



**University of Nairobi**

**INSTITUTE OF DIPLOMACY & INTERNATIONAL STUDIES**

**MASTER OF ARTS IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT MANAGEMENT**

**CHANGING STRATEGIES IN COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND  
TERRORISM IN AFRICA: CASE OF KENYA**

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**R52/8307/2017**

**A Research Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of The Degree of  
Master of Arts in International Conflict Management.**

**October 2019**

**DECLARATION**

I Dennis Munene Mwaniki do declare that this thesis is my original work and has not been presented for an award of Degree of Master of Arts in any other University.

Signature: .....

Date: .....

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This research which is part of my thesis has been submitted to:

Signature: .....

Date: .....

Prof. Maria Nzomo

## **DEDICATION**

I dedicate this thesis to all the security personnel, policymakers and scholars who have devoted themselves to fight the scourge of terrorism and violent extremism in their quest to build a resilient global community that advocates for peaceful coexistence.

## **ACKNOWLEDGMENT**

I acknowledge with gratitude my supervisor Prof. Maria Nzomo for her guidance in helping me lay the foundation of my thesis. Her intelligence and understanding of the subject matter inspired me to produce a well thought out thesis. Also, deserving immense gratitude is Prof. Peter Kagwanja and Dr. Wilson Muna who have been my intellectual mentors. Exceptional appreciation goes to my dear wife and family members, especially for their support and forbearance during my quest for intellectual growth.

Last but not least, I wish to thank all my classmates (specifically James Muiga) and lecturers for shaping my mind during our various discussions in search of lasting solutions to various inter and intra conflicts affecting our country and the global community.

To you all, I say Thank You!

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## **LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

**ACSRT**-Africa Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism

**AMISOM**- Africa Union Mission in Somalia

**ATPU** – Anti-Terrorism Police Unit

**AU**- African Union

**CAR**- Central Africa Republic

**CT**-Countering Terrorism

**CTED**- Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate

**CVE**- Counter Violent Extremism

**CJTF-HoA**- Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa

**EACTI**- East Africa Counter-Terrorism Initiatives

**FTF**- Foreign Terrorist Fighter

**FP**- Foreign Policy

**GCTS**- Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy

**GWOT**- Global War on Terrorism

**GTI** – Global Terrorist Index

**GPF**-Global Policy Forum

**IEP**- Institute for Economic and Peace

**IGAD**- Inter-Governmental Authority on Development

**IISS** -International Institute for Strategic Studies



**ISB**-Intelligence Steering Board

**IS**-Islamic Institution

**IU**-Intelligence Unit

**JTTF**- Joint Terrorism Task Force

**KDF**- Kenya Defence Force

**MRC**- Mombasa Republican Council

**MNJTF**- Multi-National Joint Task Force

**NCTC**- National Counter Terrorism Center

**NSAC**- National Security Advisory Committee

**NSIS**- National Security Intelligence Service

**OSCE**-Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

**PFLP**- Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine

**SEWS** – Strategic Early Warning Systems

**SPLM-IO** – Sudan’s People’s Liberation Movement in Opposition

**UPC** – Union for Peace in Central Africa

**UN**-United Nations

**VE**-Violent Extremism

## DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS

**Al – Shabaab** – “is a terrorist organization that originated in Somalia, and operates in the Horn of Africa.”<sup>1</sup>

**Counter Violent Extremism (CVE)** – are “proactive measures to counter efforts by extremists to recruit, radicalize, and mobilize followers to violence.”<sup>2</sup>

**Extremism-** is “the strict adherence to a set of narratives or beliefs (Whether political or religious) that constitute assaults on the mainstream values, orientations and principles of any society.”<sup>3</sup>

**Strategy** – “it implies articulating clearly a set of values, setting a vision, and deriving corresponding interests, and then identifying and prioritizing threats or challenges to these desired ends.”<sup>4</sup>

**Terrorism** – Tore Bjorgo states “terrorism is a set of methods of combat rather than an identifiable ideology or movement, and involves premeditated use of violence against (primarily) non-combatants in order to achieve a psychological effect of fear on others than the immediate targets.”<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Mustafa Ali, Mumo Nzau, and Hassan Khannenje, (Eds), “The Changing Dynamics of Terrorism & Violent Extremism: An Analysis”, HORN International Institute for Strategic Studies, Nairobi, Kenya, 2018.

<sup>2</sup>Homeland Security, “Countering Violence Extremism Task Force”. Available at: <https://www.dhs.gov/cve/what-is-cve>; Accessed on: July 19, 2019.

<sup>3</sup> Mustafa Ali, Mumo Nzau, and Hassan Khannenje, (Eds), “The Changing Dynamics of Terrorism & Violent Extremism: An Analysis”, HORN International Institute for Strategic Studies, Nairobi, Kenya, 2018.

<sup>4</sup> Africa Center, “National Strategies to Prevent and Counter Violent Extremism (P/CVE) in Africa”, Stellenbosch, South Africa, 7–11 May 2018.

<sup>5</sup> Gregor Bruce, “Definition of Terrorism – Social and Political Effects”, *Journal of Military and Veterans' Health*, Volume 21, issue 2, pp. 27, May 2013.

## **ABSTRACT**

The study focused on the changing strategies in countering violent extremism and terrorism in Africa: case of Kenya. The main objective of the study was to contribute new and effective knowledge that can assist in countering terrorism and violent extremism in Kenya and Africa in general. The study also examined the global counter-terrorism strategies and their impact in countering VE and terrorism; evaluated the trends and impacts of the strategies adopted in countering terrorism and violent extremism in Africa and lastly, carried out an investigation on the existing multi-stakeholder approaches and their challenges in countering terrorism and violent extremism in Kenya.

The findings of the study revealed that effective multi-stakeholder approaches will lead to a reduction on challenges faced in the implementation of the CVE and CT strategies in Kenya. The theory used to conduct the study was human need theory. The theory, as expounded by John Burton captures the push and pull factors that led to the adoption of the various multi-stakeholder approaches used in combating terrorism and violent extremism. In summary, Kenya's initial strategies in countering acts of terrorism and violent extremism were based on hard/militaristic power. This approach became ineffective as more young people continued to join terror groups. Also, acts of terrorism and violent extremism started to escalate making institutions of learning, places of worship, shopping malls and various bus terminuses to be targeted areas. Thus, the failure of State-led approaches to curtail the rise of violent extremism activities shifted the policy on countering violent extremism and terrorism to now the adopted multi-stakeholder approaches.

In conclusion, the study recommended that the government of Kenya to link more with think tanks, particularly universities, as knowledge hub in seeking alternative solutions in dealing with the threat of terrorism and violent extremism in Kenya, and avoid policies that alienate marginalized communities and make them more susceptible to recruitment and radicalization by terrorists.

## CHAPTER ONE

### 1.1 Background to the study

Terrorism and violent extremism (the ideology) persistently continues to be a major global threat.<sup>6</sup> Terrorism as a concept first derived its name after Maximilien Robespierre reined terror on his enemies following the French Revolution in 1793.<sup>7</sup> Robespierre's heinous act became one of the origins of modern terrorism. Thereafter, in the 1950s Amy Zalman observed that there was a "rise of guerrilla tactics by the non-state terrorism." This resulted in ethnic nationalism, anti-colonial views against the French, Portuguese, British and other empires. Also, sentiments against ideologies such as communism took center stage.<sup>8</sup>

In the 1970s terrorism became international. Here, acts such as the taking hostage of the "El Al Israeli plane" on July 22, 1968 by the PFLP, and 1972 Munich Olympic attack transformed the entire concept of what used to be known as terrorism.<sup>9</sup> At this stage, the Munich attack according to Timothy Naftali, as stated by Amy Zalman, "changed the United States' of America ways of dealing with terrorism." "The terms counterterrorism formally entered the Washington political dialogue."<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Mustafa Yusuf, Mumo Nzau, and Hassan Khannenje, (Eds), "The Changing Dynamics of Terrorism & Violent Extremism: An Analysis", HORN International Institute for Strategic Studies, Nairobi, Kenya, 2018.

<sup>7</sup> Amy Zalman, PhD, "The History of Terrorism", Thought Co. Updated May 18, 2018. Available at: <https://www.thoughtco.com/the-history-of-terrorism-3209374>, Accessed on May 6, 2019.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid pg. 1

<sup>9</sup> Zalman, PhD, "The History of Terrorism", Thought Co. Updated May 18, 2018.

<sup>10</sup> Amy. Z, "The History of Terrorism", Thought Co. Updated May 18, 2018.

The 1990s and beyond, saw the rise of what came to be known as “religious terrorism”. Here, the upsurge of groupings such as: “Al-Qaeda”, “ Hamas”, and Hezbollah amongst others justified their heinous acts of terror from Islamic precepts. Also, violent extremist from other religious groups such as Christianity, Hinduism, Judaism, and Zionism amongst others began to increase.<sup>11</sup>

Similar to Amy Zalman, David Rapoport also came up with the “four waves of terrorism”.<sup>12</sup> These waves in a summary showed the ultimate shift of violent extremism and terrorism activities that the global community has experienced. Rapoport’s “waves of terrorism” were: “The Anarchist (1880’s- 1920’s),” “the anti-colonial (1920’s – 1960’s),” “the new left-wing (1960’s – 1990’s),” and “the religious wave” that is presently been witnessed through acts of violent extremism emanating from religious appeals, and suicide bombings.<sup>13</sup> Rapoport and Zalman amongst other scholars indicated that trends in terrorism and violent extremism have changed over time.

As a result of these changing strategies in violent extremism and terrorism, the global communities, (including Africa states) have developed their own strategies to reduce the increasing acts of terrorism and violent extremism. These strategies which some are in form of soft power approaches such as established “Intelligence Collection Units” and “Strategic Early Warning Systems (SEWS)”,<sup>14</sup> have in one way

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<sup>11</sup> Ibid

<sup>12</sup> David Rapoport, "Modern Terror: The Four Waves," in "Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy", ed. Audrey Cronin and J. Ludes, Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2004.

<sup>13</sup> Nick Sitter and Tom Parker, “The Four Horsemen of Terrorism: It's Not Waves, its Strains, Terrorism and Political Violence”, pp. 197-216, 2016.

<sup>14</sup> Maurice N. Amutabi, “The place of informal early warning systems in countering and preventing terrorism in Kenya”, in “The Changing Dynamics of Terrorism & Violent Extremism: An Analysis”, HORN Institute, Nairobi, Kenya, pp. 265, 2018.

or the other led to the reduction of terror attacks. However, strategies that are in form of hard power such as military invasions have exacerbated acts of terrorism.

Thus, the changing tact by the violent extremists and terrorists networks in carrying out attacks across the world, has exposed the vulnerability of the affected countries leading to the re-viewing of their various strategies that are in place to counter violent extremism and terrorism. Hence, the study used the human need theory<sup>15</sup> to critically analyze the changing strategies in countering violent extremism and terrorism in Africa, with a focus on Kenya. The Human need theory explains the ever need to re-evaluate Africa's strategies to counter the different acts of terrorism, and violent extremism.

## **1.2 Problem Statement**

Africa is increasingly becoming a theatre of global terrorism and violent extremism. This growth emanates from the increasing numbers of violent extremist networks across the continent. With the surge of these “terrorist and violent extremist networks”, the number of terrorist attacks has also increased globally. Further, the problem continues due to lack of comprehensive strategies that address the combine input from the State and Non-State Actors. Similarly, African States do take a lot of time to be more proactive in developing effective strategies that will protect their citizens from the ever increasing violent extremism and terrorist threat.

## **1.3 Research questions**

The following are the research questions that guided the study.

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<sup>15</sup> John Burton, “Conflict: Resolution and prevention,” New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990.

- 1.3.1 What are the global strategies and their impacts in countering violent extremism and terrorism?
- 1.3.2 What are the trends and impacts of the strategies adopted in countering violent extremism and terrorism in Africa?
- 1.3.3 What are the existing multi-stakeholder approaches and their challenges in countering violent extremism and terrorism in Kenya?

#### **1.4 Research Objectives**

The main objective of the study is to contribute new and effective knowledge that can assist in countering violent extremism and terrorism in Kenya and Africa in general.

- 1.4.1 To examine the global strategies and their impacts in countering violent extremism and terrorism.
- 1.4.2 To evaluate the trends and impacts of the strategies adopted in countering violent extremism and terrorism in Africa.
- 1.4.3 To investigate the existing multi-stakeholder approaches and their challenges in countering violent extremism and terrorism in Kenya.

#### **1.5 Justification of the study**

##### **1.5.1 Policy Justification**

The study seeks to help Kenya's "National Counter Terrorism Center", (the institution tasked in designing the government counter-terrorism strategies) the "Anti-Terrorism Police Unit", the "Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Security" (specifically chiefs and county commissioner) and members of the non-state

actors in designing more effective counter-terrorism measure used for countering violent extremism and terrorism in Kenya. Hopefully, the recommendations made would cause changes or updating of the existing strategies to mitigate the changing trends in violent extremism and terrorism activities.

### **1.5.2 Academic Justification**

The study seeks to add value to the scholarly work on violent extremism and also increase the available data on the various effects of the counter-terrorism measures formulated and operational in countering violent extremism and terrorism in Africa and Kenya. Also, the research input will be of value addition to future students who will delve in a similar study.

## **1.6 Literature Review**

### **1.6.1 Empirical Review**

Globally, after the 9/11 heinous attack, the world changed how it viewed violent extremism and acts of terrorism. Defining this war on terror, an American defense policy think tank known as Rand Corporation stated that, “Counterterrorism, since 2001, threatens terrorist safe havens, infiltrates terrorists' financial and communications networks, hardens critical infrastructure, and connects the dots among the intelligence and law enforcement communities...”<sup>16</sup>

Further, Maluki and Seif observed that “the struggle against terrorism in general and countering violent extremism (CVE) in particular, is never-ending.” “Terrorism is more of a moving target, making it difficult for hard power to map with precision. Terrorism owes its survival to an ability to adapt and adjust to challenges

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<sup>16</sup> Barry Kolodkin, “What is the U.S. Doing to Counter Terrorism?” Thought Co, May 18, 2018.



and countermeasures while continuing to identify and exploit its opponent's vulnerabilities.”<sup>17</sup>

Additional they stated that “for success against terrorism, efforts must be tireless, dynamic, and innovative as that of the adversary. The development of counter-violent extremism policies reflects domestic political processes and different national approaches and could be explained by different national conceptions and institutions practices. Broadly, a counter-terrorism strategy constitutes military security, deterrence and response efforts, criminal justice mechanism, and diplomatic cooperation.”<sup>18</sup>

### **Global and Regional Counter-Terrorism Strategies**

“Resolution 60/2 88” of 2006 gave rise to the “Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy”.<sup>19</sup> Thereafter, it adopted the “UN-steering Global Action Plan to Prevent Violent Extremism”.<sup>20</sup> “The Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy” comprises of four pillars. They are: “Addressing the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism”, “Measures to prevent and combat terrorism”, “Measures to build states’ capacity to prevent and combat terrorism and to strengthen the role of the United Nations system

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<sup>17</sup> Patrick Maluki and Rashid Seif, “Using Soft Power to Counter Violent Extremism among the Youth in Kenya”, in the “Changing Dynamics of Terrorism & Violent Extremism: An Analysis”, HORN Institute, Nairobi-Kenya, pp. 129, 2018.

<sup>18</sup> P. Maluki and R. Seif, “Using Soft Power to Counter Violent Extremism among the Youth in Kenya”, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Nairobi-Kenya, pp. 129, 2018.

<sup>19</sup> United Nation, “UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy”, UN Office of Counter-Terrorism. Available at: <https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/ctitf/en/un-global-counter-terrorism-strategy>, Retrieved on: March 22, 2019.

<sup>20</sup> U.N, “United Nations Global Counter-terrorism Strategy: Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism”. New York: UN General Assembly Agenda Items 16 and 17, 2015.

in that regard”, and “Procedures to enforce respect for human rights and the rule of law in the process of fighting against terrorism”.<sup>21</sup>

The said pillars have been adopted by all UN affiliate states. This sends a clear message that the various States are willing to have a common operation and tactical methodology to fight terrorism. This notwithstanding, the UN General Assembly pledged to review the strategies at an interval of two years.<sup>22</sup> Other adopted strategies globally are the “United Nations Security Council Resolutions 2178 of 2014”, the updated “Resolution 2368” of 2017 on CVE and “Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTF) of 2005”, which acts on issues touching on incitement and “Resolution 1373” which established “the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee” as well as “the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED)”, and the recent “United Nations Secretary General’s Plans of Action to Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism”.<sup>23</sup> Also, UNESCO Member States adopted “Decision 197EX/46” to enable UNESCO’s to provide the required support to its Member States as they develop strategies to combat violent extremism.<sup>24</sup>

Regionally, Africa has not been left behind. The member States of the “Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD)” plus Tanzania from July 2016 embarked on the process of developing the now adopted 2018, “regional strategy for

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<sup>21</sup> Ibid

<sup>22</sup> United Nation, “UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy”, UN Office of Counter-Terrorism.

<sup>23</sup> UNDP, “Journey to Extremism in Africa: Drivers, Incentives and the Tipping Point for Recruitment,” New York: Regional Bureau for Africa, 2017.

UNESCO, “Preventing Violent Extremism.” Available at: <https://en.unesco.org/preventing-violent-extremism>, Accessed on: March 22, 2019.

preventing and countering violent extremism”. This strategy will be reviewed after every three years.<sup>25</sup>

Kenya too has played its role in various regional initiatives to curb acts of violent extremism. These includes, adopting the “East Africa Counter-Terrorism Initiatives (EACTI)”, enforcing the “Africa Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)”, and being part of the “Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HoA)”.<sup>26</sup> These strategies have led to the adoption of legal, operational, and strategic strategies that are now currently been used to combat violent extremism. These strategies tend to function through four jointly underlining elements: “Detect, *Prevent*, *Deny* and *Respond*.”<sup>27</sup>

To constitutionally effect the strategies, the government of Kenya undertook some legal initiatives that were aimed at putting in place the counter-terrorism strategies in combating violent extremism. The various bills and acts enacted over the last ten years have had varying and debatable degrees of success. One such legal measure is the “Prevention of Terrorism Bill 2012” that had some contentious provisions. However, in looking at Kenya’s strategies in countering violent extremism and terrorism which the study will expound further, Kagwanja observed that the reason why Kenya was attacked on September 21, 2013, was that “Kenya’s counter-terrorism system was weak, uncoordinated and with no strategy.” He added that “before 2010, Kenya had no motivation to implement stringent measures.” “This is

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<sup>25</sup> IGAD, “Regional Strategy for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism”, 2018.

<sup>26</sup> Mogire and Agade, “Counter –terrorism in Kenya”, *Journal of Contemporary Africa Studies*, pp. 473-491, 2011.

<sup>27</sup> Government of Canada, “Building Resilience against Terrorism: Canada's Counter-terrorism Strategy”, January 31, 2018.

because the country saw itself as a collateral damage more than a target.”<sup>28</sup> Nonetheless, since Westgate’s attack, Kenya has embarked on a serious mission to consolidate its strategies that are intelligent led, well-coordinated under a multi-agency unit, but still faced with challenges of deterring the heinous attacks.

### **Impact of the Counter-terrorism strategies in Kenya**

Kagwanja observed that due to the robust counter-terrorism strategies in combating violent extremism, attacks, fatalities, and casualties have reduced. “Al-Shabaab attacks fell from 72 in 2014 to 28 by the end of 2015. By August 2016, they were less than 10. Similarly, fatalities dropped from 218 in 2014 to 179 in 2015.” Quoting the National Intelligence Annual Report of 2015, Kagwanja stated that, “an intelligence-led campaign in de-radicalization is recording success.” Meaning the countries intelligence has interrupted the avenues for radicalization and recruitment of young individuals from joining al-Shabaab.”<sup>29</sup>

Similarly, the intelligence report also revealed that “over 100 returnees defected from al-Shabaab in Somalia and surrendered to Kenya in 2015. Establishing a viable system of rehabilitating returnees and ensuring their security from Al-Shabaab reprisals remains a critical issue.” “Also, more than 50 al-Shabaab terrorists were arrested and brought to court, while nearly 100 are reportedly to be on a terror watch list,” added Kagwanja.

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<sup>28</sup> Peter Kagwanja, “Counter-terrorism architecture as a pillar of regional security”, Daily Nation, August 13, 2016. Available at: <https://mobile.nation.co.ke/blogs/counter-terrorism-architecture-as-a-pillar-of-regional-security/1949942-3343646-item-1-n83tdl/index.html>, Accessed on: March 24, 2019.

<sup>29</sup> Peter Kagwanja, “Counter-terrorism architecture as a pillar of regional security”, Daily Nation, August 13, 2016.

## **Challenges in implementing the changing Trends in the counter-terrorism strategies**

According to Agade and Mogire, “one of the greatest challenges and source of resistance to counterterrorism measures is the view that the strategies are mainly driven by the West through various funding initiatives.”<sup>30</sup>As a result of this, the strategies tend to stereotype one section of the population, mostly the Muslims against the government who view the fight against terror as a U.S led attack on Islamic religion.<sup>31</sup>Another challenge facing the effective execution of the counter-terrorism approaches as observed by Ndungu is that, in addition to uncoordinated and rushed military and policy responses to violent extremism, acts of corruption stands out as the main challenge deterring the full implementation of the CVE measures.<sup>32</sup>

Further, Irene Ndungu observed that “the politicized fight against al-Shabaab, intelligence leaks and an apparent lack of adequate training and equipment have posed major impediments to the government’s ability to detect and intercept the majority of terrorist activities.”<sup>33</sup>Also, Singo Stephen noted that, “Kenya’s CVE strategies will not meet its desired ends if the country continues to be as deeply divided as it has been in recent years. Across the country, tribal politics, perceived marginalization and exclusion have rendered the Kenyan society deeply divided along tribal and regional

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<sup>30</sup> Mogire E and Agade K.M, “Counter –terrorism in Kenya”, *Journal of Contemporary Africa Studies*, pp. 473-491, 2011.

<sup>31</sup> Whitaker B.E, “Reluctant partners: Fighting terrorism and promoting democracy,” *International Studies Perspectives*, pp. 254-271, 2008.

<sup>32</sup> Irene Ndungu, “To fight terrorism, fight corruption first”, *Institute for Security Studies*, October 9, 2015. Available at: <https://issafrica.org/iss-today/to-fight-terrorism-fight-corruption-first>, Accessed on: March 24, 2019.

<sup>33</sup> Irene Ndungu, “To fight terrorism, fight corruption first”, *Institute for Security Studies*, October 9, 2015.

lines.” “Following the disputed 2017 elections, some opposition leaders called for the secession of parts of the country dominated by opposition supporters who argued that there is no need to remain as one country in the middle of electoral injustice.”<sup>34</sup>

Singo continued to state that, “in an interview with a number of key informants in Kwale and Mombasa counties revealed deep-seated grievances with some respondents arguing that owing to the marginalization of the coast region, and the persecution of Muslims by the government in its anti-terror activities, the majority of local residents are in support of calls by their leaders for secession.”<sup>35</sup> This, resulted to the emergence of “Mombasa Republican Council (MRC)”, a group that started to propagate acts of violence towards the people residing in the community.

Also, the frosty relationship between the government (state agencies task to implement the strategies) and actors within the non-state sphere increased the failure of implementing the CVE approaches. For instance, in Africa, since 2002 as reported by the IEP, “the region has experienced a total of 40,601 deaths emanating from terrorism”.<sup>36</sup> These deaths have been caused by different terrorist groups which keep mushrooming every single day based on different ideologies their leaders are propagating. In regions such as the Sahel and the Maghreb of Northern Africa, terrorist activities have been on the rise since 2016. The global terrorist index (GTI)

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<sup>34</sup> Singo Stephen Mwachofi, “Countering or Inadvertently Aiding Terror? Assessing the Kenyan State’s Response to Terrorism, 2011-2017”, in the “Changing Dynamics of Terrorism & Violent Extremism: An Analysis”, HORN Institute, Nairobi, Kenya, pp. 78-79, 2018.

<sup>35</sup> Singo Stephen, “Countering or Inadvertently Aiding Terror? Assessing the Kenyan State’s Response to Terrorism, 2011-2017”, HORN International Institute for Strategic Studies, Nairobi, Kenya, pp. 78-79, 2018.

<sup>36</sup> IEP, “Global Terrorism Index 2018: Measuring the impact of terrorism”, Sydney, November 2018.

2018, showed that Africa region by mid-2018, had approximately 9,000 violent extremist organizations that are mostly concentrated in Algeria and Libya.<sup>37</sup>

In 2017, “Al-Shabaab surpassed Boko Haram becoming the deadliest terror group in Sub-Saharan Africa.” “The other most active terror groups in the region in 2017 were Fulani extremists, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement in Opposition (SPLM-IO) and the Union for Peace in Central Africa (UPC). These three groups were collectively responsible for 15 percent of deaths throughout Sub-Saharan Africa in 2017,” based on the global terrorist index 2018.<sup>38</sup>

This notwithstanding, the fatal terror attack happened in Mogadishu, on October 14, 2017, that killed 587 people and injuring a total of 316 people.<sup>39</sup> “Other deadly terror attacks were carried out in the Central African Republic (CAR), following two armed assault attacks in May 2017 that killed 133 and 108 people each.” “The former attack was carried out by the splinter-Seleka Fulani faction UPC, while the latter was carried out by Anti-Balaka Christian extremists,” as documented by the GTI 2018.

Kenya too has had its share of terrorist attacks especially after its entry in Somalia as one of its key strategy to counter violent extremism under the code name “Operation Linda Nchi”<sup>40</sup> on October 16, 2011. These attacks include but not limited to the 1998 attack on the American embassy in Kenya that left an in-excess fatality of

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<sup>37</sup> Institute for Economics and Peace, “Global Terrorism Index 2018: Measuring the impact of terrorism”, November 2018.

<sup>38</sup> IEP, “Global Terrorism Index 2018: Measuring the impact of terrorism”, November 2018.

<sup>39</sup> Zobe Rescue Committee, “587 dead in Oct 14 terror attack”, Hiiraan Online, March 5, 2018. Available at: [https://hiiraan.com/news4/2018/Mar/157047/committee\\_587\\_dead\\_in\\_oct\\_14\\_terror\\_attack/](https://hiiraan.com/news4/2018/Mar/157047/committee_587_dead_in_oct_14_terror_attack/), Accessed on: March 21, 2019.

<sup>40</sup> Moshe Meggel, “Al-Shabaab Terrorist Affiliated Groups in East Africa”, Strategic Intelligence News, May 25, 2015. Available at: <https://intelligencebriefs.com/tag/operation-linda-nchi/>, Accessed on: March 21, 2019.

200 persons,<sup>41</sup> the Westgate attack on September 21, 2013 that left 67 people died and scores of others injured,<sup>42</sup> and the Lamu attack on June 2014 that left at least 48 people killed after the Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen militants from Somalia launched major attacks on hotels, a police station, and government offices.<sup>43</sup>

Other attacks included the April 2, 2015 Garissa University College attack in Garissa, Kenya where violent extremist open fire killing 148 students, and injuring more than 79 others,<sup>44</sup> the El Adde attack on January 15, 2016 where 141 members of the Kenya Defence Forces (Eldoret-Based 9<sup>th</sup> Rifle Battalion D Company) were killed after Al-Shabaab launched an attack on their camp.<sup>45</sup>

The January 15, 2019 terror attack at the “DusitD2 complex” in Nairobi that resulted to a loss of approximately 21 innocent individuals,<sup>46</sup> would have been averted

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<sup>41</sup> Singo Stephen Mwachofi, “Countering or Inadvertently Aiding Terror? Assessing the Kenyan State’s Response to Terrorism, 2011-2017,” in *The Changing Dynamics of Terrorism & Violent Extremism: An Analysis*, edited by Mustafa Ali, Mumo Nzau and Hassan Khannenje, pp. 59, HORN Institute, Nairobi - Kenya, 2018.

<sup>42</sup> Tristan McConnell, “What really happened two years ago in the bloody attack on Nairobi’s Westgate Mall”, FP, September 20, 2015.

<sup>43</sup> AFP, “Mpeketoni attack: Death toll rises to 48”, Daily Nation, June 16, 2014. Available at: <https://www.nation.co.ke/news/mpeketoni-Lamu-gunfire-al-shabaab-terrorism/1056-2349860-10elxgcz/index.html>, Accessed on: March 19, 2019.

<sup>44</sup> Aislinn Laing and Mike Pflanz, “Kenya university attack: ‘They were lined up and executed’”, The Telegraph, April 3, 2015. Available at: <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/kenya/11514500/Kenya-university-attack-They-were-lined-up-and-executed.html>, accessed on: March 19, 2019.

<sup>45</sup> Moses Michira and Paul Wafula, “The untold story of courage, horror and betrayal in defence of our country”, Standard Digital, January 15, 2017. Available at: <https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000229911/the-untold-story-of-kdf-massacre-in-el-adde>, Accessed on: March 21, 2019.

<sup>46</sup> Farai Sevenzo, Faith Karimi and Laura Smith-Spark, “At least 21 killed as Kenya hotel siege is declared over”, CNN, January 17, 2019. Available at: <https://edition.cnn.com/2019/01/16/africa/kenya-hotel-complex-terror-attack/index.html>, Accessed on: March 19, 2019.



if the government had put proper measures in intelligence dissemination from the non-state actors (Here, members of the public).

## **1.6.2 Theoretical literature review**

### **System Theory**

In analyzing the impacts of the strategies available in countering violent extremism and terrorism, some scholars have used the system theory. The theory tends to analyze a conflict (the threat of violent extremism) from an individual viewpoint but then again looks at other actors as the ultimate components in building a durable solution to the problem. The theory basically set its lenses on how an action by one actor (violent extremist) can result in a reaction from other players.<sup>47</sup>

As stated by Samah Albert<sup>48</sup>, “system theory was first formulated by David Easton in 1953.<sup>49</sup> Easton deduced that the politics of a country is in a great way as a biological system whereby the views, actions or demands of the citizens (inputs) are taken into consideration by the decision which has consequences on the social, economic and political settings. These outputs are sometimes welcome as well as they may not be welcomed.”

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<sup>47</sup> Brain Mass, “System Theory and Conflict Resolution”, December 20, 2017. Accessed at: <https://brain-mass.com/business/project-management/systems-theory-conflict-resolution-600465>. Retrieved on: March 22, 2019.

<sup>48</sup> Samah Albert, *Skills in Research Writing*, Wivans Publishers, Yaounde, October 2012.

<sup>49</sup> David Easton, “Political Science, Systems Theory”. Accessed at: <http://www.politicalsciencenotes.com/articles/systems-theory-according-to-david-easton/500>, Retrieved on: March 22, 2019.

Samah also goes further to simplify the system theory by saying that, “the system approach is just like all the different parts of the body structure such as the lungs, the hands, limbs, the digestive tract, the heart, and the brain. This parts of the body tend to perform different roles and the absence of one of the parts will cause the body structure to malfunction”. Thus, scholars use the analogy as explained by Samah to suggest that the actors at play: the state and non-state actors are all intertwined and any action taken by the other whether in good faith or bad will affect the outcome of the strategies and their impacts in countering violent extremism and terrorism.

David Easton’s further explains that ‘systems theory’, although established for ‘constructivist’ purposes and used for analyzing politics, it is still useful in developing a realistic theory in order to comprehend the forces that run a political system. Violent extremism is part of the political system because some of the ideologies been used to radicalize individuals to violence partly have political connotations. Thus, through the System theory, the political actors at play in any of the situations can be able to know what, or where or how a political action (violent extremism and terrorism) has happened and be able to take curative actions.

## **1.7 Gaps in the Literature**

The literature review shows that more focus has been put on developing Terrorism and CVE strategies. However, there is scarce information on the tangible outcomes of the strategies made in the fight against VE and terrorism. Thus, the study interrogated the impacts of the strategies through extensive data collection and data analysis from relevant authorities in order to enrich the existing information.

## **1.8 Hypotheses of the study**

1.8.1 (H0) Global strategies lead to a reduction of violent extremism and terrorism.

1.8.2 (H0) In-effective strategies lead to an upsurge of violent extremism and terrorism in Africa.

1.8.3 (H1) Effective multi-stakeholder approaches will lead to a reduction in challenges faced in the execution of the counter-terrorism and CVE approaches in Kenya.

## **1.9 Theoretical Framework**

The study has used human need theory<sup>50</sup> to analyze the data collected. The human need theory as expounded by John Burton captures the push and pulls dynamics that led to the implementation of the various multi-stakeholder approaches used in countering violent extremism and acts of terrorism. Also, the theory investigates the impacts and challenges affecting the implementations of the counter-terrorism and CVE strategies. On the recommendations, the theory has been used to validate new and effective multi-stakeholder approaches that can be introduced to existing approaches to mitigate the dangers of terrorism and violent extremism.

### **1.9.1 Human Need Theory**

Scholars have observed that human beings have certain common necessities and when their needs are not fulfilled then conflict will definitely occur. Thus, in categorizing the various needs, Abraham Maslow, proposed “a hierarchy of needs beginning with the need for water, shelter and food, then the need for safety and security, then belonging or love, self-esteem and, finally, personal fulfillment and

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<sup>50</sup> J. Burton, “Conflict: Resolution and prevention,” New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990.

self-actualization”.<sup>51</sup> Maslow also proposed “self-transcendence as a need above self-actualization in the hierarchy of needs”.<sup>52</sup>

However, John Burton further developed his own set of needs without having to categorize them in a hierarchical nature. Burton’s needs included; “safety and security, self-esteem, distributive justice, identity, belongingness, personal fulfillment, freedom, and cultural security”.<sup>53</sup> In conflict resolutions, human needs theorists tend to differentiate between human interests and needs. According to them, conflicts arise when individuals’ efforts to fulfill their essential needs are frustrated.

In relations to our study, the government is obliged under the statutory laws to guarantee the safety of its populace. Thus, violent extremism and terrorism are a threat and cause of conflict in the society, African countries including the government of Kenya opted to deploy all the necessary measures to curb the vice. These measures are in the form of a multi-stakeholder approach, where all actors are working as a team to fight the scourge of violent extremism and terrorism.

Further, scholars in peace and security studies tend to agree that issues of recognition, security, and identity are exacerbators of conflicts such as violent extremism.<sup>54</sup> Thus, as terrorism and violent extremism trends continue to change with time-based on various factors such as technology development, the difference in ideologies, and the ever increasing number of violent extremist groups,

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<sup>51</sup> Abraham Maslow, *The farther reaches of human nature*. Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin Books, 1973.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid

<sup>53</sup> H. B. Danesh, “Human needs theory, conflict, and peace in search of an integrated model” In D. J. Christie (Ed.), *Encyclopedia of Peace Psychology*. Hoboken, New Jersey: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011.

<sup>54</sup> Sandra Marker, “Unmet Human Needs”, *Beyond Intractability*, August 2003. Available at: [https://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/human\\_needs](https://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/human_needs), Accessed on: March 23, 2019.

States/Governments, and other non-state-actors, are also re-evaluating and re-designing their previous strategies to stay upfront in the fight against violent extremist and terrorists. On this, the human needs theory captures the different multi-stakeholder approaches put in place and analyze the impacts and challenges being experienced in the fight against violent extremism and acts of terrorism in Africa and Kenya in particular.

### **1.10 Methodology of the study**

This section focuses on the research methodology that has been used to meet the objective of the study. These comprises of: the research design, research site, target population, sample size, methods of data collection and instruments, and data analysis techniques.

#### **1.10.1 Research Design**

The study will use both qualitative (interview schedule) and quantitative (questionnaires) research methods of data collection.

#### **1.10.2 Research Site and population**

The study focused on Kenya and more specific areas that are highly targeted, and where the counter-terrorism and CVE measures have been activated. These areas include the counties of Mandera, Kilifi, Tana River, Garissa, Kwale, Wajir, Mombasa and Nyeri, Kiambu and parts of Nairobi.<sup>55</sup>

Kenya as a country has a population of about, “51,853,927 as of March 22, 2019”, as reported by the United Nations (UN) population estimates. The

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<sup>55</sup> UNDP and UoN, “Strengthening Community’s Resilience against Radicalization and Violent Extremism”, Final report funded by the Government of Japan, March 2016-June 2017.

Worldometers also reported that currently Kenya’s “27.1 % of the population is urban (14,149,974 people in 2019), the median age in Kenya is 19.2 years, covering a total of the land area of 569,140 Km<sup>2</sup> (219,746 sq. miles)”.<sup>56</sup>

### 1.10.3 Target population

The research targeted individuals who are key in designing and implementing Kenya’s counter-terrorism strategy in combating violent extremism. These includes, Kenya’s NCTC, the ATPU, and the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Security (specifically chiefs and county commissioner), Community Based Organizations and scholars involved in the study of violent extremism.

### 1.10.4 Sample Size

The study targeted population was determined using a research procedure developed by Mugenda and Mugenda.<sup>57</sup> For purposes of our study, the sample population was less than 10,000.

Hence, according to the population size, the formula is:  $nf = \frac{n}{1 + \frac{n}{N}}$

n<sub>f</sub>= “desired sample size when the population is less than 10,000”

n= “desired sample when the population is more than 10,000”

N= “estimate of the population size”.

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<sup>56</sup> Worldometers, “Kenya population” March 22, 2019. Available at: <http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/kenya-population/>, Accessed on: March 23, 2019.

<sup>57</sup> Olive Mugenda and Abel Mugenda, “Research Methods: Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches”. Nairobi: Acts Press, 1999.

Mugenda gives an efficient range of study to be 10% to 30%.

Thus, the study opted to use 10% of estimated population size of the targeted group which is approximately 1200.

- Research sample size used was 10% of 1200

$$sample\ size = \frac{120}{1 + \frac{120}{1200}}$$

So the sample size for the collection of data will be = 109

#### **1.10.5 Data Analysis**

The researcher applied content analysis to analyze the qualitative and quantitative data collected.

#### **1.10.6 Ethical Consideration**

The subject matter happens to be very sensitive in nature. Thus, the researcher conducted interviews with key personnel from the targeted sample population. The interviews were recorded based on consent from the interviewee and the questioners were not numbered and no name of the responded was included.

## **1.10 Chapter outline.**

**Chapter one: Introductory Chapter.** This chapter covers the introduction and background to the study on the changing strategies in countering violent extremism and terrorism in Africa, with a focus in Kenya.

**Chapter two: Global strategies and their impact in countering violent extremism and terrorism.** This chapter covered the various global strategies being implemented worldwide by various States and international institutions. The chapter also examined the impact of global strategies in countering violent extremism and terrorism.

**Chapter three: Trends and impacts of strategies adopted in countering violent extremism and terrorism in Africa.** The chapter investigated the trends and impacts of strategies embraced by the Africa region to counter VE and terrorism.

**Chapter four: Kenya's multi-stakeholder approaches and their challenges in countering VE and terrorism.** The chapter studied the various multi-stakeholder approaches designed to counter acts of terrorism and VE, their impacts, challenges and the new mechanism that needs to be put in place to effectively reduce acts of terrorism and violent extremism in Kenya.

**Chapter five: Data Presentation and Analysis.** The chapter focused on the data the researcher collected through the qualitative and quantitative methodology and their analysis.

**Chapter six: Summary, Conclusion, and Recommendation:** The chapter focused on the summary, conclusions, and recommendation of the findings from all the chapters.



## CHAPTER TWO

### **Global strategies and their impact in countering violent extremism and terrorism.**

#### **2.0 Introduction**

In order to organize the heinous acts, terrorists/violent extremists need to recruit supporters, mobilize funds, source for weapons and have access to the target sites. Thus, to effectively fight the upsurge of terrorism, all actors at play (States and Non-State Actors) need to have an all-inclusive and tactical approach.<sup>58</sup> Setting the center stage, after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack that killed approximately 2,996 individuals, injuring more than 6,000 others, and causing damages worth billions of dollars,<sup>59</sup> President George W. Bush launched a global approach titled the “global war on terror”. This battle against terror involved, “new security legislation, open and clandestine military operations, preventive mechanism on the financing of terrorism, intelligence gathering, and collaboration with non-state actors amongst other strategies”.<sup>60</sup>

This notwithstanding, President Bush administration rallied the international community to partner together and defeat terrorism, asserting "either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists." This retaliatory message from Washington DC led

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<sup>58</sup> Organization for security and Co-operation in Europe, “Preventing Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism: A Community-Policing Approach”, OSCE, February 2014.

<sup>59</sup> M. D. Morgan, “The impact of 9/11 on politics and war: The day that changed everything?” London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.

<sup>60</sup> G. P. F, “war on Terrorism”. Available at: <https://www.globalpolicy.org/war-on-terrorism.html>, Accessed on: May 13, 2019.

many states to adopt and implement new retributive laws, increase domestic policing and intelligence gathering.<sup>61</sup>

Subsequently, the European Council in 2005, approved the “EU counter-terrorism strategy” with the aim of making Europe safe.<sup>62</sup> The “EU counter-terrorism approach” was pegged on four key thematic – structures. These are “Prevents, Pursue, Protect, and Respond”.<sup>63</sup> These four thematic structures encompassing the “EU counter-terrorism approach” underscored the significance of cooperation with global institutions and other regions.

Fighting terrorist recruitment and the process of radicalization, the European Council approved the “strategy for combating radicalization” in 2008.<sup>64</sup> In June 2014, the EU Council decided to revise the strategy to be in tandem with the changing trends in terrorism such as acts by ‘lone-wolf terrorist’, ‘homegrown terrorist’, terrorist not affiliated with any terrorist or extremist group, use of social media by extremist and acts of cyber terrorism.<sup>65</sup> In December 2014, the EU Council approved the procedures for the enactment of the reviewed approaches by Member States.

Further, in February 2015, the European Union leaders emphasized the significance of the European Union affiliated States EU to work hand in hand with third world countries on Counter-terrorism and security issues.<sup>66</sup> Hence, the chapter

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<sup>61</sup> G. P. F, “war on Terrorism”. Available at: <https://www.globalpolicy.org/war-on-terrorism.html>, Accessed on: May 13, 2019.

<sup>62</sup> European Council, “EU counter-terrorism strategy”. Available at: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/fight-against-terrorism/eu-strategy/>. Accessed at: May 14, 2019.

<sup>63</sup> European Council, “EU counter-terrorism strategy”, 2005.

<sup>64</sup> European Council, “EU counter-terrorism strategy”, 2005.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid

<sup>66</sup> Ibid

will focus on various global strategies that are currently being implemented and their various impact in the war against terrorism and violent extremism.

## **2.1 Hard Power Global Counter-Terrorism Strategies**

### **2.1.1 Military Invasions**

After the 9/11, terror attack by the Al-Qaeda affiliated terrorists, President George W. Bush declared war against all extremists' networks. This being his major strategy on "war against terror", President Bush requested all world leaders to join the U.S led military campaign. In his address, President Bush said, "Every nation in every region now has a decision to make." "Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists."<sup>67</sup> Thereafter, his Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld on September 25, 2001, announced the U.S led military anti-terror strategy dubbed as "Operation Enduring Freedom." A day after his announcement, Saudi Arabia seized its diplomatic relations with Afghanistan. Twelve days later (October 7, 2001), U.S and Britain launched their first airstrike at the Taliban and Al-Qaeda militia base camps in Afghanistan.<sup>68</sup>

On October 20, 2001, Italy, France, Britain, Netherlands, Germany, Poland and Turkey being the coalition of the willing announced their plans to send troops to Afghanistan.<sup>69</sup>

Nearly two years later, on March 19, 2003, the coalition of the willing forces invaded Iraq after following covert report that Saddam Hussein was planning to have weapons

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<sup>67</sup> History.com Editors, "A Timeline of the U.S.-Led War on Terror", History, February 1, 2019. Available at: <https://www.history.com/topics/21st-century/war-on-terror-timeline>, Accessed on: May 22, 2019.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid

<sup>69</sup> Ibid

of mass destruction. Three years later, on December 30, 2006, Saddam Hussein was assassinated after being sentenced on crimes against humanity and war crimes. Saddam's execution led to the end of the military campaign in Iraq by President Barack Obama on August 30, 2010.<sup>70</sup>

Thereafter, May 2, 2011, Osama bin Laden was also executed in a well-coordinated swoop at a Pakistan compound by U.S. Special Forces. A month later, on June 22, 2011, the U.S government withdrew part of its troops from Afghanistan. Rolling out this strategy, on December 28, 2014, the military campaign in Afghanistan officially ended and a hand-over of power to Afghanistan's security personnel began.<sup>71</sup>

However, not strategically adequate, robust defenses have made the global community safer. These include, "ensuring planes are less exposed to takeover, restricting travel by probable terrorists, implementing enhanced screening at airports; and restricting illegal objects that can be brought on flights." However, the persistent attacks globally, shows that there is no inadequacy of soft targets.<sup>72</sup>

### **2.1.2 Aggressive and Constant Air Strike Campaigns**

Michael Vickers in his article titled "*Five counterterrorism strategies for the next president*," observed that "Precision air operations that combine high operational tempo, covert partnerships and multiple forms of combat power have been America's primary tool to deny any sanctuary to and dismantle al-Qaeda, its allies and its

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<sup>70</sup> History.com Editors, "A Timeline of the U.S.-Led War on Terror", History, February 1, 2019.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid

<sup>72</sup> Michael Vickers, "Five counterterrorism strategies for the next president", The Washington Post, September 26, 2016. Available at: [https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/in-theory/wp/2016/09/26/five-counterterrorism-strategies-for-the-next-president/?noredirect=on&utm\\_term=.f7e464d8f915](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/in-theory/wp/2016/09/26/five-counterterrorism-strategies-for-the-next-president/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.f7e464d8f915), Accessed on: May 14, 2019.

offshoots.” Constant air strike invasions fortified with accurate artilleries, efficiently dismantled Taliban’s stronghold in 2001. Thus, by changing the policy on U.S airstrike established by President Bush and sustained by President Obama, with an increase of military drones served as the best option to almost trouncing al-Qaeda and their plans in the Arabian Peninsula.<sup>73</sup>

### **2.1.3 Advising and Supporting Local Forces**

Empowering the local ground forces to effectively deploy airstrikes on targeted terrorist and violent extremist groups, has been the most proactive tactic in defeating Taliban. The U.S. forces alongside with the Afghanistan military, developed strategies that are aligned with the objectives of the local partners. Having local partners whose share the same goal in combating violent extremism and terrorism have been the key to success in draining the swathes of militia safe havens.<sup>74</sup>

As the conventional military campaigns came to an end on May 2003, the U.S and the coalition of the willing carried out major military operations against the *Sunni* militants to secure major areas in Iraq. The U.S. tactic was; “immediately Iraq establishes some degree of security, they will pass the responsibility of running the government to the duly elected civilian leaders”. As the legitimate government is being formed, the coalition forces, on the other hand, have been training and equipping the Iraqi security forces with the necessary skills to defeat the violent extremist.<sup>75</sup>

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<sup>73</sup> Vickers, “Five counterterrorism strategies for the next president”, The Washington Post, September 26, 2016.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid

<sup>75</sup> Daniel L. Byman, “Iraq and the Global War on Terrorism”, Brookings, July 1, 2007. Available at: <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/iraq-and-the-global-war-on-terrorism/>, Accessed on: May 21, 2019.

#### 2.1.4 Intelligence-Driven Strategies

Well-coordinated intelligence-driven strategies have disrupted many heinous acts from terrorist and violent extremist. Also, the intelligence acquired has resulted to further operations. However, intelligence has also had its share of failures. Yet, overall, it has been the most critical source of vital information for the global community early warning systems.<sup>76</sup> Intelligence collaboration is key to the various counterterrorism partnerships. This can be in the form of merging the military personnel's to gather credible information, and intelligence sharing.<sup>77</sup>

During the Prague Summit meeting in 2002, gathering of intelligence key stakeholders was acknowledged as a critical trait of collaboration among Partners. A "Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit (TTIU)" was established in 2003 and housed at the NATO Office of Security. The TTIU operated for seven years as a joint NATO body comprising of civilian officers and military officers from intelligence organisations.<sup>78</sup>

At the 2004 Istanbul Summit, a decision was made to evaluate the intelligence structures at NATO Headquarters. Based on the intelligence structures review, a new structure was established under "Intelligence Liaison Unit (ILU) at NATO Headquarters in Brussels and SHAPE in Mons, Belgium." As stated in the NATO Multimedia Library, "the intelligence reforms at NATO Headquarters that were undertaken in 2010-2011, the TTIU's roles were taken over by the "Intelligence Steering Board (ISB)" and the established "Intelligence Unit (IU)." These changes

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<sup>76</sup> Michael Vickers, "Five counterterrorism strategies for the next president", The Washington Post, September 26, 2016.

<sup>77</sup> Stephen Tankel, "Sixteen years after 9/11, are we any better at fighting terrorism?" The Washington Post, September 11, 2017. Available at: [https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/09/11/fighting-terrorism-takes-a-global-effort-how-have-3-u-s-presidents-fared-16-years-after-911/?utm\\_term=.baad4cf50cf0](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/09/11/fighting-terrorism-takes-a-global-effort-how-have-3-u-s-presidents-fared-16-years-after-911/?utm_term=.baad4cf50cf0), Accessed on: May 21, 2019.

<sup>78</sup> Ibid

improved the analytical tactics on terrorism and its connection with other transnational threats.<sup>79</sup>

### **2.1.5 Impact of the military Invasions, Airstrikes, and Intelligence-driven strategies in countering violent extremism and terrorism.**

After the 2003 U.S. invasion in Iraq, and subsequently Iran and Afghanistan, many foreign jihadists (violent extremist and terrorist) have found their way back to Iran, Iran, Afghanistan and other terror hot spots in the middle-east. This has made some of these middle-east countries to be considered as the hub of Jihad.<sup>80</sup> A 2006 National Intelligence Assessment by the U.S., found that “The Iraq conflict has become the major cause for jihadists, breeding a deep resentment of US involvement in the Muslim world and cultivating supporters for the global jihadist movement.”<sup>81</sup>

The intelligence assessment showed that approximately 2,000 foreign jihad militia are in Iraq. These group of violent extremists is the ones who are responsible for most of the suicide bombings. Most of the extremist are believed to be hailing from Arabic nations, with Saudi Arabia taking the lion’s share of those executed.<sup>82</sup> Deploying the military invasion, and air precision targets tactics continue to agitate the extremist, giving them more clout to attack. The instabilities in the Middle-East has also fortified some of the affiliated extremist bearing European

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<sup>79</sup> NATO Multimedia Library, “Intelligence/Information Sharing in Combating Terrorism”, May 16, 2019. Available at: <http://www.natolibguides.info/intelligence>, Accessed on: May 22, 2019.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid

<sup>81</sup> Daniel L. Byman, “Iraq and the Global War on Terrorism”, Brookings, July 1, 2007. Available at: <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/iraq-and-the-global-war-on-terrorism/>, Accessed on: May 21, 2019.

<sup>82</sup> Daniel L. Byman, “Iraq and the Global War on Terrorism”, Brookings, July 1, 2007.

passports to gain entry to the United States and other countries easily due to their European citizenships. They have mastered the ability and tact to operate in the European countries and other parts of the world with the main agenda of committing acts of terror and violent extremism.<sup>83</sup>

Also, maintaining few troops in some of these middle-east countries will have negative impacts on the terrorism threat. This is because the terrorist and violent extremist will have more ideological reasons to use, while radicalizing and recruiting members to their networks. Also, U.S. presence in Kuwait, Iraq, Jordan, Qatar, and other neighboring countries will enrage them, making the U.S troops a target of terrorist attacks.<sup>84</sup>

However, intelligence-driven operations have overall, been the most critical source of vital information for the global community early warning systems in its war against terrorism and violent extremism.

## **2.2 Soft Power Global Counter-Terrorism Strategies**

### **2.2.1 Curbing Illicit Terrorism Funding**

The ‘illicit terrorism funding’ as described by the United Nations, has become a global threats affecting peace and security around the globe. The vice tends to destabilize financial market stability and economic development.<sup>85</sup>

#### **Sources of illicit Funds**

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<sup>83</sup> Ibid

<sup>84</sup> Daniel Byman, “Iraq and the Global War on Terrorism”, Brookings, July 1, 2007.

<sup>85</sup> United Nations, “Terrorism financing”, Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee, May 23, 2017. Available at: <https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/focus-areas/financing-of-terrorism/>, Accessed on: May 21, 2019.



Observations by the United Nations revealed that “terrorists need finances to carry out their plans. Without the money, the extremist/terrorist cannot purchase weapons, and other equipment’s to carry out their heinous acts.” These financial sources can either be legal or illegal and mostly they take the mode of minor contributions, rather than large sum of donations.<sup>86</sup>

In 2002, the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) released a report revealing donations as the major source of terror funding. The donations came from wealthy personalities and charities affiliated to them. The report disclosed that for many years, charity organizations based in Saudi Arabia were the key financiers for al-Qaeda.<sup>87</sup> Prior to the CFR report, on July 2001, then US President Bush started a mega crackdown on curbing the flow of illicit funds after two financial systems were identified as key financiers of al-Qaida. The US government had identified the so-called Hawala system (financial system operating as unlicensed banks). The Hawala systems are very hard to crack, “as they are extremely informal, no existence of paper trail, and purely operate on a system of trust”.<sup>88</sup>

Other sources include the selling of drugs. An expert on the study of terrorism financing, Loretta Napoleoni, in a publication titled, “*Illicit*, Moisés Naím” revealed that the terrorists behind the 1993 World Trade Center bombing fundraised by selling counterfeit t-shirts on New York City’s Broadway, and the culprits of the 2004 Madrid train bombings peddled counterfeited CDs and trafficked drugs to fund their

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<sup>86</sup> United Nations, “Terrorism financing”, Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee, May 23, 2017. Available at: <https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/focus-areas/financing-of-terrorism/>, Accessed on: May 21, 2019.

<sup>87</sup> Kaplan, “Tracking down Terrorist Financing”, Council on Foreign Relations, April 4, 2006.

<sup>88</sup> International Relations and Security Network, “G7 to Combat Terrorism with Airline Cash Inspections”, Global Policy Forum, April 27, 2004. Available at: <https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/154/26681.html>, Accessed on: May 14, 2019.

heinous activities.”<sup>89</sup> Also, the United Nations revealed that growing of poppy in Afghanistan resulted to 86 percent of the world opium supply, which is used to generate income for major extremist networks.<sup>90</sup>

Furthermore, numerous terrorist groups are operating genuine businesses that are profit making entities, while covertly used to launder the funds such as businesses involving construction, hospitality, and agriculture. Linkages of terrorism financing have been established in trades involving fish, livestock, and skin. The New York Times in 2001, revealed that “Osama bin Laden owned and operated a string of retail honey shops throughout the Middle East and Pakistan. In addition to generating revenue, the honey was used to conceal shipments of money and weapons.”<sup>91</sup>

### **Strategies of curbing the illicit financing on terrorism**

After September 11, 2001, US terror attack, the UN Security Council adopted various resolutions demanding governments to take action to disrupt all sources of terrorist funding. These measures included enacting of legislation specifically criminalizing financing of terror activities, reporting suspicious transactions by financial institutions, and endorsing the UN convention on financing terrorism.<sup>92</sup>

Enforcing the various measures, the United Nations came up with several resolutions. For instance, “Resolution 1373” adopted in 2001, was a response to the 9/11 terror attack in America. This all-inclusive resolution obligated governments to criminalize all acts of terror, outlaw the sponsoring of terrorism, freeze all assets of persons who

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<sup>89</sup> Eben K, “Tracking down Terrorist Financing”, Council on Foreign Relations, April 4, 2006.

<sup>90</sup> United Nations, “Terrorism financing”, Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee, May 23, 2017.

<sup>91</sup> Eben K, “Tracking down Terrorist Financing”, Council on Foreign Relations, April 4, 2006.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid

commit or attempts to commit acts of terror and violent extremism, penalize supporters of terrorism activities and reinforces international collaboration in fighting terrorism. Also, “Resolution 1373 laid the foundation for the establishment of the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) to observe its implementation.”<sup>93</sup>

The UN Council further adopted more resolutions in relations to the financing terrorist acts. The UN Security Council on September 24, 2014, approved “resolution 2178”. This resolution dealt with the issue of abolishing funding for the traveling and activities related to foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs).<sup>94</sup> In May 2015, the European Parliament and the Security Council approved new guidelines to avert laundering of money and terrorist financing.<sup>95</sup> This notwithstanding, on March 24, 2017, ‘resolution 2347’ linking the financing of terrorism and illicit trade in cultural property.<sup>96</sup> Further, on December 21, 2017, “Resolution 2396” was adopted to elaborate more on how to handle FTFs returning to their home countries.

Other than the UN Security Council resolutions, the G7 Group under the “Financial Action Task Force (FATF)” in April 27, 2004, proposed that all travellers are required to file currency declarations. Today, US travellers are required to declare any amount exceeding US\$ 10,000 upon arrival or departure of its borders. Use of X-

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<sup>93</sup> Security Council Report, “Counter-Terrorism”, March 2019 Monthly Forecast, February 28, 2019. Available at: <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2019-03/counter-terrorism.php>, May 21, 2019.

<sup>94</sup> Security Council Report, “Counter-Terrorism”, March 2019 Monthly Forecast, February 28, 2019.

<sup>95</sup> European Council, “EU counter-terrorism strategy”. Available at: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/fight-against-terrorism/eu-strategy/>. Accessed at: May 14, 2019.

<sup>96</sup> Security Council Report, “Counter-Terrorism”, March 2019 Monthly Forecast, February 28, 2019.

ray scanners and dogs to detect the smell of banknotes are carried out at the airports.<sup>97</sup> However, some critics are stating that any attempts to crack down on cross-border cash flows will have less impact in preventing acts of terror and violent extremism. They back their assertions using the low budget terror attack in Madrid that killed approximately 191 individuals.<sup>98</sup>

### **Impact of curbing illicit terrorist funding**

Eben Kaplan in his article titled, “*Tracking down Terrorist Financing*”, states that the execution of the financial laws to curb the flow of illicit funds has been difficult and expensive. The British Bankers’ Association, “indicates that UK financial institutions use nearly \$430 million yearly in order to fulfil the anti-money laundering and anti-terror laws”.<sup>99</sup> Conversely, the challenge faced in implementing the strategy is the constant change by terrorist and violent extremist to bypass the existing strategies to curb the financial flows.<sup>100</sup>

Also, monetary practices entrenched in Islamic cultures, such as informal money-transfers and donations to charities have impeded tracking down terrorist financial networks.<sup>101</sup> However, despite the challenges, various global strategies on curbing illicit funds have led to the freezing of terrorist assets in excess of \$140 million held in approximately 1,400 bank accounts worldwide.<sup>102</sup>

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<sup>97</sup> Ibid

<sup>98</sup> Ibid

<sup>99</sup> Eben Kaplan, “Tracking down Terrorist Financing”, Council on Foreign Relations, April 4, 2006.

<sup>100</sup> Security Council Report, “Counter-Terrorism”, March 2019 Monthly Forecast, February 28, 2019.

<sup>101</sup> Eben Kaplan, “Tracking down Terrorist Financing”, Council on Foreign Relations, April 4, 2006.

<sup>102</sup> Eben Kaplan, “Tracking down Terrorist Financing”, Council on Foreign Relations, April 4, 2006. Available at: <https://www.cfr.org/background/tracking-down-terrorist-financing>, Accessed on: May 21, 2019.

### 2.2.2 De-radicalization strategies

The global community has come to the realization that law enforcement, overt and covert military operations and intelligence-led strategies alone are not sufficient to eradicate violent extremism and terrorism. Thus, the idea of de-radicalization came into place. De-radicalization is the “process of divorcing individuals or groups from previously held extreme views that are defined as dangerous for the stability and development of a nation.”<sup>103</sup> The purpose of this process is not to castigate the radicalized individuals but to change their mentality and sway them from implementing acts of violent extremism and terrorism.

In Indonesia, the program of de-radicalization was initiated by involving the families/relatives of former extremist and terrorist who are reformed and the communities at large.<sup>104</sup> This notwithstanding, the government of Indonesia also reached out to online users by recruiting young individuals with huge social media followers to be agents of change in pushing for messages of peace.<sup>105</sup>

In China, the process of de-radicalization has been activated by the authorities in Xinjiang province to curtail the increase of violent extremism and terrorism. Chinese authorities have stated that “religious extremism” is one of the major

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<sup>103</sup> Mumo Nzau, Mustafa Ali, and Hassan Khannenje, (Eds), “The Changing Dynamics of Terrorism & Violent Extremism: An Analysis”, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Nairobi, Kenya, 2018.

<sup>104</sup> Bayu Mitra A. Kusuma, “Using religion and culture to fight terrorism: lessons from the Philippine military”, *The Conversation*, November 21, 2018. Available at: <https://theconversation.com/using-religion-and-culture-to-fight-terrorism-lessons-from-the-philippine-military-106335>, Accessed on: May 22, 2019.

<sup>105</sup> Bayu Mitra A. Kusuma, “Using religion and culture to fight terrorism: lessons from the Philippine military”, *The Conversation*, November 21, 2018.

ideological foundation for terrorism and violent extremism in China.<sup>106</sup> In May 2013, a policy document for China's strategy of de-radicalization titled, "Several Guiding Opinions on Further Suppressing Illegal Religious Activities and Combating the Infiltration of Religious Extremism in Accordance with Law," was developed. The document is also referred to as "No. 11 Document." It outlines the thin line between extremist manifestations, ordinary religious practices, and ethnic customs.<sup>107</sup>

In 2014, a "No. 28 document" was approved referring to the policy guideline titled "Several Opinions on Further Strengthening and Improving the Work with regard to Islam."<sup>108</sup> Implementing the strategies of de-radicalization, the authorities in Xinjiang came up with various methodologies. These approaches as stated by Zunyou Zhou are "five keys," "four prongs," "three contingents," "two hands," and "one rule."

The "five keys" methodologies states that; "Cultural problems should be solved by means of culture", "Ideological problems should be solved by means of ideology," "Religious problems should be solved in accordance with religious rules", "Folk customs should be treated with an attitude of respect," and "Violent terrorism should be fought in line with the rule of law and by means of iron-fisted actions."<sup>109</sup>

The "four prongs" referred to "counteracting by culture", "squeezing by correct faith", "popularizing science," and "controlling by law."<sup>110</sup> The "three

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<sup>106</sup> Zunyou Zhou, "Chinese Strategy for De-radicalization, Terrorism and Political Violence", June 9, 2017. Available at: DOI: 10.1080/09546553.2017.1330199, Accessed on: May 22, 2019.

<sup>107</sup> Zunyou Zhou, "Chinese Strategy for De-radicalization, Terrorism and Political Violence", June 9, 2017.

<sup>108</sup> Ibid

<sup>109</sup> Ibid

<sup>110</sup> Zunyou Zhou, "Chinese Strategy for De-radicalization, Terrorism and Political Violence", June 9, 2017

contingents” are measures of consolidating three significant groups of individuals the government can rely on to uphold security. These are teachers, religious figures and cadres. The “two hands” represents one “firm hand,” that deals with terrorists. The other “firm hand,” teaches and guides the Uyghur populace. This process is a rejoinder to President Xi’s clarion call for both hard and soft actions in dealing with terrorism and violent extremism during the 2nd Xinjiang Work-shop.<sup>111</sup> Lastly, “one rule” refers to the strategy of “governing Xinjiang according to law,”

### **Impacts of de-radicalization strategies**

China asserts that it has been successful in de-radicalizing the prisoners. In February 2016, the High Court in Xinjiang’s commuted prison terms for 11 criminals who were convicted of crimes related to acts of terrorism. Seven of the convicted felons had their prison terms mitigated from life in prison to serving a sentence of up to 20 years. Four other detainees had their prison terms slashed by 6 months from the original sentence of 8 years, 13 years and 15 years. Zhang Chunxian in his speech on December 31, 2015, affirmed that the program on de-radicalization has “remarkably destabilized the atmosphere of religious extremism.”<sup>112</sup>

### **2.2.3 Safeguarding the Cyberspace**

Defeating violent extremist and terrorist affiliated networks, will need more tact than the military power. This is because most of the terrorist groups are utilizing the cyber space and more specifically social media platforms to radicalize and recruit potential extremist. The United Nations, “estimates about 30,000 foreign terrorist

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<sup>111</sup> Zunyou Zhou, “Chinese Strategy for De-radicalization, Terrorism and Political Violence”, June 9, 2017.

<sup>112</sup> Zunyou Zhou, “Chinese Strategy for De-radicalization, Terrorism and Political Violence”, June 9, 2017.

fighters from 100 countries are connected to ISIS, al Qaeda, and related terrorist groups.”<sup>113</sup>

As a result, the United States of America has developed its national-led strategy to defeat violent extremist and terrorists within the cyberspace. On this, the U.S government and in partnership with the relevant technology companies such as Facebook, Google amongst others have come together to develop effective mechanisms to deter extremists from taking advantage of the cyber space to spread their radical propaganda and use of online platforms to connect with possible recruits.

### **Impact of Cyber-security strategies**

Through government interventions and strict measures, companies offering technology services have increased their safety features to mitigate online recruitment. As of mid-2015, statistics show that Twitter has suspended approximately 125,000 accounts related to terrorist organizations. Facebook, on the other hand, has made a commitment to pull down all violent extremist and terrorist groups’ accounts.<sup>114</sup> This process by the technology companies has become of necessity to effectively curb terrorist messaging, and prevent radicalization of individuals through available propagandas.<sup>115</sup>

Also, the U.S. State Department has established a new Global Engagement Center to counter the messaging from terrorist organizations such as ISIS. This will require the

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<sup>113</sup> Sanaa Khan and Mieke Eoyang, “The Plan to Combat Terrorism”, Third Way, Updated September 30, 2016. Available at: <https://www.thirdway.org/report/the-plan-to-combat-terrorism>, Accessed on: May 22, 2019.

<sup>114</sup> Ibid

<sup>115</sup> Sanaa Khan and Mieke Eoyang, “The Plan to Combat Terrorism”, Third Way, Updated September 30, 2016.



State Department to work closely with regional and global associates to use data-tested messaging tactics in countering terrorism and VE.<sup>116</sup>

#### **2.2.4 Building community Resilience**

Disrupting terrorism and violent extremism narratives online and protecting our communities from all forms of radicalization is the best strategy to prevent home-grown terrorism. Thus, all local communities are required to build resilience against the threats emanating from all terrorist and violent extremist groups. It's important for the members of the communities led by religious leaders, civil society groups (all non-state groups), and local law enforcement agencies to cooperate in order to thwart radicalization globally.<sup>117</sup> Cooperation between the said groups, Vis- a -Vie the top-down led government initiatives will mitigate most global communities from the risk of terrorism/ violent extremism and eventually improve community relationships.<sup>118</sup>

#### **Impact of building community Resilience**

Building community resilience through providing opportunities for employment among the youths, mentoring initiatives, community engagement opportunities, will out rightly curb terrorism and violent extremism recruitment.<sup>119</sup>

#### **2.2.5 Enhancing Community Policing**

Most global countries are now using community policing as a measure to combat violent extremism and terrorism. The strategy (Community policing) focuses

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<sup>116</sup> S. Khan and M. Eoyang, "The Plan to Combat Terrorism", Third Way, Updated September 30, 2016.

<sup>117</sup> Ibid

<sup>118</sup> Ibid

<sup>119</sup> Sanaa Khan and Mieke Eoyang, "The Plan to Combat Terrorism", Third Way, Updated September 30, 2016.

on ensuring there is a constant and amicable cooperation among the public and members of the security agencies, for a proactive problem-solving mechanism, that is durable and tangible in fighting violent extremism and terrorism.<sup>120</sup>

However, both the police and policymakers, “should have realistic expectations concerning the outcomes of what the community policing can achieve in response to what is often a low-incidence, highly multifaceted and multidimensional issue.” Community policing will not solely act as a magic tool to avert violent extremism and terrorism. It needs to be supported and cooperated as a comprehensive, and human rights-compliant strategy in conditions that are conducive to deter terrorism and violent extremism.

### **Impact of community policing in combating violent extremism and terrorism**

The benefits of community policing in dealing with acts of terrorism and violent extremism will only be viable if the principles of democratic policing are adhered to. These include: “Refining public perceptions of, and interaction with, the police;” “Ensure respect for human rights and the rule of law is adhered to;” “Facilitate proper communiqué with the public on counterterrorism;” “Increasing police understanding of communities as a better place of engagement and co-operation;” “Increasing public alertness and resilience;” “Assisting to detect and address community safety concerns and grievances;” “Improve relations between the police and the community and the groups that have posed difficulty in reaching or engaging;” and to, “Aide apt identification and referral of acute situations.”

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<sup>120</sup> OSCE, “Preventing Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism: A Community-Policing Approach”, Organization for security and Co-operation in Europe, February 2014.

Thus, to ensure effective community policing, the level of trust between the police and the community needs to exist and be guaranteed. This can be achieved if the police engage the community on a wider safety concerns that are of importance to all, not essentially touching on terrorism and violent extremism.<sup>121</sup>

### **2.2.6 Embracing Religion and Culture**

The Government of Philippine has given a directive to recruit members of the Muslim community into the military institutions. This order aims to act as an incentive or form of employment to the youths affiliated to Islamic religion hence reduce the push and pull factors such as unemployment that make most of the young individuals to be recruited into the terrorist and violent extremist networks.<sup>122</sup> This came after the government faced security issues from the growing “Maute”, a group associated with Islamic State (IS), in the city of Marawi.

The counter-terrorism strategy will help to change the Muslim’s perception and have them, approve the presence of the military where most of its population sympathizes are connected to the militants. Thus, the beginning of 2017, the government of the Philippines adopted a maximum of 5 percent quota for Muslim recruits in the military. Having the military recruitment accessible to all citizens, the Muslim community all along have had low interest in being part of the military, thinking they never had the right qualifications to join the force. Therefore, setting the quota, the government hoped it will motivate the Muslims to be recruited into the military. This

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<sup>121</sup> OSCE, “Preventing Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism: A Community-Policing Approach”, Organization for security and Co-operation in Europe, February 2014.

<sup>122</sup> Bayu Mitra A. Kusuma, “Using religion and culture to fight terrorism: lessons from the Philippine military”, The Conversation, November 21, 2018.

notwithstanding, the government of the Philippines set a quota to 5 percent of indigenous people and 10 percent for female soldiers.<sup>123</sup>

### **Impact of embracing religion and culture**

First, the strategy might get it to support from local communities. This will help reduce any suspicions when it comes to deployment of the local military into the community.<sup>124</sup> Second, the strategy will offer an opportunity for dialogue with the Muslim communities and also allow for the formation of a special unit comprising of Muslims that are sensitive to and understands Muslim religion and cultural necessities.<sup>125</sup>

On the other hand, this strategy may have some negative ramifications to the government of the Philippines. This is primarily because the strategy may create factions within the military between other units and that comprising of the Muslims.<sup>126</sup>

### **2.3 Summary**

The findings of this chapter on global strategies and their impact in countering violent extremism and terrorism shows that most strategies were more militaristic in nature. Operating under four pillars – “Prevent, Protect, Pursue and Respond”, the strategies have both had negative and positive responses. On the negative impacts, most of the militaristic strategies such as military invasions, aggressive and constant

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<sup>123</sup> Bayu Kusuma, “Using religion and culture to fight terrorism: lessons from the Philippine military”, *The Conversation*, November 21, 2018.

<sup>124</sup> Ibid

<sup>125</sup> Bayu Kusuma, “Using religion and culture to fight terrorism: lessons from the Philippine military”, *The Conversation*, November 21, 2018.

<sup>126</sup> Ibid

airstrike campaigns, supporting of local forces and some intelligence-driven strategies have in one way or the other led to the exacerbation of terror attacks in the world. However, in examining some of the global strategies especially the soft-power approached such as de-radicalization strategies have resulted in a reduction of radicalization processes that leads to violent extremism and terrorist acts.

Looking through the lenses of the human need theory, the chapter shows how violent extremism and terrorism has had a negative impact on the global community, resulting to the need of developing more strategies to counter VE and terrorism, and ensure safety of all global citizens. However, the chapter has disapprove the first hypotheses which tested the development of global strategies will lead to a reduction of violent extremism and terrorism.

## CHAPTER THREE

### Trends and impacts of strategies adopted in countering violent extremism and terrorism in Africa

#### 3.0 Introduction

African countries over the past years have experienced an upsurge on threats emanating from acts of terrorism and violent extremism. These states have tried to respond to the threat through the use of regional, sub-regional, and national level strategies. However, some of these strategies in place, if not well structured and clearly defined will certainly not be able to curb the ever increasing risk emanating from acts of terrorism.<sup>127</sup> In Africa, countries are struggling to emancipate themselves from the grip of the homegrown terrorist groups such as: “Al-Shabaab in East Africa”, “the Movement for the Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MOJWA) in North and West Africa”, “the LRA in Central Africa,” “Ansaru and Boko Haram in Cameroon and Nigeria respectively”.<sup>128</sup>

Therefore, these African countries based on their diverse levels of threat, are currently at different points in developing their multi-stakeholder strategies<sup>129</sup>. Nonetheless, it is imperative for affected countries to orient themselves towards

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<sup>127</sup> Africa Center for Strategic Studies, “National Counterterrorism Strategy Development”, 2017. Available at: <https://africacenter.org/programs/national-counterterrorism-strategy-development/>; Accessed on: June 25, 2019.

<sup>128</sup> AU, “Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on Terrorism and Violent Extremism in Africa at the Peace and Security Council 455th Meeting at the Level of Heads of State and Government, Nairobi, Kenya.” September 2, 2014. Available at: <https://au.int/fr/node/25397>, Accessed on: June 26, 2019.

<sup>129</sup> Interview with Scholar 1, September 5, 2019.

recognizable long-term goals, develop legitimacy for counter-terrorism strategies within the governments, and also synchronize national counter-terrorism policies with the regional and sub-regional responses.<sup>130</sup> In articulating this chapter, the researcher has categorized the strategies into, regional, and sub-regional level strategies.

### **3.1 Regional Strategy**

#### **3.1.1 The African Union Counter-Terrorism Legal Mechanism**

The African Union as a regional body representing the 54 African States, is mandated to ensure that there is amity and security in the region. At the 28<sup>th</sup> ordinary session in 1992, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) held a conference in Dakar, Senegal. The Meeting ended with the adoption of “Resolution 213 on the Strengthening of Cooperation and Coordination among African States.” The OAU as a regional body made a pledge to fight terrorism and violent extremism.<sup>131</sup>

Thereafter, in Tunis at the 30<sup>th</sup> ordinary session (1994), the OAU approved the “Declaration on the Code of Conduct for Inter-African Relations [AHG/Del.2 (XXX)]”. Here, the OAU denounced all acts of violent extremism, including those touching on religion, sectarianism, ethnicity and tribalism.<sup>132</sup> In 2015, the “African Union Peace and Security” released a report stating that, “the AU in 1999 adopted the “AU Convention on the Prevention and Combatting of Terrorism”. Later in 2004, the “African Union Peace and Security Council (AU PSC)” was granted the mandate to “co-ordinate and harmonize continental efforts in the prevention and combating of

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<sup>130</sup> Ibid

<sup>131</sup> Africa Union Peace and Security, “The African Union Counter Terrorism Framework”, November 23, 2015. Available at: <http://www.peaceau.org/en/page/64-counter-terrorism-ct>; Accessed on: June 26, 2019.

<sup>132</sup> Africa Union Peace and Security, “The African Union Counter Terrorism Framework”, November 23, 2015.

international terrorism in all its facets”. Further, the report showed that by 2015, 41 countries had ratified the convention and approximately 50 countries had signed it.<sup>133</sup>

Agreeing to the Convention, the Member States were obligated to outlaw all acts of terrorism within their jurisdictions. Also, the convention defined areas of partnership among the states, outlined legal structure on extra-territorial investigations and extraditions, avenues for common legal assistance, and instituted state prerogative over terrorist acts.<sup>134</sup> This notwithstanding, the AU established the “African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT)” that has its headquarters in Algiers. The center’s mandate is to undertake empirical research on terrorism, consolidate information and organize symposium and programs that relate to counter-terrorism. Further, the center is mandated to organize forums for the interaction and collaboration among the Regional instruments and the Member States. Strengthening the AU abilities to counter violent extremism, the African Union body in 2010 instituted a new position and appointed a Special Representative for Counter-Terrorism. Further, the AU Assembly in helping Member states to harmonize their legislation on terrorism, the regional body adopted the “African Model Law on Counter-Terrorism” in 2011.<sup>135</sup>

Violent extremism continues to pose as a threat towards regional security and peace. Taking the threat seriously, the AU convened a Head of State-level Peace and Security Council meeting on September 2, 2014, in Nairobi, Kenya. The outcome of the Nairobi PSC meeting gave birth to the “Counter-Terrorism Fund”, which will be

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<sup>133</sup> Ibid

<sup>134</sup> Ibid

<sup>135</sup> UNOAU, “Counter Terrorism”, United Nations Office to the African Union, 2019. Available at: <https://unoau.unmissions.org/counter-terrorism>; Accessed on: June 26, 2019.



used to support research and other activities aimed at fighting VE activities. Also, “pursuant to the AU Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact, the Peace and Security Council called for the formation of a specialized joint counter-terrorism units at the sub-regional level under the context of the African Standby Force (ASF).”<sup>136</sup>

### **3.1.2 African Union – led counterterrorism regional initiatives**

#### **3.1.2.1 Prevention for payment of ransom to terrorist groups**

At the 13<sup>th</sup> ordinary session held in Sirte-Libya on July 1-3, 2009, the AU adopted decision – “Assembly/AU/Dec. 256(XIII)”. Doing this, the regional body sent a direct and stern message condemning any payment of ransom to violent extremist groups in exchange of hostages. The decision also made any ransom payout as a form of crime. The decision in consultation with the UN Security Council will ensure there is a consolidation of “Decision 256” with the “United Nations resolutions 1267 (1999)” and “1373 (2001)”.<sup>137</sup>

#### **3.1.2.2 African Union (AU) Peace Support Operations**

The AU through its Peace Support Missions has significantly drained most swathes of terrorist and violent extremist networks. Here, most governments in Africa have adopted anti-terrorism legislations to fortify their borders against the infiltration of terrorist networks. Also, most regional states have formulated integrated

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<sup>136</sup> Ibid

<sup>137</sup> AU, “Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on Terrorism and Violent Extremism in Africa at the Peace and Security Council 455th Meeting at the Level of Heads of State and Government, Nairobi, Kenya.” September 2, 2014.

instruments on how to handle the violent extremists' returnees. The options are: prosecuting them, rehabilitating them or acts of reconciliation.<sup>138</sup>

Also, the deployment of AMISOM and Multi-National Joint Task Force to fight and suppress Boko haram and other terrorist affiliated networks has significantly fragmented the plans of the terrorist and violent extremist networks in Somalia, Central Africa, and other regions. The African Union led missions have managed to build capacities in intelligence gathering services in line with the AU instruments and structures, through the establishment of the "Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA)", and the "AU Mechanism for Police Cooperation (AFRIPOL)".<sup>139</sup>

### **3.1.2.3 Djibouti and Nouakchott Initiatives for Enhancing Security Cooperation**

The Djibouti and Nouakchott initiatives for "Enhancing Security Cooperation in Eastern Africa and Sahel Regions", formed by AU, have their functions well defined. They are to ensure there is a robust mechanism for collaboration of intelligence services among Member States. The initiatives have also granted permission to the various institutions to develop a common security threat and formulate collective response procedures to address them. The meetings also played a role in building confidence measures among the intelligence services for the member

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<sup>138</sup> Reliefweb, "Briefing note on a comprehensive approach to combat the transnational threat of terrorism and violent extremism in Africa," Africa Union, February 6, 2018. Available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/world/briefing-note-comprehensive-approach-combat-transnational-threat-terrorism-and-violent>, Accessed on: June 26, 2019.

<sup>139</sup> Reliefweb, "Briefing note on a comprehensive approach to combat the transnational threat of terrorism and violent extremism in Africa," Africa Union, February 6, 2018.

states. Similarly, the AU invited all heads of security and intelligence services at its headquarters in Addis Ababa on November 10, 2017.<sup>140</sup>

#### **3.1.2.4 AU-Special Fund for Prevention and Combating of Terrorism and Violent Extremism in Africa**

The African Union in its quest to fight violent extremism and terrorism decided to establish the “AU-Special Fund for Prevention and Combating of Terrorism and Violent Extremism in Africa”. The adoption of the law was done under – “Assembly/AU/Dec. 614 (XXVII) and Assembly/AU/Dec. 627(XXVIII)”. The two decisions were adopted at two consecutive assembly of the union meetings held on July 2016 and January 2017 respectively. “The draft statute of the Fund was considered by the 10th Ordinary Meeting of the Specialized Technical Committee on Defense, Safety and Security (STCDSS) and later moved to the Specialized Technical Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs for further consideration” as stated by a 2018 AU report.<sup>141</sup>

#### **3.1.2.5 Establishment of the African Mechanism for Police Cooperation (AFRIPOL)**

The operationalization of AFRIPOL in Malabo under decision “EX.CL/Dec. 820(XXV)” on June 2014 at the 25<sup>th</sup> ordinary session in Malabo, will enable the region to handle issues related to transnational organized criminality. The formation of AFRIPOL was as a result of the “African Conference of Police Directors and Inspector-Generals”, held on February 10-11, 2014 in Algiers. The aim of AFRIPOL

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<sup>140</sup> Ibid

<sup>141</sup> Reliefweb, “Briefing note on a comprehensive approach to combat the transnational threat of terrorism and violent extremism in Africa,” Africa Union, February 6, 2018.

was to ensure there is coordination within the police strategic, tactical and operational levels. After the official commissioning of the Secretariat in Algiers, on July 2017, AFRIPOL carried out, “capacity-building workshops on Transnational Organized Crime, Cybercrime and Terrorism on October 24-25, 2017”. Other subsequent workshops such as “Enhanced Cooperation in Combating Cybercrime”, was held in December 13-14, 2017”. The forums facilitated the identification of significant areas in combating cybercrime at national, and regional levels, and transnational organized crime.<sup>142</sup>

### **Impact of AU-led Counter-terrorism Strategies**

First, the “2002 AU Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism”, aims at helping the regional states to implement all requirements that are available in various international and continental strategies such as the OAU "Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism and its related Protocol" (1999).<sup>143</sup>

Second, in collaboration with the UN Security Council “resolution 2133” of 2014, African States are also obligated to prevent or prohibit individuals, institutes, governments from providing support to terrorist organizations or pay any kind of ransom to secure the release of hostages kidnapped by either violent extremist

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<sup>142</sup> Ibid

<sup>143</sup> Africa Union Peace and Security, “The African Union Counter Terrorism Framework”, November 23, 2015.

networks or terrorist groups. Member states are obligated to ensure that no terrorist benefits directly or indirectly from any form of financing.<sup>144</sup>

### **3.2 Sub-regional Strategy**

#### **3.2.1 The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)**

Violent extremism and terrorism have become major challenges for countries in West Africa. The sub-regional body (ECOWAS) has failed to respond to the threat emanating from violent extremism and terrorism. This is because, the nature of the threat keeps changing.<sup>145</sup> However, in keeping up with AU's and UN Security Council resolutions for countering violent extremism and terrorism, ECOWAS developed its strategies to guide the sub-regional body. The strategies aim to pursue, reconstruct, and prevent violent extremist activities. Further, ECOWAS through the guidance of the African Union has set up two ad hoc response structures. The first is the "Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF)". MNJTF aim is to ensure that the threat emanating from Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin is dealt with. The second is the "Joint Force of the Group of Five of the Sahel", whose main task is to respond to the threat of violent extremism in the Sahel.<sup>146</sup>

#### **3.2.2 Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD)**

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<sup>144</sup> AU, "Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on Terrorism and Violent Extremism in Africa at the Peace and Security Council 455th Meeting at the Level of Heads of State and Government, Nairobi, Kenya." September 2, 2014.

<sup>145</sup> ISS, "ECOWAS struggles to address violent extremism", PSC Report, June 13, 2019. Available at: <https://issafrica.org/pscreport/psc-insights/ecowas-struggles-to-address-violent-extremism>; Accessed on: June 26, 2019.

<sup>146</sup> ISS, "ECOWAS struggles to address violent extremism", PSC Report, June 13, 2019.

Member States of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), plus Tanzania from July 2016 embarked on the process of developing the now adopted 2018, “regional strategy for preventing and countering violent extremism”. The strategy will be reviewed after every three years to ensure its conformity with the changing trends in violent extremism and terrorism.<sup>147</sup>

### **3.2.3 East Africa Community (EAC)**

Al-Shabaab remains as the main terrorist threat in East Africa. Having its roots from Somalia, the terrorist organization had initially taken over some parts of Somalia such as Kismayo. Although currently driven out of major Somali cities, the terrorist organization continues to carry out attacks against neighbouring countries such as Kenya, civilians within its borders and the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS).<sup>148</sup>

Trying to counter acts of violent extremism and terrorism, the EAC member states have adopted various strategies. These are: “East Africa Counter-Terrorism Initiatives (EACTI)”, the “African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)”, and the “Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HoA)”.<sup>149</sup> These strategies have led to the adoption of legal, operational, and strategic strategies that are now currently been used to combat violent extremism. These strategies tend to function through four jointly underlining elements: “Detect, *Prevent*, *Deny* and *Respond*.”

### **3.3 Impact of the Sub-Regional Strategies**

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<sup>147</sup> IGAD, “Regional Strategy for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism”, 2018.

<sup>148</sup> AU, “Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on Terrorism and Violent Extremism in Africa at the Peace and Security Council 455th Meeting at the Level of Heads of State and Government, Nairobi, Kenya.” September 2, 2014.

<sup>149</sup> Mogire E and Agade K.M, “Counter –terrorism in Kenya”, *Journal of Contemporary Africa Studies*, pp. 473-491, 2011.

First, military strategies have failed to respond to the threat of Boko Haram. This is due to the quick changing nature of the threat. ECOWAS, has experienced eminent challenges in intervening in the case of Boko Haram due to Nigeria's central position in the region and its response to such a move. Second, the non-interference policy has made countries to shun away from mobilizing each other and intervene in cases where it requires regional effort.<sup>150</sup> Third, the threat of Boko Haram has its effect felt all across the Lake Chad. Having affected both the Central and West Africa region, anchoring a regional strategy on either Economic Community of Central African States or ECOWAS has become the biggest problem.<sup>151</sup>

### **3.4 Summary**

The chapter finding shows that most of the strategies adopted by African States tend to resonate with global strategies. Categorized under regional and sub-regional strategies the finding shows that the impact of the strategies is minimal. This is as a result of having different African States developing and adopting their own counter-terrorism and CVE strategies at different times<sup>152</sup>. Also, the Africa States that have been highly targeted and have suffered major attacks are on the fore-front in pushing for the C-T and CVE strategies at the regional level. However, the C-T and CVE strategies that have been adopted under the pillars of: "Detect, Prevent, Deny and Respond" are viewed as western led strategies, hence have no connection with the causes that lead to acts of terrorism and violent extremism in Africa.

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<sup>150</sup> ISS, "ECOWAS struggles to address violent extremism", PSC Report, June 13, 2019.

<sup>151</sup> ISS, "ECOWAS struggles to address violent extremism", PSC Report, June 13, 2019.

<sup>152</sup> Interview 6 with a security official tasked to handle CT issues, September 24, 2019

Thus, the chapter study assessed objective two which was to evaluate the trends and impacts of the strategies adopted in countering violent extremism and terrorism in Africa. In conclusion, the chapter study has approved the second hypothesis that ineffective strategies leads to an upsurge of violent extremism and terrorism in Africa.



## CHAPTER FOUR

### **The multi-stakeholder approaches and their challenges in countering violent extremism and terrorism in Kenya.**

#### **4.0 Introduction**

After the August 7, 1998 bombing of the American embassy in Nairobi, Kenya has been on the forefront in countering violent extremism and terrorism. However, the initial approach was through the use of militaristic measures (security-based approaches) to counter acts of terrorism and violent extremism. This approach became ineffective as more youths continued to join violent extremist groups. The failure of State-led approaches to stem the rise of violent extremism activities on a global scale shifted the policy focus on countering violent extremism and terrorism to now the adopted multi-stakeholder approaches.<sup>153</sup>

#### **4.1 The Multi-stake Holder Approaches**

The multi-stakeholder approaches are strategies adopted jointly by both the Kenyan government and the different members and institutions representing the non-state actors to counter violent extremism and terrorism in Kenya.<sup>154</sup> Below, are some of the strategies that different groups (State and Non-State actors) are implementing concurrently to drain swathes of terrorism and violent extremism in Kenya.

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<sup>153</sup> Patrick Maluki and Rashid Seif, “Using Soft Power to Counter Violent Extremism among the Youth in Kenya”, in the “Changing Dynamics of Terrorism & Violent Extremism: An Analysis”, HORN International Institute for Strategic Studies, Nairobi, Kenya, pp. 115, 2018

<sup>154</sup> Interview 3 with a scholar of security and public policy.

#### **4.1.1 The National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism (NSCVE)**

President Uhuru in September 2016, launched Kenya's national strategy to counter violent extremism.<sup>155</sup> In his speech, President Kenyatta declared that "the NSCVE strategy will pool resources from government, private sector and the civil society in support of combating terrorism and violent extremism, and also ensure it will focus more on de-radicalization over military tactics".<sup>156</sup> The strategy which is informed by ground realities and findings pushed Kenyan government to engage non-state actors towards prevention of radicalization, and rehabilitation of disengaged combatants.<sup>157</sup>

Also based on the vision of the NSCVE, the main focus for the strategy is to, "minimize and/or eliminate violent extremism by mobilizing individuals and groups at the national and community levels", "to reject violent extremist ideologies in order to shrink the pool of individuals whom terrorist groups can radicalize and recruit".<sup>158</sup>

In essence, the NSCVE creates an opportunity for national approaches towards de-radicalization, disengagement, rehabilitation and reintegration of returnees based on the assessment of risk and counter-radicalization frameworks.<sup>159</sup>

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<sup>155</sup> PSCU, "President Kenyatta Launches Strategy on Countering Violent Extremism" Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September 2016. Available at: <http://www.mfa.go.ke/?p=744>, Accessed on: August 27, 2019.

<sup>156</sup> Counter Extremism Project, "Kenya: Extremism and Counter-Extremism". Available at: <https://www.counterextremism.com/countries/kenya>; Accessed on: August 31, 2019.

<sup>157</sup> Tom Adala and Mumo Nzau, "A critical review of state responses to counter terrorism and violent extremism in Kenya and the wider Eastern Africa Region," in the "Changing Dynamics of Terrorism & Violent Extremism: An Analysis", HORN International Institute for Strategic Studies, Nairobi, Kenya, pp. 242, 2018

<sup>158</sup> Mikewa Oganda, "A policy content evaluation of Kenya's national strategy to Counter violent extremism," Centre for Human Rights and Policy Studies, Policy Brief No. 9, November 2017.

<sup>159</sup> Ibid pg. 45.

#### 4.1.2 De-radicalization and Rehabilitation Programs

De-radicalization programs tend to address the ideological challenges and prevent the appeal of hard power (militancy); transforming attitudes and seeking to rehabilitate affected persons into the community.<sup>160</sup> These programs essentially target individuals' attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors. According to Renee Garfield, "the choice to de-radicalize was often an individual's decision and reference to role models was often cited as an important factor in distancing from radical beliefs".<sup>161</sup>

In Kenya, a majority of the radicalized youth who had joined various terror groups overseas are now coming back as 'returnees'. Most of them showing signs of being interested in the reintegrated process announced in 2015 by the government of Kenya, under the amnesty program. However, with a significant population of the returnees finding their way back into the country illegally, the government needs to partner with relevant members of the non-state actors to assist in dealing with the issue – lest the returnees mutate and become a security threat to Kenya's national security.<sup>162</sup>

The amnesty initiative focuses on "counseling and rehabilitation", as well as ensuring the safety of those who have surrendered. The program was promoted as a "counter violent extremism" strategy, to rehabilitate former militants, and help de-radicalize the societies in which they stay. Through the amnesty program, a screening

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<sup>160</sup> Leila Ezzarqui, "MA dissertation Graduate School of Arts & Sciences, Georgetown University", Washington DC, 2010.

<sup>161</sup> Garfield, Renee. "Personal Transformations: Moving from violence to peace. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, Special Report, April 2007.

<sup>162</sup> William Rosenau, "Al-Qaida Recruitment Trends in Kenya and Tanzania," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 2005.

system for returnees has been established to guarantee that former fighters do not disappear into new terror or extremist groups. The vetting process conducted by the State authorities seeks to first understand the level of commitment and accountability of these ex-combatants; and where they will be reintegrated back to the society once they have been cleared from the vetting process. The process of reintegration includes activities such as providing essential education, vocational training, organizing sporting and arts events.<sup>163</sup>

#### **4.1.3 County Actions Plans (CAPs)**

The County Action Plans are instruments that are designed to add value to Kenya's NSCVE. Its purpose is to delegitimize violent ideologies at the county level.<sup>164</sup> The action plans are meant to coordinate both the government and non-state actions in the design and implementation of the counter violent extremism strategies at the community level. This is informed by the necessity to have the ability to identify the challenges posed by terrorists and violent extremist that take advantage of the local dynamics as demonstrated at the national and regional level. Currently, counties such as Lamu, Kwale, Kilifi, and Mombasa have finalized the development of their various county action plans.<sup>165</sup>

#### **4.1.4 Strategic Early Warning Systems (EWS)**

Amutabi observes that “early warning frameworks have long been used in security and humanitarian circles, but the concept of conflict early warning systems

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<sup>163</sup> Ibid

<sup>164</sup> Tom Adala and Mumo Nzau, “A critical review of state responses to counter terrorism and violent extremism in Kenya and the wider Eastern Africa Region,” in the “Changing Dynamics of Terrorism & Violent Extremism: An Analysis”, HORN International Institute for Strategic Studies, Nairobi, Kenya, pp. 242, 2018

<sup>165</sup> Ibid pg. 46

rooted in a human security approach is recent, emerging with the United Nation (UN) Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's report. Since then, conflict early warning systems have continually been identified by the United Nations and international organizations as crucial to effective conflict prevention".<sup>166</sup>

Further, in Kenya, informal and non-formal early warning systems were incorporated in the 2010 constitution through recognition of an alternative justice system as a mechanism of resolving conflicts. However, Kenya is still struggling to have a solid informal early warning mechanism against terrorism and other forms of conflict. Experts have mapped 50 terrorism hotspots in Kenya which need to be monitored through informal early warning. Noting is that in Kenya, terror cells are often organized within communities and recruiters are often known to local individuals, but not to government agencies.<sup>167</sup> Thus, to effectively combat terrorism and violent extremism, both the State and non-state actors needs to invest heavily on strategic early warning systems.<sup>168</sup>

#### **4.1.5 Nyumba Kumi Initiative**

The "nyumba kumi initiative" was adopted by the National Police Service as a community policing model. This initiative was purely on building trust between members of the public/local communities and the law enforcement agencies in order to assist in policing the ungoverned spaces that the terrorist have been using to radicalize and recruit terrorists and violent extremists.<sup>169</sup> The initiative aims at

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<sup>166</sup> Maurice Amutabi, "The place of informal early warning systems in countering and preventing terrorism in Kenya", in the "Changing Dynamics of Terrorism & Violent Extremism: An Analysis", HORN International Institute for Strategic Studies, Nairobi, Kenya, pp. 253, 2018.

<sup>167</sup> Interview 3 with a scholar of security and public policy.

<sup>168</sup> Ibid pg. 47.

<sup>169</sup> Tom Adala and Mumo Nzau, "A critical review of state responses to counter terrorism and violent extremism in Kenya and the wider Eastern Africa Region," in the "Changing Dynamics of Terrorism &

increasing citizen participation in identifying criminal elements within their community.<sup>170</sup>

Borrowed from Tanzania, the strategy has been accredited with preventing crimes, arresting notorious criminals, and ensuring safety within communities.<sup>171</sup>

In an interview by the fair planet, Petronilla Muoka, a security expert said that “Nyumba Kumi has become one of the most effective tools of fighting mutating crime. In a country where the police to civilian ratio stands at 1:1000, it is difficult for police to be everywhere all the time and this is how criminals exploit the loopholes. By being the ears and eyes of the police the citizens have become key players in bringing crime down.”<sup>172</sup>

Thus, the initiative has ensured there is relative security within communities and prompts reporting of suspicious incidences, resulting in curbing of acts of violent extremism. For example, through a public tip-off, the security forces in Kenya were able to recover about “401 ammonium nitrate rolls of explosives” in a commuter’s bus heading to Mombasa County. According to police reports, the number of explosives were capable of destroying a 30 storeyed building.<sup>173</sup>

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Violent Extremism: An Analysis”, HORN International Institute for Strategic Studies, Nairobi, Kenya, pp. 241, 2018.

<sup>170</sup> Bob Koigi, “How Kenya’s Ten Houses Concept is Taming Crime and Terrorism”, Fair Planet, April 27, 2016. Available at: <https://www.fairplanet.org/story/how-kenyas-ten-houses-concept-is-taming-crime-and-terrorism/>, Accessed on: August 31, 2019.

<sup>171</sup> Ibid pg. 47

<sup>172</sup> Ibid pg. 47

<sup>173</sup> Ibid pg. 47

## **4.2 Challenges affecting the multi-stakeholder approaches**

### **4.2.1 Reliance on funding from the West**

According to Agade and Mogire, “one of the greatest challenges and source of resistance to counterterrorism and CVE measures by the government in countering VE and terrorism is the view that the strategies are mainly driven by the West through various funding initiatives.<sup>174</sup> As a result of this, the strategies tend to stereotype one section of the population, mostly the Muslims against the government who view the “global war on terror” as an attack on Islam and one led by the U.S., government.<sup>175</sup>

### **4.2.2 Corruption**

Another challenge as observed by Ndungu is that, in addition to uncoordinated and rushed military and policy responses to terrorism, corruption remains as a key challenges.<sup>176</sup> For example, Mwangi observed that, “during operation usalama watch in Nairobi and to be specific in the Eastleigh area, the police arrested individuals who were in the country illegally. However, the same people bought their freedom by bribing the police”.<sup>177</sup>

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<sup>174</sup> Mogire E and Agade K.M, “Counter –terrorism in Kenya”, *Journal of Contemporary Africa Studies*, pp. 473-491, 2011.

<sup>175</sup> Whitaker B.E, “Reluctant partners: Fighting terrorism and promoting democracy,” *International Studies Perspectives*, pp. 254-271, 2008.

<sup>176</sup> Irene Ndungu, “To fight terrorism, fight corruption first”, Institute for Security Studies, October 9, 2015. Available at: <https://issafrica.org/iss-today/to-fight-terrorism-fight-corruption-first>, Accessed on: March 24, 2019.

<sup>177</sup> Mwangi O.G, Corruption, human rights violation and counter-terrorism policies in Kenya. Handbook of Global Counter – terrorism Policy, 1041-1054, 2017.

### **4.2.3 Uncoordinated and Politicization of Strategy**

Further, Irene Ndungu observed that “the politicized fight against al-Shabaab, intelligence leaks and an apparent lack of adequate training and equipment have posed major impediments to the government’s ability to detect and intercept the majority of terrorist activities.”<sup>178</sup> Also, Singo Stephen noted that “Kenya’s counter-terrorism strategies will not achieve their desired ends if the country continues to be as deeply divided as it has been in recent years. Across the country, tribal politics, perceived marginalization and exclusion have rendered the Kenyan society deeply divided along tribal and regional lines.” “Following the disputed 2017 elections, some opposition leaders called for the secession of parts of the country dominated by opposition supporters who argued that there is no need to remain as one country in the middle of electoral injustice.”<sup>179</sup>

### **4.2.4 Deep-rooted grievances**

Singo state that, “in an interview with a number of key informants in Kwale and Mombasa counties revealed deep-seated grievances with some respondents arguing that owing to the marginalization of the coast region, and the persecution of Muslims by the government in its anti-terror activities, the majority of local residents are in support of calls by their leaders for secession.”<sup>180</sup> With such call of secession,

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<sup>178</sup> Irene Ndungu, “To fight terrorism, fight corruption first”, Institute for Security Studies, October 9, 2015.

<sup>179</sup> Singo Stephen Mwachofi, “Countering or Inadvertently Aiding Terror? Assessing the Kenyan State’s Response to Terrorism, 2011-2017”, in the “Changing Dynamics of Terrorism & Violent Extremism: An Analysis”, HORN International Institute for Strategic Studies, Nairobi, Kenya, pp. 78-79, 2018.

<sup>180</sup> Singo Stephen, “Countering or Inadvertently Aiding Terror? Assessing the Kenyan State’s Response to Terrorism, 2011-2017”, HORN International Institute for Strategic Studies, Nairobi, Kenya, pp. 78-79, 2018.



violent extremist groups like “Mombasa Republican Council (MRC)” began emerging and posing a serious challenge and threat to the C-T and CVE strategies in Kenya.

### **4.3 Summary**

The findings of the chapter show that Kenya’s initial approaches to counter VE and acts of terrorism were based on hard/militaristic power. This approach became ineffective as more youths continued to be attracted to VE and terror affiliated networks. Also, acts of terrorism and violent extremism started to escalate making institutions of learning, places of worship, shopping malls and various bus terminals as targeted areas. Thus, the failure of State-led strategies to root out the rise of violent extremism activities, shifted the policy focus on countering violent extremism and terrorism to now the adopted multi-stakeholder approaches.

However, the frosty relationship between the government (state agencies task to implement the counterterrorism strategies) and the non-state actors has led to the failure of available CT and CVE strategies. For example, the January 15, 2019 terror attack at the DusitD2 complex in Nairobi would have been averted if the government had put proper measures in intelligence dissemination from the non –state actors (Here, members of the public).

Conversely, after the adoption of the multi-stakeholder approaches to combat and counter acts of terrorism and violent extremism, where both State –led approaches are infused with those of the Non-State actors, a number of attacks have been prevented in most parts of Kenya.

The human need theory critically guided the researcher on the chapter findings and especially the reasons that led to the adoption of the multi-stakeholder approaches in countering violence extremism and terrorism in Kenya. The need to safeguard

Kenya's borders at all cost pushed the government to seek alternative strategies in countering VE and acts of terrorism in Kenya.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### Data Presentation and Analysis

#### 5.0 Introduction

This chapter presents and analyzes the primary information collected from members of the non-state actors including scholars who are involved in the area of Counter Violent Extremism, the youth in affected areas, Africa Policy Institute as a representation of not-for-profit institutions that has been involved in violent extremism projects and few members from Kenya's security agencies who wished to remain anonymous due to the sensitivity of the area of study.

#### 5.1 Counter-terrorism and CVE Strategies

Most of Africa's counter-terrorism and CVE strategies have been adopted from the global strategies on countering violent extremism and terrorism led by the United Nations and other western nations.<sup>181</sup> In Kenya, the government has developed several, administrative, policy, and legal CVE and counter-terrorism approaches to gather intelligence used to avert and counter acts of terrorism and violent extremism.<sup>182</sup> Implementation of the strategies has been conducted from the community, regional and national levels, with the aim of responding to the shifting nature in which acts of terrorism and violent extremism are conducted.<sup>183</sup>

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<sup>181</sup> Interview 1 with a scholar

<sup>182</sup> Interview 1 with a scholar

<sup>183</sup> Interview 1 with a scholar

## **5.2 The Multi-stakeholder strategies on countering terrorism and violent extremism in Kenya**

After the 2013 Westgate mall and the April 2, 2015 Garissa University College attacks, the government of Kenya, shifted its state-led counter-terrorism strategies and began implementing programs that are less militaristic in nature.<sup>184</sup> The government began to partner with non-state actors to first conceptualize the terms – terrorism, violent extremism, radicalization, and counter-terrorism measures.<sup>185</sup> Conceptualization of these terms led to the proper understanding of how to deal with each case (for instance-radicalization processes) that lead to acts of terrorism. With these basics, various multi-stakeholder approaches in countering violent extremism and terrorism began to emerge.<sup>186</sup> Strategies such as de-radicalization programs began to emerge.

The de-radicalization programs were developed and implemented as a “whole of society” approaches that targeted grassroots community leaders, religious leaders, youth community leaders, community-based organization, respected scholars of Islam whose task is to hold intellectual dialogue with potential extremists aimed at convincing them to denounce and reject radical ideas or ideologies.<sup>187</sup>

Other than the de-radicalization programs, the government has partnered with non-state actors to implement other multi-stakeholder strategies to combat acts of terrorism and violent extremism. These include intelligence gathering, mentorship for the youth through engaging them in life skills training, sports activities, and

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<sup>184</sup> Interview 2


<sup>185</sup> Interview 3 with a scholar

<sup>186</sup> Interview 3 with a scholar

<sup>187</sup> Patrick Maluki and Rashid Seif, “Using Soft Power to Counter Violent Extremism among the Youth in Kenya”, in the “Changing Dynamics of Terrorism & Violent Extremism: An Analysis”, HORN International Institute for Strategic Studies, Nairobi, Kenya, pp. 128, 2018

training.<sup>188</sup> More stringent measures that are also been implemented include; stern jail terms, arrests and prosecutions.<sup>189</sup>

**Figure 1: Multi-stakeholder strategies**



**Source: Researcher’s Primary Data, 2019.**

Based on figure 1, the study indicates that 10 percent of the respondents were aware of intelligence gathering as a strategy to counter VE and terrorism. 40 percent thought that military invasion was a multi-stakeholder approach yet it is more of a State-led strategy. This is because no non-state actor has the capacity or legality to carry out a military operation. More respondents (27 percent) seemed to recognize nyumba kumi as a credible multi-stakeholder strategy in countering VE and terrorism number. On De-radicalization and reintegration of ex-combatant only 13 percent and


<sup>188</sup> Interview 4 with a scholar

<sup>189</sup> Interview 4 with a scholar

10 percent respectively, recognized the multi-stakeholder strategies in countering VE and terrorism undertakings.

## 5.2 State partnering with Non-state actors to implement multi-stakeholder strategies

**Figure 2: Inclusion of Non-State Actors in implementation of CVE and CT strategies**



*Source: Researcher, 2019*

Based on the research, 30 percent of the scholars and members of the community based organisations here referred to as respondents, agreed that the government of Kenya has begun to engage various members representing the non-state actors in the formulation and implementation of the multi-stakeholder approaches in countering violent extremism and terrorism.

For instance, the non-state actors do support government initiatives by engaging in joint research and programs that involve countering violent extremism.<sup>190</sup> They also participate in facilitation of education and awareness programs within affected

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<sup>190</sup> Interview 5 with Africa Policy Institute

communities, support rehabilitation, and de-radicalization programs through funding and technical support.<sup>191</sup>

The youth also have partnered with the State through organizing peer exchange programs such as sporting activities and joint cultural festivals that sensitize fellow youth against engaging in acts of terrorism and violent extremism.<sup>192</sup>

Also, the ex-combatants have come on board to partner with the State. Those who have reformed and undergone the various de-radicalization programs in halfway-houses such as one in Gachie (near Nairobi), tend to share their experiences in different forums.<sup>193</sup> Through sharing of their experience, many young individuals who had the plan to join any terror or violent extremist group normally end up being discouraged.

Members of academia have also not been left behind. Most of them tend to organize seminars and symposiums on topics involving countering violent extremism. They also carry out research and disseminate the findings on various platforms.<sup>194</sup>

However, majority (70 percent) of the respondents still think the government is still reluctant in involving members of the non-state actors when designing and implementing the strategies.

### **5.3 Impact of the Strategies**

Through the study, the respondents agreed that the government has been extremely instrumental in enhancing technological capacity for security agencies.<sup>195</sup>

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<sup>191</sup> Interview 5 with Africa Policy Institute

<sup>192</sup> Interview 4

<sup>193</sup> Interview 4

<sup>194</sup> Interview 3 with a scholar

<sup>195</sup> Interview 6 with a security official

By these, the government has enhanced training in collection and analysis of intelligence. These have enabled the government to prevent many attacks that were to take place in various parts of Kenya. Also, implementing of early warning mechanism in partnership with the members of the various communities has really boosted the fight against terrorism and violent extremism.<sup>196</sup>

#### **5.4 Challenges affecting counter-terrorism strategies**

The study revealed that the major challenge affecting counter-terrorism strategies is the ever-evolving methods and tools used by a terrorist. The other is the corrupt government officials who prefer taking bribes than being diligent in carrying out their duties in a transparent and effective manner.<sup>197</sup>

Other challenges include, fear of being targeted and reprisals; poverty that drives many young people to terrorism in the lure of prosperity now and in the hereafter; proliferation of illicit light weapons; radicalization of illiterate youth; and inadequate resources and training for security forces.<sup>198</sup>

However, in addressing some of the challenges, there is a need to empower a multi-disciplinary approach through data collection, analysis, and practical interventions. Also, there is need to create awareness on professional standards and codes of ethics for civil servants who are involved in security matters of the country. On unemployment, this in most cases has been used as a driver/trigger to acts of terrorism. Hence, the government of Kenya has partnered with community based organizations, faith based organization, and community leaders/influencers to create a more resilient community. This is through offering of internship opportunities to

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<sup>196</sup> Interview 6 with a security official


<sup>197</sup> Interview 4 with a scholar

<sup>198</sup> Interview 4 with a scholar



many youths and also offering of life skill programs in areas that are highly affected by acts of violent extremism.

**Figure 3: Statistical Representation of the Challenges affecting CVE and CT strategies**



**Source: Researcher, 2019**

Figure 3 reveals that 41 percent of the respondents identifies corruption as the main challenge affecting the implementation of CVE and CT strategies. Proliferation of illicit light weapons took the least percentage (7 percent), despite the said weapons playing a key role in the increase of violent extremist and terrorist networks.

### **5.5 Summary**

The findings of this chapter on data presentation and analysis have shown that implementation of the multi-stakeholder approaches is more effective than the state-led mechanisms in countering violent extremism and terrorism. The study through various respondents revealed that the government of Kenya has now changed its trends from how it previously dealt with the ever increasing danger emanating from acts of terrorism and violent extremism in the country. Thus, in conclusion, the study

has effectively approved the study hypothesis that; Effective multi-stakeholder approaches will lead to a reduction on challenges faced in effectively implementation of the counter-terrorism and CVE strategies in Kenya.

Anchored by the human need theory, the concept guided the study during data collection and in analysing the findings, showing the need to change and adopt to new strategies (multi-stakeholder approaches) in countering VE and terrorism in Kenya.

## **CHAPTER SIX**

### **Summary, Conclusion, and Recommendations**

#### **6.0 Introduction**

The chapter sums up the research study on the changing strategies in countering violent extremism and terrorism in Africa, focusing on Kenya. Further, the chapter outlines the conclusion and the recommendation that the study has come up with for purposes of either further studies or an advisory opinion to the targeted population.

#### **6.1 Summary**

The study shows that despite Africa increasingly becoming a theatre of global terrorism and violent extremism, the continent has given a spirited fight against these threats. Africa nations are becoming more proactive in developing their counterterrorism strategies to insulate their citizens against any attacks and secure their borders against the infiltration of violent extremist networks.

However, despite the said instruments offering strategic and operational services in combating violent extremism, most of them have been State-led strategies, of which some have been ineffective. Changing this narrative, the study has revealed that more governments are now embracing a multi-stakeholder approach where the States are partnering with the Non-State Actors to develop effective strategies that will win the war against the scourge of violent extremism and terrorism. Using the human needs theory in analysing the findings of the study, the theory has effectively guided the study, presenting the factors that led the government of Kenya to adopt a multi-stakeholder approach in combating terrorism and violent extremism.

Thus, the study managed to answer the research questions which were; what are the global strategies and their impacts in countering VE and terrorism? What are the trends and impacts of strategies adopted in countering VE and terrorism in Africa? And, what are the existing multi-stakeholder approaches and their challenges in countering VE terrorism in Kenya?

Also, the study accepted the third hypothesis that effective multi-stakeholder approaches will lead to a reduction on challenges faced in the execution of the CVE and CT strategies in Kenya.

## **6.2 Conclusion**

Kenya's initial counter-terrorism approaches to countering acts of terrorism and violent extremism were based on hard/militaristic power. This approach became ineffective as more young people continued to join terror groups. Also, acts of terrorism and violent extremism started to escalate making institutions of learning, places of worship, shopping malls and various bus terminals as targeted areas. Thus, the failure of State-led approaches to reduce the rise of violent extremism and terrorism activities shifted the policy on countering violent extremism and terrorism to now the adopted multi-stakeholder approaches.

Also, the frosty relationship between the government (state agencies task to implement the counterterrorism strategies) and members of non-state actors has resulted to the failure of the strategies. For example, the January 15, 2019 terror attack at the DusitD2 complex in Nairobi would have been averted if the government had put proper measures in intelligence dissemination from the non –state actors (Here, members of the public).

However, after the adoption of the multi-stakeholder approaches to counter acts of terrorism and violent extremism, where both State –led approaches are infused

with those of the Non-State actors, a number of attacks have been prevented in most parts of Kenya.

Further, the study has revealed that there are various issues making the multi-stakeholder strategies not to effectively counter VE and terrorism. These are corruption, deep-rooted grievances, uncoordinated and politicization of strategy and reliance on funding from the West, fear of being targeted and reprisals, poverty that drives many young people to terrorism in the lure of prosperity now and in the hereafter, proliferation of illicit light weapons, radicalization of illiterate youth, and inadequate resources and training for security forces. Hence, solving some of these issues will be a big win in the fight against VE and terrorism in Kenya.

Nonetheless, the findings of the study show that the third hypothesis on effective multi-stakeholder approaches has led to a reduction on challenges faced in the implementation of the CVE and CT strategies in Kenya.

### **6.3 Recommendation**

The study recommends that the government of Kenya links with think tanks, particularly universities, as a knowledge hub in seeking alternative solutions in countering the threat of VE and terrorism in Kenya.

The government of Kenya should avoid policies that alienate marginalized communities and make them more susceptible to recruitment and radicalization by terrorists.

Also, as a multi-stakeholder strategy, the government through the partnership with non-state actors should embrace ‘doctrine revisions’, or ‘intellectual revisions’, or ‘rethinking initiatives’ that aim at “changing the core ideological or religious

beliefs of the terrorist groups, thus bringing the beliefs of group members in line with societal norms”.<sup>199</sup>

#### **6.4 Suggested issues for further studies**

From the findings, the following areas of study have been suggested for further studies: The place for Early Warning System as an instrument in countering VE and terrorism; and, Digital explosion in the 21<sup>st</sup> century and its impact in countering VE and terrorism in Africa.

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<sup>199</sup> Amr Abdalla, “Doctrine Revisions: Transforming the core of Radicalization and Violent Extremism”, in the “Changing Dynamics of Terrorism & Violent Extremism: An Analysis”, HORN International Institute for Strategic Studies, Nairobi, Kenya, pp. 170, 2018.

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**APPENDIX I: LETTER OF INTRODUCTION**

Date .....

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

Dear Sir/Madam:

**REQUEST FOR DATA COLLECTION**

My name is **Dennis Munene Mwaniki**, a student at the Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies, University of Nairobi, pursuing a Master degree in International Conflict Management.

I am conducting a research study titled “**CHANGING STRATEGIES IN COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND TERRORISM IN AFRICA: CASE OF KENYA.**”

You have been selected to form part of the study. Kindly assist by filling in the attached questionnaire/ interview guide. The information provided will be treated in strict confidentiality and will be solely used for academic purposes.

Your assistance will be highly appreciated.

Yours Sincerely,

Dennis Munene Mwaniki

**REG NO: R52/8307/2017**

## **APPENDIX II: QUESTIONNAIRE**

### **Tick and Fill where appropriate**

*(Background Information of Respondent)*

#### **SECTION I: DEMOGRAPHICS**

1) Please indicate your Gender

---

2) Indicate level of formal education

a) Primary [ ]

d) Degree [ ]

b) Secondary [ ]

e) Master's [ ]

c) Diploma [ ]

f) PhD [ ]

3) Indicate your religion

---

4) Indicate your institution of work

---

5) How long have you worked in the given institution/organization?

a) Less than 1 years [ ]

b) 2-5 years [ ]

c) 6-10 years [ ]

d) More than 10 years [ ]

6) Please indicate your position in the institution of work

a) Employee [ ]

- b) Supervisor [ ]
- c) Other (Specify).....

**SECTION II: Strategies for countering Violent Extremism and Terrorism**

1) List any of the counter-terrorism strategies you are familiar with:

.....  
.....  
.....

2) List any strategies on countering terrorism and violent extremism in Kenya?

.....  
.....  
.....  
.....

3) In what ways do you think that the following stakeholders in Kenya contribute toward counter-terrorism and CVE strategies:

i) Non-State Actors?

Explain:

.....  
.....  
.....

ii) The youth?

Explain:

.....

.....

iii) Ex-Combatants?

Explain:

.....

.....

iv) Academia in Counter-Terrorism studies?

.....

.....

**SECTION III: Impact of the Strategies**

1) In your opinion, has the government involved non-state actors in designing and implementation of the CVE and counterterrorism strategies?

YES [ ] NO [ ]

2) In your opinion, in what ways has the government of Kenya been effective in countering VE and terrorism?

Explain: .....

.....

.....

.....

3) Has the inclusion of non-state actors in any way helped to combat terrorism and violent extremism?

YES [ ] or NO [ ]

Explain: .....

.....

.....

**SECTION IV: Challenges affecting the strategies**

- 1) Indicate the challenges affecting the implementations of counter-terrorism and CVE strategies in Kenya?

.....  
.....  
.....  
.....

- 2) How can these challenges (listed above) be addressed?

.....  
.....  
.....

**SECTION V: Conclusion**

- 1) What suggestions do you have that you think can enhance strategies against terrorism and violent extremism in Kenya?

.....  
.....  
.....  
.....

THANK YOU!



### **Appendix III: QUALITATIVE – INTERVIEW GUIDE**

#### **QUESTIONS:**

- 1) How effective are the regional (Africa) strategies in countering violent extremism and terrorism?
- 2) What are the various strategies as an institute you have developed to counter violent extremism in Kenya?
- 3) What are the impacts (both positive and negative) emerging from the strategies in countering violent extremism and terrorism?
- 4) How has violent extremism influenced the development of the changing strategies?
- 5) What are the challenges affecting the implementations of various Kenya's multi-stakeholder strategies in countering violent extremism?
- 6) Based on your experience, how can Kenya effectively implement its existing strategies in countering violent extremism?