

EAST AFR. PROT

C.O

44506

REL. 12 SEP 18

44506

234

WAR

1918

HIRALAND OPERATIONS JULY 1917-MARCH 1918

11th Sept.

Trs copy letter from G.O.C. in C. as to grant of A.G.S. medal and requests observations.

previous Paper
W.O.
27/10/18

Mr Robertson

Mr B. [unclear] Mr J. Fuller

I think we shd certainly support

that. No. 60. 35875 [unclear] in tie

General question of [unclear] A & S [unclear]

Dft [unclear] [unclear]

6/10/18
7/10/18

7/10/18

Mr Robertson

As there is [unclear] [unclear]

sent [unclear] [unclear]

subsequent Paper
W.O.
3/10/18

For further communication should be addressed to the Secretary.

War Office

War Office

25, Whitehall Street,
Ludgate Hill,

London, E.C. 4

the following number quoted

WAR OFFICE

44506

7, Pall Mall Street

REC 12 SEP 18

WHITE HILL,

LONDON, E.C. 4

Africa/969. (Medal Branch) A.G. 10.

No. September, 1918.

Sir

235

I am commanded by the Army Council to transmit the accompanying copy of an enclosure from the General Officer Commanding in Chief, East Africa Expeditionary Force, relating to the operations in Jubaland between July 1912 and March 1916, and to request that you will so good as to furnish your observations thereon.

I am also to enquire whether you have received any recommendation in this respect.

I am,

Sir,

Your obedient servant

J. A. G. [Signature]

Secretary of State,
Colonial Office.

D. 1. 1. 1.

C.O.
44506

No. A. 8433.
General Headquarters,
East Africa Expeditionary Force,
Dar-es-Salaam, 24th June, 1918.

To:-

The Secretary,
The War Office,
London, S.W. 1.

236

Sir,

I have the honour to forward herewith a Memorandum No G 149/3 of 25th May, 1918, from the Commandant, King's African Rifles, in which he asks that a recommendation may be made for the grant of the African General Service Medal to the forces operating in Jubaland between July, 1917, and March, 1918.

2. As these operations were of a more important nature than those against the Marehan in 1914 and Turkhana in 1915 for which the medal was approved I am in accord with His Excellency the Governor of British East Africa and recommend the medal be granted. At the same time I should be glad to be informed what relations these local operations bear to the war for which it is presumed a medal will be granted. Under present circumstances the best K.A.R. units, which are and have been employed against the Germans, will only receive the medal for the war, whereas units not equally good (which in some cases contain ex-German askaris) will receive medals for both the local operations and the war.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient servant.

revised
Lieut-General.
G.O. Commanding-in-Chief, East Africa Ex. Force.

Report on the re-occupation of the Mt. It. Col. by
S.M. Barrett, Commandant, King's African Rifles,
dated 7. 12. 17.

Operations in the Jubaland District, East Africa
by Lieut. Col. S.M. Barrett, Commandant
King's African Rifles, dated 1. 1. 18.

Headquarters, 5th King's African Rifles.
Kismayu, Jubaland.
30th October, 1917.

REC. 12 SEP 18

From: The Officer Commanding,
5th K.A. Rifles.
Kismayu.

To: The Staff Officer,
K.A. Rifles.
Maidoni.

237

DESPATCH ON OPERATIONS AGAINST THE AULIHAN ON THE
JUBA RIVER.

Sir,

I have the honour to report that Sereeli having been re-occupied on the 26th September, 1917, I made up my mind to operate against the Aulihan, who were watering their stock on the Juba River.

On the 28th September, 1917, I sent a letter to the Rer Farah Ogas, Marehan, telling them to send down some of their young men to assist the Government in these operations. I particularly wished these people to come for two reasons, firstly to take the work of driving the stock off the hands of the asmaris, and secondly I was afraid if they were left in their own country, there were great possibilities of their raiding tribes other than Aulihan in our absence.

In order to prevent any information of our intended move against the Aulihan leaking out, the following steps were taken:-

(a) The Farah Ogas were instructed to inform no other tribe or section of their intended move to Sereeli.

(b) They were instructed to arrive at Sereeli at night and to keep in the bush, to avoid spies on the Italian side seeing any unusual movement in the Boma.

(c) No natives were allowed to cross from Italian side to ours or vice versa.

(d) With the exception of Major Porcelli, no officers or men were informed of the intended move.

(e) A company was sent to Farnen in order to make the natives think that after the re-occupation of Sereeli, no further operations were intended, and that the GARFA HARRE garrison was returning to that place.

(f) Rumours were spread in Bardera that we intended to make no further move against the Aulihan. It was proved later that these steps were most effective, and the Aulihan were quite unaware of our intentions.

On the evening of the 8th October, 1917, some 400 Rer Farah Ogas arrived, and at 2.0 a.m. 9th., Captain Martin moved down towards SALUGLI with these Marehan and 200 Somali soldiers. I left Sereeli with Major Porcelli at 3.0 a.m. on 10th., on the English steamer with two barges and 250 men to co-operate with the land force, camping with them at DEKATCH the same evening; both columns left for SALUGLI at 6.0 a.m. on 11th. I had exchanged 100 Swahili troops at DEKATCH for 60 Somali troops, and 60 Rer Farah Ogas. On arriving near SALUGLI 80 Somali troops and 60 Rer Farah Ogas were landed and instructed to proceed through the bush to SALUGLI with 10

12 SEP 18

object of, if possible, surprising the Aulihan watering at that place. The steamer remained concealed until shots were heard coming from the direction of SALUGLI. On proceeding to SALUGLI, it was found that the party sent on ahead had captured some 750 head of cattle, killed 6 Aulihan and captured 2 men. It was expected that the land force under Captain Martin would join us that day, but owing to the dense bush between DEKATCH and SALUGLI, through which we had to cut a road for his camels to pass, instead of taking one day of ten hours we took two days of twelve hours marching each. On the morning of the 13th, 150 Somali troops accompanied by Merahan were sent out to follow up the cattle tracks leading from the river. On the 14th this force returned having captured stock and killed 12 Aulihan. The remaining Aulihan fled to the interior and we afterwards ascertained that large numbers had died from thirst as they expected to find water at MERJISA, but found none on arrival and perished in the attempt to get back to the river. Having obtained information from prisoners that there was some stock at WAREGTA, the majority of troops were left at SALUGLI to look after the captured stock, and some Somali Troops and a few Merahan were taken to WAREGTA by steamer, arriving there at dawn on 15th. The force was landed and again effected a surprise on the Somali who were living in the Waregta area. Unfortunately these people did not have a large amount of stock, but every head they had was captured and 4 men killed. The survivors proceeded North with the intention of joining Abdurahman Mursal, but failing to find water en route a number of them died of thirst. On the 16th the WAREGTA force reached SALUGLI.

Abdurahaman Mursal having announced his intention of bringing all his forces to attack the column on its way back to Sereali, I considered it advisable to send the great majority of troops with Captain Martin by land to ensure giving the Aulihan a bad beating if they had the temerity to carry out their threat.

The steamer with 1 machine gun and 25 men left SALUGLI at 4.0 p.m. 17th for DAKATCH, the land force leaving early the following morning, both parties being timed to pass AWILA at the same time. As this locality was particularly suitable for an attack by the enemy.

On the 23rd. both river and land parties arrived Sereali. Captain Martin was not attacked en route, this was probably due to two causes:-

- (a) That the Aulihan had suffered very heavily in their attacks on the steamers, the operations at SALUGLI, and from thirst.
- (b) That Captain Martin took every precaution en route and that the Aulihan saw no opportunity of taking him by surprise.

The Italian official at DJUMA has informed me that the re-occupation of Sereali and our operations at SALUGLI had had an excellent effect on the tribes in Italian territory, who informed him they had no idea the British Government was so powerful. He also informed us that the Aulihan had announced their intention of escaping into Abyssinian territory. During these operations we had no casualties amongst the troops, but one Merahan was killed and one dangerously wounded.

In connection with the re-occupation of Sereali and the operations at SALUGLI, I should like to bring to your notice the excellent work done by Major Forcelli, who was responsible for successfully bringing the steamer to Sereali, Captain Martin, who commanded the land column to SALUGLI and back, and Lieut. Bailey, who has done continuous good work ever since my patrol left Kismayu in January last.

3.

The troops all behaved excellently, the Somalis travelling long distances into the interior in their search for cattle.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient servant.

(Sgd) W.E.H. Barrett, Lieut. Colonel.

DESPATCH ON THE RE-OCCUPATION OF SERENLI.

Serenli.

7. 10. 17.

The Staff Officer,
King's African Rifles,
Nairobi.

240

Sir,

I have the honour to forward herewith my report on the re-occupation of Serenli.

I arrived at Bardera with my patrol on the evening of the 9th September, 1917. On the 10th. I received a wire from Major Dunn, forwarded from Lugh by Lieutenant Le May, informing me that Major Forcellli was expected to be at Bardera with the two steamers on the 14th.

The Italian Resident, Bardera, informed me that there is no Aulihan on the river, and that he had obtained this information from a reliable source.

On the 11th. in the evening, a letter arrived from Major Forcellli to the Resident Bardera, informing him that he did not expect to arrive at Bardera for 12 - 14 days.

I had been informed at Lugh that it would be possible to obtain as much grain at Bardera as we wanted, but on arrival there I was only able to purchase 200 lbs. of bad matara.

On the morning of the 13th. I left with my Patrol, and proceeded down the river, arriving at HAGAGABELI on the 13th. I did not proceed any farther, as I was afraid of missing Major Forcellli, and also I was anxious not to lose my baggage camels from tsetse fly.

I had sent scouts on to DEKATCH, who reported the country clear of the enemy. I then instructed the scouts to proceed to SALUGLI, to get in touch with the steamers.

On the evening of the 17th Captain I DEKATCH with the English steamer, S.S. Some received a letter from him stating that DEW the enemy, and that Major Forcellli with the had stopped some hours in rear, owing to the the steamer would be advancing again shortly.

x arrived at
n 18th. I
is free from
steamer
the

On the evening of the 20th. I received natives sent along the Italian side by Maj Italian steamer had been attacked near ANA. I immediately proceeded with 150 men in the steamer. Early the following morning we came across Aulihan, who had just passed, coming from the steamer had tied up for the night.

We proceeded on towards ANA, and to the spot where the attack had been made, fired by the enemy, but no damage was inflicted. We proceeded on to ANA, where I got to a village on the Italian side, and from an officer and 1 of the ship's crew had been wounded fighting, and that both steamers had proceeded. These natives informed me that there were large Aulihan about and seemed surprised that we had a party. After obtaining all possible information, I proceeded northwards to join up with the steamer. Almost immediately after crossing the creek on reaching the top of a ridge a large party of A advancing in extended order on our flank. The party was estimated to be about 100. Both attacks were repulsed by fire from machine guns and by rifle fire. Our casualties were 2 machine guns and 2 rifles damaged. Natives

not interfere with us, and at 2 p.m. I joined up with the steamers near MAKAKA

As I had been suffering from fever for several weeks, I handed over the land patrol to Captain Martin, and proceeded on board the Italian steamer.

The evening the steamers arrived at HAGAGABLI where we found Captain Martin and his force already encamped.

From the first time for several days the Officers and men of my party got a full ration. All ranks had been living on nothing but the camel meat for some time as we had run out of all stores of grain, flour, sugar, tea, etc.

The following is an account of the attack made by the English on the Italian steamer on the 20th September. The steamer, commanded by Major Forcellini, was attacked at 12.45 p.m. by a small party of Aulihan, who, however, appeared to be picked shots. They were supported close at hand by a large party, the cries of whom were heard since the machine gun had ceased firing. The English steamer arrived 10 minutes after the attack had been repulsed. Officers on the Italian side reported large numbers of the enemy were to be seen in the village, but on the British side. They reported his party appeared about 2 1/2 miles to attack the steamers. While they failed to do. One bullet broke the rear chain of the steering wheel, but this was repaired very quickly. Our casualties were Forcellini slightly wounded, and 1 of the ship's crew shot in the arm. That our casualties were so few is undoubtedly due to the excellent defensive arrangements made by Major Forcellini. Reports state that 14 Aulihan had been killed, and undoubtedly a large number were wounded.

A ammunition expended 1000 rounds; this includes rounds fired by Lewis guns and Machine Guns.

The two steamers left HAGAGABLI on the 22nd for Serenli. The Italian steamer, which had been requiring constant repairing on the way up, due to pump breaking, firebars melting, etc., finally broke down near Mansur. It was decided to leave Captain Deveraux in command of the Italian steamer, and 1 barge, and to proceed with the English steamer and 2 barges to Serenli. 4 officers, 60 rank and file, with 1 machine gun and 1 Lewis gun, were left behind on the Italian steamer at midday on 24th.

On the 25th., owing to the slow rate of progress of the English steamer, it was decided to drop 30 men and 1 lighter, under Lieut. Corn near MALKADI.

The English steamer, with 1 barge, reached Serenli at 10 p.m. on the 26th.

The land party, under Captain Martin, also arrived at Serenli at 6 p.m. the same date, having improved the road at certain places.

The following day the English steamer, under Lieut. Ritchie, set out to bring up the barge, from MALKADI, reaching Serenli without incident on the morning of the 28th.

The English steamer, under Lieut. Ritchie, with 15 M.I. and rank and file, left the same afternoon to bring up the Italian steamer. It was decided to leave the remaining barge under Lieut. Ritchie and a party with 50 rank and file and 1 Lewis gun. The English steamer, leaving the Italian, was attacked near MALKADI on the 28th, first by a small party of the enemy and later by a party estimated by Captain Deveraux to be about 100. Both attacks were repulsed by fire from 2 machine guns and by rifle fire. Our casualties were 2 M.I. grazed, and 2 rifles damaged. Natives

report that after this action 24 dead bodies were seen floating down the river.

The 2 steamers arrived at Serenli on the morning of the 2nd of October. It was decided to send the English steamer for the remaining barge under Lieut. Erskine, with three Maxim Guns and 1 Lewis Gun, Lieut. Andrewes, Sergeant Nelson and the gun teams. The English steamer towed the Italian barge Bardera, where it was left at the Agent's request.

On the afternoon of the 3rd, on the return journey, they were attacked by a small party of the enemy, 1 hour steaming south of BARDERA. The attack was repulsed by fire from 3 machine guns, 2 Lewis Guns and rifle fire. Our casualties nil. Both Captain Devereux and Lieut. Erskine expended 1400 rounds each in their actions.

The English steamer and remaining barge arrived SERENLI 8-45 a.m. on the 4th instant.

In all the actions the men are reported to have been quite cool, and fire control well maintained, the Maxim Gun teams doing good work.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant.

(Sgd) W.E.H. Barrett, Lieut. Colonel.

Commanding 5th Battrn. King's African Rifles.

100 1000/8 287
Int

9 October 1948

1000 502 10

Sir,
I am etc to ask the reb of
your order no 68/E. Africa/
969 Natal Branch a. G. 10
of Sept 11th in which you

DRAFT.

The Secretary
was aware

MINUTE.

forward a 1000 recommendation
to the Soc in C. E. Africa
that the grant of two
Africa General Service medals
shd be approved for the
military operations against
the Anti-Lan Sematiro in
Juba land between July 1947
and March 1948
The Comd has recd no
recommendation as yet from
your the case of the 1000

- Mr. R. S. ... 7/10/48
- Mr. R. S. ... 7/10/48
- Mr. S. ... 7/10/48
- Mr. Grindle.
- Mr. Lambert.
- X Sir H. Read 7/10
- X Sir G. Pidd.
- Mr. Hewins.
- Mr. Long.

for Conva

Reference -
CO. 533
202

A.C.P. has recently been
afforded (cf. the Arabian

operations of 1914)

but there was no difficulty
as regards the point raised in

the second paragraph of Gen
Lan's letter of June 24th

in this connection I am to
invite reference to the letter
from this Dept No 35875

of Aug 31st. The operations against

the Arabian are unconnected

with the present war & the

A.C.P. which is definitely

associated with tribal operations

in S. and W. Africa

in the long's operations the appropriate

Department. The other Arab units

which have taken part in the

operations against the
with presumably be eligible

for the general war medal

in due course. No 1/5th

of 1/6th War No took part

in the Jubaland operations

have not, so far as the

Lang is aware, participated in

the operations against

German East Africa, but

in any case, the War Medal

of the African General Service

Medal are of an entirely

different character & the Lang

does not think it practicable

to withhold the latter

in favour of the former

DRAFT.

ably this is not
one of several of the
papers

MINUTE.

- Mr.
- Mr.
- Mr.
- Mr. Grindle.
- Mr. Lambert.
- Sir H. Ross.
- Sir G. Fidler.
- Mr. Higgins.
- Mr. Long.

(SIC) B 1 READ