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THE POLITICS OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN POSTWAR JAPAN

T. JOHN PEMPEL

Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for
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ABSTRACT

THE POLITICS OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN POSTWAR JAPAN

T. JOHN PEMPEL

This is a study of policymaking in Japan. It deals with the period since World War II and focuses on policymaking in three specific areas of higher education: university administration, specialization and differentiation, and finally enrollment expansion. As such it seeks to go beyond the single case study which is often presented as *sui generis* while at the same time being more empirically based and data intensive than broader macro-theoretical approaches. The key focus is on the isolation of three discrete and independent patterns of policymaking: policymaking by camp conflict, incremental policymaking and pressure group policymaking.

Which pattern is more likely is seen to be a function of the mutual reinforcement of several specific variables concerning the scope, affect and divisibility of the individual issue around which policy is made, plus specifically political variables concerning relevant legal requirements and the organizational and mobilizational capabilities of the political actors most directly involved. This basic framework of analysis is presented in Chapter Two.

The issue related variables are analyzed in Chapter Three, where university administration is found to be high in affect, broad in scope and non-divisible, enrollment expansion is conversely low in affect, narrow in scope and highly divisible while the third issue, specialization and differentiation, is found to represent something of a midpoint on all three issue variables.

The political variables are examined in Chapter Four. Japan is dominated by the politics of what is called "hegemonic bipolarity" in

which two political camps monopolize the political arena but only one, the conservative camp, has consistently been in charge of the governmental apparatus and has been far stronger and more mobilizable on most issues than the opposing progressives. Analysis of a series of quantitative data makes it clear that a number of policymaking devices exist which allow the conservative camp to make major policy decisions through a reliance on closed bureaucratic devices to which the progressive camp has at best limited access. This bureaucratization of policymaking is of great advantage to the conservatives and their allies in those issues where more public arenas such as the Diet can legally be ignored.

Chapters Five through Seven each examine in detail several individual decisions connected with each of the three issues, finding that the policymaking process most utilized in the resolution of each issue corresponds to one of the three patterns: university administration is dominated by policymaking through camp conflict; enrollment expansion by incrementalism; and differentiation and specialization by pressure group policymaking.

The study strongly suggests the utility of analyzing empirically a finite number of cases within a broad but fixed time period. It concludes that there is no single pattern of policymaking in Japan, but that there are several patterns which dominate policymaking. These are distinct from one another, but they repeat themselves under comparable circumstances.

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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

This is a study of policymaking in Japan. It deals with the period since World War II and focuses on three specific areas of higher education: university administration, specialization and differentiation of higher education and finally, enrollment expansion. Two fundamental questions should be dealt with quite early: why policymaking?; and why higher education? Aside from the cliched, although still quite valid, answer, "because they are there," more substantive reasons can be advanced.

The study of policymaking forces one to come to grips with some of the most basic questions in political science. Which groups and individuals hold power within societies, and how they use this power has been a dominant concern of political analysts from Thrasymachus and Aristotle, through Machiavelli and Hobbes up to Kaplan and Morgenthau. The study of policymaking is also the study of power.

In addition policymaking meshes well with another important tradition of political analysis focusing primarily on the state and its political institutions. How do individual institutions of government interact with one another? By what processes do they regulate individual and group behavior within society? How do governments authoritatively allocate values within society? Such questions are also answerable in part through an analysis of public policymaking.

Policymaking allows one to relate meaningfully to many other sub-areas of the discipline such as group theory: how formal or informal groups cooperate and compete for favorable political actions; political parties and party systems: how individual actors are in conflict over,

or reach accord on, public policy stands, how they take action on these positions, and how different aggregations of actors taking similar or dissimilar positions result in different policy formulations. More normatively, studying policymaking allows one to begin drawing conclusions regarding specific patterns of political interactions as "better" or "worse" than others, while the cumulative picture of these patterns allows one to categorize polities as democratic, pluralist, legitimate, authoritarian or dictatorial.

Numerous other connections can be made to suggest why policymaking studies are of very high potential in the field of political science, but the point should be clear that policymaking provides something of a unifying link among many of the disparate sub-fields in the discipline. Indeed, one writer has gone so far as to suggest that it may well be the dominant organizing principle in political science for the decade of the 1970's.[1] Perhaps an element of wishful thinking is contained in this proposition; nonetheless the concept has genuine potential as the entering wedge into a number of component aspects of political science.

How best to realize this potential remains something of a question. There have been numerous individual case studies of policymaking, the standard pattern involving the in-depth investigation of some specific sequence of events leading to the formulation of some discreet policy. While such intensive examination of a single case is an important and largely-relied-upon method in political analysis, its limits must be recognized: "A single case can constitute neither the basis for a valid generalization nor the ground for disproving an established generalization."[2]

[1] Irving Louis Horowitz, "Introduction," in Irving Louis Horowitz, ed., The Use and Abuse of Social Science, 1.

[2] Arendt Lijphart, "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method," 691.

In stark contrast to the usually highly empirical case study, and of far more general thrust, several extremely stimulating but rather abstract models of policymaking have been formulated in which a chain of deductive reasoning is used to generate a series of very general propositions about such things as inputs and outputs, operational environment, satisficing, or feedback loops. In almost all such approaches, however, the level of abstraction is so high that clarification of specific empirical questions is almost totally absent. Such theories thus exist in something of a practical and factual vacuum.[3]

In the face of these two such disparate approaches there is a pressing need for more "middle range" studies aimed at bridging the gap between the highly factual but conceivably atypical and virtually always non-analytic case studies, and the all too often self-evidently true but tautological models of the grand theorists.[4] In such middle range works, both fact and theory would be intermeshed, the aim being to investigate hard "facts" concerning specific cases but in a manner conducive to the creation of hypotheses capable of being tested in more than one historical, cultural or situational milieu. Correlatively, the most promising hypotheses of others can serve as theoretical guideposts in one's own gathering of facts. In short, the argument is that if comparative politics is to become truly comparative, the findings of the discipline must be presented in such a manner as to be cumulative and mutually relatable. Some agreement seems to be emerging on the fruitfulness of such principles of research despite the fact that actual results so far demonstrate little of the implied homogeneity.

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[3] Among some of the better works still subject to such criticism are Karl Deutsch, <u>The Nerves of Government</u>; David Easton, <u>A Systems Analysis of Political Life</u>; and Talcott Parsons and Edward Shils, eds. <u>Toward a General Theory of Action</u>.

[4] A particularly persuasive essay on this topic is Joseph LaPalombara, "Macro-theories and Microapplications in Comparative Politics: A Widening Chasm," 52-78.

Part, although by no means all, of this unresolved heterogeneity would appear to be due to the fact that too much variation is allowed to stand uncontrolled in many studies. Or more exactly, too much explanation is sought from particular studies without adequate efforts at controlling extraneous variation. One must strongly resist the probably natural tendency to draw overly broad interpretations from limited data and to be quite explicit in recognizing exactly the context within which one's findings make the most sense.

In the terminology of Holt and Turner, one fruitful method of doing so is to "control by specification" of the variables involved so that the precise relationships between them may be explicitly examined. It was this method, they noted, that was used by Max Weber in his study, Protestantism and the Spirit of Capitalism. Essentially Weber demonstrates that while certain material factors were otherwise common to a number of Protestant and non-Protestant societies, it was only in the former that capitalism developed as an economic system. By thus holding common the various material factors, and showing the differences that occurred in the presence of religious-cultural variables, he could logically deduce a causal relationship between the religious-cultural variance and the variance in economic system.[5] Thus, in the words of Lijphart, "by using comparable cases in which many variables are constant, once can reduce considerably the number

[5]Robert T. Holt and John E. Turner, "The Methodology of Comparative Research," in Holt and Turner, eds., The Methodology of Comparative Research, 1-20. The concomitant danger, of course, is that the more highly controlled and narrowly focused the study, the less potential relevance it may turn out to have.

of operative variables and study their relationships under controlled conditions ..." thereby maximizing the validity of inferences drawn.[6]

What one controls is of course a function of what one seeks to explain or of what one can reasonably expect to explain given the availability of data and the more general state of factual and theoretical knowledge in the area of potential investigation. In this study, explanation is sought for variations in the policymaking process in postwar Japan. The actual framework for examining such differences will be detailed in Chapter 2; suffice it at this time to note that the argument will be made the policymaking patterns differ largely in accord with different types of issues. What should be noted here is that three important controls are built into the study in an attempt to maximize the likely validity of that hypothesis and those subsequently advanced to explain such variation: control over the political unit involved, control over the historical time period involved and finally, control over the functional area of policymaking investigated.

The most elemental control being exercised is that the study concerns only one country, Japan. Arguments and evidence will be presented in a manner hopefully conducive to comparative political studies and references will be made to problems, data, and studies in areas other than Japan. Furthermore, evidence will be examined in light of deductively-generated hypotheses. In these ways, the study should be more than what is pejoratively dismissed as an area studies work.[7] But it is an explanation of

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[6] Lijphart, "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method," 687.

[7] On the relevance of such single-country studies, see Samuel H. Beer, "The Comparative Method and the Study of British Politics," 19-36.

political phenomena in Japan that is of primary concern and the limits of such a control are clear: even if a particular pattern of policymaking is unshakably shown to occur under specific circumstances in Japan, the presence of identical circumstances in China, Chile, Canada or Chad can not automatically be assumed to generate the same policymaking pattern. One can hope, and even expect, of course, that coincidence will be more likely than not and that relations noted here will be replicable by other studies in different societies. But if they do not, this study retains a certain validity: with findings documented for the Japanese case it should become the basis for further, more comparative and more refined work, which perforce will have to explain why coincidence has not occurred. The clear advantage of such an approach outweighs its limits: by focusing exclusively on Japan a number of cultural, social, political and historical variables are held constant, thereby allowing greater reliance on other variables as keys to patterns being examined.

A further control exists insofar as policymaking during a limited historical period is studied. While historical background on all issues is presented, and indeed plays a substantial role in aspects of the explanation , all cases are drawn from a common period, 1952-1970. Lost is the ability to generalize about "Japanese" policymaking as some timeless cultural adjunct, but this deficit is more than offset by the minimization of differences due to widely variant temporal circumstances. Thus, this is a study of policymaking within the specific context of postwar Japan.

Before elaborating on the third control, that of functional area, some general observations are necessary about policymaking studies of postwar Japanese politics. Concern with the specific problem of policy-

making and deliberate attempts to articulate propositions about this topic through both theory and empirical research findings should be particularly useful in the study of Japanese politics. Two elements are involved: first, the attempt to be at least implicitly comparative and analytic in the presentation of evidence, and second, the utilization of a specific organizational framework of policymaking. For all too long, much of the Western language literature on Japanese politics has been implicitly, if not explicitly, non-comparative. A number of reasons have been suggested for this, ranging from the difficulty of mastering the complexities of the Japanese language to the fact that a wide variety of stereotypes about behavior patterns seen as uniquely Japanese have gained general currency.[8] The result is that many unsubstantiated generalizations about policymaking and politics in Japan abound. We are told that Japan is ruled by a triumvirate of the Liberal Democratic Party, senior civil servants and big business[9], and factionalism is said to be rampant in all phases of Japanese politics[10]; but in very few cases is the hard, comparative evidence introduced to bolster such implicit claims of unique-

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[8] Two useful essays dealing with such influences are William Steslicke, "The Study of Japanese Politics: What Is to Be Done?"; and J.A.A. Stockwin, "Japanese Politics: Recent Writing and Research in the West," 409-21.

[9] See, inter alia, Robert A. Scalapino and Junnosuke Masumi, Parties and Politics in Contemporary Japan, passim, but esp. 63-66; Nathaniel B. Thayer, How the Conservatives Rule Japan; Chitoshi Yanaga, Big Business in Japanese Politics.

[10] Scalapino and Masumi, Ibid.; Thayer, Ibid.; Yanaga, Ibid.; Watanabe Tsuneo, Habatsu-Hoshutō no Kaibo [Factions — Dissections of the Conservative Party]: Watanabe, Habatsu -- Nihon Hoshutō no Bunseki [Factions -- Analysis of the Japanese Conservative Party]; Yomiuri Shimbun Seiji-bu, Seitō — Sono Soshiki to Habatsu no Jittai [Political Parties — Their Organizational and Factional Realities]; Asahi Shimbun Seiji-bu, Seitō to Habatsu [Parties and Factions]; George O. Totten and Tamio Kawakami, "The Functions of Factionalism in Japanese Politics," inter alia.

ness. In fact, many studies of bureaucracy, small group behavior, or business group activity could be adduced to suggest fruitful parallels, and interesting contrasts with other industrial democracies, the cumulative effect of which could easily be a broad advance in understanding both for those whose prime concerns are geographic and those more interested in the non-geographically specific structures or functions of politics.

These and other general notions about Japan must be tested against empirical realities. It is here that policymaking as a tool of analysis becomes useful. Scholars concerned about introducing a greater analytic component into the study of Japanese politics have differed among themselves concerning the most broadly beneficial concepts around which to organize. A respected group of primarily American scholars has suggested the notion of "modernization," producing a series of extremely influential books around that theme.[11] William Stelicke in a 1968 paper called for the adoption of "leadership" as a central conceptual concern.[12] More recently, J.A.A. Stockwin of Australia suggested that "the interaction of industrial power and politics" would be more fruitful than either.[13] Predominantly Japanese scholars meanwhile lean more heavily to such notions as "democratization," the Emperor system," and "class

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[11] The books, published as a series entitled, "Studies in the Modernization of Japan," are composed of the following six works: Marius B. Jansen, ed., Changing Japanese Attitudes toward Modernization; William W. Lockwood, ed., The State and Economic Enterprise in Japan; R. P. Dore, ed., Aspects of Social Change in Modern Japan; Robert E. Ward, ed., Political Development in Modern Japan; Donald H. Shively, ed., Tradition and Modernization in Japanese Culture; and James W. Morley, ed., Dilemmas of Growth in Prewar Japan.

[12] Steslicke, "The Study of Japanese Politics: What is to Be Done?"

[13] Stockwin, "Japanese Politics: Recent Writings and Research in the West."

conflict."[14] Fruitful arguments have been adduced by each group of claimants for their own concepts. Should then another possible "unifier," that of policymaking, be offered? The central question, however, given the present state of writings of Japanese politics, would appear to be not what single concept can draw together all the information available and handle all the problems that individual scholars seek to examine; rather there should be a ready acceptance of the fact that no single concept can yet bring together the existing diversities. Each of the concepts offered serves to identify numerous fruitful areas of research, and to provide for widespread argument and stimulation on highly important topics, but demands for orthodoxy are likely to be counter productive. Recognition must be given to the fact that there are numerous untapped lodes in the mine of Japanese politics and that greater productivity is likely to result from expeditions organized around various of these, each mining its lode to the utmost than from a concentration of all efforts on one single lode at a time. Aside from the fact that an overcrowding of miners may result, it is highly probable that attractive and promising as any single lode may appear at the opening of the mine, further probing may reveal it to be inherently shallow. Far more profitable in the long run would appear to be a more catholic approach: the selection and mutual development of a number of promising areas. I would contend for all of the reasons noted earlier about the potentials of policymaking that this should be one of the primary courses pursued.

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[14] Kawashima Takeyoshi stresses democracy in "Kindai Nihon no Shakaigakuteki Kenkyu, [Social Scientific Research on Modern Japan], 484-5: The "Emperor System" is a standard tool of the koza-ha of Japanese Marxism. Most noteworthy in this school is Hattori Shiso, Meiji Isshinshi [History of the Meiji Restoration]. See also the discussion of Hattori and the Koza-ha in James W. Morley, "Introduction: Choice and Consequence," in Morley, Dilemmas of Growth in Prewar Japan, 18ff. But see also Ishida Takeshi, Kindai Nihon Seiji Kozo no Kenkyu [Studies in the Structure of Modern

In utilizing policymaking as an analytic device, however, it is necessary to recognize that in contrast to the literature on policymaking in the U.S., for example, or even Britain, where case studies of specific policy formulations abound, there have been rather few studies of policymaking in Japan containing comparable levels of empirical specificity.[15] In such a situation generating a definitive "theory" of policymaking in Japan is impossible. More empirical work on specific policy formulations in Japan is necessary, rather than the articulation of unverified, and often unverifiable, models. At the same time, if any comparatively valid propositions are to be developed, it is helpful to have more than isolated case studies, valuable as these may be for eventual theory development. Only then can we begin the difficult process of testing, and refining our general impressions of how politics operates in Japan.

One final caveat on policymaking should also be entered. In the study of Japanese politics, as is true more generally throughout the discipline of political science, attention is all too frequently devoted to political <u>processes</u> at the expense of analyzing political <u>outcomes</u>. Power and influence are clearly manifest in the process of making official decisions; one can learn a great deal about the politics of any society by investigating the way it reaches decisions. At the same time, just as it is only partially correct to describe the complex inner workings of a particular watch or a television without their respective purposes,

Japanese Politics] for reliance on the term by a non-kōza member. Class conflict is a widely used term in Japan even by non-Marxists and underlies a large segment of contemporary social science.

[15] A noteworthy exception is Haruhiro Fukui, <u>Party in Power</u> which contains three very useful case studies.

adequacy, and impact, so too it is necessary to do more than convey a picture of the inner mechanics of specific policymaking processes in Japan. The policies themselves, their broader societal meaning and their consequences should also be assessed as a necessary component of any policymaking study to provide the political and normative breadth needed to make meaningful statements about "the politics" of a particular country.

It is with the hope of at least moving in these general directions that this work is undertaken. From these perspectives a partial answer emerges to the second question posed at the outset: "why higher education?" It also leads into a discussion of the third control being exercised in this study. By choosing to investigate a single functional area of policymaking, higher education, I hope to avoid the Scilla of overgeneral theorizing. At the same time by consciously attempting to relate to hypotheses and propositions formulated about policymaking both generally and in Japan and by dealing with three discreet sub-areas of higher education policymaking, I hope to steer clear of the Charybdis of "barefoot empiricism," and the dangerously atyptical case study. There is a certain wholeness and unity to the area of higher education that is lacking when one deals with cases chosen broadly from areas such as foreign policy, labor policy, budgetmaking, agriculture policy, and defense policy for example. By concentrating attention on a single functional area, the presumably most affected and involved political forces remain potentially the same, as do such things as their values and political resources. One can more easily compare the differences in reaction of a single ministry, such as the Ministry of Education, on several different issues of higher education for example than one can try to generalize about "governmental" or "bureaucratic" actions from agencies as diverse as Japan's Foreign, Labor, Finance and Agriculture

Ministries and the Self-Defense Agency. Thus a third control is exercised and some justification emerges for a study of higher education.

As noted above the study deals with three specific areas of higher educational policy: university administration, specialization and differentiation, and finally enrollment expansion. While educators would hardly accept any implication that these three areas encompass the full range or even the most important aspects of higher educational policies, it should be noted that they do touch on many dimensions of higher education that are of concern to the political scientist: who is educated; in what subjects, and in what manner; and under whose overall supervision?

Moreover, where higher education was once available only to the offspring of the most socially prominent and economically advantaged families in society, it has increasingly become a sina qua non for individual "success" and influence in industrialized societies. With higher educational enrollments now over or approaching one-quarter of the age cohort in several societies, including Japan; with expenditures for education over or approaching 5% of GNP in most industrial nations; with 20-45% of government expenditures being allocated to education in all industrial societies and with higher education taking ever larger proportions on these figures; with higher educational background playing an integral role in the individual's eventual career; and with increased demands from the business, scientific and technical worlds for specific types of research and student training; with all of these things taking place the significance of higher education for any highly industrialized society now reaches far beyond its former confines. Nor is it any longer of investigative concern only to those involved in making its administration more rational, more liberal or more godly. Sociologists, economists, social engineers, politicians and technologists all have legitimate and

specific areas to investigate in higher education. Its wide impact clearly makes it of valid concern to political scientists.

For the student of Japan there is an additional reason for being concerned with higher education. As will be examined subsequently, a variety of higher educational issues have been injected into the Japanese political world during various periods since World War II, ranging from such rather pedantic problems as the issuance of university charters to the more headline-dominating and politically titillating activities of student radicals. The range and variety of the higher educational issues that have been significant in postwar Japan thus commend the field to the attention of the political scientist interested in understanding how policy has been formulated under different problematic conditions within Japan.

As with most introductions, more may be promised than is actually warranted by subsequent analysis. The reader must be the eventual judge on such matters. Nevertheless, it seems useful at the outset to clarify the perspective from which this study is begun and to set it in at least some minimal intellectual framework. A brief outline of what is to follow may be of further orientational assistance to the reader. Chapter 2 sets forth the general framework of analysis within which the subsequent data will be presented. Chapter 3 deals with the historical background and ideological orientations and political dimensions of each of the three issues investigated. This is followed by a chapter setting out the major outlines of policymaking in Japan, and the assets and liabilities of different political actors within such outlines, while each of the following three chapters analyzes in depth the actual processes involved in formulating policy in one of the areas. Finally the major conclusions are presented.

Chapter 2

FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

Under such diverse terms as "decision-making process," "lawmaking," and "political process," modern political scientists from Burgess and Bentley through Truman, Almond and Easton have focused a great deal of attention on the means by which societies make important political determinations. As noted in the previous chapter, two major approaches which have dominated the literature on this problem so far have been the case study, aimed at assessing in microscopic detail the process of arriving at some single isolated decision, and the more sweeping grand theory aimed at isolating patterns common to some broader set of policy-making situations. This study aims at a middle level of analysis in between these two approaches, simultaneously seeking detailed empirical investigation and broader patterns. More than one case will be examined in detail and more than one single overarching pattern of policymaking will be defined. In order to place this alternative approach in proper perspective, it is well at the outset to isolate some of the more significant aspects in which it will parallel and/or differ from the existing approaches.

First, it is important to make clear how the term "policy" will be used here. While there is no hard and fast agreement on the term, one of the first steps in describing "policy" usually involves differentiating it from "decision," the former being seen as far broader than the latter. Thus, Webster defines policy as "a definite course or method of action selected from among alternatives and in light of given conditions to guide and determine present and future <u>decisions</u>." More directly within

the realm of political science, Bauer speaks of policy as involving those decisions and actions "which have the widest ramifications and the longest time perspective, and which generally require the most information and contemplation.[1] Lowi too differentiates between the two terms, contending that not all decisions are policies.[2] Thus, there is some general agreement that while policy involves decisions, not all decisions are policies. But more is needed than simply a statement of what policy is not.

More elaborate attempts at definition tend to isolate a variety of factors as integral to any policy. Harrison, for example, states that "the most common social and political usage of the term policy refers to (1) a course of action or intended course of action (2) conceived as deliberately adopted, after (3) a review of possible alternatives, (4) pursued, or intended to be pursued."[3] Van Dyke lists three somewhat comparable elements: (1) goals; (2) a plan or strategy for achieving these goals, or rules or guides to action; and (3) action.[4] Ranney's categorization includes five components: (1) a particular object or set of objects to be affected; (2) a desired course of events; (3) a selected line of action; (4) a declaration of intent; and (5) an implementation of intent.[5]

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[1]Robert A. Bauer and Kenneth J. Gergen, <u>The Study of Policy Formation</u>, 2.

[2]Theodore Lowi, "Decision Making vs. Policy Making: Toward an Antidote for Technocracy," 317-18.

[3]As cited in Austin Ranney (ed.) <u>Political Science and Public Policy</u>, 6.

[4]Vernon Van Dyke, "Process and Policy as Focal Concepts in Political Research," in Ranney, <u>Ibid</u>, 27.

[5]Austin Ranney, "The Study of Policy Content: A Framework for Choice," in Ranney, <u>Ibid</u>.,7

Such formulations while insightful in the abstract triangulate toward a definition of policy too broad for the purposes of this study, in that they include as policies many actions which lack the public component that is of interest to the political scientist and which hence fall outside the normal purview of political inquiry while simultaneously narrowly excluding areas of policy investigated here.

A strong tradition exists of differentiating between public and private policies, representing a valid and significant distinction. For the political analyst generally and in this study specifically, it is public policies which will be of prime concern. Public policy will not, however, be equated, as is frequently done, with governmental policy or governmental action. Salisbury, for example, notes that for many, "public policy consists in authoritative or sanctioned decisions by governmental actors."[6] Such a common equation misrepresents reality in two senses. First, it equates every governmental action with governmental policy when in fact the actions of specific governmental organs or officials may be in accord with, contrary to or completely irrelevant to one another, and to the broader category of actions normally labelled government policy. But second, it has been amply demonstrated that in many societies, entire arenas of public concern are under non-governmental auspices. The public nature of many (though by no means all) such non-governmental actions must also be recognized. Public policy need not be governmental in nature. It can be public by virtue of the scope of its impact.

Closely related to this is another important problem with the above formulations. All rely on the notion that the choices involved in policy formation are inevitably conscious and deliberate. Brecher too quite

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[6] Robert H. Salisbury, "The Analysis of Public Policy: A Search for Theories and Roles," in Ranney, Ibid., 152.

explicitly defines a foreign policy decision as "the selection, among perceived alternatives, of one option leading to a course of action in the international system."[7] In such senses many common definitions are too narrow. Consciousness and deliberateness are extremely difficult to establish empirically, but the gist of the assumption conveys too strong an image of some highly visible political battle resulting in the choice of one distinctly articulated set of alternatives over another, or in some compromise solution embodying elements of several such alternatives: "The government after long deliberation and much of the controversy which is healthy to our democratic way of life has decided on a policy of...." Such a notion is an undue restriction on the usage of the term "policy." As Bachrach and Baratz have suggested, "policy choices are frequently made in absence of a clear-cut, once-and-for-all-decision. They simply 'happen', in the sense that certain steps are taken that are necessary but preliminary to a decision; and the sequence of steps acquires ... a life of its own."[8] Frequently institutions fail to consider certain matters for clear-cut decisions, and yet it is senseless to deny that they have a policy on these matters, particularly when they engage in actions which operate systematically and consistently along a single line of thinking so as to have major unidirectional effects. Several examples of cases where institutions have followed rather consistent but seemingly unconscious lines of action that could only be called "policy" might serve to elaborate this point.

One cogent case relates to the situation of Blacks in America. Up until 1954, with the U.S. Supreme Court's historic Brown vs. Board of

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[7] Michael Brecher, "Images, Process and Feedback in Foreign Policy: Israel's Decisions on German Reparations," 73.

[8] Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz (eds.), Power and Poverty, 42.

Education decision declaring unconstitutional the maintenance of separate segregated school facilities, and the 1965 Civil Rights Bill aimed at insuring a variety of civil rights to Black Americans, one could for most purposes say that for over seventy-five years the Federal Government made none of the conscious watershed decisions regarding Blacks often conceived of as policy. Quite obviously, however, such "neutrality" by the Federal Government masked a wide variety of official discriminatory practices and official and unofficial discriminations written into numerous federal and local practices. Thus government "neutrality" was consistently favorable to the system of and in line with the denial of full rights to over ten percent of the national populace. In this regard its effect on the national political picture during this period was quite significant and must be seen as a definite policy in itself. Only by doing so does the word policy carry any significance whatsoever.

In most industrialized nations until quite recently, the entire question of environmental pollution was similarly an area lacking conscious and overt "policy." Despite occurrences of Minamata and Itai-itai diseases clearly traceable to various forms of industrial pollution in Japan and the choking industrial maze of the Ruhr and Los Angeles, only in the past few years did the governments of Japan, Germany, and the United States even begin to treat environmental pollution as a matter for concentrated attention. The conspicuous problems presented, however, make it impossible to hold them irrelevant, while the governments' respective courses of "nonaction" again followed distinct patterns of support -- in this case for the demands of industry -- and tacit consent to the continuance of these publicly detrimental conditions.

On the other side of the ideological coin, Canada during the Indochina War became the habitat for many young American men who either refused to serve in, or deserted from, the U.S. military. Though their numbers became quite significant, the Canadian government did not, for the most part, see fit to raise this matter as a question of public policy. Yet by "ignoring" the youths and allowing them to enter and remain unmolested, it followed as clear a policy as if it had acted legislatively to make such entry and residence either easier or more difficult.

Only if such activities as these, lacking in apparent and conscious choice and decision as they are, are included under the rubric of "policy" does the term have the needed breadth to cover many of the most significant public policies. Thus, a matter will be labelled "public policy" either when it is public in the locus of its action or inaction or when it is public in scope of its consequences. Frequently public policy will involve both but either is sufficient for affixing the label "public policy."

By extension, policymaking is the process involved in attempting to generate, maintain and/or impede such patterns of action or inaction. Policymaking is the process of translating or attempting to translate political issues into public policy.

Quite clearly there is a close relationship between public policy and public policymaking. The exact nature of this relationship is less clear however. While classical political science in its normative concerns gave a great deal of attention to policy per se, the policy-making segment of the relationship has recently received the bulk of political scientist's attention. At least three reasons might be suggested for this. At the risk of begging the question one must note in the first place, that, difficult as studying policymaking might be, a reasonably large body of empirical and theoretical material has been

accumulated on policymaking processes and the organs most frequently assumed to be involved in policymaking thereby setting out convenient guidelines for subsequent research. The study of policy meanwhile has in most cases not yet reached any level of comparability. This pattern of past research, combined with the inherently more difficult problem of finding measures and standards whereby to assess policy in any empirical way simply make studies of policymaking conspicuously easier than policy studies for the political analyst. Something of an avalanche affect is involved in all research and at present policymaking studies would appear to be a prime beneficiary of such a trend.

A second factor would seem to be that evaluating public policy content is in almost all cases quite explicitly normative, a tendency too often eschewed by political scientists (particularly American) as outside the legitimate purview of the discipline. The position taken by Watkins for example is not untypical:

> The important thing ... is the necessary distinction between the process of decision-making and the content of the decision made. If economics were the science of wealth-production, all knowledge would be its proper concern. If political science were the science of determining public policies, it would need to be at least as comprehensive. But political science, like economics, has a less ambitious purpose. It is concerned not with the potentially infinite content of all public decisions, but with the process by which those decisions are reached.[9]

Clearly one cannot study all possible policy contents; nevertheless, content should not thereby be totally ignored; nor are investigations of content meaningless simply since they can not possibly take into account all possibilities. Ignoring the content of policies vitiates at least half of what politics is about, transposing the traditional Lasswellian

[9] As cited in Ranney, "The Study of Policy Content ...," 12-13.

formulation of politics as the study of "who gets what, when, and how" into a sharply abbreviated focus on the "when" and "how." Redirecting attention to the earlier two questions -- the who and the what -- requires that attention be refocused on political outcomes. Greater concern must be paid to the content of policies and to the broad-scale political implications they portend. Limits must be set on potentially infinite consequential chains; but surely a study of the content of policy and certain social consequences can only illuminate political awareness.[10]

Numerous arguments have been made to demonstrate how in fact most if not all political analysis is at least implicitly, if not explicitly value laden and the arguments will not be repeated at length. Consequently, if in the process of examining the who and the what of Japanese higher educational policy certain normative judgements are made they are done with the clear conviction in advance that such judgments constitute a legitimate aspect of political inquiry.

Finally there is a third and potentially far more significant factor contributing to the greater emphasis on policymaking processes than on policy. As noted, the literature to date has been dominated by case study analyses and what I have called the grand theoretical approaches to policymaking. In both, policy is almost invariably treated as no more than the residual by-product of the policymaking process by which it is generated. In Eastonian systems theory for example, various environmental "inputs" are converted through a policymaking process into policy "outputs;" but these "outputs" (and "outcomes") have meaning primarily as the consquences of the policy-

[10] cf. David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life stresses the desirability of studying only "political outputs" (i.e., policies) and not "political outcomes." Moreover, it should be noted that the major focus given in Easton's work to "outcome" is as a partial feedback into the process itself. See esp. 344.

making processes whereby they emerge.[11] In Deutschian communications analysis, policy is a consequence of information flows through the political system.[12] For Truman, Dahl, and most of what is normally called the pluralist school of analysis, it is the political process of arriving at public policies that is of prime concern, with public policy simply the vector sum of the competing pressures of many actors involved in the policy-making process.[13] Most case studies of policymaking too, treat policy in the same way, primary analytic attention being devoted to the political pulling and hauling of a variety of policymaking actors.

Many works in this tradition have become milestones in the advancement of the discipline of political science. Yet, as excitingly creative as many such works have been individually, their collective impact has been to place far more emphasis on policymaking than on policy. They presume that the line of political causality runs the same course as the actual decision-making or policy-making process, political options becoming increasingly constrained during the process until eventually some single policy appears as the almost inevitable residual by-product of the process. Thus they collectively have reinforced the presumption that the most fruitful method of analyzing the relationship between policymaking and policy is to start from the a priori assumption that variations in policy-making process account for the most significant variations in policy.

Not all studies follow such a course. Certain works, for example, begin from the perspective that there is something inherently different about the context within which policy is formulated that accounts for

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[11] Easton, Ibid.

[12] Karl W. Deutsch, The Nerves of Government.

[13] David Truman, The Governmental Process; Robert Dahl, Who Governs? inter alia

significance in policymaking variations. Some of these studies focus, for example, on the societal backdrop to policymaking, often in a geographical context, with the result that numerous studies exist of policymaking in Britain, France, Africa or the Middle East; elsewhere there are studies of policymaking in culturally heterogeneous or culturally homogeneous societies. Other analysts stress economic systems as a more important determinant, resulting in studies of policymaking in capitalist vs. socialist economies or in industrial, post-industrial, or industrializing economies. Still other scholars begin from some political predeterminant such as pluralism, authoritarianism, or urbanism. Many other categories could presumably be cited, but the key commonality of all such works is that they stress some externally defining context of condition(s) within which policymaking takes place. And whatever the context or condition may be, it is presumed to have some predetermining effect on both policymaking process and policy.

A key sub-group in this tradition analyzes policymaking within some single functional arena, such as foreign policy, economic planning, or housing policy. Most of these operate on the presumption that such functional differences contributed in a meaningful way to differences in policymaking process, that they delimit the possible variations that might occur in policymaking. As result they place greater emphasis on policy for its own sake, and as a factor which will determine the most significant variations occuring in policymaking. The mechanisms and problems involved in formulating foreign policy are presumed to be comparable over time, within single societies and often from one society to the next, while being different in some relevant way from policymaking toward health care or urban redevelopment.

Both notions are intuitively appealing: the suggestion that some broad external constraints exist on the possible variations in policymaking process, and that something in the nature of the issue to be decided influences the manner in which it is decided. And both will provide starting points for the subsequent analysis in this study. In contrast to many such studies, however, the search here will not be for any single pattern of policymaking either for Japan or for higher education despite the fact that this study concerns policymaking within one single geographical unit, Japan, and within one functional area, higher education. For our purposes it serves no purpose to believe that the most significant aspects of Japan's higher educational policy and higher educational policymaking can be captured in one single pattern of interaction.

Here the contention will be that even within the limited area of Japanese higher educational policy there are highly important differences in the methods of formulating policy, even though some elements in the socio-political context may define the outer limits of policymaking and policy possibilities within Japanese society and despite the fact that something in the nature of the issue around which policy is to be formulated may contribute to meaningful variations in the policymaking process. As a result it will be necessary to look beyond both the nature of the policymaking context that is postwar Japan and beyond the functional arena of higher education.

Several promising studies have been done all of which accept the central thesis that policy may be the independent, and policymaking the dependent variable, but which seek to analyze differences among policymaking processes along lines transcending functionality. On the basis of two variables, the likelihood of official coercion and the degree to which such

coercion is applied through individual conduct as opposed to an "environment of conduct," Lowi has suggested a fourfold categorization of all political issues: regulative, distributive, constituent and redistributive.[14] Riker meanwhile has validated an important distinction between zero-sum and non-zero-sum political situations which establish separate patterns of political interaction among political actors. For him a key concern is the presence or absence of disagregable payoffs in political situations.[15] Froman, in two separate works, suggests the importance in local politics of differentiating between issues which are "areal" (affecting the entire political community) or "segmental" (affecting some group(s) within the community more than others).[16] Other works have suggested the utility of differentiating between "strategic" and "tactical" issues, or issues which involve "symbolic" or "material" satisfaction of political demands.[17] Eulau and Eyestone suggest a differentiation between policies which would require adaptation to the environment and those which would seek to control the environment.[18] Zimmerman, refining Lowi's categories, comes up with five modified categories of issues.[19] Though many have taken a comparable path, rarely has there been sufficient empirical testing of the suggested categories

[14]Theodore Lowi, "Four Systems of Policy, Politics, and Choice," 298-310.

[15]William H. Riker, The Theory of Political Coalitions.

[16]Lewis A. Froman, Jr., "An Analysis of Public Policies in Cities," 94-108; "The Categorization of Policy Contents," in Ranney, Political Science and Public Policy, 41-52.

[17]Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics.

[18]Heinz Eulau and Robert Eyestone, "Policy Maps of City Councils and Policy Outcomes: A Development Analysis," 124-43.

[19]William Zimmerman, "Issue Area and Foreign-Policy Process," 1204-1212.

to insure ready acceptance of their relevance for all policymaking situations. Consequently although there is some intellectual convergence on the utility of studying policymaking as contingent on various aspects of the policy to be determined, and although there is some common intellectual, if not terminological, unity around the dimensions most likely to aid in explaining policymaking variations, no single schema or set of variables has yet been demonstrated to have sufficient breadth or empirical relevance to insure its dominance over alternative approaches.

For our purposes three issue specific variables suggest themselves as particularly helpful in explaining some of the most important variation to be observed in postwar Japanese policymaking. And these will contribute the preponderant weight of explanation for the observed variations in policymaking. Individually the three are separable, signifying important variation in the nature of the political issues which arise and which must be dealt with politically in postwar Japan. Each would appear to exert particularly heavy influence on some rather specific aspects of the policy-making process, and these influences will be explored to some extent. Further, two explicitly "political" variables exert important contributory influence. Yet analysis of the incremental significance of each factor, will not be the prime concern of this work. Instead, the primary concern will be with analyzing the cumulative effect of the five factors; these will be seen as decisive in setting out the major variations among policymaking processes.

The central argument is that the variables converge in such a way as to provide two types of policymaking at theoretically polar extremes. These primarily deductively generated types will not be perfectly replicated, in all likelihood, by any single policymaking case; at least in very few instances will this occur. However, they may be seen as theoretical yardsticks against which to measure the empirical realities presented by the

available data on policymaking in Japanese higher education. Their utility thus will rest not on perfect correlation but on meaningful approximation to reality, as maps against which to measure reality.

The three policy variables used in the generation of the ideal types can be labelled the divisibility, the scope, and the affect of the particular political issue around which policy is to be formulated. Each of these dimensions will be examined somewhat at both the theoretical level and at the level of existing studies of Japanese politics, followed by a suggestion of how they interact in the formulation of the ideal types.

The divisibility of an issue concerns the degree to which it can be subdivided for decision-making purposes into a multitude of sub-issues or component parts. Lowi[20] and Zimmerman[21] after him, note the susceptibility certain issues have to such division, the most familiar of which is the "pork barrel." There, innumerable component projects can be isolated for individual decisions, and "logrolling," or political accomodation of many diverse interests is particularly feasible. By way of contrast, many other issues demand by their very nature a yes or no answer. Practically speaking they are indivisible. Some of the foremost problems of business-labor relations, for example, concern the presence or absence of the right to unionize, strike, engage in secondary boycotts, demand union shops, etc., none of which are inherently susceptible to "splitting the difference." The difference between these two types of issues is somewhat comparable to Riker's differentiation between zero-sum situations, in which one side's

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[20] Theodore Lowi, "American Business and Public Policy, Case Studies and Political Theory," 677-715; and also "Four Systems of Policy... " and "Decision Making vs. Policy Making...".

[21] Zimmerman, "Issue Area and Foreign-Policy Process..."

gain is the other side's loss, in contrast to non-zero-sum situations where certain solutions may be mutually profitable or where both players may "win" something,[22] and of course it is the zero-sum, or non-divisible situations in which the likelihood of head-to-head political confrontation is the highest.

In the Japanese situation, several existing case studies suggest the utility of this construction. Policies which approach zero-sum non-divisibility would have to include the U.S.-Japan Security Treat, attempts to revise the postwar constitution, and policy toward I.L.O. Convention 87 (the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize), all of which clearly required inherently some either-or solution and all of which simultaneously represented some of the most controversial policymaking situations in postwar Japan.[23] In contrast, governmental subsidization for big business, the implicit support for dual trading relations between the P.R.C. and Taiwan, and even many aspects of the budget making process emerge as both far less controversial, and more amenable to middle ground solutions.[24]

The second variable concerns the scope of any particular policy. Froman's distinction between issues which affect the entire community, and

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[22] Riker, Theory of Political Coalitions.

[23] On the Security Treaty controversy see: George R. Packard III, Protest in Tokyo: The Security Treaty Crisis of 1960; "Japanese Intellectuals Discuss American-Japanese Relations," 145-160; Robert A. Scalapino and Junnosuke Masumi, Parties and Politics in Contemporary Japan, Chapter V. On constitutional revision see Haruhiro Fukui, Party in Power, Chapter 8. Dan Fenno Henderson, The Constitution of Japan On I.L.O. 67 see Ehud Harari, The Politics of Labor Legislation in Japan.

[24] Fukui, Party in Power, Chapter 9; Chitoshi Yanaga, Big Business in Japanese Politics; John Creighton Campbell, "Japanese Budget Baransu".

those which affect only some small segment of that community represents one important aspect of political scope. It parallels Lowi's distinction between policies which would be decentral in their impact, affecting primarily specific interests or single individuals, and those policies which would be centralized or "systems level" in their impact.[25] Regardless of terminology the point remains that some policies are "total" in their impact, while others affect a much narrower subset of society. Some policies of their very nature will have highly diffuse impacts; others will be much more specific.

The diffuseness or specificity of any issue can be expected to exert a major influence over the probability that any specific political actor(s) will become involved in the policymaking process, as well as over the nature of that participation. Other things being equal, highly diffuse issues affecting large segments of society will presumably foster interest and activity by a much broader spectrum of actors than issues of much narrower and far more specific scope. Simultaneously, however, it is not unlikely that the quality of the participation when a broad number of actors is affected might well be less intense than when the scope of the policy and the interests affected are more narrow and specific. As will be seen subsequently, this statement boldly oversimplifies; many other factors are involved in determining the exact nature of political participation.

Perhaps one of the most important intervening variables that makes all things not equal is the organizational strength and mobilization capabilities of the forces affected by a policy, the first of our two "political" variables. The degree to which any explicitly affected group or sector of society will respond to a particular aspect of proposed or

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[25] Lowi, "Four Systems...", 300.

actual government policy will vary greatly with the strength and extent of its organization. Even if a rather specific segment of society might be potentially strongly affected by a particular policy, if it is totally unorganized, is the subject of overt repression, or the victim of false consciousness, it is unlikely to be very intense, visible or effective in its political activities. Conversely a well-organized, politically astute organization with a surplus of political resources should be expected to act in a very different manner. This will be most particularly true when it is likely to suffer or benefit greatly from a particular policy.

Fusing these two elements of the specificity or diffuseness of an issue and the organizational and mobilizational capabilities of those affected it is possible to conceptualize at least four possible categories. An issue may be highly diffuse, affecting many highly mobilizable actors such as has been the case in many aspects of Japanese economic policy (perhaps most notably by the strong consumer's reaction to the unwillingness or inability of the government to stem high inflation and consumer prices) and by many aspects of Japan's defense policies. Generally diffuse in nature, such policies have generated widespread reaction, and insofar as they have been perceived as affecting highly mobilizable groups they have also generated intense reactions.[26] In contrast, one can note that the equally diffuse economic policies of the fifties and early sixties taking place as they did prior to the emergence of the numerous consumer groups that now exist, failed to generate any comparable response.

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[26] On citizen's movements see Yokohama-shi Shūmin Undō Rengo (ed.) Jūmin Undō Tanjō [The Birth of the Citizen's Movement]; Matsushita Kennichi, Shimin Sanka [Citizen Participation]; Asukada Ichio, Kakushin Shisei no Tenbō [Prospects for Progressive City Politics]; Much has been written about defense policy and its volatile political consequences, but see esp. Packard, Protest in Tokyo.

Intense and quite specific policymaking and policy-influencing activities have been the result of actions aimed at compensation for both former landlords and those having lost property once part of Japan's overseas empire at the end of World War II.[27] Similarly strong and specific reactions can be seen to the attempts to regulate Japanese doctors,[28] and to establish an organization for small and medium-sized businessmen.[29] Finally, although far less attention has been devoted to such problems, one can point to a few specific instances where policies have been notably specific, but their impact has been on primarily non-mobilizable groups with the result that virtually no significant political response has emerged.

The third important aspect of any political issue is its affect, or its emotional content. In any society, certain kinds of issues have a much greater ability to touch off passionate reactions than others. In most cases these have been associated historically with the struggle of particular groups, classes or organizations within the society to achieve certain political goals, such as civil, religious or political liberties, the rights of labor, social and economic equality, linguistic unity (or diversity) etc. At other times they deal with what are generally perceived to be the broadly defining principles of the society in its present form: free market economy, political equality, states rights, national liberation, etc. Many other bases for such passion might be suggested, but the point

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[27] Fukui, Party in Power, Chapter 7; John Creighton Campbell, "The Repatriates: A Case-Study of Interest Group Politics and Party-Government Negotiations in Japan".

[28] William Steslicke, Doctors in Politics: The Political Life of the Japan Medical Association; "Doctors, Patients, and Government in Modern Japan," 913-31; "The Political Life of the Japan Medical Association," 841-62.

[29] Naoki Kobayashi, "The Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises Organization Law," in Horoshi Itoh (ed.) Japanese Politics — An Inside View, 49-67; and "Interest Groups in the Legislative Process" in Ibid., 68-87.

is that not all issues are comparably capable of exciting high emotion, either among specific groups or among the society at large. Important as such things as the postal system, museum maintenance, highway construction or zoning may be, and despite the fact that slow mail service, banking regulations, most occupational licensing, highways through a particular community or specific zoning variances may in specific cases engender rather specific controversy and high emotions, normally they are perceived with large doses of dispassion.

There is of course nothing immutable about the categorization of one issue as highly affective and another as less affective. Such matters will differ greatly from one society to another and within specific societies over time. Religion, for example, while once a highly volatile issue throughout most of Europe has declined generally in its overall power to engender spirited political controversy. Simultaneously it retains much greater salience in France, Spain and Italy than in Holland or England. The English, by way of contrast, once seemed collectively incapable of understanding why Americans had such highly emotional controversies over problems of race until the Asian and African immigration beginning in the late fifties eliminated the earlier ethnic homogeneity and generated emotions roughly comparable to those in the U.S.[30] Consequently in looking at this dimension of any issue, it will be necessary to examine the issue's historical background, in order to understand the emergence and extent of its emotional content. What is critical is perception for as W. I. Thomas has noted, "If men define a situation as real, it is real in its consequences." And if men perceive an issue as of vital concern, then surely it is likely to engender just such passions.

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[30] An excellent comparative study of the problem of race relations in the two countries is Ira Katznelson, Black Men, White Cities.

This point is particularly noteworthy in the case of Japan, where as will be examined in more depth in Chapter Four, two major political "camps" confront one another, divided and highly antagonistic on a number of passionately perceived issues. On economic matters, for example, the conservative camp openly professes adherence to a capitalistic economic system, while the progressive camp conversely holds to a Marxist economic vision that condemns capitalism to an inevitable death. On foreign policy, the conservatives have strongly supported a policy of alignment with the U.S., including the rentention of U.S. bases in the country and ultimate reliance on U.S. military power for external security. The progressives, despite certain differences among themselves, have consistently stressed the need for either "positive neutralism" or an overt alliance with the very countries against which the "conservatives" have deemed it most necessary to defend Japan. Militarily, the conservatives have supported the Self-Defense Forces, many arguing the need for constitutional revision to strengthen their legal position, others pressing for a strengthening of their military hardware as well. The bulk of the progressives have contended, conversely, that the forces are unconstitutional under Article 9 of the present constitution and that on this point the document must not be altered in the least. Others go further to argue that such forces as exist should be abolished.

These positions have not been constant throughout the period since the end of World War II. In fact, many interesting monographs could be written about developments and changes in these positions over the past quarter century. Bearing this in mind, however, it still seems fair to say that they have been among the major ideological sticking points of political organization in postwar Japan, and that the bipolarity in Japan

is deeply rooted in such fundamental differences over a broad sweep of social, economic, political and philosophical points.

Robert Dahl makes a strong argument that few political regimes are bipolar in nature. He contends that "human and organizational preferences tend toward diversity and multipolarity rather than toward bipolarity: to many groupings rather than merely two."[31] Both the general truth and the distinct limitations of this proposition must be recognized. On the one hand political conflict almost always has more than two dimensions and rarely do opinions on any issue cluster conveniently into two, and only two, antagonistic perspectives. Particularly is this so in the earliest stages of issue germination, when it is quite possible that every group and individual having a "position" on an issue tends to have one at least slightly at variance with all others.

At the same time, in many cases of political conflict, a dyadic pattern of polarization does emerge and useful analysis demands little more than assessment of these two sides. In the Japanese case the point is not whether the society is inherently bipolar or not. But it must be recognized that a number of issue areas touch on important ideological fault lines, arousing the deepest of emotions from both camps, almost without regard for the specifics of the policy involved and which consequently are seen in passionate bipolar terms. It is as though the shiboleths of the past define the battle lines of the present on certain issues, regardless of the inherent merits or demerits of specific proposals.

Such highly affective issues can be expected to guarantee the mobilization and passionate interest of the organizational members of both

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[31] Robert A. Dahl (ed.), Regimes and Oppositions, 1.

camps, and to make correspondingly easier the mobilization of large segments of the attentive public. In contrast, issues which lack a concrete link to such highly affective elements, or where such a linkage cannot be established, will not generate anything comparable to the same bipolar antagonistic camp controversy. The lines of cleavage during the policy-making process in such cases will be of a dimension cutting across camp lines or intra-camp in nature, and political passions will be qualitatively different.

Before proceding to examine how each of these three openended policy variables and the explicitly political variable of mobilization capacities exert their collective impact on policymaking it is quite important to examine one additional factor. Under any single political system certain matters by law demand that some specific formal political process be followed. In the United States for example, numerous citizen rights are formally guaranteed by the written constitution and subsequent court rulings and any legitimate attempt at abridgement of such rights, demands the passage of a constitutional amendment through explicitly designated procedures. At another extreme, many issues are administrative or technical in nature and can be dealt with normally by the decision of a single government, or quasi-governmental, official. To cite an extreme case, for example, a policy establishing the work schedules of individual sanitation crews would rarely require anything beyond the decision of a shop foreman. Many gradations could be highlighted between these extremes, but it will suffice to note two: certain matters are codified in law, and any significant change in policy requires a new law, or an amendment to the old law; others are specifically designated as within the exclusive purview of some governmental or quasi-governmental agency and can be dealt with by the responsible minister or his representative. In both cases some

official formula exists for making decisions on these matters and must be followed, or at least explicitly circumvented.

It is clear that there is at times a very close correlation between the structural requirements for dealing with an issue and the issue's scope. That is, constitutional issues most frequently are those presumed to have the most diffuse social scope, while legal or administrative issues tend generally to be far more specific. Still, a limited number of constitutional issues may be quite narrow and specific in practice while many areas under the control of single administrators are of exceptionally broad social import. It is thus well to separate scope from structure and to keep both dimensions, and their more complex possibilities separately in mind, rather than presuming that one is a simple surrogate for the other. For regardless of the actual scope (or divisibility or affect) of any issue, its very subject matter will at times require as a matter of legal and political course that some fixed, institutional set of policymaking channels be involved in the policymaking process. It is within, or in conjunction with, such explicit requirements that the three policy variables exert their influence, not in contradiction to, or totally independent of, them.

Essentially therefore we are suggesting the significance of five variables. Three of these deal explicitly with the nature of the policy around which policymaking takes place: the divisibility, scope and affect of the issue, and these will be relied upon to carry the bulk of the explanation concerning the different patterns of policymaking. But two additional variables, formal or legally specified political steps, and the organization of the various political actors most likely affected by any particular policy must also be kept in mind in the analysis. From one perspective, all five can be considered as elements closely tied to the

nature of any specific political issue, and varying dramatically from one individual issue to the next. Viewed slightly differently, the formal political process and the organizational strength and mobilization capabilities of actors affected could as well be seen as long term political givens, different over time, but relatively consistent within any political system over the short run. It is helpful to keep both perspectives in mind concerning these two variables since one can simultaneously conceptualize a rather consistent process for let us say, constitutional revision, while at the same time recognizing that not all issues could even remotely be considered "constitutional" and hence subject to such procedure. Similarly, group A or B in any society may be generally powerful or weak, but its relative strength or weakness might interface in very different ways with different issues. Even if business, the military or peasants are widely recognized as strong in a particular society, there is no justification for assuming that the strength of such groups, whatever it may be, will be brought equally to bear on all issues.

With these factors in mind it becomes possible to turn to the types of policymaking process which emerge as composites of the interaction and collective influence of the variables examined. The two delimiting or extreme types could be labelled "policymaking through camp conflict" and "incremental policymaking." Between these two exist numerous possibilities and combinations, but one which is of particular salience will be examined as well: "pressure group policymaking."

Most simply stated, "policymaking by camp conflict" involves the process surrounding issues which are non-divisible, broadly diffuse in scope, highly affective and which most often require constitutional or legislative activity and affect highly mobilizable interests and groups. "Incremental policymaking," by way of contrast, arises over issues which

are highly divisible or segmental, narrowly specific, non-affective, and which affect few and generally less mobilizable sectors and which can be dealt with primarily through administrative channels.

In policymaking by camp conflict, the issues involved are typically extremely broad in their probable impact. They touch on the interests of numerous sectors of society, including many if not all of the most politically organized and mobilizable segments of the Japanese polity. The matters at issue are perceived to be of a vital nature to most if not all of the affected sectors, with the result that their affective impact is extremely high: those who will be influenced see the issue in more than instrumental terms; involved, rather, are matters perceived to be of major principle, over which they are willing to expend great political resources. And the indivisible, non-segmental nature of the issue and principles involved makes a two party, zero-sum confrontation most probable. Most frequently, a constitutional or legislative process is inherently necessitated for the resolution of the problem in question and in theory, each side is willing to pull out all the stops in its respective political organ(s) to achieve its policy ends. The result is that the ensuing political battle generates high public interest and media coverage.

The empirical analogues to this description come quickly to mind for anyone familiar with the secondary literature on Japanese politics. Most studies of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty controversy of 1960 come quite close to describing such a pattern. Similarly the domestic political process involved in the Police Duties Bill of 1958, the Okinawan question, much of the policymaking in the area of labor relations, questions surrounding Article 9 and constitutional revision, and a host of others show roughly comparable patterns.[32] In Chapter 5 it will be argued that

[32] See footnote 23, 26.

the policymaking process involved in matters of university administration is also extremely similar.

In contrast to the process of policymaking by camp conflict is what I have labelled incremental policymaking. The issues involved here are highly segmental and divisible, in contrast to the indivisible issues involved in camp policymaking. Typically, for example, they revolve around an almost infinite aggregate of numerous small items, over which compromise is relatively easy and where the units involved are readily divisible, such as money or allocation projects. As a result the zero sum nature of camp politics is not in evidence, and all parties involved are capable of realizing some portion of their aims. Correspondingly, the issues are more specific and narrow in the scope of their probable impacts than the issues resulting in camp policymaking. Those affected as a result are quite specific and in extreme forms are among the least mobilizable sectors of society. In part because of their high divisibility and their rather specific scope, such issues are also virtually non-affective. Little if any passion is generated over them; any which emerges is either very limited or can be attributed to political posturing. Procedurally, administrative channels are usually sufficient for the solution of the problems involved and public visibility and media coverage is at a minimum.

Presumably because of the less visible nature (and possibly the presumed dullness) of the process of policymaking, far fewer studies exist of such matters in Japan than of matters which could be cited as examples of camp policymaking. Nonetheless, a few studies suggest strong parallels to the theoretical construct. Available information suggests for example that the policies of import control and support for certain critical domestic industries has evolved largely through the comparatively quiet

administrative guidance of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry.[33] Similarly research and development policy has evolved through quiet and interrelated work by a series of ministries.[34] Actual case studies on policymaking of such a pattern in Japan are, as noted, limited in number, however, two additional facts might be pointed to as suggestive in this regard. First, in studies of U.S. politics particularly, a number of cases emerge which fit closely this pattern and there is no obvious reason to assume at the outset that many parallel cases do not exist in Japan.[35] Secondly as will be examined in great detail in Chapter Four the bureaucracy plays, particularly through advisory committees and the use of administrative directives, a major policymaking role, while in the Diet, presumed to be the hub of controversy in Japanese politics (which of course it frequently is) the great bulk of legislation passes by unanimous, or nearly unanimous votes. Thus a prima facie case exists for the presumption that the incremental pattern is more than a theoretical possibility, even if examinations of its existence are sparce. In Chapter Six, the policymaking process involved in enrollment expansion within Japanese universities will be examined in detail, and suggested as a close empirical approximation of this pattern.

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[33] See U.S. Department of Commerce, Japan: The Government-Business Relationship; Dan Fenno Henderson, Foreign Enterprise in Japan.

[34] Most generally, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, the Science and Technology Agency, and the Economic Planning Agency.

[35] e.g., Aaron Wildavski, The Politics of the Budgetary Process, Aage Clausen, How Congressmen Decide: A Policy Focus, Robert Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom, Politics, Economics and Welfare, inter alia.

The suggestion being made therefore is that two patterns of policymaking can be conceptualized which involve composite extremes on all five variables. Realistically, as noted above, such concurrence of all five at some absolute extreme is unlikely, but as will be examined subsequently, actual policymaking situations sufficiently approximate such hypothetical extremes as to warrant the formulation.

Between these two extremes lies what is being referred to as "pressure group policymaking." For purposes of a first theoretical approximation, this can be conceptualized as that process resulting from a convergence at the approximate midpoints of all five variables. That is, the issue is neither as perfectly indivisible, diffuse, affective, or constitutional as policymaking through camp conflict, but at the same time it is not as divisible, specific, unimpassioned administrative as incremental policymaking. And as the label indicates, pressure group policymaking can be expected to involve more mobilizable actors than is usually the case with incremental policymaking, but without the same magnitude and impact on the numerous mobilizable actors that is the case with camp policymaking.

Here too, actual examples based on empirical studies can be suggested. Pressure from, and governmental response to, groups representing former landowners expropriated during the Occupational land reform and those representing overseas businessmen and property owners suffering losses as a result of World War II might serve as the classic examples.[36] Partially parallel is that portion of Japanese-Soviet relations hinging on fishing rights.[37] Somewhat different examples of pressure group policymaking, also exist, those representing basically pressure group response to proposed

[36] See the citations in footnote 27.

[37] Donald Hellmann. Japanese Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy.

governmental actions emerge in relation to the Japanese Medical Association and the attempts to establish an organization of small and medium-sized businessmen.[38] The pattern suggested is one well-known and well-studied in political science, both in the Japanese and in other contexts and need not be further elaborated prior to its examination in Chapter Seven.

Summarizing briefly then, it is suggested that three issue specific variables -- the divisibility, scope and affect -- combined with what might be called two long term political variables -- political structures and institutions on the one hand and organizational strengths and mobilizability on the other -- interact to produce at least two extreme and one intermediary pattern of policymaking. The five variables when collectively present in one extreme lead to what has been called policymaking by camp conflict, while in precisely the opposite guise they generate a pattern of incremental policymaking. Between these two, roughly at the midpoint convergences of the five exists the pattern labelled pressure group policymaking. A summary of the interrelationships is presented in Figure 2-1. While the three can be conceptualized in rather pure form, in reality of course, cases will only approximate one or another of the three; they will by no means replicate exactly the theoretical constructs. But in Chapters Five through Seven specific policymaking situations in the area of higher education will be examined which closely parallel these three theoretical patterns. Before such an examination, however, it is essential to examine in greater detail the specific higher educational issues themselves to understand how they vary on the three issue specific variables suggested, and to look too at the postwar Japanese political situation with particular

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[38] See the citations in footnotes 28 and 29.

reference to questions of institutional and structural variance and problems of organizational strength. These problems are the subject of the next two chapters.

Chapter 3

NATURE OF THE ISSUES

Higher education has always been an important and frequently a political issue in modern Japan. Its importance and the context of its political implications have however varied significantly over time. The educational problems and the responses to them in the late Nineteenth Century differ significantly from their counterparts in postwar Japan. Similarly distinct have been the political contexts within which they have arisen. In order to understand what has been called the nature of the policy issues in postwar Japan, it is important to highlight certain historical antecedents, for these provide the context within which many of the issues have taken on their present significance. This is most particularly true in the case of the affective component of each of the issues under scrutiny. But the present scope and divisibility of these items as well emerge more clearly from the historical background, as do the limitations on the major alternatives given political consideration and the positions of political advocacy taken by the most significant political actors.

For our purposes, two rather distinct periods of Japanese history must be considered: the period from the onset of the Meiji Restoration in 1868, most usually seen as the benchmark for the beginning of Japanese modernization and industrial development, through the end of World War II; and the period of the U.S. Occupation which lasted from 1945 through 1952. It was during the prewar period that the issues under analysis first emerged as objects of major policy consideration, while the Occupation Period takes on significance because of the attempts made then to alter radically the prewar higher educational system and to bring it more into conformity with the political and educational values of the Americans. Some elements of

the prewar system underwent drastic realteration; others continue to exert strong influence even to the present. The same can be said of the Occupation-induced changes: a good deal of the policymaking since the end of the Occupation has concerned concrete attempts at "correcting the excesses" of the Occupation and counter pressures to insure that the "democratic reforms" of the Occupation not be undermined. In still other areas, the changes introduced under the Occupation formed the basis for trends which have continued unabated. These pasts thus become important keys to the issues as they have emerged during the period 1952-70.

Higher Education in the Prewar Period:

Education was seen by the political leaders of early Meiji as an integral component of their plans for the industrialization and modernization of the country. The earliest major pronouncement of the new government, the so-called Charter Oath, issued in April, 1868 in the name of the new Emperor, set forth in five brief articles the principles which were initially to govern the new regime. The fifth of these indicates early recognition of the importance attached to education and shows the purpose for which education was to be encouraged: "Knowledge shall be sought throughout the world so as to strengthen the foundations of imperial rule."[1]

Fortunate by comparison to political leaders in many other modernizing societies in having a relatively broad educational infrastructure and a comparatively high rate of literacy as a groundwork from which to modernize,

[1] This is only one of many possible translations of this article of the Charter Oath. For the oath, its background and its possible implications, see Robert M. Spaulding, Jr. "The Intent of the Charter Oath," in Richard K. Beardsley, ed., Studies in Japanese History and Politics, 3-36.

the Meiji leaders quickly saw that a literate populace with at least a rudimentary knowledge of the three R's and a few other subjects such as history, geography and ethics was an integral component of a modern, civilized state.[2] Thus, in 1872, only four years after the Restoration, a bold plan was put forth to establish a compulsory system of over 50,000 locally financed primary schools as well as a number of institutions at higher levels.[3] Although the vast plan was never realized in full it provided the rough guidelines for the system which eventually developed, and was quite successful in rapidly educating the populace. Only eight years later over 41% of the 6-13 year old population was enrolled in primary schools and by 1910 virtually this entire age group was in attendance.[4]

Above this common base of primary school were a series of isolated tracks or streams into which entry was more limited. Those who did not terminate their education at the end of primary school had to choose between entering a middle school which would be the first step toward the university, or else of entering one of several types of schools geared toward more specifically vocational training. By 1940 nearly 20% of the appropriate age cohort was in attendance at some form of middle school.

At the apex of the educational pyramid were the universities. The first of these, Tokyo Imperial University, created in 1877, was initially developed as a training ground for government bureaucrats. Todai, as the

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[2] See inter alia, R. P. Dore, "The Legacy of Tokugawa Education," in Marius Jansen, ed., Changing Japanese Attitudes Toward Modernization, 99-131, and R. P. Dore, "Education: Japan," Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey, 176-204.

[3] Herbert Passin, Society and Education in Japan, 209-10.

[4] Dore, "Education: Japan," 189.

institute came to be called, has since then always occupied a central and most prestigeous place in the Japanese educational system. Six additional imperial universities (administered under government control) and some forty-odd other universities (both public and private) were created prior to World War II, all of which combined to provide Japan with a highly educated group of business, industrial, and political leaders thereby aiding greatly in the modernization and industrialization of the country.[5]

Several facets of this prewar system deserve underlining both because of their particular concern to Occupation authorities, and because they have impinged on policy formation since then. Perhaps the most significant of these concerns the relationship between the government and the university, both in terms of purpose and actual administrative control. Japan's industrialization and modernization was a far more conscious, governmentally-directed effort than was that in Western Europe or the United States; not surprisingly the entire educational system was viewed by government modernizers as an important contributor to the entire process and it therefore evolved under the tight supervision of the government.

From the perspective of the rest of the educational system, higher educational institutions were comparatively liberal and free from government supervision. At the lower educational levels, conscious and conscientious control over the schools was maintained through government control over teacher training, textbook supervision, and syllabus monitoring. Extensive effort also went into the instillation of patriotism and support for the Imperial system through ethics courses, the wearing of school

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[5]Asō Makoto, Eriito to Kyōiku [Elites and Education]; Ronald P. Dore, "The Future of Japan's Meritocracy," 30-50.

uniforms and caps, military control over physical education, the periodic reading of the Imperial Rescript on Education, the required daily bow of all pupils before each school's picture of the Emperor and other practices. In accord with the overall perceptions of Mori Arinori,[6] architect of the prewar educational system, however, the universities were accorded far more intellectual and administrative leeway. Nevertheless, by comparison to other countries at similar points in time, and by comparison to most better universities today, the controls were quite significant. The first article of the Imperial University Ordinance establishing Tokyo University for example declared quite explicitly that "The purpose of the imperial university shall be to provide instruction in the arts and sciences and to inquire into the mysteries of learning *in accordance with the needs of the state*" (italics added). A series of Education Ordinances in the mid-1880s asserted the supremacy of the state in all areas of education and the 1890 Imperial Rescript on Education stressed service to the state as the national educational ideal.

Harmony between university and state was by no means insured through such simple legal exigencies however and university-state conflicts arose from two rather separate features of the higher educational structure throughout much of the prewar period. The first of these was the comparative autonomy and anti-establishment nature of the earliest private universities. While the Imperial universities were created explicitly for "purposes of state" and were aimed primarily at training government bureaucrats, the private universities were founded by non-governmental and often anti-governmental individuals, such as Fukuzawa Yukichi (Keio), Ōkuma Shigenobu

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[6] See especially Ivan Parker Hall, *Mori Arinori*; Michio Nagai, *Higher Education in Japan*, 166-96.

(Waseda) and Niijima Jō (Doshisha). Waseda in particular was heavily involved in the anti-governmental "Peoples Rights Movement," following the Meiji Restoration, and Ōkuma at one point declared his philosophy on ties between government and the university to be as follows:

> From the beginning we have held to one simple proposition: the will of the people is never identical with the opinion of the government. At times, popular will and government opinion run counter to one another. If education exists under the control of a single power, will not the state be misled in its purposes?[7]

With such a founding philosophical base, Waseda and other private universities became the early homes of anti-governmental activities. Government reaction involved simultaneous efforts to break down the independence of the private institutions and to insure even greater loyalty from government administered institutions. The private universities, through a combination of financial pressures, lack of government recognition and not infrequently overt government harassment, soon came to an accomodation with the government. In 1918, with the promulgation of the University Ordinance, the private universities were subsumed into the system they had originally been established to counter, and with few exceptions they mollified their high levels of independence from the government, becoming instead the occupationally-centered training schools for white collar salarymen.

It was the best of the Imperial universities that in fact were most prominent in attempts to achieve independence from government control. Organized in accord with German principles, these universities internally were divided into faculties (gakubu) which were to be the ultimate decision making bodies in the governance of the universities, the second factor in prewar government-university conflicts and an aspect which has

[7] Nagai, Ibid., 31.

come to be of particular significance in administrative disputes in the postwar period.

A number of significant instances took place during the prewar period in which government attempts to intervene in university policy or to insure some form of ideological conformism were stoutly resisted by autonomy-minded university members. At Tokyo University for example, university-government clashes took place in 1903 when seven faculty members were suspended for criticizing the government's foreign policy, and nearly 200 faculty members united to oppose the government's demand.[8] At Tokyo Kōtō Shōgyō Gakkō, now Hitotsubashi University, faculty and student protests forced an end to government attempts to turn the institution into a purely teaching institute for the training of businessmen in 1908 and in 1919-20 Tokyo University again became embroiled in a major conflict when government officials demanded the resignation of Professor Morito Tatsuo who wrote an allegedly subversive article on the thoughts of Kropotkin.

At Kyoto Imperial University faculty opposition to covert cooperation between the Ministry of Education and university president Sawayanagi in attempting to force the resignation of several professors led to Sawayanagi's resignation in 1913, while twenty years later in 1933 then-Education Minister Hatoyama Ichiro successfully demanded that an allegedly subversive Criminal Law Reader not be used in the university, resulting in another major university-government clash. Even more serious disputes broke out during the 1930's involving the famous "organ theory of the Emperor" postulated by law professor Minobe Tatsukichi, and the theories

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[8]Ikazaki Akio, Daigaku no Jichi no Rekishi [The History of University Autonomy], 25-32.

of the state put forth by Yanaihara Tadao and others. Numerous less famous conflicts took place during the prewar period and though the government forced many resignations or dismissals they came only over strong faculty protest.

Although by no means always successful in their attempts, particularly as government liberality and powers of repression increased during the 1930's, faculty members did succeed in laying at least the groundwork for a heritage of faculty autonomy vis-a-vis government that rose to greater importance in the postwar period. Conversely, successful government intervention in the university to suppress allegedly dangerous or subversive thought was sufficiently prevalent to leave a converse heritage for government officials. Hostility between the two sides, while by no means automatic during this period, occurred with sufficient frequency to establish many of the parameters and sentiments for administrative policy and policy attempts during the postwar period.

The roots of postwar student protest can also be noted in this period as faculty attempts to withstand government demands were sometimes supported by small but ideologically-committed knots of student radicals. Quiescence and a-politicality rather than conscious political activism tended however to be dominant among the student sector.[9]

In addition to such problems revolving around university administration, faculty autonomy and university-government conflicts, all of which have left some mark on higher educational policymaking today, a second feature of the prewar system must be examined: the high degree of institutional

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[9] Henry D. Smith II, Japan's First Student Radicals.

and occupational specificity of educational institutions. In contrast to the American system of education where, from grammar school through college, most students enroll in structurally comparable institutions and move in a single stream from grammar school to high school to college, Japanese students under the prewar system moved in highly differentiated channels once beyond the six years of elementary school. As noted above a key distinction was made between institutions in the purely academic channel and those which were of an occupationally-specific character.

Students who proceeded beyond the required primary education would enter either middle school which was the first step in the academic channel, or else they would proceed on primarily to either higher elementary school, secondary vocational school or part time "youth schools," all of which were vocation-specific and aimed at providing the practical skills required by an industrializing Japan. At this level, segregation according to sex also took place, with special tracks for female students, the best of whom academically could proceed on only to women's colleges (not to be confused with the more prestigeous "universities" open only to males).

Not all those who continued on to middle school however entered universities. Upon completion of the five year middle school, students took rigid competitive examinations on the basis of which even more radical streaming than that following primary school took place. For those who continued, the choice again was between purely academic and purely vocational training, with entry into the academic higher schools being a virtual guarantee of subsequent entry into and graduation from the university. Those who did not gain admittance to higher school through the examinations could enter either the job market or schools designed to prepare them for careers in such fields as architecture, dentistry, engineering, forestry, medicine, or pharmacy.

The emphasis within the system on practical and vocational training continued to the highest levels of the system. There were numerous single faculty universities, both private and national, geared toward vocational training in medicine, commerce and engineering. The specific character of many such institutions is captured in an excerpt from the statement of the committee responsible for the formation of Tokyo Institute of Technology.

> Scholars have a common weakness. They tend to indulge in the study of abstruse theories and to be ignorant of the present conditions of industry. Furthermore, while the scientific aura of their research is pronounced, their studies are far removed from the actualities of industry, which they despise. Nevertheless, the newly established [Tokyo Institute of Technology] ... shall seek to maintain intimate contact with the realities of industry, to conduct practical research on industrial problems, and to develop a faculty and student body who will focus their attention on the problems of industrial operation.[10]

Thus, functional specificity and preparation for future occupations was an integral part of the prewar system of education at all levels.

The ever-narrowing channels of the prewar system meant that entry into universities was an extremely difficult and highly competitive process. At all stages in the educational process, constant socialization was undertaken to insure the successful adaptation of the individual to his increasingly determined and narrowed future role. Little leeway was provided for the "late-bloomer" or for individuals with uncertainties or mind-changes about careers. Cultivation or encouragement of individuality was not a prominent feature of the prewar system; a premium rather was placed on acceptance of outside direction and conformity to external determinations. Moreover, functional specificity among institutions and a high reliance

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[10] Nagai, Higher Education...., 41.

among employers on an individual's background as a criterion for employment meant that one's job and future success depended on one's education to a large extent. These factors went a long way in institutionalizing a third important characteristic of the prewar educational system: elitism.

Elitism in the prewar system took two forms: that which arose as a function of the limited number of individuals continuing on to the highest levels of education, and that which resulted from the radical prestige gradations among higher educational institutions. At the top of the institutional pyramid was Tokyo University whose prestige resulted from a series of factors ranging from such psychological elements as its having been the first university and having been _the_ Imperial university until the others were created, to more academically noteworthy facts such as the intellectual merits and achievements of its faculty and students and the subsequent career successes of its graduates. Below Todai were the other national universities, the cream of which were the other six Imperial universities. Private universities were generally accorded lower prestige, although the best private universities such as Waseda and Keio were sometimes more highly esteemed than some of the lesser national institutions. Still lower were the various "colleges" (senmongakko) or "higher colleges" (kōtō senmongakko), and so on. In the business world such gradations were consciously attended to. The school one attended determined one's subsequent job and chances of promotion; frequently, starting salaries for the same jobs within individual companies would be scaled to reward graduates from the more prestigious institutions.[11]

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[11] Passin, _Society and Education . . ._, 122-25; Koya Azumi, _Higher Education and Business Recruitment in Japan_.

Such a differentiation among institutions put a premium on entry into the best of these, and competition was intense. Only one out of thirteen middle school graduates was admitted to the higher schools that were the sine qua non for a university education. Only one out of 100 students in a graduating elementary school class could be expected to enter any university, and only one out of 200 could expect to enter one of the seven Imperial universities.[12] Professor Henry Smith aptly sums up this facet of prewar education: the system was one which provided, he says, "a little education for the many and great deal of education for the few ..."[13]

It must be pointed out however that although a very small number of universities provided virtually the only channels to the most important positions within the society, and that even though only a very limited number of individuals could enter such universities, the system was comparatively non-elitist in that rigid class barriers were never strong in Japan. The Japanese higher educational system was thus less instrumental in reinforcing inherited privilege and in preventing upward mobility by bright but impoverished children that it was in Western Europe. Informal barriers constituted by the degree of family financial status and geographical mobility as well as more psychological pressures from one's parents, peer group, community, etc. clearly operated in prewar Japan, but these factors are relatively common to all societies. Meanwhile, the open examination system combined with the low tuition in national universities and opportunities for side jobs such as tutoring made the universities a significant channel of social mobility and gave prewar

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[12]Based on Smith, Japan's First Student Radicals; Passin, Ibid., 104.

[13]Smith, Ibid., 1-2.

Japan a comparatively non-ascriptive character. In 1939 for example 16.2% of the students at Tokyo University were farmer's sons.[14] Thus the elitism of the prewar system was an institutional, rather than a class, elitism perhaps best characterized as "meritocratic elitism," and it never became the subject of the same class-based political conflicts that occurred in some European countries.

In summary, what was most significant about the prewar system was the high degree of governmental control, combined with examples of resistance by certain members of the university which thereby laid the basis for the development of a notion of faculty autonomy; the highly vocational orientation of the entire educational system, reaching up into many aspects of higher education; and the narrowness of educational channels and the constraints thereby exercised over social mobility. It was these dimensions of the prewar system which were of greatest concern to the Americans in charge of restructuring the educational system under the Occupation and they were also the aspects of the prewar system that became most salient in the post-Occupational development of higher educational issues.

Higher Education in the Occupation Period:

Initial Occupation policy towards higher education was reactionary in the true sense of the word. In bulk, it represented a reaction to, and an attempt to eliminate most of the major tendencies of the prewar period illuminated above. In keeping with its perceptions of Japan as a country whose social and economic structures were integral props for, if not direct

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[14] Shimizu Yoshihiro, Shiken [Examinations], 110 as cited in R. P. Dore, "Mobility, Equality, and Individuation in Modern Japan," Aspects of Social Change in Modern Japan, R. P. Dore (ed.), 123. It must be noted that one of the main instruments of this meritocratic elitism was the rigid examination system.

catalysts of, the politics which had led to World War II, the American Occupation sought to bring about major changes in the entire Japanese way of life that perforce included higher education. The core principles under which the Occupation initially operated were "demilitarization" and "democratization."

Any and all pro-military vestiges were to be removed from educational institutions, while simultaneously pro-democratic sympathies were to be encouraged. An October 22, 1945 directive by the Civil Information and Education Section made this quite clear:

> The content of all instruction will be critically examined, revised, and controlled in accordance with the following policies:
>
> 1) Dissemination of militaristic and ultranationalistic ideology will be prohibited and all military education will be discontinued.
>
> 2) Inculcation of concepts and establishment of practices in harmony with representative government, international peace, the dignity of the individual, and such fundamental human rights as the freedom of assembly, speech, and religion, will be encouraged.[15]

It was at the lower levels of education that "demilitarization" was most specifically aimed and also where it had its greatest impact, but a definite influence on higher education can be noted as well. While courses and books escaped the rigid ideological checks made at lower educational levels, all personnel were subjected to ideological scrutiny so as to eliminate known exponents of militarism and ultranationalism. A number of such individuals were purged from universities. In addition, the military academies were ordered closed, and all military courses were eliminated in other institutions. Moreover, in November 1945 the Americans took quick action to counter a series of moves by the Japanese Ministry of Education seen by the Japanese left as pro-military. The Minister of

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[15] General Headquarters, SCAP, Civil Information and Education Section, Education in the New Japan, II, 26.

Education had established special schools for returning Japanese soldiers and had allowed students from the disbanded military academies to enter nonmilitary universities during midyear, bypassing the entrance examinations required of other students.[16] To many these actions represented an attempt to give special privileges to military students not available to others in the country, to perpetuate militarist thinking, and to infiltrate liberal or progressive universities with a core of military-oriented students and the Americans were quick to reverse them all.

The anti-military posture of SCAP (Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers) and its CIE section (Civil Information and Education) set a clear psychological mood throughout higher educational institutions, many of which were particularly diligent in removing "tainted" faculty members and in welcoming back many previously imprisoned leftist scholars. In that much of this activity was concentrated on a few noteworthy campuses the overall political impact of the demilitarization campaign was heightened. Clearly, in terms of the atmosphere created, the program was of positive benefit to progressively-oriented members of the academic community and on numerous campuses faculty and student groups came under progressive camp influence. This control was to become quite significant in subsequent government-university conflicts, and was even to affect subsequent aspects of SCAP's higher educational policy.

The demilitarization phase of SCAP's higher educational policy while not to be minimized in significance, served primarily as a backdrop for upstage actions having more direct and first-order consequences. Demilitarization of higher education meant primarily the removal of individuals

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[16]Terasaki Masao, "Sengo Daigaku Kaikaku no Rinen to Jōken(Theory and Reality in Postwar University Reform) in Ikazaki Akio and Nagai Kenichi, eds., Daigaku no Jichi to Gakusei no Chii [University Autonomy and the Position of Students], 1, 5. Ibid., 188.

and attitudes deemed pernicious, whereas democratization meant a far more total and integrated restructuring. In order to lay the groundwork for such a policy, SCAP invited a group of twenty-seven American educators to Japan to meet with a comparable number of Japanese to examine the prewar educational system and to make broad recommendations for change. The report of this group[17] when combined with other documents of the time, is a most valuable indicator both of American perceptions of the shortcomings of the prewar system and of their initial orientations toward the restructuring of the system. In addition to its import as an outline of SCAP thinking at the time, the report is significant in that it has become an important reference point for those arguing over specific higher educational policies, all sides frequently referring to it as the legitimation for their positions.

The report took specific aim at most of the characteristics of the prewar system noted above. Strong opposition was registered to the stress on "needs of the state" as a precondition for virtually all higher educational activity and to the strong bureaucratic controls, primarily from the Ministry of Education, exerted over finance, courses, student activities, the actions of faculty members, etc. Further, strong emphasis was placed on eliminating the inequalities of educational opportunity in the form of sex discrimination, tracking, and the large gaps in quality between the old imperial universities and all others. Finally, there was great concern to eliminate the stress on vocational and specialized training and to innaugurate some form of general education in institutions of higher education.

Higher education was alleged to have three distinct aims: first, the protection and advancement of knowledge and the enlightenment of society;

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[17]"Report of the United States Education Mission to Japan."

second, the training of efficient and humane individuals; third, the promotion of technical proficiency in response to the changing needs of society.[18] Of the three, the first and second recurred most often in the report, while the third received scarcely any subsequent attention. Indeed, the report cautioned against the dangers posed to the university's freedom by financial pressures and business demands. Using an American analogy, the report stated that "the aims of trade and higher learning are as distinct as those of church and state, and they must be kept so."[19]

In the area of university autonomy and government control, the report called for a "recovery of spirit" regarding academic freedom and noted that "one sure way to preserve academic freedom is to give authority to the faculties themselves in academic matters,"[20] a suggestion seen by many academics as a strong endorsement of the position that the faculty conference should be the supreme governing organ on individual university campuses.

Beyond this the report took a strong stand against almost all forms of government supervision of the universities.

> A highly centralized educational system, even if it is not caught in the net of ultranationalism and militarism, is endangered by the evils that accompany an intrenched bureaucracy. Decentralization is necessary in order that teachers may be freed to develop professionally under guidance, without regimentation.[21]

To this end, the mission recommended that:

> Except for examining the qualifications of a proposed institution of higher education before it is permitted to open its doors, and assuring that these initial requirements are met, the governmental agency should have

[18] Ibid., 47.

[19] Ibid., 50. It should be kept in mind that this was a reflection more of the American ideal than realities.

[20] Ibid., 50.

[21] Ibid., 57.

> practically no control over institutions of higher education.[22]

To improve educational opportunities, the report noted that "Recognition of the right of access to higher learning must be made clearer to the people and to the administrative powers controlling higher education, as the prerogative and special advantages of the few are relaxed and redefined for the many."[23] To accomplish this more institutions of higher education were to be created and the distinctive position of the old Imperial universities was to be eliminated. In the interest of equal opportunity the report also recommended that "Freedom of access to higher institutions should be provided immediately for all women now prepared for advanced study; steps should be taken also to improve the earlier training of women."[24]

The overall quality level of facilities of higher education, while quite good in prewar Japan, had suffered severe physical damage as a result of the saturation bombing campaign by the United States during the war. Over one-fourth of the total building area of institutions of higher education was damaged in this way. Further, most private institutions lost virtually all their assets as well from the severe inflation of the postwar period.[25] The report thus proposed that university quality be equalized through measures aimed at improving the financial situation of the private universities, hitherto unsupported by the government.

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[22] Ibid., 62.

[23] Ibid., 47-48.

[24] Ibid., 62.

[25] Mombushō, Waga Kuni no Kōtō Kyōiku [Higher Education in Japan: Ministry of Education White Paper], 24. (Hereafter WP '64.) A translation of this report is available: John J. Blewett, S. J., Higher Education in Postwar Japan, 120-21.

Finally the report showed concern for the content of higher education, noting that general education had in the prewar period usually terminated with middle school; where it existed at higher levels it fell

> far short of meeting the real needs for general education ... For the most part there is too little opportunity for general education, too early and too narrow a specialization, and too great a vocational or professional emphasis. A broader humanistic attitude should be cultivated to provide more background for free thought and a better foundation on which professional training may be based.[26]

The report was received enthusiastically by MacArthur, and formed the basis for initial efforts by SCAP and CIE to initiate changes in higher education. The major goals of the report and of incidental CIE recommendations were quickly reflected in Japanese law. Article 1 of the Fundamental Law of Education which was passed by the Diet on March 31, 1947, stated that

> Education shall aim at the full development of personality, striving for the development of a people, sound in mind and body, who shall love truth and justice, esteem the value of the individual, respect labor and have a deep sense of responsibility, and who shall be imbued with an independent spirit as builders of a peaceful state and society.[27]

Articles incorporated into the new constitution also echoed these themes. Freedom of thought and conscience (Article 19), academic freedom (Article 23), and the right to an equal education correspondent with ability (Article 26) were guaranteed. In the School Education Law, passed on March 29, 1947, the university was declared to have as its aim "the in-depth teaching and studying of specialized arts and sciences as well as the provision of a broad general culture and the development of the intellectual, moral, and practical abilities (of the individual)"[28] (Article 52). On

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[26]"Report of the United States Education Mission to Japan," 52.

[27]Mombushō, Mombu Hōrei Yōran Shōwa Yonjūroku [Outline of Laws and Ordinances in Education, 1971], 11. (Hereafter Mombu Hōrei .

[28]Ibid. 1-10, 15-32, for both the Constitution and the School Education Law. These are variously reproduced in other collections of documents. The

the basis of this cataloguing of legal principles the more difficult problem of actualizing structural changes in the higher educational system was begun. Full understanding of the constraining elements that have since been operative within the three areas of higher educational policy to be investigated makes it necessary to look beyond these principles and to examine as well the structural changes in higher education which were attempted or established.

The structural keystone of the new system was to be the four-year liberal arts college, open in principle to all academically-qualified high school graduates. Drawing heavily on the American system and its underlying rationale, SCAP and CIE officials saw such a change as one that would significantly democratize the opportunities to receive a university education and one that would provide an education geared to knowledge of a broad and general, rather than a particularistic, vocational, nature. Such a system meant the complete realignment of the vast and complicated prewar system of over 525 different institutions of eight main types.

The question of restructuring was delegated to the Educational Reform Committee, the main advisory group established under the Ministry of Education which first considered the American proposals at its seventh general meeting on October 18, 1946. On December 27, the committee issued a recommendation to the Japanese government that "Schools following high school shall in principle be four-year universities."[29] Subsequently, this point was written into the School Education Law of March 31, 1947 (Article 55)

Ministry of Education has a pamphlet translation of the School Education Law and it appears as well in SCAP, Education in the New Japan, Vol. 11, 112-30. This last, of course, has only the initial version of the law and not its subsequent revisions.

[29] Mombushō, Kyōiku Sasshin Iinkai Yōran [Handbook to the Education Reform Committee]. (Hereafter KSI Yōran.)

and became government principle. So did the concept of equality of opportunity, which was formalized on the same day in the Fundamental Law of Education.

Insuring liberality in the curriculum was delegated to a completely non-governmental group, the University Accreditation Association, set up at the direction and encouragement of the Americans and relied on heavily for higher educational policy during the Occupation period.[30] The association set forth on July 8, 1947 a set of minimum standards for university accreditation, which were accepted by the Ministry of Education as the official requirements for charters,[31] effectively negating the unwritten and often arbitrary prewar standards of the ministry. The new standards included the requirements for at least a two year general education program in all four-year institutions. Thus, with the cooperation of both the Educational Reform Committee and the University Accreditation Association, the Americans began the creation in Japan of a higher educational system based on institutional homogeneity; universality of access and keyed to the transmission of the broad principles of liberal arts.

The new system came into effect in 1948, and by 1952 some 226 new system universities were established, the bulk of which represented various combinations of several prewar institutions of higher education.

The results of this reorganization in terms of increased opportunities have long been touted by Americans as one of the more significant accomplishments of the Occupation. The 1944 enrollment in universities was

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[30] Harada Taneo, interview, February 3, 1971.

[31] Chartering involves the process of being established as a legal person or a corporation; accreditation involves peer evaluation by other universities to determine if a university's facilities are of sufficient quality to warrant recognition by other academic associations. Kaigo Tokiomi and Terasaki, Masao Daigaku Kyōiku [University Education], 62-68.

84,000;[32] by 1952 the figure had jumped to 502,000.[33] Unquestionably the absolute increase in the number of university students was tremendous. However, it is necessary to qualify this in certain ways. For example, the total enrollment in all institutions of higher education during the prewar period, rather than simply that in universities, was nearly 400,000 in 1944.[34] Furthermore, the percent of the higher educational cohort attending higher educational institutions was 4.0% in 1940. In 1950 it was up to 6.1%.[35] Although the ages counted are different and hence not absolutely comparable, some increase in the percentage of the age group attending higher educational institutions unquestionably took place. Nevertheless, the increase from 4.0% to 6.1% over the ten-year period 1940-50 is not at all disproportionate in light of the fact, first that from 1935-1940 the increase was from 2.9% to 4.0% and, second, that there was a substantial military demobilization which freed many youths to return to school.

What really happened under the American plan was not so much that opportunities to attend institutions of higher education were genuinely increased by the shift to a four-year university system, although the psychological impact of the move in the direction of democratization of higher educational opportunities should not be minimized. Instead, there was a standardization of the differentiated prewar opportunities into a

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[32] WP '64, 267.

[33] Mombushō, ed., Wagakuni no Kyōiku no Ayumi to Kongo no Kadai: Chūō Kyōiku Shingikai Chūkan Hōkoku [The Course of Japanese Education and Future Problems: Interim Report of the Central Education Council], 380. (Hereafter CKS '69).

[34] Compiled from data in WP '64, 266-69.

[35] CKS '69, 381.

more homogenous set of chances to attend one unified type of higher educational institution. However, an examination of the reorganizational bases on which the new four-year universities were formed shows that the standardization that took place on paper was far from a standardization in reality and the institutional elitism that was an alleged target of the reorganization emerged unscathed.[36] The differences in prestige and power that existed during the prewar period continued to be reflected in the postwar patterns of combination that took place among the various institutions.[37] The national, and more particularly the former imperial universities, were most particularly favored.

Two bases existed for the formation of the new four-year universities -- those organized around an existing university and those which were not. As Tables 3-1 and 3-2 show, of 83 universities formed around extant universities, 26 were national, 14 were local public, and 43 were private, while of 143 universities formed without such a basis, the distribution was 46, 20, and 77 respectively. These figures represent percentages almost identical with the total distribution of national, local public and private universities at the time, and so no discrimination seems involved here. However, looking at the actual combinations is more revealing.

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[36] But it is reported that CIE went so far as to ban participants of both the Ministry of Education and Tokyo University, and only these two, from the organizational meeting for the University Accreditation Association. Terasaki, in Ikazaki and Nagai, Daigaku no Jichi ... , 21.

[37] Terasaki Masao, "Sengo Daigakushi no Magarikado" [Crossroads in the History of Postwar Universities], Bōsei, Vol. 2, (June-July, 1971), 55. (Hereafter Bōsei.)

Table 3-1

Universities Formed Around an Existing University

No. of Components	Type of School Formed			
	National	Public	Private	Total
1-3	3	13	38	54
4-5	11	1	4	16
6-8	12	0	1	13
Total	26	14	43	83

Source: Mombushō, Zenkoku Daigaku Ichiran [Japanese Universities at a Glance], annual.

Of fifty-four schools reorganized from three or fewer institutions, only three were national universities while of the sixteen schools composed of four or five constituent organs, eleven were national and only four were private. All but one of the schools composed of six or more units were national. Thus, all but three national universities formed around existing universities included four or more units, while only one of fourteen local public and five of forty-three private schools had such diverse roots. The new national universities formed around existing institutions thus were far more institutionally complex than their private and local public counterparts, adding immeasurably both to their existing prestige and their physical assets.

Among the schools which did not have an ongoing university as a nucleus, the pattern was the same [see Table 3-2].

Table 3-2

Universities Formed Without an Existing University

No. of Components	Type of School Formed			
	National	Public	Private	Total
1	10[a]	17	72[b]	99
2-3	25	1	5	31
4+	11	2	0	13
Total	46	20	77	143

[a]Includes one university established de novo.

[b]Includes two universities established de novo.

Source: Mombushō, Zenkoku Daigaku Ichiran [Japanese Universities at a Glance], annual.

Again the bias is clearly in favor of the national universities, as 36 of 46 national universities were formed from mergers in contrast to 3 of 20 public and 5 of 77 private universities.

This distinction between national universities on the one hand and public and private universities on the other must not obscure the fact that comparison within the two groups yields equally revealing distinctions. This can be seen in Table 3-3.

Table 3-3

National Universities Formed With and Formed Without an Existing University

No. of Components	With University	Without University	Total
1-3	3	35a	38
4-5	11	10	21
6+	12	1	13
Total	26	46	72

[a]Includes one university established de novo.

Source: Mombushō, Zenkoko Daigaku Ichiran [Japanese Universities at a Glance], annual.

Thus of 38 national universities composed of three or fewer sub-units, 35 were not formed around existing universities, while of 13 universities consisting of six or more components, all but one were formed around existing universities. The seven former Imperial universities among them totalled 33 components, or an average of 4.7 per university.

A similar distinction can be found among the far less well-endowed private universities.

Table 3-4

Private Universities Formed With and Formed Without an Existing University

No. of Components	With University	Without University	Total
1	16	72	88
2+	27	5	32
Total	43	77	120

Source: Mombushō, Zenkoko Daigaku Ichiran [Japanese Universities at a Glance], annual.

What all of this shows is a dramatic reinforcement in the very specific area of higher education of the old adage that the rich get richer and the poor get poorer — at least in the absence of external controls. The most prestigious universities attracted the most complex and desirable mergers; the less prestigious schools were far less attractive, both to the better schools and to one another, and for the most part simply upgraded their titles. But for the former imperial universities this somewhat natural law of attraction and repulsion was enhanced by a set of special provisions in the regulations establishing the four year system (Shinsei Kokuritsu Daigaku Jisshi Yōkō, July 1948). This Ministry of Education regulation provided that all national schools in a single geographical area would be amalgamated to become the single four year university for the prefecture. However, the specific areas in which the former imperial universities existed were exempted from this provision, thus giving them carte blanche to make the most advantageous mergers, trading on and enhancing their already high prestige, rather than having it limited as had been an initial Occupation goal.

In this context of equalizing higher educational opportunities, mention should also be made of eliminating discrimination against females which was closely linked to the overall social and political emancipation of women. They were given the constitutional right to vote (Article 15) and hold public office (Article 44), and absolute equality between the sexes was also written into the constitution (Article 14). Yet without a genuine elimination of existing educational barriers against women to allow them to take advantage of such social and political advantages, these others could have been relatively meaningless.[38]

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[38] Robert K. Hall, Education for a New Japan, 420-21.

As early as December 4, 1945, at the initiative of CIE, the Ministry of Education issued general outlines for a program of eliminating sexual discrimination. Entitled "The Women's Education Renovation Plan," it called for university and college courses to be opened to women and the revision of all regulations which discriminated against them. More formally, Article 3 of the Fundamental Law of Education required the elimination of educational discrimination on the basis of sex.

The effects of this policy on female enrollment in universities were significant. In 1940 there were 97 women registered in university faculties. An additional 5 were in graduate facilities and 109 were classified as "other." At most, therefore, approximately 200 women were enrolled in universities.[39] Figure 3-5 shows the rather striking increases after the war.[40]

Figure 3-5

Number of University Students by Sex

Year	Total	Male Number	%	Female Number	%
1948	11,978	10,032	83.6	1,946	16.4
1949	126,868	118,732	93.9	8,136	6.1
1950	224,923	207,599	92.3	17,324	7.7
1951	313,158	283,975	90.7	29,183	9.3
1952	399,513	358,562	89.7	41,251	10.3

Source: Mombushō, Kyōiku Tōkei Shiryōshu [Collected Statistical Source Materials on Education], 9-14 (new system universities only.)

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[39] CKS '69, 170-73.

[40] Kaigo and Terasaki, Daigaku ..., 97-99. Of particular interest is Kobe Jōgakuin which in its history, Kobe Jōgakuin Hachijunenshi specifically attributes its early reestablishment to Dr. Holmes, who had once been a teacher there. Ibid., 98.

As with the figures on overall enrollment, those for women in universities can be somewhat misleading. During the period 1934-36 women made up 9.5% of the enrollees in institutions of higher education, though few were in universities, so the figure of 10.3% at the end of the Occupation does not mark a phenomenal educational liberation of Japanese women. On the other hand, since the university is the final stage in the educational system, previous discrimination at lower levels continued to be felt in the universities for several years. Thus, the entering class for universities in 1951, rather than the entire student population of that year, was composed of nearly 13 percent women, indicating a more significant increase than appears in the total figures. Moreover in the junior college system, nearly 46 percent of the entering class in 1951 were women. Thus the actual percentage of women entering institutions of higher education by the end of the Occupation was over 18 percent, a doubling of the prewar figures.[41] Still, sexual equality remained far more of a goal than a reality in that the sharp imbalance between the percentage of women entering four year colleges and that entering junior colleges indicates the reemergence of a subtle form of the double standard in higher education.

Consequently, higher educational democratization by the Occupation, both in terms of increased opportunities to attend, sexual equality, and in terms of levelling the prestige gradations among higher educational institutions, must be judged only a partial success in light of the goals set. Certain residues of prewar elitism remained. Nonetheless, the psychological impact of the Occupation measures must be recognized, and by the end of the Occupation the issues of enrollment expansion and equality

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[41] Mombushō, Kyōiku Tōkei Shiryōshū [Collected Statistical Source Materials on Education], 71-76. (Hereafter KTS.)

of opportunity had achieved a high degree of social and political consensus. The huge number of institutions made possible an incremental approach to expansion with each university making many of the key decisions about enrollment. The broad class component of the issue that activated debates on enrollment in Europe was also defused. Meanwhile, the broad principle of a common institutional and educational basis — the four year liberal arts college oriented toward a broad general education — was widely established, in contrast to the more structurally and functionally specific prewar system.

By far the most politically controversial and complicated policies undertaken by the Occupation came in the field of administration and it is here that Occupation policies left their most controversial impact. Two overlapping and reinforcing problems emerged in this area that merit discussion: the organizational problem of authority over the universities and the broader problem of the Occupation's ideological direction. The former left the more explicit legacy for post-Occupational policymaking toward university administration; however, the latter, while less explicit, involved an important alteration in the climate of values surrounding policymaking generally, which in turn proved politically and affectively important in policymaking toward university administration, as well as in Japanese politics more broadly. By the end of the Occupation political and intellectual positions on matters of university administration had become rigidly polarized: government vs. university; conservatives vs. progressives. This polarity continued to dominate policymaking in university administration throughout the entire period following the end of the Occupation.

The earliest proposals of the Americans concerning university administration were aimed at decentralizing the vast authority exercised by

the Ministry of Education during the prewar period. And from the standpoint of Japanese progressives and academics such actions were part of a broader attitude of liberality and tolerance fostered by the Occupation. In terms of administrative powers, the earliest Occupation proposals were aimed most fundamentally at the powers of the Ministry of Education vis-a-vis educational institutions. The report of the First U. S. Education Mission called for the Ministry of Education to exercise simply "functions of leadership, stimulation, and encouragement," not control.[42] The Fundamental Law of Education declared that "education should not be subject to improper control,"[43] with clear allusion to the Ministry of Education. And in line with this, an early CIE report noted that "ultimately, ... the Ministry will be largely an advisory and reporting agency, not an administrative one. It will receive and summarize reports, carry on research studies, and publish many types of material. Its direct control over education, however, will be greatly reduced."[44]

The initial proposals of SCAP and CIE concerning decentralization took a singularly Americanist form paralleling the shift to local U. S.-style school boards for primary and secondary education. CIE demanded the transfer of control over all but ten national universities from the Ministry of Education to that of local (generally prefectural) governments.[45] On the Japanese side, numerous quasi-governmental, political and academic groups were quick to offer their own plans on how best to dissolve the

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[42]Ikazaki and Nagai, "Daigaku no Jichi ...," Chapter 6.

[43]Article 10.

[44]SCAP, Education in the New Japan, 171.

[45]This was similar to a February 1947 plan offered at Hokkaido University. On this see Kaigo and Terasaki, Daigaku ...., 578-80.

Ministry of Education and transfer its powers. Over twenty such plans were forthcoming from various organizations.[46] However, while many Japanese groups supported the notion of a less-powerful Ministry of Education, there was little agreement among them as to where the former powers of the Ministry should devolve. Academic groups generally favored positions granting university faculties supreme powers, while others favored the creation of some intermediary administrative advisory organ, between the ministry and the faculty councils, to exercise overall supervision of the system.

The Ministry of Education, meanwhile in accord with all the known axioms of bureaucratic theory, stoutly resisted all proposals for its elimination. One member of the Educational Division of CIE described the reaction as follows:

> The Japanese are showing increasing signs of balking when it comes down to the dirty work of making any real changes. The famous old phrase of having "the Mombushō emasculate itself" isn't working out so well. The boys over there, when the knife comes into actual view, show a singular reluctance toward the idea of emasculation. They've taken the phrase "freedom of education" to their bosoms, but figure it should mean that the Ministry of Education is free to run it as it sees fit.[47]

This early CIE plan has often been criticized by Japanese leftists as the first indication of nascent conservative educational impulses in the Occupation and as the beginning of efforts to undercut the power of the left on university campuses.[48] Such a judgment seems unfounded; American actions at this time make more sense in the context of a nonpartisan American orientation toward decentralization growing out of the U. S.

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[46] Suzuki Eiichi, "Kyōiku Gyōsei Enkaku" [Development of Educational Administration] in Yamamoto Toshio, ed. Kyōiku Gyōsei Gaisetsu [Outlines of Educational Administration], 11.

[47] Hall, Education ... 58.

[48] Tokyo Shimbun, November 4, 1947

experience. Regardless, opposition to the plan was fast in coming as certain conservative implications of decentralization were realized.

The University Accreditation Association in its "Opinion Paper on the Transfer of University Educational Administration to Local Control," declared that the lack of a local financial base capable of supporting these universities would be more detrimental to university autonomy than would leaving the universities under the central control of the Ministry of Education. The proposal was also criticized as permitting political and economic interests to manipulate universities for their own interests, thereby negating any connection between decentralization and autonomy.[49] The Education Reform Committee opposed the plan for similar reasons in a December 26, 1947 report.[50] Opposition came as well from a group of national university officials meeting at Tokyo Institute of Technology on December 23, 1947,[51] from the Board of Directors of the Association of National University Professors at their January 17 meeting, and from the Association of Technical School Presidents. Additionally, a number of ad hoc faculty and student groups held demonstrations against the plan.[52] And of course the Ministry of Education was also opposed in the face of such widespread opposition. With virtually no internal political support from Japanese groups this early SCAP-CIE plan quickly died. But it died a bipartisan death. Political battle lines on matters of administration were still quite fluid.

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[49] Daigaku Kijun Kyōkai, Daigaku Kijun Kyōkai Jūnenshi [History of the Ten Years of the University Accreditation Association], 135 ff. (Hereafter Jūnenshi.)

[50] KSI Yōran, 105-6. Tokyo Shimbun, January 29, 1948.

[51] Sekai Jihō, January 8, 1948.

[52] Kaigo and Terasaki, Daigaku . . ., 96; Yamanaki Tsuji, Sengo Gakusei Undōshi [History of the Postwar Student Movement], 38.

This was not the case following the second major proposal on university administration. Then the lines of major cleavage between university and government, and progressive and conservative camps took on the shape that has dominated policymaking in this area ever since as the concrete issue of university structure became enmeshed with the broader ideological issue of the "reverse course." The debate on these issues dominated much of the most visible politics of higher education until the end of the Occupation.

With the defeat of the proposal to shift administrative controls to local governmental units, CIE in the beginning of 1948 began promoting an alternative (but equally American) notion of decentralization, namely boards of trustees. Informal suggestions were made to a number of private and quasi-governmental organizations that some board of outside overseers should be created to control the overall administration of each university in the country. Numerous plans and long political arguments emerged following the CIE proposals, with virtually every academic and political organization taking a well-developed position on the question. The debate continued until the end of the Occupation and left an enormous legacy for post-Occupation policymaking.

Each of the individual plans had its distinguishing characteristics but the main lines of cleavage were between the progressive and conservative camps as they were solidifying in the face of the Occupation's reverse course, and between university and state, as they had in earlier struggles. The main focus of combined government-conservative planning was a joint proposal which emerged from CIE and the Ministry of Education[53] according

[53]The plan is reproduced in Kaigo and Terasaki, Daigaku . . . , 651-57 and Tabata Shigejiro et. al. eds., Sengo no Rekishi to Kihon Hoki [History and Fundamental Regulations of the Postwar Period], Vol. 1 of Daigaku Mondai Soshiryoshu [Comprehensive Collection of Documents on the University Problem], 13-17.

to which the Ministry of Education would create a National Advisory Board (Chūō Shingikai) composed of fifteen members, six elected from among the presidents of the national, local public, and private universities of the country (three private, three public), one member from the Education committees (Bunkyō Iinkai) of the upper and lower houses of the Diet, and seven members appointed by the Minister of Education and approved by the Diet. The new board would advise the Ministry of Education on a variety of subjects, including general policies for university education within the country, the revision of laws dealing with universities, the establishment and elimination of universities, and tuition raises and facilities.

On individual campuses "governing boards" (kanri iinkai) or boards of trustees, would be established composed of thirteen members: the university president, three members appointed by the Minister of Education and confirmed by the Diet (at least one of whom was to be from the local area of the university), three appointed by the governor of the local area and ratified by the local assembly (all of whom were required to be from the area), three alumni chosen either by direct election or by some other means provided in law, and a final three selected by the faculty conference of the university. The board would have vast powers to set administrative and financial policy for the university; it would also choose the president and, with the recommendation of the faculty conference, the faculty chairmen and individual members of the faculties. Its powers would include the establishment of new departments, budgetary policy, new lands, the number of student entrants each year, and the awarding of diplomas. In short, the board was to have exceptionally broad powers of personnel and finance as well as overall supervisory powers.

Each university president meanwhile would be appointed for a period of six years by the university's board and would be responsible primarily

for carrying out its policies. He could give advice to the faculty conference and would be responsible to report on all matters to the Ministry of Education.

The faculty conference was to be sharply curtailed in power. It would lose its power to select the university president and faculty members, its role being reduced to making nominations on such matters. Additionally it would lose personnel, finance and disciplinary powers.

SCAP and the Ministry of Education both argued that this plan represented university democratization in that it would decentralize higher education, taking control away from the Ministry of Education and giving it to representatives from local areas. The reactions of many academic and political groups were initially mixed, with positions not rigidly fixed as in earlier debates over decentralization. As the proposal advanced toward legislative action from 1948 through 1951, however, the reverse course began, and increasingly the two issues became entangled, and positions on each of the two overlapped.

The phrase "reverse course" has occassioned great debate in Occupation history; suffice to say that the term implies that early Occupational activities were aimed explicitly at Japanese democratization and by implication were favorable to Japan's progressive political forces, while activities after roughly the consolidation of communist control in China seemed aimed explicitly at making Japan into an economically solid and ideologically stalwart ally of the United States. The political positions generated by the reverse course left a strong impact on the field of higher education as well, particularly in the area of university administration and autonomy.

In 1945 the Occupation had taken the position that "discrimination against any student, teacher, or educational official on grounds of ... political

opinion ... will be prohibited" and had held that "students, teachers, and educational officials ... will be permitted to engage in free and unrestricted discussion of issues."[54] The organizational successes of the political left in the area of education and their willingness to resort to mass protest actions, however, combined with the increased American opposition to socialism and communism and led to sharp reversals in this rather broad encouragement of opinion.

The most striking indication of this change came with the speeches of Walter Crosby Eells, advisor on higher education to SCAP from 1947 to 1951. Eells first articulated the shift against the left in a speech at the opening ceremonies of Niigata University on July 14, 1949, in which he stated that faculty members who were also members of the Communist Party would be subject to control from party headquarters and therefore could not be free. Thus, he argued, they should not be permitted to remain on campuses where it was essential to have "freedom."[55] Elsewhere he argued that professors should be deprived of their status for mere membership in a political party not only for the commission of overt acts. As Eells himself describes his counterposition:

> The Civil Information and Education Section of SCAP ... approved the ... position ... that Communists, by virtue of their membership in that party, are thereby unfitted [sic] to be teachers in the schools of the country. The situation admittedly had some elements of difficulty since the Communist Party is legalized in Japan and has elected many members to the Diet, and academic freedom is guaranteed in the constitution of the country. [Nevertheless,] a

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[54]SCAP, Education in the New Japan, 27.

[55]"Daigaku no Jichi" [University Self-Government], Hōritsu Jōhō, Vol. 42, 232-34 for text of speech. See also Nomura, Daigaku Seisaku: Daigaku Mondai, 487-491.

> definite effort has been made to help Japanese educational leaders to distinguish clearly between political rights of all citizens in a democracy and fitness for the privilege of teaching in a university, and to show that Communist professors by joining the party have thereby surrendered their freedom to think independently.[56]

Eells and the other members of CIE spent the greater part of the six months between November 1949 and May 1950 defending this peculiar notion of academic freedom.

The shift to overt anticommunism was also tangibly revealed with the Second U.S. Education Mission to Japan. This group, composed of a minority of the initial mission, submitted a "supplementary" report on education in the fall of 1950, which radically revised many earlier assessments. Included was a declaration that "one of the greatest weapons against Communism in the Far East is an elightened electorate in Japan."[57]

Between July and November 1950 the so-called "red purge" was formally carried out, affecting virtually all areas of Japanese society, including universities. Several thousand teachers, from all levels of education were removed from their posts, with rarely any need to prove overt anti-government acts, subversion, intentions, or communist affiliation to insure

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[56] Eels, Communism in Education, 29.

[57] Ibid., 22. In addition to the overt adoption of anti-communism as an aim of the Occupation, U.S. attitudes toward higher education changed regarding the relative weight to be given to the several purposes of higher education. Increasingly the initial aim of developing a university system geared to the abstract search for truth and knowledge, and the substantive development of broadly educated critical citizens gave way to that of a university system which would meet the economic and political needs of the state (and, not completely incidentally, one unlikely to support political radicalism among faculty and students). Here too the report of the Second Education Mission to Japan marks the shift. The report of the Second Mission contrasts sharply with that of the first in stressing throughout the relationship between the system of higher education and the achievement of tangible social and political goals. "The final character of the country's higher education," the report maintained, "must be determined by the kinds of highly educated people needed to carry out the national objectives."

that a person be removed.[58] In fact, Eells himself noted that it was rarely even necessary to raise the question of communism to insure the purge of particular individuals.[59] The effects were felt well beyond those who simply lost their positions, in the more subtle form of withdrawn manuscripts and academic resistance to participation in round-table discussions of even minimally political topics.[60]

It was during this time of acute hostility and suspicion that the proposals to alter the power distribution affecting higher education emerged. The Ministry of Education, and SCAP were concerned about the potential exploitation of the university as a base from which to advance what they saw as dangerously radical political ideas. They were particularly fearful of the retention, let alone the expansion, of the powers of the faculty conference on individual campuses, whereby each university would become a potential bastion of radicalism. Indeed many faculty conferences had demonstrated open hostility to the conservative government and the Ministry of Education and to American opposition to the political left. Despite whatever may have been the original motivations of SCAP, CIE and the Ministry of Education in the proposal to establish a system of boards of trustees, as anti-communism became an overt motivation of actions vis-a-vis the university, the proposal took on explicitly political implications.

"Progress of Educational Reform in Japan," [Report of the Second U.S. Education Mission to Japan], 9.

[58] Robert A. Fearey, The Occupation of Japan, Second Phase: 1948-1950, 45. In July 1951, for example, CIE sent a pamphlet to universities and to the Ministry of Education entitled "Advice in the Reform of Higher Education" which among other things urged the complete elimination of communist influences from the faculty and from student groups within the university. Terasaki, Bōsei, 55.

[59] Ibid.

[60] Ibid.

The Japanese university community contended that the new arrangements would merely transfer the direct power of the Ministry of Education to a central board, the majority of whose members would in fact be appointed by the Ministry of Education and whose own powers vis-a-vis the ministry would be merely advisory. The board of trustees on each campus, meanwhile, was seen as a device to transfer power from the faculty conference to a group of men made up of only four academicians compared to nine "outsiders," raising fears that the proposed "decentralization" would guarantee not university autonomy but rather subservience to "bureaucrats, big business, and local bosses."[61]

Numerous proposals to counter the government's plan emerged from organs closely tied to the progressive camp, and to the academic community more broadly. Although each had varying elements of individuality one feature was common to all: in contrast to the Ministry of Education plan, they gave no decision-making powers on internal university administration to nonacademics -- i.e. no outsiders or "local representatives." Several proposed giving strong powers to some national-level organ below the Ministry of Education. In all such cases, however, the members of such an organ would have been elected from national or functional constituencies rather than being governmentally appointed.

An interesting political situation was presented by the outpouring of concrete plans in the period preceeding the height of the red purge. Since some bill was seemingly desired by a number of groups, the political situation was perfect for pluralistic compromise, the solution to which was obvious: bring the representatives of the differing viewpoints

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[61] Igazaki, Daigaku no Jichi ..., 103.

together in a common committee and allow them to work out their differences among themselves. This was the tactic chosen by the Ministry of Education although the results proved to be quite different.

As established by the Ministry of Education, the resultant Committee to Draft a National University Administration Bill was beyond a doubt the most broadly representative ever assembled in Japanese education. Its initial form, as announced on August 5, 1949, called for eight members — two each from the Educational Reform Committee, the Japan Science Council, the University Chartering Council, and the Assembly of University Presidents.[62] By the 6th of September, the time of the committee's formal inauguration, its membership had been broadened to twenty — the above eight plus representatives of the University Accreditation Association, the Association of University Professors, the League of Private University Associations, the Japan Teachers Union, business groups, and additional outsiders.[63] The group met twenty times from September until the following February, hearing the opinions of virtually all groups with an expressed interest in higher education, after which it published its first draft recommendation. A revised draft then became the basis for a national public relations effort culminating in large scale public hearings in Tokyo and Osaka aimed at generating discussion of and support for the proposed bill. Thereafter, a slightly revised third proposal emerged.

Structurally, all three drafts resembled those of earlier plans.[64] At the national level under the Ministry of Education would be a National

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[62] Kokuritsu Daigaku Gakucho Kaigi [not the Kokuritsu Daigaku Kyōkai], Asahi Shimbun, August 6, 1949.

[63] Nihon Keizai Shimbun, September 7, 1949.

[64] Ohara Seiji, "Daigaku Hoan no Suii" [Developments in the Plan for a University Law], passim.

University Council composed of twenty-three members all appointed by the Minister of Education. Six of these were to be representatives of university presidents, four were to be nominess of the Japan Science Council, three were to be nominees of the Association of University Professors, and ten were to be "men of learning and experience" approved by the Diet. The council was to have broad powers in the area of higher educational budgeting, legislation for national universities, and the establishment and elimination of universities.

At the university level, a council [shōgikai] parallel to the earlier boards of trustees, was to be composed of from ten to thirty members, no more than one-third of whom were to be faculty members. The university president was required to "listen" to the opinions of this body on a host of matters, including revision of major statutes, budget formulation, establishment of faculties, courses, graduate facilities, personnel standards, and student entry quotas. This council was also to select the president who was required to act in conjunction with it on major matters concerning the university.

The proposals in the first draft would have distinctly curtailed the existing powers of the faculty conference and would have centralized controls under the council or board of trustees. At the national level, however, the National University Council was to be broadly representative of faculty and other potentially or actually left-leaning groups. The powers of the council would be great, since the Ministry of Education would be required "to act in accord with its decisions." While the proposal was by no means favorable to opponents of the earliest Ministry of Education draft it was not a uniformly conservative bill.

Several dramatic changes took place, however, from draft one to draft three, and from draft three to the final bill presented to the Diet

in February 1951. The three most significant, all generated by the Ministry of Education, indicate its desire and power both to restrict encroachments on its own authority and to limit the prerogatives of faculty and student groups. Draft one would have required that three members of the National University Council be nominees of the Association of University Professors. This provision was dropped in subsequent drafts and the membership was set at twenty, eliminating any explicit provision for national level faculty representation. Drafts one and two would have required formal exchanges of views between faculty heads and university presidents on the one hand and student groups and their representatives on the other, a major advance in the recognition of students as an integral part of the university. Among other things, the faculty chairman was required to seek agreements with student representatives regarding student organizations, student life, and student activities for each of the individual faculties of the universities. He was explicitly required to take steps to improve student life and to determine through consulation with the faculty conference the best methods for selecting student representatives. Subsequent drafts eliminated such provisions as "unnecessary formalization."[65]

The third change went to the heart of government powers over the university. In all three of the council's drafts the National University Council was given considerable powers over the Minister of Education. In all areas of legislation, budget planning, and establishment or elimination of universities and faculties the Minister was required "to act in accord with the decisions of the council" (sono gisetsu o henakereba naranai).

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[65] Ibid. 79-80; Kaigo and Terasaki, Daigaku ..., 612.

That is, he could not act in these matters without the consent of the council. The final bill submitted to the Diet in February 1951, however, required that he merely "listen to their opinions" on such matters (sono iken o kikanakereba naranai). This change, made unilaterally by the Ministry after the council had agreed on its final third version, fundamentally undermined any chance that the bill would restrict the powers of the government.[66]

These changes, and particularly the final change by the Ministry, destroyed any hope that the plan would engender broad support from concerned groups. Instead it polarized political and academic groups over the question of administration. Coming as it did in the midst of a broad climate of hostility toward the progressive camp and to university freedom it could only foster fear and suspicion, even from groups desirous of decentralizing the powers of the Ministry of Education, that many of the newly acquired freedoms on university campuses throughout the country were in danger of being lost once again to the central government and to conservative forces of society.

In that the issue took the form of an indivisible legislative proposal for the restructuring of all university administration and the broad redistribution of power within the entire university system, it is not surprising that open conflict and high visibility marked the debates surrounding its resolution. Taking place in the ideologically charged political atmosphere of the red purge, the nature of the issue itself reinforced mistrust and anatagonism, and in turn became a historical

[66]The two final plans are reproduced in Nomura Hyōji, Daigaku Seisaku; Daigaku Mondai [University Policies; University Problems], 498-509. Section 2, Clause 8 contains the critical phrases in both cases.

reference point for future policymaking in the arena of administration and autonomy.

When the final bill was presented to the Diet, some of the strongest opposition came from two of the organizations that had participated in the drafting of the original version — the Japan Science Council and the Japan Teacher's Union. They were joined by all parties of the progressive camp and numerous ad hoc academic groups. Once again, the progressive camp's opposition to the government proposal received widespread support from the mass media and public opinion.

A wide ranging debate took place in Diet committees over the proposal; conservative groups lobbied for its passage and progressive groups sought both inside and outside the Diet to block its passage. Once again while the government clearly had the votes in the Diet to ensure passage of the legislation it proposed, no vote ever was taken on it. Instead, once introduced in the Diet, the legislation lingered and died an unheralded death. But by the time the proposal was withdrawn the lines of political and ideological cleavage were starkly fixed and they heralded the positions taken in subsequent debates over administration. Further, the entire policymaking process served as a prototype of actions that were to repeat themselves in several subsequent policymaking efforts during the ensuing decade and a half. Facing rather unified political, academic and perhaps even more significantly public and media opposition to their proposal, the conservatives refused to push through the legislation, despite their Diet majority.

Before proceeding, it would be well to highlight certain aspects of the historical material presented on the nature of the three issues under question, not only to isolate some of the historical constraints thereby

imposed on subsequent policymaking efforts, but also to extract in more clearcut form the issue specific dimensions noted in Chapter 2.

Without a doubt, the most highly affective and emotionally charged issue area was that relating to university administration and the corollary issues of faculty autonomy and academic freedom. Starting in the prewar period and continuing through the Occupation, issues in this area evoked the greatest concern and the deepest emotional commitments by the widest variety of political actors. Since this has been true in many other countries it should perhaps emerge as no particular surprise.

What is more surprising perhaps, when seen in comparative perspective, is the fact that university entrance, and questions of enrollment opportunities have been virtually non-emotional. Lacking the class-based history of discriminatory admissions, the prewar Japanese university system was relatively meritocratic and open (with the notable exception of discrimination on the basis of sex, which of course lacked the topicality it currently enjoys). With the structural reorganization initiated by the Occupation and the injection of new and publically accepted values of opportunity and democracy, such problems were even further reduced in emotional content. A relatively broad (though by no means universal) consensus that all able students should have the opportunity for higher education existed by the end of the Occupation.

Somewhat between these two extremes were matters relating to functional specificity of institutions. Opposition clearly existed to the statism and vocational direction of prewar higher education but this appears to have been limited and these features of higher education were attacked and largely eliminated early in the Occupation. The structural elimination of tracking undoubtedly played a large role in ensuring some partial resolution to any emotionalism the issue might have evoked, as

did the requirement that all universities offer programs of general education. The Occupation by no means resolved the issue to everyone's satisfaction and its partial reversal of the issue at the time of the Second Educational Mission served to reignite some sentiment on the issue, but the problem never reached the same proportions as matters of university administration.

Turning to questions of issue scope and divisibility, a similar pattern emerges. Administration of higher educational institutions always emerged as a rather holistic package. Broad and general regulations governing all, or at least very broad categories of institutions marked both the prewar and Occupational periods; decisions were not ad hoc in nature.

Questions of alleged interference with university autonomy and academic freedom, particularly as these emerged during the prewar period, are less easy to categorize clearly. Taking most often the form of government attempts to insure certain behavior either by specific universities or individual academics, these questions could be considered highly divisible in nature. Academics might suggest the relevance of the adage about dividing and conquering. But precisely because of this perception the issues rarely remained confined to a single institution or faculty member. The perception of a seemingly unfair threat to broad principles of academic freedom, no matter how localized or specific, was almost always sufficient to insure a much broader response. Individual faculty members sought and often gained support from colleagues at their own and other universities; institutions did the same. Precisely because of the principled nature of the questions involved the problems rarely remained highly divisible, or subject to difference splitting, for any decision adversely affecting an individual or a school could subsequently become the precedent for similar action against others. Thus a certain indivisibility,

at least in the way the issues were perceived must be accorded to such matters as well.

Finally it should be noted that such breadth of perception frequently went beyond the confines of academe. During the prewar period political parties of the left were considerably weaker than they proved to be since the war. But at least by the Occupation most issues of university administration and autonomy were seen as explicitly political, and by no means exclusively educational. Thus trade union federations and more explicitly the political parties (generally the Japan Socialist Party and the Japan Communist Party) were willing to take political actions in support of what they saw as correct positions on issues. Since individual cases of academic freedom almost always involved faculty members or student groups explicitly supportive of these parties, and since administration proposals by the government were almost always perceived as attempting to curtail political activities beneficial to these parties, such behavior was logical enough. What emerges then is a picture of administrative issues as virtually nondivisible and almost always quite broad in at least perceived, if not in acutal, impact and scope.

From one perspective the issue of enrollment could be seen as equally broad and indivisible. Involved was potentially the entire cohort of university-aged youths. But more salient is the fact that no policy decision affecting this group, qua group, emerged. At no time was there a decision or set of decisions attempting to set forth a comprehensive policy toward enrollment.[67] Rather, universities in both the prewar and Occupation periods established their own standards for admission, and the

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[67] One might cite the 1918 University Ordinance as a possible exception.

closest thing to national supervision consisted of government standardization of entrance examinations into national universities, and perfunctory ratification of the entrance quotas established by individual universities. Thus, while the cumulative effect of enrollment policies was broad indeed, this was only as the result of numerous specific and divisible component decisions. It is as though the enrollment policy affected each applicant as an individual, with the aggregate impact on the totality of the university-aged cohort emerging only as a by-product. Furthermore, the issue was never perceived by political organizations as of significant breadth over which to do battle. Indeed, as well as can be determined, none even saw fit during the prewar and Occupation periods to adopt anything more than the most cursory statements of general support for broad and unobjectionable principles of equality of opportunity. Thus the breadth of the enrollment issue remained considerably less than that surrounding the administrative and autonomy issue, while being far more subject to divisibility for its solution.

Again occupying something of a middle position between these two extremes is the issue of specialization and functional differentiation. During the prewar period, for example, a multiplicity of higher educational institutions existed and regulations concerning them were collectively broad and general, but distinct from one another. The broadest commonality was the statist orientation to which all were expected to adhere; within this framework considerable specificity existed as to the structure, course requirements etc. expected of the different institutional types. Furthermore within these general constraints there was leeway concerning course and degree requirements, with individual institutions, particularly universities, having extremely heterogeneous internal compositions. It

would seem therefore that divisibility was far greater than in matters of administration, but by no means as great as in matters of enrollment.

Under the Occupation, both the replacement of institutional diversity with the single four year university and the requirements concerning general education within the university represented policies of considerable breadth and indivisibility: common standards of national scope were required. But beyond this, considerable flexibility remained for institutions in terms of courses of study made available beyond the general education requirement, and for the types of faculties and the field of concentration to be established within each university.

Furthermore, during both the prewar and Occupation periods the perceived political scope of such matters again never reached the same proportions as university administration matters. They emerged as of concern to universities and academics to be sure, but they did not take on the significance for non-academic groups that administrative matters did.

Thus in summary the issue dimensions of university administration emerge as congregated on one extreme while those involving enrollment approximate an opposite extrême. By no means midway between these two, but clearly in no way as extreme as either, lay issues of specificity and differentiation.

Before examining how these factors have interacted in post-Occupation policymaking however it is necessary to examine explicitly the political context within which they have emerged, devoting particular attention to the key variables of organizational strength and mobilizability and to certain formal political requirements, legalisms and broad trends in formal decisionmaking. This is the subject of Chapter Four.

Chapter Four

POLICYMAKING PARAMETERS AND POLITICAL VARIANCE

All states exercise some degree of control over the societies they govern, and all societies in turn exercise some influences over state actions. What differentiates the absolute totalitarian political system from the liberal-pluralist is the relative weight of these two competing influences. In totalitarian (and somewhat less so in authoritarian) political systems the overwhelming bulk of influence goes from the state to society, while in liberal-pluralist (and less so in corporatist or consociational) systems, it is societal influences over the state which are the more significant.

While there are legitimate disagreements over the exact degree of pluralism in Japan, it is clear that, when compared to most other states, Japan emerges on the liberal and democratic ends of the spectrum; most analysts readily categorize Japan as a democratic state. As would be expected in a pluralist democracy, policymaking in Japan is characterized by a general openness not found in totalitarian systems. Newspapers, radio and TV report actively on many important aspects of public policymaking; interest groups seek actively to influence decision makers in various party and governmental offices; opposition groups are relatively free to petition and protest actions with which they disagree; parliamentarians are openly elected, and to a greater or lesser extent they are expected to represent certain of their constituents' needs; if they fail to do so Japan's relatively free elections can serve as a device for removing them. All policymaking takes place within a comparatively democratic political culture. By most instrumental definitions of the term, policymaking in Japan is democratic. Of course

instrumental definitions are limited, quite different from more ideal definitions such as those of Rousseau, Mill or Marcuse, and it must be immediately recognized that from such latter perspectives, Japan, as all other functioning societies, leaves much room for further democratization. The point is, however, that a prime consideration in analyzing Japanese policymaking involves immediate recognition of the comparatively open nature of most policymaking, and the variety of significant controls that can be exercised by society over the state. Beyond this, most aspects of policymaking in Japan take place according to various legally or traditionally prescribed procedures. That is to say, the mechanics of policymaking are neither personalistic nor arbitrary. Law and custom make clear which state and which non-state organs are responsible for the initiation, formulation and implementation of policy alternatives under a variety of different circumstances. Certain rights, for example, are clearly guaranteed by the constitution and their abrogation demands an amendment, through established procedures, of the constitution. Other matters are set by law, and can be altered only through changes in these laws as carried out through prescribed Diet proceedings. Still other matters are delegated to a particular government agency, while others still are removed from governmental auspices completely and are delegated to some specific quasi-public or social organization, whether a public commission, an advisory committee, or some totally private federation such as the Japan Medical Association.

This is particularly significant for the cases under examination here since, for example, most matters of university administration involve Diet-directed changes in law; so too do many of the matters concerned with functional differentiation among higher educational insti-

tutions. Other items connected with differentiation, as well as most concerned with increasing specialized education, are exclusively within the province of the Ministry of Education. A few items are left exclusively to the affected institutions of higher education. Finally, some aspects of chartering which affect enrollment expansion are under the control of specific advisory committees within the Ministry of Education, while others are under the control of the private University Accreditation Association, and still others are left entirely to individual universities or to the "free market." Such formal requirements quite obviously make for very different "processes" and it makes little sense to speak of any single process of policymaking in Japan--though all may be equally "open" by some common standard, or all may involve similar problems of initiation, persuasion, decision and execution, or some other set of abstract, universally applicable categories.[1] Among other things, different arenas of decision-making will make it easier or harder for specific social sectors, or political groups, to exert an impact on policymaking and the policies decided, while guaranteeing an impact to others.

Neither the openness of policymaking in Japan generally nor the fact that different courses of policymaking are spelled out for discreet areas of policy should be surprising. Nor should the fact that these different procedures bias the process in favor of certain actors in one policy area and other actors in a different area. That different social

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[1] Such categories are used, for example, in Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel P. Huntington (eds.) Political Power: USA/USSR, passim; and Ronald C. Herold and Shane E. Mahoney, "Military Hardware Procurement Procedure: Some Comparative Observations on Soviet and American Policy Processes."

sectors and interests do not exercise equal degrees of influence within the same open society, or that influence over one type of policy does not automatically mean equal influence over different policies is virtually a political truism. At the same time, one particularly noteworthy feature of Japanese pluralism is its fundamentally lopsided nature, something which sets even more explicit limits on the basically pluralist dimension of Japanese policymaking.

BIPOLARITY AND HEGEMONIC PLURALISM

If Japan is categorized as pluralist to stress certain of its similarities with other polities and to mark it as different from others, important differences among the societies broadly categorized as "pluralist" must be recognized as well. The previous chapter noted the Occupation's "reverse course" that shifted political aims from democratization and demilitarization to economic recovery, and political support from the emerging progressives to the refurbished conservatives. At least by this time, if not before, Japan's most significant political forces became divided into two mutually antagonistic "camps," the progressives and the conservatives.

The term "camp" is used by those who consider themselves members, as well as by outside observers, to convey at least two notions: first, the comparative agreement and unity among the discreet members in each camp and second, the mutual hostility and readiness for political battle with the opposing camp. In the immediate post-war period, the Japanese conservative camp was represented politically by several parties, most notably the Liberals and the Progressives (later known as the Democrats). Since 1955, there has been one single conservative political party, the

Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), formed from a merger of the existing conservative parties. Throughout the postwar period, key social support for the conservative camp has come from big business and from the agricultural sectors, and the public policy positions taken by the conservatives have reflected this fact.

The progressive camp, meanwhile, has lacked the political unity that the conservatives have enjoyed since 1955. There have always been at least two, and often three, political parties claiming to be "progressives," the Japan Communist Party (JCP), the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), which was split during the early 1950s into the Left Socialists and the Right Socialists, and finally the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP), formed in 1960 from remnants of the earlier Right Socialists. In addition, the Clean Government Party (CGP), which first emerged in national elections in 1956, has on various occasions counted itself as a member of the progressive camp. In contrast to the conservatives, the progressives have garnered the bulk of their support from organized labor, intellectuals, and, to a lesser extent, the urban dweller.

The major members of each of these two camps share a variety of fundamental assumptions about socio-political problems and solutions that serve to minimize the intra-camp differences that frequently arise. The proper level of military expenditure, the country's alliance and defense framework, the economic structure and the relative shares alloted to different social sectors, the degree of social welfare to be sustained by the state, the legitimacy of extra-parliamentary and extra-electoral political participation, and a host of other basic questions find the members of each camp relatively close to one another and far distant from the opposing camp. On such issues there is little free floating

political exchange or transference of partisan affiliation between the leaders of the different political organizations; political exchange takes place almost exclusively within the grounds of one's own camp.

In this sense Japanese political forces line up in a manner similar to that in postwar France or Italy or to Weimar Germany, rather than to postwar Great Britain, the U.S., or Austria or West Germany. Political forces in the former manifest what Duverger has called "philosophical dualism"[2] and what Kirchheimer has labeled "opposition in principle,"[3] the opposing sides seeking radically different solutions to existing political problems; in the latter, most politically significant groups have arrived at a fundamental consensus on the nature of the political game, and the boundary between "legitimate" and "illegitimate" solutions to problems. Despite the fact that all are "pluralist," there is a world of difference between the relatively moderate pluralism of the one set, and the far more extreme and ideologically antagonistic pluralism of the other.[4] In one there is far greater integration of organized social stratum and groups, far greater mutuality of access to the channels of political influence and far less consciousness of ideological predispositions than in the other.

That Japan's two political camps are ideologically far apart on many issues can be appreciated from certain assessments each has made

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2 Maurice Duverger, Political Parties, 214.

3 Otto Kircheimer, "The Waning of Opposition in Parliamentary Regimes."

4 See especially, Giovani Sartori, "European Political Parties: The Case of Polarized Pluralism." Also Robert A. Dahl (ed.), Political Oppositions in Western Democracies and Regimes and Oppositions, inter alia.

about the other.

The conservative LDP, for example, has declared its unalterable opposition to the principles on which the progressive camp has been founded.

> There is a school of thought in our country represented by, among others, the Marxist-oriented Socialist and Communist Parties, which stresses the supremacy of class warfare. In total disregard for the difficulties it would cause to the bulk of our people, this school of thought would have us destroy one another in the interests of a revolution. . . . This is something completely incompatible with the spirit of conservatism [which we espouse].[5]

Elsewhere the party has declared more succinctly that "the LDP . . . is firmly committed to fighting against communist and socialist influences."[6]

On the other side, the entire perspectives of the Socialist and Communist Parties are predicated on their own historically destined victory over the "reactionary forces." One document of the JCP, for example, states in part:

> Our party strongly desires to respond to the ardent wishes of the masses by opening up a vigorous struggle both inside and outside the Diet . . . to fight against the country's reactionary forces.[7]

The JSP has made similar declarations, including the following:

> We are building a progressive base to confront and undermine monopoly capital. . . . We will engage in broadly based common struggles and unified actions to overthrow the [present] cabinet and to reverse the political influence of the LDP; simultaneously we will be exercising all of our powers for the establishment of progressive political authority focused on the JSP.[8]

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5 Tsuji Kiyoaki (ed.), Shiryō: Sengo Nijūnenshi [Source Materials: Twenty Years in Postwar Japan], Vol. 1, "Seiji" [Politics].

6 Ibid., 124.

7 Ibid., 406.

8 Nihon Shakaitō Seisaku Shingikai, Shakaitō no Seisaku [Policies of the Japan Socialist Party], 18-19.

Rhetorical posturing undoubtedly accounts for some component of the mutual venom contained in such statements. Further, one clear aim they all have is the oversimplification of complex social and political issues for mass consumption and appeal. Nevertheless, they indicate far deeper antipathy in Japanese bipolarity than is the case in other more consensual bipolar systems such as the U.S. or Great Britain. When it is realized that most political groups identify strongly with one or another camp and usually express comparable sympathies, the underlying tension and potential for vehement conflict in Japan is clear.

In addition to the ideological distance that separates the two camps in Japan, a second feature must be noted. Although post-Occupation Japan is politically bipolar the two poles have by no means been equally successful in their efforts to secure control of the governmental apparatus of the country. Control has been monopolized since the end of the Occupation by the conservative camp, or more accurately by its electoral standard bearer, the LDP and its predecessors. Under Japan's parliamentary system, the government is chosen by the Diet, with the Lower House having the major powers; and the conservatives have enjoyed very comfortable, even though somewhat declining, majorities there since 1952. Only in the most recent elections have they even fallen below the 60 percent mark. The progressives during this same period have generally gained a combined total of only one-third of the seats.[9]

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[9] How to classify the CGP along an ideological dimension is a problem that continues to perplex social scientists, with some contending that the party is potentially fascist, and others seeing it as a populist group with left-wing leanings. To some extent the party runs counter to the notion that Japan is bipolar--at least electorally. This problem seems to support the conclusion that bipolarity may be breaking down. See Scott Flannigan, "The Japanese Party System in Transition," 231-

The result has been that during the post-Occupation period the conservative camp has enjoyed a position of unchallenged dominance in the parliament and total control over the cabinet and the offices of government. The conservatives have therefore had a virtual monopoly over the formal processes of governmental policymaking, while the progressive camp has remained a rather isolated, semi-permanent minority. Postwar Japanese politics has been the politics of hegemonic pluralism.

This hegemonic position has meant that the linkages between the LDP and the actual organs of government have become sufficiently institutionalized to make the LDP the party of government, while the close ties between the senior ranks of the civil service and LDP parliamen-

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253. On the CGP and the Sōka Gakkai which until recently was one of its main supports, see James White, Sōka Gakkei and Mass Society.

Somewhat parenthetically, it should be noted that while there has been a relatively consistent 60 percent return of conservatives to the lower house, the actual conservative share of the vote has been considerably less commanding, and shows a marked and consistent decline. A good portion of the conservatives' strength must be attributed to maximum exploitation of Japan's unusual electoral system combined with knowledgeable gerrymandering. On the effects of electoral systems on party systems, see Douglas W. Rae, The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws. On the Japanese electoral system and its effects, see Gerald Curtis, Election Campaigning Japanese Style, 30-31 and passim. Also Nathaniel B. Thayer, How the Conservatives Rule Japan, especially Chapter Five. Japan has a single vote, multi-member district system in which competition for the single vote of party supporters means intense competition among the several candidates from that party with rather little electoral competition for "floating votes" and the votes of members committed to the opposing camp.

The overall decline in conservative vote-getting power has been of obvious concern to LDP leaders and many express and play upon the purported dangers that would follow their defeat. Certain of this concern is of particular significant in understanding the strong conservative reaction to protest activities during 1968-69. This is discussed at greater length in Chapter Four.

tarians have become so institutionalized as to make discussions about the ideological neutrality of the civil service, or the logical changes that would follow the election of a new government, little more than idle utopian speculations. The result has been that the conservative camp exerts clear cut dominance over certain critical arenas of policymaking, a feature of general policymaking which demands particular attention.

THE BUREAUCRATIC ROLE AND CONTROL IN JAPANESE POLICYMAKING

A number of factors point to the closeness of ties between the LDP and the civil service. LDP Diet members, and particularly cabinet ministers, have increasingly been drawn from the ranks of retired bureaucrats.[10] In addition, the top posts in the bureaucracy, while theoretically non-political and meritocratic, are awarded only after candidates for them are screened by the LDP. Candidates unacceptable to the Party are in effect unable to rise above the level of bureau chief (kyokucho).[11]

More specifically related to the question of policymaking, the LDP has come increasingly to depend on the bureaucracy for the formulation and implementation of policy. The outline of the LDP party electoral

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[10] Chitoshi Yanaga, Big Business in Japanese Politics; Haruhiro Fukui, Party in Power; Robert A. Scalapino and Junnosuke Masumi, Parties and Politics in Contemporary Japan; Thayer, How the Conservatives. . .; Junnosuke Masumi, "The Political Structure in 1955," 30; Misawa Shigeo "Seisaku Kettei Katei no Gaikan" [Outline of the Policy-Making Process], 14-15.

[11] All appointments at this level are made by the Cabinet and before Cabinet approval is granted the LDP screens all candidates. Under unusual circumstances a leftist might be appointed, but this is rare. My thanks go to several Japanese sources who prefer anonymity and to Gerald Curtis for explaining this point.

strategies, for example, ends with a list of policies proposed by the individual ministries. Even more noteworthy is the fact that within the LDP the committees of the Policy Affairs Research Council, which sets party policy, are organized in functional parallel to the committees of the Diet which in turn are parallel to the ministries of the government. Close formal, and more importantly informal, personal ties easily emerge between LDP members and senior bureaucrats working on similar areas of public policy. The frequent result is that the same LDP members generate party proposals in conjunction with their opposite numbers in the ministry affected, and then argue for these proposals within the Diet, drawing, where necessary, on the technical expertise of the senior civil servants most closely involved.

The closeness between the LDP and the bureaucracy has obviated the need for elected government officials to serve as a constant monitor over the bureaucracy. In Japan, insuring that government policy aims are not stymied by antagonistic bureaucratic independence is not the problem that it is in societies where changes in basic policy direction normally accompany changes in government. The comparative homogeneity of policy orientation within the LDP, combined with the party's hegemonic position, insures a high degree of consistency in government policy, while the close relationship between the party and the bureaucracy make it possible for the latter to operate with increased independence in policy-making without concern that such actions will be antagonistic to the elected officials. Cabinet ministers, for example, are rotated almost annually with no apparent worry about the power over, and dependence on, the senior bureaucrats that results.

Advisory Committees:

One of the most significant, and least analyzed, aspects of bureaucratic influence on Japanese policymaking takes place even before the most visible aspects of the process occur. The bureaucracy exerts tremendous influence over the multitude of advisory committees which are an important mechanism for winnowing the multiplicity of possible approaches to a problem down to manageable proportions and tangible proposals.

Most modern bureaucracies rely heavily on advisory committees for indispensible technical and specialized information as well as public input into bureaucratic policymaking.[12] In addition, where specific groups affected by bureaucracies are formally represented, advisory committees help consolidate differing opinions, and provide forewarning of probable conflict over government proposals. From a purely political perspective, such organs are of benefit to a bureaucratic agency in that they also induce nongovernmental policy interests to run political interference for the agency both in the legislature and before the general public.[13] They have certainly been important devices in higher educational policy.

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[12] See inter alia, Henry Steck, "Power and the Policy Process: Advisory Committees in the Federal Government;" George T. Sulzner, "The Policy Process and the Uses of National Government Study Commissions."

[13] Nihon Kyōshokuin Kumiai, Kyōiku Kankei Shingikai no Jittai [Realities of Advisory Committees Concerned with Education], 22-23. See also Rinji Gyosei Chosakai, Daiichi Senmon Bukai, Daiichihan, Hokokusho [Report] passim; Ogita Tomotsu, "Shingikai no Jittai" [Realities of the Advisory Committees], 21-71. Ebata Kiyoshi, "Komuin Seido Shingikai [The Advisory Committee on the Bureaucratic System] 56-58; Okabe Shiro, "Seisaku Kettei ni okeru Shingikai no Yakuwari to Sekinin" [The Role and Responbilities of Deliberative Councils in Policymaking], 1-19; Sato Isao, "Shingikai" [Advisory Committees] 97-117; Ebata Kiyoshi, "Kore ga Seifu

In Japan, at least four different functional types of advisory committees are identifiable: those acting as administrative courts and adjudicating differences among governmental ministries; those which assess standards for accreditation purposes; and those which hear public complaints. By far the largest group, however, is the fourth type, that which deliberates and makes policy recommendations to governmental agencies.[14]

The number of advisory councils established under governmental ministries has profilerated since 1952, when 165 advisory councils were functioning under ministerial laws. By 1969 this figure had increased to 243.[15] Further, these figures represent only advisory councils formally established under law; an even more significant increase occurred in the number of study commissions established by ordinances. The scope of activities investigated has broadened correspondingly and virtually all aspects of policymaking therefore have become potentially scrutinizable by one or more of these advisory bodies.

Numerical analysis alone does not fully indicate the important policymaking role of these groups. Originally allocated rather perfunctory roles, they have become major organizational tools in overall policy formulation. The Central Education Council, for example, the most important of the groups affiliated with the Ministry of Education,

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Shingikai da" [These Are the Government's Advisory Committees] 131-141; Young Ho Park, "The Government Advisory Commission System in Japan," 436-37, inter alia.

[14] Okabe, "Seisaku Kettei ni okeru Shingikai no Yakuwari to Sekinin," 1-2.

[15] Rinji Gyōsei Chōsakai, Hōkokusho, p. 270; 1969 data supplied from Gyosei Kanricho.

initially had the areas of its inquiry determined through consultation among representatives of the several bureaus within the Education Ministry. The directors of the various bureaus met with the Educational Vice Minister, presenting short papers on subjects deemed of possible importance. Based on these meetings and subsequent consultations with the Minister of Education, a decision was made on what area(s) should be investigated by the Council.[16] Council investigations were brief, often of two to four months, and reports rarely were longer than three or four pages in length.[17] Lacking serious investigation and study, the reports consequently were almost totally devoid of real policy influence. Thus in its early phase, the Central Council was in many ways politically irrelevant. Similar situations prevailed in other ministries.

This has changed. In 1965, Planning Divisions were established within the ministries to determine areas of investigation. Decisions regarding areas to investigate alone entail as much as a year's planning, and the advisory body's anticipated role is substantial. One 1971 report, for example, required four years of investigation, and the interim report alone was a 465-page compendium of essential data on the basis of which major policy proposals were formulated.[18] This work was no anomaly,

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[16] Interview, Nishida Kikuo, former director of Planning and Research, Ministry of Education, June 17, 1971.

[17] Mombushō Chōsakyoku, Chūō Kyōiku Shingikai Yōran [Outline on the Central Education Council].

[18] Mombushō, Waga Kuni no Kyōiku no ayumi to Kongo no Kadai: Chūō Kyōiku Shingikai Chukan Hokoku [The Course of Japanese Education and Future Problems: Interim Report of the Central Education Council]. The final report is entitled Kongo ni okeru Gakkō Kyoiku no Sogotekina Kakujū Seibi no tame no Kihonteki Shisakuni tsuite: Tōshin [Report: On the Basic Policies for the Comprehensive Preparation of School Education in the Future].

and councils have come to have major impacts on such diverse areas as foreign trade, tax structure, education, the legal structure, the postal system, and local finance.

As the significance of these advisory bodies has increased, so has their dependence on the bureaucracies they allegedly advise. Four specific points support such a conclusion: 1) the controls over the areas of investigation; 2) the manner in which research is done; 3) the writing of reports; and 4) selection procedures for committee members and the resultant membership composition.

Areas of investigation are determined exclusively by the bureaucracy, i.e., by the Ministry or agency under whose aegis the committee is to serve. Even the most broadly mandated committees must confine themselves to the topics chosen for them. In almost all instances these topics are rather narrowly defined, and in many cases the manner in which the investigative questions are formulated strongly determine the direction the eventual recommendation is expected to take.

To cite but a few instances of this, one can point to the terms of reference for the 1963 report of the Central Education Council, the 1967 directions to the Science and Technology Council, the 1968 instructions to the subcommittee on university disturbances, and the 1970 directions concerning hijacking made to the Advisory Committee on the Legal System. All had long prefatory comments outlining the problems as perceived by the bureaucracy, followed by specific instructions as to the direction the investigation should take. Not surprisingly, the major thrust of subsequent reports was aimed at proving what were effectively prestated conclusions.[19]

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[19] Terms of reference for the 1968 case and the report are in Yamamoto

In addition to setting sharp delineations on the scope and direction of investigations, the bureaucracy exercises control over the investigation in a second way. Advisory committees do not have independent research staffs and all research and investigation is carried out by bureaucratic staff members of the controlling government agency. The committees may request certain data to be included, or specific points to be examined; however, because the actual work is done by ministerial personnel, the bureaucracy exerts tremendous power over the committee's eventual reports. This is even more so since the staff members who work in conjunction with a committee attend all of its meetings and discussions. Moreover, the actual reports of many committees are written, not by the committee itself or by a subcommittee thereof, but by bureaucrats.[20] These powers have become increasingly significant as the topics for research become more and more comprehensive. Even highly independent-minded committees with neutrally inclined bureaucratic staffs find it almost impossible not to be heavily reflective of official thinking within the bureaucracy. One need purport no theories of conspiracy to suggest that the power of synthesizing discussion and preparing final reports accorded to top bureaucrats gives considerable control over the committees' eventual products.

A fourth area relevant to bureaucratic influence on advisory committees is their actual membership. To analyze this dimension, extensive

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Tokushige, Daigaku Mondai Shiryō Yōran [Handbook of Source Materials on the University Problem] 424-39. This report, but not the terms of reference, are in most standard collections of sources.

[20] Nishida interview.

background data on all 676 members who have served on seven different advisory committees in the area of education have been collected.[21]

Committee members are appointed by the agency they are to serve, normally by the permanent vice-minister, the highest ranking bureaucrat, and in the analysis of background data the most significant feature for our purposes is the preponderance of bureaucrats and ex-bureaucrats. At the time of appointment to the various committees, members from the field of education made up 78.7% of the total, with members of government-related agencies totalling only 10.9%. (Businessmen constituted 6.3%, with 4.1% from other categories.) Such figures initially do not suggest that the committees are in any way composed of a preponderance of bureaucrats, but titles at the time of appointment to a committee barely scratch the surface of the occupational backgrounds of committee members. Further examination reveals that at least one-third of all members of the seven committees investigated have at one time or another been government bureaucrats. A high percentage of advisory committee members, while not bureaucrats at the time of appointment, have served as bureaucrats, and retired to some other form of work--often university teaching or administration--only _after_ which they have

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[21] The seven committees investigated were: the Educational Committee (Kyōiku Sasshin Iinkai) later named the Educational Reform Committee (Kyōiku Sasshin Shingikai); the Central Education Council (Chūō Kyōiku Shingikai); the University Chartering Council (Daigaku Setchi Shingikai); the Private Universities Council (Shiritsu Daigaku Shingikai); the Higher Technical Schools Council (Kōtō Senmongakkō Shingikai); the Science Council (Gakajutsu Shingikai); and the Investigating Committee on Preparations for the Establishment of Tsukuba University (Tsukuba Shindaigaku Sōsetsu Junbi Chōsakai). All committees deal with the functional area of education, and generalization to other committees is difficult. Especially to be noted is the low number of businessmen, which may be atypical. Data were compiled from _Jinji Koshin roku_ (Who's Who). Where possible missing data were supplied from material in other sources such as Asahi Nenkan (Asahi Yearbook).

been appointed to advisory committees.

Furthermore, it is the bureaucrats and former bureaucrats who dominate the entire system of the advisory committees examined. Bureaucratic background is far more common among those holding top committee positions, those with greatest seniority, those serving on other government advisory bodies, and those on committees dealing with broad policy questions as opposed to more technically oriented committees. Looking at these four categories, the importance of the bureaucrats and ex-bureaucrats becomes far more evident. While constituting only one-third of the total membership, bureaucrats and ex-bureaucrats make up 40% of the chairmen and vice-chairmen, 42.5% of those on broad policy committees, 66.7% of those having served ten or more years on individual committees, and 74.3% of those who have served on three or more government advisory committees.[22]

The picture that emerges from such figures is of an advisory committee system in which bureaucrats and ex-bureaucrats are disproportionately represented: longer tenure, positions of both general and policy responsibility, and greater interaction through overlapping membership on other committees give them far greater potential influence over committee proceedings than is possible for other members. Though it is difficult to predict behavior patterns precisely from background

[22] Perhaps the most egregious case of a bureaucrat engaged in the tight web of interlocking advisory committees was Ishino Shinichi, Vice Minister of Finance, who in 1964 was on no less than 57 different councils simultaneously. Numerous of his counterparts from other ministries have served on 30 or more committees at the same time. Committees considered as general policy are the Central Education Committee, the Educational Reform Council, and the Investigating Committee on Preparation for the Establishment of Tsukuba University. The technical group includes the University Chartering Council, the Private Universities Council, the Higher Technical Schools Council, and the Science Council. Ebata, "Korega seifu shingikai da," 132.

variables such as previous employment, it is likely that those possessing personal ties to the bureaucracy will be more disposed towards bureaucratic desires than those lacking them.[23]

An additional point about membership on the advisory committees should be made. It was indicated above that at the time of first appointment to the advisory committees studied, 78.7% of the members could be classified as school or university educators. That many of these were former bureaucrats has been shown, but the true character of this group can be made even clearer. Over one-half were the presidents of higher educational institutions, and an additional 16.8% were administrators (faculty chairmen or above) at such institutions. Administrators at research institutes or other educational institutions made up an additional 7.4% of the total. Only 24.1% of the "educator" group were actually teachers or researchers. Therefore it is difficult to contend that the bulk of the "university-affiliated" members in fact represent university faculty members. Although university administrators have hardly been sycophants of the government bureaucracy, they have, nevertheless, the most direct contact with the bureaucracy; so even if independence of judgment were maintained, it is safe to suggest that they would be, of all academics, the most sympathetic to bureaucratic and governmental perspectives.

What can be said of such factors over time, however? Is the bureaucratic presence on advisory committees increasing, decreasing, or remaining constant? In Table 4-1, the data have been aggregated into five-year periods to allow for an assessment of trends. The actual

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[23] Lewis J. Edinger and Donald D. Searing, "Social Background in Elite Analysis: A Methodological Inquiry," 428-45.

percentage of bureaucrats and ex-bureaucrats on committees has gone through two phases: an increase in the 15 years from 1945 to 1960, and then a decline in the following ten years. In contrast, however, all four of the other indicators of bureaucratic influence remain consistently higher than the percentage of actual bureaucrats, and in all cases have either remained relatively constant or have increased. Thus, these four indicators belie the initial impression given simply by the recently declining percentage of bureaucrats and ex-bureaucrats and suggest at least a continuous, if not rising, exaggeration of influence by bureaucrats and ex-bureaucrats relative to their actual membership.

TABLE 4 - 1

Bureaucratic Dominance of Advisory Committees to the Ministry of Education

% Bureaucratic of:	1945-50	1951-55	1956-60	1961-65	1966-70
Total Members	41.2	43.2	43.7	36.0	27.6
Committee or Sub-committee Chairmen or Vice-Chairmen	40.0	45.5	36.4	43.8	37.5
Broad Policy Committee	44.4	50.0	47.4	51.2	42.0
Members Serving 10 or More Years	——	64.3	66.7	66.7	64.7
Members Serving on 3 or More Additional Committees	66.7	75.0	100.0	66.7	81.3

Not every policy proposal in Japan emerges after investigation by an advisory committee; however, increasingly, most important decisions are reached only after at least partial inquiry by one or more such

committees. Japanese newsmen and popular critics are fond of describing the advisory committee system as a cloak to hide the actions of the bureaucracy.[24] Even if on many points this is an overstated accusation, the analysis of the structure, modes of action, and membership background of the committees suggests that extremely close ties exist between the committees and the bureaucracy they are to advise. The analysis also implies that the lines of influence between the two groups are far stronger from bureaucracy to committee than vice versa. Clearly, the increased importance of these committees has not undermined the bureaucracy's role in the policymaking process, nor have the committees served as channels of broad and open public input, both of which would be the expected consequence of most pluralist interpretations. Rather, the committees have become contributors to the overall increase in the importance of the bureaucracy, and to the hegemonic closure of certain aspects of Japanese policymaking, particularly of the initial phases. The advisory committee system provides non-conservative camp organizations with no formal input into these important early stages of policymaking and eliminates most of them from the important pulling and hauling in the initial identification of problems and definition of solutions.

Decline in Corporatism: Closely related to the situation of advisory committees and the closed nature of the policymaking process in the earliest stages of option delimitation has been the comparative decline

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[24] The usual phrase used is "kakuremi," literally, "a cloak to hide behind." See for example, an article in the series Gyōsei Kaikaku [Administrative Reform] in Mainichi Shimbun, July 15, 1967. Also Okabe, "Seisaku Kettei ni okeru Shingikai no Yakuwari to Sekinin," 10-11; Ebata, "Kore sa seifu shingikai da." For a partial retort to the charge, see Hayashi Shūsan, "Shingikai no Kōyū to Sono Genkai [The Efficiency and Limits of the Advisory Councils] 15-18.

in the formal delegation of policymaking responsibilities to non-governmental groups. The corporatist practice of delegating primary responsibilities to such groups has become quite prevalent in many societies.[25] The normative merits and demerits of the practice have been subjected to wide debate: critics are quick to point out that it is the biggest and best organized, though not necessarily the most publicly representative, organizations to whom such delegation is usually made, and that such delegation is tantamount to an abdication by government officials of their responsibility to make critical judgments on matters of public concern; advocates, on the other hand, note that even if the criticisms are legitimate, the practice does provide formal guarantees that some (if not all) interested, non-governmental voices on an issue will be heard, and that policy judgments will benefit from the inclusion of wide and competing experts from outside government circles. Though the latter position tolerates a greater degree of participant closure than the former, the situation in Japan suggests that even opportunities for this lesser degree of participation have been in decline.

Under the Occupation, numerous independent groups were encouraged to organize as a counterbalance to the powerful and independent bureaucracy that had dominated Japanese policymaking before the war. Under the heavy influence of the American corporatist pattern of directly involving major interest groups in legislative and administrative policymaking, many of these came to occupy formal and significant roles in the formulation

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[25] See for example, Grant McConnell, Private Power and American Democracy, Henry W. Ehrmann, "Interest Groups and the Bureaucracy in Western Democracies," Theodore J. Lowi, The End of Liberalism, Andrew Shonfield, Modern Capitalism, inter alia.

higher educational policies. Since the end of the Occupation there has been a significant reversal of this pattern. The educational bureaucracy has rejected the concept of formal reliance on concerned interest groups, and most groups which acquired important roles during the Occupation have been systematically shunted to the periphery of the political processes.

The earliest and most explicit rejection in the area of higher education came with the establishment of the Central Educational Council. The Council's predecessor, the Educational Reform Council, when it completed its original mission of recommending reforms in the educational system during the Occupation, suggested the creation of a replacement committee which would be explicitly representative of various organized groups. The committee proposed that its replacement be made up of 18 or 20 members elected by the other advisory committees established under the Ministry of Education. Explicit representation was to be assured for the Japan Science Council, local boards of education, the outgoing Educational Reform Committee and several other groups. A specific numerical ratio was also to be established for the inclusion of representatives from the fields of science, culture and education on the one hand, and those from the areas of politics, industry and society on the other.[26] Such an explicitly representative plan was rejected by the Ministry; instead all rights of appointment and dismissal were given to the Minister of Education, and no provision was made for the formal inclusion of any group or sector.

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26 The entire plan is reproduced in Hirahara Haruyoshi, "Kyōiku Seisaku no Ritsuan Kikō toshite no Chūkyōshin" [The Central Education Council as a Drafting Organ in Educational Policies] 28-9.

Explicit inclusion of outside groups on educationally related advisory committees is now limited to two of the earliest committees established under the Occupation. The Private Universities Council is required to maintain 2/3 of its members as representatives of the private universities and these are appointed in accord with the joint recommendations of the private university federations.[27] The University Accreditation Association, meanwhile, holds 22 of 45 seats on the University Chartering Subcommittee of the University Chartering Council.[28] But in both of these cases the roles of the committees have been sharply circumscribed.

Originally established to "make recommendations to the Minister of Education on important matters of relevance to private universities"[29] the Private Universities Council in reality has been restricted to approving changes in the composition of legal bodies governing private institutions of higher education. It serves merely as a screening committee for the Ministry over the membership of, and occasionally over the legality of certain actions taken by, the administrative organs of private universities.[30]

The case of the University Chartering Council is more complex. Its

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[27] Article 20, Shiritsu Gakkohō [Private Schools Law] in Mombu Hōrei, 309.

[28] Ōtake Hakase interview, January 7, 1971. Japanese University Accreditation Association, Japanese Universities and Colleges 5. This practice is the outgrowth of certain competitive relations between the Accreditation Association and the University Chartering Council existing when the latter was formed. Daigaku Kijun Kyōkai, Daigaku Kijun Kyōkai Jūnenshi [History of the Ten Years of the University of the University Accreditation Association] 98-108. Hereafter Jūnenshi.

[29] Shiritsu Gakko hō, clause 18.

[30] Ōzaki Shinobu, "Shiritsu Daigaku" [Private Universities] in Shimizu Yoshihiko, Nihon no Kōtō Kyōiku [Japanese Higher Education] 150-53.

history is intimately tied to that of the University Accreditation Association. The Accreditation Association began meeting in the fall of 1946, and was formally established in July, 1947, to perform the role of accreditator and evaluator of universities. Originally relying on the staff and headquarters of the Ministry of Education, the Association established its own headquarters and staff during 1946-47 and in its subsequent actions gained gradual independence from the government bureaucracy and virtually total control over these functions which previously had been the exclusive purview of the Ministry.[31]

In 1948, the University Chartering Committee (later Council) was created by, and under the jurisdiction of, the Ministry in an effort to regain control over these functions. Nevertheless, the Association continued to maintain considerable influence due to the support of SCAP and CIE. The standards it established were maintained by the Chartering Committee as its own, and one-half of the latter's members were by law chosen by the former.[32] With time, further steps were taken to reduce the Association's effectiveness, such as exempting pre-medical and dental programs from the Association's standards in 1954, and more notably the passage of the University Chartering Standards in October, 1956.[33] These latter sharply affected the Association in that its own standards, which

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31 Kaigo and Teresaki, Daigaku Kyōiku, 516-34.

32 Jūnenshi, 81-107. Daigaku Kinjun Kyōkai, Tekkaku Hantei ni tsuite [Concerning University Accreditation]

33 The actual standards established are in Mombu Hōrei 1957, 96-109. The original standards can be found in pre-1956 editions of the same, or in Daigaku Kijun Kyōkai Kijunshū [Collection of the Standards of the University Accreditation Association] 1-7. On the comparison and significance of the two different sets of standards, see Kaigo and Terasaki, Daigaku Kyōiku, 543-47 and Terasaki Masao, "Daigaku Setchi Kijun" [The University Chartering Standards], 39-44.

had hitherto been used by the Chartering Council in evaluating charter applications, lost all government sanction and became merely the requirements for universities seeking to acquire membership in the Association as a private group.

More recently, the regulations of the Chartering Council were again revised, resulting in, among other things, a diluting of the numerical importance of Association members on the Chartering Council, so that where formerly it had 22 of 45 members, it was cut to 22 of 95.[34]

One final government action, or perhaps "non-action," toward the Association should be noted. That is the failure to encourage national universities under control of the government to seek accreditation. Thus, although 21 of 75 national universities are accredited by the Association, a percentage comparable to public and private universities, 18 of these are charter members which have merely kept up their membership. Only three national universities have been accredited in the 18 years since then, i.e., of 38 universities joining the Accreditation Association after 1952 only three were national universities.[35] The overall impact of virtually all government actions regarding the Association has therefore been to limit sharply that group's formal, and informal, impact on government policymaking and policies.

Actions in regard to two other groups also point to the government's reduction of the formal participation and actual effectiveness of such outside groups. One group is the Science Council of Japan (JSC). Initially established at the encouragement of the U.S. Occupation to serve in a

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[34] Mombu Hōrei, 1971, 177-90.

[35] Daigaku Kijun Kyokai, Kaihō, No. 19, 17-21.

capacity similar to that of the American National Academy of Sciences its relations with the government are by law quite close.[36] Its administrative personnel are government employees and it is established as "the legal and official body of the scientists of Japan."[37]

Despite the original proposal for close ties between the JSC and the government, as Long has noted, the American model on which these ties were formulated "did not survive the cultural transplant."[38] In fact the government actively undermined what little formal powers the JSC has had ever since Prime Minister Yoshida publicly accused it of manifesting too many left wing tendencies.[39] In 1956, the Science and Technology Agency was established at the Cabinet level, taking over many functions of the JSC and in 1959, over the strong opposition of the JSC, the Science and Technology Council was created as a special appointive consultative organ to the Prime Minister.[40] This new group became responsible for

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[36] Its administrative personnel are primarily from the Ministry of Education. Nishiyama Masazumi, interview September 2, 1970. Miyazawa Bunji, interview September 2, 1970. See also Nihon Gakujutsu Kaigihō (Law no. 121, July 10, 1948), Articles 3, 4, 5, 6.

[37] Science Council of Japan, General Description of the Science Council of Japan 1. "Scientists" is a term broadly defined to include humanistic and social scientists as well as natural and applied scientists, and its 210 members are elected by the various sectors of Japanese science. The bulk of Japan's university teachers and researchers are eligible to elect these members and in practice nearly 90 percent of the members at any one time are chosen from these two groups. My calculations from data provided by the Science Council of Japan.

[38] T. Dixon Long, "Policy and Politics in Japanese Science: The Persistence of a Tradition," 439.

[39] Ōgose Sunao et al., "Yanaihara kara Kaya e, I" [From Tokyo University Presidents Yanaihara to Kaya: Part I] 32.

[40] Long, "Policy and Politics in Japanese Science," 440.

advice on all matters of science policy, effectively bypassing the elective JSC. More recently, the JSC's powers to make the preliminary decisions on the allocation of government scholarship monies to advanced scholars has also been curtailed, and although it still has the power to "recommend" government action, former Education Minister Sakata has stated quite frankly in 1969 that these powers "produce no substantial effects."[41]

A final group to consider is the Japan Teacher's Union.[42] The union is predominantly known as the representative of the vast majority of Japan's lower school teachers; however, it has been a rather constant spokesman on all educational issues, including those related to higher education. As will be seen in Chapter Five, members of the union were included in the committee to design a university administrative bill in 1951. This appears to have been about its only formal inclusion in the governmental policymaking processes. Almost from its origin the union has been at odds with the government because of its strong Marxian tradition and its tactics of almost constant opposition to government proposals. Formal isolation of the union, even to the extent of meetings between the President of the Union and the Minister of Education existed for nearly a decade between the early 1960s and 1970s.[43] The point here is less that ties between the union and the Education Ministry have been weakened and that the formal role of the union has been minimized, but rather that virtually no formal role has ever been accorded to this

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41 Interview in Tokyo Shimbun, August 17, 1969.

42 On the Teacher's Union, see Donald Thurston, Teachers and Politics in Japan, and Benjamin C. Cuke, Japan's Militant Teachers.

43 Nagai Michio, interivew May 29, 1971. Fukushima Akio interview, July 12, 1971; Amagi Isao, interview, April 19, 1971. The two met finally in 1972 thereby breaking the ice between them.

significant educational group.

The exclusion of outside groups is related to Japan's ideological bipolarity. Many of the groups noted have been openly identified with the progressive camp and their inclusion would have given added power and legitimacy to government opponents. Not all of them are so obviously identified with the progressive camp, however, and the exclusion of some involves nothing more than the general reluctance of the conservative camp to grant legal representative roles to any outside group and an attempt to keep tight constraints on as many policymaking arenas as possible. When the opinions of some particular group are desired they are solicited by the government, on an ad hoc basis, either privately or in the form of public testimony or written proposals. Such opinions may then be taken into consideration but at almost no time are outside educational groups given the more important role of actually meeting together, arguing out differences and making broad policy recommendations to the government. If they were, experience in the U.S. and most European countries suggests that their policymaking influence could be strengthened immeasurably.[44]

Legislation and the Diet: When one turns to the most visible, and perhaps most well studied arena, of policymaking in Japan, the obviousness of conservative control based on heavy reliance on the bureaucracy is again evident. The Diet, Japan's parliament, is the focal point of

[44] It should be noted that this exclusion, while true for higher education, may be less the case in certain other areas such as business where the corporatist pattern is far more in evidence. Since the bulk of the business community, however, is closely identified with the conservative camp, such a pattern suggests the importance of ideological considerations in the delegation of responsibilities, much the same as in the delegation of power to bureaucratic agencies. One important question which can not be dealt with here is whether groups have influence because they are in on the earliest stages of policymaking, or whether they are included because they are influential.

all policymaking activities involving legal or constitutional matters. It was noted above that there are very close ties between the various bureaucratic agencies and the policymaking organs of the Liberal Democratic Party, and that tight constraints are exercised over formal participation in the earliest stages of policy deliberation. These factors bear particular importance in the legislative process. Most legislative proposals are generated by a bureaucratic agency, and then submitted to the functionally appropriate section in the LDP's Policy Affairs Research Council (Seimu Chōsakai). Upon approval, the bill is passed on to the Policy Deliberations Council (Seisaku Shingikai), to the Executive Council of the Party (Sōmukai), to the Party's Diet Policy Committee (Kokkai taisaku iinkai) and finally to the Cabinet Bureau of Legislation (Hōseikyoku) and the Cabinet for refinement and final preparation. At all of these stages there is close interaction between party functionaries and agents of the concerned bureaucratic organs. Only after this procedure leads to cabinet approval for the proposal does the Diet become meaningfully involved.[45]

The above pattern gives tremendously important powers of policy initiation to the conservative camp and means that by the time bills materialize in the Diet a general agreement has already been reached, both within and between the bureaucracy and the LDP. Opposition and/or the generation of successful alternatives from within the Diet itself is thus extremely difficult in the face of such basic consensus.[46]

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45 Misawa, "Seisaku Kettai Katei no Gaikan," 24-25. Also Masumi Junnosuke, "Jiyū Minshūtō no Soshiki to Kinō [Organization and Functions of the Liberal Democratic Party] 62-77. Thayer, How the Conservatives Rule Japan, 207-236.

46 R. H. Levin, "On Decisions and Decision Making," passim, but esp. 24-25, deals with this problem at the theoretical level.

When the analysis moves to the Diet itself, the conservative-bureaucratic control is further evidenced. Constitutionally "the highest organ of state power," the Diet has probably never fulfilled the original expectations of those American drafters of the Japanese constitution who seemingly anticipated the development of a rather autonomous institution comparable to the United States Congress. Indeed, as an integral component of a parliamentary rather than a presidential system, the Diet should by no means be expected to act in competition with the executive branch; cooperative relations between the two would appear to be far more the norm than under a presidential system, particularly when the cabinet and the legislature are dominated for long periods of time by a single party.

Still, a parliament can be a source of policymaking independence in at least two ways. First, individual members and opposition parties can introduce their own legislative proposals, and second, both can serve as opponents of government-proposed legislation. Thus not all legislation passed need be that proposed by the cabinet, and not all legislation need pass unopposed. The evidence suggests, however, that legislative independence, as measured by both of these, is declining in the face of a growth in the combined legislative power of the bureaucracy and the ruling conservative party, particularly since 1955 when the two conservative parties, the Liberals and the Democrats merged to form the since dominant LDP.

At least three indicators point to this: success rates of governmental and individual member bills; the declining rate of amendments added; and the singular lack of success for opposition-sponsored bills. In looking at the passage rates for bills, two caveats should be kept in

mind. First, the role of the individual parliamentarian as the main bulwark in the fortress of democracy has been overly romanticized in Japan as elsewhere. Ozaki Yukio was an anomaly in his own time, mythologized as an ideal so removed from general reality as to parallel that of the "independent backbencher" in Britain.[47] In an era of administrative complexity and strong party discipline, the role of the single parliamentarian is perforce diminished.

Second, even the mere submission of nongovernmentally sponsored measures is extremely difficult. In the Lower House, at least 20 representatives must support a "member" bill before it can be introduced, while in the Upper House ten supporters are required. Should the bill require the expenditure of state funds, 50 and 20 supporters respectively are necessary. This procedure alone works against the submission of such proposals. Nonetheless during the bulk of the postwar period, approximately 40% of all bills have rather consistently been "member bills." Somewhat interestingly, only during the Occupation Period (1947-1952) were these figures significantly lower (22.6%).[48]

It is axiomatic, however, that introduction of legislation is far less significant than its passage, and there the Japanese situation is

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[47] The theme of legislative decline as seen through the apparent waning of the "independent" legislator has been particularly prevalent in the U.S. and Britain, and can be traced at least to the 19th century with James Bryce's classic, The American Commonwealth.

[48] These figures would appear to be somewhat below those for Britain where, despite difficulties of introduction for private member bills these still make up over 56% of all bills introduced during the period 1962-65. R. M. Punnett, British Government and Politics 231. See also his footnote on 228 regarding private member bills. In France and West Germany, it is even easier for private members to introduce legislation. Arnold J. Heidenheimer, The Governments of Germany, 3rd ed., 178; Nicholas Wahl, "The French Political System," in Samuel H. Beer and Adam B. Ulam, eds., Patterns of Government 424-27.

of far more interest. While the ratio of government-sponsored to member-sponsored legislation has remained roughly the same, a marked decline has taken place in the chances for the latter eventually to become law.

As Table 4-2 indicates, government-sponsored legislation was extremely successful under the Occupation, with more than nine of every ten proposals becoming law. From the end of the Occupation, however, until 1955, the rate dropped to 75%. Since then such legislation has shown a slow but increasingly steady success.

Individually sponsored legislation, on the other hand, shows a drastic decline in success. From a high of 70.4% under the Occupation, the passage rate for such bills dropped to just under 35% in the period 1952-1955, and has since remained in the 10-14% range. From a somewhat different perspective, 18% of the successful legislation during the Occupation involved member bills. From 1952 to 1955 this was up to over one-quarter. In the next five years the success rate was halved, and since then it has remained below 10%. Thus the chance for success of government bills that was only 1.3 times greater than that for individual Diet-generated bills under the Occupation and about twice as great from 1952 to 1955, was in 1970 about seven times greater, and, since 1955, approximately 90% of all successful legislation has been cabinet-sponsored.[49]

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49 The role of private member bills in Japan seems to be far less, therefore, than in either Britain or Germany, although not quite so low as in France. In Britain, for example, the passage rate of private member bills from 1962 to 1965 was over 30% and has actually been rising. Moreover, 67 of the 239 successful bills (28%) during this period were private member bills. Punnett, British Government and Politics, 231. Figures for the German Bundestag are roughly comparable. In the second Bundestag (1953-57) for example, about one-quarter of the 483 successful bills were introduced by individual members; in the fifth Bundestag

TABLE 4-2

Successful Cabinet Sponsored and Individually Sponsored Legislation
(in percentages)

Diet		Cabinet Bills Passed			Individual Member Bills Passed		
Number	Date	Number	As % of total cabinet bills submitted	As % of total bills passed	Number	As % of total member bills submitted	As % of total bills passed
1-13	(5/47- 7/52)	1352	91.1	81.6	305	70.4	18.4
14-23	(8/52-12/55)	567	74.9	74.7	192	34.8	25.3
24-37	(12/55-12/60)	822	75.3	88.5	107	14.1	11.5
38-50	(12/60-12/65)	845	77.9	92.2	71	10.7	7.8
51-64	(12/65-12/70)	609	76.8	90.4	65	12.5	9.6
51-64 (adjusted to exclude 61st Diet)		543	80.6	88.9	61	14.4	11.1

Source: Nihon Hyōron-sha, ed., Hōritsu Jiho [Legal Report], (Tokyo: Ōkura-shō, annual)

In addition to the general decline in success rates for member bills, it should be noted that such enacted member bills are usually introduced by Diet standing committee chairmen (of the 18 such bills passed in the 63rd Diet, for example, 16 were introduced by chairmen). Most frequently these deal with local or specialized benefits and hence pose no serious challenge to the bureaucratic-LDP monopoly of broad policy.[50]

Beyond this, available evidence suggests that as "potential" amender, the Diet has not been notably active. Two devices are open to it: it can either "amend" (shūsei), or it can "add a supplementary resolution of clarification" (futai ketsugi). While insufficient data make full trend analysis impossible, it is known that from 1955 to 1960 just over one-third of all successful government legislation went through one or another of these processes. Since supplementary resolutions that have no force in law, however, constituted nearly one-half of these, only 19% of the successful legislation was actually amended.[51] In the 48th Diet (1964-65) this rate was 17%; in the 63rd Diet (1970) it was 15%; and if one is to believe the contentual analysis of Takagi, most of these

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(1965-69) this figure was about one-fifth. Heidenheimer, The Governments of Germany, 2nd ed., 126 ff., 3rd ed., 176-77.

Overall, the Japanese figures would appear to be more comparable to those of France, where under the constitution of the Fifth Republic the government has the bulk of the initiatives in setting the legislative calendar despite the ease for private members in introducing legislation. Between 1959 and 1968, just under 90% of the total bills voted has been submitted by the government. It should be noted that the trend in France is in the opposite direction from that in Japan. Thus from 1959 to 1962, the figure was 93.1%; between 1962 and 1967 it was 87.4%; and from 1967 to 1968 it was down to 79.3%. François Goguel, "Parliament under the Fifth French Republic," in Gerhard Loewenberg, ed., Modern Parliaments 93-95.

[50] Takagi Ikuro, Gendai Nihon no Seiji to Ideorogii [The Politics and Ideology of Contemporary Japan] 117-118.

[51] Misawa, "Seisaku Kettei Katei no Gaikan" 25.

amendments were more procedural and definitional "sops" than they were substantive alterations.[52]

A final point is that opposition bills (also individually sponsored bills) have no chance of success. The bulk of these bills merely counter government-sponsored bills deemed to be of strong ideological content. Throughout, there is little real expectation of passage; instead, these counterplans serve as rallying points for a public relations campaign against government initiated legislation. Thus, of 317 opposition bills introduced from the 37th (1960) through the 46th (1963-64) Diets, not one became law.[53]

The picture that emerges of the Diet therefore is of a bureaucratic and LDP-dominated institution in which success has become more and more difficult for non-government bills. Individually sponsored measures have become increasingly unlikely to succeed, and such success as they have managed has tended to be in very limited areas. Amendments have become rather infrequent and of narrow consequence, and there is no chance that proposals by opposition parties will be enacted. Success for these latter must come through informal amendments or additions to government-backed bills that have a declining chance of being adopted. The main alternative thus becomes to delay or completely block such bills.

All of this is not to suggest that the Diet is but a functionless appendage of the bureaucracy and the LDP. Both in its committees and in its full sessions, the Diet is often significant as an organ of investigation and public communication. As far as policymaking is concerned,

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52 Takagi Ikuro, Gendai Nihon no Seiji to Ideorogii, 118.

53 Misawa, "Seisaku Kettei Katei no Gaikan," 26.

however, it is les the independent conceptualizer and structurer of legislation and much more the reactive amender and legitimator of proposals generated by the bureaucracy and consolidated through bureaucratic-LDP cooperation.

Administrative Directives and Bureaucratic Communications: If the independent legislative power of the Diet is on the wane, we must also realize that the legislative process by no means defines the policymaking universe in Japan. An important, and frequently overlooked, power of Japanese bureaucratic agencies is the issuance of ordinances and ministerial communications.

Technically there are two types of ordinances in Japan: cabinet (serei) and ministerial (shōrei). In contrast to laws that are to be made through an explicitly political process in the Diet by elected public representatives, ordinances are clearly intended to be directives dealing with "nonpolitical," technical matters under the jurisdiction of the cabinet or some group of ministries or, in the case of ministerial ordinances, matters under the jurisdiction of a single ministry.[54] "Communications" (tsūtatsu) are supposedly simple directions issued from a bureaucratic official to groups or organizations under his jurisdiction concerning similarly nonpolitical matters of even less moment than those dealt with by ordinances.

The power to provide the technical interpretation of a law can be tantamount to complete revision of the original intentions of that law, in contrast to the implications of a rigidly hierarchical Weberian model of a bureaucracy in which "policy" is made "above" and is meticulously

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54 Seijigaku Jiten [Political Dictionary] 663, 775.

"administered" by those "below." Interpretation and administration are clearly powers; they are not politically neutral techniques that will be performed in precisely the same way by any appropriately trained bureaucratic technician. From such a perspective alone, the policymaking powers of the Japanese bureaucracy must be recognized as substantial.

Related though they are to such a general power, however, ordinances and communications must be given more special attention for several reasons: they are highly authoritative devices for overtly or covertly bypassing the more public policymaking forum that is the Diet; they have in many cases been explicitly political in their content; and finally, ordinances have come to occupy an increasing weight in the totality of Japan's public policymaking.

Reliance on the Diet involves a certain investment of time, effort, prestige and other political resources for the government. Opposition forces, the media, occasionally dissident LDP factions, and eventually the public can and often do discover through the open and combative nature of the legislative process numerous negative and/or embarrassing elements in government proposals. Every snippet of possibly embarrassing detail in a proposal is quickly seized upon and subjected to minute scrutiny by such groups, and corrections are occasionally forced before final passage can be accomplished. Even when such corrections are not made, the public nature of the process insures the possibility that electoral revenge can be had in cases of sufficient public moment. None of these democratic controls are insured in cases of ordinance or communication. In the absence of a detailed content analysis of all ordinances and communications one cannot draw absolute conclusions about the balance between those which are "nonpolitical" and those which are purely "political."

Examples suggest, however, the large political role they have played.

A clear illustration of how these powers can be used to circumvent the Diet occurred in April, 1953. With major legislation aimed at bringing about radical changes in the university system facing serious Diet scrutiny and the likelihood of nonpassage, the Ministry of Education issued an ordinance, and subsequently a communication, to effect most of the desired changes. Coming as they did between Lower House elections and Upper House elections held four days apart, the two occasioned little attention despite their significance. In fact it was not until nearly two months after their issuance that they were first reported in the media, and then only in a student newspaper. Although public disclosure eventually resulted in heated Diet debate, the policy had been effected regardless.

A number of other clearly political matters have been dealt with through either communications or ordinances. The Ministry of International Trade and Industry has been at the forefront in the usage of such powers to aid or encourage specific developments in various sectors of Japanese industry. Checks on student protests, a complete revision of the general educational system, and numerous alterations in the university system have been but a few of the educational areas affected. And Steiner notes that communications from the Autonomy Ministry are "the main means of exercising ministerial controls under Article 15 of the Government Organization Law and Article 150 of the Local Autonomy Law. . . ."[55] A high degree of authority is attached to such communications and ordinances, and questions of their legality are rarely posed by their recipients, despite possible violations of the law they are to "interpret," or disregard they may show

[55] Kurt Steiner, Local Government in Japan, 315.

for established rights. In short, they often represent major policymaking devices in themselves and are a substantial political weapon in the hands of the bureaucracy.

Such powers, it must also be noted, are on the rise. Complete figures for the number of communications are not presently available, to the best of my knowledge, but as Figure 4-1 makes clear, ordinances are clearly growing in importance as policymaking devices as compared to laws. In the 18-year period 1953-1971, ordinances, which were once four times as numerous as laws, grew to be nine times as numerous. This general situation is in no way different within the field of education. Indeed the trend is at least as clear as within the government generally. In 1953, laws accounted for 40% of the total, but by 1969 they had dropped to 19%. Cabinet ordinances and ministerial ordinances related to education combined to form a total of over 80% with ordinances issued by the Ministry of Education jumping most appreciably from 24% of the total during 1953-59 to 42% during 1964-69. The emerging picture is of an increasing proportion of the serious political policymaking in Japan taking place outside the public arena of the Diet and under the increasing control of a democratically unresponsible and conservatively oriented bureaucracy.

In various ways, therefore, many of the fundamental outlines of policymaking in Japan suggest a tightly controlled process in which the conservative camp relies heavily on the internal mechanisms of the LDP and, increasingly, on the variety of devices open to the civil bureaucracy thereby insuring limited access to the formal channels of public policy-making and a tight control over the policy agenda. Even though different processes and arenas of policymaking make this more true in some cases than in others, the overall conservative control provides inherent

FIGURE 4-1

Ordinances & Laws as a % of Sum Total of Both



Source: Finance Ministry, ed., Hōrei Zensho [Collected Laws and Ordinances] (Tokyo: Finance Ministry, annual).

limitations on policymaking patterns generally, but more especially on the capabilities of non-conservative camp interests and pressure groups to enter formally and frequently into all stages of policymaking.[56] When the dominant arena of policymaking is the bureaucracy or the bureaucracy and the LDP this is clearly more likely to be the case than when the dominant arena is the university or the Diet. Nonetheless, the comprehensive picture shows particular favorability of access and acceptability to certain political groups and sectors, and in no way approaches the open competition, free floating political exchange and ad hoc aggregation of political interests usually associated with pluralist political systems. Conservative organizations thus have distinct advantages over non-conservative groups of otherwise equal organizational strength. A conservative cast is consequently given to the primary alternatives receiving public attention, and policies that emerge even after a process of open debate and criticism retain strong overtones of this initial coloration, while policies formulated in a less public manner or that represent a continuation of the status quo, reflect this conservative light even more.

Lest this argument appear to unduly emphasize the difficulties non-conservative interests encounter in attempting to influence the policymaking process, some attention should be given to the actual course of such attempts. Where the primary arena of decision making is one formally open to direct influence by these groups, there is no major problem. For example, when policies in higher education are determined primarily by the universities, particularly by the faculty conference, there is ample opportunity for progressive academics to exert powerful

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56 A recent examination of this problem can be found in Takeshi Ishida, "Interest Groups under a Semipermanent Government Party: The Case of Japan."

influence. And while the discussion above noted the infrequency with which higher educationally-related advisory committees represent non-conservative camp interests, it is clear that other non-educational groups such as the Rice Price Advisory Committee and the Advisory Committee on the Public Personnel System include representatives of the opposition parties, or more frequently, interest groups closely associated with these parties. Thus in some public policy areas formal channels are readily open to the articulation of non-conservative interests. Most of the discussion above, however, suggests sharp limitations on such representation in the legislative area generally, and in the bureaucratic area particularly, in educationally-related matters. How then, if at all, do non-conservative interests seek representation on matters likely to be heavily decided in the bureaucracy or the legislature?

THE DILEMMA OF NON-CONSERVATIVE INTERESTS

It is fruitful to think of such influence possibilities as rather dichotomous in nature.[57] On the one hand, there is quiet compromise and indirect conciliatory appeal; in contrast, there is direct and antagonistic confrontation. Which of these two possible paths is followed in any specific case (assuming that some attempt is made to exert influence) is largely a function of the nature of the specific issue involved. The more affective the issue, the more specifically it is seen to affect a non-conservative group, and the closer its relationship to the broader ideological struggle between Japan's two political camps, the greater the

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57 For an elaboration, see T. J. Pempel, "The Dilemma of Legislative Opposition in Japan."

likelihood that dialectical conflict will result. On the other hand, when the relevance of a particular issue to such broad values or to the specific demands and needs of an organization is limited, the likelihood of compromise is increased. Thus, the choice between compromise and conflict depends largely on the nature of the issue, or more exactly, on a particular group or individual's perception of the nature of the issue, for as W. I. Thomas has so rightly noted, "if men define a situation as real, it is real in its consequences."

In the Diet, for example, there are several ways in which progressives can exert informal influence. At what might be called the pre-legislative stage, an opposition member may raise a "teian shitsumon," a legislative proposal in the form of a question to a top level bureaucrat making general testimony. "Would it not be a good idea for your agency to consider the following form of legislation. . . ?" This is a step that is often taken during budgetary hearings. If the idea proposed is deemed meritorious, the bureaucracy, in conjunction with the LDP, frequently responds with a formal legislative proposal on the subject in the form of government-introduced legislation. The proposal for a United Nations University in Japan was initially formulated in such a manner by Socialist Party member Yamanaka Goro in a question to Foreign Minister Miki Takeo.[58] Similarly, informal suggestions or formal proposals by non-conservative groups or individuals may be submitted to a Diet committee, where the progressives have, of course, an informed entree, or to a bureaucratic agency or an investigative council. Such suggestions then subsequently appear, usually in somewhat modified version, as government legislation or an administrative directive.

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58 Yamanaka Goro, interview, June 2, 1971.

At later stages, too, compromises are worked out. From 1955 to 1964, for example, about one-third of all successful government legislation had been "amended" or "clarified," the bulk of this as a result of informal negotiations with the progressive parties. From the fact that nearly 70 per cent of these then went on to receive unanimous approval in the Diet, it would appear that most differences were of a non-ideological, somewhat easily compromised nature. Indeed, only ten per cent of the successful government bills were both amended and then passed on a split vote, in most cases with only the Japan Communist Party in opposition.[59]

Such a strategy is largely limited, however, to proposals by recognized individual experts in their particular areas of expertise, to groups with some informal access, and to proposals that fall within the limits of ideological acceptability to the right. Moreover compromise with the conservative camp almost by definition implies a recognition of its legitimacy and an acceptance of the definitional and problematic parameters it establishes. Therefore compromise would appear to be possible only on rather non-controversial, technical matters, matters on which any ideological divergence is non-existent or papered over, and the possible political payoff for either side is rather low. Nonetheless, within these limits compromise is a highly effective technique for insuring that proposals of widely recognized merit are implemented. Because in most cases such influence is so indirect as to be virtually invisible to the media and the general public, however, it is terribly

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[59] Misawa, "Seisaku Kettei Katei no Gaikan," 25. Also Koya Azumi, "Political Functions of Soka Gakkai Membership," 920. From 1967 to 1971, the JSP voted in support of 67% of the government-sponsored proposals that came to a vote; the JCP supported over 33%; the CGP 75%; and the DSP 82%.

ineffective as a device for gaining electoral or even emotional support for the original influencer or his organization. Any public credit accorded usually redounds to the benefit of the government which appears as the prime, if not the sole, architect of any eventual legislation, and only a limited number of insiders are aware of the true geneology of many fine proposals. The ideological limitations and the lack of political payoffs therefore make such techniques anathema to many.[60]

The major alternative to compromise, however, lies at the other end of the tactical spectrum involving rather unrelenting opposition. When a conservative proposal, for example, raises an ideological red flag the result most frequently is the generation of an equal and opposite reaction. In the Diet this usually means the introduction, as noted above, of a counter proposal to serve as the formulation and focal point of basic disagreements.

With or without such a bill, the tactic of opposition must aim at blocking passage of the government bill, setting high costs on its passage, and minimizing the degree of "damage" by forcing various marginal changes. This may involve the revelation of any unsavory aspects of the government proposal, the generation of media opposition and/or a public campaign against the legislation. At times, the response also includes a variety of tactics from petition campaigns and public meetings of protest to street demonstrations and, in some cases, anti-governmental violence. Should opposition to some single specific proposal be effectively joined to opposition to other conservative activities or proposals there is also the threat of a major drive to topple the entire government.

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60 Kobayashi Takeshi, interview, July 9, 1971.

Such a dialectical pattern of political confrontation therefore makes great demands on all sides for talent, time and political resources in general. For progressive groups and parties there is the additional danger posed by what may appear to be "unreasonable" opposition or opposition for its own sake. Although such activities may appeal to purists on the left, they are hardly likely to attract the sympathies of the less committed. Rather they potentially reinforce the stereotypical image of the progressive camp as rather unconcerned with "genuine" political problems, rather unpredisposed toward compromise, and inclined to call for radical opposition to any efforts made by the government at change. Thus, there is the ever present danger that direct opposition used too frequently will create for the leftist political parties a situation comparable to that of the boy who cried "wolf."

Consequently, attempts by non-conservative or openly progressive groups to influence by total opposition are rather unappealing. Only on a few crucial issues has the progressive camp seemed willing and able to sustain a collective campaign of blatant and total opposition. As will be seen, in the area of higher education the primary area in which such total opposition is most readily forthcoming concerns university administration, while institutional differentiation, specialization and enrollment problems have been more the objects of compromise tactics.

Thus non-conservative groups are presented with something of an undesirable choice--they must either compromise and negotiate over matters primarily of technique, thereby conceding much by way of legitimacy and problem parametric powers to the conservatives, or alternatively maintain a rigid posture of ideological purity, insuring a near total lack of bargaining influence on specific issues and creating a near zero-sum situation. On different higher educational issues they have usually

found themselves impaled on one horn or the other of this cruel dilemma.

Japan is clearly pluralist by most definitions; it is clear, however, that Japan's pluralism is hegemonic, with conservative camp influence far outweighing that of the progressive camp. Most important aspects of policymaking are tightly controlled by conservatives. They utilize the power of the bureaucracy to dominate policy initiation and discussion in advisory committees and in legislative proposals. The ability of the bureaucracy to issue administrative directives further bolsters this control. Non-conservative groups have consistently lost direct influence over many channels of policymaking influence, with the decline in higher educational corporatism. Areas of direct influence remain open to non-conservatives, of course. Particularly significant are the universities themselves where the faculty conference is a key factor in most on-campus policy formulation, and the Diet where a legitimate and tangible role is guaranteed to the progressive parties and, through them, to their adherents. As noted, however, the impact that these groups can exert, particularly in the legislature, is limited to two not particularly appealing extremes: compromise, and conflict.

Thus there are specific processes that must be followed for different political issues, different arenas of policymaking are more or less relevant to these different processes which in turn mean greater or lesser influence for different sectors and groups. Overall, the presence or absence of links to the conservative camp, however, is especially significant.

These political features are especially important when combined with the nature of the specific issues involved, as examined in Chapter Three.

That is to say, when an issue is highly divisible and non-specific, and at the same time is determined through a bureaucratic rather than a legislative process, one can reasonably expect a process that limits external group input, minimizes overt conflict and results in a distinctly conservative policy outcome. By way of contrast, a highly affective issue of high specificity requiring largely legislative action should result in a process of intense camp conflict in which the conservative coloration to the final product will be tempered by progressive input and alteration. This is especially true when the nation's political climate in the broadest sense is charged with high affect of a bipolar conflictual nature. When many such issues arise simultaneously the significance and conflict surrounding any single one becomes that much greater. It is the combination and interaction of these various political and issue related factors in several discreet policy situations that provide the basis for the next three chapters.

Chapter Five

POLICYMAKING THROUGH CAMP CONFLICT: UNIVERSITY ADMINISTRATION

During the politically heated summer of 1969, the conservative government succeeded in pushing through the Diet a bill which on August 17 of that year went into effect as the Law of Provisional Measures Concerning University Administration. Despite its rather innocuous title, the bill and the events surrounding it represented the culmination of a tumultuous controversy between Japan's conservative and progressive camps that was clearly the major political and media event of the year, and possibly of several years. The entire process surrounding its passage was a prototype of policymaking through camp conflict and when the bill passed, it marked a significant shift in the relative balance of power between government and university giving the government new and significant con rols over university administration.

Controversy between universities and government was by no means new to Japan, a long history of antagonism having gone before this particular controversy. Nor is such hostility between the two particular to Japan. A university system worthy of the name is bound to perceive its interests as not totally harmonious with those of the government under whose geographical jurisdiction it exists. By its very nature, as most obviously represented by the name itself, a university is dedicated to principles and values transcending the quite justifiably more parochial concerns and interests of governments. Relations between university and government need not always be antagonistic; however, harmony has historically been more of an exception than the rule and the predominant pattern of government-university interaction has involved more conflict than compromise. Indeed, when viewed from the standpoint of

social integration, economics, competing political values, educational theory, the dangers of "ivory towerism," or many other perspectives, such conflict may represent a wholesome tension.

In any event, controversies over university administration have a long and politically salient history in Japan. As noted in Chapter 3 the prewar record of university-state relations contains numerous controversies between government efforts to minimize the opportunities for anti-governmental activity on campus, and individual or group reactions to such attempts. The comparative weakness of the academic community and the political left in pre-war Japan made for great imbalance in the struggles, usually resulting in government success; however, these government successes and a few noteworthy exceptions provided the basis both for fear on the part of the post-war academic community that such actions might recur, and at least a few symbolic victories which academics could grasp as the roots of successful opposition to government controls. Thus, as was noted above, by the time of the Occupation there was already a firm basis for great hostility between government and university over questions of administration. This hostility had developed even further as a result of Occupation-induced efforts before and during the reverse course to undercut some of the university powers that had emerged immediately after the war. This tradition of animosity continued through the post-Occupation period.

At base, virtually all problems of university administration since the Occupation have revolved around the question of the justifiable degree of government supervision and control over the universities, and the types of acceptable political activities on campus. In broad outline, the conservative camp has maintained that the university should be politically "neutral," that its educational and research

activities should be "responsible" to the broader society,[1] and that to insure these ends, various forms of governmental and societal supervision of university governance is essential. To achieve these objectives the government has advocated a centralization of power in the system of university administration: more power to the Ministry of Education at the expense of university officials, and more control by university administrators vis a vis faculty and students. In addition, the government has sought to check outright the formal powers of the faculty conference and the student self-governing associations.

The progressives and academics as well, have contended in contrast, that the university must remain totally free from all "outside interference," either governmental or societal. All decisions affecting research and education, they argue, must be made exclusively by members of the university community. Decentralization of rights and powers have simultaneously been advocated on campus, with many to devolve to junior faculty and students. Most explicitly, however, they have favored a strong and autonomous faculty conference, with university administrators acting as little more than surrogates for the conference. The proposed scope of power for the faculty conference has generally been quite wide, often encompassing the right, if not the moral duty, to take stands on political matters not immediately identifiable as having direct relevance to the university.[2] Political resolutions,

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[1] See for example, Kōsaka Masaaki, Hirakareta Daigaku no tame ni [Towards Open Universities] and Daigaku Mondai to Gakusei Undō [The University Problem and the Student Movement], 145-55. Morito Tatsuo, "Bijon toshite no'Hirakareta Daigaku'," [A Vision of the 'Open University'], 14-20 and "Daigaku no 'Kōgakka' ni tsuite," [On Making University Education 'Public'], 6-14, and "Hatten suru Shakai to Daigaku no Arikata" [The Way Universities Should be in an Open Society], 43-58.

[2] E.g., see Tōkyō Daigaku Shimbunsha, Daigaku Mondai [The University Problem], chapter 3; Takizawa Katsumi, Hakai to Sōzō no Ronri: Shisō no Jiyū kara Jiyū nara Shisō e [The Logic of Destruction and Creation: From the Freedom of Thought to Thinking of Freedom], inter alia.

petitions, mass demonstrations and on occasion unremitting violence have thus been defended as the essential weapons of a vigilant university community.

Embryonic formulations of such positions can be found in the pre-war period, but they came to intellectual fruition during the battles over university administration in the Occupation. And each successive struggle over administration hardened even more the opposing positions. Chronologically speaking three major struggles over university administration took place since the Occupation: in 1952-54, 1960-63 and finally in 1968-69. All three, which culminated in the events noted at the beginning of this chapter, while raising individual problems and having certain distinguishable features, were quite similar in relation to the issue specific variables discussed in Chapter Two: all were highly affective, generating intense political emotions which followed the camp positions outlined. Furthermore, virtually all proposals took forms calculated to affect all Japanese universities (and only them) giving the issue simultaneously great scope and specificity. As a result, intense interest and reaction was generated among the university community. Politically, the proposals all required legislative action, entailing a far more visible and potentially conflict-laden process than would have been plausible if resolved through administrative measures. However, they arose in the context of much broader controversies between the progressives and conservatives. Such major similarities implicitly suggest the likelihood of rather comparable policymaking processes among all three, which was actually the case in that all three represent almost prototypical examples of policymaking through camp conflict.

At the same time there were important differences among them within these broad commonalities. The specifics of each legislative proposal

were different, and the political strengths of the two camps changed somewhat over time, with absolute conservative control in the Diet declining, but with general organizational control over the organs of state by conservatives growing even stronger. With time the left, meanwhile, lost some of the unity that marked the earliest struggles. Finally, a certain cumulative quality has adhered to the political affect involved in this, as any other issue: each successive struggle has combined to make even greater the commitment to previously held positions, and to make the emotional stakes of victory or defeat even greater than before. Hence the political resources each side was willing to commit to the 1968-69 struggle far exceeded those of earlier struggles. The most significant difference among the three is that the earliest two battles in 1952-54 and 1960-63 resulted in the defeat of government-initiated legislative efforts to alter the administrative processes of the university system while the third saw the successful passage of a law introducing major changes in the balance of power between university and government.

In analyzing the three policymaking processes, the search will be simultaneously for the commonalities defining the pattern of camp conflict, and for the differences that explain their respective paths within that broad pattern.

The problem from 1951 to 1954 emerged as very much a continuation of the 1951 efforts to pass legislation altering the administration and management of the national and local public universities. As will be recalled, the government submitted two bills on these subjects to the Diet in February, 1951, only to have them abandoned in June in the face of strong opposition from the political left and the academic community. The period was, however, one of much broader hostilities

between Japan's two political camps.

In November, 1951, two Kyoto incidents involving radical student protest took place which rekindled the government's desire to increase university controls. The first incident on November 7 followed a rally under labor union auspices to celebrate the anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution. Student protesters demonstrated through the streets and stoned the home of Mizutani Chōzaburō, a right-wing Socialist Diet member who was supporting the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. This and subsequent clashes with the police led to several student arrests.[3]

The second, and by far the most famous, incident was the so-called Kyoto Emperor Incident. The Emperor, on tour through the Kansai area, in November, was met at Kyoto University by about 1,000 student demonstrators shouting slogans, demands, and cat-calls, including the frequent use of the familiar word for "you," "kimi" -- an act that during the pre-war period would have been tantamount to lese majeste. Such actions outraged conservatives; police were moved onto campuses throughout Japan to investigate left-wing activities and numerous clashes broke out between police and students. Eight Kyoto students, allegedly leaders of the demonstration, were expelled[4] and immediately following these incidents, Education Minister Amano went before the Diet, publicly to reprimand faculty members for failing to exert sufficient leadership over students, and to call for the enactment of a bill authorizing more stringent administrative controls over the university.[5] In August, the

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[3] Arai, Kiki no Gakusei Undō-shi [The Student Movement in Crisis], 231-32; Lawrence H. Battistini, The Postwar Student Struggle in Japan , 79-80.

[4] Arai, Kiki no Gakusei Undō-shi , 232-47. For left-wing interpretations of this incident see Shiryō: Sengo Gakusei Undō [Sources: The Postwar Student Movement], 405-19. (Hereafter Shiryō)

[5] Arai, Ibid.; Ōhara, "Daigaku Hōan no Suii" [Developments in the Plan for a University Law], 82. (Hereafter Daigaku Hōan)

Ministry of Education issued a white paper on student activities which attempted to demonstrate the narrowness of the Zengakuren base, and to link protest activities to a broad pattern of allegedly subversive activities by the left. At the same time business groups began making formal statements to the effect that radical students would not be hired. The Popolo Theater Incident (February 20, 1952) served to heighten tensions even more.[6] An undercover policeman was found taking notes on attendance at a dramatic performance by the leftist Popolo Dramatic Troupe at Tokyo University. The policeman's confiscated notebook revealed that undercover monitoring of students was a normal part of police activities, enlivening for many on campus the memory of pre-war police surveillance of academics. Fears were further heightened by the government's efforts to pass an anti-subversives bill in March of that same year and by the passage of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and Administrative Agreement, both of which the left viewed as a return to militarism. Numerous leftist groups mobilized on May Day, 1952 and a violent confrontation with police left two dead, 1200 arrested and scores seriously wounded.

Two additional events, the so-called Suita and Hirakata Incidents indicate still further the high level of confrontation. The first involved the attempted sabotage of American war equipment in the Suita area near Osaka by about 1,000 demonstrators on June 25, 1952. A violent clash with police guards left one student shot and many others injured. On the same day Osaka students marched to the suburbs of

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[6] On the Popolo Incident see Ikazaki, Daigaku no Jichi to Gakusei no Chii [University Autonomy and the Position of Students], 123-37. (Hereafter Daigaku no Jichi) Nomura, Seisaku , 104-07. Decision of Tokyo court is in Tabata, Daigaku Mondai.

Hirakata and burned several homes belonging to those accused of cooperation with the American military.

It is within this context of mutual distrust, hostility and confrontation between the progressives and the conservatives that one must view the government's attempts to tighten administrative control, and the contrary reaction to such efforts. To the government, the open hostility shown by members of the progressive camp and many academics, most particularly student organizations, to its ties to the U.S., its program of defense and many of its other broad policies, could not be allowed to continue; unremitting protest and demonstrations represented a direct challenge to the authority of the government. From the standpoint of the progressive camp, the actions of the government in these other fields were seen as a consequence of the U.S. Occupation's"reverse course" and the return to power of the spiritual heirs of those who had led Japan through the tragedies of the 1930s and 1940s. Protest against what was viewed as renascent militarism was seen as a moral obligation to many intellectuals, especially in the light of the rather quiescent posture they and their predecessors had taken prior to and during World War II. Attempts to tighten administrative control over the universities, and counter-attempts to block such moves were hence part of a much broader struggle between the two camps.

At the same time a more immediate impulse for the government action must be noted. In February, 1952, the government produced a proposal aimed at tightening control over the universities, a key element of which would have given the Minister of Education the power to appoint the presidents of all national universities. When the new system universities were organized in 1949, most national university

presidents were appointed to four-year terms by the Ministry of Education. By 1951-52, many universities had begun making plans to elect their own presidents totally outside the purview of the government. Part of the government's plan was explicitly designed to prevent any such unilateral selection. Within the Ministry there was worry about the political consequences of such elections, many bureaucrats fearing left-wing "takeovers" on individual campuses. Others were concerned about the more educationally detrimental possibility of infighting among academic factions during such elections.[7] In either event, many conservatives were motivated by concern over this specific problem as well as the broader issues of university governance.

The entire government proposal was known as the Ministry of Education Secretariat Plan. Its aim was to establish the means for the "appropriate governance" in the universities. In contrast to the 1951 Board of Trustees Plan, this new plan would have created no Board of Trustees, nor any Central Educational Advisory Board. Its concerns were not with national supervision but exclusively with changes in the distribution of powers on campus. The main structural change it proposed involved the creation of a university council (Hyōgikai) as the main administrative and policymaking organ on campus. Its responsibilities would include personnel and disciplinary measures, with far fewer guarantees of due process than then existed. Another major change would give the Minister of Education formal power to appoint university presidents and they were to be "subject to [his] supervision" as well, an expansion of hitherto pro forma responsibilities, and an indication to many that the Ministry planned to exercise strong controls over the

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7. _Mainichi Shimbun_, August 6, 1953.

presidents' behavior once in office. Strong protests from the academic left, including most notably Zengakuren, the Japan Teacher's Union, and the Japan Science Council were delivered to the Minister of Education. Facing such strong protest before the conservative camp had fully discussed the problem and consolidated around a single position, the government denied that the exposed plan was in any way final, and forwarded the entire matter to the newly established Central Education Council for further examination.

The secretariat plan was submitted to the council in March, 1953. Between then and August, its Special Committee on the University Problem held four general meetings on the problem. Its final recommendations, issued in February, 1954, were virtual carbon copies of the Ministry of Education's earlier proposal concerning the powers of the university council and the subservience of the president to the Minister of Education. In addition, however, it suggested the establishment of a university advisory board (sangikai) to be composed of the president, "appropriate" faculty members, and "men of learning and experience" (i.e., non-academics) which would make major policy for the university. Thus, as Kaigo and Terasaki have noted, "The proposed law was something which combined both the characteristics of bureaucratic control contained in the Ministry of Education Secretariat Plan and the system of governance based on outsiders in the plans that had preceded it."[8]

While the council was in the midst of its deliberations, however, the Ministry of Education took two significant bureaucratic steps which increased its over-all powers in the area of university administration

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8 Kaigo and Terasaki, Daigaku Kyōiku, 627-28.

and management, thereby giving it some measure of control over radical activities on campuses. The first of these was the issuance of a Ministerial Ordinance on April 22, 1953,[9] establishing a university council in all national universities having more than one faculty and such other national universities as were deemed desirable. The council was to be composed of the university president, individual faculty heads, from two to five professors from each individual faculty, and the heads of attached research institutes . Members were to be appointed by the Minister of Education, acting on the suggestion of the university president, and the council was to be given major deliberative powers over the budget, the establishment and dissolution of faculties or courses, personnel standards, student entry quotas status and well-being of students, coordination of individual faculties, and many other areas. More importantly for the question of political autonomy, the council was to consider all matters of campus discipline thereby removing such controls from the faculty conference.

The second measure came the day after the first and involved a communication (tsūtatsu) to the national university presidents, offering two plans for selecting subsequent presidents, both of which concentrated the bulk of the selection process within the university councils which had been the subject of the previous day's directive, thus additionally diminishing the role played by the faculty conference.[10]

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9 "Kokuritsu Daigaku no Hyōgikai ni kansuru Zettei Sochi o Sadameru Kisoku" [Regulations to Establish Temporary Measures Regarding a University Council in the National Universities]. Document is in Nomura, Seisaku.., 519-21.

10 For actual plans, see Nomura, Seisaku , pp. 521-24; for an analysis of their implications see Ōhara, Daigaku Hōan, 83-4, Kaigo and Terasaki, Daigaku Kyōiku, 628-32 and Ienaga, Daigaku no Jiyū no Rekishi [History of Academic Freedom], 127-28.

By these two measures the government was able to accomplish much of what was subsequently intended to be the subject of legislative debate. Taking place as they did between the Lower House elections on April 20 and the Upper House elections on April 24, they were initially given little public or political attention. In fact only three newspapers covered them as news items at the time, the Mainichi (June 28), the Tōdai Gakusei Shimbun (June 11), and the Shakai Taimusu (May 21). Of these, only the Mainichi was of national significance, and its coverage came two months after the events.[11]

As the directives became known, and the realization spread that they effected bureaucratically items contained in proposed but unpassed legislation, they caused great progressive-conservative debate in the Diet.[12] The Education Ministry, however, maintained that these were proper ministerial procedures, and that they were moreover merely provisional measures intended to be operative until dealt with legislatively, which in fact they never were.

These two measures, taken while the Central Education Council was deliberating proposed legislation on the same matters had a twofold effect on the policymaking process. On the one hand they gave the Ministry of Education a great deal more influence over campus governance than at any time since the pre-war period, and hence minimized the actual need to act legislatively on the proposal of the Central Education Council. However, they simultaneously sharpened the opposition of the political left and the academic community to the full legislative proposal, the political intentions and potentials of which were seen as even greater than when first proposed. Strong debate

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[11] Ōhara, Daigaku Hōan, 83.

[12] E.g., see Shakai Taimusu, June 11, 1953.

ensued in the Diet over the Central Education Council's proposal once it was presented legislatively, with the progressivesunited in their opposition. Outside the Diet public protests against the bill took place; additional opposition came from many of the major news media. The result was that the government finally tabled its proposal, secure in the knowledge of a partial victory through its administrative actions. The progressive camp meanwhile took heart from the fact that not everything the government had sought had been accomplished. Under the aegis of mutual "victory" the two camps temporarily retreated from the issue of university administration, and from 1954 until the end of the decade no substantive changes were sought and none took place in the new balance struck on matters of university governance.

Not at all coincidentally, this was a period of serious decline in campus protest activities. The student movement in particular was exceptionally inactive. By 1955, only about 20 percent of the Japanese universities remained affiliated with Zengakuren[13] and the leadership of this student federation was in the midst of serious internal dispute and self-criticism. This necessitated a period of reorientation and moderation for the entire organization which lasted several years.

In 1959-60 however, there was a dramatic upsurge in protest activities revolving around the renegotiated U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, a nearly two-year-coal mine strike at Miike in Kyushu, the U-2 incident and a host of related issues that allowed the sparks of left-right

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[13] All students in a particular faculty are automatically enrolled in the self-governing association of the faculty, and the elected leaders of the association choose to make or not to make any further outside affiliations.

hostilities in Japan to blaze forth in full.[14] Once again campus activities and activities off campus by protesting groups which included large numbers of students gave rise to governmental efforts to tighten the formal controls over universities. A series of speeches, communications and directives during the period from December, 1959, through the major demonstrations of May-June, 1960, indicate the Ministry of Education's deep concern over the renewed protest activities and the apparent inability or unwillingness of university officials to keep it in check. In January, 1960 the Minister of Education called on university presidents to take "all appropriate actions" including the expulsion of "those who are exerting a significantly bad influence over the general student body. . ."[15]

This and other statements of concern sought to jar university officials into taking action against protesters themselves. Yet coupled with the velvet glove of indirection was the mailed fist: threats to alter the administrative structure of the university system so as to strengthen government control. In a January 19, 1960 press conference LDP Vice President Ono declared his intention "to eliminate government-supported humanities programs which simply serve to support Zengakuren."[16] Later that month, Education Minister Matsuda detailed

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14 That is not to suggest that total apathy was the mood, as the Sunakawa Demonstrations of June 1957, and protests in the fall of 1958 against the Police Duties Bill would clearly indicate. On the upsurge see in particular George Packard, Protest in Tokyo.

15 Mombushō, Gakusei Mondai ni kansuru Daijin Danwa oyobi Tsūtatsu Nado [Communications Statements of the Minister of Education, etc. on the Student Movement], 31. (Hereafter Daijin Danwa)

16 Newspapers of this period carried the comment, but see also Nomura, Seisaku, 830.

a plan to concentrate science and engineering departments in the national universities and to shift humanities and social science departments into the private universities. Implicit was the belief that such a change might reduce protest opportunities. Such a separation, however, was rapidly opposed by virtually all sectors of academia and was soon dropped, though it clearly impressed on academics the government's concern over the rising tide of protests, and indicated the consequences if it continued.

In May, 1960, a formal inquiry was submitted to the Central Education Council by Matsuda, calling for a comprehensive investigation of the problems in the university system established under the Occupation "including a fundamental investigation of its aims, character, establishment, organizational arrangements and administrative management..."[17] Student protest itself was not explicitly mentioned as the basis for the request although concern was expressed for ways to improve "the welfare and guidance of students." More explicitly, the Minister declared: "...we believe there is a problem regarding the political activities of university personnel and the limits to university self-government."[18] The government in its formal directions to the council suggested quite openly the direction it believed should be taken to insure greater control:

> The Minister of Education under the Ministry of Education Establishment Law (Article 5, clause 18) does not have supervisory powers in regard to the general management of national universities. These in fact are entrusted to the self-government of the universities. As a result, we believe that the supervisory powers of the Minister of Education should be more explicitly acknowledged vis-a-vis

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17 Full text in Nomura, Seisaku, 538.

18 As in Kaigo and Terasaki, Daigaku Kyōiku, 634.

> national universities, which after all are established by means of public funds.[19]

In short, the Ministry of Education sought to increase its formal powers over the university, much as it had in the earlier policymaking efforts.

Following the June 15th protest concerning the Security Treaty in which one student was killed, Matsuda denounced university educators as having abandoned their responsibilities to keep students under greater control and as a result of continued student protests on June 18, he called for an investigation into concrete methods of prohibiting or mediating in demonstrations at private universities. A lengthy report by the Investigative Council on the Administration of School Corporations in October detailed lengthy suggestions for such arbitration proceedings.[20] Then, in December, 1960, a twelve-member special advisory committee was established on the reform of university administration. This committee, separate from the Central Education Council, which was at the time studying the same question under a far broader mandate, was given the primary responsibility of defining the powers of the university president and the faculty conference and investigating ways to maintain campus order in the face of anti-governmental activities by students and faculty members.[21]

In January, 1961, the committee submitted a six-point report. Participation in the selection of the university president would be limited to permanent lecturers and above. Presidential powers would be strengthened to include, among other things, the selection of faculty chairmen. The scope of powers of the faculty conference and the

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[19] Kaigo and Terasaki, Daigaku Kyōiku, 633-34.

[20] Mombu Nenpō, '60, 213-15.

[21] Mainichi Shimbun, September 14, 1960.

university council were to be reduced, especially in personnel matters. Finally, membership in the faculty conference was to be limited to full professors.[22]

The plan would have centralized many powers on campus and would have curtailed the ability of junior faculty members, generally the more prominent left-wing activists, to utilize the faculty conference as a means to advance their causes or protect their jobs. Also, by centralizing powers in the office of the university president and the faculty chairmen and making them representative of fewer university groups, it was anticipated that these officials would be able to deal more stringently with campus protest. This report became only one of many inputs into the calculations of the Central Education Council in its dealings with the overall problems of the university, but it signified the direction eventually taken.

A major addition to this general thrust of increased control against the university's being used to political advantage by the left came in a May, 1962 speech by Prime Minister Ikeda, just prior to the issuance of the interim report by the Central Education Council. Said Ikeda:

> When we consider the present condition of Japan, should we not be strongly disturbed by the fact that education is being used as a stepping stone to revolution...? We must devise satisfactory measures to cope with this, and ... accordingly I have directed Education Minister Araki to reassess the present system of university administration.[23]

The reassessment of the university system proposed in the Central Education Council's report dealt with a wide range of issues such as the role of the university in industrial society, and the need for

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22 Ikazaki, Daigaku no Jichi, 156-57.

23 Entire speech is in Nomura, Seisaku..., 540-42.

increased emphasis on science and technology. Its assessment of the administrative structure of the university and of the distribution of powers between university and state however are of paramount concern.

The 16th Subcommittee of the Central Education Council submitted its interim report (Daigaku no Kanri Unei ni tsuite) on June 16, 1962;[24] this was greeted by widespread protest as the contents of the report leaked out. Following the pattern of 1952-54 and the directions implied in the request for the investigations, changes proposed were all in the direction of increased centralization of decision-making powers. Powers of individual faculty members and the faculty conference were diminished while the university council, faculty chairmen, the university president, and most importantly, the Minister of Education would all gain substantial powers heretofore not theirs.

The Minister of Education was given an explicit veto right over the selection of university presidents. As the logical continuation of the 1953 Ministerial Directives in reasing the power of the university council in the presidential selection, this new plan would require the council to nominate more than one candidate for university president who would then be elected by the university faculty members. The incumbent president would notify the Minister of Education of the results of the election, and the latter could either accept its results or explicitly veto the choice of the faculty conference and call for another election.

In the area of faculty selection similar concentration of administrative power was proposed. In contrast to the ongoing procedure in

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24 Tabata, Daigaku Mondai, I, 77-9.

which the faculty conference made all choices for appointment and promotions, the Council report proposed a system whereby the faculty chairman (gakubuchō) would compile a list of proposed appointees from which the faculty conference would merely make recommendations to the chairman of the faculty who in turn would notify the university president. The latter would then have the power, should he find the nominee unsuitable, to call for a new choice. Should he and the chairman be in accord, they would notify the Minister of Education who would make the final appointment. Thus, both the university president and the Minister of Education would be given veto power over the selection of faculty members.

In addition, the university president and the Minister of Education would have further veto power over the selection of faculty chairmen, who up until then were chosen by the faculty members themselves. In short, virtually all personnel matters would involve a pre-screening for suitable candidates by some higher level authority, from among which candidates subsequent choices would be made. These choices would in turn be subject to veto from higher levels of administrative authority.

The powers of the university president and the faculty chairmen were to be expanded and strengthened in other areas as well. The president, who was then in charge of "administering school duties and having ultimate supervision over its personnel,"[25] was to become "the highest administrative and managerial official in the university." The faculty chairman who had no formally defined duties other than being the department's representative on the university council was

25 School Education Law, Article 58, Clause 3.

to become "the executive in charge of the faculty and the chairman of the faculty conference."

Another centralizing element in the plan concerned participation in the faculty conference. At the time of the report each university had its own system, with many universities including assistant professors, permanent lecturers, and in some cases even lower level instructors and assistants in the conference's makeup. The report included an absolute prohibition against such flexibility, limiting participation to full professors, except "...in cases deemed necessary through consultation with the university council..."

Finally, a "central organ" (chūō no kikan) was to be created on each campus. The composition of this organ and the delineation of its formal powers were blurred in the initial report, but non-academic members would clearly be included as in plans of the early 1950s. This central organ was to be consulted in cases of "basic policies relating to education and research within the university" and was to be consulted by the Minister of Education in cases where he exercised his proposed veto rights over personnel.

Finally, these administrative changes were to be applicable not only in the national universities as the introduction to the report makes clear:

> These means have been investigated with regard to national universities; however, it is hoped that the administration and management practices of the local public and private universities will be examined in light of these suggestions since both have elements in common with national universities in so far as all are educational institutions.

Hence the report implicitly would effect changes in all universities in the country.

If implemented, these changes would have meant a significant

increase in the powers of the Ministry of Education, vis a vis the university as well as a centralization of authority on the campuses themselves, and would have given the conservative camp a strong weapon in insuring that university presidents, faculty chairmen and faculty members would be at least minimally acceptable to the government and the education bureaucracy, if not actually close allies thereof. Over the long run the opportunities for these individuals to demonstrate open hostility to the government, or to challenge its policies would have been sharply diminished. Clearly, implementation of the Central Education Council's plan would have moved universities far closer to the conservative camp than they stood at the time.

Japanese progressives were virtually unanimous in denouncing the entire plan as inherently conservative and detrimental to university autonomy. One fear, as earlier with the Board of Trustees Plan presented during the Occupation, was that those outside the university would not mean greater representativeness of the public but would simply insure a distinctly conservative hue in the universities. The expectation of most academicians was that the Minister of Education would make appointments to the "central organ" primarily from business and industry, and that all selections made by the university president would actually be under the indirect control of the Ministry since the president himself was subject to Ministry approval.

One critic complained as follows:

> setting up advisory bodies that include outsiders within the universities will not necessarily reflect popular opinion in university administration. It may do nothing more than provide a way for capitalists and those in positions of authority to express opinions and exert pressure.[26]

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26 Munakata Seiya, "The Task of Universities and the State," 93.

Other critics went further, declaring that any legislation on the question of university administration could automatically be presumed to violate the principle of university autonomy since the government had traditionally seen all education as a tool of state policy. The Socialist Party, for example, citing its version of government interference in the pre-war period stressed the dangers of any government control over higher education, condemning any legislation even if aimed explicitly at student violence on campus. To the JSP student violence was purely reactive, aimed at nothing short of government militarism which had allied Japan with the United States. From this perspective, the party declared itself unalterably opposed to any government intervention in university activities.[27]

The Japan Teacher's Union, Zengakuren, and a number of ad hoc groups such as the Association to Protect University Autonomy engaged in various forms of public protest to demonstrate opposition to all legislation on the question of university administration.[28]

In retort, the proposals were defended by the conservative camp on the basis of the internal efficiency they would purportedly create. It was necessary, they contended, "to clarify matters that could be considered by various university organs" and to "eliminate internal factionalism in which status is more important than ability."[29] Few

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[27] Asahi Shimbun, June 24, 1962.

[28] For a catalogue of the major protest activities and groups involved between April and September 1962, see Yomiuri Shimbun, October 8, 1962. For Zengakuren activities see Shiryō, 244-248.

[29] Asahi Shimbun, August 3, 1962.

if any defenses were made on ideological grounds. One of the sole exceptions was offered by a member of the Council himself:

> We need a system which acknowledges the powers of Minister of Education to veto and demand the university's reconsideration when a president is elected who is too much the representative of one faction's interests.[30]

Opposition from the established left was to be expected given the bipolarity of earlier struggles over university administration, the scope and specificity of the proposal advanced, and the highly charged bipolarity of the general political climate. Presumably the government and the Central Education Council expected no less. More surprising was the degree to which moderate groups were opposed. The University Accreditation Association and the Japan Science Council raised sharp criticisms, and university presidents, rarely the bearers of radical guidons, joined in protesting the proposed changes. Many contended that some reform of administrative and managerial procedures might be in order, but that the universities should be in charge of their own housecleaning.[31] Support for these positions came as well from major newspaper editorials.[32]

The political anomaly of university presidents taking a strong position in opposition to a strengthening of their own powers should be noted. Unquestionably much of their opposition stemmed not so much from opposition to their own aggrandizements but to fear of the increased government powers they saw behind the increase in their formal powers. In the words of President Akabori Shiro of Osaka University:

> I am afraid that by giving a veto power to the Minister of Education, we shall be greatly adding to the political interference in the personnel

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30 Ibid.

31 Asahi Shimbun, September 8, 1962

32 See for example, Asahi Shimbun, August 7, 1962.

> matters of the university. This we cannot allow. The faculty conference must elect the president of the university and individual department heads. There is a danger of authoritative interference should the Ministry of Education and the so-called central level organ come meddling in these matters and they must therefore be restrained.[33]

President Ogawa of Tokyo University declared that he was afraid that the president would be given inappropriately large powers in the selection of personnel. "What is necessary," he declared, "is a system in which we rely on specialists to choose candidates from their specialized fields."[34]

As the political battle lines formed it was finally a counter-proposal put forward by the Association of National University Presidents (Kokuritsu Daigaku Kyōkai) that became the rallying point for those opposed to the government's plans.[35] The informal protests of this influential group began almost as soon as the report of the Central Council was made public. ollowing informal complaints to him, on June 23, the Minister of Education addressed a meeting of the group and his first point was to stress that "there is absolutely no consideration being given to an unreasonable limitation of university autonomy."[36]

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[33] Mainichi Shimbun (evening edition), September 17, 1962.

[34] Asahi Shimbun, August 3, 1962.

[35] The counter plan offered by the Japan Science Council was the most suitable to the more extreme elements of the anti-government forces and represented little change from the existing situation but the National University Presidents' plan was considered by most academics, including the more moderate progressives as the more 'practical' alternative. For the plans and how they differed see the very helpful chart in Ikazaki, Daigaku no Jichi, 165-69.

[36] Asahi Shimbun, (evening edition), June 23, 1962.

The first official action the presidents took came in an interim response to the proposals of the Central Council which called for respect for the existing traditions of the various universities. It specifically opposed any standardization of administrative procedures through new laws, most notably the broad veto power over the university's elective organs, and it called for an opening of both membership in the faculty conference and participation in the selection of the university president to faculty members as low as lecturers.[37]

A more formal response came in the form of an explicit counter proposal issued on July 31, 1962.[38] This proposal of the university presidents differed substantially from that of the Council. It proposed that the selection of university presidents be left to the prevailing customs within individual universities, and that assistant professors and permanent lecturers be permitted to participate in elections. The university council would be more an independent board of inquiry responsible to the faculty than an organ of the office of the president, and the president was to be subservient to its decisions. Faculty chairmen would remain the elected representatives of the faculty and would be responsible to the faculty conference, which would continue to include assistant professors and permanent lecturers and which would continue to make all personnel decisions. As for the participation of non-academics, the report however was somewhat closer to the Council's proposal. It declared that "in cases where it is necessary to hear such opinions within the university, and to the extent that it does not interfere with the independence of the university, there should be no impediment to the establishment of organs

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37 Asahi Shimbun, August 1, 1962.

38 The full text of the report is given in Nomura, Seisaku.., 550-59, and Tabata, Daigaku Mondai, I, 83-90.

in which suitable outsiders participate." However, any outside organs set up "would have to be limited to assisting in the functioning of the various [academic] organs...," most notably the faculty conference.[39]

In short the position taken by the National University Presidents' Association made few compromises with extant practices, supporting a far less centralized structure, subject to far less external influence than that proferred in the original Central Education Council proposal. Moreover, it represented an explicitly political rather than an administrative model of the university in that it rested on no assumption of converging interests between government and university, nor between university administration, university faculty and students. Differences of opinion were seen as natural, and the administrative structure proposed was to be one in which the faculty conferences and the university council retained power as political, quasi-legislative organs representing and attempting to reconcile this plurality of interests. Differences would have to be resolved more through politics from below than through administration from above.

In an effort to resolve the differences between the plans of the Central Education Council and the National University Presidents' Association, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet Secretary entered the picture. A consultation involving them, the Education Minister, and eight presidents of major national universities took place on September 18, 1962, only a few days after the formal issuance of the counter plan.[40]

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[39] Section 4, Clause 8.

[40] It is interesting that neither the chairman of the Central Education Council, Amano Teiyū, nor the chairman of the committee which drafted the universities' plan, Hirasawa Kō, President of Kyoto University, were present. However, Morito Tatsuo, President of Hiroshima University and Kaya Seiji, President of Tokyo University, and both members of the Central Education Council attended as university delegates.

As a result primarily of this discussion, the Central Education Committee revised its proposal, the most fundamental changes being the elimination of any references to a central organ, to a veto power for the Minister of Education or to control over the selection of university personnel. References to the university president as "the highest administrative and managerial official in the university" were also cut. Instead, he was declared the official with "overall responsibility for the administration and management of the university." Moreover, the president was given no power to veto faculty chairmen or individual faculty members and his election was left open to lower ranking faculty members.[41]

These revisions mollified some of the moderate opposition, but the committed left and many academic groups remained strongly antagonistic. Numerous student demonstrations took place[42] including a boycott of exams at Kyoto University.[43] The Japan Science Council, at its general meeting in December, declared its continued opposition to the government plan and called for the faculty conference to remain the focal point of university autonomy and for the president to be elected with no government interference.[44] Prefectural delegations also met with the Minister of Education to express their opposition.[45]

Most significantly, however, the presidents of the national universities, and their associations still refused to support the

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[41] Asahi Shimbun, October 8, 1962.

[42] See, for example, those reported in Asahi Shimbun, November 2, 1962, and November 11, 1962 (evening edition), and in Nihon Keizai Shimbun, December 1, 1962.

[43] Asahi Shimbun, (evening edition), January 21, 1963.

[44] Nihon Keizai Shimbun, December 3, 1962.

[45] Nihon Keizai Shimbun, December 27, 1962.

government plan, even though the revised plan included many of the changes they demanded. A number of questions still remained. The university president was still expected "to make a prudent evaluation" of those elected as faculty chairmen or chosen to join the faculty, and on the basis of such evaluations, the Minister of Education would still make the final appointment.[46] Further, while many references to the centralization of powers were eliminated, government officials and Central Education Council members continued to talk as though elimination of formal references would not exclude their actual exercise. Kaya Seiji, a member of the Central Council, noted for example, that the Council had made no decision within its subsequent deliberations concerning a veto power for the Minister of Education; it simply decided not to touch on the question in its report.[47] Far more significantly, the Minister of Education, in testimony before Upper House Budget Committee hearings, declared that since the Minister of Education already had the [pro forma] power to appoint university presidents, it was safe to interpret this to mean that he had veto powers as well.[48] Formal declaration in law, he said, was therefore unnecessary. At this same time, he declared that he had every intention of submitting the revised plan to the next Diet for rapid legislative action,[49] the precipitate quality of which engendered further suspicion.

These fears were not ameliorated by further meetings between the Minister of Education and influential university presidents.[50] The

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46 See the article by Ōkochi Kazuo, in Asahi Shimbun, October 29, 1962.

47 Asahi Shimbun, October 16, 1962.

48 Asahi Shimbun, November 10, 1962.

49 Asahi Shimbun, November 3, 1962.

50 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, November 2, 1962, inter alia.

Presidents' Association, in an apparent effort to convince the government that the universities themselves were willing to consider administrative changes, established its own Advisory Council on University Administration to make further recommendations on internal changes. In the meantime, the Association continued its strong opposition to the Ministry of Education's plans.

Such widespread opposition to the original plans of the Central Education Council and the Ministry of Education, most particularly the opposition of the National University Presidents' Association, was disturbing to the government. Virtually the entire academic community plus the organized political left and most communications media were explicitly opposed to the plan. Although by no means strong enough to insure legislative defeat, this coalition had great potential to affect public opinion and had successfully stymied the government a decade before. The memories of government interference in universities during the pre-war period, while waning, had by no means been erased in the minds of many Japanese, while the public demonstrations of 1960 that had brought down the Kishi government were far fresher in the minds of Japanese conservatives. To have pushed through the plan in such an atmosphere of tension would also have meant a sharp deviation from the Ikeda government's "low posture" politics, and surely would have necessitated great efforts on its part.[51]

New legislative proposals were prepared in December, 1962, based on the recommendation of the Central Council,[52] but as they emerged, a split developed within the government as to procedure regarding changes

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[51] On this see, for example, Hans H. Baerwald, "Ikeda's Low Posture," 9-10.

[52] For text of the major bill, see Yamamoto, Kyōiku Gyōsei Gaisetsu [Outlines of Educational Administration], 109-12.

in university administration. At a cabinet meeting on January 11, 1963, the Ministry of Education stressed its desire to have its broad scale bill submitted to the Diet for rapid consideration. Cabinet officials, from the Legal Systems Division in particular, opposed this course of action, arguing instead for a program of incremental revision of existing laws.[53] Within the LDP too opposition to the Ministry of Education bill emerged with Secretary General Maeo insisting on no submission, his resistance based on the fear that if the bill were submitted to the Diet at that particular time, the opposition parties would be able to merge their opposition to it with the opposition to the Japan-Korea Treaty coming up at the same time. Knowing that opposition to the latter was likely to be strong, Maeo argued that it was necessary to deprive the left of any opportunity to fuse the two separate issues, making for a stronger opposition campaign. Postponing the Ministry of Education bill, he argued, would make it possible to keep the two opposition activities separate, and thereby defuse both.[54]

As the split within the LDP and the government grew, the conflict over the bill shifted to within the conservative camp. A joint delegation from the LDP's Education Committee (Bunkyō Bukai) and the Educational Investigation Campaign (Bunkyō Chōsakai) met with Education Minister Araki to protest any delay in submitting the bill and another delegation met with Cabinet Secretary Kurogane to register opposition.[55]

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[53] Notably the School Education Law and the Law of Special Regulations on Educational Personnel, Asahi Shimbun (evening edition), January 11, 1963; Mainichi Shimbun, January 11, 1963.

[54] Asahi Shimbun, January 19, 1963; Mainichi Shimbun, January 23, 1963; Nihon Keizai Shimbun, January 23, 1963.

[55] Nihon Keizai Shimbun, January 25, 1963.

A decision was made to postpone any consideration of the bill at a Cabinet meeting on January 25, 1963.[56] The Minister of Education and others supporting the bill expressed their simultaneous hope that the bill would be submitted in the near future, and publicly the government claimed that the delay was made so as to hear "constructive public opinion in hopes of getting a better bill in a year or so."[57] In fact, however, the issue died temporarily at this point, just as it had a decade earlier.

Parallels pervade the two cases investigated. Both concerned a basically non-dissegregable issue of high ideological salience, broad in scope and quite specific in probable impact. Both were marked by a policymaking process characterized by a high level of confrontation between Japan's two political camps. Protests and demonstrations by progressive camp members over on- and off-campus issues stimulated efforts by the conservative camp t tighten controls over university activities and personnel through administrative measures, which in turn stimulated even greater opposition activity by progressives, usually with the strong support of most elements of the academic community. Bureaucratic activity in the drafting of proposed changes, the articulation of political positions, and occasionally in the implementation of specific changes was high, but the arena of ultimate decision-making was the Diet, where, despite the fact that the conservatives had clear majorities, the proposals were stopped in the face of widespread intra- and extra-parliamentary opposition.

This last point is of particular interest: when direct confrontation between progressives and conservatives took place, it was the

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56 Asahi Shimbun (evening edition), January 25, 1963.

57 Asahi Shimbun, January 26, 1963.

progressives that won. Successful blockage of government legislative attempts through massive and coordinated efforts by the left showed it to have tremendous ability to exercise a certain veto power over the actions of a government having numerical superiority in the parliament. This ability, it must be recognized, rested heavily on a unified coalition of all forces in the progressive camp and support from major newspapers, university officials and their organizations, and some component of that ephemera, public opinion. Faced with such opposition, the conservative camp, itself not fully united, was forced to recognize practical limits on what even a legislative majority could insure.

Most of these same phenomena surround the policymaking process involved in the final case in university administration: that of 1968-69. One notable exception, however, is that for the first time in the postwar period, the government succeeded in its efforts to alter radically the administrative power in the university system. Where in the two early cases the left had been united and strongly backed by a number of allies, in the latter case it was internally divided, had lost most of its earlier allies outside the hard core members of the progressive camp and faced a far more united and committed conservative camp, changes which altered completely the legislative outcome of government efforts to centralize control.

For most Japanese progressives, the year 1970 was exceptionally important. It was then that Japan could legitimately demand a renegotiation of its military treaty with the United States, including the possibility of ending it completely. While the progressive camp was openly hostile to the conservatives on many issues and sought constantly to confront the government on many of them, the issue of the

military relationship with the United States was the keystone of much of this opposition; hence 1970 took on major significance as a target year for camp confrontation.

Student groups in particular became increasingly active as the target date drew near. Moreover a shift in tactics occurred as student activities became increasingly centered on campuses, in contrast to earlier periods when the bulk of student protest took place off campus and around non-campus issues. A survey of major "incidents" on university campuses for the period 1950-64, shows an average of fewer than one per year. In 1965 there were 25, and this dramatic rise turned out to represent nothing more than the first minor breeze before an onrushing tornado. The number of campus protests increased during 1966 and 1967, and climaxed in 1968 and 1969. In 1968, for example, 116 universities experienced significant conflicts, and a month-by-month analysis of conflicts in 1969 shows even further escalation. In January, 18 schools were experiencing conflicts; in March, 43; in June, 57; in July, 75; and in October a high of 77 schools were undergoing major protest activities.[58]

Police figures for this period indicate their heavy activity on university campuses. There were 31 campus actions in 1968 involving over 10,000 police and resulting in 425 arrests. For 1969 the figures were up to 938 campus actions, involving 243,000 police and resulting in over 3500 arrests.[59]

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58 Ōhashi Hisatoshi, Shiryō: Daigaku no Jichi [Source Materials: University Autonomy], 265 (from data provided by the Ministry of Education).

59 To seasoned American radicals the number of police actions and arrests in 1968 may seem surprisingly low; however, they reflect primarily a general policy of non-interference by police in university affairs through the first half of 1969 and a policy of making as few arrests as possible when on campuses. See the police statement of policy at this time in Asahi Shimbun

Moreover, these figures represent only on-campus disputes and police actions. Off campus, student activists began engaging police in numerous street confrontations starting in late 1967 with the so-called First Haneda Incident. There, students wearing helmets and armed with staves and rocks sought to prevent Prime Minister Sato's departure for Vietnam by force. The results were one dead, fifty-eight arrested, and over 600 injured. Similar confrontations subsequently took place, highlighted by the Second Haneda Incident (an attempt in November 1967 to prevent Sato from leaving to visit the United States); the efforts in January, 1968 to prevent the U.S. aircraft carrier Enterprise from docking at Sasebo; efforts to close Shinjuku Station in October 1968 as a measure to prevent trains from carrying U.S. fuel allegedly used in the war in Vietnam; and dozens of lesser ventures.

Both on-and off-campus, student protesters focused their opposition on a number of explicitly political targets: U.S. military occupation of Okinawa, the War in Indochina, U.S. military financing of university projects, the attendance of university courses by members of Japan's Self-Defense Forces, the crash of a U.S. military jet on one campus, and behind them all, the ultimate target of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.[60] This situation was similar to those of 1952-54 and 1960-63 when broader political questions formed the backdrop to the problem of university administration.

(evening edition), February 13, 1968, and Mainichi Shimbun (evening edition), February 13, 1968. On relations between police and the university community, see inter alia, Inoue Seiji, "Daigaku Jichi to Keisatsuken" [University Autonomy and Police Authority], 108-17; Okudaira Yasuhiro, "Daigaku to Keisatu" [Universities and Police], 63-70.

60 Mainichi Shimbun (ed.), Ampō to Zengakuren [The Security Treaty and Zengakuren].

Nonetheless, there were a number of explicitly administrative problems which arose at the same time, as student groups sought to raise a number of fundamental criticisms of the ongoing university system: proposed tuition raises; student control over dormitories and student unions; complaints about inadequate teaching, equipment and curriculum; opposition to various student punishments meted out; demands to limit the number of entering students; and calls to expand the role of the students in selecting university officials. All of these generated protest at one university or another.[61]

In several universities students had long been granted some significant role in such matters as selection of the university president, governance of student unions and dormitories, etc. But underlying the protests of the late 1960's was the demand for acknowledgement of students as a legitimate political force on campus, as more than the passive purchasers of educational services.[62]

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61 For a causal analysis of the earlier disputes see chart compiled in Jurisuto, No. 347 (June 1966), 46-51. Later, see the listings in Shuppan Asahi, September 13, 1968, Sandee Mainichi, February 20, 1969, Sankei Shimbun, July 3, 1968. For a related analysis which attempts to deal with the specific catalysts to student protest and the issue of university alienation, see Nagai Michio, Daigaku no Kanōsei [Possibilities for the Universities], 11-118. (Hereafter Kanosei)

62 This was in contrast to the existing theory of the student role, characterized as "eizobutsu," long dominant among university administrators and political conservatives, which holds that universities, like libraries and museums, are public institutions with certain fixed rules. The very use of these facilities by patrons (students, in the case of universities) implies a contractual acceptance of all institutional rules as they exist and no right to challenge the rules by which the institutions are governed. If they disagree in any way with the rules as initially formulated, they need not utilize the facilities. This concept has been expounded best as it relates to universities by Yamanaka Goro, JSP Member of the Lower House, and is drawn from the German administrative concept of "Anstalt." Yamanaka interview. See also the communication of the Minister of Education on January 16, 1963, "Gakusei no Higōhō Undō ni tsuite" [On the Illegal Activities of Students], in Daijin Danwa, 31.

The explicit and widespread student demands for increased participation and powers within the university posed a direct challenge to the ongoing system and complicated the issue of university administration. In earlier times the fundamental issue revolved around the balance of power between university administrators, faculty and the government. To these ongoing debates were added the pressures for explicit powers for students and student organizations.

From 1965 until early or mid-1968, the problem of government policy and U.S.-Japan relations remained more in the background, and it was the university issues which predominated. Consequently, the problem of university administration remained rather isolated from broader national political currents. It was primarily the government and members of the university who were involved while other explicitly political actors - such as the parties or non-academic pressure groups - showed little overt interest in the university problem, as it came to be called.

The Ministry of Education was primarily concerned with insuring a continuance of the "normal functioning of the universities." University administrators were explicitly concerned with the substantive requests for internal changes in administration that student groups were demanding, seeking on an ad hoc basis to delimit these as much as possible. Neither the government nor the university administrators at this time gave signs of being anxious to reconsider the recently buried problem of overall administrative relations between government and university and neither proposed any major structural changes in the governance of universities.

The government's light-handed approach in contrast to 1952-54 and 1960-63, when it sought so explicitly to strengthen its controls,

reflected the fact that it had "more important" matters on its collective mind in the area of foreign policy.[63] But it also reflected the rise to power within the Ministry of Education of the so-called modernist faction over the previously dominant moralist faction. The moralists had pushed for increased government control of universities, achieved through legislative power if necessary, even if this led to confrontation with the progressive camp or the academic community. The modernists were convinced that the university system could be made more responsive to the government without formal legislation dictating increased administrative powers to the Minister of Education.[64] They sought to achieve their political ends through cooperation with, and cooptation of, university administrations.

Thus, when a one-month strike at Waseda University protesting a proposed tuition raise occurred, Education Minister Nakamura stressed that the universities themselves and not the government should be expected to take actions to contain student protest.[65]

This approach was taken too in a speech made by the Minister of Education before the June 1966 meeting of the Association of National University Presidents. Citing the need for high quality administration to meet the threat posed by the student groups, he suggested that the presidents themselves should act on reforms from within their own campuses.[66]

As campus actions escalated, the Education Ministry continued to press the university administrators to initiate preventive measures by

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63 Fukashiro Junro, "Chian Toshite no Daigaku Rippō," [The University Law for Public Peace], 115-16. (Hereafter "Chian Toshite...")

64 Ibid. See also the history of cooptation of U.S. universities by the federal and state governments as seen by Ridgeway, The Closed Corporation, passim.

65 Daijin Danwa, 38

66 Ibid., 38-39.

themselves. It was not until June 1967 that the slightest hint came that the government might take action to alter the existing administrative relations if university administrators could not deal with the protests autonomously. Education Minister Kennoki stated that "despite the labors and efforts of university presidents, campus unrest has not been brought to a halt..." Consequently, he went on, "it is regrettable that new and improved devices will have to be added to the mechanics of university administration and management, starting with the organization and management of student guidance, in contrast to former times when you were more protective of students..."[67]

National university administrators, while not unresponsive to the pleas for a cooperative approach, continued to focus on a different dimension of the problem. A November 1966 report by a committee of national university presidents dealt far more with the problem of preserving their own authority in the face of demands for increased power to student self-government associations, than with the problem that was of primary concern to the government, i.e., curtailing protest actions.[68]

Arguing that it was desirable to respond to legitimate demands for student participation,[69] the administrators contended though that "self-government by students is not an inherent right which exists in isolation from the university which is essentially a teaching and research institution...Students who stress unlimited self-government," it warned, "simply do not understand the true nature of the university."[70] Elsewhere

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67 Ibid., 40

68 Tabata, Daigaku Mondai, I, 144-52 has the entire report of this committee.

69 Ibid., Part I, No. 1

70 Ibid., Part I, No. 1.

the report suggested that student participation be limited to the areas of sports and extracurricular activities and noted that in whatever areas students were allowed to govern themselves on campus, administration officials would be acting as overseers to insure that no administrative powers be allowed to devolve into the hands of students who were "administratively irresponsible."[71] But the report also declared that academic freedom demanded that no police be allowed on campus without their explicit consent, regardless of the scope of campus protests.

Furthermore, no tangible changes in the administrative structure of the universities were proposed to curtail protest activities. The report merely suggested that order was a precondition if the university was to fulfill its teaching and research functions.[72] Thus, from the standpoint of the Ministry of Education, the report was most unsatisfactory.

The off-campus student violence at the first and second Haneda incidents (October 8, November 12, 1967) and at Sasebo (January 17-23, 1968) brought strong protests from the Ministry of Education directed at university presidents,[73] who were urged to exert increased control over student activities and to provide sufficient "guidance" to prevent such activities. The government, however, still sought cooperation rather than confrontation. In a September 29, 1967 communication (tsuchi naikan) the Ministry, in an effort to limit campus protest activities on International Anti-War Day (October 21), reminded university presidents that "it is essential that political neutrality be

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71 Ibid., Part III, No. 1.

72 Ibid., Part I, No. 1.

73 Daijin Danwa, 41-45.

maintained within the universities," and urged strong measures of campus control so that "violent or political actions...will be prevented." Where such actions took place, severe discipline by university officials was urged. "All prudent measures must be taken in regard to [baneful] influences that could be exerted on [students]."[74]

Increasingly, however, the government began to raise the possibility that if university officials could not contain protest activities the government would consider altering the administrative structures of universities. On November 17, 1967, for example, Minister of Education Kennoki called a meeting of all Japanese university presidents to discuss the situation. While cooperation between university and government officials remained the dominant theme, he also hinted at what might happen should student actions persist: "...Widespread debate," he declared "is taking place throughout Japan over the need to strengthen administrative authority so as to improve student guidance and administrative efficiency...There are rumors concerning [the need to take] stern measures for the maintenance of public peace and order."[75]

A month later the suggestions became more blunt: "I hope that the universities themselves will carry out investigations aimed at establishing responsible procedures...before I am forced to take legal measures on the matter of university administration."[76]

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74 Communication is in Yamamoto, Kyōiku Gyōsei Gaisetsu [Outlines of Educational Administration], 149-52.

75 Daijin Danwa, 43.

76 Asahi Shimbun, December 2, 1967.

As if to further stiffen the collective backbone of university administrators, the Executive Council of the LDP demanded a cut in the national universities' budget, one of the first official party statements on the problem during this period. Ōkōchi Kazuo, President of Tokyo University and of the Association of National University Presidents, quickly declared his opposition to such a step, stating that university presidents were making constructive efforts to end protest activities. The Education Committee of the LDP, apparently with the support of the Education Ministry, agreed, suggesting explicitly that the university problem not be tied to budgetary considerations and the budgetary threat was dropped.[77] Apparently, however, it served its function as an appropriate political warning, for the formal position of the university administrators began stiffening appreciably.

A second interim report on the student problem was presented by the Association of National University Presidents in late 1967, the tone of which was far stronger than that of the 1966 report. Three major points were stressed: 1) students cannot be allowed to disregard existing regulations; 2) limits on campus activities must be maintained; and 3) all activities which "pamper" students must be corrected.[78] The final report of the committee on the student movement was totally silent on the questions of student self-government and student participation which had been of prime concern to them before.[79] Rather it

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77 Asahi Shimbun (evening edition), January 10, 1968; Asahi Shimbun, January 21, 1968.

78 Ibid.

79 "Saikin no Gakusei Undō ni Kansuru Iken" [Opinion on the Current Student Movement] in Tabata, Daigaku Mondai, I, 157-59; Nomura, Seisaku.., 186-87.

stressed the strong responsibilities for guiding student behavior of administrators and faculty who were directed to instill within students an overall respect for learning and scholarship rather than protest and violence. As a step in the direction of curtailing protests and presumably at warding off direct governmental action, the report also suggested that when university regulations were violated and it became impossible for officials of the university to handle the situation themselves, police should be called.

The fear of government action if protests persisted became increasingly obvious. In a statement parallel to that made earlier by Education Minister Kennoki, they declared, "We must explain to students that university regulations are self-imposed rules aimed at allowing the university to protect its own autonomy and that therefore respect for them is essential to the existence of the university. They must be made to realize that to ignore the internal regulations of the university and to disregard its rules is to follow a course of action whereby they themselves will destroy the autonomy of the university."[80]

Despite the university administration's efforts to placate the Ministry of Education, relations between the two cooled as increasing threats emerged from the government. Two incidents in April and May 1968 dimmed drastically any earlier chances for cooperation between the two sides.

On April 15, a similar meeting between Ministry of Education officials and national university officials was scheduled to take place the next month, and the Minister of Education called on the presidents

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80 Ibid.

of thirty-four universities to meet with him and other Ministry officials for a discussion on "the student problem and university autonomy." President Ōkōchi of Tokyo University refused to attend, testily declaring that "on basic university problems we will follow the usual procedure of determining opinions within Tokyo University and then having the president make these known to the Minister of Education."[81] Following Ōkōchi's lead, several other presidents refused to attend the meeting; those who attended were sharply critical of its having been called, and an explanation was demanded from Vice Minister Saito. On balance, little more than a cooling of relations between government and university administrators was accomplished.[82]

The second incident took place the following month when the Minister of Education called for a similar conference of all faculty chairmen of national universities. The plan was to deliver a formal opinion on the student movement, and this time the meeting was cancelled when the academics registered strong opposition on the grounds that the conference "could damage the independent character of the universities."[83]

In late June, 1968, the Ministry of Education made clear that it would no longer seek to rely on simple cooperation with university administrators but was willing to take steps of its own to curtail student protest activities. Solving the student problem, asserted Minister of Education Nadao,"is not the responsibility of a single university official (i.e., the university president); moreover, no one can assert that it is a problem which can be solved by the universities themselves...Great limits must inevitably be recognized on the

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[81] Asahi Shimbun, April 14, 1968.

[82] Asahi Shimbun (evening edition), April 15, 1969.

[83] Asahi Shimbun, May 3, 1968.

autonomy of universities and...emphasis on university autonomy must be kept in tune with contemporary realities in order to ensure the understanding and support of society in general."[84]

Tensions continued to grow and in November 1968 the Ministry of Education called on the Central Education Council, which was then in the process of an overall reexamination of the university system, to establish a special subcommittee to consider explicit governmental measures to meet the growing tide of protest. Submission of the problem to the Central Council in itself signalled a significant increase in government action and a decrease in reliance on university administrators but the terms of the Ministry of Education's reference were even clearer: "...we consider it necessary to reach a conclusion as soon as possible on the organizational and managerial measures which should be taken to secure the normal operation of Japan's university education."[85] The Council was ordered to consider "measures to terminate disturbances which are difficult for the universities themselves to resolve."[86]

From November 1968, when the Central Council was first brought into the picture, until April 30, 1969, when it issued its report, the Ministry of Education moved increasingly closer to a position of generating and supporting legislation which would bring about major changes in university-state relations. During the period the problem of protest escalated drastically. First at a number of individual universities student power victories were won. At Chuo University student protest, combined with faculty opposition, led to the resignation

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84 Daijin Danwa, 46.

85 In Yamamoto, Kyōiku Gyōsei Gaisetsu, 424.

86 Ibid.

of University President Masumoto and to a lowering and then a complete cancellation of a proposed tuition raise.[87]

At Nihon University, Japan's most factory-like "mass production university" with an enrollment of over 100,000, an administrative embezzlement of $5.5 million (some of which allegedly found its way into the political coffers of the LDP) led to campus protests from leftist student groups. These were met with attacks by the physical education club members and later a 400-man "private army" and the initially small protest grew into a major confrontation. Protesting students eventually forced President Furuta to attend several mass bargaining sessions, after one of which he "confessed" to several major errors and agreed to work for the accomplishment of various student demands, including the resignation of the trustees. On October 9 it was decided that the trustees would in fact resign, and although Furuta subsequently reneged on all his promises, the initial reaction of students and outsiders was to consider this a clearcut student victory.[88]

A third victory took place at Nagoya University in late November, 1968 where, after prolonged protest, students were granted the right to participate formally in a committee which would make screening and nominating judgments on the hiring of new faculty.[89]

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[87] Sankei Shimbun, February 15, 1968; Yomiuri Shimbun, February 18, 1968.

[88] On the Nichidai disturbances see, "Nichidai-Horobiri to Saisei no Kiro" [Nihon University -- Crossroads of Ruin and Rebirth], 4-13; On the collective bargaining session see "Nichidai Taishu Danko -- 1968.9.30" [Collective Bargaining at Nihon University -- September 30, 1968], 259-84.

[89] Dowsey, Zengakuren: Japan's Revolutionary Students, 112.

These student victories and many others like them served to refocus attention in a dramatic way on the question of student participation, particularly by the Minister of Education and it was an item to which specific attention was drawn for the Central Education Council's inquiry. Moreover, it began to arouse broader interest and participation by previously quiescent groups. Particular concern was expressed over the danger that such victories would feed the fires of protest throughout the country's campuses. As the President of the Japan Federation of Private Universities, Nagasawa Kunio, said at the time the Chuo tuition increase was voided:

> Chuo University seems to have acted rashly. If such a step becomes a precedent, the private universities will no longer be able to raise tuition and fees. While it would be nice if we could go without increasing tuition, in fact if tuition is not increased the private universities will run into greater financial difficulties only to accelerate the qualitative deterioration of private educational institutions.[90]

The increased concern over this problem of student power led also to a sharp rebuke by Ministry of Education officials when the decision was made at Nagoya University to give an increased role to students in the hiring process. "Direct participation by students in personnel deciions is not permitted by existing law...For Nagoya University to give students such rights is both excessive and illegal."[91]

The new Chuo University President specifically sought to negate any momentum that might have been felt by students. "Any student participation in the management of the university is out of the question," he declared, and in a comic anachronism he advised faculty members to step up homework assignments to keep students otherwise occupied.[92]

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90 Sankei Shimbun, February 15, 1968.

91 Asahi Shimbun, December 20, 1968, as in Dowsey, Zengakuren, 112.

92 Sankei Shimbun, February 15, 1968.

Prime Minister Sato himself was reported to have been visibly infuriated during a cabinet meeting following the mass bargaining session involving his personal friend, President Furuta. Such actions, he declared, had to be viewed in political rather than educational terms.[93]

Furthermore, a number of LDP members agreed to cooperate with university administrators at Nihon University and their support became a major factor in Furuta's eventual ability to refuse to carry through the terms of the administration-student agreement. This action also represented a substantial movement within the conservative party to take formal action against protesting students.[94]

Such student victories broadened the scope of involved political actors and put further pressures on the government to find a positive solution to the entire university problem; but even more significant in increasing the scope of the issue and the pressures on the Ministry of Education was the extension of student strikes to Tokyo University.

The Tokyo action began in January, 1968, escalated throughout the year and culminated in a nationally-televised two-day battle between students and police that resembled the siege of a mediaeval castle (in this case, Tokyo University's Yasuda Hall). Coming as it did in the midst of a host of other struggles, the strike at Todai focused attention to the university problem as could no other individual strike. The first modern university in Japan, Todai remained unquestionably the best university in the country in the minds of

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93 Yomiuri Shimbun (evening edition), October 1, 1968.

94 Asahi Shimbun (evening edition), October 1, 1968; Yomiuri Shimbun (evening edition), October 1, 1968; Mainichi Shimbun, October 3, 1968; Sankei Shimbun, October 3, 1968; Tokyo Shimbun, October 3, 1968.

most Japanese — both political actors and average citizens — and was the alma mater of the Prime Minister, the bulk of the cabinet, and scores of conservatives throughout the country.[95] Any expectations that the problem could be quietly resolved by the cooperative efforts of university administrators and the Ministry of Education were totally shattered by the experiences of Todai.[96]

The general political shock presented by an immobilized Tokyo University was further compounded on January 10, 1969, when students there won a major victory in the form of a "Note of Confirmation" whereby Acting President Kato agreed in principle to ten major categories of students demands, including the dismissal of two faculty members, an apology for "arbitrary" administrative actions, virtual amnesty for students, and an overall expansion of student powers.[97]

The reaction within the LDP was particularly strong to what was viewed as an unwarranted capitulation by university officials to student violence. A joint meeting of members of the LDP's Educational

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95 The prestige factor surrounding Tokyo University can be seen from the fact that a public opinion survey showed the President of Tokyo University to hold a prestige ranking just below that of the Prime Minister, ahead of members of the Cabinet, representatives of both Upper and Lower Houses, etc. See Nis[h]ihira S[h]igeki, "Sori Ika Kyūjūhachi no Shokugyō Saiten" [An Evaluation of 98 Occupational Positions Below the Prime Minister], 120-27. On the influence of Tokyo University (particularly the Department of Law graduates) see Shimizu Yoshihiro, Tōkyō Daigaku Hogakubu [The Tokyo University Law Department]. See also Yanaga, Big Business in Japanese Politics, 30-31.

96 On the Tōdai strike see especially Ōgose Sunao, Tōdai: Daigaku Funsō no Genten [Tokyo University: Origins of the University Disturbances]. The literature on the Tokyo disturbances is voluminous; for some of the more important works see the entries in Kokusai Bunka Shinkokai, Higher Education and the Student Problem in Japan, 185-97.

97 On this note and the overall relation to the Tōdai strike see Tōkyō Daigaku Shimbun, Daigaku Mondai, 106-118.

System Research Council and the LDP's Education Committee on January 12 declared that the Note of Confirmation went too far on several points and top party leaders[98] were urged to take official action. The Note was the subject of debate at the Cabinet meeting of January 20,[99] and was referred to the Jurisprudential Section of the Cabinet Legislative Bureau for an official legal opinion. Based on this, the Ministry of Education on February 8, strongly denounced the move, decrying, among other things, the fact that "'self-reflection' seems to be required only of university officials, while students are made to appear blameless for the disputes and their acts of violence and disruptions of order go unpunished, even though the Japanese people are far more concerned about the latter."[100]

The Ministry also expressed particular criticism of the possible influence this note would have on other universities:[101] "If the university authorities do not punish the occupation of buildings, blockades, bombings, confinements, violence, and injury on the grounds that 'there were serious mistakes made by university officials'... this will adversely affect the settlement of future campus disputes and it is a very regrettable attitude for the university to take."[102]

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98 Tōkyō Shimbun, January 14, 1969.

99 Yomiuri Shimbun (evening edition), January 21, 1969.

100 "Tokyo Daigaku Nana Gakubu Shūkai (Nana Gakubu "Danko") ni okeru Kakuninsho ni tsuite" [On the Note of Confirmation regarding the Seven Departments Conference (the Seven Departments of Collective Bargaining)"], text is in Nihon Kenzai Shimbun, February 9, 1969, Sec. 1, para. 2.

101 Ibid., Sec. 1 para 5.

102 Ibid., Sec. II, para.1, clause 1.

Stress was laid on the need to curtail, not expand, the rights of student self-government associations,[103] and, finally, the Ministry noted that "to grant the right of collective bargaining to student self-government associations...is to recognize their position as participants in the administration and management of the university...This is a serious problem which will result in radical revisions in the present concepts of the university, the university system, and university autonomy..."[104]

The increase in general attention to the university problem that took place at this time was remarkable. Journalist Fukashiro Junrō notes somewhat plaintively how he sought in vain for policy statements by the major political parties and major political groups during the summer and fall of 1968.[105] The issue had somehow remained "non-political" to the extent that most of the normally involved political bodies had made no formal comments on the subject. By late fall, however, the situation had changed dramatically.

In November the police began to issue monthly statistics on the number of university conflicts that had occurred or were still in progress. In November and December 1968 all five of the major political parties put forth tentative plans, proposals, or recommendations on the university problem. So too did the Japan Science Council, the Japan Teacher's Union, the Japan Federation of Employer's Association,

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[103] Ibid., Sec. II, para. 1, item 3.

[104] Ibid., Sec. II, para. 2, item 3.

[105] Fukashiro Junrō, "Daigaku Mondai ni tai suru Seitō no Taishitsu" [The Predispositions of the Political Parties Towards the University Problem], 6-7.

and dozens of other associations with more or less political relevance to universities.[106]

In addition, literature on the subject proliferated. One bibliographer found the figures in Table 5-1 for books and articles on the university and the student problems published for the period 1965-1969:

Table 5-1

PUBLICATIONS ON THE UNIVERSITY AND STUDENT PROBLEM

Year	Books	Articles, etc.	Total
1965	27	229	256
1966	41	494	535
1967	25	401	426
1968	89	928	1017
1969	275	1746	2021

Source: Kitamura Kazuyuki, Daigaku, Gakusei Mondai Bonmoku mokuroku (Tokyo, IDE, 1971)

Allowing for some lag-time in publication, the tremendous jump in general interest in 1968-69 is clear.

As the interests of these many actors began to focus on the university problem, the entire political complexion of the problem expanded well beyond the original two-sided battle between student protesters on the one hand and the shaky search for some cooperative arrangement between the Ministry of Education and university administrators on the other. And as more actors entered the picture, the problem took on the more classic dimensions of a full-fledged camp struggle.

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106 These various plans are contained in most document collections. See Yamamoto, Kyōiku Gyōsei Gaisetsu [Outlines of Educational Administration], Tabata, Daigaku Mondai and Nomura, Seisaku.., Also, Daigaku Mondai Kenkyūkai, Nihon no Daigaku Mondai I, II [The Japanese University Problem, I and II]

However, while in the earlier confrontations over problems of university administration a reasonably united progressive camp was joined by most members of the academic community in opposition to government efforts to alter the existing structures of university governance, in 1968-69 this unity dissolved in the face of incompatible positions on the various sub-issues. No longer was the issue defined solely in terms of government intervention in university governance or not. Rather the issues of student participation, and the tactics of student protest were interwoven with the broader concern in ways which eliminated the earlier bipolar patterns. During late 1968 and until the promulgation of the Law of Provisional Measures Concerning University Administration in August, 1969, these three questions continued to be interlocked in ways that prevented the re-emergence of the progressive-academic coalition that had been successful in blocking past government efforts at legislating changes in the university system.

Table 5-2 indicates in brief outline form the positions of the major political actors at this time concerning the three issues. It makes clear that although there was rather widespread agreement that students should have some voice in the running of the university, the scope of this voice and the means whereby it would be heard were subject to widespread disagreement. Only a few of the most left-wing groups took the position that students, as integral members of the university community, should have something approaching an equal voice on all university matters. Slightly more moderate were suggestions that decisions be established democratically within the framework of the individual universities, generally, however, with the stress on increased formal participation.

Table 5-2

POSITIONS OF MAJOR ACTORS ON THE UNIVERSITY PROBLEM, 1969

	Participation	Strikes, Barricades Violence	Government Intervention
Zenkyoto New Left	maximize (varying demands on different campuses)	justified in face of reactionary govt. & university system	opposed
Japan Socialist Party	must plan student participation re. management & administration of university with a focus on election of president and other personnel matters, curriculum, budget, self-government of student unions, dormitories and discipline problems	must recognize fundamental rights of students, including collective actions and bargaining	opposed
Japan Teacher's Union	maximize participation within framework suitable to each univ.; preserve the freedom of democratic actions of university self-government associations	violence is only the result of undemocratic nature of the university and society	opposed
Japan Science Council	must be able to participate in fixed ways with each university deciding its own system	strikes abuse right of students to receive an education but must see violence in the context of government intervention	opposed
Minsei Students & Communist Party	establish an all university conference, including students, to govern the university	present violence is anti-revolutionary action of Trotskyites; encourages repression	opposed

Table 5-2 (Contd.)

Association of National University Presidents	self-government not an unlimited student right -- participation in limited unspecified areas	violence cannot be permitted under any circumstances	opposed
League of Private Universities of Japan	essential to have student participation but not in personnel, finance or educational matters	students who engage in politically motivated group violence must be strongly criticized	(no public statement; many members privately favored)
Association of Private Colleges of Japan	hear student opinion but not in finance, education or personnel	cannot permit group violence or mass bargaining	(no public statement but membership favored)
LDP	true opinion of students should be reflected -- no accession to demands of minority students -- no rights re. personnel, finance, exams or curriculum	violent acts disregard law and destroy order; must prohibit anti-social acts which would overthrow democracy and subvert academic freedom and university autonomy	favored
Business:			
JCED	cannot deny student opinion if reflected within context of each university but cut power of student self-government associations	cannot support violence regardless of motives	favored
JFEA	students are members of community, not [illegible], opinions should be heard, but no bargaining	no mass bargaining, student violence is general problem of law and order beyond the university	favored

University administrators, the LDP and the business community on the other hand explicitly rejected any such changes. Although rarely asserting that students should be merely the docile recipients of education, they continued to maintain that broad student opinion should be heard, but that formal participation should be minimal and/or limited to areas exclusive of personnel, finance, and curriculum.

On student tactics the division was also rather clearcut. Even some groups generally regarded as progressive were sharply opposed to existing levels of violence with the Minsei student groups and the Communist Party explicitly denouncing those who engaged in such activities as counter-revolutionary Trotskyites.

Thus, on these two issues which were so intimately related to the overall question of the entire problem of university-government relations, the position of the main members of the conservative camp were, despite some shadings of hue, essentially unified while in contrast, the progressive camp and the academic community were split. Most significantly, organizations of university administrators which had on earlier occasions been quite close to the progressive camp in their positions were at this time in close agreement with the conservatives on the two major component issues of student participation and student tactics.

On the principle of governmental intervention the split was different. There the progressives were uniformly opposed to any legislative actions that would increase governmental powers to intervene in university disputes. Moreover, national university administrators collectively adhered to this position.[107] The organizations of

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[107] At one point 90 university administrators issued a declaration of opposition to the proposal. See Asahi Shimbun, July 11, 1969.

private university officials, meanwhile, remained officially uncommitted although many individual members privately favored intervention. The split among progressives and the position of university administrators on the other issues, however, left the advocates of intervention in a comparatively strong position. What other alternatives, they could ask, would allow for an end to the continuance of violence and for the retention of limits on the political power of students that were otherwise favored.

Moreover, the position of the conservatives was being bolstered by an increasingly restive public opinion which while not actively supportive of government intervention could also see no alternative. A poll taken by Asahi Shimbun in May 1969 showed that while only 25 percent favored a law granting the government intervention power, an additional 28 percent, while not approving this expansion of power in principle, felt there was no alternative under the circumstances.[108]

The report of the Central Education Council's 24th Subcommittee managed to blend together the three component issues in a way that fixed the impression that there could be no alternative to granting the government the power to intervene in university disturbances.

On the specific matter of student participation the report made the explicit distinction between "hearing student views" and allowing for student "representation," with only the former being advocated. University officials were called upon to pay due regard to student attitudes, but the student was seen as a "learner" who should "trust the scholarly attainments of his teachers and follow the educational program

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[108] Asahi Shimbun, May 29-30, 1969, as in Daigaku Mondai Kenkyūkai, Nihon no Daigaku Mondai, II, 23.

and guidance of the university."[109] The report also declared that "it is not appropriate in view of the status of students to recognize any system which would make it possible for them to participate in any final decision-making bodies or which would enable them to reject the decisions of such bodies."

From this perspective student self-governing associations which had often been the organizational mainstay of campus political activities came in for strong criticism. Of particular concern was the system of automatic student membership in the association of the faculty to which a student was admitted. Membership should be made voluntary, advised the report, and where it was not "there should be severe restrictions on the areas of [their] activities so as not to infringe on the fundamental freedom of its individual members."

On the question of protests and violence too, the report took a position advocated by most conservative groups and by university administrators. "...At the center of the present university disturbances there are groups of politically motivated students more interested in the destruction of the existing [social and political] order than in the reform of conditions within the universities. To counter them measures must be considered which will eliminate violence completely and which will protect the order of the university."

With such positions on students, student participation and violence so clearly marked out, the concluding section delineating the "responsibilities of the universities and the government in terminating present

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[109] Report is produced in Nomura, Seisaku, 84-97; Yamamoto, Kyōiku Gyōsei Gaisetsu [Outlines of Educational Administration], 425-39; Tabata, Daigaku Mondai, II, 20-32; Daigaku Mondai Kenkyūkai, Nihon no Daigaku Mondai, II, 35-43.

university disturbances" was something of an anticlimax. When serious disturbances break out the universities were urged "to concentrate decisionmaking and executive powers in the hands of suitable university administrators." The government was urged to do two things: (1) "to advise university officials of the steps they must take... when disturbances occur" and (2) "to take steps to enable the university's founders to carry out the temporary closing of the school for a period of up to six months..."

This section of the report was additionally easy to anticipate in view of the fact that during the entire period when the subcommittee of the Central Council was deliberating, the conservative camp in general had been recommending, and the government had in fact been taking, a number of steps to do precisely what the committee report was recommending. The Japan Federation of Employers' Association had made precisely the same proposal on closing schools affected by prolonged violence in February. And numerous groups within the LDP were pushing for strong government powers to act in such cases. In particular, the LDP's Education Research Council in early March[110] and Nishioka Takeo and Kono Yōhei of the LDP's Specialists Committee on the Educational System in early April,[111] called for a variety of measures to strengthen university administrators and the government, as well as to cut back the powers of the students self-governing associations.

This growing pressure was additionally bolstered by a number of concrete government steps. On November 16, the Education Ministry took

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110 Sankei Shimbun, March 6, 1969.

111 Yomiuri Shimbun, April 12, 1969.

the rather unusual step of issuing a direct communication to the administrators of four national universities undergoing student strikes, ordering them to take steps to resume normal operations. On December 23, the government cancelled the spring entrance examinations for Tokyo University and three weeks later Todai administrators and government officials called in the police to end the student strike. Then, on April 21, one week before the final report of the Central Council, the Ministry of Education issued a communication entitled, "On the Maintenance of Normal Order Within the Universities,"[112] in which administrators were ordered among other things to "cooperate positively with police authorities in taking rapid and appropriate measures to maintain order on campus" when violence appeared likely. A number of specific student activities conducive to violence were expressly banned and prosecution was ordered for faculty engaging in illegal activities.

Thus the general approach of strengthening the powers of university administrators and the Ministry of Education became clearly delineated and the government was determined to introduce legislation to curtail the protest activities during that session of the legislature. The only delay was the wait for the final report of the Central Council which would provide additional legitimation and some legislative specifics. By the end of April the questions remaining concerned only the specific form of the legislation and whether or not the proposed actions could be successfully legislated. The first problem revolved primarily around arrangements within the conservative camp. The concern and confidence of the conservatives on this matter is particularly noteworthy in the fact

112 Text is in Nomura, Seisaku..,99-100.

that contrary to normal practice, the government proposed its legislation with virtually no attempt to insure a conservative consensus on specifics. In fact, as a number of political journalists have noted, the Ministry of Education draft of the bill was made available to Diet members only two days before it was actually submitted.[113] Furthermore, the bill was introduced in an extended session of the legislature during which two other major bills (on defense and health) were to be considered, whereas in previous situations of this sort the government had always sought to keep controversial legislation chronologically separate.[114]

The final law submitted, and passed on August 7, 1969, was surprisingly mild in view of some of the demands made by the more "hawkish" conservatives inside and outside the government. Nevertheless, even though it was a temporary bill granting powers that were to last only five years, the powers it granted were substantial. The university president was declared "the person chiefly responsible for his institution" and he was required to "seek the normal functioning of his university." In the event of any disturbance he was to "demonstrate leadership and unite the entire staff of the university in seeking a settlement and to determine the principles and measures for its resolution..."[115] He was also given powers to initiate changes in administrative structures, including the power to suspend all or part of the university's functions for up to nine months.

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113 Fukashiro, "Chian Toshite..." 113.

114 In fact, of course, bringing forth the bill at such a time was politically advantageous. With university administrators almost uniformly committed to the conservative position on curbing students, with public opinion growing more restive and with even the Communist Party denouncing any continuance of student violence, opposition strong enough to stop the bill was highly unlikely. Moreover, even if the bill did not pass, the government could easily shift the blame for any continued student violence onto those opposition parties which blocked their attempted bill. Ibid., 114-15.

115 The text is in Tabata, Daigaku Mondai, I, 239-44.

The more fundamental concentration of powers went not to university presidents or administrators, however, but to the Ministry of Education. All disputes were to be reported to him and he in turn was "to give to the president...the necessary advice on measures that shall be adopted to deal with the dispute..." In making the administrative alterations noted above, the president was required to consult with the Minister of Education who would make all personnel appointments involved. Most fundamentally, however, the Minister was given the power to suspend all education and research functions in universities engaged in disputes of over nine months duration, or in institutions where a dispute of six months duration recurs within one year after an earlier settlement.

The passage and promulgation of this law thus marked the first time since the earliest reforms of the Occupation that major legislation affecting the overall governance of the university system was successfully enacted. In one sense it may be seen as the culmination of a long government drive to significantly centralize powers within the university and to sharply alter the balance of power between the universities and the government. Stalled under the late Occupation, in 1954 and in 1963, the government finally succeeded with the passage of this law in accomplishing much of what it had earlier set out to do. Certainly many of Japan's progressive scholars have offered such an interpretation.[116]

The question naturally arises as to why the government succeeded in 1969 when it was unsuccessful in earlier tries. One factor unquestionably was that the university protests in the late 1960s far outstripped

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[116] Nomura, Seisaku., Nagai Kenichi, Kenpō to Kyōiku Kihonken [The Constitution and Bases of Authority in Education], inter alia.

anything which had preceded them in terms of scope, violence and duration taking on far more significance for the overall conservative-progressive struggle than any other postwar issue involving higher education, and second only in overall significance perhaps to the struggle over the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in 1960. Thus the government was willing to risk even greater political capital to end these protests than it had in earlier cases, particularly as those early protest actions seemed to be withering partially of their own accord. This factor also had its effect on non-governmental actors.

The ability of the catchphrase "university autonomy" to mobilize the entire academic community and the more liberal segments of public opinion was similarly far more restricted given these actions of violence under the auspices of autonomy. It was also a less successful slogan than it had earlier been because of the influence of student power issues into the autonomy matrix so that even academic liberals began to question its relevance.[117]

The most important factor in the government's legislative success, however, would appear to envelop and transcend many of these points. The most politically relevant point would seem to have been the breakdown in the unity of opposition forces which had existed in earlier situations. The cohesive opposition to government action shown during the 1950s and the early 1960s was in shambles by the latter part of the decade. The phenomenal electoral success of Komeito, which party fit into neither the conservative nor the progressive camps seemed to presage a popular concern for some new voice in electoral politics. The new left as

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117 E.g., see Nagai Michio, Kanōsei, 27-28.

epitomized primarily by Zenkyoto and other student groups rejected the leadership of the existing progressive organs while the old left was sharply divided not only over that problem but over its own internal ideology. Within the Socialist Party, for example, there was sharp division over whether it should move "right" or "left" and the Democratic Socialist Party, meanwhile, showed increasing signs of becoming more conservative than some elements in the LDP. All of this left little grounds for a repetition of earlier unified actions by the non-governmental political parties which had prevented administrative changes.

Beyond this, university administrators, while publicly opposed to any government legislation were in many cases privately in favor of actions which would check student violence and prevent serious student participation in university governance. Any protests the administrators and their associations raised against the government action therefore had a rather hollow ring. Finally the media, and the public opinion shaped by it, grew increasingly favorable to government action, even if it posed a threat to university autonomy. An organized conservative camp therefore had numerous peripheral allies with which to face a sharply divided opposition.

Comparing conservative success in 1969 to earlier failures serves to provide several insights. At the same time, such an analysis easily serves to diminish the parallels among all cases of university administration when seen in comparison with other higher educational issues. It would be well therefore to highlight the major similarities among all the cases of university administration investigated.

First of all, the fact that the unity of the progressive camp broke down in the 1969 case should not obscure the strongly bipolar pattern of ideological perception, organizational commitment, and policymaking

processes common to all issues of university administration. In all cases the broad, affective, non-divisible nature of the issues fixed progressives and conservatives on opposite sides of the Rubicon. Correlatively, each side was quite willing to make reasonably heavy commitments to sustain its position on the issue, and each was willing to take a rather hard line in the advocacy of its position.

Secondly, the focal point of the policymaking processes most relevant to the issues of university administration was almost always the Diet. That is, attempts to secure or to block some legislative proposal were the dominant mode of policymaking. This mode itself, it must be noted, fostered a highly antagonistic process with little room for, and few attempts at, compromise. Moreover, the broad political climate within which the specific issues arose was tense with a variety of highly affective issues, further igniting the passions of camp conflict.

These commonalities in the area of university administration will take on added significance in contrast to policymaking in the areas of enrollment and specialization and institutional differentiation. In both these areas, the kind of conflict that marked university administration as an issue will be shown to have been less dominant, the legislative focus will be shown to have been almost totally absent, and policy itself will be shown to have had a far more evolutionary nature. Again, however, significant differences will be shown to have existed within these two fields as well.

Chapter Six

INCREMENTAL POLICYMAKING: ENROLLMENT EXPANSION

If policymaking in university administration has been dominated by highly ideological confrontation politics, university enrollment expansion represents something of a polar opposite. Enrollment expansion has been an issue lacking in major ideological overtones; it has never been perceived as specific in its impact; despite the breadth of its cumulative impact, the issue has been almost infinitely disaggregable in actual practice. Nor has it been an issue of high salience to major political actors. As a result, the policymaking process involved in expansion has been highly incremental, and almost totally lacking in controversy. Further, it is in this area of expansion that the bureaucratic influence over policymaking analyzed in Chapter Four has exerted perhaps its most significant influence.

One of the most elemental aims of the Americans during the Occupation had been to insure the greatest possible opportunities for individual students to attend institutions of higher education, and despite the limitations on this policy noted in Chapter Three, the most basic thrust of the Occupation in higher education was clearly in the direction of expanding opportunities. This has been accelerated since then, with the result that whereas in 1940 only 4.0 percent, and in 1952 only 7.5 percent, of the higher educational age cohort was attending some institution of higher education, by 1974 this figure had skyrocketed to about 25 percent,[1] among the highest in the world; and extrapolating from the expansion rate

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[1] Mombushō, ed., Wagakuni no Kyōiku no Ayumi to Kongo no Kadai: Chūō Kyōiku Shingikai Chūkan Hōkoku [The course of Japanese Education and Future Problems: Interim Report of the Central Education Council], 380. Hereafter CKS '69.

since 1956, 47.2 percent of the age group will be entering universities or junior colleges in 1980.[2] Nowhere, however, is there evidence to indicate that the continued expansion in the period since the end of the Occupation was the result of some conscious choice by Japanese executives, legislators, or administrators to encourage expansion in enrollment such as took place in the U.S. with the Morrill Act or in Britain at the time of the Robbins Report.[3] And nowhere is there evidence suggesting any of the bipolar controversy surrounding policy in administration. Instead, one faces a policy area similar to those noted earlier toward blacks in the U.S. during the bulk of the post-Civil War era, towards industrial pollution and toward Americans living in Canada as a means of avoiding participation in the war in Viet-Nam: namely, a policy which is the consequence of a series of reactions to, or a policy of non-interference with, a visible, significant and unidirectional evolutionary social trend. As was noted above, the term policy makes real sense only when such activities are considered in the same way as actions and consequences arising from the more conscious and active manipulation of events that is generally associated with the term. Lack of a formal plan should not be equated with lack of interest by the Japanese government in enrollment expansion however, nor should it be taken to infer that government actions have been in no way responsible for the expansion. In fact the actions of the government have been consistently in support of the expansionary trend, and its

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[2] Mombusho, "Kongo ni okeru Gakko Kyōiku no Sōgōteki na Kakuju Seibi no Kihonteki Shisaku ni tsuite [Concerning Basic Measures for the Overall Expansion and Consolidation of Future School Education] Hereafter CKS '71.

[3] On the Robbins Report see Richard Layard, John King and Claus Moser, The Impact of Robbins.

apparent lack of formal consideration of the problem of expansion has in fact worked in subtle ways to bolster expansion. Consequently one is clearly free to speak of a policy of enrollment expansion in Japanese higher education during the period since the Occupation.

In fact the policy has been one in which the government has encouraged maximum expansion thereby satisfying parental pressure for greater educational opportunities and providing business and industry with a more educated talent pool from which to choose its employees. On the other hand, the government has encouraged expansion in a manner which minimizes the economic and political costs to itself: expansion in numbers without concomitant expansion in the level of government funding and without any substantial disruption of the present social structure or the dominant values of the country from which it benefits. In short the explanation for the expansion which has occurred must recognize the conservative government's indirect manipulation of expansion, its reliance on extant social norms to support such a policy, and the political benefits it draws from the policy as carried out.

To begin with the indirect government encouragement of expansion it is necessary to examine two key factors: chartering of universities and non-enforcement of minimum legal standards for university conditions.

Chartering of Universities

The Minister of Education has the ultimate responsibility for granting or not granting charters to establish universities, and no university may be established without a charter.[4] In practice, charters are granted on the basis of investigations of university conditions by the Ministry's Council

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[4]Mombushō, Mombu Hōrei Yōran 1971 [Handbook of Education Ministry Laws and Ordinances]. (Hereafter Mombu Hōrei.)

for University Chartering, and in the case of private universities, additional investigations into the fiscal standing of the "legal person" establishing the university by the Ministry's Council on Private Universities.[5] Thus all applicants are subjected to at least one, and in most cases two, screenings before the Minister of Education makes the formal decision on whether to grant a charter.

An analysis of Figure 6-1 shows the close relationship in the fluctuations between the granting of new charters and expansion in the number of students. They reveal as well that there has been a far from uniform rate of expansion in either, with the major expansion of the post-Occupation period starting in 1958 and increasing sharply during the decade of the 1960's. During the period from 1953-61 there was some, but relatively little, growth in either category. This hiatus represents an initial (and prior to the massive student protests of 1968-69, the only) attempt by the Ministry of Education to give high level concern to cutting back expansion within higher education by making more difficult the process of establishing and chartering a university.

The Ministry of Education's concern was in part a plea for some period of stability following the tremendous reorganization under the Occupation. Further, it must also be recalled that this change came at a time when Japan was faced with serious social and economic changes in numerous other fields. The Ministry of Education first sought informally to check the growth in the number of four-year universities (two-year junior colleges were allowed to continue expanding at a rapid rate) but in August 1955

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[5] Mombushō, Setchi Shinsa Yōran [Handbook for Chartering Investigations]. Interview Oyama Yoshitoshi, former member of Council on University Chartering, July 15, 1971.

Figure 6-1

NUMBER OF NEW UNIVERSITIES ESTABLISHED ANNUALLY AND ANNUAL INCREASE IN NUMBER OF UNIVERSITY STUDENTS AS % OF PREVIOUS YEAR'S TOTAL



Source: Sōrifu, Nihon Tōkei Nenkan [Japan Statistical Yearbook]

Minister of Education Matsumura called for a specific set of actions aimed at raising the standards for establishing new universities.[6] By early 1956 the Ministry had already taken the step of eliminating conditional charter approval and in June of that year it announced a formal policy of granting no new charters at all, a policy to be implemented through a formal tightening of requirements and more stringent investigations by the Council on University Chartering.[7]

These attempts proved, however, to be short-lived. Opposition to the policy was rather fast in developing within the top levels of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, coming notably from then Chief Secretary of the LDP Kishi, Executive Director Ishii, Party Vice President Ono, and even Parliamentary Vice Minister of Education Takeo. Their opposition rested primarily on demands for specific, politically-based exceptions to the policy of no new charters so as to allow groups within their constituencies to establish new universities or to upgrade their high schools or junior colleges. The LDP threatened to take budgetry action if the policy remained inflexible to these political needs of the party.[8] In October 1956 the standards for chartering were changed, making the physical and course requirements even more lenient than they had been.[9]

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[6] Mainichi Shimbun, August 13, 1955, and Sangyō Keizai Shimbun, September 15, 1955 (evening edition).

[7] Ministry of Education, Education in Japan, 1955, 87; Ibid., 1956, 58; Asahi Shimbun, September 9, 1956.

[8] Ibid.

[9] The actual standards established are in Mombu Hōrei (1957), 96-109. The original standards can be found in pre-1956 editions of the same, or in Daigaku Kijun Kyōkai, Daigaku Kijun Kyōkai Kijunshū [Collection of the Standards of the University Accreditation Association] 1-7. On the comparison and significance of the two different sets of standards see, Kaigo Tokiomi and Terasaki Masao, Daigaku Kyōiku [University Education], 543-47; and Terasaki Masao, "Daigaku Setchi Kijun" [The University Chartering Standards], 39-44.

Continual compromise between the LDP and the Ministry allowed increasing numbers of new university charters to be granted every year even while the Ministry of Education and the Council sought to constrain the dimensions of the increase through the latter's investigations. By 1961, however, in part as a response to the postwar "baby boom" and in part to assuage business fears of a shortage of skilled labor, examinations became cursory at best. When a university did not really measure up to the minimal standards the Council would frequently recommend that a charter be granted anyhow.[10] The written standards themselves thus became meaningless. As Osawa has complained, "Despite the fact that these are stated to be the 'minimum standards,' they are applied as if they were desirable standards or maximum standards."[11]

The natural expansion resulting from the virtual elimination of all official standards was accelerated when, in 1962, revisions were made in the basis for funding the Private School Promotion Association so as implicitly to encourage the creation of more private universities. In the same year the Ministry dropped its prior requirement that university authorities consult with the Minister of Education when seeking to change the number of students or to create new departments,[12] and, by 1966, the attitude toward maintaining strong control over increases in the number of universities had become virtually nonexistent so that even members of the University Chartering Council seemed willing to concede that anyone able to hire an

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[10] Interview Ōyama.

[11] Ōsawa Masaru, Nihon no Shiritsu Daigaku [Private Universities in Japan], 155.

[12] WP '64, 37-38; Ōsawa, Nihon no Shiritsu Daigaku, 128-29.

architect to draw up building plans and to borrow sufficient volumes from a friend or from a neighboring library could acquire a charter.[13]

The results of this more casual attitude toward expansion and chartering can be seen in Table 6-1. The change in the percent of charter requests that were approved shows a sharp rise in the success rates in the 1960's, a change reflective of the government's increased willingness to grant new charters. The granting of new charters, in turn, has contributed to the major expansion of enrollment that has taken place.

Non-enforcement of Minimum Legal Standards

A second factor has also been of great aid in the expansion. As already implied, the bureaucracy has seen fit to ignore violations of the written standards for chartering; it has also done so in regard to those for subsequent operation. University expansion has become far easier as a result of this lack of enforced minimum standards. The University Chartering Standards set forth a number of explicit minimum criteria for universities which, according to Article 1 must be met or exceeded at the time a charter is issued, after which continual improvements in the university are expected to bring it above even these levels. The government, by this law, has the power to revoke charters from non-complying institutions; however, at no time has the Ministry of Education seen fit to enforce them in those established universities which have either failed to correct deficiencies found at the time of chartering examination or which have fallen below their inaugural standards.

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[13]Sasaki Yoshio, "Daigaku Setchi Shinsa ni tasusawatte Omou" [Participating in and Thinking About Investigations for University Chartering], 10-15.

TABLE 6-1 - APPLICATIONS FOR UNIVERSITY CHARTERS

Year	Number of Applications A	Number Approved B	B/A
1949	9	5	56%
1950	12	6	50%
1961	8	3	38%
1962	10	10	100%
1963	13	10	77%
1964	24	21	87%
1965	30	25	83%
1966	31	28	90%
1967	37	23	62%
1968	14	11	78%
1969	6	3	50%
1970	5	4	80%

Source: Unpublished data supplied by the Ministry of Education, University and Science Division.

There is a twofold deviation regarding these standards. First of all, the standards are based on the so-called "student quota," the number of students per faculty or department theoretically allowed by the Ministry of Education. However, this quota bears little relationship to the number of actual entrants. A number of smaller "miniversities" find it completely impossible to attract enough students to meet this quota.[14] On the other hand, a great number of institutions exceed their quota by egregious percents.[15] One study of sixty-nine major institutions, for example, showed all but one exceeding its quota. Of these, forty-seven were in excess by more than fifty percent, and twenty-one by more than 100 percent.[16] This situation, known and condoned by the Ministry of Education, has been a major factor in continued expansion. It means as well that any standards based on such quotas are extremely diluted to begin with.

Nevertheless, even the diluted standards have not been adhered to. For example, Article 12 of the Standards requires that no more than one-half of the faculty members in any university faculty (gakubu) can be part-time. Yet a survey of thirty-four universities for which data was available showed that sixteen of these had more part-time than full-time faculty

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[14] Ōgata Ken, "Zokuzoku Tōsan o Yosō sarete iru Abunai Daigaku" [Precarious Universities: Bankruptcies Increasingly Expected], 139-42.

[15] Mombushō, Zenkoku Daigaku Ichiran [Japanese Universities at a Glance] (hereafter ZKI) gives entry quotas by faculty, while Mombushō, Mombu Nenpō [Yearbook of the Ministry of Education] (Hereafter Mombu Nenpō, year.) gives actual entrants. It is quite possible according to other figures that even the Mombu Nenpo figures on entrants is below the actual number of entrants. Publishers of the university entry manual Keisetsu Jidai [Study Time] (Tokyo: Obunsha, annual) maintain that their surveys indicate this is so.

[16] Hōsei Daigaku Daiichi, Daini, Keizai Gakubu Ōgata Zeminaaru, Shiritsu Daigaku no Kenkyū Jōken Oyobi Zaisei, Vol. 2 [Research conditions and Finance in Private Universities], 94-95. (Hereafter Ōgata Seminar, 1970.)

members, and thus placed the entire university in clear violation of these provisions. Where statistics were broken down further they showed that many of the remaining eighteen had individual faculties which exceeded the legal limit of fifty percent part-time.[17] Thus adherence to the rules on the number of part-time faculty is almost nonexistent.

Article 37, Clause 4 of the University Chartering Standards[18] provides that libraries shall have seats for at least five percent of the students, i.e., no more than twenty students per library seat, and yet a recent survey of forty universities showed nearly half to be in violation. In one of the most blatant violations there were 115 students per library seat.[19]

Other legal standards have remained similarly unenforced by the government with the result that it has become rather easy for universities to be established, to remain in operation, and to expand their student enrollments, thereby contributing immensely to the overall growth in the number of university students in Japan.

From these two dimensions, chartering and non-enforcement of minimum standards, it becomes clear that bureaucratic decisions and non-decisions in a cumulative way sustained and greatly accelerated the trend toward rapid expansion within higher education. Normally, one might expect that a policy of expansion relying on even such incremental steps as these by the government would require major financial and administrative outlays thereby generating resistence from other sectors of the government concerned about their comparative losses due to such major reallocations. In

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[17] Ibid.

[18] Mombu Hōrei, 184.

[19] Ogata Seminar, 79-80.

the Japanese case however concerns were greatly minimized due to a reliance on private universities, and the actual funding policies of the government making even easier the incrementalist enlargement of the universities.

Reliance on Private Universities

From an administrative standpoint, there are three types of universities in Japan: those under the direct control of the national government; those under the control of local governments, such as prefectures or cities; and finally those under private administration. The great bulk of the expansion that has taken place since the end of the Occupation has come in the privately administered universities.

In 1952 there were a total of 221 four-year universities in Japan. Of these, seventy-two (thirty-three percent) were national, thirty-three (fifteen percent) were local public, and 116 (fifty-two percent) were private.[20] In 1972 the total was up to 399 universities, representing an increase of 178 institutions. This gain came almost exclusively through an increase in new private universities. From 1953 to 1972, 175 new private universities were chartered so that in 1972 there were seventy-six national universities (nineteen percent), thirty-two local public universities (eight percent) and 291 private universities (seventy-three percent).[21] In terms of student enrollment, a similar shift can be seen. Even though there has been a significant increase in the absolute number of students enrolled in public universities, increases there have been far less significant than those in the private institutions. In 1952 thirty-

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[20] ZKI

[21] *Ibid.*

nine percent of the total university student body was enrolled in national universities; four percent in local public universities; and fifty-seven percent in private institutions. By 1972 the composition had shifted dramatically so that nearly eighty percent of the student body was enrolling in private universities.[22]

From these figures it becomes clear that the vast bulk of the increase in opportunity to attend universities was made possible through increases in the private sphere, not through expansion of institutions under national or local government control. This point differentiates Japan from most other industrial societies and is essential to bear in mind because it marks a fundamental political underpinning of the politics of enrollment expansion. So too is the broader question of government financing policies regarding higher education.

Funding

At first glance, funding for higher education in Japan seems to be quite respectable. During the period from 1950-68 expenses for higher education rose twenty-four times, from 24.8 billion yen to 561.8 billion yen, representing a climb from 0.75% of national income to 1.33%.[23] Seemingly, therefore, one would be hard pressed to cite lack of funding as a correlative of higher education expansion. However, when one considers this rise along with the large increase in the total number of students and the inflation over the same period it becomes considerably less impressive.

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[22] Mombushō, Kyōiku Tōkei Shiryōshū [Collected Statistical Source Materials on Education], 9-10, 71-82, and supplemental data supplied by the Ministry of Education. (Hereafter KTS.) Similar shifts have also occurred at the Junior College level.

[23] My calculations from Sōrifu, Nihon Tōkei Nenkan [Japan Statistical Yearbook] for various years. (Hereafter Tōkei Nenkan.)

When one notes, too, that expenses in 1950 provide a very low base to start from, the rise takes on even less significance. Only in 1959, for example, did total spending per pupil in higher education reach prewar levels,[24] and current expenses (i.e., direct educational expenses exclusive of capital overhead and expansion costs) have only now reached prewar levels.[25]

Even more significantly for questions of government policy toward enrollment expansion, a decreasing portion of the money that is being spent within Japan for higher education is coming from public sources. During the period from 1950 to 1968, government's share of the total bill for higher education shrank from 67.2 percent to 51.4 percent,[26] and government expenditure per pupil is at present only about two-thirds what it was in the prewar period.[27] Finally, both as a percent of national income and as a percent of total government spending for education, the Japanese government's outlay for higher education falls far below the levels in other major countries of the world, as is clear from Table 6-2. In fact, a recent survey of government spending for higher education as a percent of total governmental spending for higher education for thirty-one countries showed that only six allocated lower percents to higher education than Japan.[28]

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[24] CKS '69, 381.

[25] Ibid., 382.

[26] My calculations from CKS '69, 286; and Ministry of Education, Educational Standards in Japan, 1970, 240. There are three volumes with this title, or the Japanese equivalent, Waga Kuni no Kyoiku Suijun, published in 1959, 1964 and 1970. The former has not been translated into English, the latter two have. All three will hereafter be cited as Standards with a reference to the year of publication. References will be to the Japanese language edition for 1959 and to the English editions for 1964 and 1970.

[27] Ibid.; WP '64, 304-305 contains prewar figures.

[28] Friedrich Edding and Dieter Berstecher, International Developments of Educational Expenditure, 1950-1965, 40.

TABLE 6-2 - GOVERNMENT SPENDING FOR HIGHER EDUCATION IN VARIOUS COUNTRIES (1968)

Country	As % of National Income	As % of Total Government Educ. Expense 1965
Japan	0.7%	15.7%
U.S.S.R.	0.9% *	17.4%
U.K.	1.0% *	22.9% *
West Germany	1.1% **	24.6% **
U.S.A.	1.9%	27.6%

* 1967
** 1966

Source: Ministry of Education, Educational Standards in Japan, 1970 (Tokyo: Ministry of Education, 1971), pp. 145-6.

This funding situation is tied directly to the previous point about enrollment coming primarily through expansion in private universities. The Japanese government allocates virtually no significant monies for these universities. Only about three percent of the total operating budget for private universities in Japan represents government funding, a figure in sharp contrast to funding policies in most other industrialized countries. In the U.S.S.R. there is, of course, no private funding. In West Germany and France over eighty percent of all funds come from government sources. In England, even though all universities are privately administered, seventy percent of the ordinary expenditures and between ninety and ninety-five percent of the funds for capital needs come from the government. In the United States about one-third of all private university monies come from the state or federal governments.[29]

What becomes clear, therefore, is that the government, while encouraging the expansion of enrollments in institutions of higher education by easy charters and nonenforcement of standards, did so at minimal cost, with funding for the university system in general and for private universities in particular being at a level of niggardliness unmatched in the industrial world. More charitably phrased, the expansion came without forcing any major reallocations of funds or personnel. As a result no significant counter pressures to the policy of expansion were forthcoming from within the government. But what of pressures from outside the circles of government? Should they have developed? Did they? Why or why not?

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[29]Ōsaki Shinobu, "Shiritsu Daigaku" [Private Universities] in Shimizu Yoshihiro, Nihon no Kōtō Kyōiku [Japanese Higher Education], 146; CKS '69, 119; Barbara Burn, et al., Higher Education in Nine Countries, 181. It should be noted that the government has recently begun moves to pay up to 50% of private university faculty salaries, but such sums will still leave Japan with a very low proportion of government support.

There were two important negative consequences to the extension policy that might have led to some strong external reaction had other circumstances been different: a sharp decline in the quality of educational facilities and a class bias to the educational opportunities that emerged as a result of the expansion. At first glance one might suppose that these would lead to certain counterpressures, perhaps from students, parents, the lower classes not sharing fully in the expanded opportunities, etc. However once they are examined in the context of other social values and political powers, it will be clear why they did not.

Deterioration of Educational Conditions

A number of statistical indicators can be examined to indicate the marked decline that has taken place in the physical aspects of university education in Japan. First of all there has been nearly a 30% increase in the number of students per faculty member since the end of the Occupation, with the major rise coming during the period of greatest chartering increases,[30] a rise which contrasts sharply with the general trends at other levels of Japanese education and with the trends in higher education throughout the world.

For example, at all other levels of education in Japan, as can be seen from Figure 6-2, the trend over the past twenty years has been toward a decline in the number of students per faculty member, while it is only at the university level that the ratio has been moving in the opposite direction. The result is that the number of students per faculty member is higher in universities than in any other level of education in Japan, in sharp contrast to normal expectations.

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[30] KTS, 9, 57-72. This increase becomes even more significant when seen in light of the changing relationship between full-time and part-time faculty.

Figure 6-2

NUMBER OF STUDENTS PER FACULTY MEMBER BY LEVEL OF EDUCATION



Source: Standards '70, 99.

Internationally too the Japanese case is odd. The definitional bases used in gathering statistics on higher education make meaningful international comparisons between absolute student-faculty ratios extremely difficult. However, the Japanese Ministry of Education figures provided in the White Papers of 1964 and 1970 show that in absolute terms Japan is in quite a poor position compared to other major industrial states.[31] Index figures over time based on consistent definitions within individual countries show even more vividly the long-term and unenviable trend in Japan. Figure 6-3 indicates quite obviously that Japan's sharp rise in the number of students per faculty member is without parallel in the other major countries of the world.

Despite the fact that teachers are carrying a bigger work load in terms of the number of students per teacher, their salaries have by no means kept pace with trends in national income per capita, a further indication of declining quality. For example, the salaries of teachers in higher education as related to average national income per capita dropped 65% over the period 1950-1968,[32] again a decline unmatched in any other country. Moreover, the actual salaries are and have been quite low to begin with, compared to these other countries, being approximately one-third that of salaries in the U.S., England, and West Germany.[33] Even allowing for the differences in per capita national income, faculty members in Japanese institutions of higher education receive about one-half what their counter-

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The number of part-time faculty has increased from approximately one out of four in 1951 to one out of three at present, with the greatest jump again coming during the decade of the 1960s. Ibid., 108.

[31] Standards, 1964, 91; Standards, 1970, 99-100.

[32] Based on data in CKS '69; 447, Standards, 1970, 109.

[33] CKS '69, 447.

Figure 6-3

NUMBER OF STUDENTS PER FACULTY MEMBER (1960=100)



Source: Standards '64; Standards '70; UNESCO Statistical Yearbook; UNESCO International Yearbook of Education.

parts in these three countries were receiving when their countries were at similar levels.[34] Part-time employment outside one's university has become an economic necessity for large numbers of faculty members, thus making them far less accessible to students and colleagues.

Figures for such items as research expenditures,[35] books and libraries,[36] and space per pupil[37] all provide similar indications of undeniable decline. For many, the large increase in enrollment alone is sufficient explanation of this deterioration, taking as their validation the phrase of Kingsley Amis: "The more, the worse." Nevertheless, Japan's enrollment increase, significant, as it may be, was by no means unusual during this period, as can be seen by a comparison of Japan's increase with that in other major industrial nations as in Table 6-3. Thus democratization of opportunity can not be brought forth as a convenient scapegoat for this deterioration of educational conditions among Japanese universities.

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[34] Ibid., 135.

[35] In 1964, for example, research expenditures in national universities amounted to about two-thirds that of prewar figures for experimental chairs and had not yet reached one-third that of the prewar figure for non-experimental chairs. Moreover, the amounts in non-chair national as well as public and private universities were and remain well below these. Ichikawa Shogo, "Daigaku wa kore de ii ka?" [Does this Mean the Universities are Good?], 15-17.

[36] Nearly one-half of the universities in Japan (46.3%) have libraries with fewer than 50,000 volumes; two-thirds have fewer than 100,000, a condition which has gotten worse, not better, over time. In 1963, for example, the figures had been 38.5% and 61.1% respectively. Additionally, in many of the considerably larger libraries the number of books has not kept pace with student increases, resulting in drastic declines in the number of books per pupil. Mombu Nenpo.

[37] A sharp decline of 47% has been registered in the period since the end of the Occupation. Consequently, there are nearly twice as many pupils per square meter of building space now as there were at the end of the Occupation. Based on figures in Jiyu Minshutō, Bunkyō Seido Chōsakai, Kokumin no tame no Daigaku [Universities for the People], part 3, 19 for data to 1965; and Mombushō, Gakko Kihon Chōsa Hōkokusho [Report on the Basic School Survey] for years after 1965.

TABLE 6-3 - ENROLLMENT EXPANSION IN INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN SELECTED COUNTRIES

	A 1950	B 1967	B/A
Japan	421,000	1,397,000	3.0
USA	2,116,000	6,912,000	3.1
France	140,000	510,000	2.3
Germany (F.R.)	136,000[a]	416,000	3.3
U.K.	134,000	412,000	3.3
USSR	1,247,000	3,861,000	2.8

[a]1951

Sources: 1950 -- Friedrich Edding and Dieter Berstecher, International Developments of Educational Expenditure, 1950-1965, (Paris: UNESCO, 1969), Annex 1.

1967 -- International Yearbook of Education, Vol. XXXI (Paris: UNESCO, 1970), Appendix VII.

The sophisticated observer of Japan would be quick to point out that these aggregate data mask significant differences among universities. While this is unquestionably true it should be noted that the major gap is between universities which are under national and local governmental auspices and those which are privately run.[38] Beyond a doubt, it is the private universities, the group in which the bulk of the expansion has taken place, that are most open to the charge of inferior and declining facilities as a breakdown of the statistical evidence in Table 6-4 indicates. Since it has been government policy to rely heavily on the private universities for expanding the enrollment of the entire system, however, the statistical inferiority of these institutions establishes even more firmly the tie between government policy and the deterioration of facilities.

Class Bias

In addition to the overall decline in quality that has been an outgrowth of the government's manner of increasing opportunities, one must also take into account the fact that there is a strong class bias to the university system as it has been evolving. Since nearly twenty-five percent of the age cohort are able to attend institutions of higher education, the Japanese system could hardly be called "elitist" in the sense that the word is normally used. However, the expansion of opportunities has not been felt at all evenly throughout Japanese society. Rather it has been the sons and daughters of the more financially endowed who have been most able

[38] Ōsawa, Nihon no Shiritsu Daigaku, 222-268; and Nihon Gakujutsu Kaigi, "Shiritsu Daigaku no Josei ni Tsuite" [On Aid to Private Universities]. Recommendation to the Prime Minister dated May 11, 1965. Reprinted in Nihon Gakujutsu Kaigi, Kankoku-Seimeishu, 4 [Collected Recommendations and Declarations], 117.

TABLE 6-4 - COMPARISON OF VARIOUS CONDITIONS WITHIN NATIONAL, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE UNIVERSITIES IN JAPAN

Condition	Year	National	Public	Private	Total
1. Student-Faculty Ration					
a. Total	1968	6.4	7.4	18.1	12.0
b. Full-time	1969	8.3	9.5	30.3	18.1
2. Percent Part-time Faculty	1968	22.2	27.8	44.6	34.2
3. Average/Library (000)	1967	89.0	57.0	47.0	63.0
4. Number of Students per Library Seat	1967	9.2	9.3	15.1	12.8
5. Number of Books per Student	1967	96.0	67.0	25.0	43.0
6. Average Space per Student (tsubo)	1970	9.5	-----	2.3	----

Sources: 1 and 2, my calculations from Mombu Nenpō, 1968, p. 344.
3 through 5, my calculations from Mombu Tōkei Yōran, 1970 (Tokyo: Mombusho, 1970), p. 49.
6, Nihon Shiritsu Daigaku Kyōiku, Jigyō Keikakusho [Working Plan], 1970 (Tokyo: n.p., 1970), p. 14.

to take advantage of the broadening of opportunities. This fact related very directly to the increased importance of the private universities in the overall structure of Japanese higher education, and more acutely to their deplorable financial situation.

Most private universities in Japan have been galloping along on a hazardous financial treadmill. Having virtually no financial equity, due either to the inflation immediately after the war, or else as a result of the weak financial requirements applicable at the time of being chartered, the universities depend almost exclusively on tuition, fees, and bank loans for their operating expenses. A vicious cycle exists in which money is borrowed from banks to establish the physical facilities for a university, then high tuition rates and fees are charged to pay off the servicing charges on the bank loans. To maximize total income, more and more students are admitted, whereupon further physical expansion is eventually required, necessitating additional bank loans, more servicing charges, and further increases in tuition and in the number of students. The result is that nearly one quarter of the private universities' budgets come from loans,[39] while twenty percent of the annual cost of operating private universities goes exclusively into debt service, a figure which has nearly doubled since 1961.[40].

In such a poor financial situation, the universities are forced to rely heavily on tuition and fees for operating expenses, and nearly one-half of the expenditures of private universities comes from tuition, fees

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[39] Ōgata Ken, "Jinzai Hihojo no Imi Suru Mono," [The Meaning of Financial Aid in Human Development], 15.

[40] Ibid., 15. Also Ōsaki, Shiritsu Daigaku, 166-177; Ōgata Ken, "Shiritsu Daigaku Keiei no Jittai to Mondaiten" [Realities and Problems in the Management of Private Universities], 69-75. (Hereafter Realities and Problems.) "Debt service" includes payment on both principle and interest. Interest constitutes about one-seventh of total debt service.

and other "contributions" from students.[41] In the United States and Great Britain, by way of contrast, such fees are frequently below ten percent and rarely exceed twenty to thirty percent, even in the most impoverished private universities.[42] The costs of entering a private university have consequently become astronomical and have far outstripped increases in the consumer price index as can be seen from Table 6-5.

Furthermore, families must be able to support their offspring for four years once in the university, putting an additional strain on family resources. As a result of such high costs, the private universities have become prohibitively expensive for the student from lower-middle income families and have become increasingly accessible only to the more well-to-do. A 1968 survey showed, for example, that the most significant factor influencing an individual student's desire to go on to college was a family income of 1.5 million yen or above. Being male, and the son of a professional followed closely, while having very high grades was significantly less important. Of the male students who did not proceed from high school to university, thirty-six percent cited economic conditions as the reason. The average annual income of parents of graduates who wished to proceed to universities was 1.3 million yen for males and 1.46 million yen for females, while for those who decided not to continue in spite of teacher evaluations that they had sufficient scholastic achievement and motivation, these figures were approximately halved. Certainly family income would appear to be quite significant as a factor in not attending a university.[43]

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[41] Standards '70, 248.

[42] Ogata, Realities and Problems, 75.

[43] Having very low grades, being a female, with parents of limited education, low income and agricultural or blue collar background operated negatively. CKS '69, 50-53.

Figure 6-4

STUDENTS ACCORDING TO FAMILY INCOME AND TYPE OF UNIVERSITY



Family Income (¥10,000)

Source: Mombushō, Nihon no Kōtō Kyōiku [Higher Education in Japan] (Tokyo: Ministry of Education, 1964), 163.

Although comparative and reliable data are difficult to locate, the limited data on family income of students entering universities also supports the notion of a class-biased system. Figure 6-4 divides all students by the type of university attended into quintiles of family income. National university students show a relatively even distribution among all five quintiles, while 53.6 percent of the students in private universities come from families in the lower two quintiles.

More recent data indicates that in 1970 the average family income of students in private universities was 2.10 million yen, or fifty percent higher than 1.45 million yen for families of students in national universities and thirty percent higher than the 1.63 million for those in local public universities.[44] Moreover, this gap is widening significantly with time.

From the data on quality and class, therefore, it becomes quite obvious that expansion of opportunities as carried out by the government has had two very significant socio-political consequences: general deterioration in university conditions and a preservation of the existing class structure. Yet no evidence emerges of any significant degree of pressure either to contract the expansion, or to expand under circumstances more calculated to reduce the class bias, or to insure the maintenance of high standards. Part of this is undoubtedly due to the unorganized

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[44] Mombu Kōhō, No. 545 (February 13, 1972), 4. The class pattern of Japanese higher education is, of course, not unique and evidence is found for its existence in other capitalist societies. In the Soviet Union offspring of aparatchiki apparently also have a better chance for higher education, although economic class per se is less relevant. Gerhard Lenski, Power and Privilege. One study however notes that the Japanese pattern is significantly more biased toward upper class students than either the U.S. or U.S.S.R. See Herbert Passin, Society and Education in Japan, 121.

Table 6.5

TUITION AND FEES IN PRIVATE UNIVERSITIES COMPARED TO CONSUMER PRICE INDEX

Year	Tuition		Entry Fees		Building Fund Contribution		Total		Consumer Price Index
	Yen	Index	Yen	Index	Yen	Index	Yen	Index	
1955	20,898	65.8	7,650	42.3	8,751	41.5	37,298	52.6	92.7
1960	31,773	100.0	18,074	100.0	1,078	100.0	70,925	100.0	100.0
1965	68,023	214.1	41,628	230.3	65,439	310.4	175,090	246.9	135.1
1967	77,110	242.7	48,311	267.3	75,464	358.0	200,885	283.2	147.6
1969	84,048	264.5	52,028	287.9	85,798	407.1	221,874	312.8	163.9
1970	85,666	269.6	52,755	291.9	90,546	429.6	228,967	322.8	176.6
1971	90,206	283.9	53,206	294.4	91,340	433.3	234,752	331.0	-----

Source: Ōgata Ken, "Shidai no Zaisei Kiki to Shigaku Seisaku no 'Tenkan'" [Financial Danger to Private Universities and 'Changes' in Private School Policies]

nature of the lower classes in Japan. More difficult to explain is the seeming disinterest with which the so-called proletarian parties viewed these consequences. An occassional perfunctory criticism of the course of the government's expansion policy can be found in the party platforms of the JSP and the JCP, but neither took any great efforts to correct the situation. The JSP's conduct can perhaps best be attributed to the party's Talmudic Marxism: Marx's doctrines in the original will help explain all significant contemporary problems; those he deals with are significant while those he does not can be ignored. Marxism is seen less as a doctrine from which to begin analysis, and more as one which if understood correctly will timelessly provide all the answers as well. And to the extent that Marx was not concerned with higher education in great detail, neither was the JSP. At the organizational level as well this orientation was bolstered by the close ties between the JSP and the major labor federations at the national level. Higher education (in contrast to primary and secondary education where the Japan Teacher's Union is most active) has never become a union issue. In contrast to university administration which could be, and was, interpreted as a matter of state intervention to enforce ideological conformity -- which could easily be squared with Marx -- and which was seen as presenting a threat to teachers, many of whom were leading theoreticians for the JSP, enrollment expansion and its consequences did not touch directly on key supporters of the JSP (i.e. students were the key group affected) nor on matters with overtly political overtones. The political implications of the government's incremental policymaking were conservative and even anti-progressive to be sure, but in a far less open way than in issues surrounding administration.

In the case of the JCP, the party was first of all extremely weak during the earliest period of the expansion policy. But even when its

strength grew in the mid- to late-sixties, it followed a strategy of localism, each campus being treated as a separate entity, with the result that it too was quite lax in bringing pressure to bear for a redirection of the entire national level of policy.

As a consequence, political pressure for change was slight and localized at best, almost totally absent at worst. But an additional factor in the ability of the policy to continue unchecked must also be recognized. There was in the society at large a core of supporting values that in many ways precluded a broad scale examination of the policy itself, and which supported incremental expansion regardless of its cumulative effect.

Supporting Values

No governmental policy is formulated in a valuational vacuum, and the enrollment expansion in Japanese higher education is no exception. Three interrelated facets of extent values have been strongly congruent with, and supportive of, the present policy and its social consequences throughout the broader society, namely, the popular importance of the university diploma, a laissez faire attitude toward the acquisition of such a degree by both government and private sectors and the general governmental policy of huge, rapid economic growth.

In Japan, as in most countries, there is a high correlation between a person's level of education and his economic success. Thus, in 1967, the starting salary for male university graduates in Japan averaged nearly seventy percent above that for middle school graduates, forty-five percent above that for high school graduates, and twenty-four percent higher than that for junior college graduates.[45] Moreover, this gap widens with age

[45] Sumiya Mikio, Kyōiku no Keizaigaku [An Economic Study of Education], 96.

and length of employment, so that even allowing for the seven years when a middle school graduate is working and a university graduate is in school, the latter's lifetime earnings remain far superior. A university education is statistically a wise investment.[46] Above and beyond the purely economic "payoff" one must recognize that the status of one's occupation as well as the type of work one does is largely dependent on education, with the most desirable positions almost invariably demanding a university diploma as a prerequisite to employment.

Such differences are not lost on Japanese parents. There is a very high concern among parents for the education of their offspring. A recent survey of parents showed that the topic most frequently discussed in the home was education (52.1 percent), and was also the greatest worry of parents (25.4 percent), nearly double the percentage for the item of next greatest concern. Expectations in the area of education are also very high, with nearly two-thirds of the parents indicating that if they had a son they would want him to finish college.[47]

The relationship between higher education and subsequent success in the minds of Japanese parents is rather blatant. A public opinion poll taken in July, 1968, by the Prime Minister's Office indicated that only twenty-two percent of the parents surveyed who wanted to send their sons to university did so in order for them "to acquire an education," while over fifty-eight percent sought entry for reasons directly related to the future material success of their offspring, such as "will be advantageous," "want him to acquire a good job," "to acquire technical skills," etc. An

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[46] Ibid., 228; Ōgata Ken, "Kyōiku Keizairon no Kadai to Hōhō" [Problems and Methods of Educational Economics], 83.

[47] Sumiya, Kyōiku no Keizaigaku, 12-18.

interesting additional 14.5 percent cited the somewhat related reason "because it is generally done."[48]

Parental desires are mirrored in part by the attitudes of the business community. Firms generally will hire their employees only from a limited number of specific schools. Close ties are frequently maintained between university officials and various business firms with mutually acceptable quotas worked out as to the number of graduates a particular firm will hire and what a university will agree to provide for the firm, so that career success depends much less on actual skills than on school standing and a school's alumni connections, the entire syndrome pointing to the greater importance of the university one graduates from as compared to what one learns there.[49]

Numerous writers have described this phenomenon rather cynically as "gakureki-shugi," literally "diplomaism," or less stiffly, as "fixation with the degree."[50] While a diploma per se is important, not all diplomas are equal, however. Some universities and some faculties offer far more prestigeous degrees than others. Indeed, a degree from a particular faculty of a particular university has a rather tangible and almost calculable economic value, both to its recipient and to the firm in which he is eventually employed. And, if the student "buys" the diploma as a passport to future success, without which passport, travel through the higher circles of government and business is impossible, many universities quite clearly can "market" these passports with such factors in mind.

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[48] CKS '69, 36. For a more in-depth analysis of those going on see: Mombushō, Kōtō Gakkō Sotsugyōsha no Shinryō Jōkyō [The Circumstances of Advancement of High School Graduates].

[49] See Koya Azumi, Higher Education and Business Recruitment in Japan.

[50] Shinbori Michiya, Gakureki--Jitsuryoko shugi o habamu [Academic Background--Thwarting the Merit System]. Fukaya Masashi, Gakureki shugi no keifu

Although most have not been terribly successful in terms of profits, as should have been clear from the earlier discussion of their financial plight, private universities in Japan do operate as profit-making institutions. Those with the best connections and placement records can command not only high tuitions but also high "voluntary" contributions, which are often inversely proportional to the attractiveness of a student's academic record, a factor which contributes to the class bias in the system as a whole.

More politically salient, the government, for its part, also treats the relationship between students and private universities in precisely this same sense by its hands-off attitude regarding funding, tuition raises, deviations from official quotas, etc. Perhaps the most pertinent facet of this attitude, however, concerns scholarship aid to students -- whether in public or private universities. In this area there is nothing to suggest any sense of government responsibility for insuring that the individual be allowed to receive a university education regardless of his, or his family's, economic well-being. The government-sponsored Japan Scholarship Association, which provides eighty-three percent of all the "scholarships" in Japanese universities, actually provides no scholarship grants whatsoever, but merely loans, these being doled out in miniscule sums to only a small portion of the student body. Of nearly one and a half million university students in 1970, the largest group of recipients was the 99,000 (7.6 percent) who received general loans of, in almost all cases, ¥3000 per month. An additional 88,000 students (6.8 percent) received special allowances of between ¥5000 and, in very unusual cases ¥12,000. Thus, amounts which by no means begin to cover normal expenses of tuition and fees are loaned to some fifteen percent of the total

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[Genealogy of Diploma-ism].

university student body, giving Japan the lowest percentage of students receiving aid, and the lowest amounts received among the major countries of the world.[51] In fact, Japan seems to be the only such country which in fact has no genuine government program of scholarship grants at all, clearly indicative of the pervasive attitude in Japan that higher education is by and large a private sector relationship beyond the purview of the government.

Such a non-interventionist policy is fully complementary with, and perhaps partly the consequence of, a final factor in present attitudes, namely, the dominant consideration given to high growth economics in the formulation of Japanese governmental priorities. To the extent that conservative political dominance in the postwar period has been at all related to governmental policies, it is fair to say that they have been heavily bolstered by the ability to deliver "peace and prosperity." Beginning with the Hatoyama Cabinet's "Six Year Plan for an Independent Economy," through the Ikeda Cabinet's "Plan to Double the National Income in Ten Years," and the industrial development plans in recent Prime Minister Tanaka's "Plan to Remodel the Archipelago," the conservatives have consistently relied on economic growth and its fallout as a mainstay of their political power. These economic policies have been based most fundamentally on the concept of growth through cyclical investment and reinvestment in high and rapid return items.[52] For a highly industrialized country such as Japan, higher education does not constitute such an item.

Economists by no means agree fully on the reasons for Japan's phenomenal growth, but one thing is clear: despite the fact that Japan's high level

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[51] Standards '70, 133-34; 233-34.

[52] In a study of the impact of economics on policy, Itō concludes that at least in the ten year period 1955-65 "politics was discussed exclusively

of education may have been a prerequisite to such growth, further investment in education would have produced no appreciable returns in terms of added growth. A comparison of the relative importance of several factors to Japan's growth during the period 1944-68, shows the minimal role played by investment in education. In terms of international comparisons, one study interestingly showed the role of education to be less significant in Japan than in any of the thirteen industrial countries or regions studied with the exception of one.[53] Ministry of Education officials have thus been in a weak bargaining position in any demand for more funds which has had an unmistakably negative effect on standards and funding.

It thus becomes clear that regardless of the immediate causes of the problems of quality and class bias, there are much more significant and much more deeply rooted values and attitudes that have exacerbated the situation and which have undergirded the policy of rapid incremental expansion of the universities. The importance of the diploma, the notion that higher education is essentially a private business transaction beyond the realm of government intervention, and finally, the dominance of economic growth as a criterion in the assessment of governmental priorities must all be seen as the attitudinal props behind both the manner in which higher educational enrollment has been expanded as well as the decline that has taken place in the quality of university facilities over the past decade and a half, and the class bias which remains a part of the higher educational system.

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in economic terms." Itō Masaya, Ikeda Hayato--Sono sei to shi [Hayato Ikeda--His Life and Death] (Tokyo: Shiseido, 1966), 90-91, as quoted in Daiichi Itō, "The Bureaucracy: Its Attitudes and Behavior," 451.

[53] Kanamori Hisao, "Nihon no Seichōritsu wa Naze Takai Ka?" [Why is Japan's Growth Rate High?], 16. See also Tsunehiko Watanabe, "Improvement of Labor Quality and Economic Growth--Japan's Postwar Experience," 33-53.

Such a climate has been the supportive backdrop to a basically incrementalist policymaking process. Lacking the visibility of policy proposals and decisions in the area of university administration, enrollment expansion has instead been a policy carried out through a series of related and mutually supportive steps no one of which was terribly dramatic, or even highly visible, but all of which in combination converged on the common policy of expansion. The bureaucracy's readiness to grant university charters coupled with its reluctance to force compliance with existing requirements were consistent if incremental contributors to this policy. The policy has been advanced no less distinctly than policies in university administration, but the policymaking process has been advanced far more through bureaucratic means and has been subject to far less controversy and publicity than was shown to be the case in administration.

As for the policy itself, it emerges as the non-fiduciary encouragement of rapid and uncontrolled expansion. But it has been an expansion lacking the democratic characteristics of parallel improvement, or at least parallel maintenance, of educational facilities and lacking also a concern for improving the mobility opportunities among the lower economic classes. Instead it has developed in such a way that overall physical quality has deteriorated markedly and new university admissions resulting from it have, because of funding policies, been accessible primarily to the offspring of the more affluent sectors of the Japanese population.

Two codas should perhaps be added on this point, however. First, the lack of governmental funding has limited to a great extent the government's ability to exercise purse string control over many universities. Conversely, however, the weakness of university organizations, and the government's ability to approach individually the more conservatively inclined university

trustees or administrators mitigates this limitation somewhat. Second, the policy should not be seen as uniformly beneficial to the government. A good deal of student protest activity during 1968-69 revolved around the poor conditions of universities. The long range impact of this problem is impossible to assess and goes well beyond the scope of the present investigation. Nevertheless, the fact that in the post-protest days of 1970-71, the government decided to alter somewhat its funding policies for both private and governmental universities would suggest that it has begun to question partially the wisdom of its non-fiduciary support for increased expansion regardless of qualititative changes. Whether or not similar assessment of the class consequences of past policies will also be re-examined remains more doubtful.

CHAPTER 7

PRESSURE GROUP POLITICS: DIFFERENTIATION AND SPECIALIZATION

There has probably never been a government free from the pressures of various individuals, groups or social sectors to carry out activities that would provide them with particularistic benefits. And when the demands are perceived to represent either inherently desirable changes, or else pressures that, if ignored, could lead to a significant undermining of the political strength of the regime, it is the rare government that does not try to respond in some way. The importance of big business to the conservative government in Japan has been so well documented as to preclude the necessity of further elaboration, and it has, through its individual members and through its organizations and federations, consistently and successfully pressured the Japanese government to make certain changes in the content and structure of higher education.

Since its earliest incarnations, the university has performed certain functions of professional training and certification. In the 12th and 13th centuries, this function was limited almost exclusively to the preparation of men for the ministry, medicine and the law, and was distinctly subsidiary to its broader role as the guardian of general knowledge, the training ground for the education of the total man, and intellectual oasis for those in search of truth. The development of highly specialized and complex societies, however, has forced dramatic changes in this orientation. One of the primary requirements of the business sector in any modern, highly industrialized and dynamic economy is for a talented and highly educated pool of citizens from which to draw the employees needed to sustain and expand that economy; the universities are generally perceived

to be the key source of that pool. The Japanese business community has been no exception to this pattern; however, the nature of prewar education and the changes introduced by the Americans have bolstered any natural inclinations it may have had to seek government action designed to secure from the universities the kind of graduates it desires.

As noted in Chapter Three, the Japanese university is a relatively modern institution, Japan's first being established only in 1877. The political leadership at that time, quite concerned about Japan's weakness vis à vis the Western imperial powers and conscious of the need to engage in rapid industrial and technological development so as to defend the integrity of the nation, quite deliberately sought to establish practicality as the guiding principal for all education, including higher learning.[1] Indeed that orientation went even further back at least to Sato Shinen who, at the time of the Opium War in China, argued that protecting Japan from western expansionism necessitated specialization and efficiency, with all adults being trained to functionally specific tasks, and prohibited from changing occupations, and with a nationally run university to provide the most specialized training. Others, too, prior to the Meiji Restoration, took up the theme of protecting national independence through a combination of "eastern morals and western technology," with the result that the earliest emphases in Japanese education were unquestionably specialization and technical skills.

In Western Europe and the United States, by way of contrast, such

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[1] Herbert Passin, Society and Education in Japan 92-99. Nagai Michio, Kindaika to Kyōiku [Modernization and Education] passim, but esp. Chapter Two (Hereafter Kindaika); Ministry of Education, Japan's Growth and Education; Nagai Michio, Higher Education in Japan: Its Takeoff and Crash.

concerns were far less central in the earliest days of universities. Only when the Morrill Act of 1862 established the land grant colleges in the United States did the practical application of what was taught at the university become anything approaching a widespread concern.[2] Even then the more established liberal arts institutions tended to scorn practicality as exclusively the province of "cow colleges." In Japan, by way of contrast, even such western-influenced leaders as Fukuzawa Yukichi called for study which focused on the immediately useful. In his essay, "Encouragement of Learning" (Gakumon no Süsume), for example, he wrote as follows:

> Learning does not mean useless accomplishments, such as knowing strange words or reading old and difficult texts, or enjoying and writing poetry. These accomplishments give much pleasure to the human mind and they have their own values. But they should not be slavishly worshipped as the usual run of scholars try to persuade us. There have been precious few scholars in Chinese classics at any time who were good providers, or merchants accomplished in poetry and yet clever in business. . . . Therefore this kind of unpractical learning should be left to other days, and one's best efforts should be given to practical learning that is close to everyone's needs. . . .[3]

As was noted at greater length above, such concerns remained philosophically dominant in higher education throughout the prewar period.

During the Occupation, such specialization and occupational relevance were the subject of particular attack. As much the captives of the structure and ideology of the American higher educational system as they were the active devotees of the broad general knowledge that had been its original justification, the Americans sought to provide a system that

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[2] Nagai, Kindaika 35

[3] In Passin, Society and Education 206.

minimized, and in some cases was overtly hostile to, the occupational relevance and distinctly technical training of the prewar period. It will be recalled from Chapter Three that some even went so far as to parallel the need for separating higher education from industrial relevance with the American penchant for separating church and state. The structural manifestation of the new system was thus the four year liberal arts college with a curriculum requiring a heavy two year program in general education. It is this system that has been the target of business-initiated pressures for change, the primary thrust of which has sought to force higher education back to the more occupationally relevant system of diversified educational institutions and specialized educational curriculums prevalent during the prewar period.

The long history of specialization and differentiation during the prewar period went largely unchallenged by academics and the political left. At a minimum it in no way approached the heightened affect surrounding issues of university autonomy and university administration. Moreover, as will be seen, the potential impact of the issue has been far less direct and far more specific. No single serious proposal focing fundamental changes in all institutions of higher education has ever emerged in this area, in contrast to the issue of university administration. Rather the issue has had a reasonably high degree of divisibility, and has been quite narrow and specific in its scope. At the same time, when compared to enrollment expansion, it appears to be much more diffuse, somewhat broader and far less disagregable. Politically, the issue has never raised constitutional questions and only rarely has it raised legal ones.[4] For the most part it has been a problem open to resolution by

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4 Some critics of the government, however, contend that any government

actions within the Ministry of Education or through a combination of bureaucratic agencies. Yet resolution has necessitated in most cases far more consciousness, planning and coordination than enrollment expansion. Incrementalism has not dominated most aspects of the differentiation and specialization question. Finally, the business sector, which has been the most concerned with the question, has been highly mobilizable, politically influential, and has operated in a climate of opinion favorable to the economic development to which the issue has constantly been connected, again separating it from the other two cases.

The result has been that in terms of policymaking, equally interesting and related contrasts can be noted. As was seen in Chapter Five, in most matters of university administration, policymaking involved attempts at passing or blocking legislation; cleavage, total commitment and vigorous opposition were almost inevitably involved. By way of contrast, in the policy area now under study, policymaking will be shown to have been accomplished almost exclusively by bureaucratic means such as ordinance revision, quota changes, encouragement of "independent" university action, financial inducement, etc., and confrontations and conflict have been far less in evidence. In this area, the importance and potential of the overall bureaucratic trends analyzed in Chapter Four are also starkly visible.

Additionally, if government policy toward university administration has been largely the result of reaction to such other specific problems as progressive protest, plus the somewhat more natural tendency of most

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direction over the universities is a violation of Article 23 of the Constitution which guarantees academic freedom. As will be seen a few items of the government's policy changes in the area of specialization and differentiation also were based on legal changes that passed the Diet.

governments to seek control and supervision over many diverse areas of society; and if its policies toward enrollment have been largely an unconscious and incremental response to a combination of specific requests by universities to expand and to the broader climate of democratic values and equality of opportunity; then its policy toward the differentiation of higher educational institutions and specialization of higher educational training have involved far more conscious and thought-out responses to clear cut and particularistic demands from big business, acting in a climate of economic development.

There have been two related but analytically distinct components of this problem: first, structural differentiation among institutions and second, changes in the types of graduate "output" emerging from these institutions. In both cases a rather consistent business demand has led to an almost equally consistent pattern of governmental policy response. It would be well to begin by assessing the demands of big business before looking at the government response.

Demands of Big Business: As a general sector of society, big business is represented organizationally in several diverse and autonomous federations. The major ones are the Japan Federation of Employers Associations (JFEA), the Federation of Economic Organizations (FEO) and the Japan Committee for Economic Development (JCED). Of somewhat lesser significance are the Japan Chamber of Commerce and the Kansai Economic Federation.[5] It has been these federations that have been the prime articulators and

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[5] On the political role of big business in Japan, see, e.g., Chitoshi Yanaga, Big Business in Japanese Politics; Frank C. Langdon, "The Political Contributions of Big Business in Japan," and "The Attitudes of the Big Business Community;" Thayer, How the Conservatives Rule . . . ; and Yomiuri Shimbunsha, Zaikai [The Financial World].

advocates of the demands of their constituent members in the area of higher education. While the organizations represent different perspectives on a variety of economic and other questions, their perspectives on the problems of specialization and differentiation in higher education have been relatively uniform: their central concern has been to bring about changes designed to make the higher educational system more directly useful to the employment needs of the major businesses of the country.

These needs have been felt in two related but isolable areas: first, the need for differentiating the higher educational structure along functional lines, and second, the need to increase the specialization of training and the number of science and engineering specialists being "produced" annually. The two themes recur constantly in a series of proposals, plans, suggestions, and demands issued over the entire postwar period by the different business federations. These proposals have generally been issued publicly and presented simultaneously to major government and political officials. Such public proclamations have then invariably been supplemented by, among other things, testimony given at public meetings and advisory committee hearings, media lobbying with reporters and journalists, direct mailings to members encouraging attention to the problems presented, and by personal and informal lobbying by individual businessmen and federation leaders of the government and party officials most directly involved in the governmental decision making process.

The two themes of specialization and differentiation can be found as early as October, 1952. Then the new system of higher education came in for particular criticism in a JFEA document entitled, "Opinion Paper on the Reexamination of the New Educational System." The report criticized

"the lack of integration between [general] education courses and specialized courses. . ." and called for increased specialization throughout the higher educational system.[6] One key argument was that although the bulk of university graduates entered the business world, "the educational perspective" was not one which treated students as potential employees.

The report went on to declare:

> It is imperative that business and industry exercise educational leadership over the learning power of students in post-secondary education so as to train people who, after graduation, will use the scientific attainments, techniques and skills they have acquired to make positive contributions as employees to society and the state.[7]

Two subsequent JFEA proposals in December, 1954,[8] and November, 1956[9] were even more specific in their criticisms. These were outgrowths of surveys conducted by the Association in March, 1953, and March, 1955, that showed a high degree of dissatisfaction among businessmen with the technical competence of young employees graduating from the "new system" universities. The surveys and reports made it clear that the business establishment was definitely unhappy with the newer arrangements, the businessmen claiming that the graduates trained under the new system were less competent than prewar system graduates. Both reports sought to

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6 Plan as in Yamamoto, Daigaku Mondai . . . , 475-76.

7 As cited in Terasaki, Bōsei, 56.

8 "Futatabi Kyōiku Seido no Kaizen ni tsuite" [A Second Proposal on the Reform of the Educational System]. The plan is analyzed in Kaigo and Terasaki, Daigaku Mondai, 447-49, and is reproduced in Yamamoto, Daigaku Mondai 477-78 under the title "Shinkyōiku Seido no Kaizen ni tsuite" [On the Reform of the New Education System].

9 "Shinjidai no Yōsei ni taiō suru Gijutsu Kyōiku ni kansuru Iken" [An Opinion on Scientific Education to Respond to the Demands of a New Age], reproduced in Yamamoto, Ibid., 479-82.

distinguish between "workers and employees" on the one hand and the "general citizenry" on the other, stressing throughout the business community's felt need for more education aimed at the former.[10]

The 1954 report called for a correction of the "imbalance" between law and literature graduates on the one hand and science and engineering graduates on the other. At the time, about 16% of the university students were enrolled in programs of science and engineering, compared to 40% in law, politics, commerce and economics, 13% in literature and 15% in teacher training.[11] By way of contrast, England, France, West Germany and the Soviet Union all had approximately 35-40% of their student populations in science and engineering, and several of these countries were undertaking programs to expand these percentages. (The U.S. was closer to the Japanese figure with approximately 19% in science and engineering.)

The report also demanded "a rationalization of the education given during the four years of university training" by "coordinating general education . . . with basic courses of a specialized nature." It also demanded training for potential employees of small and medium sized businesses and for the reestablishment of five-year industrial and technical colleges that would combine three years of high school and the first two years of college.[12]

The JFEA report two years later amplified and concretized these themes. It called again for the five year technical colleges and demanded as well a long range plan to develop more technicians, scientists and engineers. Better science and engineering facilities at the university

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10 Kaigo and Terasaki, Daigaku Mondai 126-27.

11 WP '64, 180.

12 Yamamoto, Daigaku Mondai . . . , 477-78.

and graduate school level were called for; provisions to reeducate industry's technical employees were demanded and concrete ties between the university and the industrial world were proposed.[13]

Meanwhile, in January, 1955, FEO also published a set of proposals for "Policies to Encourage Industrial Education in the Schools," that raised demands similar to those of the JFEA.[14]

A November, 1960, document of the Japan Committee for Economic Development (JCED) continued these themes, and called for a school system more closely tied to industry to serve the purposes and demands of the industrial world. Part of the proposal was explicitly political: "For the development of a healthy democracy we must train a commonsensical middle class which will serve as a stable social force. . . . In order to bring students into the camp of democracy and capitalism the financial world must make cooperative moves toward students. For these purposes, it will be most effective to rely on a movement for 'industrial and university cooperation.'"[15]

The Kansai Economic Federation was also simultaneously reiterating many of the same themes. In an "Opinion Paper on the Reform of the University System," the Federation claimed that general education was inappropriate and that the university system was not responsive to "the demands of society." It called for greater specialization; for increased emphasis on science and engineering, particularly in the former Imperial Universities; for the establishment of five-year technical colleges; and

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13 Ibid., 479-82; Kaigo and Terasaki, Daigaku Mondai 130-31, 447-49.

14 "Gakko Kyōiku ni okeru Sangyō Kyōiku no Shinkō Hōsaku."

15 Asahi Shimbun, July 10, 1960. Also in Nomura, Seisaku . . . , 666.

for long range controls over student quotas to meet industrial needs.[16]

JFEA too kept up its demand for the five-year technical college and a special subcommittee issued a further report on its desirability in December, 1960.[17] Pressure was sustained too for governmental efforts to increase the number of scientific and engineering graduates. In August, 1961, JFEA and FEO issued a joint request to the government and the Diet on this point.[18] During the entire decade of the 1960s JFEA led the business world in pressing for increased functional differentiation of higher educational institutions, for a decrease in the emphasis on general training and education within the university, for increased specialized training and specifically for more scientists and engineers.

Increasingly, the business federations, as they articulated positions calling for more occupationally relevant universities, stressed the somewhat servile position they saw the universities occupying. In 1969, for example, the JFEA declared that "notwithstanding their individual objectives and individual characteristics, today's universities are authorized to exist only insofar as they fulfill their mission by meeting the joint demands of the state and society."[19] From this perspective the Association demanded even further and more explicit differentiation along functional lines and even more professional education.

> It is necessary to diversify the length of schooling, curriculum and other matters and to diversify as well the types of institutions along lines of purpose and character: graduate schools for high

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[16] Nomura, Ibid. 670-71.

[17] Ibid. 671.

[18] Ibid. 682-83. Yamamoto, Daigaku Mondai . . . 683-84.

[19] Nihon Keieisha Dantai Renmei, "Chokumen suru Daigaku Mondai ni kan suru Kihonteki Kenkai" [Basic Views of the University Problem We Are Facing], 9. Reproduced in Nomura, Seisaku . . . 172-77.

> level academic studies and research, professional colleges (longer or shorter depending on their specialties), junior colleges focusing on the acquisition of general education, and special purpose colleges to train teachers and artists, etc.[20]

Similar demands were issued in two subsequent JFEA reports during the same year and by reports and proposals of the JCED.[21]

Throughout these and many other reports the Japanese big business community rather consistently pressed for two major sets of changes in the system of higher education established under the Occupation. They demanded increased functional differentiation among higher educational institutions, notably in their demands during the 1950s and into the 1960s for the establishment of a five-year technical college to train middle and lower level technicians, and for the further widespread institutional differentiation. Secondly, they opposed the generalist orientation of most Japanese universities, pressing instead for increased specialization and for greater numbers of scientists and engineers.

In general, this position called for a system of higher education that would be of clear benefit to the industries of Japan, providing at minimal cost to them a greater number of individuals with training directed in at least a general way toward their subsequent employment specializations, with minimum "distraction" at institutions or in subjects likely to be of less occupational significance. The benefits to business would be clear, narrow and particularistic, although in almost all cases the business federations formulated their demands not in particularistic but in general terms.

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[20] Ibid., 9-10.

[21] Nihon Keieisha Dantai Renmei, Kyōku Mondai ni tai suru Sangyōkai no Kenkai [Opinions of the Industrial World Concerning the Basic Problems of

The changes, it was invariably noted, were directed toward meeting "social demand," not business demands; they would be beneficial to national economic growth, not to the growth of big business; they were needed to allow Japan to compete internationally, not to provide the basis for big business expansion overseas; they would provide students with marketable skills, not detract from their total education. Such formulations should not be surprising; any particularistic demand is more readily received to the extent that it is identified with more universalistic needs. To be sure, some aspects of the demanded changes clearly were of broader utility, particularly within the overall nature and accepted framework of the capitalistic economic system and the significance of big business in that system.

Certainly the government and the LDP maintained such a position. The big business community has been an integral component and the financial mainstay of the conservative camp throughout the postwar period, and their ties to conservative politics can be traced even further back to the Meiji Period.[22] The government in turn has been highly responsive to

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Education] (September, 1969); and Sangaku Kankei ni kansuru Sangyōkai no Kihon Ninshiki oyobi Teigen [Basic Understandings and Proposals of the Industrial World Regarding Industrial Education]; Nihon Keizai Dōyūkai, Kyōiku Mondai Iinkai, Daigaku no Kihon Mondai [The Basic Problems in Education], (November 15, 1968); and Kōji Kōshi Shakai no tame no Kōtō Kyōiku Seido [A Higher Educational System for a Highly Productive Society] (July 18, 1969).

[22] Robert A. Scalapino, Democracy and the Party Movement in Prewar Japan; Peter Duus, Party Rivalry and Political Change in Taisho Japan; Tetsuo Najita, Hara Kei and the Politics of Compromise; Arthur E. Teidemann, "Big Business and Politics in Prewar Japan," inter alia.

a number of business demands in a variety of fields other than education. And, as noted earlier, to the extent that it perceives any demands as either inherently meritorious or politically significant, the government seeks to meet such demands as it can, and/or to reconcile in some way the competing demands made upon it.[23] What is perhaps most significant from the standpoint of interest group politics in this case is that, as will be seen, there was only minimal opposition to most of the business demands, making it particularly easy for the government to respond to most of them.

As noted before, business demands took separate forms: the demand for structural differentiation of higher educational institutions, and the demand for changes in the types of graduates produced by these institutions. For analytical purposes it is well to keep the two separate even though in practice and in effect they have been two sides of the same coin.

Functional Differentiation: Under the reorganized American style system, Japan had only one permanent and legitimate institution of higher education beyond high school: the four-year university. Since that time the government in response to business demands has authorized four entirely new forms of higher educational institution, has proposed several more and has encouraged significant functional differentiation among groups of institutions within these various categories.

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[23] One of the interesting comparisons this study suggests with other pressure group studies in Japan, however, is that the political currency of the pressure group is not always the same. John C. Campbell, "The Repatriates: A Case-Study of Interest Group Politics and Party Government Negotiations in Japan," Fukui, Chapter 7, and William Steslicke, Doctors in Politics . . . for example all deal with groups whose primary political currency is presumed ability to deliver or withhold large numbers of votes. In the case of business, clearly the political currency is money and ideology. For a contrast of pressure group policymaking within higher education, see T. J. Pempel, "Patterns of Japanese Policymaking: Higher Education."

The earliest alteration in the unified system came with the establishment of junior colleges. Although actually begun under the Occupation, the junior colleges were initially granted only temporary status to provide something of a waystation for those prewar technical colleges or higher schools that could not immediately upgrade themselves to four-year universities. This fact is clear from the provisions establishing the junior colleges:

> Because conditions of personnel and material facilities have made it difficult for some of the old system higher schools and technical schools to shift completely into the new four-year university system, [the establishment of] two and three-year universities is temporarily permitted. [However,] as quickly as possible they must make plans to qualify for the new system.[24]

In 1950, the first year they were permitted, 149 junior colleges were established. During the next two years an additional 58 were added, while only two schools left the category.[25] The government meanwhile formalized standards for the establishment of junior colleges, and set up a special Advisory Committee (later "Council") on Junior Colleges, to deal with policy proposals and other items related to the junior colleges. The existing junior colleges meanwhile organized themselves into a separate Junior College Association. With these steps and the constant numerical increase of these institutions, the political rules of organizational permanence took over. By 1955, there was a total of 264 junior colleges and the category was no longer considered temporary by any but the most avid devotees of legal literalism.

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[24] School Education Law, Supplement to articles 109-110; subsequently deleted by Law 110, 1964.

[25] Mombushō, Tanki Daigaku Ichiran [Outline on Junior Colleges] 96. (Hereafter TDI)

Initially the government and business considered the emerging junior college system as a possible way to meet the demand for more specialization. The junior colleges as they evolved went only part way toward meeting the demands of big business, however. The primary desire was to recreate some form of the prewar senmongakko (technical colleges) that would provide technicians and trained blue collar personnel, and at first business sought to have the junior colleges fulfill this function. As early as fall 1952 and continuing for the next two years the JFEA demanded that junior colleges focus their attention on industrial and work-oriented education to meet this need.[26] The junior colleges, however, were slow to respond to this suggestion and the bulk of the enrollees in junior colleges were in the fields of literature, homemaking, law and economics, with well below ten percent in the more occupationally relevant fields of science, engineering, agricultural sciences and nursing.[27] Pressure from the business world continued to mount on the Education Ministry for some action, and in the fall of 1955 Education Minister Matsumura announced at a press conference that plans were under way to submit to the Central Education Council the question of transforming junior colleges into the institutional form desired by the business world.[28]

The junior colleges perceived this as a threat and fought fiercely to retain their legitimacy and existing character. Following a long

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[26] E.g., Asahi Shimbun (evening ed.), Oct. 26, 1952; Mainichi Shimbun, Oct. 31, 1954; Nov. 15, 1954; Asahi Shimbun, Nov. 1, 1954; Nov. 5, 1954.

[27] KTS, 45-56 (my calculations).

[28] Mainichi Shimbun, September 14, 1955; Asahi Shimbun, September 15, 1955. The proposal was related to the ideas of tanka daigaku and senka daigaku, both of which phrases were in use at the time for the newly proposed institutions.

debate within the Central Education Council and the Ministry of Education, however, a government proposal emerged in December, 1957, to cease recognition of the junior colleges after April 1, 1959, and to establish occupationally-oriented Specialist Colleges (Senka Daigaku) that would begin in 1960.[29]

This plan was submitted to the Lower House where the Education Committee ratified it. The junior colleges and the Junior College Association, however, brought counter pressure upon members of the LDP in the Upper House and some revisions were made in the plans.[30]

A second submission was made to the Lower House Education Committee that month. Still, however, the positions of the business world, the LDP, the bureaucracy and the junior college federations were not reconciled. At the end of the month, a vector sum compromise emerged that provided for the creation of a five year higher technical school system to begin in 1962 and that allowed junior colleges to continue in their existing character. They were to aim explicitly at providing specialized education as preparation for employment.[31]

The junior colleges continued to oppose this formal and explicit change in their goals and a final compromise provided that junior colleges would serve to "provide [both] general and professional education for secondary school graduates and [also] to develop the intellectual and practical abilities required for their future careers and practical life."[32]

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[29] Mainichi Shimbun, December 9, 1957.

[30] Asahi Shimbun, November 1, 1958; Tokyo Shimbun, March 3, 1959; Yomiuri Shimbun, March 9, 1959.

[31] Tokyo Shimbun, April 1, 1959.

[32] School Education Law, Article 69.

In accord with the compromise the government drafted a bill to create the desired five year technical colleges. With the primary opposition from the junior colleges assuaged, with the conservative camp almost uniformly committed, and with the progressive camp almost totally uninterested, the bill sailed through the Diet meeting only perfunctory opposition. The technical schools went into effect on April 1, 1962.

Both the junior colleges and the higher technical schools have since come to occupy major and autonomous positions in the total picture of Japanese higher education. In 1950, there were 149 junior colleges; in 1970, there were 479, of which 414 were privately administered.[33] The student enrollment increased during the same time from 15,000 to nearly 260,000.[34] A startling 90 percent of the junior college students are enrolled in private institutions, and an almost equally high 82 percent are women, well over half of whom are in homemaking or literature. Only about one quarter of the students could be said to be in occupationally-related fields of study and almost all of these are either women enrolled in the education division or men attending evening courses in engineering or commerce.[35]

The higher technical schools are quite distinct from the junior colleges, being five-year institutions that combine the last three years of high school with two years of college, and being institutions whose

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33 TDI, 96.

34 Ibid., 102.

35 Ibid.; Standards '70, 209; Mombu Nenpō '68, 341. It should also be noted that all national junior colleges are attached to four year national universities as evening facilities. Clyde Vroman, Japan: A Study of the Educational System of Japan and Guide to the Academic Placement of Students from Japan in United States Educational Institutions, 62.

aim is explicitly technical and vocational. The system has been primarily under national administration, in contrast to the generally private junior colleges: 49 of the 60 higher technical schools are national while only four are local public and seven are private.[36] With only one exception there have been no new local public and private technical schools established since 1963, whereas there have been 25 national institutions created since then. In 1973, there were 18,000 students, up from an initial 3,375 in 1962.[37] Fewer than five percent of these students were women, and virtually the entire enrollment is in the technical fields of either industrial or mercantile engineering.[38] In short, the government has taken the primary fiscal and administrative responsibility for the development and maintenance of the system most explicitly demanded by the business community, a system that in turn has come to occupy a major role in the overall system of Japanese higher education, while meeting simultaneously the counter demands from the junior colleges for an autonomous existence.

Quite clearly the junior college and the higher technical school have extremely different characters and serve rather separate purposes. The junior colleges act primarily as finishing schools for women while the higher technical schools train middle and low level technicians and engineers for industry. The social classes served by the two are also quite different. Junior colleges, being privately administered, are expensive and thus available primarily to the more well-to-do, while the

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36 Mombushō, Kōtō Senmongakko Ichiran [Outline on Higher Technical Schools] 25. (Hereafter KSI)

37 Standards '70, 34. Kōtō Kyōiku Kondankai, Kōtō Kyōiku no Kakuju Seibi Keikaku ni tsuite [On the Plans for the Expansion and Consolidation of Higher Education], 18.

technical schools are government-operated and rather inexpensive, attracting many of their students from middle and lower income groups, many of whom are unable to afford the four-year colleges or have not qualified academically for the limited financial aid that is available there. Both types of institution have grown rapidly, however, and both represent significant functional differentiations within higher education and major deviations from the pattern of a higher educational system based on the four-year college.

Even further institutional differentiation was proposed by the Central Education Council in its comprehensive 1963 evaluation of the higher educational system and in the late 1960s, two components were actually added to the institutional matrix of Japanese higher education, namely the national training institutes for industrial arts teachers and the national training institutes for nursing teachers, both of which were begun in 1966. These were three-year institutes, again created and maintained by the government. At one point there were nine of the former institutes, with an enrollment of 2,300; these, however, were discontinued in 1969 once the government determined that a sufficient number of industrial arts teachers had been trained.[39] In 1969, there were eight institutes for nursing teachers, all affiliated with national universities. These had a combined enrollment of 955.[40] Although rather minimally significant numerically these institutes were a small component part of the broader trend of increasing functional differentiation of higher educational institutions through national government support.

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[38] KSI, 115; Standards '70, 34.

[39] Mombu Nenpō '68, 210.

[40] KTS, 10.

The trend toward functional differentiation manifested in the actual establishment of these diverse institutions of higher education is expected to continue even further. For example, in 1967 the Economic Planning Agency in its Economic and Social Development Plan for 1967-1971 proposed a three group distinction among higher educational institutions according to function: "a group mainly for general culture; a group mainly for training special workers; a group mainly for higher-level scientists and researchers. . . ."[41] This theme was developed even further in 1971 when the government adopted a proposal by the Central Education Council to specialize educational institutions even further.[42]

The latter report urges that five distinct categories of higher educational institutions be established. Two categories, those of junior college and higher technical school, would not represent significant deviations from the present. The three other categories, however, would require major structural changes. One category would be for "universities" nominally no different from the present; three specific types of university would, however, be provided for, each with a substantially different curriculum following roughly the earlier outlines suggested by the Economic Planning Agency. There would be a comprehensive curriculum "providing professional knowledge and skills for those careers which are not particularly specialized." An academic curriculum would "provide basic academic knowledge and skills," while an occupational curriculum would "provide the theoretical and technical training required for particular professional

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[41] Economic Planning Agency, Economic and Social Development Plan, 1967-1971, 114.

[42] CKS '71; an abbreviated English version of the plan is in Standards '70, 179-91, and a full textual translation was published as Basic Guidelines for the Reform of Education.

occupations so as to provide students with the qualifications or abilities for those occupations." The comprehensive curriculum would aim at training white collar workers, the academic curriculum at training scholars, and the occupational curriculum would seek to develop technical professionals.

Beyond the university a further differentiation would take place. "Graduate schools" would provide two or three years of academic education in specific fields--essentially the equivalent of an M.A.-granting institution, while "research centers" would provide opportunities for training those of academic bent seeking the Ph.D. If implemented, the plan would bring about a major change from the unified graduate schools attached to universities offering both the M.A. and Ph.D., and would also meet partially the business demand for institutions receptive to the retraining of technical employees. From this report it becomes clear that the earlier steps to differentiate institutions along functional lines indicate a continuing trend in official thinking, a movement that represents a return to the prewar system of widespread institutional differentiation and high occupational relevance in higher education.

Beyond the variety of actions taken by the government to increase the differentiation among various types of higher educational institution, it has also taken a number of steps to bring about differentiation among the four year universities under its control. One of the major differences among universities of course is that made along administrative lines: national, local public and private universities. These, however, have a relatively long history and despite their importance and the significant differences in quality among them noted above, they are not under consideration at this point. Here the concern is with policies that

have developed functional differentiations beyond these existing administrative divisions, the most important of which have been the distinctions among national universities. There a key distinction has emerged in regard to their primary orientations as either teaching or research institutions.[43]

Theoretically, all national universities have equal status in law, and a key goal of the early Occupation was some effort to minimize the vast differences in quality that existed in fact among the national universities. As was seen in Chapter Three, these efforts met with sharp resistance from the Ministry of Education and the more privileged of the universities, and by the end of the Occupation a clear hierarchy of prestige and quality among the national universities could be perceived. Quality differentiation is inevitable among educational institutions, but it must be noted that the government, since the Occupation, has also taken a number of overt steps to reinforce, among the national universities under its control, the more normal processes of improvement and regression such as can be readily found, for example, among private universities. The key aspect in such steps has been the distinction made between the "chair system" and the "course system" as the basis for internal organization of national universities.

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[43] An additional differentiation made among the national universities that is not discussed here is that which occurs in the national university entrance examinations. The national universities are grouped into two categories, one of the prestige schools, one of all the others. Students may take both tests, but must indicate the school of their choice on each exam; failing the high prestige exam leaves most with a choice between one year as a <u>ronin</u>, or attendance at an explicitly designated low-prestige institution.

The distinction is rooted in the structure of prewar Japanese higher education when "chairs" were established as the University organ for research and "courses" were designed for general education and teaching.[44] The arbitrary discrimination between teaching and research functions was eliminated during the Occupation, yet no specific changes were mandated in the actual organizational format of the universities. The result was that the systems extant in individual universities before the war tended to be perpetuated.

As an organizational form the chair system, particularly in the experimental and clinical fields, provides for more faculty at the junior level than does the course system. As a result it has often been cited as giving immense power to senior faculty, while limiting the mobility and the rise to positions of responsibility of junior faculty.[45] Additional importance arises in that as institutionalized bureaucratically within the Ministry of Education, the difference between the two systems has been adopted as the basis for distinctions between research and teaching, and subsequently for a variety of additionally important distinctions among universities.

The difference between the chair and course systems has emerged primarily as the outgrowth of a number of subtle, almost invisible, bureaucratic steps, rather than as the result of any dramatic legislative struggle. There is evidence that as early as March, 1951, the government was seeking to reestablish a fundamental difference between institutions

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[44] Amano Ikuo, interview March 2, 1971; Kaigo and Terasaki, Daigaku Kyōiku 145-46.

[45] OECD Report, 42-43; Amano interview, Ibid.; Kitamura Kazuyuki interview, October 28, 1970.

oriented toward teaching and those geared toward research.[46] In 1954, an administrative directive further spelled out the government's perception of these differences, establishing the chair system as the exclusive unit for research, and then specifying which institutions would be allowed to have chairs.[47] In 1956, the government issued an additional directive making the distinctions formal and setting up the chair as the basic unit for research and the course as the unit for teaching.[48] Since its initiation, this distinction has become institutionalized and the 1963 and 1971 reports of the Central Education Council have encouraged its continuance.[49] In both instances universities were categorized as either "comprehensive universities" (sōgō daigaku) that engaged in both research and teaching or "ordinary universities" (tanka diagaku or daigaku), whose faculties simply taught. The 1971 report made an even more rigid distinction between teaching and research as regards the functions of the distinct "graduate schools" and "research centers,"[50] which it proposed should be established. It was implicit as well in the sections dealing with the undergraduate university itself.

This fundamental distinction has, in addition to the distinctions

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[46] A Ministry of Education document entitled "Daigaku no kōza nado ni kansuru Yōko [Plans Relating to Chairs in the Universities] was formed at this time. Kaigo and Terasaki, Daigaku Kyōiku, 149.

[47] "Kokuritsu Daigaku no Kōza ni kansuru Shōrei [Administrative Directive on Chairs in the National Universities], Administrative Directive No. 23 (1954) of the Ministry of Education.

[48] "Daigaku Setchi Kijun" [Standards for University Chartering], Administrative Directive No. 28 (1956), Article 5, sections 2 and 3. On this see Terasaki, "Daigaku Setchi Kijun" passim.

[49] See Part 2, section 2, subsection 3.

[50] CKS '71, Part 3, Section 2, subsection 5.

it has fostered between teaching and research, become the basis for a variety of additional discriminations. Allocation of budgets and faculties, student entry quotas, educational programs offered, graduate training facilities, and so on, have almost invariably been closely related to the distinction between "chair system" universities and "course system" universities.

As far as budgeting is concerned, the two systems were essentially equal in 1949. By 1951, chair system personnel were receiving twice the funding per person as course system faculty. By 1965, this figure was three times as much and the gap continued to increase.[51] Amano, relating these factors to the additional variables of geographical distribution of incoming students and employment patterns following graduation, distinguishes three fundamentally different types of national university that have emerged: central, national and local.[52]

The so-called central universities represent the most prestigious educational institutions in Japan, constituting a group made up of the seven prewar Imperial universities plus three others. These institutions are organized almost exclusively on the chair system, rather than the course system; they have the bulk of the graduate programs and research facilities; they attract students from throughout the country; train them in all fields; and their graduates hold prestige positions throughout all sectors of society.

There are also ten universities of the so-called national type. These

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51 WP '64, 54-55; Kaigo and Terasaki, Daigaku Kyōiku, 150; "Kokuritsu Daigaku" [National Universities] in Shimizu Yoshihiro (ed.), Nihon no kōtō Kyōiku [Japanese Higher Education], 200.

52 Amano, Ibid., passim.

trace their ancestry primarily to arts and language institutions of the prewar period, and they are now organized on a course rather than a chair basis and have limited graduate facilities. They retain some truly national character in student body and alumni, however, even though the latter group remains primarily in the fields of literature and art.

Finally, the category Amano labels local universities, as the name indicates, is made up of institutions that draw students primarily from, and return them to, the specific geographical areas in which they are situated. Their prime function has been training such individuals for local white collar posts, most notably in the teaching field. These too are organized on the basis of courses, not chairs; they offer limited programs and they have disproportionately few graduate and research facilities. Table 7-1 indicates some of the more significant statistical distinctions among the three types with the powerful position of the ten central universities being most clear.

Consequently, the distinction made between the functions of teaching and research forms a link in the broader policy of differentiating higher educational institutions along discrete functional lines. This particularization of institutions has begun to create, if it has not already created, a tracking system for higher educational institutions in which each track corresponds to some particular occupational or vocational category, quite in accord with business demands.

These combined policies of institutional specialization have been only one base of the government's overall policy toward increased occupational relevance and specialization within higher education, and represent only a partial, primarily bureaucratic response, to the demands of big

Table 7-1

Internal Comparison of National Universities

	Central	National	Local	Total
1. # Schools	10	10	55	75
% of total	(13.3)	(13.3)	(73.4)	(100.0)
2. Annual # students (entry quota '67)	17,647	3,344	42,940	63,931
% of total	(27.6)	(5.2)	(67.2)	(100.0)
3. # Educational personnel	42,245	4,205	53,384	99,834
% of total	(42.3)	(4.2)	(53.5)	(100.0)
4. # Graduate courses	75	11	89	175
% of total	(42.8)	(6.3)	(50.9)	(100.0)
5. Annual # graduate students (entry quota '67)	7,653	536	3,788	11,977
% of total	(64.0)	(4.5)	(31.5)	(100.0)
6. # Research institutes	55	2	13	70
% of total	(78.5)	(2.9)	(18.6)	(100.0)
7. Budget (billions ¥)	115.5	10.4	120.0	246.0
% of total	(47.0)	(4.2)	(48.8)	(100.0)

Sources: #1, 3, 4, 7 are 1969 figures calculated on the basis of data in Mombushō, Mombushō Dai 97 Nenpō 204-209.

#2, 5 from Amano Ikuo, "Kokuritsu Daigaku," in Shimizu Yoshihiro (ed.), Nihon no Kōtō Kyōiku 191.

business. Its policies regarding "manpower production" have been the additional aspect of the overall response. The latter has involved the increase of scientific and engineering graduates both in absolute numbers and as percentages of the total student body on the one hand and the decreased general educational requirements within the university curriculum

on the other.

<u>Manpower Production</u>: Specialization has been the watchword for changes among institutions. Similarly, it has been the dominant trend in the more specific area of curriculum changes and student training within these institutions. The business community, as was noted earlier, made consistent demands during the 1950s and 1960s both for more specialized training within higher educational curriculums and for a greater "production" of graduates in scientific and technical fields. The establishment of the higher technical schools and the specific national training institutions went part way toward meeting these demands, as did the functional distinctions that emerged among national universities; the government, however, moved in two other areas to meet "production" demands. Again, the bulk of the policymaking involves conscious bureaucratic and intraministerial changes, brought about with minimal inter-camp conflict, and only limited public visibility. The two aspects of the government's scientific "manpower production" policy were first, the increase in specialized course requirements and second, the dramatic increase in the "production" of scientists and engineers graduating from universities.

As was noted earlier in this chapter, the new system of higher education set up by the Occupation sought to provide a broad based general education for the first two years as a prelude to more specialized courses for upperclassmen. The <u>de facto</u> regulations that established this pattern were the University Standards formulated in 1947 by the University Accreditation Association, under the direction of SCAP and CIE officials. These standards were developed as the basis for a university's becoming a member of the Association, that is they were the standards for accreditation of a university by its institutional peers. Although

technically private regulations, they were accepted and utilized by the Ministry of Education as the basis on which to charter universities as well.

As originally drawn up in July, 1947, and revised in June, 1953, the standards provided for two years of broad liberal arts education, setting up specific credit requirements in the areas of foreign language, physical education, specialized courses and general education. All universities were required to offer two or more foreign languages with a minimum of eight credits each and all universities were required to establish general education programs with a minimum of 15 courses, three or more to be offered in each of the three major sub-fields of humanities, natural sciences and social sciences.[53] Students were required to earn a total of 36 of their 124 credits to be earned in each of the three major sub-fields. In short, it was necessary for all graduates to have had some exposure, usually three or four courses, within each sub-field, and to devote the bulk of their first two years to the general education program, foreign language training, and physical education. Only after this would more specialized work in one's major field be undertaken, this to continue for the following two years.

There was strong opposition to this arrangement, with the big business federations particularly levelling the charge that the general education program was too broad, lacking sound integration with subsequent specialized programs, and repetitious of much of what was done or should have been done in high schools. In its more extreme manifestations the

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53 Daigaku Kijun, Article 7.

argument was also made that general education was simply irrelevant in an age of specialization.[54]

The government responded to these charges by a consistent reduction in the official requirements for general education. In June, 1954, two governmental directives were issued exempting medical and dental programs from the University Standards. Then in 1956 the government issued a Ministerial Directive called the University Chartering Regulations which affected all courses of study.[55] The new requirements accepted the existing three field division for general education programs; however they required a university to offer 20% fewer courses in each than did the old standards. Moreover, geography, education and astronomy were dropped from the possible course offerings for general education while psychology and statistics courses were added to the category.[56] Meanwhile, although universities were still expected to offer two foreign languages in principle, they could offer only one "if there were special circumstances related to the type of faculties or courses set up in the

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[54] On the problem of general education see inter alia, Inō Keigo and Nishibori Michio, "Daigaku ni okeru Ningen Keisei ni kansuru Iken Chōsa, III" [Opinion Survey Concerning Personality Development of the Students in Higher Education; Part 3] 192; Kokuritsu Kyōiku Kenkyūjo Kiyō [Bulletin of the National Institute for Educational Research] No. 69 (December 1969), 41-54. In an open-ended survey of the strong and weak points of university graduates among employers, the authors found only 72 of 355 who favored the educational system. Of these only 40 cited as desirable such items as breadth of knowledge, diversity and wide perspectives as among student advantages. In contrast, 162 of 353 cited negative points about university graduates, the major criticisms being lack of specialized knowledge, weakness in basics, poor general education, etc. See also Yoshimura Toru, "Ippan Kyōiku" [General Education] in Shimizu, Nihon no Kōtō Kyōiku, 101-144; Murakami Yasuaki and Himai Osamu, "Kyōiku," in Uchida and Eto, Atarashii Daigaku, 139-148; WP '64, 44-45.

[55] Daigaku Setchi Kijun.

[56] Article 20, clauses 2 and 3.

university."[57] Furthermore, the notion of "basic education" courses was introduced. Courses eligible for consideration in this category were introductory or prerequisite courses for subsequent specialization,[58] as many as eight of which could be offered in fulfillment of the 36 general education credits needed for graduation. These new regulations thereby weakened considerably the requirements for a university's overall offerings in general education and foreign languages and allowed specialized courses to be included in the calculation of the general education requirements needed for a student's graduation.

Business pressures against the general education program continued despite these changes, some of which were echoed by official government investigative reports. The 1963 report of the Central Education Council contained heavy criticisms of even the revised version of the general education program, for example. In that year too a special research committee was established to investigate the University Chartering Standards, and after two years it submitted a report on the problem to the Minister of Education[59] that stressed throughout the need to strengthen specialized and basic education and to eliminate any minimum standards for general education.[60] Academic groups were quick to criticize such a totalistic proposal,[61] and it never secured implementation. In August,

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[57] Article 21.

[58] Article 19, clause 2; Article 23.

[59] For composition of the committee see Mombu Nenpo, '63, 104. For report see Mombushō, Atarashii Daigaku Setchi Kijun: Ippan Kyōiku [The New University Chartering Standards: General Education] 113-36. (Hereafter Atarashii Daigaku. . .)

[60] See Section 5, clause of report, Ibid., 128.

[61] See Nihon Kyōiku Gakkai Daigaku Seido Kenkyū Iinkai reaction in

1970, however, a second major set of revisions, less total than that proposed in 1963, was made by the Ministry of Education, again by the use of a ministerial directive.[62]

Under these revisions, the requirement that a university offer a minimum number of courses in general education was dropped completely. Instead the new requirements allowed each university individually to determine its own required courses and the number of units of instruction it would offer in general education. The graduation requirement of 36 credits in general education was retained; however, whereas before a minimum of 12 credits had to be earned in each of the three sub-fields, the new provisions required no sub-field specifications, so long as a total of 36 hours was earned, making is possible for the general education requirement to be met by a school or a student with courses almost entirely within only one of the three major sub-fields. Moreover, the new regulations allowed up to 12 credits of "basic" courses in one's specialization to be substituted for portions of the general education requirement. These requirements were loosened even more for foreign students and for those in medical and dental programs. In addition, the library requirements in general education were reduced.[63]

The government, therefore, by the power of two directives, managed to cut rather drastically the general education requirements for both

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Kyōikugaku Kenkyū, Vol. 33, No. 1 (March 1966), 91-95, for a reaction to the draft report. See also the reaction of the Association of National University Presidents in Atarashii Daigaku. . . 137-154 and that of the University Accreditation Association, 155-162.

[62] Directive No. 21, 1970.

[63] Atarashii Daigaku . . . See also Zadankai, "Kaizensareta Daigaku Setchi Kijun," [The Revised University Chartering Standards] Tōki no Ugoki (October 1, 1970), 75-101.

universities and students. And insofar as the entire process involved primarily the allowance of exceptions to existing rules, rather than the governmentally-directed enforcement of new rules, the changes were of a much more divisible nature to which individual universities could respond in an ad hoc manner. The nature of the issue was thus qualitatively different from the required changes in the area of university administration, where changes were mandated throughout the entire system.

Beyond their immediate and visible impact on general education requirements, the changes allowed by the government also legitimated the entire thrust of specialization within the university. The upwardly-oriented student, faculty member or administrator is not too subtly made aware that big business and the government are strongly committed to specialization, and many have trimmed their academic sails accordingly.[64] General education has thus taken on the character of a hurdle to be cleared ancillary to, rather than the intellectual development process essential to, any serious intellectual "race."

Significant as these changes have been, the government's response to the demands for increased specialization has been most noteworthy and committed in its program to increase the number of graduates in the fields of science and engineering. The earliest efforts in this area were undertaken exclusively by the Ministry of Education, primarily through its power to establish the entry quotas for each faculty of each institution of higher education. According to a 1964 Ministry of Education document, "an increase in the number of enrollees in science and engineering departments . . . has been attempted every year since the inauguration of

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64 See for example Ōgose, et al., "Yanaihara Kara . . . ."

the new schools system."[65] As noted in the previous chapter, however, this entry quota has proven at best a rough approximation of the actual number of students entering a particular faculty, and the results of the early and annual efforts, while not insignificant, by no means met the actual demands being made by the business world that was facing massive expansion and economic growth. A more systematic, coordinated and long-range plan was developed in 1957, the key aim of which was to increase by 8,000 the number of freshmen enrolled in science and engineering departments over a five year period.[66]

During the first three years of the plan, the quotas were generally met; even these figures, however, proved to be well below the changing needs foreseen by industry and economic planners. A more coordinated and massive effort was clearly called for, and in February, 1959, the government established the Council for Science and Technology as an organ of the Prime Minister's office. The council, which consisted of, among others, the Prime Minister, the Ministers of Finance and Education, and the Ministers of State for Economic Planning and Science and Technology, was to coordinate the actions of the various related government agencies and to provide for comprehensive development of the government's policies for science and technology.[67] This step marked a considerable advance in the demonstrated level of concern by the government to meet the purported needs of the big business world, not only for increased

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65 WP '64, 100.

66 Standards '64, 25.

67 Council for Science and Technology, Outline of the Council for Science and Technology, 103. The entire organizational plan is in Tabata, VIII, 147-49.

numbers of scientists and technicians, but more generally throughout the science field.[68]

One and a half years later, the Council issued an extensive plan that became the keystone for a variety of coordinated government activities in science and technology. Among other things, the proposal, entitled "A Comprehensive Plan for the Advancement of Science and Technology in the Next Ten Years," contended that between 1960 and 1970 Japan would face estimated manpower shortages in the science and technology field of 170,000, in the medical field of 50,000 and in the engineering field of 440,000.[69] In the same month the Economic Council, an advisory committee affiliated with the Economic Planning Agency of the Prime Minister's Office, issued a document that was to become the basis for Japan's phenomenal growth during the decade of the 1960s, "A Plan for the Doubling of the National Income." This document declared among other things that "the most important thing in long term planning for economic growth involves a numerical guarantee of, and an increase in the quality of, our scientists and technicians."[70] In March, 1961, the Science and Technology Agency issued a series of recommendations in the field that concluded with a statement that the universities must increase the number of students in the sciences and engineering, and they must consider

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68 It is worth noting that a key concern in Japanese industrial circles at the time was the preservation of national control over critical areas of industry, and the IBM acquisition of the French computer firm, Machines Bull, and IBM's consequent dominant position in the French computer industry was viewed as a prelude of what might happen to Japan if its science and technology fields were not developed and protected from foreign influence.

69 Science and Technology Agency, Governmental and Administrative Organization in the Field of Scientific Research, 32. (Hereafter, Governmental and Administrative. . .)

70 Nomura, Seisaku . . . , 667.

policies to alleviate quickly the pending shortages that could be a key impediment to economic growth.[71] The responsibility for alleviating these shortages was placed on the Ministry of Education and on the individual universities, both public and private. The need for substantial government aid to reach these goals was clearly recognized in all the reports.

A number of coordinated steps were taken by the relevant government agencies to achieve the proposed expansion in science and engineering students. Several of these necessitated Diet action; the bulk were handled exclusively within the bureaucracy. In March, 1961, a bill was passed to set up temporary National Institutes for training science and technology teachers.[72] This bill ran into some opposition, particularly from the Japan Science Council, but passed rather easily; it provided for three-year programs affiliated with nine of the major national universities, and sought to alleviate some of the teaching needs that would be met by the proposed increases.

The necessary funds for the overall increases in facilities and enrollment were budgeted by the Finance Ministry in coordination with the various other governmental agencies and in September, 1961, the Ministry of Education issued a plan to increase the number of students in science and technology departments by 16,000 per year starting in 1961.

This shift in the departmental enrollment pattern was achieved again through essentially bureaucratic means: changes in the entry quota for specific university departments, encouragement of and ready permission to establish or expand existing science and engineering departments,

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[71] Tabata, I, 71.



[72] Tabata, VIII, 434-5.

and financial inducements. Special accounts were established for private university expansion in the sciences,[73] and subsidies were made available under the Budget Execution Rationalization Law. Under this latter, faculties of universities could apply for subsidies to the one or more ministries or government agencies and once funds were granted the reviewing agency would receive periodic reports on the basis of which they could modify or revise the subsidies.[74] Many of the actions taken by the Ministry of Education were carried out exclusively through directives or internal decisions; the subsidies were part of the budget process and went through the Diet along with the entire national budget; the comparatively small sums involved and the limited nature of debate and refinement of the budget that results from Diet debate virtually isolated the process from significant public debate.[75]

The main outlines of the expansion were formulated in 1960-61; subsequent refinements, however, took place. As noted, for example, the initial increase sought by the Ministry of Education was 16,000 per year. The business federations responded quickly that such an increase would be insufficient[76] and eventually a goal of 20,000 per year increase was established for the years 1961-64. This too was subsequently revised upward on almost an annual basis.

Beyond this, additional government groups reformulated in minor ways certain aspects of the proposed increases, or took, or sought to take, steps that would further advance and legitimate the overall policy.

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73 A special subsidy to encourage science education in private universities was begun in 1956. See WP '64, 133.

74 Governmental and Administrative . . . , 40-41.

75 On the Japanese budget process see John C. Campbell, "Contemporary Japanese Budget Politics."

76 "Gijutsu Kyōiku no Kakkiteki Shinko saku no Kakuritsu Suishin ni

The economic Advisory Council in a 1963 proposal entitled "Countermeasures Toward the Problem of Developing Human Talents for Economic Growth" refined many of the proposals and rearticulated the need for increasing the numbers and quality of Japan's science and engineering personnel.[77] The Committee to Investigate the Constitution in 1964 issued a report that called for some constitutional statement on the desirability of close cooperation between education and industry.[78] In 1969, a Labor Ministry survey contended that the number of technicians in the area of manufacturing was only 84% of the requirement and urged greater efforts to fulfill this need.[79] On balance, however, despite the minor revisions and further urgings, the basic policy set in 1960-61 was the key operative policy for the decade, one that was quite successful in increasing the numbers of scientists and technicians.

From 1960 to 1970 the coordinated government efforts resulted in more than a doubling of the number of science and engineering faculties, and in a 2.6 fold increase in the number of science and engineering graduates.[80] Moreover, there was a significant shift in the fields in which students were enrolled. In 1960, 18.2% of the total student enrollment was in the fields of science and engineering; by 1969, this figure was up to 23.9%. Even more significant, within the national universities

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kansuru Yōkō" [Demands in Regard to the Establishment and Promotion of a Policy for Epochmaking Advances in Technological Education], Nomura; Seisaku . . . 682-83.

77 Ibid., 683-700.

78 Nagai Kenichi, Kenpo to Kyōiku Kihonken [The Constitution and Bases of Authority in Education], 247.

79 Governmental and Administrative . . . , 33.

80 Kagaku Gijutsuchō, Kagaku Gijutsu Hakusho [Science and Technology White Paper], 101; Governmental and Administrative . . . , 33.

where the government efforts were most direct, the figure rose from 24 percent to 33 percent in these fields.[81] Further shifts in the same direction are still expected.

The composite that emerges then is of a government policy consciously formulated and implemented to alter the structure and content of the higher educational system in a way to make it increasingly specialized, occupationally-oriented and responsive to the demands of big business. The policy has involved the increased differentiation and specialization of higher educational institutions and curriculum and the increased production of science and engineering specialists graduating from such institutions. The process whereby these changes have been brought about has, for the most part, been bureaucratic. Bureaucratic directives have been the key to most of the shifts in the general education requirements, to the differentiations made between universities on the chair system and those on the course system, and to many of the proposals to differentiate further among higher educational institutions. Bureaucratic action increasing entry quotas and making financial inducements more or less available were a substantial force in increasing the number of science and engineering departments, as well as the number of scientists and engineers, during the decade of the 1960s. In nearly all cases, bureaucratic advisory committees were a key device in the generation of concrete policy proposals.

In virtually all of these cases the policies of the government were effected with minimum opposition. The only significant opposition came from the Junior College Association over the attempt to force the junior

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81 Standards '70, 51-52.

colleges into the mold of prewar technical colleges. Similar to most studies of pressure group politics, this case was resolved by a compromise in which both sides received substantially what they wanted.

Opposition in most other cases was blunted or virtually non-existent. Financial measures, for example, could be argued in the annual budget hearings, but only on the basis of ad hoc appeals that amounted to highly disagregable matters that could be dealt with on an individualistic basis. No substantial collective movement ever emerged around the problem of the government's financial measures.

Entry quotas too were ad hoc. Bargaining between individual universities and the Ministry of Education occurred on most occasions, but again agreements could be made on a case by case basis. And to the extent that the government's attempts at expansion into science and engineering were congruent with the desires of most private universities to expand anyway, there was little argument from the universities about these inducements.[82]

General education had never been very popular with those trained under the prewar system, and never really gained widescale public support, and the government's efforts to reduce these requirements was opposed primarily by liberal educators. Insofar as the changes involved exceptions to rules rather than mandated changes, though, the individual universities affected and groups of administrators were rarely opposed; at worst those who disagreed with the changes could always retain stricter requirements.

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82 The actual government supervision over the uses to which these monies could be put was lax as well, and frequently sums were appropriated for science and engineering faculties, but were used instead for other fields. Harada interview.

The specific proposals to expand the number of science and engineering facilities and graduates often came in for general criticism from the political left in the form of opposition to the close ties between industry and the university (sangaku kyōdō). But in this area the most frequent concern was less with the broad changes that were taking place and much more with specific ties established between the universities and specific projects with military overtones.[83] The broader aspects of the shifting policies on specialization were given minimal attention.

At the time of the 1956 administrative directive establishing the new "University Chartering Standards," for example, the academic community and the political left were curiously silent. The only public statement of opposition appears to have been that of the Japan Teacher's Union denouncing the directive as reactionary and claiming that "it essentially prohibits research activities in the new system universities, reducing the bulk of the national universities to the status of [prewar] technical colleges." Beyond the issuance of such a statement, however, the union did nothing.[84] Throughout the postwar period progressive groups have similarly issued one or another form of general denunciation about the growing ties between the university and industry and most statements or actions by the Ministry of Education or the Central Education Council fostering such ties have occasioned some verbal response from progressive political parties or organizations. Rarely, if ever, have these gone beyond pro forma charges that all such activities are being made exclusively in response to "the demands of monopoly capital."[85] Such rhetorical

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83 See for example, Tokyo Daigaku Shimbunsha Henshūbu, Daigaku Mondai [The University Problem], Chapter 5.

84 Terasaki, "Daigaku Setchi Kijun," 41-42.

85 Nihon Kyōshokuin Kimiai, Kokumin no tame no Daigaku [Universities for the People] 29.

genuflections aside, there has been little genuine activity within the progressive camp aimed explicitly at altering conservative policies in this area.

Much of this must clearly be attributed to the nature of the issues involved: low affect, high specificity, explicit scope and high divisibility. Furthermore, in almost all cases the changes in policy have been carried out through the almost invisible processes of the bureaucracy, with little opportunity for non-conservative groups to exert an early, formal and visible impact on decisions. Lastly, attention must be given to the fact that the bulk of the policies have been pushed by big business federations having a great deal of internal political strength and intimate connections to the major organs of the LDP and the government. These groups have also formulated their demands in a manner very difficult to oppose. The demands have been formulated in very generalistic terms, with particular stress being laid on their contribution to national economic growth. Japan's progressive camp has, in general, found it exceptionally difficult to argue with the phenomenal growth achieved under LDP governments during the late 1950s and the 1960s, and the business community, legitimately or not, has been able to convince both the government and large sectors of the public that its demands for specialization and differentiation are necessary for the continuance of that growth. The result has been that issue definition has been far less dichotomous than was shown to have been the case in issues of university administration and the government's policy of responding to business demands by increasing specialization and institutional differentiation has been effected rather easily by the bureaucratic devices over which the conservatives exercise almost total control. At the same time the process has been more conscious

and to some extent more conflictual than the incrementalism of enrollment expansion. In short, the process has been something relatively midway between the other two cases.

CHAPTER EIGHT

CONCLUSION

The most striking characteristic of Japanese policymaking which emerges from this study is its diversity. In contrast to those case studies of decision making or policymaking which analyze single decisions or policies made at specific times and places, and in contrast to the broader macro-theoretical approaches which formulate broad generalizations about policymaking regardless of time and place, this study has concentrated on a limited number of cases over a broad, but distinct and finite time period. As a result, it has been possible to analyze specific decisions in some depth, recognizing their discrete and individualistic characteristics, while at the same time highlighting certain underlying commonalities and patterns. The result has been an emphasis on both similarities and mutabilities, isolating broad and distinct patterns of policymaking while at the same time taking account of the further modulations of each specific case within these broad patterns.

While it makes no pretensions to being a mutually exclusive and totally comprehensive typology of policymaking patterns, this study does suggest that at least three clearly identifiable policymaking patterns can be found in postwar Japan: policymaking by camp conflict, policymaking by incrementalism and pressure group policymaking. These patterns differ from one another in terms of the degree of manifest conflict, in the open or closed nature of the process, and in the relative weight of different governmental and non-governmental organs in the actual formulation of policy. Which pattern is most nearly approximated in any individual case is a function of the interaction and combination of two different types of variables. One set, labelled issue variables, involves the affect, scope and divisibility of the particular issue; the other set, labelled

political variables, involves the relevant legal requirements governing the policymaking process and the organizational strength and mobilizability of the political actors most heavily involved in it.

The limited number of cases prevents any precise numerical analysis of the contributions made by the individual variables to the process of policymaking, but at the same time, it is clear that in the cases examined, the variables recur in a high degree of synchronicity with one another. At the one extreme of policymaking by camp conflict, for example, the issue of university administration was clearly the most highly affective of those studies, as well as being the broadest in scope and the most difficult to disaggregate. In addition, it almost always arose in the context of legislative proposals requiring Diet action, and which would clearly and directly affect the fortunes of large numbers of significant and comparatively easily mobilizable political actors. The result was always a publicly visible process involving high participation and mutual conflict between Japan's two political camps. At the same time, significant variations occurred among all three of the major cases of administration studied, with only one, for example, resulting in the successful passage of government legislation altering relations between the universities and the government.

Representing something of a polar opposite was incremental policymaking. The issue of enrollment expansion lacked almost any meaningful historical affect and was a broad, unspecific and easily disagregable issue. Never requiring any specific legislation and influencing no major organizations or political actors in any significant and particularistic ways, expansion was almost exclusively dealt with through bureaucratic

devices, in the form of easy processing of charter applications, non-enforcement of certain minimum legal standards concerning quality, discretionary funding flexibilities and a heavy reliance on private sector universities and market mechanisms. Almost no clear-cut decision to expand enrollments seems ever to have been made; however, this area shows how easily policy can result from the combination of several discrete decisions, each one of which has come about through a slightly different process, and no one of which independently has the scope or comprehensiveness to be called a policy by itself.

Occupying close to a midpoint on most of the issue and political variables and in the actual policymaking process as well was the case of specialization and differentiation of higher education. The issue was distinctly more affective than enrollment expansion, but in no way as emotional as administrative issues; far less disagregable than enrollment, but again not so comprehensive as administrative issues; and with a probable scope both narrower and more specific than enrollment but not so broad as administration. Politically as well, specialization and differentiation occupied a midpoint of sorts: it affected the well organized and mobilizable business community quite specifically, but few other groups saw any immediate consequences for themselves, therefore pressure on the government for action tended for the most part to be unopposed. When it was opposed in the case of the efforts to make the junior colleges more occupationally relevant, the government solution was a pluralistic compromise, with both sides winning large measures of what each had sought. And finally, most of the steps demanded some, but only limited legislative action, being solvable for the most part through bureaucratic means, although means more conscious and directed than were used to expand enrollments.

These cases suggest the necessity to analyze both politics and issue content in order to understand which particular policymaking process is more or less likely to occur in any particular case. For it is the combination of the two, not either in isolation, which correlates most directly with the patterns of policymaking analyzed. Again, no claim of exclusivity or totality is advanced for the three patterns examined. They are explored only in the context of a very limited number of cases within the admittedly narrow area of higher education. Moreover, there is a distinct theoretical possibility that many policies will be formulated as a result of hybrids of the different patterns analyzed here. At the same time, these three are congruent with most existing case studies of Japanese policymaking and it is expected that further research will demonstrate their representative nature while at the same time allowing for their greater refinement and elaboration.

Although the broad thrust of this study has been an analysis of policymaking processes, certain limited conclusions about the substance and evolution of Japanese higher educational policies can also be advanced. Major changes were fostered in higher education by the U.S. Occupation in all three areas under investigation. The Americans sought to bring about a more open, autonomous and generalist system than existed in the prewar period. The close controls of the government were to be checked, as was the functional differentiation of institutions and specialization of educational content which had dominated the prewar system. At the same time, greater egalitarianism of opportunities for students, and more substantial equality among institutions was sought. Not all of these goals were actually achieved under the Occupation, but even more certainly,

there has been substantial movement away from several of the Americanist thrusts of the Occupation-induced changes.

In a sense, the policy area which has shown the greatest continuity with American aims and changes has been the area of democratization of enrollment opportunities. There, the actual changes induced by the Occupation were not as great as is often imagined. Nevertheless, there can be no question but that substantial democratization has taken place since over one-quarter of the college aged population was, by the early 1970s, receiving some higher education, giving Japan one of the highest ratios of continuity of education in the industrial world. This conclusion emerges despite the fact that nothing approaching actual equality in the quality of institutions has taken place, despite the fact that opportunities are not equally available to both sexes, despite the fact that there has been a substantial decline in the overall quality of the educational facilities in most areas of higher education and despite the fact that the heavy reliance on impoverished private institutions and the minimal commitment of governmental funds to higher education has meant that this expansion of educational opportunities has not been felt equally by all social classes in Japan. Yet despite all of these limitations, the conclusion still emerges that there has been substantial movement toward expanded, and more equal opportunities in higher education.

At the same time, it is clear that these emerging opportunities have been for an education substantially different from the very general training in the four year liberal arts college that was envisioned by the Occupation forces. The establishment of the junior college and higher technical school systems, plus the expectation that additional new types

of functionally differentiated institutions [illegible] of the seventies make this clear. So too, although to a lesser extent, does the differentiation which the government has fostered among the national universities, whereby a limited number of institutions have been heavily funded allowing them to maintain high level research and graduate facilities, while the bulk of the rest have been relegated to less prestigious functions.

Perhaps the most visible trend in the universities, and one which has also meant a reversal of Occupation policies, has been the shift toward a more specialized system of higher education. Institutions have become more functionally specialized, and the general education courses offered have declined in proportion to the increased demands for technically trained graduates. A massive program begun in 1960, and continued into the seventies, has increased substantially the number and proportion of graduates in the fields of science and engineering, and has resulted in a decline in the relative importance of general education, social science and the humanities within higher education. All this has been in response to demands from the industrial sectors of society for a more occupationally-relevant system than that which was set up between 1946 and 1952. The trend itself is unmistakable, although it is difficult to evaluate normatively: one of the great problems of the university in any industrial society involves striking a sensible balance between legitimate, but inherently one-sided occupational needs, and the university's own historical, but often dangerously ivory-towered responsibility to serve society as something more than a mere processing plant for technocrats. How well the Japanese system has fared in this delicate balancing

act must remain largely a matter of debate by those with competing visions of the ideal equilibrium.

It is in the area where the greatest political battles have been fought that it is most difficult to assess any particular trend. Japanese progressives have been quick to suggest that starting with the "reverse course" during the Occupation there has been an unrelenting effort by the government to increase its control over all actions on campus, and to abridge the autonomy of the university and to check particularly the powers of the faculty conference. Unquestionably, many such government efforts can be cited; on the other hand, the great bulk of these efforts, prior to 1969, were singularly unsuccessful in the face of persistent and unified opposition by the academic community and the progressive camp. At the same time, the successful passage of the 1969 University Control Act may well signal a greater government willingness to exercise far stricter controls over the universities than it has been able to in the past.

The actual impact of the law, in terms of utilized government powers has actually been rather minimal. The law is only a five-year temporary measure and the provisions allowing the Minister of Education to close universities undergoing sustained violence have not actually been used.

From another perspective, however, the formal provisions and implementations of the law represent its least significant aspects. The law's real impact lies more in its practical effect on the centralization of powers within the individual university, in the actual curtailment of student protest, and perhaps, as some recent events suggest, in the bolstering of a new willingness of the Ministry of Education to exercise powers over individual universities not affected in any way by the law itself.

The law quite definitely had the desired effects on campus protests. University presidents, faced with the alternative of ending protests on their campuses or coming under the provisions of the law which would allow the Minister of Education to suspend all operations in the university, almost unanimously chose the former course of action. Police on campus, once an event capable of generating flames of protest among even relatively conservative academicians, became a relatively common occurrence throughout the country during late 1969 and early 1970. In October 1969, 77 universities were undergoing major protests, but with the passage of the law, university administrators began to call in police at the slightest indication of student activism and such actions dropped off sharply. By December the figure was down to 38, by January it was 15, and in February only 8 universities were undergoing significant protests.[1] By mid-1970 virtually all protests had ceased. The new willingness by university administrators to act against protesting students under the threat of being closed by the provisions of the new law actually obviated any need for the Minister of Education to use the powers given to him. The law therefore served to centralize power on campus, both <u>de jure</u> in its provisions and <u>de facto</u> in the rapid assumption by administrators of positions of initiative and control.

Although the original provisions of the law provided for its expiration after a five year period, the government began actions in 1972 to make it permanent suggesting therefore that further centralization of authority and control by the government was in the offing.

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1 <u>Standards '70</u>, 30.

Such centralizing aims of the government can also be seen in that the Ministry of Education, soon after the law's passage, became much more willing than it had previously been to take strong actions against individual universities acting in ways which displeased it. For example, the Ministry began refusing to appoint university presidents selected by procedures legal within the universities, but at odds with ministerial orientations. In many cases, such refusals were based on the fact that students, or student organizations, in some way participated in the selection or veto of certain choices,[2] while at Kyushu Univeristy Inoue Seiji was duly elected by the faculty, only to find that his outspoken criticisms of the government and of police actions on campus resulted in the Ministry's refusal to accredit his election.[3]

Additionally, the Ministry began to hold up funds for some universities whose actions it opposed. In the summer of 1970, for example, in the spirit of university reform which followed the protests of the late 1960s, Toho University selected a temporary faculty chairman, and two heads of affiliated hospitals who were assistant professors, rather than full professors, as was expected of all administrators. The Ministry of Education quickly suspended all research and construction aid money to the school on the grounds that this constituted an illegal action.[4]

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2 In regard to the refusal to appoint the elected President of Kobe University, see Mainichi Shimbun, February 16, 1971. At Hokkaido, the refusal to appoint Sunazawa as Chairman of Education may be cited as well. Ōhashi, Shiryō, 42-55. For other incidents see 1-68.

3 On this see Ōhashi, Shiryō, 17-42.

4 Asahi Shimbun, June 17, 1971, "Kyōiku Kaizō" [Educational Restructuring Series].

How directly such microcosmic actions by the Ministry of Education can be attributed to actual changes in the power relations between the government and the universities is difficult to establish. Obviously none of them are based on powers granted by the law itself. The law, however, in addition to the formal changes it made, represented a significant symbolic shift in the balance of power between government and university, and it would appear that this symbolism has transformed relations even more than the law itself. These few actions however must be viewed only as suggestive of an increased desire and willingness by the government to exercise greater controls over the universities. They do not warrant the conclusion that the government has dramatically increased its powers over the university, and will continue to do so. On the other hand, they are significant enough to foster concern that even further alterations in the power balance between the universities and the government may be forthcoming. If this were to happen it could signal a significant weakening of the internal autonomy of the Japanese universities and a return to many of the controls that proved so awesome during the 1930s and 1940s. That certain transitions have already occurred in this direction can not be denied.

On the basis of the findings concerning policymaking processes and higher educational policy in Japan, it is also possible to advance several broader comments on the nature of postwar Japanese politics. What emerges most strongly is the need for refinement of many easily held assumptions about either the inherent similarities or uniquenesses of most aspects of Japanese politics. This is particularly true for policymaking but it holds also for statements about such things as the role of particular

government institutions, such as the Diet or the bureaucracy, or for comments about the role played in Japanese politics by big business, LDP factions, or the opposition parties. The case studies make it clear that meaningful generalization depends largely on the specific content involved. For example, the Diet was a significant focus of action in most areas of university administration, but was totally irrelevant to enrollment expansion. LDP factional politics were hardly involved in any of the cases, big business was significant only in differentiation and specialization and the opposition parties played very different roles from one issue to the next. The study therefore forces recognition of some of the great diversity in Japanese political life.

Overarching such diversity however is the hegemonic pluralism examined in Chapter Four. This can be seen in all of the case studies. The bureaucratic influence over policymaking is constant, especially in the reliance on bureaucratically-dominated advisory committees and on bureaucratic directives and communications. Moreover, the general ability of the conservative camp to achieve its policy ends is almost constant. This is so in areas where it could rely on closed, bureaucratic processes of policymaking such as prevailed in enrollment expansion, and to a lesser extent in differentiation and specialization. But it was true as well in the 1969 passage of the University Control Act.

At the same time, emphasis on the hegemonic nature of much of Japanese policymaking should not obscure the fact that it is pluralistic as well. If different groups in Japan lack the unfettered participation in the policymaking process that is so readily presumed to be a component of open pluralism, many areas of policymaking still remain significantly

open to non-conservative groups and parties. At a bare minimum these groups often set the outer limits on what the government can achieve without causing major fissures in social serenity.

Ironically, the power of these groups has seemed to be the greatest in the areas where the conservatives seemed to care the most, notably in the efforts to alter the university administrative system. Certainly the ability of the Japanese progressives to join academics in successfully blocking government efforts in this area in 1953-54 and 1960-63 proved them to have significant political capabilities. This occurred despite the fact that the Diet, which was the focal point of policymaking efforts, was under the clear majoritarian rule of the conservative LDP. Although in principle they are also able to operate quietly behind the policymaking scenes to influence the government, in the cases examined they were largely uninfluential in those areas of policy dominated by bureaucratic policymaking, where their channels of effective communication were minimal.

Finally, in addition to the fact that the hegemony of the conservative camp is well-tempered by elements of pluralism, it is necessary to realize that there are genuine disadvantages to fluid, all encompassing, open choice among alternatives on all issues of public policy, as the <u>immobilisme</u> of France under the Fourth Republic or Italy since the end of World War II makes clear. There can be no question but that the conservative camp has exerted increased control over the organs of public policymaking, even as their electoral totals continue to ebb. Yet they have provided political leadership and control that has met many of the major challenges facing the country in the area of higher education. At times it has done so in ways which must be applauded as inherently favorable to democratic

principles, such as enrollment expansion. And such actions, emerging as they did from a very closed process raise a question about the importance of claims made for the necessity of "open" policymaking to achieve democratic aims. Nevertheless, this policy has been only superficially egalitarian, while many other areas of government policy, particularly in administration, specialization and differentiation have provided either direct and particularistic benefits to limited sectors of society, or else hold forth the potential for direct abridgement of such democratic essential academic freedom. On balance therefore, it becomes difficult not to argue that the greatest potential for democracy in policymaking and in policy is likely to result from the more open, not the more closed, processes.

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