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IMPLICATIONS OF ORGANIZED CRIME ON URBAN AREAS OF KENYA: A CASE OF KAYOLE ESTATE IN NAIROBI CITY COUNTY

By

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DECLARATION

I declare that this project is my original work and has not been presented in any other university for any other academic award.

Signature…….Date…….

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This project has been submitted for examination with my approval as the university supervisor.

Signature…….Date……..

Professor Beneah Mutsotso

University Supervisor

DEDICATION

I dedicate this research work to my family for their incomparable love and support without which completion of the work would not have been possible. I thank you very much for having been understanding during the entire process of this research. God bless.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AP	Administration Police
APHRC	African Population and Health Research Centre
ASTU	Anti-Stock Theft Unit
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
DCICC	Directorate of Central Intelligence Counter-Narcotics Center
DCICNC	Directorate of Central Intelligence Crime and Narcotics Center
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
GOC	Global Organized Crime
GoK	Government of Kenya
ICC	International Crime Control
Interpol	International Police
ISS	Institute for Security Studies
NPS	National Police Service
OCC	Organized Crime Council
OMGs	Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs
ODPP	Office of Director Public Prosecutions
PDD-42	Presidential Decision Directive-42
UN	United Nations
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNTOC	United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime
USA	United States of America
USDJBJSR	US Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report
WDR	World Development Report

ABSTRACT

The rising incidents of organized crime in Nairobi City County, like in many other urban areas, keep on raising serious security concerns among the residents. Yet, the dynamics of these emerging typologies of crime on urban safety remain largely unclear. The main objective of this study was to understand the implications of organized crime on urban areas of Kenya, with specific focus on Kayole estate in Nairobi City County. Specific study objectives included to find out the determinant factors for the emergence and persistence of organized crime, establish the effect of organized crime on the livelihoods of urban residents, understand how urban communities respond to the phenomenon of organized crime, and find out some of the challenges faced by urban residents in resolving the problem of organized crime. The study adopted descriptive research design and target residents of Soweto in Kayole estate and key informants who involved senior police officers, local administrators, youth leaders, religious leaders, civil society groups, and business community. A sample of 384 respondents was selected through purposive and systematic sampling techniques and interviewed using a semi-structured questionnaire and key informant interview guide. Both of the research instruments were tested for validity and reliability before being used in the field for collection of quantitative and qualitative data. Quantitative data was analyzed using descriptive data analysis with the help of SPSS computer software and presented using tables while qualitative data was analyzed thematically and presented in narrative form. The findings of the study revealed that there were a number of organized criminal gangs in Kayole estate and its surroundings, such as Yakuza, Gaza, Mungiki, Kamanzira, Smarter, Chini ya Maji, and Bagdad Boyz among others. Some of the factors that contributed to the existence and persistence of organized criminal groups in Kayole included police inaction and laxity, police collusion with criminals, parental protection of their criminal children, and too much idleness by the youth due to lack of constructive work or employment, and lack of recreational facilities for keeping the unemployed youth engaged. Presence and persistence of criminal groups had affected the residents' livelihoods in various ways. These included landlords incurring extra costs for security purposes and people having to report to work late for fear of being attacked when leaving their houses very early in the morning. Other prominent members of the community had also been extorted and forced to pay bribes for personal and business protection. There were also other levies that were imposed by criminal groups such as water connection, electricity connection, transport/stage, construction, security fee, personal and business protection, as well as relocation fee among other illegal charges. The study recommended the need for enhanced government-public cooperation and government's creation of job opportunities for the idling youth as some of the approaches for addressing organized crime in urban informal settlements.

CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the Study

Organized crime is a security threat that has affected many countries in the world. According to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC), the main international body addressing organized crime, there is no clearly agreed definition of organized crime. However, UNTOC (2003) defines organized crime as coordinated illegal activities by groups or networks that take place in varied forms and through elaborate structures where the perpetrators often have a chain of command through which to scheme and execute their plans. The criminal activities may be carried out through violence, corruption or related undertakings in order to directly or indirectly obtain a financial or material gain. According to United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), some of the most common types of organized crime include money laundering, fraud and extortion, illegal arms dealings, human trafficking, prostitution, cybercrime, dealing in counterfeit and contraband goods, and asset misappropriation, to mention but a few.

The US Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report (USDJBJSS) indicates that historically organized crime is commonly associated with developed countries, with several studies having being undertaken to understand the dynamics of this phenomenon (USDJBJSS, 2003). Some of the countries where organized crime is prevalent include the United States of America (USA), Russia, Mexico, China, Brazil, and Japan among other world strong economies (OCC, 2008). Yet, as a dynamic enterprise, organized crime is viewed as a formidable network where it often transcends generations and defined social or state boundaries. Therefore organized crime is a global and societal issue that generates both social and financial consequences to the societies that experience it.

In the USA, one of the oldest organized crimes includes Barrio Azteca which can be traced to the 1920s where it engaged in gambling and prostitution as well as voter intimidation (Angela, 2007). Equally dreaded in the US in the 1920s was the Italian-American organized American Mafia network which was notorious in illicit trade thereby causing a serious security concern in New York and Chicago (Muggah & Katherine, 2018). Studies indicate that later the Mafia

morphed into a widespread criminal gang further spreading its activities into drug trafficking and infiltrating labour unions and legitimate sectors such as the construction and garment industries (Laura, Octavio & David, 2018). Although during the latter part of the 20th century the US government applied anti-racketeering legislations to root out the Mafia through conviction of its top-ranking mobsters, its violent crimes, secret rituals and notorious operatives such as John Gotti and Al Capone have continued to fascinate the public and remained akin to popular culture in some parts of the American society (Wang, 2017).

In Europe, some of the persistent organized criminal gangs include the three main Italian mafia-style groups Cosa Nostra, Camorra and Ndrangheta which have proven elusive to law enforcers for a very long time and spread across the world through underhand operations (Schultze-Kraft, 2018). The groups' infiltration of key government sectors continues to pose high security risks to the public and the international community. In 2016 for instance, the Italian Calabinieri and Europol arrested in Sicily two lead figures of the Ceusi mafia, an offshoot of the Cosa Nostra organized criminal group, for arms trafficking (Muggah & Katherine, 2018). In Finland, organized crime can be traced to the early 19th century, and which over time has transformed to the notorious Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs (OMGs) that dominated the stage in the 1990s-2000s and engaged in tax evasion, fraud, drug trafficking, and money laundering among other black market activities (Laura et al, 2018).

In France, it is estimated that the proceeds from drug trafficking which is often associated with Ndrangheta, Turkish and Asian organized criminal groups amount to more than $5.4 billion annually (Adams, 2011). Studies further indicate that in the Netherlands, the Dutch criminal gangs extensively engage in international illegal transactions such as smuggling of drugs, human trafficking, tax evasion, firearms dealings, stolen vehicles and money laundering among other criminal activities. Other globally known organized criminal entities include Barrio Azteca in the USA and Juarez Drug Cartel in Mexico, among others. Developing countries have not been spared by this vice, with a number of urban areas bearing the heaviest brunt of this form of crime. The World Development Report (WDR) of 2011 highlights the devastating effect of organized crime on the world economies, with weaker states feeling much of that burden (Schultze-Kraft, 2018).

On the African continent, organized crime continues to reign in many countries thereby causing serious security concerns and destabilizing social order. The phenomenon has been viewed from four main perspectives. The first typology is the mafia-like criminals groups which are defined by violence. In South Africa, for instance, such criminals in Cape Town have closely been linked to wanton killings, extortion, and trafficking of illicit goods as well as infiltration of key government sectors for illicit profiteering (Farah, 2011b). A similar organization remains deeply entrenched in Nigeria where sophisticated criminal networks with international connections continue to cause nightmares to security agencies.

A second typology is viewed as more complex where on the face of it the criminal group may not qualify to be a classic definition of 'organized' crime yet the perpetrators have national and international connections and organize around trading in illegal products (Felbab-Brown, 2011). Many of the profiteers tend to have overlapping interests in the states. According to Gastrow (2011), a typical case is Guinea-Bissau which has been termed as a 'narco state due to sophisticated involvement of senior state officials in cocaine trafficking. A third category of organized crime in Africa encompasses a strong cross-over between loose political organizations, militias or armed groups, and trafficking or smuggling operations. Libya, the Sahel and Horn of Africa have strongly been linked to this kind of organized crime (Felbab-Brown, 2011).

A fourth category of organized crime in Africa is cybercrime, especially as enhanced by widespread use of the internet. Socio-culturally, organized criminal gangs are known to engage in large-scale political and public resource thefts, drug trafficking and syndicates and extortions from the business sector where illegalities are often glorified to unprecedented high levels, and ironically made to appear like normal occurrences (Kleiman, 2011). The overall effect of organized crime is a creation of insecurity and promotion of lawlessness that end up interfering with normal delivery of essential goods and services such as healthcare services, education, and sanitation among others. Olson (2012) states that organized crime gangs have often been associated with terror attacks, horrific politically-motivated murders, drug trafficking, and prison breaks among other serious crimes.

In Nairobi, crime is generally linked to the fast growing population in the city where it is thought to be in an alarming rate. This unprecedented growth of population has led majority of city

dwellers to reside in slums which are generally vulnerable to all sorts of crime and insecurity (Ndikaru, 2011). Sana and Okombo (2012) further state that the densely populated slums of Nairobi are thought to be the most insecure, with very poor policing structures. In a previous study by the African Population and Health Research Center (APHRC) on the population and health dynamics in the informal settlements of Nairobi, it emerged that crime and insecurity were among the major threats to the wellbeing of the Nairobi residents (APHRC, 2010). The rising crime rates were mostly linked to organized criminal groups usually residing in sprawling Nairobi slums where it is estimated that more than 65% of urban residents actually inhabit (UN-Habitat, 2010).

In 2010, Kenya initiated the Prevention of Organized Crime Act No. 6 of 2010 which provided for the prevention and punishment of organized crime, recovery of proceeds of organized criminal group activities and for the connected purposes. The Act further defined what criminal activities entail, the kind of offences to be associated with organized crime, aiding and abetting of the offences, oath-taking, and obstruction of justice as well as membership into an organized criminal group among other provisions (GoK, 2010). The Act also provided a clear definition of an organized crime in the Kenya context.

In December 2016, the Ministry of Interior released a list of at least 90 criminal gangs that were suspected to be terrorizing Kenyans at the behest of politicians (US Department of State, 2016). Most of these groups were alleged to be operating in urban areas, with slums or urban informal settlement areas being their favourite spots. Some of them prominent names of the groups included the 42 brothers, Gaza, Superpower, Mungiki, Siafu, Yausa, Bagdad Boys, and Yakuza, among others, which were operating in different parts of the country. Media reports further indicated that Kayole estate was one of the most hit areas in the Eastland of Nairobi, with Gaza, Smarter and Yakuza gangs thought to be the most common criminal gangs here (The Star, 1st March, 2018).

Although a number of studies have been carried out on organized crimes in the informal settlements in Kenyan urban areas, according to the National Crime Research Centre (NCRC), most of them have tended to focus on the factors motivating these crimes without paying closer attention to the implications of proliferation of organized crimes on the whole question of urban

security (NCRC, 2012). This is a major concern, especially given that various unique organized criminal gangs keep on emerging, with their own unique overarching objectives. Kayole estate is one of the areas in the Eastland in Nairobi notoriously associated with incidences of crime linked to organized criminal groups, including Gaza, Yakuza, and Smarter gangs among others (Mutuku, 2017).

1.2 Statement of the Problem

The phenomenon of organized crime in urban informal settlements of Nairobi city raises serious safety and social interaction concerns among the city residents. In addition, the dynamics of the emerging organized criminal gangs, their typologies, organization, mode of operation and impact on social life are scarcely understood. Whereas a number of studies have linked organized crimes to proliferation of small arms and light weapons, others have associated these with laxity by or compromised security agencies where corruption makes it hard for the police to dismantle criminal gangs decisively. Some security pundits argue that city residents deliberately fail to cooperate in the fight against organized crime for fear of being double-crossed by the police thereby endangering their lives even more. Furthermore, some criminals are alleged to have been released from police custody under unclear circumstances; a phenomenon often associated with police bribery. These developments make it complicated to understand the implications of organized crime on urban security in Kenya.

Kayole estate in Nairobi City County has in the recent past prominently featured on headlines in the local media about increasing cases of organized crime and insecurity (Daily Nation, October 10, 2019). One of these groups is the Yakuza, an alleged reincarnation of the dreaded Gaza gang which has in the recent past been linked to very serious coordinated series of crimes in Kayole and other areas in Eastlands in Nairobi. Complete dismantling of the gang is alleged to have been frustrated by collusion with some police officers in sabotaging the Government's peace and security restoring efforts. This generally leaves the residents on the receiving end and very vulnerable to insecurity. According to the area residents, the situation is giving them sleepless nights hence petitioning the government to come to their aid by dismantling the organized criminal groups in the area and tightening security (Daily Nation September 11, 2019). The

scenario therefore called for an empirical study to assess the implications of organized crime on urban areas of Kenya, with specific focus on Kayole estate in Nairobi City County.

1.2.1 Key Research Questions

The study addressed the following research questions:

i. What factors account for emergence and persistence of organized criminal gangs in Kayole?
ii. How has organized crime affected the livelihoods of urban residents?
iii. In which ways have urban communities responded to the problem of organized crime?
iv. What are the challenges faced by urban residents in resolving the problem of organized crime?

1.3 Overall Objective

The main objective of this study was to understand the implications of organized crime on urban areas of Kenya, with specific focus on Kayole estate in Nairobi City County.

1.3.1 Specific Objectives

The study was guided by the following research objectives:

i. To find out the determinant factors for the emergence and persistence of organized crime.
ii. To establish the effect of organized crime on livelihoods and how communities respond to organized crime.
iii. To find out some of the challenges faced by urban residents in resolving the problem of organized crime.

1.4 Justification of the Study

The problem of organized crime affects the lives of most urban residents. The numbers of organized criminal gangs are on the increase, new ones are forming and old ones mutate. The complexity and modus operandi are still not understood and therefore actions to address the problem are still not accurate. Activities of organized criminal gangs have been witnessed in many Kenyan urban areas, with these mostly disrupting normal lives of the city inhabitants.

Often, illegalities perpetrated by the criminal gangs leave the residents living in fear thereby being distracted from pursuing their normal daily activities which may in turn affect the people's livelihoods. Taming the problem of organized crime in the city and in many Kenyan urban areas is alleged to have been complicated by suspected collusion of the police with gang leaders. The findings of this study will inform the government and other stakeholders in security matters on some of the appropriate modalities to address the problem of organized criminal gangs in the country. Furthermore, the outcomes of the study may provide a clear roadmap to the law enforcers on how to deal with the bad elements within the police service for the sake of effective policing and ensuring security and safety to people and their property

In addition to providing a roadmap for the best practice when it comes to security service delivery, the findings of this study may be critical for policy formulation. This will be important for creating a basis for synergy between the national and county governments on proactive and effective security policy guidelines design. It is also anticipated that the study will serve as reference material for other scholars and researchers keen on focusing on the theme of urban security and organized criminal gangs. In this sense, the study will serve as a foundation for further research on the relationship between organized crime and security service delivery in urban areas and how this translates into confortable living by city residents.

1.5 Scope and Limitations of the Study

This study was conducted in Soweto area in Kayole estate in the eastern part of Nairobi City County, and was restricted to assessing the implications of organized crime on the residents of Kayole estate and its environs. More specifically, the study dwelt on finding out factors for the emergence and persistence of organized crime, effect of organized crime on the livelihoods of urban residents, how urban communities respond to the phenomenon of organized crime, and some of the challenges faced by urban residents in resolving the problem of organized crime.

1.6 Definition of Key Terms and Concepts

I**nsecurity**: this refers to a situation of uncertainty with regard to personal safety and that of individual or communal property.

Livelihoods of residents: these are the residents' daily activities for their upkeep. These may be considered based on type of jobs, type of businesses, sustainability of income generating ventures, and income level of economic activities.

Organized crime: these are coordinated illegal activities by criminal groups or networks which are undertaken through elaborate structures, with perpetrators often having a chain of command through which to scheme and execute their plans. The activities may be carried out through violent, corrupt or related manner so as to directly or indirectly obtain financial or material benefits.

Strategies for addressing organized crime: these are approaches that can be adopted for addressing the problem of organized crime. These may be viewed in terms of police-public partnerships, community policing, public-police trust, resource availability/allocation, and political goodwill.

Urban security: this is the state of tranquility or safety ideally expected in urban areas for the residents to be able to live peacefully and freely to carry on with their daily activities without any fear of disruptions. In this context, urban security will be viewed in terms of personal and property safety as well as commercial interruptions.

CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Introduction

This study sought to assess the implications of organized crime on urban security in Kenya, with a specific focus on Kayole in Nairobi City County. Literature review is carried out based on themes emanating from the specific research objectives. These include: organized crime and urban insecurity; organized crime and the residents' urban livelihoods; the influence of police on prevalence of organized crime; and government's strategies for addressing organized crime. Additionally, the chapter highlights theoretical and conceptual framework.

2.2 Factors Accounting for Emergence and Persistence of Organized Crime

Organized crime remains a persistent global security and public safety concern, especially in urban settings and is a serious threat to safety of the people and security of their property regardless of the environment. The concept of organized crime has various definitions. However, there seems to be a consensus by various social scientists that the term "organized crime" has flexible connotations, referring to a broad range of ever-changing activities and circumstances (Neskem 2006). In the absence of a universal definition of "organized crime", this concept has generally been viewed on the basis of four criminal actors including mafia-style groups, criminal networks, state-embedded actors, and foreign criminal actors. As a global security concern, organized crime is fast evolving, thereby giving law enforcers difficult time to contain.

Globally, organized crime is increasingly viewed from criminal, political, socio-cultural, and security perspectives, with an emphasis on how to end the menace for the sake of overall human security and safety (International Crisis Group, 2011). At international and national levels, organized crime attempts to revolve around huge sums of money and loss in revenue collection as well as money laundering; which ultimately tend to destabilize countries both internally and externally. Furthermore, there are illegal markets for goods and services that cater for the local demand. On political and governance fronts, organized crime has pervaded some countries' governance structures and political orders where illegalities underpin political and governance

institutions. For instance, according to Farah (2011a), Colombia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, and Nigeria are some of the countries in the world that continue to suffer from the effects of organized crime.

There are a number of international organized criminal groups that are commonly associated with terror activities. These include extremist groups such as Al-Qaeda, Al-Shabaab and ISIS among others that are increasingly enticing the youth with all manner of material goods and money and recruiting them to further their heinous objectives (Wang, 2017).The terrorist groups continue to pose serious security and safety concerns by creating fear and despondency among community members, who fear that their children will be recruited into these outlawed groups. Given the sophistication of terrorism, shrouded in highly discreet operations, this also remains a formidable security threat to a number of urban centers. Common, indiscriminate attacks on innocent citizens make these groups among the most dreaded forms of organized criminal entities not only in Kenya, but also globally.

The advancement and widespread use of technology has made it easy for criminal gangs to organize and share information about their illicit activities (Passel, 2005). In a study conducted by (Rytina and Simanski, 2009) in the US to understand the relationship between organized crime and security, the findings revealed that the multi-faced nature of organized crime continues to pose numerous challenges on how to root it out decisively. For instance, there are numerous emerging criminal gangs in form of terrorist networks, maritime piracy, human, arms, and drugs trafficking as well as cybercrime which often create fear and uncertainty among the public (Icduygu & Toktas, 2012).

In Kenya and many other African countries, the youths are in high risks from organized crime owing to the high unemployment rate in the country. Musoi et al (2012) postulate young adults in the coastal region for instance, are increasingly being recruited into terrorism networks and piracy groups that continue to cause fear and despondency among the residents of the area. Extortionist rings are also commonly formed with known habits of attacking ships in the Indian Ocean and involved in serious cross-border crimes such as human, arms, and drugs smuggling. According to Sana and Okombo (2012), all these underhand dealings pose serious security risks to the public hence denying them the opportunity to maximize their efforts in earning their daily

living. Ndikaru (2011) further states that fighting of organized crime has been complicated by the sharp economic and social disparities amongst different social classes where those in the lowest economic cadres feel discriminated against by the society and therefore justified to engage in coordinated crime for their survival. This view may however not be commonly justifiable since organized crime does not necessarily exclusively involve the less financially endowed in society.

In a study by the National Crime Research Centre (NCRC) to understand the extent of organized criminal gangs in Kenya, more than 50% of the respondents indicated that they were aware of existence of a criminal gang (NCRC, 2012). Furthermore, the study revealed that, ironically, the residents were not ready to reveal the names or report the activities of these gangs to the relevant security agencies for fear of retaliatory attacks. More telling was the fact that the respondents felt that the Government did not have the goodwill or the capacity to deal with the criminal groups. Often, the criminals went scot-free even after they were evidently linked to crimes within their jurisdictions. The collusion by security agents such as the police in committing heinous crimes gave the gangs leeway to escape arrests thereby complicating the fight against organized crime as most of them were often released without any charges being preferred against them (Muggah & Katherine, 2018).

According to Dreyfus, Guedes, Lessing, Bandeira, Sousa and Rivero (2008), the nature of organized crime made it more complicated to deal with. The gender-dichotomy in the execution of the crimes served to divert attention of Government thereby often defeating justice. For instance, while women in the gangs were sometimes used to lure victims into traps of the criminals, men mostly executed the plans. Shockingly, even children were used in such roles as spying for the adult criminals in the groups whereas some women also spied, spiked food or drinks of the victims, and lured potential victims using sex. Studies have also indicated that older members of the criminal gangs were used in oath-taking, recruitment of gang members, spying and dispute resolution among other roles (Interpol, 2010). These complexities worked complementarily to entrench organized crime in society and this posed immense threats to human security and safety of property. In urban settings, the situation was even more complicated owing to other social dynamics such as ethnic backgrounds where fellow tribes members tended to shield their “own‟ regardless of the fact that a crime was actually committed.

Another study was conducted by Buddenberg and William (2006) in Afghanistan to understand the survival tactics of criminal gangs in urban informal settlements. Using descriptive research design and a questionnaire for collection of primary data, the study established that a number of young people involved in organized criminal activities were often protected by people close to them including people who belonged to their ethnic communities. Furthermore, close to 40% of those interviewed indicated that there were numerous cases of criminal gang members depending on their respective ethnic groups for support especially when it came to crackdowns by the police. Sometimes people were coerced by the criminals to shield the latter from police persecutions by concealing their identities. There were also other intra-gang support mechanisms that made it extremely difficult for the Government and other stakeholders in security matters to root out organized crime in urban areas. The common strategies used for intra-gang survival included financial, advisory, and protection and housing services as well as bailing out of courts, paying fines and hiring of lawyers among others (Walker, Flatley, Kershaw and Moon, 2020).

Some studies have further indicated that criminal gang members were rarely arrested or detained for long whenever arrests were made (Dreyfus et al, 2008). Corruption in the criminal justice system played a critical role in sabotaging criminal justice processes. For instance, in a study conducted by Laura et al (2018) to establish the influence of organized crime on urban security in Mexico, it emerged that there was rampant bribery of the police, judiciary officials, police biases and lack of cooperation, deliberate delayed arrival of the police at the scene of crime, and fear by the public of reporting crimes to the police as well as political interference where criminal gangs enjoyed favours from their political godfathers. The study further revealed that over 60% cases had been reported of gang members meting violence on their perceived traitors thereby sending a warning to the public such actions were likely to be directed to whoever dared to disclose to the police the groups" heinous activities. The tactics used by organized criminal gangs to keep their grip on community affairs and sometimes blackmail community members to keep the gangs' activities under wraps point to the complex nature of addressing organized crime as a serious threat to peace and security among urban communities (Ndikaru, 2010).

2.3 Effects of Organized Crime on Urban Residents' Livelihoods

Organized crime, like any other forms of criminality, creates fear among the residents and often disrupts their normal activities of daily living. According to United Nations Security Council (UNSC), although organized crime is frequently associated with unemployment and lack of livelihood opportunities especially among the youth, on the other hand the phenomenon causes majority of the people to live in uncertainty thereby not being able to really focus on their usual engagements for normal lives (UNSC, 2009). Globally, criminals have viewed organized crime as a network through which to make quick money. From human trafficking to drugs and narcotics smuggling and prostitution, individual or even organizations at the highest level of the network reap huge financial rewards. In Europe, for instance, human trafficking is considered to be more pronounced than in any other parts of the world, and this generates huge returns to those behind the rackets (Varese, 2011). Literatures have revealed that since the end of the Cold War, human trafficking for sexual exploitation became common. This is further slowly being replaced with migrant smuggling, with workers commonly being smuggled from Latin America to North America and from Africa to Europe (Olson, 2012).

Other elements in organized crime include heroin and cocaine as well as firearm trafficking, with heroin linked to Afghanistan as it its main source and European countries as the major destination. With regard to firearm smuggling, the primary markets for illicit arms are majorly determined based on criminal intent and political ends. According to Olson (2012), arms trafficking from the United States to Mexico usually target criminal enterprises whereas those from Eastern Europe to Africa are often meant for political ends. A holistic and critical analysis of both scenarios reveals as serious impact on the livelihoods of individuals and communities. For the victims of human trafficking and sexual exploitation, the experiences are devastating on their ability to stay positive and be productive especially given the translocations and psychological torture involved (Varese, 2011). On the other hand, to the perpetrators of the illegal trade, huge profits are usually anticipated thereby flooding the market with 'dirty' money and propagating illegalities through their chains of operation. Be it as it may, organized crime is often driven by the desire for individuals to enrich themselves and in the process cause suffering to others. This kind of disruption of social order is a typical example of the implications of not only organized crime on security but all typologies of criminality.

In Kenya, in an annual crime report of 2018 by the National Police Service (NPS), it was evident that crime was generally on the increase (GoK, 2018). Right from 2016 to 2018, the country witnessed a rise in crime rate, from 76,986 in 2016 to 77,992 cases in 2017 and 88,268 incidences in 2018. Instructive to note is the fact that between 2017 and 2018, the rate of increase of crime was 13%, and this was projected to be even higher in the near future. Although the upward trend was mostly noted in incidences of defilement, assault, general stealing, creating disturbances, and possession of drugs such as bhang as well as malicious damage, in one way or the other these crimes could easily be linked to organized crime. For instance, organized crime can also be viewed as an umbrella concept under which other crimes can be analyzed, including drug and substance trafficking, human trafficking, prostitution, and extortion among others (*The Star*, 1st May 2018).

In the period 2017-2018, Nairobi County witnessed the highest incidences of crime, amounting to 7,128 at the end of 2018 according to police records (GoK, 2018). Statistics also revealed that the highest number of cases related to assault was committed by individuals known to the victims who had resorted to joining crime gangs as a way of survival. Some of the most common typologies of crime in Kenya in the recent past include terrorism, cattle rustling, trafficking of illegal immigrants, proliferation of illegal arms and light weapons, and prostitution among others (NCRC, 2018). Although some of these crimes are more pronounced in certain specific regions than others, their common denominator is the insecurity they cause to the residents of those areas and the country at large. For instance, terrorist networks such as al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda terror groups are a common security threat in the north eastern and south coast regions owing to these regions' proximity to porous borders. Given the sophistication of terrorism shrouded in highly discreet operations, this also remains a serious security threat to a number of urban centers. Common indiscriminate attacks on innocent citizens make the group one of the most feared form of organized criminal entity not only in Kenya, but globally.

Although sometimes mistaken for not being a form of organized crime cattle rustling remains one of such criminal activities posing immense security threats in the country. A recent police crime report in the country indicates that in 2018, 133 incidences of cattle rustling were reported where almost 11,000 livestock were stolen (GoK, 2018). During these raids, 28 people were killed and 58 were left with grievous injuries. Another security threat as a result of organized

crime relates to illegal and undocumented immigrants who move into the country due to political turmoil back in their home countries or who are driven by criminal intent as they transit through Kenya to other countries (NCRC, 2018). Possession of illegal arms in the country is another organized crime that continues to pose serious security to the country, especially to the pastoralist communities and urban residents.

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In the context of organized crime and livelihoods of the people, the impact is more serious in urban neighbourhoods especially for the people living in slums where most of them live from hand-to-mouth. Kayole estate in the Eastlands of Nairobi remains of the expansive poor urban areas in the county that has very high crime rates. In terms of organized crimes, the area is thought to be home to some of the most dreaded criminal gangs such Gaza, which is thought to have in the recent past rebranded itself into Yakuza (The Standard, 1st March 2018). The delicate nature of the economy of Kayole as a largely informal settlement means that people's livelihoods are often interrupted with every time crime rates go high. Among other variables, this study will therefore seek to examine the influence of organized crime on the residents' livelihoods.

2.4 Urban Communities' Response to Organized Crime Phenomenon

The complicated nature of organized crime tends to take communities, the Government and other security stakeholders a lot of time and effort to deal with. At the local level, enhancing community policing and collaboration with law enforcement agencies has been the best option

for communities to respond to organized crime (Mutuku, 2017). However, this approach has a number of setbacks, especially given the fear created on residents by organized criminals who tend to commit some of the crimes with impunity. At higher levels, transnationally, organized crime units and Interpol attempt to deal with cross-border organized crimes such as drug and human trafficking, smuggling of animal trophies and cybercrime among others. Some of the strategies used by the law enforcement agencies globally include creating intelligence systems for conducting criminal analysis based on biometrics, facial recognition and other related variables.

Although the Interpol and other policing agencies have over the years tried to institute mechanisms for dealing with organized crime and other web of criminal entities, the ever-evolving nature of crime means that a lot of resources and intelligence must be expended in order to effectively deal with the unique challenges that this scenario presents. Lack of enough financial resources and advanced skills to stay ahead of the criminals tends to complicate the fight against organized crime (Mutuku, 2017). Other strategies include collaboration of communities with the police on instituting national and international law enforcement systems for exchanging of operational data, best practice and lessons learnt with the aim of dismantling specific organized criminal gangs. However, according to US General Accounting Office (1996), Global criminal gangs present unique challenges to law enforcement agencies all over the world, especially given their financial muscle strong and widespread networks as well as their ability to infiltrate government systems.

Further, the tools of diplomacy are proving ineffective in addressing the gangs, especially owing to the level of organization of some of the criminal groups. In the world of organized crime, consensus between parties is hardly an option as the groups are mostly motivated by money hence wired to making as much as possible under any circumstances. This trait tends to cut across virtually all organized criminal groups regardless of the level of organization or spread.

The police have the responsibility to ensure that citizens stay in peace where they feel assured of their safety and that of their property. However, the complicated nature of organized crime often makes it extremely difficult for security agencies to fight crime and restore security of the people and guarantee safety of the people (Wang, 2017). Given the usually high stakes involved in

organized crime, often police personnel have lost lives in the line of duty. This bespeaks of a type of crime where the perpetrators are not ready to take chances and will go to any lengths to ensure that their deals are executed, even if it means killing policing agents (UNODC, 2009). In South America, where for instance there are high-stake drug trafficking syndicates, the police have been accused of being involved in organized criminal rings where they facilitate movements and transactions of illicit goods and services with intent of getting kickbacks to a tune of hundreds of thousands of dollars (U.S. Department of State, 2016). Such a scenario continues to complicate the fight against organized crime.

Besides cases of direct or indirect but conscious involvement of the police in organized crime, lack of the institution's capacity to deal with crime has also been blamed on persistent nature of insecurity in many countries (OECD, 2012). Widespread use of the internet which has emerged as an essential part of modern life for millions of people has led to cybercrime where criminals spread their unlawful messages aimlessly. Like most aspects of globalization, rapid expansion of internet-based crime has far outstretched regulatory capacity, and this has created a gap in terms of policing. Lack of strict control of the internet use is continually creating challenges for the policing agencies thereby increasing security concerns for the public. The biggest challenge of cybercrime remains how to categorize certain offences as organized crime or otherwise. However, the fact that cybercrime may easily revolve around criminalities that can involve multiple players at the same time such as disseminating child pornography or spreading pirated content, makes it more an organized crime than not (Varese, 2011).

The internet-based crime has drastically evolved from malicious spread of information to profit-making criminal enterprises where a number of organized criminal activities are perpetuated and quickly spread to as many destinations as possible within a very short time (Felbab-Brown, 2011). Many people's dependence on the internet continues to create new opportunities for crime to thrive. Electronic trafficking and transmission of contraband goods across borders through the internet is increasingly proving a challenge to the policing units thereby watering down the influence of the police as security and safety keepers. Gastrow (2011) further postulates that cyberspace is increasingly offering criminals advantage over policing agents due to the advantage of anonymity and the ability to allow otherwise unrelated people in different parts around the globe to transact on offences which can then spread far and wide. The growing use of

automation has also posed serious challenges to keeping cybercrime under check. Millions of unsolicited loose junk messages can be spread through robotics within a short duration. Furthermore, hacking is now also increasingly being launched with as much as almost 100 million hacking attacks in less than 24 hours using computer software appliances that can damage thousands of computer systems within a very short time (Schultze-Kraft, 2018).

Launching of millions of attacks at the same time has given cyber thieves an advantage over security organs in the sense that scammers are able to steal only a small amount of money from each unsuspecting victim, thus dimming chances of being easily detected (Felbab-Brown, 2011). Security analysts estimate that losses resulting from cybercrime could be running into trillions of US dollars given the huge number of victims recorded yearly throughout the world (Gastrow, 2011). Closer home, the ever-evolving nature of crime is constantly proving a serious challenge to the police in Kenya where lack of resources for capacity-building often places the institution below international standards in terms of security service to the public. The Kenya police service is alleged to be incapacitated to handle the common forms of modern organized crime in the name of money laundering, cybercrime, counterfeiting and contraband, sophisticated fraud and extortion rings, and asset misappropriation among others (ISS & Interpol, 2019).

In many parts of Africa, organized crime thrives, especially with regard to informal urban settlements where majority of the youth remains unemployed hence taking advantage of the situation to engage in various criminal enterprises (Transparency International, 2011a). In Dakar, Senegal and Douala in Cameroon for instance, youth gangs continue to terrorize people on the streets; this being a reflection of what happens in most cities in developing countries (Varese, 2011). In Kenya, overt organized crimes have been viewed in terms of militias, such as the once dreaded *mungiki* group, which have largely been associated with senior politicians and other influential government officials (Musoi, Muthama, Waiya & Kitiku, 2012). The militias are alleged to flourish on smuggling of small arms and light weapons, extortion rings and drug trafficking among other coordinated criminal enterprises as they take advantage of weak policing structures (Varese, 2011).

Kenya has in the recent past been placed in the forefront in the list of countries in Africa with the highest presence of organized crime. According to the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) and the

International Police (Interpol), Kenya tops in Africa in organized crime-related violence, mega corruption and narcotics trade (ISS & Interpol, 2019). Carjacking, animal theft and banditry, terrorism, ethnic fights/violence, and corruption were some of the common forms of organized crime in Kenya. To make matters more complicated in the fight against organized crime, the police and other key government institutions have often been accused of colluding with criminal gangs to facilitate the latter's criminal activities. For instance, after the February 2019 Dusit D2 Hotel terror attack, financial institutions and the police were accused by the Office of Director of Public Prosecutions (ODPP) as enablers of terrorism, as a typology of organized crime. Security pundits have further associated organized crime in Kenya with weak or dysfunctional institutions, permeable borders and weak policing systems (Daily Nation September 11, 2019).

Furthermore, the fact that organized criminal gangs in urban areas often get protection from their native communities, makes it even more complicated for the police to get to the bottom of organized crime so that these can be dismantled (Felbab-Brown, 2011). Entrenched culture and oathing among the organized criminal gangs in most urban places in Kenya tend to make it hard for the police to infiltrate these groups for the sake of reigning in on them. Some of the groups can easily be traced to given ethnic communities, which sometimes renders their sinister activities to be closely guarded secrets as they enjoy protection from the police by their ethnic communities. Some of these groups in Nairobi which have been traced to particular tribal lineages include Taliban, Kosovo boys, Bagdad boys, and Chinkororo, Mungiki, and Kalinin warriors among others (ISS & Interpol, 2019). In 2018, police statistics on crime incidences indicates that close to 65 police officers were reported to have lost their lives while more than 500 officers were seriously injured. More than 23 of the deaths were linked to terrorism and a number of them associated with cattle rustling among other types of crime (GoK, 2018). The reorganization of the National Police Service to conform to NPS Act 2011 has so far not borne tangible fruits in terms of effective policing and dismantling of criminal gangs.

2.5 Challenges Faced by Urban Residents in Resolving Problem of Organized Crime

The complicated nature of organized crime tends to take governments a lot of time and efforts to deal with. Transnationally, organized crime unit and the Interpol attempt to deal with cross-border organized crimes such as drug and human trafficking, smuggling of animal trophies, and

cybercrime among others. Some of the strategies by the police service across countries include creating intelligence systems for conducting criminal analysis based on biometrics, images and related variables. This strategy is meant to provide a global link of criminal gang organizers, financiers, and patrons (Muggah & Katherine, 2018). However, criminal networks continue to pose serious challenges to several countries especially owing to the intricate nature of organized crime. Although the Interpol and other policing agencies have over the years tried to institute mechanisms for dealing with organized crime and other web of criminal entities, the ever-evolving nature of crime means that a lot of resources and intelligence has to be expended in order to effectively deal with the unique challenges that this scenario presents. Lack of enough financial resources and advanced skills to stay ahead of the criminals tends to complicate the fight against organized crime (Mutuku, 2017).

Other strategies include putting in place national and international law enforcement systems for exchanging of operational data, best practice and lessons learnt with the aim of dismantling specific organized criminal gangs. According to US General Accounting Office (1996), Global criminal gangs present unique challenges to law enforcement agencies all over the world, especially given their financial muscle, strong and widespread networks as well as their ability to infiltrate government systems. Further, the tools of diplomacy are proving ineffective in addressing the gangs, especially owing to the level of organization of some of the criminal groups. In the world of organized crime, consensus between parties is hardly an option as the groups are mostly motivated by money hence wired to making as much as possible under any circumstances. Polish Press Agency (1996) states that global organized crime continues to pose serious threats to national and international peace, and this limits the effectiveness of policing and restoring of security in many countries. The new threats present conflicts that may need innovative strategies by the police to effectively handle.

Some countries have attempted to come up with new anti-crime legislations in order to deal with emerging organized criminal gangs. For instance, the American Presidential Decision Directive-42 (PDD-42) was meant to project the US as "the strongest world in peace and freedom, security and prosperity" in the 21st century. The decree recognized that Global Organized Crime (GOC) was a serious threat to national security hence ordered all relevant government agencies to employ creative and aggressive legal means to thwart international organized crime. These

included denying visas to a broad spectrum of suspected criminal gang leaders and issuing sanctions against governments that cooperated with or provided asylum to organized crime lead figures (Quarantiello, 1996). Despite the PDD-42 bringing public attention to the international organized crime phenomenon, critics faulted the directive as lacking the mettle to totally review the then existing policy on security (Hacket, 1996). This meant that the decree did not provide mechanisms for increasing the amount of intelligence resources directed towards international crime. Furthermore, contrary to expectations by security experts, there was no provision for declaring intelligence collection and analysis of criminal and narcotics operations as a top priority.

Besides the PDD-42 directive, the US also had the International Crime Control (ICC) Act of 1996 which focused on GOC by expanding definitions of money laundering and encouraging international collaboration among states through joint-law enforcement programs when it came to dealing with organized crime. The Act further provided US law enforcement agencies with more flexibility in its overseas investigations and arrests of international organized criminal elements (U.S. Department of State, 2016). Dealing with organized crime requires operational synergy between law enforcement agencies and the Intelligence Departments since this kind of crime tends to have a global impact, with criminals having international ties. Polish Press Agency (1996) further states that as law enforcers try to reduce organized crime through arrests and prosecutions of the criminal gang leaders, the Intelligence strives to deal with the possible global political and economic networks overseas which often make the presence of organized crime to be felt far and wide. The cooperation between law enforcement and intelligence agencies makes it more possible for not only gathering information and prosecuting cases but also helps in making evidence-based policies on the fight against globally organized crime. Despite this argument, sometimes it is not easy for countries to agree on a single formidable policy for addressing the question of organized crime, which happens to be largely a transnational crime (Dreyfus et al, 2008).

The law enforcement mission is to implement the law and provide relevant information for the justice process in the courts of law that will help in proving cases beyond reasonable doubts. On the other hand, intelligence agencies have the responsibility to furnish the policymakers with national security intelligence for analysis and monitoring of security situations. Hence, due to the

different operational prisms for law enforcement and the intelligence agencies, it sometimes becomes untenable trying to reconcile their operational platforms (Icduygu & Toktas, 2012). Often, there arises mutual mistrust of working together, with the intelligence more concerned with protecting its sources of information and its criminal investigation methodologies whereas law enforcement's emphasis is on how to protect their evidence. This variance between the two critical institutions in security matters sometimes makes it difficult for Governments to deal with organized crime in a more coordinated and decisive manner.

In some instances the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has tended to operate at cross purposes with other key security institutions overseas. Whereas the FBI's modus operandi is usually spying, other international law enforcement units have argued that dismantling cross- border syndicates can not only rely on spying and counter-spying hence the need for close collaboration from all quarters. Without inter-agency cooperation, fighting globally organized crime would be a tall order since some international networks allow criminals to hide crucial information and cover their tracks through various storage means (U.S. Department of State, 2016). Other organized crime fighting institutions have equally faced challenges. These include the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) which has not been very effective despite its recent reorganization of some of its critical departments such as the Directorate of Central Intelligence Counter-Narcotics Center (DCICC) which has since been renamed Directorate of Central Intelligence Crime and Narcotics Center (DCICNC). Despite the new center trying to provide greater opportunities for the law enforcement opportunities to access actionable intelligence on specific global organized criminal groups, there are certain aspects of the investigations that the DCICNC has not been able to streamline due to incapacitation (Passel, 2005).

The biggest threat to addressing global organized crime is poor coordination of overseas law enforcement and investigative activities between intelligence and law enforcement agencies. Empirical evidence shows that more often than not there is the problem of overlapping responsibilities, unclear hierarchical coordination points, and inter-agency clash over priority areas. For instance, in 1992, five law enforcement agencies experienced replicating analysis of drug trafficking movement by air into Mexico (Farah, 2011b). However, international cooperation remains the most effective strategy to transnational criminal problems, with enhanced training of law enforcers and investigating agencies.

By way of combatting organized crime, the Government of Kenya has put legislative frameworks in place through enactment of "The Proceeds of crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act No.9 of 2009." Popularly referred to as "POCAMLA", this piece of Legislation has imposed rules and responsibilities on all financial institutions to report all suspicious financial transactions to the Financial Reporting Centre. This law also created "Assets Recovery Agency" that can confiscate, restrain and recover all realizable property that is suspected to be proceeds of crime through criminal prosecution. Another progressive piece of legislation in Kenya is "Prevention of Terrorism Act No.30 of 2012 which outlines the manner of dealing with suspected terror groups through enabling regulations of 2013.Some of the punitive measures contemplated by this law are seizure and forfeiture of Assets of the suspected terror groups and freezing and restraining their bank accounts.

The global challenges encountered by law enforcement and investigative institutions are not unique to any particular country. In Kenya, despite the reorganization of the National Police Force into National Police Service under the central command of the Inspector General (IG), which is aimed at effectively discharging its mandate, there are still challenges that make the institution unable to deal with crime as it is expected of it (GoK, 2018). In 2018 the government launched a policy framework and strategy for further reorganization of the NPS as a way of consolidating the gains made through the NPS Act of 2011. This move was meant to ensure that the fight against crime is streamlined where the IG has more powers for combating serious crimes through well- defined structures. To make this rearrangement a reality and eliminate wastage and duplication of roles and harness synergy, close to 40,000 Kenya police service and 25,000 Administration Police (AP) officers were merged so as to operate under a central police command. Integrating the AP and regular police aimed at boosting the general duty police – public ratio from about 1: 991 to 1: 643.

Furthermore, integration of close to 2,500 Anti Stock Theft Unit (ASTU) and 482 APS Stock Theft Prevention Units increase led to a strong 5,000 APS-ASTU personnel under the command of DIG-APS. However, despite all these moves to ensure effective fighting of organized crime and other forms of criminalities, the infrastructural gaps in the NPS still make it ineffective, with rampant corruption thought to be one of the biggest hurdles (Mutuku, 2017). These gaps in policing in general means that even dealing with organized criminal gangs will not be a walk in

the park. Hence, this study will seek to address the gaps by analyzing implications of organized crime on urban insecurity in Kenya.

2.6 Theoretical Framework

2.6.1 Anomie Theory

The Anomie theory by Emile Durkheim (1967) postulates that the society is regulated by social rules where sometimes individuals may choose to break away from these rules so that they can discover their new potentials. The theory further postulates that each individual in society is at war with himself or herself, which is a necessary state so that people can be motivated to aspire to outdo themselves and achieve what they may not have at any given moment in time. Durkheim (1967) uses suicidal thoughts in pathologically mentally disturbed people to demonstrate how such aspirations can keep on pushing a person to "achieve" another state of mind. Such a person is constantly driven by anger, disillusionment and disturbance which in extreme cases may lead him or her to end his or her life (Agnew, 2001).

This study sought to assess the implications of organized crime on urban security in Kenya, with Kayole estate as a case study. In looking at how organized crime has affected the residents of Kayole in general, the Anomie theory helped to explain how people try to innovate ways of survival as they go about their day activities. On the part of the criminals, based on the Anomie theory, criminals driven to involve in criminal activities by the material possessions they do not have. Like Durkheim argues about a pathologically mentally disturbed individual who is strongly driven to commit suicide as his/her new ultimate "achievement", criminal gang members may be viewed as strongly driven by the desire to achieve their ultimate goals through criminal activities.

The Anomie theory further postulates that naturally individuals live under similar social values, and that this uniformity helps to hold the society together, with highly organized division of labour. In this communal solidarity however, according to Durkheim (1967), crime is normal. Based on this argument, the study analyzed how the urban residents come together to innovate ways of survival bearing in mind that crime is part of life. According to the anomie theory, crime is essential in helping to create a sense of communal harmony, with criminals aspiring to bridge

the gap between the haves and have-nots by, for instance, stealing from the rich in order to satisfy their own needs. In the same breadth, the anomie theory presupposes that punishing crime is critical in maintaining solidarity in society, otherwise those who mean good for the society would be discouraged from showing their goodwill if crimes were to go unpunished. By considering the strategies for addressing organized crime, this theory was instrumental in shaping the study along this objective.

From the foregoing, the anomie theory helps to explain the existence of crime and general deviant behaviours in society. In modern times where crime seems to be evolving so fast, the theory is relevant in providing a basis for justification of crime. Despite the strength of the anomie theory in helping to explain the existence of crime, the theory falls short of giving explanations for higher rates of crime in certain neighbourhoods as compared to others. Furthermore, the theory fails to explain why some forms of crime are more prevalent than others in specific geographical areas. For instance, locally organized criminal gangs tend to concentrate in urban slums or informal settlements where one would easily argue that this is due to the Government's negligence of poor urban neighbourhoods in terms of provision of policing services. Kayole estate is one area mostly inhabited by notorious criminal gangs within Nairobi.

2.6.2 Social Control Theory

Social control Theory was initiated by Travis Hirschi in 1950 and sought to explain the relationship between social behavior and the outcome of such behaviours. The theory further highlights the circumstances that lead certain individuals or social groups to exhibit certain behaviours in order for them to achieve their goals. According to Hirschi (1950), social rules are set so that they can guide individuals, groups or communities on how to behave as they strive to meet their life expectations. Yet, due to varied conflicting interests among individuals or groups, certain rules are broken for the sake of individualistic interests. In the context of organized crime choose to go against the existing laws in order to achieve their own selfish ends.

Related to this study, social control theory was very helpful in explaining why organized crime thrives regardless of the existing laws and regulations enforced by government security institutions. The theory further helped to explain how security organs, such as the police, are

sometimes compromised by criminals so that the latter can continue perpetuating crime for individual gains. Just like the organized criminals who choose to defy social norms and rule of law so that they can reap from where they have not sown, security apparatus does the same to collude with the criminals to advance their ulterior interests. Based on the social control theory, although the police are supposed to operate within the law by safeguarding security and safety of individuals and their property, they are tempted to go against their code of conduct to, ironically, be conduits of lawlessness.

In the context of this study, organized criminal activities such as extortionist rings have often been associated with the police where criminals give kickbacks for their protection from law enforcers. That means that as much as the law is there to protect the society, it can also be used to the advantage of criminals to oppress the same society it was meant to secure from social injustices. Furthermore, as Conklin (1995) points out, the theory was applied in the study to put into perspective how individuals are driven by their individual aspirations and expectations to participate in crime, either directly or indirectly. For instance, this may explain why several cases have been reported about security officers compromising their work for the sake of bribes from criminals yet their work is to deal with crime. In some instances, security forces have been linked to illegal activities with terror organizations, especially where there are high financial expectations from the illicit businesses run by these organizations. Hirschi (1950) therefore concluded that individuals will always be ready to avoid crime if they considered the treatment they received from society to be fair regardless of their social status. However, it remains unclear whether this is what motivates individuals to be involved in organized crime, either as criminals or law enforcement officers.

2.7 Conceptual Framework

The study focused on four independent variables, namely drivers of organized crime, effect of organized crime on the residents' livelihoods, community response to organized crime, and challenges of resolving organized crime in Kayole. These were predictor variables whereas level of public safety was the dependent variable. Each of the variables was measured using various sub-variables in order to present a clearer relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable. Figure 2.1 illustrates a detailed conceptual framework of the study.



Figure 2.1 Conceptual Framework

CHAPTER THREE
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

The chapter presents the methodologies used in the study. These include the site description, research design, units of analysis and units of observation, target and population. Also, the following are highlighted in the chapter: sampling procedure, data collection methods and tools, validity and reliability of the research instruments, data analysis techniques and ethical considerations.

3.2 Study Site

The research was conducted in Soweto slum located in Kayole estate in Embakasi sub-county in the eastern side of Nairobi City. Kayole is surrounded by Kariobangi North and Dandora which are also low-end residential areas in Nairobi, as well as Umoja estate which is a middle-income area in the city. Based on the 2019 national population census, Kayole has more than 600,000 inhabitants and is thought to be one of the most congested residential places in Nairobi. In terms of crime rate, the National Crime Research Centre (NCRC) rates the area as a highly crime-prone region, popularly known for organized criminal gangs such as Gaza, Mungiki, Baghdad boys, and Yakuza among others (NCRC, 2012). The area's high propensity for criminal activities made it an ideal study area.

3.3 Research Design

The study adopted descriptive research design to guide on data collection, data analysis and data presentation. A qualitative and quantitative approach was used. Kothari (2013) posits that descriptive research design is suitable for helping researchers to elicit the right information from respondents for answering the research questions. This design further allows collection, summarization, interpretation and presentation of data in a clear manner without manipulating the variables used in the study. Based on this framework, the researcher was able to collect data on specific characteristics of the study population and develop a report without subjectively interfering with the study variables. Descriptive research design further allows description of

social phenomena based on their social realities hence objectively reflecting what is affecting people or the community at any particular time.

3.3.1 Unit of Analysis

The unit of analysis for this study was urban insecurity whereas the units of observation entailed level of organized crime, influence on residents' incomes, police influence, and intervention strategies. Whereas the unit of analysis was viewed as the outcome of the study, units of observation represented predictor or independent variables.

3.3.2 Unit of Observation

The unit of observation comprised of sources of information which entailed residents, business people, security officers and administrators.

3.4 Target Population

The target population for this study comprised the adult residents of Kayole. These were individuals who had had an uninterrupted residence of at least three years in the area.

3.5 Sampling Procedure and Sample Size

Two sampling procedures were involved in the study. To begin with, key and relevant institutions were identified through purposive sampling before using simple random sampling technique to identify community members to respond to the research questions. Purposive is a non-probability sampling method that enables the researcher to identify respondents that are uniquely placed to provide informative answers to the research questions based on their in-depth knowledge of the study subject (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2013). Random sampling technique, on the other hand, is a probability sampling method that gives the research elements an equal chance of being selected (Kothari, 2013).

A sample of 384 male and female adult Kayole residents was selected using Krejcie & Morgan 1970 sampling table (***see appendix III***) where the first respondent was randomly selected and thereafter every fourth respondent was interviewed until the entire sample was exhausted. Nine

key informants were selected purposively, and these included senior police officers (2), local government administrator (1), youth leaders (1) religious leaders (1), civil society groups (1), and business community (3).

3.6 Methods of Data Collection

The study used both quantitative and qualitative methods of data gathering and analysis. For quantitative method, the study used survey whereas key informant interviews were used for qualitative approach.

3.6.1 Survey

Both adult male and female members of the public were interviewed using a questionnaire where they were asked about various aspects of organized crime in relation to the livelihoods of Kayole residents. The respondents were interviewed at their households and other places of their convenience such in business premises or spots among others.

3.6.2 Key Informant Interviews

Key informants entailed individuals who have in-depth knowledge of the subject of study, which is organized crime. The study involved various categories of key informants to give as varied views as possible, with regard to the implications of organized crime on the lives of Kayole residents. These included senior police officers, local administrators, youth leaders religious leaders, civil society groups , and business community who were interviewed using key informant interview guide to give detailed information on organized crime and its implications on the lives of Kayole residents.

3.6.3 Tools of Data Collection

i. **Questionnaire**: this was the main research tool for quantitative data collection. The questionnaire was designed to comprise of subsections focusing on the respondents' background information and various aspects of organized crime in line with the research objectives. This was administered to the respondents through face-to-face interviews.

ii. **Key Informant Guide**: this is an open-ended discussion guide for interviewing respondents who have detailed information on organized crime and its implications on the livelihoods of community members. The tool was used for qualitative data gathering where the respondents were interviewed through face-to-face contacts, and were given an opportunity to give their detailed explanations with regard to the subject of study.

3.7.1 Validity Test

Validity of the instruments was tested before data collection began. According to Kothari (2013), validity is the ability of a research instrument to measure what it was meant to measure and perform as it was designed to. The university supervisor was closely engaged to ensure that the research tools constituted clear constructs to allow effective measuring of what the instruments were meant to measure. In this sense, the questionnaire was tested for both content and constructs validity so that it could capture relevant information for addressing the research questions. Pretesting of the instrument also provided further assurance that it was going to be uniformly understood by all the respondents for collection of objective data.

3.7.2 Reliability Test

Reliability is a measure of the degree to which a research instrument yields consistent information or data after repeated trials (Kothari, 2013). This contributes to standardization of a research tool so that the results of a study can be generalizable to the general population. In addition to using half-split test method to ascertain their reliability, data from pilot test was keyed into SPSS to allow subsequent generating of Cronbach's alpha which would help in checking internal consistency of the questionnaire based on average inter-item correlation. A range of 0.7-1.0 tally was considered to signify high reliability of the instrument hence fit to be used for data collection (Saunders et al, 2013).

3.8 Data Analysis Technique

After fieldwork, data was checked for completeness and ridden of any errors before being coded and entered into SPSS computer software for descriptive analysis. Analyzed quantitative data was presented using frequency distribution tables and figures. Qualitative data was organized

thematically and analyzed using thematic content analysis technique so as to complement quantitative data. Analyzed qualitative data was presented using narratives.

3.9 Ethical Considerations

Relevant authorizations were sought before proceeding for fieldwork. These included a letter from the University of Nairobi's Department of Sociology and Social Work to allow the researcher to proceed for fieldwork and a research permit from the National Commission of Science, Technology and Innovation (NACOSTI) authorizing a research to be carried out on the proposed topic. During data collection, the researcher and his research assistants ensured that there was proper introduction of the purpose of the study to allow voluntary participation by the research participants. Furthermore, the research team strictly observed the principles of confidentiality, anonymity, and informed consent so that the respondents were protected from any possible harm following their role in the study.

The nature and purpose of the study was fully disclosed to the respondents so that they could participate in the research out of their own volition. Besides, their shared information was going to be used only for the purpose of the study without allowing any unauthorized access by any other entity. Further, the actual names of the respondents were withheld at the time of publication of the research report hence adhering to the need for anonymity of data for the sake of the respondents' safety and privacy. Overall, ethical research ethics were observed to the letter during the entire period of the research.

CHAPTER FOUR
DATA ANALYSIS, PRESENTATION AND INTERPRETATION

4.1 Introduction

This chapter presents analysis and presentation of data. The chapter presents analyzed data on demographic characteristics of the respondents, factors for the emergence and persistence of organized crime, effect of organized crime on the livelihoods of urban residents, community's response to organized crime, and challenges faced by urban residents in resolving the problem of organized crime. The study was conducted in Soweto sub location, Kayole location, Embakasi Central subcounty in Nairobi County. Out of the target population of 375, 296 respondents managed to conclude and return the questionnaires. This translated to 79% response rate, as illustrated in table 4.1 summary.

Table 4.1 Questionnaire Return Rate

Category	**Sample Size**	**Response Rate**	
	Frequency(n)	**Frequency (n)**	**Percentage (%)**
Members of the Community	375	296	79
Total	**375**	**296**	**79**

4.2 Respondents' Background Information

Each category of the respondents was further asked about their personal demographic details such as gender, age, religion, marital status, highest level of education, period of stay in current residential area, main source of livelihood, and their respective positions in the community. The respondents' background data was important in revealing their level of understanding of the demands of the study.

4.2.1 Gender Distribution of Respondents

Out of the 296 respondents who completed the questionnaires, 182 (61%) of them were male whereas 114 (39%) were female. Male respondents were easily available and more willing to participate in the study hence the disparity in their numbers. Despite their difference in

frequency, both male and female respondents were representative enough to give balanced views on the subject matter of the study. Table 4.2 presents a summary of the respondents' gender distribution.

Table 4.2 Gender of Respondents

Gender	Frequency (n)	Percentage (%)
Male	182	61
Female	114	39
Total	**296**	**100**

4.2.2 Age Distribution of Respondents

Based on the analysis, majority of the respondents were aged 26-35 years, accounting for 81 (27%) of the total number. Those who were aged 16-25 years totaled to 71 (24%), 36-45 years were 61 (21%), 46-55 years were 52 (18%), and those aged 56 years and above were 31 (10%). Overall, a bigger number of the respondents were aged 16 to 45 years, with a cumulative total of 213 (72%). This implied that majority of the respondents were within the actively working age bracket, hence they were able to effectively articulate implications of organized crime on the lives of urban residents living in informal settlements. Age distribution of the respondents is presented in table 4.3.

Table 4.3 Age of Respondents

Age of Respondents	Frequency (n)	Percentage (%)
16-25	71	24
26-35	81	27
36-45	61	21
46-55	52	18
56-& above	31	10
Total	**296**	**100**

4.2.3 Distribution of Respondents by Religion

The respondents were also asked about their religion, with majority of them (229; 77%) saying that they were Christians whereas the minority (2; 1%) subscribed to no religion or belonged to Hindu. Furthermore, 59 (20%) of the respondents said they Muslims while 7 (2%) of them said they professed traditional African religion. Based on this distribution, views from at least all common religions were taken on board thereby giving the study a balanced religious perspective. The respondents' religious inclinations are captured in table 4.4.

Table 4.4 Religion of Respondents

Religion	**Frequency (n)**	**Percentage (%)**
Christian	229	77
Muslim	59	20
Traditional African	7	2
Other (No religion, Hindu etc.)	2	1
Total	**296**	**100**

4.2.4 Distribution of Respondents by Marital Status

Regarding marital status of the respondents, 119 (40%) were married, 74 (25%) single, 42 (14%) separated, 32 (11%) divorced, and 29 (10%) widowed. From this analysis, overall a greater majority (60%) of the respondents did not have spouses because they were not married, were separated, divorced or widowed. This marital pattern may further imply that many people living in Kayole are likely to be leading relatively poor lives hence preferring to live without marital partners. These statistics are presented in table 4.5.

Table 4.5 Marital Status of Respondents

Marital Status	Frequency (n)	Percentage (%)
Single	74	25
Married	119	40
Separated	42	14
Divorced	32	11
Widowed	29	10
Total	**296**	**100**

4.2.5 Distribution of Respondents by Highest Level of Education

The analysis shows that 144 (49%) of the respondents had secondary level of education, 79 (27%) had post-secondary diplomas, 37 (13%) university, 33 (11%) primary, and 3 (1%) had no education at all. These statistics may imply that majority of the residents of Kayole did not have post-secondary college certificates, hence most likely restricted to low-paying sources of livelihood. The distribution of the respondents' highest level of education may further imply that majority of the residents of Kayole estate, with their low level of education, may not be involved in serious careers and this was likely to significantly impact their lives in a negative way. High level of financial vulnerability could make majority of residents to fall prey to organized crime, either as criminals directly or indirectly as victims to extortion by organized criminal rings in their areas of residence. Table 4.6 summarizes the responses on highest level of education for the respondents.

Table 4.6 Highest Education Level of Respondents

Highest Education Level	Frequency (n)	Percentage (%)
No education	3	1
Primary	33	11
Secondary	144	49
Post-secondary Diploma	79	27
University	37	13
Total	**296**	**100**

4.2.6 Respondents' Length of Residence

Asked about the number of years they had stayed in their area of residence, majority (131; 44%) of the respondents said they had stayed for more than 4 years. On the other hand, 91 (31%) indicated they had stayed for 2-4 years while 74 (25%) said they had stayed for 0-2 years. Overall, a greater majority of the respondents had stayed in Kayole for at least 2 years, totaling to 222 (75%). This implied that most of the respondents had lived in Kayole for a considerably long time and therefore they understood well the dynamics involving organized crime in the area. Responses on the respondents' residence duration are summarized in table 4.7.

Table 4.7 Residence Duration of Respondents

Duration of Residence (in Years)	**Frequency (n)**	**Percentage (%)**
0-2	74	25
2-4.	91	31
Over 4 years	131	44
Total	**296**	**100**

4.2.7 Respondents' Main Source of Livelihood

Regarding the main source of livelihood for the respondents, majority of them were business people, accounting for 79 (27%) of the total interviewed. Seventy four (25%) of the respondents were casual employees, 63 (21%) private sector employees, 34 (11%) public servants, while 46 (16%) were jobless. Based on this distribution, statistics indicate that greater majority of residents of Kayole were either jobless or worked in sectors which did not provide them with adequate job security. This was likely to jeopardize their livelihood chances thereby leaving them more vulnerable and potential criminals for the sake of their survival. These responses are summarized in table 4.8.

Table 4.8 Source of Livelihood of Respondents

Source of Livelihood	Frequency (n)	Percentage (%)
Public Servant	34	11
Private Sector Employee	63	21
Business person	79	27
Casual employee	74	25
Other (jobless)	46	16
Total	**296**	**100**

4.2.8 Respondents' Positions in the Community

The respondents were asked about the positions they held in their community, and the responses are presented in table 4.9. Based on this analysis, a greater majority of the respondents (269; 91%) were ordinary members of the community while 27 (9%) held some leadership roles. The distribution of the respondents in terms of the community roles gave an opportunity to receive balanced views regarding the impact of organized crime on the lives of urban residents who live in informal settlements. The bias on ordinary residence further provided the chance for a wider range of perspectives regarding the subject of study.

Table 4.9 Position Held in Community

Position in Community	Frequency (n)	Percentage (%)
Leader	27	9
Ordinary Resident	269	91
Total	**296**	100

4.3 Emergence and Persistence of Organized Criminal Gangs

The study sought to establish determinant factors for the emergence and persistence of organized crime in informal settlements. A number of organized criminal gangs had emerged in the area that posed serious security threats to the residents. Some of the common names included Gaza, Mungiki, Kamanzira, Yakuza, Chini Ya Maji, Smarter, and Bagdad Boyz among others.

Activities of these groups were well known to the residents of Kayole estate and the authorities but it was taking so long for the groups to be dismantled. Asked if they were aware of any organized criminal gang in their area, 179 (59%) of the respondents said yes while 124 (41%) said they were not aware. Furthermore, for the 179 who said they were aware, 75 (42%) of them indicated they had heard of criminal gangs in their area for 0-2 years while 104 (58%) indicated that they had become aware of such groups for over 2 years.

Based on the trend of the analysis, criminal groups had existed in Kayole estate for a long period of time. Regarding whether they had been victims of organized criminal gang actions at individual level, 93 (31%) answered in the affirmative while 210 (69%) said they had never been victims personally. A similar trend was noted with regard to whether any family member had been a victim of organized criminal gangs' actions where 88 (29%) said yes whereas 215 (71%) said they had not. It was emerged that some neighbours to the respondents were known to have been victims of organized criminal groups' actions, with 137 (45%) saying they knew someone while 166 (55%) said they had not. The analysis is presented in table 4.10.

Table 4.10 Prevalence of Criminal Gangs in Community

Statements	**Yes/0-2 years**		No/Over 2 years	
	Frequency (n)	**Percentage (%)**	**Frequency (n)**	**Percentage (%)**
Are you aware of any organized criminal gang in this area?	179	59	124	41
If yes, for how long have you heard of them?	75	42	104	58
Have you been personally a victim of organized criminal gang actions?	93	31	210	69
Has any family member been a victim?	88	29	215	71
Do you know a neighbour who has been a victim?	137	45	166	55

Furthermore, based on a 5-point Likert scale, the respondents were asked whether members of the criminal gangs were known by people of their localities/estate. As illustrated in table 4.11, 92 (31%) agreed, 92 (31%) said they were not sure, 51 (17%) disagreed, 35 (12%) strongly agreed, and 26 (9%) strongly disagreed that organized criminal group members were well known in the

community. From these responses, it would appear that mostly criminal gang members were not well known in the community, thereby making it difficult to report them to the authorities.

Table 4.11 How Well Criminal Gangs are known in Community

Responses	**Frequency (n)**	**Percentage (%)**
Strongly Agree	35	12
Agree	92	31
Not sure	92	31
Disagree	51	17
Strongly disagree	26	9
Total	**296**	**100**

Conversely, asked whether they personally knew any of the members of the gangs, 214 (72%) of the respondents answered in the affirmative while 82 (28%) said no. This may imply that a few criminals were probably known to individuals who were not ready to make it public, either for fear of retaliation or for the purpose of protection of the said criminals.

Concerning why criminal gangs may have emerged and operated in Kayole, 90 (30%) of the respondents blamed it on the police who were accused of appearing not to care so much about organized criminality in the area. Presence of illicit brews in the area played a role in encouraging organized criminal activities, with 69 (23%) of the respondents expressing this view. The local government administration's office also came into sharp focus, with 51 (17%) of the respondents indicating that since the local administration representative was not well known to majority of the residents, they did not have the confidence of reporting criminal matters without fearing of being exposed to the criminals. Forty (14%) of the respondents also attributed organized criminality in the area to inadequate policing due to few police officers posted in the community's neighbourhoods. A few (29; 10%) respondents felt that the general chaotic environment in the area contributed to the emergence and persistence of organized criminal groups who could easily get hideouts for abetting their criminal activities. Other reasons for the prevalence of organized criminal groups in the area included peer influence that encouraged new members to joining the groups and forming new gangs (11; 4%), and poor lighting at night (6;

2%) that enabled criminals to hide in dark alleys as they waited to waylay their targets who were late from their daily activities of living. Table 4.12 provides a summary of these responses.

Table 4.12 Reasons for Rise and Operation of Criminal Gangs in Kayole

Why criminal Gangs emerged & Operate	Frequency (n)	Percentage (%)
The area has no planning	29	10
There are no Police	40	14
Police appear not to care	90	30
The local administrator is not known	51	17
Presence of illicit drinks	69	23
No lighting at night	6	2
Other (peer influence)	11	4
Total	**296**	**100**

It also emerged that police inaction significantly contributed to successful operation of organized criminal gangs in Kayole. Based on a 5-point Likert scale, 171 (58%) of the respondents strongly agreed with this account, 91 (31%) agreed, 12 (4%) said they were not sure, 11 (4%) disagreed, while 11 (4%) strongly disagreed. From these responses, the police appeared to play a big role in the existence and persistence of organized criminal groups in informal settlement, either directly or indirectly due to their laxity. These responses are summarized in table 4.13.

Table 4.13 Police Inaction's Contribution to Operation of Organized Criminal Gangs

Responses	Frequency (n)	Percentage (%)
Strongly Agree	171	58
Agree	91	31
Not sure	12	4
Disagree	11	4
Strongly disagree	11	4
Total	**296**	**100**

Similarly, lack of lighting at night contributes to organized criminal gangs, as this provided them with the opportunity to hide in dark corners as they waited for their victims in darkness. Based on the analysis in table 4.14 however, majority (76; 26%) of the respondents strongly disagreed with this view. Also, 75 (25%) disagreed, 63 (21%) agreed, 41 (14) said they were not sure, while 41 (14%) agreed that poor lighting at night encouraged operation of criminal groups in Kayole estate. Distribution of these responses is summarized in table 4.14.

Table 4.14 Influence of Lighting at Night to Operation of Organized Criminal Gangs

Responses	**Frequency (n)**	**Percentage (%)**
Strongly Agree	41	14
Agree	63	21
Not sure	41	14
Disagree	75	25
Strongly disagree	76	26
Total	**296**	**100**

On whether the presence of open and ungoverned areas/spaces in the vicinity contributes to organized crime in the area, 80 (27%) disagreed, 72 (24%) strongly disagreed, 70 (24%) agreed, 39 (13%) said they were not sure, while 35 (12%) strongly agreed. From the analysis, a greater majority of the respondents did not generally consider the presence of open and uncovered ground as a serious contributor to organized crime in Kayole estate. Table 4.15 presents the data on open and ungoverned areas.

Table 4.15 Influence of Open and Ungoverned Areas to Organized Crime

Responses	**Frequency (n)**	**Percentage (%)**
Strongly Agree	35	12
Agree	70	24
Not sure	39	13
Disagree	80	27
Strongly disagree	72	24
Total	**296**	**100**

Furthermore, the respondents were asked their opinions regarding the relationship between older organized criminal groups and the emerging of new ones. Based on the analysis, 109 (37%) of the respondents strongly agreed that if older organized criminal gangs were not suppressed, they were likely to encourage the birth of the new ones. Seventy three (25%) of them agreed, 50 (17%) disagreed, 41 (14%) were not sure, wile 23 (8%) strongly disagreed. Overall, a greater majority (62%) of the respondents thought that the influence of older criminal gangs played a significant role in the emergence of new ones. These statistics are illustrated in table 4.16.

Table 4.16 Influence of Older Organized Criminal Gangs on New Ones

Responses	**Frequency (n)**	**Percentage (%)**
Strongly Agree	109	37
Agree	73	25
Not sure	41	14
Disagree	50	17
Strongly disagree	23	8
Total	**296**	**100**

There was also the influence of the kind of fear instilled on the residents by criminal gangs and the possible punishment met on them. For instance, an overwhelming majority (266; 90%) of the majority agreed that the residents fear to expose the members of organized criminal gangs for fear of retaliation, and this encouraged their formation and operation. Similarly, majority of those who were interviewed thought that residents who are suspected to have exposed criminal groups are punished to create fear. Sixty percent of the respondents held this view, as opposed to 35% who did not agree with this account. On the other hand, majority (56%) of the respondents disagreed that they were aware of anybody who had been punished by organized criminal gangs for exposing them. These findings are captured in table 4.17.

Table 4.17 Influence of Residents' Fear & Punishment by Criminal Gangs

Statements	Yes		No		Total
	Frequency (n)	Percentage (%)	Frequency (n)	Percentage (%)	
The residents fear to expose the members of organized criminal gangs and this encourages their formation and operation	266	90	30	10	296
Those who are suspected to expose them are punished to create fear	193	65	103	35	296
Do you know anybody who was punished by the organized criminal gang	130	44	166	56	296

There were various ways of punishment to those who were found on the wrong side of the criminal groups. Intimidation or verbal threats took the most common form of punishment, with 92 (31%) of the respondents saying that they were aware of that kind of punishment. This was followed by beatings or assaults, with 75 (25%) of the respondents saying that this was happening to people they knew. Other forms of punishment included killings (18%), expulsion from the area (14%), and paying of fines (11%). Table 4.18 captures a summary of these findings.

Table 4.18 How Organized Criminal Gangs Punish People

Statements	Frequency (n)	Percentage (%)
Killed	54	18
Expelled from the area	41	14
Pay fines	34	11
Intimidated/threatened	92	31
Beaten/Assaulted	75	25
Total	**296**	**100**

Organized sports activities also played a role in contributing to activities of organized crime in Kayole estate. On whether the area/estate had places designated for organized sports activities

such as playfields or social halls, 104 (35%) of the respondents said no, 98 (33%) said yes, while 94 (32%) of them said they were not sure. As to whether the absence of such places contributed to organized criminal gangs in the community, 126 (43%) of the respondents said no, 97 (33%) said they were not sure, while 73 (25) agreed with this proposition. Overall, sports activities had significant influence on organized criminal groups in Kayole estate.

Furthermore, operation of the local administration's office was associated with organized criminal gangs in Kayole. Majority (97; 33%) of the respondents had a feeling that the local administration's office had been compromised by criminal groups, 80 (27%) felt that the office was ineffective against organized crime, 69 (23%) said that the office was strong and effective whereas 52 (18%) were of the opinion that the office was weak. To capture the common sentiments by the community members about the role of the local administration's role in fighting organized crime, Mzee Ngugi (not his real name), a village elder from Kayole had the following to say:

> *We have the local administration's office here which always seems busy addressing the problem of organized crime in the area. However, there is a common feeling among the residents that the local administration is generally not interested in decisively ending organized crime in Kayole. We really feel that if the government was very serious we could not be repeatedly experiencing young men extorting money from the residents while the authorities are just watching. There must be a high level of collusion between the criminals and the security agencies; otherwise this problem would not have persisted this long.*

The study also established that police action or inaction had a role to play in the emergence, operation and persistence of organized criminal groups in Kayole estate/community. Asked to rate police actions in controlling organized crime in the area, 101 (34%) of the respondents felt that the police was part of organized crime; 95 (32%) said that the police were compromised; 89 (30%) had a feeling that the police were facilitating organized crime; while only 11 (4%) said that the police were effectively working against organized crime in the area. Overall, as illustrated in table 4.19, the police were rated poorly with regard to their role in fighting organized crime in Kayole.

Table 4.19 Influence of Police Controlling Actions on Organized Crime

Statements	Frequency (n)	Percentage (%)
Effective against organized crime	11	4
Facilitating organized Crime	89	30
Part of Organized Crime	101	34
Compromised	95	32
Total	**296**	**100**

To emphasize the role of the police in controlling or abetting activities of organized criminal groups in Kayole, mama Charity (not her real name) who has been running a small grocery shop in Kayole for over five years expressed what she called the frustrations by most community members in the following manner:

> *The police service is almost always present in our area, but it is unfortunate that for many years crime rate has never quite reduced here. We often face these young people who sometimes even tend to extort money from businesses around but little is being done by the police. We really hope that more could be done by the government to save us from organized crimes in this area. We highly suspect that the police work in collusion with criminals to frustrate us.*

Despite the residents' frustrations with the police regarding increased organized criminal activities in Kayole, the police insist that they are doing their work professionally and that the residents' allegations that they collude with criminals are baseless. These sentiments were reinforced by a senior police officer who had this to say:

> *We are aware that there are organized criminal groups in Kayole, and the police is always on the lookout to ensure that insecurity does not become the order of the day here. Yet, the public tends to always blame the police for not doing a good job. Of course we may have challenges here and there, but it is not true that we work in collusion with the criminals to frustrate justice and increase levels of insecurity within our jurisdictions. We only want to appeal to the members of the public to trust the police and be ready to avail any information that can help us in tackling this vice.*

4.4 Effects of Organized Crime

The second objective of the study was to establish the effect of organized crime on the livelihoods of urban residents. Regarding whether organized criminal gangs have changed peoples' ways of life in Kayole estate, majority (213) of the respondents answered in the affirmative, accounting for 73% whereas 81 (27%) had a contrary opinion. Table 4.20 summarizes these responses.

Table 4.20 Influence of Organized Criminal Gangs on Peoples' Ways of Life

Responses	**Frequency (n)**	**Percentage (%)**
Yes	213	73
No	81	27
Total	**296**	**100**

The presence of criminal gangs in Kayole has also changed people's behaviour in their daily endeavours. These include that fact that people tend to come home earlier than before, for fear of attacks from organized criminal gangs. Ninety five (32%) of the respondents strongly agreed, and 88 (30%) agreed that this was actually happening. However, 52 (18%) of them disagreed, 33 (11%) said they were not sure while 28 (9%) strongly disagreed that people were coming home earlier than they used to. Overall, a greater majority of the respondents (62%) appeared to agree that the presence of criminal gangs in their community had changed people's timing from their normal routine activities. The study also revealed that people in Kayole estate generally live in fear due to the presence of criminal gangs in the area. One hundred and one (34%) of respondents agreed with this view, 64 (22%) strongly agreed, 59 (20%) disagreed, 43 (15%) said they were not sure, while 29 (10%) strongly disagreed with this account. To reinforce the views that the presence of organized crime had drastically changed the residents' way of life, pastor Musambi (not his real name) one of the local preachers who had lived in Kayole for more than eight years said the following:

> *The crime rate in Kayole has never reduced to a level where we can actually celebrate. It is unfortunate that organized criminals here have affected many people's way of life, including work and business activities. Some people tend to close their businesses earlier than they would have were it not because of fear*

from criminal attacks. Some for instance tend to close their businesses or come from their places of work earlier than they would have wished to.

Particular behavioural changes among the community members included interruptions in watching football games, drinking in bars, and security measures by landlords in the area. for instance, 72% of the respondents agreed that most men do not watch late night football matches any more in their area due to criminal activities of organized criminals in the estate. Similarly, majority (53%) agreed that bars in Kayole area closed earlier than before. However, 66% of the respondents disagreed with the fact that plot owners/landlords incur more costs to erect night lighting. This is perhaps because much of the public lighting in the area falls within the domains of relevant government institutions, hence not the direct responsibility of private individual business people.

Businesses also have tended to close up earlier than before, due to the presence of criminal groups in Kayole. Out of the 296 respondents interviewed, 98 (33%) agreed, 54 (18%) strongly agreed, 59 (20%) disagreed, 49 (17%) strongly disagreed, while 36 (12%) of them said they were not sure. These responses are summarized in table 4.21.

Table 4.21 Impact of Organized Crime on Businesses

Responses	**Frequency (n)**	**Percentage (%)**
Strongly Agree	54	18
Agree	98	33
Not sure	36	12
Disagree	59	20
Strongly disagree	49	17
Total	**296**	**100**

Furthermore, organized criminal gangs in Kayole estate had directly affected people's lives in various ways. For instance, there are places one cannot go, unlike before, with 57% of the respondents holding this view. Furthermore, water supply may now be irregular due to interference by criminal groups, where 63% of the respondents thought so, against 37% who thought otherwise. It also emerged that many houses now have steel doors, with 96% of the

respondents expressing this opinion while only 4% had differing opinions. Also, many plot owners/landlords incur more costs to erect night lighting, where 52% of the respondents held this view, against 48% of them who had contrary opinions. The cost of housing has also generally gone up in the area, with 51% of the respondents concurring with this view, whereas 49% thought otherwise. An overwhelming majority (85%) of the respondents also agreed that many residents now pay more levies besides housing rent. To help put these views in clear perspectives, John Okello (not his real name) a civil society group activist, said the following:

> *The presence of organized crime in Kayole and other parts of Eastlands has several impacts on the people's lives. There are areas which people generally dread going to, even when their business or work places are situated there. Some of the people around have also been forced to relocate elsewhere due to fear of attacks and extortions. A number of people also have lost their sources of income, especially businesses, because of intimidations from criminals. We therefore continue to urge the government to deal with the situation decisively.*

Regarding the kind of levies paid to the organized criminal gangs besides the house rent, the respondents indicated that there were various 'services' for which they were charged by criminal gangs. Top on the list were transport/stage fee (16%), construction fee (16%), and security fee (15%). These were followed by electricity connection fee (13%), water connection fee (13%), business protection fee (11%), and others such as relocation fee (10%) which individuals were charged for relocating to or out of Kayole estate. There was also personal protection fee (6%), which prominent personalities were charged so that they could be protected from possible harm by criminals. Overall, it was evident that organized criminal gangs in Kayole estate maltreated residents of the area in various ways, including through extortion on the basis of providing them with an assortment of 'services'. These responses are summarized in table 4.22.

Table 4.22 Levies Paid to Criminal Gangs besides Rent

Statements	Frequency (n)	Percentage (%)
Security fee	117	15
Water	99	13
Electricity	101	13
Personal Protection	43	6
Construction fee	121	16
Transport/Stage fee	127	16
Business Protection fee	87	11
Other (relocation fee)	75	10

The presence of organized criminal groups in Kayole had also changed the public view of police and how they served the community. Majority (94; 32) of the respondents agreed and 83 (28%) strongly agreed that people's view of the police or their work had significantly changed as a result of the emergence and operation of criminal groups in Kayole. Fifty three (18%) of them said they were not sure, 36 (12%) disagreed while 30 (10%) strongly disagreed with this view. These responses are summarized in table 4.23.

Table 4.23 Police Public View Resulting from Organized Criminal Gangs' Operation

Responses	Frequency (n)	Percentage (%)
Strongly Agree	83	28
Agree	94	32
Not sure	53	18
Disagree	36	12
Strongly disagree	30	10
Total	**296**	**100**

Political leaders also played a significant role in supporting the presence and operation in Kayole estate. This was evident based on the responses by majority (114; 39%) of the respondents who strongly agreed that political leaders supported organized criminal gangs in the area.

Furthermore, 86 (29%) of the respondents agreed with this account while 37 (13%) said they were not sure, 30 (10%) disagreed and 19 (10%) strongly disagreed. These responses are illustrated in table 4.24.

Table 4.24 Political Leaders Support Organized Criminal Gangs in Kayole

Responses	**Frequency (n)**	**Percentage (%)**
Strongly Agree	114	39
Agree	86	29
Not sure	37	13
Disagree	30	10
Strongly disagree	29	10
Total	**296**	**100**

Regarding the role of political leaders in the presence of organized criminal groups in Kayole, the youth felt that they were being exploited by the political class to advance the latter's political agenda. This view was aptly captured in the words of Muturi (not his real name) a young person who runs a barber shop in the areas for the last one year who said:

> *As much as there are several other factors which play out regarding organized criminal groups in this area, politicians are also notorious in using unemployed and desperate young boys to advance their dirty political agenda. There are many young people involved in crime in this area who are answerable to local politicians. Even when they are arrested, they are almost immediately bailed out by these political big people. I would encourage young people not to fall into such traps and destroy their own lives.*

Another respondent from the National Police Service said:

> *The youth should be aware of the dangers of having their finger prints taken because it puts them into criminal records. It would be better to sensitize the youth in schools and colleges on this issue to help them avoid joining or being associated with organized criminal gangs.*

The study also established that wealthy people had a hand in emergence and persistence of organized crime in Kayole estate. A combined 105 (35%) of the respondents agreed that this was actually happening, against 119 (39%) who disagreed and 67 (22%) who said they were not sure

about the role wealthy people played in persistence of organized criminal groups in the area. Table 4.25 summarizes these responses.

Table 4.25 Wealthy People Support Organized Criminal Gangs in Kayole

Responses	Frequency (n)	Percentage (%)
Strongly Agree	65	22
Agree	38	13
Not sure	78	26
Disagree	66	22
Strongly disagree	49	17
Total	**296**	**100**

4.5 Community Response to Organized Criminal Gangs

The community in Kayole estate has responded to organized crime in the area in varied ways. Majority (59; 20%) of the respondents said that people leave for their work late for fear of attacks during the very early hours of the morning, while almost the same number (57; 19%) indicated that people in the estate returned from work early in the evening for fear of possible attacks if they returned late. Similarly, landlords have tried to erect steel gates to keep away potential attackers, with 56 (19%) of the respondents expressing this view. Some of the residents have also reduced or no longer watch late night sports activities, with 51 (17%) of the respondents holding this opinion. There were also respondents who said that some residential plots had enhanced security lights (42; 14%), and that some people had come up with local response mechanisms such as WhatsApp groups for alerting their friends and relatives of any impending criminal groups' activities so they could be cautious; accounting for 31 (10%) of the total respondents. Table 4.26 summarizes these responses.

Table 4.26 How People Have Responded to the Presence of Organized Criminal Groups

Statements	Frequency (n)	Percentage (%)
Leave for work late	59	20
Return from work early	57	19
Reduced or no longer watch late night sports activities	51	17
Landlords have erected steel gates	56	19
A local response mechanism has been formed	31	10
Some plots now have security lighting	42	14
Total	**296**	100

Furthermore, community members had specific ways of responding to the presence or activities of organized criminal groups in Kayole estate. Asked if they were planning to relocate just like their neighbours or friends might have relocated to escape the wrath of or potential harm from organized criminals, 201 (66%) of the respondents said no, against 102 (34%) who indicated that they were likely to move out of the area. On whether the respondents were aware of anybody who relocated from the area because of organized criminal gang problem, 219 (72%) said yes while 84 (28%) said no. Local residents have formed a security association to counter the criminal gang, which 161 (53%) of the respondents thought was effective in addressing the problem of organized crime in the area. On the contrary, 142 (47%) of the respondents did not agree that forming of local security associations to counter criminal gang activities was effective.

Overall, the findings indicated that the residents were conscious of the existence of criminal groups in the area and they were proactively engaging in strategies to counter them. However, there were mixed reactions to how they responded. This was perhaps an indication that there were no straightforward counter-measures for responding to organized criminal activities in Kayole estate and among the communities living in the area. Generally, some people had relocated to other estates while others had chosen to stay put.

The doubts regarding effectiveness of security association for countering criminal gangs were pegged on various reasons. Common among the reasons for failure of security associations by community members was the fact that members of the committee stood the risks of attack and intimidation from the criminal gangs, hence instilling fear in the former. Furthermore, 83 (28%) of the respondents felt that security associations were not very effective due to police collusion with criminal gangs which created fear among the members hence preventing them from

proactively pursuing the criminals. Criminal gangs were also thought to have support from the area local government administration, with 72 (24%) of the respondents expressing this view. This made it difficult to confide in the local administration officers or report activities of criminal groups without the possibility of retaliatory attacks on some members of the security associations. There was also a feeling among the respondents that criminal gangs had a lot of money, with 57 (19%) of the respondents holding this view. This would easily enable criminals to buy loyalty from some community members or the police to 'spy' on members of the community who were determined to scuttle criminal activities of the gangs. Furthermore, the idea of criminal groups having a lot money meant that they were in a position to buy their freedom in the event that they were arrested by the police. This thought then discouraged some of members of the community from proactively being engaged in strategies to scuttle criminal groups' activities. These responses are summarized in table 4.27.

Table 4.27 Effectiveness of Security Association to Counter Criminal Gangs

Statements	**Frequency (n)**	**Percentage (%)**
The criminal gang has more money	57	19
The criminal gang has police support	83	28
The criminal gang has the support of the local admin	72	24
Members of the committee are attacked and intimidated	84	28
Total	**296**	**100**

Despite the general feeling by the community members that the government was to blame for the presence and persistence of organized criminal groups in Kayole estate, the local administration had this direct rebuttal by one government administrator:

> *While it is true that there may be some criminal groups in this area, but the government has nothing to do with their activities. We are doing our best to arrest the situation, but not actually to facilitate their activities as is sometimes claimed by some of the members of the public. The government is doing all possible to eradicate crime in general in this area, and we will not tire up or stop doing that.*

Individuals to and from work had various ways of managing criminal gangs. The most common strategy used involved people walking in groups, with 107 (36%) of the respondents expressing this view. People had also formed a tendency of waiting for each other, especially for those who

walked long distances from their places of work or from bus stages to their houses. Furthermore, 68 (23%) of the respondents said that they were aware of a strategy where individuals could call each other on phone to be out of the gates/houses all at the same time whenever there were reported suspected cases of organized criminal activities in the area. Some people also used WhatsApp to pass quick messages on the presence of the gang members whenever they were suspected to have struck. Table 4.28 presents a summary of these responses.

Table 4.28 How Individuals to and from Work Manage Organized Criminal Gangs

Statements	**Frequency (n)**	**Percentage (%)**
They walk in groups	107	36
They call each other on phone to be out of the gates/houses all at the same time	68	23
They wait for each other	83	28
Use WhatsApp to pass quick messages on the presence of the gang members	38	13
Total	**296**	100

4.6 Challenges Faced by Urban Residents in Resolving Problem of Organized Crime

There were a number of challenges that made it difficult for urban residents in resolving the problem of organized crime, especially in informal settlements. Some of these included collusion between the police and the gang, unwillingness on the part of the community to report due to police inaction, fear of retribution by the gangs, and collusion of some of the gangs with some of the community members. Furthermore, some community feared of being killed whenever they made reports about criminal gangs. Few employment opportunities that cannot accommodate the big number of youths also contributed to persistence of criminal groups. There was also the problem of lack of cooperation of some parents or community leaders who protect some gang members, especially given that majority of the gang members are very young and even underage children.

Mushrooming of informal settlements with poorly managed access roads, access to urban shopping centers or businesses led some desperate young people to take advantage of the

situation to terrorize residents. Lack of trust in police made some members of the public to shun away from sharing information regarding criminal gangs. High poverty levels, lack of employment opportunities, minimal financial supply, information exposure risks, prevalence of drugs and illicit drinks, and lack of proactive support from the police created stumbling blocks for dealing with criminal gangs in informal settlements. Drug and alcohol addiction of young people in informal settlements also increased cases of organized criminal gangs. Moreover, since gangs are part of the community, people around them tend to feel insecure if they report them, and this enabled the gangs to thrive more. Ignorance from the community members makes a number of them to wait till when criminal strike before they can report; and in some cases it turns out to be too late.

4.7 How to Address the Problem of Organized Criminal Gangs

Based on the findings of the study, a number of suggestions or recommendations were provided on how to address the problem of organized crime. These included introducing working police hotlines, launching speedy investigations and successful prosecution of violent crimes, and encouraging community policing programs such as the Nyumba Kumi initiative, and utilizing of available local structures such as community welfare committees. It was also important for the government to provide street lighting, create more employment opportunities to accommodate more young people and dissuade them from engaging in criminal activities. Furthermore, good parenting should be encouraged and local leaders provide model leadership where socialization of the general population is fashioned through religious teachings. Use of community-based approach will also significantly help in identifying criminals and reporting them to the authority .The Police should have outreach lecture programmes in schools and colleges to sensitize the students that criminal conduct will lead to their fingerprints being kept as record of bad conduct hence denying them future job and scholarship opportunities.

Creation of jobs for the youth and reduction of poverty, addressing environmental design and physical planning of informal settlements as well as financially facilitating village gate keepers will greatly help in curbing organized crime in informal settlements. There is also the need for enhancing a strong mutual relationship between police and community, and creation of public awareness, especially among the youth, on the dangers of joining organized criminal gangs.

Working of the police in a more resolute manner and launching of more and firm crackdowns on criminal groups will also help in addressing the problem of criminal gangs. There was also need for enhanced street lighting where the city county properly takes care of the bills, proper planning for the street alleys, building of social halls and recreation facilities for the youth, introduction of youth programs to curb idling, and enhancing of police patrols.

There should also be frequent police transfers so that they do not get too familiarized with the locals; a situation which could easily lead to police officers being compromised by the criminal gangs. Furthermore, police officers should be increased in the area and be ready to work with the community since they also have families to protect against the criminals. Making of non-governmental organization and private security and creation of a fund by the government to end these gangs will help in dealing with organized crime. People should also be more vigilant all the time to ensure that any criminal activities by organized groups are reported to relevant government authorities. Imposing heavy punishments to the criminal gangs will also be instrumental in dissuading criminals from further illegal activities.

CHAPTER FIVE
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

This chapter presents summary, conclusions, and recommendations of the study as well as suggestions for further studies. The chapter presentation is based on the analysis of the collected data in line with specific objectives of the study.

5.2 Summary

The main objective of the study was to understand the implications of organized crime on areas of Kenya, with specific focus on Kayole estate in Nairobi City County. Specific objectives of the study included: to find out the determinant factors for the emergence and persistence of organized crime, establish the effect of organized crime on the livelihoods of urban residents, understand how urban communities respond to the phenomenon of organized crime, and find out some of the challenges faced by urban residents in resolving the problem of organized crime.

5.2.1 Determinant Factors for the Emergence and Persistence of Organized Crime

A number of organized criminal gangs have emerged in Kayole estate that poses serious security threats to the residents. Some of the common names included Gaza, Mungiki, Kamanzira, Yakuza, Chini Ya Maji, Smarter, and Bagdad Boyz among others. Despite activities of these groups being in the domain of the public and the security agencies, it was taking too long for the groups to be dismantled. Public knowledge of the gangs was clearly demonstrated through the findings, with some of which having been in existence for more than two years. Furthermore, the findings indicated that police inaction and laxity, presence of illicit brews in the area, and ineffectiveness of the local administration's office significantly contributed to the emergence and persistence of organized crime in Kayole estate. There was also the question of general chaotic environment in the area that gave the criminals places for hideouts; peer influence where older criminal gang members influenced and recruited younger ones into their groups and encouraged even new groups to emerge.

Poor lighting in some of the areas in the estate provided the criminals an opportunity to hide in dark alleys as they waited to waylay members of the community who came back late from work. The police was particularly blamed for their collusion role with the criminals while the residents also feared to expose members of organized criminal gangs for fear of retaliation, and this encouraged their formation and operation. Threats came in form of verbal warnings, possible murder, harming of close family members, beatings and assaults, and extortion among others. There were also possible expulsions of some community members from the estate if they were suspected to be leaking information of the criminal groups to the authorities.

5.2.2 Effects of Organized Crime on the Livelihoods of Urban Residents

The presence and operation of criminal groups in Kayole estate affected the residents' livelihood in various ways, such as forced relocations, leaving for work late or early, as well as living in general fear and. Some landlords were also forced to incur extra costs in reinforcing security measures such as erecting night lighting at strategic places and placing steel doors in their gates to forestall break-ins by the gangs. Other notable interruptions centered on water connections and supply, electricity connections, and movement of tenants to other estates and creation of business losses to the landlords in the estate. There were also some places that were not easily accessed due to fear of harm by the criminals, as well as unnecessary levies demanded by the criminals, such as transport/stage, construction, security fee, and electricity connection fee.

5.2.3 How Urban Communities Respond to the Phenomenon of Organized Crime

The communities living in informal settlements had devised various ways of responding to the phenomenon of organized crime. Some people had chosen to be leaving late for work for fear of being attacked. Some community members had also decided to relocate to other estates to escape activities of the criminal groups in the area. Overall, the findings indicated that the residents were conscious of the existence of criminal groups in the area and they were proactively engaging in strategies to counter them. Furthermore, effectiveness of security associations was interfered with by police collusion with criminal gangs which created fear among the public. Individuals to and from work had various ways of managing criminal gangs, such as walking in groups, and waiting for each other, especially for those who walked long distances from their

places of work or from bus stages to their houses. Others also ensured that they contacted their household members to readily open their compound gates whenever leaving their work places.

5.2.4 Challenges Faced by Urban Residents in Resolving the Problem of Organized Crime

Some of the common challenges include police inaction and collusion with criminals, failure by the public to report criminal activities for fear of retribution, and threats by criminals that discourage people from reporting criminals to the authorities. There was also overprotection of criminals by the parents and close relatives, as well as compromised local administration's office which does not take proactive decisions to end the vices. Mushrooming of informal settlements with poorly organized physical environment and ungoverned spaces encouraged young people to idle around where they end up planning on how to commit their illegal activities.

Lack of mutual trust between police and members of the public make the former to avoid going to report criminalities in police stations for fear of being falsely incriminated. High poverty levels, lack of employment opportunities for the youth, prevalence of drugs and illicit drinks, and lack of proactive support from local and political leaders make it hard for criminal groups to be completely rooted out in informal settlements. Drug and alcohol addiction of young people in informal settlements also increased cases of organized criminal gangs. Furthermore, high level of ignorance among community members makes it hard for most of them to proactively guard against criminal activities in their midst as they tend to report criminal matters to the authorities after they have occurred repeatedly hence giving criminal gangs the leeway to thrive in informal settlements.

5.3 Conclusion

Organized crime in informal settlements is a serious threat to urban safety in Kenya. Many criminal enterprises are still coming up, and these will not be completely eradicated without adopting a multi-sectoral approach where government security agencies and local communities work closely together to solve security challenges. Security and safety threats have negative implications on livelihood opportunities of urban residents, and therefore this must be addressed in a decisive manner. Some of the approaches adopted by community members in addressing organized crime are counterproductive to their livelihood opportunities, such as changing

residential places on short notice, which may have financial implications to the affected individuals or households. There are multiple challenges faced by urban residents in resolving the problem of organized crime; and therefore they require an integrated approach to address them.

5.4 Recommendations

Based on the findings of the study, the following recommendations are made:

1. Stakeholders need to work together to address the causal factors that lead to the emergence of organized criminal gangs in the area.
2. Property owners need to enhance safety features as part of the housing plans and construction.
3. The government should increase police patrols and reshuffle police officers from time to time to discourage officers being compromised by rogue members of the public due to too much familiarity.
4. The police to have outreach programmes in schools and colleges to sensitize students on how criminal conduct can lead to their fingerprints to be kept as record of bad conduct hence denying them job opportunities and scholarships in future.

5.5 Suggestions for Further Studies

The study made the following suggestions as possible topics for further research:

1. A comparative study should be done in Nairobi informal settlements where other estates are compared to allow a wider generalization of the findings.
2. A study should be conducted on the challenges encountered by security agencies in combating organized crime in Nairobi informal settlements.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1: Questionnaire for Kayole Residents

University of Nairobi

Department of Sociology and Social Work

Master of Arts in Criminology and Social Order

Implications of organized crime on urban areas of Kenya: a case of Kayole estate in Nairobi City County

1.0 BACKGROUND INFORMATION

1.1 County: -----Nairobi----------

1.2 Sub County: ----------

1.3 Location: ----------

1.4 Sub location: ----------

1.5 Village/Estate Name: ----------

1.6 Gender: (1) Male (2) Female: ----------

1.7 Age: (1) 16-25 (2) 26-35 (3) 36-45 (4) 46-55 (5) 56 & above

1.8 Religion: (1) Christian (2) Muslim (3) Traditional African (4) Other (Specify) ----------

1.9 Marital Status: (1) Single (2) married (4) Separated (4) Divorced (5) Widowed

1.10 Highest level of Education attained: (1) No education (2) Primary (3) Secondary (4) Post-secondary Diploma (5) University

1.11 Number of Years of residence in this place: (1) 0-2 (2) 2-4 (3) Over 4 years

1.12 Main Source of Livelihood: (1) Public Servant (2) Private Sector Employee (3) Business person (4) Casual employee (5) Other (Specify) ----------

1.13 Position held in the community: (1) Leader (2) Ordinary Resident

2.0 Emergence and Persistence of Organized Criminal Gangs

2.1 Are you aware of any organized criminal gang in this area? (1) Yes (2) No

2.2 If yes for how long have you heard of them? (1) 0-1 year (2) 2 years above

2.3 Have you been personally a victim of organized criminal gang actions? (1) Yes (2) No

2.4 Has any family member been a victim? (1) Yes (2) No

2.5 Do you know a neighbour who has been a victim? (1) Yes (2) No

2.6 The members of the criminal gang are known by people of this estate/area. (1) Strongly Agree (2) Agree (3) Not Sure (4) Disagree (5) Strongly Disagree

2.7 Do you personally know any of the members of the gangs? (1) Yes (2) No

2.8 Why do you think criminal Gangs emerged and operate in this area? (Rank in Order of Importance e.g. 1, 2……) (1) The area has no planning (2) There are no Police (3) Police appear not to care (4) The local administrator is not known (5) Presence of illicit drinks (6) No lighting at night (7) Other(Specify)----------

2.9 Police inaction contributes to successful operation of Organized criminal gangs (1) Strongly Agree (2) Agree (3) Not Sure (4) Disagree (5) Strongly Disagree

2.10 Lack of lighting at night contributes to Organized Criminal gangs (1) Strongly Agree (2) Agree (3) Not Sure 43) Disagree (5) strongly disagree

2.11 The presence of open and ungoverned areas/spaces in the vicinity contributes to Organized Crime (1) Strongly Agree (2) Agree (3) Not Sure (4) Agree (5) Strongly Disagree

2.12 The older organized criminal gangs were not suppressed and they encouraged the birth of the new ones (1) Strongly Agree (2) Agree (3) Not Sure (4) Disagree (5) Strongly disagree

2.13 The residents fear to expose the members of organized criminal gangs and this encourages their formation and operation. Do you agree? (1) Yes (2) No

2.14 Those who are suspected to expose them are punished to create fear (1) Yes (2) No

2.15 Do you know anybody who was punished by the organized criminal gang? (1) Yes (2) No.

2.16 If yes, how was the person punished? (1) Killed (2) Expelled from the area (3) Paid fine (4) Was intimidated/threatened (5) Beaten/Assaulted

2.17 Does this area/estate have places designated for organized sports activities e.g. playfield, social hall etc.? (1) Yes (2) No (3) Not Sure

2.18 Do you think the absence of such places contributes to organized criminal gangs in this community? (1) Yes (2) No (3) Not Sure

2.19 How would you describe the administration services of the local administrator to be in this area (1) Strong and Effective (2) Weak (3) Compromised (4) Ineffective against Organized Crime

2.20 How would you rate police actions in controlling organized crime in this area (1) Effective against organized crime (2) Facilitating organized Crime (3) Part of Organized Crime (4) compromised

3.0 Effects of Organized Crime

3.1 Do you think organized criminal gangs have changed peoples' ways of life in this area? (1) Yes (2) No

3.2 People nowadays come home earlier than before for fear of organized criminal gangs. Do you agree? (1) Strongly disagree (2) Disagree (3) Not Sure (4) Agree (5) Strongly Agree

3.3 People in this area/estate generally live in fear 1) Strongly disagree (2) Disagree (3) Not Sure (4) Agree (5) Strongly Agree

3.4 Most men do not watch late night football matches any more in this area. Do you agree? (1) Yes (2) No

3.5 Bars in this area close earlier than before. Do you agree? (1) Yes (2) No

3.6 Many plot owners/landlords incur more costs to erect night lighting. Do you agree? (1) Yes (2) No

3.7 Businesses close much earlier in the evening unlike before. (1) Strongly disagree (2) Disagree (3) Not Sure (4) Agree (5) Strongly Agree

3.8 In which ways below has Organized Criminal Gangs affected life in this Area? (Multiple Responses Possible Allowed)

There are places one cannot go unlike before ( )

Water supply is now more irregular ( )

Electricity supply is now more regular ( )

Many houses now have steel doors ( )

The cost of housing has generally gone up ( )

Many residents now pay more levies besides housing rent ( )

3.9 Which of the Levies do you know or hear of are paid to the organized Criminal Gangs (besides house rent)? [Multiple Responses Possible Allowed]

(a) Security fee ( )

(b) Water ( )

(c) Electricity ( )

(d) Personal Protection( )

(e) Construction fee( )

(f) Transport/Stage fee ( )

(g) Business Protection fees ( )

(h) Other Specify----------

3.10 The presence and operations of organized criminal gangs in this area has changed your (or peoples' view of the Police)/perspective of the work of the Police. Do you agree? (1) Strongly agree (2) agree (3) Not Sure (4) disagree (5) Strongly disagree

3.11 Political leaders support organized criminal gangs in this area. (1) Strongly agree (2) agree (3) Not Sure (4) disagree (5) Strongly disagree

3.12 Wealthy people support organized criminal gangs in this area. (1) Strongly agree (2) agree (3) Not Sure (4) disagree (5) Strongly disagree

4.0 Community Response to Organized Criminal Gangs

4.1 How have people responded to the presence of organized criminal groups in this area (1) Leave for work late (2) Return from work early (3) Reduced or no longer watch late night sports activities (4) Landlords have erected steel gates (5) A local response mechanism has been formed (6) Some plots now have security lighting

4.2 Some residents have relocated from this area. Are you planning to relocate as well? (1) Yes (2) No

4.3 Do you know anybody who relocated from this area because of organized criminal gang problem? (1) Yes (2) No

4.4 Local residents have formed a security association to counter the criminal gang. Do you think it is effective? (1) Yes (2) No

4.5 Why do you think it will not be effective? (1) The criminal gang has more money (2) The criminal gang has police support (3) the criminal gang has the support of the local administrator (4) Members of the committee are attacked and intimidated.

4.6 How have individuals to and from work managed the problem of gangs?

(1) They walk in groups

(2) They call each other on phone to be out of the gates/houses all at the same time

(3) They wait for each other

(4) Use WhatsApp to pass quick messages on the presence of the gang members

5.0 Challenges

5.1 Enumerate some of the challenges faced by the community in addressing the problem of organized Criminal Gangs:

1.----------

2.----------

3.----------

4.----------

6.0 Recommendations on how to address the problem of organized criminal gangs in Kayole

1----------

2----------

3----------

4----------

APPENDIX 1I: Interview Guide for Key Informants

1. Please name some of the organized criminal gangs in this area:

   ……

   ……

   ……

2. Why do you think organized criminal gangs emerge and operate in this area?

   ……

   ……

3. What conditions are favourable for their emergence?

   ……

   ……

4. What conditions are favourable for their operations and or persistence?

   ……

   ……

5. In which way has organized crime affected the people in their everyday life?

   ……

   ……

6. How has the community responded to the problem of organized crime?

   ……

   ……

7. What challenges do the government (Police, local administrators) face in addressing organized crime?

   ……

   ……

8. What recommendations do you have to address organized criminal gangs?

   ……

   ……

Thank you

APPENDIX III: Krejcie & Morgan 1970 Sampling Table

Table 3.1

Table for Determining Sample Size of a Known Population

N	S	N	S	N	S	N	S	N	S
10	10	100	80	280	162	800	260	2800	338
15	14	110	86	290	165	850	265	3000	341
20	19	120	92	300	169	900	269	3500	346
25	24	130	97	320	175	950	274	4000	351
30	28	140	103	340	181	1000	278	4500	354
35	32	150	108	360	186	1100	285	5000	357
40	36	160	113	380	191	1200	291	6000	361
45	40	170	118	400	196	1300	297	7000	364
50	44	180	123	420	201	1400	302	8000	367
55	48	190	127	440	205	1500	306	9000	368
60	52	200	132	460	210	1600	310	10000	370
65	56	210	136	480	214	1700	313	15000	375
70	59	220	140	500	217	1800	317	20000	377
75	63	230	144	550	226	1900	320	30000	379
80	66	240	148	600	234	2000	322	40000	380
85	70	250	152	650	242	2200	327	50000	381
90	73	260	155	700	248	2400	331	75000	382
95	76	270	159	750	254	2600	335	1000000	384

Note: N is Population Size; S is Sample Size *Source: Krejcie & Morgan, 1970*