

**THE INFLUENCE OF NATIONAL INTEREST ON REGIONAL INTEGRATION
CHOICES: A CASE STUDY OF TANZANIA (1980-2017)**

**MUGENI BWIRE, KEVIN
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SUPERVISOR: PROF. FRED JONYO

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DECLARATION

This research project is my original work and has not been presented for examination or degree award to any other institution or examination body.

Signed 
Mugeni Bwire, Kevin
C50/7022/2017

Date 16th October 2020

This project has been submitted for the review with your approval as the university supervisor.

Signature..... **Date 16th October 2020**
Prof. Fred Jonyo
Supervisor,
Department of Political Science and Public Administration,
University of Nairobi.

DEDICATION

I dedicate this project to my grandparents, Daniel, and Martina Wangira. They are the ones who inspired this work but unfortunately, they will not read it. I hope through this work, I will amount to what they wanted me to. Even though posthumously, thank you for the mastered seed of unbridled ambition that you sowed in me, “*mutio muno*”. I also dedicate this work to the late Dr. Patrick O. Asingo, who despite having supervised and guided me throughout this study period, did not live to see the end of this process.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

APEC	Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations
AU	African Union
BREXIT	Britain Exit from European Union
CFSP	Common Foreign Security Policy
COMESA	Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa
CSDP	Common Security Defence Policy
EAC	East African Community
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EEC	European Economic Community
EFTA	European Free Trade Association
EMP	Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
EU	European Union
FLS	Front Line States
FTA	Free Trade Area
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IBM	International Business Machine
IR	International Relations
JHA	Justice and Home Affairs
MNCs	Multi-national Corporations
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
RCT	Rational Choice Theory
RECs	Regional Economic Communities
SADC	Southern African Development Community
TAZARA	Tanzania Zambia Railway
TVET	Technical and Vocational Education and Training
TVSD	Technical and Vocational Skills Development

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ABSTRACT

Due to the constraints that the multiplicity of membership in RECs portends for African countries such as duplication, multiple financial commitments, competing rules of origin, tariff reduction rates, obligation to comply with different policy decisions and inefficiency, this study sought to examine the way Tanzania's multiple membership to the EAC and SADC curtails her from harnessing ultimate benefits from these regional integration arrangements. To this end therefore, this study sought to underscore various aspects influencing Tanzania's regional integration choices and the way forward. The research was guided by three objectives, namely; to assess how national economic interests help define Tanzania's regional integration choices; secondly, to examine how national political interests help define Tanzania's regional integration choices; and, thirdly, to review how national socio-cultural interests help define Tanzania's regional integration choices. This study utilised Mwesiga Baregu's imperatives for regional integration theoretical approach which holds the view that there are factors that create the impetus, and give rise to the drive and yearning, for integration among states in a given regional integration scheme. Adopting the longitudinal research design using a case study approach, the research data was obtained by use of primary (key informant interviews) and secondary methods of data collection. Content analysis was used to analyse data. The study indicates that within the SADC regional integration scheme, Tanzania lies in the outer fringes of the scheme geographically as SADC rotates around South Africa as the sub-regional hegemon creating an oligopolistic REC where other countries are just but pawns. As such, Tanzania is better placed to be in the EAC owing to her geographic centrality within the EAC. In addition, Tanzania's inroads in the EAC through historical interactions make it easier for her to foster stronger integration with other members. Noting that majority of the partner states of the EAC are landlocked and intra-EAC trade is still a great distance away from full potential, sea bound countries such as Tanzania can harness this potential for stronger trade ties. For Tanzania, the EAC also carries much better developmental prospects owing to deepened infrastructural linkages. To this end therefore, Tanzania should seek to consolidate the gains that can be made within the East African Community while pursuing trade with SADC countries under the rubric of the EAC or bilaterally.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

Regional blocs have prominently featured on the agenda of African countries (Vanheukelom and Bertelsman, 2016). States from both the North-South divide view regional integration arrangements as potent vehicles that cushion them against the vagaries of globalization and its undersides such as drugs and human trafficking, environmental and resources problems, proliferation of arms and weapons, terrorism, to mention but a few. Gathi (2009) defines regional integration as a process through which different countries join hands and agree to cooperate in certain areas that they have common interest. Regional integration can assume various forms, based on the goals of the partaking countries (Gathi, 2009). Bela Balassa (1961) identifies five levels of regional integration. The initial level is the free trade area here, members are exempted from tariffs and quotas, then a customs union where non-members are subjected to common external tariffs. The next phase is the common markets which combines features of both free trade area and the customs union. Further, hinderances to free flow of capital and labour are removed before the economic union which harmonizes and adopts a single currency is ushered in followed by the ultimate stage of integration, the political federation. At the political federation level, policy structures and political institutions are harmonized into a unified supranational entity, this process is linear (Balassa, 1961).

George Modelski (1962) opines that states have goals, objectives and duties that can either be achieved individually or collectively. As such, cooperation in terms of regional integration is not something new rather, a compelling development mechanism for all strata of states in the international system, be it the global south or the global north. In Africa, it has been observed that the quest for integration in the post-colonial period was due to the awareness of the small size of some of the economies involved and that without joining others as a collective, they risked becoming vulnerable thus not able to realize their economic potential (Jalloh, 1980). In this regard, the East African countries, one could argue, were influenced by the European Economic Community (EEC). The rationality according to Jalloh (1980) was that if great economies such as France and Germany were rooting for regional integration, then such a need was even more compelling for smaller and highly peripherized economies like the case of EAC member states.

Regional integration arrangements in their essence have a windfall of benefits spanning large markets, collective security, collective bargaining power, increased trade opportunities, comparative

advantage and economies of scale (Venables, 2000; Haas, 1975; Deutsch, 1971; Mitrany, 1966). This was the basis upon which the defunct East African Community was initiated in 1967, a process which started when Kenya and Uganda formed a customs union in 1917, with Tanganyika joining later in 1927. The period between 1948-1961 saw the establishment of the East African High Commission after which the initial EAC was institutionalised (1967-1977). The initial EAC collapsed in 1977 prompting the three member economies, notably: Tanzania, Kenya, and Uganda to enter negotiations for the sharing of assets and liabilities which was signed in 1984. The EAC partner states established East African Co-operation (1993-2000) which ushered in the EAC II from 2000-present (East African Community, 2019). Despite the centripetal role that colonial legacy and historical relations played in integrating the three partner states in the EAC, national interest seemed to have steered Tanzania towards SADC.

Tanzania joined SADC in 1980, three years after the collapse of EAC I but still remained a key actor in the revamping of the current EAC. SADC traces its origin in the 1960s and 1970s, following the concerted effort by the leaders of the Frontline States (FLS) to coordinate their diplomatic, military, and political efforts to end colonial rule in southern Africa. SADC morphed from SADCC on 17th August 1992 and was tasked with facilitating political and security and socio-economic cooperation among member states (Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 2017). Today, Tanzania has membership in both the EAC and SADC, which imperatives draws Tanzania to both regional blocs? Harold (1965) observes that multiplicity of membership to regional bodies appeals sufficiently to integration needs of a state at different stages. Could this be the basis for Tanzania's multiplicity of membership?

According to Hans Morgenthau (1993), states seek to augment power in their inter-state relations. Power in this sense, may assume different dimensions such as economic development, political stability, and socio-cultural advancement. To achieve this aim, states may project their intentions as goals geared towards realization of their national interest. Therefore, Tanzania's regional integration choices could be viewed as a strategy to advance her national interest. By being in both the EAC and SADC, Tanzania seems to have imperatives that inform her regional integration choices. Ojo, Orwa and Utete (1987) posit that in regional integration arrangements, resources tend to move from less developed areas to relatively more prosperous ones within the region. This study, therefore, seeks to evaluate the influence of Tanzania's national interest on her regional integration choices.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Whereas regional integration has been viewed world over as a panacea for development (World Bank, 2000), multiplicity of membership constrains regional integration arrangements especially in Africa as a result of duplication and inefficiency (Mengistu, 2015). Therefore, Tanzania's multiple membership to the EAC and SADC curtails her from harnessing ultimate benefits from these regional integration arrangements. This multiplicity of membership makes Tanzania liable to unnecessary costs that could have been avoided. For instance, being in both the EAC and SADC, requires Tanzania to make multiple financial commitments, face distinct rules of origin, deal with tariff reduction rates as well as comply with different policy decisions. In addition, Biswaro (2012) concurs that belonging to multiple regional economic communities at times conflict and compete or duplicate rather than complement one another.

Thus, Tanzania's dalliance with SADC is puzzling. Why did Tanzania join SADC, when the EAC countries according to their preferential terms, are supposed to be treating SADC members as outsiders and similarly, why did Tanzania join the EAC, when SADC partner states according to their preferential terms, are supposed to be treating the EAC member states as outsiders? Furthermore, all five Tanzania partner economies in the EAC and eight of her partner economies in SADC are in COMESA, but Tanzania is not, why is that? Moreover, Tanzania's multiplicity of membership has raised questions over her commitment to the EAC leading to suspicion by her other partner states. For functional regional integration arrangements, this should not be the case. Conversely, this study intends to indicate that perhaps Tanzania could be losing out on being a sub-imperialist power in the EAC over her multiple membership, and obviously wields less influence in SADC given South Africa's hegemony. For instance, Tanzania following her historical relations could align with Uganda to counter Kenya's sub-imperialist status in the EAC. According to Phillip Nying'uro (1997), sub-imperialist position attracts aid and favours from the West. Progressively, Tanzania's multiple loyalty has raised concerns in both the academic and policy circles over her commitment. Therefore, the study seeks to indicate whether Tanzania's regional integration choices are as a result of her national interest, a move which has put Tanzania's regional integration efforts in a problematic situation. Tanzania seems to be in a dilemma and fears to lose out on both the real and perceived opportunities each regional economic community bears, a move which seems to be hampering Tanzania's realization of full regional integration benefits. This study, therefore, seeks to underscore various aspects influencing Tanzania's regional integration choices.

1.3 Research Questions

1.3.1 Major Question

How has Tanzania's national interest influenced her regional integration choices?

1.3.2 Specific Questions

- i. How has Tanzania's national economic interests influenced her regional integration choices?
- ii. How has Tanzania's national political interests influenced her regional integration choices?
- iii. How has Tanzania's national socio-cultural interests influenced her regional integration choices?

1.4 Objectives of the Study

1.4.1 Overall Objective

The overall objective of this study is to evaluate the influence of Tanzania's national interest on her regional integration choices.

1.4.2. Specific Objectives

- i. To assess how national economic interests help define Tanzania's regional integration choices.
- ii. To examine how national political interests help define Tanzania's regional integration choices.
- iii. To review how national socio-cultural interests help define Tanzania's regional integration choices.

1.5 Justification of the Study

1.5.1 Academic Justification

This study underscored the nexus between Tanzania's national interest and her regional integration choices. The study also contributed on existing literature on regional integration by demonstrating how national interest informs regional integration choices in the quest for development, an area which had been given little focus by antecedent scholars in this field hence elevating knowledge repository. For instance, studies by Lodompui, (2010); Schiff and Winters, (2003); Adar and Ngunyi, (1994); Makinda, (1983); Fredland, (1980); Langdon and Muriuki, (1979) have to a large extent linked the collapse of the defunct EAC generally on national interest of the founding states and specifically on Tanzania. In addition, this study sought to benefit students and scholars more so those pursuing International Relations by serving as a point of reference on regional integration choices and for stimulating intellectual discourse.

1.5.2 Policy Justification

Tanzania's multiplicity of membership has persisted despite the fact it has raised questions over her regional integration commitments. This may imply there could be benefits Tanzania is drawing from this multiplicity of membership arrangements. The study findings, therefore, sought to inform policy change by acquainting policy makers and bureaucrats on the implications of multiplicity of membership in regional bodies. In addition, political actors involved in the integration process would be able to draw basic lessons from this study in their quest for integration mechanisms. The study would also enable involved political actors to identify and prioritize regional integration choices by identifying strengths, opportunities, weaknesses, and constraints in regional integration arrangements. This would in return guide the integration efforts towards attainment of a state's set goals. Overall, this study sought to provide relevant information to help guide countries' regional integration choices. Recommendations of this study would be crucial in reinforcing change in institutions, policy, behaviour, and organization and would benefit both the law and policy makers and think tanks by providing feasible mechanisms on regional integration in the region and beyond.

1.6 Scope and Delimitation of the Study

The study focused on the influence of Tanzania's national interest on her regional integration choices. There are several aspects of national interest, but this study chose to focus on the three because of their critical nature to Tanzania's self-preservation. The study explored the history and evolution of the EAC and SADC and imperatives for Tanzania's dual membership to the EAC and SADC. The study looked at both the EAC and SADC. The initial EAC had three partner states namely: Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania but currently, it has expanded to include Burundi, Rwanda, and South Sudan. Notably, SADC has remained the same and includes Eswatini, Lesotho, South Africa, Botswana, Zambia, Angola, Malawi, Tanzania, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Central African Republic, Madagascar, Comoros, Burundi, and Democratic Republic of Congo. This study put Tanzania at the center stage by evaluating her membership to both the EAC and SADC and why she quit COMESA, whereas all her partners in the EAC and eight of her partner economies in SADC are in COMESA. The study focused on Tanzania's national interest taking the following three dimensions: a) National economic interests b) National political interests and c) National socio-cultural interests. The study period was between 1980 when Tanzania joined the then SADCC (now SADC) and 2017 for the sake of bringing this study to current development.

1.6.1 Limitations of the Study

The major challenge the research anticipated was securing appointments with respondents, this might have delayed the study beyond the anticipated time. To take care of this, the researcher begun the process of reaching out to respondents early to minimize delays. Another challenge was whether respondents were willing to divulge certain information due to its sensitive nature. The researcher assured all respondents prior to the interviewing period that the information obtained will be used merely for academic purpose. Another challenge envisaged by the study was getting biased information since some of the respondents may not share true information, the researcher counterchecked the information with secondary data. Some respondents were reluctant to be recorded on phone therefore notes were taken by the researcher in such scenarios. The researcher was also likely to face financial constraints during the research process, the researcher therefore focused more on doing a desktop study and complemented it with key informant interviews to reduce cost implications. Lastly, for respondents who declined to be interviewed since they did not want to be quoted, the researcher utilised secondary data. Recommendations, suggestions, and findings in this study underpin critical policy implications despite the highlighted limitations.

1.7 Literature Review

1.7.1 Overview

This section is thematically organized into three parts: the national economic interests and regional integration, the national political interests and regional integration and the national socio-cultural interests and regional integration.

1.7.2 National Economic Interests and Regional Integration

According to Archick (2016), he argues that the EU's integration effort begun after World War II as a post-war deterrence mechanism. The creation of the EU was a culmination of the mistrust brought by the security dilemma. Consequently, the EU is highly interdependent through the adoption of common trade and agricultural policies, harmonized laws across economic, political and security and socio-cultural spheres and with a functional shared customs union. What Archick fails to observe is the extent to which EU prosperity has been realized through member states pursuit of their national interest and failure to further underscore factors that make some states not to be part of such choices for instance, the case of Britain's choice of exiting the EU. Archick seems to suggest that regional integration initiatives once they take off, member states comply fully. Archick's study was also done on the European Union. To complement Archick's work, this study will look at the imperatives under the banner of national interest which inform regional integration choices. Further, this study will demonstrate how national interest can either enhance or curtail regional integration efforts by assessing in brief; the defunct and operational EAC in addition to multiplicity of membership in regional bodies. This study will also be done on Tanzania to have an African perspective.

Bhattacharya (2014) observes that integration of ASEAN has a great economic potential for partaking states. Through this integration, the ASEAN can reap great benefits from emerging economies of China and India through increased trade in the region. However, Bhattacharya cites lack of political will buttressed by sound leadership thus leading to difficulties in creating formidable partnerships and collaborative efforts to ensure an integrated South and Southeast Asia. Bhattacharya does not address the issue of the influence of the national interest of ASEAN constituent states. States have always been rational actors with selfish interests and even in situations which give them imperatives to cooperate; they always seek to pull benefits to themselves. As such, regional integration arrangements in the eyes of states are deliberate self-development mechanisms. This study will seal this gap by identifying national interests behind states' regional integration choices. What Bhattacharya views as lack of political will and sound leadership emanates from states' perception of her national interest.

Rahman, Khatri and Brunner (2012), have observed that economies all over the world, have been involved in regional economic integration oblivious of the fact that, these arrangements have their own ramifications. In this study, the argument being advanced is that regional integration is synonymous to the trade policy of discriminatively eradicating or reducing barriers within the bloc. Therefore, trade is viewed as the lowest level of integration with other integration functions emanating thereof. However, the trio has failed to address the fact that, integration efforts can take a security dimension primarily without having to stem from economic cooperation. The case for NATO and the now defunct Warsaw Pact being a clear example; this study seems to be presumptive. Therefore, this gap will be filled by doing a study to help discover what set of imperatives draw Tanzania to both blocs.

Schmitter (2007), views the EU as the 'ideal type' regional integration due to its intricate economic association which projects an exemplary cooperation of states. He further notes, this economic association has seen nineteen-member economies adopt a common currency the "Euro", while at the same time twenty-two-member states are part of Schengen. Through Schengen initiative unhindered mobility of people and means of production has been enhanced by elimination of internal border controls among member states. Further, the EU has institutionalised a common foreign policy (CFP) that encompasses a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). What Schmitter fails to address in this study, is the aspect of policy adoption at the state level. The EU policies are centralized at the supra-institutional level because partner states have ceded a significant amount of their sovereignty. For that matter, EU is at a more advanced level of integration compared to other regional bodies, especially in Africa. In this study on regional blocs in Africa, states have not ceded much sovereignty thus treaties that have been enacted or ratified are implemented based on member states' perception of their national interest. To seal this gap, this study intends to look at various Tanzania's national interests and how they are realized through her regional integration choices.

Dee (2007) avers that both growth and investment have been impacted on positively by the economic integration model. He attributes this development on globalization through intensified interdependence due to technology, transport and trade which have ripple effect on partner states. However, he further underpins the fact that there are developments in Newly Industrialized Economies comprising Japan, Singapore, Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong which have a negative impact on economic integration efforts of South and South East Asia. In his observation, Dee looks at the incentives tailored to help countries relocate labour intensive steps during production to states with lower wages predominantly in the vast East Asia. In his assessment, Dee uses computer generated equilibrium to evaluate ASEANs economic integration by focusing at the net welfare impact as the indicator. This literature fails to acknowledge potency of national interest. Even in regional integration arrangements, states use national interests as yardsticks for compliance. As a

result, states may deem it rational to engage Newly Industrializing Economies unilaterally as opposed to as a bloc. This study will look at Tanzania's national interest and how it influences her relations either in regional blocs or by engaging external developed economies.

Schiff and Winters (2003) observe that the initial EAC failed in 1977 as a result of the perception of imbalanced benefits by both Uganda and Tanzania which seemed to favor only Kenya at the time. Kenya had an upper hand because it served as a base for white settlers and played host to MNCs, factors that led to relative development in infrastructure compared to her other two EAC founding member states. What the duo points out is important however, their observation is mute on why Tanzania pro-actively took part in the revamping of the EAC II in 1984, seven years having walked away from the EAC. Tanzania joined SADC in 1980 and became actively involved in the negotiations that revived the EAC. Therefore, to seal these gaps and establish a link, this research seeks to look at various imperatives whether economic, political, security related and socio-cultural that led Tanzania to not only join SADC after the collapse of the EAC I, but also why it joined the EAC II and withdrew from COMESA. This research will thus complement Schiff and Winters study and contribute to knowledge repository.

MacKay (2002) argues that at the onset, Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) partner states were optimistic but increasingly they have become dismissive about its achievements and future activities. Despite this observation, Mackay notes that APEC still executes her mandates as corroborated by the latest partner states conference in Shanghai which still affirmed that, APEC is still important in executing her regional integration roles. What the study fails to indicate is why are the APEC partner states still banding together with no apparent economic gains? Besides economic gains, are there other imperatives to regional integration? If yes, what are they? Therefore, if this is the case Mackay is bringing out, could states still be part of the regional bodies even with the perception of their interests not being met? Or maybe states, just like individuals, are optimistic about the future to the extent they are willing to put up with regional blocs' choices that do not optimally satisfy their national interest? Could this be the case why Tanzania is in both SADC and EAC? Further, is this move to be in both blocs informed by Tanzania's future prospects or the fear of the unknown? This study seeks to find out the overarching imperatives that make states to integrate and revamp regional integration efforts that had collapsed.

Kasekende and Ng'eno (2000) posit that regional integration has become widespread in Sub-Saharan Africa as a countervailing measure to address common challenges such as poverty reduction, rapid economic development and cushioning developing economies against the vagaries of globalisation in a coordinated and collective way. By pooling together, the duo argues, this provides impetus to integrate fragmented domestic markets and fosters economic growth by enhancing economies of

scale. The duo observes that Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda revived EAC with the hope of buttressing industrialization that will in the end usher in economic reforms that will spill over into adjacent states. What the duo fails to mention, is the aspect of multiplicity of memberships and its perils. In as much as regional integration arrangements present opportunities and formidable ways to address globalization challenges, partaking states in this case Tanzania, has failed to realize optimal benefits of functional regional integration arrangements due to her dual membership in both the EAC and SADC. To seal this gap, the study will evaluate Tanzania's costs vis-à-vis benefits and offer recommendations that will not only complement Kaseke and Ng'eno's work but also underscore the rationality behind Tanzania's regional integration choices.

1.7.3 National Political Interests and Regional Integration

According to Mahbubani and Severino (2014), the ASEAN region has witnessed peace in three elaborate ways that are being benchmarked by other regional integration schemes across the world. The region has nurtured an elaborate culture of 'consultation and consensus' locally known as, "muswawarah and mifakat". It is under the banner of this culture that Malaysia bailed out other economies as a result of Asian financial crunch. Myanmar also was able to pull through her long spells of military rule through this cultural tradition. Secondly, ASEAN organizes over 1000 multilateral forums that address every concern ranging from social, political, economic to security. Thirdly, ASEAN member states do not interfere in domestic matters of partner states in ASEAN, thus drastically reducing disputes in the region. What Mahbubani and Severino fail to address is the prevalence of inter-state disputes that do not degenerate into conflicts among states integrating. Tanzania for instance, has had trade disputes with Kenya but the two countries still band together in the EAC. Tanzania and Malawi also have a perennial border dispute, but they are both in SADC. In terms of economic bail outs, the duo seems to be oblivious to the fact that, regional bodies that Tanzania is part of have a large number of economies that cannot afford to bail each other out, though they still integrate. Tanzania also intervened in Uganda in 1979 a move which saw change of leadership. Therefore, Tanzania was still advancing her liberation goals despite her implied commitment to peaceful neighborliness.

Freund and Ornelas (2010) observe that African states have shifted emphasis from regional integration's efficiency to political economy of preferential consideration. The two note that, in Africa, the traditional efficiency imperative has been superseded by distribution of gains across FTAs, geography and political motives. While fronting this perspective, the duo looks at the prevalence of conflicts in Africa by drawing examples from Rwanda and through the assessment of

ECOWAS. In this study, the former uses her trade strategy to enhance her regional integration and cooperation whereas the latter, uses regional economic integration arrangement as a mechanism for preventing and quelling regional conflicts by member economies. Despite their crucial observation, the duo fails to observe the colonial legacy, historical ties, migration patterns and existence of cross-border communities as crucial factors beyond the mentioned geography and distribution of gains indicated in their study. To seal this gap, the study seeks to establish a trend of Tanzania's historical ties, migration patterns, existence of cross-border communities and external actors influence in Tanzania's regional integration choices. The study will juxtapose Tanzania against the EAC and SADC member states to find out a correlation. This will further inform research findings that will later recommend an appropriate policy approach and further complement Freund and Ornelas' study. The study will specifically address Tanzania thus introducing additional sample.

Branch (2006) avers that periodic regional conflicts and all out political tensions among Euro Mediterranean Partnership member states are a hindrance to optimal cooperation. Thus, for financial and economic partnership to be revamped, focus should shift to building, improving and creating capacity by leveraging on technology and complying with European standard operation procedures. Branch in his study fails to look at the identitive variables in regional integration arrangements. His only focus on technology and compliance on European standard operation procedures leaves out the aspect of culture, shared history, language, migration patterns and how these identitive variables spur further integration by offering incentives for cooperation. This study will be different to Branch's because it will be done in Africa by taking a different approach of looking at state involvement in two regional bodies. The findings thereof will go a long way in complementing Branch's findings thus ultimately contributing to a new body of knowledge.

Smith (2000) argues that with intensified interdependence, potency of military power has withered away. Thus, for the EU or any other regional integration arrangement to be headed towards championing for a collective security entity will be abdicating the complex interdependency principles it had institutionalised in the first place. Smith further portends that this may instigate a spiral model if the outliers perceive danger as a result of the formation of a military wing meant to secure its members. In line with the above, Smith surmises that EU's quest to attain military capability is not prudent and may jeopardize her efforts. Among other principles, Smith notes that the EU's quest for security community is self-defeatists since it goes against the EU's founding ideals. Smith's study fails to address security as one of the imperatives for regional integration by overtly omitting security community perspective. Cooperation starts at the basic level through trade then spills over to more sensitive areas such as security with political integration being the ultimate goal. Therefore, this gap identified in Smith's work is to be filled by delving into previous, current and prospective political and security goals that inform states regional integration choices by focusing

on Tanzania as a way of complementing Smith's study on the EU thus contributing to a new body of knowledge.

1.7.4 National Socio-cultural Interests and Regional Integration

Dartey-Baah (2013), observes that culture however subtle it imbues human knowledge framework with some "country specific characteristics". Dartey-Baah goes further to argue that for instance, success of multinational teamwork, composition, and implementation of business strategies and how workers respond to both non-pay and pay perks is entirely influenced by culture. Dartey-Baah makes his argument by relying on Hofstede's cultural frameworks which revolves around cultural aspects which include uncertainty avoidance, masculinity, individualism, and power. Data on these cultural aspects was collated by Hofstede from on-line data sets through surveys. He then subjected these cultural aspects to a grading mechanism ranging from 1 to 120 (Wu, 2006). What this study fails to capture is, despite the fact culture could be to a large extent country specific, with globalization as a result of traveling and other cross-border interactions such as schooling, trade, intermarriage the concept of culture being country specific is steadily waning. Dartey-Baah also fails to mention the centripetal role of colonial legacy and increasingly, a uniform way of life of cross-border communities and their effect on diluting country specific culture. To seal these gaps, this study intends to look at the socio-cultural drivers of integration such as colonial legacy, cross-border communities, shared language and historical ties between Tanzania and her counterparts both in the EAC and SADC.

According to Cupido and Ukpere (2011), in their seminal work on the influence of culture on regional integration they have indicated benefits of understanding existence of cultural differences when managing employees in organizations within such blocs (Cupido, &Ukpere, 2011). In this literature, relativism of culture has been probed to a large extent thus drawing conclusion that culture is a ubiquitous variable with a great impact on human resource management. Culture in this context is an identitive aspect which serves as an imperative for integration. What this study has failed to address is the fact that culture is a dynamic feature that does not necessarily have to precede regional integration choices. In fact, where other imperatives for cooperation are available culture can be created. Case in point is the introduction of English by Rwanda as a means of bolstering her integration in the EAC. This study will look at different aspects of the Tanzanian society that circumvent cultural related dimensions like ethnic composition, language and relation of Tanzania communities vis-à-vis her EAC and SADC counterparts and by looking at how education, cross border relations and globalization in general has buttressed integration efforts. Therefore, findings in

this study will complement Cupido and Ukpere's study on influence of culture in regional integration schemes and contribute to a new body of knowledge.

Mwasha (2011) argues that, to have effective regional integration, a number of imperatives such as common language, ideological similarities, geographical proximity as well as cultural and historical sameness, and economic linkages among other centripetal factors are of central importance. In the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), both anglophone and francophone countries have ringed together in the spirit of pooling their resources together for the attainment of the common goal despite their centrifugal historical and cultural ties. This aspect is what Mwasha's study has barely addressed. Therefore, this study intends to delve into the possibility of there being other additional imperatives that have buttressed Tanzania's regional integration choices. Mwasha's study also does not focus on the multiplicity of membership to regional bodies. This study intends to address multiplicity of membership in regional bodies in Africa by using Tanzania as a case study.

Tuomioja (2009), observes that regional integration has gained prominence in the era of intensified globalisation. States have become so inter-dependent to the extent of adopting regional bodies as potent vehicles for development. What Tuomioja's work fails to address is the fact that states also ring together to cushion themselves from the vagaries of globalization. For instance, by Tanzania being in both the EAC and SADC it has a bargaining power against highly industrialized economies, newly emerging economies and other countries acting collectively like the EU. So, states while in regional blocs arrangements not only seek to eclipse negative effects of globalization, but also envisage tapping into immense potentials that globalization brings. Today, less developed economies like Tanzania view multiplicity of membership to regional bodies as informed by the state in its quest for survival, a fact Tuomioja's study fails to point out. Therefore, this study will look at the imperatives of multiplicity of membership in regional bodies by focusing on Tanzania's national interest. Findings thereof will complement Tuomioja's study.

Lawrence and Huntington (2000), observe that culture is a key ingredient in integration. The duo posits that a certain degree of cultural homogeneity is a precursor in regional integration arrangements. The research was done on EU founding members composed of France, Italy, Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg. The study analysed the influence culture has on regional integration (Lawrence and Huntington, 2000). Cultural homogeneity in this case is composed of shared language and ethnic composition attributing identitive aspects of partner states in regional bodies. What this study fails to address is what other imperatives dictate states to integrate, especially in Africa, where regional bodies are composed of countries with diverse colonial heritage. The study will assess the influence of other variables on national interest by specifically focusing on Tanzania's involvement in EAC and SADC.

Oates (1972) underscores importance of common policies in regional blocs by noting that, common decision making ensures more spillover benefits especially in Africa, where transport and communication infrastructures are under-provided. However, the ethno-linguistic diversity poses a great challenge in harmonization and general regional operation. He further attributes this challenge to be emanating from the onset of ‘artificial borders’ mimicking the Westphalian state system of 1648. In this study, Oates fails to capture the significance of politically motivated individuals in decision making. Ideally, regional integration to function effectively, imperatives such as shared culture, ethnic identity are important but crucial decisions are made by political elites who rarely consult their constituents. For instance, the Tanzania-Zambia Railway (TAZARA) was build due to good relations between Nyerere and his Zambian counterpart, Kenneth Kaunda. In fact, with all other imperatives held constant, political leaders’ idiosyncratic variables are very crucial in state decision making particularly in the global south, where Tanzania falls. The study assessed the cross-border communities, shared cultural aspects, colonial legacy, geographical proximity, citizen mobility and Tanzania’s involvement in the liberation struggle of the southern African states.

1.8 Theoretical Approach

1.8.1 Overview

Mwesiga Baregu Imperatives for regional integration

This study employed Baregu (2005) imperatives for regional integration as its approach to understanding the influence of national interest on Tanzania’s regional integration choices. To Baregu (2005), imperatives are the kind of factors that create the impetus, and give rise to the drive and yearning, for integration among states in a given regional integration scheme (Baregu, 2005).

1.8.2 Major Assumptions of Mwesiga Baregu’s Imperatives for Regional Integration

There are four predominant regional integration imperatives that drive regional integration. These include; first, the affection imperative which refers to a situation where countries come into an integration arrangement because they have a lot in common and feel some bonds of affection; secondly, the gain imperative which denotes the benefits that a country joining a regional integration scheme will and/or hopes to benefit; thirdly, the dominance imperative which denotes the ability of a state to assert its regional power and/or hegemonic status in the regional integration scheme; and finally, the threat imperative which drives states into regional integration schemes in order to create a commonwealth where they can collectively insulate themselves from risks (Baregu, 2005).

1.8.3 Application of Mwesiga Baregu's Imperatives for Regional Integration to the Study

The import of Baregu's (2005) imperatives for regional integration in the study lies in the fact that the approach departs from the largely descriptive traditional approaches to integration which are overly focused more on the intents, structures, institutions and mechanism of integration as opposed to the imperatives or driving forces that lie behind integration scheme. Secondly, the pivotal influence of the approach lies in its understanding that states are primarily driven to forming and sustaining regional integration schemes due to interests. Thirdly, the approach offers plausible theoretical lenses unto which we can critically examine the factors that create the impetus and/or drive Tanzania's regional integration choices including delineating the threat impetus informing the formation of the defunct Frontline States.

1.9 Definition and Operationalisation of Key Terms

1.9.1 National interest

Von Dyke (1962) defines national interest as objectives states seek to protect or achieve in relation to each other. In the context of this study, national interest includes Tanzania's economic, political as well as socio-cultural interests.

1.9.2 Regional integration

Soderbaum (2009) views regional integration as a deeper process through which the previously politically independent units are merged into a whole. In this context, regional integration infers the joining together of several states to form the EAC and also SADC. The study focuses on the EAC at Customs Union phase and SADC at Free Trade Area phase.

1.9.3 Regional Integration Choices

According to Sarath Rajapatirana (1997), regional integration choices denote an act of choosing between two or more regional economic communities with the specific objective of raising national welfare through maximization of efficiency and gains geared towards raising levels of investment while diversifying the economy (Rajapatirana, 1997). In the context of this study, regional integration choices imply Tanzania's decision to join the EAC while also being a member of SADC and not COMESA.

1.9.4 National Economic Interest

According to Lenin (1918), he observes that these are state objectives that enhance production relations within the society. In the context of this study, economic interests refer to benefits ensuing from trade opportunities and market access Tanzania has in the EAC and SADC that leads to her economic well-being.

1.9.5 National Political Interest

According to Von Dyke (1962) these are values, desires, and elements which states seek to protect or achieve in relation to each other as a sovereign state. In the context of this study, this implies Tanzania's quest for stability and cooperation within the EAC and SADC.

1.9.6 National Socio-Cultural Interest

Thomas Robinson (1967), views this as the preservation and spread of a country's history, art, way of life, national cultural propagation, and protection from local cultural decadence due to foreign intrusion as a result of globalization. In the context of this study, this means Tanzania's historical ties, language, migration patterns and Tanzania's cultural proximity to partner states in the EAC and SADC.

1.10 Research Hypotheses

1.10.1 General Hypothesis

Tanzania's national interest influences her regional integration choices.

1.10.2 Specific Research Hypotheses

- i. Tanzania's national economic interests influence her regional integration choices.
- ii. Tanzania's national political interests influence her regional integration choices.
- iii. Tanzania's national socio-cultural interests influence her regional integration choices.

1.11 Methodology

The research methodology is covered in the following sub-topics; study area, area of study selection, research design, target population, sampling technique and sample size, data collection methods, data analysis and presentation, data validity and reliability, and ethical considerations.

1.11.1 Study Area

This study was conducted on the United Republic of Tanzania.

1.11.2 Area of Study Selection

Tanzania was selected as the point of focus because of choices she has made which reflect a deviant case of regional integration arrangements. To start with, Tanzania joined SADC in 1980, after the disintegration of the initial EAC. Three years later, she actively took part in the revival of the EAC II which became operational in 2000. This decision is rather bizarre since these two regional blocs Tanzania became part of have preferential treatment terms among their members thus putting Tanzania in a predicament situation. Further, whereas all Tanzania's partner states in the EAC and majority of her partners in SADC are in COMESA, Tanzania is not having withdrawn her membership in 2000, six years after joining (Suleiman, 2019). As such, this study sought to find out imperatives behind Tanzania's regional integration choices.

1.11.3 Research Design

This study made use of the longitudinal research design since regional integration choices are long term processes that can only be explained longitudinally. To be able to understand Tanzania's behavior and her national interest and how it has influenced her regional integration choices, one has to analyse this interplay for a long time which, in this study dates back to the colonial era. In addition, this approach also helped the study to analyze the dimensions and trends on the specific influence played by Tanzania's national interest towards her regional integration choices.

1.11.4 Target Population

This study engaged the EAC Secretariat officials who were interviewed in Arusha and Nairobi, SADC secretariat officials who were sent prompting questions through email and interviewed via WhatsApp video call, officials from Tanzania's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and East African Cooperation who were interviewed in Dar Es Salaam, Economics Lecturer from the Institute for Finance Management, officers at Tanzania's National Museum and House of Culture who were interviewed in Dar es Salaam, two lecturers and three other respondents including Think Tanks who attended round table discussion on Law and Policy of East African Community held at Strathmore University's School of Law, Center for Africa Bio-Entrepreneurship a Kenyan based Non-Governmental Organization that is in partnership with Morogoro University, and other key respondents majorly in Tanzania and Kenya for example, the principal education for sustainable development officer at Kenya's Ministry of Environment and Forestry (interviewed over the Annual Mara Day Celebration which took place in September, 2019 pitching both Kenya and Tanzania), a Tanzanian student pursuing MA in IR at the University of Nairobi, Tanzania owned bus companies plying Nairobi-Dar es Salaam route, Liquor store owners in Dar es Salaam who sale Zambian Distilled Afri-koko liqueur brand and IR Lecturer from the United States International University-

Africa, who has previously engaged with the civil society platforms in East Africa and currently presides over Danish International Development Agency's governance engagements in Kenya and the East African region. The researcher also established contacts with the COMESA Deputy Secretary General who issued his response via WhatsApp. Finally, the researcher interviewed one project management officer working with the Kisumu based Lake Victoria Basin Commission.

1.11.5 Sampling Technique

The research utilised purposive sampling which is a non-probabilistic technique that focuses on a particular population that is of interest. It is this population that helped the researcher to answer the study questions. This was of significance because information that was being sought in this study was privileged and somehow technical and hence only a few targeted individuals had it. As such, the researcher cherry picked respondents based on their knowledgeability. Further, the overarching goal of purposive sampling in a qualitative study is the attainment of saturation (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). According to this duo, there gets to a point where increasing number of respondents in the research does not generate additional information. Even though Morse (1994) observes that thirty to fifty respondents is an adequate sample pool that attains saturation in a qualitative study, Creswell (1998) suggests twenty to thirty respondents. This research thus incorporates both Morse and Creswell and utilized a sample size of thirty-one respondents.

1.11.6 Data Collection Methods

This study employed primary and secondary data collection methods. Using both primary and secondary data collection techniques gave greater insights to the data collected and further helped highlight points which might have been missed through use of one method. Primary data was obtained by key informant interviews. Key informant interviews involved specialists in the topic of interest. As such, the researcher sought information from those in charge. For instance, officials at EAC and SADC Secretariats, official at COMESA Secretariat, officials from respective government ministries and lastly, experts spanning academia, those working with governmental, inter-governmental and non-governmental organisations and think tanks on regional integration.

The researcher purposively approached these key informants to triangulate and cross-check to ensure that information generated was reliable and not biased. Through this approach, the researcher was able to ask questions about the influence of Tanzania's national interest and her regional integration choices with the intent to find out the overall view of how Tanzania's national interest influences her regional integration choices.

Secondary data was extracted from existing documents collated then analyzed. These documents included the EAC and SADC charters, treaties, records, agreements, baseline data and periodic reports authored and published by these regional integration blocs and Tanzania on specific national interest dimensions. These documents enabled the researcher to develop the scope, identify sub-topics and avoid duplicating previous studies. The study also scrutinized donor reports and other materials written and published by external actors specifically on Tanzania, the EAC and SADC.

1.11.7 Data analysis and Presentation

A combined method which utilised both qualitative and quantitative methods was adopted. This ensured all data collected either through primary or secondary data collection methods was respectively analyzed. Data relating to Tanzania's national socio-cultural interests and Tanzania's national political interests was analyzed qualitatively to help, "gain in-depth insights about what key relationships are and how different aspects of the study are inter-linked" (Gosling and Edward, 1998 P.43). Data on Tanzania's national economic interests was analyzed quantitatively due to its numerical nature. The study posed questions such as: how much, how many, how often? (Gosling and Edward, 1998 P.42). The study compared Tanzania's economy as juxtaposed against the EAC and SADC member countries. The study also made use of graphical displays of data, tables, and pie charts to give trends and patterns on selected economic indicators.

1.11.8 Data Validity and Reliability

The researcher triangulated and cross-checked information attained from primary sources with existing secondary data. This ensured that information generated was reliable and not biased. The study utilized structured interviews that aimed to answer research questions, fulfill study objectives thereby helping seal knowledge gaps. The research made use of appropriate theoretical approach to help weave and infuse theoretical assumptions that helped guide the study.

1.11.9 Ethical Considerations

The researcher complied with all ethical principles of conducting research and ensured that all cited work was appropriately referenced. The researcher was free of bias while conducting the study and ensured that all stipulated University of Nairobi Departmental guidelines were adhered to. The researcher obtained informed consent from respondents' way before interviewing them and strived to ensure utmost anonymity and confidentiality while using information obtained for research purposes only.

Table 1.1: Interview Respondents Schedule

Country/Organisation	Office	Designated Interviewees
EAC	EAC Secretariat in Arusha, Tanzania	Five EAC officials from Customs and Trade Directorate, Productive and Social Sectors Directorate and Cooperation in Political Matters Department
SADC	SADC Secretariat in Gaborone	Four officials from Trade, Political and Socio-Cultural Affairs Departments
Tanzania	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and East African Cooperation	Four officials from trade, political and socio-cultural affairs departments
COMESA	COMESA Secretariat	One official
Kenya	Kisumu Based East African Community Lake Victoria Basin Commission (LVBCOM)	One official
United States International University of Africa	Department of International Relations	One International Relations Lecturer with keen interest on EAC and AU, has worked with civil society platform in East Africa and currently works with Danish International Development Agency.
Strathmore Center for Law and Policy	Strathmore University School of Law	Five respondents (two lecturers and three panelists) Strathmore Center for Law and Policy Roundtable on the East Africa Community

Tanzania	Institute for Finance Management, Dar es Salaam	One Lecturer
Kenya	University of Nairobi, Department of Political Science and Public Administration	One Tanzanian national, MA in International Relations Student
Tanzania	National Museum and House of Culture, Dar es Salaam	Two officials
Tanzania	Members of Tanzania Business Community in Dar es Salaam	Two owners of Bus Companies plying Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam routes
Tanzania	Tanzania Business Community in Dar es Salaam	Two owners of liquor stores selling Afri-koko liquor which is originally distilled in Zambia and sold en mass to Tanzania
Kenya	Ministry of Environment and Forestry	One Official interviewed over Mara Day celebration in September 2019 (Tanzania, Kenya Annual Conservation Festival)
Kenya	Nairobi (Center for Africa Bio-Entrepreneurs, a Kenyan based NGO in collaboration with Morogoro University of Tanzania).	One official

1.12 Proposed Chapter Outline

Chapter one introduces the study and outlines the following sections: background to the study, statement of the problem, research questions, objectives of the study, justification of the study, scope of the study, limitations of the study, study hypotheses, theoretical framework and methodology. Chapter two discusses the historical perspective of the EAC, Tanzania, SADC, national interest and imperatives for regional integration and literature review. Chapter three focuses on analysis and synthesis of findings. Chapter four contains summary of findings, conclusion, recommendations of the study and suggestions for further research.

CHAPTER TWO

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

2.1 Regional Integration

Literature on regional integration espouses a three-pronged dimension to regional integration. According to Joseph Nye (1968), integration can be explained based on the following three dimensions; first, economic integration which entails the creation of a transnational economy; secondly, social integration which entails the institution of a transnational society; and thirdly, political integration which entails the formation of trans-border political interdependence. Regional integration majorly moves from economic and social integration to political integration (Nye, 1968).

According to Philip Jacob and Henry Teune (1964), “political integration generally implies a relationship of community that possess a feeling of identity and self- awareness”. Furthermore, “the essence of the integration relationship is seen as collective action to promote mutual interests” (Jacob & Teune, 1964). There are two key sub-categories of institutional integration, namely, jurisdictional and bureaucratic. Jurisdictional integration is measured by looking at the supranationality of decision-making. This supra nationality of integration schemes can be distinguished based on various levels of binding decisions, which include measures such as the ability of the supranational organization’s laws and policies to take root in individual members of the polity (Jacob & Teune, 1964).

On the other hand, Nye (1968) observes that bureaucratic institutional integration is measured primarily by the robustness of central institutions and essentially, by the scope of the major bureaucratic resources in-terms of the budget and human resource. Put differently, diplomatic considerations play a major role in increasing resources of regional organisations (Nye, 1968).

In Central America and Europe, there have been ongoing debates on regional integration theory. These debates have focused on assessing the level of the strength of institutions that is needed to anchor several integrative effects. Federalists for instance, have long belonged to the school of thought that vouches for there being fairly strong key institutions as a precursor for a soaring degree of other types of integration (Nye, 1968).

2.2 Theories of Regional Integration

The prospects for international cooperation have been the subject of growing debate with the arguments being advanced in favour of the integrity of the state as the principal actor in the international system, while other scholars pointing to the increased growth and importance of transnational organizations at the regional or continental level. Liberal internationalism has gained traction in forging cooperation in the 20th and 21st century. This has been evidenced by Biermann (2001), who has observed that for purposes of trans-border cooperation, the state is increasingly finding itself interacting with other states across the border. In the process, states have both adapted to and adopted the new ways of sharing information, resources, ideas, and have harmonized policies. As the issues states contend with have gone global, so have the states.

In the post Second World War, the international system has increasingly been gravitating towards cooperation and states have joined hands in order to cooperate in diverse areas of mutual interest. In East Africa, the autonomous states such as Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda, South Sudan and the United Republic of Tanzania came together and established the East African Community (EAC). According to Warui (2013), EAC is feted among the best regional economic organizations in Africa (Warui, 2013).

A number of theories explain the regional integration process. The federal theory of regional integration contrarily denotes the process of forging a specific organizational form for instance, a federation which embodies institutions and procedures from member states. The federation therefore becomes distinct since it serves as a collective organisation established by the constituent states. As per Dosenrode (2008), federations may be organised in two ways, first, it may adopt a peripheral approach where partner states are strong alongside various competencies or it may be centralized, in which case the federal government wields predominant power (Dosenrode, 2010).

The second theory of integration, the functionalist theory of regional integration is hinged on the premise that functional efficiency is the loci under which regional integration is premised. As such, regional integration is hinged upon a rationality. For instance, functionalism approach is conceptualized as the need to enhance efficiency as the rational basis for political choice in integration across the border. David Mitrany (1965. P. 159), in his ‘common index of need’, observes that, “welfare gains or losses” determines whether a particular policy will, or will not, be selected within the regional integration scheme (Mitrany, 1965).

The functionalist theory of integration argues that cooperation in socio-economic aspects gradually spills into other complex aspects of power politics. Proponents of the functionalist theory contend that the functional needs of a state to integrate with other states are informed by the state's presumption of the scope of the REC bloc in question (Haas, 1964). Consequently, when integration at the very basic level begins to bear fruits, it becomes discernible that integration can effectively be broadened to other practical, non-controversial needs. Mitrany avers that feasible regional integration demand consensus about collective outcomes and self-restrain from conflict (Mitrany, 1965).

Contrarily, the neo-functional theory of regional integration presents three intervening processes. The first intervening process is the functional spillover which is witnessed when integration takes place in a related area. The second intervening process is the process of externalization which results when parties to a regional integration bloc adopt a singular and integrative policies towards non-members. The final intervening process is the process of politicization (Schmitter, 1969).

According to Schmitter (1969) in his hypothesis on the neo-functional hypothesis, a number of factors also predispose states to regional integration. First, regional integration enhances the interdependence of functional tasks and issue areas of two countries. As such, there is a high probability that in the case of a conflict, there is a capability of mobilization against military action by pressure groups, parties or government agencies whose interests are affected (Schmitter, 1969). In East Africa for instance, such mobilization may take the form of Kenyan multinational corporations which have invested heavily in neighbouring states as well as pressure groups such as student organizations of Kenyans in institutions of higher learning such as in Uganda and Tanzania as well as Kenyan small scale traders in neighbouring states.

2.3 National Interest as the Driver of a State's Foreign Policy Attitudes towards Regional Integration Schemes

According to Marleku (2013), all states anchor their foreign policy on the altar of national interest. National interests denote the inclination and goals of autonomous units in the international arena. According to Florentine thinker and political theorist, Nicolo Machiavelli, national interest is the fundamental organizing principle in the international realm in that, the prince must discern when to use power and when to cooperate. This is supported by German war philosopher, Carl von Clausewitz who argues that all state behaviour must be motivated by the interests of state survival and state prosperity (Marleku, 2013).

National interest falls under various typologies, first, the primary and secondary national interests. Primary national interest is also known as vital national interest which include physical existence of the state, a free and independent nation, and protection of institutions, people, and fundamental values. Further, secondary national interests include interests a given state may seek to negotiate or compromise, unlike the primary ones which are clear, secondary interests are harder to be defined. Characteristically, secondary national interests pose no significant danger to autonomy of the state however, these interests may persist in the world view of decision makers until they are viewed as critical for instance, the frontline statehood adopted by Tanzania in the liberation course for African countries. For a state to preserve vital national interests, going to war cannot be ruled out. This is because state interests of survival and self-preservation must be defended at any price (Marleku, 2013).

Scholars such as Hans Morgenthau further demarcate on national interests underscoring the difference between temporary and permanent interests. Morgenthau further avers that national interests can further be categorized as specific, general, conflicting, and complementary interests. To Morgenthau, permanent interests are comparatively unceasing while temporary interests are what a state identifies as its national interest at present. In the same vein, general interests are those that a country applies in a positive manner to a number of nations whereas specific interests are defined as off shoots of general interests tailored to address particular policy issues (Marleku, 2013).

To Kiyono (1969), national interests can be understood in terms of how they are formed. On the one hand, there are national interests that are rationally demanded and, therefore, borne out of necessity for the state for instance, water security in Egypt. On the other hand, there are national interests that are changeable and decided by situations. However, since the nation state is a historical product and is constantly changing, the interplay between national interest and the state also keeps on mutating both in time and space (Kiyono, 1969).

In understanding national interest, the pivotal importance of underlining realities in the international realm are of paramount importance. The idea of systemic anarchy is hinged on a number of assumptions; first, that there is no higher central authority that can enforce rules over individual states; secondly, due to the systemic anarchy, states act on the basis of self-help whereby they operate with the aim of survival. The third assumption portends that the structure of the international system only changes if hegemonies take actions that will lead to a change. This assumption is hinged on the rationale that most states have no power to change the structure. In this regard, states will strive towards balance and power parity in the international milieu in order to enhance their survival chances (Waltz, 1979).

According to Waltz (1979), systemic anarchy is largely hinged upon the rationale that there are constraints imposed on state behavior by the international environment. Furthermore, Waltz observes that there are several patterns of systemic behaviour which cannot be delineated at the state level thus rendering the argument advanced by the two approaches weak (Waltz, 1979). The systemic structure socializes autonomous units to act similarly since it constrains menu of their actions. He also argues about the systemic balancing of states which he observes take two formations, namely, internal, and external. In regard to the internal balancing, he avers that this infers consolidation of military prowess to match up and increase power parity. On the other hand, external balancing implies formation of alliance to counter a stronger or adversarial power (Waltz, 1979).

Wendt avers that state desires are composed of what we know. He refers to these desires as 'schemas'. He summarizes his thesis on interests by arguing that they are beliefs and ideas that enable the state to meet its needs. These needs form objective state interests which constitute exigency for state survival. In this regard, characteristic of states, are not inborn, but rather the consequence of unmet needs (Wendt, 1999).

As countries relate with others in the international arena, several factors and constraints determine these relations. The environment of the state from a holistic viewpoint plays a pivotal role as there are important dynamics and interplays across the domestic and international spheres that influence country's relations in the international milieu. In the case of Tanzania, its strategic geopolitical positioning and its economic and political realities are among some of the ecological factors to consider especially with a view to understanding the ecological constraints and opportunities to her relations with other actors in both the near abroad and the far abroad.

The crux of the influence of the environment in determining international relations and foreign policy outlook is best elucidated upon in the Man-Milieu Relationship hypothesis as articulated by Harold and Margaret Sprout. The Sprouts see the environment as playing an integral role in the understanding of a country's relations with other actors in the international arena especially in terms of understanding the reciprocal challenges related to how factors internal to the state underpin the aforementioned relations. This duo contends that foreign policy is contextualised therefore consideration should be given to the environment where the actors make decisions. In this view, the Sprouts contend that both psychological and operational environment interact to shape the world view of the decision maker. Notably, the duo portends that psychological environment is key as compared to the operational environment in decision making (Sprout and Sprout, 1965). Thus, Tanzania's deviant regional integration choices could be as a result of the psychological environment.

2.4 The East African Community

According to Adar (2011), the scions of the East African Community sprung from the 1960s when the desires of pax-East Africanism were legitimized by the post-colonial integrationist euphoria as well as the Pan-Africanist leaders of the three founding EAC states, namely; Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya, Julius K. Nyerere of Tanzania and Milton Obote of Uganda who wanted to marshal support for an East African political federation as a jumping-off place to regional integration (Adar, 2011:4).

This aspiration for a political federation was rejuvenated when the three East African leaders signed the Nairobi Declaration in 1963 which committed the three countries to establishing an East African political federation by 1964 in the spirit that such a political federation was driven by a great urge amongst the populace for admiration of the importance of federation. The leader's quest for a political federation was also driven in part by similar historical experiences (Ibid: 5).

With national realities of the individual states such as Cold War alignments becoming a stumbling block to the quest for political federation however, the top echelons of the three East African states had no alternative other than to re-write their integrationist strategy by opting for a federation that was primarily economic – driven. This was the watershed moment whose culmination saw the three countries sign East African Cooperation treaty in 1967 establishing the first East African integrationist organization, the East African Cooperation. With economic cooperation being the sole driving force of the integration scheme, the three countries opted for a joint ownership of common services (Adar 2005: 37).

In 1977 however, following a decade of operation, the East African Cooperation broke up raising key issues on the essence and viability of regional cooperation in Africa. In addition, the breakup served as proof enough that economic integration under regional groupings devoid of political integration which was thought to have the necessary ingredients to override political concerns was a farce (Potholm, 1979: 45).

In 1999 however, the East African Community was reinvented by member states of the three founding members of the first regional economic scheme. Like the mythical phoenix, East African Community arose from the ashes of the East African Cooperation which collapsed in 1977. Remarkably, the novel East African Community sought to bestow sovereignty unto the people on the direction of their regional integration scheme through a legislature that would advance their interests.

2.5 Tanzania

After attaining independence, Tanzania's foreign policy leaned towards a liberation ideology and emancipation from the yoke of capitalistic exploitation and colonial oppression and subjugation. This

was articulated in form of a frontline state underpinning the efforts of other African nations to obtain independence. Furthermore, Tanzania rooted for the creation and preservation of self-determination of the African continent within the auspices of the OAU as well as political, economic and social independence from Western domination and influence (Global Security Organization, 2018).

This explains the reason why Tanzania is a member of many regional organizations. For instance, unlike other states which largely belong to one economic integration community, Tanzania is a member of two economic integration schemes that seek to achieve deep cross-border economic integration which include, the East African Community as well as the Southern African Development Community (SADC). In both economic integration schemes however, Tanzania has been described as dragging its feet in socio-economic integration (Anyimadu, 2016).

The spiral model may best explain Tanzania's foreign policy stance towards regional integration. The spiral model denotes situations in anarchy in international relations where actions by a state intended to intensify its security, for instance making alliances, committing to use weapons or increasing its military preparedness, can lead to other states retaliating in the similar manner, resulting to conflict as a result of tensions, even when no side in actual fact fancy it (Christopher, 1997).

The understanding is that regional economic schemes run counter to Tanzania's domestic economic policies which are heavily influenced by historical protectionism and ambitions for self-sufficiency of the Nyerere era (Anyimadu, 2016). As such, while the Tanzanian foreign policy as articulated in written policies, legislations as well as international agreements takes a pro-market pro-EAC trade integrational stance, Tanzania perceives regional integration models as development vehicles for dominant economies. Subject to the EAC case for instance, Tanzania perceives the scheme as Kenya's scheme for, "advancing her economic interests within EAC" (Cooksey, 2016).

2.6 SADC

Unlike other African sub-regional economic integration schemes, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) draws its partner states from a geographically, economically, linguistically and politically diverse pool of states underbuilt by a joint heritage of liberation struggles such as, experiences and solidarity ethos of the previous front line states (FLS) during apartheid period in South Africa in the latter half of the 20th century. These anti-apartheid liberation undertones increasingly morphed into informing the regional integration agenda by seeking to address governance, economic and trade issues in the region (Desmidt, 2017).

The economic community has its inceptions in two organizations, FLS, and SADCC (Desmidt, 2017). SADC borrows heavily from SADCC's aims at reducing its members' dependence through promotion of economic development. As such, structural issues such as addressing infrastructure inadequacy and building a plan of action to promote dialogue and obtain funding from foreign donors was a fundamental part that remains salient to the course of the later day SADC. With the ascension of a black government in South Africa and the demise of apartheid era, the basis of the SADCC was appraised. This saw SADCC incorporate the Frontline States (FLS) which transformed it into the current SADC in August 1992 (Thornhill & van Dijk, 2002).

Since then, SADC has grown its scope to cover issues such as democracy, governance, and regional security. However, just like in any other regional bloc in Africa, compliance to these ideals is retarded by a stringent application of sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs, buttressed by consensual decision-making in SADC's main peace and security bodies, the Organ and the SADC summit. To complicate the achievement of these expanded agendas, the partner states do not share the same values as projected in SADC treaty (Desmidt, 2017).

CHAPTER THREE

ANALYSIS AND SYNTHESIS OF FINDINGS

3.1 Overview

This chapter evaluates data on economic, political, and socio-cultural integration of Tanzania into the two sub-regional integration blocs which she is a member, EAC and SADC. The data is then synthesized and analyzed to inform the best integration prospects for Tanzania.

3.2 Economic Juxtaposition of the EAC and SADC

3.2.1 Contextualizing Overlapping Memberships to Different Regional Integration Schemes in Africa

Diverse regional integration arrangements are spread across the African continent. According to UNECA (2018), these regional groupings have been formed with diverse reasons including but not limited to historical, political or economic reasons (UNECA, 2018). As such, it is not uncommon to find overlapping memberships for instance, a country being part of more than one regional integration scheme. A textbook case is as enumerated by Lunogelo and Mbilinyi (2009) who point out the case of COMESA whose membership is drawn from countries in Central, Southern and Eastern Africa. Of the members of COMESA, states from the Southern Africa region are also members of SADC (which also includes Tanzania, an East African country) while economies in the Eastern Africa region are also part of the EAC (Lunogelo & Mbilinyi, 2009).

EAC countries such as Uganda and Kenya are also members of IGAD, a specialized regional integration scheme catering for special geopolitical needs such as cross border inflation of security threats in the horn of Africa as a distinct conflict zone. On the other hand, while Northern African countries are part of the Western Africa Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), those of Arabic roots such as Algeria, Morocco, Libya, Mauritania, and Tunisia belong to the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU). In Southern Africa, on top of being members of COMESA and SADC, South Africa and its immediate neighbours for instance, Lesotho, Botswana, Namibia, and Eswatini are also members of SACU (Lunogelo & Mbilinyi, 2009).

3.2.2 Comparing SADC and EAC: Juxtaposing the Foundational Origins of the two RECs

According to Adar (2011), the East African Community traces its origin from the 1960s when the desires of *pax-East Africanism* were legitimized by the post-colonial integrationist euphoria as well as the Pan-Africanist leaders of the three East African countries, namely; Julius K. Nyerere of

Tanzania, Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya and Milton Obote of Uganda who wanted to marshal support for an East African political federation as a precursor for regional integration (Adar, 2011).

The aspiration for a political federation was rejuvenated when the three East African leaders signed the Nairobi Declaration in 1963 which committed the three countries to instituting an East African political federation by 1964 in the spirit that such a political federation was driven by a great urge amongst the populace for integration and admiration of the importance of federation. The leader's quest for a political federation was also driven in part by similar historical experiences (Ibid).

With national realities of the individual states such as Cold War alignments becoming a stumbling block to the quest for political federation however, the top echelons of the three East African states had no alternative other than to re-write their integrationist strategy by opting for a federation that was primarily economic – driven. Consequently, the three countries signed the East African Cooperation treaty in 1967 initiating the first East African integrationist organization, the East African Cooperation. With economic cooperation being the sole driving force of the integration scheme, the three countries opted for a joint ownership of common services (Adar, 2005).

In 1977, following a decade of operation, the East African Cooperation broke up raising key issues on the essence and viability of regional cooperation in Africa. Furthermore, the breakup served as proof enough that economic integration under regional groupings devoid of political integration which was thought to have the necessary ingredients to override political concerns was a farce (Potholm, 1979). In 1999 however, the EAC was reinvented by member states of the founding members of the first regional economic scheme. Like the mythical phoenix, the EAC arose from the ashes of the East African Cooperation which died in 1977. Remarkably, the novel East African Community sought to bestow sovereignty unto the people on the direction of their regional integration scheme through a legislature that would advance their interests.

On the other hand, the origins of SADC are traceable to the then Southern African regional organization, SADCC, which was established in 1980 with the formalization of the cooperation arrangement that bound together nine frontline states of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Eswatini, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe since 1970s. The system of regional cooperation through SADCC varied largely from other regional blocs in that the organizational arrangements were decentralized, according partner states opportunity to oversee a particular sector. Given the economic destabilization effect and military prowess of South Africa, the Frontline States were forced to create a structure that restored mutual confidence (Vanheukelom & Bertelsmann-Scott, 2016).

As the successor of the frontline states' organization, SADC was initiated in 1992 as a way to forge

a new regional cooperation in Southern Africa. The establishment of SADC in 1992 thus signified the transformation from former frontline states to a group of economies with a shared wider ambition for regional unification. According to Vanheukelom and Bertelsmann-Scott (2016) SADC's mandate focused on among other aspects, trade, governance, peace and security, environment, transport, gender, tourism, infrastructural development, corruption, to mention but a few. Further, Vanheukelom & Bertelsmann-Scott (2016) liken this expanded mandate to the linear economic integration model adopted by the EU (Vanheukelom & Bertelsmann-Scott, 2016).

3.2.3 Trade Integration in EAC and SADC


EAC and SADC do not significantly differ in terms of trade integration as compared to other regional economic communities. While the EAC was ranked as the best performing regional bloc in Africa from a survey of all integration indicators, SADC also has a higher than average score on regional integration as well and particularly in regard to the aspects of financial and macroeconomic integration, free movement of people and regional infrastructure (AUC, AfDB, & UNECA, 2016).

The intra-area trade in the EAC and SADC regions has been on a steady relative growth in the first two decades of the 21st century. In the EAC, for instance, total intra-area exports grew from estimated US\$500 million in 2000 to slightly more than US\$2.36 billion in 2010, an augmentation of above and beyond 400%. Due to this, we can comfortably deduce that regional integration in the EAC has had a notable positive development on intra-EAC exports (Yu, 2012).

According to Yu (2012), the share of total intra-SADC exports in the region's total exports oscillated between 15.3% and 18% in the period between the year 2000 and the year 2010. Majority of these intra-regional exports were destined to South Africa, the regional integration scheme's largest economy. However, SADC's combined imports from the world tangentially surpassed her cumulative exports by a smaller amount (Yu, 2012).

3.2.4 Perceptions of Tanzania's Trade and Economic Integration within the EAC

Fig. 3.1 Pie Chart Showing Perceptions of Tanzania's Trade Integration in the EAC




Source: Study Data (2019)

From the above figure, 87% of the respondents were of the view that Tanzania's trade was increasingly oriented towards the East African Community to a very great extent. As such, this


implies that there was an overriding perception among Tanzanians that trade with the outside world was more oriented towards East African countries such as Kenya, Burundi and Rwanda. This explains why there was a corresponding view that trade between Tanzania and other countries within the SADC regional integration community were lower than that of countries in the EAC regional bloc as illustrated in the two figures below.

Fig. 3.2 Pie Chart Showing Perceptions of Trade Integration within the SADC Regional Integration Scheme




Source: Study Data (2019)

Fig. 3.3 Bar Graph showing Perceptions of Tanzania’s Trade Integration within the SADC Regional Integration Scheme



Source: Study Data (2019)


Fig. 3.4 Pie Chart Showing Perceptions on Tanzania's Economic Integration to the East African Community



Source: Study Data (2019)

From the above figure, 70% of the respondents were of the view that Tanzania was highly integrated economically with other countries in the East African Community to a very great extent on the efficiency of the supply chain while 17%, 10% and 3% of the respondents were of the view that Tanzania was highly integrated economically with countries in the East African Community to a great extent, moderate extent and small extent respectively. This is in sharp contrast with the perceptions the respondents had on Tanzania’s regional integration in economic terms with other countries in the SADC regional integration scheme as enumerated in the pie chart below.

Fig. 3.5 Perceptions of Extent of Tanzania’s Economic Integration Within the SADC Regional Integration Scheme



Source: Study Data (2019)

3.2.4 Where is the Bread Buttered? Analyzing Tanzania's Best Bet in the two Regional Economic Communities

In both regional economic groupings, Tanzania's bread has been buttered. For instance, in the EAC, Tanzania's share of trade within the community has been buoyed in the 21st century by increasing exports from its rising manufacturing sector. These exports have seen Tanzania's share of revenue from intra-regional trade with other East African Community partner states hit a trade turnover of over 1.5 billion American dollars with excess of 723 million US dollars in 2013 up from a deficit of 158.8 million American dollars in 2012. In this regard, Tanzania's intra-EAC trade increased by twenty-six percent in 2013 alone, while exports grew by an impressive 115%, even though imports registered a decline of 41% (Daily News, 2014). Total trade by EAC partner countries is enumerated in the table below.

Table 3.5: Total trade by EAC Partner States between 1991 and 2015 (in million US dollars)

	Kenya		Uganda		Tanzania		Burundi		Rwanda	
	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports
1991	1,185.07	1,924.30	195.49	451.85	351.99	1,390.87				
1992	1,082.15	1,835.32	168.45	428.49	410.62	1,300.65				
1993	1,268.36	1,743.59	195.73	429.10	437.03	1,282.85				
1994	1,526.61	2,051.33	463.52	686.47	520.36	1,307.41				
1995	1,893.75	3,018.84	576.56	1,047.65	679.15	1,340.95	104.03	232.97		
1996	2,070.05	2,950.72	710.76	863.24	785.21	1,211.10	37.57	123.31		
1997	1,921.65	3,042.11	594.63	894.37	701.58	1,142.48	87.32	122.75	69.78	349.91
1998	1,957.68	3,195.29	536.75	1,093.33	634.04	1,559.26	63.95	156.94	64.14	238.33
1999	1,556.71	2,621.64	488.84	994.20	618.75	1,652.94	54.96	117.66	62.01	233.92
2000	1,766.31	3,249.27	401.64	958.18	734.88	1,520.38	48.51	146.07	69.04	216.14

2001	1,878.61	3,692.6 7	467.24	975.44	805.38	1,653.75	38.46	138.61	93.55	236.73
2002	2,150.18	3,273.3 5	478.17	1,040.76	886.77	1,598.67	30.61	128.37	67.36	285.30
2003	2,411.88	3,711.5 0	572.22	1,197.47	1,131.40	1,958.82	37.17	155.30	63.03	363.89
2004	2,704.85	4,604.5 1	759.12	1,426.75	1,400.42	2,420.72	48.11	174.5 0	98.10	450.86
2005	3,447.06	5,864.9 4	1,015.86	1,745.57	1,571.28	3,043.47	65.91	289.7 7	124.98	583.00
2006	3,481.19	7,232.77	1,187.64	2,215.5 8	2,000.12	3,864.10	59.75	441.4 2	36.51	124.30
2007	4,080.02	8,988.9 8	1,776.16	2,958.1 8	2,007.00	5,919.02	56.86	309.1 6	45.03	200.60
2008	5,054.16	11,291. 59	2,207.63	4,042.7 7	3,119.30	6,907.80	69.65	402.9 6	46.25	308.10
2009	4,462.48	10,188. 45	2,326.56	3,835.2 4	2,982.45	6,531.22	68.42	402.2 6	47.34	347.60
2010	5,172.01	11,954. 68	2,163.97	4,375.6 9	3,976.79	8,070.36	101.23	508.83	54.16	395.90
2011	5,755.58	14,817. 78	2,514.90	5,684.8 0	4,771.62	11,184 .25	123.98	755.59	80.71	500.90
2012	6,126.19	16,261. 53	2,811.20	6,095.8 0	5,361.41	11,715.7 3	134.70	751.53	115.59	532.56
2013	5,832.41	16,410. 46	2,829.00	5,871.2 0	5,174.70	12,525.4 0	189.65	911.93	122.94	516.39

2014	6,110.36	18,406.28	2,676.60	6,139.30	5,732.05	12,752.04	131.25	765.58	142.33	546.23
2015	5,918.25	16,068.25	2,666.10	5,592.40	7,840.89	10,545.48	117.46	831.86	120.16	519.10

Source: EAC Fact Sheet (2016)

In the case of Tanzania's dalliance with SADC, according to Sudi (2018), Tanzania's 7.1% GDP growth rate is the highest in the region. However, unlike in the case of the EAC, Tanzania has continued to witness a slump in her intra-SADC trade. Despite this decline in exports and imports, Tanzania managed to post a trade surplus of USD 445.5 million in 2017 by trading in SADC. Further, Tanzania reported a trade surplus with South Africa, DRC, Malawi, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Angola and Botswana, while posting a trade deficit in the same period with Zambia, Madagascar, Mauritius, Namibia, Eswatini, Seychelles and Lesotho (Sudi, 2018). Tanzania might therefore seek to consolidate the gains that can be made within the auspices of the EAC.

Respondent 102 observes that Tanzania's regional integration forays and practices could be informed by the need to adapt to day to day activities without necessarily being entangled or bogged down by the rules guiding the given regional integration community.

Tanzania is more moved or swayed by politics around integration and necessarily the economic benefits of integration. As we have seen, I think it is just political moves, and it goes from president to president and the EAC structure itself gives you clue for integration to be based on whoever is at the helm at the moment. So, I would say that perhaps if you study the history of integration and the history of the relationships of the members of the summit or the members of the council or the executive bodies of these community, the relationship can tell you why Tanzania is being very stingy. The minute Tanzania feels attacked, it closes her border, increases import levy. It does this based on political considerations (Respondent, 102).

Respondent 102 was of the view that Tanzania approaches regional integration with the maxim that,

they just need this little thing from you and it is just economic in nature and we are not allowed to cross over this line, we are not allowed to challenge any decision you make in terms of human rights or anything touching on governance of the country (Respondent, 102).

According to Respondents 103,129 and 130 Tanzania would be much better dealing with East African countries owing to geographical closeness, historical interactions and to prevent domination in the SADC.

In the EAC, we are able to trade with Kenya and Uganda. In fact, there is a pipeline which is being constructed from Uganda going all the way to Tanga, Tanzania, a decision which was brought about by these two presidents: President Magufuli and President Museveni. This initiative will bring benefits to these two countries and what has escalated that to come is East African Community. The EAC gives these countries avenues to trade with each other and this is more historical because Uganda and Tanzania have a good historical relationship starting from the era of Milton Obote to Museveni. So, Uganda and Tanzania had good historical relations, so this pipeline was to go from Uganda to Mombasa, but I do not know what happened in between. (Respondents, 103,129 and 130).

Following historical relations Tanzania has within the EAC, respondents 129 and 130 together observed the following.

The initial EAC was established in 1967 and by then it was composed of three countries: Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. Each country had a Mercedes Benz 230.6 for state activities related to East African Community. Mercedes Benz 230.6 had enough space to accommodate two presidents, one assistant for president, a pressman and the host president at once. Royal Excellence No. 1 (RE-1) was the official registration number for this car. This uniquely portrays the historical bond that links Tanzania to the other two founding partner states in the EAC. In fact, this bond is significant in the manner it anchors these three countries on a shared colonial legacy unlike any other regional integration arrangement (Respondents, 129 and 130).

According to Respondent 105, Tanzania is better suited to pursue regional integration in the EAC. The EAC trade regime offers great incentives to small scale traders and SMEs that engage in cross-border movement of goods. The SMEs and small-scale traders constitute a significant part of Tanzania's economy.

So, the simplified trade regime mostly benefits small scale traders for instance, if you are a trader and you want to move your agricultural commodities across the border maybe from Kenya to Tanzania or from Tanzania to Kenya. If the value of those goods is less than USD 2000, then you do not have to pay any duties, taxes or tariffs, you just fill some documentation and then you are able to move your goods freely.

Furthermore, commodities produced and traded within the region are exempted from tariffs and duties but, anything outside the region is subjected to some agreed upon tariffs and duties so, that is also another framework benefiting trade in the region (Respondent, 105).

Another benefit that respondent 105 points out is the harmonization of sectoral policies in the EAC.

Before harmonization if a company wanted to register a pesticide that company will be required to do three seasons of trials in Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi and South Sudan. A total of 18 seasons, but now we have reduced that to two seasons and in some cases just one season per country through harmonization and that also translates to some benefits to some farmers in the region; it means farmers can access these products much faster and also the companies should be able to charge less because the cost associated with testing and registration is less compared to the way it was before we did the harmonization. We are also doing something similar for seeds. Seeds is also more less the same because there is what we call ‘‘National Performance Trial’’, if a seed company wants to introduce seed variety you have to do the seasons in Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and in the other countries but we also want to reduce that so that farmers can access seeds much easier and much faster. And then the other thing in the pipeline which I should be able to also share with you in the area of harmonization, are other issues that are trade related but of course sometimes Tanzania has been difficult because when it comes to facilitating free movement of people; Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda have accepted that you do not need to have a passport you can just use your national identity card (Respondent, 105).

In the same vein, respondent 107 underscored the economic potential of both Tanzania and Kenya and the likelihood of the EAC to buttress realization of benefits of natural resources for instance, the Lake Victoria basin.

During the launch of Mara Day 2019, Tanzania and Kenya commemorated the importance of this shared resource to their respective economies and communities, and to the ecosystem of countries in East Africa. Tanzania and Kenya benefits more because Mara River Basin harbors famous tourist destinations. The spirit of this festival recognizes that without the healthy flow of the Mara River, the great wildebeest migration would stop leading to loss of livelihoods and foreign exchange to both economies. By being part of the EAC other shared resources such as Lake Victoria and tourist circuits can be best managed sustainably in order to positively impact respective communities within the region and for posterity (Respondent, 107).

Further, respondent 107 averred,

even though this mutual resource could still be managed bilaterally, the spirit of regional integration guarantees meaningful cooperation even on the most antagonistic issues. Conservation of the Mara Basin is of central importance for every aspect of both countries, whether socially, culturally, economically or environmentally. Even politically, it creates unique identity to surrounding communities within this region. Therefore, with both Tanzania and Kenya being in the EAC, it enhances chances of rehabilitating and restoring the healthy flow of the Mara River. The two countries must continue to synergize interventions through frameworks such as the EAC (Respondent, 107).

Respondent 108 was of the view that Tanzania benefits more economically in the EAC than it does in the SADC.

Tanzania's dalliance towards the SADC could be mainly due to the stride Kenya has taken in the EAC. However, this does not mean that Tanzania benefits least from the EAC compared to the SADC, in fact, this relation is historical. As you may be aware there has been ideological debacle between the two countries. For instance, in terms of economy, Kenya is more developed compared to Tanzania perhaps due to its capitalistic orientation that has courted foreign capital. Tanzania might have woken up a little bit late and now they have to play catch up, and in fact, what Tanzania resent about Kenya is not the people, it could be the foreign owned firms in the country. If you went to a good Sunday School you could have heard of the Biblical sibling rivalry between Cain and Abel, we cannot deny that this could be the case between the two countries. We work with traders and you realise that most agricultural produce in Kenya come from the surrounding countries, as a matter of fact, Tanzania exports more food stuff to Kenya, leave alone other EAC partner states, so the notion that Tanzania is pro SADC could be for other reasons, not economic ones. If for instance, Tanzania was to pull out from the EAC, farmers, fishermen and businessmen would protest. I don't foresee this happening, in as much as peasants are not ones who make such critical decisions, they are the ones who vote, and politicians would not want to shoot themselves in the foot by disregarding their electorates' interests. Whenever Tanzania closes her borders with Kenya farmers contend with food wastage, it can only go on for some time otherwise, this could spark internal tensions at best and a peasant's revolution at worst (Respondent, 108).

Respondents 124 and 125 opined that Tanzania should not be in a dilemma at all, choosing between

the two regional blocs due to economic benefits involved.

Tanzanian manufactured and agricultural products fetch more sales within the EAC market as compared to SADC. If you look at trade outside the EAC, Tanzanian commodities are purely agricultural without value addition and are majorly destined to South Africa. Tanzania should therefore make efforts to consolidate and secure more markets within the EAC. In terms of the strength of institutions, the EAC has progressed a lot. Perhaps to ensure that it does not lose its current hold on trade in commodities outside the EAC, it should bolster its bilateral ties with South Africa, maintain its historical links with Zambia and other SADC member countries but be pro-active in securing and pursuing more business interests within the EAC. There being only two littoral states in the EAC, Tanzania has a better chance alongside Kenya, being the only gateway economies to the Indian Ocean in East African Community (Respondents, 124 and 125).

3.3.1 Juxtaposing Tanzania's Political Integration in Regional Blocs: EAC or SADC?

There is a greater political affinity to regional integration in EAC than with the SADC for Tanzania. This can be deduced from the closer affinity Tanzania has attained as a result of among other things, the colonial legacy with the EAC partner states. Further, as the country that borders all other members of EAC except South Sudan which is a late entrant, Tanzania's in roads within this bloc make it easier for her to foster stronger integration with other members. Furthermore, the geography of the East African Community favours Tanzania. With only two economies, Kenya and Tanzania being the littoral states while considering the fact that intra-regional trade is still below par, Tanzania can harness this potential for stronger trade ties (Ordu, 2019).

It is also important to note that the precursor for a thriving future is well enabled through the infrastructural development and linkages. The East African Community carries much better developmental prospects since the member states, including Tanzania, are regenerating already established railways that serve the regional bloc. The existing infrastructures will connect the region by helping reduce the cost of transport and time taken to traverse various countries. These infrastructures would facilitate the exchange of ideas by contributing towards augmentation of the continental and global integration (Hoppe, 2007).

The gel of political integration is institution building. As opposed to SADC, the EAC has made tremendous progress in establishing and reinforcing its institutions. The "one stop" border points are worth noting due to their contribution of advancing linkages within the EAC. This has expedited clearance at border points (Ordu, 2019).

According to Respondent 101, the national interest issue in Tanzania has made them pursue policies with no clear direction. This has slowed down regional integration process in addition to curtailing optimal benefits Tanzania could reap from deep regional integration arrangement.

Multiplicity of membership as a national interest is very divisive. It is a kin to a gentleman having two wives; you have to decide which day you have to be this side and which day you have to go this side, someday you will be here and this one will be feeling bad or jealous or neglected. In as much as you are the majority in decision making you feel much more isolated. People sit down and talk which is a better way of moving forward, otherwise if the EAC feels aggrieved, SADC feels aggrieved and Tanzania cannot reach a decision that means you cannot move. So, the dilemma Tanzania is in is being myopic to say the least (Respondent, 101).

Respondent 102 however faulted the configuration of the EAC structures adding that they give a leeway to political leaders in the EAC countries to choose which paths to follow, whether integration or disintegration.

If we continue like this with how the structure of the EAC is looking. If we continue like this where all the powers are in the Summit and the Summit cannot take a step without each member of the Summit saying yes, Tanzania will always do what it wants to do, it has the power, meaning it will remain at this intergovernmental thing alone, it will never move to sort of federation. If we say decision making remains at the summit as per the structure that we have now, we are stuck at intergovernmental, meaning that Tanzania will have power to choose where it wants to be. It will have the power to choose whether to be in the EAC for this year and for what exactly. It is sad, Tanzania will always be that country which is not compliant unless they get a new president that will say ‘oh, I am so for this integration’. As long as the structure is not changed it will depend on the moods of the guys in power meaning Tanzania will do whatever it wants to do, whenever it wants to do it and come back whenever it wants to come back, will we ever expel Tanzania? I do not know. (Respondent, 102).

However, Respondents 103, 126, 127 and 128 put a caveat by pointing out a number of fissures in the relations between the East Africa and the Southern Africa tracing the same in the two region's political economy.

We have amicable relations with these countries in south. For example, South Africa and Tanzania have a very close relationship, if we look at history, Nelson Mandela used to come to Tabora. They were trained on how to combat against apartheid in

South Africa during that time and more, so the South African army stayed in Tanzania and we have a lot of children who were left behind. So, Tanzania is one of the Front-Line States in SADC who were pushing for liberation in South Africa and more so southern states. But again, when we say East Africa, we did not create it. It was a colonial entity and so we inherited it from the colonial and so we have to modify it so that it could meet the standards of the East African people. We had only three states then, Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania. But again, we have to see that in East Africa, Uganda and Kenya were a British colony but, due to repercussions of First World War, Tanzania was put under British classification and that is when Tanzania could now qualify to be part of the EAC.

On the other hand, Tanzania had cordial relation with SADC and other countries in the south. The construction of TAZARA for instance, has three significant benefits to Tanzania which include, provision of the sea route to Zambia through the North Eastern part of the country, thus linking Tanzania port to its other underdeveloped parts, including the entire Rufiji Basin. This route enhanced trade between Tanzania and Zambia thus helping connect the Southern and Eastern Africa. The decision to join SADC was to help solidify the relations forged during the liberation struggle that Tanzania was of notable contribution. Also, the Kaunda-Nyerere relations, played a significant role since one of their major agenda was to spur the North Eastern Zambia and Southern Tanzania development, so, what other better way to do it, if not being in SADC? (Respondents, 103,126, 127 and 128).

Respondent 109 spoke about basis for sound regional integration initiatives and opined that, trust is one of the key ingredients for lasting regional integration efforts.

Perhaps the reason Tanzania is skeptical about the EAC in general and at Kenya in particular could be that Kenyans are more litigious compared to Tanzanians and by extension to other countries within the SADC. In Tanzania, mediation, and reconciliation more so at communal level, are highly utilized. It is uncommon to have feuds every time they manifest reported to mainstream tools of justice in these countries compared to Kenya. Unlike the mainstream judicial system, whose intent is to deter wrongful deeds through punitive measures, alternative modes of justice are not protracted, they engender reconciliation and relationship building. So, regional integration needs to be looked at cautiously and holistically, given the dynamics witnessed more so within the South-South mechanisms for engagement (Respondent, 109).

Respondents 121, 122 and 123 spoke about Tanzania's membership in SADC, they observed that membership to both the EAC and SADC are complementary. In no way does Dar Es Salaam prefer Arusha to Gaborone, both regional integration initiatives help President Magufuli advance 'Tanzania First' with the aim of maximizing Tanzania benefits without leaving any regional integration bloc, this mirrors the rise of nationalism at systemic level.

Among other reasons, Tanzania's need to join SADC was occasioned by the anticipation of consequences of the ever-mounting security challenges. As a result, Tanzania is party to SADC's Regional Early Warning System (REWS). The mandate of REW is to provide early warning information to threats within the region to enable effective timely preventive measures. Therefore, Tanzania stands to benefit from a strengthened mechanism for conflict prevention, management, and resolution in line with SADC's Protocol on Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation and Strategic Indicative Plan (SIPO).

Tanzania among other SADC member countries is expected to enhance the early warning system through data collection and analysis and by monitoring people's wellbeing for a timely response to emergence situations. The early warning sign acquaints policy makers with information spanning across social, economic, security and conflict thereby affording them time to respond appropriately. SADC's early warning system engenders national chapters in each partner country while the Headquarter is domiciled at SADC secretariat in Gaborone. While it's the role of national chapters to feed the regional center with information, upon receipt, the regional center shares the same with her member partner states. The early warning system has ensured conflict prevention through timely monitoring of regional threats, thus being able to put in place measures that mitigate the same in addition to, disseminating information to all partner countries. Therefore, Tanzania continues to enjoy achievements of SADC's early warning system both at regional and national level. By extension, this too, through information sharing or technology transfer could help bolster Tanzania's relations within the rubric of the EAC or bilaterally (Respondents, 121, 122 and 123).

3.3.2 Juxtaposing Tanzania's Social Integration in the East African Community and the South African Development Community

3.4.1 Understanding Culture in the Context of Regional Integration

According to Dosenrode (2007), culture denotes a wider spectrum of values, rules, moral norms and actual conduct as well as the material and immaterial products and symbols that human beings within a given context and over a given time span take over from the previous generation and pass it down to the next generation, in doing so, this differentiates a group of human beings belonging to one culture from the other (Dosenrode, 2007).

Culture has also been defined as the values, attitudes, beliefs, orientations, and underlying assumptions prevalent among people in a society or, a culture is a complex system, a set of interacting variables including but not limited to "social organization that function to maintain a community in a state of equilibrium with its environment". The latter definition is peculiar in that it stresses the prescriptive function of maintaining the balance of a culture within its environment (Dosenrode, 2007).

The two definitions conceptualise culture at two levels; the upper level which is more manifest and the deeper level which is the core culture. However, within a regional integration context, the latter definition means that it assumes the analysis of the advancement of international politics in the post-Cold War era. Dosenrode (2007) observes that this definition will be key in availing a framework and a paradigm for analysing international politics that will be useful to policymakers and scholars of global politics (Dosenrode, 2007).

3.4.2 Cultural Integration of Tanzania to Members of a Regional Integration Scheme: A Comparison between the East African Community and the South African Development Community

Unlike the South African Development Community, Tanzania is culturally integrated to East African Community owing to the linguistic and colonial legacies that harmonized systems as well as geographic proximity which increases socio-cultural integration through movements of ideas, music as well as students seeking education across the border.

Furthermore, there have been cultural forays to integration in the East African Community (EAC). As maintained by Ramadhan (2019), this offers a wide scope and prospects for sustainable promotion of cultural integration and especially through regional tourism and economic growth. Through promotion of cultural tourism, there is a spiral of socio-cultural integration as this not only

creates jobs for the youth but also ensure that the citizens are brought up in harmonized proper values, norms, attitudes, customs and morals (Ramadhan, 2019).

A good example is the cross-border movement of music such as Tanzanian Bongo music across the border. To this end therefore, cross border trade in Tanzanian cultural goods is thriving in the region today. It is common to find Tanzanian Maasais selling the cultural ornaments in other EAC nations today such as Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi. As such, cultural integration is an imperative to regional integration, economic growth, and promotion of tourism in addition to promotion of the economic development of the region in a sustainable as well as inclusive manner (Ramadhan, 2019).

Furthermore, cultural forays towards integration such as the Jumuiya ya Afrika Mashariki Utamaduni Festival (JAMAFEST) have been forged to strengthen the EAC integration and to celebrate the East African traditions and cultures. Activities undertaken by JAMAFEST are indicative of the integrational direction that the EAC has taken to unleash the potential of the East Africans in regional integration and development process. Socio-cultural integration is hinged on the underpinning thesis that the people in an integration scheme, both as actors and beneficiaries of integration, are central to regional integration schemes development process. As such, socio-cultural integration activities empower people within a regional integration scheme in order to enhance their participation in regional integration projects and programmes. A good example is the improvement in the number and quality of local Tanzanian artistic productions in terms of music, films, arts and crafts with a corresponding upsurge in the number of qualified and trained professional artists, musicians and visual artists as they seek to compete at the regional level as well as satisfy a bigger audience (Ramadhan, 2019).

According to Nzioki, et al. (2015), the socio-cultural integration of Tanzanian to the other members of the five East Africa regional countries is hinged on near similar education systems particularly Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, language (Kiswahili and English in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania), business ethics and the human resource culture. This has created unprecedented opportunities with indigenous multinational corporates riding on this windfall to expand their enterprises within the EAC (Nzioki, Nyambagera, & Wawire, 2015).

Worth noting is that the East African Community has been at the center stage of adopting education and training curricula through harmonization among the EAC member states. Another milestone for the EAC has been the uptake of African languages through the institutionalization of the Kiswahili Commission. The Kiswahili Commission is mandated to advance the usage of Swahili language for regional interaction in furtherance of the political, economic, and socio-cultural development of East Africa (African Union, 2014).

Respondents interviewed in the study however raised a number of issues and reservations. According to Respondent 100, these issues can be attributed to the refugee issue which has brought about some tensions. Another challenge is the heritage of the collapsed community in 1977.

The challenge with refugee integration when it comes to East African Community is the approach Tanzania has had over a period of time; let us say around 1996 when they used the military to get Rwandese refugees out of Tanzania. They were able to get out Rwandese refugees with the help of UNHCR despite denials from the UNHCR. Fast forward to 2019 when the military was being used to remove Burundian refugees from Tanzania. So Tanzania has had a very difficult relationship with refugees in their country probably due to skepticism towards the East African Community which started way back in 1977 during the first EAC and also when the second EAC was being formed then the same problem came back again. This was understandable because out of all the countries, only Tanzania was communist or socialist in nature and again in a socialist society the government has to control resources and everything is for everyone and the government is like a mother who divides food for the children as compared to Kenya, Uganda, and Rwanda where it is purely capitalistic in nature. Rwanda is debatable but Uganda and Kenya are purely capitalistic (Respondent, 100).

The respondent also raised an issue with regard to the ideological differences manifested across the EAC countries over the years and which have brought about animosities as well as coalitions around one country (or a group of countries) or another.

This ideological difference brings a lot of problems which is why you get a lot of hindrances to Tanzania. You need a yellow fever certificate and you need a passport; you go to Rwanda and Uganda you only use your national identity card. That shows the operational aspect of the EAC, it already shows the difficulty between Tanzania and other states because of the approach which is more conservative in nature and is more social in nature and I think it is so because the late Nyerere build up Ujamaa system in Tanzania and while Tanzania might not be aggressive as Kenya or Uganda would so, definitely that fear has gotten inside and that has brought in these difficulties. As you can see the relationship between Tanzania and Rwanda was messed up because of the genocide and then returning back of refugee. That is why Tanzania, despite being the biggest country in the East African Community tends to have the least refugees while Kenya and Uganda which are comparatively smaller tend to have the most refugee. So, it is a bit difficult to see where there are problems

because they do not voice their problems and what that leads to is the decision that is stuck in East African Community Summit, things cannot move. So, when it comes back to refugee matters it is a deep-seated thing that started long time ago. As you can see the fight they have with Burundi, “not a fight really” but the aspect of returning Burundi refugees back to Burundi despite that there have been violence in Burundi that already shows the relationship with the refugees, they did it to Rwanda and they did it to Burundi. The question is what could happen today if Tanzania went to civil war, will the other East African countries accept them? Maybe it will be answered if it happens (Respondent, 100).

According to the respondent, the problem with Tanzania’s approach to other East African countries in addition to the EAC, is one of contempt.

There is a contemptible kind of a relationship among the East African Community partner states. They might feel they are more meaningful though; however, their operations are different from EAC. However, it is worth noting that there is no common heritage between Tanzania and other Southern countries. Tanzania shares more with the East African Countries particularly due to cross border communities e.g. the Maasai, Kuria, the Luo, etc. So, the aspect of shared culture would be a driving force to be in the East African Community. The only problem is their contempt to the EAC which makes the EAC move so slow because of lack of trust by Tanzania. Jakaya Kikwete, the former president was much better because he was trying to bring back Tanzania to the fold but Magufuli’s policies are protectionist in nature which makes it difficult for regional integration (Respondent, 100).

While explaining cross border integration in the EAC, respondent 104 traces the historical interactions that these cross-border communities have undergone and the deepened interaction between Tanzania and other EAC countries.

There are a lot of Kikuyus and Luos who are very rich, they have houses, have businesses in Arusha; you go to Zanzibar, go to Dar es Salaam, go to Mbeya and you find a lot of Kenyans with huge lands. There is a cabinet secretary of Kenya, Amina Mohammed, when she was in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, she said, “we have to remember our history, the Maasai of Kenya, the Maasai of Tanzania have been having this mutual relation going from one area to another to visit relative and we do not have to break that bondage, that blood related relationship”. Between Kenyatta’s regime and Magufuli’s regime they have passed a certain proposal or law that if a Tanzanian is arrested in Kenya committing a crime or a Kenyan is arrested

in Tanzania committing a crime that person should be punished by the law of that land, you do not have to extradite that person to their country (Respondent,104).

According to Respondent 106, Tanzanians are however reserved in regard to accepting foreigners as opposed to other countries in the East African Community such as Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda.

Tanzanians are just reserved and inward looking otherwise, Tanzania right now would be the leading economy in the region because they have the resources. If you look at the land size, Tanzania is a very big country but, they are not as open as Rwanda when it comes to creating a conducive environment for traders and businessmen. They are so restrictive to the extent that it is now becoming very difficult for a non-Tanzanian to get a job in Tanzania because now they have this policy that for you to employ a non-Tanzanian you have to demonstrate that that capacity is not available, that you do not have a local person to take over that position (Respondent, 106).

According to Respondents 110,111 and 112, Tanzania has had strong cultural ties with countries down south for instance, Zambia.

It is difficult to wish such ties away. In as much as the EAC is deemed closer, what happens between Tanzania and other countries within the SADC connects us. The Afri koko drink is a favorite for many, it is not common amongst your generation. In fact, you have just admitted that you have been to a number of stores here in Dar es Salaam and you did not find it. Afri koko is originally produced in Zambia and the only country its exported to en mass is Tanzania. It is distilled from whole coco nut and chocolate. People like it, its normally found in high end stores, popular with experimenting foreigners who prefer to indulge in native liquor. We find it unique because other than Tanzania, the other place you can find it is Zambia. Consequently, there are vast business networks which have propped up between these two countries because of the framework SADC has created. In addition, historical and cultural relations such as Afri-koko liquor have proved to be the fabrics that have tied down Tanzania in SADC (Respondents, 110,111 and 112).

As per respondents 113, 114 and 115, Swahili language has been central in aligning Tanzania within the EAC.

Our bus companies ply Nairobi-Dar Es Salaam routes daily, others ply Tanga-Moshi-Mombasa. This is mainly due to closeness and other factors such as cross-border communities, inter-marriages, and vast touristic sceneries along these routes. We are really grateful on how the EAC integration is taking shape, the inclusion of six other

countries from the original three implies more interconnectedness, more intermingling and more business to the business community. This implies harmonization of infrastructural development, policies on insurance and other regulations. We are happy, increasingly, the cost of operating business within the EAC has gone down. We only operate Tanzania-Kenya routes and ply various routes within Tanzania and business is going on well. Of course, during holiday period we get more bookings, but this does not imply that other regular days there are no commuters. What we are working towards now is to have joint cross-border transport companies (including cargo and commuters) to aggregate our voice alongside lobbying for conducive business environment. At times we find it difficult but we realise both Kenyans and Tanzanians are facing such challenges hence the aptness of having an active association (Respondents, 113, 114 and 115).

3.4.3 Educational Integration of Tanzania to Members of a Regional Integration Scheme: A Comparison between the East African Community and the South African Development Community

The EAC's current efforts at educational harmonization are aimed at bolstering economic integration. According to Stefan Trines (2018), Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania constituted the British colonial empire. As such, they were already economically inter-connected because of colonial trading patterns, education (the creation of the East African University with campuses in Nairobi, Kampala and Dar-es-Salaam) as well as transportation links like railway lines, the cross-border port system in Lake Victoria, the East African Harbours, East African Airways and cross border road networks. It is no wonder then that with their attainment of independence (1961 for Tanzania, 1962 for Uganda and 1963 for Kenya), these three countries sought rapid economic development through cooperation in various ways such as labor migration, customs and taxation. This led to the first iteration of the EAC which sought to establish a common market which lasted until its collapse in 1977 (Trines, 2018).

In 2000, the three founding countries re-engineered the East African Community and revitalized efforts to remove trade barriers with the quest to further integrate their economies, an effort that catalysed intra-regional trade by 96 percent between 2004 and 2009. In 2007, the EAC opened its doors to Burundi and Rwanda before admitting South Sudan in 2016 (Trines, 2018).

According to the African Union (2014), education is a key driver of regional integration. This is simply because it intensifies the productivity of regional integration through enhanced production and consumption of goods and services. Within the East African Community, access to primary education has been a major milestone as juxtaposed against secondary education. The EAC partner states seized the Universal Free Primary Education declaration to roll out free primary education. Even though below par, compared to primary education, effort has been put in place to guarantee secondary school enrolment. According to the African Union report (2014), these measures have heralded increase of secondary students' intake from 50 to 75 per cent between 2006 and 2012 in all EAC countries (African Union, 2014).

Integration in the higher education component has been at high peaks fueled in part by the history of intra-regional higher education cooperation and the new higher education policies established by the East African Community. Stefan Trines (2018), observes that implementation of the EAC harmonization effort has been made a core mandate of the Kampala based Inter-University Council for East Africa (IUCEA). The IUCEA coordinates and implements harmonization among 116 Higher Education Institutions (HEIs), as well as well having plans to accommodate all 300 Higher Education

Institutions operating in the region. However, to be part of IUCEA, institutions are required to fulfil two key mandates which are: formal recognition at home and have a clear demonstration of internal quality assurance standard operation procedures (Trines, 2018).

Trines (2018) further observes that in late 2000s, IUCEA embarked on a robust capacity building targeting systems and personnel through provision of quality assurance guidelines to Higher Education Institutions in the EAC and by training university administrators through support of German Academic Exchange Service. The efforts of the IUCEA bore fruits in 2012 when an all-inclusive East African Higher Education Quality Assurance Network (EAQAN) adopted. This framework has continued to enhance quality of Higher Education in the region by offering continual training to quality assurance officers within the EAC and by extension, through promotion of the institutionalization of common standards and training manuals (Trines, 2018).

Furthermore, substantial progress has been seen particularly in Kenya and Uganda following their inclusion of ICT and HIV/AIDS education in their Higher Education curricula. On the other hand, primary school enrolments have been on the steady rise among all partner states with all surpassing the 15 percent which was the major target of attaining universal access to Primary Education by 2015. The African Union Report (2014), further notes, despite the success achieved at the primary education level, higher level education continues to lag behind. For instance, in 2012 the EAC partner states reported a net enrolment rate of below 30 per cent. That notwithstanding, EAC partner economies have expressed their dedication and urge to roll out efficient post-secondary non-tertiary programmes to promote holistic education at a low level (African Union, 2014).

This is buttressed by Respondent 104 who explains education integration among EAC countries.

First of all, one of the objectives of EAC is to have free universal education. I mean high learning institution could be free within the region of EAC within the member states. Like me, I finished my form 6 and I came to Kenya. Now when I completed, I came here and I was able to enroll with my credentials from Tanzania, why? Because of the East African Community, it says that is one of the agreements. Today you do not need some letter to go and do some research in Tanzania, I mean that recommendation is okay because it introduces you but Tanzania as a country cannot restrict you with “where is your visa, where is your what”. So East Africa on itself is giving what COMESA is emulating from this regional integration, likewise, in SADC, I think we have a high number of Tanzanians who are studying in South Africa. That is the benefit of SADC so, we are not losing and whatever COMESA brings we already have. Your question on yellow fever and passport, I think right

now, this year all Tanzanians have registered for their national identity cards. We did not have the national identity cards but now we are going to get it maybe if we finish that process, we will come back to EAC and decide to do what you guys are already doing. You could use your national identity card to travel within East Africa. We started this last year (Respondent, 104).

3.4.4 Cross Border Movement of Labour

The establishment of the EAC's common market protocol heralded the creation of a qualifications structure that sought to strengthen regional integration through ease of mobility of labour and learners within the EAC. As a result, Trines (2018) has observed that there has been mutual recognition of both professional and academic credentials within the region. As Trines (2018) further notes, 2015 was a historic moment since this was when the East African Qualifications Framework for Higher Education (EAQFHE) was launched. This framework was a precursor to the harmonization of education within the EAC. According to Trines (2018), EAQFHE has enabled the prescription of the duration, learning objectives and structural components of academic programs offered in the EAC region (Trines, 2018).

Consequently, the EAQFHE structure has put in place a uniform credit system that regulates credit requirements similar to the model used by the European Credit Transfer and Accumulation System (ECTS). The development of the credit system has rendered academic credentials transferable and its uniformity has made them compatible within the EAC. As per Trines (2018), this framework has a set of guidelines and principles that define and set pathways that have resulted to standardisation of education system in EAC which has in part led to the institutionalization of an East African Graduation Statement (Trines, 2018).

As far as education and professional mobility is concerned, Tanzania still has more to do. It is worth noting that URT allows visa free or visa upon arrival to citizens of 27 African economies as well as having ratified the EAC protocols pertaining both the free movement of labour and persons. On the other hand, URT has not formalized pertinent SADC articles such as Article 14, 17 and 18.

Tanzania's Labour Integration Score within SADC

Country	Labour Integration Score
South Africa	0.74
Botswana	0.56
Namibia	0.56
Zambia	0.52
Swaziland	0.52
Zimbabwe	0.49
Mozambique	0.48
Seychelles	0.48
Mauritius	0.47
Average	0.46
Lesotho	0.39
Malawi	0.37
United Republic of Tanzania	0.36
Madagascar	0.34
Dem. Rep. of the Congo	0.30

Country	Labour Integration Score
Angola	0.28

Source: (Africa Regional Integration Index, 2019)

Tanzania's Labour Integration Score within EAC

Country	Labour Integration Score
Kenya	0.66
Uganda	0.58
Rwanda	0.55
Average	0.54
Burundi	0.48
United Republic of Tanzania	0.43

Source: (Africa Regional Integration Index, 2019)

With regard to the movement of labour, respondents 105, 116, 117, 118, 119 and 120 lauded the creation of the “One Stop Border Post” across the borders of East African states.

Of late we have what is called “One Stop Border Post”, right now we have like 11 borders in the EAC that have been bundled into One Stop Border Post. Previously, if you reached at the border, you go to Kenyan side you get cleared, they stamp your passport then you cross to Tanzanian side they also stamp your passport. But currently, if you are coming from Kenya going to Tanzania, you only cross to the Tanzanian side, so on the Tanzanian side you will find immigration officer, they are both from Kenya and Tanzania, they do everything together and clearance is much

faster even if it is cargo with goods it is just cleared on one side instead of both sides. So that has really helped traders' in terms of reducing time and clearance. (Respondents, 105, 116,117,118,119 and 120).

Respondent 131 refused to comment simply because,

“...Tanzania is not a member of COMESA”.

3.4.5 Integration in Other Social Indicators of Regional Integration Scheme's Development

According to a 2014 African Union report, the East Africa Community has made tremendous progress in a number of social indicators of regional integration scheme's development. In regard to social aspects of gender and culture for instance, the region has made significant milestones that have operationalized policies geared towards addressing gender equity and equality within the EAC. For instance, EAC partner states have adopted the Plan of Action which is being implemented at the country level. Even though, there have been slow pace at implementing especially on matters affecting women and girls, the African Union Report (2014) indicates that there has been some progress (African Union, 2014).

There has also been notable increase in deployment of teachers within the EAC. Partner countries have reported increased deployment rate from between 17 percent to 70 percent for the period lasting 2010s. The AU report (2014) also notes that there has been a significant increase in number of trained teachers being deployed within the region for a period exceeding six years however, no country attained 100 per cent mark. The report attributes enhancement of education within the region to several factors for instance, the adoption of harmonized quality assurance strategies and policies that came to effect in 2006. The expansion of private sector has also brought competition and absorbed the burgeoning number of students in the region. Despite the efforts that have been realised in education sector, inadequate funds and incoherent policy implementation has continued to compromise both quality of education and gender mainstreaming within the region (African Union, 2014).

The EAC has also prioritised the Technical and Vocational Skills Development (TVSD) which recognises the existing market need for specialized skills. According to the African Union Report (2014), the EAC partner states have developed conducive policy frameworks for TVET institutions.

This affront has been utilised as an employment opportunity generating sector that has acquainted skills to several youth and artisans plying their trade in the informal sector which represents a critical source of livelihood to a majority of the poor in Sub-Saharan Africa (Samman, Stuart and Hunt, 2018).

Despite concerted efforts that have been realised at the country level, it is incumbent upon the EAC bloc to institutionalise an integrated policy framework encompassing all six member economies for sustained development of TVET. As per the African Union Report (2014), this should be established through a harmonized strategy (African Union, 2014). On this front, Tanzania is faring on well boasting of 58 percent representation of TVET in its upper secondary school curricula against the other EAC partner states where only less than 11 percent secondary school education addresses technical skills. Similarly, gender parity is yet to be realised in this sector as well thus presenting an opportunity for gender mainstreaming across various sectors of the economy and education. In addition, the report further fetes the EAC to be performing exemplary in Africa as far as literacy rates are concerned (African Union, 2014).

3.4.6 Cross tabulation of Data on Perceptions of Tanzania’s Regional Social Integration

The study cross-tabulated the data obtained from respondents in order to examine the extent to which Tanzania was socially integrated to other countries in the two regional integration blocs which she is a member of namely, the EAC and SADC. The level of education was also used as a control test.

Table 4.10 Cross-Border Labour and Educational Related Migration from Tanzania to the EAC Region

		No Extent	Small Extent	Moderate Extent	Great Extent	Very Great Extent	Total
Highest Level of Education	University	0	1	1	1	6	9
	College Diploma	0	1	1	0	3	5

Secondary School/"O" Levels	1	2	7	4	3	17
Total	1	4	9	5	12	31

Source: Study Data (2019)

Table 4.11 Cross-Border Labour and Educational Related Migration from Tanzania to the SADC Region

		No Extent	Small Extent	Moderate Extent	Great Extent	Very Great Extent	Total
Highest Level of Education	University	1	4	1	0	1	7
	College Diploma	0	3	1	0	1	5
	Secondary School/"O" Levels	1	4	13	1	0	19
Total	2	11	15	1	2	31	

Source: Study Data (2019)

With regard to Tanzania's social integration within the two regional integration blocs. The study found out that there were perceptions of higher social integration the more one is educated. Notably however, among all educational groups, there was a corresponding agreement that the level of integration within EAC regional integration scheme was higher as opposed to the SADC region.

CHAPTER FOUR

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE STUDY

4.1 Introduction

This chapter outlines a summary of the findings of this study. Secondly, the chapter concludes the study by teasing out the findings vis-à-vis the study's theoretical and hypothetical foundations before outlining the policy recommendations. Finally, the study will offer suggestions for further research.

4.2 Summary of Findings

4.2.1 National Economic Interests and Tanzania's Regional Integration Choices

The study's thesis on the economic interests of Tanzania's regional integration choices was premised on trade integration within the two regional integration schemes which Tanzania is a member. Within the EAC, trade integration is pursued within the wider rubric of deepening trade integration through a series of incremental steps underpinned by the essence of the Community. Worth noting is the fundamental idea of variable geometry which sets the basis for cooperation within the community in various sectors and at non-identical pace. Conversely, the SADC was mooted with the attendant need to focus majorly on programs harmonization as opposed to regional integration.

Generally, this has delayed operationalization of SADCs trade protocol with regard to the need to undertake liberalization within the community in order to enhance meaningful trade engagement. The study is cognizant of the entanglement Tanzania finds itself in noting the fact that the EAC and SADC do not significantly differ in terms of trade integration vis a vis other regional blocs. However, there are perceptions within the Tanzanian populace that Tanzania's trade forays are much better

articulated and oriented towards the East African Community to a very great extent. Tanzania is also significantly integrated economically within the EAC vis a vis countries in the SADC.

4.2.2 National Political Interests and Tanzania's Regional Integration Choices

Within the SADC regional integration scheme, Tanzania lies in the outer fringes of the scheme geographically. Politically, SADC rotates around South Africa as the sub-regional hegemon creating an oligopolistic REC where other countries are just but pawns. As such, the study concludes that Tanzania is better placed to be in the EAC as compared to SADC. In the EAC, Tanzania is geographically centred with her territory bordering all other members of the regional bloc (except South Sudan which is a late entrant). In addition, Tanzania's in roads in the East African Community through historical interactions make it easier for her to foster stronger integration with other members). It is also worth noting that majority of the EAC member states are landlocked with intra-area trade way below the potential, sea bound countries such as Tanzania can harness this potential for stronger trade ties. For Tanzania, The East African Community also carries much better developmental prospects owing to deepened infrastructural linkages.

4.2.3 National Socio-Cultural Interests and Tanzania's Regional Integration Choices

Furthermore, unlike SADC, Tanzania is culturally integrated to the East African Community owing to the linguistic and colonial legacies. Furthermore, geographic proximity has heralded unparalleled socio-cultural integration through the movements of ideas, music as well as students seeking education across the border. To Tanzania, this offers a wider menu and possibility for lasting cultural integration particularly through tourism and other expansive economic growth opportunities.

4.3 Conclusion of the Study

This study concludes that Tanzania should seek to consolidate the gains that can be made in the EAC while pursuing trade with SADC countries within the rubric of the EAC bloc or bilaterally. The EAC, as the study has found, has aptly articulated its platform for deepening trade integration through the East African Community (EAC) Common Market Protocol which will pertinently work for the case of Tanzania. While it covers goods, capital, and services just like in the case of the trade agreements within SADC, its peculiarity is the fact that it not only engenders zero tariffs on intra-regional trade but also a common external tariff toward non-partners and the removal of non-tariff barriers. Furthermore, Tanzania would be much better dealing with East African countries owing to geographical closeness, historical interactions and to prevent domination in the SADC. In the EAC, Tanzania is able to trade with Kenya and Uganda at almost equal and/or superior trading terms.

Cognizant of the economic context of Tanzania where the engine of the economy is pegged on micro, small and medium enterprises, the study concludes that Tanzania should pursue regional integration due to the benefits this has on cross border movement of goods and labour and the ability of small scale traders and SMEs to trade goods and services across the border owing to geographic proximity. Furthermore, unlike SADC, the EAC's trade instruments are premised on the need to ease cross border trade by small scale traders.

4.4 Recommendations of the Study

4.4.1 Recommendations of the Study to the United Republic of Tanzania

The study calls for the need for Tanzania to institute some policy measures in order to benefit from deeper integration within the EAC.

- Institutionalization of a 'mindset' change among elites and policy makers to avoid the fear of their own shadows i.e., paranoia in the very sense Machiavelli warns of which has been bogging down the deepening of integration within the East African Community and to enhance the effect on the implementation of policies on integration in the EAC.
- Institute measures for Tanzanian elites and MNCs to pursue cross border collaborative investments in order to neutralize economic dominance from foreign MNCs.
- Institute measures to fight domestic class fissures such as high-income disparities, poverty, and inequality in order to ensure that the citizenry is at the frontline competing for the regional economic and social pie (inclusion).
- Institute pro-active gender equality policies and affirmative resource allocation mechanisms not only to women but also to marginalized constituencies in order to move the Tanzanian population from a subsistence based economic activities to region-oriented services and industry.
- Non-state actors in Tanzania need to enhance their efforts in promoting the understanding of the idea of regional integration amongst the Tanzania citizens. There is a very strong and entrenched Tanzanian identity, but for effective regional integration, national identity should come second to regional identity. So, Tanzanians should be made recipient of the identity that is bigger than Tanzania, the identity of the EAC.
- Tanzania as a committed member of the EAC and SADC needs to assess itself whether it has spread itself too thin to be able to fulfill its regional integration obligations in terms of attendance and subscriptions. The former has crippled summit decisions while the latter has slowed down the progress of the EAC.

- Tanzania needs to have full clarity on why it is in both the EAC and SADC. Based on that while adopting the rational choice theory, then Tanzania should be at ease if it feels that it is gaining much better by being in the two regional blocs, or by having all its eggs in one place either the EAC or the SADC; that should be informed by an objective criteria.

4.4.2 Recommendations of the Study to the EAC and EAC partner states

The study builds the case for the EAC and EAC member countries to institute some policy measures and citizen socialization in order to benefit from deeper integration within the EAC.

- The EAC countries need to come up with robust measures and a clear inter-state relations mechanism that hold each other to account with regard to regional integration objectives. The EAC should not be a forum where they only encourage brazen advancement of national interest as opposed to advancement of collective interest.
- EAC countries need to honour their word and ensure that the EAC Secretariat is not cash strapped to the extent of facing the embarrassment of relying on Western donors for support, due to late submission of membership subscription fees. This essentially waters down the philosophy of pride that is inherent in the spirit of coming together as a regional bloc.
- EAC countries need to invest in the idea of raising awareness about the benefits of regional integration to their citizens. But first, they need to ensure that their respective citizens break out of the ethnic cocoons to embrace their national identity which makes it easier for them to adopt the regional identity. Tanzania has done well in terms of consolidating their national identity however, they need to be socialized towards adopting an extra identity of being East Africans.

4.5 Suggestions for Further Research

This research suggests the following areas for study consideration by other scholars and students of regional integration:

- Regional integration and cross-border criminal enterprises
- Deepening trade integration within regional integration schemes
- Regional disintegration: actors, causes and responses
- State/elite capture and its forays on regional integration

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APPENDIX I: KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS (KII)

Greetings.

My name is Kevin Bwire Mugeni, a M.A in International Relations student from the department of Political Science and Public Administration at the University of Nairobi. I am currently writing my project. My research topic is on the “*Influence of National Interest on Regional Integration Choices: A case study of Tanzania 1980-2017*”. The main research question for this study is on how has Tanzania’s national interest influenced her regional integration choices? I am requesting you to allow me to interview you for the next forty minutes. Your expertise and informed opinion will help shape this study. The purpose of this research is purely academic. I commit to keep your anonymity and the information you provide will remain confidential and used for research purposes only.

Section Two: Interview Schedule

Part 1: Tanzania's Membership in the EAC

1. What are the Tanzania's national interests?
2. Do you think Tanzania's national interests influence her regional integration choices?
 - i. If yes, in what ways, in what areas and to what extent?
 - ii. If Tanzania's national interests influence her membership in the EAC, in what areas and to what extent since the formation of the EAC II (2000) to present?
3. Opportunities and challenges of Tanzania's membership in the EAC.
Are there any challenges and opportunities Tanzania face in the EAC?
 - i) If yes, what are the opportunities for Tanzania?
 - ii) What should be done to enhance these opportunities and address these challenges?
4. Recommendations
In your view, what should be done to buttress Tanzania's commitment in the EAC?

Part 2: Tanzania's Membership in SADC

1. What are the Tanzania's national interests?
2. Do you think Tanzania's national interests influence her regional integration choices?
 - i. If yes, in what ways, in what areas and to what extent?
 - ii. If Tanzania's national interests influence her membership in SADC, in what areas and to what extent since 1980 to present?
3. Opportunities and challenges of Tanzania's membership in SADC.
Are there any challenges and opportunities Tanzania face in SADC?
 - i) If yes, what are the opportunities for Tanzania?
 - ii) If yes, what are the challenges for Tanzania?
 - iii) What should be done to enhance these opportunities and address these challenges?
4. Recommendations
In your view, what should be done to buttress Tanzania's commitment in SADC?

Part 3: Tanzania's Decision to Leave COMESA

1. What are the Tanzania's national interests?
2. Do you think Tanzania's national interests influence her regional integration choices?
 - i. If yes, in what ways, in what areas and to what extent?
3. What interests led Tanzania to leave COMESA in 2000?

Are there any opportunities Tanzania is missing as a result of not being a member of COMESA?

- i) If yes, what are the opportunities for Tanzania?

4. Recommendations

In your view, what should be done to ensure Tanzania benefits ultimately from her regional integration agreements?