THE INFLUENCE OF NATIONAL INTERESTS ON BILATERAL RELATIONS BETWEEN STATES: THE CASE OF KENYA AND ISRAEL (2007-2017)

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DECLARATION

Student Declaration

This Project is my original work and has never been presented before in any other University or institution of higher learning.

Signature …………………………………Date ……………………………………………
Wanjaiya Marion Wambui
(C50/87405/2016)

Supervisor's Declaration

This Project has been submitted for examination with my approval as the University Supervisor.

Signature ……………………………….Date ……………………………………………
Dr. C.A. Mumma-Martinon
 (University Supervisor)

DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to my beloved son Anthony Kinoti.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

ABSTRACT

Kenya-Israel bilateral relations were formally established in 1963 when Kenya gained her independence. At the time, Israel was facing hostilities from its Arab neighbours such as Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and Syria, arising from Israeli occupation of Palestine. These hostilities resulted in a number of Middle East Wars including the 1973 *Yom Kippur* War. Following the War, African states including Kenya in solidarity with Egypt, severed bilateral relations with Israel beginning a prolonged period of diplomatic disengagement. Official Kenya-Israel bilateral relations were restored fifteen years later in 1988 although the re-established Kenya-Israel bilateral relations remained largely passive with little enhancement as Israel's interest in Africa had since declined. However, in mid-2000's, Kenya-Israel bilateral relations began to flourish with notable enhancement between 2007 and 2017, as demonstrated by bilateral agreements and cooperation in security, economic and political agendas driven by national interests. Moreover, in 2016, Israel adopted a "*Return to Africa Policy*" aimed at strengthening bilateral relations with African states. In executing this Policy, Israel embraced Kenya as its preferred partner in Africa as Israel seeks to increase its footprint and pursue its national interests in the Continent. This further enhanced the bilateral relations between the two states and the study assessed the influence of Kenya's and Israel's security, economic and political interests on the enhanced relations between 2007 and 2017, guided by two objectives. The first was to assess the extent to which Kenya-Israel bilateral relations were motivated by Kenya's security, economic and political interests. The second objective was to assess the extent to which Israel-Kenya bilateral relations were motivated by Israel's security, economic and political interests. The study was further guided by two research questions – to what extent are Kenya-Israel bilateral relations motivated by Kenya's security, economic and political interests and to what extent are Israel-Kenya bilateral relations motivated by Israel's security, economic and political interests. As existing literature tends to generalize Israel's interests in Africa, the study sought to fill this gap by assessing Israel's interests in a specific country – Kenya. The researcher adopted a qualitative methodology, a descriptive longitudinal research design and made use of the case study method. Data was collected using expert and structured interviews as well as focus group discussion. Findings from the study established that Kenya's and Israel's national interests influenced the enhanced bilateral relations between 2007 and 2017 to a very large extent. Moreover, the study found that Kenya's national security interests and Israel's political interests comprised the priority interests that each respective state pursued in enhancing the bilateral relations. The study recommended that the two states maintain the enhanced bilateral relations in pursuit of their respective national interests. Specifically, the study recommended to the Government of Kenya, that it considers the appointment of qualified diplomats as Kenya's representatives abroad, the admissibility of intelligence in court and the refining of its oil resources for export to Israel. Moreover, the study recommended to the Government of Israel that it sustains the high level political consultations with Kenya, the re-introduction of *El Al* Airlines as a direct flight between Kenya and Israel and the establishment of an overseas base in Kenya as Kenya is strategic to Israel's security and geopolitical interests.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF FIGURES

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

APRMC	Africa Peer Review Mechanism Committee
AU	African Union
BDS	Boycotts Divestments and Sanctions
DCI	Directorate of Criminal Investigations
ESD	Education towards Sustainable Development
EU	European Union
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FIFA	International Federation of Association Football
GCTF	Global Counter Terrorism Forum
GSU	General Service Unit
H.E	His Excellency
HRC	Human Rights Council
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
JCPOA	Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
KDF	Kenya Defense Forces
KFOI	Kenya Friends of Israel
KP	Kenya Police
MASHAV	Israel's Agency for International Development Cooperation
MOSSAD	*HaMossad leModiʿin uleTafkidim Meyuḥadim* (Hebrew) (Institute for Intelligence and Special Operations) English Translation
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NACOSTI	National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation
NIS	National Intelligence Agency
OAU	Organisation for African Unity
OPEC	Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PA	Palestinian Authority
PFLP	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PLO	Palestinian Liberation Organization

PM	Prime Minister
SEZ'S	Special Economic Zones
UN	United Nations
UNESCO	United Nations Education Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
USA	United States of America
VIP	Very Important Person
WB	World Bank

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

Peters (1992), observes that Israel's quest for bilateral relations with African states began after African support for Palestine was affirmed in 1955 during the Bandung Conference.[1] At that time, many African states such as Morocco (1956) and Ghana (1957) were emerging from colonization with Israel and the Arabs battling for Africa's political support. According to the Embassy of Israel (2018), Israel was among the first countries that established bilateral relations with Kenya, when Kenya attained independence in 1963. Oded (2000), submits that the bilateral relations were strengthened by mutual apprehension on the Somali *Shifta*[2] whose rebellious activities in Northern Kenya were supported by Arabs States such as Egypt. Kenya-Israel relations subsequently thrived, resulting in military and technical assistance in agriculture, public health, education, urban planning and water sanitation through Israel's MASHAV[3] program initiated in Kenya in 1964.

However, increased belligerence between Israel and her Arab neighbours including Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon culminated in a number of wars including the 1948 War of Independence, the 1956 Suez Crisis, the 1967 Six Day War and the 1973 *Yom Kippur* War[4] after which, African states including Kenya disengaged Israel as a bilateral partner. Although there were no formal Kenya-Israel bilateral relations from 1973, a declassified Central Intelligence Agency Memorandum (2004), points out that Kenya continued as a base for Israeli interests and trade activities persisted despite the diplomatic disengagement. Official Kenya-Israel bilateral relations were re-established in 1988 although Israel's interest in Africa had declined.

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[1] This was an Afro-Asian Conference held in Bandung, Indonesia in 1955 that excluded Israel commencing its diplomatic isolation.

[2] Ethnic Somalis in Kenya's former North Eastern Province who attempted to secede from Kenya and join fellow Somalis in the Greater Somalia through armed conflicts between 1963 and 1967. Shifta is a Somali word that means bandit.

[3] Israel's Agency for International Development Cooperation that is responsible for the design, implementation and coordination of Israel's development programs that aim to alleviate hunger, disease and poverty in developing countries.

[4] This was an Arab-Israeli War led by Egypt and Syria to recover Sinai, Golan Heights, Gaza and the West Bank seized by Israel during the 1967 Six Day war.

Since 2007, Kenya-Israel bilateral relations have progressively advanced with notable benefits aligned to the national interests that both states pursue. For instance, according to Nzioka (2012), Kenya has gained significant socio-economic benefits in agriculture through the Kibwezi Irrigation Scheme funded by Israeli Aid, while Carol (2012), suggests benefits in public health, through training of Kenyan medical students at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Moreover, Trademark East Africa (2014), notes that economically, enhanced Kenya-Israel bilateral relations have contributed to a 13% increase in Kenyan exports to Israel from $ 11.3 million to $ 12.9 million between 2007 and 2012. Increased foreign exports promote Kenya's national economic interests as outlined in Kenya's Vision 2030[5].

Kenya-Israel bilateral relations have also realised substantial benefits for Kenya's national security efforts. According to Gisesa (2012), these benefits include ongoing joint military training exercises with Israel's Defence Forces on desert and mountain combat in Isiolo and Mount Kenya regions (2007 to date), counter terrorism and counter insurgency operations, use of light weapons and operation of heavy artilleries. Moreover, Olingo (2016), submits that security collaboration between Kenya and Israel arising from enhanced bilateral relations has resulted in intelligence sharing, aimed at thwarting terrorism in Kenya that majorly targets Israeli establishments. For instance, according to Kamau (2018), a joint intelligence operation between Kenya and Israel in June 2012 resulted in the arrest of two Iranian nationals – Ahmad Mohammad and Sayed Mousavi who were suspected of planning terror attacks on the Embassy of Israel in Kenya.

Israel-Kenya bilateral relations have also promoted Israel's national interests, yielding considerable gains for Israel. According to Oded (2000), from a security perspective, Israel has benefited through accessing Kenya's territory to gather intelligence particularly on fundamentalist activities in the Horn of Africa[6] since 1963. Moreover, Israel through the bilateral relations also accesses the Kenyan Coast from where it protects Israeli passenger and cargo ships. Additionally, Trademark East Africa (2014), notes that

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[5] Development plan driven by economic, social and political strategies launched by former President Mwai Kibaki in June 2008.
[6] Peninsula located in the northeastern tip of Africa that lies south of the Gulf of Aden and east of the Arabian Sea. It includes Somalia, Djibouti, Eritrea and Ethiopia. Countries in the Greater Horn of Africa include Kenya, Sudan, Uganda, Somalia, Djibouti, Eritrea and Ethiopia.

economically, Israel has realised significant gains from Kenya-Israel bilateral trade by registering a 65% increase in Israel's exports to Kenya from $ 51.6 million to $ 85 million between 2007 and 2012. Further, arising from the enhanced bilateral relations, Kenya appears to be responding positively to Israel's political interests aimed at countering anti-Semitism in international organisations such as the United Nations (UN). For instance, according to UN Watch (2017), Kenya moved away from its traditional anti-Israel voting pattern at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) and abstained from resolution ES-10/L.22 that condemned the unilateral recognition of Jerusalem as Israel's capital by the United States of America (USA) in December 2017. This action may indicate Kenya's growing solidarity for Israel although constrained by the need to balance between Arab and Israeli interests.

Berridge (2015), submits that bilateral relations seek to achieve national interests and a critical analysis would reveal that the bilateral relations between Kenya and Israel serve the national interests of both states. It is against this background that the study seeks to assess the influence of national interests on Kenya-Israel bilateral relations between 2007 and 2017.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

The recurrent Arab-Israeli conflicts that arose from Israel's occupation of Palestine in 1948 resulted in diplomatic consequences for Israel particularly in Africa. Egypt led the Arab states against Israel and African states including Kenya severed bilateral relations with Israel in 1973 after the Yom Kippur War. This severance was in solidarity with Egypt and in observance of the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) Resolution AHG/Res.70(X)[7] of 1973. According to Geldenhuys (1990), severance of the bilateral relations damaged Israel's international posture leading to diplomatic isolation in Africa. Although restoration of relations with some African states such as Zaire, Liberia and Cameroon came towards the end of the Cold War in 1991, Israel remained skeptical as Africa upheld support for Palestine. Sanchez (2016), notes that Mali and Chad for instance, declined to reinstate relations with Israel, while Libya under President

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[7]This called upon African states to take political and economic action should Israel fail to withdraw from the occupied territories.

Muammar Gaddafi (1961-2011), opposed Israel's Observer Status[8] at the African Union (AU), OAU's successor. Moreover, South Africa's post-apartheid administration led by President Nelson Mandela (1994-1999) viewed Israel as imperialist while Uganda's support for Palestinian terrorists under President Idi Amin (1971-1979) had eroded Israel's trust.

The Kenya-Israel situation was however different and demonstrated growing trust between the two states during the period of diplomatic rapture (1973-1988) and after resumption of ties in 1988. According to Maumo (2009), Kenya for instance helped Israel in 1976 during the Entebbe Raid[9] and maintained Israeli diplomats at Kenya's Embassy in Denmark as "interest officers." Hallahmi (1988), further notes that former President Daniel Toroitich Arap Moi's (Kenya's second president 1978-2002) personal security was arranged for by Israel. Moreover, Israel's disaster management assistance to Kenya increased and in 1998, Israel sent a team of specialised rescue operatives to assist in the search and rescue of survivors after the 1998 terrorist attack on the USA Embassy in Nairobi. In 2006, Israel sent rescue workers and medical specialists to assist Kenya when a multi-storey building in Nairobi's *River Road* Area collapsed.

Further, according to the Embassy of Israel in Kenya[10] (2018), Israel's development aid to Kenya in the form of technology transferring projects in agriculture, education and public health continued. These include the 2010 Kenya Agricultural Carbon Project to reduce agricultural carbon emissions and the training of over 90 Kenyan Educators on Education towards Sustainable Development (ESD) in 2012. In addition, according to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Kenya (2018), security, economic and political cooperation between Kenya and Israel progressively enhanced, evidenced by political consultations held in Jerusalem in 2016 and in Nairobi in 2017, bilateral security agreements on counter terrorism and cybersecurity signed in 2016 and the opening of Israel's Economic Office in Nairobi in 2018.

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[8] Observer Status is a privilege granted by some regional and international organisations such as the African Union and the United Nations, allowing non-members to participate in the organisations activities such as meetings. However activities such as voting or proposal of resolutions are excluded from the privileges extended.
[9] A rescue mission to free Israeli hostages in a plane hijacked by Palestinian terrorists and commandeered into Uganda in 1976.
[10] Embassy of Israel in Kenya.

In 2016, Israel's foreign policy focused on strengthening bilateral relations with African states, embracing Kenya as the best partner in the continent as it executes the policy. Whereas Israel's historical preference for Kenya is demonstrated by Kenya's hosting of the Embassy of Israel in Nairobi that serves Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Malawi and Seychelles, contemporary concerns as to why Kenya emerged as the best partner in Israel's "*Return to Africa Policy*" arose, particularly as Israel is in seemingly good standing with other African states including Ethiopia and Togo. This study holds the contention that Kenya presents a favorable environment for Israel to pursue her national interests hence the preferred status, whereas Kenya significantly promotes her national interests through bilateral relations with Israel. It is against this background that the study sought to assess the influence of national interests on Kenya-Israel bilateral relations. Specifically, the study assessed the extent to which Kenya-Israel bilateral relations were motivated by Kenya's security, economic and political interests and the extent to which Israel-Kenya bilateral relations were motivated by Israel's security, economic and political interests in the years between 2007 and 2017 when relations enhanced.

1.3 Research Questions

i. To what extent are Kenya-Israel bilateral relations motivated by Kenya's security, economic and political interests?

ii. To what extent are Israel-Kenya bilateral relations motivated by Israel's security, economic and political interests?

1.4 Objectives of Study

Overall Objective

The overall objective of the study was to assess how the national interests of Kenya and Israel influenced bilateral relations between 2007 and 2017. The core assumption the study embraced was that the pursuit of national interests promotes bilateral interactions between sovereign states in the international system.

Specific Objectives

    i.   To assess the extent to which Kenya-Israel bilateral relations are motivated by Kenya's security, economic and political interests.

    ii.   To assess the extent to which Israel-Kenya bilateral relations are motivated by Israel's security, economic and political interests.

1.5 Justification of the Study

Academic Justification

Several scholars have written about national interests and bilateral relations. Rozental & Buenrostro (2013), contend that globalization presents a new order in which technology and economic supremacy are elements of power and that bilateral relations are enablers in the pursuit of power and influence. Jordan, Taylor, Meese & Nielsen (2009), discuss bilateral relations and submit that the goal is to advance national interest without sponsoring conflict.

Various scholars have also written on Israel's interests in Africa and the use of bilateral relations in promoting these interests. Dahir (2017), observes that Israel's increased relations in Africa are driven by commercial and geopolitical motives. On the other hand, Oded (2010), argues that strategic, diplomatic and economic interests motivate Israel's infiltration of Africa. Bishku (2017), assessed Israel's interests in East Africa and notes that military and economic influences, containment of Iran and combating fundamentalism sponsor Israel's increased bilateral relations in the region.

While the above studies yield insightful knowledge, they fail to appreciate the fact that each African state is unique and therefore making generalizations is inaccurate. Moreover, few studies focus on how Kenya and Israel have managed to maintain and enhance bilateral relations for this long period. This is the gap this study intends to fill by contributing academic literature on the subject and focusing on assessing the extent to which the bilateral relations are motivated by Kenya's and Israel's national interests and the challenges of the relations on both states.

Policy Justification

According to Kenya's National Trade Policy (2017), Kenya's Ministry of Trade, Industry and Cooperatives (Department of International Trade) is mandated to formulate and appraise international trade policies and promote export of Kenyan products as Kenya is a net importing country. This means that Kenya registers trade deficits[11] with international trading counterparts including Israel, arising from importing more products than it exports. Trading Economics (2018), demonstrates that Kenya's trade imbalance in favour of Israel averages 3.5% of Kenya's aggregate trade deficit.

Whereas Kenya's National Trade Policy (2017), acknowledges that Kenya's trade performance is characterized by trade deficits, it fails to recommend how country-specific trade imbalances may be addressed. Insights arising from the research will help government policy makers to devise policies that address the trade imbalance that stems from Kenya-Israel bilateral trade.

1.6 Scope and Limitations of Study

This study assessed the influence of national interests on Kenya-Israel bilateral relations between the years 2007 and 2017. The scope of the study encompassed the security, economic and political Kenya-Israel affairs within the period, informed by a number of considerations. First, the period includes the last term of Kenya's third president, His Excellency Mwai Kibaki (2002-2013) and the current administration of President Uhuru Kenyatta (2013 to date). These administrations focus on Kenya's economic progression as envisioned by the Vision 2030 and the Big Four Agenda[12] respectively. This study argues that Kenya's pursuit of economic interests between 2007 and 2017 promoted bilateral relations that sought to increase bilateral trade with trading partners including Israel, for Kenya's growing economy hence adoption of the period.

Second, the years between 2007 and 2017 comprised a period when Kenya's relations expanded beyond historical Western counterparts to embrace contemporary bilateral partners such as China. China has funded some of Kenya's economic projects including key infrastructural developments such as the Standard Gauge Railway (2014-2017) and

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[11] The amount by which a country's imports exceed its exports.
[12] Development agenda focusing on security, affordable housing, affordable healthcare and manufacturing.

the *Thika* Super Highway (2009-2012). Notably, China competes with the United States of America (USA) for super power status in the international system and Kenya's associations with China may be misconstrued to imply the undermining of USA as the current super power. The study therefore contended that enhanced Kenya-Israel bilateral relations between 2007 and 2017 served to pacify traditional western partners particularly the USA that is also Israel's global patron.

Third, it is within this period that Israel declared the "*Return to Africa Policy*" in 2016, under Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's Administration in Israel (2009 to date). This policy intends to reinforce bilateral relations with African states and the Prime Minister adopted Kenya as the preferred partner in executing the policy. Further, the period comprises President Barack Obama's Administration in the United States of America (USA) (2009-2017). The significance of this consideration is that while previous USA administrations protected and patronized Israel's global interests, President Obama's Administration discounted them. The study argues that there exists a nexus between President Obama's Administration snubbing Israel and the "*Return to Africa Policy*" adopted by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in 2016. Israel looked to Africa to achieve its interests in the absence of support from President Barack Obama's administration, hence adoption of the study period 2007 to 2017.

Fourth, it is in this period that Israel intensified efforts to subvert anti-Semitism particularly in international organisations such as the United Nations, whose membership includes African states. Israel identifies African states as sympathetic to the Palestinian Cause[13] and seeks to undermine that support. The study therefore argues that Israel in pursuing political interests of countering anti-Semitism in international organisations, sought to utilize Kenya's prominence in the East African region and in the larger African continent, to mobilize African states against anti-Israel voting, hence the enhanced bilateral relations with Kenya between 2007 and 2017.

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[13] Support for Palestinian right to self-determination undermined by Israel's occupation of Palestinian Territories.

Fifth, is the increased threat of terrorism on Israel and her global establishments between 2007 and 2017. Kenya is a host to several Israeli installations that have been targets of terrorist activities during this period and in the past. These include the *Westgate* Mall that was attacked by gunmen terrorists in 2013, the Paradise Hotel and Norfolk Hotel that were bombed in 2002 and 1980 respectively. This study argues that enhanced bilateral relations between 2007 and 2017 sought to advance Kenya's and Israel's national security particularly against the rising threat of terrorism.

Sixth, the period between 2007 and 2017 witnessed Israel's increased desire to curtail Iranian influence in the Horn of Africa as hostilities between the two states increased. Palmer (2013), notes that throughout Africa, Iran maintains a wide network of rogue states such as Sudan, rebel groups such as in Northern Nigeria and fundamentalists such as the *Nasr City Cell* in Egypt. Further, Palmer notes that Iran patronizes dominant terrorist groups including *Hezbollah* in Cote d'Ivoire and Sierra Leone, *Al Qaeda* in Mali and Somalia, as well as *Al Shabaab* in Somalia, Kenya's neighbour to the North East. Moreover, Palmer points out that *Hezbollah* and *Al Qaeda* are the two most powerful terrorists groups globally and that by working with Iran, they posses nation-destroying potential. This study therefore contends that Israel pursues national security and political interests of containing Iran, noting that according to Mahan and Griset (2013), Iran is a state sponsor of terror that desires to annihilate Israel. Further, the study submits that in enhancing Kenya-Israel bilateral relations between 2007 and 2017, Israel sought to access Kenya to collect intelligence on Iranian activity, radical elements in the Horn of Africa and use of Kenya's coast to protect naval routes from Iranian aggression. This submission is augmented by Kamau (2018), who notes the arrest of two Iranian nationals with explosives in Mombasa, Kenya in 2012, suspected of planning a terror attack on the Embassy of Israel in Kenya.

1.7 Definition and Operationalization of Key Terms
National Interests
Morgenthau (1949), defines national interests as the objective of foreign policy reasonably required and derived from the imperative of a nation's survival. Naaz (2012), outlines national interests as what states seek to protect or achieve in relation to each

other while Nuetcherlein (2015), observes national interests as the foreign policy goals of nations. The study will adopt Morgenthau's definition of national interests.

Bilateral Relations

The Norway Grants Mechanism (2009), defines bilateral relations as economic, political, cultural and historic ties characterized by cooperation between institutions and persons at political and administrative levels, civil society, the private sector and academia. Dyduch, Kosir, Kupozyk & Usiak (2017), observe bilateral relations as dynamic associations that present two countries the opportunity for intensive cooperation while Azad (2017), views bilateral relations as a myriad of politico-economic connections involving two states. The study will adopt Norway Grants Mechanism's definition.

Kenya-Israel Bilateral Relations

Kenya-Israel bilateral relations comprise security, economic, political, educational, agricultural, health, infrastructural and technological cooperation, as well as training exchanges under Israel's MASHAV[14] development program. As Kenya-Israel bilateral relations extend to a number of areas, this study focused on security, economic and political relations. Kenya-Israel bilateral relations for purposes of this study therefore comprised the Kenya-Israel security, economic and political affairs between 2007 and 2017. Further, as Kenya-Israel security bilateral relations may extend into a number of areas such as national security, food security cyber security and human security, this study limits its focus to national security. Similarly, as Kenya-Israel economic bilateral relations comprise bilateral trade, aid and socio-economic assistance, this study limits its focus to bilateral trade. The study's political focus centered on political collaborations in Regional and Multilateral Organisations such as the African Union and the United Nations.

State

Anter (2014), defines a state as a political organisation characterized by territory, population, sovereignty and bureaucracy while possessing the monopoly of legitimate use of force. Mitchell (1999), defines a state as an object of analysis that exists

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[14] This is a Hebrew acronym for Israel Agency for International Development Cooperation.

simultaneously, both as a material force and as an ideological construct. Duhaime (2018), describes a state as groups of people with international recognition, a population, a common language and a defined territory. The study will adopt Anter's definition of a state and will utilize the state level of analysis in assessing Kenya-Israel bilateral relations. A level of analysis provides the platform against which observations are made and includes the international system, the state and the individual levels of analysis. As Kenya and Israel are sovereign states and the study will interrogate interactions at state level, the appropriate level of analysis in this case is the state level of analysis.

Israel's Return to Africa Policy

This is a segment of Israel's foreign policy that focuses on strengthening bilateral relations with African states. It was launched in 2016 by Israel's Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (2009 to date). The study will adopt the policy as it is.

1.8 Chapter Outline

This section briefly describes the chapters in the Research Project. Chapter One introduces the study and outlines the Background to the Study, Statement of the Research Problem, Research Questions, Objectives of the Study, Justification of the Study, Scope and Limitations of the Study, and Definition and Operationalization of Key Terms. Chapter Two discusses Literature Review. It also details the Theoretical Framework, Research Hypotheses and the Conceptual Framework. Chapter Three presents the Research Methodology comprising the Study Area, Study Area Selection, Research Design, Target Population, Sampling Technique, Interview Respondents Schedule, Data Collection, Ethical Considerations and Limitations of the Study. Chapter Four provides the Data Presentation and Critical Analysis of Findings. Chapter Five presents the Summary, Conclusion and Recommendations.

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

The study reviews literature by assessing national interests and bilateral relations globally, continentally and nationally within the Kenya-Israel context. The literature also considers the extent to which the bilateral relations were influenced by Kenya's and Israel's national interests.

2.2 National Interests and Bilateral Relations: Global Perspectives

Bilateral relations in the international system are designed to advance national interests and this is apparent globally. According to Alperen (2017), The United States of America (USA) for instance, builds security partnerships based on the reality that on its own, it cannot eliminate every terrorist or terrorist organisation that threatens the safety, security and interests of the Americans. Alperen further notes that therefore, the USA in pursuing its national security interests engages in bilateral counter terrorism measures with partners including Israel and participates in joint military training such as the joint aerial capability training held in November 2013 in Israel, to boost aerial response to terror threats on the national security of both states.

The Centre for Strategic and International Studies (2018), cites another example of USA bilateral relations founded on national interests, and notes that the USA-Russia bilateral relations for instance, are anchored on national security objectives such as countering terrorism and violent extremism, nuclear security, non-proliferation of arms and managing the regional instability in the Middle East. For instance, in the Middle East, the USA and Russia cooperate bilaterally to fight off foreign terrorist groups such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and rebel groups such as the *Al-Nusra* Front that present threats to their respective national security and undermine President Bashar Al Assad's regime (Syrian President 2011 to present) in Syria. The two also intervened militarily in the Syrian Crisis (2011 to present) in 2014 and 2015 respectively, where the USA was fighting ISIS and Russia was combating anti-Assad rebels such as *Al-Nusra* Front and the Army of Conquest. Moreover, according to Lee (2015), the USA-Russia counter terrorism collaboration involves intelligence sharing, noting various instances

where intelligence on terrorist elements has been shared bilaterally. For instance, Russia in 2011 shared with the American Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) intelligence on a radicalized Russian operative - Tamerlan Tsarnaev warning of his likely involvement in terror activities against the USA. In April 2013, Tsarnaev and his brother Dzhokhar Tsarnaev detonated two bombs at the Boston Marathon[15] that killed 5 people and injured 264 others. In addition, the USA also engages in bilateral counter terrorism collaboration with Turkey and in 2011, the two states formed the Global Counter Terrorism Forum (GCTF) from their bilateral collaborations to prevent, combat and prosecute terrorists whilst countering incitement and recruitment into terrorism (Ibid).

2.3 National Interests and Bilateral Relations: Continental Perspectives

In Africa, the bilateral relations between South Sudan and China demonstrate the influence of China's economic interests in the oil rich African state. According to the Crisis Group (2017), the Government of South Sudan maintains Oil Development Agreements signed in 2011 with the state owned China National Petroleum Corporation, which allows unlimited Chinese access to Sudan's oil reserves. Moreover, Chinese companies such as Shandong Hi-Speed Group Ltd infiltrated South Sudan after it attained formal independence in 2011 in an effort to exploit the ready market for Chinese products with limited competition. According to Aguirre (2014), an estimated 120 Chinese firms[16] operate in South Sudan and have conducted business worth $10 billion, sanctioned by the South Sudan- China bilateral relations.

From a security perspective, Israel's bilateral relations in Africa are influenced by her national security interests and partners with several African states such as Cote d' Ivoire in counter terrorism collaboration. According to Aljazeera (2017), Cote d'Ivoire, a West African state is perceived as infiltrated by *Hezbollah,* a terrorist organisation based in Lebanon, Israel's neighbour to the north. Consequently, Israel-Cote d'Ivoire bilateral relations have centered on countering terrorism in the interest of national security for both states. For instance, Aljazeera notes that in 2014, Israel engaged Visual Defence an

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[15] Annual marathon held in Boston, Massachusetts, USA on Patriots day - every third Monday of April to commemorate the first Summer Olympics of 1896.
[16] These include China Harbour Engineering, China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation, JIT Mart Supermarkets, Shanghai Restaurants, and Chinese Friendship Hospitals among others.

Israeli-Canadian company to handle security at Abidjan[17] International Airport, enabling Israel to monitor the flow of people and goods into and out of Cote d'Ivoire, collect intelligence on *Hezbollah* operatives and to curtail terrorists' movement. In East Africa, Israel also undertakes counter terrorism collaboration with Uganda and Tanzania and in 2016, Israel signed a Joint Agreement on Counterterrorism with Uganda and Tanzania, emphasizing the need for cooperation in intelligence sharing to depress the threat of terror in the region (ibid).

2.4 Bilateral Relations and National Interests: Kenya-Israel Perspective

Historical Perspective

Oded (2000), observes that Israel was the first country to establish bilateral relations with Kenya upon independence in 1963, setting up an embassy in Nairobi in a ceremony attended by Golda Meir, the then Israeli Foreign Minister (1956-1966). Oded further submits that Israel shared a special relationship with President Mzee Jomo Kenyatta (Kenya's first President 1963-1978) who believed in the Bible and its predictions of the Jews return to Israel. Moreover, the bilateral relations were concretized by mutual anxiety about dissident activities by Somali Muslims in North Eastern Kenya that called for the annexation of parts of Kenya and Ethiopia in the 1960's, buttressed by the Arab States such as Egypt. This laid the foundation for relations that sought to counter extremism and enhance national security. In addition, according to Alpan (1976), Israel resonated with Africa's colonization struggle and compared the achievement of independence with the resurrection of Israel and thus assisted newly independent African states such as Kenya in nation building. This resulted in development assistance and transfer of technologies in agriculture, health, water management and education, amidst escalating hostilities between Israel and neighbouring Arabs states such as Egypt, Syria and Jordan.

Escalating hostilities between Israel and Arab states including Egypt, Syria and Jordan that arose from Israel's occupation of Palestine threatened the newly established Kenya-Israel bilateral relations. Kenya as an African state subscribed to the provisions of the

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[17] The Capital City of Cote d' Ivoire.

Organisation for African Unity such as Resolution AHG/Res.70(X)[18] of 1973, which called upon African states to take political and economic action should Israel fail to withdraw from the occupied territories, espousing Palestinian sympathy. Consequently according to Gasper (2014), Kenya in 1973 joined other African states in severing diplomatic relations with Israel following the *Yom Kippur* War and in exercising solidarity with Egypt, a combatant in the War. Formal bilateral relations between Kenya and Israel were thus curtailed.

Despite severance of diplomatic ties between Kenya and Israel, Maumo (2009), observes that friendly relations flourished with unofficial interactions replacing diplomatic dealings. For instance, Israeli delegations attended multilateral conferences in Nairobi including the International Conference on Social Services in 1974 and the United Nations Education Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) conference in 1976. According to Maumo, Kenya also hosted Israeli diplomats as "interest officers" at the Kenyan Embassy in Denmark and further submits that Nairobi became a base for Israeli intelligence noting that Israel's access to Kenya during the 1976 Entebbe Raid was facilitated by Mossad – Israel's National Intelligence Agency.

In 1976, Kenya assisted Israel during the Entebbe Raid to counter Palestinian terrorists and rescue Israeli hostages held in Uganda. This occurrence marked an outstanding historical element of Kenya-Israel bilateral relations and had a significant impact on future counter terrorism collaborations particularly on intelligence sharing. According to Kamau (2016), powerful officials in President Jomo Kenyatta's Administration (1963-1978) including Charles Njonjo (Former Attorney General 1963-1979), Bernard Hinga (Former Commissioner of Police 1964-1978), Ben Gethi (Former General Service Unit Commandant 1967-1978) and Bruce McKenzie (Former Cabinet Minister 1959-1961 & 1963-1970) held to be a Mossad agent, assisted Mossad operatives including Uri Lubrani, Ehud Barak and Mike Harari to plot the Entebbe Raid in Charles Njonjo's *Muthaiga* home. The success of the rescue mission was to a large extent attributed to Kenya's support and willingness to cooperate with the Mossad, whose infiltration of Kenyan

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[18]This called upon African states to take political and economic action should Israel fail to withdraw from the occupied territories.

territory was evident. Arising from the Entebbe experience, Kenya-Israel collaboration on countering terrorism began.

In President Daniel Toroitich Arap Moi's era (1978-2002), Hallahmi (1998), submits that friendly relations with Israel continued despite the absence of official diplomatic relations. Cooperation on intelligence and security increased with Kenya purchasing weapons and non-military equipment from Israel. Moreover, according to Hallahmi, H.E. Daniel Toroitich Arap Moi's personal security was arranged for by Israel, while Israeli intelligence operatives such as David Kimche (Deputy Director for Mossad 1980-1982) made secret visits to Kenya in 1981. In addition, according to Kamau (2017), secret business deals between Israeli businessmen and President Moi's close associates flourished through companies like *Lima* Limited[19] and *HZ* Limited[20]. Moreover Kamau notes that Kenya government functionaries had Jewish associations, showcasing the personal connections the President and his friends had with Israel, even in the absence of formal diplomatic relations.

According to Maumo (2009), President Mwai Kibaki's Administration (2002-2013) maintained Kenya's friendly relations with Israel whilst adopting a policy of non-interference in the Israeli-Palestine conflict. Moreover, this administration focused on socio-economic development and H.E Mwai Kibaki turned to Israel for socio-economic development support. Consequently, according to a Statement on Kenya and Israel Diplomatic and Political Relations by the Kenya Embassy in Tel Aviv (2018), numerous agreements were signed during this period such as the Agreement on Water Resource Management, Technologies, Irrigation and Capacity Building (2009), the Memorandum of Understanding on Defense Cooperation (2010), the Memorandum of Understanding on Fisheries Cooperation (2011) and the Agreement on Cooperation in Public Security Issues (2011). President Mwai Kibaki's administration also hosted high level Israeli delegations, pursuing Israel's economic interests in Kenya. For instance, according to Bishku (2017), Avigdor Liberman (Israel's Deputy Prime Minister 2009-2012) led Israeli businessmen including weapons dealers on a visit to Kenya in 2009 to promote Israel's

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[19] A Company owned by H.E Daniel Arap Moi, Nicholas Biwott and Israeli Vaizman Aharoni.
[20] A company owned by Nicholas Kipyator Biwott and Israeli Gad Zeevis.

defense exports. Arising from the above accounts on Kenya's relations with Israel in the previous three regimes, one would argue that historical Kenya-Israel bilateral relations were anchored on national security interests particularly intelligence sharing and countering terrorism, as well as economic and socio-economic interests.

Contemporary Perspective

Kenya-Israel bilateral relations under the Uhuru Kenyatta Administration (2013 to date) have historical dimensions and maintain the cordial relations inherited from previous regimes. Cooperation on areas of mutual interest such as security and economics linger on decades after the establishment of bilateral relations in 1963, with political cooperation increasing since 2016. From a security perspective, contemporary Kenya-Israel bilateral relations comprise counter terrorism collaboration centered on intelligence sharing and border security, arms sales such as supply of drones by Israel, as well as military personnel training and exchange programs. For instance, according to Staff (2019), Israel has been training military personnel from various African states including Kenya on urban combat and hostage rescuing, skills that are vital for counter terrorism operations.

Economically, Kenya-Israel bilateral relations have embraced and enhanced bilateral trade that according to Trading Economics (2018), comprises Israeli exports to Kenya including medicine, agricultural products, telecommunication and construction equipment amongst others. On the other hand, Kenyan exports to Israel have consisted of coffee, animal produce, wood, textiles, precious stones amongst others. Moreover, according to Cohen (2014), arms sales constitute a significant portion of the bilateral trade further submitting that Kenya is an importer of Israeli arms such as rifles and short range pistols. Socio-economic assistance provided by Israel's MASHAV development programs in food security, education, disaster management, and public health have also comprised the contemporary Kenya-Israel bilateral relations. For instance, according to the Embassy of Israel (2018), Israel through MASHAV donated books to Moi Girls School Nairobi in 2017, Gatoto Primary School in 2016 and refurbished the Pediatric Oncology Ward at the Kenyatta National Hospital in 2014.

Politically, contemporary Kenya-Israel bilateral relations have entailed intergovernmental exchanges by senior officials of both states because they remain integral to the current relations as they did under previous administrations. For example, President Uhuru Kenyatta was on a state visit to Israel in February 2016 with Prime Minister Netanyahu reciprocating the visit in July 2016 and November 2017. Moreover, political Kenya-Israel bilateral relations have comprised consultations between the two states and active lobbying by Israel for Kenya to adopt pro-Israel voting patterns in international organisations such as the United Nations. Additionally, according to Ramani (2016), Israel seeks observer status at the African Union (AU) and Kenya has since 2016 adopted a position in favour of Israel's observer ambitions at the AU, arising from intense political consultations and lobbying by Israel. For instance, in July 2016, President Uhuru Kenyatta pledged Kenya's support for Israel at the AU during a joint address with PM Benjamin Netanyahu at State House in Nairobi.

Perspectives of Israel as a Unique State

Myers (2017), notes that two dominant features in Israel's history influence its international relations. These are the global dispersion of Jews and persistent anti-Semitism which position Israel as a beleaguered minority in the international system. Moreover, historical efforts aimed at Jewish elimination including the Holocaust[21], the Arab Wars (1948-1982), the Palestinian Liberation Organization's (PLO) intention to destroy Israel and Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's (Iran's Supreme Leader 1989 to date) declaration in 2001 to annihilate Israel, display Israel's global insecurity and the need to expand friendly networks in the international system.

The State of Israel came into being through the occupation of Palestinian territory in 1948 and faces several unique circumstances that threaten its survival. According to Gasper (2014), the first unique circumstance threatening Israel's survival is the antagonism with Palestine, arising from Israeli settlement that was influenced by the British Balfour Declaration of 1917. This declaration encouraged the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine and was followed by mass migration of Jews escaping persecution in

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[21] The Persecution and murder of six million Jews in Europe by the Nazi Regime in Germany between 1933 and 1945. Nazis considered themselves racially superior to the Jews and killed to eliminate the perceived racial threat in Jews.

Europe. Moreover, Gasper extends that in 1947, Britain terminated its mandate over Palestine and the United Nations through the Partition Plan,[22] recommended the establishment of two separate states – an Independent Arab State (Palestine) and an Independent Jewish State (Israel), with Jerusalem[23] as a separate entity under the administrative jurisdiction of the United Nations.

The Jews accepted this recommendation and in May 1948, David Ben-Gurion (Israel's First Prime Minister 1948-1963) declared the Independent State of Israel. The Arabs rejected the recommendation, commencing perennial aggression between Israel and Palestine, in what has been a protracted conflict in the Middle East over the last seventy one years since 1948. The Israel-Palestine conflict took a regional dimension as Arab states such as Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Iraq allied with Palestine, posing a threat on Israel's survival.

According to Corsi (2009), the second unique circumstance threatening Israel's survival is the belligerence with Iran. Iran is Israel's principal adversary and possesses nuclear capabilities that allow it to pursue a nuclear weapons development program, ultimately enabling it to be a regional hegemon in the Middle East to the detriment of Israel. Corsi further observes that a nuclear Iran is a threat to Israel that has precipitated a destabilizing nuclear arms race in the Middle East, as other states including the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are advancing their nuclear abilities. Moreover, Teitelbaum (2008), concurs with Corsi and notes Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's declaration of 2001 that the foundation of the Islamic regime (Iran) is opposition to Israel and the perpetual subject of Iran is the elimination of Israel from the region. According to Teitelbaum, this declaration was made during the Ayatollah's meeting with organizers for the International Conference for Support of the *Intifada*[24] in 2001 and reflects Iran's desire to destroy Israel, primarily through advanced nuclear technology.

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[22] Subject matter of UN Resolution 181that recommended the establishment of an autonomous Jewish State and an autonomous Arab State.

[23]City in the Middle East contested by both Israel and the Palestinian Authority as their Capital City.

[24]Period of intense Israel-Palestine violence characterized by stone throwing by the Palestinians and aggressive retaliation by the   Israelis. The violence began in September 2000 after Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon (2001-2006) visited Temple Mount that was viewed by Palestinians as highly provocative. The Temple Mount is considered a Holy Site by Muslims.

According to Corsi (2009), the third unique circumstance threatening Israel's survival is the increased threat of terrorism on Israel and its establishments abroad, propagated by Iran and its proxy terrorist groups such as *Hezbollah* and *Hamas* that are devoted to the annihilation of Israel. Moreover, Mahan & Griset (2013), note that Iran is a designated state sponsor of terror and finances terror groups in the Middle East that wage terrorist activities against Israel, such as Iranian financing of *Hamas* in the Second *Intifada* of 2000.

The fourth unique circumstance threatening Israel's survival is the resurgent anti-Semitism in the international system. Curtis (2013), considers anti-Semitism as the negative assertions about Jews including Jewish hatred that accompanies the condemnation of Israel for its existence, rather than for a specific action. Israel has perennially been condemned in international organisations such as the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) and the Human Rights Council (HRC). For instance, according to UN Watch (2017), UNGA in 2016 adopted resolution A/C.4/71.l.13 that condemned Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. Curtis further observes that the rise of contemporary anti-Semitism is not just in Arab and Muslim majority countries, but also in European democracies such as Ireland and Netherlands. Curtis notes that anti-Semitism in European democracies is largely accompanied by the Boycotts Divestments and Sanctions (BDS)[25] movements, which seek to impose economic embargos against Israel. For instance, according to the Palestinian BDS National Committee (2014), the European Union (EU) in 2014 disclosed its intention to ban milk and dairy products that originated from factories, dairies or farms in Israel's illegal settlement areas – the Occupied Territories of Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and the West Bank. Additionally, the Irish Parliament in 2017 drafted the Control of Economic Activity in Occupied Territories Bill that sought to criminalize the import and trading of goods and services originating from Israel's illegal settlement areas. The bill was approved in January 2019 pending ascension into law and would have catastrophic effects on Israel's export earnings if ascended.

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[25] BDS movements call for withdrawal of support and investment in Israeli companies, rejection of trade agreements with Israel and expulsion of Israel from international organisations such as the United Nations.

2.5 The Extent to Which Kenya-Israel Bilateral Relations Are Motivated by Kenya's National Interests

1. Security Interests

Terrorism as a global issue affects both Kenya and Israel and according to Alexander & Nanes (1986), Kenya is a target for terrorism as it retains associations with Israel. Several terrorist attacks in Kenya have targeted Israeli establishments such as the *Westgate* Mall in 2013. Hornsby (2013), opines that arising from the numerous Western interests in Kenya, poverty, porous borders, increasing Islamic fundamentalism and nearness to Somalia, stringent counter terrorism policies are necessary. Counter terrorism is thus, a prevalent theme in the relations and has enhanced intelligence sharing and high-level Kenya-Israel consultations in pursuit of Kenya's security interests. For instance, according to Bishku (2017), President Kenyatta while addressing Israeli leaders in 2014, intimated that bilateral security support would defeat terrorism that targets both Kenya and Israel.

In advancing security interests, Kenya engages with Israel in security collaborations and according to Khlebnikova (2017), Kenya-Israel security collaboration arises from the mutual threat of terrorism. Further, Khlebnikova contends that Kenya pursues Israel's advanced military technology and counter terrorism strategies in defending national security while Israel seeks to depress terrorist activities in the Horn of Africa. The indicators of the security collaboration include intelligence sharing, arms sales, military training and security agreements on counter terrorism.

2. Economic Interests

Kenya's economic motivation in the bilateral relations with Israel stems from its national priorities as a developing country. Chapter one of Kenya's Foreign Policy (2014), outlines economic prosperity as a national objective inspired by Vision 2030. Chapter Two of the policy further aspires to promote Kenya's products in foreign markets and enhance Foreign Direct Investments (FDI), while increasing bilateral trade, undertaking economic cooperation and negotiating for development assistance. According to Kariuki

(2016), Kenya in 2016 approved FDI in Special Economic Zones[26] (SEZ's), key enablers of Kenya's Vision 2030 that produce goods for export. Fundamentally however, these changes sanctioning external investors into Kenya's SEZ's were ratified by the Kenyan government soon after bilateral visits by Israel's PM Benjamin Netanyahu, Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and India's PM Narendra Modi in 2016 hence demonstrating Kenya's attraction to FDI. According to Ceic Data (2017), Kenya's FDI increased by 71% from $ 393.4 million in 2016 to $671.5 million in 2017 and this study contends that this may be attributed to enhanced bilateral relations. Further, Yacobi (2015), submits that the introduction of foreign investments in SEZ's by Third World countries (such as Kenya) is a precondition for loans from international organisations including the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This study argues that FDI is a major economic motivation for Kenya-Israel bilateral relations as it also serves to satisfy conditions for multilateral borrowing. Moreover, Maumo (2009), submits that Kenya's desire for economic assistance without stringent conditions sways Kenya towards bilateral relations with Israel.

The bilateral relations between Kenya and Israel have experienced challenges including severance of diplomatic relations between 1973 and 1988 by Kenya and the resultant halting of Israeli assistance to Kenya precipitated by the severed ties. Contemporary relations have also posed particular challenges. First, according to Trading Economics (2018), Kenya contends with trade imbalances that favour Israel in the bilateral trade relationship. Such imbalances exist because Israel exports to Kenya more products than it imports from Kenya. The second challenge is the increased terrorist attacks in Kenya. According Alexander & Nanes (1986), Kenya is a target for terrorist activities due to its close relations with Israel. Cannon & Pkalya (2017), further contextualize the observation by Alexander & Nanes (1986), and submit that *Al Shabaab* never launched any attacks in Kenya between 2006 and 2007 but between 2008 and 2015, the group coordinated 272 attacks on Kenyan territory.

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[26] Geographic areas in which trade rules are different others and aim at increased trade, job creation and increased investment.

2.6 The Extent to Which Israel-Kenya Bilateral Relations Are Motivated by Israel's National Interests

1. Security Interests

Nye (2013), argues that globalization and the rise of non-state actors has presented transnational issues such as terrorism and proliferation of nuclear weapons that threaten state security and that bilateral relations are effective in addressing shared threats. As Kenya and Israel both face terrorism as a national security threat, the influence of Israel's security interests on bilateral relations with Kenya is apparent. Eligur (2014), contends that the Arab Spring[27] prompted instability across the Middle East and North Africa, triggering negative security repercussions for Israel particularly the infiltration of *Al Qaeda* in the Horn of Africa who export terrorism to the Middle East. Eligur however, fails to consider individual states in the Horn of Africa and this study contends that in addressing the increased threat of terrorism, Israel pursues bilateral relations with Kenya due to its proximity to the Horn of Africa deemed to be a region saturated with terrorist groups such as *Al Shabaab*.

2. Economic Interests

Oded (2010), submits that Israel-Kenya bilateral relations are motivated by an assortment of Israel's economic interests. These include Israel's desire for raw materials such as skins and hides, Kenya as an optimal market for Israel's products such as agricultural machinery and communication equipment as well as Kenya's appeal as an investment destination for Israeli establishments such as the *Art Caffe* chain of restaurants in Nairobi. Apart from commodity trade, arms export is a fundamental economic factor in Israel-Kenya relations. According to Yacobi (2015), Israel exports artilleries to Kenya and notes the cooperation between the Israeli government and private arms dealers in arms trade. He submits that delegations such as that comprising private arms dealers to Kenya in 2009, escorted Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman (2009-2015) on foreign trips, exhibiting the link between private arm sales and Israel's economic interests in arms trade.

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[27] Uprisings that began in 2010 affecting Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain, Syria, Algeria, Kuwait, Morocco and others.

Yacobi (2015), further submits that the Israeli government benefits from utilizing private arms dealers who foster commercial activities in countries where Israel lacks official relations. This is due to the personal ties private arms dealers sustain with the ruling elite as was the case in Kenya during H.E Daniel Toroitich Arap Moi's administration (1978-2002). Bishku (2017), concurs with Yacobi's observation noting that Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman (2009-2015) was accompanied by an entourage of private arms dealers in a visit to Kenya in 2009 on a mission to promote arms sales to Kenya.

Mintz (2013), outlines Israel's interests from an economic perspective and submits that Israel has over the years sought to develop its arms exports, targeting Africa's rising economies that are dependent on imports including Kenya. While Trading Economics (2018) indicates that Kenya comprises only 1.8% of Israel's arms exports, demonstrating the potential for increasing arms sales, it fails to consider the economic impetus driving Israel's arms sales to Kenya. This study argues that Israel's arms sales comprise a significant proportion of its economic interests pursued to achieve economic supremacy and political power in the international system.

Arising from Israel's economic interests in Kenya, Israel-Kenya economic collaboration has prevailed. This economic collaboration is characterized by bilateral trade, trade missions, appointment of trade consuls, bilateral economic forums and foreign aid. According to the Embassy of Israel in Kenya (2018), Israel opened a Trade Mission in Nairobi in 2018 whereas Kenya hosted the Israel-Kenya economic forum in 2016 that aimed at increasing economic cooperation. Moreover, Udasin (2017), notes the appointment of Shlomo Grofman as Israel's Honorary Trade Consul for Kenya in 2017, tasked with growing bilateral trade between the two states.

3. Political Interests

Israel's condemnations in international organisations, global anti-Semitism, desire for observer status at the African Union, as well as the agenda to contain Iran comprise the political interests that motivate Israel-Kenya relations. According to Kamau (2017), during a state visit to Kenya in 2016, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu outlined Israel's key interest as altering African anti-Israel voting at the United Nations.

Moreover, Gilboa & Inbar (2009), argue that Israel pursues political interests that seek support in international organisations including the UN and some of its agencies deemed to be anti-Semitic, such as the Human Right Commission and the Commission on the Status of Women amongst others. Further, UN Watch (2017), indicates that Israel is the most condemned state by the UN[28]. For example, in 2016, the UN adopted resolution A/RES/70/225 that raised concern on Israel's exploitation of the natural resources in Occupied Palestinian Territory and A/RES/70/89 that expressed grave concern about the systemic violation of the human rights of the Palestinian people by Israel (ibid). Consequently, Israel has sought to counter anti-Semitism through enhancing bilateral relations with counterpart states to diminish the anti-Israel condemnation in international organisations.

Further, Israel desires observer status at the African Union and according to Sanchez (2016), President Uhuru Kenyatta, a strong proponent of Israel's quest at the AU was the Chairman of the AU's Africa Peer Review Mechanism Committee (APRMC) (2015-2018). This study contends that President Kenyatta's position at the AU and Kenya's hegemonic status in East Africa is beneficial in persuading other African states to support Israel's attempt as an observer at the AU, hence motivating Kenya-Israel relations.

Additionally, Ayee (2011), observes that Israel's desire to contain Iran's influence particularly in the Horn of Africa is another political interest motivating Israel-Kenya relations. Hassan & Thabet (2018), concur with Ayee and note that Israel strives to counter Iran's diplomatic activities in Africa aimed at acquiring uranium for Iran's nuclear program, the growth of *Shia*[29] Doctrine and improved trade. However, Hassan & Thabet, fail to consider Israel's political interests in specific states and discuss Africa in general. In Kenya, Iranian influence intensifies through the advancement of *Shia* Doctrine by an active Iranian Cultural Centre in Nairobi through programs such as collaborations with Universities and Islamic media outlets, Iranian scholarships, cultural festivals, and teaching the Persian language.

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[28] Between 2012 and 2015, the UN adopted 97 resolutions condemning states and 83 of these condemned Israel.
[29] Islamic Doctrine which believes that only God can chose a successor to His appointed Prophet (That God chose Ali as Prophet Mohammed's successor) and in the centrality of the Imam as the leaders in the Islamic faith. It is contrary to the Sunni Doctrine that believes in Abu Bakr as Prophet Mohammed's successor, who was chosen by members of the Islamic faith through a vote.

In pursuit of Israel's political interests Israel-Kenya political collaborations exist and according to the Kenya Embassy in Tel Aviv (2018), these are governed by a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Consultations between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kenya and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the State of Israel, signed in 2007. Moreover, according to the Kenya Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2018), the political collaborations comprise political consultations such as that held in Jerusalem in 2016 and in Nairobi in 2017, as well as interactions between the foreign ministries and high-level visits between state agents. These visits include the visit by Avigdor Lieberman (Israeli Deputy Prime Minister 2009-2012) to Kenya in 2009, Hon.Raila Odinga's (Kenyan Prime Minister 2008-2013) visit to Israel in 2011 and the Late Professor George Saitoti's (the then Internal Security Minister 2008-2012) visit to Israel in 2011, amongst others. Additionally, President Uhuru Kenyatta visited Israel in 2016 and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reciprocated the visit in July 2016 and November 2017 (Ibid). Bergeijk, Okano-Heijmans, & Mellisen (2011), agree that the inclusion of political considerations in bilateral relations cultivates trust between counterparts and this study contends that Kenya-Israel political collaborations seek to inspire trust as the two states promote their national interests through the bilateral relations.

Other Factors

Geopolitical Interests

Israel's geopolitical interests comprise another motivation for Israel-Kenya bilateral relations. According to Spykman (1938), the geography of a state cannot be discounted in devising policy and highlights among others, the setting of a state relative to water masses, communication routes and neighbouring states as fundamental for foreign policy. Israel's location in the Middle East among hostile Arab neighbours such as Iran can thus be regarded as a geographic influence on Israel's foreign policy. Moreover, Harkavy (2013), argues that foreign policies of Major Powers are intent on accessing overseas bases, where access serves national security through gathering intelligence, surveillance and military communication. He further observes that access to overseas bases has developed as an agenda for diplomatic relations between Major Powers and Third World

countries, resulting in arms sales, military and economic aid being offered in exchange for access.

According to Lindenstrauss (2015), Israel's quest as a Major Power in the Middle East for access to areas deemed strategic to its interests such as Azerbaijan[30] is apparent, while Harkavy's submission contextualizes Israel-Kenya bilateral relations from an access perspective. Further, Oded (2010), identifies safeguarding of maritime passages as an interest Israel maintains, noting Kenya's significance in protecting Israeli passenger and cargo ships due to its proximity to the Indian Ocean. According to Staff (2018), Israel's presence in Kenya has geopolitical implications and Kenya as a littoral state is vital, as Iran undermines Israel's use of the Red Sea and supports the Yemeni *Houthi* rebels' crusade to block the Strait of *Bab Al-Mandab*. This study argues that Kenya's strategic location relative to Israel's geopolitical interests is a motivating factor in Israel-Kenya relations.

Idiosyncratic Characteristics of State Leadership

The complementary idiosyncratic characteristics of Kenya's President Uhuru Kenyatta and Israel's Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu constitute another motivation for Kenya-Israel bilateral relations. Kinsella, Russet & Starr (2012), submit that some personal characteristics of leaders including education, physical health, age, personal experience and belief system help to clarify the policies embraced in response to global problems. President Kenyatta's age and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's personal experiences support this submission as President Uhuru Kenyatta ascended to power in 2013 at the age of 50 years, considerably younger than his predecessor H.E Mwai Kibaki who was 71 years when he became President of Kenya in 2002. Moreover, President Uhuru Kenyatta's physical health is observably better than that of former President Mwai Kibaki and one would thus contend that his foreign policy is more robust as evidenced by Kenya's expanded relations.[31] Arguably, Kenya's desire to embrace bilateral partners is

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[30] Iran's neighbour to the north that is deemed strategic to Israel's objectives of surveilling Iranian activities.
[31] New diplomatic missions like Austrian Consulate, signing of numerous bilateral agreements such as Kenya-Israel Security Cooperation (2016) and hosting delegations such as former US President Barack Obama in 2015, Israeli PM Netanyahu in 2016.

attractive to countries that would benefit from relations with Kenya in pursuit of their national interests including Israel.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's personal experiences particularly in his youth motivate his response to terrorism, one of the greatest threats on Israel's national security. Silverman (2016), submits that PM Netanyahu took part in military operations from an early age of eighteen when he joined the Israeli Defence Forces and that he was very close to his elder brother Yonatan Netanyahu. Silverman further notes that Yonatan's death in 1976 during the Entebbe Raid in response to a terrorist act significantly predisposed Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's life into its present course. This is evidenced by the crusade against terrorism demonstrated through scholarly writing[32] disdain for perpetrators of terror including Iran and the impetus for counter terrorism. Ostensibly, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's personal experiences have been a motivating factor in Israel-Kenya relations, noting that counter terrorism is a dominant dialogue in the bilateral relations.

Israel faces some challenges in the bilateral relations as it seeks to alter anti-Israel voting in international organisations. According to Chazan (2017), this is the reason for the use of security and economic incentives by the current Israeli leadership in exchange for favorable votes. However, such political control according to Chazan is detrimental to Israel due to state sovereignty and notes that African support for Palestine is unlikely to change. This submission is demonstrated in the Kenyan context as Kenya continues voting against Israel despite enhanced bilateral relations. In March 2017, Kenya voted in favour of United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution E/CN.6/2017/L3 that condemned Israel as the only violator of women's rights in the world in reference Palestinian Women. According to UN Watch (2017), Kenya also abstained from UNGA resolution ES-10/L.22 that condemned the unilateral recognition of Jerusalem as Israel's capital by the USA in December 2017. Concurring with Chazan, Mogire (2008), submits that at the multilateral level, Kenya's inclination appears to be Pro-Arab despite maintaining close bilateral ties with Israel. Ostensibly, Kenya is unlikely to change her

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[32] PM Netanyahu has authored several books including International Terrorism: Challenge and Response (1979), Terrorism: How the West can win (1987) and Fighting Terrorism: How democracies can defeat domestic and international terrorism (1996).

anti-Israel voting in international forums occasioned by her oil interests in Arab states and solidarity with Palestine as prescribed for by the African Union.

Arising from the foregoing, this study identifies two gaps in the literature reviewed. The first is that the existing literature largely generalizes Israel's interests in Africa without considering that each state is unique and generalizing may be inaccurate. For instance, Oded (2010), and Chazan (2017), assess Israel's interests in Africa while Bishku (2017), details Israel's interests in East Africa, assessments that are not country specific. This study will address this gap by assessing Israel's interests in a specific country – Kenya. Secondly, as evidenced by the literature, existing literature fails to consider the effect of state leadership in motivating bilateral relations aimed at pursuing national interests. This study addresses this gap by assessing the complimentary idiosyncratic characteristics of state leadership in Kenya and Israel, specifically President Uhuru Kenyatta and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

2.7 Theoretical Framework

The study adopted Political Realism, a branch of Realism which is a theory of International Relations that stems from the term *Realpolitik. Realpolitik* is a system of politics that is based on practical rather than moral or ideological concerns and is closely associated with Niccolo Machiavelli an Italian political scientist (1469-1527). According to Donnelley (2000), Political Realism emphasizes the limitations of human nature particularly that man is naturally egoistic, aggressive, power hungry, overbearing on others and always pursuing selfish ends. These limitations when juxtaposed illuminate the characteristics of a state including being selfish, aggressive, amoral and always pursuing self-interest. The proponents of Political Realism include Classical Theorists such as Hans Morgenthau (1949), Edward Hallett Carr (1946), John Mearsheimer (2007), Niccolo Machiavelli (1532) and Reinhold Niebuhr (1932) among others.

Assumptions of Political Realism

First, Political Realism assumes that economic interests are the core of politics arguing that a state possessing economic wealth has resources and that resources are power. According to Soilen (2012), power in this regard refers to the ability to influence others

and to access or control territories, resources and important geopolitical areas such as maritime routes, canals, ports and harbours. Moreover, Political Realism views a correlation between arms trade as an economic interest and pursuit of power in the international system, supposing that one way in which states pursue economic supremacy and political power is through arms exports as is the case with Israel and constitutes a fundamental argument of the study.

Second, according to Pease (2015), Political Realism assumes that the international system exists as anarchy without a central government to secure the interests of individual states. This assumption supposes a situation where states pursue their national interests and in so doing, cooperate with other states in the international system solely for the achievement of national objectives. As such, collaborations and alliances between states in the international system serve the national interests of the states involved, as is the case with Kenya and Israel.

Third, Political Realism assumes a constellation of states in the international system each pursuing survival and that pursuit of national interests is essential for survival. Morgenthau (1948), contends that in seeking survival, a state pursues its security, economic and cultural interests. Fourth, Political Realism assumes the centrality of the state as the sole actor in the international system. According to Norton (2010), this arises from the Westphalia Treaty of 1648[33] that presented the concept of sovereignty where a state decides its domestic and foreign policies bereft of interference from external actors.

Fifth, Political Realism assumes that the state is a unitary and rational actor and according to Pease (2015), this implies that a state is able to ascertain its national interests, rank them in order of significance and adopt ideal strategies in pursuing the national interests. Moreover, the theory focuses on the external milieu contending that a state's foreign behaviour is conditioned by occurrences in the international system rather than by domestic events.

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[33]This was a European Agreement signed to end the anti-Habsburg conflict that had resulted in a Thirty Year war.

The primary limitation of Realism is that it ignores the role of non-state actors in the international system, supposing that intergovernmental organisations and non-governmental organisations are creations of states, advancing state interests and are dependent on states financially and for legitimacy. To address this limitation, the study will adopt the assumptions on matters of national security, economic supremacy and acquisition of power for political influence and will not discuss the role of non-state actors.

Whereas the study may have used other theories including Idealism and Neo-Realism, the assumptions of Political Realism significantly resonate with the security, economic and political affairs to be interrogated in the study thereby making it most applicable.

Utility of Political Realism in this Study

The assumptions of Political Realism strongly resonate with several contentions of the study making it most applicable. First, the assumption on pursuit of economic interests through arms exports that aim for power acquisition will enable the reader comprehend the study's contention on Israel's economic interests. The study contends that Israel maintains economic interests to increase its arms exports fundamentally aimed at economic supremacy and political power in the international system. Moreover, Pierre (2014), submits that states intent on power acquisition expand their domestic military industries for export purposes as is the case with Israel.

Second, Political Realism stresses the importance of power in the international system and that power is significant in influencing others. This assumption is important in assisting the reader comprehend the study's contention that Israel pursues political interests to enable it influence events in the international system particularly anti-Israel voting patterns in international organisations and global anti-Semitism. Moreover, Political Realism will enable the reader comprehend another contention of the study that Israel pursues political interests to contain Iran. The theory submits that states seek to access or control areas that are strategic to their geopolitical interests in pursuit of power. The study argues that Israel accesses Kenya for geopolitical reasons including the use of Kenya's Coast to survey and protect maritime routes used by Israeli passenger and cargo

ships against Iranian threats. Further Israel also accesses and utilizes Kenya as an intelligence base, collecting intelligence on fundamentalist activities in the Horn of Africa patronized by Iran.

Third, Political Realism views cooperation in the international system from the perspective of national interest and submits that states only cooperate if the cooperation serves national interest. This assumption explains why Israel and Kenya are cooperating and advancing the bilateral relations, as the relations serve the national interests of both states. Moreover, Political Realism focuses on the external environment of a state contending that a state's foreign behaviour is conditioned by occurrences in the international system rather than by domestic events. This assists a reader to comprehend that Kenya and Israel in advancing their bilateral relations are responding to external threats on their national security including terrorism and anti-Semitism.

2.8 Research Hypotheses

  i.   Kenya's security, economic and political interests play a critical role in motivating Kenya-Israel bilateral relations.

  ii. Israel's security, economic and political interests play a critical role in motivating Israel-Kenya bilateral relations.

Figure 2.1: Conceptual Framework

2.9 Conceptual Framework

Dependent Variable   **Independent Variable**

National Interest

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                                    ┌──────────────────────────────┐
                                    │ Security Interests           │
                                    │   • Intelligence sharing     │
                                    │   • Military Training         │
                                    │   • Security agreements       │
                                    │   • Counter Terrorism         │
                                    └──────────────────────────────┘

┌──────────────────┐                ┌──────────────────────────────┐
│   Bilateral      │                │ Economic Interests           │
│   Relations      │ ─────────────▶ │   • Bilateral Trade           │
│                  │                │   • Trade Missions            │
└──────────────────┘                │   • Trade Consuls             │
                                    │   • Economic Forums           │
                                    └──────────────────────────────┘

                                    ┌──────────────────────────────┐
                                    │ Political Interests          │
                                    │   • Political consultations   │
                                    │   • MOU on Political          │
                                    │     Consultations             │
                                    │   • High-level                │
                                    │     government official       │
                                    │     exchanges                 │
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Source: Author (2019)

The Conceptual Framework illustrates the variables in the study. Bilateral relations represent the dependent variable, whereas national interests represent the independent variable. The three national interests within the scope of the study, security, economic and political interests are operationalized further into various indicators as demonstrated by the diagram above.

CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

This chapter outlines the area of study, the study area selection, research design, target population, sampling techniques and selection of interview respondents, data collection procedures, data validity and reliability. The chapter also highlights data analysis, ethical considerations, and limitations of the study.

3.2 Data Analysis and Presentation

The study adopted a qualitative research methodology that according to Kumar (2008), is concerned with qualitative phenomenon and aims at discovering the underlying motives or desires. Specifically, the study adopted content analysis. Qualitative methodology was appropriate for the study as it sought to assess the influence or motivation of Kenya's and Israel's national interests on the Kenya-Israel bilateral relations. Upon completion of primary data collection, the researcher organised the responses from the interviews and focus group discussions and began the transcription process. This was done through recording study responses in an excel workbook maintaining the originality in the interview transcripts. The researcher then went through the data in detail to gain an understanding of the general ideas presented by the data. The researcher then copied the data into a separate excel workbook and filtered the data to remove repetitions and information that was not relevant to the study. Filtered data was then grouped into similar themes aligned to the research questions highlighting Kenya's security, economic and political interests, Israel's security, economic and political interests and the challenges affecting the two states in the bilateral relations. This resulted in coded data.

The researcher then input the coded data into an excel worksheet to produce charts and graphs. The charts and graphs were used to describe the outcomes using percentages and frequencies in presenting the data. Secondary data was subjected to content analysis and grouped into thematic areas guided by the research questions.

3.3 Study Areas

The study chose to interrogate the bilateral relations between Kenya and Israel as few scholars have researched on the enhanced bilateral relations between 2007 and 2017. The study was carried out in Nairobi County, the capital city of Kenya. According to the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (2013), Nairobi is situated at latitude 1.29° and longitude 36.82°, measures 696 Km^2 and has a population of 3.14 million. Further, according to Ochieng (2016), Nairobi is the second largest city in the African Great Lakes Region[34] and the most attractive investment city in the East African Region[35] due to good infrastructure, ease of doing business and strong prospects for economic growth. Nairobi hosts several prominent installations including the Presidential State House, Jomo Kenyatta International Airport, Kenyatta International Conference Centre, the National Assembly and the United Nations Office in Nairobi (UNON) which is the United Nations Headquarters in Africa. Nairobi enjoys tropical climate and lies within close proximity of the Nairobi National Park. The major languages spoken in Nairobi are English and Kiswahili. The City hosts a diverse set of ethnic groups including majority the tribes in Kenya (ibid).

According to the State of Israel (2013), Israel is located at the eastern end of the Mediterranean Sea in the Middle East region where Africa, Asia and Europe converge, covering an area of 20700 km² and a population of approximately 8 million. The State of Israel is situated at latitude 31.05° and longitude 34.85° and borders Lebanon to the north, Syria to the north east, Jordan and the West Bank to the east, Egypt to the south and Gaza Strip to the South West. Jews, Christians and Muslims regard Israel as the Holy Land as it hosts several sacred sites in Jerusalem including The Temple Mount, The Church of the Holy Sepulchre, and *Al Aqsa* Mosque among others. The most populous City in Israel is Tel Aviv and it hosts Israel's economic and technological hubs. The language spoken in Israel is Hebrew.

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[34] The Great Lakes Region comprises of the following countries: Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Malawi, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda.
[35] The East African Region comprises of the following countries Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania.

3.4 Study Area Selection

Nairobi County was selected as the geographic locality within which the study was conducted and the choice was justified by a number of reasons. First, the Embassy of Israel[36] is located in Nairobi since 1963. Second, all the ministries, organisations and institutions where the interviews were conducted are also located in Nairobi. For example, the Ministry of Defense Headquarters[37], the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade[38] and the Ministry of Industry, Cooperatives and Trade[39]. Third, the City hosts several Israeli establishments including hotels, high-end coffee shops, malls and businesses[40]. These presented an opportunity to inquire into Israel's economic activities in Kenya.

Fourth, Nairobi as a cosmopolitan city hosts Israeli citizens working as expatriates or having voluntarily migrated to Kenya including members of the Jewish Community in Nairobi, with whom the study engaged. Fifth, the few academic experts conversant with the Middle East were interviewed in Universities located within the City like the University of Nairobi. As such Nairobi was a viable area to conduct the study as it hosts the highest concentration of the targeted study respondents.

3.5 Research Design

The study adopted a descriptive longitudinal research design. According to Menards (2008), a descriptive longitudinal research design is one in which data is collected on one or more variables for two or more time periods, allowing the measurement of change and the explanation for the change. According to McNabb (2015), descriptive longitudinal research design involves the assessment of variables over two or more intervals with the aim of assessing the change in the variables. The study adopted descriptive longitudinal research design as it sought to collect data and describe on the same variables (national interests and bilateral relations) over ten years.

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[36] The Embassy is located along Bishop's Road in the Upper Hill Area.
[37] Located at Ulinzi House in the Hurlingham Area.
[38] Located within Nairobi City Centre along Harambee Avenue.
[39] Located in Telposta Towers along Kenyatta Avenue in Nairobi City Centre.
[40] These include Amiran Limited and Shikun and Binui Limited among others.

The study adopted a qualitative research methodology. According to Lapan, Quartaroli & Reimer (2011), this methodology studies phenomena with the aim of generalizing findings. Further, Kumar (2008), states that qualitatitive research methodology is concerned with qualitative phenomenon relating to or involving quality of some kind and aims at discovering the underlying motives or desires. Kothari (2004), submits that this methodology is suitable for interrogating the motivations or influences of certain occurrences and is appropriate for the overall objective of the study in assessing the influences or motives of national interests on bilateral relations.

Further, the study adopted a case study method. According to Gagnon (2010), this method is a logical procedure employed by a science that makes it possible to analyze phenomena as a single, thereby providing in depth understanding of that phenomenon. Further, Woodside (2010), supposes that a case study method is an inquiry that focuses on describing, understanding, predicting or controlling individual phenomena. The study adopted a case study method as it is appropriate for descriptive studies and assists to assess in depth understanding of relationships between the two variables, national interests and bilateral relations.

3.6 Target Population

The study targeted representatives of the Israeli Government including Israel's Deputy Ambassador to Kenya as well as military, trade and political attachés at the Embassy of Israel in Nairobi. The study also targeted officials in Kenya's Ministries of Foreign Affairs (Middle East Division), Defense (Counter Terrorism staff at Headquarters and deployed to Somalia) and Trade (Department of International Trade). Further, the study sought to interrogate officials from the National Intelligence Service, Officials from the National Counter Terrorism Centre and Officials from the Administration Police. Further, the study also targeted academic and security experts, business representatives engaging in Kenya-Israel trade and the Vice-Chair of the Senatorial Committee on National Security, Defense and Foreign Relations. Also targeted were other respondents including members of the Jewish Community in Nairobi, Trade Officers at the Export Promotion Council, Israeli trained Extension Officers, the Kenya Friends of Israel, Middle East

opinion writers, the MASHAV Coordinator in Kenya and Shalom Club members. Shalom Club comprises the Kenyan beneficiaries of Israel's MASHAV training program.

Table 3.1: Interview Respondents Schedule

State National Interest	Kenya	Israel
Security	- Ministry of Defense: ➢ 1 Counter Terrorism Unit Official. ➢ 1 Official Deployed to Somalia. 2 National Intelligence Officers. - Vice Chair Committee on National Security and Foreign Relations. 2 National Counter Terrorism Centre Officials.	1 Military Attaché.
Economic	1 Ministry of Trade Official (Department of International Trade). 1 Export Promotion Council Official 3 Kenyan Businessmen engaging in Kenya-Israel Trade.	1 Economic Attaché. 3 Israeli Businessmen operating in Kenya.
Political	Ministry of Foreign Affairs: ➢ 1 Director Middle East Division. ➢ 1 Political & Diplomatic Secretary.	1 Political Attaché. 1 Deputy Ambassador
Others	- Middle East Studies Experts: ➢ 1 University of Nairobi Lecturer: Department of Political Science and Public Administration. 1 Middle East Opinion Writer - Chair, Kenya Friends of Israel. 1 Israeli trained Extension Officer.	1 MASHAV Kenya Chapter Coordinator at the Israeli Embassy. 2 members of the Jewish Community in Kenya. 2 members of Shalom Club.
Respondents	18	12
Total Respondents	30	

Source: Author (2019)

3.7 Interview Respondents Schedule

Respondents were categorized according to the different national interests and selected purposively based on the information they held on the security, economic and political relations between Kenya and Israel. Owing to their different expertise, the respondents held in-depth knowledge on the motivating factors promoting Kenya-Israel bilateral relations, the areas of collaboration and the challenges arising from the bilateral relations. As such, the researcher deemed that the sample was sufficiently useful in answering the research questions and meeting the study objectives. The researcher contacted the respondents through phone calls and pre-arranged appointments.

3.8 Sampling Technique

The study adopted purposive sampling. According to Kothari (2004), this is a practice whereby the researcher selects items from a population to form a sample, constructed on the assumption that the items within the sample are descriptive of the entire population. Purposive sampling is ideal for the study as the information sought is held by a distinct group of individuals that the researcher specifically targeted. Further, according to Glaser & Straus (1967), the aim of purposive sampling when used in qualitative studies is the achievement of saturation. This occurs when including more respondents in the study does not provide extra information as was the case in this study. Morse (1994), suggests that 30 to 50 respondents is an adequate sample size that achieves saturation in a qualitative study, whereas Creswell (1998), proposes 20 to 30 respondents. For this study, the researcher was aided by the guidelines provided by Morse and Creswell and used a sample of 30 respondents.

3.9 Data Collection

The study adopted secondary data and employed the use of publicly available information from scholarly writings, journals, publications, policy documents of the Kenyan and Israeli Governments, bilateral agreements, newspaper articles and internet sources. The study further incorporated the use of primary data and made use of face to face expert and structured interviews. The study also embraced focus group discussions with study respondents. According to Wanyonyi (2013), structured interviews are effective in data collection as they are easier to administer and resultant responses are easier to analyze as

compared to unstructured interviews. On the other hand, expert interviews and focus group discussion enable the researcher to have a deeper understanding on the issues under investigation and compliment the normal structured interviews (ibid).

Prior to data collection, the researcher obtained an introductory letter from the Chair of the Department of Political Science and Public Administration at the University of Nairobi and acquired a research permit from the National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation (NACOSTI) to legitimize data collection within Nairobi County. The researcher also obtained authorization from the Nairobi County Regional Directorate of Education Office. The researcher undertook data collection between 26th February 2019 and 4th April 2019. Before this period, the researcher pre-arranged appointments with the study respondents and dealt with logistical issues and requirements for the interviews. The requirements for the researcher to obtain a letter from the University and a research permit from NACOSTI are important as they formally introduce the researcher to the respondents and authenticate data collection within Nairobi County, respectively.

3.10 Data Validity and Reliability

According to Baumgarten (2012), reliability in research may be described as the consistency of measurement of a concept using an identical measurement procedure and the replicability of the findings. This entails establishing whether, if the research is conducted by a different researcher at a different time, similar findings would be arrived at. Validity on the other hand surrounds the accuracy with which to ascertain the relationship between variables. Validity may be internal or external, where internal validity is concerned with how well the study is conducted and the causal relationship between variables. External validity on the other hand relates to how generalizable study findings are (ibid). This study focused on internal validity, as it adopted a case study method. Case study findings are largely not generalizable and generalizability is the essence of external validity. According to Thietart *et al* (2010) validity and reliability may be tested in quantitative studies, but in qualitative studies, precautions are taken to improve the validity and reliability of the study and they propose several measures to

improve validity and reliability in qualitative studies. As this study was qualitative, the researcher adopted the proposals by Thietart *et al* in ensuring data validity and reliability.

First, is the use of multiple sources of data. The researcher employed the use of structured expert and face to face interviews as well as focus group discussions as primary sources of data. The study adopted face to face expert and structured interviews to provide consistency and accuracy of the questions posed to the respondents and embraced focus group discussions as an appropriate data collection instrument to gain an in depth understanding to study responses of the research questions and fulfil the research objectives. Moreover, the researcher made use of information that was publicly available in books, journals, policy documents, newspaper articles and internet sources as sources of secondary data.

Second, is the removal of the researcher's personal biases that may affect the study and study outcomes. According to Taylor (2013), the researcher's personal biases occur where the researcher influences the study results to portray a certain outcome. To ensure data validity and reliability while undertaking the study, the researcher remained free of bias by acknowledging respondents answers as they were without implying that there is a right or wrong answer and by making use of open-ended questions in interrogating respondents to ensure that respondents relayed as much information on the subject under inquiry.

Third, Thietart *et al* (2010), recommend the collection of data to saturation points, which occur when the collection of incremental data does not yield any new information. According to Morse (1994), 30 to 50 respondents is an adequate sample size for a qualitative study. Moreover, Creswell (1998), proposes 20 to 30 respondents as a generally accepted sample size for qualitative studies in which saturation is achieved. As this study was qualitative in nature, the researcher was aided by the guidelines provided by Morse and Creswell and used a sample of 30 respondents.

3.11 Ethical Considerations

Ethical considerations provide guidelines for the responsible conduct of research. According to David & Resnik (2015), there are various reasons for upholding ethics in research. First, ethics promote the aims of research such as creation of knowledge and truth. For instance, adherence to ethics promotes truth, minimizes error and prohibits misrepresentation of research data. Second, ethics in research promote values that are necessary to conduct a research undertaking. These values include trust, accountability and fairness and are essential because research involves cooperation and coordination by several people and institutions such as the researcher, study respondents, Universities and authorizing institutions among others (ibid).

Third, David & Resnik further observe that ethics help to hold the researcher accountable to the public and guard against conflicts of interest and research misconduct especially where research is funded by tax payer funds. Fourth, ethics promote public support for research as people are more likely to fund research projects where the quality and integrity of research can be trusted. Fifth, ethics in research promote moral and social values such as social responsibility, compliance with the law and public safety (ibid).

The researcher observed several principles in upholding ethical considerations. First, the researcher obtained informed consent from the study respondents prior to administering research questions. This involved the researcher relaying the nature and purpose of the research followed by voluntary participation of the study respondents. No respondent was coerced into participating in the study. Second, the researcher maintained honesty in recording and reporting the data as obtained from the field without deliberate errors or distortion. Third, the researcher ensured that there was no conflict of interest while undertaking the study. Conflict of interest is present where financial or personal gains compromise the researcher's judgement in conducting the research or reporting outcomes. The researcher did not offer and was not offered financial or personal gains in conducting the research or presenting the findings.

Fourth, the researcher further observed privacy of information and of study respondents. The researcher only collected information from the respondents that was necessary for the study. Moreover, the researcher was cognizant that each respondent as a human subject has a right to privacy when participating in research and therefore maintained confidentiality particularly for those that preferred to remain anonymous. The researcher however published the identities of the study respondents that were willing to have their identities published.

Fifth, the researcher observed no maleficence. This is a principle that requires both the subject of inquiry and the process of inquiry to be free of harm. The study assessed in to the influence of national interests on the Kenya-Israel bilateral relations between 2007 and 2017. This assessment did not hold the potential to cause harm nor did it cause actual harm to the researcher, the study respondents or to the general public. Sixth, the researcher maintained intellectual integrity and did not plagiarize. Plagiarism refers to the presentation of other persons work or ideas as the researcher's without consent or non-acknowledgement of original authors. The researcher acknowledged all sources of information and did not use previous works in verbatim, rather understood the context and relayed it contextually.

In upholding ethics, the researcher was also guided by Weber (1949). According to Weber, personal values constitute a fundamental ethical concern in undertaking research as they may distort the interpretation of study responses. Weber held that a researcher must maintain value neutrality in the course of undertaking the study and in providing study outcomes, without omitting or misrepresenting data. In this study, the researcher presented the data as obtained from the field without omissions or misrepresentation. Moreover, the researcher maintained utmost integrity in conducting the research including acknowledging and appropriately referencing all sources of data. The researcher remained objective and free from bias when undertaking the study and complied with the stipulated University procedures. The researcher also treated interviewee responses with utmost confidentiality and used the information collected for research purposes only.

3.12 Limitation of the Study

The researcher encountered several limitations in carrying out the study. First, was limited access to two of the study respondents[41] due to the nature of a busy schedule in undertaking national duties in Kenya. Second, was the bureaucratic challenge in accessing government offices[42] during data collection. These challenges included the unavailability of study respondents away on official duty or busy with office work. This was mitigated by undertaking a pre-survey to identify convenient time for the study respondents and proper planning to offer sufficient allowance for rescheduling of interviews[43]. The researcher also used secondary data that is publicly available in publications, foreign policy documents, institution websites and journals.

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[41] The researcher was unable to interview the Vice Chair of the Senate Committee on National Security and Foreign Relations despite seeking audience on 28/02/2019, 11/03/2019 and 03/06/2019. The researcher was also unable to interview the Political Diplomatic Secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 6th March 2019. A substitute respondent was however provided.

[42] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence.

[43] The researcher rescheduled interviews with the Israel Desk Officer from 6th March 2019 to 13th March 2019 and with the Middle East Trade Officer from 1st March 2019 to 7th March 2019.

CHAPTER FOUR: DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

4.1 Introduction

This chapter provides a detailed presentation of data as collected from the field and a critical analysis of the research findings in response to the study objectives. This study sought to assess the influence of Kenya's and Israel's national interests on the Kenya-Israel bilateral relations between 2007 and 2017. Specifically, the study sought to assess the extent to which Kenya-Israel bilateral relations were motivated by Kenya's security, economic and political interests between 2007 and 2017, and to assess the extent to which Israel-Kenya bilateral relations were motivated by Israel's security, economic and political interests between 2007 and 2017.

This chapter is structured into two sections. The first section presents information on the demographic characteristics of the respondents and their understanding of Kenya-Israel bilateral relations. The second section provides a comprehensive analysis of the study responses in relation to the research objectives.

4.2 Response Rate

The researcher managed to successfully administer expert and structured interviews to 29 out of 30 targeted study respondents. According to Morse (1994), 30 to 50 respondents is an adequate sample size for a qualitative study. Moreover, Creswell (1998), proposes 20 to 30 respondents as a generally accepted sample size for qualitative studies. As this study was qualitative in nature, the researcher was aided by the guidelines provided by Morse and Creswell and used a sample of 30 respondents. The researcher further held a focus group discussion with 5 respondents drawn from the security interest stratum at Vigilance House in Nairobi. The sample size of 29 respondents represents a 97% response rate that was sufficient for generalizing study outcomes.

According to Mugenda and Mugenda (1999), a response rate above 50% is sufficient to generalize the findings of a study. Specifically, the study achieved 100% response rate from respondents within the security interests' stratum, representing 8 respondents out of a target of 8 respondents within the security interests' stratum. Further, the study achieved 100% (9) and 75% (3) response rates in the economic and political interests'

strata respectively. Finally, the study obtained a response rate of 100% (9) from respondents that were classified under the "Others" stratum. This stratum comprised respondents from the Kenya Friends of Israel (KFOI)[44], beneficiaries of Israel's MASHAV[45] programmes in Kenya, members of the Jewish Community in Kenya and members of Shalom Club[46].

Table 4.1: Response Rate

National Interest	Sample Size	Actual Respondents	Response Rate
Security	8	8	100%
Economic	9	9	100%
Political	4	3	75%
Others	9	9	100%
Total	**30**	**29**	**97%**

Source: Author (2019)

4.3 Demographic Characteristics of the Study Respondents

This section gives an overview of the respondents' gender, age and years of experience in Kenya-Israel relations.

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[44] Kenya Friends of Israel is a registered non-profit organisation in Kenya that undertakes activities to enhance and sustain the relationship between Kenya at various levels including government, business, social, economic, education, technological, medical and agriculture through proactive engagement.

[45] Israel Agency for International Development Cooperation that offers developing countries assistance to fight poverty, hunger and disease through technical training and technology transfers in public health, education, agriculture, water and sanitation, urban planning and others.

[46] The club is a forum where MASHAV (Israel Agency for International Development Cooperation) alumni participate in professional and social activities.

Table 4.2: Gender Distribution of the Respondents

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Male	24	83%	83
Female	5	17%	100.0
Total	**29**	**100.0**	

Source: Author (2019)

The above gender distribution in the respondents illustrates that 24 of the respondents were from the male gender, while 5 respondents were female. Of the 24 men, 8 were from the security interests' stratum, while 6 were from the economic interests' stratum. Moreover, 2 men were from the political interests' stratum while 8 were from the stratum aforementioned as the "Others" stratum. Of the five women, none was from the security interests' stratum, three were from the economic interests' stratum, one was from the political interests' stratum, while one was from the "Others" stratum.

Table 4.3: Age of the Respondents

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
30 - 40 Years	4	14%	14%
41 – 50 Years	18	62%	76%
51 – 60 Years	3	10%	86%
Above 60 Years	4	14%	100.%
Total	29	100%	

Source: Author (2019)

Respondents were classified into various age brackets arranged in intervals of ten years each. The age distribution ranged from 30 years to above 60 years with the 41 – 50 years age bracket having the highest number of respondents. This can be attributed to the fact

that generally, this age group comprises the active age of government and government agency workers as well as established businessmen and women who comprised a significant part of the study respondents. The researcher interviewed 5 respondents from the Kenya and Israeli governments, 9 government agency respondents, 3 businessmen and 1 businesswoman within this age group. The researcher also observed that 14% (4) of the total respondents were above 60 years of age, 2 from Kenya and 2 from Israel. Of these (2) were from the security interests' stratum.

This observation was explained by Respondent X who informed the researcher that governments invest a lot in training security staff in intelligence gathering, counter terrorism, defensive combat, and weapons use among others. According to the respondent, governments including the Kenyan Government do not entirely release security personnel upon attainment of retirement age, but keep them to train younger personnel in the security forces and to ensure minimal compromise of intelligence held by these experienced security staff. This point was also corroborated by Respondent Y, who submitted that security personnel above 60 years in Kenya were still engaged in official duties, seconded to security agencies or working as undercover security operatives. Respondents were further classified according to their gender, age and respective country.

Table 4.4: Male Gender: Age Distribution Table per Country

Age / Country	Kenya	Israel
31-40 Years	4	2
41-50 Years	8	6
51-60 Years	2	2
Country Totals	14	10
Study Totals (Male)	24	

Source: Author (2019)

Table 4.4 illustrates the age distribution of study respondents among the male gender. 25% (6) of the male respondents were between 31 and 40 years of age, while 58% (14) of the male respondents were between 41 and 50 years. Moreover, 17% (4) of the male respondents in the study were within the age bracket of 51 to 60 years. Further, 58% (14) of the male respondents were from Kenya, while 42% (10) of the male respondents represented Israel.

Table 4.5: Female Gender: Age Distribution Table per Country

Age ╲ Country	Kenya	Israel
31-40 Years	0	1
41-50 Years	3	1
51-60 Years	0	0
Country Totals	3	2
Study Totals (Female)	5	

Source: Author (2019)

Table 4.5 illustrates the age distribution of study respondents among the female gender. 20% (1) of the female respondents were between 31 and 40 years of age, while 80% (4) of the female respondents were between 41 and 50 years. None of the female respondents in the study were within the age bracket of 51 to 60 years.

The researcher further established that majority of the respondents from both countries were well conversant with Kenya-Israel bilateral relations through work experience and that 93% (27) of the study respondents possessed more than five years' of familiarity with the subject. Moreover, a combined total of 69% (20) of the study respondents were experienced in Kenya-Israel bilateral relations for a period between 5 and 20 years. This occurrence was beneficial to the study as it sought to interrogate Kenya-Israel bilateral relations over a period of 10 years, from 2007 to 2017 and thus the vast experience and

extensive knowledge held by the respondents provided valuable insights into the study. Table 4.6 illustrates the years of experience study respondents had in Kenya-Israel relations.

Table 4.6: Years of Experience in Kenya-Israel Relations

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Less than 5 Years	2	7%	7%
5 – 10 Years	8	28%	35%
11- 20 Years	12	41%	76%
Above 20 Years	7	24%	100%
Total	29	100%	

Source: Author (2019)

4.4 Presentation of Findings

This study sought to assess the influence of national interests on Kenya-Israel bilateral relations between 2007 and 2017, guided by two objectives. The first objective was to assess the extent to which Kenya-Israel bilateral relations were motivated by Kenya's security, economic and political interests between 2007 and 2017. The second objective was to assess the extent to which Israel-Kenya bilateral relations were motivated by Israel's security, economic and political interests between 2007 and 2017.

Primary Data Findings

Objective One: The extent to which Kenya-Israel bilateral relations were motivated by Kenya's security, economic and political interests between 2007 and 2017

Security Interests

According to Respondent X, Kenya faces a myriad of national and transnational security threats including banditry, vigilantism, cybercrime, terrorism, smuggling and narcotics trade amongst others. Among these, terrorism presents the most prevalent security threat

as it destabilizes the economy, damages infrastructure, causes anxiety and increases unemployment. The respondent further notes that between 2007 and 2017, terrorist attacks in Kenya particularly in Nairobi, Mombasa and Garissa increased, concurring with Cannon & Pkalya (2017) who submit that *Al Shabaab* never launched any attacks in Kenya between 2006 and 2007 but between 2008 and 2015, the group coordinated 272 attacks on Kenyan territory. For instance, in October 2011, *Al Shabaab* militants launched a grenade attack in *Mwaura's* Bar, a club in downtown Nairobi, while in May 2012, another grenade exploded at *Assanands* House along Moi Avenue in Nairobi. In January 2013, *Al Shabaab* terrorists hurled grenades at the District Officer's office in Garrisa while in September 2013, *Al Shabaab* gun men attacked shoppers at the *Westgate Mall* in Nairobi. Moreover, according to Soi (2014), *Al Shabaab* radicals in June 2014 launched an attack in the Coastal area of Mpeketoni, killing at least 48 people. Respondent X further stated that arising from the increasing terrorist attacks, Kenya sought to enhance her bilateral relations with Israel between 2007 and 2017, in response to the rising threat of terrorism on Kenya's national security. This is because Israel has itself been a historical target of terrorism and has managed to secure its borders and reduce terror attacks through advanced counter terrorism and modern weapons technology. According to the respondent, Kenya specifically sought enhanced counter terrorism techniques, intelligence gathering capabilities, advanced military hardware and ongoing specialised training of Kenya's *Recce Squad*[47] with skills comparable to that of Israel's *Sayaret Matkal*.[48] In explaining Kenya's appetite for Israel's counter terrorism assistance, Respondent X detailed the genesis of Kenya as a terror target, a history that draws in the state of Israel. He stated that in 1975, Kenya arrested five Palestinians in Nairobi suspected of planning the bombing of an Israeli plane and that the suspects were handed over by Kenya to the State of Israel through a cargo plane destined for Israel. Kenya thus found itself entangled in the Israel-Palestine crisis as Palestine threatened to retaliate Kenya's action. Moreover, Kenya in 1976 assisted Israel in executing the Entebbe Raid to rescue terror hostages held in Uganda by Palestinian Terrorists, prompting retaliatory terror attacks that targeted Kenya. Kenya therefore looked to Israel

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[47] Elite group of soldiers within Kenya's General Service Unit.
[48] Elite unit within Israel's Defense Forces tasked with counter terrorism, hostage rescue operations and intelligence gathering.

to train Kenyan security forces on counter terrorism techniques including handling and detonating explosives, sky marshalling, hostage rescue operations, security of vital installations and specialised Very Important Person (VIP) training. Further, due to the mutating nature of terrorism and the increased terror attacks in Kenya between 2007 and 2017, Kenya sought to enhance bilateral relations with Israel in furtherance of her national security interests (ibid).

According to another respondent, the changing patterns of global terrorism against Israel and its establishments abroad, further influenced Kenya to enhance the Kenya-Israel bilateral relations. Initially, the terror trend against Israel involved hijacking planes such as *El Al*[49] Flight 426 hijacked in 1968 by members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) enroute to Rome from London. Following increased flight security, the nature of terrorism against Israel progressed to targeting individual Jews such as during the Munich Massacre of 1972 in which 11 members of Israel's Olympics team were killed by members of Black September, a Palestinian terrorist group during the Olympics in Munich, Germany. The trend later changed to bombing key installations including embassies such as the 1992 bombing of Israel's Embassy in Bueno Aires, Argentina and 1994 bombing of Israel's Embassy in London (ibid).

The respondent further submitted that the terror trend advanced to targeting Israeli establishments abroad that aimed at killing multitudes such as the 2013 terror attack at *Westgate*, an upmarket mall in Nairobi, Kenya with Israeli ownership links. Terrorism then penetrated religious groups, profiled targets and recently began to radicalize young men and women to orchestrate terror attacks in their own countries. According to Respondent X, the need to keep up with terror trends, remain informed on possible terror execution strategies and to maintain intelligence on terrorist activities is paramount in forestalling terrorist attacks. As such, he stated that advanced intelligence gathering capabilities particularly aimed at thwarting terror attacks, influenced the enhancement of bilateral relations with Israel from Kenya's perspective.

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[49] Israel's National Airline.

Respondents in a focus group discussion offered deeper insights into Kenya's security motivations that enhanced Kenya-Israel bilateral relations between 2007 and 2017. The dominant theme that emerged during the discussion with the researcher was training of several arms of Kenyan security forces. This aims to meet both internal and external security threats, with a significant estimate of 70% of Kenya's security training being provided by Israel. This is due to Israel's advanced security capabilities that are attractive to Kenya. The training includes Regular Police (3%, of the Israeli training) General Service Unit (35% of the Israeli training), Anti-Stock Theft Unit (1% of the Israeli training), Directorate of Criminal Investigation (1% of the Israeli training), National Intelligence Service (15% of the Israeli training) and the Kenya Defence Forces (15% of the Israeli training).

According to the respondents during the focus group discussion, Kenya prefers Israel as a security training partner because Israel tailor makes the training to meet Kenya's specific security needs particularly on counter terrorism such as responding to terrorist attacks, hostage rescue operations, protection of vulnerable targets and critical infrastructure such as the Presidential Residences, the National Assembly, the Judiciary amongst others. This is contrary to other training partners such as Britain who provide ongoing general security training to Kenyan Forces in the *Nanyuki* area of *Laikipia* County, in capacity building, rapid response to security threats, illegal wildlife trade and emerging humanitarian crises such as drought. *Laikipia* County is preferred because of the favorable climate and terrain. Consequently according to the focus group discussion respondents, Kenya enhanced her bilateral relations with Israel between 2007 and 2017 in pursuit of advanced and tailor made security training such as the routine joint military training exercises with Israel's Defence Forces on desert and mountain combat in *Isiolo* and *Mount Kenya* regions, areas with favorable terrain, counter insurgency and counter terrorism operations, use of light weapons and operation of heavy artilleries.

Apart from security training, the researcher also established from the focus group discussion respondents that ongoing Kenya's Police Reforms[50] which began in 2010, borrow heavily from the Israel Police Force. Enshrined in Kenya's Constitution of 2010, the Police Reforms comprise several initiatives to change the command structures in the Kenya Police, Administration Police and the Directorate of Criminal Investigations. Moreover, the Police Reforms comprise integration of functions, rebranding, renaming of some positions and mainstreaming of all forces into one Police Force as is the case in Israel. For instance, according to Respondent Y, Kenya in 2012 renamed the Head of the Kenya Police Force from Police Commissioner to Inspector General of Police. This title is similar to the one held by the Head of Israel's Police Force, demonstrating Kenya's desire to run its Police Forces like Israel.

According to the respondents in the focus group discussion, another initiative in the Kenya Police Reforms that borrows heavily from the Israel Police Force is the recalling of retired police officers to boost Kenya's police capacity to fight insecurity. According to Respondent X, the Kenyan government in 2014 amidst rising insecurity, realised the need for additional security personnel and looked to Israel's model of integrating retired officers and making use of their extensive skills in intelligence gathering, weapons use and border security. Consequently, arising from Kenya-Israel security collaboration the National Association of Retired Police Officers of Kenya (NARPOK) was established in 2016 and has since recalled over 4000 retired police officers. These are currently assisting serving police forces to fight escalating crime, respond faster to security threats, gather and efficiently disseminate intelligence as well as train newly recruited security personnel, assisted by Israel.

According to Respondent Y, another initiative of the Kenya Police Reforms is the merging of the Kenya Police and the Administration Police into one unit known as the General Police Force, working under the command of the Deputy Inspector General. Fundamentally however, the respondent stressed that mainstreaming of the Kenyan Forces into the new structure was very similar to the structure adopted by Israel that has

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[50] Transformation of Kenya's Police Service into a professional, efficient and accountable police force entrenched in Kenya's Constitution of 2010.

one conventional Police Force. Moreover, according to the respondent, the scrapping of the two units (Kenya Police and the Administration Police) is set to reduce the duplication of duties and wastage of resources within the forces as well as realise efficiencies in Police services comparable to that of Israel's Police.

Aside from counter terrorism, intelligence cooperation, security training and police reforms, study respondents provided other security motivations for Kenya's enhanced relations with Israel. Respondent A, for instance stated that Kenya's attraction for advanced military hardware and surveillance apparatus such as drones used to monitor the Kenya-Somalia border, motivated Kenya-Israel bilateral relations between 2007 and 2017. He further alluded to Israel's sophisticated weapons that Kenya sought in enhancing the bilateral relations with Israel.

When asked in what specific area Kenya's security interests motivated bilateral relations with Israel, 34% (10) of the study respondents indicated that counter terrorism was the underlying security interest driver motivating Kenya-Israel bilateral relations. Study respondents who held this opinion stated examples of Israel's counter terrorism assistance that influenced Kenya's enhancement of the relations. For instance, Israel's support for Kenya Defense Forces fighting *Al Shabaab* insurgents in Somalia since 2011, as well as the monetary and technical aid for the construction of a wall along the Kenya-Somalia border. According Respondent A, Israel views the construction of the wall as a fundamental and effective counter terrorism initiative similar to the wall along the border between Israel and the West Bank. This wall was constructed by Israel in 2000 during the Second *Intifada*[51], to prevent spread of terrorism and waves of uprisings from the West Bank. Kenya thus seeks Israel's support for a similar intervention to curb the free flow of terrorist elements from Somalia, thereby enhancing the Kenya-Israel bilateral relations.

According to Respondent X, other counter terrorism activities that motivated Kenya-Israel relations from Kenya's perspective include Israel's training of security personnel on profiling, trailing and identifying suspected terrorists, protection of key installations

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[51] Period of intense Israel-Palestine violence distinguished by stone throwing by the Palestinians and aggressive retaliation by the Israelis that began in September 2000 after Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon (2001-2006) visited Temple Mount that was viewed by Palestinians as highly provocative. The Temple Mount is considered a Holy Site by Muslims.

such as embassies, infantries and military bases, sky marshalling, weapons use, detonation of devices and hostage rescue operations. In his account, Respondent Z observed that arising from specialised counter terrorism training from Israel, Kenyan security forces were better prepared to respond to terrorist attacks. For instance, he cited the swift and well-coordinated multi-agency response to the *Dusit D2* terror attack in Nairobi in January 2019, led by the Recce Squad although commandeered by the Director of Criminal Investigations George Kinoti. He contrasted this to the futile security response to the *Westgate* terror attack in Nairobi in 2013 that was largely associated with lack of a central command, confusion and little familiarity with hostage rescue operations.

When asked in what specific area Kenya's security interests motivated bilateral relations with Israel, 28% (8) of the study respondents were of the opinion that intelligence cooperation was the primary security interest driver. Respondents who held this opinion alluded to the intensive intelligence training offered by Israel to Kenya's security agencies and the benefits of intelligence sharing that assisted Kenya deal with threats to national security, particularly frustration of terrorist attacks. For instance, according to Respondent C, intelligence sharing between Kenya and Israel resulted in the arrest of two Iranians in Mombasa, Kenya in 2012. The two were found in possession of explosive elements and were suspected to be planning an attack on the Embassy of Israel in Kenya. Moreover, He highlighted other instances where intelligence cooperation between Kenya and Israel had anticipated and thwarted terror attacks on the National Assembly in Kenya in 2012. However, he noted that although Israel had very advanced intelligence gathering capabilities, sharing of intelligence with Kenya was only in as far as it met Israel's national interests and thus Kenya could not be entirely reliant on Israel. Additionally, he noted that as Kenya was not obliged to act on intelligence it receives from Israel, avoidable security situations sometimes occur as a result of Kenya ignoring intelligence.

To add to this, Respondent D considered training of Kenya's security personnel as a key security interest driver motivating Kenya's enhanced relations with Israel. He submitted that intelligence gathering skills required intensive training that Kenya sought from Israel, appreciating that Israel's Intelligence Agency – The Mossad was among the best in

the world[52]. Further, he was of the opinion that arising from Israeli intelligence gathering training, Kenya's intelligence personnel in various agencies such as the National Intelligence Service (NIS), the Kenya Defense Forces (KDF), the Directorate of Criminal Investigations (DCI) and the Kenya Police (KP), were more efficient in gathering intelligence. For instance, infiltration of terrorist cells by Kenya's intelligence agents as a means of gathering intelligence has enabled the frustration of terror attacks, apprehension of terror suspects and the identification of sources of terror finance.

When asked in what specific area Kenya's security interests motivated bilateral relations with Israel, 24% (7) of the study respondents opined that security training was the key Kenyan consideration in enhancing Kenya-Israel bilateral relations, while 14% (4) of the study respondents felt it was supply of weapons. Respondents indicated that Israel developed highly sophisticated weapons that Kenya sought in advancing her national security interests. According to one respondent, territorial integrity is a vital security interest and Kenya in preserving her territorial integrity sourced drones from Israel to assist with border surveillance. Moreover, Kenya also sought small weapons from Israel including pistols and shot range guns. Figure 4.1 illustrates the study respondents' views in response to the various Kenya security interest areas that motivated Kenya-Israel bilateral relations between 2007 and 2017.

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[52] According to Respondent D, Mossad is considered among the best Intelligence Agency due to its efficiencies in conducting operations abroad, counter terrorism and intelligence gathering.

Figure 4.1: Kenya's Security Interest Areas That Motivated Kenya-Israel Bilateral Relations, 2007 – 2017

Kenya's Security Interest Areas That Motivated Kenya-Israel Bilateral Relations 2007-2017.

Supply of Weapons 14%
Counter Terrorism 34%
Security Training 24%
Intelligence 28%

Counter Terrorism
Intelligence
Security Training
Supply of Weapons

Source: Author (2019)

Economic Interests

As a developing country, economic prosperity is at the forefront of Kenya's national interests. According to Respondent E, Kenya's economic interests motivated bilateral relations with Israel and he outlined boosting trade ties with Israel as a key economic agenda for Kenya. Specifically, he pointed to bilateral trade agreements signed between Kenya and Israel in 2016 and joint trade committee meetings held during the period 2007 to 2017 as specific efforts Kenya undertook towards increasing trade and achieving her economic interests as far as Israel was concerned. This view was also echoed by Respondent Y who held that promoting trade between 2007 and 2017 significantly influenced the enhancement of Kenya-Israel bilateral relations. Fundamentally however, he noted that Kenya experienced trade deficits arising from importing more goods and services than it exported to Israel, adding that reducing Kenya's trade deficit was a key economic motivation for enhancing relations with Israel.

Economic statistics (2019) on Kenya-Israel bilateral trade (2007-2017) availed by the Export Promotion Council[53] indicated that Kenya exports various products including fish, fruit and vegetable juices, nuts, horticulture and basketworks amongst others to Israel. The statistics further indicated that Kenya imports from Israel, automatic data processing machines, disk drivers, magnetic and optical readers, mechanical appliances, plastics, shotguns, rifles and pistols amongst others. More importantly however, the statistics demonstrated a trade imbalance largely in favour of Israel, According to the statistics, this trade deficit averaged Five Billion Kenya Shillings annually in the period between 2007 and 2017, showcasing Respondent X view that significant trade imbalances were present in Kenya's trade with Israel. This situation thus necessitated enhanced relations to offset the deficit. Table 4.7 illustrates Kenya's trade imbalance in the Kenya-Israel bilateral trade between 2007 and 2017.

Table 4.7: Kenya's Trade Imbalance in Kenya-Israel Bilateral Trade: 2007-2017

Year	Export in Kenya Shillings	Imports in Kenya Sillings	Balance of Trade
2008	1,532,368,727.00	8,216,278,160.00	-6,683,909,433.00
2009	1,596,619,006.00	5,129,271,161.00	-3,532,652,155.00
2010	1,547,170,072.00	4,718,749,567.00	-3,171,579,495.00
2011	1,424,006,959.00	6,345,158,124.00	-4,921,151,166.00
2012	2,058,279,918.00	7,229,564,733.00	-5,171,284,815.00
2013	1,126,214,729.00	9,436,809,671.00	-8,310,594,942.00
2014	1,336,833,988.00	5,659,136,198.00	- 4,322,302,210.00
2015	1,448,755,989.00	10,409,610,316.00	-8,960,854,328.00
2016	1,448,755,989.00	5,027,019,892.00	-3,962,921,489.00
2017	1,064,098,403.00	6,292,568,691.00	-5,545,116,003.00
Average Value	**747,452,687.00**	**6,846,416,651.00**	**-5,458,236,604.00**

Amounts expressed in Billions of Kenya Shillings.

Source: Export Promotion Council (2019)

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[53] Research visit to Export Promotion Council, Anniversary Towers, Nairobi, Kenya, March 12, 2019.

Table 4.7 demonstrates a dynamic trend in Kenya's trade imbalance in the Kenya-Israel bilateral trade between 2007 and 2017. Following the enhancement of the bilateral relations in 2007, the trade imbalance began a downward trend until 2010, which was beneficial to Kenya. This is because a reducing trade imbalance with one country contributes to the reduction of Kenya's overall trade deficit with global trading partners. Between 2010 and 2017, the trade imbalance demonstrates an upward trend followed by cycles of increases and decreases. This dynamism demonstrates that there may be outside factors such as political stability (especially in Kenya) and government or regime priorities that determine the level of bilateral exports and imports.

According to Respondent C, Israel is a highly industrialised economy that does not rely on imports and there is thus a ceiling as to how much it can import from Kenya, even as Kenya seeks to reduce the trade imbalance through increased trade. Moreover, he stated that Israel has over time managed to produce food items it previously imported from Kenya such as avocados and pineapples and thus increasing exports to Israel in an attempt to reduce the trade imbalance was not a viable economic option for Kenya. Instead, he held the opinion that Kenya's search for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) was the economic motivation for engaging with bilateral partners including Israel. Concurring with him, Respondent E opined that in enhancing Kenya-Israel relations, Kenya mainly sought to increase Israeli FDI in the country. 41% (11) of the respondents also expressed the view that Kenya's economic interest in the relations with Israel was in pursuit of FDI. This expression resonates with the aspirations of Chapter Two of Kenya's Foreign Policy (2014), which include attracting FDI through enhanced relations.

Additionally, according to Kariuki (2016), the Kenya government in 2016 approved FDI in Special Economic Zones (SEZ's), considered to be significant enablers of Kenya's Vision 2030 that produce goods for foreign markets. Fundamentally however, the approval of external investors into Kenya's SEZ's were ratified soon after bilateral visits by Israel's PM Benjamin Netanyahu in 2016, Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in 2016 and India's PM Narendra Modi in 2016 hence demonstrating Kenya's attraction to FDI, that increased by 71% from $ 393.4 million in 2016 to $671.5 million in 2017

according to Ceic Data (2017). Figure 4.2 illustrates respondents' views when asked in what specific area, Kenya's economic interests' motivated bilateral relations with Israel.

Figure 4.2: Kenya's Economic Interest Areas That Motivated Kenya-Israel Bilateral Relations 2007-2017

*Source: Author (2019)*

Political Interests

According to the study findings, the researcher established that only 2% (1) of the respondents from Kenya was of the opinion that Kenya sought to enhance Kenya-Israel bilateral relations in pursuit of political interests. The respondent aligned to this view maintained that Kenya enhanced its bilateral relations with Israel between 2007 and 2017 to preserve its hegemonic status in East Africa and within the larger African Continent, as Israel is perceived to be a close friend of the United States of America (USA). This is because in the current unipolar[54] international system, the USA is the dominant super power and therefore states align themselves with the USA and its close allies in order to be politically correct in global matters. The study respondent who held this view was thus considering Kenya's position in the international system (that is far from the centre of international power) and that by enhancing bilateral relations with Israel, Kenya by extension sought to appease the USA. Moreover, as the USA has historically adopted a

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[54] An international system where concentration of power is upon one state known as a super power.

pro-Israel position in the Israel-Palestine crisis, Kenya's enhancement of bilateral relations with Israel may be construed to be a foreign policy choice that demonstrates Kenya's alignment with the superpower on the Israel-Palestine crisis.

Aside from discussing Kenya's security, economic and political interests which in the opinion of respondents motivated Kenya-Israel bilateral relations, respondents further ranked the extent to which these interests influenced the relations. Due to the variety and relatedness of the motivating interests, the study grouped and discussed the findings as security, economic and political interests. This is also in line with the study's first objective that sought to assess the extent to which Kenya-Israel bilateral relations were motivated by Kenya's security, economic and political interests between 2007 and 2017. From the study respondents, the researcher established that Kenya's security interests influenced Kenya-Israel bilateral relations to the largest extent, followed by economic interests, while political interests were ranked third by the study respondents. Consequently, Figure 4.3 demonstrates the extent, to which Kenya-Israel bilateral relations were motivated by Kenya's security, economic and political interests.

Figure 4.3: The Extent to Which Kenya-Israel Bilateral Relations Were Motivated by Kenya's Security, Economic and Political Interests, 2007-2017

Source: Author (2019)

Respondents further discussed the extent to which Kenya's national interests from a general perspective influenced the relations with Israel. According to one respondent, Kenya's national interests significantly influenced Kenya-Israel bilateral relations between 2007 and 2017, as pursuit of national interests underpinned bilateral relations between states in the international system. This point of view was also articulated by Respondent S who agreed that indeed Kenya's national interests motivated bilateral relations with Israel between 2007 and 2017. According to the responses from study respondents, 97% (28) of the respondents were of the opinion that Kenya's national interests motivated bilateral relations with Israel, although to varying extents as illustrated by Figure 4.4.

Figure 4.4: The Extent to Which Kenya-Israel Bilateral Relations Were Motivated by Kenya's National Interests, 2007-2017

Source: Author (2019)

According to 70% (20) of the study respondents as illustrated in Figure 4.5, Kenya-Israel bilateral relations between 2007 and 2017 were motivated to a very large extent by Kenya's national interests. 20% (6) of the study respondents on the other hand considered the influence of Kenya's national interests on the bilateral relations with Israel as to a large extent. Additionally, 7% (2) of the study respondents viewed Kenya's national

interest as minimally influencing the Kenya-Israel bilateral relations between 2007 and 2017, while 3% (1) of the study respondents supposed that Kenya's national interests did not influence the bilateral relations.

Respondents further discussed challenges Kenya faced in the bilateral relations. The first challenge according to study respondents involves the use by Israel of intelligence gathered within Kenyan territory. According to Respondent P, challenges existed in as far as intelligence gathering was concerned and pointed out that although both states embarked on cooperation on intelligence gathering, Israel has more advanced intelligence gathering capabilities and resources at its disposal compared to Kenya. Consequently, Israel is in a position to gather intense intelligence on activities across a wider geographical expanse but in most cases, only shared intelligence with Kenya to the extent that it was in Israel's interest. A similar point of view was expressed by Respondent Q who opined that cooperation was only in so far as the interests of each state were safeguarded. Moreover, in his opinion, Kenya as the weaker partner in the Kenya-Israel bilateral relations is not in a position to establish how the operational intelligence collected within its territory is used, citing for instance the extensive intelligence collected along Kenya's maritime areas by Israel. 17% (5) of the study respondents also expressed a similar view that Kenya faces challenges in as far as intelligence cooperation is concerned.

The second challenge according to 24% (7) of the study respondents was an increased threat of terrorism on Kenyan territory. According to Respondent Y, Kenya's friendly relations with Israel increase terrorist appetite for execution of attacks in Kenya resulting in economic effects such as impaired infrastructure and reduced tourism arising from travel advisories against Kenya. For instance, according to Staff (2019), *Al Shabaab* in claiming responsibility for a terrorist attack in Nairobi's *Dusit D2* Hotel in January 2019, maintained that it orchestrated the attack in response to the USA's recognition of Jerusalem as Israel's capital. The assumption is that since *Al Shabaab* may not have been in a position to execute a terrorist attack in Israel or in the USA, Kenya was the next viable option for the terrorist group due to its friendly relations with Israel and perhaps geographical proximity to the *Al Shabaab* base in Somalia. However, he extended his

opinion and submitted that a number of other factors combined together to expose Kenya to terror attacks.

The first factor mentioned by Respondent Y was that terror dynamics are changing and moving from targeting only Israeli installations to establishments in Israel friendly states such as Kenya. The second factor mentioned is Kenya's location in the Horn of Africa within close proximity to Somalia and the Indian Ocean, from where equipment destined for the *Al-Shabaab* is smuggled through. Some of this equipment is re-routed to Kenya to execute attacks. The third factor is the increasingly marginalized Kenyan youth struggling with unemployment, who are easily radicalized against Israel and the West, sent for training in Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria, then return to execute terror attacks. The fourth factor is the unmanned areas along the Kenya-Somali border such as at *Kyunga, Bula Hawa and Liboi,* that enable cross over of terrorist elements into Kenya according to the respondent. However, Respondent P held a contrary view and was of the opinion that Kenya's relations with Israel did not expose Kenya to increased terror attacks. He submitted that proximity to Somalia and porous borders that allowed permeation of the country by insurgents increased Kenya's exposure to terrorist attacks.

The third challenge identified in the study was Kenya's balance between Israel and the Arab States[55]. 31% (9) of the respondents interrogated were of the opinion that Kenya faces a significant dilemma in balancing its interests between Israel and the Arab States such as the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, regional hegemons from where Kenya sources her oil. According to one of the respondents, the geopolitics of the Middle East Region is dynamic and Kenya's dealings with the region requires tactful maneuver to ensure neutrality. Agreeing with this point of view, another respondent was of the opinion that Kenya finds itself in a quagmire as it strives to appease Arab States and benefit from oil supply and donor funding from the oil rich Arab countries, while maintaining friendly relations with Israel. Moreover, he corroborated this view holding that Kenya's relations with Arabs States has in the past been construed as jeopardizing to

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[55] Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen, Egypt, Jordan, and Mauritania and Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO).

relations with Israel and balancing between Israel and the Arabs states is a challenge for Kenya. For instance in 1973 following the *Yom Kippur* War, Kenya joined other African States in severing official diplomatic relations with Israel. This action was held to be in support of Egypt, an Arab State in Africa and a contender in the *Yom Kippur* War against Israel.

The fourth challenge respondents submitted in response to the challenges facing Kenya in the Kenya-Israel bilateral relations was the negative trade imbalance experienced in the trade with Israel. 21% (6) of the study respondents were of the view that the balance of trade currently in favour of Israel contributes to Kenya's overall trade deficit and that the situation arises from Kenya importing more goods from Israel than it exports to Israel. According to Munda (2019), trade deficits compound a variety of economic problems that Kenya is also facing such as slow creation of employment as earnings are spent buying foreign goods thereby increasing production capacities and jobs in the exporting countries.

The fifth challenge identified by respondents that faces Kenya in the bilateral relations with Israel is Kenya's underdeveloped diplomatic capabilities that undermine the capacity with which to actively pursue Kenya's national interest. According to 7% (2) of the study respondents, political appointments of diplomats representing Kenya abroad, compromises the ability and seriousness with which they are able to pursue Kenya's national interests. Holders of this opinion compared the importance Israel attaches in appointing its diplomats noting that the current   Ambassador of Israel to Kenya Noah Gal Gendler (2017 to date) holds a Master's degree in Political Science from the Hebrew University and diplomatic experience of over 30 years. Moreover, Israel's Deputy Ambassador to Kenya Eyal David (2018 to date) is a PhD[56] Candidate and holds a Master's Degree in Islamic and Middle East Studies (2014) plus a Bachelor's degree in International Relations (2012) both from the Hebrew University. Kenya's current Ambassador to Israel, Lieutenant General Samuel Thuita is a retired commander of the Kenya Air Force with no previous diplomatic experience. Figure 4.5 illustrates further the

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[56] Doctor of Philosophy.

respondents' views in response to the challenges of Kenya-Israel bilateral relations facing Kenya.

Figure 4.5: Challenges Facing Kenya in Kenya-Israel Bilateral Relations 2007-2017

Source: Author (2019)

Objective Two: The extent to which Israel-Kenya bilateral relations were motivated by Israel's security, economic and political interests between 2007 and 2017

According to the Embassy of Israel in Kenya[57] website, Kenya-Israel bilateral relations are founded on mutual friendship, respect for each other as sovereign states and trust. This view was corroborated by Respondent F who submitted that offering socio-economic assistance through MASHAV[58] to Kenya in areas such as public health, agriculture, education and food security was a key priority for Israel in enhancing bilateral relations with Kenya. Moreover, he mentioned that Israel pursued security, economic and political interests through enhanced Kenya-Israel bilateral relations in the period between 2007 and 2017 and that terrorism was a shared threat faced by both Israel and Kenya that necessitated enhanced bilateral cooperation to combat the vice. Further, Israel also sought to promote trade with Kenya to the extent of opening a Trade Mission within the Embassy of Israel in Nairobi. As concerned political interests, Israel

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[57] Website view (Embassy of Israel in Kenya) https://embassies.gov.il, Nairobi, Kenya, March 3, 2019.
[58] Israel Agency for International Development Cooperation.

considered Kenya a longtime friend and sought Kenya's support for Israel in international organisations such as the United Nations (ibid).

Security Interests

Globalization and the increase of non-state actors such as armed militias, terrorist groups and arms smugglers has presented transnational issues such as terrorism and proliferation of nuclear weapons that threaten state security. According to one respondent, Israel and Kenya both face terrorism as a threat to national security and the influence of Israel's security interests on bilateral relations with Kenya is apparent. Fundamentally, the instability across the Middle East and North Africa as a result of the Arab Spring[59] prompted the infiltration of the Horn of Africa by terrorist groups such as *Al Qaeda*, *Al Shabaab* and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). This situation elicited negative security repercussions for Israel because of the increased risk of terrorism being executed by insurgents from the Horn of Africa targeting Israel and its establishments abroad.

Based on the study findings, 27% (8) of the study respondents held the opinion that indeed, Israel's security interests influenced Israel-Kenya bilateral relations between 2007 and 2017. According to Respondent W, Kenya's geographic position and particularly the proximity to the Horn of Africa and Somalia, is strategic to Israel in its fight against terrorism. Bilateral engagements with Kenya thus afforded Israel the opportunity to avert the physical movement of insurgents including *Al Shabaab* and ISIS from their training grounds largely held to be in Somalia, Kenya's neighbour to the north-east, to execute terrorist attacks in the Middle East. Mwai stated that this aversion was done collaboratively between Israel and Kenya through active surveillance of the Horn of Africa region to monitor movements of suspected terrorists, gathering intelligence including through infiltration of terror cells and the use of informers, dismantling terror financing networks and enhanced counter terrorism training to upgrade the skills of Kenya's security personnel.

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[59] Uprisings that began in 2010 affecting Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain, Syria, Algeria, Kuwait, Morocco and others.

On the other hand, Respondent G argued that Israel enhanced bilateral relations with Kenya to counter Iranian activity in Africa and its increasing presence in the Horn of Africa region, contending that Kenya was strategic to this Israeli security agenda. In his opinion, Iran maintained animosity for Israel and was penetrating African states such as Somalia with the intention of arming and financing terrorist groups to execute terror attacks on Israel and its establishments abroad. Moreover, he observed that Iran also sponsored pirates in the Horn of Africa along the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden generating significant risk in international waterways. Thus, according to him, Kenya's position and proximity to both the Indian Ocean and the Horn of Africa was a very convenient and stable location for Israel to monitor the security of her ships from Kenya's coastline, surveil the region and collect intelligence on terrorist activities. He further made reference to the arrest of two Iranians in Kenya's coastal city of Mombasa in 2012 suspected of terrorist activities and highlighted Kenya's significance to Israel's security agenda in as far as fighting terrorism and containing Iran were concerned. On the contrary however, Respondent G submitted that Iran was a global problem faced by many states including USA and Saudi Arabia, and thus containing Iran was not a specific Israeli interest.

Respondent P agreed with Respondent G, and asserted that Israel indeed surveilled Iranian activity using Kenya's territory and maritime areas (land and ocean spaces) through the deployment of intelligence operatives and the use of advanced naval surveillance equipment positioned in the Indian Ocean. He also drew comparisons between Kenya and other East African states such as Uganda in alluding to Israel's preference for Kenya as a bilateral partner through which Israel could pursue her national security interests. For instance according to Respondent G, Israel maintains significant trust for Kenya for the assistance provided during the Entebbe Raid of 1976, whereas Israel recalls that Uganda sided with the Palestinian Terrorists that held Israeli hostages during the incident. Further, Kenya maintained geostrategic importance due to its geographic position close to water masses unlike Uganda that is landlocked. As such, historical trust issues coupled with Kenya's lengthy coastline, endear Kenya to Israel as it pursues strategic security interests.

Similarly, Respondent B was also of the opinion that in the period between 2007 and 2017, Israel enhanced bilateral relations with Kenya in order to collect intelligence on threats to Israel's national security emanating from the Horn of Africa. Specifically, he noted that Israel was intent on minimizing the chances of Kenya being used to perpetrate attacks on Israel by radicalized adherents of terrorist groups, who spill over from Somalia and pointed to the increased presence of Mossad[60] in Kenya, gathering intelligence in the interest of Israel's national security. Moreover, he submitted that Kenya's security and stability was important to Israel, as it guaranteed the continued presence of Israeli businesses, investment in infrastructure and ability to operate Kenya as a base for collecting intelligence in the region and in the larger African continent.

Arising from the study respondents' opinions, Figure 4.6 illustrates the views derived when asked about the particular Israel security interest areas that motivated Israel-Kenya bilateral relations. 58% (17) of the study respondents were of the opinion that Israel's need to gather intelligence as a means of averting threats on her national security significantly influenced enhanced Israel-Kenya relations between 2007 and 2017, and continues to be a fundamental influence on the relations. Meanwhile, 30% (9) of the study respondents on the other hand, were of the opinion that collaborations on countering terrorism as a mutual national security threat was the key motivation for Israel-Kenya relations from Israel's perspective. Conversely, 12% (3) of the study respondents viewed Israel's security agenda of containing Iran as a security interest area that motivated Israel-Kenya bilateral relations between 2007 and 2017.

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[60] Israel's National Intelligence Agency.

Figure 4.6: Israel's Security Interest Areas that Motivated Israel-Kenya Bilateral Relations, 2007-2017

Economic Interests

Findings based on the views expressed by study respondents indicated that Israel-Kenya relations during the period 2007 to 2017 were motivated by a variety of Israel's economic interests. Out of the 29 study respondents, 24% (7) of them were of the opinion that Israel's economic interests were the primary driver of Israel-Kenya relations. These interests included Israel's aspiration for raw materials available in Kenya, Kenya as a prime market for Israel's products and Kenya's attraction as an investment environment for Israeli establishments. According to Respondent H Israel imports raw materials such as soil, skins and hides that support farming and leather tanning industries. Additionally, Israel also imports from Kenya, products for domestic consumption such as fruits, vegetables, nuts and grains such as rice and wheat. Economic statistics for the year 2017 from the Export Promotion Council illustrate that Israel imported from Kenya fruits and vegetables worth Kenya Shillings 94 Million, nuts such as macadamia worth Kenya shillings 28 million and grains such as rice and wheat worth Kenya Shillings 19 Million.

18% (4) of the study respondents who viewed economic interests as the primary motivation for the bilateral relations, were also of the opinion that Kenya was a prime market for Israeli products and that in enhancing bilateral relations with Kenya, Israel sought to increase her bilateral trade. One respondent informed the researcher that trade interests were significant to Israel referring to the various trade expos and exchanges held between Israel and Kenya such as in 2016 that promoted Israel's products in Kenya. Another respondent was also of the opinion that Israel sought economic cooperation with Kenya to increase penetration of Israeli products in the Kenya market, particularly fertilizers and agricultural machinery as Kenya is an agricultural economy. Economic statistics (2017) from the Export Promotion Council further demonstrated that Israel exported to Kenya fertilizers worth Kenya Shillings 191 million and mechanical appliances valued at Kenya Shillings 784 million in 2017. The statistics also revealed Israel's exports to Kenya in other civilian products such as plastics, foil plates, data processing machines, printers, scanners and disk drives. On the other hand, Respondent H submitted that Israel views Africa as virgin ground for business and investment and therefore promotes trade through enhanced bilateral relations. Moreover, Respondent F concurred with him, submitting that growing Israel-Kenya trade ties and promoting bilateral trade were priorities for Israel.

Aside from trading in civilian products, study respondents were also of the opinion that, Israel's arms export to Kenya was a fundamental economic factor in Israel-Kenya relations between 2007 and 2017. Respondent X noted that increased terrorist attacks in Kenya during the period necessitated the procurement of military apparatus and weapons, particularly for use by the Kenya Defense Forces in Somalia as well as for enhanced security within the Kenyan borders, adding that Israel was a primary supplier of the weapons. Respondent H was also of the considered opinion that weapon sales comprised a moderately significant reason for enhanced bilateral relations, as Israel seeks to expand her arms exports globally. 17% (5) of the study respondents viewed Israel's weapons sales to Kenya as a fundamental economic influence on the Israel-Kenya bilateral relations from Israel's perspective, with statistics from the Export Promotion Council (2019) indicating Israel exported to Kenya weapons such as shotguns, rifles and pistols valued at Kenya Shillings 467 million in 2017.

The researcher also established other economic reasons from study respondents that motivated Israel-Kenya bilateral relations. Respondent T, for example, held the opinion that Israeli investors established businesses in Kenya as facades for intelligence gathering. The researcher also noted that 7% (2) of the respondents alluded to Israel targeting Kenya's oil resources as an economic interest, to diversify its sources of oil. According to one of the respondents, Israel currently sources oil from Azerbaijan, Venezuela, Nigeria and Angola and seeks to spread these oil sources. Conversely, 3% (1) of the respondent was of a different opinion, suggesting that Israel's economic engagement Kenya was driven by goodwill and friendly benevolence.

According to Respondent K, Israel as a highly industrialised economy, seeks to assist countries such as Kenya to develop their economies through sustained friendships. As a beneficiary of Israel's MASHAV training, articulated her opinion citing an example of funding she receives from Israel's Embassy in Kenya for her *Umoja* Women Healthcare Mobile Clinic initiative, which she considers a goodwill gesture. Figure 4.7 illustrates respondents' views when asked about Israel's economic interest areas that motivated Israel-Kenya bilateral relations.

Figure 4.7: Israel's Economic Interest Areas that Motivated Israel-Kenya Bilateral Relations 2007-2017

Source: Author (2019)

Political Interests

According to opinions expressed by the study respondents, the researcher established that combating increasing global anti-Semitism[61] against Jews, Israel's historical condemnations in international organisations such as the United Nations, the aspiration to host counterpart embassies in Jerusalem, the desire for observer status at the African Union and the agenda to contain Iran's diplomatic activities comprise the political interests that motivated Israel-Kenya bilateral relations in the period 2007 to 2017. Moreover, 48% (14) of the study respondents were of the opinion that Israel's political interests motivated Israel-Kenya bilateral relations to the largest extent among the three national interests that the study considered – security, economic and political interests.

According to Respondent J, anti-Semitism in the international system has spread from the Middle East, with an upsurge in anti-Semitic occurrences in the USA, Europe and lately in Africa, as well on social media platforms such as Twitter. For instance in the USA, 11 people were killed in a shooting attack in the Tree of Life Synagogue in St Pittsburg, Pennsylvania in 2018. In France, three Jewish men were stabbed outside a Synagogue in Marseille by persons' shouting anti-Jewish slogans in 2015. Additionally, in 2015 Dr. Sarah Halimi[62] died after being thrown off a balcony resulting in global displeasure about rising anti-Semitism in France. In Africa, anti-Semitic incidents have been witnessed in Tunisia including violent attacks on Jews, synagogues and extremists calls for Jews to leave Tunisia in 2018. Moreover, the Boycotts, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement[63] has been held to be an anti-Semitic crusade with economic consequences for Israel. For instance in 2014, Chile called off free trade agreement talks with Israel following violence between Palestine and Israel in Gaza, and this was largely viewed as an anti-Semitic gesture inspired by the BDS movement.

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[61] Hostility, prejudice or discrimination against Jews.
[62] Jewish Kindergarten Teacher murdered in Paris in an anti-Semitism incident.
[63] Global movement that seeks to end international support for Israel's oppression of Palestine through withdrawal of support for Israeli companies and their products, encouraging withdrawal of investments from Israeli companies and running campaigns aimed at Israel's expulsion from international forums such the UN and FIFA. The aim of movement is to pressurize Israel to comply with obligations under international law including withdrawal from occupied territories, removal of the separation wall in the West Bank, Equality of Palestinian citizens in Israel and the right of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes in Israel.

Fundamentally however, is the view that anti-Semitism offers a platform where anti-Israel ideologies converge and thrive, to the detriment of Israel, her citizens and her establishments abroad. Consequently Israel has sought to establish stronger relations with bilateral partners across the world in an effort to increase solidarity with the people of Israel and diminish global hostility towards Jews. According to Respondent H, the Embassy of Israel in Kenya for instance undertakes several initiatives aimed at increasing Kenyans unanimity with the Jewish people through soft power techniques such as Israeli food festivals and music performances that promote Israeli culture and solidarity for Israel among Kenyans. For example in 2018, the Israeli food and wine festival was held in at *Dusit D2* in Riverside, Nairobi, while in 2019, it was held at *Ananas* Restaurant in Westlands, Nairobi. Moreover, Gilad Millo, Israel's former Deputy Ambassador to Kenya (2003 – 2005) settled in Kenya in 2008 and has collaborated with local musicians such as Wendy Kimani with whom he released a song titled *Unajua* in 2015. Additonally, trainings offered by the Kenya Friends of Israel aim at expanding Kenyans knowledge of Jewish history and ultimate appreciation of the same. 17% (5) of the study respondents were of the opinion that combating anti-Semitism was a key political interest area that Israel pursued in enhancing bilateral relations with Kenya between 2007 and 2017.

Another political interest Israel pursued in enhancing Israel-Kenya relations according to study respondents arose from the desire to diminish anti-Israel voting in international organisations. According to Respondent M Israel's condemnation in international organisations such as the United Nations and some of its agencies including the Human Rights Commission and the Commission on the Status of Women amongst others, compel Israel to enhance its diplomatic relations with bilateral partners while lobbying against anti-Israel voting. In her view, she asserted that Israel considers itself unfairly treated in international organisations such as the United Nations due to the criticism and condemnation expressed through resolutions such as resolution E/CN.6/2017/L3 that condemned Israel as the only violator of women's rights in the world in reference Palestinian Women. These condemnations compel Israel to enhance bilateral relations with states including Kenya in the hope that friendly states would adopt pro-Israel voting in international forums.

In undertaking the study, the researcher established that hostility towards Israel was not a fallacy and that two previous and current United Nations Secretary Generals have acknowledged the seemingly hostile treatment towards Israel. For instance, Kofi Annan[64] (1997-2006) while addressing the 61st General Assembly of the United Nations in September 2006 remarked that Israel was often unfairly judged by the UN and that supporters of Israel feel it is harshly judged by standards not applied to its enemies (Palestine and Iran). On his part, Ban Ki Moon[65] (2007-2016) while speaking at a UN Security Council meeting in December 2016, observed that the UN had a disproportionate focus on Israel and that years of political maneuvering had created a disproportionate number of resolutions, reports and committees against Israel. Additionally, Antonio Guterres[66] (2017 to date) whilst speaking at the World Jewish Congress in April 2017, acknowledged rising anti-Semitism, particularly the denial of the right of the State of Israel to exist and promised to combat the global trend (Jewish Virtual Library, 2018).

Respondent N observed that Israel's political interests were a fundamental influence on Israel's bilateral relations with Kenya between 2007 and 2017, submitting that Israel faces legitimacy issues in the international system arising from the fact that 18[67]out of 22 Arab League[68] states do not recognize Israel's existence. These states maintain this disposition towards Israel because of the antagonism with Palestine, as they consider Israel's geographic existence as an occupation of Palestinian Territory. Consequently, the Arab League states adopt anti-Israel voting patterns in international organisations to Israel's detriment. This situation prompts Israel to seek for political and diplomatic support among friendly states globally including Kenya, to adopt pro-Israel voting patterns in international organisations such as the United Nations (ibid). 38% (11) of the study respondents held a similar opinion.

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[64] 7th Secretary General of the United Nations (Deceased: 1938-2018).
[65] 8th Secretary General of the United Nations.
[66] 9th Secretary General of the United Nations.
[67]Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates and Yemen. Three States in the Arab League that recognize Israel are Egypt, Jordan, and Mauritania. The 22nd member is the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO).
[68] Regional organisation of Arab states in North Africa, Horn of Africa and the Middle East.

In his account, Respondent F acknowledged the anti-Israel voting patterns in international forums, primarily the United Nations. He observed that despite the close and enhanced ties with many bilateral partners including Kenya, many states continued to adopt anti-Israel resolutions. Moreover, he expressed the hope that Israel wishes to see the strong bilateral relations reflecting in different multilateral organisations through support for Israel at these forums. Additionally, according to the respondent, Israel's desire to have counterpart embassies including the Kenyan Embassy in Israel located in Jerusalem comprises another political interest pursued in enhancing bilateral relations. Currently, Kenya's Embassy in Israel is located in Tel Aviv, with only the Embassies of Guatemala and the United States of America sited in Jerusalem. Further, Israel maintains the desire to hold Observer Status in the African Union and looks for Kenya's support and leadership in the agenda. Previously, Israel held Observer Status in the Organisation for African Unity until its dissolution in 2002 when the African Union was formed. However, Israel was not admitted into the newly formed African Union with Observer Status and thus seeks to regain its former eminence within the regional organisation (ibid). This is particularly so as the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (Israel's nemesis) holds Observer Status in the African Union since 2002, from where it is able to push its agenda and influence African States. Ostensibly, enhanced Israel's enhanced bilateral relations with Kenya seek to achieve the aforementioned political objectives.

Respondent G agreed with the view that Israel sought to promote political interests through enhanced bilateral relations with Kenya, making reference to Prime Minister's Benjamin Netanyahu's visits to Kenya in 2016 and 2017. In the visits, PM Netanyahu actively lobbied for Kenya to support Israel's readmission to the African Union with Observer Status. Further, according to Kenya's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2018), Israel-Kenya political collaborations in pursuit of Israel's political interests exist and are governed by a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) comprising political consultations, interactions between the foreign ministries and high-level visits between state agents. For instance, Kenya hosted the political consultations in 2017 while high-level interstate visits such as the visit by Avigdor Lieberman (Israeli Deputy Prime Minister 2009-2012) to Kenya in 2009, Hon. Raila Odinga's (Kenyan Prime Minister 2008-2013) visit to Israel in 2011 and the Late Professor George Saitoti's (the then

Internal Security Minister 2008-2012) visit to Israel in 2011, amongst others. Additionally, President Uhuru Kenyatta visited Israel in 2016 and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reciprocated the visit in July 2016 and November 2017.

Similarly, Respondent C concurred with Respondent F's assertions that Israel sought Kenya's political support amidst hostile anti-Israel voting in international organisations and rising global anti-Semitism. Additionally, he observed that countering Iran's diplomatic ambitions including stifling trade ties comprised a political agenda Israel maintained in enhancing bilateral relations with Kenya. For instance according to Olingo (2018), Kenya stopped importing oil from Iran in response to the threat of sanctions by the United States of America (USA), on countries that maintained trade ties with Iran. Iran is already under economic sanctions that aim to compel it to abandon the nuclear development programme, deemed to be developing nuclear weapons targeting Israel. However in response to the question of Iran, Respondent F offered a contrary opinion and reiterated that Iran was a global problem that threatened many states including the USA, Israel and Saudi Arabia and was thus not an independent agenda that Israel pursued. Figure 4.8 demonstrates respondents' views in response to Israel's political interest areas that motivated bilateral relations with Kenya between 2007 and 2017.

Figure 4.8: Israel's Political Interest Areas That Motivated Israel-Kenya Bilateral Relations, 2007-2017

Source: Author (2019)

Aside from discussing Israel's security, economic and political interests which in the opinion of respondents motivated Israel-Kenya bilateral relations, respondents further ranked the extent to which these interests influenced the relations. Due to the variety and relatedness of the motivating interests, the study grouped and discussed the findings as security, economic and political interests. This is also in line with the study's second objective that sought to assess the extent to which Israel-Kenya bilateral relations were motivated by Israel's security, economic and political interests between 2007 and 2017. From the study respondents, the researcher established that Israel's political interests influenced Kenya-Israel bilateral relations to the largest extent according to 48% (14) of the study respondents. On the other hand, 27% (8) of the respondents ranked Israel's security interests second in extent of motivating the bilateral relations. Israel's economic interests were ranked third in extent of motivation by 24% (7) of the study respondents. Consequently, Figure 4.9 demonstrates the extent, to which Israel-Kenya bilateral relations were motivated by Israel's security, economic and political interests.

Figure 4.9: The Extent to Which Israel-Kenya Bilateral Relations Were Motivated by Israel's Security, Economic and Political Interests, 2007-2017

Source: Author (2019)

Respondents further discussed the extent to which Israel's national interests from a general perspective influenced the relations with Kenya. According to respondent F, Israel's national interests influenced Israel-Kenya bilateral relations between 2007 and 2017, as they did with other bilateral partners in the international system. This point of view was also articulated by Respondent A, who agreed that indeed Israel's national interests motivated bilateral relations with Kenya between 2007 and 2017. According to the responses from study, 93% (27) of the respondents were of the opinion that Israel's national interests motivated bilateral relations with Israel, although to varying extents as illustrated by Figure 4.10.

Figure 4.10: The Extent to Which Israel-Kenya Bilateral Relations Were Motivated by Israel's National Interests, 2007-2017

Source: Author (2019)

According to 72% (21) of the study respondents as illustrated in Figure 4.10, Israel-Kenya bilateral relations between 2007 and 2017 were motivated to a very large extent by Israel's national interests. On the other hand, 14% (4) of the study respondents viewed Israel's national interests as influencing the bilateral relations between 2007 and 2017 to a large extent. Meanwhile, 7% (2) of the respondents were of the opinion that Israel's national interests minimally motivated the bilateral relations with Kenya. Similarly 7%

(2) of the study respondents were of the opinion that Israel's national interests did not motivate its bilateral relations with Kenya.

Respondents further discussed challenges Israel faced in the bilateral relations. According to study findings, one major challenge facing Israel in the Israel-Kenya bilateral relations is the contradiction or discrepancy between the strong relations with Kenya at the bilateral level and the anti-Israel position adopted by Kenya at the multilateral level in international organisations such as the United Nations. Historically, Kenya votes for resolutions that criticize or condemn the State of Israel. For instance on 30th November 2017, Kenya voted in favour of UN General Resolution A/RES/72/15 (Jerusalem) that renounced Israeli ties to Jerusalem. Specifically, the resolution reiterated that:

> "Any actions taken by Israel the occupying Power to impose its laws, jurisdiction and administration on the Holy City of Jerusalem are illegal and therefore null and void and have no validity whatsoever, and calls upon Israel to immediately cease all such illegal and unilateral measures" according to the United Nations" (2017).

Fundamentally however, Kenya's vote for the resolution came barely two days after Prime Minister Netanyahu's visit to Kenya for President Uhuru Kenyatta's inauguration on 28th November 2017 signaling some disparity between the two states at the bilateral and multilateral levels. According to one of the respondents, this is because the African Union provisions such as AHG/Res.70(X)[69] lean towards solidarity with Palestine and Kenya as an African Union member state is obliged to adopt the provisions. Consequently, Israel lacks Kenya's guarantee for the much desired support in international organisations such as the UN. Further, another respondent stressed on the discordance between Kenya's friendly relations with Israel bilaterally and the anti-Israel status Kenya adopts in multilateral forums, considering this situation as a challenge for Israel. 41% (12) of the study respondents concurred with this point of view.

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[69]Resolution calls upon African states to take political and economic action should Israel fail to withdraw from the occupied territories.

The second challenge Israel faces in the bilateral relations with Kenya concerns the lack of business trust for Kenyan business partners. According to Respondent H, Israeli businessmen and investors have over time targeted Kenya as a preferred investment destination but the fear of being conned, demand for kickbacks and rampant corruption in Kenya diminishes the chances of Israelis investing in Kenya. 20% (6) of the study respondents were of a similar opinion according to study findings.

The third challenge facing Israel according to study findings is competition from other donors funding Kenya's economy. According to Respondent C, Israel's status as an aid receiving state[70] limits its capacity to provide donor funding particularly in the form of cash injections into national economies of bilateral partners. According to respondents, economic aid from Israel to Kenya is in the form of projects and technical assistance in public health, agriculture and education amongst others and this limits the extent of cooperation in comparison with cash-providing donors such as China. As such, Israel contends with significant competition from other contributors to the Kenyan economy. 27% (8) of the respondents were of the opinion that though Israel's technical assistance was important for Kenya's growing economy, Kenya's increasing appetite for liquid assistance seemed to outweigh the need for technical assistance.

The fourth challenge facing Israel in the Kenya-Israel bilateral relations according to respondents is regime changes in Kenya. 10% (3) of the study respondents were of the opinion that regime changes in Kenya were intermittent challenges that Israel faced, as different administrations embraced Israel differently According to Respondent D for example, H.E Jomo Kenyatta's Administration (1963-1978) established bilateral relations with Israel and maintained friendly unofficial ties even after severance of diplomatic relations. This administration assisted Israel in 1976 during the Entebbe Raid to rescue Israeli hostages held in Uganda, and according to Respondent F, this represents a gesture that Israel is forever grateful for. Furthermore, H.E Daniel Toroitich Arap Moi's administration (1978-2002) was extremely open towards Israel at both personal and government levels and may be held to have been the friendliest regime to Israel. At a personal level, the former President had close relations with Israel including his personal

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[70] Israel receives donor aid from the United States of America.

physician who is an American Jew and to date, the former President maintains Israel as his preferred medical destination. For instance in March 2018, H.E. Daniel Toroitich Arap Moi flew to Tel Aviv, Israel for medical treatment.

Moreover, according to Kamau (2017), a former Cabinet Minister and close associate of former President Moi had an Israeli wife, demonstrating the close personal connections the former President and his friends had with Israel. At a government level, H.E. Daniel Toroitich Arap Moi's administration restored official diplomatic relations with Israel in 1988, increased cooperation on intelligence and security, purchased weapons and non-military equipment from Israel. Further, according to Hallahmi (1998), the administration had the President's personal security arranged for by Israel. It was also under this regime that Israel restored technical assistance to Kenya. Moreover, Israeli intelligence operatives infiltrated Kenya during the regime's tenure, and according to Maumo (2009), high level operatives made secret visits to Kenya including David Kimche, the Mossad Regional Chief for Africa in March 1981 and Rahahim Timor, the Director of International Cooperation at the Foreign Ministry, also in March 1981. Additionally, according to Kamau (2017), business deals between Israeli businessmen and Moi's close associates flourished such as through *Lima* Limited[71] and *HZ* Limited[72] in the 1980's and 1990's.

As opposed to his predecessors, H.E Mwai Kibaki's regime (2002-2013) focused on Kenya's economic development and prioritized relations with donors such as China. Although Kenya-Israel relations began to slowly enhance towards the end of his term, H.E Mwai Kibaki's foreign priority remained China as it financed infrastructural development projects in the regime's agenda such as the *Thika* Super Highway[73].

Under H.E Uhuru Kenyatta's administration (2013 to date), relations between Kenya and Israel have flourished with enhanced cooperation in security, trade and socio-economic development. Moreover, state visits have occurred during President Uhuru Kenyatta's administration with Israel's Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu visiting Kenya twice in

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[71] A Company owned by H.E Daniel Arap Moi, Nicholas Biwott and Israeli Vaizman Aharoni.
[72] A company owned by Nicholas Kipyator Biwott and Israeli Gad Zeevis.
[73] Highway that links Kenya's Capital City Nairobi to the industrial town of *Thika*. It also forms 50 Kilometers of the A2 Highway that links Capetown in South Africa to Cairo in Egypt.

2016 and 2017, while President Uhuru Kenyatta visited Israel in 2016. However, President Uhuru Kenyatta continues to look towards China and carries on with his predecessor's ambitions for Kenya's economic development that is dependent on monetary aid as opposed to technical aid provided by bilateral partners like Israel, undermining the intensity of the relations.

In summarizing respondent's views on the challenges facing Israel in the Israel-Kenya relations, 41% (12) of the study respondents were of the opinion that Kenya's need to balance between Israel and the Arab States presented a significant challenge. Moreover, 28% (8) of the study respondents held that other donor countries imposed challenges on Israel as Kenya's development priorities require significant cash injections into the national treasury that Israel is not in a position to provide. Additionally, 21% (6) and 10% (3) of the study respondents were of the opinion that Israeli investor trust and regime changes in Kenya comprised other challenges facing Israel in the Israel-Kenya bilateral relations. Figure 4.11 details the respondents' views in response to the challenges facing Israel in Israel-Kenya Bilateral Relations

Figure 4.11: Challenges Facing Israel in Israel-Kenya Bilateral Relations 2007 -2017

Source: Author (2019)

Secondary Data Findings

Secondary data illustrates that the bilateral relations between Kenya and Israel are influenced to a very large extent by the national interests of both states. According to Alexander & Nanes (1986), terrorism as a transnational issue affects both Kenya and Israel and Kenya is a target for terrorism as it maintains associations with Israel. Several terrorist attacks in Kenya have targeted Israeli establishments such as the *Westgate* Mall in 2013. Moreover, Hornsby (2013), opines that arising from the numerous Western interests in Kenya, poverty, porous borders, increasing Islamic fundamentalism and nearness to Somalia, stringent counter terrorism policies are necessary. Counter terrorism is thus, a prevalent theme in the relations and Kenya in pursuit of her national security interests has enhanced bilateral relations with Israel particularly intelligence sharing and security training. For instance, according to Bishku (2017), President Kenyatta while addressing Israeli leaders in 2014, intimated that bilateral security support would defeat terrorism that targets both Kenya and Israel.

According to Khlebnikova (2017), Kenya in advancing national security interests engages with Israel in security collaborations that arises from the mutual threat of terrorism. Further, Khlebnikova contends that Kenya pursues Israel's advanced military technology and counter terrorism strategies in defending national security while Israel seeks to depress terrorist activities in the Horn of Africa. The indicators of the security collaboration according to Khlebnikova include intelligence sharing, arms sales, military training and security agreements on counter terrorism.

From an economic perspective, Kenya's economic motivations in the bilateral relations with Israel arise from its national objectives as a developing country. Kenya's Foreign Policy (2014), outlines economic prosperity as a national objective inspired by Vision 2030. The policy aspires to promote Kenya's products in foreign markets and enhance Foreign Direct Investments (FDI), while increasing bilateral trade, negotiating for development assistance and undertaking economic cooperation. This is similar to the study findings that established Kenya's desire to increase Kenya-Israel bilateral trade and attract foreign direct investment from Israel as economic drivers in enhancing the bilateral relations.

The Kenya-Israel bilateral relations have experienced several challenges including severance of diplomatic ties between 1973 and 1988 by Kenya and the resultant termination of Israeli assistance to Kenya precipitated by the severed ties. Contemporary relations have also encountered particular challenges. First, Trading Economics (2018), observes that Kenya deals with trade imbalances that favour Israel in the bilateral trade relationship.   The second challenge is the increased terrorist attacks in Kenya. Alexander & Nanes (1986), argue that Kenya is a target for terrorist activities due to its close relations with Israel. Cannon & Pkalya (2017), further contextualize the observation by Alexander & Nanes and submit that *Al Shabaab* never launched any attacks in Kenya between 2006 and 2007 but between 2008 and 2015, the group coordinated 272 attacks on Kenyan territory, the period under which Kenya-Israel relations enhanced. Moreover, Eligur (2014), argues that the infiltration of *Al Qaeda* and *Al Shabaab* in the Horn of Africa who export terrorism to the Middle East, has necessitated Israel's enhanced bilateral relations with Kenya, in pursuit of national security interests, due to its proximity to the Horn of Africa deemed to be a region saturated with terrorist groups.

From Israel's economic perspective, Oded (2010), submits that Israel-Kenya bilateral relations are motivated by an assortment of Israel's economic interests. These include Israel's desire for raw materials, Kenya as an optimal market for Israel's products as well as Kenya's attractiveness as an investment destination for Israeli establishments. According to Yacobi (2015), Israel also pursues military exports to Kenya as an economic agenda while Mintz (2013), outlines Israel's interests from an economic perspective and submits that Israel has over the years sought to develop its arms exports, targeting Africa's rising economies that are dependent on imports including Kenya. Arising from Israel's economic interests in Kenya, Israel-Kenya economic collaboration has prevailed. This economic collaboration is characterized by bilateral trade, trade missions, appointment of trade consuls, bilateral economic forums and foreign aid.

From a political perspective, Israel's condemnations in international organisations, global anti-Semitism, desire for observer status at the African Union, as well as the agenda to contain Iran comprise the political interests that motivate Israel-Kenya relations. Gilboa & Inbar (2009), argue that Israel pursues political interests that seek support in

international organisations and that Israel has sought to counter anti-Semitism through enhancing bilateral relations with counterpart states to diminish the anti-Israel condemnation in international organisations. Further, Israel desires observer status at the African Union according to Sanchez (2016), while Ayee (2011), observes that Israel's desire to contain Iran's influence particularly in the Horn of Africa is another political interest motivating Israel-Kenya relations. These observations resonate well with the study findings on Israel's political interests that influenced enhanced bilateral relations with Kenya between 2007 and 2017.

Kenyan Actors Perspectives on Kenya-Israel Relations

Responses from study respondents further reflected the perspectives of Kenyan participants and on the bilateral relations. From the Kenyan viewpoint, respondents were of the opinion that the bilateral relations with Israel were indeed influenced to a very large extent by the national interests of both states. The respondents also concurred with other study respondents that Kenya's national security interests influenced the enhanced relations to the largest extent. For instance, according to Respondent P, the increased threat of terrorism and increased execution of terrorist attacks in Kenya precipitated the enhancement of bilateral relations with Israel, in pursuit of counter terrorism assistance and advanced security training. Moreover, Respondent Q was of a similar opinion, submitting that national security interests particularly counter terrorism assistance was a fundamental influence on Kenya's enhanced relations with Israel.

Economically, Kenyan participants were of the opinion that bilateral trade was a key driver that motivated the bilateral relations with Israel. For example, Respondent S was of the opinion that Kenya sought to increase her exports to Israel particularly food products, to reduce the trade imbalance in the bilateral trade. On the other hand, Respondent R submitted that Kenya sought Foreign Direct Investment from Israel as an economic incentive in enhancing bilateral relations with Israel. Overall, Kenyan study participants were of the opinion that the enhanced Kenya-Israel bilateral relations were beneficial to both states and recommended the sustenance of the relations.

Israeli Actors Perspectives on Kenya-Israel Relations

Study responses reflected the perspectives of Israeli participants on the Israel –Kenya bilateral relations who held the opinion that the bilateral relations were influenced to a very large extent by the national interests of both states. Specifically, the respondents identified political interests as the overriding reason for the enhanced relations from Israel's viewpoint. For, instance according to Respondent F, the rising global anti-Semitism particularly in international organisations compelled Israel to look to friendly states to adopt pro-Israel voting patterns in these international organisations. In so doing, Israel enhanced bilateral relations with states including Kenya. Further, Respondent F alluded to Israel's political desire to host counterpart embassies in Jerusalem contending that enhanced bilateral relations with Kenya sought to achieve this objective.

From a security perspective, Israeli participants noted the increased threat of terrorism on both Israeli and Kenya territories that therefore necessitated combined effort to forestall. Specifically, according to study respondents, Israel enhanced bilateral relations with Kenya as several terrorist attacks have targeted Israeli establishments in Kenya in the past. Economically, respondents were of the opinion that Kenya like several African states was a ready market for Israeli exports and that bilateral trade was a significant influence. According to Respondent F, increasing bilateral trade was thus a significant agenda that Israel maintained, resulting in trade forums, trade expos and a dedicated trade consul with the responsibility of increasing Israel-Kenya bilateral trade.

4.5 Confirmation of Hypotheses

In undertaking the study, the researcher adopted three hypotheses before undertaking fieldwork. The first hypothesis was that Kenya's security, economic and political interests play a critical role in motivating Kenya-Israel bilateral relations. Responses from the study endorse this hypothesis as 97% (28) of the respondents were of the opinion that Kenya's security, economic and political interests motivated Kenya-Israel bilateral relations between 2007 and 2017. Specifically, 70% (20) of the respondents held the view that the extent of motivation was to a very large extent.

The second hypothesis the researcher adopted was that Israel's security, economic and political interests play a critical role in motivating Kenya-Israel bilateral relations. According to responses from the study, 93% (27) of the respondents were of the opinion that indeed Israel's security, economic and political interests motivated Kenya-Israel bilateral relations between 2007 and 2017. Moreover, 72% (21) of these respondents viewed the extent of motivation as being to a very large extent, confirming the hypothesis.

4.6 Critical Analysis of the Findings

This section provides an analysis of the study findings contextualized within the researcher's understanding of the influence of national interests on the Kenya-Israel bilateral relations between 2007 and 2017. In doing so, the researcher considered a number of issues. First, why there has been a changing bilateral relationship between Kenya and Israel, particularly during the different administrations. Second, the sustainability of the relations in light of the fact that Israel's economic assistance to Kenya is primarily in the form of technical aid. Third, the reasons why Kenya prefers Israel to other countries in counter terrorism collaboration yet terrorism affects other countries. Fourth, the reason why Israel wants to join the African Union with Observer Status, yet she is not an African country and whether this would be possible. Fifth, the reasons why Kenya-Israel bilateral relations have enhanced more during the tenure of the current Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (2009 to date) unlike others before him. Sixth, is whether the bilateral relations with Israel have negative impacts on Kenya's relations with other countries.

According to respondents from the study, the influence of Kenya's and Israel's national interests on the bilateral relations between the two states from 2007 to 2017 was apparent. Ostensibly, the two states being political organisations with centralized governments and authority over geographical territories maintain national interests that they must pursue in order to survive in the international system. Out of the three national interests that the study considered – security, economic and political, findings established that Kenya's priority interest pursued through bilateral relations with Israel was national security, followed by economic interests, while political interests came third.

Additionally, the study also established that political interests comprised Israel's primary interest pursued through bilateral relations with Kenya, followed by security interests then economic interests in that order.

In assessing why there has been a changing bilateral relationship between Kenya and Israel particularly during the different administrations, the researcher concurred with study respondents that the national interests of the two states influenced the bilateral relations. Further, the researcher established that the bilateral relations were influenced by the different national interests pursued by the different regimes at various times. For instance, Kenya-Israel bilateral relations under H.E Mzee Jomo Kenyatta (1963-1978) and Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir (1969-1974) and later Prime Minister Yitzak Rabin (1974-1977), were cordial and demonstrated significant trust between the two states. According to Oded (2000), Kenya at the time was a newly independent state having emerged from British colonization in 1963, and its major interests were nation building, economic assistance and military assistance.

Naim (2005), on the other hand observed that Israel was at the time in its early years of nationhood, and faced a number of issues including wars with Arab neighbours such as Egypt, Syria and Jordan, anti-Israel resolutions at the United Nations and economic boycotts. Consequently, these issues influenced Israel's national interests and Israel embarked on pursuing security, political and economic interests. Kenya-Israel bilateral relations thus flourished, as both states achieved their respective national interests to a large extent through the bilateral relations. Naim notes that Kenya secured Israeli support in nation building, socio-economic assistance in agriculture, irrigation, animal husbandry and child care among others, and military assistance through training of the Kenya Army pilots and intelligence collaboration. Israel on the other hand achieved a major political interest and attained diplomatic representation in Kenya in 1963, at a time when Israel faced significant global diplomatic isolation. This was through the establishment of the Embassy of Israel in Kenya in 1963. Most notably, this was the first foreign embassy to be established in Kenya after it attained Independence in 1963. Further, Israel pursued its security interests through Kenya-Israel bilateral relations and established Kenya as an intelligence collection base with a heavy presence of Mossad in Kenya. According to

Kamau (2016), the extent of Mossad operations in Kenya under H.E Jomo Kenyatta was evidenced by the Mossad's articulate planning and execution of the 1976 Entebbe Raid in Uganda, Kenya's western neighbour. Arising from the above, the researcher concludes that Kenya-Israel bilateral relations during H.E Mzee Jomo Kenyatta's administration were influenced by Kenya's nationalism, socio-economic and security interests while Israel's political and security interests influenced the relations.

During H.E Daniel Toroitich Arap Moi's administration (1978-2002), official Kenya-Israel bilateral relations were absent arising from the severance of diplomatic ties in 1973, following the *Yom Kippur* War. This administration reigned towards the end of the Cold War[74] and Maina (2013), notes that it pursued ideological, economic and regional stability as the major national interests. In pursuing ideological interests at the time, Kenya sought to align with the West as enshrined in the Sessional Paper No. 10[75] of 1965. Consequently, the President sought to appease Western Powers particularly the United States of America (USA) that emerged as the Super Power at the end of the Cold War, and its allies, primarily Israel. According to Kamau (2017), unofficial Kenya-Israel relations thrived more than in the previous regime due to the personal connections established between the President, his close associates such as Nicholas Biwott and Israeli businessmen including Vaizman Aharoni and Gad Zeevis. In the researcher's opinion, Kenya's deep embrace of Israel in the absence of official diplomatic relations was H.E Daniel Toroitich Arap Moi's foreign policy strategy of demonstrating his alignment to the USA, its Capitalist Ideology[76], and preserving Kenya's ideological interest - Capitalism. Moreover, this strategy was based on the principle of "my friend's friend is my friend" and H.E Daniel Moi's administration hoped that it would receive favorable status from the USA particularly donor aid to support Kenya's struggling economy at the time.

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[74] Ideological war between the United States of America (USA) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) that occurred between 1945 and 1991. The USA promoted Capitalism while the USSR promoted Communism.
[75] Sessional Paper No. 10 on African Socialism and its application to planning in Kenya is a Government Policy passed by Kenya's National Assembly in 1965 and emphasized the eradication of poverty, ignorance and disease.
[76] Capitalism is an economic and political system whereby a state's trade and industry is controlled by private owners for profit, rather than by the state. It is characterized private property, capital accumulation, voluntary exchange wage labor, a price system and competitive markets.

From Israel's perspective, political interests in Kenya and in the larger African Continent had declined since the severance of diplomatic relations in 1973. However, Yacobi (2015) observes that Israel maintained economic interests and it pursued these interests aggressively through business deals with the political elite and arms sales, that were orchestrated by private businessmen and the Mossad on behalf of the Israeli government, in countries where official diplomatic relations were absent. This was the case in Kenya under H.E Daniel Toroitich Arap Moi's administration and explains the close relations between Kenya's political elite and Israeli businessmen. For instance, Kamau (2016), notes that former President Moi, the Late Nicholas Biwott and Israeli businessman Vaizman Aharoni are the directors of *Lima* Limited, a company registered in Kenya and dealing in agricultural machinery. Moreover, Hallahmi (1998), states that Kenya purchased Israeli weapons including missile boats and military equipment such as uniforms and that the President's personal security was provided for by Israel. From the aforementioned, the researcher postulates that Kenya-Israel bilateral relations during H.E Daniel Moi' administration flourished as Kenya's ideological interests and Israel's economic interests primarily through arms sales, were being achieved through the relations.

In analyzing Kenya-Israel bilateral relations during H.E Mwai Kibaki's administration (2002-2013), the researcher observes a decline in the intensity of the Kenya-Israel bilateral relations particularly in the first term (2002-2007), compared to H.E Daniel Toroitich Arap Moi's era. In the researcher's opinion, this decline was occasioned by the pursuit of economic development as the primary interest that H.E Mwai Kibaki embraced. Consequently, the President's foreign policy at the time focused on enhancing bilateral relations with counterparts that provided funds for Kenya's economic expansion particularly China. However, the bilateral relations began to enhance in President Kibaki's second term (2008-2013) and the researcher opines that this was occasioned by Israel's renewed focus in Africa as it pursued political interests under Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (2009 to date).

Kenya's fourth administration under H.E Uhuru Kenyatta (2013 to date) continued with economic development as the primary interest it pursued and just like the preceding regime, sought to enhance bilateral relations with China. However, this administration also sought Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to boost economic development and enhanced bilateral relations with states such as Israel, India and Turkey in attracting FDI. The re-emergence of terrorism as a significant threat to Kenya's national security in 2013 compelled H.E Uhuru Kenyatta's administration to turn to Israel for counter terrorism assistance. This is because Israel maintains advanced counter terrorism capabilities arising from the historical threat of terrorism on her national security, and Kenya sought to learn Israeli counter terrorism expertise. Moreover, Israel continued to increase its footprint in Africa in pursuit of its political interests and in 2016 under Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, adopted the "*Return to Africa Policy*". This policy is a diplomatic rapprochement strategy and aims to enhance relations with African states including Kenya that were damaged by the severance of official diplomatic ties in 1973 following the *Yom Kippur* War. Further, during this time, Israel embraced Kenya and the larger African continent as a ready market for Israeli exports, thereby enhancing bilateral relations to pursue economic interests. Ultimately, the researcher submits that Kenya-Israel bilateral relations under H.E Uhuru Kenyatta and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu enhanced, influenced by Kenya's economic and security interests and Israel's political, security and economic interests. This submission is in line with the findings of the study, that the aforementioned Kenya and Israeli interests influenced Kenya-Israel bilateral relations between 2007 and 2017.

The researcher further analyzed the sustainability of the Kenya-Israel bilateral relations in light of the fact that Israel's economic assistance to Kenya is primarily in the form of technical aid, whereas Kenya as a developing country prefers cash injections into its national economy. The researcher submits that the relations are indeed sustainable for several reasons, First, Kenya benefits from other forms of economic assistance including Israeli Foreign Direct Investment particularly in the hospitality industry that creates employment opportunities for Kenyans. For instance, Art Caffe, an Israeli owned chain of restaurants has adopted an expansion strategy and opened new outlets within Nairobi and its environs, such as in *Capital Centre Mall* and in *Kitengela.* It is therefore in

Kenya's interest to sustain the relations and exploit the potential for increasing Israeli Foreign Direct Investment in the country.

Second, Kenya is a direct consumer of Israeli exports comprising both civilian and military commodities including arms and is in Israel's best interests to preserve and enhance the trade relationship with Kenya. Israel is a technologically advanced economy with enormous production capabilities that surpass its domestic consumption needs. Consequently, surplus production requires being exported to foreign markets hence the impetus for enhancing trade relations according to respondents. The researcher was of a similar opinion and further considered that Israel's defense exports were at the centre of enhancing trade relations with Kenya. Israel's defense industry responsible for the manufacture of weapons, artilleries and arms has undergone tremendous growth in recent years as Israel seeks to continuously develop ultra-modern defense equipment. Moreover, the quest to continuously develop contemporary weapons technology has meant that weapons previously developed need to be disposed. Kenya as a country struggling with a myriad of national security issues including banditry, vigilantism and terrorism may thus be construed to be a ready market for Israeli weapons. Thus Kenya's consistent need for modern weapons to secure its territory internally and externally, and Israel's ability to supply the modern weapons Kenya seeks, contributes to the sustainability of the Kenya-Israel relations.

Third, the researcher considers the Kenya-Israel bilateral relations as sustainable because the two states pursue other objectives apart from economic interests including security and political interests through the bilateral relationship. The researcher argues that the bilateral relations are sustainable to the extent that these interests are being achieved. Kenya's national security interests are of vital importance and Israel's security assistance on counter terrorism, weapon sales, military training and intelligence gathering have proven to be beneficial to Kenya. For instance intelligence cooperation between Kenya and Israel enabled the apprehension of two Iranians in 2012 in Mombasa[77] who were suspected of planning a terrorist attack on the Embassy of Israel in Kenya. Moreover, the

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[77] Coastal City of Kenya. It is the oldest and second largest city after Nairobi, the capital city of Kenya.

hostage rescue capabilities of security agencies after terrorist attacks have significantly improved over time and this can be attributed to counter terrorism collaboration between Kenya and Israel that involves intense hostage rescue training. For instance, rescue operations after the January 2019 *Dusit D2* terrorist attack in Nairobi demonstrated considerably higher skill levels compared to the rescue operation after the September 2013 *Westgate* attack also in Nairobi. It is thus the researcher's opinion that Kenya will continue to engage with Israel as a bilateral partner to the extent that her national security interests are being met and the relations are thereby sustainable. On the part of Israel, political interests dominate the bilateral relations, particularly the need for Kenya's support for Israel in international organisations, the desire for Kenya's support in Israel's quest to attain Observer Status in the African Union and the hope for Kenya to relocate its embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Arising from the enhanced relations with Kenya, Israel has realised some benefits aligned to its political interests. For instance, in December 2017, Kenya abstained from voting against UN General Assembly resolution A/ES-10/L.22 that rejected the USA's recognition of Jerusalem as Israel's capital city. Kenya's decision to abstain may be construed to be a goodwill gesture towards Israel and essentially as a vote for Israel, as Kenya has historically voted against Israel in multilateral forums. Although Israel is yet to obtain Observer Status at the African Union and Kenya is yet to relocate her embassy to Jerusalem, the researcher is of the opinion that Israel will continue to engage with Kenya as a bilateral partner to the extent that her national interests are being met. As such, the researcher is of the opinion that the enhanced Kenya-Israel bilateral relations are sustainable, to the extent that the national interests of both states continue to be achieved.

In analyzing study findings, the researcher considered the reasons why Kenya prefers counter terrorism collaboration with Israel, yet other countries are also affected by the threat of terrorism on national security. The researcher concurred with study respondents that Kenya sought to acquire Israel's expert counter terrorism strategies and techniques to mitigate the threat of terrorism. This is because Israel has over time developed advanced counter terrorism strategies, as it is the most targeted state by terrorists and has been

under the continuous threat of annihilation through terrorism[78] and wars[79] yet it continues to survive. Moreover, Israel has advanced intelligence gathering capabilities that enable it to forestall threats to its national security. As such, Kenya, in the researcher's opinion prefers Israel in counter terrorism collaboration as Kenya aims to upgrade intelligence gathering competencies and develop efficiencies in the use of both domestic and foreign intelligence. Ultimately, this would enable Kenya collect and decipher information that is relevant to addressing terror threats on national security that emanate internally and externally.

The researcher further sought to interrogate the reason why Israel is intent on joining the African Union (AU) with Observer Status, yet she is not an African country and whether this would be possible. Observer Status is a privilege granted by some regional and international organisations such as the African Union and the United Nations, allowing non-members to participate in the organisations activities such as meetings. However activities such as voting or proposal of resolutions are excluded from the privileges extended. Previously, Israel maintained Observer Status in the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) until 2002 when it was transformed to the AU, but Israel's Observer Status was not renewed with the AU. However, the Palestinian Liberation Organisation[80] (PLO), Israel's adversary in the Middle East was granted Observer Status in the African Union in 2002. The significance of the PLO in the African Union while Israel is not is that the PLO is able to influence the AU member states at regional level to adopt pro-Palestine positions and policies, while Israel lacks the ability to influence AU member states at a regional level by virtue of its absence in the regional organisation. Moreover, one fundamental aim for the establishment of the African Union was to coordinate and harmonize the economic, diplomatic, defense, scientific, health, educational, and welfare policies of member states. As such, the researcher argues that Israel seeks Observer Status at the African Union in order to influence these member state policies, specifically in two key areas aligned to Israeli national interests.

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[78] Including stabbings, shootings, arson kites, petrol bombings and grenade attacks.
[79] War of Independence (1948), Suez Crisis (1956), Six Day War (1967), Yom Kippur War (1973), Lebanon War (1982), First Intifada (1987), Second Intifada (2000).
[80] The Palestinian Authority is an interim self-governing body formed in 1994 to administer over the autonomous Palestinian Territories of the West Bank and Gaza and territories that Israel will withdraw from in future.

First, Observer Status at the African Union would enable Israel to influence the member states diplomatic policies and align them to Israel's political interests, particularly the desire to diminish anti-Israel voting in international organisations. Fundamentally, Israel targets the 54 member states as they form a large bloc that may determine the outcome of voting processes in international organisations such as the United Nations. For instance, the United Nations comprises 193 member states and African States form 28% (54) of UN membership. Another large bloc present in international organisations is the Arab and Muslim states that according to the Organisation for Islamic Cooperation (2019), comprise 29% of UN membership as 56 Arab and Muslim states are members of the UN. These two blocs therefore form an automatic majority (57%) at the United Nations and may be construed to be a major reason the United Nations adopts anti-Israel resolutions. This is because the two blocks have historically adopted anti-Israel resolutions and favored pro-Palestine resolutions, to the detriment of Israel. As such, Israel seeks to dismantle this automatic majority in the United Nations and Observer Status at the African Union, would present a platform for Israel to advance this agenda at a regional or bloc level.

Moreover, Israel's Observer Status at the African Union would enable her pursue other political interests including influencing African States to relocate their Embassies in Israel to Jerusalem. Currently, Israel hosts majority of its counterpart Embassies in the cities of Tel Aviv and Haifa, with only the Embassies of United States of America and Guatemala located in Jerusalem. Presently, Jerusalem is a contested area between Israel and Palestine, with both claiming Jerusalem as their respective capital city. Israel therefore seeks to populate Jerusalem with administrative, judicial and diplomatic representation structures in a bid to control the disputed city of Jerusalem. The second area the researcher submits that Israel seeks to influence African states through Observer Status at the AU, is aligned to Israel's economic interests. Israel views the African continent as a ready market for Israeli civilian and defense exports, and strives to develop enhanced trade ties with African States. A regional platform such as that provided by Observer Status in the African Union provides a cheaper option for Israel to engage with African states economically.

Further, in analyzing the study findings, the researcher sought to establish the reasons why the Kenya-Israel relations have been more enhanced during the tenure of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel's current Prime Minister (2009 to date), and not quite with others before. Kinsella, Russet & Starr (2012), submit that some personal characteristics of leaders including education, physical health, age, personal experience and belief system help to clarify the policies embraced by individual leaders in response to global problems. The researcher thus examined the Prime Minister's idiosyncratic characteristics that have influenced the "*Return to Africa Policy*" and enhancement of Kenya-Israel bilateral relations, submitting two reasons as to why the relations have enhanced under his tenure.

First, is Prime Minister Netanyahu's belief system. He believes strongly in Jewish nationalism and the right for Jews to defend themselves to enlist the survival of the State of Israel. The State of Israel has historically been under constant threat of annihilation and previous Prime Ministers have looked to the United States of America to protect and patron Israel. However the researcher argues that when PM Netanyahu rose to power in 2009, he failed to gain the automatic protection and support from the newly elected USA President Barack Obama (2009-2017). According to Buchanan (2017), the Obama Administration was largely held to be reclusive towards Israel fundamentally because of Israel's expanding settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. In May 2009, the administration called for an immediate stop to Israel's settlement expansion strategy and maintained this position to the end of President Obama's tenure. For instance in 2016, the USA abstained from Security Council resolution S/Res/2334 that declared Israeli settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem illegal and invalid, leaving Israel feeling vulnerable and betrayed. This is because, the USA has historically voted against UN resolutions condemning the State of Israel. Moreover, according to Setton (2018), Israel seeks an active American policy in the Middle East particularly as concerns Iran, because Israel considers Iran's nuclear capabilities a national security threat, preferring the imposition of Iranian sanctions to curtail its nuclear developments. However, the Obama Administration opened up nuclear talks with Iran, resulting in the Joint Comprehensive

Plan of Action[81] (JCPOA) in July 2015 that Israel strongly opposed because Iranian sanctions were lifted under the JCPOA.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu thus sought an alternative strategy to protect Israel's interests and safeguard her survival, drawing from his strong belief in the right of Jews to protect themselves. This strategy involved countering global anti-Semitism particularly in international organisations and turning Israel into an economically self-reliant state. Consequently, the Prime Minister turned to the African Continent that had largely been ignored by previous Prime Ministers after the severance of diplomatic ties with Israel in 1973. He launched the *"Return to Africa Policy"* and toured African States including Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda in 2016 and became the first Israeli Prime Minister to visit Africa in 17 years since 1999. Further, he envisaged that developing ties with African states would support his objective of countering anti-Semitism in the United Nations and other international organisations. From an economic perspective, PM Netanyahu viewed Africa as a ready market for Israel's exports, particularly defense apparatus. Israel under PM Netanyahu's Administration has developed and expanded its defense industry, primarily producing arms for export to guarantee Israel's national income. Moreover, arms production for sale enables continuous development of modern weapons with enhanced capabilities, which ensures Israel maintains contemporary artilleries in the event of war.

Although the aforementioned relates to the African continent, PM Netanyahu preferred to work with Kenya as he executed the *"Return to Africa Policy"* submitting that Kenya was Israel's best partner in Africa. The researcher argues that the Prime Minister considered Kenya's hegemonic status within the East African region and within Africa, believing that Kenya would assist Israel pursue its political and economic interests within the continent. For instance, according to Sanchez (2016), Israel desires Observer Status at the African Union and President Uhuru Kenyatta, a strong proponent of Israel's quest at the AU was the Chairman of the AU's Africa Peer Review Mechanism Committee

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[81] Agreement signed between Iran and United States of America, United Kingdom, China, Russia France and Germany on 14th July 2015 in Vienna, Austria. The agreement lifted economic sanctions imposed against Iran on condition that it would comply with the nuclear requirements of the agreement including period assessment of its nuclear programmes by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

(APRMC) (2015-2018). PM Netanyahu thus believed that President Kenyatta's standing in the regional organisation was beneficial in persuading other African states to support Israel's attempt as an observer at the AU, hence his preference for Kenya.

Second, are personal experiences. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's personal experiences particularly in his youth motivate his response to terrorism, one of the greatest threats on Israel's national security. Silverman (2016), submits that PM Netanyahu took part in military and counter terrorism operations from an early age of eighteen when he joined the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF). Silverman further notes that the Prime Minister lost his elder brother Yonatan Netanyahu in 1976, during the Entebbe Raid in response to an act of terrorism in which hostages including Israeli nationals were held in Uganda by Palestinian terrorists. Moreover, this personal loss significantly predisposed Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's life into its present course focused on fighting terrorism in Israel. This is evidenced by the crusade against terrorism demonstrated through scholarly writing[82] disdain for perpetrators of terror including Iran and the impetus for counter terrorism. Kenya faces terrorism as a major threat on its national security and has in the past suffered terror attacks some of which have been on Israeli establishments such as the Norfolk Hotel in 1980 and the *Westgate* Mall in 2013.

Moreover, in 2002, an Israeli airliner was nearly shot down by a missile in Mombasa, Kenya's Coastal City, while a terrorist attack on Israel's Embassy in Kenya was thwarted in 2012. Further, Kenya borders Somalia, a country deemed to be an operating base for terrorists who export terrorism to the Middle East targeting Israel or execute terror attacks on Israeli establishments abroad. One can thus argue that in seeking to combat the threat of terror on Israel and its establishments abroad and heavily influenced by his personal experiences, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu chose to enhance bilateral relations with Kenya due to its geostrategic location and proximity to Somalia and the larger Horn of Africa. Kenya's geostrategic position enables Israel to collect intelligence on terrorist activities in the Horn of Africa to forestall terror attacks. Moreover, Kenya's maritime areas facilitate Israeli surveillance of the Indian Ocean, a shipping route for its

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[82] PM Netanyahu has authored several books including International Terrorism: Challenge and Response (1979), Terrorism: How the West can win (1987) and Fighting Terrorism: How democracies can defeat domestic and international terrorism (1996).

passenger and cargo ships destined to Asia, as acts of aggression in international waters increase. For instance, according to Staff (2018), Iran undermines Israel's use of the Red Sea and supports the Yemeni *Houthi* rebels' crusade to block the Strait of *Bab Al-Mandab*, a major naval trading route for Israel. Additionally, an Iranian oil vessel was seized in Gibraltar on 4th July 2019, while Iran seized a British oil tanker in the Strait of Hormuz on 19th July 2019. One may thus contend that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's personal experiences as a result of terrorism influence his desire to fight the transnational threat. Further, Kenya is an attractive counter terrorism partner as the threat of terrorism is mutual with Israel, hosts Israeli establishments such as the Embassy, hotels and malls and provides geostrategic advantage that Israel may exploit in the fight against terrorism.

The researcher further considered whether or not Kenya's bilateral relations with Israel have any negative impacts on Kenya's relations with other countries. According to study respondents, one challenge Kenya faced in the relations with Israel, was the need to balance between Israel and the Arab states. Despite this challenge, the researcher is of the opinion that Kenya-Israel relations do not have any negative impact on Kenya's relations with other countries. This is because states maintain bilateral relations with each other to the extent that their respective national interests are being met. Therefore, if Kenya's relation with other bilateral partners' results in the achievement of each other's national interests, Israel would not present a threat to the relations. Moreover, the dynamics of the Middle East are changing and Arab states including the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Jordan, Oman and Bahrain are beginning to embrace and align with Israel in an effort to contain Iran, due to its nuclear developments and quest for regional hegemony in the Middle East. For instance, according to Shragai (2019), Saudi Arabia in 2015 allowed Air India flights operating between India and Israel, to fly over Saudi Arabian airspace. Further, Shragai notes that a joint initiative known as *"Tracks for Peace"* which Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Israel are pursuing to create a rail network connecting the three states for trade purposes, would provide economic and strategic advantage due to a shorter and cheaper land route, than the current maritime route.

Fundamentally however, a rail network would diminish the reliance on the currently dangerous maritime trade routes patronized by Iran including the Strait of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf and *Bab Al Mandeb* in the Red Sea. These emerging alliances between Israel and major powers in the Middle East such as Saudi Arabia are beneficial for Kenya's relations with Israel as they diminish to some extent historical Arab hostility to Israel friendly states. However, the researcher appreciates that regime changes in the Arab states, the unresolved Israel-Palestine crisis and the nuclear arms race in the Middle East could destabilize the friendly Arab-Israeli alliances, particularly in light of the fact that official diplomatic relations between Israel and states such as Saudi Arabia are still absent. Hostile Arab regimes would thus complicate Kenya-Israel relations, necessitating a delicate balance as Kenya pursues its national interests in the Middle East.

The researcher further considered whether the enhanced Kenya-Israel bilateral relations had any effects on the Kenyan population aside from having significant impacts at the strategic level. In the researcher's opinion, the bilateral relations offered Kenya the opportunity to enhance her national security which is a necessary imperative for economic development. For instance a safe, stable and secure Kenya would have positive effects on tourism, increase foreign direct investment and provide an environment for prosperity and ultimately benefitting the Kenyan citizenry, with increased opportunities for employment and entrepreneurship. Additionally, soft power techniques employed by both Kenya and Israel such as scholarship and cultural exchanges provide an opportunity for citizens of both states to appreciate the culture and values of the counterpart state, thereby increasing solidarity between Kenyans and Israelis. For instance, Kenya promotes her culture in Israel through teaching of Kiswahili which is her national language while Israel uses food festivals and music to promote Israeli culture in Kenya.

CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

The principal aim of this study was to assess the influence of national interests on bilateral relations between states, by examining the Kenya-Israel bilateral relations from 2007 to 2017. This chapter summarizes the study guided by the three specific objectives the study sought to achieve. The first objective of the study was to assess the extent to which Kenya-Israel bilateral relations were motivated by Kenya's security, economic and political interests. The second objective was to assess the extent to which Israel-Kenya bilateral relations were motivated by Israel's security, economic and political interests. The third objective was to examine the challenges of these bilateral relations on the two states. The researcher employed the use of structured interviews, expert interviews and focus group discussions as instruments of primary data collection. The researcher further relied on information available in Kenyan and Israeli government policy documents, scholarly articles, newspapers and internet sources for secondary data. The chapter also provides comprehensive conclusions drawn from study findings and provides recommendations for implementation. Finally, the chapter offers insights into areas for further research drawn from the researcher's experience during the study.

5.2 Summary of Findings

The extent to which Kenya-Israel bilateral relations were motivated by Kenya's security, economic and political interests, 2007-2017

From the research findings, majority of the respondents were of the opinion that national interests influence the bilateral relations between states. Specifically, the results derived from the study indicated that a major proportion of the respondents agreed that enhanced Kenya-Israel bilateral relations between 2007 and 2017 were influenced by the national interests of both Kenya and Israel. 97% (28) of the study respondents opined that Kenya's national interests motivated the enhanced Kenya-Israel bilateral relations between 2007 and 2017 to a very large extent.

Arising from the relatedness and multiplicity of motivating interests from respondents, the study grouped and discussed findings as security, economic and political interests in line with the study objectives. In interrogating specific national interests from Kenya's perspective and the influence on Kenya-Israel bilateral relations, 64% (18) of the study respondents were of the opinion that Kenya's security interest influenced the relations with Israel to the largest extent. Further, 34% (9) of the study respondents stated that economic interests was the second most prevalent Kenyan interest motivating Kenya-Israel bilateral relations. Kenya's political interests were ranked third in order of influence, with only 2% (1) of the study respondents considering Kenya's political interest as motivating the Kenya-Israel bilateral relations between 2007 and 2017.

The study further established particular interest areas aligned to the national interests that Kenya pursued in enhancing bilateral relations with Israel between 2007 and 2017. According to the findings, 34% (10) of the respondents identified counter terrorism cooperation as a major security interest area that Kenya pursued in enhancing bilateral relations with Israel. This finding resonated with the views of Bishku (2017) who argues that Kenya seeks to enhance its counter terrorism operations through bilateral relations with Israel. Moreover, 28% (8) of the respondents suggested intelligence gathering while 24% (7) of the respondents suggested security training as security interest areas, a finding that resonates with the submission of Staff (2019). He submits that Kenya in enhancing bilateral relations with Israel, sought to secure advanced training techniques for security personnel. Additionally, 14% (4) of the respondents suggested weapons supply as a security interest area that Kenya pursued in enhancing bilateral relations with Israel, a point of view similar to that of Yacobi (2015). Yacobi opines that Kenya's interest in enhancing bilateral relations with Israel is driven by the desire for modern weapons, particularly in light of the fight against terrorism.

As concerns Kenya's economic interests, the study identified two areas that Kenya pursued. The first area was bilateral trade and 59% (17) of the respondents were of the opinion that Kenya sought to increase bilateral trade with Israel in enhancing Kenya-Israel bilateral relations. The second area was Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and 41% (12) of the respondents opined that in enhancing Kenya-Israel bilateral relations, Kenya

pursued Israel's FDI in the country. Only 2% (1) of the study respondents was of the opinion that Kenya's political interests motivated Kenya-Israel bilateral relations, citing protection of Kenya's hegemonic status in East Africa and within the larger African continent.

The extent to which Israel-Kenya bilateral relations were motivated by Israel's security, economic and political interests

The study established through the findings that 93% (27) of the study respondents were of the opinion that Israel's national interests influenced Israel-Kenya bilateral relations. 72% (21) of the respondents held that the influence was to a very large extent. Specifically, as the study interrogated Israel's security, economic and political interests, the study found that Israel's political interests ranked first as the major interest motivating enhanced Israel-Kenya bilateral relations between 2007 and 2017. According to findings, 48% (14) of the study respondents held that Israel's primary interest in enhancing bilateral relations with Kenya was political This finding corresponds to the argument postulated by Chazan (2017) who argues that Israel's major interest in Kenya and the African continent is political. The second Israeli interest that enhanced Kenya-Israel bilateral relations according to respondents was security interests and 27% (8) of the respondents were of this opinion. The third Israeli interest in enhancing bilateral relations with Kenya was economic and 24% (7) of the respondents alluded as such.

The study further inquired into Israel's specific interest areas that it sought to pursue through enhanced bilateral relations with Kenya. According to 48% (14) of the respondents, Israel's political interests comprised the fundamental force behind enhanced relations with Kenya. Specifically, Israel pursued three political interests. The first one was Kenya's diplomatic support in international organisations such as the United Nations, hoping to transform Kenya's traditional anti-Israel voting pattern into pro-Israel voting at the multilateral level. According to study respondents, this is motivated by Israel's desire to increase its international acceptance and legitimacy, an argument also held by Gilboa & Inbar (2009). The second political interest Israel pursued was the quest for readmission into the African Union with Observer Status and sought Kenya's leadership in lobbying African states to readmit Israel into the regional body. The third

political interest Israel pursued was convincing Kenya to relocate her Embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. The study further established specific security interest areas that Israel pursued in enhancing Kenya-Israel bilateral relations. These were intelligence gathering, counter terrorism and containing Iran. Additionally, the study established several economic interest areas that Israel pursued through enhanced Kenya-Israel bilateral relations. These were bilateral trade, attractive investment opportunities in Kenya, weapon sales, intelligence gathering masquerading as trade, Kenya as an oil source and economic goodwill.

5.3 Conclusion

Based on the study results, the enhanced Kenya-Israel bilateral relations between 2007 and 2017 were influenced to a very large extent by the national interests of both states. The dominant national interest that influenced Kenya in enhancing bilateral relations with Israel was national security, in the advent of increased terrorist attacks in Kenya. On the other hand, the primary national interest that influenced Israel in enhancing bilateral relations with Kenya was political/diplomatic support in international organisations, occasioned by increased global anti-Semitism against Israel. Moreover, the study established several reasons why Israel adopted Kenya as a preferred bilateral partner as Israel executes the "*Return to Africa Policy*".

First, Kenya is strategic to Israel's geopolitical interests in the Horn of Africa and the Indian Ocean. This is because Israel can surveil the region in pursuit of her national security interests, against terrorism and maritime aggression. Second, Israel targets Kenya's hegemonic status in East Africa and the larger African Continent in advancing Israel's political interests, particularly lobbying for Observer Status at the African Union. Third, Israel and Kenya maintain historical trust arising from Kenya's assistance to Israel during the Entebbe Raid in 1976. Israel thus considers Kenya-Israel historical ties as fundamental to its current agenda, hence the preference for Kenya as it executes the "*Return to Africa Policy*". Ostensibly, this study has contributed to academic literature by focusing on assessing the extent to which Kenya-Israel relations are motivated by Kenya's and Israel's national interests, the specific national interests that influenced

enhanced Kenya-Israel bilateral relations between 2007 and 2017, and the challenges of the bilateral relations on both states.

5.4 Recommendations

This study proposes several recommendations that policy makers may adopt, that correspond to the objectives that the study sought to achieve.

Recommendations for the Government of Kenya

Findings from the study revealed that national security interests influenced Kenya's enhancement of bilateral relations with Israel to the largest extent. Fundamentally, Kenya sought Israel's assistance in counter terrorism and intelligence collaboration. Moreover, the study established that Kenya's economic interests, specifically increasing bilateral trade and attracting foreign direct investments, motivated enhanced bilateral relations with Israel. The study further found four challenges that Kenya faces in the bilateral relations with Israel. These are Kenya's need to balance her Israeli interests and Arab interests, trade imbalances in the bilateral trade with Israel, increased threat of terrorism and inefficient diplomatic capacities. The recommendations provided, aim at addressing these findings, guided by the study objectives.

i. Short Term Recommendation

On the issue of inefficient diplomatic capacities, the Government of Kenya should maximize on the available and specialist trained graduates in International Relations and Political Science as diplomats to enhance collaborations with Israel.

Appointing diplomats who have undergone academic and diplomatic training to represent Kenya and pursue her national interests abroad would enhance collaborations with Israel in specific interest areas for Kenya's ultimate benefit. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs can partner with academic institutions such as Universities and source for qualified graduates, who can best represent Kenya's interests in Israel.

ii. Mid Term Recommendation

On the issue of counter terrorism and intelligence collaboration, the Government of Kenya should make intelligence admissible in court to significantly support the fight against terrorism, as is the case in Israel.

The admissibility of intelligence in court is fundamental in fighting terrorism in Kenya through deterring against the engagement in terrorist activities and motivating efficient intelligence gathering by security agencies. Permitting the prosecution of suspects based on intelligence would also suppress the radicalization and recruitment of Kenyan youth by terrorist groups.

iii. Long Term Recommendation

On the issue of Kenya's trade imbalance in the bilateral trade with Israel, the Government of Kenya should consider refining its oil resources and exporting the same to Israel.

Exporting oil to Israel would provide a practical opportunity for the Government of Kenya to diminish the trade imbalance experienced as a result of importing more goods from Israel than it exports to Israel. Oil export supported by domestic refinery would be aligned to the manufacturing initiative of the Big Four Agenda and provide employment opportunities for Kenya's youth.

Recommendations for the Government of Israel

Findings from the study revealed that political interests influenced Israel's enhancement of bilateral relations with Kenya to the largest extent. Fundamentally, Israel sought Kenya's assistance in diminishing anti-Israel voting in international organisations such as the United Nations, support for Israel's Observer Status at the African Union and relocation of Kenya's Embassy in Israel to Jerusalem from Tel Aviv. Moreover, the study established that Israel's economic interests, specifically increasing bilateral trade with Kenya and the search for investment opportunities influenced enhanced bilateral relations. The study further established that Kenya is strategic to Israel's geopolitical interests and serves Israel's national security interests fundamentally the collection of intelligence through Kenyan territory, counter terrorism collaboration and containing Iran influenced the relations. The study further found four challenges that Israel faces in the

bilateral relations with Kenya. These are regime changes in Kenya, competition from other donor countries such as China, investor trust and Kenya's need to balance Israeli and Arab interests. The recommendations provided aim at addressing these findings, guided by the study objectives.

i. Short Term Recommendation

On the issue of Israel's political interests, the Government of Israel should sustain the high-level political consultations with Kenya.

Sustaining high-level political consultations between Israel and Kenya is essential in embedding Israel's political interests beyond regime changes in Kenya. This is important as Israel seeks Kenya's relentless support in multilateral organisations, Kenya's regional leadership in lobbying for Israel's Observer Status in the African Union and relocation of Kenya's Embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. As these are immediate priorities for Israel, consistent high-level political consultations would maintain the momentum towards achievement of the same even after regime changes in Kenya.

ii. Mid Term Recommendation

On the issue of Israel's economic interests in Kenya, the Government of Israel should re-introduce Israel's *El Al* Airline as a direct flight between Israel and Kenya.

Re-introduction of *El Al* Airline as a direct flight between Israel and Kenya would be a viable means for Israel to increase bilateral trade with Kenya and increase Israel's national income through Kenya-Israel travel. The airline's operations in Kenya were curtailed in 2002 following a missile attack on *El Al* flight 582 in Mombasa, Kenya in 2002.

iii. Long Term Recommendation

On the issue of Israel's national security interests and Kenya's strategic importance, the Government of Israel should consider establishing an overseas base in Kenya.

An overseas base is a facility provided by a host country to a foreign counterpart and allows for security operations such as intelligence gathering, surveillance, military training, military communication, access of strategic establishments such as airport and

sea ports and weapons stock piling. Overseas bases are important for countries that are under continuous threat of attack and enables retaliation or management of conflicts from foreign territories. As Israel is under the constant threat of terror and nuclear attack, it may consider upgrading her current intelligence gathering and surveillance activities in Kenya to an overseas base.

Recommendations for both Governments

According to study findings, Kenya and Israel face terrorism as a major threat on their national security. Moreover, the two states face a mutual challenge arising from the need to balance between Israeli and Arab interests. The study submits two recommendations for both governments in light of these mutual issues.

First, on the issue of terrorism as a threat on the national security of both Kenya and Israel, both states should maintain the enhanced counter terrorism collaboration. Maintaining counter terrorism collaboration would enable both governments to suppress the threat. Kenya would continue to benefit from Israel's advanced counter terrorism techniques including the use of advanced weapons such as drones for border surveillance and hostage rescue operations. Israel would continue to benefit from collecting intelligence on terrorist activities particularly in Somalia and the Horn of Africa.

Second, on the issue of balancing between Israeli and Arab interests, the governments of both states should maintain neutrality in the conduct of their bilateral relations, to avoid jeopardizing relations with Arab states. Moreover, the study recommends the sustenance of friendly relations between Kenya and Arab States and encourages development of friendly Israel-Arab relations, for the ultimate international cooperation and benefit for Kenya, Israel and the Arab states.

5.5 Suggestions for Further Research

The researcher identified areas in which further research may be done. First, although this study focused on assessing the influence of national interests on the bilateral relations between Kenya and Israel, other studies may focus on examining the impact of the Kenya-Israel bilateral relations on the national interests of the respective states. This would provide an opportunity to assess whether the bilateral relations are contributing to

the achievement of the national interests maintained by both Kenya and Israel. For instance studies may examine the impact of enhanced Kenya-Israel bilateral relations on Kenya's national security or the impact of enhanced Israel-Kenya bilateral relations on Israel's political interests. As enhancing bilateral relations between counterpart states requires resources such as money and personnel, examining the impact of enhanced bilateral relations on achievement of national resources would enable a state decide if enhancing relations is worthwhile or not.

Second, the scope of this study enveloped the influence of security, economic and political interests of both Kenya and Israel on the Kenya-Israel bilateral relations. However, further studies may interrogate other interests such as cultural interests or socio-economic interests and their influence or impact on the Kenya-Israel bilateral relations. This suggestion is critical to Kenya-Israel relations as Israel provides significant socio-economic assistance to Kenya. Studies may seek to enquire into how this assistance affects the Kenya-Israel bilateral relations and the impact if any. For instance, as Kenya is primarily an agriculture based economy, further studies may assess the impacts of Israel's technical aid in agriculture on the Kenya-Israel relations. Future studies may even inquire into the impacts of specific socio-economic projects funded by Israel such as the Galana-Kulalu Irrigation Scheme or the Kibwezi Irrigation Scheme.

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ANNEXES

ANNEX I: INTERVIEW GUIDE

University of Nairobi: Department of Political Science and Public Administration. Assessing the Influence of National Interest on Bilateral Relations between States: The Case of Kenya and Israel (2007-2017)

Interview Guide

My name is Wanjaiya W. Marion, a Master of Arts Student at the University of Nairobi in the Department of Political Science and Public Administration. As part of the requirements for the award of a Master's Degree in International Relations, I am conducting a study on "*Assessing the Influence of National Interests on Bilateral Relations between States: The Case of Kenya and Israel (2007-2017).*" I kindly request you for a brief interview to better understand Kenya-Israel bilateral relations. The information you provide will be treated with utmost confidentiality and strictly used for the purposes for which it is intended; research.

1. Kenya-Israel Bilateral Relations

A) When did Kenya and Israel begin bilateral relations? _____

B) What kind of bilateral relations do Kenya and Israel have? _____

C) What are the indicators that Kenya-Israel bilateral relations are taking place? _____

2.National Interest And Bilateral Relations

Kenya

A) What are Kenya's national interests? _____

B) Do you think Kenya's national interests motivate bilateral relations with Israel? _____

i) If yes, in what ways, in what areas and to what extent? _____

ii) If Kenya's national interests motivate bilateral relations with Israel, in what areas and to what extent during the period 2007 – 2017? _____

Israel

A) What are Israel's national interests? _____

B) Do you think Israel's national interests motivate bilateral relations with Kenya? _____

i) If yes, in what ways, in what areas and to what extent? _____

ii) If Israel's national interests motivate bilateral relations with Kenya, in what areas and to what extent during the period 2007 – 2017? _____

3. <u>Challenges of Kenya-Israel Bilateral Relations</u>

A) Are there any challenges Kenya and Israel face in the bilateral relations? _____

i) If yes, what are the challenges for Kenya? _____

ii) If yes, what are the challenges for Israel? _____

iii) What should be done to address these challenges? _____

4. <u>Recommendations</u>

A) In your view, what should be done to enhance Kenya-Israel bilateral relations? _____

B) Any other suggestions or comments? _____

Source: *Information Cradle, 2014*

Map of Israel

Source: Wellmake, 2016