

1921

(12)

KENYA

173

59570

DATE

19TH OCTOBER 1921

REG. NO. 2

PRINCE
QUEEN

1467

SUBJECT

DIVORCE ORDINANCE 190.

Reports abpt of Commission of Enquiry to consider question of desirable alterations to existing Divorce and Bastardy Laws. Requests expedition of consideration of steps to validate any divorces granted to persons not domiciled there.

Grindle

Lambert

Read

Mathison Smith.

Wood

Churchill

Previous Paper

MINUTES

Gov
580/61

Mr. Justice B. O'Connell

Re. Draft Validating Bill

has now gone out on 580/61 Mysore

the records amendment of the

local law we now have the

reports by the C. J. of 1919. In

that he added in 1917, but as

reference to a inquiry has

been set up it will be best

to wait for his report

if any rule, was some if

we get a reply from Mysore to

our it should be in 1917. It is

not clear that our of collection only

W. G. S. 1/12/21

Subsequent Paper

Gov 10000/22

W. G. S.

S. P. A.

I think that this can wait for the time being, but in passing I would note that the use of the expression "domiciled in", in para: 3 of the despatch on 29157/21, was not a mistake, as the Chief Justice supposed, not unnaturally perhaps. I used the expression after a good deal of consideration. It is true that the claim is made in this country to grant nullity in respect to a marriage contracted outside the country and of which the parties are domiciled outside this country, provided that they are resident within the country, but I think it is dangerous to extend this to cases where the parties are domiciled outside the country, and it is dangerous to do so in places like Kenya and Nyasaland. We can consider the position anew with Mr. Risley later on, but for the moment I am inclined to think that they had better confine their jurisdiction of nullity to cases in which the marriage was either contracted locally or the parties were domiciled locally.

10/10/61
 wait
 W.G.
 15/11/61
 C.M.

I think that this can wait for the time being, but in passing I would note that the use of the expression "domiciled in", in para: 3 of the despatch on 29157/21, was not a mistake, as the Chief Justice supposes, not unnaturally perhaps. I used the expression after a good deal of consideration. It is true that the claim is made in this country to grant nullity in respect to a marriage contracted outside the country and of which the parties are domiciled outside this country, provided that they are resident within the country, but I know of no case in which this has actually been done. I have always thought it a dangerous and a dangerous for adoption in places like Kenya and Nyasaland. We can consider the position anew with Mr. Risley later on, but for the moment I am inclined to think that they had better confine their jurisdiction of nullity to cases in which the marriage was either contracted locally, or the parties were domiciled locally.

15/1/51

*wait
15/1/51*

NYA.

0 1467.



GOVERNMENT HOUSE,
NAIROBI,
KENYA

19th October, 1921.

59570

Sir,

With reference to your despatch No. 1064 of July 9th, 1921 regarding certain amendments which appear to be necessary to the Divorce Ordinance 1904, I have the honour to transmit in accordance with your wishes expressed in the 5th paragraph of your despatch Memoranda by the Chief Justice and the Attorney General and to intimate that in terms of a Resolution carried in Legislative Council on August 21st a Commission of Enquiry is being appointed to consider what alterations are required in the existing Divorce and Bastardy laws of the Colony and Protectorate.

2. In view of the fact stated by the Chief Justice that certain divorces have been granted in this Colony in which the husband had no domicile here I trust that you will be able to expedite the steps mentioned in the last paragraph of your despatch under reference.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your humble, obedient servant,

Edward M. Kelly

cc
29/10/21
Memoranda

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE
WINSTON CHURCHILL, P.C., M.P.,
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES,
BONNERS STREET, LONDON, E.C.

13 23 42

in Dec. 1921

1921

181

SUPREME COURT OF KENYA,

NAIROBI,

11th October 1921.

The Honourable
The Acting Colonial Secretary,
Nairobi

Ref. No. 19754/79 of the 10th August 1921.
RE: DIVORCE ORDINANCE.

It is evident that the Divorce Ordinance 1921 which was sent out in draft by the Foreign Office for enactment in the Protectorate is based on the Indian Divorce Act 1920. The partial application of that Act by the East Africa High Court in the case of *Widdows v. Widdows* was reversed by legislation by virtue of the enactment of the Divorce Ordinance 1921 which deals with the matters now before in those parts of the Protectorate where the law of England applies.

The question arises whether the Ordinance is intended to apply to the Protectorate as a whole or whether it is intended to apply only to those parts of the Protectorate where the law of England applies. The question is one of construction and it is necessary to consider the language of the Ordinance and the intention of the Legislature.

3. The Court here has no authority to give a ruling as to the law to be applied in the case of divorce in the Protectorate. The question of the meaning of section 2(1) together with section 4 of the Divorce Ordinance was discussed in *Widdows v. Widdows*, a copy of the judgment in which has already been sent to you under cover of my No. 1919/21 of the 13th May 1921. But since the receipt of the telegram of the 15th April from the Secretary of State I have gone through the records of divorce cases in the Protectorate and in a little number of cases in recent years in which a decree of divorce has been pronounced the question of domicile was not raised, although it appears to me that in some of such cases it is obvious that the husband was not domiciled in the Colony or Protectorate. I can only assume that the importance of domicile relative to divorce is not

the basis of jurisdiction was overlooked because it was not raised in the pleadings or at the trial by the parties. The basis of jurisdiction was in any event not discussed in the cases to which I refer.

4 Section 2 of the Divorce Ordinance was apparently taken from the Indian Divorce Act 1869 with the addition to the qualification of professing the Christian religion of the alternative qualifications of having been married under the Marriage Ordinance of East Africa, Uganda or British Central Africa. I do not know what was the intention of this section which with section 7 of the Ordinance corresponds to section 4 of the Divorce Ordinance as discussed in Professor Dicey's Conflict of Laws 2nd edition page 300. The reference to the Christian religion may be a relic in the mind of the draughtsmen of the ecclesiastical origin of the law applicable in matrimonial causes; it may well be that it was probably have been inserted in the Ordinance to restrict its operation from Hindus, Parsees and other sects whose personal law in matrimonial causes applies based on their religious law.

I am however of opinion that any reference to the Christian religion should be omitted and that the Court should have full jurisdiction in divorce a vinculo for all persons domiciled in the colony or protectorate who have entered into a monogamous marriage wherever such marriage may have been contracted or wherever the matrimonial offence may have been committed. The jurisdiction in the case of nullity in other forms of relief such as judicial separation and restitution of conjugal rights should in my opinion be based on the same principles as those applied in England to petitions for similar relief. On this section I would suggest that jurisdiction in suits for nullity should be based on

(1) residence, rather than domicile or that the domicile of the

(3)

marriage was solemnised in the colony or Protectorate vide Roberts v Brennan (1902) page 141 and Hoey's Conflict of Laws page 268].

As the Secretary of State states in his third para "domicile" is not essential to confer jurisdiction in nullity cases. It therefore appears as if the word "domicile" in clause (2) of the suggested amendment to section of the Divorce Ordinance 1904 is a slip for "resident".

Subject to the above remarks I think the suggested amendment of section of the Ordinance puts the jurisdiction on a satisfactory footing.

Section 5 of the Ordinance provides that a native Christian population shall be deemed to be domiciled in the colony if it is necessary to do so. I think against a possible change of faith on the part of a man who has been married to another woman, the clause for nullity of marriage should be read in the clause or has been guilty of adultery. It is not to be read in its separate from its context so as to make it a ground of divorce. It is a ground of divorce and is not to be read as a ground of a profession of Christianity. In section 10 not only adultery in addition to bigamy with adultery as a ground of divorce there is a provision for adultery with another woman with adultery being a further ground of divorce. Some of these provisions in the absence of any real reason for the apparently duplicated provisions might go.

I have no objection with the question of the reform of the divorce law generally as that will be the subject of an inquiry by a Commission.

Ed. M. BARKER
SOLICITOR GENERAL

(3)

marriage was solemnized in the Colony or Protectorate (vide *Roberts v Brennan* (1902) page 143 and *Dixon's Conflict of Laws* page 256).

As the Secretary of State states in his third para "domicil" is not essential to confer jurisdiction in nullity cases. It therefore appears as if the word "domiciled" in clause (2) of the suggested amendment to Section 2 of the Divorce Ordinance 1904 is a slip for "resident".

Subject to the above remarks I think the suggested amendment of Section 2 of the Ordinance puts the jurisdiction on a satisfactory footing.

The first part of Section 5 (2) of the Ordinance should in my opinion stand. With a native Christian population in a Mohammedan country such as the Protectorate it is necessary to protect the wife against a possible change of faith on the part of the husband plus marriage with another woman. I am however of opinion that the clause may have been guilty of inadvertent adultery should be separated from its context so as to make it clear that it is a distinct ground of divorce and is not dependent on a change of a profession of Christianity.

In this section I am not clear why attention to bigamy with adultery as a ground of divorce there is a provision for marriage with another woman with adultery being a further ground of divorce. One of these grounds in the absence of any real reason for the apparently duplicated provisions might go.

I have not dealt with the question of the reform of the Divorce Law generally as that will be the subject of an inquiry by a Commission.

Sd J. W. BARTH

CHIEF JUSTICE

MEMORANDUM.
ON THE DIVORCE ORDINANCE, 1904, AND THE SECRETARY
OF STATE'S DESPATCH 1064 DATED 9TH JULY, 1921.

1. The practice usually followed in the local High Courts has been, I am informed, to refuse divorce to parties not domiciled in the Colony and Protectorate. In a case which came before the Chief Justice the other day the principle laid down in *Le Mesurier v Le Mesurier* 1895 A.C. 517 was adhered to. It appears however that in one or two cases recently decided by puisne judges the principle has been lost sight of and divorces have been granted without due regard to the necessity of establishing a local domicile in order to found jurisdiction.

2. It appears desirable therefore that clause 2 should be amended so as to make it clear that local domicile is an essential qualification to enable the Courts to grant divorce. It is also in accordance with the principles of English jurisprudence that jurisdiction in cases of nullity should be determined on the lines suggested by the Secretary of State.

3. The reference in Section 2 of the Divorce Ordinance, 1904, to marriages celebrated under various local Marriage Ordinances as distinguished from Christian marriages appears to be of some importance.

4. Under the East Africa Marriage Ordinance, 1902, it appears that monogamous marriages may be solemnised and registered under the Ordinance though the parties are not Christians and this is in fact done by Jews and Parsees. It is settled law that such marriages have the same effect

as marriages contracted according to Christian rites. *Briskley v Attorney General* (1890) 15 P.D. 76. It seems necessary to provide similar relief in respect of these marriages as is provided in the case of Christian ones. In cases where the parties are domiciled in Kenya unless facilities for divorce are provided here they cannot obtain divorce anywhere, on the principle of *Le Mesurier*.

5. Neither the Marriage Ordinance, 1902, nor the Divorce Ordinance, 1904, is intended to apply to any but non-nuptial marriages.

This limited application seems to be clear in the case of the Marriage Ordinance more especially from Sections 3, 4, 51 and 52. In Nyassaland and I understand in this Colony the Ordinance has always been so interpreted. It was however that in Uganda the corresponding Ordinance was applied to Mohammedan Marriages until 1936 when a special Ordinance was passed to deal with such marriages.

The Divorce Ordinance, 1904, applies only to Christian Marriages or to marriages celebrated under one or other of the aforesaid Ordinances (consequently only to non-nuptial marriages). It has however the defect referred to in the preceding paragraph that no relief can be granted in the case of other non-nuptial marriages although the parties are domiciled here.

6. I suggest that this difficulty might be overcome by substituting in the Divorce Ordinance for the present Section 2 the section suggested by the Secretary of State and by adding a definition in Section 3 of the term "marriage" in some such terms as the following:-

"Marriage" means the union of one man and one woman for life to the exclusion of all others. Provided that such union may be dissolved in accordance with the provisions of this Ordinance".

7. If this change is made it will be necessary to alter section 5 (2). I suggest that the grounds on which a wife could obtain divorce should be the following:-

Bigamy:

rane, sodomy, or bestiality;

adultery coupled with cruelty;

adultery coupled with desertion without reasonable excuse for two years.

incestuous adultery;

contracting a polygamous union or a union by native law or custom.

8. The Indian Divorce Act, 1869, has not been expressly repealed by the Divorce Ordinance but all its provisions are covered by that Ordinance and it is no longer applicable. I agree however that if amending legislation is to be introduced the application of that Act should be expressly provided.

9. Other amendments of the Divorce Law might be suggested raising broader issues but these are questions rather of policy than law. It has been suggested for instance that in some respects the provisions in regard to divorce of the present law in respect of a wife's remedies are better adapted to modern ideas than those of English law. These are however controversial matters which are outside the scope of this memorandum.

Sd. R. W. LYALL-GRANT.

Nairobi,

22nd August, 1921.

ATTORNEY GENERAL.

7. If this change is made it will be necessary to alter section 5 (2). I suggest that the grounds on which a wife could obtain divorce should be the following:-

Dignity:

Rape, sodomy, or bestiality;

Adultery coupled with cruelty;

Adultery coupled with desertion without reasonable excuse for two years.

Incestuous adultery;

Contracting a polygamous union or a union by native law or custom.

8. The Indian Divorce Act, 1869, has not been expressly repealed by the Divorce Ordinance but all its provisions are covered by that Ordinance and it is no longer applicable. I agree however that if amending legislation is to be introduced the application of that Act should be expressly preserved.

9. Other amendments of the Divorce Law might be suggested relating broader issues but these are questions rather of policy than law. It has been suggested for instance that in some respects the provisions in regard to divorce of Scots law in respect to a wife's remedies are better adapted to modern ideas than those of English law. These are however controversial matters which are outside the scope of this memorandum.

Ed. R. W. LYALL-GRANT.

Nairobi.

22nd August, 1921.

ATTORNEY GENERAL.