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1936

CO 533/465

38066

KENYA

Italian Occupation of Ethiopia
(Kenya Aspects)

Happenings in the Province of Borana

Previous

Subsequent

R 247

3/3

to proceed

Kenya Secret - 7 October 1936

Is copy of report by M. G. Leese, HM Consul,
on activities in the Borana Province during the
period Apr - Aug 1936.

The report embodies and expands the information on our files in regard to the happenings on the Kenya-Abyssinia frontier between April and August, 1936. The narrative makes interesting reading and is supplemented by "Notes concerning the Norwegian and Swedish Red Cross Units" and "Notes on Italian methods of warfare and administration employed near the Kenya frontier".

side
summary
17.

In sum, there have been very few serious frontier incidents. The Italians have agreed temporarily to accept the boundary line and the arrangements concerning watering and grazing that had been observed in former times by the Ethiopian Government. But bearing in mind the fact that it is old-established Italian colonial policy to refuse trans-frontier watering and grazing facilities to neighboring nomadic tribes and to entice as many people as possible into their own territory, it is not anticipated that in the future the situation on the frontier, where nearly all the wells are on the Ethiopian side of the boundary, will necessarily remain either easy or satisfactory.

summary
18.

The following points are of particular interest in the report:-

Paragraph 4. The results of urging the Gurren, Boran and Degodia tribes.

French
Paragraph 9. The flight of tribesmen into British territory, *followed by Abyssinian*

Paragraph 18. The murder of Messrs. Mitonell and Devers by Arusi tribesmen.

Paragraph 22. The Italian obsession that all kinds of assistance was being given to Mas Bosta by the Kenya Government.

Paragraph 25-26. The occupation of Mega and Loyale.

Paragraph 31. Italian efforts to collect rifles from tribesmen.

Paragraph 38. Attempts made by Italians to burn forests in order to dislodge Abyssinian tribesmen.

Paragraph 40. Italian deserters from British assisting the Abyssinians. (These Tigre soldiers must have deserted at the same time as the men now interned in Kenya).

Paragraph 42. The freeing of slaves by Italians impossible because they had exterminated their Abyssinian masters.

Paragraph 52. Fence sitting tactics of the tribes astride the frontier while they made up their minds whether to live in the territory occupied by the Italians or in Kenya.

Paragraph 54. A certain number actually crossed over at Giddedua and near Sololo and will probably now stay in Italian territory.

Paragraph 55. But a certain number of Abyssinians have crossed into Kenya.

The notes on the administration of the occupied territory disclose that with towns and dwellers the issue is clearly black v. white. Whatever hatred there may have been of the Italian Abyssinian is forgotten, and news of the war is eagerly sought, always in the hope that there may be indications of the coming defeat of the Italians. Mr. Reece concludes his report by saying that though there is much that may be criticized in connection with the Italian methods of warfare, pacification and administration, the fact remains that, at present at any rate, they do evidently desire, and intend to try, to keep the peace on the new frontier. They have already made it clear that they are doing all they can to stop tribal raids and murders and to prevent friction being caused by soldiers.

It is a pity that only one copy of the report has been sent home. The P.O., T.G. and Air Ministry will be interested to see it. Circulate in original, to P.O. in the first instance for perusal and return.

Reece saying it has been read with interest & that it is being circulated to the P.O. & Air.

C. H. Ross

Seen
20/36
21/36
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36/36

The Appendix is interesting
Very interesting. To S. G. might like to see
20/11/36
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DESTROYED UNDER STATUTE

10 For Kenya Secret (Africa) - 10/12/36

11 FO (copy enc 6 1 in orig) (to be returned) 1. 12.36
replace in ③

12 FO 6058/45/1 3. 12. 36

No copy kept to 229 from High Radio Station
containing Mr. Rees's report (as in 1). Return
copy to ③.

Foot Put by (Mr. Rees's revision
a part of the work from
the 7th)

But the report should not
be sent to Gov. for
approval & return.

Draft handwritten -

3. H. Jones, Lt
8/1/36

as we now have 2 copies of
the report we can send them
simultaneously to the W.O. & AFM.
also we need not ask the
W.O. to return their copy (I
have spoken to Major Cole who
opines that W.O. will wish to
have a copy of this report. If
the AFM want a copy - which is
unlikely, - they can either
copy it themselves, or borrow
the W/O copy).

J. J. Gamm
8/1/36

7. War Office (copy enc 6 1 in orig) - 10 Dec 1936

6. The Ministry (copy enc 2 1 in orig) - 10 Dec 1936
revised
reference

7. The Ministry 3/12/36 22 2 3
revised
reference

reference enc 6 6

reference
- see attached
as per 23/1/36

8. FO 6571/30/1 9. 1 37

No copy of report from Africa Secret Station

Gov. Kenya relating to the Administration of the Territory

reference

Chief of Staff to Gov. Kenya
C. H. Gamm
23/1/36

Put by

J. J. Gamm
23/3

In any further communication on this subject, please quote
No. *J. 571/30/1*
and address—*not to any person by name, but to—*
"The Under-Secretary of State," Foreign Office, London, S.W. 1

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his
compliments to *the Under Secretary of State*
for the Colonies and, by direction of the Secretary of State,
transmits herewith copy of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office.

Feb 4 1937

Reference to previous correspondence

F
C. O. R. 31

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.

Subject.

From H. M. Consul -
General
Addis Ababa
no 14 of Jan 19. 37

Administrator of the
territory of Bora

Similar letter sent to *U. D.*

COPY

(J 571/30/1)

No. 14 (97/1/37)

His Majesty's Acting Consul-General at Addis Ababa presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit to him the under-mentioned documents.

BRITISH CONSULATE-GENERAL,

ADDIS ABABA.

19th January, 1937.

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
To the Governor of Kenya Colony, Nairobi, No.2 of the 19th January, 1937.	Administration of the territory of Boran.

BRITISH CONSULATE-GENERAL,

ADDIS ABABA.

No. 2.

(97/1/37)

19th January, 1937.

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that, by a Decree of the Governor of Galla-Sidamo dated the 2nd July, 1936, the territory of Boran is divided for political and administrative purposes into four Residencies : Moga, Moyale, Yavello (Idvello) and Muggelli, the seat of each Residency being at the place of the same name. The Residencies are placed under the "Commissariat for the Borana" with seat at Moga.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

(Sgd) W.L. BOND.

Acting Consul-General.

His Excellency

The Governor of Kenya Colony,

Nairobi.

35066 12/16

G. O.

Mr. ^{8/12} ~~Wasson~~
Mr. ~~Parkin~~ ^{8/12}
Mr.

Sir C. Parkinson.
Sir G. Tomlinson.
Sir C. Holtomley.
Sir J. Shuckburgh.
Permt. U.S. of S.
Parly. U.S. of S.
Secretary of State.

G.D.
11 8-DEC

Confidential

10 December

DRAFT.

- ① See A.S. of S. ^{8/3}
W.O.
 - ② The Secretary ^{8/3}
M.R.
- Report (sent to No. 1
in original)
do (sent to No. 2
in original)
- (G.O.)
(To M.R.)

I am etc to be done to be
said before the ^{① Army}
^{③ air}
Committee, a copy of
a "Narrative of Happenings"
in the Province of Borona
in Elthoria from April
to August 1956 prepared
by two former Peace
Officers, the Consul in
Southern Nigeria.

a spare
2 ~~to only one copy of~~
the report, ~~has been~~
received from the ^{F.O.} ~~Secretary~~
~~of State~~, ~~for the~~
one will be ~~stored~~
if the copy ~~expires~~
whenever ~~it may be returned~~
to the C.O. in ~~due~~

FURTHER ACTION.

(To W.O. only)

An order that it may be
circulated to the
Ministry. The report has
been seen by the
A.

Agree

is being sent to the ATR for
perusal and return.

- (To ATR
only).
2. ^{Further} A copy of this report is being
sent to the W.O. for retention
by that Dept. as the enclosed
copy is the only one available
for use in the CO. It is
requested that it may be
returned in due course.

Sya J. W. Wood


In any further communication on this subject, please quote
No. *J 8658/45/1*
and address — not to any person by name, but to
"The Under-Secretary of State," Foreign Office, London, S.W. 1.

CONFIDENTIAL 49

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his
compliments to *the Under Secretary of State*
for the Colonies and, by direction of the Secretary of State,
transmits herewith copy of the under-mentioned papers

Foreign Office.

3rd December 1936



Reference to previous correspondence

C.O. Letter No. 38066/21/36 of 1st December.

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.

Subject.

From

H. M. Representative,

Addis Ababa,

No: 227

To

30th October

ditto

No: 255

2nd December.

Report by Consul Reece,

Moga, on events in his

district April - August, 1936

(Enclosure to C.O. Letter under
reference returned as requested)

Similar letter sent to

BRITISH LEGATION,

ADDIS ABABA.

No. 227.

(345/14/30)

30th October, 1936.

Sir,

I have the honour to transmit to you the accompanying copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Consul for Southern Ethiopia, now established at Moyale, under cover of which Mr Reece has furnished a most valuable report on events in his district from April to August, 1936.

2. Whilst the account of events which forms the first part of Mr Reece's report is most useful as giving for the first time a clear and coherent picture of the course of the campaign generally associated with the name of General Geleso, perhaps even greater interest attaches to the "Notes on Italian methods of warfare and administration" which follow. In addition to the experience of Italian methods and mentality gained by first-hand observation, combined with his knowledge of the peoples with whom they now find themselves in contact, Mr Reece has further equipped himself by a study of the Italian press, with its peculiar presentation of affairs, both within Italy and without, and its revelations of Italian aspirations, foibles and attitude towards the many novel problems with which their "imperial" heritage confronts them. It seems to me that Mr Reece has observed with discrimination and in his provisional conclusions has maintained a detached impartiality which lends them an added value.

3.

The Right Honourable Anthony Eden, M.C., M.P.,

etc. etc. etc. etc.

3. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the
Governor of Kenya Colony.

I have the honour to be
With the highest respect,

Sir,

Your most obedient, humble Servant,

(Signed) PATRICK ROBERTS

COPY.

BRITISH CONSULATE,

No. 6 (69/1/36)

131

NO. 6-21st September, 1936.

Sir,

I have the honour to submit herewith a copy of a paper which I have written entitled "A Narrative of Happenings in the Province of Borama in Ethiopia from April to August, 1936".

2. It is probable that it contains little, if any, information that is new and that has not already been sent to you by the Kenya Government, but perhaps it may be of some use in your archives as a summary of the more important events that took place near the Kenya Frontier during that time.

3. I should like to take this opportunity of explaining that on my return here at the end of May I was told by the Kenya Government that they were sending to you every week, and at other times, all the information that was transmitted to them by the Officer in Charge of the Northern Frontier and myself, and that it was therefore unnecessary for me to send you separate messages or reports. I have therefore refrained from doing so.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

(Sgd) GERALD REECE.

His Majesty's Consul.

His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires,

British Legation,

Addis Ababa.

A NARRATIVE OF HAPPENINGS

IN THE PROVINCE OF NORAMA IN ETHIOPIA.

FROM APRIL TO AUGUST

1936.

OBJECTS OF
AGOSTINI'S
OCCUPATION
OF OMO
AND LIBAN

In January, General Agostini had advanced from Gola and had occupied the desert of Liban which lies between the Juba and the Gana rivers.

He garrisoned two posts, one at Gulla, near the Sidamo mountains, and one at Warka Gurri, on the Kenya frontier.

2. By occupying this worthless piece of country, two objects had been achieved. The people in Italy had been given the satisfaction of hearing of a victory and an advance at a time when the war was not progressing too well and there was also removed the menace of a prod in the ribs in the neighbourhood of Gula from Ras Dosta Dasta (1).

Having got as far as Guggelli, the Italians did little more for five months. Indeed they were fairly well occupied in protecting and feeding themselves in their exposed position in the Liban Plateau.

3. They did however continue work on the two roads from Gola to Guggelli - one along the Gana River and the other via Filtu - and they started to build bridges at Warka Guba (between Gulla and Gola) and also at Warka Gurri.

(1) Actually the seriousness of a possible invasion into Italian territory by Ras Dosta's army had been exaggerated for he had only a comparatively small ill-equipped, and inadequately trained force, with very few food or other and scanty supplies.

It was claimed in Italy that this advance also served another useful purpose. (Vide Il Giornale d'Italia 24th January 1936)

"The first effect is to cut more completely the activity between Ethiopia and British Kenya, which has been lavish in every way with supplies to the Ethiopian armies and in suggesting movements to them".

(A sequel is appended)

PREPARATIONS
FOR FURTHER
ADVANCE

PREPARATIONS
FOR FURTHER
ADVANCE
(contd)

They began also to prepare the ground further west for the next stage of their advance. This was done by somewhat peculiar methods. Rifles were distributed, both at Kuggeli and Malka Gurri, apparently without discrimination, to Gurroh, Boran, and Degodia tribesmen with the evident intention that they should go forth and kill as many Ethiopians as possible. (1)

4. But unfortunately since all of these tribes are enemies of each other with feuds of long standing, the results of this device were different from what was intended. A few Ethiopian patrols were indeed attacked and odd Ethiopian soldiers were murdered, but the main effect was simply to turn all the country on the Kenya frontier between Malka Gurri and Moyale into a worse no-man's-land than had been seen for many years.

5. Most of the trouble was caused by the Gurroh, who were led by a young man of the name of Hassan Gababa. This creature had not long before been given the rank of Graznach by the Emperor Haile Selassie for espionage in Italian Somaliland, and he had made great preparation to fight the Italians; but like all the other local tribesmen, on the appearance of the enemy he deemed it wiser to be on the winning side.

6. Much heed was paid to Hassan Gababa by the Italian officials, and he and his men were consequently able to do a great deal of mischief. The Gabbra tribe suffered most at their hands for they were weak and had few rifles. A large proportion of their stock was stolen by Gurroh youths armed with Italian rifles.

(1) The following reference was made to this procedure in the "Giornale d'Italia" on 14th March 1935: "The armed bands recently formed composed of natives of the Degodia tribes, also Boran people around Kuggeli who submitted to us on our arrival. We have armed these bands with Mauser rifles, mostly captured by the people themselves from the former Amharan oppressors. ...The guerilla warfare by the bands against the remainder of Ras Desta's army is absolutely without quarter."

**EASTERN
BORANA
IN A
DISTURBED
STATE
(contd)**

about six miles N.W. of Moyale, and destroyed two villages of Boran, killing about fifty people.

11. This state of affairs naturally led to the flight of a large number of tribesmen into Kenya, and a great deal of trouble and anxiety was caused to the British officials in dealing with them.

**LOSS OF
CONTROL BY
ETHIOPIANS
AND
INADEQUATE
PREPARATIONS
FOR DEFENCE**

12. The situation had soon become beyond the control of the Ethiopians. They evacuated Gaddadum, and confined themselves to maintaining a garrison of several hundred men at Mega and in the country between there and the Juba River, and a few more at Moyale, (1) but it cannot be said that any serious or adequate attempts were made either to control the tribes or to prepare for the defence of the country against the impending invasion. In April a raid was made by Ethiopians on the Italian post at Malka Guba and a number of casualties were incurred by the Italians, but they were not driven out.

**SITUATION
NEAR
MUGGOLI.**

13. But while this was going on in Borana, Ras Desta who, after his defeat on the Juba River, had withdrawn to Badara and Adola in Sidamo was in a much stronger position. He had with him Dejazmach Gabra Mariam, the former Governor of Harar and Minister of the Interior, and also Dejazmach Makonnen, Governor of Balazo, both of whom had brought with them large and fairly well equipped armies.

14. Soon after their arrival at Muggoli, General Agostini's forces had actually occupied Badara (the Ethiopians withdrew on 20th January) but they afterwards returned to Muggoli, deeming it unsafe to remain there.

There were then several engagements, two of which at least were of some consequence.

After 6th June a detachment from the Muggoli garrison under the guidance of a certain Fitawari

(1) - Occasional patrols were sent out from Mega and Moyale.

**SITUATION
NEAR
HUGGELI
(contd)**

Adama Ambesso who had deserted from Ras Dosta's army, attacked a force of Dejazmach Gabra Mariam's men near Madara, and were badly defeated. In this action a number of white troops were killed. A few weeks later Dejazmach Gabra Mariam himself with some of his men encircled Huggeli and succeeded in ambushing an Italian convoy bringing supplies from Dolo. A quantity of material was captured by the Ethiopians.

15. During this period there were also several raids made by parties of Abyssinians over the Juba River into the territory between Huggeli and Dolo, and in consequence the main road between these two places became unsafe. Use seems to have been made to a large extent of the new road along the Luan River, though this was not very satisfactory during the wet weather. It had been made very close to the river, and in places was flooded when the river rose.

16. Though Ras Dosta was in a much better position in the Sidamo mountains that were the people of Borana, his security was constantly threatened by internal troubles in that area.

At the beginning of April, the Arusi tribe, just beyond the Sidamo boundary, became completely out of hand. They destroyed the village of Huggeli (another Huggeli about 60 miles North of Irge Alem) and murdered many Amharas. They also killed sixty Abyssinians soldiers who were escorting a large caravan loaded with hides and coffee, and murdered (on May 9th) two missionaries from Irge Alem (Messrs Mitchell and Devora) who were trying to reach Addis Ababa.

17. A little later, in April, there was a war between the people of Kambata and Walamo, and this was with difficulty stopped by the Government's soldiary.

At the same time in Sidamo the Jan Jantu tribes became troublesome, and revived their old feuds

**INTERNAL
TROUBLES
IN SIDAMO
AREA.**

**INTERNAL
TROUBLES
IN SIVANO
AREA
(contd)**

with the Boris and others. They were eventually pacified.

In May the people of Gamo tried unsuccessfully to invade the Kofso district, and there was much fighting there.

**SITUATION
IN THIRD
WEEK OF
JUNE**

12. The position in the third week of June when the Italians resumed their advance westwards from Suggelli and Malka Gurri was therefore as follows.

There were large forces commanded by Ras Costa and Dejazmach Gabra Mariam near Wadera and Adola. (1) Further East in the Bale Province there were known to be several detachments that were occasionally raiding over the Juba River into the country between Dolo and Suggelli, and who were also preventing the Italians from moving Northwards along the Sobba Gestro much beyond Labba Shilinti - 50 miles North of Dolo. (2).

19. In Borana there was a small Abyssinian force between Arero and Malka Guba (3). At Meqa there were about one thousand men, and some efforts had been made to fortify the town by digging trenches, etc. There was also a garrison of several hundred soldiers at Yaballo.

But in the other surrounding villages such as Hiddilola, Dalka Koba and Tuka, nothing was being done, and the people seemed to be living in the normal manner as though the war were still far distant. Even at Royale no preparation had been made beyond the augmenting of the small garrison to about one hundred men.

.....
(1) Dejazmach Makonnen by this time had returned to Walamo with his army to quell the disturbances on the Kumbata border.

.....
(2) It is known that Dejazmach Dayanna Warid, the Governor of Bale, Hajironi Fikro Selassie and Fitauraria Atnaf Sugud and Tafari were in command of some bodies of troops there; and there were probably also some of the Rasibu's men in that area.

.....
(3) Malka Guba is on the Daus River, and the Italians had built a bridge there and put a post to guard it.

THE OCCUPATION OF MEGA AND MOYALE

23. On 23rd June Lieut. Colonel Settani left Malka Murri with a detachment consisting mainly of dubats augmented by several hundred men of the Gurreh tribe bearing arms. They proceeded on foot with camel transport via Balde, Ell Dor, Lo, Gof and Egder to Jamakk on the Mega-Moyale road and there awaited another force coming from ^{Mega} ~~Moyale~~:

24. On 25th June a column commanded by General Celoso, the newly appointed Governor of the Galla-Sidamo Province, left Muggoli for Mega in lorries escorted by tanks and armoured cars. At Mega Dejazmach Bobay and Grazmach Aboba fought in defence of the town for two days, and the Italians were not in occupation until 27th June. It seems that the casualties on neither side were heavy, and that there was no hand to hand fighting, but the Ethiopians at least succeeded in maintaining the defence until all their people had had time to depart westwards with their possessions, so that the Italians entered a completely empty town. It had not been bombed, and the only damage done was by the shells from a few small field guns (1).

25. Two days later, on 29th June, Colonel Zambon left Mega with a detachment in motor lorries to occupy Moyale. He met Colonel Settani with his force from Malka Murri at Jamakk, and together they advanced on Moyale which was reached soon after 2 p.m.

At Moyale there were only about seventy Ethiopian soldiers, and Ato Tekla Ghiorgis, who was in charge, had done practically nothing in preparation for the attack. Indeed he did not even know of the fall of Mega. For the

(1) The British Consulate had been evacuated on 5th May. It was subsequently entered by Abyssinian robbers who stole what few things remained. Practically no damage was done to it by the Italians and General Celoso put a post of soldiers there to guard the ground and buildings.

THE
OCCUPATION
OF NEQA AND
NOYALE
(contd)

local Baran, though professing still to be loyal to the Ethiopian Government, had treacherously concealed all news of the Italians' movements.

26. Noyale village is situated in undulating open country, and it was not in any way fortified. The only buildings were of mud. To deal with this handful of Abyssinians, armed mostly with very inferior rifles and with little ammunition, Colonel Zambon was given a battalion of Italian machine gunners, two Arab-Somali companies, some engineers, one or two small pieces of artillery, several armoured cars, an aeroplane, and about two or three hundred armed tribal levies - a force of nearly two thousand men.

The Abyssinians were taken completely by surprise and most of them fled to the North East.

27. A good deal of ammunition was expended, and a certain number of bullets came into the British village, but only one British subject, a woman, was hit, and she was not killed. The number of combatants killed and wounded on both sides cannot have exceeded twenty.

On entering the village, machine guns were fired through the mud walls of the houses, in case any one remained inside, and the soldiers then occupied themselves with looting. This was done with the evident consent, and in the presence, of the officers.

28. The worst incident of the expedition took place soon after dark, when some of the Gurah levies proceeded to steal cattle, rape, and murder some of the tribesmen, who were living a few hundred yards from the village. Three old men were shot in cold blood, and for several minutes rifles were fired at random. This happened between the Abyssinian and the British villages of Noyale, and only a few hundred yards from the commanding officer's tent; but such was the discipline of the force that, so far as is known, no action was taken about it, either at the time or subsequently.

ADMINISTRATION 20. As soon as Moga and Moyale were occupied, a
OF AREA BEGUN

Residents was appointed to each, and a start was made with the reorganization of the administration of the area. Patrols were sent to the Abyssinian villages of Tuka, Balcha Roba and Middilola, whence all the inhabitants had fled, and small posts of Dubata commanded by native non commissioned officers were put at Gafadama and so.

The people were called in, and were told of the new era that had started and how they would in future receive many benefits and would not be troubled with taxation. (1)

30. But in fact not much was done. A dressing station was started, but the doctor seems to be more occupied with politics than medicine. A school was opened, but the Boran, though ordered to do so, refused to send their children to it.

Many complaints were made about crimes that had been committed during the past few months by youths armed with Italian rifles, but nothing happened. The Gurch were allowed to keep the cattle they had looted from the Boran, and also a large number of camels stolen from the Gabbra.

31. Orders were given that all rifles in the possession of the tribesmen were to be handed over to the Government within ten days, but no steps seem to have been taken to enforce these orders and it is very doubtful if they were properly obeyed.

The one thing over which some determination actually was shown was the apprehension of the perpetrators of murders of children and travellers - a crime that has

.....

(1) They were also shown the might of Italy, and at Moga a tank was driven into and over the Abyssinian mud houses to impress the assembled populace.

ADMINISTRATION OF AREA BEGUN. (contd)

always been too common in Borana. 32. At this stage the Gur-oh levies began to give trouble. They were not being paid and had not succeeded in getting much loot, and so they refused to function further. Most of them drifted home. The Italians then tried to find Boran to take their place but were not very successful for by now the system of using native levies or irregulars in the war was becoming well known, and was not appreciated. Moreover the Boran are not a fighting people.

33. The Ethiopians who had fled from Moyale and the surrounding villages all went to the neighbourhood of Domo (1) where they remained for a few days while they were collecting their stock and other possessions. Letters were sent to them by the Italians calling on them to surrender, but only abusive answers were received. Eventually they all moved off to Tartull.

34. Probably not more than twenty or thirty Abyssinians had remained behind or returned subsequently to these villages. Middilela, Habel, and Daska Roba were completely deserted, and for some time there was no one at all at Tuka (2).

Since they were not prevented from going so, the Boran and others then went and stole the ripening crops from all the abandoned farms.

35. General Galoso had entered Naqra on 27th June. Shortly afterwards he occupied Yaballo, where he established his military headquarters, and on 3th July moved Northwards with a force of several thousand men

ADVANCE NORTHWARDS FROM MOGA

(1) Durin, the battle at Moyale a few Abyssinian men and a certain number of women and children - mainly of the Burji and kindred tribes - had fled to the British village. These were sent back to their homes the following morning.

(2) 35 miles West North West of Moyale.

**ADVANCE
NORTHWARDS
FROM MEGA
(contd.)**

along the Addis Ababa road. (1)

The Ethiopian forces evacuated Kulu (Agra Mariam) near the Sidamo border on 13th July, and it was occupied by the Italians two days later. They had not succeeded in getting any farther by the end of August.

36. Practically the whole of Sidamo is open undulating country which is very suitable for conventional warfare, and the Italians found that their British Army aeroplanes took and dropped bombs very accurately and usually where they liked, quickly and with very few casualties. But it seems that they had not given adequate consideration to the very different conditions that were found as soon as they left the Borana plains.

37. Wajada Forest near Kulu was the first real obstacle encountered. There they lost three tanks that fell into pits dug by the Abyssinians in the narrow track.

38. About twenty miles North of Kulu there is a big hill called Jabba Sirre, difficult of access and almost surrounded by forests and deep valleys full of dense bush. There Ras Iesta's force made their stand.

The Italians soon found that in this country nearly all their machinery was useless to them. The roads were too steep for lorries and armoured cars, while the forests were impracticable for tanks. Aeroplanes could see very little owing to the mountain mists and the dense forests and bush. They tried to use bombs and poison gas but found that as often as not they wereinjuring

.....
(1) On 29th June and for the six following days the town of Wadara was heavily bombed by Italian aeroplanes. Since no advance was attempted from Suggell this was evidently intended merely to divert attention and to assist in some way the operations in the Kulu area.

FIGHTING AT
JABBA SIRRE
(contd)

injuring the Jam Jantu tribesmen instead of the Abyssinian forces. Attempts were made to burn the forests, which protected so well the Abyssinians, but they were not successful (1).

39. The Ethiopians seem here to have adopted true guerilla tactics, and the Italians were often ignorant as to their whereabouts. On several occasions advances were made along different lines and sometimes they got beyond Jabba Sirre, but were always driven out again. There do not seem to have been many encounters on a large scale, but there can be no doubt that the Italian casualties were heavy and amounted to at least several hundred, including a large number of Europeans. On at least one occasion it was credibly reported that during a retreat the Italians had fired with machine guns into their own troops.

40. Both Ras Desta and Dejazmach Gabra Mariam had anti-aircraft guns, and several Italian aeroplanes were brought down. In the more skilled operations such as this the Ethiopians seem to have used with advantage some of the Tigre soldiers who had been trained in the Italian army, and who had deserted to Ras Desta during the operations in Oddo in the previous January.

41. After trying unsuccessfully to advance for nearly two months, the Italians eventually withdrew their outposts to Kuku and decided to wait.

They hoped that eventually other forces would penetrate into Sidamo from the North and from the East and so make things easier. They considered too that if they waited a little longer the Ethiopians would be getting short of food.

.....

(1) It is proposed to use aeroplanes very extensively for police work in Ethiopia.

ITALIANS
UNABLE TO
GO FURTHER

42. Meanwhile all efforts were made to embarrass the "rebels" by sending emissaries amongst the tribesmen in the unoccupied territory to encourage them to revolt against the Amhara, and many messages were also sent to the Abyssinians themselves calling on them to surrender.

In anticipation of the fact that when the rains in Sidamo have ended in October a rainy season is beginning in Borana, they collected large stores of all kinds of material, and also got together a few horses and camels which they now realise were necessary for any further advance Northwards or Westwards.

43. They also tried hard to recruit more men locally - without much success - and at the end of August reports were received that reinforcements of white troops had arrived and that orders had been given for Somalis to be conscripted in the Bardera area. A large body of men had also been collected in the Mijertoin country for service here.

The army in Borana seemed to have become much demoralised and discouraged by the continual defeats in the vicinity of Jabba Siree. Latterly whenever any Italian soldier crossed the frontier and felt himself able to speak without fear of eavesdroppers and secret agents, he would tell stories - not of the wonderful successes of the Italian army of occupation announced by his officers - but of untoward incidents. There were frequent tales of defeats, of aeroplanes shot down by the Abyssinians, and of lorry loads of troops being ambushed and killed. The Italian soldiers spoke too of the vast numbers of Ethiopians in front of them and of the awful difficulties of the country.

They were harassed a good deal by sniping, they said, and by other similar tactics of guerilla warfare.

ITALIANS
UNABLE TO
GO FURTHER
(contd)

On several occasions it was reported that an attack planned by the Italian staff had had to be abandoned because the men refused to obey orders to advance. Both at Hega and Moyale the Italian officers seemed to have but a slender control of their men and extreme precautionary measures and false alarms gave an atmosphere of nervousness.

44. It was quite evident that some miscalculation had been made. Marshal Graziani must have underestimated the difficulties of advancing through the Sidamo mountains and he possibly thought that he would be able to send reinforcements from Addis Ababa. The situation elsewhere was evidently such that he could not spare any men. Both he and General Geloni also probably did not anticipate that this force would suffer so much from battle casualties and sickness, nor did they imagine perhaps that there would be so little enthusiasm on the part of the local tribesmen to enlist (1) or so keen a determination in the Amhara to defend his country.

45. Whatever the reason was, the impression was gained at the end of August that though the Italians here still had plenty of money to spend, they had not nearly enough men to continue with the occupation of further territory. Not only did they need men to fight, but the farther they went the more garrisons were needed, and lines of communication were already pretty long.

46. At the end of August the position was as follows:-

.....

(1) In spite of the high rates of pay, the Somali and Galla tribesmen were usually unwilling to serve because the war seemed to be going badly for the Italians who had by then got the reputation for being reckless with the lives of their native troops.

POSITION
AT END OF
AUGUST

POSITION
AT THE END
OF AUGUST
(contd)

The Italians were in effective occupation of territory as far West as Punan Gubbi. Their Northern limits were Kuku and Nuggeli.

The extent of their penetration into the area North East of the Ganale Doria was uncertain. In the Gobe Gostro they seem to have come to a halt a few days march North of Habba Shilinti (1) and the Ethiopian forces were apparently still in possession of Jibir an Yalalo, though it had been reported that the Italians were at one time in occupation of the latter town.

IN THE
UNOCCUPIED
TERRITORY

47. No attempt had been made to penetrate in force into the country west of a line between Yaballo (in the Obda hills) and Kuku, but in that area several reconnoitring parties of Italian troops had been severely handled by the Ethiopians who were occasionally raiding villages there and who came even as far as Kunchurro. One small party actually reached the neighbourhood of Middilola (forty miles N.W. of Moyale) and remained there for a week or so. There were only a few Ethiopians left at Tertulli and these were apparently willing to submit, but in the Burji country (30 miles South West of Kuku) there was a fairly large force of hostile Ethiopians, consisting mainly of the people who had fled from the Gobe and Moyale areas. (2).

48. At the end of July there had been a rising in the Konso country, and the Itaureri in charge, together with his Amharic officials, had fled. A line towards the

(1) A big battle in which the Ethiopians were said to have inflicted heavy losses on the Italians was reported to have taken place at Mil Kot, in that neighbourhood, during May.

(2) West of Tertulli as far as the Omo River the tribes were apparently still unaffected by the war and the only incidents reported from there were one or two of the usual small fights between the Galubba and Hagar people.

POSITION
AT END OF
AUGUST.
(contd)

end of August there was another rising of Konno and Burji but by this time more Ethiopian troops had come from the North into the Konno country, and it is reported that the rebellion was rigorously quelled.

IN THE
UNOCCUPIED
TERRITORY.
(contd)

49. North West of Kuku the Guji tribe similarly revolted against the Ashara Government in July, soon after the Italian occupation of Kuku, but they were also suppressed and driven south west to the Burji border, where they remained.

50. In Sidamo there was reported to be a large Ethiopian army still sufficiently well organized and adequately supplied with food and ammunition. In the territory immediately north of Kuku, most of the troops appeared to be Ras Desta's men, though it is probable that the officer to whom credit is due for the successes the Ethiopians have had there is not Ras Desta but a certain Hagadras Sahalo (1). Some of the units of this force were being moved northwards apparently in anticipation of an attack being made by an Italian column from Addis Ababa.

Further East near Adola there was Dejazmach Gabra Mariam with his army, watching the Italians at Muggoli though the garrison there and at Arero showed no signs of activity and there was in fact little likelihood, owing to the mountainous nature of the country, of an advance from that direction.

51. Who, if any, of the many Ethiopian officers of high rank reported to be in Sidamo was in supreme command could not be discovered, but there was evidently some kind of understanding and cohesion amongst them, and the

(1) Ras Desta himself was known to have been at Adara in the middle of June, but when the Italians occupied Kuku he had moved to Adola. Since then he is reported to have gone farther West - presumably to defend Irga Alca.

POSITION
AT END OF
AUGUST
(contd)

IN THE
UNOCCUPIED
TERRITORY.

Italians were clearly not unimpressed at the size and seeming solidarity of the force in front of them.

52. In the occupied territory of Borana little of any consequence was happening. The tribes were living fairly peacefully and they had little to complain of, except perhaps the impressment of a certain number of their cattle and horses, the ordinary small extortions of the soldiers, and occasional offences against women. Some tribesmen had grievances about raids, stock thefts, and murders that happened prior to the arrival of the Italian main body which the officials would not deal with.

In the towns there were very few civilians, for practically all of the Abyssinians had fled. The traitor Fitaurari Adame Amboye was at Moga and was used mainly to sign letters sent to the "rebels" calling upon them to surrender. These invariably produced rude answers. Another minor official, Balambaras Aboya, had surrendered with eight of his men at Yaballo; but submissions had been very rare, and General Celso had not even the satisfaction of freeing the slaves because they had nearly all gone with their masters.

53. The Commissario at Moga, Colonel Sattani, was in charge of an area extending from Malka Kurri on the Dawa River to Lake Stefania, and he had divided this up into districts with headquarters at Moga, Yaballo, Moyale, Ruggell and Arero.

North of the Dawa River and East of Malka Kurri the administration was being controlled from Mogadiscio (the Odde district is excluded from the Galla - Sidamo Province) and the Residente's headquarters were at Bekol Manye. There was a big post at Saddoh (opposite Femu) on the Dawa River, and there were also smaller posts at nearly all the "malkas" or crossing places on the river between Mandera and Malka Kurri.

POSITION
AT END OF
AUGUST
(contd)

IN THE
UNOCCUPIED
TERRITORY
(contd)

54. Malka Murri was apparently still being used as a dump, and although there was no properly cleared road between there and Moyale, lorries were sent backwards and forwards via it. But latterly, owing to the difficulty of using the road on the river bank when the Laua was in flood the tendency seemed to be to neglect Malka Murri and the bridge that was begun there, and to concentrate ^{work} on a diversion at Saddoh going towards Ruggeli.

55. The tribes who have always lived astride the frontier had remained more or less in their accustomed places, and were clearly sitting on the fence awaiting developments.

For cattle owners there are no attractions on the Kenya side, and it was formerly only the bad administration of the Abyssinians that had kept them out of territory where the water and grazing is very much better. Their concern now is to decide whether the new Italian administration will eventually be so much better than that of the Abyssinians that it is worth while crossing over.

56. At Gaddadum and near Sololo a certain number of Adjuran, Sakuye and Boran cattle people did actually go, and will probably now stay in Ethiopia. Many camel owners also moved north to the Gaddaduma area, but it is unlikely that they intend to remain there since it is too old for camels at certain times of the year, whereas most of the Northern Frontier of Kenya is good camel country.

57. At the outset the Boran and Gureh seemed to be glad at the coming of the Italians. The Degodia were much more reserved and disinclined to enlist or to help them, and a certain number seem even to have gone into Kenya, fearing the possible consequences of the Italian occupation.

58. In all the tribes there are many individuals who have profited exceedingly by the war and the high prices

POSITION
AT END OF
AUGUST
(Contd)

paid for live-stock, and the traders of Moyale and Mandera have also benefited considerably. The latter now realize that it is not the intention of the Italian Government to encourage, or even to tolerate, the spending of Italian money in British territory, but nevertheless they are confident that since they can sell things so much cheaper than the merchants in Italian territory (1) a good deal of trade is certain to continue for some time to come.

59. There have been on the whole very few serious frontier incidents. The Italians have agreed temporarily to accept the boundary line and the arrangements concerning watering and grazing that had been observed in former times by the Ethiopian Government.

60. On occasions their troops have violated the British Frontier - notably at Gandad Guda, East of Gaddaduma and at Tulitu East of Moyale; and several times had they protested formally about the presence of British military or police posts near the Frontier at such places as Harbor, Gurar, and Sololo. It is likely that this was due as much to ignorance of the country as anything else (for their maps are very inadequate and inaccurate); but bearing in mind the fact that it is old established Italian colonial policy to refuse trans-frontier watering and grazing facilities to neighbouring nomadic tribes and to entice as many people as possible into their own territory, it is not anticipated that in the future the situation on this frontier, where nearly all the wells are on the Ethiopian side of the boundary, will necessarily remain either easy or satisfactory

(1) For example sugar brought from Mogadiscio costs about three times as much as Kenya sugar at Moyale.

32

Notes concerning the
Norwegian and Swedish Red Cross units.

Members of the Norwegian and Swedish Ambulances, (in charge of Drs. Uland and Rylander respectively) and Mr. A. Ion Smith of the Sudan Interior Mission arrived at Lukana on the Kenya Northern Frontier on 6th August, 1938.

The Swedish unit had come from the Bale province and the Norwegian had been in the Wadara-Adola area. They had met South of Iriga Alem.

They reported that they had received instructions to return (sent by the Ethiopian Red Cross Headquarters at Addis Ababa and dropped from an Italian aeroplane) on 22nd May. Dr. Uland had also had a message from the British Consul at Moyale on 18th June when he was near Agara Salaam but had been unable to answer it.

Their journey Southwards via Burji, Badessa, Tortulli, and Lug Ballal, on which they were escorted by some of Ras Desta's soldiers, had been comparatively uneventful.

They stated that the town of Iriga Alem was being controlled by Tigre deserters from the Italian army who had on 15th June arrested and imprisoned two Belgian coffee farmers from Wando named M. Biez and M. Colaris.

The Greek, Javak Karavasilis, who was used by Ras Desta as a factotum, and who was at one time in command of a column of his army on the Dawa River, was also imprisoned there on a charge of communicating information to the Italians.

The following Europeans were, they thought, still at the places mentioned:-

At Iriga Alem.

Mosara Saak, Cricar, Athanas, Dimitri, Panayoti, Coata, Dara, Wahan, Panayoti, Coata, Manoli, Alexander, Coata Manoli, (all Greeks or Armenian).

At Wando.

M. Chamol (French) H. Khl & wife (German) M. Flexa wife (Belgian).

South of Iriga Alem.

Pava Imbolis (French) M. Bartolani (Hungarian).

At Koffale.

Abbe Salaman (French).

They had no news of the Boran High Priest Pitaurari Gado Jile nor of Pitaurari Guyo Anna, or the other Boran chiefs and priests who had been arrested by Ras Desta when their people began to show signs of disloyalty, though it had generally been supposed that they were in detention at Irge Alem.

Mr Allen Smith, in contradiction to the propaganda published by the Italians concerning the atrocities committed by Ras Desta and his army, stated that on one occasion when one of Ras Desta's men cut off the hand of a prisoner he was put in chains and treated with great disfavour by the Ras. Mr Smith had heard of no other atrocities.

APPENDIX.

Notes on Italian methods of warfare
and administration employed near the
Kenya Frontier. (1)

HAIVEE
TROOPS
SENT IN
FRONT.

Native troops were apparently always sent in front when operations were in progress. (2)

On the other hand in the posts white troops are often used for manual labour which native troops could do.

The Italian have never succeeded in getting the natives to do work as should be expected.

GREAT
RELIANCE
ON
MACHINERY

Great reliance is put on air-cast bombs, tanks and aeroplanes, without which the troops seem reluctant to advance. But in the country of Sidamo machinery does not seem to have justified expectations.

USE OF
POISON
GAS.

Bombs containing poison gas or corrosive fluids have been dropped from aeroplanes on several occasions.

On March 19th when in a town was bombed, a British missionary (Dr. Allen Smith) witnessed the injuries sustained by about fifty people from some corrosive chemical said to be mustard gas.

On 29th Feb, and 3rd March following at a place where there were a great number of casualties from the same cause. Dr. Smith of the above hospital cross dealt with these cases, and photographed some of them.

(1) In compiling these notes, due consideration has been given to the difficulties involved in this war and to the fact that it is still early in the day to judge or to express opinions on Italian achievements and capabilities. But it can be remembered without injustice that Italy had planned this campaign for a long time; that she has used in it large numbers of men and expended enormous sums of money; and that many of the things on which comment is now made have also been observed for a number of years in So. Africa.

(2) On a number of occasions it has been noted that a favourite device is to send forward a small detachment of irregular Gubats (or preferably tribal levies) in the hope that they will draw the fire of the Abyssinians and when they retreat will bring their pursuers within range of machine guns manned by regulars or European troops.

DISCIPLINE
OF
IRREGULARS.

5. The training and discipline of the Irregular 'Dabats' who preponderate and who are mainly natives of Somaliland (Mijertein, Hawia, Mohamed Zubeir, Shebelle Bahanwein etc.) is not good. In spite of very high pay (1) and adequate rations, there is much discontent and insubordination. There is also a good deal of sickness owing to the cold and the high altitude which the Somalis cannot stand.

6. It seems that many of these men are conscripted. Some tribes like the Hawia are generally fairly willing, but the spirit of the Mijertein has been bad throughout the campaign, for they still remember and resent the incidents of some twelve years ago, when their own territory was occupied and they themselves were treated with considerable violence by the Italian Government.

7. One of the most noteworthy things in this area has been the manner in which the Italians have made use of the tribes through whose territory they are passing.

It is realized that the employment of tribal levies is not a new idea, but on this occasion it has seemingly been done with an exceptional lack of prudence and disregard for the future.

8. Mention has already been made in this report of the distribution at Nuggeli and Malka Murri of rifles to young men of the Gurreh, Boran and Dogodia tribes, and the results thereof.

On arrival at Moyale and Mega, the Gurreh refused to do anything more, partly because they had reached the limits of the country they knew, and partly because

TRIBAL
LEVIES.

(1) The pay of an ordinary soldier is at least 250 Lira a month, or nearly as much as that of a native Sergeant Major in the King's African Rifles or the Kenya Police.

TRIBAL
LEVIES-
(Contd.)

(5)
36

they were not making sufficient profit. It should be recorded that these tribal levies were never paid, but it was apparently understood that they should make what they could by looting. During the operations at Oyale, several hundred of the Gurreh were fed on cattle that had been raided by them from the Boran, and subsequently in reward for services rendered, they have been allowed by the Italian officials to retain a large number of camels which they stole from the Gabbra tribe during the campaign.

9. When the Gurreh failed them, the Italians turned again to the Boran, and issued rifles to them. In this case it appears that, although the recipients were utterly untrained and undisciplined, they were at least enlisted and controlled after a fashion.

10. The Italians are not, it appears, quite unconscious of the dangers of the scheme, for as soon as they have utilised each tribe undisciplined their territory, orders are given for all rifles in the possession of the people to be surrendered.

These orders have already been given to the Aulihan, Dogodia, Gurreh, and Boran, but although a certain number of firearms have been handed over in response to the order, there can be little doubt that many of them (though they may be hidden) remain at the disposal of the tribesmen.

11. However, the Italian authorities seem to be satisfied that these people are in fact disarmed, for they proceeded to re-issue to most of the tribes a number of Government rifles. These are nominally for their own protection, but are probably intended also to be used (together with their registered recipients) on Government service when occasion arises.

It is likely therefore that the net result

DISARMAMENT

DISARMAMENT
(Contd.)

of this procedure has been simply that some of the worst rifles in the tribesmen's possession have been exchanged for good Italian ones, and that each tribe is still adequately equipped to carry on with its feuds and raids as heretofore.

CHARACTERISTICS
OF OFFICERS.

12. The standard of competence shown by officers is not on the whole a high one. As would be expected, they are nearly all soldiers, and seem to understand very little about native administration.

They appear not to realise the capacity of the Galla and Somali for prevarication, exaggeration, and sheer mendacity; and the word of a native soldier, whether in connection with a complaint by the tribesmen, or concerning news of happenings elsewhere, is usually accepted as sufficient.

13. Perhaps their worst fault, to which most objection is taken by the natives, is their refusal as a general rule to hear minor complaints. While the tendency among the commissioned ranks seems to be not to decentralise - every small matter being referred to higher authority - the Residents in charge of a district tries to leave as much as possible of the actual administration and the judicial affairs of the tribesmen to 'akids' (native Sergeants), Wakils and Moslem Cadis.

14. The white officials do not generally seem to be well adapted to lonely posts in this climate, and they are criticised by the natives for being impatient and quick tempered.

Their attitude towards native women is not the same as ours; nor is their point of view on the subject of pouboires, and the participation of officers in local commercial transaction.

Their methods of dealing with official matters are likewise somewhat oriental, and their great aim

CHARACTERISTICS
OF OFFICERS
(contd)

(as a 'Times' correspondent recently explained) is evidently to be 'furbo' or crafty. For example a personal interview or a verbal message conveyed by an emissary is preferred to the written word; and letters are suitably evasive.

It is noticeable and is indeed commented on by the tribesmen that orders are frequently changed and while they sometimes remain unenforced, occasionally rigorous action is suddenly taken without warning. Native chiefs are not usually consulted about administration measures.

The result of this system is to create an atmosphere of uncertainty and uneasiness which does not contribute to the wellbeing of the people.

SUBORDINATE
STAFF

15. At this early stage it would perhaps be unfair to expect there to be a very good subordinate administrative staff, but one cannot fail to observe that at present a number of the non commissioned officers and headmen are natives, not of good character, who have been discharged from some inferior position in the Kenya services, while the advisers and agents of the various officials are frequently the better known scoundrels of the neighbourhood.

ADMINISTRATION
BY POSTS OF
NATIVE SOLDIERS.

16. When territory has been occupied, the Italians seem always to adopt the bad system of controlling the tribesmen with posts of native soldiers commanded by native non commissioned officers. These men are usually untrained and undisciplined; apparently no trouble is taken to select them according to character or tribes; and they are never given rations. The posts are very seldom visited by a white officer, and the word of the native non commissioned officer is accepted in all disputes without question by the Italian officer in charge of the district.

ADMINISTRATION
BY POSTS OF
NATIVE SOLDIERS
(contd)

DESTRUCTION
OF FORMER
ADMINISTRATIVE
STRUCTURE AND
DISREGARD OF
TRIBAL AREAS

EXPLOITATION
OF ONE RACE
AGAINST
ANOTHER

This system leads to much corruption and injustice to the tribesman, and also to Frontier disputes.

17. Reference has been made in the newspapers Il Giornale d'Italia and Resto del Carlino to the necessity for the destruction "from top to bottom" of the whole rudimentary structure, political and "administrative, of the old Abyssinian Empire", and for "the destruction of the old social system of "Ethiopia".

A beginning of this process seems to have been made in this area by disregarding the entity of the nomadic tribes. It is frequently announced that all of the country now being Italian, the tribesmen may to a large extent go where they wish.

18. This would appear to be a policy of doubtful value in this part of Ethiopia and the results of the inevitable invasion of what little is left of the Boran tribal lands by Somalis, and of the ensuing strife between the different tribes, are being awaited with interest - if not some small anxiety for the peace of the Kenya Frontier.

19. Il Resto del Carlino went further and stated that there was no intention of using "the methods of the English" and exploiting one race or religion against another.

It is apparent that though Italy has for long past posed as a friend of Islam and a supporter of the Moslem tribes, she has not in fact given any indication yet that she intends to treat with less consideration other native tribes, like the Boran, with their own religions.

But it is clear that as much as possible is being done to foster in the Somali and Galla people a

**EXPLOITATION
OF ONE RACE
AGAINST
ANOTHER
(contd)**

hatred of the Amhara. For example in the Mega market place a local native was recently applauded by Italian officers for hitting - quite gratuitously - an inoffending Abyssinian officer in the face.

20. Moreover the indiscriminate use of tribal levies - a practice regarded in recent times as of doubtful wisdom in our own Colonies - against large forces consisting of the Amharic inhabitants of the area (as opposed to bands of outlaws) can scarcely be described as anything but the exploiting of one race and religion against another.

**PERSECUTION
OF THE AMHARA
A SHORT
SIGHTED POLICY**

21. In adopting this attitude towards the Abyssinians, the Italians seem to be short sighted. Having embittered the Amhara unnecessarily by such actions as the bombing of villages, when there was no good reason for doing so nor purpose served thereby, he is not likely subsequently to be an easily controlled or loyal Italian subject, for he does not, like the African negro, soon forget and ignore what has happened in the past.

**THE LOYALTY
OF THE GALLA
AND SOMALI
AN ASSET OF
DOUBTFUL
VALUE**

22. And in reality little safety lies in the balance of power derived from the supposed hatred for the Amhara oppressor felt by all the subordinate tribes. It is known to all dwellers in this country that consistent and permanent loyalty to a flag or to a Government, as it is understood in Europe, is an idea that is quite incomprehensible to the Somali and Galla. They will undertake most things for money, and are capable of making acts of submission and of salivoring suitably phrased loyal addresses to the officials of any Government that happens to be in control for the time being of land that they want to use for the sustenance of their animals and children.

**THE LOYALTY
OF THE GALLA
AND SOMALI
AN ASSET OF
DOUBTFUL
VALUE
(contd)**

It seems that a critical time may come when the Italians have scattered their resources throughout the country and can no longer afford to do everything in the present extravagant style, and to pay such large sums of money for wages and bribes.

The Somali soldiers (many of them conscripted) will eventually discover the true losses of their tribesmen, and the Galla people - perhaps deprived of a good deal of their land - may begin to wonder whether the last state is really better than the first. The cruelties of their former masters will be forgotten, and it may be felt that while the Amhara at his worst did usually listen to complaints and grievances, and sometimes tempered justice with mercy; at his best he understood the mentality of the people in a way that very few white men can do. (1).

**CONSERVATION
AND
COLLECTION
OF
POPULATION**

23. As has always been the case on the Jubaland Frontier, all possible steps are taken to prevent tribesmen from leaving Ethiopia and efforts are also made to encourage others to come to, and to remain in, Italian territory to swell the population. (2).

**MONEY MAY NOT
LEAVE THE
COUNTRY, AND
ONLY ITALIAN
PRODUCTS ARE
WANTED**

24. Here, as in Italy, the policy is to prevent money from leaving the country, and to do everything possible to discourage imports of foreign goods that compete with Italian products.

.....
(1) The future attitude of the people towards the Italians and the former Ethiopian Government is of greater importance here than elsewhere, because it is intended to garrison this area almost entirely with native troops - most of whom will most likely, owing to the nature of the country, be locally enlisted men, and many of them only partially trained irregular "dubats".

.....
(2) The methods adopted to prevent tribesmen from crossing the Frontier is to put out posts of dubats who patrol the boundary and sometimes even a few men in each village. People are encouraged to immigrate by promises of freedom from taxation and by making it easier for them to get water for their stock if they are Italian subjects.

MONEY MAY NOT
LEAVE THE
COUNTRY, AND
ONLY ITALIAN
PRODUCTS ARE
WANTED
(contd)

Many British merchants who went to Italian
Somaliland to sell livestock were forced to hand over
their Italian currency and to accept in its place
pass books - the money having meanwhile been deposited
in the local Post Office Savings Bank.

INTELLIGENCE

25. The Italians, in accordance with their usual custom,
employ here many spies and agents, and take great pains
over the collection of news; but they seem usually to
employ unreliable persons, and to be unskillful in sifting
the very small grains of truth from the immense amount
of inaccurate, exaggerated, or utterly false news that is
always current in this country.

THE
ATMOSPHERE
OF ITALY
INTRODUCED

SILENCE
AND
SECRECY

26. No time has been lost in introducing the
atmosphere of Italy. Natives dare not now discuss
anything appertaining to the affairs of the Government
within earshot of any one else. Secret agents are
largely employed in the towns and spies sent out amongst
the tribesmen; propaganda is disseminated, and Government
servants are told in no uncertain manner that they may
not disclose, in writing or by word of mouth, news of
any untoward incidents, or of casualties.

ROADS,
TRANSPORT
AND
BUILDINGS

27. Less work on roads has been done here than in
other parts of Ethiopia that have been occupied by the
Italians. Gangs of white labourers are engaged in
metalling the main road from Holo to Muggeli via
Filtu, and others are making an alternative route to
Muggeli via Saddoh on the Daua River. But west of
the Daua nothing has as yet been done, and the old
tracks are still being used.

Nevertheless the Italian transport services
seems to be efficiently organised - seemingly regardless
of cost - and the troops are seldom if ever short of
rations.

ROADS,
TRANSPORT
AND
BUILDINGS
(contd)

NATIVE
WOMEN

(15)

A good deal of building material is being brought from Mogadiscio and a start has already been made on buildings and protective walls of stone in most of the larger ports.

28. On many occasions in Somaliland in the past the Italian has learnt that Hamitic people in this part of Africa will not tolerate the conscription of their women, and in Borana it has not yet been attempted.

There are always a certain number of incidents connected with women that cause scandal amongst the tribesmen and townfolk, but on the whole there has been far less trouble than might have been expected.

It is clearly quite ridiculous at the present time, when no white women are here, for the Italian Government and the newspapers to exhort the army against "contamination" with the conquered race, and the prevalence of venereal disease throughout the country is certain ultimately to have a serious effect on the white Italians.

29. In former times there existed on this frontier a definite fear of the Abyssinian, who was generally regarded as a self-seeking ruler, caring little for anything that was not connected with his own profit.

The nomadic people still do think that possibly the departure of the Ethiopian officials may be to their advantage, though they remain uncertain as to the real nature of the Italians, who arouse suspicion in the natives' mind by promising an eldorado.

But there is no doubt that a very definite change has come over the point of view of the more sophisticated people in the towns.

With them the issue now quite clearly is white versus black. Whatever hatred there may have been of

COLOUR
FEELING

the Christian Abyssinian is forgotten, and news of the war is eagerly sought - always in the hope that there may be indications of the coming defeat of the Italians.

Probably the harsh manner in which British traders are treated in Italian territory has contributed to the fear and dislike felt for the Italians by Arab Somali and Indian merchants; but the main reason for the hope that the Ethiopians will eventually get the better of them is undoubtedly the feeling that a nation of white people, supported by others, (including the British), has behaved unfairly and brutally towards a black race for no valid reason; and that their action constitutes a menace to other coloured races.

30. The people in the towns continually discuss the many local prophecies foretelling the ultimate recovery by the Ethiopians of their own country, and the alleged assistance being given them by the Turks, and the extraordinary things that have happened at Sheikh Hussein's village North of Gidir, and so on. (One Italian airman who ventured over Sheikh Hussein's village came back blind.)

The general trend of these rumours is to show that God is on the side of the Ethiopians, and is helping them in the same way that the Mad Sultan was supposed to have been helped. A certain number of stories - for example one concerning the burial of white Italian soldiers in consecrated ground, while the corpses of native soldiers are left out for hyenas - are obviously repeated with an underlying feeling of colour-consciousness.

31. Though there is much that may be criticised in connection with Italian methods of warfare, 'pacification' and administration, the fact remains that at the present time at any rate they do evidently desire,

ITALIAN
DESIRE
FOR PEACE
ON THE
KENYA
FRONTIER
(contd)

and intend to try, to keep the peace on the Kenya Frontier. They have already made it clear that they are doing all they can to stop tribal raids and murders and to prevent friction being caused by soldiers.

But they have not an easy task. It is one thing for Signor Gayda to write that "Italian occupation will henceforth preserve the frontier of Kenya and its peace in the interior.....and in that way Italy will reward the help that Kenya now supplies to the Abyssinian raiders" (1). It is another to achieve it.

What matters most at the moment to Italy's neighbours is not what she may perhaps intend to do, but what she is capable of doing in such very difficult circumstances, and what will in fact happen.

G.R.

Moyale,
September, 1936.

(1) Il Giornale d'Italia, 24th January, 1936.

GAZETTEER

Map References:-

AFRICA 1:8,000,000
(Sheets Abyssinia and Kenya Colony)
ABYSSINIA 1:1,000,000 (Consul's map)

Adola	A District and a town about 76 miles due East of Lake Chamo.	
Agal	Hills about 8 miles N.E. of Moyale.	
Agra Marion (Kulu)	38°18'E	5°36'N
Agra Salnam	38°36'E	6°28'N
Arero	38°52'E	4°54'N
Balo	A Province North of the Ganale Goria and East of Sidamo.	
Bardera	42°20'E	2°22'N
Bekel Marga	41°44'E	4°28'N
Borana	The country immediately South of the Kenya Frontier between the Daua River and Lake Stefanie and bounded in the North by the Sagan River, Kulu and Arero.	
Bubel	A small village adjoining Lakka Koba	
Burji	A district to the N.E. of Konso	
Lakka Koba	38°43'E	3°45'N
Dirro	The Boran Plateau immediately North of the Kenya Frontier and East of the Daua River.	
Dole	40°01'E	4°10'N
Dulans	37°00'E	4°01'N
Egdorr	39°52'E	3°58'N
El Dor	39°44'E	3°51'N
Piltu	41°00'E	5°00'N
Funan Guda	37°59'E	4°27'N
Gaddadum	39°36'E	3°51'N
Garrida	39°46'E	3°30'N
Garu	A Province N.E. of Lake Chamo	
Canded Guda	39°56'E	4°08'N
Ginir	40°44'E	7°10'N
Gef	80 miles due North of Moyale	
Gurar	39°59'E	3°04'N
Irga Alen	39°26'E	6°35'N
Harbor	A small village about two miles South East of Moyale township.	

Hiddiola	38°34'E	3°48'N
Jabba Sirro	38°15'E	5°52'N
Jam Jantu	A district North West of Tuggoli in the Sidamo Province	
Jamokk	An area of about 10 miles N.W. of Moyale	
Juba River) Ganale Beria)	This is one river but in Ethiopian territory North of Dola it is known as the Ganale Beria and South of there as the Juba	
Jambata	A Province adjacent to the North of Walamo	
Konso	A Province South of Lake Chamo	
Kunchurro	37°51'E	4°32'N
Kuku	See Agra Hariam	
Labba Shilinto	42°05'E	4°20'N
Lo	39°15'E	3°45'N
Liban	A district East of the source of the Daua River	
Lugh	42°34'E	3°48'N
Magalo	40°42'N	6°53'N
Magada Forest	Immediately South of the town of Kuku.	
Malke Juba	39°24'E	4°46'N
Malke Harri	41°05'E	4°20'N
Maldora	A British Post on the Frontier at the extreme N.W. corner of Kenya.	
Muggoli	39°40'E	5°16'N
Obda Hills (Yaballo)	38°06'E	4°52'N
Odido	The low country between the Daua and Ganale Beria Rivers	
Orxu	41°15'E	3°55'N
Saddah	41°20'E	3°59'N
Solelo	38°40'E	3°31'N
Tertullii	A district East of Lake Stefano	
Tuka	39°50'E	3°37'N
Tulitu	7 miles to the East of Moyale.	
Wedara	39°05'E	5°53'N
Walamo	A Province N.W. of Lake Abaya.	

Waldo 2 miles North West of Gandad Guda.

Waqdo 38°50'E 7°00'N

Webbe Gostro A river flowing southwards from the mountains west of Ginir and joining the Juba River about 10 miles North North West of Dolo.

Yaballo 38°05'E 4°52'N
(Obda Hills)

.....

No. 221.

PAULINA PRINCE, A. S.

13th St. S. E.

2nd December, 1936.

Sir,

I have received your despatch No. 227 of October 31st, enclosing copy of report by Mr. Deputy's Commissioner for Southern Ethiopia made in his district from April to August, 1936.

I am conveying direct to Mr. Secretary the expression of my appreciation of his report, which has been read with great interest.

Yours, with great truth,

Sr.

Your obedient servant,
(for the Secretary of State)

J. Roberts, Esq.,
etc., etc., etc.,
Secretary of State.

G. O.

38066/13/36 Kenya

C.D.
28 NOV
30

Mr. Groganith.

Mr. *Parkinson* 27/11

Mr.

Sir C. Parkinson.

Sir G. Tomlinson.

Sir C. Bottomley.

Sir J. Shuckburgh.

Permt. U.S. of S.

Parly. U.S. of S.

Secretary of State.

NOTHING STATED.

1st November, 1936.

13

Sir,

an

Enclosed for the Secretary of State

to you, to be sent to the

Mr. Secretary Eden, a copy of a

"Narrative of happenings in the Province

of

of Borana in Ethiopia from April 1

August, 1936" prepared by

Mr. Gerald Reed, of the Department of

Southern Abyssinia. A copy of a

despatch which is being sent to the

Governor of Kenya is also enclosed.

2

As only one copy of the

report has been received from the

Governor of Kenya, Mr. Reed

will be obliged if the copy enclosed

herewith may be returned to the

Colonial Office *in the course*

processed it, in order that it may be

discontinued

DRAFT.

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE,
FOREIGN OFFICE.

*Copy Kenya (copy draft)
Enclosure to No 134 (in copy.)*

FURTHER ACTION.

KENYA.

No. SECRET.



50
END
GOVERNMENT HOUSE
NAIROBI,
KENYA.

RECEIVED
31 NOV 1936
C. O. REGY

7/6 October, 1936.

Sir,

I have the honour to enclose, for your information, a copy of a "Narrative of Happenings in the Province of Borana in Ethiopia from April to August, 1936," which has been prepared by Mr. Gerald Reece, His Majesty's Consul for Southern Abyssinia, and which is of considerable interest.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient, humble servant,

Brigadier-General,
GOVERNOR.

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE

W. ORMSBY GORE, P.C., M.P.,

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES,

DOWNING STREET,

LONDON, S.W. 1