

KENYA

X. 4175

11 MAY 1926

DATE

394 -- 16th April 1926.

R'S DEPT  
RTHCOTE

57

RAID NEAR EASTERN SHORES OF LAKE VICTORIA

Encloses copy report by Mr Glenday and states that a cable has been recd. from Ras Tafari suggesting that British and Abyssinian Officers should proceed to the spot to institute an investigation into the raid.

S. of S.

S. of S.

S. of S.

of State

Views Paper

<del>18/5</del>	19/5
18/5	17/5
Ch. Harrington	18/5
E. Stirling	18/5
Sir J. Wilson	20/5
Sec of State	21/5
E.A. Dept	
Room 3	3/7
Room 1	

Copy 6/10  
 Copy enclos. D.S.O. 8 - JUL 1926 or 29/5/26  
 29/5/26

Quent Paper

V. West

C.O. 500 517

This is an interesting account of good work, in spite of the failure to recover all except a small proportion of the camels. The scene of the affair is at the extreme <sup>North-Eastern</sup> ~~Southern~~ end of Lake Rudolf, in fact, the starting point (at Herr) marks the scene of the brush with Abyssinians in September 1913, when Lieutenant Lloyd Jones was seriously injured. Our transport arrangements have improved since then, of course, but it is probable that if anything of the kind had occurred on this occasion the injured officer would have had as bad a time as that which still furnishes Major Lloyd Jones with copy: *which can be doctor with the patrol*

We should note the good work on the files of Mr. Glenday and Mr. <sup>X</sup>Robertson, and also send a copy of Mr. Glenday's report to the War Office, with a view to their noting Lieutenant Robertson's work. We should acknowledge the receipt of the despatch <sup>Express satisfaction</sup> and inform the Governor of the action taken. In addition, we should send copies of the despatch and the enclosure to the Foreign Office and ask that they may <sup>be</sup> communicated to His Majesty's Minister at Addis Ababa, and suggest that Mr. Bentinck should be authorised, if the joint action referred to in the despatch does not take place, to make strong <sup>representations</sup> ~~recommendations~~ to the Abyssinian Government and claim compensation from that Government for the losses suffered by our tribes.

*Note § 21 as to value of Somalia for this kind of work.*

*W. B. Stoney*

17.5.26.

*son's file  
from 23/7  
my's file  
20.5.27*

*A*

Mr Mackay.

I saw Mr Gladney  
& Lt Robertson at Marsabit  
three weeks after their return  
from this patrol.

I consider the work they  
did excellent - and deserving  
of recognition.

Gladney told me that  
Robertson was most anxious  
to follow up the Raudies but  
that he himself considered  
they were too near the Abyssinian  
boundary to justify a further  
advance.

The scarcity of doctors in Kenya  
does not permit of one being

69  
attached to a small patrol of  
this kind - I think the S.A.S.  
if available should have  
accompanied it.

There is no excuse now  
for leaky paramils. There is  
an ample supply of new ones  
in Nairobi and the worn-out  
ones should have been replaced.

In any case Paramils shd.  
necessarily be tested before starting  
on an expedition of this sort.

As regards casualties -  
severe cases would have to  
be carried in a stretcher or strong  
hammock - Slight cases <sup>could</sup> <sub>be</sub> carried  
walk or ride.

Para 24  
The Somalis are first into

at this particular kind of  
work - They are a nuisance  
in Garrison - especially those  
locally recruited - A supply  
from British Mainland  
shows that the case - is  
equally good in the field &  
less troublesome in quarters.

As regards para 17. I shd.  
like to point out that it is not  
the role of the Officer commanding  
a patrol to fire the Lewis Gun.  
I entirely concur with  
Mr. Bottomey's remarks.

18/8/26

J. H. Wright  
CS 18/5

Rec of State.

You may care to see. I  
think we should proceed as

prepared by Mr. Bottomey at

70

letter to WO  
required.

no files

P.H.G.  
20.5.26.  
822 20

Downing Street,

5  
June, 1924.513  
Sir,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 394 of the 16th of April on the subject of a raid by Abyssinians and natives of the Gelubba tribe on the Hagkra tribe which resides near the Eastern shores of Lake Rudolf, and to express my satisfaction at the prompt and effective action taken to deal with the raiders.

3. A note has been made of your testimony to the energetic and courageous enterprise of Mr. Glenday and Lieutenant Robertson, and I have caused a copy of Mr. Glenday's report to be sent to the War Office in order that Lieutenant Robertson's services may be brought to the notice of the Army Council.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient

and humble servant,

(Signed) H. S. AMERY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL,

SIR H. H. M. GRIGG, K. C. V. D., C. M. G., D. S. O.,

SIR H. H. M. GRIGG, K. C. V. D., C. M. G., D. S. O.,

Jewell 27. 5.26.

Allen 27  
Potterley up

Ind.

72

E. Harding

Strachey

J. Shuckburgh

G. Grindle

Davis

Wilson

Ormsby-Gore

Clarendon

Amery

44

Downing Street,

~~May 1926~~

22 JUN 1926

Sir,

I have etc., to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No.394 of the 16th of April on the subject of a raid by Abyssinians and natives of the Gelubba tribe on the Gabre tribe which resides near the Eastern shores of Lake Rudolf, and

**RAFT.**

NYA

513

Gov. Grigg.

to express my satisfaction at the <sup>prompt</sup> ~~prompt~~ & efficient <sup>effective</sup> ~~effective~~ action taken to deal with the raiders in which the ~~matter~~ has been dealt with.

A note has been made of your <sup>2.</sup> I have taken note of the good testimony to the energetic & courageous <sup>enterprise of</sup> work performed by Mr. Glenday and

Lt. Robertson, and I have ~~also~~ caused a

copy

Handwritten scribbles and notes including "LF. 22 3/2 4486"

245

copy of Mr. Glenday's report to be sent

*in order that Lt. Robertson's*  
to the War Office ~~with a view to that~~  
*services may be brought to the notice of the*  
~~officer's work being noted in that~~

*Army Council's*  
~~Department.~~

I have, etc.

Telegraph

JAMES

X.4175/1926

Downing Street, 73

May, 1926.

- 20.5.26

Sir,

04.16th  
11.1926

With reference to the letter from this Department No.X.3667/26 of the 7th of May, I am directed by Mr. Secretary Amery to transmit to you, to be laid before Secretary Sir Austen Chamberlain the accompanying copy of a despatch from the Governor of Kenya with enclosure on the subject of a raid by Abyssinians and natives of the Gelubba tribe on the Gabbra tribe which resides near the Eastern shores of Lake Rudolf.

2. I am to request that, if Sir Austen Chamberlain sees no objection, these papers may be communicated to His Majesty's Minister at Addis Ababa, and I am to suggest that Mr. Bentinck should be authorised, if the joint action referred

to

UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE?

FOREIGN OFFICE.

14



in the despatch does not take place, to make  
strong representations to the Abyssinian Government  
and claim compensation from that Government for  
the losses suffered by the tribes under British  
protection.

I am,

Sir,

Your most obedient servant.

(Signed) W. C. BOTTOMLEY.

Tewell 27 5.26.

Allen 27  
Bottanley 28/5/26

... ..

... ..

Shuckburgh.

Grindley.

Dunn.

Wilson.

... ..

... ..

C.D.  
R. 28 MAY  
D 27/5

Sud

*[Handwritten signature]*

75

Downing Street,

E 27 MAY 1926

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this Department No. K.3667/26 of the

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Sir Austen Chamberlain, the

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RAFT.

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Foreign Office.

394 : 16 Apr 26

242

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compensation from that Govt. for the

losses suffered by the tribes under

British protection.

I have, etc..

(Signed) W. C. BOTTOMLEY.

OFFICE

Reference

C.C.O. 533 / 347

COMPILATION  
RE PRODUCTION  
ALLY VILLAGE  
PUBLISHED BY

X. 4175



MAY GOVERNMENT HOUSE  
NAIROBI  
KENYA.

KENYA.

No. 394

16<sup>th</sup> April 1926.

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that in the latter part of last year news was received by telegram of a raid by Abyssinians and natives of the Gelubba tribe on the Gabbra tribe which resides near the Eastern shores of Lake Rudolf.

2. As the telegram merely conveyed the bare facts, the incident was not communicated to you pending the receipt of detailed reports from the officers concerned.

3. From the information now to hand it appears that the raid was perpetrated by about 40 Abyssinians and 300 Gelubba and that the total casualties of the Gabbra tribe amounted to 29 killed and wounded, and the losses in stock to between 4000 and 5000 camels.

4. It is satisfactory to note that Mr. Glenday, Acting District Commissioner at Marsabit, and Lieutenant Robertson of the King's African Rifles, in a subsequent patrol came up with the main force of the raiders and in addition to inflicting on them serious losses, succeeded in recovering a portion of the looted stock.

5. I append herewith copies of the report of Mr. Glenday and would particularly commend to your attention the energetic and courageous enterprise of this Officer and of Lieutenant Robertson.

Copy enclosed to W.O. 8-JUL-26

/5.

RIGHT HONOURABLE  
LIEUTENANT COLONEL L. C. M. S. AMERY, P.O., M.P.,  
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES,  
DOWNING STREET,  
LONDON, S.W.

6. As you will note Mr. Glenday considers that the raiders have been taught a severe lesson which will deter prospective raiders in the future from similar enterprises.


7. A cablegram has been received recently from His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Addis Ababa conveying a suggestion of the Prince Regent that British and Abyssinian officers proceed to the spot and institute a joint investigation into the raid.

It is satisfactory to record this evidence of a desire on the part of the Abyssinian Government to investigate such outrages in the future, and the proposal will be submitted to the Governor on his return from tour.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient humble Servant,

  
GOVERNOR'S DEPUTY.

7th January, 1926.

The Ag. Senior Commissioner,  
Northern Frontier Province,  
Wajir.

MOVEMENTS OF D.C.

Patrol N.E. Area & Lake Rudolf, Ref.  
My 16/A/154 of 31st October & 1925  
November, 1925, and Action at BANI  
against Abyssinians and Shangilla  
or Gelubba.

I returned to Marsabit on December 31st after a track of 42 days, so I hasten to send you a report on the results of the patrol.

A. Objects of Patrol.

Before describing the events of this patrol, I wish briefly to recapitulate the objects which I had in mind when I decided to undertake it. As you know we suffered serious losses in the recent raid at MOITE not only in human beings and stock, but also so much in prestige that it augured ill for the future influence of the Civil Administration. I, therefore, felt I must at all costs act in such a way that I might ensure peace for the next few months, both from the incursion of Abyssinian poachers, and also more particularly from raids by the Gelubba, Reshiat, etc. (I believe Gelubba, Reshiat and Shangilla are all the same); for, though the acts of the former are aggravating, causing us as they do considerable loss in prestige, the success of the latter always constitutes a severe political set-back.

2. To retaliate was the surest way of effecting this. Thus my attention was turned to the N.W. corner of the district (shaded red in the attached map), because I knew from past history that all raids had come from

that

DISTRICT OFFICE,  
MARSABIT.

78

7th January, 1926.

The Ag. Senior Commissioner,  
Northern Frontier Province,  
Wajir.

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that



that quarter. But no one up to now had tackled this area. It was a No Man's Land. Excepting the two Boundary Commissions no patrol had ever penetrated beyond GIBRISA (and only one, so far as I know, had reached there), nor had any patrol, I believe, moved up the Lake shore as far as the place I had reached on my tour of September and October last (c.p. report 18 Seq of 12.10.25.)

3. I therefore decided to take a small mobile patrol to make a reconnaissance of it in order that by the information gained therefrom I might be in a better position to guard against future raids. Since I also hoped (c.P. letter 16/A/154 of 31st October) that I might possibly come in contact with the recent raiders or other hostile persons, I decided to move due North to our boundary and thence due West via the southern end of Lake Stephanie to Lake Rudolf in order to surprise and drive out such persons. Should I meet with the recent raiders, I wished to inflict as severe a punishment as possible.

4. So, briefly, the objects were threefold:-
- (1) Reconnaissance of unknown N.W. corner of district.
  - (2) Driving out of hostile persons from British territory.
  - (3) The infliction of as severe punishment as possible on the recent raiders should they be in our territory.

B. The Outward Journey.

5. I left Marsabit on November 19th with the following Military patrol under the command of Lt. Robertson 5th K.A.R.:-

- (1) 22 R.&F. & from Horn Post 8 R.&F. - 30 R.&F.
- (2) 2 Lewis Guns.

Accompanying

Accompanying me were sufficient Police to take over the Horr Post from the Military in obedience to instructions (c.p. Ag. C.N.C's minute of 20/10/25).

6. We reached Northern Horr on November 25th, and after relieving the Post there, commenced our march North on the 28th. We arrived at GIBBISA on December 2nd without incident, except the discovery of sites of old Abyssinian poachers' camps at HILLA-DUKANA and SARDU. The country through which we had passed consisted of lava plateau covered in places with rough jagged boulders, lava scarps and rift valleys. There was good grazing for camels, sheep & goats, for the rains had been plentiful. BIL YIBO would probably form a good centre for this area. GIBBISA, a gneissic tor protruding out of the lava, is a prominent landmark. On the 3rd after a strenuous climb we reached the top in order to scout out the country North and West of us. We had a good view of the Stephanie depression and corresponding scarp which separates it from the Rudolf basin.

7. On the 5th we continued our march in a North-westerly direction and soon discovered recent tracks of a few camels and 3 men. On the 7th at BISSAN BAI we came up with a large meat camel, but could not seize it because of its wild condition. It was one of the camels recently raided from the Gabbrah. Lieft. Robertson therefore sent a mounted patrol to the BULUK area in the South-west as my Hoften guides thought the camel might have come from that place. We ourselves continued our march across the Stephanie depression, passing some 5 miles South of the Lake, to Jugga Tiri, where the BULUK patrol returned having seen no one. (I was interested to hear that BULUK had some 20 wells of the same pattern and shape as Wajir).

8. Continuing North-west across the scarp which divide

Lake Stephanie from Lake Rudolf we followed the L. GAWITO and soon discovered the footprints of 5 men. They were only a day old. A patrol was therefore despatched South to TULU BOR area as the guides suggested the Shangilla might be there. We found another stray camel and again it was recognised as one of the recently raided ones.

### C. The Action at BANI.

9. On the 10th, moving towards the Lake, we discovered fresh tracks of sheep and goats. About 10 a.m. our advance guard, with whom Lieut. Robertson and I were, came on unmistakable signs that manyattas were close by. Lieut. Robertson, therefore, sent out patrols S. and S.W. under Sgt. Said Maddar and Cpl. Hussein, whilst we moved with another W.N.W. towards some sheep & goats which had come into view. All patrols received orders to try and capture some man, so that I could discover who these people were.

10. Moving along we soon came on a Manyatta containing some of our raided camels. There were only women and children in it. Leaving some men to seize the camels, we moved in the direction of the Lake, but soon heard heavy firing in the direction which had been taken by Sgt. Said Maddar and Cpl. Hussein's patrols. We, therefore, wheeled off in that direction and ere long came across natives, similar in stature appearance and war-paint to the Turkana, running in thick bush.

11. They opened fire on us and we were soon hotly engaged. Almost at once we found ourselves fired on from rear and flank as well as front, because of the skilful way in which the enemy concealed themselves at the base of the thorn bushes; it was most difficult to detect where they were and only the bluish smoke, which their .450 P.C. ammunition gave

out, enabled us to do this. Practically simultaneous with the commencement of this attack we heard the other Lewis Gun firing from the place where we had left Sgt. Hussein to concentrate our baggage camels, etc. On our right considerable firing told us Sgt. Said Maddar was well engaged. Under Lieut. Robertson's direction we advanced by rushes towards our starting point and reached it at 12.30 p.m. after killing 4 and wounding 1 of our assailants. We also captured 3 rifles. On our arrival we found Sgt. Said Maddar and Cpl. Hussein had returned after having encountered and been attacked by a large number of Shangiila and Abyssinians who were concentrated on some rising ground by a water-pan. They estimated them at 150, most of whom had rifles. Sgt. Said Maddar stated he had inflicted considerable casualties on the enemy and himself had had 3 men wounded, 1 mule killed and 1 wounded. Sgt. Hussein whilst concentrating the camels had also been attacked and had driven off the enemy with loss.

12. Now there was no water in the laggar where we were, and moreover it was mid-day and scorchingly hot. Lieut. Robertson, therefore, decided to move with the captured camels and sheep & goats to the water-pan reported by Sgt. Said Maddar. The march occupied till 2 p.m. during which time we were continuously sniped from van and rear, the enemy being most persistent. Above the water was a small plateau, where Lieut. Robertson decided to camp. The position was not good going to the close proximity in parts of thick bush, but it was essential to stop in order to attend the wounded and allow the men who had been fighting since 10 a.m. in the hot sun, to quench their thirst etc. We worked strenuously all the afternoon building "zarebas" for ourselves

ourselves and the stock, lest the enemy should try and recapture or stampede the stock, during the night. From my knowledge of Turkana fighting methods, I considered this very probable.

13. The position on the evening of the 10th therefore was that we still had no sure knowledge of the enemy's strength. From the make of the manyattas and from the kind of stock we had captured it was obvious we had come upon the 'ferr' or 'guyess' stock. So the question was were the stubborn fighters of the day only the warriors guarding this stock, or had the riflemen from the manyattas round Melka Oda also fought against us? If <sup>only</sup> the former then it would be wise to expect a counter-attack from the latter when news of the fight reached Melka Oda some 2 days away. Should they do so we ought to inflict severe punishment on them.

14. Lieut. Robertson considered it essential that we should move as early as possible the next morning on to the open grass plain which borders the lake shore, because in thick bush we held no appreciable advantage and the chances of the enemy recovering the captured stock was very favourable to them. I concurred with him, because to encourage the enemy to counter-attack us in the open was in my opinion the best way of inflicting further effective punishment. To my surprise the night passed quietly, and no attempt was even made to stampede the captured stock. On the following morning our passage through some very thick bush to the shore plain was unopposed. On reaching it we commenced moving South. There were no signs of the enemy anywhere.

15. The question arises as to whether on reaching the lake shore, we should have halted and tried again to engage the enemy. To have gone then searching for the enemy would not

in my opinion have been sound bush tactics, for the initiative remained entirely with the enemy whether he accepted action; and if he did so it would have been under conditions most favourable to himself, that is, in thick bush. Any results we achieved would have been small, whilst we should have used up a considerable amount of our already depleted stock of ammunition. Again as the boundary was in my opinion not far, our range of action would have been very restricted.

16. To have captured more stock, which we could have done easily, was also of no value as we could not possibly have handled it. Before starting I never intended to capture stock and made no provision for it. I aimed at mobility; for it is the very essence of bush warfare. Thanks to Lieut. Robertson, I had it.

17. Of the action on the 10th itself I only have one regret, namely, that Lieut. Robertson did not fire himself, the Lewis Gun which was in action close to him, instead of using his own rifle, because the enemy's casualties would have been much greater.

18. We have taken great pains to estimate the casualties which we inflicted on the enemy, but as the fighting took place in thick bush it is very difficult to do so. We estimate 14 killed and 20 wounded. Of the dead we know their leader was killed. Since no attempt was made either to attack, or harass us, I now believe we fought their main body, who had been forwarned by the 5 men whose trail we found on the 8th, and that we inflicted such punishment on them as to deter them from making any reprisals. The casualties may, therefore, be greater than this estimate. Our casualties were 3 wounded - 2 through the arm and one on the knee-cap.

We were lucky to escape so lightly.

19. We captured:-

- (1) 3 rifles.
- (2) 117 camels.
- (3) 2387 sheep & goats.
- (4) 7 donkeys.

#### D. The Return.

20. The return down the Lake shore was the most arduous part of the patrol, because in order to be prepared for an attack during the night, or more particularly at dawn, we could not move until sunrise, and then had to march, ever alert, through the scorching heat at the high noon, and even the afternoon, along the glaring sands of the Lake shore. Had we been compelled, because of bush country, to make "zarebas" every night, it would have been a physical impossibility to have got the stock away, for with 5 wounded, there were only 27 R. & E. to mount all guns, drive the stock, etc. etc.

21. Lieut. Robertson's men were nearly all Somalis, and they proved once again - despite their detractors, - that they are the only men for a job of this kind. Their work was done cheerfully and adequately. With your wide experience in Turkana you can appreciate better than most what all this work meant.

22. On December 24th we reached Northern Horr and on December 27th Maikona, where I returned the Gabbra their lost camels and divided up the sheep & goats according to each section's losses.

23. Thus the result of the patrol exceeded my expectation for, I believe, we inflicted on the recent raid-



ers such punishment as will deter them from raiding in our country for some time to come; and the news of the action in an area none had thought we could reach should spread far and wide and damp the ardour of any persons intending to visit our territory for poaching or other purposes. Moreover I have obtained conclusive evidence of the recent raiders' identity, and of the actual whereabouts of the lost camels. As this tribe does not possess any camels of its own, the Abyssinian authorities can no longer burke the question by giving their usual evasive answer that they do not know where the raided stock has been hidden. In a separate despatch I am addressing you on what I consider ought to be our next moves to recover the stock.

24. Before concluding I must again bring to your notice the great anxiety we suffered owing to the terrible state of our beramils. They are so only in name, and it seems unfair either to add to our difficulties the constant they cause us, or to increase the rigours of the trekking anxiety/in this climate by the constant hardship of a short water-ration.

25. In conclusion may I bring to your notice that the excellent results of the patrol were entirely due to the most efficient way Lieut. Robertson conducted it. Sgt. Said Maddar, D.C.M., with his past experience in Northern Somaliland and this country, proved of great value. Of the men I have already commented on their excellent work. I shall be most pleased if you will bring this to the notice of the Officer Commanding Troop, Nairobi.

(sgd) V. G. Glenday.  
 Ag. District Commissioner.