



EAST AFR. PROT
34699

C.O.
34699
13 00 13

for Browning Conf. 118
1913
12 Sept.
Last previous Paper.
for 32503

Merchan. Situation

Confirms tel. comes resp. portion - just
further reasons for disarmament. Explains
as to alternatives resp. to in for tel. 1 Sept.
in respect to which Mr. Hicken is awaiting
further orders

Mr. Read. himself Sec. Mr. 32508
Col. Graham gave the alteration -
before August 15th - as a date not
stated. He telegraphed on July 29 -
apparently without mentioning the date
of expiration of the alteration -
saying that reinforcements should
be necessary & that conditions should
be obtained but that steps should
be taken now till be reached towards
as (as it happens) August 15th.
Mr. Browning & the Govt, being (as I
understand it) also informed of the
contents of the nature of the alteration
decided to wait for Col. Graham's
arrival before asking for conditions
for reinforcements

100,000, No. 20, 1913-14
41,000, 12/12, A. 100, W.

New unnumbered Paper
for 32508

In reply to the latter part of the dispatch
 (page 10) (page 10) it would
 appear that it was not off before the
 receipt of our tel. (no. 31670) of 12 Sept.
 according to the instructions of 6 Sept. (30570)
 and that these instructions had not
 been there (& may not have been now)
 sent to Major Hicken, who had previously
 been ordered to do nothing.

Mr. Kearney suggests that it is a better
 bet for explicit instructions to be sent to
 Major H., but I see no reason for sending
 anything further. The I. G. will be on or
 near the spot by the end of October and
 in the execution of the arrangements
 have caused the tubes and to a
 considerable extent of apprehension.

If the telegraph at all I think it
 should be

I have received your copy dated 4th Sept.
 The same I have forwarded
 to Major H. with discretion allowed on
 4th Sept.

W. H. R.
 8/10/13

? Send the - in major's hands

H. J. R. I am inclined to send with my
 further pending to J. G. Arnold
 8/15/13 4th. 9. 10. 13 J. G. Arnold
 W. H. R.

10. 10. 13
 10. 9. 10. 13

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GO
34299

EAST AFRICA PROTECTORATE

GOVERNMENT HOUSE
NAIROBI,
BRITISH EAST AFRICA 10

CONFIDENTIAL No. 111



12th September 1913.

853

Sir,

for
32523

for
29924

for
30530

for
32523

In continuation of my confidential despatch No. 111 of August 28th, on the subject of the situation in the Marsabit country, I have the honour to inform you that on receipt of cypher telegram of August 28th I again discussed the position with Colonel Graham and requested him to furnish me with a statement on the lines requested by you. This statement was duly embodied in my cypher telegram of September 1st.

2. As regards my own reasons for recommending the disarmament of the Marsabit I have little to add to what I have already stated in my confidential despatch of the 28th of August and my cypher telegram of the 1st of September. It may be assumed that the news, both of our action with regard to the Far Ogas Section and of the order which was issued to the Ahmed Vet and the Ali Dafi, has been circulated not only amongst the Marsabits themselves but also amongst the

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE
LEWIS HARCOURT, P.O., M.P.
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES,
DOWNING STREET, LONDON, S.W.

* No. 21112
No. 21174
No. 2115

car

the whole of the Somali Community in the Protectorate - in Southern Jubaland, Tanaland and elsewhere. It is also a fair assumption that the Somalis generally are now awaiting with the greatest interest the next move on the part of the Government. The recent incident in Northern Somaliland must, I consider, also be reckoned as a factor in the attitude of the tribe. If no move is made the effect cannot in my opinion fail to be serious, and I fear that such inaction will constitute a menace to the peaceful administration of the Districts populated by the Somalis. Further the large number of itinerant Somali traders would very probably spread exaggerated reports of the apparent helplessness of Government throughout the Protectorate, a procedure which could only tend to lower our prestige with other tribes besides the Somalis. As regards the Mashaan themselves failure to disarm will mean a continuance of strained relations with Government, and we shall lose the benefits of direct control for it is obvious that they will be chary of coming into contact with our administration while they are in retention of their arms contrary to our expressed wishes and orders. One effect of this loss of touch with them will be a danger of an increased activity in the arms traffic.

5. On the other hand the successful enforcement of the order for disarmament cannot but have a most beneficial effect, for the Somalis

will

will realize that we mean what we say and do not intend to resort to a policy of "bluff".

4. As the Officer Commanding Troops remarks in paragraph 2 of the Memorandum enclosed in my despatch of August 28th, the Marehan cannot be compared either as regards numbers or fighting power with the Ogaden group of Somalis. Colonel Graham believes that the loan of an additional Company of Troops will ensure the disarmament. He does not anticipate any serious active opposition or any considerable fighting, but the employment of a larger number of troops than the existing garrisons in the Marehan country will be necessary in order to safeguard the lines of communication and to afford a numerically sufficient force which may have to be split up into columns to follow up the sections who may be expected to do all in their power to evade disarmament and to avoid direct conflict with our men.

5. If it is decided not to proceed with the disarmament of the Ahmed Wet and Ali Dani Sections, it will not be necessary to reinforce the troops now in the Marehan country. The present force is considered ample for a defensive policy and can also furnish small patrols if necessary from time to time. It cannot however for the reasons already given be relied upon to enforce the disarmament.

6. A policy of inaction will, however, necessitate the retention in the Marehan country of the force at present there for an indefinite period

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period whereas once the Sections have been disarmed it should be possible to reduce, I hope considerably, the existing garrison. The cost of maintaining a considerable garrison so far from the Coast is as you are aware very great and apart from this the very greatest difficulty exists at present in arranging for the relief of detachments in all parts of the Protectorate and for proper periods of training at headquarters of the different Companies.

7. Colonel Graham has stated that there is no pressing reason from a military point of view to disarm the Sections, but I would venture to suggest that the effect of inaction cannot fail eventually to have a bad effect on the morale of our own troops. They have been undergoing considerable hardships and privations, they are aware of the orders issued to the tribe by the Government and I cannot but think that they will sooner or later begin to wonder why steps are not taken to enforce the same. It appears to me possible that they will begin to lose confidence both in the Government and in themselves.

8. In your cypher telegram of September 6th you state that you are but imperfectly informed of the position in the Marahan country. I regret extremely that such should be the case and I trust my despatch of August 28th which is due to arrive in London on the 17th instant will give you the further information which you require.

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With

* N: 30974
 7 A 2352

5.

With the exception of the Officer Commanding Troops' telegram, referred to below, no news was received from Northern Jubaland since my despatch of July 19th was written until he returned from his tour of inspection. A memorandum prepared by him as a result of this inspection was duly enclosed in my later despatch.

9. On August 3rd, while the Governor was on tour in the Masai Reserve, I had received the following telegram from Colonel Graham via the Italian station at Bardera:-

"July 29th Latest information Ahmed Wet and Aladera have moved in a Northerly direction so as to avoid disarmament. In order to carry out disarmament consider one Company in addition essential recommend sanction one Company should be obtained from Uganda immediately. Order for move of one Company should be deferred pending arrival of Graham Nairobi probably about August 15th."

10. In view of the issues involved and the fact that both Colonel Graham and the Governor were due back in a few days time I decided to take no action until the latter had had an opportunity of discussing the situation with the former. The file was placed before the Governor immediately on his return and he expressed the desire to see the Officer Commanding Troops as soon as he arrived in Nairobi.

* N-278/12

Nairobi. As a matter of fact Colonel Graham's return was delayed for a few days and the interview took place while I was in Mombasa. On my return from the Coast Mr. Belfield informed me that he had instructed Colonel Graham to prepare a memorandum on the situation but I had no opportunity of ascertaining Mr. Belfield's views as before he had had time to consider the memorandum he had been obliged to give up all work. I accordingly dealt with the matter myself, as explained in paragraph 7 of my despatch of August 28th.

13. As regards the ultimatum of which you were first made acquainted in my cypher telegram of September 1st, the explanation is as follows:-

The Governor's Minute quoted in paragraph 6 of my confidential despatch of July 16th in which he stated that the Marehan must be made to comply with the order for disarmament and that the Officer Commanding Troops was to settle the question of reinforcements, was written after Colonel Graham had left on his inspection. It was repeated to the Officer in charge at Nairobi who communicated it to Colonel Graham. On his arrival in the Marehan country Colonel Graham did not order immediate action by the troops for the reasons (1) that he considered an extra Company necessary and (2) that the arrangements for rationing the men were not complete. He caused messengers to be sent to the Ahmed Wab and Ali Dori Sections ordering them to hand in their firearms by August 15th, and informing them that

x No 3234
+ No 3157

that unless they did so they must take the consequences.

12. Colonel Graham of course left the district before the prescribed date but had, as quoted above, before going so reported that the Sections were attempting to avoid disarmament and that in order to enforce the order reinforcements were necessary.

13. After I had discussed the position with him on the receipt of your cypher telegram of August 29th, ^x Colonel Graham immediately telegraphed to Major Hickson as follows:-

"August 30th. Do not undertake any active operations against Marchan until you receive further orders from me stop acknowledge this by wire."

This telegram was duly acknowledged by the Officer in Command at Sereali who replied as follows:-

"Your telegram of August 30th received and forwarded."

Major Hickson was to the best of our information at Lelished the advance base in the Marchan country, some 75 miles distant, and it is certain that if the orders had failed to reach him in time we should have heard by now.

14. The present position is therefore that the date given in the ultimatum has expired but that Major Hickson is awaiting further instructions before proceeding to disarm the Sections by force.

15. As reported to you in my earlier telegram of September 9th I have addressed the Governor of Uganda on the subject of the loan of a Company for service in Northern Jubaland and Colonel Graham is now arranging details with the Officer Commanding the 4th Battalion, King's African Rifles. I have also authorized him to purchase the necessary number of camels and mules, though it will be difficult to obtain the latter owing to the position on the Northern Frontier (which is the only place where the mules can be obtained at anything but exorbitant prices) on which I am addressing you in a separate despatch.

16. In my earlier telegram of September 9th I felt compelled to ask that the orders which you instructed me to convey to Major Hickson in your telegram of September 5th might be modified so as to enable him to use his discretion as to the action to be taken by him when he has received his reinforcements. It appeared to me that no useful purpose would be served if he were authorized to disarm by peaceful methods only and that it would be better, if he were not permitted to resort to force, that he should make no overtures at all to the Sections who have been ordered to surrender their arms. If, with a still larger force than is at his disposal at present, he is ordered to refrain from forcible assertion of his authority

authority after again requesting the Sections to hand in their arms our prestige would in my opinion suffer to an even greater extent than by taking no further action whatever until the Inspector General has reported on the situation.

17. Although there is no reason to apprehend that resort to force would result in any considerable fighting or would aggravate the present situation, it would, I most respectfully submit, place a comparatively junior Military Officer in a very difficult position if he were told that he was to be held directly responsible to you for any unforeseen and at present, to all appearances, improbable result of the exercise of his discretion.

18. In the meantime as stated above, Major Nickson has already received orders to undertake no active operations and there will be ample time to convey to him any further and more implicit instructions before the reinforcements reach him.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your humble, obedient servant,

ACTING GOVERNOR.