



UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI

INSTITUTE OF DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

**FACTORS AFFECTING THE PERFORMANCE OF PREVENTION OF
VIOLENT EXTREMISM (PVE) PROGRAMS IN AFRICA: CASE OF LAMU
COUNTY, KENYA**

FRANCISCAR MALI SAMUEL

R52/12653/2018

Supervisor: DR. MUMO NZAU, PhD

**A RESEARCH PROJECT SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT FOR
THE REWARD OF DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS IN INTERNATIONAL
CONFLICT MANAGEMENT**

2021

DECLARATION

This research paper is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other university

Signed..........Date.....03/11/2021.....

Franciscar Mali Samuel

R52/12653/2018

This research paper has been submitted for examination with my approval as University Supervisor.

Signed..........Date.....03/12/21.....

Dr. Mumo Nzau

Lecturer, Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies

University of Nairobi

DEDICATION

I dedicate this project to God for His mercies and blessings throughout this journey. I extend special dedication to my parents, siblings, husband and children.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

My special thanks go to the Almighty God for the far He has brought me and giving me strength to finish my project. This project would not have been completed without His sufficient mercy and grace.

I thank the University of Nairobi for allowing me to undertake my graduate studies at the institution.

I greatly appreciate my supervisor for the continued guidance in the development of this paper.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DECLARATION.....	i
DEDICATION.....	ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT.....	iii
ABBREVIATIONS.....	viii
ABSTRACT.....	ix
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION.....	10
1.1 Background of the Study.....	10
1.2 Statement of the Research Problem.....	12
1.3 Research Questions.....	13
1.4 Objectives of the Research.....	13
1.5 Rationale.....	13
1.5.1 Academic Rationale.....	14
1.5.2 Policy Justification.....	14
1.6 Literature Review.....	15
1.6.1 Performance of Prevention of Violent Extremism (PVE) Programs in the post-911 International System: A Global Perspective.....	15

1.6.2 Performance of Prevention of Violent Extremism (PVE) Programs in the post-911: Regional Perspective.....	18
1.6.3 Performance of Prevention of Violent Extremism (PVE) Programs in the post-911: Kenyan Perspective.....	20
1.6.4 Research Gap.....	22
1.7 Theoretical Framework	22
1.8 Methodology.....	24
1.8.1 Research Design.....	24
1.8.2 Target Population	25
1.8.3 Methods of Data Collection	26
1.8.4 Methods of Data Analysis	26
1.8.5 Legal and Ethical Considerations.....	27
1.9 Study Layout	27
CHAPTER TWO:	29
2.1 Introduction	29
2.2 Objectives and Activities in PVE Programs.....	29
2.3 Performance of PVE Programs in the Post 9-11 International System	33
2.4 Factors Affecting Performance of PVE Programs in the Post 9/11 Attack.....	36
2.5 Solutions to Challenges hindering Performance of PVE Programs Post 9/11 Attack	40

2.6 Chapter Summary	43
CHAPTER THREE.....	45
3.1 Introduction	45
3.2 Structure of PVE Programs in Africa.....	46
3.2.1 Objectives of PVE Programs in the African region	46
3.2.2 Focus Areas of PVE Programs in Africa	48
3.2.3 Strategies adopted by PVE Programs in Africa	49
3.2.4 Sources of Support for the PVE Programs in the African Region.....	51
3.3 Performance of PVE Programs in Africa	53
3.4 Factors affecting Performance of PVE Programs in Africa	56
3.5 Solutions to the Factors hindering the Success of PVE Programs in Africa.....	59
3.6 Summary of the Chapter.....	62
CHAPTER FOUR:.....	63
4.1 Introduction	63
4.2 Structure of PVE Programs in Lamu County	63
4.2.1 Strategies adopted by PVE Programs in Lamu County	63
4.2.2 Objectives of the PVE Programs in Lamu County	66
4.3 Performance of PVE Programs in Lamu County Kenya.....	68

4.4 Factors Affecting Performance off PVE Programs in Lamu County	72
4.5 Way forward to Improve Performance of PVE Programs in Lamu County	77
4.6 Summary of the Chapter.....	80
CHAPTER FIVE: FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.....	82
5.1 Introduction	82
5.2 Summary of Findings	82
5.3 Conclusion	84
5.4 Recommendations	85
5.5 Suggestions for Further Studies.....	86
BIBLIOGRAPHY	87
APPENDICES	92

ABBREVIATIONS

BRAVE	Building Resilience against Violent Extremism
CSO	Community Social Organization
CVE	Countering Violent Extremism
CIPK	Council of Imams and Preachers of Kenya
DIDA	Danish International Development Agency
GTD	Global Terrorism Database
GTI	Global Terrorism Index
PVE	Prevention of Violent Extremism
P/CVE	Prevention/Countering Violent Extremism
SUPKEM	Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations

ABSTRACT

This research paper focused on the factors affecting performance of prevention of violent extremism programs in the post 9-11 era with a specific focus of Lamu County in Kenya. The first objective of the study was to examine factors affecting the Performance of Prevention of Violent Extremism (PVE) Programs in the post-911 International System, the second objective was to assess the factors affecting the performance of PVE Programs in Africa and the third objective was to critically analyze the Factors affecting the Performance of (PVE) Programs in Lamu County, Kenya. The study was anchored on the theory of change. A combination of archival and qualitative survey methods were employed in this study with primary data being collected using interviewing technique. Findings of the study first revealed that numerous programs had been developed at global level, regional level, and country-specific levels and these included UN P/CVE strategy, EU's PVE programs, USAID's PVE initiatives and UK's Prevent strategy. In as much as the programs had played an important role in reducing the magnitude and number of terrorism related activities, and resulted in significant positive changes in attitudes towards VE, several factors affected implementation. On a global scale, these factors included financial and technical support, lack of data based interventions, insufficient monitoring and evaluation strategies and conflicts amongst different country stakeholders on the strategies of the programs. In Africa where PVE programs have been concentrated in West, Central and Eastern Africa, factors affecting performance included the lack of support from communities, inadequate financial and technical support, poor structuring of some PVE projects were the main factors affecting the performance of the programs. In Lamu County, financial and technical support from international bodies and the Kenyan government positively contributed to the success of PVE programs. Factors like low levels of community support, tough economic times heightened by Covid-19 pandemic, poor coordination amongst the PVE initiatives and low financial capacity in some cases impacted negatively on the performance of PVE programs. Corruption and mismanagement of resources was also found to be a great hindrance to the success of PVE programs from an international, regional and local perspective. The researcher concluded in this study that world over, societies have been critical in coming up with prevention of violent extremism programs especially after the September 11th terrorism event of 2001 in USA. The PVE programs have recorded recognizable levels of success with regards to increased numbers of ex-VE group members, reduced recruitment levels of individuals by VE groups, low magnitude of VE related incidences and declining influence of VE related groups in societies. Such programs are however affected by factors such as low levels of community support, poor coordination strategy, lack of data based interventions, high poverty rates and powerful religious radicalization programs. The researcher suggested the need to continuously review the programs and involve communities in crafting case based initiatives that can deal with existing drivers of violent extremism. Employing advanced technology, strengthening governance and political systems and infrastructural development would also help in improving the performance of PVE programs and in preventing violent extremism in societies.

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the Study

The events that took place on September 11, 2001 in USA must have greatly caused countries and international bodies to re-strategize their fight against violent extremism and terrorism. This is because within the same month of its occurrence and in subsequent years the UN implemented international frameworks of countering and preventing extremism such as Resolution 1368, 1373, 2178, 2242 and the global CT architecture in 2006.¹ The direct victim of the event, USA, initiated NATO operations in Afghanistan, put sanctions on countries suspected of funding terrorism, strengthened governance structures and invested in intelligence technology.² The European Union encouraged adoption of air transport security, humanitarian aid, police and judicial co-operation and emergency preparedness within the same month.³ Amongst African states, prevention of violent extremism (PVE) strategies have included educational and vocational training programs targeting to empower youth and women, economic empowerment through infrastructure development, solving land issues and improving governance.

Performance of most of the enlisted PVE programs and others has often been internally assessed in line with whether the program has been meeting its objectives or not. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for instance determines the success of its PRAC program through assessing the number of extremist who change their extremist tendencies after going through the program. Performance of UN's P/CVE since 911 has been assessed by looking at the extent to which its three roles of 'setting norms and imposing binding obligations on member states to suppress terrorism,

¹ Katselli, E and Shah S, *September 11 and the UK Response*, The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Cambridge University Press (2003), 52(1), pp. 245 – 255

² Ilardi J G, *The 9/11 Attacks—A Study of Al Qaeda's Use of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, (2009);32 (3)3, pp. 171 – 187

³ Wilkinson, P, *International Terrorism: the Changing Threat and the EU's Response*, Chaillot Paper (2005), 84, pp. 1 – 47

enforcing sanctions against terrorists and states supporting terrorism and proposing new ways of action in the field⁴ have been met. Global terrorism index evaluates the success of the PVE programs by comparing the number of terrorism activities from year to year and the impact of such activities on human lives, health, economies and property.⁵ Another common measure of performance has been counting the number of people joining extremist organizations (EO), assessing the state of those who have left the extremist groups, counting the number of extremist activities within a period and assessing the impacts of such activities.

Performance of the PVE programs has however not been smooth as there are many factors hindering achievement of 100% success rate. Studies indicate that several factors ranging from macro, country specific, institutional and individual do affect the performance of the enlisted PVE programs. According to UN; economic state, historical background, weak governance, social and political systems are the main factors determining the success of these strategies.⁶ Insufficient financial capacity, technical capacity and technological capacity have been listed as factors affecting a majority of the developing countries at a time when strategies by violent extremist groups like Al-Qaeda, ISIS, Boko Haram and even Al-shabaab continue advancing with time. With regards to individual factors; emotional, psychological and the influence of family and friends have been listed as the main aspects. Further, there have been issues of coordinating PVE strategies from global to country and even to local levels due to region-specificity of violent extremist activities. If there is to be any chance of winning in this war

⁴ Bourekba M, *The United Nations' Evolving Approach to Counterterrorism*, CIDOB report (2020) pp 33

⁵ Institute for Economics & Peace, *Global Terrorism Index 2020: Measuring the Impact of Terrorism*, Sydney, November 2020, Available from: <http://visionofhumanity.org/reports> (accessed 6th May 2021), p4

⁶ United Nations Development Programme, *Preventing Violent Extremism through Promoting Inclusive Development, Tolerance and Respect for Diversity*, A development response to addressing radicalization and violent extremism (2016), pp 8 – 38

against violent extremism, clear details on the factors affecting performance of PVE programs need to be documented and addressed right from local levels in all countries.

1.2 Statement of the Research Problem

Governments, international security bodies and even scholars in the field of peace and security have become resilient in preaching against violent extremism, especially after the 911 incident. Counter Terrorism architecture by UN, ASEAN Declaration on Transnational Crime amongst Asian states and AU Counter terrorism Framework amongst African states are just a few of the many strategies in place to deal with the disaster regionally and globally. Programs such as gender sensitivity, community empowerment and specific community based programs against negative radicalization further highlight efforts to deal with the situation.⁷ The problem of violent extremism has however been evolving with time and seems to vary from nation to the other and society to society. A lot of focus has also been on countering violent extremism rather than preventing it, despite acknowledgement of the need to prevent it.⁸ Further, most programs are spelt from international frameworks or country frameworks with little consideration of the coordination of the activities at the local levels.⁹ The Coastal region of Kenya could be the right proof of this given that it continues to report cases of individuals joining Al-Shabaab and Mombasa Republican council; the two dominant extremist groups in the region.¹⁰ This study therefore focused on the performance of PVE programs in Lamu County, with the aim of assessing factors affecting performance of these programs and crafting modern strategies of dealing with the menace.

⁷ Idris I, *Preventing/Countering Violent Extremism Programming on Men, Women, Boys and Girls*, UKAID Publication (2019), pp 7 – 19

⁸ Norwegian Refugee Council, *Risk Management Toolkit in Relation to Counterterrorism Measures*, Position paper (2015) pp 1 – 6

⁹ Zyl, I V, *Preventing violent extremism Lessons from Africa*, Institute of Security Studies, Africa Report 17 (2019)

¹⁰ Botha, A, *Radicalisation in Kenya: Recruitment to Al-Shabaab and the Mombasa Republican Council*, Institute for Security Studies Paper 265 (2014)

1.3 Research Questions

1. What are the factors affecting the performance of Prevention of Violent Extremism (PVE) Programs in the post-911 International system?
2. Which factors affect the performance of Prevention of Violent Extremism (PVE) Programs in Africa?
3. What are the factors affecting the performance of Prevention of Violent Extremism (PVE) Programs in Lamu County, Kenya?

1.4 Objectives of the Research

The objectives of the study are:

1. To examine the factors affecting the Performance of Prevention of Violent Extremism (PVE) Programs in the post-911 International System.
2. To assess the Factors affecting the Performance of Prevention of Violent Extremism (PVE) Programs in Africa.
3. To critically analyze the Factors affecting the Performance of Prevention of Violent Extremism (PVE) Programs in Lamu County, Kenya.

1.5 Rationale

Violent extremism is an evolving issue that continues to affect human life in many parts of the world.¹¹ As such a study on prevention of violent extremism and factors affecting performance of PVE programs is not only important to policy makers of the programs and affected communities but also in the field of academics globally.

¹¹ Idris I, *Preventing/Countering Violent Extremism Programming on Men, Women, Boys and Girls*, UKAID Publication (2019), pp 7 – 19

1.5.1 Academic Rationale

This study will provide useful references to academicians in the field of conflict management and international peace relations. With a focus in the Kenyan Coastal region, findings of the study will add to existing global research on the performance of PVE programs at grassroots levels. Suggestions on improving quality and performance of PVE programs that will be provided in this study will also enhance research on international, regional and local perspective of preventing violent extremism and its subsequent impacts.

1.5.2 Policy Justification

Findings from this study will provide a good basis for international peace keeping bodies such as UN, USAID and UKAID and government bodies across the world on the performance of existing PVE programs and how best to structure them and achieve high performance. Since violent extremism cases and their impacts are common globally, as proven by history, understanding drivers of violent extremism, success rate of PVE programs and factors affecting the success in the post 911 period can help the enlisted bodies to formulate effective policies on how best to handle violent extremism to reduce loss of lives and to reduce excessive impacts on the security of innocent civilians.

Other than its impact on human life, violent extremism leading to terrorism has been known to affect economic and environmental aspects in the affected countries.¹² Tourists fear visiting targeted countries, the countries spend hugely repairing destroyed infrastructure, and hatred is

¹² Condra L, N, *Ethnic Group Rebellion against the State: Perils of the Periphery*, (San Diego: Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, 2010a), pp. 107 - 115

spewed amongst states in some of the repressive PVE programs.¹³ From the study findings of this research paper, international peace bodies and governments across the world will understand far reaching impacts of their PVE programs and formulate policies to ensure good performance of their PVE programs and good inter-country relations. They will also come up with environmental protection policies and economic empowerment policies based on this study paper that effectively conserve environments and support countries in the times of crises caused by violent extremism incidences.

1.6 Literature Review

This section presents a review of literature on the topic of factors affecting prevention of violent extremism (PVE) programs from an international, regional and Kenyan perspective in the post 9/11 period. The researcher has assessed articles, journals, conference papers, study papers and other literature materials in order to present conclusive findings on the topic.

1.6.1 Performance of Prevention of Violent Extremism (PVE) Programs in the post-911 International System: A Global Perspective

The programs immediately after the September 11 attack in 2001 across the world aimed at bringing together countries in countering violent extremism rather than preventing it. The programs were also event driven after the magnitude of the 9/11 attack and a series of other global terrorist attacks.¹⁴ The UN's global policy of adopting resolution 1373 and 1540 for example, bound member states to cooperate in combating cross border terrorism.¹⁵ Sanctions placed against countries suspected of funding terrorism and those where terrorists were directly

¹³ Heupel, M, *Adapting to Transnational Terrorism: The UN Security Council's Evolving Approach to Terrorism*, Security Dialogue, 38(4), 2007, pp 477–499; 486

¹⁴Coolsaet,R, *EU Counterterrorism Strategy: Value Added or Chimera?*, International Affairs, vol.86, no.4, 2010, pp.857 - 873

¹⁵ Bourekba M, *The United Nations' Evolving Approach to Counterterrorism*, CIDOB report (2020) pp 27 – 34

operating from.¹⁶ The EU immediately formed a CT plan and the adoption of the 2002 framework decision on countering terrorism. The goal of the EU was to streamline member country legal and judicial systems in coordinating strategies of dealing with the events.¹⁷ These early programs failed to a large extent in meeting their objectives; as there were resentments about discriminative policies.

With evolving times in the last two decades, the programs have become policy driven, directed at changing legal frameworks to help deal with the events and prevent future occurrence of violent extremism. Other than resolutions agreed upon by bodies such as UN, ASEAN, EU and AU, specific countries have also come up with country changes in criminal codes, penal codes and immigration law provisions to deal with the same. ‘Belgium refined its criminal law provisions under Article 140b (i) criminal code, article 22 on anti-discrimination and article 140 on participation in terrorist associations.’¹⁸ Denmark refined section 136(1) on incitement to commit criminal offence, section 136(3) on approval of certain criminal offences such as terrorism and section 266b on hate speech.¹⁹ France defined Article 421-2-5 penal code’s chapter on terrorism, provocation to or apology of terrorism in Criminal code art. 421-2-4, Law of 2014 on the fight against terrorism and Penal code article 4221-2-1 on association with terrorist enterprises.²⁰

The programs and initiatives have also transformed based on need basis and a strong desire to focus on prevention rather than countering violent extremism. The UN adopted a new CT architecture in 2006, ‘countering violent extremism (CVE)’ in Resolution 2178 in 2014 to

¹⁶ Ibid, p30

¹⁷ Council of the European Union Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA of 13 June 2002 on Combating Terrorism; David Casale, ‘EU Institutional and Legal Counter-Terrorism Framework’, *Defence Against Terrorism Review*, vol.1, no.1, 2008, p.52

¹⁸ Belavusau et al, *A Comparative Research Study on Radical and Extremist (Hate) Speakers in European Member States*, ICCT (2019), pp 10 – 12

¹⁹ Ibid, pp 15 – 17

²⁰ Ibid, pp 19 – 24

contain the number of foreign fighters joining ISIS in the Middle East and included the concept of ‘preventing violent extremism (PVE)’ in its Global CT architecture in 2015 after a series of global attacks by ISIS.²¹ The new practice by UN allowed states to adopt their definition of VE and assist in structuring PVE strategies. USAID transformed from focused approach to a more dynamic approach involving capacity building in communities, developing specific programs that are tailor made and measurable, coordinating CVE programming, disengagement & reintegration, harnessing the power of youths and recognizing the multiple roles played by women.²² The 2005 bombings in London and Madrid made the EU to transform from Countering strategy to a prevent strand, with the aim of providing framework to coordinate national policies, share information and determine good practices. Empowering mainstream opinions, combating radicalization and recruitment to terrorism and promoting justice, security and democracy have been the key elements of the prevent strategy.

Despite the existence of several international PVE frameworks and programs, a common metric has not been established to assess the performance and states and institutions apply those at their convenience. A majority however rely on observations of changes in character of individuals, communities and countries towards violent extremism before and after enrolling for the program.²³ Using this measure however, the UN’s PVE program has seen cooperation amongst member states in the recent times to deal with VE. Through its agencies such as UNDP and UN women working in several countries, national and local organizations have been formed and continue changing characters of individuals likely to join the VEOs. UK’s Prevent strategy and

²¹ Heupel, M, *Adapting to Transnational Terrorism: The UN Security Council’s Evolving Approach to Terrorism*, Security Dialogue, 38(4), 2007, pp 477–499; 488

²² USAID, *Policy For Countering Violent Extremism Through Development Assistance*, USAID Publication (2020), p9

²³ Holmer G, Bauman P & Aryaeinejad K, *Measuring Up and Evaluating the Impact of P/CVE Programs*, United States Institute of Peace Publication (2018) pp 5 – 17, 6

Saudi's PRAC program have also recorded tremendous levels of success in dissuading individuals who had previously associated with extremism.²⁴

From existing studies on the performance of the PVE programs, discriminatory policies emerge as the main hindrance to the success of the programs. Such was noted in UNSC's earlier policies immediately after the 9/11 event where some states felt that they were targeted by the sanctions imposed.²⁵ They threatened to leave the body with a majority refusing to cooperate with the implementation of the strategies. Communities feeling targeted like Islam in EU's prevent strand and UK's prevent strategy also make it hard for the program to achieve desired levels of success. Such individuals refuse to cooperate in international and national strategies of giving required intelligence to pursue the practices. Another serious problem has been with the coordination of strategies from the global, regional, national and to local levels. This is because the problem in most cases originates from local areas, with each place having different drivers to the others. Reaching out to the very bottom line has been hard due to financial barriers, language barriers, religious differences and corrupt in-country systems.

1.6.2 Performance of Prevention of Violent Extremism (PVE) Programs in the post-911: Regional Perspective

The last two decades has seen many programs developed in the African continent to counter and try and prevent violent extremism. Most of the projects and programs have been concentrated in West Africa Central Africa, some parts of North Africa and in Eastern Africa; with fewer initiatives in the Southern parts of Africa. This is because the development of most of such projects has been event triggered following extremism activities and acts of terrorism in

²⁴ Combes.W S, Assessing Two Countering Violent Extremism Programs: Saudi Arabia's PRAC and the United Kingdom's Prevent Strategy, Small Wars Journal (2013), pp 5 – 12

²⁵ Bourekba M, *The United Nations' Evolving Approach to Counterterrorism*, CIDOB report (2020) pp 27 – 34

countries in the enlisted places. Boko Haram the lead extremist group has conducted most of their activities in West and Central Africa from 2002, Al-Qaeda and ISIS affiliates have been in Tunisia, Morocco and other countries in the North while Al-Shabaab has led in extremist activities in East Africa. UNDP in its reviews notes that there could be around 250 projects directly and indirectly linked to PVE in West and Central Africa and about 480 in Eastern Africa both licensed and unlicensed. A large number of the projects have been initiated and supported by the African Union in conjunction with regional agencies like IGAD, ECOWAS, EAC and SADC.

A review of literature reveals that there has been a steady shift from countering of extremism to prevention of violent extremism in the region. The African Union has constantly reviewed its policies and frameworks of dealing with extremism and encouraged their adoption by the different member states.²⁶ The implementation of the projects' visions on the ground has however been slower compared to the theoretical projections. This is because the projects have had to address broader issues such as economic, political and societal development before committing to the prevention of violent extremism. Common programs have included education/training and capacity building, humanitarian aid, violence prevention and conflict resolution.²⁷ Most programs in the region have also directed their efforts to women and youths.²⁸ This could be probably because this group is the most vulnerable and easy recruits for violent extremism activities. Transforming the youths and women with the theory of change would probably help to transform societies away from extremist tendencies.

²⁶ African Union, *Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on Terrorism and Violent Extremism in Africa at the Peace and Security Council 455th Meeting at the Level of Heads of State and Government, Nairobi, Kenya*, AU Publications (2014)

²⁷ Zyl, I V, *Preventing violent extremism Lessons from Africa*, Institute of Security Studies, Africa Report 17 (2019)

²⁸ Lorentzen J, *Women as 'New Security Actors' in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism in Mali*, Oxford University Press, *International Affairs* 97 : 3 (2021) pp 721–738

The PVE projects have not reached their full potential with regards to success due to the negative perception of PVE initiatives in the areas where they have been established. Some communities which feel targeted like Muslims in Eastern and Western Africa have refused to take part in the initiatives and even directed attacks at the organizations.²⁹ The projects have also suffered from insufficient funding as most funding is provided for a period of less than a year.³⁰ Governments have not been at the forefront in funding the initiatives with lead donors being US government, EU, UN, and specific countries like UK, Germany and France. Capacity of the PVE projects has also been wanting, with fewer qualified persons willing to undertake the risky initiative according to studies by Afrobarometer in South Africa, East Africa and West Africa.³¹

1.6.3 Performance of Prevention of Violent Extremism (PVE) Programs in the post-911: Kenyan Perspective

Kenya has had its own fair share of the consequences of violent extremism since the 9/11 attack in the USA. The lead group operating in the country has been Al-Shabaab, targeting youths and women in the North Eastern and Coastal region and carrying out terrorist attacks like the West gate mall attack of 2013, Garissa University attack of 2015 and Dusit attack of 2019.³² A majority of immediate strategies after the 2001 attack were government initiated projects in conjunction with international development associations such as the UN, AU and IGAD. These strategies were mostly aimed at countering violent extremism and were triggered by events happening. The reason for the programs being government driven is probably due to the high costs that are involved in countering extremist activities perceived at the time.

²⁹ Institute for Economics & Peace, *Global Terrorism Index 2020: Measuring the Impact of Terrorism*, Sydney, November 2020, Available from: <http://visionofhumanity.org/reports> (accessed 6th May 2021)

³⁰ Zyl, I V, *Preventing violent extremism Lessons from Africa*, Institute of Security Studies, Africa Report 17 (2019)

³¹ Nkomo, S & Clarke, *Violent extremism in Africa Popular assessments from the 'Eastern Corridor'*, Afrobarometer Policy Paper No. 65 (2020)

³² Botha, A, *Radicalisation in Kenya: Recruitment to Al-Shabaab and the Mombasa Republican Council*, Institute for Security Studies Paper 265 (2014), pp 4 – 23

With evolving trends and times, the programs in the country have taken a more preventive and multilateral approach. A program like ‘Operation Linda Nchi’ by the government of Kenya in conjunction with the African Union has incorporated training and capacity building for victims of VE while at the same time combating Al-shabaab directly in Somali. Organizations have also joined the process of PVE, working closely with both international bodies and the government in the implementation of their programs. Programs dealing with violent extremism have majorly included training and capacity building, societal development, prevention of health and gender based violence, trauma counseling and PVE and counter terrorism. The perception of Islamic community in the Coastal region and North Eastern region where a majority of these programs have been directed has however been negative, some feeling that they are directly targeted.

Performance of the PVE programs as assessed using observation indicates that there have been commendable success levels. Sharamo and Mohamed noted that the number of individuals joining Al-shabaab and Mombasa Republican Council has been declining over the years.³³ Women and youths who were once part of the groups have also transformed and are actively engaged in other business activities in the region. A RUSI research team with an assessment of the performance of P/CVE programs in 2019 revealed that great success had been achieved from the coordination and design of the activities.³⁴ The programs have however not been overly effective in reducing the effects of violent extremism as over 40 incidences relating to violent extremism for the last 20 years.

Monitoring PVE programs has also not been successful due to limited financial capacity. A majority of these programs have been receiving funding for less than a year according to the

³³ Sharamo R D and Mohamed A A, *Countering violent extremism in Kenya: experiences and innovations*, Publication of the Institute for Security Studies, East Africa Report 36 (2020), pp 2 – 13

³⁴ Jones M, *A Template for the Global South? Understanding the Promises and Pitfalls of Preventing/Countering Violent Extremism in Kenya*, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) for Defence and Security Studies (2020)

Institute of Security studies survey. Evolving and advanced recruitment techniques by extremist group members have also meant that violent extremist events continue happening despite the preventive measures in place. Other factors affecting performance of the programs in Kenya have included poor coordination of efforts amongst the different stakeholders taking part in PVE, centralized decision making in the administration of the projects and the lack of local ownership by the individuals implementing the projects.

1.6.4 Research Gap

This section has reviewed literature on performance of PVE programs implemented in the post 9/11 attack of USA from a global, regional and local perspective. It is evident from the literature that a majority of the programs assessed have focused greatly on CVE rather than PVE. This is probably due to fact that initial programs immediately after the US attack were event driven, dealing with terrorism related events as they occurred. And even the existing PVE programs implemented during the period; challenges such as lack of cooperation from stakeholders, inadequate financial and technical support and poor monitoring strategies have been common and which have not been comprehensively addressed to ensure improved success. Further, there has been no identifiable best measure of performance from the different programs to the best of the researcher's review. This study aimed at filling the enlisted research gap and providing comprehensive analysis of the factors affecting the performance of these programs together with working solutions to improve performance.

1.7 Theoretical Framework

This study was anchored on the social exchange theory which explains how social behaviour is a result of an exchange process between parties, with the parties aiming at maximizing benefits

and minimizing costs.³⁵ Benefits refer to the positives in working or friendly relations such as sustainability, effective operations, savings, fun, efficiencies, chances of making profits and support. Costs are the negatives in relations such as effort, money spent, probability of failure and time. In as much as the benefits and costs in the give-and-take relations may not be equal, the social exchange theory suggests that parties choose to continue with the relations only if the benefits outweigh the costs.³⁶ The difference between the gains and costs, also referred to as the worth of the social relationship is highly determined by a number of factors both within individuals and in the macro environment such as expectations set, past experiences, politics and socio-cultural practices.³⁷

The social exchange theory will be relevant in explaining the structuring and implementation of PVE programs and the factors that affect performance of such programs. From the designing phase up to implementation period, a majority of the PVE programs often aim at maximizing gains such as reduced number of people in VE groups, elimination of VE groups in societies, reduced effects of VE groups and improved peaceful relations in societies.³⁸ Other PVE programs with initiatives like poverty eradication, sensitization of the public, youth and women empowerment often aim at achieving the best while minimizing costs, and the effort of moving around. Organizations and individuals behind the programs interact with many different stakeholders like societies, governments, donors and even members of violent extremist groups in achieving the set objectives and their interactions matter a lot in the success or failure of the programs. If the PVE programs adequately identify and address factors affecting optimization of objectives in line with the social exchange theory, they are likely to maintain and improve

³⁵ Homans, G. C., *Social Behaviour as Exchange*. American Journal of Sociology (1958); 63, 6: Pp. 597 – 606

³⁶ Blau, P, *Exchange and Power in Social Life*, New York: John Wiley & Sons(1964)

³⁷ Lawler, E. J., & Thye, S. R., *Social Exchange Theory of Emotions*, Cornell University, ILR School Pp 12 – 36

³⁸ Jones M, *A Template for the Global South? Understanding the Promises and Pitfalls of Preventing/Countering Violent Extremism in Kenya*, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) for Defence and Security Studies (2020)

relationships with enlisted social system and achieve high performance with regards to declining trends in violent extremism amongst other critical objectives of their existence.

1.8 Methodology

This section presents the methodology that the researcher followed in carrying out this study. It highlights the research design adopted, target population, data collection techniques and data analysis processes that were undertaken to make the research on insurgency and human security a success.

1.8.1 Research Design

This study was carried out using a combination of archival and qualitative survey methods. This helped the researcher to benefit from textual information obtained from existing literature and interview from key parties related to the study. The main focus was to examine and establish factors affecting performance of PVE programs and to draw explanatory inferences. In this study the researcher sought to establish the factors affecting performance of PVE programs post 9/11 attack from the international, regional and local perspectives; using the case of Lamu County Kenya. The study first employed archival research. Archival research makes use of documents and records available for information.³⁹ This allows one to study about past relationships of people and how this has occurred over time till date. This provides empirical data which is needed to answer questions which cannot be answered in any other way. It also enables the researcher to have comparative studies. Qualitative survey design was also be employed. This aimed at identifying associations, characters and other forms of data from responses by

³⁹ Mohr, J W & Ventresca M, *Archival Research Methods*, Blackwell companion to organizations (2002), pp.805 – 828

individuals.⁴⁰ This kind of design helped in collecting and analyzing data from individuals that will form the target population of this study.

1.8.2 Target Population

The target population of this study included government security agencies, media houses, VSOs, Islamic religious bodies, Christian religious bodies, and youth and women groups in Lamu County and ordinary citizens in Lamu County. The researcher targeted members of the enlisted organizations who have interacted with violent extremism, been part of VE groups and those who have left the VE groups. To obtain a suitable number of 94, the researcher employed purposive sampling in selecting all the members of the target groups. As defined by Kothari, purposive sampling method is a non-probabilistic sampling design where researchers rely on their own judgement when choosing members of a population to participate in the survey.⁴¹ The researcher chose the participants of this survey on the basis that they were part of civilians who had resided in Lamu County for over twenty years, members of security agencies both private and public, head of PVE programs implemented by religious institutions, heads of youth and women groups in Lamu and heads of local VSOs involved in prevention of violent extremism. Purposive sampling helped to come up with the right participants who could engage on the topic under study and help in data collection towards the achievement of objectives of this study. The small number of participants was easy to reach adequately over the short period under study and to cover all desired concepts in data collection.

⁴⁰ Kothari, C.R, *Research Methodology, Methods and Techniques*, (New Delhi New Age International (P) Limited. 2nd ed, 2008) pp. 109 – 110

⁴¹ Kothari, C. R., & Garg, G, *Research Methodology: Methods and Techniques*. New Delhi: New Age International Publishers (2014).

1.8.3 Methods of Data Collection

In this study, the researcher relied on primary data collected using interviewing technique and secondary data. Interviewing technique included meeting members of the population and engaging them on the topic under study. While some interviews were conducted virtually in line with containment measures of Covid-19, others required physical interactions with the respondents. The researcher used the interviewing technique because it helps to guide respondents on the information required, helps the researcher to predict mood and to clarify on any questions that may arise in the process of data collection. Secondary data from journals, scholarly reports, and media reports from international, regional and local platforms were also used in this study. Secondary data provided for a broad framework on which to build analysis and allowed for scrutiny and evaluations of data collected on past cases of insurgencies and compare the data with the study hypothesis⁴².

1.8.4 Methods of Data Analysis

Data collected was cleaned, edited and analyzed using descriptive analysis. According to Kothari, descriptive analysis helps to summarize data points in a constructive way such that patterns and trends can be identified from the data.⁴³ To test the hypothesis, the study data analyzed was presented thematically and categorized based on objectives. This was followed by reviewing, categorizing, tabulating and combining evidence to ascertain meaning relating to study's initial objectives, research questions and hypothesis. In analyzing qualitative data from secondary sources, the researcher used content analysis. Content analysis helped to quantify, analyze and present meanings, patterns and relationships between concepts in qualitative data.

⁴² Zikmund, W.G., Babin, B.J and Griffin, M, *Business Research Methods*, (Australia : South-Western engage publishers, 9th Edition, 2013) pp. 56 – 88

⁴³ Kothari, C. R., & Garg, G, *Research Methodology: Methods and Techniques*. New Delhi: New Age International Publishers (2014)

1.8.5 Legal and Ethical Considerations

The researcher handled the personal information from the respondents with confidentiality. All the data collected from the interview schedules was specifically used in this study work and then disposed carefully thereafter. The researcher collected data from willing respondents without giving out tokens to influence the answering of the results or forcing them.

1.9 Study Layout

Chapter One: Introduction

This chapter introduces the factors affecting performance of PVE programs. It covers the background of the study, statement of the research problem, literature review, and hypotheses of the study, justification of the study, theoretical framework and research methodology.

Chapter Two: Performance of Prevention of Violent Extremism (PVE) Programs in the post-911 International System: A General Appraisal

This chapter seeks to provide an in-depth analysis and findings of the factors affecting PVE programs post 911 from an international perspective. It firstly covers the PVE programs, and then assesses goals and objectives of the programs. The chapter finally assesses the performance of these programs and discusses factors affecting performance of the program. The study relied on data from secondary sources in this section.

Chapter Three: Factors Affecting the Performance of Prevention of Violent Extremism (PVE) Programs in the post-911 International System: An Assessment of Eastern, Western and Southern Africa Experiences

This chapter presents analysis and findings of the factors affecting performance of PVE programs post 911 in Africa. It starts by identifying PVE programs in western Africa, Eastern Africa and Southern Africa and the objectives of such programs. The chapter then provides an assessment of the performance of the programs and discusses factors affecting performance.

Chapter Four: Factors affecting the Performance of Prevention of Violent Extremism (PVE) Programs in Lamu County, Kenya: A Critical Analysis

The chapter presents analysis and findings on the factors affecting performance of PVE programs in Lamu County in Kenya. The chapter analyzes primary data from respondents in Lamu and combines with secondary data on the topic. Finally, the chapter presents findings on possible future strategies that can be adopted to ensure the success of PVE programs and initiatives in the area.

Chapter five: Conclusion and Recommendations

This chapter provides a summary of the findings; the conclusion of the study gives recommendations. The chapter also provides suggestions on areas of further studies based on the literature review and findings from the study.

CHAPTER TWO:

PERFORMANCE OF PREVENTION OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM (PVE) PROGRAMS IN THE POST-911 INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM: A GENERAL APPRAISAL

2.1 Introduction

This chapter presents findings and analysis of findings on the performance of PVE programs in the period after the September 11, 2001 terrorism attack in the USA. The chapter starts with a discussion on the structure of the programs with regards to objectives, timelines and goals from a general international perspective covering programs by UN globally, UK's prevent strategy, Saudi Arabia's PVE program, USAID's initiatives and that by the International Center for Countering Terrorism (ICCT); and addresses findings on the performance of the programs. Factors affecting performance of the programs and their impact on performance is then presented and finally proposed solutions to challenges on the performance of PVE Programs are discussed in this chapter.

2.2 Objectives and Activities in PVE Programs

In assessing the performance of international PVE programs, this study undertook a multi-dimensional approach by first assessing the objectives of the main programs, targeted groups, planned time and budgets and expected impact on societal change. This performance measure has also been used by UNDP in assessing the performance of its social impact programs globally.⁴⁴ The multi-faceted approach is also being applied by USAID in a number of its programs globally including P/CVE initiatives.⁴⁵ The United States Institute of Peace in its

⁴⁴ United Nations Development Programme, *Preventing Violent Extremism through Promoting Inclusive Development, Tolerance and Respect for Diversity*, A development response to addressing radicalization and violent extremism (2016), pp 16 – 25

⁴⁵ USAID, *Policy for Countering Violent Extremism Through Development Assistance*, USAID Publication (2020)

measure of the performance of PVE programs assessed its impact on the behaviour of communities involved in violent extremism, relationships and attitudes of individuals in the communities in terms of violent extremism.⁴⁶ This institute in assessing this impact starts from the objectives set before evaluating performance against these objectives.⁴⁷

From an analysis of the UN Security council's CVE program right after 911, the main objective was to combat cross border terrorism and to discourage states from sponsoring terrorism groups.⁴⁸ To achieve these two, the UNSC imposed sanctions on states suspected to be funding terrorism. It also enforced resolutions binding member states to help in exchanging information internationally, strengthening their borders and control distribution of weapons of mass destruction. Such resolutions included 1373 in 2001 and resolution 1540 and 2170 in 2014. UN targeted its member states, with the view that leaders of these countries would help reach out to their nations in the fight against VE. In addition, financial, human expertise and technical support was provided to member states (especially those developing nations).⁴⁹ This was probably one of the main immediate actions on an international perspective towards countering and preventing violent extremism and has been evolving with time since 2001.

In the newly introduced PVE programs by the general assembly of UN post 2014, focus is addressing the drivers of radicalization and ensuring the respect for human rights and the rule of law.⁵⁰ The first objective has been addressing drivers of radicalization, the UN aiming at bringing together different agencies such as UNESCO, UNDP, and UN Women at the

⁴⁶ Holmer G, Bauman P & Aryaeinejad K, *Measuring Up and Evaluating the Impact of P/CVE Programs*, United States Institute of Peace Publication (2018) pp 5 – 17

⁴⁷ *Ibid*, pp 7 – 10

⁴⁸ Ucko, H. D, *Preventing Violent Extremism through the United Nations: the Rise and Fall of a good Idea*, *International Affairs* 94: 2, (2018), pp 251–270

⁴⁹ Heupel, M, *Adapting to Transnational Terrorism: The UN Security Council's Evolving Approach to Terrorism*, *Security Dialogue*, 38(4), 2007, pp 494 – 498

⁵⁰ *Ibid*, p 488

international level and country-agencies to work on PVEs. UN Women targets women globally with the aim of instilling gender mainstreaming principles, dimensions and priorities for PVE that offers comprehensive background information together with resources and guidance for the UN system, and supporting Member States in their efforts to prevent and counter violent extremism and terrorism. The UN provides financial and technical support through UNDP for the national and even local agencies such as civil society organizations in addressing violent extremism. The UN also left open the definition of violent extremism, allowing countries to choose their own definition and to define intervention strategies as part of its global PVE and CT architecture.

The UK's Prevent strategy is conducted with the aim of countering militant Islamist ideology by combining a strong sense of social welfare with an ideological thrust based on British values.⁵¹ It uses several components such as Channel and statutory agencies like police, local authorities, and youth offending services, social workers and voluntary groups. The focus has always been on identifying individuals at the risk of falling to the allure of terrorism using the mentioned multiagency partnership and trying to influence change of direction through available institutions. Prevent strategy has relied on a strong societal rubric for referral of the individuals likely to cause or join violent extremism.⁵² The government of UK has invested in societal awareness programs such as education and training in order to ensure that the welfare of the society is used to prevent and fight against violent extremism.

Saudi Arabia's PRAC Program was developed by Saudi Arabia's Ministry of the Interior to support the country's operations of countering extremism in 2002 – 2003 periods. The aim of the program is to “combat ideological and intellectual justifications of violent extremism based on

⁵¹ May, T, *Prevent Strategy*, Her Majesty's Government (2011), 107

⁵² *Ibid*, p 57

Wahhabi Islam.”⁵³ PRAC aims at convincing extremists to abandon their ideologies which pervert true Islam by using a framework of Islamic ideologies (a process call delegitimization) supported by state authority. This is done through education and inculcating right morals in citizens such as loyalty, obedience, recognition of authority and leadership.⁵⁴ The program also has a rehabilitative plan targeting victims of radicalization in prisons. Clerics take detainees through education and counseling on such topics as *Takfir* (accusations of appostacy), *bay’ah* (allegiance), *wala’ah* (loyalty), and self-esteem, legal rules for Jihad, terrorism and psychology. The idea behind this is that state sponsored clerics can have a strong social bond with detainees together with family members and help detainees to repent and change course.⁵⁵ The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia invests in financial support in form of family healthcare, lost salary and the school fees of detainees’ children and family. By conducting the financial and psychological support, the PRAC program implementers believe that social welfare to prevent violent extremism in the kingdom is the best strategy.

ICCT, another body with global impact, conducts research around threats of violent extremism and the effectiveness of PVE measures on a global scale with an aim of identifying the problem early and helping in the crafting of effective prevention measures.⁵⁶ ICCT also carries out tailor made workshops on the different aspects of preventing and countering violent extremism as part of their technical support to countries. Under this technical help, ICCT relies on former VE offenders, experts and security officials to educate societies on the need to dissociate themselves from the VE activities. Rehabilitation of ex-members of VE groups and reintegration in societies

⁵³ Boucek C, *Saudi Arabia’s ‘Soft’ Counterterrorism Strategy: Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Aftercare*, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2008), 1

⁵⁴ Porges, M L, *The Saudi Deradicalization Experiment*, (2010), Available at www.cfr.org/terrorism/saudi-deradicalization-experiment/p21292, accessed on 13th June 2021

⁵⁵ Boucek C, *Saudi Arabia’s ‘Soft’ Counterterrorism Strategy: Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Aftercare*, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2008), 1

⁵⁶ International Center for Countering Terrorism, *Preventing and Countering violent extremism*, ICCT Publication (2021), 1

is part of the broader technical function. Furthermore, the ICCT has been at the forefront in developing multi-stakeholder approach of PVE bringing together women, youths, civil societies, governments and victims of terrorism, an aspect that is expected to assist governments globally deal with VE in advance.

2.3 Performance of PVE Programs in the Post 9-11 International System

This section reviews performance of the enlisted PVE programs in the previous section. As established by the United States Institute of Peace, there is no universally agreed performance measure of PVE programs. Common approaches just assess changes in attitudes, behaviours and relationships in societies before and after implementation of PVE programs and in line with the objectives of these programs. This section therefore undertakes a multiagency approach; looking at these changes from an international perspective in line with structure, objectives, timelines, target groups and expected changes in societies.

From the study findings, the UNSC's initial initiatives and programs of dealing with violent extremism achieved some small degree of success and were marred with criticisms. The strategy of combating cross border terrorism using sanctions against countries suspected of funding terrorism created a rift amongst member states with some threatening to pull out. Other states criticized the strategies on the basis that USA was using UN to fight its global war on terrorism. States such as Afghanistan felt that they were being targeted by the resolutions in place. A study by Ucko confirms that the UNSC's programs which were focused on countering violence failed

to unite all member states in the fight and this made strategists at the council to adopt a CT strategy in 2006.⁵⁷ The UN continued reviewing the strategies to align to modern practices.

The new programs by the UN general assembly have however exhibited tremendous levels of success towards the prevention of violent extremism globally. Member states have become more content with the strategy and are taking part in implementing national strategies in line with the global strategy.⁵⁸ UN Women has reached out to more women in societies through financial support and education programs in Asia, Africa and Latin America.⁵⁹ The women used in PVE have helped reduce levels of radicalization according to UN women. UNDP, another agency assisting in PVE has supported many CSOs, youths and religious bodies in reducing the number of people recruited in VEOs.⁶⁰ The Global terrorism index confirms this through their assessments showing a declining trend in the number of terrorism related activities globally over the past two decades.⁶¹

Based on its structure and objectives, this study finds that the USAID PVE program enrolled globally has exhibited positive performance. By working with local governments in Middle Eastern countries through developmental programs such as Iraq, Lebanon and Syria, USAID has helped in changing the attitude of youths and women against joining Al-Qaeda and ISIS. The program has also been responsible with rehabilitation of ex-militants in the Middle Eastern countries through helping them financially and psychologically. From the reports by USAID in

⁵⁷ Ucko, H. D, *Preventing Violent Extremism through the United Nations: the Rise and Fall of a good Idea*, International Affairs 94: 2, (2018), pp 251–270

⁵⁸ Holmer G, Bauman P & Aryaeinejad K, *Measuring Up and Evaluating the Impact of P/CVE Programs*, United States Institute of Peace Publication (2018) pp 5 – 17

⁵⁹ Speckhard, A, *Women In Preventing And Countering Violent Extremism*, UN Women Publication (2021)

⁶⁰ United Nations Development Programme, *Preventing Violent Extremism through Promoting Inclusive Development, Tolerance and Respect for Diversity*, A development response to addressing radicalization and violent extremism (2016), pp 8 – 38

⁶¹ Institute for Economics & Peace, *Global Terrorism Index 2020: Measuring the Impact of Terrorism*, Sydney, November 2020, Available from: <http://visionofhumanity.org/reports> (accessed 6th May 2021)

Middle East, there have been fewer and fewer people joining extremist groups in the region.⁶² USAID in conjunction with the Nigerian government has also helped reduce the number of people joining Boko Haram, a violent extremist group in the North of the Country. USAID has also successfully turned away youths from joining Al-shabaab in the North Eastern and Coastal parts of Kenya since 2010.

An analysis of the UK's Prevent strategy proves that it has succeeded to a large extent in preventing and countering violent extremism. A vast majority of terrorism offenders in the country who have been identified through the channel program and punished don't go back to their terrorist activities.⁶³ A study by Douglas identifies 'Khan' an individual in the UK who asked for deradicalization help in 2012, received a mentor and through the program has been able to change attitude towards VE. Arab News in a recent study however revealed that there is no evidence that Prevent Strategy for prisoners is working.⁶⁴ In fact an independent reviewer quoted by the paper sad that the program is 'struggling with disruptive behaviour such as pretending to sleep and taking long toilet breaks by attendees'.

Saudi's PRAC Program has also achieved tremendous success in the country in line with its objective of reducing radicalization levels. According to the Kingdom's evaluation, the program has achieved 80% to 90% success rate, judging from the number of detainees who have abandoned their radical traits and changed for good.⁶⁵ By looking at the declining incidences of terrorism activities in the country, this study supports findings that the PRAC program has been successful to a large extent. Studies by independent reviewers however found that the PRAC

⁶² USAID, *Policy for Countering Violent Extremism Through Development Assistance*, USAID Publication (2020)

⁶³ Weeks, D, *Lessons Learned from U.K. Efforts to Deradicalize Terror Offenders*, Combating Terrorism Center Publication (2021), 14(1)

⁶⁴ Peter, C, *'No evidence' UK de-radicalization program works: Watchdog*, Arab News Publication

⁶⁵ Boucek C, *Saudi Arabia's 'Soft' Counterterrorism Strategy: Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Aftercare*, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2008), 1

program could be struggling in achieving its objectives. Concluding that individuals who have changed character have been deradicalized according to Porges does not directly mean that they may not revert to their extremist tendencies.⁶⁶

2.4 Factors Affecting Performance of PVE Programs in the Post 9/11 Attack

From study findings, the PVE programs have achieved some recommendable amounts of success but this has not been to 100% rate. This study identified lack of data-based interventions, lack of monitoring and evaluation mechanisms and conflicts from different stakeholders as the main factors affecting this performance. On the other end the study identified financial and technical support as some of the factors causing high performance of the programs.

Financial and technical support for instance has had a positive impact on the performance of assessed PVE programs. Contribution of UN's member states towards meetings held, policies formed and support to states affected has helped strengthen the UN counter terrorism architecture over the years.⁶⁷ The UNSC has continuously invested in intelligence technology and helped distribute it to member states. Through the expertise of its agencies such as UN Women and UNDP, the UN has been able to reach out to women and youths who are likely to be radicalized in time with clear PVE strategies. Financial support of the USA government towards its USAID program has enabled the program to reach as far as Asia and Africa in targeting victims of VE and in preventing VE.⁶⁸ The UK's Prevent strategy has also been able to exist to date due to financial support by the British government and other stakeholders and the commitment by local

⁶⁶ Porges, M L, *The Saudi Deradicalization Experiment*, (2010), Available at www.cfr.org/terrorism/saudi-deradicalization-experiment/p21292, accessed on 13th June 2021

⁶⁷ United Nations Development Programme, *Preventing Violent Extremism through Promoting Inclusive Development, Tolerance and Respect for Diversity*, A development response to addressing radicalization and violent extremism (2016), pp 8 – 38

⁶⁸ Awadallah A., Lang H., and Densmore K, *Losing the War of Ideas: Countering Violent Extremism in the Age of Trump*, Center for America Progress 2017)

authorities in meeting the objectives of the program. The Saudi's PRAC program involving financial and psychological aid to families affected with VE is only possible with financial commitment from the Kingdom. It is highly certain from this study that this is what has sustained the program and caused it to achieve some commendable level of success.

The lack of data-based interventions in most of the PVE programs has affected performance negatively. As established in the study, most of the programs are conducted with anecdotal evidence with results that remain unknown. The programs rely on attitudes, behaviours and relationships of individuals in societies to determine levels of deradicalization and inability to engage in violent extremism in future periods.⁶⁹ This is a hard aspect to track as there are no real numbers on the personal attributes to be assessed and monitored over time. The programs such as the UN's CT strategy proved inadequate when ISIS carried out a series of global attacks in 2015.⁷⁰ This according to the study was due to a missing trail of accurate data reflecting the extent of PVE programs worldwide. Further, most of the programs are assessed internally by the bodies implementing them. This has been the common case with Saudi's PRAC program where the Kingdom indicated 80%-90% success rates based on the number of prisoners who took part in the program.

Conflicts from different stakeholders in the roll out of the PVE programs have been another challenge affecting the performance of such programs. Reasons for the conflict range from repressive policies undermining human rights of some individuals in the society to suspected instances of bias in the program objectives. In the case of early UNSC's P/CVE program, some

⁶⁹ Holmer G, Bauman P & Aryaeinejad K, *Measuring Up and Evaluating the Impact of P/CVE Programs*, United States Institute of Peace Publication (2018) pp 5 – 17

⁷⁰ Ucko, H. D, *Preventing Violent Extremism through the United Nations: the Rise and Fall of a good Idea*, *International Affairs* 94: 2, (2018), pp 251–270

member states that felt targeted by the strategies threatened to leave the council.⁷¹ The program could not run effectively in the periods after 9/11 due to the negative perception from the states that felt US government was using UN to run its Global War on Terror campaign and these issues had to be addressed in the new PVE plans.⁷² The UK's Prevent strategy has also received criticisms for its one-sided nature on the British values and alienation of other societies. As Combes points out, 'some Universities refused to take part in the channel program on the basis that some communities were being targeted.'⁷³ The programs like PRAC and Prevent strategy also seem to rely on societal welfare approaches, aspects that make them unpopular amongst individuals inclined to different perspectives.

Diversity of the issue of violent extremism presents a challenge on the structuring of PVE programs in a global perspective, measuring performance and doing follow-ups. Violent extremist groups operating in different countries are motivated by different factors, adopt varying strategies in recruiting members and in conducting attacks. A VE group in Africa like Boko Haram has for instance been associated with the kidnapping of school-going girls and demanding Islamic influence in the Northern part of Nigeria. VE groups in South American countries such as Columbia work to promote their drug-dealing businesses and use kidnappings, bombings and other forms of threats. Even in the Al-Qaeda with operations in several countries, the strategy of operations has been seen to be different in the Middle Eastern countries of Lebanon and Syria as compared to their operations in Northern Africa. Further still, the tactics by these VE groups have been advancing with time and with technological transformations. Some of the groups continue investing in Industry 4.0 technologies such as cybersecurity, artificial intelligence and robotics,

⁷¹ Heupel, M, Adapting to Transnational Terrorism: The UN Security Council's Evolving Approach to Terrorism, *Security Dialogue*, 38(4), 2007, pp 477–499; 497

⁷² *Ibid*, pp 477 – 494

⁷³ Combes, W S, *Assessing Two Countering Violent Extremism Programs: Saudi Arabia's PRAC and the United Kingdom's Prevent Strategy*, *Small Wars Journal* (2013)

big data analytics, cloud technology and the use of advanced weapons in carrying out attacks. This enlisted diversity of the VE programs continues to make it hard for PVE programs to keep up with the pace. The PVE programs adopted in some developing countries have had the challenge of meeting the tactics adopted by global VE groups and eventually collapsed within a few years of their operations.

The study findings revealed that varying individual country's poor governance structures and political systems globally affected the implementation and performance of PVE programs. As had been indicated in UNSC's report, the success of PVE and CVE initiatives relied on the cooperation of states. Unfortunately, some states have experienced many civil wars over the last twenty years with others still under the environment of civil wars. Examples of these states include Syria, Lebanon, Yemen in the Middle East. In Africa, the likes of Mali, Ivory Coast and Sudan continue recording civil wars. In such country cases, the breeding environment for violent extremism grows and presents an opportunity for global based VE groups to join. In some countries, governments in charge have refused to cooperate with international bodies in the structuring and implementation of PVE related programs. This happens despite the realization that a majority of their domestic PVE programs have failed. With such poor political and governance systems, success of PVE programs is limited, no matter how good they might seem on paper.

Finally, a majority of the programs as established in this study have lacked robust monitoring and evaluation approaches. The successful implementation of these programs as was noted by UN required the integration of international, national and even local policies of PVE. With the huge time spent in the drive, resources and levels of commitment by individuals from different sectors, monitoring these PVE programs has proved a disaster. This partly explains why newer cases of

terrorism keep on happening in areas like Afghanistan where UN had invested a lot. This could be probably be because societies keep advancing with VEOs adapting newer tricks of radicalizing individuals, an aspect that upbeats any previously laid strategies. Coming up with monitoring and evaluation programs is also hard due to the lack of data based interventions. The evaluation is therefore not adequate enough to correctly predict societies and to influence positive change.

2.5 Solutions to Challenges hindering Performance of PVE Programs Post 9/11 Attack

Given that the programs hold good motives for societies with regards to the elimination of VE, it is important that a few factors be put into consideration to promote positive performance. The UN with its renewed strategies of PVE should hold countries accountable for national and local level policies. Leaders of the UN Security Council should leverage on their relationship with world leaders to review all the policies in line with human right provisions. A reporting framework on the PVE policies so far should be clearly established for all countries and monitoring should be done to ensure that they effectively meet their objectives. On their part, countries and member states of UN and those working with USAID and EU on PVE should work closely with local authorities to collect legitimate data on performance.

Continuous investment in technology and modern security practices at the global level in the PVE programs will help improve their performance with regards to speed of responding to cases and acceptability in societies. Given that innovations are being applied in almost every aspect of human life to transform the ways of working, it will be prudent to also engage security teams dealing with the prevention of violent extremism on innovations and modern technology. Sensors can for instance be used to detect presence of dangerous ammunitions before explosion, robotics to disengage planned bombs, artificial intelligence to predict occurrence of VE related attacks

and big data analytics used in predicting the probability of terrorism events occurring. PVE programs can also adopt virtual platforms such as Google meet, Microsoft teams and zoom to deliver training and other educational programs to community members that are vulnerable and likely to join VE groups. In fact through virtual platforms, experts in different continents can meet and deliver desired content in any part of the world to prevent violent extremism. The virtual meeting process can also allow local PVE programs in several parts of the world to pull together resources; create robust strategies and reach out to communities with regards to prevention of violent extremism.

Focus on defining political and governance structures of countries will also improve performance of the PVE programs. The political climate of a country is the basic structure of promoting peace and enabling the thriving of economic activities. As such, focus of the international bodies involved in PVE should be first strengthening the political systems of countries globally. This can be through encouraging country leaders to have in place working constitutions, promoting equality in appointments, encouraging them to respect rule of law and eradicate corruption in operations. Working with conflicting leaders to restore peace in countries experiencing civil wars will also go a long way in promoting peace, promoting economic growth and dissuading people from being part of VE groups. Regional bodies such as ASEAN, EU and AU amongst others can continue monitoring political status of member countries, legal systems of the countries and commit resources to the stabilization of political systems of countries within their regions. The regional bodies can also promote efficient governance structures in countries, solve issues like border conflicts likely to spark animosity between states and encourage countries to share ideas on best governance strategies.

Independent parties should be allowed to assess performance of PVE programs and present their honest opinions. Getting independent parties to work on this reduces chances of bias and allows diverse metrics to be considered.⁷⁴ Success can for instance be on the basis of societal, economic and environmental progress of the programs at both international and local levels. Other than accurate and reliable findings from independent experts, implementers of PVE programs can access wide range of knowledge on the best strategies to adopt to make the programs even more effective.

Undertaking an integrated stakeholder approach in formulating, implementing and monitoring PVE programs at the international level can also be a good solution to the challenges and a positive move towards improved performance. Stakeholders of the PVE programs range from local societies directly affected with VE, local leaders from religion, cultural and administrative offices, country heads, scholars and appointed organizational executives. All these individuals when engaged bring an important piece of information on the table towards building robust PVE strategies. The UN, in its evolving strategies, has tried to incorporate agencies, allowed states to adopt their own definitions of PVE and allowed participation of local communities in its PVE strategies and this has seen tremendous improvements in the recent past. Continuous engagement is however needed if any success is to be sustained due to the evolving nature of violent extremism. Researchers and scholars on the topic can help in revealing newer approaches being undertaken by VEOs, performance of existing PVEs and recommendations on better practices to solve the VE menace.

The study further established that investing and promoting investments in infrastructural projects in regions and specific countries will help in improving performance of PVE programs.

⁷⁴ Combes.W S, *Assessing Two Countering Violent Extremism Programs: Saudi Arabia's PRAC and the United Kingdom's Prevent Strategy*, Small Wars Journal (2013)

Infrastructural projects in this case range from social infrastructure such as schools, hospitals and recreational facilities, to transport infrastructure such as roads, rail, ports and airports, to telecommunications infrastructure, water and even energy related projects. International bodies like World Bank Group have been working at promoting this, and should continue reaching out to more countries and promoting the structuring and implementation of such projects. International Monetary Fund, USAID and even UN can set aside funds to support the infrastructural projects which consume large amounts of resources. Benefits of infrastructural projects surpass that of creating employment to locals and reducing poverty rates, and include that of creating steady income streams for governments and supporting other businesses. International bodies with expertise like the World Association of PPPs and educational institutions can help governments in structuring the procurement of large infrastructure projects through public-private partnerships and delivering such projects in the shortest time possible. Approving loans to support projects and sending experts in development are other functions that can be played by members of the international community to support developing countries in creating robust projects and influencing lives away from violent extremism.

2.6 Chapter Summary

This chapter has assessed the performance of PVE programs since the 9-11 incident from an international perspective. From the findings, renowned programs have included UN P/CVE strategy, EU's PVE policies, USAID's program, UK's Prevent Strategy and Saudi Arabia's PRAC program. The objectives of these programs have been engaging societal welfare to raise awareness on violent extremist ideas, reducing the number and influence of VE groups on a global level, reducing number of people joining VE groups, defining national policies on identifying and preventing violent extremism and raising awareness on the overall concept of

VE. Bodies behind the programs have invested finances, technology and human resources in the implementation of the programs. Findings revealed that the PVE programs have had commendable levels of success in several states globally. This is evidenced by reduction in terrorism related events, impact of terrorism and positive changes in attitudes and behaviour away from VE.⁷⁵ The influence of large VE groups like Al-Qaeda has been declining over the last ten years according to the study findings, a positive performance indicator for the PVE programs. Targeted groups like women, youths and marginalized sections have been reached through the different programs and significant impact in terms of character change has been noted. Factors affecting performance of the programs as discussed in this study include financial and technical support, lack of data based interventions, insufficient monitoring and evaluation strategies and conflicts amongst different stakeholders on the strategies of the programs. Other factors as identified in the chapter included poor governance and political systems amongst various countries globally and advancements in strategies and technologies used by VE groups. Out of the factors; only financial and technical support resulted to improved performance of the PVE programs. The researcher found that strategies such as undertaking an integrated stakeholder approach in the creation, implementation and monitoring of the PVE strategies and allowing independent audits of the programs. The chapter has also enlisted the need to invest and promote investments in infrastructural projects at country and regional levels and improvement of political and governance structures in countries as additional suggestions on improving the performance of PVE programs on a global scale.

⁷⁵ Institute for Economics & Peace, *Global Terrorism Index 2020: Measuring the Impact of Terrorism*, Sydney, November 2020, Available from: <http://visionofhumanity.org/reports> (accessed 6th May 2021)

CHAPTER THREE

FACTORS AFFECTING THE PERFORMANCE OF PREVENTION OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM (PVE) PROGRAMS IN THE POST-9/11 INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM: AN ASSESSMENT OF EASTERN, WESTERN AND SOUTHERN AFRICA EXPERIENCES

3.1 Introduction

This chapter presents findings and discussion of findings on the performance of prevention of violent extremism programs in Africa in the period after the September 11th of 2001 terrorist attack in USA. As established in the literature review, the world at large became more cautious of violent extremism groups and their dangerous activities after the 9-11 attack that claimed the lives of 2,977 people, led to 6,000 being injured and destroyed property worth of millions.⁷⁶ Increased caution was also due to the findings that violent extremist groups, some with global reach and impact in several continents such as Al-Qaeda and ISIL continued increasing their reach, targeting states even in the African region.⁷⁷ As such several programs both prevention and counter interventions have continued to be implemented to deal with violent extremism and protect humanity. This chapter focused only on the prevention of violent extremism programs in Africa from 2001 to date, assessing the performance of the programs, analyzing factors affecting performance and finally addressing possible solutions to the factors hindering the success of the projects in the African region.

⁷⁶ Coolsaet,R, *EU Counterterrorism Strategy: Value Added or Chimera?'*, International Affairs, vol.86, no.4, 2010, pp.857 - 873

⁷⁷ Zyl, I V, *Preventing violent extremism Lessons from Africa*, Institute of Security Studies, Africa Report 17 (2019), pp 2 – 4

3.2 Structure of PVE Programs in Africa

This section sought to first analyze the structure of PVE programs in Africa with regards to objectives of the programs, activities undertaken by the PVE programs, support systems of the programs and the strategies followed in achieving the objectives. Discovering these attributes was an initial step towards assessing performance of PVE programs in the multidimensional analysis approach followed in this research paper. Secondary data formed an important source of information in this section.

3.2.1 Objectives of PVE Programs in the African region

From the study findings, the two common primary objectives of PVE Programs across Africa for the last twenty years have been to prevent vulnerable people from joining VE groups and preventing the spread of the influence of VE groups with their doctrines in African societies. 27 PVE programs from Nigeria, 15 from Kenya, 12 from the Northern parts of Africa and 6 from South Africa reviewed in this study had the mission of limiting as many youths and women as possible from joining violent extremist groups. The findings agree with Lorentzen's study findings with a focus in Mali that the aim of PVE programs implemented by both private parties and the government was to prevent youths and women who were most vulnerable from joining VE groups.⁷⁸ PVE programs also aimed at reaching out to individual members of VE groups and converting them away from violent extremism. Further, the objective of reducing the impact of VE related activities with regards to death rates, injuries and property destruction was found to be a common primary objective amongst security teams working to prevent violent extremism in Africa. This was however most common amongst security and peace keeping agencies dealing with the prevention of violent extremism.

⁷⁸Lorentzen J, *Women as 'New Security Actors' in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism in Mali*, Oxford University Press, *International Affairs* 97 : 3 (2021) pp 721–738; 726

Secondary objectives of PVE programs revealed in the study findings included that of improving financial capabilities of individuals and improving knowledge capacity of people on peaceful and harmonious living. By improving the financial capabilities for instance, most PVE programs worked to dissuade individuals who joined VE groups to benefit from financial incentives offered by the groups.⁷⁹ Improving knowledge around violent extremism and its effects on humanity aimed to increase the understanding of civilians on the importance of living peacefully in communities, accommodating each other and changing their motive of joining VE groups. The study findings agreed with the objectives of UNDP and the projects implemented across the African continent to improve education levels and reduce poverty.⁸⁰ Most USAID related programs in the continent also aimed at reducing poverty levels and improving the reasoning independence of individuals in Africa to enable them lead positive lives away from violent extremism.⁸¹

Other secondary objectives of PVE programs as revealed in the study included improving legal and justice systems, strengthening inclusive politics and governance, improving security and strengthening other PVE programs. The goal of improving legal and justice systems has mostly been founded on the realization that weak systems limited justice where it was due and led to violent extremism as vengeance by the groups that felt disadvantaged.⁸² The aim of strengthening inclusive politics and governance structures also relied on the assumption that equal representation of communities in leadership positions would create the need of working together and living in harmony. Strong governance structures similarly provided opportunity for

⁷⁹ Cold-Ravnkilde, S. M., and Jacobsen, K, L, *Disentangling the security traffic jam in the Sahel: constitutive effects of contemporary interventionism*, International Affairs Journal, 96 : 4 (2020) 855–874

⁸⁰ United Nations Development Programme, *Preventing Violent Extremism through Promoting Inclusive Development, Tolerance and Respect for Diversity*, A development response to addressing radicalization and violent extremism (2016), pp 10 – 12

⁸¹ USAID, *Policy for Countering Violent Extremism Through Development Assistance*, USAID Publication (2020)

⁸² Zyl, I V, *Preventing violent extremism Lessons from Africa*, Institute of Security Studies, Africa Report 17 (2019), pp 2 – 8

every member of societies to participate in policy making, an aspect that reduced rivalries. The objective of improving security was envisioned to identify weak links used by VE groups, create robust security response teams and seal any chances of insecurity in the continent. The aim of supporting other PVE program, and especially those with local outreach was on the basis that working together in addressing the VE disaster would have more impact than working singly.

3.2.2 Focus Areas of PVE Programs in Africa

Findings of the study revealed that most PVE projects and programs have been conducted in East Africa, Central and West Africa with very few initiatives being carried out in the Southern parts of the continent. This is because most PVE projects have been implemented by organizations that previously dealt with CVE; and which have been purely event driven. With this regard, the projects identified were majorly in ‘high risk’ countries which include Somali, Nigeria, Mali and Libya.⁸³ Somali is high risk as it is home to Al-shabaab group that has spread its reach in East Africa; Nigeria due to the presence of ‘Boko Haram’, Libya due to the existence of Al-Qaeda affiliates and Mali due to many community VE groups. PVE programs have also been concentrated in countries neighboring the ‘high risk’ countries such as Kenya, Ethiopia, Cameroon, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad, Tunisia and Mauritania and which seem to be host potential recruits.

Notable PVE projects have also been identified in countries marred with political instability such as DRC, Sudan, Central Africa Republic and Togo. These projects have however failed after short periods of operation due to hostile working environments such as the regular coups, fights and hostility from communities. In the Southern African space, focus has been on the events in Mozambique where high levels of insurgency have been witnessed since 2017. The region had

⁸³ Mets, S, *How to handle the threat of an expanding Islamic State in Africa*, World Politics Review (2019)

been insulated since 2001, but the new entrance by ISIS and Al-shabaab in the country has meant the cropping up of PVE programs.⁸⁴

With regards to vulnerable groups and individuals in societies, findings established that a majority of the PVE groups targeted women and youths. In Mali, Lorentzen notes that PVE programs developed from as early as 2011 have been targeting women to revolutionize and change perspective of VE in societies.⁸⁵ In Nigeria, similar cases of targeting women in the Northern parts of the Country have been common. Women in this case are educated, empowered with finances to start businesses and earn a living, and involved in the activities of counseling people from joining VE groups.⁸⁶ The youths have also been a target in East African countries of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda and amongst the Southern African countries of South Africa and Mozambique.⁸⁷ Youths, who are known to be a majority of those recruited to join VE groups, have been targeted for financial empowerment, education and rehabilitation for those using drugs. Improving the employment rate of youths and women through infrastructural development is envisioned by governments and international bodies as the best way of reducing numbers joining VE groups.

3.2.3 Strategies adopted by PVE Programs in Africa

From the analysis of PVE programs implemented in the African region in line with their objectives, most PVE programs have approached the issue of preventing violent extremism by first promoting development and empowering communities. In fact, a majority a majority of the

⁸⁴ Fabricius, P, *Is Islamic State taking charge of Mozambique's jihadist insurgency?* Institute for Security Studies (2020)

⁸⁵ Lorentzen J, *Women as 'New Security Actors' in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism in Mali*, Oxford University Press, *International Affairs* 97 : 3 (2021) pp 721–738

⁸⁶ *Ibid*, 728 – 730

⁸⁷ Zyl, I V, *Preventing violent extremism Lessons from Africa*, Institute of Security Studies, *Africa Report* 17 (2019), pp 2 – 8

PVE programs did not enlist prevention of violent extremism as their key priority but rather chose to enlist activities like education, training, counseling and humanitarian aid as their main areas of focus. The findings agree with a survey by Institute of Security Studies covering 67 organizations with 133 PVE programs in West Africa confirmed that 35% of the assessed had education/training and capacity building as their main activity.⁸⁸ 26% did advocacy/legal aid and humanitarian support, another 26% did peace building and violence prevention, 14% listed humanitarian support, 11% focus on development, another 11% do agriculture and food security, 6% have listed health and gender based violence prevention, 3% do reconciliation, trauma counseling and reintegration, 2% do research while only 10% have defined P/CVE and counter terrorism as their main activity.⁸⁹

In the East African region, another survey by ISS covering 117 organizations implementing 148 projects revealed that 35% conducted education/training and capacity building as their main business, 26% did violence prevention and peace building while another 26% listed human rights/advocacy/legal aid as their main.⁹⁰ 14% did humanitarian aid, 11% listed agriculture/food security & resource allocation, 6% listed health and gender based violence prevention, 3% listed reconciliation, re-integration and trauma counseling as their main activity, 2% listed research and only 7% listed P/CVE as their main activity.⁹¹ In the Southern African region, programs by SADC and individual governments such as the South African, Zambian and Tanzania have revolved around training and capacity building, research and analysis; empowering local

⁸⁸ Zyl I and Frank C, *Preventing Extremism in West and Central Africa*, Institute for Security Studies(2018), <https://issafrica.org/research/west-africa-report/preventing-extremism-in-west-and-central-africa>

⁸⁹ Ibid, p3

⁹⁰ Zyl I and Mahdi M, *Preventing violent extremism in East Africa: Lessons from Kenya, Somalia, Tanzania and Uganda*, Institute for Security Studies (2019), <https://issafrica.org/research/east-africa-report/preventing-violent-extremism-in-east-africa-lessons-from-kenya-somalia-tanzania-and-uganda>

⁹¹ Ibid, p8

communities, addressing the political, legal, social and economic push factors; and promoting P/CVE diplomacy to underpin broad-based partnerships.

The study found that in the countries where conflict existed, the problem of social and economic development such as gender based violence, low quality of health, unemployment and marginalization were greater. Given that the enlisted problems are key drivers of violent extremism, imparting life skills in the communities has been seen as a sure way of improving financial capabilities of individuals, changing the reasoning of individuals with regards to extremism and make them live in peace. In a survey by UNDP, approaches taken by organizations included strengthening democracy and inclusive politics, improving justice systems, improving general security, increasing sustainable economic opportunities, improving infrastructure, peace education, improving healthcare and making development programs in conflict areas more sensitive to conflict dynamics.⁹²

3.2.4 Sources of Support for the PVE Programs in the African Region

PVE programs in the African region have relied on technical, socio-political and financial support from different stakeholders both locally and internationally over the past 20 years. With regards to socio-political support, PVE programs have had to rely on the support of existing governments and regional bodies in the form of goodwill and strategy implementation. Governments like Kenya for instance, implemented a National Counter terrorism and prevention strategy and reached out to communities, aiding CSOs to prevent and counter violent extremism. The government of Nigeria has also been at the forefront in creating goodwill and supporting programs aimed at preventing and countering violent extremism in the Northern region of the

⁹² United Nations Development Programme, *Preventing Violent Extremism through Promoting Inclusive Development, Tolerance and Respect for Diversity*, A development response to addressing radicalization and violent extremism (2016), pp 10 – 12

Country. In fact, the government has offered security to the program implementers to support them in their work. The Africa Union through its mission in Somali (AMISOM) has been supporting PVE programs in Somali, other than combating members of the Al-shabaab group.⁹³

Technical support in the form of training on PVE strategies and technologies required at work have been offered by several international bodies such as UNDP, USAID and HAKI group international. Governments, religious institutions and private businesses operating in specific countries have also contributed funds, donated technology and dedicated time to address the issue of violent extremism.⁹⁴ Media houses operating across Africa like France 24, BBC and CNN have been covering violent extremist events, inviting experts to educate CSOs and other PVE related teams on best ways of handling the issue and informing on the progress of PVE in Africa. ‘Radio Waumini’ for example, in the Coastal region of Kenya has worked together with the local community in identifying members of VE groups, counseling them and educating general society on shunning away from VE.

With regards to financial support, the study found that most of the PVE projects are being funded by the European Union, individual states within Europe and the government of USA. Statistics by UN indicate that the US government donated US\$109,551,927 towards projects in West and Central Africa.⁹⁵ Intergovernmental organizations like UN contributed US\$ 10,327,383 towards projects in West and Central Africa. Six organizations in West and Central Africa were receiving donations from their governments. With regards to specific countries, Mali received US\$ 2,272,620, Nigeria US\$ 8,223,347, Cameroun US\$ 12,604,513, Chad US\$ 1,521,898, Niger US\$

⁹³ Search for Common Ground, *Meet Me at the Maskani: A Mapping of Influencers, Networks, and Communication Channels in Kenya and Tanzania* (2017), Accessed at: <https://www.sfcg.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/SFCG-Meet-Me-at-the-Maskani-Final.pdf>, on 20th September 2021

⁹⁴ Ibid, pp 16 – 19

⁹⁵ Zyl I and Frank C, *Preventing Extremism in West and Central Africa*, Institute for Security Studies(2018), <https://issafrica.org/research/west-africa-report/preventing-extremism-in-west-and-central-africa> p 7

5,956,434 and Mali US\$ 2,272,520. In West Africa, 34% of the projects were funded for between 0 to 12 months, 14% received funding for 1 to 2 years, 3% received funding for 2 to 3 years, 4% received funding for more than three years while 74% did not come out clearly on the duration of funding that they get.

In East Africa, the government of USA contributed US\$ 60,089,784 towards PVE related projects. The European Union and countries within EU donated US\$ 47,867,043 to projects in East Africa. Intergovernmental organizations like UN contributed US\$ 23,440,170 towards projects in East Africa. Eight organizations in East Africa were receiving donations from their governments. With regards to specific countries: Kenya received US\$ 103,284,503, Somalia received US\$ 31,463,115, Tanzania received US\$ 12,700,122 and Uganda received US\$ 11,804,001. In East Africa, 51% received funding for 0 to 12 months, 34% received funding for 1 to 2 years, 30% for 2 to 3 years and 31% for more than 3 years.

3.3 Performance of PVE Programs in Africa

This section sought to assess performance of PVE programs in line with their objectives, strategies adopted, focus areas and target groups and support received. Performance has been assessed in terms of effectiveness to meet objectives, timeliness in responding to the case at hand, value for money invested and flexibility in responding to changing societal needs. From the study findings, PVE programs in the East African region have been more effective in reducing influence of VE groups with regards to numbers recruited as compared to West and Northern Africa. The findings agreed with surveys by Zyl who had found that more youths and women have been joining VE groups in West and Northern Africa as compared to Eastern

Africa.⁹⁶ Though no systematic record of number of individuals saved from joining and participating in VE activities across the African continent exists, qualitative reports of PVE programs indicated that the numbers have reduced greatly over the past ten years.

Findings also revealed that PVE programs by religious institutions and media houses in East and West Africa have been timely and worked well in converting VE groups' members and in successfully rehabilitating them. Through their message of countering misleading ideologies used by VE groups, many individuals have been convinced to leave VE groups over the last two decades and pursue other positive economic activities. Wide coverage of the bodies has ensured that positive message spreads quickly even in the camps of VE groups. Those willing to transform and leave VE have been received by the religious bodies and counseled appropriately in East Africa.⁹⁷ Further, findings revealed that timely reaching out to individuals ready to join VE groups and educating them on the adverse consequences of being part of the groups has helped reduce the number of people who would have been part of VE groups.⁹⁸

With regards to VE related incidences, study findings revealed that PVE programs have recorded different performance rates across regions with those in West and Central Africa performing relatively poorer than those in East Africa and those in the Southern African region. This has been evident in the increasing high number of VE related incidents recorded in Nigeria, Mali and DRC in the past ten years as compared to those recorded in East Africa.⁹⁹ One respondent,

⁹⁶ Zyl I and Frank C, *Preventing Extremism in West and Central Africa*, Institute for Security Studies(2018), <https://issafrica.org/research/west-africa-report/preventing-extremism-in-west-and-central-africa>

⁹⁷ Search for Common Ground, *Meet Me at the Maskani: A Mapping of Influencers, Networks, and Communication Channels in Kenya and Tanzania* (2017), Accessed at: <https://www.sfcg.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/SFCG-Meet-Me-at-the-Maskani-Final.pdf>, on 20th September 2021

⁹⁸ Sempijja, N & Nkosi B, *National counter-terrorism (c-t) policies and challenges to human rights and civil liberties: case study of Kenya*, (2019), in: shore., hoadley s. (eds) international human rights and counter-terrorism. international human rights, springer, singapore, pp. 1 – 18

⁹⁹ UN Security Council, *Situation in West Africa, Sahel 'Extremely Volatile' as Terrorists Exploit Ethnic Animosities, Special Representative Warns Security Council*, SC/14245

interviewed by ISS from Nigeria confirmed that many people in Northern Nigeria were still joining Boko Haram, despite existing persuasion from PVE programs in the region.¹⁰⁰ In fact, according to reports by CSOs in the Northern parts of the country, most of the rehabilitated members received backlash from their peers, rejoined the VE group and even assisted in raiding those supporting PVE initiatives. In the East African region, though cases related to VE are still being recorded, VSOs and government agencies have enjoyed relatively peaceable environments in their drive and have contained attacks that could have otherwise been detrimental. Government of Tanzania reports for instance reveals the tremendous success of ‘*polisi jamii*’ PVE initiative that has thwarted serious plans by terrorism groups to recruit and even attack their facilities.¹⁰¹

Preventing violent extremism by developing schools, transport, communication and market infrastructure have had relatively low levels of success in dealing with VE in West and Central Africa. This is partly because of the high rate of unemployment amongst youths, some of whom have acquired tertiary education.¹⁰² Hard economic times brought about by rising inflation in African states, drought and famine, and the recent Covid-19 pandemic also seem to have reduced the hopes of a better living amongst youths and women, influencing some to join VE groups. Success with this initiatives has however been seen from personal empowerment initiatives like career development programs, talent development and microfinance facilities directed at the youths and women, a group that is likely to fall to the allure of VE groups. One interview from South Africa, as part of the study by RUSI confirmed that economic empowerment programs

¹⁰⁰ Zyl I and Frank C, *Preventing Extremism in West and Central Africa*, Institute for Security Studies(2018), <https://issafrica.org/research/west-africa-report/preventing-extremism-in-west-and-central-africa> p 8

¹⁰¹ Dang, L, *Violent Extremism and Community Policing in Tanzania*, United States Institute of Peace, (2019), 442, pp. 7 – 18

¹⁰² Zyl I and Frank C, *Preventing Extremism in West and Central Africa*, Institute for Security Studies(2018), https://issafrica.org/research/west-africa-report/preventing-extremism-in-west-and-central-africa_p15

together with increasing infrastructural development could be helping a great deal to pull people away from VE.¹⁰³

3.4 Factors affecting Performance of PVE Programs in Africa

Study findings indicate that structure of projects, insufficient financial and technical capacity, and lack of support from societies, cultural and communication barriers have been the most common factors affecting the success of PVE projects. With regards to finances, this study established from ISS survey¹⁰⁴, Afrobarometer¹⁰⁵ and UNDP reports that most PVE projects in Africa suffered from inadequate financing. In as much as a majority of the projects received funding from UN, EU, AU and specific countries across the world, most of the funding received was for less than one year.¹⁰⁶ PVE programs, just like projects in institutions, have expenses to meet. For their case, common expenses include human resource expenses, travelling expenses, and costs of conducting meetings, investigations and costs of training materials. For the projects choosing to empower societies economically, additional costs include those of developing infrastructure, markets and establishing businesses. With these expenses, which require huge amounts, the short term funds available could be inadequate. Evolving societal needs also imply new investments, which when hampered result to a stalling of the projects.

The structure of some of the PVE projects has also contributed to their success or failure. Projects structured around regressive ideologies that use force and violate human rights for instance, have received backlash from societies and operated with limited success. Measures

¹⁰³ Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), STRIVE: Lessons Learned. Nairobi: Royal United Services Institute (2017)

¹⁰⁴ Zyl I and Frank C, *Preventing Extremism in West and Central Africa*, Institute for Security Studies(2018), <https://issafrica.org/research/west-africa-report/preventing-extremism-in-west-and-central-africa> p 18

¹⁰⁵ Nkomo, S & Clarke, *Violent extremism in Africa Popular assessments from the 'Eastern Corridor'*, Afrobarometer Policy Paper No. 65 (2020)

¹⁰⁶ Zyl I and Frank C, *Preventing Extremism in West and Central Africa*, Institute for Security Studies(2018), <https://issafrica.org/research/west-africa-report/preventing-extremism-in-west-and-central-africa> pp 12 - 16

targeting and isolating groups based on religious, ethnic or other communities as perpetrators have even increased intensity of violent extremism by causing victimization and exclusion. There has been a recording of very few members from the targeted communities in East Africa who have taken part in the programs.¹⁰⁷ The discriminated communities have also directed attacks at these bodies. With regards to the structure of projects, some donor organizations assisting in the modeling of PVE projects impose strict guidelines on activities, target groups and areas of work. The structure may be different from specific requirements in the localities in Africa, and this has resulted to slow uptake of the desired objectives.

The study also found that corruption related cases and mismanagement of resources were a huge hindrance to the success of PVE programs in Africa. Corruption has been evident in the embezzlement of funds meant for outreach and using of funds meant to support PE initiatives for personal projects.¹⁰⁸ Poor accounting practices, general greed of program managers, and lack of proper auditing procedures have resulted to the loss of considerable amounts to corruption. In some cases institutional donors towards PVE projects in East and West Africa have had to stop funding the projects due to the lack of accountability from the part of PVE groups. Mismanagement of resources with regards to underpaying trainers helping to reach out to communities on PVE, not fully utilizing assets set for given courses and use of resources for personal rather than desired objectives have brought in conflicts in PVE groups. As such, mismanaged PVE groups have recorded high staff turnover and received bad reputation from communities where they work in.¹⁰⁹ High levels of resentments from the communities have in

¹⁰⁷ LeSage, A, *The rising terrorism threat in Tanzania: Domestic Islamist militancy and regional threats*, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University (2014)

¹⁰⁸ Sempijja, N & Nkosi B, *National counter-terrorism (c-t) policies and challenges to human rights and civil liberties: case study of Kenya*, (2019), in: shore., hoadley s. (eds) international human rights and counter-terrorism. international human rights, springer, singapore, pp. 1 – 18

¹⁰⁹ Ibid, pp 8 – 12

turn led to the closure of many PVE programs in several parts of Africa over the last twenty years.

The lack of support for PVE projects has is another factor affecting the success of the PVE projects across Africa. Communities in West Africa for example are afraid of speaking about ‘Boko Haram’ and participating in project activities directed at reducing its influence in the society.¹¹⁰ Most PVE projects have also not labeled themselves as those preventing violent extremism and have adopted different main businesses for fear of community perception. In some cases, governments refusing to negotiate with terrorists refused to work with international organizations in delivering PVE programs.¹¹¹ PVE is still perceived in negative light in some communities and the term has negative meanings. Marginalization of some groups and stigmatization makes some of the PVE projects targets by violent extremism groups. In cases where security forces have continued to attack the communities in question, such as North Eastern in Kenya, the support from such communities has been close to zero.¹¹² In this situation, revenge killings continue being witnessed to date.

Quantifying the success of PVE programs in Africa remains a challenge due to diverse measures proposed by different stakeholders. While some managers of PVE programs prefer evaluating performance by the number of people who have been influenced to leave VE groups, judging the attitude of the converts is difficult as some continue working for the VE groups. Quantifying success of initiatives such as infrastructure development is also difficult due to the many expectations from infrastructural development. Relying on the number of incidences related to

¹¹⁰ Holmer G, Bauman P & Aryaeinejad K, *Measuring Up and Evaluating the Impact of P/CVE Programs*, United States Institute of Peace Publication (2018) pp 5 – 17

¹¹¹ Zyl I and Frank C, *Preventing Extremism in West and Central Africa*, Institute for Security Studies(2018), <https://issafrica.org/research/west-africa-report/preventing-extremism-in-west-and-central-africa> pp 15 - 17

¹¹² Ibid, pp 14 – 15

VE over time and their magnitude also seems to be unreliable because of varying situations. In one case for instance, two VE cases recorded over five years could have resulted to more impact than twenty incidences recorded in another area over a similar time frame. Some scholars have also suggested that PVE programs being social in nature need to involve qualitative metrics. Setting targets for such metrics from year to the next is however difficult due to the subjectivity of the measures. In the case of lack of a uniform metric, setting objectives and conducting monitoring and evaluations proves difficult for PVE programs in Africa. Some could have collapsed due to this difficulty of measuring performance as more effort is input with no clear output being witnessed from the activities.

3.5 Solutions to the Factors hindering the Success of PVE Programs in Africa

To solve the enlisted challenges in the performance of PVE programs, this study suggests that there is need for governments, international entities, local PVE programs and communities to work in harmony in the planning and delivery of the projects. This will help in the preparation of community specific projects that handle drivers of violent extremism in the best way possible. This will also help in coordinating strategies of dealing with violent extremism, measuring success of the programs and carrying out reliable monitoring and evaluation programs. This view has also been discussed in studies by UN, and has resulted in the formation of UNDP and UN women to reach out to country specific PVE programs with support.¹¹³ Continued targeting of women and youth and additional focus on men in societies to address the issue of violent extremism will also help in ensuring success in the fight against VE.

Strengthening of ethics structure and promoting accountability in PVE programs in Africa will go a long way in improving the performance of the programs. Ethics can include the creation of

¹¹³ Bourekba M, *The United Nations' Evolving Approach to Counterterrorism*, CIDOB report (2020) pp 27 – 34

strong policy frameworks in the PVE programs with regards to work structure, defining positive work values and establishing sustainable relations with societies. When proper ethical standards are followed, minimal cases of corruption are recorded and this improves the acceptability of PVE initiatives in societies. Internal control systems such as robust accounting frameworks, segregation of duties, proper physical security on assets, monitoring and evaluation and digitalization of systems will help improve management structures of the PVE programs.

High levels of internal controls and accountability reduces chances of errors in organizations, encourages staff to abide by standard codes of ethics and improves effectiveness of workforce. Well managed PVE programs will not only attract funding and other forms of support from local and international organizations, but will also be accepted by the societies that they operate in and achieve critical performance objectives. The study findings on the importance of ethics in strengthening management and acceptability of PVE programs agree with Alex who focused on the mining sector and its contribution in the prevention of violent extremism. African Union in its annual paper indicated that proper management of organizations involved in preventing violent extremism in Africa resulted to improved performance of the programs with regards to reducing number of people joining VEs and preventing occurrence of VE related activities.

Provision of adequate funding and necessary financial management education can be another appropriate way of strengthening the projects. As noted by ISS, finding that a majority of the PVE programs are receiving funding for less than a year, planning together with meeting objectives has been an issue.¹¹⁴ The PVE programs therefore need to clearly highlight their objectives and have in place working budgets. Other than waiting for funding from international

¹¹⁴ Zyl I and Frank C, *Preventing Extremism in West and Central Africa*, Institute for Security Studies(2018), <https://issafrica.org/research/west-africa-report/preventing-extremism-in-west-and-central-africa>, pp 7

¹¹⁴ Ibid, pp 14 – 15

agencies, governments should also enlist their support for these entities. Training of the program facilitators on the best ways of structuring projects and financial expenditure will work a long way in ensuring successful management of the projects. The management of the PVE organizations should also to consider projects that can provide for sustainability of their operations.

Strengthening governance structures and legal systems in individual countries in Africa will also help improve performance of PVE programs. To achieve this, individual countries through citizens need to support processes of election and ensure that they have good political leaders in offices. Political leaders from the presidency also need to work in line with country constitutions to protect humanity and promote good governance. Having in place good political environment will not only allow PVE programs to thrive but will also be a blow to VE groups that take advantage of weak political systems. Equal opportunities for all citizens of a country in employment, leadership, business opportunities and settlement provisions will improve peaceful relations other than eradicating poverty. Efficient legal systems that uphold the rule of law and administer justice where it is due similarly help to improve harmony in societies. This further reduces discrimination and chances that some groups feel marginalized, an attribute that has been proved to motivate individuals to joining VE groups. The African Union together with regional bodies such as ECOWAS, EAC and SADC can help member countries in coming up with efficient leadership structures. By suspending non-compliant countries and limiting support for their activities, countries will take the issue of preventing violent extremism more seriously. International bodies such as EU, UN and specific countries like UK, France, Germany and USA can also support specific African countries experiencing difficulty in leadership structure to stabilize by providing needed fundings and technical support.

3.6 Summary of the Chapter

This chapter has assessed the performance of PVE programs in the African region over the last two decades. Findings established that the two common primary objectives of PVE Programs in Africa for the last twenty years have been to reduce the number of people joining VE groups and ensuring that transformed ex-violent extremists do not rejoin the VE groups. Additional objectives included that of containing and sustaining ex-violent extremists and that of reducing the impact of VE related activities with regards to death rates, injuries and property destruction. Findings have shown that most of the PVE projects have been undertaken in the West, Central and Eastern Africa with the Southern parts of Africa remaining insulated until 2017. The theory of change has been a common concept amongst the projects in transforming individuals from violent extremist tendencies in societies to peaceful and harmonious people. This has been done through education, training, job creation, fostering cohesion amongst communities and between governments and citizens, legal empowerment and support of good governance structures. Factors affecting performance of the PVE programs have included lack of support from communities with many having negative perceptions towards the programs and inadequate financial and technical support, poor structuring of some PVE projects. Suggested solutions to these problems from the chapter presentations have included the need to enlist the support of governments, international bodies and societies in the crafting of the PVE programs. Provision of financial and technical support to the facilitators of the PVE programs and efficient structuring of the projects have also been discussed as possible ways of ensuring improved success of PVE programs.

CHAPTER FOUR:

FACTORS AFFECTING THE PERFORMANCE OF PREVENTION OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM (PVE) PROGRAMS IN LAMU COUNTY, KENYA: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS

4.1 Introduction

This chapter presents findings and interpretation of findings on the performance of PVE programs in Lamu County. The researcher conducted 94 interviews with key informants such as government officials, community leaders, PVE program heads, religious leaders, youth and women leaders and civilians in Lamu County. The interview schedule attached in appendix 1 guided the data collection process from the respondents in Lamu County. The researcher also reviewed journals and other study materials on the topic in Lamu County and the Coastal region of Kenya. Primary data collected was analyzed using descriptive statistics to identify trends and patterns in line with the objectives of the study. Secondary data from research studies and reports on PVE in Lamu County was analyzed using content analysis. The chapter presents an assessment of the structure of some of the PVE programs, interventions undertaken, success rate of the programs, factors affecting the performance of the programs and proposition of better strategies to prevent violent extremism in Lamu County.

4.2 Structure of PVE Programs in Lamu County

4.2.1 Strategies adopted by PVE Programs in Lamu County

This section sought to review the structure of PE programs in Lamu County Kenya with regards to objectives, intervention measures, support initiatives and activities pursued. Findings of the study revealed that a majority of the PVE programs in the region have been structured to address the problem of violent extremism using two approaches or a combination of the two; dealing

with incentives of joining VE groups and dealing with factors likely to provide a breeding ground for VE to exist. The first direction of dealing with structural factors aimed at addressing societal aspects like high poverty rates, low education levels and unemployment that were likely to cause individuals to join VE groups as an alternative to better life. Government officials, and members of international groups who took part in the survey agreed that programs such as road construction, expansion of communication lines, market developments and improvement of schools was aimed at improving livelihood and dissuading people from joining VE groups that use financial incentives to recruit members.

‘The County government of Lamu together with the national government has in the last 7 years focused on infrastructural development in order to uplift livelihoods and reduce the number of unemployed youths likely to join the Al-shabaab.’¹¹⁵

These findings agree with the categorization of PVE initiatives by USAID who enlisted them under ‘pull factors’ such as economic and social incentives for joining VE groups. The findings agree with Badurdeen and Goldsmith who categorized the activities under primary initiatives aimed at addressing deep rooted grievances leading to extremist behaviour such as poverty, lack of job opportunities and low educational levels.¹¹⁶ VE groups with the understanding of social and economic challenges facing youths and women often ride on this to offer finances and promise ‘good life’ for those willing to join.¹¹⁷ Dealing with this root cause by empowering people economically through conducive business environment and socially through the right education is expected to go a long way in preventing violent extremism. Ongoing construction of

¹¹⁵ Response from Interview with government official involved in PVE on 28th August, 2021

¹¹⁶ Badurdeen F, A., & Goldsmith, P: *Initiatives and Perceptions to Counter Violent Extremism in the Coastal Region of Kenya*, Journal for Deradicalization (2018), 16, Pp. 77 – 79

¹¹⁷ James Khalil, Martine Zeuthen, Countering violent extremism and risk reduction: a guide to programme design and evaluation, Whitehall Report 2-16, Royal United Services Institute

LAPPSET project, support of vocational training centers, encouraging individuals to attend schools and the promotion of talent in the area are aimed at addressing economic hardships and marginalization, which are common vantage points used by Al-shabaab in recruiting individuals and groups.¹¹⁸

The second strategy embedded in the PVE programs in Lamu, according to study findings, was that of dealing with societal factors likely to provide a breeding ground for violent extremism. In the case of Lamu County, these factors included negative cultural differences, misleading religious ideologies, poor governance structure and marginalization of communities. According to one respondent, *'misleading religious ideologies especially amongst members of Islamic community' led many to joining the Al-Shabaab VE group.*¹¹⁹ With this realization, religious organizations such as Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims (SUPKEM), Council of Imams and Preachers of Kenya (CIPK) and Building Resilience against Violent Extremism (BRAVE) are closely working with media houses such as Radio Salaam and local NGO such as HAKI Africa and Kenya Community Support Centre to deal with the drive.¹²⁰ The government of Kenya through its National strategy of countering and preventing violent extremism also works with local VSO groups to spread a message of positivity and counter misleading information in societies.

The study findings agree with the original objective of UN's strategy of PVE of dealing with communication likely to influence people into joining VE groups. The USAID categorizes these strategies as those dealing with 'push' factors – the environmental, structural, political and

¹¹⁸ Badurdeen F, A., & Goldsmith, P: *Initiatives and Perceptions to Counter Violent Extremism in the Coastal Region of Kenya*, Journal for Deradicalization (2018), 16, pp 81 – 82

¹¹⁹ Response from interview, 2nd September, 2021

¹²⁰ Badurdeen F, A., & Goldsmith, P: *Initiatives and Perceptions to Counter Violent Extremism in the Coastal Region of Kenya*, Journal for Deradicalization (2018), 16, Pp. 77 – 79

cultural conditions which create an environment for the thriving of VE. RUSI with a study in the Coastal region of Kenya agreed that critical messages by religious bodies, design of inter-faith dialogues amongst different actors, public awareness and monitoring preaching in mosques and churches aimed at disrupting existing platforms for radicalization by dealing with enablers such as peer pressure. CIPK, SUPKEM and BRAVE have been at the forefront in generating critical arguments countering the religious basis for radical Islamist ideology, including replacing versus of Quran and Hadith misused. BRAVE engages radical preachers with theological debates.¹²¹

The study findings further established that PVE programs received financial and technical support from the international community, the government of Kenya and private organizations in Kenya. Respondents from local VSOs revealed that they received training from USAID and UN in dealing with ex-members of VE groups. Respondents from government offices acknowledged that, *'fixed budget allocations were directed at youth and women program aimed at supporting them start businesses.'* *'It is through economic empowerment and sustainability in businesses that the number of youths joining Al-shabaab would reduce.'* Out of the foreign contributions towards PVE related projects, Kenya received US\$ 103,284,503 out of which Lamu County got a share.¹²²

4.2.2 Objectives of the PVE Programs in Lamu County

From the analysis of the structure and strategies adopted by PVE programs in Lamu County, the study established that most of the PVE programs aimed at reducing the number of youths and women likely to join the Al-Shabaab group and any other international group. Lamu County is close to Somali, which forms the headquarters of Al-shabaab, an aspect that increases the

¹²¹ Badurdeen F, A., & Goldsmith, P: *Initiatives and Perceptions to Counter Violent Extremism in the Coastal Region of Kenya*, Journal for Deradicalization (2018), 16, pp 76 – 82

¹²² Zyl I and Frank C, *Preventing Extremism in West and Central Africa*, Institute for Security Studies(2018), <https://issafrica.org/research/west-africa-report/preventing-extremism-in-west-and-central-africa> p 7

likelihood of joining the VE group. Previous evidence showing how the Al-shabaab group has been targeting youths from this Coastal County could have prompted the PVE programs in the area to be keen on reducing number of individuals influenced. This objective is clearly embedded in the structuring of PVE programs such as education empowerment, poverty reduction and reduction of drug and substance abuse.¹²³ Creating proper economic structures with increased economic opportunities has for instance been conducted to improve earnings amongst individuals and dissuade them from the notion of joining VE groups to run away from poverty. Educating members of the society on positive ideologies is also set to produce reasonable members of societies unlikely to be influenced to join VE groups. The kind of strategies adopted mainly aimed at reducing the numbers likely to join VE groups.

The second objective of the PVE programs as identified in the study was that of converting people that had joined VE groups to better law-abiding citizens. Achieving this objective was expected to reduce the influence of VE groups in Lamu County and in the broader Coastal region. Activities and strategies such as customized religious messages to counter negative ideologies, improvement of living conditions at home in Lamu and targeted family messages to reclaim their kin from Al-Shabaab mainly were to meet the enlisted objective.¹²⁴ Increasing intensity of attacks on members of VE groups by security forces both in Malindi and showcasing the consequences of being part of the group also worked to convince residents to leave the VE groups and convert for good. Further, strategies such as rehabilitation of ex-violent extremist group members, monitoring of their resettlement levels in societies and follow up on their daily

¹²³ Search for Common Ground, *Meet Me at the Maskani: A Mapping of Influencers, Networks, and Communication Channels in Kenya and Tanzania* (2017), Accessed at: <https://www.sfcg.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/SFCG-Meet-Me-at-the-Maskani-Final.pdf>, on 20th September 2021

¹²⁴ Ruteere, M. and Mutahi, P., Civil Society Pathways to Peace and Security: The Peace and Security for Development Programme in Coastal Kenya, in Mazrui, A., Njogi, K., and Goldsmith, P. (Eds.). *Countering Violent Extremism in Kenya: Between the Rule of Law and the Quest for Security*. Nairobi: Twaweza Communications, (2018), pp. 169-182

living after moving out of rehabilitation centers is part of the fulfillment of the objective of keeping people away from VE groups.

The third objective of PVE groups in Lamu County has been that of averting attacks and incidences by VE groups and reducing the magnitude of losses in case the incidences occurred. Preventing attacks only happens when they can be rightly detected before hand and when the right response systems are enacted.¹²⁵ From the study findings, strategies such as improving training levels of security personnel, investing in robust intelligence technology and working with informants in Lamu communities were set at meeting the objective of detecting VE related activities in advance and preventing their occurrence. International personnel with expertise in extracting information on the probability of occurrence of terrorism activities have also been introduced as part of some PVE programs to meet the objective three. Investment in infrastructure such as good roads, telecommunication lines and equipping health facilities in Lamu County would help reduce number of deaths related to VE incidences and magnitude of injuries sustained. Training provided by PVE programs to members in communities on self protection in the times of attacks, and conduct in such times can only be slotted to meet the objective of averting great loss in the times of VE related attacks according to the study findings.¹²⁶

4.3 Performance of PVE Programs in Lamu County Kenya

This section presents an assessment of the performance of the PVE programs based on responses from individuals in Lamu County and from a review of published reports. Study findings established that PVE programs in Lamu County have recorded recognizable levels of success

¹²⁵ Ibid, 170 – 178

¹²⁶ Search for Common Ground, *Meet Me at the Maskani: A Mapping of Influencers, Networks, and Communication Channels in Kenya and Tanzania* (2017), Accessed at: <https://www.sfcg.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/SFCG-Meet-Me-at-the-Maskani-Final.pdf>, on 20th September 2021

with regards to reduced number of individuals wanting to be part of VE groups. Reports by HAKI Africa proved that the real number of youths and women joining Al-shabaab over the last decade have reduced due to ongoing PVE initiatives in the area. Respondents interviewed also agreed that the number of individuals joining VE groups had dropped tremendously and that those that many converts had also been received over the last five years.¹²⁷ In fact, the number small VE related groups in Lamu County had dropped greatly over the last ten years.

Findings also revealed that PVE programs had achieved success with regards to an increasingly large number of converts who had once been part of VE groups. Respondents from community-based CSO groups agreed to a large extent that they had been receiving increasing numbers of people who have been part of VE groups over the last ten years.¹²⁸ A majority of those who agreed to abandon their violent extremist behaviour and leave VE groups pursued the counseling sessions to the end, according to statistics presented by VSO groups in Lamu. Responses from civilians who took part in this study agreed that many youths who had once taken pride in working with Al-shabaab were shying away and choosing to actively engage in other economic activities in the area. Strict security measures in Lamu coupled by the positive message of better lives outside violent extremism as advanced by PVE programs helped to persuade those part of VE groups to change their minds and leave violent extremism. The study findings agree with findings by Enos who established that the influence of Al-shabaab has been slowly going down in the Coastal region since 2011. War by the government of Kenya on Al-shabaab and strong messages of transformation had transformed some members of the group from the Coastal region of Kenya and reduced their reach in the area.

¹²⁷ Responses from multiple interviews, 24th August, 2021

¹²⁸ Ibid, 24th – 26th Aug 2021

Further still, the study established that timeliness of responding to potential attacks by VE groups had improved in Lamu County over the last ten years. According to study findings, PVE programs run by religious bodies responded quickly to information relating to VE groups trying to recruit individuals and reported this to security forces immediately. Security teams also acted quickly on intelligence received and deployed personnel in targeted areas to prevent the occurrence of VE related activities. This, according to the respondents was due to the use of phones and other digital technologies in communication. Openness of members of the society and their desire to avert dangers of violent extremism also led them to making crucial reports on the expected attacks, people being recruited and those involved in the recruitment process. Statistics provided by security forces who are part of PVE programs in Lamu County indicate that a number of individuals involved with recruitment of youths and women to join VE groups had been arrested and charged over the last decade. The reports also indicate that intelligence on executors of VE related activities had led to the arrest of individuals, averting possible terrorism related attacks.

Effectiveness and reliability of security forces in handling attacks by VE groups had also improved tremendously according to study findings. Out of the several small terrorist related incidences recorded in Lamu County over the last twenty years, the number of casualties has been decreasing over time. The number of vehicles, buildings and other assets destroyed in the incidences has also been reducing over time according to responses by PVE program heads that took part in this survey. Further, records by media personnel who took part in this survey show that several executors of terrorism related incidences get arrested before carrying out heinous acts. This is courtesy of new advanced intelligence systems being applied in Lamu County.

According to study findings on the reasons for reducing number of people joining VE groups in Lamu County, infrastructural development and governance structures were listed to be important contributors. Improvements in governance and subsequent improvements in infrastructure have not only helped small businesses to thrive but have also encouraged people in the area to start their own businesses and be self-sustaining. Talent promotion initiatives in the county such as soccer tournaments, music competitions, annual talent search platforms and promotion of education have also helped in dealing with the immediate social drivers pushing people to join the violent extremist group. The study revealed that engaging youths and women in active projects at the County level in Lamu also reduced levels of peer influence to engage in drug abuse and being used in promoting violent extremism.

Findings also revealed that CIPK and SUPKEM with their inter-faith dialogues and debates have attracted the participation of many youths and women from the county.¹²⁹ The debate has also been taken to social media platform and exposed some of the religious leaders misquoting Quran verses and using them to influence membership into radical groups.¹³⁰ One respondent stated that *'corrective messages spread by Radio Salaam and regulatory practices by CIPK on the message preached in churches and mosques have reduced the influence of radicalists and even converted doubtful youths away from the extremist group.'* The focus on women through 'Chamaas' (self-help groups), supporting women in business through microfinance loans and empowering women to beware of misleading ideologies has played a big role towards prevention of violent extremism. Using women in this agenda of PVE, founded on the realization of the role

¹²⁹ Badurdeen F, A., & Goldsmith, P: *Initiatives and Perceptions to Counter Violent Extremism in the Coastal Region of Kenya*, Journal for Deradicalization (2018), 16, Pp. 78 – 92

¹³⁰ Field notes

that women play in VE, is expected to go a long way in changing families and even youths away from violent extremist ideas.¹³¹

4.4 Factors Affecting Performance off PVE Programs in Lamu County

Findings of the study established that insufficient financial resources were an impediment to the success of most PVE programs in Lamu County. In fact, from the interview responses in the study, this was the main factor affecting performance as several PVE programs had collapsed over the years for lack of finances while a majority of those that thrived to date did so due to existence of reliable sources of finances.¹³² Finances were instrumental in remunerating staffs, acquiring assets for use in the program and for compensating community members on contracts entered amongst other functions. The lack thereof meant that PVE programs could not adequately meet these crucial functions and as such survived for short periods. From the PVE programs working in Lamu County that were assessed in this study, the problem of insufficient funds mainly arose because of inadequate funds from sponsors and mismanagement of resources.¹³³ The case of inadequate funds from sponsors was common amongst PVE programs that were structured and supported by international agencies which pulled out abruptly from ongoing programs. Increasing budget requirements from the PVE programs in Lamu County and new regulations by the government on the registration of the bodies served to discourage some sponsors from actively supporting PVE programs in the County.

With regards to mismanagement of resources as a probable reason for low financial capacity of PVE programs, findings revealed that corruption was the main element behind this. This was with regards to usage of resources for personal gain, neglecting ex-VE groups' members and

¹³¹ Interview, women group leader, 12th August 2021

¹³² Interview responses, 14th to 18th August 2021

¹³³ Interview responses, 16th to 20th August 2021

their well being and squandering all of the firms' finances in non-business activities. The lack of robust internal control systems promoted the vices as a majority of the firms supporting PVE programs were not for profit. Corruption in the form of bribery and kickbacks with funding agencies, extortion and solicitation of money and other forms of bribery from VE group members, collusion with members of VE groups, trading information and embezzlement of company resources led to compromise on the intelligence around violent extremism. As such PVE program achieved very little in terms of tracing organizers of violent extremism, bringing them to book and prosecuting them.

The lack of adequate technical capacity adversely affected the performance of PVE programs to a large extent in Lamu County according to the study findings. Technical capacity was with regards to less man power to undertake prevention of violent extremism initiatives like training youths and women in societies and the utilization of outdated intelligence and defense tools. Available experts in PVE demanded higher pay than could be provided according to CSO members who responded, an aspect that made them rely on those with low skill levels.¹³⁴ The application of lower levels of technology amongst security teams involved in PVE for instance meant that VE groups with advanced technology accessed greater intelligence and over-powered some local strategies. Lowly skilled human resource similarly implied that in most cases VE groups would take advantage to advance their interests unnoticed and grow their reach in Lamu County.

Findings also revealed that poor coordination amongst the different parties involved in the prevention of violent extremism affected the performance of the programs in Lamu County. Conflicts amongst the different parties involved in PVE from media personnel, security forces,

¹³⁴ Interview, CSOs, 21st – 23rd August 2021

and members of religious institutions and even to sponsors of the CSOs have existed for a long time according to respondents who took part in this study.¹³⁵ The main reasons behind these conflicts has often been the strategies expected to be followed in meeting the vision of preventing violent extremism. While some security personnel believed in the use of force by flashing out people suspected of engaging in violent extremism in Lamu County, some members of religious groups with PVE programs insisted on soft approaches such as educating the members, forgiving them and rehabilitating them.¹³⁶ With the varying strategy alignments, sharing of intelligence was hard amongst the PVE programs which subsequently meant that little or no coordination can be achieved. The poorly coordinated system of preventing violent extremism has in most cases led to the escape of serial members of VE groups, the occurrence of VE under the noses of security forces and continued recruitment of youths and women from the area by Al-shabaab.

Prevailing economic conditions was also revealed as a key factor affecting performance of PVE programs in Lamu County. Economic conditions in this case refer to prices of commodities, unemployment rates and economic output which generally determined earning ability and ability to live comfortably.¹³⁷ With a poverty rate of around 20% and unemployment rate of about 24% according to KNBS,¹³⁸ some Lamu County's residents could have been joining Al-shabaab and other VE groups in the area to try and escape from poverty despite the existence of PVE programs. The advent of the pandemic in early 2020 that came with the imposition of strict containment measures such as curfews, lockdowns, closure of hotel and bar businesses, closure of public markets and social distancing requirements could have worsened the situation for

¹³⁵ Interview responses, 13th to 20th August 2021

¹³⁶ Interview responses, 26th August 2021

¹³⁷ Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), STRIVE: Lessons Learned. Nairobi: Royal United Services Institute (2017)

¹³⁸ KNBS, *Census Survey 2019*, KNBS Publication

residents in Lamu County.¹³⁹ These local measures together with those at the global level, led to the closure of some companies, downsizing plans and restructuring that saw many people lose jobs. The price of commodities in these times also remained high despite the adverse effects on societies, pressing hard on people not only in Lamu County but also in other parts of the country. From the study findings, the hard economic times could have increased life problems and made some people in the County to contemplate joining Al-shabaab while others could even have joined.

Further still, politics was found to be a critical factor that affected performance of PVE programs in Lamu County. Politics had both positive and adverse effects in that the support from top politicians in the national and local governments helped to increase acceptability of PVE programs in Lamu County. Since 2013, the top leadership of Lamu County government has preached peace and encouraged people to shun from crime, drug abuse and violence related activities.¹⁴⁰ Visits by President Kenyatta Uhuru, according to respondents, and his address to youths in Lamu County has to a large extent informed decision making climate around participating in violent extremism.¹⁴¹ Findings however revealed that politics and conflicts in some religious bodies in the area have served to motivate the existence of some forms of violent extremism. Disagreements on the right doctrines to be inculcated in societies have led to breakaways and flow of people in the neighboring Somali to be part of the doctrines being taught by the Al-shabaab group.¹⁴² In as much as PVE programs received support from stable political environment, misleading politics in the area slightly pulled down initiatives of preventing violent extremism.

¹³⁹ USAID, Policy for Countering Violent Extremism Through Development Assistance, USAID Publication (2020)

¹⁴⁰ Interview responses, 19th to 22nd August 2021

¹⁴¹ Ibid, 22nd August 2021

¹⁴² Interview responses, 24th August to 26th August 2021

Findings also revealed that socio-cultural attributes of the people of Lamu County affected performance of PVE programs to a moderate extent. A majority of the people in the area are the Swahili people and mijikenda, even though other tribes like the Kamba, Kikuyu, Luhya, Arabs and Luo do live in the area in relatively smaller numbers.¹⁴³ Other than the broad cultural practices which seem to be dying due to modernization, most community members withhold crucial information on those engaging in violent extremism despite knowing them. The community has also on several occasions according to responses protected notorious criminals for fear of being branded ‘snitches’ or for the mere reason of being related.¹⁴⁴ This factor has not only denied PVE programs necessary information to pursue prevention of violent extremism, but has also induced fear amongst PVE program implementers. Low levels of community involvement in the mega LAPSSET infrastructural project and County administrative activities is another factor that has caused disgruntlement and resentment from civilians in Lamu County. The project which was engineered by the national government to improve trade relations with Ethiopia and Sudan other than supporting the local Coastal population is viewed by many locals as a national project. In spite of the many locals who are involved in the construction phase, many still feel left out. The lack of ownership on the projects has partly resulted to low support levels of PVE programs operating in Lamu County. This continues to make it hard for development oriented PVE programs to penetrate the society in Lamu and achieve objectives of preventing violent extremism.

¹⁴³ KNBS, *Census Survey 2019*, KNBS Publication

¹⁴⁴ Interview response, 14th August 2021

4.5 Way forward to Improve Performance of PVE Programs in Lamu County

As part of the solution to the challenges hindering success of PVE programs in Lamu, this study found the need to build capacity of PVE projects. This is through improving knowledge base of Quran teachings amongst Islamic leaders and the divertive strategies used by radicals in the area. Church leaders also need to be continuously educated on the message they preach, delivery practices and the impact that it can have on the congregation of both Muslims and Christians. Leaders of CSOs, religious bodies and other organizations dealing with CVE and PVE should be enlightened on budgeting practices, strategy formulation, implementation and monitoring and evaluation.¹⁴⁵ This will not only help them to determine the right finances needed, but also in the efficient management of the resources allocated to them. Knowledge capacity will also enable the programs to be versatile, correctly identifying strategies used by VE groups and responding before time.

The study established the need to continuously involve the local community in structuring PVE programs in order to create unified approaches. One respondent suggested that employing qualified local youths and women as reserve police officers or part of the strategizing teams will go a long way in preventing the menace.¹⁴⁶ A unified approach will mean that all players in the sector from international bodies with worldwide experience share common understanding with local population in the formulation of customized programs. Locals who have participated in the crafting of strategies are more likely to own up the process and to help in the correct identification of radicalized people, help rehabilitate them and even report those leading the recruitment exercise on time to authorities for action. These individuals are also likely to foster

¹⁴⁵ Interview, religious leader, 12th August 2021

¹⁴⁶ Interview, CSO leader, 13th August 2021

debates on the prevention of violent extremism, take part in the sessions and reach out to the vulnerable individuals.

The need to develop more social, physical and policy infrastructure in Lamu County will reduce economic hardships and also improve performance of PVE programs in the area. Primary schools, secondary and tertiary institutions as social infrastructure will help empower the society on positive standards, make them responsible individuals in societies and help them to change the narrative being used by VE groups.¹⁴⁷ Hospitals will help in rehabilitating drug and substance abusers, those that had been part of the radical groups and even provide employment for locals. Sports facilities helping in talent identification and development will help in creating self-reliant individuals and reduce the rate of idleness amongst youths. Road infrastructure, fisheries projects, markets and other physical infrastructure will open up Lamu to investments, create more job opportunities and support existing business to bloom. Enhancement of policy such as Public private partnerships, regulation on governance structures and structures of reducing corruption will help in reducing cases of marginalization and discrimination that are likely to spark the desire to join VE groups.¹⁴⁸

Introduction of management by objectives strategy would also help improve performance of PVE programs. Right from government-initiated programs such as infrastructure development and policy establishment to private based initiatives, management by objectives will involve measuring progress based on objectives set. Management of the entities involved in prevention of violent extremism will be required to set clear objectives after taking into consideration both

¹⁴⁷ Ruteere, M. and Mutahi, P., Civil Society Pathways to Peace and Security: The Peace and Security for Development Programme in Coastal Kenya, in Mazrui, A., Njogi, K., and Goldsmith, P. (Eds.). *Countering Violent Extremism in Kenya: Between the Rule of Law and the Quest for Security*. Nairobi: Twaweza Communications, (2018), pp. 169-182.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid, p. 170

internal and external attributes, engage adequate resources to achieve the objectives, measure performance and do monitoring and evaluation practices. Coming up with quantifiable objectives like for instance completion of road project in one year, sensitization of 10,000 youths every three months or resettling 80% of ex-violent extremist members in societies per cohort will help improve management efficiencies. Goals set can adopt the approach of being Smart, Measurable, achievable, realistic and Time bound in order to influence results. Specific methodologies of meeting the objectives should then be set and reviewed by all stakeholders involved in PVE. Organizations can form synergies on this and work with the local communities in order to come up with customized plans. Throughout the implementation phase, continuous effort should be made to compare with objectives and existing environmental conditions and adjusted appropriately. Monitoring and evaluation of the success rate of the programs and open reporting framework will then help to improve reach, reliability and effectiveness of PVE programs in dealing with violent extremism.

Digitalization of operations of PVE programs and application of ethical standards in the structuring and implementation of the projects will also help in improving performance. Digitalization involves the increased use of mobile phone devices, e-mailing and other digital platforms in communication and carrying out of activities. Advanced technological practices such as artificial intelligence, internet of things, robotics, big data analytics and cybersecurity will really help in preventing violent extremism. Cybersecurity for instance will help in tracking malicious communication by VE groups, help in recording any form of criminal activities planned online and assist in tracking down and arresting perpetrators. Big data analytics through data mining and storage of large volumes of data will form a good support system of understanding trends in VE attacks, networks in VE groups, individuals rehabilitated and those

that need immediate attention. The use of robotics on the other end like drones will help in tracking down any recruitment activities of VE groups in Lamu, help detect attacks with minimal casualties and help in information collection on VE groups. Ethical standards in operations such as strong work values, zero-tolerance for corruption in project implementation and safeguarding of resources will also help improve management and performance of PVE programs in Lamu County.

4.6 Summary of the Chapter

This chapter has presented findings and interpretation of findings on factors affecting performance of PVE programs in Lamu County of Kenya. Findings have revealed the existence of many PVE programs with the aim of eliminating the environment likely to breed VE or that of dealing with social and economic factors likely to be taken advantage of by VE groups or a combination of both. Programs aimed at eliminating a breeding environment include religious debates and sensitization targeting to counter misleading ideologies, building proper governance structures and eliminating tribal politics. Other programs such as improvement in road, communication, markets and social infrastructure, creation of jobs and improved educational levels were aimed at reducing social and economic inefficiencies likely to be taken advantage of by VE groups through incentives. Findings of the study revealed that the PVE programs in Lamu have registered recognizable levels of success, seen in the reduced number of individuals joining the lead VE group and the increased number of fully converted Ex-VE groups. The success of the PVE programs has not been 100% due to low levels of support from local communities, low financial and technical capacity and poor coordination and structuring of some PVE programs according to study findings presented in this chapter.

CHAPTER FIVE: FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

This final chapter presents a summary of findings on the factors affecting performance of prevention of violent extremism programs in Africa. The paper addressed performance of PVE programs in the post 9-11 era from a global perspective, regional perspective and local perspective with a specific focus of Lamu County in Kenya. The chapter further presents the conclusion, recommendations and suggestions for further studies.

5.2 Summary of Findings

The first objective of the study was to examine the factors affecting the performance of prevention of violent extremism programs in the post 911 international system. Findings of the study first revealed that numerous programs had been developed at global level, regional level, and country-specific levels and these included UN P/CVE strategy, EU's PVE programs, USAID's PVE initiatives and UK's Prevent strategy. In as much as the programs had played an important role in reducing the magnitude and number of terrorism related activities, and resulted in significant positive changes in attitudes towards VE, several factors as established in the study have affected implementation. These have included financial and technical support, lack of data based interventions, insufficient monitoring and evaluation strategies and conflicts amongst different stakeholders on the strategies of the programs. Out of the factors; only financial and technical support resulted to improved performance of the PVE programs.

The second objective of the study was to assess the factors affecting the performance of prevention of violent extremism programs in Africa. Findings of the study first showed that a majority of the PVE programs existed in West, Central and Eastern Africa with very few

initiatives being carried out in the Southern region of Africa. Programs initiated have aimed at preventing violent extremism through education, training, job creation, fostering cohesion amongst communities and between governments and citizens, legal empowerment and support of good governance structures. From the study findings, the lack of support from communities, inadequate financial and technical support, poor structuring of some PVE projects were the main factors affecting the performance of the programs. These factors affected the performance negatively and resulted to the collapse of some of the PVE programs, limited outreach of the programs in the societies and continued operation of VE groups especially in the Western and Northern regions of Africa.

The third objective of the study was to critically analyze the factors affecting performance of PVE programs in Lamu County Kenya. Findings of the study revealed that numerous programs have been implemented in the area with the consideration that it is a hot spot for the recruitment of members of Al-shabaab VE group. These programs have been conducted by international agencies from the USA, Israel, UK, other European countries, AU, the national government of Kenya, County government of Lamu, CSOs, religious organizations and youth and women groups. Common programs to prevent and counter violent extremism have entailed infrastructural development, improvement in governance structures, social cohesion and enabling cultural and religious interactions. In as much as the programs have recorded recognizable levels of success, common factors affecting performance have included the lack of community involvement in PVE programs, low capacity of organizations implementing PVE programs, lack of coordinated strategies and hard economic times escalated by Covid-19 pandemic. Unified working approach from the different stakeholders has however contributed to the positive performance of the programs.

5.3 Conclusion

The researcher concluded in this study that world over, societies have been critical in coming up with prevention of violent extremism programs especially after the September 11th terrorism event of 2001 in USA. Bodies such as the UN with membership of many countries across the globe have initiated and improved programs and policies aimed at reducing the number of people joining VE groups, involved member countries in crafting policies and offered financial and technical support towards PVE. The European Union, USAID, African Union amongst other regional bodies have also been involved in crafting programs and implementing them together with specific countries. From a global perspective, common PVE programs have recorded recognizable success due to existing large financial and technical resource capacity of the peace keeping bodies. Misunderstandings amongst countries and low levels of cooperation continue to affect the performance of PVE programs negatively though. In Africa, the PVE programs which have been concentrated in West, Central and Eastern Africa are yet to record 100% success due to low financial capacity, low levels of support from local communities, and poor structuring of the programs. The researcher also concluded that PVE programs have recorded tremendous levels of success in Lamu County of Kenya since the 911 terrorism event. This success is due to the unified approach in PVE from international, national and local communities and the continued involvement of religious bodies in fighting against misleading doctrines. Factors affecting performance of the programs in the Coastal area included low financial and technical capacity of some of the PVE program developers, low community participation and poor state of living of youths and women.

5.4 Recommendations

The researcher recommended that managers of international peace keeping bodies and those involved in the fight against VE should continuously involve local communities in crafting PVE programs. These bodies which include the UN, USAID, EU and even AU should conduct reviews with country specific communities to get reasons for joining VE groups, performance of existing PVE programs and ways of improving performance. Involving local communities will not only create a sense of ownership for the communities in the program, but will also improve chances of completely eradicating VE.

The researcher recommended that financing agencies such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, Asian development bank and even the African Development bank should set aside some funds to support PVE programs. The funds should then be channeled to responsible PVE program managers and then follow up for accountability to ensure that the resources are used for the right purpose. This will help improve financial capacity of PVE programs and even enable them acquire right expertise and technical resources to improve success rates of PVE programs.

The researcher recommended that local political and spiritual leaders in Lamu County of Kenya should continue educating and implementing PVE programs. These individuals ranging from members of parliament, the senator, governor, members of County Assembly, pastors and Imams are greatly trusted by majority of the population. They should therefore be at the forefront in influencing positive talks around PVE, educating youths and women on the importance of staying away from violence and initiating projects to uplift the well being of individuals in Lamu County. Such initiatives will not only dissuade local population from VE but will also improve the security status of the County.

5.5 Suggestions for Further Studies

The researcher suggested that further studies on the topic of performance of PVE programs in the post 911 era be conducted in Somali. The study can be focused in Mogadishu which is a hot spot operation area for the Al-shabaab terrorist group. Findings of this study can be compared with study findings presented in this paper and be used to craft more strategies of preventing violent extremism.

The researcher also suggested that further studies on the factors affecting performance of PVE programs be conducted for a period both before 2001 and that after 2001. Since this study focused on the period after 2001 when the September 11 attack occurred, a similar study can just focus on the period before 2001 and cover 5 years, 10 years or even 20 years before. The study findings can be compared and used to reinforce the concept of PVE across the world.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Anderson, A, A, *The Community Builder's Approach to Theory of Change: A practical Guide to Theory Development*, The Aspen Institute Roundtable on Community Change (2021)
- Awadallah A., Lang H., and Densmore K, *Losing the War of Ideas: Countering Violent Extremism in the Age of Trump*, Center for America Progress 2017)
- Badurdeen F, A., & Goldsmith, P: *Initiatives and Perceptions to Counter Violent Extremism in the Coastal Region of Kenya*, Journal for Deradicalization (2018), 16
- Belavusau et al, A Comparative Research Study on Radical and Extremist (Hate) Speakers in European Member States, ICCT (2019), pp 10 – 12
- Bergen, P L, *September 11 attacks*, *Encyclopedia Britannica*, <https://www.britannica.com/event/September-11-attacks>, Accessed 5 June 2021
- Blau, P, *Exchange and Power in Social Life*, New York: John Wiley & Sons (1964)
- Botha, A, *Radicalisation in Kenya: Recruitment to Al-Shabaab and the Mombasa Republican Council*, Institute for Security Studies Paper 265 (2014)
- Boucek C, Saudi Arabia's 'Soft' Counterterrorism Strategy: Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Aftercare, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2008), 1
- Bourekba M, *The United Nations' Evolving Approach to Counterterrorism*, CIDOB report (2020) pp 27 – 34
- Cold-Ravnkilde, S, M., and Jacobsen, K, L, *Disentangling the security traffic jam in the Sahel: constitutive effects of contemporary interventionism*, International Affairs Journal, 96 : 4 (2020) 855–874
- Combes.W S, Assessing Two Countering Violent Extremism Programs: Saudi Arabia's PRAC and the United Kingdom's Prevent Strategy, Small Wars Journal (2013)
- Connell, J.P. & Kubisch, A.C, *Applying a theory of change approach to the evaluation of comprehensive community initiatives: progress, prospects and problems in*: K. Fulbright (1998)
- Coolsaet,R, *EU Counterterrorism Strategy: Value Added or Chimera?*, International Affairs, vol.86, no.4, 2010, pp.857 - 873
- Council of the European Union Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA of 13 June 2002 on Combating Terrorism; David Casale, 'EU Institutional and Legal Counter-Terrorism Framework', Defence Against Terrorism Review, vol.1, no.1, 2008

- Couture, K, *A Gendered Approach to Countering Violent Extremism: Lessons learned from women in peace-building and conflict prevention applied successfully in Bangladesh and Morocco*, Brookings Institute Policy Papers (2014), p 32
- Creswell, J. W., *Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative and Mixed Methods Approaches* (4th ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage (2014)
- Dang, L, *Violent Extremism and Community Policing in Tanzania*, United States Institute of Peace, (2019), 442, pp. 7 – 18
- El Haitami, M, *Women in Morocco: Re-conceptualising Religious Activism*, The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences (2013), 30(4): pp 128 – 141
- Fabricius, P, *Is Islamic State taking charge of Mozambique's jihadist insurgency?* Institute for Security Studies (2020)
- Heupel, M, *Adapting to Transnational Terrorism: The UN Security Council's Evolving Approach to Terrorism*, Security Dialogue, 38(4), 2007, pp 477–499; 488
- HM Government, *Prevent Strategy*, the Stationery Office Publication (2011), Available at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97976/prevent-strategy-review.pdf, Accessed on 2nd June 2021
- Holmer G, Bauman P & Aryaeinejad K, *Measuring Up and Evaluating the Impact of P/CVE Programs*, United States Institute of Peace Publication (2018) pp 5 – 17
- Homans, G, C., *Social Behaviour as Exchange*. American Journal of Sociology (1958); 63, 6: Pp. 597 – 606
- Idris, I and Abdelaziz, A, *Women and Countering Violent Extremism*, GSDRC Helpdesk Research Report1408 (2017), Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of Birmingham
- Idris I, *Preventing/Countering Violent Extremism Programming on Men, Women, Boys and Girls*, K4D Helpdesk Report 671. Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies (2019)
- Ilardi J G, *The 9/11 Attacks—A Study of Al Qaeda's Use of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, (2009);32 (3)3, pp. 171 – 187
- Imran A, "I am a Muslim Not an Extremists": How the Prevent Strategy HasConstructed a 'Suspect' Community," *Politics & Policy* 40, no. 6 (2012): Pp1158 – 1185
- Institute for Economics & Peace, *Global Terrorism Index 2020: Measuring the Impact of Terrorism*, Sydney, November 2020, Available from: <http://visionofhumanity.org/reports> (accessed 6th May 2021)

- International Center for Countering Terrorism, *Preventing and Countering violent extremism*, ICCT Publication (2021), 1
- Katselli, E and Shah S, September 11 and the UK Response, *The International and Comparative Law Quarterly*, Cambridge University Press (2003), 52(1), pp. 245 – 255
- Kothari, C.R, *Research Methodology, Methods and Techniques*, (New Delhi New Age International (P) Limited. 2nd ed, 2008)
- Kothari, C. R., & Garg, G, *Research Methodology: Methods and Techniques*. New Delhi: New Age International Publishers (2014).
- Lawler, E. J., & Thye, S. R., *Social Exchange Theory of Emotions*, Cornell University, ILR School (2006), Pp 12 – 36
- Lorentzen J, *Women as 'New Security Actors' in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism in Mali*, Oxford University Press, *International Affairs* 97 : 3 (2021) pp 721–738
- MacFarlane C, *Terrorism in South Africa*, *Prehosp Disaster Med* (2003); 18(2): pp.133 – 139
- Masys, A J, *Radicalization and Recruitment: A Systems Approach to Understanding Violent Extremism*, Decision Management: Concepts, Methodologies, Tools, and Applications (2017)
- Mets, S, *How to handle the threat of an expanding Islamic State in Africa*, *World Politics Review* (2019)
- Mohr, J W & Ventresca M, *Archival Research Methods*, Blackwell companion to organizations (2002), pp.805 – 828
- Nkomo, S & Clarke, *Violent extremism in Africa Popular assessments from the 'Eastern Corridor'*, Afrobarometer Policy Paper No. 65 (2020)
- Norwegian Refugee Council, *Risk Management Toolkit in Relation to Counterterrorism Measures*, Position paper (2015) pp 1 – 6
- Ouma I, *Violent Extremism in Lamu County*, Centre for Human Rights and Policy Studies publication, Workshop Note 4 (2020)
- Peter, C, 'No evidence' UK de-radicalization program works: *Watchdog*, Arab News Publication
- Porges, M L, *The Saudi Deradicalization Experiment*, (2010), Available at www.cfr.org/terrorism/saudi-deradicalization-experiment/p21292, accessed on 13th June 2021

- Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), *STRIVE: Lessons Learned*. Nairobi: Royal United Services Institute (2017)
- Ruteere, M. and Mutahi, P., *Civil Society Pathways to Peace and Security: The Peace and Security for Development Programme in Coastal Kenya*, in Mazrui, A., Njogi, K., and Goldsmith, P. (Eds.). *Countering Violent Extremism in Kenya: Between the Rule of Law and the Quest for Security*. Nairobi: Twaweza Communications, (2018), 169-182.
- Search for Common Ground, *Meet Me at the Maskani: A Mapping of Influencers, Networks, and Communication Channels in Kenya and Tanzania* (2017), Accessed at: <https://www.sfcg.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/SFCG-Meet-Me-at-the-Maskani-Final.pdf>, on 20th September 2021
- Sempijja N & Nkosi B, *National Counter-Terrorism (C-T) Policies and Challenges to Human Rights and Civil Liberties: Case Study of Kenya*, (2019), In: Shor E., Hoadley S. (eds) *International Human Rights and Counter-Terrorism*. International Human Rights, Springer, Singapore, pp. 1 – 18
- Sharamo R D and Mohamed A A, *Countering violent extremism in Kenya: experiences and innovations*, Publication of the Institute for Security Studies, East Africa Report 36 (2020), pp 2 – 13
- Sharland, L, Grice T & Zeiger S, *Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism in Africa: the Role of Mining Sector*, Australian Strategic Policy institute (2017)
- Ucko, H. D, *Preventing Violent Extremism through the United Nations: the Rise and Fall of a good Idea*, *International Affairs* 94: 2, (2018), pp 251–270
- United Nations Development Programme, *Preventing Violent Extremism through Promoting Inclusive Development, Tolerance and Respect for Diversity*, A development response to addressing radicalization and violent extremism (2016), pp 8 – 38
- UN Security Council, *Situation in West Africa, Sahel ‘Extremely Volatile’ as Terrorists Exploit Ethnic Animosity, Special Representative Warns Security Council*, SC/14245
- USAID, *Policy for Countering Violent Extremism Through Development Assistance*, USAID Publication (2020)
- White, J ‘*Community and Gender in Counter-Terrorism Policy: Challenges and Opportunities for Transferability Across the Evolving Threat Landscape*’, *The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague (ICCT) Evolutions in Counter-Terrorism*, 2 (2020): Pp 77 – 100
- Wilkinson, P, *International Terrorism: the Changing Threat and the EU’s Response*, Chaillot Paper (2005), 84, pp. 1 – 47

Zyl I and Frank C, *Preventing Extremism in West and Central Africa*, Institute for Security Studies(2018), <https://issafrica.org/research/west-africa-report/preventing-extremism-in-west-and-central-africa>

Zyl, I V, *Preventing violent extremism Lessons from Africa*, Institute of Security Studies, Africa Report 17 (2019)

Zyl I and Mahdi M, *Preventing violent extremism in East Africa: Lessons from Kenya, Somalia, Tanzania and Uganda*, Institute for Security Studies (2019), <https://issafrica.org/research/east-africa-report/preventing-violent-extremism-in-east-africa-lessons-from-kenya-somalia-tanzania-and-uganda>

APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1: Interview Schedule

This survey aims at collecting data on the performance of Prevention of Violent Extremism (PVE) programs in Lamu County. Findings of this study are part of my Management research paper to be submitted to the University of Nairobi in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the degree of master of arts in diplomacy and international relations management. The information you give in the survey will therefore be used solely for the purposes of this study and thereafter discarded.

Section A: Demographic Information

1. What part of Lamu County do you reside in? _____
2. For how long have you been living in Lamu County? _____
3. Have you ever been a member of any VE group in Lamu County?
4. Are you part of the teams contributing to prevention of violent extremism in Lamu County? _____
5. If Yes, which team/organization do you work with?

Section B: Violent Extremism in Lamu County

1. List violent extremism groups that exist and those that operate in Lamu County
2. List the common areas of operation of violent extremist groups
3. How do the violent extremist groups in Lamu County operate? _____
4. What groups do the violent extremist groups target? _____
5. How have the VE groups fared in recruiting members from Lamu County over the last 20 years? _____
6. What has been the effect of violent extremist groups in Lamu County over the last twenty years? _____

Section C: Prevention of Violent Extremism strategies in Lamu County

1. List some of the prevention of violent extremism programs you are familiar with in Lamu County

2. Which organizations support the PVE programs in the County? _____
3. What are the common activities carried out by the PVE programs in Lamu County?
4. What strategies do the PVE programs employ in the prevention of violent extremism in Lamu County?
5. How do the PVE programs reach out to the community with regards to prevention of violent extremism?

Section D: Performance of Prevention of Violent Extremism Programs in Lamu County

1. Comment on the performance of prevention of violent extremism programs in Lamu County
2. How have the PVE programs in Lamu County achieved their objectives?
3. What factors affect the performance of PVE programs in Lamu County
4. What is the general view of the community with regards to PVE programs and their role in preventing violent extremism in Lamu County?
5. What is the general view of the local authorities with regards to PVE programs and their role in preventing violent extremism in Lamu County?

Section E: Recommendations on Prevention of Violent Extremism in Lamu County

1. In your own view, what can the PVE programs do to improve their performance towards preventing violent extremism in Lamu County?
2. What can you do if given an opportunity to lead the prevention of violent extremism in Lamu County?

Thank you for participating in this Interview session