

INFORMATION TO USERS

This material was produced from a microfilm copy of the original document. While the most advanced technological means to photograph and reproduce this document have been used, the quality is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original submitted.

The following explanation of techniques is provided to help you understand markings or patterns which may appear on this reproduction.

1. The sign or "target" for pages apparently lacking from the document photographed is "Missing Page(s)". If it was possible to obtain the missing page(s) or section, they are spliced into the film along with adjacent pages. This may have necessitated cutting thru an image and duplicating adjacent pages to insure you complete continuity.
2. When an image on the film is obliterated with a large round black mark, it is an indication that the photographer suspected that the copy may have moved during exposure and thus cause a blurred image. You will find a good image of the page in the adjacent frame.
3. When a map, drawing or chart, etc., was part of the material being photographed the photographer followed a definite method in "sectioning" the material. It is customary to begin photoing at the upper left hand corner of a large sheet and to continue photoing from left to right in equal sections with a small overlap. If necessary, sectioning is continued again — beginning below the first row and continuing on until complete.
4. The majority of users indicate that the textual content is of greatest value, however, a somewhat higher quality reproduction could be made from "photographs" if essential to the understanding of the dissertation. Silver prints of "photographs" may be ordered at additional charge by writing the Order Department, giving the catalog number, title, author and specific pages you wish reproduced.
5. PLEASE NOTE: Some pages may have indistinct print. Filmed as received.

Xerox University Microfilms

300 North Zeeb Road
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106

75-7672

WEBER, Andrea Lynn, 1947-
THE POLITICS OF POST-INDUSTRIALISM: A
COMPARATIVE INQUIRY.

Washington State University, Ph.D., 1974
Political Science, general

 Xerox University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106

© 1974

ANDREA LYNN WEBER

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

THIS DISSERTATION HAS BEEN MICROFILMED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED.

THE POLITICS OF POST-INDUSTRIALISM:
A COMPARATIVE INQUIRY

By

ANDREA LYNN WEBER

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

WASHINGTON STATE UNIVERSITY
Department of Political Science

1974

© Copyright by Andrea Lynn Weber 1974
All rights reserved

To the Faculty of Washington State University:

The members of the Committee appointed to examine the thesis of ANDREA LYNN WEBER find it satisfactory and recommend that it be accepted.

Taketsugu Tsurutani

鶴谷 武治

Chairman

Jack Walter

Jack Dowell

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The writer wishes to acknowledge the prompt and helpful assistance of members of the thesis committee. Special thanks are extended to Dr. Jack B. Gabbert for his thorough editorial advice and to the committee chairman, Dr. Taketsugu Tsurutani, for stirring my interest in the study of the post-industrial society and for providing patient and insightful professional guidance.



THE POLITICS OF POST-INDUSTRIALISM:

A COMPARATIVE INQUIRY

ABSTRACT

by Andrea Lynn Weber, Ph.D.
Washington State University, 1974

Chairman: Taketsugu Tsurutani

The study of political change and development has customarily focused on Third World rather than advanced industrial nations because it has been implicitly assumed that the latter are stable and modern. Recently, however, scholars have begun to re-examine customary ideas about the stability of modern democracies and have suggested that they may be entering a new era of change. This era is commonly termed "post-industrial."

This dissertation explores some of the political--as opposed to economic, technological, or social--features of post-industrialism. Because so few of the studies of post-industrialism go beyond an investigation of the United States as a post-industrial society and are consequently noncomparative in nature, the present study includes cross-national data wherever possible.

Post-industrialism is defined in terms of labor force: in a post-industrial nation, the largest segment of the labor force is employed in the service sector. This differs from the pre-industrial society, where most of the workers are farmers and miners, and the industrial society, where factory workers comprise the bulk of the labor force. As defined above, eight nations are post-industrial: the United States, Canada, Israel, Australia, New Zealand, Great Britain, Sweden, and Japan.

The dissertation first presents a simple model of national development in order to orient the concept of post-industrialism historically. The model is based upon two interrelated spectra, the technological-industrial and the socio-political. Technological advancements periodically accumulate and, as a result, nations move from pre-industrialism to industrialism and from industrialism to post-industrialism. In each stage the panoply of technological changes that make possible these occupational shifts triggers socio-political change. Consequently, flux replaces stability and uncertainty replaces predictability. Nations in the early stages of industrialism are generally termed "transitional" and, in the present study, post-industrial nations are referred to as "trans-modern."

Second, consideration is given to the symptoms of trans-modernity. It is suggested that these symptoms are similar to those of transitional nations: (1) political mobilization and participation flourish, and (2) traditional political institutions cannot adequately channel burgeoning demands.

Third, attention is given to those challenges of post-industrialism that contribute to trans-modern tensions. Three challenges are discussed in detail: (1) growing mobilization among service sector employees, (2) the lag between slow-to-change institutions of the industrial era and fluid demands of the post-industrial era, and (3) fissures in symbolic control.

Fourth, it is suggested that the degree to which these challenges are destabilizing varies according to the unique historical, social, and political makeup of each post-industrial nation; i.e., nations respond differently to similar challenges. The dissertation investigates this problem by comparing and contrasting two post-industrial nations with dissimilar backgrounds--Japan and Sweden. It suggests certain variables that might affect how a nation

responds to post-industrial challenges and that might profitably be considered in comparative studies of post-industrial societies.

The study concludes with the observation that post-industrialism is a valuable analytical device for studying change in advanced industrial democracies. Not only does it generate new ideas for comparative inquiry but it bids us to re-examine traditional assumptions about the role of these nations in political development.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	iii
ABSTRACT	iv
LIST OF TABLES	ix
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS	xi
Chapter	
I. INTRODUCTION	1
Statement of the Problem	1
Review of the Literature	11
II. SYMPTOMS OF TRANS-MODERNITY	25
Mobilization in Post-Industrial Societies	26
Deficiencies in Traditional Institutions	31
III. SERVICE SECTOR CONFLICT	47
Significance of Tertiary Labor Activity	55
Post-Industrialism and Tertiary Activity	61
Tertiary Agitation and the Industrial Era	72
IV. INSTITUTIONAL LAG	82
Environmental Politics	83
Summary	104
V. FISSURES IN SYMBOLIC CONTROL	112
The Importance of Symbols	112
Power Variations in Advanced Industrial Democracies	115
Symbolic Fissures	124
VI. COMPARATIVE INQUIRY: JAPAN AND SWEDEN	130
Japan	132
Sweden	147
Summary	165

Chapter	Page
VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS	182
BIBLIOGRAPHY	191
APPENDIX	207

LIST OF TABLES

Table	Page
1. Examples of alternative political behavior	32
2. Frequency of anti-government demonstrations, United States, United Kingdom, Japan	33
3. Participants in 216 demonstrations, September 16-- October 15, 1968, U.S.	34
4. Incidence of riots, 1956-1966, U.S.	35
5. Party identification of the electorate, 1940-1968, U.S.	37
6. Voting intention, 1970-1973, Great Britain	39
7. Number of tertiary work stoppages in selected post- industrial nations, 1960 and 1969	48
8. Working days lost per tertiary work stoppage in selected post-industrial nations, 1960 and 1969	50
9. Public employee work stoppages, 1958-1968, U.S.	53
10. Occupation expectation by social class, Vancouver, B.C.	65
11. Level of education upon entering labor force, Japan	66
12. Women as percentage of civilian employment in selected advanced industrial nations	71
13. Working days lost due to labor disputes in selected advanced industrial nations	76
14. Private disposable income, private consumption expenditures, and private savings, 1959-1968, Japan	84
15. Opinions on industrial development in four post-industrial nations	91
16. Acquisitive and post-bourgeois value preferences, by age cohort, in six advanced industrial nations	93
17. Percentage of each major occupational group voting for each party in Dunedin Central Electorate, New Zealand, 1960	99

Table

Page

18. Voting by occupational groups in Presidential elections, 1952-1972, U.S. 100

19. Opinions on energy controls, by occupational groups, December, 1973, U.S. 102

20. Share of scientific research and development expenditure by industry and government in major industrialized countries, 1967 120

21. Satisfaction among youth in four post-industrial nations 133

22. Percentage of ex-bureaucrats among major officials of the Liberal Democratic Party 139

23. Indicators of industrial costs in post-industrial nations 141

24. Voting according to occupational group, November, 1960, Japan . . . 143

25. Various factors considered in voting, 1968, Japan 144

26. Indicators of leadership commitment to transforming change in post-industrial nations 150

27. Elite appraisals of past protest group activity, Sweden 151

28. Elite predictions of future protest group activity, Sweden 152

29. Elite predictions of future opportunities for mass political participation, Sweden 153

30. Recruitment of Commissioners, 1905-1967, Sweden 156

31. Representation of Swedish interest organizations in parliament 158

32. Instances of civil violence, 1969-1971, Japan 208

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure	Page
1. Model of national development	4
2. Post-industrial nations defined by labor force, 1970-1971	8
3. Public ratings of Congress, 1963-1974, U.S.	38
4. Number of work stoppages in tertiary sector by industrial group, 1964-1968, U.S.	52
5. Work stoppages in state, county, and municipal government by type of work, 1958-1968, U.S.	54
6. Average annual density of sulfur oxides in Japan's main cities, 1957-1967	85
7. Copper and steel consumption and GNP per capita, U.S.	87
8. Mercury consumption, 1946-1968, U.S.	88

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Traditionally the study of political development has focused on Third World nations, variously described as developing, modernizing, changing, and transitional. The assumption underlying this customary focus has been that highly industrialized Western democratic nations not only are developed, modern, and stable, but also collectively provide a standard by which to evaluate the development of Third World nations. Recently, however, scholars have begun to cast a more critical eye on the complexion of these "modern" and "developed" nations and suggest they may be enmeshed in a largely unanticipated period of change, an era commonly termed "post-industrial." The present dissertation assumes that the study of political development should not be reserved for Third World nations but should include post-industrial nations as a separate category of analysis.

Statement of the Problem

Numerous schemes for classifying nations have alternately prospered and languished since the days of Aristotle. Some are complex and liberally sprinkled with jargon,¹ others are comparatively unsophisticated and lucid,² and some are fairly neutral³ while others unapologetically reflect contemporary values.⁴ Classification schemes are useful shorthand and organizational devices but they must be scrupulously re-evaluated lest they blind researchers to changing political realities. Two classification schemes which have particularly enjoyed post-war popularity also appear to be

suffering from myopia: (1) pre-industrial/industrial, and (2) traditional/transitional/modern. The first refers to industrial advancement, the second to socio-political change. Third World nations are thought of as early industrial and also as transitional, and Western democracies are classified as industrial or modern.

Because many nations are now industrial, the pre-industrial/industrial dichotomy no longer seems adequate. Chile is an industrial nation as is the United States. But is there not a difference in the degree of industrialism of these two countries? The myopia of the pre-industrial/industrial dichotomy has been circumvented by a trail of adjectives that accompanies the mention of highly industrial nations. Western democracies are no longer simply industrial; they are advanced-industrial, super-industrial,⁵ post-industrial,⁶ new industrial,⁷ and service economy⁸ states.

The inadequacy of the traditional/transitional/modern trichotomy is not as innocent in its scholarly impact. This scheme implicitly assumes that Western democracies have reached the end of the line, that they have already passed through critical periods of development and change. While no one seriously argues that Western democracies are fully developed and thus static, social scientists nevertheless plod along under the easy assumptions that Western democracies provide the model of political stability, and that Third World nations are, of all nations, the most obviously and fundamentally "transitional."⁹ But riots, demonstrations, and New Left movements have, among other things, fed a growing suspicion that nations which are no longer "merely" industrial are no longer "merely" modern either.¹⁰ Something is happening which has precipitated largely unforeseen socio-political flux. Political scientists have gingerly commenced inquiries into socio-political change in advanced industrial nations,¹¹ in effect re-evaluating the tendency to confine the study of political transition to Third World nations.

But these initial ripples have been very hesitant: few students have argued with any firmness that post-industrial societies are in a transitional period similar to (but perhaps less fundamental than) that of Third World nations, and few have offered systematic, comparative studies of post-industrial transition.¹² The present study offers an exploratory inquiry into the dynamics of political transition in post-industrial societies. Its purposes are three:

1. to delimit the symptoms of transitional change in post-industrial societies (how do we know that a new era of change is upon us?)
2. to speculate on some causes or contributing factors of transitional political tensions, and
3. to ask which social, historical, and political variables might affect a nation's response to post-industrial challenges.

First, we offer a simple model of political development in order to orient the study of post-industrial transition in a theoretical framework. This model is based upon the two typologies discussed above, the pre-industrial/industrial and the traditional/transitional/modern. A new category is added to each in order to update it: "post-industrial" joins the pre-industrial/industrial dichotomy and "trans-modern" is added to the traditional/transitional/modern typology. These modified typologies are then regarded as interrelated dimensions of national change (Fig. 1).

"Development" implies growth, a forward movement, progression, or a series of changes. During the process of national development, a nation acquires the capacity to modify and adapt its institutions in response to ever-changing challenges. With each challenge successfully resolved, a nation is said to have progressed, achieved, developed.¹³

The process of national development is largely irregular and unpredictable. Under certain conditions challenges may accumulate and prove

Technological-Industrial
Spectrum

Pre-industrial ----- Industrial ----- Post-industrial

Socio-Political
Spectrum

Traditional ----- Transitional ----- Modern ----- Trans-modern



Fig. 1.--Model of national development.

troublesome; at other times they may not be so tenacious. A nation may skim through several quiet decades marred only occasionally by periods of turbulence. Or, the decades of flux may be broken only rarely by calm periods allowing the consolidation of political institutions. Each nation, depending on its historical and socio-political makeup and on the intensity of challenges originating from outside its borders, develops or progresses at its own pace.

Although political development is largely idiosyncratic, certain patterns emerge. The model presented here draws out one such pattern by proposing that technological-industrial (T-I) advancements accumulate to produce socio-political (S-P) change. The movement from pre-industrialism to industrialism and then to post-industrialism precipitates at each step basic socio-political change which heralds a new transitional era.¹⁴

Technological-Industrial Spectrum

This spectrum records the advancement and application of scientific knowledge. Technology is the application of scientific knowledge.¹⁵ Knowing how to do certain things is science but applying the knowledge is technology. Industrialism has historically been a major offshoot of technology. It involves the pooling of knowledge, manpower, and money to convert natural resources into finished goods. It requires technology at each step--from the invention of machinery and the harnessing of energy, to the successful marriage of machinery and energy for economically feasible mass production. Because technology necessarily precedes industrialism, these two concepts can be analytically combined, as on the T-I spectrum. As nations become more highly industrialized (hence more technologically proficient), they move along this spectrum.

The degree of industrialism can be measured by the proportion of a nation's labor force involved in industrial pursuits. In pre-industrial nations, like Thailand or Paraguay, the vast majority of the population is engaged in agricultural pursuits. As technology and industry advance, most of the labor force eventually is employed in the industrial, or secondary, sector and the nation is thought of as industrial.¹⁶ Finally, technology becomes so advanced and industrialism so efficient and lucrative that most of the working force is employed in the sector which mainly distributes and repairs material goods¹⁷--the service sector.¹⁸ At this point the nation is post-industrial. Industrialism still lies at the heart of the post-industrial economy, but because industrial workers no longer predominate numerically, we have the ironical statement that "post" industrial nations are actually highly industrialized.¹⁹

The International Year Book of Labour Statistics is relied upon in order to identify post-industrial nations.²⁰ The Year Book breaks down total employment by industry and by occupation. Industries which fall under the rubric "service sector" include:

1. electricity, gas, water, and sanitary services
2. commerce
3. transport, storage, and communication
4. services

Occupational groups in the service sector are:

1. professional, technical, and related workers
2. administrative, executive, and managerial workers
3. clerical workers
4. sales workers

- 5. service, sport, and recreation workers
- 6. workers in transport and communication occupations

The service sector is comprised both of white-collar workers (such as doctors and sales clerks) and nonwhite-collar workers (such as electricians and garbage collectors). It is impossible to distinguish between white-collar and nonwhite-collar in the industrial breakdown; for example, "electricity, gas, water, and sanitary services" includes white-collar executives and garbage collectors. But in the occupational classification, white-collar workers can be isolated.²¹

To identify particular post-industrial nations, we combine measures of the entire service sector and of the white-collar segment of the service sector (Fig. 2).²² Although we do not indicate a clear point at which nations become post-industrial, we suggest a rule of thumb for identifying the post-industrial society: at least 50 percent of the labor force is employed in the service sector as broken down by industrial group, and at least 40 percent falls in the white-collar segment of the service sector. On this basis the United States, Israel, Canada, Sweden, and the United Kingdom are definitely post-industrial. Current data would undoubtedly move New Zealand and Australia closer to these countries. Japan, also, is close enough to be called post-industrial: according to other sources, most of Japan's working force presently is employed in the tertiary sector. When the Japanese labor force is categorized by industry, 49 percent is employed in the tertiary sector, 35 percent in the secondary sector, and 16 percent in primary industries.²³

Socio-Political Spectrum

This refers to the dimension of socio-political change. Traditional nations, such as Thailand and Paraguay, are also pre-industrial. Because




Fig. 2.--Post-industrial nations defined by labor force, 1970-1971.
 (SOURCE: International Labour Office, 1972 Year Book of Labour Statistics,
 Geneva, 1973, pp. 44-277.)

^aStatus and occupational group, 1961.

^bStatus and occupational group, 1962.

^cStatus and occupational group, 1966.

^dIndustrial and status occupational group, 1966.

industry does not lure people to the cities much of the population remains in the countryside where infrequent communications and restricted physical mobility limit exposure to new stimuli. Rural people adhere to centuries-old values that ordain a rigidly hierarchical social structure and a fatalistic attitude toward material progress and social change.²⁴ Political participation is virtually nil, social change is minimal, and the nation is generally stable:

A traditional political system . . . is one in which there is virtually no mobilization of the population for political tasks, no real penetration of the central decision-making apparatus into the lower levels of society, and relatively little participation by the members of society in any institutions of governments.²⁵

Transitional nations, such as Chile and India, are enmeshed in a period of rapid socio-political change, largely precipitated by the advancement of industrialism. Industries lure people from the countryside to the cities, raise their expectations, and introduce class conflict between worker and industrialist,²⁶ all of which disturbs the security of traditionalism. As these nations seek to emulate the modern model, they encounter a series of hurdles which contrasts markedly with the relative stability of traditionalism.²⁷

Modern nations, such as the Netherlands, are highly industrialized and have largely resolved the problems stemming from the onset of industrialism. Tremendous amounts of new stimuli reach the citizens by virtue of their physical mobility and access to mass communications. But despite the continual presence of new stimuli, the social and political structures of modern nations are fairly stable, having previously undergone a gradual consolidation. Social and political flux is minimal.²⁸

Trans-modern states fall in the initial stages of post-industrialism, with its concomitant rapid technological advancement. The nations step from

the relative tranquillity of the modern stage to the uncertainty of a transitional era. More will not be said here: the remaining chapters of this dissertation are devoted to a description of trans-modern politics.

A caveat may be in order here. Although this model of national development posits that T-I change largely precipitates S-P change, it is important to recognize that this generalization cloaks the subtle interchanges of these two dimensions of change. The relation between T-I and S-P conditions is to some extent reciprocal: technology often cannot advance without certain socio-political prerequisites. For example, in the Middle East of the seventh century B.C., technological skills in the cultivation and storage of crops had advanced to such a point that a nomadic way of life had been transformed into life devoted to stationary farming and community development. Despite these advancements, however, "the birth of civilization" did not take root. According to one eminent archaeologist, further technological advancement was impeded by the absence of necessary socio-political transformations such as "systematic urbanization; strong political control and adequate concentration of economic resources."²⁹ Similarly, the series of technological advancements that comprised the Industrial Revolution followed a range of spiritual and intellectual transformations in Europe.³⁰ The Protestant ethic, which lauded the redeeming value of work, has frequently been credited as a major force spurring the inventiveness and enterprise that made possible the Industrial Revolution.³¹ Christianity also nourished the belief that "the universe and, indeed, God himself were rational, governed by universal laws capable of being grasped by man."³² Through the pursuit of knowledge, man was held to be capable of understanding and controlling the ordered universe. Finally, Christianity fostered a "basically hostile attitude toward nature,"³³ and it preached that nature must be conquered by man rather

than joined in a symbiotic relationship with him. The blossoming of these ideas increased man's confidence in his capacity to create substantial changes in his world and convinced him of his duty to do so. From these ideas grew congenial conditions for the series of technological advancements comprising the Industrial Revolution.

In summary, our model of development suggests that historically T-I advancements accumulate and precipitate S-P flux, although we recognize that T-I and S-P change is reciprocal. The period of flux accompanying the transition from pre-industrialism to industrialism has been the target of many political inquiries. But the transition from industrialism to post-industrialism is of recent vintage and needs to be studied in more detail. In this model we take an initial step in this task by christening the post-industrial period of flux "trans-modernity" and treating it as an extension of the traditional/transitional/modern trichotomy.

Review of the Literature

The literature is less than satisfactory for studying the post-industrial society in the broader context of political development, largely because the study of the post-industrial society is relatively recent. The pioneering works have helped us appreciate the vague contours of what the concept post-industrialism entails. However, the political scientist with a special interest in the post-industrial society is not likely to be satisfied with what the literature offers. For the person who desires a more intimate understanding, at least four features of the extant literature hamper the quest: (1) the definitional confusion; (2) the slighting of specifically political features of post-industrial societies; (3) the futuristic orientation; and (4) the parochial concentration on the United States.

Definitional Potpourri

Efforts to define post-industrialism have been quite confusing. An initial problem is posed by those who argue that post-industrialism is a mythical construct which, far from proving useful as a device for analyzing nations, hinders comparative political study.³⁴ But, undaunted, the enthusiastic "believers" in post-industrialism submit a wide variety of definitions.³⁵

Some use a philosophical approach in which they suggest a very broad and/or ambiguous indicator of post-industrialism. According to Christopher Lasch, for example:

Post-industrial society can be said to come into being when capital accumulation has reached the point where scarcity is no longer a major social problem--that is, when the industrial system has developed the capacity to satisfy all the basic human needs.³⁶

Using the end of scarcity as a criterion opens the door to numerous difficulties, including the query, "What are the basic human needs?" Are they minimum survival needs, or the array of created needs which has exploded over the centuries, or abstract needs such as self-fulfillment?

Also popular is the "onslaught" approach to the identification of post-industrialism. Writers using this approach list numerous characteristics of post-industrial societies, leaving the reader to assume that they are the defining requirements of post-industrialism. Alvin Toffler, for example, defines what he calls the "super-industrial" society as a "complex, fast-paced society dependent upon extremely advanced technology and a post-materialist value system."³⁷ Here are several factors: the pace of life, an advanced technology, and novel values. The difficulty in measuring them is obvious, although, in all fairness to Toffler, it should be noted that he was not attempting to give a rigorous definition. Kahn and Weiner are more

thorough. They identify the post-industrial society as one with the following characteristics:

1. Per capita income about fifty times the preindustrial
2. Most "economic" activities are tertiary and quaternary (service-oriented), rather than primary or secondary (production-oriented)
3. Business firms, no longer the major source of innovation
4. There may be more "conservatives" (vs. "marketives")
5. Effective floor on income and welfare
6. Efficiency no longer primary
7. Market plays diminished role compared to public sector and "social accounts"
8. Widespread "cybernation"
9. "Small world"
10. Typical "doubling time" between three and thirty years
11. Learning society
12. Rapid improvement in educational institutions and techniques
13. Erosion (in middle class) of work-oriented, achievement-oriented, advancement-oriented values
14. Erosion of "national interest" values
15. Sensate, secular, humanist, perhaps self-indulgent criteria become central³⁸

Finally, Daniel Bell envisages five characteristics of a post-industrial society:

1. The creation of a service economy.
2. The pre-eminence of the professional and technical class.
3. The centrality of theoretical knowledge as the source of innovation and policy formulation in the society.
4. The possibility of self-sustaining technological growth.
5. The creation of a new "intellectual technology."³⁹

The "onslaught" approach poses at least two difficulties. First, is there a priority ordering to the numerous criteria? Must a nation meet all these requirements to qualify as a post-industrial society, or are certain characteristics more critical than others? Second, how are we to know which nations to study? We are faced with an ambitious description with no subject.

The problem with these approaches is that they set forth a complex description of the post-industrial society first and leave to others the dubious task of identifying individual nations. A preferable approach is to identify post-industrial nations on the basis of a simple quantifiable criterion first and then comparatively study these nations to describe the

features of post-industrialism. Before a character analysis can be drawn, the characters must first be identified. We suggest it is simpler to use post-industrialism in a non-controversial sense first and iron out difficulties later than to be mired down in definitional intricacies at the onset. Daniel Bell used this approach in part when defining the post-industrial society in terms of its labor force, and we adopted that simple criterion also.⁴⁰ This may court oversimplification (some argue against any but a multiple-factor approach) but it has the compensating advantage of allowing a quick identification of individual post-industrial nations.

Political Phenomena

Much of the literature on post-industrial societies avoids discussions of politics.⁴¹ The preponderance of ideas and hypotheses deals not with "political" subjects, such as policy processes or the structure of political institutions, but with subjects more often associated with other academic disciplines. For example, J. K. Galbraith writes about the economic features of the United States as a post-industrial society,⁴² while Faunce, Bennis and Slater, Touraine, and Reich⁴³ focus on what might be called the sociological aspects of post-industrialism. Alvin Toffler asks primarily about the cultural repercussions, as do Theodore Roszack and Ken'ichi Tominaga.⁴⁴ Kahn and Weiner and also Kahn and Bruce-Briggs⁴⁵ could best be described as investigators of the technological facets of post-industrialism. Although these authors may devote a chapter or two to the political features of these societies, it is difficult to extract more than a fleeting understanding of the complexities of political institutions and behavior from these cursory accounts. Even the trailblazer of the study of post-industrialism, Daniel Bell, largely avoids a satisfying discussion of politics in his profuse works on the topic.⁴⁶

Hopefully this limitation is transitory: Although in a perfunctory, semi-organized state, the study of post-industrial politics is receiving increasing scholarly attention.⁴⁷ For example, the 1973 American Political Science Association's convention included a special panel on the politics of post-industrial societies, and the newly formed Center for the Comparative Study of Post-Industrial Societies at the University of Wisconsin will undoubtedly provide a springboard for other political studies as well. But, for the most part, these studies are for future perusal. The extant literature lacks studies displaying a rigorous analysis of the political aspects of post-industrialism.

Speculative

At least until recently, the literature on post-industrial societies has been speculative and futuristic. Although most of the authors assume that at least one post-industrial society, the United States, already exists,⁴⁸ their attention is devoted less to the query of what the post-industrial society is like now than to what it will be like 10, 20, 30, or more years hence (the year 2000 is often used as a reference). This probably is due to the simultaneous development of the study of post-industrial societies and the so-called Futurist movement which has frequently led to an intermingling of the topics. Kahn and Weiner, Kahn and Bruce-Briggs, Bell, Brzezinski, and Toffler all study the post-industrial society in the futurist framework. Kahn and Bruce-Briggs top each suggested characteristic of the post-industrial society with a question mark. It is open to question how much we learn by reading that the post-industrial society will be a learning society? a gentlemanly society? a leisure society?, and so on.⁴⁹ Many of these authors repeat the same fascinating yet tiring themes; for example, the

query: "What is man to do with the great amount of leisure time envisioned for the post-industrial society?"⁵⁰ Further, the tenor of the works range from the optimistic to the painfully pessimistic. On the one hand we are told that the post-industrial society will be abundantly wealthy⁵¹ and, on the other hand, we form a picture of technologically generated stress in which the forlorn human is flanked by death and environmental deterioration.⁵²

Futurist queries are of great moral and practical concern. Yet to reap the full benefit of the scholarly study of post-industrial societies, one must also describe the post-industrial society of the present. Speculation is interesting, important, and enjoyable, but it should be balanced with a rigorous investigation of current events.

Noncomparative

The post-industrial literature tends to be parochial and idiographic⁵³ in its concentration on the United States as a paragon of post-industrialism. By implicitly assuming that what is true in the United States will be true of all post-industrial societies, students inadvertently distort the picture of what a post-industrial society is like and cheat themselves and others of a comprehension of its complexities. For example, in a recent article, Samuel Huntington entices the reader with the title, "Post-Industrial Politics: How Benign Will It Be?" But the reader is promptly disappointed to learn that the discussion, at least in its critical sections, relates solely to the United States. The same holds true for the voluminous works by Daniel Bell.

More recently, studies of other individual post-industrial societies have been added to the literature⁵⁴ and provide a welcome contribution to the theoretical study of post-industrialism.

The least evident type of approach is that which compares two or more post-industrial societies. Here, again, Inglehart's studies of political values provide important exceptions. Also, Schneider and Schneider investigated political instability in "ten of the world's more affluent nations."⁵⁵ Although the authors never mentioned post-industrialism, their methodology points to the feasibility of systematically comparing the wealthiest as well as the poorest nations. Advanced industrial nations do appear to be "moving in a common direction,"⁵⁶ but systematic comparative research of this type is needed in order to chart explicitly and accurately the dimensions of socio-political change in these nations.

The present study seeks to avoid these difficulties. It focuses almost exclusively on political features of post-industrialism; it analyzes current post-industrial tensions (offering predictions only into the very near future); and, although examples and data come predominantly from the United States, Sweden, and Japan (owing to availability of information), care is taken to include cross-national figures and information whenever possible to maximize the cross-national validity of its conclusions.

Chapter 2 delimits the symptoms of trans-modern change. Perhaps belatedly, we describe political features of post-industrial societies that have led people to suggest that a new era of flux is upon us.

Chapters 3, 4, and 5 speculate on some causes of trans-modern tensions. Granted, technological-industrial change provides an initial impetus to change, but a more careful and specific statement is required here. Exactly in what ways do T-I developments trigger S-P flux and tension? Chapter 3 suggests that activism among service sector employees is one of these ways. Chapter 4 suggests that "institutional lag"--as originally developed by Samuel Huntington in reference to Third World nations--contributes to

trans-modern strains, and Chapter 5 posits that technological advancements create destabilizing fissures in the system of symbolic control.

These chapters deal with the symptoms and some of the causes of trans-modern change, in line with the first two purposes of the dissertation. But is it not likely that nations have differing capacities to respond to the same types of challenges? As Daniel Bell has surmised:

. . . [post-industrial societies] may confront a similar core of problems. But this in no way guarantees a common or like response. The response will be relative to the different political and cultural organization of the specific society.⁵⁷

Chapter 6 considers this neglected pursuit. It suggests selected social, historical, and political factors that may affect the way individual nations respond to post-industrialism. Analysis centers on two nations, Japan and Sweden. Finally, Chapter 7 summarizes and concludes the dissertation.

Chapter I--Notes

¹See, for example, Arend Lijphart, "Typologies of Democratic Systems," Comparative Political Studies, I (April, 1968), 3-44; and Fred W. Riggs, Prismatic Society Revisited (Morristown, N.J.: General Learning Press, 1973).

²An example is the classification of nations according to geographical area (Latin America, Western Europe, Southeast Asia) which has long served to organize political science curricula.

³Included is the economic scheme, capitalism/socialism/communism.

⁴These include the totalitarian/democratic and underdeveloped/developed schemes.

⁵Alvin Toffler, Future Shock (New York: Bantam Books, 1971).

⁶This is a term popularized by Daniel Bell. See, for example, Daniel Bell, "Notes on the Post-Industrial Society (1)," The Public Interest, VI (Winter, 1967), 24-35; and "Notes on the Post-Industrial Society (2)." The Public Interest, VII (Spring, 1967), 102-118.

⁷John Kenneth Galbraith, The New Industrial State (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1971).

⁸Victor R. Fuchs, The Service Economy (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1968).

⁹See, for example, Lucian W. Pye, Aspects of Political Development (Boston: Little, Brown, Inc., 1966); Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, eds., Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1960); and Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1968).

¹⁰Advanced industrial nations now receive a variety of titles, including: "temporary society," Warren G. Bennis and Philip E. Slater, The Temporary Society (New York: Harper and Row, 1968); "technological society," Jacques Ellul, The Technological Society (New York: Vintage Books, 1964); "programmed society," Alain Touraine, The Post-Industrial Society, trans. by Leonard F. X. Mayhew (New York: Random House, 1971); "post-modern society," Amitai Etzioni, The Active Society (New York: The Free Press, 1968); and "welfare state" and "post-welfare state"--see M. Donald Hancock, Sweden: A Multi-Party System in Transition? (Denver, Colorado: University of Denver,

The Social Science Foundation and Graduate School of International Studies, 1968), p. 41. The list might also include Zbigniew Brzezinski's "technetronic age" and Harvey Cox's "technopolitan era"--see Victor C. Ferkiss, Technological Man: The Myth and the Reality (New York: George Braziller, 1969), p. 14.

¹¹For example, M. Donald Hancock, Sweden: The Politics of Post-industrial Change (Hinsdale, Ill.: The Dryden Press, Inc., 1972); Claire Abrams and Todd LaPorte, "California as a 'Post-Industrial Society': A Test Case?" Draft of a paper in progress, presented at the 1973 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New Orleans, September 4-8, 1973; Norman Birnbaum, "Is There a Post-Industrial Revolution?" Social Policy, I (July-August, 1970), 3-13; Peter F. Drucker, The Age of Discontinuity: Guidelines to Our Changing Society (New York: Harper and Row, 1969); Samuel P. Huntington, "Post-Industrial Politics: How Benign Will It Be?" Comparative Politics, VI (January, 1974), 163-192; and Taketsugu Tsurutani, "Japan as a Post-Industrial Society," Paper delivered at the 1973 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New Orleans, September 4-8, 1973.

¹²See infra, p. 24, n. 54, for a citation of comparative studies.

¹³See Robert J. Jackson and Michael B. Stein, "The Issue of Political Development," in Issues in Comparative Politics, ed. by Robert J. Jackson and Michael B. Stein (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1971), pp. 19-38, for an excellent summary of the approaches to the study of political development and a listing of the pertinent literature. Reflecting Huntington, Political Order, we realize that as a nation moves toward the goals of political development, the process may be one of political decay with a fundamental breakdown in social and political institutions.

¹⁴This is by no means a novel observation. At least since the days of Marx, people have been studying the relation between technological change and social change. According to anthropologist Leslie White, "The technology is the independent variable, the social system the dependent variable," Leslie A. White, "The Concept of Culture," American Anthropologist, VI (1959), 365, as quoted in Ferkiss, p. 30. John Dunlop agrees: "Technological change has been the underlying factor creating social changes in society," John T. Dunlop, "Introduction: Problems and Potentials," in Automation and Technological Change, ed. by John T. Dunlop (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962), p. 15. Victor Ferkiss is slightly more cautious: "... throughout human history up to the present transitional period, technology has been a necessary but not wholly sufficient cause of the rise and fall of civilizations; technology conditions civilizations and explains much about them, but never completely determines them. . . ." Ferkiss, p. 30.

¹⁵Dunlop, p. 4.

¹⁶It is possible to trace empirically the evolution of industrialism. For example, in 1970, 14.6 percent of the Swedish labor force was employed in the industrial and handicraft sector; by 1900 this had risen to 27.8 percent, and in 1920, fully 35 percent were industrial workers. Hancock, Post-Industrial Change, p. 23.

¹⁷Automation, defined as the automatic or mechanized control of a production process [Richard A. Peterson, The Industrial Order and Social Policy (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1973, p. 411)], has freed many workers from factory jobs. Rather than creating vast unemployment as originally feared, automation has released workers for other types of employment, most notably the selling and repairing of industrial goods. Also, as technology stimulates industrial productivity, the overall wealth of the country grows and this helps finance public service occupations.

¹⁸See infra, p. 77, for a more detailed definition of the service sector. It includes doctors and similar professionals who distribute services, not the goods of industrialism.

¹⁹See, for example, Abrams and LaPorte, p. 6.

²⁰The source used in this section was: International Labour Office, 1972 Year Book of Labour Statistics, Geneva, 1973, pp. 44-277.

²¹They include: (1) professional, technical, and related workers, (2) administrative, executive, and managerial workers, (3) clerical workers, and (4) sales workers.

²²Some have argued--particularly Daniel Bell--that the crucial indicator of the post-industrial society is the white-collar worker. See Bell, "Notes (1) and (2)," and Daniel Bell, "Technocracy and Politics," Survey, XVII (Winter, 1971), 1-24. The view adopted in this paper is that the entire service sector, and not just the white-collar segment, characterizes the post-industrial society. However, the size of the white-collar segment is included in Fig. 2 because it helps one assess the "degree" of post-industrialism; i.e., it distinguishes among various post-industrial societies and may prove helpful in future research.

²³Japan, Public Information Bureau, Information Bulletin 1972 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.p.), p. 79.

²⁴For a description of traditional societies see Peter H. Merkl, Modern Comparative Politics (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1970), p. 51.

²⁵Jackson and Stein, p. 27.

²⁶See, for example, Karl Deutsch, "Toward an Inventory of Basic Trends and Patterns in Comparative and International Politics," American Political Science Review, LIV (March, 1960), 34-57; Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1958); and Merkl, p. 51.

²⁷For discussions of political instability in transitional nations, see Ivo K. Feierabend and Rosalind L. Feierabend, "Aggressive Behaviors within Politics, 1948-1962: A Cross-National Study," Journal of Conflict Resolution, X (September, 1966), 249-271; and Huntington, Political Order, passim.

²⁸See Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966); and Merkl, p. 51.

²⁹James Mellaart, "The Beginnings of Village and Urban Life," in The Dawn of Civilization, ed. by Stuart Piggott, p. 63. The account is from Ferkiss, p. 31.

³⁰This discussion draws upon Ferkiss, pp. 36-54.

³¹Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (London: Allen and Unwin, 1930). See also R. H. Tawney, Religion and the Rise of Capitalism (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1926).

³²Ferkiss, p. 38.

³³Ibid., p. 39.

³⁴For example, Jean Floud, "A Critique of Bell," Survey, XVII (Winter, 1971), 25, contends that the concept of the post-industrial society "is a hindrance to an understanding of modern societies."

³⁵Some do not bother with any introductory definition. For example, Ronald Inglehart, "The Silent Revolution in Europe: Intergenerational Change in Post-Industrial Societies," American Political Science Review, LXV (December, 1971), 991-1017, carried out a major cross-national survey of post-industrial nations without actually defining the concept. Rather, he simply assumed that all advanced Western democracies are post-industrial.

³⁶Christopher Lasch, "Toward a Theory of Post-Industrial Society," in Politics in the Post-Welfare State: Responses to the New Individualism, ed. by M. Donald Hancock and Gideon Sjoberg (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), p. 36.

³⁷Toffler, p. 491, n.1.

³⁸Herman Kahn and Anthony J. Weiner, The Year 2000: A Framework for Speculation on the Next Thirty-Three Years (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1967), p. 25. See also pp. 185-220.

³⁹Daniel Bell, "The Measurement of Knowledge and Technology," in Indicators of Social Change, ed. by Eleanor Bernert Sheldon and Wilbert E. Moore (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1968), pp. 152-153.

⁴⁰We proceeded one step farther by identifying various post-industrial nations. Bell only identified the United States.

⁴¹To avoid an untimely discussion here of what is meant by "politics," it is simply defined as the distribution of advantages and disadvantages to the citizens of a policy. Louis A. Froman, "Politics in Everyday Life," in Readings in Modern Political Analysis, ed. by Robert A. Dahl and Deane E. Neubauer (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968), p. 33.

⁴²Galbraith.

⁴³William A. Faunce, Problems of an Industrial Society (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968); Bennis and Slater; Touraine; Charles A. Reich, The Greening of America (New York: Bantam Books, 1971).

⁴⁴Toffler; Theodore Roszack, The Making of a Counter-Culture: Reflections on the Technocratic Society and Its Youthful Opposition (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1969); and Ken'ichi Tominaga, "Post-Industrial Society and Cultural Diversity," Survey, XVII (Winter, 1971), 68-77.

⁴⁵Kahn and Weiner; and Herman Kahn and B. Bruce-Briggs, Things to Come: Thinking about the Seventies and Eighties (New York: Macmillan Company, 1972). See Ferkiss, p. 279, n.1, for additional sources.

⁴⁶Bell, "Notes (1) and (2)"; Bell, "Measurement of Knowledge"; Bell, "Technocracy." In his latest work, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting (New York: Basis Books, Inc., 1973), Bell devotes only a few pages to a consideration of the politics of post-industrial societies.

⁴⁷See Huntington, "Post-Industrial Politics"; Ronald Inglehart, "Industrial, Pre-Industrial and Post-Industrial Political Cleavages in Western Europe and the United States," paper delivered at the 1973 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New Orleans, September 4-8, 1973; Inglehart, "Silent Revolution"; and Marvin E. Olsen, "Power Trends in Systemic Societies," in Power in Societies, ed. by Marvin E. Olsen (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1970), pp. 370-379.

⁴⁸Kahn and Bruce-Briggs do not think post-industrialism has come yet, pp. 220-231.

⁴⁹Kahn and Bruce-Briggs, pp. 220-231.

⁵⁰See, for example, Henry Winthrop, "The Forthcoming Problems of Leisure in the Post-Industrial Society," Journal of Human Relations (1971), 115-134.

⁵¹Kahn and Weiner generally predict continued wealth and prosperity as does Daniel Bell.

⁵²See, for example, Brian McConnell, Britain in the Year 2000 (London: New English Library, 1970).

⁵³Fred W. Riggs, Administration in Developing Countries (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1964), p. 403, distinguishes between two approaches to an inquiry: the nomothetic and the idiographic. The first is general in orientation and it is "primarily concerned with the formulation of laws and general propositions," and the second is "primarily concerned with unique instances, such as a particular government, case or organization." Post-industrial literature tends to follow the idiographic approach in its description of particular nations, especially of the United States.

⁵⁴For example, Abrams and LaPorte; Hancock, Postindustrial Change; M. Donald Hancock and Gideon Sjoberg, eds. Politics in the Post-Welfare State: Responses to the New Individualism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972); and Tsurutani, "Japan as a Post-Industrial Society."

⁵⁵Peter R. Schneider and Anne L. Schneider, "Social Mobilization, Political Institutions, and Political Violence," Comparative Political Studies, IV, (April, 1971), 69.

⁵⁶J. Rogers Hollingsworth, "Perspectives on Industrializing Societies," American Behavioral Scientist, XVI (June, 1973), 715-739.

⁵⁷Bell, Coming of Post-Industrial Society, p. 114.

CHAPTER II

SYMPTOMS OF TRANS-MODERNITY

Samuel Huntington's model of political transition and instability is elegant in its simplicity and effective in its thrust:

The stability of any given polity depends upon the relationship between the level of political participation and the level of political institutionalization. . . . As political participation increases, the complexity, autonomy, adaptability, and coherence of the society's political institutions must also increase if political stability is to be maintained.¹

Participation and institutionalization are two forces which may or may not grow simultaneously. When participation outweighs the capacity of institutions to adapt and accommodate, "praetorian politics" result. Here "social forces using their own methods act directly in the political sphere,"² and the "wealthy bribe; students riot; workers strike; mobs demonstrate; and the military coup."³ When institutionalization effectively keeps pace with participation, the latter is orderly and channeled, and "civic politics" hold reign. Civic states are modern while praetorian nations are transitional.

In effect, Huntington provides a method of diagnosing political transition: when political and social mobilization far exceed the capacity of institutions to channel the groundswell of demand, the nation is enmeshed in a period of flux or transition. Huntington diagnosed transition in Third World nations; his formula can be used just as effectively to diagnose transition and flux in post-industrial societies. How do we know that a new era of transition--called trans-modernity--is upon us? Following Huntington, the symptoms of trans-modernity are two: (1) mobilization and participation are

on the upswing, and (2) existing institutions lack the necessary capacity to accommodate this participatory surge.

Mobilization in Post-Industrial Societies

Civil Rights

Human rights have been imbued with a new aura of respect in the 1960's and 1970's. Discrimination--the penalizing of those with socially defined "infirmities"--is a highly sensitive rallying cry. Individuals who previously had been the targets of discrimination but who ignored it, either through blindness or resignation, began to rebel against it, and even those not subject to discrimination clamored to denounce it. In these years of mobilization angers have been sparked, words spoken, and action taken.

Outspoken attacks on discrimination have been raised particularly by racial groups, such as black Americans. The 1954 Supreme Court decision, Brown v. Board of Education,⁴ and the 1955-1956 Montgomery bus boycott sparked the black movement; it then hibernated for a time, was tested in the 1960 "sit-ins" and the 1963 March on Washington, and finally erupted in the riots of the 1960's.⁵ As black persons proudly banded together and acted, instead of silently yearning, to end discrimination, the fervor began to spread. By the end of the 1960's the Black Panthers were joined, in rapid succession, by other groups speaking for racial minorities. The Young Lords, Brown Panthers, and Young Puerto Rican Society were formed by Americans of Puerto Rican ancestry; the American Indian Movement represents Native American interests; and Mecha, La Raza, and the National Mexican American Anti-Defamation Committee are but three of the groups speaking for Mexican-Americans. Racial awareness has not stopped at the U.S. borders either. Black Panther groups have also sprung up in Australia (representing

aborigines) and Israel (formed of Jews of African and Asian origin); and Canada's Native Youth Association and the Native Sons of Canada speak for Canadian Indians. A recent addition to this list is New Zealand's Polynesian Panther Party, a revolutionary group claiming to represent the nation's Polynesian minority.⁶

Canada's most serious mobilization problems have stemmed from disputes among English and French speaking groups in Quebec. The Front de Liberation du Quebec, formed in 1963, has been the outspoken and often notorious spearhead of Canada's language controversy.⁷

The fight against sexual discrimination has erupted with renewed vigor in post-industrial societies, particularly in the United States. The Feminine Mystique, by Betty Friedan, is often credited with renewing the American interest in sexual equality.⁸ Bathed and nurtured in the receptive atmosphere of the era of human rights, the "consciousness-raising" groups and feminist activists propelled the issue of women's rights into a full-blown social movement. The National Organization for Women and the Women's Liberation Front remain the mainstays of the movement in the United States.⁹

Various groups speak for women in Canada, including the Voice of Women, the Canadian Women's Club, and the National Council of Women of Canada.¹⁰ Uman ribu (Women's Liberation groups) surfaced in Japan in the late 1960's.¹¹ At present, ribu groups are scattered throughout the country and lack a national organizational structure. They number about 50 and send publications regularly to at least 3,000 women.¹²

Groups protesting assorted other forms of discrimination now emerge regularly in post-industrial societies. Gypsies in Britain have formed the Gypsy Council, American homosexuals have abandoned their closets to form the Gay Liberation Alliance, elderly people are represented by the Gray Panthers,

and mental patients have united in the Mental Patients Union in Britain and the less prosaic Insane Liberation Front in the United States.

Consumer-Rights

David Truman spoke of "potential groups": persons with only tangentially similar interests who could be mobilized in response to perceived threats.¹³ If his book were written today Truman would have abundant examples in the wake of the emerging consumer identity in various post-industrial societies. Individuals with "submerged, potential interests"¹⁴ have uncovered a common element among themselves--their status as consumers.

Shoddy workmanship, unhealthy products, rising costs, and industrial filth have motivated people from all socio-economic strata to join under the banner of "exploited consumer." Japan's jūmin undō groups (jūmin meaning residents of a community; undō meaning a movement) increased nine-fold between 1971 and 1973 and now number about 3,000.¹⁵ These movements predominantly speak for consumers, especially in relation to environmental deterioration.¹⁶ At least 10,000 local disputes currently involve jūmin groups.¹⁷ Also in Japan the Consumer Association has been busily processing the growing number of consumer protests. Between 1962 and 1970 the "number of consumer protests registered through [the association] rose twenty-seven times . . . and . . . protests and petitions about environmental pollution doubled during a recent three-year period."¹⁸

In Sweden, protest groups have been joined by associations such as Environment Center and Alternative City and other community action groups.¹⁹ Ralph Nader's Public Citizen is only one of many consumer groups in the United States, and the Consumers Association of Canada is a major Canadian consumers' group.

In an eloquent passage Theodore Lowi describes the first stage in a social movement--a stage he calls the "Spark of Life":

In Michelangelo's spectacular painting on the Sistine ceiling, God is about to create Adam. Their index fingers are pointed at each other, poised hardly an inch apart. Across that space one can almost see passing the mysterious spark that will begin all human life. Something like that must happen if a mass is to cross the threshold of organizational life. Some observers speak of this as the sudden discovery of common irritants. Others are struck by the emergence and definition of the issue or issues between the emerging movement and society; still others speak of tangential interests and overlapping attitudes. But whatever it is called, it is that sensitive point where people find some basis of interaction--or else the mass will remain a mass.²⁰

Before 1960 the spark among groups flashed only infrequently; since that time the Spark of Life kindles at the slightest heat as people in advanced industrial nations more easily and more quickly join together after "common irritants" are discovered.

In several ways, this quickening mobilization appears to be related to the technological-industrial advancements that are also responsible for the emergence of the post-industrial society. A particularly important factor contributing to political mobilization is the wealth generated by advanced industrialism.²¹ In the first place, industrially generated wealth has made possible a shortened workweek for thousands of workers. Workers who desire to participate may find it easier to do so with their extra leisure time.²² Second, industrial wealth has been accompanied by an improvement in working conditions.²³ Factory workers have benefited from factory modernization, higher wages, and expanded fringe benefits;²⁴ and service sector employees, whose jobs are generally not physically demanding, have come to comprise an increasingly large segment of the total labor force. Freed from an overriding concern with occupational conditions, these workers theoretically can parcel their attention to other political matters. Third, wealth has increased the proportion of citizens attending universities. Since

university campuses are places conducive to the growth of political awareness, university attendance may contribute to post-industrial mobilization. Fourth, rising wealth conceivably has contributed to frustration and, hence, mobilization on the part of economically underprivileged groups. Frustration, according to Feierabend and Feierabend, arises from a discrepancy between "social want formation" and "social want satisfaction."²⁵ When an individual's expectations (want formation) far outpace achievements (want satisfaction), he feels blocked or frustrated.²⁶ Post-war wealth has in effect nourished the social and material expectations of underprivileged groups; using Feierabend and Feierabend's terms, we surmise that wealth has accelerated social want formation. At the same time, satisfaction of these wants has proceeded at a slower pace.²⁷ In the bargaining and consensus political style of a democracy, reform often takes place at a slower rate than many crusaders would wish. Also, deep-seated social prejudices directed at underdog groups obstruct speedy change.

Technological advancements contribute to political mobilization in various other ways. Improvements in the mass media conceivably have fed upon the imitative element of human nature. No longer must citizens rely for information on the written or spoken word (newspapers, magazines, and radios); they can now actually see instances of unconventional political behavior on the television and can more easily appreciate the dynamism, enthusiasm or anger, and determination of political participants. The extent to which television influences behavior remains open to question; but, if nothing else, it demonstrates that unusual or aggressive forms of behavior stand a high chance of being publicized.

Finally, technological advancements have stimulated feelings of the omnipotence of man. Russian and American space accomplishments fed the belief

that human capabilities were of a much broader scope than previously thought. Impatience emanates from the realization that many earthly ills remain unresolved despite the technological capacities to resolve them. Choking cities, inedible fish, and dying birds are regarded as especially unjustified in juxtaposition to journeys to the moon.²⁸ This discrepancy may well have contributed to the rise of consumer and environment crusaders in the post-industrial society.

Deficiencies in Traditional Institutions

Alternative Political Behavior

The justification for claiming that existing institutions are in some measure ill-equipped to accommodate participatory demands stems from actions of the participants themselves: increasingly they opt for "alternative" rather than "conventional" modes of political behavior.²⁹

A glimpse at most introductory textbooks helps one identify "traditional" political institutions: they include formal interest groups and electoral institutions (parties, campaigns, elections). These are the standard channels through which concerned citizens in modern polities seek to influence decision-makers. Lester Milbrath's hierarchy of electoral behavior ranging from very passive (wearing a campaign button) to very active (entering a race oneself) typifies traditional political behavior.³⁰

Political behavior which is not channeled in these traditional ways we call "alternative" (Table 1).³¹ In cases of alternative behavior, participants take it upon themselves to act directly in politics rather than through customary interest articulating channels. As such, where alternative behavior is common, Huntington's description of praetorian politics is apropos. In post-industrial societies, alternative political behavior

TABLE 1.--Examples of alternative political behavior

Type of alternative behavior	Examples
1. Lawful, individual	Sending a box of peanut butter sandwiches to President Nixon to protest high meat prices.
2. Lawful, massive	Demonstrations, sit-ins, boycotts
3. Illegal, individual, peaceful	Lying in front of a bulldozer, flag-burning, pouring blood over draft files
4. Illegal, mass, peaceful	Demonstrations without permits, marijuana smoking sit-ins at town council meetings
5. Illegal, individual, violent	Bombs, assassinations, politically motivated kidnappings
6. Illegal, mass, violent	Using weapons at demonstrations, Indians storming Bureau of Indian Affairs offices

appears to be common in the United States, Canada, Japan, and Great Britain; it is less common in Sweden and Australia, and virtually nil in New Zealand.

Demonstrations were among the post-war forerunners of current alternative behavior patterns. In Japan, the United States, and the United Kingdom anti-government demonstrations started to increase in number about 1960 (Table 2). Since that time demonstrations are frequently called for issues ranging from environmental causes to social problems.³² Amitai Etzioni compiled a list of "every incident of protest" that occurred between September 16, 1968, and October 15, 1968, in the United States.³³ Finding that 216 demonstrations were reported in that month-long period, he concluded that one may accurately call demonstrations a "daily occurrence in contemporary America."³⁴ As Table 3 reveals, a wide range of social interests were represented in these demonstrations.

TABLE 2.--Frequency of anti-government demonstrations,
United States, United Kingdom, Japan

Year	United States	United Kingdom	Japan
1956	4	0	0
1957	2	0	0
1958	1	0	0
1959	2	1	0
1960	22	6	8
1961	3	2	1
1962	7	2	3
1963	60	5	4
1964	11	4	2
1965	13	1	1
1966	13	0	0

SOURCE: Adapted from Arthur S. Banks, comp., Cross-Polity Time-Series Data (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1971), pp. 289-295.

The civil rights and consumer groups discussed above appear at first glance to be traditional interest groups. But the tactics these groups employ often include those of the alternative genre. For example, Native Americans do not simply lobby for legislation in Washington, D.C.; they occupy Alcatraz Island and storm Bureau of Indian Affairs offices. The Australian aborigines are not content with the ballot; they demonstrate when the Queen arrives³⁵ and camp in front of Parliament.³⁶ At least one Japanese manual on "jūmin power" encourages disobedience and suggests which types of disobedience are most effective for different issues.³⁷ Jūmin groups regularly adopt direct action. In one particularly dramatic case, 150 fishermen and their wives created havoc as they protested a chemical plant's mercury discharge:

The fishermen . . . linked about twenty fishing boats together to block access to the plant from the sea . . . [they then] succeeded in stuffing sandbags against the factory's waste discharge pipes. Meanwhile their

TABLE 3.--Participants in 216 demonstrations,
September 16--October 15, 1968, U.S.

Primary participants	Number of demonstrations	Primary participants	Number of demonstrations
Negroes	37	Cuban refugees	2
College students	34	Catholic priests	2
High school students	27	University employees	2
Anti-war	16	Mexican-Americans	1
Teachers	12	Church members	1
Parents	12	"Welfare patrolmen"	1
Hippies	11	Italian-American students	1
Union members	10	Mexican grape pickers	1
Catholics	9	Anti-HUAC	1
Community residents	7	Cafeteria workers	1
Anti-Wallace	7	Hospital workers	1
Prisoners	6	Sanitation workers	1
Welfare recipients	5	Welfare workers	1
Puerto Ricans	4	Professional social workers	1
School children	4	Housewives	1
Pro-Wallace	3	Policemen's wives	1
Anti-Humphrey	2	"Voters"	1
Pro-war	2		228 ^a

SOURCE: Adapted from Amitai Etzioni, Demonstration Democracy (New York: Gordon and Breach, Science Publishers, Inc., 1970), p. 7.

^aThe total number of groups is larger than the number of incidents studied because when two groups participated, both were counted.

wives and other fishermen defied police orders and barricaded the front and back gates of the plant to prevent more than 3,000 employees from getting to work.³⁸

Alternative behavior also includes violence. Table 4 records the number of riots in the United States between 1956 and 1960. Violent alternative behavior has plagued Canada, particularly in connection with her language disputes. The Front de Liberation du Quebec (FLQ) has, since 1963, been responsible for bombing and other violent activities, such as the kidnapping of the British trade commissioner, James Cross, and the kidnap-murder of Quebec's Labor Minister, Pierre LaPorte. Between 1969 and 1972, politically motivated actions resulted in 194 arrests, 236 injuries, and four

TABLE 4.--Incidence of riots, 1956-1966, U.S.

Year	Number
1956	4
1957	4
1958	3
1959	2
1960	8
1961	7
1962	4
1963	19
1964	14
1965	12
1966	16

SOURCE: Adapted from Arthur S. Banks, comp., Cross-Polity Time-Series Data (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1971), p. 295.

deaths. Most of these instances were related to the FLQ and other separatist groups.³⁹ Foreign policy and student-related issues have sparked massive student violence in Japan. Between 1969 and 1972, 5,648 were arrested, 1,206 injured, and five killed in actions relating variously to student rights, the Vietnam War, and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.⁴⁰

In short, boycotts, strikes, "sit-ins," flag-burning, garbage dumping, demonstrations, riots, kidnappings, and other forms of alternative behavior have been experimented with in supposedly stable modern societies.⁴¹ No longer limited to fringe, or marginal groups, alternative behavior--at least of the nonviolent genre--is viewed as acceptable by many who for one reason or another feel stymied in their attempts to make political waves via conventional channels. The willingness to use these channels varies among nations. In a recent international youth poll, 54 percent of the U.S. respondents reported that if dissatisfied they would resort to measures such as demonstrations and strikes, while 38 percent in Sweden and 37 percent in both Japan and the United Kingdom agreed that they would use these tactics.⁴²

Other Evidence of Institutional Rejection

Other evidence, albeit sketchy, reveals public dissatisfaction with traditional political institutions in some post-industrial nations. In the United States, for example, there has been a steady decrease in voter turnout in the last decade.⁴³ Miller et al. report that this turnout is caused not by characteristics of the particular election but by public disillusionment with the government and its institutions. For example, voters and nonvoters voiced equal levels of governmental support. But in 1968 and 1972 nonvoters were less supportive of the government than were the voters.⁴⁴ The authors also found that "confidence in elections remained relatively high for whites but it declined sharply for blacks."⁴⁵ Because black persons also frequently use alternative behavior as a tactic, a relation between political estrangement and alternative behavior is suggested.

Loyalty to political parties has been suffering for the past three decades in the United States. As of 1968, the Independents (those not aligned with either major party) comprised the second largest block in the electorate (Table 5).⁴⁶ The latest polls indicate a further strengthening of the Independents (Democrats 43 percent, Independents 33 percent, Republicans 24 percent).⁴⁷ This assumes new significance in light of the finding of Miller et al. that political estrangement is most noticeably rising among self-proclaimed Independents.

Finally, in the United States the public's rating of Congress has been increasingly negative since 1963 (Fig. 3). This trend was evident well before Watergate-related developments surfaced with their devastating effect on public confidence.

In Japan, it also appears that electoral turnout is on the downswing. The proportion who said that they would vote in 1953 was 62 percent; by 1963

TABLE 5.--Party identification of the electorate, 1940-1968, U.S.

Party identification	1940	1944	1947	1952	1954	1956	1958	1960	1962	1964	1966	1968
Democrats	41%	41%	46%	47%	47%	44%	47%	46%	47%	51%	45%	45%
Independents	20	20	21	22	22	24	19	23	23	22	28	29
Republicans	38	39	27	27	27	29	29	27	27	24	25	24
Nothing, don't know	1	--	7	4	4	3	5	4	3	2	2	2

SOURCE: Adapted from William H. Flanigan, Political Behavior of the American Electorate (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1972), p. 33. Flanigan's sources were the National Opinion Research Center; Survey Research Center, University of Michigan; George Gallup, The Political Almanac, 1952 (New York: Forbes, 1952), p. 37; A. Campbell et al., Elections and the Political Order, p. 13.




Fig. 3.--Public ratings of Congress, 1963-1974, U.S. (SOURCE: Adapted from Seattle Times, March 11, 1974, p. A-12. The data were collected from the Harris Survey, 1963-1974.)

it was 53 percent; and it dropped two more percentage points--to 51 percent--in 1968.⁴⁸ Those disaffected from the political parties (both "nonparty" as well as "anti-party") have risen steadily until they now account for one-third of the electorate. In 1967, 9.4 percent were "antiparty"; by 1972, 15 percent so declared themselves.⁴⁹ Thirty-six percent of Tokyo's electorate--more than those who support any one party--is now disaffected from parties.⁵⁰ Also, support for the Communist party appears to be on the upswing. In a recent election for a House of Councillors seat in the conservative stronghold of Kagawa, the Communist candidate received 16 percent of the vote--four times what the party had received in the last election for the same seat.⁵¹

On the basis of recent elections in other post-industrial societies, it appears that parties which have traditionally amassed a large share of the votes are in danger of losing previously assured votes. The Swedish Social Democrats and the Israeli Laborites scarcely retained their parliamentary edges in the 1973 elections.⁵² The Scottish Nationalist and the Liberal parties of Great Britain experienced a renaissance of support even before the 1973 coal dispute loomed in the headlines (Table 6).⁵³

TABLE 6.--Voting intention, 1970-1973, Great Britain

Party preference	At last election (1970)	April 1973	August 1973	September 1973
Conservative	46.2%	36%	30%	30%
Labour	43.9	41	41	38
Liberal	7.7	20	26	29

SOURCE: London Times, September 14, 1973, p. 1.

In summary, following Huntington's model, one can detect the classic symptoms of political transition and strain in several post-industrial societies. Mobilization is on the upswing at a time when public enthusiasm toward traditional political institutions is at low tide. The public's verbally professed dissatisfaction with institutions and its willingness to use alternative forms of political behavior are critical symptoms of a new era of flux. Alternative behavior is symptomatic of a new era of transition--it indicates that the era of modernity as we have customarily defined it no longer accurately describes advanced industrial nations (particularly the United States, Japan, Canada, and Great Britain). Its occurrence supports the addition of the trans-modern stage to the socio-political spectrum.

Alternative political behavior cannot be explained simply: it has multiple causes. Sometimes alternative behavior which appears to be political is actually nonpolitically motivated. Consider, for example, airplane hijackings. According to psychologists, the hijacker is generally unbalanced. If a hijacker professes political motives, as did a recent Mexican-American hijacker in New Mexico, or the man who planned on smashing the White House in a Kamikaze dive in order to purge the "Watergate cancer," it is probable that he is only attempting to introduce an element of bravado into an otherwise pathetic and desperate act. Similarly, after the Patricia Hearst political kidnapping in February, 1974, two people calling themselves the American Revolutionary Army kidnapped newspaper editor Reg Murphy. However, it is highly unlikely that the kidnappers were interested in political rather than financial ends, especially since the "political" element was added almost as an afterthought.

Other instances of alternative political behavior are motivated by the urge to conform: participants act not out of a personal conviction of

politically motivated goals but out of the urge to bolster their feelings of being part of the mainstream or to court publicity. Behavior is contagious and this contagion is exacerbated by the media's zeal for pouncing on instances of novel behavior and widely publicizing them.⁵⁴

Keeping in mind that these and other nonpolitical factors can play a part in alternative political behavior, we suggest that political conditions more often play a fundamental role. In Chapters 3, 4, and 5 which follow we consider three political factors that contribute to the political strains that in turn lead to alternative behavior: service sector activism, institutional lag, and fissures in symbolic control.

Chapter II--Notes

¹Huntington, Political Order, p. 79.

²Ibid., p. 80.

³Huntington, Postindustrial Politics, pp. 174-175.

⁴347 U.S. 483 (1954).

⁵See Martin Oppenheimer and George Lakey, A Manual for Direct Action (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1964), for a brief history of the black civil rights movement.

⁶New York Times, May 12, 1974, p. 21.

⁷See Robert Moss, Urban Guerillas (London: Temple Smith; Ltd., 1972), pp. 112-129, for a discussion of the Liberation Front.

⁸Betty Friedan, The Feminine Mystique (New York: Norton, 1963).

⁹Ad hoc groups form frequently, such as the Women's Equity Action League, the Women's Affirmative Action Coalition, and the Women's Action Alliance.

¹⁰Frederick C. Engelmann and Mildred A. Schwartz, Political Parties and the Canadian Social Structure (Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice-Hall of Canada, Ltd., 1967), pp. 95-96.

¹¹Frank Baldwin, "The Idioms of Contemporary Japan V," Japan Interpreter, VIII (Spring, 1973), 237-251.

¹²Ibid., p. 238.

¹³David B. Truman, The Governmental Process (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951), pp. 511-516.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 512.

¹⁵Tadashi Yamamoto, "Peasant Uprisings and Citizens' Revolts," Japan Interpreter, VIII (Autumn, 1973), 279.

¹⁶Yasumasa Kuroda, "Protest Movements in Japan: A New Politics," Asian Survey, XII (November, 1972), 948. At the time of his writing, Kuroda estimated that 61 percent of the groups were involved with environmental issues, 20 percent with anti-war activities, 6 percent with immigration policies, and 13 percent with civil rights.

¹⁷Yamamoto, p. 279.

¹⁸Tsurutani, "Japan as a Post-Industrial Society," p. 4.

¹⁹M. Donald Hancock, "Elite Images and System Change in Sweden," Paper delivered at the 1973 Annual Meeting of the American Political Association, New Orleans, September 4-8, 1973, p. 14.

²⁰Theodore J. Lowi, The Politics of Disorder (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1971), pp. 40-41.

²¹Automation and other mechanical improvements have contributed to industrial efficiency. Throughout the century, resources have been extracted and goods manufactured more quickly at less cost. Profits generated through industrial efficiency have, in turn, contributed to the overall level of wealth in industrial nations.

²²See Abrams and LaPorte, pp. 6-7; and Winthrop, passim. For example, the normal weekly number of hours worked per week in Britain in 1956 was 44.2; in 1968 it had dropped to 40.1. Great Britain, Department of Employment and Productivity, British Labour Statistics: Historical Abstract 1886-1968 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1971), p. 70.

²³Inglehart, "Industrial, Pre-Industrial and Post-Industrial Political Cleavages," p. 35.

²⁴This is not to say that workers no longer have significant grievances. See, for example, G. David Garson, "Automobile Workers and the Radical Dream," Politics and Society, III (Winter, 1973), 163-177.

²⁵Feierabend and Feierabend, "Aggressive Behaviors," p. 250.

²⁶Frustration is defined as interference with behavior leading to an expected or desired goal. Reed Lawson, Frustration (New York: Macmillan Company, 1965), p. 14.

²⁷For example, the distribution of wealth in the United States has changed little since the 1930's. According to Robert Lampman, "the share of wealth held by the top two percent of families fell steadily from 1929 to 1949, but then rose between 1949 and 1956." Further "between 1953 and 1962, the share of net worth of the top decile of wealth-holders rose from 58 to 61 percent, and that of the bottom fifth of income receivers fell from 11 to

7 percent." Robert J. Lampman, "Income and Inequality: The 1930s to the 1960s," in Poverty in Affluence, ed. by Robert E. Will and Harold G. Vatter (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1970), p. 51.

In Great Britain, 5 percent of the population owned 79 percent of all personal property in the 1936-1938 period; by 1960, 5 percent of the population owned a relatively unchanged 75 percent. Robin Blackburn, "The Unequal Society," in Power in Britain, ed. by John Urry and John Wakeford (London: Heinemann Educational Books, Ltd., 1973), p. 19.

²⁸See, for example, Abrams and LaPorte, pp. 23-24.

²⁹One reason why institutions may be ill-equipped related to the nature of the issues raised in the post-industrial society. Ronald Inglehart, for example, argues that issues relating to individual value priorities (such as religion, race, and linguistic issues) are surpassing economic issues in salience in post-industrial societies. Significantly, issues relating to value priorities are not as readily amenable to resolution through compromise and bargaining as are economic issues. Because economic issues are based upon money, they allow "incremental adjustments in the distribution of economic benefits" that are "easy to bargain about." Inglehart, "Pre-Industrial, Industrial and Post-Industrial Political Cleavages," p. 50. He is quoting Richard Rose and Derek Irwin, "Social Cohesion, Political Parties and Strains in Regimes," Comparative Political Studies, II (April, 1969), 39. Religious, racial, and linguistic issues (and the like) do not lend themselves to such incremental bargaining. Seeing that institutions of the modern state revolve around the bargaining style, participants of the trans-modern state may choose instead to adopt "confrontation" tactics.

Inglehart's distinction between post-industrial values and industrial values may not be as relevant as he thinks, however. Those religious, racial, and linguistic issues often narrow down to economic, bread and butter, issues. For example, black Americans are deeply concerned about occupational security, desiring to break the "last to get hired, first to get fired" syndrome of which they are victims.

³⁰Lester W. Milbrath, Political Participation: How and Why Do People Get Involved in Politics? (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1965), p. 18.

³¹The reader may note that these are mainly instances of what is often called "anomic" behavior. See, for example, Almond and Powell, pp. 75-76. The term "anomic" derives from anomie (rootlessness and isolation). Those who applied the term to spontaneous and extra-institutional behavior often felt that its propagators were social misfits using "deviant" forms of behavior for their own cathartic or otherwise questionable motives. Anomic came to signify behavior which deviated from the norm. See Philip Resnick, "The Political Theory of Extra-Parliamentarism," Canadian Journal of Political Science, VI (March, 1973), 70, for a discussion of the traditional biases of political scientists in this respect. We use "alternative" as a more neutral term than "anomic."

³²These include, for example, the demonstration of 6,000 of Stockholm's citizens demanding more greenery in their city, New York Times, May 11, 1972, p. 8; and the rally of 15,000 in Japan to promote respect for the aged, New York Times, September 15, 1972, p. 1.

³³Amitai Etzioni, Demonstration Democracy (New York: Gordon and Breach, Science Publishers, Inc., 1970). The month was chosen at random. Etzioni consulted the New York Times and the Washington Post.

³⁴Etzioni, Demonstration Democracy, p. 4.

³⁵New York Times, March 1, 1974, p. 11.

³⁶News Dictionary: An Encyclopedic Summary of Contemporary History (New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1972), p. 16.

³⁷Yamamoto, p. 281.

³⁸Ibid.

³⁹Compiled from News Dictionary, 1969-1972.

⁴⁰Ibid.

⁴¹See Oppenheimer and Lakey, passim, for a broader discussion of direct action in the 1960's.

⁴²Gallup Opinion Poll Index, October, 1973, p. 35. In an American poll 40 percent of the respondents believed that violence was sometimes necessary in order to bring about change in a society. Sunday Oregonian, May 12, 1974, p. 27.

⁴³Arthur H. Miller, Thad A. Brown, and Alden S. Raine, "Social Conflict and Political Estrangement, 1958-1972," Paper delivered at the 1973 Midwest Political Science Association Convention, May 3-5, 1973, p. 65.

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 71.

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 64.

⁴⁶See also Ronald Inglehart and Avram Hochstein, "Alignment and Dealignment of the Electorate in France and the United States," Comparative Political Studies, V (October, 1972), 343-372.

⁴⁷Gallup Opinion Poll Index, October, 1973, p. 20. Among college students, 49 percent now classify themselves as Independents (14 percent identify with the Republican Party and 37 percent with the Democratic Party). Sunday Oregonian, May 12, 1974, sec. 4, p. 9.

⁴⁸Nobutka Ike, "Economic Growth and Intergenerational Change in Japan," American Political Science Review, LXVII (December, 1973), 1202.

⁴⁹Tsurutani, "Japan as a Post-Industrial Society," p. 6.

⁵⁰Ibid. The party support is: 27.5 percent Liberal Democratic Party, 18.3 percent Japan Socialist Party, 7 percent Japan Communist Party, 6.1 percent Democratic Socialist Party, and 5.1 percent Komeito Party.

⁵¹The Japan Letter, No. 22, February 15, 1974, p. 2. See also Taketsugu Tsurutani, "A New Era of Japanese Politics: Tokyo's Gubernatorial Election," Asian Survey, XII (May, 1972), 429-443, for a discussion of disaffection from parties in Japan.

⁵²It is risky to generalize from the Israeli vote because it was virtually a referendum on the government's readiness for, and handling of, the Yom Kippur War.

⁵³Also, an opinion poll taken in 1973 revealed that the floating (nonaligned) voter makes up 38 percent of the British electorate. London Times, September 30, 1973, p. 2.

⁵⁴As a third nonpolitical cause, it could be, as Seymour Martin Lipset argues, that there is always a contingent of people ready to form an "anti-movement": ". . . every yes has a no; every plus has a minus; everything that is, has an opposite. If you reject what is, you often have a limited set of alternatives." Seymour Martin Lipset, "Symposium on Technology and the Counter-culture," in Technology, Power and Social Change, ed. by Charles A. Thrall and Jerold M. Starr (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath and Company, 1972), p. 85. According to Lipset, the "law of limited possibilities" dictates that anti-movements or counter-cultures will historically emerge and diminish. So, alternative behavior might be no more than an historic phenomenon, one which arises from the need to reject what is, and not necessarily as a response to particular political conditions or institutions.

CHAPTER III

SERVICE SECTOR CONFLICT

Sociological research has traditionally slighted the tertiary, or service sector, employee¹ in favor of the blue-collar worker. Tertiary employees have not basked in the scholarly limelight partly because they have been pictured as docile workers who, far from potentially disrupting the political calm (as many feared the manual worker would do), actually contribute to national peace and tranquillity. For one thing, tertiary employees are said to be psychologically aligned with management.² For another, they have traditionally been politically conservative.³ Finally, they do not form a distinct class, such as the blue-collar, or "working" class.⁴ For these reasons the tertiary worker has been seen as one devoted to the status quo and not likely to exacerbate employee/employer conflict.

Recent events belie these assumptions. As Table 7 makes clear, "passivity" is no longer an accurate description of tertiary employees. The number of tertiary work stoppages in five post-industrial nations has increased many fold from 1960 to 1969. While the number of strikes indicates the "strike propensity" of workers, it does not give a complete picture of the seriousness of each strike. "Seriousness" is measured by computing the average number of man-days lost per strike. Table 8 reveals that strikes have also generally become more serious over the nine-year period.

Figure 4 shows the growing frequency of tertiary strikes within the United States. In this figure the slope of strikes by government workers is relatively steep. Other data as well clearly reveal the increasing militancy

TABLE 7.--Number of tertiary work stoppages in selected post-industrial nations, 1960 and 1969

Occupational category	Country	Year	Number of strikes	Percent change between 1960 and 1969 ^a
Commerce	United States	1960	296	+ 66
		1969	492	
	Canada	1960	18	+144
		1969	44	
	Israel	1960	8	- 63
1969		3		
United Kingdom	1960	20	+125	
	1969	45		
Japan	1960	39	+ 92	
	1969	75		
Electricity, gas, water	United States ^b	1960	266	+ 20
		1969	320	
	Canada	1960	6	+ 50
		1969	9	
	Israel	1960	2	0
1969		2		
United Kingdom	1960	28	+157	
	1969	72		
Japan	1960	23	- 22	
	1969	18		
Transport, storage, communication	Canada	1960	31	+ 19
		1969	37	
	Israel	1960	3	+700
		1969	24	
	United Kingdom	1960	179	+202
1969		540		
Japan	1960	185	+147	
	1969	456		

TABLE 7.--CONTINUED

Occupational category	Country	Year	Number of strikes	Percent change between 1960 and 1969 ^a
Services	United States ^c	1960	138	+ 33
		1969	183	
	Canada	1960	7	+814
		1969	64	
	Israel	1960	26	+ 96
		1969	51	
	United Kingdom	1960	18	+206
		1969	55	
	Japan	1960	137	+ 19
		1969	163	
Others	United States ^d	1960	36	+1050
		1969	414	

SOURCE: International Labour Office, 1970 Year Book of Labour Statistics (Geneva, 1971), p. 792-865.

^aPercentages are rounded to the nearest whole figure.

^bU. S. data include electricity, gas, water, transport, storage, and communication.

^cExcluding government and administrative and municipal services.

^dIncluding government administration, government business enterprises, and municipal services.

of American government employees. Table 9 shows the incidence of stoppages by government employees in the United States with figures dating back to 1958. To be noted is the rise of 1900 percent of the average man-days lost per strike.

Figure 5 shows some of the state, county, and municipal government occupations in which the rise in the number of strikes is most pronounced.

The increase in the number of school and library strikes is especially dramatic.⁵

TABLE 8.--Working days lost per tertiary work stoppage in selected post-industrial nations, 1960 and 1969

Occupational category	Country	Year	Man-days lost per strike ^a	Percent change between 1960 and 1969 ^b
Commerce	United States	1960	1551	+ 98
		1969	3069	
	Canada	1960	2432	+153
		1969	6158	
	Israel	1960	235	+450
		1969	1293	
	United Kingdom	1960	250	+ 96
		1969	489	
	Japan	1960	3827	- 79
		1969	795	
Electricity, gas, water	United States ^c	1960	6579	+ 90
		1969	12,593	
	Canada	1960	273	+2237
		1969	6380	
	Israel	1960	36	+236
		1969	121	
	United Kingdom	1960	857	+195
		1969	2528	
	Japan	1960	2236	- 63
		1969	822	
Transport, storage, communication	Canada	1960	947	+153
		1969	1358	
	Israel	1960	577	- 40
		1969	344	
	United Kingdom	1960	3553	- 59
		1969	1457	
	Japan	1960	1986	+ 15
		1969	2274	

TABLE 8.--CONTINUED

Occupational category	Country	Year	Days lost per strike ^a	Percent change between 1960 and 1969 ^b
Services	United States ^d	1960	2203	+ 73
		1969	3809	
	Canada	1960	400	+502
		1969	2408	
	Israel	1960	426	+209
		1969	1316	
United Kingdom	1960	278	+959	
	1969	2945		
Japan	1960	1912	- 63	
	1969	711		
Others	United States ^e	1960	1622	+ 12
		1969	1819	

SOURCE: International Labour Office, 1970 Year Book of Labour Statistics (Geneva, 1971), p. 792-865.

^aCalculated by $\frac{\text{number of stoppages}}{\text{man-days lost in year}}$.

^bPercentages are rounded to the nearest whole figure.

^cU. S. data include electricity, gas, water, transport, storage, and communication.

^dExcluding government and administrative and municipal services.

^eIncluding government administration, government business enterprises, and municipal services.

Although figures on the incidence of government employee strikes in other post-industrial nations are not so readily available, a few examples may suffice to illustrate the growing activity of these workers. In Sweden in 1966 a 26-day teachers' strike involving 20,800 teachers was heralded as the most serious strike in that country since 1945. Joined by sympathetic




Fig. 4.--Number of work stoppages in tertiary sector by industrial group, 1964-1968, U.S. (SOURCE: Adapted from U.S., Department of Labor, Handbook of Labor Statistics 1970 [Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971], pp. 351-352.)

TABLE 9.--Public employee work stoppages, 1958-1968, U.S.

Year	Number	Workers involved	Man-days idle	Average days idle per stoppage (rounded)
1958	15	1,720	7,510	501
1959	26	2,240	11,500	422
1960	36	28,600	58,400	1,622
1961	28	6,610	15,300	546
1962	28	31,100	79,100	2,825
1963	29	4,840	15,400	531
1964	41	22,700	70,800	1,727
1965	42	11,900	146,000	3,476
1966	142	105,000	455,000	3,204
1967	181	132,000	1,250,000	6,906
1968	254	201,800	2,545,200	10,021

Percent increase in number of stoppages: 1593%

Percent increase in average days lost per stoppage: 1900%

SOURCE: Adapted from Pickets at City Hall: Report and Recommendations of the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Labor Disputes in Public Employment (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1970), p. 32.

professionals and civil servants, this strike was surpassed in seriousness only in 1971 when civil servants again went on strike.⁶ Israel also was plagued in 1971 with a wave of strikes by civil servants,⁷ and in March, 1972, the biggest public service walkout in Canadian history occurred when 200,000 Quebec public servants staged a four-day strike.⁸ Disruptive public servant work stoppages also affected West Germany in February, 1974, when two million public employees staged a three-day stoppage which created delays in mail, garbage, rail, and services, and Great Britain in March, 1973, when civil servants staged a series of short strikes in reaction to the government's wage control policy and the rise in food prices.⁹




Fig. 5.--Work stoppages in state, county, and municipal government by type of work, 1958-1968, U.S. (SOURCE: Adapted from Michael H. Moskow, J. Joseph Loewenberg, and Edward Clifford Koziara, Collective Bargaining in Public Employment [New York: Random House, 1970], p. 118.)

Significance of Tertiary Labor Activity

Why study tertiary labor activity? The actions of white-collar workers or garbage collectors do not appear to be capable of seriously undermining the stability of advanced industrial nations, and theories do not admit a vital role for tertiary workers in a capital "R" revolution. Further, of the total number of man-days lost to strikes in post-industrial nations, the service sector contributes a relatively small proportion.¹⁰ One may answer that tertiary labor agitation warrants investigation because any increase in labor strife is apt to have some societal repercussions. Conflict may eventually prove functional, but the process precipitates a change in values, a realignment of animosities among politically active groups, and a change in the relative distribution of resources, all of which may be destabilizing. As such, labor activity is an appropriately "political" topic. But this does not answer why tertiary activity in particular warrants investigation. Three reasons why tertiary activity is uniquely significant are offered below.

Nature of Tertiary Work

Tertiary strikes, as opposed to strikes in the secondary sector, generate a special impact owing to the nature of tertiary work. Tertiary workers deal with an intangible commodity--service. The firefighter douses fires when they occur; the nurse assists in a person's recovery when he or she becomes ill, and a telephone operator connects two persons when one wishes to communicate with the other. These workers act when their services are required. But because they produce a service and not a tangible commodity, a reserve of the products of their labor cannot be stored. The firefighter has no way of storing labor for use at a future time; nor does the nurse, or the telephone operator. Consequently, when service sector employees strike, the

impact is often immediate: no stockpile or inventory of resources can be tapped to alleviate shortages. The costs of a service sector strike can be sudden, visible, and potentially quite serious. A strike of garbage collectors increases the risk of infectious disease, a nurses' strike threatens the efficiency of health services, and a teachers' strike can reap hardships on families in which both parents work. During the strike of San Francisco's public servants in April, 1974, for example, over one million tons of raw sewage was pumped into San Francisco Bay daily, creating health hazards and aesthetically repugnant conditions.

In contrast, workers in the manufacturing sector produce a tangible commodity (manufactured items) for which an inventory or reserve can be built. The impact of secondary sector strikes consequently is less sudden and less immediately serious. For example, if the employees of a light bulb production plant go on strike, the existence of a "light bulb reserve" forestalls an immediate impact. The same holds true for strikes of auto production workers or cannery workers: a lag occurs between the time of the strike and the societal impact. Especially in countries without a compulsory arbitration plan, this lag can be used judiciously for labor-management arbitration. It is possible that a settlement can be reached during this time and the societal impact felt only later and in diffused form (usually through price increases). No such period of grace accompanies the service sector strike.

The service sector strike also differs from the manufacturing strike in the choice it leaves to consumers. The consumers affected by a manufacturing strike generally have at their disposal an alternative course of action when a strike-affected commodity becomes scarce: they may buy a substitute product. For example, if canned vegetables fall in short supply due to a cannery strike, consumers have the option of eating fresh or frozen vegetables.

If a General Motors strike increases the cost of a Chevrolet, the consumer may buy a Ford or an American Motors product.

The consumer's options are not so versatile in a service sector strike. When commuter trains are not traveling, the hapless worker must either spend a great portion of his time driving to work or he may forego work completely. If postal workers stage a slowdown the expectant mail recipient must merely wait for the delayed mail to be delivered. Of course, not all service sector strikes leave the community helpless. The national guard might be called in to clear the streets of accumulated garbage in a garbage workers' strike, or the army might help quench fires in the event of a firefighters' strike. But, in general, scarce service is difficult to replace.

In summary, the immediate impact of the service sector strike, its potential seriousness, and the helpless position in which it places affected citizens--all of which result from the nature of tertiary work--combine to make tertiary strikes potentially disruptive. The recent railway workers' strike in Japan provides ample illustration. There, angry mobs wrought widespread damage in railway stations when their chosen means of transportation was unavailable.¹¹

Nature of the Tertiary Employer

Tertiary activity is also significant because it poses special difficulties for the capacity of the government, as a major tertiary employer, to finance labor demands. The government--whether it be national, state or provincial, or municipal--employs a sizable number of tertiary workers in the post-industrial society. This, combined with the rising militancy on the part of government employees,¹² presents a quandary: at the time that the government is employing more workers who are becoming more militant, the government is just beginning to experience the difficulties of financing the demands of

its employees. These two factors, employee militancy and employer perplexity in financing the outcome of the militancy, are mutually contradictory. The result is a burden placed on the government that cannot be resolved easily.

Governments as employers face special financial difficulties because they cannot, as private corporations, pass on burgeoning costs through price increases.¹³ Bureaucratic costs include not only program expenditures, machine and building costs, and paper work considerations, but also the needs of its employees (wages and fringe benefits). According to Daniel Bell, the government has three options in coping with flourishing costs, none of which is wholly satisfactory.¹⁴ First, it can increase the rate of GNP growth and use the resulting monetary gains to finance the needs of the public sector, but this is inflationary. An inflationary policy is unacceptable both because of its unpopularity and because it will negate the wage benefits granted if relied upon as a long-term financing mechanism. It also is a policy available primarily only to the federal level of government and does not directly help the provincial or municipal levels. Second, the government can raise taxes. But again, this is highly unpopular. Even the Scandinavians, who have been traditionally committed to income redistribution through progressive taxation, are beginning to rebel against what they consider to be excessive taxes.¹⁵ Third, the government can offset rising costs by spurring productivity of its employees. But this is impossible beyond a certain point as William Blaumol succinctly explains in an article outlining grim portends of things to come in the service-oriented society.¹⁶

Blaumol distinguishes between two types of labor: that in which the productivity per man-hour can grow, and that in which rises in productivity are severely limited.¹⁷ Factory workers exemplify the former. In the factory, output per man-hour (productivity) can be extended through

"innovations, capital accumulation, and economies of large scale." Manufacturing allows "progressive productivity"; i.e., a higher quality item can be manufactured at less cost in terms of man-hours. The service occupations illustrate the second form of labor. Here the productivity is "nonprogressive," meaning that past a certain point it is impossible to squeeze any additional productivity per man-hour. Consider the teaching occupation:

Here, despite the invention of teaching machines and the use of closed circuit television and a variety of other innovations, there still seem to be fairly firm limits to class size. We are deeply concerned when elementary school classes grow to 50 pupils and are disquieted by the idea of college lectures attended by 2000 underclassmen.¹⁸

The teacher can effectively teach only a limited number of pupils. No matter what technological advances are introduced, the teacher's efficiency per man-hour remains the same. The ambulance driver is another employee whose productivity is inherently nonprogressive. Despite the improved ambulance engine, the smoother road surface, and the quicker telephone connection with the ambulance company, the driver must still spend time transporting the sick to the hospital: no matter how great the improvements, his productivity per man-hour is limited. Because of the rising cost of living the driver must be paid more for exactly the same productive output.

Concludes Blaumol: ". . . inherent in the technological structure of [service] activities are forces working almost unavoidably for progressive and cumulative increases in the real costs incurred in supplying them."¹⁹ Service sector costs are not offset by improved labor productivity and, consequently, they steadily and stealthily rise. Since the bulk of government employees work in the service occupations, this creates a true problem for the government.²⁰

In summary, the government as a major service sector employer faces significant difficulties in paying its employees in the years ahead. Its

available options run the risk of taxing public patience to an unacceptable degree. This problem is likely to surface at a time when government employees are increasingly vocal in pressing their demands. The contradictory nature of these two forces leads one to predict continuing tertiary labor strife in the post-industrial society.

Political Nature of Tertiary Labor Disputes

The fact that the government employs a large number of tertiary workers makes tertiary strikes significant for yet another reason: they become enmeshed in the political decision-making process. Public employee demands are political issues. Because it is the legislators and government administrators who ultimately decide what the employees are to receive, and because the decisions involve the spending of public moneys, public employee demands relate integrally to the setting of priorities. Government officials must decide who is to receive what resources. Demands by public employees are political also because they can mobilize large segments of public opinion. When public employees strike or engage in wage-related collective bargaining, they are asking the public to pay for services which it may or may not be happy to provide. The extent to which public opinion is mobilized can influence the outcome of the strike.²¹ A sympathetic or indifferent public guards against openly political conflict. But an unsympathetic public can engender a high degree of political animosity which may polarize opinion and unduly politicize the event.

Canada's postal workers' strike of 1970 illustrates some of the difficulties resulting from labor conflict in the public sector. Labor strife began when Prime Minister Trudeau asked Communications Minister Eric Kiernans to reorganize the Post Office Department "in the interests of greater economy and efficiency."²² As it turned out, this effort endangered the job

security of numerous postal employees and posed a threat sufficiently serious to trigger the labor conflict:

The drivers halted work Feb. 3 and stepped up their protest which eventually included violence and vandalism. Truck tires were slashed and scuffles occurred between unionists and nonunionists. Police suspected arson in a fire which destroyed 20,000 pieces of mail in the main Montreal post office March 21.²³

The strike had several political repercussions. For one thing, its policy implications pitted government leaders against one another, creating a "major rift" within the Trudeau cabinet.²⁴ Also, the public was directly affected as the strike was in process because it resulted in the closure of various regional post offices and impaired the quality of mail service. Finally, and most importantly, the settlement of the dispute incurred additional costs to the public. The strike stemmed from a report designed to revive the deficit-ridden post office system. But as a result of the strike, the expected \$82 million deficit actually rose to \$110 million. Postal rate increases compensated for the deficit increase: that is, the public paid for the public employee strike.

In conclusion, tertiary activity poses special problems for the post-industrial society. The nature of tertiary work necessitates a speedy resolution of labor conflict to minimize societal hardships. But the government, as employer, faces or is likely to face problems in satisfying the requirements of public tertiary employees. Since the public must ultimately finance any resolution decided in favor of the employees, its needs must also be considered in labor negotiations.

Post-Industrialism and Tertiary Activity

Are tertiary strikes ephemeral in post-industrial nations, or is the nature of post-industrialism such that tertiary activity is likely to

continue? We suggest that at least three features of post-industrialism forewarn continuing tertiary agitation: (1) white-collar job insecurity, (2) reduction of status differences between white-collar and blue-collar workers, and (3) growth of automation. Except where otherwise stated, these features relate to the white-collar segment of the tertiary sector.

Employment Insecurity

Post-industrialism appears to have introduced a disparity between occupational expectations and employment reality: the number aspiring to white-collar jobs exceeds the nation's capacity to provide white-collar employment.²⁵ The following series of related thoughts attempts to explain the quandary and summarize its implications.

1. The tertiary sector cannot expand indefinitely.
2. Aspirations for tertiary employment are high in the post-industrial society.
3. The number qualified for tertiary employment is growing.
4. Given the potentially fixed proportion of tertiary positions and the expanding body of qualified persons for the positions, it is likely that at some time there will be an excess of persons qualified for work in the tertiary sector.
5. Competition for scarce occupational positions provides an incentive for tertiary labor organization.


1. "The tertiary sector cannot expand indefinitely." In all probability, the tertiary sector, and particularly the white-collar segment, will eventually reach a plateau in post-industrial societies; it is highly unlikely that close to 100 percent of the population in post-industrial societies will be employed in service-related occupations. Just as the agricultural sector ceased growing in the pre-industrial society and the manufacturing sector leveled off in the industrial society, so it is likely that the tertiary sector will reach a plateau in the post-industrial society.

In the first place, industrialization remains the lifeblood of the post-industrial society. Industrialization requires raw materials and then factories for converting these materials into finished products. Although automation has reduced the proportion of workers who must extract or grow the raw materials and who must be involved in the manufacturing process, no one seriously argues that the extraction and production processes will be totally automated. Both the primary and the secondary sectors will always require a certain amount of human labor. The demands of these sectors for human labor limit the number of workers who can be employed in the tertiary sector.²⁶

Tertiary growth is also limited by the nonprogressive productivity of the service employee. The reader will recall William Blaumol's thesis that the costs of employing a service worker rise steadily without a compensating gain in his productivity. The reader will also recall that the growth of government employment is responsible for much of the expansion of the tertiary sector in post-industrial societies. Now, if tertiary expansion is dependent upon the enlargement of public employment, and if the government faces difficulties in coping with the costs generated by its role as public employer, then this clearly limits tertiary expansion.

Blaumol's thesis also relates to tertiary employment in the private sector: nonprogressive productivity may eventually limit the size of the privately financed service sector. Theatrical production is a case in point.²⁷ For the theatrical company to produce a play and not a soliloquy, more than one actor must be employed. For the audience to receive its money's worth, the play must run about two hours. For the actor to remain with the company, his wages must increase with the cost of living. But after increasing the actor's wages, the company does not reap a compensating increase in the productivity of the actor--he still performs the same amount of work in the same

time. The resulting costs must be made up either by cutting back on the props and upkeep of the theater or by raising the price of a theater ticket, or a mixture of both. Blaumol's point is that eventually the nonprogressive productivity of the actor raises the cost of the admission ticket so much that the prospective audience refuses to attend theatrical performances. Blaumol suggests that unless voluntary contributions are used to finance the theater, it will eventually disappear. It is this type of scenario which fuels the suggestion that service sector employment will eventually level off in post-industrial societies, as illustrated in the following diagram.




2. "Aspirations for tertiary employment are high in the post-industrial society." In a recent survey, young people in Vancouver, B.C., were asked about their expectations for future employment. The results of the survey, presented in Table 10, reveal a high value placed upon white-collar employment. The proportion expecting to become professionals (lawyers, doctors, and so on) is striking, especially among those with blue-collar family backgrounds. And there is little reason to doubt that this type of response is representative of the feelings of young persons in other post-industrial societies: white-collar work is generally viewed as attractive. This attraction is partly a result of the premium placed on higher education in post-industrial nations. The key to the good life, young people are told, is through a college education. It is understood that a college degree opens the way to employment in the professions, and it is rare to hear of a person

TABLE 10.--Occupation expectation by social class,
Vancouver, B.C.

Respondent's social class	Respondent's occupational expectation				
	Profes- sional	Managerial	Lower white collar	Upper blue collar	Lower blue collar
Professional	61.8%	0.0%	7.4%	1.2%	7.4%
Managerial	59.6	2.8	6.4	1.8	3.7
Lower white collar	54.6	3.0	10.6	1.5	4.5
Upper blue collar	51.4	1.0	10.7	5.8	3.9
Lower blue collar	58.3	0.0	4.2	4.2	25.0

SOURCE: Adapted from Gary B. Rush, "The Radicalization of Middle-Class Youth," International Social Science Journal, XXIV (1972), 316.

attending college who actually aspires to factory-line work, although some will eventually settle into this occupation.



3. "The number qualified for tertiary employment is growing in the post-industrial society." The simple fact is that increasing numbers of people are being educated in post-industrial societies and are consequently qualified for many types of tertiary employment. Table 11 shows the level of education upon entrance to the labor force in Japan, both at present and

projected levels. The projection indicates that the number of college-educated persons will continue to grow, although at a decreased rate.²⁸




TABLE 11.--Level of education upon entering labor force, Japan

Year	Middle school	High school	University
1960	53.4%	37.4%	9.3%
1971	18.6	57.4	23.9
1975	11.8	59.1	29.1
1980	8.4	61.1	30.5

SOURCE: Adapted from Robert E. Cole, "Changing Labor Force Characteristics and Their Impact on Japanese Industrial Relations," Paper prepared for Yale Advanced Research Seminar Series Japan by 1980 (New Haven, Conn.: February, 1973), p. 11.

4. "Given the potentially fixed number of positions in the tertiary sector and the expanding body of qualified persons for these positions, at some time there will be an excess of persons qualified for work in the tertiary sector." This is merely a verbal summation of factors 1, 2, and 3 above. A gap develops between Q and T as tertiary positions become scarce.

At this point, a caveat is in order. Future contingencies may belie the shape of the A and Q curves. As one possibility, young people may realize that a college education does not necessarily guarantee tertiary employment and may change their aspirations (A) and forego college, thereby

reducing the number of those qualified (Q). Rumblings to this effect are already heard in the United States where a disenchantment with college and the employment situation leads some young people to foresake college education.

But even if various contingencies belie the above assumptions, there still is likely to be a period in which the disparity between Q and T, and A and T is pronounced. For example, Americans are already witnessing a glut on the job market of white-collar professionals. The market for science doctorates is a case in point. Between 1960 and 1965, the average yearly increase in the number of science doctorates conferred was 10.9 percent. Between 1965 and 1972, the yearly increase rose to an average of 11.1 percent.²⁹ But at the same time, the federal expenditure for scientific research and development (one avenue through which science doctorates are employed) has been declining. In 1967 the proportion of the GNP spent on scientific research and development was 3 percent; in 1971 it was 2.6 percent. The amount spent for basic research peaked in 1968 and has since been declining.³⁰

5. "Competition for scarce tertiary positions becomes an incentive for labor organization." The implication of factors 1 through 4 above is that scarcity breeds feelings of job insecurity which, in turn, are precursors of union activity and work stoppages. For example, American college professors suffer from employment insecurity and, partly for this reason, have been slowly but steadily unionizing: by the end of 1971, more than 30 four-year colleges had instituted systems of collective bargaining.³¹

Other white-collar workers are also concerned with job security. For example, the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) ran a recent advertisement which posed this question: "What can AFSCME do for me?" The answer read, "Give you power. Power that will help

decide: Promotion policies, job security, fair hearing of grievances, better wages, pensions and other benefits."³² The primary goals, those meant to catch the eye of the prospective member, relate to job security and promotion. These public employees are being asked to join a union mainly in defense of their occupational security.

Future white-collar employees, those who will face heavy competition in the job market, are also likely to experience feelings of job insecurity and to guard jealously their positions. Assuming, as we do here, that threats do indeed stimulate the formation of associations, it is likely that white-collar unionization will increase in the post-industrial society, both for today's and tomorrow's white-collar employees.³³

Reduction of Status Differences

Rolf Spaehten, the leader of a major German white-collar union, once candidly remarked, "I am not really an inveterate advocate of the class struggle, but we must advance again to avoid egalitarianism."³⁴ Similarly, an official of the Professional Engineers' Association of Australia is credited with the following observation:

Pre-war days have a glamour for the clerk. That was the period, recruits were told, when their seniors built their credit foncier home in Glen Iris and employed part-time domestic help. At the [recent] meeting of Bank Officers . . . , an official said that as a group Bank Officers are living far worse than plumbers next door. Mr. O'Dea commented: "I would suggest that the more weighty grievance is that the plumbers are now living next door."³⁵

These observations support the oft-expressed suggestion that white-collar workers in advanced industrial societies notice a reduction in their status relative to other workers and are bothered by it. Survey research by an Australian, K. F. Walker, also supports this argument. Walker solicited the attitudes of Australian white-collar union officials toward their union's

objectives.³⁶ By far, most saw their union's objectives in terms of "higher wages" and "relative wage justice" (94 percent and 92 percent respectively). Noting also that, in general, demands for "relative wage justice" are more prevalent among white-collar than blue-collar unions, Walker concluded that many white-collar unions "are not so much engaged in a direct struggle for 'more' as concerned to restore their relative position in the community structure of salaries and conditions."³⁷ He surmised that "[t]he white-collar worker's economic position has suffered under inflation, and his status in the community has been jeopardized."³⁸

This position is also supported by a recent strike of 12,000 Swedish civil servants. According to news accounts, "[t]he white-collar and professional strikers reportedly . . . resented the Social Democratic government's policy of giving high industrial wage differences that narrowed the wage differential between classes."³⁹

Now, if status reduction is worrisome to white-collar workers in post-industrial societies, as the above seems to indicate, then it is not farfetched to suggest that white-collar workers will attempt to widen the distance between themselves and blue-collar workers. One alternative is to seek benefits not presently enjoyed by blue-collar workers, such as insurance and stock-sharing programs, annual leave, long-service leave, and better retirement conditions.⁴⁰ Thus, status reduction may be one factor contributing to white-collar labor activity in the post-industrial society.

Post-industrialism reduces status differences between white-collar and blue-collar workers in various ways. First, the automation that accompanies post-industrialism tends to reduce differences between blue-collar and lower white-collar occupations:

Even today the production worker who monitors a bank of dials in the control room of an automated continuous process chemical plant has more responsibility, skill, and control over his work activities than the common office worker who operates an IBM tabulating machine or a Xerox copier.⁴¹

"Responsibility," "skill," and "control over work activities" are desirable, especially to white-collar employees.⁴² When white-collar workers are assured that their jobs have more of the desired features, they can, in effect, mentally widen the status differential. Conversely, if they come to realize that these features are available less to them and more to blue-collar workers, as may result from office automation, the white-collar workers may experience psychological discord and consequently strive to widen the status differential.

Second, the affluence generated by advanced industrialism has improved the lot of the manual worker in relation to the white-collar worker. In a country such as the United States where consumer goods are status symbols, higher wages and lower priced goods have made it possible for blue-collar and white-collar workers alike to purchase luxury status symbols such as color television sets and large cars.

Third, the male white-collar worker is no longer a numerical minority in the post-industrial society. The number of white-collar workers encroaching upon and around him reduces his "elite" status. Worse (for him), a large portion of the burgeoning white-collar labor force is female. For example, 80 percent of the increase in white-collar workers in the United States in the last 20 years has been due to females entering the labor force.⁴³

Table 12 shows the increase in the last decade in the percentage of women in total civilian employment for various advanced industrial nations. Much of this increase has settled in the white-collar sector. Assuming that many men do not appreciate occupational competition, especially from women, this

factor may well infringe upon the status superiority felt by the male white-collar worker.

TABLE 12.--Women as percentage of civilian employment in selected advanced industrial nations

Country	1960	1971
Canada	26.8	33.3
United States	33.3	37.8
United Kingdom	34.4	37.2
Belgium	30.7	33.4
Germany	37.8	36.2
Denmark	31.8	40.0
Sweden	36.1	40.1
Japan	40.7	38.7
Australia	28.2	32.2

SOURCE: Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Labour Force Statistics 1960-1971 (Paris, 1973), p. 31.

Automation Versus the White-Collar Job

Automation in the blue-collar field has been found to disturb workers, not only by posing a threat to their job security but also by assaulting the satisfaction they derive from their work. Automation reduces the factory worker to a single nerve in a vast industrial ganglion: it dehumanizes the work setting and it prevents the worker from identifying with the finished, complete product. Worker dissatisfaction is manifested, among other ways, by shoddy workmanship.

The effect of automation on white-collar employees has not been investigated as thoroughly, but indications are that the introduction of office automation has certain negative psychological effects on white-collar

workers. For one thing, automation reduces the overall interest of the job. One study concluded the following about an office in which automation (in the form of new electronic machines) was recently introduced:

[N]ot only was there more intrinsic interest [before automation] since the employees might have been filing, checking, posting, typing, but the former occupations involved a certain amount of moving about the office and contact with other employees or customers. The workers now complain of "being chained to the machines."⁴⁴

Automation also has a negative impact on the promotional possibilities for elementary white-collar employees. As a result of automation, machine-operator jobs are created in large numbers but middle-level office jobs are cut:

The division between managerial duties, reserved to top and middle management, and the tasks performed by the employees is becoming constantly sharper. Whereas the employee could formerly hope to rise gradually in the hierarchy, through a number of intermediate stages, he now finds himself confined to the role of mere operator.⁴⁵

Automation, then, creates grievances that may contribute to union formation. Walker, for one, predicts that white-collar unions will grow in Australia in reaction to the disruptive impact of spreading office automation.⁴⁶

Tertiary Agitation and the Industrial Era

At various points in this dissertation, mention is made of the problem of "residual behavior" in political development.⁴⁷ Attitudes and behavior of a previous era persist in a period of change and hinder the nation's accommodation to new sets of challenges. Here we discuss residual behavior of the industrial era which might hinder the post-industrial society's accommodation to tertiary labor strife.

Preclusive Legislation

In the industrial era tertiary workers were passive, numerically insignificant, and generally overlooked in contrast to their enterprising blue-collar brethren. No furor erupted as legislators nonchallantly denied white-collar workers recourse to unionization, collective bargaining, and the strike.

In the post-industrial society, however, laws inimical to white-collar organization harbor a less innocuous impact. Features of the post-industrial society arouse white-collar interest in tactics heretofore common mainly to the blue-collar worker. Long-standing prohibitive laws only irritate the increasingly perceptive white-collar worker. For example, if the strike is deemed illegal, then workers might engage in illegal behavior anyway, or the prohibitive legislation might become in itself a rallying cry. Both possibilities breed flux: the first triggers illegal behavior which by its nature undermines authority, and the second incites militancy and anger.

Japan is one country in which public sector employees are denied access to the strike. In 1948, General MacArthur, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, issued an order to this effect which has never been repealed.⁴⁸ But this does not mean that the order is tolerated by Japanese tertiary workers. The railway workers have been vociferous crusaders for the repeal of MacArthur's executive order and have paid a price for their zeal: in recent years "nearly 3,000 workers have been suspended, 291 been [sic] dismissed, 69,000 have had their wages reduced, and 33,500 have received a reprimand."⁴⁹ The railway workers' activity proved to be quite disruptive in the general strike of April 26, 1973, in which four million workers participated. The strike was marred by violence, mostly generated by angry commuters and other railway passengers:

Three nights before the strike was due to start Tokyo was turned into a city of siege. Thirty-eight railway stations on main suburban lines were systematically attacked by rioters. A total of 90 train coaches were badly damaged, 208 vending machines put out of action and 54 ticket devices smashed with iron bars. Drivers were assaulted and ticket collectors had to flee from angry mobs.⁵⁰

In the United States and Canada, federal public employees are also denied the strike.⁵¹ So far, this has not directly triggered labor conflict, although Canadian federal public employees are willing participants in illegal activities. H. W. Arthurs had in mind recent Quebec disruptions when he stated:

[T]he early experience of the federal public service appears to be that many professional groups will in fact seize the opportunity to engage in collective bargaining activities and (if Quebec provides a lesson of general significance) may even become extremely militant.⁵²

Whether the lack of access to the strike will actually become a rallying point remains open to question.

Receptivity to Labor Activity

A nation's receptivity to strikes and unionization of manual laborers has a direct bearing on its receptivity to similar activities on the part of tertiary workers. Holdover hostility to unionism is a form of residual behavior which may delay successful accommodation to the mobilization of tertiary employees. Conversely, a tolerant attitude toward blue-collar labor suggests tolerance toward tertiary labor. A receptive atmosphere helps obviate serious tertiary labor strife because it signals a willingness on the part of management and government actively to cultivate methods of conflict resolution.

Sweden enjoys an elaborate system for resolving labor conflict. The system, which dates back to 1938, revolves around regularly scheduled meetings between potential antagonists--the employers and employees--before conflict

surfaces. Every two or three years, the Swedish Federation of Trade Unions (LO), to which almost all industrial workers belong, and the Swedish Employers' Association (SAF) meet "to negotiate nation-wide wage agreements", which are legally binding. Sweden's extremely low level of labor conflict in comparison with other advanced industrial nations is testimony to the success of the system (Table 13).⁵³

Tertiary agitation in Sweden operates amidst a successful arrangement for resolving labor disputes and in an environment receptive to the desires and needs of labor in general. The low level of hostile residual attitudes leads one to predict a minimum degree of tertiary strife in Sweden. But the answer will come only after it has been demonstrated that the system is capable of accommodating new types of white-collar demands.

Australia's system of resolving labor disputes also suggests tolerance. Compulsory arbitration has been credited with keeping the number of strikes to a minimum and with maintaining a low level of public hostility to unions.⁵⁴ According to one source, this has already smoothed the way for the development of white-collar unionism:

The idea of unionism and of submitting one's claims for improved employment conditions to a government system of compulsory arbitration was fairly widely accepted in the Australian community. Trade unions did not confront such a hostile environment as in America and, at the same time, the social distinction between the various classes in the community was not so strong as in Great Britain. The idea of joining a union in order to further one's economic aims was therefore not so repugnant to the middle class Australian as in some other countries.⁵⁵

In summary, attitudes and arrangements of the industrial era may arouse and nourish tertiary conflict or, as in the case of Australia and Sweden, may combine to create a receptive atmosphere for the increasingly perceptive white-collar worker.⁵⁶

TABLE 13.--Working days lost due to labor disputes in selected advanced industrial nations

Country	1963		1964		1965	
	In thousands	Per 1000 inhabitants	In thousands	Per 1000 inhabitants	In thousands	Per 1000 inhabitants
United States	16,000	84.4	22,900	119.2	23,300	119.5
United Kingdom	1,755	32.5	2,277	42.0	2,925	53.2
Denmark	24	5.0	17	3.6	242	48.4
Belgium	247	26.6	444	47.3	70	7.8
The Netherlands	38	3.1	44	3.6	55	4.6
West Germany	878	15.2	17	0.3	49	0.8
Norway	226	61.5	1	---	9	2.3
Sweden	25	3.3	34	4.4	4	0.5

SOURCE: Adapted from Sweden, Stockholms Enskilda Bank, Some Data about Sweden 1967-1968 (n.p.), p. 105.

Chapter III--Notes

¹The service sector is an occupational potpourri. It includes the chauffeur, the electrician, and the highly educated and technically proficient computer analyst. See Ralf Dahrendorf, "Recent Changes in the Class Structure of European Societies," Daedalus, XCIII (Winter, 1964), 245. While an underlying dimension is easily apparent for the secondary sector (involvement in the production of tangible goods) the tertiary sector is without a simple communal link. Indeed, it is based upon a negative factor: service sector employees are those "not involved in the production of food, clothing, houses, cars or other tangible goods." Robert E. Cole, "Changing Labor Force Characteristics and Their Impact on Japanese Industrial Relations," Paper prepared for Yale Advanced Research Seminar Series Japan by 1980 (New Haven, Conn., February, 1973), p. 14, emphasis added. For the present purposes, the tertiary sector is divided into four categories:

- a. Personal services--those employed in a one-to-one service basis with consumers; e.g., the barber, butler, cook.
- b. Industrial services--those engaged in fixing or distributing the products of industrialism; e.g., the truck driver, mechanic, electrician.
- c. Elementary white-collar--those involved in mainly nonmanual work but whose jobs do not demand high levels of skill; e.g., the sales clerk, office worker, postal employee, bank and insurance employee.
- d. Advanced white-collar--those whose jobs demand a high degree of skill; e.g., the business executive, scientist, teacher, policeman.

²See, for example, Everett M. Kassalow, "White-Collar Unionism in the United States," in White-Collar Trade Unions: Contemporary Developments in Industrialized Societies, ed. by Adolf Sturmthal (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1966), p. 356. Seymour Martin Lipset, "White-Collar Workers and Professionals--Their Attitudes and Behavior towards Unions," in Readings in Industrial Sociology, ed. by William A. Faunce (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1967), pp. 525-548, cites older studies in which white-collar workers were reported to identify with management. A more recent Australian survey questions the validity of this argument. A questionnaire was administered to Australian white-collar union leaders, manual union leaders, personnel officers, and business executives with results showing "that on socio-economic issues the leaders of the white-collar unions tend to fall between the leaders of the manual unions on the one hand and personnel officers and business executives on the other . . ." That is, the white-collar union leaders were not "aligned" with management even though they were closer than were the blue-collar union leaders. On 11 out of 17 items the differences between white-collar union leaders and management were statistically significant. K. F. Walker, "White-Collar Unionism in Australia," in Sturmthal, pp. 15-21.

³Kassalow, p. 356.

⁴Dahrendorf, passim, maintains that white-collar workers do not form a distinct class for two reasons. First, the heterogeneity of white-collar occupations means that white-collar workers include those who are served (the powerful) and those who serve (the less powerful). Because of this mingling of power relationships, white-collar workers cannot form a class, if one defines class in terms of power, as does Dahrendorf. Those in a communal class must have similar power relationships vis-à-vis the rest of society. Second, white-collar workers are not part of a common class because they have no class consciousness.

⁵See also, the New York Times, September 6, 1973, p. 15, for a review of cities hit by public schoolteachers' strikes.

⁶Twelve thousand were on strike and 35,000 were involved in a lockout. News Dictionary 1971, p. 454.

⁷News Dictionary 1971, p. 259.

⁸News Dictionary 1972, p. 52.

⁹Manchester Guardian Weekly, March 10, 1973, p. 6.

¹⁰Israel, where the service sector has been responsible for the bulk of stoppages and man-days lost in recent years, is the exception, not the rule. In 1970, service sector strikes amounted to 35 percent of the total number of stoppages and 79.8 percent of the total working days lost. In 1971, service sector strikes catapulted to 68.7 percent of the total number and amounted to 71.1 percent of the total working days lost. Israel, Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract of Israel 1972 (n.p., n.d.), p. 338.

¹¹Alex Mitchell, "The Japanese Cataclysm," London Times Magazine, October 21, 1973, p. 76.

¹²As well as becoming more "strike prone," public servants have unionized in large numbers. "The fastest growing segment of the organized labor movement [in the United States] is now in government. The net increase in all union membership in the U.S. from 1958 to 1968 was 1.8 million. More than 1 million of these new union members were public employees." Pickets at City Hall: Report and Recommendations of the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Labor Disputes in Public Employment (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1970), p. 31. The percent increase in union membership of government employees was 135.5 from 1956 to 1968. Thomas M. Love and George T. Sulzner, "Political Implications of Public Employee Bargaining," Industrial Relations, XI (February, 1972), 18.

¹³Bell, Coming of Post-Industrial Society, p. 157.

¹⁴Ibid., pp. 157-158.

¹⁵In the Danish general election of December 4, 1973, the traditionally powerful Social Democrats and other Socialist-oriented parties suffered "devastating setbacks," mainly at the hands of new anti-tax parties. The Progress (anti-tax) Party gained 28 parliamentary seats, making it the second largest party in Parliament. New York Times, December 5, 1973, p. 2. The Swedish general election of September 17, 1973, in which high taxes were a major issue, led to great parliamentary losses for the Social Democrats. The voters were said to be rebelling against the policies, including tax programs, of the Social Democratic party. New York Times, September 23, 1973, sec. 4, p. 5.

¹⁶William J. Blaumol, "Macroeconomics of Unbalanced Growth: The Anatomy of Urban Crisis," American Economic Review, LVII (June, 1967), 415-426.

¹⁷Ibid., pp. 415-416.

¹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 414.

²⁰Blaumol was especially pessimistic about the ability of municipal governments to resolve this problem.

²¹Pickets, p. 36.

²²This and the rest of the description of the postal dispute follow from News Dictionary 1970, pp. 60-61.

²³Ibid.

²⁴Kiernans disagreed emphatically with Labor Minister Bryce Mackasey and Regional Development Minister Jean Marchand on the order in which government priorities ought to be arranged to resolve the conflict.

²⁵This does not seem to be the case in Australia, where the number of professionals is not sufficient to meet Australia's need for professionals.

²⁶This bars unforeseen circumstances, such as a widespread reintroduction of colonialism. If colonialism were to rear its head again, farmers, miners, and manufacturing workers would be tapped from the colony's population, leaving more service workers in the mother post-industrial society.

²⁷This example comes from Blaumol, p. 422.

²⁸As of 1968, one in 10 Americans had less than eight years of schooling; in 1980 it is estimated that the ratio will drop to one in 16. Bell, Coming of Post-Industrial Society, p. 143.

²⁹U.S., Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1972 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972).

³⁰New York Times, September 6, 1973, p. 13.

³¹Joseph W. Garbarino, "Faculty Unionism: From Theory to Practice," Industrial Relations, XI (February, 1972), 1.

³²University of Washington Daily, January 17, 1974, p. 16.

³³The converse argument may also be true: workers who struggle to secure scarce jobs will be so anxious to keep the jobs that they may be more conservative regarding the formation of white-collar associations.

³⁴Der Spiegel, June 27, 1962, p. 24, as quoted in Adolf Sturmthal, "White-Collar Unions--A Comparative Essay," in Sturmthal, p. 389, n. 19.

³⁵L. G. Matthews, "The Growing White Collar Unions," Paper presented at the Tenth Annual Industrial Officers' Convention of Victorian Employers' Federation, n.p., 1961, p. 4, as quoted by Walker, pp. 14-15.

³⁶Ibid.; pp. 15-23.

³⁷Ibid., p. 16.

³⁸Ibid., pp. 14-15.

³⁹News Dictionary 1971, p. 455.

⁴⁰Kassalow, p. 362; Sturmthal, p. 389; Walker, p. 14.

⁴¹Peterson, p. 48.

⁴²See, for example, Floyd C. Mann, "Psychological and Organizational Impacts," in Dunlop, pp. 43-65; Walker, p. 21.

⁴³Michel Crozier, The World of the Office Worker, trans. by David Landau (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), p. 16.

⁴⁴Ida R. Hoos, "When the Computer Takes over the Office," Harvard Business Review (July-August, 1960), 102-112, as quoted in Kassalow, pp. 356-357.

⁴⁵Claudine Marenco, "Psychological Incidences of Office Work Rationalization of Employee Status," Trade Union Information, No. 35 (Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1962), as quoted in Kassalow, p. 357. See also Mann, pp. 64-65.

⁴⁶Walker, p. 34.

⁴⁷See, for example, infra, p. 146.

⁴⁸Manchester Guardian, October 17, 1973, p. 28.

⁴⁹Ibid.

⁵⁰Mitchell, p. 76.

⁵¹The Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 prohibits "any individual employed by the United States, or any agency thereof, including wholly-owned Government corporations, to participate in any strike." Kassalow, p. 336, n. 35.

⁵²H. W. Arthurs, Collective Bargaining by Public Employees: Five Models (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Institute of Labor and Industrial Relations, 1971), p. 8.

⁵³See M. Donald Hancock, "Post-Welfare Modernization in Sweden: The Quest for Cumulative Rationality and Equality," in Hancock and Sjoberg, p. 229; and Sweden, Stockholms Enskilda Bank, Some Data about Sweden 1967-1968 (n.p.), p. 104.

⁵⁴Walker, pp. 9-12.

⁵⁵Ibid., p. 12.

⁵⁶It should be kept in mind that receptivity is modified by the fact that the public must often directly pay for benefits (through higher taxes) for governmental white-collar workers.

CHAPTER IV

INSTITUTIONAL LAG

Samuel Huntington's hypothesized "institutional lag" was mentioned briefly in Chapter 2.¹ Institutional lag occurs because demands remain fluid but institutions become rigid. The clash between established forces reflecting a bygone era and viable forces reflecting new conditions produces tensions and social flux. When institutions "lag" in their capacity to cope with new realities, participatory fervor does not subside; rather, it plows ahead in the form of unusual, extra-legal, and often violent behavior.

The thesis of institutional lag is based upon the well accepted idea that institutions tend to become rigid and unchanging. A variety of phrases is used to describe this tendency, including "dynamic conservatism,"² the "Iron Law of Decadence,"³ and "overinstitutionalization."⁴ Rigidity follows when institutions elevate one goal to supreme importance--self-perpetuation. This is achieved by resisting change: institutions "fight to remain the same"⁵ and strive "to maintain themselves at the expense of needed change and innovation."⁶

The history of the Co-Operative Union and Wholesale Society (KF) of Sweden typifies an institution's tendency to rearrange its goals and devote its energies to self-maintenance.⁷ In 1899 several of Sweden's increasingly popular consumer co-operatives banded together to form the KF. The classic Liberals who formed the KF were devoted to at least two principles: (1) providing low-priced consumer goods, and (2) setting up many small stores to balance unpopular power monopolization by large businesses. Now, after

having thrived for 70-odd years, the KF's goals have been twisted by self-preservation secured at the expense of its founding ideals. First, the concentration of power in the board of directors has undermined the KF's original democratic ideals. Second, the distrust of bigness has been spurned and KF stores have grown in size and have diminished in number, sounding the death-knell for the small neighborhood store. Finally, no longer are KF managers self-righteously refusing top wages. Their recent wage boosts have assaulted the founders' egalitarian convictions. As of today:

The role of the cooperative movement is no longer as dramatic as it was earlier. It continues to act as a price dampener and a threat to monopolies that make large profits but, for the most part, it keeps busy trying to compete with private enterprise.⁸

Chapter 2 demonstrated that the symptoms of institutional lag have surfaced in several post-industrial societies. But is institutional lag a likely explanation for these tensions? Can it be substantiated in an illustrative case? We suggest that it can be and we use environmental politics to illustrate how stable industrial institutions and values act to thwart fluid demands of the post-industrial era.

Environmental Politics

Values

As nations move along the technological-industrial spectrum, they become highly dependent upon industrialism. Advanced industrialism has brought costs as well as benefits, costs that are most keenly felt in terms of environmental deterioration and global resource scarcities.

Environmental Deterioration

Much is currently written about the deleterious effects of industrialization.⁹ Predominantly gloomy reports document the ramifications of

the "spillover effect" in which the costs of industrial pollution are borne by the society at large rather than the industry at fault.¹⁰ Industrial progress brings odors, dirt, limited recreational facilities, urban congestion, and health dangers. Industrial costs are particularly high in Japan, which has become the third largest industrial producer in the world in the short span of 25 years. Phenomenal industrial growth has brought prosperity to the Japanese people (Table 14) along with multiple costs. For example, industry's thirst for labor has spurred a rural exodus to urban areas that has created critical space problems in already overcrowded cities.¹¹ Also, steadily increasing air pollution (Fig. 6) taxes the people's health in the form of asthma and chronic bronchitis.¹² Environmental pollution cruelly surfaced in the mercury poisoning cases of Minamata (in which 111 victims either died or were maimed between 1953 and 1960)¹³ and in the cadmium-based Itai-itai disease which affected at least 217 persons.¹⁴

TABLE 14.--Private disposable income, private consumption expenditures, and private savings (%), 1959-1968, Japan

Allocation of income	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968 ^a
Private disposable income	11.6	15.3	17.0	15.4	16.3	14.0	14.0	13.4	16.0	15.6
Private consumption expenditures	9.4	14.3	14.5	16.2	17.2	15.8	12.5	13.4	13.8	15.1
Private savings	24.0	20.5	28.9	12.0	12.3	6.0	21.7	13.3	26.0	17.6

SOURCE: Adapted from "White Paper on Living Conditions," White Papers of Japan 1969-70 (Tokyo: Japan Institute of International Affairs, 1971), p. 87. The figures were originally published in the Economic Planning Agency's "National Income Statistical Report."

^aFigures for 1968 are estimates.




Fig. 6.--Average annual density of sulfur oxides in Japan's main cities, 1957-1967. (SOURCE: Adapted from "White Paper on Pollution," White Papers of Japan 1969-70 [Tokyo: Japan Institute of International Affairs, 1971], p. 28. The figures were originally supplied by the Pollution Department of the Japanese Welfare Ministry.)

Not surprisingly, the Japanese are well aware of industrial costs: in a recent survey only 7 percent of the respondents saw an improvement in the natural environment over the preceding five years, while 43 percent reported "virtually no change" and the highest proportion, 46 percent, felt the environment had deteriorated. More than one-third (36 percent) reported that in the last five years they had personally suffered from environmental disruption.¹⁵

Resource Depletion

A second deleterious effect of industrialism has been the steady depletion of those resources on which it thrives. Thomas Malthus, over 170 years ago, forecast doom owing to overpopulation and dwindling food supplies.¹⁶ Although his study startled a number of people, it was largely forgotten in the years of technological advancement and industrial gain. Today, however, the depletion of resources is more noticeable, and gloomy forecasts cannot be shunted aside so easily.

Many books document the depletion of the earth's resources and offer grim predictions of the future.¹⁷ Oil, coal, and tin are only some of the natural resources upon which industrial nations depend and which are gradually being depleted. The expected life of these deposits is brief, a prediction that clashes with industrial demands such as those recorded in Figures 7 and 8. Food and timber are renewable resources, unlike copper and mercury. But even here the rising demand outpaces the ability or will of nations to refurbish dwindling supplies.

Shrinking Pie Values

The growing awareness of industrial costs and resource depletion is leading to a gradual but steady transformation of beliefs about progress in




Fig. 7.--Copper and steel consumption and GNP per capita, U.S.
 (SOURCE: Adapted from Donella H. Meadows et al., *The Limits to Growth* [New York: Universe Books, 1972], p. 111. The authors derived the copper and steel consumption figures from *Metal Statistics* [Somerset, N.J.: American Metal Market Company, 1970]. The GNP figures came from U.S., Department of Commerce, *U.S. Economic Growth* [Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1969].)




Fig. 8.--Mercury consumption, 1946-1968, U.S. (SOURCE: Adapted from Donella H. Meadows et al., The Limits to Growth [New York: Universe Books, 1972], p. 79. The authors are citing Barry Commoner, Michael Carr, and Paul J. Stamler, "The Causes of Pollution," Environment, April, 1971.)

post-industrial societies. In any social order beliefs about progress are so fundamental that incipient changes in these beliefs are likely to have a broad societal impact.

In medieval, pre-industrial nations (and even in some traditional nations today) beliefs were of a "constant pie" orientation. People felt that the size of the pie to be delivered was constant and that no amount of human effort would significantly improve conditions. According to John Plamenatz:

[The human species] was to endure for a time, and to achieve nothing while it endured; it moved neither forward nor backward, nor in circles. In the mediaeval view of the world, humanity, as distinct from the individuals who composed it, had neither destiny nor history; it merely occupied the space and the time allotted to it by God. There was nothing for mankind to accomplish or to live through and be affected by; no course of change, social and cultural.¹⁸

The prevailing attitude was fatalistic, and the moral was: "do not try to change things for they will not change." Man was a creature under the control of supernatural forces. And this orientation had societal implications: the medieval world, steeped in superstition and intolerance, was culturally and socially static.

Events of the 17th and 18th centuries shook the "constant pie" orientation. Inventions spurred industrial production and new lands with abundant resources were colonized. As the production of material goods grew and as the cargoes of exotic items from far-off lands were unloaded, the feeling blossomed that people could intervene to change their lot. Philosophers nurtured this view as did the Protestant ethic, which preached the material rewards of hard work and sacrifice. Vast resources were waiting to be tapped: the pie was expandable. Thus, industrialism and the "expanding pie" orientation grew hand in hand. The "modern belief in progress" suggested "that man's knowledge and power over nature increase indefinitely,

and that this knowledge and power bring worldly happiness."¹⁹ Industrialism promised the happy, wealthy life. Once people accepted the idea that they, and not supernatural forces, controlled the earth, the societal implications were vast. The "expanding pie" orientation has been with us for nearly 200 years. A fairly simple change in values has brought about tremendous social change.

Currently, beliefs about the "modern definition of progress" appear to be changing on a serious scale and a "shrinking pie" orientation is emerging. Resource scarcities (both actual and predicted) have prodded a reassessment of the feasibility of unlimited industrialism. Also, the realization that "progress" is not as gratifying as expected has spurred a re-evaluation of those traditional values and goals making up the "modern definition of progress."

Survey studies reveal a disenchantment with "expanding pie" values, especially in the younger generation. A recent international Gallup poll asked youth in 11 countries, including four advanced industrial nations, whether they thought the following statement was true or false: "The Government's strong emphasis on industrial development tends to make people unhappy." The results (given in Table 15) show that an overwhelming proportion of the respondents does not see a connection between industrialism and happiness, therefore implicitly rejecting the "expanding pie" definition of progress. This rejection is the most striking in Japan, a nation which has experienced a strong dose of industrialization in a very short period of time.

Other studies support the Japanese skepticism toward industrialism and materialism. When asked for what tasks should Japan's economic capacity be utilized, only 6 percent listed economic growth. Garnering significantly more support were tasks relating to environmental protection (42 percent) and

TABLE 15.--Opinions on industrial development in four post-industrial nations

Opinion	Japan	Sweden	United Kingdom	United States
Question: "Do you think the following statement is true or false: 'Industrial development tends to make people unhappy.'"				
True	90%	76%	65%	69%
False	8	20	32	29
No answer/no opinion	2	4	3	2

SOURCE: Adapted from Gallup Opinion Poll Index, October, 1973, p. 28.

social programs (social welfare 53 percent, social services 33 percent, and education 26 percent).²⁰ Also, more Japanese now than in 1953 think that people should orient their lives to suit their own tastes rather than aiming to earn money or secure fame.²¹ Intergenerational value changes surface in yet another Japanese survey: of people in their twenties, 33.2 percent feel the purpose of work is to develop one's capabilities and only 20.9 percent feel that earning a living is the major purpose. The reverse is true of those respondents in their thirties and forties: only 10.9 percent feel that developing one's capabilities is important, whereas 33 percent emphasize earning a living.²²

Ronald Inglehart discovered similar intergenerational differences in his survey of six post-industrial societies:²³ younger persons are less concerned with acquisitive values (those associated with the modern definition of progress) than are older persons. Inglehart distinguished between two types of values: "acquisitive" and "post-bourgeois." He asked respondents in the six advanced industrial democracies the following question:

"If you had to choose among the following things, which are the two that seem most desirable to you?

Maintaining order in the nation.

Giving the people more say in important political decisions.

Fighting rising prices.

Protecting freedom of speech."²⁴

A person was said primarily to hold acquisitive values if he chose items one and three; he was said to adhere to post-bourgeois values if he selected items two and four. Table 16 summarizes the findings as they relate to the respondents' ages. Inglehart concluded that acquisition is less important to younger persons because they were raised in a more affluent age than their parents.²⁵

This re-evaluation of traditional ideas about progress may contribute a new dimension to the politics of the post-industrial society. Just as ideas about progress in the past have had significant repercussions on the social order, so it is likely that the "shrinking pie" orientation will have its impact.²⁶ One dimension of this impact is already being felt--the emergence of "environmental politics" as a new area of political concern which articulates conflict between "shrinking pie" and "expanding pie" adherents. So-called environmentalists embrace the following distinguishing tenets:

1. Man is not master of his environment.
2. In policy-making one must consider long-range costs as more important than short-run economies.
3. Industrial growth must not be secured at all costs.

In short, environmental issues, which result from advanced industrialism, pose a challenge to the post-industrial society. Because they involve decisions that are largely irreversible, they assume an especially sensitive and important role in the policy process.²⁷

Values and Institutions

The emerging public consciousness about environmental issues does not guarantee a quick or easy resolution of these problems. Policy aimed at

TABLE 16.--Acquisitive and post-bourgeois value preferences, by age cohort, in six advanced industrial nations

Age range of cohort in 1970	Percentage choosing each pair											
	Netherlands		Belgium		Italy		France		Germany		Britain	
	Acq.	P-B	Acq.	P-B	Acq.	P-B	Acq.	P-B	Acq.	P-B	Acq.	P-B
16-24	20%	29%	19%	26%	18%	28%	21%	20%	21%	23%	25%	14%
25-34	27	16	35	13	30	15	35	11	35	15	29	9
35-44	36	14	28	19	36	11	36	14	46	8	29	8
45-54	29	15	29	13	37	8	39	10	47	7	37	5
55-64	37	7	37	8	42	7	48	6	60	4	41	8
65+	44	5	45	2	54	4	50	2	56	2	50	5

SOURCE: Adapted from Ronald Inglehart, "The Silent Revolution in Europe: Intergenerational Change in Post-Industrial Societies," American Political Science Review, LXV (December, 1971), 1000.

improving environmental quality is hampered by the carryover of industrial values and habits and by industrial-based institutions that are to some degree ill-equipped to aggregate environmental demands.

Industrial Values

The public order of industrial society preeminently expresses perceptions of material need and the values of economic growth--perceptions and values rooted in the experience of material want and economic insecurity of past generations.²⁸

Industrial values still pervade the post-industrial society. The public is analogous to a giant Freudian psyche, in which the id and the ego vie for predominance.²⁹ According to Freud, the id represents the instinctual or emotional element of the human personality and propels persons to act impulsively. Operating through what is known as the "pleasure principle," the id motivates the person to seek immediate pleasure, no matter how deleterious the consequences might be. Opposing and balancing the id is the ego--the intellectual element--which gives the person the capacity to act intelligently and rationally. The ego operates through the "reality principle," and it persuades the person to seek deferred rather than immediate pleasure if doing so is a safer, more rational course of action to follow. The simultaneous tug of these contradictory elements produces psychological strain and unpredictable behavior. Similarly, the public in the advanced industrial society experiences social tensions and evinces behavioral irregularities when the pleasure principle and the reality principle conflict.³⁰ On the one hand, the public's intellectual element has been strengthened markedly in relation to environmental questions. Highly readable books on environmental deterioration,³¹ mass media attention,³² interest group activities,³³ and the overall level of knowledge in post-industrial nations all combine to educate the public about environmental problems. Through development of the reality

principle, the public is able to appreciate the danger posed to future generations when it indulges in immediate pleasures.

On the other hand, the id lurks as a countervailing force which all too easily overpowers the budding environmental ego. Instincts for material comfort and prosperity, nurtured by the "expanding pie" mentality, conflict with forces for knowledge, and all too often the pleasure principle emerges victorious.

Public ambivalence along this line was captured in a recent survey of the citizens of Hamilton, Ontario.³⁴ At the time of the survey, Hamilton's residents listed pollution and environmental concerns as their most important problems. They felt strongly about these problems: 41 percent were extremely concerned, 49 percent were concerned, and only 10 percent were not too concerned. Yet despite their intellectual awareness (ego), their desire for material comfort (id) held sway. Although the residents were willing to pay slightly higher taxes in order to stem environmental deterioration--a move that would have only a slight impact on their living styles--they were unwilling to limit the growth of a nearby airport in the interests of environmental protection. The survey researchers concluded that the public is basically ambivalent: people want to arrest environmental deterioration but they shy away from remedial policies which would materially affect their standard of living.

When Japanese citizens were asked if the natural environment had improved, remained the same, or deteriorated over the past five or six years, most people reported that it had deteriorated (46 percent). When asked the same question about convenience in daily life, 49 percent said convenience had improved, 40 percent reported no change, and only 8 percent felt it had deteriorated.³⁵ The realization that the natural environment is deteriorating

is balanced with the knowledge that daily tasks had become more convenient. These cognitions are incompatible and therefore induce ambivalence.

The Arab oil embargo uncovered ambivalence on the part of American citizens. The threat to prosperous and mobile lifestyles signalled the victory of id over ego. The Alaskan oil pipeline--stalled for years by environmentalists--was approved and blessed with unusual dispatch. Off-shore oil drilling--recently halted by environmental demands--suddenly looked enticing to all concerned. When it came to the crunch, the id won easily.

In summary, even those aware of the "shrinking pie" cannot necessarily be counted on to act consistently with their thoughts. Underlying ambivalence introduces societal tensions and policy stalemate. If the future is as bleak as environmental pundits tell us, the crunch will grind tighter and the public psyche will undergo appreciable turmoil.

Interest Organizations

According to Gabriel Almond, interests are represented in the policy process in two steps. Interest groups serve an initial function by articulating, or voicing, demands:

Interest groups articulate political demands in the society, seek support for these demands among other groups by advocacy and bargaining, and attempt to transform these demands into authoritative public policy by influencing the choice of political personnel, and the various processes of public policy-making and enforcement.³⁶

Political parties carry through by performing a second function, that of bringing together disparate interests:

Political parties . . . are aggregative, i.e., seek to form the largest possible interest group coalitions by offering acceptable choices of political personnel and public policy . . . [T]he party system stands between the interest group system and the authoritative policy-making agencies and screens them from the particularistic and disintegrative impact of special interests. The party system aggregates interests and transforms them into a relatively small number of alternative general policies.³⁷

The functions of interest groups and parties are not mutually exclusive: some political parties represent very narrow interests and take on the aura of interest groups (for example, the Prohibition Party and the Tax Cut Party, both of which entered the 1960 American Presidential contest),³⁸ and some interest groups aggregate demands (for example, the American AFL-CIO and the Swedish Federation of Labor).

In advanced industrial nations, interest groups have, indeed, articulated environmental demands. Groups of varying degrees of cohesiveness have publicized these demands and have assumed the initiative in vocally pressing for policy changes aimed at improving environmental quality. People sometimes form ad hoc groups which flourish and then fade in response to particular issues. Other groups become permanent, dues-collecting organizations, such as the Environmental Defense Fund and the Friends of the Earth in the United States. Interest articulation takes many forms, from demonstrations in which citizens don gas masks in order to protest air pollution, to concentrated pressure tactics aimed at legislative bodies.

It is also true that political parties have aggregated environmental issues. Party platforms in recent years have included pledges of support for environmental quality,³⁹ and elected officials have passed legislation in pursuit of this goal. Although parties do appear to be performing this aggregative function, we suggest that because of the cleavages and interests parties represent, the vigor with which party organizations will pursue environmental goals remains open to question.

According to Lipset and Rokkan, "party systems of the 1960's reflect, with few but significant exceptions, the cleavage structures of the 1920's."⁴⁰ Specifically, party systems in Western democracies today represent, in varying degrees, industrial cleavages. We argue that these alignments reduce the

abilities of the parties to politicize environmental issues in post-industrial societies.

Industrialism introduced a fundamental new cleavage in formerly agricultural nations, one which pitted the industrial worker against the entrepreneur. This worker-management cleavage developed simultaneously with the growth of political parties. In Britain, factory workers first organized in pressure groups, seeking direct economic conflict and parliamentary influence. Disparate unions then merged into the Trade Union Congress and, consequently, from its "bowels" was born the Labour Party.⁴¹ Similarly, in Sweden the Social Democratic Party grew directly from labor unions,⁴² and the German Social Democratic Party emerged as "the party of the German worker,"⁴³ as did the Labour party of New Zealand.⁴⁴ Parties on the right spoke for the interests of business, and the opposing sides solidified on the basis of economic cleavages, surpassing salient pre-industrial cleavages.⁴⁵

This industrial alignment continues to characterize party systems today, although the post-war years have witnessed a muting of economic divisiveness between the major parties on the left and right.⁴⁶ Voting patterns, particularly, continue to reflect industrial cleavages. In 1963, Robert Alford found that in three Anglo-American nations (the United States, Australia, and Canada) "the working-class vote for the Left party varies between 50 and 70 percent." In a fourth, Great Britain, "the working class supplies roughly three-quarters of the Labour Party's support."⁴⁷ Alford has since updated his study, finding no significant change in class-party alignments.⁴⁸ Alan Robinson complemented Alford's study by investigating class voting in a fifth Anglo-American democracy, New Zealand. As Table 17 reveals, manual workers vote in quite high numbers for the major leftist party.

TABLE 17.--Percentage of each major occupational group voting for each party in Dunedin Central Electorate, New Zealand, 1960

Group	Party		
	Labour	National	Social Credit
Upper professional and company directors	12%	86%	2%
Lower professional, self-employed, and business people	25	67	8
"White-collar" and "uniform" workers	44	55	1
Skilled and semiskilled "blue-collar" workers	74	15	11
Unskilled "blue-collar" workers	87	8	5

SOURCE: Adapted from Alan D. Robinson, "Class Voting in New Zealand: A Comment on Alford's Comparison of Class Voting in the Anglo-American Political Systems," in Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives, ed. by Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan (New York: The Free Press, 1967), p. 97.

There are indications that class voting is declining in advanced industrial nations,⁴⁹ but the decline is not dramatic. G. J. Pulzer can still say, for example, that "[c]lass is the basis of British party politics; all else is embellishment and detail."⁵⁰ In the United States manual workers still characteristically vote for the Democratic Party (Table 18). Discounting the 1964 and 1972 elections, which were somewhat atypical, the Democratic vote among manual workers has remained fairly steady at 50-55 percent.

Also, patterns of policy-making in post-industrial societies reflect the close association of labor unions and leftist parties on the one hand, and management and rightist parties on the other. In Sweden, the relation between the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the labor unions remains strong.

TABLE 18.--Voting by occupational groups in Presidential elections, 1952-1972, U.S.

Occupational group	1952		1956		1960		1964		1968			1972	
	D	R	D	R	D	R	D	R	D	R	Other	D	R
Professional and business	36%	64%	32%	68%	42%	58%	54%	46%	34%	56%	10%	31%	69%
White-collar	40	60	37	63	48	52	57	43	41	47	12	36	64
Manual	55	45	50	50	60	40	71	29	50	35	15	43	57

SOURCE: Adapted from Gallup Opinion Poll Index, December, 1972, p. 10.

The Swedish Federation of Labor (LO), to which over 90 percent of the industrial workers belong, is tied with the ruling SDP in a number of ways:

. . . Arne Geijer, the present chairman of the LP . . . serves as one of seven full members of the Social Democratic Executive Committee. Moreover, the LO contributes 60 to 70 percent of the party membership through the collective affiliation of individual unions and provides the principal source of the party's financial resources. In 1964, for example, the LO and member unions donated 4,144,500 crowns to Social Democratic campaign efforts. LO and party members also form joint ad hoc committees to coordinate campaign strategy, with union mobilization of voters contributing a substantial share of Socialist electoral support. Within parliament 45 members of the Social Democratic delegation in 1963-1965 were either members of the LO or party members who considered themselves spokesmen for organized labor.⁵¹

In Britain, too, trade unions provide most of the membership and income of the Labour Party.⁵²

Industrial-based parties are not appropriate for the politicization of environmental issues because this key alignment splits the electorate in such a way that neither side enthusiastically speaks for the environment and neither side qualifies as markedly liberal or change-oriented. The economic cleavage cuts across the electorate so that environmental policies prove detrimental to the interests of each. Parties on the right do not speak enthusiastically for environmental causes for a fairly obvious reason: these parties represent industrial management--a principal culprit in environmental deterioration. Public policy aimed at reducing environmental deterioration often imposes costs on industry.

Industrial workers, once part of a fluid social movement, also tend to be quite "conservative" in regard to environmental change. For example, in the aftermath of the Arab oil embargo in the United States, manual workers were less willing than other occupational groups to allow greater governmental controls to restrict energy consumption (Table 19). Another study revealed that manual laborers were less concerned with air pollution generally, less worried about the effects of air pollution on their health and

TABLE 19.--Opinions on energy controls, by occupational groups,
December, 1973, U.S.

Occupational group	More strict	Less strict	About same	No opinion
Question: "Do you think controls on the use of energy, that is, gasoline, oil, and electricity--should be made more strict, less strict, or kept about as they are now?"				
Professional and business	48%	4%	42%	6%
Clerical and sales	47	2	40	11
Manual workers	32	7	55	6
Non-labor force	41	5	48	6

SOURCE: Adapted from Gallup Opinion Poll Index, January, 1974, p. 10.

property, less likely to remember reading about air pollution in their local paper, and less likely to rate air pollution as a "serious" problem in their community than those in professional-managerial occupations.⁵³ Finally, Inglehart found that lower socio-economic groups (those more likely to be manual workers) valued acquisition more than did those in the middle and upper socio-economic status.⁵⁴

The labor movement originally was an attempt by underdog groups to secure power. Workers realized that the only way they could escape from the yoke of entrepreneurial subjugation was to present a united front and fight power with power. But the basis of this movement was ultimately a rational calculus of material well being. Workers wanted higher pay, shorter working hours, and more humane working conditions: in effect, they desired policies having a detrimental effect on industry, but a positive effect on themselves.

Environmental policy also has a negative impact on industries but without a direct gain to labor. In fact, the impact often is negative for the workers as well, as when factories close down rather than meet standards designed to protect the environment.⁵⁵

In short, so long as laborites retain control over the parties which would most naturally speak for social and political change in Western democracies, the probability is weakened that party systems will serve as vocal mouthpieces of environmental demands.⁵⁶

The close connection between parties and industrial groups suggests a related reason why parties may not enthusiastically embrace environmental issues. As an organization, a political party's primary interest is survival.⁵⁷ It thrives by selectively promising and distributing rewards to its loyal clientele; i.e., it promises and allocates specific benefits to social and economic groups in order to woo and retain supporters. For example, the British Labour Party is closely related to the Trade Union Congress: at annual party conventions five-sixths of the votes are cast by union representatives.⁵⁸ In Norway the Agrarian Party represents the farmers' associations and the Labor Party speaks for the trade unions.⁵⁹ Austria's Socialists are linked to the trade unions and the People's Party represents "a complex business and agrarian interest-group structure as well as . . . Catholic affiliations."⁶⁰ West Germany's Social Democratic Party represents trade unions as does Sweden's Social Democratic Party. Even in the so-called "catch-all" parties, such as the Christian-Democratic Union of Germany, the British Conservatives, the Japanese Liberal Democratic Party, or the Republican and Democratic parties in the United States, it is still possible to identify those interest affiliations that support the party in exchange for preferential treatment. In the United States the Democrats promise benefits to racial minorities, labor groups, and inner-city dwellers, and the Republicans treat business associations, rural interests, and military groups preferentially. The parties woo support by promising benefits to specific interests even on an informal basis.⁶¹

The interest of the party organization in specific benefits, however, does not always correspond with the nature of environmental issues. These issues often involve collective benefits, such as clean air or water:

Collective benefits are indivisible and cannot be captured by any social grouping whose membership does not include the whole community. The distinguishing quality of these benefits is that "they must be available to everyone if they are available to anyone."⁶²

In essence, pushing for environmental issues is not always politically expedient for the party. At times it may be more rational for the party to expend resources to secure specific benefits for its supporters than to push for benefits that can be shared by supporters of the opposing parties.⁶³

Summary

An hypothesis commonly found in the political development literature is that demands are more fluid than institutions and that the failure of institutions to reflect and adapt to changing realities produces tension. Generally this hypothesis is voiced in the context of pre-industrial/ industrial change. In this chapter, an attempt was made to apply it to the industrial/post-industrial transition. Environmental politics was chosen as an illustrative case of tensions resulting from fluid (post-industrial) demands clashing with more rigid (industrial) institutions.

The post-industrial era has witnessed a sharpened awareness of the costs of industrialism. Realizing with a new sense of urgency that environmental quality is deteriorating and that natural resources are being steadily and terminally devoured, citizens in large numbers are questioning old values and ideas that prodded them into industrialism in the first place. Demands of the post-industrial era include a cry to mitigate these industrial costs.

A desire for change does not necessarily produce change, however. Certain institutions and behavioral patterns of the industrial era obstruct

the passage of policies designed to curtail industrial spoliation. For one thing, the human yen for convenience and comfort lurks nearby in the shadow of self-righteous environmental movements. Even those most aware of the grim prognosis of advanced industrialism are reluctant to sacrifice now for the betterment of upcoming generations. The "expanding pie" conception of progress stubbornly thrives in the public psyche, albeit more in the shadows than in the forefront. Second, those who are committed to policies protective of the environment face hurdles in systematically aggregating their views. Political parties, which served so effectively to politicize and aggregate worker-management issues of the industrial era, do not appear likely to push forcefully for environmental policies. Not only do parties inappropriately thrive on specific rather than collective benefits, but their lines of cleavage work against development of a markedly "liberal" side of the environmental controversy.

Because of the obstacles posed by existing values and institutions, environmental enthusiasts may find it more expedient to resort to stopgap measures such as civil disobedience, demonstrations, and other forms of alternative political behavior.

Chapter IV--Notes

¹Viz., "The primary problem of politics is the lag in the development of political institutions behind social and economic change"; "[instability is] in large part the product of rapid social change and the rapid mobilization of new groups into politics coupled with the slow development of political institutions." Huntington, Political Order, pp. 4-5.

²Donald A. Schon, Beyond the Stable State (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1971), p. 32.

³Lowi, p. 5.

⁴Mark Kesselman, "Overinstitutionalization and Political Constraint: The Case of France," Comparative Politics, III (October, 1970), 21-44.

⁵Schon, p. 32.

⁶Lowi, p. 67. Similarly, Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (New York: n.p., 1967), p. 199, as referred to in Kesselman, pp. 24-25, talks about the "displacement of goals." This, according to Kesselman, pp. 24-25, means that "in order to survive, organizations must inculcate loyalty to the organization as a separate value Institutions cannot develop strength . . . unless they come to be valued for their own sake aside from the concrete benefits they deliver."

⁷This discussion draws on Frederic Fleisher, The New Sweden: The Challenge of a Disciplined Democracy (New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1967), pp. 29-39.

⁸Ibid., p. 37.

⁹See, for example, Barry Commoner, The Closing Circle (New York: Bantam, 1972); Edward Edelson and Fred Warshofski, Poisons in the Air (New York: Pocket Books, Inc., 1966); McConnell; Katherine Montague and Peter Montague, Mercury (New York: Sierra Club, 1971); and Robert Rienow and Leona Train Rienow, Moment in the Sun (New York: Ballantine Books, 1967).

¹⁰See, for example, Marc J. Epstein, "The Consequences of Economic Growth," Canadian Public Administration, XVI (Spring, 1973), 145.

¹¹"In the 1950s the rural-urban ratio was 65:35; in the 1960s it reversed to 35:65." Chitoshi Yanaga, Big Business in Japanese Politics (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 4.

¹²According to a 1964 survey, bronchitis in the polluted areas of Osaka and Yokkaichi was two to three times greater than in unpolluted sections. "White Paper on Pollution," White Papers of Japan 1969-70 (Tokyo: Japan Institute of International Affairs, 1971), p. 29.

¹³Ibid., p. 31.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 32.

¹⁵Information Bulletin, p. 178.

¹⁶Thomas Robert Malthus, An Essay on the Principle of Population, with a Biography and a Critical Introduction by G. T. Bettany (London: Ward, Lock and Co., 1890).

¹⁷The best known is Donella H. Meadows et al., The Limits to Growth (New York: Universe Books, 1972).

¹⁸John Plamenatz, Man and Society, Vol. II (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1963), pp. 409-410.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 410.

²⁰Japan, Economic Planning Agency, "White Paper on People's Lives" (Tokyo, 1971), p. 127. Respondents were not limited to one answer; hence, the figures add up to over 100 percent.

²¹Twenty-one percent in 1953 as compared to 32 percent in 1968. Cole, p. 46.

²²Japan, Office of the Prime Minister, "White Paper on Youth" (Tokyo, 1972), p. 157.

²³Inglehart, "Silent Revolution."

²⁴Ibid., p. 994.

²⁵Ibid., pp. 1000-1009.

²⁶William Ophuls, "The Scarcity Society," Harper's Magazine, April, 1974, pp. 47-52, considers some of the implications of scarcity on democratic political processes; and Lester R. Brown, "The World Resources Shortage," International Herald Tribune, November 26, 1973, p. 6, ponders some of the implications for international relations.

²⁷Erasmus H. Kloman, "Public Participation in Technology Assessment," Public Administration Review, XXXIV (January-February, 1974), 52. Kloman makes the point that once a mountain is leveled for coal or once a dam is constructed on a previously placid river, the effects can never be reversed.

²⁸James D. Carroll, "Participatory Technology," Science, CLXXI (February 19, 1971), 648.

²⁹This description of the id and the ego is based upon Richard S. Lazarus, Adjustment and Personality (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1961), pp. 139-146; and Fillmore H. Sanford, Psychology: A Scientific Study of Man (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc., 1965), p. 447.

³⁰Continuing with the analogy, it appears that the public is in the initial stages of id-ego competition in relation to environmental issues. As such, the third element of Freud's paradigm, the super-ego, has not yet emerged. It "represents morality and the ideals of society" and is the last element to develop. Lazarus, p. 145.

³¹American books include Rachel Carson, Silent Spring (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1962); Commoner; Fairfield Osborn, Our Plundered Planet (New York: Pyramid Books, 1968); and Rienow and Rienow.

³²For example, in the New York Times Index for 1956, no category entitled "Environment" is listed. In 1972, approximately four pages of news items relating to the environment are indexed. New York Times Index 1956 (New York: The New York Times Company, 1957); New York Times Index 1972 (New York: The New York Times Company, 1973).

³³Activities relating to the Amchitka atomic blast, the supersonic transport jet, and the Alaskan oil pipeline, for example.

³⁴Gilbert Winham, "Attitudes of Pollution and Growth in Hamilton, or 'There's an awful lot of talk these days about ecology,'" Canadian Journal of Political Science, V (1972), 389-401.

³⁵Information Bulletin, pp. 178-179.

³⁶Gabriel A. Almond, "Interest Groups and the Political Process," in Comparative Politics: Notes and Readings, ed. by Roy C. Macridis and Bernard E. Brown (Homewood, Ill.: The Dorsey Press, Inc., 1961), pp. 129-130. The quote is taken from Engelmann and Schwartz, p. 93.

³⁷Ibid.

³⁸ Frank J. Sorauf, Party Politics in America (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1968), p. 43. Parties in Germany's Weimar Republic often tended to take on the aura of narrow interest groups. These parties included the People's Coalition of the Victims of Inflation; and the Non-Political List of War Victims, Work Invalids, and Welfare Recipients. Charles E. Frye, "Parties and Pressure Groups in Weimar and Bonn," in European Political Processes: Essays and Readings, ed. by Henry S. Albinski and Lawrence K. Pettit (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1968), p. 125.

³⁹ See, for example, the American platforms of 1968 and 1972 and the Canadian platforms of 1968. American platforms of 1968 are found in Kirk H. Potter and Donald Bruce Johnson, eds., National Party Platforms 1840-1968 (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1970), pp. 739-758. The 1972 Democratic platform is contained in Facts on File, XXXII (July 9-15, 1972), 536-548; and the Republican platform is found in Facts on File, XXXII (August 20-26, 1972), 661-672. Canadian platforms of 1968 are reproduced in D. Owen Carrigan, ed., Canadian Party Platforms 1867-1968 (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1968), pp. 339-356.

⁴⁰ Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction," in Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross National Perspectives, ed. by Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan (New York: The Free Press, 1967), p. 50.

⁴¹ See Samuel H. Beer, British Politics in the Collectivist Age (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966), pp. 105-125. Beer refers to Ernest Bevin's well known remark that "The Labor Party has grown out of the bowels of the T.U.C. [Trade Union Congress]." Beer, p. 113.

⁴² "In the 1899 delegates from over 60 trade unions and Social Democratic clubs convened in Stockholm to found the Swedish Social Democratic party." Hancock, Postindustrial Change, p. 28.

⁴³ John H. Herz, The Government of Germany (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1967), p. 77.

⁴⁴ Alan D. Robinson, "Class Voting in New Zealand: A Comment on Alford's Comparison of Class Voting in the Anglo-American Political Systems," in Lipset and Rokkan, pp. 100-101.

⁴⁵ Cleavages based on religion and landlord-tenant conflict diminished in salience in the industrial era. See Robert R. Alford, "Class Voting in the Anglo-American Political Systems," in Lipset and Rokkan, pp. 67-93; David Butler and Donald Stokes, Political Change in Britain (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1971), pp. 95-110; and Lipset and Rokkan, "Introduction."

⁴⁶For example, both sides of the party spectrum tend to concur on the basics of the welfare state. See Lars Gyllensten, "Swedish Radicalism in the 1960's: An Experiment in Political and Cultural Debate," in Hancock and Sjoberg, p. 284; and Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Further Comments on 'The End of Ideology,'" American Political Science Review, LX (March, 1966), 17-18. Differences still remain, however. The 1973 British Labour Party platform was widely touted as the most "leftist" since World War II. Manchester Guardian, October 3, 1973, p. 1.

⁴⁷Robert Alford, Party and Society: The Anglo-American Democracies (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1963). The quotations above are from Alford, "Class Voting," p. 81. Class Voting ranged from highest to lowest in this order: Great Britain, Australia, the United States, and Canada.

⁴⁸Alford, "Class Voting." See also Morris Janowitz and David R. Segal, "Social Cleavage and Party Affiliation: Germany, Great Britain, and the United States," American Journal of Sociology, LXXII (May, 1967), 601-618. They found the highest index of class voting in Britain and the least in the United States, with Germany in the middle.

⁴⁹See Butler and Stokes, pp. 126-134; Inglehart, "Industrial, Pre-Industrial, and Post-Industrial Political Cleavages," pp. 31-33; D. R. Segal and D. Knoke, "Political Partisanship: Its Social and Economic Bases in the United States," American Journal of Economic Sociology, XXIX (July, 1970), 253-261; and Arthur C. Wolfe, "Trends in Labor Union Voting Behavior, 1948-1968," Industrial Relations, IX (October, 1969), 1-10. Class voting has always been low in Japan. See infra, pp. 142-146.

⁵⁰G. J. Pulzer, Political Representation and Elections (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), p. 98.

⁵¹Hancock, Postindustrial Change, p. 154.

⁵²Carter, p. 47. As of 1967, unions furnished six million out of seven million Labour Party members.

⁵³Nahum Z. Medalia, "Air Pollution as a Socio-Environmental Health Problem: A Survey Report," Journal of Health and Human Behavior, V (Winter, 1964), 161-162. None of the differences were significant but the tendency for lower environmental concern on the part of laborers was clear. For another study which showed that those lower on the socio-economic scale are less worried about environmental quality, see Louis N. Tognacci et al., "Environmental Quality: How Universal is Public Concern?" Environment and Behavior, IV (March, 1972), 73-86.

⁵⁴Inglehart, "Silent Revolution," p. 1001.

⁵⁵For example, the Reserve Mining Company of Silver Bay, Minnesota, is, at the time of this writing, appealing a court order that it must stop dumping its wastes into Lake Superior. If the company loses the appeal, it may close its plant and put 3,000 employees out of work. See New York Times, March 19, 1974, p. 1; March 22, 1974, p. 1; and March 25, 1974, p. 7.

⁵⁶Nor does it appear that the development of new environmental parties provides the answer, mainly because of the difficulties new parties face in trying to penetrate established party systems. See, for example, Douglas W. Rae, The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1967); and Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1957). Also, parties are not particularly effective policy-makers, least of all when it comes to complex technical issues, such as those concerning environmental policy. See Leon Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970), pp. 264-288.

⁵⁷See supra, pp. 82-83.

⁵⁸Gwendolen M. Carter, The Government of the United Kingdom (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1967), p. 49.

⁵⁹Most of these examples come from Epstein, Political Parties, pp. 111-129.

⁶⁰Ibid., p. 119.

⁶¹According to Epstein, Political Parties, p. 120, in Europe "it is hard to find a democratic party except the British Conservatives with a large membership and without an interest group structure."

⁶²Matthew A. Crenson, The Un-Politics of Air Pollution: A Study of Non-Decisionmaking in the Cities (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1971), p. 137. He is quoting Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965), p. 14. It is not always the case, though, that environmental issues involve collective benefits. For example, the construction of a dam raises environmental questions, but one can point to those groups which are specifically benefited, such as the dam constructors and recreation officials who might benefit from a new lake.

⁶³Crenson, pp. 133-158, makes this argument in relation to local party organizations in the United States.

CHAPTER V

FISSURES IN SYMBOLIC CONTROL

The Importance of Symbols

Symbols play an important role in every polity:

Politics, however it may be defined, can be regarded as one-third force and two-thirds symbols. . . . Legitimacy is the function of symbols. The greater and more durable the efficacy of such symbols, the more stable the polity concerned.¹

Symbols may be mundane and tangible, such as the flag or the national anthem, and susceptible to overt political manipulation. For example, in a Watergate-related television appearance, President Nixon appealed to the American people to believe his noninvolvement in the Watergate affair. Strategically placed in full view of the cameras was a bust of "Honest Abe" Lincoln himself. The implication was inescapable that Nixon was trying to associate a symbol of honesty with his televised message. Or, the symbols may be overarching and intangible, such as the democratic tenet that "all men are created equal." These symbols are passed on from generation to generation, become an integral part of the political culture, and are not so easy to manipulate. For example, when Franklin Roosevelt attempted to "pack" the Supreme Court, public outcry over this assault on the symbol of judicial independence prevented Roosevelt from carrying out his mission.

Symbols, whether they are susceptible to easy manipulation or not, serve at least three purposes: they (1) promote civil harmony, (2) engender active support of a polity, and (3) help secure support for specific policies.

1. No political leaders can survive by relying solely on force to maintain civil harmony. For at least two reasons, the "wise" leader will attempt to secure compliance by ways other than force. First, force requires a pervasive police patrol that devours precious resources--both financial and human--that might more judiciously be spent on other tasks. Second, the effectiveness of force as a tool for changing behavior is questionable. Laboratory experiments show that punishment (of which force is a form) at best suppresses behavior only temporarily.² Markus and Nesvold have shown, in a cross-national inquiry, that the relationship between government coerciveness and civil violence is curvilinear: moderate levels of government force in one month are related to high levels of civil violence in the next month.³ This casts doubt on the effectiveness of coercion in securing acquiescence.

For these and other reasons, leaders who wish to control civil strife generally combine force with other mechanisms of social control, including symbolic manipulation. The ratio of symbol to force varies with the nation's philosophical underpinnings: where respect for civil liberties is pervasive, symbols are relied on more extensively and force less extensively. But even where force is used wantonly to secure compliance, symbolic manipulation occurs. For example, although President Francois Duvalier ruled Haiti through the iron hand of the dreaded "Tonton Macoutes," he manipulated voodoo symbols to cow the masses and suppress personal enemies.⁴ Symbolic manipulation is limited only by the creativity of the manipulators.⁵

2. Symbols also help engender support among citizens for the political system and its leaders. This is especially important in a democracy where, as Almond and Verba argue, some degree of citizen involvement is necessary to maintain a healthy democratic order.⁶ Citizens participate when

they are proud of their nation, accept the rules of the game, and feel efficacious in their role as active citizens. These feelings amount to a sense of positive "affect," a feeling that is nurtured by symbols. Almond and Verba credit Mexican integration to the unifying symbol of the Mexican Revolution of 1910. Burmese leaders preparing for Independence Day festivities publicly consulted astrologers before choosing the day in order to legitimize the new political order in the minds of the Burmese people.⁷

3. Symbols can help secure support for specific policies. Since Cuban peasants reacted negatively to the idea of cooperatives, in 1961 the term "cooperative" was changed--symbolically--to "agricultural society."⁸ Indonesia's President Sukarno launched a symbolic blitz in 1959 to elicit support for his new program of "Guided Democracy." Its official title was Manipol-USDEK, USDEK being an acronym for five Indonesian principles--the 1945 Constitution, Indonesian Socialism, Guided Democracy, Guided Economy, and Indonesian Identity--which were meant to be psychologically meaningful to Indonesians.⁹ Also, President Nixon described the Vietnam peace accords as "peace with honor," a symbolic label designed to placate those reluctant to undergo the "humiliation" of "dishonorable withdrawal."

Modern democracies have evolved a system of symbols that may be called "representational symbols."¹⁰ The masses attribute legitimacy to the political system and its leaders because they have been socialized to believe that their will is represented in decision-making. The masses believe that representative democracy is a reasonable and even preferable alternative to direct democracy. Through the electoral apparatus, the people are assured at least an indirect hand in policy formulation. Thus, the symbolic network that secures acquiescence and legitimizes policy rests on the fundamental assumption of elective supremacy: it is assumed that those who are elected are those who make the decisions.

It is argued in this chapter that advanced industrialism disrupts this symbolic network because it undermines the assumption of legislative supremacy upon which symbolic control rests. Advanced industrialism has been accompanied by an erosion of legislative power and a corresponding growth of bureaucratic power. Because bureaucrats are not popularly elected, their power threatens symbolic veracity. It is further submitted that the tensions of trans-modernity are in part caused by these fissures in symbolic control.

Power Variations in Advanced Industrial Democracies

It is generally recognized that bureaucracies have been amassing power at the expense of legislatures in the latter part of the 20th century. This shift has been blamed variously on lackadaisical legislators who are only too happy to "pass the buck" and rest secure in a noncontroversial retreat; on democratic ennui (just as human resourcefulness peaks and gradually diminishes during the life cycle, so perhaps has the vitality of democracy reached its peak); and as the result of the sheer volume of decisions in heavily populated countries. At least one reason, however, is a function of advanced industrialism: with the onset of advanced industrialism come highly complex and technical decisions that fall beyond the capacity of legislative generalists to decide. Instead, expertise, or "technocratic counsel"¹¹ is required.

Four types of complex decisions come to mind. First, the technology that necessarily accompanies post-industrialism creates problems that appear to many to be solvable through the administration of more technology.¹² Consider, for example, the automobile. Born of technology, the automobile has created air pollution of sufficient import to prod governments into regulating pollution emissions, a move that requires more technology. Even a blanket decision, such as an unlikely ban on automobiles, would call upon technology

to develop mass transit alternatives. Or, consider pesticides. To feed wealthy industrialized peoples, pesticides have been developed. But these have negative effects on man and animal alike. To feed the people and yet avoid deleterious physical consequences, technology again is called upon to develop biological pesticide control. Second, nations have come to regard laissez-faire economics as unsuitable to the complexities of advanced industrialism. Consequently, economic regulation has fallen under the purview of advanced industrial governments, creating the need for widespread technical decisions. Third, the wealth accruing from advanced industrialism has prodded nations to adopt varying degrees of welfarism to redistribute the wealth more equitably. Fourth, technological advancement has complicated decisions relating to national security. The government, as purchaser and controller of military hardware, must consider technical information when deciding whether to buy "smart bombs," submarine missiles, and anti-ballistic missiles. In all these ways, expertise enters the decision-making process. Consequently, the site of much decision-making has shifted from legislatures (generalists) to bureaucracies (specialists).¹³

While there is agreement that the site of power has shifted, the extent of the power shift in post-industrial nations is a subject of debate. At least two schools of thought can be discerned: the "power displacement" thesis and the "scientific utility" thesis.¹⁴ Unfortunately, debate is often vague and couched in glittering generalities: little substantive evidence is offered in support of either.

Power Displacement

The tenets of the power displacement thesis are:¹⁵

- I. Theoretical knowledge is supremely important in the post-industrial society.

- a. Knowledge generates change.
 - b. Knowledge is necessary for complex decisions.
- II. Since knowledge is a valued resource, those with knowledge have power.
- III. Experts have knowledge; therefore, they have power.
- IV. Experts amass power at the expense of politicians. They displace politicians on the power hierarchy because:
- a. Experts control the flow of change.
 - b. Politicians are dependent upon experts for knowledge.

The thesis is simply this: knowledge begets power. Since politicians are, by and large, generalists, and bureaucrats and scientists are specialists, the latter are powerful. Ultimately a wholly "technological society" is envisioned:

[In the technological society] technology . . . will set all social goals and will provide the answers to all questions of social policy, and the only role left for the politician will be to use the techniques of organization to elicit popular co-operation with the plans made by experts.¹⁶

There is support for the idea that science and scientists now play a substantially broader role in policy-making than in previous years. Government structures have been set up to incorporate scientific input, and people with scientific backgrounds are increasingly appointed to bureaucratic positions. In Canada, the recently formed Science Council of Canada, and the Planning Programming and Budgeting System (PPB), both have the effect of infusing science into decision-making.¹⁷ The first is essentially an advisory body set up "to define and determine feasible long-term objectives for science in Canada, to suggest appropriate paths for reaching them and to consider the responsibilities of the various segments of the industrial, academic and government communities in this field."¹⁸ The PPB "is an information system designed to produce and recombine information in such a way that it will serve planning, programming, and budgeting objectives in an integrative way."¹⁹

Bureaucratic appointees reflect the presence of technocratic philosophies. Between 1960 and 1970, the number of scientists employed by the federal government jumped by 49 percent; social science personnel rose 52 percent.²⁰ In President Nixon's first years in the White House, his advisors and appointees quickly took on an expert hue, this despite Nixon's professed intolerance of Lyndon Johnson's "cult of planners."²¹ For a sampling: Henry Kissinger's top aide, Laurence E. Lynn, Jr., had a Ph.D. from Yale in Economics; the principal aide on the environment to then Presidential Assistant John Erlichman held a Ph.D. in Geology; the White House staff specialist in telecommunications policy held a doctorate in Management; and the staff director of the National Goals Research Staff was a former science policy researcher with the National Science Foundation.²² In Sweden, the proportion of lawyers in the civil service has decreased while the scientists and engineers have become more numerous. In 1917, 61 percent of Sweden's civil servants were lawyers; by 1967, this figure had dropped to 28 percent.²³

However, caution should be taken before these and other figures are used to conclude that experts have taken over or are soon likely to take over political power. For several reasons the power displacement thesis seems exaggerated: we argue that scientists are not likely to infiltrate power hierarchies to the extent that Bell and others would like us to believe.

First, the scientific community does not represent the monolithic elite envisioned in the power displacement thesis.²⁴ The scientific community is more accurately envisioned as a pluralist community torn by conflicting loyalties and interpretations. Science, although based on observable phenomena, is controversial. Every observation and every interpretation is subject to a counter-observation and a counter-interpretation. It is a myth that scientific knowledge is rational and hence subject to only one

interpretation, as scientists themselves are only too quick to recognize. Because human values enter into scientific interpretation, scientists resort to crafty blind and double-blind experimentation in which experimental overseers are unaware either of the study's hypotheses or of the manipulations to which each experimental group has been exposed. In a nation allowing the free flow of ideas, the scientific community is interlocked in any number of dissents, objections, and counterarguments.

The scientific community is pluralist also because of its diverse loyalties. Scientists are not financially independent; they are employed by corporations, governments, and universities.²⁵ Illustratively, Table 20 compares the percentage of scientific research and development (R and D) funds spent by industry and government for six advanced industrial nations. In all cases, industry's expenditures amount to at least 30 percent of the total; in Japan the figure rises markedly to over 60 percent. How often does one hear of a scientist employed by a food manufacturer exposing the dangers of food additives, or of a scientist working for a cigarette producer proclaiming the deleterious effects of nicotine? While these scientists probably do not deliberately bias their finding to extol the virtues of additives or nicotine, they may seek to undermine the validity of noncorporate scientific findings. It is a matter of selectively publishing and communicating findings. In this sense, the scientific community is definitely engaged in a political lobbying activity.

Second, supportive evidence offered by those who believe in the power displacement thesis is less than satisfactory. The mere physical presence of experts does not in itself constitute proof that they have seriously infiltrated the power hierarchy in the post-industrial society. Indeed, for every scientist there is at least one nonscientist. Among Trudeau's top

TABLE 20.--Share of scientific research and development expenditure by industry and government in major industrialized countries, 1967

Country	Percentage share		
	Industry	Government	Other ^a
Japan	62.8	30.2	6.9
United States	34.4	61.0	4.6
United Kingdom	43.0	49.6	7.4
France	31.5	53.5	15.0
W. Germany	57.5	41.3	1.2
Canada	31.0	53.4	15.6

SOURCE: Adapted from "White Paper on Science and Technology," White Papers of Japan 1970-71 (Tokyo: Japan Institute of International Affairs, 1972), p. 171.

^aIncludes nonprofit research institutions, universities, and overseas agencies.

advisers in the Prime Minister's Office and the Privy Council, only one is a computer analyst; the rest have backgrounds in law and communications.²⁶

Nor do R and D figures provide convincing support; they do not in themselves warrant concluding that recipients of the funds are eroding the power base of those who allocate the funds.²⁷

Third, the power displacement thesis assumes that scientists have amassed sufficient data to make decisions adeptly. However, two conditions point to the fallacy of this assumption: (1) information is often quite spotty, as scientists are well aware with their frequent cautions that "more evidence is needed" before conclusions can be drawn; (2) scientists often are ill-informed about the mechanisms of translating information into workable policy.²⁸ The fact that scientists cannot draft policy in its final form reduces their key role in the formulation of policy.

Fourth (and this opens up a question that to this writer's knowledge has not been systematically researched), it must be asked whether the presence of experts in bureaucracies has exceeded the proportion of experts in post-industrial societies in general. Put another way, is it not true that the increased number of governmental scientists is simply a reflection of increased numbers of scientists in the entire society? Actually, it appears that the government should be employing even more scientists to increase its representativeness: "While the federal government's employment of scientists increased by 49 percent in the ten year period [1960-70], the output of doctorates in the United States increased by 185 percent."²⁹

Fifth, can one seriously argue that knowledge, per se, generates change in the post-industrial society? Robert Lane somewhat naively argues that because information is now available to document starvation and poverty in the American South, these evils will be promptly eliminated in the rational atmosphere generated by the knowledgeable society.³⁰ To Lane, this knowledge is so overwhelming that it in itself generates change because it is inconceivable that a rational person could shunt aside such information. But this argument is naive because it ignores the role that self-interest plays in human actions: people tend to act only if it is rational in terms of personal benefit for them to do so.³¹ Although knowledge might present a stimulus for change, a politician's urge for self-preservation becomes an intervening variable. Politicians rely less on scientific considerations than on other factors. For example, in a recent study of the relation between interest groups and Canadian parliamentarians, researchers found that members of parliament (MP's) did not rely on interest groups for information to the extent that one would expect in light of "the range and technical complexity of contemporary policy issues, and the inability of [parliamentary] members,

as generalists, to develop expertise in more than one or two substantive areas."³² Only 40 percent of the MP's thought an important function of interest groups was to "[provide] information on pending legislation."³³

For these reasons, we suggest that the power displacement thesis has been overplayed. A more plausible assessment of scientific power in the post-industrial society is provided by the scientific utility thesis.

Scientific Utility

This thesis states that traditional political elites (legislators and bureaucrats) use science and scientists when it is expedient to do so. Far from being displaced by scientists, these elites remain at the helm of decision-making and admit science only when useful: (1) before and during policy formulation when decisions may be so complex that outside information is essential, and (2) after the policy is made in order to legitimize the decision in the eyes of the public. It is the latter case that occupies the attention of those who suggest this thesis. Argues Irving Horowitz:

For the most part, [social scientists] do not establish or even verify policy--only legitimize policy. . . . They proclaim a position, more than prove its efficacy or necessity. . . . They enter at the termination, not the beginning, of the policy-making process.³⁴

Horowitz gives several examples, including the Defense Department's Project Camelot (designed to legitimize U.S. policy in Latin America), and the Moynihan Report (meant to legitimize Lyndon Johnson's shift in emphasis in programs for black Americans).³⁵ In both these instances, Horowitz argues, policy was pre-determined and the reports were ex post facto legitimizing tools.

While this thesis is by no means foolproof, in the absence of adequate support for the power displacement thesis, it provides a safer, more reasoned, and more plausible assessment of science's role in the

post-industrial policy process. It tempers the power displacement thesis by saying that knowledge is not in itself ordinarily a force for change but must be admitted by those with political power.

We suggest that the use of science and information for legitimizing policy has opened the way to what may be called "technocratic symbols." People are asked to accept policy decisions on their rationalistic and scientific basis. Given that policy is increasingly bureaucratic in origin, technocratic symbols may prove useful where representational symbols cannot logically be used. In Horowitz's words:

In the absence of mass legitimation through the electoral process or through the indirect authority of the people, politicians must seek legitimacy through the analytical process or through the will of Platonic social scientists.³⁶

Technocratic symbols regularly accompany bureaucratic decisions. For example, when the Arab oil embargo began in October, 1973, ~~President~~ Nixon immediately instituted a Federal Energy Office and named William Simon as director. Since Simon was an appointee, his policies could not be legitimized by representational symbols. Consequently, in his press conferences and numerous television appearances, Simon relied on data to legitimize his decisions (figures relating to current demand in terms of barrels of oil per day, current import of barrels per day, net decrease of imports over the previous year, and so on). Simon had little choice. He could not, for example, ask the populace to trust him because they had voted him into office to do a job (representational symbols). As a second example, in order to legitimize the U.S. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's decision that air bags become a feature of all automobiles manufactured after September 1, 1976,³⁷ television crews filmed experimental crashes in which air bags were and were not used. Embellishing the reports with data helped legitimize decisions made by a nonelective body.

Symbolic Fissures

Given that bureaucratic officials cannot logically rely on representational symbols, it is likely that the rise of technocratic symbols serves a useful stabilizing function in the era of greater bureaucratic power. Some type of symbol is necessary. But for several reasons, reliance on technocratic symbols may create tensions.

First, not all persons in post-industrial societies defer to the "rationality" of science. Anti-intellectualism is a force of varying degrees of strength. "Pointy-headed intellectuals" (George Wallace), "effete snobs" (Spiro Agnew), and "ivory tower dreamers" remain the target of distrust and dislike. Suffering along with intellectuals and scientists is that which they produce--scientific findings. The scientist and his statistics alike often more effectively elicit sneers and distrust than awe. For example, when scientists argued that by fluoridating water supplies dental disease would diminish, right-wing groups in the United States launched a major counter-offensive denouncing fluoridation plans as communist plots. Scientists were pictured as villains cloaking their evil aims behind the facade of scientific purity. Also, scientific innovations can backfire. The artificial sweetener "cyclamate" was on the Food and Drug Administration's GRAS³⁹ list for years before it was hauled off the market as unsafe. Subsequently, a substitute sweetener, saccharin, was also deemed unsafe. Or, to reduce the harmful effects of carbon monoxide emissions from automobiles, governmental agencies ordered automobile manufacturers to install anti-pollution devices. It has since been discovered that these devices emit other chemicals equally harmful to humans. When contradictory findings such as these become known, public skepticism about science grows rather than dissipates. So, at least to a

segment of the population, technocratic symbols are unconvincing and perhaps even counterproductive.

Second, representational and technocratic symbols are basically incompatible. The former promise that the "needs of the people 'percolate' upward and provide directives for social action."³⁹ They ask for public acquiescence and support because they promise that the people's needs are being represented. The latter, however, ask for popular support because they represent what is rational, having secured the stamp of scientific approval. They do not refer to the will of the people; they readily admit that the decisional bases lie with a knowledgeable elite group.

Because these sets of symbols are incompatible, the authenticity of representational symbols is questioned. "Authenticity," as used by Etzioni, equals responsiveness. A "relationship, institution, or society" is authentic if it both claims to be responsive and actually is responsive. It is inauthentic if it claims responsiveness but actually is not.⁴⁰ Representational symbols claim responsiveness: they claim that policy is made on the basis of the popular will. But technocratic symbols undermine this claim: they demonstrate that policy is actually made on the basis of other considerations. This produces a discrepancy between the claimed and the actual, and diminishes the authenticity of representational symbols.

When representational symbols are so weakened and when technocratic symbols are not fully accepted, the entire system of symbolic control suffers, and this augments the tensions of trans-modernity.

The idea that fissures in symbolic control accompany post-industrialism is suggested here in hypothetical form: little attempt is made to defend it vigorously as a thesis. But it might profitably be investigated more thoroughly on a cross-national basis. One question that arises is the impact

of differential ratios of representational and technocratic symbols in individual post-industrial societies. For example, bureaucratic agencies have traditionally been treated with more respect than legislative bodies in Japan, contrary to other post-industrial societies. Deference is shown the bureaucracy because of "the deep faith of the people in general that the bureaucracy is by nature neutral" and is a superior decision-making body.⁴¹ Symbolic control in Japan thus emanates in part from the belief of nonelective superiority. Consequently, representational symbols do not serve the same symbolic importance in Japan as in other post-industrial nations with longer democratic tenure. It is a subject for future inquiry what impact the rise of technocratic symbols might have on symbolic control in Japan.

Chapter V--Notes

¹Taketsugu Tsurutani, The Politics of National Development (New York: Chandler Publishing Company, 1973), p. 129.

²See, for example, James G. Holland and B. F. Skinner, The Analysis of Behavior (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1961), p. 262.

³Gregory B. Markus and Betty A. Nesvold, "Governmental Coerciveness and Political Instability: An Exploratory Study of Cross-National Patterns," Comparative Political Studies, V (July, 1972), 231-244.

⁴"Duvalier nurtured the belief . . . that he had magical power and controlled the loas or invisible spirits that can invade and dominate the human body. To many, Duvalier was not only the supreme secular authority in Haiti, but also the country's most powerful houngan (Voudoun priest) or bocor (sorcerer)." H. Jon Rosenbaum and Peter C. Sederberg, "The Occult and Political Development," Comparative Politics, IV (July, 1971), 565.

⁵For discussions of symbolic manipulation, see Murray Edelman, Politics as Symbolic Action (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1971); Tsurutani, Politics of National Development; and Richard M. Merelman, "Learning and Legitimacy," American Political Science Review, LX (September, 1966), 548-561.

⁶Gabriel A. Almond and Sydney Verba, The Civic Culture (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1965).

⁷Rosenbaum and Sederberg, p. 567.

⁸See, for example, Theodore Draper, Castroism: Theory and Practice (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1969), pp. 75-140.

⁹George McTurnan Kahin, "Indonesia," in Major Governments of Asia, ed. by George McTurnan Kahin (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1963), pp. 660-661.

¹⁰The complex network of symbols in these nations is not described in depth; to do so would only amount to an exposition of democratic theory.

¹¹Jeffrey D. Straussman, "Technocratic Counsel and Societal Guidance," Paper delivered at the 1973 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New Orleans, September 4-8, 1973.

¹²Kloman, p. 52.

¹³For example, in Sweden, where policy is generally formulated in Royal Commissions, civil servants have become increasingly prominent in the composition of the commissions: from 1945-54 the proportion of legislators to civil servants was 25 percent to 41 percent; and from 1955 to 1967, the proportion shifted to 19 percent and 60 percent respectively. Thomas J. Anton, Claes Linde, and Anders Mellbourn, "Bureaucrats in Politics: A Profile of the Swedish Administrative Elite," Canadian Public Administration, XVI (Winter, 1973), 630. Also, "over 90 percent of all commission chairmen have been recruited from the public administration during the postwar era." Hancock, Postindustrial Change, p. 203.

¹⁴Straussman, pp. 21-23, distinguishes between these schools of thought; the labels are introduced here for the sake of convenience.

¹⁵Straussman, pp. 20-21. Those who support the power displacement thesis in varying degrees include Bell; Ellul; Touraine; and Zbigniew Brzezinski, Between Two Ages (New York: Viking Books, 1970).

¹⁶Ferkiss, p. 156. He is summarizing Ellul's views.

¹⁷G. Bruce Doern, "Recent Changes in the Philosophy of Policy-Making in Canada," Canadian Journal of Political Science, IV (June, 1971), 243-264. Doern also discusses Prime Minister Trudeau's enthusiasm for science in decision-making.

¹⁸Hon. C. M. Drury, from Doern, p. 251. The Council's recent report, Towards a National Science Policy for Canada, reiterated its position that science and policy are compatible. Doern, pp. 251-252.

¹⁹Doern, pp. 251-252.

²⁰Straussmann, p. 33.

²¹Andrew Hamilton, "Nixon's White House Staff: Heyday of the Planners?" Science, CLXVII (February 27, 1970), 1232.

²²Doern, pp. 1232-1233. Also, of the 16 "planning and evaluation" appointees in Nixon's administration, eight held Ph.D.'s. Straussman, p. 19.

²³Anton et al., p. 635.

²⁴Bell takes care to point this out. See also Ferkiss, pp. 174-176.

²⁵See Avery Leiserson, "Scientists and the Policy Process," American Political Science Review, LIX (June, 1965), 412.

²⁶Doern, p. 249.

²⁷Indeed, the argument is undermined by the fact that R and D expenditures are decreasing in the United States. Straussman, pp. 12-13. See also New York Times, September 6, 1972, p. 13.

²⁸Straussman, p. 15.

²⁹Ibid., p. 18. Straussman is referring to the total output of doctorates.

³⁰Robert Lane, "The Decline of Politics and Ideology in a Knowledgeable Society," American Sociological Review, XXXI (October, 1966), 661-662.

³¹Downs, for example, bases his "economic theory of democracy" on this assumption of rationality.

³²Robert Presthus, "Interest Groups and the Canadian Parliament: Activities, Interaction, Legitimacy, and Influence," Canadian Journal of Political Science, IV (December, 1971), 449.

³³Ibid., p. 448.

³⁴Irving Louis Horowitz, Foundations of Political Sociology (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), p. 415. The reader will note that Horowitz is very skeptical that the social scientist enters at the formulation stage, contrary to what we suggested above. Probably Horowitz is stretching his argument too far if he believes that social scientists never serve a useful function at this stage.

³⁵Ibid., pp. 418-429.

³⁶Ibid., p. 417.

³⁷New York Times, March 19, 1974, p. 1.

³⁸Generally regarded as safe.

³⁹Etzioni, The Active Society, p. 637.

⁴⁰Ibid., pp. 618-622.

⁴¹Kiyooki Tsuji, "The Bureaucracy Preserved and Strengthened," in Asian Political Systems, ed. by Betty B. Burch and Allan B. Cole (New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1968), p. 139. Also, see infra, p. 137.

CHAPTER VI

COMPARATIVE INQUIRY: JAPAN AND SWEDEN

The study of post-industrialism requires not only a description of challenges that arise from technological-industrial advancements, but also an explication of national responses to these challenges. Merely to delineate common challenges seriously glosses over individual differences and encourages the controversial interpretation that post-industrial challenges will affect all nations equally. Small wonder that this interpretation has gained a foothold in scholastic circles; virtually all extant studies of the post-industrial society concentrate on similarities rather than differences. More realistically, the unique historical, social, and political complexion of each nation must be taken into consideration in the study of post-industrialism. The historical "mix" of each nation leads to what Tsurutani has called "differential manifestation":

Different societies respond to one same stimulus differently, and thus one same phenomenon manifests itself in divergent forms in these societies. This difference is caused, among others, by the variation among these societies in the extent to which various functionally comparable institutions and organizations are entrenched and routinized, as well as in sociopolitical tradition and cultural environment.

In this chapter we discuss two post-industrial nations, Japan and Sweden, in order to draw out certain variables that might profitably be used to explain and predict a nation's response to post-industrial challenges. The purpose of the chapter is limited: it seeks mainly to point out features which can, at a later date, be used for cross-national inquiry. It does not provide a detailed political analysis of Japan or Sweden.²

Japan and Sweden are chosen because, as dissimilar nations, they suggest a wide range of variables that might be considered in explaining idiosyncratic response. The symptoms of trans-modernity are significantly more acute in Japan than in Sweden and the contrast might explain what types of socio-historical factors help effect a smooth transition to post-industrialism.³ Also, relatively abundant evidence is available for these countries. The Japanese political literature, in particular, is quite rich in survey studies. This contrasts to the literature on, say, New Zealand or Australia, which is deficient in attitudinal surveys.

The chapter asks certain questions about Japan and Sweden. Why has Japan experienced more of the symptoms of trans-modernity than Sweden? What factors--historical, social, political--contribute to Japan's internal turmoil? Contrariwise, what are some of Japan's potential bonuses, or features that perhaps might in the long run boost her capacity to respond to post-industrialism in comparison to other nations? The questions are reversed for Sweden. The country has experienced fewer symptoms of trans-modern tension. Why? What features boost Sweden's capacity to absorb challenges with minimal social and political disruption? Also, what might be some "hidden" features that are dysfunctional for effective response and that could surface at some later time?

At first glance, this approach may seem dangerously tautological. Japan experiences turmoil, so it is concluded that whatever is true of Japan produces turmoil; Sweden is stable, so whatever is true of Sweden is conducive to stability. However, this chapter avoids becoming wholly tautological because trans-modernity is regarded as an extended developmental period. A nation becomes post-industrial at a certain point when the tertiary sector becomes predominant. But the socio-political repercussions may be felt for a

long time and may change over the years. Japan is currently more unstable than Sweden in these initial years of trans-modernity. But because of social and historical factors, this may very well change. Consequently we also ask what might be some of Japan's strengths and Sweden's weaknesses.

Japan

Among the post-industrial nations, Japan, as well as the United States, has experienced considerable civil turmoil. Violence erupted in the 1960's as Japanese students reacted to their government's aid to U.S. involvement in Vietnam and negotiations with the United States over the Security Treaty, and to outmoded university facilities and practices. More recently, jūmin groups have adopted a panoply of alternative behavior techniques. Also the rapidly growing number of those people who are either altogether disengaged from political parties or who support the Communist Party indicates a deep-seated dissatisfaction with current political arrangements. Even more ominous is the apparently widespread social malaise in Japan. Compared with young people in other post-industrial nations, Japanese youth reveal a marked dissatisfaction with their society and their jobs (Table 21). Nor is dissatisfaction confined to youth; when respondents from a stratified sample were asked how they felt about their present life, the largest proportion, 42.5 percent, revealed that they were not yet satisfied. Slightly over 41 percent professed a fair degree of satisfaction, 9.9 percent judged their lives unbearable, and only 6.3 percent were satisfied.⁴ Factors which may contribute to this malaise and disenchantment include rapid and simultaneous change, dysrhythmic change, and the costs of industrialism.

TABLE 21.--Satisfaction among youth in four post-industrial nations

Response	Japan	Sweden	United Kingdom	United States
<u>Question:</u> "To what extent are you satisfied with your society?"				
Satisfied	4%	15%	38%	25%
More or less satisfied	22	49	41	39
More or less dissatisfied	46	23	12	21
Dissatisfied	27	12	9	14
No answer/no opinion	1	1	--	1
<u>Question:</u> "To what extent are you satisfied with your job and working conditions?"				
Satisfied	42%	86%	80%	78%
More or less satisfied	42	12	17	19
More or less dissatisfied	13	1	1	2
Dissatisfied	3	--	1	1
No answer/no opinion	--	1	1	--

SOURCE: Adapted from Gallup Opinion Poll Index, October, 1973, p. 27.

Dysfunctional Features

Rapidity and Simultaneity of Change

In the years prior to World War II, Japan's value system was highly integrated. Japan developed her distinctive and homogeneous character in part because of her insular status, much as Britain's homogeneity has been reinforced and solidified due to her geographical separation. But unlike

Britain, Japan's insularity was shattered by the intrusion of victorious allied forces who, through fear, distrust, ethnocentricity, and the "prerogative of the victor" sought to transform Japan's cultural and political complexion. Decades of rich socio-cultural evolution crumbled under the presence of the Western aliens who eagerly sought to recreate the Japanese in their own image. And these attempts were not wholly repulsed: shocked by the calamities of war, thousands of Japanese willingly rejected traditional political and social values which propelled them into war in the first place. Since that sudden break with traditionalism less than 30 years ago, Japan has undergone tremendous change in all facets of her life.

Social and familial values have undergone tremendous change, as dramatically illustrated by two Imperial Army officers who recently straggled from jungles contested in World War II. These soldiers, so committed to subservience to the Emperor that they, with numerous other veterans, refused to surrender at the war's end,⁵ represented philosophies now rejected by some of the older generation and alien to many born since 1945. Especially in juxtaposition to the rebellious student of the 1960's and 1970's, the subservient warrior presents a sharp contrast of values.⁶

As yet, Japanese values have not reached a new plateau of social agreement. The question of what is "Japanese" seems to perplex observers and residents alike, as evident in the large number of recently published books asking this question.⁷ Also, surveys conducted at five-year intervals by the Institute of Mathematical Statistics reveal inconsistent response patterns even by the same individuals, leading one observer to suggest "that relatively few individuals are consistently traditional or modern in their attitudes; rather, each person represents a varying mixture of traditional and modern views."⁸

Japan has also experienced rapid change in the intellectual achievements of her citizens. Although mental excellence has long been strived for by the Japanese people, in the post-war years intellectual changes have been particularly marked. For example, the percentage of those entering the work force who received some form of college education more than doubled from 1960 to 1971 (from 9.3 percent to 23.9 percent).⁹ Also, the number of magazines bought per year per capita jumped from 3.0 in 1955 to 14.3 in 1971; the number of books purchased per year per capita rose from 1.1 to 3.2 in the same time span; and the number of newspaper subscriptions rose from 0.25 to 0.35.¹⁰

Japan's industrial and economic growth has also catapulted in the last two decades, as the following summary makes clear:

Japan's productive capacity is now 500 percent greater than it was before the war During the past decade the annual growth rate has been 10%, labor productivity has increased 8% each year, exports have expanded 14% annually (twice the world rate), and savings and investment have been piling up at a rate of 32% of GNP a year (nearly double the rate for the United States).¹¹

Between 1960 and 1966 alone, "manufacturing rose 99%, employment 35%, and productivity 67%, for an average productivity growth rate of 9%, compared to 3.7% in the U.S. in the same period."¹² Japan's GNP growth rate frequently tops that of other advanced industrial nations; for example, her 1968 GNP growth rate of 17.6 percent was the highest in the world.¹³

The above changes have not only been rapid, they have occurred simultaneously with the advent of post-industrialism. Japan is assaulted by challenges on two fronts, unlike other post-industrial nations that have experienced the luxury of relatively greater social consensus and stability before facing post-industrial challenges. In a sense, Japan has gone from the transitional to the trans-modern stage without the mediating calm of modernity.

In addition, post-industrial challenges have not been staggered in Japan as they have in other countries. Post-industrial challenges have been

separated by time lags in the United States which have allowed a partial consolidation of each. For example, the American tertiary labor force passed the 50 percent mark in 1956. Later, starting with the Kennedy years, technocrats and their legitimizing symbols entered the policy-making scene. The politicization of industrial costs was not keenly felt until the late 1960's. Post-industrial challenges in Japan emerged more or less simultaneously in the 1960's. In a span of less than ten years, service sector employment zoomed, technocratic counsel blossomed, and industrial costs surfaced with disconcerting speed.

In short, three variables--rapid social change, simultaneous social and post-industrial change, and nonstaggered post-industrial challenges--place a burden on Japan's capacity to cope with novel post-industrial challenges.

Dysrhythmic Change

Japan faces the problem of dysrhythmic change: social, cultural, and economic transition has been rapid but political reform has been less thorough. Despite many advancements in the post-war development of democratic procedures,¹⁴ Japanese politics retain more than a vestige of traditional patterns of bureaucratic control and, in an era of citizen mobilization, such control can be at once frustrating and alienating.¹⁵

Japan's tradition of bureaucratic rule dates back centuries, leading one observer to assert that "Japan comes close to being the oldest and most consistent model of institutionalized bureaucracy in the world."¹⁶ However, it was after the Meiji Restoration of 1868, described by Robert Ward as "a sort of bureaucratic coup d'etat,"¹⁷ that the power of the bureaucracy grew quite notably. Bureaucratic power was enhanced by one of the myths of the Restoration, that the Emperor possessed almost divine powers as a result of his alleged descent from Amaterasu-omikami, the goddess of the sun.¹⁸ Because

the Emperor was believed to be superior, he was also felt to be infallible. This aura of infallibility extended beyond the Emperor to include that which was part of or extended from him, and this included the civil bureaucracy.¹⁹

With the post-war constitution of 1946, power relationships in Japan were rearranged, and the bureaucracy formally lost some of its power. Other bodies, including a Diet and a cabinet and Prime Minister responsible to the Diet, gained power. The Emperor was relegated a purely symbolic role:

Article I of the Constitution states that "The Emperor shall be the symbol of the state and of the unity of the people, deriving his position from the will of the people, with whom resides sovereign power."²⁰ Despite these formal changes, in practice the bureaucracy continues to function as the leading source of political power.²¹ Tsuji observes that "[i]n the postwar period, just as in the prewar period, the National Diet and the political parties, though clad in their new gorgeous gowns, have danced on a stage synchronized by a complex bureaucracy."²²

The bureaucracy retains its prominence for several reasons. First, traditional attitudes and beliefs did not automatically die with the publication of a new constitution. The halo of infallibility which had extended to the bureaucrats has retained its glow, as noted by Tsuji:

The Japanese people have always had a vague but obstinate notion that, on the one hand, the government and the bureaucrats are impartial and neutral and that, on the other hand, partisan conflict and party politics are liable to upset the equilibrium of the established order.²³

Politicians continue to be looked upon with some distaste, especially as purveyors of corruption. For example, in a recent survey, Japanese people were asked: "Is there anything that contributes to corruption of current politics?" Fully 32.6 percent mentioned the politician, 21.2 percent mentioned the political party, and only 8.5 percent mentioned the bureaucracy.²⁴

Second, as has previously been discussed, the tendency in most industrial nations since the war has been toward increased bureaucratic power. Complex decisions seem to demand the expertise that bureaucracies can offer, and Japan's civil service is, indeed, a highly competent body.²⁵ In this respect, efforts to develop representative democracy in Japan have come at an awkward time.

Third, the emergence of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)²⁶ is said to have contributed to legislative weakness on the one hand, and to bureaucratic power on the other.²⁷ The LDP's bureaucratic ties are strong, partly because so many party officials are recruited from the bureaucracy.²⁸ Table 22 records the number and percentage of LDP officials in power between 1956 and 1966 who had bureaucratic backgrounds. Also, a fairly high percentage of LDP members of parliament are ex-bureaucrats. In 1963, 28 percent of the LDP members of the House of Representatives were ex-bureaucrats and, in 1964, 38 percent of LDP's members in the House of Councillors were former bureaucrats.²⁹ According to Yoshisato Oka, parties have recruited their members from the bureaucracy since the early days of the Occupation. At that time the parties' lack of capable leaders was compounded "by the Occupation's policy of purging undemocratic though capable conservative politicians."³⁰ To circumvent the problem, the parties recruited their leaders from "retired, high-ranking bureaucrats."³¹

Fourth, legislative weakness is a function of structural and procedural restrictions which were in part self-imposed by the Diet itself.³² For one thing, it passed the Diet law which had the effect of diminishing the importance of private bills. In the 1965-1966 legislative session, for example, only 11 bills out of 147 were initiated in the Diet. The rest

TABLE 22.--Percentage of ex-bureaucrats among major officials of the Liberal Democratic Party (up to July, 1966)

Position	Total officeholders	Percentage of ex-bureaucrats ^a
Secretary-General	8	38
Chairman of the Executive Board	11	36
Chairman of the Policy Board	12	50
Chairman of the Financial Committee ^b	4	50
Chairman of the National Organization Committee	12	25
Chairman of the Publicity Committee ^c	8	25
Chairman of the Diet Relations Committee	13	15
Chairman of the Party Discipline Committee	<u>10</u>	<u>50</u>
Total	78	35

SOURCE: Shigeo Misawa, "An Outline of the Policy-Making Process in Japan," in Japanese Politics--An Inside View: Readings from Japan, trans. and ed. by Hiroshi Itoh (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1973), p. 23.

^aThose who occupied positions of section chief or higher at central administrative offices, mainly those who have passed the government's higher civil service examinations.

^bCreated in 1962.

^cCreated in 1959.

originated in the cabinet.³³ The Diet also disbanded the Joint Committee on Legal Statutes, a significant step in light of the Committee's potential powers:

It was responsible to both the Diet and cabinet for proposing new legislation and recommending the revision or abolition of existing laws and ordinances and was also charged with advising the chairmen of both houses concerning the revision of procedural rules governing the Diet.³⁴

Finally, legislators imposed restrictions on provisions for open debate.

Yet another factor that erodes legislative power is the constitutional provision that parliament can meet only when the Premier and cabinet are present.³⁵ This provision effectively reduces the amount of time parliament is in session, and reinforces the pattern of bureaucratic rather than legislative initiative.

Fifth, legislative weakness stems from the internal instability of Japan's major parties. Japanese parties tend to be divided into multiple factions which are "held together primarily by the tactical requirements of effective campaigning and parliamentary competition."³⁶ The result of this "constant instability and strife within each party" is weak party leadership as the leaders' attentions are devoted to retaining power within the party.³⁷

Industrial Costs

Two measures which are readily amenable to cross-national comparison--population density and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth--are useful indicators of the extent of industrial costs. Specifically, it is hypothesized that: (1) the more densely populated a country, the more likely are its citizens to feel the impact of pollution and industrial sprawl, and (2) the greater the GDP growth rate (which reflects, in part, industrial growth), the more forcefully will industrial costs be felt. Table 23 ranks eight post-industrial nations according to these two indicators. Japan has the highest density and also the highest annual growth rate. If these are valid measures of industrial costs, the conclusion is inescapable that Japan ought to feel the costs more vividly than other countries.

The politicization of industrial costs increases public demands upon the government to improve the quality of life. Public ambivalence toward the reduction of industrial costs further complicates the government's task.³⁸

It is difficult to predict the extent to which Japanese citizens are willing

TABLE 23.--Indicators of industrial costs in post-industrial nations

Country	Population density per square kilometer, 1971 ^a	Country	Average annual rate of growth of Gross Domestic Product per capita 1965-1970 (percent) ^b
Japan	283	Japan	11.2
United Kingdom	228	Israel	5.2
Israel	146	Australia	3.9
United States	22	Canada	3.0
Sweden	18	United States	2.3
New Zealand	11	Sweden	2.0
Canada	2	United Kingdom	1.9
Australia	2	New Zealand	n.a.

^aSOURCE: United Nations, Statistical Office of the United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Statistical Yearbook 1972 (New York, 1973), p. 63.

^bSOURCE: United Nations, Statistical Office of the United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Statistical Yearbook 1972 (New York, 1973), pp. 586-588.

to sacrifice in order to stem environmental deterioration. In one survey, 51 percent favored giving priority to environmental protection even if it meant "[sacrificing] economic growth somewhat." Only 11 percent opted for economic growth, and 30 percent replied that the question could not be answered simply.³⁹ But other surveys reveal a sharp impatience with inflation and the rising cost of living in Japan,⁴⁰ raising the question as to whether the people actually are prepared to pay through the pocketbook for environmental protection.

Functional Features

As discussed in previous chapters, a primary cause of developmental tensions is the tendency toward institutional rigidity. Behavior appropriate to a past era is defended, nourished, and clung to even though it becomes inappropriate for the resolution of new issues:

. . . the tenacious problem of residual behavior creates serious problems of adaptation in post-industrial society that are fundamentally akin to those we have long noted in relation to developing nations. In post-industrial society, the patterns of thought and behaviour that are appropriate in industrial society still persist and they necessarily inhibit processual and functional changes in changing environment.⁴¹

Although Japan's formal political arrangements seem to indicate rigid behavioral patterns, other features of the Japanese socio-political scene lead one to suggest fluidity rather than rigidity. In particular, we refer to the absence of strong industrial cleavages between white-collar and blue-collar workers.

Japan is unusual among advanced industrial nations in the degree of camaraderie which has developed between blue-collar and white-collar workers. For one thing, fairly large numbers of both blue-collar and lower status white-collar workers support the major party of the left, the Japan Socialist Party (JSP). Table 24 shows, for the 1960 House of Representatives election, the similarity between white-collar and blue-collar voting patterns.⁴² By 1968, the same pattern prevailed.⁴³

Another survey, taken in 1968, asked respondents why they voted as they did in the upper house election. The results, reproduced in Table 25, show that white-collar and blue-collar workers both frequently mentioned labor considerations. Concludes Watanuki:

Many Japanese white-collar workers, in spite of their higher education and higher monthly income than both workers in sales and services and field [manual] workers, appear to choose their candidates for the same reasons as the latter two, an indication of their strong class consciousness.⁴⁴

TABLE 24.--Voting according to occupational group, November, 1960, Japan

Group	Party					
	Liberal Democrats	Socialists	Democratic Socialists	Miscellaneous and nonpartisan candidates	"Don't know"	Nonvoter
Farmers and fishermen	70.1%	17.5%	3.6%	0.6%	1.4%	6.8%
Merchants and small manufacturers	64.8	19.6	4.0	1.8	---	9.7
White-collar workers	31.8	44.0	4.9	1.9	0.4	17.0
Blue-collar workers	31.0	43.2	1.1	4.8	5.2	14.7
Housewives	51.2	25.2	5.4	0.9	3.2	14.0

SOURCE: Adapted from Jōji Watanuki, "Patterns of Politics in Present-Day Japan," in Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives, ed. by Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan (New York: The Free Press, 1967), p. 448. The poll was taken "just" after the election by Shinbun Yoronchosa Renmei (Public Opinion Survey League for the Presses).

NOTE: The question was, "For which party did you vote in the election of the Members of the House of Representatives in 1960?"

TABLE 25.--Various factors considered in voting, 1968, Japan

Factors	Occupational group			
	Managerial workers	White-collar workers	Sales and services workers	Blue-collar workers
Local interests	0%	1.9%	2.6%	0.5%
Business interests	11.1	1.9	2.6	0.5
Position of labor	15.6	25.9	21.9	27.6
Living conditions	2.2	7.5	5.3	7.7
Policies and viewpoints	31.1	21.8	16.7	16.8
Recommendation by organization and unions	2.2	13.9	8.8	12.2
Agreement with a candidate's opinion	22.2	13.9	17.5	15.8
Familiarity with a candidate through mass media	4.4	5.6	11.4	8.7
Others and unknown	11.1	7.5	13.2	10.2

SOURCE: Adapted from Jōji Watanuki, "The Voting Behavior and Party Preference of Labor," in *Japanese Politics--An Inside View: Readings from Japan*, trans. and ed. by Hiroshi Itoh (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1973), p. 128.

In a well researched article on the history of labor unionization in Japan, Solomon Levine suggests several reasons for this white-collar and blue-collar solidarity.⁴⁵ Levine's major theme is that the white-collar and blue-collar solidarity stems from experiences in union formation in the years immediately following the war, a time when unionization proliferated under the encouragement of the Occupation forces. First, the white-collar workers were an intelligent and highly respected group, and blue-collar workers looked to them for ideological and practical guidance in the unionization movement.⁴⁶

Second, unionization occurred simultaneously with a proliferation of lower status white-collar workers whose labor grievances proved similar to those of the manual workers: white-collar and blue-collar workers "were threatened equally by the ravages of rampant inflation and dire shortages" which followed World War II.⁴⁷ Third, white-collar and blue-collar workers joined together in unionization because of the Japanese practice of enterprise unionism. In this type of unionism, workers within a single enterprise join together into a union, irrespective of class differences.⁴⁸ There are at least four reasons for the growth of enterprise unionism in Japan:

- (1) patriotic associations during the war "deliberately had stressed the unity of [manual and nonmanual workers] with the enterprise in which they were employed together";⁴⁹
- (2) white-collar and blue-collar workers were drawn together in the post-war years by the fact that they all suffered from inflation and shortages of goods;
- (3) because management was "sorely harassed by the Occupation," white-collar workers took upon themselves the task of managing the companies and watching over manual workers;⁵⁰ and
- (4) the Japanese tradition of group harmony made the enterprise "sociologically similar to the tradition of family and village society" and contributed to internal harmony.⁵¹

Enterprise unionism continues to play an important role in drawing together white-collar and blue-collar workers.

Japan's white-collar and blue-collar solidarity contrasts to the tensions that continue to be exhibited between these groups in Sweden and in other advanced industrial societies.⁵² Observes Levine: "Perhaps in no other major industrialized nation [than Japan] has so intimate a relationship been achieved between the blue- and white-collar components of a trade union movement."⁵³ As discussed in Chapter 3 of this dissertation, in other post-industrial societies white-collar workers desire to maintain status

distances between themselves and factory workers.⁵⁴ For example, a recent strike of 12,000 Swedish civil servants reportedly was triggered by white-collar resentment of "the Social Democratic government's policy of giving high industrial wage differences that narrowed the wage differential between classes."⁵⁵

In short, the similar voting patterns of white-collar and blue-collar workers in Japan and the historical co-operation between the two groups in union formation reveal less of an industrial-based class cleavage in that country than in other post-industrial societies. Industrial-based cleavages typify "residual behavior," which, it will be recalled, can be detrimental in view of the changing needs of the post-industrial society: "[the] phenomenon of residual behavior inhibits both the emergence of appropriate structural changes when they are needed and the proper functioning of them when they are brought about."⁵⁶ Although persistent industrial cleavages are not likely to be seriously destabilizing for the post-industrial society, they may present an irritant. For example, Inglehart has argued that in post-industrial societies issues relating to individual value priorities (such as religion, race, and linguistic issues) are rivaling economic, industrial-based issues in salience.⁵⁷ If it is indeed true that social values are changing, then--using the "residual behavior" argument--it is desirable that these changes be reflected by changes in political structures. A nation experiences fewer tensions when structural change keeps pace with value change. One can hypothesize that because political structures (parties and unions) reflect industrial cleavages less in Japan than in other post-industrial societies, the structures are better able to adapt to those value changes that Inglehart describes.

Sweden

Symptoms of trans-modernity, although evident, have been of much less magnitude in Sweden than in Japan, the United States, Great Britain, or Canada. Demonstrations and other instances of alternative behavior occur periodically, but property and human damage resulting from them is virtually nil. In Gurr and Ruttenger's compilation of civil violence for 119 nations in the years 1961-1963, Sweden (along with one other post-industrial society, New Zealand) tallied no instances of political violence.⁵⁸ The frequency of labor strikes has not risen noticeably as it has in other post-industrial nations.⁵⁹ Although voters are increasingly disenchanted with the long-reigning SDP, their disgruntlement has not been voiced, as it has in some other post-industrial nations, via electoral abstinance. On the contrary, electoral turnout recently peaked at 89.3 percent in the 1968 general elections.⁶⁰ Features of Sweden's socio-political climate which contribute to trans-modern stability include the country's historical consensus, leadership behavior, and organizational diversity.

Positive Features

Historical Consensus

Japan, Sweden, and Britain are similar in their geographical isolation: Japan and Britain are islands, and Sweden is part of a peninsula in the northern reaches of Europe.⁶¹ Geographical isolation is often credited with engendering consensus and cultural homogeneity among a nation's people.⁶² As discussed above, this consensual evolution was shattered in Japan by the Occupation which followed World War II. Japan was launched into an era of rapid change and, consequently, post-industrial challenges emerged in the context of an ongoing period of transition. The Swedish tradition, on the other hand, was not disrupted by a foreign occupation.⁶³ The fact that

post-industrial challenges emerged in a period of stable "modernity" minimized the destabilizing effect they might otherwise have had.⁶⁴

Leadership Strategies

A nation's capacity to respond effectively to post-industrial challenges does not depend solely on historical factors but is also greatly affected by the actions of political leaders. To a certain extent, all crises and challenges are amenable to leadership manipulation. National problems are man-made and are dependent on human resourcefulness for their resolution.

In assessing a nation's capacity to respond to post-industrial change, leadership variables may well be taken into consideration.⁶⁵ As M. Donald Hancock points out:

. . . elite conceptions of policy choice . . . will to a significant extent determine that choice and hence the direction, scope, and quality of system change. For appraising the prospects of national and global transformation in the postindustrial era, elite attitudes toward system change therefore comprise a crucial predictive index.⁶⁶

Further:

. . . alternative models which take into account elite attitudes toward system change will serve as a more useful "prediction" of the future than unilinear projections from existing economic and sociopolitical characteristics of any given nation.⁶⁷

Elite behavior, in other words, should be considered an important independent variable affecting the likelihood of stable and integrative change in a post-industrial society. Unfortunately, it is a variable that is not readily amenable to quantification; perhaps that is why it is often ignored in explanatory studies of socio-political upheaval and turmoil.⁶⁸

According to M. Donald Hancock, a nation can move in one of three ways: (1) it can lose "previously-attained levels of control over man's environment" (regressive change); (2) it can retain previous economic and sociopolitical patterns of control (maintaining change); or (3) it can

"attain new control capabilities" (transforming change).⁶⁹ Whether a nation moves backward, forward, or remains the same depends largely upon elite conceptions and behavior.⁷⁰

In light of novel conditions of the post-industrial era, it is probably accurate to assume that leadership ought to follow a course designed to transform the nation, as Swedish leaders appear to be doing. For one thing, Swedish leaders demonstrated a commitment to transforming change in the industrial era. In that era politics in large part revolved around the distribution of wealth and resources accruing from industrialism, and governments assumed the role of social activist. But governments in some nations were more chary of this role than in others. We suggest that the extent of resource distribution is an indication of leadership commitment to transforming change. Two variables are used here to compare resource distribution: infant mortality and public expenditure on education. It is hypothesized that the less the infant mortality and the more the education expenditure, the greater the leadership commitment to transforming change. As Table 26 makes clear, Sweden is well ahead of the other nations in its capacity to mobilize and redistribute resources.⁷¹ Japan also demonstrates a marked capacity for transforming change.

The attitudes of Swedish leaders towards social protest and alternative behavior also reveal a transforming or mobilizing strategy. Because protest activity has not been as widespread in Sweden as in many other post-industrial societies, one cannot say exactly what Swedish officials would have done if faced with massive protest challenges. However, indications are that the leaders would have assumed a fairly pragmatic posture. For example, in May, 1968, students in Stockholm started an occupation of university student offices to protest "shortcomings" in university administration and

TABLE 26.--Indicators of leadership commitment to transforming change in post-industrial nations

Country	Number of deaths of infants under one year of age per 1,000 corresponding live births, 1970 ^a	Country	Public expenditure on education as percentage of total government expenditure, 1967 ^b
Sweden	11.7 ^c	Sweden	24.6
Japan	13.1	Canada	21.6
New Zealand	16.7	Japan	20.1
Australia	17.9	United States	16.0
United Kingdom	18.4	United Kingdom	12.3
Canada	18.8	New Zealand	11.6
United States	19.8	Israel	11.2
Israel	22.9	Australia	11.0

^aSOURCE: United Nations, Statistical Office of the United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Demographic Yearbook 1971 (New York, 1972), pp. 674-688.

^bSOURCE: United Nations, Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, UNESCO Statistical Yearbook 1971 (Belgium, 1973), pp. 504-529.

^c1969.

curriculum. The dispute was settled peaceably, not through massive police breakthroughs but through open lines of communication between political leaders and students.⁷² Also, Hancock's interviews with 60 members of Sweden's political elite reveal pragmatic and sympathetic attitudes toward alternative behavior.⁷³ Hancock interviewed a wide range of political officials including those of a politically conservative bent.⁷⁴ Results, reproduced in Tables 27-29, portray socialist and nonsocialist leaders alike who are aware of shortcomings of the democratic order and who are generally

TABLE 27.--Elite appraisals of past protest group activity, Sweden (in absolute numbers)

Appraisal	Total frequency	Sub-totals by party and/or occupational position		
		Socialists, high-level administrators	Non-socialists	Media spokesmen
No effect on domestic affairs	1	0	1	0
Marginal effect; for example, they prevented trees from being cut down in one of Stockholm's parks	21	10	9	2
Postive effect on domestic and/or foreign policy	36	18	16	2
No opinion	0	0	0	0
Question not asked	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>
Total	60	29	27	4

SOURCE: M. Donald Hancock, "Elite Images and System Change in Sweden," Paper delivered at the 1973 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New Orleans, September 4-8, 1973, p. 16.

receptive to extra-parliamentary activity. For example, the highest number of both socialists and nonsocialists felt that past protest activities had a "positive effect" on policy (Table 27). Very few feared that protest groups would "become undemocratic or reactionary" in the future; indeed, many felt that protest activity in the future might again prove to be effective (Table 28). Somewhat surprisingly, high numbers professed to being even "hopeful" that opportunities for mass participation would increase (Table 29).

The transforming character depicted by these responses is clear. Swedish leaders recognize that fundamental changes of the 1960's may make

TABLE 28.--Elite predictions of future protest group activity, Sweden (in absolute numbers)

Prediction	Total frequency	Sub-totals by party and/or occupational position		
		Socialists, high-level administrators	Non-socialists	Media spokesmen
Decreasing importance; the various protest groups of the 1960s and early 1970s are only a temporary phenomenon	15	7	5	3
No change from present scope of activity	11	5	6	0
Can have somewhat greater significance for the domestic political debate	24	11	12	1
Significantly greater role than at present	3	2	1	0
Risk that ad hoc protest groups can become undemocratic or reactionary	2	2	0	0
No opinion	3	1	2	0
Question not asked	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>
Total	60	29	27	4

SOURCE: M. Donald Hancock, "Elite Images and System Change in Sweden," Paper delivered at the 1973 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New Orleans, September 4-8, 1973, p. 17.

obsolete certain political arrangements and may warrant new avenues through which social demands may be transmitted to political elites. Pragmatism of this character contrasts to the reaction of Japanese leaders to student disturbances of the 1960's. In the appendix of this dissertation some of the

TABLE 29.--Elite predictions of future opportunities for mass political participation, Sweden (in absolute numbers)

Prediction	Total frequency	Sub-totals by party and/or occupational position		
		Socialists, high-level administrators	Non-socialists	Media spokesmen
Fewer opportunities than at present	9	5	2	2
No change from present	1	1	0	0
Potential exists for both fewer and increased opportunities	10	3	6	1
Marginally increased opportunities	1	1	0	0
Hopeful expectation of increased opportunities	18	9	8	1
Certain expectation of increased opportunities	15	5	10	0
No opinion	2	2	0	0
Question not asked	<u>4</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>
Total	60	29	27	4

SOURCE: M. Donald Hancock, "Elite Images and System Change in Sweden," Paper delivered at the 1973 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New Orleans, September 4-8, 1973, p. 18.

more important instances of police-civilian conflict in the Japanese student disturbances are recorded. To be noted is the large number of police deployed for many of the instances and also the large proportion of police injuries where the number of injuries is reported. By rushing in such large numbers of police it is conceivable that the Japanese leadership was fueling

the very disturbances it wished to quell. The police stood as the very symbols of tradition and authority against which the students rebelled.⁷⁵

Organizational Diversity

Sweden is frequently dubbed the "organization society" in reference to her complex and pervasive network of associations.⁷⁶ As we seek to demonstrate below, organizational interest groups do play an important role in the life of the ordinary Swede and they also assume a somewhat unusual significance, in comparison to other post-industrial societies, in political decision-making. As we also seek to demonstrate below, this organizational structure, in the context of Sweden's political culture, may prove to be stabilizing in an era of post-industrial change.

"The Organization Society"

Sweden is held to be one of the most highly organized democracies in the world.⁷⁷ While other democracies are also highly organized,⁷⁸ the mere number of organizations, the scope of membership, and the role they play in the policy process has led observers to single out Sweden as the organization society par excellence.

Organizations, both of the noneconomic and economic variety, figure predominantly in the life of the Swedish people, as Gunnar Heckscher illustrates in his account of a typical Swedish worker:

Let us take for example an ordinary worker; he probably lives in a building owned by a housing co-operative, or if not, he will be a member of a tenants' association; he buys his provisions at a co-operative store on the corner; his working conditions are fixed by an agreement between his employer and his union; if he wants to study, there is a workers' cultural organization which organizes study circles or courses where he can go and hear lectures; if he likes sports, there is a sports association; if he wants to go out on a Sunday excursion there is a tourist association which will organize everything for him; and when he wants to go on vacation he has only to go to the travel association of the workers' movements. So that all his life, from morning to night,

he is surrounded by associations and organizations, and one might say that the only thing in this worker's life that is not organized for him is his sleep. . . .⁷⁹

Organizations range from the Sailing Association, Historical Society, and the Football Association to the Federation of Labor (LO), Swedish Employers' Federation (SAF), and consumers' co-operatives (KF).⁸⁰ Union membership is especially high among Swedish workers: "Nearly 100% of Sweden's industrial workers, over 90% of state employees, and approximately 70% of privately employed white-collar workers . . . are organized in national unions."⁸¹ And total membership in Sweden's nine principal economic interest groups rose almost four-fold from 1945 to 1967.⁸²

Sweden's political culture places a premium on organizational membership. As Jenkins notes, Swedes are expected to join organizations: "it is taken for granted that every Swede belongs to whatever organizations are appropriate to his station in life and that if something is to be accomplished, it will be done through these bodies."⁸³ Organizational membership is also linked to feelings of class consciousness among Swedes: "class organizational solidarity has come to be regarded as a kind of public moral duty, as the only vehicle by which the interests of one's class can be expressed."⁸⁴

Of major interest here is the role these organizations play in Swedish policy-making. Organizations secure access to decision-making sites both inside and outside of the Riksdag (parliament).

Parliamentary Access. Interest groups have virtually guaranteed access to decision-making at several points in the parliamentary process. First, they assume an important role in the initial, planning stage of proposed legislation. A typical practice in Sweden since the nineteenth century has been for appropriate governmental ministers to appoint Royal Commissions "to gather facts on specific issues and recommend legislative action."⁸⁵

Often in a lengthy process,⁸⁶ Commissions work out details of legislation independently of the government. In this important investigatory and planning stage, interest group representatives are invited to enter into the process.⁸⁷ For example, in 1961 a Commission was appointed to study education for employees of the central government. Sitting along with the chairman (who was a civil servant) and five other civil servants were representatives of the following associations: the Confederation of Industrial Unions, the Swedish Confederation of Professional Associations, the Clerical Employees Association, and the Association of Government Officers.⁸⁸ As Table 30 shows, interest representatives have comprised from one-fifth to one-quarter of the total Commission membership in the twentieth century.

TABLE 30.--Recruitment of Commissioners, 1905-1967, Sweden

Year	Sources of Commissioners			
	Number of Commissioners	Percent Riksdagsmen	Percent civil servants	Percent organizations
1905-14	1579	27	51	21
1915-24	2083	27	47	26
1925-34	1690	32	43	25
1935-44	2560	23	47	30
1945-54	3306	25	41	34
1955-67	3651	19	60	20
1955-60	1662	22	59	19
1961-67	1989	18	60	22

SOURCE: Adapted from Hans Meijer, "Bureaucracy and Policy Formulation in Sweden," Scandinavian Political Studies, IV (1969), 109.

After the Commission has completed its investigation and detailed its recommendations, it publicizes the report and solicits comments, additions, and criticisms in what is called the remiss procedure. The report is sent not only to the appropriate government authorities but also to those organizations represented on the Commission and to other interested organizations.⁸⁹ In the 1961 education study referred to above, the report was sent to about 50 government agencies and various organizations. The report was modified on the basis of the suggestions of these agencies; the organizations represented on the Commission; and also of two other organizations, the Association of Social Workers and the Association of Local Government Administrators.⁹⁰ Heckscher believes that "on the whole the views expressed by such organizations as the [Federation of Trade Unions, Central Organization of Salaried Employees, Swedish Employers' Association, Consumer Co-Operatives] and the farming co-operatives are taken equally or more seriously than those presented by government organizations" in this publicity stage.⁹¹

After the publicity stage, the modified report is sent to the parliament where it is voted upon. Here, interest representatives secure a third point of access, mainly because so many interest group representatives serve concurrently as parliamentary representatives. As Table 31 reveals, interest groups enjoy direct representation in parliament.⁹²

Some interest groups also secure parliamentary access through their connections with political parties. Primarily this is the case with the LO and the Social Democratic Party. The LO is an important financial contributor to the SDP and it also participates in campaign planning.⁹³ Also aligned with the Social Democrats are the consumer co-operatives.⁹⁴ Although other interest groups are identified with particular parties, they are hesitant to become as closely aligned as the LO and Social Democrats:

TABLE 31.--Representation of Swedish interest organizations in parliament.

Organization	Number of Riksdagsmen who are members	Percent of Riksdag's members who belong to the organization
S.A.C.O. ^a	24	7.3
T.C.O. ^b	58	17.7
L.O. ^c	75	22.9
S.A.F. ^d	12	3.7
K.F. ^e	102	31.1
R.L.F. ^f	71	21.7

SOURCE: Adapted from Joseph B. Board, Jr., The Government and Politics of Sweden (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1970), p. 125. The data were originally reported in Nils Elvander, Intresseorganisationerna i dagens Sverige (Lund: Gleerup, 1966), pp. 197-200.

^aFederation of University Graduates.

^bCentral Organization of Salaried Employees.

^cSwedish Federation of Trade Unions.

^dSwedish Employers' Association.

^eConsumer Co-Operatives.

^fSwedish Farmers' Union.

Employer groups within the SAF [Swedish Employers' Association] and the Federation of Industries concede that they contribute financially to both the Moderate Unity and the Liberal parties. Similarly the National Association of Farmers provides considerable manpower and financial support for the Center. But all three interest associations as well as the TCO, SACO, and SR [Central Organization of Salaried Employees, Federation of University Graduates, and Federation of Government Employees] claim official "neutrality" in their political orientations, and seek to influence the democratic parties simultaneously.⁹⁵

Extra-Parliamentary Access. Interest groups are also involved in political decision-making in ways that bypass formal parliamentary structures

altogether. Groups retain "the capacity . . . to pursue their goals through autonomous access routes to the sites of political power" ⁹⁶ This autonomy is most clearly illustrated in the area of labor relations. Since 1938, when the LO and SAF (the umbrella organizations representing labor and management, respectively) signed the Basic Agreement, industrial conflicts have been resolved with essentially no interference by the government. In this Agreement, labor and management pledged to meet at two- or three-year intervals "to negotiate broad guidelines for wage contracts and grievance procedures in industry." ⁹⁷ Decisions relating to wages, working hours, and fringe benefits are reached by the LO and SAF and then serve as guidelines for labor and management groups affiliated with these parent organizations. ⁹⁸ This voluntary and independent route to power pursued by major economic organizations has proved so successful that the Swedish government has had little cause for intervention:

Sweden has no legislation comparable to the Taft-Hartley Act, no law requiring compulsory arbitration, and no minimum wage law. The limited role of the state in labor relations is confined to legislation concerning vacations, social security, safety conditions, compensation and the like. The only laws which touch directly on labor-management relations are ones like the Collective Contracts Act of 1928 and the Freedom of Association and Bargaining Act of 1936, which for the most part simply ratify the understanding already reached by labor and management that their disputes should be resolved by negotiation. ⁹⁹

Interest groups also secure access by direct negotiations with governmental and administrative figures. In many cases, representatives of interest organizations enjoy membership in government agencies. Most notably, agricultural groups play an important role in government agencies which oversee regulatory policies. ¹⁰⁰ Also, in what has come to be called "Harpund democracy," ¹⁰¹ the Social Democrats periodically have invited representatives of major interest organizations for informal consultations with cabinet ministers outside established consultative channels; "i.e.,

independently of formal legislative channels."¹⁰² The last series of Harpsund meetings took place in 1959. Although officials denied that decisions were made at these meetings, it was later suggested that at least two decisions were made: "one concerning credit grants to small business firms and a second relating to regulation of insurance savings."¹⁰³ Criticisms about the secretive nature of the 1959 meetings led to their demise. Instead, a more official image was given organization-government consultation by creating in 1962 the Research Council and the Planning Board. Each of these agencies is comprised of representatives of major economic organizations and of governmental ministries. Here, rather than at the Harpsund residence, government and interest group consult.¹⁰⁴

Organizations and Post-Industrial Stability

At various points in this dissertation it has been suggested that political parties are in some respects ill-equipped to deal with post-industrial realities. For one thing, post-industrialism appears to be accompanied by a shift of power from elective to nonelective agencies (from legislatures to bureaucracies). Political parties, which are organizations concerned with elective functions, more appropriately aggregate public opinion for the benefit of elective legislatures than for nonelective bureaucracies. Also, parties in most post-industrial nations continue to represent cleavages of the industrial era that may no longer be highly salient. This may interfere with the aggregation of new areas of public concern, such as the politics of the environment. Ominously, public opinion polls do seem to bear out a popular disenchantment with parties: loyalties to particular parties are weakening among post-industrial citizens.¹⁰⁵

A demise in the relevance of political parties is significant in advanced industrial democracies because the party has come to stand as a

symbol of popular representation. The party assumes a special role in the political socialization process, as Almond and Powell point out.¹⁰⁶ Parties shape cognitive, affective, and evaluative aspects of the political culture. Through party activity, people are informed about political issues and events (cognitive); they develop loyalties to parties (affective); and the pronouncements of the party leaders provide a "yardstick" by which people can judge political events (evaluative).¹⁰⁷ Parties can also perform a stabilizing function in that they reinforce the idea of representative democracy: "[the] party assures [the individual] that his general interest will be safeguarded with minimal personal involvement."¹⁰⁸ The party signals to the citizen that a route for political participation is available should he care to use it.

Democratic viability may be maintained in a period in which parties are under attack in two ways: (1) a resurgence of power to legislative bodies might help invigorate parties, and (2) some of the functions heretofore handled by parties might be taken over by other political institutions. The first opens up new lines of inquiry that would be counterproductive to follow in the present study. The second, though, can be considered in the context of this discussion of interest groups in Sweden.

It is suggested that the importance of the organization in the Swedish polity may prove beneficial in an era in which the role of the party is changing. The organization can function as a viable alternative to the party in that it provides a channel through which public opinion can reach decision-makers. Sweden's organizational diversity can provide a "padding" in the event that party demise becomes a long-term trend (as of now this cannot be predicted). The fact that Sweden has a viable network of associations that are reasonably well-institutionalized in the policy process and that are representative organs makes them likely functional substitutes for parties.

The organization, in its institutionalized role in the Swedish political process, can serve at least some of the functions that parties do now. Like the party, the organization can function as a symbol that, if participation is desired, a channel exists for the active individual.¹⁰⁹ It can also provide information, serve as an instrument of loyalty, and serve as a yardstick for evaluating policies.¹¹⁰

The combination of strong interest groups and weak parties is by no means an ideal situation. Ideally, the functions of interest groups and parties are distinct: groups articulate interests and parties aggregate "interests and [transform] them into a relatively small number of alternative general policies."¹¹¹ Parties can help blend and modify the particularistic interests of associations. Consequently, the danger exists that if interest groups are not flanked by aggregative parties, they will generate conflict and consensual breakdown.

This fear appears to be mitigated by the Swedish political culture. The literature on Swedish politics draws a picture of a culture capable of subduing excesses of organizational divisiveness and conflict. For one thing, Swedes of the twentieth century have been raised in the belief that the organization is a symbol of democratic viability and, consequently, they view interest groups with very little skepticism. Joseph Board, Jr., is especially convinced of the value of organizations known as folkrörelser (popular movements) that emerged in the early part of this century. Speaking for such diverse causes as suffrage, education, temperance, and trade unionism, the popular movements instilled positive attitudes toward interest groups in upcoming generations of Swedes:

Scarcely any other phenomenon can be said to have had greater consequences for the development of political democracy in Sweden. Above all else, what these movements gave to millions of ordinary

men and women was the opportunity and the encouragement to participate in small-scale democracies. They were in fact pre-democratic schools for a democratic politics [sic], and much of Swedish politics today bears the unmistakable mark of their influence. The high participation of Swedish citizens in politics, the disposition toward compromise, the reluctance of the Swede to let concern for a part become an obsession for the whole, the limited nature of Swedish political objectives--all this and more derives in part from these movements.¹¹²

The style of decision-making in Swedish politics also tends to allay fears that interest group power might generate highly divisive conflict. It is a style of compromise and co-operation and it reflects a strong desire to avoid conflict whenever possible.¹¹³ It is a pragmatic style reflecting a willingness to forego principle in order to arrive at a mutually acceptable decision.¹¹⁴ A characterizing feature of decision-making is what Rustow has called the "obstruction taboo": political leaders willingly abandon their policy positions when it appears that not to do so becomes counterproductive and obstructionist.¹¹⁵ Several survey studies of Swedish leaders provide support for these claims of leadership pragmatism. For example, Anton et al. interviewed "300 top level Swedish administrators" and found them to be a pragmatic and consensus-oriented group.¹¹⁶

Although the popular trust of organizations and the consensual style of decision-making help guard against divisiveness resulting from organizational diversity and power, one must take care not to overstate the case. Organizations are not given unlimited reign by the Swedish people nor are they always able to resolve differences smoothly. For example, press criticism of the 1959 Harpsund meetings was sharp: the secretive meetings smacked too noticeably of nonrepresentative and shady politicking.¹¹⁷ Labor-management relations may also be approaching the end of their consensual honeymoon. One observer noted that the labor-management negotiations of 1966 and 1969 (as per the Basic Agreement) "were unusually prolonged and tense."¹¹⁸

Increased militancy on the part of government employees also threatens serene labor relations because it calls into the decision-making arena a new protagonist--the government as employer.

Negative Features

Swedes do not seem overly dissatisfied with the politics of their country. Voting patterns reflect dissatisfaction with the long-reigning Social Democratic Party but alternative behavior, which is indicative of social malaise, has not surfaced with any degree of frequency. This is not to say, however, that rumblings are not being felt or that malaise is not likely to grow in the future.

One of Sweden's problems stems from the centralization of power within organizations. Local governments are consolidating into larger decisional units, party leaders tend to be amassing power at the expense of junior parliamentary members, and interest organizations are becoming increasingly centralized.¹¹⁹ For example, the consumer association has consolidated its member societies to such an extent that within one decade, 338 societies have been collapsed into approximately 20.¹²⁰ Also, although total membership in trade unions is increasing, the number of individual bodies dropped from 9,000 in the early 1950's to 3,300 in 1968.¹²¹

Some negative reactions to this centralization have already been heard among associational members. For example, apathy among members within highly centralized organizations appears to be a growing problem.¹²² Also, Hancock refers to a recent strike among workers at Sweden's largest government-owned industrial corporation, the Luosavaara-Kiiruavaara AB (LKAB) mining company as illustrative of displeasure among union members.¹²³ In 1969, in direct defiance of the LO-SAF agreement reached in that year, miners at LKAB struck.

Ostensibly the miners' goals included higher wages and the dismissal of certain LKAB officials. But the root cause, observers believed, was a protest against the increasingly remote and estranged leaders of the Miners Union.

Noted Kurt Samuelsson, a prominent Swedish economic historian:

The price paid for the great benefits of centralization . . . has been an ever-increasing distance between the leadership and the members, an increasing feeling that all decisions are made centrally, over the heads of the members, that too little is done to cope with the many various local problems which naturally are closest to the individual member.¹²⁴

Settlement of the strike proved to be a difficult task. Because they were in part rebelling against union leaders, the striking miners "formed their own strike committee and demanded the right to negotiate directly with the LKAB management."¹²⁵ However, the official union leaders refused to abrogate their power by allowing the ad hoc group to negotiate so they proceeded to negotiate alone with the LKAB management. The initial agreement between the union representatives and management was rejected by the miners. Union leaders continued to pressure and bargain with the miners until eventually a compromise was reached: the miners would return to work if their ad hoc group would be allowed to participate in tripartite negotiations. Subsequently, an agreement was reached.¹²⁶

Serious implications of the miners' rebellion lingered in a society used to smooth labor-management relations. Specifically, the question was raised as to how to reconcile the need for union efficiency with the need to understand grievances of individual members.¹²⁷ It is the dilemma posed by the threat of institutional inertia in a mobilized society that poses a challenge to highly efficient Sweden.

Summary

Japan and Sweden differ historically and culturally. They also differ in the degree to which they have manifested trans-modern tensions.

The two countries were selected for case studies in this chapter because these very differences suggest a wide range of variables that might influence how a nation responds to post-industrial challenges.

Japan and Sweden are similar in that each appears to be experiencing problems of institutional lag; i.e., problems resulting when demands far outpace the capacity or willingness of institutions to change in order to accommodate these demands. In Japan, institutional lag is most evident in relation to formal political arrangements; in an era of public mobilization, these arrangements have not expanded to produce new channels through which citizen participation may be expressed. Parties remain faction-ridden and weak and the legislature assumes a subservient posture in relation to the bureaucracy. Japanese citizens have not remained passive in the face of this lag; instead they have displayed a determination to circumvent traditional institutions in order to achieve their goals. Not only have citizens formed jūmin groups but also, in a growing number of local elections, have formed suprapartisan electoral organizations.¹²⁸

Institutional lag has surfaced in relation to Sweden's highly centralized and efficient interest organizations. Associations which in the industrial era had functioned as loosely structured channels for popular mobilization have become highly centralized organizations with significant communications problems between leaders and members. In particular, the consumer co-operatives and the labor unions have been accused of becoming conservative, elitist, and static.

Japan is unusual in one respect that may help minimize institutional lag: compared to Sweden, Japan has weaker industrial-based class cleavages. While political parties in Sweden are organized along lines that reflect economic class divisions,¹²⁹ this cleavage is less pronounced in Japan. Also,

the camaraderie between white-collar and blue-collar workers in Japan contrasts with the desire of Swedish white-collar workers to maintain status distances between themselves and blue-collar workers.¹³⁰ Indeed, the credit for much of the blue-collar unionization that occurred in post-war Japan is given to white-collar workers. Far from desiring to maintain socio-economic differences between white-collar and blue-collar workers, Japan's white-collar workers have displayed a desire to minimize these disparities. It is difficult to say exactly what the effect of Japan's relatively weak industrial cleavages might be; therefore, this remains a speculative area of inquiry. Following the argument of institutional lag, we suggest that in an era of novel post-industrial challenges, a nation is benefited when political structures are less tied to problems and demands of the industrial era. Parties, unions, and other structures may be "freer" to reflect new, more salient dimensions of post-industrial conflict and cleavage. This relative advantage may be lost in Japan, however, because of the internal weaknesses of her political parties.

An incidental factor common to Japan and Sweden is that they both have one political party that predominates over the rest. The Swedish Social Democrats have held power since 1933, except for one brief period of coalition government. The Japanese Liberal Democratic Party has been in power since it emerged from the Liberal Party and the Democratic Party in 1955. The absence of regular party turnover may enhance the danger of institutional rigidity because relations between party officials and other political officials quickly form a pattern which, if suitable to those concerned, becomes impervious to change.

Finally, Japan and Sweden are alike because of the important role the bureaucracy plays in decision-making. In part this stems from the fact that

Japan and Sweden are parliamentary governments, and cabinet initiative is common to this form of government. It also stems from the need to consult bureaucratic experts in order to resolve complex problems resulting from advanced industrialism.

Despite the similar challenges that have faced Japan and Sweden in the past two decades, the responses of the two nations have been quite different. Japan has experienced considerably more domestic turmoil than Sweden; political violence is more common and Japanese citizens more frequently engage in alternative forms of behavior. According to one cross-national survey, Japanese youth express substantially more dissatisfaction with their society and jobs than Swedish youth.¹³¹ These differences raise the question of differential manifestation: What explains the differences in the scope and intensity of trans-modern symptoms in Sweden and Japan?

Perhaps the most obvious reason why Japan experiences more civil turmoil lies in the fact that post-industrial challenges have been superimposed on a rapidly changing social and political structure. Post-industrialism did not emerge atop a stable social order in Japan; rather, it coincided with Japanese efforts to cope with the fundamental changes wrought by the post-war allied Occupation. As such, Japan experienced simultaneously post-industrial challenges and other challenges resulting from her own historical discontinuity. Sweden, on the other hand, already fit the textbook description of the stable, "modern" democracy when post-industrial challenges first appeared.

Japan and Sweden differ according to the costs that industrialization has visited upon each. Being a very densely populated country, Japan experiences more vividly the pollution and overcrowding that tend to accompany industrialism. Also, Japan's phenomenal rate of industrial growth magnified the impact of these industrial costs. It does appear that industrial costs

have become more highly politicized issues in Japan and have burdened the government to a greater extent than have the same issues in Sweden.

Both Japan and Sweden have features that may help minimize the disruptive effect of encroaching bureaucratic power, although in each country bureaucratic power is criticized by many. Bureaucratic strength in Sweden has not yet greatly alarmed the people because democratic pathways to the bureaucracy remain open. Interest groups, which are appropriate channels through which popular opinion can be relayed to the bureaucracy, thrive in Sweden amidst a political culture that gives its blessings to the proliferation of groups and the expression of public opinion through them. There is no widespread feeling that groups are inimical to open and representative democracy. Consequently, interest group consultation with bureaucratic decision-makers does not unduly harm the aura of democratic viability. Japan's political culture includes vestiges of pre-war ideas that the Emperor and his bureaucratic subordinates are the proper and, indeed, the only effective political decision-makers. The lingering sense that bureaucrats are superior to popularly elected officials serves to minimize alarm that might be generated over bureaucratic strength in present-day politics.

A nation's reaction to post-industrial challenges is not determined solely by historical factors such as those just mentioned. It is likely that other, manipulative, variables play a role also. These have to do with political leadership: to some extent a nation's response is influenced by policies advanced, and strategies employed, by leadership. As suggested previously, a nation coping with these challenges is benefited by a flexible leadership--one willing and able to invoke change in response to novel stimuli. Leadership flexibility is especially important when institutions lag in their capacity to respond to change.

In several respects, Swedish leaders display this quality of flexibility. First, survey results reveal that members of the Swedish political elite are sympathetic to the efforts of those who engage in alternative forms of political behavior in order to influence the allocation of goods and services. Second, Swedish leaders have displayed a willingness to engage in political experimentation. For example, in 1970 a fourth ombudsman was added to Sweden's long-standing stock of citizen-government arbitrators.¹³² This, the office of consumer ombudsman, was instituted before consumer mobilization reached a peak of high frustration, thus providing an example of pre-emptive leadership action.¹³³ Third, Swedish leaders displayed the capacity to mobilize and redistribute resources in the industrial era. Among current post-industrial nations, Sweden has the lowest rate of infant mortality and expends more of her national income on education than the other post-industrial nations.

Japan scores close to Sweden in the rate of infant mortality and expenditure on education. However, Japan's leadership appears to be less flexible than Sweden's, as evident in Japan's authoritarian response to student disturbances of the 1960's.

In short, the way a nation responds to post-industrial challenges is influenced by a number of variables. A nation may be hindered in responding to post-industrial challenges when: (1) rapid social change and the onset of post-industrialism occur simultaneously, (2) post-industrial challenges emerge within a relatively brief time span, (3) industrial costs are high, and (4) cleavages from the industrial era remain strong. Contrariwise, a nation's response to post-industrial challenges is aided when: (1) public acceptance of political institutions other than political parties is strong (this may prove useful in the event that parties suffer a continued demise in

the post-industrial era), and (2) political leaders demonstrate the will and possess the capacity to embark on a course of transforming change.

These variables are suggestive of questions that may be posed in future comparisons of post-industrial nations. But, as the summary of this chapter reveals, considerably more research must be generated before confident conclusions can be drawn.

Chapter VI--Notes

¹Taketsugu Tsurutani, "Japan as a Post-Industrial Society," in The Future of Industrial Society, ed. by Leon Lindberg (New York: McKay, forthcoming).

²A descriptive rather than empirical approach was chosen for two reasons. (1) The purpose of this paper has been to consider post-industrialism in a broad sense. To present a rigorous empirical analysis at this point would produce an unwieldy study. (2) A descriptive case analysis can suggest variables that are worthy of consideration in a theory of post-industrialism but that may be overlooked in an empirical investigation because they are not readily quantifiable.

³Neither New Zealand nor Australia is chosen as a "stable" nation because Sweden is probably more intrinsically "interesting" than either; it is physically proximate to the European community and its advanced welfarism is unique. This contrasts to the physical isolation of New Zealand and Australia and the more "conventional" social and political arrangements of each.

⁴"Opinion Survey on National Power, The People's National Image and Life Awareness," as reported in White Papers 1969-70, p. 393. Of the respondents, 0.2 percent did not answer.

⁵One, an army sergeant, was reluctant to come out of the Guam jungles because he had not given his life for the Emperor; the other remained to carry out his own form of guerilla warfare against the Philippine people.

⁶For a discussion of survey studies revealing intergenerational value change in Japan, see supra, p. 91.

⁷See Minami Hiroshi, "The Introspection Boom: Wither the National Character," Japan Interpreter, VIII (Spring, 1973), 159-175.

⁸Nobutaka Ike, Japanese Politics: Patron-Client Democracy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1972), p. 14.

⁹Cole, p. 11. See supra, Table 11.

¹⁰Information Bulletin, p. 252.

¹¹Marshall E. Dimock, The Japanese Technocracy (New York: John Weatherhill, Inc., 1968), p. 23.

¹²Ibid., p. 24. See also Peter F. Drucker, Men, Ideas and Politics (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), p. 186.

¹³News Dictionary 1969, p. 232.

¹⁴See, for example, Key Sun Ryang, "Postwar Japanese Political Leadership--A Study of Prime Ministers," Asian Survey, XIII (January, 1973), 113-125.

¹⁵See, for example, Yoshiro Kunimoto, "Pollution and Local Government," Japan Quarterly, XXVIII (April-June, 1971), 162-167.

¹⁶Dimock, p. 43.

¹⁷Robert E. Ward, Japan's Political System (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967), p. 96. Between that time and World War II, bureaucratic power was shared with the military, the privy council, and retired statesmen. Dimock, pp. 44-45.

¹⁸Ward, pp. 43-44.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 96.

²⁰Dimock, p. 73. See also Ward, p. 44.

²¹See, for example, Ike, Japanese Politics, p. 65.

²²Tsuji, p. 141.

²³Ibid., p. 139.

²⁴"Public Opinion Survey on Political Consciousness, November, 1969," as reported in Japan, Japan Institute of International Affairs, White Papers of Japan 1970-71 (Tokyo, 1972), pp. 411-412. Other responses included pressure groups (17.3 percent) and voters (17.3 percent).

²⁵See, for example, Kunimoto, p. 166.

²⁶The Liberal Party and the Japan Democratic Party merged to form the Liberal Democratic Party in 1955. This party has held power ever since. Yoshisato Oka, "Political Parties and Party Government," Journal of Social and Political Ideas in Japan, II (December, 1964), 22.

²⁷Shigeo Misawa, "An Outline of the Policy-Making Process in Japan," in Japanese Politics--An Inside View: Readings from Japan, trans. and ed. by Hiroshi Itoh (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1973), pp. 12-17.

²⁸Junnosuke Masumi, "The Political Structure in 1955," Journal of Social and Political Ideas in Japan, II (December, 1964), 33; Dimock, p. 99.

²⁹Misawa, p. 22.

³⁰Oka, p. 15.

³¹Ibid.

³²This discussion follows Misawa, pp. 17-18. The restrictive laws it passed were largely the result of the "chaos which occurred during the debate over the proposed revision of the Police Procedure law in the 1953-1954 session." Misawa, p. 17.

³³Dimock, p. 99.

³⁴Misawa, p. 17.

³⁵New York Times, September 28, 1973, p. 3.

³⁶Ward, p. 74. See also Sannosuke Matsumoto, "Political Parties: Notes by the Editor," Journal of Social and Political Ideas in Japan, II (December, 1964), 37-40; and J. Rey Maeno, "Japan 1973: The End of an Era?" Asian Survey, XIV (January, 1974), 52-64.

³⁷Ward, p. 74. See also Dimock, p. 75. Of course, to some extent factions within parties are useful. They help promote democracy within the party by insuring that the leader considers opposing sides of a question. G. W. Jones, "The Prime Minister's Power," in Albinski and Pettit, p. 288. Especially in a predominantly one-party system like Japan, factions may increase the overall representativeness of the party. However, most observers agree that the factions in Japanese parties are so severe that they have weakened party effectiveness. See, for example, Maeno, passim.

³⁸See supra, pp. 94-96.

³⁹Information Bulletin, p. 181. On the other hand, when asked in a different survey whether "it is desirable of Japan to continue in the future the high economic growth as at present," 42.8 percent answered in the affirmative. Only 18.7 percent said no; 27.2 percent replied that it was hard to say, and 11.3 percent did not know. "Opinion Survey on Economic Problems, April, 1969," White Papers 1970-71, p. 396.

⁴⁰"Opinion Survey on National Power, the People's National Image and Life Awareness," White Papers 1969-70, p. 393.

⁴¹Tsurutani, "Japan as a Post-Industrial Society," in Lindberg (forthcoming).

⁴²"White-collar" in the 1960 survey includes all white-collar workers, from the sales clerk to the upper echelons of management. If the more conservative management sector had been excluded from the white-collar category, it is likely that the proportion of white-collar workers supporting the JSP would have been even higher.

⁴³Jōji Watanuki, "The Voting Behavior and Party Preference of Labor," in Itoh, pp. 114-134. Findings in the early 1970's reveal a somewhat greater disparity between white-collar and blue-collar Socialist support. An opinion survey conducted on the eve of the Lower House elections revealed 23 percent of the white-collar and 28 percent of the blue-collar workers supporting the JSP. A similar survey on the eve of the Upper House elections in 1971 revealed 25.5 percent of the white-collar and 30.1 percent of the blue-collar workers supporting the JSP. In both cases, the spread was approximately the same--5 percent. Asahi Shimbun, December 9, 1972, p. 2, and June 26, 1971, p. 2, respectively.

⁴⁴Watanuki, "Voting Behavior," p. 129, emphasis added.

⁴⁵Solomon B. Levine, "Unionization of White-Collar Employees in Japan," in Sturmhthal, pp. 205-260. The main points of his discussion are included here. See also Jōji Watanuki, "Patterns of Politics in Present-Day Japan," in Lipset and Rokkan, pp. 447-466.

⁴⁶White-collar workers were prestigious in large part because they comprised a small core of workers with guaranteed employment. In pre-war Japan, each large industrial enterprise developed a "core of permanent regular workers" by promising them "lifetime employment, higher wages (periodically increased), better working conditions . . . , improved welfare benefits, paternalistic treatment, and so forth." This core was comprised almost totally of white-collar workers. In contrast, manual workers lacked guarantees of job security. Levine, p. 209.

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 235.

⁴⁸It was estimated in the early 1960's that 90 percent of Japan's 45,000 basic organizational units were enterprise unions. Ibid., p. 234.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 232.

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 235.

⁵¹Ibid., p. 236.

⁵²This is not to say that conflict between white-collar and blue-collar workers in Japan is totally lacking. The upper echelons of the white-collar workers (i.e., management) hold different attitudes than lower-status white-collar workers, as Table 25, supra, reveals.

⁵³Levine, p. 205.

⁵⁴See supra, pp. 68-71.

⁵⁵News Dictionary 1971, p. 455.

⁵⁶Tsurutani, "Japan as a Post-Industrial Society," p. 2.

⁵⁷See supra, Chapter 2, n. 29.

⁵⁸Ted Robert Gurr with Charles Ruttenberg, "The Conditions of Civil Violence: First Tests of a Causal Model," in Macro-Quantitative Analysis, ed. by John V. Gillespie and Betty A. Nesvold (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, Inc., 1971), pp. 187-215.

⁵⁹Between 1955 and 1968, the total number of industrial disputes in Sweden generally moved downward (from 18 in 1955 to 7 in 1968). Disputes in Japan, on the other hand, rose from 659 in 1955 to 1,546 in 1968. "Work Stoppages in Industrially Advanced Countries, 1955-1968," Labor Developments Abroad, XV (February, 1970), 20.

⁶⁰Hancock, Postindustrial Change, p. 56. "Since 1948 political participation has averaged 81 percent (compared to 60.5 percent in postwar presidential elections in the United States)"

⁶¹Hancock, Multiparty System, p. 7.

⁶²Thomas J. Anton, "Policy-Making and Political Culture in Sweden," Scandinavian Political Studies, IV (1969), 95; Carter, pp. 3-7; Hancock, Multiparty System, p. 7; Dankwart A. Rustow, "Sweden's Transition to Democracy: Some Notes toward a Genetic Theory," Scandinavian Political Studies, VI (1971), 12.

⁶³The lack of a "large-scale immigration" such as that which occurred in the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Israel is further credited with maintaining Sweden's insularity. Rustow, p. 12.

⁶⁴Of course, it may also be the case that novel challenges are more disruptive in a nation "set in its ways" following a long period of stability. As has been suggested in various places in this dissertation, Japan's flexibility may eventually prove to be a resource in the post-industrial era.

⁶⁵Some authors who do consider the importance of leadership include Edward W. Gude, "Batista and Betancourt: Alternative Responses to Violence," in The History of Violence in America, ed. by Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert Gurr (New York: Bantam Books, 1969), pp. 731-748; Arend Lijphart, "Con-sociational Democracy," World Politics, XXI (January, 1969), 207-225; Eric

Nordlinger, Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies (Harvard University: Center for International Affairs, 1972); and Tsurutani, Politics of National Development.

⁶⁶Hancock, "Elite Images," p. 1.

⁶⁷Ibid., p. 3.

⁶⁸An exception is Edward N. Muller, "A Test of a Partial Theory of Potential for Political Violence," American Political Science Review, LXVI (September, 1972), 928-959.

⁶⁹Hancock, "Elite Images," p. 3.

⁷⁰Ibid. See also Lars Rudebeck, "Political Development: Towards a Coherent and Relevant Theoretical Formulation of the Concept," Scandinavian Political Studies, V (1970), 21-63, who distinguished between two types of "developmental strategies," the "revolutionizing planning" (socialism) and the "adaptive planning" (liberal capitalist).

⁷¹Of course, the long period of Social Democratic rule has helped make possible massive redistribution; the party was given the time and enjoyed the sense of security to mobilize resources as it saw fit. After enough years in office, fundamental changes can be effected if the leadership desires to make the changes.

⁷²Hancock, Postindustrial Change, p. 197.

⁷³Hancock, "Elite Images."

⁷⁴Officials he interviewed were "in the Social Democratic and the three nonsocialist political parties; the Departments of Finance, Industry, Commerce, and Foreign Affairs; the LO [Swedish Federation of Labor], the two largest white-collar unions, the Swedish Federation of Industries, the nation's two largest private banks, and the National Association of Farmers; and key policy-makers and/or editorialists in the public radio-television corporation (Sveriges Radio), the liberal newspaper, Dagens Nyheter, and the Social Democratic newspaper, Aftonbladet." Ibid., p. 7.

⁷⁵When Feierabend and Feierabend ranked 84 nations on a seven-point coercive-permissive scale for the years 1958-1960, all current post-industrial nations except Japan were rated as very or moderately permissive. Japan was termed only slightly permissive. Australia, Canada, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States were "most" permissive; Israel and New Zealand were "moderately" permissive. Ivo K. Feierabend and Rosalind L. Feierabend, "The Relationship of Systemic Frustration, Political Coercion, and Political Instability: A Cross-National Analysis," in Gillespie and Nesvold, p. 425.

⁷⁶See, for example, Joseph B. Board, Jr., The Government and Politics of Sweden (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1970), p. 40; and David Jenkins, Sweden and the Price of Progress (New York: Coward-McCann, Inc., 1968), p. 75.

⁷⁷Board, p. 40.

⁷⁸Other countries, notably the United States, are also highly organized. Tocqueville long ago noted the propensity of Americans to join associations: "The Americans of all ages and of all conditions, and of all dispositions, constantly form associations . . . not only commercial and manufacturing . . . but associations of a thousand other kinds, religious, moral, serious, futile, restricted, enormous, or diminutive." Jenkins, p. 76. (Jenkins does not provide the source of this quotation.)

⁷⁹As quoted in Jenkins, p. 75. Jenkins does not give the source of Heckscher's comment.

⁸⁰See Jenkins, p. 77; Gunnar Heckscher, "Interest Groups in Sweden: Their Political Role," in Interest Groups on Four Continents, ed. by Henry W. Ehrmann (Pittsburgh, Penn.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1958), pp. 157-161; and Board, pp. 42-77, for a recounting of the major organizations.

⁸¹Nils Elvander, "Democracy and Large Organizations," in Hancock and Sjoberg, p. 302.

⁸²It rose from 1,602,113 in 1945 to 4,824,462 in 1967. Hancock, Postindustrial Change, p. 150.

⁸³Jenkins, p. 74.

⁸⁴Board, pp. 62-63.

⁸⁵Hancock, Postindustrial Change, p. 156. Government agencies, parliamentary members and interest groups may all suggest that a Royal Commission be formed to consider pending legislation.

⁸⁶Commissions often last two or more years. Jenkins, p. 78.

⁸⁷If large labor organizations are to be represented in the Commission, they are asked by the appropriate ministerial head to choose the representatives they desire. If smaller organizations are to participate, they are asked to submit a list of candidates and the ministerial head chooses the particular representative. Hans Meijer, "Bureaucracy and Policy Formulation in Sweden," Scandinavian Political Studies, IV (1969), 109.

⁸⁸Jenkins, p. 79.

⁸⁹See Hancock, Postindustrial Change, p. 204; and Heckscher, pp. 166-167.

⁹⁰Jenkins, p. 79. The parliament passed the final report in 1967. Ibid., p. 80.

⁹¹Heckscher, p. 166.

⁹²Board, p. 125, suggests that the figures (reproduced here in Table 31) are low because of a low response turnout to the questionnaire. A study conducted in 1941 revealed that 36.8 percent of the parliamentary members had been or were still members of trade unions, and 13.7 percent, 21.8 percent, and 41.4 percent were members of white-collar organizations, farmers associations, and temperance organizations, respectively.

⁹³Hancock, Multiparty System, p. 12. See also Hancock, Postindustrial Change, p. 154.

⁹⁴Hancock, Postindustrial Change, p. 155.

⁹⁵Ibid.

⁹⁶Hancock, Multiparty System, p. 18.

⁹⁷Ibid. The LO and SAF met every year until 1956, every two years from 1956-1966, and they have met every three years since then. Hancock, Postindustrial Change, pp. 151-152.

⁹⁸Hancock, Postindustrial Change, p. 152.

⁹⁹Board, p. 53.

¹⁰⁰Hancock, Postindustrial Change, pp. 159-160.

¹⁰¹Named after the Prime Minister's summer residence where consultations between interest group representatives and the Social Democrats took place. Ibid., p. 161.

¹⁰²Ibid. See also Nils Stjernquist, "Sweden: Stability or Deadlock?" in Political Oppositions in Western Democracies, ed. by Robert A. Dahl (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966), p. 130.

¹⁰³Hancock, Postindustrial Change, p. 163.

¹⁰⁴Ibid.

¹⁰⁵See supra, pp. 36-39.

¹⁰⁶Almond and Powell, pp. 120-127. This role, of course, varies among different countries.

¹⁰⁷Ibid., pp. 124-125.

¹⁰⁸Ibid., p. 123.

¹⁰⁹Stjernquist, p. 130, points out that organizations give people "channels to political decision-making other than voting on election day."

¹¹⁰One thing the organization is not particularly appropriate for is the "harnessing of charisma" of political leaders, an important task of parties. Almond and Powell, p. 126. But as Anton notes, Sweden has always experienced a dearth of charismatic leaders. In a recent poll, 2,000 young people were asked: "Which person in the world do you most admire?" Only seven respondents mentioned a Swedish political leader. In another poll, "four-fifths or better of supporters of each major party would continue to support their party if present leaders left." Anton, p. 96.

¹¹¹Almond, "Interest Groups," pp. 129-130, as quoted in Engelmann and Schwartz, p. 93.

¹¹²Board, pp. 41-42.

¹¹³See Anton, p. 99; Anton et al., passim; and Heckscher, p. 170. Almond, p. 231, notes that the consensual nature of politics in the Scandinavian and Low countries is what makes their party systems function smoothly.

¹¹⁴Anton, p. 99.

¹¹⁵Dankwart A. Rustow, The Politics of Compromise (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1955), p. 195, as referred to by Hancock, Postindustrial Change, p. 200.

¹¹⁶Anton et al.

¹¹⁷Hancock, Postindustrial Change, p. 162.

¹¹⁸Board, p. 57.

¹¹⁹Hancock, Postindustrial Change, pp. 82-83.

¹²⁰From 1965 to the mid-1970's. Ibid., p. 82.

¹²¹Elvander, pp. 303-304.

¹²²Board, p. 121.

¹²³This example comes from Hancock, Postindustrial Change, pp. 164-167. See also News Dictionary 1970, p. 552.

¹²⁴Kurt Samuelsson, "The Ironminers Walkout--Signal of a Change?" Viewpoint (New York: Swedish Information Service, January 28, 1970), p. 3. (Mimeographed) Quoted in Hancock, Postindustrial Change, p. 165.

¹²⁵Hancock, Postindustrial Change, p. 166.

¹²⁶Ibid.

¹²⁷See ibid., pp. 167-169.

¹²⁸Tsurutani, "A New Era," passim. See also Tsurutani, "Japan as a Post-Industrial Society," in Lindberg (forthcoming).

¹²⁹See, for example, Hancock, Multiparty System, pp. 10-13.

¹³⁰As we argued in Chapter 3, however, the Swedish system of labor arbitration reveals an environment receptive to the needs of workers in general (blue-collar and white-collar alike).

¹³¹See supra, Table 21.

¹³²See Hancock, Postindustrial Change, pp. 167-169.

¹³³Sweden's system of labor arbitration also illustrates the capacity for pre-emptive action on the part of organization and business leaders.

CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Post-industrialism, a concept used with increasing frequency, describes highly industrialized and generally quite wealthy democracies. Those who use the term implicitly assume that the traditional distinction between pre-industrial and industrial nations is oversimplified. Certain nations have become so highly industrialized that they encounter problems different from those of nations in the early or middle stages of industrialization. Hence, the term "post-industrialism" is used analytically to distinguish between nations in the early and late stages of industrialization. In this dissertation, a post-industrial nation is defined as one in which the bulk of the labor force is employed in the service (or tertiary) sector. This differs from the pre-industrial society, where most of the workers are farmers and miners, and the industrial nation, where the labor force is comprised mostly of factory workers. Currently, eight nations are post-industrial as defined above: the United States, Canada, Israel, Australia, New Zealand, Great Britain, Sweden, and Japan.

Certain parallels can be drawn between nations moving from pre-industrialism to industrialism on the one hand, and from industrialism to post-industrialism on the other. In both stages, the panoply of technological advancements that make possible these shifts in the occupational structure trigger changes within the socio-political order. When nations enter the initial stages of either industrialism or post-industrialism, social and political flux replaces stability, and uncertainty replaces predictability.

In reference to this socio-political change, nations in the early stages of industrialism are generally referred to as "transitional" and, in the present study, post-industrial nations are referred to as "trans-modern." Another parallel concerns the symptoms of socio-political flux. Two symptoms characterize both the transitional and the trans-modern stages: (1) political mobilization and participation intensify, and (2) traditional institutions face difficulties in adequately channeling burgeoning political demands, as evident in popular dissatisfaction with traditional institutions and the frequency of alternative (unconventional) forms of political behavior.

In this dissertation we discussed three political challenges which appear to be associated with post-industrialism, keeping in mind the fact that these challenges do not assume the same significance in each of the post-industrial nations. Chapter 3 suggested that advanced industrialism engenders discontent among a previously quiescent group of employees--those in the service sector. Accompanying advanced industrialism are conditions worrisome to service sector employees that lead them to organize and strike. These include threats to job security and status superiority. Service sector strikes contribute to community tensions because they have an especially disruptive impact owing to the vital nature of many of the services provided. In the case of government employees, strikes assume a special political significance because the public is the ultimate employer.

Post-industrialism contributes to political strains by creating a lag between industrial institutions which are slow to change and the rapidly changing demands brought on by advanced industrialism. Chapter 4 illustrated the problem of institutional lag by referring to environmental politics. Advanced industrialism is accompanied by a growing awareness that industrialization has its costs in the form of environmental deterioration.

Demands for an improvement in environmental quality (or at least for a slackened rate of deterioration) encounter lagging institutions and values held over from the industrial era. For example, the desires for greater and greater material comfort which were nourished in the industrial era are slow to die, even in the face of new realities. Also, liberal political parties, which were the instrument of great change in the industrial era, exhibit little enthusiasm for forcefully championing improvements in environmental quality.

Chapter 5 suggested that advanced industrialism has strengthened the power of the bureaucracy vis-à-vis elected bodies of decision-makers. This conflicts with the theory of representative democracy that has evolved in Western democracies and that serves as a means to control, via symbols, citizens of the polities. As such, fissures in this system of symbolic control create social and political tensions.

The degree to which these challenges are destabilizing varies according to the unique historical, social, and political makeup of each post-industrial nation. In what has elsewhere been termed "differential manifestation,"¹ each nation responds differently to similar challenges. The concept of differential manifestation must play an integral role in any theory of post-industrialism. However, few studies go beyond an investigation of common challenges of post-industrialism to consider idiosyncratic responses to these stimuli. Chapter 6 considered the neglected problem of differential response by comparing and contrasting two post-industrial nations with dissimilar backgrounds--Japan and Sweden. The chapter suggested certain variables which might affect how a nation responds to post-industrial challenges and which might profitably be considered in any cross-national comparison of post-industrial societies. These include: (1) simultaneity of general

socio-political change and the onset of post-industrialism, (2) strength of industrial class cleavages, (3) extent of industrialization costs, and (4) leadership flexibility.

The present study was planned with an eye to certain deficiencies in the literature on the post-industrial society that must be alleviated before a theory of post-industrialism can be developed. For one thing, the component parts of the theory should be cross-nationally valid. Currently, the literature dealing with post-industrialism tends to draw disproportionately from observations of events and trends in the United States. This parochialism runs the danger of reducing the usefulness of the concept of post-industrialism should it become a mere synonym for American political, social, and economic features. Hence, this study delineated eight post-industrial societies and attempted to incorporate information about them whenever possible.

In comparing two or more post-industrial societies, it rapidly becomes apparent that the differences among them can be significant. In order for a theory of post-industrialism to be developed, an "escape hatch" must be included; that is, a way must be left to incorporate and explain individual differences among nations. The present study included a section on the differential responses of nations to common stimuli. A theory of post-industrialism must not only explain similarities but it also must recognize and account for the differences. A consideration of idiosyncratic response may also help assuage the controversy surrounding the concept of post-industrialism. Scholars frequently criticize post-industrial enthusiasts for generalizing about nations when it actually appears that the differences override the similarities. The study of differential responses recognizes the importance of individual differences.

Many questions remain to be answered in the study of the post-industrial society, some deriving from this dissertation, others incidental to it. First, in order to develop a theory of post-industrialism, it is necessary to operationalize variables with care and precision, to collect cross-national data, and to test and interpret the data with a variety of statistical techniques. For example, Schneider and Schneider investigated the problem of political violence in ten affluent nations. Using data which covered a twenty-year period, the authors employed a variety of statistical tests in order to determine the correlates of political violence.² Their study is important because it demonstrates the feasibility of using cross-national data to discern differences among wealthy countries ("which tend to cluster on many statistical indicators") as well as among poorer countries.³ Using an approach similar to Schneider and Schneider, one could investigate the correlates of alternative political behavior in post-industrial countries (alternative political behavior, which includes nonviolent as well as violent actions, is a broader dependent variable than political violence) and, in so doing, further our understanding of the dynamics of post-industrialism.

Other ideas can best be explored by way of a descriptive approach. For example, in Chapter 6 of the present study, factors contributing to differential response were delineated, but no attempt was made to discuss the relative salience of these factors. A theory of post-industrialism requires yet another step; after citing relevant variables the interrelations among them should be considered. Illustratively, one may ask: Are leadership variables or historical factors more important in determining how a nation responds to post-industrialism?

Finally, the study of post-industrialism lends a new area of inquiry to those interested in the theory of political development. It bids us to

compare and contrast transitional and trans-modern societies and, in so doing, expand and refine the elements of political development theory. Below are some questions this dissertation raises in relation to political development:

1. Huntington defines political modernization as the "differentiation of new political functions and the development of specialized structures to perform those functions."⁴ Similarly, Almond and Powell contend that one criterion of political development is structural differentiation.⁵ But is differentiation of function (and the institutionalization which it subsumes) actually healthy for a polity, or is there a point beyond which differentiation is counterproductive?⁶ The concept of institutional lag described in Chapter 4 of this dissertation suggests that institutionalization is not necessarily synonymous with political development.

2. In developing their structural-functional approach, Almond and Powell distinguish between two aspects of the policy process: the articulative function carried out by interest groups, and the aggregative function assumed by parties.⁷ However, the cases of Japan and Sweden question the validity of this commonly expressed distinction. In Japan parties are increasingly falling out of popular favor while jūmin groups are aggregating the views of diverse people. Interest groups in Sweden have long assumed a highly important role in the political process and their function is not confined to articulation. Perhaps the salience of various political structures is changing in advanced industrial nations. As such, the functions traditionally "assigned" to the structures by Almond and Powell and others might be changing also.

3. Almond and Powell posit that governments can be compared according to their "capabilities." In describing five important capabilities--the extractive, regulative, distributive, symbolic, and responsive⁸--the authors

implicitly assume that governments of advanced industrial democracies garner more of these capabilities than governments of Third World nations. However, the study of post-industrial societies suggests that some governmental capabilities in these nations are no longer strong. Chapter 6 of this thesis, for example, argued in effect that the symbolic capability of post-industrial nations has been weakened.

It may also be that Almond and Powell's five capabilities need to be "updated" analytically. Consider, for example, the "distributive" capability. Almond and Powell focus on the distribution of resources. But in light of today's environmental deterioration, is it not also important for post-industrial governments to have the capability to minimize the distribution of costs (pollution, and so on) to groups within the polity?

4. A common idea among social scientists is that economic development is curvilinearly related to political stability: both the very poor and the very rich nations tend to be more stable than the nations in the middle of the economic ladder.⁹ However, the case of the wealthy post-industrial societies casts a shadow on this idea. Economic and technological advancements continue to fuel rising expectations at the same time that advanced industrial governments are experiencing greater difficulties fulfilling these expectations (mainly because of the "shrinking pie"). The relation between economic growth and political development may be more complex than at first believed.¹⁰

As the preceding comments illustrate, the concept of post-industrialism subsumes a variety of heuristic concepts and ideas. Although one social scientist has contended that the concept of post-industrialism "is a hindrance to an understanding of modern societies,"¹¹ a contrary conclusion is drawn here: the concept of post-industrialism opens up a wide

range of questions that stimulate a more careful scrutiny of the politics of change in highly industrialized democracies and that lead one to reconsider possibly dated assumptions about them.

Chapter VII--Notes

¹Tsurutani, "Japan as a Post-Industrial Society," in Lindberg (forthcoming).

²They found, among other things, that "political violence is more apt to occur when social mobilization is taking place faster than economic development." Schneider and Schneider, p. 87.

³Ibid., p. 88.

⁴Huntington, Political Order, p. 34.

⁵Almond and Powell, passim. See also Samuel P. Huntington, "The Change to Change: Modernization, Development, and Politics," Comparative Politics, III (April, 1971), 400.

⁶This question was posed by Kesselman, p. 24. He believed that "[i]n developed political systems, the political landscape is clogged with institutions that have outlived their original purposes but refuse to die."

⁷Almond and Powell, pp. 73-127.

⁸Ibid., pp. 190-212.

⁹See, for example, Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1963), pp. 28-63; and Jean Blondel, Comparing Political Systems (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972), p. 51.

¹⁰See, for example, Schneider and Schneider, p. 70.

¹¹Floud, p. 25.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

- Alford, Robert. Party and Society: The Anglo-American Democracies. Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1963.
- Almond, Gabriel A., and Coleman, James S., eds. Politics of the Developing Areas. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1960.
- Almond, Gabriel A., and Powell, G. Bingham, Jr. Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966.
- Almond, Gabriel A., and Verba, Sydney. The Civic Culture. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1965.
- Arthurs, H. W. Collective Bargaining by Public Employees: Five Models. Ann Arbor, Mich.: Institute of Labor and Industrial Relations, 1971.
- Banks, Arthur S., comp. Cross-Polity Time-Series Data. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1971.
- Beer, Samuel H. British Politics in the Collectivist Age. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966.
- Bell, Daniel. The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1973.
- Bennis, Warren G., and Slater, Philip E. The Temporary Society. New York: Harper and Row, 1968.
- Birnbaum, Norman. The Crisis of Industrial Society. New York: Oxford University Press, 1969.
- Blondel, Jean. Comparing Political Systems. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972.
- Board, Joseph B., Jr. The Government and Politics of Sweden. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1970.
- Brzezinski, Zbigniew. Between Two Ages. New York: Viking Books, 1970.
- Butler, David, and Stokes, Donald. Political Change in Britain. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1971.
- Carrigan, D. Owen, ed. Canadian Party Platforms 1867-1968. Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1968.

- Carson, Rachel. Silent Spring. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1962.
- Carter, Gwendolen M. The Government of the United Kingdom. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1967.
- Commoner, Barry. The Closing Circle. New York: Bantam, 1972.
- Crenson, Matthew A. The Un-Politics of Air Pollution: A Study of Non-Decisionmaking in the Cities. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1971.
- Crozier, Michel. The World of the Office Worker. Translated by David Landau. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971.
- Dimock, Marshall E. The Japanese Technocracy. New York: John Weatherhill, Inc., 1968.
- Downs, Anthony. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper and Row, 1957.
- Draper, Theodore. Castroism: Theory and Practice. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1969.
- Drucker, Peter F. The Age of Discontinuity: Guidelines to Our Changing Society. New York: Harper and Row, 1969.
- _____. Men, Ideas and Politics. New York: Harper and Row, 1971.
- Eckstein, Harry. The Evaluation of Political Performance. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1971.
- Edelman, Murray. Politics as Symbolic Action. Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1971.
- Edelson, Edward, and Warshofski, Fred. Poisons in the Air. New York: Pocket Books, Inc., 1966.
- Ellul, Jacques. The Technological Society. New York: Vintage Books, 1964.
- Engelmann, Frederick C., and Schwartz, Mildred A. Political Parties and the Canadian Social Structure. Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice-Hall of Canada, Ltd., 1967.
- Epstein, Leon D. Political Parties in Western Democracies. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970.
- Etzioni, Amitai. The Active Society. New York: The Free Press, 1968.
- _____. Demonstration Democracy. New York: Gordon and Breach, Science Publishers, Inc., 1970.
- Faunce, William A. Problems of an Industrial Society. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968.

- Ferkiss, Victor C. Technological Man: The Myth and the Reality. New York: George Braziller, 1969.
- Flanigan, William H. Political Behavior of the American Electorate. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1972.
- Fleisher, Frederic. The New Sweden: The Challenge of a Disciplined Democracy. New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1967.
- Friedan, Betty. The Feminine Mystique. New York: Norton, 1963.
- Fuchs, Victor. The Service Economy. New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1968.
- Galbraith, John Kenneth. The New Industrial State. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1971.
- Great Britain. Department of Employment and Productivity. British Labour Statistics: Historical Abstract 1886-1968. London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1971.
- Gurr, Ted Robert, and McClelland, Muriel. Political Performance: A Twelve-Nation Study. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1971.
- Hancock, M. Donald. Sweden: A Multi-Party System in Transition? Denver, Colo.: University of Denver, The Social Science Foundation and Graduate School of International Studies, 1968.
- Sweden: The Politics of Postindustrial Change. Hinsdale, Ill.: The Dryden Press, Inc., 1972.
- Hancock, M. Donald, and Sjoberg, Gideon, eds. Politics in the Post-Welfare State: Responses to the New Individualism. New York: Columbia University Press, 1972.
- Herz, John H. The Government of Germany. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1967.
- Holland, James G., and Skinner, B. F. The Analysis of Behavior. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1961.
- Horowitz, Irving Louis. Foundations of Political Sociology. New York: Harper and Row, 1972.
- Huntington, Samuel P. Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1968.
- Ike, Nobutaka. Japanese Politics: Patron-Client Democracy. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1972.
- International Labour Office. 1970 Year Book of Labour Statistics. Geneva, 1971.

- International Labour Office. 1972 Year Book of Labour Statistics. Geneva, 1973.
- Israel. Central Bureau of Statistics. Statistical Abstract of Israel 1972. n.p., n.d.
- Japan. Economic Planning Agency. "White Paper on People's Lives." Tokyo, 1971.
- _____. Japan Institute of International Affairs. White Papers of Japan 1969-70. Tokyo, 1971.
- _____. Japan Institute of International Affairs. White Papers of Japan 1970-71. Tokyo, 1972.
- _____. Office of the Prime Minister. "White Paper on Youth." Tokyo, 1972.
- _____. Public Information Bureau. Information Bulletin 1972. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.p., n.d.
- Jenkins, David. Sweden and the Price of Progress. New York: Coward-McCann, Inc., 1968.
- Kahn, Herman, and Bruce-Briggs, B. Things to Come: Thinking about the Seventies and Eighties. New York: Macmillan Company, 1972.
- Kahn, Herman, and Weiner, Anthony J. The Year 2000: A Framework for Speculation on the Next Thirty-Three Years. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1967.
- Lawson, Reed. Frustration. New York: Macmillan Company, 1965.
- Lazarus, Richard S. Adjustment and Personality. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1965.
- Lerner, Daniel. The Passing of Traditional Society. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1958.
- Lipset, Seymour Martin. Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics. Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1963.
- Lowi, Theodore J. The Politics of Disorder. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1971.
- Malthus, Thomas Robert. An Essay on the Principle of Population. With a Biography and a Critical Introduction by G. T. Bettany. London: Ward, Lock and Co., 1890.
- Marx, Wesley. The Frail Ocean. New York: Ballantine Books, 1967.
- McConnell, Brian. Britain in the Year 2000. London: New English Library, 1970.

- Meadows, Donella H.; Meadows, Dennis L.; Randers, Jørgen; and Behrens, William W. The Limits to Growth. New York: Universe Books, 1972.
- Merkl, Peter H. Modern Comparative Politics. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1970.
- Milbrath, Lester W. Political Participation: How and Why Do People Get Involved in Politics? Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1965.
- Montague, Katherine, and Montague, Peter. Mercury. New York: Sierra Club, 1971.
- Moskow, Michael H.; Loewenberg, J. Joseph; and Koziara, Edward Clifford. Collective Bargaining in Public Employment. New York: Random House, 1970.
- Moss, Robert. Urban Guerillas. London: Temple Smith, Ltd., 1972.
- News Dictionary: An Encyclopedic Summary of Contemporary History. New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1968-1972.
- Nordlinger, Eric A. Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies. Harvard University: Center for International Affairs, 1972.
- Olson, Mancur. The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965.
- Oppenheimer, Martin, and Lakey, George. A Manual for Direct Action. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1964.
- Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development. Labour Force Statistics 1960-1971. Paris, 1973.
- Osborn, Fairfield. Our Plundered Planet. New York: Pyramid Books, 1968.
- Peterson, Richard A. The Industrial Order and Social Policy. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1973.
- Pickets at City Hall: Report and Recommendations of the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Labor Disputes in Public Employment. New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1970.
- Plamenatz, John. Man and Society. Vol. II. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1963.
- Potter, Kirk H., and Johnson, Donald Bruce, eds. National Party Platforms 1840-1968. Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1970.
- Pulzer, G. J. Political Representation and Elections. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967.
- Pye, Lucian W. Aspects of Political Development. Boston: Little, Brown, Inc., 1966.

- Rae, Douglas W. The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1967.
- Reich, Charles A. The Greening of America. New York: Bantam Books, 1971.
- Rienow, Robert, and Rienow, Leona Train. Moment in the Sun. New York: Ballantine Books, 1967.
- Riggs, Fred W. Administration in Developing Countries. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1964.
- Prismatic Society Revisited. Morristown, N.J.: General Learning Press, 1973.
- Roszak, Theodore. The Making of a Counter-Culture: Reflections on the Technocratic Society and Its Youthful Opposition. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1969.
- Sanford, Fillmore H. Psychology: A Scientific Study of Man. Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc., 1965.
- Schon, Donald. Beyond the Stable State. New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1971.
- Sorauf, Frank J. Party Politics in America. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1968.
- Stagner, Ross, and Rosen, Hjalmar. Psychology of Union-Management Relations. Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc., 1965.
- Sweden. Stockholms Enskilda Bank. Some Data about Sweden 1967-1968. n.p., n.d.
- Tawney, R. H. Religion and the Rise of Capitalism. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1926.
- Toffler, Alvin. Future Shock. New York: Bantam Books, 1971.
- Tomasson, Richard F. Sweden: Prototype of Modern Society. New York: Random House, 1970.
- Touraine, Alain. The Post-Industrial Society. Translated by Leonard F. X. Mayhew. New York: Random House, 1971.
- Truman, David B. The Governmental Process. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951.
- Tsurutani, Taketsugu. The Politics of National Development. New York: Chandler Publishing Company, 1973.
- United Nations. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. UNESCO Statistical Yearbook 1971. Belgium, 1973.

- United Nations. Statistical Office of the United Nations. Department of Economic and Social Affairs. Demographic Yearbook 1971. New York, 1972.
- _____. Statistical Office of the United Nations. Department of Economic and Social Affairs. Statistical Yearbook 1971. New York, 1972.
- _____. Statistical Office of the United Nations. Department of Economic and Social Affairs. Statistical Yearbook 1972. New York, 1973.
- United States. Bureau of the Census. Statistical Abstract of the United States 1972. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972.
- _____. Department of Commerce. U.S. Economic Growth. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1969.
- _____. Department of Labor. Handbook of Labor Statistics 1970. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971.
- Weber, Max. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. London: Allen and Unwin, 1930.
- Yanaga, Chitoshi. Big Business in Japanese Politics. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1968.

Articles and Periodicals

- Abrams, Claire, and LaPorte, Todd. "California as a 'Post-Industrial Society': A Test Case?" Draft of a paper in progress, presented at the 1973 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New Orleans, September 4-8, 1973.
- Alford, Robert R. "Class Voting in the Anglo-American Political Systems." Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives. Edited by Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan. New York: The Free Press, 1967, pp. 67-93.
- Almond, Gabriel A. "Interest Groups and the Political Process." Comparative Politics: Notes and Readings. Edited by Roy C. Macridis and Bernard E. Brown. Homewood, Ill.: The Dorsey Press, Inc., 1961, pp. 227-238.
- Andrén, N. "Sweden: State Support for Political Parties." Scandinavian Political Studies, III (1968), 221-229.
- Anton, Thomas J. "Policy-Making and Political Culture in Sweden." Scandinavian Political Studies, IV (1969), 88-102.

- Anton, Thomas J.; Linde, Claes; and Mellbourn, Anders. "Bureaucrats in Politics: A Profile of the Swedish Administrative Elite." Canadian Public Administration, XVI (Winter, 1973), 627-651.
- Baldwin, Frank. "The Idioms of Contemporary Japan V." Japan Interpreter, VIII (Spring, 1973), 237-251.
- Bell, Daniel. "The Measurement of Knowledge and Technology." Indicators of Social Change. Edited by Eleanor Bernert Sheldon and Wilbert E. Moore. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1968, pp. 145-246.
- _____. "Notes on the Post-Industrial Society (1)." The Public Interest, VI (Winter, 1967), 24-35.
- _____. "Notes on the Post-Industrial Society (2)." The Public Interest, VII (Spring, 1967), 102-118.
- _____. "Technocracy and Politics." Survey, XVII (Winter, 1971), 1-24.
- Birnbaum, Norman. "Is There a Post-Industrial Revolution?" Social Policy, I (July-August, 1970), 3-13.
- Blackburn, Robin. "The Unequal Society." Power in Britain. Edited by John Urry and John Wakeford. London: Heinemann Educational Books, Ltd., 1973, pp. 17-38.
- Blaumol, William J. "Macroeconomics of Unbalanced Growth: The Anatomy of Urban Crisis." American Economic Review, LVII (June, 1967), 415-426.
- Bournes, A. N. "But Do We Really Need All Those Ph.D.'s?" Science Forum, XI (April, 1969), 8-9.
- Carroll, James D. "Participatory Technology." Science, CLXXI (February 19, 1971), 647-653.
- Cole, Robert E. "Changing Labor Force Characteristics and Their Impact on Japanese Industrial Relations." Paper prepared for Yale Advanced Research Seminar Series Japan by 1980, New Haven, Conn., February, 1973.
- Dahrendorf, Ralf. "Recent Changes in the Class Structure of European Societies." Daedalus, XCIII (Winter, 1965), 225-270.
- Deutsch, Karl. "Toward an Inventory of Basic Trends and Patterns in Comparative and International Politics." American Political Science Review, LIV (March, 1960), 34-57.
- Doern, G. Bruce. "Recent Changes in the Philosophy of Policy-Making in Canada." Canadian Journal of Political Science, IV (1971), 243-264.
- Dunlop, John T. "Introduction: Problems and Potentials." Automation and Technological Change. Edited by John T. Dunlop. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962, pp. 1-6.

- Elvander, Nils. "Democracy and Large Organizations." Politics in the Post-Welfare State: Responses to the New Individualism. Edited by M. Donald Hancock and Gideon Sjöberg. New York: Columbia University Press, 1972, pp. 302-324.
- Epstein, Marc J. "The Consequences of Economic Growth." Canadian Public Administration, XVI (Spring, 1973), 144-149.
- Facts on File (New York: Facts on File, Inc.), XXXII (July 9-15, 1972) and (August 20-26, 1972).
- Farnsworth, Lee W. "Japan 1972: New Faces and New Friends." Asian Survey, XIII (January, 1973), 113-125.
- Feierabend, Ivo K. and Feierabend, Rosalind L. "Aggressive Behaviors within Politics, 1948-1962: A Cross-National Study." Journal of Conflict Resolution, X (September, 1966), 249-271.
- _____. "The Relationship of Systemic Frustration, Political Coercion, and Political Instability: A Cross-National Analysis." Macro-Quantitative Analysis. Edited by John V. Gillespie and Betty A. Nesvold. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, Inc., 1971, pp. 417-440.
- Floud, Jean. "A Critique of Bell." Survey, XVII (Winter, 1971), 25-37.
- Froman, Louis A. "Politics in Everyday Life." Modern Political Analysis. Edited by Robert A. Dahl and Deane E. Neubauer. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968, pp. 31-42.
- Frye, Charles E. "Parties and Pressure Groups in Weimar and Bonn." European Political Processes: Essays and Readings. Edited by Henry S. Albinski and Lawrence K. Pettit. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1968, pp. 123-137.
- Garbarino, Joseph W. "Faculty Unionism: From Theory to Practice." Industrial Relations, XI (February, 1972), 1-17.
- Garson, G. David. "Automobile Workers and the Radical Dream." Politics and Society, III (Winter, 1973), 163-177.
- Gude, Edward W. "Batista and Betancourt: Alternative Responses to Violence." The History of Violence in America. Edited by Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert Gurr. New York: Bantam Books, 1969, pp. 731-748.
- Gurr, Ted Robert, with Ruttenger, Charles. "The Conditions of Civil Violence: First Tests of a Causal Model." Macro-Quantitative Analysis. Edited by John V. Gillespie and Betty A. Nesvold. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, Inc., 1971, pp. 187-215.
- Gyllensten, Lars. "Swedish Radicalism in the 1960's, An Experiment in Political and Cultural Debate." Politics in the Post-Welfare State: Responses to the New Individualism. Edited by M. Donald Hancock and Gideon Sjöberg. New York: Columbia University Press, 1972, pp. 279-301.

Hamilton, Andrew. "Nixon's White House Staff: Heyday of the Planners?" Science, CLXVII (February 27, 1970), 1232-1234.

Hancock, M. Donald. "Elite Images and System Change in Sweden." Paper presented at the 1973 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New Orleans, September 4-8, 1973.

. "Post-Welfare Modernization in Sweden: The Quest for Cumulative Rationality and Equality." Politics in the Post-Welfare State: Responses to the New Individualism. Edited by M. Donald Hancock and Gideon Sjoberg. New York: Columbia University Press, 1972, pp. 223-245.

Heckscher, Gunnar. "Interest Groups in Sweden: Their Political Role." Interest Groups on Four Continents. Edited by Henry W. Ehrmann. Pittsburgh, Penn.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1958, pp. 154-172.

Hiroshi, Minami. "The Introspection Boom: Wither the National Character." Japan Interpreter, VIII (Spring, 1973), 159-175.

Hollingsworth, J. Rogers. "Perspectives on Industrializing Societies." American Behavioral Scientist, XVI (June, 1973), 715-739.

Huntington, Samuel P. "The Change to Change: Modernization, Development, and Politics." Comparative Politics, III (April, 1971), 283-322.

. "Postindustrial Politics: How Benign Will It Be?" Comparative Politics, VI (January, 1974), 163-192.

Ike, Nobutka. "Economic Growth and Intergenerational Change in Japan." American Political Science Review, LXVII (December, 1973), 1194-1203.

Inglehart, Ronald. "Industrial, Pre-Industrial, and Post-Industrial Political Cleavages in Western Europe and the United States." Paper delivered at the 1973 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New Orleans, September 4-8, 1973.

. "The Silent Revolution in Europe: Intergenerational Change in Post-Industrial Societies." American Political Science Review, LXV (December, 1971), 991-1017.

Inglehart, Ronald, and Hochstein, Avram. "Alignment and Dealignment of the Electorate in France and the United States." Comparative Political Studies, V (October, 1972), 343-372.

Jackson, Robert J., and Stein, Michael B. "The Issue of Political Development." Issues in Comparative Politics. Edited by Robert J. Jackson and Michael B. Stein. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1971, pp. 19-38.

Janowitz, Morris, and Segal, David R. "Social Cleavage and Party Affiliation: Germany, Great Britain, and the United States." American Journal of Sociology, LXXII (May, 1967), 601-618.

- Jones, G. W. "The Prime Minister's Power." European Political Processes: Essays and Readings. Edited by Henry S. Albinski and Lawrence K. Pettit. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1968, pp. 281-296.
- Kahin, George McTurnan. "Indonesia." Major Governments of Asia. Edited by George McTurnan Kahin. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1963, pp. 535-700.
- Kassalow, Everett M. "White-Collar Unionism in the United States." White-Collar Trade Unions: Contemporary Developments in Industrialized Societies. Edited by Adolf Sturmhäl. Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1966, pp. 305-364.
- Kesselman, Mark. "Overinstitutionalization and Political Constraint: The Case of France." Comparative Politics, III (October, 1970), 21-44.
- Kloman, Erasmus H. "Public Participation in Technology Assessment." Public Administration Review, XXXIV (January-February, 1974), 52-61.
- Kunimoto, Yoshiro. "Pollution and Local Government." Japan Quarterly, XXVIII (April-June, 1971), 162-167.
- Kuroda, Yasumasa. "Protest Movements in Japan: A New Politics." Asian Survey, XII (November, 1972), 947-959.
- Lampman, Robert J. "Income and Inequality: The 1930s to the 1960s." Poverty in Affluence. Edited by Robert E. Will and Harold G. Vatter. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1970, pp. 50-52.
- Lane, Robert E. "The Decline of Politics and Ideology in a Knowledgeable Society." American Sociological Review, XXXI (October, 1966), 649-662.
- Lasch, Christopher. "Take Me to Your Leader." Review of The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting, by Daniel Bell. New York Review of Books, October 18, 1973, pp. 63-66.
- "Toward a Theory of Post-Industrial Society." Politics in the Post-Welfare State: Responses to the New Individualism. Edited by M. Donald Hancock and Gideon Sjoberg. New York: Columbia University Press, 1972, pp. 36-50.
- Leiserson, Avery. "Scientists and the Policy Process." American Political Science Review, LIX (June, 1965), 408-416.
- Levine, Solomon B. "Unionization of White-Collar Employees in Japan." White-Collar Trade Unions: Contemporary Developments in Industrialized Societies. Edited by Adolf Sturmhäl. Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1966, pp. 205-260.
- Lijphart, Arend. "Consociational Democracy." World Politics, XXI (January, 1969), 207-225.

- Lijphart, Arend. "Typologies of Democratic Systems." Comparative Political Studies, I (April, 1968), 3-44.
- Lipset, Seymour Martin. "Some Further Comments on 'The End of Ideology.'" American Political Science Review, LX (March, 1966), 17-18.
- _____. "Symposium on Technology and the Counterculture." Technology, Power and Social Change. Edited by Charles A. Thrall and Jerold M. Starr. Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath and Company, 1972, pp. 83-90.
- _____. "White-Collar Workers and Professionals--Their Attitudes and Behavior towards Unions." Readings in Industrial Sociology. Edited by William A. Faunce. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1967, pp. 525-548.
- Lipset, Seymour Martin, and Rokkan, Stein. "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction." Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross National Perspectives. Edited by Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan. New York: The Free Press, 1967, pp. 1-64.
- Love, Thomas M., and Sulzner, George T. "Political Implications of Public Employee Bargaining." Industrial Relations, XI (February, 1972), 18-33.
- Maeno, J. Rey. "Japan 1973: The End of an Era?" Asian Survey, XIV (January, 1974), 52-64.
- Mann, Floyd C. "Psychological and Organizational Impacts." Automation and Technological Change. Edited by John T. Dunlop. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962, pp. 43-65.
- Markus, Gregory B., and Nesvold, Betty A. "Governmental Coerciveness and Political Instability: An Exploratory Study of Cross-National Patterns." Comparative Political Studies, V (July, 1972), 231-244.
- Masumi, Junnosuke. "The Political Structure in 1955." Journal of Social and Political Ideas in Japan, II (December, 1964), 30-36.
- Matsumoto, Sannosuke. "Political Parties: Notes by the Editor." Journal of Social and Political Ideas in Japan, II (December, 1964), 37-40.
- Medalia, Nahum Z. "Air Pollution as a Socio-Environmental Health Problem: A Survey Report." Journal of Health and Human Behavior, V (Winter, 1964), 154-165.
- Meijer, Hans. "Bureaucracy and Policy Formulation in Sweden." Scandinavian Political Studies, IV (1969), 103-116.
- Merelman, Richard M. "Learning and Legitimacy." American Political Science Review, LX (September, 1966), 548-561.

- Miller, Arthur H.; Brown, Thad A.; and Raine, Alden S. "Social Conflict and Political Estrangement, 1958-1972." Paper presented at the 1973 Midwest Political Science Association Convention, Chicago, May 3-5, 1973.
- Misawa, Shigeo. "An Outline of the Policy-Making Process in Japan." Japanese Politics--An Inside View: Readings from Japan. Translated and edited by Hiroshi Itoh. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1973, pp. 12-48.
- Mitchell, Alex. "The Japanese Cataclysm." London Times Magazine. October 21, 1973, p. 76.
- Morse, Stanley J., and Peele, Stanton. "A Study of Participants in an Anti-Vietnam War Demonstration." Journal of Social Issues, XXVII (1971), 113-136.
- Muller, Edward N. "A Test of a Partial Theory of Potential for Political Violence." American Political Science Review, LXVI (September, 1972), 928-959.
- Nilstein, Arne H. "White-Collar Unionism in Sweden." White-Collar Trade Unions: Contemporary Developments in Industrialized Societies. Edited by Adolf Sturmthal. Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1966, pp. 205-260.
- Oka, Yoshisato. "Political Parties and Party Government." Journal of Social and Political Ideas in Japan, II (December, 1964), 14-24.
- Olsen, Marvin E. "Power Trends in Systemic Societies." Power in Societies. Edited by Marvin E. Olsen. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1970, pp. 370-379.
- Ophuls, William. "The Scarcity Society." Harper's Magazine, April, 1974, pp. 47-52.
- "Opinion Survey on Economic Problems, April, 1969." White Papers of Japan 1970-71. Tokyo: Japan Institute of International Affairs, 1972, pp. 393-396.
- "Opinion Survey on National Power, The People's National Image and Life Awareness." White Papers of Japan 1969-70. Tokyo: Japan Institute of International Affairs, 1971, pp. 391-395.
- Presthus, Robert. "Interest Groups and the Canadian Parliament: Activities, Interaction, Legitimacy, and Influence." Canadian Journal of Political Science, IV (December, 1971), 444-460.
- Resnick, Philip. "The Political Theory of Extra-Parliamentarism." Canadian Journal of Political Science, VI (March, 1973), 65-88.
- Robinson, Alan D. "Class Voting in New Zealand: A Comment on Alford's Comparison of Class Voting in the Anglo-American Political Systems." Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross National Perspectives. Edited by Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan. New York: The Free Press, 1967, pp. 95-114.

- Rosenbaum, H. Jon, and Sederberg, Peter C. "The Occult and Political Development." Comparative Politics, IV (July, 1971), 561-574.
- Rudebeck, Lars. "Political Development: Towards a Coherent and Relevant Theoretical Formulation of the Concept." Scandinavian Political Studies, V (1970), 21-63.
- Rush, Gary B. "The Radicalization of Middle-Class Youth." International Social Science Journal, XXIV (1972), 312-325.
- Rustow, Dankwart A. "Sweden's Transition to Democracy: Some Notes toward a Genetic Theory." Scandinavian Political Studies, VI (1971), 9-26.
- Ryang, Key Sun. "Postwar Japanese Political Leadership--A Study of Prime Ministers." Asian Survey, XIII (January, 1973), 113-125.
- Schneider, Peter R., and Schneider, Anne L. "Social Mobilization, Political Institutions, and Political Violence." Comparative Political Studies, IV (April, 1971), 69-90.
- Segal, D. R., and Knoke, D. "Political Partisanship: Its Social and Economic Bases in the United States." American Journal of Economic Sociology, XXIX (July, 1970), 253-261.
- Spates, James L., and Levin, Jack. "Beats, Hippies, the Hip Generation, and the American Middle Class: An Analysis of Values." International Social Science Journal, XXIV (November, 1972), 326-353.
- Stjernquist, Nils. "Sweden: Stability or Deadlock?" Political Oppositions in Western Democracies. Edited by Robert A. Dahl. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966, pp. 116-146.
- Straussman, Jeffrey D. "Technocratic Counsel and Societal Guidance." Paper presented at the 1973 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New Orleans, September 4-8, 1973.
- Sturmthal, Adolf. "White-Collar Unions--A Comparative Essay." White-Collar Trade Unions: Contemporary Developments in Industrialized Societies. Edited by Adolf Sturmthal. Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1966, pp. 365-398.
- Tognacci, Louis N.; Weigel, Russell H.; Wideen, Marvin V.; and Vernon, David T. A. "Environmental Quality: How Universal is Public Concern?" Environment and Behavior, IV (March, 1972), 73-86.
- Tominaga, Ken'ichi. "Post-Industrial Society and Cultural Diversity." Survey, XVII (Winter, 1971), 68-77.
- Totten, George O., III. "Models and the Problem of Internal Legitimacy." Developing Nations: Quest for a Model. Edited by Willard A. Beling and George O. Totten. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, 1970, pp. 207-225.

Tsuji, Kiyooki. "The Bureaucracy Preserved and Strengthened." Asian Political Systems. Edited by Betty B. Burch and Allan B. Cole. New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1968, pp. 136-141.

Tsurutani, Taketsugu. "Japan as a Post-Industrial Society." The Future of Industrial Society. Edited by Leon Lindberg. New York: McKay, forthcoming.

. "Japan as a Post-Industrial Society." Paper presented at the 1973 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New Orleans, September 4-8, 1973.

. "A New Era of Japanese Politics: Tokyo's Gubernatorial Election." Asian Survey, XII (May, 1972), 429-443.

Walker, K. F. "White-Collar Unionism in Australia." White-Collar Trade Unions: Contemporary Developments in Industrialized Societies. Edited by Adolf Sturmthal. Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1966, pp. 1-36.

Watanuki, Joji. "Patterns of Politics in Present-Day Japan." Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives. Edited by Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan. New York: The Free Press, 1967, pp. 447-466.

. "The Voting Behavior and Party Preference of Labor." Japanese Politics--An Inside View: Readings from Japan. Translated and edited by Hiroshi Itoh. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1973, pp. 114-134.

"White Paper on Living Conditions." White Papers of Japan 1969-70. Tokyo: Japan Institute of International Affairs, 1971, pp. 79-93.

"White Paper on Pollution." White Papers of Japan 1969-70. Tokyo: Japan Institute of International Affairs, 1972, pp. 25-40.

"White Paper on Science and Technology." White Papers of Japan 1970-71. Tokyo: Japan Institute of International Affairs, 1972, pp. 168-173.

Winham, Gilbert. "Attitudes on Pollution and Growth in Hamilton, or 'There's an awful lot of talk these days about ecology.'" Canadian Journal of Political Science, V (1972), 389-401.

Winthrop, Henry. "The Forthcoming Problems of Leisure in the Post-Industrial Society." Journal of Human Relations, XIX (1971), 115-134.

Wolfe, Arthur C. "Trends in Labor Union Voting Behavior, 1948-1968." Industrial Relations, IX (October, 1969), 1-10.

"Work Stoppages in Industrially Advanced Countries, 1955-68." Labor Developments Abroad, XV (February, 1970), 19-22.

Yamamoto, Tadashi. "Peasant Uprisings and Citizens' Revolts." Japan Interpreter, VIII (Autumn, 1973), 279-283.

Miscellaneous

Asahi Shimbun, June 26, December 9, 1972.

Brown, Lester R. "The World Resources Shortage." International Herald Tribune, November 26, 1973, p. 6.

Brown v. Board of Education 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

Gallup Poll Index, December, 1972; October, 1973; January, 1974.

The Japan Letter, No. 22, February 15, 1974.

London Times, September 14, 30, 1973.

Manchester Guardian, October 3, 28, 1973.

Manchester Guardian Weekly, March 10, 1973.

New York Times, September 6, 23, 28, 1973; December 5, 1973; March 1, 19, 22, 25, 1974; May 12, 1974.

New York Times Index 1956. New York: The New York Times Company, 1957.

New York Times Index 1972. New York: The New York Times Company, 1973.

Seattle Times, March 11, 1974.

Sunday Oregonian, May 12, 1974.

University of Washington Daily, January 17, 1974.

APPENDIX

INSTANCES OF CIVIL VIOLENCE,

1969-1971, JAPAN

TABLE 32.--Instances of civil violence, 1969-1971, Japan

Number	Date	Group	Estimated number in group	Brief description	Number of police	Total injured	Number of police injured
1.	1/9/69	Students	-- ^a	Clashes between militants	--	130	--
2.	1/10/69	Students	--	University reform	--	--	--
3.	1/18-19/69	Students	400	Clashes between militants	9,000	293	253
4.	2/28/69	Students	--	Clashes between militants	--	150	--
5.	3/1-2/69	Students	--	Entrance exams	2,000	230	--
6.	3/4/69	Students	--	Entrance exams	--	--	--
7.	9/4/69	Students	20	University reform	--	--	--
8.	9/5/69	Students	--	Occupation of univ.	--	--	--
9.	9/21-22/69	Students	--	Occupation of univ.	2,000	10(?)	7
10.	10/21/69	Students	700,000 throughout country	Anti-war	70,000	102	81
11.	10/31/69	Students & workers	20,000	Railway workers slowdown	--	--	--
12.	11/8/69	Students	--	University reforms	2,000	30	--
13.	5/31/70	Students & workers	--	American military bases	--	--	--

TABLE 32.--Continued

Number	Date	Group	Estimated number in group	Brief description	Number of police	Total injured	Number of police injured
14.	6/14/70	Students & general public	50,000	Extension of security treaty with U.S.	--	23	19
15.	6/15/70	Students & general public	28,000	Extension of security treaty with U.S.	--	--	--
16.	6/21/70	Students & general public	150,000	Extension of security treaty with U.S.	--	None	--
17.	6/23/70	Students & general public	750,000	Extension of security treaty with U.S.	--	31	Mostly police
18.	9/4/69	Students	20	University reform	--	--	--
19.	12/20/70	Young people	--	Anti-U.S.	--	--	--
20.	2/22-3/5/71	Squatters & students	1,000	Protest airport	--	--	12
21.	9/16/71	Squatters & students	5,000	Protest airport	5,000	150	34 injured; 3 killed
22.	11/14-24/71	General public	96,000	Protest American bases at Okinawa	--	25 injured; 1 killed	15

SOURCE: News Dictionary: An Encyclopedic Summary of Contemporary History (New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1969-1971).

^aThe figure was unreported.