predominated in the responses, but Neguchi Hideo, the Nobel Prize-winning physicist, was chosen most often by both samples. Very few children (about 6 percent of one sample and 4 percent of the second) chose the Emperor and even fewer (5 percent and 0 percent respectively) chose then Prime Minister Kishi.⁴⁸ No military figures were cited, while from history, a number of children chose the agriculturalist Ninomiya Sontoku instead of the warrior Kusunoki. But an even more telling difference was the appearance among the postwar children of foreign heroes. In the 1960 sample, it was Abraham Lincoln

⁴⁷ Karasawa Temitaro, Asu No Nihonjin (Tomorrow's Japanese) (Tokyo, 1964), pp. 52-53.

⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 64.

who was second only to Noguchi. In 1968 another sample, this time of Tokyo middle school pupils, John F. Kennedy was overwhelmingly picked as the political leader whom they most respected.⁴⁹ In the same year students at four universities—Tokyo, Nihon, Doshisha, and Kyushu—were asked the same question. Between 35 percent and 60 percent (the latter figure being of the students at Tokyo University, the alma mater of nearly every Japanese Prime Minister) replied that there was no political figure whom they respected. Moreover, those who did name a figure most frequently picked foreign leaders, of whom the four most often named were Kennedy, Lincoln, Lenin, and Churchill. Only two Japanese Prime Ministers were mentioned—Yoshida Shigeru, who piloted Japan through the Occupation, was tied for fifth place with Charles de Gaulle, and Ito Hirobumi, one of the founders of the Meiji regime, was tied for twentieth place.⁵⁰ If asked a similar question, no doubt most American children would choose American Presidents—probably Lincoln and Kennedy; Chinese children would probably choose Mao Tse-tung; and most French children, de Gaulle. But the fact is that the political heroes of young Japanese either do not exist or are foreign leaders.

⁴⁹Owaki Kenzo, "Chugakusei No Seiji Ishiki" (The Political Consciousness of Middle-school Students), Ide, 77 (February, 1968), 38.

⁵⁰Asahi Shinbun, November 24, 1968.

Conclusion

Is democratic Japan the worse for having no revolutionary hero, no benevolent leader? The answer depends greatly upon the success of other means for creating legitimacy. Japan has now been a democracy for nearly a generation. As we have seen in this paper, during that time the political socialization process has inculcated among many young people a profound skepticism of government. But it has also inculcated in many of them a commitment to popular sovereignty, to the principle of popular participation in government and hence to support for an important element of the democratic ideal. Although space does not permit further discussion here, additional data from my survey makes it clear that commitment to democracy as a value in itself and to democratic norms of political behavior are widespread among Japanese teenagers.⁵¹ This ideological commitment to democracy is supplemented, I have argued, by a concomitant commitment to those elements of the structure of the regime—elections, parties and the press—that mediate popular participation in politics. Moreover, I found evidence that local level support may serve as a surrogate for national level alienation, that the local leader in Japan may be an important and safe personal agent of regime legitimation.

The very success of the Japanese democracy thus far must prompt us to ask the comparative question: how do most

⁵¹See chapter 3, below.

new regimes perform? Of course, there are too many unusual characteristics in the Japanese case to permit facile comparison with the experiences of new regimes in other nations —the Occupation itself, the high level of socio-economic development of Imperial Japan, her extensive bureaucracy, and even some domestic tendencies toward democracy, among others. Still, it is obvious that all too often new regimes fail not in spite of the revolutionary hero and the benevolent leader, but in part because of him. The history of the postwar world is filled with the skeletons of young democracies and the ghosts of revolutionary heroes. Pakistan, Indonesia, Ghana, and others tell us of the sad but common tale of the revolution that is either betrayed by its own hero or unable to endure his passing.

We might also ask whether, from the perspective of democratic theory, Japan is indeed not better off because of the missing leader. If the consent of the governed is to be an effective means of democratic control, then the presence of a benevolent leader who elicits a profound emotional response from those to whom he is responsible might prove someday too high a price to pay for stability. Japan already knows how high the price of the benevolent leader can be.

CHAPTER III

SYMBOLS OF CONSENSUS: DEMOCRACY AND PEACE

We have seen that the origin of the democratic regime in an alien military occupation effectively rendered impossible legitimation of that regime through the person of a national hero. Hence it was vital, if the new regime were to survive, that it become the vehicle of its own legitimation, by instilling in the Japanese not merely acquiescence but also conviction in and enthusiasm for its principles and values. Thus the occupation authorities attempted to make democracy the legitimizing ideology of a new order in both political and social life. In this chapter, I assay the success of that attempt in a survey of the role democracy plays in the political orientations of today's Japanese, both the youngsters who have been wholly socialized under the new order and their parents who have been re-socialized under it.

This chapter addresses itself to two broad questions. Is democracy valued in today's Japan? What does it mean? The analysis begins with the latter question, concentrating

at the outset on the cognitive aspects of democracy. What do Japanese teenagers understand by it and how do their conceptions differ from those of their parents?

But the main focus of the chapter involves the role of democracy in the values of today's Japanese. Has democracy become positively valued? This involves asking what are the sources of resistance to its acceptance in Japanese culture? Since a standard answer is that "traditional culture" is the major inhibitor of democracy in Japan, I compare reactions to it among those elements of Japanese society in which traditional culture allegedly persists most strongly, the older generation and rural residents, with those among whom it is thought least influential, the young and the urbanites.

The analysis of affective feelings about democracy considers reaction to two aspects of democracy. The first is the term or symbol itself. The second is the democratic system of making decisions. Japanese culture traditionally placed a high premium on consensus and harmony, and as a result sought unanimity in decisions and their acceptance by all concerned. The democratic rules of the game prescribe that decisions are to be based on the principles of majority rule and respect for minority rights. The question thus becomes to what extent the majoritarianism and tolerance of conflict or dissent of democracy have run afoul of the preference for consensus and unanimity. In short, does the anti-majoritarian norm still obtain in contemporary

Japanese political culture, and if so how does it affect Japanese feelings and conceptions about democracy?

The latter part of the chapter deals with the value of democracy to today's young Japanese and their parents from a rather different perspective. After establishing democracy's role as a symbol and value, I turn to its relative role in the hierarchy of values and ideals that form the framework within which the Japanese define national ideals and national goals. Here, as we shall see, another value propagated by the occupation must be considered: pacifism. The chapter ends with a consideration of the place of these two symbols and values in the emerging political culture and some speculation on their role in national consensus and national identity.

The materials on which this chapter is based include, in addition to the questionnaires administered to the teenagers and their parents and the interviews with forty teenagers, a set of compositions on the theme "Democracy, Capitalism and Socialism" written for me by an eighth grade class in a middle-class Tokyo middle school. The compositions were done at home, without any supervision from either myself or the teacher, other than the instruction regarding the topic. As a result, the contents quite often manifest not the spontaneous ideas, images, and attitudes of the youngsters themselves, but rather their reading of materials readily available at home—books, magazines and frequently encyclopedias—on the three belief systems. They are thus

useful less as indicators of the youngsters' own stable cognitive and affective states of mind re democracy or capitalism and socialism than as reflections of the substantive content of some important ambient socializing influences at play in adolescence in today's Japan.

The Meaning of Democracy

The democratic politics imposed on the Japanese by the occupation were, as Japanese and American skeptics of the progress and the prospects of democracy in Japan have often noted, alien to the Japanese experience. Apart from a brief flirtation with the charms of democratic government on the part of a few elite political activists in the 1920s—the so-called "Taisho democracy"—democracy had played no real role in the Japanese political heritage prior to 1945. Without the legacy of symbolism and imagery that infuses the concept of democracy in some of the Western nations, the United States and France in particular, the question thus arises as to how Japanese perceive and conceive of democracy. One particularly salient dimension of the question concerns the generational differences, if any, in Japanese views of the meaning of democracy. Older Japanese were raised under a political system that rejected democracy as inimical to traditional Japanese customs and values, and which portrayed it in negative terms and symbols such as "individualism." Younger Japanese have, on the other hand, been explicitly indoctrinated into the democratic belief

system in their schooling.

We saw in chapter two that popular sovereignty, especially the normative belief that the people should rule, was a major theme in Japanese youngsters' conceptions of the prominent actors in the political process. It is thus no surprise to discover that popular sovereignty is also a major, indeed the predominant, image in Japanese youngsters' conceptions of democracy. It was with a sense of fascination that I heard repeated in interview after interview in almost identical words that democracy was where "the opinions of the people are reflected in politics." Compare, for example, the following:

. . . when all sorts of peoples' opinions, the opinions of everybody in Japan, are brought together and the will of the people is emphasized.

--rural eighth grade boy

. . . a form of society where the government of a state listens to what the people say and reflects this in politics.

--suburban Tokyo twelfth grade boy

. . . where the people are made the basis
. . . where what the people think is respected.

--rural tenth grade girl

In a pretest of the questionnaire, which I conducted among more than ninety Tokyo eighth graders, 54 percent chose "the people have sovereign power" as the response which best expressed the meaning of democracy over seven other responses, none of which was selected by more than

9 percent. Comparative data here is scant, but Hess and Torney's data show that among their nationwide sample of American children, equality and voting were the most commonly perceived components of democracy while "the people rule" trailed in third place.¹

The stress on popular sovereignty in Japanese youths' conceptions of democracy is not surprising. The new democratic regime, after all, was created to supplant a regime based on imperial sovereignty and, as a result, the Constitution itself lays great stress on the role of the people. This emphasis is reflected in the stress laid upon popular rule in the inculcation of the young into the democratic belief system. Okamura Tadao and his associates found in a study of primary, middle and high school social studies texts that by far the principal emphasis in the definitions of democracy given in those texts was popular sovereignty.² Moreover, of course, it must not be overlooked that the very word for democracy in Japanese, minshushugi, literally means "the principle of popular rule" and, unlike the Greek-derived English word, it needs no linguistic explanation but is directly understandable.

¹Robert D. Hess and Judith V. Torney, The Development of Political Attitudes in Children (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1968), Table 13, p. 75.

²Okamura Tadao, et al., "Seijiteki Shakaika ni Okeru 'Minshushugi' to 'Heiwa'" (Democracy and Peace in Political Socialization), Shakai Kagaku Janaru (1969), see especially pp. 4 ff.

In the interviews, few of the youngsters were spontaneously concrete as regards how the people rule or get their views reflected in politics. But those who did clearly understood the idea of representative democracy. Witness the following definitions of democracy:

. . . politics of the people. But in fact each one of the people can't directly participate in politics, so in Japan it's the Diet.

--suburban Tokyo twelfth grade girl

. . . when everyone's opinions are considered. But in Japan there are so many people that each person can't give his, and so there are representatives and politics is left up to them.

--urban Tokyo tenth grade boy

While popular sovereignty is obviously a prime component of every classic and contemporary definition of democracy, it is far from being the whole of the concept. To get at the other elements of the democratic conception in the minds of young Japanese (and those of their parents) I included an item in my questionnaire asking the respondent to select the two statements from a group of eight which best express the meaning of democracy.* Table III-1 presents the responses chosen as most expressive.

The responses in the table include four broad categories of definitional emphasis: (1) libertarian, including safety to criticize the government and respect for human rights; (2) egalitarian, including the absence of poverty

* Popular sovereignty was intentionally excluded on the basis of the results of the pretest.

TABLE III-1

THE MEANING OF DEMOCRACY

(Percent of students by grade and of parents as a whole choosing each response)

"There are many ideas about democracy. From the following, pick in order the two you think best express the essence of democracy."

	<u>Voting</u>	<u>Criticize</u>	<u>Majority Rule</u>	<u>Respect of Rights</u>	<u>No Poverty</u>	<u>Free Party Com.</u>	<u>Equality</u>	<u>Peace</u>	<u>NR</u>	<u>Total</u>
Students:	<u>A. First Choice</u>									
Grade										
8	13	12	18	17	12	1	13	10	3	100%
10	4	7	21	19	21	1	9	17	1	100%
12	5	8	23	28	16	1	9	11	1	100%
Parents:	23	5	25	15	16	2	5	7	2	100%
Students:	<u>B. Second Choice</u>									
Grade										
8	3	3	9	11	7	3	27	34	3	100%
10	1	5	10	14	18	4	26	21	1	100%
12	2	5	10	21	15	5	22	19	1	100%
Parents:	3	4	9	14	18	7	20	21	4	100%

Voting: all adults can vote in elections; criticize: the people can freely and safely criticize the government; majority rule: the nations' politics are decided by the opinions of the majority of the people; respect of rights: such basic human rights as freedom of speech and assembly are respect; no poverty: there is no poverty—the government attempts to make it possible for everyone to lead a life with minimum basic health and cultural standards; free party competition: political parties, including those opposed to the government, can freely compete in elections to take office; equality: there is no discrimination; everyone has an equal chance to get the place to live, the education, and the job that he chooses; peace: the people have the right to live in peace.

and discrimination; (3) participatory, including the right of all adults to vote, politics decided by majority opinion, and free party competition; and (4) pacifist, the right to live in peace. These four elements and the individual response categories themselves were derived from articles in the Japanese Constitution. The first three are familiar components of most descriptions of democratic ideals. The fourth, peace, was included because it is a most important theme in the new Japanese regime and is given a place of prominence in the Constitution; and because early interviewing revealed that it was frequently closely linked in the minds of some youngsters to democracy.

Inspection of the table reveals no single dominant response among children or parents. On the whole, in so far as first-choice responses go, the emphasis among the students tends to be rather evenly split among the participatory (majority rule), libertarian (rights), and egalitarian (no poverty) elements. The parents, however, tend much more strongly than do the students to emphasize the participatory element; and indeed, the only clear generational difference is over the importance to democracy of voting, a significant difference which shall be discussed shortly.

When we look at the distribution of second choices, however, we may note that there is a marked tendency among all groups to choose the right to live in peace. As we shall see later in this chapter, this theme of peace as a

right and an ideal will occur over and over again in the images that young Japanese, and to a lesser extent even their parents, have of their ideal society.

Taken together, then, the cognitive orientations of Japanese youngsters with regard to democracy tend to be dominated by the notion of popular rule; once that is taken as a given component of their conceptions of democracy, the other constituent democratic values tend to draw roughly equal support both from parents and from students in all grades. A look at age trends, however, suggests that as the age of students increases they become less likely to choose egalitarian and pacifist ideas of democracy's essence and more likely to choose participatory and libertarian ones.

Democracy, then, is a familiar concept to Japanese, young and old alike, and the range of cognitive content which it takes on among them appears to be quite close to that found among Americans, even if the emphases differ. But the more important question is whether democracy has come to be valued in Japan. There are reasons of history and of culture why democracy should be alien to Japanese life and values, and it is to the success of democracy at establishing itself in the hierarchy of values in Japan in the face of such obstacles that I now turn.

The Value of Democracy

The values and virtues that have been emphasized in traditional Japanese culture, as many have noted, are

essentially undemocratic and in some respects even anti-democratic. Japanese culture gives precedence to the group over the individual, demanding unanimity and harmony, abhorring dissent and conflict. Before 1945 it was widely felt that the ideals of collective harmony and democracy were antithetical, that democracy indeed was the ultimate manifestation of Western individualism and hence not only unsuited for Japan but directly opposed to the basic thrust of Japanese norms and social ideals. The discreditation of the old ways caused by the defeat in World War II led many Japanese to seek a new basis for social conduct as well as for politics. But old values and symbols do not vanish overnight and the negative image of democracy continued to persist in the new Japan. An American sociologist found that even as recently as the late 1950s urban white collar families in Tokyo tended, in their search for a new value system, to see democracy and individualism as "only a justification for selfishness and therefore not a solid basis for morality."³

Nevertheless, democracy is the formal ideal and value of the political system, and an ideal that is widely and uniformly propagated in the educational system and in the media. The result has been a constant recession of antagonism toward it and an increase in public acceptance of it over

³Ezra Vogel, Japan's New Middle Class (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1963), p. 142.

the postwar period, as the Japanese political scientist Shinohara Hajime has documented. In 1946 over 93 percent of a nationwide sample of adults felt that democracy had gone too far; in 1955, 64 percent of another sample believed that there were aspects of democracy unsuited to Japan that needed to be corrected.⁴ Nevertheless, it was clear, as Shinohara points out, that by the 1960s democracy had become a positive symbol. The Research Committee of the Study of National Character of the Institute for Statistical Mathematics conducts a national survey asking many of the same questions every five years. In both 1963 and 1968, 38 percent of those surveyed thought that democracy was good, while roughly half felt that it depends on circumstances.⁵ This acceptance of democracy thus appears to be a qualified one for many adults. For comparative purposes, the same organization asked the same question of Japanese-Americans in Hawaii. Seventy-four percent of them thought democracy was good, while only 21 percent believed it depends on the circumstances.⁶ To gauge the comparative extent of attachment to democracy as a concept or symbol among Japanese of both the prewar and postwar generations, I asked the respondents in my survey whether they had a

⁴Shinohara Hajime, Nihon No Seiji Fudo (Japanese Political Culture) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shinsho, 1968), p. 74.

⁵Tekei Suri Kenkyujo, Kokuminsei Chosa Inkai, Dai-Nihonjin No Kokuminsei (Japanese National Character: Second Study) (Tokyo: Shiseido, 1970), p. 443.

⁶Mainichi Shinbun, June 10, 1972.

favorable reaction when they heard the word democracy.

Table III-2 presents the results.

As the figures make clear, both generations report favorable reactions toward democracy. But two things are noteworthy about the findings for both young and old. First, almost no one of any age rejects democracy outright; it has become in a sense sacrosanct. Second, and conversely, the support is surprisingly restrained in view of the duration and intensity of pro-democratic socialization in postwar Japan. The proportion responding "very favorable" is in all age groups substantially smaller than that responding "favorable." It is of interest to note, however, that the more positive response increases with the age of the student, reflecting, perhaps, the intensified exposure of the older youngsters to social studies texts, newspapers, books and other sources which frequently sing democracy's praises.

Resistance to democracy is invariably asserted to stem from the traditional elements of Japanese culture. Hence we would expect, and it is often simply assumed, that those segments of Japanese society most closely identified with the traditional culture would be most likely to show the least acceptance of democracy. We have, however, seen that generation makes no significant difference. But if generation is one supposed cultural watershed, another such watershed variable, and one of probably longer run significance, is that of place of resident. The "real" Japan of

TABLE III-2

REACTIONS TO THE WORD DEMOCRACY

(percent of students by grade
and parents as a whole choosing
each response)

	<u>Very Fav.</u>	<u>Fav.</u>	<u>Don't Knew Can't Say</u>	<u>Unfav.</u>	<u>Very Unfav.</u>	<u>Total</u>
Students:						
Grade						
8	24	44	29	2	1	100%
10	32	50	16	1	1 ^A	100%
12	39	47	13	1	0	100%
Parents:	31	52	15	2	0	100%

traditional custom and culture is rural Japan. It is here in the fishing or farming village where traditional Japanese culture evolved and where it is alleged to retain its greatest hold. The village is the archetype of Japanese society, and its human relations the classic models of the norms and values governing Japanese social conduct. We would expect therefore that rural Japanese would be less receptive to democracy as a symbol and value. But we would expect, also, that the universal propagation of the democratic faith through Japan's uniform national educational system would lessen the difference in reaction to democracy on the part of young urban and young rural Japanese by comparison with that between their parents. Table III-3 presents the evidence of how urban-rural residence and generation affect reactions to the term democracy.

It is plain to see that in fact urban versus rural residence makes utterly no difference among the adults. The rural youngsters, however, exhibit a significantly more positive reaction than do their urban fellows. This is of course directly contradictory to the hypothesis that those who live in the countryside are less likely to value democracy than their city citizens. Two points must be made in this connection. To begin with, as we shall see in later chapters, rural youngsters tend to be generally more supportive of the institutions of politics and government. Their more positive stance toward democracy may

TABLE III-3

URBAN-RURAL RESIDENCE AND REACTION TO DEMOCRACY BY GENERATION

Students' Reactions

	<u>Very Fav.</u>	<u>Fav.</u>	<u>Don't Know</u>	<u>Unfav.</u>	<u>Very Unfav.</u>	<u>Total</u>
Urban	29	49	20	1	1	100%
Rural	37	46	15	1	1	100%

p. = <.05

Parents' Reactions

	<u>Very Fav.</u>	<u>Fav.</u>	<u>Don't Know</u>	<u>Unfav.</u>	<u>Very Unfav.</u>	<u>Total</u>
Urban	31	52	15	2	0	100%
Rural	31	52	15	2	0	100%

p. = n.s.

reflect this. Secondly, expressed attitude and actual behavior may not agree. The rural Japanese may in fact be less attracted to democracy than appears to be the case. I shall return to this point shortly in the discussion of consensus that follows.

In so far, at least, as the general abstract term itself is concerned, there seems to be widespread agreement, across generations and across the main social line of cleavage in today's Japan, on its positive value. But democracy carries with it an important set of associated concepts and ideals with quite specific implications for the behavior of individuals and groups. Let us turn now to one of these, a central element of democracy, majoritarianism.

Consensus versus Majority Rule

The emphasis on majority rule that we have observed to be prominent in Japanese youngsters' first choice of ideas expressing the meaning of democracy is a significant problem for the analysis of the present and future role of democracy in Japanese political culture, because it runs head on into a widely noted cultural norm of the Japanese—a preference for deciding by a consensus of the whole group and avoiding decisions in which one part of the group, even a majority, wins and another loses. Robert Ward's description of this preferred decision pattern is thorough and lucid:

The traditional Japanese system of decision making is different [from the adversary system of the West]. It operates by consensus, that

is by unanimous agreements. A problem is posed and is then discussed by the group concerned with a minimum of open commitment to positions by participants. Eventually a sense of generally acceptable compromise emerges from the discussion; this is formulated by a senior member of the group and is then adopted by unanimous consent. In such a system no one is openly defeated or humiliated, "face" is preserved, at least the semblance of unanimity is achieved, and group harmony is thus maximized. Also the explicit recognition of minorities is avoided. Reciprocally, if the system is to operate along traditionally approved lines, it becomes an obligation of the majority faction not to ignore or ride roughshod over the opinions of the minority elements which do in fact exist. If they do so, the minority can then raise the cry of tyranny of the majority and solicit and obtain public sympathy on this ground.⁷

In order to ascertain the extent to which the preference for consensus exists among Japanese of both pre- and postwar generations and has for each group the implications it appears to have, I included a number of items in the questionnaire dealing with group decision making and followed these up in the individual interviews. Table III-4 presents the results of an item designed to evoke preferences toward three varieties of group decision making—authoritarian, consensual, and majoritarian.

The results appear unquestionably to accord with the anti-majoritarian thesis. The teenagers overwhelmingly prefer

⁷Robert E. Ward, "Japan: The Continuity of Modernization," in Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba, eds., Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 62.

TABLE III-4

PREFERRED METHOD OF GROUP DECISION MAKING

(Percent of students by grade and parents as a whole choosing each response)

"Let's suppose you belong to a certain group (such as a club, etc.). Suppose that group had decided to go on a trip. But there were some people who wanted to go to the mountains and others who wanted to go to the seashore. Circle which one of the three ways of deciding where to go that you think would be best.

- a) One person says that since the group's affairs have been put in the charge of its leaders, you should rely on them and have them decide. [Authoritarian]
- b) Another person says that everyone should give his opinion, and discussion should be continued until all agree on one opinion. [Consensual]
- c) Someone else says that it should be decided by majority rule, even if there is a large minority. [Majoritarian]

	<u>Authori- tarian</u>	<u>Consensual</u>	<u>Majori- tarian</u>	<u>DK, NR</u>	<u>Total</u>
Students:					
Grade					
8	12	67	16	5	100%
10	16	72	10	2	100%
12	10	71	16	3	100%
Parents:	12	58	26	4	100%

the consensual path to decision. So too do their parents, but in a surprising reversal of what we would expect and predict on the basis of presumed change in the content of political socialization in childhood and adolescence, especially in school practices—the parents were more apt than the teenagers to choose the majoritarian mode.

That consensual methods are preferred by the great majority of young Japanese, and majority versus minority contention avoided, in day-to-day life is clearly evident also from the results of the individual interviews I conducted. When I asked how they themselves made decisions in their school clubs, etc., the great majority of the students interviewed replied that they all talked it over until they came to an agreement. Interestingly enough, several of the students noted that their clubs had strong leaders and so decisions tended to follow the leader's preferences. Deciding by majority rule—by choosing sides and taking a vote or a show of hands—was, with only one or two exceptions among all those interviewed, felt to be a disagreeable solution, to be used only as a last resort. Nevertheless, it was apparent that in the students' own group experiences instances did arise in which consensus was impossible and majority vote decisions were taken.

Further evidence for the aversion to the majoritarian mode of decision making among young and old Japanese is to be found in the responses, shown in Table III-5, to a follow-up question to that just discussed.

TABLE III-5

SIZE OF A FAIR MAJORITY

(percent of students by grade and of parents as a whole choosing each response)

"Let's suppose that that group had decided to determine where to go by taking a vote. If there were 30 people in the group, how many should agree for the decision to be fair to everyone?"

	<u>Nearly Everyone (27-30)</u>	<u>About 4/5th (24 or +)</u>	<u>About 2/3rds (20 or +)</u>	<u>About 3/5ths (18 or +)</u>	<u>About 1/2 (16 or +)</u>	<u>NR</u>	<u>Total</u>
Students:							
Grade							
8	18	17	47	5	13	0	100%
10	18	25	47	2	8	0	100%
12	13	28	51	3	6	0	100%
Parents:	11	15	52	6	15	1	100%

Both for parents and for students at all grade levels by far the predominant preference is for a two-thirds majority. From 82 to 91 percent of the students believe that two-thirds or more of the group members should agree for the decision to be fair to all. Again, interestingly, the parents are slightly more prone to the majoritarian position, with a slightly higher proportion of them than of any grade level of students choosing the bare majority. This generational difference is quite slight, however, and what is of more interest is that this predominance of a preference for at least a two-thirds majority evidently is clear secondary corroboration for the antimajoritarian thesis. But it must be noted that this finding does not set Japan apart, in comparison with other cultures, as peculiar. Social psychologists researching small group decision processes in the United States have reported that American subjects in experiments strongly tend to seek decisions agreed to by two-thirds or more of the group members.⁸

The emphasis on unanimous consensus in Japanese culture appears to have two major implications for democracy in the Japanese setting. These have been aptly summarized by Robert Scalapino who, noting that "Japanese society denies the moral validity of majoritarianism," asserted that "the right of the

⁸The social psychologist Lee Levy found that American college students believed that in a group decision involving 40 people, a split of 30 to 10 would be required to indicate a clear majority. Cited in William W. Lambert and Wallace E. Lambert, Social Psychology (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964), p. 42.

majority to govern is not accepted by all, nor is the right of the minority to oppose."⁹ Two fundamental democratic principles, the majority's right to make its position law and the liberty of the individual and the minority to dissent and oppose, are thus alleged to be jeopardized by the consensus norm. Let us examine each of these in turn.

The first problem for democratic politics has to do with the right of the majority to impose its will on the minority. It does seem clear that the Japanese preference for unanimity both hampers the operation of this principle in Japan and that the principle itself is not wholly accepted among influential elements of the public. In particular it has been the case in national politics for most of the post-war period that the governing party has held a majority that while clear has been a good deal less than the two-thirds most Japanese apparently recognize as fair. Hence when controversial issues, such as the renewal of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, have arisen, the opposition parties in the Diet have either forcibly resisted the taking of votes or have refused to take part, claiming that the imposition of the government position as national policy in such controversial matters is "tyranny of the majority." Some of the popular feeling on this point is suggested by the following remark of one of my interviewees, a twelfth grade Tokyo boy:

⁹Robert A. Scalapino and Junnosuke Masumi, Parties and Politics in Contemporary Japan (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1962), p. 152.

I feel this way a bit about the force of the majority. Our teacher has said that at times when a decision is made in the Diet, you can tell even from the beginning what the outcome's going to be. I think I read in a book that in England the people who hold the majority opinion don't ignore the minority; it said that they intensify talks until they're unified. I think that's ideal, but in Japan it feels as if it's like war, somehow, and sometimes there're fights, and the majority always crushes the minority, and there's the feeling that the minority can never make itself heard.

As the quote suggests, not only does the imposition of the majority rule principle seem illegitimate, but it casts something of a blight on the perceived moral character of the Diet and the actors in the political process and induces a feeling of political impotence. These are serious consequences for the prospects of democracy in Japan. Just how common among young Japanese and their parents is this rejection of the legitimacy of majority rule in the face of a large minority? Table III-6 presents the results of an item in the questionnaire designed to get at this question.

The table leaves little room for doubt that among both youngsters and adults there is little taste for majority rule in a close contest. Scalapino's assertion that "the right of the majority to govern is not accepted by all" would appear to have some validity among both generations of Japanese. We might explain the rejection of majority rule here on the part of the adults by reference to traditional cultural norms and practices. But how can we explain its also holding for the students in the survey who have been raised under the new

TABLE III-6

ATTITUDES TOWARD MAJORITY RULE: THE LARGE MINORITY

(Percent of students by grade and parents as a whole choosing each response)

"When you're trying to decide something, if there is a relatively large number of people in the minority, those in the majority shouldn't insist on their own opinion."

	<u>Strongly Agree</u> <u>+ Agree</u>	<u>Don't Know</u> <u>No Response</u>	<u>Strongly</u> <u>Disagree</u> <u>+ Disagree</u>	<u>Total</u>
Students:				
Grade				
8	45	31	24	100%
10	57	22	21	100%
12	66	20	14	100%
Parents:	61	23	16	100%

democratic regime and presumably schooled in the values and beliefs of democracy? One important explanatory factor may be traceable directly to the school experiences of Japanese youngsters. In the questionnaire, I asked the students whether they had ever in the past three years been candidates for club or school office and if they had ever served as officers. While only 27 percent had ever run for office, fully 65 percent had actually served, as officers. In other words, it would appear that elections for office do not occur in most cases. Frank Langdon's assertion that "Japanese social experience does not provide sufficient socialization in the ritualized hostility that lies behind the operation of party politics in Western countries"¹⁰ would appear to be correct in so far as schooling in the process of electoral competition is concerned.

To put another perspective on the resistance to majoritarianism, however, it might be useful to consider the role that consensus is supposed to play in democracy by contemporary political theorists. Robert Dahl, to take a well-known democratic theorist as an example, lists consensus as one of eight standards of achievement by which the democraticness of a political process should be judged:

Consensus in political discussion and decision making [is necessary] in the sense that solutions are sought that

¹⁰ Frank Langdon, Politics in Japan (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1967), p. 73.

will minimize the size, resentment and coercion of defeated minorities, and will maximize the numbers of citizens who conclude that their goals have been adequately met by the solution adopted.¹¹

It may be that in a political system, such as that in Japan, in which government and opposition are deeply divided over fundamental policy issues, and where their respective forces are fairly evenly split with but a slight edge to the former, bare majority rule without any attempt at consideration of the opposition's views would be likely to produce conflict too severe for the system to resolve peacefully. The fact is, of course, that the parties have worked out a system of majority-minority consultation and accommodation of minority principles on most issues, so that the frequency of what might be called majority-minority confrontation on fundamentals has been sharply reduced.

The second implication for democracy in Japan of this cultural preference for unanimous consensus is that it restricts the freedom of the individual or of the minority to oppose and dissent. It allegedly attacks, that is to say, not only the majoritarian but also the libertarian basis of democracy. As Ezra Vogel has put it with respect to the urban middle class:

. . . there is no fully legitimate basis for standing against the group. Once group consensus is reached, one should abide by the

¹¹Robert A. Dahl, Political Opposition in Western Democracies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), p. 387.

decision. Although some deviants attempt to justify their failure to follow group consensus in terms of democracy or freedom, these values have not been internalized sufficiently to justify the deviant's behavior to himself, let alone to other members of the group.¹²

This subordination of the individual to the group is a classic theme in treatments of Japanese culture. But there is evidence from several sources to indicate that in some important realms the principle of the freedom to dissent and to oppose is in fact now widely recognized and practiced in Japan. In the first place, comparative studies of support for civil liberties of high school and college students in Japan and the United States have shown that young people in today's Japan are much more likely than their American fellows to express support for civil liberties, especially the rights of minorities and of individuals to espouse and express unpopular views.¹³ In a less abstract, perhaps more salient issue context, Whitehill and Takezawa found that Japanese workers were more likely to resist what they considered illegitimate group pressures toward conformity than were American workers.¹⁴ Certainly there is clearly no suppression of dissent in the

¹² Japan's New Middle Class, p. 148.

¹³ See Elliott McGinnies, "Attitudes Toward Civil Liberties Among Japanese and American University Students," Journal of Psychology, 58 (1964), 177-186; and Kato Takakatsu, "Political Attitudes of Japanese Adolescents in Comparison with American," Psychologia (Kyoto), IV (December, 1961), 198-200.

¹⁴ Arthur Whitehill and Shin'ichi Takezawa, The Other Worker (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1965).

political realm. The Japanese government is probably criticized more often and more bitterly by both the press and the opposition than that of almost any other nation. How do Japanese youngsters view the rights of the minority to persist in their views in the face of group pressure to conform? Table III-7 presents the results of an item used in the questionnaire expressly designed to get at this.

It is immediately apparent that here, in contrast to the case of the large minority, there is a decided generational split in attitudes. Slightly more parents agree than disagree that the persistent small minority should be condemned as selfish—the traditional anti-libertarianism alleged to be an important element in the consensus norm. The teenagers, on the other hand, overwhelmingly reject this position and their rejection increases with age, suggesting that a new libertarian norm may have taken the place of the old conformist one. We have already seen in chapter two that there is strong evidence that young Japanese reject the symbols of authority. Here is evidence that they also reject the coercive, authoritarian aspects of consensus. When we consider this in comparison with the other available evidence on Japanese youngsters' reactions to authority—the Kato and McGinnies studies of attitudes toward civil liberties and the Whitehill and Takezawa study of workers' attitudes toward their bosses—it would appear that there may be taking place a major shift in Japanese culture—away from the authoritarianism

TABLE III-7

ATTITUDES TOWARD MAJORITY RULE: THE SMALL MINORITY

(Percent of students by grade and parents as a whole choosing each response)

"When you're trying to decide something, and only a very few people disagree, for those people to continue insisting on their opposing opinion should be condemned because it is selfish."

	<u>Strongly Agree + Agree</u>	<u>Don't Knew No Response</u>	<u>Strongly Disagree + Disagree</u>	<u>Total</u>
Students:				
Grade				
8	20	31	49	100%
10	16	27	57	100%
12	14	24	62	100%
Parents:	36	32	32	100%

of the past to a new emphasis on the liberty of the individual. Robert Frager, a social psychologist, found in replications of the famous Asch conformity tests among Japanese college students that a substantial proportion had to be classified as either "autonomous"—i.e., those who made correct judgments in the face of an incorrect majority—or as "anti-conformist"—those who disagreed with the majority when the majority opinion was correct.¹⁵ We shall explore the psychological aspects of this question as they bear on the political personality of young Japanese in a later chapter. Suffice it to say here that the old stereotype of the Japanese as ridden with conformity and hence incapable of governing themselves freely appears to be inaccurate and inapplicable as regards the young people of today.

What still might be the case, however, is that the decline of coercive conformity and the other anti-democratic aspects of the consensus norm might be confined to young people in the most "modern" sectors of the society, particularly the urban areas. Indeed, much has been written about the Japanese rural village as the prototypical social system, the original source—as the starting point of all communities in Japan—of the "national characteristic" of consensus. In the village the good of the community took first priority, and the will of the community was decided by a consensus that

¹⁵ Robert Frager, "Experimental Social Psychology in Japan: Studies in Social Conformity," Rice University Studies, 56:4 (Fall, 1970), 250.

was expressed by the village head. But urban society is neither so tightly knit nor so communally interactive; the urban individual belongs to several disparate worlds, as it were, working in one place and living in another, and the roles of friends, co-workers, and neighbors are not mutually overlapping as they are in the country. The sanctions impelling the urban adult to subordination to group consensus in any of the urban adult's spheres of life are thus less significant than those faced by the rural adult.

Do we in fact observe a clear gap with both generations between urban and rural dwellers as regards consensus and conformity? Cross tabulation of the items just discussed by urban versus rural place of residence for each generation separately reveals some interesting findings. Table III-8 presents the cross tabulation for each of the four items.

The tables show that the impact of urban versus rural residence is not a decisive one on the students' attitudes toward majority rule and consensus. On none of the four items is there a statistically significant difference between urban and rural students. Rural students did choose the authoritarian responses in the first and last items to a slightly greater extent than did urban children, but not sufficiently, more frequently to make the difference statistically significant. On the other two items, there is almost no discernible difference between the proportions of urban and rural youngsters choosing each response. But among the parents, rural

TABLE III 8

IMPACT OF URBAN VERSUS RURAL RESIDENCE ON ATTITUDES TOWARD CONSENSUS
AND MAJORITY RULE AMONG STUDENTS AND PARENTS
(Percent of each group choosing response)

	<u>Students</u>				<u>Parents</u>							
	<u>6 - a: Item 1, Decision Modes</u>											
	<u>Authorit.</u>	<u>Consensual</u>	<u>Majorit.</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Authorit.</u>	<u>Consensual</u>	<u>Majorit.</u>	<u>Total</u>				
Urban	11	75	14	100%	14	54	32	100%				
Rural	16	69	15	100%	12	68	20	100%				
	p. = n.s.				p. = <.001							
	<u>6 - b: Item 2, Size of Fair Majority</u>											
	<u>Nearly All</u>	<u>4/5</u>	<u>2/3</u>	<u>3/5</u>	<u>1/2</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Nearly All</u>	<u>4/5</u>	<u>2/3</u>	<u>3/5</u>	<u>1/2</u>	<u>Total</u>
Urban	17	24	48	3	8	100%	8	13	56	7	16	100%
Rural	15	23	49	3	10	100%	15	18	49	5	13	100%
	p. = n.s.						p. = <.002					
	<u>6 - c: Item 3, Bare Majority Shouldn't Impose Its Will</u>											
	<u>Strongly Agree + Agree</u>	<u>Neutral</u>	<u>Strongly Disagree + Disagree</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Strongly Agree + Agree</u>	<u>Neutral</u>	<u>Strongly Disagree + Disagree</u>	<u>Total</u>				
Urban	57	25	18	100%	64	21	15	100%				
Rural	57	23	20	100%	58	24	18	100%				
	p. = n.s.				p. = n.s.							
	<u>6 - d: Item 4, Small Minority Opposition Is Selfish</u>											
	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Neutral</u>	<u>Disagree</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Neutral</u>	<u>Disagree</u>	<u>Total</u>				
Urban	14	28	58	100%	36	32	32	100%				
Rural	20	26	54	100%	36	30	34	100%				
	p. = n.s.				p. = n.s.							

parents were indeed significantly more likely than urban parents to choose the consensual decision mode and to opt for a very large size for a fair majority. In each case, however, the difference between the urban and rural adults is a matter of degree, re the size of the proportions supporting the old ways, rather than a matter of direction. A substantial majority of both urban and rural adults chose the consensual responses to the two questions. Moreover, there is no significant difference between the urban and rural adults on the other two questions.

It would appear then that in so far as patterns of decision making and the rights of the majority and those of the minority are concerned, urban-rural residence has no significant impact on the attitudes of young Japanese; while older Japanese attitudes are significantly distinguished by this urban-rural split only with regard to what we might refer to as the "harmonizing" aspects of consensus, but not its coercive aspect. On balance, then, the stereotype of the traditional consensus norm as finding its most intense and anti-democratic form in rural Japan no longer appears valid. Whether expressed attitudes and actual behavior are congruent is another question. It may be that village Japan is still ridden with conformity and suppression of the individual, but the norms of today's culture no longer permit the verbal expression of anti-democratic attitudes. That fact in and of itself is noteworthy, because it indicates that at a minimum

the attitudinal supports for traditional modes of suppression of dissent and subordination of the individual are giving way, and without such supports the behavior itself is unlikely to continue unchanged.

In the analysis of the value of democracy, and of support for democracy, among Japanese teenagers and their parents, I have discussed both reaction to democracy as a general, non-specific symbol and reactions to democratic procedures and "rules of the game," and how each has been affected by elements of Japanese culture that are often asserted to be inherent impediments to democracy in Japan. The analysis has shown that the impact of these allegedly inhibiting factors is neither particularly great or consistent. Positive feelings about democracy in general appear to prevail even among those, the older generation and the rural folk, to whom they are alleged to be most alien and repugnant. And the old values of consensus and conformity appear to have bent to accommodate the new; the pattern of responses suggests a blending of a desire for harmony with an acceptance and tolerance of non-conformity and dissent.

If democracy has become an integral part of the value structure of contemporary Japanese political culture, how centrally located is it in that structure? One answer to that may be gained by comparing it with other positive values. If there is a national set of ideals and values in today's Japan, and particularly among today's youth, how does

democracy rank in comparison with the other values? Indeed, what other values are to be found there?

Democracy, Peace, and National Identity

There is little question that democracy as a political creed, a set of ideals and principles of political conduct and blueprint for government is widely accepted among the young.⁸ Nearly every interview and composition revealed a picture of an ideal Japan governed by democratic procedures and institutions. In chapter five I discuss the perceived relationships of democracy to other belief systems, in particular socialism and capitalism. Here it suffices to note that it is unquestionably accurate to describe democracy as the accepted creed, the system of principles and institutions within which the overwhelming majority of Japanese youngsters not only desire but expect that politics will take place, and the criterion against which they feel political conduct should be judged.

Democracy as a creed is thus a legitimating ideology in the sense that David Easton uses the term. For American youngsters, democracy's role as the pre-eminent political creed and legitimating ideology is supported by its role as the central political symbol. The very word evokes in the American a host of great events, rhetorical phrases, and heroic figures: the Constitutional Convention, Washington at Valley Forge, and Lincoln at Gettysburg: "Give me liberty or give me death"; "We hold these truths to be self-evident...";

"A new nation conceived in liberty and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal." The single word democracy is thus magical because literally in a word it encapsulates the political heritage and the national identity of the American who hears or utters it. It defines him to himself, in similar fashion to the way in which a devout believer derives a substantial part of his identity from his faith.

Democracy in this sense is more a symbol than a creed. Indeed, it must be said to be the central symbol of American political life. It is what has been called by Harold Lasswell a "key sign," a symbol that "provide[s] a unifying experience festering sentiments that may transcend limitation of culture, class, organization, and personality."¹⁶ Murray Edelman in The Symbolic Uses of Politics has referred to such symbols as "condensation symbols":

Condensation symbols . . . condense into one symbolic event, sign, or act patriotic pride, anxieties, remembrances of past glories or humiliations, promises of future greatness: several of them or all of them.¹⁷

Democracy, given its history in Japan, could hardly play such a role there as it does in America. In a sense,

¹⁶Harold D. Lasswell, "Key Signs, Symbols, and Icons," in L. Bryson, et al., eds., Symbols and Values: An Initial Study (New York and London: Cooper Square Publishers, 1954), p. 201.

¹⁷Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1964), p. 6.

democracy has the flavor, for the Japanese, of an important lesson to be learned and mastered almost, it might be said, like a catechism lesson rather than having the evocative magic of the source of national identity and pride. But there is a Japanese political condensation symbol that brings forth something of the same kind of emotional response among Japanese youngsters, and indeed among many adults, that democracy evokes from Americans. That symbol is peace.

Something of the importance of the role played by peace in the political lives of young Japanese is suggested by the contents of compositions written for me by some 43 Tokyo eighth graders. They were asked to discuss their "ideal Japan" and the role therein of democracy, capitalism, and socialism. Nearly all of the children did, as expected, describe democracy as a requisite of their ideal Japan. In addition, however, and despite the complete lack of any mention of peace by me or by the teacher when he gave them the assignment to write the essay, 23 of the 43 included peace as an essential attribute of their ideal Japan, and most treated it as the sine qua non, prior to all other attributes. The following excerpts from the compositions are illustrative:

I think that provided Japan always has peace, freedom and prosperity, that any kind of "ism" is alright.

I think that no matter what, peace is the most ideal.

My ideal is a country like this: first, a country which is peaceful and where there is no war. That is because, when there is

war, even children who have committed no crimes end up being entangled in it.

I think that an ideal Japan would have:

- 1) Lots more playgrounds . . .
- 2) No traffic violations . . .
- 3) Not going to war.

My favorite country is Switzerland. If you ask what I like about it, the first thing that comes to mind is that it absolutely does not go to war.

Table III-9 presents the reactions of students and parents to the term pacifism as compared with their reactions to democracy by way of further evidence of the importance in contemporary Japan of peace as a symbol and value.

While the great majority of both students and parents respond positively to both terms, it is clear that pacifism evokes a more enthusiastic reaction, especially among the young, than does democracy. While very few students (or parents) responded negatively toward either of the two terms, twice as many students were uncertain about democracy (19 percent) as were about pacifism (9 percent). The central difference, however, is that many more students felt "very favorable" about pacifism than did so about democracy, or for that matter about any other of a group of "isms" that also included liberalism, capitalism, socialism, and communism. Pacifism was the only symbol with respect to which "very favorable" was the modal response. (I shall discuss the reactions to the other "isms" in chapter five.) It should be noted that the parental response to pacifism was also more positive than that for democracy, though among the parents

TABLE III-9
 REACTIONS TO PACIFISM AND DEMOCRACY COMPARED

	<u>Very Fav.</u>	<u>Fav.</u>	<u>Don't Know Can't Say*</u>	<u>Unfav.</u>	<u>Very Unfav.</u>	<u>Total</u>
Students:						
Pacifism	54	35	9	2	0	100%
Democracy	32	47	19	1	1	100%
Parents:						
Pacifism	37	42	18	2	1	100%
Democracy	31	52	15	2	0	100%

*Includes a small number of non-responses.

the gap between the two symbols was much less than among the students (an 8 percent difference versus a 22 percent difference in the proportion of parents and students choosing very favorable versus favorable in each case).

These responses to the terms themselves should not, of course, lead us to overlook the size of the majority of both students and parents alike who felt positive about democracy. The point to be made here is only that democracy, while highly prized, is second to peace as a symbol and value, especially among the young Japanese of today. The historic experience of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the renunciation of war in the Constitution continue to evoke in Japanese, young and old, a sense of a special mission and role for Japan in today's troubled world. Indeed, the Constitution of 1946 is often referred to as the "Peace Constitution," an identification which has been most significant for many youngsters, as the words of one eighth grader's composition suggest:

Ideal Japan, for me, would be peaceful. Since this is even now decided by the Constitution, if we really obey the Constitution, it will be alright as things stand.

Table III-10 presents data to show that indeed this renunciation of war is for many Japanese teenagers the Constitution's most important feature.

While we see in the table evidence for the importance of popular sovereignty and liberty in the abstract political creed of Japanese youngsters, the importance of peace as the

TABLE III-10
 ROLE OF PEACE IN THE CONSTITUTION

(Percent of students by grade
 choosing each response)

"Please choose the one thing that you think is the most important thing written in the Constitution."

Grade	<u>Em- perer</u>	<u>Pop. Sev.</u>	<u>Renuncia- tion of War</u>	<u>Respect of Rights</u>	<u>Peoples' Responsi.</u>	<u>D.K. Oth.</u>	<u>Total</u>
8	2	15	42	18	9	14	100%
10	0	24	36	34	2	4	100%
12	0	26	33	37	1	3	100%

Source: T. Okamura, 1968 Survey

central element of the Constitution of the new regime is even clearer; it predominates in the two younger age groups and remains very high among the twelfth graders.

To test the relative values Japanese youngsters and their parents place on peace and on democracy in a more direct fashion, I included in my questionnaire an item asking them to choose between the two in a hypothetical dilemma. Table III-11 shows the results.

The results are interesting in a number of respects. To begin with, for no group in the table is there any question that peace is by far the preferred value. But the generational difference is noteworthy; it is somewhat of an anomaly that the parents, nearly all of whom experienced World War II, should be less inclined to prefer peace over democracy than their children, who are, as the Japanese themselves frequently remark, without any direct knowledge of war. But inspection of the age trends in the students' responses reveals that there is a distinct shift as age increases toward the parental pattern of responses. Hence it may very well be that the difference is attributable to age rather than generation, and that the preference for peace over democracy may diminish with age. The slight decline with age in the percentage choosing the renunciation of war in Table III-10 is further evidence that this may be the case.

One important component of the explanation of the pre-eminence of peace in the hierarchy of Japanese youngsters'

TABLE III-11

PEACE VERSUS FREEDOM

(Percent of students by grade and of parents as a whole choosing each response)

"Everyone would like to live in a peaceful and free country. But unhappily, not all countries are always peaceful and free at the same time. Suppose you had to live in one of the two countries given here. Which would you choose?

- a) In this country, there is peace and its people don't have to worry at all about war. But this country's government severely restricts the liberty of the people. Hence the people of this country can live in peace but not in freedom. [Peace]
- b) In this country, there is freedom; fundamental human rights are guaranteed, so its people don't have to worry at all about tyranny. But this country is at war with another country. Hence the people of this country can live in freedom, but not in peace. [Democracy]

	<u>Peace</u>	<u>Democracy</u>	<u>N.R.</u>	<u>Total</u>
Students:				
Grade				
8	76	23	1	100%
10	70	27	3	100%
12	63	34	3	100%
Parents:	56	36	8	100%

tend to think of democracy as something of an "intellectual game" that is not directly linked to their own lives. Moreover, being invariably described with Western referents; it comes across in the texts as an "import." My data also suggest that Japanese, young and old, do continue to perceive democracy as an import. Thirty-two percent of the eighth and tenth graders and over 40 percent of the twelfth graders and the parents agreed that "Japan's democracy is not a real democracy because it was forcibly imposed by foreigners," in contrast to less than 25 percent (or 30 percent in the case of the tenth graders) of both generations who disagreed. Doubts as to the democraticness of a foreign-imposed democracy have been widespread and persistent throughout the postwar period. But, I would argue, they do not augur ill for Japan's democracy. On the contrary, they keep the Japanese more concerned and sensitive to inadequacies and failings in the concrete process and institutions rather than cause criticism of democracy per se. For many Japanese, especially the young, democracy is a cherished ideal that will require effort and commitment to attain. It is the commitment of Japan's leaders to attain that ideal, not the desirability of the ideal itself which they question. Forty percent of both students and parents alike agreed with an item in my questionnaire stating that "most Japanese politicians don't really believe in democracy; they only pretend to." S

Conclusion

The question to which this chapter ultimately has been addressing itself is whether in the emerging political culture of Japan, the central elements of which will be the political values and beliefs of those who have been born and bred in postwar Japan, democracy will be able to establish itself firmly as the legitimate principle of government and of political life. The question is all the more important because of the absence in Japan of an historical heritage and contemporary leadership that would provide the kind of personal legitimation that has been so instrumental in cementing the allegiance of citizens in other lands, and especially in the United States, to their democratic regimes.

As we have seen, there is substantial and consistent evidence to indicate that democracy has become established in the attitude structure of young Japanese, and indeed of their elders as well, as the preferred system of government. The symbol itself draws an overwhelmingly favorable response among members of both generations. Moreover, although it was hypothesized that rural residence would tend to diminish acceptance of democracy as a value given the presumably greater persistence of old anti-democratic norms and values in the village than in the city, no difference whatever in its acceptance among urban and rural adults was observed, and among the students the difference that was observed was in the opposite direction from that expected, rural children

being more positive than urban children.

At the more specific level of the actual application of democratic rules for decision making, however, the data showed that both generations retained the traditional preference for consensus over majoritarianism. The preference for consensus, however, held across the urban-rural gap as well, and, although the rural adults were more inclined toward consensus than the urban adults, it was only a difference in degree rather than in direction. The one surprising finding was that, although the bulk of both generations favored consensus options in the various questionnaire items, more parents than children chose majoritarian responses. This finding of course runs counter to expectations. The explanation may lie in the fact that many parents have experienced decision-making situations, including voting, in which a desired (or undesired) outcome has come about as the result of simple majority rule. The children, on the other hand, clearly lack experience with decisions involving contest and conflict. Even school experiences do not appear to socialize Japanese youngsters into majoritarianism, for, as I pointed out, the data on school office-holding indicate that many offices are filled by means other than contested elections. The greater preference for consensual decision making on the part of the children may thus reflect more strongly the influence of general cultural values, in comparison with the influence of experience with voting and decision making in the work place, etc., on the

part of parents. The fact that far more parents than children chose voting as one of the two principal meanings of democracy tends to reinforce this interpretation, and suggests that socialization into democracy also takes place as the result of adult experiences in the political system and not simply as the result of pre-adult, pre-political learning.

The general pattern of responses to the consensus versus majority rule items suggests, however, that while consensus has retained its significance in Japanese political culture, it has become modified so as to be compatible with the main elements of democracy. In turn, democracy, as assimilated into the value structure of the two generations of Japanese, has also become adapted to incorporate elements of consensus. In this new synthesis of democracy and consensus, only the ameliorative and harmony-inducing aspect of consensus has been retained; the oppressive anti-libertarian intolerance of individual or minority group dissent that was characteristic of pre-1945 consensualism is no longer apparent. Indeed, what is remarkable about this new blend of consensus and democracy is that it seeks to remove even the slightest vestige of authoritarianism from democracy. "If," the position of most young Japanese seems to be, "the majority cannot persuade the minority of the rightness of the majority view, or if the two cannot agree on some compromise, then it is preferable that nothing be done rather than that the majority impose its will." Conversely, under no circumstances

should the minority be silenced or coerced or ignored. In other words, there is in this area of beliefs about the rules of the game, a widespread and prevailing belief in the legitimacy of minority dissent and resistance to authority coupled with a belief in the illegitimacy of the use of majority rule to coerce dissenters. This is fully consistent with the attitude found in chapter two, where we saw a prevailing pattern in which many youngsters support the input institutions of politics that may be viewed as "on the peoples' side" but are suspicious of the authoritative institutions of government.

This ideal of a consensual democracy is, of course, understandable—but it is also problematic. Government often must take decisions that offend substantial minorities. If aversion to majority rule is untempered by the realization that consensus is often unattainable, then it is possible that "tyranny of the majority" would be thwarted by an even more objectionable "tyranny of the minority." But nearly all of the youngsters I interviewed, with few exceptions, were willing to concede, however reluctantly and grudgingly, that sometimes, no matter what, unanimity is impossible and then the majority view should and must prevail. In the end, the legitimacy of the majority's right to prevail is not denied; rather, the majority is denied the right to ignore or casually override the minority view. Only when the majority has tried consultation and discussion, and found

agreement or compromise to be beyond achievement, can it legitimately impose its will. Such a notion of consensual democracy, based on consultation and accommodation between conflicting sides in a dispute, is most appropriate to Japan. It is appropriate first of all because it is in keeping with her cultural norms. But even more importantly, it is appropriate because it provides a political cultural rationale for democratic politics in a system that is so polarized ideologically that dissensus rather than consensus is the rule. The more frequently that majority and minority can accommodate one another's interests in the face of their ideological differences, the smaller and less dangerous the tides of dissensus become.

Finally, it has become fashionable of late to speak of Japan as a nation in search of an identity on the one hand; and, on the other, as undergoing a rebirth of militarism. In so far as the beliefs and images and visions of Japan that the youngsters harbor are concerned, neither of these generalizations is anywhere near the mark.

It is clear that Japanese youngsters overwhelmingly share a belief in and desire for a Japan in which democracy is the operative principle of politics and of social conduct, and whose major goal is peace. The importance of peace in the values and ideals of young Japanese, its centrality in their conceptions of the requisites of an ideal society, and their belief that Japan is specially and uniquely entrusted

with the mission of peace make it clear that for the great majority of young Japanese, Japan's national goals and national identity are bound up with peace. In the emerging Japanese political culture, peace and democracy serve as the two central elements of national consensus.

CHAPTER IV

SYMBOLS OF DISSENSUS: THE GROWTH OF PARTISANSHIP

In the preceding chapter we saw that there are symbols and values, notably peace and democracy, that are widely inclusive in their appeal to today's Japanese youth, and to the majority of their elders as well. These symbols may be said to constitute the nuclear elements of consensus in contemporary Japanese political culture. This chapter, in contrast, is concerned with those symbols that divide rather than integrate, the sources of the conflict that is the fuel of much of the political process. Specifically, the focus here is on the development of party identification.

In Japan, as in many polities, the scope of national consensus often appears to be exceeded by that of cleavage and dissensus. Partisan conflict extends over a broad range of issues, and is often—perhaps even usually—accompanied by hostility and harsh rhetoric. An important difference from American partisan politics is that in Japan the most significant partisan division is based on explicit and profound ideological cleavage. The ruling Conservative party and the capitalist economic system it supports are confronted by the challenge of a "progressive" camp, led by

the Japan Socialist Party, whose philosophy of society and economics is explicitly Marxist. Much of party politics, then, and by extension party identification as well, takes on a decidedly ideological character, and our analysis of the origins of partisanship must of necessity give careful attention to the development of ideology in adolescence as well. For analytic purposes, however, it is useful to treat the development of these two orientations sequentially since, as studies of American youth have shown, and as the evidence of Japanese youth will corroborate, party identification occurs substantially earlier in the life cycle than even the embryonic stages of ideology. In this chapter, therefore, I shall deal with the development of party identification, reserving discussion of the emergence of ideology for the chapter that follows.

The first part of this present chapter, however, presents an abbreviated introduction to the Japanese party system, and to the ideological themes and overtones of Japanese political life as reflected in the party system and adjacent sectors of the political arena, particularly the student movement. Hence, this brief discussion of the main groups involved in Japanese partisan politics and their beliefs, while part of this chapter, is meant to serve as a background for the next chapter as well.

After setting the stage I turn to four substantive questions about Japanese youngsters' acquisition of party

identifications. First, how many young Japanese develop party identification and from how early in childhood? Second, what role does the family play in transmitting partisanship? Third, to what extent do Japanese youngsters' partisan loyalties reflect the impact of sources alternative to, or supplementary to the family; in particular, to what extent are they grounded in the major social bases of adult political cleavage, urban-rural differences and status differences? And finally, what does having a party identification mean in terms of affective feelings as well as of cognitive awareness of policy and ideology differences? Let me expand on the significance of each of these concerns before I turn to the data.

The questions of how many Japanese youngsters from how early an age acquire party identification are important because each bears on the potential stability of the party system. The age at which partisanship develops is significant because it has been shown that the strength of an individual's attachment to his party depends on how long he has had it. In particular, if the attachment was formed early in childhood it is, like the attachment to the leader I discussed in chapter two, especially apt to endure and to color the political learning and experiences that come later. It becomes a deeply-rooted part of the individual's political self-identification.

The widespread existence among the electorate of personal attachments to political parties which date from

childhood has been linked to the stability of the American¹ and British² party systems and its absence to the turmoil of partisan politics in Third and Fourth Republic France.³ New parties have found it extremely difficult to gain a foothold in the American and British systems, whereas in pre-de Gaulle France the great reservoir of unattached loyalties made possible the sudden emergence and equally sudden demise of small parties often concerned with only a single issue. Conversely, the continued instability of the French parties meant that few French adults formed party loyalties and, in particular, those French children received little in the way of socialization into partisanship from the family.⁴

The Japanese case bears a certain resemblance to that of France. The parties have only a short history, most of them, and during the relatively brief period of the postwar there have been new parties which have emerged and others

¹The literature on party identification and its effects on politics in the United States is vast. The seminal source remains Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, The American Voter (New York: Wiley, 1960). See also, by the same authors, Elections and the Political Order (New York: Wiley, 1966); Fred I. Greenstein, The American Party System and the American People (2nd ed.; Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970), provides a useful overview of the literature.

²See David Butler and Donald E. Stokes, Political Change in Britain (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1971).

³See Philip Converse and Georges Dupeux, "Participation of the Electorate in France and the United States," in Campbell, et al., Elections and the Political Order, pp. 269-291.

⁴Ibid., pp. 279-280.

which have passed away. Moreover, those that have survived have either changed their names or split apart and merged and split once more. Since about 1960 or so, however, when the Democratic Socialist Party and the Komeito made their appearance, no significant changes have occurred. Still, for many Japanese adults the depth or even the existence of their party loyalties is problematic. Thus a major concern of this chapter becomes whether the members of the present Japanese electorate are transmitting loyalties to the existing parties to the upcoming electorate, or whether, as in pre-*de Gaulle* France, Japan's party system is likely to continue in a state of flux and volatility. Hence, I pay particular attention to the correspondences between parents' party identification and those of their children.

A third focus recognizes that there are important sources of partisanship alternative to, and often supplementary to, or compensatory for, family socialization. Specialists on Japan have long noted the profound impact on political attitudes and behavior of whether one lives in the country or in the city. Since rural residence and conservative partisanship go hand in hand, as do urban (though to a lesser degree) residence and attachment to one of the opposition parties, it may well be that the family's transmission of party identification is reinforced by the social milieu when it occurs, and compensated for when it does not.

An examination across generations of this relationship between urban-rural residence and partisanship is

important, too, because on the strength of the association rests the continued validity of one of the major themes of Japanese mass politics, namely that the status politics of systems like England and other Western European systems do not apply in Japan, where partisanship is rooted not in class or status but in culture—the two competing cultures of city and countryside.⁵ Hence my discussion of the social bases of partisanship compares the effects of both of these social characteristics on the patterns of party loyalties of both generations of Japanese.

Finally, I turn to the cognitive and affective meaning of party support to young Japanese as a prelude to the discussion of ideology that follows in the next chapter. Much of the impact of party support on politics in the United States derives from the strength of the affective attachment to and identification with the party, its "feeling tone" so to speak. Conversely, the cognitive bases of partisanship, awareness of policy differences and especially of ideological differences, appear to play a lesser role. In Japan where the parties have shorter histories and shallower roots and are also more divided ideologically, the question of the relative weight of affective and cognitive components of party support takes on a special interest and significance.

⁵ See Watanuki Joji, "Patterns of Politics in Contemporary Japan," in S.M. Lipset and Stin Rokkan, eds., Party Systems and Voter Alignments (New York: The Free Press, 1967), pp. 447-466.

Parties and Ideologies:
The Nature of Political Confrontation⁶

The present party system in Japan is the product of a series of evolutionary changes that have taken place over the postwar period. The most important of these occurred in 1955, when the Liberal Party and the Democratic Party, the two leading conservative parties, merged to form the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which has held national power ever since. The Liberal Democrats are usually portrayed as the champions of capitalism, of big business, and of farm interests. It would be difficult, however, to pin any ideological label on them, other than the generic term of conservative, with a small "c." Under their rule, and that of their postwar predecessors as mentioned above, the Japanese government has actively pursued a national

⁶ The literature in English on the Japanese party system is growing, but there has been no really adequate overview since Robert Scalapino and Junnosuke Masumi's Parties and Politics in Contemporary Japan (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1962) appeared nearly a decade ago. This slim volume remains useful even today, but is somewhat dated and of little value as regards the Komeito. A more recent but abbreviated treatment can be found in Theodore McNelly, Politics and Government in Japan (2nd ed.; Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1972). On the policies and ideologies of each of the parties consult: LDP—Haruhiko Fukui, Party in Power (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1970), Nathaniel Thayer, How the Conservatives Rule Japan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), and Chitoshi Yanaga, Big Business in Japanese Politics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); JSP and DSP—Allan B. Cole, et al., Socialist Parties in Postwar Japan (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966); Komeito and Sokagakkai—James White, The Sokagakkai and Mass Society (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970); JCP—Robert Scalapino, The Japanese Communist Movement, 1920-1966 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967).

policy of placing priority on economic growth before all else. Indeed, if one were compelled to specify their particular brand of socioeconomic philosophy, "growth capitalism" might be the most appropriate term. It is important to note that these conservatives do not share the American right's ideals of "rugged individualism" and laissez-faire. Government control and care of big business is overt and manifest in LDP policy. Nor are the Liberal Democrats averse to having the government run certain industries and services. Under conservative rule there has been a government monopoly on tobacco; the largest railway is nationally owned and operated, as is the major radio and television network; and the government has placed great stress on economic planning. In short, the Japanese conservatives are a pragmatic political party, a "catch-all" party, interested above all in continuing to win at the general elections. Ideology plays no role whatever in their rhetoric and very little if any in the substance of their politics.

There could be no greater contrast to these pragmatic conservatives than the major opposition party, the Japan Socialist Party (JSP). Although there remain a few right wing socialists in its midst, the mainstream of the party is firmly committed to Marxist principles of socialism. The party identifies itself with the proletariat, proclaiming itself as a "class-based" rather than "mass-based" movement. Its campaign themes are invariably ideological in

tone and content, and nearly always focus on Japan's alliance with the "imperialist camp" (via the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty), and on the allegedly repressive, anti-democratic, and militaristic nature of capitalist society, and rule by the conservatives.

The pre-eminence of ideological considerations within the party has caused it to suffer several major schisms. Like the conservatives, the socialists' right and left wings coalesced in 1955 after a major split several years earlier. But by 1960 the tension between the two wings eventuated in the secession of most of the right wing, which in that year formed the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP). The DSP is an evolutionary rather than revolutionary socialist party, differing from the JSP principally in its objective of achieving reforms within the capitalist system while the JSP seeks to replace the capitalist system entirely. The Democratic Socialists, often called the "second conservative party," have gained little support from the electorate. Most Japanese political analysts believe that this is the result of the party's lack of a clear image.

Sharing the middle of the spectrum with the DSP is a party that does not really fit neatly into the classic left-right classification. The Komeito (literally "clean government party") appeared on the scene only in the early 1960s. Since then, it has made strong inroads into the support for the socialists and conservatives among the urban working class. The party is not readily classifiable

because, though it often advocates positions similar to those of the socialists and communists, it is religiously based, having until this past year been the official political arm of a popular new Buddhist sect, the Soka gakkai ("value creation society"). This sect has caused a furor over its nationalistic principles ("Japan is destined to lead the world to salvation in Buddha"), the pressure tactics it employs in proselytization, and the authoritarian, almost para-military, complexion of its organization. Much of the electoral support for the Komeito comes from the bloc vote of Soka gakkai adherents. But the success of the party, until 1972 the third largest in the Diet, has also been due in large part to the fact that its candidates have stressed bread-and-butter issues and taken stands on the practical kinds of problems—such as hygiene in the wholesale food markets—that have broad appeal to ordinary citizens. The party tries to project the image of a working man's party that cares more for day-to-day, down-to-earth problems, than for abstract ideologies.

The third of the smaller parties is the Japan Communist Party (JCP), an orthodox Marxist-Leninist party that is found farthest to the left on the spectrum of party politics. Of the five parties that now constitute the Japanese party system, only the JCP has maintained the same name and the same organizational continuity from the beginning of the postwar period and before. The party, of course,

makes extensive use of ideological rhetoric. But its real impact on politics lies not in its membership or in its electoral strength, which is growing but still slight, but rather in its influence among intellectuals, scholars, and teachers. Of particular note for our purposes here is that the party is extremely influential in the Japan Teachers Union, the nationwide organization of school teachers. This fact, and the fact that the party maintains a large youth organization, popularly known as the Minei or "Democratic Youth," magnify its potential importance in the political socialization process far beyond its numbers in the Diet or supporters in the electorate.

The Japanese party system, then, is one with a diversity of parties, and with a history of changing party labels and changing party structures and organizations. In its present five-party line-up it dates back only a dozen years or so. But the basic cleavage between two camps, "conservatives" versus "progressives," has been a continuing characteristic of partisan politics throughout the postwar period.

It would leave the picture of the partisan and ideological forces in present-day Japan very much unfinished if I were to ignore another major element—the student movement.⁷ From the earliest days of the postwar period right

⁷The student movement has been the subject of a vast number of books and articles in Japanese. Among these most germane here are: Takahashi Akira, "Katsudoka Gakusei: Sono Undo no Doki" (The Activist Students: Their Motivation for

down to the present, the student movement has been more visible and, in diverse ways, more influential in national politics in Japan than have similar movements in any other developed country. The movement is riven with innumerable factions, and is split into two camps—that of the JCP's Minsei and that of the groups to the left of the JCP. Despite these splits, all important segments of the movement share a common commitment to Marxism, differing on the whole on abstract points of doctrine and on whether to follow Lenin or Trotsky with regard to implementation. Probably more than any other element in Japanese politics, the student movement has been responsible for the infusion of ideological terminology into the vocabulary and discourse of politics.

The student movement's impact on the political socialization process has been diffuse but significant. In the most extreme case, the movement has spawned a high school student movement patterned after it. The high school radicals have worn the same helmets and masks as their elders

Joining the Movement), Chuo Koron (June, 1968), pp. 170-187; and Suzuki Hiro, Gakusei Undo (The Student Movement) (Tokyo: Fukumura Shuppan, 1968) and the works cited therein. In English, see Ichiro Sunoda, "The Thought and Behavior of Zengakuren," Asian Survey (June, 1969), pp. 457-474. There is nothing in English on the high school student movement and very little in Japanese of a scholarly nature. See Suzuki Hiro, Kokosei Undo (The High School Student Movement) (Tokyo: Fukumura Shuppan, 1969).

in the college level movement, have adopted the same tactics of seizing school buildings and harassing teachers, have shouted the same slogans, and have even printed their own journals dealing with questions of ideology and dialectics. But their numbers have been small, and their activities have waned sharply since 1969, when their takeover of several prestigious high schools in Tokyo and elsewhere made headlines in the national newspapers, and caused the Prime Minister to call for bringing them under control.⁸

Probably the more important impact of the student movement on the political socialization of youth has been twofold. First, among many of those who go on to college, the student movement has been the direct cause of ideological "consciousness-expansion." Secondly, for pre-college youth, the college student radicals are in a sense prototypes who serve as highly salient models for political behavior and political thought. Whatever the way it makes its impact on the individual, however, it is clear that the student movement has made a major contribution to the infusion of ideology into the political climate and culture of today's Japan.

The Extent of Party Identification

Partisan conflict is of course endemic in democratic nations. In varying degrees, depending on the party system

⁸See the front pages of the March 14, 1969, evening editions of all the major newspapers.

of the nation in question, the involvement of individual citizens in the political process is deeply bound up in his attachment to and self-identification with a political party. In the United States and Great Britain such party affiliation is extremely widespread among adults, running about 75 percent and 90 percent respectively.⁹ Such widespread identification with the political parties has two important consequences. First, it strengthens the stability of the party system, and hence of the political process generally, by making abrupt changes in the loyalties of the electorate unlikely, impeding the easy formation of new parties. Second, at the individual level, political participation becomes primarily, even perhaps exclusively, mediated through the partisanship, which is the single most influential determinant of political and especially electoral behavior. Thus, for the political life of both the system in general and of the individual citizen, party identification assumes major importance.

The Democratic and Republican parties in the United States, and the Conservative, Labour and Liberal parties in Britain, are long-established organizations with deep roots in the histories of their respective countries, extending back, in some cases, several generations. They have, that is, been stable and durable objects around which popular affections could crystallize. As I attempted to make clear

⁹Greenstein, op. cit., p. 33, and Butler and Stokes, op. cit., p. 27.

in the preceding section of this chapter, the Japanese party system has been anything but stable, in either the names of the parties or the numbers of parties, in the postwar period. Such frequent changes in the composition and labels of parties, Frank Langdon argues,

. . . lessen the chance of strong or long-continued party attachment. In the more frequent party reorganizations before 1955, many politicians could carry their voters with them despite a switch in their party affiliation. Some informants even admit to identification with a party faction. This suggests an underlying stability of partisanship yet to be transferred to the party.¹⁰

If Langdon is correct, Japanese adults are unlikely to bequeath enduring party identifications to their children. Such a lack of early socialization into party identification was found to be the case in France, as I have mentioned above, and was blamed for the proliferation of "flash parties" whose rapid appearance and disappearance in pre-de Gaulle France engendered much of the instability of French parliamentary politics.¹¹

But the data on the whole do not bear out Langdon's assertion that partisanship has not been transferred to the parties. Examination of the national opinion polls on the question of party liking or support establishes that between

¹⁰Frank Langdon, Politics in Japan (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1967), p. 213.

¹¹Converse and Dupeux, op. cit.

65 and 70 percent of the national samples polled consistently preclaim their support for one or another of the five parties.¹² And a nationwide survey of adults conducted for a University of Michigan project on the Japanese voter, paralleling that done on the American voter, likewise found that 61 percent of the sample, in response to a Japanese adaptation of the standard party identification item used in the United States, considered themselves to be Liberal Democrats, Socialists, or identified with one of the other parties, while another 5 percent were classifiable as "leaners."¹³ These figures portray adult partisan affiliation as being nearly though not quite as widespread in Japan as in the United States. This implicitly contradicts Langdon's assertion, as, in more direct fashion, does the fact that over the 17 years between 1955 and 1972, support for the Liberal Democratic Party has remained remarkably constant in the polls. Indeed, up to 1968 (the time of the present study), the percentage of respondents who were classified as LDP supporters or "leaners" (i.e., said that "liking aside" they would vote for the LDP in an election) never went below 45 percent or above 51 percent. Support for the JSP showed a similar constancy, taking into account

¹² The Asahi Shinbun and Mainichi Shinbun polls, both of which are conducted several times yearly. See in particular Asahi Shinbun, December 27, 1968.

¹³ Bradley M. Richardson, "Party Loyalties and Party Salience in Japan" (unpublished manuscript, 1972), p. 5.

the entrance onto the scene of the Democratic Socialists. What the figures do show, however, is that the proportion of those who claim to support no party or who will not answer—these, that is, who are neither party identifiers or leaners—has dropped in half, from an average of 20 percent during the period between 1955 and 1960 to 10-11 percent during the latter part of the 1960s and the early years of the 1970s.¹⁴ In other words, while the two new parties have caused some moderate defections among supporters of the JSP, their major impact appears to have been to decrease sharply the proportion of non-identifiers in the electorate. Though the time frame is too short to permit firm prediction, the direction of the evidence runs counter to the thesis of unstable partisanship, and in support of the emergence of a five-party system with healthy roots in the political culture.

To what degree has the institutionalized basis of conflict become stabilized in Japanese politics? The foregoing evidence on the extent of partisanship among Japanese adults has provided some evidence bearing on this point. Perhaps more telling evidence, and certainly the most important evidence from the perspective of this study, has to do with the acquisition of party identification by Japanese children. I noted in chapter two that in his study of the socialization of American children, Fred

¹⁴ According to the figures for the period 1955 to 1971 given in the December 27, 1968 and September 18, 1972 issues of the Asahi Shinbun.

Greenstein felt the most striking finding to be that of the benevolent leader syndrome. Of nearly equal note, however, was his finding that American children typically acquire a party identification at an early age; in his New Haven sample he found that already by fourth grade 60 percent of the children chose to call themselves Democrats or Republicans despite their inability to describe how the two parties differed. This was a percentage not much less than the percentage of adults professing a party identification, and, indeed, equal to that of young adults in their twenties who did so.¹⁵ Greenstein concluded that since partisanship, like the image of the President, was acquired so early it was likely to have an enduring impact on the political self-definition, attitudes, and behavior of the individual, and ultimately therefore to form an enduring basis for party stability.

Do we find a similar pattern of early acquisition of partisan affiliation in Japan? Let us begin to answer this by looking at Table IV-1, which presents data from Okamura's 1968 survey relevant to the question. Unfortunately, the wording of Okamura's question does not conform to either the standard U.S. party identification question or to the standard questions used in the public opinion polls in Japan. It also includes a response category (would vote

¹⁵Fred I. Greenstein, Children and Politics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), pp. 71-72.

TABLE IV-1

PARTY SUPPORT OF JAPANESE CHILDREN

(percent choosing each response by grade to the item,
"If you could vote, which party would you vote for?")

<u>Grade</u>	<u>LDP</u>	<u>JSP</u>	<u>DSP</u>	<u>Komei</u>	<u>JCP</u>	<u>Vote w/out rela. to party</u>	<u>D.K. Other</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>% with I.D.</u>
3	10	24	8	9	5	3	41	100	56
4	13	20	8	13	3	6	35	100	58
5	17	22	6	11	2	10	34	100	58
6	22	20	6	7	3	15	28	100	58
7	23	14	5	6	2	18	32	100	50
8	23	14	4	7	2	21	28	100	51

Source: Okamura, 1968 Survey.

without relation to party) that has normative connotations —"vote the best man regardless of party"—not found so explicitly in the more typical residual categories of "independent" or "support no party." Nevertheless, the figures are useful because they probably represent minimum proportions of party identifiers among Japanese children. In any event, as a glance down the final column in the table will reveal, from the early days of primary school close to 60 percent of the children were willing to name which party they would vote for. These are close to the proportions of American school children in the primary grades who, Greenstein found, identify with the Republicans or Democrats. Moreover, as Greenstein also found to be the case, the proportion of identifiers among the children closely approximates the proportion of party supporters among the youngest adult voters. For instance, 60 percent of those between twenty and twenty-four in a 1972 nationwide sample of voters "liked" one of the five parties.¹⁶

A somewhat broader cross-national comparison is presented in Table IV-2, using data from my survey as well as Okamura's in an adaptation of a table on comparative proportions of party identifiers among American and European children at various age levels. The Japanese youngsters evince a propensity to affiliate with parties that appears to approximate the degree to which their age-mates in the

¹⁶Asahi Shinbun, September 18, 1972.

TABLE IV-2

CROSS-NATIONAL COMPARISON OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION
 AMONG JAPANESE, AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN YOUTHS
 (percent of preadults at each level by
 nation who professes a party affiliation)

<u>Nation</u>	<u>Youngest</u>	<u>Age Level*</u>	
		<u>Middle</u>	<u>Older</u>
Japan: 1968 ^a	58	49	46
1969 ^b	--	53	59
United States	49	56	64
Britain	80	79	79
West Germany	50	62	68
Italy	45	51	55

Sources: (a) Okamura 1968 Survey.

(b) Massey 1969 Survey.

The remainder of the table is an abbreviated version of a table in Jack Dennis and Donald McCrone, "Preadult Development of Political Party Identification in Western Democracies," Comparative Political Studies 3:2 (July, 1970), 252.

*The age groups are: Youngest: 9-10 years for the United States, West Germany and Japan; 8-10 years for Britain, and 10 years for Italy; Middle: 12-13 for the United States and Japan, 11-13 for Britain and West Germany, and 13 for Italy; Older: 17-18 for the United States and Japan, 14-16 for West Germany, 14-17 for Britain, and 16 for Italy.

United States, Germany and Italy do so, particularly if the figures for the middle and older children are based on the data from my survey rather than Okamura's.¹⁷ Only the English youngsters show a markedly higher degree of party identification, and that is reflective of the significantly greater prevalence of partisanship found among adult Englishmen than among adults in any other nation so far studied.

¹⁷The specific items used in the countries other than Japan can be found by consulting the citations in Jack Dennis and Donald McCrone, "Preadult Development of Political Party Identification in Western Democracies," Comparative Political Studies (July, 1970), p. 257. Okamura's item is given in the text. The item I used was one of a series in which the child was asked to choose which party he thought each of the following person supports: himself, if he could vote, his father, his mother, his teachers, his friends. In addition to the five parties, the other responses included were "other," "support no party," and "don't know."

There are some obvious dangers in using the data in the table for comparative purposes. First of all the ages of the children included in each age level differ from country to country; only the Japanese and American groups are identical in age across all three age levels. Secondly, the items used to elicit party identification also differ from country to country, and even within countries by age group. There is no way of estimating how these differences affect the validity of the findings, and thus the figures must be used only with caution. But at present this is the only comparative data available. I present it in lieu of better data, mainly to suggest that there is probably no reason to believe Japanese youngsters to be especially unusual in the extent to which they identify with political parties or fail to do so.

The Inheritance of Partisanship:
The Family as Source

In so far as children's own identifications are concerned, then, Japan appears to have as extensive preadult partisanship as most of her Western counterpart democracies. But how stable are these likely to be over the long run? One obvious approach to an answer to this question is to compare the distribution of party affiliations across generations to see whether the socialization process is re-creating the adult pattern of identifications among the young. The Japanese polls have long broken down party affiliation by age, and the finding which has been most prominently emphasized has been that the youngest members of the electorate, those in their twenties, have shown a markedly lesser propensity to identify with the Liberal Democrats than older adults.¹⁸ Table IV-3 presents a summary of the over-all distribution of responses to the party support items in both the student sample (as a whole and by grade) and the parent sample in my survey.

We observe that in my survey, as in the polls mentioned, young supporters of the Liberal Democrats, and to a lesser degree the Democratic Socialists, are proportionally fewer than their parents. But the disparity between the two generations appears to be based not on defections

¹⁸ See, for instance, the polls reported in the Asahi Shinbun, June 26, 1971, and in Nishihira Shigeki, Nihonjin No Iken (The Opinions of the Japanese) (Tokyo: Seishin shobo, 1963), p. 146.

TABLE IV-3

DISTRIBUTION OF PARTY SUPPORT BY AGE AND GENERATION:¹⁹

PARENTS AND STUDENTS COMPARED

(percent of students by grade and parents by total)

Grade	LDP	DSP	Komei	JSP	JCP	Other None	D.K. N.R.	Total	N
8	26	6	5	13	3	17	30	100%	282
10	30	5	3	15	2	19	26	100%	334
12	34	5	3	14	4	24	17	100%	326
Total	30	5	4	14	3	20	25	100%	942
Parents	53	10	5	18	2	7	5	100%	1637

¹⁹By comparison with an Asahi Shinbun poll for the period just prior to the date of my survey, the pattern of partisanship in my adult sample appears slightly more conservative, LDP and DSP supporters being somewhat over-represented (by 6 percent and 3 percent respectively) and JSP supporters somewhat under-represented (by about 8 percent). This slight bias of course makes no difference to the point being discussed here, since I am concerned with the degree to which the distribution of partisanship among parents is being reproduced among children. The Asahi figures for all adults are as follows: LDP - 47%, DSP - 7%, Komei - 6%, JSP - 26%, JCP - 3%, other and no reply - 11%. Asahi Shinbun, November 17, 1968.

among the young to the left, but rather in the abstention of many youngsters from support for any party. The polls do show that young adults tend more than their elders to support the parties of the left. But since they have been showing that very same phenomenon over the past twenty-five years without any significant change in the over-all distribution of partisanship having taken place, the inevitable conclusion is that even when such defections to the left do occur they are impermanent. Young adults give up their support for the left as they grow into middle age, a phenomenon apparently unique to Japan among the major party systems on which empirical research has been done, and for which Donald Stokes has coined the phrase "political senescence."²⁰

Nevertheless, while in gross terms teenagers may not yet be rejecting the LDP partisanship of their parents but rather abstaining from partisan commitment, and despite the identical rank orderings of partisan preferences in the two generations, it is clear that the socialization process is not simply reproducing parents' party affiliations in the younger generation. It behooves us, therefore, to give careful attention to the correspondence between the partisan affiliates of parents and children at the individual level.

The degree to which an individual's party identification is rooted in a family tradition bears ultimately on

²⁰ Donald E. Stokes, "The Study of Political Generations," Noel Buxton Lecture, University of Essex (London: Longmans, 1969), p. 9.

the stability and durability not only of his own identification but through it, in mass terms, on the stability and durability of the party system and the legislative process. In their study of French and American adults' political interest and participation, Converse and Dupeux found that far fewer Frenchmen than Americans acquired their partisan affiliations from their parents. This was due in no small measure to the fact that few Frenchmen could even recall knowing what party their father supported. Converse and Dupeux blamed this gap in the family political communication process for the French party system's instability.²¹

There is evidence that much the same failure of the family to transmit partisan affiliation took place in the childhood of today's adult Japanese. Only 50 percent of the respondents in the University of Michigan survey could recall their father's party affiliation, and even fewer—38 percent—their mother's. Bradley Richardson has argued that this is one indication of the low salience of partisanship in Japanese political culture.²² But, of course, it is not surprising that many of those over forty should be unable to recall their parents' party affiliation. To begin with, women did not receive the franchise until 1946. And until 1925, there were property qualifications for voting. Finally, during the decade before 1945, the parties had

²¹Converse and Dupeux, op. cit.

²²Richardson, op. cit., p. 9.

been gradually abolished, until, during the years of World War II, there remained only one "party"—the Imperial Rule Assistance Association which was in fact nothing more than an arm of the government and a device for suppressing opposition. Thus, the childhood of today's adults would have come during the wartime period when the parties had been dissolved, or else earlier, in the twenties and thirties, when the party system was made up of now-defunct parties.

A discontinuity in the transgenerational transmission of partisanship is inevitable when the party system changes from one generation to the next. The more relevant question, with reference to the potential stability of the present party system, is whether today's children know their parents' party identifications and whether they inherit them.

Okamura's data show that a large proportion of youngsters in Japan believe they know their parents' party identifications: 41 percent of the third graders claimed to know their father's party and 39 percent to know their mother's; by eighth grade the respective proportions rose to 71 percent and 70 percent. But these proportions are undoubtedly much higher than the proportions of youngsters who actually have an accurate knowledge of their parents' partisanship. Okamura's data do not include independent data on the parents themselves, but my own do. I found that 68 percent of the teenagers gave a preference (including "none") for their fathers and 67 percent for their mothers. But when the

child's report was compared with the parents' own reports of their preference it became apparent that many children were either guessing or in fact misperceiving: only 43 percent of the fathers and 44 percent of the mothers in my sample had their partisan preference accurately reported by their children when all parents, including those whose children said they did not know their parents' parties, are included in the calculation. Moreover, no doubt some of those youngsters who did report accurately did so as the result of lucky guessing.

A similar pattern of inaccuracy in children's perceptions of parental partisanship has been reported in both the United States and England.²³ The consistency across cultures of this finding provides ample reason for skepticism about the value of relying on recall data, such as adults' recollections of their parents' partisanship during the adults' childhood. More important for present purposes, these data on Japanese teenagers' perceptions of their parents' partisanship are at the same time preliminary evidence weighing against a determinist role of the family in the creation of party identification, and evidence that at least in respect to their apparent knowledge of parental partisanship, Japanese youngsters closely parallel their American and British peers.

²³ See Elia Zurich, "Party Images and Partisanship among Young Englishmen," forthcoming in the British Journal of Sociology, pp. 18-19.

A close look at children's reports of parental party preferences compared with their parents' own reports reveals some interesting differences, however, in the degree to which adult supporters of the various parties are accurately perceived (or guessed) by their children. It is apparent from Table IV-4 that Komeito supporters are strikingly more likely to be accurately perceived as such by their children than are supporters of any of the other parties. Since Komeito support is usually linked with adherence to the Soka gakkai sect of Buddhism, a religion in which fervent belief is accompanied by extensive group activities and proselytization, such support is almost certain to play a more prominent role in the self-identification and daily life of the Komeito supporter than purely secular partisanship would.

Liberal Democratic parents were also less frequently misperceived than those who identified with the remaining three parties. This may be because homogeneous husband-and-wife pairs of supporters are decidedly more common among Liberal Democrats than among any other group: when only party identifiers are included in the analysis, 86 percent of LDP husbands have LDP wives, and 85 percent of LDP wives have LDP husbands. Such partisan homogeneity facilitates political discussion between parents and hence probably increases the frequency with which the child receives cues about parental partisanship. Moreover, the cues will be

TABLE IV-4

STUDENTS' AND PARENTS' REPORTS OF PARENTS' PARTY IDENTIFICATIONS COMPARED

(percentages across)

A. Father's Party Identification:

<u>Father's Report</u>	<u>Student's Report</u>						<u>Don't Know</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>N</u>
	<u>LDP</u>	<u>DSP</u>	<u>Komei</u>	<u>JSP</u>	<u>JCP</u>	<u>None</u>			
LDP	55	3	1	10	2	4	25	100%	432
DSP	39	16	1	8	0	7	29	100%	98
KOMEI	17	3	67	3	0	0	11	100%	36
JSP	24	2	0	36	2	2	34	100%	150
JCP	18	6	0	29	29	0	18	100%	17
None	29	0	2	16	0	10	43	100%	49

B. Mother's Party Identification:

<u>Mother's Report</u>	<u>Student's Report</u>						<u>Don't Know</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>N</u>
	<u>LDP</u>	<u>DSP</u>	<u>KOMEI</u>	<u>JSP</u>	<u>JCP</u>	<u>None</u>			
LDP	55	2	2	7	1	3	30	100%	453
DSP	35	21	0	10	0	4	31	100%	74
KOMEI	9	2	65	7	2	2	12	99%	43
JSP	24	3	2	34	1	2	34	100%	158
JCP	25	0	0	0	38	25	12	100%	8
None	37	8	1	10	0	4	41	100%	79

reinforcing, in the sense that the child will have less trouble keeping parents' affiliations straight (and also more reason himself to identify with that party). The reverse may be true of the Democratic Socialist and Communist supporters, who tend more frequently than the others to have spouses from other parties. As Parts A and B of Table IV-4 show, DSP and JCP supporters—both fathers and mothers—are often believed by their children to support the ruling conservatives; indeed, more DSP parents were reported by their children as LDP supporters than as DSP supporters. This may perhaps indicate something of the image problem that plagues the DSP, even in the minds of adult voters, who often find its positions hard to distinguish from those of the LDP. That so many Communist supporters' children can so wrongly perceive their parents' identifications as to put them in the enemy camp is particularly surprising and raises serious questions about the validity of Kubota and Ward's assertion that JCP families are the most effective in transmitting partisanship from parent to child.²⁴

More important than whether children know their parents' party identifications is whether they share them. Table IV-5 provides us with the basic data on this question of the extent of partisan inheritance in Japan, through

²⁴Akira Kubota and Robert E. Ward, "Family Influences and Political Socialization in Japan," Comparative Political Studies 3:2 (July, 1970), 150.

TABLE IV-5

STUDENTS' PARTY IDENTIFICATION BY
PARENTS' PARTY IDENTIFICATION

A. Students by Fathers:

<u>Father's Party Identification</u>	<u>LDP</u>	<u>DSP</u>	<u>Students' Party Identification</u>				<u>Total</u>	<u>N</u>
			<u>Komei</u>	<u>JSP</u>	<u>JCP</u>			
LDP	69	8	2	16	5	100%	261	
DSP	48	23	2	21	6	100%	52	
KOMEI	28	4	52	16	0	100%	25	
JSP	32	8	4	52	4	100%	77	
JCP	27	0	0	46	27	100%	11	
Total	56	9	5	24	5	100%	426	

Goodman and Kruskal's Gamma = .45

Kendall's Tau-B = .30

B. Students by Mothers:

<u>Mother's Party Identification</u>	<u>LDP</u>	<u>DSP</u>	<u>Students' Party Identification</u>				<u>Total</u>	<u>N</u>
			<u>Komei</u>	<u>JSP</u>	<u>JCP</u>			
LDP	67	8	3	17	5	100%	263	
DSP	61	18	0	18	3	100%	38	
KOMEI	22	7	59	7	4	99%	27	
JSP	33	11	1	52	3	100%	94	
JCP	33	0	0	0	67	100%	3	
Total	56	9	6	24	5	100%	425	

Goodman and Kruskal's Gamma = .42

Kendall's Tau-B = .27

cross-tabulations of students' and parents' party affiliations.

As the table makes clear, the degree of correspondence in parents' and children's affiliations is moderately high. Expectations, like those implied in the quote from Langdon cited earlier, that the changing nature of the party system would result in a breakdown in the transmission of partisanship from parent to child are shown to be inaccurate. Neither, however, is there the complete identity of the two generations' affiliations that a naive application of the alleged "Mendelian law" of political inheritance would predict. With the parties arranged from conservative to progressive in the order shown in the table, an order based on the parties' own policy and ideological positions and on the results of a study by Watanuki Joji on sex, age, education, income and socioeconomic status characteristics of each party's supporters,²⁵ the rank-order correlations between parents and children that result are the highest of the parent-child correlations on political attitudes that occur in my data. Jennings and Niemi found this to be the case in their study of American families as well, as did Zurich in his study of English children,

²⁵Watanuki Joji, "Tato Jokyoka no Seiji Ishiki to Tohyo Kodo" (Political consciousness and electoral behavior in multi-party circumstances), materials prepared for the panel on politics of the Convention of the Japan Sociological Association, October, 1968.

and Kubota and Ward in their pilot study of fifteen to nineteen year old Japanese.²⁶ Hence, it seems clear that in Japan, as in the United States and England, the family's role in the direct transmission of political orientations to the young is at its highest in the passing on of partisanship, though the transmission is far from perfect.

The next question that arises, of course, is whether the Japanese family plays as important a role as British and American families do in transmitting party identification. My primary objective in this chapter is not to provide a thorough analysis of the family's part in socializing various kinds of political orientations; that I do in detail in chapter seven. Nevertheless, it is important for present purposes to present comparative evidence on the family as a source of partisanship. We can make such cross-national comparisons using two kinds of measurement: correlations between parents' and children's identifications, and percentages of children and parents with the same identification. Table IV-6 presents a summary of both kinds of evidence for the countries for which they are available.

It should be noted that there are some problems of comparability that must be faced in treating these figures. The first

²⁶See M. Kent Jennings and Richard G. Niemi, "The Transmission of Political Values from Parent to Child," American Political Science Review 62:1 (March, 1968), 179; Zurich, op. cit., p. 26; Kubota and Ward, op. cit., p. 152.

TABLE IV-6

GROSS-NATIONAL COMPARISON OF PARENT-CHILDREN
AGREEMENT IN PARTY IDENTIFICATION

<u>Country</u>	<u>Correlation</u> ¹	<u>Percentage Agreement</u>
Japan: with fathers	.30 (.41) ²	58% (63%)
with mothers	.27 (.38)	59% (63%)
United States ^a	.47	59%
Britain ^b	.45	41%
West Germany ^c	--	57%
France ^c	--	29%

¹Kendall's Tau-B

²Figures in parentheses are for high school seniors (ages 17-18) only.

Sources: (a) Jennings and Niemi, "The Transmission of Political Values from Parent to Child," Table 1, p. 173; (b) Elia Zurich, "Party Images and Partisanship among Young Englishmen," p. 24; (c) Dennis and McCrone, "Preadult Development of Political Party Identification in Western Democracies," Table 2, p. 257. The age groupings are Japan: 13-18 and () 17-18; United States: 17-18; Germany: 14-16; France, 15-16.

is that the ages differ from country to country. Second, the Japanese correlations and percentages of agreement are based necessarily²⁷ only on those students and parents who identify with one of the five parties; non-identifiers were excluded from the tables from which the figures were calculated. The American data, however, derived from a table in which independents were included along with party identifiers. If the independents are excluded, the percentage agreement rises sharply, to 87 percent,²⁸ and the correlation

²⁷Necessarily, because while independents may fit neatly between two parties, as in the United States, there is no way of knowing where they or other non-identifiers should be placed along a multi-party spectrum as in Japan. Hence, with their inclusion no ordinal correlation could be calculated. Speaking of ordinal correlations, it should be noted that I use Kendall's Tau-B only when comparison with American or British data is necessary. Apparently when Jennings and Niemi first analyzed their data no other ordinal measure of association was available on the Michigan computer, and they and those who followed, like Zurich and Kubota and Ward, have all reported parent-child correlations in terms of this coefficient. Tau-B, however, has no generalizable interpretation for its values, and thus is not meaningful except in the most restricted sense, namely in comparison of one Tau-B value with another. Goodman and Kruskal's Gamma, another ordinal measure, is in every respect to be preferred, since it has an intuitively meaningful interpretation which is also very similar to the interpretation of the common measures of correlation of interval-level data: the value of gamma indicates the percentage reduction in errors committed in assigning individuals to ranks on the dependent variable when their rank on the independent variable is known as opposed to when it is unknown. In other words, the coefficient expresses in probability terms the proportion of the "variance" in individuals' ranks on the dependent variable that is attributable to their ranks on the independent variable.

²⁸My recalculation of the figures in Table 1 of Jennings and Niemi, op. cit., p. 173.

rises accordingly. I have not ascertained whether the figures for the other nations in the table include independents (non-identifiers) or not. If they do, they also must be considered as probably understating the degree of agreement between parents and children.

Nevertheless, so long as these caveats are taken into consideration, comparison is possible, if it is understood as being suggestive rather than precise and definitive. This must be borne in mind particularly with comparison between Japanese and American figures, the bases of which are unambiguous.

Turning to a comparison with the American case, a number of things become apparent if we restrict the comparison to high school seniors and their parents to insure comparability at least in this regard. To begin with, there is a higher degree of partisan agreement among the Americans (87 percent) than among the Japanese (63 percent in the case of both parents), when only party identifiers are considered. Moreover, even when we lump the Japanese parties into two camps, conservatives (LDP and DSP) and progressives (JSP and JCP), and a middle (the Komeito, for want of anywhere else to put it), the rate of children's defections from the parental camp to the "enemy camp" is greater than that found among the Americans: 24 percent from the father's camp and 23 percent from the mother's camp, compared with 13 percent (considering only Republicans and Democrats). Twice as many

Japanese youths as Americans take the fateful step into the "enemy camp," as it might be called. Nonetheless, the nearly two-thirds of the party identifiers among the oldest Japanese youngsters who share their parents' partisanship is a surprisingly high proportion in view of the strong reasons to expect a low rate of parent-child agreement on partisanship. At a minimum, then, it seems safe to say that parent-child correspondence in partisanship in Japan is neither unusually low nor unusually high by comparison with the Western systems. It is clearly substantially higher than is the case in France, contradicting the hypothesis that the earlier variability in the Japanese party system would result in the same absence of family socialization into partisanship. What is more, agreement increases with the age of the child, from Tau-5's of .21 and .14 between the eighth graders and their fathers and mothers respectively, to ones of .41 and .38 between the twelfth graders and their fathers and mothers. In other words, despite the growing teenager's increasing exposure to socializing agencies other than the family, such as the peer group and the media, the family successfully strengthens its influence on partisanship. This again contrasts markedly with the evidence from France, where Dennis and McCrone found that the rate of parent-child partisan agreement declined among older children as compared to younger ones, suggesting, they point out, "low familial reinforcement for whatever partisan cues are transmitted."²⁹

²⁹Dennis and McCrone, op. cit., p. 257.

In discussing children's perceptions of their parents' party identifications, I noted that the accuracy of these perceptions varied with the parents' actual partisanship. A second look at Table IV-5, Parts A and B, will reveal that the rates at which children retain their parents' identification or defect from them also varies with the parents' party. While Komeito support was the most accurately perceived parental affiliation, it is clearly the LDP that benefits most in so far as the proportion of children professing the same identification as their parents is concerned. By comparison, the Komeito retention rate is rather mediocre, as is that of the JSP, while the DSP rate is so low as to suggest serious difficulties for the party even to maintain its already small following in the electorate. Similarly, parents whose identification is with the JCP do not seem, on the whole, to be able to entice their children to support that party. While JCP families lose many of their children to ideological neighbors, the JSP, the Socialists themselves lose a substantial number of children to their arch-rival in the opposing camp, the Liberal Democrats. JSP to LDP defections are twice as high as those in the reverse direction, a bad omen for a party which has laid great stress on its appeal to youth. Indeed, a striking finding in these tables is the significantly greater success of the conservatives in retaining the offspring of its own supporters, and at acquiring the offspring of all the other parties. Still, in absolute numbers, the LDP suffers a net loss from one generation

to the next; in the case of fathers and children (Table IV-5A) for example, the LDP fathers lost a total of 81 of their children to one or another of the parties, and gained 60 of the children of all the other parties, for a net loss of 21. The figures in the case of the mothers were roughly the same: 87 lost to 61 gained, for a net loss of 26. This loss to the ruling LDP of from 8 percent to 10 percent of its supporters from one family generation to the next represents a potential source of major change in the distribution of party identifications in Japan with all the consequences that would entail for Japanese politics and the course of Japanese foreign and domestic policy. But, as I pointed out earlier, many young adults appear to adopt an LDP partisanship as they enter their thirties and forties. It may be that the continuing gradual decline in the electoral strength of the LDP reflects a small but constant net loss in LDP identifiers as the result of the two transition processes in partisanship, the one generational in nature and the other, age-related, that I have outlined here.

We saw earlier that in Japan as elsewhere children frequently misperceive their parents' partisan affiliations. Studies in the United States and Britain have shown that there is a notably greater degree of correspondence in children's own identification with their perceptions of their parents' identification than there is with parents' actual identification.³⁰ They have also shown that the

³⁰Richard G. Niemi, A Methodological Study of Political

direction of distortion is typically toward perceiving the parents' party as the same as one's own. Figure IV-1 presents the comparative evidence on this phenomenon in Japan, the United States, and Britain.

The Japanese data confirm the American and British findings. Children's identifications show a substantially higher degree of agreement with perceived parental identification than with actual identification. The percentage agreement rises in this case to 65 percent with father's perceived identification and 70 percent with that of the mother, as opposed to the 59 percent and 58 percent rates that were found between the independently measured actual identifications. However, this difference is related in the Japanese case to the age of the child.


We saw earlier that the strength of the association between parents' actual identifications and the teenagers' identifications increased with age. No such increase occurs in the strength of the relationship between the child's perception of his parents' partisanship and his own, despite a marked increase in the accuracy of the perceptions from $\text{Tau-B} = .22$ between perceived and actual parental partisanship for both parents among the eighth graders to $.51$ in the case of the father and $.55$ for the mother among the twelfth graders. In other words, the Japanese high school

Socialization in the Family (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Department of Political Science, University of Michigan, 1967), p. 117; and Zurich, op. cit., p. 27.

FIGURE IV-1

CROSS-NATIONAL COMPARISON OF CHILDREN'S PERCEPTIONS
OF PARENTAL PARTISANSHIP AND
CHILDREN'S AND PARENTS' ACTUAL PARTISANSHIP

(Kendall's Tau-B's)



Source: Adapted from Zurich, "Party Images and Partisanship among Young Englishmen," p. 27.

Note: Age groups are: Japan: 13-18 and () 17-18
United States: 17-18;
Britain: 9-18.

seniors are almost as accurate in their perception of their parents' party support as the American high school seniors studied by Jennings and Niemi, despite the greater complexity of the Japanese party system.

It would appear then that the younger Japanese teenagers, following precisely the same pattern as the American and British youngsters, tend to exaggerate their partisan solidarity with the family; perhaps, as Niemi has suggested, as a result of a psychological need to make it "appear to themselves that they are not really so different from their parents."³¹ However, this solidarity is often misplaced, as the low correlation of their perceptions of their parents' partisanship with their parents' actual partisanship indicates. The older teenagers, who are more interested in politics and more consciously aware of their parents as political role models, tend to be much more accurate about their parents' partisanship so that there is no appreciable difference between the twelfth graders' degree of agreement with their parents' actual partisanship and with their perceived partisanship. In addition, as we shall see, the major social forces that influence parental partisanship become increasingly operative among the older teenagers, and tend to reinforce the influence of the family in pushing the teenager in one or another partisan direction.

There are diverse and interesting questions that remain about the role of the Japanese family in the transmission

³¹Niemi, op. cit., p. 117

of partisanship and in the broader sphere of cross-generational value and attitude continuity and change. Such obvious concerns as the relative influence of the family versus other agencies of socialization, and the influence of fathers versus mothers, are treated in detail later in this study. The foregoing discussion, however, covers these aspects of the Japanese family which have a direct bearing on our present concern, the family as a source of partisan affiliation. Contrary to expectations, we have found that young Japanese have roughly similar aggregate patterns of partisanship to those of adults, with levels of non-identification that approximate those among young adults. They show a level of accurate knowledge of their parents' partisanship comparable to that found in the United States and Britain, as well as comparable, though slightly lower, correlations with parental partisanship. Their partisan agreement with their parents increases with age, and they tend to imagine their parents as being more similar to themselves in partisanship than in fact they are. In short, the family does appear to play a comparable if slightly weaker role in the genesis of partisanship in Japan to that which it plays in the United States and Britain, and a far more important role than in France.

The influence of the family on a youngster's partisanship may come about not only by transmitting the partisanship of his parents to him but also by placing him into a

social environment, into relationships with other people who tend to share the same values and beliefs and identifications as his family. Being born into a family means also being born into a social class, into a village community or the teeming city. Almost inevitably, then, the influence on the political attitudes and beliefs of the growing child of the family and the influence of such basic social characteristics as social status or urban-rural residence overlap, and it is to the impact of these social characteristics on the partisanship of young Japanese that I now turn.

Social Determinants of Partisanship:
Urban-Rural Residence and Socioeconomic Status

In adult politics in most polities, social factors—notably whether one lives in urban centers or rural areas, and one's social status—have an impact on two aspects of partisanship. The first is whether one identifies with a party or remains uncommitted or alienated; the second, the direction of partisanship among those who do identify with parties. Among the adults in my study, I found that typically for Japan, and contrary to the United States, urban dwellers and upper status individuals were significantly more likely than rural and lower status individuals to avoid affiliation with a party. Excluding those who did not respond to the item, 10 percent of the urban residents supported no party as compared to only

4 percent of the rural residents, while 10 percent of the upper SES group expressed no party support as opposed to only 5 percent of the lower SES group.

The same pattern held true for the teenage sample as well. While urban and rural students had roughly equal proportions (25 percent and 23 percent) of those who replied "don't know" to the item asking which party they would support if they could vote, substantially more urban than rural youngsters (24 percent and 14 percent) chose the "don't support any party" response. The relationship between the socioeconomic status of the teenagers' families and non-identification had a somewhat different pattern. Here, significantly more low status than high status youngsters (33 percent to 22 percent) replied "don't know." But, conversely, more upper status teenagers (25 percent) chose the intentional non-identification response—"don't support any party"—than did lower status teenagers (19 percent). On the whole, then, the impact of urban-rural residence and socioeconomic status on the adult pattern of non-identification appears to be reflected among preadults as well. The association of intentional non-affiliation (as opposed to the "don't know" variety) with the upper status and urban teenagers has some interesting comparative implications.

Greenstein found no significant differences between upper and lower status children in the over-all tendency to identify with a party, but his figures show a clear trend

for more upper status children to call themselves independents.³² Hess and Torney also found that upper status children were more apt to opt intentionally for the status of independent, while lower status children who did not identify with a party had for the most part a less clearly based lack of commitment. A study of British children and adolescents revealed that while among the younger children more middle-class than working-class youngsters identified with a party, the reverse was true among the sixteen to eighteen year olds, where there were more non-identifiers among middle-class children than among the working-class group.³³ The cross-national evidence thus appears on the whole to corroborate the tendency apparent in my data for upper status children to be more apt than lower status children to intentionally refrain from identifying with a party. In Japan, as we shall see in a later chapter, this is symptomatic of the greater alienation from some aspects of politics of upper status and urban youth.

A second important question confronting us here is how these two social factors affect the direction of partisanship. Table IV-7 presents the distribution of partisanship among both teenagers and parents according to urban-rural residence and socioeconomic status.

³²Greenstein, Children and Politics, Table 4.3, p. 73; Robert D. Hess and Judith V. Torney, The Development of Political Attitudes in Children (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1968), p. 190.

³³Zurich, op. cit., Figure IV, p. 20.

TABLE IV-7

PARTY IDENTIFICATION OF STUDENTS AND PARENTS
BY URBAN-RURAL RESIDENCE AND SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS

A. By Urban-Rural Residence:

<u>Party Identification</u>	<u>Students</u>		<u>Parents</u>	
	<u>Urban</u>	<u>Rural</u>	<u>Urban</u>	<u>Rural</u>
LDP	46	61	54	68
DSP	11	8	16	7
Komei	7	6	7	3
JSP	28	22	21	21
JCP	<u>8</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
(N)	(274)	(255)	(789)	(680)
	Gamma = -.26		Gamma = -.23	

B. By Socioeconomic Status:

<u>Party Identification</u>	<u>High</u>	<u>Med.</u>	<u>Low</u>	<u>High</u>	<u>Med.</u>	<u>Low</u>
	LDP	50	56	51	60	62
DSP	15	6	8	19	9	8
Komei	4	6	11	4	5	8
JSP	25	25	26	16	22	26
JCP	<u>6</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>
Total	(100%)	(100%)	(100%)	(100%)	(100%)	(100%)
(N)	(168)	(229)	(132)	(466)	(370)	(333)
	Gamma = -.02			Gamma = .08		

As is immediately evident, urban-rural residence does have a moderate impact on party identification among both generations. Socioeconomic status, however, appears to be only weakly related to partisanship among the adults, and not at all among the teenagers. This appears to corroborate Watanuki Joji's interpretation of Japanese politics as "cultural politics" or "value politics" rather than status politics; that is, cleavages in Japanese politics seem to be founded in differences in cultural outlooks and values, in particular those between the traditional values and norms of country folk and the modern challenges to the traditional beliefs and practices that have grown up in the city.³⁴

Status differences, however, are not so totally irrelevant to partisanship as Table IV-7 would lead us to believe, for, in fact, there is a negative relationship between socioeconomic status and rural residence: rural families have lower incomes and typically lower levels of parental education. Hence, we must take account of this before simply dismissing any place for socioeconomic status in the molding of partisanship. Table IV-8 presents the relationship between SES and partisan affiliation among both generations with urban-rural residence controlled.

With the impact of area of residence partialled out, it is clear that there is a correlation between the family's socioeconomic status and the direction of partisanship among both children and adults. Higher status families produce

³⁴Watanuki Joji, *op. cit.*, pp. 456 ff.

TABLE IV-8

INTERACTION OF URBAN-RURAL RESIDENCE AND SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS ON PARTY IDENTIFICATIONS OF STUDENTS AND PARENTS

A. Urban Residence:

Party Identi- fication	Students' SES			Parents' SES		
	High	Med.	Low	High	Med.	Low
LDP	48	44	39	57	53	39
DSP	15	8	4	21	11	7
Komei	5	8	22	4	8	20
JSP	26	30	26	17	24	32
JCP	6	11	9	1	4	2
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
(N)	(144)	(107)	(23)	(387)	(327)	(75)
	Gamma = .12			Gamma = .20		

B. Rural Residence

Party Identi- fication	Students' SES			Parents' SES		
	High	Med.	Low	High	Med.	Low
LDP	62	67	54	77	71	62
DSP	17	5	9	8	6	8
Komei	0	5	8	1	2	5
JSP	17	21	26	13	20	24
JCP	4	2	3	1	1	1
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
(N)	(24)	(122)	(109)	(79)	(343)	(258)
	Gamma = .16			Gamma = .20		
	Partial Gamma = .14			Partial Gamma = .20		
	Zero-order Gamma = -.02			Zero-order Gamma = .08		

more adults and children who affiliate with the conservatives than do lower status families, which produce more socialists and communists. But the striking aspect of the distributions in the table is that while the drift from right to left as one proceeds down the status level is quite clear among rural adults and teenagers, in the urban sample we note an interesting generational difference. Support for the parties of the left (JSP and JCP) does not change markedly from high to low status groups among the teenagers; it is nearly the same in both high and low groups (32 percent and 35 percent respectively), and slightly higher among the middle group. This contrasts with the parents where, though the proportions of left-affiliation are lower than among the children, comparing each status level cross-generationally there is a clear upward progression of left support as status decreases.

In other words, there is a generational difference between urban adults and children. This does not occur simply in the level of support for the parties of the left but also in the relationship between status and partisan affiliation. It is noteworthy that when the student's age is added as a second level control, we discover that among the urban, though not the rural, teenagers, the correlation between SES and partisanship decreases with age, from .16 among the eighth graders to .07 among the twelfth graders. This is the result of concurrent increases with age of the

proportions of upper status urban youths identifying with the left parties and of lower status urban youths identifying with the conservatives. Meanwhile, in further support of Watanuki's notion of the prevalence of "cultural politics" over status politics, the correlation between urban-rural residence and partisanship increases with age, from $-.21$ among the eighth graders to $-.32$ among the twelfth graders, which is a stronger association than that found among the adults ($-.23$).

It would appear, then, that the principal social correlate of partisanship among both adults and teenagers in Japan is whether they live in the relatively conservative countryside or the relatively progressive metropolis. But the social status of the family also makes a difference, though this is only apparent when the effect of urban-rural residence is held constant. For both parents and teenagers, higher social status is associated with increased support for the conservatives in both urban and rural areas. The correlation is fairly weak, however, especially among the urban teenagers. Nevertheless, while it is generally true that the lines of partisan cleavage among Japanese young and old are drawn principally along the classic dichotomy of culture and values in Japan of city versus country, there is also a basis for partisan differences in the lines dividing economic and social strata. "Cultural politics" continues to prevail as the social basis of partisanship,

but "status politics" plays a role as well, though one of less impact and less consistency.

The Cognitive and Affective Content of Partisanship

However they are acquired, party affiliations among young Japanese seem to be rather less salient and ego-involved than they are for young Americans and Britains. Bradley Richardson, in a secondary analysis of the Kubota and Ward data, found substantially fewer strong identifiers than is true of American veterans.³⁵ He also found many fewer adults for whom the party was the object of affect, of liking or disliking.³⁶ In my interviews with Japanese teenagers, I obtained the impression that much the same was true for most of them. No student I interviewed spontaneously identified himself verbally as a Liberal Democrat, or a socialist, or whatever. Clearly this particular component of the galaxy of groups and symbols that might be used to make reference to one's identity is little used and not very salient for most young Japanese. Nevertheless, of course, despite its not being at the forefront of their self-definitions, their partisanship is significant because, as we shall see, it has a systematic impact on their ideological perspectives and on their attitudes toward other political objects, including their support for the input and output institutions of the regime.

³⁵ Richardson, op. cit., p. 5.

³⁶ Ibid., p. 6.

Before turning to a discussion of the place of ideology in the socialization of young Japanese, and its relationship to partisanship, it is appropriate to ask whether party affiliation is founded on an awareness of what the parties stand for. Greenstein found that few of his New Haven children could or did distinguish between the Republicans and Democrats in terms of policies or ideologies.³⁷ Unfortunately, the kind of spontaneous data evoked by Greenstein's open-ended question is not available on Japanese children's perceptions of differences between the parties. But Okamura provides us with some useful data on Japanese youngsters' ability to recognize the positions of the two major parties. He asked children in grades 7 through 12 to "pick two things that the Liberal Democratic Party maintains" from a fixed list of choices and then to pick two that the Japanese Socialist Party maintains. Table IV-9 summarizes the proportions of children who chose accurately and inaccurately for each party, by grade.

The three issues to which the questions refer have been among the most debated policies of the entire postwar period. The Self-Defense Forces and the Security Treaty with the United States, especially the latter, are the targets of sustained opposition attacks that have continued to receive wide coverage in the press. At election time, abolition of each is almost invariably the principal theme

³⁷Greenstein, Children and Politics, p. 68.

TABLE IV-9

ACCURACY OF CHILDREN'S PERCEPTIONS OF POLICIES
OF THE TWO MAJOR PARTIES (LDP AND JSP)

(Percentage of accurate and inaccurate choices by grade; two choices were permitted, so percentages total to 200%; nonrespondents are omitted)

<u>Grade</u>	<u>LDP Positions</u>		<u>JSP Positions</u>	
	<u>% Correct</u>	<u>% Incorrect</u>	<u>% Correct</u>	<u>% Incorrect</u>
7	98	53	87	64
8	117	49	99	65
9	124	49	116	56
10	157	23	149	28
11	162	20	159	20
12	183	17	168	19

Sources: Okamura, 1968 Survey; Non-responses not shown here.

<u>Issues and Positions</u>	<u>LDP Position</u>	<u>JSP Position</u>
Existence of Self-Defense Forces	Supports	Opposes
Seating of Mainland China in the U.N.	Opposes	Supports
U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty	Supports	Opposes

of the socialist and communist campaigns. It may be something of a tribute to the persistent attempts of the opposition parties to keep these issues at the forefront of public awareness that so many youngsters—indeed, a rough majority from eighth grade onward—are able to accurately perceive (or guess) the parties' positions on them. But underlying the division between the Japanese parties, and the conflict over these issues of national policy, is a cleavage between left and right that goes to basic questions about the nature of government and society. How far that cleavage has penetrated into the political learning of Japanese adolescents constitutes the subject matter of the next chapter.

Conclusion

Despite its newness and the changes that have occurred in it during the past several decades, the multi-party system in Japan has apparently laid down its roots in the political culture. The evidence indicates that partisanship among Japanese adults is comparable in extent to that among Americans and Western Europeans. Similar levels of party allegiance were also found among Japanese children to those which prevail in the Western nations studied, from early in childhood through adolescence. But there appear, on impressionistic evidence, to be fewer strong identifiers among the Japanese youths. The influence of the family on partisanship also seems similar in Japan to the Western countries. Contrary

to expectations, Japanese teenagers not only know their parents' party affiliations in proportions that equal Western teenagers, but they also share their parents' attachments to a degree that approaches that of their Western peers.

Because of the importance of social factors to both the ideological aspects of partisan politics and the over-all bases for the aggregate balance of party support, the analysis then considered to what extent socioeconomic status and urban-rural residence functioned as sources of partisanship among young Japanese. The evidence pointed to an important inter-generational continuity in the over-all predominance of urban-rural "cultural" differences over status differences as influences on partisanship. Coupled with the evidence of low net transmission rates of defection from the conservative parties to the parties of the left, the continued clear impact of urban-rural residences among the young as compared to the inconsistent and weaker, but still real, impact of status differences suggests that change in the distribution of party strength in the electorate is likely to occur only gradually and incrementally as the younger generation replace their elders in the electorate.

It would appear, in short, that partisanship, at both the level of the individual's party affiliation and the aggregate level of socially-based distribution of party strength, is being reproduced from one generation to the next to a degree that exceeds what we might expect in a party system with such a short and checkered history. But

the explanation of this finding may lie outside the relationship of individuals to particular parties. For, despite the discontinuities of party names and numbers, there has been throughout the postwar period a basic continuity of the ideological camps, conservative and progressive, into which the parties fall. It is to an examination of this ideological aspect of political life and its manifestation in the political learning process that I now turn.

CHAPTER V

SYMBOLS OF DISSENSUS: THE EMERGENCE OF IDEOLOGY

The role of ideology in contemporary mass societies has been a source of continuing controversy and debate. One element of the controversy centered on whether, during the nineteen-fifties and early nineteen-sixties, there had taken place an "end of ideology" in the industrial democracies of Western Europe.¹ Another aspect of the question of ideology's role, however, has grown out of studies of the American electorate, in which it has been argued that whatever role ideology plays, the sphere within which it is relevant and significant is a very limited one, involving only a small segment of the population.² This chapter is meant to be a contribution to the debate over the role of ideology in contemporary mass societies, and in particular to that part of the debate involving the question of how important ideology is in the political life

¹See, for instance, Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology (Rev. ed.; New York: The Free Press, 1962); and Joseph La Palombara, "Decline of Ideology: A Dissent and an Interpretation," American Political Science Review, 50:1 (March, 1966), 5-18; and the sources cited therein, on this debate.

²Philip E. Converse's well-known essay is the seminal work on the question of the role of ideology among the mass of Americans. "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," in David E. Apter, ed., Ideology and Discontent (New York: The Free Press, 1964), pp. 206-261.

of mass publics, by examining a country in which ideological symbols are very widespread.

One need not look long or far to find the traces of ideology in Japan. They can be found in the headlines of the newspapers, detailing the latest acts of urban guerrilla warfare committed by the revolutionary students on the left, or the gory ritual suicide of a famous novelist and his chief lieutenant after the failure of their rightist putsch. They can be found, too, in less violent places: on the spines of countless popular books about the ills of present-day life in the countless bookshops throughout Japan, and in the record of the civil suit against government control of school texts brought by a famous historian.

Ideology, highly articulated and logically constrained, asserting universal social principles and prescribing specific courses of action for both society and the individual, is a vital and propulsive force in the political life of today's Japan. Among its most characteristic features has been its attraction to the young, a characteristic which demands the attention of any study of the socialization process.

This chapter, therefore, focuses on the development of ideological thought among Japanese adolescents. More precisely, I concentrate on how teenagers think and feel about the elements of the ideological dimension that overshadows all others in contemporary Japan: the symbols and substance of the confrontation between left and right, socialism versus capitalism.

While there are other dimensions of ideology in Japanese politics, most if not all of them (the role of Buddhism being an obvious exception) can be and have been subsumed under the left versus right dimension. As in so many of the world's nations, political conflict in Japan is characteristically phrased and framed in support of or opposition to the Marxist view of man and society. The Socialist and Communist Parties, needless to say, as well as the student movement, employ the Marxist framework and terminology in their rhetoric almost exclusively. But ideological rhetoric and a terminological framework within which to articulate a unified social and economic philosophy have never been an important part of postwar Japanese conservatism. So, it is in a sense by default that the ideological stimulus to which Japanese young and old respond, positively or negatively, more than to any other is the leftist critique of the contemporary socio-economic system.

This dominance of the Marxist-derived left-right ideological dimension in the rhetoric and substance of partisan conflict makes Japan of particular interest for the comparative study of political learning in adolescence. Studies of the development of ideological thought during the teenage years have so far been largely confined to the United States.³

³See especially the work of Joseph Adelson and his various associates and students: Joseph Adelson and Robert P. O'Neill, "Growth of Political Ideas in Adolescence: The Sense of Community," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 4:3 (1966), 295-306; Joseph Adelson, B. Green, and Robert O'Neill, "The Growth of the Idea of Law in Adolescence," Developmental Psychology, 1 (1969), 27-32; Judith Gallatin

But, of course, despite the differences between the two major parties and the existence of groups and movements like the Students for a Democratic Society and the Black Panthers, it continues to be the case that the main currents of American politics are notably devoid of ideological content. In particular, the absence of a strong ideologically based socialist movement or party with a national following sets America apart from most other industrial nations. As a result, definitions of what is "ideological" in the context of American politics are apt to involve high levels of conceptualization and abstraction. In other political systems, such as Japan, however, ideology manifests itself not only in the intellectual's domain of ideas and abstractions but also in the popular domain in which concepts become political labels which, like party labels, serve as simplifying screens through which political complexity can be reduced to readily understandable categories by the common citizen.

In this chapter, then, I shall investigate the predominant ideological concepts and labels, specifically "socialism" and "capitalism," and their role in the political learning that takes place in adolescence in Japan. The first

and Joseph Adelson, "Individual Rights and the Public Good: A Cross-National Study of Adolescents," Comparative Political Studies (July, 1970), pp. 226-242. See also Richard M. Merelman, "The Development of Political Ideology: A Framework for the Analysis of Political Socialization," American Political Science Review, 53:3 (September, 1969), 750-767; and the same author's "The Development of Policy Thinking in Adolescence," American Political Science Review, 55:4 (December, 1971), 1033-1047.

objective will be to examine the cognitive and perceptual aspects of these concepts and labels. What do "socialism" and "capitalism" mean to Japanese teenagers? How do they perceive these "issues" to relate to their country? How much of the content of these concepts is understood, and how does age affect the depth of understanding?

A second and related objective will be to assay the affective responses to these ideologically-related concepts of both the teenagers and their parents. How do evaluations of these ideological symbols compare with each other and with those of other leading political symbols such as democracy and pacifism? How do they rank in the political value hierarchies of the two generations? What do youngsters believe to be the merits and faults of the two "isms"? To what extent do these responses to the labels parallel their responses to the unlabeled concepts?

Where a classic ideology, such as Marxism, exerts a major influence on important actors and groups in the political process, its impact on the content of preadult political attitudes and beliefs is of obvious significance. But there is another perspective on ideology that must also be considered and dealt with. In it, ideology is taken to refer to a style of thought, a way of putting ideas and attitudes together to form an over-all, integrated view of social, economic and political processes. The literature on ideology in this latter sense is extensive.⁴ But running through

⁴Merelman, "The Development of Political Ideology,"

nearly all the definitions of ideology in that literature are several elements usually considered fundamental prerequisites of ideological thought. Two that are of particular relevance to the study of teenagers' political attitudes are the constraint of the attitudes, and the use of causal reasoning about society and politics, based on general principles or beliefs.

"Constraint" is a term coined by Philip Converse to refer to the degree of consistency between attitudes:

. . . the probability that a change in the perceived status (truth, desirability, and so forth) of one idea-element would psychologically require . . . some compensatory changes in the status of idea-elements elsewhere in the configuration.⁵

Thus, for example, in the most straightforward case in the present context we would expect that among ideologues, attitudes toward socialism and capitalism would be mutually constrained. To the extent that positive attitudes toward socialism are coupled with negative attitudes toward capitalism, the constraint or consistency of the component beliefs of an individual's political attitude structure or belief system would be high, and an important condition of ideology

loc. cit., provides a useful introduction to this literature in both the text and the notes. See also Robert D. Putnam, "Studying Elite Political Culture: The Case of Ideology," American Political Science Review, 55:3 (September, 1971), especially pp. 655-656.

⁵Philip E. Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Politics," in David E. Apter, ed., Ideology and Discontent (New York: The Free Press, 1964), p. 208.

would be satisfied.

A second condition of ideology is that attitudes toward political issues and objects be founded on certain basic, general principles, what Converse has called "crowning postures—like premises about the survival of the fittest in the spirit of Social Darwinism."⁶ It will be evident that this latter condition is a rather stringent one, in that it requires both a fairly sophisticated grasp of abstract concepts and abstruse theories as well as the capacity to use those concepts and theories in evaluating the real world. Such knowledge and use of abstract concepts and principles in politics obviously is apt to be more characteristic of political elites than of common citizens, and more characteristic of adults than of children and adolescents.

The development among Japanese teenagers of these two conditions of ideological thought thus constitutes a third major focus of this chapter. In this connection I will be particularly concerned with how the data fit two alternative models of the growth of ideology in adolescence. The first model derives from the work of developmental psychologists, notably Joseph Adelson and his associates.⁷ It stresses the growth of cognitive capacities, and posits a series of stages as prerequisite to the emergence in mid-adolescence of the capacity for ideology.

⁶Ibid., p. 211.

⁷See the works cited in footnote 1.

The second model derives from an empirical study of the development of policy thinking among American teenagers by Richard Merelman.⁸ Merelman found that cognitive capacity alone is inadequate to explain the process through which an adolescent forms a style of political thought which could be considered ideological. He tentatively concluded that the nature of politically-related stimuli in the environment was of greater importance to the development of ideology than the adolescent's cognitive capacities. The contrast between the near total absence of vivid and salient ideological symbols in American political life, and their widespread presence in Japanese politics (at the national level at least) makes this political stimulus model of particular relevance. I will argue in particular that the overlapping and mutual reinforcing of party labels and ideological labels is a particularly important way in which stimuli in the political environment affect the ideological development of Japanese youngsters. Thus the fourth focus of the chapter will involve the manner in which the party identification that young Japanese develop interacts with their beliefs and attitudes about and reactions to ideological symbols and values.

Cognitive and Perceptual Aspects of Ideology

It is readily apparent to the observant eye that the lexicon of politics in both the popular and elite cultures

⁸See "The Development of Policy Thinking in Adolescence," loc. cit.

in Japan differs from that in use in the United States. When Americans discuss politics, the terms heard most often are "democracy," "freedom," "liberty," and so on. These terms are used in political discourse in Japan too. But there are others which rarely appear in American political discussions that occur often in Japan. "Socialism," "capitalism," and associated terms are encountered not only in the slogans of the leftist parties and of the radical students but also in the titles of endless popular books and articles—and even in the social studies texts in the schools.

Capitalism is particularly prominent among the terms, since it refers to the present economic system which is the target of the critical ire of the opposition in Japan. Something of the degree to which this term has become not just common but prominent in political discourse and hence ultimately in the political learning process is suggested by Table V-1.

Ask an American to pick one word to describe his country and the likelihood is great that he will choose "democracy." The chances that he will choose "capitalism" are remote—especially so, I believe, if the American in question is a teenager. But as is apparent in Table V-1, capitalism far outdistances democracy as the primary defining characteristic of their society in the eyes of Japanese teenagers from as early as the tenth grade. Only among the youngest teenagers, the eighth graders in my student sample,

TABLE V-1

CAPITALISM VERSUS DEMOCRACY
AS DEFINING CHARACTERISTICS OF JAPAN

(percent of students by grade and of
parents as a whole choosing each
response)

"What kind of country is Japan? Pick the one that you
think suits Japan best."

<u>Grade</u>	<u>Socialist</u>	<u>Capitalist</u>	<u>Dictator- ship</u>	<u>Demo- cratic</u>	<u>D.K.+ N.R.</u>	<u>Total</u>
8	10	24	0	46	20	100%
10	4	60	2	25	9	100%
12	0	70	2	24	4	100%
Parents	3	41	0	45	11	100%

does democracy prevail. This suggests that there may be a learning sequence involved in which democracy precedes capitalism in the "political consciousness" of Japanese youngsters.

Indeed, if we examine the content of social studies texts and curricula for primary and middle school we can find mention of democracy from very early in the school years. But capitalism and socialism do not appear in any significant manner until ninth grade, in the "politics and economics" course in social studies taken by all students. I cannot cite any direct evidence to show that this and subsequent social studies courses, which also treat the economic system, account for the dramatic shift away from democracy to capitalism as Japan's primary characteristic among the tenth and twelfth grade students. And, indeed, as the teenager matures his exposure to the mass media, popular magazines, and other sources of political information also expand, bringing to bear multiple influences on his political learning. Nevertheless, probably a large part of the impetus for this change in the priority of capitalism and democracy in the perceptual screen through which young people view their world comes from the relative emphasis placed on the two in the schoolroom.

I should point out that it is the precedence of these two characteristics which I am stressing here. When, in the interviews, I asked the youngsters to choose two characteristics, nearly all chose both capitalism and democracy. But there was no doubt that among the older youngsters the majority believed capitalism to be more characteristic of Japan

than democracy. As one fourteen year old Tokyo boy told me, "I think capitalism is the more important, because before the war Japan wasn't democratic but it was capitalist. The war didn't change that."

Japanese youngsters, then, come by tenth grade to perceive capitalism as the most important characteristic of their country. The questions arise, therefore, as to what they conceive this most important characteristic to mean and how it differs from the alternative "ism" offered by the opposition—socialism. The interviews I conducted with some forty students as well as the compositions written by 43 Tokyo eighth graders provide useful data.

It was apparent from the interviews that both capitalism and socialism were conceived in rather skeletal fashion, with little complexity or descriptive richness, by nearly all the interviewees. Capitalism seemed to be an especially elusive concept for most of the students. Few were as off the mark as the rural eighth grader who thought it was "where they do foreign trade and such." But even the more accurate verbalizations were conceptually limited and sparse in content. One relatively frequent definition centered around the image of rule by capitalists:

Well, capitalism is where people with money—big capitalists—run the economics of the country.

--8th grade Tokyo boy

With capitalism, you get capitalists, after all. . . . I have an image of being controlled by capitalists when you say capitalism.

--10th grade Tokyo boy

A number of youngsters, however, showed a somewhat more specific grasp of a principal element of the concept of capitalism, the relationship between work and reward:

. . . [It's where] you get the return you work for yourself.

--8th grade Tokyo boy

. . . when a person by his own efforts . . . well, only that person becomes better off . . . and there is free competition.

--10th grade rural girl

Socialism seemed to be more widely and easily understood:

With socialism, there is a planned economy, and everyone works hard and things are divided equally among everyone.

--12th grade Tokyo boy

. . . when the state provides social security. The state does everything and there isn't free competition.

--8th grade Tokyo boy

Well, the people, er . . . land and that sort of thing are all controlled by the state . . . somehow that sort of feeling.

--12th grade rural boy

A planned economy, social security, and public ownership of enterprise—these seem fairly widely understood to be what socialism is all about and how it differs from capitalism, with its somewhat less distinct image of private ownership and free competition. Table V-2 provides some evidence from Okamura's survey on the extent to which these characteristics are correctly associated with each "ism" as well as the extent of misassociation.

TABLE V-2

MEANING OF CAPITALISM AND SOCIALISM:
CORRECT AND INCORRECT ASSOCIATIONS

(Percent of students by grade associating the responses shown with capitalism and socialism; each student was allowed two choices for each, so totals amount to 200%*)

Grade	Capitalism		Socialism	
	Correct ^a	Incorrect ^b	Correct ^c	Incorrect ^d
7	37	56	83	14
8	54	62	102	16
9	73	49	107	12
10	143	17	159	6
11	148	15	158	5
12	151	13	154	5

Source: Okamura, 1968 Survey.

*Other ambiguous responses were also possible.

^a"Private ownership; free competition."

^b"Public ownership; planned economy; social insurance."

^c"Public ownership; free competition."

It is clear at a glance that a major increase in the frequency of students understanding both capitalism and socialism takes place after ninth grade. This is probably in large part a consequence of what is learned in the latter half of the "politics and economics" social studies course given in all middle schools in the ninth grade. It is also apparent that at all age levels more youngsters are aware of the basic elements of socialism than of those of capitalism, though the disparity decreases sharply by tenth grade. The closing of the awareness gap between the two is also due no doubt to the aforementioned social studies course. But why should so many more youngsters in the earlier middle school grades understand socialism than understand capitalism? Indeed, before ninth grade, more youngsters chose incorrect than correct responses about capitalism, while accurate responses about socialism far outdistanced inaccurate ones.

To begin with, of course, capitalism does seem to present greater intrinsic cognitive difficulties. Socialism is definable essentially by reference to a simple notion, that of public ownership. Capitalism, however, is less clear-cut, especially since abstract notions of private ownership and free enterprise are confused by images the youngsters have of concrete capitalist countries. Almost without exception the youngsters I interviewed chose Japan and the United States when asked to name capitalist countries in today's world. But in their own country, at least, they are likely to have

heard that there is economic planning, social security and other forms of social insurance, and they all are aware of the publicly-owned railway (popularly called by its abbreviated name of Kokutetsu—the National Railway), airline, television network, national monopolies and utilities. Second, again almost invariably the most prominent characteristic that the students attributed to capitalism was—in a direct translation of a phrase used by nearly all—"the gap between rich and poor." Yet their discussions of their own country in the interviews revealed little tendency on their part to see Japan as riven with such a gap, and their image of the United States as a land of affluence and prosperity clearly did not mesh with the abstract image of what a capitalist state is supposed to resemble.

While nearly every student interviewed quickly named the United States and Japan as examples of capitalist nations, when it came to naming socialist countries the responses were somewhat less quick and sure. Most of the youngsters listed the Soviet Union and the Eastern European nations. But few knew anything about non-Soviet socialism. None of the interviewees had any idea of what sort of economic system could be found in Sweden, for example. It was obvious that socialism is equated with Marxian socialism, in so far at least as the best-known socialist states are concerned. This is not surprising in view of the emphasis on Soviet style socialism in the texts, and the relative inattention to the Scandinavian states.

More surprising, however, was the clear-cut pattern that emerged from the interviews with regard to communism. There was a striking lack of conceptual clarity and differentiation in the notions of communism. Many of those interviewed were unable to say anything whatever about what communism means. Those who did venture definitions usually said only that it was a stronger or harsher form of socialism. It was apparent that the teenagers' understanding or "consciousness" of the relationship between socialism and communism was at best a fuzzy one. Interestingly enough, however, a number of the students interviewed—even including those who could say nothing about the meaning of communism—were willing to choose certain nations as communist nations as opposed to socialist ones. In nearly every case, the nation identified as communist was the People's Republic of China, along with North Korea and North Vietnam. Many of the youngsters may have carried over their awareness of a split between the Soviet and Chinese blocs into their perceptions of socialism and communism.

It is also highly likely that the common Japanese abbreviations for the Soviet Union (Soren) and the People's Republic (Chukyo) have something to do with this, especially the latter. The second character of Chukyo (中共) is the initial character of the word for communism (共產主義), and the term thus is roughly similar to the English phrase Communist China. No such reference to communism is associated with the term Soren for the Soviet Union. Nor indeed is

communism usually mentioned in discussions of that country, which is almost always referred to in the textbooks and in the newspapers as a "socialist state" and the leader of the "socialist bloc."

Capitalism, then, is the characteristic most widely felt by young Japanese to typify their society. By the mid-high school years, a substantial majority of youngsters can recognize the basic elements of both capitalism and socialism, though communism appears to be much less well understood. In view of the importance of capitalism in teenagers' views of their society, it is important then that we turn to an analysis of their attitudes toward it and toward the other concepts associated with it.

Affective Responses to Capitalism, Socialism, and Other Symbols

We saw in chapter three that so many youngsters place a high positive value on peace and democracy that they may be considered consensual elements in the emerging political culture in Japan. But we have also seen here that more youngsters believe capitalism to be Japan's most important characteristic than believe that democracy is.

In order to know what this implies in regard to their evaluation of their society, we must first ascertain how they feel about capitalism in comparison with other relevant concepts and symbols. I asked the students and parents to whom the questionnaire was administered whether they reacted favorably or unfavorably when they heard a number of political

terms. Table V-3 presents a summary of the results for each of the terms, ranked in decreasing order of favorable responses.

The same over-all preference ranking obtains for both generations of Japanese. Peace and democracy, as noted, receive an overwhelmingly positive response. But the three socioeconomic terms, which are what concern us at present, show much less overt support. As I also discovered in the interviews—where, as I mentioned, some children referred to communism as a "harsh" variety or stage of socialism—Table V-3 indicates that communism is clearly a negative symbol for many. Indeed, significantly more teenagers (11 percent) responded that they felt very unfavorable" to it than to any of the other terms.

More important here, however, is that capitalism is positively valued by only a minority of students and of parents. Almost as many students reported an unfavorable reaction to the term as reported a favorable one. Second only to communism, capitalism received a higher proportion of very unfavorable" responses than any other term: 6 percent as compared, for instance, with only 2 percent who were very unfavorable" to socialism. Over-all, then, capitalism falls near the bottom of the list in popularity, negative feeling toward it being surpassed only by that for communism. But a large group of students and parents, indeed a majority of the former and a near majority of the latter, remained noncommittal.

TABLE V-3⁹AFFECTIVE REACTIONS TO VARIOUS
"ISMS" OF STUDENTS AND PARENTS(percent of all students and
parents choosing "react favorably"
or "react unfavorably")

	<u>Students</u>		<u>Parents</u>	
	<u>Favorable</u>	<u>Unfavorable</u>	<u>Favorable</u>	<u>Unfavorable</u>
Pacifism	89%	2%	79%	3%
Democracy	79	2	76	3
Liberalism	58	10	50	13
Socialism	29	14	26	22
Capitalism	29	22	21	31
Communism	11	40	5	67

⁹The actual order of the terms as they appeared in the questionnaire was: pacifism, socialism, liberalism, capitalism, democracy, communism. These items were modeled on similar ones included in a major continuing study of Japanese attitudes being carried out by the Tokei Suri Kenkyujo Kokuminsei Chosa Iinkai (National Character Study Committee of the Institute for Statistical Mathematics). See Nihonjin no Kokuminsei [Japanese National Character], Tokyo: Shiseido, 1961, pp. 503-504, and Daini Nihonjin no Kokuminsei [Japanese National Character: Second Study], Tokyo: Shiseido, 1970, pp. 443-444.

Socialism appears to evoke a pattern of reaction similar to that brought out by capitalism. But there is less hostility toward socialism and an even greater degree of neutrality. Nevertheless, there is no evidence in the table of a wholesale rejection of capitalism by the young in favor of socialism. This is in keeping with other findings on the attitudes of the young toward these two competing ideological symbols.¹⁰

It is noteworthy that despite the relatively primitive cognitive content of the youngsters' images of capitalism and socialism, they not only hold opinions about each but many were willing to make comparisons of the relative merits of each with respect to a set of other values. Table V-4 shows the percentages of all students who felt that each of several attributes was to be found more or much more in capitalist countries or more or much more in socialist

¹⁰ See ibid. Also see Asahi shinbun, July 23, 1969, where figures are reported from a survey of young members of the All Communications Employers Union showing that 44 percent would prefer to reform capitalism as opposed to 36 percent who believe that Japan should become socialist. A 1962 survey showed that fewer of those in their teens than adults believed that things would improve if a progressive party took power. See Bando Satoshi and Iwai Sadao, eds., Seinenron [On Youth], (Tokyo: San'ichi Shobo, 1963), p. 174. The results of a cross-national survey of teenagers in Japan, Germany, England, and France showed the Japanese youths consistently more favorable to socialism and negative to capitalism than their peers in the other countries. But differences in the size of the samples in the various countries, and the nature of the items used, make the comparative value of the study problematic. Ushijima Yoshitomo, Seio to Nihon no Ningen Keisei [Human Development in Western Europe and Japan], (Tokyo: Kaneko shobo, 1961), pp. 317-333.

TABLE V-4
 CAPITALISM AND SOCIALISM COMPARED
 ON FIVE ATTRIBUTES

	<u>Students</u>		<u>Parents</u>	
	<u>Pro-Capitalism^a</u>	<u>Pro-Socialism</u>	<u>Pro-Capitalism</u>	<u>Pro-Socialism</u>
Liberty	66%	9%	58%	13%
Democracy	46	17	43	18
Peace	19	32	32	22
Inequality ^b	11	67	13	54
Poverty ^b	8	73	13	60

^aPro-Capitalism: those choosing "found more in capitalist countries" plus those choosing "found much more in capitalist countries." Pro-Socialism: likewise.

^bResponse categories reversed to accord with the direction of favor. That is, the respondents who picked "more in capitalist countries" for inequality and poverty were counted as pro-socialist; and vice versa.

countries. Parental responses are also given for the sake of generational comparison.

The table confirms what I found in the interviews; liberty and democracy were widely identified as positive attributes of capitalism that are missing in socialist countries.

When you talk about socialism . . . I don't know. I get a feeling of something dark, not free.

--10th grade Tokyo girl

[In socialist countries] there isn't any freedom of speech; you can't say the things you want to say.

--8th grade Tokyo boy

Socialism is strong. It's really tightly controlled. There's no freedom such as in Japan.

--10th grade Tokyo girl

Conversely, capitalism is believed to promote discrimination, inequality, and poverty:

. . . in order to have real, out-and-out democratic politics, it is wrong to have a social system like capitalism, in which the difference between rich and poor gets bigger.

--from an 8th grader's composition

[In capitalist countries] people who are strong succeed; people who are weak are used. That is, there is discrimination. So, looking at it as a person who isn't strong, it isn't a very good country.

--another 8th grader's composition

But, not surprisingly for a people who have been said to have a "work ethic," there were also a number of youngsters who were put off by socialist-style egalitarianism:

With socialism, everyone is equal, but I think it's sad that people of ability can only get the same amount of money as people with no ability.

--from a composition

If no matter how hard a person works, he gets the same wages as other people, wouldn't his will to work be blunted?

--from a composition

So far the analysis has concentrated on the labeled concepts of socialism and capitalism. But what kinds of responses to socialism and capitalism occur when their basic ideas are presented without the identifying labels? Table V-5 presents a summary of students' and parents' responses to an item asking that they choose one of three types of society as that which they would prefer to have in Japan.

An unbridled laissez-faire free enterprise system with the poor left to fend for themselves wins very little support. On the whole, the students prefer the controlled economy with guaranteed social security for all, including the poor, reflecting the positive sentiments many interviewees expressed about socialism. But interestingly enough, what I have termed "welfare capitalism" wins an increasing number of supporters among the older students, so that by twelfth grade there is an even division between those favoring capitalism and those favoring socialism. The oldest students, however, remain to the left of their parents.

How do these preferences accord with the students' reactions to the labeled concepts of capitalism and socialism? Table V-6 presents the relevant cross-tabulations.

TABLE V-5

IDEAL JAPAN: RESPONSES TO THREE TYPES OF SOCIETY

(percent of students by grade and of parents as a whole choosing each response)

"We all have hopes about the sort of society we'd like to make of Japan. Which of the following sorts of society is closest to your hope?"

- a. A society in which people can compete freely and men of ability can readily become wealthy, but where there are people who have a hard time earning a living. [Laissez-faire Capitalism]
- b. A society where the government controls the economy, so one can't get very wealthy, but where a minimum standard of living is firmly guaranteed. [Socialism]
- c. A society where able men can become wealthy, but where such people are highly taxed by the government to help look after the disadvantaged. [Welfare Capitalism]
- d. Don't know.

<u>Grade</u>	<u>Laissez-faire Capitalism</u>	<u>Socialism</u>	<u>Welfare Capitalism</u>	<u>D.K.</u>	<u>N.R.</u>	<u>Total</u>
8	5	64	21	10	0	100%
10	4	57	35	3	1	100%
12	5	48	43	4	0	100%
Parents	8	37	47	6	2	100%

TABLE V-6

COMPARISON OF STUDENTS' ATTITUDES TOWARD SOCIALISM
AND CAPITALISM WITH THEIR IDEAL ECONOMIC SYSTEMS

(percentages across)

Attitudes toward:	Ideal Economic System			<u>Total</u>
	<u>Laissez-faire Capitalism</u>	<u>Welfare Capitalism</u>	<u>Socialism</u>	
<u>Capitalism</u>				
Favorable	8	45	47	100%
Neutral	4	34	62	100%
Unfavorable	2	28	70	100%
	Gamma = .29			
<u>Socialism</u>				
Favorable	7	30	63	100%
Neutral	4	37	59	100%
Unfavorable	7	41	52	100%
	Gamma = -.09			

The preferred ideals show a moderately strong relationship with the students' reactions to capitalism. The correlation with reactions to socialism is quite a bit weaker. However, when we control for age, the latter correlation rises to $-.30$ among the twelfth graders, rivaling the former, which goes up slightly to $+.33$. In other words, we see an association between reactions to ideological labels and to unlabeled ideals that suggests that by twelfth grade these ideologically relevant attitudes are crystallizing and cohering. If that is true generally over the range of ideologically relevant attitudes, we will have useful evidence of the growth in adolescence of an important element of ideology as a style of thought.

Constraint and Causal Reasoning:
Ideology as a Style of Thought

Intellectuals, academicians, journalists, and others who think a good deal about politics tend to appraise political issues and occurrences by applying a set of abstract, integrated principles to them. But in doing so they are, at least in the United States, in a very small minority.

Among a sample of American adults, Philip Converse and his associates found only a handful, about $2\frac{1}{2}$ percent, who could be classified as ideologues who consistently evaluated political issues by reference to such general principles. Another 9 percent were classified as "near-ideologues" whose use of the liberal - conservative—or any other ideological—spectrum as a yardstick of evaluation appeared

either inconsistent or based on a shaky understanding of the terms.¹¹

The available comparative evidence suggests that Japanese adults as well as adults in Europe are more "ideologically conscious" than Americans. Roughly 30 percent of a national sample of Japanese over the age of fifteen said that they thought in terms of left versus right differences or could identify their own positions on a left-right continuum.¹² This is a smaller proportion than was found in Germany, France and Italy,¹³ but is substantially greater than the American figures cited above. In another Japanese national survey, over 50 percent of the sample chose to identify themselves as either conservative supporters or progressive supporters.¹⁴ While the evidence is not strictly comparable—particularly in the latter case, since it does not distinguish between party support and ideological positions—it is most important to recognize, as I shall argue later, that partisanship and ideology bolster one another through overlapping partisan and ideological labels and a tendency of Japanese to identify with "camps." The implication is clear that a significantly

¹¹"The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," p. 218.

¹²Bradley M. Richardson, "Party Loyalties and Party Salience in Japan," unpublished manuscript, p. 9.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Watanuki Joji, "Rodosha no Tohyo Kodo to Seito Shiji Taide" [Workers' Electoral Behavior and Party Support], Nihon Redo Kyokai Zasshi, January 1969, p. 22.

greater number of Japanese adults, probably at least twice as many as American adults, appear to qualify as "ideologues" or "near ideologues." Nevertheless, that still means that roughly only one adult in three is ideologically conscious—in today's ideologically riven Japan.

If only a minority of adults can meet this condition for ideology, how much more likely it is that even fewer pre-adults will be able to do so. There is, above all else, the problem of whether they have the cognitive capacity for such abstract and deductive reasoning. Recent studies of American children and adolescents suggest that there are stages in the growth of such cognitive capacities, and that it may not be until mid-adolescence that the so-called stage of "formal operations" is attained, in which the ability to apply general principles to specific cases and to reason deductively is developed.¹⁵

This analysis of the antecedents of ideology in adolescence must therefore take into account these two conditions for ideological thought—constraint and the use of general principles, and the data permits us to do this, though in each case to an imperfect degree. Let us look first at the problem of the constraint on consistency between Japanese teenagers' attitudes regarding socialism and capitalism. As a standard against which to judge the

¹⁵ See the citations listed in footnote 3 for this chapter; especially Adelson and O'Neill, "Growth of Political Ideas in Adolescence."

relative level of constraint among the teenagers' attitudes, parents' attitudes will be analyzed concurrently.

Of necessity, my survey could not include items dealing with the whole range of specific issues on principles relevant to socialism and capitalism. As I have discussed briefly in earlier chapters, I put primary emphasis on the very terms themselves and on their relationship to other symbols and values. Needless to say, however, the correlations between reactions to the terms and the other values provide a readily interpretable measure of the degree to which what must be considered the basic elements of the ideologically-relevant attitudes cohere. The developmental psychology model of the growth of ideology would predict that the coherence of attitudes toward socialism, capitalism, and communism will increase with age. Table V-7 presents the ordinal level gamma coefficients of correlation between reactions to these three "isms" among the students as a whole and by grade, and for parents as a whole. This will provide a starting point for the discussion.

The level of congruence between reactions to socialism and capitalism among eighth graders is not only strikingly low but is in the opposite direction from what we would expect, being slightly positive. The same is true for the correlation between capitalism and communism. It is not until tenth grade that consistency begins to emerge in these basic attitudes. But by twelfth grade, the teenagers evince as much or more congruence as do their parents.

TABLE V-7

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN REACTIONS TO CAPITALISM,
SOCIALISM, AND COMMUNISM

(Goodman and Kruskal's Gamma)

<u>Students Grade</u>	<u>Capitalism and Socialism</u>	<u>Capitalism and Communism</u>	<u>Socialism and Communism</u>
8	.07	.03	.32
10	-.08	-.12	.55
12	-.27	-.15	.59
Total	-.10	-.10	.50
Parents	-.16	-.15	.56

It is also evident that there is a substantially greater degree of consistency between the reactions to socialism and communism, among both parents and students. I pointed out earlier that a large proportion of all students were antipathetic to the term communism. Among those favorable to socialism, the proportions favorable and unfavorable to communism were about even (26 percent to 28 percent respectively). However, those unfavorable to socialism were also overwhelmingly unfavorable to communism (5 percent favorable to 78 percent unfavorable). On the whole, as a second glance at Table V-3 will remind us, the students were neutral toward capitalism and socialism. Few—only about one in seven—reported an unfavorable reaction to socialism. But that so many of them should reject communism as well hints at an unexpectedly strong stream of anti-left coherence among the students in so far as attitudes toward these conceptual labels are concerned.

Attitudes toward communism are not our central concern here. Rather, we are interested in attitudes toward socialism and capitalism, which are more widely employed and legitimate terms and ideas. Thus, it is important to reiterate that despite the modest value of the correlation between reactions to these terms in comparison with that between reactions to socialism and communism, the correlation does point to a pattern of consistency prerequisite to the development of ideology as being present among a significant minority of the oldest teenagers. Does a similar pattern

of emerging consistency appear in the relations between other attitudes as well? Let us take the reactions to the terms capitalism and socialism once more, and this time compare them to evaluations of whether a number of values are to be found more in capitalist or in socialist countries. Table V-8 presents these correlations for both parents and students, with the latter again broken down by grade.

The over-all student correlations (zero-order gammas) on the whole show a moderate degree of association between the evaluations of the attributes and the two terms. But while the correlations with reactions to capitalism show an increase with the age of the student in four out of five cases, no such developmental pattern is evident in the correlations with reactions to socialism, where indeed there seems to be a small but uniform decrease in the strength of association with age. Part of this anomalous finding may be due first to the fact that there takes place an increase with age (grade) in the proportion of students who are non-committal toward socialism, from 52 percent of the eighth graders to 61 percent of the twelfth graders. Fewer of the older than the younger students, on the other hand, are non-committal about capitalism.

Second, many of the youngsters appear to be trying to be objective; that is, to judge the two systems on what they believe to be the systems' merits rather than giving their own preferences. What they know of the relative merits of the two systems is often a set of generalized images,

TABLE V-8

CORRELATION OF STUDENTS' AND PARENTS' REACTIONS TO
CAPITALISM AND SOCIALISM WITH COMPARISON OF VALUES
IN CAPITALIST VERSUS SOCIALIST COUNTRIES

(Goodman and Kruskal's Gamma for students by grade
and as a whole and for parents as a whole)

Reaction to Capitalism

<u>Value</u>	Students:				<u>Parents</u>
	<u>8</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>Total</u>	
Liberty	.19	.33	.36	.32	.40
Democracy	.23	.39	.33	.33	.36
Peace	.22	.37	.38	.32	.28
Inequality	.22	.12	.25	.13	.23
Poverty	.29	.28	.02	.13	.17

Reaction to Socialism

<u>Value</u>	Students:				<u>Parents</u>
	<u>8</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>Total</u>	
Liberty	-.16	-.22	-.31	-.22	-.27
Democracy	-.42	-.33	-.32	-.36	-.28
Peace	-.42	-.19	-.38	-.33	-.36
Inequality	-.26	-.31	-.20	-.24	-.22
Poverty	-.29	-.26	-.16	-.21	-.28

reinforced through the social studies courses, if the content of the texts is reflective of the tenor of the courses, and through stereotypes they absorb from adult political discourse. Capitalism is often connected with war and socialism with tyranny or suppression in such stereotyped thinking. A good many youngsters seem to have absorbed both such anti-capitalist and anti-socialist images. One twelfth grade rural boy, for instance, told me that "socialism is better than capitalism and democracy [sic] so far as equality is concerned, but . . . the people don't have freedom."

Third, if we examine the intercorrelation of the evaluations themselves, by age, we also note almost no increase with age in the average strength of the relationships.

One implication of these facts is that while development of the capacity for ideology may take place during adolescence, concurrent development of actual attitudes and stances toward ideological objects and of consistency between such attitudes does not necessarily occur. The evidence from the Japanese case is mixed; some pairs of attitudes show increased congruence with age, and others show decreased congruence. Clearly other influences supplementary to and in some instances unrelated to age and the development of cognitive capacities are at work in shaping the ideological tendencies in Japanese teenagers' thought. I shall return to this important point shortly.

The second requisite of ideological thought is that of arguing from general principles about causes and consequences in social and political life. An excellent example of such cause and effect analysis based on "crowning postures," to borrow Converse's phrase once again, is this passage from one eighth grader's composition:

In modern Japan, capitalists with lots and lots of money give out money to use laborers for their own profit. And then, because no one says anything to those capitalists, they compete with each other. So, because there is free competition, there is no planning in society as a whole, and there are the unemployed who have met with misfortune. So the gap between the rich capitalists and the poor laborers gradually becomes wider.

Such an articulate, sophisticated grasp of causal reasoning about economics and politics is unlikely to have been achieved by a thirteen-year old, and this statement no doubt reflects the influence, if not the hand, of an adult or elder brother or sister, or even perhaps a book. But among high school seniors one can find youngsters with such ability to discuss society with full competence in causal reasoning and a reliance upon general principles. I interviewed the editor of one of the "organs" (journals) of the high school student movement. The son of working-class parents who had had little formal education, he himself was nevertheless impressively well-versed in the basics of Marxism, and claimed to have begun to read Das Kapital in ninth grade. In our discussion of the state of world politics and of Japanese politics and society, he brought

to bear in his positions many of the central concepts and principles of Marxist and Leninist thought. His beliefs were manifestly ideological in the sense of both being constrained and in being derived from a set of general principles that he applied in analyzing contemporary problems.

But of course, neither the eighth grader's composition nor the wide-ranging, well-integrated beliefs of this high school activist are representative of the caliber of most Japanese teenager's causal analyses of political and economic reality. Much more typical are the statements about the merits and debits of capitalism and socialism that I noted earlier on pages 232-233. Often the causal link in these expressions is only implicit. But, as is apparent even in those statements, a number of the teenagers linked socialism or capitalism in a cause-effect relationship with democracy: "Capitalism promotes a gap between rich and poor, so it is opposed to democracy."

Since a major concern of this study is to examine the sources of support for democracy in the political attitudes of young Japanese, I decided, after several pretest interviews in which teenagers linked democracy and socialism or capitalism in a manner similar to the above, to incorporate a set of items on this theme in the questionnaire. First of all, on an abstract plane, I asked the respondents to agree or disagree with consecutive items stating that democracy was impossible in a capitalist country; or in a socialist country. Then, they were asked in specific terms about

Japanese democracy, and whether they agreed that it required socialism or required capitalism. The actual items to which they were asked to agree strongly, agree, disagree, or disagree-strongly were as follows.

Real democracy is impossible in a capitalist country.

Real democracy is impossible in a socialist country.

Japan is not really a democracy because the capitalists hold power. For Japan to become a real democracy the socialist forces must take power.

In a socialist country, individuals do not have freedom, so it is necessary to preserve capitalism in Japan.

Table V-9 presents a summary of the students' responses to these four items, as usual broken down by age and accompanied by the responses of the parents.

As I anticipated, a substantial proportion of the students at all age levels responded "don't know" to each of the items; more, in fact, than the proportion of parents who did so. Even so, given the fact that, in Okamura's survey, only one eighth grader in four, including those who responded "don't know," was able to choose the correct characteristics of capitalism, it seems likely that many of the youngest students who did not reply "don't know" are exemplifying the dictum that "affect precedes information." It is also interesting to note that markedly fewer students, especially among the eighth graders but also at nearly all grade levels, replied "don't know" to the items about

TABLE V-9

ATTITUDES TOWARD THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
DEMOCRACY AND CAPITALISM AND SOCIALISM

(percent of students by grade and of
parents as a whole choosing the
responses shown)

A. In the abstract:

Democracy is impossible in:

<u>Grade</u>	<u>Capitalist Countries</u>			<u>Socialist Countries</u>		
	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Neutral</u>	<u>Disagree</u>	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Neutral</u>	<u>Disagree</u>
8	26	59	15	24	58	18
10	23	49	28	21	52	28
12	29	42	29	18	52	30
Parents	34	39	27	34	45	21

B. In Japan:

To be democratic, Japan should have:

<u>Grade</u>	<u>Capitalism</u>			<u>Socialism</u>		
	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Neutral</u>	<u>Disagree</u>	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Neutral</u>	<u>Disagree</u>
8	27	47	26	26	49	25
10	32	45	23	14	36	50
12	25	45	30	15	40	45
Parents	35	41	24	21	39	40

democracy and capitalism or socialism in Japan than those about the interrelation of those principles in the abstract.

The use of general principles as a basis for political and social judgment would, of course, have to be consistent to qualify an individual's thought as ideological. Once again, the pattern of intercorrelations of items reveals a moderate degree of association, an average gamma of about .29 for all students as compared with .31 for the parents. When cross-tabulated with reactions to capitalism and socialism we find these items showing stronger degrees of association than did the evaluations of socialism and capitalism with regard to the five values. In this sphere, the area of prescriptive attitudes as opposed to the more descriptive character of beliefs about relative distribution of attributes, it would appear that affective and emotive responses to the ideological stimuli play a more influential role in shaping even teenagers' attitudes.

It is particularly noteworthy here that the strength of the relationships between these four items and reactions to the two economic systems increase sharply with age in six of the eight cases. By twelfth grade, students' attitudes toward the relationship between democracy and capitalism and socialism are as strongly related to whether they are favorable to capitalism or to socialism as are those of their parents. But in a reversal of the previous findings, it is the relationship between these attitudes and reaction to socialism that shows the strongest increase

with age.

Even among teenagers, then, there are those whose attitudes toward socialism and capitalism are so organized that they satisfy the criterion of constraint. The evidence indicates that similarly, some teenagers—indeed, probably more than levels of information would suggest—respond to ideological arguments based on "crowning postures" or the deductive application of general principles in political and social affairs. However, it is likewise clear that the model proposed by developmental psychologists, in which political learning occurs in stages, does not serve as a wholly adequate guide to the Japanese data. We saw that consistency in attitudes and beliefs relevant to socialism and capitalism increased with age generally, but that there were a number of cases in which increased age did not yield larger proportions of teenagers with congruent attitudes. Moreover, there did not seem to be a greater increase between the fifteen year olds (tenth graders) and the thirteen year olds than between the fifteen and seventeen year olds. Indeed, it was more often the case, with specific reference to ideologically related beliefs and attitudes, that the real jump in attitude coherence came in the last year of high school. The growth of ideology in adolescence would appear to be influenced not merely by the individual's capacity to absorb ideological learning but by the nature of those factors in his environment which reinforce or dilute the ideological

stimuli themselves. In Japan, where ideology is at the heart of partisan politics, party support takes on a special significance as a potential source of and reinforcement for ideology.

Ideology and Partisanship

Much of the path-breaking work on the political socialization of American youth was concerned with the experiences and learning undergone by young children. One important reason for this focus on political learning in early childhood was the belief that those attitudes and values acquired early in childhood become deeply rooted and endure as determinants of adult values and behavior; that they endure to a greater degree than those acquired later in life; and that they pervasively affect and color what is learned later in pre-adult life. It was quickly established that party identification was one of the orientations that developed early in the socialization process and that ideology was not. Even the oldest of Greenstein's sample of New Haven grade school children made so few "ideological" references to the differences between the parties that he concluded that there was probably a stage of childhood before which the acquisition of so abstract and complex a thing as ideology was impossible for most.¹⁶ Hyman decided that much the same point was the general conclusion to be

¹⁶ Fred I. Greenstein, Children and Politics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), p. 70.

drawn from a variety of studies.¹⁷ Hess and Torney, noting the same low level of ideological consciousness among their eight to thirteen year old sample of American children, suggested that the tendency of young children to identify with the personalities of key leaders might in some way be compensatory for this inability to ideologize.¹⁸

Richard Merelman has pointed out that these findings imply ideological instability:

Because the earliest stages of human thought are not conducive to . . . ideological development, it seems fair to speculate, accepting the Freudian position on the psychological dominance of earliest modes of thought, that adult political ideologies always rest on an unstable base.¹⁹

But of course, such a consequence is most likely where party and ideology are only weakly related, if at all. Such is true in the United States where one can be either a conservative or a liberal Democrat or a conservative or a liberal Republican. In Japan, however, the lines of partisan cleavage overlap to a great extent with the lines of ideological cleavage. As the evidence cited earlier shows, substantially more Japanese than American adults

¹⁷ Herbert Hyman, Political Socialization (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1959), p. 46.

¹⁸ Robert D. Hess and Judith V. Torney, The Development of Political Attitudes in Children (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1968), pp. 19-22.

¹⁹ "The Development of Political Ideology," p. 755.

think of politics in ideological terms: the left-right cleavage, and the division of the parties into two opposing camps. The central point is that in Japan, unlike the United States, the nature of the parties and the party system, and in particular the unambiguous ideological position of most of the parties, means that party support supplies both an intense and unequivocal stimulus to the development of ideology, as well as a stable basis and reinforcement for that ideology.

To begin the discussion of how party support and ideology interact in the political socialization of Japanese teenagers, let us look at Table V-10, which summarizes the correlations between party support and a capitalism-versus-socialism scale, made up of a number of the items just discussed.²⁰ For convenience, I shall refer to the composite scale as the ideology scale.

As the table makes clear, there is indeed a strong general association between the students' partisanship and their over-all ideological tendency. Inspection of the

²⁰The scale was formed as follows: a factor analysis was performed on the responses to the political attitude items of the eighth graders in the sample, and a varimax rotation performed on the principal components. Eight items loaded at a level of .30 or higher on one rotated factor. These were all related to attitudes toward capitalism and toward socialism, and included most of those I have mentioned so far. All of these were five point Likert-scale items. I recoded them all so that a strongly pro-socialist response was given a score of 1 and a strongly pro-capitalist response a score of 5. The scores on the eight items were then cumulated for each individual in a summary index. This index was then trichotomized into the three-point ideology scale.

TABLE V-10

STUDENTS' PARTY SUPPORT AND IDEOLOGY

(percent of students supporting each party who are pro-capitalist, neutral, or pro-socialist)

Ideology Scale

<u>Party Support</u>	<u>Pro-Capitalist</u>	<u>Neutral</u>	<u>Pro-Socialist</u>	<u>Total</u>
LDP	44	40	17	100%
DSP	16	50	34	100%
Komei	34	26	40	100%
JSP	17	30	53	100%
JCP	7	33	60	100%

Goodman and Kruskal's Gamma = .50

breakdown by each party, however, reveals differential patterns of party-ideology correspondence. One particular hypothesis suggests itself in this regard. We would expect that supporters of the parties of the left, the JSP and JCP, would show the highest degree of party-ideology congruity. To begin with, these are the parties which use ideological rhetoric in politics, and the very terms of that rhetoric derive from their philosophical and conceptual vocabulary. Moreover, these two parties carry primary ideological terms or labels as their names. I have already suggested that ideological labels, like "socialist" and "communist," play the same sort of simplifying role that party labels play: they reduce complex ideas and complex realities to images that are easily comprehensible and have strong affective color. A common pair of such images is the fat capitalist with his cigar, and the idealistic and dedicated socialist working for the good of all. When such ideological labels as these, which are the real "building block" elements of ideologies, are also the labels of political parties, they create a synthesis of party and ideology that forms a unified object of support and affection, or of rejection and hostility.

This hypothesis is supported by the figures in the table, as it is generally in the cross-tabulations of party support with nearly every individual item relevant to socialism and capitalism. Interestingly enough, when we examine the relationship between party support and

reactions to the terms socialism, capitalism and communism, we observe that while indeed more JSP and JCP supporters are favorable to socialism and communism than, for example, the proportion of Liberal Democratic supporters favorable to capitalism, we find that significantly fewer of them are unfavorable to capitalism than were favorable to socialism and communism. Apparently, the reinforcement of positive party and ideological labels that takes place is stronger than the generation of hostility toward the opposing label.

The importance of party support to ideology among Japanese teenagers is underscored by comparison with other relevant potential influences. Neither the student's age or sex correlates with ideology to any great extent, the gammas being $-.08$ and $.00$ respectively. Even urban-rural residence is only weakly related ($\text{gamma} = -.15$). Once again, as in the case of partisanship itself, we observe that there is little direct impact of socioeconomic status on ideology ($\text{gamma} = .03$). Controlling for urban-rural residence results in the emergence of a fairly weak link ($.17$) between socioeconomic status and ideology among the urban teenagers, but not among their rural peers ($.01$).

Although these other factors have little or no direct influence on the teenagers' ideology as measured by the composite scale, they do affect the relationship between partisan support and ideology. Table V-11 presents

TABLE V-11

PARTIAL AND CONDITIONAL GAMMAS BETWEEN STUDENTS'
PARTY SUPPORT AND IDEOLOGY SCALE WITH
OTHER FACTORS CONTROLLED

<u>Control</u>	<u>Partial Gamma^a</u>	<u>Conditional Gamma^b</u>		
Grade	.50	<u>8</u> .46	<u>10</u> .45	<u>12</u> .58
Sex	.51	<u>Boys</u> .61	<u>Girls</u> .35	
Urban-Rural	.49	<u>Urban</u> .53	<u>Rural</u> .43	
SES	.52	<u>Low</u> .30	<u>Med.</u> .67	<u>High</u> .39
Media Exposure	.50	<u>Low</u> .27	<u>Med.</u> .48	<u>High</u> .66

^aPartial gamma = over-all value of gamma between party support and ideology scale when the effects of the control variable are held constant.

^bConditional gamma = value of gamma in each category of the control variable.

a summary of the correlations between party support and the ideology scale controlling for other factors.

The emphasis on the growth of cognitive capacities with age in the approach of developmental psychology to the emergence of ideology would lead us to expect an increase in the correlation between partisanship and ideology with the age or grade of the student. There is indeed an increase, but only a modest one—since even among the youngest the relationship is already quite strong. It is clear from the table that other factors have an even greater impact in specifying the correspondence of party and ideology. The correlation is much greater among boys than girls, and somewhat greater among urban than rural children. These differences reflect, indirectly I believe, the same influence on the development of ideology that is more explicit in the case of media exposure. The more the student reads magazines and newspapers and watches television programs about politics, the closer the fit between his party support and his ideology, as I am using the term here. One obvious reason for this is that in following politics in the media, the student increases his information and knowledge about the symbols and the positions associated with the party he supports and with those which he does not support.

The sex difference reflects this same point, because politics in Japan is a man's world—there are literally no more than a handful of women political leaders, none of

them being well known. Moreover, women in Japan generally show less interest in politics and express fewer political opinions than men.²¹ Girls, then, receive markedly less impetus toward political interest than do boys.

Similarly, the urban teenager comes in daily contact with more political stimuli than the rural teenager as a function of the constant presence of intense and fairly pervasive partisan conflict that is missing or muted in the village, where nonpartisanship and an overwhelming predominance of conservatism stifle the flow of partisan and especially ideological stimuli.²²

In short, it seems evident that in so far as the fit between party support and ideology is concerned, the frequency and strength of relevant stimuli seem more important than age in influencing the ideological development of the Japanese teenager. To account for the development of ideology, in the simple sense that I have been using

²¹See, on this point, for example, Yasumasa Kuroda, "Aspects of Community Political Participation in Japan: Influences of Education, Sex and Political Generation," a paper delivered at the American Sociological Association Annual Meeting, San Francisco, California, August 1967, p. 8.

²²A substantial part of the explanation for the curvilinearity of the party-ideology relationship when SES is controlled is due to the same factors. The low SES group, a substantial part of which is made up of rural youngsters, is less politically interested and less politically stimulated than youngsters from the white collar, urban families that make up most of the middle and upper SES groups. In the upper SES group, on the other hand, as I noted in the preceding chapter, there is a high proportion of youngsters who intentionally abstain from partisanship.

that term to mean the set of reactions to symbols and labels associated with the classic left-right, socialist-capitalist continuum plus a set of attitudes and beliefs about how other values relate to these symbols, it is not enough to look to the emergence of cognitive capacities. Richard Merelman has theorized that such cognitive development would be of central importance in the creation of ideology only in the absence of strong and unambiguous ideologically-related stimuli in the environment. In Japan, the ideological nature of much of partisan politics provides a basis for such a stimulus in the very process of party identification, and that stimulus is accentuated and reinforced by factors associated with increased political interest.²³

Conclusion

The frequency and intensity with which ideological symbols and rhetoric are employed in Japanese politics give to ideology a significant place in the political

²³Bradley Richardson, in a secondary analysis of the University of Michigan survey on Japanese voting behavior, reports that in Japan strength of party identification is highly related to political interest (gamma = .41 as compared to .04 for the 1968 Survey Research Center's sample of American adults). Unfortunately, my data do not permit direct measurement of the strength of party identification, but there is a clear parallel between this finding about adults' partisanship with the evidence in my data that political interest increases the fit between party and ideology among teenagers. See Richardson, op. cit.

learning of Japanese teenagers. From their mid-teens, most conceive of their country as primarily capitalist and only secondarily democratic. At the beginning of adolescence their conceptions of capitalism are ill-formed and nebulous, while socialism appears more readily and clearly grasped. By age fifteen or so, however, the great majority appear to understand the fundamental characteristics of both these "isms." But neither evokes the widespread positive reaction accorded to peace and democracy. Nevertheless, a substantial proportion, on the order of one-half those in the study, reacted affectively to the terms, either negatively or positively. There was widespread agreement among teenagers and parents alike on the merits and faults of the two systems: on the superiority of capitalism in promoting liberty and democracy, and on the superiority of socialism in advancing equality and diminishing poverty and the "gap between rich and poor."

Analysis of the consistency with which teenagers held attitudes relevant to the left-right ideological continuum revealed moderate over-all correlations. The degree of correspondence in such attitudes did appear to increase with age, in keeping with the model of the development of political thought as dependent on a process of progress from one stage of cognitive capacity to another. But the increases in consistency were not uniform across all attitudes, nor were they generally large in magnitude. The evidence on the relationship between party support and

ideology suggested that for Japanese teenagers, the acquisition of an ideology is closely linked to the acquisition of partisanship, and that age and developing cognitive capacities are less important determinants than in situations where salient and potent external stimuli are lacking. This finding parallels the tentative finding of Richard Merelman, cited earlier, that American adolescents develop modes or styles of political thought characterized by consistency and argument from broad principles not so much as a function of increased cognitive capacity but as a response to powerful and unambiguous stimuli from the political environment.

I emphasized that, in particular, ideology is made both salient and readily comprehensible in Japanese politics by the wide-ranging use of simple ideological labels like socialist and capitalist. In turn, these labels become closely associated with the parties, being in some important cases the very names of the parties and in any event unambiguous in their party referents, unlike conservative and liberal in American politics—words which are totally unrelated to the party names and largely unclear as to how they relate to party positions. Hence the stimuli to a synthesis of partisanship and ideology among Japanese teenagers are intense and clear-cut.

In the preceding chapter we found that "cultural" factors, in particular urban and rural residence, lie at

the root of partisan cleavage. In this chapter, we have witnessed the emergence in adolescence of an ideological cleavage paralleling and overlapping that partisan cleavage and deriving from it. How that politico-ideological cleavage interacts with other lines of cleavage and with cultural factors to influence adolescents' support for the institutions of democratic politics as well as orientations affecting the political self is the question to which the chapter that follows must address itself.

CHAPTER VI

THE POLITICAL SELF: SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL INFLUENCES

So far this study has concentrated mainly on what Japanese teenagers learn about politics. But an equally important question is how they acquire their political beliefs and values. One answer of obvious importance is that they may acquire them from other people with whom they interact, socializing agents like the family, the school, and the peer group which communicate political ideas and values. That is an avenue of approach which I shall explore fully in the next chapter.

A second answer is that they may also acquire them by virtue of their own identities, by being members of categories of people, social strata, sexes, or generations, for instance. A great part of the body of social science literature on politics is concerned with the effects of such sources of identity on political beliefs and behavior. In this chapter, I examine how belonging to an important set of such categories affects the political values and beliefs that Japanese teenagers acquire. Specifically, the question is

how basic social and personal background characteristics, sex, age, urban or rural residence, and family socioeconomic status, affect the development by Japanese teenagers of three political orientations that are important as elements both of theories of democratic political culture and of competing models of political man among adult Japanese: political interest, political efficacy, and political trust, here broken into input support and output support.

Because democracy is predicated upon the participation of citizens in the political process, theories of the attitudinal and other psychological sources of support for democracy, or of democratic political culture, usually place great emphasis on the importance of political participation and the attitudes associated with it. The ideal typical model of the participant democrat is one who takes an active part in politics as the result of his interest in events in the political realm, confident that his voice and his action can influence both the process and the outcome of decisions, and being essentially optimistic about the responsiveness and the general fairness and morality of the actors, institutions, and processes involved in politics—though with a healthy skepticism of, and independent attitude toward, authority.¹

¹This composite ideal type of the democratic participant can be found in numerous discussions in the literature. See for the most frequently cited example, Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Princeton: Princeton

Now any observer of politics in the real world will recognize that this is indeed an ideal, and idealistic, image of the actual attitudes and behavior of citizens in a democratic system. Many people are apathetic, many feel powerless, many are cynical, many never participate at all. And indeed in Japan there are two alternative ideal typical models of political man which are widely supposed to be more accurate representations of actual adult political attitudes and behavior. These I shall call "mobilized traditional man" and "alienated mass man."

Traditionally, politics in Japan was the domain of the privileged, the elite, the influential; it was not for the common man. The political participation of ordinary people was the result of mobilization by local influentials, relying on the traditional social norm that valued participation for its own sake and which manifested itself as a social pressure to participate, rather than the spontaneous result of the individual's own political interest. Political interest was usually low to nonexistent. Nor was the ordinary man likely to feel influential in a political system that emphasized the exaltation of the officials and the degradation of the people (kanson minpi). The citizenry were basically oriented to the output side of politics, trusting in and bowing to the superior wisdom of government and

University Press, 1963), pp. 17 ff., and passim; Almond and Verba do not emphasize an independent attitude toward authority, however. On this point see Robert A. Dahl, Modern Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970, 2nd ed.), p. 94 and the works cited there.

officials while being wary of and skeptical about the motives and interests of the political parties and other actors involved in the input process.²

Modern day mass society is also alleged to have created another alternative ideal type in competition with the participant-democratic citizen: alienated mass man. The converse of the "subject" orientation of the mobilized traditional man is that of the alienated mass man. He is likely to be interested in politics, but not in participation, at least not within the established framework of participation. He has lost faith in the morality of the actors and institutions in the political process and in his ability to have his voice heard in that process. Much of the most visible politics of youth in Japan, as well as of the Japanese left in general, appears to fit many of these descriptive indicators of alienation.³

²The best statement of the assumptions and hypotheses from which this model derives may be found in Watanuki Joji, "Social Structure and Political Participation in Japan," University of Iowa, Department of Political Science, Laboratory for Political Research, Report No. 32, May, 1970, especially pp. 2-3.

³The literature on alienation is vast but diffuse. An excellent introduction to the subject can be found in Joel D. Aberbach, "Alienation and Political Behavior," American Political Science Review, LXIII, 1 (March, 1969), 86-99. See also Ada W. Finifter, "Dimensions of Political Alienation," American Political Science Review, LXIV, 2 (June, 1970), 389-410. James White, "The Political Implications of Cityward Migration in Japan" (unpublished manuscript, 1971), presents an excellent review of the literature on the city as a source of alienation. His The Sokagakkai and Mass Society (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970) also discusses the applicability of theories of mass man and mass society, notably that of William Kornhauser, to an important group of contemporary Japanese adults.

Now it will be noted that these two alternatives to the democratic participant model of political man in Japan are closely linked to some important social and personal differences, in particular urban-rural residence, sex, and generation. Rural residents, women, and the prewar generation tend to be associated, in Japanese political stereotypes, with the mobilized traditional model; while urbanites, men, and the postwar generation are associated with the image of alienated man. These stereotypes reflect also another dimension of assumptions about the sources of political attitudes and behavior; namely, that two general kinds of influences are at work. The first kind includes cultural or rather psychocultural influences, in which, in the case of the mobilized traditional man, traditional Japanese culture allegedly inhibits both his political interest and his general sense of efficacy, and ultimately therefore throws a pall on his view of the input aspects of politics, all by creating in him a sense of self-suppression, of subordination to the group and a loss of autonomy. The culture is also alleged to discourage sociability beyond the limits of the immediate group and thus to engender distrust in others, which in turn contributes to distrust of the remote and impersonal world of politics, as well as skepticism about the possibility of being able to affect decisions taken there.

The second set of influences associated with the models of mobilized and alienated men are those related to social

and ideological cleavage. Urban-rural residence is known to be the major source of difference among Japanese adults in partisanship and ideology.⁴ While urban life itself may have direct influence on political man different from the effects of rural life, urban-rural differences appear to operate as influences on political man to a large degree through the intermediate effects of party and ideology on political interest, participation, and support.

Since all teenagers are part of the postwar generation, the generational differences I mentioned do not play any direct role in explaining differences among them. But as in previous chapters I shall compare their political orientations with their parents. In addition, however, I shall also examine the effects on the dependent political attitudes, and the intervening psychocultural and cleavage factors of the age of the teenager. Preceding chapters have shown rises in both political cynicism and partisan and ideological sophistication concurrent with increased age.

At the outset, the chapter examines the interrelationship between the independent and intervening variables in order to pave the way for the multivariate analysis of the political orientations that will follow. The orientations themselves will then be considered individually and in a sequence based on a set of assumptions about their relationship

⁴See the discussion on these points in chapters four and five.

to one another. This is done because the over-all objective will be to develop several multivariate models of the sources and structure of the orientations of Japanese youth relevant to the democratic participant ideal type of political man. In order to arrive at such models I make use of the technique of path analysis, a variety of causal modeling. The analysis of the correlations between the independent, intervening and dependent variables, therefore, will present not only cross-tabulations, as in previous chapters, but also product-moment correlations between variables. Appended is a matrix of the intercorrelations of all of the variables used in the analysis at the end of the chapter (Appendix VI-1).

The Intervening Influences:

I. Psychocultural Characteristics

An important strain in modern democratic theory has emphasized that for democracy to flourish it requires support in the culture of the society it serves and in the personalities of its citizens. The current conception of a political culture of democracy, composed of patterns of specifically political attitudes and beliefs and of other psychological orientations clearly relevant to such political attitude and beliefs, is the outgrowth of a long history of theories of how culture and personality affect politics. Before the political culture approach, there was the psychocultural approach, which attributed many of the political characteristics of adults to experiences with their parents

in infancy and earliest childhood. Thus, the political characteristics of entire societies were interpreted by reference to patterns of child rearing. Many such analyses were made of Japan. They exhibit the flaws that caused many social scientists to direct intense criticism at psychoculturalism on methodological, epistemological and substantive grounds—lack of concern with the representativeness of the sample; the absence of evidence testing the general applicability in a society of asserted psychocultural characteristics; the naive generalization of characteristics of relationships at one level of human interaction, especially those of the family, to the much more complex level of politics; and the inattention to the effects on adults of life experiences after childhood, among others.⁵ But while the psychocultural approach is heavily flawed, it does provide an emphasis on factors that may lie deeper and endure longer than attitudes, and which, by affecting more specifically political orientations, may be important links in the causal chains that lead to adult political behavior.

Ego-autonomy and social trust are two psychocultural characteristics which play leading roles in both theories of democratic personality and theories of the Japanese national psyche. Let us look first at ego-autonomy.

⁵See Alex Inkeles, "National Character and Modern Political Systems," reprinted in Nelson Polsby, et al., eds., Politics and Social Life (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1963), pp. 172-192; and Almond and Verba, op. cit., pp. 34 ff.

The democratic personality, to use Robert Lane's phrase, or the democratic character, to use Harold Lasswell's, is a man in control of himself and confident of his ability to deal with and control the environment. Lane's use of this concept of inner and outer control, which he terms ego-strength, in his conception of the democratic personality derives from his view that without these two capacities

. . . it is possible neither to pursue a long-term course of action nor to effect much social change. Equally important, without the inner experience of control, a man hardly understands how control processes can work; he projects anarchy or conspiracy upon the world.⁶

Lasswell's notion of character strength, a basic aspect of democratic character enabling the individual to "maintain the self-system despite environing conditions which are adverse,"⁷ or, in Greenstein's phrase, "to withstand environmental pressure adverse to one's values,"⁸ is very similar to Lane's formulation and is particularly appropriate in the context of Japanese culture. The subordination of the individual to the group, the coercive character

⁶ Robert E. Lane, Political Ideology (New York: Free Press, 1962), p. 412.

⁷ Harold D. Lasswell, "Democratic Character," in The Political Writings of Harold D. Lasswell (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1951), p. 503.

⁸ Fred I. Greenstein, "Personality and Political Socialization: The Theories of Authoritarian and Democratic Character," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 361 (September, 1965), p. 95.

of consensual decisions, and the use of shaming as a principal technique for inducing conformity are all commonly asserted to be characteristic elements of traditional Japanese culture.⁹ The potential corrosive effect of these cultural characteristics on the external aspects of ego strength are obvious. A similar corrosion of internal controls by the indulgence of the male child and the authoritarian character of the father-child relationship in the Japanese family is asserted by Iga Mamoru to be the cause for suicide among Japanese youth.¹⁰

What then of contemporary Japanese? Do they exhibit this alleged cultural characteristic of personal incompetence? In a comparative study of American and Japanese grade school children an American anthropologist found the Japanese to be "other directed" and dependent on the group in comparison to the self-directed autonomous Americans.¹¹ But a study of conformity among Japanese college students revealed that

⁹ See, among others, Ruth Benedict, The Chrysanthemum and the Suburb (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1946); Geoffrey Gorer, "Themes in Japanese Culture," reprinted in B.S. Silberman, ed., Japanese Character and Culture (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1962), pp. 3-; Weston LaBarre, "Some Observations on Character Structure in the Orient," reprinted in B.S. Silberman, ed., Japanese Character and Culture, pp. 325-359.

¹⁰ Iga Mamoru, "Cultural Factors in Suicide of Japanese Youth with Focus on Personality," Sociology and Social Research, 46:1 (October 1961), 75-90.

¹¹ Mary Ellen Goodman, "Values, Attitudes, and Social Concepts of Japanese and American Children," American Anthropologist, 59:6 (December 1957), 979-999.

not only did many of the students make judgments independent of those of the group, but about a third of them even disagreed with the group when the group judgment was correct. Robert Frager, the author of the study, called this phenomenon "anti-conformity" and argued that since it constituted a reaction against the group it was in effect another variety of group controlled behavior.¹² Nevertheless it can also be interpreted as evidence for an assertiveness of the self that is hard to square with the characteristics of the weak ego.

Similarly, the finding of Whitehill and Takezawa that Japanese blue collar workers are more likely than American workers to resist an order from a superior which they believe to be illegitimate does not bespeak a culturally based inability to withstand pressures opposed to the values of the individual in contemporary Japan.¹³

In order to tap this particular psychological dimension, I included in my survey four items related to external control, or ego autonomy, and one related to inner control. Table VI-1 presents these items with a comparison of childrens' and parents' reactions to each. In so far as these indicators of ego-autonomy are concerned, there appears to be no dramatic and consistent generational difference. But

¹²Robert E. Frager, "Conformity and Anticonformity in Japan," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 15:3 (1970), 203-210.

¹³Arthur Whitehill and Shin'ichi Takezawa, The Other Worker (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1965).

TABLE VI-1

EGO-AUTONOMY SCALE ITEMS WITH RESPONSES BY GENERATION^a

<u>Item</u>	<u>% Autonomous</u>	<u>% Non- Autonomous</u>
a. When your friends and others belittle a movie or TV program that you liked as "dull" or "stupid," it is best to keep silent and say nothing	(Disagree) 67% 47%	(Agree) 14% students 40% parents
b. Do you often lose confidence when many of your friends and others disagree with you?	(Not very often-- hardly ever) 50% 64%	(Very often and often) 50% students 35% parents
c. When you make plans do they often work out as you planned?	(Very often and often) 36% 57%	(Not very often, hardly ever) 64% students 42% parents
d. When you have disagreements with others do you often get your own way?	(Very often and often) 45% 40%	(Not very often, hardly ever) 55% students 60% parents
e. When you have made up your mind about something do you often change your mind if someone tries to argue you out of it?	(Not very often-- hardly ever) 60% 74%	(Very often and often) 40% students 25% parents

^aPercentages may not total to 100% in some cases because the table omits neutral responses (don't know) to the first item and non-respondents to all items.

let us focus more specifically on the ego autonomy of members of the younger generation and factors associated with their differences in this respect. Table VI-2 presents the above five items cumulated into an ego autonomy scale broken down by the four personal and social background variables. (The scale, like all others used here, is trichotomized so that roughly one-third of all the students fall into each of its three categories.)

The table shows that neither grade nor sex correlates with ego autonomy to any substantial degree. (Indeed, since in each case the value of r is less than .10, neither can be said to explain even as much as 1 percent of the variance among the teenagers on ego autonomy. For present purposes, a value of $r = .10$ will be taken as a minimum criterion for any correlation to be deemed to exist.) That sex and ego autonomy are so weakly related may seem something of a surprise in view of the stereotypical image of the Japanese woman as being bred to submissiveness and docility. On the other hand, however, the Japanese mother is alleged to cause the male children—specifically the oldest boy—to develop an emotional and physical dependency on her, leaving the daughters and younger sons to develop into stronger, more autonomous individuals.¹⁵ Thus there may be offsetting influences at work here that are responsible for the fact that

¹⁵Richard K. Beardsley, "Personality Psychology," in John W. Hall and Richard K. Beardsley, eds., Twelve Doors to Japan (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1965), pp. 378-379.

TABLE VI-2
 JAPANESE TEENAGERS' EGO AUTONOMY
 BY PERSONAL AND SOCIAL BACKGROUND VARIABLES

A. By Grade						B. By Sex					
Ego-Autonomy						Ego-Autonomy					
	<u>High</u>	<u>Med.</u>	<u>Low</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>N</u>		<u>High</u>	<u>Med.</u>	<u>Low</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>N</u>
12	33	37	30	100%	325	Boys	37	34	29	100%	489
10	38	33	29	100%	329	Girls	30	36	34	100%	444
8	29	34	37	100%	279						
Gamma = .07; r* = .05						Gamma = .12; r = .07					
C. By Urban-Rural Residence						D. By Family Socioeconomic Status					
Ego-Autonomy						Ego-Autonomy					
	<u>High</u>	<u>Med.</u>	<u>Low</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>N</u>		<u>High</u>	<u>Med.</u>	<u>Low</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>N</u>
Urban	37	36	27	100%	532	High	40	35	26	100%	312
Rural	29	34	37	100%	401	Med.	32	36	32	100%	414
						Low	27	33	40	100%	207
Gamma = .17; r = .12						Gamma = .17; r = .14					

* r = Pearsonian product moment correlation calculated on the uncollapsed distributions of all variables in this and succeeding tables.

boys are only slightly more autonomous than girls. Similarly, the increase of self-reliance and confidence that we would expect to occur between the ages of thirteen (when the individual is in many ways still a dependent child) and seventeen or eighteen (when the individual is on the verge of adulthood) may be countered by continued socialization by family and especially peer group pressures to conform. In any event, though the observed difference in the proportion of twelfth graders high on ego autonomy by comparison with eighth graders is in the expected direction, it is slight indeed.

In the classic view of Japanese society presented in many anthropological studies of Japanese culture, and in many of the psychocultural analyses of the Japanese "national character," the village is depicted as being the archetypal conformist society, due in the main to the close-knit interaction of its residents and their inherent conservatism and preference for harmony and consensus. Recent studies, such as that mentioned above of the tendency toward conformity among college students, have suggested that traditionalism, a preference for these old consensual, harmonious, and hierarchical patterns of value and behavior, is associated with conformity.¹⁶ Thus we would expect that low autonomy will be associated with rural residence and with low socioeconomic status, since traditional ways and values are most likely to

¹⁶Fragar, op. cit., p. 206.

be found among the groups which have lower levels of education, are employed in manual occupations, and are thus less exposed to stimuli to pull them away from the old to the new. These two hypotheses seem to hold, but the relationships are fairly weak. In the first case, 37 percent of the urban children as opposed to 29 percent of the rural children rank high on ego autonomy, with a gamma of .17 and a product-moment correlation of .12. A similar, fairly weak correlation exists between family socioeconomic status and ego autonomy, where $\text{gamma} = .17$, $r = .14$, and 40 percent of the high SES students are high on autonomy as against only 27 percent of those from low SES families.

Since neither sex nor grade meet the minimum criterion of correlations with ego autonomy, of the four independent variables only urban-rural residence and SES are correlates of this psychocultural characteristic. However, these two social characteristics are fairly strongly intercorrelated ($r = .47$) and it is likely that the correlation between either one and ego autonomy may be due to this intercorrelation. In fact, the partial correlation (r) between urban-rural residence and autonomy controlling for SES drops to .07 while that between SES and autonomy with urban-rural residence drops only to .11. This is an unusual outcome because as we shall see it is usually the case that urban-rural residence explains a link between SES and some other variable. In any event, it appears that if "traditionalism"

is a cause of low ego autonomy, it is a traditionalism that derives basically from low socioeconomic status—probably from the low educational level of the family, and that the link between urban-rural residence and ego autonomy is due in large part to the presence of a high proportion of families with low educational levels among the rural group.

The second of the psychocultural intervening variables in the analysis, social trust, is also one which plays a leading role in conceptions of democratic man. Two of the three components of the self-system of the democratic character in Harold Lasswell's classic model are related to the capacity for trust in other people. Democratic man, Lasswell postulates, is characterized by "deep confidence in the benevolent potentialities of man" and the "maintenance of an open as against a closed ego" in which the individual's attitude toward other human beings is warm rather than frigid, inclusive and expanding rather than exclusive and constricting . . ."¹⁷ Almond and Verba likewise accord to the sense of social trust the status of one of the foundations of the democratic political culture.¹⁸

Few observers have asserted that cynicism or misanthropy is a major element in the Japanese national character. There appears to be little of the corrosive cynicism and the

¹⁷Lasswell, "Democratic Character," pp. 495-502.

¹⁸Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture, p. 287.

"associational incapacity" claimed to characterize the French or of the "amoral familism" of the southern Italians."¹⁹ It is clear that the Japanese have traditionally been capable of civic cooperation and of forming highly effective and durable groups. Nevertheless, it has been asserted that the group life of the Japanese tends to be dominated by a single, intimate group whose closed boundaries play a significant role in determining the individual's social self. Nakane Chie has argued that the Japanese divide the world into uchi (we) and yoso (they), one of the consequences of which is a degree of suspicion about others not part of one's group. "To say that someone belongs to another group is to imply a moral censure of him."²⁰ A second consequence is that multiple group membership is inhibited. "The nature of group formation in Japan, the total 'emotional participation,' the sense of 'group oneness,' the separation of

¹⁹ See on France: Laurence Wylie, Village in the Vaucluse (New York: Harper & Row, 1964); and Sidney Tarrow, Fred I. Greenstein, and Mary F. Williams, "Associational Incapacity in French Children: Some Evidence from a Study of Political Socialization in France and England" (unpublished manuscript, 1971); on Italy: Edward C. Banfield, The Moral Basis of a Backward Society (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1958).

²⁰ "Nihonteki Shakai Kozo no Hakken" (The Discovery of a Japanese-style Social Structure), Chuo Koron (May, 1964), pp. 60 and 64.

'we' and 'others' leaves no room for the cultivation of sociability."²¹ Ezra Vogel has made essentially the same point in his study of Japan's new middle class:

Because [the member of the new middle class] ordinarily belongs to only one or two intimate groups to which he is absolutely devoted, these groups tend to absorb his total personality. He has no clear conception of himself apart from the group. He rarely belongs to special interest groups with specific and limited purposes.²²

My questionnaire included four items relating to trust in people, to see to what role, if any, general cynicism plays in the attitude structure of Japanese youth. The items are given in Table VI-3, with responses by generation.

On the whole, the students appear somewhat less cynical than their parents, a finding that would not be surprising except that, as we saw in chapter two, they were substantially more cynical about some aspects of politics than were their parents.

We would expect that each of the four independent variables in the analysis would have an impact on social trust. Table VI-4 presents the cross-tabulation of each variable with trust. With regard to age, the obvious hypothesis is that the older teenagers ought to be more cynical,

²¹Ibid., p. 61.

²²Japan's New Middle Class (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1963), p. 118.

TABLE VI-3²³

SOCIAL TRUST ITEMS AND RESPONSES BY GENERATION

<u>Item</u>	% (disagree)		% (d.k.)		% (agree)	
	<u>Trusting</u>	<u>Neutral</u>	<u>Trusting</u>	<u>Neutral</u>	<u>Cynical</u>	
a. Given the chance, most people will try to take advantage of you.	26	24	50	students		
	44	21	35	parents		
b) Most people can be trusted.	31	38	31	students		
	28	39	33	parents		
c) It is necessary to take adequate precautions when dealing with people.	33	32	35	students		
	17	24	59	parents		
d) Other people can't be depended upon. When you get right down to it, the only one you can rely on is yourself.	41	25	34	students		
	14	18	62	parents		

²³See Appendix VI-II for the matrix of intercorrelations of students' responses to these items.

TABLE VI-4

JAPANESE TEENAGERS' SOCIAL TRUST
BY PERSONAL AND SOCIAL BACKGROUND VARIABLES

A. By Grade

Social Trust					
	<u>High</u>	<u>Med.</u>	<u>Low</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>N</u>
12	25	40	35	100%	325
10	31	43	27	100%	333
8	26	44	29	99%	280

Gamma = -.05; r = -.06

B. By Sex

Social Trust					
	<u>High</u>	<u>Med.</u>	<u>Low</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>N</u>
Boys	32	42	26	100%	491
Girls	23	42	35	100%	447

Gamma = .19; r = .10

C. By Urban-Rural Residence

Social Trust					
	<u>High</u>	<u>Med.</u>	<u>Low</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>N</u>
Urban	28	41	31	100%	536
Rural	27	44	29	100%	402

Gamma = -.01; r = .00

D. By Family Socioeconomic Status

Social Trust					
	<u>High</u>	<u>Med.</u>	<u>Low</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>N</u>
High	31	40	29	100%	316
Med.	27	41	32	100%	416
Low	24	47	29	100%	206

Gamma = .05; r = .03

if the increasing political cynicism that we observed in chapter two holds for general cynicism as well, as if they become more like Japanese adults. But in fact, there is only a very weak negative relationship ($\gamma = -.05$, $r = -.06$) between grade in school and social trust. Cynicism increases only very faintly with age during adolescence. The hypothesis must be considered disconfirmed.

We would expect, secondly, that urban residence would tend to lower teenagers' trust, since the evidence is that rural Japanese have substantially more extensive social contacts than their urban peers.²⁴ Moreover, urban life is the central factor in many theories of alienation.²⁵ On the other hand, of course, the urbanite is more used to interaction with strangers and might be less likely to the suspicion and cynicism about the "others" of which Nakane was speaking. In any event, the data here show no difference whatever between urban and rural teenagers' social trust ($\gamma = -.01$, $r = .00$). Nor does family socioeconomic

²⁴Bradley M. Richardson, "Urbanization and Political Behavior, The Case of Japan" (unpublished manuscript, 1971), forthcoming in the American Political Science Review.

²⁵See White, "Political Implications of Cityward Migration," esp. pp. 1-10, for an extensive discussion of the role of city life in various theories of alienation and, conversely, of alienation as a major consequence in theories of the effects of urbanization.

status have any effect ($\gamma = -.05$, $r = .03$).

It is striking that among the four independent variables, only sex has any relation to how teenagers feel about other peoples' trustworthiness, with boys more trusting than girls (32 percent to 23 percent high in trust, respectively). The relationship is, however, fairly weak ($\gamma = .19$, $r = .10$). A similar weak positive relationship between sex and the social trust scale is observed among the adults in my sample as well ($\gamma = .12$). This may be the effect of the widely noted indulgence of the male in Japanese life and the relative deprivation of the Japanese female, whose traditional role has been to serve men—the father and the eldest son in particular.²⁶ Despite improvements in the "woman's lot" in Japan, there are still many areas of sex discrimination. Nationwide surveys have shown that a substantial number of women would prefer to be men if they could be reborn, and believe that men have much more pleasure in life. Many fewer teenage girls go on to college,²⁷ and the future life

²⁶ See the discussion in Beardsley, *op. cit.*

²⁷ The Institute of Statistical Mathematics quintennial surveys of Japanese attitudes in their continuing study of Japanese "national character" have included several questions on woman's lot in Japan. They have found that many more women would prefer to be reborn men than vice versa. However, there has been a steady drop in the proportion of women who would rather be men over the period of the four surveys they have conducted (1953, 1958, 1963 and 1958) from 64 percent (1958) to 43 percent (1968). Moreover, in the latest survey they found that a clear majority (58 percent) of the youngest women, those in their early twenties, would be born women again, as against only 39 percent of the oldest women, those in their sixties, who would do so.

opportunities of a young woman tend to be much more constricted than those of her male peer. It is no wonder then that women, young and old, tend to be somewhat more cynical than men.

Ego autonomy and social trust, then, are only weakly related to the social and personal bases of identity among Japanese teenagers. Nevertheless they are important because, as we shall see, each has a direct effect on several of the political orientations of Japanese teenagers that I am here discussing, and each also specifies the indirect impact of an independent background characteristic on those political orientations.

Intervening Variables:

II. Partisanship and Ideology

Chapters four and five dealt in detail with the nature of party support and of ideology among Japanese youngsters. I shall not go over that ground again, but a number of points

Nevertheless, the proportion of men who say they would prefer to be reborn women has continued to be miniscule, remaining in 1968 as in 1958 at the same mere 5 percent. Men in their early twenties were only very slightly more likely (7 percent) than those in their sixties (56 percent) to be dissatisfied in being males. Likewise, very few men or women (10 percent and 16 percent respectively) responded that they believed women have more pleasures in life, and in this case the younger the woman the likelier she was to say that men had more pleasure. See Tokai Suri Kenkyujo Kokuminsei Chosa Inkai (Japanese National Character: Second Study), Dai-ni Nihonjin no Kokuminsei (Tokyo: Shiseido, 1970), especially the tables on pp. 436-438 and the discussion on pp. 111-124. Analysis of the earlier data on these questions is given in the same authors, Nihonjin no Kokuminsei (Japanese National Character) (Tokyo: Shiseido, 1964), pp. 253-272.

do need to be made here about how these variables interrelate with one another and with the independent variables under discussion in this chapter. To begin with, since we know that party support emerges as a political characteristic of pre-adults, in Japan as elsewhere, earlier than ideology, there is no doubt that the direction of the relationship revealed by the moderate correlation of $r = .35$ is from party support to ideology.

I showed in chapter four that teenagers' party support and urban-rural residence are related; urban residence correlates, as we have seen, negatively with conservative (LDP) partisanship among the teenagers at a moderate level (gamma = $-.26$; $r = -.16$). As we also saw, socioeconomic status appeared to be completely unrelated to partisanship (zero order gamma = $-.02$; $r = .00$), but in fact when the effects of urban-rural residence were partialled out, there was a rather weak positive relationship between high status and conservative partisanship (partial gamma = $.14$; partial $r = .09$). This apparent anomaly of a weak but actual partial relationship between socioeconomic status and partisanship when the zero order relation appeared nonexistent is due to the fact that urban residence is positively related to high socioeconomic status but negatively to conservative party support, while socioeconomic status and party support are themselves positively related. There is thus a mutual dampening effect between urban-rural residence and socioeconomic

status in their respective correlations with teenagers' partisanship. Thus the partial relationship between place of residence and partisanship, controlling for socioeconomic status, is also greater than the zero order relationship (partial gamma = .35; partial r = .20).

Neither age nor sex are related to partisanship, but there is a relationship between age and ideology, though for reasons related to those set out in chapter five, that correlation is only a weak one (gamma = .08; r = .10). Finally, a glance at the matrix of interrelationships, (shown in Appendix VI-A) shows that neither of the psychocultural variables is related to either of these two political variables.

Before turning to an analysis of the dependent political orientations whose explanation is the objective of this chapter, it will be useful to summarize the analysis thus far. Essentially, the analysis establishes two sets of intervening variables, psychocultural factors—ego autonomy and social trust; and political cleavage factors—party support and ideology. The former two factors are not related to one another and vary with different background factors, ego autonomy being related to socioeconomic status and indirectly through SES to urban-rural residence, while social trust is associated solely with sex.²⁸ The political cleavage factors are, conversely, moderately interrelated and are related to

²⁸ According to the latest available figures only one college student in five is female, although four out of five junior college students are female. Yomiuri Shinbun, December 5, 1972.

both urban-rural residence and family socioeconomic status either directly, as in the case of partisanship, or indirectly through partisanship in the case of ideology. The teenager's age (or, more accurately, his grade in school) is also related, though weakly, to his ideology, with older youths tending to be more pro-socialist. Such is the nature of the interrelationships among the independent and intervening variables which make up the context of the analysis of Japanese teenagers' political selves that follows.

The Dependent Variables: The Teenager's Political Self

A. Political Efficacy

The norms of democratic ideology not only prescribe that the individual citizen should participate in political life but that his participation should be based on the belief that he is capable of influencing the course of events in politics. This latter concept, political efficacy or political competence, has been the subject of a large body of research on adult political attitudes and behavior. As David Easton and Jack Dennis have pointed out, several important studies of the political attitudes of adults, such as The Voter Decides and The American Voter, have concluded that political efficacy is an orientation of a deeper and more stable variety than most political attitudes and predispositions, one approaching the status of a personality component.²⁹

²⁹"The Child's Acquisition of Regime Norms: Political Efficacy," The American Political Science Review, LXI:1 (March, 1967), 33.

In their view, this suggests that political efficacy "is likely to begin to form in childhood, when personality development is at its peak."³⁰ They concluded that their data on American-children confirmed this hypothesis, as they found substantial evidence of the development of political efficacy as an attitude with coherence and structure from as early as third grade.³¹ My own data include evidence that is directly comparable to theirs, and which, as I shall show, tends to corroborate this finding. Table VI-5 presents the political efficacy items used in my survey and the over-all responses of students and parents to each item.

The students appear to be slightly more efficacious than their parents, but the edge though consistent on three of the four items (all but c) is slight. Both generations appear to be quite evenly split into politically efficacious and inefficacious groups. Since it is often asserted that Japanese traditional political culture relegated ordinary citizens to the role of subjects or supplicants vis-a-vis the powers that be, the nearly equal proportions of efficacious and inefficacious respondents in the older generation as in the younger indicate that the characterization may be less generally applicable than in the past.

Turning to the way in which youngsters differ in this orientation, however, let us begin with the question of the impact of age. Easton and Dennis's conclusion, mentioned above, that political efficacy becomes an established psycho-

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid.

TABLE VI-5 ³²

POLITICAL EFFICACY SCALE ITEMS AND RESPONSES BY GENERATION

	<u>Efficacious</u> (disagree & disagree strongly)	<u>Neutral</u> (don't know & no res- ponses)	<u>Non- Efficacious</u> (agree & agree strongly)	
a. What ordinary people like my family say has no effect on what the government does.	42%	21%	37%	students
	29%	29%	42%	parents
b. Things like politics and government are so complicated that people like myself can hardly understand how they work.	38%	24%	38%	students
	31%	30%	33%	parents
c. Ordinary people have no opportunity to get their views reflected in politics.	36%	15%	49%	students
	40%	22%	38%	parents
d. What the government does is like the weather; ordinary people can't do anything about it.	45%	25%	30%	students
	39%	28%	33%	parents

³² See Appendix VI-II for the matrix of intercorrelations of the students' responses to these items.

logical orientation early in childhood was in large part founded' on their discovery that' the items they used as individual indicators of efficacy converged to form a separate identifiable attitudinal dimension when a factor analysis was performed on the responses of the children to the political attitudinal items in their questionnaire. From third grade on, the same factor emerged when the analysis was performed on the responses of children in each grade, and the loadings (correlations of responses to individual items to the factor) remained quite constant from year to year.³³ Since three of the four items I used were virtually identical to those used by Easton and Dennis, I decided to perform a factor analysis on the responses to the political attitude items of the eighth graders in my sample, to see if the same pattern held among my youngest respondents, who were in the same age group as Easton and Dennis's oldest respondents. The procedure I employed was to perform a principal components factor analysis on the matrix of product-moment correlations between all of the political attitudinal items in my survey, based on the Likert-scale scores of each item, or in a few instances on dichotomous "dummy variables" created from the categories of some of the non-scalable items. The principal components were then put through a varimax orthogonal rotation taking an eigenvalue of 1.0 as the minimum criterion

³³"The Child's Acquisition of Regime Norms," p. 30, Table 1.

for rotation. The procedure duplicated that used by Easton and Dennis in every detail except that they used tetrachoric correlations. Table VI-6 presents the striking comparative results.

The three nearly identical items used in both studies show an uncanny level of similarity in the strength of their relationship to the political efficacy factors in the two data sets. The Japanese data thus provide strong corroboration that political efficacy emerges as a distinct component in the individual's structure of political attitudes and predispositions by at least the beginning of adolescence. An equally important implication suggested, but of course not shown, by the similarity of the American and Japanese evidence is that political efficacy may be a measurable component of "political personality" that is culture-free. Like nearly all concepts used in the analysis of political culture, political efficacy is the product of American thought and culture. But the Japanese data show that not only does it emerge as an independent dimension of the political attitude structure or political "personality" of Japanese youngsters, as it does among American youngsters, but that its elements cohere with one another (load on the same factor) in a manner so nearly identical to that in which they cohere among the American children that we might almost be talking of one component in a single factor analysis rather than components on totally independent factor analyses performed on two different cultures.

TABLE VI-6

THE POLITICAL EFFICACY COMPONENT ON THE POLITICAL
ATTITUDINAL STRUCTURES OF JAPANESE AND AMERICAN
EIGHTH GRADERS: SCALE ITEMS AND FACTOR LOADINGS
ON VARIMAX-ROTATED PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS

<u>Item</u>	<u>Factor Loading</u>	
	<u>Japanese Children</u>	<u>American Children</u>
Japan: What ordinary people like my family say has no effect on what the government does.		
U.S.: My family doesn't have any say about what the government does.	.70	.71
Japan: Ordinary people have no opportunity to get their views reflected in politics.		
U.S.: Citizens don't have a chance to say what they think about running the government.	.61	.71
Japan: What the government does is like the weather; ordinary people can't do anything about it.		
U.S.: What happens in the government will happen no matter what people do. It is like the weather, there is nothing people can do about it.	.59	.59
Japan <u>only</u> : Things like politics and government are so complicated that people like myself can hardly understand how they work.	.64	not used
U.S. <u>only</u> : There are some big forceful men in the government who are running the whole thing and they do not care about us ordinary people.	not used	.73

<u>Item</u>	<u>Japanese Children</u>	<u>American Children</u>
I don't think people in the government care much about what people like my family think.	not used	.76

Source: David Easton and Jack Dennis, "The Child's Acquisition of Regime Norms: Political Efficacy," American Political Science Review, LXI:1 (March, 1967), Table 1, p. 30.

Let us return now, however, to the question of how Japanese teenagers differ among themselves on political efficacy. Table VI-7 presents a cumulative scale of political efficacy based on the above four items, broken down by grade, sex, place of residence and family socioeconomic status of the students.

Having established that political efficacy is an identifiable component of Japanese youngsters' political attitude structure by eighth grade, it is appropriate to begin the analysis of the sources of difference with age. Easton and Dennis found that a substantial and consistent increase in efficacy occurs with age among American grade school children so that proportionally three times as many eighth graders as third graders score high on the variable.³⁴ Among my Japanese teenagers, however, there is but a slight increase with age: from 30 percent of the eighth graders to 38 percent of the tenth graders scoring high, while no further increase occurs after tenth grade, suggesting that if the variable does indeed lie at a deeper level of the psyche, its direction may become fairly set by age fifteen or so.

Despite the implied link between rural residency and low efficacy contained in characterizations of traditional

³⁴Ibid., p. 33. A general increase in political efficacy with age is also reported for British, Italian, and German children and teenagers, as well as Americans, in Jack Dennis, Leon Lindberg, Donald McCrone, Rodney Stiefbold, "Political Socialization to Democratic Orientation in Four Western Systems," Comparative Political Studies, p. 79.

TABLE VI-7

JAPANESE TEENAGERS' POLITICAL EFFICACY
BY PERSONAL AND SOCIAL BACKGROUND VARIABLES

A. By Grade

Political Efficacy

	<u>High</u>	<u>Med.</u>	<u>Low</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>N</u>
12	38	31	31	100%	326
10	38	30	32	100%	334
8	30	37	33	100%	282

Gamma = .07; r = .08

B. By Sex

Political Efficacy

	<u>High</u>	<u>Med.</u>	<u>Low</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>N</u>
Boys	42	29	29	100%	492
Girls	29	36	35	100%	450

Gamma = .20; r = .13

C. By Urban-Rural Residence

Political Efficacy

	<u>High</u>	<u>Med.</u>	<u>Low</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>N</u>
Urban	37	29	34	100%	538
Rural	34	37	29	100%	404

Gamma = .02; r = .00

D. By Family Socioeconomic Status

Political Efficacy

	<u>High</u>	<u>Med.</u>	<u>Low</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>N</u>
High	40	29	31	100%	316
Med.	35	32	33	100%	417
Low	31	37	32	100%	209

Gamma = .06; r = .06

Japanese as incapable of dealing with political authority as "citizens" rather than "subjects," there is little evidence of any correlation between urban-rural residence and political efficacy among adult Japanese. Neither Watanuki Joji³⁵ nor Bradley Richardson found any urban-rural difference; although Richardson found evidence that urban adults were somewhat more efficacious with respect to national politics while rural adults felt more capable of influencing local politics.³⁶ The teenagers in the present study also do not differ in efficacy by place of residence ($\gamma = -.02$; $r = .00$). Nor do they differ consistently, by socioeconomic status; while 40 percent of the upper status but only 31 percent of the lower status youngsters scored high on efficacy, the proportions scoring low were nearly identical at 31 percent and 32 percent respectively, so that there was only a very weak correlation, $\gamma = .06$; $r = .06$. This again mirrors findings showing a lack of any socioeconomic status based differences in efficacy among Japanese adults,³⁷ but contrasts markedly with Easton and Dennis's data on American youngsters, which showed a moderate and consistent relationship between the two variables (Pearson's r ranging from .16 to .22).³⁸

³⁵"Social Structure and Political Participation in Japan," p. 5, Table 1.

³⁶"Urbanization and Political Behavior," p. 14.

³⁷Watanuki, *op. cit.*

³⁸"The Child's Acquisition of Regime Norms," p. 36.

One basis on which American, European, and Japanese adults have all been observed to differ with regard to their belief in their ability to have an impact on politics is sex—almost without exception, women have been found to feel less politically competent than men. However, the exceptions to this general rule are significant because they affect expectations about how Japanese boys and girls might differ with regard to efficacy. Kuroda and Kuroda found in one study of the political participation and related orientations of Japanese men and women that while women in general scored lower on efficacy, women of the postwar generation actually scored higher.³⁹ In addition, Easton and Dennis found no difference between American boys and girls, but were loath to accept the finding at face value since they also found that in such other areas of political involvement as political interest and political participation, girls were markedly lower.⁴⁰ No such anomaly is present in the case of Japanese teenagers; the boys are notably more efficacious, with 42 percent of them versus 29 percent of the girls scoring high, and 29 percent of the boys scoring low as opposed to 35 percent of the girls, for a correlation of $\gamma = .20$; $r = .13$.

³⁹Yasumasa Kuroda and Alice K. Kuroda, "Aspects of Community Political Participation in Japan: Influences of Education, Sex, and Political Generation," paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association, San Francisco, California, August, 1967, p. 23.

⁴⁰"The Child's Acquisition of Regime Norms," p. 37.

The preadult's belief that ordinary people like his family and himself when he becomes an adult exert some control over politics should, we would expect, be affected by his own sense of himself and of the environment. If he feels incapable of dealing with the world immediately around him and of influencing the course of his own life, he is unlikely to feel influential over the more remote, complex, and harder to understand realm of politics. Similarly, if the world is peopled with unscrupulous and threatening strangers then politics, which for the Japanese youngster, as we have seen, is often associated with strangers out for their own interests and nonresponsive to ordinary folk, should be beyond the capability of people like himself or his family to influence. In short, the psychocultural variables of ego autonomy and social trust can be expected to affect Japanese youths' political efficacy. Table VI-8 presents the evidence bearing on their influence in this respect.

As the table makes plain, each of these two psychocultural variables does have an effect on teenagers' political efficacy. Nearly half again as many of those scoring high on ego autonomy as those scoring low are politically efficacious (43 percent to 30 percent) but the correlation is fairly weak. In comparison the effect of social trust is markedly greater, with twice as many of the trusting youngsters being efficacious as those who are cynical, and nearly three times as many of the latter as the former scoring in

TABLE VI-8

JAPANESE TEENAGERS' POLITICAL EFFICACY BY
PSYCHOCULTURAL FACTORS

(percentages across)

A. By Ego Autonomy

<u>Ego Autonomy</u>	Political Efficacy				<u>N</u>
	<u>High</u>	<u>Med.</u>	<u>Low</u>	<u>Total</u>	
High	43	30	27	100%	313
Medium	34	34	32	100%	325
Low	30	34	37	100%	295

Gamma = .15; r = .14

B. By Social Trust

<u>Social Trust</u>	Political Efficacy				<u>N</u>
	<u>High</u>	<u>Med.</u>	<u>Low</u>	<u>Total</u>	
High	52	31	17	100%	259
Medium	32	37	31	100%	395
Low	26	28	46	100%	284

Gamma = .34; r = .28

the lowest rank on efficacy. Clearly, then, how ready teenagers are to place their trust in other people has an important bearing on their sense of ability to influence politics.

The almost total monopoly of national governmental offices and power by the conservatives throughout the post-war period makes party support and ideology also of obvious potential relevance to Japanese youngsters' feelings about the power of the ordinary citizen to make an impact on politics. The fact that the opposition parties have been shut out of power for so long and can realistically foresee no imminent end to their minority status might be expected to engender some level of political powerlessness among their adult supporters, and thereby through the socialization process to their teenager supporters as well. In a similar vein, the continued predominance of capitalism can presumably be expected to have deleterious effects on the efficacy of the believer in socialism. Table VI-9 presents the relevant evidence.

The evidence firmly rejects both of the political cleavage factors as influences on youngsters' political efficacy. Not only do the supporters of the parties on the left not evince any greater feelings of political powerlessness than their conservative fellows, indeed, the JCP supporters among the students are the most efficacious, and more among the pro-socialist youngsters than among their pro-capitalist peers rank high on efficacy as well. It may be that the

TABLE VI-9

JAPANESE TEENAGERS' POLITICAL EFFICACY BY THEIR
POLITICAL PARTY SUPPORT AND IDEOLOGY
(percent across)

A. By Party Support

<u>Party</u>	Political Efficacy				<u>N</u>
	<u>High</u>	<u>Med.</u>	<u>Low</u>	<u>Total</u>	
LDP	38	33	29	100%	281
DSP	38	32	30	100%	50
Komei	29	31	40	100%	35
JSP	37	28	35	100%	133
JCP	43	30	27	100%	30

Gamma = .04; r = -.02

B. By Ideology

<u>Ideology</u>	Political Efficacy				<u>N</u>
	<u>High</u>	<u>Med.</u>	<u>Low</u>	<u>Total</u>	
Pro-Capitalist	36	35	29	100%	269
Neutral	35	35	30	100%	319
Pro-Socialist	38	26	36	100%	308

Gamma = .03; r = .01

progressives "gaining" power at the local level on the big cities has resulted in the supporters of the left parties coming to feel able to make an impact on politics at that level.⁴¹ In this connection, the fact that it is the Komeito youngsters who feel most powerless is especially intriguing. The Komeito, as I have noted earlier, is the political arm of the most influential of a number of "new religions" in Japan, the Soka gakkai, whose military-like organization, pressure tactics used in proselytization, and nationalistic rhetoric, coupled with its appeal to the lower and lower-middle classes in the urban areas, have caused many observers to liken it to the European fascist movements of the 1930s. It is widely felt that the Soka gakkai adherents, who constitute the overwhelming proportion of the Komeito's supporters, are one variety of mass man, alienated from democratic politics, politically suspicious and distrustful, and afflicted with feelings of powerlessness that make them prey to the appeals of an all-encompassing, mass movement founded on an irrational, intolerant and fanatic belief in their sole possession of the true religion. But James White, in his study of the Soka gakkai, found evidence from several surveys that was contrary to this stereotype and to his own hypothesis

⁴¹Terry E. McDougall has pointed out that 40 percent of all Japanese now live in cities or municipalities in which there is a progressive mayor or governor. "Local Politics and the Emergence of a Viable Political Opposition in Japan," in a paper prepared for the Seminar on Japan by 1980, Yale University, 1973, p. 26.

based on his application of Kornhauser's theory of mass man, that the adult Soka gakkai members were actually more likely to be politically efficacious than other adults, despite the fact that they were also found to be more susceptible to feelings of personal incompetence and futility than other Japanese.⁴² But among the teenagers in the present study the figures in Table VI-9 indicate quite unambiguously that the Komeito supporters are indeed substantially less politically efficacious than those of the other parties. Paradoxically, however, I found no difference between the teenage Komeito supporters and supporters of the other parties on ego autonomy; but the Komeito supporters were significantly less likely to score high on social trust than were the others.

An additional perspective on the way in which party support might affect political efficacy is that those without any partisanship might be expected to be especially prone to powerlessness, being, as it were, without any champion at all. The questionnaire included two categories which the respondent could select to indicate the nature of his non-identification with a party: "I do not support any party whatever," which expresses a positive and purpose rejection of partisanship and "don't know," which merely indicates that no decision has yet been made and suggests apathy or a low level of political "consciousness" rather than the alienation

⁴²The Sokagakkai and Mass Society, pp. 187-188.

implied by the more direct rejection. The two groups do exhibit an interesting difference with regard to political efficacy. Those who reject the parties tend to fall into either the high (36 percent) or the low (40 percent) efficacy categories, with relatively few in the mid-range (24 percent). Those who "didn't know" their partisanship tended to be both less efficacious (30 percent) and less nonefficacious (28 percent) and to congregate in the mid-range (42 percent). The image of the latter group as being less politically minded, more apathetic, seems, thus, to find support in the neutral complexion of its members' over-all level of efficacy. The bimodal distribution on efficacy of those who reject party identification, conversely, suggests that the group may include both traditional, conservative, apolitical independents, who feel comfortable with the established political process and those alienated from the parties and from the established political process itself. But because the evidence is only indirect and suggestive, it will be necessary to examine the effects of these two patterns of nonpartisanship on political interest and political trust as well before deciding whether they reflect apathy and alienation, or in the one case, both.

In general, as we have seen, then, Japanese teenagers' feelings of political efficacy vary little with social and political sources of cleavage and tend to be associated more with psychocultural or personality characteristics and that

inescapable and immutable variable of sex. Social trust was found to be the strongest correlate of efficacy among the variables in the analysis, followed by ego autonomy and sex. But political efficacy itself, if we treat it as part of the political personality, should play a role in influencing other aspects of the political man emerging within each of our teenagers. One obvious and important such aspect is that of political interest.

B. Political Interest

As I pointed out in the introduction to this chapter, interest in what happens in politics, a concern with following the course of political events, is a pivotal variable not only in the conception of democratic man, but in the ideal typical—or rather, perhaps, stereotypical—models of political man in Japan. The participant democrat's political participation is sparked by his political interest; the alienated mass man's high political interest either never materializes in political action or else is associated with extra-system participation—violence, mass demonstrations, and other sorts of anomie; the mobilized traditional man's participation in the established modes is not due to his own inherent interest in politics, but to social pressures to participate. The measure of political interest I shall employ here is based on four items given in Table VI-10, which as usual shows the responses of both students and parents to each item.

TABLE VI-10

POLITICAL INTEREST SCALE ITEMS AND
RESPONSES BY GENERATION

<u>Item</u>	<u>High Interest</u>	<u>Low Interest</u>
a. Are you interested in politics?	(Very + Somewhat)	(Not very + hardly at all)
	51%	49% students
	60%	39% parents
b. Do you often read articles about politics in the newspaper?	(Every day + sometimes)	(Not very often + hardly at all)
	60%	40% students
	73%	27% parents
c. Do you often watch TV programs or listen to the radio about politics?	(Every day + sometimes)	(Not very often + hardly at all)
	58%	42% students
	78%	21% parents
d. Do you often read articles about politics in weekly and monthly magazines?	(often + sometimes)	(Not very often + hardly ever)
	35%	65% students
	54%	45% parents

Not surprisingly, the teenagers are lower on each of the individual measures of political interest than their parents. It is noteworthy that newspapers are as frequently the media through which youngsters report following politics as television is, and this roughly equal reliance on these two media is true throughout the teenage years. But, taking professed interest and the items on following politics in the various media together as a scale of political interest, how do the teenagers differ among themselves? A number of hypotheses immediately present themselves for our scrutiny. All of the independent variables and several of the intervening variables can plausibly, and for good theoretical reasons, be expected to make an impact on teenagers' political interest. Let us turn first to the effects of the independent variables, which are presented in Table VI-11.

If the years of adolescence are a time in which the social and political consciousness of the individual is expanding and he becomes more fully aware of stimuli from beyond his immediate sphere of existence, as he grows, that is, into political as well as psychological adulthood, we can expect that he will also grow increasingly interested in what is happening in this wider world. Hess and Torney, in their study of American grade school children, found that their political interest increased with age.⁴⁴ The Japanese

⁴⁴ Robert D. Hess and Judith V. Torney, The Development of Political Attitudes in Children (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1968), p. 177, Fig. 43.

TABLE VI-11

JAPANESE TEENAGERS' POLITICAL INTEREST
BY PERSONAL AND SOCIAL BACKGROUND VARIABLES
(percentages across)

A. By Grade

Political Interest					
	<u>High</u>	<u>Med.</u>	<u>Low</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>N</u>
12	44	32	24	100%	326
10	28	38	34	100%	334
8	21	41	38	100%	279

Gamma = .25; r = .20

B. By Sex

Political Interest					
	<u>High</u>	<u>Med.</u>	<u>Low</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>N</u>
Boys	41	31	28	100%	490
Girls	22	42	36	100%	449

Gamma = .28; r = .19

C. By Urban-Rural Residence

Political Interest					
	<u>High</u>	<u>Med.</u>	<u>Low</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>N</u>
Urban	34	37	29	100%	536
Rural	29	35	36	100%	403

Gamma = .12; r = .05

D. By Family Socioeconomic Status

Political Interest					
	<u>High</u>	<u>Med.</u>	<u>Low</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>N</u>
High	35	35	30	100%	316
Med.	31	36	33	100%	415
Low	26	39	35	100%	208

Gamma = .09; r = .07

data likewise confirm the hypothesis; twice as many twelfth graders as eighth graders (44 percent to 21 percent) score high on political interest and the proportion of youngsters with low interest drops nearly as much (38 percent to 24 percent), for a gamma of .25 and r of .20.

Sex, too, should have an impact. Adult women generally are less interested in politics, as researchers have found in numerous countries.⁴⁵ Japanese women have not been notable exceptions to the rule, as studies by Kuroda and Kuroda⁴⁶ and Watanuki have found.⁴⁷ The adult women in the present study are also less interested than the men, whether the criterion be the present scale or any of a number of alternative measures such as, for example, the proportions who have political opinions, as against those who chose the "don't know" response. But sex differences in political interest and associated political orientations have been noted among preadults as well. Greenstein reported that whenever there were differences between the boys and girls in his sample, the former were "invariably" more political.⁴⁸ Hess and Torney also found that the girls in their sample were less politically

⁴⁵See Robert E. Lane, Political Life (New York: The Free Press, 1959), pp. 209-216 for a good summary of sex-related differences in political attitudes and behavior.

⁴⁶"Aspects of Community Political Participation in Japan," p. 23.

⁴⁷"Social Structure and Political Participation in Japan," p. 5, table 1.

⁴⁸Fred I. Greenstein, Children in Politics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), p. 115.

active and less concerned about politics than the boys.⁴⁹ It would be surprising, then, if Japanese teenage girls were more interested than boys, and indeed, as the weight of the other evidence would lead us to expect, they are not. Nearly twice as many boys as girls seemed high on interest (41 percent to 22 percent), while substantially more girls were low on the scale, 37 percent as opposed to only 28 percent of the boys.

Since the models of alienated mass man and the mobilized traditional man are usually associated with urban and rural residence respectively, there is theoretical reason to hypothesize that urban teenagers will be more likely to be politically interested than their country cousins. But it must be said that there is empirical evidence that no urban-rural difference in adult political interest exists. Watanuki Joji's data on social structure and political participation show political interest unaffected by the urban-rural variable.⁵⁰ Data reported by Bradley Richardson from various nationwide surveys conducted by the Komei Senkyo Renmei (Clean Elections League) and others also show no clear-cut urban-rural difference in political interest. Urbanites appear to be slightly more interested in national politics than rural folk, but less interested in local politics. But, Richardson points out, "Rural residents showed almost as much interest in

⁴⁹Hess and Torney, op. cit., p. 232.

⁵⁰"Social Structure and Political Participation," p. 5, table 1.

national elections as contrasted with 'politics'—as urban residents and similar tendencies can be seen in concern about national election outcomes.⁵¹ The data in my study support the finding that urban-rural residence and political interest are essentially unrelated. Urban teenagers do score slightly higher than their rural peers (34 percent to 29 percent high, and 29 percent to 36 percent low, respectively, for urban versus rural youngsters), but the correlation is very weak—gamma = .12; r = .05.

Many studies have shown that among adults, those in the upper status groups, with better education, more income, and in the white collar, mental labor rather than physical labor occupations tend to be better informed and more interested in politics.⁵² In Japan, as well, Watanuki reports that there is a moderate positive correlation between socioeconomic status and political interest,⁵³ as do Kuroda and Kuroda.⁵⁴ With respect to comparative evidence, Hess and Torney reported that socioeconomic status did affect the political interest of their American grade school children.⁵⁵ Socioeconomic status, however, appears to have only a marginal impact on the political interest of Japanese teenagers. True,

⁵¹Richardson, op. cit., pp. 13 and 14.

⁵²Lane, op. cit., pp. 220-234.

⁵³"Social Structure and Political Participation in Japan," p. 5, table 1.

⁵⁴"Aspects of Community Political Participation in Japan," p. 22.

⁵⁵Hess and Torney, op. cit., p. 176.

more upper status than lower status youngsters score high on interest (35 percent to 26 percent) and fewer score low (30 percent to 35 percent). But while the positive direction of the relationship is confirmed, it is very weak, $\gamma = .09$, $r = .07$, too weak indeed, as in the case of urban-rural residence, to be statistically significant.

If the intense interest in political matters that characterizes the leftist students whose own special kind of political participation has been so visible in postwar Japan, and who are clearly one important variety of the alienated mass man, can be taken as a guide, we would expect that among the young left party support and left ideology would be associated with political interest. Table VI-12 presents the relevant evidence.

The direction of the relationship is in both cases in line with the hypothesis, but only partisanship exhibits an appreciable correlation, the 5 percent difference in high political interest between pro-capitalist and pro-socialist teenagers being too small to produce any notable correlation. The direction of partisanship on the other hand does have an impact; the communist supporters are the most interested, followed by the Socialist and Democratic Socialist youths. Bringing up the rear are the Liberal Democrats and the Komeito supporters. The low level of interest of the Komei group is of particular interest since, as we have already seen, they were similarly low on political efficacy as well.

TABLE VI-12

JAPANESE TEENAGERS' POLITICAL INTEREST BY POLITICAL CLEAVAGE
(percent across)

A. By Party Support

<u>Party</u>	Political Interest				<u>N</u>
	<u>High</u>	<u>Med.</u>	<u>Low</u>	<u>Total</u>	
LDP	29	35	36	100%	280
DSP	42	36	22	100%	50
Komei	26	43	31	100%	35
JSP	44	33	23	100%	132
JCP	48	31	21	100%	29
None	42	32	21	100%	185
D.K.	16	42	42	100%	216

Gamma = $-.21$; $r = -.14$

B. By Ideology

<u>Ideology</u>	Political Interest				<u>N</u>
	<u>High</u>	<u>Med.</u>	<u>Low</u>	<u>Total</u>	
Pro-Capitalist	30	38	32	100%	267
Neutral	31	34	35	100%	319
Pro-Socialist	35	38	27	100%	307

Gamma = $-.08$; $r = -.10$

Over-all, then, the direction of partisanship has a moderate impact on teenagers' political interest, while that of ideology is much weaker and nearly disappears when party support is controlled (partial $r = .01$), indicating that the weak zero-order correlation that does exist reflects in large part the indirect influence of partisanship.

Once more, however, it is important to examine the effect of nonpartisanship as well as that of the direction of partisanship. Among those who explicitly reject the parties, 42 percent score high and 26 percent low on interest. In sharp contrast only 16 percent of those who "don't know" what party they support are high on interest, while 42 percent are low. In effect, then, the former group resembles the supporters of the DSP and JSP, whereas the latter are far more apathetic than any of those who support one or another of the parties.

The interest Japanese teenagers have in politics, then, depends in several ways on how they relate to the lines of political cleavage in their society. But how does that interest relate to the psychocultural factors affecting the teenagers' personalities? Table VI-13 presents political interest broken down by ego autonomy and social trust.

As Lane's statement, cited earlier, suggests, the individual with a sense of personal control and mastery of the environment is likely to take an active interest in the control processes of his society.⁵⁶ In contrast, as I noted,

⁵⁶Lane, op. cit.

TABLE VI-13
 JAPANESE TEENAGERS' POLITICAL INTEREST BY
 PSYCHOCULTURAL FACTORS
 (percent across)

A. By Ego Autonomy

<u>Ego Autonomy</u>	Political Interest				<u>N</u>
	<u>High</u>	<u>Med.</u>	<u>Low</u>	<u>Total</u>	
High	44	34	22	100%	313
Medium	30	38	32	100%	324
Low	20	37	43	100%	293

Gamma = .31; r = .25

B. By Social Trust

<u>Social Trust</u>	Political Interest				<u>N</u>
	<u>High</u>	<u>Med.</u>	<u>Low</u>	<u>Total</u>	
High	34	42	24	100%	259
Medium	27	37	36	100%	392
Low	36	30	34	100%	284

Gamma = .05; r = .05

the stereotype of the mobilized traditional man was neither interested in politics nor endowed with an ability to withstand social pressures to conform. As the table indicates, there is indeed a clear-cut relationship between ego autonomy and political interest. This sense of personal competence has more of an impact on the student's political interest than any other factor. Since it also affects political efficacy it thus plays something of a central role as a personality or psychocultural source of an important side of the political man developing among Japanese youngsters. Thus the lack of any link between trust in people and political interest is rather surprising in view of the major impact trust has on efficacy.

Finally, with respect to the correlates of teenagers' political interest, it seems plausible to expect greater political interest among those youngsters who feel that they or those with whom they most closely identify can make their voices heard in politics than among those who feel politics is beyond their understanding and influence. Table VI-14 shows that political efficacy and political interest satisfy this expectation; nearly twice as many politically efficacious youths are highly interested in politics as those who feel politically powerless, and the over-all relationship, though only moderate in absolute terms, is fairly strong in comparison with the average strength of the relationships among Japanese teenagers' attributes and attitudes.

TABLE VI-14

JAPANESE TEENAGERS' POLITICAL INTEREST BY THEIR
POLITICAL EFFICACY
(percent across)

<u>Efficacy</u>	Political Interest				<u>N</u>
	<u>High</u>	<u>Med.</u>	<u>Low</u>	<u>Total</u>	
High	42	34	23	99%	335
Medium	26	42	43	100%	303
Low	25	33	42	100%	301

Gamma = .25; r = .25

By now I have presented the relationships between four personal and social background, independent variables, four intervening psychocultural and political cleavage variables, and two political orientations. As a means of both summarizing the discussion and of establishing how each of these variables fits into the emergence of the political self among Japanese teenagers, I have put them all into a path analysis model of the development of political efficacy and political interest. Path analysis is a variety of causal modeling in which the direct effect of each antecedent variable on a succeeding variable is calculated with the effects of all other antecedent variables affecting the succeeding variable held constant.⁵⁷ The particular utility of path

⁵⁷Strictly speaking, path analysis requires one to make five assumptions about his data: that the variables are measurable on an interval scale, that their relationships are linear, additive, and asymmetric; and that the other causes of each of the variables in the model are uncorrelated with the other variables in the model. Social scientists routinely make the first assumption even when using ordinal or nominal level data. The data I am using are, of course, ordinal level cumulative indices. In the three models I present in this chapter the causal sequence of the variables is, in most instances, not problematic, social and biological characteristics earliest in the sequence, "personality" level orientations next, and political orientations last. The ordering of the political orientations is of course arbitrary but, I believe, reasonable, and the absence of relationships between the political cleavage variables on the one hand and the psychocultural variables avoids any problem on that score. The assumption that is probably least well-founded is additivity, since as might be expected in a study of teenagers' developing political orientations, there is a certain amount of interaction, especially on the part of age. But the interaction effects are mild and scattered and do not produce major changes in the main effects. A clear and useful introduction to the social science use of path analysis is


analysis in the present case is to reduce the complexity of the many interrelationships among the independent and intervening variables to a set of meaningful links in a causal pattern that explains why some Japanese youths are more politically efficacious or politically interested than others. As will be evident in the model, moreover, path analysis permits us to rank the correlates of the dependent variable by the strength of the direct impact on it of the independent variables and to view both the direct and the indirect paths between causes and effects, a characteristic that is especially useful when the objective is to show the developmental relationship between "sociological" characteristics like urban-rural residence or socioeconomic status (or biological ones like sex), and "psychological" characteristics such as social trust, ego autonomy, and party support, in an explanation of political attitudes.⁵⁸ Figure VI-A presents the path analysis.

Otis Dudley Duncan, "Path Analysis: Sociological Examples," reprinted in Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., Causal Models in the Social Sciences (Chicago and New York: Aldine-Atherton, 1971), pp. 115-138.

⁵⁸ See Fred I. Greenstein, Personality and Politics (Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 1969), pp. 36-40. Greenstein points out that it is essential to recognize that sociological and psychological characteristics are often related developmentally as intrinsic parts of a causal sequence affecting some third variable rather than being competing explanations of that variable. The mediation of the effects of the sociological biological variable by the psychological one is of obvious concern when one is trying to depict the process through which political man emerges in adolescence.

FIGURE VI-A

PATH ANALYSIS MODEL OF JAPANESE TEENAGERS'
POLITICAL EFFICACY AND POLITICAL INTEREST



To begin by examining the specifics of the model, it is apparent that political efficacy is directly affected by only three factors: sex and the two psychocultural variables, ego autonomy and social trust. Social trust is the single most influential of these determinants, while sex exerts both a direct effect and an indirect effect through social trust. The impact of ego autonomy, though slightly greater than that of the direct effect of sex, is substantially weaker than that of social trust. Taken together these three factors account for only 10 percent of the variance in Japanese teenagers' feelings of political competence, and it is clear that I have to seek out other influences on this important dimension of emerging political man in Japan. This I do in examining family influence in the next chapter.

Political interest is affected directly by five of the variables; in order of their respective impact they are: ego autonomy and political efficacy, grade (or age), sex, and the duration of party support. Whereas political efficacy was largely unrelated to the social and political cleavage factors in the analysis, being linked only indirectly through ego autonomy (which is related to socioeconomic status), political interest is clearly the outcome of both psychocultural and cleavage factors, as well as maturational influences. But the impact on interest of the cleavage elements in the model is not great, as will become apparent by comparison with the models of input and especially output support that will be presented later. Most of the influence on political interest involves the psychocultural and personality characteristics

of the youngsters. It is noteworthy, nonetheless, that while there are essentially two streams of causal links, one psychocultural and one relating to cleavage, both streams are related to urban-rural place of residence, a sociological difference but also, as Watanuki Joji has emphasized, ultimately a cultural one.⁵⁹ As we shall see again in the case of political trust, urban-rural differences play a consistent role in the genesis of political differences among Japanese youngsters; but it is in how that influence is mediated, whether directly or through its effect on the personality-related variables, or through its influence on partisanship and ideology, that a major part of the differing causal patterns of individual orientations develops.

C. The Nature and Sources of Political Trust:
Input and Output Support

A pervasive sense that politics is corrupt, that politicians are dishonest, that the processes through which decisions are made are under the influence of special interests, that the rules of the game are disregarded or flaunted or "fised," are some of the elements of the phenomenon known as political cynicism. On the opposite end of the spectrum is implicit trust in government, deference or even awe toward political leaders, and a spirit of submissiveness and obedience toward the authorities that was said to have characterized

⁵⁹See "Patterns of Politics in Present Day Japan," in S.M. Lipset and S. Rokkan, eds. Party Systems and Voter Alignment (New York: The Free Press, 1967), pp. 447-466, esp. pp. 456 ff.

the ordinary Japanese before 1945. Somewhere in the gulf between these two extremes the ideal-typical democratic citizen steers his course. On the one hand he needs a fundamental belief that democratic political institutions and processes, and the men who are engaged in politics, are essentially moral, concerned with and responsive to the needs and desires of ordinary citizens. On the other, he must feel able to deal with government not in awe and obedience but confidence of himself and his rights as a citizen.

Chapter two dwelled at length upon the beliefs and attitudes related to political institutions and authority figures of Japanese youngsters, from children in the earliest school grades to those at nearly the end of adolescence, high school seniors. As both interviews and the responses to the questionnaire made clear, children from early on give short shrift in general to the Prime Minister and the other institutions of authority in political life, in their evaluations of these institutions' responsiveness, inclusiveness, rectitude, and concern for ordinary people's problems. But attitudes toward the political party system and the electoral process, as well as the institution of popular participation in the political process, appeared markedly less negative. I concluded that there were in effect two kinds of political support in the attitudes of young Japanese, depending on whether the figure or institution toward which the attitude was directed was involved in the authoritative, "output" side

of government, or in the demand-making "input" side of the political process and through which popular participation in politics was mediated. The most straightforward test of this dichotomous classification of political support attitudes would be the correlate attitudes toward the various institutions and ascertain whether two clusters of related attitudes emerge. Table VI-15 presents the matrix of correlations between summary indices of support for all the various institutions discussed in this context in chapter two.

It is readily apparent that two such attitude clusters do exist. Attitudes toward the Prime Minister, Diet, and government intercorrelate strongly with each other, but correlate with those toward the other institutions at sharply lower levels. Support for party system, elections, and popular participation also correlate with each other more strongly than with the first three, but the coherence of these attitudes is somewhat lower than that of the other group. It would appear that to a certain extent attitudes toward the political parties are less distinctly separate from output attitudes than are those toward elections and popular participation. This somewhat ambiguous status of the parties in the attitude structure of Japanese youth is understandable, of course, since in some respects the parties, especially the LDP, do play "output" roles as well as input roles. Nevertheless, the strength of the correlation between attitudes toward the parties and party system and those toward popular

TABLE VI-15

MATRIX OF INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT SCALE CORRELATIONS
(Goodman and Kruskal's Gammas)

<u>Support for:</u>	<u>P.M.</u>	<u>Diet</u>	<u>Govt.</u>	<u>Party System</u>	<u>Elections</u>	<u>Popular Partic.</u>
Prime Minister	1					
Diet	.70	1				
Government	.73	.74	1			
Party System	.33	.36	.33	1		
Elections	.27	.29	.35	.36	1	
Popular Partic.	.04	.09	.06	.63	.57	1

participation (.63) makes it clear that the former belong, on balance, to the dimension of input support.

The correlations in Table VI-15 provide firm evidence, then, that input and output support exist as separate dimensions of political evaluation for young Japanese. To ascertain how these two kinds of support differ in their origins, I have created a summary index of each; output support as used hereafter will refer to the scale created by summing the Prime Minister support, Diet support, and government support scales; input support will represent a similar summary of scores on party system, election and popular participation support. These two scales do correlate ($\gamma = .44$; $r = .46$) but are clearly separate dimensions of political evaluation: less than half (47 percent) of the sample fall into the same ranks on both variables when each is trichotomized.

Given, then, that two separate dimensions of political trust (or support) exist among Japanese youngsters, how do they differ with regard to basic differences among the teenagers that I have been examining in this chapter so far? Table VI-16 presents the first set of relevant evidence: a breakdown of each kind of political support by the students' personal and social background characteristics.

It is immediately evident that the correlates of the two kinds of political support differ. Neither is significantly affected by sex, in contrast to political efficacy and interest. Age, however, shows a dramatically different effect

on the two types of support: a very weak positive relationship with input support, and a much more substantial negative relationship with output support. This reflects the finding of chapter two that a persistent decline in support for the Prime Minister, government and Diet occurred with age, while the level of support for elections, the party system, and popular politics remained generally constant or slightly increased. In short, then, the political cynicism that emerges during adolescence is mainly directed toward the output institutions rather than toward the input institutions.

The distinction between output support and input support is equally salient when we consider the impact of place of residence on teenagers' political trust. The stereotype of the traditional Japanese, whose support for political institutions as based on deference and uncritical acceptance, is often associated with rural culture. That of the politically alienated and cynical mass man is equally closely associated with urban life. Bradley Richardson found on the basis of a large number of surveys that urban adults were consistently less positive than rural adults about politicians' and institutions' responsiveness, rectitude, and concern.⁶¹ As we observe in Table VI-16, urban teenagers are more negative than their rural fellows toward both input and output institutions. But the impact of urban-rural residence is substantially greater on output support than on input support.

⁶¹"Urbanization and Political Behavior," p. 17, fig. 6.

TABLE VI-16

JAPANESE TEENAGERS' INPUT AND OUTPUT SUPPORT
 BY PERSONAL AND SOCIAL BACKGROUND VARIABLES
 (percentages across)

Input Support						Output Support					
A. By Grade											
	<u>High</u>	<u>Med.</u>	<u>Low</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>N</u>		<u>High</u>	<u>Med.</u>	<u>Low</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>N</u>
12	38	26	36	100%	325	12	20	33	47	100%	325
10	38	30	32	100%	333	10	31	38	31	100%	274
8	29	33	39	100%	273	8	49	31	20	100%	274
Gamma = .07; r = .03						Gamma = -.36; r = -.26					
B. By Sex											
Boys	38	28	34	100%	485	Boys	32	31	37	100%	486
Girls	32	32	36	100%	446	Girls	33	37	30	100%	445
Gamma = .08; r = .04						Gamma = -.08; r = -.06					
C. By Urban-Rural Residence											
Urban	30	30	40	100%	531	Urban	21	33	46	100%	531
Rural	42	29	29	100%	400	Rural	48	35	17	100%	400
Gamma = -.22; r = -.14						Gamma = -.53; r = -.35					
D. By SES											
High	33	31	36	100%	313	High	25	34	41	100%	314
Med	34	29	37	100%	411	Med	36	32	32	100%	410
Low	41	29	30	100%	207	Low	37	38	25	100%	207
Gamma = -.08; r = -.06						Gamma = -.19; r = -.14					

Since the output institutions have a partisan coloration, especially the Prime Minister and government, this is not surprising, since conservatives predominate among the rural group, and opposition party supporters and those who reject all of the parties are found mainly in the urban group. Richardson found, however, that the effects of the urban-rural differences on political trust were not wholly or even mainly attributable to partisanship, since urban adult LDP supporters were less politically trusting than rural LDP supporters.⁶²

Family socioeconomic status also appears to have an impact on political trust. Youngsters from upper status families are more cynical about both aspects of politics. This parallels findings by Greenstein, Hess and Torney and others that lower status American youngsters are more positive about the President and other aspects of politics than are their more advantaged fellows.⁶³ The relationship appears stronger in the case of output support ($\gamma = -.19$; $r = -.14$) than that of input support ($\gamma = -.08$; $r = -.06$). In both cases, however, the relationship between socioeconomic status and support disappears when urban versus rural residence is

⁶²Ibid., pp. 20-21.

⁶³See Greenstein, Children in Politics, pp. 101-102 and Hess and Torney, op. cit., p. 154. But a study of New York teenagers found no relationship between family socioeconomic status and a political cynicism scale. See Sandra J. Kenyon, "The Development of Political Cynicism Among Negro and White Adolescents," paper delivered at the 1969 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York, September, 1969, pp. 14-15.

controlled (the partial gammas are $-.04$ for output support and $.03$ for input support). Thus it appears that in the Japanese case the prevalence of political cynicism among upper status youngsters is due not to the inherently alienating effects of higher status but rather to the effects of urban residence, which is the major determinant of social status. Among urban youngsters there is almost no difference in cynicism by socioeconomic status, and the same holds true for rural youngsters. The absence of any clear and consistent status-based differences in the political cynicism of Japanese adults that is observed in data reported by Bradley Richardson is corroborative in this regard.⁶⁴

Of the basic personal and social characteristics of the teenagers, then, only urban-rural residence has a major impact on both input and output support, while age affects only output support. Turning from these predetermined characteristics of the inner man, let us examine the impact on political trust of the psychocultural variables, as shown in Table VI-17.

The total absence of a correlation between ego autonomy and political trust is not surprising since it seems plausible to expect two contradictory effects of a feeling of personal incompetence or powerlessness on the young person's view of political institutions and processes. On the one hand, he might be pessimistic and cynical about politics, suspecting

⁶⁴"Urbanization and Political Behavior," p. 19, fig. 7.

TABLE VI-17

JAPANESE TEENAGERS' INPUT AND OUTPUT SUPPORT
BY PSYCHOCULTURAL CHARACTERISTICS

(percentages across)

A. By Ego-Autonomy

Input Support						Output Support					
	<u>High</u>	<u>Med.</u>	<u>Low</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>N</u>		<u>High</u>	<u>Med.</u>	<u>Low</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>N</u>
High	35	31	34	100%	309	High	34	32	34	100%	311
Med	35	31	34	100%	322	Med	29	39	32	100%	321
Low	36	26	38	100%	293	Low	35	31	34	100%	292
Gamma = .02; r = .00						Gamma = .00; r = .04					

B. By Social Trust

Input Support						Output Support					
	<u>High</u>	<u>Med.</u>	<u>Low</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>N</u>		<u>High</u>	<u>Med.</u>	<u>Low</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>N</u>
High	44	28	28	100%	257	High	42	31	27	100%	257
Med	35	33	32	100%	391	Med	35	36	29	100%	388
Low	27	27	46	100%	279	Low	21	34	45	100%	282
Gamma = .21; r = .23						Gamma = .25; r = .23					

that it lies beyond both his influence and his understanding, as does the course of his own life. Or he might be trustful especially of the output side of politics, government and authority, as a result of deference to authority based on his inability to assert himself against the world.⁶⁵ Distrust of politics and politicians has been widely linked to personal cynicism, as a particular manifestation of a deep-seated, general distrust of others. Such a relationship, between personal cynicism and political cynicism, has been documented in a number of studies of American and European adults, as well as of American teenagers.⁶⁶ Thus the finding that Japanese teenagers' general trust in others affects their political trust comes as no surprise, but does add corroborative data to the accumulating store of evidence that this personality characteristic, or psychocultural characteristic,

⁶⁵ Edward Greenberg, however, found that there was a significant tendency for black grade school children who felt "powerless" to reject various components of the American political system more than those who felt "powerful." But there was also some evidence of greater socialization of the President among those feeling powerless. "Black Children and the Political System: A Study of Socialization to Support," paper delivered at the 1969 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York, September, 1969, pp. 17-18.

⁶⁶ See Morris Rosenberg, "Misanthropy and Political Ideology," American Sociological Review, 33 (December, 1956), 650-695; Robert E. Agger, Marshall Z. Goldstein, and Stanley A. Peart, "Political Cynicism: Measurement and Meaning," Journal of Politics, 23 (August, 1969), 495-499. Edgar Litt, "Political Cynicism and Political Futility," Journal of Politics, 25 (May, 1963), 312-322; and Kenyon, op. cit.

has a significant impact on political man. As I showed earlier, trust in people is also related to political efficacy among Japanese teenagers. But the particularly noteworthy fact about the impact of their social trust on political trust is that the relationship is equally strong in the case of both input and output support. The other correlates of political trust, both those I have already discussed and those which I present below, differ significantly in the strength of their relationships to the two kinds of political support. That social trust correlates with each almost equally indeed does suggest that a portion of political cynicism is an extension of personal cynicism unrelated to the political institution, figure, or process to which it attaches.

The unusual nature of social trust's impact on political support is well illustrated by the markedly different levels of association that the political cleavage factors have with input and output support, as shown in Table VI-18.

It is, of course, to be expected that support for political institutions will be greater among conservative supporters than among supporters of the opposition parties. And it is also to be expected that the disparity between right and left supporters should be greatest with regard to the output institutions, which, as I have pointed out, have continued to be dominated by the Liberal Democratic Party. The input side of politics is much less closely identified with any

TABLE VI-18

JAPANESE TEENAGERS' INPUT AND OUTPUT SUPPORT
 BY POLITICAL CLEAVAGE VARIABLES
 (percentages across)

A. By Party Support

Input Support						Output Support					
	<u>High</u>	<u>Med.</u>	<u>Low</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>N</u>		<u>High</u>	<u>Med.</u>	<u>Low</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>N</u>
LDP	44	29	27	100%	280	LDP	47	35	18	100%	281
DSP	48	28	24	100%	50	DSP	40	34	26	100%	50
Komei	29	26	46	100%	35	Komei	15	32	53	100%	34
JSP	34	25	41	100%	131	JSP	22	32	46	100%	132
JCP	37	30	33	100%	30	JCP	14	34	52	100%	29
Gamma = .16; r = .23						Gamma = .42; r = .35					

B. By Ideology

Input Support						Output Support					
	<u>High</u>	<u>Med.</u>	<u>Low</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>N</u>		<u>High</u>	<u>Med.</u>	<u>Low</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>N</u>
Pro-Cap.	40	29	31	100%	269	Pro-Cap.	45	34	21	100%	266
Neutral	38	30	32	100%	314	Neutral	32	36	32	100%	316
Pro-Soc.	30	28	42	100%	305	Pro-Soc.	20	34	46	100%	307
Gamma = .15; r = .14						Gamma = .33; r = .27					

single party; thus substantially larger numbers of teenagers who support the opposition parties are able to feel trust and respect for one major part of the regime while rejecting another. As the table shows, twice as many or more Komeito and JCP supporters, and half again as many JSP supporters are highly supportive of the input institutions as of the output ones.

It is again noteworthy that the Komeito youths are the least supportive of all the party identifiers on both dimensions of support. Although, as I have said, more Komeito supporters score high on input support than on output support, in both cases the largest proportion falls into the low support category. The only other group of young partisans of whom this is true are the JSP supporters. The Communist party identifiers among the teenagers, on the other hand, are the clearest case of a group which is overwhelmingly negative toward the authoritative, output side of politics while tending on balance to support the input side. Since the Communist Party has been particularly diligent in creating organized popular "movements" including both partisan and supra-partisan adult "citizens' movements," and a youth organization (popularly known as Minsei, the "Democratic Youth League), the moderately high level of input support among the JCP identifiers in the sample is not at all surprising. Only those who reject identifying with any party score lower on input and output support (56 percent low in both instances) than the Komeito

supporters (46 percent and 53 percent low, respectively). Interestingly enough, those youngsters who "don't know" their party support are much less negative; only 32 percent and 24 percent score low on input and output support respectively.

The impact of political cleavage on teenagers' political support is also evident in the relationship between ideology and the two varieties of support. We would anticipate that youngsters favorable to capitalism would tend more than their pro-socialist fellows to support the output institutions. This they do, and to a lesser degree with regard to input institutions as well.

In addition to the background characteristics, and the psychocultural and political cleavage factors, the analysis of the social and psychological influences on political trust requires looking at the impact of one further variable. If as appears to be the case political efficacy lies deeper in the personality than most other political orientations, it can and probably should be considered as a potential influence on political trust, as it was earlier considered a potential influence on political interest. Table VI-19 presents the teenagers' input and output support broken down by political efficacy (and by political interest to round out the delineation of the over-all structure of attitudinal relationships).

As the table makes clear, political efficacy is related to both kinds of support, but its effect is particularly marked on input support. This is understandable since while

TABLE VI-19

JAPANESE TEENAGERS' INPUT AND OUTPUT SUPPORT BY
POLITICAL EFFICACY AND POLITICAL INTEREST

(Percentages Across)

A. By Political Efficacy

Input Support						Output Support					
	High	Med.	Low	Total	N		High	Med.	Low	Total	N
High	51	29	20	100%	332	High	42	30	28	100%	331
Med.	34	31	35	100%	302	Med.	35	37	28	100%	301
Low	18	29	53	100%	297	Low	20	35	45	100%	299
Gamma = .42; r = .37						Gamma = .26; r = .24					

B. By Political Interest

Input Support						Output Support					
	High	Med.	Low	Total	N		High	Med.	Low	Total	N
High	40	25	35	100%	292	High	31	24	45	100%	293
Med.	36	30	34	100%	338	Med.	33	38	29	100%	338
Low	28	34	38	100%	298	Low	33	40	27	100%	299
Gamma = .10; r = .06						Gamma = -.13; r = -.12					

we would expect whether one feels capable of influencing politics to affect his feelings of how concerned and especially how responsive government is (and vice versa, of course), we would expect it to be even more important in shaping whether one believes that citizen politics and the whole process of making demands on the system is worth while and estimable or useless and suspect. Such is the case, and indeed not only does political efficacy correlate more highly with input support than with output support; it is the only variable which does so, as well as being by far the strongest correlate of input support.

Finally, it is interesting to note that while weak to negligible strength of the relationships between political interest and the two varieties of support is surprising, the difference in the direction of the two relationships is as would be expected. As we have seen, factors which increase political interest, in particular age, decrease output support while tending to increase input support, albeit very weakly.

I have examined the impact on the two varieties of political support or trust of an extensive number of factors. As in the case of political efficacy and political interest, path analysis models of input and output support will serve to summarize and clarify the multivariate causal influences on these two aspects of political trust. Figures VI-B and VI-C present the two models.

FIGURE VI-B

PATH ANALYSIS MODEL OF JAPANESE
TEENAGERS' OUTPUT SUPPORT





FIGURE VI-C
PATH ANALYSIS MODEL OF JAPANESE
TEENAGERS' INPUT SUPPORT



Seen adjacent to each other in graphic form, the differences in the patterns associated with the two kinds of political support are distinct. Once again, as in the case of the model of political efficacy and political interest, a psychocultural causal stream, now including political efficacy as well as social trust and the antecedents of both, and a social and social cleavage stream comprising urban-rural residence and party support, are involved in each case. But there is a striking difference in the role the two causal streams play in the two models. The dominant stream in the case of output support is the cleavage stream reflecting, as we have said, the partisan hue of the output institutions. The psychocultural forces are relatively less influential. Indeed, the model understates the impact of partisanship since it includes only the direction of party support with no consideration of the effects of rejection of the parties. Age, too, has a substantial negative effect.

In the case of input support, however, the balance of causal forces is quite different. Not only does the influence of age disappear, but the dominant causal stream is the psychocultural one. Not only does ideology play no role, but both urban-rural residence and party support have less impact than on output support. The main influence affecting Japanese youngsters' support for the process and institutions of popular politics is political efficacy, supported by trust in others and a sense of personal competence and autonomy.

In chapter two I argued that teenagers' tendency to be relatively supportive of the institutions and processes mediating citizen participation in politics builds into the emerging Japanese political culture an avenue of support for democratic politics that counters the predominant stream of cynicism toward authority and government. Here I have presented evidence that this input support is also relatively immune, in comparison with output support, to the influence of the cleavages that divide the Japanese socially and politically—the two cultures of city and countryside, and especially the gulf between left and right. In effect, I would argue, this provides a sound support for an important element of the democratic regime that both transcends those cleavages and lessens their corrosive effect on political trust when, for the supporters of the left, the government and the authorities are controlled by the opposition.

Conclusion

I began this chapter by asking how the Japanese teenager acquires his political orientations, and more specifically to what extent each youngster's political self derives from his personal and social characteristics. As the analysis has shown, each of the four basic characteristics is indeed involved in one way or another in molding the emerging political man. It is appropriate now to summarize the over-all effects of each of these characteristics.

Sex, that most elemental human difference, is also among the most pervasive sources of difference in the political attitudes and behavior of people everywhere. Among Japanese teenagers, as we have seen, its effects are relatively muted. Its greatest impact comes on political interest, boys being markedly more interested—prefiguring one of the major sex role differences in the political lives of adults. A similar but less strong direct effect is true also of feelings of political efficacy, where again boys, like men, are more efficacious. In both cases, the influence of sex is also felt indirectly through the greater tendency of girls toward personal cynicism which in turn contributes to lowered efficacy and lowered interest. And it is only indirectly through this effect on social trust and on political efficacy that sex has any effect on input or output support.

Age, like sex, affects some political orientations more than others. Its most marked effects are to diminish support for output institutions and to increase political interest. Twelfth graders are notably more interested in politics and notably more cynical about government than the eighth graders. Age effects that cynicism indirectly as well by nudging the teenager to the left, ideologically, as he matures.

The effects of age per se on the other political orientations dealt with here are negligible. But it would understate the role that increasing age plays in molding the teenager's political self if I were to ignore a different

kind of age-related effect. In a few instances age either increases or decreases the impact of one of the other factors on a political orientation. An increase with age in the strength of the relationship between partisanship and output support is a case in point. So is a decrease in that between social trust and output support. But these interaction effects of age with the other variables are relatively few and do not alter the main effects shown in the path analysis.

Of all the background variables, however, that of greatest interest with respect to its effects on adolescent political man in Japan is, of course, the urban-rural dimension. At the outset, I pointed out that Japanese political stereotypes identify rural residents as "mobilized traditional men" essentially not motivated toward playing the role of the participating democratic citizen; while urbanites are seen as alienated. As the analysis in this chapter has shown, the urban-rural dimension does indeed play a role in the background of Japanese youths' political selves. To begin with, it explains almost all of the effects of socioeconomic status on youngsters' political orientations. But its own direct impact is limited to those spheres that are tinged with political cleavage—party support, ideology, and support for the authoritative institutions. While it does play a role as one source of the other main causal stream identified in this chapter, that of the psychocultural influences, that role is unexpectedly small and indirect. The image of the

village as the perpetuating source of the subordination of the individual to the group appears to be of declining validity, if we judge by the fact that the urban-rural dimension has only an indirect effect on ego autonomy. Although ego autonomy itself does have an impact on both of the two orientations most directly tied up with the nature of democratic participation, political efficacy and political interest, in each case its impact is relatively small.

In short, then, despite the greater tendency of rural youngsters to support the conservatives and the output institutions, and of urban youngsters to reject both, the over-all differences between them across the broader range of political characteristics are too small for us to accept as valid a classification of the emerging Japanese political culture as broadly divided into an urban and a rural subculture. And it is most definitely not the case that the pattern of differences accords with the stereotypes of rural apathy and mobilization versus urban alienation and political withdrawal. Politically interested and efficacious youngsters exist in both the countryside and city in proportions that differ only insignificantly, and nearly as many urban as rural youngsters support the input processes and institutions of popular politics.

It would appear on balance that maturational and personal factors, including what I have termed "psychocultural" influences are more important sources of difference among Japanese teenagers when it comes to the main indices of the

democratic self versus apathy or alienation. It is thus particularly noteworthy that only one readily identifiable group of youngsters clearly and consistently manifested an over-all rejection of the major characteristics of democratic man—the supporters of the Komeito, who scored low on political interest, political efficacy, and on both kinds of political support, and on trust in other people as well. It may be that the elements of both mass alienation and traditional apathy and authoritarianism converge in the culture of the Soka gakkai and Komeito. Happily for most other Japanese youngsters, where one aspect of the political self may be caused by external cleavage or the internalized legacy of past culture to reject the democratic participant model, the other elements of the political self usually embrace it.

MATRIX OF INTERCORRELATIONS OF TEENAGERS' POLITICAL ORIENTATIONS
AND INDEPENDENT AND INTERVENING VARIABLES
(r's above the main diagonal; gammas below)

	Grade Sex		Urban-SES		Party Sup.		Ideology		Social Trust		Ego-Auton.		Pol. Int.		Pol. Eff.		Input Sup.		Output Sup.	
	1	.02	.00	.09	-.03	-.10	-.06	.05	.20	.08	.20	.08	.03	.03	.05	.06	.03	.03	.03	.03
Sex	.04	1	.05	.09	-.04	.00	.10	.07	.19	.13	.04	.06	.04	.13	.04	.04	.04	.04	.06	.06
Urban-Rural	.00	.00	1	.47	-.16	-.13	.00	.12	.05	.00	.14	.35	.14	.05	.00	.14	.14	.14	.35	.35
SES	.12	.15	.71	1	.00	.01	.03	.14	.07	.06	.06	.06	.06	.07	.06	.06	.06	.06	.14	.14
Party Support	.05	-.08	-.26	-.02	1	.35	.03	-.03	-.14	-.02	.23	.35	.35	-.14	-.02	.23	.23	.23	.35	.35
Ideology	.08	.00	-.15	.03	.50	1	.07	-.09	-.10	.01	.14	.27	.27	-.10	.01	.14	.14	.14	.27	.27
Social Trust	-.05	.19	-.02	.05	.03	.11	1	.03	.05	.28	.23	.23	.23	.05	.28	.23	.23	.23	.23	.23
Ego-Autonomy	.07	.12	.17	.17	-.03	.12	.10	1	.25	.14	.00	.04	.04	.25	.14	.00	.00	.00	.04	.04
Pol. Interest	.25	.28	.12	.09	-.21	-.08	.05	.31	1	.25	.06	.12	.12	1	.25	.06	.06	.06	.12	.12
Pol. Efficacy	.07	.20	-.02	.06	.04	.03	.34	.15	.25	1	.37	.24	.24	.25	1	.37	.37	.37	.24	.24
Input Sup.	.07	.08	-.22	-.08	.16	.15	.21	.02	.10	.42	1	.46	.46	.10	.42	1	1	1	.46	.46
Output Sup.	-.36	-.08	-.53	-.19	.42	.33	.25	.00	-.13	.26	.44	1	1	-.13	.26	.44	.44	.44	1	1

High Score = 12 Boys Urban High Status LDP Pro-Cap. High Trust Auton. High Int. High Eff. High Sup. High Sup.

APPENDIX VI-II

MATRICES OF INTER-ITEM CORRELATIONS IN FOUR ATTITUDE SCALES
 (Goodman and Kruskal's Gammas)

<u>Ego Autonomy</u>					
	a	b	c	d	e
a	1				
b	.15	1			
c	.15	.37	1		
d	.18	.21	.16	1	
e	.18	.45	.17	.13	1

See Table VI-1 for items

<u>Social Trust</u>				
	a	b	c	d
a	1			
b	.20	1		
c	.15	.40	1	
d	.22	.39	.34	1

See Table VI-3 for items

<u>Political Efficacy</u>				
	a	b	c	d
a	1			
b	.34	1		
c	.40	.25	1	
d	.50	.33	.39	1

See Table VI-5 for items

<u>Political Interest</u>				
	a	b	c	d
a	1			
b	.81	1		
c	.66	.74	1	
d	.67	.74	.64	1

See Table VI-10 for items

CHAPTER VII

SOURCES OF THE POLITICAL SELF: THE ROLE OF THE FAMILY

Preceding chapters have detailed both the patterns of Japanese teenagers' political orientations and the ways in which social, cultural, and psychological factors affect them. The major remaining question concerns the sources of those orientations. Where do Japanese teenagers acquire their attitudes, values, and beliefs about the political world? This chapter deals with the major agents which may influence the political orientations of young Japanese, and in particular with the diverse ways in which one principal agent of political socialization, the family, affects the development of political man.

The maturing individual is exposed to a variety of potential socializing agents. These may be face-to-face relationships with people such as the teacher, or one-to-one contact with others within a primary group context such as the peer group. Other agents are more impersonal and formal, especially the mass media and the school, including the social studies curriculum. While I shall deal to some extent with the impact of such agents, particularly the students' personal

relationships with teachers and the peer group, the primary focus of the chapter is on the role of the family in the political socialization of the Japanese youngster.

The family occupies a central position in theories about the development of political man and also in well-known interpretations of Japanese society and politics. The old familiar saw that "the hand that rocks the cradle rules the world" reflects a view that has been long and widely held, that the family is preeminent among the forces that mold political man. During the formative years in the life of the individual not only does he spend more time in contact with the family than with any other individuals, but his relationships with the family, and in particular with his father and mother, are among the most profound and intense emotional relationships he will ever have. The fundamental nature of family ties confers on the family a special influence over the values and attitudes the child learns. Moreover, the family's role in the life of the individual is at its height in his early years when he acquires very basic attitudes, values, and identifications, which are apt to become more deeply rooted and enduring than others acquired later, and which therefore are likely to become elements of a political screen through which later learning is likely to be filtered. As the child matures, he will come into contact with other agents: the school, the peer group, mass media, etc. From these he will also acquire political values and beliefs; but

the foundations of his political self will have been laid within the family, and the later learning will be heavily influenced thereby. Such, in general, are the outlines of a widespread picture of the role of the family in the molding of political man.

The role of the Japanese family that is commonly depicted in interpretations of Japanese society and politics, and particularly in psychocultural or "national character" analyses, parallels and extends this view. For many writers the family has been the sole key, sufficient in and of itself, to an understanding of Japanese behavior and institutions. Society and the state were seen as the "family writ large." The authoritarian "family state" of the pre-1945 "Emperor system" reflected the paternal authoritarianism of the family. Submissiveness to political authority was forthcoming as a result of submissiveness learned in the family toward paternal authority. Even such aspects of politics as the factionalism of the postwar parties have been explained as consequences of the nature of affective relationships between superiors and subordinates first learned in the parent-child context.¹

Interpretations of the role of the Japanese family in affecting politically relevant characteristics of Japanese have thus been quite wide-ranging. They have usually hinged on a view which sees the structure of Japanese social and political institutions as analogous to the structure of the

¹Frank Langdon, Politics in Japan (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1967), p. 207.

family. Ultimately, most interpretations have been based on unsupported assertions linking adult political behavior to early childhood training—weaning, toilet training, and other elements of child-rearing in which the parent-child relationship undergoes a change in the balance of affection and authority.

This chapter attempts to provide firm evidence on the role played by the Japanese family in the development of political man by considering family influence from several different perspectives. At the outset, I deal with the family comparatively, in an attempt to assess the degree to which it prevails over other sources of political learning, particularly the school in the person of the teacher, and the peer group. The view that, as Hyman put it, the family is "foremost among agencies of socialization into politics,"² has been challenged by several recent empirical studies of American youngsters. In a study involving a detailed comparison of the political attitudes of pairs of grade school age siblings with matched pairs of unrelated children, Hess and Torney found little evidence for family preeminence. While noting that "in early years the family's role is to promote attachment to country and government,"³ their over-all

²Herbert Hyman, Political Socialization (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1959), p. 69.

³Robert D. Hess and Judith V. Torney, The Development of Basic Attitudes and Values Toward Government and Citizenship during the Elementary School Years, Part 1, Office of Education Cooperative Research Project No. 1078 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), p. 191.

conclusion was that "the family transmits its own particular values in relatively few areas of political socialization and that, for the most part, the impact of the family is felt as only one of several socializing agents and institutions."⁴

A second challenge to the belief in the family's pre-eminent role in political socialization came from the results of a study of the political attitudes of American high school seniors and their parents by Jennings and Niemi. After finding that the degree of correspondence between parents' and children's attitudes was, with the exception of party identification, low to moderate at best, Jennings and Niemi concluded that it is "clear that any model of socialization which rests on assumptions of pervasive currents of parent-to-child value transmissions of the type studied here is in serious need of modification."⁵ The second section of this chapter, therefore, is devoted to an analysis of the degree to which parents' political orientations are transmitted to Japanese teenagers. I examine parent-child correspondences over a broad spectrum of political orientations, ranging from partisanship and ideology to output and input support and political interest and efficacy.

In this second section of the chapter, the analysis is shaped around several general hypotheses. One of these is

⁴Ibid., p. 193.

⁵M. Kent Jennings and Richard G. Niemi, "The Transmission of Political Values from Parent to Child," American Political Science Review, 62:1 (March 1968), 183.

the prediction of a decrease in parent-child correspondence as the age of the child increases. In addition to the effects of age, the discussion also considers the effects of a number of factors which might be expected to lower the congruence in political orientations of parent and child. One central issue revolves around the political role of the mother versus that of the father. Conventional wisdom has long portrayed the father as the dominant political model for the child, both as authority figure and as political opinion leader. But the alleged political dominance of the father has been shown to be illusory in studies of American and Jamaican families.⁶ Thus a major concern of the chapter is with determining which parent is more effective in transmitting political values to the child, and in identifying those factors which work to intensify or to blunt paternal and maternal political influence.

In addition to considering the transmission of specific political orientations from parent to child I also consider the political role of the family in a broader sense, one that centers on the view that the structure of affect and authority in the family serves as the prototype for the political system. The analysis of this variety of family influence takes several emphases. The first is on patterns of contact and affection

⁶See ibid.; and Kenneth Langton, Political Socialization (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), especially pp. 52-83.

between parent and child and their political impact. The second emphasis is on the patterns of authority and decision making in the family. Is the family still an authoritarian patriarchy where the father rules by fiat? An opposing view suggested by some writers is that the father has withdrawn from involvement in the family. Which view more accurately represents the prevailing patterns of authority and decision making in the contemporary family?

An additional question dealt with here is that of the nature and extent of political rebellion against parents on the part of Japanese teenagers. One persistent hypothesis in this regard has been that youngsters from authoritarian families, forced to conform and obey at home, will seek autonomy by rejecting their parents' political views. Such a view is echoed in the recurring interpretations of the radical student movement in Japan as essentially a manifestation of rebellion against the authoritarian family.

The "family writ large" view has witnessed something of a renaissance in studies of political socialization at least insofar as the conception of generalization is concerned. Almond and Verba and others have argued that with particular regard to the feeling of political efficacy the individual who experiences a family decision structure open to his efforts to exert influence on decisions affecting himself will be more likely, ceteris paribus, to believe that he will be able to make his voice heard in the political

process as well. The chapter investigates the evidence bearing on this hypothesis.

The final element of the analysis continues the focus on generalization, again in the context of the "family writ large" view of politics, this time concentrating on the generalization of affect from parent to political authority figure. One major element of the theory of the benevolent leader discussed in chapter two is that the leader gains much of his emotional significance from being invested by the child with the qualities of a parent. The analysis of family influence ends with a consideration of the diverse ways in which Japanese teenagers' images of and reactions to the Prime Minister parallel their affective responses to their parents.

The Family in the Wider Nexus of Socializing Influences

By the time a child enters his teens the near monopoly over his social and political learning which the family enjoyed during his youngest years has given way to a situation in which there are various institutions and agencies to which he has been exposed. He is likely to have learned both cognitive and affective orientations about politics at school, from his friends, from the newspapers, from television, etc.⁷

⁷A full scale analysis of the impact of agents outside the family is beyond the scope of the available data. However, the data do include indirect evidence on some important aspects of the role played by these agents in the political socialization process.

To what extent do these sources of political learning supplant the family? Table VII-1 presents evidence bearing on the question in the form of teenagers' responses to an item asking about whom they would turn to for advice on politics.

The figures show a fairly clear-cut trend: among the younger teenagers the father is clearly the preferred source of advice. Among the twelfth graders, however, he is displaced by "other," an open-ended category in which by far the largest number of write-in responses were "myself." Nevertheless, the continued strength of the father even among the oldest group, where he is named more often than teacher or friends, does not support the hypothesis that these other agents come to supplant the family.

The sharp decline with age in the respondents' naming their mother as the one whose opinion they would most respect and take into account, however, accords with that element of the hypothesis which suggests a general decline in family influence. Here we have our first evidence that early in their teenage years Japanese youngsters discern the political role differences between their parents. The finding parallels Greenstein's finding that American youngsters named their fathers more frequently than their mothers as the person whose advice they would seek in regard to voting.⁸

⁸Fred I. Greenstein, Children and Politics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), p. 119.

TABLE VII-1

TEENAGERS' SOURCES OF POLITICAL ADVICE

(percent of students by grade choosing each response)

"When you don't yet have an opinion about some political or social problem and want to clarify what you think, whose opinion do you most respect and take into account?"

<u>Grade</u>	<u>Father</u>	<u>Mother</u>	<u>Teacher</u>	<u>Friend</u>	<u>Other</u>	<u>N.R.</u>	<u>Total</u>
8	36	10	19	16	14	5	100%
10	34	5	22	18	17	4	100%
12	26	2	20	18	30	4	100%

It is interesting to note that there is little change with age in the proportion of youngsters who chose the two extra-family sources, teacher and friends. While there is only scant comparative evidence, from the eighth graders in Greenstein's study, it would appear that the teacher's role as source of advice is not strikingly different; Greenstein found that 11 percent of the eighth graders from higher status families and 15 percent from the lower status families would seek the teacher's advice on how to vote, in comparison with the 19 percent of the Japanese eighth graders who most respect the teacher's opinion.⁹

The strong showing of the teacher in this rather hypothetical situation, however, should be contrasted with the following evidence on the frequency with which the teenagers report they actually discuss political and social issues with their teachers as well as their parents and friends. (Cf. Table VII-2)

Not surprisingly, the proportion of youngsters who report discussing politics with their teachers is substantially lower than in the case of the other agents. The legal norms of the educational system proscribe teachers from advocating partisan positions; civic education is supposed to be neutral, and there is thus little room for the teacher to discuss political and social questions individually with students.

The trends in the figures on the youngsters' discussions with the other agents are interesting and revealing. The father contends with friends for the discussion partner most

⁹Ibid.

TABLE VII-2

TEENAGERS' DISCUSSION OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ISSUES
WITH PARENTS, TEACHERS, AND FRIENDS

(percent of students in each grade
who report discussing such issues
"often" or "sometimes" with each
agent)

<u>Grade</u>	<u>Father</u>	<u>Mother</u>	<u>Teacher</u>	<u>Friends</u>
8	35	24	13	34
10	39	26	11	41
12	47	25	10	66

often chosen among the eighth and tenth graders. But by twelfth grade friends are cited substantially more often; indeed, fully two-thirds of the high school seniors report discussing political and social issues with their peers, signalling the emergence of a new crop of political men who now are beginning to relate, politically, primarily with one another rather than to their parents. Strikingly, while there is a rise with age in those reporting discussing politics with their fathers as well as with friends, no such rise occurs vis-a-vis discussions with mothers, reflecting once more the low salience of the mother as a political role model for most children.

Table VII-3 changes the focus slightly from the frequency of youngsters' political contact with the various agents to their knowledge of the political opinions of the four agents and their identification with them. Here, the peer group, "friends," stands out from the rest of the agents. Markedly more students report that their friends share their opinions than report that any of the other agents do. Moreover, this perception of the political similarity of one's friends increases with the student's age, while in the other three cases there takes place a decrease. By twelfth grade twice as many students feel a sense of political identification with their friends as with their fathers, the agent next most frequently picked as having the same opinions. It is noteworthy that the perception of political difference from

TABLE VII-3

TEENAGERS' PERCEPTIONS OF PARENTS', TEACHERS', AND FRIENDS'
POLITICAL AND SOCIAL OPINIONS AS SIMILAR TO OR DIFFERENT
FROM THEIR OWN

(percent of students by grade
choosing each response)

<u>Grade</u>	<u>Same</u>	<u>Father</u>		<u>Same</u>	<u>Mother</u>	
		<u>D.K. N.R.</u>	<u>Different</u>		<u>D.K. N.R.</u>	<u>Different</u>
8	32	54	14	30	59	11
10	27	49	24	25	61	14
12	29	41	30	21	59	20

<u>Grade</u>	<u>Same</u>	<u>Teachers</u>		<u>Same</u>	<u>Friends</u>	
		<u>D.K. N.R.</u>	<u>Different</u>		<u>D.K. N.R.</u>	<u>Different</u>
8	16	78	6	44	51	5
10	13	80	7	47	44	9
12	7	82	11	58	31	11

others increases with age in the case of all of the agents, even friends. This parallels the finding noted earlier that there is a marked increase with age in those who say they would rely only on themselves in forming a political opinion. But while the ratio of respondents who perceive friends as similar to those who perceive them as different remains quite high, by twelfth grade equally as many youngsters see their parents as different as those who see them as sharing the same opinions. There is, however, an illuminating difference between the patterns of perception of fathers' and mothers' opinions. More youngsters at each grade level perceive their fathers as dissimilar than any of the other agents, including the mother. The father is thus salient both as a positive and as a negative opinion source, and this salience increases with age, as the decrease in the proportion responding "don't know" suggests. There is no concurrent decrease with age in the proportion of youngsters responding they "don't know" their mothers' opinions, constituting further evidence of the mother's low political salience for the teenager. The high level of "don't know" responses in the case of the teachers suggests, once again, that they too play only a minor role as overt sources of political opinions for most youngsters.

The evidence bearing on the relative influence of parents, teachers, and friends has thus far been rather general in character. Table VII-4 presents more specific evidence — a comparison of the teenager's inability to identify the

TABLE VII-4

TEENAGERS' INABILITY TO NAME THE PARTY SUPPORT
OF PARENTS, TEACHERS, AND FRIENDS

(percent of students by grade
responding "don't know" to
party support item for each
agent)

<u>Grade</u>	<u>Father</u>	<u>Mother</u>	<u>Teachers</u>	<u>Friends</u>
8	41	45	63	63
10	33	33	54	57
12	21	20	47	55

party support of each parent and of the majority of their teachers and friends.

The three previous tables, based on the youngsters' general reactions to the four agents as political role models and opinion leaders, seemed to establish a hierarchy in which father and peer group occupied the positions of greatest influence. Teachers were important mainly only in the hypothetical case of a need for political advice but not in actual political contact with the youngsters. And mothers played the least central role, one which decreased severely in significance as the youngster's age increased. Table VII-4, however, does not support such a picture of paternal and peer group dominance. There is no significant difference in the proportion of youngsters who can name paternal and maternal partisanship. Those proportions are much higher than in the case of the two extra-family agents. Even taking into consideration the misperception of parental partisanship that I discussed in chapter four, the fact remains that when asked about an important specific political characteristic many more of the students felt able to identify their parents' position on it than that of the majority of their teachers, and especially than that of the majority of their friends. This finding is most useful because it helps us interpret the impact of the students' perceptions of their relationships with the agents on their evaluations of the agents as opinion sources.

Despite the over-all decline in the pattern of reliance on parents for opinions found in Tables VII-1 and VII-3 as well as the rise in the reported political contact and identification with the peer group found in Tables VII-2 and VII-3, Table VII-4 shows that apparently a much greater increase in awareness of the parents than of the peer group as political "cue-givers" in this particular regard takes place during the teenage years. It would appear that the increase with age in orientation toward the peer group, and the concurrent decline in orientation toward the family, represent not a diminishing in the actual flow of political communications within the family but rather an increase in extra-family contacts accompanied by a tendency for older youngsters to give themselves in their own eyes a greater sense of autonomy and independence from the family. They accomplish this by overstating their political differences with the family at the same time as they overstate their political similarities with their friends, despite their greater ignorance of their friends' actual politics. While I believe that such a process of imagining oneself to be politically more similar to one's friends and different from one's parents as a means of achieving a sense of autonomy is probably characteristic of many Japanese teenagers, an alternative explanation of equal plausibility is that the peer group may come to have substantial impact on some political attitudes and values but not on others. In particular, as analysis of peer group

influence on the political attitudes of American high school seniors has indicated, the peer group may be able to influence "short term" opinions such as reactions to political candidates and particular issues but is much less influential vis-a-vis more basic and enduring orientations such as party identification.¹⁰ To the extent that the peer group supplants the family in transmitting such short-term opinions, of course, the family's monopoly of political influence declines. But even though we lack direct evidence, the indirect evidence suggests that if indeed a rise in the influence of the peer group as a source of political cues does occur, it does not intrude in any major way into the main area of the family's direct transmission of political values, namely that of partisanship.

Table VII-4 also bears on the thrust of the evidence vis-a-vis the influence of the teacher. The relatively high proportion of youngsters at all grade levels who are unable to name the party preference of most teachers is a finding in keeping with those from the earlier tables. Teachers do not appear to be perceived by most youngsters as salient cue-givers in the realm of political opinions. As I have said, this no doubt partly reflects the taboos on the overt and direct intrusion of teachers' political opinions into the

¹⁰Susanne K. Sebert, "Friend and Peer Influences on the Politics of the High School Senior," paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York, September 1969.

educational process. Of course, the teacher does carry out a number of important activities relevant to political socialization: the teaching of cognitive skills and knowledge regarding politics, the nature of democracy, the meaning of capitalism, socialism, and communism, to name some. But while the specific teaching about such political phenomena may be neutral, my discussions with Japanese teachers tended to reinforce the impression that many believe their responsibility involves imbuing Japanese youngsters with a critical awareness of the gap between political ideals and political reality coupled with a critical attitude toward authority. A thorough assessment of the impact of the school—texts, curricula, and teachers—on the political socialization of Japanese teenagers is regrettably beyond the scope of the present study; but it is clear that the school plays a major role in the transmission of cognitive learning about politics in Japan, and serves as well to instill in many youngsters a focus on the flaws and problems in the political system.

On the whole, then, it would appear that the increase in the transmission of political cues from beyond the boundaries of the family that accompanies and stimulates the rising political interest of Japanese adolescents does not entail a general diminishment of the family's political influence. But it does appear that one aspect of the family's role is affected as the teenager matures: the mother becomes increasingly less salient as a perceived source of political opinions.

I say as a "perceived" source because, as Table VII-4 suggests, she may continue to be an important source of political learning, but one whose influence is unrecognized by the teenager, who no longer regards her as a model for his own political opinions and behavior.

Fathers versus Mothers as Political Role Models

We have seen that only one eighth grader in ten and one twelfth grader in fifty names his mother as the person whose political and social opinions he would take most into consideration in determining his own opinion on some question; and that 60 percent of teenagers at all grade levels claim not to know their mothers' opinions, while substantially fewer students report discussing politics with their mothers than with their fathers or friends. The reasons for this low salience of the mother in the political consciousness of youth are well known. As I pointed out in chapter six, women in Japan as elsewhere are much less involved in politics than are men. They tend to participate less, to be less interested, and to have fewer opinions. Politics, in short, at both elite and mass levels, is a man's game.

The mothers of the students in my sample are no exception to the general rule. Only 34 percent of them report that they discuss political and social questions with their friends, as opposed to 71 percent of the fathers who do so. In regard to participation, only 24 percent of the mothers

as opposed to 41 percent of the fathers had attended a political speech or assembly in the previous three years. On each of five other measures of political participation, substantially fewer mothers than fathers reported having taken part. The sex differences in parents' reported political interest follow a similar pattern. Four times as many fathers as mothers (45 percent to 12 percent) say they read newspaper articles about politics on a daily basis, and nearly three times as many (34 percent to 13 percent) say that they watch television programs about politics every day. Altogether over three-fourths of the fathers (76 percent) say that they are interested in politics as against less than half of the mothers (44 percent). This systematic difference in political interest is reflected in a consistently lower level of mothers who express political opinions. In 51 of 58 relevant items in the parent version of my questionnaire, for instance, more mothers than fathers replied "don't know" or did not respond; the mean difference between the percentage of mothers without opinions and fathers without opinions was 7 percent.

That Japanese youngsters early become aware that their mothers and fathers play different political roles is clear in Table VII-5, which presents students' perceptions of their parents' political interest. As we see, from as early as eighth grade far more Japanese youngsters view their fathers as politically interested than view their mothers as such. Strikingly enough, while there is little change in the

TABLE VII-5

STUDENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF PARENTS' POLITICAL INTEREST

(percent of students by grade
choosing responses shown)

"Do you think your father and
mother are interested in politios?"

<u>Grade</u>	<u>Very + Somewhat</u>		<u>Not very + Hardly at all</u>	
	<u>Father</u>	<u>Mother</u>	<u>Father</u>	<u>Mother</u>
8	68	46	8	19
10	72	35	8	33
12	71	30	13	43
Parents' Report of own Interest	75	44	24	56

proportion of youngsters in the higher grades reporting paternal interest in politics, a sharp decline takes place in the number reporting that their mothers are interested. This parallels the same trend that we observed in several of the earlier tables in the chapter, where mothers are seen to lose ground as salient sources of political opinions, either in terms of an absolute decline in the proportion of youngsters naming the mother's opinions as those most reported (Table VII-1) or by virtue of the lack of any increase in the proportions of older teenagers who know their mothers' opinions (Table VII-3) or who report discussing political and social questions with them. It would seem likely, then, that the mother's political influence would be less than the father's and would decline as the teenager matures.

But it would be premature to accept any such hypothesis simply on the basis of children's images of their parents as political role models. In the first place, there is the seeming anomaly that the proportion of youngsters who report knowing their mother's party identification is as high as the number who report knowing their father's, and both proportions increase with the age of the child. Moreover, as we discussed in chapter four, the youngsters' own party identifications correlate almost as highly with their mothers' as with their fathers' identifications and the mother-student correlation shows as substantial a rise with the age of the student as does the father-student correlation. This one area of

partisanship might of course be one in which the mother is uniquely influential, a possibility that I shall explore shortly. But there is also substantial alternative evidence to suggest why the mother might be expected to play at least as large a part in transmitting political orientations to the child as the father. The nature of that evidence can be stated simply as relative exposure or contact. The Japanese teenager sees a great deal more of his mother than he does of his father. This is shown in Table VII-6 in the form of the proportion of teenagers in each grade who report having talks with each parent often, together with the proportions of fathers and mothers who also report often talking with their children.

One of the major implications of the apparently greater mother-child interaction is that the mother's influence on the political orientations of the child may derive at least in part from the child's feeling closer to her than to the father. I deal with this question later. Here the manifest importance of the figures is that they indicate the persistently greater exposure to the mother that most youths have. What is only implicit in the figures, however, is that greater exposure to the mother in general may also very often mean a greater exposure to her political orientations.

We saw in Table VII-2 that substantially more teenagers reported discussing political and social questions "often" or "sometimes" with their fathers than with their mothers.

TABLE VII-6

STUDENTS' AND PARENTS' REPORTS OF PARENT-CHILD DISCUSSIONS

(percent of students by grade and of parents as a whole replying "often")

<u>Students:</u> <u>Grade</u>	<u>Discussions with:</u>	
	<u>Father</u>	<u>Mother</u>
8	23	32
10	22	35
12	19	34
<u>Parents'</u> <u>Report</u>	23 ^a	41 ^b

^aFather's report of his discussions with child

^bMother's report of her discussions with child

But we have just seen that the reverse was true when the question asked only about discussions in general. This discrepancy is illuminating in the light of a further datum: when the parents were asked how often they discussed politics with their children, more mothers than fathers (44 percent to 38 percent) responded positively, i.e., "often" or "sometimes." In short, then, there are two processes at work during adolescence which appear to bear on the relative potential capacities of the father and mother to transmit their political orientations to the child. On the one hand, teenagers appear to be early and increasingly aware of the apolitical tendencies of their mothers and to ignore or reject them as political role models. But at the same time they are in much more frequent contact with their mothers and with their mothers' ideas and attitudes than with their fathers'. Yet because they see the father as the salient political role model and political opinion leader they tend to magnify their political interaction with him and to diminish in their own minds the equally frequent or perhaps even more frequent political interactions they actually have with the mother.

It is clear, then, that the mother has a role to play as a source of political orientations to be absorbed by the child. Obviously we must now ask how important an influence she is in comparison with the father, in the context of the broader question of the family's role in transmitting political orientations.

Parent-Child Agreement on Political Orientations

Having set the stage with the preceding discussion, it is time to see just how Japanese mothers and fathers compare in their ability to transmit political orientations to their youngsters. There is, of course, from one perspective, reason to believe that Japanese teenagers will be unlikely to absorb either parent's political values and beliefs to any great degree. I will not reiterate here in any detail the arguments about the different socializing experiences and value systems under which the two generations have been raised. The discussion of partisanship in chapter four, however, established that in regard to the transmission of this important political orientation Japanese parents were very nearly as effective as their American and British counterparts. What about the broader spectrum of political orientations? Table VII-7 presents the correlations between students and fathers and mothers on six important political orientations.

As we see, partisanship is the area in which both parents are most effective at passing on their political characteristics to their children. Only the student-mother correlation on output support is at all close to the strength of the associations on partisanship. This is in keeping with the findings of Jennings and Niemi on American high school seniors, and those of the Kubota and Ward pilot study of Japanese 15 to 19 year olds.¹¹

¹¹See Jennings and Niemi, op. cit., and Akira Kubota

TABLE VII-7

PARENT-STUDENT AGREEMENT ON SIX POLITICAL
ORIENTATIONS BY SEX OF PARENT

(gammas)

<u>Correl.</u> <u>with</u>	<u>Party</u> <u>I.D.</u>	<u>Ideology</u>	<u>Output</u> <u>Support</u>	<u>Input</u> <u>Support</u>	<u>Pol.</u> <u>Int.</u>	<u>Pol.</u> <u>Effic.</u>
Fathers	.45	.15	.20	.13	.15	.18
Mothers	.42	.21	.36	.17	.17	.14

As to the relative influence of the two parents, there appears to be little difference. The father's slight over-all advantage in transmitting partisanship is duplicated in the case of political efficacy. But, at least in the case of partisanship, even the slight paternal advantage is negated when, rather than looking at the over-all figures, one considers only those cases in which parents disagree on party support. In those instances, slightly more students agree with their mothers' than their fathers' partisanship (25 percent to 22 percent respectively) as was also found to be the case among American teenagers.¹² Moreover on four of the orientations in Table VII-7 we observe that the mother-student correlations surpass the father-student ones. However, only in the case of output support is there a difference of more than 10 points in the gamma coefficients.

Although the Japanese father is more politicized than the mother, and is widely perceived by teenagers as the more salient adult political role model, his actual influence, as measured by the correlations between parents' and students' political orientations, is not generally higher than that of the mother. On the contrary, the mother appears to have an

and Robert Ward, "Family Influences and Political Socialization in Japan," Comparative Political Studies, 3:2 (July 1970), p. 152.

¹² Langdon, op. cit., p. 65.

equal impact, perhaps even a slightly greater one, although the differences between the two are for the most part very small. The American and Jamaican evidence on parent-child political correspondences indicated a clear rejection of the hypothesis of paternal dominance and indeed showed a clear advantage to the mother.¹³ The Japanese data confirm the rejection of the paternal dominance hypothesis but also indicate a balance between the influence of the two parents. This finding that neither parent clearly prevails in the transmission of political orientations to the child is supported by Kubota and Ward's study of 15 to 19 year old Japanese youths in which they found that in the first wave of their multi-wave study the father-student correlations on partisanship were higher than the mother-student ones, while on the second wave the reverse was true.¹⁴ In sum, then, Japanese parents seem to have roughly equal levels of political influence on their children. That influence, however, is far from extensive—centering mainly, as in the American family, on the creation of students' party identifications.

Under what circumstances is the correspondence in political opinions and values between parents and children likely to be at its highest? Do the circumstances that intensify the correlations between fathers and students operate in the same direction and to the same degree as those between mothers and students? There are a number of plausible hypotheses as

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴"Family Influences and Political Socialization in Japan," p. 161.

to the factors which may stimulate students to absorb the political orientations of their parents, or of one parent. Two factors that seem most likely to make a difference in the effectiveness with which parents transmit their values are the age and the sex of the child.

As we saw earlier the older the child the more likely he was to be aware of extra-family opinion sources, such as the peer group. It was likewise clear that older youths turned away from their mothers as political role models. Two obvious hypotheses emerge from these trends: first, parent-child correlations on political orientations will decline with the age of the child; second, the decline will be greater in the case of mother-child correlations than father-child correlations. Table VII-8 presents evidence bearing on both hypotheses.

Clearly, the first hypothesis is rejected outright. In only three of the twelve cases is there a decline in the size of the correlations from eighth to twelfth grade. And in most (eight) cases, the trend is actually the reverse of that predicted by the hypothesis. Second, controlling for student age does not save the paternal dominance hypothesis. Among the oldest students father-student correlations are higher than mother-student correlations on three of the orientations, but lower on the other three. Moreover, the influence of the mother appears actually to increase rather than decrease as the student's age increases. The magnitude of the mother-

TABLE VII-8

PARENT-STUDENT CORRELATIONS ON SIX POLITICAL
ORIENTATIONS BY STUDENT'S GRADE

(gammas)

<u>Correl.</u> <u>with</u>	<u>Party</u> <u>I.D.</u>	<u>Ideology</u>	<u>Output</u> <u>Support</u>	<u>Input</u> <u>Support</u>	<u>Pol.</u> <u>Int.</u>	<u>Pol.</u> <u>Effic.</u>
<u>With</u> <u>Father:</u> <u>Grade</u>						
8	.32	.17	.19	.18	.21	.16
10	.40	.13	.23	.12	.02	.17
12	.66	.20	.25	.10	.21	.20
<u>With</u> <u>Mother:</u> <u>Grade</u>						
8	.25	.32	.29	.11	.22	.17
10	.40	.23	.40	.29	.04	.04
12	.61	.10	.38	.09	.30	.22

student correlations is higher among the twelfth graders than among the eighth graders in four of the six cases.

If age is the first obvious factor, sex is the second. The hypothesis that suggests itself is that sex role patterning may occur: boys will be more like their fathers and girls more like their mothers. Table VII-9 presents the relevant evidence. The data here are intriguing, because of the differences between the parents' "pull" for sons as opposed to daughters. In half the cases (party identification, output support, and input support) boys are more like their fathers than girls are; but in the other three cases the girls correlate more highly with their fathers. So there seems no systematic sex similarity in the case of father-child pairs. But in the case of the mothers, daughters are more like them than sons are on five of the six orientations, while the mother-daughter correlations tend, in four of the six cases, to be the strongest parent-child correlations. Thus daughters and sons tend to be equally like their fathers; but daughters tend to be more like their mothers than sons do. These findings generally corroborate those from the study of American teenagers, although American daughters were found to be slightly more similar to their fathers than were the sons.¹⁵

The urban-rural difference is another obvious factor that might bear on the capacity and effectiveness of parents to transmit their political values. Rural parents might be

¹⁵Jennings and Niemi, op. cit., p. 180.

TABLE VII-9

PARENT-STUDENT AGREEMENT ON SIX POLITICAL
ORIENTATIONS BY SEX BOTH OF STUDENTS AND PARENTS

(gammas)

<u>Corre- lation with:</u>	<u>Party Identification</u>		<u>Output Support</u>		<u>Input Support</u>	
	<u>Boys</u>	<u>Girls</u>	<u>Boys</u>	<u>Girls</u>	<u>Boys</u>	<u>Girls</u>
Father	.50	.47	.21	.18	.14	.12
Mother	.41	.51	.33	.39	.13	.22

<u>Corre- lation with:</u>	<u>Ideology</u>		<u>Political Interest</u>		<u>Political Efficacy</u>	
	<u>Boys</u>	<u>Girls</u>	<u>Boys</u>	<u>Girls</u>	<u>Boys</u>	<u>Girls</u>
Father	.06	.27	.15	.18	.15	.19
Mother	.09	.32	.18	.15	.13	.14

less effective because they are likelier than urban adults to retain older attitudes and opinions from which younger Japanese have been turning, and which other agents like the school and the mass media contradict in their socialization. On the other hand, the urban child is likely to be more fully exposed to a range of extra-family influences that might run counter to parental attitudes and values. Table VII-10 shows the evidence on the influence over their children's political orientations of urban versus rural parents.

As the table shows, the differences are slight and inconsistent. Neither urban or rural parents can be said to be generally more effective at transmitting their political orientations to their children. One interesting finding not shown in the table is that the higher correlation of urban parents' and children's partisanship (especially urban fathers) is due in large measure to the high desertion of children of rural supporters of the Japan Socialist Party from their parents' party to the Liberal Democrat Party which, of course, is the party that predominates in their communities. Rural JSP fathers lose 41 percent to the Liberal Democrats as compared with only a 24 percent loss to the LDP among urban JSP supporters. The percentage losses among urban LDP families to the JSP are, conversely, only very slightly higher than among rural LDP families (17 percent to 16 percent). This suggests that pressures for conformity to the norms of the community may be more potent in the village than in the city.

TABLE VII-10

PARENT-STUDENT AGREEMENT ON SIX POLITICAL
ORIENTATIONS BY URBAN-RURAL RESIDENCE

(gammas)

<u>Corre- lation:</u>	<u>Party I.D.</u>	<u>Ideology</u>	<u>Output Support</u>	<u>Input Support</u>	<u>Pol. Int.</u>	<u>Pol. Effic.</u>
<u>With Father:</u>						
Urban	.52	.14	.11	.18	.13	.16
Rural	.42	.23	.21	.12	.15	.22
<u>With Mother:</u>						
Urban	.46	.22	.31	.22	.08	.12
Rural	.40	.19	.31	.19	.24	.18

However, the difference is substantially smaller in the case of the mother-child correlation on partisanship (only 9 percent greater losses among rural than urban JSP mothers) and, as the other gammas in Table VII-10 make apparent, rural parents are more effective than urban parents in transmitting several of the other orientations. In general, then, urban-rural residence cannot be said to have a systematic impact on the degree of parent-child congruence in political attitudes.

It seems plausible that the degree to which the child is aware of his parents' political orientations should affect his own orientations and their congruence with those of his parents. Jennings and Niemi found that this hypothesis of greater parent-child political congruence where there is greater political cue-giving in the family was only partially supported in the case of the American teenagers. Taking the frequency of student-parent political conversations and of husband-wife political conversations as two measures of the extent of such cue-giving, they found that only correspondences in parent-child political cynicism were affected by both measures while partisanship was affected by parental conversations but not by parent-child discussions. None of the four other orientations was affected by either measure.¹⁶ Table VII-11 presents the Japanese evidence on the effects of family participation on parent-child political congruences.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 182.

TABLE VII-11

FAMILY POLITICIZATION AND PARENT-STUDENT AGREEMENT ON SIX POLITICAL ORIENTATIONS

(gammas)

Correlation:	Party I.D.	Ideology	Output Support	Input Support	Political Interest	Political Efficacy
A. Father-Mother Political Discussions: Father's Report						
Often	.73	.39	.24	-.23	0.02	.14
Sometimes	.42	.24	.10	.18	.07	.18
Not very often	.40	.10	.22	.07	.27	.23
Hardly ever	.67	-.22	.60	.39	.29	.14
B. Father-Mother Political Discussions: Mother's Report						
Often	.74	.45	.54	.16	.38	.18
Sometimes	.39	.15	.30	.11	.13	.10
Not very often	.47	.22	.42	.30	.20	.22
Hardly ever	.39	.16	.28	.12	.15	.18

(Continued)

(TABLE VII-11 continued)

<u>Correlation:</u>	<u>Party I.D.</u>	<u>Ideology</u>	<u>Output Support</u>	<u>Input Support</u>	<u>Political Interest</u>	<u>Political Efficacy</u>
C. Student-Father Political Discussions: Student's Report						
Often	.63	.06	.26	.01	.64	.18
Sometimes	.58	.17	.03	.16	.18	.10
Not very often	.40	.20	.37	.14	.01	.16
Hardly ever	.29	.06	.16	.11	-.10	.22
D. Student-Mother-Political Discussions: Student's Report						
Often	.33	.32	.21	-.31	.07	-.12
Sometimes	.77	.35	.35	.12	.16	.07
Not very often	.50	.18	.49	.26	.09	.23
Hardly ever	.14	.09	.21	.20	.00	.08

The necessity to deal with both father-child and mother-child pairs makes the table appear complex. But let us consider the effects of each measure of politicization separately. Looking first at the effects of father-mother political discussion, it is apparent that there is no general increase in parent-child political congruence produced by increases in the frequency with which the parents discuss politics with each other. Such an effect can be seen only in the case of father-child correlations on ideology. In the cases of partisanship of both father-child and mother-child pairs, the correlations are indeed highest when the parents report discussing politics often, but do not decrease uniformly as the reported frequency of discussions diminishes. Indeed, the father-child relationship correlation is very high (.67) in families where the father reports himself hardly ever discussing politics with his wife.

The effects of parent-child political discussion on the correlations are equally indistinct. Insofar as father-child political congruence is concerned, the correlations on partisanship and political interest do show a uniform increase with the frequency of discussions. But none of the other father-child correlations are so affected. Moreover, the mother-child correlations show a rather strange pattern in several instances—partisanship, ideology, and political interest in particular. The strength of the correlations

increases in linear fashion as discussions increase from "hardly ever" to "sometimes," but then decreases in the highest category of frequency of mother-child political discussions. One possible explanation for this may be that the youngster motivated to discuss politics frequently with his mother will also be frequently discussing politics with fathers and friends, who, as we saw earlier, are more often perceived as appropriate opinion sources than is the mother. Hence, the drop in the mother-child correlation may be the result of the mother's lesser "pull" on the politically interested youngster in comparison with that of father and friends. In any event, however, the fact that family politicization does not have a general and uniform impact on the degree to which Japanese teenagers absorb their parents' political perspectives is significant because, particularly in view of the corroborating data from the American study, it would seem to disconfirm one widely held assumption about how the family transmits political orientations. In the words of Jennings and Niemi, "students with highly politicized backgrounds do not necessarily resemble their parents more closely than students from a-politicized families."¹⁷

We have seen that the degree to which students take on the political characteristics of their parents varies with the nature of the political orientation. But the analysis

¹⁷ Ibid.

of potential intervening variables which would explain the circumstances under which parental effectiveness at transmitting political orientations is maximized has been notable mainly for its negative findings. I found that neither sex, urban-rural residence, or family politicization had a substantial, uniform effect on the degree of parent-child political congruence. Only the age of the student had a consistent and marked impact. But there is another dimension of family life, not yet discussed, which has often been alleged to play a major role in shaping the political nature of the young individual. That is the character of the patterns of authority and affection in the relations between parents and child, to which I now turn.

Affection, Authority, and Family Political Influence

Two stereotypes of the structure of authority and affection predominate in discussions of the Japanese family. The older of the two portrays the Japanese family as essentially a microcosm of arbitrary authority, in which a stern father rules without constraint and in which there is little expression of paternal affection for the child. To some extent such a situation of ultimate and arbitrary paternal authority, it has been argued, persists even in such modern families as those of the urban middle class.

The second and more recent stereotype is one in which Japanese fathers have, in the view of such writers as Robert Lifton, withdrawn into ineffectual non-involvement in the

life of the young Japanese. In this new family, Lifton argues, the mother remains as the primary source of affection for the child. But in consequence of the father's emotional absence from the family, Japanese youths seek strong extra-family identifications and release from anxiety by engaging in mass demonstrations and radical student movements.¹⁸

The relevance of these two stereotypes for the role of the family in the political socialization process should be self-evident. One classic theme in discussions of the politics of adolescence has been the allegation that a syndrome of political rebellion from the family occurs, in which the teenager, feeling estranged from his parents and chafing under their authority, seeks independence from and symbolic retribution on his parents by adopting political views hostile to those of the parents. A second, equally prominent assertion, has been that the authoritarian family will, on the contrary, produce a child who in his adulthood will seek authoritarian government—as, for example, Douglas Haring argued in the quote cited in chapter one.¹⁹

These stereotypes raise several questions of relevance here. Let us begin by looking at the evidence on the pattern of paternal involvement in the making of decisions and child-rearing in the Japanese family, presented in Table VII-12.

¹⁸Robert J. Lifton, "Youth and History: Individual Change in Postwar Japan," in Erik H. Erikson, ed., The Challenge of Youth (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor, 1965), p. 268.

¹⁹See pp. 9 and 10.

TABLE VII-12

PARENTS' REPORTS OF PATTERNS OF-DECISION MAKING
AND CHILD-REARING

(percent)

Decision Making:"In your family who usually makes the decisions
about family matters?"

	<u>Father's Report</u>	<u>Mother's Report</u>
Husband makes almost all	26	25
Wife makes almost all	5	7
Both discuss and decide all together	39	38
Husband makes some: wife makes others	28	27
No response	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>
Total	100%	100%

Child-Rearing:"In your family, who takes care of rearing
the children?"

	<u>Father's Report</u>	<u>Mother's Report</u>
Husband	6	4
Wife	39	38
Both	52	57
No response	<u>3</u>	<u>1</u>
Total	100%	100%

The juxtaposition of the two items in the table is illuminating. The figures do reveal that most families have shared parental participation in decision making and in child-rearing. But in a substantial minority of cases it also would appear that the father's role is that of an authority who steps in to make decisions but who takes little part in the rearing of the children, a pattern Vogel had asserted to be characteristic of many middle-class families.

One implication of the patterns of parental authority and emotional involvement is that Japanese teenagers are likely to feel closer to their mothers than to their fathers. We have already seen that at each age level more teenagers report discussing things with their mothers than with their fathers. Table VII-13 adds to this some comparative evidence on the extent to which teenagers feel fathers and mothers understand them and care about them, two further measures of feelings of closeness.

Roughly three-fourths of all students responded by choosing the two more positive categories in the case of both parents. But the mother is clearly more often perceived as benevolent than is the father, as might be expected, and as has been found to be true of American youngsters' feelings toward their parents as well.²⁰ Nevertheless, those children whose negative responses indicate a marked estrangement from their fathers are far fewer than those who seem fairly content

²⁰Langdon, *op. cit.*, p. 68.

TABLE VII-13

TEENAGERS' FEELINGS OF PARENTS' UNDERSTANDING AND CONCERN

(percent of students choosing each response)

"Do your father and mother understand you?"

	<u>Very well</u>	<u>Some- what</u>	<u>Not very well</u>	<u>Hardly at all</u>	<u>N.R.</u>	<u>Total</u>
Father	23	44	24	5	5	101%
Mother	31	43	22	3	1	100%

"Do you think your father and mother are concerned about you and take good care of you?"

	<u>Very well</u>	<u>Some what</u>	<u>Not very well</u>	<u>Hardly at all</u>	<u>N.R.</u>	<u>Total</u>
Father	35	38	19	3	5	100%
Mother	53	34	10	1	1	100%

with their relationships.

Still, one important part of the alleged political rebellion syndrome is that the child who is estranged from his parents emotionally will be likely to reject them politically. Or, as Jennings and Niemi have put it, the closer the child feels to his parents, "the more susceptible he [will] be to adopting, either through formal or informal learning, the political values of the parent."²¹ Table VII-14 puts this hypothesis to the test by examining the effects on father-child and mother-child correlations on the six political orientations of a scale of the child's closeness to the parent, based on the two items shown in Table VII-13 and the frequency of general discussions with each parent.

Jennings and Niemi found in the American case that the hypothesis was untrue.²² As Table VII-14 demonstrates it is equally unsupported by the Japanese data. The child's emotional closeness to his parents has no consistent or significant effect on the degree to which he agrees with their political orientations.

A different perspective on the impact of family affection and authority patterns stresses the child's feelings about his own influence in the family. The stereotype of the decision structure of the traditional Japanese family portrayed

²¹"The Transmission of Political Values from the Parent to the Child," p. 181.

²²Ibid.

TABLE VII-14

STUDENTS' CLOSENESS TO PARENTS AND PARENT-STUDENT
AGREEMENT ON SIX POLITICAL ORIENTATIONS

(gammas)

<u>Corre- lation:</u>	<u>Party I.D.</u>	<u>Ideology</u>	<u>Output Support</u>	<u>Input Support</u>	<u>Pol. Int.</u>	<u>Pol. Effic.</u>
<u>With Father:</u>						
High	.53	.14	.13	.12	.14	.13
Medium	.38	.78	.29	.15	.28	.18
Low	.56	.12	.17	.12	.04	.21
<u>With Mother:</u>						
High	.47	.15	.28	.11	.13	.03
Medium	.41	.11	.46	.19	.21	.24
Low	.50	.46	.32	.24	.09	.13

the child as having to obey his parents', particularly his father's, rules without complaint. The new norms of democracy, however, were meant by their occupation authors to penetrate even the authoritarian family. Table VII-15 provides the evidence on how far such democratic norms have entered family decision processes in the form of students' and parents' replies to two items asking about children's influence on family decisions affecting them.

As the patterns of responses in both generations make clear, the Japanese family no longer appears to be an authoritarian microcosm. Very few youngsters, especially among the oldest students, feel they have little or no influence on the decisions that affect them; and a majority, which increases to nearly three-fourths among the twelfth graders, believe they can affect decisions already made. In each case the proportions of parents giving the same replies seem to bear out the students' predominant feeling of efficacy.

But there is another, more recent stereotype of family authority which must also be considered, one which has a particular significance in contemporary Japan. Here the emphasis shifts away from arbitrary parental authority to pervasive parental interference in the child's use of his time. The parent, especially the mother, concerned that her youngster should succeed in the fierce competition of Japan's "examination hell" nags and pesters the child to study hard, and keeps a close watch on how much time is spent on leisure

TABLE VII-15

FAMILY EFFICACY: STUDENTS' AND PARENTS' REPLIES
TO TWO ITEMS ON THE CHILD'S INFLUENCE IN THE FAMILY

(percent of students by grade and
parents as a whole giving each
response)

Item A

Student version: "When some decision concerning you
(such as going on to the next level of school,
etc.) is made in your family, how much does
your opinion count?"

Parent version: "In your family, how much do you
listen to your child's opinions when you are
making a decision concerning him?"

<u>Grade</u>	<u>Very much</u>	<u>Some- what</u>	<u>Not very much</u>	<u>Hardly at all</u>	<u>N.R.</u>	<u>Total</u>
8	21	59	18	1	1	100%
10	46	46	6	2	0	100%
12	51	41	7	1	0	100%
Parents	61	35	3	0	1	100%

Item B

Student version: "When you disagree with some
decision made at home, how much effect do you
think it would have to complain?"

Parent version: "In your family do you ever change
decisions you [the parents] have made concerning
your child if he objects to the decision?"

<u>Grade</u>	<u>A lot^a (often)</u>	<u>Some (some- times)</u>	<u>Not much (not very often)</u>	<u>Hardly (hardly ever)</u>	<u>N.R.</u>	<u>Total</u>
8	5	47	39	8	1	100%
10	11	54	30	5	0	100%
12	15	59	21	5	0	100%
Parents	11	62	24	2	1	100%

^aParents' response categories in parentheses.

activities, with whom her child becomes friends, etc. Various writers have blamed the tiresome nagging of the kyoiku mama ("education mama") for the numerous social pathologies that afflict Japanese high school and college age youth. Table VII-16 affords a view of the accuracy of the stereotype, again by reference to the responses of students and parents to two items designed to get at this question.

Judging by the responses to the two items, most Japanese teenagers do not feel that their parents interfere too much in their lives. And the proportions who do feel such interference decline in each case with the age of the child. Thus, in whichever version it may be, the old or the new stereotype, family suppression of teenagers' autonomy does not seem to be prevalent in the families in my sample. Moreover, in the case of both dimensions of the family authority structure, the proportion of youngsters expressing dissatisfaction decreases as age increases. Thus, in general the Japanese family appears to offer most youngsters by the time they reach the age of high school seniors the ability to control a large part of their lives.

The relative influence and competence of the adolescent within the family decision process has been linked to two kinds of family impact on youngsters' political development. The first has to do with the success of parents at having their children accept their political orientations. The second concerns the generalization by the youngster of his experiences

TABLE VII-16

STUDENTS' FEELINGS OF PARENTAL INTERFERENCE:
RESPONSES TO TWO ITEMS

(percent of students by grade choosing each item)

Item A

"Do you think your parents interfere too much in such things as whom you become friends with and when you go to play, etc.?"

<u>Grade</u>	<u>Too much</u>	<u>Some</u>	<u>Not much</u>	<u>Hardly at all</u>	<u>N.R.</u>	<u>Total</u>
8	10	28	51	10	1	100%
10	6	26	55	14	0	100%
12	8	25	49	18	0	100%

Item B

"Do your parents nag too much about studies?"

<u>Grade</u>	<u>Too much</u>	<u>Some</u>	<u>Not much</u>	<u>Hardly at all</u>	<u>N.R.</u>	<u>Total</u>
8	9	27	52	11	1	100%
10	6	26	48	19	1	100%
12	5	17	42	36	0	100%

with family decision processes to expectations about his potential competence at influencing decisions and decision makers in the broader political process.

Let us look first at the effects of teenagers' feelings of autonomy in the family on their absorption of their parents' political orientations. The hypothesis operative here is that the youngster who is burdened down by a compelling parental authority which yields him no autonomy or influence will react by rebelling against parental values, including those in the political realm. Conversely, the family which does afford the child a sense of self-determination gives him an incentive to accept and identify with its values and beliefs. Table VII-17 offers the evidence relevant to the hypothesis.

While it is apparent that once again there is no consistent and uniform effect of family authoritarianism upon the parent-child political congruence, there are several noteworthy instances of a patterning of differences in the predicted direction. Agreement on party identification is the clearest example: father-child agreement increases as the child's autonomy increases on both measures, which is also true of father-child agreement on political interest. Mother-child agreement on partisanship increases with increased family efficacy, but is not affected by changes in the degree of family interference. In spite of the over-all negative outcome of this test, as of the test of the impact of most of

TABLE VII-17

PARENT-STUDENT AGREEMENT ON SIX POLITICAL ORIENTATIONS
 BY TWO MEASURES OF FAMILY INTERFERENCE
 WITH STUDENT'S AUTONOMY

A. By Student's Sense of Family Efficacy

<u>Corre- lation</u>	<u>Party I.D.</u>	<u>Ideology</u>	<u>Output Support</u>	<u>Input Support</u>	<u>Pol. Int.</u>	<u>Pol. Effic.</u>
<u>With Father:</u>						
High	.52	.11	.07	-.03	.25	.18
Medium	.52	.13	.37	.21	.15	.12
Low	.38	.21	.12	.20	.05	.22
<u>With Mother:</u>						
High	.59	.00	.27	.18	.03	.21
Medium	.46	.30	.51	.14	.22	.12
Low	.27	.31	.23	.18	.24	.09

B. By Student's Feeling of Family Interference

<u>Corre- lation</u>	<u>Party I.D.</u>	<u>Ideology</u>	<u>Output Support</u>	<u>Input Support</u>	<u>Pol. Int.</u>	<u>Pol. Effic.</u>
<u>With Father:</u>						
Low	.62	.10	.24	.15	.21	.17
Medium	.46	.16	.20	.13	.14	.20
High	.42	.17	.15	.12	.14	.13
<u>With Mother</u>						
Low	.51	.03	.39	.11	.09	.02
Medium	.39	.18	.33	.18	.17	.20
High	.49	.45	.37	.18	.23	.11

the other intervening variables, the patterning of the parent-child correlations on partisanship is in the predicted direction.

This outcome raises something of a dilemma for any interpretation of the value of the hypothesis that the authoritarian family produces political rebellion. The dilemma comes from the fact that the major area of the family's direct political influence is indeed affected by family authoritarianism, but other dimensions of political orientations are not. On the whole, it was also congruence on partisanship that was most consistently affected by the other variables discussed earlier. Partisanship is a more concrete and visible political characteristic than almost any other. Thus, the parents' partisanship becomes the clearest target toward which the child can express either his ire or his identification. In this sense, then, it would be unwarranted to simply dismiss the political rebellion hypothesis, or indeed the family politicization hypothesis. Clearly, both hypotheses have some validity in regard to the most important area of family political influence. But the vagaries of the process whereby youngsters absorb or reject other political characteristics of the family mean not only that the family's influence as the source of specific political orientations is limited, although to an admittedly basic sphere, but that the factors that may maximize or minimize the success with which the family transmits its political values are likewise operative almost exclusively

within that sphere.

I have been discussing the political influence of the family purely with reference to the transmission by the parents of their specific political attitudes and values and acquisition of those attitudes and values by the child. That is one kind of potential political role of the family. Another, with a longer history of scholarly interest, is that of the role of family as prototype for the polity.

"The Family Writ Large": Generalization
from the Family to the Polity

Aside from possibly affecting the strength of parent-child political congruence, family authority patterns have an additional potential effect on the political development of the child. The psychoculturalists often drew heavily on family authoritarianism as the explanation, by analogy, of political authoritarianism. While rejecting this "family writ large view" in any simple form, students of political culture, notably Gabriel Almond, have argued that the individual's experiences with authority in the familiar institutions and setting of personal life may serve as the source of one's expectations of political authority, particularly if the personal experiences tend in the same direction. If the individual finds himself able to exert an impact on the making of decisions in the family, the classroom, and the job, he is likely to expect to be able to influence decisions in the political process as well.²³

²³Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture

We have seen that on the whole the Japanese family seems fairly open to the child's influence. From my own observations, moreover, as well as those of others who have visited Japanese schools,²⁴ the classroom situation seems likewise quite unauthoritarian. Regrettably, I do not have evidence on the teenagers' feelings about their ability to influence their teachers and other elements of the decision process at school. But the evidence on their feelings of family efficacy affords the opportunity to test one element of the generalization hypothesis, and one which bears on the nature of family influence. Table VII-18 presents the evidence on the correlation between students' feelings of family efficacy and political efficacy.

Clearly, there is very little relationship between the two feelings. Whatever the factors affecting the student's belief that he can exert influence on the political system, his experience in influencing family decisions is not prominent among them. The finding of Almond and Verba that experiences in later decision systems, such as the job and the school, tended to override those in the family suggests that age might be an intervening factor here, with younger children

(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), especially pp. 326 ff.

²⁴ See the comments of Ronald P. Dore, City Life in Japan (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1963), p. 231; and Kazuo Kawai, Japan's American Interlude (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), p. 200.

TABLE VII-19
 STUDENTS' POLITICAL EFFICACY BY FAMILY EFFICACY
 (percentages across)

		Political Efficacy				
		<u>High</u>	<u>Medium</u>	<u>Low</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>N</u>
Family Efficacy	High	42	29	29	100%	310
	Medium	33	33	33	99%	322
	Low	32	35	33	100%	303

Gamma = .10

being likelier than older ones to generalize from the family. There is only a slight drop in the size of the correlations, however, from .09 among the eighth graders to .05 among the twelfth graders.

The concept of generalization is not confined to such projection of feelings of family efficacy into the political realm, however. Among the most important and best known specific hypotheses based on the notion of generalization is that in which the political authority figure becomes a "parent writ large."

The discovery of the "benevolent leader" phenomenon led researchers to seek explanations as to why a child should idealize the political leader. Because the phenomenon is so marked among younger children it was natural that explanations would be sought in the nature of a child's relationships with his parents. A long tradition of scholarship on national character had, as I have pointed out, asserted that the political world was in effect "the family writ large," and indeed some of the early empirical research seemed to suggest correspondences in children's images of primary authorities, especially the father, and their images of secondary authority figures, in particular the president. Easton and Hess summarized the American child's "typical" responses to authority figures as follows:

. . . children display a strong tendency to generalize attitudes developed in connection with authority in their immediate experiences

to perceived authority beyond their knowledge and direct control. The authority figures with which they have earliest and most intimate contact are of course their parents, and it is this image of authority that they subsequently seem to transfer to political figures that cross their vision. The child not only learns to respect and admire political authorities but with regard to many characteristics regards them as parents writ large.²⁵

The notion that the leader is the "parent writ large" is certainly congruent with a major aspect of Japanese culture, the traditional (i.e., prewar and wartime) imagery of the Emperor's role in the life of the nation. As we noted earlier, Imperial Japan was portrayed as a "family state" with a benevolent and paternal Emperor at its head to whom each subject owed ultimate filial devotion. The Occupation brought an end to the "family state" and the virtual end of the Emperor's significance in the political emotional life of the nation.

The Emperor, thus, as I pointed out in chapter two, is no longer a salient political authority figure. But the Prime Minister is, and the highly negative character of his role in the imagery and feelings of young Japanese, in comparison with the benevolent leader image of the American president and British Queen, makes the question of whether his image is generalized from the child's images of the parents an intriguing one. The data in my questionnaire included

²⁵David Easton and Robert D. Hess, "The Child's Political World," Midwest Journal of Political Science, 6:3 (August 1962), p. 242.

items asking youngsters about similar aspects of both parents and Prime Minister. In particular, I asked whether the students thought the Prime Minister cared about the problems of ordinary Japanese and tried to help them; I also included two items, mentioned earlier in this chapter, regarding the child's^o perception of his parents' care and concern for him. These parallel the content of the item on the Prime Minister's concern: "Do you think your father and mother are concerned about you and take good care of you?" and "Do your father and mother understand you?" Table VII-19 presents the correlations between the teenagers' responses to these two parental concern items and the Prime Minister concern item. Since the "political authority is the parent writ large" hypothesis originated in studies of younger children, its applicability to teenagers may be questionable. But a plausible corollary to be drawn from the hypothesis is that the younger the child the more likely he will be to generalize from parent to political authority. It seems useful, therefore, to see to what extent, if any, such generalization occurs among children at various stages of adolescence and particularly to see if a diminishment in the size of the correlations between responses on the parent items and the Prime Minister item does occur. The table, therefore, shows both the over-all correlations and the partial correlations for children in each grade level.

The results are notable not for the strength of the over-all correlations, but for the clear-cut way in which they

TABLE VII-19

CORRELATIONS OF STUDENTS' IMAGE OF PRIME MINISTER'S
 CONCERN FOR THE ORDINARY PEOPLE WITH TWO MEASURES
 OF PARENTAL CONCERN FOR THE CHILD

(gamma)

<u>Prime Minister's Concern</u>	<u>Father's Concern for the Child</u>	<u>Mother's Concern for the Child</u>	<u>Father's Under- ing</u>	<u>Mother's Under- ing</u>
Grade:				
8	.15	.22	.20	.33
10	.08	.11	.18	.21
12	.08	.09	.09	.04
Total	.09	.13	.16	.19

evaluations of family authority figures are directly projected onto remote political ones."²⁷

While direct projection of parental image onto the political figure is one version of the generalization hypothesis, there is an alternative hypothesis linking children's feelings toward their parents with their feelings toward the political figure. It is a view that portrays the child's endowment of the political authority figure with benevolence as a reaction formation, in which the child seeks a positive authority figure either to compensate for specific negative experiences with parental authority or in reaction to his general feeling of vulnerability in the face of authority. Such a mechanism, it has been argued, is particularly apt to be the case among Japanese. Doi, for example, states that ". . . the Japanese are always prepared to identify themselves with, or introject an outside force, to the exclusion of other ways of coping with it."²⁸

A full explanation of the degree to which these two hypotheses fit Japanese children is beyond the scope of the

²⁷Dean Jaros, Herbert Hirsch, and Frederick J. Fleron, Jr., "The Malevolent Leader: Political Socialization in an American Subculture," American Political Science Review, 62:2 (June 1968), p. 573.

²⁸Doi Takeo, "Amae: A Key Concept for Understanding Japanese Personality Structure," in Robert J. Smith and Richard K. Beardsley, eds., Japanese Culture: Its Development and Characteristics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 137.

present analysis. But inspection of the cross-tabulations of the two measures of parental concern with that of Prime Minister's concern suggests that direct projection is a more common pattern than that of reaction formation.²⁹ In most cases, the principal factor producing the correlation was the high proportion of youngsters who felt their parents didn't care or didn't understand who also believed that the Prime Minister didn't care. Among the youngest teenagers in the sample, those who were positive about their parents also tended to be positive about the Prime Minister. But this positive-positive link tended to disappear among the older youths. In nearly every instance, however, those who felt negative toward their parents and positive toward the Prime Minister constituted the smallest proportion in the table. The reaction formation hypothesis thus finds little support. In short, the principal way in which Japanese teenagers link parents' images with images of the Prime Minister appears to

²⁹This accords with an interesting interpretation of the role played by the family and teacher in the tendency of some Japanese teenagers to social and political alienation, proposed by Christie Kiefer. Kiefer views the teacher as ". . . 'a motherly father,' helping his students accept their own masculinity in a culture that creates social distance between fathers and sons.

"As a condition for accepting the teacher as a 'good father,' however, many young men are driven to seek objects for the hostile feelings they continue to have toward authority. In other words, the "bad father" image is projected onto politicians, business bosses, policemen, and soldiers—the impersonal male authorities usually selected as targets for student activism." See "The Psychological Interdependence of Family, School, and Bureaucracy in Japan," American Anthropologist, 72:1 (February 1970), 73.

be by converting negative feelings toward parents into negative feelings toward the leader.

Summary and Conclusions

The magnitude and the pace of the changes that have taken place in Japanese society since the end of the war have led many observers to conclude that the family's role in shaping and molding the values of youth would inevitably become attenuated and atrophied. In this chapter, we have seen that while it is true that the Japanese family is far from having a monopoly of influence over the political development of the teenager, it nevertheless continues to have an appreciable effect on the politics of youth in a variety of ways.

In the first part of the analysis, I focused on the family's political role in the wider nexus of socializing influences, especially the school and the peer group. It was evident that for the most part, a great increase takes place during adolescence in the salience of one major extra-family source of political orientations and interaction, the peer group, but not in another, the teacher. At the same time, the family's role does not suffer a general decline, as the father continues to be a salient opinion source.

But Japanese youngsters early become aware of the political role differences between their parents, and particularly of the low level of political involvement of their

mothers. The mother's perceived salience, already low among even the eighth graders, declines to nearly nothing among the oldest youngsters. This does not, however, reflect a decline in her actual influence on the child's political attitudes. The evidence on parent-child correlations over a broad range of political orientations showed not only that the mother's orientations were as likely or more likely than the father's to be absorbed by the teenager, but that as in the case of the father-child political agreement, the strength of maternal influence actually increases with the age of the child, especially in the case of the family's most important contribution to the developing political man, party identification. The commonplace image of adolescence as a time in which a political gap develops and widens between parent and child is contrary to fact. The evidence shows that parents and child—and even, most unexpectedly, mother and child—grow closer politically.

The seeming anomaly between the teenager's low and still decreasing orientation toward the mother and her apparent equality of influence with the father on the child's political orientations (which increases just as the child supposedly is turning away from her) is due, I have argued, to two closely related factors. Children spend more time with their mothers than their fathers, and thus are more often exposed to their mothers' political values and beliefs. Moreover, they very often fail to realize how frequently they discuss political

and social questions with her. She is a constant but unrecognized influence on their developing political attitudes and values.

The analysis of the family as the source of specific political attitudes and values thus established three major conclusions: first, that that influence tended to concentrate on the sense of partisanship, as it does in American families. Second, that such family influence was as much maternal as it was paternal in origin; and third, that such influence tended on the whole to increase with the age of the child. What the analysis did not show was that the child's sex, his closeness to his parents, or the urban-rural residency dichotomy made any consistent difference in the degree to which the child adopted his parents' political outlook.

The final section of the analysis turned from the family as a source of specific political attitudes to the family as prototype for the polity. We saw that the stereotypical authoritarian patriarchy no longer prevails in contemporary families, and that indeed in the majority of families both parents and children themselves report that the child has a voice in, and influence over, family decisions affecting him. But the teenagers gave no evidence supporting the "family writ large" extension of feelings of efficacy at home onto feelings of efficacy in politics. Nor, on the whole, did the data show consistent support for the hypothesis that adolescent political rebellion against the political views of the

parents occurs as a result of resentment against an authoritarian family. But if the latter effect was inconsistent, its appearance in the case of the congruence between parents' party support and that of the child was significant, because of the weighty role of partisanship in the family's legacy to the child. The data do appear to confirm that the authoritarian family creates a political rebel, in the sense of a child with a party allegiance at odds with that of the parents.

The final section of the analysis provided another significant piece of evidence on the indirect political role of the family, because contrary to expectations I found that a substantial number of the youngest respondents in the sample did invest the Prime Minister with the same characteristics as those of their parents. If the over-all tenor of the evidence was contrary to the theory of the political system as the "family writ large," the finding of correspondences between the eighth grader's images of the benevolence of their parents and of the Prime Minister suggested that one element of the theory, that of the political authority figure as "parent writ large," does indeed describe a major component of the influence of the family in the early political life of the child.

Finally, however, the most important conclusion to be drawn from the analysis of family influence must involve the transmission of partisanship. While I have laid little emphasis on the acquisition of cognitive learning about politics,

it seems clear that the school bears the brunt of much of the transmission of this, and it is seconded by the mass media. The peer group becomes an increasingly salient source from which the Japanese youngster may acquire opinions and attitudes. But as we have seen, it does not appear to be a major factor in the creation of partisanship. That role belongs to the parents, in Japan as in the United States, which is a fact of no small significance. In serving as the source of the young Japanese partisanship, his parents not only provide him as an individual with an orientation that becomes a basic filter through which he views politics and evaluates issues, but also provides the political system with a psychological foundation for one of its most important elements— the party system— and thus also one basis for political stability.

CHAPTER VIII
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Reflecting on the occurrence in rapid succession of the imposition of martial law in South Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines during the last year, a writer in Japan's best known daily newspaper column "Tensei Jingo" of the Asahi Shinbun, was moved to remark:

Taking a look around us, we can't help feeling that Japan today may be a rarity in Asia. For whatever reason, she is stable, and we are free to assemble and free to speak. . . . Throughout the long-tension-filled period of the postwar period, Japan has come through without ever once having to resort to martial law or to calling out the troops. This makes us part of a rare group of nations, not just in Asia, but even in comparison with Western Europe.¹

What explains Japan's rare success in the contemporary world at establishing and maintaining a viable new democratic regime? That is the central question that has been the impetus and guide to this study. The approach to dealing with the question that I have taken here has been to investigate the formation of democratic roots in the political culture which constitute resources on which the regime can draw for support.

¹Asahi Shinbun, October 19, 1972.

In the preceding analysis I have attempted to assay to what extent the political socialization process operates in contemporary Japan to create such resources. Now it is time to draw together the results of the analysis and to consider the implications of the findings, both for the continued vitality of democratic politics in Japan, and for the role of the political socialization process in a new democracy.

The Findings

The main body of the analysis in this study falls into essentially three sections. The first section took as its objective the delineation of the role played by the socialization of children and adolescents in the development of diffuse support for the democratic regime. Chapter two focused primarily on the national leader's potential role as a personal agent of legitimation and on the ability of the other important institutions of government and politics to function in a similar capacity. Chapter three then turned to the way young Japanese react to democracy as a concept and as a value and investigated the function of democracy as a legitimating ideological symbol and belief system.

The middle section of the analysis considered the development of two central elements of the self as a political actor during adolescence. Here, chapter four followed the growth of partisanship and the factors affecting it, while chapter five dealt with the related topic of the emergence of ideology.

The final section was essentially explanatory. Chapter six studied the multiple factors influencing Japanese teenagers' development of a wide range of political characteristics—factors including aspects of the family's social situation and of the youngster's own psychological characteristics. Chapter seven shifted the focus to the agents involved in the socialization process, especially the family. Such are the general outlines of the analysis. Let me now highlight the major findings and conclusions from each section.

Sources of Diffuse Support: Personal, Institutional, and Ideological Legitimation

1. Japanese youngsters have no "benevolent leader."

The first major finding to emerge from the early studies of political socialization in the United States was that the President plays the role of "benevolent leader" in the eyes of American children. The initial section of this study addressed itself to the question of whether a "benevolent leader" exists in today's Japan who, like the American President or British Queen, would serve as the agent through which Japanese children are bound to their country's political regime. The data revealed that the Emperor, once a "benevolent leader" par excellence, has become for most children a figure of little salience and little emotional appeal, a "peripheral monarch." Striking as the Emperor's decline in the hierarchy of expressive symbols in the political culture of Japanese youth is, however, the Prime Minister's place in

that culture is equally noteworthy. We saw that Japanese children from the early years of elementary school not only do not have an image of the Prime Minister as an omniscient and omnipotent "benevolent leader," but that indeed they tend to have a negative image of him as unlikeable and untrustworthy. The incidence of such negative feelings among children rises so sharply with age that by as early as age thirteen more Japanese children were found to have negative feelings toward the Prime Minister than did their parents—a dramatic reversal of the American findings. The available comparative evidence from England and other European countries likewise made it apparent that markedly fewer Japanese youngsters than youngsters in other lands feel positive toward their national leader.

But the dislike and mistrust of the Prime Minister does not, we found, betoken a wholesale rejection by Japanese youngsters of political authority figures. Comparison of the Prime Minister's image with that of the local leader, for example a mayor or governor like Tokyo's Minobe Ryokichi, made it clear that Japanese teenagers show a persistent positive reaction to the local leader. I attributed the difference to several factors, particularly the non-partisan nature of local politics which absolves the local leader of the stigma of being a "politician" at the same time as it enhances the importance of personality as a factor in his leadership and as a factor which contenders for the role of

local leader use in their appeal to the electorate.

2. Japanese youngsters "diffuse support" for political institutions is selective, directed heavily toward the input institutions and processes of democratic politics. The analysis showed that Japanese youngsters' cynicism toward the Prime Minister does not constitute part of an undifferentiated cynicism toward the institutional structure of the regime, but rather a limited negativism directed against the authoritative output institutions of government. If the "missing leader" was the most important negative finding of the second chapter, the relatively widespread supportive feelings of Japanese teenagers with regard to elections, parties, and popular participation in politics was the most important positive finding. Such support for the institutions and processes through which the citizenry take part in the democratic process reflects, I concluded, the existence in the political culture of Japanese youth of an important basis of institutional legitimation for the democratic regime, one particularly appropriate in a society that has rejected an authoritarian ancien regime founded on the personal legitimation of a sanctified monarch.

One theme running through the study has been that of the question of generational continuity or change in political culture. The finding that Japanese youngsters tend to be more negative than their parents toward the authoritative output institutions of politics is matched in significance by the

fact that they also tend to be more positive than their parents toward the participatory input institutions. This constitutes, I believe, a major redirection of Japanese political culture, away from one in which the prevailing pattern was for the individual to relate to politics mainly or exclusively as a subject, oriented primarily toward the authorities, to a pattern in which the individual perceives politics as a process in which he has a stake and a voice, and a right to have that voice heard.

3. A synthesis of the symbols of democracy and peace has become the core of consensus in the emerging political culture as well as a defining element of Japan's national identity in the eyes of Japanese youth. Chapter three turned from the potential personal and institutional bases for regime legitimation to the role democracy itself might play as concept, value, and symbol—as the vehicle of its own legitimation. After establishing the prevalence of a Lincolnian popular sovereignty interpretation of the meaning of the concept, the analysis showed that democracy has become a strongly positive symbol among the overwhelming majority of both Japanese youngsters and adults. But the analysis also found that the traditional Japanese preference for decision by consensus rather than by majority rule continues to predominate even among the young. The rules of the game in the adaptation of democracy preferred by Japanese youth emphasize achieving decisions fair to all, which do not ignore or override the

dissent of the minority. In this new amalgam of democracy and consensus, the traditional emphasis on harmony has been retained; but the intolerance of dissent that the principle of consensus used to entail is no longer legitimate.

Perhaps the most unusual finding on democracy's role in the political culture of the young is that it is closely linked to the value and symbol of peace. One influential element in many Japanese youngsters' conception of democracy is an emphasis on the right of the people to live in peace. My analysis showed that peace stands at the pinnacle of the hierarchy of social values among young Japanese, surpassing even democracy. And the evidence suggests that many Japanese youngsters seem to find Japan's national identity in her unique role of a democracy constitutionally committed to peace. This synthesis of the two symbols appears to serve as a major source of ideological legitimation of the contemporary regime for Japanese youth.

Symbols of Dissensus: Partisanship and Ideology

In chapters four and five the focus of inquiry shifted from symbols of consensus and legitimacy to symbols of dissensus and cleavage.

4. The Japanese party system has established extensive roots in the political culture of Japanese youth as well as in the adult culture. One of the major ways in which the individual citizen in a democracy relates to the political process is through his identification with a political party.

Party affiliation serves not only as a guide and a mediator to much of the individual's political activity but also as a filter through which the complexities of politics can be screened and political issues interpreted. From the point of view of the stability of the political system, moreover, widespread durable affiliations to the existing parties among the electorate are a means to insure against the kind of recurrent swings in political loyalties and the consequent turmoil that pervaded pre-de Gaulle France. It seems clear that the socialization process in contemporary Japan, like that in Britain and in the United States and unlike that in France, is creating substantial numbers of Japanese youngsters allegiant to one or another of the five parties. Japanese youngsters appear to form party identifications in proportions only slightly less than American youngsters and from an equally early age. Moreover, they acquire their partisanship as their main political legacy from the family; they share their parents' partisanship to a degree that approaches that to which American youngsters do. Thus despite the recency of the Japanese party system, it appears to have developed a set of allegiances among Japanese that reach from one generation to the next and in so doing provide a basic element both of generational continuity in the political culture and of political stability.

One additional significant aspect of the findings on partisanship among Japanese teenagers is that the social

factors which influence party affiliation continue to be dominated by the urban-rural dichotomy that has figured in so many analyses of the social bases of Japanese politics. Despite the class conflict rhetoric of the opposition in Japan, the impact of socioeconomic status and class continues to be less significant than that of the "cultural" differences of city versus countryside.

5. The high density of ideological stimuli in Japanese politics (compared to the United States) means that ideologically-based symbols and labels play a significant role in the political learning process, one which is reinforced by the nature of partisan cleavage. Like most other industrial nations and many of the developing countries, but unlike the United States, Japan is a nation whose principal political cleavage is based on an ideological split, a classic conflict between a conservative, capitalist establishment and a Marxian socialist opposition. Much of the political rhetoric is thus infused with the terminology and conceptual framework of Marxism. The evidence showed, to begin with, that this permeation of politics by ideological symbols and rhetoric makes an impact on the way in which Japanese youngsters perceive their society. For a substantial majority of the older teenagers, capitalism takes precedence over democracy as the principal defining characteristic of Japan. The basic characteristics of capitalism and of its opposite, socialism, are understood by most youngsters by about age fifteen. But

neither term or symbol has the positive appeal to young Japanese of the symbols of democracy and peace; and although attitudes toward capitalism tend to be more negative than those toward socialism, the difference is generally slight, with about half of the students being neutral in each case.

The analysis also investigated attitudes toward the two symbols from the perspective of ideology considered as a style of thought characterized by consistency and reasoning from causal principles. Here the most significant finding was that partisanship in Japan appears to offer a powerful and clear-cut stimulus to ideological development, with the acquisition of an ideology being closely linked to the acquisition of a party identification for many teenagers. This process is facilitated, and ideology made readily salient and comprehensible, by the extensive use of simple ideological labels like "capitalist" or "socialist," which may in turn become familiarly linked with the political parties. Thus the lines of political cleavage are drawn where party and ideological symbol coincide, and the simplicity of the symbols and their similarity to party labels, makes it possible for ideology to penetrate mass politics and the political learning process to a much greater degree than in the United States.

Influences on the Developing Political Self

The two final analytic chapters, six and seven, both dealt with the factors affecting the over-all development of the teenager's political self. Chapter six focused on the

multiple influences on political orientations of a youngster's social situation and his own psychological characteristics. Chapter seven investigated the impact of potential agents of socialization, especially the family.

6. The relative impact on the teenager's political orientations of psychocultural factors and that of cleavage-related factors varies with the degree to which the orientation is linked with partisan divisions. The multivariate analyses of the social and psychological influences on the various dimensions of the political self (partisanship and ideology, political interest, political efficacy, and input and output support) are too intricate to be summarized in detail here. But the principal results can be summarized broadly as indicating that essentially four main streams of influence are at work in affecting the political development of the teenager. The first are maturational factors, associated with increased age. The second stream includes psychocultural influences deriving from culturally determined aspects of personality. In the present analysis these have been ego-autonomy and social trust. The third stream of influence is linked to the basic social cleavages that divide Japanese society, notably urban versus rural residence and socioeconomic status. Finally, sex constitutes an additional factor that impinges on the Japanese teenager's political development.

The major finding in this respect is that the nature and balance of forces working to increase or diminish Japanese

teenagers' support for political institutions varies markedly from output to input institutions. The main correlates of teenagers' support for output institutions are factors involved with the basic social and political cleavages of Japanese society—urban-rural residence and party support. These factors, especially the urban-rural dichotomy, play lesser roles in affecting input support. In this context, I concluded that the relative immunity of support for the input institutions and processes to the influence of the social and ideological cleavages was further evidence that those elements of the democratic regime involved with popular political participation play an important legitimizing role which is able to bridge the gap between city and country and even, to some extent, between left and right. The over-all character of the evidence, moreover, led me to reject the validity of any classification of the political culture of Japanese youth as broadly divided into an urban and a rural subculture, since only with respect to partisanship and output support was the direct influence of the urban-rural difference strongly present. Significantly, the pattern of urban-rural differences among Japanese teenagers failed to support urban and rural political stereotypes. Neither urban nor rural youngsters were significantly more politically interested or politically efficacious, on the average, than the other. And while substantially more rural than urban teenagers were supportive of the output institutions, the difference was much smaller with regard to input support.

7. The family makes its main direct political impact on the child by influencing his partisanship; direct paternal and maternal influence, as measured by parent-child agreement on political values, are roughly equal, and in each case tend to increase with the child's age. Over the course of adolescence the family's monopoly of political influence over the child recedes, at least as measured by the rise in the salience of other agents to the child, and in his reported exposure to other agents such as friends, the mass media, etc. But strikingly enough, despite the increased exposure that the young child has to extra-family sources, the congruence of parents and child on political attitudes rises with the age of the child, particularly in the case of party identification. Equally striking is the fact that despite her severe decline as a political role model, the mother's actual influence increases at the same pace as that of the father. In large part this anomaly appears due to her unrecognized political contact with the child, in the broader context of her more frequent over-all contact with him than that which the father has.

8. The Japanese family no longer fits the image of an authoritarian patriarchy; teenagers and parents both reported a family decision process in which the child can exert influence. The consequences of family authority structure on the child's political orientations are intriguing. The "family writ large" hypothesis of an extension of experiences with

family decision processes into expectations about feelings of influence in the political realm was not supported; there was no correlation between youngsters' feelings of family efficacy and political efficacy. The evidence on the transmission of parently partisanship to the child did show that those teenagers from the most "democratic" families tended to resemble their parents most closely and those from the most authoritarian families to resemble theirs the least. Thus in the case of partisanship the hypothesis that the authoritarian family breeds political rebellion was upheld by the Japanese data.

My data also provided a certain degree of corroboration for a related hypothesis, namely that the child's affective response to the political authority figure is a generalization of his response to his parents. But, as was also predicted, the correspondence on parent and political figure images is appreciable only among the youngest students in the sample, and declines in linear fashion as the student's age increases. Thus the Japanese family operates as an agent of political socialization not only by directly transmitting parental political values, but by the parents serving as prototypes for the leader. Moreover, of course, the family also influences the child's political development indirectly by giving him a social identity that has political consequences. In the case of Japan, that means most importantly by making him an urban or a rural resident.

Some Remaining Questions

Despite its length, this study has not begun to plumb the depths of political socialization in Japan. Some major areas are in need of further exploration if the process and its results are to be more fully understood. One obvious area in need of further analysis is that of the extra-family agents of socialization. I have not been able to deal here with the influence of the school, mass media, and peer group fully and systematically. The fact that the Japanese family, like the American family, transmits its political values primarily within the realm of partisanship leaves open a whole host of developing political attitudes and values on which the other agents may have a significant impact. Clearly this is the case with regard to the impact of the school on the child's cognitive orientations toward politics. But even in the cognitive realm, it would be desirable to be able to specify and assess the nature of the school's influence in comparison with that of the mass media, for example.

A second major question involves the life cycle. The evidence on changes in the partisanship of age-cohorts in Japan suggests that changes in important political values of young Japanese adults may occur during their late twenties and early thirties, and that these changes may constitute a resocialization away from values acquired in pre-adult socialization. In a political system like Japan, whose regime is still young, the political culture is in a continuing state

of flux that makes it difficult to sort out age-related change from generational change. But if there is significant age-related change during adulthood on such basic elements of the political self as partisanship, then the influence of the family in the socialization of Japanese political man may be even more restricted than the present analysis has indicated.

A third question that remains to be investigated has to do with what may be the major pattern of social change in contemporary Japan--urbanization. During the past two decades, the proportion of people living in the cities in Japan has seen a vast increase, with a parallel decrease in the proportion living in the country. These urban immigrants have had their political values and beliefs formed in the countryside, which as we have seen, tends to be the major continuing source of support for the output institutions of politics, as well as for the ruling Liberal Democratic Party. The question arises as to how the political values and attitudes that the children of these immigrants develop will differ from those of their parents. From the perspective of Japanese political culture this is an important and problematic question because if a "second generation effect" of rejection of parental values in the face of contradictory social pressures occurs, the consequence is likely to be a further diminishment of support for output institutions coupled with a sharper decline in the conservative dominance of the distribution of

party loyalties than is already occurring. From the perspective of political socialization theory the question is interesting because of the additional stress placed on the family's ability to communicate its political values and, consequently, because of the competition of extra-family agents, especially the peer group, in the family's major area of political influence, partisanship.

Political Socialization and the Future of Japanese Political Culture

Unquestionably the most important general finding of the study has been of a profound shift in Japanese attitudes toward authority. Japanese youngsters do not link themselves to the political regime by developing an emotional bond to the authority figure; there is no benevolent leader in Japanese culture now, despite the long history of intensely emotional leader-follower relations. Nor do young Japanese defer to political authority; contrary to his parents, today's teenager's posture toward politics is that of the confident popular sovereign, supportive of the institutions and processes that convey popular demands and mediate participation. Toward the authoritative institutions young Japanese are cool, skeptical, and even mistrustful. Toward the decision process they are equally sensitive to the undesirable possibility of coercion or suppression of dissent.

What is the likelihood that this change will endure as a major shift in emphasis in Japanese political culture? To

some extent, as the remarks above would suggest, part of the apparent generational difference in attitudes related to authority may be actually a function of age. But there is evidence of a steady and substantial decline over the twenty years since 1953 in the proportion of respondents in the sample of the quinquennial survey of Japanese national character who choose the authoritarian response to an item on "leaving politics to leaders."² Moreover, both culture and cleavage contribute to make it likely that a large part of this shift will endure as a principal component of Japanese political culture: culture because the new anti-authoritarianism coincides with a traditional preference for harmony and solidarity; cleavage because the tension between opposition and establishment, progressive and conservative, is likely to continue to play a central role in politics. From that continuing confrontation the notion of democracy as resistance to wrongful authority³ has taken hold of one segment of

²In 1953, 43 percent of the sample agreed, as opposed to 38 percent which disagreed with the statement that "if we get good political leaders the best way to improve the country is for the people to leave everything to them rather than for the people to discuss things among themselves." By 1968 the proportion agreeing had fallen to 30 percent while those disagreeing had risen to 51 percent. See Tokei Suri Kenkyujo Kokuminsei Chosa Iinkai, Dai-ni Nihonjin no Kokuminsei (Tokyo: Shiseido, 1970), p. 565; see also Table II-11, p. 90, supra.

³See Shinohara Hajime, Nihon no Seiji Fudo (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1968), p. 53, where the argument is made that urban Japan is characterized by a combination of two types of democratic political culture, one emphasizing participation, the other resistance to authority. The rural political subculture Shinohara portrays as dominated by obligation rather than real participation.

Japanese society and is unlikely to disappear so long as the confrontation continues, and that is apt to be for the foreseeable future. Moreover, that segment is found in the urban areas where, if the "second generation" effect I discussed earlier should occur among the children of the new urban immigrant, it is likely that the anti-authoritarian emphasis would become even more predominant than it is among today's youth.

But while it seems most unlikely to me that the basic substance and thrust of the change away from deference toward authority will be reversed, the re-emergence of expressive leadership at the national level seems equally likely, though not of the pre-1954 variety. Such expressive leadership is already common at lower echelons of politics, as in the case of Governors Minobe and Yara on the left, and Matsushita Shonosuke and the late Mishima Yukio on the right. It seems apparent that many Japanese, old and young—as we saw in the youngsters' quotes in chapter two—alike, desire more human and approachable leaders. But during the postwar period the supply of potential expressive leaders at the national level was effectively reduced to nil. Those were the years in which the primary national political figures, the Emperor and the Prime Minister, were in effect kept in quarantine away from the emotional leader-follower relation that had been the hallmark of the discredited ancien regime and to which they themselves retained links. From now on, however, a new generation

of national leaders, men wholly of the present without any links to the older, repudiated forms of expressive leadership, are beginning to emerge. It seems probable that if the present Emperor should pass away in the next few years and a young new Emperor, one with a beautiful commoner wife and several handsome children, should ascend the throne, he would be able to evoke the same kind of popular affection that the Scandinavian monarchs enjoy. And a similar possibility seems open to the younger generation of partisan political leaders, like Prime Minister Tanaka or Nakasone Yasuhiro, who are wholly men of the contemporary era. But in either case the popular affection these leaders might evoke would be unlikely to overcome the bases on which the other elements of the new antipathy toward authority depend. If Japan were to have a new benevolent leader, that leader's role would still be likely to be more constricted and restrained than in the United States, or England, let alone than in Japan's own past.

Finally, it is important to point out that the factors that intervene between the values and attitudes of the mass of men and the character of political systems are so many and so complex that democratic politics are not guaranteed by the existence of a democratic political culture. But if the democratic predispositions of the citizens are not a sufficient guarantee of democracy, they are surely a necessary condition. The nearly thirty years of democracy that Japan has enjoyed in the postwar era have been possible partly because of a

redirecting of Japanese political culture. In this study, we have seen that the values and beliefs being acquired by Japanese children and teenagers in the socialization process are dominated by the elements of an emerging political culture of democracy that, in its selective emphases, accords with both the cultural and the cleavage aspects of Japanese political life.

APPENDIX
STUDENT AND PARENT QUESTIONNAIRES

Introductory Note

This appendix includes the English translations and the Japanese original versions of the questionnaires used in the survey that is the primary source of the data in the present study. Full details of the questionnaire construction, sampling procedures, and other aspects of the research design are given in the methodological discussion in chapter one. But for convenience sake some important details are repeated here.

In May and June of 1969 I conducted a survey of 942 Japanese teenagers and their parents in Tokyo and Tochigi Prefecture. The survey sites were public middle schools and high schools in an urban and a rural area. The urban schools were located in the shitamachi (central city) and yamate (middle-class residential) sections of Tokyo; while the rural schools were in two small cities, Kuroiso and Karasuyama, and two farming communities, Higashi-Nasuno and Kita-Takanezawa, in Tochigi Prefecture, about 100 miles north of Tokyo. The site selection was intended to maximize the demographic representativeness of the sample. The sample was not randomly drawn due to the survey procedure employed, which made classrooms of children the basic sampling unit.

The questionnaire had two versions: one for the students; and another for the parents. Items numbered herein Q9 through Q60 were identical in both versions. Item Q61 differed only in the addition in the parent version of the phrase "during the past year or two"; items numbered C1 through C8 and C62 through C80 were asked only of the student respondents, while those numbered P1 through P6 and P62 through P78 were asked only of the parents. Both versions were of the self-completion type. The student questionnaire was administered to eighth, tenth and twelfth grade students in their classrooms under my direction or that of one of my Japanese assistants. The students were also asked to take home a sealed envelope containing two copies of the parental questionnaire, to have these completed by their parents, and to return them to the school within several days. Fathers and mothers were explicitly requested to complete their questionnaires individually and without conferring with one another; inspection of the returned questionnaires revealed few cases of obvious mutual parental consultation, all of which were subsequently discarded from the parental sample. The response rate for the parents, adjusted to exclude from the sample any parent who answered fewer than 75 percent of the items, was 85 percent (802) for the fathers and 89 percent (835) for mothers. In 80 percent (752) of the cases, both parents responded to 75 percent or more of the items.

This appendix includes both the English translation and the original Japanese version of each of the two questionnaires. In both the English and Japanese versions I have here omitted from the parents' questionnaire items Q9 through Q61, since as was explained above, they are identical to those used in the student questionnaire.

STUDENT QUESTIONNAIRE: ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Yale University Department of Political Science

Tokyo University Sociology Laboratory

May - June 1969

International Comparative National Character Survey

This is not a test of your school abilities. Mostly it asks about your opinions. What you write will be kept secret. Some of the questions may be too simple, some may be too difficult, but please answer exactly what you think. When answering, except in special cases, put a circle around the number of the one answer that you think fits best. Please be sure to answer every question.

Q9. What kind of country do you think Japan is? Pick the one that you think suits Japan best.

Q10. Everyone would like to live in a peaceful and free country. But unhappily, not all countries are always peaceful and free at the same time. Suppose you had to live in one of the two countries given here. Which would you choose?

Q11. We all have hopes about the sort of society we'd like to make of Japan. Which of the following sorts of society is closest to your hope?

1. A socialist country
2. A capitalist country
3. A dictatorship
4. A democratic country
5. Don't know

1. In this country, there is peace and its people don't have to worry at all about war. But this country's government severely restricts the liberty of the people. Hence the people of this country can live in peace but not in freedom.

2. In this country, there is freedom; fundamental human rights are guaranteed, so its people don't have to worry at all about tyranny. But this country is at war with another country. Hence the people of this country can live in freedom, but not in peace.

1. A society in which people can compete freely and men of ability can readily become wealthy, but where there are people who have a hard time earning a living.

2. A society where the government controls the economy, so one can't get very wealthy, but where a minimum standard of living is firmly guaranteed.

3. A society where able men become wealthy but where such people are highly taxed by the government to help look after the disadvantaged.

4. Don't know.

Q12. There are many opinions about democracy. From the following eight, pick in order the two that you think best express the essence of democracy and write their numbers in the two boxes.

1. All adults can vote in elections.
2. People can freely and safely criticize the government.
3. The nation's politics are decided by the opinions of the majority of the people.
4. Basic human rights, such as freedom of speech and assembly, are respected.
5. There is no poverty; the government attempts to make it possible for everyone to lead a life with minimum basic wealth and cultural standards.
6. Political parties, including those opposed to the government, can freely compete in elections to take office.
7. There is no discrimination; everyone has an equal opportunity to get the place to live, the education, and the job that he chooses.
8. The people have the right to live in peace.

First choice

Second choice

Q13. Is your reaction favorable when you hear the following words?

	Fav.	Fav.	Can't say either; don't know	Unfav.	Very Unfav.
Pacifism	1	2	3	4	5
Socialism	1	2	3	4	5
Liberalism	1	2	3	4	5
Capitalism	1	2	3	4	5
Democracy	1	2	3	4	5
Communism	1	2	3	4	5

Q14. Do you think you find the following things more often in capitalist or in socialist countries?

	Much more in Cap.	More in Cap.	About same; don't know	More in Soc.	Much more in Soc.
Peace	1	2	3	4	5
Poverty	1	2	3	4	5
Democracy	1	2	3	4	5
Inequality	1	2	3	4	5
Justice	1	2	3	4	5
Liberty	1	2	3	4	5

C1. What's your family's occupation?
Please circle the one that applies.

1. Professional occupation (doctor, teacher, lawyer, etc.)
2. Managerial occupation (bureau chief or alone in a company or government office).
3. Self-employed A (owner of a large store or factory, etc.).
4. Self-employed B (owner of an ordinary store, beauty shop, barber shop, grocery store, etc.).
5. A-Clerical (office worker in a government office, company, or store, etc.).
B-Sales or service (clerk or attendant in a store, beauty shop, grocery store, etc.).
C-Security (policeman, fireman, member of the Self-Defense Forces).
6. Skilled laborer or production process employee (machine operator, carpenter, mechanic, etc.).
7. Simple labor (handyman, day laborer).
8. Farming, fishing, forestry.
9. Unemployed, other.

C2. How many children are there in your family including yourself?

Children

C3. What number child are you in your family?

Number

C4. Who lives with your family, aside from you and your brothers and sisters?

1. Father 2. Mother 3. Grandfather
4. Grandmother 5. Others ()

C5. How old is your father?

years

C6. How old is your mother?

years

C7. Which school did your father last attend?

1. Primary school 2. Old higher primary, new middle school
3. Old middle, new high school
4. Old higher technical or normal, new junior college
5. College 6. Don't know

C8. Which school did your mother last attend?

1. Primary school 2. Old higher primary, new middle school
3. Old higher girls, new high school
4. Old higher technical or normal, new junior college
5. College 6. Don't know

Q15. How much do you think each of the following cares about the problems in the lives of an ordinary Japanese and tries to do something about them?

	Very Much	Some-what	Can't say; Don't know	Not Much	Hardly At All
Prime Minister	1	2	3	4	5
Diet	1	2	3	4	5
Government	1	2	3	4	5
Political Parties	1	2	3	4	5

DO YOU AGREE OR DISAGREE WITH THE FOLLOWING OPINIONS?

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Can't Say either; Don't Know	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
Q16. What ordinary people like my family say has no effect on what the government does.	1	2	3	4	5
Q17. Most Japanese politicians don't really believe in democracy; they only pretend to.	1	2	3	4	5
Q18. Things like politics and government are so complicated that people like myself can hardly understand how they work.	1	2	3	4	5
Q19. If we get good political leaders, the best way to improve the country is for the people to leave everything to them rather than for the people to discuss things among themselves.	1	2	3	4	5

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Can't Say Either; Don't Know	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
Q20. Real democracy is impossible in a capitalist country.	1	2	3	4	5
Q21. Real democracy is impossible in a socialist country.	1	2	3	4	5
Q22. Japan is not really a democracy because the capitalists hold power. For Japan to become a real democracy the socialist forces must take power.	1	2	3	4	5
Q23. In a socialist country individuals do not have freedom so it is necessary to preserve capitalism in Japan.	1	2	3	4	5
Q24. Japan's democracy is not a real democracy, because it was forcibly imposed by foreigners.	1	2	3	4	5
Q25. Ordinary people have no opportunity to get their views reflected in politics.	1	2	3	4	5
Q26. The Prime Minister makes many public pledges but he usually doesn't intend to keep them.	1	2	3	4	5
Q27. When the Prime Minister decides on a policy, he pays a great deal of attention to what the people want.	1	2	3	4	5

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Can't Say Either; Don't Know	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
Q28. The Prime Minister works hard for the sake of all the people, not just for himself and his party.	1	2	3	4	5
Q29. A good many people in the government are dishonest and involved in corruption.	1	2	3	4	5
Q30. The government's policies are increasing the gap between rich and poor, and work only for the benefit of the rich.	1	2	3	4	5
Q31. Over the long run, the government pays a great deal of attention to what the people want, when it decides on policies.	1	2	3	4	5
Q32. Since the same one party always wins, general election results don't really represent the will of the people.	1	2	3	4	5
Q33. Since there are always so many election law violations, it would be better if our representatives were chosen by some other means such as competitive examinations, instead of elections.	1	2	3	4	5
Q34. Elections make the government pay attention to what the people think.	1	2	3	4	5
Q35. It would be better if instead of all the present political parties, there were only one party which represented all the people and really did its best for the country.	1	2	3	4	5

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Can't Say Either; Don't Know	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
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Q36. The political parties play an important role in making the government pay attention to what the people think.

1	2	3	4	5
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Q37. The political parties are all nothing more than groups of factions and influential men who think only of their own interests.

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

Q38. When it comes to deciding what to do in the Diet, most Diet members pay very little attention to the wishes of the voters who elected them.

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

Q39. Most Diet members are trustworthy, honest men, who do not get involved in things like graft.

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

Q40. In the Diet, the majority ignores the rights of the minority, and the minority impedes majority decisions, so I don't think it is carrying out its responsibility to the people.

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

Q41. In most cases, demonstrations and strikes cause a lot of trouble to ordinary people, so the government ought to take strong steps to control them.

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

Q42. Demonstrations and mass movements are better ways of making the government pay attention to what the people want than relying on the Diet and the political parties.

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

Strongly Agree Agree Don't Know Disagree Strongly Disagree
 Can't Say
 Either;

Q43. What the government does is like the weather; ordinary people can't do anything about it.

Q44. Let's suppose you belong to a certain group (such as a club, etc.). Suppose that group had decided to go on a trip. But there were some people who wanted to go to the mountains and others who wanted to go to the seashore. Circle which one of the three ways of deciding where to go that you think would be best.

Q45. Let's suppose that that group had decided to determine where to go by taking a vote. If there were 50 people in the group, how many should agree for the decision to be fair to everyone.

- | | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. One person says that since the group's affairs have been put in charge of its leaders, you should rely on them and have them decide. | | | | | |
| 2. Another person says that everyone should give his opinion, and discussion should be continued until all agree on one opinion. | | | | | |
| 3. Someone else says that it should be decided by majority rule, even if there is a large minority. | | | | | |
| 1. Nearly everyone—27-30 people | | | | | |
| 2. About four-fifths 24 people or more | | | | | |
| 3. About two-thirds 20 people or more | | | | | |
| 4. About three-fifths 18 people or more | | | | | |
| 5. About half 16 people or more | | | | | |

DO YOU AGREE OR DISAGREE WITH THE FOLLOWING OPINIONS?

Strongly Agree Agree Can't Say Either; Don't Know Disagree Strongly Disagree

Q46. When you're trying to decide something, if there is a relatively large number of people in the minority, those in the majority shouldn't insist on their opinion.

1 2 3 4 5

Q47. When you're trying to decide something, and only a very few people disagree, for those people to continue insisting on their opposing opinion should be condemned because it is selfish.

1 2 3 4 5

Q48. When your friends and others all make little of a movie or TV program that you liked, as "dull" or "stupid," it is best to keep silent and say nothing.

1 2 3 4 5

Q49. Given the chance, most people will try to take advantage of others.

1 2 3 4 5

Q50. Most people can be trusted.

1 2 3 4 5

Q51. It is necessary to take adequate precautions when dealing with people.

1 2 3 4 5

Q52. Other people can't be depended upon. When you get right down to it, the only one you can rely on is yourself.

1 2 3 4 5

Q53. Do you often lose confidence when many of your friends and others disagree with you?

Very Often	Fairly Often	Not Very Often	Hardly Ever
1	2	3	4

Q54. When you have disagreements with others, do you often get your own way?

1	2	3	4
---	---	---	---

Q55. When you make plans do they often work out as you thought?

1	2	3	4
---	---	---	---

Q56. When you have made up your mind about something do you often change your mind if someone tries to argue you out of it?

1	2	3	4
---	---	---	---

Q57. Are you interested in politics?

Very Often	Some-what	Not Very Often	Hardly At All
1	2	3	4

Q58. Do you often read newspaper articles about politics?

Every Day	Some-times	Not Very Often	Hardly Ever
1	2	3	4

Q59. Do you often watch TV programs or listen to radio programs about politics?

1	2	3	4
---	---	---	---

Q60. Do you often read magazine articles about politics?

Often	Some-times	Not Very Often	Hardly Ever
1	2	3	4

Q61. Have you ever done any of the following things in connection with politics and elections, or a citizen's movement or student movement?

- A. Attended a speech or other meeting? 1. Yes : 5. No
- B. Made a donation (including to people soliciting in public places for a fund-raising campaign)? 1. Yes 5. No
- C. Signed a petition? 1. Yes 5. No
- D. Participated in a demonstration? 1. Yes 5. No
- E. Yourself distributed handbills or collected donations or signatures? 1. Yes 5. No

Very Don't Know Not Very Hardly At All

Q62. Do you think your mother and father are interested in politics?

Father

Mother

1 2 3 4 5

1 2 3 4 5

Often Some-times Not very Often Hardly Ever

Q63. Do you discuss political and social questions with the following people?

Your father

Your mother

Your teachers

Your friends

1 2 3 4

1 2 3 4

1 2 3 4

1 2 3 4

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Q64. On political and social questions, do you think your opinions are the same as those of the following people, or different?

Your father
Your mother
Your teachers
Your friends

Very Much the Same
Fairly Similar
Fairly Don't Know
Fairly Diff.
Very Diff.

1	2	3	4	5
1	2	3	4	5
1	2	3	4	5
1	2	3	4	5

Q65. When you don't yet have an opinion about some political or social problem and want to clarify what you think, whose opinion do you most respect and take into account?

1. Father
3. Teacher
2. Mother
4. Friend
5. Other ()

Q66. There are a number of political parties in Japan. Which party do you think each of the following persons supports? Put the number of that party in the box next to each person.

A. Yourself, if you could vote
B. Your father
C. Your mother
D. Most of your teachers
E. Most of your friends

1. Liberal Democratic
2. Japan Socialist
3. Democratic Socialist
4. Komeito
5. Japan Communist
6. Other
7. Support no party at all
8. Don't know

[]
[]
[]
[]
[]

C67. Do you often have talks with your father and mother?

	Often	Sometimes	Not very Often	Hardly Ever
Father	1	2	3	4
Mother	1	2	3	4

C68. Do you think your father and mother understand you?

	Very Well	Fairly Well	Not very Well	Hardly At All
Father	1	2	3	4
Mother	1	2	3	4

C69. When you have some worry or problem, with whom do you usually discuss it?

	Very	Somewhat	Not Very	Hardly At All
Father	1	2	3	4
Mother	1	2	3	4
1. Father		2. Mother	3. Teacher	
4. Friend		5. Other ()		
6. Have no one to consult				

C70. Do you think your father and mother are concerned about you and take good care of you?

	Very	Somewhat	Not Very	Hardly At All
Father	1	2	3	4
Mother	1	2	3	4

Interfere Very Much	Interfere Some	Don't Interfere Very Much	Interfere Hardly At All
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C71. Do you think your parents interfere too much in such things as whom you become friends with, and when you go to play, etc.?

1	2	3	4
---	---	---	---

Very Much	Somewhat	Not Very Much	Hardly At All
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C72. When some decision concerning you (such as going on to the next level of school, etc.) is made in your family, how much does your opinion count?

1	2	3	4
---	---	---	---

Very Much	Somewhat	Not Very Much	Hardly At All
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C73. When you disagree with some decision made at home, how much effect do you think it would have to complain?

1	2	3	4
---	---	---	---

Nag much Too Much	Nag Somewhat	Don't Nag Too Much	Hardly Nag At All
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C74. Do you think your parents nag too much about study?

1	2	3	4
---	---	---	---

Very	Somewhat	Not Much	Hardly At All
------	----------	----------	------------------

C75. Are you concerned about your school record and entrance examinations?

1	2	3	4
---	---	---	---

C76. Do you attend after-school classes, etc.?

1. Yes 5. No

C77. During the past three years, have you ever run for office in the student council, class council, or a club, etc.? If you have, please write the number of times you have run in the box.

1. Yes [times] 5. No

C78. During the past three years, have you ever served as an officer in the student council, class council, or of a club, etc.? If you have, please write the number of times you have served in the box.

1. Yes [times] 5. No

C79. This year, do you belong to any circles or clubs? If you do, please write the number of clubs to which you belong in the box.

1. Yes [] 5. No

C80. How far do you want to continue in school?

1. Middle school 2. High school
3. Junior College 4. College and beyond

THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR COOPERATION. PLEASE CHECK ONCE MORE FROM THE BEGINNING TO BE SURE THAT YOU HAVE NOT MISSED ANSWERING ANY QUESTION.

エール大学政治学部
東京大学社会学研究室
昭和44年5月・6月

国際比較国民性の調査

これは学力テストではありません。主としてあなたの意見をきくためのものです。あなたが書いたことは秘密にされます。やさしすぎる質問や、むづかしすぎる質問があるかもしれませんが、思った通り答えてください。お答えにあたっては、特別の場合を除いて、最も適当と思う答えの番号をひとつだけ○でかこんで下さい。すべての質問にもれなく答えて下さい。

年 組 男・女

1. あなたの家の職業は何ですか。あてはまるものにつけて下さい。

1. 専門的技術的職業 (医師, 教師, 弁護士など)
2. 管理的職業 (会社や官庁の課長以上)
3. 自営 A (大きい商店や工場などの自営)
4. 自営 B (ふつうの商店, 理容, 調理, 飲食店, などの自営)
5. A 事務 (官庁, 会社, 商店などの事務)
B 販売やサービスの職業の従業員 (商店の店員, 理容や飲食店などの従業員)
C 保安 (警察, 消防, 警備, 自衛隊など)
6. 技能工, 生産工程従事者 (工具, 大工, 職員など)
7. 単純労務 (被服夫, 土工など)
8. 農林漁業
9. 無職, その他 ()

2. あなたをふくめて、きょうだいは何人ですか。

人

3. あなたは、きょうだいの何番目ですか。

番目

4. あなたの家族には、きょうだいのほかに、だれがいらっしゃるに住んでいますか。

1. お父さん
2. お母さん
3. おじいさん
4. おばあさん
5. その他の人 ()

5. あなたのお父さんは何歳ですか。

歳

6. あなたのお母さんは何歳ですか。

歳

7. あなたのお父さんが最後に行った学校はどれですか。

1. 小学校
2. 高小, 新制中学
3. 旧中, 新制高校
4. 旧高等, 師範, 短大
5. 大学
6. わからない

8. あなたのお母さんが最後に行った学校はどれですか。

1. 小学校
2. 高小, 新制中学
3. 旧高女, 新制高校
4. 旧高等, 師範, 短大
5. 大学
6. わからない

9. 日本はどのような国だと思いますか。あなたがもっとも適当だと思うものを一つあげて下さい。

10. 人間はだれでも平和で自由な国に住みたいと思います。しかし、不幸なことに、必ずしもすべての国が平和であると同時に、自由であるとはいえません。もしあなたがここにあげている二つの国のどちらかに住まなければならないとしたら、どちらを選びますか。

11. 私達は日本をこんな社会にしたいという希望をもっていると思います。ここにあげている社会のうち、あなたの希望に近いのはどれでしょうか。

12. 民主主義について、いろいろな意見があります。ここにあげている八つのうち、あなたが民主主義の本質をもっともよく表わすと思うことを順番に二つ番号で書いて下さい。

13. あなたは次のことを聞いたとき、よい感じがしますか、よくない感じがしますか。

平和主義
社会主義
自由主義
資本主義
民主主義
共産主義

	非常に よい	よい	どちらとも いえない わからない	よくない	非常に よくない
平和主義	1	2	3	4	5
社会主義	1	2	3	4	5
自由主義	1	2	3	4	5
資本主義	1	2	3	4	5
民主主義	1	2	3	4	5
共産主義	1	2	3	4	5

1. 社会主義国家 2. 資本主義国家 3. 独裁国家
4. 民主国家 5. わからない

1. ある国には、平和があり、その国民が戦争を心配する必要は全然ありません。しかし、この国の政府は国民の自由をきびしく制限しています。したがって、この国の人たちは平和に生活できますが、自由に生活できません。
2. ある国には、自由があり、基本的人権が保障されているから、その国民が暴政を心配する必要は全然ありません。しかし、この国はほかの国と競争しています。したがって、この国の人たちは自由に生活できますが、平和に生活できません。

1. 自由に競争ができて能力のある人は、どんどん金持になれるが、暮りに困る人も出る社会。
2. 国が経済を統制するので大金持にはなれないが、最低限の生活は確実に保障されている社会。
3. 能力のある人は金持になれるが、国がその人達から高い税金をとって、暮りに困る人の面倒をみる社会。
4. わからない。

1. すべての成人は選挙で投票できます。
2. 人々は自由に安全に政府を批判できます。
3. 国の政治は国民の多数の意見で決められます。
4. 言論や集会の自由などの基本的人権が尊重されています。
5. 貧困がなく、だれもが健康で文化的な最低限度の生活ができるように国が努力します。
6. 政権をとるため、政府に反対する政党をふくめて政党は選挙で自由に競争できます。
7. 差別がなく、だれにも希望する居住、教育、職業などのための均等の機会があります。
8. 国民には、平和に生きる権利があります。

1番目

2番目

14. 次のものが資本主義国か、社会主義国か、どちらのほうに多いと思いますか。

	資本主義国に		同じぐらい	社会主義国に	
	非常に多い	多い	わからない	多い	非常に多い
平和	1	2	3	4	5
貧困	1	2	3	4	5
民主主義	1	2	3	4	5
不平等	1	2	3	4	5
正義	1	2	3	4	5
自由	1	2	3	4	5

15. 次のものはそれぞれどれほど私達一般の日本人の日常生活の問題に関心を持ち、その問題の解決をみようとしてくれると思いますか。

	非常に	や	や	どちらとも	あまり	ほとんど
	みる	みる	みる	いえない わからない	みない	みない
総理大臣	1	2	3	4	5	
国会	1	2	3	4	5	
政府	1	2	3	4	5	
政党	1	2	3	4	5	

あなたは次の意見に賛成ですか、反対ですか。

- | | 非常に賛成 | | 賛成 | | どちらとも
いえない
わからない | 反対 | 非常に反対 |
|--|-------|---|----|---|------------------------|----|-------|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| 16. 私の家族のような一般の人々が何をいっても政府のやることが変わるとは思いません。 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | | |
| 17. たいていの日本の政治家は本当に民主主義を信じていません。ただ信じているふりをしています。 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | | |
| 18. 政治とか政府とかいうことはむずかしくて、私みたいな者には本当はどうなっているのかよくわかりません。 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | | |
| 19. 日本の国をよくするためには、すぐれた政治家がでてきたら、国民がたがいに議論をたたかわせるよりは、その人にまかせるほうがいいです。 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | | |
| 20. 本当の民主主義は資本主義国家にはありえないと思います。 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | | |
| 21. 本当の民主主義は社会主義国家にはありえないと思います。 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | | |
| 22. いまの日本は資本家が権力をもっているから、本当の民主国家ではありません。日本が本当の民主国家になるには、社会主義勢力が政権をとらなければなりません。 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | | |
| 23. 社会主義国家には個人の自由がないから、日本は資本主義を守る必要があります。 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | | |

- | | 非常に賛成 | 賛成 | どちらとも
いえない
わからない | 反対 | 非常に反対 |
|--|-------|----|------------------------|----|-------|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 24. 日本の民主主義は外国人によって強制的に押しつけられたので、本当の民主主義ではありません。 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 25. 一般の人々には、その意見を政治に反映させる機会はありません。 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 26. 総理大臣はたくさんの公約をしますが、大体果すつもりはありません。 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 27. 総理大臣は政策を決定するときに、国民が希望することをよく考慮していると思います。 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 28. 総理大臣は自分や自分の政党のためだけでなく、国民全体のために本当につくしていると思います。 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 29. 政府には汚職をするような不正な人間が多いです。 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 30. 政府の政策が金持や貧乏人の差をますますひどくし、金持の利益になるようなことばかりやっています。 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 31. 長い目で見ると、政府は政策を決めるときに、国民が希望することをよく考慮していると思います。 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 32. 総選挙で同じ一つだけの政党がいつも勝っているから選挙の結果は本当に国民の意志を表しません。 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 33. 選挙にはいつも逆反が多いから選挙の代りに、競争試験などみない別の方法で議員を選んだほうがいいです。 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 34. 選挙が国民の希望していることに政府の注意を向けさせます。 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 35. 今ある全部の政党の代りに、国民全体を代表して、国のために本当につくす一つだけの政党があったほうがいいと思います。 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 36. 政党は国民が考えていることに政府の注意を向けさせるのには、重要な役割を果たしています。 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 37. 政党は全部、自分の利益のことしか考えない派閥や実力者のグループにすぎません。 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

- | | 非常に賛成 | 賛成 | どちらとも
いえない
わからない | 反対 | 非常に反対 |
|---|--|---|--|------------------|-----------------|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 39. 国会で何をしたらいいかを決めるときに、大体の代議士はかれを定めた投票者の希望をほとんど気にとめません。 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 39. たいていの国会議員は信頼できる正直な人で、汚職のようなことはしません。 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 40. 国会では、多数意見の人々が少数意見の人々の権利を軽視したり、少数意見の人々が多数決を妨害したりして、国民への責任を果たしていないと思います。 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 41. デモやストライキは大体一般の人々に迷惑をかけるから、政府はそれを規制する強い措置をとるべきです。 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 42. 国民がその意見を政治の上に反映させるためには、国会や政党にまかせるより、デモや集会などの大衆運動をやるほうがいいです。 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 43. 政府のやることはお天気のよう、一般の人にはどうにもなるものではありません。 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 44. あなたがあるグループ(クラブ、〇〇会など)に入っているとしましょう。そのグループは旅行に行くことになりました。しかし、山へ行きたい人も、海へ行きたい人もいます。どこへ行くかを決める方法として、ここにあげている三つのうち、あなたがもっともいいと思うものをまるでかこんで下さい。 | 1. ある人はグループのことは指導者にまかせてあるから、指導者を信頼して、その人たちに旅行の行先を決めてもらえばよいと思います。 | 2. ある人はみんなが意見をのべ、一つの意見にまとまるまで話し合を続けるべきだといいます。 | 3. ある人は、反対意見がたくさんあっても多数決で決めるのがよいといいます。 | 4. わからない。 | |
| 45. もしもそのグループは旅行の行先を決めることを投票によることにしたとししましょう。そのグループには30人がいるとすれば、決定がみんなに公平であるために、何人ぐらい同意しなければならぬと思いますか。 | 1. ほとんど全席 27~30人 | 2. 5分の4ぐらい 24人以上 | 3. 3分の2ぐらい 20人以上 | 4. 5分の3ぐらい 18人以上 | 5. 過半数ぐらい 16人以上 |
| あなたは次の意見に賛成ですか、反対ですか。 | | | | | |
| 46. 何かを決めようとする場合、少数意見の人が比較的に多いとき、多数意見の人はその意見を押し通すべきではありません。 | 非常に賛成 | 賛成 | どちらとも
いえない
わからない | 反対 | 非常に反対 |
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

47. 何かを決めようとする場合、反対意見がとてもなく
ないとき、その人達が反対意見を主要しつづけて同意
しないのは、わがままだから責められるべきです。
48. 友達や他の人がみな「つまらなかった」、「ばかばか
しかった」とけなしている映画やテレビ番組などを自
分はおもしろかったと思うとき、だまって何もいわな
いほうがいいです。
49. 人間は大体チャンスがあれば人の弱みにつけこもう
とします。
50. たいていの人は信用できます。
51. 人と交際するとき、十分な警戒が必要です。
52. 他人なんてあてにはならないもので、結局預れるの
は自分だけです。

次にあなた自身のことについてお尋ねしたいと思います。

53. あなたは、多くの友達や他の人が自分の意見に反対
したら、自信を失うことが多いですか。
54. あなたは人と議論するとき、自分の意見を押し通す
場合が多いですか。
55. 何か計画を立てると、思いどおりに行くことが多い
ですか。
56. 何かを決心したとき、人に説得されると、決心が変
わる場合が多いですか。
57. あなたは政治に関心がありますか。
58. 新聞で政治関係の記事をよく読みますか。
59. テレビやラジオで政治関係の番組をよく見たり聞い
たりしますか。
60. 週刊誌や雑誌で政治関係の記事をよく読みますか。

61. 政治や選挙または市民運動や学生運動などの関係で、

次のことをしたことがありますか。

- A 演説会やそのほかの集会に行ったこと。
 B 寄付したこと（カンパでも結構です）
 C 署名したこと。
 D デモに参加したこと。
 E 自分自身がピタを配ったり、寄付や署名を集めたりしたこと。

1. ある 5. ない
 1. ある 5. ない
 1. ある 5. ない
 1. ある 5. ない
 1. ある 5. ない

62. あなたのお父さんやお母さんは政治に関心があると
思いますか。

お父さん
お母さん

- | 非常に
ある | ややある | わから
ない | あまり
ない | ほとんど
ない |
|-----------|------|-----------|-----------|------------|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

63. あなたは、政治や社会問題について、次の人と話し
合いますか。

お父さんと
お母さんと
先生達と
友達と

- | よく
話し合う | ときどき
話し合う | あまり話し
合わない | ほとんど話
し合わない |
|------------|--------------|---------------|----------------|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |

64. 政治や社会問題について、あなたの意見は次の人の
意見と同じですか。それとも違っているとしますか。

お父さん
お母さん
先生達
友達

- | ほとんど
同じ | 大体同じ | わから
ない | かなり違
っている | 非常に違
っている |
|------------|------|-----------|--------------|--------------|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

65. 何か政治・社会問題について、自分の意見をまだも
っていない、はっきりさせたいときに、あなたはだれ
の意見をもっとも尊重し、参考にしますか。

1. お父さん 2. お母さん
3. 先生 4. 友達
5. その他（ ）

66. 日本にはいろんな政党があります。次の人はどの政
党を支持すると思いますか。それぞれ番号で書いて下
さい。

1. 自民党 2. 社会党 3. 民社党 4. 公明党
5. 共産党 6. その他 7. どの政党も支持しない
8. わからない

もし選挙に行くことができれば、自分
あなたのお父さん
あなたのお母さん
あなたの先生達の大部分
あなたの友達の大部分

67. あなたはお父さんやお母さんとよく話し合をしまし
か。

お父さんと
お母さんと

- | よく
話し合う | ときどき
話し合う | あまり話し
合わない | ほとんど話
し合わない |
|------------|--------------|---------------|----------------|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |

68. お父さんやお母さんは自分のことをよく理解してくれていると思いますか。

お父さん
お母さん

よく理解している	やや理解している	あまり理解していない	ほとんど理解していない
1	2	3	4
1	2	3	4

69. あなたは何かなみや問題があるとき、大げだれと相談しますか。

1. お父さん 2. お母さん 3. 先生 4. 友達
5. その他 () 6. 相談相手はいない

70. お父さんやお母さんはあなたのことに関心を持ち、あなたの面倒をよく見てくれていると思いますか。

お父さん
お母さん

よくみている	ややみている	あまりみしていない	ほとんどみしていない
1	2	3	4
1	2	3	4

71. 両親はあなたがだれと友達になるか、どこへ遊びに行くかというようなことに干渉しすぎると思いますか。

非常に干渉しすぎる	やや干渉しすぎる	あまり干渉しない	ほとんど干渉しない
1	2	3	4

72. 家であなたのこと（例えば進学などのこと）を決めるときに、あなたの意見がどれほど通ると思いますか。

非常に通る	やや通る	あまり通らない	ほとんど通らない
1	2	3	4

73. あなたが家で決まったことに反対の場合、もし文句をいったら、効果があると思いますか。

非常にある	ややある	あまりない	ほとんどない
1	2	3	4

74. 両親は勉強のことをやかましくいすぎると思いますか。

非常にいいすぎる	ややいいすぎる	あまりいいすぎない	ほとんどいいすぎない
1	2	3	4

75. あなたは成績や入学試験が気になりますか。

非常に気になる	やや気になる	あまり気にならない	ほとんど気にならない
1	2	3	4

76. あなたは塾やおけいごに通っていますか。

1. 通っている 5. 通っていない

77. あなたはここ三年の間に、自治会員、学役員、クラブの役員などの選挙に立候補したことがありますか。あれば、何回立候補したか、の中に書いて下さい。

1. ある 回 5. ない

78. それでは、ここ三年の間に、自治会員、学役員、クラブの役員などをしたことがありますか。あれば、何回したか、の中に書いて下さい。

1. ある 回 5. ない

79. あなたは、今年、何かサークルやクラブに入っていますか。入っていれば、あわせていくつかのサークルやクラブに入っているか、の中に書いて下さい。

1 入っている 5. 入っていない

80. あなたはどこまで進学したいですか。

1. 中学まで 2. 高校まで 3. 短大まで 4. 大学以上

ご協力ありがとうございました。書きおとしがあると嬉しみますのでお手数ですが、もう一度ははじめから見なおしてください。

PARENT QUESTIONNAIRE: ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Yale University Department of Political Science

Tokyo University Sociology Laboratory

May - June 1969

International Comparative National Character Survey

In cooperation with the Sociology Laboratory of Tokyo University, the Political Science Department of Yale University is conducting comparative research on national character with particular emphasis on youth in Japan and various other countries. This survey of the views and ideas of Japanese middle and high school students and their parents about contemporary society and life is being conducted as one part of the research. This questionnaire is addressed to the fathers and mothers of the students being studied. We hope that you will be kind enough to spare a moment from your busy day to assist us in our study.

This survey is for purely scholarly purposes; all results will be treated only in computational form, and will be scientifically analyzed by statistical methods. While this questionnaire is anonymous, a common number has been affixed to the questionnaires of father, mother, and child so that results may be calculated on the family as a unit. Needless to say, no one outside your family knows this number. Consequently, there is absolutely no way in which your name or your answers could become public. So please answer just as you think.

When answering, except in special cases, please put a circle around the number of the one answer that you think fits best. Please be sure to answer every question. Please do not consult with anyone before answering the questions. We request that parents also not consult with one another. This is because your own personal opinions are most important in this survey. When you have completed the questionnaire, please place it in the envelope, seal the envelope, and return it to the school through your child at your earliest convenience.

P1. Are you the student's father or mother?

1. Father 2. Mother

P2. What is your age?

[years]

P3. Which is the last school you attended?

1. Primary school
2. Old higher primary, new middle school
3. Old middle, new high school
4. Old higher technical or normal, new junior college
5. College

P4. What is your family's occupation? Please circle the one that applies.

1. Professional occupation (doctor, teacher, lawyer, etc.)

2. Managerial occupation (bureau chief or above is a company or government office)

3. Self-employed A (owner of a large store or factory, etc.)

4. Self-employed B (owner of an ordinary store, beauty shop, barber shop, grocery store, etc.)

5. A Clerical (office worker in a government office, company, or store, etc.)

B Sales or service (clerk or attendant in a store, beauty shop, grocery store, etc.)

C Security (policeman, fireman, member of the Self-Defense Forces)

6. Skilled laborer or production process employee (machine operator, carpenter, mechanic, etc.)

7. Simple labor (handymen, day laborer)

8. Farming, fishing, forestry

9. Unemployed, other ()

P5. How many children do you have?

[children]

P6. Aside from yourself and your children, who is now living with your family? Please put a circle around the number of those persons who live together with you. Please omit servants, etc.

1. Husband

2. Wife

3. Husband or wife's father

4. Husband or wife's mother

5. Husband or wife's brothers or sisters

6. Other ()

[Questions 9 - 61 are identical to those in the student questionnaire and are omitted here.]

Often Sometimes Not Very Often Hardly Ever

P62. How often do you discuss political and social questions with the following people?

Spouse
Friends
Children

1 1 1

2 2 2

3 3 3

4 4 4

Very Much the Same Fairly Similar Don't Know Fairly Diff. Very Diff.

P63. Do you think your opinions on political and social problems are the same as your wife's (husband's) or are they different?

1

2

3

4

5

P64. Which political party do you support?

1. Liberal Democrat
2. Japan Socialist
3. Democratic Socialist
4. Komeito
5. Japan Communist
6. Other ()
7. Independent

Strongly Agree Agree Can't Say either: Don't Know Disagree Strongly Disagree

P65. There are various opinions about today's youngsters. Do you agree with the opinions about them expressed here.

- a) They should respect their parents' opinions more.
- b) They have too much freedom; they need more discipline.
- c) They'll grow up at their own pace, even if their parents don't keep after them.
- d) They're too individualistic and don't care about others.
- e) They're too soft; they need stricter training.

P66. In your family, who generally makes the decisions about family matters?

1. Husband makes almost all decisions.
2. Wife makes almost all decisions.
3. Both discuss everything and then decide together.
4. Sometimes decisions are left to husband, other times wife makes the decisions.

P73. If you didn't keep after him, would your child study hard?

Would Study Hard	Would Study Some	Would Not Study Much	Would not Study at All
1	2	3	4

P74. Are you satisfied with your child's school record and attitude toward the entrance examinations?

Very Satisfied	Fairly Satisfied	Somewhat Dissatisfied	Very Dissatisfied
1	2	3	4

P75. How far do you want your child to go in school?

1. Middle school	2. High school
3. Junior college	4. College and beyond

P76. Do you often attend PTA meetings?

Often	Sometimes	Not Very Often	Hardly Ever.
1	2	3	4

P77. Have you ever held office in, or been on a committee of, the PTA?

1. Yes	5. No
--------	-------

P78. How much is your family's monthly take-home income, including that of all the family? (Average bonuses and other special income into the monthly total.) Please circle whichever place on the list you fit into.

1. Less than 30,000 yen	5. 100-150,000 yen
2. 30-50,000 yen	6. 150-200,000 yen
3. 50-70,000 yen	7. 200,000 yen and over
4. 70-100,000 yen	

THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR COOPERATION. PLEASE CHECK ONCE MORE FROM THE BEGINNING TO BE SURE THAT YOU HAVE NOT MISSED ANSWERING ANY QUESTION.

61. この一、二年間に政治や選挙または市民運動の関係で、次のことをしたことがありますか。

- | | | |
|--------------------------------|-------|-------|
| A 演説会やそのほかの集会に行ったこと。 | 1. ある | 5. ない |
| B 寄付したこと（カンパでも結構です） | 1. ある | 5. ない |
| C 署名したこと。 | 1. ある | 5. ない |
| D デモに参加したこと。 | 1. ある | 5. ない |
| E 自分自身がビラを配ったり、寄付や署名を集めたりしたこと。 | 1. ある | 5. ない |

62. あなたは、政治や社会問題について、次の人と話合いますか。

奥さん（ご主人）と
友達と
お子さんと

よく話し合う	ときどき話し合う	あまり話し合わない	ほとんど話し合わない
1	2	3	4
1	2	3	4
1	2	3	4

63. 政治や社会問題について、あなたの意見とあなたの奥さん（ご主人）の意見は同じですか、それとも違っていますか。

ほとんど同じ	大體同じ	わからない	かなり違っている	非常に違っている
1	2	3	4	5

64. あなたはどの政党を支持しますか。

- | | | | |
|--------|-----------|--------|--------|
| 1. 自民党 | 2. 社会党 | 3. 民社党 | 4. 公明党 |
| 5. 共産党 | 6. その他（ ） | 7. 無所属 | |

65. 現代の子供について、いろいろな意見があります。現代の若い人たちについての次の意見に、あなたは賛成ですか、反対ですか。

- A もっと親の意見を尊重すべきです。
- B 自由がありすぎて、もっと規律が必要です。
- C 親があまり心配したり世話をやかなくても、自分なりに成長しています。
- D あまり個人主義的で、人のことを考えません。
- E 楽観になりすぎて、もっと厳格な規律が必要です。

非常に賛成	賛成	どちらともいえない	反対	非常に反対
1	2	3	4	5
1	2	3	4	5
1	2	3	4	5
1	2	3	4	5

66. あなたの家庭では、家族のここの決定は、大体だれがしますか。

- ほとんどの場合、夫が決定をする。
- ほとんどの場合、妻が決定をする。
- 夫と妻が何事も相談しあって、一緒に決定をする。
- あるときは、夫にまかせ、別のときは妻が決定をする。

67. あなたの家庭では、だれが子供のしつけを担当していますか。

- 夫
- 妻
- 二人とも

68. あなたはお子さんとよく話し合えますか。
- | | | | |
|-------------|---------------|----------------|-----------------|
| よく話し合う
1 | ときどき話し合う
2 | あまり話し合わない
3 | ほとんど話し合わない
4 |
|-------------|---------------|----------------|-----------------|
69. 何かなやみや問題があるとき、お子さんはあなたとよく相談しますか。
- | | | | |
|-------------|---------------|---------------|----------------|
| よく相談する
1 | ときどき相談する
2 | あまり相談しない
3 | ほとんど相談しない
4 |
|-------------|---------------|---------------|----------------|
70. あなたはお子さんがだれと友達になるが、どんなところへ遊びに行くかというようなことによく注意をあたえますか、それとも子供の好きなようにさせていますか。
- | | | | |
|----------------|----------------|------------------|--------------------|
| よく注意をあたえる
1 | やや注意をあたえる
2 | やや好きなようにさせる
3 | ほとんど好きなようにさせる
4 |
|----------------|----------------|------------------|--------------------|
71. あなたの家庭では、お子さんのこと（例えば進学などのこと）を決めるときに、お子さんの意見をどれだけききますか。
- | | | | |
|-----------|-----------|--------------|---------------|
| よくきく
1 | ややきく
2 | あまりきかない
3 | ほとんどきかない
4 |
|-----------|-----------|--------------|---------------|
72. あなたの家庭では、お子さんのことについて両親が決めたことに対して、お子さんから反対の意見や希望が出た場合、決めたことを変えることがありますか。
- | | | | |
|-----------|-------------|------------|-------------|
| よくある
1 | ときどきある
2 | あまりない
3 | ほとんどない
4 |
|-----------|-------------|------------|-------------|
73. もしあなたがよく注意しなかったら、お子さんはよく勉強すると思いますか。
- | | | | |
|-------------|--------------|---------------|----------------|
| よく勉強する
1 | すこし勉強する
2 | あまり勉強しない
3 | ほとんど勉強しない
4 |
|-------------|--------------|---------------|----------------|
74. あなたはお子さんの成績や入学試験への態度に満足していますか。
- | | | | |
|------------|---------|-----------|------------|
| 非常に満足
1 | 満足
2 | やや不満
3 | 非常に不満
4 |
|------------|---------|-----------|------------|
75. あなたはお子さんにどこまで進学させたいですか。
1. 中学まで 2. 高校まで 3. 短大まで 4. 大学以上
76. PTAや父兄会によく出席していますか。
- | | | | |
|-------------|---------------|---------------|----------------|
| よく出席する
1 | ときどき出席する
2 | あまり出席しない
3 | ほとんど出席しない
4 |
|-------------|---------------|---------------|----------------|
77. PTAや父兄会の役員や委員をしたことがありますか。
1. ある 5. ない
78. お宅の収入は、ご家族全部合わせて、月平均手取りでどのくらいですか。（ボーナスや臨時収入は月割りにして毎月の給料にあわせて下さい。）ここにあげているリストのどれにあたるか、まるでかこんで下さい。大体のところで結構です。
- | | |
|-----------|------------|
| 1. 3万円未満 | 5. 10-15万円 |
| 2. 3-5万円 | 6. 15-20万円 |
| 3. 5-7万円 | 7. 20万円以上 |
| 4. 7-10万円 | |

ご協力ありがとうございました。書きおとしがあるとごまりますのでお手数ですが、もう一度ははじめから見なおしてください。

INTRODUCTION TO THE SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

The literature on Japanese politics and political culture is growing apace. Until the 1960s the number of English language books dealing with the broad questions of Japanese political attitudes and behavior were limited to a few. Probably the best known of these interpretive studies of Japanese political culture are Nobutaka Ike, Japanese Politics (New York: Knopf, 1957), and Chitoshi Yanaga, Japanese People and Politics (New York: Wiley, 1956). Robert A. Scalapino and Junnosake Masumi, Patterns and Politics in Contemporary Japan (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1962) should also be mentioned as should the various works of Robert A. Ward; see particularly, "Japan: The Continuity of Modernization," in Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba, eds., Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965).

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The works of Watanuki Joji, in both English and Japanese, are central to the study of contemporary Japanese political culture. See in English, "Patterns of Politics in Contemporary Japan," in S.M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan, eds., Party Systems and Voter Alignments (New York: Free Press, 1967); and "Social Structure and Political Participation in Japan," University of Iowa, Department of Political Science, Laboratory of Political Research, Report No. 32, May 1970. In Japanese see his Nihon No Seiji Shakai (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1967) and Gendai Seiji To Shakai Hendo (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1962). For an interesting interpretive treatment of contemporary political culture see Shinohara Hajime, Nihon No Seiji Fudo (Tokyo: Iwanami Shinsho, 1968).

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