

EAST AFR. PROT.
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War
Office
1914
Dec 4
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German East Africa

Forwards telegraphic correspondence
as to the supersession of General
Aitken and the position as regards
German East Africa generally.

by Bokorony 4.12.14
by ~~...~~ 4
Lt. J. Fiddes.

- Some of the correspondence is
evidently missing. At the same time
- (1) That Genl. Aitken has been
superseceded (Good)
 - (2) That a defensive, coupled with a
minor offensive is to be adopted
for the present.
 - (3) That small operations against the
Germans are to be undertaken
near Uanga & Inyanga - at the
extreme S.W. of the land frontier of
the T.P.P.
 - (4) That the Uvuli area is reported
to be strongly held by the enemy

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- (5) That it is Tabora the occupation
 of which by the Belgians is reported
 (6) That Dar-es-Salaam has been
 bombarded from the sea. I understand
 that considerable damage has
 been done to it since.

Partly?

W. J. R. 4/12/14

H. J. R.

4/12/14

Note the statement in
 the Belgian news in
 London's tel

5.12.14

yes

7.12.14

5.12.14

6.12.14

4th December 1914

The Director of Military Operations
presents his compliments to the Under
Secretary of State for the Colonies, and
forwards for the information of the Secretary
of State copies of telegrams relating to
operations in British East Africa.

To the Under Secretary of State
Colonial Office

from War Office to

General Wapshare, Mombasa.

L.O. 126 December 4 AAA Your S. 66 December 2nd AAA

Until arrangements can be made to reinforce East Africa
offensive on any considerable scale is impracticable AAA

It is not possible to say when reinforcements will be
available but ultimate resumption of offensive must not be

lost sight of and meanwhile defensive attitude should be
adopted coupled with such minor offensive measures as you

find practicable e.g. the proposals in your para 6 AAA

Under these conditions distribution in your Command should

be arranged as indicated in your para 4 that is a C.O.S.

in Command of the whole with 2 area Commands and Uganda as

sub-area AAA You should effect redistribution accordingly

Further retention of all the transport seems unnecessary

and you might return greater part if not all to India AAA

Please report your complete proposed arrangements including

disposal of railway personnel and material AAA

General Aitken has been recalled and you will in the

meantime remain in Command AAA He has been so informed

directly. AAA

Troopers.

M.O.

From War Office to
General Sir
Sensibar.

C 127 December 4 1914 The Secretary of State desires that
you will hand over the Command in East Africa to Brigadier
General Wapshare who has been so informed and that you
will proceed to England at the first opportunity

roopers

12/14

SECRET.*Private and Unofficial - War Office.*

(No. 608)

2nd December, 1914, 6.35 p.m.

Your Nos. M O 113, 119 and 120

(1) It is necessary to modify in some degree my Nos. S. 51, 52 and previous telegrams, owing to the report that Tabora has been occupied by the Belgians, that Dar es Salaam has been bombarded, and other factors lately come to light.

(2) If a pure defensive is contemplated it might be possible for the whole force in British East Africa to be controlled by one General, though their administration would be very heavy. The proposals in my No. S. 52 would then hold good, except for the sending of Colonel Mackay to Zanzibar, and the retention of Majors Orr and Barclay as censors and embarkation and railway staff. Colonel Sheppard, Major Keen and Captain Elias to return. Major Dobbs and Captain Meinertzhagen to remain as administrative and intelligence staff. My aides-de-camp to be posted to regiments, British East Africa.

(3) Secretary of State for India's telegram No. 1378 suggested the appointment of two Generals. This would mean that the senior, who must make his headquarters at Nairobi, or some other centre, would have to delegate his authority over his area. If Tighe and Stewart are the only ones left, the former specially wishes to retain Sheppard, Dobbs and Meinertzhagen as his force staff, Keen and Elias as brigade staff in area, remainder as in paragraph 2.

(4) I am convinced, owing to the great extent of the frontier, the advisability of assuming the offensive on however small a scale, and the necessity of preparing for future offensive operations on a larger scale, should reinforcements be sent, that in any case, British East Africa should be divided into two areas with Uganda as a sub-area, the whole under the command of the General Officer Commanding of the force. In that case, if General Aitken resumes the command, I should return as he recommended. If he is prevented by ill-health from returning to duty, I venture to suggest that I should remain in command, the staffs and departments being as in paragraph 3.

(5) We are now organising and improving the defences of the frontier of British East Africa. It will then be possible for the less reliable Infantry to be used in fortified positions, and I hope thus that my present reserves of 1,000 reliable Infantry will be doubled. I am also taking steps to push Germans back from Umpa Valley near Vanga, to attack Mwanza, and to improve communications and water supply. The pioneers are doing useful work by technical unit.

(6) With the force at present at my disposal it is not possible to make anything like an effective occupation of German East Africa. The Infantry is short of British officers and the enemy have a very large preponderance of machine guns. I could not undertake offensive operations in German East Africa without reinforcements of at least two brigades of real good troops, preferably with four Maxims per battalion. If I had these I should propose to attack at Moshi, Arusha area and Voi Tsavo Longido combined with a landing at Dar es Salaam, which will probably be no more difficult to take and easier and more healthy to hold than Tanga.

For the command of the brigade of troops already in British East Africa I would suggest Stewart; for one of the new brigades, General Tighe; and for the other myself, or, if I am in general command, General Mallison. The two area staffs would be ready for Stewart and Tighe brigade. In that case I should not recommend that any departmental or administrative staffs should be reduced.

(7) With regard to the railway, if no reinforcements are sent, the railway personnel and material, except the railway companies, can be sent to India. If reinforcements are sent, I recommend the retention of personnel and material for use in German East Africa as at first intended rather than for use between Bura and Voi.

Repeated to Chief of General Staff.

SECRET

From Sir H. Belfield to Earl Kitchener.

2nd December, 1914, 2 p.m.

Referring to your cipher telegram of 30th November, No. 122, M.O. 1 (A), my opinion, after consulting with Wapshire, is as follows:

While the reliable troops now available in British East Africa are sufficient for defensive purposes, and can be effectively utilized in strengthening our position on the frontier, they are insufficient to attempt a resumption of offensive movements as originally planned.

The following movements have been arranged: (1) clearance of the enemy from the Mt. Valley near Vanga, (2) an attack on Mwanza, (3) improvement of water supply and communications on the Voi—Taveta road.

In my opinion it is most desirable to resume offensive operations as soon as possible. General Officer Commanding concurs with this, and states that as additional reinforcements he requires two reliable brigades, each containing one British battalion. Consequently, if possible, with an attack on Dar es Salaam, operations should then commence an advance on Moshi. The troops now in the country are adequate for the protection of Uganda, and no extensive movement is proposed from that direction.

No reliable information is available regarding the strength of the enemy, but recent intelligence leads me to believe that in the Tanga—Moshi region there are 3,000 to 4,000 Europeans and about 5,000 native troops. The whole frontier is fortified and the coastal railway is strongly held. If the report is true that the Belgians have occupied Kibira, this is an additional reason for a rapid offensive.

Pending the final decision on future operations I do not advise any material reduction of the existing staff. Further details are being submitted to you by telegraph from General Officer Commanding.

SECRET.*From Sir F. Jackson to Secretary of State for War.*

(No. 314)

2nd December, 1914, 7.45 p.m.

Your No. 2283, M.O. 1 (A), No. 123, 2nd December. Reference your cipher of 1st December. I formed the opinion, when passing through East Africa, that the available force including the six companies, Uganda King's African Rifles, is insufficient to take (the?) offensive unless reinforced by more guns and maxims, and by more reliable troops than Madrisi and Imperial Service troops. The only alternative in the absence of such reinforcements is an attitude of offensive defence.

the position of enemy's main force was between Tanga and Kibimanjara, with railway to reinforce any point threatened by us.

On my arrival here on 20th November, I found the position on our southern frontier was less satisfactory, and defended by police and reservists only. As I landed, our one company, King's African Rifles, was being embarked to proceed south owing to the sudden advance the enemy had made on our position. Since that date, the 13th Baputs have arrived with two mountain guns; they may alter the position, but the former were badly shaken at Tanga. They are very short of officers and, having no senior officer, our Officer Commanding troops has assumed command. At present the whole force can only act on the defensive, with no trained reserves in support, but I hope that East Africa will return a fair portion of our King's African Rifles. The troops available in East Africa together with any Colonial forces (if such are of the way to assist from other Colonies) should be employed to the east of Lake Victoria, whether for offence or defence. On this side the commissariat and transport is very difficult, and I consider the lake to be our weak point.

It will be necessary without delay to arm the three largest Council steamers; they are without any defence. The enemy still has an armed tug, the "Muansa," at large, and the crew of the "Königsberg" are now available by railway to Tabora.

Grogan, the Intelligence Officer in the Belgian Congo, reports that the Belgian Commandant, General Henvon, is not averse to taking an offensive, and that he assumes that Great Britain will absorb German East Africa. He is now acting on the defensive by Defence Scheme. I can see no reason why the Belgians should not be asked to undertake an offensive, except that we are not able at present to co-operate with them. In the event of offensive operations being contemplated by East Africa, I venture to suggest that the objective should be Dar-es-Salaam, in the firm belief that an occupation of the capital would result in an automatic relief of the pressure on the frontier, and would have a far-reaching political effect upon the whole native population.

* Group indesipherable.