

UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI
INSTITUTE OF DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
EFFECT OF CROSS-BORDER ETHNIC CONFLICTS ON SOCIAL
ECONOMIC SECURITY OF PASTORALIST LIVING ALONG
KENYA-UGANDA BORDER: A CASE OF TURKANA
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DECLARATION

I, Bencie Njeri hereby declare that this research project is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other University.

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ABSTRACT

The main objective of the study was to analyze the effects of cross-border ethnic conflict on socio-economic security of pastoralist communities living along Kenya Uganda border, particularly the Turkana community. The study was guided by the following specific objectives: to examine the nature and extent of cross border aggression in Turkana County; to determine the effect of cross border conflict on socio-economic security of households in Turkana County; and to evaluate the effectiveness of state response strategies to cross-border conflict on the socio-economic security of households in Turkana County. The study used descriptive research design. The design provided insight into the research problem and examined the associative relationships and information on potential cause-and-effect relationships of the problem. The target population was drawn from residents of Loima location/ward in Turkana County along Kenya-Uganda border. A sample size of 100 respondents was selected from the target population of 19,848. The data collection exercise involved questionnaires and interactive interviews with respondents. The questionnaire provided depth understanding of the issues under. Primary data was collected by the researcher with assistance of field assistants who also double up as interpreters where necessary. The study utilizes descriptive analysis approach. Study found that cattle raid by non-Kenyan communities, organized raid by foreigners to repulse insurgents, killing of locals by outsiders, and cross border robbery by non-Kenyans are the frequent forms or types of cross border conflict in Turkana County along Kenya Uganda boarder. In addition, these attacks are done jointly with locals and are motivated by cultural practices and revenge motives to settle scores; major effects of cross border conflict includes loss of properties to raiders/looters, reduction in sales increased losses; low response rate to cross border aggressions by the state security agencies. Lastly, the study found that security agents that respond to cross border aggression are locals and home guard or combined operation between local and home guards and the government agents; and disarmament has lowly improved insecurity a lot as resident do harm themselves for personal security. The study recommend for multi strategy approach to combat cross border conflict.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

1.1 Background of the Problem

International conflicts might occur between governments striving to monopolize the exploitation of resources in disputed territories. Conflicts between countries are often presented as occurring between their governments while the bone of contention is usually territory or some other economic resource¹. It is seldom the welfare of the ordinary citizens of the states concerned that provokes conflict situations. Even when such reasons are brandished, they often turn out to be attempts at concealing other agendas.

In Africa the phenomena of cross-border raids and rebel militia insurgencies have indeed become prominent and aggravating sources of regional insecurity and political destabilization in Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Uganda, Chad, Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia and Kenya. Orogun² demonstrates that cross-border wars, rebel infiltrations and direct military, state action against renegade militias have occurred in Southern, Central, and Western African regions since the end of the Cold War era³. The net effect of the cross border aggression has been the erosion of the inviolable principle of the sanctity of the territorial sovereignty of many post-colonial African states, violation of human rights, and grave loss of livelihoods in the affected

¹ Asobie, A. 2003. Nigeria, Cameroun and the unending conflict over Bakassi. Available from: www.nigerdeltacongress.com/narticles/nigeria_cameroun_and_the_unending.htm

² Orogun S. Paul. (2002). "An analysis of Armed conflicts in Angola, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of Congo". Paper presented at the 2002 International Studies Association (ISA) Annual Convention New Orleans, Louisiana, March 24-March 27, 2002.

³ Ibid

communities⁴. Moreover, cross border aggression and raids have persistently undermined concerted efforts by the local governments and international community to facilitate the processes of provision of security and socio-economic development.

There are several cases of cross border resource based conflicts in Africa. Examples include, Nigeria- Cameroon conflict over the Bakassi peninsula, South Sudan –Sudan conflict over disputed territories along the border including in the contested Abyei and Blue Nile states, Kenya- Uganda Migingo Island in Lake Victoria and others. It could arise when a nation-state intervenes in the domestic disputes of another state. Occasionally, a conflict may occur where the nationals of one state are attacked, killed or maimed and their property destroyed by the agents of another state⁵.

In many pastoral regions, the realization of adequate security objective is, heavily challenged by insecurity propagated through cross border conflict which reflects a combination of threats and vulnerabilities that may lead to state collapse⁶. Conflict resulting from cross-border aggression is considered one of the main threats to developing countries' peace and security in the post-Cold War era⁷. The effects of such violent conflict on Africa have had far reaching consequences. According to Zeleza, violent conflict of one type or another have afflicted Africa and exerted a heavy toll on the continent's societies, politics and economies, robbing them of their developmental potential and democratic

⁴ Zartman, I. William. (1995). *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority*. (Eds). Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

⁵ Amutabi, M N. (2010). "Land and Conflict in the Ilemi Triangle of East Africa". *Kenya Studies Review Volume 1 Number 2 December 2010*.

⁶ *ibid*

⁷ Gerson, Joseph and Bruce, Birchard. (1991). *The Sun Never Sets: Confronting The Network of Foreign US Military Bases*. (Eds). Boston: South End Press

possibilities⁸. Poverty is continuously cited as one of the principal factors responsible for conflict in many parts of Africa. Poverty and conflict have been on the rise particularly in Africa since 2000 UN Millennium Declaration⁹. Studies have indicated that poverty makes conflict more likely and conflicts in turn worsen poverty¹⁰. These relations are stronger for very poor communities than for well off communities and conflicts tend to last longer in poorer communities where the majority are pastoralists. According the UNDP¹¹, armed violence has a constraining influence on the resource allocations that are at the root of many of Africa's pastoral conflicts, and measures to reduce the violence have failed in most African pastoral contexts.

Eastern Africa has numerous pastoral groups who live in a broad geographical area that stretches from the Kenya-Somalia border northwards into Ethiopia, and northwest to encompass regions of Uganda and Sudan. These regions suffer large-scale intra-state wars that have grave consequences on the economic security of the people. Many conflicts in pastoral Eastern Africa, whether violent or non-violent, usually occur over scarcity of resources and mostly during droughts and famine that raiding for livestock intensifies in the pastoralist domains¹². Conflicts over resources are typical of Turkana where these conflicts are protracted and human livelihoods are greatly destroyed. In the county, certain

⁸ Zeleza, T. P., (2008). "The causes and Costs of War in Africa: From Liberations Struggles to 'War on Terror'" in Alfred Nhema & Paul Tiyambe Zeleza, *The Roots of African Conflicts: The Causes and Costs*. Ohio: Ohio University Press.

⁹ Draman, Rasheed. (2003). "Poverty and Conflict in Africa: Explaining a Complex Relationship". Paper prepared for Experts Group Meeting on Africa-Canada Parliamentary Strengthening Program Addis Ababa, May 19-23, 2003.

¹⁰ Macartan, Humphreys. (February 2003) "Economics and Violent Conflict", Harvard University.

¹¹ United Nations Development Programme. (2007) "*Armed Violence in African Pastoral Communities*". UN, New York.

¹² Amutabi, M N. (2010). "Land and Conflict in the Ilemi Triangle of East Africa". *Kenya Studies Review Volume 1 Number 2 December 2010*.

cross border ethnic groups have been raiding the county indiscriminately. The situation has been made more complicated and grave by the introduction of sophisticated weaponry originating from neighbouring states, through porous international borders¹³. In Turkana where the economy is principally dependent upon pastoralism, the state has limited presence for maintenance of basic levels of security¹⁴.

Border security relations remain major source of contestation with regard to Kenya-Somalia-South Sudan-Uganda and Ethiopia political, military, and diplomatic relations. Pockets of militias, extremists and criminal gangs have persistently carried out cross-border raids into contiguous territories and caused cruel destruction of border village communities and pillaged resources. In case in mind is the prolonged al-Shabaab terrorist threat on Kenya. Its cumulative socio-economic devastation and strain imposed on Kenya provoked the later to invoke Article 51 of the UN Charter on “self defence” and made incursions into Somalia in October 2011¹⁵.

Numerous reports in the media show that Turkana has been affected by cross-border aggression perpetrated by state actors either directly or through proxies and by non-state actors comprising of militias, bandits and raiders. Incidents of destruction of property and massacre of the Turkana by militiamen from Ethiopia, Sudan and Uganda during cattle rustling have raised serious questions about the level of security in the region. But

¹³ *ibid*

¹⁴ Mkutu, K. (2003). “Pastoral Conflict and Small Arms: The Kenya-Uganda Border Region”. Saferworld.

¹⁵ The *Standard News paper*, Friday, 23 Septembers, 2011, Nairobi.

whenever cross border conflicts have occurred, the state has used multidisciplinary interventionist response strategy mostly heavy-handed coercive disarmament operations¹⁶.

All states have a fundamental objective of obtaining and enjoying maximum national security so as to satisfy their interests as they safeguard their sovereignty. This is enshrined in the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia on which the United Nations (UN) Charter of 26 June 1945 is founded¹⁷. The existence of the states obligates them to provide adequate security to their citizens in accordance with the “social contract” between the individual and the government. Accordingly, the state’s obligation is to maintain public order, defend citizens’ lives and their property from predators, enforce agreements and provide economic opportunity. Article 238 of the Kenyan constitution recognizes citizens as being central to state security since they are the first object of securitization¹⁸.

1.2 Statement of the Research Problem

Several studies have been done concerning the insecurity brought about by cross-border conflict in Turkana. Most of these studies concentrate on small arms found in the county, because of its close proximity to most unstable and violent countries in Africa: Somalia, South Sudan, Ethiopia and Uganda. Mohamud Adan and Isabella Masinde have in their study focused on the internally displaced victims of the ongoing conflict in Turkana. Stephen K. Muntet focuses on cattle rustling as a major contributor to violence witnessed in Turkana and the solutions to that Conflict. To pastoralist “A Cow is Life”.

¹⁶ Mkutu, K. (2003). “Pastoral Conflict and Small Arms: The Kenya-Uganda Border Region”. Saferworld.

¹⁷ United Nations. (2000). *Basic Facts about the United Nations*. UN, New York.

¹⁸ Katumanaga, M. (2011). “Morphing Mirror Images of Military Culture and the Emerging Nation State Insecurity”. (Unpublished discussion paper). Nairobi.

In spite of a number of response strategies, little appears to have been achieved in alleviating the problem of cross border aggression. Failure to properly address the impact of the conflict on socio-economic security may reverse the little gains in the County in addition to being a threat to national economic security, sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Arising from the foregoing, a number of fundamental questions emerge which constitute the main focus of the study: What is the nature and extent of the conflict? What is the impact of the conflict on economic security of the County? What is the impact of response on economic security? It would be difficult to address state security concerns without addressing the impact of cross border conflict on economic security in Turkana. It is against this background that this study seeks to provide important insight into the effects of cross border conflict on the community's economic security.

1.3 Objectives of the Study

The main objective of the study was to analyze the effects of cross-border aggression on socio-economic security of pastoralists living along Kenya Uganda border with reference to Turkana County. To achieve this, the following specific objectives guided the study:

- i. To examine the nature and extent of cross border aggression in Turkana County.
- ii. To determine the effect of cross border aggression on socio-economic security of households in Turkana County.
- iii. To evaluate the effectiveness of state response strategies to cross-border aggression on the socio-economic security of households in Turkana County.

1.4 Hypotheses of the Study

- i. The extent of the cross border aggression in Turkana County is majorly caused by poverty in the region.
- ii. Cross border conflict have adverse effect on the socio-economic security of households in Turkana County.
- iii. The response strategies have had little effect on combating cross-border ethnic conflict in Turkana County.

1.5 Significance of the Study

There are various explanations for frequent reports of acts of cross border aggression in Turkana emanating from Toposa, Merille (Dassenach), Dodoth, Nyangtom and Karamojong armed groups. Despite many studies on the area, there is remarkably little empirical evidence on the impact of cross border violent conflict on socio-economic security in Turkana. Much less is available on the conceptualization, measurement and analysis of the possible link between cross border conflict and economic security in Turkana. There is therefore desire for increased research in linkages between violent conflict and economic insecurity.

This study adopts a micro-level analysis of the relationship between cross border conflict and household economic security in Turkana. The study is influenced by the fact that, most studies on this subject have focused on macro-level, cross-sectional violent conflicts¹⁹. Further, most existing research on the economic motivations of violent conflict is, however, based on intra state conflict and its level of analysis is at national-level, which

¹⁹ Brown, 2001; Collier and Hoeffler, 2001; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Luckham, 2003; Luckham, 2004; Singer and Small, 1994.

assumes the course of armed conflict to be determined by the preferences and behaviour of elites. This approach offers limited application to the conflict of external aggression nature, and the analysis of the economic behaviour of households in conflict communities.

Additionally in academia sphere, the study will seek to demonstrate that relationship between household's (individuals) economic security and conflict provide valuable though overlooked micro foundations to debates on the causes and frequency of cross border conflict. Therefore, the findings of this study are likely to add to the existing literature on the interrelationships between conflict and economic security and also counter response strategies. Furthermore, the methodology used in the study and the results will deepen understanding of various aspects under investigation on external aggression.

All forms of cross border conflict and the subsequent responses shape the economic behaviour of households in ways that will have significant implications for policies, especially those that are aimed at the prevention of new conflicts and the resolution of ongoing ones. For that matter, and with regard to policy, it is hoped the study will have direct and indirect implications in determining which intervention strategies are best to enhance security and those that threaten security. The findings and recommendations would help policy makers and stakeholders in security sector. Academic and scholars will also benefit from the study.

1.6 Scope and Limitations of the Study

The study collected data among traders, household heads and public administrators. The study focused on the nature and extent of cross border conflict, the impact of aggression on economic security of households in the County, and the effects of state

response strategies on the economic security of the County. The study targeted the borderline divisions of Loima (at border of Kenya and Uganda)

The main limitations envisaged in conducting the study include the following. The first being general insecurity in the target divisions which may hinder proper data collection. Secondly, poor infrastructure, nomadic lifestyle, the sparse population and rugged terrain may militate against easy accessibility to the target respondents. Lastly is the limitation of the language. The instrument for data collection, the questionnaires, is in English, but considering most of the targeted respondents are illiterate. These limitations will be addressed or mitigated by use of research assistant. The research assistant will aid in administering and translating research contents to the respondents. In addition, the researcher will create a favorable rapport with respondents to ease any tension that might arise during data collection.

1.7. Literature Review

This section reviewed literature on the nature of cross border conflict in Turkana County, the impact of the conflict on households' economic security.

1.7.1. Nature of Cross Border Conflict in Turkana

Reports of skirmishes and clashes in Turkana especially in areas along international borders abound. According to Liotta²⁰, conflicts occur among tribes as well as with those across the border in neighbouring countries. The main cause of external aggression in Turkana region has been compounded by the proliferation of Small and Light Weapons

²⁰ Liotta, P. H. (March 2005). "Through the Looking Glass: Creeping Vulnerabilities and the Reordering of Security". *Security Dialogue* vol. 36, no. 1.

(SLWs) and events in neighbouring states and porous international borders. Inter-tribal clashes in the area have frequently erupted between the Turkana (Kenya) and the Toposa (Sudan), Turkana and Merille (Ethiopia) and between Turkana and Karamojong (Uganda). The consequences of the conflicts range from grave fatalities, displacement of families, and severe depletion of livestock to heightened human insecurity²¹. According to McEvoy and Ryan, a total of 164,457 people were displaced by conflict in northern Kenya²². This state of affairs has seriously undermined peace, safety, and economic security of the community.

Leff²³ study that analyzed the scale, consequences of, and responses to the many pastoral conflicts, has observed that, the border lands occupied by the Turkana connecting Kenya, Sudan, Ethiopia and Uganda experience harsh environmental conditions that favour pastoralist activity. The study further observes that with limited access to water and competing rights to land, porous borders, inter-tribal conflict arises when pastoralists from one tribe enter the territory of another.

A chronology of external attacks on Turkana reveals disturbing trend as highlighted below. On May 3 2011, the Rift Valley Provincial Commissioner Osman Warfa reported that the Merrille tribesmen from Ethiopia killed at least 42 people among them 37 Turkana villagers in Todonyang area, Daily Nation, (June 2011). The same reports were collaborated by OCHA. On 14 February 2010, two Kenyan soldiers were shot dead and six others injured in an attack along the Nadapal-Lokichogio border, New Sudan Vision,

²¹ Mkutu, K. (2003). "Pastoral Conflict and Small Arms: The Kenya-Uganda Border Region". Saferworld.

²² McEvoy C. and Ryan M (2008). Gauging Fear and Insecurity: Perspectives on Armed Violence in Eastern Equatoria and Turkana North. *Small Arms Survey Working Paper 14*. Geneva: *Small Arms Survey*.

²³ In a study entitled "Pastoralists at War: Violence and Security in the Kenya-Sudan-Uganda Border Region",

(Monday, 15 February 2010). There have been frequent cases of shootouts between Kenyan security forces and the Toposa militia opposed to the former's presence in the area, New Sudan Vision.

Violent confrontations involving the Toposa and Turkana have been reported in the last decade too. For instance, in May 2008, Taposa raiders crossed into the Lokichoggio Division, resulting in an estimated forty-three deaths, the majority being Taposa²⁴. In one such raid in October 1992, more than 200 Turkana were massacred when a Toposa raiding party attacked them in Narus in southern Sudan where they had migrated to escape a dry spell. A similar raid had occurred on the Kenyan side of the border in 1988 when a Toposa raiding party attacked Turkana villages at a watering point near Lokichoggio killing more than 190 people²⁵.

1.7.2. Impact of Cross Border Conflict on Economic Security in Turkana

The impact of cross border conflict on the economic security through trade and other related economic activities among communities that heavily depend on trade either for local barter exchange or exchange for profit cannot be underestimated. The Turkana have remained one of the most isolated ethnic groups in Kenya, and have engaged in small scale trade by mainly selling livestock to buy grains and household needs among themselves and between their neighbours²⁶. The economy is extremely limited and

²⁴ McEvoy Claire and Ryan Murray. (2008). Gauging Fear and Insecurity: Perspectives on Armed Violence in Eastern Equatoria and Turkana North. Small Arms Survey Working Paper 14. Geneva: Small Arms Survey.

²⁵ Zeleza, T. Paul. (2008). "The causes and Costs of War in Africa: From Liberations Struggles to 'War on Terror'" in Alfred Nhema & Paul Tiyambe Zeleza, *The Roots of African Conflicts: The Causes and Costs*. Ohio: Ohio University Press.

²⁶ Alessandro De Matteis. (2006). "Market Functioning in Turkana District, Kenya", OXFAM GB – Kenya Programme Report, May 2006.

predominantly based on trade, as is typical of pastoral societies. Trade is considered the backbone of food security and a major determinant of food supply and a mainstay of economic security of Turkana. Estimates put the ratio between traders and total population in Turkana as one trader more or less per every 100 people. Moreover, it is estimated that trade in the County is conducted by small traders (77%), medium traders (20%), large traders (3%); or retailers (97%) and wholesalers (3%)²⁷. Despite profitability of trade, the onset of conflict has had negative impact on the flow of trade and market integration between the County and her neighbours.

The empirical analyses of violent conflict point to low-per capita income as the most robust explanatory factor in determining the risk of violent internal conflict breaking out²⁸. Further, some studies have focused on the relationship between conflict and poverty. Poverty has continuously been cited as one of the principal factors responsible for conflict in many parts of Africa. Similarly, poverty and conflict have been on the rise particularly in Africa since 2000 UN Millennium Declaration. Studies indicate that poverty makes conflict more likely, and conflicts in turn worsen poverty. Macartan²⁹ notes that these relations are stronger for very poor communities than for well off communities and conflicts tend to last longer in poorer communities. Moreover, Draman³⁰ observes that some of the hot spots in Africa reveal that there is a very high correlation between poverty and conflict. Similarly, some analysts view participants in many of Africa's violent

²⁷ *ibid*

²⁸ Collier and Hoeffler. (2010). cited in Draman, Rasheed "Democratizing Security for a Safer World: What Role for Parliamentarians?" Discussion Paper for Africa-Canada Parliamentary Policy Dialogue, *Parliament Buildings, Ottawa, September 23-26, 2003*

²⁹ Macartan, Humphreys. (February 2003) "Economics and Violent Conflict", Harvard University.

³⁰ Draman, R. (2003). "Poverty and Conflict in Africa: Explaining a Complex Relationship". Paper prepared for Experts Group Meeting on Africa-Canada Parliamentary Strengthening Program Addis Ababa, May 19-23, 2003.

conflicts as being motivated by poor economic conditions under which they live. However, there are those who dismiss the link between poverty and conflict, and argue that poverty may lead to conflict when other factors prevail. Among the economic studies and explanations which link conflicts to poverty include Dramer³¹, have questioned the explanation linking conflict to poverty, especially those that conduct empirical measurement of poverty using the income inequality index of Gini coefficient.

There are several ways conflict may affect economic security of a community. According to Kalyvas³², violent conflicts affect the economic status of individuals and households through the intensity and type of violence they set in motion, and the impact of such violence on economic security of units is either direct or indirect. Direct effects include changes in household composition due to killings, injuries and changes in the household economic status due to the destruction of assets and livelihood activities and effects caused by forced displacement. Indirect effects take place at the community level and include changes in households' access to and relationship with local markets, business, and employment.

Cross border conflict causes death to many local people, in addition to causing extensive injuries, disability and psychological damage. During violent conflicts, assets such as houses, land, labour, property, utensils, and livestock get lost or destroyed through heavy fighting and looting. Ibanez and Moya³³ have noted that these effects are made worse by the large population displacements that accompany most violent conflicts. Turkana

³¹ ibid

³² Kalyvas, S. (2004), "The Urban Bias in Research on Civil Wars", *Security Studies* 13(3): 131.

³³ Ibanez, A M & Moya A, (2006). 'The Impact of Intra-State Conflict on Economic Welfare and Consumption Smoothing: Empirical Evidence for the Displaced Population in Colombia', Households in Conflict Network, Working Paper 23 (<http://www.hicn.org/papers/wp23.pdf>)

County has the highest number of displaced persons most of the displaced were from Kakuma and Lokichogio divisions. Kondylis³⁴ and Steele³⁵ showed that displaced populations often struggle to find work, are less likely to work in the post-conflict period, exhibit lower productivity levels, and also the same displaced people may be pushed in criminal or illegal forms of activity with adverse economic outcomes³⁶.

These direct effects of violence will result for many household in considerable reductions in total income and consumption due to the loss of livelihoods and decreases in productivity and human capital when key household workers die or are incapacitated. Surviving members may forgo other economic activities to care for injured and disabled household members.

With regard to conflict and trade, the study³⁷ notes that, for a long time the classical liberals have provided competing arguments on the relationship between trade and conflict. Yet the relationship between trade and conflict remains mired in a host of conflicting logics and empirical results. Liberals have always argued that interdependence reduces conflict because conflict discourages commerce. The use of force reduces the gains from trade and imperils the flow of information necessary for the development of mutual understanding³⁸. According to Liberal like Paul Krugman, trade improves quality of life and reduces the likelihood of conflict. Economic interdependence promotes peace because conflict is

³⁴ Kondylis, Florence. (2007). 'Agricultural Outputs and Conflict Displacement: Evidence from a Policy Intervention in Rwanda', Households in Conflict Network, Working Paper 28 (<http://www.hicn.org/papers/wp28.pdf>)

³⁵ Steele, Abbey. (2007). 'Massive Civilian Displacement in Civil War: Assessing Variation in Households in Conflict Network'. Working Paper 29 (<http://www.hicn.org/papers/wp29.pdf>)

³⁶ *ibid*

³⁷ *ibid*

³⁸ Stein, A. Arthur. (2001). "*Trade and Conflict: Uncertainty, Strategic Signaling, and Interstate Disputes*"

inconsistent with mutually beneficial economic ties³⁹. Omar *et al*⁴⁰ have noted that an interstate dispute reduces bilateral trade, but trade does not reduce the risk of a dispute. According to Stein⁴¹, a core contradiction of trade is that it generates conflict even as it is intended to facilitate conflict avoidance. Trade reduces both the occurrence of political crises and the need for militarized actions once they arise⁴².

The impact of conflict on trade (markets and exchange business in general) has the consequence of affecting the incomes of the business community through changes in the market price of goods sold and purchased by the household. Costs of transacting business are likely to rise as a result of insecurity. Savings and hence potential investment are bound to suffer and will have negative consequences for productive decisions. During armed conflict markets and businesses may fail to operate resulting in significant reductions in household utility and welfare. Watson and van Binsbergen⁴³ have singled out insecurity as being a major impediment to both livestock production and marketing particularly in the northeast of the Turkana, where cross-border raids are a frequent occurrence. According to the study, insecurity depresses livestock prices as traders have to factor in possible losses from theft, and makes moving cash risky. Furthermore, the lack of cash diminishes chances of access to credit with the consequence of limiting livestock marketing which further weakens the capital base as well as diminishing the pastoralists' bargaining power. In a

³⁹ Polachek, S & Xiang J., (2008). "How Opportunity Costs Decrease the Probability of War in an Incomplete Information Game". Unpublished.

⁴⁰ Omar, M. *et al.* (2004). "Trade Still Follows the Flag: The Primacy of Politics in a Simultaneous Model of Interdependence and Armed Conflict". *Journal of Politics* 66(4):1155–1179.

⁴¹ Stein, A. Arthur. (2001). "*Trade and Conflict: Uncertainty, Strategic Signaling, and Interstate Disputes*"

⁴² *ibid*

⁴³ Watson, D.J. and Van, Binsbergen. J. (2008). "Livelihood Diversification opportunities for Pastoralists in Turkana Kenya". ILRI Research Report (5). Nairobi, Kenya.


related study but different focus, Graham Carrington⁴⁴ has analyzed the effects of cross-border conflict on trade between Sudan and Uganda and its implications for peace building, whose results show that organized and formal interstate trade helps to promote peace and reduce conflict among communities.

1.8. Conceptual Framework

Arising from the literature and field pilot study, a conceptual model has been synthesized for the proposed research as illustrated in Figure 1.1. The study conceptualizes that low national incomes and natural resources are almost always associated with the occurrence and duration of conflicts. In the framework, we conceptualise that conflict impacts on household economic security through a range of direct and indirect effects. Direct effects of conflict on the household may involve its breakdown through killings, injuries and physical and mental disability. Other direct effects are through loss and/or destruction of assets and population displacement. Indirect effects of the conflict include disruption of proper functioning of local markets or businesses (trade), employment market and social networks. During and in the aftermath of the conflict, the households are left with limited resources for socio-economic survival and advancement. The direct and indirect effects of violent conflicts may be made more or less serious through response strategies that may directly and indirectly influence changes in socio-economic development in the affected area. These effects and relationship are depicted in Figure 1.1.

⁴⁴ *ibid*

Figure 1: Conceptual Framework



Source: own data

The study identified the following as specific ways through which conflict can affect social-economic security of households. First, violent conflict may hinder previously well off individuals from prospering by increasing dependence ratio. Second, the conflict may lead to breakdown networks for example through displacement from areas of economic and productive activities. Third way is when conflict and counter conflict strategies disrupt trade and business resulting in dysfunctional markets making accessibility to tradable items and food difficult, thereby accentuating household socio-economic insecurity and poverty.

The fourth way is when conflict creates opportunities for some people in the community accumulate fortunes.

1.9. Research Methodology

This section provides an overview of the research methodology to be adopted by the study. It highlights on research design, sample size, sampling methodology, variables, instrumentation, and procedures for data collection, data analysis and interpretation.

1.9.1 Research Design

The study used descriptive research design. The descriptive approach provided insight into the research problem by describing the variables of interest, and also examining associative relationships, while the causal design provided information on potential cause-and-effect relationships of the problem⁴⁵. In addition the study employed the qualitative approach as it mostly focuses on respondents' perceptions of life and life related issues. This approach gave more room for interpretation and understanding as opposed to other techniques. Conversely, Strass and Corbin⁴⁶ have shown that those who use qualitative research obtain satisfactory results and appropriate answers to the central research questions being investigated. The design has been chosen because of its usefulness in obtaining an overall picture of a situation at a particular time.

⁴⁵ Kumar, Ranjit. (2011). *Research Methodology: A Step by step guide for beginners* (3rd edition). New Delhi: SAGE

⁴⁶ Strass, A. L. & Corbin, J. (1990). *Basics of qualitative research: Grounded theory procedures and techniques*. Sage Publications, Newbury Park, CA.

1.9.2 Target Population

Study population as the bigger group or residents of a community about whom the study is concerned while sample is a subgroup of the population which is the focus of the enquiry and is elected carefully to represent the study population⁴⁷. The target population was residents of Loima location/ward in Turkana County living along Kenya-Uganda border. According to the Kenya Population and Housing Census Basic Report of 31st August 2010, there were 19,848 people distributed among 2550 households within Loima Ward as shown in Table 1.1

Table 1.1: Target Population

Gender	Population	Percent
Male	8,535	43%
Female	11,313	57%
Totals	19,848	100%

Source: Kenya Population and Housing Census Basic Report (2010)

1.9.3 Sample Size and Sampling Procedure

Researchers conservatively set the smallest legitimate sample size at 100 units; however Guthrie notes that a sample of 30 will usually give results similar to a normal distribution, although such would be good for small studies; and for larger projects, the sample ranges between 30 and 400 for populations ranging from 30 to one million⁴⁸. In the contrary, if research is mainly of qualitative nature, whose main focus is to describe a

⁴⁷ Kumar, Ranjit. (2011). *Research Methodology: A Step by step guide for beginners* (3rd edition). New Delhi: SAGE

⁴⁸ Guthrie, Gerard. (2010). *Basic Research Methods: An Entry to Social Science Research*. SAGE Publications. New Delhi.

situation, issue or phenomenon, the question of size of the sample is less important according to Kumar⁴⁹. The study sample size will be worked out using Slovin's sample size formula. Slovin's sample size formula is ideal used when the target population is finite⁵⁰, like in the case of study. The sample is worked out as follows:

$$n = \frac{N}{1 + N(e)^2}$$

Where: n = the sample size

N = the population size

e = the error tolerant allowed by researcher.

From the target population of 19,848 and a sampling error of 0.1, the worked sample size is 100 respondents. The study will apply simple random sampling method to select respondents to be issued with questionnaire.

1.9.4 Data Collection Tools and Methods

The methods for data collection for the study were both qualitative in nature and will mainly use primary data sources. The instruments that the researcher intends to use in the study for primary data collection is structured questionnaires. According to Rasmussen *et al.* the primary data collection tools are useful for getting in-depth understanding of the issues under investigation rather than measuring those issues⁵¹. Primary data collection will

⁴⁹ Kumar, Ranjit. (2011). *Research Methodology: A Step by step guide for beginners* (3rd edition). New Delhi: SAGE

⁵⁰ According to Orotho & Kombo (2002)

⁵¹ Rasmussen, Erik S., *et al.* (2006). *Essentials of Social Research Methodology*. Odense University Press of Southern Denmark.

be done by the researcher with assistance of field assistants who also double up as interpreters where necessary, and drawn from the sample divisions.

1.9.5 Data Analysis

Collected data was analyzed using descriptive statistics in order to determine frequencies and percentages with the aid of Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) version 23. These frequencies and percentages are presented in tables and graphically.

1.10 Chapter Outline

The study consisted of five chapters. Chapter one gives an overview of the study and it provides foundation of the project. It gives the objectives of the study, the methodology and the study hypotheses. It also provides the literature review and research methodology. Chapter two provided a historical and more descriptive overview of the causes of cross-border ethnic conflict in Kenya. Chapter three examined effects of strategies adopted to curb cross-border ethnic conflict. Chapter four discussed social-economic security challenges arising from ethnic conflict and finally chapter five will give the summary, key findings and recommendations and suggestions for further research.

CHAPTER TWO

AN OVERVIEW OF CROSS BORDER CONFLICTS AND THEIR DRIVERS

2.1 Introduction

This section undertakes a more detailed literature review on the nature of cross border conflict in Turkana County, the impact of the conflict on households' economic security.

2.2 The Nature of Cross Border Conflict in East Africa

Reports of skirmishes and clashes in Turkana especially in areas along international borders abound. According to Liotta⁵², conflicts occur among tribes as well as with those across the border in neighbouring countries. The main cause of external aggression in Turkana region has been compounded by the proliferation of Small and Light Weapons (SLWs) and events in neighbouring states and porous international borders. Inter-tribal clashes in the area have frequently erupted between the Turkana (Kenya) and the Toposa (Sudan), Turkana and Merille (Ethiopia) and between Turkana and Karamojong (Uganda). The consequences of the conflicts range from grave fatalities, displacement of families, and severe depletion of livestock to heightened human insecurity⁵³. According to McEvoy and Ryan, a total of 164,457 people were displaced by conflict in northern Kenya⁵⁴. This state of affairs has seriously undermined peace, safety, and economic security of the community.

⁵² Liotta, P. H. (March 2005). "Through the Looking Glass: Creeping Vulnerabilities and the Reordering of Security". *Security Dialogue* vol. 36, no. 1.

⁵³ Mkutu, K. (2003). "Pastoral Conflict and Small Arms: The Kenya-Uganda Border Region". Saferworld.

⁵⁴ McEvoy C. and Ryan M (2008). Gauging Fear and Insecurity: Perspectives on Armed Violence in Eastern Equatoria and Turkana North. *Small Arms Survey Working Paper 14. Geneva: Small Arms Survey.*

Leff⁵⁵ study that analyzed the scale, consequences of, and responses to the many pastoral conflicts, has observed that, the border lands occupied by the Turkana connecting Kenya, Sudan, Ethiopia and Uganda experience harsh environmental conditions that favour pastoralist activity. The study further observes that with limited access to water and competing rights to land, porous borders, inter-tribal conflict arises when pastoralists from one tribe enter the territory of another.

A chronology of external attacks on Turkana reveals disturbing trend as highlighted below. On May 3 2011, the Rift Valley Provincial Commissioner Osman Warfa reported that the Merrille tribesmen from Ethiopia killed at least 42 people among them 37 Turkana villagers in Todonyang area, Daily Nation, (June 2011). The same reports were collaborated by OCHA. On 14 February 2010, two Kenyan soldiers were shot dead and six others injured in an attack along the Nadapal-Lokichogio border, New Sudan Vision, (Monday, 15 February 2010). There have been frequent cases of shootouts between Kenyan security forces and the Toposa militia opposed to the former's presence in the area, New Sudan Vision.

Violent confrontations involving the Toposa and Turkana have been reported in the last decade too. For instance, in May 2008, Taposa raiders crossed into the Lokichoggio Division, resulting in an estimated forty-three deaths, the majority being Taposa⁵⁶. In one such raid in October 1992, more than 200 Turkana were massacred when a Toposa raiding party attacked them in Narus in southern Sudan where they had migrated to escape a dry

⁵⁵ In a study entitled "Pastoralists at War: Violence and Security in the Kenya-Sudan-Uganda Border Region",

⁵⁶ McEvoy Claire and Ryan Murray. (2008). Gauging Fear and Insecurity: Perspectives on Armed Violence in Eastern Equatoria and Turkana North. Small Arms Survey Working Paper 14. Geneva: Small Arms Survey.

spell. A similar raid had occurred on the Kenyan side of the border in 1988 when a Toposa raiding party attacked Turkana villages at a watering point near Lokichogio killing more than 190 people⁵⁷.

2.3 Factors Contributing to Cross Border Conflicts

2.3.1 Colonial and Post-Colonial Policies

Cattle raiding among pastoralists is a phenomenon that stretches back centuries. Traditionally, cattle rustling, often involving some violence was redistributive and only involved the theft of cattle to replenish herds after death from drought or to pay out as bride price⁵⁸. When tribe members were killed, cattle were offered as compensation and the culprits were subjected to intense cleansing rituals. Prior to the system of hierarchical government, councils of elders, traditional courts, and peer groups were at the center of authority among tribes. As such, they governed raids to ensure that they did not spiral out of control, and when disputes arose, traditional mechanisms were employed to settle them⁵⁹. Typically, there was some loss of life from raiding, but on a much smaller scale.

Colonial rulers disrupted the pastoralist social order, replacing it with a system of provincial government appointees within newly established borders that limited the free movement of pastoralists. Traditionally, land belonging to families was passed down from one generation to the next, but alienation of pastoralists from their land, combined with

⁵⁷ Zeleza, T. Paul. (2008). "The causes and Costs of War in Africa: From Liberations Struggles to 'War on Terror'" in Alfred Nhema & Paul Tiyambe Zeleza, *The Roots of African Conflicts: The Causes and Costs*. Ohio: Ohio University Press.

⁵⁸ Mkutu, K., (2003), Pastoral Conflict and Small Arms: The KenyaUganda Border Region. Saferworld. <http://www.saferworld.org.uk/images/pubdocs/Pastoral%20conflict.pdf>.

⁵⁹ *ibid*

discriminatory land reforms eroded this custom⁶⁰. In addition, pastoral communities were isolated from other areas that enjoyed the benefits of colonial security and development⁶¹. The apparent crackdown on cattle raiding is emblematic of an overall attack on pastoralism itself, on the grounds that it was a primitive and thus inhumane way of life. The weakening of traditional governance has undermined pastoralists' authority and ability to settle disputes. Without adequate alternatives to replace traditional structures of governance and security, pastoralists operate in an anarchic environment⁶².

Today, with a colonial attitude that has persisted in the post-colonial era, the spread of land privatization, and government policies favoring sedentary groups and large scale agriculture over nomadic livelihoods, competition over grazing areas has grown increasingly fierce. Pastoralists are also heavily underrepresented in parliament and civil service posts⁶³. Furthermore, Duffield argues that neo-liberal policies that embrace a market economy polarize rich and poor, resulting in a new generation of youth that disregard the authority of elders by obtaining wealth through militia formation and banditry. Local business and political elites use cattle rustling as a means for commercial profit, capitalizing on the breakdown of traditional lines of authority.

⁶⁰ Kandagor, D., (2005), Rethinking Pastoralism and African Development: A Case Study of the Horn of Africa. [www. codesria.org/Links/conferences/general.../kandagor.pdf](http://www.codesria.org/Links/conferences/general.../kandagor.pdf)

⁶¹ Mburu, N., (1999), Contemporary Banditry in the Horn of Africa: Causes, History, and Political Implications. *Nordic Journal of African Studies* 8 (2): 89–107

⁶² Mkutu, K., (2003), Pastoral Conflict and Small Arms: The KenyaUganda Border Region. Saferworld. <http://www.saferworld.org.uk/images/pubdocs/Pastoral%20conflict.pdf>

⁶³ Duffield, M., (1997). Ethnic war and International Humanitarian Intervention: A Broad Perspective. In *Understanding and Managing Pastoral Conflict in Kenya: A Literature Review*, ed S. Kratli and J. Swift, 1997 University of Sussex, UK

2.3.2 Environmental Factors

Unfavorable climatic conditions play a critical role and often precipitate the need for pastoralists to migrate in search of pasturelands and water. During the dry season, sources of water become desiccated and lands turn arid. This forces young pastoralists to leave villages with their livestock in search of water and grazing lands. It is during these times that pastoralists engage in conflict over herding territory and replenishment of lost cattle. When conditions are made worse by extended periods of drought, conflicts become more intensified and frequent.

In the past few decades, drought-related emergencies have risen sharply. Oxfam⁶⁴, for instance, reports that from 1975 to 2006 the number of people affected by drought rose from 16,000 to an estimated three million. This calculation does not take into account that the population has also grown significantly, but not nearly as exponentially as those impacted by the recurrent droughts. The Turkana have been faced with a persistent drought problem since 1999. In some areas of Turkana District, 70 percent of people's livestock were lost. In financial terms, this is equivalent to losing 70 percent of one's savings. Not surprisingly, prolonged drought and the cattle deaths associated with it brought escalating levels of violence in the region. In the past, pastoralists had strategies for coping with the impacts of drought. However, more severe weather patterns terns resulting from climate change, coupled with colonial and post-colonial policies that constrain the movement of pastoralists, makes inter- and intra-tribal rivalries more commonplace.

⁶⁴ Oxfam. (2006). Delivering the Agenda: Addressing Chronic Under-development in Kenya's Arid Lands. Oxfam International Briefing Paper 88

2.3.3 Commercialization of Cattle Raiding

The emergence of local elites that aim to profit from cattle rustling is a fairly new phenomenon that has changed the scope of the conflict by creating economic incentives that did not previously exist. This has exacerbated the brutality associated with raiding and has created links between the illicit trades in stolen cattle and small arms. Mkutu writes that commercialization in cattle rustling is “leading to major changes in economic, social and political structures in the border area”. Local businessmen and even politicians reportedly fund raids in order to sell cattle on the black market to places as far away as South Africa and Saudi Arabia⁶⁵. Stolen cattle are also used to supply large towns, which have grown in population through rural-to-urban migration. Whereas small-scale raiding does not deplete entire stocks, commercialized raids with elaborate planning and logistical know-how can render entire communities destitute. Buchanan-Smith and Lind⁶⁶ suggest that there are typically five large raids in Southern Turkana in a given year. Large infrequent raids, coupled with repeated small-scale incidents create an environment of insecurity and financial hardship.

The commercialization of cattle raiding has had devastating effects on the pastoralist economy. Whereas cattle traditionally circulated within the pastoralist region, they are now being sold outside without any revenue to speak of. In many instances, warriors conducting large commercial raids outnumber security forces. There is also evidence that many local security providers are in collusion with the profiteers of raids⁶⁷.

⁶⁵ Mkutu, K., (2003), Pastoral Conflict and Small Arms: The KenyaUganda Border Region. Saferworld. <http://www.saferworld.org.uk/images/pubdocs/Pastoral%20conflict.pdf>

⁶⁶ Buchanan-Smith, Margie, and Jeremy Lind. 2005. Armed Violence and Poverty in Northern Kenya. Centre for International Cooperation and Security (CICS), University of Bradford, UK.

⁶⁷ Mkutu, K., (2003), Pastoral Conflict and Small Arms: The KenyaUganda Border Region. Saferworld. <http://www.saferworld.org.uk/images/pubdocs/Pastoral%20conflict.pdf>

The lack of state control in the pastoralist region has made way for, what Osamba calls “the emergence of cattle warlords with armed militia” (2000). Without proper security provision, a small number of entrepreneurs will continue to benefit at the expense of a great number of people.

2.3.4. Lack of State Security Provision

As part of a political campaign that favors sedentary communities over non-sedentary groups, governments have neglected to invest a great deal in infrastructure and public services in the pastoralist border areas, thus exacerbating the lack of state security in the region. Without sufficient roads, accessible lines of communication, and a large qualified security presence, pastoralists have had no choice but to take up arms in order to protect their families and livestock. Moreover, cross-border raiders are immune from prosecution, because governments lack the capacity or infrastructure required to prosecute those involved in acts taking place in other jurisdictions. The Small Arms Survey reports that nearly 60 percent of residents living along the Kenya-Sudan border are dissatisfied with security provisions in their communities⁶⁸.

In Kenya and Uganda, where the military’s role is restricted to responding to large-scale incidents and carrying out community disarmament programs, governments have armed local defense units to provide security at the local level. These comprise civilians who are given a registered firearm and ammunition without any training or remuneration. In Kenya, for instance, the Kenyan Police Reservists (KPR), armed with Kalashnikov-

⁶⁸ McEvoy, Claire, and Ryan Murray. 2008. Gauging Fear and Insecurity: Perspectives on Armed Violence in Eastern Equatoria and Turkana North. Small Arms Survey Working Paper 14. Geneva: Small Arms Survey.

pattern and G3 assault rifles, function as a community task force mandated to respond to local crime and disputes. While the KPR are sometimes effective in defending communities against cattle raids, they are known to lend out their weapons to warriors for raiding purposes, undermining the very security they are supposed to protect. Moreover, a 2008 ammunition study in Kenya found that the majority of illicit civilian-held ammunition was Kenyan-manufactured; revealing that it had either been stolen from weakly guarded stockpiles or sold by corrupt officials⁶⁹.

The Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) in Southern Sudan has also been accused of corruption and poor response to violent incidents. There is a growing police force in Southern Sudan, but it lacks training, is poorly funded, and due to insufficient transportation and communications, cannot respond in time to violent events. Between the border town of Nadapal (Sudan) and Lokichoggio (Kenya), a disputed 25-kilometer road connects the two countries. Without any security posts on the road, Turkana warriors from the hills are able to ambush the many cars that travel up and down this road daily. The SPLA Commander of Nadapal confirmed that banditry on the border road results in fatalities on a weekly basis. Deficits in the government security sector are compounded by the common practice of governments and security forces arming paramilitary groups for political advantage against opponents, notably in Uganda and Sudan. This, among other things, sustains the circulation and widespread availability of small arms.

⁶⁹ Bevan, James. 2008a. Blowback: Kenya's Illicit Ammunition Problem in Turkana North District. Occasional Paper 22. Geneva: Small Arms Survey.

2.3.5 Proliferation of Small Arms

Pastoralists living in the border region provide a large market for small arms. Traditionally, pastoralists practiced cattle rustling using bows and arrows. Today, with the availability of cheap and easy-to-use high-powered assault rifles, namely the AK-47, the conflict has taken on epidemic proportions with increased fatalities and indiscriminate killing during raids. A 2008 study in Karamoja, Uganda, found that 88 percent of respondents recalled a small arm being used in the last violent attack on their community⁷⁰. Likewise, the Small Arms Survey suggests that small arms are used in 96.9 per cent of cattle rustling events in the Kenya-Sudan border region⁷¹. While it is difficult to estimate the exact number of small arms in circulation in the region, experts estimate that it is well over 300,000⁷².

Pastoralist communities arm themselves for several reasons. First, they need to protect their family and livestock from warriors of other tribes and bandits. Second, guns are used to raid livestock from other communities. Lastly, guns are an investment that can be traded for livestock and other commercial goods. Small arms have been present throughout the region since the early twentieth century. However, past wars in Uganda, Sudan, and Ethiopia left a surplus of weapons in circulation. One event, in particular, that is often recalled is the 1979 raid on the Moroto arms depot in Uganda, following the collapse of the Idi Amin regime.

⁷⁰ Bevan, James. (2008). Blowback: Kenya's Illicit Ammunition Problem in Turkana North District. Occasional Paper 22. Geneva: Small Arms Survey.

⁷¹ McEvoy, Claire, and Ryan Murray. 2008. Gauging Fear and Insecurity: Perspectives on Armed Violence in Eastern Equatoria and Turkana North. Small Arms Survey Working Paper 14. Geneva: Small Arms Survey.

⁷² Regional Program of Action for Peace and Security (2006)

The Matheniko Karimojong sub-clan were successful in acquiring large quantities of weapons and ammunition during the raid⁷³. A similar event took place in Kapoeta, Southern Sudan, in 2002, during the North-South war. After the SPLA captured Kapoeta, which at the time was a military stronghold of the north, security at arms stores was lax or non-existent, and as a result, Taposa tribesmen (who live around Kapoeta) were able to seize thousands of weapons⁷⁴. Compounding the situation, the SPLA laid off several hundred troops after the war, offering them small arms as part of their retirement package. Not surprisingly, many of the officers sold them to gun markets in Sudan, Uganda, and Kenya⁷⁵. Furthermore, it is widely believed that the government of Sudan in Khartoum provides arms to pastoralist communities in the South in order to destabilize the government of Southern Sudan's power base, and to challenge the authority of the SPLA. These weapons inevitably leak out of communities into the greater arms trade routes of the region.

⁷³ Mkutu, K., (2003), Pastoral Conflict and Small Arms: The KenyaUganda Border Region. Saferworld. <http://www.saferworld.org.uk/images/pubdocs/Pastoral%20conflict.pdf>

⁷⁴ Bevan, James. 2008a. Blowback: Kenya's Illicit Ammunition Problem in Turkana North District. Occasional Paper 22. Geneva: Small Arms Survey.

⁷⁵ Mkutu, K., (2003), Pastoral Conflict and Small Arms: The KenyaUganda Border Region. Saferworld. <http://www.saferworld.org.uk/images/pubdocs/Pastoral%20conflict.pdf>

CHAPTER THREE
IMPACT OF CROSS BORDER CONFLICT ON SOCIAL-ECONOMIC
SECURITY IN TURKANA

3.1 Introduction

This section reviews literature on the impact of cross border conflict on social-economic security. It commences with a review of the concept of social-economic security, followed by impact of cross border conflict on social security and impact of cross-border conflict on economic security.

3.2 The impact of Cross Border Conflict on Social Economic

The main effects that cross border conflict has on the marginalized communities that live along the border on social and economic activities are immense. This section highlights on a few:

3.2.1 Access to Productive Assets

The access and use of an extensive area of land coupled with high levels of mobility are ‘the double imperative of cross border conflict’⁷⁶. Pastoralists need seasonally varied grazing lands and water sources for their different livestock species. Freedom of movement over large areas is a crucial element of the pastoralists’ resource management system in the dry lands⁷⁷. Land issues, including use, access and property rights are a well-known determinant of pastoralists’ vulnerability and in the literature they are widely discussed in

⁷⁶ Markakis J. Pastoralism on the Margin. 2004. Minority Rights Group International

⁷⁷ *ibid*

relation to their political marginalization⁷⁸. As discussed above, formal institutions have systematically failed to recognize pastoralists' rights to the land since the colonial era. For example in Kenya 'land tenure is based on English property law, which does not recognize the communal system as understood and practiced by pastoralists'⁷⁹. Similarly, customary tenure arrangements in Ethiopia have been increasingly 'subordinated to unitary national land legislation on the basis of issues relevant primarily to the arable agriculture in the highlands. The pastoral areas [are] either ignored or very superficially treated'.

The ongoing appropriation of land for commercial, tourist, environmental and conservation projects, in many cases without consultation or even communication to pastoralists living in the area, has deprived those groups from a key productive asset and has often rendered pastoralism unsustainable. Many pastoralist groups have been unable to defend their land rights and as a result many have dropped out of pastoralism or have been forced to migrate. The progressive loss of their productive assets is partly due to the fact that pastoralists are in many cases unaware of their rights, often unable to articulate their demands collectively, and ill-equipped to make their voices heard within formal institutions. In addition to the difficulties in accessing productive assets, access to markets a precondition for growth and efficiency of livestock production- is another challenge for pastoral communities in the HoA.

⁷⁸ Morton J. 2005. Legislators and Livestock: A comparative Analysis of Pastoralist Parliamentary Groups in Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda. Final Report for the NRI/PENHA Research Project on Pastoralist Parliamentary Groups

⁷⁹ Markakis J. Pastoralism on the Margin. 2004. Minority Rights Group International

3.2.2 Access to Basic Services

Pastoral including Turkana areas have long been neglected by central governments in the provision of basic services, such as health and education. In the East Africa education participation rates among pastoralists are lower than national averages⁸⁰. In Kenya, primary schooling enrolment in the Central province is up to 91.2%, while in the Northern Eastern province, where the majority of pastoralists' communities live, the enrolment is only 20.5%⁸¹. In Ethiopia, while the national average gross enrolment for the primary level is 64.4%, in the Afar and Somali pastoral regions the enrolment drops to 13.8% and 15.1% respectively⁸². A similar disparity can be observed also in relation to health statistics. Lack of education among pastoralists' communities is a key determinant of pastoralists' political marginalization as it significantly reduces their ability to engage in advocacy activities and 'to understand and speak out for their rights'⁸³.

3.2.3 Dependence on aid

There is a growing awareness that the resilience of marginalized communities has been progressively weakened and that pastoralists are increasingly unable to cope with environmental shocks. In the last few decades, droughts in the HoA have triggered widespread and severe livelihoods crisis and have plunged millions of pastoralists into humanitarian crisis. For example, the increased frequency and severity of droughts in Kenya is leaving pastoralists more and more exposed to shocks as the time needed to rebuild the herd (15-20 years) is longer than the intervals between the occurrences of

⁸⁰ Trench P, Rowley J, Diarra M, Sano F, Keita B. 2007. Beyond Any Drought. Root causes of chronic vulnerability in the Sahel. The Sahel Working Group

⁸¹ Markakis J. Pastoralism on the Margin. 2004. Minority Rights Group International

⁸² *ibid*

⁸³ Oxfam. 2008. Survival of the fittest. Pastoralism and climate change in East Africa. Oxfam Briefing Paper no. 116

drought⁸⁴. Unable to recover, pastoralists become trapped in a downward spiral of vulnerability and destitution and are increasingly dependent on international aid. Their dependency on relief assistance however can also be seen as related to ‘years of neglect and misunderstanding by central governments’⁸⁵.

Rather than addressing pastoralists’ vulnerabilities with social protection mechanisms, such as the provision of safety nets or any rapid responding mechanism with compensatory protection, all too often national governments can ‘get away with the neglect [of pastoralists areas] in the knowledge that the international community will step in as a guarantor of last resort of the lives of the very poorest’⁸⁶.

3.2.4 Food crisis

Food insecurity and high levels of malnutrition continue to plague pastoral areas in the East Africa. The seminal work of a number of scholars has pointed to the need of understanding food crises as long drawn out political processes^{87,88}. A focus on the process that leads to malnutrition and culminates in starvation is especially useful as it helps to focus the analysis on the reasons why those crises happen. There is plenty of evidence that food crises occur even in times of plenty and that people starve because they lack the political power to secure access over an adequate amount of food. Amartya Sen’s famously argued that ‘starvation is the characteristic of some people not having enough to eat. It is not the characteristic of there not being enough to eat’⁸⁹. The political, social and economic

⁸⁴ Longley K and Wekesa. 2008. M. An Analysis of Kenya’s Drought Response: Lessons from the 2005-06 drought response in pastoral areas (draft unpublished)

⁸⁵ Grahn R. 2008. The Paradox of Pastoral Vulnerability. Background Paper for the development of From Poverty to Power. How Active Citizens and Effective States Can Change the World. Oxfam GB

⁸⁶ *ibid*

⁸⁷ De Waal A. 1989. Famines that Kill: Darfur 1984-85. Clarendon Press, Oxford;

⁸⁸ Keen, D. 1994. The Benefits of Famine: A political economy of famine and relief in southwestern Sudan 1983 – 1989. Princeton University Press, Princeton

⁸⁹ Sen, A. 1981. Poverty and Famines: an essay on entitlement and deprivation, Oxford University Press, Oxford

marginalization of pastoralist groups is a primary cause of the food crises that recurrently engulf pastoral areas in the.

3.2.5 Conflict

Competition for scarce natural resource is widely understood to be a primary cause of conflict in the region and is in part related to the inability of pastoralists to assert their land rights. In addition to loss of grazing land to irrigation schemes, conservation projects, natural reserves and so on, trends in land use also indicate a shift towards converting rangelands to croplands. This even if the potential of the rangelands for sedentary agriculture under the low production system and the variability and unpredictability of rainfall is marginal⁹⁰. In some regions these trends are alarming. The land under crop production in the pastoral areas of Ethiopia amounts to an estimated total of 2,030,172 hectares: Loss of communal grazing land to increased farming activities or to environmental degradation has fuelled conflicts in a number pastoral area across the HoA⁹¹.

For example in the Awash Valley in Ethiopia, home of the Afar pastoralists for centuries, the irrigation potential of the Awash river has been attracting the attention of the Ethiopian state since the 1950s. The gradual appropriation of large areas along the river for cultivation purposes by the state has led to the progressive exclusion of Afar pastoralists from some of the most important resources of the Valley⁹². Having lost access to key livelihoods resources, the Afar started to utilize larger tracts of the open rangelands. The competition for scarce resources with the neighboring clan, the Somali Issa, has led to the

⁹⁰ Lautze, S., Aklilu, Y., Raven-Roberts, A., Young, H., Kebede, G. and Leaning, J. 2003. Risk and Vulnerability in Ethiopia: Learning from the Past. Report prepared for USAID

⁹¹ *ibid*

⁹² Hedlund K. 2007. Slow-onset disaster: drought and food and livelihoods insecurity. Learning from previous relief and recovery responses. ALNAP and Prevention Consortium

conflict between the two clans, with raids and counter-raids being a regular feature. Ultimately, ‘the lack of attention to the needs of pastoral producers has created a highly volatile security situation and a continued need for food security emergency interventions in the area’⁹³.

3.3 Disarmament Operation on Cross Border Conflict in East Africa

The internationally prescribed and favored course of action for governments in response to conflict of this nature has been civilian disarmament programs. In East Africa, and particularly Kenya, governments have implemented heavy-handed coercive disarmament programs. Such crackdown operations often intensify insecurity for disarmed groups, in some cases prompting raids from neighboring tribes who seek to take advantage of their neighbors’ temporary weakness.

3.3.1 Disarmament in the North Rift Region of Kenya

The government of Kenya also launched a series of military led disarmament programs in seven districts of the North Rift region in mid-2006. The process proceeded in three phases: (1) Operation Dumisha Amani (maintain peace), a voluntary weapons collection that promised increased security and amnesty from prosecution, where no force was used; (2) Operation Okota I (collect 1), a forceful disarmament of communities that had not cooperated with phase one of the program; and (3) Okota II (collect 2), a development component designed to improve economic conditions in previously armed areas so as to reduce incentives for arms possession⁹⁴. The disarmament campaign returned

⁹³ *ibid*

⁹⁴ Riam Riam. 2007. *Disarming the Turkana: The Riam Riam Experience*. Presented at the IGAD Regional Workshop on the Disarmament of Pastoralist Communities, May 28–30, 2007.

approximately 1,710 firearms and 5,700 rounds of ammunition from Turkana District⁹⁵. Disarmament, however, came at a price, especially for those in Turkana South, where neighboring tribes repeatedly attacked disarmed communities⁹⁶. During the exercise, the Pokot of Turkana South were able to flee into Uganda to avoid having their weapons confiscated. The Turkana, on the other hand, were unable to relocate, which left them exposed to returning Pokot warriors from Uganda. Allegations also surfaced that a number of Kenyan military personnel tortured and abused civilians when they refused to voluntarily surrender their weapons or divulge information concerning armed community members⁹⁷.

Although well intentioned, the program lacked clear objectives and genuine consent from community leaders and populations. The campaign was rushed and failed to sensitize participants. Furthermore, civilian populations rapidly lost confidence when they discovered that they were not going to be compensated for their surrendered weapons. Pastoral populations, long used to repressive interventions from the state, interpreted the disarmament process as yet another offensive intended to undermine their overall development and freedom of movement⁹⁸.

When the news from Turkana South reached Turkana North, chiefs and community leaders requested that the government conduct disarmament on a voluntary basis. As an alternative to giving up their arms, weapon holders were recruited as KPR, exchanging

⁹⁵ *ibid*

⁹⁶ *ibid*

⁹⁷ Riam Riam. 2007. Disarming the Turkana: The Riam Riam Experience. Presented at the IGAD Regional Workshop on the Disarmament of Pastoralist Communities, May 28–30, 2007.

⁹⁸ *ibid*

their weapons for registered government-issued ones⁹⁹. It is clear from these cases that disarmament schemes that ignore the root causes of demand for small arms, while simultaneously putting communities on the defensive without proper state-led security provision may result in an array of unintended consequences. A 2008 Small Arms Survey report from the Sudan-Kenya border region reports that more than 60 percent of respondents believe that civilian disarmament would decrease security in their villages¹⁰⁰. When locals were asked how disarmament in Jonglei and Turkana South affected the security of those areas, the majority of respondents claimed that it had decreased security. Not surprisingly, when asked how a potential disarmament program in the community would change the level of security, most said it would decrease security a lot. Whereas civilian disarmament has yielded mixed results, a number of local conflict resolution initiatives have brought some hope to the situation¹⁰¹.

3.3.2 Disarmament in Karamoja, Uganda

Uganda has long experimented with coercive disarmament of its pastoral populations, particularly in the Karamoja region. At least eight disarmament campaigns have been undertaken since 1945. More recent campaigns in 2001 and 2002 led to the recovery of at least 10,000 weapons, though many (8,000) were subsequently re-issued to warriors who were recruited into Local Defense Units and Anti-Stock-Theft coalitions¹⁰². By 2006, many of the latter were considered obsolete, with a great deal of their weapons

⁹⁹ *ibid*

¹⁰⁰ McEvoy, Claire, and Ryan Murray. 2008. Gauging Fear and Insecurity: Perspectives on Armed Violence in Eastern Equatoria and Turkana North. Small Arms Survey Working Paper 14. Geneva: Small Arms Survey

¹⁰¹ *ibid*

¹⁰² Uganda. 2005. Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and Development Programme: Creating the Conditions for Promoting Human Security and Development 2005–2008. Kampala: Office of the Prime Minister. June.

and ammunition in circulation. Beginning in April 2006, the Uganda People's Defense Force (UPDF) launched aggressive "cordon and search" disarmament interventions. Preliminary assessments suggest that these activities generated widespread distrust and fear among the local population and a concomitant increase in demand for weapons¹⁰³.

The UPDF adopted a heavy-handed approach to disarmament in 2006 and 2007. Forces used mounted machine guns, assault rifles, and grenades against civilians during offensives in the Karamoja region. The casualties included many (unarmed) women and children. Predictably, antigovernment/UPDF sentiments flared amongst the Karimojong, resulting in a number of reprisal attacks¹⁰⁴. For example, in mid-October 2006 during retaliation against cordon and search operations launched near Kotido town, Jie warriors shot dead 16 soldiers including the commanding officer of the UPDF 67th battalion¹⁰⁵. Moreover, UPDF initiated disarmament campaigns leave Karamoja communities vulnerable to raids from tribal groups in other areas of Uganda, Kenya and Sudan. Unable to defend themselves.

3.4 Impact of Cross Border Conflict on Social-Economic Security

The impact of cross border conflict on the economic security through trade and other related economic activities among communities that heavily depend on trade either for local barter exchange or exchange for profit cannot be underestimated. The Turkana have remained one of the most isolated ethnic groups in Kenya, and have engaged in small scale trade by mainly selling livestock to buy grains and household needs among

¹⁰³ Bevan, James. 2008. Crisis in Karamoja: Armed Violence and the Failure of Disarmament in Uganda's Most Deprived Region. Occasional Paper 21. Geneva: Small Arms Survey.

¹⁰⁴ *ibid*

¹⁰⁵ Bevan, James. 2008b. Crisis in Karamoja: Armed Violence and the Failure of Disarmament in Uganda's Most Deprived Region. Occasional Paper 21. Geneva: Small Arms Survey.

themselves and between their neighbours¹⁰⁶. The economy is extremely limited and predominantly based on trade, as is typical of pastoral societies. Trade is considered the backbone of food security and a major determinant of food supply and a mainstay of economic security of Turkana. Estimates put the ratio between traders and total population in Turkana as one trader more or less per every 100 people. Moreover, it is estimated that trade in the County is conducted by small traders (77%), medium traders (20%), large traders (3%); or retailers (97%) and wholesalers (3%)¹⁰⁷. Despite profitability of trade, the onset of conflict has had negative impact on the flow of trade and market integration between the County and her neighbours.

The empirical analyses of violent conflict point to low-per capita income as the most robust explanatory factor in determining the risk of violent internal conflict breaking out¹⁰⁸. Further, some studies have focused on the relationship between conflict and poverty. Poverty has continuously been cited as one of the principal factors responsible for conflict in many parts of Africa. Similarly, poverty and conflict have been on the rise particularly in Africa since 2000 UN Millennium Declaration. Studies indicate that poverty makes conflict more likely, and conflicts in turn worsen poverty. Macartan¹⁰⁹, notes that these relations are stronger for very poor communities than for well off communities and conflicts tend to last longer in poorer communities. Moreover, Draman¹¹⁰ observes that

¹⁰⁶ Alessandro De Matteis. (2006). "Market Functioning in Turkana District, Kenya", OXFAM GB – Kenya Programme Report, May 2006.

¹⁰⁷ *ibid*

¹⁰⁸ Collier and Hoeffler. (2010). cited in Draman, Rasheed "Democratizing Security for a Safer World: What Role for Parliamentarians?" Discussion Paper for Africa-Canada Parliamentary Policy Dialogue, *Parliament Buildings, Ottawa, September 23-26, 2003*

¹⁰⁹ Macartan, Humphreys. (February 2003) "Economics and Violent Conflict", Harvard University.

¹¹⁰ Draman, R. (2003). "Poverty and Conflict in Africa: Explaining a Complex Relationship". Paper prepared for Experts Group Meeting on Africa-Canada Parliamentary Strengthening Program Addis Ababa, May 19-23, 2003.

some of the hot spots in Africa reveal that there is a very high correlation between poverty and conflict. Similarly, some analysts view participants in many of Africa's violent conflicts as being motivated by poor economic conditions under which they live. However, there are those who dismiss the link between poverty and conflict, and argue that poverty may lead to conflict when other factors prevail. Among the economic studies and explanations which link conflicts to poverty include Dramer¹¹¹, have questioned the explanation linking conflict to poverty, especially those that conduct empirical measurement of poverty using the income inequality index of Gini coefficient.

There are several ways conflict may affect economic security of a community. According to Kalyvas¹¹², violent conflicts affect the economic status of individuals and households through the intensity and type of violence they set in motion, and the impact of such violence on economic security of units is either direct or indirect. Direct effects include changes in household composition due to killings, injuries and changes in the household economic status due to the destruction of assets and livelihood activities and effects caused by forced displacement. Indirect effects take place at the community level and include changes in households' access to and relationship with local markets, business, and employment.

Cross border conflict causes death to many local people, in addition to causing extensive injuries, disability and psychological damage. During violent conflicts, assets such as houses, land, labour, property, utensils, and livestock get lost or destroyed through

¹¹¹ *ibid*

¹¹² Kalyvas, S. (2004), "The Urban Bias in Research on Civil Wars", *Security Studies* 13(3): 131.

heavy fighting and looting. Ibanez and Moya¹¹³ have noted that these effects are made worse by the large population displacements that accompany most violent conflicts. Turkana County has the highest number of displaced persons most of the displaced were from Kakuma and Lokichogio divisions. Kondylis¹¹⁴ and Steele¹¹⁵ showed that displaced populations often struggle to find work, are less likely to work in the post-conflict period, exhibit lower productivity levels, and also the same displaced people may be pushed in criminal or illegal forms of activity with adverse economic outcomes¹¹⁶.

These direct effects of violence will result for many household in considerable reductions in total income and consumption due to the loss of livelihoods and decreases in productivity and human capital when key household workers die or are incapacitated. Surviving members may forgo other economic activities to care for injured and disabled household members. With regard to conflict and trade, the study¹¹⁷ notes that, for a long time the classical liberals have provided competing arguments on the relationship between trade and conflict. Yet the relationship between trade and conflict remains mired in a host of conflicting logics and empirical results. Liberals have always argued that interdependence reduces conflict because conflict discourages commerce. The use of force reduces the gains from trade and imperils the flow of information necessary for the

¹¹³ Ibanez, A M & Moya A, (2006). ‘The Impact of Intra-State Conflict on Economic Welfare and Consumption Smoothing: Empirical Evidence for the Displaced Population in Colombia’, Households in Conflict Network, Working Paper 23 (<http://www.hicn.org/papers/wp23.pdf>)

¹¹⁴ Kondylis, Florence. (2007). ‘Agricultural Outputs and Conflict Displacement: Evidence from a Policy Intervention in Rwanda’, Households in Conflict Network, Working Paper 28 (<http://www.hicn.org/papers/wp28.pdf>)

¹¹⁵ Steele, Abbey. (2007). ‘Massive Civilian Displacement in Civil War: Assessing Variation in Households in Conflict Network’. Working Paper 29 (<http://www.hicn.org/papers/wp29.pdf>)

¹¹⁶ *ibid*

¹¹⁷ *ibid*

development of mutual understanding¹¹⁸. According to Liberal like Paul Krugman, trade improves quality of life and reduces the likelihood of conflict. Economic interdependence promotes peace because conflict is inconsistent with mutually beneficial economic ties¹¹⁹. Omar *et al*¹²⁰ have noted that an interstate dispute reduces bilateral trade, but trade does not reduce the risk of a dispute. According to Stein¹²¹, a core contradiction of trade is that it generates conflict even as it is intended to facilitate conflict avoidance. Trade reduces both the occurrence of political crises and the need for militarized actions once they arise¹²².

The impact of conflict on trade (markets and exchange business in general) has the consequence of affecting the incomes of the business community through changes in the market price of goods sold and purchased by the household. Costs of transacting business are likely to rise as a result of insecurity. Savings and hence potential investment are bound to suffer and will have negative consequences for productive decisions. During armed conflict markets and businesses may fail to operate resulting in significant reductions in household utility and welfare. Watson and van Binsbergen¹²³ have singled out insecurity as being a major impediment to both livestock production and marketing particularly in the northeast of the Turkana, where cross-border raids are a frequent occurrence. According to the study, insecurity depresses livestock prices as traders have to factor in possible losses

¹¹⁸ Stein, A. Arthur. (2001). *Trade and Conflict: Uncertainty, Strategic Signaling, and Interstate Disputes*

¹¹⁹ Polachek, S & Xiang J., (2008). "How Opportunity Costs Decrease the Probability of War in an Incomplete Information Game". Unpublished.

¹²⁰ Omar, M. *et al*. (2004). "Trade Still Follows the Flag: The Primacy of Politics in a Simultaneous Model of Interdependence and Armed Conflict". *Journal of Politics* 66(4):1155–1179.

¹²¹ Stein, A. Arthur. (2001). *Trade and Conflict: Uncertainty, Strategic Signaling, and Interstate Disputes*

¹²² *ibid*

¹²³ Watson, D.J. and Van, Binsbergen. J. (2008). "Livelihood Diversification opportunities for Pastoralists in Turkana Kenya". ILRI Research Report (5). Nairobi, Kenya.

from theft, and makes moving cash risky. Furthermore, the lack of cash diminishes chances of access to credit with the consequence of limiting livestock marketing which further weakens the capital base as well as diminishing the pastoralists' bargaining power. In a related study but different focus, Graham Carrington¹²⁴ has analyzed the effects of cross-border conflict on trade between Sudan and Uganda and its implications for peace building, whose results show that organized and formal interstate trade helps to promote peace and reduce conflict among communities.

¹²⁴ *ibid*

CHAPTER FOUR

DATA ANALYSIS, PRESENTATION AND INTERPRETATION

4.1 Introduction

This chapter presents data analyses, interpretation and presentation of finding in line with the objectives of the study. The chapter is further sub divided into methodology, response rate, demographic results, and discussion of objective finding.

4.2 Methodology

The study used descriptive research design. The design provided insight into the research problem and examined the associative relationships and information on potential cause-and-effect relationships of the problem. The target population was drawn from residents of Loima location/ward in Turkana County along Kenya-Uganda border. A sample size of 100 respondents was selected from the target population of 19,848. The data collection exercise involved questionnaires and interviews with respondents. The questionnaire provided in depth understanding of the issues under. Primary data was collected by the researcher with assistance of field assistants who also doubled up as interpreters where necessary.

4.3 Response Rate

The study issued 100 questionnaires as per the sample size. Out of this, 75 questionnaires were return fully filled, 11 questionnaires partly filled and 14 not returned at all. This corresponds to 75% response rate for fully filled questionnaire, 11% partly filled and 14% non response rate as illustrated in Table 4.1. The study considered only fully filled questionnaires for analysis and this represents a 75% response rate, above the 70%

minimum response rate required for analysis according to Creswell (2009). In addition, Mugenda and Mugenda (2003) ascertains that a response rate of 50% is adequate for analysis and reporting, a rate of 60% is good and a response rate above 70% is excellent. Therefore, the study response rate of 75% was excellent to progress to analysis. The high response rate implies a higher degree of awareness of cross border conflict and its effects among respondents.

Table 4.2: Response Rate

Responses	Frequency	Percent
Returned Fully Filled	75	75
Returned Partly Filled	11	11
Not Returned	14	14
Total	100	100

Source: own surveyed data

4.4 Demographic Information

Respondent's background information finding is presented and discussed under this section. Demographic results discussed are age distribution, gender distribution, marital status, level of education, and engagement in economic activities.

4.4.1 Age of the Respondent

The determination of age distribution within the study respondents' was important characteristics in understanding their maturity and ability to provide reliable information based on experience. The result for respondent's age distribution is illustrated in Table 4.3.

Table 4.3: Respondents' age distribution

Age Bracket	Frequency	Percentage
18-25 yrs	8	10.67
26-35 yrs	10	13.33
36-45 yrs	9	12.00
46-55 yr	44	58.67
Above 55 yrs	4	5.33
Total	75	100.00

Source: own surveyed data

Results illustrated in Table 4.3 reveals that 10.67% of the respondents were in the age bracket 18-26 yrs, 13.33% in the age bracket of 26-35 yrs, 12.00% in the age bracket of 36-45 years 58.67% in the age bracket of 46-55 yrs and 5.33% aged above 55 years. This finding shows that the majority of the respondents were in the age bracket of 46-55 years implying respondents were mature adults who are well informed of cross border conflict and thus provided relevant and important information or data needed for study objectives. In addition, respondents within the age bracket of 18-35 years may not have been actively involved in cross border conflict; they were also able to provide their views on how conflict has impacted on them. Respondents in the age bracket of above 55 yrs

provided real and experienced view of the study theme as they have nearly experienced all conflicts since Kenya gained independence.

4.4.2 Gender

Gender is an important variable that affects respondents' views, opinion and response to social or economic phenomenon impact of cross border conflict is not an exception to it. Therefore, gender issue was important to explain whether gender plays influence in assessing impact of cross border conflict. The study findings for gender distribution are shown in table 4.3.

Table 4.4: Gender Participation

Gender Participation	Frequency	Percentage
Male	54	72
Female	21	28
Total	75	100

Source: own surveyed data

According to Table 4.4, the total number of male's respondents who participated in the study comprised 72% of total respondents while female comprised of 28% of the respondents. It can be concluded that the number of males was the dominant gender that responded to the study. This finding reveals a higher gender disparity in cross border conflict issues as in most cases women rarely participate in conflict issues. The high gender disparity may have been due to cultural practices among the study population community. According to Mutuku¹²⁵, women are less recognized to talk on behalf of the family and

¹²⁵ Mkutu, K. (2003). "Pastoral Conflict and Small Arms: The Kenya-Uganda Border Region". Saferworld.

thus participates less due to cultural inclination on gender roles. In African settings, there is the belief that some roles are purely a reserve for male counterpart, especially those roles viewed to be masculine in nature, security provision included. This may have greatly affected women engagement and participation in the study.

4.4.3 Highest level of Education

Just like gender, education is another most important characteristic that might affect the person's attitudes and the way of looking and understanding any particular social and economic phenomena. Therefore, the study sought to find out highest academic qualification of the respondent. The findings are illustrated in Table 4.4.

Table 4.5: Highest level of education

Level of Education	Frequency	Percentage
No education	24	32.00
'A' Level	21	28.00
'O' Level	16	21.33
Tertiary	8	10.67
Undergraduate	6	8.00
Total	75	100.00

Source: own surveyed data

Table 4.5 indicates that 32.00% of the respondents had no education at all, 28.00% were primary ('O' level) school graduates, 21.33% were secondary ('A' level) education graduates, 10.67% and 8% of respondent were tertiary level and undergraduate respectively. It can be concluded that the majority of the respondents had attained no

education followed by primary levels of education. The low level of education can be attributed to by the marginalization of the area and the constant conflict experienced in the area leading to low infrastructural development.

This finding are in agreement with Trench et al¹²⁶ who observed that pastoral including Turkana areas have long been neglected by central governments in the provision of basic services, such as health and education. In their finding that education participation rates among pastoralists are lower than national averages with primary schooling enrolment in the Central province is up to 91.2%, while in the Northern Eastern province, where the majority of pastoralists' communities live, the enrolment is only 20.5%¹²⁷. Similar situation also exist in Ethiopia, where the national average gross enrolment for the primary level is 64.4%, in the Afar and Somali pastoral regions the enrolment drops to 13.8% and 15.1% respectively¹²⁸.

4.3.4 Engagement in Business Activity

It was also prudent for the study to establish the nature of business activities that respondents engaged in. first respondents were asked whether they engage in business activities. Finding showed that majority (78.55%) engaged in economic activities. Further to that, responses regarding the nature or type of economic activity are illustrated in Table 4.5

¹²⁶ *ibid*

¹²⁷ Markakis J. Pastoralism on the Margin. 2004. Minority Rights Group International

¹²⁸ *ibid*

Table 4.6: Economic Activity

Economic Activity	Frequency	Percentage
Livestock trade	14	18.67
Fishing/fish trade	11	14.67
Tourism	8	10.67
Shop/grocery trade	13	17.33
Transportation	6	8.00
Mining	5	6.67
Handcraft/weaving	8	10.67
Hawking	10	13.32
Total	75	100.00

Source: own surveyed data

Table 4.6 reveals that 18.67% of respondents engaged in livestock trade, 14.67% engaged in fishing/fish trade business, 10.67% engaged in tourism 17.33% in shop/grocery trade, 8.00% in transportation, 6.67% in mining, 10.67% in handcraft and 13.32% in hawking. This finding confirmed that livestock trade, shop/grocery trade, fishing/fish trade and hawking are the main economic activities among the respondents. This finding corroborates with the finding of Oxfam¹²⁹ which reported that the main economic activity within pastoralist communities is live stock trading and handcraft/weaving. In addition, the finding illustrated that resident or respondents experience economic loss due to cross border conflicts.

¹²⁹ Oxfam. 2008. Survival of the fittest. Pastoralism and climate change in East Africa. Oxfam Briefing Paper no. 116


4.4 Objective Finding

The main objective of the study was to analyze the effects of cross-border aggression on socio-economic security in Kenya, with reference to Turkana County, Kenya-Uganda border. Thus, the study was guided by three objectives namely: to examine the nature and extent of cross border aggression in Turkana County; to determine the effect of cross border aggression on socio-economic security of households in Turkana County, and to evaluate the effectiveness of state response strategies to cross-border aggression on the socio-economic security of households in Turkana County. Finding for these objectives are discussed below.

4.4.1 The Nature and Extent of Cross Border Aggression in Turkana County

Study objective one was crafted to assess the nature and extent of cross border aggression in Turkana County. First, respondent were asked whether they have experienced or participated in cross border conflict. Finding as shown in figure 2 revealed that 68.98% have while 31.02% have not. This finding affirmed that cross border conflict is a common phenomenon among the pastoralist community living along the borders. Similarly, this finding is supported by Mutuku who attributed this phenomenon a large market for small arms due to the availability of cheap and easy-to-use high-powered assault rifles, namely the AK-47; the conflict has taken on epidemic proportions with increased fatalities and indiscriminate killing during raids.


Figure 2: Participation in Cross Border Conflict



Source: own surveyed data

Secondly, study sought to identify the common types and nature of cross border attack along Kenya Uganda border. Respondent were thus asked to specify how frequent they have experienced incidences relating to the provided attacks in the area. Finding is illustrated in Figure 2

Figure 3: Nature/Type of cross border attacks



Source: own surveyed data

Findings as illustrated in Figure 3 indicates that 60.00% of the respondents agree that cattle raid by non-Kenyan community is a very frequent form of cross border attack in Turkana along Kenya-Uganda border, 32.00% said frequent attack, and 8.00% said rare attack. For organized raids by foreigners, majority of respondents 45.33% said very frequent attack, 36.00% said frequent attack, 17.33% rare attack and 1.33% very rare attack. For abduction by foreigners form of cross border attack, 14.67% said is a very frequent attack, 21.33% said frequent attack, 48.00% aid rare attack, and 16.00% said very rare attack. In addition, for killing of locals by outsiders' incident, 38.67% of respondents said very frequent, 46.67% said frequent, 10.67% aid rare and 4.00% said very rare. For cross border robbery

by non-Kenyan, finding shows that 16.00% said very frequent attack, 24.00% said frequent attack, 49.33% said rare and 10.67% very rare. Finally for rape incident, 16.00% said very frequent incident, 17.33% said frequent, 67.33% said rare and 9.33% very rare.

This finding confirmed that cattle raid by non-Kenyan communities, organized raid by foreigners to repulse insurgents, killing of locals by outsiders, and cross border robbery by non-Kenyan are the frequent forms or types of cross border conflict in Turkana County along Kenya Uganda boarder. In addition, abduction by foreigners and rape are rare types of cross border incidents. High rate of cattle raid attack was due to the fact that cattle rearing and trading being is the backbone economic activity in the area. Since most of cattle raiders use firearms, this in turn flames killing of locals by foreigners (raiders) and cross border robbery. As argued by one respondent,

‘...rape incidents are rare because in most cases women do not actively participate in cross border attacks...’ (Respondent)

This finding corroborated with Liotta¹³⁰, who reported that conflicts occurring among tribes as well as with those across the border in neighboring countries are mainly cause of external aggression and compounded by the proliferation of Small and Light Weapons (SLWs) leading to organized raids, mass killing, and cross border robbery.


Study further sought to know whether cross border attacks are conducted in collaboration with locals. As argued by Liotta¹³¹, the Turkana and Pokot communities live both in Kenya and Uganda and thus in most case have dual citizens allowing them, in some

¹³⁰ Liotta, P. H. (March 2005). “Through the Looking Glass: Creeping Vulnerabilities and the Reordering of Security”. *Security Dialogue* vol. 36, no. 1.

¹³¹ *ibid.*

instances, to commit crime in Kenya and seek shelter in their Uganda counterpart. This implies that there could be a network of criminals coordinating crime or cross border crimes among respondent. In order to dig into the truth of this matter, respondents were asking how the attackers act. Finding is shown in figure 4.

Figure 4: How attack are conducted



Source: own surveyed data

Figure 4, shows that 28.67% of the respondents are of the view that foreigners conduct cross border attacks alone, 63.65% conduct cross border attack jointly with locals and 7.68% did not know how these attacks are done. This finding confirms that cross border attacks are usually done jointly with locals. This finding is supported by Riam Riam who observed that during the disarmament exercise, the local Pokot of Turkana South were able

to flee into Uganda to avoid having their weapons confiscated. This clearly indicates that the attackers have wide network stretching beyond the border and one of the mandates is to provide refuge to neighbor during disarmament operation. In addition, one respondent claimed

‘.....that during attack, they seek for reinforcement effort from warriors from Uganda. Similarly, they organize for attack jointly with the locals in Uganda who acts as their point or guide men.’

In addition, the study further sought to determine wither Kenyans also conduct cross border attacks in Uganda. In this regard, respondents were asked whether Kenyan also conduct attack across the border. Finding shows are shown in Table 4.6


Table 4.7: Kenya attacks across border

Category	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	34	45.33
No	21	28.00
I do not know	20	26.67
Total	75	100.00

Source: own surveyed data

Table 4.6 shows that 45.33% agrees that Kenyans do conduct cross border attack, 28.00% did not agree while 26.67% did not know. This finding clearly confirmed that Kenyan also conduct cross border attack, however the less than halve percent response shows that is not frequent. In connection to this question, respondents opinion were further sought to determine the drives or motives of cross border conflict in the area. Findings are illustrated in figure 5.

Figure 5: Motives/reasons for cross border conflict



Source: own surveyed data

Figure 5, shows that 20.00% said revenge or settlement of scores is the main motive for cross border conflict, 13.33 sad wealth accumulation, 34.67% said cultural practice, 8.00% said to earn a living and 24.00% said combination of several factors. This finding clearly affirms that cultural practices are the major drive for cross border conflict, followed by revenge motives to settle scores. In addition, wealth accumulation and to earn a living is rare motives for cross border attack or conflict.

4.4.2 Effect of Cross Border Aggression on Socio-Economic Security of Households in Turkana County

Study objective two was designed to assess the effect of cross border aggression on socio-economic security of households in Turkana County. In order to achieve this; the study first inquired whether respondents business or that of other traders has been affected by cross border aggression. The Finding reveals that 89.02% of respondent businesses have been affected while 10.08% have not. This finding affirms that cross border conflict affects all types of business in the areas. The low percentage of those who have not been affects are either those who begun their business recently. In relation to finding on business affected by cross border aggression, study further asked respondents with their business affected to specify the nature of effect based on the provided options. Findings are illustrated in Table 4.7.

Table 4.8: Nature of loss suffered by business as a result of cross border conflict

Category	Frequency	Percentage
Lost property to raiders/looters	35	46.67
No/reduced sales due to insecurity	12	16.00
Increased profits	5	6.67
Increased losses	13	17.33
Increased levies by security agent	10	13.33
Total	75	100.00

Source: own surveyed data


Finding for nature of damages suffered by business as a result of cross border conflict shows that 46.67% of damages are related to loss of property to looters, 16.00%

related to no or reduction in sales due to insecurity, 6.67% related to increased profit, 17.33% related to increased losses and 13.33% related to increased levies by the security agents. This confirms that the major effects of cross border conflict are loss of properties to raiders/looters, reduction in sales increased losses. However, as some businesses suffer negative effect, there is small margin (6.67%) that strives and reported increased profits. This finding corroborated by Alessandro De Matteis study that reported that Turkana have engaged in small scale trade by mainly selling livestock to buy grains and household needs among themselves and between their neighbours¹³². The economy is extremely limited and predominantly based on trade, as is typical of pastoral societies. Therefore during cross border conflict, the major activity that suffers is livestock trade, additionally, since trade is considered the backbone of food security and a major determinant of food supply and a mainstay of economic security of Turkana, cross border conflict caused estimates of over 65% loss in economic activities.

Additional analysis was conducted to determine whether respondents have been displaced from their homes or business by cross border conflict or activities by state agents during security operations. Finding revealed that 100% of respondents have been displaced and this affirms the greatest effect of cross border conflict as displacement of residents. Accordingly, Alessandro De Matteis also affirmed that Kenya has long history of displacement of population especially due to croo border aggression relate conflicts. Respondents were also asked how they safe they feel living in the area or carrying out their business. Response for this question is depicted in Figure 6.

¹³² Alessandro De Matteis. (2006). “Market Functioning in Turkana District, Kenya”, OXFAM GB – Kenya Programme Report, May 2006.

Figure 6: Safety levels



Source: own surveyed data


Figure 6, illustrates that only 16% of respondents felt very safe living in the area or doing their business activities, 40% of respondents feels safe and 44% of respondents feels not safe at all. This finding affirm that majority of respondents do not feel safe at all either living in the area of doing business in the area. This finding confirms that the area is quite unsafe due to cross border conflicts and other insecurity issues. Specifically Macartan¹³³ affirmed that after disarmament of the local karamajo pastoralist in Uganda, when locals were asked how disarmament in Jonglei and Turkana South affected the security of those areas, the majority of respondents claimed that it had decreased security. Not surprisingly, when asked how a potential disarmament program in the community would change the level of security, most said it would decrease security a lot. Thus he concludes that whereas civilian disarmament has yielded mixed results, a number of local conflicts resolution

¹³³ Macartan, Humphreys. (February 2003) "Economics and Violent Conflict", Harvard University.

initiatives have brought some hope to the situation. Similarly, Draman¹³⁴ also reported that disarmament program in the community would change the level of security, in most cases; it would decrease security a lot.

Lastly, objective three attempts to evaluate the effectiveness of state response strategies to cross-border aggression on the socio-economic security of households in Turkana County. The analysis of this objective was also done on stages and stage one sought to establish whether security agencies have been responsive to cross border attacks in the region. In his regard, respondent were asked whether there has been state response after aggression. Finding is shown in figure 7.

Figure 7: State Response after aggression



Source: own surveyed data

¹³⁴ Draman, R. (2003). "Poverty and Conflict in Africa: Explaining a Complex Relationship". Paper prepared for Experts Group Meeting on Africa-Canada Parliamentary Strengthening Program Addis Ababa, May 19-23, 2003.

Figure 7 reveals that respondents agreed that 28.88% of cross border aggression are responded to by state operators while 71.22% of these aggressions are never responded to. This finding affirms that there is low response rate to cross border aggressions by the state security agencies. The low response rate could be attributed to the inaccessibility of the region due to poor infrastructural development especially bad roads condition and network. According to Trench et al¹³⁵, majority of pastoralist regions in Kenya, Turkana County included has poor road network and this has been the major hindrance to state response to aggression operation.

Further analysis was conducted to establish the security agency that commonly responds to cross border aggression. Finding for this analysis are represented in Table 4.8 and revealed that 16.00% of respondents said that government agents commonly respond to cross border aggression, 46.67% of respondents agreed that local and home guard commonly responds to cross border aggression while 37.33% agreed that both government agents and locals and home guards responds to cross border aggression.

These findings confirm that the frequent security responses to cross border aggression are made of locals and home guards or combined operation between local and home guard and the government agents. In addition, the finding also confirms that the government security agent rarely responds to cross border aggression. This finding also affirms the previous finding on low response by state agencies towards cross border aggression. These finding corroborates with Riam¹³⁶ finding of that government of Kenya

¹³⁵ Trench P, Rowley J, Diarra M, Sano F, Keita B. 2007. Beyond Any Drought. Root causes of chronic vulnerability in the Sahel. The Sahel Working Group

¹³⁶ Riam Riam. 2007. Disarming the Turkana: The Riam Riam Experience. Presented at the IGAD Regional Workshop on the Disarmament of Pastoralist Communities, May 28–30, 2007

launched a series of military led disarmament programs in seven districts of the North Rift region in mid-2006. The process proceeded in three phases: (1) Operation Dumisha Amani (maintain peace), a voluntary weapons collection that promised increased security and amnesty from prosecution, where no force was used; (2) Operation Okota I (collect 1), a forceful disarmament of communities that had not cooperated with phase one of the program; and (3) Okota II (collect 2), a development component designed to improve economic conditions in previously armed areas so as to reduce incentives for arms possession.


Table 4.9: Security agencies common responses to cross border aggression

Category	Frequency	Percentage
Government security agents	12	16.00
Locals and home guards	35	46.67
Both government and local guards	28	37.00
Total	75	100.00

Source: own surveyed data

Having determine the most responsive security agent in cross border conflict, respondents were also asked to rate the efficiency and promptness of security personnel in as far as repulsing foreign attacks in the county is concerned. Findings for this response are depicted in Figure 8.

Figure 8: Efficiency of State Personnel



Source: own surveyed data

The findings on efficiency and promptness of security personnel repulsing foreign attackers shown in figure 8 show that 46.67% of respondents said there is poor efficiency and promptness, 29.33% said average efficiency and promptness, 14.67% said above average and 9.33% said excellence. This finding affirms that there is poor or below average efficiency and promptness in security agents repulsing foreign attackers in the county. This poor or below average efficiency and promptness is as a result of the fact that commonly and active security agent that respond to cross border conflict are the home guards and locals, who in most cases lack the knowledge and expertise to conduct successful anti-aggression operations. In addition, home guards and locals do not have tools, equipment


and weapons needed for effecting efficiently and promptly responds to foreign attacks.

This is also echoed by responded who ascertained that the:

“.... local security agents are not well equipped to handle cross border conflict or aggression because foreign raiders uses sophisticated weapons superior to local police and reservists...’

The study further inquired how the state has responded to cross border violence conflict whenever it occurred. In this regard, respondent were asked to rate the extent to which the provided response strategies by state security agents have prevalent. Result is depicted in Figure 9

Figure 9: State response to cross border aggression



Source: own surveyed data


Results illustrated in Figure 9 revealed that for disarmament response strategy to cross border aggression, 8.00% of respondent said it has worked very well, 20.00% said it has worked well, 33.33% of respondents said it has somehow worked and 26.67% of respondent agreed that it has not work well with 12.00% respondents agreeing that it has never worked. For pursuing attackers across the border response strategy to deter cross border aggression, 6.67% said it has worked well, 11.33% of respondents said it has somehow worked 60.00% of respondent agreed that it has not work well and 20.00% of respondent said it has never worked at all. For temporal closure of border strategy as a remedy to cross border aggression, 4.00% of respondent said it has worked very well, 16.00% said it has worked well, 29.33% of respondents said it has somehow worked 45.33% of respondent agreed that it has not work well and 10.67% said it has never worked. Finally for use of diplomatic channels as a remedy to cross border aggression, 6.67% of respondents said it has worked very well, 20.00% said it has worked well, 24.00% said it has worked somehow, 45.33% said it has not work well and 4.00% said it has never worked at all.

This finding affirms that among the study provided state agency response strategy to cross border aggression, disarmament strategy has somehow worked but not effective, pursuing attacker across the border has never worked, temporal closure of the border to restrict movement has not deterred the cross border conflict and use of diplomacy has equally never worked at all. Thus all strategies employed have not effectively worked leading to persistence cross border aggression along Kenya – Uganda border. Although it appears as if local disarmament has somehow deterred revenge attacks, this has weakened

local capacity to defend themselves given the inadequate security provided by the state agents.

In view of the fact that disarmament is the major security operation in the area, the study sought to determine whether it has effectively and efficiently mitigated cross border aggression in the study area. To achieve this, respondents were asked whether they have heard or are aware of disarmament efforts in the area. Findings revealed that 100.00% of respondents have been victim of disarmament. Furthermore, respondents were asked to rate how often security agencies have been involved in the disarmament exercise. Finding is shown in Figure 10.

Figure 10: State security agent response to disarmament



Source: own surveyed data

From figure 10, for administration police response participation in disarmament revealed that 21.33% of respondent said AP have worked very well, 20.00% said it has worked well, 33.33% of respondents said it has somehow worked, 13.34% of respondent agreed that AP has not work well with 12.00% respondents agreeing that it has never participated in disarmament exercise. For General Service Unit (GSU) police participation in disarmament revealed that, 10.67% said they have worked very well, 29.33% of respondents said it has somehow worked, 13.33% of respondent agreed that it has not work well, 33.33% said not yet and 13.33% agreed GSU have never succeeded in disarmament.

For regular police participation in disarmament revealed that 17.33% participated well, 29.33% of respondents said they have somehow participated, and 26.67% of respondent agreed that they have not worked. For army participation in disarmament revealed that 45.33% of respondents agreed they have participated very well, 26.67% of respondents said they have participated well, 17.33% said they have somehow participated, and 10.67% said they have not well participated. For the Anti stock theft police participation, 33.33% agreed to very well extent, 29.33% agreed to well extent, 26.67% agreed to somehow extent participation, 6.67% said not well participation and 4.00% agreeing that they have never participated at all in disarmament. Finally for use Kenya Reservist Police (KRP), 21.33% of respondents said it they have participated very well, 20.00% said it has participated well, 33.33% said they have participated somehow, 13.33% said they have not participated well and 12.00% agreed that KRP have not participated at all.

These findings indicate that Administration Police (AP) have somehow participated in disarmament following cross border conflicts or aggression (GSU) have participated

well in disarmament, army have participated very well in disarmament, Anti Stock Theft Police have somehow participated and finally Kenya Police Reservist (KPR). This finding further affirms that Army, Anti Stock Theft and GSU have actively participated in disarmament exercise following cross border conflict. This finding concurs with Riam¹³⁷ who reported that military have been widely used for effective disarmament operations among the pastoralist communities.

The study also inquired on how disarmament has help improve security in the region. Response for this finding is presented in Table 4.9. From Table 4.9 it can be seen that 16.00% of respondents agrees that disarmament has increased security a lot, 21.33% of respondents agreed that disarmament has increased security a little, 45.33% of respondents agreed that disarmament did not make a different at all, and 17.34% of respondent agreed that disarmament decreased security a lot. This finding confirmed that disarmament has lowly improved insecurity a lot with majority of respondents affirming that disarmament has made no different at all. Some small margin of respondent conform that disarmament has decreased in security in the region given that most of resident do harm themselves for personal security.

¹³⁷ ibid


Table 4.10: Security agencies common responds to cross border aggression

Response	Frequency	Percentage
Increase security a lot	12	16.00
Increase security a little	16	21.33
Did not make a difference	34	45.33
Decrease security a lot	13	17.34
Total	75	100.00

Source: own surveyed data

In relation to how disarmament operation has enhanced security in the area, study further sought to determine how residents' feels disarmament operation has assisted improved security in the area. Findings for this analysis are presented in figure 11.


Figure 11: Locals response to disarmament



Source: own surveyed data

From figure 11, shows that 21.33% of respondents said that during disarmament operation they feel very face, 48.00% said they feel safe and 30.67% said they feel very unsafe during disarmament operations. This finding clearly denotes that during disarmament operation, residents of Turkana County feel safe. This finding could be attributed to the fact that foreigners are less bound to attack during disarmament operation due to presence of security agents in the area. In summary, the study further sought to determine how the government efforts as far as the disarmament exercise are rated by respondent. Finding for this result is depicted in figure...

Figure 12: Locals rating disarmament



Source: own surveyed data

Figure 12, shows that 42.67% of respondents' were of the opinion disarmament efforts have achieved poor results, 30.67% of respondents' were of the opinion that disarmament efforts have achieved average result. In addition, 16% of respondents were of the opinion that disarmament efforts have achieved above average results and 10.67% of the respondents were of that opinion that disarmament effort have achieved excellence result. This finding confirmed that disarmament results have achieved poor results. These findings are in agreement with Macartan¹³⁸ who affirmed that disarmament of the local in Jonglei and Turkana South affected the security of that area as the majority of respondents claimed that it had decreased security. Not surprisingly, when asked how a potential disarmament program in the community would change the level of security, most said it would decrease security a lot. This he concluded that whereas civilian disarmament has yielded mixed results, a number of local conflicts resolution initiatives have brought some hope to the situation. Similarly, Draman¹³⁹ also reported that disarmament program in the community would change the level of security, in most cases; it would decrease security a lot.

¹³⁸ Macartan, Humphreys. (February 2003) "Economics and Violent Conflict", Harvard University.

¹³⁹ Draman, R. (2003). "Poverty and Conflict in Africa: Explaining a Complex Relationship". Paper prepared for Experts Group Meeting on Africa-Canada Parliamentary Strengthening Program Addis Ababa, May 19-23, 2003.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

5.1 Introduction

This chapter presents summary of findings, conclusion and recommendation. It commences with summary of finding for both demographic and research findings, followed by conclusions drawn from the study finding and finally recommendation. The chapter also highlights on suggestion for further analysis.

5.2 Summary of Findings

The study achieved 75% response rate, above the 70% minimum response rate required for analysis according to Creswell (2009). Summary of respondent background revealed that majority of the respondents were in the age bracket of 46-55 years implying respondents were mature adults who are well informed of cross border conflict and thus provided relevant and important information or data needed for study objectives. Male was the dominant gender that responded to the study as women rarely participate in conflict issues. Summary finding for level of education revealed that majority of the respondents had attained no education followed by primary levels of education. Majority of respondents engaged in economic activities with livestock trade, shop/grocery trade, fishing/fish trade and hawking are the main economic activities among the respondents.

5.3.1 Summary of Key Objective Findings

The study developed three research hypothesis from the study objective, namely the nature and extent of the cross border aggression in Turkana County is majorly caused by poverty in the region; cross border aggression have adverse effect on the socio-economic security of households in Turkana County, and the response strategies has little

effect on combating cross-border ethnic conflict in Turkana County. Answers to this research hypothesis are discussed below.

5.3.1 Nature and extent of the cross border aggression in Turkana County is majorly caused by poverty in the region

Since majority of respondent have experienced cross border conflict, the study affirmed that cattle raid by non-Kenyan communities, organized raid by foreigners to repulse insurgents, killing of locals by outsiders, and cross border robbery by non-Kenyan are the frequent are the forms or types of cross border conflict in Turkana County along Kenya Uganda boarder. These attacks are done jointly with locals. However, he study affirmed that cultural practices are the major drive for cross border conflict, followed by revenge motives to settle scores. In addition, wealth accumulation and to earn a living is rare motives for cross border attack or conflict. Therefore based on the study hypothesis that nature and extent of the cross border aggression in Turkana County is majorly caused by poverty, the study confirmed that as most of the reasons responsible for cross border conflict are poverty related.

5.3.2 Cross border aggression have adverse effect on the socio-economic security of households in Turkana County

Finding for nature of damages suffered by business because of cross border conflict confirms that the major effects of cross border conflict are loss of properties to raiders/looters, reduction in sales increased losses. However, as some businesses suffer negative effect, there is small margin strives and reported increased profits. Additionally, most of resident feel the area quite unsafe due to cross border conflicts and other insecurity issues.

5.3.3 Response Strategies has Little Effect in Combating Cross-Border Ethnic Conflict in Turkana County

Study finding affirms that there is low response rate to cross border aggressions by the state security agencies. The low response rate could be attributed to the inaccessibility of the region due to poor infrastructural development especially bad roads condition and network. Further analysis affirms that the frequent security response to cross border aggression is locals and home guard or combined operation between local and home guard and the government agents. In addition, finding also affirms that government security agent rarely responds to cross border aggression. However, when they respond, response is poor or below average efficiency and promptness in repulsing foreign attackers in the county. This poor or below average efficiency and promptness is as a result of the fact that commonly and active security agent that respond to cross border conflict are the home guards and locals, who in most cases lack the knowledge and expertise to conduct successful ant-aggression operations.

5.4 Conclusion

The study draw the following conclusion based on the finding. First, the study found that cattle raids by non-Kenyan communities, organized raid by foreigners to repulse insurgents, killing of locals by outsiders, and cross border robbery by non-Kenyan are the frequent forms or types of cross border conflict in Turkana County along Kenya Uganda boarder. In addition, these attacks are done jointly with locals. Secondly, the study concluded that cultural practices and revenge motives to settle scores are the major drive for cross border conflict. Thirdly, the study concluded that the major effects of cross border conflict are loss of properties to raiders/looters, reduction in sales increased losses. This

makes most resident feel the area quite unsafe due to cross border conflicts and other insecurity issues. Fifth, the study concludes that there is low response rate to cross border aggressions by the state security agencies due to the inaccessibility of the region due to poor infrastructural development especially bad roads condition and network. Furthermore, the study concludes that frequent security agent that response to cross border aggression are locals and home guard or combined operation between local and home guard and the government agents. The study also concluded that the response is poor or below average efficiency and promptness. Finally, the study concluded that disarmament has lowly improved insecurity a lot as resident do harm themselves for personal security.

5.5 Recommendations

Based on the finding and conclusion, the study makes the following recommendations, Based on finding that cross border raids are organized jointly, the study recommends a joint operational approach to tackle the matter reaching out to both culprits in both states. Since cultural practices is the major drive for cross border conflict, the study recommends that the state should embark on transforming the local culturally from violence practices to modern civilization. This can best be achieved by increasing the level of formal education in the area. This too should be approached from multidimensional approach touching both states. In addition, there is a need for cultural transformation from “readiness to raid and revenge” to “report [to local authorities] and wait for action.”

Due to finding that disarmament operation negatively affects or decreased security, as this weakens their ability to protect themselves, the study recommends that disarmament operations should be conducted jointly and across both states at the same time so as not to make one opponent be vulnerable. In addition, the government should also enhance security of the local.

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APPENDICES

Appendix I: Letter of Introduction

University of Nairobi (UoN)

P O Box

Nairobi.

Dear Sir/Madam,

RE: REQUEST FOR DATA COLLECTION

I am a Masters of Art in International Studies student at the UoN. I am conducting a research entitled “Effect of Cross-Border Ethnic Conflicts on Social Economic Security in Kenya: A case of Turkana County, Kenya-Uganda Boarder”. I kindly request you to spare some time to respond to the attached questionnaire. The collected data will be treated with all necessary confidentiality.

Thank you.

Yours faithfully

Bancie Njeri.

Appendix II: Respondents Questionnaire

SECTION A: INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this questionnaire is to collect information for academic purpose. Please select the right choice by ticking or filling in.

SECTION B: GENERAL DATA

1. Please select your age bracket:

18 – 25 years	<input type="checkbox"/>
26 – 35 years	<input type="checkbox"/>
36 – 45 years	<input type="checkbox"/>
46 – 55 years	<input type="checkbox"/>
Above 55 years	<input type="checkbox"/>

2. What is your gender?

Male	<input type="checkbox"/>
Female	<input type="checkbox"/>

3. What is your Marital status?

Single	<input type="checkbox"/>
Married	<input type="checkbox"/>

4. Highest level of education?

No education	<input type="checkbox"/>
A' level	<input type="checkbox"/>
O' level	<input type="checkbox"/>
Tertiary	<input type="checkbox"/>
Undergraduate	<input type="checkbox"/>
Postgraduate	<input type="checkbox"/>
Others (specify)	

5. Do you engage in any economic activity/ Occupation

Yes	<input type="checkbox"/>
No	<input type="checkbox"/>

6. Which economic activity do you engage in, and why? (Please list)

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SECTION C:

7. Have you ever been a victim of cross border conflict in this area?

Yes	<input type="checkbox"/>
No	<input type="checkbox"/>

8. The table below lists the nature/type of the common cross border attacks. Please choose/tick those that are you have experience indicating the frequency of the incidences in your area?

Nature	Very frequent	Frequent	Rare	Very Rare
Cattle raids by non-Kenyan communities				
Organized raids by foreigners to repulse insurgents				
Abduction by foreigners				
Killings of locals by outsiders				
Occupation by foreigners				
Cross border robbery by non-Kenyan				
Rape				

9. How do the attackers organized?

Attack alone	<input type="checkbox"/>
Attack jointly with locals	<input type="checkbox"/>
Do not know	<input type="checkbox"/>

10. In your opinion, do Kenyans conduct attack across the boarder?

Yes	<input type="checkbox"/>
No	<input type="checkbox"/>
I don't know	<input type="checkbox"/>

11. In your opinion what is/are the reason(s) for cross border violent conflict?

Revenge motive (settle scores)	<input type="checkbox"/>
Wealth accumulation	<input type="checkbox"/>
Cultural practice	<input type="checkbox"/>
To earn a living/survival motive	<input type="checkbox"/>
Combination of several motives	<input type="checkbox"/>

B Questions relating to business

12. Has your business or that of other traders been affected by cross border aggression?

Yes	<input type="checkbox"/>
No	<input type="checkbox"/>

13. If yes, state how.

Lost property to raiders/Looters	<input type="checkbox"/>
No/reduced sales due to insecurity	<input type="checkbox"/>
Increased profits	<input type="checkbox"/>
Increased losses	<input type="checkbox"/>
Increased levies by security agent	<input type="checkbox"/>

14. Have you been displaced from your home and business by cross border conflict or activities by state agents during security operations?

Yes	<input type="checkbox"/>
No	<input type="checkbox"/>

15. Do you feel doing your business here?

Very safe	<input type="checkbox"/>
Safe	<input type="checkbox"/>
Not safe at all	<input type="checkbox"/>

16. Why?

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C Questions relating to response to aggression

17. Was there any state response after the aggression?

Yes	<input type="checkbox"/>
No	<input type="checkbox"/>
Don't know	

18. If yes, who responded?

Government security agents	<input type="checkbox"/>
Locals and home guards	<input type="checkbox"/>
Both government security agents and locals	<input type="checkbox"/>

19. How would you rate the efficiency and promptness of security personnel in as far as repulsing foreign attackers in the county is concerned?

Poor	<input type="checkbox"/>
Average	<input type="checkbox"/>
Above average	<input type="checkbox"/>
Excellent	<input type="checkbox"/>

20. Explain your Answer.

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21. How has the state responded to cross border violent conflict whenever it has occurred?

Response	Very well	well	Some how	Not well	Never
Disarmed the locals					
Repulsed/pursued attackers across the border					
Closed the border					
Used diplomatic channels					
Do not know					

SECTION D: Questions relating to disarmament

22. Have you heard about the disarmament operation in your division/district?

Yes	<input type="checkbox"/>
No	<input type="checkbox"/>

23. Rate how the following security agencies have been involved in the disarmament exercise?

Response	Very often	Often	Rare	Very rare	Not at all
AP					
GSU					
Regular police					
Army					
Ant stock theft police					
KPR					

24. Rate hoe disarmament operation has affected the security of the people in the area in terms of the provided areas.

Response	Very high	High	Low	Very low	Not at all
Increase security a lot					
Increase security a little					
Did not make a difference					
Decrease security a lot					

25. How safe do members of your household feel going about their daily activities during disarmament operation?

Very safe	<input type="checkbox"/>
Safe	<input type="checkbox"/>
Very unsafe	<input type="checkbox"/>

26. How would you rate the government's efforts in as far as the disarmament exercise is concerned?

Poor	<input type="checkbox"/>
Average	<input type="checkbox"/>
Above average	<input type="checkbox"/>
Excellence	<input type="checkbox"/>

27. How best should cross border conflict be dealt with by the state whenever it occurs?

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Thank you very much.