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INSTITUTE OF DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

CONFLICT PREVENTION AND MANAGEMENT IN AFRICA: ROLE OF TRACK TWO DIPLOMACY IN KENYA.

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DECLARATION

I, **Daniella Achieng Omollo**, declare that this research project is my original work and has never been presented for any academic award.

Signature: …………………………   Date: …………………………..

Daniella Achieng Omollo

R52/11375/2018

This research project has been submitted for examination with my approval as University Supervisor.

Signed…………………………………………..Date…………………………………………

Prof. Maria Nzomo

Director, Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies

DEDICATION

I humbly dedicate this project to God for His mercies and blessings throughout this journey. I extend special dedication to my mother Everlyne Munyasia for her prayers and support.

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ABSTRACT

This study focused on track II diplomacy in conflict prevention and management in Africa; and specifically in Kenya. Objectives of the study included examining how track II diplomacy has led to conflict prevention and management in Africa, to find out how track II diplomacy has helped in preventing and managing conflict in Kenya and assessing the key challenges and future prospects of track II diplomacy in managing conflicts in the continent. The study was founded on liberal theory. Survey research design was adopted. Primary data was collected using structured questionnaires directed at different non-state actors like the civil societies, media, private citizens and non-governmental institutions. The data collected was then analyzed qualitatively and quantitatively in line with the study objectives. Findings established that track II diplomacy has broadly been employed in Africa, with notable countries including Mozambique, South Africa, DRC and Kenya. The employment of track II diplomacy in the enlisted states involved the use of non-state members such as religious leaders, youth leaders, influential business people, local NGOs and members of the international community. Application of track II diplomacy helped to restore order amongst adversaries, helped to voice the demands of victims, addressed the concerns of affected communities and facilitated justice for individuals in the community by bringing perpetrators of the war to book. In Kenya, notable conflicts necessitating the use of track II diplomacy included the 2007-2008 post-election violence, 2017 violence, conflicts amongst the pastoralist communities in Baringo and Turkana and conflicts at the border between Kenya and Somali. The use of track II diplomacy helped in opening and improving channels of communication, changing attitudes of conflicting parties about the "other", restoring relationships by building trust, offering new opportunities for negotiation, changing the dynamic of conflict by strengthening voices of moderation and building stable infrastructure of peace. Challenges facing track II diplomacy as identified in this study included introduction of 'wrong' diplomats, introduction of right diplomats but with limited influence on policy formulation, changing of sides by diplomats, changing of the peace keeping environment and the dismissal of the efforts of track II diplomats in the official negotiation processes. The researcher concluded that track II diplomacy has been very important in managing and preventing conflicts in Africa, together with track I and other peace keeping processes.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AU   African Union

DRC   Democratic Republic of Congo

ECK   Electoral Commission of Kenya

ICRC   International Committee of Red Cross

NGOs   Non-Governmental Organizations

ODM   Orange Democratic Movement

PNU   Party of National Unity

SADC   South Africa Development Community

UN   United Nations

UNHCR   United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

<p style="text-align:center">**CHAPTER ONE**</p>

<p style="text-align:center">**INTRODUCTION**</p>

1.1 Background of the Study

Scholars and policy makers after World War II have sought to coming up with ways of ensuring long term peace which has proved to be a challenge. Establishing peace is not just a matter of separating military forces but also involves other procedures such as identifying what caused the conflict so as to be able to find ways of building peace where conflict has occurred. Negotiating a political solution or a cease-fire is always a priority where a conflict has occurred. Track II Diplomacy plays a critical function in enabling the signing of agreements to cease fire. In most cases, it works to bring efforts of reconciliation at a civil society level. Reconciliation should begin at a community level according to Stein.[1]

This presents the unarmed forces a chance to organize into stronger voice of action and allows them greater co-ordination of their programs hence initiating more peace initiatives for a conflict to be addressed.[2] Track one actors over the years have an already common and established involvement in regards to peace processes but the recent decades have seen track two actors also get involved in a wide variety of duties involving peacemaking activities. Track two activities involve unofficial or informal people working outside official mediation or negotiation. These activities are intended to try work with the disputing parties to either transform the conflict or solve the conflict. The definition of track II diplomacy according to Montville Joseph is:

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[1] Stein J, *Image, Identity and the Resolution of Violent Conflict*. In C.A. Crocker, F.O. Hampson & P. Aall (Eds), *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict*. (pp189-208) Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press (2001) p.193
[2] Paul J L, *Building Peace- Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*. (Washington: US Institute for Peace, 1997), p.75.

"an unofficial, informal interaction between members of adversary groups or nations that aims to develop strategies, influence public opinion, and organize human and material resources in ways that might help to resolve their conflict. ...It is a process designed to assist official leaders to resolve or, in the first instance, to manage conflicts by exploring possible solutions out of public view and without the requirements to formally negotiate or bargain for advantage"[3]

Track two diplomacy is normally carried out by non- state actors such as academics, religious bodies, media, humanitarian organizations, private donors and NGOs. In some given instances, government officials or governments can also take up the role of informal actors when they facilitate talks among private citizens from conflicting parties. Their unofficial nature often makes them flexible in carrying out their duties.[4] This actors also have an upper hand because they tend to have close relations with local communities as compared to the track one actors.[5]

The end of cold war brought out the need to re-define the term security and define the role of track I diplomacy in establishing peace and security. This resulted to the development of more attention given towards the effectiveness of track II diplomacy in preventing and managing conflict. Track two diplomacy as an unofficial way of resolving conflicts has the capacity of reducing the intensity of protracted conflicts through encouraging communication hence resulting to the de-escalation of conflict before attempts of official negotiations are done. Track two diplomacy is also getting more attention due to the changing nature of conflicts in terms of actors. Dealing with

[3] Montville, J, *The Arrow and the Olive Branch: A Case for Track Two Diplomacy*, Ed., Vamik D. Volkan et al., The Psychodynamics of International Relationships, London: Lexington Books (1990), p.262
[4] Claude Bruderlein, *The Role of non-State Actors in Building Human Security: The Case of Armed Groups in Intra-State Wars*, (Geneva, May 2000) p. 2
[5] Ibid p.3

governments only has proven to be difficult since other actors like community organizations, rebel groups and local leaders are also involved in a given conflict.

During conflicts, non- state actors always take up different roles in accordance to the situation at hand for instance the International Community of Red Cross (ICRC) acts as a relief agency during emergency needs when governments are unable to.[6] Track two actors have an advantage since they can deal directly with conflicting parties at grassroots level and they are not restricted by foreign policies of a given country. However, they also come with their own shortcomings like for instance they may lack resources such as economic or political influence to carry out negotiations. They might also have limited information to carry out their activities and in many cases there is lack of coordination due to many actors.

Over time, there has been rise of the need of non-state actors in conflict resolution in the world. Many countries have involved the use of non-state actors in managing their conflict. Globally, the United Nations has played several roles in negotiating peace in countries such as Bosnia in 1995, Cambodia in 1979 and Kosovo in 1998 and 1999.[7] In the case of Africa, International organizations like Red Cross have helped in managing conflict in DRC, Rwanda in 1994 and Angola in 2002 among other states.[8] The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has also played conflict resolution roles in different countries like Somalia from 1998.[9]

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[6] The Red Cross created a website to help re-establish contact between family members in the former Yugoslavia. To assist persons wishing to locate their relatives, computers were installed in ICRC offices in Albania, Macedonia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. http://www.familylinks.icrc.org Accessed 1st April 2020.
[7] Roy G, *A Witness to Genocide: The "Ethnic Cleansing" of Bosnia*, (MacMillan, 1993)
[8] Sadara Shine, "The Globalization of Human Rights in Post-Genocide Rwanda," Bridges 8 (New York, Spring 2014) p. 55
[9] Jutta B &Kirsti S, *Violence & Social Order Beyond the State: Somalia & Angola*, Review of African Political Economy Nos.104/5:359-382 (ROAPE Publications Ltd., 2005) p. 360

The use of track two diplomacy is getting more attention as compared to track one diplomacy since track one is more authoritative and often results to escalation of conflict. This research aims to bring out the effectiveness of track two diplomacy in preventing and managing conflict in Africa, the challenges they face and also analyze the future prospects of track II diplomacy in building establishing peace and security. The latter is not a replacement of official diplomacy but a complementary tool to help in successful negotiations. Most scholars and experts believe that track two diplomacy has not been fully utilized to its potential.[10]

Its potential can be realized if linked with track I diplomacy as an alternative to conflict resolution. Without this, track two diplomacy will keep on suffering from limited human resources and insufficient funding. Even though it seems to be new globally, some successes have been recorded like in Mozambique. A Rome based community known as Sant'Egidio took up the role as unofficial facilitators to help conflicting parties in reconciliation which paved way to the Mozambique Peace Agreement in 1992, October.

1.2 Statement of the Research Problem

Conflict prevention and conflict management has been the key focus of building peace and security in the African region. Many scholars have argued out the need of conflict management in a situation where conflict has occurred so as to remove its negative effects. Major governments have relied greatly on official government personnel in managing and preventing war. There has been less focus on the contribution of track II diplomacy in preventing and managing conflict. This study will focus on how track two

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[10] Havermans, J, *Private Professionals for Peace, in People building peace: 35 Inspiring Stories from Around the World,* European Centre for Conflict Prevention (1999), p.223

diplomacy has played various roles in issues of peace and security in Africa with a case study of Kenya.

1.3 Research Questions

i.) How has track two diplomacy contributed to conflict prevention and management in Africa?

ii.) What role has track two diplomacy played in preventing and managing conflict in Kenya?

iii.) What are the key challenges and future prospects of track two diplomacy in building peace and security in Africa with a focus in Kenya?

1.4 Research Objectives

The main objective of the study is;

To analyze the role of track two diplomacy in preventing and managing conflict in Africa.

The objectives of the study are:

i.) To examine how track two diplomacy has led to conflict prevention and management in Africa

ii.) To analyze how track two diplomacy has helped in preventing and managing conflict in Kenya.

iii.) To assess the key challenges and future prospects of track two diplomacy in building peace and security in Africa with a focus in Kenya.

1.5 Literature Review

This section seeks to review scholarly contribution in issues concerning non-state actors and their contribution in conflict management through track II diplomacy in various nations.

1.5.1 Track Two Diplomacy –An Analysis

Joseph Montville, one of the earliest researchers and advocates of track II diplomacy, defined it as the interaction of members of adversary groups in an informal way and supported by unofficial processes, targeting at the organization of resources in order to resolve conflict.[11] His definition was influenced by seminal works of Kelman Herbert and Burton John and is rooted in many social-psychological assumptions.[12] Track II diplomacy describes all peace management functions which happen outside official channels of governments.[13]John McDonald and Diamond Louise explain, track two as "informal, non-governmental and unofficial contacts and activities between private citizens and warring groups.[14]

The non-state actors are comprised of organizations or individuals who tend to have influence politically but do not ally with a particular country. They include non-governmental organizations, religious groups, multinational corporations, academics, media, humanitarian organizations, former government officials and private donors. The major role they play is by acting as a link between the civil society and various state actors through establishing relations.[15]After the end of cold war there were several debates on the need to re-define security. This also involved the need to review how effective traditional security was in the governments and states.

The main focus was the ability of a state to resolve conflicts and how effective they were. This resulted to attention being paid to the non-state actor's role in promoting

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[11] Montville, J, *The Arrow and the Olive Branch: A Case for Track Two Diplomacy*, Ed., Vamik D. Volkan et al., The Psychodynamics of International Relationships, London: Lexington Books (1990), p.162
[12] Kelman, H, *The Problem-Solving Workshop in Conflict Resolution*, Ed. R. L. Meritt, (Communication in International Politics, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1972)
[13] Ibid 1
[14] Diamond, L & John M, *Multi-Track Diplomacy: A Systems Guide and Analysis*, (Occasional Paper No. 3, Grinnell, Ia.: Iowa Peace Institute, 1991).p.1
[15] Wallace, W & Josselin, *Non-State Actors in World Politics*, (New York: Palgrave Publications, 2012), pp3-4

peace and security through track two democracy. Track two as a concept was born from the belief that if contacts between individuals are created by building ties of understanding and friendship, then war can easily be avoided. Track two diplomacy contributes to the transformation of conflict through encouraging the conflicting parties to participate in dialogues that are constructive in nature.

Processes such as cultural exchange, problem solving workshops and dialogues between the conflicting parties are normally carried out in track II diplomacy.[16] The aim of this kind of diplomacy is always to work with all parties involved in a given conflict but in some instances it can work with one party so as to be able to have a clear picture on their position in the conflict at hand. This helps when a group or individual feels marginalized by their own ethnic group.

Track two diplomacy being accepted in the contemporary world is dependent on types of conflicts, magnitude therein and the people involved in battle. In recent times, conflicts have become increasingly a result of internal disputes and one of the actors involved is the government.[17] Due to this reason, during conflict resolution, one cannot only deal with the government alone but must include all other actors like community based organizations, rebel groups and local leaders. For example, the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo had more than one internal actor in the country. In fact, the war drew eight regional states and rebel movements including the RCD-Goma, Congolese Liberation Movement (MLC) and RCD-ML groups. Carrying out mediation in the country therefore needed the interaction with the enlisted internal and external

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[16] Rouhana, N.N. & Kelman, H.C, *Promoting Joint Thinking in International Conflicts: An Israeli-Palestinian Continuing Workshop*, Journal of Social Issues;50 (1994) ,pp157-178
[17] Havermans, J, *Private Professionals for Peace, in People Building Peace: 35 Inspiring Stories from Around the World*, European Centre for Conflict Prevention, (1999),
p.223 http://www.euforic.org/euconflict/pbp/2/2_intro.htm accessed on 29 March 2020

participants. Due to this reason using traditional methods for peace processes became complex, necessitating for the employment of track two diplomacy.

With its several advantages such as being used as an instrument for pre-negotiation, track two efforts provides useful information on the road to peaceful resolution.[18] Yet, as argued by scholars, the full potential of track II has never been realized. However, in the limited cases where it has been applied, success has been seen in the peace processes. Examples include Mozambique, where religious institutions played critical role in restoring peace during the 1991 and 2003 conflicts. Groups like Sant' Egidio brought on board informal discussions with leaders of civilians who were leading protests and helped in linking with official peace processes. Another instance is the Oslo Peace Process which was a long journey to building trust among the conflicting parties. The process maintained a high level of confidentiality away from the public.[19] Even though the government was the one recognized for completing peace treaties like White House lawn and Oslo accords, the presence of non-official actors had been very instrumental in resolving the conflict. As identified thus far, the role of track II diplomacy on peace processes has not been easily defined due to the overwhelming presence of visible official processes.

1.5.2 Track II Diplomacy in Conflict Prevention and Conflict Management

Some scholars challenge the idea that governments are the only significant actors in conflict resolution. There are different causes of conflict according to Mwagiru.[20] For conflict to be managed it must include different factors like the context of the conflict,

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[18] Ibid, p 224

[19] Mitchell, C, *Track Two Triumphant? Reflections on the Oslo Process and Conflict Resolution in the Middle East*, *ICAR Newsletter Volume* 5, Issue 6 (1993), p.8

[20] Mwagiru, M., *Conflicts in Africa: Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management*, (Nairobi: Centre for conflict research, 2006), p6

the actors and external factors which create interdependence.[21] Scholars like Butler view the world system being centered on states. This reflects track one diplomacy in the management of conflict as a tool that uses force in order to arrive at a settlement.[22]Track one diplomacy hence results to creating short term solutions in conflict situations.

Interactive conflict resolution is also known as track two diplomacy. Reasons to why people result to conflict are many and not all conflicts can be solved through the use of coercion and threats. What is important is the identification of the actors of the conflict, the right time to intervene in the conflict and the issues at hand. This will help come up with the best conflict management approach. A state system requires other actors apart from the state. This other actors are known as non-state actors who fall under track two diplomacy.

They come in so as to manage a conflict and take on the responsibility of finding a solution to the issues in conflict through encouraging the parties in taking participations. However, track two diplomacy lacks clarity on what approach it takes in conflict management hence this should be defined distinctively from track one diplomacy.[23] According to Capie, he points out that limited scholarly evidence and debate has resulted to track two diplomacy having little effect on policy change. This begs the question of to what extend are states open by non-governmental actors.

Of the models of track II diplomacy in existence, the interactive problem solving workshop is one of the commonest. This model was advanced by Burton, Fisher, and Kelman et al. In the model, citizens from the conflicting groups are engaged in

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[21]Chataway, C, In *Practice Track Two from A Track One Perspective*, (Negotiation Journal, 1998) pp.269-287.

[22] Butler, M. J., *International Conflict Management*, (London: Routledge, 2009) pp 1, 248 -249

[23] Chataway, C, *In Practice Track Two from A Track One Perspective*, (Negotiation Journal, 1998) 269-287.

formulating processes to be followed in the political arena to change stereotypes and perceptions.[24] Harold also came up with a similar process and added that the citizens are made to understand that peace is possible, and the importance of working with their compatriots. The interactive problem workshop was adopted during the Dartmouth Conference Regional Task Force in the Inter-Tajik Dialogue.[25]

In the process of track two diplomacy; influential non-official members usually take the lead in carrying out joint analysis of the conflict and in solving the problem jointly. These people are mostly knowledgeable and with skills in problem resolution. For success to be achieved, these individuals must be impartial.[26] This allows for the development of productive dialogue amongst conflicting groups. In fact, four separate tracks can be identified from the concept of track II diplomacy according to Lee Michael. These include exchanges amongst private citizens, professional conflict resolution, business community's actions and international broadcasting.[27] He however notes that these distinctions soon were inadequate. For the reason of inadequacy, Diamond proposed that the categories would rather be referred to as 'Multi track' diplomacy. The use of various definitions for tracks as highlighted above by scholars and different practitioners has brought confusion in understanding of track II diplomacy.

For some time now, NGOs such as World Vision, Greenpeace and Save the Children have provided humanitarian support and economic support to people that have been caught up in wars. However, McDonald noted that most forms of humanitarian aid have

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[24] Kelman, 2000; Rouhana, N.N. & Kelman, H.C, *Promoting Joint Thinking in International Conflicts: An Israeli-Palestinian Continuing Workshop*, Journal of Social Issues;50 (1994), pp157-178

[25] Saunders, Harold H. & Slim, Rana H., *The Inter-Tajik Dialogue: From Civil War towards Civil Society* (Conciliation Resources, 2001).

[26] Fisher, R.J. & Keashly, L, *The Potential Complementarity of Mediation and Consultation within a Contingency Model of Third Party Consultation*, The Journal of Peace Research, 28, 1 (1991), pp29-42.

[27] Lee, M. 1997. Multi Track Diplomacy. http://www.le.ac.uk/csd/dsp/n2lee.html accessed on March 15,2020

"done little to resolve the root causes of conflict".[28] This necessitates revising the roles of NGOs and non-official parties as agents of conflict resolution and peace building.

Track two diplomacy has been an important conflict resolution tool in various countries including the Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia and Kenya among others. The non-state actors have played major roles like bringing together leaders from conflicting sides to interact with each other through workshops so as to try introducing win-win concepts. Through the workshops, they encourage the parties to conflict in developing good relations of understanding and encourage them on the need on working together for their mutual interest. Non-state actors are easier to work with since most of their work is off the record, flexible and unofficial. This allows them to deal with various groups including armed groups. They are seen to be more impartial hence they are easy to trust as they lack geopolitical interests.

1.5.3 Challenges of Track Two Diplomacy

The challenge non-state actors face is that even though they are flexible, they barely have the capacity to coerce parties hence gaining entry into a conflict can be difficult especially if they are dealing with state actors.[29] A major setback is that unofficial actors often have insufficient resources to carry them through the entire process of negotiations hence they might fail to bring the change needed. Non-state actors also lack guarantees and incentives as compared to a track one actor.

The recent times demands for the change of traditional responsibilities and roles. Due to this changes in conflict and security, governments should no longer be the only

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[28] McDonald, J, *Further Exploration of Track Two Diplomacy*, in Kriesberg, L. & Thorson, S. (Eds), Timing the De-Escalation of International Conflicts, 201-220. Syracuse. New York, 1991), p.201
[29] Deutsch, M, Competition and Cooperation," in *The Handbook of Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice,* eds. Coleman, Peter T. & Deutsch, Morton, (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 2000)

guardian of diplomacy.[30] The diplomatic space can be shared with non-state actors carrying out track two diplomacy. This can be made possible through co-operation, dialogues and proactive consultation. Due to complexity of conflicts, governments should allow and recognize the presence of multiple stakeholders who should not be restricted by geographical or political boundaries.

1.5.4 Conclusion

The contributions of non-state actors in track two diplomacy are indirect and often limited but the results they bring out ought to not only be assessed by visible influence of official track I processes. Informal intervention does have a big contribution to parties' perceptions and they enable capacity building for parties to negotiate and come up with solutions when the window of opportunity arises. This process provides an opportunity for parties to build on their relations and communication so as to be able to negotiate their solutions freely and effectively.

Many countries have benefited from the actions of non-state actors in carrying out track two diplomacy directly or indirectly. A good number of books, articles and journals have been written regarding unofficial diplomacy but little attention has been paid in its effectiveness in conflict prevention and management. Due to this reason, it is very crucial to do a more detailed research on the non-state actors and more attention given so as to validate the need of track two diplomacy in conflict situations.

1.6 Justification of the Study

1.6.1 Academic Justification

Various scholars have looked into the concept of track II diplomacy. Many have written about different ways of preventing and managing conflicts in the world system but the

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[30]Chufrin, G.I. & Saunders, H.H, *A Public Peace Process*, Negotiation Journal, 9, 2, (1993) pp155-177.

issue of how effective track two diplomacy is in preventing and managing conflict still has a gap to be filled. Track two diplomacy has not been adequately utilized in the prevention and management of conflicts. While various studies and research have been undertaken on aspects of track two diplomacy, this study will add to the existing literature by providing an in-depth research on its effectiveness in conflict prevention and management.

1.6.2 Policy Justification

The data generated from the study is expected to contribute in improving on existing policies that advocate for political stability which enhance peace and security in any given country. This will enable more participation of unofficial actors in matters of conflict prevention and management. The findings from this study will improve the capacity of policy makers in a variety of ways such as encouraging policy makers in work closely with track two diplomacy actors and involving them in decision making processes.

1.7 Theoretical Framework

This study will adopt the liberal theory. Liberalism as a school of thought, was influenced by thirty years of war and enlightenment in the 17th and 18th centuries. Major works were written by various philosophers such as Immanuel Kant, Voltaire, John Locke and Smith. Based on three principles, the theory advocates for international cooperation, denies power politics as the only available outcome of international relations and it recognizes the role of non-governmental actors and international organizations in shaping policy choices and state preferences.[31] Liberal theorists state

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[31] Shiraev, E B, *International Relations*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014) p.78

that international organizations serve a major purpose in bringing peace amongst governments.[32]

Liberals agree that with the right diplomacy and institutions, state and non-state actors can work together to reduce conflicts and increase cooperation. The significance of this theory is that it legitimizes and recognizes parties outside governments and international bodies in shaping policy choices and state preferences so as to avoid conflict in the state system. This actors and organizations fall under track two diplomacy which is the main focus of the study. So as to avoid conflicts among states, the study focuses on how track two actors are effective in preventing and managing conflict in Africa with a case study of Kenya.

1.8 Hypotheses of the Study

The researcher intends to test the following hypotheses:

  i.) Track two diplomacy has played significant roles in the prevention and management of conflict in Africa
  ii.) Track two diplomacy actors have played a role in preventing and managing conflicts in Kenya.
  iii.) The collaboration between governments and non-state actors will enhance the role of track two diplomacy in promoting peace and security.

1.9 Methodological Research Tools

This section highlights the research design adopted, study location, target population, sampling procedures, methods of collecting data, and methods of analyzing data.

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[32] Shiraev , E B. and Vladislav M. Z, *International Relations*: New York, (NY: Oxford University Press, 2014) p.86

1.9.1 Research Design

This study was conducted through a combination of methods. This helped researcher to benefit from textual information obtained from existing literature and interview questionnaires from key parties related to the study. The main focus was to examine and establish interrelationship among variables and to draw explanatory inferences. In this study the researcher sought to establish the effectiveness of track II diplomacy in preventing and managing conflict in Africa with a case study of Kenya.

It incorporates archival research. Archival research makes use of documents and records available for information. This allows one to study about past relationships of people and how this has occurred over time till date. This provides empirical data which is needed to answer questions which cannot be answered in any other way. It also enables the researcher to have comparative studies.

1.9.2 Target Population

This refers to that portion of the total population from which a sample is drawn. The research targeted different non-state actors like the civil societies, media, private citizens and non-governmental institutions.

1.9.3 Research Sample Size

A sample size of various individuals was used so as to be able to get sufficient primary data. Questionnaires were sent out to the target population so as to come up with information. Interviews were also be carried out to be able to achieve first-hand information.

1.9.4 Data Collection

The study used primary and secondary data sources. With regards to primary data, first-hand information from the target population through interview and questionnaires was

collected. Secondary data will involve use of materials written before by other academic researchers. The study also adopted secondary sources by looking at data that already exists from journals, academic books, security and policy materials, online content, articles and newspapers. Primary data was used to fill in the knowledge gaps.

1.9.5 Data Analysis

Secondary data was analyzed through content analysis while data from interviews and discussions was transcribed and analyzed qualitatively to draw explanatory patterns and generalize the assumptions that underpin this case study.

1.9.6 Presentation

After collection of data, inferences and deductions were made. It involved extracting important variables and testing the assumptions. After coding into a computer, analysis was then made. Descriptive statistics was used in order to determine percentages and frequencies.

1.9.7 Ethical Considerations

Every given research requires an ethical approach so as to ensure integrity of the research is upheld. The University of Nairobi code of conduct for research was used as a guide. A research permit was obtained from the National Commission for Science, Technology and Information so as to carry out the study. This enabled carrying out primary data research with total integrity and honesty.

1.10 Scope and Limitations of the Research

Although there are various types of diplomatic interventions, the study focuses on track two type of intervention. Due to the limitation of time the study cannot examine in detail roles played by non-state actors in managing conflicts in many countries. It mainly

focuses on Kenya. The study focuses mainly on effectiveness of track II diplomacy. Track I diplomacy and dual diplomacy are beyond its scope.

1.11 Chapter Outline

Chapter One: Introduction

This chapter introduces the role track two diplomacy in preventing and managing conflict in Africa beginning from a broad context of the research study. It will cover the background of the study, statement of the research problem, literature review, and hypotheses of the study, justification of the study, theoretical framework and research methodology.

Chapter Two: Track Two Diplomacy in conflict prevention and management in Africa

This chapter will seek to provide an analysis of the concept of track two diplomacy including an in depth research on the historical evolution of the concept and the actors involved using examples drawn from Africa. Secondly, it sought to identify and analyze efforts of managing and preventing conflicts by track two actors in Africa.

Chapter Three: Conflict Prevention and Conflict management in Kenya. Role of track II diplomacy

This chapter will review literature of track II diplomacy in conflict prevention and management focusing on different non state actors in Kenya.

Chapter Four: Analysis of the challenges and future prospects of Track Two Diplomacy

The chapter tries to bring out efforts by track two actors in Africa and the key challenges they have faced trying to establish peace and security.

Chapter Five: Data Presentation and Analysis

This chapter presents the analysis and interpretation of data collected on the role of track II diplomacy in conflict prevention and management in Kenya. The researcher collected data using questionnaires administered to members of civil societies, private citizens, NGOs and the media.. The data was then subjected to SPSS for analysis.

Chapter Six: Conclusion and Recommendations

This chapter provides the conclusion of the study, gives recommendations and provides suggestions on areas of further studies based on the literature review and findings on from the study.

CHAPTER TWO
TRACK II DIPLOMACY IN CONFLICT PREVENTION AND MANAGEMENT IN AFRICA

2.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the assessment of the application of track II diplomacy in conflict prevention and management in Africa. It enlists attributes that necessitated the adoption of track 2 diplomacy in conflict management; the impact of track II diplomacy in conflict management and the challenges that faced successful employment of track II diplomacy in Africa.

2.2 Factors that Necessitated the Use of Track II Diplomacy in Conflict Resolution in Africa

In the African region, conflict has formed and still makes part of human history.[33] Whether small involving smaller communities or between civilians and governments, the wars have been detrimental to the human security. In common cases the large civil wars have continued for long durations; claiming many lives, leading to destruction of property and displacing many people from their homes amongst other negativities in the society. To solve the conflicts, concerned parties have employed several strategies

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[33] Mwagiru, M, *Conflicts in Africa: Theory, Processes and Institutions of management,* (Nairobi: Centre for conflict research, 2006) pp6.

ranging from track I diplomacy, to track II diplomacy and even to track III diplomacy. This section specifically focuses on conflicts in Africa where track II diplomacy was applied to prevent and manage them.

Findings from the review of journals indicate that track II diplomacy has been adopted in conflict resolution in several countries in the region like South Africa, Madagascar, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Kenya amongst other states. Factors that necessitated the use of tack II diplomacy in the enlisted countries according to study findings include conflict nature and the insufficiency of traditional means of resolving conflict. The nature of war in the identified countries have been identity based, persisting for long periods and have been marred by structural inequalities. The South African war for instance, was identity based in the sense that the Africans and Indians who felt secluded from the Apartheid system revolted and fought for their rights in the government.[34]

Racial discrimination had started long before that, whereby blacks were forcefully evicted from fertile lands and resettled in dry lands. Their lands were taken over by Whites. The Apartheid law that came into force in 1948 also denied Africans and other communities the right to participate in top elective positions and further divided them along tribal lines. The war took place from 1948 and ended in 1990, happening for around 42 years. Despite the employment of traditional conflict resolution techniques like military interventions and economic sanctions, the war seemed to recur and even got worse with time. The jailing of prominent leaders of resistance like Nelson Mandela and the tear gassing of student demonstrators in the country proved insufficient in solving the conflict, necessitating for the employment of track II diplomacy.

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[34] Lieberfeld, D, *Getting to the Negotiating Table in South Africa: Domestic and International Dynamics*, Politikon: South African Journal of Political Studies Volume 27, Issue 1 (2000), pp19 – 36

Findings presented above are in line with research findings by Kelman and Steven in South Africa that the strengthening of the apartheid rule in 1948 led to non-violent demonstrations, strikes and protests from communities that were secluded. Despite the retaliation by the government using armed force, arrests of prominent personalities, lockdowns and economic sanctions, the war persisted and was only resolved with the intervention of the international community, informal organizations and unofficial meetings aside from the state.[35]

In the conflicts in Madagascar; recorded in the periods 1971-1972, 1990-1991, 2001-2002 and 2009-2010, the nature of the war also made it difficult to resolve using traditional diplomacy means. From history, the country has 18 main ethnic groups that speak the same language and have almost similar lifestyles.[36] In the conflicts enlisted, the military played an important role in pressurizing existing government regimes and even removed the presidents from power. Given that the army was involved and that it enlisted the support of the population against the government, resolving the conflict using formal strategies of agreements and military actions proved to be terrible.

In line with study findings by Wenche, the 1971-1972 conflict involved a revolution led by Jaona Monja of the National pour l'Inde´pendence de Madagascar movement just after the resignation of President Philbert Tsira. The church helped so much to solve this conflict. But in the 1990-1991 conflict, the church was part of the revolution against president Ratsiraka making it hard to use it to solve the conflict. The 2009-2010 war in the country started by a military coup against President Marc Ravalomanana. The revolution was led by Mayor Rajoelina. In the enlisted conflicts, the army was always

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[35] Kelman, H C. & Steven P. C, *Resolution of International Conflict: An Interactional Approach*, in Stephen Worchel & William G. Austin, Eds, Psychology of Intergroup Relations. Chicago, IL: Nelson-Hall (1986) pp323 – 342

[36] Hauge, W and Tanja, E, *Beyond Environmental Scarcity: Causal Pathways to Conflict*, Journal of Peace Research Volume 35, Issue 3 (1998), pp 299 – 319

part of the revolution, making it hard to use military force to quell the war.[37] This necessitated the employment of track II diplomacy in bringing and maintaining peace.

On its part, the war in DRC was characterized by the involvement of regional players and the military in the country. Participation by other countries' forces increased the intensity of the conflict making it hard to come into formal agreements between political parties. In fact, the rebelling parties felt betrayed by the then president Kabila and it would prove a difficult task to bring all of them on the same table to negotiate for peaceful talks.[38] The findings are in line with study findings by Naidoo who established that President Kabila who assumed power after overturning the government of Mobutu in 1997 betrayed Rwandese and Uganda forces that had helped him get power.[39]

He had promised them that he would assist them economically, help transition the government and improve the political situation in the country. On the contrary, President Kabila refused to honor his part of the deal, banned political parties and suppressed political rights of people in the country. Despite the employment of track I diplomacy and ensuring the signing of a ceasefire agreement, a number of parties like the lead opposition and the Mai-Mai rebel group were left out, igniting more rebellion.[40] Interstate conflicts amongst eight countries trying to solve the conflict increased the intensity of the war, making it hard to continue applying traditional conflict resolution strategies.

In Kenya, the post-election conflict 2007-2008 also necessitated the adoption of track II diplomacy to a great extent. The conflict was ethnic based, with some communities

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[37]Wenche H, *Madagascar between peace and conflict—domestic capabilities for peaceful conflict management*, Conflict, Security & Development, Volume 11:, Issue 5 (2011), pp509 – 531
[38]Dietrich C, *The commercialization of military deployment in Africa,* African Security Review, Vol. 9 No.1 (2000).
[39] Naidoo S, *The Role of Track Two Diplomacy in the Democratic Republic of Congo Conflict*, (Sowetan publishers, 2000) pp 12 – 36
[40] Ibid.

rallying behind former Prime Minister Raila Odinga while others rallying behind former president Mwai Kibaki.[41] Each party held clearly to their stand that they had won elections, making the conflict to continue for some months. The fact that the then president was part of the conflict, coming up with formal agreements initially proved to be hard as communities on the opposing side would not entrust him with the top seat. The military force used only served to increase the intensity of the conflict with more deaths, destruction of property and displacement of people. It is at this point that the mediating parties saw the need to introduce track II diplomacy amongst other strategies in order to see to an end the ugly fighting in the country.

2.3 Track II Diplomacy in Conflict Prevention and Management in Africa

Findings from the analysis of the conflicts where track II diplomacy was instrumental indicate that participants in the conflict resolution to a large extent were non-state players. These included teachers, leaders of youth groups, religious leaders and lead business people. In the South African conflict; church leaders, the international community, journalists and other non-state actors helped to start talks with conflicting communities and to convince them to come into formal agreements.[42] The church was also instrumental in solving the civil conflict of 1971-1972 and that of 1990-1991 in Madagascar.[43]

In Kenya, lead businessmen, community influencers, youth leaders, religious leaders and journalists helped to reduce tensions amongst communities and to reduce fighting

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[41] Nmaju, M. C., *Violence in Kenya: Any Role for the ICC in the Quest for Accountability?* (African Journal of legal studies, 2009)

[42] Lieberfeld, D, *Getting to the Negotiating Table in South Africa: Domestic and International Dynamics*, Politikon: South African Journal of Political Studies Volume 27, Issue 1 (2000), pp. 19 – 36
[43] Wenche H, *Madagascar between Peace and Conflict-Domestic Capabilities for Peaceful Conflict Management,* Conflict, Security & Development, Volume 11, Issue 5 (2011), pp. 509-531

in the 2007-2008 violence.[44]Findings further established that as part of track II diplomacy; informal activities were used to bring together conflicting sides. The unofficial channels such as informal peace meetings and community based empowerment initiatives provided room for dialogue amongst conflicting parties and helped restore connections in the country.

In DRC for instance, concerned parties had to facilitate a platform for dialogue between unarmed rebel groups and civil society where they articulated their demands on the peace agreement.[45] Indeed, initiatives of track two diplomatic activities in DRC conflict led to constructive and open discussions among different civil society groups that helped to harmonize relations amongst themselves. Also in Madagascar, non-state parties solving the conflicts carried out education programs intended at enlightening people of importance of peaceful demonstrations.

There were efforts to provide track II diplomats with conflict management skills during the process of conflict resolution, according to study findings. This included trainings through seminars, meetings and workshops and general empowerment. This was done by international groups like the UN in South Africa and regional bodies like African Union and South African Development Community (SADC) and even the local community leaders themselves. This is because naturally, some of the partisans to the conflicts have low skill sets and may increase conflict by joining sides if not well informed.

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[44]Nmaju, M. C., *Violence in Kenya: Any role for the ICC in the Quest for Accountability?* (African Journal of legal studies, 2009)
[45]Naidoo S, *The Role of Track Two Diplomacy in the Democratic Republic of Congo Conflict'* (Sowetan publishers, 2000), pp 12 – 36

The International community got serious with the conflict in South Africa in 1976 after the street demonstration by students.[46] They engaged community influencers such as musicians, journalists and youth leaders through education programs, on the road to restoring peace. From the study findings, partisans to conflicts always aimed at changing the stereotype held by conflicting groups against each other. Peaceful agreements were generated basing on proposals by conflicting parties and fed into the official peace making process. In the South African conflict for instance; the whites, Indians and Blacks held strong stereotypes against each other, a concept that made it difficult to immediately restore peace.

Concerned parties had to educate the Africans on one side and the whites on the other side of the need to incorporate every race in the development of the nation. They had to enlighten the whites of the need to adjust discriminatory laws against other races and to accommodate them in the government. Proposals by Africans as presented by their leaders and that by the whites in the country had to be brought to table and a consensus reached on the way of governance and new laws. This saw Nelson Mandela being released from prison and elected to presidency in 1990 and later the signing of a political agreement with Di Clarkeson.[47]

In Madagascar, there was need to adopt a different recruitment style and training of Special Forces in order to reduce stereotype in the armed forces. Religious leaders, teachers and other political leaders had to change the mindset of civilians into acknowledging that there was need to abandon traditional hostilities and live together peacefully. They introduced and practiced the 'Malagasy culture' and later the

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[46]Lieberfeld, D, *Getting to the Negotiating Table in South Africa: Domestic and International Dynamics*, Politikon: South African Journal of Political Studies Volume 27, Issue 1 (2000) pp19 – 36
[47]Ibid.

'Fihavanana culture' signifying resemblance and kinship traits in the nation.[48] In DRC, partisans held meetings with conflicting states and had them agree to work together for the betterment of the society.

Concerned parties also worked around the clock to convince protestors and rebel groups against overthrowing the government of President Kabila. Similarly in Kenya, the media and the international community amongst other non-state actors had to convince communities of the need to abandon stereotypic convictions against others. The proposals forwarded by the communities as presented by the leaders were considered for formal peace talks which led to the formation of a coalition government.

2.4 Impact of Track Two Diplomacy in Conflict Prevention and Management in Africa

From the analysis presented above, track II Diplomacy had a significant impact in resolving the conflicts in South Africa, Madagascar, Kenya and in DRC amongst other notable states. Findings of the study establish that the employment of track II diplomacy helped in drawing working strategies to end war, assisted in drafting long lasting peaceful resolutions, helped in formulating peace policies and assisted in bringing to book perpetrators of war. With regards to drawing working strategies to end war; track II diplomacy through religious leaders, youth leaders, influential business people and international players helped to correctly identify the cause of the fights, parties to the conflict and their demands.

By incorporating all these in conflict resolution, partisans were able to come up with effective peacemaking strategies for forwarding to the official channels of peace making. In this way, the impact of track II diplomacy was great towards resolving

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[48]Bloch, M, *Placing the Dead: Tombs, Ancestral Villages, and Kinship Organization in Madagascar*, (Seminar Press, London, 1971)

conflict. Findings agree with research studies in South Africa that partisans helped in bringing together African representatives, Indian representatives and Afrikaans on the road to peace.[49] Proposals by church leaders in Mozambique also helped to resolve the conflict in 1990-1991.[50]

Findings further indicate that informal players helped in drafting long lasting peace resolutions in the affected countries; impacting positively on conflict management in the affected countries. By bringing youth leaders on the same table of policy formulations, the partisans were able to craft effective policies with nearly all the demands of the conflicting parties in place. The findings agree with study findings in Kenya, whereby members of the public were involved in giving their opinions with regards to long lasting peace making after the 2007-2008 post-election violence.[51] Findings also agree with research findings in DRC, where concerned parties were able to bring all conflicting parties on the same platform and allowing them to come up with long lasting peace policies to be followed.

Finally, from the study findings, track II diplomacy aided in identifying people behind ugly fights in the country and in finding justice for the affected. By involving the community, it is easy find out from the community perspectives on the perpetrators of violence. The people if presented before justice systems, and prosecuted, serve as justice to the people that lost their loved ones or sustained injuries. Through the informal activities, resettling affected people after the war is easy and follows equitable

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[49]Lieberfeld, D (2000). `Getting to the Negotiating Table in South Africa: Domestic and International Dynamics', Politikon: South African Journal of Political Studies Volume 27, Issue 1 (2000), pp19 – 36
[50]Wenche H, *Madagascar between Peace and Conflict-Domestic Capabilities for Peaceful Conflict Management*, Conflict, Security & Development, Volume 11, Issue 5 (2011), pp. 509 – 531
[51]Nmaju, M. C., *Violence in Kenya: Any role for the ICC in the quest for accountability?* (African Journal of legal studies, 2009)

ways as the people on the ground can rightly identify what was rightfully theirs. The findings agree with study findings by Dayton that the informal channels helped restore lands to Africans.[52] They also helped reach out to the affected with post war management strategies and processes of helping the affected. In Kenya, the perpetrators of the conflict were identified and forwarded to the International Criminal Court at The Hague.

2.5 Challenges that faced the Employment of Track II Diplomacy in Africa

In as much as track II diplomacy impacted greatly on the road to peaceful resolution of conflicts in some countries in Africa, the process in itself did not lack challenges. Findings from this study establish that the lack of policy relevance was a huge impediment to the success of the process. Given that track II diplomacy follows informal and unofficial forms of interactions, the partisans usually have no right to commit state resources and are unable to make official peace agreements.[53] As such, the citizen diplomat responsible for advocating for peace were forced in the end to seek for formal ways of signing peace agreements after prompting conflicting parties to dialogue.

The cost of carrying out informal meetings, training citizen diplomats on peace building strategies such as mediation and bringing together conflicting parties is high. Given that non-state actors are the ones trying to build peace, they are usually forced to employ their own resources in the process with no promise of better returns. Insufficient resources on the part of partisans therefore arise as a challenge towards restoring peace

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[52] Dayton B.W, '*Track Two Diplomacy and the Transfer of Peace Building Capacity*,' In: Brown S.S. (Eds) Transnational Transfers and Global Development. International Political Economy Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2012)
[53] Ibid.

within expected times. The fear of committing resources in not for profit initiatives makes the track II diplomacy process take long periods or even fail completely.

These findings are supported by study findings by Thuee in South Africa who enlists how diplomats had to spend large amounts of money in travelling around the country and advocating for peace. Some individuals had to bear long durations in prisons for trying to help restore peace. The international community through United Nations had to come in and meet some of the costs in order to make the process a success.

Findings also identified the challenge of making credible contacts in the process of making peace. As stated by Montville, the success of track II diplomacy usually relies on the ability to create and maintain reliable networks of contacts; generate trust and respect in the process of intermediation, provide a safe and neutral environment and to facilitate interactions and joint activity.[54] Since the diplomats also originate from the society that is conflicting, they risk sparking off a war of "us" versus "them". Some of the diplomats also change course in the process and align themselves with either of the parties.

This was evident in the Conflict in Madagascar where the church had been involved in the government of Ravolamanana from 2001 to 2009.[55] As such the church would not be trusted with resolving the conflict that arose in the 2009-2010 period in as much as it would have played a key role in resolving the conflict. Findings further established that interference from external players was a great impediment to the success of track II diplomacy. The players include neighboring states, regional bodies and the international community that may take sides in the conflicts. Interests in resources in

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[54] Montville, J, "*The Arrow and the Olive Branch: A Case for Track Two Diplomacy,*" Ed., Vamik D. Volkan et al., The Psychodynamics of International Relationships, (London: Lexington Books, 1990)
[55]Wenche H, *Madagascar between peace and Conflict—Domestic Capabilities for Peaceful Conflict Management*, Conflict, Security & Development, Volume 11, Issue 5 (2011), pp. 509 – 531

the country, economic benefits or political favors is usually at the center of conflicting support from other states who supply ammunitions and even go to the extent of training either belligerents or rebels.

It becomes hard for the unofficial diplomats to bring to table the external players and to convince them to help bring the conflict to an end. The external players with huge resources also end up suppressing the power of track II advocators. This was the case in the conflict in DRC where eight states were conflicting over the nation.[56] Rwanda and Uganda who had helped president Kabila to capture power were also demanding for their part of promise, increasing the intensity of the conflict. This made it hard for local non-state peace makers to bring on board all the parties to the conflict and settle it on time.

2.6 Summary of the Chapter

This chapter has assessed the application and impact of track II diplomacy in Africa. From the study findings, notable states in the region where track II diplomacy has been applied in conflict management include South Africa, Democratic Republic of Congo, Madagascar and Kenya. In South Africa, the conflict occurred from 1948 to 1990, propelled by apartheid laws that promoted institutional racial discrimination. In Madagascar, a series of conflicts occurred in the periods 1971-1972, 1990-1991 and 2009-2010 brought about by rebellion against poor government regimes.

In the Democratic Republic of Congo, the conflict that started at around 1998 was caused by political opposition and external players against the government of President Kabila who misused power after being helped to acquire it. In Kenya, the conflict

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[56] Naidoo S, The Role of Track Two Diplomacy in the Democratic Republic of Congo Conflict, (Sowetan publishers, 2000) pp 12 – 36

happened in the period 2007-2008, after ODM party refused to accept the outcomes of the general elections on the premise that they had been rigged out. The employment of track II diplomacy in the enlisted states involved the use of non-state members such as religious leaders, youth leaders, influential business people, local NGOs and members of the international community.

The non-state actors reached out to members of conflicting groups, facilitated dialogues, and helped to forward their proposals on the official peace keeping agreements. The track II diplomacy had great impact on conflict resolution in the countries: helping to restore order amongst adversaries, voicing the demands of victims, addressing the concerns of affected communities and facilitating justice for individuals in the community by bringing perpetrators of the war to book.

The chapter finally presented findings on the challenges that faced track II diplomacy in Africa. They include insufficient resources to carry out peace advocacy missions, inability to make credible contacts in the conflicting areas, fear of changing course and taking sides in the battle, interference from external players and the lack of policy relevance. A majority of these challenges were overcome through the help of international players such as the United Nations, regional bodies like the African Union and the resilience of the track II diplomats. From the analysis therefore, the enlisted countries managed to resolve ugly conflicts with the aid of track II diplomacy.

CHAPTER THREE

CONFLICT PREVENTION AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN KENYA:
ROLE OF TRACK II DIPLOMACY

3.1 Introduction

Kenya, just like many other countries in the world, has had its own fair share of conflicts since independence. Though Kenya has on most occasions overcome the ugly part of prolonged wars and managed to restore peace, important lives and property has always been destroyed in the battles.[57] Identifying the most suitable conflict resolution mechanism has not been easy and third parties have had to employ a number of strategies. This chapter focuses specifically on the findings and analysis of findings on the role of track II diplomacy in conflict prevention and management in Kenya. It starts by assessing the conflict recorded in the country, strategies employed in conflict management, the employment of track II diplomacy and finalizes on benefits of the diplomatic processes in managing the conflicts in Kenya.

3.2 Major Conflicts in the History of Kenya

Findings from a review of literature on the history of Kenya established that most of the major conflicts in the country have occurred during general elections. The ugliest conflicts were witnessed in 2007-2008 and in 2017 just after general elections. The 2007-2008 election violence was brought about by what was claimed as struggle of power between the then president Mwai Kibaki and the former Prime Minister Raila Odinga.[58] The election itself had been characterized by tribalism with Kibaki enjoying the support of his ethnic community in Central Kenya while Raila enjoyed the support

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[57]Mwagiru, M., *Conflicts in Africa: Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management*, (Nairobi: Centre for conflict research, 2006) pp6.

[58] Kioko, M.P, *A Study on the Post-Election Violence: Case Study Kenya, an International Law Perspective,* (SSRN Electronic Journal, 2010) Pp10 – 14

of Luos, Kalenjins from Rift Valley, Luhyas from Western Kenya and Muslims from Coast.

After the release of the results of the elections, Raila and his supporters refused to accept the results on the claims that they had been manipulated in favor of Kibaki. Kibaki and his supporters rubbished the claims, an issue that spark off tribal war between supporters of the two teams. The conflict lasted for more than one month; claiming the lives of 1,333 people, displacing about 650,000 citizens and destroying millions worthy of property.[59]

Findings established that the conflict in 2017 started with pre-election violence during primary elections in April the same year. Other incidences of violence included an attack on the deputy president's home and the assassination of the head of information, communication and technology at the IEBC who served the role in developing new system of voting during election. The first elections of August 8th were nullified by the Supreme Court due to evidence of irregularities. During the one month period after the announcement of President Kenyatta, violence broke out in several parts of the country claiming that the president had rigged himself in.

Violence was also witnessed after the nullification of the results, with the CORD coalition led by Raila Odinga refusing to take part in the second elections. Again, property worth millions was destroyed, hundreds of lives lost and several people displaced from their homes.[60] Other instances of violence after elections experienced included clashes between supporters in some parts of the country in the elections of

[59]Prunier,G.,(2008),Kenya:TheRootsofCrisis,7[th]January2008.http://www.opendemocracy.net.article/kenya_roots_of_crisis Accessed on 15, August,2020
[60]Human Rights Watch (2017). Kenya: Post election Killings, Abuse. Accessed at https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/08/27/Kenya-post-election-killings-abuse Accessed on 5, August, 2020.

1963, attempted coup of 1982, elections of 1992 and in 2013. These instances were however on a small scale with limited impacts on the nation's peace.

Other instances of conflict in the country have been witnessed amongst the pastoralist communities of Turkana, Samburu and Pokot. Cattle rustling, a rampant activity in the communities involves one community raiding the other and stealing their cattle. These activities have often resulted in fights, killings of people, loss of animal life, destruction of property and long standing beef amongst the communities involved.[61] Conflicts have also been witnessed in the North Eastern parts of Kenya between Al-Shabaab sympathizers and the local community. These conflicts have further been recorded in Coastal regions between Muslims and Christians over the attacks directed at non-Muslims by the Al-Shabaab terrorist group.

From the analysis of the findings, the largest conflicts witnessed in Kenya have mainly been tribal in nature. The conflicts tore communities against each other in the struggle for the top leadership position. From the findings; claims by one party of the manipulation of the elections process was the main reason for causing tensions, violence and fear across the country. Since tribal communities in Kenya have been known to occupy specific regions such as Kikuyus in Central Kenya, Luos in Nyanza, Kalenjins in Rift Valley and Luhyas in Western Kenya, the conflicts have always been directed at removing 'visiting tribes' from foreign regions.

For instance, Kalenjins in the 2007 violence killed and destroyed property of non-Kalenjins who were found dwelling in Rift valley towns like Eldoret. Luos targeted non-Luos in Kisumu, Nyanza while Kikuyus targeted non-Kikuyus living in Central

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[61] Kaimba, G.K., Njehia, B.K. & Guliye, A.Y (2011). Effects of cattle rustling and household characteristics on migration decisions and herd size amongst pastoralists in Baringo District, Kenya. Pastoralism 1 (18)

Kenya at the time. The magnitudes of the conflicts were large, even though the wars lasted for very short times of less than six months.

3.3 Conflict Management Strategies in Kenya

The desire to see an end to conflicts in Kenya and reduce ugly effects has seen the employment of different strategies to bring peace. Findings of this study establish that conflict management tools employed have ranged from track I diplomacy to track II diplomacy and even to multi track diplomacy. In most instances, the immediate approach to resolving conflict has been the use of existing formal institutions such as police force to counter individuals identified to be propagating violence.

The respondents who took part in the study agreed to a large extend (mean of 4.333) that the government and concerned parties used a combination of both formal and informal channels to restore peace. They used legal systems, executive orders and police force units such as the Kenya police and the General Service Unit (GSU) to try and restore order amongst conflicting groups. In the process, individuals believed to be propagating the conflicts were arrested and prosecuted in courts of law.

Table 3.3 Conflict Management Strategies in Kenya

RESPONSE	Mean	Std. Deviation
Combination of both formal and informal channels	4.333	0.840
Employment of formal channels such as established legal channels, police and other peace keepers	3.611	1.036
Use of mediation and negotiations with political leaders	3.500	1.382
Use of informal channels such as religious leaders, journalists, influencers etc.	3.333	1.328
Grand mean	**3.694**	**1.147**

Researcher (2020)

Findings from the responses also indicated an agreement to a large extent (mean of 3.611) that concerned parties to conflicts in Kenya employed formal channels such as established legal systems, police and the military though in restrained measures. To a

large extent still, mediators and negotiators were used to try and bring peace between conflicting political leaders. Finally, the responds agreed that informal channels have been widely applied in the country to restore peace in the cases of conflict.

From the study findings, it is evident that there has been an application of various strategies in the times of conflict to manage the conflict and to restore peace. In handling war amongst pastoralist communities in Baringo, Turkana and West Pokot, both official channels and informal channels have been employed to manage tensions and to restore peace. Still in the post-election violence, informal, formal and track III diplomacy strategies were employed to manage conflicts. These findings agree with study findings by Nmaju that both formal and informal channels were employed to manage the post-election conflict in 2007.[62]

The findings also agree with a study by Prunier in Kenya that established formal institutes, informal bodies and the international community members have been instrumental in handling conflicts in Kenya and in restoring peace.[63] Since this study focused on track II diplomacy, the researcher maintained a narrow scope on how track II diplomacy was employed in resolving conflicts in the following sub-sections.

3.4 Track II diplomacy in Conflict Management in Kenya

The researcher sought to discover how track II diplomacy has been employed in managing conflicts and restoring peace in the enlisted conflicts in Kenya. This section presents findings of the analysis of the application of track II diplomacy in conflict

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[62] Nmaju, M. C., *Violence in Kenya: Any Role for the ICC in the Quest for Accountability?* (African Journal of Legal Studies, 2009)
[63] Prunier,G., (2008), Kenya: The Roots of Crisis. 7th January 2008.

resolution in Kenya by assessing parties to conflict management, activities carried out by the diplomats and benefits of the process.

3.4.1 Parties Involved in Track II Diplomacy

From the study findings, the main mediators in track II diplomacy in Kenya have been individuals outside the government. Respondents who participated in this study from Kenya agreed to a large extent that the parties to conflict resolution included top religious leaders (mostly Christian and Muslim leaders), community leaders and retired political leaders. Influential media houses and renowned youth leaders have also been key participants in the mediation processes. For the post-election wars, the parties were sourced from across the country and strategically targeted people in the conflicting towns during times of war according to responses. For the community conflicts revolving around cattle rustling, community elders have helped in managing conflicts. The identified channels are informal and closely linked to track II diplomats as stated by Montville.[64]

3.4.2 Models Adopted in Conflict Management

This section sought to understand the models followed in track II conflict management in Kenya. The study findings indicated that the common models included pre-negotiations, consultations and joint brainstorming. Others included the creation of a free environment that allowed for the exploration of ideas for resolution, provision of a low-key, non-judgmental and non-coercive environment and the creation of an environment where participants feel free to share fears, perceptions and demands. Respondents who took part in the study agreed to a large extend that the enlisted

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[64] Montville, J, "*The Arrow and the Olive Branch: A Case for Track Two Diplomacy*," Ed., Vamik D. Volkan et al., The Psychodynamics of International Relationships, (London: Lexington Books, 1990)

activities were the common ones carried out in the instances of ugly conflicts. The mean of the responses was 3.930 with a standard deviation of 1.710.

Table 3.4.2 Models Adopted in Conflict Management

RESPONSE	Mean	Std. Deviation
Pre-negotiation, consultation and facilitated joint brainstorming	4.444	1.652
Creation of a free environment that allows for exploration of ideas for resolution	4.000	1.748
Provision of low-key, non-judgmental, non-coercive environment	3.778	1.778
Creation of a process that allows for free sharing of fears, perceptions and demands	3.500	1.664
Grand mean	**3.930**	**1.710**

Pre-negotiation, consultation and facilitated joint brainstorming is often carried out amongst the non-official leaders who intend to go out and resolve conflict. At this stage, they formulate strategies aimed at educating the conflicting masses on the right track to peaceful resolution. International community participants may join in at this stage to enlighten the peace keepers on the best strategies to adopt by comparing with the activities followed in other countries. Once the leaders have designed workable models, they first work on creating a free environment to enable the exploration of ideas for resolution.

Here, the top leaders' network reach more people on the ground that may be beneficial in resolving conflicts. Such people include more religious leaders, youth leaders and influencers who had initially chosen to stay silent. The Diplomats then reach out to members of conflicting times at suitable times and then provide safe, low-key and non-judgmental environment. This can be through carrying out meetings in the homes of the affected communities and initiating structured workshops where they can air their grievances.

The members are encouraged to speak without fear and are assured of the safety of their sentiments. Educational and empowerment programs can also be carried out to the neglected section of the community like women and youths. The aim is always to provide room where participants feel free to share their fears, expectations, perceptions and demands. With information on these attributes collected, track II diplomats can go ahead and feed the communication to formal channels and aid in conflict resolution.[65]

Findings from a review of secondary sources also established that peace keepers carried out educational programs, seminars and peace enlightenment initiatives. As identified in the conflicts between Muslims and Christians in North Eastern Kenya and in the Coastal region after Al-Shabaab attacks in 2015; religious leaders and top political leaders conducted workshops to address the conflicts between Christians and Muslims that was building up. In the post-election violence periods, media houses ran peace campaigns directed in Kenyan slums and in the regions that witnessed high tension build up. The campaigns aimed at calming the situation of violence and allowing people to speak out their concerns.

The study findings agree with findings by Nmaju in Kenya on the 2007 post-election violence.[66] In his study, the researcher had pointed at how religious leaders and respected tribal leaders had helped to convince communities through local based workshops and campaigns on the need to stop violence. Although the study pointed at how some media houses manipulated individuals and incited them into engaging in conflict, other media houses with national reach were instrumental in reaching out to

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[65] Chigas, D (2003). "Track II (Citizen) Diplomacy." *Beyond Intractability*. Eds. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess. Conflict Information Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder. Posted: August 2003 <http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/track2-diplomacy>. Accessed on September. 3. 2020

[66] Nmaju, M. C., *Violence in Kenya: Any role for the ICC in the Quest for Accountability*? (African Journal of legal studies, 2009)

Kenyans on the need to restore peace. The use of track II diplomacy did not work on its own, but was carried out to complement the official processes of conflict resolution.

The study findings also agree with findings by Wasike, Okoth and Were of how meditated workshops and seminars between Kenya and Somali helped to reduce tensions and restore peace in the border region between Kenya and Somali.[67] The models approached as identified in the study findings are similar to those presented by Libberfeld in his study of the employment of track II diplomacy in South Africa.[68] In his study he noted that pre-negotiations, consultations and joint brainstorming amongst mediators were employed in the initial stages before reaching out to the Africans, Asians and other conflicting parties. The same was also applied in DRC during the protracted conflicts in 1998 when war erupted during president Kabila's ruler ship regime.[69]

3.4.3 The Role of Track II Diplomacy in Conflict Management

This section sought to understand the roles played by track II diplomats in resolving conflicts in Kenya. From the study findings; the roles of diplomats included the facilitation of confidence building among private citizens in influential sectors, facilitation of interactive problem solving approaches by unofficial mediators and direct mediation. The respondents agreed to large extent as seen in the table 3.4.3 on the different roles played by track II mediators.

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[67]Wasike S., Okoth P, G and Were, E, *Processes of Track Three Diplomacy In The Management of Cross-Border Security Relations Between Kenya And Somalia,* The International Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities Invention, Volume 3, issue 7 (2016), pp2377 - 2388
[68] Lieberfeld, D, *Getting to the Negotiating Table in South Africa: Domestic and International Dynamics,* Politikon: South African Journal of Political Studies Volume 27, Issue 1 (2000), pp19 – 36
[69] Naidoo S, *The Role of Track Two Diplomacy in the Democratic Republic of Congo Conflict*, (Sowetan publishers, 2000) pp 12 – 36

Table 3.4.3: The Role of Track II Diplomacy in Conflict Management

RESPONSE	Mean	Std. Deviation
Facilitation confidence-building among private citizens in influential sectors	4.544	0.987
Facilitation of interactive problem-solving approaches by unofficial mediators	4.211	1.748
Direct mediation	3.888	0.884
Grand mean	**4.214**	**1.206**

Researcher (2020)

In conflict resolution, it is always important to instill confidence amongst third party mediators that they are on the right track in conflict management. By carrying out pre-negotiations, joint brainstorming and consultations, private citizens aiding in peace keeping improve their confidence and are able to develop more resilient strategies. The other significant role as established from the study was the facilitation of an environment for joint problem solving amongst third party actors. Unity of voice reduces chances that some mediators may slip back and join sides in the conflicts. Finally, by feeding information directly to the official channels and with the aid of international players, track II diplomats have been able to solve conflicts through direct mediation.[70]

3.4.4 Contributions of Track 2 Diplomacy in Conflict Resolution

This section presents the findings of the analysis on the contributions of track 2 diplomacy in conflict resolution and management. Findings established several contributions of the process such as opening and improving channels of communication, changing attitudes of conflicting parties about the "other", restoring relationships by building trust, offering new opportunities for negotiation, changing the

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[70] Chigas, D (2003). "Track II (Citizen) Diplomacy." *Beyond Intractability*. Eds. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess, (Conflict Information Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder, 2003) Posted: August 2003 <http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/track2-diplomacy>. Accessed on 10 August, 2020

dynamic of conflict by strengthening voices of moderation and building stable infrastructure of peace. Respondents who took part in the study agreed to a large extent that informal mediators played the roles enlisted.

Table 3.4.4 Contributions of Track II Diplomacy in Conflict Resolution

RESPONSE	Mean	Std. Deviation
Opening and improving channels of communication	4.291	1.160
Changing attitudes and perceptions of conflicting parties about the "Other"	4.167	1.007
Restoring relationships by building trust	4.167	1.007
Offering new options for negotiation	3.791	1.318
Changing the dynamic of conflict by strengthening voices of moderation	3.875	1.190
Building a stable infrastructure of peace by strengthening social networks	3.500	0.877
Grand mean	**3.965**	**1.093**

Researcher (2020)

By reaching out to conflicting parties through informal channels, the confidence instilled in the people allows them to address their issues thereby improving communication levels. The workshops and seminars guided by influential people also help to change the mindset of those involved in the conflicts against their 'enemies'. Adjustments in perceptions and attitudes enabled the re-establishment of unity in the communities and creating a road for peace building. In addition, warring groups get an understanding of their adversaries' rationale, decision making ways and behavior culture.[71]

Participants in most cases noted that workshops helped to clarify misunderstandings about the other side, and helped in understanding that the other community, just like them, had suffered in the conflict. "The development of an empathetic understanding

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[71] Chigas, D, "Track II (Citizen) Diplomacy." *Beyond Intractability*. Eds. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess, (Conflict Information Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder, 2003) Posted: August 2003 <http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/track2-diplomacy>.

of the experiences, perspectives, and needs of the other side forms an initial basis for trust. In unofficial intermediation; participants exchange personal stories about their experiences with the conflict."[72] The problems are now analysed in a structured way focusing on arguments and positions so as to understand the priorities, values, fears, interests, needs, constraints and concerns.

Participants start to realize how use of bad language also contributes to mistrust between both parties, like use of threats and offensive and disrespectful words against the other. De-escalatory language is promoted and this helps in creating an environment in which they can communicate and solve problems more effectively. Once the understanding is established, a strong infrastructure of peace that is likely to last for long is also created. The findings are in line with findings by Libberfeld on the contributions of track II diplomacy in conflict resolution in South Africa.[73] This author identified improved communications amongst conflicting parties and the establishment of a strong peace infrastructure as the greatest contributions of track II diplomacy towards the establishment of peace in a conflicting nation.

3.5 Summary of the Chapter

This chapter has discussed the findings of the study on track II diplomacy and its application in resolving conflicts in Kenya. It has started by enlisting the common wars experienced in the country which included 2007-2008 post-election violence, 2017 violence, conflicts amongst the pastoralist communities in Baringo and Turkana and conflicts in the border between Kenya and Somali. Despite the application of other strategies in resolving the conflicts as identified in this study, the chapter focused on

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[72] Meyer, K, Dalia D, *Track Two Diplomacy and Regional Security in the Middle East*, International Negotiation: A Journal of Theory and Practice,6,*1*,(2001): pp 49 – 77
[73] Lieberfeld, D, *Evaluating the Contributions of Track-Two Diplomacy to Conflict Termination in South Africa*, Journal of Peace Research, Volume 39, Issue 3 (2002)*: pp. 355-372.

the utilization of track II diplomacy. This has involved the following of informal channels with common mediators including religious leaders, political leaders, and respected elders in societies, media houses, youth leaders and influencers such as musicians.

Pre-negotiations, consultations, joint brainstorming, and the provision of a free environment for exploration of ideas, expression of fears and understanding of perceptions are the common models adopted in track II diplomacy according to the study. Finally, the study established that track II diplomacy helped in opening and improving channels of communication, changing attitudes of conflicting parties about the "other", restoring relationships by building trust, offering new opportunities for negotiation, changing the dynamic of conflict by strengthening voices of moderation and building stable infrastructure of peace.

CHAPTER FOUR

CHALLENGES AND FUTURE PROSPECTS OF TRACK II DIPLOMACY

4.1 Introduction

This chapter presents findings and analysis of findings on the challenges hindering the successful utilization of Track II diplomacy in Kenya. Findings from the responses of civil societies, media, private citizens and non-governmental institutions that formed the target population have been compiled and compared with secondary sources of data in line with study objective three in order to present comprehensive findings. The chapter also presents findings and analysis of the findings on the future prospects of track II diplomacy in the country.

4.2 Challenges facing Track II Diplomacy in Kenya

The processes of the application of track II diplomacy in resolving conflicts in the country have not been 'a walk in the park' as such. Findings of this study established that the application of track II diplomacy has faced many challenges; right from the moment of finding track II mediators to the process of closing peace agreements. This section discusses the challenges along the implementation process of track II diplomacy.

4.2.1 Challenges in Finding Mediators

At the inception stage, two main challenges were identified from the study findings. The first challenge as supported by an agreement to a large extent (mean=4.200) is the introduction of 'wrong' types of diplomats. These are diplomats who from the onset, identify with specific communities amongst the conflicting parties; but due to their large influence, get involved in the mediation process. Since in the unofficial mediation

processes diplomats arise by themselves[74], it is sometimes very hard to dismiss some diplomats on the basis that they are with a certain group. 'Wrong' diplomats in the process of mediation are likely to incite parties more and to create a wide divide amongst the conflicting groups. As supported by findings by Kaye in the Middle East and South Asia, 'when the people with wrong motives are brought on board to aid in unofficial conflict resolution, the intensity of the conflict is likely to increase rather than come to an end.'[75]

Table 4.2.1 Challenges in Finding Mediators

RESPONSE	Mean	Std Dev
'Wrong' types of diplomats	4.200	0.859
Incapacitated right type of diplomats	4.166	0.578

Researcher (2020)

Findings also established that the inception of incapacitated right type of diplomats is another great challenge affecting the success of track II diplomacy. This case involves either having diplomats with limited influence on the official policy or those with little legitimacy in their domestic environment. Since track II diplomacy greatly relies on trust and confidentiality[76], mediators with little impact amongst the conflicting groups will have limited outreach. In managing the bilateral security relations between Kenya and Somalia, finding security agents to work with the community posed a challenge due to the little impact they had in the community.

Top religious leaders, who were deemed the best, changed and took preferable sides in the conflicts rendering them unreliable in conflict resolution. The right type of

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[74] Montville, J, "*The Arrow and the Olive Branch: A Case for Track Two Diplomacy,*" Ed., Vamik D. Volkan et al., The Psychodynamics of International Relationships, (London: Lexington Books, 1990)
[75] Kaye, D.D, *Rethinking track II Diplomacy: The Middle East and South Asia*, The Hague, Netherlands Institute of International relations publications, Clingendael Diplomacy papers no. 3, (2005), pp 24 – 27
[76] Mitchell, C, *Track Two Triumphant? Reflections on the Oslo Process and Conflict Resolution in the Middle East*. ICAR Newsletter 5(6) (1993)

diplomats may also change their course with time as the conflict continues, and fuel the war rather helping in its resolution. The findings are in line with presentations by Mapendere who identified the lack of influence on official policies as the greatest challenge affecting track II diplomats.[77] In his study he had identified how participants with limited ability to influence foreign policy and political power weakened the success of track II diplomacy.

4.2.2 Challenge of Selling New Ideas and Policies

In this phase of changing the minds of conflicting groups and in recruiting more unofficial mediators in the mediation process, the challenge as identified by the study findings is that of selling new ideas and policies. Conflicting parties usually are so strongly pegged on their ideologies with the view that their propositions are the only right way of resolving conflicts. As witnessed in the 2008 post-election violence in Kenya, top religious leaders and influencers found it hard to convince sympathizers of Raila Odinga who were mainly Kalenjins from Rift Valley, Luos from Nyanza and Luhyas from Western Kenya to change their minds and accept the announced outcomes of the elections.[78]

Similarly, it was difficult to convince Kikuyus in Central Kenya to adopt peace and stop attacking and retaliating violence on other communities in their region.[79] Even amongst the conflicting communities in the Kenya-Somali border, selling ideas of change and the need to accommodate other parties was one of the greatest challenges in resolving the border conflict. These findings are in line with findings in the DRC whereby

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[77]Mapendere, J, *Track One and a Half Diplomacy and the Complementarity of Tracks*, Culture of Peace Online Journal, Volume 2, Issue 1 (2000), pp 66 – 81

[78] Nmaju, M. C., *Violence in Kenya: Any role for the ICC in the quest for accountability?* (African Journal of legal studies, 2009)

[79] Ibid.

convincing local rebel groups and communities to calm down and present their grievances using the existing channels.[80]

4.2.3 Challenges in the General Conflict Resolution Environment

Possible challenges, according to the study findings, present themselves in the continuing peace resolution processes. Respondents who took part in this study agreed that conflicting parties are likely to lose trust in the mediators (mean=4.500), a change in the domestic capabilities for peace resolution (mean = 4.200) and changing position of mediators (3.500).

Table 4.2.3 Challenges in the General Conflict Resolution Environment

RESPONSE	Mean	Std Dev
Loss of the trust by the conflicting parties	4.500	1.879
Changing domestic capabilities for peace resolution	4.200	1.264
Changing position of mediators	3.500	0.891

Researcher (2020)

The worst happening in the event of track II diplomatic peace resolutions is when conflicting parties that had started the peace journey lose trust in the mediators. This can be brought about by mistreatments or 'perceived mistreatments' by mediators, feeling that the mediators are working for opposite parties and the knowledge that mediators are in the situation for their own interest. Betrayal of conflicting group's secrets and poor communication between the groups increases chances of mistrust amongst the conflicting parties in the mediation process. Another possible cause of mistrust could be in the spread of propaganda amongst the communities about the role of the mediators by persons who are dissatisfied by the mediation processes.

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[80] Naidoo S, *The Role of Track Two Diplomacy in the Democratic Republic of Congo Conflict*, (Sowetan publishers, 2000), pp 12 – 36

The loss of trust is likely to renew fights on a higher level and endangers the lives of the diplomats. In Kenya, this was evident amongst the conflicting pastoralist communities in Kenya, when the Pokot lost trust in their political leaders and decided to revenge for their animals against the Turkana.[81] The Turkana also attacked police officers in 2014 in what was identified as a revenge mission for the mistrust in the government that was solving their regional conflicts. These findings are in line with findings in Mozambique, when the civilians lost trust in church in resolving the 2009 conflicts.[82] The church had been instrumental in resolving the 1991-1992 conflict but was so much involved with government affairs that top religious leaders were not trusted fully to resolve the conflict in 2010.[83]

The changing position of mediators is another key challenge in the mediation process. Since the track II diplomats are sometimes members of the local communities, pulling them downwards into the conflict is a situation that happens more than often according to the study findings. Reasons for 'falling back' include changing consequences of the war such as increased death of members of their community, bribery by conflicting parties, change in the direction of the war and personal reasons. As identified in the previous sections, track II diplomats are usually individuals with large influence and when they go back to join sides in the battle, the intensity of the battle is likely to renew.[84]

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[81]Kaimba et al, *Effects of Cattle Rustling and Household Characteristics on Migration Decisions and Herd Size amongst Pastoralists in Baringo District, Kenya*, Pastorallism Volume 1, Issue 18 (2011)
[82]Wenche H, *Madagascar between Peace and Conflict—Domestic Capabilities for Peaceful Conflict Management,* Conflict, Security & Development, Volume 11, Issue 5 (2011), pp509 – 531
[83] Ibid.
[84] Wallace, W & Josselin D, *Non-State Actors in World Politics*, (New York press: Palgrave, 2012)

Identifying new mediators becomes a challenge in this case due to the fear that they might fall to the same trap. Despite the employment of large amounts of resources to train diplomats, some could have joined the process for their own gain. They may be influencing war to a direction that will enhance their gains politically and economically. Changing domestic capabilities for peace resolution similarly affects the track II diplomacy processes in conflict management. Low numbers of mediators who are willing to undertake the bottom-up negotiation processes limit the success of the peace process. At other times, track II diplomats may be dismissed in the peace resolution processes.

Their efforts to undertake unofficial mediation processes by meeting leaders of conflicting groups can be reduced to zero if the political environment in the country is unfavorable. In other cases; once track II diplomacy processes have begun, new conflicts may arise involving even bigger groups, or the conflicts may renew in greater levels, thwarting any ongoing peace processes. As seen in the post-election conflict in Kenya in 2017, unofficial peace keeping processes that had begun in August the same year were thwarted by renewed conflicts in October the same year.[85]

The peace keeping environment changed for the worst, calling for renewed peace keeping strategies. The findings are similar to findings in DRC that identified how processes that had been initiated by religious leaders were thwarted by renewed fronts in the battle against Kabila's government in 1998.[86] Every other strategy that had taken course by media personalities and political leaders were affected by the changing

[85] Response from questionnaire, 27th September 2020
[86] Naidoo S, *The Role of Track Two Diplomacy in the Democratic Republic of Congo Conflict,* (Sowetan publishers, 2000) pp 12 – 36

environment which hindered the successful completion of peace resolution processes at the time.

4.2.4 Challenges in the Post Conflict Resolution phase

Conflict management processes sometimes employ numerous diplomatic processes ranging from track I diplomacy, to track II diplomacy, to track III diplomacy and even to the combination of the different conflict resolution mechanisms. According to the study findings, the challenge to track II diplomacy at this final level is the successful integration of the efforts from all the participants in the conflict resolution. In as much as track II diplomats may have collected grievances of the conflicting groups, the acceptance of the terms by officials is what determines the success of the peace keeping process. The terms by unofficial peace keepers may be way higher than expectations by formal participants; and as such be refused on presentation at the negotiation table.

Leaders may also refuse to take part in the negotiation process with unofficial diplomats either due to personal issues or the fear of losing weight in the battle. All these challenges present problems to the entire track II diplomacy process. This was the case as identified in the 2007-2008 post-election violence when leaders at first refused to accept the propositions by track II diplomats in the country.[87] The former Prime Minister Raila Odinga and his top political sympathizers refused the aid of the US ambassador to Kenya at the time on the claims that the American Embassy was behind the then president Kibaki's 'rigging'. It had to take the efforts of official peace keepers such as representatives from the African Union and top religious leaders to resolve the conflict fully.[88]

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[87]Prunier, G., (2008). Kenya: The Roots of Crisis. 7th January 2008.
[88] Ibid

4.3 Future Prospects of Track II Diplomacy

Though track II diplomacy is not a new thing in the field of conflict resolution, its continued application is set to advance and transform for the better according to study findings. Based on primary data collected from civil society groups and private citizens, there was an agreement to a large extent that the benefits gained from the application of track II diplomacy thus far will increase trust and confidence in track II mediation processes (mean=4.333). This is expected to come from the conflicting parties, government bodies and the international community. Increased confidence in unofficial diplomats such as religious leaders, youth leaders and even community leaders will improve the communication process and speed up the conflict resolution process.

Table 4.3 Future Prospects of Track II Diplomacy

RESPONSE	Mean	Std Dev
Increased trust and confidence in unofficial mediation processes	4.333	0.916
Improved investment in track II diplomacy	3.722	1.564
Increase in the number of track II mediators	3.611	1.767
Combination of track II diplomacy with other diplomatic processes	3.500	1.555

Researcher (2020)

Findings also identified that there will be improved investment in the track II diplomacy processes. Respondents agreed with this to a large extent (mean=3.722). Once the international community, regional bodies and governments have approved of the increasing importance of track II diplomacy, they will channel more efforts, funds and strategies into supporting track II diplomacy. The future will witness more trainings for track II diplomats, introduction of track II diplomacy in institutions of international relations and diplomacy to equip students with the right knowledge and increased exposure of influential personalities in improved strategies.

Further still, more diplomats are likely to join unofficial mediation processes in the times of conflict in the country and world at large. These will include the many number of students focusing their studies on track II diplomacy, more religious leaders from the diverse denominations, social media influencers and retired political leaders. With the advancement in technology and globalization of processes, more members of the international community and regional bodies will also join in the conflict resolution processes in a country. The increased participation of variety of peace keepers will help improve communication amongst conflicting groups, voice their concerns appropriately and help in prosecuting those found on the wrong side, propagating violence.

Finally, the study found that there will be increased integration of peace keeping activities including track I, track II, track III and any other diplomatic processes. The combination of the processes will be with the objective of trying to reduce the intensity of conflicts and the likelihood of violent scenes. The understanding of how to evaluate the performance of track II diplomacy will help governments; the international community, NGOs, private citizens and civil society groups to measure and come up with more effective strategies of integrating the diplomatic activities. Over-reliance on tack I diplomacy as has been happening around the world is set to change with the realization of sustainable practices under track II diplomacy and in other mediation processes.

4.4 Summary of the Chapter

This chapter has presented findings and analysis of findings on the challenges and future prospects of track II diplomacy. According the study findings, challenges in track II diplomacy were notable from the inception stage, to the process of conflict resolution and to the post conflict resolution stage. Some of the discussed challenges included the introduction of 'wrong' diplomats, introduction of right diplomats but with limited

influence on policy formulation, changing of sides by diplomats, changing of the peace keeping environment and the dismissal of the efforts of track II diplomats in the official negotiation processes. On the future prospects, the chapter has presented a discussion on factors such as increased application of track II diplomacy, improved investments in tack II diplomatic activities and increased integration of track I, track II, track III and other diplomatic functions.

CHAPTER FIVE

DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

5.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the analysis and interpretation of data collected on the role of track II diplomacy in conflict prevention and management in Kenya. The researcher collected data using closed end questionnaires administered to members of civil societies, private citizens, NGOs and the media. The data was then subjected to SPSS for analysis.

5.2 Response Rate

The researcher targeted and issued questionnaires to 100 individuals in the media, civil societies, NGOs and private citizens in Kenya. Out of this, only 41 responded which represented 48.6% response rate. This was encouraging given that the study was carried out at a busy time of the year.

Table 5.2 Response Rate

	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE
Responded	41	48.6
Did not respond	59	51.4
Total expected to respond	100	100.0

Researcher (2020)

5.3 General Information of Respondents

This section sought to discover the personal characteristics of individuals who took part in the study in terms of gender, education level and period of residence in Kenya. This was important to ascertain whether the respondents were fit to be used in this study and whether or not their responses would be reliable in meeting the objectives of this study.

5.3.1 Gender of the Respondents

Table 5.3.1 Gender of the Respondents

RESPONSE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT
Male	28	63.6
Female	16	36.4
Total	44	100.0

Researcher (2020)

63.6% of those who took part in this study were men while 36.4% were women. This showed that a majority of non-state actors in Kenya, working in civil societies, media and private citizens were men. This section is therefore male dominated.

5.3.2 Education Level of Respondents

Table 5.3.2 Education Level of Respondents

RESPONSE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT
Diploma level	8	18.18
Degree level	22	50.00
Master's Degree	10	22.73
PhD level	4	9.09
Total	44	100.00

Researcher (2020)

From the study findings, 50% of the respondents hold an undergraduate degree certificate, 22.73% had master's degree certificate, and 18.18% had diplomas while 9.09% had PhDs as their highest education levels. A majority of the respondents were highly educated and could therefore be relied upon to provide reliable feedback based on academic exposure and their understanding of life around track II diplomacy in Kenya.

5.3.3 Duration of Residence in Kenya

Table 5.3.3 Duration of Residence in Kenya

RESPONSE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT
11 - 15 years	4	9.09
16 – 20 years	8	18.18
Over 21 years	32	72.73
Total	44	100.00

Researcher (2020)

72.73% of the respondents have resided in Kenya for more than 21 years. 18.18% have been in the country for 16 to 20 years while 9.09% have resided in Kenya for between 11 to 15 years. Since a majority the respondents have been in the country for that long, their accumulated experience over time on conflicts in Kenya will be instrumental in presenting reliable findings.

5.3.4 Membership Categorization of Respondents

This section sought to understand the exact category where the non-state actors who responded are from. Findings revealed that 31.82% of the respondents were members of the media, 27.27% were members of civil society groups and 22.73% were private citizens while 18.18% were members on nongovernmental organizations.

Table 5.3.4 Membership Categorization of Respondents

RESPONSE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT
Media	14	31.82
Civil Societies	12	27.27
Private Citizens	10	22.73
Nongovernmental Organizations	8	18.18
Total	**44**	**100.00**

Researcher (2020)

5.4 Descriptive Statistics

This section sought to analyze responses using mean and standard deviation in line with the study objectives. The respondents were asked to comment on the extent of their agreement to which conflict was experienced in Kenya, how the conflict was managed, the application of track II diplomacy in conflict management and future prospects of track II diplomacy. This was the interpretation of means on the Likert scale; $0 \leq$ no extent ≤ 1.4, $1.5 \leq$ small extent ≤ 2.4, $2.5 \leq$ Moderate extent ≤ 3.4 and $3.5 \leq$ large extent ≤ 5.0.

5.4.1 Findings on Conflict Management Strategies in Kenya

This section sought to understand the conflict prevention and management strategies that have been adopted in Kenya during the times of conflict.

Table 5.4.1 Findings on Conflict Management Strategies in Kenya

RESPONSE	Mean	Std. Deviation
Combination of both formal and informal channels	4.333	0.840
Employment of formal channels such as established legal channels, police and other peace keepers	3.611	1.036
Use of mediation and negotiations with political leaders	3.500	1.382
Use of informal channels such as religious leaders, journalists, influencers etc.	3.333	1.328
Grand mean	**3.694**	**1.147**

Researcher (2020)

The respondents who took part in the study agreed to a large extent that a combination of formal and informal channels were employed (mean = 4.333), formal channels were employed such as established legal systems, police and the military (mean = 3.611) and mediators and negotiators were used (mean = 3.500). The respondents also agreed to a moderate extent that informal channels have been widely applied in the country to restore peace in the cases of conflict (mean = 3.333).

5.4.2 Findings on Track II diplomacy in Conflict Management in Kenya

The researcher sought to discover how track II diplomacy has been employed in managing conflicts and restoring peace in the enlisted conflicts in Kenya. A majority of the respondents agreed that parties to track II conflict management include religious leaders, community leaders, influential media personalities and youth leaders. The models used included pre-negotiations, consultation and facilitated joint brainstorming is often carried out amongst the non-official leaders who intend to go out and resolve conflict (mean = 4.444).

Table 5.4.2 Findings on Track II diplomacy in Conflict Management in Kenya

RESPONSE	Mean	Std. Deviation
Pre-negotiation, consultation and facilitated joint brainstorming	4.444	1.652
Creation of a free environment that allows for exploration of ideas for resolution	4.000	1.748
Provision of low-key, non-judgmental, non-coercive environment	3.778	1.778
Creation of a process that allows for free sharing of fears, perceptions and demands	3.500	1.664
Grand mean	**3.930**	**1.710**

Researcher (2020)

The diplomats then create a free environment to enable expression of ideas by conflicting parties (mean = 4.000), provision of a low-key, non-coercive and non-judgmental environment (mean = 3.778) and creation of a process that allows the exchange of perceptions (mean = 3.500).

5.4.3 Findings on the Role of Track II Diplomacy in Conflict Management

Table 5.4.3: Findings on the Role of Track II Diplomacy in Conflict Management

RESPONSE	Mean	Std. Deviation
Facilitation confidence-building among private citizens in influential sectors	4.544	0.987
Facilitation of interactive problem-solving approaches by unofficial mediators	4.211	1.748
Direct mediation	3.888	0.884
Grand mean	**4.214**	**1.206**

This section sought to understand the roles played by track II diplomats in resolving conflicts in Kenya. From the study findings; the roles of diplomats included the facilitation of confidence building among private citizens in influential sectors (mean = 4.544), facilitation of interactive problem solving approaches by unofficial mediators (mean = 4.211) and direct mediation (3.888). The respondents agreed to large extent as shown in the mean of the responses.

5.4.4 Findings on the Challenges of Implementing Track II Diplomacy

Challenges in implementing track II Diplomacy started from the initial stage of finding mediators, to the selling of new ideas and policies, to the general conflict resolution and even in the post conflict resolution period. This section assessed the responses of participants of the study with regards to challenges facing track II diplomacy.

Table 5.4.4 Findings on the Challenges of Implementing Track II Diplomacy

RESPONSE	Mean	Std Dev
Challenges in Finding mediators		
'Wrong' types of diplomats	4.200	0.859
Incapacitated right type of diplomats	4.166	0.578
Challenge of Selling New Ideas and Policies		
Lack of confidentiality on the diplomats	4.166	0.684
Challenges in General Conflict Resolution environment		
Loss of the trust by the conflicting parties	4.500	1.879
Changing domestic capabilities for peace resolution	4.200	1.264
Changing position of mediators	3.500	0.891
Challenges in the Post Conflict Resolution period		
Disintegration of the efforts from all the participants	4.444	1.025
Refusal of terms of legitimacy of track II diplomats	4.200	0.984
Refusal by formal leaders to take part in negotiation	4.166	0.897

Researcher (2020)

On the challenges in finding mediators; respondents agreed to a large extent that finding 'wrong' type of mediators (mean = 4.200) and incapacitated right type of diplomats (mean = 4.166) were the main challenges. On the challenge of selling new ideas; respondents agreed to a large extent that the lack of confidentiality on diplomats (mean = 4.166) was the main challenge. In the general conflict resolution environment; challenges as identified by respondents included loss of trust in mediating parties, changing domestic capabilities for peace resolution and changing position of mediators. In the post conflict resolution period; main challenges as identified by the respondents included disintegration of the efforts by participants, refusal of legitimacy of track II diplomats and refusal by formal leaders to take part in negotiation.

5.4.5 Findings on Future Prospects of Track II Diplomacy

This section sought to find out the future prospects of track II diplomacy by assessing primary data collected from civil society groups, media, NGOs and private citizens.

Table 5.4.5 Findings on Future Prospects of Track II Diplomacy

RESPONSE	Mean	Std Dev
Increased trust and confidence in unofficial mediation processes	4.333	0.916
Improved investment in track II diplomacy	3.722	1.564
Increase in the number of track II mediators	3.611	1.767
Combination of track II diplomacy with other diplomatic processes	3.500	1.555

Researcher (2020)

Findings as identified from responses established that trust and confidence in the unofficial mediation processes is likely to increase, there is going to be an increased investment in track II diplomacy processes, an increase in the number of track II mediators and increased combination of track II diplomacy with other diplomatic processes.

5.5 Discussion of Findings

The first objective of the study was to examine how track II diplomacy has led to conflict prevention and management in Africa. Findings established that track II diplomacy has notably been applied in conflict management in South Africa, Madagascar, Democratic republic of Congo and Kenya. The employment of track II diplomacy in the enlisted states involved the use of non-state members such as religious leaders, youth leaders, influential business people, local NGOs and members of the international community. Application of track II diplomacy helped to restore order amongst adversaries, helped to voice the demands of victims, addressed the concerns

of affected communities and facilitating justice for individuals in the community by bringing perpetrators of the war to book.

The second objective of the study was to analyze how track II diplomacy has helped in preventing and managing conflict in Kenya. From the study findings, notable conflicts in the country necessitating the application of track II diplomacy included the 2007-2008 post-election violence, 2017 violence, conflicts amongst the pastoralist communities in Baringo and Turkana and conflicts at the border between Kenya and Somali. Diplomats in the management of the enlisted conflicts included religious leaders, political leaders, and respected elders in societies, media houses, youth leaders and influencers such as musicians. The employment of track II diplomacy helped in opening and improving channels of communication, changing attitudes of conflicting parties about the "other", restoring relationships by building trust, offering new opportunities for negotiation, changing the dynamic of conflict by strengthening voices of moderation and building stable infrastructure of peace.

The third objective was to assess the key challenges and future prospects of track II diplomacy in building peace and security in Africa. Notable challenges from the study findings included the introduction of 'wrong' diplomats, introduction of right diplomats but with limited influence on policy formulation, changing of sides by diplomats, changing of the peace keeping environment and the dismissal of the efforts of track II diplomats in the official negotiation processes. On the future prospects, findings established that there shall be an increase in the application of track II diplomacy, improved investments in track II diplomatic activities and increased integration of track I, track II, track III and other diplomatic functions.

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 Introduction

This chapter focuses on the conclusions and recommendations of the study. It gives a summary of the research work by showing the findings in association with the objectives, hypotheses and the theoretical frameworks that was used in the study. The chapter also presents recommendations and suggestions for further studies.

6.2 Conclusion

The study has evaluated the contribution of track two diplomacy in the prevention and management of conflict in Africa with a specific focus on Kenya. This study was based on three hypotheses. First hypothesis was to test that track two diplomacy has played significant roles in the prevention and management of conflict in Africa. From the study findings, notable states in the region where track two diplomacy has been applied in conflict management include South Africa, Madagascar and DRC. This involved the use of non-state members such as religious leaders, youth leaders, influential business people, local NGOs and members of the international community to reach out to members of conflicting groups, facilitating dialogues, and helping forward their proposals on the official peace keeping agreements.

The objective that aligns with this hypothesis was to examine how track two diplomacy has led to conflict prevention and management in Africa. In regard to the mentioned objective and hypothesis, the study has shown that track two diplomacy has played significant roles in the prevention and management of conflict in Africa. This is seen through track two actors helping restore order amongst adversaries, voicing the demands of victims, addressing the concerns of affected communities and facilitating justice for individuals in the community by bringing perpetrators of the war to book.

The second hypothesis was that track two diplomacy actors have played a role in preventing and managing conflicts in Kenya. Kenya experienced conflicts such as the 2007-2008 post-election violence, 2017 violence, conflicts amongst the pastoralist communities in Baringo and Turkana and conflicts in the border between Kenya and Somali. Track two diplomacy was involved through informal channels with common mediators including religious leaders, political leaders, and respected elders in societies, media houses, youth leaders and influencers such as musicians.

The objective in line with this hypothesis was to analyse how track two diplomacy has helped in preventing and managing conflicts in Kenya. Track two diplomats have tried to manage and prevent conflicts in Kenya through enabling pre-negotiations, consultations, joint brainstorming, and the provision of a free environment for exploration of ideas, expression of fears and understanding of perceptions so as to try de-escalate conflict situations. Track II diplomacy helped in opening and improving channels of communication, changing attitudes of conflicting parties about the "other", restoring relationships by building trust, offering new opportunities for negotiation, changing the dynamic of conflict by strengthening voices of moderation and building stable infrastructure of peace.

The third hypothesis was that collaboration between governments and non-state actors will enhance the role of track two diplomacy in promoting peace and security. It is evident that even though track two diplomacy has played roles in conflict management and prevention, it faced many challenges. These included lack of enough resources to influence the process, the processes taking too long, limited influence to policy formulations and the dismissal of the efforts of track two diplomats in the official negotiation processes. On the future prospects, the chapter has presented a discussion on factors such as increased application of track II diplomacy, improved investments in

tack II diplomatic activities and increased integration of track I, track II, track III and other diplomatic functions.

The objective that is in line with this hypothesis was to assess the key challenges and future prospects of track two diplomacy in building peace and security in Africa with a focus in Kenya. Track II diplomacy works well when integrated with other peace keeping and security management process such as track I diplomacy. The application of track II diplomacy is however faced with many challenges right from the onset to the post conflict resolution stage that need to be contained in order to achieve maximum success from the process.

Throughout this entire research, it has been evident that track two diplomacy has been very instrumental in major conflicts in Africa. It has played major roles of conflict management and conflict prevention hence assisted in creating peace. Even though most of this efforts have not been recognized officially by some governments, it still remains that non-governmental actors and international organizations play key roles in shaping policy choices. Therefore, this findings supports the liberal theory with major works from philosophers such as John Locke, Smith, and Immanuel Kant.

Liberalists advocate that with the right institutions and democracy, non-state actors can work together to increase cooperation and reduce conflicts. The theory recognizes international organizations and non-governmental actors in shaping policy choices and state preferences, advocates for international cooperation and denies power politics as the only available outcome of international relations. The liberal theory is significant in legitimizing and recognizing international organizations and non-state actors in the international system as players of peace and security.

The methodologies used involved use of secondary and primary resources. The secondary data included journals, books, newspapers, articles and online sources from jstore. The primary resources included media, government, church and personal records. It was gathered through interviews and closed end questionnaires. The respondents were sampled using two techniques that is selective sampling and snowballing.

In the selective sampling, the researcher made a decision to purposely interview the people certain to have the needed information. This therefore meant that certain individuals were interviewed based on criteria such as experiences, positions in the specific areas and age. For instance, in the religious organizations, church elders, and priests were selected and also Islamic leaders.

Snowballing involved informants using their own social contacts to refer the researcher to other people they thought to have some important information. Thus the researcher begun with one known individual who assisted to get and identify other respondents.

Closed end questionnaires were used. This gave the respondents choices to pick from so as to come up with a survey to test the hypotheses. This results were then analysed through Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS). At the end of the study, based on the findings that the researcher got from all sources, the researcher concluded that track two diplomacy has helped in preventing and managing conflict in Africa.

6.3 Recommendation

The researcher recommends that civil societies, non-governmental organizations, influencers and other peace keeping organizations should constantly review processes of mediating between conflicting groups as presented in the study paper in order to prepare effectively for any upcoming conflicts. They should identify the challenges and find ways to overcome them so as to reduce failure of track two diplomacy.

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APPENDICES

Appendix I: QUESTIONNAIRE

This Questionnaire aims at collecting information on the role of track II diplomacy in conflict prevention and management in Africa with a specific focus in Kenya. The research is part of my study and shall be submitted to the University of Nairobi for the award of master's degree in International Conflict Management. Any information you provide shall be valued as part of my research work. Kindly tick where appropriate

SECTION A

PERSONAL INFORMATION

1. **Name of the respondent**
    (optional)_____

2. **Gender of the respondent**
    Male **( )**

    Female **( )**

3. **Level of education (Highest academic qualification)**
    Primary certificate **( )**   Secondary school level   **( )**   Post-secondary Certificate Level **( )**   Diploma Level **( )**   Bachelors degree level **( )**   Masters degree level **( )**   **Any   other**
    _____

4. **How long have you resided in Kenya?**
    1 - 5 years **( )**   6 - 10 years **( )** 11 – 15 years **( )** 16 – 20 years **( )** Over 21 years **( )**

5. **I am a member of**

    Civil societies **( )**   media **( )**   Private Citizens **( )**   NGOs **( )**

    Other, _____

6. **Town of residence**: _____

SECTION B: CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN KENYA

To what extent do you agree with the following statements with regards to the Conflicts in your country and resolution processes? Tick where appropriate using the following scale:

1 = No extent, 2 = Small extent, 3 = moderate extent, 4 = Large extent, 5 = Very large extent

		1	2	3	4	5
	Common Conflicts experienced in the Country					
(i)	Election related violence					
(ii)	Border conflicts					
(iii)	Inter-community conflict over resources					
(iv)	Civil uprisings					
	Conflict Management strategies in Kenya					
(i)	Combination of both formal and informal channels					
(ii)	Employment of formal channels such as established legal channels, police					
(iii)	Use of mediation and negotiations with political leaders					
(iv)	Use of informal channels such as religious leaders, journalists, influencers etc.					
	Parties involved in Track II peace resolution					
(i)	Top religious leaders					
(ii)	Community leaders and retired political leaders					
(iii)	Influential media houses					
(iv)	Youth leaders					
	Processes Adopted in Conflict Management					
(i)	Pre-negotiation, consultation and facilitated joint brainstorming					
(ii)	Creation of a free environment that allows for exploration of ideas for resolution					
(iii)	Provision of low-key, non-judgmental, non-coercive environment					
(iv)	Creation of a process in which participants feel free to share perceptions, fears and demands					
	The Role of Track II Diplomacy in Conflict Management					
(i)	Facilitation of confidence-building among private citizens in influential sectors					
(ii)	Facilitation of interactive problem-solving approaches by unofficial mediators					
(iii)	Direct mediation					
	Contributions of Track II Diplomacy in Conflict Resolution					

		1	2	3	4	5
(i)	Opening and improving channels of communication					
(ii)	Changing attitudes and perceptions of conflicting parties about the "Other"					
(iii)	Restoring relationships by building trust					
(iv)	Offering new options for negotiation					
(v)	Changing the dynamic of conflict by strengthening voices of moderation					
(vi)	Building a stable infrastructure of peace by strengthening social networks					

SECTION C: CHALLENGES FACING TRACK II DIPLOMATIC PROCESSES

To what extent do you agree with the following statements with regards to the challenges hindering the success of track II diplomacy in your country? Kindly tick where appropriate using the scale:

1 = No extent, 2 = Small extent, 3 = moderate extent, 4 = Large extent, 5 = Very large extent

		1	2	3	4	5
	Challenges in the preliminary stages					
(i)	'Wrong' types of diplomats					
(ii)	Incapacitated right type of diplomats					
	Challenges in the General Conflict Resolution Environment					
(i)	Loss of the trust by the conflicting parties					
(ii)	Changing domestic capabilities for peace resolution					
(iii)	Changing position of mediators					

SECTION D: FUTURE PROSPECTS OF TRACK II DIPLOMACY

To what extent do you believe that the following is the future of track II diplomacy? Kindly tick where appropriate using the scale:

1 = No extent, 2 = Small extent, 3 = moderate extent, 4 = Large extent, 5 = Very large extent

		1	2	3	4	5
(i)	Increased trust and confidence in unofficial mediation processes					
(ii)	Improved investment in track II diplomacy					
(iii)	Increase in the number of track II mediators					
(iv)	Combination of track II diplomacy with other diplomatic processes					

Any   other   suggestion?

_____

Thank you for your time.

APPENDIX II: RESEARCH BUDGET

s/n	ITEM	Description	Cost
1	Stationery	• Flash disk & CD@ 2,000 • Writing materials @1000	3,000
2	Travel expenses	Meals, logistics and accommodation	15,000
3	Typing/photocopying/binding of report		10,000
4	Research assistant allowances		8,000
5	Contingency		5000
6	NASCOTI Research permit		1000
	Total		42,000

Appendix III: NACOSTI Permit

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR
SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY & INNOVATION

Ref No: 886528

Date of Issue: 17/November/2020

RESEARCH LICENSE

This is to Certify that Miss., Daniella Achieng Omollo of University of Nairobi, has been licensed to conduct research in Nairobi on the topic: CONFLICT PREVENTION AND MANAGEMENT IN AFRICA: ROLE OF TRACK TWO DIPLOMACY IN KENYA for the period ending : 17/November/2021.

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Appendix IV: Plagiarism Report

CONFLICT PREVENTION AND MANAGEMENT IN
AFRICA: ROLE OF TRACK TWO DIPLOMACY IN
KENYA

ORIGINALITY REPORT

10%	8%	3%	5%
SIMILARITY INDEX	INTERNET SOURCES	PUBLICATIONS	STUDENT PAPERS

PRIMARY SOURCES

1	www.intractableconflict.org Internet Source	1%
2	erepository.uonbi.ac.ke Internet Source	1%
3	scholar.sun.ac.ke Internet Source	1%
4	www.crinfo.org Student Paper	1%
5	www.ajol.info Internet Source	1%
6	pdfs.semanticscholar.org Internet Source	<1%
7	en.wikipedia.org Student Paper	<1%
8	ir.jkuat.ac.ke Internet Source	<1%