

UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI



**UNITED STATES MILITARY INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN: LESSONS
FOR KENYA**

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other university

Signed-----

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APPROVAL BY SUPERVISOR

Date -----

This project report has been submitted with my approval as University supervisor:

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DEDICATION

I dedicate this project to my family for support during the study. Your encouragement and prayers gave me the strength to persevere.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I would like to first thank the Almighty God for His grace during my studies. His name be praised

My sincere gratitude goes to Dr. Rose Anyona for the encouragement, assistance and guidance throughout this research process. We walked together from conceptualization of the idea to writing this project. It is through your encouragement that my focus was renewed and sustained until the end. Let me also thank the entire staff of the Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies and assistance during the entire period of the studies.

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ABSTRACT

The focus of this research project is United States military intervention in Afghanistan: lessons for Kenya. The study examined the systemic effects of United States military intervention as it impacted in Afghanistan and the lessons Kenya retrieve from the intervention, with the objectives of analyzing why US used the military instrument in pursuit of terrorists in Afghanistan and their coping exit mechanisms. The study offered a background of the Somalia crisis and the lessons that Kenya can undertake to intervene in Somalia under AMISON. The study mainly focused on the lessons for Kenya from the US military intervention in Afghanistan. when KDF operated initially as a single country force, and later as part of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). According to the study, Afghanistan state collapse adversely impacted on her neighbours in the global, continental, regional and in particular Kenya, Activities in Afghanistan have a close relationship with the terrorism activities in Kenya and have adversely impacted negatively on Kenya's security. The study delved deeper focus mainly on the lessons learned both negative and positive impacts that the war and US intervention in Afghanistan is having on Kenya level and state of security as supported by the theoretical explanations of realism theory that guided the study.

The study involved interviews from key informants of the government. Interviews were conducted using semi-structured questionnaire guide, and emerging themes of negative and positive impacts of the war and US intervention in Afghanistan and improvised coping exit strategies were recorded. It was noted that the complex conflicts cannot be solved by force alone; no matter how militarily powerful or technically superior the intervener is, but only through a politically driven process. Experience from AMISOM operations has taught that peacekeepers should avoid intervening in areas that lack a viable political process The study further noted that with the comprehension of moral systems to address the ethical quandaries of mediation and a comprehension of the idea of Somalia's issues, it is the assessment of this investigation that the intercession drove by the Kenyan government was good and as per the broadly acknowledged worldwide standard of simply war hypothesis. Overall, the Somalia war had a significant emotional, economic and social impact on KDF military. It is the spirit of this study of the need for Kenya to restructure KDF strategies and mechanisms to better address the effects of terrorism brought about by the Somalia war.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

1.1 Background

Since the end of the Cold War, terrorism has become more prominent because of globalization, increased cross-border movement of goods, people, and information.¹ Terrorism remains highly concentrated in many countries across the globe and majority of the countries targeted by the terrorists seem to be from the western world.² However, statistics also show that African countries such as Kenya have suffered enormous terrorist attacks that have resulted to massive loss of lives and property. Consequently, majority of countries in the world have resorted mostly to military action to curb the threat of terrorism.

Foreign military intervention has been a defining feature of 21st century life in many regions across the globe, notably in Central Asia and the Middle East.³ Western intervention in these regions has caused social and political upheaval, and also a rise in terrorism with attacks being exported from these countries to the West. Leading countries in the current war on terror, namely the U.S. and the UK, have substantial troop deployments, with their sophisticated weapons and their 21st century systems such as use of Special Forces, armed drones and privatised military companies, against small terror groups. Yet in spite of these efforts, a military victory against terrorism seems elusive.⁴

In many of these countries such as Pakistan, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Somalia, Nigeria, Niger, Mali and the Caucasus, the use of the military instrument created unintended consequences that led to new problems such as, weakening of the target government and other domestic institutions, and breakdown in the rule of law, potentially increasing the rate of looting, violence, deaths and other criminal activities. This has attracted the attention of

¹Regan Patrick. "Choosing to Intervene: Outside Interventions into Internal Conflicts as a Policy Choice." *Journal of Politics*, vol. 60, no. 3: (2012) pp. 754-779.

² Ibid

³ Butcher Steve. "The Politics and Ethics of Military Intervention." *Survival*, vol. 37, no. 4: (2015) pp. 29-51.

⁴ Edward David. *War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton and the Generals*. (London: Bloomsbury, 2014).

academia and policymakers. From an academic perspective, the main discussion about the use of military in counterterrorism revolves around the issue of effectiveness. After, the US 9/11 attack, the Bush administration and the cabinet of former British Prime Minister Tony Blair made nearly all of the important decisions about the fight against terrorism, and the most important decision was to give military leaders enormous latitude and especially the design and execution of the operations in the war of Afghanistan.⁵ Barack Obama, Gordon Brown, and David Cameron made no major changes in policy direction but they majorly focused on advancing their own interests and solving global problems as diplomacy and defence.⁶ For the U.S. and the UK, the main instrument of the fight against terrorism is still the military and drone military attacks, and no major change in this regard seems likely in the near future. Nevertheless, Al-Qaeda still sustains its existence in countries like Afghanistan, Iraq Pakistan and Yemen.⁷

According to Waltz, policies in the past 30 years have caused at least 288,000 Muslim fatalities, mostly in the Middle East.⁸ Al-Qaeda purports that the U.S. was directly responsible for the high number of deaths in the Taliban and Saddam Hussein fatalities.⁹ This study attempts to reveal how military intervention has manifested over the course of recent U.S. involvement in Afghanistan and the lessons AMISOM can learn in its current and future operations in Somalia.

Kenya has suffered various attacks attributed to terrorist elements. For example, in 1980, the Jewish-owned Norfolk Hotel was attacked by the Palestinian Liberal Organization (PLO) which aimed at avenging Kenya's authorization to Israeli soldiers who re-fuelled their war planes in Nairobi during the famous Entebbe hostage predicament where an Air France

⁵ Herspring, Dale R. Rumsfeld's Wars: The Arrogance of Power. University Press of Kansas. 2008

⁶ Clinton, Hillary Rodham. Remarks on Development in the 21st Century. U.S. State Department. January 2010. <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/01/134838.htm>

⁷ Greenwald, Glenn. Obama's Embrace of Bush Terrorism Policies is Celebrated as "Centrism." Salon.com. May 2009. http://www.salon.com/news/opinion/glenn_greenwald/2009/05/19/obama

⁸ Waltz, Stephen M. et al. "What Role Should the U.S. Play in Middle East?." Belfer Center Newsletter (Summer 2011).

⁹ Ibid

Flight 139 en route to Paris was taken hostage by terrorists affiliated to (PFLP) and forced it to land at Entebbe International Airport in Uganda under the controversial president Idi Amin permission.¹⁰ In 1998, United States Embassy bombings happened in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. This led to the killing of 220 people in Nairobi and 11 in Tanzania and 70 injured.¹¹ This attack in Kenya acted as an eye-opener leading to the global war on terrorism, although this war gained momentum after the September 11 attack in the US.¹² In 2002, an Israeli owned hotel known as Paradise Hotel was attacked. The hotel was famous for hosting tourists mainly from Israel and this explosion was well timed to explode immediately after an estimated sixty tourists had checked in to the hotel. The explosion left a trail of fifteen deaths and eighty people injured.¹³ In 2014, Kenya experienced one of its worst acts of terror, when Al-Shabaab militants attacked the Westgate Shopping Mall in Nairobi, killing several Kenyans as well as foreign expatriates who frequented the Mall. Furthermore, Kenya has experienced other attacks such as the Garissa University attack where about 148 several students were killed, an attack on a military base in the coastal province, an attack on a mining quarry in Mandera, sporadic attacks on police and military outposts in the north-east of the country and most recently, the Dusit attack on 15th January, 2019.¹⁴

Kenyan military intervention in Somalia has increased Al-Shabaab recruitment of Kenyan youth particularly in the coastal regions, where the group exploits school drop outs, university students and unemployed youths to join its organization. Although the war against Al-Shabaab has been fought by the joint forces of Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, Burundi and Somalia, Kenya is paying the highest price in this war of terror attacks. The attacks by Al-

¹⁰ Davis, J. (2007). Africa and the war on Terrorism. Aldershot, Burlington: Ashgate.

¹¹ Downing, W. (2009). Al-Qaeda's Adventures in the Horn of Africa. Diane Publishing Company.

¹² Muiruri, S. (2004, January 29th). Counter terrorism Centre Established in Kenya, CNSNEWS. Nairobi, , Nairobi

¹³ Terror in the Horn of Africa. (2004, January 15th). Special Report. Retrieved August 10th, 2016, from United States Institute of Peace: <http://www.usip.org>

¹⁴ Ibid

Shabaab are aimed at forcing Kenya to withdraw its soldiers from Somalia where they are jointly fighting the group as part of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).¹⁵

Kenya's decision on sending her troops across the border into Somalia is in line with the international policy on military intervention that allows a state to defend her boundaries. Kenya's decision to cross the border into Somalia was triggered by several factors prime among them was that Kenya's national security was threatened by the Somalia-based Islamist militant group, Al-Shabaab. The terrorist group had in fact carried out a number of cross-border raids during the months preceding the operation. Secondly, Kenya had for a long time wanted to create a buffer to protect itself from the conflict in Somalia with the fear that the war in the neighbouring state would spill over into Kenya.¹⁶ Also, Kenya's reason for invading Somalia is simply because Kenya's economic interests were threatened by Al-Shabaab with the abduction of tourists and distorted image of the KDF in the eyes of the population in the midst of allegations of corruption.¹⁷

1.2 Statement of the Research Problem

Both the United States of America and Kenya have resorted to using the military instrument to deal with terrorism. These two countries have expressed sentiments regarding non-negotiation with terrorists or their sympathizers.¹⁸ According to a recent report by Center for Strategic and International Studies, the cost of the war in Afghanistan to the United States from year 2001 through to year 2015 amounted to \$641.7 billion.¹⁹ Furthermore, taking into

¹⁵ Ibid

¹⁶ Okwany Charles. Countering violence extremism in Somalia and Kenya: actors and approaches. (Norway: Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research, 2016)

¹⁷ Mutua Muthama. and Mwaniki Paul. National Intelligence Service report warned of Nairobi terror attacks. (Standard, 28th September, 2013)

¹⁸ Aronson Simson. "Kenya and the Global War on Terror": African Journal of Criminology and Justice Studies vol. 97, no. 1: (2013) pp. 75-90.

¹⁹ Weil Celestine. "The Protection-Neutrality Dilemma in Humanitarian Emergencies: Why the Need for Military Intervention." International Migration Review, vol. 35, No. 1: (2014) pp. 79-116.

account non-combat expenditures such as medical bills, a 2013 Harvard study found the Iraq and Afghan wars to be the most expensive conflicts in U.S. history.²⁰

Increase in violence and growth of radical militant Islamic terrorism, proliferation of small arms, rampant kidnapping, refugees menace and maritime piracy among other insecurity issues. These have resulted to massive loss, not only to Kenya, but also to the region in terms of citizens being killed by suicide bombers, property destructions, travel advisories hurting tourism industry, massive investment in security by states, destruction of infrastructures among others. Several attempts that have been made to restore Somalia lawlessness have proved fruitless because of lack of a legitimate government due to government collapse. Although a number of Al-Shabaab attacks have been thwarted, the police have failed to compellingly engage the militia due to the guerrilla warfare they deploy.

The efficacy of U.S. intervention operations in Afghanistan is questionable at best, and the current counterinsurgency strategy has not been successful. Since the initial military intervention in 2001, the U.S. has failed to create legitimate and sustained progress in developing and creating the political, economic, social, and security related institutions and systems needed in order for Afghanistan to stabilize. In Kenya particularly, the decision to send Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) troops to Somalia has received more criticisms than accolades. Okwany and Wainaina viewed this action as an exercise in futility as Kenya's security was and continues to be shaken more in its history which has caused human, economic, and political losses. It is imperative that Kenya adopts a new strategy used by US towards Afghanistan.

²⁰ Jehl Darius. "Conflict in the Balkans; Clinton Outlines U.S. Interest in Bosnia Air Strikes." (The New York Times, 2014)

1.3 Research Questions

- i. Why did the US use the military instrument in pursuit of terrorists in Afghanistan?
- ii. What lessons can Kenya learn from the US as it continues with its intervention in Somalia?
- iii. Which is the possible exit strategy for Kenya based on the strategic analysis of US war in Afghanistan?

1.4 Objectives of the Study

- i. To analyse why the US used the military instrument in pursuit of terrorists in Afghanistan.
- ii. To assess the lessons Kenya can learn from the US as it continues to intervene in Somalia under AMISOM
- iii. To come up with an AMISOM exit strategy based on the strategic analysis of US war in Afghanistan.

1.5 Literature Review

The literature review section is divided into four sub-sections. The first section analyses the literature on the meaning of terrorism, while the second part examines literature on the global war on Terrorism in Afghanistan. The third sub-section examines literature on military intervention as a counterterrorism measure. The last part of this literature review will focus on, terrorism in Kenya and military intervention by Kenya.

1.5.1 Terrorism

Terrorism is the use of aggression against innocent individuals or persons who are not armed and with the sole aim, of causing intimidation, panic and fear within the targeted group

of individuals.²¹ The 11/9/2001 attack by terrorists in the US has indeed raised the awareness about contemporary terrorism.²² Nowadays, it seems that terrorism is equated with Islamic violence and Al-Qaeda in particular. Terrorism is however a broad concept that has its origins in the French Revolution and is therefore not a phenomenon of recent years and certainly not exclusively related to Islam. Schmidt's typology of terrorism illustrates its six broad characters. Schmidt distinguishes between five types of terrorism: social revolutionary terrorism (left-wing), right-wing and racist terrorism, single issue terrorism, nationalist and separatist terrorism (including ethnic terrorism), and finally, religious terrorism.²³

Terrorism has proved to be a perennial ceaseless struggle which has adapted and has adjusted through the challenges and countermeasures imposed by states and governments as counterterrorism measures.²⁴ For success in containing terrorism, governments and states must work tirelessly with dynamic countermeasures that are usually above those of the terrorists. This fight on terrorism otherwise referred as counterterrorism has become a global phenomenon because the problem of international terrorism transcends borders and can never be effectively fought by a single state.²⁵ September 11, 2001 was a turning point in the understanding of terrorism and terrorists. Though it was not the first incident that occurred, it was so lethal in its nature and magnitude that it exhibited a rare recourse of terrorist resolve.²⁶

The US had left a gap in antiterrorism defence where a traditional long proven tactic of airline hijacking was neglected in favour of less conventional threats. No single attacks in the entire 20 centuries had killed more than 500 persons at any one time, a record broken by 9-

²¹ Pape, R. (2003). The strategic logic of suicide Terrorism. *American political science Review* vol 97 No. 3 , 343 - 361.

²² Miller, E. (2015). National Consortium for the study of terrorism and response to terrorism: Global Terrorism Database. New York: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism.

²³ Schmid, A.P. (2004). —Frameworks for Conceptualizing Terrorism, *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol.16 No.2 pp, 197-221

²⁴ Global Terrorism Index. (2014). *Measuring and Understanding the impact of Terrorism*. New York: Institute for Economics and Peace

²⁵ Fearon Joyson. "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War." *American Political Science Review*, vol. 97, no. 1: (2013) pp. 75-90.

²⁶ Mearsheimer Dennis. *First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*. (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2012).

11 attacks. Malcolm Shaw says that “the use of terror as a means to achieve political ends is not a new phenomenon, but it has recently acquired a new intensity”. It owes its survival to an ability to adapt and adjust to challenges and countermeasures and to continue to identify and exploit its opponent’s vulnerabilities.²⁷

Terrorism is multi-dimensional; politically, it ranges from self-determination, political independence, sovereignty, jurisdiction, security, interference between conventional diplomacy and diplomacy of terrorism. In finance and economics: destruction of property, decreased investment, money laundering, decreased tourist visiting hence low per capita income and GDP and Legally it covers international criminal law, national penal law and human rights law.²⁸ This multi-dimensional nature calls for a multi-faceted approach that will deal with terrorism in a multitude of ways. First and foremost a clear definition of terrorism that is universal in character devoid of sectarian interests should be devised to succeed in the cooperative efforts in countering the menace.²⁹

The 9-11 attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon was an aftermath of terrorist planning that began way before the actual commission. The bombing of Dar es Salaam and Nairobi in 1998 was a result of detailed planning that took five years. Historically, the beginning of Islamic politics may have been a rejuvenating factor in international terrorism seen in the Middle East. The first Islamic revolution was in 1979-1980 to withdraw shah to form the first ever Islamic state in Iran. The 1979-week long takeover of Mecca by Islamists got a brutal response from the Saudi government killing more than 1000 religious’ rebels. Following those series of events in the Middle East Syria, Algeria, and Egypt cracked down Islamic opposition in their respective countries.³⁰

²⁷ Ibid

²⁸ Finnemore Martin. *The Purpose of Intervention*. Ithaca: (Cornell University Press, 2015).

²⁹ Cunningham Daniel. “Veto Players and Civil War Duration.” *American Journal of Political Science*. vol. 5, no. 4: (2013);875-92

³⁰ Ibid

Governments should have realistic expectations on the war on terrorism since it is futile to think that one can totally eliminate terrorism and terrorists. The only realistic effort that states and governments should be keen on is to strive to contain terrorism.³¹ The new international terrorism has seldom been exhibited by past occurrences.

East Africa and the Horn of Africa region have faced three types of terrorism. Firstly, international terrorism was carried out with the main goal being to harm a third party as was the case for United States and Israel during the bombing of the American embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Kenya by al-Qaeda in 1998 and the synchronized al-Qaeda attacks in Mombasa, Kenya, in 2002 against an Israeli airliner and a hotel which had hosted Israeli tourists. Secondly, the other kind of terrorism is when civilians are targeted as was witnessed when neighbouring Somalia terrorist group, al-Ijtihad al-Islam (AIAI) targeted civilians in Ethiopia in the 1990s. Another example of civilians being caught in the middle is during the attacks in the Sudan-based Eritrean Islamic Jihad (EIJ) which took place in Eritrea killing civilians though their intended target was the military. The third category of terrorist attacks happens when indigenous organizations carry out attacks to humiliate, harm, or even overturn a legally elected government though these attacks are not aimed at third parties. A case in point is the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), Allied Democratic Front (ADF) in Uganda, Ogadeni National Liberation Front (ONLF) and Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) in Ethiopia are examples of such organization which have carried out terrorist attacks in Uganda and Ethiopia.³²

The US identified regions in Sub-Saharan Africa as most susceptible and prone to home-grown and international terrorism. States in East Africa and the Horn of Africa (Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, and Somalia) were singled out. This region is highly attractive to

³¹ Regan Patrick. "Choosing to Intervene: Outside Interventions into Internal Conflicts as a Policy Choice." *Journal of Politics*, vol. 60, no. 3: (2012) pp. 754-779.

³² David H. Shinn; *Journal of Conflict Studies*, Vol. XXIII, No. 2, Terrorism in East Africa and the Horn Vol 23, No 2 (2003)

terrorist actions due to the fact that it has been experiencing both internal and regional conflicts in the recent decades. The causes of the conflict include; ethnicity, cultural differences, boundaries which are disputed, religion, conflicting ideologies, struggle for scarce resources, inequitable sharing of resources which are managed by the state, and the sheer ambition for power. These conditions fan direct or indirect conflicts creating a fertile ground for terrorist attacks. Other conditions include: - poverty and social injustice, long porous borders, weapons that are readily available, limited financial resources and lack of qualified personnel to counter the activities of terrorist elements. Corruption combined with low pay for security personnel is also a contributing factor for terrorists to seek support. Some terrorist groupings are associated to Islam while others operate under the cover of political change.

Kenya was ranked in Africa by the Global Terrorism Index (GTI)³³ as one of the countries highly threatened by terrorist attacks from Al-Shabaab due to the country's increased activities in Somalia. The Global Terrorism Database (GTD)³⁴ indicates that in 2014 alone, Al-Shabaab committed more than eighty attacks in Kenya, which had increased from the seventy-four attacks that had been committed in the year 2013.

The intervention pursued by the Kenyan government through the invasion of Somalia rubbed other nations, especially those dominated by Muslims, the wrong way. This situation was worsened by the perceived alienation of Muslims in Kenya which is a dominant religion at the coastal and northern regions. Muslims therefore became more unified after sensing this alienation which turned into hostility and suspicion due to mysterious killings of their religious leaders such as Sheik Aboud Rogo, and —Makaburi for their radical Islamic teachings. The earlier emergence of a secession group in Mombasa which was known as

³³ Global Terrorism Index. (2014). Measuring and Understanding the impact of Terrorism. New York: Institute for Economics and Peace

³⁴ Miller, E. (2015). National Consortium for the study of terrorism and response to terrorism:Global Terrorism Database. New York: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism.

Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) came about due to this perceived alienation. In retaliation to this perceived marginalization, many Muslim youths have been radicalized and even gone to Somalia to join the Al-Shabaab.

The Kenyan government has been partly blamed for paying little attention to internal security while fighting the perceived external enemy. Little attention has been given to the on-going recruitment of youths to join the Al-Shabaab and the persecution of Muslims under the excuse of fishing out the terrorists. This perception has been viewed as the main cause of extensive radicalization ideology of extreme views amongst the Muslims in Kenya.³⁵ The rampant attacks on police stations which are icons of security highlight the dire security situation in Kenya. It appears therefore, that there exists a wide gap in objectives of the US military instrument and the need for reviewing the Kenya's current military instrument used in recruitment of youths.

1.5.2 The Global War on Terrorism in Afghanistan

Since the beginning of the war in Afghanistan on October 7, 2001, the initial combat phase ended early 2002. Despite that, war is still ongoing threatening to rejuvenate. This is a different kind of war fought by America on what they prefer to call the 'war on terror'³⁶. Under the rules of war, the war in Afghanistan was not justified. This is because a just war has to meet certain prerequisites: it should be fought against aggressors, should be linked to a particular situation and should respect ethical norms.³⁷

War must be fought by a competent state authority that can be held responsible for decisions held in warfare. To justify their actions, the US conveniently assimilated the Taliban for purposes of war. This is supposedly because they refused to hand over the al-Qaida

³⁵ Aronson, S. L. (2012). United States aid to Kenya: A study on regional security and counterterrorism assistance before and after 9/11. *African journal of criminology and justice studies* 5 (1) , 119 - 12

³⁶ Jehl Darius. "Conflict in the Balkans; Clinton Outlines U.S. Interest in Bosnia Air Strikes." (The New York Times, 2014)

³⁷ Ibid

members suspected in the attacks of the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. However, the US may have had other reasons that were a driving force in that irrational decision since the Bush government was under great psychological and political pressure to do something drastic in response to the 9-11 attacks. The military intervention in Afghanistan was a diversion of the inadequacies of the US security to prevent the attacks.³⁸

This war on terrorism has been a reason the US has made many enemies. A group of Saudi scholars wrote in a joint statement in 2002 that “we consider the United States and its current administration as a first-class sponsor of international terrorism, and it along with Israel form an axis of terrorism and evil in the world”³⁹. They claimed that the two have been instigating acts of terrorism calling it the war on terrorism. The US believes that the war on terrorism is a response in terrorizing the terrorists. The global war on terrorism in Afghanistan had two primary national interests; to rid Afghanistan of terrorists and ensure it never again becomes a safe haven for terrorists and that chaos in Afghanistan do not spill over to Pakistan. To destroy al-Qaida safe haven is a long feat for the US and may take a long time and many wars to finish alternatives for al-Qaeda. But this was a justification the US used to wage war in Afghanistan⁴⁰.

The US forces are still in Afghanistan even though al-Qaeda has long fled the country. This raises questions as to what is the real American objective in the military intervention in Afghanistan.⁴¹ Many are the times that large countries often do what they wish while small countries do what they must. This is because of the strength they possess in terms of military, economic as well as the diplomatic manoeuvres to arm-twist any country in pursuit of its perceived national interests. It’s a known fact that access to Middle East oil on

³⁸ Lyon Anelisa. “American Humanitarian Intervention: Toward a Theory of Coevolution.” *Foreign Policy Analysis*, vol. 3, no. 1: (2016) pp. 46-78.

³⁹ Ibid

⁴⁰ Ibid

⁴¹ Robert Ian. “The Compulsive Empire.” *Foreign Policy*. No. 137, (2013) pp. 82-87.

favourable terms remains a national-security priority for the US government and Saudi Arabia will be a US ally so long as the Saudi government cooperates with US efforts to maintain a steady flow of reasonably priced oil. This among other national interests has been driving the US to wars least of all expected.⁴²

It is in the national interest of the US which they seek to protect that makes them continuously go to war. States frequently go to war for lack of imagination; blinded by their aroused passions and wounded sensitivities; they are unable to conceive honourable schemes of mutual accommodation and consequent blunder into belligerence in a state of intellectual bankruptcy.⁴³ The US and all other democracies that value freedom and liberties remain vulnerable to terrorism because protecting all possible targets all the time is a practical impossibility. Also because of the many enemies the US has created due to its actions in the war on terror, they will be targets of terrorists. The Taliban for example is and will remain enemies of the US because of the war in Afghanistan.⁴⁴ The US have incorporated everybody in the fight in terrorism and made everybody think they are together in it.

There is reason to think that what is being called a war on terrorism but which increasingly serves other interests, is itself a major source of further terrorism, a help not a hindrance to the creation of terrorism around the world.⁴⁵

1.5.3 Military Intervention as a Counterterrorism Measure

U.S. foreign military intervention operations have consistently been a part of American history. Since 1960, there have been over seventy-five different types of U.S. foreign military interventions. Many of these military interventions were justified as humanitarian relief and defence and security related operations. After the launch of many

⁴² Samkange Titus. *Military Interventions in Sierra Leone: Lessons from a Failed State*. (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2013).

⁴³ Claude, V. D., "Globalization and the Study of International Security," *Journal of PeaceResearch*, 37(3), (2000)

⁴⁴ Ibid

⁴⁵ James Dobbins, "The UNs Role in Nation-building: From the Congo to Iraq", Rand, 2005.

foreign military interventions the U.S. and its international allies often conduct intervention operations in order to help rebuild or establish democratic institutions, systems, and structures.

The use of military options in the war on terrorism has been rather an overreaction by the US to the fight against terrorism.⁴⁶ A military option in counterterrorism has several limitations. The cardinal rule for war is that you should know your enemy well. War in this sense is caused by ignorance and misunderstanding of facts involved in international terrorism. Strive to know everything about your enemy through investigating adequately the causes of terrorism, grievances, power or ability of terrorists. In terms of the war in Afghanistan pinpointing who is the enemy and who is not is hard.⁴⁷

The efficacy of U.S. intervention operations in Afghanistan has always been in question since the initial military intervention took place. Many have called on the U.S. to re-design their current military and developmental strategy by placing more emphasis on helping to create legitimate and accountable institutions than deal with the country's economic, poverty, and unemployment related issues rather than only security/military related institutions and services.⁴⁸ Another growing concern of the U.S. occupation in Afghanistan that has arisen over the last several years is the lack of an accountable, federal and provincial government that is capable of providing leadership to the many needs of the Afghan people. Without this vital component of intervention, efforts to increase the likelihood of a sustained government capable of defeating internal and external threats will be nearly impossible to achieve.⁴⁹

⁴⁶ William Bother. "Military Intervention Decisions regarding Humanitarian Crises: Framing Induced Risk Behavior." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 48. No. 3: (2015) pp. 331-355.

⁴⁷ *Ibid*

⁴⁸ Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development. *Concepts and Dilemmas of State Building in Fragile Situations*. *Journal on Development* 2008, Volume 9, No. 3 <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/59/51/41100930.pdf>

⁴⁹ Winderl, Thomas. *Nation-State Building*. Vienna, 1998. p. 7, 23-25.

Therefore, in the course of military intervention other people will be affected raising emotions and anger. This increases terror, extremism and hatred provoking incidences aimed at them. "Above all states must remember not only who they are fighting, but what they are fighting for. A government faced with terrorism must be concerned, therefore with both the effectiveness and the legitimacy of its policies."⁵⁰ American power is adequate to address the vital US interests emanating from any state or combination of states "however it's much harder to deter motivated individuals and small groups that often thrive where central authority is weak, and where deterrence is therefore less effective operations, search and recovery operations, rescue operations and retaliation and punitive raids."⁵¹

The military intervention in Afghanistan has not been successful in eliminating the enemy but rather dispersed them to other places making it harder to find, target, monitor and contain. Al-Qaeda has crossed the border to Pakistan FATA region since 2002. This fact has been seen by the killing of Osama in Abbottabad inside Pakistan. Dealing with terrorism through war polarizes the nation states hampering anti-terrorist efforts.⁵² When terrorists diversify their strength is hard to estimate. Therefore, counter-terrorism efforts should be reassessed with the view of not becoming reactionary but of concrete basis of legitimacy and efficiency not to provoke the terrorists' resolve and turn the masses against the government in place.⁵³

This quest of changing policies and mechanisms should be done with the aim of countering terrorism and not to embolden their resolve. Samkange⁵⁴ argues that there is substantial evidence of the emergence of the international links of terrorists. He says that "there are cooperative efforts in training, procurement of weapons, and documentation such as

⁵⁰ Stanley Houston. *International Public Opinion and the Bosnia Crisis*. (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2013).

⁵¹ James Dobbins, "Americas Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq," Rand, 2003.

⁵² Ibid

⁵³ Smith Gordon. & Hay Jepton. "Canada and the Crisis in Eastern Zaire." In: Crocker, C.A., Hampson, F.O. and Aall, P. (eds.). *Herding Cats: Multi-party mediation in a Complex World*. (Washington, DC: USIP Press, 2014)

⁵⁴ Samkange Titus. *Military Interventions in Sierra Leone: Lessons from a Failed State*. (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2013).

passports, visas, identity cards reconnaissance of airline routes and targets, and actual terrorist operations". Rutherford⁵⁵ gives another possibility of this international network that governments rather than political groups may sponsor terrorism as an arm of foreign policy. He further goes on to say that though terrorism is now rejected as a legitimate form of warfare, its future may be different in that terrorists could be employed to provoke international incidences or existing terrorists may be employed to attack other terrorists or they could create their own terrorists.⁵⁶

Legally, efforts geared towards agreeing on international law to regulate political crimes of violence have been hampered by the problem of defining terrorism. Attempts at reaching at a satisfactory definition have been hampered by divisions, political differences and sectional differences. Grant argues that the problem of universal definition of the term terrorism has been marked by divergent views with reference to the famous phrase 'one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter'. This has hampered the way states have reacted to the issue of counterterrorism. Domestically, police powers have been broadened, others fear to act for fear of incidences against them. There has also been a rapid increase in attention to antiterrorism response capabilities leading to this inquiry.⁵⁷

1.5.4 Terrorism in Kenya and Military Intervention in Somalia

Kenya has been a primary target and has faced a continuing terrorist threat from Al-Shabaab, the chief terror threat in the Horn of Africa for several reasons.⁵⁸ This is because, of several geographic, historical, regional, political, economic and socio-cultural factors which include Islamic radicalization in the region; Kenya's vibrant coastal beach tourism industry

⁵⁵ Rutherford Rashid. *Humanitarianism under Fire: The US and UN Intervention in Somalia*. (Sterling: Kumarian Press, 2014).

⁵⁶ Claude, Van. "Globalization and the Study of International Security," *Journal of Peace Research*, 37(3), (2000)

⁵⁷ *ibid*

⁵⁸ Kagwanja, Peter, "Counter-terrorism in the Horn of Africa: New security frontiers, old strategies", *Institute for Security Studies, African Security Review* 15.3, 2006

that threatens domestic Islamic culture; poor socio-economic condition in the country; historical marginalization of the country's Muslim minority; Kenya's geographical proximity to Somalia where Al-Shabaab is headquartered & the Middle East; unstable neighbours (Sudan and Somalia); porous borders between Kenya and Somalia; as well as Kenya's strong historical ties with the West and Israel.⁵⁹

In line with the latter, most terror acts in Kenya have been against Western targets in the country. In response to many terror attacks, the KDF have had success in its counter military operations in 2011 invasion in Somalia. However, those successes are short-lived as there are continued terror attacks after periodic short cessation of hostile attacks. This is attributed to the ever-growing risks of home-grown terror, violent extremism and radicalization. Few terror attacks against Kenya and before the 2002 Paradise hotel bombing have been mentioned in the previous chapter. Thereafter, and since late 2011, Kenya has passed through many terror attacks.⁶⁰

It started with the Monday, 24 October 2011 small-scale terror attack on a blue-collar bar known as Mwaura's in Mfangano Street in Nairobi. The hurled grenade left one person dead while wounding more than 20 people. Later on, the same day, a second blast happened, when a grenade was thrown into a bus terminal from a moving vehicle. About 69 people were subsequently hospitalized, of which five people were confirmed dead. This came after the US issued a potential threat of attack which stated that there are risks of reprisal actions by the Al-Shabaab due to the KDF operations in Somalia in the previous months and especially the October operations. In November of the same year, there was an attack on Holiday Inn Hotel, the East African Pentecostal Church, a military convoy and several other attacks.

⁵⁹ Kimani Mathew, "Tackling piracy off African shores: More regional cooperation needed for peace and security," *Africa Renewal*, Volume 22, No. 4:3, January, 2013

⁶⁰ Ken Menkhaus, "After the Kenyan Intervention," *Enough Project*, January 2012, pp.1- 15.

There were around nine other attacks in Kenya, in December. On 21 September 2013 was the Westgate Shopping Mall terror attack in which unidentified gunmen attacked the upscale mall in Nairobi. The attack resulted in around 67 deaths, and dozens of people were reportedly wounded in the mass shooting. Another major attack was in 2014, known as Mpeketoni attacks. They happened between 15 and 17 June, and more than 60 people were killed in attacks in and close to Mpeketoni, Lamu County. The attacks started when about 50 masked gunmen hijacked a van and raided a police station in the predominantly Christian as well as burning hotels, restaurants, and government offices. Around 53 people were reportedly killed during the attack, and eight others were unaccounted for as of 18 June.⁶¹

In April 2015, gunmen stormed the Garissa University College, and killed almost 150 people while wounding several others. This was notwithstanding intelligence warnings that an attack was planned. The attackers claimed to be from the Al-Shabaab militant group, and indicated that they were carrying out retaliation over non-Muslims occupying Muslim territory. Several students were taken hostage; Muslims were free but Christians were withheld. Between 2012 and 2015, there were other lesser attacks, which include the 30 September 2012 attack at the Sunday school of St Polycarp's church in Nairobi; 14 December 2013 Nairobi bus attack; 1 April 2014 Eastleigh attack; 23 April 2014 Nairobi police station bombing; 10 May 2014 Nairobi bus bombings on the Thika Highway in Nairobi; 16 May 2014 Gikomba bombings; 26 May 2015 Garissa ambush and dozens of more.

In most of these attacks, Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility, carried most of the attacks themselves or through radicalized Kenyan youths that could be considered as Al-Shabaab sympathizers. In line with the latter, in 2014, estimates suggested that about 25% of the total contributing forces of Al-Shabaab are Kenyans which are preferably called "Kenyan Mujahideen". Most of these radicalized Kenyans are typically over enthusiastic poor and

⁶¹ Lind, James. Counter-terrorism and the Politics of Aid: Civil Society Responses in Kenya. *Development and Change*, 41: 335–353. (Hague, 2013) doi:

young individuals that were specifically targeted by the cells of Al-Shabaab for recruitment. It's been harder for Kenyan security forces to track the terror or those radicalized Kenyans due to the facial and cultural dissimilarities between the Kenyan Mujahedeen's and the rest 75% fighter forces of Al-Shabaab; Thus, an advantage for the Kenyan Mujahedeen's to fully blend into the larger population of Kenya with little or limited trace and detection.

Al-Shabaab further termed these attacks, reprisals for the Kenyan military's deployment in the group's home country of Somalia through *Operation Linda Nchi*. The Operation was a coordinated military mission between the Somali and Kenyan militaries that began in October 2011, when troops from Kenya crossed the border into the conflict zones of southern Somalia. The Operation triggered many of these incessant attacks. By May 2014, the US, UK, and other Western countries had issued high security warning on their citizens residing or travelling to Kenya and this ultimately affected the tourism sector in Kenya. The tourism sector is the largest earner of foreign exchange to the country and the exit of foreign visitors leads to reduced hotel and transport operations which in-turn results to labour or staff cut down. This trends affect not only the tourism sector but also extends to the foreign missions in Kenya as some have been forced to reduce their presence in Kenya to only one city usually Nairobi as observed by the move by UK to close down the Mombasa Consulate; The U.S has also reduced its staff strength in the bid to ensure adequate protection of all its staff after the death of many of its staff in the 1998 bombing.⁶²

1.6 Justification of the Study

From the above review of literature of the Afghanistan collapse as well as the attendant causes of the state collapse as propounded and expounded upon by various scholars, analysts, conflict and security practitioners as well as other notable authorities both within and without the domain of international relations, the study finds that the Afghanistan state

⁶² Marshall Center., PTSS 16-12 Participants Study Civil Society's Role in Defeating Terrorism, Counter Terror Financing. (2016).

collapse has adversely impacted on her neighbours in the global, Continental, regional and in particular Kenya in general. Activities in Afghanistan have a close relationship with the terrorism activities in Kenya and have adversely impacted negatively on Kenya's security. This study is however intended to delve deeper into this, and focus mainly on the lessons learned both negative and positive impacts that the war and US intervention in Afghanistan is having on Kenya level and state of security.

To the field of academia, the study is expected to contribute valuable knowledge on the evolution of interventions in the wake of increased terror attacks. The study will try to fill the gap that exists in formulation of military interventions due to the increased terror attacks by explaining the matrix between new military interventions that are arrived at due to terror attacks. The study will offer researchers a framework to build on so as to come up with a way of executing military interventions in Kenya to Somalia.

The scholarly literature about the US military intervention in Afghanistan and their implications in the fight against terrorism, are fragmentary and often indirectly relates to the Kenya's case. Thus, the study will add to the existing literature and ongoing studies on terrorism and security studies. The rationale of the study will be to create an understanding on the lessons that Kenya and other countries in Africa could learn about the use of military in fighting terrorism. At a time, the world, and in particular Kenya, is grappling with terror threats, this study would help the government, especially intelligence to decipher the trends and influence policy formulation in counter terrorism response.

1.7 Theoretical Framework

This study will use realism to explain military intervention by states. Realists view the world from the lenses of perpetual conflict, anarchy, power, state survival and national

interests in analysing the actions of states in the international system.⁶³ For realists, power is the ultimate tool used by states to attain their interests and by exercising their power in pursuit of their interest is what ultimately leads to conflict among states. From a Realist perspective, foreign military intervention stems from an innate desire by states to acquire, conquer and exploit territories of other states in order to maximize on strategic gains and fulfil their interests.⁶⁴

Variants of realism such as neorealism also offer an explanation of foreign intervention. Waltz⁶⁵ states that defensive realism encourages states to maintain staunch security policies which are far less likely to act as a catalyst for conflict, as opposed to offensive realism which explains that states should strive to maximize their power through hegemonic tendencies thereby directly confronting threats to a state's security.

Following this realist thought it can be said that Kenya's defence forces intervention in Somalia was designed to confront the threat that posed an imminent danger to the existence of the state hence the act of intervention was justified. Given that state interests are paramount in realism, any action taken by states to deal with the threats of national interests are justified among realists.

Kenya's decision to invade Somalia provides sufficient fodder for a realist explanation as to why it deemed it necessary to exert its power and position itself not only as an economical power but also a military force to reckon with.⁶⁶ There exist many theories surrounding Kenya's decision including the assertion that some external forces like the US and China could have a hand in this but it is clear that Kenya went to war because it needed to

⁶³ Haftendorn, H., 'The Security Puzzle: Theory-Building and in International Security', *International Studies Quarterly*, vol.35, 1991, no. 1, pp. 3-17,8

⁶⁴ Robert Ian. "The Compulsive Empire." *Foreign Policy*. No. 137, (2013) pp. 82-87.

⁶⁵ Waltz Silvan. *Aspects of Peacekeeping*. (Portland: Frank Cass Publishers, 2014).

⁶⁶ Kagwanja, Peter, "Counter-terrorism in the Horn of Africa: New security frontiers, old strategies", *Institute for Security Studies, African Security Review* 15.3, 2013

protect Kenya's interests. It wanted to reduce the risk of Al -Shabaab to act aggressively against it.⁶⁷

This theory will be applied in this study to show that Kenya's intervention efforts towards the Somali security threat are a necessary condition as its state preference is to see that the peace and stability of its neighbour country is achieved as this is crucial and essential for its own. Realism theory also goes further to demonstrate the role of international law in governing the behaviour of states towards each other. It also shows how the values and actions of individual states have impacts on other states' behaviour.

1.8 Hypotheses

Kenya had every right to intervene in Somalia due to the effects of terrorism the country had witnessed over the past three decades. There are many lessons Kenya can learn from the United States intervention in Iraq, some are positive and others negative.

1.9 Research Methodology

This section refers to the methodology that the researcher used in conducting the research, it included the research design, the research site, the sample size and sampling techniques among others.

1.9.1 Data Collection

Data collection is a process of gathering information from both primary and secondary data. This study uses primary and secondary data to investigate the lessons for Kenya in US military intervention in Afghanistan, which now forms a basis for analysis. Primary data is to be derived from telephone interviews due to the unavailability of some key persons for a one-

⁶⁷ Ibid

one interview, while texts from documents formed secondary sources. Primary data was gathered from key interviews with key informants' professionals.

Interviews were administered to key informants of the government. Interview is obtaining information from an interaction between the researcher and respondents. It can be structured or semi- structured. Interviews help see the reactions, values and attitude of the respondents. They also ensure that all questions are answered because the researcher can probe further in order to get more information. On the other hand, Interviews are very costly and time consuming. The presence of the researcher may intimidate the respondents. Quality of data to be collected may be affected especially when the respondents don't have time to reflect or consult. The study focuses on already published work as well as the unpublished data gathered from books, journals, newspapers, reports, and thesis, private and public papers. This information mainly focuses on the lessons for Kenya from the US military intervention in Afghanistan.

Data collected was analysed to answer the objectives and the hypothesis. Raw data will be cleaned in order to make sense of the study. The interviews will be conducted by the researcher. The researcher will visit the respondents at their work station or any other convenient venue, or through telephone conversation. The researcher will note down the responses from the respondents during the interviews.

1.9.2 Data Analysis

The qualitative data from interviews and focus group discussions will be analysed using content analysis. Content analysis is a research tool used to determine the presence of certain words or concepts within texts or sets of texts. It uses a set of categorisation for making valid and replicable inferences from data to their context. Researchers quantify and analyse the presence, meanings and relationships of such words and concepts, then make inferences

about the messages within the texts, the writer(s), the audience, and even the culture and time of which these are a part.

1.9.3 Data Presentation

The research was basically qualitative and the results of the study were presented in a narrative form where the research identifies various emerging issues.

1.10 Chapter Outline

Chapter one contains the background of the study, statement of the research problem, objectives of the study, literature review, justification of the study, theoretical framework, hypotheses, and methodology

Chapter two covers US military intervention in Afghanistan. Further it elaborates the military invasion approach used, the rise of insurgency in Afghanistan, the development of the political infrastructure of the Afghan state and the Obama era in relation the military invasion.

Chapter three covers Kenya's intervention in Somalia. The chapter further elaborates the Kenyan goals in the intervention, and the challenges faced during the invasion. A chapter summary is also done to sum the chapter content.

Chapter four- analyses the lessons that Kenya can learn from US intervention in Afghanistan.

Chapter five- contain the conclusions and recommendations of this study.

CHAPTER TWO

US MILITARY INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN

2.1 Introduction

This chapter looks at the US military intervention in Afghanistan. Further, it elaborates the military invasion approach used, the rise of insurgency in Afghanistan, the development of the political infrastructure of the Afghan state and the Obama era in relation the military invasion.

The US war effort in Afghanistan has been mixed in terms of success, and this is the result of multiple factors.⁶⁸ The major reason lies with conflicting wartime objectives, which created a negative trickle-down effect on strategy and tactics. The two prominent objectives that have influenced the direction of the war are the counterterrorism campaign against al-Qaida and the nation-building effort across Afghanistan.⁶⁹

The war's main successes are the result of when the "light footprint" is focused on specific objectives such as the toppling of the Taliban's government or the targeting of terrorist networks. The United States has faced far more difficulties in its nation-building attempts where the "light footprint" lacks relevance. Internal problems such as widespread corruption made Afghanistan unsuitable for any nation building attempt.⁷⁰ Further, as the war has continued, the "light footprint" faced several constraints, such as the diverting of Special Operations Forces personnel to Iraq or the imposition of restrictive Rules of engagement.⁷¹

⁶⁸ Marshall Center., PTSS 16-12 Participants Study Civil Society's Role in Defeating Terrorism, Counter Terror Financing. (2016).

⁶⁹ Kfir, Isaac, "Islamic radicalism in East Africa: Is there a cause for concern?" *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 31(9). 2008: 829-55 76

⁷⁰ Zarey Christine. "Thy Neighbour's Curse: Regional Instability and Economic Growth." *Journal of Economic Growth*. Vol. 2, no. 3: (2015) pp. 279-304.

⁷¹ Ibid

2.2 Military Invasion Operations in Afghanistan.

Following the 9/11 attacks, the George W. Bush administration was clear that it wanted a prompt, military-centric response. US Central Command began to plan for the invasion, yet this process began without the White House laying out a specific war aim.⁷² There was confusion as to whether the central focus should be against al-Qaida or the Taliban or to focus on both equally. Rumsfeld was adamant that he did not want to commit large numbers of ground forces to Afghanistan to avoid disrupting the lives of the local population. Rumsfeld cited the difficulties that plagued the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan during the 1980s and felt that the United States must avoid similar mistakes. The Soviets had occupied Afghanistan with a large force and were met with fierce resistance from local Afghans as well as foreign fighters who viewed them as imperialist invaders.⁷³

During the invasion, the operations, which would also become known to some as the Afghanistan people, involved a combination of US airpower, intelligence assets, and special operational forces, which were paired with indigenous ground troops Northern Alliance forces to achieve strategic effects.⁷⁴

This began with US airpower destroying Taliban air defence. Next, special operative forces and intelligence assets identified new targets that included larger enemy field units and command and control centres for new airstrikes. This all occurred while Northern Alliance forces acted as a screen against enemy counterattacks and held captured territory. The speed of the invasion surprised many, and it led to the decisive defeat of the Taliban forces and their al-Qaida allies.⁷⁵ However, Operation Enduring Freedom was a learning process for the military, and the light footprint is something that has continued to evolve over time. In

⁷² Waltz Silvan. *Aspects of Peacekeeping*. (Portland: Frank Cass Publishers, 2014).

⁷³ William Bother. "Military Intervention Decisions regarding Humanitarian Crises: Framing Induced Risk Behavior." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 48. No. 3: (2015) pp. 331-355.

⁷⁴ Saunders Eleanor. "Transformative Choices: Leaders and the Origins of Intervention Strategy." *International Security*, vol. 34, No.2 (2011): pp. 119-161.

⁷⁵ Lyon Anelisa. "American Humanitarian Intervention: Toward a Theory of Coevolution." *Foreign Policy Analysis*, vol. 3, no. 1: (2016) pp. 46-78.

particular, there was poor coordination between CIA assets, special operative forces, and airpower during the initial stages of the invasion.

Stephan⁷⁶ pointed out that there were difficulties during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), arguing that the lack of U.S ground forces and at times the unreliability of Northern Alliance units led to many al-Qaida fighters being able to slip away and avoid capture at the battle of Tora Bora. Still, despite some operational difficulties, the light footprint was able to achieve success by destroying the central forces of the Taliban and their al-Qaida allies during the initial invasion of the Afghanistan with relative ease. Following the toppling of the Taliban, Rumsfeld was clear that there was to be no significant presence of US boots on the ground, and his directive was reinforced by the initial successes of Operation Enduring Freedom.⁷⁷

There was a belief that the US had secured a great victory with minimal commitment of casualties and financial investment and had ushered in a new era of military interventions centred on this light footprint approach. However, this new trend was met with significant criticisms. Some observers became highly critical of the Bush administration's handling of Afghanistan in the period of 2002 to 2008 and argued Bush and Rumsfeld should have utilized a heavy footprint of conventional forces to secure the country.⁷⁸

2.3 The rise of Insurgency in Afghanistan.

During the period of 2002 to 2008, the security situation across Afghanistan began to decline as an insurgency formed and spread across the country.⁷⁹ Geographically, most insurgent activity was centred in the southern and eastern ethnic Pashtun regions of the country, and the northern regions of Pakistan were used frequently by insurgents as safe

⁷⁶ Stephan, Morrison, "The terrorist threat in Afghanistan," *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2014, pp 75–86.

⁷⁷ *Ibid*

⁷⁸ William Bother. "Military Intervention Decisions regarding Humanitarian Crises: Framing Induced Risk Behavior." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 48. No. 3: (2015) pp. 331-355.

⁷⁹ Weil Celestine. "The Protection-Neutrality Dilemma in Humanitarian Emergencies: Why the Need for Military Intervention." *International Migration Review*, vol. 35, No. 1: (2014) pp. 79-116.

havens. The Taliban were following an indirect strategy as they were attempting to exhaust the Afghan government and to survive and outlast the US and allied intervention. They were not attempting to defeat the new Afghan government or the US forces in a decisive battle since they quickly realized they lacked the capabilities to do so.⁸⁰ The insurgency in Afghanistan was and is not a cohesive unified force. Rather, it is a series of networks. It primarily consisted of the Taliban, al-Qaida, Haqqani network, the Hezb-i-Islami, various foreign fighters, local warlord militias, and criminal gangs.⁸¹

The Taliban is not a singular organization but rather a movement of several loosely aligned networks that have a vested interest in seeing the central Afghan government fall. The Taliban and Haqqani network are the most prominent groups. There are senior leaders across the insurgency, but there is a lack of centralized direct control. Senior leaders provide guidance rather than direct orders to local fighters. Not all insurgents are driven by ideological fervour, including Taliban fighters, as many are focused on more localized interests. Often insurgents are driven into fighting due to physical threats, humiliation, drug addiction, and opportunistic financial benefit. In this period of 2002 to 2008, the war objective expanded from focusing on the systematic destruction of al-Qaida toward nation building.⁸²

The United States and its allies attempted to develop the political infrastructure of the Afghan state at the federal and local level. Every level of governance in Afghanistan had to be established from the ground up, and this was paired with a major social engineering project to implement human rights in a region lacking any tradition of liberalism or experience with modern governance.⁸³ The military found itself having to perform a broad variety of tasks, from helping to establish a governmental bureaucratic system to instructing locals on new

⁸⁰ Rubin, Barnett. *Peace Building and State-Building in Afghanistan: Constructing Sovereignty for Whose Security?* *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 27, No.1, p.175-185. 2006

⁸¹ *Ibid* pg 186

⁸² Saunders Eleanor. "Transformative Choices: Leaders and the Origins of Intervention Strategy." *International Security*, vol. 34, No.2 (2011): pp. 119-161.

⁸³ Michael Wainaina. *Foreign Interventions in Ethnic Conflicts: Global Security in a Changing World*. (Burlington: Ashgate, 2013).

farming techniques. Further, the military had to establish new security forces for the Afghan state, which was going to be a tremendous task.

What emerged is a situation where the nation-building and counterterrorism objectives were clashing and leading to incoherent strategies. The counterterrorism goal required high tempo kinetic operations that centred on capturing and killing terrorists, yet this strategy undermined the holistic goal of state building by ignoring the provision of security to Afghan civilians and forced the US to partner with local allies that were at times less than reliable. Any attempt at nation- building was also gutted by poor decision making from the Bush administration. As noted, Rumsfeld held little interest in overseeing nation building, and so the US sought to outsource the security of the Afghan countryside as quickly as possible, as well as secure allies for counterterrorism operations. This led to the US giving preferential support and considerable financial aid to certain Northern Alliance warlords.⁸⁴

Once the Taliban had been defeated, these warlords would fight one another for control over illicit industries like narcotics and toll roads, and they became hated by the average Afghan civilian. This greatly undermined the US attempt at building infrastructure and institutions in Afghanistan. Also, this pattern of instability suggested that the country was not ready for the considerable change necessary to turn into a modern state.⁸⁵

The “light footprint’s relevance” in 2002–2008 faced major constraints brought on by the Bush administration’s decision to invade Iraq, which stripped Afghanistan of much of its special operations forces personnel and intelligence assets. During the lead up to the Iraq war many special operations forces personnel disengaged from Afghanistan to prepare for the next war, and some officers had speculated that post–Tora Bora al-Qaida had gone cold so there was little need for their continued presence.

⁸⁴ Mearsheimer Dennis. *First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*. (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2012).

⁸⁵ *Ibid*

The shifting of US military's attention and resources towards Iraq severely hindered the "light footprint's" ability to have operational success in Afghanistan. The "light footprint", which had managed to secure several key victories during the initial invasion of Afghanistan, was constrained highly in the 2002–2008 period, much to the detriment of the US war effort.⁸⁶

2.5 The New Strategy for Afghanistan

In 2009, there was a general perception among observers that Afghanistan was heading toward disorder and that the US lacked a proper strategy.⁸⁷ During the 2008 presidential campaign, Barack Obama had made Afghanistan a central part of his national defence platform. This would set the stage for debate over war objectives and strategy within the new administration. Some, like Vice President Joe Biden, wanted to utilize the light footprint on a strictly counterterrorism mission, while the senior military leadership, including McChrystal, who was now the commander of the Afghan mission, wanted to shift focus toward a manpower-intensive heavy footprint and embrace traditional Population-Centric Counterinsurgency (COIN).⁸⁸

President Obama opted to side with the heavy footprint option and announced his support for McChrystal's plan in December 2009, deploying an additional 30,000 troops as part of a troop surge to the country. The troop surge did not lead to a clear victory, and a US troop drawdown was initiated in July 2011; it was later followed by the end of the NATO combat mission in December 2014. Senior military commanders would acknowledge that violence levels had not overall decreased during the surge period. The heavy footprint had failed to achieve its aims. The situation inside Afghanistan remained completely unsuitable for the nation-building objective as corruption remained rampant and the insurgency was able

⁸⁶ Livingston Samson. "Clarifying the CNN Effect: An Examination of Media Effects According to Type of Intervention." The Joan Shorenstein Center, Press-Politics: Research Paper (2015) R-18.

⁸⁷ Jehl Darius. "Conflict in the Balkans; Clinton Outlines U.S. Interest in Bosnia Air Strikes." (The New York Times, 2014)

⁸⁸ Huth Paul. "Great Power Interventions in International Crises 1918-1988" Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol.42, (2011) pp. 6.

to sustain itself via its safe haven in Pakistan. Afghanistan remains beset with instability across the country, and the US military presence once again resembles the light footprint by relying on airpower and special operational forces to target terrorists and the insurgency while other military advisors focus on training the Afghan security forces.⁸⁹

Starting in 2015, the Obama administration placed new constraints on the “light footprint’s” relevancy. It implemented new restrictions on the US military’s rules of engagement, and so airpower was no longer being used as an offensive tool against the insurgency rather it was constrained for use only to target some al-Qaida members, respond to close air support requests from Afghan commanders, and protect remaining NATO forces. This decision negatively impacted the operational utility of the light footprint, which requires the freedom for rapid offensive operations.⁹⁰

The restrictive rules of engagement allowed the Taliban to have breathing space to better use staging areas for their own offensive actions. US commanders on the ground felt that airpower would need to be used more to undercut Taliban advances. Afghan security forces commanders also preferred a more aggressive US presence, including a loosening of the restrictive rules of engagement to help counter any further gains by the insurgency. The overall strategic situation since 2015 is best described as a stalemate between the United States and the insurgency. The Taliban have achieved some battlefield success yet have been unable to translate that into major strategic gains, such as toppling of the new Afghan government. Afghanistan remains locked in a protracted struggle with no clear end in sight for either side of the war.⁹¹

In sum, the United States remains stuck in strategic limbo in Afghanistan. No matter how many allied forces were deployed to Afghanistan, there is no victory to be had on the

⁸⁹ Finnemore Martin. *The Purpose of Intervention*. Ithaca: (Cornell University Press, 2015).

⁹⁰ Edward David. *War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton and the Generals*. (London: Bloomsbury, 2014).

⁹¹ Daly Martin. *Darfur’s Sorrow: A History of Destruction and Genocide*. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

battlefield. But Afghanistan is where the 9/11 attacks were planned. This is a fact that imprisons US presidents and policymakers.

While the US and its allies continue to send young men and women to fight and die, certain facts remain constant: The Taliban is not going anywhere. Terrorists are not going anywhere 17 years later; the Islamic State has joined al-Qaida as a threat. The Afghan state will not achieve a level of stability that will put American policymakers at ease in the foreseeable future. Pakistan will not change its two-sided policy of working with the US in Afghanistan with one hand while quietly enabling the Taliban with the other.

2.6 The Afghanistan Challenge

There are many challenges confronting the U.S. and coalition forces in their attempt to conduct intervention operations in Afghanistan. A brief analysis of the political, economic, social/cultural, and security/military related challenges confronted U.S. and coalition operations. These challenges are complex, interconnected, and are vitally important components that the operations in Afghanistan should seek to address some of the lessons Kenya learn from their interventions.

One of the most pressing issues in recent world events is the challenging U.S. relationship with Afghan President Hamid Karzai and the Afghan government. Research maintains that a central impediment to any U.S. or international effort in Afghanistan is the structure of the Afghan government⁹². The Afghan government is structured to have a strong executive presidency and a very weak legislative branch. In order for the U.S. to conduct legitimate intervention operations, it is important to not to give the appearance of undermining a democratically elected head of state.

⁹² Sinha, Shakti. State Building and Stabilisation in Afghanistan-Design Constraints to Effectiveness. Institute of South Asian Studies. April 2009.

However, propping up the Karzi administration, which many Afghans and foreign U.S. allies consider corrupt, undermines and challenges the types of initiatives the U.S. is attempting to conduct in Afghanistan. Finding a political balance between these challenges is vital in order for U.S. objectives to be achieved. This similarly applies for the Kenyan government which is corrupt, undermines the challenges the types of initiatives necessary for Somalia. Although KDF forces are scattered throughout Somalia, their troop and developmental forces are limited to the tasks and challenges assigned to them. This current process is effectively leaving the regional provinces to the hands of local war lords and tribal religious leaders. Recent research on U.S. operations in Afghanistan have advocated that the current practice of allowing the Department of Defence to lead and be responsible for key diplomatic and development related activities in Afghanistan be curtailed and that the State Department resume authority and provide direction for Afghanistan nation-state building operations. Kenya also needs to re-evaluate and re-design the roles of senior executive officers within the Department of Defence and Foreign Service Officers.

When analysing the U.S. operations and the current state of progress in Afghanistan, it is apparent that the U.S. and its allies have failed to really tackle Afghanistan's historical economic and funding challenges. Throughout the academic literature, arguments have been made that one of the most challenging aspects in Afghanistan is the ability and capacity to improve Afghanistan's economic situation, including its illegal economy, governmental institutions, and foreign aid expectations.⁹³ Kenya has also failed in its economic stability and has failed to improve since 2015.

Another vital issue confronting Afghanistan is that it currently relies too heavily on international aid to help maintain the states security and human services as well as Kenya.

⁹³ Rubin, Barnett. Peace Building and State-Building in Afghanistan: Constructing Sovereignty for Whose Security? Third World Quarterly, Vol. 27, No.1, p.175-185. 2006

According to the World Bank ⁹⁴ , other important economic challenges confronting Afghanistan include the weak rule of law, the drug trade, political insecurity, and derailed reconstruction efforts in which similar case applies to Kenya.

Since the U.S. military intervention in Afghanistan few foreign aid and NGO programs have worked to improve the social and cultural related challenges which are affecting the unity and cohesion among many Afghans in the nation-state building operation process.⁹⁵ Research indicates that social and cultural related services, particularly to war torn nations like Afghanistan, are provided to manage or reduce the level of psychological and physical trauma they may have experienced. Basic social and cultural services, typically found in Kenya and even some developing countries, are lacking. Services lacking in Kenya include:- hospitals, public schools for all, clothing stores, public service training facilities, youth activity facilities, and sports and recreational facilities. There are a variety of reasons why many of these services are not provided, including security concerns, but it is important to understand how the lack of political, economic, and security related progress in the state impact the state's social issues and vice versa.

Providing security and military support to the Afghan people has been one of the most challenging U.S. operations since the initial U.S. military intervention in 2001. The U.S. was ill-prepared to go into Iraq and Afghanistan for a number of reasons. Regardless of the reasons, it has placed a great constrain to the effectiveness on the mission in which the military was given.⁹⁶ Due to the military having poor language capabilities and knowledge of the cultures of Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. counterinsurgency and operations were not effective in communicating and forming relationships with the native indigenous peoples

⁹⁴ The World Bank. State Building, Sustaining Growth, and Reducing Poverty Report on Afghanistan. September 2004.

⁹⁵ Schutte, Stefan. Urban Vulnerability in Afghanistan: Case Studies From Three Cities. Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit. May 2004.

⁹⁶ Laughrey, James. Know Before You Go: improving Army Officer Socio-cultural Knowledge. U.S. Army War College. 2008.

throughout the course of the intervention. This similarly applies to the KDF forces in Somalia, they have not been effective in communicating and forming relationships with the native indigenous peoples throughout the course of the intervention

The long-term security sustainability in Afghanistan relies heavily in the countries police and armed forces.⁹⁷ Without an effective Afghan security presence established it will be hard for U.S. and allied troops to leave the nation due to concerns over the Taliban and regional stability.

2.7 Pros and Cons in Military Intervention

Throughout the human history, many events constituted genocidal acts that are purely criminal or inhuman, yet they should not be considered as clear-cut matters. In nearly every case, where accusations of genocide have circulated, partisans of various parties tend to dispute such interpretation and cover-up the details of such events, often to the point of promoting wildly different versions of the facts to confuse the public. In such events, even within both defenders and initiators, different interpretations would arise. In that case, to see pros and cons of use of military intervention in addressing large-scale human rights abuses, we must consider which party is telling the story.

In the last thirty or forty years, thanks to globalization, local humanitarian crises, civil wars, natural disasters, oppressive regimes and the like have become global problems with organizations like the UN or NATO pitching in to help. The “intervention” often involves the deployment of troops or at least air raids like in the cases of Afghanistan.

On the pro side, immediate military intervention in preventing genocide becomes necessary from the defender’s point of view. Yet, when we turn the table to see it as an initiator, military intervention could set concrete examples to the defending force in matters

⁹⁷ Jones, Seth G. U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan. Rand Counterinsurgency Study, Rand National Defense Research Institute. 2009.

including ethnic, race, religion, or national issues. The Afghanistan government's military action towards its citizens had permanently crippled the democracy that the new generation of Afghanistan longed for. Afghanistan would argue that the activists are abusing the system, while the government abusing the human rights of the students and the people. To the Afghanistan government, military intervention might have been a timely and, or even cost-effective solution, which in this case it was executed quickly, rather than lengthy periods as with diplomatic solutions.

In a global level, a pro in military intervention allows the initiator to showcase its military power. In the case of Afghanistan point of view, it might have been a warning, it might have been an initiation for war, or it might have been a simple show-off for its military development. And any one of the possibilities to Afghanistan, it would be an act that benefits its own self unless it was just an act of rage. Then it will link us into seeing the con side of military intervention.

On the con side, if and when a nation makes the decision to intervene in other sovereign nation's affairs, they become responsible for what happens. It could be the case with Afghanistan, and it could also be the US invades Syria even when there is a legitimate reason for doing so. What led the US army into Afghanistan is because the human rights were being abused there. After that, many questions like what direction of the government will go and who takes the leadership in Afghanistan are to be answered under the aegis of US.

Another con is cost. One can obviously argue that preventing genocide should happen regardless of the cost, but there are human rights abuses all over the world. Who is paying for all of the military intervention and how much rebuilding is required? If the cost of the intervention becomes too great, then should it run at the risk of financial and moral fatigue? Given the current Afghanistan state of affairs as an example, you would not expect them to contribute military force to end human rights abuses. So even though cost should not out-

weigh the human rights, one must acknowledge cost as an important factor in deciding for military interventions since they are expensive.

Lastly, when military intervention becomes an expected action or reaction to abuses, it creates a subtle agreement that one party could push just enough in abusing human rights yet not enough to raise war. This is rather dangerous to every nation and its people. This might also be the reason why many nations continue violating human rights on their people yet enjoying the ungoverned power without the military intervention.

After discussing both pros and cons of imposing military intervention in large-scale human rights abuses, and since people of all nations seldom holds military power, when intervention occurs, the people hold no position in either initiation or defence but to agonize such notion. If the people's welfare is the focus of the basic human rights, at least that's the way it should be, since the people are in no position to negotiate benefits but to suffer the consequences any policy maker dictates.

CHAPTER THREE

KENYA'S ENTRY INTO SOMALIA

3.1 Introduction

In chapter two, the study discussed the military intervention specifically delving into its pros and cons. Further, the study discoursed US military intervention in Afghanistan which elaborated the military intervention operations and the rise of a new strategy for Afghanistan during Obama's administration, the challenges the US faced in Afghanistan and so on. Chapter three covers Kenya's intervention in Somalia which will elaborate the Kenyan goals in the intervention, and the challenges faced during the invasion.

Since the failure of the Somali central government, armed UN forces and African Union have intervened in Somalia in at least a dozen conflicts. Although peacekeeping tasks often placed peace keeping troops in the line of fire, the UN force had largely been limited to self-protection. This was the case with the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) and the African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) troops. However, the decision by Kenya in October 2011 to deploy thousands of troops in Somalia's Juba Valley to wage war on Al-Shabaab was a radical departure. The International Crisis Group (ICG) report termed this operation the biggest security gamble Kenya had taken since independence.⁹⁸ Kenya which had previously preferred diplomacy and a non-military approach to the Somali crisis changed its tactics. The implication of this was that the Al-Shabaab who had little motivation to target Kenya now had the reason to do so. Initially Kenya had suffered from the activities of such belligerents for hosting "Westerners". By intervening Kenya stood as a target for Al-Shabaab attacks. This chapter looks at the circumstance that led to the military intervention in Somalia, the operation, and the challenges of the operation on the Kenyan military.

⁹⁸ International Crisis Group, "Kenya's Military Intervention in Somalia", International Crisis Group, Africa Report No. 184, February 2012.p. 1

Kenya's intervention was launched 'to protect its territorial integrity from foreign aggression'⁹⁹ as explained by the country's late minister for internal security a day before the launch of the intervention in 2011. This statement implied that the KDF would move in and advance as far into Somalia as possible in pursuit of al-Shabaab militia. The move marked Kenya's largest military operation since its independence in 1963. At the onset, around 2,400 KDF personnel were deployed.¹⁰⁰ The intervention was done in haste and more importantly, reports indicate that it was launched in the absence of consultations with the then the Federal Government of Somalia.¹⁰¹

There were several reasons that made the Kenya Defense Forces to intervene in Somalia. These included: the terror threats, kidnappings of foreign nationals in Kenya, the Somalia refugee problem and the Jubaland project of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD). The operation also arose after AMISOM peacekeeping had already proven inadequate in restoring order and alleviating human suffering in Somalia and in Refugee camps in Kenya. Some of the reasons for the intervention are discussed hereunder:

3.1.1 The Threat of Terrorism

The failure of central government in Somalia in 1991 caused several militias to thrive. Since 1991, a number of these extremist groups freely operated from Somalia and facilitated terrorist attacks in the region.¹⁰²

The first was al-Ittihaad al-Islami (AIAI), a Somali Islamist and nationalist political grouping linked to Al-Qaeda. AIAI had aimed to establish an Islamic state in Somalia. Its strategy relied upon use of intimidation and violence to undermine the Somali government. It

⁹⁹ Kimunguyi, Patrick, "Terrorism and Counter terrorism in East Africa", Global Terrorism Research Centre and Monash European and EU Centre Monash University, 2011.

¹⁰⁰ Kimani Mathew, "Tackling piracy off African shores: More regional cooperation needed for peace and security," Africa Renewal, Volume 22, No. 4:3, January, 2013

¹⁰¹ Ibid

¹⁰² International Crisis Group. Africa Reports N°95, Counter-Terrorism in Somalia: Losing Hearts and Minds?, 11 July 2005; and N°100, Somalia's Islamists, 12 December 2005; and Briefing N°74, Somalia's Divided Islamists, 18 May 2010.

also killed government activists who had been working to bring peace in Somalia. The group claimed responsibility for several high-profile bombings and shootings in Mogadishu targeting Ethiopian troops and Somali government officials.¹⁰³

Its members secretly travelled to Kenya, Somalia and elsewhere in the region. In Kenya they built considerable infrastructure for recruitment, fundraising and communication centered on the Somali populations in Nairobi, Mombasa and North Eastern Province.¹⁰⁴ In the mid-1990s, it claimed responsibility for several terrorist attacks in Ethiopia. However some leaders remained active and played a supporting role in the 1998 bombing of the U.S. Nairobi embassy.¹⁰⁵

The Kenyan government insisted that the August 7, 1998 attack in the U.S Nairobi embassy as well as one carried out the same day against the U.S. Dar es Salaam embassy, which together killed 225 and wounded over 4,000, were carried out by members of al-Qaeda cell in East Africa who were also based in Somalia.¹⁰⁶ Although increased international involvement led to the capture or killing of a number of the group's leaders, Al-Qaeda operatives remained a serious threat to Kenya. On 28 November 2002, it attacked the Paradise Hotel, a beachfront lodge in Kikambala, Kenya. The attack killed fifteen people and injured about eighty people. Al-Qaeda operatives in East Africa also tried to bring down an Arkia airline flight 582 a Boeing 757-300 aircraft departing Mombasa's Moi International Airport for Tel Aviv. The aircraft carrying two hundred and sixty-three passengers and 10 crew members was narrowly missed by two air-to surface missiles.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰³ Ibid

¹⁰⁴ Crisis Group Report, Counter-Terrorism in Somalia, op. cit., pp. 1-5.

¹⁰⁵ International Crisis Group, Briefing No.85, Kenyan Somali Islamist Radicalization, 25 January 2012.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid

¹⁰⁷ Crisis Group Report, Counter-Terrorism in Somalia, op. cit., p. 8.

3.1.2 The Famine of 2010 and Humanitarian Aid in Somalia

In 2010, UN declared that there was a famine in Lower Shabelle and Bakool regions and near-famine conditions throughout southern Somalia.¹⁰⁸ This declaration called attention to the humanitarian plight in Somalia and raised questions about the wisdom of trying to send humanitarian aid to an area dominated by an al-Qaeda-affiliated militant group. Al-Shabaab, which had Al-Qaeda ties and controlled most of the southern and central regions of the country, had from 2007 banned international aid agencies from operating within territories under its control.

On July 2009 Al-Shabaab established an Office for the Supervision of the Affairs of Foreign Agencies (OSAFA). This body monitored the movements of all non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and international organizations that operated within Somalia.¹⁰⁹ At the same time, Al-Shabaab ordered and closed offices of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the United Nations Department of Security and Safety (UNDSS), and the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) for engaging in activities “hostile” to Islam.¹¹⁰ Immediately following the issuance of the ban on the UN agencies in Somalia, Al-Shabaab militants raided UN offices in Baidoa and in Wajid. The UN was forced to suspend its operations in these cities. Strict restrictions on aid activities and food distributions severely impacted on humanitarian assistance operations in areas under Al-Shabaab control.

Al-Shabaab’s attacks on aid workers and agencies’ offices made most of southern and central Somalia one of the most hostile environments for humanitarian activities. Al-Shabaab had used the presence of aid agencies to its advantage. In some instances, the group benefited financially through fees extracted for security assurances or from ransom payments from the kidnapping of aid workers. In other instances, the families of Al-Shabaab militants

¹⁰⁸ Katherine Zimmerman, “Al-Shabaab History with Humanitarian Assistance”, 2011

¹⁰⁹ “Shabaab Restricts NGO Activity; Closes UN Offices,” Site Intelligence Group. Available at on <http://www.criticalthreats.org/Somalia/Zimmerman-Shabaab-humanitarianassistance-somalia-july-27-2011>.

¹¹⁰ “Shabaab Bans UN Mine Action,” Site Intelligence Group, December 18, 2009.

had registered as refugees in camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs), where they received food rations. Access to the camps was controlled by Al-Shabaab militants.¹¹¹

The severe conditions in southern Somalia drove families to seek assistance in areas outside of Al-Shabaab's control. Reports indicated that Al-Shabaab had prevented some of these families from leaving its territories in Kismayo.¹¹² Access to food and water, however, remained limited and on average 3,500 Somalis a day entered Kenya seeking help.¹¹³

3.1.3 The Refugee Problem

This refugee burden exacted an enormous toll on locals and the government. The Kenyan government was deeply alarmed at the ever-increasing refugee population in the Dadaab refugee camp. Some of them sneaked into urban centers. The government and the people of Kenya were uneasy about the increasing numbers of Somali population and more so over the increased economic clout of Somalis in Eastleigh estate in Nairobi. There was growing anti-Somali sentiments in the major urban centers as often proclaimed by the Kenyan Somali leaders. The documentation of refugees also became a big problem largely because of the presence of Kenyan Somali population. A large but unknown of non-Kenyan Somali obtained Kenyan identity cards and passports illegally. This was largely due to corruption, but also because it was often difficult to distinguish between Kenyan Somalis and Somali Somalis.¹¹⁴

Kenya was a signatory to the UN refugee convention, which bars forced return of refugees and was forced instead to establish a "safe zone" in which the Somali refugees could function.¹¹⁵

¹¹¹Ibid. p 61

¹¹²Shabelle Media Network, "Al Shabaab Blocks Drought-Hit People from Fleeing to Kenya," Shabelle Media Network, July 9, 2011. Available: <http://allafrica.com/stories/201107110361.html>

¹¹³ Ibid

¹¹⁴ International Crisis Group Briefing, Kenyan Somali Islamic Radicalization, op. cit., p. 8.

¹¹⁵157African Blog "Kenya, Jubaland, and Somalia's Refugees: No Quick fixes", Africa blog, London School of

3.1.4 Kidnappings of Foreign Nationals

Although a military intervention was in the process, the timeline for KDF intervention was accelerated by a string of cross-border kidnapping and attacks that targeted Western tourists on the Kenyan coast and aid workers from the refugee camp in Dadaab. Tourism which is a key industry in the Kenyan Coast was threatened. Several Europeans citizens were kidnapped in the Lamu area in September and October 2011. These incidents hit hard the tourism industry. Above all Kenyan capital Nairobi hosts a large UN presence. The last straw reached when two Spanish aid workers with Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) were kidnapped in a Dadaab refugee camp, on 13 October 2011. One day later, Kenyan troops crossed into Somalia.¹¹⁶

3.2 Kenya's Goals in Intervening in Somalia

There are some indications that Kenya's assertion, that frequent kidnappings and killings by al-Shabaab were the main reason for its intervention in Somalia, might have provided a convenient excuse to explore deeper national interests. Kenya's professed reasons aside, there are other key issues that arise from an analysis of Kenya's potential gains from launching the intervention.¹¹⁷

Oil is emerging as a key resource of interest in East Africa. Kenya is one of a number of countries in the region that have discovered oil deposits in its territory. Oil explorations are on-going along the country's coast. Reportedly, some of the areas where exploration is continuing lie in Somalia's waters, implying that the advance into Somalia have been aimed at securing these sites to ensure Kenya's smooth and uninterrupted exploration.¹¹⁸

Economics, available on (<http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/>), accessed 24 November 2011

¹¹⁶ Ibid

¹¹⁷ Kfir, Isaac, "Islamic radicalism in East Africa: Is there a cause for concern?" *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 31(9). 2008: 829–55 76

¹¹⁸ Ibid

The intervention could also be linked to the 2013 election in Kenya. The move could have been aimed at rallying up support for the government and politicians who had shown their ability to defend the country and its citizens.¹¹⁹ Moreover, at regional level, Kenya might have wanted to demonstrate its military capability and ability to effectively address a major regional security threat. The AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is dominated by Uganda which contributes the highest number of troops to the mission. Ethiopia has influence in Galgaduud, Hiraan, Bakool and Gedo areas next to its border with Somalia. By mounting an invasion, Kenya might have sought to gain influence in Lower and Middle Juba as well as parts of the Gedo regions of Somalia.¹²⁰

The lack of stability in Somalia has made it a safe haven for terrorist groups to operate their networks both regionally and internationally. Al-Shabaab are blamed by the Ethiopian, the Federal Government of Somalia and AMISOM forces for the deterioration of security, the spillover of conflict to neighboring countries, including Kenya, and the grave humanitarian situation which persists in large parts of Somalia. Kenya, however, had emerged as a target for terrorist attacks well before the emergence of al-Shabaab.¹²¹

The 7 August 1998 bombing of the American Embassy in Kenya, which killed 213 people and left 4,000 others wounded,¹²² played a major role in raising the government's and citizens' awareness on the issue of terrorism as a clear threat to the country. Since then, Kenya has been making renewed strides to curtail terrorism and its networks in the country, including the recent amendment of the Prevention of Terrorism Bill 2018. It is against this backdrop that Kenya was convinced that the spread of al-Shabaab militias into Kenya necessitated a strong

¹¹⁹ Mayoyo, Paul., "Kenya Muslims say no to US school funds," East African, 23 February 2014.

¹²⁰ Human Rights Watch. Somalia no mercy in Mogadishu: The human cost of the conflict and the struggle for relief. (Human Rights Watch, 2013)

¹²¹ Morash, Bob. Union of Islamic Courts. An opportunity lost for stability in Somalia. Conference Paper. Northeastern Political Science Association, (2011) pp. 1–28.

¹²² Shabelle Media Network. Somalia: Kenyan jets kill 2, wound 3 civilians in south Somalia. (allAfrica, 24 March, 2012)

response, due to fears of repeat major terrorist attacks like the al-Qaeda-claimed bombing of 1998.

Reportedly, Kenya, with international support, had planned to move into the Somalia conflict years prior to October 2011. This planned intervention was aimed at creating a buffer zone in the Juba area in southern Somalia, which is close to the border with Kenya.¹²³ What is now widely believed to be the core aim of Kenya's intervention is the creation of this buffer zone. The border between Kenya and Somalia stretches approximately 682km, with the Juba and Gedo regions in southern Somalia being closest to Kenya. Kenya's early plans, however, were never pushed through due to external influences and concerns that influential Somali political actors from the Juba and Gedo regions had not been properly briefed and included in discussions to take over the interim administration of the region once it was out of al-Shabaab control.

Through the stabilization of the Juba region, the Government of Kenya intends to be able to counter the direct threat of al-Shabaab militias who have long controlled this area and derived financial profit from the collection of customs revenue from charcoal exports and commercial imports through the port of Kismayo. On 28 September 2012, KDF spokesman Colonel Cyrus Oguna claimed that after a combined offensive involving air, ground and naval operations, the KDF had achieved a major victory in its capture of Kismayo from al-Shabaab militias.¹²⁴

Kenya hosts 500,000 Somali refugees, the largest number of Somali refugees on the continent, in Dadaab refugee camp¹²⁵ in Northern part of Kenya. Although the large influx of refugees in itself poses a great social and economic crisis for Kenya, the bigger issue has been the reported infiltration of al-Shabaab militias, disguised as refugees, into the camps. Al-

¹²³ Kamau, Cyprian. Kenya and the war on terrorism. *Review of African Political Economy*, 33(107), (2014) pp. 133–141.

¹²⁴ Ibid

¹²⁵ McConnell, Tom. Kenya troops aim to carve 'buffer zone' out of Somalia. (*Global Post News*, 15 November, 2011)

Shabaab members have allegedly been entering Kenya as refugees, using the camps as bases to plan and launch attacks on Kenyan territory. There are further claims that they also use the camps as recruiting grounds for new members.¹²⁶ As the conflict in Somalia continues, it has become increasingly difficult for Kenya's government to control the flow of refugees and to adequately screen them so as to separate members of al-Shabaab from bona fide refugees. Further, by helping to stabilize Somalia, Kenya would be able to support the resettlement of refugees from the camps to Somalia, thus relieving the government of the social, political and economic costs of hosting the refugees.¹²⁷

3.4 Kenya Military Invasion Challenges

More than 7 years into the invasion and despite the liberation of Kismayo from al-Shabaab control, there are some lessons from the intervention process. The timing of the invasion was sub-optimal as the operation was launched at the beginning of the rainy season in Somalia's Juba and Gedo regions.¹²⁸ Kenya's military planners demonstrated a flawed strategic approach as the first hurdle that the KDF had to face was flooding of the roads, which slowed down the operation for weeks on end and presented logistical challenges which added to the cost of the operation. Additionally, the fact that this was Kenya's largest military operation since its independence in 1963 meant that KDF personnel had limited prior experience in carrying out an act of this magnitude. Whilst these were big challenges for the KDF, the force managed to overcome them and advance further into Somalia.¹²⁹

The invasion of Somalia has made Kenya more vulnerable on the domestic front as the country risked its national security as a result of the offensive in Somalia. By intervening in Somalia, Kenya provided ample justification for al-Shabaab to finally make good on its

¹²⁶ United Nations High Commission for Refugees. UNHCR ref world. (United Nations High Commission for Refugees, 2012)

¹²⁷ Kamau, Cyprian. Kenya and the war on terrorism. *Review of African Political Economy*, 33(107), (2014) pp. 133–141.

¹²⁸ Human Rights Watch. Kenya: Security forces arbitrarily detaining people. (Human Rights Watch, 2011)

¹²⁹ Warner, Luis. In Somalia, Kenya risks death by a thousand cuts. *NDU Press, PRISM* 3(3) 2012.

threats to attack Kenya. The group subsequently announced that it would carry out reprisal attacks on Kenya's home soil. It is clear that al-Shabaab militias are against any foreign intervention in Somalia, including by Kenya. Small-scale attacks and violence, mainly through grenade attacks launched in Nairobi, Kenya's capital, the coastal region and the North Eastern border regions have escalated since the beginning of the intervention, providing evidence that threats of al-Shabaab counter attacks are real. Many of the attacks have not been carried out directly by al-Shabaab, some have been perpetrated by people inspired by or affiliated to the group. Now that al-Shabaab has reportedly lost its main operating base, Kismayo, the 'lone wolf style terror attacks on Kenya are likely to become more pronounced.¹³⁰

The intervention risks adding insult to injury in already existing tensions with Kenya's ethnic Somali community. Days into the invasion, the Kenyan government announced a parallel operation to root out al-Shabaab sympathizers in the country, asserting that al-Shabaab was 'like a big animal with a tail in Somalia and a head in Eastleigh' a suburb of Nairobi that is home to many Somali-owned businesses and a large refugee community. Furthermore, reports document serious human rights violations, including cases of ethnic Somalis being profiled and discriminated against due to their ethnicity and in the worst cases being beaten and mistreated. Somalis are also reportedly arbitrarily detained and even deported unless they have documentation to prove their legal right to be in Kenya, or if they cannot afford to bribe local security forces.¹³¹

As the KDF launched its attacks in the al-Shabaab-controlled areas of Somalia using fighter jets, many civilians, including children, were reported to be among those who were killed and seriously injured in the process. In Kenya, grenade attacks did not only cost lives,

¹³⁰ The Associated Press. Kenya claims Somalia port city of Kismayo seized from al-Qaeda-linked al-Shabaab militants. (CBS News, 28 September, 2012).

¹³¹ Ibid

they also fueled feelings of resentment from locals who blamed the government for focusing more on the KDF invasion of Somalia while neglecting the internal security of the country. Seemingly, the KDF might have been successful in rallying up citizen opinion in support of the invasion during the early stages. However, if civilian casualties continue, the forces will receive more condemnation from citizens in both Kenya and Somalia.

Al-Shabaab fighters have abandoned Kismayo. This, in many regards, is a victory for KDF and SNA forces as al-Shabaab fighters have lost ground, the port city having been their main stronghold. Nevertheless, al-Shabaab might only be retreating in order to regroup and re-emerge stronger in tactics similar to those of other radical groups like the Taliban in Afghanistan.

War will always come at a great cost. For Kenya the invasion into Somalia has been very expensive. Estimates put the cost of the invasion at Ksh.210 million (US\$2.8 million) per month in personnel costs alone this during a year where Kenya has recorded a Ksh.236 billion (US\$3.1 billion) total budget deficit.¹³² The cost of supporting personnel, maintenance and procuring military equipment and hardware became too much for Kenya to bear alone. Therefore, the country turned to the international community, particularly the UNSC and regional organizations like the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the AU to support its invasion of Somalia in the hope that this support would ease the financial and legal burden of the invasion.¹³³

In conclusion, the chapter has demonstrated that Kenya has long suffered from spillover of Somalia crisis. Armed conflict and lawlessness from Somalia have at times destabilized Kenya's North Eastern province. The Somali neighborhood of Eastleigh in Nairobi in particular is a booming commercial center that is largely beyond the control of Kenyan authorities. It has served as a center of Al-Shabaab recruitment and fund-raising. The

¹³² Warner, Lewis. In Somalia, Kenya risks death by a thousand cuts. NDU Press, PRISM 3(3) 2015

¹³³ McConnell, Tom. Kenya troops aim to carve 'buffer zone' out of Somalia. (Global Post News, 15 November, 2011)

strife in Somalia ensured an enormous flow of Somali refugees into Kenya, placing considerable strain on the country. Uncounted numbers of Somalis -including some Al-Shabaab members - have taken advantage of corruption in Kenya to secure Kenyan ID cards. Al-Shabaab was also responsible for a series of terror and grenade attacks in Kenya. Al-Shabaab also kidnapped foreign nationals in Kenya. This and other reasons prompted the Kenya's intervention in Somalia. Though the intervention received both local and international support, Kenyan troops in Somalia were faced with challenges that have led to various effects.

CHAPTER FOUR

AN ANALYSIS OF LESSONS KENYA CAN LEARN FROM THE UNITED STATES INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN

4.0 Introduction

This chapter highlights the findings from analysis based on the research questions and lessons for Kenya drawn from the United States' intervention in Afghanistan. This chapter will also delve into why states intervene in the internal affairs of others and justification for intervention. Are there lessons Kenya can learn from the United States intervention in Afghanistan, and is there a justification for both interventions?

The chapter then focuses on the AMISOM peacekeeping efforts in Somalia with a view of establishing the progress that was made and the challenges the peacekeeping mission faced during its first five years in Somalia.

4.1 Lesson on Military Intervention by States

Military intervention is the use of force across state borders by a state (or group of states) aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of the fundamental human rights of individuals other than its own citizens without the permission of the state within whose territory force is applied.¹³⁴

Two kinds of behaviors are occasionally associated with the term. They are: non forcible interventions such as the threat or use of economic, diplomatic, or other sanctions; and forcible interventions aimed at protecting or rescuing the intervening state's own nationals.

¹³⁴ J. L. Holzgrefe. R.O Keohane. *Humanitarian Intervention Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemma*, Cambridge University Press, 2003, p18

Broadly the doctrine of intervention has come to be justified as a coercive interference-consensual or imposed operation- in the internal affairs of a sovereign state with the aim to undertake appropriate measures of protection.¹³⁵

In the 21st Century, templates of conflict resolution illustrate the development of a new kind of intervention, which has tended to become a Trojan horse used by the great powers. The Rwandan genocide and the 9/11 attacks for instance heralded a new era leading to an abrupt change in the conception of humanitarian intervention. Many believe that the change in attitudes towards human rights occurred successfully after these events. According to Weiss, George Bush's humanitarian justifications to invade Iraq and Afghanistan contaminated the legitimate idea of humanitarian intervention.¹³⁶ The former Canadian Ambassador to the UN Paul Heinbecker supports this argument suggesting that:

“Since September 11, the kind of intervention that has dominated international debate had differed considerably from that of the previous decade and indeed from that which motivated the Government of Canada to launch the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). The inaction on Srebrenica and Rwanda has given way to reaction against Afghanistan and some argue overreaction against Iraq. In the cases of Srebrenica and Rwanda, the issue was protecting “other”. In Afghanistan and Iraq, the motivation is protecting “self”.¹³⁷

These aforementioned crises (Srebrenica and Rwanda) played a pivotal role in the evolution of the theory and practice of military intervention and after 9/11, there have been enormous difficulties in discussing the norms of intervention with any degree of effectiveness

¹³⁵ Abiew F. (1999). *The Evolution of The Doctrine and Practice of Humanitarian Intervention*. The Hague: Kluwer Law International

¹³⁶ Weiss T (2007). *Humanitarian Intervention: Ideas in Action*. USA: Polity Press.

¹³⁷ Canadian Ambassador to the United Nations, Paul Heinbecker

and consistency. The level of controversy among analysts is not alleged to stem from the imperative “to intervene or not to intervene” but rather from the question “what interests are intervening states pursuing?” Liberal and classical approaches reject the behind the scenes calculations associated with the doctrine and claim that intervention is motivated by an interest to protect civilians and to promote democracy. Efforts to alleviate starvation and establish some kind of political order in Somalia (Operation Restore Hope), endeavors to enforce protected areas for Kurds and no-fly zones over Shiites in Iraq, to name a few, are all instances of military intervention whose primary goal is not territorial or strategic but humanitarian. However, pluralist and realist approaches of intervention are that the latter besides being incompatible with the concept of “national sovereignty” is more likely to be motivated by geostrategic interests.¹³⁸

Pan-Africanists who find inherent links between neo liberalism and Neo colonialism emphasize economic or trade advantages to be gained by intervening states. The United States has on many occasions been accused of using such interests in their intervention in Afghanistan. Kenya Defense Forces have also been known to advance their economic interests in Somalia. These states have repeatedly disregarded this notion and claimed they are protecting their nationals.

4.2 Lessons Kenya can Learn from Peacekeeping / Military Intervention

The term “peace” is often associated with a range of terms such as: peace keeping, peace enforcement, peace making, peace building, peace maintenance and preventive diplomacy.

It is important to critically examine these terminologies as it should be noted that definitions of peacekeeping has evolved with time.¹³⁹ In this respect, peacekeeping operations

¹³⁸ Ayoob M (2002). Humanitarian Intervention and State Sovereignty. *Int. J. Hum. Rights* 6 (1):81-102.

¹³⁹ O’neill John T. and Rees Nicholas, *United Nations Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era*, op.cit., p. 5

have continuously adopted to their work milieu to the challenges of newly evolving security environments. Currently, peacekeeping operations are characterized by a mix of military, police and civilians who are deployed in hazardous situations.¹⁴⁰

Peace enforcement is the intervention of troops from an external state or states into a situation of conflict with the purpose of imposing peace. There is usually the absence of consent to maintain a ceasefire by the parties involved in the conflict and consequently, it has been argued that this may be regarded as being synonymous with war-fighting.¹⁴¹

In October 2011, Kenya launched an attack in Somalia. The United States claimed that it was not involved in the decision making process. There were also conflicting reports from the Transitional Federal Government in Somalia where some officials stated that there had been consultations made while others denied it.¹⁴²

The first chapter of the UN Charter outlines the aims and principles of the organization. In Chapter 1, Article 2, paragraph 4, the framers prohibited the use of force. “All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”¹⁴³ This however did not stop Kenya from invading Somalia.

The Kenyan Government had considered intervening in Somalia prior to this episode; but it was accelerated by cross-border kidnapping targeted at Kenyan tourists and aid workers operating at the Dadaab Refugee Camp. Evidently, Kenya relies heavily on the tourism

¹⁴⁰ St-Pierre, K, ‘Then and Now: Understanding the Spectrum of Complex Peace Operations’, Pearson Peacekeeping Center, (2008) p. 1

¹⁴¹ Furley Oliver and May Roy (eds), *Peace Keeping in Africa* (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 1998) p. 4

¹⁴² Shinn D., ‘International Efforts to Counter AL-Shabaab,’ *op.cit.*, p. 1

¹⁴³ Article 2(4) UN Charter

industry and it has numerous international humanitarian relief agencies operating from Nairobi with some serving inside Somalia.¹⁴⁴ The cross border kidnappings had posed a critical economic and social threat to Kenyan tourists and investors were reluctant to visit the country. Kenyan citizens along the border also became wary of their security. Kenya claimed the episode as its sole right to self-defense under article 51 of the UN Charter, which recognizes the right to individual and collective defense in the wake of an armed attack against a member of the United Nations.

In December, 2011 the AU approved the participation of the Kenyan troops and by early January 2012 Kenya made its official request for its troops to become part of the AMISOM operation with the main aim of defeating the Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda networks in Somalia.

The Bush Administration's rationale was built around six main themes: Saddam's possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD); the threat Saddam posed to the Middle East; Iraq's links to Al-Qaeda; Saddam's harsh treatment of the Iraqi people; Iraq's lack of democracy and the example a free and democratic Iraq would set for authoritarian regimes in the region.¹⁴⁵

4.2.1 An Analysis of Lessons to Learn

A lot of gain has been achieved by the AMISOM troops; but this has not been matched with a political and reconciliation process.¹⁴⁶ Another complication is that there was no peace to keep in Somalia and no peace agreement to be enforced.¹⁴⁷ Experience from AMISOM

¹⁴⁴ International Crisis Group, 'The Kenyan Military Intervention in Somalia,' Africa Report, Issue No. 184, (February, 2012) p. 3

¹⁴⁵ Esther Pan, *IRAQ: Justifying the War*, Council on Foreign Relations. February 2, 2005.

¹⁴⁶ Omar M., 'Intervention in the Somali Conflict,' op.cit., p. 24

¹⁴⁷ Cilliers J. and Boshoff H. et al., 'Somalia: The Intervention Dilemma,' op.cit., p. 7

operations has taught that peacekeepers should avoid intervening in areas that lack a viable political process.¹⁴⁸ Both Somalia and Afghanistan were states that did not meet the characteristics of statehood. AMISOM, like any other peacekeeping force is not designed to resolve the Somali conflict but unfortunately the TFG with support from AMISOM and the international community opted for the military action ahead of a political process.¹⁴⁹

The 2006 Ethiopian intervention serves as a lesson that has been overlooked. Ethiopian forces increased their troop's number to 20,000 in order to deal with the Islamic Courts Union (ICU); but they did not succeed in eliminating jihadists because of lack of acceptance of the TFG and due to the fact that Somalis viewed Ethiopians as foreign invaders. The question then is what has really changed in the current context; and why would an increase in AMISOM's troops ensure a more stabilized Somalia?¹⁵⁰

Apart from this, matching force to need is important and that coercion is undertaken in a responsible and neutral manner.¹⁵¹ Past experiences also show that Somalis resented the presence of large contingent troops; and instead of the government strengthening its support base, it further opted to marginalize the Somalis.¹⁵²

Overall, the Somalia situation is similar to that of Afghanistan. The USA and NATO forces had been engaged in fighting with the Taliban in Afghanistan since 2001 and the increase in peacekeeping forces has had the opposite effect against what was initially intended. So instead of improving the security situation in Afghanistan, it led to attacks targeted on the peacekeeping forces and national government officials. Just as in Somalia,

¹⁴⁸ Omar M., 'Intervention in the Somali Conflict,' op.cit., p. 30

¹⁴⁹ Le Sage A., 'Somalia's Endless Transition: Breaking the Deadlock,' op.cit., p. 4

¹⁵⁰ Cilliers J. and Boshoff H. et al., 'Somalia: The Intervention Dilemma,' op.cit., p. 6

¹⁵¹ Schmidl Erwin Aand Oakley Robert B., *Peace Operations Between War and Peace*, op.cit, p. 37

¹⁵² Bruton B., 'Somalia: A New Approach,' op.cit., p. 21

Killings of civilians have intensively been capitalized by the Taliban. The Al-Shabaab and the Taliban have strived to turn the population against the coalition forces.¹⁵³

Lessons from Afghanistan and Iraq have also shown beyond a shadow of doubt that complex conflicts cannot be solved by force alone; no matter how militarily powerful or technically superior the intervener is, but only through a politically driven process.¹⁵⁴ Much of the focus on Somalia has been aimed at addressing the symptoms of the conflict rather than the causes.¹⁵⁵ Foreign fighters are indeed capable of reducing the strength of the Al-Shabaab; but they cannot completely eradicate them. It is not possible to depend on a military solution to resolve the crisis in Somalia; it can only be done by a political process with the people of Somalia on the driver's seat.¹⁵⁶

On the other hand, when a reconciliation effort was undertaken, the Somali population including community leaders, intellectuals and traditional leaders were marginalized and faction leaders quickly learnt how to manipulate international diplomats. By so doing they were assured of access to resources without necessarily doing much to create peace and national stability. Hence, international intervention fuelled warlords and inter-clan power struggles; and it prevented local communities from gaining resources to promote reconciliation.¹⁵⁷

The Somali experience has shown that peace processes that involve faction leaders are highly inadequate. There is also need to consider critically needed transformative approaches that can provide viable options for institutional building, arms control, involvement of the

¹⁵³ Cilliers J. and Boshoff H. et al., 'Somalia: The Intervention Dilemma,' op.cit., p. 6

¹⁵⁴ Coning C., 'The Emerging AU/UN Peacekeeping Partnership,' op.cit., p. 10

¹⁵⁵ Dersso S., Somalia: The Quest for Peacemaking and Peacekeeping, (Paper Presented in a Workshop from 10th to 11th December, 2008, Hilton Hotel, Nairobi) p. 4

¹⁵⁶ Shinn D., 'International Efforts to Counter AL-Shabaab,' op.cit., p. 2

¹⁵⁷ Cornelissen Scarlett, CheruFatu et al., Africa and International Relations in the 21st Century, op.cit., p. 94

community in grassroots reconciliation and their assistance in the denouncement of ‘clannism’. There is also need for the reconfiguration of the Somali war economy.¹⁵⁸

In addition, the experience of Somalia vividly shows that a peace agreement is more than signing a document. It is about signing an agreement that identifies and addresses the main causes of the conflict; addresses local concerns and provides feasible mechanisms for sustaining the agreement.¹⁵⁹

AMISOM had demonstrated that moral authority of an operation is important in order to obtain local legitimacy. When an operation is perceived to lack moral authority, it may affect the country’s decisions to deploy personnel. Peacekeeping operations need adequate number of personnel otherwise legitimacy issues may be raised; since lack of sufficient staff can hamper the accomplishment of the mission’s mandate.

“For example failures to match resources and mandates have had tragic consequences. One may question what more could have been done in Rwanda to prevent the catastrophe or if more could have been done in Bosnia to prevent the safe areas from failing to protect the population of Srebrenica? Answers are most definitely yes. However, it is doubtful that in any of these cases, more could have been done without the means and a mandate at hand.”¹⁶⁰

The experience of AMISOM once again has proved that hurriedly deploying troops without clear management structures put in place lessens the impact. In the case of AMISOM, troops were deployed prior to the actual planning and management unit being established.¹⁶¹

¹⁵⁸ Oder, S. and Lisa P (eds.), *Seeking Peace in Somalia: A Review of the Impact of AMISOM Police*, op.cit., p. 5

¹⁵⁹ Williams P., ‘Pathways for Peace in the Horn of Africa,’ op.cit., p. 11

¹⁶⁰ Sheehan Nadege, *Economics of UN Peacekeeping*, (New York: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, 2011) p. 188

¹⁶¹ Oder, S. and Lisa P (eds.), *Seeking Peace in Somalia: A Review of the Impact of AMISOM Police*, op.cit., p. 17

In other words, lack of a peace process, a fully equipped force and a mandate that is not fit to fight insurgents made AMISOM tasks a challenge.¹⁶²

AMISOM is important for facilitating the conditions for national reconciliation. It was also instrumental for ensuring the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops. However, military intervention is not a lasting solution. For in order to create lasting peace and security, there must be a political dialogue that should include all Somalis, institutional capacity development and the training of the Somali security forces.¹⁶³

One of the lessons learnt from military intervention is that it is possible to win a military battle but end up being confronted by insurgency tactics and risk suffering casualties through guerilla tactics. It is complicated when AMISOM is trying to contribute towards the stability of Somalia; yet its neighbors are engaged in proxy wars at the expense of the Somali population.¹⁶⁴

Nevertheless, it seems that AMISOM has succeeded where the USA and UN had failed. It proves that a lot can be achieved when African nations come together and spearhead their challenges. Through great sacrifice and dedication African problems can be solved by Africans themselves.

4.2.2 Social-Political and Military lessons and Solutions for Kenya

The criteria established in this section, is derived from governmental and academic research institutions. It was collected to help establish the criteria in which this research study will use to assess current U.S intervention operations in Afghanistan. Criteria collected have been compartmentalized in four major categories. These categories include: political, development security/military development and social/cultural development.

¹⁶² Observatoire de L'Afrique, 'Challenges and Opportunities for the AU Mission in Somalia,' op.cit., p. 2

¹⁶³ Swan J., US Policy in the Horn of Africa, op.cit., p. 4

¹⁶⁴ Oder, S. and Lisa P (eds.), Seeking Peace in Somalia: A Review of the Impact of AMISOM Police, op.cit., p. 4

Political Development Criteria

Essentially, intervention operations should work to formalize the “pillars” of a democracy. In order to achieve this type of political aspiration, Kenyan operations should work to ensure that regional, ethnic, reconciliation and a strong, credible enforceable judicial system and religious institutions are created and that the populations reflecting these segments are incorporated in all aspects of the federal executive, legislative, and judicial branches. This aspiration will be especially hard to accomplish for countries that have long history of internal conflict and external interventions such as Afghanistan and Somalia. However, in order for nation- state building operations to leave positive and sustainable impacts after external actors have left the state, political development within the state must be accomplished.

In the case of Kenya, it is important to note that creating legitimate and legal political sectors may be extremely hard to accomplish due to the widespread systemic corruption within the Kenyan government, and lack of trust within the Kenyan people due to security concerns and the effects of having a large population that is unemployed and illiterate.

Economic Development Criteria

“Retarded” economic impact can significantly weaken the long term growth of a country.¹⁶⁵ The effects of a “retarded” economic impact can result in the displacement of people, property, investments, opportunities and markets. The important component of operations should always be to help build or rebuild economic and monetary institutions. By creating these institutions in Kenya just like in Afghanistan, a state that has historically had challenges confronting long term unemployment and high poverty, will have a greater chance in stabilizing a failed state. This will be a significant challenge in Somalia due to the prospects

¹⁶⁵ Thapa, Manish, 2008. Role of Civil Society & Political Party in Current nation-state Building Process of Nepal. Center for Economic and Technical Studies

of having a recently failed state adopting economic systems that have been developed over centuries, used by highly developed nations.

Intervention operations should work to improve the economic conditions in the state through poverty alleviation and reduction strategies.¹⁶⁶ This would entail intervention activities that would work to hire police officers, teachers and other public service related professionals after receiving education and training preparation. This would help increase the likelihood for the native population to have a stronger loyalty to the state.

Social/Cultural Development Criteria

The engagement of civil societies would occur through the promotion of NGO organizations and local grass root organizations in the coordination, advocacy and implementation of state-building activities. For Kenya, these activities would include having the federal and regional governments engaging NGO's and grassroots organizations to do the following: issue specific conversations between community meetings; assisting in the delivery of social services; provide opportunities to hold conflict mediated dispute resolutions between conflicting local parties; and work to engage community residents in local political activities. It is important to note that in many failed states, NGOs had either left or are prevented from entering the state due to the many security issues. Until safety and security is provided to local communities where NGOs operate, NGOs and grassroots organizations will not be able to do their vital work in which they excel in providing.

Security/Military Criteria

One of the most important aspects of military and counter terrorism operations should be the building and development of a state's security and military related institutions and

¹⁶⁶ Walle, Steven Van de Zoe Scott. The Role of Public Services in State and Nation-Building: Exploring Lessons from European History for Fragile States. Governance and Social Development Resource Center, July 2009

systems.¹⁶⁷ Research indicates that a state should engage the native population in the beginning stages of an intervention. One of the troubles many military interventions typically have is the failure to secure the entire state and its borders not just the nation's capital within a short period of time. Research maintains that when a foreign intervention occurs it is important that these troops be dispersed throughout the state, including local tribal communities, and not just the central government.¹⁶⁸ It is vital for these troops to be immersed in local communities to ensure that war lords, foreign agents, or other security threats will not have the chance to grow or cause conflict in these regions. It is important for foreign troops to engage these local communities through the building of infrastructure projects and the hiring of police agents. This engagement will be difficult, however it will provide the military an opportunity to learn more about the native culture, to find best ways to improve these communities and ensure that these communities, with time, develop the capacity to govern themselves.

In conclusion, Kenya needs a vitally important aspect to the development of security and military related institutions and structures, especially after a foreign military intervention in counter terrorism operations. Counter terrorism theory argues that armed forces are needed and should be used to fight off indigenous or foreign groups seeking to prevent intervention projects from taking place. In order to defeat these terror attacks the US and its allies have created counter terrorism operations aimed at defeating these counter-productive movements, which is a successful lesson the Kenyan military should adopt.

Moving forward, it will be essential for Kenya to help Somalia and take steps to address its internal factions and to build a strong Somalia; one that is inclusive of everyone

¹⁶⁷ Dobbins, James, 2008. Nation Building and Counterinsurgency: A Century Foundation Report, The Century Foundation 1-20.

¹⁶⁸ Bullimore, Steven L. The Military's Role in Nation-Building: Peace and Stability Operations Redefined, march 2006

and one that does not rely on clan divides and factions. Given that part of the issue in Somalia is Muslim extremism, Kenya needs to devise a more inclusive plan of engaging more moderate Muslims and including them in their intervention and long-term strategy.

Stark differences and similarities between US and Kenya in employing military intervention tactics.

The United States has higher military spending than any other country partly because its foreign policy goals is more ambitious: defending its borders, upholding international order and promoting American interests abroad. “Our current strategy is based around us being a superpower in Europe, the Middle East and Asia-Pacific,” said Todd Harrison, the director of defence budget analysis at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. “We’ve sized our military to be able to fight more than one conflict at a time in those regions.”

Differences between two military groups are more in power and the sophistication of machine and more so the tactics they use while going to war. For instance, the American troops are involved in more than one war unlike the Kenyan troops who are not involved in more than one war. The Kenyan military have less technology and less powerful machinery when it comes to going to war.

The United States has approximately 1.3 million active-duty troops, with another 865,000 in reserve, one of the largest fighting forces of any country. The US also has a global presence unlike any other nation, with about 200,000 active troops deployed in more than 170 countries; many of which are stationed in allied nations in Europe and northeastern Asia. The Kenya military on the other hand is only in Kenya and along its borders with a paltry presence in Somalia.

Analysts informally categorize fighter aircrafts by “generations” as a way to compare capabilities. While there is some variation among analysts on how planes are classified, there is a broad consensus that American aircrafts are more advanced than those of other nations.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

5.1 Conclusions

This chapter presents a summary of the findings, as regards to the main objectives of the study. Based on these findings the conclusions were drawn and some recommendations on the way forward made.

Peacekeeping can prove its worth if it is done properly and will in turn confirm its place as a primary tool of conflict prevention, management and resolution when the circumstance calls for it. It is therefore, likely to remain for the foreseeable future.¹⁶⁹ Evidence has shown that military intervention alone cannot prevent violence and promote human security.¹⁷⁰ Peacekeeping operations are meant to be temporary measures and can never resolve conflicts in isolation. They are meant to control hostilities and are therefore useful to create conditions to facilitate peace-making.¹⁷¹ This is especially needed when conflicts have caused distractive behaviour or are likely to do so.

The right intention, contrary to the just-case intention, for going to war is an aspect which cannot normally be substantiated with any legal useful evidence, and as such is excluded from international law as a requirement.¹⁷² Stated simply, any intervening state or institution must have only the intentions of the stated objective at heart, rather than ulterior motives such as economic or territorial acquisition. In the Somali case, a good example of this would be that of Kenya's continuing strategic interests within its borders and the entire horn of Africa. In review of Kenya's case, the security threats caused by the non-state actors, the Al-Shabaab called for serious consideration not for ulterior motives but to try and solve the

¹⁶⁹ Findlay Trevor, *Challenges for the New Peacekeepers*, op.cit., p. 31

¹⁷⁰ Newman Edward and Schnabel Albrecht, *Recovering from Civil Conflict: Reconciliation Peace and Development*, op.cit., p. 66

¹⁷¹ United Nations, *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping*, op.cit., p. 8

¹⁷² Khadiagala, G., "Eastern Africa," *Security and the legacy of fragility*. New York: International Peace Institute, 2011.

grave violation of fundamental human rights. Israeli economic interests are evident in Kenya, such as the Westgate shopping mall. The United States has recently strengthened ties with the East African region to benefit its economic and strategic interests owing to the new findings of oil and natural gas along the east African coast. For these reasons therefore, Kenya has benefited from the support of such partners to solve its problem of terror.

Following the tragedies witnessed all over the world after world war two, the international community began to seriously debate how to react effectively when human rights are grossly and systematically violated. The question at the heart of the matter was whether states have unconditional sovereignty over their affairs or whether the international community particularly state actors have the right to intervene in a country.

5.2 Recommendations

The study has found out that the issues of Somalis are deeply rooted in their history. It is through this understanding and the understanding of the history of the region that we can delve into solutions to address the pressing concerns. With the understanding of ethical frameworks to address the moral dilemmas of intervention and an understanding of the nature of Somalia's issues, it is the opinion of this study that the intervention led by the Kenyan government was moral and in accordance with the widely accepted international norm of just war theory.

Though moral within the confines of just war theory, it is still important to note that many opposing views do not view intervention as moral and consider it as an inappropriate overreach of government sovereignty or they may comprehend it to be immoral due to the inevitable violence and harm that it had caused. The ideas of the concept of the right to protect (R2P) should be vigorously explored further. The intervention is a milestone and great step in the right direction for Kenya and Somalia as well as the entire horn of Africa. However,

certain lessons need to be taken to pave way for peace and stability in Somalia and the rest of the region.

As highlighted in the study, clan divides and factions have been part of Somalia's past and continue to be part of its present. This can serve as a destructive force. With the listing of local leaders and representation from all groups and clan, a thorough peace and reconciliation process must be launched. There is significant history and past full of distrust and competition that is rooted in Somalia's culture and society. Therefore, military intervention without the knowledge of such issues will only plunge the nation into deeper chaos. Luckily, Somalia is slowly forming a stable government that has total control over its territory. The government has been able to achieve control in most states within Somalia. If Kenya is to instill long term peace and resolution to Somalia, it must understand the complex religious and clan tensions and how this may affect the intervention and long term stability.

The international community, particularly the United Nations, also has a role to play in holding countries accountable for hosting and supporting terrorist groups and insurgencies as they not only destroy prospects for regional security but also destroy prospects for international peace and security.

Kenya should consider negotiation approach seeing as Military intervention has had more negative effects and resulted in more attacks. We can present both arguments for and against.

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APPENDIX I: TURNITIN REPORT

UNITED STATES MILITARY INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN: LESSONS FOR KENYA

ORIGINALITY REPORT

4%	1%	0%	4%
SIMILARITY INDEX	INTERNET SOURCES	PUBLICATIONS	STUDENT PAPERS

PRIMARY SOURCES

1	Submitted to Midlands State University Student Paper	1%
2	Submitted to Baze University Student Paper	1%
3	Submitted to UNIVERSITY OF LUSAKA Student Paper	1%
4	Submitted to Copperbelt University Student Paper	<1%
5	Submitted to National University Of Science and Technology Student Paper	<1%
6	Submitted to Management & Science University Student Paper	<1%
7	Submitted to Indian School of Mines Student Paper	<1%
8	Submitted to Bindura University of Science Education Student Paper	<1%

