

Encl after FROT
5538

Info.
Hearing 140

1916

1 Inch.

Raid by Aulikan Somalis
on Samburu

in Dec last. Submit report with
reports by Civil, military & Police officers.
Raid must not be confused with recent attack
on Seranti, although it may possibly be due to
same influences. States action taken for protection
of frontier

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Subsequent Paper
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J. C. ...

EAST AFRICA PROTECTORATE
No. 140.

GOVERNMENT HOUSE,
NAIROBI,
BRITISH EAST AFRICA.

March 1st, 1916

17 8
Rec
Recd 31 MAR 16

Sir,

I have the honour to report as follows on a raid made by Aulihan Somalis on the Samburu in the early part of last December. This raid must in no way be confused with the more recent attack on Serehli by the same tribe, although it may very possibly be similarly due to the influence of Abdurrahman Mursaal.

2. On December 6th a telegram sent via Nyeri was received from Mr. Ashton, the Assistant District Commissioner in charge of transport at the Uaso Nyiro Post to the effect that Samburu manyattas three days distance from the Post had been raided by Somalis with a loss of 45 killed and a large number of stock looted.

Mr. Deck
10-12-15

Mr. Ashvon
18-12-15

Mr. Horne
with encls.
18-12-15

Mr. ...
18-12-15

Ag. P. C. Nismayu
with encl.
4-1-16

Do.
4-1-16

Mr. C. of P.
with encl.
4-2-16

Mr. Ag. P. C. Nyeri
with encl.
18-2-16

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE
ANDREW BONAR LAW, P.C., M.P.,
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES,
DOWNING STREET,
LONDON, S. W.

London. Four days later the same information was received by a telegram from the same source on its way down to Nairobi after a delay. A copy of one of the northern Frontier reports of the same character. From this telegram, a copy of which I attach, it became clear that the raid had taken place in the Kericho District. Mr. Beck was instructed to remain where he was and the various communications suggested by him were sent to London, Addis Ababa, Nairobi, the military authorities being at the same time asked to state what assistance they could give. The latter were at first unable to spare any men, but subsequently on the receipt of a further communication from Mr. Beck emphasizing the need for active measures of reprisal it was arranged that 50 men of the Police Service Companies under Captain Gulseley-Fourue should be sent to cooperate with him. The Officer Commanding Troops, Jutaland, also arranged to send a Camel Corps patrol to endeavour to intercept the raiders at Dieff.

3. In the meanwhile the District Commissioner, Kericho, and his officers were endeavouring to follow up the Aulihan in conjunction with Mr. Ashton, but though they made the most strenuous efforts they were

unable

unable to do so and were eventually compelled to return owing to the dispersal of their transport porters in a sudden attack. I attach copies of reports by Mr. Ashton and Mr. Horne on this phase of the affair. I consider that the energy displayed by these officers was most commendable and caused an intimation of my approval to be addressed to them.

4. On January 4th Mr. Deck telegraphed that the raiders had either gone to the Deshek Wama in Jubaland or down the Tana River and arrangements were made that Mr. Chamier should proceed from Kipini with 20 Police and Mr. Llewellyn from Wajheir with 30 to meet at Sankuri in case they took the latter route.

5. On January 7th the attached report was received from Mr. Deck making it clear that the two sections of the Aulihan involved were the Jibrail and the Turadda, of whom the former living near the Lorian were inclined to make reparation, while the latter and more irreconcilable section had retired to Jubaland. With these it fell to Lieutenant Rayne and the Camel Corps to deal. His first attempt to recover the stock was unsuccessful, vide the report attached, but he was subsequently

able to seize the greater part as reported in the enclosed letter of February 5th from the Acting Provincial Commissioner, Kismayu.

6. In the meanwhile Mr. Deck and Captain Welseley-Bourne had been collecting the fine from the Jibrail for their share in the raid and up to the 9th of February had collected 1,000 head of cattle and more than 1,500 sheep out of 1,480 cattle, 4,000 sheep and 100 donkeys, which they had been told by Mr. Deck that they must pay, and it was anticipated that the balance would shortly be forthcoming.

7. I attach reports by Captain Welseley-Bourne and Mr. Deck on this phase of the operations.

8. The whole matter has of course been seriously complicated by the events at Serenli which I have reported to you separately. Captain Welseley-Bourne has been instructed to remain at Marti, where he will be joined by two additional Police Service Companies under Captain Rigby. The move on the Tana River by Messrs. Llewellyn and Chamier has been countermanded and those officers ordered to retire on Marti and Kipini respectively, with their being evacuated. The reprisals for this raid

raid in fact now become merged in the general precautions taken to protect the Northern Frontier District and Jubaland.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your humble, obedient servant,



By 
GOVERNOR

24 Dec 1916

TELEGRAM FROM NYERI TO CHIEF SECRETARY, NAIROBI.

253

Dated 10th December, 1916.

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1 98

Samburu south of Unso Nyiro east of Igombi hills heavily raided by Aulihan somalis from south of Lorian 110 Samburu killed and captured five manyattas goats cattle and donkeys driven off eastwards Northern Frontier District Constabulary understrength none to spare for recovery of stock suggest one officer SO. F.A.R. or Police be sent to Lorian at once Llewellyn can co-operate from Wajhier with 20 men Aulihan few in number and anticipate will hand back most of stock and captured Samburu transport and food for 50 men ready here now highly important immediately steps be taken or general outbreak of raiding at Wajhier may be expected suggest warnig kamu Kisumu and Serenii look out for and hold up all stock brought by Gaden raiders very likely making for Serenii via Dieff or Afuada suggest Kisumu send a patrol of 50 men to Dieff serious shortage of officers in Northern Frontier District, Moyale and Wajhier single handed please wire if I am to proceed to Nyeri report following.

DECK,

NORTHERN FRONTIER DISTRICT.

typed by

AP/C.

INCLOSURE

In Despatch No. 148 of 1916

M E R U,

18th December, 1916

259

The Hon. The Chief Secretary,
N A I R O B I.

C. O.
15398
Recd.
Dec 31 MAR 16

Sir,

I have the honour to forward a Report of my action subsequent to my telegram of Tuesday November 30th. on the raid on the Samburu Manyattas East of Yombi.

News reached me while on tour at Campi EI Borana at 10 p.m. on the night of November 29th. of a reported raid on the Samburu. I at once left for the Uaso Nyiro Post and arrived at 7 a.m. on November 30th. I there was able to make a fuller investigation and obtain some details as to the nature of the raid and the persons concerned.

I decided that in spite of the few days delay which had occurred in the arrival of the report, it was still possible by taking energetic measures to come up with the raiding party.

Owing to the Samburu Manyattas being situated in the Meru District and that further information elicited the fact that certain Men had been killed, I at once sent the information I had received to Mr. Horne, District Commissioner Meru, at the same time informing him that I was proceeding with 10 Northern Frontier District Police to Yombi and that I hope to be able to cooperate with him.

I reached Yombi at 5 p.m. on Friday December 1st and joined with Mr. Horne on that date. Mr. Horne informed me of all details of the raid.

and proceedings taken against the raiding party are embodied in his report and it is therefore unnecessary for me to reiterate them. He however wishes me to report on the action of the afternoon of December 6th.

It had been decided that we had gained all the information necessary to show by whom the raid had been committed and as we were now within the Aulehan Country nothing could be gained by pushing further ahead.

We had halted at 4 p.m. in thick bush country and Mr. Horne had informed me that he was going ahead to find water as the safari was only halted for a short rest. The camels were not unloaded and the porters were sitting by their loads. The Samburu levies had been halted at the rear of the safari and I had just instructed the Corporal in charge to place a guard on the rear. I then joined Mr. Gamble about 3 minutes afterwards a shout was raised and at the same time the Samburu levies rushed through the safari followed by the guard. Heavy firing now began and it was necessary to retreat some 300 yards before I was able to rally the askaris and effectively return the enemies fire. Directly afterwards the fire was open on our left by Mr. Horne and his party who had returned with all possible speed. Simultaneously with Mr. Horne's arrival I gave the order to charge, and on the enemy breaking we were able to clear the bush for some 500 yards to the rear of the place where our safari had originally halted. Mr. Horne then gave orders for a camp to be made and at 6 p.m. the same evening we started in the direction of the bush country.

Proceedings following on this are, I am informed included Mr. Horne's report.

The people concerned in the raid are the Tur Adah Section of the Aulehan, and although there can be no doubt that their action is only temporarily checked, I do not contemplate any further trouble from them for a short time.

The effect of our action on the Samburu is I think most satisfactory, for, while being unable to recover either their women or cattle they were convinced that the Government had taken all possible steps to do so, and there is no feeling among them now of lack of protection.

I have not yet had time to go fully into the individual losses on Samburu Manyattas, nor of the approximate numbers of stock driven off. I hope however to be able to send in a full report of this in the course of the next ten days.

I am sending copies of this report together with Mr. Horne's Report to the Officer in charge Northern Frontier District and Mr. Deck who I hear is now at the Uaso Nyiro Post.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your etc. etc. etc.

sd/- A.A.G.Ashton.

Asst. District Commissioner.

I/C Uaso Nyiro Post.

DISTRICT COMMISSIONER'S OFFICE,

M E R U.

18th December, 1915.

The Ag. Provincial Commissioner,

M E R U.

Sir,

In continuation of my letter No. 452/4/15 of 1st December I have the honour to inform you that I left Maua at 4.15 p.m. Just as I left the Maua a runner came through from Mr. Ashton, requesting me to meet him in Igumbi with 10 Police.

I arrived Maua (30 miles) at 2 a.m. of 2nd Dec. and sent for Mr. Gamble who was on tour to Igumbi, to meet me at Maua at 6 a.m. with his Police, as, from Mr. Ashton's letter, I considered the raid more serious than I had at first been led to believe.

We left Maua and marched to Kathau hoping to meet Mr. Ashton. He had not arrived, so I left next morning for the Samburu Manyattas. About 25 miles out we camped on the 3rd, and Mr. Ashton joined us with us, bringing with him 10 Northern Frontier District Police. This made our total 22 rifles, about 150 Samburu, and 12 Meru Tribal Retainers. From questioning Samburu and Meru I made out that the raiders had ten days start.

On the 10th we set out from Yambi with 24 porters—nine with our personal loads, five with Police loads, ten loaded with ammunition and 3 with packs. These with 2 camels carrying eight loads of packs constituted our transport. We reached the raided Manyattas at 11 a.m. Messervy inspected to corroborate the Samburu story of the raid. Numerous corpses and empty fowl grain containers were left no doubt as to the truth of their story. We marched till 5.30 p.m. and camped

the first camp of the raiding party. Here were mere empty cartridge-cases, and mere children had been killed, presumably because they were too tired to be of any further use in driving stock.

On the 5th. we marched all day passing two camps of the raiders. We camped at the Chibba at 6.30.

On the 6th. we ^{7th} marched a river bed called Kerimua, beyond which was a country comparatively unknown to any Samburu. I estimate we were now about half way between the Tana river and the Uaso Nyiro. We passed three of the raider's camps.

On the 7th. at 11. a.m. we came to a camp at which the raiders had branded all the stock, and divided the spoil, we passed two of their camps.

On the 8th we reached the River Mado Janga at noon and found two goats freshly branded with a brand which our Somali askaris identified as that of the Aulihan.

About 2.30. we came across the fresh tracks of two men; who had come as far as the top of a rise; the tracks then returned and went East again. We stopped four hours and then marched at night till 4.30. a.m. Here we heard voices ahead of us, and waited till dawn.

We then followed the tracks, and in about 30 minutes reached a Manyatta from which a shot was fired, and a Samburu was killed next to Mr. Ashton. The Manyatta was taken, and two men killed, both with rifles; a woman was captured and she informed us that the people who had the cattle had slept at the Manyatta 2 days ago; but had gone away.

I realized that it was useless now to try and obtain the cattle, as we were in the middle of the Aulihan Country, and the track here was crossed those of other herds; so I decided to make for the Uaso Nyiro by the Lorian, which, according to the woman, was N.W. of our position. We had obtained the information

the first camp of the raiding party. Here were mere empty cartridge-cases, and mere children had been killed, presumably because they were too tried to be of any further use in driving stock.

On the 5th, we marched all day passing two camps of the raiders. We camped at the Chibba at 5.30.

On the 6th, we ^{crossed} a river bed called Kerima, beyond which was a country comparatively unknown to any Sembari. I estimate we were now about half way between the Tana river and the Uaso Nyiro. We passed three of the raider's camps.

On the 7th, at 11 a.m. we came to a camp at which the raiders had branded all the stock, and divided the spoil, we passed two of their camps.

On the 8th we reached the river Mada Janga at noon and found two goats freshly branded with a brand which our Somali askaris identified as that of the Anlehan.

About 2.30. we came across the fresh tracks of two men; who had come as far as the top of a rise; the tracks then returned and went East again. We stopped four hours and then marched at night till 4.30. a.m. Here we heard voices ahead of us, and waited till dawn.

We then followed the tracks, and in about 30 minutes reached a Manyatta from which a shot was fired, and a Sembari was killed next to Mr. Anlehan. The Manyatta was taken, and two men killed, both with rifles; a woman was captured and she informed us that the people who had the cattle had slept at the Manyatta 2 days ago; but had gone away.

I realized that it was useless now to try and obtain the cattle, as we were in the middle of the Anlehan Country, and the tracks were quite different from those of other herds; so I decided to make for the Uaso Nyiro by the Lorian, which, according to the woman, was N.W. of our position. We had

We had obtained the information necessary to show by whom the raid had been committed, as there was nothing to be gained by following small herds which would have been mixed with the Somali cattle.

We marched in a N.W. direction through thick thorn scrub and at about 4 p.m. I left Messrs. Ashton and Gamble, and went ahead with 5 Police to look for water; which I had just found, about $\frac{1}{2}$ of a mile ahead when I heard shots. I ran back as quickly as possible, and met a quantity of Samburu and porters running away. I then came upon a party of Somali firing apparently at Mr. Ashton and party on my right. My party opened fire at some 40 yards, and after about $\frac{1}{2}$ minutes heavy fire the enemy broke just as Mr. Ashton charged into the open with a few Police followed by Mr. Gamble with the rest of the Police. We cleared the bush for about 500 yards. And at the Roll call found we were left with 3 porters (13 Mnyamwezi and two Meru). Our casualties were 1 Meru askari and two Samburu killed; 2 Askaris had run away-one Meru Policeman and the Corporal incharge of the Northern Frontier District Police. We then collected the loads, and placed them in a Boma. I came to the conclusion that we could do no good by staying; our porters had run towards the Uaso and as long as the enemy could not get round us they were safe. We took the two loads of ammunition and 2 small loads and started at 6 p.m. We marched all night in a N. Westerly direction and had reached open plain country by morning. At 9 a.m. we reached a Boran Manyatta. Here I rested the men for the day, fed them and bonased up for the night.

We consulted as to whether to make for Merti or for the Government ~~Station~~ Station near the Lorian, and decided on the latter, as Mr. Llewellyn might be there, and we could then get food for the men and ourselves. We reached this

We reached Boma at 4 p.m. of the 10th. and found that Mr. Llewellyn, Asst. D.O. was away at Wajhler.

About 5.30 next morning Isaac Issa Chief of the Balchan came in to see us. He gave us certain information which I forward under separate cover.

On the 11th. we left Aradima at 4 p.m. we marched till midnight when a halt was made. We set out again at 4.30 a.m. and marched all day camping near the Uaso Nyire at 10 p.m. of the 12th. Next day we passed Balesaa where we picked up the two askaris and Mr. Ashton's boy, who had run away. We arrived at Merti at 9 p.m. of the same day (13th.)

Next morning (14th.) we set out at 5.30 a.m. leaving behind 5 Meru Police and all the Northern Frontier District Askaris as they were too foot-sore to proceed.

We camped one night on the road and arrived in Igambi on the second night (15th.). There we met Mr. Deorly who had set out to meet us.

I am forwarding under same cover a mileage report of daily marches.

I have, etc., etc.,

Sd/-Edward B. Horne.
DISTRICT COMMISSIONER.

MILEAGE OF SAFARI.

266

December	1st.	Meru to Maua	30 miles
"	2nd.	Maua to Mathsu	16 "
"	3rd.	Mathsu to Igombe	23 "
"	4th.	Igombe to 1st Manyatta	25 "
"	5th.	1st Manyatta to Chibba	28 "
"	6th.	Chibba to Camp in bush	28 "
"	7th.	Camp in bush to Rest Camp	25 "
"	8th.	Rest Camp to Somali Manyatta	12 "
"	8th.	Somali Manyatta to Scene of action	12 "
"	9th.	Scene of action to Boran Manyatta	35 "
"	10th.	Boran Manyatta to Aradima	30 "
"	11th.	Aradima to Camp on Guaso	25 "
"	12th.	Camp on Guaso to 2nd Camp (Dec.12)	30 "
"	13th.	Dec.12th. to Merti	35 "
"	14th.	Merti to 14th Dec. Camp	30 "
"	15th.	14th Dec. Camp to Igombe	35 "
"	16th.	Igombe to Mathsu	23 "
"	17th.	Mathsu to Meru	41 "

Total 484 miles

Average of just over 29 miles per day.

At a Barak held by me at Aradima, I obtained the following information in reference to the recent raid on the Samburu Manyattas.

Issac Issa, Headman of the Ref Ali Section of the Aulehan stated as follows:-

"The people who were concerned in the raid were the Tur Adah Section of Aulehan, instigated by Haasaa Wighen, and led by his son Abdullai Ismail Wah Dekkeh. He further states that he Issac Issa on knowing that this raid was contemplated laid information at the Government Boma at Aradima to the Corporal in charge in the absence of Mr. Llewellyn. He also states that this section has been engaged in other minor raids on one occasion when he reason-
trated with them for taking boran camels he was put over the wrist with a knife; The Tur Adah are supposed to have approached the Boran to come in with them and on their refusal shot one of their men. He also admits that the cattle slept in the Manyatta to which the tracks led, and states that this was one of his own Manyattas, and that the place in which we were attacked was within 500 yards of his own village. Issac Issa states that this was an attempt to implicate him in the raid, and that main body of Tur Adah with the women and cattle are well on their way to Wamu (Wama?) which is six days march from Kimaya. He estimates the strength of the Tur Adah at 50 rifles and 150 Spearmen." This ends Issac Issa's report.

From the attitude of Issac Issa and the other Somali Chiefs, I am of opinion that the young men of the Aulehan generally are implicated if not in the actual raid at any rate in the subsequent proceedings specially in harbouring the raiders in their Manyattas.

All the Chiefs and Elders who were present expressed a strong desire to disassociate themselves entirely from the Tur Adah, and asked to be given letters stating that they had come in and reported the matter to Government.

I am not in a position to verify any of these statements nor was I, as they requested, able to inform them what steps Government would take, but told them that if they wished to show their loyalty to Government, they should at once exert their influence in endeavouring to obtain the return of the women and stock taken. As they promised to do. The results of their action should be reported by Isaac Isaac to the Usao Nyiro Post after ten days.

Sd/- Edward B. Herne.

District Commissioner

District Commissioner's Officer,

Meru.

18th December, 1915.

Block 4
13235
US

1st camp
18 Dec

Station
19 Dec

Station Road

2nd camp
20 Dec

3rd camp
21 Dec

4th camp
22 Dec

5th camp
23 Dec

N
E
R
D
3rd camp
21 Dec

D
I
S
T
R
I
C



Old camp
in 2001

Old camp
in 2001

High
road

Station

Old
camp

Old
camp

Camp

Station
in 2001
in 2001

Station
in 2001

Station

INCLOSURE *2004*

In Despatch No. 140 of *Maid 14* 1916

Inclosure No. 4 in Despatch No. 140
of March 1st 1916.

271

Lorian, Uaso Nyiro,

25th December 1916.

Sir,

I have the honour to send you the following information with regard to the recent raid by the Aulihan on the Samburu.

When I arrived where Mr. Llewellyn, Acting District Commissioner, Wajkeir, who had already arrived at the Lorian, had been visited by a number of Aulihan headmen who said they were willing to make reparation for the raid on the Samburu provided they were not attacked by the Government. These headmen, Issak Isa, Daganni Sheikh Hassan, Mohamed Omar and others all belonging to the Jibrail section of the Aulihan. There is ample evidence to show that they all tried to stop the young men of their section from joining in the raid but that in spite of their efforts about 50 of them followed the raiders and obtained 17 captives, about 350 head of cattle, about 2,000 sheep and a few donkeys. The headmen have promised to restore the captives and stock, and to point out to the Government Officers the men implicated in the raid though they acknowledge their inability to arrest them and bring them in. On Mr. Llewellyn's arrival at the Lorian they at once brought to him 8 of the Samburu captives and two mules which escaped from Mr. Horne's safari. If these headmen really intend making satisfactory reparation for the raid (I shall be able to judge of this in a few days), I consider their case will be met by

Honourable the levying of a fine _____
Chief Secretary,
to the Government,
Nairobi.

fine of 200 head of cattle and the arrest of at least 6
of the men who took part in the raid.

272
the Swadda

It was the other section of the Amiham, which insti-
gated the raid. The headmen of this section Hassan Seyid
Abdulla Hassan and Ibrahim Dalgub are all involved.
They have made no offers of reparation, and are obstinately
willing to see what action the Government is going to take
before making overtures. They have taken most of the
cattle and the loaded stock and have moved East along the
lak Dera in Jubaland and are now living about 4 days
journey East of Waika Wafo (Lorian). They are reported
to have sent large presents of stock to the Abd Ham tribe
in Tassiland with a view to securing a safe retreat for
themselves to the Juna in case of necessity.

I consider that no time should be lost in punishing
severely this section and exacting from them adequate
compensation for the Samburu. In view of the behaviour of
the tribe towards Mr. Horne's patrol resistance is to be
expected. Mr. Liggallin puts the numbers of the Turudde at
about 150 men with possibly 20 rifles, and very little
ammunition. There is very little chance of their getting
any support except from the Sarracah District, or, if
they retire to the Juna, from the Abd Ham and Abdulla
tribes. Prompt action will prevent them gaining support
from other tribes and should have the effect of making the
Fibril bring in their share of the stock, prisoners and
fine without further action being necessary. The Turudde
are at present living on rain pools about midway between
the Lorian and Amaha near the lak Dera. The rains have
been good and they will be able to stay there another month
at least. When the rains pools dry up they will be obliged
to go to some permanent water. It is impossible to say now
whether they will go to the Sarracah District, the Abd
Ham, Amaha or the Lorian. It is most important

OFFICE, LONDON

3.

to prevent them from going to Becher Pass or Serrenlah District, as from either of those places they can escape into Italian Territory. For this reason a patrol of 80 men from Kimsaya to Dief and thence to the Lak Dara is an urgent necessity. It will have the effect of driving the Turadda back towards the Lorian and Tanaland. A patrol of 50 men is also required to rove between Sunkur on the Tana and the Canal of (midway between the Tana and the Lorian) in case the Turadda try to escape into Tanaland and obtain support from the Abd Wag and Abdalla.

If these measures are adopted the Turadda will be compelled to come to the Lorian in the dry season (January, February and March) and they can then be dealt with by the 80 police and 15 Constabulary who will be stationed there.

It is of the highest importance that the Turadda should be adequately punished during the coming dry season otherwise the authority of the officer at Najhair over the Tades will be reduced to a minimum and that station might as well be abandoned.

The Mahamed Zubair are naturally very anxious to help the Government against the Adilman. They state, however, that if the Government does not take action against the raiders it will be very difficult for them to maintain any authority over their young men.

I see no advantage in following up the raiders from the Lorian while there is rain water all over the district as such action could only have the effect of driving them further from the Lorian. My present plan is to recover the captured stock from the Jibrail section who are living close to the Lorian and wait for the dry season to bring the Turadda within striking distance.

4.

(7th 18th) I have received your telegrams of December 10th and 18th. No further communication has reached me at present.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient,
 humble servant,

Sd/- G.F. Dyer.

District Commissioner.

PROVINCIAL COMMISSIONER'S OFFICE,
KISMAYU, 275

4th January 1916.

Raid by the Aulihan Somalies on
the Samburu.

Sir,

With reference to the above raid I herewith have the honour to forward report by Mr. Rayne who was in charge of the Patrol sent out to recover the looted stock.

2. I do not agree with Mr. Rayne's idea of "moving out during new moon with the camel corps and deal with them in the same way as they dealt with the Samburu". The whole of the Sereeli Aulihan are in a disturbed state owing to their being unable to obtain return of all their stock looted from them by the Marehan and threaten to leave the country and go and live in Northern Somaliland, so in my opinion it is not the moment to take drastic measures against a section of the Aulihan.

3. Mr. Rayne is again proceeding next week to Dierr on patrol but I do not think that the looted stock will be sent to Sereeli District but is more likely to be sent to the Abd Wak country.

4. I am daily expecting a report on the attitude of the Sereeli Aulihan and when this is received I shall be able to form an opinion as to whether it would be wise to recommend the Camel Corps to be sent out on a punitive expedition against the Tur Adi section of the Aulihan.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

THE HON'BLE

THE CHIEF SECRETARY,

NAIROBI.

Your most obedient servant,

AG. PROVINCIAL COMMISSIONER

The Provincial Commissioner,
Kisumu.
From the Officer Commanding Troops,
Southern Jubaland.

Sir,

In obedience to the request contained in your No. 1030/592 of 14th December 1915, I left Goowen at 2.20 a.m. on the morning of the 17th instant.

The patrol consisted of two British Officers, one Native Afendi and fifty rifles camel corps; two guides one of whom was a policeman and two officers' servants. The route taken was direct from Goowen via Solya on Dushak Wama, Kumbo to Amadu, from Amadu to Irres via Arabadebu and from Irres directly back to notua without touching Amadu and thence directly back to Goowen. The road was fairly good, though as nearly all marching was done at night the patrol had rather a hard time from thorns; bushes always interlacing over the track just about the height of a man's face when mounted on a camel. I supply attached to this report a copy of my road diary, so that you may see fully and judge for yourself the reliability or otherwise of the conclusions at which I have arrived.

I will now give you a brief outline of the incident which occurred and the interviews which I had with Somali which led to my adopting these conclusions. Very clearly in the day I found that the two guides, who were supplied to us, were quite unreliable and could not possibly go anywhere without asking natives for information. At Solya I received my first information as to the whereabouts of the Mohamed Kameir. A number were at Amadu, though their

chief -

chief was on the Deshak with a number of his followers, and the remainder of the people in Afmudu district were either moving on Afmudu or Kumbé, as water was running out fast at all rain-pools. I found at this camp naturally to take one of the guides into my confidence, but though he promised to keep his mouth shut, I found that no later than five minutes after leaving me, he had talked openly in camp of where we were going and the business we were about on. I then decided to have no more secrecy about the matter and rode boldly up to Afmudu and asked where the Anlthan raiders were. I had been led to believe that the Anlthan and Mohamed Zobeir were on very bad terms but I was informed at Afmudu that the two sections were more or less coming to terms, and patching up their quarrels, and that part of both tribes were still at Wassa, though a section of the Anlthan wished to come up to Kedit, near Pierré. The Afmudu people had all the news about the Semboum raid, and as I anticipated, on what information I had then gleaned, the probability of my running into some of the raiders at Pierré, I sounded them on what action they were likely to take if I had trouble with the Anlthan and had to lift my camp rapidly from them. They all protested that they were very good friends of the Government, that the Anlthan had misbehaved themselves, and their blood upon their own head. I told them in that case if the Anlthan raiders were anywhere within striking distance, we were going to deal with them, that I was glad of their friendly intentions as it saved me sending back for a Somali boy to keep our road open behind us, and that the last thing we wanted was fighting with the Mohamed Zobeir, but that the

Government intended to deal with the raiders wherever and whenever they could lay hands on them, and that there would be no shilly-shallying with any tribe who attempted to harbour or help them. I asked for guides for Bierr, and they were at once forthcoming. The fact that the Afmadu people were so ready to guide us to Bierr made me suspicious that there were no Amihan at Bierr whatever, and this suspicion was strengthened to a certainty by information gleaned from the Natives, by Sergeant Hirsch Eddah of "B" Coy, who accompanied the safari.

I then decided before doing anything further, to see a man named Maalin Abdi, late Afmadu in the British West Africa Protectorate Police, whom I knew well and from whom I was sure I could procure some information.

On the night of the 20/1/15 I marched from Afmadu to Bierr about 21 miles on the Bierr road. From Bierr at 11 p.m. I sent the guide who accompanied us from Afmadu with a letter to Maalin Abdi who reads and writes - telling him of my whereabouts and asking him to meet me.

If this was inconvenient I proposed going to meet him. At 6 a.m. next morning Maalin Abdi reported in our zariba. He stated that he had heard all about the Amihan raid, and that only one section the Fur Adl raided Sambara. The Fur Adl he stated had three subdivisions:-

- (1) Under Wazee Ibrahim Suldat
- (2) Under Wazee Hassan eji
- (3) Under Wazee Sheikh Mohamed and Sheikh Issak.

No Wazee went on the raid. The raiders have returned Eastward to Sumr, Djerrir between Mala and Shimbirre. These three subdivisions are probably not very strong. The road from Irree to where the raiders are now camped is via Ay-hale, Tanna or Dirrima, then westward via Issa and Bekacha. At Djirma there is water at present but every other place including Fargal there is no water. Water is also out at Dieff, but there is still a couple of days' supply unless the Mohamed Zubeir camped there and now moving (21.12.16). Southwards towards Madu and Mumba have finished it off. Maalim Abdi further stated that some of the Mohamed Zubeirs now at Dieff come from Saasu and that they have Adan Hazal's camels there. Adan Hazal is the chief of the Ser Ahmer. None of these men have been concerned in the raid, also that the Aulihan from Terent side had come as far as Dieff but though the Mohamed Zubeirs and Aulihan were patching up their quarrels that the Mohamed Zubeirs were distrustful of the Aulihans and had ordered them back from Dieff. The Aulihans had gone back with the exception of one man who came right through from Dieff, travelling at night with his cattle, and who had entered the camp of a friend of his amongst the Mohamed Zubeirs. This man was being turned back. Practically the whole of this information received from Maalim Abdi was verified by information gleaned by my spies. I kept Maalim Abdi in the camp with me under my own eye from the

the moment he entered until he left, a period of some hours, so that once he knew what I was after he had no opportunity of warning his people what he had told me. He gave it as his opinion that the raiders wished to come through Dirrib on to Kumbo as they had expressed their intention of doing so should the shauris between the two tribes be properly arranged. He stated that they must either do that, return to Wassa or go to Gare and join the Ogaden there. Personally I think this is unlikely and from information gathered through my men, also from a Herti Safari from Dieff added to the above, I concluded that the raiders, who by their action have made themselves most unpopular with the remainder of their own people, are hanging round between Wassa and Dirrib. Their idea being to come into Dirrib and water at CULLOLI and perhaps Tabtu where there is still a few months' supply of water - until any trouble blows over; or else, in the event of trouble, running South and joining in with the ABDWAK with whom they are most friendly. Any attempt to procure guides to show us the way to Tabtu was hopeless. There was no difficulty in procuring one for Dieff, though the road there presented no difficulties without a guide. I felt certain that if we wanted the raiders our road was straight over to Tabtu. I was quite satisfied that any further patrol along the Dieff road was needless, so I called a council consisting of myself, Lieut. Martin and Affendi Saleh Mohamed Kheir. I placed before these

Officers

6.

So were the information which I had cleared and pointed out that though I should dearly like to see the thing through, that we were getting very far in for such a small patrol should we cut across to Sautu, and in the event of our striking the railers our one and only chance of success was to start in and clean them up, a course of procedure which my orders did not warrant. That did a hitch occur and the Lohamed Subeirs youngsters get excited and join in that we had not sufficient ammunition to fight our way back. That we could not possibly, take cattle back that distance if fighting, and that our orders were to take the cattle, and that I was of the opinion that if we did take the cattle we would have to fight and it would mean another "deplorable incident" in Bomaliland. Both these Officers agreed with me that the patrol had done a lot of good and had been most friendly treated by the Lohamed Subeirs. That no raided cattle were making North towards Sarenli whatever and that the best thing we could do was to return and report. Maslim Andi has promised to keep me informed and states that should the railers come in he will send a letter on to me at once. Although I offered him half of the raised cattle the patrol recaptured, to show us the way across country and point out the proper cowpits he refused to do so - but in a most friendly way. Before closing this report I give you extracts from statements made by Hertie en route from Wajheir to Doshak. These Hertie state that the morning they left Wajheir news came of the raid. That they heard at Dieff only two sections of the Aulihan were concerned, the TUR ADI and Ber OWKUTO. The Ber Ali at the time of the

raid

raid had left Wagon and were at Turgudah en route Wana when they heard of it. They were afraid and very annoyed with the raiders and returned towards Wagon. The raiders are supposed to be attempting to enter the Abd Wak country and the Herti believe they have already done so. No Anlikans were at Dieff but some Mohamed Subair's were there and when the Herti passed through these people were packing up for a move into Dargis where there is stated to be plenty of water. Water was just finishing at Dieff when Herti passed through. You may remember that during the fighting about two years ago between the Mohamed Subair and the Abd Wak that the Anlikans tended and harboured a number of Abd Wak wounded and refugees, and it seems probable that the Abd Wak may help the Anlikans now.

It may be interesting to note that when we were at Wana that there was only three days supply of water and that all Somalis were trekking for Kumbo and the Wana. All the wells had fallen in and required cleaning out before water could be procured. I could see no evidence of any intention to put this work in hand. In my opinion there is at present only one absolutely safe way of dealing with the raiders and that is to mark them down properly, procure absolutely reliable guides and during the next moon move out with the camel corps, drop on the raiders and deal with them in the same way as they dealt with the Gumbere when they raided. No cattle should be taken away, but a few of the raiders themselves if possible captured alive with a view to negotiating for return of stolen cattle. The whole of the country from the time of departing on the first mission of the raiders not with, until the resumption of the march down and commencement of the return journey should not be

raid had left Wassu and were at Turgudah en route Wama when they heard of it. They were afraid and very annoyed with the raiders and returned towards Wassu. The raiders are supposed to be attempting to enter the Abd Wak country and the Heri believe they have already done so. No Aulihans were at Dieff but some Mohamed Saibars were there and when the Heri passed through these people were packing up for a move into Darris where there is stated to be plenty of water. Water was just finishing at Dieff when Heri passed through. You may remember that during the fighting about two years ago between the Mohamed Saibir and the Abd Wak that the Aulihans tended and harboured a number of Abd Wak wounded and refugees, and it seems probable that the Abd Wak may help the Aulihan now.

It may be interesting to note that when we were at Kuma that there was only three days supply of water and that all Sompalis were trekking for Kumba and the Wama. All the wells had fallen in and required cleaning out before water could be procured. I could see no evidence of any intention to put this work in hand. In my opinion there is at present only one absolutely safe way of dealing with the raiders and that is to mark them down properly, procure absolutely reliable guides and during the next moon move out with the camel corps, drop on the raiders and deal with them in the same way as they dealt with the Sambura when they raided. No cattle should be taken away, but a few of the raiders themselves if possible captured alive with a view to negotiating for return of stolen cattle. The whole of the business from the time of dropping on the first section of the raiders met with, until the resumption of the march during the commencement of its return journey should not occupy

raid had left Wassu and were at Turgudah en route Wama when they heard of it. They were afraid and very annoyed with the raiders and returned towards Wassu. The raiders are supposed to be attempting to enter the Abd Wak country and the Heri believe they have already done so. No Aulihans were at Dieff but some Mohamed Zubeirs were there and when the Heri passed through these people were packing up for a move into Darris where there is stated to be plenty of water. Water was just finishing at Dieff when Heri passed through. You may remember that during the fighting about two years ago between the Mohamed Zubeir and the Abd Wak that the Aulihans tended and harboured a number of Abd Wak wounded and refugees, and it seems probable that the Abd Wak may help the Aulihan now.

It may be interesting to note that when we were at ~~Adna~~ that there was only three days supply of water and that all Somalis were trekking for Kumba and the Wama. All the wells had fallen in and required cleaning out before water could be procured. I could see no evidence of any intention to put this work in hand. In my opinion there is at present only one absolutely safe way of dealing with the raiders and that is to mark them down properly, procure absolutely reliable guides and during the next moon move out with the usual corps, drop on the raiders and deal with them in the same way as they dealt with the Samburu when they raided. No cattle should be taken away, but a few of the raiders themselves if possible captured alive with a view to negotiating for return of stolen cattle. The whole of the business from the time of dropping on the first section of the raiders met with, until the reassembling of the ~~corps~~ and commencement of its return journey should not occupy

more than an hour and a half as no opportunity should be given the raiders to collect their scattered senses and retaliate any large expedition would be a total failure as would any ~~unsuccessful attempt~~ attempt to seize cattle at this time of year owing to shortage of water. I have taken great pains to collect information about the country water &c. and I am of opinion that the camel corps can easily get at the raiders. Also the last thing in the world the Mohamed Sabair wish at present is any trouble with the Government. A sudden blow at the raiders if successful would help to make this tendency on the part of the Mohamed Sabair more permanent and would save much trouble later on. I do not think you can afford to ignore the raid. Subject to the approval of my Commanding Officer whom you will have to consult before taking such a step, I am prepared to stake my reputation on the successful carrying through of the operation described above.

Sd/- H. RAYNE, Lieut.,

Officer Commanding Troops,
Southern Jubaland.

PROVINCIAL COMMISSIONER'S OFFICE,
KISUMU,

5th February 1916.

Sir,

Mr. Rayne returned from patrol on the 5th instant and reports that he was successful in recovering the whole of the looted Samburu stock in possession of the Hawash section Fur Adi Aulihan and also twenty four Samburu women and children. The remaining two sections of the Raidans, one under Ibrahim Duigh is reported to have gone South towards the Tana and the other section under Hassan Weji is reported to be at Indait.

Mr. Rayne managed to seize two hundred head of cattle belonging to Hassan Weji and Abdalla Wadaka.

These were sent into Sobiya on the Deshak and Hassan Weji was written to and ordered to bring in all looted stock and captives in the possession of his section within seven days. On the 3rd instant Hassan Weji arrived at Sobiya with two Samburu women who stated that the remainder of stock and captives was on the way.

On the 5th instant Mr. Rayne received news of the attack on Garwali and his instructions to

return

THE HON'BLE,

THE CHIEF SECRETARY,

NAIROBI.

to return at once to Yont. He accordingly collected Hassan Waji's cattle and returned to Yont bringing Hassan Waji and a captive Sereali Amihan with him.

Up to the time of writing the remainder of the stock in the hands of Hassan Waji has not yet come in.

2. Concerning the Sereali affair I am expecting the survivors in shortly and hope to be able to obtain some reliable information concerning the future intentions of Abdurrahman Marsal.

This man had a great idea of becoming a second Mohamed Abdalla - of Northern Somaliland - but unless joined by Mohamed Zubair he would be of no consequence.

I am of the opinion although I cannot produce proof at present that one Sheriff Ali Nairobi who was living at Bardera has had a hand in the Sereali raid.

I do not anticipate any trouble from the Mohamed Zubair but shall be in a better position to judge after my interview with the chiefs which I expect to take place in a day or two.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

J. Power

AG. PROVINCIAL COMMISSIONER.

Office of the Commissioner of Police,
P. O. Box No. 135, Nairobi,
14th February 1916.

Sir,

MILITARY PATROL.

I have the honour to forward for your information a copy of a report from Capt. J. F. Wolsley Bourne, O.C., E. A. Police Patrol, at Lorian.

2. If Mr. Beak has not been informed of the decision to occupy Merti might I suggest that this information be conveyed to him with the least possible delay in order that he may issue the necessary instructions to Captain Wolsley-Bourne.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

COMMISSIONER,
E. A. POLICE.

Hon'ble,

The Chief Secretary,

NAIROBI.

"MALKA WAJA"

or LAKDENA,

287

Reference Map North A 37.

16.1.16.

Marsabit.

To,

The Commissioner of Police,

NAIROBI.

"AULIKAN PATROL"

I have to report that the Patrol left Meru on the afternoon of 13.1.16 and after a most trying march across open and waterless plain reached MALKA WAJA (old name) or MALKA NYANJA (new name) on S.E. end of Lorian Swamp at noon on MONDAY 17.1.16.

The Patrol consists of Mr. DECK Officer i/c N.F.D.

Mr. Horne Dist. Commr. MERU.

1 Officer 46 R & F. N.F.D. Service Unit K.A. Police.

20 R & F. N.F.D. Constabulary

4 men Meru Police

4 Armed Meru Kangas.

6 Armed Camel and Donkey Syces.

Water for whole party as well as loads was carried on Camel and Donkeys.

On arrival at Malka Nyanja (New name) We were joined by Mr. Llew Ellis, A.D. Cat Wajhaiv with 9 N.F.D. Constabulary and 1 armed syce.

At Malka Nyanja, it was found that the bulk of Somali Villages etc. were at a point some 6 hours march down the LAKDENA midway between MALKA NYANJA - "WAJA" on Map and MADELI at place called MALKA WAJA, so we camp on here today built a stray ^{one} Boma and to-morrow will interview all the Somalis in the neighbourhood and decide what action is to be taken for the raid.

must

I must here note that Mr. Decks original plan of going to a point S.E. of Merti - known as GANALE GOR - had to be abandoned since rain pools had dried up and all Jibrail Somalis with their stock had moved up to the Lorian whilst the TURRADA Section (principal offenders in raid) had moved to SHIMBANRE on the LAKDERA, consequently well well out of our reach and with the three quarters of raided stock etc. etc. our attention should as a result only be directed to the JIBRAIL Section amongst whom we are now camped. This Section had about 60 men implicated in raid and are reported to have in their possession a quarter of stock taken from the SA BURU.

ALMA WAJA, 10.1.16. A meeting was held to-day at which a large number of Somalis Healden and Wasar were present.

Mr. Decks made it clear to them (they were all of the JIBRAIL sub-section) that unless they returned the $\frac{1}{2}$ share of raided stock and paid them $\frac{1}{2}$ share of fine and compensation for Askari (100 cattle) and other persons killed in raid 60.

Accounting in all to

1480 cattle)	
4000 sheep)	by the 25th January 1916 -
100 Donkeys)	

they would all be driven from the waters around the Lorian and all cattle there seen - Captured and Somalis of the TURRADA and JIBRAIL sub-sections of AULIHAN shot or taken prisoners.

Driving their cattle away from here will cause them less inconvenience and probably owing to lack of water for some considerable distances away; to say nothing of mortality amongst the cattle as the result of being forced away from water in this very dry season - (1) compel the JIBRAIL to join up with the TURRADA (who are now beyond our ^{reach} reach) and so enable

both

both sub-sections (of the whole of Aushab Section) to be collectively dealt with in a severe manner later on if so approved by authorities in Nairobi (SI) or to meet the demands now made by the Officer in charge N.F. District.

It is difficult to express a definite opinion, but I am inclined to think the JIBRAIL will meet our demands and consequently merely leave the TURRADA to be dealt with. This it will be impossible to do for some time, nor could it be done with the small number of men comprising this patrol. Distances are too great - several columns would have to operate from various points.

Tomorrow we proceed to the North End of the Swamp and will camp at ALKA BOBA between KALKA ATHI and Edge of swamp. We will there erect a strong boss and await level reports.

Above the Swamp trees are more plentiful and we there strike the MASIN-NIERO. Very little water is running out of Swamp.

Everything is drying up.

The men are all keeping ^{very} well.

Ed. J. F. Wolsela - Kourna.

Capt.

N.F.D. Service Unit.

S.A. Office

18285-

40.6
The Dispatch Number of March 1st 1816

NY 142/10/1/18.

290

Office of the Secretary of the Board of Directors,

New York,

February 17th 1816.

Dear Sir,

I have the honor

to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 14th inst.

In compliance of the order of today's date I
enclosed herewith some copies of the Journal of the Society, but let
you be assured that the Journal will be sent to you at 3 a.m.

Wm. D. D.

Ag. Principal Secretary.

15285-

1040

ENCLOSURE 408
In Despatch No. 140 of March 1st 1916

No. 147/10/H/16.

290

Offices of the Provincial Commissioner,
Nyeri.

February 16th, 1916.

The Hon. Chief Secretary,
Nairobi.

Small Rains on Semouru.

In confirmation of my wire of today's date I
send herewith copy of report for Mr. OBER, District
Commissioner, received this morning at 9 a.m.

J.R. Dale

Ag. Provincial Commissioner.

Cony.

Merti,
February 26th, 1918. 291

The Provincial Commissioner,

Myeri.

Sir,

I have the honor to inform you that I returned here from the Jordan to-day and hope to arrive at Myeri about February 28th.

1. Owing to long water-lays etc. etc. intervening I was unable to follow on the Faraha Section, which has split up, the no-section having gone to Jaoli and the Rara Tala district to Basalwa etc. etc. etc. section to Wana Sikani and Sankari.

2. Of the fine Wahier section, of which no doubt Mr. Wahier has already informed you, 1000 head of cattle and more than 1000 sheep have been received. Under these circumstances I feel I am no longer justified in retaining Capt. Wahier and his men. The headmen of the Wahier are busy collecting the balance of the fine and in my opinion that no immediate danger now threatens the administration of the Wahier district.

3. I hope I shall have the opportunity of discussing the Wahier question with you on my arrival at Myeri.

I have etc. etc.

S/- S. F. Dack.