

CO553/490.

1935

CLOSED  
UNTIL

1969.

↓  
No. 38066/15C

KENYA

SUBJECT

Italian Occupation of  
Ethiopia - Frontier Questions:  
Occupation of Post North of  
Kokoi

Previous

Subsequent

ETHIOPIAN  
Sudanese  
Kokoi  
Tulle  
Kokoi  
copy  
and  
copy  
will

Tu, with comments, copy of report received from O/C N. Frontier District, regarding occupation of a post north of Kokoi by the Italians.

The Italians have established a post near the eastern shore of Lake Rudolf 18 miles south of the Maud line (see paragraph 2 of Mr. Reece's report enclosed in No. 1). There is another post at Bani which (paragraph 8 of the report) is 20 miles north of this post - i.e. two miles north of the Maud line.

(On the map I have Bani is five to seven miles south of the Maud line.)

There is another post at Eil Dima which (paragraph 9 of the report) is six or seven miles on the Kenya side of the Maud line.

(On my map the Maud line passes through Eil Dima.)

The Italian's purpose appears to be to control the Gelubba and, in particular, to prevent the return in force of the Abyssinians who have fled into Kenya (paragraph 6 of the report).

It is thought that the Italians will not remain there long, however, as communications are very difficult and are continually interrupted by raiders (paragraph 19 of the report).

The Governor thinks that this might be brought to the notice of the Italian Government, but refers to paragraph 4 of No. 22 on the 1937 file which says, inter alia, "... there would not appear to be sufficient grounds for a strong protest to the Italian Government". It seems, however, quite clear that the southernmost post (that near Kokoi) must be in Kenya.

? Send copy to Foreign Office, reference No. 22 on the 1937 file, asking that, if

38003/13/37

no objection is seen, H.M.R., Rome, <sup>might</sup> ~~not~~ be asked to invite the Italians' attention to the fact that a post has been established in British territory.

Clothe white.

11.1.38.

It is odd that the Gov. has omitted to mention that KOKOI is situated on the Southern boundary of the area, shown on the map in No 77 on 46598/37, which is to be kept in reserve as a possible bargaining counter in the negotiations for the rectification of the northern frontier of Kenya. The fact that the Italians have thought it worth their while to establish a post at this point ~~and seem to show that~~, as a bargaining counter, that area may be of more use than I shd. have been disposed to think.

2. To F.O. as in dt.  
& copies cover to <sup>W.O.</sup> ~~W.O.~~ <sup>off.</sup> ~~off.~~  
+ print (as indicated on aft.)

J.J. Pasquin  
17/1

below

Since preparing this draft I have seen the reports (now registered at Nos. 1 and 2 on 38066/15D/38) of an Italian post established at Kangalimoru, some 40 <sup>kilos</sup> ~~miles~~ within Sudan territory. I have accordingly inserted a reference to those reports in paragraph 5 of the draft on this file.

Signed  
G.P. Chalson  
2/11

J.J. Pasquin  
21.1.38.

P.I. Goo

A. J. Maw  
22.1

W.C.S. 22.1.38

reel  
21.1.38  
Chalson

R. 20/2  
1/10 (see aft. 2)

(3 copies 4)

To F.O. (w/c/land encls) secret. <sup>copy</sup> ~~copy~~ 27.1.38

To Kenya - Secret - A/1. 28.1.38  
(w/c 2 w/c encls)

To W.O. Secret } B/1a  
To A/Min. Secret } (w/c/land + 2) 28.1.38

W.C.S.

copy to B.P.  
4/3

6 P.L. Rose (FO) J. 333/86/1 Secret 9.2.38  
Ref 2 Is of opinion that a reply to Lt. No. 68  
of 6.2.38 to Cairn regarding Kungulimom (copy enclosed)  
should be awaited before taking action as to K. Kori.

Sir A. Wade

The following is being informed of this  
development in a draft on 46599/38.

? No need to act.

Cloke, White 16/2

300  
4/3  
Copies for Mr Parkin and for printing.

I am preparing next a copy of  
letter to Sir A. Wade  
46538/38 pls go to Mr Lambert.  
This will serve as - see: of No 6.  
otherwise as proposed.

J.J. Parkin  
16/2

Att me

A.W. Wade  
17.2

Kenya - Secret

15.2.38

4

copy to  
B.P. 4/3

Ref 3. Two week comments; copy of report of a  
meeting between Mr. Glendon & Italian Provincial Com.  
at Beni on 25.1.38 to discuss the situation arising out of  
the occupation of K. Kori.

This report by Mr Glendon makes clear that  
the Italians are deliberately "invading" Kenya,  
presumably with the idea (see para 10 of the  
report) of eventually setting up a seaplane  
base on the shores of Lake Rudolph.

? Copy to FO in official letter referring  
to No 2 and asking that representations  
may be made to the Italians at once with  
a view to the withdrawal of the port; at  
the same time an s/o letter to Mr  
Lambert referring to No 6 and pointing  
out that in view of the Cel at (46) on  
46627/1/38 EA (copy at 8 on 38086/150/38)  
saying that the port at Kungulimom has  
been withdrawn there is presumably now  
no reason for delaying protest in Rome;  
and copies to WO. and AFM L.F.; and  
extra copies to P.D. for printing and for  
Mr Parkin.

Cloke, White

23/2

I do not see how the Italians could  
have made such a "mistake" as to  
have "accidentally" over shot the frontier  
by such a distance. It seems to  
me that they have ~~been~~ established

these posts with the firm intention  
of remaining there, by opening  
out arguments as to whether  
this area is in Kenya or Abyssinia  
until the time comes for the  
discussion of frontier questions.

Now, although Kenya is  
prepared to cede this corner  
of the colony, if it is necessary  
to do so, in order to secure the  
rectification of the frontier further  
east, it has been agreed on  
all sides that this should only be  
done in the last resort. This  
has been particularly urged by  
the G.O. in the A.P.C. I should not  
be surprised if, in the light  
of the reasons mentioned in No. 1,  
the A.P.C. were now to withdraw  
their concurrence that this particular  
area should be ceded in any  
circumstances.

Even if we are still permitted  
to keep the possible cession of  
this area up our sleeves for  
use as a bargaining point  
in the negotiations for the rectification  
of the frontier, its value as such  
will be very materially lessened  
if we allow the Italians to  
remain in occupation in the  
near future.

The present is clearly not

a favorable time to be making  
proposals to the Italian Govt. in  
such a matter, but I think that  
it would be a great mistake not to  
demand the immediate withdrawal  
of these posts.

(No. 25 on  
46598/3)  
—not annexed)

The sentence marked X on p. 8  
of R. Glenday's report is cryptic but  
interesting. In his despatch of the 15<sup>th</sup> of June  
(1937), the Govt. told us that if we  
can get neither a rectification of  
the frontier nor a continuation of  
the trans-frontier grazing arrangements,  
the administration of the area adjoining  
the frontier will become impracticable,  
& that there will be no alternative to  
withdrawing to a distance of about 60  
miles from the frontier. It now appears  
that there is an alternative, of which  
we have not been informed.

I accordingly submit a copy of  
to the Govt. to elaborate this point. (I  
do not think we need send it to F.O. at this stage).

J. J. Parker  
22/2

Since the A.P.C. concurred  
in the use of this area  
as a bargaining point,  
the Govt. has drawn  
attention to the  
possibility that its  
cession will enable  
the Italians to  
establish a base for  
flying boats —  
L. Rudolf,



8 FO. (J. 474/25/1) Secret - 21.2.38  
(orig on 38066/15D/38)

copy F.P.D.

Invos. copy despatch No. 192 d. 14.2.38 to  
M.P.R. Rome regarding withdrawal of protest  
with Italian Govt. against the occupation of  
Kangalimora & Kokoi.

It is a pity that we had not  
received a copy of this despatch before  
our offer letter on No 7 was  
prepared.

I have however not received  
that offer, & made a  
consequential slight alteration  
in the offer despatch to the Govt.

J.P. Parnin  
23/2.

9 FO. (J. 687/25/1) Secret - 23.2.38  
(Despatch on 5815D)

copy sent to  
P.D. 3/3

Ref (8) Invos. copies tel. NO. 45 (S) d. 14.2.38 &  
No. 84 d. 22.2.38 from M.P.R. Rome stating that  
Comte Ciano had informed him privately that orders  
had been sent to the Viceroy to withdraw from both  
posts referred to in (8)

This is good news. The order has been  
given for the posts at Kokoi and  
Kangalimora to be withdrawn; but the  
post at Bani remains, and it is  
believed there is another at Eil Duna;  
and there may very well be others south  
of the Treaty Line between Eil Duna  
and Lake Rudolph.

Redraft of the letter to the F.O.  
and despatch to Kenya submitted in the  
light of these facts.

Extra copies of these two drafts and  
of Nos 6, 7 & 9 are required for P.D.

and for Mr Parnin.

? Copies of these two drafts and of 7 + encs.  
to WO and A/M LF (4) ~ (5).

Cloke, White 25/2

J.P. Parnin  
25/2

P. J. Gore  
10/2

A. J. Maw  
26.2

W.D. 28/2/38

10 To Kenya - Secret (2) <sup>4/3</sup> 3.3.38  
(M.P.C. 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15)

copy F.P.D.  
3/3

11 To F.O. <sup>4/3</sup> 3.3.38  
(M.P.C. 7, 12, 13, 14, 15)

copy F.P.D.  
3/3

P. 392  
L.F.F. Parnin d/10.11

12 To W.D. } B/1a Secret } 4.3.38  
13 To B/M. } (4, 12, 14, 15) }  
Parnin (6)

Mr. Gressy

In a recent semi-official letter  
Sir R. Brooke-Popham suggested that the Secretary  
of State should read Mr. Glenday's report in  
No. 7 on this file. The position is that the  
Italians have been establishing posts on the Kenya  
side of the frontier - in the case of Kokoi, about

twenty miles within Kenya, and Mr. Glenday and the Governor are definitely of the opinion that this was done in deliberate violation of the frontier and not by inadvertence. However, as you will see from the second enclosure to No. 9, instructions have been issued from Rome for the withdrawal of the post at Kokoi and one at Kungalinoru, (which is situated in the Ilemi Triangle in the Sudan). At that time Kokoi was the only post of which we had definite information in Kenya, but since then we have asked the Foreign Office (No. 11) to request the Italians to withdraw the other post definitely reported by Mr. Glenday, and any other posts that the Italians may have established on the wrong side of the frontier.

*W.D.*

*J.J. Paine*  
*4/s*  
*W.D. 7.3.38*

14 F.O. (J.803/25/1) 3 3 38  
(Deyinger S.F./O.D.)

Ref. (9) Dews copy tel. NO. 96 (R) d. 2.3.38 from H.C.A. Rome reporting that instructions have been sent to Italian Govt. Genl. that present existing situation shall be restored. Also promise regarding termination of frontier.

The news in No 9 that the two posts (at Kokoi & Kungalinoru) were to be withdrawn was semi-official only; Cuss Ed gives it officially.

As action has already been taken in No 10-13 it is unnecessary to do more

7  
can send a copy Secret LF to Kenya ref No 10, and make extra copies for P.D. & for Mr Parkman

Clothes Mule 10/3

The wording of the last two lines in order obscure & I think we had better wait for the translation of the note.

*W.D.*

*J.J. Paine*  
*10/3*  
*adman*

15 F.O. (J.816/86/1) Secret 12 3 38

Copy of the  
W.D. 18/3

Ref (11) Dews copy tel. NO. 64 d. 10 3 38 H.C.A. Rome directing meeting to M.P.A. as to other posts occupied. Suggests Kenya be asked by tel. to telegraph when withdrawal has taken place & for info. as to simultaneous para of Mr. Glenday's report in (7)

Para 1 and enclosure implement the request in No 14 that H.C.A. Rome should be asked to request the withdrawal of the Italian posts at Bani and Bil Dima.

? Copy of encl should go to Kenya secret ~~ref to~~ in O.H.

Para 2. The F.O. perhaps does not realise that an expedition to Kokoi Bani & Bil Dima is quite an undertaking. Unless aeroplanes could be used it would involve a small expedition going up to that corner of the NFD in order to keep watch for the withdrawal of the Italian posts. However the F.O. would not ask for

watch to be kept unless they regarded it as important, so ? Telegraph to Kenya as in draft kenewite, & send copy of tel to F.O. in the letter prepared below.

Para 3. Kenya has already been asked to elucidate the penultimate para of Mr Glendon's report - see para 3 of No 10. ? Tell F.O. as in draft kenewite.

Copies of No 10 should be made for P.O. and for Mr Parkin. Clothwhite 14/3

16 F.O. (J. 826/25/1) 14. 3. 38  
(Dunroper 2:15 D.)  
Ref: Duns copy note No. 219 d. 2-3-38 from H.O.R.  
Enc. enclosing copy note Verbale from H.O.R. d. 1-3-38 reporting instructions to Gov. Gen. of Italian Africa regarding withdrawal from posts indicated

I do not understand the remark in parenthesis in the Italian Note. There is, as far as I know, only one Treaty, that of 1907, relevant to the question of the boundary line.

? Copy of <sup>sent</sup> ~~letter~~ ~~copy~~ ~~note~~ ~~to~~ ~~No~~ ~~16~~ ~~to~~ ~~Kenya~~ in ~~the~~ ~~draft~~ ~~prepared~~ ~~above~~ - and extra copies of the Italian note for P.O. & for Mr Parkin.

Clothwhite 15/3

I have read the oft. tel.  
I think we ought also to try to clear up the ~~the~~ meaning of the obscure parenthesis in the Italian Note Verbale. I have accordingly prepared a oft. Dep., in wh. I have suggested a possible explanation.

J.P. Cassin  
15/3

(Hone  
U.P. Dawe  
15-3

copy to  
b.p.d.  
15/3

17 Tel. 26 to Gov. Kenya - Secret <sup>copy</sup> - Cont - 15/3/38  
Ans. 21

18 F.O. (J. 990/24/1) - Secret 15. 3. 38  
Ref (11) Duns copy lit. No. 150 d. 14. 3. 38 from H.O.R.  
Re: some regarding occupation of posts at Bani & Bil Dima which H.O.R. state is not intentional but due to line maps etc.

The Italians are being accommodating over these posts, but there is as yet no promise to withdraw them at Bani & Bil Dima.

? It will be sufficient to include a copy of this tel in the Dep. to Kenya. I have altered the draft accordingly.

Copies also to be made for P.O. & for Mr Parkin

Clothwhite 16/3

J.P. Cassin  
16/3  
/abner

copy to  
b.p.d.  
15/3

copy to  
b.p.d.  
15/3



copy 19  
K.P.D. 18/3

19 To Kenya - Secret - cone - 18.3.38  
(Spec. sub. incl. 14/16, 15 same, 20, & 21 (4/5)  
and 21)

20 To F.O. Secret (15 same) 18.3.38  
(Spec 17, 10 & 19 4/5 same)

copy 20  
K.P.D. 18/3

copy 20  
K.P.D. 18/3  
L.F.F.  
203  
20.4/15.17/18/29

21 To W.O. } Secret O/1a 19/38  
(Spec 17.19.20.21.22.23.24.25.26.27.28.29.30.31.32.33.34.35.36.37.38.39.40.41.42.43.44.45.46.47.48.49.50.51.52.53.54.55.56.57.58.59.60.61.62.63.64.65.66.67.68.69.70.71.72.73.74.75.76.77.78.79.80.81.82.83.84.85.86.87.88.89.90.91.92.93.94.95.96.97.98.99.100)

22 - A.M. } Secret O/1a 19/38  
(Spec 17.19.20.21.22.23.24.25.26.27.28.29.30.31.32.33.34.35.36.37.38.39.40.41.42.43.44.45.46.47.48.49.50.51.52.53.54.55.56.57.58.59.60.61.62.63.64.65.66.67.68.69.70.71.72.73.74.75.76.77.78.79.80.81.82.83.84.85.86.87.88.89.90.91.92.93.94.95.96.97.98.99.100)

copy 23  
K.P.D. 20/3

23 F.O. (J 1006/25/1) Secret 16.3.38  
(Spec. sub. incl. 14/16, 15 same, 20, & 21 (4/5)  
and 21)

Kenya - Secret (2) 14.3.38  
Ref (10) Reports that Mr. Stender has now left  
will personally explain as to alternative course  
on arrival. Adds there is no alternative to course  
indicated in No. 25 or 46598/37.

No. 23  
at 4.

No. 24  
copy =  $\frac{FO}{W.O.}$  } 4/4  
17/1

Print (extra copies to be made  
for purpose of for m. (Pamini))

Pamini  
22/3

25 To F.O. } O/1a Secret 22.3.38  
26 - W.O. }  
(Spec 24)  
27 - A.M. }

copy 27  
K.P.D. 20/3

28. Foreign Office. J 1005/56/1 (Spec) 29.3.38  
Trans. copy tel. No. 206 of 28.3.38 from Am. Home  
Stations that Ministers of Italian Africa have given notice  
for ports of Brani & Eil Dima to be withdrawn and they be  
situated outside Italian Territory.

copy  
K.P.D.  
20/3

Copy sent to Kenya &  
Print (extra copies to be made  
for P.D. & for m. (Pamini))  
Pamini  
30/3

29 To Kenya - Secret (2) (Spec. sub. incl. 14/16, 15 same, 20, & 21 (4/5)  
and 21) 31.3.38

30 F.O. (J 1168/86/1) 1.4.38  
(Spec. sub. incl. 14/16, 15 same, 20, & 21 (4/5)  
and 21)

copy K.P.D.  
21/4

Ref (11) Enquires whether, in view of Italian withdrawal  
from ports indicated, instructions may be sent to Govt  
of Kenya to withdraw the military post at Namurupus  
after confirmation of Italian withdrawal has been received.

copy K.P.D.  
21/4

31 Kenya Tel. No. 30 - Secret 1.4.38  
(Spec. sub. incl. 14/16, 15 same, 20, & 21 (4/5)  
and 21)

Ref (17) states that O. de N. Franke's latest reports  
that Italians have abandoned ports between Kasko  
& Beni and other ports cover to found in British  
territory near Beni or Eil Dima. Only Italian post  
left between to the north of frontiers.

32 To P.L. Rose (FO) (Spec 31) 3/12 Secret 4.4.38

Copy R.P.D.  
S/4

33

FO. (J.1229/46/1)

2.4.38

Ref (28) Incls. copy despatch No. 303 d. 25.3.38  
from M.F.A. Rome enclosing note Verbale d. 24.3.38  
from M.F.A. regarding withdrawal from posts  
at Bani Eil Dima

Copy R.P.D.  
S/4

34

Kenya - Secret

29.3.38

Ref (29) Assumes that the use of the word  
"treaties" in note Verbale in (16) is as suggested  
in (19).

No.30.

The Italian request for the withdrawal  
of the post at Namurupus would have to be  
referred to Kenya before being granted, but  
it is perhaps unnecessary to refer to Kenya  
before replying to the letter.

Namurupus has always been regarded  
as being in British territory. The Ethiopian  
occupation of the post there, which continued  
till March, 1937, when it was reoccupied by  
us, and upon which the Italian claim to it  
has been based, was only tolerated as an act  
of grace (see paragraph 2(1) of No.1 on  
38003/3/37 attached) and our position has been  
fully explained to the Italians (see enclosure  
to No.31 on the same file). In the course of  
correspondence about the post the Italians  
sought an assurance that the status quo ante  
the Italian occupation of Ethiopia should not  
be disturbed as far as the frontier was  
concerned, and when (see No.31 on the same  
file) an assurance was given that in future the  
status quo would be maintained Signor Crolla  
requested the evacuation of Namurupus in order  
that eventual negotiations over the frontier

might

(See end Co (3) on 38066/57/3)  
at flag in attached print

x No 16 on 38003/3/37

might start from a position similar to that which  
existed before the post had been occupied by us.  
This request was not acceded to and has not been  
pressed again until now. The ground upon which it  
is suggested that the post should now be withdrawn -  
namely improved Anglo-Italian relations - seems  
insufficient to warrant the evacuation of British  
territory, even as a sign of good-will. Moreover,  
evacuation by us would certainly be followed by  
Italian occupation of the post, which could scarcely  
be allowed to pass without protest as has happened  
in the case of the Italian post north-west of  
Namurupus, which is believed to be 50 yards within  
British territory (see paragraphs 4 and 5 of No.22  
on the same file).

? Reply that the Secretary of State sees no  
reason to abandon the position as set out in the  
enclosure to No.31 on that file; but that if  
Lord Halifax considers it important that a "sign  
of good-will" of this sort be made the Governor of  
Kenya will be consulted. And send copies of the  
Foreign Office letter and the reply to it to Kenya.  
No.30 should also be printed.

Handwritten note: *see also...*

No.31.

The Foreign Office wished to know at once  
when we heard that the Italian posts in the Kokoi  
area had been withdrawn so a copy of this telegram  
has been sent over semi-officially (No.32).  
? A copy should be sent officially in the letter  
replying to No.30, and copies should go LF. to the  
W.O. and the A.M. The telegram should also be  
printed.

No.33.

? Copies to Kenya LF. reference No.29.

And print.

No. 34.

Kenya's view about the remark in parenthesis in the Italian note at No. 16 is what was expected.

? A copy of the despatch should be <sup>sent</sup> included in the letter to the Foreign Office, with <sup>once</sup> referring to the enclosures to No. 20. Copies also to WO. and AM LFF and <sup>Print</sup> ~~Print~~.

Clough White

4.4.38.

Mr. Costley White

Please get Mr. Glenday's news on (30) when you see him tomorrow.

V.G. Glenday  
S: 4

Mr. Costley-White.

From (31) it would appear as if the Italians have effected all the withdrawals which the Kenya Government require.

2. I believe that H.E. the Governor of Kenya would agree to a withdrawal from Namorupus under the stipulation proposed in paragraph 4 of (30) if the Italians will agree to do the same.

3. Namorupus is relatively an unimportant place but I feel that H.E. should be consulted first.

(Signed) V.G. GLENDAY

6.4.38.

N.D.

The joint evacuation of the sand pit <sup>would</sup> ~~take~~ suit, in my opinion, provided no hampers the other Administration

V.G.  
7/4/38

35.

FO (S 1363/25/1) - Secret - 5/4/38  
First copy of tel No 202 from H.M. Cairo.  
A new post has been established near Kangalimoon.  
(original at (22) on 7/5/38)

No 35.

This tel shows that the Italians may be agreeing to withdraw posts only 60 feet across down nearby. Kenya might be warned that this may be happening in the Koton zone too, when a convenient opportunity for writing out arises. But as this post is in the Sudan ? it is unnecessary to bother Kenya with correspondence by sending out copies.

Nos 30-34

Drafts submitted for comment after consultation with Mr. Glenday. As the FO have marked their letter "Immediate" it is perhaps best to telegraph to Kenya. Otherwise the FO will not be able to give an answer to Signor Costa for a fortnight or so.

Clough White 7/4

?TD.

Sir C. Bottomley.

Please see Foreign Office letter at (30). I have discussed with Mr. Glenday, Commissioner of Northern Province, Kenya, who is now here, and Mr. Costley-White.

I think that the immediate action is to send a fairly full telegram to the Governor based on the Foreign Office letter. If we withdraw our post at Namurupus it might be desirable to make it a condition that the Italians should also withdraw their post north-west of that place and undertake not to re-occupy any place in the neighbourhood south of the Maud line.

The position is that we regard Namurupus as being unquestionably within British territory, but you will recollect that there was an Abyssinian post there for about ten years up to 1937. When they withdrew we went in and established a British post. Although, therefore, in our view the place is British territory, our long acquiescence in the existence of the Abyssinian post there no

doubt

doubt makes our claim appear to be debatable in Italian eyes.

Beyond sending the Foreign Office a copy of our telegram I would not attempt any further reply to them pending receipt of the Governor's views.

? Telegraph as in the draft.

*A. J. Mawe*

8.4.38.

*Sgt. Lamsd.*

*was 8/4/38*

*Print this. Check with 12/4 (see 620.14)*

36 To Kenya tel 38 Secret cons 8.4.1938  
*1614*

37 To F.O. B/1<sup>a</sup> Secret (WR 36) - 11.4.38

38 To Kenya Secret. (W/Co. med 5.33) D/1. 12.4.38

39 To F.O. } B/1<sup>a</sup> Secret.  
40 - wa (4cc. (31) + (34) - 11.4.38  
41 - A.M.

*copy 10. 11. 13. 14. 16  
1937  
14/4*

*W/Co*



42 Kenya - Tel 42 Secret - 14.4.38  
Ref (36) Report regarding withdrawal from  
Namurupus.

I was considerably puzzled by this telegram in the form in which it at first appeared in the file, because the use of the word "their" in the last sentence of paragraph 2 appeared to imply that the Governor was only prepared to agree to the withdrawal of our post at Namurupus on condition that two Italian posts were withdrawn; and from the use of the word "equivalent" in the previous sentence I assumed that one of the Italian posts to be withdrawn was definitely established on the Italian side of the frontier, and I did not see how we could properly ask for such a post to be withdrawn.

With the help of the Telegraph Section, however, I have succeeded in clearing up the two obscurities in this telegram, which is now much more intelligible, and I think we might now proceed as in the draft herewith.

J. J. P. [Signature]  
26.4.38.

I have marked the  
dft. for issue in S in C.  
Bottomley's absence.

A. J. [Signature]  
21.4

13  
copy to  
R.D. 214  
303  
V.P. v. [unclear]  
43 TO F.O. (Wk 42) Cons 22.4.38  
44 TO W.O. } B/11 Secret } 25.4.38  
45 . A/M. } (47cc. 42-43) }  
46 TO Kenya. Secret(3) - A/11 26.4.38  
(47cc 43)

47 F.O. (J.1623/25/1) 26.4.38  
Ref (30) Sws. copy despatch No. 399 d. 8.4.38 from  
H.M.R. Cairo enclosing copy despatch No. 44 (94.B.3) d. 2.4.38  
2.4.38 from Khartoum regarding Italian posts  
on Abyssinian border together with copy F.O. despatch No.  
508 d. 26.4.38 to Cairo in reply.

copy to P.D. 30/3/38

A copy of the report on Italian posts in the Sudan has already been sent to Kenya direct from Khartoum, and will have put Kenya wise as to the Italian trick of agreeing to withdraw a post and then placing another a couple of miles from the old one. No action on the report is therefore necessary here. But the FO despatch to Cairo (No 508 of 26th April) concerns the question of the withdrawal of posts and it will interest Kenya to see that the FO is proposing, for Egypt's concurrence, to inform Italy that the Sudan Govt "do not admit [the Italian Govt's] right to have posts in the places in question, which [the Sudan Govt] considers to be in its territory; or that if it is not insisted that

Italian Govt withdraw these posts, this fact must not be held to prejudice the frontier line. This is a much less strong line than has been taken over the Italian posts in Kenya. The F.O. are no doubt being very gentle with Italy until the recent agreement comes into operation.

? Copy of the Khart desp to Cairo to Kenya etc. ? This point that desp but not the other ends.

Cloughwhite  
19/4

I have discussed this with Mr. Lambert and asked him why the Foreign Office appear to be contemplating taking a less firm stand in the matter of the Italian posts which have been established in Sudan territory as compared with the stand taken in respect of those posts which had been established in Kenya. I pointed out to him that, although the Colonial Office do not appear to be directly affected by what the Foreign Office does in relation to the Sudan, we have an indirect interest in the matter in that if these posts are allowed to remain, the cession of the Ilembi triangle will not be such an effective concession to Italy ~~as~~ <sup>it would be</sup> if they are cleared out, thereby establishing it indubitably that this is Sudan territory over which the Italians have no claim. I pointed out that, in the Foreign Office view, even the cession of the Ilembi triangle

may

14  
may not in any case be regarded by the Italians as a sufficient quid pro quo for the Baro salient, and that the possible concessions which we are exploring in Kenya are intended partly to redress this adverse balance. We therefore have an interest in any policy which may tend still further to depreciate the value of the Ilembi triangle as a bargaining counter.

I also pointed out to Mr. Lambert that the Government of Egypt had been asked to concur in this line of action possibly under a misapprehension as to our intentions as regards Namarupus, as to which (see No. 43) we have strongly deprecated the proposal that we should withdraw our post from that place.

Mr. Lambert said that the marked passage in paragraph 3 of their despatch to Cairo of the 26th of April is not to be read as indicating that they are not intending to continue to press the Italians to withdraw, at any rate from those posts which have been established some distance within the borders of the Sudan. He promised, however, that he would look up their papers again particularly in relation to Namarupus and would discuss the matter further with me in connection with the correspondence on this matter which is proceeding with the Embassy at Cairo on 46598 G/38. In the meantime I said that we would not send out copies of this correspondence to Kenya where it might be misunderstood.

F.O. have now decided G  
Telegraph G  
Cairo to make this clear.

19/4  
6/5

J. J. Paine  
6.5.38.

Copy sent to  
Mr. Paskin from  
Mr. Paskin's room for  
attent. of (48) & (49)  
of (48) & (49)  
copy sent to  
Mr. Paskin  
copy sent to  
Mr. Paskin  
copy sent to  
Mr. Paskin

48 F.O. (J.1623/25/1) Conf. 6.5.38  
Ref(47) Dms. copy cl. No. 274 d. 6.5.38 to  
M.H.A. Cairo regarding amend. to desp. No. 508  
dated 26.4.38 to Cairo (encl. in 47)

49 F.O. (J.1496/25/1) Conf. 18.5.38  
Ref(47) Dms. copy desp. No. 607 d. 16.5.38  
to H.M.A. Cairo enclosing record of conversation  
between F.O. & a Counsellor of Italian Embassy  
regarding Sudan-Ethiopian frontiers & ports across  
Sudan-Kenya frontier.

No 48 puts quite a different complexion on  
para 3 of the F.O. desp. to Cairo of 26th April (in  
No 47). Perhaps the best way of letting  
Kenya know of this would be to send a  
copy of the desp. to Cairo, as now  
amended, in a short desp. explaining  
that the desp. has been amended by  
telegram since <sup>being sent</sup> ~~being sent~~, but not stating  
in what particular respects.

No 49 All but the last para (No 9) concerns  
affairs which do not directly affect Kenya.  
It is interesting to learn that the Italians  
conceive "appreciable rectifications of the  
frontier, where necessary". Kenya  
will clearly have to have a copy of  
para 9, so we might as well  
send out the whole thing. But  
only para 9 need be printed.

Cloughwhite 20/5  
J.J. Paskin  
20/5  
at once

This was read after  
discussion with  
Mr. Paskin  
Beston and  
then  
revised  
J.J.P.

50 To Kenya - Secret - P/1  
{ Mcc. 2 subm. in 47 }  
{ encl. in 48 }  
{ encl. in 49 }

51 F.O. (J.2067/25/1) Secret 30.5.38  
21 (40) (40) Dms. copy desp. No. 534 d. 10.5.38 from  
M.H.A. Cairo copy cl. No. 298 cl. 28.5.38 to M.H.A.  
Cairo regarding Italian occupation of ports.

52 Extract from Report dated March 1938  
furnished by Lt. Col. D.R. Chato, O.C. S.C.C.  
orig. negs. 50/14619/38 E.A.

53 Kenya Tel 71 Secret 2/8/38  
Reports capture of Italian post at Bani Lugga in  
N.F.O. of Kenya.  
Comments:

54 To E.A. Rose, F.O. (w/c 53) 3/12c - 2/16/38

No. 51 - first enclosure.

Sir Miles Lampson shares the view which  
has been expressed in Mr. Paskin's minute of 5.5.,  
that it is unwise to let the Italians maintain their  
posts in the Sudan as this will lessen <sup>in their eyes</sup> the value of  
the area which we are proposing to cede to Italy  
in exchange for various favourable boundary  
adjustments.

Second enclosure cancels the action proposed  
in the last sub-enclosure to No. 47 - namely that  
Cairo should consult the Egyptian Government before  
a reply to Italian Government was returned to their  
proposal.

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