University of Nairobi

STATE FRAGILITY AS DRIVERS OF FORCED MIGRATION AND DISPLACEMENT IN SOUTH AND CENTRAL SOMALIA

BY:

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DECLARATION

I Ahmed Siad Odeysuge hereby affirming that this research project report is my original work and it has never been presented by any other student an award of post Graduate Diploma in University of Nairobi or other Universities or Institutions of learning for award of a post-graduate.

Signature: Date: May 4, 2020

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Q68/31344/2019

APPROVAL

This is to confirm that this research study of Ahmed Siad Odeysuge, on State fragility as a Drivers of Forced Migration and Displacement in South and Central Somalia supervision of Maastricht University. It is now ready for submission to the University of Nairobi, population studies and research Institute (PSRI) and KIMS, with my approval.

Signature: **Date: July 18, 2020**

Sonja Fransen

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

As an Immigration officer of first cohort of Postgraduate diploma in Migration Studies will put extra effort for changing and transfer of the knowledge I have learn in my country and also the IGAD countries in order to have Facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through the implementation of planned and well managed migration policies.

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ABSTRACT

One of the most significant objectives of international community in 21st century is overcoming of state fragility. Most of unstable countries have become failed nations having millions of citizens caught in hopeless conditions and deprivation. Fragile States are not empowered, legitimated or able to develop their people in a modern state and present profound challenges to policy development and execution. For example, how can help be designed and delivered so that people in vulnerable countries are able to absorb and use aid in their governments? And what can we do about the adverse effects that fragile states have on their neighbors and the global community, such as increased insecurity, increasing migration, displaced populations and the destruction of natural resources. Fragile countries are perhaps the international community's major political challenge in terms of forced migration. Policy on links between fragile States and forced migration should not, however, confine itself to government enhancement or programmes for capacity-building. In particular in terms of border securitization, an integrated approach must also be taken into account the relationship between state fragility and the behavior of northern states. The negative effects of cross-border fragility are often seen as a basis for international intervention. However, the 'cost' of fragile states have been analyzed relatively poorly and some research has called into question the concept of the direct causal link between vulnerability and international security threats., the absence 0f capable and legitimate institutions in a country exposes citizen to human rights abuses, criminal violence and persecution, all of which are recognised, explicitly or implicitly, both as direct causes of displacement and as signs of fragility. The combination of exposure to internal and external stresses and the strength of a country's 'immune system' (the social capability for coping with stress embodied in legitimate institutions) will determine how fragile the country is. The stresses could be either security-related – legacies of violence and trauma, external invasion, external support for domestic rebels, cross-border conflict spill overs, transnational terrorism and international criminal networks; or justice-related – human rights abuses, real or perceived discrimination, and ethnic, religious or regional competition; or economic in nature – youth unemployment, corruption, rapid urbanization, price shocks and climate change. Some of these stresses (such as youth unemployment, price shocks, poorly managed natural resource wealth and corruption) could indirectly lead to people becoming refugees or IDPs. Conflict and fragility also hinder the pursuit of durable solutions for displaced populations. Fragility undermines durable solutions, in particular voluntary repatriation, in various ways. First, the fragility of areas of origin, the main cause of displacement in the first place, makes the whole idea of return Unattractive to the displaced and the institutions providing assistance. The IDPs in Somalia are more vulnerable the human rights violations and they are less protected for the sake of lack of well-functioning of institutions, legitimate authority and capacity to maintain law and order and to protect the its citizen internal and external threat.

ABBREVIATIONS

DFID:	Department for International Development
DRC:	Democratic Republic of Congo
FMR:	Forced Migration Review
GSDRC:	Governance and Social Development Resource Center
HIV:	Human Immunity Deficiency
IDMC:	Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
OECD:	Organization of Economic Cooperation Development
SDC:	Sustainable Development Centre
UNDP :	United Nations Development Program
UNHCR:	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
USAID:	United States Aid
FSI:	Fragile States Index
DSS:	Durable Solutions Secretariat

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of Study

This study examines the dimensions of state Fragility within the context of conflict, and governance in Somalia state fragility, and internally displacement people in south and central Somalia. Also, this research will assess the consequence of fragile states on internally displaced people of south and central Somalia, in other hand the research will also observe various methods fragile states handled internally displaced people. following Somalia's overthrow in 1991 of Siad Barre's authoritarian rule, civil wars and inter-clan violence culminated in the fall of the State and the breakdown of institutions controlling the functioning of the nation states. The formal institutions, which typically safeguard ownership, provide law and order and allow markets to function, have given way to an anarchy that undermines security by the continuous transfer of power among the opposing groups (Betts, 2013).

Somalia is regarded as a weak state that is emanating from prolonged conflicts which led to the fall of the central government's and power transition to the regional administration. Studies described the major drivers of fragility and conflict as "clannism," weak governance, rivalry for resources, militarization, ethnic conflicts, colonization and international engagement (Heinrich Böll Stiftung, 2008; World Bank, 2005).

Fragile countries now play a key role in the international landscape of growth, security and diplomacy with estimated billions of citizens living within their borders. The concentration of the poorest in the world in developing countries poses significant governance, economic and security challenges. The drivers of fragility are complex and are related to factors both foreign and local including economic and social disparity and isolation, the lack of effective mechanisms to pacify demands and aspirations of people, extreme economic decrease and competition for natural resources. At its heart, conflict and fragility frequently arise from policy failures, raising the likelihood of violent forms of settling conflicts (Mbugua, 2013).

Several studies examine the fragility condition influence on development, either by its direct effect on income and growth, or by its indirect influence on aid allocation. Baliamoune-Lutz (2009) found that the SSA has a different effect on per capita income: in vulnerable countries, the influence of vulnerable per capita income can also be harmful to revenue, whereas minor adjustments in political institutions may be detrimental to their effects beyond a threshold. Fosu (2009) showed that the lack of political syndromes promotes development in Africa; however, the fragility of one portion only of the syndromes he deemed the state's breakdown. Burnside and the Dollar (2000) show that aid with sound institutions and policies in developed countries is most successful, even if the assumption is questioned by Hansen and Tarp (2001), Dalgaard et al. (2004), Easterly et al. (2004), and Rajan and Subramanian (2008). Studying the increasing effect of assistance in an international sample of vulnerable countries, McGillivray and Feeny (2008) found that it relies on the relative fragility degree. Chauvet e Collier (2008) analyzes the prerequisites for sustainable policy reforms in failed States and demonstrates financial aid can be less successful than technical support.

The overthrow of Siad Barre's authoritarian rule in Somalia in 1991 sparked the outbreak of civil wars and inter-clan violence, replacing the most stable nation-states governance systems. The formal institutions, which ordinarily guarantee rights to land, maintain law and order and allow markets to operate, have given way to anarchic territory where ever-changing power sharing among rival groups undermines security. Somalia is regarded as a weak state that is emanating from prolonged conflicts which led to the fall of the central government's and power transition to the regional administration. Studies described the major drivers of fragility and conflict as "clannism," weak governance, rivalry for resources, militarization, ethnic conflicts, colonization and international engagement (Heinrich Böll Stiftung, 2008; Mbugua, 2013; World Bank, 2005).

In 2008–2013, Somalia surpassed the Fragile States Index (FSI) (Messner, 2015), despite the prolonged existence of turmoil and conflict and the prolonged absence of central government. Somalia is seen as one of the most violent countries in the world in terms of the number of violent incidents and the ninth "fatalest" country in conflict-related deaths

(ibid.). The political and economic system of Somalia remains unstable. Meanwhile, Bryden and Thomas (2015) point out a lack of political will and a political infighting as barriers for sustainable solutions to the many problems in Somalia.

Fragile countries have been associated to a number of transnational threats of stability which includes mass migration, organized crimes, violent conflicts, communicable and environmental diseases and more recently terrorism. Some claim that the weak countries have significant impacts on their neighbors, including decreased productivity and destabilization. The negative consequences of cross-border fragility are also used as a reason for foreign interference. However, relatively little empirical study of the 'costs' of fragile states was carried out, and other scholars have called into question the notion of a clear causal relation between fragility and international security threats (Lisa Chauvet, Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, 2007; Mcloughlin, C. 2012).

This represents the prevalent characterization of the fragility of a State as a failure to perform certain tasks to respond to fundamental needs and desires of people. Fragile states are often characterized as unable to provide their people with fundamental protection, the upholding of the rule of law and justice or basic services and economic opportunities (Mcloughlin, 2009). DFID describes fragile states as: 'those in which the government, including the weak, cannot or will not perform central functions for most of their population' (DFID 2005). On a conceptually more profound point, some organizations recognize that in the absence of a formal social contract and in the non-reciprocal relationship between the State and community, social expectations and the state capacity are not fundamentally balanced (Mcloughlin, 2012).

1.2 Statement of Problem

The key obstacles for the contemporary world order are the problems of sovereign states' instability (Demir & Varlik, 2015, 40). The final stage of fragility means the government's lack of control over the economy, that is to say the nation is left to an economy that is anarchical (Miner & Trauschweizer, 2014). There is a strong consensus, however, that these countries pose a significant threat to people, neighboring countries and the

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international community (Sandler, 2014; Roy & Crane, 2015; Demir & Varlik, 2015). Somali as a state has to fight this tag due to the mass displacement to her people to the neighboring states and to the wider International community.

State fragility can be an essential part of forced migration in the aftermath of natural or environmental disasters, as failures of management affect communities' vulnerabilities and their ability to adapt and resilience. This is especially evident in Southern and Central Somalia in the Federal Republic of Somalia. However, we may use state fragility in order to explain some essential facts which are not capable of providing basic services and of meeting critical needs, dysfunctional and poor governance, persistent and severe deprivation, territorial loss of control and high conflict and civil war propensity. The fragility relevance is very extreme especially in areas like sub-Saharan Africa, the varying displacement nature as well as the state of existing responses of international protection when the assumed links amongst between state and citizen breaks down and states are not able to provide for the citizens' rights.

The impact of forced migration itself on the fragility of the state are also recognized. Resolutions of the UN Security Council in 1991 already recognized the connection between regional instability and displacement (UN Security Council 1991). The problem is the government's inability to protect its citizen the violation of their human rights, conflict, war and to be displaced internally not delivering core function.

1.3 Objectives of the Study
1. To identify causes of Fragile State on internally displaced people.
2. To assess the effects of State Fragility on Internally Displaced People.
3. To observe various methods fragile states handled internally displaced people.

1.4 Research Questions
1. What are the causes of state fragility on the internally displaced people?
2. What are the effects of State Fragility on Internally Displaced People?
3. What are the various methods fragile states handle the internally displaced people?

1.5 Significance of Studies

This study will be able to dig out and outline the impact of state stability as a factor that brings coherence and unity among the people as opposed to fragility that leads to mass displacement and forced migration leading to brain drain and loss of productive labor force that affects the development of a state.

This research also important to for further research to governments, researchers, practitioners, governments and other interested institutions such as universities and students who have interest in this area of State fragility, forced Migration and Displacement.

1.6 Conceptual Framework

The definition of state fragility indicates that states have vital social roles, and that their existence is dependent on them. Understanding how these roles are performed helps countries to deal with internal conflict and is important to the development policy agenda (OECD 2008). The conceptual bases of current literature may be extracted from a practical approach to measuring fragility of state, we argue, aim to empirically apply a method that preserves its core premises and use replicable and reliable aggregation technology (cp.Gisselquist, 2014).

While strong criticism has been made of the concept of fragility in society, it can imply a certain weakness in governance or lack of government, unable to provide security, and can also be linked to the abolition of political, economic and social rights. It is also linked to the inadequate private economic opportunities, justice access, institutions that are secure, accountable and inclusive as well as legal security (GSDRC 2016, Carter and Rohwerder 2016; Strachan 2016; SDC 2013).

Fragile countries are high-risk areas. Many states fail in their obligations to their citizens, however fragile, failure or poor countries are especially vulnerable to their citizens. Authority or authority failures can lead to significant organized violence, which can then be further exacerbated by state failure in protecting their citizens particularly the minor

groups. Conflict as a cause of displacement therefore often co-ordinates fragility with state fragility whether a symptom or cause of fragility; it has also become a key indicator of fragile states and neighbors failing or succeeding in dealing with displacement (FMR 43 Issue 43 May 2013).

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

There is no single definition of state fragility, as what is considered to make a state fragile will always to some extent reflect what importance is given by a particular approach to different aspects of the state. The OECD has been central in definition and importance in policy of the idea of state 'fragility'; though this definition has evolved over time.

Looking at the 2009 report for the OECD **'**The Legitimacy of the State in Fragile Situations' we can see how this definition has changed over the previous two years. States are fragile when structures of States do not have the political will and/or capacity to perform basic functions necessary to reduce poverty, develop and to protect people's safety and human rights (Dijkema, Gatelier, Samson & Tercinet, 2012).

The state's failure to meet the expectations of its population or manage expectations and capabilities changes through the political process. The report in question seeks to combine the first, more state cantered definition with the second that places more emphasis on state-society relations. "A fragile state is a state with limited capacity for governing or governing its society and for building relations with society that are mutually constructive and mutually consolidated" State fragility defines the lack of capacity or power and the relations between the government and society are key to stability: it can be caused by insufficient financial, technical and human capacity and inadequate legitimacy. A lack of legitimacy cannot be considered central as long as the state has the capacity to deal with this crisis. If it does not, it can be considered fragile (Dijkema, Gatelier, Samson & Tercinet, 2012).

Fragility is a combination of risk exposure and insufficient coping of the risk management, absorption, or mitigation capability of the State, system and/or communities (OECD 2016, p. 16). Although various organizations and scholars are diverse in their interpretation of fragility, their definitions usually concentrate on the state's inability to give its people a protection and economic chance. As an example, the World Bank states: "Fragile or

vulnerable circumstances can be said to be times when states or institutions do not have the power, duty or authority to mediate relationships among people and between people and the State and are therefore vulnerable to abuse" (World Bank, 2011: xvi). Fragility makes sustainable development challenging, since certain characteristics occur and mutually reinforce (Hoeffler, A. (2019).

The international community today faces the major challenges of state tension, conflict, aggression and political instability. Western actions and the "business as normal" in vulnerable countries are now becoming increasingly commonplace. Innovative developmental and humanitarian strategies are needed to incorporate wider security, governance and legitimacy problems, which are fundamental to power and political issues (Elhawary, Foresti & Pantuliano, 2010).

Fragile countries are now considered the focus of many internal and global development issues and security challenges to other countries and the international order's stability. Although it is still highly speculative to understand the security risks faced by vulnerable countries and to carry out more study, fragile states are often said to be the perfect breedbed for domestic and international terrorism, organized crime (e.g. trafficking in human beings and drugs) and military conflict. All these are types of asymmetrical armed conflicts dubbed 'new wars,' something linked to state vulnerability (Iqbal & Starr, 2008) see also (Kaldor, 2007).

There is political, social, and political fragility in Eastern Africa and the Horn of Africa countries (Rutinwa 2002). In the last two decades, for example, Somalia is a fragile territory, where there is no possibility of a secure return from the intractable condition of refugees (Frelick 2012). In this context, Somalia stands out as an exemplary example of the conditions in which states at the head of the FSI continue to live. For 13 years, Somalia has been stubbornly among the most vulnerable nations. This is still the case today as Somalia stands at number two. Since 2007 when the FSI was scoring 111.1, the overall result of 122.3 is essentially unchanged (Messner, Haken, Taft, Onyekwere, Blyth, Fiertz & Horwitz, 2018).

Nevertheless, in spite of persistence al-Shabaab terrorist group violence together with devastating deadly drought cycles as well as mass displacement, the Somali people resilience is remarkable and one to be proud of. Perhaps the overall score taken in isolation is not a better measure of Somali resilience, but rather to dig into the numbers in order to compare where Somalia was poor before the establishment of Somalia Federal Government in the year 2012 based on index Understanding Resilience for fragile states like Somalia.

One of the biggest obstacles for the international community is to establish research in developing countries. The most challenging countries in the world to establish are the fragile ones. They are difficult and expensive to deal with and bear substantial risks. Development projects are challenging political dilemmas in developing countries. Donors have all too frequently determined that doing little or depending on humanitarian responses is less detrimental (DFID 2005, pp. 3, 5).

Fragile countries have features which significantly affect their economic and social output. These consists of poor government, weak administration, ongoing humanitarian problems, recurrent social conflicts and, sometimes, violent conflict and civil war abuse or legacy. Weak policy, structures and governance in these countries greatly undermines the efficiency of the economy, the provision of basic social services and the effectiveness of donor assistance. The implications on economic growth of neighboring countries are also strongly negative (OECD, 2016).

State fragility has become a common term both in the last decade for policy-makers and researchers concerned with international development, humanitarian assistance and global conflict issues (USAID 2005; DFID 2005; UNDP 2008; World Bank 2009a; OECD 2009). This reflects partly an increasing recognition between Western countries and international organisation, as shown in the difficulty encountered in Iraq and Afghanistan, of the complexities of post-conflict reconstruction and State stabilization. The securitization of discourses on growth also demonstrates that fragile states have become a growing principle of fighting international terrorism since 2001 (Duffield, 2007).

There have been considerable attempts by scholars to identify the contours of the state's fragility. This contributes to a general agreement that fragile states, which lacks legitimate bodies and are thus prone to structural conflicts and crisis, are fragile to internal and external disorder (Grono 2007; Crisis Index for Foreign Policy 2009; Stewart and Brown 2009; World Bank 2009b; www.crisisstates.org). The dynamic relationship between state fragility and violent conflict is of particular interest to researchers and policymakers as well (e.g. Menocal 2009; World Bank 2009c).

Fractionalization in those countries will lead to flight because of widespread violence. (e.g. Chad, DRC, Haiti). Fragile countries have also shown sometimes incapacity to withstand the financial crisis or environmental disaster that has resulted from a breakdown of existential threats (e.g. Zimbabwe); that is political induced, an phenomenon recently calling 'survival migration.' (Survival Migration Workshop, 2009).

The forced migration impact on the fragility of the state are also recognized. Resolutions of the UN Security Council in 1991 acknowledged the relation between regional volatility and migration flows (UN Security Council 1991). The emphasis was on the fragility of state impact on the viability of approaches, in particular repatriation, as regards forced migration. It is also a answer to the reality of chronic fragility in many protracted refugee situations (Loescher 2009; Loescher, Milner, Newman and Troeller 2008).

The vulnerable countries are also providing unique barriers to humanitarian assistance and safe spaces. The militarization and polarization of relief is also triggered by systemic insecurity, pervasive brutality and a lack of institutional controls systems. Forced migration is a movement according to IOM that involves force, compulsion or constraint, even though the drivers may be diverse. The definition includes a note which clarifies that, "Though it's not a global legal concept, that term is used to describe refugee movements, displaced people and in some cases the victims of trafficking (including those who have been displaced by disasters or projects). Internationally this term is discussed as it is widely recognized that there is not a voluntary / forced dichotomy but a continuum of agency, and

that it could undermine the current international system for international legal protection."
(IOM Glossary on Migration, 2019).

2.2 Causes of Forced Migration

Forced migration is defined as "refugee movements and internally expelled persons (conflict displaced persons) and persons who suffer from natural or environmental disasters, chemical and nuclear disasters, starvation or projects of development". The word "forced migration," now used, includes refugees, internally displaced persons on the basis of refugee law, displaced persons through projects for development, environmental migrants and natural disasters victims and incidents caused by human beings, such as failures in the nuclear plant. In relation to both critical theory and practice and initiatives, critical focus has been considered on forced migrants versus forced migration.

In wider migration studies, refugees or forced migration studies are also a vibrant topic (see Fiddian-Qasmiyeh et al. 2014) as discussed below. Migration forced, "they would include, but go beyond that. For analysis, the broader term allows for comparing and contrasting among subtypes of coercive migration.

For defenders of human rights, similarities in subcategories of forced migrants will promote the at least partial remediation of claims for human rights on behalf of "victims" of forced migration and deter or minimize potential unwanted or needless victims. To evaluate the history of refugees and studies of forced migration (see Elie 2014; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh et al. 2014; Black 2001.) Research and policy groups are increasingly well aware that 'forced' migration and displacement could lead either to a flight or to a change of motives in long-term refugee circumstances (PRSs) (UNHCR 2007a; Van Hear 2009).

The exclusion of some communities from national membership contributes frequently to forced displacement, and as such it is both a product of the community's fragility and the institutions fragility. Sustainable reconstruction not only means improving national technological and institutional capabilities but also addressing this Group isolation and inability to create a viable and cohesive national identity. Further research is needed on the

links between national identity, state structures and forced immigration flows, especially as regards understanding the necessary means for achieving sustainable stability in society as well as in the territory.

We argue that one important finding emerges that forced and unintended migration should not be confused. "Forced" refers to an overwhelming constraint that a non-moving decision might have catastrophic effects such as death, serious injury or punishment for actors or events beyond the control of an individual. The operational problem is not individual desire. Due to the circumstances in which an ordinary reasonable actor have moved to avoid negative consequences to life, health, or quality of life for themselves or human or natural causes dependents, forced immigration is relocation. In a legal, human rights or scientific context, using "voluntary" or "forced" as antonyms is misleading. (see McAdams 2014).

Refugees are often called visible human rights violations. But it's not just a human rights issue for refugees. It is an essential component of world politics (Betts & Loescher, 2010). The refugee and state systems are on both sides of the same coin. The former cannot be understood without reference to the latter.

The 'figure of the refugee' is integral to a system that symbolizes the breakdown of the state-to-citizenship-territorial relationship that the State system has assumed (Haddad 2008). Even other types of forced migration-such as internal displacement, statelessness and the displacement of the environment-are only made significant by the relationship with the State system which is mutually constitutive.

The common conceptual characteristic that links these areas is that the country of origin does not want or cannot guarantee the protection of its own citizens, and therefore international protection is required. By definition, the nation-state system breakdown be seen through forced migration. All forced migration forms go to the sovereignty issues and invites many more security and economic issues in the world.

The causes, consequences as well as refugees' responses and other forced migration categories are all linked closely to global politics. Conflict, state failures and the inequity of the global political economy underpin the causes of refugee movements. Security, conflict expansion, terrorism and transnationalism have been associated with the consequences of the movement. The challenge of responding to refugees is facilitating global cooperation and the international institutions and law roles. In this broader context of world politics, forced migration opens up a vast potential research agenda.

It is highly contentious to describe forced migrants as illegal immigrants because those who have no choice but to migrate seem to be criminalizing (Schuster 2011; Hamlin 2012). The term 'forced migrants' refers to the extremes under which certain groups are 'decided' to embark on the migratory journey. The forced migration emphasis involves a number of factors including political persecution, ethnic conflicts, natural resources unfair access, a decrease in living conditions and the chronic and pervasive abuse of the rights of immigrants, which mark a limited agency (Castles, 2003). In general, forced migrants are considered legitimate or not strictly lawful based on this assumption of a restricted agency. Article 31 of the Geneva Convention of 1951 therefore stipulates that 'the States which have been unlawful in or present shall not impose penalties [on refugees] (as cited in Dauvergne 2008: 50).

There are many and inter-related reasons behind forced people migration. The forced migration origin and nature can be debated because of this diverse and entangled relationship. This section examines the forced migration root causes in literature. Firstly, in relation to the forced migration root causes at the moment, the environmental role, violence, poverty and persecution as reasonsor force migration.

2.2.1 Environmental

The environmental displacement caused mainly by climate change is the most recent category of forced migration, such as increasing numbers of hurricanes and tornados, droughts and ice cream worldwide. Hurricane Katrina is a good example of a global disaster leading to thousands of people being displaced. Many of these disasters occur

worldwide, and more recently the increased number of people seeking asylum is linked to climate change in Europe. Even the UNHCR insists that displacement of climate change is not a hypothetical future — it is true today (UNHCR, 2016b).

2.2.2 Violence

In most of the regions that are more generally home to 'acute causes' of forced immigration, the most widely conceived driver or routine forced migration cause is violence with inter- and intrastate wars that create instability (Angenendt, Koch, & Meier,2016, p. 29).

2.2.3 Persecution

Although violence is widespread, it is most likely that whole groups will be persecuted regularly because persecution is often intensified in violent areas (UNHCR, 2015b). Prison, torture, harassment, violations of human rights or harmful threats may include persecution. The persecutor may be a group of rebels or groups such as military officials (UNHCR, 2015b). Persecutor may also be groups of ethnic or religious backgrounds, for example in Rwanda, genocide, or current Arab-Israeli violence between Jews and Muslims. Persecution must therefore be considered in conjunction with broader economic and political drivers for migration because it has an effect on institutional level.

2.2.4 Poverty

Though forced migration is usually caused by negative political, economic and social advancements as well as increased poverty (Angenendt et al., 2016, 29), Poverty-alone individuals are often portrayed as illegitimate and unfit for infrastructure to respond to 'authentically' asylum seekers. This literature suggests that 'economic migrants' are not deemed worthy, but opportunistic and separate themselves from a legitimate asylum request. For example, Nick Cohen criticized advocates for not separating 'economic migrants' from 'real migrants' in an article published on The Guardian online (Cohen, 2016).

2.3 Fragile States

Fragile countries are not capable of functioning to ensure fundamental security within their borders, or to provide their populations with fundamental social needs or the political legitimacy to effectively represent citizens both domestic and internationally (CIFP, 2006).). What are common to such definitions is that they contain one or more central attributes of the State such as: efficacy (as well as the performance of state functions), authority (intended to be enforcing a monopoly on legitimate application of force) and legitimacy (public, uncoerciced state acceptance) (Mata & Ziaja, 2009).

Violent conflict may be designated for a reason, as a symptom or as a result of fragility, which explains why most of the indices are fragile. Unrest, municipal violence and armed conflicts can lead to state failure (Mata & Ziaja, 2009).

When the State doesn't deliver basic services it is supposed to weaken the social contractedness and public trust in so far as public discontent easily transforms into the violent contest between sectors of society where its authority is restricted or arbitrarily exercised or its legitimacy is systemically questioned. The state often reacts to violence caused by its own failures in an effort to regain order.

Violent conflict and fragility are mutually fueling. The very damaging consequences of violent conflicts weaken State effectiveness, authority and legitimacy, and fragility will manifest itself in violent conflict or contribute to it in extreme situations. Violent conflict is often more violent, that is, when armed conflicts have previously taken place, the probability of armed conflict is higher. There is little doubt about the strong destabilizing effect of armed conflicts on states, creating situations of fragility (Mata & Ziaja, 2009, Page 6-7).

2.4 Causes of Displacement in Somalia

Displacement and link to war and conflict, threat of violence, and political instability which can force people leave their country. Other factors may contribute or determining factors informing people to leave their homes they include Droughts, Hunger, Environmental

Disaster, and effect of Environmental change. One epicenter of regional dispute and displacement lies in Somalia. At least 1,5 million Somali refugees are estimated to be living outside the region, 1 million refugees in the region and 1.2 million IDPs in the region (see UNHCR statistics and also Avis and Herbert 2016).

Somalia's internal movements are characterized by complex and often interconnected conflicts and climate drivers. It is estimated that over half of the estimated 2.6 million people who are internally displaced were forced to move to much of the country from late 2016 after the four consecutive failed rainy seasons. Most of them have moved to informal sights in cities and suburbs from rural areas (UNHCR February 2019)

The past and current movement of the country has all been a major part of conflicts as well as violence, slow and sudden disasters, and food insecurity. Displacement due to conflict is linked to al-Shabaab activity, which mainly exists in the south-eastern part of the country, while displacements due to catastrophes are usually associated with overwhelming drought and flash flows (IDMC 2018)

Around 178 000 new displacements were registered in the first half of 2019, with the population being very vulnerable to internal displacement were reported as 106,000 in disasters and 72,000 in conflict and violence. In past and current displacements in the country, conflict and violence, slower and southern natural and environmental threats as well as food and subsistence insecurity and underdevelopment played an important part (IDMC, 2018)

In 2017, most new displacements occurred as a result of disasters and 892 000 new displacements were caudated by a country-wide drought. The very poor rainy season in October-December 2016 worsened drought conditions in most of Somalia and forced hundreds of thousands to flee for water, food and livelihoods. Almost 300,000 new displaced people peaked in March 2017, but displacement continued throughout 2017 and 2018. The protracted warfare caused by further displacement caused a further 400,000 displaced people between January 2017 and August 2018, and flooding displaced more

than 300,000 people in April 2018 (see figure 10). In two years, from January 2017 to August 2018, internal dry displacement had an effect of $500 million, equal to 7.4% of the country's GDP of 2016 (IDMC, 2018).

2.5 Fragile State Measurement

Fragility States (2016) report on fragility as a combination of risk exposure and the state, system and/or communities' insufficient capacity for the management, the absorption and/or the mitigation of these risks by an author of fragility status. The consequences of fragility, such as violence, institutional disintegration, displacement, humanitarian crisis or other emergencies, may be negative. The fragility framework of the OECD offers a global picture of fragility (Raleigh, C. A. (2016).

The calculations reflect a system-based fragility conception. Five aspects of risk and capacity measurements: economic, environmental, political, security and social. Capacities are also measured on state level and can be used by societies to deal with negative events and shocks by taking into account the various formal and informal mechanisms. These dimensions are selected and the decision taken to approach fragility in the entire society is based on expert judgments. The new OECD fragility framework is among the significant consultation process outcomes (Raleigh, 2016).

Violence is one of many contributing factors to fragility. It's not, however, the only factor, and violence does not mean the context is fragile automatically. Fragile States 2016-Violence in all its forms is the focus of the study of how violence can contribute to fragility and of what to do (Raleigh, 2016).

Domestic political stability increasingly drives violence. Political violence is often due to the structurally weak institutions led by governments that are systemically excluded, economically and politically, in segments of society. It in turn worsens the crisis of state legitimacy and breaks the social treaty between state and citizen, leading to ongoing poverty cycles and other forms of violence, including conflicts (Raleigh, 2016).

New research on violence presents new risks that aggravating the old ones by eroding the coping mechanisms, operating markets, access to public services and citizens' rights, which face the most extreme risks in vulnerable and conflict-affected societies (Raleigh 2016). These risks are further increased by the failure of weak states and weak institutions of judiciary to control arms or penalize violence. Still low levels of violence, such as a highly criminalized State, can be symptomatic of fragility (Gastrow, 2011).

It is now well known that multi-dimensional fragility and universal challenges are. Fragility is not only of concern to developing countries; its challenges are universal, underlined by the development framework for the period after 2015. The OECD therefore has a universal, multidimensional framework for fragility. A broad consultative process took place in 2015 and 2016 has informed this new framework for fragility. Fragility is defined as the combination of risk exposure and insufficient coping of risk management, absorption or mitigation by the state, system and/or communities. Poorness, including violence, institutions, displacement, humanitarian crises and other emergencies, can lead to negative outcomes.

2.6 State Fragility Index Indicators

2.6.1 Security Apparatus

The Security Apparatus indicator (Messner, J. J., Haken, N., Taft, P., Onyekwere, I., Blyth, H., Fiertz, C., ... & Horwitz, M. (2018) Consider a state's security threats, such as bombing, attacks and deaths related to the struggle, rebellion, mutiny, assassination or terrorism. The security tools as well takes serious criminal factors like organized and murdered crime and perceived domestic security confidence of citizens into account.

In certain instances, the security device may include private militia supported by State or State support which frightens political rivals, suspected "enemies," or citizens that show sympathy to the opposition, over and above traditional military or policing forces. In other cases, a "depth state" may consist of the secret intelligence of the political head or clique or other irregular security forces. The security system may include a deeper state. The indicator will also consider armed resistance, especially violent uprisings and insurgents,

by the ruling authorities as well as the proliferated use of force by independent militia, vigilante, or mercenaries (Messner, Haken, Taft, Onyekwere, Blyth, Fiertz, ... & Horwitz, 2018).

2.6.2 Factionalized Elites

The Factionalized Elites (Messner, Haken, Taft, Onyekwere, Blyth, Fiertz, ... & Horwitz, 2018) the indicator examines the state institutions fragmentation across ethnic, class, clan, racial or religious groups and between ruling elites as well as the brinks and gridlock. It will also influence the ruling elites' use of nationalist political rhetoric, often in nationalism terms, chauvinism, municipal irredentism (e.g. "Grand Serbia") or common solidarity (e.g. "ethnic cleansing" or "defense of the faith"). In extreme cases, the lack of legal leadership, generally considered to represent the whole citizenry. The Factionalized Elites indicator takes measures to ensure the credibility of election processes, power struggles, policy competition and political transitions where elections are held (or, in their absence, the legitimacy perceived by the ruling class).

2.6.3 Group Grievance

The Group Grievance Indicator (Messner, Haken, Taft, Onyekwere, Blyth, Fiertz, ... & Horwitz, 2018) concentrates on divisions and schisms among society groups, in particular social or political divisions, and their role in access and inclusion in the political process. Group Grievances can also have a historical aspect in which aggravated communal groups mention past injustices, which are sometimes centuries old and which have an impact and shape the role of this group in society and in relations with other groups.

At the same time, this history can be formed from patterns of atrocities or "crimes" perpetrated impunity against community groups. Groups may also feel exacerbated since they think they have the right to autonomy, autonomy or political independence. The indicator also takes account of the selection by government authorities or ruling groups of specific groups for persecution or repression, and the public scapegoats of those groups that are believed to have acquired "illegitimate" wealth, state or strength may manifest themselves in rhetorical style such as hatred radios, pamphlets, stereotypes, and

nationalistic behaviour (Messner, Haken, Taft, Onyekwere, Blyth, Fiertz,... & Horwitz, 2018).

2.7 Economic Indicators

2.7.1 Economic Decline and Poverty

The Economic Decline Indicator (Messner, Haken, Taft, Onyekwere, Blyth, Fiertz, & Horwitz, 2018) Consider economic decline-related factors within a country. For example, the indicator examines ways in which societies are progressively declining by per capita incomes, GNP, unemployment, price increases, and production, debt, poverty or failures in business. It as well includes sudden decreases in commodities, businesses and foreign investment and any domestic currencies collapse or devaluation.

In addition, the Economic Decay Index examines the responses and implications for economic conditions like extreme social challenges caused by austerity programs of the economy or the increasing group inequalities incidences. It focuses on formal business – illicit trade, comprising drug trafficking, trafficking of humans and capital flights, corruption as well as illegal transactions like laundering money.

2.7.2 Uneven Economic Development

The Uneven Economic Development Indicator (Consider economic inequality irrespective of an economy's actual performance. For example, the indicator examines structural inequalities based on group (e.g., race, ethnicity, religion, or other identity) or education, economic conditions or a region (e.g. urban-rural divides).

The Indicator not only considers real inequality, but recognizes that economic inequality perception can foster both complaints and actual inequality, and can enhance community tensions or nationalist rhetoric. The Indicator also address chances for groups to enhance their status economically, in order to massify economic inequality, like by employment access, education or employment, to the extent to which it reinforces, even though economic inequality is present (Messner, Haken, Taft, Onyekwere, Blyth, Fiertz, ... & Horwitz, 2018).

2.7.3 Human Flight and Brain Drain

The Human Flight and Brain Drain Indicator takes account of the impact economically (for economic or political reasons) of human displacement and its consequences on the development of a nation. On the other hand, voluntary middle-class emigration – especially economically productive segments of people, like businessmen or skilled workers such as doctors – could be attributed to the deterioration of the economy in their own country and the hope that there might be more opportunities

It may include, on the other hand, professional people forced displacement or intellectuals who flee their state because they were actual or feared persecuted or repressed and, especially, the economic consequences of losing professional and productive labor which displacement can have on an economy (Messner, Haken, Taft, Onyekwere, Blyth, Fiertz,... & Horwitz, 2018).

2.8 Political Indicators

2.8.1 State Legitimacy

Representativeness, openness and relations between governments and citizens are taken into account in the National Legitimacy Indicator. The indicator examines the level of public trust of government institutions and processes and the effects of the lack of such faith, demonstrate the continuing civil disobedience, mass protests, or the rise of armed insurgencies.

Although the State Legitimacy Indicator does not necessarily assess the democratic governance of elections, it does take into account the integrity of elections (such as failed or elections boycotting), the political transitions nature and the extent to which a government represents the people it governs when democratic elections are not conducted.

The indicator recognizes the transparency, responsibilities and political representativeness of ruling elites and reverses the levels of corruption, profit and exclusion of the opposition groups in particular. The indicator also examines the ability of a State to perform

fundamental tasks, such as tax collection and the inhibition of public trust in its government and institutions (Messner, Haken, Taft, Onyekwere, Blyth, Fiertz, & Horwitz, 2018).

2.8.2 Public Services

The Indicator refers to the essential existence of public functions. Moreover, main services can be provided such as safety, training, water and sanitation, transport infrastructure, electricity and power, the Internet and connectivity. The State's ability to defend its citizens, on the other hand, may be included by perceived effective police action, such as terrorism or violence. In addition, even if basic functions and services of state are provided.

The measure also looks at who is serving governmental figures, such as security agencies, presidential officers, central banks and diplomats – although the level of service provided to the public at large, including rural and urban communities is not comparable. The indicator also takes into consideration the level and maintenance of general infrastructure insofar as the current or potential development of the country is affected.

2.8.3 Human Rights and Rule of Law

In so far as fundamental rights and freedoms are respected and respected, the indicator of human rights and the rule of law reflect the relationship between the State and its people. The indicator examines whether the abuse of rights, including of individual, group and institutional rights, is widespread (e.g., press harassment, political politization of the judiciary and domestic military use for political purposes).

The indicator also takes into consideration the outbreaks of political violence against civilians (as opposed to criminals). It also examines factors like the due process denial in line with global standards and political prisoners' practices and dissidents, as well as the question of whether or not the rule of constitutional and democratic institutions and processes is authoritarian, dictatorial or militarily established.

2.9 Social and Cross-cutting Indicators

2.9.1 Demographic Pressures

The demographic pressure indicator takes into consideration state pressures from the people or the environment around the people themselves. The indicator monitors populations-based food security stresses, access to clean water and other health and life-related services, such as diseases and the prevalence of epidemics.

The Indicator takes population characteristics into consideration, such as high growth of population pressures or skewed distributions of population such as 'youth or age bulge' and sharply divergent population growth rates between the rival communal groups in recognition of deep social, economic and political consequences. The public also takes into consideration the stresses of natural catastrophes and the environmental risks on the population as a result of hurricanes, earthquakes, floods or droughts. (Messner, J. J., Haken, N., Taft, P., Onyekwere, I., Blyth, H., Fiertz, C., ... & Horwitz, M. (2018).

2.9.2 Refugees and IDPs

This indicator measures the pressure on States due to large communities being forced out of society, politics, the environment or other causes, measures the movement within countries as well as flux for refugees. The indicator measures the pressure on the refugees and internally displaced persons. Recognizing the additional burden on State services, indicators may sometimes create broader humanitarian and security challenges for the recipient state in the absence of absorption capacity and adequate resources, refugee measures by the asylum country.

The indicator is also measured on the basis of domestic pressure due to violence, the environment and others, internally discharged persons (IDPs) and refugees by country of origin. These actions are examined within and over time the national (per-capita) population and the paths of human development (year after year, for example) in recognition of the possibility of a displacement of certain IDPs or refugees for long periods of tim (Messner, Haken, Taft, Onyekwere, Blyth, Fiertz,... & Horwitz, 2018).

2.9.3 External Intervention

The external intervention indicator assesses the effects and influence of external actors on the functioning of the state-especially in terms of safety and economy. In a government's internal affairs, armies, information services, identity groups and other organizations may affect a power balance or dispute resolution within a country, external intervention focuses on safety aspects of external actors' engagement both hidden and overt.

Foreign intervention is also centered on external factors such as multilateral agencies, economic involvement via large-scale lending, projects of development or foreign aids like creating economic dependence, such as ongoing budget support, financial control or state management of economic policies. Other humanitarian actions such as implementation of an international peacekeeping mission are also considered in external action (Messner, Haken, Taft, Onyekwere, Blyth, Fiertz, ... & Horwitz, 2018).

CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH DESIGN METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

This study uses secondary data, which is obtained by other field researchers from the first-hand information. It will take advantage of the reports produced by the competent government agencies, intergovernmental organizations and NGOs. A literature review is carried out on the basis of books published by the United of Nairobi library, local and international media interviews, publications and articles. The research will also include authentic Internet sources and journals by previous scholars and authors. All relevant materials from previously covered contents will be examined. The data collected will then be analyzed for the final result of this research project.

3.2 Research Design

A research design sets out the methods and procedures required to obtain the necessary information. The general operational pattern or framework of the project specifies the information from which the sources are collected using which procedures.

The researcher will use the explanatory research method and the secondary data will be collected from reports from official policy documents from the Government of Kenya and Somalia, the United Nations and other agencies reports, journals, academic findings and newspapers.

3.3 Data Collection

The researcher will make procedures a formal request to the relevant agencies then do a follow up to obtain them. Those that are posted online will be of immense importance to provide the missing link to successfully carry out the research.

3.4 Data Analysis Techniques

Literature will be thoroughly and critically reviewed and the findings reported under various sub-headings and titles.

3.5 Limitation of the Study

The following limitations are expected during the research study in order to conduct the research study:

a) Secondary data availability from the needed records of the agencies could be challenging.

b) There might be inadequate information and data access to which is needed.

c) Also, language barriers are the part of limitations.

CHAPTER FOUR: FINDINGS

4.1 Somalia Fragile State Indicators

In a weak trap, Somalia is stuck. According to the Fragile States Index, the country has been ranked for much of the last decade as the most fragile state in the world — Somalia also has other indexes very much (Messner, J. J., Haken, N., Taft, P., Blyth, H., Lawrence, K., Graham, S. P., & Umaña, F. (2016). Some of the problems in Somalia can be traced back to the colonial and authoritarian period.

4.2 Key Drivers of Fragility of Somalia

The challenges overview in Somalia clearly demonstrates that weak bodies of governance and weak bodies of security are critical drivers of weakness and adversely affected authority and legitimacy. Poor economic performance, enhanced by weak management and security agencies, also helps to undermine government capacity and the ongoing trap of fragility (Ali, Z., Nicholl, S., & Salzmann, Z. (2017).

LEGEND

Risk	LOW	MODERATE	HIGH
Condition	⬆ Improving	➡ Stable	⬇ Deteriorating

4.3 Governance and Political Stability

The risk of stability in Somalia is high for governance and political stability. Although the general trend is stable, the country remains below all indicators of government and stability politically and the degradation potential will have key impacts on the State operations. Because of the historical stability in this cluster at sub-state level, economic growth is a moderate risk for nations' stability. The trend overall is better, but there are still low indicators. In order for further progress in this field, further fragility clusters, such as human development, would have positive surging effects. The safety of other groups of vulnerable groups, such as administration and political stability, poses a great risk and poses stability challenges (Ali, Z., Nicholl, S., & Salzmann, 2017).

Somalia is poorly classified in all governance indicators as defined by the WGI Project (Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A., & Mastruzzi, M. (2011). In the public sector, for example, corruption is still endemic (Index, 2015), the free expression is severely restricted (House, 2017), and the public has limited voice. Since the FGS was inaugurated in 2012, considerable progress has been made towards creating political order and governance institutions in the country.

A particular issue in Somalia is the absence of officially recognized political parties and the main form of politics is clan allegiances. In governance institutions too, women and minorities remain underrepresented and discriminated against. A loss of the circumstances in this cluster presents a high risk of country stability.

Governance and Political Stability ➡	
Indicators	**Description**
Political rights (1= best, 7=worst)	**2016:** 7^{26} **2015:** 7^{27} **2014:** 7^{28}
Level of corruption in public sector (0= highly corrupt, 100=very clean)	**2015:** 8/100, ranked 167/168 countries[29]
Rule of law (-2.5 to 2.5. Higher values reflect better score.)	**2010:** -2.42[30]
Freedom of expression (16= best possible score)	**2016:**1/16[31] **2015:**1/16[32] **2014:** 1/16[33]
Political Pluralism (16= best possible score)	**2016:** 0/16[34] **2015:** 0/16[35] **2014:** 0/16[36]

Sources: Ali, Zeinab, Samantha Nicholl, and Zach Salzmann. "Somalia Fragile State Analysis: Policy Options for the Government of Canada." (2017).

4.4 Economic Development

Recent reports show the economy is growing partly because of the expanding private sector, livestock export growth, and capital-in- and-round foreign-sponsored building projects (Bailey, S. (2016). Economic advances still depend heavily on a stable situation

of security and can be disrupted by shocks in the environment. However, the economy in Somalia is a resilience area. The economy growth is strongly linked with other fragile areas-environmental resilience and key indicators of human growth, for instance-strengthening the economy is still a FGS and the donor community key priority.

The Somalia's economy is largely underdeveloped and non-diverse as a consequence of two decades without a legitimate government. Sub-Somali Diaspora send out from abroad and aid from donor countries are highly dependent on the economy.

Most of Somali citizens, especially in Mogadishu, have adapted to an environment without a central job creation authority, and entrepreneurial development, especially with regard to telecommunications, has been encouraged (Mohamed, A., & Childress, S. (2010). The GDP growth in 2013 rose by \$5.3 billion to \$5.9 billion in 2015 and the per capita increase in revenues was reflected. Somalia remains the fifth poorest nation gloablly, with a per capita income of only \$435. (International Bank (2016). At present, the government is not able to reinvestiture sufficient tax revenue for goods and services.

With 65-70% of Somalis engaged in agriculture, agriculture – and the farming sector – is still the largest economy segment, accounting for almost 60% of Somalia's GDP. Food and Agriculture Office. However, farming production is largely incompatible with present environmental conditions due to farming methods. The failed harvests have led to the participation of many Somalis in the illegal industry of charcoal. What was more worrisome is that Al-Shabab, especially among young Somalis, was able to exploit economic anxieties to boost recruitment numbers (Botha, A., & Abdile, M. (2014).

Economic Development ↑	
Indicators	**Description**
GDP growth	**2015:** GDP= $5.9 Billion for 2015, up from $5.3 billion in 2013.[44]
Government debt and foreign aid	**2015:** ODA= $1.3 billion. Aid has increased in the past two years ($1.8B), accounting for more than the total aid disbursed from 2005-2012 combined ($1.78B).[45] **2015:** Government debt= $3 billion.[46]
Poverty rate	**2012:** 73%[47]
Youth unemployment rate (14-29 year olds)	**2012:** 67%[48]

Sources: Ali, Zeinab, Samantha Nicholl, and Zach Salzmann. "Somalia Fragile State Analysis: Policy Options for the Government of Canada." (2017)

4.5 Security

Security in Somalia, especially in recent months, has continued to worsen, leading to a decline in trend and high-risk levels. Extreme groups, especially Al-Shabab, still pose the country's greatest security risk. In 2015, Somalia was ranking eighth on the GTI (Index, G. T. (2015). In terms of terrorist activity, Somalia has remained in the top 10 in the last eight years. G. T. (2015). (Index). Between 2012 and 2013, there was a 32 percent increase in the deaths in Somalia caused by terrorist attacks and almost 3 percent in the world. (Index, G. T.). In 2014, 469 terrorist incidents occurred in the country and related deaths increased, making it one of Somalia's worst terrorist years Index, G. T. Index (2015) (2015). Mogadishu is following suit in southern Somalia with most attacks. The illegal flow of arms into the country also contributes to the destabilization of the safety situation. Ibid.

The Somali army is now in the early stages of its life and has recently been reforming since its dissolution in 1991. The preservation of security in the country is largely a matter of international security forces. The National Army creation is an effort of establishing a national organization representing the entire clan, however the integration process remains a problem. Currently, it has 20,000 soldiers (John Njagi 2016) and Turkey is now planning

to train 10,500 Somali military personnel to help strengthen the army. (Ali H. Warsame 2016). (Ibid.)

Security ⬇	
Indicators	**Description**
Military expenditure	$50,985, 000 (2011) 0.9 % of GDP[54]
Military strength	20,000 soldiers in the SNA[55]
Violent outbreaks	469 Terrorism-related incidents in 2014[56] Statistics for crime-related violent outbreaks could not be verified.
External military presence	22,126 AMISOM troops,[57] 200 Turkish soldiers (in Somalia to train troops)[58] and 200-300 U.S. Special Forces personnel[59]

Sources: Ali, Zeinab, Samantha Nicholl, and Zach Salzmann. "Somalia Fragile State Analysis: Policy Options for the Government of Canada." (2017).

4.6 Environmental Stress

Since environmental and economic issues are strongly interrelated and the capability of building resilience in the face of environmental shocks largely depends on rural economic restructuring, our policies will not directly targeted the environment. The brunt of climate change is Somalia and the Horn of Africa countries as a whole (Halae Fuller (2011).

Somalis are heavily susceptible to agriculture, both agriculture and pastoralism, but environmental shocks like drought have made current farming practices unproductive, as events become more frequent and severe because of climate change (Masih, I., Maskey, S., Mussá, F. E. F., & Trambauer, P. (2014). This has allowed many Somalis to participate in the illegally productive carbon industry, which funds militia organizations and the government's undermining Al-Shabab (Goldberg, 2012).

The charcoal industry, that engages tree cutting and burning of acacia trees in large quantities, aggravates degradation of the environment via deforestation as well as

desertification. This negatively impacts farmers 'and pastoralists' livelihoods and made Somalia very vulnerable to impacts linked to change in climate.

Environmental Stress ➡	
Indicators	**Description**
Flooding	Flash floods occur annually in Somalia every spring. Impact of flooding increasing due to population increase and climate change.[69] 50,000 people were displaced in 2013 as a result of flooding.[70]
Droughts	The East African drought of 2011-12 was considered to be the worst drought in 60 years. At present, large parts of the country are experiencing a severe drought. The FGS and regional leaders have called for humanitarian assistance.[71]
Farming practices	1.6 percent of land in Somalia cultivated.[72] Bananas and sugarcane two of the major cash-crops grown. Maize is the main crop grown for domestic consumption, but it is not considered drought-resistant.[73]

Sources: Ali, Zeinab, Samantha Nicholl, and Zach Salzmann. "Somalia Fragile State Analysis: Policy Options for the Government of Canada." (2017).

4.7 Human Development

Somalia has weak institutions that cannot monitor and record human development indicators effectively. However, the state is still facing health problems and an undeveloped healthcare sector in 2013, with the central agencies within Somalia setting out a plan of achieving universal fundamental healthcare by 2016 (Ali, Z., Nicholl, S., & Salzmann, Z. (2017).

Our policies will not directly target health; therefore, progress is being made in Somalia in work with UN agencies like WHO, UNICEF and UNFPA. The Government of Somali initiated the first draft of its 30-year National Development Plan in November 2016, which demonstrated its commitment to addressing the challenges of sustainable development within the country. Currently only 42% of kids, most of whom are girls, attend school (Ali, Z., Nicholl, S., & Salzmann, Z. (2017).

Human Development ➡	
Indicators	**Description**
Life expectancy	52.4 years (Male: 52.3; Female: 54.5). Ranks 218th in the world.[77]

Infant mortality	96.6 death per 1000 live births. (3rd highest in the world)[78]
Child malnourishment	12.5 percent of child under 5 years old considered chronically malnourished.[79]
Secondary school enrollment	28% of 14-17 years old enrolled in secondary school.[80]

Sources: Ali, Zeinab, Samantha Nicholl, and Zach Salzmann. "Somalia Fragile State Analysis: Policy Options for the Government of Canada." (2017).

4.8 Demographic Pressure

Due to its impact on other clusters, like economic, security and human development, demographic concerns constitute a modest risk to stability for a country. The repatriated refugees from Kenia's Dadaab refugee camp, as well as the country's young Bulgarians, are two of Somalia's main populations. During the process of repatriation in December 2014, UNHCR has accelerated the process in the last year to comply with the original plans of the Kenyan government to shut down the camp by November 2016 (Ty McCormick (2016). However, as of September 2016, 30,731 Somali refugees were repatriated. The government of Kenya has since eased its deadlines.

The lack of sufficient resources in place for Somali refugees to return, coupled with high unemployment, increases the risk of refugees joining militia groups such as Al-Shabab. Somalia also has a significant population of youth between 0 and 14 years of age, accounting for 47% of the population (UNHCR, 2015). This poses a problem when it comes to low employment, poor living conditions and poor education, making young people vulnerable to extreme recruitment in Somalia and fueling further civil unrest.

Demographic Pressure ⬇	
Indicators	**Description**
Population ages 0-14 (% of total)	**2015**: 47% [84] **2010**: 45%[85]
Refugees	As of 2016, there are over 1M internally displaced persons in Somalia, an estimated 11,000 refugees in the country and over 11,000 asylum seekers.[86]
Fertility rate (birth/woman)	**2014**: 6.5[87] While fertility rate (births/woman) is high, it has seen a steady decline since 1997.[88]
Population flight/ migration of labour force	According to a 2012 UNDP report, 60% of youth in Somalia have intentions of leaving.[89]

Sources: Ali, Zeinab, Samantha Nicholl, and Zach Salzmann. "Somalia Fragile State Analysis: Policy Options for the Government of Canada." (2017).

4.9 State Authority

The fundamental concept that determines the government's authoritative power in the course of this research are the state's economic stability, the government's monopoly on violence and the functioning level of the country's rule of law. (Miner & Trauschweizer, 2014). This work will determine the powers of the government. Governmental monopoly on violence is important to enforce public order or community security against internal or external threats (Miner & Trauschweizer, 2014, 6).

4.10 State Legitimacy

State legitimacy is the second field that needs to be carefully investigated in accordance with key fragility principles. A definition of the concept of political legitimacy is to be adopted based on Rawls (1993, 137) which states that, in accordance with a Constitution, the use of political power is only fully appropriate when all citizens are free and equal and reasonably supported by principles and ideals acceptable to their common house.

In other words, in order to be legitimate, a political organization must be accepted by the people and complied with by the citizens of a State's common rule of law. Otherwise, the general public has no obligation to respect State judicial institutional rules and decisions

(Peter, 2016). A country's fragility can be measured by using fundamental democratic ideas, such as fair and free elections, public openness or press freedom (ibid).

Many vulnerable countries are often affected by ethnic or religious differences in which the government benefits groups compared with others and cause tension, often leading to protests and/or violence (ibid.). A State must uphold a certain degree of democracy in order to gain foreign recognition, such as freely elected legislatures, freedom of the press and respect for human rights. (Miner & Trauschweizer, 2014, 6).

4.10.1 State Capacity

As per fragility core principles, the last defined principle includes the capacity of the governments to provide basic services like development of humans as well as infrastructure in the entire nation (Miner & Trauschweizer, 2014).

These two concepts are selected as key government capacity indicators to include the greatest possible amount of information while limiting the study to essential elements. Therefore, they should be seen as broader government development projects indicators.

The capacity of the State to provide social services, such as health services and education, to improve the population live is a representation human development. Infrastructure services will be covered by the technical State, such as electricity access, wastewater and water systems, roads, machinery and technology. Such material services illustrate the quality of life that a state should provide to its people, comparable to human growth. The infrastructure also supports important industries and enables the state to govern the territory properly (Miner & Trauschweizer, 2014, 6).

Land and resource infrastructure management is a vital component of government capacity, indicating state productivity and efficiency (Gerard et al, 2015). A good indicator of a country's stability or fragility for human development is the education system. In states with low literacy rates, high drop-out rates and school enrollment, the population is often poor and country productivity is low (Miner & Trauschweizer, 2014, 6).

## 4.11 Displacement of South and Central Somalia

Sources: PRMN. Small displacement flows are not displayed on the above graphics.

than 578,000 new displacements in connection to conflicts and war have been the highest figure in Somalia in ten years and the outcome of three main drivers. Roughly 44 percent of the figure were expelled from urban centers mostly IDPs. The number of evictions in increasingly crowded areas has reached a record high driven by a shortage of enough housing and informal tenure agreements (IDMC, 2018)

In addition, there are approximately 547,000 new displacements in Somalia due to disasters. Nearly half or 249,000 people have been linked to drought, mostly in the southern regions of Bay, the Lesser Shabelle and Bakool, while rural people are on the move looking for water and livelihoods. About 289,000 new displacements were also caused by flood in the southern and central areas of the country over the average rainfall in April and May. For months, some families have been separated from the rest of the country in distant villages, which makes them particularly at risk (RadioErgo (2018)

Some of Somalia's serious problems include insecurity, war and inadequate protection. There are approximately 2,7 million people who have been internally displaced. Many of them are at great risk of being misused, abused, abused, forced evicted and limited access to basic everyday necessities ('Somalia Events'). Internally, a total of 2,648,000 internally

displacements have occurred during 2018, with a total of 1,125,000 new displacements further categorized as two causes of natural disaster or conflict caused by human beings (Andrea, Chloe, Darynne, Madeline (2019)


Sources: PRMN. Small displacement flows are not displayed on the above graphics.

Somalia is one of the most internally displaced sub-Saharan countries in Africa, with more than 2,6 million people who have been internally displaced by the population at the end of 2018. Last year, 578,000 new displacements were the highest in one decade, linked to conflict and violence. Disasters have nearly as much effect on the southern region of Bay, Lower Shabelle and Bakool, with 547,000 displacements caused half due to floods and the other half as a consequence of drought (IDMC, 2019.)

After four consecutive seasons of drought in 2017, the country was on the verge of famine. Hundreds of thousands of livestock and farm dependants were forced to leave their farmhouses and move to city centers to find new ways of living. Drought-related displacement continued in 2018, with 249,000 reported new displacements. Most of the IDPs live in informal urban settlements with extremely poor conditions and forced expulsion. This was the case for those surveyed who moved from countryside to the suburbs of Mogadishu as part of this case study. The newly displaced people joined those

with a prolonged displacement. More than once, many are displaced (Christelle Cazabat & Marco Tucci, 2019).

Sources: PRMN. The district names and figures are shown only when the new displacements value exceeds 400

4.12 Durable Solution for Internally Displaced People of Somalia, Especially South and Central Somalia

A sustainable solution can be achieved if the displaced have no more specific needs in terms of aid and protection related to their displacement and can benefit from their human rights due to their displacement, without discrimination. Return, local integration and relocation can be achieved.

Displaced Internally Personal (IDPs) Individuals / groups that have been forced to flee, have been obliged to abandon their residence or places of habitual residence or are not subject to international recognition due to prevent the armed conflict effects, widespread violence, violation of human rights, or natural or human disasters (Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement).

Some good news from Somalia can be reported. The government has made significant progress both at the federal and municipal levels in developing policies and frameworks

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designed to defend and promote sustainable solutions for internally displaced persons (IDPs) by, among others, local integration in urban areas. The key now is to effectively implement these policies (Yarnell & Thomas, 2017).

Currently, around 2.6 million Somalis in their own country are displaced. Some have been displaced about 30 years ago, while others continue to reach the city on a daily basis because of the conflict and climate factors. The biggest concentrations, some half a million, lie in the capital of Somalia, Mogadishu. The Refugees International team visited Mogadishu in October 2019 to evaluate the current situation and to analyze the opportunities for progress in sustainable solutions (Yarnell & Thomas, 2017).

Sustainable solutions are achieved in accordance with the international standards, when the IDPs do not have a specific aid and protection needs associated to displacement. In this regard, the local administration in Mogadishu developed an IDP policy earlier in 2019 and set up a Sustainable Solutions Unit in the office of the mayor. The Federal Government recently created a Durable Solutions Secretariat (DSS) comprising all ministries and federal institutions, and adopted the IDP policy in national terms, accompanied by the Guidelines for National Eviction, to ensure planned and legal implementation of evictions that safeguard the rights of displaced people and also to provide alternative land and housing options (Yarnell & Thomas, 2017).

The approach of the Somali government to IDPs has undergone a significant shift over recent years from calling on all IDPs to "go home" to defining sustainable solutions and incorporating the needs of displaced persons into its NDP (Yarnell & Thomas, 2017).

In the aftermath of consistent engagement and consultations with the government and with humanitarian and development actors, including launching the UN and government-led Somalia Durable Solutions Initiative in 2016, policy support has begun. It has been recognized that although displaced people who would certainly want to return home should be helped, for many of them it is not a choice or desire (Yarnell & Thomas, 2017).

In 2017, Somalia's new National Development Plan focused significantly on the rights of IDPs and promoted a local integration strategy for displaced persons in urban areas. In January 2019 a sustainable IDP solutions policy was introduced and a Durable Solution Unit set up within its offices by the Benadir regional administration, led by the mayor of Mogadishú, who also serves as governor of Benadir as it covers the same geographical area as the city (Yarnell & Thomas, 2017).

At the federal level, the Government has moved to improve coordination among ministries by creating a DSS chaired by the Planning Ministry. In October 2019 the DSS was launched and includes government institutions including the Prime Minister's Bureau and the Refugee and IDP National Commission.

The Federal Government, through the establishment of a Durable Solutions (DS S) Secretariat, chaired by Ministry of Planning, has moved for improved coordinating among ministries. The DSS was launched in October 2019 and includes the Prime Minister and the National Commission on Refugees and IDPs, as well as government institutions.

The policy also emphasizes the need to prevent forced displacements and promotes the government's responsibility for facilitating sustainable solutions for IDPs. The Cabinet has indeed taken on the National Elimination Guidelines and the new IDP policies as a demonstration of its commitment to this end. The conditions, safeguards and legal evictions process are set out in these guidelines in line with the international standards. Indeed, landowners can fully recover or repurpose their land, because the vast majority of the expulsions have caused so much damage, both forcibly and unplantedly.

The International Covenant on Civil and Politological Rights, the Human and People's Rights Charter of Africa, the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Guiding Principles of Internal Movements are both the IDP policy and the national expropriations policies. This includes a number of international conventions and agreements. Significantly, at the end of November 2019, the Government of Somalia ratified the IDP African Union Convention (the Kampala Convention).

Following an almost unanimous vote by the Somali parliament in favor of ratification, the President signed this Convention. The instrument confirms the rights of IDPs in Africa, and it is legally binding. States Parties to the Kampala Convention shall, in accordance with their provisions, adopt or amend legislation. Somalia is now being welcomed as a good example for promotion of IDP's rights and their inclusion in the efforts for national and local growth and development. This ratification is a remarkable change from 2013. United Nations management in Ethiopia initiated plans to replicate the experience of Somalia to engage the government of Ethiopia on its approach to the IDPs. However, there's a lot to be done. "This is just a first of a thousand steps, as a senior government official stated at the DSS launch event.

4.13. Factors related to the IDPs

The largest concentration of IDPs—around half a million—are located in Mogadishu, Somalia's capital. Displaced Somalis continue to arrive in Mogadishu daily, most of them fleeing conflict between AMISOM and the Al-Shabaab extremist group in the Lower Shabelle region. There have been nearly 100,000 new arrivals in 2019 alone. There were two previous major waves of movement into the city over the past decade—first during the 2011–2012 famine and again following successive periods of drought in 2016–2017. Others arrived during the famine of 1992.

Refugees International has conducted regular missions to Somalia and reported on the significant challenges that its IDPs face, particularly in Mogadishu, including exploitation and abuse by camp "gatekeepers," extremely overcrowded and unsanitary conditions, poor shelter, limited access to basic services, increased risk of gender-based violence, frequent unlawful evictions, and significant tension with the host community.

Although these serious challenges remain, there is progress. The government, at both the federal and local levels, has embarked on a concerted effort to establish durable solutions policies for IDPs that involve supporting local integration from an urban planning perspective.

Migration and displacement in Somalia are complex phenomena. Two decades of armed conflict and severe recurring droughts and floods have forced a remarkable part of the Somali population to leave their homes. Mogadishu hosts the largest estimated protracted internally displaced population in the country, mainly living in informal settlements across the city. At the same time, displaced people continue to move into the city from other parts of the country, while others are forced to move from within the city to its outskirts.

The nature and consequence of Somalia's civil conflicts make the issue of displacement highly complex. Communities have suffered multiple displacements and violations of their human rights, especially in the south. Populations that initially fled conflict and insecurity suffered further as a result appropriation of their farming lands along the banks of the Juba and Shabelle Rivers during their absence. Many of these IDPs eventually moved north in search of economic livelihoods.

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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Conclusion

As one of the most affected countries in sub-Saharans, Somalia has taken a number of important steps towards a more sustainable approach to the question of 2016 the Somali Sustainable Solutions Initiative was launched and IDPs are included in the existing national development plan. It has also established in the national aid system a dedicated group on migration, displacement and sustainable solutions. In the Ministry of Planning, Investment and Economic Development a Durable Solutions Unit has been created and began operations in January 2019. In 2019 a national policy is expected to be adopted on IDPs, refugees and returnees. All these initiatives should lead to broader support for the IDPs and offer opportunities for community involvement and involvement (Christelle Cazabat (2020)

Although the fragility is different defined by different agencies and scientists, definitions typically focus on the lack of security and economic opportunity for the state to provide its citizens. As an example, the World Bank states: "Fragility or fragility could be described as periods in which states or institutions cannot mediate between citizens' groups, between individuals and the State and become vulnerable to violence." (World Bank, 2011: xvi).

Fragility is challenging sustainability, because different features take place and mutually strengthen. This coexistence of characteristics is called the 'fragility syndrome' in the LSE-Oxford State Fragility, Growth and Development Commission which helps break down the complex interlocking structures characteristic of fragility. Six characteristics are commonly observed:

   i.   Society is divided up into various groups. The fight to rule the state is seen as a non-sum game. This prevents cooperation and the development of a State that is in the national interest.

   ii.   As a result of society's fractured nature, citizens' groups don't see or comply with the State as legitimate.

   iii.   There's a third problem with the struggle to control rents and the lack of legitimacy.

The state does not have the capability of performing fundamental roles including security, taxation, services as well as infrastructure.

iv. Low state capacity leads to higher (violent) crime rates and an increased likelihood of organized armed conflict.

v. These are all serious barriers to a prosperous private sector's development. There are few economic opportunities, high levels of poverty and a small economic base. This reduces the government's chances of collecting income and government capacity.

vi. The limited base vulnerability of the economy to economic and political shocks. This instability feeds on other processes and hence makes it more difficult to sustain technological progress.

Inherently political are the challenges of fragile states, and so the starting point needs to be to put politics at the center of their approaches.

There is an urgent need for collective action to address conflict and violence, forced displacement, food insecurity, and other challenges caused by increased instability and persistent vulnerability. However there is a fragile and outdated international agreement and mechanism to address those challenges. Recent efforts to rethink the approach to fragility from the United Nations (UN), the World Bank and other influential bodies offer promise, but lack an agreed set of principles, political will and sufficient resources to turn potential into progress. Thier, J. A. (2019).

When viewed through the lens of fragile states, the prospect of achieving the SDAs by 2030 (or ever) diminishes (Samman et al., 2018). After the historic decrease in conflict and violence and dramatic human development improvements, fragility has risen, bringing enormous costs for humanity, politics, economics and the environment. Although many fragile environments have seen improvements over time, others are stuck in 'fragility traps' (Commission on State Fragility, Growth and Development, 2018).

A broken social compact between individuals and their governments is being created by fragile environments which suffer institutional deficits and political legitimacy which increase the risk of instability and violent conflict, sabotage their resilence against disruptive shocks by the State and society. The fragility trap further fuels violent extremism, displacement, conflict and famine, creating fundamental obstacles to leaving no one behind, greater peace and prosperity and living sustainably together on our shared planet. These challenges are a primary reason why we are not on track to end extreme poverty by 2030 (Manuel, *et al*., 2018).

Therefore, urgent collective action is needed to reverse these trends. Although the world came together in 2015 to set a framework for sustainable development, a global commitment to address conflict and fragility is lacking. There are signs, among civil society actors and major multilateral institutions as well as some world powers, of a growing consensus on the need for new tools, approaches and commitments. This new political landscape is emerging alongside an increased policy focus on fragile states by international institutions and donors. Thier, J. A. (2019).

Forced migration and displacement can be economic, either as a result or of changing motives in long-term situations of refugee (PRSs) (UNHCR 2007a; Van Hear, 2009). Migration from and to vulnerable countries and in conflict situations tends to occur. These circumstances present particular economic challenges in connection with forced migration, which the political community is now recognizing.

Somali experiences of environmentally induced migration have shown that fragile states are in danger of failing to adapt to environmental change and the complex dynamics linked to change in climate, conflicts as well as mobility: This serves as a valuable reminder that climate change can also force both resolution and displacement (Kolmannskog, 2009b; International Alert, 2009).

5.2 Recommendations

The world is facing a persistent set of challenges emerging from fragile environments. The two billion people living amid fragility are systematically denied the opportunities and dignity that every person is entitled to. Premature death, dislocation, malnutrition, trauma and oppression too often define a life in such circumstances. These blights do not respect borders. Disease, displacement, environmental degradation and violence in fragile environments have impacts that diffuse regionally and globally, undermining security, health, climate and norms. Leaders in these societies, and those in the partner nations and international institutions supporting them, cannot abide these conditions. Left unchecked, they undermine progress on critical issues in all our societies. Yet despite considerable attention and resources, efforts to make progress too often do not deliver results.

Fragile countries are perhaps the international community's major political challenge in terms of forced migration. Policy on links between states that are fragile and forced migration shouldn't, however, confine itself to government enhancement or capacity-building programmes for. In particular in terms of border securitization, an integrated approach must also be taken into consideration the links amongst state fragility and the behavior of northern states.

Historically, forced migration was dealt with in terms of aid delivery and legal protection by the international humanitarian community. This remains the principal operational objective of a number of global organizations, ranging from relief operations like MSF to UNHCR activities of protection. States though tends to see forced migration as an issue of politics that also concerns the right to national membership and interregional security. In particular, in the last 10 years, it is clear that a more secure public policy discourse about all forms of migration threatens the humanitarian approach to forced migration.

The following should be done by Somalia federal government:
 Enhance collaboration in sustainable solutions with local governments, such as the Mogadishu Municipal Government. In order for both bodies to coordinate and support each

other, the federal DSS needs to develop an institutional link with the Mogadishu mayor's sustainable solutions department.

The Mogadishu municipal government should do the following:
Prevent illegal expulsion from private territory of IDPs. Municipal officers must directly engage private landowners in order to prevent expulsion and, where land is recovered, develop alternative land options for IDPs. It would be appropriate for the government to consider issuing official occupancies between landlords and IDPs.

Assert government accountability for the support of displaced persons and reduce the role of IDPs. City and district authorities should be empowered to facilitate the involvement of the aid community with IDPs, so that they are not at the expense of the gatekeepers known to exploit and divert aid as a form of rent.

To purchase additional public land using development funding. Most of Mogadishu's land is private, which limits the government's possibility of providing land to IDPs with safe holdings. If the city gains access to additional financing for development, it should buy land for this purpose.

Humanitarian agencies should do the following:
Need to increase the UN Refugee Agency funding for IDPs. Last year, UNHCR spent less than 20% of its funds for Somalia on supporting IDPs.

Due to the huge need and the new UNHCR internal displacement policy, the UNHCR headquarters should supplement Somalia country office with the support of donor governments for the IDPs.

For regular informational and information communication, the Protection Cluster shall invite key development actors. As development organizations' support for sustainable solutions programs is increased, it is essential to engage regularly with protective actors, especially in matters related to evictions.

Donor governments and international financial institutions should do the following:

Strong humanitarian funding should be maintained. Long-term process involves sustainable solutions initiatives for IDPs. Meanwhile, there are acute humanitarian needs. Fortunately, donor governments have made progress in contributing more than 75% of this year's United Nations appeal of 1.1 billion dollars. Donors must sustain this support.

Increased cooperation with protection agencies should be developed to assist in working on sustainable solutions. This collaboration may be done through the regular involvement of the Protection Cluster, as recommended above or through the establishment of a UN's UN Human Rights and Protection Group special forum for humanitarian and development actors.

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APPENDICES

Appendix I: Certificate of Correction

Kenya Institute of Migration Studies (KIMS)

in collaboration with **Maastricht University**

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RE: CERTIFICATE OF CORRECTION: Ahmed Siad Odeysuge - Q68/31344/2019

This is to certify that Mr. Ahmed Siad Odeysuge has effected corrections form the board of examiners.

Dr. Sonja Fransen.

Supervisor.

Appendix II: Turnitin Report