

UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI
INSTITUTE OF DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

**CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS OF PREVENTION AND MANAGEMENT
OF CONFLICTS IN AFRICA: THE ROLE OF IGAD EARLY WARNING
MECHANISM**

BY

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THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE AWARD OF A DEGREE OF MASTER OF
ARTS IN INTERNATIONAL STUDIES**

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DECLARATION

I declare that this research project is my own work and has not been submitted for examination in any institution of higher learning. No part of this project may be reproduced in any form without the prior written permission by the author and/or the University of Nairobi.

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DEDICATION

This research project is dedicated to my family: parents and siblings for their moral support, prayers and guidance throughout this research work. They have been a great inspiration in the completion of the work. Above all, I dedicate it to the Almighty God without whom my academic life would have no meaning.

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None of the individual aforementioned are responsible for any errors of fact, omission or commission. The author takes full responsibility for the contents of this project.

ABSTRACT

The continent has experience conflicts over time with most of them reoccurring or having new dynamics over time. Governments and Sub regional Organizations have faced various challenges in trying to manage conflicts in the region. As part of the move to solve own African problems, Sub regional organisations within the region have incorporated early warning and response mechanisms in order to boost their security and peace architecture. Early warning systems is structured in a way that they can anticipate conflicts, analyze them, and come up with response strategies and make sure they are well implemented. IGAD has established an early warning system called CEWARN which aims to prevent conflict in the Horn of Africa. CEWARN has been described as the most elaborate system in the continent and has actively taken part in developing early warning systems in the region. Nonetheless, despite its existence, the horn of Africa is one of the most volatile regions in the continent having experienced various types of conflict which keeps re occurring. The key problem that the project seeks to study is whether the use of early warning systems has proven successful in mitigating conflicts in the horn of Africa or is it just a mere academic exercise. The unending conflict cycle in the region has proven to be a key challenge facing the region despite the existence of elaborate structures aimed at preventing, managing and resolving conflicts. As a conflict prevention strategy, the project will specifically focus on IGAD early warning mechanism. Using CEWARN as a case study, the project sought to find out the challenges and prospects of conflict prevention and management in Africa, it analysed the contributions of CEWARN TO IGAD'S peace and security architecture and also successfully identified the key challenges sabotaging CEWARN functions. Among the key findings observed in this project is that there are various systemic problems which has sabotaged conflict PMR efforts in the region including the lack of political will among member states, the failure to augur well all the processes involved during conflict early warning and response mechanism has also hindered the effectiveness of the initiative. Drawing from data gathered through interviews and desk top methods, the study, however shows that there are commendable jobs done by CEWARN to combat pastoral-related conflict in the horn of Africa. As part of the conclusions and recommendations observed is that the few successes is a step in the right direction and would therefore need more willingness from member states, the regional body to expand the mandate of the mechanism to cover other types of conflict. IGAD member states also need to remain committed and act beyond the ratification of treaties aimed at managing conflict. They should work together to ensure the mechanism is effective and not just a mere academic exercise which bores no fruit.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AAR	Area of Reporting
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
AORs	Areas of Reporting
APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture
ASF	Africa Standby Force
CEW	Continental Early Warning System
CEWARN	Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism
CEWER	Conflict early warning response
CEWERU	Conflict Early Warning and Response Units
COMESA	Common Market For East and South Africa
CPMR	Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution
CPS	Committee of Permanent Secretaries
CSOs	Civil Society Organisations
EAC	East Africa Community
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EW	Early Warning
EWS	Early Warning System
FM	Field Monitors
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IGADD	Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development
IPSS	International Peace and Security Strategy
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation
NRI	National Research Institute
OAU	Organisation of African Unity

PSA	Peace and Security Architecture
PSC	Peace and Security Council
RRF	Rapid Response Fund
SADC	South African Development Cooperation
SALWs	Small and Light Weapons
SIPO	Strategic Indicative Plan for the ORGAN
UN	United Nations
UNECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
UNOSOM	United Nations Operations in Somalia
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USAID	United States International Agency for Development

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

Uprisings and conflicts are a common phenomenon globally, humans are prone to conflict over various issues, ideologies, natural resources among many other issues. It is by no means a negative force but rather a natural expression of social difference and therefore, if managed peacefully, it becomes a source of progress, creativity and growth (UN)¹. Nonetheless, over time, governments, international organizations and leaders have developed mechanisms on conflict prevention, management and resolution and it ranges from armed intervention, mediation, peacekeeping among others. This can be traced to the end of World War where the international community majorly focused on issues disrupting international peace. For decades now, nearly every country in Africa has experienced a fair share of conflict. Ranging from highly volatile Civil wars in Libya and Sudan ,the conflicts in Eastern Congo/Rwanda and Uganda, Ethnic violence in South Sudan , Islamist insurgencies, Kenya's 2007 postelection violence to South Africa's recent xenophobic attacks. Most of these conflicts can be traced to the post-colonial era where independence was the main agenda for most nations. Majority of these conflicts have been unsuccessfully resolved with recurrence, failed negotiations, deep rooted ideologies, historical bitterness which has seen some of the conflict survive the test of time.

Some of the main used forms of mitigating conflict include, negotiations, mediation, armed intervention and early conflict warning systems. The use of the initial methods have remained common raising concern of their effectiveness in some of the conflicts

¹Charron, Andrea. *UN sanctions and conflict: responding to peace and security threats*. Vol. 7. Routledge, 2011.

which are increasingly heightening in some areas. The emergence of conflict early and response system as witnessed in the post-cold war period has prompted the need to prevent conflicts at the early stage before they escalate into full-blown violence. At the international level, the UN charter contains an implicit early warning, and the Security Council is mandated to bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter that may threaten the maintenance of international peace and conflicts. In 1992, then Sec-Gen Boutros BoutrosGhali published the 'Agenda for Peace' report which, among other things, advocated that the UN lay more emphasis on the identification of conflict at the earliest possible stage rather than becoming active once the battle had reached a violent stage. Early detection would see the removal of any sources of tension before full escalation². In his 2001 report on prevention of armed conflict, UN Sec General Kofi Annan emphasized on the need for governments to be responsible in addressing conflicts before it escalates. Africa, which has been characterized by considerably high levels of conflicts, the African Union created a Continental Early Warning Systems. Several sub-regional organizations have set up similar systems. For Instance, within the Horn of Africa, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has come up with the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN).Despite being among the most advanced system in Africa being in existence since its launch in 2002. The question arises on whether conflict early warning systems play a crucial role in conflict management.

1.2 Statement of the Research Problem

The re occurring conflicts in Africa have questioned Regional Economic Communities (REC) and its capacity to manage violent conflicts in the region. For instance, the

²Boutros-Ghali, B. (1992). An agenda for peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping. *International Relations*, 11(3), 201-218.

popular uprisings in North Africa in 2011, the insurgence groups in Eastern Congo, Sudan as well as Libya. Based on this few examples, its imperative that violent conflicts are difficult to contain and it has raised questions on the capacity of the African Union, IGAD and international community to manage fully escalated violence. The continent has had one of the longest civil wars in the recent times. The involvement of the international community, has in most cases worsened the crisis, case in point, Libya which has remained unstable since the intervention of NATO forces in 2011. In Most African conflicts conflict managements has been the dominant approach whereby the conflicts are addressed superficially to minimize the intensity of an already worse situation. For instance, the war in South Sudan, Burundi/Rwanda conflicts are some of the protracted conflicts. In Burundi, the focus was on diplomatic interventions by various actors and agency. While the interventions helped to quell the crisis through the establishment of War Crime Tribunals, none of the actors involved emphasized on the need to address the concerns of the parties of the conflict³. In most of these cases, the tribunals formed usually emphasize on the need to punish the individuals deemed guilty instead of finding out the deep causes of the conflict that remain deeply intertwined within the societies

Despite the fact that the wars in the region has had massive impact on human lives and material, most interventions by RECs and international community is mainly focused on the ‘peace and stability’ as advanced by international organization. The problem with such kind of interventions is that it focuses on the short- term impact and therefore ignores the deep rooted causes of conflicts. This explains why some of the conflicts keep re occurring.

³Zenko, Micah, and Rebecca R. Friedman. "UN early warning for preventing conflict." *International Peacekeeping* 18, no. 1 (2011): 21-37.

The primary outcome of early warning systems should be conclusively tied to the respective response mechanisms used to mitigate the conflict. If these two are not linked, the purpose of using the early warning system loses meaning and becomes irrelevant.

Early warning systems is structured in a way that they can anticipate conflicts, analyze them, and come up with response strategies and make sure they are well implemented. Regional organizations are mandated to perform International Relations' purpose of ensuring peace and security. To ensure the region achieves peace and security, they ought to use these systems as signals to provide other actors like states) act on conflicts⁴. Having existed for long, IGAD's CEWARN ought to be reviewed whether it has achieved its intended goals. Using IGAD'S early warning system as a case study, this paper answers this question. The study carefully analyzes the role of CEWARN to management of conflict in Africa. At the same time, the paper analyses whether there is a gap between the expectations and the reality of the use of early warning systems in mitigating conflict while also looking at the challenges and prospects of managing conflict in Africa.

1.3 Research Questions

- i. What are some of challenges and prospects of conflict prevention and management in Africa
- ii. What is the role of IGAD'S CEWARN in managing conflict in Africa
- iii. What are some of the challenges sabotaging the functions of CEWARN

⁴Allen, C. (1999). Warfare, endemic violence & state collapse in Africa. *Review of African Political Economy*, 26(81), 367-384.

1.4 Objectives

- i. To find out the challenges and prospects of conflict prevention and management in Africa
- ii. To analyze the contributions of CEWARN to IGAD's Peace and Security Architecture of managing conflict in Africa
- iii. To identify the challenges sabotaging the functions of CEWARN

1.5 Literature Review

The section reviews the literature on several thematic areas which are linked to conflict prevention and management in Africa and role of conflict early warning systems. It is divided into three parts. Under the first section, the paper looks at the Empirical literature review (focused on objectives) and is categorized into ; literature on peace and security; this area is essential since conflict prevention and management is aimed at enhancing the architecture of peace and security. The aspects of conflicts need to be carefully understood to understand and develop an effective prevention measures like an early warning system.

The second section reviews the theoretical literature review that looks at theories that argue about the topic: Literature on the cause of conflict and the main issues in understanding conflict dynamics. Under this sections, the study will also discuss writing on the involvement of sub-regional organizations in preventing conflict and determine their usefulness and effectiveness to partake in this role. The final part looks at the literature on early warning systems and identifies the missing gaps in the literature.

1.5.1 Literature on Peace

The Democratic Peace Theory by Immanuel Kant observes that democracies are unlikely to get into conflict with other democracies. The theory posits that states enter into cooperation to attain mutual pursuit of freedom and other benefits. Under this theory, Leaders in democracies do not enter wars because they are too occupied with re-election. The approach has, however, been challenged and revised by neoliberal scholars like Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, who proved that such countries do get into wars. Neoliberals say that conflicts among such states are easy to resolve because their economies are more dependant owing to capitalist ties.⁵

Nonetheless, theorists like Adam Curle have rejected the dichotomy of peace and war as propagated by many scholars.⁶ He argued that despite the clear cut between peace and war that order is the absence of war, he said that there are situations without a fight which can be classified as unpeaceful. Such societies are not characterized by physical violence but have existing structures that encourage the propagation of injustices. In such cases, these societies inhibit their citizens from attaining self-realization and capabilities and thus are in a state of uncertainty.

Under this theory, he relates the positive and negative peace to the classification of stable and unstable order. According to him, precarious peace is achieved through the constant use of threat and force. As much as there is no war, its possibility is high, and the parties are continually preparing for one.

⁵Elman, Miriam Fendius. "Unpacking democracy: presidentialism, parliamentarism, and theories of democratic peace." *Security Studies* 9, no. 4 (2000): 91-126.

⁶Paffenholz, Thania. "International peacebuilding goes local: analysing Lederach's conflict transformation theory and its ambivalent encounter with 20 years of practice." *Peacebuilding* 2, no. 1 (2014): 11-27.

Stable peace, on the other hand, is maintained when the parties and actors involved always learn how to settle on an order by freeing their minds and disarming themselves and their institutions. In such cases, all parties are not bracing themselves for war and not scheming ways to using force as a means of ironing out their difference.

Understanding aspects of peace theory creates two main possibilities on how to look at conflict. Understanding peace from a negative sense will lead to prioritization of the structures, which mainly target addressing of factors that causes physical violence ignoring the possible underlying issues which led to the emergence of physical violence. On the other hand, a positive understanding of peace overlooks the causes of physical violence of the conflict.

1.5.2 Literature on Security

The issue of security, as addressed by DanReiter⁷ points out that the primary debate revolves around two issues: what is being secured and who is being secured. On the subject of security threats, scholars differ on the understanding with the main one being the realist perspective that security is mainly a militarized one in nature. Hans Morgenthau notes that the ultimate reason for insecurity is founded on human nature and primarily a man's desire to gain power. Morgenthau pointed out that the primary source of social conflicts and injustices is based on man's ignorance and selfishness. The realist perspective is that threats are militarized and of physical nature.

Nonetheless, this argument has been contended by scholars Ullman and Buzan,⁸ who argued that security could be defined as events that threaten human life and does not

⁷Chapman, Terrence L., and Dan Reiter. "The United Nations Security Council and the rally'round the flag effect." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48, no. 6 (2004): 886-909.

⁸Buzan, Barry, and Lene Hansen. *The evolution of international security studies*. Cambridge University Press, 2009.

have to be militarized. According to scholars, security threats are also described as issues that threaten and sabotage a range of policy choices available for a government, state, or non-governmental institutions within a country. In his book, Buzan noted that the main security threats range from military, political, economic, societal, and environmental issues; he clarified that security is attained when there are no threats to the above sectors.

Buzan's perspective was, however, criticized by Ayooob⁹, who said that it was inadequate and in states outside the western world do not fit the above assumptions. Unlike Western countries, Ayooob, 1980 noted that nonwestern states lack representative governments that can solve the legitimacy problem and has high power on socially mobile citizens who are affluent, homogenous. He said that majority of threats are internal and mostly tied with the processes of state-building. Therefore the security threats are illegitimacy in state boundaries, state regimes, and institutions. He said that poor social cohesion and lack of consensus on issues tied to social, political, and economic organizations pose threats to security.

A human security research program by Booth, 2017 noted that security could be well understood as those factors which pose a threat to the well-being of individuals saying that safety and survival are synonymous. He raised concern on the need to distinguish between security, which allows one to pursue their ambitions and their existential conditions (survival.) According to this argument, safety should be understood as

⁹Ayooob, M. (1995). *The third world security predicament: State making, regional conflict, and the international system* (pp. 41-42). L. Rienner Publishers.

having more than just survival meaning more freedom from threats in life, which would pave the way for more life choices.

A United Nations Development Program (UNDP) study backed the above argument saying any form of threat to one's freedom is a security threat. Therefore, security means the protection of vital liberties of people from pervasive threats and situation which may hinder their strengths and aspirations. Such theories and arguments broadened the understanding of security threats to more non-militarized threats surrounding political, social, economic, or environmental areas.

The second issue on threats is on the individuals to secure; traditionally, these threats were centered on the state. However, other critiques are raising the question of different referents of securities that needs to be achieved.

Weighing in on the issue, Makinda¹⁰ noted that there exists a significant gap between states and nations, with many countries having not achieved the national status. He, therefore, indicates that state security is an ineffective and irrelevant way of analyzing security, saying that the focus should be society-centric- security. It has become challenging to manage the security of a state in cases where certain groups of people feel deprived of the basic needs; therefore, without the safety of groups, communities, state-security becomes futile. People are the central core of cities, states, political groups and should be the foundation of security. African and global security agenda. Herbert ¹¹shared the same saying viewing the world from the people-based point of reference and that it focuses on justice, change, and people with the main aim of eliminating insecurities which provide a breeding ground for violence and conflict.

¹⁰Makinda, Samuel M., and F. Wafula Okumu. *The African Union: challenges of globalization, security, and governance*. Routledge, 2007.

¹¹D .Hubert, 'Human Security: Safety from People in a Changing World'

The literature on security shows that security is a complex concept (multi-faceted and multilevel), the protection of people within a state, and addressing the physical, militarized, and non-militarized threats. Such assurance enables the country to live freely without fear, and it provides sustainable foundations for a peaceful region and state.

1.5.3 The literature on the conflict in Africa

Under this theory, general theories on the nature of society and social change in Africa will be understood. Liberal approaches to social organization say that conflict is highly dependent on a society's attitude to the everyday life of production and distribution of all factors. According to John Locke, (1689) in his "Two treatises of Government," people are born as new states without any pre-ordained ideas. However, as people grow, they start to shape their thoughts and actions based on experience. That people are always in the state of nature until provoked with an issue that changes their wildlife. He outlines the necessity of civil government, which he said has the capability of being a remedy of anarchy. Locke says that people can act more rationally with a government in force because there are laws and consequences to abide by.

Generally, conflict is a negative concept described as dysfunctional and disruptive to a healthy life that needs to be eliminated and gotten rid of. Nonetheless, other academic work view conflict as an unavoidable social phenomenon which is part of social life and is an essential aspect of social change. It views conflict positively as a means of expressing interest, values which arise as new social formations. (Reuck,1984) observes that a conflictual situation is one in which there are more parties with incompatible goals. The convergence of the definition of conflict is broad. Dixon says that conflict emanates from a mutual recognition that conflicting material interest is a central feature of social relations.

In his book, *Warfare endemic violence, and state collapse in Africa*, Allen¹² noted that most causes of conflict are associated with the way politics is carried out. With an analysis of Rwanda's violent strife of 1994, he says that politicians thrive in the manipulation of the indifferences among the populace to thrive politically. Due to the many successes for many politicians, the discourse has always been seeking hegemonic instead of accommodative politics. This has been witnessed in many states and has been seen in most conflict cases, including Kenya's 2007/2008 post-election violence and Somalia's case where clan indifferences has been subject of contention. Several other scholars view Africa's perennial conflicts as a sign of weak state formation structures, which is mostly seen to be artificial, making it impossible to practice infrastructural and despotic power. These states are mainly weak because its citizens do not believe the regime is normatively legitimate.¹³

A different group of scholars links the various conflicts in Africa to the scarcities within the environment. (Dixon, 2010) noted that three types of deficiencies: supply-induced, demand induced, and structural weakness, which results when resources are unevenly distributed. These three depicts a case of a section of people advancing their grievances against those who are said to be behind the indifferences.

In Africa, the other reviewed literature identified as the cause of conflict is natural resources. Many conflicts in the conflict are spurred by the various economic intentions which have been characterized as economic insurgency.¹⁴ Meaning the profits accrued

¹²Allen, C. (1999). *Warfare, endemic violence & state collapse in Africa. Review of African Political Economy*, 26(81), 367-384.

¹³Makinda, Samuel M., and F. Wafula Okumu. *The African Union: challenges of globalization, security, and governance*. Routledge, 2007.

¹⁴Franke, Benedikt, and Stefan Gänzle. "How "African" is the African Peace and Security Architecture? Conceptual and practical constraints of regional security cooperation in Africa." *African security* 5, no. 2 (2012): 88-104.

from disputes are more than the number of returns expected in cases of peace. A case of South Sudan and oil crisis. Therefore actors benefiting and involved in wars are more interested in the continuity of conflicts and will continually spur such violence.

Another possible explanation of conflicts in Africa is that it's main historical and always erupt as a result of memories and narratives used to justify the current existence. Such unforgotten pasts are carried forward and make violence possible. Therefore, Richards noted that to mitigate natural resource-based conflict, it is imperative to understand the underlying histories of the conflict patterns to identify the linkage with the current discourse.¹⁵

From the above literature on conflict, it is clear that conflict is a dynamic and complex process which if well managed, can lead to productive outcomes of social change.

However, it would need the right understanding of its history, politics, grievances, parties involved, nature, and the drivers of the conflict.

1.5.4 The literature on Conflict Management within Africa's Sub Regional Organisation

Conflict Management is more efficient with the involvement of regional organizations¹⁶ due to the direct linkage through quick geographical proximity, which makes it easier to respond to erupted conflicts quickly. Also, local organizations are well placed to meet conflicts since they have a better understanding of the specific dynamics since they understand the players well and know the ideal interventions to

¹⁵Richards, Paul. "The history and future of African rice: food security and survival in a West African war zone." *Africa Spectrum* (2006): 77-93.

¹⁶Franke, Benedikt. *Security cooperation in Africa: A reappraisal*. FirstForumPress, 2009.

use. Also, most players in conflict will feel more at ease to be managed by regional bodies, unlike at the international level.

Regional security plays a vital role because states are intertwined and will rely on one's safety to guarantee its own. For instance, insecurity in a single country has a ripple effect on neighbors, and therefore, it's more important to view security at a regional level. The security interdependence creates more need for local bodies to have the local security organs which need to address the security at that level.

To ensure sub-regional peace and security, the regional bodies consist of various structures, including peace keeping missions, armed intervention mechanisms, mediation and diplomatic intercessions and Conflict Early warning system, which, like other mitigation measures, aims to mitigate conflict at its earliest stages.

The early warning system refers to the use of timely and appropriate intervention measures in reducing conflict. The system consists of data collection, risk analysis, and delivering the information on the recommendations to targeted stakeholders. There are various interventions and theoretical approaches to conflict early warning systems, unlike the specific examples. Scholars have shown that effective early warning programs have accurate information from reliable sources, can monitor the ever-changing dynamics of conflict, and thoroughly understand the local context of the trends of the early warning programs. Also, effective programs are seen to have a wide range of participants with the involvement of local actors who have good knowledge of the incidents. In his definition, Nhema says that EWS is aimed at alerting decision-makers to the possibility of an outbreak, escalation, and resurgence of conflict, and it is aimed at promoting understanding between and among key decision-makers of the

nature of the violent conflict¹⁷. While trying to understand the methodology of EWS, Goldstone contends that EWS aims to identify unknown and better results, which is gotten by assessing various approaches with either qualitative or quantitative methods. Wolfgang,2006)¹⁸, on his part, said that the use of the quantitative approach is not practical because it barely identifies the conflict of an origin since it is based on empirical relationships that oversee the role of human factors in conflict violence¹⁹. Nhema, noted that qualitative, on the other means, is vulnerable to biases, limits, and blindness by the analysts despite providing an in-depth, context information on the conflict.

Most regional early warning systems have been faced by an inadequate database of information that should be used to forecast, predict, and guess on possible scenarios. He also says that there exists a gap in the linkage to response systems to the necessary resources. Schnabel said that the primary challenge experience is the lack of timeliness by the stakeholders to act appropriately in a coordinated manner.²⁰ With weak linkages, the use of early warning systems then becomes a mere academic exercise. Value incongruence has been observed as another challenge in regional early conflict systems; member states tend to have a different orientation on the strategies and mechanism used in conflict management, thus leading to a weak architecture. Regional security organs need some set of autonomy and supranational to set the pace for regional security. Despite their effectiveness of conflict, early warning systems, conflicts in Africa continue to be experienced, with many of them having aspects that should have been

¹⁷Nhema, Alfred G., Paul TiyambeZezeza, and TiyambeZezeza, eds. *The roots of African conflicts: The causes & costs*. Ohio University Press, 2008.

¹⁸Wolfgang, H. Lewis, and Weimin Fang. "System for protecting the transmission of live data streams, and upon reception, for reconstructing the live data streams and recording them into files." U.S. Patent 7,024,609, issued April 4, 2006.

²⁰Ehrhart, Hans-Georg, and Albrecht Schnabel, eds. *Security sector reform and post-conflict peacebuilding*. Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2005.

detected during the early warning systems. Therefore, it is essential to assess the role of these systems and whether they are effectively used and if they are used, what degree of impact do they have on conflict management in Africa, with a particular case on Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD).

1.5 Study Justification

Upon the completion of this CEWARN study, it provides adequate information that identifies weak points and will act as a reference point in studying early warning systems in the continent.

At the policy level, the study will come up with relevant information that complements the work of a wide range of stakeholders in the continent who can apply the data on the function ability of early warning systems as a means to mitigate conflict. While it does acknowledge the possible existence of an ideal academic model of CEWARN, the study provides critical gaps that may ease the process of detecting conflict and factors to be considered before creating regional early warning systems like CEWARN.

1.6 Theoretical Framework

The data in the research will be based on Neo liberal theory of International Relations (a revised version of liberalism) which contends that in the international systems, states are more focused on attaining absolute gains as opposed to relative gains to other states. Neo liberals like Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye argue that owing to increased capitalist ties amongst states, those that are economically, politically and security dependent on each other are unlikely to have intense conflicts but instead use diplomatic means to resolve their differences. Democratic peace theory as advanced by Immanuel Kant also emanates from this theory and it also posits that democratic countries are unlikely to engage in war with each other. Based on this theory, the study draws the

concept that conflicts are preventable, that using advanced systems, conflict prevention is attainable, especially among countries that have established relations over time and also deepened their inter dependence.²¹

With the use of conflict early warning systems as a means to prevent conflict this theory shows that the parties involved are able to efficiently use the data collected through the early warning system stage to come to a consensus in order to respond to the concerns which potentially could have escalated conflict among the warring parties.

Also, the theory is based on the role of non-state actors, mainly the regional management bodies and their role in track one (official) diplomacy in states and in conflict management. These bodies include AU Peace and Security Council and Africa Peace and Security Architecture which consists of IGAD, ECOWAS, SADC, COMESA and EAC.

1.6 Hypotheses

- Africa is marred with great conflicts and faces great challenges in prevention and management of its conflicts.
- IGAD, through the Conflict early warning systems can contribute to the region's peace and security
- If well established, Conflict early warning systems can detect early warning signs of conflict and prevent its escalation but weak early warning systems can lead to conflict escalation.

²¹Richmond, Oliver P. "A genealogy of peace and conflict theory." In *Palgrave advances in peacebuilding*, pp. 14-38. Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2010.

1.7 Methodology

The research will use a qualitative case study which involves an in-depth investigation and analysis of an individual, institution, or specific phenomena. This design is ideal since it enables the researcher to identify specific and critical issues and views expressed by scholars and professionals who have studied conflict early warning systems. The methods of data collection will involve sourcing data from secondary and primary sources; secondary ones will be collected via library research of both unpublished and published works and also studies and publications of the sub-regional organizations globally. To get the state to forewarn, the study will rely on magazines, publications, expert opinions, and newspapers. Through CEWARN's page, the study will access the state of affairs of conflicts within the continent and the journey undertaken by the system in mitigating conflict. The reports on CEWARN, also have information on the kind of interventions sought to assess the effectiveness of CEWARN. The United Nations Security Council will also look at the state of affairs of conflict prevention, management, and resolution to get supplementary reports on CEWARD's case.

Primary data will be obtained from interviews with specific stakeholders who understand the contribution of IGAD CEWARN and the challenges faced in the running of its activities. The meetings will be sampled depending on the expertise provided and the relevance to the subject at hand- IGAD's CEWARN.

CHAPTER TWO

CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS OF PREVENTION AND MANAGEMENT OF CONFLICTS IN HORN OF AFRICA

The Chapter below introduces the main issue which is being addressed by the study, it highlights the Challenges and prospects experienced in conflict prevention management and resolution (CPMR) in Africa since the post- cold war period.

The need to have an established security architecture was necessitated by the fact that the continent may be left alone by the International community especially at a time when there are imminent and existing violent eruptions across various countries. With the creation of REC's and its security organs, it showed the continent's need to come up with solutions to the complex problems faced in the region. Key among them is the presence of peace and security which is a solid requirement for many other processes to work. As part of the solutions for preventing and part of the peace and security assurance within the region is the Conflict Early Warning Systems which became a security pillar at the continent and specifically in various regional blocs.

Despite the existence of these institutions, the continent continues to experience conflicts of varying magnitude; Using the case study on the Horn of Africa, this chapter will highlight the challenges and prospects of CPMR mechanisms.

2.1 Trends and Characteristics of Conflicts in Horn of Africa

The Horn of Africa has hosted multiple and protracted conflicts over the past years of the twentieth century and has thus been subjected to long civil wars, prolonged instability. For examples in the Sudan civil war which dates back to 1955, the Ethiopia/Eritrea which broke out when Ethiopia annexed Eritrea and the Somalia one

which started as resistance Movement against the despotic government led by Mohammed Barre

Major types of conflict are the civil wars or the transnational conflicts whereby most conflicts overlap or the inter-state ones such as one between Ethiopia and Eritrea. According to Owen Greene²², Most of these conflicts share features like the multiplicity of armed groups, the use of border regions, defying international humanitarian laws, manipulation of ethnic and tribal loyalties by the conflicting parties and the capacity of armed groups to engage in the sale of illicit, trafficking natural resources or arms including young children. i.e rebel groups in Eastern Congo.

They are also characterized by marginalization, inequality, poverty and insurgency. The quest for peace in the region has thus become a very dynamic process.

Emerging and existing conflicts in Africa continue to pose a huge threat to the progress of Africa's political, social and economic growth. Wars, rebel groups threat, terror threats, violence, ethnic violence, political instability have heavily contributed to the continent's increased human suffering and has hindered the poverty alleviation schemes.

Nonetheless, preventing such conflicts has posed great challenges to various governments, organization, civil societies and international community with some of this conflicts lasting for decades with insignificant progress, i.e Somalia, Libya, South Sudan crisis.

²² Greene, Owen, and Nic Marsh, eds. *Small arms, crime and conflict: global governance and the threat of armed violence*. Vol. 15. Routledge, 2013.

According to a report by Koffi Annan²³ 14 of the continent's 53 countries were afflicted by armed conflict in one year (1996) and over 30 wars have occurred in Africa since 1970, mostly within States and caused over 8 million people to become refugees, returnees and displaced persons.

Conflict prevention measures are required to prevent/ reduce manifested tensions and minimize outbreaks while management and reduction activities are aimed at preventing an escalated conflict and bring it to an end. Upon the end/reduced conflict, peacebuilding activities come in handy to address underlying causes of the conflict and boost resilience against similar repeats. At this stage, conflict resolution plays a role by bringing the warring parties to resolve the indifferences. Practically, most of these processes have been partaken by the various RECs, countries and international community to manage, reduce, end wars and also ensure the existence of post-conflict stability. However, most of these processes have proved futile with re - emergence of conflicts, change in dynamic of conflict, broken ceasefires among others.

For instance, In South Sudan , the Sudan Army and rebels have accused each other of breaching ceasefires ²⁴severally since 2013 when violence erupted around two years after S Sudan gained independence.²⁵

In such cases, the efforts for CPMR becomes a struggle with the constant manipulation and undermining by the actors. The CPMR process should focus on strengthening the actors involved in dispute resolution because their input is as useful as the CPMR itself.

²³Anderson, Mary B., Kofi A. Annan, Rony Brauman, Romeo A. Dallaire, Richard J. Goldstone, Colin T. Granderson, Pierre Hassner et al. *Hard choices: moral dilemmas in humanitarian intervention*. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1998.

²⁴ Forster, Robert. "Ceasefire Arrangements." *Political Settlements Research Programme* (2019).

²⁵<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/06/south-sudan-ceasefire-violated-hours-effect-180630110701463.html>

Generally, coordination of various actors is hard to achieve and therefore, when there is involvement of many actors, they should all work in the same direction to minimize widened conflict.

2.2 Misunderstanding Conflict Dynamics

One of the challenges leading to ineffective strategies of Conflict PMR, is the misunderstanding of conflict processes at hand including the contexts and the ideal possible interventions for the particular conflict. Most conflicts in the region are usually complex with deep historical roots and structural features. Nonetheless, the actors involved in PMR have developed the tendency of generalizing and over simplifying them on a single factor basis. Case in point, the pinning of ethnicity, demographics, religion, resource-based, poverty, selfish interest, border interest as single causes of a conflict. For instance, in Somalia, the conflict was merely looked at from the military - led resistance against former President Siyad Barre-led government with minimal insight on the clan based indifferences in the region which washed away the nationalists unity factor in the region), the country's poverty rate, growing population, land pressures and increased rate of unemployment which enabled the elite and military groups to take advantage and recruit them into the army.

Therefore, based on this context, it can be very easy and misleading for the actors to confuse between the secondary and primary causes of a violent conflict. Although there is usually a need to infuse the two, the primary causes of the conflict should remain the focus and then superseded by other factors, unlike some other cases where the secondary causes outplay the main causes and thus creating a stagnation in the prevention and management process.

2.3 Distinguishing the Urgent Security

Another key obstacle in the PMR process is a failure to distinguish between the needs of a regime security, human security and state security because most times, the focus is lost and the security of the vulnerable populations is unassured. Mack (ed) in his Human Security Report ²⁶released in 2005 noted that many conflicts PMR programs in the region have been aimed at securing the stability of a regime, such kind of mentality assumes that a certain regime or leadership is the sole solution and option for the residents of the country. State security, on the other hand, is aimed at protecting and establishing a strong state with

The disconnect between these types of securities therefore poses a huge threat to the achievement of a successful CPMR in an unstable area. In East Africa, the war in South Sudan, the Somalia and Rwanda and Burundi conflicts are examples of protracted conflicts where the actors involved addressed them superficially. Most of the conflicts were aimed at diplomatic interventions which resulted in the establishment of tribunals. Actors did not consider the need to address the deep concerns of the conflicting parties. As for the tribunals, the sole purpose was to punish the perpetrators of the crimes and not aimed at unearthing the deep-rooted causes of the conflict.

The case was not different for the war in South Sudan where the IGAD -intervention was mainly intermittent. It became a difficulty for several years to pinpoint the willingness of the agencies in seeking to find a lasting solution since it was merely about peace talks between Riek Machar, Salva Kiir and other parties. According to Cohen East Africa and Horn of Africa, the region has neither experienced advanced

²⁶ Mack, Andrew. "Human security report 2005: War and peace in the 21st century." *Die Friedens-Warte* 80, no. 1/2 (2005): 177-191.

conflict management from AU and International community beyond the humanitarian aid.²⁷

2.4 Failure to Seize Right Opportunities

Another challenge in CPMR is the failure to seize opportunities which call for agreements on important decisions, for instance, the ceasefire could be achieved and violence slowed down but with an uncomprehensive agreement, the violence is just on a break and may likely reemerge. For instance, the Somali case demonstrates a case where a big opportunity was missed to agree on leadership following the ouster of the Barre government. During the early period of the armed conflict(1989-1990), external efforts- international community failed to broker agreements between the Barre regime and the insurgents thus pushing for the breaking out of the full-fledged war, this may be linked to the misunderstanding of the scope of the conflict. .Mohammed²⁸ said that at the time, the international community was mainly focused on ‘bigger matters’ since it was the end of the cold war, there was the Gulf war in Kuwait. Also, the clan liberation movements In Somalia failed to agree amongst themselves on the structure of the new government following the ouster of the Barre regime. Failure to fully maximize the post-conflict stage through mediation and international pressure forced the Somalia militia commanders to further engage in a conflict leading the deadly 1991 clashes that destroyed major parts of central Mogadishu.

²⁷ Achankeng, Fonkem. "Conflict and conflict resolution in Africa: Engaging the colonial factor." *African journal on conflict resolution* 13, no. 2 (2013): 11-38.

²⁸ Mohamed, Sahnoun. "Somalia: The Missed Opportunities." *Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace* (1994): 25-27.

2.5 Ever-Changing Conflict Dynamics

Another challenge posed in conflict PMR in Africa is the failure by the actors to adapt to the ever-changing dynamics of conflict at hand. Still, on Somalia case, IGAD undertook various efforts to bolster unity among the clan and conflicting parties leading up to the establishment of the Transitional Federation Government in 2004. According to Wassara,²⁹ , the pattern of the conflict has over time evolved forcing the African Peacekeeping force (AMISOM) to be directly involved. The war is currently at a place where it is linked to terror-related threats as compared to 1989 when it was a grievance-based insurgency and 2006 when it was a war economy. The conflict has changed so rapidly and incorporated the new and destructive conflict dynamics which is driven mainly by regional and global interests. While the UN operation is known as UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) partly succeeded in ending the civil war and the war economy, it started a war with clan militia, one which eventually sabotaged its mission and its objective of ensuring the establishment of a functional stable government and promote national reconciliation.

The two-year break of the civil war, presented an opportunity for new dynamics (political, social and economic) to crop up. Based on this, Wassara says that ³⁰it is imperative to say that efforts to promote reconciliation can be threatened by elites who benefited from the war. Finally, the challenge in CPMR exposed using this example is that an effort to contain a conflict, if not carefully achieved, can unleash a deeply contentious matter- for Somalia, it exposed the political representation gap through the lens of the clans.

²⁹Wassara, Samson. "Why Conflict in South Sudan and Somalia is Beyond Prevention and Management." *Africa Insight* 49 (2019): 3.

³⁰Wassara, Samson S. "Traditional mechanisms of conflict resolution in Southern Sudan." *Berghof Foundation for Peace Support* (2007).

Even with the intervention of the IGAD and neighbouring countries through reconciliation conferences, there have been minimal tangible results, old conflicts continue flaring up while new ones make their appearances. According to Rothchild,³¹ for conflicts such as this one- ethnic groups, the intervention of political elites creates a bigger problem whereby they always try to manipulate the identity to advance their interests

2.6 Poor Reception of Conflicting Parties to CPMR

The UN intervention in Somalia was also challenged by the poor reception of the conflicting parties amid rising dangers of keeping peacekeeping operations, For instance upon the UN/US intervention in December 1992, the troops were dedicated at saving Millions of Somalis from starving and also restore peace and stability in the area. However, the killing of twenty-five Pakistani in the area and eighteen US army rangers in 1996 and 1993 forced the American government to withdraw its military personnel from the country effective 1995.

In 2006, the dynamics of the war changed entirely with the rise of well- organized Islamist movement in the region, the rise and presence of al Qaeda figures in the region and US counter-terrorism operations, Woodhouse says the polarization of the Transitional Federal Government including the increasing influence and involvement of the neighbouring Ethiopian Government all contributed to the creation of an explosive environment in Somalia.

³¹ Lake, David A., and Donald S. Rothchild. *The international spread of ethnic conflict: Fear, diffusion, and escalation*. Princeton University Press, 1998.

2.7 Regional Outlook: Prospects and Challenges

The Input of regional dimensions in the perspective of CPMR also is a great challenge and prospects in managing conflict. The involvement of neighbouring countries creates a ripple effect, changes the dynamic of a conflict and in most cases creates a security dilemma in which the pursuit of national security by a neighbouring country can result in the threat of insecurity by the parts of the region/ country experiencing conflict, Sandille ³². Also, external forces can infuse some level of ideological polarization which makes the aspect of compromise and power-sharing much more unlikely to happen.

For instance, on the Somalia case, the regional rivalry between Ethiopia and Eritrea has played out via proxy war in war-torn Somalia, Eritrea resorted to backing the insurgents while Ethiopia threw their weight on the TFG, this interference made it a regional conflict in which the two warring countries played out their rivalry.

Also, Kenya's act of sending troops in the region by providing support to TFG gave the Islamist group Al Shabaab a leeway to pay back by attacking Kenyans (through Westgate, Garissa University Attacks) on the basis that the Kenyan Government had failed Kenyans by sending Kenya Defense Forces (KDF) to Somalia. According to Miyandazi³³, this spillover effect had a great impact in Kenya and arose controversy ³⁴on whether Kenya should have their soldiers in Somalia- Even though the intent was to prevent the spread of instability to Kenya- the involvement in the conflict created a bigger enemy where facts/intent of the interference got mixed up.

³²Gwexe, Sandile G. "Prospects for African conflict resolution in the next millennium: South Africa's view." *African Journal on Conflict Resolution* 1, no. 1 (1999): 103-124.

³³ Miyandazi, Luckystar. "Kenya's military intervention in Somalia: An intricate process." (2012).

³⁴Munene, Macharia. "Conflicts and Postcolonial Identities in East/the Horn of Africa." *The crises of postcoloniality in Africa* (2015): 123-137.

Uganda and Sudan were involved post the South Sudan civil war in 2001, Sudan threw its weight behind The Sudan People's Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (*SPLM-IO*) led by Riek Machar while Uganda supported the Salva Kiir led government.

2.8 South Sudan Case

In the South Sudan case, the regime of Ethiopian President Mengistu Haile Mariam saw the emergence of SPLM/A which retaliated against the harbouring of opposition parties and rebel wings in Ethiopia and Eritrea. With the collapse of the Mengistu regime, the new leadership in Ethiopia kicked out the SPLM/A who ended up finding ground in Uganda and made Sudan retaliate by supporting Lord's Resistance Army.³⁵

This feud was reflected in South Sudan when the civil war broke out in 2013. IGAD's mediation was sabotaged since the agreement was broken by parties in 2015 and was largely blamed on the competing interests of Sudan and Uganda in South Sudan.³⁶

2.8.1 External Forces

Similarly, the challenge of negative consequences of a global conflict on an interstate conflict can result in the inability to compromise or engage in power sharing amongst the parties involved. For instance in Somalia, According to Leeson³⁷ the presence of Al Qaeda forces has forced the US and other international community to support the TFG and other non- state actors opposing the Islamist movements, this subsequently leads to the polarization into the Somalia politics and makes CPMR improbable. In Somalia still, While the influence of the diaspora has in many times resulted in peace or power

³⁵ Rudincová, K., 2017. Viability of a Secessionist State in Africa: Case of South Sudan. *Acta*

³⁶ [2] Rudincová, K., 2017. Viability of a Secessionist State in Africa: Case of South Sudan. *Acta*

³⁷Leeson, Peter T. "Better off stateless: Somalia before and after government collapse." *Journal of comparative economics* 35, no. 4 (2007): 689-710.

brokerage, it has at times been a force for war-making the war become Somali seem like a globalized nation with many interested parties with various opinions on the issue.

Former Secretary-General, Annan, in his report also pointed out that the role some of the international organisations play in this post-cold-war period enable what he said was “ foreign interests continue to play a large role in sustaining some conflicts in the competition for oil and other African resources”

2.8.2 Increased Complexity and Co-ordination Challenge

A challenge posed during the CPMR in Africa is the failure to distinguish between mandates and capabilities of the actors involved in the process. While it may seem like an ideal way to send peacekeeping mission or engage armed intervention in a conflict-torn region, the actors need to assess whether they are effective means. The catastrophic result of the UN mission in Somalia ultimately changed the developed countries involvement with them either reducing or altering the peacekeeping related support and also reduce the number of peacekeepers dispatched to UN-led operations and this poses a great challenge in the management of conflict- specifically since most countries lack the technical and resource capability to contain conflicts of higher magnitude. Developed countries, therefore resorted to providing their assistance through the response capacities of RECs like the AU- via logistics, transport, training, military advisory and finances. Nonetheless, the involvement of RECs,(as will be discussed later) has its own challenges- emanating from poor leadership and lack of political will which subsequently sabotages CPMR efforts in the region.

Also, multi-dimensional operations are faced with the challenge of increased complexity whereby there is the duplicity of roles. The convergence of institutions and actors creates a shift on the policy consensus on the nexus between development and

security ³⁸and this calls for a more integrated intervention in governance and social development and economic sectors during the aftermath of a conflict.

UN has largely been termed, according to Gowan et al³⁹ , as a fragmented system with overlaying agencies, funds and programmes which are deployed and support operations which are largely autonomous and managed under varying command chains and even funded by various agencies separately, such inter-agency relationships are competitive and difficult to coordinate

Therefore, effective CPMR needs a collaborative engagement of all stakeholders involved in the mitigation of a conflict with a detailed understanding of the scope of the conflict and keep up to date with the ever-changing dynamics of the conflict. According to Bayne⁴⁰, such kind of strategies needs to not only focus on a particular country and efficiently incorporate cross border dimensions to prevent the emergence of inconsistencies which would create loopholes and entry points for spoilers who want to enhance their agenda. For instance, the rebel groups in DRC, Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi, they are all synergized and have full operations so that attempt to foil the plans in one area forces re-emergence in another. This explains why the Rwanda rebel groups can be found in DRC where they are gaining stronghold and pose threat to the DRC citizens, same case to the Allied Democratic Forces which has expanded to DRC.

³⁸ Haslie, Anita, and Axel Borchgrevink. "International Engagement in Sudan after the CPA

³⁹Johnstone, Ian, Benjamin Cary Tortolani, and Richard Gowan. "The evolution of UN peacekeeping: unfinished business." *Die friedens-warte* (2005): 245-261.

⁴⁰Bayne, Sarah, Catriona Gourlay, and Hanna Ojanen. "Conflict prevention, management and reduction in Africa." (2006).

2.8.3 Lack of Comprehensive Action

Effective CPMR in the region needs a comprehensive action because most of the causes of conflict are deep-rooted and very profound, the challenges towards achievement of peace and development and also ineffective CPMR measures has to be addressed by the respective governments⁴¹ and its population first with minimal input from the international community to make a difference because most of the programs are usually poorly designed⁴², implemented with minimal resources and mostly are sabotaged by other selfish interests and engagement of external forces with the government.

2.9 Lack of Political Will

No matter how effective CPMR methods are in resolving conflicts, lack of political will from the leaders, politicians, Regional economic blocs, rebel leaders and other heads of conflicting parties will water down the entire process. Normally, as the conflict persists, the opposing sides and respective rebel groups usually fragment into multiple fractions thus making CPMR more complex. The mediating conflict between Sudan and South Sudan initially had only two parties at the table; the Government of Sudan and SPLM/A. However, in 2015, four parties were involved in signing the agreement on the resolution of the conflict in the Republic of South Sudan(ARCSS) which was later broken and later the Revitalised Agreement on the resolution of the conflict in the Republic of South Sudan(R- ARCSS) which had 10 parties and 17 signatories in form of national stakeholders.-The proliferation of these actors has greatly sabotaged the mediation process and implications⁴³. These peace agreements have governance sections which clearly stipulates power and power sharing and security arrangements.

⁴¹Haslie, Anita, and Axel Borchgrevink. "International Engagement in Sudan after the CPA

⁴²Commission on Human Security. *Human security now*. United Nations Publications, 2003.

⁴³ Report on the piloting of OECD/DAC's' Principles for Good International Engagement in the Fragile States' for the Case of Sudan." (2007).

With the emergence of many parties, the priority for the political and military elites is usually aimed at their interests and positions with very little emphasis on the root causes of the conflict or citizens⁴⁴. The lack of political willingness to resolve the conflict is an enabler of the conflict. The politicians constantly struggle to have a larger share of power in order to maximize their control of national wealth.

The failure of the actors to comply with the peace agreements is achieved easily because of increased actors at play, the increased interests, the transnational nature of conflict and the dominant interest of the regional actors.

Former UN Secretary Koffi Annan in his report on resolving conflict in Africa stressed the need for political will as an important means to solve Africa's problems, he challenged Africa to rely on political rather than military responses to its problems⁴⁵. Annan said that the leaders should summon the political will and take good governance seriously in order to enhance transparency and capacity in public administration.

"By not averting these colossal human tragedies [as in Rwanda, Somalia and Liberia]", says the Secretary-General, "African leaders have failed the peoples of Africa; the international community has failed them; the United Nations has failed them". Repeatedly, the Secretary General calls on all concerned to "summon the political will" to produce positive change in Africa.

⁴⁴Vhumbunu, Clayton Hazvinei. "Conflict resurgence and the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan: a hurried and imposed peace pact?." *conflict trends* 2016, no. 3 (2016): 3-12.

⁴⁵Annan, Kofi. "Crucible of Conflict—How Africa Has Shaped Conflict Management Worldwide." *Track two* 6, no. 1 (1997): 31-33.

2.9.1 Security Sector Reform as an Integral Part of CPMR

Since the study has established that most conflicts are transnational, having been built up and reoccurred based on many underlying causes, the challenge in managing them emanates from the ideology of creating a status quo whereby the CPMR aims on maintaining stability and the status quo.⁴⁶

While conflict is aimed at creating stability in a region, all efforts towards this, must be integrated with the Security sector reform whereby the main objective must be to provide and assure an effective security to the citizens and also ensure that the legitimate interests of a state are achieved with minimal external influence. Therefore, any programme engaging in CPMR should focus on the long term goal⁴⁷ and be developed in a way to promote security and good governance.

2.9.2 Undetected Early Warning Signs

Over the years, it has been widely agreed that the most efficient strategy is to prevent the emergence of wars and this is through the early warning systems. IGAD'S CEWARN, for instance, was established with a similar aim to prevent conflicts eruption in the horn of Africa. Nonetheless, this has obviously not worked effectively since the region's two countries- South Sudan and Somalia have experienced instability for nearly a decade despite the existence of a functioning IGAD and its organ- CEWARN. Normally, there have been existing opportunities to manage and prevent conflicts, for instance with the involvement of international organisations, peace talks, mediation. Nonetheless, prevention of conflicts requires more than just that, Besides the need for

⁴⁶Politologica, 9(3), pp.73–74; De Vries, L. and Schomerus, M., 2017. South Sudan's Civil War Will Not End with a Peace Deal. *Peace Review*, 29(3), pp.333–339.

⁴⁷Vhumbunu, Clayton Hazvinei. "Conflict resurgence and the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan: a hurried and imposed peace pact?." *conflict trends* 2016, no. 3 (2016): 3-12.

political will among both parties, there must be substantial political, economic, social and security engagement. In the continent, the involvement of high-level international attention has widened the scope of conflict with the involvement of more stakeholders who are key drivers of the conflict thus making it more contentious with the increased blame game, structural changes, and unnecessary interference

Conflict early warning systems are aimed at detecting signs of a looming conflict during its initial stages before the final eruption into full-blown violence, the ideology is very logic considering its preventiveness⁴⁸. Nonetheless, despite IGAD's CEWARN existence since 2002, the horn of Africa is still marred with conflict and violence including the recent violence in Ethiopia following the clash between the army and minority ethnic group. Failure to detect these early signs have over, time led to disastrous events with difficulty in managing⁴⁹. With established structures, funding and personnel, CEWARN is yet to achieve its maximum potential in serving IGAD member states. While this study it's focused on the early warning mechanism in conflict prevention, more information on the nexus between the two will be discussed in the preceding chapters. Among the leading causes of the ineffectiveness of this systems is the lack of comprehensive and systemic gathering and analysis of data, with the emergence of gaps in the collection of data, the unclarity emerges leading to a failed process.

Also, according to Babaud⁵⁰, Failure to engage multi-stakeholder cooperation also results in a failed implementation of the data collected. The actors involved must be able to draw sufficient data from a wide range of parties including the state, private

⁴⁸[\[1\]](#) Rudincová, K., 2017. Viability of a Secessionist State in Africa: Case of South Sudan. *Acta*

⁴⁹ Butterwick, Michael Robert. "Conflict Prevention: A Cautionary Analysis."

⁵⁰Babaud, Sébastien, and Natalia Mirimanova. "The European Commission early-warning architecture and crisis-response capacity." (2011).

sector, civil society, security organs, community-based groups, and peacemakers in order to come up with effective response mechanism.

2.10 Conclusion

While effective CPMR methods require maximum cooperation, good strategy and deep understanding of the conflict, it is clear that a lasting solution to Africa's conflicts must come from the continent and its leaders, institutions and people⁵¹. There are many systems put in place to mitigate, prevent, manage and resolute conflict, the first process is to maximise the use of these systems and have it efficiently perform its duties. However, due to the costly nature of conflict resolution and peacekeeping, external support from the international community may come in handy but ONLY to facilitate Africa's initiatives. They, can, therefore, channel the support through logistics, security expert advice, financial expertise and humanitarian aid.

Also, the Somalia conflict now demonstrates that peacekeeping and conflict resolution should not be fixated on military intervention but should also look at the various dynamics of the society including the civil society, community leaders, politicians, community-based civil society, international organization. With the involvement of these stakeholders, the conflict can be understood from a wider point of view and not a monopoly of using armed intervention

⁵¹Annan, Kofi. "Crucible of Conflict—How Africa Has Shaped Conflict Management Worldwide." *Track two* 6, no. 1 (1997): 31-33.

CHAPTER THREE

THE ROLE OF IGAD'S CEWARN IN MANAGING CONFLICT IN AFRICA: AN ANALYSIS OF CEWARN'S IGAD'S PEACE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE AND ITS CONTRIBUTION TO MANAGING CONFLICT IN AFRICA

The following chapter is going to focus on the role of early warning system in Africa with a specific focus on the IGAD early warning system (CEWARN), this chapter will analyze its contribution to IGAD's peace and security architecture and how it has managed various types of conflict in the horn of Africa.

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development was founded in 1996 succeeding in the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Desertification which dealt with drought and desertification issues in the Horn of Africa⁵². The mission of IGAD was, among other things to achieve peace and security in the region by creating mechanisms aimed at prevention, management, and resolution of interstate and intrastate conflicts, its members include Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, and Uganda.

As part of its mechanisms, IGAD established its conflict early warning and response mechanisms (CEWARN) in 2002 whose aim was to prevent violent conflict⁵³. Its mandate includes sharing received information related to potentially violent conflicts and update any information on their outbreak and escalation in the region.

CEWARN's aim was also to conduct and share an in-depth analysis of the information, provide possible case scenarios, and come up with an ideal response mechanism to be

⁵² Mwagiru, Makumi. "The legal framework for CEWARN." (2000).

⁵³Bereketeab, Redie. "Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD): A critical analysis." *Regional Integration, Identity, and Citizenship in the Greater Horn of Africa* (2012): 173-94.

used. The early warning system is also aimed at conducting studies on the common types and the 'hotspots' for conflict in the IGAD region⁵⁴. The most important function, however, is data collection, analysis, and quick dissemination of the data to the right people and institutions.

The history of the early warning systems can be traced back to its evolution and use of conflict early warning systems during the cold war period. While there were increased security threats over the existing ideological differences between the communist-led by the USSR and capitalists societies led by the American government, there increased the need to predict and obtain information threatening peace and security. Although the cold war was not characterized by full-blown violence, warfare, and arms, the need to spread their respective ideologies by the rival blocs saw instances when one bloc ended up destabilizing their rival's sphere of influence, a good example of this was the Vietnam wars which saw the USA and USSR play out their indifferences in the Asian country.

Although this war was a mere representation of the differing ideologies, it brought about the threat of nuclear attacks which became a new norm that forced states to arm themselves in anticipation of such violence.

In this regard, therefore, IGAD's CEWARN was formed to prepare and alarm IGAD states of potential conflict. The horn of Africa region is still marred with varying conflicts. Muhabie⁵⁵ says that the region is more the norm with conflicts⁵⁶ including

⁵⁴Kasaija, Phillip Apuuli. "The Intergovernmental Authority on Development's Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism: Can it go beyond pastoral conflicts?." *African Security Review* 22, no. 2 (2013): 11-25.

⁵⁵Mengistu, MuhabieMekonnen. "The root causes of conflicts in the Horn of Africa." *American Journal of Applied Psychology* 4, no. 2 (2015): 28-34.

⁵⁶Bereketeab, Redie. *The Horn of Africa: intra-state and inter-state conflicts and security*. Pluto Press and NordiskaAfrikainstitutet, 2013.

Sudan one in South Kordofan and the Blue Nile which erupted In 2011 following unresolved issues emanating from the bitter fighting in Sudan's 1983-2005, the feud between non-Arab minority groups that long rallied against the Arab domination of successive governments in Khartoum, forging peace with rebels has been the main agenda of Sudan's transitional government which came to power months after strongman Omar al- Bashir was toppled in 2019.

South Sudan is also marred with tensions following the civil war that broke out in 2013 two years after it gained independence, Kenya has also engaged in intra-state conflict with Ethiopia and South Sudan over Elemi Triangle including other interstate conflicts in some regions like West Pokot, Somalia on the other end is faced with every changing conflicts including the terrorism threat and clan-based feuds.

Therefore, IGAD has a huge role to play, its peace and security framework is based on a peace and security council of the African Union and United Nations and also the specific agreements and mechanisms such as the CEWARN protocol, the system has been termed as the most advanced one in Africa and shows how the continent has attempted creating own solutions to threats to peace and security. Despite the existence of underlying challenges on which the systems were built, it does not negate the fact that these systems are important facets in the continent's peace and security architecture.

The initial foundation for the formation of CEWARN did not specify the type of conflicts it would focus on but the program has tied its mandate to cross-border and pastoral conflicts. The reason for this can be attributed to the fact that IGAD member states are still not confident about each other and thus decided to focus on pastoral and

cross border conflicts which were less political and not sensitive to various governments in the horn of Africa.

A pilot study for CEWARN⁵⁷ was conducted with the pastoralist groups in the Karamoja area in Uganda including neighboring districts of Kapchorwa to prevent cross-border conflicts from breaking into violent conflicts. Based on the report, the documentation efforts by CEWARN was so effective and lauded.

3.1 Structure of CEWARN

According to the 2002 protocol, CEWARN is a very integral part of IGAD and therefore it should augur well with existing structures in the body, especially those involved in the decision making processes. Therefore, this means that the process of early warning should be seamless and every information collected should be relayed smoothly.

In line with this, At the highest level, there are the organizational structures-the Heads of State and Government, the Council of Ministers(composed of Foreign Affairs ministers), and committees.⁵⁸Under the council of ministers- the committee of Ambassadors sits and is composed of IFGAD member states' Ambassadors accredited to the country of IGAD headquarters.

The operational level has the Committee of Permanent Secretaries which is comprised of undersecretaries of member states whose role is to make political decisions on CEWARN in collaboration with the IGAD secretariat. At this level, a CEWARN unit was established to coordinate and supervise the national units known as the Conflict

⁵⁷Ashine, Yonas. "New Regionalism as a Response to Environmental Conflicts among Pastoralists of the Horn of Africa: The Case of IGAD/CEWARN." *Climate Change and Pastoralism: Traditional Coping Mechanisms and Conflict in the Horn of Africa*: 375.

⁵⁸Nyawalo, William. "Effectiveness of IGAD's Conflict Early Warning Mechanism (CEWARN)."

Early Warning and Response Units (CEWERU), CEWRU unit composes of all the seven member states.

The third level of the mechanisms is composed of the national research institutes- each represented by the member states, these institutes are mandates to infuse intellectual expertise and knowledge needed for conflict analysis. The institutes also recruit and supervise all the country coordinators and field monitors and they make sure field data is received, coded, and analysed, and submitted to CEWARN and CEWERU units.

Under operation still, the CEWARN units, besides the supervision and coordination of CEWERU units, are supposed to house each state's data reporter system and setting standards, management, coordination of quality control of data, and analysis produced.

CEWERU is mandated to receive analysis from research institutes and review them to formulate and adopt strategies that prevent conflicts and establish functioning local peace committees.

As part of efforts to enhance the activities of CEWERU, IGAD established a Rapid Response Fund (RRF), which provides finances for short-term projects aimed at preventing, minimizing, and resolving conflicts in the region. It, nonetheless, activities that are established by CEWERU and local peace committees⁵⁹. A particular focus is always placed on those programs that support dialogue, mediation, improving community access to resources, and enhance capacity building.

⁵⁹Kasaija, Phillip Apuuli. "The Intergovernmental Authority on Development's Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism: Can it go beyond pastoral conflicts?." *African Security Review* 22, no. 2 (2013): 11-25.

3.2 CEWARN Analytical Model

The CEWARN mechanism has employed qualitative and quantitative models to collect data, analyzing, and providing early warning reports. The system has adopted the *Fruhnanalyse Von Spannungen und Tatsachenermittlung* (FAST) model, which combines the two analyses to address the shortcomings of combining two models in collecting data. This model focuses on the root causes of conflict and addresses other secondary factors contributing to the escalation of violent conflict. This model, unlike others, not only looks at the main drivers of conflict but looks at other issues which may lead to de-escalation. Besides early warning, this model ensures early response strategies are well crafted. For example, in the case of pastoral conflicts, this analytical model focuses on indicators such as an increased supply of arms to communities and underlying problems such as depleted resources like pastures, engages stakeholders in peace meetings, ensures the provision of necessities, and deep engagement with community members.

According to this model⁶⁰, CEWARN gathers data using Reporter and generates the following kind of reports; Alerts, Situation Briefs, Country updates, and Cluster reports. IGAD security architecture comprising structural and supplemental data, which is used to supplement the data collected in the Reporter. Based on this conclusive reports, CEWARN will be able to prepare a long term assessment report that includes baseline surveys and annual risk assessments.

According to Schirnding⁶¹, most CEWARN indicators have been used in various fields and have played a key role in highlighting trends- problems and have contributed to

⁶¹Y. Von Schimding. Health in Sustainable Development Planning: The Role of Indicators. Geneva: World Health Organisation, 2002, P.5

conflict prevention by setting priority on key focus, formulation, and evaluation of policies and the assessment of the progress.

CEWARN's ability to identify root causes of conflict, their dynamics, and prepare predictions is boosted by the model and the proper selection of indicators that can understand and highlight the relationships between conflict and their evolution over time.

3.3 Functions of CEWARN

Facilitate the exchange of information and collaboration among member states on early warning and response based on the timeliness, transparency, cooperation and free flow of the information.

CEWARN is mandated to gather, verify, process and analyze information about conflicts in the region according to the guidelines. The body is thereafter mandated to communicate all such information and analysis to decision-makers.

The specific early warning functions of CEWARN include:

- Receiving information and reports from CEWERUs;
- Processing and analyzing such information;
- Deliver the information to the secretariat
- Provide processed information to CEWERU
- Updating processed data
- Monitoring and coordinating information collection and reporting;
- Enhance dialogue in information analysis
- Ensure smooth interconnectedness among those involved in news gathering

- Verifying information received from the CEWERUs.

3.4 CEWARN Input of Civil Society

IGAD CEWARN system has made great efforts to involve civil society groups within its structures since these groups have an area of strengths which can be used to make them more effective; they are also important since they are trusted more than the government by people at the grassroots level and have the potential of accessing critical info at the grassroots level⁶². In scenarios where the state has low structures, these bodies are the sole sources of sensitive information available at the lower level. Finally, with increased donor funding and boosted capacity, they can hire experts, acquire technology that will enhance processing and analysis, and deliver high-level information.

In recognition of these, CEWARN has set aside one seat for a civil society member representing each member state in the Technical Committee on the early warning stage. At the CEWERU stage, IGAD protocol stipulates that each member from civil society must be present.

Their involvement assures objectivity, unbiased reports, and minimizes government influence the threat of vested interests. In Both Sudan and Ethiopia, the data collection exercises have primarily been performed by the national research institutes, mainly CSOs.

Based on the brief analysis of the CEWARN, it is clear that IGAD has put in place an elaborate system whose conceptualization and implementation has achieved an ideal early warning system. It prioritizes the state and human security and has vital input of

⁶²Amao, Olumuyiwa Babatunde, Dorcas Ettang, Ufo Okeke-Uzodike, and Clementine Tugizamana. "Revisiting the Utility of the Early Warning and Early Response Mechanisms in Africa: Any Role for Civil Society." *Peace and Conflict Review* 8, no. 1 (2014): 77-93.

non-governmental actors. The system integrates both early warning and response and has infused principles that ensure reactions are effected at the most appropriate level⁶³. For instance, the Rapid Response Fund has been solely mandated to enhance peace communities and Civil Societies Organisations.

3.5 Contribution of Cewarn In Conflict Management.

The contribution of CEWARN has to be compared to the above analysis since, over time, the organization of states has identified the gap between policymaking and implementation. Mwaura ⁶⁴says that despite a perfect blueprint, an unsatisfactory performance will water down the effort.

IGAD'S CEWARN has set itself apart as a system in the continent with a well built data-based early warning system with a developed state of the art field monitoring and data analysis tool. It has highlighted the extent and dynamic nature of conflict in the pastoral areas. Its capacity for conflict prevention, management and response has been enhanced via skill training of stakeholders at all levels.

CEWARN has also managed to stir confidence and collaboration amongst all the stakeholders involved in the early warning mechanisms and that includes governments, civil society, community-based institution.

3.6 Role in Ending Pastoral conflicts in the horn of Africa

Being a third-generation system, CEWARN provides an appropriate link between the early warning system and initial response units. Practically, CEWARN, through its data

⁶³Amao, Olumuyiwa Babatunde, Dorcas Ettang, Ufo Okeke-Uzodike, and Clementine Tugizamana. "Revisiting the Utility of the Early Warning and Early Response Mechanisms in Africa: Any Role for Civil Society." *Peace and Conflict Review* 8, no. 1 (2014): 77-93.

⁶⁴Mwaura, C., &Schmeidl, S. (Eds.). (2002). *Early warning and conflict management in the Horn of Africa*. The Red Sea Press.

collection mechanism, it has developed an advanced database⁶⁵ for pastoral conflicts that can arrest the escalation of such conflicts. Due to its prone to drought and inadequate resources, the region has the largest number of pastoral disputes. Most communities rely on pastoral activities ranging from Sudan, which has the highest number, followed by Somalia, Ethiopia, and Djibouti, whose third population is pastoralists. In Kenya, semi-arid and arid land represents 80 percent of the total land area and covers 14 key regions. There are various factors which contribute to intense conflicts associated with pastoralism, and this includes cattle rustling, small arms proliferation, weak policies, and security policies and weakened governance systems, low development and land policies, marginalization of pastoralists and low engagement with governments. In Kenya, Pokots and Turkana have, over time, engaged in pastoral-related conflicts, the Ugandans in Kapachorwa regions of Uganda.

For example, based on the Karamajong case, Ateyo and Akabwai have observed that central governments in the area have a poor perception of the pastoralists viewing their lifestyle as pre-modern, which usually makes them marginalized and creates a recipe for chaos⁶⁶. Through a developed database on pastoral conflicts, CEWARN has highlighted these outlying conflicts, which have deepened human securities and are usually ignored by the state. Between 2003 and 2009, statistics reveal that 2627 violent incidents led to nearly 5,000 deaths. Such data provides an in-depth understanding of the conflict, which directs more attention to the conflict's underlying causes.

⁶⁵Ndikumana, Jean, J. Stuth, R. Kamidi, S. Ossiya, R. Marambii, and P. Hamlett. "Coping mechanisms and their efficacy in disaster-prone pastoral systems of the Greater Horn of Africa." (2000).

⁶⁶Mkutu, Kennedy. *Pastoralism and conflict in the Horn of Africa*. Saferworld. Organisation, 2001.

Besides highlighting the plight to various stakeholders, the system has built up confidence among the key actors involved and ensures the involvement of local actors in the CEWERU activities. A comprehensive unit can work seamlessly and build trust within the community. By incorporating norms and values at an early warning stage, the culture of CEWARN is easily localized and institutionalized. The study, therefore, notes that CEWARN has been able to contribute towards the process of entrenching early warning cultures in the Areas of Reporting (AORs).

3.6.1 CEWARN In Ethiopia

IGAD established the Conflict Early warning system in Ethiopia in 2003 in line with the protocol; it has two components: early warning system and first response unit, the operation in Ethiopia is based in two clusters; the Karamoja, which is more recent, and Somali clusters which is fully operational.

Using the information collected in the area by three field monitors, a baseline study of the area was first produced in 2004. Since then, quarterly reports have been issued periodically to CEWERU units for public use after being analyzed before being adopted by the CEWER steering committee. The Early warning and response units are linked institutionally and operationally and are functional in Ethiopia.

CEWARN also has a crucial role in disseminating early warnings, which eventually prevented the eruption of violent conflicts. Since 2002, the system has produced various signs led by the first one, which was vital in stopping a conflict between pastoral communities of Dassench and Turkana of Ethiopia and Kenya respectively; this conflict was about fishing on Lake Turkana which was faulted by the Turkana communities

who decried increased fishing by the Dassench fishermen working for a state-owned business.⁶⁷

The Turkana communities complained that the former was depleting fishing resources and their source of livelihood. The Dassench had started engagement with Kenya Somali traders due to their lower prices. In return, the Turkana attacked the Ethiopian fishermen ten times separately within a week stealing fishing nets, and within no time, the situation escalated, which involved Kenyan security forces and saw the killing of 12 people.

In response, the first alert was sent to CEWARN by National Research Institutes. (NRI) who relayed the information to the steering committee member institutions who passed the info requesting security measures at the border; within fourteen days, security beefed up on the Ethiopian side of the Lake that stopped the movement of communities' movement and reduced theft of fishing equipment⁶⁸. In Kenya, local administrators discussed with Turkanas, who agreed to return the stolen equipment and engage in mutual fishing.

3.6.2 An Analysis of the alert process

The main reason that led the NRI to produce these alerts mainly was that NRI had not encountered fishing incidents related to the fishing activities between these two communities and this presented a different dimension from the previous factors such as grazing fields and watering points.

⁶⁷Ngugi, Timothy N. "Conflict early warning systems and conflict management: a case study of Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Conflict Early Warning and Response mechanism." PhD diss., University of Nairobi, Kenya, 2011.

⁶⁸Ashine, Yonas. "New Regionalism as a Response to Environmental Conflicts among Pastoralists of the Horn of Africa: The Case of IGAD/CEWARN." *Climate Change and Pastoralism: Traditional Coping Mechanisms and Conflict in the Horn of Africa*: 375.

Also, government security forces involvement was new warning information that raised a concern that could have triggered a similar response from the Ethiopian security forces and subsequently transformed the conflict into a cross-border one and possibly an interstate one. Therefore, these two aspects raised the number of conflict indicators and prompted the release of the alert to the CEWERU via an email statement in 2005. After careful dissemination, CEWARN witnessed the following activities.⁶⁹

1. Beefed-up security on the Ethiopian side and increased discussion among the local communities on an agreed consensus

Another alert was about a conflict between the Dassench and Karamoja in Uganda, which began in 2005. Ten matches had occurred before the signal was produced by CEWARN, resulting in 10 people's death and 220 cattle theft. The NRI used the following reasons to produce the alert. First, the area's pastoral conflict pattern showed that the elders played a crucial role in the peacemaking process and enhancing peace in the region. Still, for this conflict, the elders were the ones inciting the youth to attack each other.

Second, this specific conflict's scope covered a wider area, unlike previously, when concentrated in fewer places. For this one, youths from distant communities became increasingly involved in solidarity with their fellow community members, including Nyangaton and Topossa communities, who lived in neighboring Sudan who had close ties with Ethiopia. These communities had begun crossing the border to assist the Ethiopian communities. Such development posed a significant threat to the conflict's escalation, becoming an interstate one.

⁶⁹Ashine, Yonas. "New Regionalism as a Response to Environmental Conflicts among Pastoralists of the Horn of Africa: The Case of IGAD/CEWARN." *Climate Change and Pastoralism: Traditional Coping Mechanisms and Conflict in the Horn of Africa*: 375.

Similarly, another factor that led to NRI to send the alert was the limited capacity of the district administration. The incident occurred when preceding the May election in Ethiopia, which had resulted in a reshuffling exercise for the officials at the Zonal level; the activity led to a gap and incapacity of local leaders to act on the escalating conflict.

The alert paved the way for the conduct of negotiations and peace conferences, which calmed the situation; the signal was followed by a briefing with CEWERU, which saw the alert's delivery to steering committee member⁷⁰s, the Ministry of Federal Affairs, Defense, and the Federal Police. However, the government agencies indicated their inability to respond to the situation unless authorized by the regional government. Eventually, the message was delivered to the regional authorities. The following measures were taken: deployment of local security forces and increased local authorities' intervention to encourage indifference settlement.

In this regard, Nyawalo observed that CEWARN has made few attempts to resolve cross border conflicts in Ethiopia. The political will and enthusiasm from the CEWERU side are visible and can be manifested by the full representation of member institutions and the seriousness in the report's review process. The action taken in these two alerts was successful. Furthermore, the activities undertaken to form local response committees were effects. Initial reports' information collection and production are attainable With a developed early warning unit, translating the data into useful information that can be translated into action should remain the core of the conflict early warning system.

⁷⁰Needs, A., and I. G. A. D. CEWARN's. "Investigating the Potential of Peace Committees in Ethiopia."

As a vital facilitator of the achievements of CEWARN is the increased involvement of CSOs in the operations, the early warning component is being handled by CSOs or National Research Institute, with the use of CSOs, the collection of data is unbiased as well the production of independent and objective reports.⁷¹ Therefore, this promotes useful early warning collection, except, of course, for the partisan CSOs. The trust built between CSOs and government agencies is also supplemented by the input of local communities who are directly involved in the dispute resolution process at the lower level of conflict management processes.

3.7 Prospects of CEWARN In Ethiopia

In Ethiopia, the recent clashes in the Oromo region that saw the death of more than 200 people and arrest of 3500 people, including Kenyan journalists, Oromo activists, and several supporters, questions the role of the conflict early warning system.⁷² The erupted conflict was poorly handled, considering its early warning signs, including the anti-government protests spearheaded by Hachalu Hundessa (who was later killed) and the Tigrayans community grievances.

The country is still filled with ethnic tensions, which can be historically traced with underlying causes. The early warning system has emphasized on the pastoralists and cross border conflict, putting less emphasis on other dynamic conflict causes.

Ethiopia-Eritrea Conflict- The two countries for a long time engaged in conflict with structural and dynamic causes linked to ideological differences, border disputes and the rights of citizenship. The Ethiopian parliament had issued a warning on the inevitability

⁷¹Mwagiru, Makumi. "Conflict early-warning and response mechanisms: a review of sub-regional organisations in Africa." *Africa Review* 2, no. 2 (2010): 163-174.

⁷²Kasaija, Phillip Apuuli. "The Intergovernmental Authority on Development's Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism: Can it go beyond pastoral conflicts?." *African Security Review* 22, no. 2 (2013): 11-25.

of war between the two states. However, failure to act on these warnings led to widening of rift between the two countries.

3.8 CEWARN Activities in Kenya

CEWARN has also enhanced capacity building in early warning and management of conflicts. In 2010, CEWARN held a capacity building program in Kenya⁷³; Eldoret garnered 60 grass-root women organizations Karamoja cluster with a critical aim of boosting their ability to prevent conflict eruption. Similarly, in Hawassa town, Ethiopia, CEWARN collaborated with a German agency through a training workshop that focused on best practices towards meeting local responses. The training program targeted government and NGOs stakeholders from IGAD member states.

To minimize incapacities, CEWARN also set up a Rapid Response Fund, w finances short term projects that prevent de-escalating and resolving pastoral -related conflicts.⁷⁴

3.8.1 Kenya's 2007/8 Post Election Violence

The conflict witnessed in Kenya raised many questions on why IGAD's early warning systems failed to give the necessary warning, further questioning its effectiveness in arresting such a conflict. Despite having well-placed structures, the unit has obtained warning information in the two pilot clusters- The Karamoja cluster comprising Baringo, Trans Nzoai, West Pilot, and Turkana counties and the Somali group comprising of Isiolo, Marsabit, Mandera, Wajir, and Garissa counties.

Ahead of the 2007 General Election, the country had been partly divided along with the calls for constitutional change, which saw President MwaiKibaki and his former ally

⁷³Murithi, Edward E. "An evaluation of IGAD conflict early warning system in addressing the Kenya post-election violence, 2007-2008." PhD diss., University of Nairobi, 2015.

⁷⁴Ekuam, Daudi E. "Livestock identification, traceability and tracking: Its role in enhancing human security, disease control and livestock marketing in IGAD region." *Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies* (2009).

Raila Odinga take an early election campaign. Kenyan elections have been characterized by ethnic divides, deep historical land injustices, especially among specific communities. While Kibaki campaigned based on his socio-economic track record in the first term, Odinga caught millions of Kenyans' plight with the call for political and socio-economic reform. As the country awaited results on December 29, the Electoral Commission of Kenya Chair Samuel Kivuiti shocked Kenyans when he said he is still awaiting results from some returning officers, further instilling tensions among Kenyans. Shortly after, the country was marked with violence-shooting, looting, burning houses, blocking roads, and as a wave, it happened in various parts of the country. According to Von⁷⁵, the violence would be avoided if IGAD had done an active role during the campaign and election period by sending election observers to monitor the progress. Nonetheless, this was not possible since the sub mandate of CEWARN restricts it from performing such roles. With such repetitive violence in Kenya since 1992, which mirrors those in Sudan and Somalia, IGAD through CEWARN is doing nothing to address its mandate to promote the region's security architecture, which plays a huge role in destabilizing the region.

There were various triggering factors leading to the PEV, including unemployed youth, negative ethnicity, and inciting media.⁷⁶

3.8.2 Role of CEWARN In Elemi Triangle

Elemi triangle is a hotly contested area bordering Kenya, Ethiopia, and South Sudan, and the threat of the conflict in the area is still glaring, its caught up in a reoccurring spate of intra and interstate wars having major causes linked to the presence of five

⁷⁵ Von, K.N., and Kopfmüller, S. 2006. Conflict Early Warning Systems. Lessons Learned from Establishing a Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) in the Horn of Africa.

⁷⁶Waki, Philip N. *Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Post Election Violence (CIPEV)*. Government Printer, 2008.

major ethnic groups in the area. At the core of the triangle is the Turkana who move around Kenya and South Sudan, the Didinga and Toposa from South Sudan, grazing their cattle on western parts of Ilemi, the Nyangatom from South Sudan and Ethiopia, and Dassanech, who occasionally use the triangle. The Ilemi triangle currently has natural resources(cite) such as oil and mineral and plays a considerable role in contributing to increased violence in the area. Some of the reasons which contribute to conflict in the area are the lack of an official state presence, the lack of an exact boundary, scarcity of sufficient resources for all, shared resources like OmorRiverm Gibe Dam and Lake Turkana, availability of illegal weapons, and the social exclusion and marginalization in the region.

Odote⁷⁷ established the role and impact of conflict early warning systems in the prevention of conflict in the Ilemi triangle through a collection of demographics data and examination of situational factor such as the most vulnerable lot that are affected, the role of actors in conflict PMR, the standard interventions in conflict prevention and the role of governments, international institutions, negotiators, and those who instigate such conflicts.

As part of efforts to prevent conflict escalation, CEWARN engaged governments in securing their borders, provide security to safeguard its people against attacks, educate people, and arresting law offenders.

IGAD has played a vital role in cross-border pastoralists and related conflicts, and most of the insecurity issues have been linked to human security problems⁷⁸. In 2011, May,

⁷⁷Odote, Peterlinus O. "Role of Early Warning Systems in Conflict Prevention in Africa: Case Study of the Ilemi Triangle." PhD diss., University of Nairobi, 2016.

⁷⁸Wild, Hannah, Jok Madut Jok, and Ronak Patel. "The militarization of cattle raiding in South Sudan: how a traditional practice became a tool for political violence." *Journal of International Humanitarian Action* 3, no. 1 (2018): 2.

Kenya, and Ethiopia had some of their communities engage in attacks, which led to 24 fatalities. The two countries eventually settled the matter through diplomatic interventions; CEWARN field monitors had picked up the case in 2009 and had made appropriate reports. According to CEWARN, the local peace committees had already engaged the communities to prevent further conflict deterioration at the time of government intervention.

The pilot CEWARN system employed in Karamojong clusters has significantly impacted cross border rustling and arms trafficking in the region. Nonetheless, the area is still marred with conflicts of varying magnitudes; in its adopted strategy in 2012, IGAD broadened its mandate to focus on other disputes in the region, which was differently adopted in various countries.

SUDAN

IGAD's early warning mechanisms were introduced in Sudan during its formation in 2000 with the Khartoum Declaration of November 23, 2000, which finalized the 8th IGAD summit, which called for creating a draft CEWARN protocol. Since its inception in 1994, IGAD has attempted to resolve the Southern Sudan conflict⁷⁹ through the Declaration of Principle initiative in 1995. Both the government and SPLM responded to the declaration, and negotiations began under Kenya's committee. These negotiations evolved in 2002, wherein the first protocol on the agreement was signed and subsequently led to the January 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). Currently, Sudan has established a national unit of early warning and response and a

⁷⁹Wild, Hannah, Jok Madut Jok, and Ronak Patel. "The militarization of cattle raiding in South Sudan: how a traditional practice became a tool for political violence." *Journal of International Humanitarian Action* 3, no. 1 (2018): 2.

focal point at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Several workshops have been organized in the country to boost the use of conflict early warning system.

Under the first workshop held in August 2003, the aim was to find and provide information on the initiation of mechanism to the interested parties. The second one, held in August 2004, aimed to launch the national agency of early warning through a meeting with the steering committee and subsequently provide logistics. The early warning capacities have, however, not been efficient in other areas. Especially with minimum impact recorded so far, for instance, in both Sudan and South Sudan, which has witnessed conflicts over the years, the Sudan Conflict early warning response unit has not engaged in activities despite having structures in place, which many have blamed inadequate funding and logistical difficulties. CEWARN technical committee held several meetings at the Steering committee level to elaborate on the terms of reference for the mechanism's local level. Despite Sudan occupying a more massive chunk of the Karamajong cluster, which was under the CEWARN pilot program, the area still faces operationalization issues and is only useful in the Ethiopian-Kenyan and Ugandan-Kenyan border. It is not operational in the Sudanese-Ethiopian, Sudanese-Ugandan, and Sudanese-Kenyan border owing to the conflict in South Sudan. According to Nyawalo⁸⁰, The main challenge which has hindered the implementation of the CEWARN mechanism on the Sudanese side is the failure to design successful linkages between the committees of DDR and the CEWERU local committees and the national steering ones who are jointly expected to work within the national early warning units.

⁸⁰Nyawalo, William. "Effectiveness of IGAD's Conflict Early Warning Mechanism (CEWARN)."

In Sudan, the South Sudan Peace and Reconciliation Commission, United Nations Development Program(UNDP), and InterGovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) conducted training on conflict early warning systems in Juba in 2019 to activate the CEWER system in line with other IGAD member states. These units are expected to work jointly with research institutions and civil society organizations to provide data to the Sudanese Karamoja cluster.

The rebel activities in Uganda through the Lord's Resistance Army has also hindered effective early warning mechanism in Southern Sudan. The South Sudan Government and the Ugandan Government are working closely to drive the LRA forces outside Sudan and pose a delicate situation since the technical committee of early warning has been prohibited from passing any information on the LRA. Since LRA has found a ground to operate, it inhibits functions of CEWARN, the scope of the program should apply to

This organization to achieve an effective regional mechanism that would prevent conflict in the region.

According to the Africa Security Review by Hassan⁸¹, the national CEWERU in Sudan lacks an appropriate financial means to operationalize. CEWARN identified the University of Juba Peace and Development Studies as the research center that would receive information, analyze it, and submit the reports to the national CEWERU. The national steering committee should have had an official headquarters which would be coordinating with other CEWARN institutions. The CSOs would have a representative who would be appointed by the Steering committee. However, CEWERU institutions

⁸¹Hassan, Rania. "CEWARN's new strategy framework: Implications for Sudan and South Sudan's existing and emerging conflicts." *African Security Review* 22, no. 2 (2013): 26-38.

cannot function well without adequate human resources and financial means to operate.

On the other hand, KENYA has the CEWERU units are more advanced with the existence of synergies and peacebuilding structures and initiatives. The lack of coherence between national forms that collect and process information and the existing CEWARN units have derailed the work of conflict early warning systems. CEWARN has, however, displayed its successes through the areas of database development and management of recurrent conflicts, enhancing the capacity of actors as well as creating trust between member states

Based on the effectiveness of CEWARN of conflict prevention of the pastoral-related conflict in the Karamoja clusters, Nyawalo notes that this is sufficient to prove that it is a useful program to provide actionable data can be used in conflict prevention and mitigation. Therefore, Based on the hypothesis presented by this study, First, CEWARN has effectively helped in conflict mitigation through early warning mechanisms. Secondly, the Timely provision of early warning signals by IGAD's conflict early warning program positively correlates with conflict resolution in Africa's IGAD region having success stories. It has been shown that early warning signals have been used effectively to prevent further escalation of conflicts.

CHAPTER FOUR

DATA ANALYSIS, FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

4.1 Introduction

This chapter presents analysis and findings of the study as set out in the research methodology. The results are presented on challenges and prospects of prevention and management of conflicts in Africa

4.1.1 Response Rate

The study targeted 50 respondents IGAD (employees) in collecting data. From the research study, 48 out of 250 respondents filled in and returned the questionnaire contributing to 98% response rate. According to Wimmer and Dominick (2006), a response rate of 70% and above is acceptable for self-administered questionnaires. It guarantees accuracy and minimizes bias. Therefore, the data collected is consistent and can be relied on for unbiased results.

4.1.2 Demographic Profile of the Respondents

This section covers the general characteristics about the respondents who took part in the research. The background information sought from the IGAD CEWARN employees was gender, age group and department the employee worked.

4.1.2.1 Gender

From table 4.1 the findings found that the male gender was fifty four percent (54%) and the female gender forty six percent (46%). This shows that female and male genders were well represented and the difference does not affect the findings of this study..

Table 4. 1 : Composition of Respondents by Gender


Gender	Frequency (n)	Percentage (%)
Male	26	54%
Female	22	46%
Total	48	100%

Source: (Field data,2020)

4.1.2.2 Age Group of Respondents

The study sought to determine the age category of the respondents and therefore requested the respondents to indicate their age groups. From figure 4.1 the study established that twenty nine percent (29%) of respondents were aged below 25 years, Twenty one percent (21%) of respondents were aged between 26-30 years, twenty five (25%) of respondents were aged between 30-35 years, four percent (4%) of the respondents were aged between 36-40 years and twenty one percent (21%) were aged over 40 years. This implies all age groups of respondents were distributed evenly.

Figure 4.1: Age group




Source: (Field data, 2020)

4.1.2.3 Duration of working at the Organization

From figure 4.2 respondents were also asked to indicate the duration working in the organization they are working. Twenty one percent (21%) of the respondents had worked for less than 5 years, fifty four percent (54%) of respondents had worked for less than 10 years and twenty five percent (25%) of employees had worked for less than 20 years in the organization..

Figure 4.2: Duration of working in the organization



Source: (Field data, 2020)

The study sought to determine the duration of working by respondents and therefore requested the respondents to indicate their responses. From the findings it was established that most of the respondents as had worked for long period to understand the subject matter under study and therefore their responses will be reliable for analysis.

4.2 Study Findings

4.2.1 Challenges and prospects of conflict prevention and management in Africa

From Table 4.2 the responses of respondents on the challenges and prospects of conflict prevention and management in Africa. A Likert scale was used to rate the level of responses on each indicator.

Table 4.2 :Responses on challenges and prospects of conflict prevention and management in Africa

Statement	Strongly disagree	disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly agree
Conflicts are becoming protracted by intense rivalries between global powers and regional powers as they support proxies to wage conflicts	1	5	6	12	24
Leaders use pretext of counter terror to crush dissent and political opposition it escalates conflict	0	0	4	28	16
Military intervention in regime change escalates violent conflicts	2	0	1	30	15
Struggling humanitarianism has brought a challenge in managing conflicts	1	7	8	20	12

Table 4.2, majority of twenty four (24) respondents ‘strongly agreed’ that Conflicts are becoming protracted by intense rivalries between global powers and regional powers as they support proxies to wage conflicts hence form a consensus. Majority of Twenty eight (28) respondents agree that Leaders use pretext of counter terror to crush dissent and political opposition it escalates conflict. Thirty (30) respondents agreed that Military intervention in regime change escalates violent conflicts. Respondents further agreed that struggling humanitarianism has brought a challenge in managing conflicts.

Based on the response findings it is evident that majority of respondents agree on challenges faced by African countries. This implied that the respondent’s responses closely clustered around agreed. The fact that respondent’s responses clustered around ‘agree” implied that respondents agreed on the challenges.

Respondents further indicated on the prospects of conflict management as increased willingness and determination among leaders to enter into negotiation intended to resolve conflict, increased political dialogue and confidence building efforts among countries in the region, Another is return of IDPs and refugees to their countries of origin. Prospect also mentioned was increased respect for regional protocols for peace and development with increased attention on the region by international partners.

4.2.2 What is the role of IGAD’S CEWARN in managing conflict in Africa

From Table 4.3 the responses of respondents on the role of IGAD’S CEWARN in managing conflict in Africa. A Likert scale was used to rate the level of responses on each indicator.

Table 4.3 : Responses on role of IGAD’S CEWARN in managing conflict in Africa

Statement	Strongly disagree	disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly agree
Disaster risk management programme including training, resource mobilization, as well as implementation of regional food security strategy and risk disaster fund	0	0	4	29	15
Alleviation and mitigation of humanitarian crises to maintain peace and stability in the region	1	6	3	31	7
It has developed a draft protocol on democracy governance and election to align member states practices in conflict management	2	2	4	28	12

Table 4.3, majority of twenty-nine (29) respondents ‘agreed’ that the role of IGAD is Disaster risk management programme including training, resource mobilization, as well as implementation of regional food security strategy and risk disaster fund. responses were majority at thirty-one (31) respondents agreed that another role of IGAD was alleviation and mitigation of humanitarian crises to maintain peace and stability in the region.

Respondents were further asked on the role of IGAD and most responses twenty eight (28) making majority indicated it has developed a draft protocol on democracy governance and election to align member states practices in conflict management.

Based on the response findings it’s evident that majority of respondents agree that the role of IGAD is developing Disaster risk management programme including training, resource mobilization, as well as implementation of regional food security strategy and risk disaster fund, Alleviation and mitigation of humanitarian crises to maintain peace and stability in the region and developing a draft protocol on democracy governance and election to align member states practices in conflict management.

4.2.3 What are some of the challenges sabotaging the functions of CEWARN

From Table 4.3 the responses of respondents on the challenges sabotaging the functions of CEWARN. A Likert scale was used to rate the level of responses on each indicator.

Table 4.4 : Responses on challenges sabotaging the functions of CEWARN

Statement	Strongly disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly agree
Presence of a number of illegal armed groups	2	11	8	25
Persistence of a climate of tension and mistrust among political leaders	0	1	12	29
Proliferation of small arms and light weapons	1	3	12	32
Illegal exploitation of natural resources	2	2	12	32
Contested boundaries	0	3	11	34
Population displacement	0	4	7	35

Table 4.4, majority of twenty-five (25) respondents ‘strongly agreed’ that Presence of a number of illegal armed groups sabotage conflict resolution. Twenty-nine (29) respondents strongly agree persistence of a climate of tension and mistrust among political leaders is another factor causing sabotage. Thirty-two (32) respondents strongly agreed Proliferation of small arms and light weapons is another major factor.

CHAPTER FIVE

CHALLENGES SABOTAGING THE FUNCTIONS OF CEWARN

IGAD's CEWARN system has proven effective in mitigating few related pastoral conflicts in the region, especially in Karamoja cluster. The existence of a conflict warning mechanism is aimed at ensuring continuous monitoring, prevention, and management of violent conflict, an objective which IGAD has failed, and this is evidenced by the various conflicts experienced in the horn of Africa, including the recent ones in Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia and Northern Parts of Kenya regions. The majority of these conflicts have deep-seated causes which could be easily evaluated and detected during the early stages by the CEWARN. The following chapter highlights various challenges by CEWARN in partaking its mandate to mitigate conflicts in the horn of Africa.

5.1 Inadequate Resources

Inadequate financial and human resources have sabotaged the operations of CEWARN. According to the institutional mandate of CEWARN, the program is supposed to align to standard operating procedures stipulated in its order; the initiative lacks the drive to explore new options and challenges but has been fixed on the technical, institutional, communication channels and decision making structures⁸². Although the CEWARN process has played a key role in its successes, the lack of sufficient resources and the need to use before the eruption of violence conflict receives less attention. That is why the program has explored the use of CSOs, especially in the information collection stage, whereby most CSOs are mandated to operate as the CEWERU units.

⁸²Kasaija, Phillip Apuuli. "The Intergovernmental Authority on Development's Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism: Can it go beyond pastoral conflicts?." *African Security Review* 22, no. 2 (2013): 11-25.

Nonetheless, the use of external collaborators encourages dependency, which is likely to sabotage the effective function of early response to conflicts.

IGAD has recognized that the initiative is also being hindered by the operational implementation gaps, which include the inadequate information base to collect early warning signs, and thus it misses out on critical information that poses a threat to the eruption of conflict in the horn of Africa.

The regional body also acknowledges that it lacks an effective response component; the IGAD secretariat is incapacitated, the number of staff employed in the headquarters is inadequate due to the incapability and low funding of CEWARN and IGAD. The regional body is yet to decide whether the operations mandated to CEWARN will expand to other types of conflict and this creates a limbo in the operation of the Program. Given the vastness of the IGAD region and the diverse problems faced in the area, a large number of staff is needed at the regional level to gather data and report on any possible emerging conflicts. However, CEWARN has limited capacity with less staff. According to Tiruneh⁸³, due to the deficiencies in the member states' governance, civil servants and public servants lack the individual responsibility to effectively monitor and report human rights situations, early warning conflict signs, and injustices in their countries.

IGAD has restricted its mandate to two pilot areas, which is focused on cross border level conflicts, the fact that the compromised political-linked conflicts sabotage the order of the EWR system to predict violent conflict because most violent disputes in the horn of Africa are tied to political temperatures of respective IGAD member states.

⁸³Tiruneh, BirikitTerefe. "Establishing an early warning system in the African peace and security architecture: Challenges and prospects." (2010).

However, the focus on the local cross-border disputes has been advantageous to IGAD's EWR because it is collected at a local level, a key aspect in need of local space in mediating conflict.

However, CEWARN does not provide mechanisms to consult with member states during the negotiations and participation of the civil society organizations; the initiative lacks a credible mechanism for regional responses to the cross-border crisis. According to Bond⁸⁴, IGAD is also being threatened by the implementation of early warning mechanisms, as most governments are entitled, assumed power through violent means and, therefore, view violence as an inevitable means to attain power; this sabotages the process due to lack of state commitment among member states.

The Ultimate Challenge for IGAD will be to convince member states to cooperate to activate CEWARN for the interest of the entire region and galvanize support from the international community to resource and monitor the process based in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, as part of the IGAD directorate on political and humanitarian affairs

The IGAD Secretariat is incapacitated with inadequate expert human resources, which has subsequently sabotaged the EWR systems. As of 2012, CEWARN's headquarters in Addis Ababa had only 13 personnel, including five early warning specialists working on a full shift. Five individuals working for such a big regional body with many member states negatively impact their performance since they are stretched beyond their limits⁸⁵. Even if the program employed Information Communication Technology

⁸⁴Meier, Patrick, Doug Bond, and Joe Bond. "Environmental influences on pastoral conflict in the Horn of Africa." *Political Geography* 26, no. 6 (2007): 716-735.

⁸⁵Waweru, Rachael W. "Implementation of conflict early warning and early response: IGAD-CEWARN in Kenya." PhD diss., University of Nairobi, Kenya, 2012.

services, the lack of experienced employees would not result in an ineffective CEWARN.

Friedman⁸⁶ has noted that most policymakers and information specialists⁸⁷ have not suffered from information shortage but the opposite, information saturation whereby they cannot analyze and timely relay the reports. Therefore, any individual mandated to investigate information must be competent enough to make good use of FM's data.

Zenko, on the other hand, noted that most of the data generated from the early warning system lack the intellectual rigor with a key focus on politically insensitive conflicts, which does not warrant the attention of policymakers since it has not posed a major threat. Fanta, on the other end, noted that the appointments to IGAD secretariat are politically linked and lacking the merit and professionalism. Competency should be a major concern during the recruitment because data collected by FM s cannot be merely used unless carefully analyzed by the greatest minds.

5.2 International Influence

The majority of African policymakers are still dependant on external factors and have not taken full control of the continent's future, and this is why we find many think tanks funded externally, with the majority of them based outside the continent. In their argument, Gilbert Khadiagala and Lyons noted in their book *African Foreign Policies, Power and Process*⁸⁸ that there are 'constraints' that sabotage the scholars and policy

⁸⁶Zenko, Micah, and Rebecca R. Friedman. "UN early warning for preventing conflict." *International Peacekeeping* 18, no. 1 (2011): 21-37.

⁸⁷WEBB, PATRICK. "PREVENTING CATASTROPHES: DISASTER AND CONFLICT EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS." (2007).

⁸⁸Social Council. Committee for Development Policy, and Social Council. Committee for Development Policy. Session. *Development Challenges in Sub-Saharan Africa and Post-conflict Countries: Report of the Committee for Development Policy on the Seventh Session (14-18 March 2005)*. United Nations Publications, 2005.

makers' will in the continent⁸⁹. The two noted that outside forces have a significant influence in the region, and this has seen the rising need to secure socio-economic requirements with minimal impact. It remains the fact that Africa's foreign and security policy is still shaped against the national interests of states⁹⁰. Instead, the external survival forces have used it to acquire political and economic power and manage rising threats according to their understanding and against African states' interest.

CEWARN is externally funded.⁹¹ The European Union is the main partner to the entire continental conflict early warning mechanism; it is also supported by the United States International Agency for Development (USAID), Germans, and member states. The contributions made by IGAD member states are not sufficient to finance operations in the secretariat and the implementation of programs. At the same time, some member states do not frequently make their regular contributions. Overreliance on donors loses the system's independence and their ability to undertake a response mechanism that relies on financial inputs. Also, CEWARN becomes unable to recruit required staff members.⁹²

African governments need to be more active players in CPMR initiatives. All actors involved, including CSOs, NGOs, local communities, government representatives, and private sector bodies, should play a key role and not merely participate as observers in the wider scene. Lack of cooperation among these bodies⁹³ However, international

⁸⁹Khadiagala, Gilbert M., and Terrence Lyons, eds. *African foreign policies: Power and process*. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001.

⁹⁰Jane Boulden, *Responding to Conflict in African: The United Nations and Regional Organizations* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 52-53.

⁹¹Macharia, Mwangi J. "Engaging the Right Security Actors in the Horn of Africa: The Case for CEWERU in CEWARN in the IGAD framework."

⁹²United Nations University-Comparative Regional Integration Studies. *Capacity Survey: Regional and Other Intergovernmental Organizations in the Maintenance of Peace and Security*. Bruges: UNU-CRIS, 2008. p.85

⁹³OECD, *Conflict and Fragility International Engagement in the Fragile States Can't We Do Better? Can't We Do Better?* (N.P: OECD Publishing, 2011), 14. 218

players have been faulted for ignoring the work done at the grassroots levels and usually come up with external preventive strategies that do not augur well with the risks. International input on any regional conflict should be objective, timely, and must be based on the local actors' efforts⁹⁴. While procedures must be abided by, the excessive rigidity on intergovernmental organs' functioning must be reduced to reduce political sensitivities surrounding conflicts.

Failure to understand the various dynamics of conflict also presents a major challenge to the CEWERU units as they seek to identify a set of principal political conflict escalation indicators. There are multiple conflicts between states ranging from territorial, trade, resource-based, ethnic-based, among others; these dynamics present a confusing and complex scenario for actors involved in Africam's horn. The CEWERU teams must comprehend the contextual factors and challenges, including the diverse opinions of each conflict's risk, to establish proper complementary responses. Failure to do so will present a case whereby CEWARN emphasizes the inability to mitigate conflict rather than tackling the contextual challenges by advancing the management approaches to early warning signs.

5.3 Challenge of Knowing What to Collect

CEWARN is also challenged by the fact that its mandate has been fixed on collecting, analyzing, and disseminating information, which has made it look like a 'mere' spectator in conflict prevention.⁹⁵ By sharing information, the program is dependent on the decision-making body, which plays a major role in early response. Although CEWARN

⁹⁴ United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, *Development Challenges in Sub-Saharan Africa and Post-Conflict Countries: Report of the Committee for Development*

⁹⁵ Wenani, Andrew K. "Conflict early warning and early response mechanisms in the IGAD sub-region: an analysis of the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict, 1996-2000." PhD diss., 2003.

has been linked to the decision-making body, it has created a bureaucracy whereby various communications departments hinder the smooth flow of information. Therefore, these structures' existence slows the policy decision process, which is so critical in enhancing early response and subsequently sabotages the late response to conflict.

The first challenge by the CEWERU units is asking the question, early warning of what? A sneak peek into the literature on early warning and response mechanisms reveals that the alarm should alert any impending danger to human life and the environment. However, dissecting this information onto whether it's supposed to an alert on genocide, armed conflict, ethnic tension, state failure, natural resources feud, internal displacement, or alienation of certain community members should be the greatest challenge. Some of these alerts are closely linked and can be understood in different contexts, depending on the demographics of the area in the study. For instance, a natural resource-rich place could be having deep ethnic divisions, but it could be a very insignificant factor that triggers conflict, case scenario of countries like Tanzania with very many tribes. Therefore, it is imperative for actors involved to be well-versed with the conflict dynamics of an area. Rupensinghe⁹⁶ further observes that the Rwandan crisis could have been overlooked by international actors who failed to collect and analyze data and, in turn, translate them into tangible information that could be used to strategize and plan ways forward. George and Holl further noted that little information available also led to misinterpretation of a case that violently erupted.

⁹⁶Arnado, Mary Ann M. "Women's involvement in conflict early warning systems: Moving from rhetoric to reality in Mindanao." *Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue* (2012).

However, another challenge identified is the possibility of detecting false alarms, which can predict uncommon events and thus produce warnings that may end up being hazardous to the communities.

Another dilemma presented throughout the conflict early warning cycle is knowing the right time to act on an alert. In several instances, decision-makers buy a lot of time before responding to a signal due to many reasons; it could be a vague/ misleading alert, it could be poorly timed; It could be complex and thus challenging to understand, or it may be hard to pinpoint a conflicting sign from the alert. While the above delays are justifiable, the right timing is critical to avert a crisis, and in most cases, a delay in time can lead to mass atrocities. For instance, in Rwanda, the UN and other international stakeholders received tangible information on the impending danger but failed to act on it at the right time; there were many looming signs, including media to spread hate, organize killings and strategize on the countrywide genocide. Another major hurdle faced during the early warning stage is the tendency by the cewarn ACTORS to rely on bureaucratic procedures of transmitting early warnings heavily. According to Daniel, regional actions from IGAD should immediately update policymakers at a higher level with the local actors involved.

Similarly, Susan Schmeidl⁹⁷ further backed this discourse, noting that the failure of how early is mostly linked to bureaucratic complications and breakdowns. Case in point in Rwanda when the warning was issued of an impending huge massacre of Tutsi in Kigali to the Department of Peace Keeping Operation (DPKO). Despite the issuance of a sign, it never reached the Security Council, and the only action Dallaire was given was to

⁹⁷Wulf, Herbert, and Tobias Debiel. "Conflict early warning and response mechanisms: Tools for enhancing the effectiveness of regional organisations? A comparative study of the AU, ECOWAS, IGAD, ASEAN/ARF and PIF." (2009).

inform us, France, and Belgium embassies, and he was denied the chance to investigate the weapon arsenals which had reached the country.⁹⁸

5.3.1 Knowing Who Will Act on the Information And Take Preventive Measures

Knowing who will act on the information and take preventive measures is also another hurdle faced by CEWARN actors. Generally, African early warning has been challenged with operational obstacles; conflict early warning systems and RECs lack sufficient technical apparatus to operate. IGAD, for instance, was founded with an aim of tackling desertification and drought issues in the region, another RECs was founded to stimulate economic growth. Therefore, most of these conflicts were not grounded and geared up for armed conflicts; attempts to re-structure them came when the area was marred by intense inter and intrastate conflicts. IGAD, for instance, lacks sufficient funding, right personnel. Due to its incapacities, CEWARN cannot efficiently recognize areas that pose imminent dangers to the region's security. For instance, in Kenya, CPMR bodies are present at both the national and local levels, but inadequate resources have hindered its government successes.

5.4 Lack of Political Will

The absence of Political Will among member states is also a major threat to the smooth functioning of CEWARN; during its formation, IGAD, which is a formation of states, did not emphasize early warning and early response in its mandate, and this was trickled down to CEWARN when it was launched as an initiative in 2002. Being a state structure, the industry would be affected by past failures related to the political maneuvers and projections of member states' national interests. The lack of political

⁹⁸Adelman, Howard, AstriSuhrke, and Bruce Jones. *The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience: Early Warning and Conflict Management*. Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, 1996.

systems in the mechanism enables the absence of political will during the conflict early warning response initiating the process. Unlike AU, ECOWAS, and ASEAN, IGAD's peace and security architecture lacks a peace and security council organ, the military capacity. Therefore, the lack of political will allows CEWARN functions to be hindered by the political intrigues and interests of various IGAD member states.⁹⁹

Unwillingness by member states, intergovernmental and regional organizations to act fast during the early days of conflict has led to many mass atrocities, destruction, and unending war. Unlike NGOs and Civil societies whose work is determined by various factors, Government institutions have all the capacity it takes to act on the alerts issued; government representatives can make political sacrifices to identify, evaluate and act on any conflict signs¹⁰⁰. Nonetheless, IGAD is marred with a lot of political misunderstandings characterized by incompetent and ineffective strategies. For instance, the principle of sovereignty and non intervention has been the main obstacle to CEWARN. In most cases, critical decisions on the information on conflicts are usually left with the senior policymakers and not the local level stakeholders who are at a more advantage to understand the ever-changing local dynamics, the causal factors, and the critical factors affecting the conflict.

5.5 Inadequacy of Indicators

The functioning of CEWARN is also challenged with the inability to fully assess whether the indicators are comprehensive to highlight all the dynamics surrounding religious conflicts. Signs play a major role in highlighting problems, marking the trends

⁹⁹Tadeos, Kidane Gebrehiwot. "Political Challenges to Regional Integration in Africa: The Case of IGAD Region." *Ethiopian e-Journal for Research and Innovation Foresight (Ee-JRIF)* 10, no. 2 (2019).

¹⁰⁰Kasaija, Phillip Apuuli. "The Intergovernmental Authority on Development's Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism: Can it go beyond pastoral conflicts?." *African Security Review* 22, no. 2 (2013): 11-25.

to prioritize how to formulate and evaluate policies, and monitor progress. CEWARN has been able to capture all key indicators related to pastoral conflicts except the rising trend of livestock rustling, which usually goes unnoticed due to its commercial nature.¹⁰¹

According to Lind¹⁰², commercialized rustling has thrived in some parts of Kenya, which is a huge threat to related pastoral conflicts- especially in the Mandera region, which is part of the Somali cluster, this was seconded by Mtuku, who noted that such activities could easily change social, economic, and political structures, thereby can trigger an increase in the supply of arms, radicalization, ethnic divisions, and political influence. The majority of the masterminds behind such trading are high-level people, well-financed with a huge following, especially bandits and former security officers who constantly supply weapons and funds. Furthermore, they access better markets where the business thrives, and since they are well connected, they can easily be protected by governments. The inability to capture such indicators by CEWARN can easily influence the dynamics of pastoral-related conflicts to include issues like terrorism, which is a major security threat in the 21st century.

5.5 Data Validity

Theoretically, early warning systems are meant to predict conflict, but the continued failure of CEWARN to predict conflict in the horn of Africa has threatened its credibility. Having existed since 2002, the system ought to have advanced ways of making a good prediction using rigorous and meticulous data collection systems.

¹⁰¹Disperati, Peppino Stefano, Jeanette Van De Steeg, Paulo Van Breugel, An Notenbaert, John Owuor, and Mario Herrero. "Environmental security and pastoralism." In *GeoSpatial Visual Analytics*, pp. 409-424. Springer, Dordrecht, 2009.

¹⁰²Buchanan-Smith, M., and J. Lind. "Armed violence and poverty in northern Kenya: a case study for the Armed." (2005).

Mersha, in his book¹⁰³, however, puts the blame in field monitors stating they could not provide important information to the NRI; he highlights a possibility of the FMs presenting biased information, which subsequently sabotages the entire process. According to Mersha, overreliance on the FMs is a failure on CEWARN, ignoring the possibility of them reporting biased information and withholding critical data to protect their communities. Another challenge faced by FMs is the inability to fully cover the assigned area due to most locations' vastness within the region.

The region Poor Communication Barrier is also among the main challenges faced by FMs, especially those operating in remote places; thus, relying on FM for the collection of feedback becomes a major setback in CEWARN programs. Failure to send an alert within a specific time can result in a development of a conflict to a more irreparable level. For instance, during the Turbi Massacre in 2005 July, more than 1,000 armed bandits attacked the Digigalalo-Turbi area near Marsabit town, where more than 100 people were killed¹⁰⁴. Nonetheless, despite the graveness of the matter, the report reached Marsabit two a day later. State security officers who were present at the place lacked communication equipment required to seek back up¹⁰⁵. Lack of advanced communication in such geographical locations, therefore, sabotages the prevention of pastoral-related conflicts, and this explains why the Somali and Dhikil clusters have not been fully operational.

Despite the vastness of the area, the FM assigned to the site is inadequate, so that a single field monitor has mandated a larger size. Currently, the three clusters have 33

¹⁰³. Mersha' Achievements and challenges of the CEWARN Mechanism in Ethiopia in Ateya E. and Wisler D. (Eds/ Conflict early warning system for Sudan, op cit 3 See CEWARN communication chat in Chapter Four, p.89

¹⁰⁴ 2 On turbi massacre see O. Mwangi, 'Kenya: Conflict in the 'Badlands': The Turbi Massacre in Marsabit District,' Review of African Political Economy, No. 107, 2006. p.86

¹⁰⁵Huka, Bonaya D. "Dynamics and spillover of regional conflicts in the horn of Africa: a critical analysis of Turbi massacre." PhD diss., University of Nairobi, 2014.

field monitors who are required to operate a large area. Since CEWARN has limited itself to pastoral conflicts, these FMs lack extensive cooperation with the community, which will enable them to gain trust and deep understanding to allow them to predict other disputes. IGAD's early warning has been limited to pastoral conflicts, but these inadequacies to manage one conflict, which ideally is ranked lower by various governments in priorities, presents a major question to the system's ability to manage conflict entire Horn of Africa.¹⁰⁶

5.6 Poor Capacities of Ceweru Units

CEWERU units face major institutional challenges with poor housing institutions and budgets. Most of them are structured under the government ministries, which sabotages their independence. For instance, in Ethiopia, the CEWERU has not established a local committee, which is critical in its performance. Instead, it has incorporated nonformal actors like CSOs to perform mandates, although CSOs, as highlighted in Chapter Two of this study, has played a key role in the functioning of CEWARN. Their lack of formal relations to CEWARN hampers their duty, and it would be critical to establishing a collaboration to enhance their capability¹⁰⁷.

CEWARN ought to establish a body of knowledge that will help it identify, select, and diffriatante information, which is part of its memory. Categorizing information will enable effective problem solving To be effective, CEWARN ought to apply its strategies throughout the conflict cycle and in the structuring of decision-making organs with a special focus on structural factors tied to the conflict's background causes..

¹⁰⁶Wulf, Herbert, and Tobias Debiel. "Conflict early warning and response mechanisms: Tools for enhancing the effectiveness of regional organisations? A comparative study of the AU, ECOWAS, IGAD, ASEAN/ARF and PIF." (2009).

¹⁰⁷Cilliers, Jakkie. "Towards a continental early warning system for Africa." *Institute for Security Studies Papers* 2005, no. 102 (2005): 28.

5.7 Challenges Faced During Early Response

Another challenge faced by CEWARN is that during the early warning process, the Committee on early warning needs to approve the information collected by CEWERU, which creates a tedious process that hinders the smooth flow of information. CEWARN is anchored on the early warning information and the response mechanism. Therefore, forestalling the initial report gathered tends to prevent the process since the program may ignore new emerging signs that may be more critical in the response mechanism¹⁰⁸. Although it is sensible to analyze all information gathered, the Committee on early warning should act on any warning sign critical in mitigating conflict through the initial response stage.

The information flow gap is further sabotaged with the disconnect between early warning advisors and first action decision-makers. Nathan argues that even if an early warning system is accurate and timely, it will not lead to effective response until the output is well-tailored to meet the specific needs. The initial response decision-makers are usually experts in governance and human rights, conflict mediation, peacekeeping, military/humanitarian programs, and preventive diplomacy. These experts would need tailor-made information on the conflict alerts and not general reports on the potential violence. Nathan¹⁰⁹ highlights reasons leading to the disconnect between the advisors, decision-makers is that the decision-makers prefer to depend on their sources of information as opposed to that given by advisors. Second, this superiority factor leads them to have an information overload, which contradicts and sabotages the process.

¹⁰⁸Tiruneh, BirikitTerefe. "Establishing an early warning system in the African peace and security architecture: Challenges and prospects." (2010).

¹⁰⁹Nathan, Laurie. *The peacemaking effectiveness of regional organisations*. Crisis States Research Centre, 2010.

Thirdly, due to the confidentiality of the information, the decision-makers face the dilemma with some of the data's political sensitivity.

While it is easy to fault a poorly analyzed alert on the lack of political will among states to resolve conflict, Scholars like Woocher and Jentleson¹¹⁰ note that it has always been used as a smokescreen by the actors due to the failure of the actors involved to create an appropriate response to the alert issued, Major analysis usually best done by the persons who were involved in the structural anticipation of the conflict since they are aware to the warning indicators and signs to look out for during the initial process.

On paper, an early warning system is expected to facilitate an initial response to a conflict before its escalation. An early warning's functioning is not complete without a first answer, and this would be a mere academic exercise. As discussed above, CEWARN has faced several challenges during the early warning, which is also encountered during the response.

5.8 WEAK IGAD STATES

Weak IGAD member states have contributed to CEWARN ineffectiveness; Africa's horn is vast with some territories large enough and doesn't have stage presence. The borderlands are dynamic and characterized by shared natural resources, divided tribes, and similar pastoralism activities, which becomes a threat for most communities. Most governments have failed to provide long-lasting solutions to their citizens and have instead opted to look at this issue at a low level. States and influential government officials opted to arm their local communities to protect their security. Due to the availability of small and light weapons(SALWs), communities have continually armed

¹¹⁰ 04 Karl Cordell and Stefan Wolff, *Routledge Handbook of Ethnic Conflict* (Routledge, 2010), 173

themselves¹¹¹, i.e., in Kenya's West Pokot and Turkana regions whereby the conflict cycle continues every year. These communities secure their livestock, raid other communities, and protect their land from invaders. This cycle has been enabled by low literacy levels whereby young men are recruited into these armed groups yearly; most governments have failed to note that it presents an opportunity for a change in conflict dynamic like Terrorism. The culture has led to an increased arms race, especially in the Mander Triangle, which covers Kenya, Ethiopia, and Southern Sudan. While CEWARN aims to prevent and stop the conflict cycle, the governments' inability to deal with deep-rooted causes like climate change, inflation, droughts, education gap, and ethnic divisions, these conflicts will continue, and CEWARN activities will prove ineffective.

Numerous conflicts in the Horn of Africa are also the main problem faced by IGAD in ensuring the region's peace and security architecture is enhanced¹¹². Most of these conflicts are linked and regionalized so that it keeps reoccurring and has a ripple effect on another country¹¹³. Due to Globalization and the increased need to protect self-interest globally, states in the region have shifted their focus to other issues leaving behind the mitigation of religious conflicts to CEWARN with zero intention to play a part in the activities of minimizing disputes in the region.

Nhema argues that most conflicts in the Horn of Africa are characterized by abuse of power, human rights violation, state ignorance, poor governance, corruption, and ethnic politics; these indicators are linked to decision-making ability and willingness to

¹¹¹Farah, Ibrahim, Aisha Ahmad, and Daud Omar. "Small Arms and Border Controls in the Horn of Africa: The Case of Malkasufta, Ethiopia; Mander, Kenya; and Bula Hawa, Somalia." *Controlling Small Arms in the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes Region* (2005): 53.

¹¹²Goldsmith, Paul. "The future of pastoralist conflict in the Horn of Africa." *Pastoralism and Development in Africa: Dynamic Change at the Margins* (2013): 131-142.

address¹¹⁴. So long as these issues are not addressed, CEWs will be useful because IGAD does not have the mandate to influence governments' internal practices to address these issues.

5.9 Poor Relations Among IGAD Member States

The international relations within the horn of Africa can be categorized as one of hostility rather than amity¹¹⁵. For instance, Kenya has had a strained relationship with most of her neighbors, Tanzania, and Ethiopia, while the latter was in war with Eritrea twice. Eritrea also had issues with Djibouti and Djibouti, Somalia. Sudan and South Sudan embarked on a civil war that saw the creation of an independent country. Sudan and Uganda have faulted each other for sponsoring rebellions in respective countries. The above portrays mistrusts among member states, which hinders cooperation and boosts fragility in the region.

This hostility was magnified with the failure to adopt the IGAD Peace and Security Strategy (IPSS)¹¹⁶, which aimed to provide a roadmap on enhanced security in the region through the idea of collectivism that calls for a regional approach towards approaching the security. It aimed to shift from the sovereignty narrative and envisaged a framework which converged individual national interest to form a standard local part. IPSS sought to have a progressive regional organization to make critical policies and enforce them in the region. It also aimed at establishing Conflict management and

¹¹⁴Rupiya, Martin R., and Alfred C. Nhema. "A Regional Security Perspective from and for the Horn of Africa." In *Globalization and Environmental Challenges*, pp. 801-810. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2008.

¹¹⁵Elowson, Camilla, and Adriana Lins de Albuquerque. "Challenges to Peace and Security in Eastern Africa: The role of IGAD, EAC and EASF." *Studies in African Security. Swedish Research Agency* (2016): 1-4.

¹¹⁶Healy, Sally. "Seeking peace and security in the Horn of Africa: the contribution of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development." *International Affairs* 87, no. 1 (2011): 105-120.

Response Mechanism and expand CEWARN mandate to other conflicts beyond pastoral related ones.

Without trust and cooperation among member states, regional efforts to combat insecurity is null. Hammerstad¹¹⁷ observes that mutual trust and a typical value basis are the most basic conditions that enhance security integration. For IGAD, member states are always invested in structuring their programs to promote their self-interest without an ounce of concern for the entire region.

Lack of cooperation among IGAD member states and the CSOs involved in the early warning mechanism also impacts on the functioning of CEWARN and its programs. The entire African structure and CPMR mechanisms have been signified by a bureaucratic intergovernmental structure, limiting the cooperation of organizations mandated to perform similar functions. Poor association inhibits smooth linkage between sub-regional organizations, the AU, the International Community, and other civil societies' complementary efforts.

6.0 Lack of A Regional Hegemony in The Region

CEWARN's early warning model is challenged by the international system's anarchical nature¹¹⁸, which lacks the centralized system and is thus being sabotaged by the sensitivities of member states that are keen on protecting their national interests. Therefore, the absence of a centralized power undermines the effectiveness of how CEWARN augurs the information load and makes critical decisions in solving inter-state conflict, unlike intrastate conflict. For instance, it would be essential to analyze

¹¹⁷Hammerstad, Anne. "Defending the state or protecting the people? SADC security integration at a crossroads." (2003).

¹¹⁸Prichard, Wilson, and David K. Leonard. "The role of IGAD in shaping livestock policy in the Horn of Africa: Understanding the international system, international actors and implications for reform." (2008).

whether under IGAD, the hegemonic struggle between Kenya and Ethiopia to be a dominant player in the IGAD region, affects the operation of CEWARN or pose a threat to its function.¹¹⁹

For a long time, Africa's entire horn has lacked a regional hegemony with an arising debate on whether Ethiopia and Kenya can take the lead. The concept of hegemony was coined by Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci¹²⁰, who argued that various forms of power are maintained through consent and coercion, which defines hegemony. He was refining Karl Marx's ideology that the ruling class dominates the entire world society by force. In contemporary IR, hegemon has been maintained through consent. The dominant state uses its political leadership to establish its understanding of the world to shape the lower/ subordinate class's interests and needs. The role of hegemon in regional organizations has been analyzed by various scholars¹²¹, including Moller¹²², who contended that one means possession of a power that can enable the influence and instilling of multiple norms and values, and it includes disciplining or errant members.

SADC and ECOWAS have witnessed successes attributed to the hegemonic role played by South Africa and Nigeria; their ability to provide military and financial resources has boosted regional peace and security initiatives¹²³. Nigeria has provided a more massive chunk of forces worth USD Eight billion during the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia and Sierra Leone. IGAD has no state willing to raise such an amount. None of

¹¹⁹Ember, Carol R., Ian Skoggard, Teferi Abate Adem, and A. J. Faas. "Rain and raids revisited: disaggregating ethnic group livestock raiding in the Ethiopian-Kenyan border region." *Civil Wars* 16, no. 3 (2014): 300-327.

¹²⁰Gramsci, Antonio. *Hegemony*. na, 1971.

¹²¹Rothchild, Donald. "From hegemony to bargaining in East African relations." *Journal of African Studies* 1, no. 4 (1974): 390.

¹²²Møller, Bjørn. *The pros and cons of subsidiarity: The role of African regional and subregional organisations in ensuring peace and security in Africa*. No. 2005: 4. DIIS Working Paper, 2005.

¹²³Hulse, Merran. "Regional powers and leadership in regional institutions: Nigeria in ECOWAS and South Africa in SADC." (2016): 30.

the members can take the hegemonic role, but governments have resorted to unwanted rivalry, hostilities, and uncooperative, which has resulted in a weak organization.

Another sign of uncooperative and unwillingness by member states is their membership to multiple regional organizations resulting in duplicity of roles¹²⁴. Kenya and Uganda are members of IGAD, EAC, COMESA, AND CEN-SAD. Sudan and Djibouti are IGAD, Arab League, COMESA, Organisation of the Islamic States, and CEN-SAD. Ethiopia is the only country that does not have a membership to another organization besides IGAD¹²⁵. Their membership to other bodies makes them less committed to IGAD's cause of Conflict early warning. For instance, EAC is in the process of setting up the East Africa Standby Brigade, while member states are IGAD members whose plan includes an early warning system.

Multiple memberships also deplete members' resources due to demand from both sides, leading to conflicting political commitments, especially when the objectives do not augur well. Furthermore, it weakens the states' ability to deal with security problems as it blames the responsibility on one or other sub-regional organizations.¹²⁶

¹²⁴Jacobsen, Katja Lindskov, and Johannes RiberNordby. *East Africa: Regional security organisations and dynamics*. DIIS, 2012.

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¹²⁶Weldemariam, Alemayehu F. "A Nascent Peace and Security Architecture in the Horn of Africa: Prospects and Challenges." *Horn of Africa Bulletin* 22, no. 3 (2010).

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION, SUMMARY AND RECCOMENDATIONS

6.1 Summary

The study set out to examine the challenges facing Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution in Africa with a specific focus on conflict early warning systems in the horn of Africa, CEWARN has been labelled as the most advanced in Africa and represents a third generation one which combines both early warning and response. In addition, it has adopted a model which employs a FAST model. The study opted to use CEWARN because of its structure which on paper, is ideal for conflict prevention. Conflict early warning has been described as progressive move aimed at incorporating the preventive nature in organ to prevent violent conflict. In order to examine this, the study was divided six chapters, Chapter one introduced the study by developing research questions . It noted that as part of CPMR activities, Africa established several initiates to combat conflict. The need to solve own problems, regional and sub regional organisations in the region incorporate the peace and security architecture in their mandates. Among this is the CEWARN which was under study. Nonetheless, the initiatives have proved ineffective and this explains recurring conflicts in the region. To answer the question, the study looked at the challenges faced in conflict prevention with a major focus on the role of CEWARN traced the origin of early warning systems, how effective it has been used and also looked at the IGAD early warning system and creation and operationalisation of CEWARN in 2002. Under the second chapter, the study looks at some of the challenges which has inhibited conflict prevention and management in Africa and identified the failure to identify conflict indicators during the early stages of war. Among the major challenges faced is lack of political will to ensure the conflict prevention initiatives perform their functions effectively, another

challenge raised is the lack of cooperativeness among member states...Chapter Three provided an overview of the effectiveness of CEWARN in mitigating conflict prevention in the Horn of Africa, several circumstances which has relied on early warning and response mechanism was highlighted and it was observed that the system has a bias towards pastoral related conflicts and has been used effectively in Karamoja cluster and rarely in the Somali custer, the study focused on specific countries in the Horn of Africa region and how CEWARN has performed its activities in each of them Besides the effectiveness of CEWARN in its assigned areas, the study further looked at how the system has been used to prevent certain conflicts like the Ilemi Triangle, Kenya's Post-Election Violence and a small analysis on the 1994 Rwandan genocide .Based on the data collected, the study observed that despite its existence in 2002, the mechanism has not been effectively used in the region to prevent conflicts that pose greater threat to peace and security. Although few successes were reported, the program deemed ineffective on a broader perspective, it has failed IGAD member states and has not met its full potential. Under Chapter Four of this study, challenges faced by CEWARN in executing its mandate was addressed.

Lack of a hegemony in the region has also contributed to the lack of good coordination in efforts to prevent conflict in the region. The study looked at the challenges in the response mechanism of CEWARN and that includes the lack of resources, inadequate personnel, vast land mass and unwillingness of the field monitors to report early warnings. The study looked at the challenge faced in data collection of conflict alerts and was identified as challenge of knowing what to collect, inadequacy of indicators, data validity and dilemma of knowing what to do with the information collected and take preventive measures, absence of civil society participation, structural weaknesses

of CEWARN, International influence was also listed as a major hindrance towards effective performance of CEWARN.

6.2 Conclusions

Early warning and response mechanism is one of the most ideal mechanism to combat conflict owing to its preventiveness nature which minimizes the total cost of war, loss of lives and destruction of property. However, as the study has found, it is one thing to have an elaborate system and another to transform it into a reality, it found out that the harsh reality faced is to integrate the various variables including the financial and material resources in order to provide an actual plan that will determine the outcome of the design. Among the major findings the study noted include the fact that the system is faced by various challenges which hinder it from performing its mandate and prove their relevance. Secondly, the conflict early warning and response mechanism ought to be integrated hence minimize scenarios whereby failure in one aspect trickles down and affects the whole process, the mechanism ought to be seamless. As part of the findings, the study found out that CEWARN has operated in a vacuum and this has enabled the failures of IGAD to have major consequences in the early warning; this ranges from the financial, human resources, legal and conduct of IGAD member states. Therefore, in order for CEWARN to perform effectively, IGAD ought to be strengthened.

While early warning activities is governmental , there is need to incorporate societal process through civil societies and should have strong CSO components which will act in collaboration with government groups. Among the key challenges that were observed in the study include the lack of political will and cooperativeness among IGAD member states which has sabotaged efforts by IGAD and specifically CEWARN to combat conflict in the horn of Africa.

Africa is still faced with a myriad of conflict prevention but the approach towards CPRM should be re looked. The establishment of IGAD's early warning and response mechanism is a major step in realizing the effort of boosting the regional organization in proactively preventing conflict, it resuscitates the hope of African in resolving own conflicts at the grassroots level with minimal external interference.

6.2.1 Comprehensive Strategy

The study has noted that the existence of a system has only proven to be a stopgap measure but there is need to establish a more comprehensive strategy that encompass a future outlook on conflicts in the region.

The study notes that there is need to have a mechanism that incorporates more relevant actors and have an enhanced communication channels that links up all the actors involved with minimal political interference. It does not end there, but it should be continuously monitored over the ways with an update and review of better ideas. The mechanism should also have a firm decision making organ which will act on the alerts and information supplied to it by those in the lower ranks.

The study has established the failure of the Field Monitors to share information in time thus slowing the response mechanisms, CEWARN mode of information collection is hierarchical and vertical whereby information is collected from field and directly transmitted to headquarters for analysis which is contrary to the mode of information collected whereby data is shared and transmitted at the local level before its finally relayed to the headquarters.

Lack of appropriate monitoring and analytical frameworks has led to situations where there is weak signals whereby the early warning system does not have a systematic

way of dealing with weak signal, thus brings about cases where field monitors get information on potential violence but do not know how to deal with it.

The study further found out that CEWARN sub mandates has also limited the realization of the overall mandate and this has been caused by the limited geographical space in which Field Monitors operate in and this has restricted the type of conflicts to be used, So far CEWARN operates in only Somali and Karamoja clusters with a bias on pastoral than political conflict. Such restrictions has led to non clarity in the mode of operation. This restrictive mandate has resulted in circumstances whereby important conflict indicators on serious threats is handled as rumours since political violence is not as lethal. This was the case with Kenya's Post Election violence whereby information collected on the early signs was not considered important until the conflict erupted fully.

6.2.3 Expanding the Mandate

CEWARN should expand its mandate to cover the entire IGAD region and not only based on clusters; Karamoja (border areas of Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and Uganda), Somali (border areas of Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and Uganda) and, Dikihil Cluster (between Djibouti and Ethiopia), Deployment of Field Monitors countrywide will prompt the revelation of timely information at the grassroot level. Also, the IGAD Secretariat should be increased and properly financed in order to increase efficiency in conduct of Conflict early response.

The fact that CEWARN has only been restricted to pastoral conflicts which was the initial role proves the laxity shown by IGAD and its member states, the regional organization has failed To capture the conventional and dynamic conflict causes that have emerged since the advent of the system. Instead, it has fixated its role to pastoral

conflicts, which despite being a great instigator of conflict, has been overshadowed by the re-emerging issues of the 21st century like supply of small and light weapons, terrorism, religious ideologies, blue economy- case of Lake Turkana, Lake Victoria,, and other new found natural resources; like Oil and minerals in the Ilemi triangle. The study notes that there is a huge failure by IGAD to think beyond pastoral conflicts to other new found issues that pose a bigger threat to the peace and security architecture of the region.

6.2.3 Political Unwillingness

This study noted the commendable job done in the establishment of the CEWARN to combat pastoral conflicts in the horn of Africa. The effort to expand the mandate to cover other conflicts has been minimal and met with political unwillingness by IGAD member states' governments. There exists indifference among various governments who barely agree on several issues, this feud is reflected at the regional level and played out politically. Such uncooperativeness and lack of drive to boost the capacity and mandate of CEWARN has heavily sabotaged the performance of CEWARN and its potential towards finding a sustainable solution towards ending conflicts in the horn of Africa. While the International rules call for sovereignty among states, countries in the horn of Africa have failed to break loose of this and focus on a broader perspective of solving conflicts at the regional level. Key stakeholders at IGAD have failed to think beyond the establishment of the organ, more can be done to enhance its capacity and end perennial and frequent avoidable conflicts experienced in the region.

6.3 Recommendations

The study has identified a gap in research of the early warning system that would be required in order to solidify the early warning and response mechanism. Previous scholars have solely focused on conflict indicators as a determinant of a conflict early

warning sign without looking at peace which is also a key sign of conflict with the knowledge of absence of peace is war.. A keen look of conflict indicators in the region would not only be used to arm up in preparation of conflict mitigation but should also be used to enhance peace initiatives and use of peace mechanism to prevent conflict. Lack of this makes actors involved in conflict early warning and response mechanisms to tie themselves on conflict indicators.

Also, there is need to research more on the analytical process used in decision making process that initiate early response. The study has noted that in most cases , CEWARN process has ended in the information collection stage whereby there is information overload but failed early responses which waters down the entire process.

6.4 Objectives and Hypothesis

Based on the strengths of the findings, the following section examines whether this study achieved its objectives and tested the hypothesis, the first objective was to analyse the challenges and prospects of conflict prevention and management in Africa. This has been achieved in chapter two which has provided an overview of the main challenges sabotaging the conflict prevention and management in Africa. The second objective was examine the role of IGAD'S CEWARN in managing conflict in Africa, this objective was met in chapter three which provided an overview of various successes of CEWARN in managing conflict , the chapter examined the role of CEWARN in managing various conflicts in the horn of Africa. The third objective was to identify challenges sabotaging the functions of CEWARN and it was met in chapter four which looked at the various obstacles hindering performance of CEWARN.

Having achieved the objective, the remaining question is to determine whether the hypothesis have been nullified or validated. The first hypothesis was that Africa is

marred with great conflicts and faces great challenges in prevention and management of its conflicts the hypothesis has been validated because the study under Chapter one and Two has highlighted various conflicts which has reoccurred over the years, some becoming more dynamic and others which are transnational in nature.

The second hypothesis was that IGAD, through the Conflict early warning systems can contribute to the region's peace and security, this hypothesis is neutral since the study has shown , CEWARN has recorded some successes which has however, been limited to pastoral conflicts which has in a way contributed to peace and security architecture of this region. But looking at the dynamics of conflicts and the various kinds of conflict in the region, its contribution has been limited.

The third hypothesis was that if well established, Conflict early warning systems can detect early warning signs of conflict and prevent its escalation but weak early warning systems can lead to conflict escalation., this hypothesis has been validated in Chapter Three where the system has been successfully used to prevent pastoral conflicts from turning violent, the use of Field Monitors, CEWERU units and civil society organisations who have collaborated effectively to stop pastoral conflicts.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX I: QUESTIONNAIRE

Dear Interviewee, this interview is part of research project required for the completion and award of Masters of Arts Degree in International Studies at the Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies. Kindly fill in all the questions on Challenges and Prospects of Prevention and Management of Conflicts in Africa: The Role of IGAD Early Warning Mechanism. The information given will be used for the academic purposes only.

SECTION A: PERSONAL DATA

1. What is your gender? Male () Female ()

2. How long have you worked at IGAD Early Warning Mechanism?

- a) Less than five year ()
- b) Between 5-10 years ()
- c) 10 years and above ()

3. What is your age group?

- a) Below 25 years ()
- b) 25-30 years ()
- c) 31-35 years ()
- d) Over 35 years ()

Section B: challenges and prospects of conflict prevention and management in

Africa

- The statements indicate the challenges and prospects of conflict prevention and management in Africa. Indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements.

Key

1. =Strongly disagree 3. =Neutral 5. =Strongly agree
2. =Disagree 4. =Agree

Statement	1	2	3	4	5
Conflicts are becoming protracted by intense rivalries between global powers and regional powers as they support proxies to wage conflicts					
Leaders use pretext of counter terror to crush dissent and political opposition it escalates conflict					
Military intervention in regime change escalates violent conflicts					

Section C: role of IGAD'S CEWARN in managing conflict in Africa

- The statements indicate the role of IGAD'S CEWARN in managing conflict in Africa. Indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements.

Key

1. =Strongly disagree 3. =Neutral 5. =Strongly agree
2. =Disagree 4. =Agree

Statement	1	2	3	4	5
Disaster risk management programme including training, resource mobilization, as well as implementation of regional food security strategy and risk disaster fund					
Alleviation and mitigation of humanitarian crises to maintain peace and stability in the region					
It has developed a draft protocol on democracy governance and election to align member states practices in conflict management					

Section D: challenges sabotaging the functions of CEWARN






- The statements indicate the challenges sabotaging the functions of CEWARN. Indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements.

Key

1. =Strongly disagree 3. =Neutral 5. =Strongly agree
2. =Disagree 4. =Agree

Statement	1	2	3	4	5
Presence of a number of illegal armed groups					
Persistence of a climate of tension and mistrust among political leaders					
Proliferation of small arms and light weapons					
Illegal exploitation of natural resources					
Contested boundaries					
Population displacement					

Appendix II: NACOSTI Permit

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Appendix III: BUDGET

This Research project had an estimated budget of Shs 100,000.

S/NO	ITEM DESCRIPTION	QTY COST	TOTAL AMOUNT
1	Lenovo Laptop	1	Kshs 50,000
2	Printing	10 rims of paper each costing Kshs 450	Kshs 4500
3	Typing and Photocopy Services		Kshs 8,000
4	Transport and Lunch	3 meals for 3 days each Kshs 2,000	Kshs 18,000
5	Data Analysis Program	Kshs 10,000	Kshs 10,000
6	Phone Services	KShs 3500	Kshs 3500
7	Miscellaneous	KShs 6,000	Kshs 6,000
TOTAL BUDGET			Kshs 100,000