

EAST AFR. PROT.
 K.A.H.
 No. 26193

26193
 Rec.
 Rec. 23 JUL 07

Individual Unit
 1907
 March
 previous Paper
 Copy made 7 Jan. 09
 subsequent Paper

(Subject)

Jubaland

Observations as to the situation in
 necessity at some time or the other for a
 military expedition

(Minutes)

It has been reported separately so
 that Lord Manning's views may not be
 lost sight of, of the question of the
 policy to be adopted in Jubaland areas
 up to the frontier

Part of
 at once
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Memorandum No. 174
Inspection Report on 3rd Battalion

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INSPECTION REPORT.

1. Since the last inspection it has been decided to reduce the 3rd Battalion K.A.R. by 2 companies (250 rank and file). This reduction has been gradually carried out during the past three months in order that by the 1st April 1907 the establishment may consist of six companies (750 R. & F). The less valuable material in the battalion has been got rid of and though numbers are decreased it is probable that the fighting value of the battalion has not decreased in proportion to the numbers disbanded.

The present distribution of the battalion is

Naifesi, Head Quarters	2 companies.
Babo and Nyeri	1 company.
Luswa	1 "
Jubaland, (Kismayu, Gebwen, Yontel)	2 companies.
Total	6

The garrison in the Nandi country has been entirely withdrawn. One company is now stationed at Luswa to watch that portion of the Nandi country from which the Nandi were expelled during the late operations and to prevent their return.

With the exception of some minor operations in the Babo district there have been no outbreaks since

since the close of the Nandi Expedition.

The garrison in Jubaland which is now 2 companies appears to be sufficient for the duties of covering and defending the port of Kismayu and for dealing with local disturbances in the neighbourhood of Kismayu.

The policy of non-interference with the Somalia of the interior has been carried out, but the character of the Somali in Jubaland differs somewhat from that of the Somali in Northern Somaliland and it seems likely that not being content with their independence they will endeavour to further improve the situation by acts of lawlessness in order to improve their position in regard to the Administration. The Ogaden are at present quiet and have no communications with the Administration, there are however other sections whose conduct has lately been unsatisfactory and concerning whom reports are received showing that during the coming rains outrages are probable. It seems also quite likely that raids upon neighbouring tribes will be made, and that the feeling of independence and the severance of all communication with the Administration may encourage the Somalis to acts that may eventually necessitate protest and then interference.

It is quite evident that in a very few years the Jubaland Province will be the only Province in the East Africa Protectorate where law and order will not be firmly established, at any rate amongst the Natives. Portions of the Jubaland Province on the Juba River and in the Goshu country are undoubtedly rich and eminently suited for the cultivation of

cotton, fibre etc. in addition to which the Boran Trade which now passes via Bardera to the Italian Benadir Coast Ports should more naturally pass down the Juba River to Kismayu were that route opened up and safe. It is probable that capital may be attracted to the Province and that applications for land for planting purposes will be made, in my opinion there can be no half measures as to the policy to be pursued in Jubaland, if land is sold, if plantations are opened up, if it is attempted to open the trade route to Bardera via the Juba River, if white settlers enter the Province, nothing can prevent a collision with the Somalis in the near future and the result of a costly Military Expedition. If on the other hand the Province is closed to all commercial enterprise and the Somalis left entirely to their own devices it is probable that for some time at any rate they will not force the hand of the Administration, but I think it is quite safe to prophesy that the Somali will eventually compel attention, and in this case the inevitable is merely postponed.

A Military Expedition is not to be lightly undertaken in the Jubaland Province. its cost must be very heavy; and its results problematical, unless a military occupation of certain posts follows the expedition necessitating further considerable expenditure.

It would seem therefore that the wisest course to pursue as regards Jubaland, is to close it at the present to commercial enterprise and to allow such

such time as it is considered convenient to deal with the Somalis once and for all.

There are no other tribes in the East Africa Protectorate who are likely to cause serious anxiety and concerning whom such a difficult problem exists as in the case of the Jubaland Somalis.

2. I inspected the detachments at Lumbwa and in Jubaland and the Head Quarters companies of the 3rd Battalion. I found matters generally satisfactory. The improvement in drill, training, organisation, interior economy and general efficiency in the battalion since my first inspection in 1902 is most marked. The state of the battalion at my first inspection in 1902 was most unsatisfactory, but since that date matters have gone on steadily improving until the battalion can now be said to be in an efficient state.

The Camel Corps in Jubaland is an exceptionally good unit, experience has now been gained in the management of Arab Camels and the mortality, which was at one time very heavy, has now fallen considerably. This Corps has a very valuable moral effect in Jubaland and in the dry season when it can be efficiently used there is little probability of the Somalis attempting any outrages within range of it, but in the wet season the Camel Corps can not move with the same freedom with the result that at this season

season the Somalis are encouraged to more daring being fully aware of the limitations of the Camel Corps.

3. The composition of the battalion now stands as follows:-

Soudanese	417.
Other races	<u>333</u> <u>750.</u>

Of "Other races" there are shown Masai 61, Nandi 41. The latter are making fair soldiers and are anxious to enlist. The Soudanese element last year was 479 and this year is 417 a decrease of 62 due to the discharge of time expired men. An attempt has been made to form a colony of time expired Soudanese in Jubaland but unfortunately the results are not encouraging. The time expired Soudanese in Jubaland does not appear to take kindly to work.

It is very essential that in Jubaland there should be a body of thoroughly reliable troops and the garrison there at present is mainly composed of Soudanese, but with the Soudanese element in the battalion now gradually on the decrease, difficulty in maintaining such a body of reliable troops in Jubaland is inevitable.

4. In estimating the troops available for Jubaland I do not take count of the 1st battalion, the

The King's African Rifles since after the present year the battalion will consist of 4 companies, 3 of which will be on detachment in Zanzibar, the garrison of Nairobi is in excess of the requirements at the present moment of the rest of the East Africa Protectorate though it is possible that with the expansion of administrative control further detachments will be required in out-stations, and the idea of inter-dependence for military assistance between the Uganda and East Africa Protectorate is carried out troops from East Africa might be required to assist in Uganda, and vice versa.

5. From the foregoing remarks it is evident now that the Nandi trouble has been disposed of and with it the probability of trouble with the Lumbwa, and assuming that the Masai are unlikely to prove trouble. Some, there remain the Somalis in the Jubaland Province who will be a cause of anxiety and apprehension who may at any time disturb the peace of the Protectorate. The matter will in a very few years resolve itself into the fact that though a military force may no longer be necessary in the rest of the East Africa Protectorate yet owing to the turbulent Somali inhabitants of the Jubaland Province, a Province which for the greater part is a worthless possession a considerable expenditure will be incurred in maintaining a body of troops ready to cope with the disturbances in Jubaland and the point will of necessity arise as to whether it will not be cheaper

in the long run to deal once and for all with the
Somalis by means of a Military Expedition.

I have had no small experience of Somalia
and until they are shown that we are stronger than
they are I am afraid there is no hope for their
regeneration. In this particular they are no
different to the Nandi and other truculent tribes
who will never settle down peacefully until they
recognise our ability to compel them to listen to
our orders.

(Signed) W. H. MANNING, BRIG-GEN.

I.G., K.M.A.R.

OMBASA,

22/3/07