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THE INVISIBLE POWER OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND ITS PARADOXES

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ABSTRACT

Liberal democracy ought to be a polycracy that safeguards the civil liberty of the people from states' mastery. In a free democratic, judgements of the majority imparts on predominant regions of states' assertive theme to the restrictions that the state's policies and decisions do not violate freedoms and rights as set out in the constitution. As a result of the antagonism, to many theorists and policy makers it appeared that liberal democracy as stipulated above is the best form of governance. Theoreticians supported their positions in various ways. It is the presumption in this study that it is indeed the best socio-political regime. Many developing countries including Kenya opted for this socio-political regime however, it is not clear whether the essentials of the regime have been established together with its paradoxes. There is moreover a challenge that the paradoxes pose.

The research is library based and has greatly relied on texts, books and scholarly articles. In the research we found out that paradoxes arises out of conditions that key antiauthoritarian pledges are accomplished nonetheless, jeopardized by self-internal contradictions or by other social and economic proclivities. Democracy as a political order has a number of its principles such as liberty that are paradoxical.

In chapter one, the study centers on chronicles of liberal democracy within Kenya and particular constitutional and institutional changes that have been done.

Chapter two of the research focuses on how some underlying democratic principles turn out to be paradoxical. These paradoxes impact negatively on the quality of a democracy in any given state. The research therefore acknowledges the insufficiency that lie within the democratic principles.

In chapter three, the focus is on three social factors of class, ethnicity and patronage and how they are potential threats to the functionality of a true democracy without incorporation of the human positive factors.

Chapter four outlines the human positive factors and how they impact on the human development which then plays out at establishing the quality of a democracy in a country. This is because, the research found out that for the success of a democracy, organizational and institutional changes alone are not sufficient. Organizations and institutions comprises human and material resources. The human resources of an agency is responsible for the transforming or conversion of the material resources of an institution in complete or fusible outputs and it is the human resources that can see the failure of an institution role so that it is not about the resources available but the moral ability that uttermost defines the human character.

The research therefore recommends that a "true democracy" demands a modicum model of existing, that in return demands a modicum degree of growth. This development that is required is not only economic and social but human development as well.

Human development and growth forms the basic foundation on which all the four principles rests. So that without proper human development, then the basic principles could not be essential because it will be impossible to achieve any democratic state.

CHAPTER ONE

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

1.0. Background of the Study

After gaining independence from the British, Kenya has undergone various political transitions. The second leadership change occurred in 1978, when former president Daniel Arap Moi took the state's leadership after the first president Jomo Kenyatta passed on. Jomo Kenyatta had donned the state's leadership since self-rule in the year 1963. Kenyan government was very dictatorial prior 1980s and 1990s. The dictatorship policies and laws saw many courageous political activists who were critical of the government harassed, jailed while others fled into exile. An attempted coup de tat by a section the Kenyan air force 1982 was quashed and its suspected perpetrators court-marshaled. In the same year of the coup de tat, the constitution was amended to turn Kenya legally one party state from the de facto status. This was largely an attempt to neuter the rising anti-establishment ideology driven by opposition leaders.

During the twenty- four years of Daniel Arap Moi's reign, Kenya's system of governance was completely centralized, autocratic, and personalized. The constitution amendment that turned Kenya a legally one state party plunged the country into its darkest moments. In the early 70s and 80s, Kenyan elections were sham and marred by a number of malpractices. The sham elections were as a result of a number of voting irregularities.

The stifling political environment provoked struggle for legalization of multi-partism which eventually was allowed in 1991. Also included in the amendments was the limitation of the president's terms to two. Then, Kenya joined other many nations that had officially adopted liberal democratic form of governance. Despite this adoption Kenya still struggles to attain democratic potentials. The aspects of constitutionalism, liberalism and democracy have been undertaken, but they have also been threatened since amendment of the de jure party status. After the initialization of multi-partism in 1991, Kenya then started to move towards what could be considered a democratic state. Many stakeholders within the country began a push for drafting a new constitution that would propel it towards the realization of a liberal society.

In September 2002, Kenya had a draft constitution which aimed at restoring political stability and authenticity. The draft constitution aimed at creating a new system of governance that could be accountable to its citizens through the balance of powers.

The impetus of that provision was the view that greatest obstacle to establishing authentic and accountable system of governance was as a result of power imbalance. For the twenty four years in government Daniel Arap Moi has concentrated too much power to the executive. He had successfully established a dictatorial system of governance through myriad amendments in 1969, 1978, and 1992. The nation's public institutions were made answerable to the executive, rather than to the Kenyan citizens who had delegated power by electing those who they wanted to represent them. The constitutional amendments gave the president wide-ranging powers and was ill-suited to multiparty politics.

Following violence outbreak in 2007 after the disputed general elections, Kenya under a team of mediators, Kofi Annan and President Kufuor of Ghana pushed for a renewed constitutional review. The recommendations for a constitutional review were made after National Dialogue and reconciliation process had been completed in February 2008. The mediation team also recommended for a formation of coalition government to enhance national unity and to reinforce national reforms. One key agenda of the mediation team was to initiate and complete both constitutional and institutional changes.

The considerations of agenda 4 led to the formulations and promulgation of constitution 2010. The essence of the 2010 constitution was to address one, the sovereignty of the people and supremacy of the constitution. Given that democracy rests on the authority and choice of a people, the celebrated constitution was meant to address the past injustices that had been committed by the state to its people. The supremacy of the constitution was spelled down in the rule of law. That a country had a specified set of rules that it should operate on. This then ensured equality, freedom and liberty of all citizens

Two, the 2010 constitution stipulated the roles of the legislature and the executive. In doing so, it ensured that there were minimal cases of dictatorial kind of governance that the country had risked falling into. In outlining the roles of the president and his deputy, the Kenyan constitution looked aimed at limiting the excessive power that initially the president had. The legislature was also freed from manipulation by the state by outlining its roles, authority and limits.

Three, citizenship. The constitution was to clarify on the entitlement of citizens, retention and acquisition of citizenship and revocation of citizenship. This was a result of a number of citizens that were forced into exile because of their criticism of the state and its dictatorial operations in the early 70s. This was in line with the bill of rights that outlined the rights of each person. It ensured a number of fundamental rights and freedom, its application, realization and compliance of these statutes. This then allowed the creation of various institutions that would help realize the concepts of equality, human dignity, privacy and freedom.

Four, the constant change of leadership through elections that forms the backbone of democracy then drove the 2010 constitution into addressing the fundamental aspect of representation of the people. The representation of a people involved the electoral system and its process, legislation on election, basic requirements for political parties and the electoral body its delimitation of electoral units. This was due to the sham elections and many of the election irregularities that the country had experienced under the past regime which led to violence.

Five, in choosing a devolved system of governance, the 2010 constitution set out to attain and promote regional balance in the country. Regional balance in the long run would then propel the country into attaining equality of all citizens.

1.1. Statement of Research Problem

After all chronicled constitutional and institutional reforms, Kenya is still struggling to realize the benefits of liberal democracy. The country still experiences political and economic instabilities that were often experienced in the early 70's and late 80's that arose due to poor systems of governance and political betrayals.

In the available scholarly literature on democracy there is a general consensus that for liberal democracy to be functional and provide dividends to citizens it might be that certain key aspects and conditions must be in place and potent. Despite the agreement that democracy is a good political system, there are still practices that make democratic practice fail as a paradigm of good governance. So far, it is not clear what aspects and conditions are necessary and sufficient for liberal democracy and its attendant socio-economic mode to thrive. An immediate problem is however associated with the social factors and the core human values that in the end help in shaping human person.

This translates into the question of what could be the other essential aspects that could be needed so as to obtain ideal democracy.

1.2. Objective of the study

The overall goal of the study is to undertake philosophical reflection with a view to providing insights on how some of the essential aspects of liberal democracy are paradoxes which then undermines it as a political order. Consequently, the following are my specific objectives:

1. To identify ethical paradoxes of liberal democracy.
2. To investigate the extent of social factors in undermining a political order.
3. To explicate the other various aspects that are essential for the realization of a liberal democracy.

1.3. Study Questions

- I. Is Kenya's failure to attain optimal democracy the outcome of inadequate establishment of essential aspects of liberal democracy?
- II. In what ways do the paradoxes of liberal democracy play out in Kenya?
- III. How can the impact of paradoxes be blunted/minimized in the democratic processes and institutions in Kenya?

1.4. Justification and Significance of the Study

The study is justified on the following four grounds:

A belief that good governance as a value is sought by every society. The case for democracy as a form of governance that sought out to represent the interests and protect the rights of every citizen in a political community therefore deserves special attention.

Since democracy has its authority and credibility rooted in the people, the citizens in a democratic nation have then to commit themselves by participating in public matters. It is from participation that the citizens get to freely elect those they wish to rule on their behalf. The right to participation is a right onto which all other rights could be anchored in a democracy. In choosing their leaders the citizens will be demonstrating their ultimate powers.

In order to develop a theory likely to inform a democratic form of governance it is important that we understand the various aspects regarding the social being of the human person. The human development then becomes a crucial aspect in the formation, thriving and survival of any form of governance. The understanding of the paradoxes of liberal democracy and the social aspects of liberal democracy will be essential to the realization of good governance. Democracy having been put forward as the best form of governance, the study will seek to outline the paradoxes and the contradictions that underlie the concept of liberal democracy and outline the possible essential aspects that are needed for democracy to deliver.

1.5. Scope and Limitation of the study

The question of democracy and its failures can be approached from a wide variety of standpoints- sociological, political, anthropological, historical, legal and philosophical among others.

It is therefore crucial to bear in mind that this research examines the concept of liberal democracy in democratic theory and practice. The research therefore, has been restricted to pure conceptual analysis of theories encountered during the research in the domain of political philosophy. The research has analyzed what Liberal Democracy means, concentrating on the conceptions shared by specific ruminative principles and constitutional process that emerged in the Enlightenment period. Liberalism as a concept has also been analyzed.

The research however, does not get into general considerations of the nature of democratic governments, or the empirical issues of how such governments work. The major text forms the basis of this study is Cultural Hegemony by Antonio Gramsci and Democratic Theory and Practice by Gitonga and Oyugi.

In my view, the texts referred to make the best attempts so far, at explaining the failures of liberal democracy in Kenya.

1.7. Methodology

In its quest for a rationale set of principles, values and of character to serve as a basis for attaining ideal democracy, the study has employed two methods of inquiry, namely, description and philosophical reflection. The study has anchored on conceptual analysis. Consequently the

study has been undertaken through library research. To this end, books, scholarly journal, articles, internet sources, unpublished dissertations have been consulted since the nature of the research demanded analysis and interpretation of concepts presented in these materials.

1.8 Literature Review

1.8.1 Introduction

Democracy has become the most appealing form of government in the modern age. Plato and Aristotle had refuted it largely as unworkable form of rule that complied fully with their metaphysical elaboration of man and reality. Aristotle did support what we can now call modified democracy- a balance between democracy and oligarchy.

In the modern times, subscribing to democracy has had a number of conflicting positions. It may indicate a source of respect, a reflection of good and sound reasoning that ultimately shows respect for human beings by valuing their dignity and rights.

The quest for democracy gathered momentum in the enlightenment period. As a political authority, democracy had two assumptions: first, that no person was regarded to be naturally superior to another. The equality principle then implied that any forms of authority relations needed justification. The equality principle implied that all the citizens ought to enjoy equal rights of social and political life. Secondly, democracy entrusted the ultimate powers to the people. The people were regarded as the final repository of social and political life. Therefore, all the leadership of a democratic state remained accountable to the people. But this still left it open, because the peoples roles in government were to be clearly outlined. Should the people be directly involved in legislating, or should they only participate in the choosing of their representatives who then would wield authority on their behalf.

1.8.2. Democracy in Ancient Greek

Cleisthenes, one of the ancient Greece leaders introduced a political system that was deemed for political and social reforms in Athens. Cleisthenes called this form of political authority demokratia which meant 'rule by the people.' In establishing democracy, Cleisthenes anchored the new political order on three basic institutions. The institutions were to aid the successful run of this political order. The first institution was called the ekklesia. This institution comprised the sovereign governing body which was mandated to dictate foreign policies and the writing of the

laws of the land. The boule was the second institution which was comprised of a council of representatives from the Athenian tribes. Dikasteria was the third institution. It comprised the public tribunals where the people alleged lawsuits. The dikasteria was controlled by a group of jurors who were selected from the citizens. The selection of the jurors was done by lottery.

However, despite democracy having established itself as the most admirable and enduring forms of political orders, it only survived for two centuries in ancient Greece.

1.8.2.1. Demokratia and the Demos

Herodotus, one of the Greek historian regarded a democracy as a political system that is committed to upholding virtues and promoting equality of all before the law. This was in line with Cleisthenes line of thought in the conception of a democracy. He sought out to abolish the political distinctions that had been established in Athens. For a long while, the aristocrats had managed to monopolize political and social decision making process. The Athenian society had major social imbalance which often times played out and impacted on social and political decisions. It is this imbalance that Cleisthenes seek to abolish.

However, the kind of equality Herodotus sought to establish was a limited equality. He proposed a new form of equality which would be restricted to a minority division of the Athenian citizenry.

1.8.2.2. The Ekklesia

The ekklesia comprised of the sovereign governing body which was mandated to dictate foreign policies and the writing of the laws of the land. The institution was open to any members of the male adults in Athens. All the male members were welcomed to attend all the meeting which were held 40 times in a year. However, not all the male attended the sessions and this was because other male members were needed to serve in the military or work to sustain their households. The ekklesia was mandate to make decisions regarding external wars and establishment of foreign policies. The assembly was also tasked to write and revise the laws of the land.

In writing and revising laws, the assembly also adopted or convicted the behavior of state employees. If found to have breached the foreign policies or the laws of the land, ekklesia would issues punishments which included expulsion from the Athenian city. Usually, the expulsion

could last for as long as 10 years. In making its decisions, the ekklesia relied on the majority rule, decisions were made by the majority rule.

1.8.2.3. The Boule

Boule or the council was the second most influential institution in the Athenian democracy. The boule was made up of a group of about 500 men that represented the 50 tribes of Athens. The members of the council were mandated to work for up to a period of one year. The boule meetings were held each day as it worked hand in hand with the government. The council had a role of supervising all government officials. The council was equally mandated to monitor the marine ships and the military horses.

In working hand in hand with the government, the boule also dealt with foreign representatives and ambassadors that visited Athens. However, the primary function of the council was to make resolutions on matters that were crucial and therefore needed to come before the ekklesia. This ultimately implied that the council and its members dictated how the entire operations of governorship would operate.

In order to ensure a smooth run and practice of democracy, these positions were chosen by lottery. The lottery selection for the boule members was to ensure that the selection was more random and democratic. Lottery was fully dependent on luck and pure chance, there was no possibility of bribery and influence by the elites in monetary or ethnic squares that would mobilize the masses. The selection system of the lottery was also advanced in attempts to block any permanent establishment of the council members. This was because any permanent establishment of the council members would severely work against the Athenian people who had historically been discriminated against by the aristocrats. However, it is still thought that the selection into the boule was never entirely dependent on pure luck and chance of the lottery. The rich men of Athens were found to be serving in the boule more frequently than it would have happened if the lottery process was never manipulated.

1.8.2.4. The Dikasteria

The courts or the dikasteria was the third democratic institution that was established by Cleisthenes. For the courts to run, 500 jurors were hired from the male citizens. However, not all men qualified because the courts required men who were older than 30 to serve. The jurors were hired on a daily basis and the age factor was to play part or impact on the crucial decisions that were to be made by the courts. Aristotle, from the three established democratic institution believed that the dikasteria contributed the most strength and crucial support to democracy. Aristotle observes this because of the almost unlimited powers that the jury had.

For a very long while there were no established body of council which was mandated to represent the civil servants of the Athenian government. The people therefore were tasked to bring court cases. The jury then listened to their proceedings, alleged for litigation, the advocacy, and finally tasked to pass resolutions. Judgments were then decided on by majority rule.

In its attempt to bring about fairness and justice, the Jurymen were remunerated for their duties. This helped in ensuring that they remained open and accessible by everyone in society and not just to the wealthy men and women. The jurors' wage however was gathered through custom duties and other states' contributions from all the allies. This was the case because the Athenian citizens were never mandated to paying tax to the state.

1.8.3. The End of Athenian Democracy

The reigning period of General Pericles in the 460 B.C saw Athens establish another kind of political authority. The new political authority was attributed to what Herodotus had proposed as 'the one man' or 'the best man.' However, the decline of the democratic principles and values didn't affect the influential effect of the democratic rule throughout the globe.

1.8.4. The Conception of Liberal Democracy

Having established itself as one of the most successful political authorities in the world, liberalism can be difficult to pin down. This is because in establishing itself out, democracy has several distinct streams of thought within it. However, Liberal democracy traces its conception to the 18th century European struggle, the enlightenment period. During this period, many of the European states were considered monarchies and they were run by the monarchs or the aristocracy. The monarchs and the aristocrats were regarded as undisputed leadership. The political actors were said to have been either appointed or anointed by God or they were from the elite and royal families.

Because of the doubts about the successful establishment and survival of democracy, many of the political theorists never gave it a thought. It was widely believed that democracy would be inherently unstable and chaotic. This was because of the values and principles it sought to establish in democratic states. The projected chaos of democratic policies were attributed to the changing whims and the beliefs that had been held for decades. Man for a long time in history had manifested a strong desire and need for change in society. It was additionally considered that constitutional rule was opposed to humanity. For a very long time, human beings had been thought to be inherently evil and violent. This then implied that they needed strong leaders who had the capacity to restrain their deductive impulses.

The need for strong leaders who would tame and restrain the deductive impulses explains why the Monarchs thought that their leadership was established by God.

European Royals maintained that their authority had been destined by the Divinity. These Monarchs believed to be different from other people. The supremacy principle therefore meant that doubting their entitlement to govern was identical to impiety. However, in the later periods such customary ideas were contested. A clique of young thinkers and the Enlightenment intellectuals chose to challenge the long held belief of other citizens regarding themselves as superior to others. The Enlightenment intellectuals believed that all of the human affair needed to be guided by reason. However, they strongly believed that the principles of liberty and equality were to be applied equally. In the 18th century, these ideas of liberty and equality inspired revolutions in some parts of the European nations. The American and French upheavals later

gave birth to the ideology of liberality. The birth of liberality initiated several types of regimes that primarily sought to implement the philosophy of equality and liberty for all citizens.

Liberals believed in individual freedom and liberty as key fundamental value in a democracy. However there is need to tame individual's freedom when it clashes with other democratic values and principles. Liberalism was driven by the presumption that freedom is a good thing, this then meant that there is need to justify any forms of restrictions and limitations. Liberalism sort to distance itself from the limited liberty that had been instituted by the Monarchs without any rational justifications. The metaphysical definition of leadership was also abandoned.

The development of modern democracy saw America and France develop and establish themselves out as the most industrialized nations. The two European giant states also established themselves out as having the dominant political authorities in the twentieth century. Until 2008, there are barely three political authorities that by no means determine themselves in their formal statutory awareness as democracies.

Huntington (1991; 1997) draws tripartite historic lengthy tides of democracy. The initial tide is said to have commenced in the initial half of the nineteenth century. In this first period democratic states are said to have passed on all the powers and authority to the people. The people were regarded as the power holders because they were to choose on their leadership. They had the right to choose and replace their representative.

The second wave is said to have established out following the Second World War which lasted between the 1960s through to 1970s. The third and final democratic wave rose due to the expansion of democracy as the political authority in Latin America and the post-Communist states in Europe (McFaul, 2002). These three democratic waves outlines the different stages that democracy has undergone in realizing the different potentials that lie within the democratic principles of liberty and equality.

Oyugi points out that many of the African states, despite having adopted democracy as a form of governance still remain undemocratic. He points out at various literature sources that have been

asserted by political anthropologists. It was established that the many concerns of undemocratic attitude in African states was as a result of the post-colonial event.

This view held that, the pre-colonial African countries were in most cases open and participatory. So that leadership in the African states could be said to have been democratic to some extent. He observes that decisions in African states were often established on common accord. The interest always being the welfare of the public. That in cases where there was a conflict of interest between an individual and the community, the community took precedence. However, Oyugi notes that there are exceptions. The exception could be drawn from those states that had stratified socio-political systems. This was because the stratified socio-political regimes had a rigid structure of authority. In these societies, Oyugi states that a number of factors had to be put in consideration before a decision is reached. Simply put, Oyugi indicates that the bureaucratization of the socio-political life had negatively acted on democratic behavior. The structured system only worked on undermining democracy. (Oyugi, 1997: 44)

There was idea that pre-colonial Africa were by and large democratic and in this sense that the common citizens had a say in their governance is questioned by Vincent Simiyu. Drawing his examples from Central Africa, Simiyu points out that to a larger extent, there were no forms of democracy in traditional African societies. However, Vincent Simiyu observes that democratic problems were accentuated in the stratified centralized polities. He also points out on how democracy tended to act against openness and political participation of all the citizens in a country.

So that instead of inheriting and fostering the multiparty systems, many states still introduced practices that made it hard for opposition parties to operate freely. The political unity was only possible and existent within a one party system. (Simiyu, 1997: 54)

In his analysis of what would be the reasons for the failure of many African states in attaining optimal level of democracy, Oyugi points out at the bureaucratization of the socio-political life which still leaves many African states undemocratic. Even after the adoption of democracy many states still ensured that there was limited or no space for the opposition parties to exist. He however does not tell us why this remained to be the case. He does not look at how the social

factors would have led to many states being undemocratic, this is because the social factors will eventually define how a human person develops.

Fukuyama's last man standing notion attracts certain plausibility. Fukuyama (1989) speaks of equality and inequality also of "moral qualities". He concedes that in history, democracy has shown both strength and weakness. Democratic strength can be said to have been established and realized in the fundamental principles and values of freedom and liberty. However, liberal democracy has shown weaknesses concerning the principle of equality. According to Malouta, the democratic constraints of liberal democracy could be traced in what he calls the equality principle. The equality principle constituted the gender democracy, economic, socio-economic sustainability, and environmental responsibility (Pantelidou-Malouta, 2006).

In his works, Fukuyama acknowledges that Liberal Democracy is the last man standing. Fukuyama reaches this conclusion after the study and analysis of the events of history: "The state that emerges at the end of history is liberal insofar as it recognizes and protects through a system of laws man's universal right to freedom, and democratic insofar as it exists only with the consent of the governed" (Fukuyama 1992, 20).

Fukuyama also acknowledges that as much as liberal democracy forms the ideal state of government, it has internal contradictions that clearly undermine its very concept of liberalism. *The Last Man Standing*, draws a central concern on whether liberal democracy is a prey to serious contradictions that can internally be traced. Fukuyama outlines that these contradictions within liberal democracy are so radical and serious that they ultimately play out in undermining it as a socio-political authority. Fukuyama is therefore concerned and fears for the human history. This is after he observed that the human history was moving towards an idealized state via the democratic mechanisms.

In establishing accountability and transparency, democracy demands that the citizens must be full informed by the states agencies and their various institutions. In archiving the demand of accountability and transparency, communication in any of the democratic states takes the central stage. Communication becomes the central objective to all the political actors. They perfect on

the communication skills which has them set for the ballot box rather than archiving the democratic demands of accountability and transparency of the states' agencies.

This objective of accountability that is reached at by communication brings about what is known as the 'political communications paradox'. The political communication paradox comes about when the citizens in fulfilling the democratic values and principles require that the political actors be honest and accountable to them. However, instead of wanting to fulfill this demand, the politicians (and their proxies), implicitly have another agenda in operation when they communicate with the public. They communicate with an aim of securing their approval and consequently an attempt to win the electorate support. These agendas held by the political actors' leads to communications that are produced in attempt to appeal and achieve positive impact rather than to establish the public enlightenment. Communications made on such grounds over time, leads to erosion of various democratic values and this ultimately makes one of the democratic pillars (accountability and transparency) of no value.

A call to accountability and transparency paradoxically appear to have two effects: the first effect is where the states' institutions and agencies will appear to make communications, rather than delivery, their real priority. The second effect is that trust in politicians and political systems will often times appear to wane and if this is the case political apathy is bound to arise and become widespread. Both effects could endanger liberal democracy and yet they are outcomes of aspects that are supposed to strengthen this model of democracy. The question is do these aspects feature in the political processes of Kenya and if so, how do they exactly play out?

In his analysis of liberal democracy as the last man standing, Fukuyama draws the concept of paradox as what undermines the ideal state of liberal democracy. He however does not address how the various aspects of socialization that could possibly play out in undermining the survival and sustenance of liberal democracy in a society.

Gitonga outlines three foundations of democracy without which democracy would not be able to be realized or sustained over time.

The infrastructure of democracy forming the first foundation where he addresses the governability aspect of a people. The governability aspect becomes very crucial in Gitonga's

analysis because the citizens are considered as the backbone of any democratic form of political authority.

The governed have to be healthy and sound both in mind and body. Every aspect within the social and material welfare that contributed in the positive development of an individual was regarded as essential. This is because the material and social welfare made it easier for any governments to establish out and govern the citizens.

The other level at which democracy needs to be anchored is the institutional technostructure of the society. This refers to the structural and functional arrangements of the governmental apparatus and processes. It questions the adapted mechanisms of the government in terms of their objective value as promoters of the ambitions of the democratic ideal.

Gitonga points out that failure to establish proper institutions would lead to poor governance. He clearly points out that democracy can be defeated on technicalities just as certain technical arrangements can make it more difficult to undermine.

In establishing a practical democracy Gitonga points out at principles that would help structure the technostructure. Among these are one, the openness of the systems which refers to primarily the degree of freedom that the participants enjoy in making contributions to the operations of the democratic political system. For a democracy to reach its optimal level the people must be as free as possible in the choice of their representatives: two, the simplicity of the operational mechanisms which refers to elections being as direct as possible and three the clarity of the institutional role structure.

Under the superstructure foundation, Gitonga indicates that democratic behavior cannot be generically conditioned nor can it be an inherited faculty. Democratic behavior however could be acquired through formal and informal learning. The practice of democracy should then be taught to its practitioners. This is fully embedded in what he refers to as the cultural patrimony. Culture in this context referred to what the people learn within and without the relation contexts of social and the material world.

It also has to outline how knowledge is acquired. In this regard learning has to be descriptive of what is excellent, atrocious, and beneficial, action ought to be taken and how it ought to be done.

Gitonga emphatically believes that this training or culture is what will shape values, attitudes, beliefs and habits of persons and social communities in a society. Consequently it has to find its structures on the basis of conduct and behavior of the community. It is because of it that persons and groups understand to identify, admit and regard conventional social agencies and activities. The super structural foundations of a democracy are therefore to be found in the values, beliefs and attitudes of the people.

Robert Dahl, scrutinizes popular political order. He then sort to evaluate if the contestation that are in support of it are actually, precise. In setting out democracy's benefits and problem Dhal focuses his analysis on what he calls the political system. He sets out to establish whether it is actually a worthwhile political system. Dhal quickly focuses his analysis to the many established states which are said to be democratic but fail to practically practice any of the democratic values and principles.

However, Dahl is not only concerned in disclosing uneasy facts that lie within the very principles of democracy. He sets on going further into creating different sets of norms through which we can all determine if a country is truly democratic or not.

Dahl's proof guides him to deduce; that there are some criterion that should be met for a political system to be deemed genuinely democratic. The first criteria is that every elected officers command decision-making; two is that there are open and just elections of leaders which are periodically held; three, people ought to have a right to vote; four, is that everyone has the right to run for public office; there should be total freedom of speech; substitutive information; and that the people can form open, autonomous socio-political groups.

In his conceptual on the merits and failures of democracy, Robert Dahl equally does not set his analysis into investigating the social factors and their effects to the development of a human person and which consequently contributes in the making of the foundation of various political orders.

Campbell, in his analysis on identifying a democratic state and in ranking of the best democracy, he observes that there are several crucial and fundamental principles that have to be in place: quality of

Democracy = (freedom + other characteristics of the political system) + (performance of the non-Political dimensions) (Campbell, 2008, p.3)

Campbell clearly indicates that in finding out the quality of democracy there are a number of factors that have to play out. The political systems, freedom and the non-political extents that could comprise the media, religion and the schools play out a big role in a democratic setup. The non-political extents like the other arms of the government, should have little control from the state and remain independent at all costs.

He, however doesn't look at the social factors that would help in the development of a human person because in addressing the non-political dimensions Campbell does not look at the human person development as such. His focuses on media, religion and the teaching institutions.

Antonio Gramsci, outlines what he calls the power of social change and the manufacture of consent by the ruling class. Gramsci saw the capitalist state as being made up of two overlapping spheres, the sphere of 'political society' (that rules through force) and the sphere of 'civil society' (that rules through consent). He contests that the formulations of civil societies as a public sphere that helped the trade unionists and politicians obtain privileges from the bourgeois nations. The civil societies also had the role of shaping ideas and beliefs that governed the public sphere. This meant that bourgeois 'hegemony' was replicated in traditional life within the media, school curriculums and the many religious institutions. The cultural hegemony was to 'fabricate approval and lawfulness (Heywood 1994: 100-101).'

Concretely, Gramsci sets out a clear insight on how power is established in the domain of thoughts and awareness by the political actors. The elite in society sort to express consent rather than force through the various channels at their disposal. The bourgeois have encouraged the use of clear schemes to challenge dominant standards of legality. This claims by Gramsci had far reaching political and social implications. He warned of a possible limited struggle for establishing immediate radical contests for the command of the medium of manufacture. Gramsci believed that this 'war of attack' may only thrive with a preceding 'war of position' in

the shape of combat through concepts and philosophies, to establish a new domination (Gramsci 1971). The thought of a 'counter-hegemonic' combat was to be bred and established within the cultures of formal and informal education. The establishment of the alternative ideas was to work against the leading thoughts of what is taken to be normal and legitimate. The struggle to change the dominant belief system created by the political elites has been sought out through history by various political theorists. The dominant beliefs have corrupted the society's cultures. Additionally, it has imparted to the thought that 'expertise' is a social fabricate that helps to authenticate social constructions (Heywood 1994: 101).

Gramsci in his analysis on how the dominant groups seek to keep and maintain the socio-political structures by consent looks at how the social world and political worlds are defined and shaped by the political elites. It is through this very aspect of the consent that the dominant class seek to define the social and political structures that aims at preserving power. However, Gramsci does not get into the analysis of the human development.

As the sampled literature reveals there is still a wide gap in the democratic discourse on what are the effects of the social factors that are very key in the human development which then is fundamental for any political order. This project has therefore attempted to address this problem with a purpose of working out for the possibility of a well ordered society.

1.9 Theoretical Framework

1.9.1. Introduction

This research uses two theories, namely the human perspective theory and virtue ethics. The use of the two perspective theories is informed by the evaluation that certain aspects of society are not precisely captured by the human factor perspective. The two theories are useful to this research endeavor because although the human factor perspective advances a very significant thesis, it does not exhaustively expound certain aspects of human beings and societies that are crucial to optimization of nation-state choices. These include ethical values, norms, virtues and the personality aspects, which are well articulated by virtue ethics. In order to determine if the paradoxes of liberal democracy can be resolved or diminished, consideration of socialization is vital.

1.9.2. The Human Factor Perspective Theory

The HF perspective as advanced by Adjibolosoo contests that the principal cause for the breakdown of economic, social and political growth possibilities in many African states is due to absence of proper HF (Human factor). The human factor perspective was advanced by Adjibolosoo in attempt to accounting for the many economic, social and political failures in African states. Adjibolosoo defines the HF as the 'range of individual features and diverse human proportions (including moral development) that enables political systems, economic and social agencies to operate efficiently and remain functional' (Adjibolosoo 1994:26).

Adjibolosoo (1995b) attributes the lack of sense of duty and liability in many of the African authority to what he calls the lack of appropriate HF. He observes that the absence of proper HF is largely as a result of unawareness and/or disregard on overall public. He therefore indicates the need to developing an appropriate HF as the only way of removing these obstacles. Adjibolosoo points out at education as the only way to achieving this new kind of development. However, he notes that this education must go beyond the usual borders of educating masses how to simply interpret and record in foreign dialect. An appropriate education system was to be established, a system that would equip the masses with instruments which makes them subject on administration agencies and association. He observes the need to develop a different education system because what is required is an education that has the motive to instill in persons a feeling of personal realization, duty, liability and commitment to establishing their societies and states. The absence of commitment to the task of developing the African nations was as a result of the absence of features of duty and responsibilities in persons.

The leading exponent of this perspective, Adjibolosoo (iop.cit, 1994), establishes the HF as the 'scope of individual features and other extents of human efficiency that allows social, economic and political agencies to operate and remain operating.' This perspective identifies the human resource power as the most necessary of any country or society. However, only with the appropriate HF characteristics.

The human factor perspective acknowledges the role of natural resources, capital, technology and institutions in realizing any development process in society. However, these by themselves cannot bring about change without people with the appropriate personality characteristics to operate them

(Adjibolosoo, 1995b; Ofori-Amoah, 1996a). The HF in this case is beyond the person's resources acquired under education. The human factor would also include the spiritual, moral and aesthetic resources, along with personal aptitudes and prospective (Adjibolosoo, 1995b).

1.9.3. Virtue Ethics Theory

Virtue ethics is an extensive word for moral theories. In establishing virtue ethics theory, Aristotle sort out to establish a strong character personality with the qualities of correct character of mind and body. In establishing these personalities, virtue ethics builds from virtues. Virtue ethicists are therefore tasked with establishing how virtues are obtained, and applied in actual life contexts. Historically, the virtue ethicists have also been tasked in establishing whether the virtues are universally rooted in the human nature, or whether there is a possibility of tracing the virtues in the plurality of cultures.

In the history of philosophy, a virtue has generally meant the characteristic trait. It could refer to habitual actions or settled sentiments. Specifically, a virtue has to imply the positive traits that will describe its possessor as a good human being. It therefore has a strong line of distinction from single actions or feelings.

Virtue ethics finds its traces in ancient Greece. It was first established by Socrates. It was afterwards advanced by Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics philosophers. It refers to a set of normative ethical teachings which aimed at placing an emphasis on being rather than doing. Morality in virtue ethics has its foundations on the identity of individuals' character rather than his actions and consequences.

In moral philosophy, virtue ethics has three main branches; Eudemonism, agent-based theories, and the ethics of care. Eudemonia is a term that was advanced by Aristotle, term that could be simply translated as happiness. It bases virtues under situations where human person flourishes.

Eudemonia equates human flourishing aspects to performing one's functions well. In advancing human flourishing, eudemonia puts much emphasis on happiness and the well-being of individuals as the chief good for every man. True happiness however, is thought to constitute a state of mind which is achieved by performing virtuous actions.

Socrates and Aristotle thought that human beings wanted eudemonia more than anything else and so man's primary role was the search of happiness. The Stoics believe that eudemonia was the highest good but on reaching the highest good, virtue was key.

In addressing human action, Aristotle recognizes that human actions always have an aim. This is because from our actions different aim could be drawn. Every action aims at achieving some good. Furthermore, Aristotle points out that some things are done so as to achieve a hidden motive (means to others) while some things are often done for their own sake. There are never hidden ulterior motives (ends in themselves).

Agent founded virtue is other branch of virtue ethics. As per agent founded ethics, the moral standing of an actions maybe be drawn within two strings: primarily, the first one is wholly reliant upon the moral condition of agent. Therefore, the motive and the character qualities of an agent would ascertain the moral standing of any action. The agent based theory was phrased by Michael Slote. It has an outstanding emphasis on the maturation of common-sense and the intuitions of character that are virtually excellent.

A third classification of virtue ethics is ethics of care. Ethics of care is another impressive edition which was drafted by feminist authors. Annette Baier is one of the famous feminists who led the development of ethics of care. This account of ethics was stimulated by the masculine thought of numerous societies. In numerous societies, it was alleged that there were numerous terms which were wholly described in a masculine phraseologies, terms such as justice and liberty. Nonetheless, the feminists noted some of the feminine phrases which then constituted the core ground in struggling for equality. A term such as caring was said to be wholly feminine.

These theory thus pointed out the demand for change. Ethics of care was thus invented to advocates for options in how we view morality and the virtues. The feminists called on societies to be discreet to both the masculine and the feminine variations.

Aristotle draws a vital difference between the various classes or beings in the world. Aristotle retaliates that the distinctive feature of the human person is the capacity to reason and therefore the life worth living is one which is founded on right reason.

An agent-based theory stresses that virtues are decided by sensible insights that we as onlookers evaluate as excellent features in other persons.

Aristotle enlivens most of the virtue ethicists. They are motivated by Aristotle's deposition that a virtuous person is that person with excellent characteristic qualities. These qualities, Aristotle asserts are derived from natural intrinsic dispositions. Nonetheless, regardless of these qualities being natural they need to be nurtured and once established they become persistent.

Contrary to the deontological and consequentialist ethical theories, virtue ethics theories do not purpose predominantly to determine common standards which could be applicable in any moral condition. The virtue ethics theories deals with extensive inquiries; such as "How are we obligated live", "What is the good life" and "What embodies appropriate family and social values"

Over time, virtue ethics has been said to present a rather self-centered perception of what morality ought to be. This so, considering human thriving is considered an end in itself. The very emphasis on human thriving does not adequately examine the scope to which our actions could impact on other people. Virtue ethics has also been deemed unavailing given that it does not present guidelines on how we ought to act. It does not demonstrate apparent standards for steering operations apart from "act as a virtuous person would act considering the moral condition." Ultimately, virtue ethics does not endeavor to lay down the role of education, society, friends and family on shaping individuals quality.

From the three categories of virtue ethics, eudemonia ethics best suits this study because it highlights the components of virtue in character formation.

CHAPTER TWO

Capitalism and its effects on Liberal Democracy

2.1. Introduction

Across the previous two millennia, free trade (economic system) and democracy (political authority) have widely been adopted as the most successful systems. Nations that adopted liberal democracy as the political order have also settled on capitalism as their economic mode. However, strictly speaking Capitalism and democracy have indicated apply different logics to attain success: capitalism advances unequal distribution of property rights while besides it calls for equal civic and political rights; capitalism is also profit-oriented trade. This is another contrary logic, the hunt for the customary good within democratic struggles; in a democratic world it compromises debates and majority decision-making while the capitalistic world is characterized by hierarchic decision-making by managers and capital owners.

Throughout history free market and democracy have been said to be natural partners because of their economic and political success they carried. Nonetheless, in the recent past, contemporary politics have begun to doubt this long held assumption. Many of the contemporary political theorists sorts to find out in applying their principles, whether democracy and free trade are co-

actively congenial (Kocka 2014, Merkel 2014, Streeck 2015). Historically, a significant wellspring of anxiety between liberal democracy and free trade is the implications for democracy. That in applying the various principles of democracy they seem to be in contradiction with the capitalistic principles. The disquiet comprises three key elements:

1. Without significant regulatory policies and measures to be put in place, there are no clear ways or means under a free trade economy to stop the transformation of economic resources and power into political resources. By converting the capitalistic power into political strength a few economic elites in the capitalistic world would definitely influence the political system.

2. Concentrations of wealth has a number of implications in any open political state. This is because particular advantages will reflect in exercising influence. The advantages are reflected in the collective actions, whereby a few elites will constantly be spared because of their influence in society this then limits activities of other groups.

3. This economic effect will then be used to extricate political privileges. The influential men, the affluent and the elite' interests will overshadow the lower class citizens. This will further increase inequality and interfere with the market order. The interference will then lead to spiral growth of inequality and economic distortion.

Clearly, capitalism has the potential to undermine democracy if the essential human factors are not in place. The potential can directly correlative or as a consequence of violation of democratic principles. The various democratic institutions definitely require restrains- the absence of human restrains implies that there will be violation of these institution.

Capitalism over time has greatly affected the principle of equality that democracy holds. This is so because for anyone interested in taking up a political seat, he/she has to be financially stable. Candidates have to influence the campaigns by injecting lots of money to woo supporters to their side. Socioeconomic inequality that has been breed by capitalism has radically risen and converted forthwith into political inequality.

The clear cut of various classes in society has brought about division. So that the lower third of created societies silently opted to withdraw from political participation. This then has a negative political implication on any society because the preferences of the withdrawn class are less represented in parliament and government. The lower class citizens have been extensively manipulated by the most dominant classes in society which has frustrated their choices and decisions hence withdrawing. The ability of democratic governments to govern has been cut short by deregulated and globalized markets.

2.2. The Conception of Capitalistic mode of economy

In a capitalistic mode of economy, private stakeholders possess and manage assets in a tune with their benefits, demand and provision. These private actors also set prices in markets in ways that serves their interest and the interest of the society. One essential feature that sets the capitalistic actors apart is their motive to maximizing profits. In engaging in any economic transactions, clearly the parties involved have their own interests in the outcome. However, neither party can obtain their interests by not tackling what the other wants.

It is this logical self-interest that ultimately makes it possible for economic prosperity of the parties involved. This is because in market trade economy, capital means such as factories, mines, and railroads can be individually possessed and commanded. There is however a need to purchase labor for money or wages because profit accumulate to personal holders while the prices disperse capital and labor amidst two or several rival uses (“Supply and Demand” 2010). Today, the basis of all economies could be strongly attributed to capitalistic success. However, for much of the last century there has been significant change. This is due to the two primary approaches to socio-economic structure around the world. In socialism, the government possess the mediums of generation, and country-possessed corporates attempt to optimize social well-being instead of gains.

2.3. Pillars of capitalism

Capitalistic mode of economy has been anchored on the following three essential elements:

- **Private property**- here the economic actors are given the freedom to own tangible and intangible assets. They include land, residence and other immaterial properties which include reserves and securities.
- **Self-interest**- this pillar authenticates all economic actors into pursuing their own good without necessarily exerting any form of sociopolitical pressure on these actors.
- **Competition**- capitalism through its set firms, sets out liberty to all the economic actors to enter and exit markets. This then plays out as a joint welfare to both producers and the consumers in the economic world. (Baumol, Litan, and Schramm, 2007).

2.4. Types of capitalism

The primary variance in several types of free trade is found in the relation between the market and the states. Basically, the relationship between the state and the market leads us to three types of capitalism. These modes of capitalism that survived through this period can be understood as perfect models of economic mode. This is because of the count of delimiting components which could be lowered to the very fundamental ones. The tangible qualities of those individual features could also be described in a styled fashion that include:

Market-liberal capitalism: this type of capitalism was coined by the prevalent market principles that could be drawn in the correlation between contrasting companies. The market liberal economic mode was leading in Europe and North America in the nineteenth century. One major characteristic of the market-liberal capitalism is the limitation of the state institutions from interfering with the markets, economic and social policies. (Berend and Schubert 2007). In this market worlds, taxes rates and dissipation were low. The prosperousness of the state had merely occurred in an immature state.

Organized and embedded capitalism: After the realization of both technological and renovation eminence, there was need for capitalism to develop internal coordination and regulatory modes. This is because a lack of synchronized form of capitalism give rise to increasing social and

political tensions in society. Technological and innovation growth were the two driving forces behind a more systematic form of free trade.

Technological innovations were achieved in various facades: Huge enterprises started to find means of collaborating restricted rivalry. There were increased number of business operations that were formed by cartels. The merges and the associations aimed at retaining the resources and remaining as the dominant economic power.

There also arose need and ways to distinguish and represent ordinary interest of the society at large and not just the economic actors. Furthermore, in some existing states, there was change in the economy world. State institutions began to not only interfere in the economy and community by implementation of work legislations, particular grants, communization and growing order, as well as by establishing the wellbeing of the country and growing its social guidelines since the 1880s (Winkler 1974; Lash and Urry 1987).

Neoliberal capitalism: this type of capitalism stressed market operations/techniques and principles of capitalistic self-restrain and the bounds of country regulations. (Harvey 2007). Keynes's conception of controlling free trade over the command edge and Karl Polanyi's belief of a communally rooted free trade were substituted by that of Von Hayek and his awareness of the market as a natural demand, and by Milton Friedman's guarantee for a minimal state. Milton Friedman and Friedrich August advocate for an economic market where there was minimal or zero state interference. The proposed minimal interference was thought to give much growth and success of the capital market. States would ensure minimal interference according to August and Milton by ensuring a modest change in the supply of money.

Since then, there was a new conception version of the capital market. The new capitalistic era was characterized by isolationism, privatization and a minimal/partial deregulation of the state's fortune. Financial capitalism saw its growth both in size and influence increase globally. The success and dominance saw this form of economic market become extremely essential. However, socioeconomic inequalities within societies began to increase.

In the following section the focus of the research is on the compatibilities and incompatibilities in democratic and capitalism principles.

2.5. Compatibilities and incompatibilities

In their operations, capitalism and democracy are fundamentally different, the difference of logic in their operations has the potential to lead into a significant friction between the two. Democracy and capitalism have diverse assertions to finding legality and success: equal civic rights which is sort by the democratic principles and unequal distribution of property rights which is a result of the capitalistic operational pillars.

Within the claims to legitimacy, different procedures clearly prevail between capitalism and democracy: in the capitalistic world, profit-oriented trade brings about legitimacy while debates and majority rule will bring legitimacy in a democratic world. Clearly, capitalist activities aim at facilitating selfish seeking behaviours. There is a clear particularistic advantage that could be drawn. However, according to Adam Smith, such selfish actions are said to serve the common good of the society. This will then imply that capitalism and democracy have a common viable path because the consummation of the ordinary good is the purpose of a democracy. Nonetheless, in the capitalistic backdrop rivalry and concurrence of pluralist interest is only a posteriori consequence (Fraenkel 1974 [1964], p. 189).

In free trade, resolutions and their implementations will often lead to some extent of economic and social imbalance. In a democracy this is hardly acceptable. It is not tolerable since democracy is founded on tenets, these principles are fundamentally founded on equitable rights, chances and obligations. This is also in contradiction to capitalism where full solicitation of democratic action taking of equal involvement along with majority decisions and minority securities are dubious. Thus, there are clear contradictions which imply that free trade is not democratic and democracy is not capitalist.

However, in looking at the contradictions that are embedded between capitalism and democracy, two other aspects must be examined. The first aspect is the principal rule of liberal democracy. There is need to limit political decisions: by obtaining rudimentary rights by virtue of the

constitutions and the rule of law, and not minimal under the realization of the tenets that democratic decision making is a fundamental pointer component of the civil set up. Nonetheless, other partisan set ups should have the self-determination to work as per to contrasting rationale within the bodywork provided by a politically set and only democratically alter-able constitution (Walzer 1983; Luhmann 1984).

The second fundamental aspect is the realization that capitalism and democracy can undoubtedly fall out. The possibility of conflict can be drawn in the following two positions: in case the dispensation and use of property rights lead to an amassment of wealth large sufficient to hamper politics within free trade thrust, and if democratic resolutions are made to enormously damper attempts to utilize property rights. Evaluating the two opposed to each other, it is obviously clear that rights to wealth and the use of free trade will require to be restricted and controlled by democratic states. This is because it will threaten and overshadow the democratic values and principles which will negatively impact on democratic decisions in the political circle.

In its attempts to reach the hierarchy of validity, democratic rights has the possibility of claiming normative superiority on condition that it does not infringe human rights by abolishing property rights. It becomes necessarily indispensable to apogee specific relationship and congruencies within free trade and democracy. In capitalism fruition plays key role while in a democracy, electoral and decision making executes an indispensable role.

However, in principle, free trade and democracy share sweeping antagonists: the turbulent collection of state or economic ascendancy, disarray, uncertainty and bribery. Nonetheless, there is a principal imbalance: while specific fashion of free trade furnish and operate with an acute of property and resource, democracies cannot cohabit with an identical dread and engrossment of ascendancy. Eventually, there is a possibility of capitalism and democracy supporting each other. However, throughout history capitalism grapples without a commonly foreseeable state order, something rarely to be accomplished in the long run within democratic mediums. Communally rooted free trade on the other hand has the capacity to execute supportable development that for its part warrants and nourish democratic agencies.

2.6. Challenges for Democracy

After looking at the operational pillars of capitalism and democracy, it is clear that without clear restrictions there are potentials that lie within these two economic and political modes that will negatively impact on one another.

Capitalism, throughout history has proven as one of the successful economic mode. However, its prosperity and ascendancy in the twentieth century was not out of mastery logical coexistence with the democratic essentials. Its success has clearly been due to its preparedness to disconnect itself from communal and restricting structures that are confirmed by democratic essentials and desirability. Out of the political aid of democratic administration, capitalism directed to disconnect itself from considerable communal and political liabilities.

However, the 2008 economic upheaval demonstrated that capitalism mastery comes with the danger of self-destruction. The increased “denationalization” (Zürn 1998) of the economy and political resolutions had one main effect. It steered the increased numbers of socioeconomic inequalities thereby initiating contrasting categories of classes in society. Adoption of capitalistic mode of economy which led to socioeconomic inequality has primarily weakened two basic tenets of democracy:

1. In societies, interior democratic principles that are influential and which carry crucial political decisions are left to a few who are validated by the democratic mechanisms and as outlined in the constitution.
2. There has been unequal distribution of socioeconomic resources in the state. This in turn negatively impacts on the essence of political impartiality that is strongly approved by democracy. However, the diluted essence of political impartiality is greatly felt by the lower societal classes.

Recent study has indicated that economic inequality that arises due to capitalistic principles has reached levels that led to the World War One (Piketty 2014). As time goes by financial imbalance slowly construe into social and then expeditiously into political imbalance. In history, many theorists have drawn relationships that are necessarily connected to bring about socioeconomic goods and their metamorphosis into intellectual agency that carries bureaucratic leverage. It already turns evident in the milieu of the minimal demanding alacrity of political

involvement, specifically public electoral. The election turnout has considerably dwindle across the globe. This is because of the socioeconomic imbalance that have dissect societies into halves.

Prevalent poll in which only 50% (or even less) of the electorate take part are paradoxical. The plain concurrence for and constitute of the elected inferior to those delegates that were elected in ballots with a turnout of 70 or 80%. Despite this significant difference between those who turnout for polls and who don't, democratic theory has not established what we can call a faultless ballot turnout in democracies. The absenteeism of millions of citizens throughout significant act of making legitimate in a representative democracy is clear authentication of how political involvement has become dispensable overtime. This becomes so negative since empirical studies have also indicated that the predominance of those who desist from voting also never commission in other forms of constitutional involvement (Przeworski 2010). Manin (1997, pp. 222) referred to this as a "democracy of spectators". Joseph Schumpeter, nonetheless, comprehended this status of democracy as the classic mode of an elitist democracy.

The most pre-eminent challenge that democratic theory faces is not the apparel particulars but rather the social discriminability that these particulars primarily implicate. The factual proven empirical rule is that the lower the electoral turnout, the higher the social ostracism through the milieu of polls. Undeniably, existing authentication reassert that it is the lower social classes that are quitting the political space with the middle and upper classes staying put.

Considering class oriented economic voting system that is created due to socioeconomic inequalities, it could be argued that all voters who have considerably an income lower that the intermediary would vote for political revolution. This type or pattern of voting by the lower class citizens will be informed by the quest to seek redistribution of resources in the state. This will then give democratic theory a vital instrument that would act as a counterbalance to the severe socioeconomic inequalities that would have been created.

Any attempts practically apply a counterbalance mechanism has proven impossible in the past decades. There has been no success for this mechanism because:

- The lower class citizens, like the middle and upper class citizens are growingly staying home on Election Day. Furthermore, vote-maximizing parties are cajoled to desert the lower classes as prospective voters to be won over. This will therefore imply that many of the social democratic regimes will claim to represent the interests of those classes that fall in their party systems. However, strictly speaking this is often only lip service that is paid to preserve the party's "social justice" image rather than a genuine attempt to mobilize the politically unmoved and average lower classes. Additionally, any attempts to authentically represent the citizens would signal a clear separation between party manifestos and the blueprints.

Based on or relating to a system of ideas/ideals and electoral reasons, traditionalists and liberals do not write standardized or electoral allurements into active policies of top-bottom redistribution. In seeking change, left-wing parties that wish to pass schemes aimed at improving the situation of the lower classes citizens are constantly threatened by the capital owners and the wealthier classes. The threats are aimed at frustrating their attempts to improving and bringing about change in education, minimum wage policies, maintenance of the state's welfare and ensuring taxation of higher incomes to raise public returns. The main prospect from these classes is to move capital and investment abroad. This is because over time, capitalism has made it possible to move financial capital across state borders. This easy movement has made democratic states very vulnerable. The vulnerability aspect quickly results in a conflict of interest. Conflicts will arise the moment investors choose to shift investments across borders because this will negatively impact on jobs. Lack of jobs will result into lower economic growth, less revenue which will translate into less social investment.

Consequently, economic voting is not only the cause of low voter turnout. The socioeconomic inequalities also brings about conflicts divided along cultural lines. The socioeconomic conflicts could be categorized as religious or ethnic in nature. (Kitschelt 2001). Usually, men in the lower classes are ever willing to adapt to authoritarian and ethnocentric kind of policies.

The increase of size and influence of capitalism has had its own effects. Its ascendancy has increased levels of unsafe state banks, cushion funds and also the big investors. This mastery, in

the last two to three decades has changed the alliance between capitalism and the states. Heires and Nölke (2013, p. 248) define financialization as a process that command the deregulation of financial markets, eliminates national borders and ease the introduction of new “financial products” such as derivatives and debt obligation. Growth in size and influence established mechanism that can protect the capital actors against financial loss. This ascendancy also made the ideology of shareholder desirability the essential criterion for investment decisions. The financial sector began to occupy assertive key position in the economy. Relying on its pillars, capitalism profits outgrew the industrial sectors by far. This also meant that the industry sector had to increase its dependency on the financial industry of capitalism. This dependence level quickly translated into total dominance of society by the economic elites because the states also grew its dependency levels. Whether intentional or unintentional, in its attempts to emasculate itself from the economic elites the state chose to deregulate the financial markets. The financial and Euro crisis in 2008 threatened government states of the potential to be voted out by big foreign investors. This became a possibility because by increasing its size and influence around the states, capitalism had taken control of many government states. Out of the financial muscle, the capital actors dictated and controlled majority of political decisions.

Many governments felt compelled to follow the self-guided agency in its endeavor to fight the big investors. The self-guided system however resulted into extra-constitutional state of emergency which never justified sacrificing freedoms of the democratic government. The state was tempted into making decisions without engaging the right democratic system. Given that the taxpayers were required to foot bills, this further meant that capitalism would remain dominant and therefore enforce policies on society and state. Following the rationale of financial free trade, some nations gave up their influential role as the rule author. The state then regressed to be a policy taker while the capitalists became the policy makers. This in itself had a negative impact to many states. The negative effect resulted from the fact that every autonomous action that challenges the new rules could pilot the lower credit rating or a shoot in interest tariffs at which the nation could be capable to loan money on free financial markets (Simmerl 2012).

The amalgamation of an international run on investments, national party contests and neoliberal economic doctrine among those governing lead to a “liberation of the market from mass

democracy” (Streeck 2013a, p. 77). In the long run this could lead to a “Hayekian dictatorship of the market”, which would be independent from democratic dictates. Should this process not be stopped, free trade and democracy would have to be divided ultimately (Streeck 2013a, p. 235).

Consequently, the need to deregulate the markets successfully managed to put a strain on the harmony of capitalism and democracy. This is so because deregulating made the many underlying incompatibilities between the two more perceptible. The growth of size and influence has transformed capitalism into a monster hence castigating the democratic essence and efficacy.

The state did not become a more proactive synchronized force despite the fact that the monetary sector caused the economic crisis. Neoliberalism outlived the self-inflicted catastrophe, which Colin Crouch has pertinently termed “the strange non-death of neoliberalism” (Crouch 2011).

This shows the non-discriminatory state of helplessness and impressionistic lack of willingness of democratic regimes to act in times of financialization. Angela Merkel highlighted this rather openly when she stated that a “market conformist democracy” is what we should aim for. In stating her political course, she made it clear that it is not the market that should consent to democracy but rather democracy had no choice but to accede to the capitalistic exigency. The economic catastrophe of history and of our times are sufficient proof: Democracy is dependent to the market, democracy must attune to the market.

Evident truth of monetary capitalism are seen on speed, volume, complexity and the scope of economic transactions. However, in many of the democratic governed state, the decision-making process has proved to be slowing down significant pronouncements. The law making bodies are ever bound by their territorial horizon and the need for time to prepare, deliberate and pass bills into laws. On the other hand, large scale economic transactions are able to take only a snippet of seconds to circulate in the markets.

William Scheuermann (2004) speaks in general terms of an “empire of speed”. German sociologist Hartmut Rosa calls this the “desynchronization” (Rosa 2012; Rosa and Scheuermann 2009) of affairs of the state and financial systems, of democratic state resolutions and privately owned economic undertakings. The increased rate of the financial systems and society works in

favor of governments' institutions that do not act ruminatively like the legislature, introspective citizen councils or the judiciary, but rather act pensively like the executive.

In spite of attempts to ensure speedy political resolutions, it is impossible to presuppose that political determinations could keep stride with the monetary swift of the capitalistic world. Yet, both the demos and the worldwide aristocracy implicitly and explicitly sought after speedy political dispensation. This is justified principally in times of setbacks that call for a redoubtable executive (Schmitt 1996 [1931]).

The demand for speedy political dispensation illustrates a peculiar democratic paradox in times of setbacks: Far-reaching setback deliberations frequently have renowned prosperity and redistributive notability. Thus, especially those deliberations require well founded democratic input soundness (Enderlein 2013, p. 720, 733). The aspiration or assumed time curtailment typically result in technocratic-executive deliberations with thin input soundness. Within the milieu of democratic authorities, the circumvention of fundamental principal democratic approaches cannot be legitimized with preferable offshoot.

2.7. Capitalism in Kenya

Over the past epoch, the principal of the worldly economy have retracted. Venture capitalists look towards advancing economies for inflated rates of return. This quest for exorbitant rate returns has been spearheaded by the three backbone of private enterprise;

Personal property, that authorize demos to own material valuables such as land and houses and non-material valuables such as stocks and bonds.

Self-interest, through which people proceed in pursuit of their personal success short of regard for sociopolitical stress.

Competition, through firms' liberty to enter and exit markets, amplify social prosperity, that is, the joint security of both producers and consumers.

Consequently, capitalism has greatly contributed to the failures of democratic principles and values in Kenya. Capitalism has led to the reduction or elimination of the state's powers. This is as a result of its growth in size and influence. This growth of influence and size has led to

increased numbers of socioeconomic imbalance. Socioeconomic inequalities has greatly contributed to deterioration of democratic quality. This is because democratic regimes lacked the mechanisms to prevent the possibility of transforming economic powers into political powers. So that the socioeconomic exclusion and imbalance converted into political ostracism and imbalance. This ostracism and imbalance predominantly strained the lower social classes.

The feasibility of moving capital markets across borders has also led to lack of crucial deliberations on monetary policies. This change then meant that the parliament loses its grip of authority to the executive. This meant that democratic nations lost its deliberative system and went back into dictatorial kind of regimes. However, the possibility of moving the capital market across the world also made it strenuous or impractical for national governments to command.

2.8. Conclusion

The above analysis into the operational mechanism of capitalism clearly unearths the underlying incompatibles between capitalism and democratic principles. Capitalism as an economic principle is clearly guided by principles that are opposing to the democratic values and principles.

However, it is clear that capitalism is able to survive and prosper in democratic or authoritarian governments. The incompatibilities primarily stem out of the socioeconomic inequalities that divides society into classes. The possibility of transforming economic power into political power is also an incompatibility within the capitalistic world. Accumulation of wealth brings about a greater sense of political influence within a state. The political ascendancy challenges the democratic principles of impartiality in participation and representation in the government regimes.

In history, democratic regimes have clearly experienced moments of deteriorating quality of its values and principles. The deteriorating effect has not only been as a result of the capital market but the financial capitalism has equally played a relevant role.

History outlines two suggestions as the causal explanations:

1. The reduction or elimination of the state's powers. The in growth size and influence of the capital market which led to increased numbers of socioeconomic inequality has greatly contributed to deterioration of democratic quality. This is because democratic regimes lacked the mechanisms to prevent the possibility of transforming economic powers into political powers. So that the socioeconomic ostracism and imbalance transformed into political prohibition and imbalance. This barring and imbalance mainly affected the lower social classes.
2. The feasibility of moving capital markets across borders led to lack of crucial decisions on economic policies. This change then meant that the parliament loses its powers to the executive. This meant that democratic nations lost its decision making system and went back into dictatorial kind of states. However, the possibility of moving the capital market across the world also made it difficult or impossible for national governments to govern.

Monetary free trade is dangerous for democracy, as it has snapped its social and political "embeddedness". However, this does not mean that private enterprise is irreconcilable per se with democracy. The difference in capitalism and democratic principles and values only suggests that there has to be mutual embedding for the two to coexist. As much as there a right to own private property in a democratic form of government, capitalism has the potential to make democracy successful or undermine the democratic principles. In conjunction with industrialization, capitalism has a number of demands. These demand through the emancipatory and protests movement can lead to democratization in spite of the split intentions of the private enterprise regimes.

The growing of size and influence factor of private enterprise over time has posed challenges to crucial democratic principles. The socioeconomic imbalance as a result of private enterprise has threatened the democratic principle of political equitability. This has been a constant threat because for a long time, democracy has not been able to find an antidote against the socioeconomic and political imbalance. All defensive measures debate in democratic

assumptions from referenda to ruminative gatherings, surveillance (Keane 2011), or counter-democracy (Rosanvallon 2008) may save whales, help command government and enhance specific domains of local democracy, nonetheless, have little significance for controlling markets, rehabilitating social interest and faltering advancing imbalance. The continuous association of democratic failures to culture overtime has cast a shadow over the economic redistribution problem. This has made it difficult if not hard to address democratic main problem of imbalance.

Is private enterprise harmonious with democracy? It rests on the type of private enterprise and on the type of democracy. If one asserts that democracy is more than the conservative idea as suggested by Joseph Schumpeter and takes the essentials of political balance and Hans Kelsen's doctrine of "autonomous norms" severely, the current form of financialized "disembedded capitalism" poses substantial concerns to democracy. If these challenges are not met with democratic and economic amendments, democracy may gradually transmute into an aristocracy, solemnly justified by global elections.

CHAPTER THREE

SOCIAL FACTORS AND THEIR EFFECT TO DEMOCRATIC RULE

3.1. Introduction

Social determinants are particular and experiences that influence individuals' personality, attitudes and lifestyle. The influence could in turn alter some aspects in a society, for example social institutions, social behaviours or social relations.

This chapter focuses on three social factors; class, patronage and ethnicity and how they influence democratic rule of a state. This is essentially because patronage, class and ethnicity are incompatible with positive human factors and therefore could negatively impact the quality of democracy. The three social determinants are basically not wrong but it is possibly the case that

lack of positive human factors in citizens and leaders make the three factors to be noxious to democratic rule and practice. .

3.2. Patronage

Introduction

Political patronage is a trade connection in which a range of goods and services are exchanged between a primary and an agent. The exchange of goods and service are subtly not traded within the laws and regulations principles of a state. This implies that there are legal prescripts do not inform the relationship between the clients and their respective patrons. As a result of its lack of legal framework, patronage has led to recruitment based on non-compliance. This is because many if not all of the governments jobs are not distributed on merit but rather on cliental relations. Usually, the goods and services offered by both the patrons and the clients appear to comply with state laws but ultimately the dynamics set off undermine democratic institutions. Although the practice and use of political patronage in Africa appears to date back to the colonial times, it existed in both traditional and modern societies, democratic and non-democratic institutions, in organizations and local, regional and national levels of a state.

Background

Patronage roots can be found as early as in the pre-colonial times. Historically, the colonist agency was established in 1854 and mandated with delivering overseas chattels. At the summit of its effect, the British colonial regimes is said to control approximately a fifth of the world's territory. The administrators by then were mandated with the governance of different nations. Nonetheless, it was proven hard for the administrators to govern all the states efficiently. There was demand to locate clientele who would give a helping hand. It is from this that the patronage-client relations were established.

Contemporary study has found out that contemporary African ethnicity is as an outcome of social making of the colonial term within the backlashes of pre-colonial orders. The colonial influence has impinged on the social, economic, cultural and political powers of imperialism. Ethnicity is the produce of an ongoing past operations, always concurrently old and new, founded in the past and unceasingly in formation.

The African states across history have considered it hard to liberate themselves from the prevalent colonial influence of patron-client ties. The colonists' influence has lingered through the intricate ethnic contention of assimilation, fragmentation and the competition. This has been so enduring in that the patron-client ties remain the only primary concatenation between state and society in times of disaster. This ethnic effect of patron-client ties accounts for the personalistic, materialistic and opportunistic attributes of the African politics. Such ties also permeate institutions of public society and liberal democracy, jeopardizing schemes of socio-economic and political reform.

After independence, many of the African states endorsed the patronage mind-set from its colonial lords. The colonial effect was so ascendant in that it laid the ground for the formation of all the African leadership scheme. The heritage of patron-client ties were far reaching and intricate dialect which has endured in the post-colonial states. This is proved with tentative case studies, instances drawn around the continent beginning with colonialism, post-colonial expansion support to and other Western aid which has been futile on the continent. Other researches relied on elections-corruption relates to establish the colonial influence that were endorsed by the African nations.

Houphouët effects the 1980 elections to exclude Ivorian politicians who had become too autonomous. In setting up themselves, the African leaders ballooned their political alliances by appointing politicians into government. In the Kenyan context, president Moi in his first precarious years in government added multiple members to his cabinet. This was an endeavor to insulate himself against any forms of opposition powers within or without his government. Their number increased from 20 in 1979 to 27 by 1982. By distinction, in the same period, Sierra Leone's Siaka Stevens decreased the number of ministers in his cabinet from 32 in 1979 to 23 in 1985, when he shifted power over to his successor, Joseph Momoh. And by the time Momoh was toppled in 1992, he had additionally decreased the cabinet to 17 ministers. The ballooned cabinets were as a result of African leaders using the ministerial appointments as a reinforcement tool. This system was founded on patronage-client ties.

Attached to the proclivities in cabinet enlargement, the prototype in coup often elicits concerns about possible endogeneity. A regime's cabinet size in a given year might be caused by the

leader's expectancy of political ravenous. Failing to acknowledge such endogeneity might lead to partial guesses as well as fallacious conclusions about the causative system. Political volatility seeks to ensure the expansion of the clientelism ties which offers a cover to the patrons. Altogether, these results give convincing evidence that there are large costs of patronage, both for the British Empire but also for the independent countries that sprouted from its Empire following decolonization.

3.2.1. The Impact of Patronage on Democracy

Kenyan political system was and remains characterized by strong ethnic identities which are strongly entrenched in patron-client relations. Overtime, tribalism and patronage have created possible venues for corruption in the Kenyan state. Since 1991, when Kenya reintroduced multi-party politics, the country has witnessed the rise of election-related corruption. The reason behind election-related corruption is the need to capture and retain control of the state resources.

The Goldenberg scandal is an example of this type of corruption. Between 1990 and 1993, the Kenya exchequer lost billions of shillings through a fictitious exportation of gold and diamond jewelry. The fictitious trade was done by an international company called Goldenberg international Limited. Kenya has no diamonds and very little deposits of gold. The actors in the scandal took advantage of several economic ploy that had been introduced in the Kenyan economy. The scheme was exploited by high-level government officers and 'traders' to siphon billions of dollars from the public coffers. Although appearing legitimate, the process was aimed at raising funds to finance campaign and secure victory for the incumbent regime in Kenya's first multi-party elections. Massive voter-buying was witnessed and this is a clear case of networks of relationships that were essentially contrary to democratic rule.

Despite numerous attempts to reform the civil services, use of patronage in appointing civil servants has remained a widespread aspect in Kenya. Over time, the states' political leadership has shown little concern about the possible dangers posed by appointing government servants on patron-client relation to establishment of democratic rule and the effectiveness of state's capacity to deliver its manifestos to its citizens. Clientilism, neopatrimonialism, or "big man" rule, the

patron–client tie is the primary systems controlling political and economic life in African states (Bratton & van at de Walle, 1997).

The patron-client form of recruitment has meant that conventional institutions are too frail to execute their functions, in conversely to their counterparts in Western Europe and United States. The institutions have failed to account, aggregate, mobilize and represent their ordinance to their respective states. This is because the institutional mechanisms and powers are palsied patron-client networks and corruption. “A system of relations linking rulers not with the ‘public’ or even with the ruled (at least not directly), but with patrons, associates, clients, supporters, and rivals, who constitute the ‘system’” (Jackson & Rosberg, 1982, p. 19).

In offering rewards, patrons bind clients to loyalties that defy democratic ethos of citizens holding their leaders to account. As a result, the nation is a place where political players negotiate over the allotment of resources and safeguard their intake under circumstances of economic shortage (Hyden, 2006; Lemarchand & Legg, 1972). By drumming up support, political actors have one main agenda; the need to capture and retain the state’s resource and public offices, which they use to entrench their networks. In Kenya and most African countries, this phenomenon has led to pervasive instability, distortion of economic policies, and subversion of state institutions.

The Kenyan economy was greatly affected by the Goldenberg affair. Economic theorists estimate the scum to have affected at least 10% of the country’s GDP. This is because significant proportion of the funds ended up in private accounts. The key institutions that were involved include the customs, the Central Bank, the department of mines and Geology, commerce and industry. The economic and institution distablized the country and impeded the country’s attainment of optimal democracy. This is because of widespread unmerited acquisition of wealth transforms the political landscape by multiplying patrons and clients. Moreover, forms the misgovernance involved in the Goldenberg are connected to the zone’s civil battles (World Bank, 2000) and delayed democratization (Diamond & Plattner, 1999).

Various studies provide validating proof for this steady view of patronage and strategic deployment of it by authorities to amalgamate their systems since independence (Bienen, 1978; Lemarchand, 1972; Rothchild, 1970, 1997; van de Walle, 2006; Zolberg, 1966). Political actors who would otherwise be least preferred in proper democratic processes are able to hold onto their positions and to counter dissent by maintaining linkages with elite client and compromised community leaders.

Patronage therefore plays an instrument for governing intra-elite competitions, allowing unpopular leaders to harness and use state resources in placating aggrieved groups. Bayart (1993) contests that the usage of patronage has enhanced the amalgamation of ethnic delegates, bureaucrats, and business authorities to more or less integrated elite, unified by their ordinary benefits of accessing nation resources on which their locations rely.

The stabilizing fact on the use of patronage ultimately undermines democratic rule. Since 1991, Kenya has witnessed election-related corruption. Behind the election-related corruption is the need to possibly capture and retain state chief resources. However, there has been a difference in the mode of exchange between the patron networks over time. Increasingly, patrons and clients have deployed brokers or intermediaries to ensure realization and maintenance of networks. The intermediaries trade influence and therefore expand resource cultivating by establishing contacts with the patrons. They provide information to their respective patrons and introduce them to other beneficial networks. The relationships are multilayered and hierarchical, with some 'super-patron' at the top of the pyramid.

In the globalizing world, the intermediaries have proven to play an even more crucial role. They serve as links between national patrons and the world patrons. They are, therefore, crucial in facilitating international contracts at a fee. The brokers also act as negotiators on behalf of the ministers and therefore assist their patrons in hiding their corruptly acquired assets across borders. The seizing and transfer of states' resources across borders directly impacts country's economy, and pertinently impoverishes the populace and makes it more vulnerable to election-bribery. Simultaneous with this kind of developments is political cynicism and quietism among some of the elite.

Reliance on patronage has proved hard to the political actors under difficult economic times. Widner (1992) contests, that Moi retained the presidency in the early 1980s by making the political schemes even more limited, focusing the spread of patronage at his whim under stiff monitoring of the then ruling party, Kenya African National Union, and across a methodical flushing of his predecessor's confederates from government.

Apart from capturing and retaining states' economy, patronage has been used by political actors as insulators. By recruiting clients, political actors insulate themselves from political challenges. Clearly, there is a necessarily connection between patronage, false political stability, and apathy. Under institutional mechanisms, political actors count on high-level government assignments to remain reliable to their clients. If many of the persons in African nations have entry to patronage, as clients of one excellent-related individual, as Chabal and Daloz (1999) contests, then the discernable allocation of government posts, throughout elites with ethnic counties, can be used by authorities to indicate who entitles for access to state resources as a member of a patronage coalition.

In Africa, political actors have sought all forms of mechanisms to discourage constitutional concerns. By enlisting elites into the patronage alliances, political actors ensure total insulation. The political actors' appointments deter potential opponents from relating other elites against them. The various institutions that ought to make democratic rule viable also are managed and run by individuals within the same coalition which in makes it hard if not impossible for the institutions to operate

The patronage coalition is also mandated to block any kinds of resistance that may grow from the citizens. This is because the political actors, who are usually the patrons, require that their clients drum up support for them. This support blindfolds and makes it hard for marginalized communities to launch a political challenge to an incumbent patronage coalition. Because of the incentives the clients receive, they mobilize their communities for or against a particular agenda, in most cases by propagating ethnicity.

Certainly, a purely calculating commander who is interested with accumulating authority or riches will fancy to create a minimal appealing alliance by buying off only those politicians fundamental to maintain authority. Nonetheless, within this circumstances of political

indeterminacy, accurately when the allegiance of political followers might come into distrust, authorities may demand to extent the size of their alliances as a medium of cutting down reliance on any particular associate (Riker, 1962).

This patronage-founded phenomenon provides a straight forward theory: a commander with a well-oiled patronage coalition has the likelihood of minimizing extra-constitutional threats. This is achieved by expansion of the patronage coalition to the levels of being capable of marshalling ‘numbers’ to undermine democratic principles and values.

This research also adopts van de Walle’s intuition (2001) which uses cabinet data as a proxy. Many African governments have deployed cabinets in representation of the elite clients’ relationship. The ballooned cabinet ministries have been established to buy off government critics. By appointing them to various ministerial jobs, incumbent political actors insulate their corrupt regimes, mute dissidence, and prevent formulation of viable alternative governance option. The recruitment is usually done based on political support across the ethno-counties communities. A cabinet leader in Africa is deemed “a kind of super representative” (Zolberg, 1969, p. 283) who is anticipated to talk for the demands of co-ethnics, in addition to direct resources to their communities. Having established themselves in top government positions, ministers have the authority to dictate public resource allocation. They also have power to supplement their personal income by favor from contractors and jobseekers.

Van de Walle (2001) employs cabinet volume as a gauge of intake by the top players of the political rank in Africa. He contests that many regimes protected their elites from harsh conditions although the endurance of the counties’ economic disaster: “African states have long been notorious for their large cabinets, with ministerial appointments that often have little relevance to policy-making priorities or the size of actual budgets” (p. 103). Almost all African states are guilty of using ballooned ministerial appointments as instruments for managing the elite and ethnic groups.

3.2.5. Patronage and Political consequence

There has been enormous agreement between scholars that across democracies, political appointments are predominantly applied by politicians as a technique to amplify their political underpin (Remmer, 2007: Lewis, 2007). In spite of patronage upshots being dependent upon political structures, agency designs and cultural levels of democracy, political influence can customarily executed in the following areas:

- Politicized directorates - where partisanship shapes blueprint selections;
- Electoral artifice with a clear edge of the incumbent politician actors who rely on administrative reservoir and public facilities as their personal instrument;
- Unreliable political institutions with depraved judges, MPs and ministers;
- A divided society: "ours" and "against us";
- Inoperative political structure that does not metamorphose political inlets in outlets;
- Misgivings in communal institutions.

Consequently as a result, Remmer (2007), citing Diamond (1998) and Fox (1994) calls patronage “distasteful form of governance centrally contrary to democratic rule”. By affecting political agencies, patronage negatively footprints on policy choices which then destabilizes states authority. Usually, patronage creates contrivance under which democratic principles and values are undermined.

For decades now, there has been election related corruption which has negatively affected many nations. This is because in a democratic state any form of electoral manipulation directly violates the peoples’ will. By violating a people’s will, the system then imposes leaders onto power.

3.2.6 Institutional consequences

The main contrast between efficient and non-efficient protocol is shelled in the human resource that runs the organization, and has less to do with other factors (Wilson, 1989). In purveyed communal sectors politicians never pay any caution to appointees' qualifications and knowledge. Having appointed executive officials on patron-client or ethnic grounds, the required skills to run these institutions are hardly met. This lack of skills quickly translates into ineffective public policies which are neither efficient nor effective. The public policies will automatically impact on both political and economic states of the states. Since the appointees’ are not made based on

attestation and record of merit but from the political principal's perspective, the policy that various institutions come up with remain out of the people's enthusiasm. Usually, it is the political principles interests that are given much priority. However, at time, by dint of the moral decadence and negative selection in addition to the high level of consideration designated directors have, they may tend to neglect their duties and operate on their personal will and personal interest.

In the same manner, Lewis (2007) elucidates other dreadful effects that patronage has on institution' production. In his research on USA federal agencies, he makes clear that initiatives administrated by political appointees "regularly get subservient assessment than programs run by civil service". This has been linked to the several appointments that are founded on ethnic based alliances. Such lower assessments are linked to lack of knowledge. Additional consequence patronage has on agencies is given by hindrance in the implementation of reforms and other long term policies. Moe (1989) too proposes the perspective that politicians and chief appointees have short term goals and are not distracted by economy and efficiency as objectives. Therefore, the policies supplied are typically short period directed, indicative, with little or no implication at all.

3.2.7 Effects on social policy

Patronage avenues federal reservoir to party's networks of allies and clientele (Remmer, 2007). In the year 1999 Ghana experience (Miguel and Farhan, 2004), indicates that the party in power apportion almost 30% more grants for schools in the localities where it had flattering ranking in parliamentary polls of 1996. Correspondingly, in 2010, in Pakistan, the state safeguarded the districts that had paid kickback to state appointees in spite of the noteworthy grants from international society (Quiroz Flores and Smith, 2010). Communal cost is related to patronage expenditure and relies on electoral competence. Communal expenditure magnifies before elections to widen political sustenance, nonetheless, diminishes after elections, when major portions of the open budget are allocated for administrative costs (Remmer, 2007).

Even though such guidelines constitutes an exceptionally tool for reigning governments, they directly impact on the quality of public goods dispatched to citizens. That comprises an

asymmetrical stipulations of education, health, justice, social security, and infrastructure, police, etc. which mainly are dispatched to political aids and make citizens reliant upon patronage networks.

3.2.8 Patronage impact on Per Capita

Politics is about authority associations between the predominant and the trustee. The trustee is contracted and honored to enact policy precedence of the predominant. The political dominant, on the other hand has the ascendancy to render legislation, admittance to state structures and or job opportunities in trade of various enjoyment such as electoral support, campaign contributions, party allegiance, fashionable information and prowess available from the trustee. Patronage therefore leads to a bloated government-wage-bill since the patrons have to ensure their clients are well-covered.

Political patronage steers politicisation rather than professionalization of state institutions. Politicisation of the state institutions in due course peak into abysmal institutional capacity and lack of accountability on public goods allocation as the system is immoral and a democratic chronic. This in return expands the state's expenditure with a few individuals benefiting.

Since a state operates under distinctive and independent institutions, patronage in the long run undermines and frustrates any possibilities of the institutions running independently. The failure of these institutions to operate independently results to lack of accountability and transparency. This is because these institutions are also run by the clients who have the mandate to protect the patron's interests. The clients in building a defensive shield to their respective patrons end up violating people's rights and freedom. Patronage therefore skews the distribution of incomes leading to violation of the democratic ideal of equity and GDPs that are unmatched by quality of livelihoods.

3.3 Ethnicity

3.3.2. Ethnicity and its effects-The problem of permanent winners and losers

Horowitz (Ethnic Groups in Conflict, 1985) accounts for several steps that can be linked to the insertion of elections and to the meltdown of democracy. The first is that elections lead to formation of ethnic coalitions. Second, whenever elections are conducted the numerically bigger

communities (or coalition of groups) conquers. Third, in view of the fact that ethnic claims for control are conjointly irreconcilable, the victors excerpt the advantages of commanding the state for their own ethnic party and bar other groups from state resources. Fourth, considering that voting takes place along established ethnic chains, the losers cannot anticipate to lure additional voters in future electoral rounds. Eventually, confronting the possibility of permanent expulsion, the losers will have no grounds to proceed playing the electoral gambling and will be more likely to pursue non-democratic medium of winning authority or schism.

The principal hypothesis in Horowitz's score is that voter inclinations are consistent within ethnic communities and opposed between communities. His justification for ethnic balloting builds on a psycho-social comprehension of collective ties. Citizens connect predominantly with other members of their ethnic localities, enhancing social unanimities. Once elections are initiated, voting becomes an occasion to declare one's affective relations to the society and to voice group allegiance. For this reason, parties are unfit to lure voters from other ethnic communities and no swing voters exist. This means that the losing party cannot anticipate to grow its vote percentage in future elections by swelling its endorse base. In Horowitz's words, "to the excluded, exclusion from power appears permanent" (p. 349).

Nevertheless, once voters concern about the rule, losers can win in subsequent rounds by alluring voters who are disappointed with the incumbent's efficiency or by providing different policy platforms.

3.3.3. The problem of indivisibility

Theoretically, elections that generates perpetual winners and losers need not be precarious if the two communities can share power and effects following the election. Nonetheless, Horowitz view the nations as undivided. Both accounts focus on destitute nations rising from colonial command where politics whirls around control of patronage resources. Under circumstances of scantiness, political leadership should necessarily decide which groups will receive profits and which will not. Both accounts deduce that the demand for reelection will oblige leaders to distribute produce to their own ethnic communities and to rule out other communities.

Clientilism remains an effective mechanism for candidates seeking to marshal backup within their own ethnic communities (Wantchekon, 2003). In addition, if leaders encounter intra-community hindrances, they may find it convenient to direct benefits to principal allies rather than outsiders, if doing so will mitigate the prospect that challengers will surface (Kasara, 2004, p. 14).

Following the point that intra-communities rivalry obliges leaders to prefer their individual communities – is at the core of prior conjectures of democracy and its meltdown. According to both Horowitz and R&S, leaders that neglect to repay their individual communities become susceptible to allegations that they have sold out the community's aspirations. In view of that fact, leaders will ordinarily channel patronage resources to their own communities, ruling out other communities. Furthermore, both accounts presupposes that because elections in multinational context are repeatedly supplemented by divisiveness ethnic discourse and brutality, inter-community strain may make it complex for leaders to reliably pledge to divide the prizes of success upon taking on office. Therefore, both group of authors infer that the state is undivided and that all communities will thus solicit total, not shared, command of the state.

3.4 Class

Introduction

The phrase class rose into wide use in the early 19th century substituting such phrases as status and decree as accounts of primary hierarchical assemblies in society. This utilization mirrored alterations in formation of societies following the industrial and political revolutions in the late 18th century.

The leading researchers of present day democracy, Robert Dahl (1971, 1), alleged that ‘a key component of a democracy’ is ‘the permanence sensitiveness of the government to the priorities of its citizens, deemed as political equals.’ This awareness has motivated a great deal of research over the past half-century reviewing the link between citizens, deemed as political equals.’ This awareness motivated a great deal of realist inquiry over the previous century considering the connection between citizens’ policy priority and the policy choices of elected leaders. According to Shapiro 2011, the inquiry has produced ‘proof for robust implications of public belief on government policies,’ offering a ‘buoyant image of democracy in operation.’

Gilens 2005; 2012; Bartels 2008; 2016b; Gilens and Page 2014) have issued a remarkable testimony that the visible ‘strong effects’ of summed public belief in these studies conceal serious disparities in reactivity to the priority of wealthy, middle-class and poor citizens apparent breach of Dahl’s provision that government should react to the priorities of citizens ‘deemed as political equals.’

The political, legal, and moral equity of every citizen is a primary value of democracy. The facets of equality are outlined in the concept that there can be no second-class citizens in a democracy. The democratic philosophy of political equity is that no one is born with the right to rule others; and no one is born with the liability to political obedience. On account of this essential political equity the only way that validates political power can be established through the approval of the subject.

Nonetheless, it is clear that there is need to place primary components that will aid perceive what precisely does equity amount to. Of what value is it to what we call the attainment of democratic cause? We have to cross-examine the variations that subsist in our world, the variations of awareness ability, economic power and the proceedings that can bring about overturn. The mandatories that can help us talk of equity.

3.4.1. Class Difference

Tentative data indicates that representative democracy often leads to judgments and choices that mirror middle class, rather than lower class concerns. A search that is often attributed to the fact that there is improved middle class political engagement than lower class engagement. Whereas it has been extensively authenticated that socially and economically unprivileged groups have lower political engagement rates than middle or upper class groups. There are some doctrines that seek to elucidate why. Nonetheless, majority of the doctrines agree "economic drawback hinders equal involvement in the making of culture in public domains and in daily life.

3.4.2. Structural Constraints

Structural limits includes any framework that may prohibit accessibility to public talk potentials or may consistently misrepresent connections in ways that advantage specific well-being, voices, and interpretations over others. Akin frameworks or procedures ensues in sidelining minority or alternate viewpoints in ways that impede identical representation. The deformity of just and identical representation processes under the expansive event itself is explained by Deetz (1992).

Contact challenges emerges from connection usages that prohibit quality discussion and combat, that proxy effigies and illustrative connections for self-presentation and truth claims, that wantonly restricts reach to contact channels and platforms and that then steer to decisions founded on unlawful jurisdiction relations. Akin communication concerns have been ascribed to the communication frameworks that operate as a part of the political and economic system. Communications of this kind displaces arbitration, debate and decision making about political concerns usually in ways that benefit those who already possess greater resources.

Alleging that the political-economic scheme is repeatedly to censure for imbalances in resources, chances for involvement, and non-representative policy making frameworks. Forrester is also alleging for alterations in communicative frameworks that would serve as a restorative for structural catalysts of imbalance in hopes that chances for more comprehensive, just and pensive decisions would be enhanced.

3.4.3. Rights to participate.

Participation demands the concession of authentic control across the content of cogitations to groups influenced by those very proceedings. This interpretation presupposes one simply wiretapping to public opinions is unsatisfactory. It demands mechanisms for incorporating the thoughts in the resolution itself. In reality, inhabitants' involvement will happen within structured teams troubled with precise concern-hiking, boating, and the like. It is unrealistic to seek the opinions of specific citizens many of whom are deeply disinterested.

Democratic exercise is customarily understood as a self-contradictory procedure marked by rivalry, strife, and power contest between chosen proxies. The fashion of representative democracy is commonly linked to a concept of citizen political involvement that principally involves voting in an election. However currently, representative democracy regularly begets decisions "for the majority being made by a few" that negligently under-represent minority.

This is, certainly the primary democratic obligation: universal adult right to vote, freedom of speech for all. In the U.S., these are quite in place considering the 19th amendment and the Civil Rights Acts. Nevertheless, the overtures that have been enacted in many democratic states, it is clear that there is never equal rights of participation. States decision hardly incorporate its citizens and in instances where citizens are intricate the state always manipulates and finds its way out.

Ideally, the struggle for engagement in authority decision making is growing across societies. Struggles for devolved academic facilities, alliances in prisons, and student command of higher education institutions all originate from customary roots (Altschuler, 1970, p. 63): Political involvement turns into a concern when substantial groups of citizens demand that they have uneven shares of power to affect critical governmental decisions.

3.4.5. Democracy and Equality

The principles of democracy and equality demands that governments ought to act in ways that enhance the citizen lives. However, all these must be achieved through equal concern for the lives of each other.

Even ability, where imbalance rumps its head in the setting of even legislations. This is what ties political evenness to equilibrium in the other significant domains of life. If an even capacity to impact states' outlets under ones political action is something we are looking for, then having the legislative entitlement to vote or opine, participate in a political drives or agencies requirements to be complemented by the ability so to do. This ability entails the expertise, the resources to do what one ought to do. The scope of political evenness implies that it is profoundly dependent upon fairness in other realms that promote that potential on the degree of evenness in schooling, earnings, medical and prosperity.

Identical capacity presumes a state of uniformity for all the citizens in a state. This in itself is not attainable anywhere, citizens are never equal and they remain unequal throughout. The very state of inequality impedes any possibilities of every citizen being able to make impact.

3.4.4. Why political equality matters

The existence of political imbalance is a problem in and of itself. It aggrieves our standards promptness to a democracy where each citizen has the potential to exercise and influence power and where political power is not undemocratically and unaccountably controlled. Political imbalance has the capacity to harm the probity of the political procedure and to affect how society and the economy are afterwards organized. Imbalance begets a vicious circle of underrepresentation and animosity prodding a sense that the political system no longer works for common people or is competent of representing their interest.

By political fairness we relate to the standards that all citizens have an identical voice across states' decisions. One of the foundational philosophy in a democracy is the identical emphasis of the choices and concern of all nationals. This is informed in philosophies such as individual man/single-vote, sameness before ordinance, and identical rights of open discourse. Identical factors of the predilection and requirements of all nationals is abetted by identical political action between nationals; not just identical voting participation within essential groups of nationals but equity in other forms of actions. Such actions involve operation in a political drive, drive premiums, action under ones domestic society, immediate communication with officials, and protest. Identical action is pivotal for identical reflection given that political action is the medium

through which nationals apprise ruling classes of their requirements, priorities and persuade them to be compliant. Nationals' involvement is consequently at the core of political identity. Within their actions nationals in a democracy demand to monitor who will oversee public agency and to impact what the authority does. Political involvement sets out the processes by which nationals can transmit message regarding their concerns, priorities, requirements and beget strain to react.

Participatory Equality: Parity in all realms of social and political life is complicated. It possibly can be about various distinct esteemed products. It can traverse persons or classes, it can be pre-mediated through diverse efforts and on principle of distinct standards. There exists several models and translations of fairness. In majority of its models, it is fairly a heterogeneous worth. For much valued matters earnings, enlightenment, healthcare, reverence or political effect coarse imbalances are something we distaste. Nonetheless, total fairness is seldom explicitly desirable. It is ordinarily impracticable to achieve, or the procedure of accomplishing it would be too high, or its implications would be adverse. It therefore may be beneficial to reflect why political equality established roughly as equal effect over government policies across nationals could be vital under democratic system of governance. Political equality is fundamental for the following reasons:

3.5. Elitism

An elite is a comparatively small group of people with the excellent status in a society, or in some realm of activity, who have more special rights or power than other people due to their status. Elitism is trusting in or promoting this sort of arrangement. It however cuts across several spheres of life, they include; the academic world, politics, art, sports and many other. In socio-political philosophy elitism is the trust that societies have or should be ruled by an elite, and theorists of elitism study how the elite profit and preserve their status and what they get for it.

The elites could be divided into several groups, they include;

3.5.1. Academic elite; this are people who are distinguished from other because of their excellent academic qualifications. On the basis of this are accorded or argued to deserve certain privileges. In every society this is a relatively small portion of society and more so in Africa. The

term academic elitism has connotation of self-conscious identity derived from caliber of institutions that educational institutions that individuals attended.

3.5.2. Intellectual elite; although this class distinction seems to bear no contempt, social/political conservatives use it to refer to individuals perceived to hold anti-establishment view. They are also referred to as ‘the left.’ Some of their labelers point to an intrinsic alliance between intellectuals and liberal principles. Conservatives object to this class, its attitude and positions that are explicit in debates on including or exchanging evolution and not creationism in curriculum. While most intellectuals are liberals and they possess advanced degrees, they do not necessarily enjoy some specific privileges. They do not wield any distinctive power outside the academic world. They do not manifest any elitism in the deep sense of the world.

3.5.3. Economic elite; since democratic processes are affected by the transformation of economic power into political power, it is vital to consider this sub-class of elites. The interplay between these aspects occurs in various forms constituting systems for winning elections, undeserved power of business entities to compel democratically constituted governments to enact or not to enact certain policies and unabashed corruption of leadership. Political parties that ought to be vehicles for broadening and deepening of democracy have become distanced from the ideals and morphed into outfits that strive to subtly monopolize state power. In all these there is self-perpetuation, sustenance and enhancement of exclusion of citizens from ‘clubs’ of political elite. The tragedy is that the ‘clubs’ continue to bear labels of democratic parties and empty slogans. In this mix there is also the mass media that is cleverly beholden to private economic or ideological interests.

3.5.4. Co-optation of democratic institutions by elites

In the democracies of developing countries, economic elites generally manage to forge and exercise undue influence in political process. The grounds for this predominant influence are not hard to find. Elites by their very nature possess aspects that are crucial to political processes, namely knowledge, financial resources and control of the media. Elite capabilities drive and manipulate democratic process and outcomes and could insulate them from political machinations more so if where they control capital. Political process and outcomes are rendered

pseudo-democratic by the fact that elites are not as compact as the cognate term signals. Their diversity and capabilities provide the basis for creating smokescreens of process and outcomes that adhere to and uphold democratic ethos and ideals. These observations mean that elites are primed to secure their social, economic and political interests within what appears to be democratic process and to perpetuate pre-existing anti-poor biases in economic policies.

Even though apart from elite, some other groups might arise as significant players, with capacity to influence affairs through the ballot and exercising the principle participation, the poor lack the capacity to do so. Urban workers, consumers, and large-scale farmers, have some capabilities and resources to be significant players, but insofar as their interests are not identical with those of the poor, they simply have the potential to engage in self-serving measures and activities. This is evident in a process that is widespread in developing countries: the influence of civil servants, urban workers, and urban consumers in political affairs. These groups manage secure favorable prices, remunerations, and policies. Since, members of these groups have the potential ascend into the political sphere, the political elite strives to manifest concern for their priorities.

Further, these groups often back their demands with actions such as mobilization of citizens and lobbying of government officials. In extreme situations, these are the citizens threaten fragile nations with urban unrest. For these reasons, developing countries' policies feature a bias to urban interests: commodity pricing, development priorities and policies. Yet these leveraged, disproportionate benefits mean that development is skewed and the democratic component of equality is abstract. The visible result of this relationship between the elite and these urban groups is depressed farm incomes and marginalization of rural priorities.

3.6. Conclusion

In this chapter we have analyzed the various social factors that can possibly undermine liberal democracy. Social factors such as class, patronage and ethnicity and how they undermine democracy. Currently, a reliance on patronage has led to greater instability in Africa which has in turn led to the distortion of economic policies and political institutions. The economic and institution distortion has made it difficult for democracy to attain its optimal point. This form of

governance has been linked to the region's civil wars so that any efforts that are meant to salvage the democratic rule in African states still remains a major problem.

The paradox of efforts over the past twenty years to recreate democracy in Africa has been that rather than restraining the fires of ethnic conflict. In the past decade these efforts have been accompanied by the explosion of violent conflicts of autochthony and constant confrontations that have threaten the very bases of social order and cohesion in multi-ethnic societies.

The instrumentalization of ethnicity as the principle means has become an inevitable fact of political life in Kenya. Political conflict and failure across Africa is often linked to the widespread use of patronage, ethnicity and class in retaining control of the state.

In recent years, (Gilens and Page 2014) have produced striking evidence that the apparent 'strong effects' of aggregated public opinion in these studies mask serious inequality in responsiveness to the preferences of wealthy, middle-class and poor citizens an obvious infraction of Dahl's prerequisite that government ought to respond to the interests of citizens 'considered as political equals.' This class inequalities require a tenderer look at the tenets of democracy that are presumed to be in place. The tenet of equality for instance presumes that all citizens are equal when actually there are social differences. It is obviously impossible to talk of equality in a state where the elite control the principles that have to define and uphold the qualities of improving the standards of lower class citizens.

CHAPTER FOUR

LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND POSITIVE HUMAN FACTORS

4.1. Introduction

Organizations and institutions constitute two kinds of resources: the human and material resources. Nonetheless, it is the human resource of an institution that is essential into converting the material resource into a complete or possibly a fusible product. In establishing the breakdowns or the prosperity of an organization, the human resource becomes very essential. Still, in converting policies and the material resources of any organizations deliberations have to be made. At times the organizations are called upon to make critical deliberations that essential impacts on their success or failure.

Institutions have to make deliberations regarding their production, the raw materials needed in creating the desired products. The human force has to establish the type of machinery needed for production efficiency, the capital resources and their sources. To achieve the above objectives, deliberations have to be made. Nonetheless, the human virtuous capacity plays a fundamental role in the kinds of deliberations individuals will make. This therefore implies that for an institution to be able to make success both the human and the material resources have to be considered. Since the success or failure of an institution is not about the resources available but the moral ability that uttermost defines the human character which directly impacts on the kinds of choices an individual makes.

Owing to the progressive alterations in government tenets and dissemination of power in society, democracy form of government was effectively founded. In setting its principles and values, democracy set out to accomplish its success via four major principles. Democracy, as political system, is a system through which the electing and substituting of government officials is accomplished. Nonetheless, in electing and substituting of government officials' democracy

confides heavily on the decree and accord of the people. It consequently presupposes active involvement of citizens in politics and public life. Democracy also envisions conservation of all citizen rights. All these four principles are tethered on the principle of rule of law.

4.2. Basic Principles of Liberal Democracy

The first precept of democracy as a political system for choosing and replacing governments through free and fair elections. By electing their leaders, the people have the authority to hold them answerable for both their actions and policies. In this respect, the people display their will by deciding who would represent them through free and fair elections that ought to be held periodically.

In a democratic form of governance, the citizens have to take part in all matters relating to public life. In taking part in public life, the citizens have a right to information. By holding their leaders answerable the citizens demand to be informed about their public life. Another way of participating is through the period voting where the citizens have the duty to choose those they wish to represent them. In participating in choosing of their leaders, all citizens are considered as equals. This principle of equality is what forms the base and right to participate in public decisions. After accomplishing specific requirements, all citizens have the right to run for public offices and also to participate in campaigns.

In a democratic state, democracy sets out values, principles and rights of all citizens that cannot be elapsd from them by the government. As a way of illustration, all citizens have the right to worship, follow their own belief, religion and culture. In extolling for the rights of liberty and association, democracy allows all the citizens to choose freely those they would feel comfortable associating with. The citizens have the right to control their sources of information and listen to what they want to. The citizens are also at liberty to form any groups of associations. The groups and the associations are also at liberty to protest against any of the government actions.

Ultimately, democracy is also a structure of rule by law. The rule of law sets out the foundation on which all the citizens' rights are founded. Nevertheless, the rule of law in democracy also aids in maintain order and restrict the states powers. The rule of law also consider all citizens as equals. It helps fight against any forms of segregation that might arise in a state. That no citizens

will be discriminated against, be it on religious basis, race, or ethnic grounds. This forms the basis of equality of all citizens in a democratic state. Under this principle, no citizens is considered above the law. The law is fair, unbiased (impartial) and enforced by courts autonomous of the other branches of government.

Nonetheless, the four basic principles can never make a democracy (viable) practicable. Notwithstanding the participation principle being pertinent and viable it is not regarded as one of the basic aspects of democracy. This is because at times, citizens have demonstrated to be benighted (uneducated) and oblivious/uninformed on matters. The lack of civic education and uninformed allows many of the political actors to exploit them on tribal lines and other biases. The lack of knowledge also negatively impacts on the quality of decisions the citizens make. The citizens may fail to fully perceive the implications of their decisions. When this happens, they may be taken superiority of by politicians who appeal to their emotions instead of their intellect and hence dividing them on bias grounds.

4.3. Democracy and other possible Essential Aspects

According to *The Interaction Between Democracy and Development*, democracy embodies four basic principles. The principles of justice, free participation of all citizens, freedom and the principle of human rights. From these four basic principles, democratic form of government is able to constitute a source of values and principles that can be attributed to all citizens and their heritage. Despite being common to all forms of democracies, these basic principles and values assumes different forms and are realized by different means. This is because, it is thought that for every society, its form of democracy should be able to reflect its social, cultural and economic context.

However, a true form of democracy is said to require a certain required minimum standards of living. These standards of operation in turn requires that there has to be a certain level of development in a society. The required development that is not only economic and social but the human development as well. Human development and growth forms the basic foundation on which all the four principles rests. So that without proper human development, then the basic principles could not be essential because it will be impossible to achieve any democratic state.

4.4. The Human Factor (HF)

The basic premise of the HF perspective theory is that any forms of development establishes it's beginning and ending in people. More importantly, it is not the presence or quantity of people that matters but the quality they possess in icons of their personality characteristics essential for making their respective societies function and remain functional over time.

As per to the HF perspective the prime cause for the breakdown of economic growth proceedings in many of the African states is due to absence of appropriate HF. In advancing this theory, Adjibolosoo defines the HF as the 'spectrum of personality features and other human measures that allows political, economic and social institutions to operate efficiently and continue to do so over time' (Adjibolosoo 1994:26).

Adjibolosoo (1995b), contents that absence of proper HF in Africa is displayed by the lack of accountability and responsibility in the African management which, alternately is largely due to ignorance and/or apathy on the part of the overall masses. However, Adjibolosoo points out that the growth of proper HF in citizens demands a long term action. The long term action is meant to remove all the impediments. In order to attain this development, Adjibolosoo recommends a new kind of education. However, the new education that is required has to be different. The recommended education ought to go over training public to simply interpret and write in European or other languages such as English, French and Spanish, or outfitting the public with tools that make them reliant on authority agencies or community.

A kind of education that is needed is one that instills sense of self-realization, obligation and duty in persons. These three kinds of knowledge and skills will then propel individuals towards selfless commitment to developing their societies and states. It is the absence of these features that has made it impossible if not hard for many of the African states to achieve successful development in history.

The leading exponent of this perspective, Adjibolosoo (iop.cit, 1994), delimits the HF as the ‘spectrum of personality features. He however suggests that there are other aspects of human execution that allows social, economic and political agencies to operate and remain operational over time.’ This perspective sees people as the most pivotal resource of any community or state. Having established people as the focal point of any forms of development, Adjibolosoo acknowledges that lack of such characteristics will definitely work against any possibilities to achieve any meaningful development. The human perspective theory also acknowledges the role and importance of natural resources, technology, capital and institutions in any kinds of development. However, the theory quickly points out that, these by themselves cannot bring about change without people with appropriate personality characteristics and qualities to operate them (Adjibolosoo, 1995b; Ofori-Amoah, 1996a). The Human Factor influence in this case is more than just human capital acquired through education. It consists of religious, ethical and aesthetic capital, as well as human capabilities and possibilities (Adjibolosoo, 1995b).

4.5. The cause of HF decay

According to Adjibolosoo (1995b), the causes of Africa’s HF decay arc both external and internal. The provision of colonial handouts depressed African ingenuity, initiative and creative urge. Lack of African policies and programs deprived Africans of the skills they needed to man effective institutions. Finally, education and curricula training were limited to the three Rs of reading, writing and arithmetic with a strong European content.

Adjibolosoo (1995b) identifies excessive stress on individual affluence and extreme misuse of present protection scheme as the main internal causes of Africa’s HF decay.

Both external and internal factors have combined to produce social vices such as Kalabule, ‘palm greasing,’ ghost workers and the culture of silence (Adjibolosoo, 1995b: 58-72). Absence of liability and obligation are the dons of HF rot and ineffective functioning of Africa’s economic, social and political institutions. These arc caused in turn by simpleton and disregard on the part of the overall public. People in leadership positions arc not held accountable for their actions. There is, therefore, no obligation, incentive or motivation to perform and make sure that the political, social and economic agencies operate and keep doing so over time. The root causes of

Africa's HF decay can be solved by introducing a proper training for the revitalization of certitude and promptness to Africa's development in our people.

4.4.1. A suggested solution to Africa's HF decay

Adjibolosoo in recommending for a proper education system which instills qualities and right characteristics trains defined this type of education as that which is able to instill knowledge, values skills and the capability to remain functional over time. These qualities and characteristics traits are meant to introduce a new dimension of personality into individuals. The individuals are to be made effectual actors of optimistic modifications of the community and society at large.

The new education system must be capable of training people beyond mere learning. Development education goes beyond mere training to interpret and record regarding matters in alien and African dialects. The development education has to cut across the lines of mere reading and writing because its supreme objective is to furnish individuals into owing the proper human factor features which will enable both the political and social agencies to operate effectively and remain operational over time.

4.4.2. The three aims of development education are

According to Adjibolosoo, development education is necessary since it serves to promote three aims in the human development.

(1) Development education will provide individuals with appropriate characteristic, skills and knowledge. These characteristics will identify with the development problem of a society and therefore provide possible solutions.

(2) This new kind of education also serves to alert individuals to appropriate values which require certain kind of knowledge and skills so that the skills and the knowledge will be beneficial to both the individuals and their societies.

(3) Development education has to equip individuals with proficiencies and the potential necessary to convert expertise base into resolving personal and communal concerns that are associated with development. In instilling the ideal human factors into individuals, the development education will also be fundamental in shaping the human character and moral development.

4.5. Virtue Ethics and Human Character Formation

4.5.1. Introduction

Virtue ethics is an extensive phrase for conjectures which stresses virtues of mind and character in moral philosophy. Virtues are moral habits that then form part of the character or way of being of a person. They are strengths in a person's character that make it easier to perform good actions because they form an inclination towards the actions that correspond to the given virtue. This does not make them less meritorious but rather more meritorious since they imply a greater conformity of the will with the good action involved. The virtuous action as Aristotle teaches is always a point between two possible extremes, the defective and the unreasonable excess. The mean, the middle point is not, by any means, a point of mediocrity. It is the point of excellence. Virtue is the exercise of excellence guided by right reason. Virtue results from the positive and habitual good use and application of our capacities for rationality, freedom, consciousness and deliberate action. When the latter are subjected to right reason the result is virtue.

Virtue ethicists debate on the essence and interpretation of virtues and diverse connected concerns.

The ethicists investigate how virtues are acquired, implemented in different situations and if the virtue can be said to be rooted in a global human essence in this multiplicity of civilizations. However, there has been agreement regarding how virtue ethics could be defined. It is concurred to be a personality feature which includes both the habitual actions and settled sentiments.

Particularly, a virtue is an optimistic feature that makes its possessor a good human being. A virtue is thus to be discern from unique activities or sensations.

4.5.2. Human Moral Development

In moral history, moral character has been said to be formed by one's actions. The moral good of every individual who is regarded as a person of good character involves habits, actions and emotions. In establishing the actions of the human person it is necessary to fully understand who a human person is. The human person has been thought to constitute a body and a soul. Activities of the body are therefore activities of the self- human beings which are absolutely self-possessing, self-governing and self-determining. However, so as to be of excellent personality, human beings are required to not only know the good but to also incline towards the good. This is only possible through maturation of virtues.

Overtime, personality and comportments have been said to be so intertwined and hard to separate. For instance, ones duty cannot be overridden by one's conscience missing negatively changing an individual's personality.

4.5.3. Character Formation

According to Paul Ricoeur personality is something that is impossible to be isolated from an individual (Ricoeur 1992, 122). Personality has firmness that pertains every individual's personality (Ricoeur 1992, 118). He sets out personality as a set of peculiar marks which enables re-identification of persons as being the same. It is virtually impossible for one to distinguish a person personality from their character. However, it is possible to distinguish people from their actions but the same difference cannot be made between personality and activities.

Aristotle in establishing the virtue ethics states that character develops over time. This is because it requires an individual to acquire habits from both parents and the community. The ability to acquire these fundamental aspects are first acquired using prize and penalty.

One attains a good personality much as one may discover to play a musical instrument: at first, one could be under some push to train but ultimately one relishes playing with skills and insight.

Aristotle also believed that individuals were also somewhat accountable for their characters. So that a person who is said to be of good character is said to have chosen that willingly and freely. However, Aristotle points out that in facing complex and accurately situations, individuals will

require rational reflections. The rational reflections will then form the foundation on which the character traits of individuals will be developed and nurtured.

In educational and routinely exercising the virtue, “one learns to escape the excess and deficiency “of rashness and fear (Hartman 2012). In avoiding the excesses and the deficiency one is able to go through the phases of learning which basically is done on incentives. Individuals are required to consistently act in ways which help them overcome temptations. Nevertheless, the subsequent stage of learning virtue is featured by rational and sensible intelligence (Hartman 2012). Without sensible intelligence recognition of virtue by individuals is impossible. It is the rational reflection that ultimately informs the practical wisdom of the individuals.

Moral theorists have also been quick to lay down a fundamental difference between habits and virtues. Basically all virtues can be said to be habits of individual’s personality traits. However, not all practices could be said to be virtuous.

Habituation is simply an aid to the growth of virtue. This is because individuals requires a long time to acquire knowledge. In attempts to acquire virtues, individuals will ultimately require to make choices, exhibit some levels of understanding, and demonstrate knowledge (Hartman 2013). Moreover, as mentioned, the virtuous actor does not act justly simply out of an unthoughtful reaction. The rational reflection which translates into practical wisdom allows individuals to fully demonstrate and acknowledge the worth of virtues and why it is a relevant reaction.

Virtue ethics is a moral perspective initiated in Greece which says that ethics is primarily about learning to live well. The foundation of virtue moral compasses is the notion of eudaimonia, “the excellent life” or “life lived well” or “flourishing” or “happiness.”

Aristotle contends that eudaimonia ought to be realized as a condition of living life well. Consequently, being excellent at living the human life will implicate accomplishing the human operations. Human operations has to be something unique to humans. The only thing unique to humans is that we are sensible beings (we are rational animals).

The rationality aspect alone then suggests that every human function must be led by an aspect of rational reflection. Happiness will therefore be a result of a life led by rationality and practical wisdom. The other significant notion of virtue morals is that of virtue. A virtue is a habitual feature that enables individuals to fulfill one's operation well.

Moral philosophers also recognize the fact that actions are not merely pointless since they always aim at some goal. According to Aristotle, all actions must then aim at achieving some good. Furthermore, Aristotle also suggests that there are two motives under which things could be done:

One, things could be done for the sake of other things (means to others) and

Two, some things that are done for their own sake (ends in themselves).

In establishing the two motives under which things could be done, Aristotle encourages individuals to always define things as ends in themselves. This is because in carrying out their actions individuals will be motivated into looking at the value of things. Individuals will be able to show high levels of sensitivity and respect in any kinds of relations they seek to establish.

4.6. Conclusion

Democracy has establish itself as a good form of governance both intrinsically and instrumentality. Intrinsically, democracy establishes viable foundation upon which its values and principles are able to develop. A successful development of democratic values and principles endows individuals with the ability and capacity to live freely. This is because democracy in its four basic principles is able to create a base of equality of all individuals.

Instrumentally, democracy establishes institutions that guarantees creation of policies and laws that are reasonable and fit the basic concerns of a person. Thus over history, democracy has determined itself as one of the core deceive factors of the quality of life of individuals. It is a vital instrument with a central element and ability to offer both men and women the opportunity to live voluntarily.

Therefore in defining a democracy, we can represent its central characteristics from two categories: from personal common man's perspective and from a political institution perspective under which its values and principles are able to be realized.

At an individuals' level, there are various core and delimiting standards-setting obligations that collectively determine the civil hypothesis of a democracy. A democracy could therefore be identified as a political system that joint judgment of laws, policies procedures and manifestations both direct and indirect are regarded as equal. The equality aspect stresses on the individual aspect who participate in a democracy. Democracy therefore relates to the self-rule of a politically established social assemblage.

A number features separates a political group from diverse types of unions: being the political crew is authorized to compel its personnel over the levying of taxes, constraints on the utilization of assets, and the introduction of legislations and statutes; secondly, the leadership of the crew does not rely on the constant deliberate approval of the personal for the exercitation of its influence. The nationals could occasionally vote with his or her footfalls; nonetheless, citizens inside the purview of the political crew, the residents can be obliged to operate in accordance to the statutes, policies, and ordinance of the political leadership. Additionally statutes have the unalterable feature of limiting liberty; specifically, they desirably operate to limit people from working on alternatives they if not would have made. Hobbes, Rousseau, Mill, and Rawls, considered that people within a state need certain core control so as to set up a mechanism of statutes, to impede brutality, and to decree policies in the public interest. Society presupposes a state. Additionally, democratic hypothesis seek to give the better overall sketch feasible for the authentic state.

In establishing institutional success, human resource plays a vital role. Institutions are composed of twain human and material resources. It is the human resources of an institution that converts the material resources of an agency into complete or fusible products and it is the human resources that can see the failure of an agency. In attempt to transmute/change the material resources of a given agency, decisions must to be made.

CHAPTER FIVE

Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations

5.1. Summary

In this research we have analyzed the historical conception of democracy, its fundamental principles and other possible essential aspects that might have hindered its success. As a means of organizing the human society, democracy began in the ancient Greece and as ever it has since received recognition as the ideal system of social organization. This is because as a system of organizing human affairs, it rests the ultimate decision making on collective issues. Resting its ultimate decision making on its democrats, democracy presumes certain aspects are in place which are essential for its operations.

Even though democracy has a long history of endorsement as the best political paradigm for organizing society, there has still been serious misgiving in regard to its efficacy with some theorists preferring a cautious approach to its claims and others taking outright adversarial positions. In a democratization republic, democrats envisage to take part in enacting public resolutions that direct them. They envisage choices to be apprised by far-reaching public

cogitations. They envisage those who steer public debates and execute the common volition to be held responsible for their actions by the citizens. The citizens also anticipate democracy to transform the world into a preferable place. They presume it will dwindle partiality and subjugation and provide rationale to endure on agencies of corporate life. Democracy is repeatedly vaunted as dwindling the prospects of war, safeguarding human liberation and expediting economic proliferation.

Nonetheless, Liberal democracy regularly baffles. It has significantly aground both in its actuations and implications, it has flunked to reside up to the pledge people fraternize it with. Democratic engagement is transitory, amenability is diminutive and the true artifices of democratic resolutions are indistinct and it consists a number of paradoxes within its underlying principles that ultimately undermines it.

In the research we find out that paradoxes arise from the instances that many of the democratic pledges are met but compromised by their own visceral dissents or by additional social and economic propensities. Democracy as a political order has a number of its principles that are paradoxical.

Karl Popper observes how tolerance becomes paradoxical. 'Boundless tolerance should result to the dissipation of tolerance. If we stretch boundless tolerance even to those who are intolerant, if we are not willing to safeguard a tolerant society against the attack of the intolerant, then the tolerant will be shattered and tolerance with them.'

Simply put, Karl Popper does not champion for restraining of the vocalization of intolerant principles; for he holds if they can be countered by logical contestations and kept in control by public stance, cancellation would undoubtedly be unreasonable. Nonetheless, we ought to demand the right to stifle them if needed even by coercion; for it may readily end up that they are not drafted to reach us on the level of logical contestations, although initiate by censoring all contestation; they may interdict their acolytes to heed to logical contestations, considering it is treacherous and instruct them to answer contestations by the use of their fists or pistols. We ought to as a result contend in the name of tolerance, the right not to tolerate the intolerant.

Lawfulness, equally generates its own paradoxes. Ordinance is in due form open to all, but has turn out to be exorbitant, granting prerogative to the affluent and to corporates. There remains depravities in many judicial systems. Conventionally, even civil rights may be safeguarded, which is a significant gain, but as far as this does not stretch to social and economic dues may be compromised. International trade accord may embed the rights of trade actors against laws founded on social cogitations. Ordinance is also susceptible to domestic concerns. Like political parties, the judicial itself might turn into a class with its own endured concerns, offering hindrance to democratic alteration. There is also a lingering friction between democracy and ordinance. Democracy has generally been concerned by the rule of the vast majority; ordinance is also concerned by the protection of minorities.

Free trade, similar to ordinance and freedom, is another kind of the paradox. It is evident that free trade can flourish under both democratic and authoritarian systems nonetheless so far, democracy has resided only with free market. In emerging markets, free market has had a composite notability. Whereas it advances autonomy it has also occasioned political and economic victimizations.

Nonetheless, there is something rudimentary potent about the primary idea of individual nobility and liberty. Free trade and democracy are directed by philosophies that generate anxiety between the two. This is testified predominantly in the distinct ties to parity and disparity. The level of disparity that sets out particular alternatives of free trade and ostensibly safeguard fecundity and gains is barely accordant with the democratic philosophy of even rights and prospects for political participation. Socioeconomic inequality challenges the core democratic principle of equality in engagement, representation and governance.

Economic free market is pernicious to democracy, as it has fissured its social and political “embeddedness”. This has led to fiscal volatility, technological breakdown, broadening social and economic imbalance and organic flaws. This anyway does not by any means imply that free trade is incongruous with democracy. A viable concomitance of free market and democracy is obtained best under collective integration. The subsistence of the right to privy possessions and

operational trades are critical constraints on the concentration of political authority in democratic rules. Notably in connection with industrialization, free trade frees requisitions, protests and liberates endeavors that can, under propitious circumstances, lead to democratization regardless of the deviating market trade targets.

Ultimately, there are intrinsic structural filings in democratic policy. In Kenya, unrestrained campaigns funded continues to subvert democracy. The splendid corruption of the electoral scheme only accentuates the problem. The schism of media has also tainted the aptitude of the democratic structure to establish a viable concurrence around what is left of the political core.

Social factors such as class, patronage and ethnicity are other possible factors that might lead to the failure of a democracy. These social factors outlines the foundation on which democracy as a political regime rests. The reality of class difference in society has negatively affected democracy which has a principle that respects all citizens as equals. Today, a dependence on patronage has ushered increased volatility in Africa that has guided misrepresentation of economic policies and political agencies. The economic and agencies misrepresentations has made it difficult for democracy to reach its ideal level. This fashion of governance has been associated to the region's political warfare.

Democracy epitomizes four core philosophies: liberty, justice, free engagement of citizens and human rights. These "democratic tenets" are said to "institute a primary fountain of ordinary value that can be portrayed as the ordinary patrimony of man." Though ordinary to all "genuine democracies," these tenets will take on different forms, and will be realized by different means, in different societies. It is considered that democracy ought to reflect the particular social, cultural and economic context of a given society.

5.2. Conclusions

The first and main objective of this paper was to identify the distinct paradoxes that underpin the very idea of liberal democracy. Upon review of selected literature sources the study has established that paradoxes arise from the conditions that many of the democratic commitments are met but compromised by their own intrinsic contradictions or by other social and economic

fashions. In this regard, the study has established that democracy as a political order has a number of its principles that are paradoxical which then play out as possible obstacles to obtaining optimal point of liberal democracy.

The study has also established that social factors compromise democratic operations. Social factors such as class, patronage and ethnicity are other possible factors that might lead to the failure of a democracy. These social factors outlines the foundation on which democracy as a political regime rests. The reality of class difference in society has negatively affected democracy which has a principle that respects all citizens as equals. Today, a dependence on patronage has ushered increased volatility in Africa that has guided misrepresentation of economic policies and political agencies. The economic and agencies misrepresentations has made it difficult for democracy to reach its ideal level. This fashion of governance has been associated to the region's political warfare.

Hence the study concludes by suggesting that, Kenya's failure to attain optimal democracy could partly be attributed to the inadequate establishment of essential aspects of liberal democracy. For a swift run of democracy, democratic principles and ideals have to be in place. Since democracy embodies four basic principles: freedom, justice, free engagement of citizens and human rights. These "democratic tenets" are thought to "embody a primary source of ordinary value that can be described as the ordinary tradition of man." Though ordinary to all "genuine democracies," these tenets will take on different forms, and will be accomplished by different means, in different societies. It is considered that democracy should reflect the specific social, cultural and economic context of a given society

In search for possible ways to blunt the paradoxes, the study established that, success of liberal democracy does not only lie in institutional and constitutional changes. It is from these institutions that the democratic principles of equality principle, constitutionalism, universal citizenship principle, popular sovereignty principle are achieved and realized. As much as it is necessary to have various institutions in place for the smooth run of a democracy, the human factor should also be given much priority. This is because, agencies and bodies are composed of human and material resources. It is the human resources of an agency that converts the material

resources of an institution into a complete or consumable products and it is the human resources that can see the failure or success of an institution.

These institutions epitomizes the principal demand of a democratic rule. Nonetheless, these tenets do not decree a particular execution. Instead, it is imperative for a given political system to draft a set of political agencies through which the tenets of liberty, equality, and sovereignty are executed. There is a sensible rift between the tenets and the agencies execution, in the sense that people can always contest in the event that the specifics of local agencies properly implement the pertinent primary values. It is probable, additionally, that different multi agency provisions represent different ways of accommodating the primary values, and represent different types of compromise among them.

5.3. Recommendations

Clearly after finding out that some of the key essential principles of liberal democracy are paradoxical, we realize the need to blunt them so as to reach an ideal state of liberal democracy. The research recommends human development as a vital element that will be key in unlocking the human positive factors. In that the development of right human persons will therefore positively impact on the general development of human persons by positively inculcating virtues and therefore transform their character as well.

Virtues are moral habits that then form part of the character or way of being of a person. They are strengths in a person's character that make it easier to perform good actions because they form an inclination towards the actions that correspond to the given virtue. This does not make them less meritorious but rather more meritorious since they imply a greater conformity of the will with the good action involved. The virtuous action as Aristotle teaches is always a point between two possible extremes, the defective and the unreasonable excess. The mean, the middle point is not, by any means, a point of mediocrity. It is the point of excellence. Virtue is the exercise of excellence guided by right reason. Virtue results from the positive and habitual good use and application of our capacities for rationality, freedom, consciousness and deliberate action. When the latter are subjected to right reason the result is virtue.

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In liberal democracy, representations forms another core principle because poor choice of representatives will jeopardize any efforts in establishing optimal democracy. A representative government is understood to stand for 'the whole people', or some numerous portion of it. It exercises the ultimate controlling power through deputies periodically elected by the people themselves. Representation that has been corrupted by social factors of ethnicity, elitism and patronage therefore undermines the very key functionality of a democracy.

J.S. Mill states that 'the individuals in a democratic state ought to command supreme authority in all its totality. The citizen ought to be commanders any time they gratify. They have to remain the chief commanders of all the activities of the state'. The very capacity to posse and be the master can clearly be realized by instilling the human positive factors which will bring about the development of virtuous men and women.

Edmund Burke, a philosopher and politician, states down the conditions necessary for representatives in their attempts to create a vital democracy. He claimed that a representative ought to be directed by four things, specifically electorate standpoints, logical evaluations, regard of the domestic well-being and personal ideologies or awareness. In the contemporary realm, most individuals tend to view a delegate in Burkean terms: an individual with prudence and liable or anticipated to act in responsiveness to domestic, nationwide and privy demands.

Finally the research established the need to redefine democracy, many nations have to define democracy as a value. So that on the course of shaping the kind of leadership in Kenya, the only possible solution is to inculcate values into the political system. Values are effects individual treasure and volition to safeguard and guarantee their durability.

Culture, by description is the way of life of particular people, is an ideal model of an embodiment of values. Democracy as a value therefore means that citizens will do what it takes to safeguard it as part of their culture making it a way of life of particular individuals. Like any feature of culture, communities require to be socialized into adopting democracy and its principles. Socialization, which is the technique of transmitting (democratic) values, can be accomplished in two ways: The primary techniques is the formal method of learning or schooling which demands a structured learning curriculum within which members of a particular community will be obliged to learn.

The second is within an informal method of shift of values of democracy- the human positive factors. As democracy transits into a way of life among societies. Democratic values are transmitted down from one period to another, sometimes within a non-deliberate process within the initial phases of one's socialization.

For democratic values to be passed on to the members of a society, formally or informally, the polity culture across a particular state ought to be convenient to democratic standards. For instance, it is hard to anticipate democracy to take base in a tyranny. Even where the ambience is convenient to the prosperity of democracy, it has to embed in citizen's culture.

Comprehending democracy as a value also implies that it will be practiced at all stages and in all domains of life. It is not only confined to fields of conventional political primacy but rather forms an orienting principle in ordinary life. Consequently, if democracy as a value is realized, endorsed and integrated by the citizens it ought to be practiced in households, localities, learning institutions and at workplaces. That way, every citizen in a democratic community is socialized into the society's democratic norms and customs.

A "genuine democracy" demands a minimal model of existence that in return demands a minimal degree of growth. This growth that is demanded is not only economic and social but the human development as well. Human development and growth forms the basic foundation on which all the four principles rest. So that without proper human development, then the basic principles could not be essential because it will be impossible to achieve any democratic state.

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