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POLITICAL VALUES AND CLASS DIFFERENTIATION

IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN

by

RAY ALBERT GEIGLE

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment

of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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We have carefully read the dissertation entitled "Political Values and Class Differentiation in Contemporary Japan"

_____ submitted by
Ray Albert Geigle _____ in partial fulfillment of
the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
and recommend its acceptance. In support of this recommendation we present the following joint statement of evaluation to be filed with the dissertation.

Mr. Geigle has demonstrated that the standard view of contemporary Japanese political values is highly suspect, and he has offered an alternative which, although necessarily incompletely substantiated, is very persuasive.

He argues that the standard view of the Japanese as people who have retained the so-called subject and parochial political orientations of their past--despite the "modernization" of much of Japanese society, especially the economy--is based upon incorrect presuppositions regarding the distribution of political values in a society and upon a very limited method of inquiry. By pointing out that different social strata of a "modern" society have different orientations regarding different aspects of their experience, he has undermined the standard generalization that all the Japanese at all times exhibit an almost unthinking acceptance of custom and power. By utilizing the extensive survey data obtained by the National Institute of Statistical Mathematics of the Ministry of Education of Japan, and by processing these according to modern statistical methods, he has presented an impressive piece of empirical evidence that is inconsistent with the standard generalization.

The positive part of the dissertation has two parts: first, careful theoretical analyses of the concepts of political culture and the "rational man," of the processes of value-change, and of the social stratification of industrial society; and second, the use of survey data to establish associations between those who perform the more technical functions of industrial society and "modern-rational" attitudes regarding basic values, orientations toward groups and self, political role perceptions, and political participation.

The result of this approach is to provide a clear model of political culture and a clear theory of its relationship to social roles, and then to arrive at an empirical generalization based on the survey data.

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James J. Best
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Reading Committee Report
Ray Albert Geigle
Page 2

Although the evidence does not by itself fully support the generalization, it was the best evidence available, and Mr. Geigle's handling of his entire argument strongly suggests that the use of further, as yet unavailable evidence would only add to the probability of his thesis that the Japanese "middle classes" have the kind of belief-system to be expected of people in such social roles.

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INTRODUCTION

The concept of political culture is one of the most extensively used concepts of inquiry for the political scientist. The empirical and theoretical applications of the model of political culture developed by Almond and Verba have been systematically applied for a full decade now. In spite of the utility of the concept and its widespread application, little use of political culture has been made by political scientists as a conceptual tool in the study of orientations to political life of Japanese people. There are a number of reasons for this, but principally, it seems to me, it is a reflection of the relatively small number of political scientists using empirical methods of inquiry to examine the Japanese polity and its citizens.

The preponderance of literature in the field has been produced by sociologists, anthropologists, and psychologists. As a result the techniques of inquiry used in these disciplines seem to be rather narrowly applied, and reapplied, by each new generation of researchers with somewhat constant results. That is, the attitudes of Japanese citizens toward political objects and symbols, their input and output orientations toward the system, and their own role perception of themselves as political actors, according to much of the literature, seems to have remained rather constant over several hundred years.

In this same period, however, dramatic changes have

taken place in almost all other aspects of the lives of Japanese people. There has been a remarkable increase in the economic standard of living, significant dispersions of population, widespread educational opportunity, a physical mobility unmatched by almost any country in the world, and significant changes in the political system itself. Social scientists have thoroughly documented the changes occurring in the social and economic spheres of Japanese life. Anthropologists have regularly studied the Japanese family system, the village unit, and the kinship system, and reported that significant changes have occurred. Yet, in spite of these changes, if much of the literature is correct, few substantive changes have occurred in the orientations to political life of Japanese people and their own social and political role perceptions.

There are at least two reasons for this apparent contradiction in scholarly research. First, it seems to me, there are too few political scientists doing empirical research in Japan who are familiar with the language, history, and culture of the people. Second, there has been an inadequate application of the conceptual tools available to the researcher trained in quantitative methods. Much of the research that has been done in Japan has used a single methodology developed primarily for anthropological research - the "live-in" approach. It has been argued that the difficulty of mastering the language and culture of the people required a significant

period of "residence apprenticeship" before any meaningful research could be undertaken. As a result the biggest body of literature on the attitudes of Japanese people has been produced by universities in the United States that have sponsored continuing "field research" programs in Japan for their graduate anthropology and sociology students and faculties. The major problem these programs have created is a paucity of methodological diversity in scholarly research done in Japan.

A thesis of this paper is that a valuable addition to our understanding of the political culture of the Japanese people can be achieved through the application, by political scientists, of the techniques of empirical analysis to survey and interview data, if that data is gathered, scaled, coded, and reported according to high standards of empirical inquiry. Some research of this type is beginning to appear, but its audience has been small to date, probably because of the small number of political scientists both empirically oriented and interested in this area of inquiry. Those who have been most active have been "area specialists" who have, in the main, adopted the anthropologists approach to field research.

I will attempt to apply the concept of political culture developed by Almond and Verba, in their Civic Culture,¹ to survey data gathered by the National Institute of Statistical Mathematics of the Ministry of Education in Japan to determine if an attitudinal matrix of political participant orientations

can be developed, and then to draw a socio-economic profile of the participant stratum of Japanese society. As a result it will be shown that the discovery of subject and parochial orientations, as defined below, among Japanese citizens is a result of application of only a single methodology. When an adequate socio-economic profile is drawn, I shall argue that a distinct class of people with participant orientations will be discovered.

Almond and Verba argue that political culture is, "the patterns of individual attitudes and orientations toward politics among the members of a political system."² It "consists of the system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols, and values which defines the situation in which political-actions take place."³ The political culture has to do with attitudes, specifically with orientations to action that may be classified as cognitive, affective, and evaluative. The particular positive, negative, or neutral content of these orientations are the basis for classification of persons into classes as participant, subject, parochial, allegiant, and alienated. The diffusion of these orientations and their unique mix is the distinguishing characteristic of a political community and is the political culture of that society.

It is Almond and Verba's position that there will be a mix of participant and subject roles in a community and that the mix is most characteristic of modern industrial societies. Because of the great diversity of the life experience of

members of the community, some will be less cognitive of political life, have fewer expectations, and consequently fewer evaluations of system output. There will also be those, in the same polity, who by reason of a different life experience, will have a high degree of cognition of system input, will be critical evaluators of system output, and will constitute a participant class. Almond and Verba's departure from other literature on the same subject is primarily a recognition that both participant and subject orientations will be a part of a single political culture.

I will depart from their thesis by arguing that a single person will also have a complex mixture of subject and participant orientations, that there may be no easily definable way to separate the two, except as orientations to specific political objects and symbols. That is, I will argue that each member of the participant stratum also has a set of carefully preserved subject orientations, but that when evaluations of input and output, and of demands for allocation of community resources are made, the participant actor will behave as prescribed in the classic liberal model of "rational-activist" behavior.

The participant citizen is cognizant of the discrepancy between conflicting role orientations and consciously chooses the "rational-activist" role when there is a contest for allocation of community values. When there is no contest, or when there are undesired resources being allocated, the participant may consciously revert to subject orientation

roles. The political culture must be determined, according to this model, on the basis of the ability of system members to distinguish their own mix of roles (cognition of personal as well as system roles) and to act as either subject or participant depending upon the nature of the contest for the allocation of system rewards and penalties.

An analogous situation might be a U.S. Senator who goes regularly to his astrologer for advice but acts according to the "rules of the legislative game" in pursuing his goals. He is clearly a mixture of parochial and participant orientations, but the critical variable is the role he plays when behaving politically. A representative in the Diet is said to behave on the basis of traditionally prescribed roles of status and deference while at the same time playing the legislative game. I will argue that when the two are in conflict, that is, when the Diet member must choose between achieving an important political goal or pursuing traditionally prescribed patterns of public behavior, he will behave according to the "rational-activist" model. When there is no personal stake in the outcome of the contest, he will feel free to pursue parochially oriented patterns of behavior.

I will also test the hypothesis that the "rational-activist" model of participant orientations can be expected whenever a particular socio-economic profile occurs. This argument differs qualitatively from the anthropological approach to culture since the expected patterns of political behavior will not be congruent within an entire community;

they will be determined by the "life experience" of the person. I will argue that the critical variables are not the traditionally prescribed roles for norms of community behavior but rather the economic situation of the individual that will determine his orientation to political life. The economic situation, which will be elaborated upon and carefully defined below, will include key variables such as work situation, extent of leisure activity and its uses, types of formal training and education, group associations and so forth.

The major thesis will be that the data, compiled by the Institute of Statistical Mathematics, will show that Japanese people who fit a particular socio-economic matrix will have participant orientations whenever making political judgments, and those persons who fit another socio-economic matrix will have subject orientations when making political judgments. The key variable that must be determined is the life-experience of each person within the specified strata in the community.

A typology of the "Japanese way of thinking," or of their "value system," as compiled from some important sources, based upon anthropological research, content analysis of Japanese literature, and historical analysis yields the following characteristics.⁴

- I. Acceptance of actuality
 1. Apprehension of the absolute in the phenomenal world
 2. "This-worldly" orientation
 3. Acceptance of natural human qualities
 4. A spirit of tolerance
 5. Strict cultural stratification
 6. Weakness of the spirit of direct criticism

- II. Tendency to emphasize a particular social nexus
1. Emphasis on group relationships
 2. Human relationships more important than individual well-being
 3. Absolute view of limited social organization
 4. Strict reverence for family morality
 5. Emphasis on form rather than substance of merit
 6. Hierarchical status relationships
 7. Absolute supremacy of state
 8. Absolute obedience to Emperor
 9. Closed sects and cliques
 10. Protection of a particular social nexus by force
 11. Emphasis on societal rather than individual activity
 12. Sensitivity to moral introspection
- III. Non-rational tendencies
1. Non-logical predispositions
 2. Weakness in ability to think in terms of logical consequences
 3. Strong intuitional and emotional tendencies
 4. Lack of ability to form complex representations
 5. Fondness for simple, symbolic representations
 6. Weakness of cognition of objective processes
 7. Failure to evaluate or criticize anything in the public sphere
 8. Extreme action to avoid conflict situations

The above typology, representative of a cross-section of anthropologists, philosophers, sociologists, and some political scientists, is a fairly good picture of how the Japanese value system is seen by many observers whose work will be identified and evaluated in the body of the dissertation. The analytical difficulty arising from the typology is that most of the characteristics describe persons living in traditional, pre-industrial societies. The parochial-

subject orientations described in the typology are associated by most students of the development process with pre-industrial, rural societies. In this school of thought however, they are posited as dominant in a modern industrial society where one would expect to find a concentration of allegiant-participant roles. One could argue, if the Almond-Verba typology is valid, that such a predominance of traditional, ascriptive, parochial orientations would make it difficult and perhaps impossible to construct a "modern" political system. Certainly, if the typology is correct, the system lacks an adequate number of participant "rational-activists" to operate a modern democratic polity with all that implies.

It seems to me that adequate, qualitative evidence will suggest that this typology is a good representation of traditional Japanese value structures, but that it is an inadequate explanatory device for the existing value system. I have constructed a preliminary matrix of value orientations that could represent an "allegiant-participant's" orientation to the value preferences listed above to test for congruence in the theories within a sampling of the national population. The matrix will also satisfy the requirements Almond and Verba outline for a civic culture in that they combine but do not replace parochial with participant political orientations. That is, political activity, involvement, and rationality are tested, but are balanced by some passivity, traditionality, and commitment to parochial values.

The matrix I am proposing, which can be constructed from the data available in the National Character Surveys, will have the following variables:

1. Orientations toward self in a social context.
2. Orientations toward family
3. Orientation toward the self as a political actor
4. Orientation to logic and reason as guides to action
5. Orientations toward change
6. Orientations toward the political process
7. Orientations toward system output

My argument is that the data will show that allegiant-participant orientations on the above matrix will occur principally in the middle-class defined by occupation, education, and residence with differences also occurring according to age and sex.

Chapter I

POLITICAL CULTURE AND THE RATIONAL MAN MODEL

The Concept of Culture

To be valuable, the concept of political culture requires some explanation. The writer who uses it must specify how it is important, in what way it should be studied, and what kinds of assumptions about political life can be made when something is known about it. Serious attention of a systematic nature to the concept of political culture now seems requisite to the complete understanding of political life in any community. A political culture can be described as a system of "empirical beliefs, expressive symbols, and values which defines the situation in which political action takes place."⁵

In the past, in a more general way, political scientists spoke of "national character" to describe the unique mix of cognitive and affective orientations of members of a community to political life. The national character model of investigation sought to explain the differences in political processes and outputs that arose in systems with nearly comparable institutions, and which seemed to perform roughly comparable functions.

The uniqueness of any political community was sought in its national character. The techniques of discovery used by social scientists investigating national character usually involved extensive researcher participation in the political

and social life of the subjects under investigation. The profile, or typology of a particular community, as perceived by the observer, became a model for analysis used by other social scientists in making evaluations of the political process and output of different polities. An example of this technique is the "live-in" approach used by anthropologists such as Ruth Benedict and Margaret Mead. In the instance of Japan, a pioneering work by Ruth Benedict⁶ established a model of "national character" still used by many social scientists to explain the uniqueness of political culture in the Japanese community.

The weaknesses in the national character approach - particularly its static nature, its unclear relationship to the functions of the political system, and the difficulty of explaining causality in value change - led social scientists to search for more precise methods for discovering linkages between political life and value orientations. The concept of political culture provided the methodological framework within which this inquiry has been made.

Studies of political culture seek to define the value preferences of members of a community, to seek out linkages between values and political behavior, examine goals established on the basis of these values, and thereby to explain variances between systems in political process and output. It does not claim to be the only or the most important variable in understanding political life; it claims only that political life cannot be understood unless one understands

political culture. It is a model that is uniquely valuable in explaining the process of value change because it requires identification of economic and social variables that accompany particular patterns of value orientations.

The concept of political culture is only analytically distinct from the more general concept of cultural system.⁷ This is because many non-political values are the primary components of general orientations that may shape political behavior and in turn become part of the structuring of political institutions that effect change. A person living in a traditional society will likely hold attitudes of a religious nature that are inimical to political change. Very important belief dimensions include man's attitude toward nature, his time perspective, his view of human nature, and his estimation of the value of life. These are all integral parts of a much broader political orientation. It is therefore important to note that attitudes toward political issues will constitute only a small part of the general affective orientations that have political significance.

Some questions that might be asked in determining what beliefs are significant for investigation include the question of cross-national comparability. The national character researchers and area specialists have generally argued against this approach on the grounds that distinct value characteristics are not subject to comparison because comparison implies examination outside the context of a particular system. If one can assume, however, that values are learned and that the

learning conditions and teaching processes are contrived, then the conditions of their learning and their contrivance can be compared. If one can also assume that environments determine the conditions of learning and teaching values to any significant extent, a beginning point of reference would be to seek comparable values in communities having some environmental comparability. The requirement of comparability is also necessary to develop typologies and to demonstrate causality. Comparisons might be made, by way of example, on the basis of personal political identity of subjects, identity with fellow citizens, beliefs about political actors, expectations and goals of governmental output, and orientation toward the process of decision-making within the system.

It is also consistent with the model of political culture to expect variations of attitudes, within general limits, among different segments of the population and in particular categories of persons. Wide variations of life experience will occur within a single community as a result of varying degrees of exposure to a variety of stimuli. The life experiences of members of a community may be expected to have as many incongruities as congruities. For example, persons within a single community will vary considerably in terms of ownership of property and other forms of wealth, education, occupation, and residential community. As a result of these differences, typologies of attitudes can be constructed that would be expected in a particular stratum of a single community

and not within any other strata of that community.

Because values are learned they may be said to be in a constant state of change. It is therefore useful to examine the economic, social, and political conditions that seem to accompany a particular set of values. If a high degree of statistical correlation can be shown to exist between certain values and specified economic conditions in a number of different polities, typologies of political cultures can be determined. I will argue here that there is a high degree of correspondence in some basic values among most middle-class people in all advanced industrial societies. Their value typologies might be classified as "industrial cultures" to distinguish them from all others.

The idea that cultural conditions are unchanging factors that determine the nature of political life can be laid to rest if common values can be shown to exist in most developing societies at comparable stages of economic development. If the argument is refined still further, persons in common economic strata, having similar "life-experiences" defined and determined by their economic situations, will have a high degree of value correspondence with one another. Persons in one stratum of society can be expected to have values more in common with the same stratum of other societies than they will with other strata in their own society. Middle-class people in all advanced industrial societies can be expected to share roughly comparable values. Similar values may not transcend all strata in one society, however.

The political culture will therefore be more accurately seen as a statistical mode, compiled by the observer, of a wide range of variations of orientations to political life, but with manageable bounds. The political culture will, in aggregate, be a composite, or a mix, of the variations on a continuum. As Almond and Verba point out, the political culture is unique in its particular mix of orientations, not in its exclusivity. There are universally wide ranges of orientations to political life in all cultures ranging from complete disaffection to complete involvement.

In even the most traditional society there are those with high levels of participant orientations, and in the most modern society there are still those with very parochial orientations. The model is useful if a scale is developed as part of the typology, and the distribution of particular orientations is measured. The intensity of value preferences, the numbers of persons located at different points on the scale, and the relationship between attitude and behaviors can then be discovered.

A very general typology posits a distinction among political communities according to their relative degrees of modernity. The scale, running from traditional at one end to modern at the other, with all those in-between transitional, has conceptual value if one postulates political life as developing on a linear scale. Although this may not conform to reality in all instances, it is still a useful axiom because it does allow the development of a typology that has manageable limits. It is also no more arbitrary than any other typology

if one assumes, as is generally assumed, that political life is always in flux. The universal principle of change means that movement from one point to another can be thought of in almost any context as long as the model allows room for change.

There has been enough empirical investigation to achieve general agreement among observers on a matrix of values that could be expected on either end of the continuum. That is, general agreement on a set of values that would most generally typify the traditional orientation to political life has been achieved through prolonged study of traditional societies and comparison with other "non-traditional" societies. At the same time there is general agreement on a matrix of values that would be expected in a community situated on the "modern" end of the scale. The general mix of the two, and the frequency of each within a particular community allow its placement on the scale in some type of relationship to other communities also located on the scale.

If values are assumed to be learned things, then one can also develop a matrix of variables to define the environmental conditions concomitant to value matrices and the extent of association and their regularity can be used to make predictions and develop policies. This also allows measurement of association between specific stimuli and value preferences. It then leads to the ability to predict, with a good degree of accuracy, the values that can be expected in a particular society resembling, in its environmental

configuration, other societies having similar configurations.

Models of Rational Man

A content analysis of recent books and articles dealing with the value orientations of persons living in a modern political community gives this general typology.⁸ Persons living in a modern community will be expected to have a preponderance of "rational" responses to political questions. They will be participants, or potential participants who are motivated primarily by self-interest. They hold strong opinions, are issue oriented, and can be easily stimulated to political activity. They have personal confidence, confidence in their opinions and judgments. They are pragmatists who judge their means according to their goals and have confidence in the political system to satisfy their demands.

They have the basis of strong ideological orientations but still independent inquiring minds. They play a wide variety of roles and tend to minimize conflicts between different roles in their role-playing. They are likely to be members of the middle class and have strong identification as middle-class persons. They have a relatively high degree of tolerance for diversity, eschew conflict that leads to violence, and are members of functionalist voluntary associations. They are oriented to group membership on the basis of satisfaction of personal goals and expectations.

There are a number of ways to look at the concepts

associated with modernity, but it seems to me that the central issue is the role of rationality in modern belief systems. A rational orientation toward change is the key variable in modern belief systems. The process through which rational perspectives are developed is the key variable in political as well as economic development. The techniques used by persons in adjusting to change and in causing change in controlled directions are closely related to the ability to comprehend reality in rational terms. For this reason an understanding of the concept of rationality and its function as a variable in attitude configurations is essential for the development of a typology of a modern belief system.

Although there is no single definition of the concept of rationality there does seem to be some agreement among observers on a few essential minimums. The most commonly accepted conception of rationality as an attitudinal orientation to action is that of the classical economic model. Economic theorists have postulated a rational man who, after determining his goals, calculates the costs of various possible methods of achieving them and chooses the method that is least costly. The act of rationality is in consciously weighing alternatives and choosing those that the actor believes have the greatest possibility of leading to goal satisfaction with the smallest possible amount of risk and cost. It is clearly a rational evaluation of means to reach an end.⁹

There is no requirement, in this model of rationality, for omniscience or infallibility on the part of the rational

persons.¹⁰ All that is necessary for a rational choice model is that a person choose values and pursue actions that he believes to be consistent with his goals. Although a more general conception of rationality may require a "reasonable" judgment about the nature of the ends of choices, the economic model requires only that the selection of values be consistent with the attainment of goals as perceived by the valuer. Kaplan and others have argued that this limited view of rationality is inadequate as an explanatory device and that the whole idea of rationality implies not only choice of values to be pursued, but some reasonable determination that certain values are worth pursuing.¹¹

Kaplan argues that values enter into our calculations as expectations of probabilities. That is, in making the best use of the knowledge we have, in order to behave rationally, we must calculate the probabilities of worth of a value preference as well as the mechanical question of alternative actions that will lead to that goal.¹² The hypothesis is that a rational man will also prefer, based upon reasonable calculation, certain political and social values over other possible alternatives. Some suggestions might be a preference for liberal institutions as opposed to authoritarian ones.¹³ Although this view cannot be carried too far, empirical evidence compiled to date does seem to suggest preference for liberal institutions as opposed to authoritarian ones in a divergent selection of modern polities.¹⁴

Another school of thought argues that rationality is a

calculation of utility maximization where choices are possible. In this view men order preferences according to elementary rules of logic and consistency and act to maximize expected utility.¹⁵ In a simulation model of game theory Riker and his associates found that, "Utility maximization is the theory that fits political behavior best."¹⁶ Shapiro reached the same conclusion in assessing the social-psychological model of rationality. From his point of view the rational actor in a social system behaves according to the concepts of prizing and appraising. That is, the evaluative process (of ends and means) preceding formation of an attitude consists of assessments of the desirability of various outcomes (prizing) and "of the object, persons, or events that are likely to contribute to the outcomes" (appraising).¹⁷

A further widely held view of rationality is that which associates reason with particular institutions. The argument is that the market mechanism of the capitalist economic system has an imperative of its own that requires rational consumer orientation, and also is a cause of reasonable behavior in other types of non-related activity. A leading exponent of this view, Joseph Schumpeter, argues that the capitalist process rationalizes behavior and ideas in the sense that it causes "free thinking."¹⁸ Thus having his mind ordered toward "materialistic monism, laicism, and pragmatic acceptance of the world," the rational man is able to chase from his mind "metaphysical belief, mystic and romantic ideas of all sorts."¹⁹ In this view the rational mind will become

utilitarian in the sense that goal orientation will be rooted in a desire to achieve the "betterment of mankind."²⁰

For Schumpeter an essential part of rationality seems to be a world-view built upon the rational requirements of the ordering of a capitalist society. The conception that a "modern" man must divest himself of traditional value preferences in order to apply the principles of deductive logic in ordering his values and in selecting proper means of achieving them has received wide-spread agreement in the literature. This perspective also holds that rational minds will invariably prefer liberal political institutions. There is, in this rationalizing process, a higher concern for the betterment of the human condition that manifests itself in a preference for liberal institutions that operate to provide a wide array of social welfare functions.²¹

The other perspective on capitalism as a determinant of rational behavior argues that the market imposes rational values on persons and that it standardizes behavior among successful participants in the market process. It argues that rationality means essentially an understanding of self interest, and the ability and willingness to pursue it. The rational man, according to Anthony Downs, "approaches every situation with one eye on the gains to be had, the other eye on the costs, a delicate ability to balance them, and a strong desire to follow wherever rationality leads him."²² He is a calculating rationalist who must be primarily concerned with discovering whose ends are being served by different types of public

behaviors, and after having done so is able to calculate his own behaviors on the basis of suitability with his own ends. This view of rationality requires a generally stable and predictable social order. That is, in order to behave rationally a person must be able to predict with a good probability of accuracy the behaviors of other persons and of the government. Only then will chaos be avoided and regularity, a major condition of rational behavior, be maintained within the system.²³

This axiom, as old as the Wealth of Nations,²⁴ argues that rational behavior is primarily pursuit of selfish ends. The pursuit of those ends most highly prized, the desire to minimize costs in achieving them, and the use of trial and error to maximize utility and conserve energy bring regularity and stability in human affairs and also offer guides to normative and ethical value ordering.²⁵ Downs argues that selfish interests guide the "good" behaviors necessary to reach these "good" ends. Therefore men in public life as well as private "should" behave according to selfish standards.²⁶

Another less demanding view of reason is that it requires the holding of viewpoints on issues and that competence, or valid judgments about means and ends, are not necessary if the reasonable person perceives himself as competent. This view holds that the common man is far less competent than is generally assumed by the rational man theorists; but whatever his degree of incompetence, the common man is competent to determine the general ends of government policy and determine

who ought to run the government.²⁷ In this view the major contribution of the rational man to liberal institutions is that he is a potential participant in the processes associated with the organizing of his views and that others acting in concert to organize their views will provide an unrestrained dialogue that will ensure responsibility of rulers to those ruled. This is similar to Lane's view that the capacity for rationality exists in the common man but must be "nurtured" and also that the common man is able to learn to apply rational solutions to complex problems.²⁸

Perhaps the most clearly stated of the cases for rationality argues something a little less than the most optimistic of the above choices and a little more than the most pessimistic. This model might be described as an "information" model. Herbert Simon outlines six conditions under which rational behavior can occur;²⁹ "1) a set of behavior alternatives (alternatives of choice or decision) must be available; 2) there must be a subset of behavior alternatives (a choice may be made within a set of alternatives more limited than those objectively available); 3) there must be knowledge of the possible future status of affairs, or outcomes of choice; 4) there must be a 'value' or utility placed upon each of the possible outcomes of choice; 5) the rational man must have information as to which outcomes will actually occur if a particular alternative is chosen; 6) rational behavior requires information as to the probability that a particular outcome will ensue if a particular behavior alternative is chosen."

This perspective, emphasizing constraints and levels of information, probably brings the theories of rationality closest to the realities of the human dimension. A person aspiring to rational behavior is confronted with a wide array of constraints including his own limitations in terms of experience and knowledge. He is constrained consciously and unconsciously, but if he aspires to rational ideas and behaviors then he accounts for his limitations in his calculation. Recognizing the perpetual lack of information to maximize the quality of his personal decision-making nexus, the rational man is forced to seek alternative methods of minimizing his costs.

A major cost that can reasonably be reduced is that of expertise. The rational man develops sources of historically and potentially good information, based upon judgments about authority, and rationally calculates his own behaviors according to the judgments of others he perceives to be expert. A minimum amount of rational behavior is necessary to conform to this model. The ability to recognize a wide variety of constraints and the ability to find and respond to authority are the necessary and sufficient conditions of rational behavior orientations.

An additional perspective treats the non-economic aspects of rational behavior and social choice. If the most common variable in the different perspectives on the rationality question is the pursuit of self-interest, a necessary step in formulating a useful construct is defining the nature of the

process for identifying and pursuing self-interest. The classical economic theorists, as well as many contemporary models of rational behavior, posit a unidimensional self-interest model based solely upon personal maximization of economic interest. Motivation is determined to be a function of personal perspective, information, and experience. The three vectors combine to form a motivational causality link for a person in choosing rational behaviors that will maximize his economic self-interest. It is generally agreed that men are motivated by a wide variety of stimuli, including public spirit, and behave according to motivational stimuli that may mean sacrifice of personal self-interest for some other goal.

John Harsanyi has proposed a hypothesis that forms what he calls a "rational choice model" designed to take account of the difficulties of multi-motivational theories in explaining rational behavior.³⁰ He postulates that 1) people tend to be public-spirited when it costs them little in terms of their own personal interest; 2) they prefer "social, public welfare functions" and "fair compromises" when they are "third" parties to conflicts; 3) people are required to behave more altruistically because of family and friendship commitments and, 4) people are also motivated by a need for social acceptance and status that parallel economic needs in importance and priority.³¹

A critical variable in this model of rational behavior is the relationship between selfish and unselfish behavior. An important dimension in understanding rational behavior must

account for behaviors that are against the immediate and perhaps the long-term self-interest of the individual. This is done by specifying a universe in which there are numerous stimuli and in which personal motivations can be shown to be associated with a wide variety of different perceptions of interest, only one of which is self-interest.

Harsanyi's model accounts for a universe of alternative interests, that is, the community, the family, the state, and others to whom the actor may have no relationship other than a common "humanity." Rational choice models imply that choices among alternative behaviors require that persons make assessments of various outcomes and their effect on their own interest in a complexity of events and interactions in which their behavior choices will be a cause of perceptible outcomes for others. In making the choice, rational decision-making also requires assessment and valuation of the ends as well as their consequences in terms of the general interest of others, both immediate and far. It can be postulated that a scaling of behavior choices will have some close relationship to the immediacy of the others who are affected by the decisional outcome. The decision, however, cannot be made without knowledge of its effects as well as a choice among priorities, perhaps all of which may be against personal self-interest.

Certainly this model is useful in explaining behaviors that seem irrational, such as the giving of one's life for national symbols, or the sacrifice of personal property or goals to satisfy needs of others who may be personally unknown

to the decision-maker. These types of "irrational" behavior might be thought of as "expressive or symbolic" behaviors.³² According to Harsanyi, "If people attach strong positive or negative emotions to a given person or object, they will often extend the same positive or negative emotions to persons and objects associated with the former by similarity or by contiguity in space or time."³³ Because of the strong emotional attachment to persons and objects, people find considerable psychological satisfaction in symbolic action. Although the action may not be consciously undertaken to satisfy the felt but undiscerned need, the result is the same as though it had been understood.

These actions are rational in the sense that all activities in a social context must be given meaning to a wide variety of participants with different capabilities and dispositions toward the institution itself. In order that the institution be maintained it must be abstracted symbolically so that personal linkages of attitudes and behaviors of participants and potential participants can become unified in a single set of goals.³⁴ The symbolic behavior patterns will be chosen for a wide variety of reasons, but to the individual participant they reflect self in relation to others, self-interest in relation to others-interest, and as such require rational choices. The most extreme forms of symbolic political behavior may not be rational, but rational man models do not attempt to offer variables to explain behavior that is completely deviant from group norms.

Rational choices of alternative behaviors assumes choices made in a social setting by persons making social commitments. Extreme forms of commitments are considered to be aberrations from the norm and as such need other-explanatory theories. It is not expected that all persons will make rational decision-choices, only that most will, and also that those decisions will be made only under specified conditions. When the conditions cannot be met, otherwise rational persons will make irrational choices and act accordingly.

The important point is that a rational man will many times be confronted with situations in which no rational choice among alternative behaviors is possible. This does not mean the person is not rational, only that rational choices of action are not available. When reality is distorted, or unperceived, the rational choice model is not applicable. A model of deviant or aberrant behavior is necessary; but this extreme form of disattachment, usually manifested in surreal mysticism, magic, extreme ritual and so forth cannot be judged rational or irrational since the consequences of behaviors for self or others cannot be known. For this reason such behaviors are usually defined as "non-rational" by philosophers.³⁵

Summary of Rationality Hypothesis

There seems to be general agreement among theorists of a high correlation between modernity and rationality in most conceptual models of development. It is clearly expected that in modern political communities the attitude configuration of

most of the members of the community will be based upon a common rationality, particularly a common use of reason in political orientations. Empirical research in modern politics has demonstrated the existence of a predominance of rational orientations. Most typologies of political culture have therefore posited rationality as a primary condition of modernity. Where there is no rationality modern political and social institutions do not seem possible. Where modern social and political institutions occur, they are generally accompanied by patterns of rational value orientations and behaviors.

It is also clear that not all persons living in modern communities have rational value orientations and those who do have are also likely to behave in an irrational manner occasionally. Those, who by reason of their life-experience, are minimally touched by the conditions of modern social and economic life, are less likely to have rational orientations than those whose life-experience maximizes contact with rationalizing social and economic institutions. For this reason most, but not all, persons living in communities with modern institutions can be expected to have predominantly rational value orientations.

The economic and social conditions that are generally thought to accompany modernity are associated with high levels of economic productivity. A brief list of these variables might include widespread urbanization, high levels of aggregate wage and expenditure, widespread educational accomplishment,

comprehensive transportation and communications networks, and so forth. The precise conditions are detailed in the following chapter. The point here is that most of the conditions generally accepted as requisite to modern social and political institutions have been satisfied in Japan. If the models of rational man have applicability anywhere they should therefore have applicability in Japan. The evidence of modernity indicates that the political culture of modern Japan ought to be based upon rational value orientations shared by most of the members of the system.

This hypothesis might be questioned by some because of our lack of agreement about the precise meaning of rationality. I have looked at the major arguments in this chapter from a variety of perspectives and they seem to have some common elements upon which there is a basis for some agreement. The most common of the variables has to do with orientation toward change. In all of the models considered here there is agreement that a rational perspective is characterized by positive orientations toward change. In each instance the models were predicated upon an assumption that rational orientations meant that change was accepted and that it was a desirable end. In an economic sense it means a positive orientation toward innovation, invention, and discovery. In a social sense it means a positive orientation toward new patterns of primary relationships; the kinship group, village, tribal associations and so forth. In a political sense it means a positive orientation toward secular, pragmatic, and functionalist political

institutions.

It can therefore be reasonably hypothesized that since Japan is a modern polity most Japanese should be favorably disposed toward economic discovery, invention, and innovation, toward diffuse and particularistic social roles, and toward pragmatic, secular, and functionalist political institutions. If this is the case the political culture of Japan can be shown to be predicated upon rational value orientations.

Since there is also agreement that reason did not characterize traditional Japanese value orientations, and is also not part of the typologies of other traditional societies, something must be said about the process of value change that accounts for the transition to a modern belief system. The next chapter is an analysis of the process of value change. It is necessary to the argument to demonstrate that the processes of value change and the conditions that give rise to the processes have been met in modern Japan.

Chapter II

THE PROCESSES OF VALUE CHANGE

Macro-Analysis of Conditions of Value Change

The postulate that attitudes are in a constant state of change requires for its support the development of some type of continuum on which attitudes can be plotted and their direction mapped. A simple device would be a continuum of attitude change from traditional to modern with everything scaled between those two poles. The characteristics of the traditional value model, along with a theory of causation in attitude change could be offered as support for a theory of change in attitudes to a "modern" configuration. The major characteristic of a traditional belief system is its irrational or "pre-rational" base.

A traditional man is stoic, somewhat intransigent, and possesses an extremely limited conception of the world around him. He is fatalistic about his ability to affect nature or events in any meaningful way, and sees no alternative courses of action, or beliefs to those handed down from past generations. He is "pre-rational" in the sense that he does not understand causality, sees few means-ends relationships, does not see events in flux, and lacks desire, as well as ability, to expand his experience or knowledge. The physical and economic conditions of his existence are generally posited as the major determinants of his value orientations. The process of changing from the "pre-rational" perspective to the

rational perspective can be looked at as a "transition" process induced principally by economic change.

Traditional man did not understand the concept of choice and as a result was not in a position to question values. It would not have occurred to him that there could be choices made among alternative values according to their relative desirability in terms of their effects on his life. The inability of the traditional man to establish connections between himself and the larger world was a significant aspect of his perspective. As Lerner describes it, "His personality has been socially disciplined to constrict imagination to the familiar time-space dimensions of his daily life."³⁶

A broad range of opinions on public questions can be taken as a distinctive characteristic of modern man. The development of these opinions is part of the process by which transitional man becomes modern. Lerner cites the example of the Turkish peasant, a chief in the village of Balgat, who responding to the question as to what he would do if he were President of Turkey answered, "My God! How can you ask such a thing? How can I . . . I cannot . . . President of Turkey . . . master of the whole world?"³⁷ Lerner then inquired of a grocer in the same village who replied, as President of Turkey, "I would make roads for the villagers to come to towns to see the world and would not let them stay in their holes all their life."³⁸

The grocer in the village had one experience that the chief had not enjoyed; he had traveled out of the village.

The relative immobility of the traditional man prevented him from coming into contact with more than a very few people, most of whom, like himself, had only very limited perspectives. The grocer, on the other hand, had more mobility because of the road that had been built into his town.

The mobility of modern man is one of the important causes of his exposure to various value systems, and is therefore a source of his opinions. The same village chief who had been frightened to imagine himself as President of Turkey was interviewed again four years later and responding to a question about the great changes that had occurred in the village, answered, "It all began with the election that year. The Demokrat men came to Balgat and asked us what was needed here and told us they would do it when they were elected. . . They brought us this road and moved out the gendarmerie. Times have been good with us here. We are all Demokrat party here in Balgat now."³⁹

The increased mobility of the villager is a primary source of his newly acquired opinions. The mobile person is distinguished by a high capacity for identification with new aspects of his environment. He is able to see his own ability to manipulate and change his future. Traditional man rejected innovation and showed a high degree of preference for established forms. The transitional man, that is one whose values are in process of change toward modernity, on the other hand, shows a moderate amount of curiosity which increases in proportion to the diversity of his opinions. As his opinions grow,

his heritage becomes less binding, and he tends to view his future as being within his own control. Mobility is, however, only one release from the traditional world, and is often not within the means of most traditional people.

Another important influence for change on the attitudes of traditional people is the communications media. The mass media, especially radio and movies, which do not depend upon high levels of literacy for communicating ideas, serve to simplify perception and permit a person to have a high degree of identification with forms and values that may be distant from his own personal world. The identification with these values leads to the formation of opinions that in turn lead to a desire to participate. In Lerner's view, "high empathic capacity is the predominant personal style only in modern society, which is distinctively industrial, urban, literate, and participant."⁴⁰

The concept of participation is a crucial variable in Almond and Verba's classification of polities according to stages of political development.⁴¹ When there is an absence of activity orientations to political objects, an absence of expectation of change initiated by the political system, and few or no evaluative orientations to the political process, the people in the system are classified as parochial. The first attitude change in development occurs as perceptions of system output become clear. When orientations to a differentiated political system develop the people in the system are classified by Almond and Verba as subject. Only in a modern

system is there a participant culture "in which the members of the community tend to be explicitly oriented to the system as a whole and to both the political and administrative structures and processes . . . to both the input and output functions of the system . . . they tend to be oriented toward an activist role for the self in the polity."⁴²

Lerner describes the development process as a "transition to participant society,"⁴³ characterized by a change in public communication toward constantly expanding opinion areas. Lucian Pye also stresses the importance of communications and mobility in the formulation of participant orientations toward the system. He argues that it is essentially communication that provides the basis for the development of a rational basis for mass politics. It is, according to Pye, the communications media that allow a person to see order in the otherwise random actions of others, including leaders within the system. He argues that persons are able to calculate their own activities, shape personal values based upon predictions about the nature of others and their value preferences, and also make "predictions about the likely behavior of men in different contingencies, and interpretations about the significance of apparently random events."⁴⁴

Lerner sees the change from a traditional society as occurring not when there is an infusion of new values, but when the traditional man discards his apathy and begins to "participate." "For the true transitional is defined, dynamically, by what he wants to become. What differentiates

him from his traditional peers is a different latent structure of aptitudes and attitudes. The aptitude is empathy - he sees things the others do not see, 'lives' in a world populated by imaginings alien to the constrictive world of the others."⁴⁵

Traditional man may be characterized as possessing opinions about things that concerned him personally. Modern man is characterized by the possession of opinions on numerous diverse subjects and matters, many of which may not have any direct effect on his life. Lerner cites examples of modern attitudes held by students living in urban Turkey, "I would adjust the taxes according to social justice. . . . To base the economic policy on a liberal doctrine. . . . I would like the government to do things a private enterprise cannot do. . . . To follow a peaceful foreign policy, basing my actions on the U.N. charter."⁴⁶

A further characteristic of a belief system changing to a rational orientation is the rejection of fatalism in favor of a belief in the ability of men to control their economic and social situation. The belief is not only in personal ability, but also in the ability of political institutions to take positive action in eradicating some of the persistent problems of poverty and deprivation. As a result of exposure to the relatively high level of comfort and wealth that occurs after industrialization, the expectations of the people are much higher than can be met in a short period of time. When governments are unable to respond positively to the increased expectations of their constituents, there is often a retreat

to the greater security and harmony of traditional value structures.

McCord cites an example of an interview he conducted with a 95 year-old leader of an Indian village. "I had asked him what had changed most in his lifetime. Objectively, of course, he had witnessed national independence, land reform struggles, the infiltration of roads, machines, medicine, schools, and new methods of agriculture into his area. Yet, after he had ruminated for several minutes, he replied, 'Why nothing has really changed. Prices are a little higher now than in earlier years. After all, what could possibly change.'"⁴⁷

The conviction that existence cannot be altered by passing events has a foundation in the hard realities of village existence. "If one is always under the command of fickle nature, life may seem to change superficially, but actually one cannot escape the round of seasons, the cycle of drought and flood, the threat of locusts or plague."⁴⁸

Unsuccessful attempts to control the devastating forces of nature precipitate uncertainty and anxiety, often sending the political subject back to his traditional mystical and fatalistic explanations of life. McCord cites the illustrative example of how the members of an Indian village were taught to build dams of mud and clay around their fields to prevent them from being flooded by the yearly rise in the river. He notes that for ten years the people built the dam only to see the water wash it away for lack of a firm foundation. Finally, the villagers abandoned the attempt, and were reinforced in

their conviction of the inability of man to control nature.⁴⁹

McCord sees this frustration as a cause of return to primitive religion and its traditional attitudes of mysticism, fatalism, and complacency. "In his despair, he turns to religion in the hope that by placating the supernatural he can save himself from the god's anger. He shrouds his life in ritual and reverence. When a new irrigation canal is driven through an Indian field, it is not at all uncommon for the villagers to gather around and worship the innovation as if God had put it there by magic."⁵⁰ McCord believes that the major deterrent to innovation of fatalistic attitudes is the omnipresence of traditional religion.

He points out, I believe correctly, that religion provides a basis of meaningful identification with the universe, one that cannot be achieved by the more fragile identification with modern conceptions of change and innovation. The inherent conservatism of religion is a powerful, independent obstacle to change, to innovation, and consequently to the development of a modern belief system.

An obstacle to the attempts of government at innovation in a traditional society is the inability of the people, the leaders as well as the masses, to understand the subtleties of politics and government. The people view politics as a matter of personal influence, bribery, and "pull."⁵¹ Banfield points out that in southern Italy the peasant looks first to his local patron as the source of political guidance, as he has done for centuries. The establishment of centralized

government has not succeeded in disrupting the traditional hierarchical positions of power. The local officials have used the naiveté of the peasants to enhance their own power and wealth, and they are therefore reluctant to institute change.⁵²

A further possible limitation upon the ability of the traditional peasant to change his value preferences is the strength of village and local group ties. It is McCord's view that one can seldom uncover in village life a community value that treats the individual as separate from his group and as possessing rights that transcend the group.⁵³ Elders, using power bestowed by ancestors and gods, quite often reign as supreme authorities; such supremacy does not provide fertile ground for ideas of freedom, personal rights, and assertive behaviors associated with a modern belief system.

The traditional person is also limited by his reverence for land, his deep belief that the farmer close to the earth has more value than his urban peers. Although this concept has been challenged by the appeals of city life, many rural residents still live and work in rural poverty situations by choice, not necessity. There is a large body of literature attesting to the necessity for a market-orientation as a primary element of modernization. Psychologist David McClelland has produced convincing evidence that men must possess a strong desire for achievement before a modern economy can develop.⁵⁴ Everett Hagen and Benjamin Higgins have also postulated convincing models of development, with a rationality dependent

upon a market orientation of members of the community.⁵⁵

The necessity for market orientations is part of the dilemma in changing value systems. The attitudes of the members of the community have to be oriented toward the market before modernization can proceed, and, on the other hand, it seems that the population must be taken from the land and resettled in the world of industry and innovation before fundamental and lasting changes in their value systems occur. However, as the mobility of the peasant increases, and as he becomes increasingly more exposed to the comforts of modern economic life, he becomes increasingly dissatisfied with his traditional place in society. He is therefore, unwillingly perhaps, drawn into an urban environment and his relocation, whether voluntary or coerced, becomes a stimulus to his new value orientations.

The physical setting that seems to be a primary stimulus to value change can be summarized according to the following typology. Changes in values are caused by changes in the levels of communication, mobility, and extra-community relationships people share with people of other communities. In most instances value change will have to do principally with the levels of economic development and the nature of the technology in the system. This is so because mobility, communication, and inter-personal contact all result from the economic surplus created through industrialization and its abundant production and attendant leisure.

Micro-Analysis of Conditions of Value Change

There is still another dimension of attitude change that must be part of a postulate of rational attitudes in modern societies, and that is the personal or psychological dimension. Although the environmental stimulus may be clearly understood, the internal mechanism that operates to reorient the value preferences of people is not as clear. The hidden nature of the internal mechanism does not make it any less important to the theory of attitude change. There are specific internal conditions, just as there are specific environmental conditions, that must be satisfied in order to formulate a rational perspective and a scientific world-view. If both the environmental conditions and the internal conditions can be known, a fair degree of confidence in predicting attitude change can be achieved.

Two of the standard clichés about attitudes is that they are always in a state of change and that attitudes change only with great difficulty. The apparent contradiction in the two concepts is explained by the spatial variable. Attitudes are constantly changing in certain contexts, and in almost all contexts it seems to be human nature to resist change, or at least to make all effort possible to minimize its disruptive effects on the orderly processes of life. The holding of attitudes is, in the main, subconscious, although many are consciously held.

The attitudinal component of value orientations includes (a) cognitive orientations, (b) affective orientations, and

(c) evaluative orientations.⁵⁶ The cognitive dimension is the knowledge dimension and may or may not be an accurate reflection of reality. In either case it is perceived reality. The affective dimension includes feelings, emotional reactions of attachment, and rejection. The evaluative dimension includes judgments and opinions that are the result of application of personal value standards to objects and events.⁵⁷

The holding of attitudes and their resultant behaviors makes it possible for a person to cope with his immediate environment. The attitudes are the substance of a person's adaptability to a constantly changing, sometimes hostile, sometimes friendly environment. The theory that there is a close correlation between attitudes and behaviors rests upon the assumption that the people have a tendency to respond consistently from one situation to another given a nearly comparable set of external stimuli. In order to explain the consistency, psychologists argue that attitudes are categorized and placed into classes according to personal perceptions of external environment.⁵⁸

When a person perceives a familiar stimulus, according to one theory, an automatic response is built into his cognitive map. He is oriented toward the stimulus according to the category and class he has given it within his value structure automatically without any conscious or deliberate judgment being made. When the stimulus is unfamiliar, that is when it will not fit into an existing category, or when the respondent perceives harmful consequences resulting from the responsive

behavior, the stimulus may initiate the conditions necessary to value change.⁵⁹

Attitudes assist people in classifying and ordering objects and events and making appropriate behavior responses available for coping with changes in the objects or events. Attitude change, according to this theory, is a result of stimuli unfamiliar to the receiver, that is unclassified in the person's value configuration, making it difficult, painful, or impossible for him to cope with the new circumstances.⁶⁰

Another perspective on attitude change is that opinions are a reflection of a man's unique life-experience and that they are involved in a pattern of consistency reflecting the pattern of his life.⁶¹ Man naturally seeks to order his experience and in doing so he maximizes the consistency between his experiential world and his attitudes. He behaves according to the patterns of consistency he perceives existing in the outside world. His consistency is maintained by maximizing his personal satisfaction and minimizing his personal dissatisfactions.

He also complies with expected patterns of behavior of his social group because he desires to minimize punishment and achieve reward whenever possible.⁶² He is desirous of receiving a favorable reaction to his behavior from another person or group and is therefore willing to accept influence in establishing his priorities. When he accepts influence and behaves according to expected patterns established by a social group, he is said to be playing a role.⁶³

Values change, in this theory, when cues from influentials within a group are passed on to group members. Any member of the group may play a role in passing cues because each group member perceives advantages and disadvantages of specific behaviors independent of other members of the group. Since the object of the spread of influence is to maximize the satisfaction of attainment of group goals, goals change slowly. There is satisfaction to be achieved through conformity. Change occurs only when the amount of perceived satisfaction through conforming appears less than perceived satisfaction through introduction of new perspectives.

In this theory maximization of personal role-satisfaction depends upon reciprocal relationships; the potential for improving the reward to be expected through the relationship is an inducement to value change. Also when maintenance of established value patterns, because of changes in the relative environmental conditions, causes increasing amounts of dissatisfaction, individual as well as group momentum will push to newer, less dissatisfying behaviors.⁶⁴

Another perspective on attitude change argues that value change is dependent upon change in external stimuli. Persons may not order or classify responses if external stimuli seem well-ordered.⁶⁵ If the stimulus lacks specific standards a person's judgment scale will not be well-graded or unambiguous. In this theory value change occurs readily since it involves reordering of stimuli that are already accepted by the receiver. In this perspective changing stands on social issues, for

example, can be easily facilitated because the stimulus already provides measures of "favorableness-unfavorableness."⁶⁶

Social attitudes scaled by an ideology, such as Marxism or liberal democracy, provide ordered sets of stimuli to attitudes and their attendant behaviors with a minimum amount of difficulty for the receiver of the stimulus. When changes in the democratic creed or the Marxist philosophy are made, they are more easily assimilatable since they, not the respondent persons, provide the consistency and the ordering. In the mind of the respondent persons, ambiguity and lack of immediate incentive are less of a problem since the change is being received as part of an already externally ordered value-scale. This also allows persons to discriminate, without difficulty, between different sets of proscriptions of various social groups. Differentiation as to favorableness-unfavorableness with respect to the personal dimension is facilitated by the ordering of the external stimuli.⁶⁷

Another perspective on value change is that the major component of value consistency is congruence between affective and cognitive perceptions. In this view attitudes remain constant as long as there is a high degree of correspondence between affective and cognitive perceptions, but they are subject to change when inconsistency occurs between the two.⁶⁸ All persons have different tolerance levels to inconsistency between cognitive and affective perceptions according to their physiological differences. However, when the personal tolerance level is reached conditions are correct for an attitude

change.

In this theory if a person has preferences for an object or event he will also have cognitions that will relate the object or event to a set of goals or priorities. Likewise, if a person is convinced that a particular object or event will further some personal goal attainment, he will probably increase his "liking" for the object or event. When there is an inconsistency between the cognitive and affective orientations that is not resolved, the conditions for attitude change are established.⁶⁹

According to Rosenberg, "The arousal of affective cognitive inconsistency to a degree in excess of the person's tolerance level is conceived as a basis for the production of attitude change."⁷⁰ A person approaches a "threshold" of attitude change when he reaches his tolerance level for inconsistency between cognitive and affective orientations toward external stimuli. In this model the conditions of attitude change therefore, are also products of the conditions that create the life experience of people. Although individuals will vary in their response to inconsistencies, and express different levels of tolerance, it can be expected that changes in life experience will cause inconsistencies in cognitive and affective orientation resulting in conditions favorable to attitude change.

Attitudes may be placed on a scale of expected accommodation of resistance to change according to environmental conditions and personal tolerance levels for inconsistency.

Those accustomed to absolute reconciliation of conflict between expectation and experience will probably have some difficulty accommodating inconsistency and demonstrate a high degree of resistance to attitude change. This might be hypothesized as the condition of traditional man living in a rural, non-complex, harmonious, and mostly peaceful world. The urban resident in a modern context, on the other hand, is likely to expect less agreement between his experience and his ability to explain events and objects around him and will therefore probably have higher tolerance levels for attitude change. It might be argued that the greater the goal of rationality, defined here as an ability to relate means and ends and to pursue goals on this basis, the lower the threshold for response to inconsistency, the greater the degree of tolerance for attitude change.⁷¹

Another theory of attitude change, postulated by W. R. Catton, deals almost exclusively with affective orientations. He posits a model under which there are six dimensions of value structures; 1) spatial distance, 2) social distance, 3) remoteness in time, 4) probability, 5) irrevocability or permanence, and 6) free selectability.⁷² In this theory affective orientations toward what Catton calls "desiderata" are the primary bases of "operative," "conceived," and "object," values.⁷³ Operative values are those observed when studying a person's actual values; conceived values are those expected by the valuer based upon anticipated outcomes of alternative behavior choices; object values are those that are in fact preferable whether or not perceived as preferable

by the valuer.

Catton's theory is designed primarily to account for those variables in human value choice that cannot be accounted for in terms of socially "acquired conceptions of the desirable."⁷⁴ Although most observable value preferences may be accounted for in terms of socialized response patterns, intervening variables, not accounted for in the institutions of socialization, may also be responsible for value orientations and value change. Three postulates - spatial distance, social distance, and remoteness in time - account for some of the unique variables that occur in a valuer's consideration of certain desiderata. The characteristics of the desideratum will invariably be perceived differently by individual valuers according to their "distance" in physical, social, and intellectual terms from the object being valued.

A key distance factor in Catton's model is the "socially acquired knowledge" variable. According to Catton, "The influence of values upon human choices among non-symbolic desiderata is conditioned by socially acquired knowledge of the characteristics of the desiderata."⁷⁵ This model of attitude orientation and change accounts for variations, within cultures, and within specific cultural strata, of preferences according to "distances" in both formal and informal learning. These are learned values that are institutionally socialized by private and public institutions.

The primary component in this model could be postulated as the access to formalized political and social institutions.

It could be postulated that different value preferences result from different levels of exposure to various occupational experience, income differences etc. within a single culture. A key variable, in this model, possibly more important than community culture preferences, is proximity to the key institutions of formal instruction.

Catton draws conclusions about the motivational prerequisites for value change from the concept of spatial proximity. In this view the "apparent" value of an object and its probability of acquisition are functions of its spatial proximity to the valuer.⁷⁶ Achievement orientations, particularly in terms of long-term occupational and income goals, can be thought of as aspirational rather than immediate goals. A plumber's assistant attending night school studying to be an accountant, for example, will probably identify, in the beginning of his studies, with his immediate environment and his expectations will likely follow from his plumbing occupation and the environment a plumber's income affords him. However, as he approaches his goal of graduation in accounting, his values could be expected to change to those reflecting the situation he expects to be in when he achieves his goal.

College students studying dentistry would be expected to have views similar to practicing dentists. Value orientation will be a factor, in this view, of increased motivation, which will in turn be a factor of increasingly greater proximity to ultimate goals. One might hypothesize that if access to channels for attaining long-term goals is perceived to be open

by the valuer he can be expected to hold values commensurate with his aspirational goal rather than goals commensurate with his immediate condition. One could also develop a scale, if this theory is valid, upon which attitude change, or its stimulus, could be scaled according to proximity to established goal-realization.

The concept of spatial distance has these three variables: physical distance, social distance, and remoteness of the desideratum in time.⁷⁷ Two other dimensions of valuing, probability and irrevocability, have to do with the valuer's relation to the desideratum rather than a characteristic of the desideratum itself. The greater the probability of goal achievement perceived by the valuer the more intensely the value will be held. Likewise, if the valuer perceives limited opportunity for goal-achievement, that is, if it seems to be a once in a life-time "opportunity," the intensity of value-oriented behavior associated with the goal will probably be greater than if it is seen as a recurring "opportunity."

An example might be the possibility of achieving a college degree. Generally, educational opportunity, at least as a full-time pursuit, is seen as an experience reserved for the young. There are reasonable age limits, usually self-imposed, at which motivation to undertake a college degree program begins to decline. At this stage, it can be hypothesized, held-values begin to become more rigid; as expectations of occupational and income goal-achievement become restricted to immediate work-situations, objects and events valued are

also seen in the context of more limited aspiration-levels. Motivation may also decrease and with decreased motivation a threshold of resistance to value-change may also become more rigid.

In summary of Catton's theory, valuers must be understood by observers in terms of their physical distance from, desiderata, the social distance which is the major variable in motivation, and remoteness of the desiderata in time. The probability of achievement of goals and their frequency are also variables that determine the intensity of held-values and their possibility of change.

Two other theories of attitudinal change are also relevant to this discussion. Charles Osgood and Percy Tannenbaum have argued convincingly that a major factor in construction of models of attitudinal change is the concept of congruence.⁷⁸ They argue that the most significant variables in predicting the direction of attitude change are (a) "existing attitude toward the source of a message, (b) existing attitude toward the concept evaluated by the source, and (c) the nature of the evaluating assertion which relates source and concept in the message."⁷⁹ They argue that observers can predict direction and relative amounts of attitude change according to generalized attitudinal scales developed according to the principle of congruity. According to this theory, every person has attitudes or potential attitudes toward an infinity of objects. Various and even conflicting attitudes may be held toward an object or event as long as no association or judgment is made. In their view, "the issue of congruity arises

whenever a message is received which relates two or more objects of judgment via an assertion."⁸⁰ The positive, negative, or neutral quality of the assertion and the positive, negative, or neutral quality of the value determine the congruity.

If expressive assertions are positive and the object of the association is one of negative judgment, direction and intensity of change are predictable. If both the assertion and the object of the assertion are neutral, little or no change is expected. For example, prestigious institutions and people are the objects of popular myths and a corresponding set of behavior expectancies in almost all social groups: The prestigious person is expected to behave in terms of certain norms defined by group beliefs. Thus expressions of affection for or even tolerance of domestic Communists by the President of the United States would constitute a value incongruity for most of the members of the American political community. If President Nixon were to express feelings of hostility or apprehension about American Communists, congruence would be very high and little value change would be expected. On the other hand, expressions of affection or tolerance would cause new affective orientations toward either Mr. Nixon or American Communists. The source of the change, according to this theory, would be the incongruity between an existing attitude and an object of judgment.⁸¹

The degree of polarization between the object being judged and the existing value determines the intensity of the change

in values. In Osgood and Tannenbaum's view, "relatively less polarized objects of judgment, when associated with relatively more polarized objects of judgment, absorb proportionately greater amounts of the pressure toward congruity, and consequently change more."⁸² The question of intensity must measure two related but independent variables, the assertion itself, whether positive or negative in terms of existing value judgments, and the source of the assertion.

The principle of "credulity" is an intervening variable that may be obvious to the valuer, but not as clear to the observer. The greater the credulity, the less potential for polarization in spite of the nature of the assertion. Conversely, the less the credulity, the greater the potential for polarization in spite of congruity with existing value judgments. The degree and direction of value change respecting a single valuer will be, in this theory, a function of expressive assertions made as well as a judgment of the credulity of the person making the assertion. Application of these principles should allow the investigator to determine which strata in a sample population would show the greatest potential for value change and which would potentially have the greatest resistance.

Congruence factors become more difficult as the levels of affective orientations grow. The relatively immobile, uneducated, and poor, are likely, in a traditional context, to have few affective orientations and those that are held are likely to explain all value judgments on the basis of the

source of an assertion. Authoritarian or dominant religious and political leaders are thought to be the sources of all knowledge and incongruencies between their assertions and value judgments would probably not cause problems of congruence for the valuer. The illiterate, impoverished strata in a "modern" community would also probably have a small potential for perceiving incongruencies between sources of assertions and the assertions themselves since they would generally have a low threshold of expectations.

On the other hand, those in a modern society with a high level of personal mobility, strong educational opportunity, and meaningful occupational goals are likely to have great potential for disaffection resulting from incongruencies between assertions and the sources of the assertions. One could hypothesize that a higher potential for incongruity exists within certain strata of a particular community according to their occupational, educational, and mobility potential. It follows, in the Tannenbaum and Osgood theory, that this stratum would also have a more predictable direction of attitude change and that the change would be at a more measurable rate.

In their summary they conclude, "Predicted changes in attitude toward both source and concept are based upon the combined operation of a principle of congruity, a principle of susceptibility as a function of polarization, and a principle of resistance due to incredulity for incongruous messages."⁸³ All three principles, it can be argued, will be shown to empirically exist more in some strata of any political community .

than in any other of its strata. The easiest to demonstrate would be the credulity factor since this would be directly related to experience and education.

The greater the mobility and exposure to different life experience, the more complete the cognitive map. Whether it is accurate or inaccurate, it becomes a source for explanation of events and objects. The increased domain of the cognitive map is also a source of increasing incongruity between values and objects of judgment if only for quantitative reasons. If the first two assumptions are correct, then it would also be correct to assume that the valuer with the most complex cognitive map and the largest number of affective orientations would also be most susceptible to the greatest degree of polarization between potentially incongruous value sources and concepts. In conclusion, if this theory is valid, one would expect to find a greater degree of value change in predictable directions in strata of societies with the highest degree of education, personal mobility, and occupational-goal satisfaction.

Robert P. Abelson and Milton J. Rosenberg have posited a useful theory of attitudinal cognition in which they hypothesize a kind of "ideal type" particularly amenable to value change. In their views the primary factor in valuing is thinking and thinking is an exercise done in terms of what they call "psycho-logic."⁸⁴ The argument is that a reduction in dissonance between cognitive and affective orientations is primarily a function of thinking and that imbalances of

cognition are only potential until they are recognized by the individual. In order to recognize them he must be motivated to think about them and in doing so he will place them in what they call a "common-sense" cognitive structure with "good," "bad," and "null" categories.⁸⁵ Their ideal type, that is the person who is motivated to think about the potential imbalance in his cognitive structure, has the following characteristics:⁸⁶

- (a) "Pressure to reach a decision on the topic.
- (b) Socially derived needs to appear informed on the topic, to converse well about it, to win over others, etc. Anticipation of the relevant social situations would motivate thinking.
- (c) Relevance of the topic to needs, conflicts, and persisting preoccupations. Activation of such processes would generate pressure to think.
- (d) A general 'cognitive' style of the individual such that thinking per se is satisfying."

In this view a person, when motivated to think about a problem, will bring to bear a set of cognitive orientations that form his historical response pattern plus new orientations that will be part of his "psycho-logic."⁸⁷ The new psychological orientations may or may not be compatible with existing orientations but in either case they represent the minimum general requirement for attitude change. In the instance of conflict with existing orientations the dissonance theory

applies.⁸⁸ In the instance of compatibility there is a new unit or added increment of cognition which will be part of shaping "automatic responses" to stimuli confronted at a later stage. The critical variables in the model are external pressure, socially derived needs, relevance, and a special cognitive style relating to thinking.

Although application of the theory may be difficult, some general considerations might be given. First, it seems to me that in any society a single stratum can be shown to be more likely to produce the "ideal types" described by Abelson and Rosenberg. The externally generated pressure to arrive at decisions, the social situation that creates need for participation and interchange, and environmental generation of conflict and so forth could all be shown to exist in certain communities in greater abundance than in others and within certain strata in any community more than in other strata in that same community. Again, it seems reasonable to hypothesize that people engaged in occupations that are complex in their nature, who have achieved significant levels of education and who live in highly urbanized environments are more likely to experience conflict, pressures to make personal decisions, and social norms requiring adjustment to external environment than those engaged in mundane, routine, and non-complex work, with little or no formal education, and living in an essentially non-conflict rural setting. Thus the frequency and direction of value-change should be, according to this theory, significantly different in the two contexts: the earlier being

more likely to produce the "ideal types" suggested by Abelson and Rosenberg, and the latter environment less likely to produce these same types.

Summary of Micro and Macro Analysis of Value Change

The perspectives of both the micro-analytic and the macro-analytic models of value change seem to share some regularities. Both models ultimately explain value-change in terms of change in the phenomenal world. Macro-analysis seeks to explain value-change through identification and ordering of events and objects that comprise conscious perception of immediate surroundings. The particular ordering of these events and objects is the basis of a unique "life-experience" of persons perceiving that order of events and objects.

Although there are several approaches to value-change that might be usefully explored, I have argued that the best explanatory model is one based upon theories of economic change. It is primarily the economic conditions of a particular system and the unique economic condition of particular members of the system that determines the boundaries within which perceptions of reality are formed. Major constraints on perspectives are economically imposed. Mobility, education, diverse occupational experience, and complex experience of most kinds generally occur only in economic systems having a significant surplus production.

The possibility of leisure time to think, research, discover, or innovate is dependent upon the continued

availability of surplus production. Subsistence economies create the least complex life experiences because all activities must be confined to routine daily functions necessary to sustain life. The preponderance of complexity, of unique life-experiences, of occupational and educational opportunity, will be found in advanced industrial societies.

Although the economic system provides opportunity or constraint, the relative amounts of each will not be uniform throughout all strata of the community. Those with unique talent and training that is prized most highly in one society will enjoy greater rewards than those with less talent and training. Every society arranges its desired behaviors on a hierarchical ladder and status positions are held according to attributes possessed at various levels of the hierarchy. Thus those persons with attributes most highly prized in a society will be rewarded with status and perhaps pecuniary reward. Those with few or none of the prized attributes receive few of the rewards.⁸⁹

In industrial societies attributes that result in high productivity are more highly regarded than other attributes. Strata in the society are thus created according to the schedule of disbursement of surplus production among producers. Those with the greatest reward achieve greatest access to the conditions that comprise complex and unique life experiences. Value-change within this stratum of the society will be greater than in any other. In this manner the macro-analytic model of attitude change identifies social systems as well

as strata within a social system where value-change is most likely to occur.

The micro-analytic model examines the complex psychological processes that occur as a reaction to change in the phenomenal world. Cognitive, affective, and evaluative orientations characterize response patterns of the mind to perceived reality. The complex inter-relationships between these three orientations seems to be the key to understanding psychological reactions to changing phenomena. The human mind operates by ordering and categorizing stimuli it receives through various physiological means.

The nature of the internal ordering process and the change in external stimuli seem to be the two keys to understanding how the mind handles new or unique information. I have explored the complexity of these mental processes here only very briefly in order to demonstrate that most of the current theories do not see these processes as causes of value-change. They are reactions to new conditions, new information, or changed external stimuli.

In searching for causation it is still necessary to examine a wide variety of variables including the immediate conditions of persons that give rise to their unique life-experience. The levels of cognition, affectation, and evaluation are determined, in the main, by the unique life-experience of persons as shaped by many possible variables, one of which is their economic condition. "Ideal types" have been hypothesized in this chapter as a set of economic

characteristics defining a person most likely to have the correct balance among cognitive, affective, and evaluative orientations. These "ideal economic types" have been described as those most likely to have the highest propensity for value-change.

Those whose life experiences are most complex, as a result of holding the greatest share of surplus production in the society, are believed to be those most likely to accommodate value-change. Those with simple, non-complex life-experiences are thought to be most likely not to hold affective and evaluative orientations and therefore as least likely to accommodate value-change.

Chapter III

THE INDUSTRIAL CULTURE

The Model of Participation

Of all the correlations agreed upon by students of political development, the association between economic development and citizen participation seems to have achieved the most efficacy in the literature. The argument that an agricultural society, or what Sutton calls, "Agraria," is characterized by a predominance of ascriptive, particularistic and non-participant orientations while the industrialized society, or "Industria," is characterized by a predominance of universalistic, achievement and participant norms is widely accepted by students of political development.⁹⁰ This differentiation is also the basis of the Almond-Verba typology of political cultures.⁹¹ The expectation of changes in role-perceptions and role-behaviors accompanying economic development have been verified by recent empirical evidence as well. In a factor analysis of the data compiled in the Almond-Verba study, Nie, Powell, and Prewitt found a direct correlation between economic development and participant attitudes and behaviors in the five countries of the study.⁹²

The argument that universalistic, achievement and participant norms are most likely to characterize modern industrial societies does not imply that all persons living in an industrial society will have these characteristics, only that this set of norms describes a "modal" culture-type that

will be dominant within the society. It can be argued that the "rational-activist" model cannot be applied to a society in general, even as a modal norm, but must be applied to a particular stratum of society in order to have explanatory value. I will argue later in this chapter that the rational-activist model is most closely approximated in the "middle-stratum" of an industrialized society, that its frequency and intensity will be greater within the middle stratum than anywhere else on a scale of socio-economic stratification.

The dimensions of the participant orientation do not require that behaviors of all persons who fit the norm constitute action that directly affects political outcomes in the polity. There are a wide variety of conditions of action and action-orientation that go to make up the norm of "participant," and according to the model, may range from the level of direct involvement in the political process to a lower level of simply holding opinions about how decisions should be made and by whom.

The critical variable that differentiates the participant from the subject mode is not active involvement in a process designed to influence political decision-making, but the nature of the expectations of persons of their system's output. The participant model, unlike the parochial model, implies a pragmatic orientation toward personal involvement and a high degree of expectation of system output. A participant may rely upon organized activity of others in the system to achieve satisfaction of his own demands. It is not necessary,

in his view, to expend personal resources to achieve satisfaction of demands if it can be done at less cost. If not, he is willing to actively participate.

It is not necessary to the model of modern culture types that all persons be personally and actively involved in decision-making. It is only necessary that they be actively formulating opinions about the political process and output and that they make those opinions known to the few who do expend their resources to attempt to make or influence decisions. It is also critical that they believe in the power of organization. They may perceive themselves as powerless as individuals, as did their traditional forebears, but they will not perceive themselves as powerless to effect change in concert with others in like circumstances in the community. They are participants if they believe in change, are aware of proposals for change, evaluate them, and make opinions about the proposals known.

The context in which people express their preferences need not be an open or public forum. The nuances of expression of demands makes the entire process difficult to examine except in the instance of those preferences that are articulated and aggregated through organized associations. The process of formulating mass demands and the individual contribution to those demands is, however, much more subtle.

The demands that form the major portion of expectations respecting political process and output are not necessarily formally articulated by any group and participation in the

development and maintenance of these demands does not necessarily require membership in a functional group. The context in which general notions of desirable process and output are determined by those who are activists is created by the members of the community. It is in the formulation of these norms of expected community behaviors that individual members of the community are participants. Cues are given to persons in leadership positions subtly through all types of communication including the press, gatherings of informal associations, literature and the arts, religious associations, and from "experts" and those who perceive themselves as expert. These cues define a general range of acceptable behaviors. Public policies within this range, although implemented by position-holders, can be said to be a function of the norms of acceptable behaviors determined by all "participants" in the community.

In this model participation is active sharing and persistent evaluation of a set of norms that define the context in which political activity takes place and that pass on the validity of the political output of the system. Thus participation cannot be said to be a passive activity, but neither is it correctly described as active involvement to influence or make public decisions. Participation may also be looked at as a process for providing constraints or boundaries of permissible behaviors for those who do attempt to influence and make political decisions.

On a continuum of development those who are activists

and participants are the basis of the modal culture type expected in a modern system. The necessity of functional specialization in industrialized societies prohibits large numbers of persons from actively sharing power in decision-making processes. However, the same technology creates the conditions under which formulation and expression of the community values defining the scope of demands and expectations are open to a substantially greater part of the population. These conditions, I will argue later, also create the circumstances under which participant roles can be developed and maintained. It can also be argued that functionally diffuse and specialized economic societies must be accompanied by functionally diffuse and specialized political communities that depend for their efficiency and operation, and perhaps even their survival, upon large numbers of citizens playing participant roles. The very active, however, cannot be more than a small percentage of the population, and the processes of technical efficiency are also working to limit the number of actual decision-makers.

Middle-class Argument

The creation of a strong, well-integrated middle class is generally conceded to be a major consequence of the industrialization process. Its creation can be properly viewed as a natural outgrowth of increased production and consumption and the general rise in leisure time associated with surplus production.⁹³ In the early stages of economic development, the absence of innovation, discovery, and

invention is a cause of labor-intensive economic systems. The factors of production of land and capital are fixed by existing technologies and therefore the only factor of production that can readily be increased is labor.⁹⁴ The result is that the surplus needed for industrialization is created thru maximizing labor output. The labor force is thus drained of its energy in production and has little or no time for non-productive activities.⁹⁵

Because the surplus needed for industrialization is in scarce supply, most surplus, in the early stages of development, is channeled into investment rather than the consumption that might provide leisure and enjoyment for the laboring class. It is only when a significant portion of productive surplus is channeled into investment that leisure goods and services become abundant enough to become widely distributed. Leisure, for purposes of this example, can be defined as any activity not resulting in the creation of a good or service with immediate market value. Innovation, invention, and discovery can be thought of as activities that occur only when a significant degree of surplus production allows leisure time for people to innovate, discover, and invent. The "fuel" that propels the economic system is innovation. As a consequence of innovation, increases in production are realized beyond the needs of immediate investment, and capital can be channeled into production for consumption.⁹⁶

In the stage of diffusion, defined as a condition of mass consumption, enough goods and services are produced to

provide a significant percentage of the population with high standards of consumption.⁹⁷ The consumption function and its attendant leisure activities are a minimum requirement for the creation of a middle class, defined in terms of economic "situation." The major part of the middle class argument rests upon the assumption that abundance and the distributive process will invariably result in a stratification of society according to ownership, leisure time, occupational status, and so forth. Societies are usually classified by sociologists according to models of stratification based upon employment, income, and residence. The middle class is defined as that stratum having a "medium" amount of goods in relation to other members of the community; that is, there are others in the community with more possession and some with less possession. The middle-class person is one who looks around himself and decides that he is in the "middle range" of economic well-being.⁹⁸

This, I believe, is the most important variable in class identification. A class should functionally be defined as an economic condition perceived by persons themselves, not according to an index constructed by observers of income, occupational strata, or education. It is a person's own view of his situation that determines his value structure, not the categories of an observer. It also seems to me that class identification is often a function of aspiration rather than immediate condition.

In a society where technology makes abundance more

increasingly obvious to the members of the community, aspirations to share in the abundance are also raised. A person exposed to conditions of affluence is very likely to seek to share in that affluence. If so, his values may reflect the status he will have when he has achieved his goal rather than the conditions of his immediate surroundings.⁹⁹ An index of income or occupational status devised by observers might well place a person very low on a scale even though he perceives himself in vastly different terms and much higher on the scale. It is a better analytical tool, therefore, it seems to me, to define a person's class standing on the basis of his personal perception of his own "economic situation."¹⁰⁰

A precise definition of the variables in a person's economic situation is difficult because of the varying contexts in which such judgments are made. There are, however, positive correlations demonstrated both theoretically and empirically between specific attitudes and their hypothesized attendant economic conditions. I propose a model in which the critical variables in a person's economic situation are his occupation, education, and personal mobility. These are the most important variables in a person's life experience and compositely form a useful index for classifying people according to the economic variables likely to produce clusters of particular value orientations.

The Occupational Variable

The occupational variable, although traditionally scaled according to manual and non-manual classifications, has a

number of important characteristics that do not readily lend themselves to scaling. The aspects of a person's occupation that are an important part of shaping his orientation to the political and social world are subtle and therefore difficult to define. Some of the most important might be amount of leisure time afforded, rules and restrictions imposed from above, amount of routinization of effort, personal satisfaction felt in achievement, and identification with overall objectives of the product or service goal.¹⁰¹

A very important component of the occupational variable is the amount of leisure time afforded when leisure time is defined as activity not related to the satisfaction of an immediate production goal. A worker values the amount of vacation time, the length of the work-day and work-week, the location of the work-shift in the twenty-four hour day, and coffee-breaks, shower-time, and change-time, as important parts of the status associated with a particular occupation.

Workers with long vacations and short working schedules in favorable times perceive themselves as having more status than workers with short vacations, long work schedules, and unfavorable shifts.¹⁰² The low-class laborer may in fact be doing the same job as a middle-class laborer but be distinguished by lack of leisure time. An example might be a plumber who works for himself subcontracting. While he may do identical work with hourly paid plumbers, he will derive additional personal status from being able to arrange his own schedule and in doing so perhaps lump his work into an

intense but short period and arrange frequent three or four-day holidays.

The greater the increase in leisure activity, or perhaps more correctly, the greater the amount of leisure activity associated with a particular occupation, the greater the status afforded to a person in the position. Corporate executive officers are usually perceived, incorrectly in most instances I might add, as possessors of unusual amounts of leisure time spent in pursuit of recreational activity. The status that is afforded to a person on a routine daily schedule is much less than that afforded to the person perceived to possess much more leisure time even though the stereotype may have no correspondence in reality. The middle-class worker is one who perceives himself as possessing a medium amount of leisure at convenient times and who also has expectations that the amount of leisure available to him will increase. He also believes the variety of alternative methods of spending his leisure time will increase.

Status is defined here as the achievement of a position in which a person identifies himself with others according to the possession of some common characteristic ranked by himself and others on a hierarchical scale of achievement or possession. The hierarchy is a number of people "ordered on an inferiority-superiority scale with respect to the comparative degree to which they possess or embody some socially approved or generally desired attribute or characteristic."¹⁰³ The placement of a person on the hierarchy gives him status and

the amount of possession of different kinds of status places a person in a class. One aspect of the status scale is the leisure, a second, the degree of personal freedom a person has in making choices about how, when, and under what circumstances he will perform his work.

The idea of rules and restrictions imposed from above, on a worker carries with it a notion of unfreedom and hence a low status in the occupational hierarchy.¹⁰⁴ Small things such as the requirement to punch a time clock twice a day, carry a time card, record hourly job accomplishments on job sheets, report at regular intervals on job progress to a supervisor, or wear specified safety clothes under particular work conditions are all factors that contribute to a general feeling of inability to control one's own work situation and therefore a certain amount of powerlessness. The feeling that those in charge lack confidence in a worker to perform assigned tasks and not be treated as an essentially incompetent or untrustworthy person is perhaps more important than just the absence of power.

The greater the degree of personal freedom in establishing the rules of one's occupational situation the greater the feeling of confidence and concomitantly the greater the status associated with the position. Thus a sign of status first achieved by a manager or supervisor is the removal of the requirement to punch a time clock. The manager or supervisor may work longer hours, come earlier, and stay later, but the confidence placed in him to be self-regulating gives additional

status to his position. It should also be noted that many line supervisors take wage cuts in order to assume supervisory positions and put in a great deal of overtime without extra compensation in order to achieve this additional status.

Another example is the small businessman, the person who owns the tools of his own trade, who is in a sense an entrepreneur, but who is still performing tasks similar to those done previously as an hourly employee. Again the example of the plumber is illustrative. As an independent contractor he may work far more hours, make less pay and work under much more adverse conditions, not the least of which is an unfriendly market in which he must compete for business, but he still enjoys more status in his own estimation by being an independent entrepreneur, by being self-directed, and by not having to accept rules imposed from persons in supervisory positions above him.

An inverse proposition is the ability to make rules and regulations that are binding upon those lower in the occupational hierarchy. The former line employee who lost status by punching in and out of work can gain status by being in a position to supervise the punching in and out of those in his employ. A condition of holding power over the activities of subordinates imputes status. A lack of power to make even small decisions is a clear and visible sign of lack of status. The person who exercises power over others, is self-directing and motivated, and who establishes his own rules of conduct, is in a unique occupational situation and as a result holds

unique attitudes that reflect his life experience. As an economy becomes more technologically sophisticated and the professional and managerial class increases in size, the number of persons in this occupational situation increases until they become the largest stratum and their ideas become a general norm of "middle class" orientations.

An increasingly complex problem for managers of assembly line production is the decreased status of occupations that require routines involving repetitious completion of a simple, mechanical operation.¹⁰⁵ As a result of the decrease in status and a belief that the worker is merely performing a machine function, one that requires little or no personal imagination or ingenuity, fewer and fewer workers are willing to accept assembly line occupations and even fewer want their sons to follow them in their occupations.¹⁰⁶

In the beginning of the industrialization process, almost all workers are engaged in this type of routine work and no special significance is attached except that one is identified as a member of the working class. As technology increases and the mundane jobs are phased out, as workers are replaced by machines in routine mechanical operations, status accrues to those who are able to operate the machines. There is a feeling that a person who does a job that can be done by a machine lacks status in relation to those who do not.

There are two variables at work here. First is the status attached to advancing higher than others in terms of escaping the routine work, but an equally important factor

is the acquisition of a skill.¹⁰⁷ Those who have special skills are part of a group that is smaller than and distinct from the general working class. As a result they have special status coming from their uniqueness and because of the small number of the working force possessing similar skill.

The uniqueness is also a factor of increasing demand. The fewer the persons possessing the skill in the market-place, the greater the demand, and the greater are the feelings of importance attached to the work. On the other hand, all persons are thought capable of performing routine mechanical operations and as such no special status accrues to persons who have only the ability to perform at that level. An adjunct of acquisition of a skill that is also important in shaping the life experience of workers is accomplishment or feelings of satisfaction brought about through making a direct contribution to production that can be seen, felt, and measured.¹⁰⁸

The literature of political psychology is replete with models and theories of alienation of people in industrialized, urbanized societies.¹⁰⁹ At least one common variable in most of the models of alienation is the nature of the work experience and accomplishment found in work achievement. In traditional societies production was on a "putting-out" basis and each artisan, craftsman, and even farmer was able to see and compare the product of his labor with that of other workers in similar situations.¹¹⁰ A great stimulus to accomplishment and also a source of personal comfort and satisfaction was created by production. It was necessary for the worker to be

close to the product of his work and to find status in achievement.

The mechanization of the production function prohibits, except in the instance of highly skilled laborers, the close identification of work and output previously a regular feature of work situations. The industrial line-worker rarely sees the end product of his effort and consequently finds little satisfaction in the effort he expends toward production. This is at least one source of "alienation" of industrial workers from their economic situation.¹¹¹

In a highly advanced technological society like the United States or Japan the number of workers required to perform routine mechanical tasks that disassociate them from the product of their work is declining. With the decrease in numbers and loss of unique contribution to the productive process there is also a decrease in the status associated with the occupation. Thus an industrial lineman, a quality control inspector, a furnaceman, or a riveter must seek meaning and status in something other than occupational experience while work commands the biggest share of their time.

At the same time technology has offered new substitutes for the "putting-out" system in terms of the personal contribution to a project or mission. Programs such as the moon landing or the construction of a large ship or airplane require large numbers of skilled workers acting in unison each doing the thing they do best and are uniquely qualified for. The team mission requires success by each individual and his

status, and therefore his sense of accomplishment, accrues in successfully accomplishing his part of the team mission. The numbers of skilled people required in an industrialized society is increasing at the same time the number of routine jobs is being reduced. One result is the creation of a middle class of workers performing highly skilled and sometimes professional occupations. There is also a concomitant decrease in the lower class of workers performing unskilled work.

Another increment of the occupational variable is the identification of the producers with the general goals and aspirations of the productive ethic. One of the characteristics of industrialized societies is a high sense of commitment on the part of community members to shared goals and values. The expression of these goals and values is usually in the form of nationalism or patriotism of some form.¹¹²

The increasingly complex socialization mechanism made possible by instantaneous communication has resulted in a degree of pride and commitment to community goals previously not shared by peoples of such heterogeneous circumstances and covering such a broad geographical area. An important part of this commitment is the belief that a legitimate goal of the community is an ever increasing level of production and productive efficiency.¹¹³ There are traditional metaphysical arguments that mesh with the nationalistic justification to provide impetus and incentive to meet productive

goals.

The idea that the Americans are destined to lead the world in productive efficiency or that the Japanese are destined to lead Asia into the industrialized world provide justification for occupational efficiency and give workers meaning in the jobs they perform. They also achieve satisfaction in knowing that they are part of the apparatus that brings prosperity and high levels of consumption to previously impoverished members of their own communities, even though they may be unknown personally to the workers and physically apart from their immediate environment.

The idea that increased productive efficiency is the major factor in eliminating poverty in one's own nation or in providing a defense mechanism impregnable to its enemies is justification for meaning in work. It is well documented that productive efficiency is highest during periods of extreme national crisis such as the major world wars. High levels of efficiency were noted for Japanese, German, and American workers during the war years.¹¹⁴

The Educational Variable

The greatest change, and perhaps the most difficult to assess, in the transition to modernity is the content of men's minds.¹¹⁵ At any moment in time the speed and direction of change in a society is dependent upon the attitudes of its people toward innovation, technology and its proper applications, the use of scarce resources, and the organization of authority.¹¹⁶ Decisions regarding change made by the society

are collectively restricted by traditional alternatives as much as by physical or technological barriers. In the long run the content of men's minds is in a state of constant flux, but in the short term the constraints of traditional orientations to change are an impediment to innovation and thus to growth in both the economic and political institutions within the community. For this reason, a necessary corollary of economic and political development is the proposition that the content of men's minds must be modifiable through manipulation of the constraints that define perceived existing alternatives.

There are two aspects of manipulation of values that need some explanation. From the point of view of the historian seeking answers to the "why" of historical change, causality defined by the existence of institutions causing change is an adequate explanatory device. However, this model leaves no room for explaining the values that preceded the institution that caused the change.

From the perspective of the social scientist, values precede institutions and account for whatever direction institutions give in changing societies. The tautology of both arguments can be resolved only through selection of social and institutional theories of causality. Judgments then seem to be only a matter of choosing between equally convincing evidence.

It is my thesis here that the imperative of economic development that is most critical - the requirement of

logical reasoning and rationality in allocating scarce resources - will require institutions that formally manipulate the content of men's minds.¹¹⁷ Men who think in terms of causality and can associate means and ends of alternatives and make choices based upon efficiency and reason are trained to do that. They do not a priori exist as a part of any population. It can be justifiably argued that a few may "naturally" think in these terms; however, economic and political development require that substantial proportions of the total community's labor resource think in such terms.

It is on the basis of this principle that many "elitist" theories of economic and political organization are developed. The human resources required to operate sophisticated economic and political institutions are thought to be in such scarce supply that a priori only a tiny percentage of the total population is capable of performing these functions. This minority, or "elite" is thought to be responsible for creating and managing those institutions in society that are ultimately responsible for manipulation of the content of men's minds. They are consequently in a position of control. Whatever changes occur in institutions that shape the content of the minds of masses must, in this theory, originate with the elite in that society.¹¹⁹

It seems more accurate to me to say that all men are by nature industrious and have inquiring minds with the potential for rationality. The conditions of existence are more propitious, however, for some than for others, for development of

these qualities. There is therefore a difference in levels of performance. The gap is quickly closed, however, when the conditions that allow development are made more uniformly equivalent.

The "natural" advantage thought to be held by elites will soon disappear as the economy develops. The men required to run the vast enterprises and research organizations necessary to provide innovation and discovery to propel the economic system will be needed in ever greater numbers as the system grows. The demands of the system will then force the creation of institutions that train substantial numbers of innovators to provide fuel to propel the system.¹²⁰ They will necessarily have to be provided with reasonable and logical accounts of the real world since they themselves will spend most of their lives inquiring into its nature.

The result is creation of a class, the largest class in the society, of workers trained to be positively oriented toward change, including innovation, discovery and invention. This class of "educated" workers will have a system of values most favorably oriented toward the selection of means optimally suited to realize ends derived through controlled but rapid change. They will be a class "created" by institutional manipulation of the content of their minds that emphasizes market values of consumption, with all that implies about equality, production, and all that implies about organization, and also ownership, and all that implies about distribution of property, and change and innovation.¹²¹

The argument is not seen as tautological when it is looked at in time sequence. If man is naturally an inquiring animal, as most political philosophers seem to agree, then new ideas will originate in all societies. If there are also "natural" differences in ability, attributable to physiological differences, then some will be better and quicker than others' in formulating new ideas. As a result events and ideas will always be originated by only a few in any society.

If man is also selfish, as most political philosophers seem to agree, these few will use their information and insight to improve their own condition. To do that they must create the conditions under which numerous others may share in the processes of discovery. Since this can only be done through highly structured organizations designed to promulgate ideas, to teach means-ends relationships, and to search for causality, a formal system of instruction seems to be necessary to the development and continuing growth of any industrial society.

Those who create and maintain the institutions designed to impart certain mental images to large numbers of people must deal with two principal problems.¹²² First, according to Spengler, "the mind must be dealt with in terms that assign it a role which is significantly determining and yet selectively responsive to external stimuli."¹²³ It is his argument that the mind is, at any point in time, a product of accumulated past events and the combination of this reservoir of information and the mind's autonomy from much of its environment allows a person to "deal selectively and

authoritatively with current events, stimuli, and situations."¹²⁴

A formal educational institution must provide mechanisms that maintain linkages between knowledge held in reserve and possible new-alternatives of personal and institutional behavior. It can be argued that an educational system designed to maximize numbers of creative, innovating, and inquiring minds will create the conditions most likely to develop persons who are "selectively responsive to external stimuli."¹²⁵ A mechanism in an industrial society designed to educate innovators must also create selectively responsive thinkers.

A second problem is discovering and utilizing ways in which some of the content of the mind has undergone change in the past.¹²⁶ It is important to remember that the role of the educational institutions in contributing to the creation of "rational-activists" in society is tempered by processes of discovery and change that are traditionally transmitted and maintained by members of a particular community. Although generalizations about the rationalizing process of industrialization and its sub-units of organization like the educational system are valid, it must be said that the generalizations are valid only within limitations imposed by cultural perspectives.

The same end may be met through a wide variety of alternative mechanisms that vary according to a number of different cultural preferences. The participant in society is still a complex mixture of interactions between parochial,

ascriptive, and subject orientations, and rational, universalistic ones.¹²⁷ The point is this; a minimum level of similarity is all that is necessary in all industrial societies to create necessary and sufficient conditions of rationality. It is not necessary that all idiosyncratic forms of cultural preference be eliminated. When the necessary conditions for rational, innovative, inventive, and acquisitive preferences have been satisfied, all other norms may remain constant from traditional through industrial societies without any deleterious effect on the process of development.¹²⁸

The process of political as well as economic change requires rational orientations to only a limited number of decision-categories. The nature of change, the uses of technology, the distribution and accumulation of wealth are examples of decision-categories that must be generally constant in all industrial societies. Such variables as religious preference, recreational preferences, family structures, and so forth, may or may not have consequences for industrialization and as a result may or may not be the focus of manipulation of socialization institutions in a society. If there is no consequence for change, invention, innovation, or discovery, wide variations in these categories can be expected in industrial societies according to traditional or other preferences. As an example the numerous Protestant faiths, although there are some basic agreements on market values, have little in common across continents. The differences between Shintoism and Christianity are also

significant when the similarities of market value are discounted.

The educational process will maximize its socialization potential by using culturally transmitted preferences in manipulating mind content. A major educational goal is therefore a reconciliation of traditional values to market orientations. An effective past procedure has been the infusion of market values through religious institutions. An agreement between the institutions that socialize economic and political values and the church, to divide lines of expertise and inquiry into specialized categories, and to exclusive areas of jurisdiction, is an example of this kind of infusion.

As long as the church does not inculcate values antithetical to market values and as long as the educational system does not attack metaphysical values, each maximizes its own goal satisfaction through a functional division of effort. Educational institutions meet many of the possible objections raised by those having traditional value preferences through this kind of functional agreement. Traditional institutions survive in a modern industrial society by agreeing to accept an increasingly smaller area of functional jurisdiction.

Mind content is shaped in new directions to accommodate innovation and change in economic and political institutions without effect upon deference to traditional norms in religious and other social institutions. There is no contradiction here, only a functional division of jurisdiction that is

necessitated by technology and the requirement of development, and acquiesced to by traditional institutions as an alternative to obsolescence.

Those developing and maintaining educational institutions will be engaged in a process of discovering values accessible to external influence that are institutionally modifiable and classifying them according to their importance in the development process. These values become the strategic ones for those wishing to "orient the values present in the minds of the members of the community more fully to economic growth and development."¹²⁹ The mission of the educational process might be described as maintenance and development of those particular values that strengthen rational, innovative, and inventive attitudes and eliminating or minimizing the importance of those values that weaken these orientations. Again this argument will not be seen as tautological if the time sequence is recognized.

It will be argued by some that the thesis is tautological because technology depends upon rational and innovative orientations and rational, innovative orientations are created only under conditions of high technology. Sequentially the potential for rationality will be realized, because of exposure to variations in external stimuli, at different levels and times by different members of the system. Those who have had exposure to many non-formalized learning processes take the initiative in structuring learning environments which will duplicate the conditions of their "conversion" and attempt

to inculcate the increasingly larger numbers of their own. Those so exposed finally become a numerical majority and ultimately comprise most of the members of the community.

The greatest number of persons so exposed become a middle class in the sense that they are a numerical majority and have experienced less exposure than a few and more exposure than a few. The demands of industrialization will mean that an ever-increasingly larger number of persons so "converted" will be necessary. At the same time differences in physiology will always create a "scale" of persons according to their respective abilities at invention and innovation. Few will be at the top and few at the bottom because the vast majority are statistically of "average" physiology and consequently of "average" ability to perform in an educational setting.

Emphasis on market values of change, innovation, and invention is unlikely, at least in the short run, to create the conditions necessary for the development of a single type of economic or political organization. The possibilities of organization of rational values according to a wide variety of principles seems to be, at this point in time, unlimited. If one accounts for only the experience in the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, Japan, and West Germany, as many as twenty different forms of political and economic organization can be seen in the present century. Yet, to one degree or another, all have emphasized primary values of change, innovation, invention, and discovery. The model I am arguing here is not designed to explain changes in basic

institutions, only in attitudes of members of the community as it changes from a traditional agricultural community to a modern industrialized one.

The Mobility Variable

The level of economic development and its resulting technology are the determining factors in the occupational and educational situations of members of the community. It is also the critical variable in determining the mobility of members of the community. Mobility is used here to mean physical mobility in the sense of freedom of movement made possible by mechanical transportation devices. It also means mental mobility made possible by exposure to a wide variety of alternative life conditions through both formal and informal communications processes. Mental mobility might be described as the ability to see or project one's self into situations and environments other than those dictated by immediate physical circumstances. Mental mobility is a necessary, although not sufficient condition of physical mobility.

The technological conditions that optimize physical and mental mobility occur only in industrialized societies. However, even in the most advanced technologies access to the resources necessary to avail one's self of these ends is in scarce supply in relation to potential demand. Because it is in scarce supply it will invariably be distributed to some strata in society and not to others.¹²⁹ In the beginning stages of industrialization the resources are so scarce that they are possessed by only a small "elite" but as industrial-

ization proceeds an increasingly larger segment of the population's demand can be satisfied until ultimately most of society has been at least partially satisfied. In most advanced industrial societies it is characteristic that the vast "middle-class" enjoys relatively good access to resources that allow physical and mental mobility.

The ability to see one's self in new and unknown environments is essential to the process of industrialization. The working as well as the owning classes in industrial societies must be both physically and mentally mobile in order to accommodate forces of industrialization that are precipitated by technological change. A particularly difficult adjustment in the transitional process has been the transformation from rural to urban orientations.

The industrialization process requires vast numbers of workers in close proximity to one another and to natural resources. In practical terms this has meant massive population shifts from rural, stagnant, mostly harmonious environments to dynamic, and complex urban environments.¹³⁰ Most industrial populations have moved into urban locations reluctantly. Persons with little or no exposure to varying life situations have difficulty visualizing themselves in any other than their immediate environment that has provided the security they have known. Their traditional lack of mobility permitted only a small amount of human interaction, and what did occur was primarily with others who were almost totally similar in life styles and attitudes. Those with different

values were usually thought of as enemies and treated with hostility. As a result little or no contact between rural villages occurred and perspectives of tolerable life situations were limited to their own immediate environments.¹³¹

When forced into urban environments these people became exposed to increasingly larger numbers of other people with heterogeneous values and life styles. As urbanization intensified and cities became crowded numerous adjustments in traditional life styles had to be made to survive.¹³² Perhaps the most fundamental change was that from ethnic and family or kinship group allegiances to commitment to voluntary functional associations. These associations were made up of persons unlike each other in any special way except their desire to associate to accomplish social, economic, or political ends.¹³³ In this sense the communications process most instrumental in creating mental patterns of mobility were very informal. The processes of human interaction necessary to survive in urban environments drew people unwillingly into circumstances where they were forced to identify with others of divergent values and accommodate mutual differences in order to satisfy some common goals. In doing so they were forced to construct mental images of conditions other than those that they were accustomed to and that they preferred.

The necessity to voluntarily associate one's self with others to accomplish functional goals cannot be overstressed as a basic rationalizing process. It should be seen as a condition precipitated by urbanization and strictures of

urban environment that differed from those of rural settings.¹³⁴ A rural life could be led from birth to death, with a fair amount of satisfaction of human needs, and a minimum amount of personal interaction. The family and kinship groups operated as functional economic units. More importantly they served to restrict the activities of members of the community to limited geographical areas and hold ideas and values within narrowly defined traditional limits. The principle of economic efficiency established through family or village cooperation was not extended to larger groups because of the apparent inability of group members to see any world larger than that handed down by previous generations. Relocation in urban centers made it impossible to organize functional groups based solely on kinship because of the requirements of expertise necessitated by complexity. The ability to see one's self allegiant to groups larger than village or kinship is the first requirement in developing "mental mobility."

The association between nationalism and commitment to national goals, and industrialization is well documented.¹³⁵ Identification with large political communities and with functional groups larger than those in an immediate environment is a function, in part, of formalized processes of communication.¹³⁶ The utilization of the press, radio, television, and movies as agents of socialization of market values in industrialized societies can be seen in two contexts. The worker, accustomed to indefinite scarcity in traditional

society as well as in the beginning stages of industrialization, is satisfied with his condition if he believes that almost everyone lives in similar circumstances. He believes there are no alternatives because resources are too scarce, or because of "divine necessity."¹³⁷

However when he participates in the productive process and "sees" surplus production the question of his own condition of consumption is raised. When he sees no wealth or surplus except that possessed by a tiny elite it is reasonable for him to believe that there is simply not enough for him to share and although unhappy, he will probably be stoical about his situation. When he believes there is adequate resource available to allow wide consumption then his predisposition toward the distributive mechanism in society will be altered.

He will view himself in other than the conditions of poverty. His ability to see himself in another life situation will therefore be a function of his contribution to the creation of surplus production and his exposure to alternative distributive mechanisms. Totalitarian leaders attempt to reconcile the discrepancy between the life experience of workers of surplus production and limited personal consumption by manipulating the formal media to confuse and thereby control their subjects.¹³⁸ The illusion cannot be maintained however when what is said in the media and the life experience of workers are in conflict. The rationalizing processes that must occur to train industrial workers and managers invariably leads to the necessity for genuine communications that reflect

the real life experience of the workers and managers. Thus the greater the demands of technology for skilled and rationalized operatives the greater the demand to apply the same rationalizing process to the media. In the long term, if not in the short run as well, people tend to make judgments about the quality of their immediate life experiences and alternative forms based on the various life experiences they are exposed to in the media.¹³⁹

The traditional attitudes respecting distribution of scarce resources and property ownership are the first challenged when economies begin to develop significant surpluses. They are challenged in an industrial rather than an agricultural society for reasons having to do with the nature of wealth in each society.¹⁴⁰ In the traditional setting a society's wealth is seen as fixed in quantity, and redistribution therefore involves only changing ownership of a scarce and a fixed quantity of goods or property. However the industrialization process created a new conception of wealth; that quantities were not limited and distribution was therefore a matter of historical events and existing power relationships.¹⁴¹

Goods and services as well as property are seen in industrialized societies as fixed only by the extent of resources and the use of technology. Because of the apparent abundance of resources created by the productive mechanism almost all persons in industrialized societies expect to be property owners. If people are not owners and they know

others who are in similar circumstances and own property they are motivated to acquire property themselves. This is done in a variety of ways, including the formation of functional groups whose purpose is the redistribution of community wealth.¹⁴²

The impact of television on American Blacks is a good example of this principle. The relative wealth of the white community as compared to the poverty in the black community has been transmitted, with all its attendant inequities, into the homes of black people through television. The resultant dissatisfaction and rise of new organizations to create new and different distributive mechanisms in the American economy is a part of the rationalization process promulgated by exposure to the media.¹⁴³

The general theoretical statement that can be made here is that the ability to perceive one's self in new and different life situations, including roles as consumers, decision-makers, and generally in positions of exercise of power, occur principally in industrialized societies where a high degree of exposure to formal communications is widespread.¹⁴⁴ It can also be postulated that the degree of mental mobility is a result of life in an urbanized environment where exposure to formal communications processes is maximized. It would be almost impossible to live in an urban society and not be affected by communications processes. The open question is the nature of the impact and the behaviors precipitated by exposure.

It is my thesis that the mental mobility created by exposure to both informal and formal communications processes will be the basis for rationalizing tendencies, for active participation in processes seen as affecting personal goals, and for making judgments and expressing preferences about existing and alternative life situations. It is the reason expectations of improved life conditions are formulated. It leads to a belief that certain ends are desirable and also possible through actions that can be initiated by most members of the community. Expectations of the exercise of power in the process of change are not always realized, perhaps they seldom are. But the belief that change ought to occur and can through existing or alternative institutions remains as long as alternatives are perceived.

When the conditions of mental mobility are met they form the basis for physical mobility. Physical mobility is defined as the taking of positive action to achieve a change in life situations deemed desirable and possible.¹⁴⁵ Actual movement from one community to another, for short or long periods of time is a major factor in creation of a belief in the possibility of change.¹⁴⁶ Those in an industrial society who most easily move from one geographical area to another, particularly from one culture to another, are most likely to develop attitudes that the existing life situations they experience can be other than they have historically been. Exposure to alternative methods of accomplishing similar ends broadens perspectives on the capabilities of human institutions to be

modified and adapted to the needs and wants of their membership.¹⁴⁷ Those in industrial societies most likely to have the ability to make frequent changes of environment and occasional changes of cultural settings will be only those who possess its surplus production. As the needs of technology become increasingly sophisticated and the class of entrepreneurs and technicians is increasingly larger there will be more and more "middle class" persons who experience the rationalizing effects of mental and physical mobility. In the end they will form the nexus of those in society who expect and will work toward change in controlled directions. They become the principal source of innovation.

Summary of Middle Class Argument

My thesis in this section is that people have experiences, develop attitudes, and form values in response to the conditions created by their environments. The aspect of environment seen as most instrumental in shaping attitudes is the economic situation of members of the community. This includes access to consumer goods and services, occupational situation, duration of exposure to formal and informal educational processes, and personal mental and physical mobility. It also includes intangibles that result from various degrees of exposure to these variables such as status, security, and respect. My argument is that within broad limits these persons will have the same life situation within different cultures and that attitudes will be similar across polity lines when similar life situations occur.

This is not to argue that all values will be held in exactly the same way and that all behaviors will be comparable. Those who make this criticism of the economic determinist argument are attacking a straw man. The argument allows for a great deal of latitude in cultural and idiosyncratic differences within common value matrices. Traditional culture does have an impact on values and this argument does not deny its impact. However, the effects of the industrial environment are posited as being dominant in the process of attitude formation respecting certain key values. The values are the attitude toward change, innovation, discovery, and rationality. There are many corollary values but these are the dominant values that are created by industrial environments.

If industrial processes create what Inkeles calls "standard environment with standard institutional pressure" for particular groups, then it should also be postulated that these particular groups should have "relatively standard patterns of experience, attitude, and value."¹⁴⁸ In his view, "Men's environment, as expressed in the institutional patterns they adopt or have introduced to them, shapes their experience, and through this their perceptions, attitudes and values, in standardized ways which are manifest from country to country, despite the countervailing randomizing influence of traditional cultural patterns."¹⁴⁹

The key variables in creating these standardized conditions are hypothesized to be occupational situation, exposure to formal and informal educational processes, and mental and

physical mobility. The key conditions of the occupational variable are the amount of leisure time allowed in an occupation and the way it is used, the degree of self-direction and motivation, and extent to which the work done is repetitious and routine, whether the worker is employed to use his hands or mind, his personal satisfaction with the goals of the productive effort, and ownership of the means of production. These situations are hypothesized to exert the dominant influence in shaping attitudes respecting change, innovation, and discovery. Some other factors such as culturally transmitted beliefs are hypothesized to exert only moderate influence.

The educational variable is comprised of the formal and informal processes through which abilities to think causally, associate means and ends, make choices based upon reason and efficiency principles, are institutionalized. The institutions are dominant as influences that shape selectively responsive thinkers and utilize culturally transmitted values to make the processes of adaptation easier. The institutions will vary significantly in their formal structure because a single goal can be accomplished within a varying configuration of structures. The values of change and innovation can be taught in a wide variety of circumstances with an infinite number of instructional techniques. There is commonality in values transferred, not necessarily in the institutions that transfer them.

The third variable is the ability to see one's self in new

and insecure environments, to accept changing conditions when the outcome is unknown, and to risk personal security to gain unknown advantage all require certain values not common in all people in all societies. The urban resident, who is most fully exposed to the formal and informal communications processes and who is forced to organize himself into functional groups to accomplish personal objectives, is more likely than others in the population to be willing to accept the risks of confrontation and personal commitment to achieve individual and group goals.

An error that is made by many who accept this thesis is the methodology chosen to test its validity. Indices of national averages of education, mobility, and occupational variation ignore the obvious fact that the industrial environment will not be the same for all those who live in industrial society. We can more correctly hypothesize as Inkeles does; "We should, rather, expect that, in accord with the differences among positions in the modern occupational hierarchy, the different occupational groups will have differentiated attitudes and values."¹⁵⁰ The extent to which different segments of the population in industrial societies experience the variables outlined above will stratify them into attitudinal groups. The common variable in determining attitudes once these parameters have been outlined, if the hypothesis is correct, should be the class position, or location on the hierarchy, of conditions created by these "economic situations."

The final postulate of this thesis is that the "economic laws" of industrialization will necessitate the creation of a substantial "middle class" of workers whose "economic situations" are comparable across cultural boundaries. The need for managers, researchers, technicians, and professional people is common wherever industrialization occurs. The economic laws demand rational, means-oriented, efficiency-minded producers who must be mass-produced. The greater the degree of industrialization, the larger the class becomes until the "middle" becomes nearly the entire working population in the final stages of diffusion of the economy.¹⁵¹

Chapter IV

REASON IN VALUE-ORIENTATIONS OF MIDDLE-CLASS JAPANESE

The Methodology

I have previously hypothesized that two variables, first, middle-class economic strata in industrial cultures and second, attitudes emphasizing rationality, participation, innovation, and change, are positively correlated. I shall test that hypothesis through the use of survey data gathered by the National Institute of Statistical Mathematics of the Ministry of Education in Japan. The Institute was first established by SCAP, the American Occupation Authority, under the direction of several distinguished American social scientists including Clyde Kluckhohn.¹⁵² The Institute has maintained close contact with American scholars since its founding and as a result its survey techniques are comparable in quality to work being done in major American universities.

Careful attention in the research design was given to scaling, coding, and indexing the data. A good representative sample was selected from voting lists (all persons over 20 years of age are automatically registered to vote in Japan) that included variables of age, sex, occupation, education, city size, religion, and political party preference. There were three administrations of the survey questions, in 1957, 1960, and 1963. The questions were designed to test "national character" variables and were refined in each of the last two samples. All the data used here are from the 1963 survey.

Careful controls and checks were used throughout, including alternate interview teams, random tests for interviewer contamination, etc. All the interviewers were trained by the sociology departments in major Japanese universities. The interviewers were all students and the supervisors were their instructors. The data are therefore probably as good as could be collected and are worthy of high levels of confidence.

Many observers discount the usefulness of survey data taken in Japan for the following reasons: "1) Traditions that ordinary people's opinions do not count and are not worthwhile. 2) Vivid experience with all the elements of rigorous 'thought-control' and punishment for deviant opinion. 3) No IBM equipment, bad communication and transportation and lack of funds. 4) A speculative non-empirical tradition in the social sciences, with limited personnel and few technical resources."¹⁵³

These criticisms are generally made by those who argue that present-day Japan is "historically determined" and who feel Japanese people still have predominantly traditional values. Their argument is difficult to refute without the use of survey data, but since they deny its validity they do not test their theories empirically. There is evidence that the criticisms are unfounded.

A measure of the validity of survey research in Japan is the percentage of refusals to be interviewed. Hyman reports that the "best interview" agencies have only ten

percent refusals, a rate that would not be high according to American standards.¹⁵⁴ Those answering "don't know" could be considered as persons emphasizing traditional values and using an easy way out. In a composite of the nation's best "survey groups" Hyman found only a fifteen percent "don't know" response rate.¹⁵⁵

Two other measures of validity were tests for correlation of survey results with independent sources of information and with election polling. Both tests showed surveys in Japan to be very reliable. The election surveys tested were no more than two percent off the mark in the prefectural election forecasts.¹⁵⁶ The evidence indicates that attitude surveys are as valid in Japan as they might be anywhere else. When careful techniques of validation are used, as was done in the National Character Surveys, confidence levels are the same as those achieved by the best American Institutes.

Perspectives on Japanese Rationality

No conception of the Japanese character dies harder among social scientists than the belief in the basic irrationality of Japanese people in their world view. It is a strongly held view among many social scientists analyzing the Japanese character that the same traditional, mystical, and non-rational world-view ascribed to Easterners in general and the Japanese in particular for thousands of years is still the key in understanding Japanese orientations to the social and political world.¹⁵⁷ The most commonly shared orientation is thought

to be an inability, culturally instilled in each new generation, to think in logical terms, to understand the phenomenal world in a means-ends relationship, and to think causally.¹⁵⁸ Nakamura argues that the inability to see events and objects in relative terms is a culturally transmitted value having to do with the traditional Japanese respect for nature. He argues that, "The way of thinking that recognizes absolute significance in the phenomenal world seems to be culturally associated with the Japanese traditional love of nature. The Japanese in general love mountains, rivers, flowers, birds, grass, and trees, and represent them in the patterns of kimono etc."¹⁵⁹

An inability to understand cause and effect and to think in means-ends relationships is thought to be related to traditional Japanese mythology. In this perspective the fixation with the phenomenal world, the absence of concern with the future, the general lack of fear of death, and the emphasis on this-worldly pleasures that characterize traditional Japanese mythology are thought to be variables explaining the inability of Japanese to think causally. Nakamura believes that, "Japanese mythology as a whole is attached to this world and makes much of this life. Consequently, such a metaphysical concept as Karma or moral law of cause and effect (i.e. postmortem rewards for good deeds and punishment for bad ones) is lacking."¹⁶⁰ This school of thought has enjoyed impressive credibility among Western students of Japanese culture in explaining what appears to some to be a

significant concern with ritual, spiritualism, and the supernatural among the Japanese.¹⁶¹ These values are not selectively applied to certain groups or strata, but are universally ascribed to Japanese irrespective of social and economic differences.

The concern with witchcraft, divinely caused illness and plague, mystical healing, divine retribution, and "spirit-gods" is thought to be a socializing force of stability and harmony in village Japan. In Yoshida's view, "spirit possession beliefs and practices tend to prevent disruptive conflict in the community, to encourage cooperation between non-kin neighbors, to temper undue accumulation of wealth, and to maintain and safeguard the order of complex interdependence between persons and households in the village."¹⁶² The values associated with spirit possession and divine retribution are thought to be the major factors maintaining the traditional sociocultural system of the village and making it impervious to the influences of communication and transportation that bring the outside, non-mystical world into village life.

Residency in the village of Umani led Yoshida to conclude that technological change has not been a barrier to maintenance of beliefs in retribution and spirit possession. This was thought true even though there was modern medicine in the village, an increasing level of local industry and some mechanization of most nearby farms. He also concluded that education in the community has not been a factor of change

nor has the change in the poverty level had an impact.¹⁶³ He asserts that these beliefs are held rather uniformly across age lines and uniformly among all social strata of the village.

Religion is thought to play a more significant role in the lives of Japanese people than their peers in other industrial societies. The general belief in a wide-spread practice of ancestor worship, animistic conceptions of malevolent and benevolent spirits, enduring attachments to spirits of the dead, and regular, devoted religious ceremonies are thought to be a part of the lives of most Japanese people.¹⁶⁴ Emperor-worship and the myriad ascriptional values that follow are thought to be causes of the inability of Japanese to think in individualistic terms.¹⁶⁵ It is believed that Japanese seek and maintain only a collective identity and place the "good" of the collectivity above the "good" of self principally because of the tempering effects of traditional religion on general conceptions of universalism.

In Ichiro's view, "Because the gap between the religious elites and the masses in Japan is so broad and deep even today, consciousness of individuality among the people, in the Western sense, seems to have been undeveloped. Also, because of the supremacy of group-consciousness and the political value system seemingly based on the ancient socio-cultural religious system, individualism and universalism did not necessarily develop completely among the common people."¹⁶⁶ Japanese are thought to hold deep-seated culturally transmitted collectivity orientations maintained primarily through

religious experience.

The religion is thought to be the dominant influence in shaping attitudes toward individual well-being and the place of the individual in the social as well as the mystical order. The religious experience is regarded as a mechanism for disassociating people from the problems of the "real world" and creating, within the mind, a surreal world with fewer anxieties, complexities, and disruptions. The conflict typical of other industrial societies is thus avoided and in this sense the Japanese perspective is thought to be "non-rational." It is thought to be free from anxieties about the proper role of the individual in relation to others in the social and political world.¹⁶⁷

The conclusions of a prominent group of philosophers attending an East-West philosophers conference in Honolulu recently is characteristic of much of the thought concerning Japanese rationality of scholars in the humanities. "The two most fundamental characteristics," writes Charles A. Moore, "of the Japanese thought-tradition and of Japanese culture, even today, may be summed up in the expressions 'direct (or immediate) experience,' the general experiential point of view, and 'indirect thinking,' 'indirectness,' or 'indeterminateness in thought,' called variously 'irrationalism,' 'anti-intellectualism,' nonrationalistic tendencies, etc."¹⁶⁸ (my emphasis) The point of view of these philosophers is that traditional values are still the major sources of attitudes toward social and political objects in Japan even though, in

their view, this is not true of other Asian nations, including India and China. Rationalism, that is, logical, relative, causal thinking, in their view, has been "rejected almost completely in Japan."¹⁶⁹

They conclude that the non-rational Japanese character is described best according to the following criteria: "1) non-logical tendencies, 2) weakness in ability to think in terms of logical consequences, 3) intuitional and emotional tendencies, 4) lack of ability to form complex representations, 5) fondness for simple, symbolical representations and 6) weakness in knowledge of objective processes."¹⁷⁰

An American observer, Ezra Vogel studying and living in a Japanese community argues that in spite of implicit recognition of status achieved through education and of upward social and occupational mobility, residents of a medium-size Japanese town, Mamachi, believed they had little control over their own fate, and especially over the activities of government.¹⁷¹ There still persists in Mamachi, according to Vogel, a strong collectivity orientation that de-emphasizes the individual, places group goals above personal ones, and stresses group consensus and harmony. Inability to relate means and ends in status achievement and occupational mobility were ascribed to even the "salaried" workers in Mamachi. In Vogel's view, even the values of economic reward for effort in the marketplace are discouraged and not considered "legitimate."¹⁷²

One hypothesized result of the contradictions between real-life experience and the "non-rational" perspectives

transmitted culturally is a great amount of hypersensitivity and ambivalence.¹⁷³ Beardsley argues that, "Japanese might well oscillate between seeing themselves as the heirs of age-long civilization and viewing themselves as ignorant simpletons. Ambivalence and hypersensitivity feed on each other, and it has been extreme and contradictory expressions of these sentiments that have caught attention; deep humility and self-denigration at one point, exceptional arrogance at another. Where such attitudes have marked Japanese conduct, it is not inborn qualities of character, but as the crystallization of the insecurities affecting the entire people caught in these particular historical-geographical circumstances."¹⁷⁴

Part of the non-rational perspective is manifested in extreme guilt feelings, personal frustration, feelings of failure, conflict between group and personal values, and occasionally, in its extreme form, suicide. In this view the conflict between the irrationality of the extreme commitment to group and group values and personal values is harmoniously resolved only when confrontation is avoided and the basic irrationality of life in modern society is accepted as the norm.

Some interesting work has been done by linguists who argue that the basic irrationality of the Japanese character is a result of the construction of the Japanese language and its unique syntax.¹⁷⁵ The Japanese language has a big vocabulary for expressing subjunctive preferences but it is very limited in vocabulary for expression of logical

relationships and universal norms.¹⁷⁶ Classical Japanese literature has tended, for its subtle expressions, to emphasize terms associated with the natural world, the phenomenonal realm of existence. It lacked the realism founded in European literature on a rational, scientific background.

The approaches used by men of letters were associated with classical Japanese studies and subsequently with the classical language.¹⁷⁷ Although in English a full statement of the subject-object relationship is usually required to construct a sentence correctly, the Japanese language requires no such formality. It is grammatically correct to specify simple objects as complete sentences without reference to subjects, verbs, or pronouns.¹⁷⁸ The language permits, in this view; one to "project man's experience in its immediate and unanalyzed form."¹⁷⁹

The nuances of grammatical construction as determinants of thought form are varied and complex. It is not my intention to thoroughly explore them here, only to mention the subtleties that might be associated with this line of thought. An argument is made by the linguists, most of whom are Japanese, that Japanese irrationality is supported by an inability to think in analytic terms because of the unique construction of the language.

Western modes of thought that tend to emphasize relationships, particularly those between idealism and realism, can be said to be, in part at least, reflected by the necessity to show relationships in a complete, grammatically correct

sentence. Factual events and objects must be related to one another through a complex series of verbs denoting action and association. Even simple sentences, in English, must show relationships and therefore involve at least a small amount of conceptual thinking.

In the Japanese language complete expressions can be rendered without the use of objects, verbs, or pronouns. It would be completely satisfactory to simply say "tired," "lonesome," "involved," etc. without ever specifying an object of the action or a doer of the action. No complex relationships need be specified and a feeling, or subjective preference, is usually communicated rather than an objective condition.

Japanese thinking may therefore seem more idealistic, less "empirical" and more subjective than "Western" thinking because of the unusual freedom allowed in the language. Systems of formal logic and abstract thinking have made little progress in Japan and speculative thinking has been deemed undeveloped as compared to other industrial countries. The Japanese are widely known to be "copiers" but rarely as "originators." The stereotype has some validity in terms of the type of thinking that may be part of their cultural history.

Although the Japanese language may be characterized as subjectively oriented, it has not prevented conceptual thinking. It has caused a particular type of conceptual idealism that does not rely upon hard facts or empirical data for its conclusions. Conceptual speculation must be rooted in hard

reality. The further it slips from reality into abstraction, the fewer the tools provided by the language to deal with concepts.¹⁸⁰ The Japanese desires to be "realistic." But, as Kishimoto suggests, "to be realistic does not necessarily mean, for a Japanese, to go back to factual realism, but to be realistic to the reality of immediate experience."¹⁸¹

Some mechanical differences in the language structure affect thought process as well. For example, classical Japanese poetry lacks words expressing values such as "truth" and "beauty."¹⁸² On the other hand place names have "imagistic suggestions and euphemistic qualities" which give them a poetic feeling in the Japanese language lacking in English.¹⁸³ Japanese poetry has never developed rhymes, and relies extensively for its expression on particles of few syllables communicating only expressive feelings such as "oohs" and "ahs."¹⁸⁴ The differences of usage and form also reflect peculiarly Japanese mores. "Particularly noticeable are the differences denoting social position, polite and abrupt forms, honorific and humble words, distinctions between men's and women's speech, and words denoting family relationships; all reveal a great subtlety of status distinctions which are less easily found in European languages."¹⁸⁵

A socio-psychological view of the irrationality argument is that guilt is the operative motivator to action. Certain norms of guilt are culturally infused, causing unique syndromes of thought and public behavior in different cultures. This thesis is that "Guilt in many Japanese is not only

operative in respect to what is termed superego functions, but is also concerned with what has been internalized by an individual as a so-called ego ideal."¹⁸⁶ A member of a community is thought to assimilate norms of guilt and shame as part of his socialization process, the formulation of which is a major factor in determining behavior and thought. In the West guilt is generally associated with the handling of sexual and aggressive urges, in Japan it is thought to be associated with realization of expectations of parents of offspring achievement. Failure to achieve at levels of expectation established through the family is a cause of guilt and shame that can be controlled by a child.¹⁸⁷

A child learns that he is able to "hurt" a person in his family by failing to achieve or perform at expected levels and uses this process to satisfy ego urges. The sources of guilt are thus thought to be failure to meet parental expectations by the young, and "unsubmissiveness" of women in the female role or as mothers. Traditionally, Japanese women were completely dedicated to the mother role and brought honor to their families through rearing "proper" children and serving their husbands. A form of rejection causing guilt was manifested in behavior deliterious to these ends.

For the husband guilt accrued from failure to pay proper respect to elders, to religious and political figures, and to a wide variety of hierarchically defined social obligations. The primary unit, both legally and socially, in traditional Japan was the family and all its members defined themselves

in its roles in what DeVos calls "non-instrumentally organized quasi-religious concepts of family continuity."¹⁸⁸

The guilt feelings generated by failure to conform to expectations of family and group caused persistent pressures in the direction of personal commitment. In this psychological view achievement is seen as an escape valve for release of frustration and potential aggression. It operates through individual commitment to a particular social role and extreme forms of self-dedication. The failure of the hierarchically structured behavioral norms to provide easy sources for release of hostility, and the internalization of the processes creating potential guilt, led to a high degree of achievement orientation based upon non-rational or irrational drives. In this view, economic development should be seen as "ethno-economic."¹⁸⁹ This view holds that the industrialization process in the West that required rational goal-orientations and achievement preferences, could also be accomplished in the East through achievement orientation based upon non-rational motivations.¹⁹⁰

The achievement drive in Japanese middle class workers is thought to be an "irrational uncommon force" based upon internalized guilt mechanisms.¹⁹¹ There is no conflict between the supposed traditional values of irrationality and achievement in a modern industrialized society. A well functioning industrial society, in this view, can and does function upon a base of irrationally motivated workers seeking outlets for guilt associations thru self-realization in meeting productive

goals. My point here is that great effort has been expended by a scholar to accommodate his desire to maintain a belief that Japan, alone among industrial nations, has managed to develop industrially, enter the modern political world as a viable force, and lead most of the nations of the world in economic production, with a basically irrational, traditional population.

The final conception of rationality to be dealt with here is that of the ability to establish goals, to choose between alternative courses of behavior, and to take personal action to achieve those goals. Because of the stress on collective identifications the Japanese are thought by some observers to lack the ability to make individual choices among alternative goals and take action intended to lead to those goals. This inability is seen as part of the overall irrationality that makes it difficult for Japanese to think causally and see events in terms of means and ends. The argument is made that the Japanese mind is taught to think in a very restricted human nexus, the focus of which is the family, and is unable to extend his vision beyond these bounds.¹⁹² Goals are collectively established and correct methods of goal achievement are traditionally defined.

This is the argument often used to account for the authoritarian governments Japan experienced in the thirties and forties. The identification with the smaller human nexus of the family or community, and behaviors coincident with family and community-established goals was thought to have

been transferred to the larger community of Japan. Deference to the Japanese military state was thought to be "natural" because the Japanese were conditioned by tradition, and therefore by preference, to pursuing goals established by dominant group personalities. They are thought to be uncritical of goals established through the group process because of their own inclination to accentuate their personal social nexus. They are, according to Nakamura, "lacking in the radical spirit of confrontation and criticism."¹⁹³

If they do establish personal identities of their own, including goals for personal achievement, they are always subordinated to the goals of the group, according to this perspective. Individual goals and preferences must correctly be buried under a labyrinth of rules of propriety where they can surface only under very unusual circumstances. There is a resultant harmony within the group that is preserved by each member no matter what the personal cost. Each member of the group perceives himself in terms of his relation to a circumscribed society in which self-dedication to a specific human nexus is the most powerful factor in his life.¹⁹⁴

Society is therefore hierarchically structured to emphasize these collectivities and operates according to the values established at the top of the hierarchy. In this fashion Emperor worship is established. The combination of ascription to hierarchical positions and high respect to living persons results in extreme forms of veneration for religious leaders and the Emperor. Japanese tradition

establishes the tie between the Emperor and the gods.

"According to the tales of the gods in the Kohiki (Record of Ancient Matters) after the heavens and the earth were separated, the two divinities Iaqname (female) and Izanagi (male) descended to the island of Onokoro, and then gave birth to the various islands of Oyashima (i.e. the territory of Japan). After that they gave birth to various other divinities; the gods of the wind, of trees and mountains were born, and at the end the goddess died from burns, because she gave birth to the god of fire. Thereupon, the god wanted to meet his spouse, and went to the land of night and saw her. Then, after returning to this world, when he washed the filth from his eyes and nose were born the three divinities Amaterasu Omikami, Tsukiyomo no Mikoto, and Susano no Mikoto. It is said that this Amaterasu Omikami (Sun Goddess), was the ancestor of the Imperial House. In this way the legend of the ancestors of the Royal House is connected with the legend of the creation of the universe. This account is without parallel among other nations."195.

The tradition established the Emperor at the top of the hierarchy and created an ordering system thru which goals could be established for the entire community. It created rank from the Emperor to the bottom in which the individual could not express or pursue preferences of his own. By the time the process of decision-making works its way through to the bottom of the hierarchy few will be in a position to establish goals of their own. The argument is that since

this was the traditional experience of Japanese people there is still an inability to establish goals individually, if from no other cause, from lack of experience. From this limited world-view, the priorities of behaviors established within the family, the lord-and-vassal relationship, the clan, the state, and even world-religions took preference over individual judgments. On this basis the Japanese are thought to lack the ability as well as the inclination to establish personal goals in terms of some universal value system or even in terms of their own mundane preferences and needs.

In Nakamura's view, "Scarcely any thought has been given to any universal external law which every man should follow beyond the confines of this limited human nexus."¹⁹⁶ In general Japanese can be expected, according to this view, to devote themselves to those social relations and actions "which form the basis of mutual understanding and loyalties to the family, clan, and nation."¹⁹⁷ Upon this limited basis of human action no attempt is made to make each man's understanding and expression universal or logical, and so "the thinking of most Japanese tends to be intuitive and emotional."¹⁹⁸

In summary, Japanese are seen by many observers as irrational in their world-view. This is defined as meaning that they are emotional and intuitive in their thinking, illogical, unable to think causally, oriented to non-functional collectivities by tradition, unable to establish or achieve personal goals, unable to weigh means and ends, and disinclined to abstract thinking.

The Survey Results

Survey data gathered in the national character study shows an attitude profile of "middle-class" Japanese unlike that described by observers applying the "historically determined present-day Japan model."¹⁹⁹ An attitudinal profile of a middle class Japanese, based on this data, shows him to be rational according to Western standards of rationality. He is confident in his own opinions. He weighs evidence and makes judgments about a wide variety of personal and public matters. He is goal-oriented in his aspirations, able to think conceptually, and conscious of the value of minimizing costs to achieve desired ends. He has faith in the merit of his own convictions, is willing to pursue personal goals when they contradict convention, and has faith in technology and man's ability to control nature for productive purposes. He is pragmatic in his occupational and educational choices and in his child-rearing preferences. He is conscious of both individual and public needs and unlikely to believe in a religion. He still has faith, however, in a basic "religious attitude" as a desirable personal trait.

These characteristics occur within a wide strata of the Japanese population but are especially prevalent within certain occupational, educational, and age groups. Although the hypothesis of the industrial culture posits urbanization as an important variable, much less difference appeared in the data between urban and rural residents of the same educational, occupational, and age groups than was anticipated.

Similar results were found in the five nations of the Almond-Verba study in a recent examination of that data.²⁰⁰ Their results were supported in this survey. Of the variables generally thought most useful in predicting attitude changes from traditional-ascriptive ones to participant-activist ones, urbanization proved to have the least saliency in this study. The variables with the highest saliencies were occupational, educational, and age, differences. There are a number of possible explanations.

In Japan there is increasingly less difference in the life-styles of urban and rural people, with the exception of village and hamlet farmers, partly because of the universal population pressure on limited space and partly because urbanization, in one form or another, has spread to all but the most remote area of the islands. Japan is unique, among industrial nations, in its extreme population density. This overcrowding has blurred some of the lines that provide sharp contrasts and distinctions in life styles in other industrial nations. It has reached a saturation point in which populations reside in only two different demographic situations: vast metropolitan urban areas and rural, mechanized, and industrialized agricultural areas. In this sense the impact of urbanization on attitudes of members of the community might be much less than a society entering the economic take-off or even one coming into the stage of diffusion.²⁰¹

Perhaps the first characteristic necessary to establish a basic rationality profile has to do with a person's ability

to make judgments, weigh alternatives, and choose personal goals. Several questions in the National Character Survey were designed to test Japanese people's willingness and ability to make personal choices or judgments on important public and private questions and to maintain their choices when in conflict with traditionally prescribed patterns of behavior. The extent to which Japanese people consciously establish personal goals and pursue goal-oriented behavior can be taken as indicators of their rationality.

When asked the question, "If you are convinced that you are right, do you think you should go ahead even if it is contrary to convention or do you think it would be safer to follow convention?" thirty-one percent of the sample chose the "follow convention" alternative. They came from socioeconomic situations characterized by middle and elementary school educational levels, manual, farm, day-labor, and non-professional work. They were over-represented by the old and by women. They believed in a religion more than the total population, were less likely to identify with a political party, and represented urban as well as rural areas in about equal proportions. (Table IV-A)

Those sixty-five percent of the population choosing either "go ahead if you feel you are right," or "depends on the situation," are preponderantly from the younger, well-educated, professional and skilled workers, and male strata of the population. It is conclusive that those citing "don't know" or unable to make a judgment represent only two percent

of the total sample; that is only fifty-seven of two thousand six hundred and ninety-six respondents. Those answering "don't know" were predominantly the elderly, poorly educated, and unskilled or unemployed strata of the population. The median percentage of "don't know" respondents throughout all seventy-one questions in the survey was six percent, a very small average number of persons undecided or unable to make determinations. The belief in some scholarly circles that Japanese are unwilling to make public their preferences on public as well as private issues was not born out in the survey. There was an especially small percentage, probably not greater than most public surveys taken in the United States, of persons unable or unwilling to make choices in response to the interviewers. The evidence from the survey is that Japanese people can and do make choices.

Housewives ranked higher in the scale of preferences for convention rather than individual assertiveness, ahead of other occupational groups including blue and white collar workers, and day-laborers. The housewife seems less "rational," according to the criteria of the establishment and pursuit of personal goals, probably because she has historically been denied a meaningful opportunity to participate in the educational process, or to be involved in making and pursuing family goals. This pattern seems to be changing.

When the variable of occupation is held constant and factored for age, younger housewives seem more similar to their male age-peers in their attitudes than older housewives.

TABLE IV-A

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND
AND DESIRE TO FOLLOW CONVENTION
(in percentages)

	RESPONSE CHOICES				TOTAL %	TOTAL N
	Go Ahead	Follow Convention	Depends on Situation	Don't Know		
Sex						
Male	46	24	28	2	100	1251
Female	34	38	24	4	100	1445
$X^2 = 33.19$ df = 1 P < .0001 G = .22						
Age						
20-30	43	25	30	2	100	696
31-45	42	28	26	4	100	973
46-60	35	37	22	6	100	643
60+	37	41	16	6	100	384
$X^2 = 20.95$ df = 4 P < .02 G = .05						
Education (completed)						
Low school	31	46	16	7	100	562
Med school	42	33	23	2	100	1102
Hi school	40	25	34	1	100	794
College	49	17	32	2	100	238
$X^2 = 22.68$ df = 3 P < .0001 G = -.10						
Occupation						
Housewife	35	36	25	4	100	647
Student	42	16	42	0	100	19
Professional- Managerial	46	20	29	5	100	407
Factory - Blue Collar	47	26	24	3	100	409
Factory - White Collar	43	22	34	1	100	281
Farm & fishermen	35	39	23	3	100	522
Day-laborer	58	30	9	3	100	43
Unemployed	37	40	16	6	100	311
$X^2 = 34.14$ df = 7 P < .0002 L = .011						
City-Size						
Six largest	37	31	31	1	100	433
200,000+	35	33	31	1	100	334
100,000+	36	32	29	3	100	286
50,000+	40	29	26	5	100	307
< 50,000	44	35	18	3	100	310
Town, Village	42	31	23	4	100	1026
$X^2 = 13.93$ df = 5 P < .01 G = -.08						

Housewives in the twenty to thirty age group chose the "go ahead if you feel you are right" category by thirty-six percent while the older group (forty-five and older) chose the same category by only twenty-seven percent. (Table IV-B)

When the occupation variable is held constant and factored by community size, no patterns of variation occur, indicating that suburban and rural housewives are subject to much the same attitude conditioners as their urban counterparts. (Table IV-C)

Age, although an important factor, was less useful as an explanatory variable than occupation and education. Although forty-one percent of the over sixty group chose the "follow convention" alternative, and only twenty-five percent of the under thirty group chose the same category, the occupational category produced greater distances with a low of eleven percent of the professional people choosing the "follow convention" alternative to a high of sixty-four percent for farm laborers.

The small variation of urban and rural housewives' responses was not predicted. In a scale of city-size ranging from the six largest cities to villages of fewer than twenty-thousand the differences from the top to the bottom of the scale in housewives' choice of "follow convention" were only three percent. It is apparent that the age variable in the rational orientation scale for women is more important than urban and rural differences. Only recently have women, urban or rural, been exposed to educational and occupational

TABLE IV-B

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HOUSEWIVE'S DESIRE TO
FOLLOW CONVENTION AND AGE
(in percentages)

	RESPONSE CHOICES				TOTAL %	N
	Go Ahead	Follow Convention	Depends on Situation	Don't Know		
Age						
20-30	36	37	25	2	100	165
31-45	37	32	28	3	100	346
46-60	30	42	23	5	100	159
60+	27	51	12	10	100	121

TABLE IV-C

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HOUSEWIVE'S DESIRE TO
FOLLOW CONVENTION AND CITY-SIZE
(in percentages)

	RESPONSE CHOICES				TOTAL %	N
	Go Ahead	Follow Convention	Depends on Situation	Don't Know		
City-Size						
Six largest	29	36	33	2	100	141
200,000+	31	37	30	2	100	85
100,000+	31	39	25	5	100	88
50,000+	35	30	32	3	100	76
<50,000	39	43	15	3	100	71
Town, Village	40	33	18	9	100	186

situations comparable to those available to men.

A well-established characteristic of the traditional Japanese value system was deference to authority. Deference in all interpersonal relations provided the harmony that occurred between inferiors and superiors in the different status roles they played within the community. Deference to the opinions and judgments of elders, family and clan leaders, heads of households, and political and religious leaders was demanded of all members of the community. An intellectual servility was created that prevented people from upholding their personal convictions, or even voicing them because of the possibility that they might conflict with those opinions of some other person to whom deference was owed.

A person's well-being, and even personal and family security depended heavily on constant vigilance to maintain proper deference to authority and station. In this scheme of things the spoken word, out of its proper context, was as important as any physical act of an improper nature. It can be considered an important change in the traditional Japanese character if Japanese are now willing to voice and uphold personal convictions in spite of the effects of those actions on others in a higher status position. It is also characteristic of rationality to hold and voice convictions on important public and private matters.

Respondents in the survey were asked, "Suppose someone is convinced that he is right about something and no matter how he explains himself to people, they refuse to listen to him, which of these two do you think is better? 1) The

person who goes ahead in spite of opposition or 2) the person who gives up when he finds himself opposed?" Fifty-nine percent of the total responded with the first choice. (Table IV-D) The respondents choosing the "give-up" category were, in the main, lower class people. Fifty-two percent of those with only an elementary education advocated deference to authority, and only thirty-seven percent of college educated people were similarly inclined. Forty-seven percent of day-laborers and forty-five percent of farmers advocated deference to authority, and fewer than twenty-five percent of professional, managerial, and office people advocated this position. Only ten percent of college students were so inclined. The differences according to sex and community size were not statistically significant. The most important variables, on the basis of this sample of the population, in formulating new perspectives emphasizing individual judgment, rather than absolute deference, seem to be occupational and educational experience. (Table IV-D)

A further characteristic of traditional Japan ascribed to modern Japanese has to do with the relation of man and nature. In traditional Japan, as in most traditional societies, there was a fatalism that characterized the acts of nature as they related to the lives of the people. The forces of nature were seen as omnipotent, unchangeable, and out of the realm of human understanding. People stoically accepted the acts of nature, malevolent as well as benevolent, as ordered and unchangeable, by human direction.

A mark of a rational man is the holding of opinions, and

TABLE IV-D

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND
AND BELIEF THAT INDIVIDUALS SHOULD UPHOLD THEIR CONVICTIONS
(in percentages)

	RESPONSE CHOICES			TOTAL % N
	Go Ahead in Spite of Opposition	Give Up to Opposition		
Sex				
Male	59	41	100	1190
Female	58	42	100	1322
$\chi^2 = .259$ df = 1 P < .6102 G = .02				
Age				
20-30	63	37	100	670
31-45	60	40	100	916
46-60	55	45	100	599
60+	53	47	100	332
$\chi^2 = 28.23$ df = 4 P < .0004 G = .10				
Education (completed)				
Low school	48	52	100	491
Med school	60	40	100	1028
Hi school	63	37	100	761
College	63	37	100	212
$\chi^2 = 30.38$ df = 3 P < .0001 G = -.15				
Occupation				
Housewife	60	40	100	608
Student	90	10	100	19
Professional- Managerial	75	25	100	401
Factory - Blue Collar	61	39	100	469
Factory - White Collar	68	32	100	281
Farm & fishermen	55	45	100	375
Day-laborer	53	47	100	40
Unemployed	53	47	100	270
$\chi^2 = 15.11$ df = 7 P < .03 L = .001				
City-Size				
Six largest	54	46	100	421
200,000+	57	43	100	322
100,000+	59	41	100	268
50,000+	63	37	100	277
< 50,000	62	38	100	286
Town, Village	57	43	100	938
$\chi^2 = 7.02$ df = 5 P < .2189 G = .03				

also the belief that through his endeavor personal goals and objectives can be realized. The belief in man's ability to use nature in his own behalf is an important part of the perspective of rationality expected in industrial societies. Respondents in the National Character Survey were queried respecting their attitude toward nature and its relationship to man.

They were asked the following question, "There are the following opinions concerning the relation of man and nature. Please choose the one on the list that you think is closest to the truth, to reality. 1) In order to be happy man must submit to nature; 2) In order to be happy man must use nature; 3) In order to be happy man must conquer nature." More than seventy percent of the respondents chose the last two alternatives, believing that man must either use or conquer nature to be happy. (Table IV-E)

A note here on the use of the word "happy." The Japanese adjective connotes more than a feeling of happiness as conveyed in the English word "happy." It includes a sense of completeness, satisfaction, or accomplishment. The most significant variables for positive correlation to this response were education, occupation, and age. The differences in community size were not significant statistically and the differences in sex were small, tending to be more closely correlated with the occupations of women than their sex.

Only forty-eight percent of those questioned in the low educational group chose the "conquer" and "use" categories,

TABLE IV-E

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND
AND ATTITUDE TOWARD NATURE
(in percentages)

	RESPONSE CHOICES				TOTAL % N
	Man Must Submit to Nature	Man Must Use Nature	Man Must Conquer Nature	Don't Know	
Sex					
Male	15	45	33	7	100 1251
Female	22	35	29	14	100 1445
$X^2 = 75.38$ df = 1 P < .0001 G = .007					
Age					
20-30	14	42	38	6	100 696
31-45	16	44	31	9	100 953
46-60	25	39	24	12	100 643
60+	25	26	23	26	100 384
$X^2 = 22.3$ df = 3 P < .0001 G = .009					
Education (completed)					
Low school	25	30	18	27	100 562
Med school	20	40	32	8	100 1102
Hi school	14	44	36	6	100 794
College	11	51	33	5	100 218
$X^2 = 32.3$ df = 3 P < .0001 G = .018					
Occupation					
Housewife	21	37	30	12	100 647
Student	0	63	37	0	100 19
Professional- Managerial	13	47	31	9	100 407
Factory - Blue Collar	16	37	36	11	100 409
Factory - White Collar	14	50	34	2	100 281
Farm & fishermen	19	44	25	12	100 522
Day-laborer	30	25	32	13	100 43
Unemployed	24	26	25	25	100 311
$X^2 = 23.5$ df = 7 P < .0001 L = .003					
City-Size					
Six largest	18	46	30	6	100 433
200,000+	19	36	36	9	100 334
100,000+	18	34	35	13	100 286
50,000+	21	37	30	12	100 307
<50,000	20	40	31	9	100 310
Town, Village	19	41	28	12	100 1026
$X^2 = 47.48$ df = 5 P < .0001 G = .021					

but eighty and eighty-four percent of the high school and college educated felt they had control over natural forces that affected their lives. The occupational differences ranged from one hundred percent of students, eighty to ninety percent of professional and managerial people, and seventy-five percent of factory workers expressing a belief in man's ability to control nature to only fifty-five to sixty percent for the farm and day-labor respondents.

The age variable was very significant with only forty-nine percent of those over sixty expressing confidence in man's ability to control nature and ninety-two percent of those under twenty-five holding the same opinion. The differences by city-size were negligible. The mean percentage in all six categories was 18.8 with a standard deviation of only 1.6 in the category of necessity to submit to nature. The hypothesis of significant differences in attitudes based only upon urban-rural differences is not born out by the data. Occupations, levels of education, and age are the significant variables in determining the extent of evaluative orientations held by Japanese respondents in this survey.

Other social scientists doing survey research have found similar patterns of attitudes. John W. Bennett's research in Japan led him to the conclusion that a primary concern of many Japanese is betterment of the living conditions of all members of the community through a strong and viable economy. He concludes that, "From an historical standpoint it is our view that the 'modernization without Westernization' theory

of change really applied to a particular period or to a transitional phase in the change process. Whether or not one wishes to explore the meaning of the term 'Westernization,' it would seem on the basis of various indices of change in contemporary Japan that feudal-familial forms of social structure are changing, and the macroscopic social patterns are rapidly shifting toward those associated with high industrialization and urbanization elsewhere in the world."²⁰² There is a feeling within what he calls the "middle class consisting of white-collar, managerial, and professional groups," of the desirability and need for personal advancement through competition in the market.²⁰³

Part of the change from total respect for superiors and status positions, from absolute deference to authority, is a new mobility of class and economic position. It occurs when personal financial gain and status achieved through individual merit are accepted as legitimate goals for all members of the society, not just a privileged few. Concern has shifted away from maintenance of position irrespective of personal cost to a concern for progress through competition and status through consumption.²⁰⁴ The "middle-class" attitude has become, in Bennett's view, a "national" mood. He argues that, "Along with this shift in power has gone a change in the national mood; Japanese concern for the traditional culture, the 'Japanese Spirit,' or national prestige in the Imperialistic sense has given way to an emphasis on progress and the health of the national economy."²⁰⁵

I am not arguing that no deference is paid to authority and position, both within the family and the community, but that it now takes a functional rather than a ceremonial significance. In traditional Japan, and in modern Japan in the view of many observers, deference to position and careful maintenance of personal station was necessary to maintain social and political institutions in a state of harmony and unity. All conflicts were avoided by absolute deference to decision-makers ranked in hierarchical order on even the most minute of personal decisions.

The right to make decisions was earned through patience and servility. Decision-makers had to climb the ladder and earn the right to control the lives of others through an apprenticeship of subservience. These outward forms of deference still remain; now they have a new significance. Their primary purpose is functional; they are used as indications of earned respect, not traditional obligation. Deference is now accorded on the basis of principles of merit rather than simply station.²⁰⁶ Obligations are kept because of mutual benefits received. Reciprocity is now the principle because of the advantage to be gained. One is allowed to establish personal goals and pursue them and he is obligated to himself to do so. To fail to do so is not just a cause of personal loss, but also of loss to the community.²⁰⁷

One of the most widely reported phenomena in Japan in recent years has been the upsurge in membership in "new" or "modern" religions. The rapid growth of the "Soka Gakkai," of the Nichiren Sect of Buddhism, and of other smaller,

less well-known religious organizations has prompted a belief that Japanese response to the conflict and tension of industrial society has been a retreat to the security offered by traditional religion.²⁰⁸ The rapid numerical growth of the Sokka Gakkai has been well-documented, but the attitudes toward religious dogma and practices of its new members has been less well explored.

There has been an assumption made, not supported by survey evidence, that a desire for membership in a very old and established sect of traditional Buddhism could be equated with a nostalgia for the pre-industrial life styles of traditional Japan. As is the case in many other industrial societies, the reasons for membership in religious organizations are diverse and often not related to belief in dogma or supernatural practices. A rational perspective demands non-dogmatic thinking. It requires open, inquiring minds on ultimate questions. The nature of the attitudes of Japanese people toward religious organizations is therefore more important as an indication of their rationality than just membership in a particular sect or group.

When the respondents to the National Character Survey were asked if they believe in a religion more than sixty-nine percent responded negatively. (Table IV-F) However, when asked the question, "Well, wholly apart from any of the established religions, would you say that a religious sentiment, a religious attitude is important or not?" eighty-three percent indicated a belief that a religious attitude was

TABLE IV-F

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND
AND BELIEF IN A RELIGION
(in percentages)

	RESPONSE CHOICES		TOTAL	
	Believe	Do Not Believe	%	N
Sex				
Male	28	72	100	1251
Female	33	67	100	1445
$\chi^2 = 9.214$ df = 1 P < .001 G = -.10				
Age				
20-30	12	88	100	696
31-45	25	75	100	953
46-60	44	56	100	643
60+	56	44	100	384
$\chi^2 = 334.885$ df = 3 P < .0001 G = -.46				
Education (completed)				
Low school	45	55	100	562
Med school	30	70	100	1102
Hi school	24	76	100	794
College	22	78	100	218
$\chi^2 = 107.616$ df = 3 P < .0001 G = .27				
Occupation				
Housewife	37	63	100	647
Student	5	95	100	19
Professional- Managerial	29	71	100	407
Factory - Blue Collar	18	82	100	409
Factory - White Collar	19	81	100	281
Farm & fishermen	38	62	100	522
Day-laborer	30	70	100	43
Unemployed	48	52	100	311
$\chi^2 = 168.033$ df = 7 P < .0001 L = .0001				
City-Size				
Six largest	29	71	100	433
200,000+	34	66	100	334
100,000+	30	70	100	286
50,000+	30	70	100	307
<50,000	33	67	100	310
Town, Village	30	70	100	1026
$\chi^2 = 12.428$ df = 5 P < .04 G = .012				

important. (Table IV-G) The key variables in religious belief in the sample were age, sex, occupation, and education. Forty-five percent of the lowest educational group expressed belief in religion, but only twenty-two percent of those with college educations were so disposed. (Table IV-F) Of the remaining respondents only forty-one percent of the low educational group expressed a belief that a religious sentiment was important, and seventy-two percent of college graduates held a belief in a religious posture. (Table IV-G)

On the occupational scale a high of thirty-eight percent of farmers expressed a belief in a religion and a low of five percent for students. Housewives and unemployed both ranked well above the sample average with respectively thirty-seven and forty-eight percent professing a belief in a religion. Women had a higher percentage as a group than men and the old were markedly higher in professed religious belief than the young. Only seven percent of young people in the below twenty-four age category expressed a belief in religion, and fifty-six percent of those over sixty were so inclined. There were almost no differences accountable to city size. In all six categories the difference ranged only between twenty-nine and thirty-three percent, a non-significant statistical index.

Those who believe a religious attitude is important span the remaining age, occupational, and sex groups within a narrow range of deviation. Thus it seems accurate to say that for the Japanese in general membership in a religion

TABLE IV-G

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND
AND BELIEF THAT A RELIGIOUS ATTITUDE IS IMPORTANT
(in percentages)

	RESPONSE CHOICES			TOTAL %	TOTAL N
	Is Important	Is Not	Don't Know		
Sex					
Male	83	10	7	100	1251
Female	85	8	7	100	1445
X ² = 12.655 df = 1 P < .0001 G = -.088					
Age					
20-30	70	20	10	100	602
31-45	80	11	9	100	732
46-60	84	7	9	100	358
60+	79	10	11	100	171
X ² = 49.141 df = 3 P < .0001 G = -.16					
Education (completed)					
Low school	87	7	6	100	562
Med school	84	9	7	100	1102
Hi school	82	10	8	100	794
College	85	8	7	100	218
X ² = 100.011 df = 3 P < .0001 G = .163					
Occupation					
Housewife	82	8	10	100	647
Student	74	11	15	100	19
Professional- Managerial	83	8	9	100	407
Factory - Blue Collar	82	13	5	100	409
Factory - White Collar	80	12	8	100	281
Farm & fishermen	90	6	4	100	522
Day-laborer	81	12	7	100	43
Unemployed	88	6	6	100	311
X ² = 191.001 df = 7 P < .0001 L = .007					
City-Size					
Six largest	86	6	8	100	433
200,000+	83	10	7	100	334
100,000+	86	7	7	100	286
50,000+	86	6	8	100	307
<50,000	83	12	5	100	310
Town, Village	86	9	5	100	1026
X ² = 29.663 df = 5 P < .0001 G = .008					

is thought of more in terms of its humanism, as a kind of life-style, than as a set of dogma that guides everyday action. Although this generalization is valid for the entire sample, it is particularly characteristic of those in the middle-class occupational groups, among the well-educated and college students, and particularly among the young.

A great deal is said, however, about the apparent devotion of many Japanese to daily religious exercise. A common practice among Japanese is the calling of deceased relatives by making recurring sounds created by pounding two wood sticks together. The practice is most widespread among the elderly but is still practiced by some among the young. Anyone who has visited Japan will attest to the widespread nature of the practice. It is a very common experience to walk down residential streets, housing even the very well-to-do, in the late evening hours and hear the incessant pounding of the sticks to signal ancestors for whom small particles of food and other gifts are placed at small family alters. The important questions that must be asked concerning the practice are the meaning that is imparted by the person engaging in the exercise and the "economic situations" of those most primarily engaged.

The respondents were asked, to determine the extent of their religious activity, "What do you do? What is your degree of religious participation?" Less than one percent, or twenty-two respondents indicated that they "Go so far as to encourage religion in others," and three-hundred and

seventy or thirty-seven percent of the "believe in religion" respondents indicated that they had "no participation whatsoever." (Table IV-H) Those who did participate daily were mainly elderly women with little or no education who had been housewives and were at the time of the survey resident members of the household of an offspring. One of the reasons for their preoccupation with religious ceremonies might be that they are closer to the age of death than the rest of the population sampled. Another would be the amount of leisure time afforded to these "obasans" (old women and grandmothers) because of their peculiar situations in the household.

A belief that has carried over from the traditional Japanese is the obligation the young feel for the old of the immediate family. Almost without exception the elderly, whatever the economic situation of the children's households, are cared for by their children. Most households are composed of a family unit of mother, father, and children, plus a grandmother and grandfather or two. There is therefore a surplus of labor for menial tasks in the household and the elderly are usually afforded a great deal of leisure time. These factors, and the unique socialization process that occurred in the period when the aged were young, account for their unusually high level of religious participation. There is no concomitant level of belief or participation in any other segment of the sample.

There is also some incidence of "non-rational" behavior among middle-class persons in the religious side of their

TABLE IV-H

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND
AND RELIGIOUS PARTICIPATION
(in percentages)

	RESPONSE CHOICES				TOTAL % N
	Encourage Religion in Others	Participate Daily	Middling Ordinary	No Part	
Sex					
Male	1	8	5	86	100 1251
Female	1	11	7	81	100 1445
$\chi^2 = 12.126$	df = 1	P < .001	G = .083		
Age					
20-30	1	4	2	93	100 696
31-45	1	7	3	89	100 953
46-60	1	11	6	82	100 643
60+	1	26	6	68	100 384
$\chi^2 = 45.800$	df = 3	P < .0001	G = .080		
Education (completed)					
Low school	1	18	9	72	100 562
Med school	1	9	7	83	100 1102
Hi school	1	6	4	89	100 794
College	1	3	5	91	100 218
$\chi^2 = 134.037$	df = 3	P < .0001	G = .217		
Occupation					
Housewife	1	9	8	82	100 647
Student	-	-	-	100	100 19
Professional- Managerial	2	6	5	87	100 407
Factory - Blue Collar	1	5	2	92	100 409
Factory-White Collar	2	4	2	92	100 281
Farm & fishermen	1	10	8	81	100 522
Day-laborer	-	5	7	88	100 43
Unemployed	1	19	8	72	100 311
$\chi^2 = 221.025$	df = 7	P < .0001	L = .001		
City-Size					
Six largest	1	7	6	86	100 433
200,000+	-	14	7	79	100 334
100,000+	2	7	2	89	100 286
50,000+	1	10	7	82	100 307
<50,000	1	11	7	81	100 310
Town, Village	1	9	6	84	100 1026
$\chi^2 = 43.46$	df = 5	P < .001	G = -.08		

lives. Even middle-class professional people are likely to engage in religious practices that make little sense within the context of other aspects of their lives. Examples are the deference paid to religious leaders, trips to religious shrines, rituals associated with marriage, birth, and death, and other religious holidays and festivals.

The meaning attached to these acts is the important consideration. If they are done as part of a regular religious posture and seen as determinants of significant behavior patterns that is one thing. If, on the other hand, they are seen as primarily recreational, or as signs of respect rather than obligation, or as simply unimportant leisure acts, then they cannot be posited as determinants of attitudes critical for social and political behaviors. For example, bank presidents, university professors, and medical doctors may all walk around rather than under ladders, may carry rabbit's feet, or read a daily horoscope. But they do not determine surgical procedures, discount policies, or research methodologies based upon these "charms." They are only nuances of behaviors not critical to their life styles. If they did use these methods for determining their work habits and practices they could be considered "non-rational." The same is true of Japanese in many instances. The annual trip to the shrine, the recitation of prayers during subway rides, and the purchase of small family shrines can be seen as actions comparable to carrying rabbit's feet, reading horoscopes, or avoiding black cats.

Much has been written about the hypothesized link between rationality, individual self-interest, and democratic values. Often this association is also made with capitalistic values. I am not willing to push this thesis very far because it has a number of obvious limitations, including the difficulty of assigning uniform meanings to abstract concepts. However, a general commitment to values believed by respondents in the survey to be associated with their own conceptions of democracy or capitalism, liberalism or socialism, has some limited significance.

Two widely associated concepts of liberalism and democracy are reason and welfare.²⁰⁹ The hypothesis is made that reasonable men demand political and social institutions that satisfy basic human needs or at a minimum provide the opportunity for these needs to be met. Belief in and demand for basic welfare functions to be performed by political institutions is thought to be a characteristic of rational man.²¹⁰ I would add here that reasonable man might demand these services within the context of a wide variety of political institutions, including those that have classically been defined as democratic and socialistic. There is not necessarily any commonality of institutions preferred, only of services. Similar services performed by divergent institutions satisfy the demand for welfare programs in this theory.

In Japan there is a growing agreement that individual worth ought to be determined by the merit principle through competition. There is also, however, a belief that this

ought to be done through institutions that provide at least a minimum level of well-being to all members of the community irrespective of individual abilities to compete. Much of the literature of comparative politics in recent years has stressed the basic compatibility of historically transmitted collectivity orientations and welfare policies of modern governments. These orientations are seen as supports for rapid and efficient industrialization.²¹¹ Perhaps one of the traditional values that has carried over, albeit in new contexts, is the collectivity orientation among many Japanese. The traditional values associated with social group harmony and the new emphasis on individual initiative have created the conditions in which the welfare of all depends on the initiative of each. Japanese people do not seem to be willing to have the principle of individual initiative replace the principle of group welfare.

When asked to make choices in hypothetical situations when individual rights and public welfare conflicted only twenty-nine percent of the respondents to the National Character Survey felt the public welfare should be sacrificed. (Table IV-I) They were asked the following question, "There are the following opinions, but which would you agree with?" "Of Course, it would probably differ depending on the case and on the degree, but generally speaking which do you think ought to be stressed: A) In order to give recognition to the individuals' rights, it cannot be helped if the public welfare at times is sacrificed, or B) For the sake of the public

TABLE IV-I

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND
AND OPINION ON INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND PUBLIC WELFARE
(in percentages)

	RESPONSE CHOICES		TOTAL %	N
	Public Welfare Should Be Sacrificed	Individual Rights Should Be Sacrificed		
Sex				
Male	32	69	100	1163
Female	38	62	100	1195
$\chi^2 = 9.95$ df = 1 P < .001 G = .13				
Age				
20-30	40	60	100	641
31-45	38	62	100	872
46-60	30	70	100	558
60+	28	72	100	287
$\chi^2 = 39.37$ df = 8 P < .0001 G = -.15				
Education (completed)				
Low school	37	63	100	406
Med school	35	65	100	964
Hi school	35	65	100	756
College	27	73	100	214
$\chi^2 = 6.40$ df = 3 P < .09 G = -.05				
Occupation				
Housewife	40	60	100	547
Student	42	58	100	19
Professional- Managerial	28	72	100	391
Factory - Blue Collar	43	57	100	191
Factory - White Collar	41	59	100	181
Farm & Fishermen	27	73	100	356
Day-laborer	34	66	100	38
Unemployed	30	70	100	238
$\chi^2 = 45.45$ df = 7 P < .0001 L = .001				
City-Size				
Six largest	38	62	100	409
200,000+	34	66	100	301
100,000+	32	68	100	257
50,000+	35	65	100	252
<50,000	36	64	100	269
Town, Village	33	67	100	870
$\chi^2 = 4.20$ df = 5 P < .52 G = -.04				

welfare, it cannot be helped if the individuals rights are sometimes sacrificed." More than fifty-seven percent of all respondents felt that when the two were in conflict individual rights should be sacrificed. (Table IV-I)

The variation by socio-economic index is greatest in terms of education, occupation, age, and sex, with no significant difference according to city-size. There was a high of seventy-two percent among those over sixty stressing group welfare to a low of fifty-five percent for those under twenty-five. All age groups were strongly in favor of the general welfare orientation, but there was also a tendency for the inclination to decrease with the young. Males and highly educated people were most likely to choose the public welfare category.

Very interesting breakdowns occurred in the occupational variable. Those who owned their own businesses, or were managers or entrepreneurs in large firms stressed the community welfare just as strongly as did those in the farm category. The managers were the highest occupational group, with more than seventy-two percent emphasizing community welfare. Part of the explanation for this is a carry-over of attitudes of paternalism that characterize the Japanese form of capitalism. The "unique" attitudes associated with employee-employer relationships in Japan has been the subject of extensive observation.²¹² I will discuss the nature of mutual obligation assumed in the employee-employer relationship in the next chapter. There is corroboration in the data of the thesis

of a correlation between industrialization and concern for public welfare. This attitude of concern in traditional Japan stretched no further than family or village boundaries, and welfare of the lower classes was certainly not a matter of concern for any but those in the immediate family. The industrialization process seems to have been the stimulus for extending this principle beyond its former bounds to a social nexus emphasizing all members of the national community.

At the same time there is concern that the industrialization process will depersonalize inter-human relations and that human feelings will be destroyed in the drive for modernity. Although science and technology are seen as instruments of economic and social advance, there is also concern that these forces will create the conditions in which human feelings diminish. Respondents were asked the following question, "There is the opinion that as science and technology develop, life becomes more convenient but human feelings decrease. Would you agree with this or disagree?" Given three response choices, agree, disagree, or can't generalize, those with higher educational achievement, professional and white-collar occupations, and college students average more than forty-percent who feel that human feelings do decrease. Only twenty-two percent of the total sample indicated a belief that human feelings are not decreasing. The concern with anomie, with the depersonalization process associated with high levels of industrialization, seems to be another common concern in all industrialized societies, capitalist as well as socialist. The data indicates that this concern exists in

almost all strata of Japanese society, but it is greatest in the middle class.

There is further evidence of rationality shown in the patterns of response choices made by the respondents in the survey. An example is the selective process used by respondents in expressing their ideological preferences. The response pattern to questions in the survey eliciting opinions on the questions of the desirability of democratic, liberal, capitalistic, and socialistic values shows careful distinctions being made. There is evidence of a selective process demonstrating abstract and logical thinking. Preferences for welfare, concern for human feelings, and a desire for industrialization are expressed with caution in making choices about institutions most likely to achieve these ends. The commitment to democracy and liberalism is not matched by a similar commitment to capitalism.

In four questions in which the respondents were asked their feelings on capitalism, democracy, liberalism, and socialism, the most frequently chosen response was "depends on the circumstances." (Tables IV-K, IV-L, IV-M, IV-N) However, almost forty percent of the respondents felt democracy was "good" while a maximum of twenty-four percent were willing to say the same about any of the remaining three concepts. The number expressing the feeling that democracy was "not good" was three percent. Sixteen percent chose the same category for capitalism. Fifteen percent of the sample felt socialism was "good" while forty percent withheld judgment on all four

TABLE IV-J

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND
AND OPINION ON TECHNOLOGY AND HUMAN FEELINGS
(in percentages)

	RESPONSE CHOICES			TOTAL %	N
	Human Feelings Decrease	Human Feelings Do Not Decrease	Can'T Generalize		
Sex					
Male	39	24	37	100	1251
Female	37	21	42	100	1445
$\chi^2 = 31.513$ df = 1 P < .005 G = .09					
Age					
20-30	39	24	37	100	696
31-45	37	23	40	100	973
46-60	39	20	41	100	643
60+	38	15	47	100	384
$\chi^2 = 152.367$ G = .072					
Education(completed)					
Low school	36	15	49	100	562
Med school	37	21	42	100	1102
Hi school	39	27	34	100	794
College	43	23	34	100	218
$\chi^2 = 205.777$ G = -.159					
Occupation					
Housewife	37	22	41	100	647
Student	32	42	36	100	19
Professional- Managerial	40	21	39	100	407
Factory - Blue Collar	35	21	44	100	409
Factory - White Collar	44	22	34	100	281
Farm & fishermen	38	22	40	100	522
Day-laborers.	35	12	53	100	43
Unemployed	39	15	46	100	311
$\chi^2 = 178.201$ L = .008					
City-Size					
Six largest	41	28	31	100	433
200,000+	42	23	35	100	334
100,000+	41	21	38	100	286
50,000+	33	22	35	100	307
<50,000	40	14	46	100	310
Town, Village	35	22	43	100	1026
$\chi^2 = 95.906$ G = .114					

concepts depending on the circumstances.

Selective judgment and analytical thinking is evident in all groups, but the most selective groups seem to be those in the middle class economic situations. Only twenty-six percent of those in the lowest educational category felt that democracy is "good," but sixty-five percent of those with a college education, in all age groups, including many of those educated before the occupation, felt democracy was "good." Ten percent of the lowest educational group preferred socialism, and fifteen percent of the college graduates expressed similar feelings.

The lowest educational group had a very strong propensity to choose the "don't know" category in all four questions. The "don't know" in the low education group ranged from twenty-eight percent in the question on democracy to forty-eight percent in the question on socialism. (Tables IV-K, IV-M) "Don't knows" in the college and high school categories ranged from three percent in the question on democracy to nine percent in the question on socialism. It is revealing that such a high percentage of respondents chose the "don't know" category in spite of an alternative choice specifying "depends on the circumstances." The hypothesis that part of being rational is being highly selective in making choices about alternative concepts is born out by the evidence.

Those people with the greatest access to formal educational institutions expressed the highest levels of cognitive and evaluative orientations while those in the lowest educa-

TABLE IV-K

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND
AND OPINION ON DEMOCRACY
(in percentages)

	RESPONSE CHOICES				TOTAL %	TOTAL N
	Good	Depends on Circumstance	Not Good	Don't Know		
Sex						
Male	49	41	3	7	100	1251
Female	28	56	3	13	100	1445
$X^2 = 150.56 \quad G = .369$						
Age						
20-30	44	50	1	5	100	696
31-45	38	51	3	8	100	973
46-60	36	48	3	13	100	643
60+	29	37	6	28	100	384
$X^2 = 229.638 \quad G = .186$						
Education (completed)						
Low school	26	40	5	29	100	562
Med school	34	54	4	8	100	1102
Hi school	43	53	1	3	100	794
College	65	31	1	3	100	218
$X^2 = 389.936 \quad G = -.366$						
Occupation						
Housewife	27	62	1	10	100	647
Student	79	21	-	-	100	19
Professional- Managerial	60	35	1	4	100	407
Factory - Blue Collar	40	49	3	8	100	409
Factory - White Collar	49	46	2	3	100	281
Farm & fishermen	41	41	5	13	100	522
Day-laborer	42	42	5	11	100	43
Unemployed	25	43	5	27	100	311
$X^2 = 341.031 \quad L = .031$						
City-Size						
Six largest	46	46	2	6	100	433
200,000+	37	52	4	7	100	334
100,000+	42	48	2	8	100	286
50,000+	32	52	2	14	100	307
<50,000	37	48	5	10	100	310
Town, Village	35	49	3	13	100	1026

(Variances are not statistically significant)

TABLE IV-L

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND
AND OPINION ON CAPITALISM
(in percentages)

	RESPONSE CHOICES				TOTAL % N
	Good	Depends on Circumstance	Not Good	Don't Know	
Sex					
Male	23	43	19	15	100 1251
Female	15	39	14	32	100 1445
$\chi^2 = 144.328 \quad G = .280$					
Age					
20-30	20	49	14	17	100 696
31-45	17	45	17	21	100 973
46-60	18	35	18	29	100 643
60+	17	27	12	44	100 384
$\chi^2 = 173.966 \quad G = .162$					
Education (completed)					
Low school	12	24	15	49	100 562
Med school	18	42	17	23	100 1102
Hi school	22	50	17	11	100 794
College	28	52	12	8	100 218
$\chi^2 = 371.170 \quad G = -.347$					
Occupation					
Housewife	16	43	14	27	100 647
Student	37	53	10	-	100 19
Professional- Managerial	25	47	18	10	100 407
Factory - Blue Collar	12	47	21	20	100 409
Factory - White Collar	25	51	15	9	100 281
Farm & fishermen	21	32	15	32	100 522
Day-laborer	14	35	26	25	100 43
Unemployed	16	29	10	45	100 311
$\chi^2 = 323.413 \quad L = .016$					
City-Size					
Six largest	27	47	13	13	100 433
200,000+	15	47	16	22	100 334
100,000+	21	42	19	18	100 286
50,000+	12	44	16	28	100 307
<50,000	19	34	21	26	100 310
Town, Village	18	38	16	28	100 1026
$\chi^2 = 99.449 \quad G = .137$					

TABLE IV-M

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND
AND OPINIONS ON SOCIALISM
(in percentages)

	RESPONSE CHOICES				TOTAL %	TOTAL N
	Good	Depends on Circumstance	Not Good	Don't Know		
Sex						
Male	18	42	24	16	100	1251
Female	13	37	17	33	100	1445
$\chi^2 = 134.217$	$G = .246$					
Age						
20-30	16	53	13	18	100	696
31-45	18	44	14	24	100	973
46-60	13	29	29	29	100	643
60+	8	21	30	41	100	384
$\chi^2 = 264.926$	$G = .241$					
Education (completed)						
Low school	10	21	21	48	100	562
Med school	16	37	21	26	100	1102
Hi school	17	53	20	10	100	794
College	16	58	16	10	100	218
$\chi^2 = 341.679$	$G = -.329$					
Occupation						
Housewife	13	41	20	26	100	647
Student	32	37	26	5	100	19
Professional- Managerial	17	49	25	9	100	407
Factory - Blue Collar	25	40	17	18	100	409
Factory - White Collar	12	60	15	13	100	281
Farm & fishermen	11	33	22	34	100	522
Day-laborer	26	26	19	29	100	43
Unemployed	10	28	20	42	100	311
$\chi^2 = 326.559$	$L = .021$					
City-Size						
Six largest	15	49	21	15	100	433
200,000+	14	46	20	20	100	334
100,000+	14	41	25	20	100	286
50,000+	11	36	19	34	100	307
<50,000	18	30	22	30	100	310
Town, Village	16	37	18	29	100	1026
$\chi^2 = 77.40$	$G = .071$					

TABLE IV-N

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND
AND OPINION ON LIBERALISM
(in percentages)

	RESPONSE CHOICES				TOTAL	
	Good	Depends on Circumstance	Not Good	Don't Know	%	N
Sex						
Male	31	42	14	13	100	1251
Female	19	45	11	25	100	1445
	$\chi^2 = 91.663 \quad G = .242$					
Age						
20-30	27	52	9	12	100	696
31-45	25	45	12	18	100	973
46-60	22	40	14	24	100	643
60+	21	27	14	38	100	384
	$\chi^2 = 183.235 \quad G = .181$					
Education (completed)						
Low school	18	27	13	42	100	562
Med school	24	42	14	20	100	1102
Hi school	27	55	10	8	100	794
College	36	48	7	9	100	218
	$\chi^2 = 335.413 \quad G = -.316$					
Occupation						
Housewife	19	50	12	19	100	647
Student	32	63	-	5	100	19
Professional- Managerial	28	46	11	15	100	407
Factory - Blue Collar	28	49	13	10	100	409
Factory - White Collar	30	52	10	8	100	281
Farm & fishermen	26	30	15	29	100	522
Day-laborer	19	28	21	32	100	43
Unemployed	16	32	11	41	100	311
	$\chi^2 = 285.145 \quad L = .010$					
City-Size						
Six largest	30	49	9	12	100	433
200,000+	23	52	11	14	100	334
100,000+	27	43	12	18	100	286
50,000+	14	49	12	25	100	307
<50,000	29	34	14	23	100	310
Town, Village	24	40	14	22	100	1026
	$\chi^2 = 88.334 \quad G = .108$					

tional groups were especially low in cognitive orientations as well as in affective and evaluative ones. Those in the managerial and entrepreneurial classes opted for democracy, again across all age lines, at about a sixty percent rate while withholding judgment on the relative merits of capitalism and socialism as economic systems. Fewer than thirty percent of the managerial class opted for capitalism as a "good" system and less than twenty percent of the same group chose socialism. The highest preference for democracy was expressed by the student group, seventy-nine percent of which preferred it as a "good" system. The student group split evenly, thirty-one percent choosing socialism and thirty-six percent choosing capitalism. Only one student chose the "don't know" category as a response to any of the four questions.

On all four questions women were twice as likely as men to choose the "don't know" category and expressed a significantly higher preference for the "depends on the circumstances" answer to the question. The younger, particularly those under thirty expressed, not surprisingly, a higher preference for democracy than their older occupational counterparts and a nearly comparable preference for socialism. There was also a significant correlation between age and the choice of a "don't know" category.

The breakdown shows that even those who identify with a specific political party preponderantly chose the "depends on the circumstances" alternative. A higher percentage of those identifying themselves as Socialists chose democracy

as a "good" system than those who identified themselves as Liberal Democrats. The Socialists were, however, much more critical of capitalism than of socialism, but all categories of party identification expressed rather uniform preferences for democracy. The most significant differences are in age, occupation, education, and sex, and not party identification. (Tables IV-0, IV-P)

The evidence here does suggest that selective, analytic thinking is occurring and that cognitive levels run high, as would be expected, in those most highly educated and in professional and skilled occupational situations. Those with little mobility and low educational levels - such as the day-laborers, farmers, and the unemployed - evidenced low cognition levels and as a result expressed few affective and evaluative orientations. The hypothesis that analytic thinking, the ability to logically relate concepts and events, and strong evaluative cognitions will most likely occur in populations experiencing physical and mental mobility, with access to a formal educational system, and with "middle-class" occupations, seems to be born out by the evidence. In this regard the Japanese seem to be much like residents of other industrial societies.

One of the methods used extensively by anthropologists and sociologists to determine national character is the attitudes of parents toward child-rearing practices. The perpetuation of traditional child-rearing practices is thought to be a primary condition of socializing the young with

TABLE IV-0

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POLITICAL PARTY PREFERENCE
AND OPINION ON DEMOCRACY
(in percentages)

Party Preference	RESPONSE CHOICES				TOTAL %	N
	Democracy is Good	Depends on Circumstance	Not Good	Don't Know		
Liberal Democrats	40	51	3	6	100	1161
Social Democrats	49	46	4	1	100	80
Socialists	41	51	3	5	100	588
Communists	54	31	15	-	100	13
Koseiren(Sokka Gakkai)	33	48	3	16	100	46
None	34	48	4	14	100	604
$\chi^2 = 252.955 \quad L = .008$						

TABLE IV-P

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POLITICAL PARTY PREFERENCE
AND OPINION ON SOCIALISM
(in percentages)

Party Preference	RESPONSE CHOICES				TOTAL %	N
	Socialism is Good	Depends on Circumstance	Not Good	Don't Know		
Liberal Democrats	8	41	30	21	100	1161
Social Democrats	13	60	20	7	100	80
Socialists	34	42	8	16	100	588
Communists	77	15	-	8	100	13
Koseiren(Sokka Gakkai)	20	30	28	22	100	46
None	10	39	16	35	100	604
$\chi^2 = 538.101 \quad L = .049$						

culture values. This thesis has been used by observers of the Japanese model including, most notably, Ruth Benedict.²¹³ Traditional practices, ranging from swaddling techniques to parental permissiveness in toilet training and bathing, are thought to be processes for transmission of culture traits from one generation to another.

In the instance of the Japanese, children are thought to have authoritarian preferences because of the hierarchical, male-dominated family structure. Japanese children were taught the importance of the family rather than the individual as a social unit and encouraged to judge personal action on the basis of its effects on the family pride, name, and station in the community. The public image rather than the reality of pride and prestige was emphasized. All things not sanctioned by the approval of community elders were kept from public view, including conflict or difference of opinion. Truth was less important than the image of truth. Chastity and virtue were less important than the reputation for virtue and chastity.

One can learn much about the persistence of traditional, "non-rational" beliefs in a society by examining the attitudes of its adult population to child-rearing. If the Japanese maintain a non-rational perspective on inter-personal relations that would in all likelihood be the basis of their child-rearing practices. Several questions were included in the National Character Survey to ascertain the persistence of traditional perspectives on family child-rearing practices.

The respondents were given the following question: "Supposing the child hears somewhere that the teacher at school has done something wrong, and asks the parents about it. If the parents know that this true, do you think it is better to tell the child that it is not true, or do you think it would be better to tell him that it is true?" The question was designed to test persistence of the belief that public face for the teacher and consequently his worth to the children, was more important than confrontation with human frailty in a complex real-life situation. In traditional Japan it would have been most important to protect the child from a belief that any person in a position of influence, such as a teacher, might be guilty of any kind of impropriety.

The respondents in the survey tended to reflect attitudes expected of persons in their economic situations. The better educated, professional people, factory workers, and the young all emphasized the importance of telling the child the truth. The elderly, the low educational achievement groups, and the women more than men, tended to emphasize the importance of protecting the image of the teacher in spite of the necessity to lie to their children. Those in the farm occupational group and the age group over sixty had the most propensity to save face for the teacher while students and college graduates were most likely to emphasize telling the truth to the child. (Table IV-Q)

Summary of Findings on Reason in Japanese Value-Orientations

The evidence presented here seems to indicate that reason

TABLE IV-Q

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND
AND OPINION ON TELLING TRUTH TO CHILDREN
(in percentages)

	RESPONSE CHOICES				TOTAL %	N
	Tell Child it is Not True	Tell Child it is True	Don't Know			
Sex						
Male	29	54	17	100	1251	
Female	35	46	19	100	1445	
$\chi^2 = 22.750$	$G = -.065$					
Age						
20-30	25	56	19	100	696	
31-45	32	53	15	100	973	
46-60	40	43	17	100	643	
60+	40	40	20	100	384	
$\chi^2 = 71.435$	$G = -.085$	$L = .016$				
Education (completed)						
Low school	38	43	19	100	562	
Med school	31	53	16	100	1102	
Hi school	32	51	17	100	794	
College	27	47	26	100	218	
$\chi^2 = 90.656$	$G = .053$					
Occupation						
Housewife	33	49	18	100	647	
Student	11	63	26	100	19	
Professional- Managerial	34	45	21	100	407	
Factory - Blue Collar	23	60	17	100	409	
Factory - White Collar	24	56	20	100	281	
Farm & fishermen	37	46	15	100	522	
Day-laborer	28	63	9	100	43	
Unemployed	43	37	20	100	311	
$\chi^2 = 141.691$	$L = .017$					
City-Size						
Six largest	28	55	12	100	433	
200,000+	29	50	21	100	334	
100,000+	32	49	19	100	286	
50,000+	30	50	20	100	307	
<50,000	36	51	13	100	310	
Town, Village	35	48	17	100	1026	
$\chi^2 = 40.217$	$G = -.055$					

in Japanese value-orientations occurs most within the stratum defined earlier as the "middle-class." When reason is defined in terms of the existence of evaluative and affective orientations, of the ability and willingness to make choices, to relate means and ends, and to relate individual choices to perceived reality, the evidence indicates the existence of reason in Japanese value orientations. It further indicates that the middle stratum is more inclined toward reason as a guide to action than other strata within Japanese society.

The middle stratum seemed more inclined to use logical reasoning, eschew mystical, fatalistic explanations, in favor of testable propositions about reality. Their attitudes were less circumscribed by positional ascription, by traditional deference, or by hierarchical lines of authority. They seem to emphasize group well-being, but not at the cost of loss of individual identity. They believe in individual assertiveness and pursuit of goals they have personally established. Although they seem to be ideologically oriented, their selection of specific theories or types of systems seems to be based upon careful selective processes. The traditional world of all-or-nothing, either-or choices seems to have been supplanted by a desire to withhold judgment until merit has been demonstrated. Norms for both social and political behaviors are not accepted without justification. The justification seems to be in terms of pragmatic orientation toward achievement of personal goals.

The argument that seems to be supported by the evidence

presented here is that Japanese people whose life experiences are most complex, who have the most education, personal mobility, and the most technically demanding occupations, are the most rationally-oriented stratum of Japanese society in their attitude and behavior choices. Further, this stratum of Japanese society seems to share these characteristics with similar strata in other industrial societies. Their attitudes seem to be similar enough to hypothesize that the most important variable associated with rational orientations seems to be the particular stratum in an industrial society.

Chapter V

PATTERNS OF FAMILY, GROUP, AND INDIVIDUAL ORIENTATIONS

Patterns of Obligations

It is generally conceded by students of comparative government that culture in most modern societies can be understood best in terms of a "duality" of cultural values. The persistence of traditional values is seen, in many instances, as reinforcement for many of the institutions of modern economic and political life. Traditional patterns of family allegiance, as an example, are thought to be important sources for stability in modern political communities. This is so because of the role of the family in socializing values of obedience, deference, and so forth. Authoritarian family structures are thought to be conducive to authoritarian political institutions in this manner.

Similarly, the allegiances to traditional group and family obligations as they persist in pluralist societies are thought to be important variables in explaining the ability of traditional associations to accommodate the stress of pluralistic competition and to adapt to the rigors involved in political and economic processes. The precise nature of the commitment felt by Japanese people to the family, family units, village and community groups, and the nation, is this kind of a variable. Because of the strength of traditional values of personal obligation to the family and kinship units and the

concomitant de-emphasis on the individual in any other than a collective sense, and the system of hierarchically structured status positions created on these principles, families, local communities, and other group associations have been the subject of intense investigation.

There is no agreement among researchers on the extent of feelings of obligation of Japanese people to these kinship and demographic associations in modern Japan. The extent of these feelings of obligation is perhaps, however, the key variable in determining the extent to which present-day Japan is "historically determined." It is my thesis that traditional collective orientations are giving way to new individualistic ones, that the allegiance to family and other kinship units is of primarily ceremonial and sentimental significance for Japanese in general, and particularly for middle-class Japanese, and that the allegiance to groups has been supplanted to organizations that might best be described as "functional associations."

The evidence used here, based upon survey research techniques, must be regarded as tentative, just as any other empirically produced data. It does point, however, in a direction not taken by those using other research techniques, and must therefore be examined on its own merit. The persistence of deference to elders, strong positional ascription, and allegiance to various demographic groups is not denied. The important point in analyzing these phenomena, however, is not whether these practices can be found, but how the people

feel about them and what "functional" role they play in determining action orientations.

All persons living in modern societies may be accurately thought of as having feelings of deference to some traditional values. There may be a wide variety of reasons for these feelings, however, and they are not significant in determining a person's value orientation unless they play a functional role in determining his action orientations. The values most important in determining action orientations for middle-class Japanese, I will try to demonstrate here, are roughly comparable to those one might expect to find in most industrial societies.

There are three types of association common in traditional Japan that are posited as the foundation of obligations felt by modern Japanese to social groupings. The dozoku or Japanese family, consisting of a main branch (honke), and its sometimes geographically removed branches (bunke), is one of three predominant types of traditional associations that were responsible for creation and maintenance of an elaborate system of obligation.²¹⁴ The other two types of associations were the oyabun-kobun system, a family-like structure of non-kindred persons, and the buraku, a village or hamlet association.

The basic unit, the household (ie) is a kind of corporate household that has an identity transcending its individual members. It is a property-holding unit patriarchally and patrilineally organized.²¹⁵ The male head of household is

in the dominant position of authority and establishes the rules of operation for all members of the family.

Members of the family occupy a status position that is common from one family to another. Each position has its unique responsibilities and strictly defined set of privileges. Status positions are ordered according to age, sex, and birth; rarely are exceptions made, but the dominant male does have some latitude in choosing his successor as family heir. All individual identity is lost to the family unit. Actions of one member are seen and interpreted as actions of all. "Good" and "bad," "moral" and "immoral," are established in relation to conformity to ethics established by the household, not in relation to "universal" principles. What one "ought" to do as a member of the ie is to perform with dignity those responsibilities designated to persons of one's status rank and meticulously avoid impropriety that might discredit the family. The individual identity is lost.

Biological perpetuation of the family in order to maintain the unity and continuity of the family in traditional Japan was essential. Elaborate adoption and marriage procedures were part of the ie tradition to insure a male heir when none was produced by the head of the family.²¹⁶ The ranking gave great privilege to sons over daughters and to first sons over younger brothers. Although the ideal was what Matsumoto calls "partilocal" units, limited land holdings made it impossible to satisfy the needs of large family units and "stem" units (bunke) were formed as branches of the main

unit (honke).²¹⁷

An elaborate system of mutual obligation between the honke and bunke units of the family was developed that included cooperation in "marriage and funeral ceremonies, construction and repair of houses, prevention and repair of damages, and mutual help after childbirth and illness."²¹⁸ In addition a number of holidays and religious festivals were celebrated jointly by the two family units.²¹⁹ They included religious ceremonies such as "worship of the guardian deity of the 'dozoku' ancestor worship, the Buddhist services for the ancestor spirits, the New Year ceremony, and the lantern festival."²²⁰ The custom of primogeniture kept the bunke and the honke in close contact. The head of the branch family was usually the second son, and any misfortune that befell the first son made the second son head of the family and heir to the family lands and possessions. Often businesses and shops were established in the cities of Japan by a head of household for a second or third son to insure his well-being and close proximity in the event he should become heir and family head. Rigid patrilineal succession, reinforced through adoption and "functional" marriages insured the perpetuation of the honke as well as the bunke.

There is also a group of relatives, connected to the family through the mother, wife, or sister who are not functional members of the ie. They do, in some instances, participate in family events such as weddings and funerals, but are not part of the ie because they are likely to be

members of other households and conflicting loyalties of that nature were not permitted. These people fit into a category that Beardsley calls "bilateral kindred."²²¹ Their relationship is recognized by some groups, but marriage of a daughter takes her out of any "functional" relationship with her original ie and makes her a part of a new household.

A second pattern of association traditionally responsible for the establishment of a wide array of obligations and rights was the oyabun-kobun system of what anthropologists call "ritual kinship."²²² The oyabun-kobun relationship is one in which persons unrelated by blood or marriage establish ties that create a unit similar to the ie. Persons voluntarily accepted a compact to assume obligations and receive rights that would otherwise accrue only through a tight family structure.

The "father" (oyabun) became the head of the household, with similar rights and obligations as the head of the ie. The children (kobun) accepted status positions as heirs with all the attendant rights and obligations.²²³ The "ritual" family grew to several generations until patterns of corporate ownership and inheritance insured perpetuation of the unit. The "ritual" family unit often served a functional purpose in its association with business pursuits. Ishino reports that Japanese racketeers used a "ritual-kinship" form of organization that appears much like the "Cosa Nostra" in Western societies.²²⁴

The oyabun-kobun systems were established to maintain specific kinds of functional associations for economic,

political, and occupational purposes and therefore established a different set of obligations that did not necessarily conflict with the obligations established by the ie. Overlapping membership in an ie unit and a oyabun-kobun association did not necessarily result in conflicting loyalties. The sanctions against membership in two associations with potentially conflicting loyalties were strong enough to prevent it from happening. The "ritual-kinship" institutions accommodated the ie units in the demands made upon their common members.²²⁵

The "ritual-kinship" institution played an important role in the establishment of cooperatives for business and agricultural purposes. This type of oyabun-kobun group, also known as an "instrumental organization" was particularly important in the processes of capital accumulation, income distribution, and the centralization of skilled labor resources during the Japanese industrialization period.²²⁶ A primary function of the association in this period was defining the occupational roles of workers, managers, and owners. The system that developed has had wide publicity for its "humane" treatment of the working classes by owners of capital.

Although the capitalist systems of Western Europe and the United States accumulated the surpluses needed for industrialization primarily through the exploitation of human resources, the same productive efficiency was extracted from Japanese workers through the oyabun-kobun system. Owners were conscious of obligations to those workers who were part

of the "family" and care was taken for their well-being. The workers reciprocated with high levels of productive efficiency.²²⁷

Workers were also highly motivated because of the close system of contacts and mutual ties established within the kinship unit. Employment was "arranged" for rural workers migrating to the city through the kinship unit. A good performance was therefore necessary to avoid damage to the reputation of the family member making the recommendation. The whole system of reciprocity, mutual obligation, and status positions seems to have been a more humane way of extracting surplus capital needed for industrialization than has occurred in other societies lacking comparable social institutions.

The ovabun-kòbun system also allowed extra business growth through a chain of "branch" operations. The Sano or "boss" of one part of a company was also a "ritual child" of a manager at a higher echelon in the business structure. A system of promotions and rewards through the family structure ensured loyalty and high levels of production. All workers in an office, plant, or shop, during Japan's industrialization, were not "family" members or "ritual relations" of the owners and managers. Occasionally kobun status was conferred for outstanding productive performance, and so the special privilege associated with family membership also served as incentive to unusual production for "non-family" workers.²²⁸

The third form of local organization was the buraku or social community (also known as the mura - a term designating

a political community).²²⁹ The ties to the buraku were very strong and were second in terms of allegiance given by members of the family unit. The relationship of members of the buraku was also established on the basis of status rank determined by age, sex, and family membership. Obligations and rights of membership in the buraku were strictly enforced and carefully adhered to because of the social and economic benefits derived through mutual cooperation. This type of "collaterality" is thought to be a reason for many of the "collectivist" orientations discovered in much of the survey research being done among Japanese residents.²³⁰

Buraku associations were formed primarily to serve the agricultural needs of the community, but they also performed other functions. These included such things as holding community rites at Shinto shrines and Buddhist temples. Even though some wealthy families owned shrines, major religious rites were still performed at the mura level. Members of the buraku also cooperated in such matters as "funerals, house repairs, transplanting of rice, and maintenance of roads, ditches and ponds. The 'mura' also decided upon holidays and ritual days when people were allowed to rest or to hold feasts. . . the 'mura' had several communal properties, including pasture land or forest land given it by the ruler, irrigation facilities, a granary, a meeting place or common house, and tools and furniture for cooperative use. Villages along the seacoast had common ocean areas for fishing."²³¹

These formal institutions and the practices of on and

giri formed the basis of an intricate system of mutual obligation, reciprocity, and rights defined within a framework of group membership. On was a practice of bestowing favors by a superior on an inferior in order to create a kind of permanent obligation. It was intended to create a hierarchical status relationship between the giver and the receiver, and to establish an obligation that kept the receiver in a position of inferiority to the giver. Beardsley says that "types" of relationships that denote superior status are, "1) A class superior, such as a master who gives employment to a servant, a lord who supports his retainer, or a shogun who grants a fief to a lord; 2) a kin superior, such as one's father or elder brother; 3) an age-status superior such as one's teacher; or 4) a superior in a limited situation, such as the go-between who arranges one's marriage."²³²

The permanency of the obligation created is more important than the nature of the gift. Repayment of the obligation, called ongaeshi, required a lifelong commitment of loyalty to either a lord (chu) or family head (ko). These patterns of loyalty were hierarchically established and created classes of subjects and lords who, except in very rare circumstances, experienced either upward or downward mobility. Through the hierarchical structuring of obligation the loyalty of the lowest class to feudal lords at the top were established. In this manner loyalty of the Samurai to the lord was also created, and fixed societal stratification was established and perpetuated.²³³

The practice of giri is another method through which obligations are established. Unlike on, however, the giving and receiving of gifts do not create or maintain status relationships. The giving and receiving of gifts create specific obligations that do not necessarily specify any status relationship and that can be satisfied much more easily. Often they are reciprocal. A gift given at a wedding established an obligation to give a gift at a subsequent wedding of the giver or his kin. Assistance at a funeral obligates the receiver to assist the giver at a funeral of his kin.

Giri is important irrespective of the quality of the gifts. It is important because of the relationships that are created. It is most important that the gifts be given in the "proper" spirit and with the correct attitude toward the receiver. A gift given without the proper ritual, or without the proper attitude does not satisfy the obligation. Interpersonal relations and relations between whole families depend upon the correctness of these exchanges of gifts. The importance must be seen in the nature of the obligations established through the practice, not in the giving of the gifts.

Functions of Groups and Classes

Students of the Japanese polity see at least two important consequences of these patterns of obligations. It is believed that the strong commitment to a particular social group has been a deterrent to social stratification in modern Japan. In this view, two main consequences of social stratification that occur in other industrial societies are either missing or less important in the Japanese context. The

ability to build and maintain functional and viable interest groups able to articulate and aggregate group interests, and stratification of society into a relatively large middle class and smaller upper and lower classes are thought to be difficult or impossible because of the continuities associated with traditional group loyalties.²³⁴

The argument is that commitment to traditional conceptions of on and giri, the ie and the buraku, make it difficult for Japanese people to organize themselves into groups reflecting particularistic interests.²³⁵ Total commitment and complete "in-group" consciousness is thought to be so necessary that the risk of overlapping or competing memberships cannot be taken and hence few Japanese are thought willing to associate themselves with functional interest groups.²³⁶ The Japanese people are thought to be so concerned with the maintenance of existing group loyalties, particularly family and occupational loyalties, that they are unwilling to join an association that might pursue a particularistic interest in conflict with family or firm interest.²³⁷

In Bakke's view, a Japanese person, in a modern as well as in a traditional setting, "finds his justification and his life satisfaction in acting, in accordance with his position and function, within a constraining framework of obligations to other members and especially the group head or leader."²³⁸ The thought of pursuing a personal, or a particularistic interest, or an interest of a "functional" group as opposed to a traditionally defined group is, in his view, "well-nigh

unthinkable" for a Japanese.²³⁹

Takeshi believes that the demands for action on the part of group members are always tempered by a desire "not to offend" and the groups therefore become so diversified as to be functionally ineffective.²⁴⁰ He argues that groups are required, as a matter of priority, to equate their interests with the general public interest in order to satisfy the belief carried over from traditional Japan that private interests of any group could not be considered legitimate.²⁴¹

It is thereby established that Japanese people do not make demands upon interest groups to satisfy personal or private interests, that group orientations are still traditionally prescribed, and that Japanese do not think of themselves as individuals, but as members of associations defined by traditional practices. Those groups that do exist and purport to represent particularistic interests are thought to be ineffectual. Those groups serving a general interest are thought to benefit from this traditional practice and thus to operate effectively. An example of such a group would be the civil bureaucracy, or in pre-war days, the military.²⁴²

A similar argument is hypothesized to explain the failure of Japanese people to develop a class identification. Although some research is being done in Japan in terms of different strata in society, the members of these strata are thought to fail to identify with the particular stratum, and to identify with some other primary association such as an ie or perhaps a buraku.²⁴³ Class identification, like individual identifi-

cation, is thought to be constricted by identification with loyalties to traditionally defined groups.

Some Conclusions from the Data

The data from the National Character Survey provided significant evidence of the changed condition of obligation, deference to status, and the trend toward "individuation" among middle-class Japanese. The evidence points to a measurable change throughout all strata in traditional forms of association and obligation, but it is clearly the middle stratum defined occupationally and educationally, that is the primary mover. There are also significant differences according to city size, not found in other parts of the survey, indicating an impact of urbanization on the traditional family and village structures. The theory that ties are maintained in urban settings by migrating farm children was not confirmed in the data. The data offer convincing evidence of the existence of a "middle-class" industrial culture whose members share attitudes much in common with their counterparts in other industrial societies. There is almost no reaffirmation of traditional values of association and obligation except in rural farm communities.

The importance of maintaining the family line, of maintaining strong ties between the main branch family units and the patriarchal family structure of traditional Japan, is not reaffirmed in modern Japan. The attitude toward maintenance of family line is still that it is desirable, but not a priority over other, perhaps more mundane, considerations

such as birth control. There has been notable success in Japan in politically and socially instituted population controls. The national rate of population increase is lower than almost any other industrialized nation in the world.²⁴⁴ This success has been possible only because of new attitudes about the purpose and function of the family unit in Japanese society. The respondents in the National Character Survey showed strong new orientations to the problem of maintaining family bloodlines.

The respondents were asked the following question to test their belief in the traditional necessity to maintain the family unit as a priority objective for all members of the family: "If you do not have a child, even if the child is not related to you by blood, do you think it is better to adopt a child and continue the family line, or do you think it is not necessary to do so?" Significant differences were recorded according to age, occupation, education, and size of city categories. (Table V-A) Only forty-one percent of those in the twenty to twenty-four age-group category would adopt to continue the blood-line, but more than seventy-five percent of those over sixty thought it necessary to continue the bloodline by adoption.

The scale of increase in propensity to adopt was graduated pretty evenly from forty-three percent to seventy-six percent in each intervening age-category. There was almost no difference in sex categories but the difference according to education was statistically the most significant in the entire

TABLE V-A

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND
AND DESIRE TO CONTINUE BLOODLINE THRU ADOPTION
(in percentages)

	RESPONSE CHOICES		TOTAL	
	Would Adopt	Would Not	%	N
Sex				
Male	54	46	100	1200
Female	52	48	100	1386
$\chi^2 = .98$ df = 1 P < .32 G = .040				
Age				
20-30	43	57	100	658
31-45	48	52	100	926
46-60	60	40	100	615
60+	76	24	100	367
$\chi^2 = 133.699$ df = 3 P < .0001 G = -.268				
Education (completed)				
Low school	69	31	100	529
Med school	59	41	100	1057
Hi school	40	60	100	769
College	28	72	100	213
$\chi^2 = 167.623$ df = 3 P < .0001 G = .391				
Occupation				
Housewife	46	54	100	626
Student	17	83	100	18
Professional- Managerial	36	64	100	176
Factory - Blue Collar	44	56	100	202
Factory - White Collar	51	49	100	186
Farm & fishermen	75	25	100	407
Day-laborer	58	42	100	40
Unemployed	65	35	100	290
$\chi^2 = 141.879$ df = 7 P < .0001 L = .148				
City-Size				
Six largest	37	63	100	416
200,000+	36	64	100	321
100,000+	45	55	100	268
50,000+	58	42	100	293
<50,000	55	45	100	299
Town, Village	64	36	100	989
$\chi^2 = 140.477$ df = 5 P < .000 G = -.318				

survey. Sixty-nine percent of those with only a low or elementary school education would adopt to continue the bloodline but only twenty-eight percent of those with college degrees were similarly inclined. Sixty percent of those with high school educations said they would not adopt to continue the bloodline. The occupational differences were also wide with seventy-five percent of farmers favoring adoption to maintain the family line and only seventeen percent of students, thirty percent of professional people, forty percent of managers, and fifty percent of factory workers similarly inclined. The urban and rural differences were also marked even though few differences occurred in the tests for individual "rationality." In the six largest cities only thirty-seven percent of the respondents favored adoption to continue the family line but sixty-four percent of town and village residents felt adoption was necessary.

Data collected by other social scientists indicate analogous trends among Japanese middle-class people. A good analysis of surveys of public opinion taken by Scott Matsumoto in the Japanese newspaper, Yomiuri Shimbun, indicates changed Japanese feelings toward the family structure and particularly the practice of primogeniture.²⁴⁵ His conclusions are that, "Although it is held with great tenacity in the rural communities, there is no denying that rigid patrilineal succession is weakening in the younger, educated, white-collar groups in the urban and industrial areas of Japan. The tradition of primogeniture definitely persists, but the

outlines of the heritage become progressively more diffuse."²⁴⁶

He found that "the surveys indicated that the majority of older and less educated Japanese generally, and agricultural populations particularly, favored the right of primogeniture."²⁴⁷ The feeling among Japanese that the family unit must be preserved and that a male-dominated hierarchically structured family system should provide the key to social stability is clearly on the wane in Japan, and particularly among its middle classes. Psychologists doing research into the attitudes of American and Japanese children concerning attitudes toward the family structure found similarities among children of both countries.²⁴⁸

There is evidence to indicate that these new values respecting family lineage are held by adults who are also parents. In research results published by two psychologists, the socialization of children seems to have occurred in a value context similar to that discovered in the Japanese National Character Survey.²⁴⁹ They report strong generational differences in attitudes respecting family structure beginning at even pre-school age, indicating the absence of strongly traditional socialization processes in the home.²⁵⁰ Two other studies taken in local Japanese communities by Takashi Koyama also support the hypothesis of a changing family structure and new emphasis on individual orientation to kinship ties.²⁵¹

The "new" family structure indicated in the research noted above is not one completely devoid of traditional trappings. There is still some indication of male-dominance

in the household, of strong family ties, and positional status ascription in the Japanese family unit.²⁵² These practices, however, clearly play a new role in modern Japan. They are less important as orientations to action when they conflict with individual self-interest. They are important, but perhaps no more important than in other industrial societies where, for example, the practice of male-dominance seems to be rather widespread. Household ties seem to be more rigorously maintained in modern Japan when there is practical advantage to be gained whereas in Japanese traditional society lineages were maintained irrespective of monetary and human cost.

As an example, a young man and woman I knew in Japan were contemplating the family name they should choose after their marriage. Since it would be acceptable both legally and by custom to choose either the name of the bride or the groom as the family name, they were contemplating the advantage and disadvantage they thought might accrue from the adoption of each name. They discussed the decision with me and decided upon her family name (for euphonic reasons) in spite of the fact that he was the eldest son. I might add, however, that there was little or no property in his father's estate, but her father was a well-to-do businessman.

The respondents to the survey also de-emphasized parental filialty as a primary human virtue. For the Japanese, being filial to one's parents is much more than a similar orientation in the West since it involves a sense of obligation,

both economic and social, as well as the general conception of respect. For this reason a belief in the necessity to be filial implies much more than just respect for parents. It might also include an obligation of maintenance during a parent's old age or other economic costs. Respondents were asked to choose important values to emphasize from a list of five including, "To be filial to one's parents." Opting for this choice indicated a much greater commitment than would be the case in a similar sample of the American population. The key variables in strong preferences for filialty were age, sex, occupation, education, and to a lesser extent, size of city.

Only forty-seven percent of the youngest age-group expressed a commitment to parental filialty and seventy-five percent of those over sixty felt it was important. (Table V-B) Women were much more committed than men. Sixty-five percent of females queried felt obligations of filialty while only fifty-four percent of males were so inclined. The education variable was statistically the most significant of the five in this category. Seventy-four percent of those of elementary school education levels thought parental filialty was important and only thirty-nine percent of college graduates were similarly disposed. The importance of education as a socialization process, and as a rationalizing force in Japanese society was clearly demonstrated in the survey results.

The same occupational groups previously expressing middle-class values ranked low in parental filialty, but the

TABLE V-B

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND
AND ATTITUDE TOWARD PARENTAL FILIALTY
(in percentages)

	RESPONSE CHOICES		TOTAL	
	Important to be Filial	Not Important	%	N
Sex				
Male	54	46	100	1251
Female	65	35	100	1445
$\chi^2 = 36.259$ df = 1 P < .0001 G = .234				
Age				
20-30	51	49	100	696
31-45	57	43	100	973
46-60	64	36	100	643
60+	75	25	100	384
$\chi^2 = 70.02$ df = 3 P < .000 G = -.20				
Education (completed)				
Low school	70	30	100	562
Med school	64	36	100	1102
Hi school	49	51	100	794
College	39	61	100	218
$\chi^2 = 132.818$ df = 3 P < .0001 G = .349				
Occupation				
Housewife	65	35	100	647
Student	37	63	100	19
Professional- Managerial	42	58	100	176
Factory - Blue Collar	58	42	100	216
Factory - White Collar	51	49	100	193
Farm & fishermen	65	35	100	422
Day-laborer	70	30	100	43
Unemployed	75	25	100	311
$\chi^2 = 75.349$ df = 7 P < .0001 L = .045				
City-Size				
Six largest	55	45	100	433
200,000+	53	47	100	334
100,000+	58	42	100	286
50,000+	60	40	100	307
<50,000	65	35	100	310
Town, Village	63	37	100	1026
$\chi^2 = 19.107$ df = 5 P < .001 G = -.108				

rural, low-income occupations ranked highest. The city size also proved to be important as an indicator of parental filialty with fifty-five percent of the residents in the sample residing in the six largest cities expressing feelings of parental filialty and sixty-three percent of those in rural hamlets and villages similarly inclined.

One of the persistent themes in traditional Japanese literature is the conflict that arises out of contradictory obligations (on and giri) and ninjo, or human feelings. The moral dilemma caused by a desire to do that which seems "human" in the face of conflicting obligations was almost always resolved, in the classical literature, by sacrifice of one's personal feelings. To uphold one's dignity by keeping obligations under conditions of extreme hardship and suffering was the certain path to status in the community. Particularly vexed were those young lovers forced to marry spouses chosen by parents as mutual marriages of convenience.

The idea that one should sacrifice all personal good in order to keep obligations unfreely taken is characteristic of traditional people in many societies, but it would be an uncommon perspective for a person in a modern context. Japanese people are thought to pay highest priority to these obligations in contemporary Japan. Any persistence of these values could be considered a vestige of traditionalism that is unexpected in a modern society.

Respondents in the National Character Survey were asked several questions to determine the extent of feelings of

commitment to traditional concepts of on and giri. These obligations, arising out of father-son, lord-vassal, boss-employee relationships seem, on the basis of the data, to be less intensely felt among Japanese in general and particularly in the middle class than many social scientists believe. When asked if they felt it was necessary to repay obligations that have been incurred in the past, fifty-seven percent of all the respondents answered, "no." (Table V-C) However, an important point is that the on and giri practices caused obligations not freely or willingly taken. The response is therefore probably not an indication of the belief among Japanese in the necessity to repay obligations voluntarily and freely taken. The involuntary obligations are still much more important to the old than the young. Only thirty-six percent of those over sixty said they would not repay obligations taken in the past and seventy-six percent of those under twenty-four were similarly inclined.

Women much more than men felt the necessity to repay obligations incurred in the past. A person receiving only a grade school education was almost three times as likely to respond affirmatively as was a college graduate. Only twenty-four percent of college graduates felt the necessity to repay obligations, but sixty-five percent of the lower educational group felt it was necessary. Only ten percent of students and twenty-seven percent of professional people queried thought repayment of obligations was necessary, but forty-three percent of farmers and nearly sixty percent of

TABLE V-C

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND
AND BELIEF IN NECESSITY TO REPAY OBLIGATIONS
(in percentages)

	RESPONSE CHOICES		TOTAL	
	Important to Repay Obligations	Not Important	%	N
Sex				
Male	38	62	100	1251
Female	48	52	100	1445
$X^2 = 26.107$ df = 1 P < .0001 G = -.19				
Age				
20-30	23	77	100	696
31-45	44	56	100	973
56-60	56	44	100	643
60+	64	36	100	384
$X^2 = 247.458$ df = 3 P < .0001 G = -.38				
Education (completed)				
Low school	65	35	100	562
Med school	45	55	100	1102
Hi school	31	69	100	794
College	24	76	100	218
$X^2 = 185.628$ df = 3 P < .0001 G = .405				
Occupation				
Housewife	44	56	100	647
Student	11	89	100	19
Professional- Managerial	30	70	100	176
Factory - Blue Collar	42	58	100	216
Factory - White Collar	28	72	100	193
Farm & fishermen	43	57	100	422
Day-laborer	49	51	100	43
Unemployed	59	41	100	311
$X^2 = 76.259$ df = 7 P < .0001 L = .060				
City-Size				
Six largest	41	59	100	433
200,000+	37	63	100	334
100,000+	41	59	100	286
50,000+	48	52	100	307
<50,000	41	59	100	310
Town, Village	47	53	100	1026
$X^2 = 15.75$ df = 6 P < .007 G = -.08				

the unemployed thought it was necessary. Differences that occurred according to city size were negligible.

The evidence indicated that commitment to obligations not freely undertaken, by a person, but by a family in his or her behalf, are less honored among the middle class workers than any other segment of the population. The most important variables in determining commitment to traditional forms of obligation are age, education, and occupation. Sex is also an important variable, but when sex is held constant and the occupational variable is introduced, the important consideration seems to be the occupation of housewife. Those women educated and employed in equal capacity with the men surveyed in the sample tended to respond about the same as the men interviewed respecting the making and keeping of obligations. Also younger women, much more than older women, tend not to feel the necessity to repay obligations.

One of the most functional forms of on and giri has been the establishment of employee-employer relations on the basis of family or other "connections."²⁵³ Obligations were often repaid (ongaeshi) through contacts resulting in employment of the giver of a gift or a relative. The practice was widespread and is still a part of the intricate system of employee-employer relations in Japan. The attitudes of Japanese people toward these kinds of obligations is a good indicator of their ties to past social institutions that may or may not be functional in a complex industrial society.

Respondents in the survey were asked the following

question, "Suppose that you are the president of a company, at your company, an exam is held in order to hire one new employee, and the section-manager who is responsible for the exam reports to you, 'your relative was second place in the exam, but as far as I am concerned, it does not make any difference whether the new employee will be the person who was first in the exam or your relative.' Which would you tell the section manager to do?" Almost uniformly through the entire sample more than three fourths of the respondents replied that the person who was first in the exam should be hired. (Table V-D)

However, when the qualifying clause was added, "Suppose that the person who was second was not your relative, but the child of someone who had done favors for you in the past (onjin). What would you do then? Which one would you hire?" The older, less educated persons with fewer job skills, and women more than men chose to hire the relatives of the person to whom the obligations were owed. (Table V-E) The younger, college educated, and middle-class workers maintained their position that the person demonstrating the greatest merit should be hired in spite of the obligations held. Although only thirty-seven percent of college educated people would hire the relative of the person who had done them favors, fifty-six percent of those in the lowest educational group felt the necessity to honor past obligations.

The evidence points to two tentative conclusions. For the younger, better educated, and skilled or professional

TABLE V-D

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND
AND ATTITUDE TOWARD HIRING RELATIVE
(in percentages)*

	RESPONSE CHOICES			
	Hire Person First in Exam	Hire Relative	TOTAL %	N
Sex				
Male	78	22	100	1216
Female	78	22	100	1317
Age				
20-30	80	20	100	696
31-45	79	21	100	973
46-60	75	25	100	643
60+	78	22	100	384
Education (completed)				
Low school	72	28	100	510
Med school	80	20	100	1065
Hi school	80	20	100	782
College	72	28	100	215
Occupation				
Housewife	78	22	100	626
Student	72	28	100	19
Professional- Managerial	75	25	100	176
Factory - Blue Collar	79	21	100	216
Factory - White Collar	87	13	100	193
Farm & fishermen	78	22	100	422
Day-laborer	80	20	100	43
Unemployed	76	24	100	311
City-Size				
Six largest	79	21	100	421
200,000+	71	29	100	331
100,000+	73	27	100	273
50,000+	81	19	100	301
<50,000	82	18	100	293
Town, Village	78	22	100	973

*Relationships are not statistically significant

TABLE V-E

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND
AND ATTITUDE TOWARD HIRING PERSON TO WHOM DEBT IS OWED
(in percentages)

	RESPONSE CHOICES			TOTAL % N
	Hire Person First in Exam	Hire Person to Whom Debt is Owed		
Sex				
Male	59	41	100	1212
Female	49	51	100	1335
	$\chi^2 = 24.626$ df = 1 P < .0001 G = -.19			
Age				
20-30	57	43	100	665
31-45	55	45	100	828
46-60	44	56	100	614
60+	49	51	100	336
	$\chi^2 = 19.223$ df = 3 P < .01 G = -.09			
Education (completed)				
Low school	44	56	100	496
Med school	54	46	100	1041
Hi school	57	43	100	775
College	63	37	100	215
	$\chi^2 = 28.783$ df = 3 P < .0001 G = .157			
Occupation				
Housewife	49	51	100	611
Student	89	11	100	18
Professional- Managerial	66	34	100	176
Factory - Blue Collar	48	52	100	205
Factory - White Collar	59	41	100	189
Farm & fishermen	46	54	100	422
Day-laborer	45	55	100	38
Unemployed	46	54	100	273
	$\chi^2 = 31.997$ df = 7 P < .0001 L = .033			
City-Size				
Six Largest	55	45	100	424
200,000+	47	53	100	322
100,000+	54	46	100	271
50,000+	59	41	100	292
<50,000	54	46	100	288
Town, Village	53	47	100	950
	$\chi^2 = 9.75$ df = 5 P < .08 G = -.001			

workers, merit has superceded obligation as a principle of managerial operation. The tradition of obligation incurred through the acceptance of gifts confers new types of obligations. The obligation to confer favors irrespective of the consequences for the obligated person does not seem to continue to be a viable principle in all strata of Japanese society. Obligations now freely taken can be more correctly seen as social commitments taken and fulfilled within the normal range of social costs. They are not permanently or absolutely taken or given. They seem to be more a part of social and business etiquette than guides to imperative actions. Their continued existence is an observable fact. Their importance in determining action orientations seems questionable. Like many other carryovers from traditional society the form continues to exist but the substance has been altered to accommodate the more immediate needs of existence in a complex society. The merit principle, necessary to productive efficiency, seems to have permeated a substantial segment of the Japanese population.

In order to test for variation in response between an abstract and a practical situation, the principles of obligation to parent and to persons having done favors was tested in the National Character Survey. The respondents were shown three pictures, 1) Mr. Nishikino on his death bed, 2) Mr. Minamiyama reading a telegram, and 3) Mr. Minamiyama at the conference table with two other men, and then asked the following question. "Mr. Minamiyama was orphaned when he

was very young, but a kind neighbor, Mr. Nishikino took charge of him and even sent him through college. Eventually Mr. Minamiyama became the president of a company. One day, Mr. Minamiyama received a telegram informing him that Mr. Nishikino, who so kindly brought him up, is on his death-bed, and would Mr. Minamiyama please come. But this is the day that an important meeting, which will decide whether Mr. Minamiyama's company will go bankrupt or not is going to be held. Which attitude do you think is the best? 1) Leave everything and rush home to Mr. Nishikino, or 2) Even if Mr. Nishikino's condition worries him, Mr. Minamiyama should attend the meeting."

The story is intended to contain elements of the classical Japanese tragedy described earlier. The conflict between obligations owed, and the desirability of the conflicting behavior pattern are woven into the story in the same sense that conflicts between ninjo and ongaeshi formed the basis of tragedy in many Japanese classics. It would have been unthinkable for a person in traditional Japan to consider any course of action as an alternative to visiting Mr. Nishikino on his death-bed. Any propensity to ignore this obligation in favor of the protection of a business interest can be considered a strong indication of attitude change. Failure to meet an obligation of this kind shows a strong movement toward individualistic orientations. The placing of business interests and monetary gain ahead of obligations to an adopted parent could be considered an important

indication of orientations that would be expected in an "industrial culture."

Those respondents in the survey choosing the "go to the meeting" response were primarily the young, the well-educated, and the professional and managerial workers.

(Table V-F) Women, more than men felt the necessity to rush home to Mr. Nishikino's bedside. In the age groups sixty percent of those over sixty felt going to Mr. Nishikino's bedside was the preferable alternative and only forty-one percent in the twenty-four year old age group were similarly inclined. Only thirty-seven percent of college graduates in all age and sex categories felt a necessity to go to his bedside and fifty-eight percent of the elementary school educational group thought going to Mr. Nishikino's bedside was the best alternative. About half as big a percentage of professional and managerial people were inclined to honor the obligation as were the unemployed and day-workers.

When the conditions of the story were changed to substitute a parent for Mr. Nishikino the changes in the survey results were negligible. (Table V-G) Obligations to parents do not seem to be regarded as any different in kind than obligations incurred for favors done. Both survey responses tended to confirm the hypothesis that traditional obligations of filialty, obligations incurred through favors, on and giri, are being seen in new contexts. Their persistence is documented in the data, but it is much less intense in the middle class than in any other strata in Japanese society.

TABLE V-F

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND
AND CHOICE BETWEEN PERSONAL AND BUSINESS OBLIGATIONS
(in percentages)

	RESPONSE CHOICES			TOTAL % N
	Go Home to Sick Bed of Adopted Parent	Attend Business Meeting		
Sex				
Male	46	54	100	1200
Female	51	49	100	1315
$\chi^2 = 7.786$ df = 1 P < .005 G = -.11				
Age				
20-30	47	53	100	671
31-45	45	55	100	936
46-60	52	48	100	613
60+	60	40	100	344
$\chi^2 = 33.64$ df = 3 P < .0001 G = -.09				
Education (completed)				
Low school	58	42	100	506
Med school	52	48	100	1046
Hi school	41	59	100	768
College	37	63	100	216
$\chi^2 = 51.25$ df = 3 P < .0001 G .221				
Occupation				
Housewife	48	52	100	612
Student	50	50	100	18
Professional- Managerial	35	65	100	176
Factory - Blue Collar	50	50	100	201
Factory - White Collar	48	52	100	187
Farm & fishermen	51	49	100	396
Day-laborer	58	42	100	280
Unemployed	54	46	100	41
$\chi^2 = 24.33$ df = 7 P < .006 L .058				
City-Size				
Six largest	50	50	100	420
200,000+	41	59	100	325
100,000+	42	58	100	276
50,000+	55	45	100	284
<50,000	55	45	100	290
Town, Village	49	51	100	957
$\chi^2 = 21.68$ df = 5 P < .0001 G = -.03				

TABLE V-G

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND
AND CHOICE BETWEEN FAMILY AND BUSINESS OBLIGATIONS
(in percentages)

	RESPONSE CHOICES			TOTAL % N
	Go Home to Sickbed of Parent	Attend Business Meeting		
Sex				
Male	44	56	100	1193
Female	51	49	100	1344
$\chi^2 = 11.417$ df = 1 P < .0001 G = -.135				
Age				
20-30	51	49	100	663
31-45	43	57	100	923
46-60	48	52	100	624
60+	54	46	100	338
$\chi^2 = 25.412$ df = 3 P < .001 G = -.004				
Education (completed)				
Low school	56	44	100	505
Med school	51	49	100	1035
Hi school	41	59	100	764
College	37	63	100	215
$\chi^2 = 44.036$ df = 3 P < .0001 G = .205				
Occupation				
Housewife	50	50	100	608
Student	42	58	100	19
Professional- Managerial	34	66	100	176
Factory - Blue Collar	49	51	100	199
Factory - White Collar	44	56	100	187
Farm & fishermen	55	45	100	390
Day-laborer	44	56	100	41
Unemployed	53	47	100	277
$\chi^2 = 24.99$ df = 7 P < .005 L = .060				
City-Size				
Six largest	51	49	100	415
200,000+	44	56	100	321
100,000+	38	62	100	274
50,000+	54	46	100	272
<50,000	49	51	100	291
Town, Village	48	52	100	964
$\chi^2 = 18.57$ df = 5 P < .002 G = .013				

It would seem accurate to speculate that these obligations are still part of the ritual and ceremony of interpersonal relations in Japan, but that their priority as action orientations has changed. Obligations, particularly those freely taken, are made and kept conditionally. When there are not other priorities, action orientations are decided by traditional behavior norms. However, when personal interests, including pecuniary reward, conflict, in middle-class society in modern Japan, they seem to take precedence.

The response patterns to this question, also reflect a significant amount of ambiguity. The statistical significance of this response is less than in most of the questions in the survey because of the small amount of variance between the two response choices. This seems to indicate that the choice could not be made on the basis of a fixed response orientation, reflecting ambiguity between pragmatic and psychological needs. This ambiguity is, however, an important reflection of the impact of modernity on a traditional value system. In this instance the indication of modernity and the evidence for rationality, is the ambiguity arising from the conflict between personal achievement and human feelings typical of conflict situations arising in industrial cultures.

This conclusion can be interpreted as a question of emphasis as well. The evidence points to the conclusion that Japanese middle class people tend to emphasize personal and individual conditions and de-emphasize traditional and non-functional collective behavior in their evaluative and

affective orientations to action. Japanese people themselves, interviewed in this study, feel that they are less concerned with repayment of obligations now than they have ever been before. Sixty-six percent of all respondents felt that Japanese people are less concerned with the repayment of obligations incurred, in the past, "tangible and intangible," now than they have ever been before. (Table V-H)

Westerners observing the great amount of attention that seems to be given to ceremony and customary observance of ritual are easily misled. The meaning of these acts, that are widespread in Japan, has changed. Meaning cannot be imparted by the observer; it must be a function of participant orientations. Those acts reported by many Western scholars are apparently not given the same meaning as they are by the persons performing these acts. This is an easy methodological trap to fall into since most of our Western industrial societies seem to be rather free of similar ritual and ceremony. In conclusion, the meaning given by Japanese people to their own public actions seems to indicate maintenance of the form of tradition, but not its substance.

TABLE V-H

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND
AND BELIEF THAT JAPANESE ARE LESS CONCERNED NOW
THAN EVER BEFORE WITH REPAYMENT OF OBLIGATIONS
(in percentages)

	RESPONSE CHOICES		TOTAL	
	Less Concerned	No Change or More Concerned	%	N
Sex				
Male	70	30	100	1251
Female	68	32	100	1445
$X^2 = 5.72 \quad G = .034$				
Age				
20-30	55	45	100	696
31-45	66	34	100	973
46-60	70	30	100	643
60+	78	22	100	384
$X^2 = 131.111 \quad df = 3 \quad P < .0001 \quad G = -.223$				
Education (completed)				
Low school	73	27	100	562
Med school	67	33	100	1102
Hi school	62	38	100	794
College	58	42	100	218
$X^2 = 54.05 \quad P < .0001 \quad G = .123$				
Occupation				
Housewife	65	35	100	647
Student	27	73	100	19
Professional- Managerial	62	38	100	178
Factory - Blue Collar	63	37	100	198
Factory - White Collar	63	37	100	188
Farm & fishermen	71	29	100	416
Day-laborer	61	39	100	43
Unemployed	72	28	100	311
$X^2 = 69.88 \quad P < .0001 \quad L = .001$				
City-Size				
Six largest	66	34	100	433
200,000+	67	33	100	334
100,000+	64	36	100	286
50,000+	73	27	100	307
<50,000	69	31	100	310
Town, Village	63	37	100	1026
$X^2 = 20.89 \quad G = .045$				

Chapter VI

PARTICIPATION AND POLITICAL-ROLE PERCEPTIONS OF JAPANESE MIDDLE-CLASS PEOPLE

The hypothesis of Subject Orientations

There is a growing literature questioning the functionality of democracy in Japan because of the theoretical contradictions between the activist-participant orientations that are necessary to a viable democratic system and the subject-parochial attitudes presumed to characterize present-day Japanese people. There is a belief that the traditional conception of individuals as "non-participants" in the political process is still the basis of relationships between decision-makers and the masses in Japan. Japanese people are characterized as uninterested in the political process because it is seen as outside of their sphere of understanding and competence.²⁵⁴

Some observers see the Japanese people as interested but disaffected because of the lack of "propriety" usually involved in participation in the political process.²⁵⁵ Others see them as unable to establish goals and aims apart from traditional groups.²⁵⁶ Still others see them, much like people in other industrial societies, as desiring to participate but lacking confidence in their ability to "change things" in spite of political activities in which they might participate.²⁵⁷ Unlike participants in other cultures, however, this view sees Japanese people as responding to failure to

make direct political changes by retreating to the comfort and harmony of traditional associations.²⁵⁸ They are presumed to feel a sense of "powerlessness" and "frustration" with the democratic forms forced upon them in the American occupation. This powerlessness is thought to be a result of the inability of traditional systems to accommodate the public conflict and tension that must inevitably result from competition between competing interests for political power.²⁵⁹

Some observers report a lack of desire for political participation because of deference still paid to the Emperor and to authoritarian systems of government.²⁶⁰ Still others perceive an inability of Japanese people to "find stable positions within a group as a major obstacle to the development of assertive, independent thought processes," seen as necessary to maintenance of a viable democracy.²⁶¹ All of these conclusions were reached by researchers sharing a commonality in their methodologies; none of them used survey research in formulating their conclusions.

Their conclusions are based upon a wide variety of methodological techniques including personal introspection, visits to Japan, discussion with "Japanese friends," historical analysis, and occasionally, interviews with Japanese people. None used a valid survey. Much of the research done on Japanese people can be put into similar categories. The rigorous methodological techniques associated with behavioral research are not widely applied nor are they considered necessary. These same researchers would probably not attempt

to formulate judgments about attitudes of Americans based upon visits to the United States, discussions with friends, casual interviews, or historical readings, yet the same techniques seem to have earned some academic credibility in the Japanese setting.

The data compiled by researchers doing empirical analysis of attitudes of Japanese people provide a compellingly different picture of Japanese orientations toward political life. The National Character Survey confirms the hypothesis that studies such as those of Nakamura, Ishida, and Maruyama are less credible in modern Japan than they might have been in an earlier period. My thesis in this section is that participant and activist orientations best characterize the Japanese middle class.

The imperatives of industrial life demand rational perspectives that in turn are the basis of predispositions toward the holding of opinions about political life and the taking of action to achieve political goals. The Japanese people, who are participants in one of the most accelerated industrialization processes in the modern world, can be expected to have activist-participant orientations roughly similar to those held by residents of other industrial communities. The data from the National Character Survey and other empirical data collected by social scientists support this hypothesis.

There are three successive steps that are hypothesized to be necessary to the development of "activist-participant"

roles in political life. A potential activist must first hold opinions about political life, and particularly about the nature and desired rate of political change. He develops these opinions by being confident in his own analytical abilities, in his own experience as a guide to understanding, and in his ability to acquire knowledge and interpret it when he lacks information. The processes through which this confidence is developed are associated with access to formalized educational processes, communications media, and authoritative persons. Equally important is a wide variety of experience gained through occupational and physical mobility.

Once judgments about political life are made they must be transformed into goals or ends to be met through personal or collective political behavior. Goals established for one's self and goals established for the system may be subconsciously formulated as a result of subtle socialization processes, but they must be compatible with an individual's cognitive orientations to become part of his behavioral objectives. The development of these "cognitive maps" precedes evaluation, but both are prerequisites to involvement in social and political processes.

Part of the process of establishing goals is to understand and accept formulative processes for their achievement. That is, the potential participant recognizes and accepts social and political institutions that facilitate change in the direction he deems necessary and makes a positive correlation between the two. The process and ends of change must be seen

as causally related before participant patterns of orientations are likely to be developed. Desired change, if perceived as impossible through human intervention, will not be a stimulus to participation.

The third step in development of participant orientations is the making of demands. Once goals have been established and the means of goal attainment perceived, demands must be made upon institutional decision-makers to attempt change in desired directions. When these three steps have been satisfied - the development of confidence in one's own opinions, the establishment of goals based upon this confidence, and demands made on decision-makers for change in the direction of these goals - the conditions for "participant" roles in the community can be said to have been satisfied.²⁶²

Most Japanese people do hold attitudes about a wide variety of political issues. They are issue-oriented about a wide spectrum of issues when they are personally affected by the political process or when public issues are closely concerned with the goals they have established for themselves or the political system. Those who are strongly issue-oriented are predominantly in the middle stratum although issue-oriented people are found in other strata to a lesser degree. Cognitive and affective political orientations are most strongly held by the mobile, well-educated, and white-collar young. The political policies that seem to cause the most uniform interest are those that have to do with war and with the Japanese military.²⁶³

The defeat of Japan in World War II, the implementation of democracy and the end of the "Emperor System," and the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima are all thought to be reasons for the apparently universal interest among Japanese in the SDF (Self Defense Force), American military policy in Asia, and relations between Japan and Communist China.²⁶⁴ There has been a very strong reinforcement of negative values respecting the military in Japan since the defeat in 1945, and as a result the military profession is held in rather low esteem by the young.²⁶⁵ At the same time substantial segments of the population feel that Japan must develop her own military capability to protect her economic and political interests in Asia.²⁶⁶ The American involvement in Vietnam has increased the interest in matters relating to military and foreign affairs, and judgments about the desirable Japanese policy toward the war and American intentions are found in all strata of Japanese society.²⁶⁷

The issues that seem to concern most Japanese have to do with the quality of life, especially in economic terms, of all strata of society, the poor and the unskilled as well as the relatively well-off. The amount of leisure time, the quality and quantity of consumer goods available, rates of taxation, and distribution of governmental services and favors, are issues about which strong opinions are widely held.²⁶⁸ There are widespread opinions on the governmental policies that ought to be pursued as well as judgments about what the quality of life in Japan ought to be.

The evidence from the National Character Survey indicates a persistent interest in the quality of life in Japan and rather widely held beliefs about how it can be achieved. There is no evidence of a failure to establish personal goals or to participate in system goals. The survey clearly leads to the conclusion that opinions are widely held about a variety of political policies and that government action or inaction is being evaluated on the basis of system goals that are designed to meet these ends.

One of the theoretical weaknesses of the "activist-participant" model of democratic behavior has been a belief that participation must be direct action taken to effect or participate in a decision that allocates authoritative values by political institutions.²⁶⁹ If members of the community are not discovered voting, writing to government officials, contributing to campaigns, and so forth, they are counted as "non-participants" in the system.²⁷⁰ The theory could be improved by accounting for another type of political behavior that is more subtle and hence more difficult to detect or measure.

If members of the community are satisfied that political decisions are being made within roughly similar limits to those they personally establish or approve, they may participate and not be actively involved. Their "non-involvement" may be an indication that they do formulate goals, do have expectations of government behavior, and are satisfied that everything is being done that could be done to meet these ends.

In this situation, the critical act of participation is to share in the general establishment of the community goals and to be cognizant of political or social progress in meeting them. No overt acts of measurable participation are necessary, unless persons become dissatisfied with programs or policies established by social and political leaders.

It is not necessary to find uniform active involvement by even a majority of the members of a community to demonstrate a preponderance of participant orientations. According to this modification of the participant theory, it is necessary only to show that a preponderance of members of the community know and diligently evaluate government policies with reference to personal and collective goals in which they participate. In this broader sense of participation the evidence is strong that participant orientations are the dominant ones in many strata of Japanese society, but particularly in the middle stratum.

The next step in this analysis, following a thesis of participation, is to identify attitudes of Japanese people toward the processes of interest articulation and aggregation and the institutions that are responsible for authoritative decision-making. The existence of interest groups, political parties, and liberal governmental institutions is not as important to this argument as the attitude of the people to the structure of these institutions, their processes of action, and the goals they pursue. The findings in the data indicate participation and involvement in this context.

There is ample empirical evidence to analyze political participation of Japanese people at three levels - local government and hamlet-level associations, national government, and organized political interest groups. Involvement in political activity at any of these occurs only if the Japanese people perceive themselves as being able to influence political outcomes in some way. Their self-perception as political actors is the crucial variable in predicting the kind and amount of political activity to be expected. The evidence from the National Character Survey indicates that Japanese people perceive themselves as actors playing political roles in a political contest over priorities of values, processes, and institutions.

Although many observers believe that most Japanese people do not identify with political parties and their ideologies,²⁷¹ the evidence in the survey points to the opposite conclusion. Japanese people do tend to be ideologically oriented, do understand the different perspectives of the various parties, and do identify themselves with particular parties. More than seventy percent of the respondents in the survey identify with the Liberal Democrats, Social Democrats, Socialists, Communists, or the "Koseiren" (The Sokka Gakkai sect of Buddhism). (Table VI-A) Only twenty-nine percent indicated no support of any political party. A breakdown of the data according to demographic variables indicates that these levels of party support run rather uniformly throughout the country. Males slightly more than females, young slightly more than

TABLE VI-A

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND
AND POLITICAL PARTY SUPPORT
(in percentages)

	RESPONSE CHOICES						TOTAL % N
	Lib- eral Demo- crats	So- cial- Demo- crats	So- cial- ists	Com- mun- ists	Koseiren	None	
Sex							
Male	47	4	23	1	1	24	100 1251
Female	40	2	21	-	2	35	100 1445
$X^2 = 72.320$	$G = .179$						
Age							
20-30	35	4	31	1	1	28	100 696
31-45	45	3	22	-	3	27	100 953
46-60	50	1	15	-	2	32	100 643
60+	53	2	8	-	1	36	100 384
$X^2 = 225.283$	$G = -.075$						
Education (completed)							
Low school	42	2	14	-	2	40	100 562
Med school	44	2	23	-	2	29	100 1102
Hi school	43	5	25	1	1	25	100 794
College	42	7	26	1	1	23	100 218
$X^2 = 212.918$	$G = -.083$						
Occupation							
Housewife	39	3	24	-	2	32	100 647
Student	21	5	42	-	5	27	100 19
Professional+							
Managerial	52	3	14	-	2	29	100 367
Factory - Blue							
Collar	25	3	42	1	2	27	100 409
Factory-White							
Collar	42	3	26	1	2	26	100 407
Farm &							
fishermen	60	3	12	-	1	24	100 522
Day-laborer	35	2	28	2	2	31	100 43
Unemployed	42	1	13	-	1	43	100 311
$X^2 = 416.173$	$L = .022$						
City-Size							
Six Largest	40	4	23	1	3	29	100 433
200,000+	37	5	27	1	4	26	100 334
100,000+	46	2	15	1	1	35	100 286
50,000+	36	3	23	-	2	36	100 307
<50,000	45	1	18	1	1	34	100 310
Town, Village							
Village	47	3	22	-	1	27	100 1026
$X^2 = 127.183$	$G = .037$						

old, educated slightly more than uneducated, and middle-class workers slightly more than lower-class workers support one of the major political parties, but in general, widespread party identification and support occurs in all strata of Japanese society.

This party support is also translated into active participation at the three levels described above. When asked, "What do you usually do when there are elections for the Lower House?" fifty-three percent responded "leave everything aside and vote," forty-one percent responded, "try as much as possible to vote," and only four percent said they "can't really get very interested in voting." Eight tenths of one percent of the respondents said they never vote. When the first two response categories are combined, that is those who almost always vote, there is a uniform pattern of voting across all age, occupation, education, and sex categories. Ninety-four percent of those surveyed do vote and statistics on national voting percentages confirm the accuracy of their statements.²⁷² It can be concluded on the basis of the data that political party identification is wide-spread in Japan, cutting across all class lines, and that voting is an even more universal characteristic behavior. (Table VI-B)

Critics of the "rational-activist" model as applied in Japan argue that the voting statistics are deceiving because Japanese people vote only as part of a ritual.²⁷³ They argue that the voters do not think ideologically, do not understand issues, and do not express preferences when they vote. Their

TABLE VI-B

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND
AND VOTING HABITS IN DIET ELECTIONS
(in percentages)

	RESPONSE CHOICES				TOTAL % N
	Leave Everything and Vote	Try as Much as Possible to Vote	Don't Vote		
Sex					
Male	57	38	5	100	1251
Female	50	43	7	100	1445
	$\chi^2 = 21.804 \quad G = .144$				
Age					
20-30	43	51	6	100	696
31-45	54	40	6	100	953
46-60	57	38	5	100	643
60+	62	30	8	100	384
	$\chi^2 = 99.479 \quad G = -.131$				
Education (completed)					
Low school	51	38	11	100	562
Med school	53	41	6	100	1102
Hi school	55	41	4	100	794
College	51	48	1	100	218
	$\chi^2 = 67.458 \quad G = -.051$				
Occupation					
Housewife	48	46	6	100	647
Student	26	74	-	100	19
Professional- Managerial	58	40	2	100	367
Factory - Blue Collar	53	40	7	100	409
Factory - White Collar	43	54	3	100	407
Farm & fishermen	62	32	6	100	522
Day-laborer	63	33	4	100	43
Unemployed	53	37	10	100	311
	$\chi^2 = 119.106 \quad L = .010$				
City-Size					
Six Largest	39	53	8	100	433
200,000+	47	45	8	100	334
100,000+	50	43	7	100	286
50,000+	60	35	5	100	307
<50,000	57	37	6	100	310
Town, Village	59	37	4	100	1026
	$\chi^2 = 84.792 \quad G = -.176$				

act of voting is seen as a simple act of subservience to a powerful omnipotent central authority that requires voting as one of the evidences of subservience. In this perspective, no expectations of politically efficacious policies are thought, by the voters, to result from this form of political activity.

The evidence points to the opposite conclusion. Middle-class Japanese people are cognizant of different political ideologies, understand their differences, and vote to express their preferences. They have strong feelings about how political actors should behave, what policies they should pursue, and the consequences of policies on their own lives. Respondents were tested for their willingness to follow leaders unquestioningly and their desire to avoid confrontation by not participating in politics themselves. They were asked the question, "There is the opinion that in order to improve Japan, if there is a good politician, it is better to leave politics to him, rather than for the people to argue among themselves. Would you agree with this or disagree?" Although fifty-one percent of those responding agreed with the statement, there are significant differences according to age, occupation, education and sex variables. (Table VI-C)

Only thirty-nine percent of those under twenty-four agreed with this statement however, sixty-four percent of those over sixty agreed. Fifty-seven percent of male respondents agreed to leave politics to the politicians but only forty-five percent of females were so disposed. Although

TABLE VI-C

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND
AND WILLINGNESS TO LEAVE POLITICS TO OTHERS
(in percentages)

	RESPONSE CHOICES		TOTAL	
	Leave Politics to Politician	Should Not Leave Politics to Politician	%	N
Sex				
Male	57	43	100	1211
Female	45	55	100	1301
$X^2 = 39.57$ df = 1 P < .0001 G = .248				
Age				
20-30	42	58	100	661
31-45	46	54	100	913
46-60	54	46	100	607
60+	64	36	100	331
$X^2 = 57.85$ df = 3 P < .0001 G = .1817				
Education (completed)				
Low school	63	37	100	477
Med school	50	50	100	1026
Hi school	43	57	100	777
College	40	60	100	213
$X^2 = 51.349$ df = 3 P < .0001 G = -.215				
Occupation				
Housewife	45	55	100	594
Student	47	53	100	19
Professional- Managerial	38	62	100	172
Factory - Blue Collar	47	53	100	194
Factory - White Collar	36	64	100	187
Farm & fishermen	53	47	100	391
Day-laborer	56	44	100	41
Unemployed	60	40	100	269
$X^2 = 39.144$ df = 7 P < .0001 L = .102				
City-Size				
Six largest	49	51	100	421
200,000+	45	55	100	319
100,000+	46	54	100	266
50,000+	54	46	100	278
<50,000	52	48	100	283
Town, Village	49	51	100	945
No Significant Association				

sixty-three percent of those in the lowest educational category agreed to leave politics to politicians, only forty percent of college graduates would agree to do so. Fifty-three percent of farmers and fifty-six percent of day-workers would not involve themselves in politics; however, only thirty-six percent of employees in large firms and forty-seven percent of employees in medium firms felt they should not be involved. The differences according to city size were not statistically significant.

Generally the data indicate that the young, the well-educated, and the middle-class workers feel a necessity to participate in politics even at the cost of having the people "argue among themselves." They are oriented toward personal political involvement as a means of achieving their goals. The feeling that one should avoid public display or confrontation whenever possible may still exist, but there is no feeling that confrontation politics to resolve competing demands should not be a legitimate process or that it should not involve widespread participation. This is a part of the "myth" of Japanese participation politics that is most difficult for Western observers to understand and place within proper theoretical limits.

The "unique" form of confrontation politics, particularly between the student groups and the government, has received a great deal of attention by social scientists.²⁷⁴ The "Zengaukeren," a militant, left-wing student group is widely known for its confrontation tactics that seem to require

strict adherence to traditionally prescribed rules of behavior. Even in the most violent of confrontations deference is paid to the problem of "face" for both competing groups. When the contest has ended both sides agree, and the media report that no "victors" and no "vanquished" emerged as a result of the confrontation. A stalemate prevents the necessity for prolonging the confrontation by either side to protect its "image" and so both sides agree to contest the issues in a way permitting each adversary to emerge from the contest with pride. When missiles are used they are used against opponents who are adequately protected with defensive paraphernalia, care is taken on both sides to prevent loss of life, and designated property targets are agreed to by both belligerents and police to prevent widespread destruction. These conditions of confrontation are not widely understood.

The point that is important here is that the forms of participation may be so diverse as to accommodate a wide variety of cultural idiosyncracies without doing any damage to the principle involved. The articulation of interests through accepted channels of communication and involvement to achieve these interests through commonly accepted institutions is all that is required. No uniformity of institutions or "rules of the game" are necessary to comply with the "activist" model of participation orientations required in "modern" or "liberal" polities.

In Japan participation of a wide variety of different groups, including the radical groups such as the Zengaukeren,

is accepted by members of the community as long as behavior patterns conform to standards accepted within that community. There is some regularity and uniformity of standards of public behavior in modern polities, particularly as the size of the middle classes increase, but no absolute regularity is needed to validate the theory. There are variations about tolerable levels of violence and disruption, about the proper and improper public positions of individuals and groups, but there are uniformities of beliefs in most industrial societies that individuals can and ought to participate in the political processes that effect their lives. Japan does not seem to be an exception. Based upon evidence obtained in the National Character Survey, Japanese people also perceive the desirability and necessity of citizen involvement in the political process.

The argument of continuities in processes of citizen participation and commonality of demands in industrial cultures, however, can be made only in very general contexts. It is not necessary to establish that demands for socialist or capitalist economic institutions must be made in two polities to demonstrate that residents of both are "modern" and that they are "rational-participants." It is only necessary to establish that their demands are roughly comparable within broad categories. Such categories could include demands for processes allowing wide-spread articulation of interests, recognition of individual worth and individual needs of members of the polity, social welfare programs, and

"individual rights" defined in a variety of ways. Individual rights, defined very broadly as the right to life and well-being, can be institutionalized in many different ways according to traditional and cultural preferences in all modern industrialized societies. The cultural peculiarities of the different modes of institutionalization of the concepts does not detract from the basically similar concerns.

Accordingly, individual rights may be construed in one context as a right to express one's opinion no matter its content and in another a right to medical treatment regardless of means. Neither medical treatment nor free speech can be shown to be necessary or sufficient conditions for liberal institutions but a concern for individual worth and well-being, however manifested in institutions, may be posited as such a condition. When attitudes of members of a community are strongly oriented in these directions they can be said to be oriented toward liberal institutions.

The extent of these values and the levels of participation centered upon these issues can be an important factor in determining what configuration institutions will take, but it may not. The commonality that is theoretically posited here is that of demands, articulated and sometimes aggregated through group activity, made upon diverse political institutions for policies that recognize the worth and well-being of the individual as a basis of governing.

Data from the National Character Survey indicate a rather wide-spread concern for freedom, individual rights,

justice, and the quality of law. Concern for these "liberal" ideas was, however, strongly centered in the middle-class respondents. The young, the well-educated, the professional, managerial, and factory workers, all were much more strongly oriented in these directions than their opposites. (Table VI-D) Seventy percent of the twenty to twenty-four age group felt a need to respect individual rights and only twenty-five percent of those over sixty felt the same need. Of all those under fifty, fifty-five percent respected individual rights and of all those over fifty, only thirty percent were similarly inclined. Males were much more "libertarian" in this survey, but the strongest differences occurred within education categories.

Only twenty-six percent of the respondents in the lowest educational category indicated a belief in the necessity to respect individual rights but more than seventy percent of the college educated thought that respect of individual rights was necessary. The occupational differences were also very significant. Eighty-four percent of the students polled, sixty-four percent of professional people, and sixty-one percent of white-collar employees all expressed preferences for individual rights and only twenty-nine percent of the unemployed, thirty-nine percent of farmers, and thirty-seven percent of day-workers were similarly inclined. There were also some differences discernible according to city size.

The same patterns emerged from the responses to the question on the necessity to respect freedom. Fifty-four percent of the young and only twenty-one percent of the old,

TABLE VI-D

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND
AND RESPECT FOR INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
(in percentages)

	RESPONSE CHOICES		TOTAL	
	Necessary to Respect Individual Rights	Not Necessary to Respect Individual Rights	%	N
Sex				
Male	54	46	100	1251
Female	44	56	100	1445
$\chi^2 = 21.563$ df = 1	P < .0001 G = .179			
Age				
20-30	65	35	100	696
31-45	51	49	100	976
46-60	41	59	100	643
60+	25	75	100	384
$\chi^2 = 205.999$ df = 3	P < .0001 G = .339			
Education (completed)				
Low school	26	74	100	562
Med school	44	56	100	1102
Hi school	64	36	100	794
College	71	29	100	218
$\chi^2 = 234.570$ df = 3	P < .0001 G = -.453			
Occupation				
Housewife	48	52	100	647
Student	84	16	100	19
Professional - Managerial	64	36	100	172
Factory - Blue Collar	53	47	100	194
Factory - White Collar	61	39	100	187
Farm & fishermen	39	61	100	422
Day-laborer	37	63	100	43
Unemployed	29	71	100	311
$\chi^2 = 106.594$ df = 7	P < .0001 L = .119			
City-Size				
Six largest	52	48	100	433
200,000+	59	41	100	334
100,000+	50	50	100	286
50,000+	44	56	100	307
<50,000	49	51	100	310
Town, Village	45	55	100	1026
$\chi^2 = 25.663$ df = 5	P < .0001 G = .105			

forty-eight percent of males and only thirty-four percent of females, sixty percent of college graduates and only twenty-one percent of elementary school education, and middle-class workers more than lower class workers felt a necessity to respect freedom. (Table VI-E) Similar response patterns occurred to the question of respect for laws that either "are made so that people will live together without friction," or "are made so that justice will be carried out in this world."

The evidence from this survey is clear. Middle-class Japanese people, those who are better educated or trained, who have professional, managerial, or skilled occupations, are strongly in favor of government policies emphasizing those values closely associated with classical liberalism. A respect for the law tempered with equal concern for individual rights and freedom can be posited as the necessary and sufficient attitudinal conditions of liberalism. The "industrial culture" of Japan seems to have been the major factor in the creation of "activist" orientations that seem to resemble the classical liberal model. Other empirical studies done recently in Japan have produced similar findings.²⁷⁵

The forms that expression of demands may take vary widely between systems. The formal processes for the aggregation and articulation of interests vary according to custom, function, and technique. Japan is in a unique position regarding the form and technique its associations may take, but it shares some commonality with other industrial societies. There are high levels of participation manifested in demands

TABLE VI-E

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND
AND RESPECT FOR FREEDOM
(in percentages)

	RESPONSE CHOICES		TOTAL %	N
	Necessary to Respect Freedom	Not Necessary to Respect Freedom		
Sex				
Male	48	52	100	1251
Female	34	66	100	1445
$\chi^2 = 55.40$ df = 1 P < .0001 G = .287				
Age				
20-30	54	46	100	696
31-45	43	57	100	976
46-60	30	70	100	843
60+	21	79	100	384
$\chi^2 = 148.665$ df = 3 P < .0001 G = .298				
Education (completed)				
Low school	21	79	100	562
Med school	39	61	100	1102
Hi school	50	50	100	794
College	61	39	100	218
$\chi^2 = 153.408$ df = 3 P < .0001 G = -.371				
Occupation				
Housewife	35	65	100	647
Student	63	37	100	19
Professional- Managerial	65	35	100	172
Factory - Blue Collar	42	58	100	216
Factory - White Collar	52	48	100	193
Farm & fishermen	38	62	100	422
Day-laborer	40	60	100	43
Unemployed	25	75	100	311
$\chi^2 = 84.879$ df = 7 P < .0001 L = .061				
City-Size				
Six largest	44	56	100	433
200,000+	42	58	100	334
100,000+	42	58	100	286
50,000+	40	60	100	307
<50,000	37	63	100	310
Town, Village	38	62	100	1026
Relationships not significant				

made upon political institutions through local and national associations. These associations are viewed by Japanese people as an integral and legitimate part of the political process. There is a wide-spread belief that legitimate interests ought to be represented through formal, competitive associations that pursue individualistic as well as public interests.²⁷⁶

Interest groups in Japan work within a more narrowly defined range of legitimate activities than may be the case in other industrial societies. The limits of their legitimate behavior are carefully defined through reference to customary ideas about how conflicts ought to be resolved. There is a traditionally transmitted belief that conflicts ought not to be public even when they seem to be legitimate processes for reconciliation of differences of opinion or interest. The conflict itself, in traditional Japan, was meticulously avoided whenever possible even at the sacrifice of personal or group interest.

In modern Japan there is a feeling that conflict should not be avoided at the cost of loss of personal or group gain, but that associations ought to competitively pursue group interests while keeping the conflict from being public as much as possible. There is a feeling that legitimate political processes include group competition over the allocation of community resources as long as the competition is not made too public. Thus trade unions seem to lack some of the effectiveness of American labor unions since they rarely, with the exception of one or two international unions, engage in

strikes. Their unwillingness to strike or engage in public boycott is seen by many observers as an indication of the traditional limitations placed upon active participation in the political process. A more realistic interpretation is possible when traditional preferences are placed in proper perspective, when their limitations on action orientations are determined through empirical inquiry.

It would be difficult for a group to pursue collective goals unless it used methods perceived as legitimate by its members. Failure to do so would mean a lack of group cohesiveness and ineffectual competition with competing interests. The rational step in the Japanese context is to compete with opposing interests to achieve group goals but to do so within the context of legitimate behaviors when possible. This does not necessarily mean that the group will be ineffective. If all interested parties to a conflict agree to use similar processes, the nature of the processes will not be the measure of success or failure of any interest. Whether the activities are overt or covert, whether there is publicity or no publicity, whether prestige and "face"⁹ of participants is maintained or not, the outcomes will not necessarily be changed if all parties to the dispute agree on fundamental rules of operation.²⁷⁷

In the Japanese context groups do function effectively, they do articulate interests, and they do contest their preferences in the public bodies. They do so with less ostentatious display, with more regard for the fate of their

adversaries, and with as little conflict as possible, but they still do it. By conforming to these rules of propriety they maintain public acceptance of their activities and enjoy much greater success than would be the case if they adopted American or European methods of noisy, public, vitriolic competition. In either case, the importance to the industrial culture theory is that interests are aggregated and articulated and that is certainly the case in Japan. It is important for my thesis here that the activities of associations representing group and individual interests be regarded favorably by the dominant middle classes in Japan. There is viable evidence that this is the case.²⁷⁸

Some of the most effective associations are the bureaucratic associations, teacher associations, student groups, labor unions, and professional clubs.²⁷⁹ The effectiveness of religious organizations and even of associations like the League of Women Voters depend upon compliance with the rules of the game outlined above.²⁸⁰ Associations that seem least effectual are those using the techniques that might be legitimized in other systems like the United States or Europe. Threats, coercion, and even violence characterize the least successful associations like "Bin Akao's Great Japan Patriots' Party."²⁸¹ The unwillingness of interest groups in Japan to adopt Western techniques should be regarded as a sign of their strength, not weakness. The competitive ethic, based upon pursuit of individual and group goals seems to be

regarded as a legitimate process in Japan when behaviors conform to accepted standards of "propriety."

Chapter VII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The study of the political culture of Japan is singularly important to the process of theory-building in the area of political development. This is so because "modern " Japan is much like other modern states in terms of the secularization and differentiation of its political institutions, the significantly high levels of economic prosperity, the rationalization of its political policies and processes, and the instrumentality and functionalism of its social institutions. It is much like other modern states in terms of the life-experiences of its people. There are high levels of consumption, significant amounts of leisure time, high levels of educational opportunity, significant personal mobility, and extensive exposure to the public media in almost all strata of the population.

Japan seems to be unique among Asian nations in the levels of rationality, political sophistication, and individual acquisitiveness of its people. It has, in short, achieved levels of political development common only in Western polities in a principally "non-Western" setting. Economic development has occurred in the absence of a "Protestant Reformation." Capitalism has been the route to significant production in the absence of strict "laissez-faire" economic thought. It has achieved high levels of political participation and identification with rationalized political processes

and nevertheless attempted to minimize conflict and tension common in other modern systems.

If generalities about the development process are assumed to be uniformly valid, they must apply to non-Western as well as Western systems. Japan is therefore a good place to begin evaluating theories of political development. Cross-national comparison of political systems designed to test the validity of theories of development ought to be made between systems that have experienced the entire range of different historical cultures in order to reach meaningful conclusions about the theories. The theories can be validated only when commonalities of behaviors and attitudes are discovered in modern systems that have experienced heterogeneous and divergent cultures, histories, and traditions.

I have attempted to apply to Japan three of the central assumptions about modern political cultures, - the assumption of rationality in personal decision-making, the assumption of dominant individualistic value orientations, and the assumption of participation in the political process - in order to test for congruity with other modern political systems. I have sought to discover if survey data support the hypothesis that the Japanese political culture has changed from one of predominantly ascriptive, subject role orientations to one of predominantly rational-activist role orientations. I have also tested the hypothesis that the values associated with the rational-activist model of political behavior are predominantly middle-class values, occurring across all strata of Japanese

society, but principally within the middle stratum.

The most important difference between modern and traditional political cultures, it seems to me, is the occurrence of reason or rationality in thought processes. People living in modern political systems, in general, behave and form attitudes according to rational thought processes. People living in traditional political systems generally do not. Although there is no agreement on a precise meaning of the concept of rationality, its precise definition is more a philosophical than a practical problem. In order to be useful in understanding the concepts associated with political development, only one conception of rationality must be understood - individual orientation toward change. A person's attitude toward innovation, discovery, and invention, his ability to understand causality in his immediate experience, and to make affective and evaluative judgments based upon this understanding, determine his level of rationality. If the attitude toward change is known, no other perspective of a person's presumed rationality must be known to understand the effect his attitudes will have on the process of political development.

The response patterns to the National Character Survey indicate significant levels of rationality when rationality is measured as an index of perspective on change, the ability to understand life-experiences in terms of cause and effect, persistent discrimination among values, careful selection of values according to self-interest, and a pragmatic orientation

toward mystical, supernatural, or superstitious belief.

Although construction of an index of rationality will inevitably be at least partially arbitrary, the indices listed above do form a good representation of those perspectives that are seen as most important by social scientists doing research in this area.

The evidence in the survey strongly supports the thesis that middle-class Japanese people are more positively oriented toward change, are less superstitious, are more pragmatically oriented, and more likely to evaluate their life-experience in terms of causality, than any other strata in their society. The incidence of responses indicating these perspectives among middle-class Japanese was furthermore as frequent as one would expect to find in almost any other modern political community. There was convincing evidence that the orientations of middle-class people toward change and their perspectives on rationality were similar to the orientations of middle-class people who might be found in any industrial culture.

I accept the criticism that I cannot conclusively demonstrate that the questions asked in the National Character Survey, those I have used as indices of rationality, have actually measured rationality. Other social scientists possibly prefer different questions when testing for rationality. However, there is no single set of questions that measure rationality that all students of Japan accept. In the absence of a set of uniformly acceptable questions, those asked in the survey are as useful as any other set of possible

questions. They were prepared by competent persons who are knowledgeable in the nuances of meaning of the Japanese language, and they attempt to measure the attitudes I have hypothesized as indicators of rationality. They are therefore probably as good a set of questions as could be devised for this study.

The appropriateness of survey data to measure rationality is an additional problem. I accept the criticism that behaviors are probably a better indication of attitudes than responses to questions asked in an attitude survey. It would be desirable to assign research personnel to validate responses to survey questions by identifying corroborative behaviors. When this is done, however, the list of respondents must be narrowed considerably to make the investigation methodologically possible and the sample becomes less useful because it loses statistical significance.

It seems to me that both kinds of research are necessary to validate theories about the Japanese political culture. Survey analysis and observation of behaviors compared and contrasted with one another provide the best possible research world. The behaviors of Japanese people, those that occur in public and that can be measured for the population as a group, generally uphold the hypotheses advanced here. More particular research into public behaviors of Japanese people - voting studies, interest group activities, and so forth - still need to be done.

If these limitations on the data are accepted, it is

otherwise empirically sound. It was coded, scaled, and gathered according to accepted standards of proficiency. It is therefore probably as good an indication of value preferences of Japanese people as can be obtained using survey research techniques. A major strength of the data is its uniform statistical significance. In every instance the sample was large enough to meet those tests generally accepted as indicators of statistical significance. In almost all instances the tests of correlation coefficient of variables were higher than the acceptable minimums for publishable research.

The data indicate the existence of a generally rational middle-class population, one that is pragmatic in its judgment about behaviors and which emphasizes positivistic explanations of reality. The middle class feels itself less bound by traditional values and practices, by traditional approaches to religion and child-rearing, and by historical answers to ultimate questions than any other strata in Japanese society and less than is expected by many social scientists.

The data lead to the conclusion that the hypothesis of predominantly rational value-orientations among middle-class people in industrial cultures is validated in Japan. Although there are idiosyncratic differences in institutions and practices, Japanese middle-class people seem to share attitudes of rationality common to middle-class people in other industrial societies.

The data support the hypothesis that the most important

variable in determining a rational value orientation is the "economic situation" of people living in a political system. Although other variables might be usefully explored, one cannot understand value orientations unless one understands the unique life-experiences associated with particular economic situations of members of a polity. The data also tend to validate the hypothesis that when economic conditions are known values can be predicted with a significant degree of accuracy irrespective of historical, cultural, or other differences.

The data also indicate significant departures from tradition in values of Japanese people relating to family, group, and individual orientations. Although there are new orientations in all strata of Japanese society, they are most frequent among the well-educated, the young, the professional and white-collar workers, and men. The tendency to choose values in terms of individual rather than family or village interest was predominant among Japanese middle-class people. The belief that obligations unfreely taken, or taken by a parent or relative for a Japanese person, need not be kept, is characteristic of almost all of the middle-class population. Obligations freely taken by the individual are honored.

Deference to persons because of their station - their age, position in a social or political group, or rank in a family structure - is less important to Japanese middle-class people than deference to persons based on principles

of merit. Thus deference is not automatically paid to all elderly males, only to those who have earned respect through achievement.

Conflicts of interest are resolved in favor of individual rather than family or other social-group interest. Deference is still paid to family lines of authority, but when conflicts between an individual's personal interest and obligations to family occur, the conflicts are resolved in favor of the individual. Traditional loyalties to family and family-like associations have been given new and functional uses. They are used as incentives for personal achievement and advancement. They serve to enjoin common loyalties to production goals. They form a complicated set of relationships in the work situation of Japanese people in which obligations run in both the directions of employees and employers. Employees are obligated to their employers to produce at their capacity and employers are accountable for the well-being of their employees. The relationship is goal-oriented, and the related behaviors are associated with the goals. Deference not associated with merit or mutual reciprocity is rarely given.

Traditional conceptions of personal ascription also seem to have been superceded, in the Japanese middle class, by a new willingness to participate in public social and political processes. The evidence from the survey indicates the existence of a belief among middle-class Japanese that politics ought to be a matter of universal concern and that participation by only a few is less desirable than participation by

many. This belief is associated with a regard for personal liberty and rights. It is also associated with concern for the general welfare.

There seems to be a close correlation between the political values of middle-class Japanese people and the classical models of liberal democratic thought. These political value preferences are not matched, however, by commitment to any particular economic institutions. Neither capitalism nor socialism as economic institutions received the same support in the survey as the commitment to personal freedom, individual rights, and the public welfare.

The evidence I have examined in this study leads to a conclusion that a change of emphasis in scholarly work on Japan might be desirable. I am arguing for a change of emphasis more than a change in direction. Many researchers seem to be cognizant of the value of empirical research in studying the Japanese political culture. However, the evidence is often evaluated within the limits imposed by perceptions of traditional Japanese culture. I am arguing for evaluation of empirical evidence in Japan according to the same standards that are applied in evaluating evidence from any other industrial society.

This is not to suggest that continued inquiry into the effects of traditional Japanese beliefs and practices on modern value systems is not desirable, but that the conclusions from these inquiries should be tested according to methodologies uniformly applied in other cultures that have comparable

levels of economic and political development.

There is a comparatively small volume of literature available to the behavioral scientist who desires to compare political behaviors of Japanese people with political behaviors of people living in other modern political systems. The available data on voting, interest group activities, legislative behavior and process, and bureaucratic and judicial behavior are so scarce that comparison with other modern systems is difficult. It seems to me that this is so because of the large number of scholars whose research assumptions minimize the importance of behavioral data in doing research on the Japanese polity and its population. They are convinced that the "historically determined present-day Japan" model is accurate and therefore empirical inquiry is either invalid or unnecessary.

The evidence from the National Character Survey indicates that these research assumptions may not be valid. It indicates that practices and beliefs of traditional Japanese people should not prescribe limitations on current research methodologies. A tentative conclusion indicated by the evidence presented here is that survey research, and perhaps many other types of behavioral inquiry, have as much validity in Japan as they might have in any modern political system.

The evidence presented here points strongly in this direction. It points in this direction because it is an approach that is not usually taken by scholars of Japanese politics, and because it leads to conclusions not generally

accepted by these scholars. For these reasons this study seems to point in a direction in which more useful inquiry might be made.

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