

1911

EAST AFR. PROT.

3419

3419

2 FEB 11

Colonial

Date.

1911

2 Feb.

Last previous Paper.

4. 2803/10-11

Military Situation in E. Africa.

Memo. by Insp. Genl. K.A.R. with minutes recording discussion with military officers. Proposals recommended (1) 3rd Bn. K.A.R. to be recruited up to 8 Companies of which for the present 6 to be on the frontier & 2 at Nairobi. (2) All the Nyasaland troops to be returned to Nyasaland & K.A.R. to furnish garrison of 2 Co. at Zanzibar for so long as necessary.

Mr Fiddes.

The Secretary of State has now approved in principle of the suggestion that the East Africa Protectorate should have only one battalion (of 8 companies for the present) of the King's African Rifles stationed in it (of eight Companies for the present) and should be relieved of the duty of garrisoning Zanzibar. It now becomes necessary to send instructions to the Governor. This will, I presume, take the form of an intimation that the Secretary of State approves of this arrangement, and that two more Companies should therefore be recruited so as to bring the ^{3rd} ~~third~~ battalion up to a strength of eight Companies by May, when the ^{2nd} ~~second~~ battalion is due to return to Nyasaland.

It is absolutely necessary at the same time to consider the arrangements to be made by Nyasaland. Unless

this

21 1623/KAR

to 20 / cons 16 Feb. ✓
to 20 / CA

this is done, Nyasaland will find herself saddled with the presence and expense of two battalions (eight Companies) instead of one battalion (four Companies) as at present, and will only be able to get rid of two Companies of the extra ^{four} Companies in garrisoning Zanzibar. That is, she will be burdened with six Companies permanently instead of four. It was admitted by the Committee which sat to consider the military question in July last (see paragraphs 22 and 23 of their report, 24641/10), that the needs of Nyasaland herself would be met by two Companies, the Indian contingent of 75, and the Reserve which has been formed in Nyasaland and did so well in Somaliland. It will thus be seen that two of the Companies already in Nyasaland are surplus to ^{her} ~~their~~ requirements and are only maintained as a reserve force for the East Africa Protectorates generally. The effect of returning the ~~two~~ battalions from the East Africa Protectorate would thus be, not only to perpetuate, but seriously to increase the burden already imposed upon Nyasaland of keeping up a reserve for the other Protectorates.

The logical way out of the difficulty appears to be to disband one of the two Nyasaland battalions outright. (Some of the officers and men might conceivably be taken over by the East Africa Protectorate to form the two new Companies of the ~~third~~ ^{3rd} battalion). Nyasaland would then be left with one battalion of four Companies, two Companies of which, with the Indian contingent, would garrison Nyasaland, while the other two Companies would garrison Zanzibar and would be paid for from Zanzibar funds. This would mean a relief of something like £10,000 a year to Nyasaland, a relief which is badly wanted.

If

If this course is agreed to, ~~the arrangements~~ should be put to the Governor of the East Africa Protectorate and the Governor of Nyasaland as the outline of the procedure to be followed and they should be instructed to set about arranging all details with one another direct. It will be necessary to inform the Foreign Office of the proposal to garrison Zanzibar from Nyasaland instead of from the East Africa Protectorate in future. Colonel Thesiger should be at once informed of the whole arrangements and should advise as to the absorption of the officers of the Nyasaland battalion which is to be disbanded and on any other points which may occur to him as demanding special consideration.

F.G.A.B. 4 Feb.

See the attached memo by Col. Thesiger written before the interview with Col. Seely. It deals with the question of officers, on which Col. Seely asked Col. Thesiger to let him have his views. See also the attached note from Col. Thesiger, dated the 5th inst.

FFAB
Feb 6

T.O

Mr. Zoller

83

Col. Stenger, Mr. Butler & I
have been discussing the steps to be
taken in consequence of the decision
recently arrived at with regard to
the new military arrangements for the
E.A.P. The 2nd Batt: K.A.R. is
due to return to Nyasaland in
April & May, & the relief Batt:
(1st Batt: K.A.R.) is due to leave
Nyasaland at the same time. The
necessary shipping arrangements are
now being made by the C.A., &
that immediate action is required.

The first thing to be done is to
cancel the arrangements for sending
the 1st Batt: to the E.A.P. - the
arrangement for sending back the
2nd Batt: must of course, stand.

We should communicate with the C.A.
at once as to the shipping arrangements
& I submit 2 Spt: tbs which have
been prepared by Mr. Butler with a
view

view to clearing up certain points.
Col: Steinger concurs in the tel. 5784
to Nyasaland, but, with regard to
the Sft: tel: to the S.A.P., deems to
submit the accompanying memo: and
alternative Sft: tel: as he was
unable to develop his views fully
at the recent meeting in Col:

Seely's room.

The difficulty ^{main} ~~main~~ seems to be to
make satisfactory arrangements for the
garrisoning of Zambezi, but it should
be remembered that we are under
no pledge to garrison Zambezi &
could easily insist on that point
making its own arrangements, & further
that, if the worst comes to the
worst, we could garrison Z' bar
with S.A.P. Police & instead of K.A.R.
as Z' bar did not merely asked us to
send the two companies of K.A.R. to
replace them unreliable police. It might
be argued that it is better for
henceforward to prefer us to have
two

There seems to
be difficulty
concerning
the Police.
W.J.H.

two companies of R.A.R. - ~~that~~ 85
Zanzibar
~~R.A.R.~~ as they could be utilized in
case of trouble in the S.A.P., but on the
other hand, Sir P. Frouard has assumed
as that the S.A.P. Police are as good
material as the R.A.R.

R.A.R.

11/2

Col Seely

Mr Harcourt

1) The tel. herewith, drafted by Mr (A)
Dessiger with hardly do it requires a
question which, as I understand, is decided.

2) Nine tenths of the difficulties suggested
as a consequence of the decision arise from
our providing a garrison for Zanzibar.
I think it will be far better to make a clean
sweep of the whole business of cutting
ourselves adrift from this East African continent.
Up to now the arrangements have been of mutual
advantage: in the altered conditions I don't
see where we come in.

We are pledged to keep up the garrison
as I understand, till the end of June. I
will write to D.O. explaining the altered circumstances
and that we cannot provide a garrison
after June. (Incidentally, this will force on

the grant of the future adv^{ce} of Zanzibar).
I wd telegraph to his P^rsonal asking him
if he can arrange for the retention ^{in Zanzibar} until
the end of June of the two Com^{rs} who are
(apparently) due for relief about end of
April. We may well think this on the
face of it is one of the results of his policy, &
he is the person who can do it most easily:
it would be a very small matter if a portion
of the men is sent on taking their discharge,
& if necessary a small bonus might ease
the situation.

If this is done it seems to me that we
have a fairly straight run home.

If this is agreed to, the two telegrams
submitted to the Dept. sh^d be modified
accordingly.

W.A. 13/2

Mr. Harcourt

I agree with Mr. Alder, with whom I
have discussed the matter, and think we
may act as he proposes.

J.S.
13.2.

I agree also

H. 14.2.11

Mr. Butler

It is true that I agreed that 6
 Companies would suffice to garrison
 the frontier providing one of these
 was a mounted (mule) company
 in addition to the present Cavalry
 Company, but it must be
 clearly understood that in the
 event of trouble very few of
 these troops could be used in
 their proper role i.e. as a mobile
 striking force, and that if we
 are required to put in the field
 a striking force of 400 men we
 could not do so without
 calling upon aid from elsewhere.
 In this I understand Sir P.
 has agreed. If the Govt
 is satisfied with this
 arrangement then we can do
 with the eight companies.
 We must now consider the question
 in detail. It is proposed to
 raise the 3rd Battⁿ to a strength
 of 8 Companies and as the

2

Ulyssian Company will almost certainly be disbanded or at any rate the larger proportion of them, this will mean the raising of three companies in addition to the ordinary necessities of recruiting. In the present year 200 Soudanese are due for discharge. During the last five or six years the greatest difficulty has been experienced in even keeping up the 3^d Battalion to its present establishment, and as regards the Soudanese recruits who are the only really proved fighting material, they can practically be eliminated. As a special favour the Soudanese is allowing us to see if we can obtain 100 for Uganda and East Africa; it is however very doubtful if our terms are sufficiently good to attract the men; the Egyptian Staff say

3
87

they are not. We have at the present time 3 Companies Soudanese, 1 Mixed Company, 1 Company French, 1 Company Ulyssians. To have more than half the latter composed of Europeans whose fighting qualifications are entirely improved appears to me to be running a very grave risk. We have tried a Masai Company and they have failed, and had to be disbanded. Presupposing however that the eight companies can be raised, and on this point Sir P. Giraud has no fear; it must necessarily take time to get them unless we are prepared to accept a very much lower standard than we have hitherto done, and after we have obtained them it will take nine months to a year to train them, even if we had an adequate staff of instructors. During this period we shall have

five companies to do the work of eight -

We now come to the question of the garrison of Langkat. To garrison it from Nyasa appears to me not only unwise in Nyasa but also a very costly way of doing it. From Mairabi the troops can be sent over in about 36 hours; from Zomba it took me 14 days and troops would probably take longer. Troops at Langkat should be relieved every six months or so otherwise they will suffer severely in health.

In three years the two companies should be relieved about 5 times and this would cost considerably more than the three yearly relief of the 4 Companies from Nyasa to EAT.

since written
this I have
fully done
for the cost
of relief
from EAT
Nyasa -

As regards the immediate disbandment of the 2^d B^o; it is obvious that sudden and unlooked for disbandments cannot be effected with impunity on certain unavoidable hardships on officers and men. As an example I will take two specific instances - Major Ward in the 2^d B^o came as Company Commander from the disbanded 6th B^o with a view to command, in fact his recommendation has already been forwarded by me to the Gov. By transferring he forfeited 248 per annum, the difference in pay between 2^d in Command 6th B^o and Company Commander 2^d B^o -

The present Serjeant Major was appointed last year, had he stayed in his Battⁿ I have reason to believe that he would have stood a very good chance of being a Warrant Officer by now. I am afraid that the sudden

the detachment of two Battalions within
a year will have a most
detracting effect upon recruiting
as well as in those now serving.
By disbanding the 2^d B: a whole
cadre is destroyed which has
taken several years hard work to
build up and you then lose
trained gunners signallers and
N.C.O.s who take a very long
time to train.

According to Mr. Bullers minute
he appears to contemplate the
reduction of two companies in
Nyasaland. I object I cannot
concur in this proposal, not
on Nyasaland's account but
looking on the East African
Protectorates as a whole.
In 1906 the Colonial Defence
Committee laid down that
"the strength of the Colonial
forces should be fixed at
the minimum force required
to insure the maintenance
of internal order and to deal
with insurrections of the native
population." Looking at the
general situation throughout
East Africa and to the possibility
of a reduction of the Indian
Contingent I consider we are
now in a bad way, and
this view was taken by the
Committee which set to consider

the military situation in Italy
as July 1918 —

Now then are we to meet the
situation which has arisen
and reduce expenditure in
£ 200 with the smallest amount
of friction, ~~and loss of~~
efficiency

I would suggest for consideration
the following proposal.

1. That the 1st and 2nd Battalions
should be merged into one
Battalion of 8 Companies
2. That four of these companies
should be sent to
East Africa in the same
way as an Indian Contingent
is now sent to Uganda
and Nyasaland.
3. That after the present C.O.'s
time is up (Colonel Stevens)
the four companies would
be commanded by a Major
2nd in command.
4. By this means the
question of the two C.O.'s
would eventually be
got over i.e. one would

He might
be detailed
at once in
company

disappear.
The Adjutant and Paymaster would
disappear and consequently a certain
amount of ~~blacks~~

5. The 3rd Bⁿ meanwhile could see if
they could raise the necessary
men and if successful companies
could be gradually disbanded.
When the Indian Contingent is
due to leave Uganda, I feel sure
from what the Det. Gen. told me
that they would only be
too glad to take over some
Nyasaland troops

By this means you would
effect the following almost
immediate reductions

2 nd in Command in place of Commandant	£
7844 - 698	= 148
Adjutant	496
Paymaster	320
Band 3 rd B ⁿ and mess expenses	647
	<hr/> 1811

I have included no reduction for blacks
as it is not possible at present to force

what can be done.

This Memorandum was written before
my second interview with Colonel
Seely, and is not intended in
any way to try and work behind
the policy already laid down,
but is an expression of my
views which I would wish to
have put forward either at or
after the first conference had it
been less time.

4177 Feb 7th

what can be done.

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my second interview with Colonel
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any way to try and mark behind
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views which I would wish to
have put forward either at or
after the first conference had it
been less time.

417 Feb 7th

drafted by Col. Thengden (or an alternative
in view of his memo of 9th Feb.
attached to the paper.
N. Y. K.]

91

DRAFT. Telegram (cypher)

Jackson
Nairobi

MINUTE.

Mr. Ch. Thengden Feb 11.

Mr.

Mr. Fiddes. See minute

Mr. Just.

Mr. Cor.

Sir C. Lucas.

Col. Seely.

Mr. Harcourt.

I agree with Mr. Fiddes
that this draft will not do.

$\frac{9}{2}$

Communicate this to
Gionard ~~immediately~~
on arrival begins are
you satisfied that you
can recruit locally up to
eight full companies
of good fighting material
stop Have you sufficient
staff to train these men
stop During time which
will elapse before these
men are fully trained
is safety of country

adequately met by
present five
companies excluding
Abyssinians stop

~~by amalgamating first
and second battalions
and attaching four
companies of the amalgamated
battalion under a major
to the 3rd Battalion and
abolishing band a
saving of approximately
£1600 a year could be
effected stop would.~~

Omit.

28

you consider this
~~alternative~~ best

Captain Seely told me to get out a comparative statement of the cost of sending troops from East Africa to Zanzibar, and from Nyasaland to Zanzibar. I have been over to the Census Office and compared with them.

Without going to East Africa there appears no means of finding out the actual cost of sending troops from Nairobi to Zanzibar; they of course use the Government Railway, and are taken from Mombasa by the Sultan's ship. The actual cost of transport from Chinde to Zanzibar based on the estimate lately given by the Hon. Mr. Curle for the relief of the 2^d Bⁿ by the 1st is as under.

Officers	15	-	15	-	0
Soldiers	4	-	0	-	0
Followers	3	-	10	-	0
Women					

Children $\frac{1}{2}$ of the rate for women up to 15 years of age

The approximate cost therefore of relieving
two companies from Chinde to Zanzibar
would be

45 Officers at 15 - 15	=	63
200 Soldiers	=	800
say 8 Followers	=	32
say 150 Mules	=	525
say 150 Children at 20/ each	=	<u>150</u>
		1570

$$1570 \times 2 = \text{£ } 3140$$

To this must be added the cost of
railway journey from Blantyre to
Port Herald, and river journey from
Port Herald to Chinde. This we should have to
obtain from Nyasa.
The Sultan's ship The Cupid is only 330 tons
and can carry 600 deck passengers for
short voyages of a day or two.

It must be remembered that the
estimate of the Crime Agents with
the Crime Centre is for a larger
number of men than we should be
sending, i.e. 2 Battalions ^{each way} as against
two companies ^{each way} so the cost might easily be greater.
I shall see Telegraph for the cost to
O.A. to Nyasa + E.A.P.

Fildes.

4/11/77 Feb 13/77

W. ~~Rand~~

It looks very much as if
the cost of parading Zanzibar from

Nyasaland, even at intervals of
six or seven months, would be
prohibitive. I do not think it is ⁹³ worth
while making further enquiry until
we get the replies to the telegram
to Nyasaland of the 4. A. P. on the
military situation which we drafted
& sent on Saturday.

JAB

Feb 13

I agree with Mr Butler

H J R

13/II

Mr. Harcourt

C. O.

3413

94

EXP

FEB 2 1894

I have today had a discussion about military matters in East Africa with Mr. P. Girouard, Col. Théniger, and Col. Kirkpatrick. Mr. Fidler and other members of the Department were present. It seemed quite clear as a result of our conversation that it was desirable to have only one battalion of the King's African Rifles in the East Africa Protectorate. Apart from a saving in cost of from £4000 to £5000 a year there would be an increase in efficiency, other things being equal, by having only one Commanding Officer instead of two.

At present there are 800 men in all, 600 of the (East African) 3rd Battⁿ and 200 of the Nyasaland Battⁿ. Of these 8 companies, 3 companies are on the frontier (Kaka Rudo to ^{mouth of the} The Zimba River) 4 are at Harare, and two half companies are on reserve duty.

As regards the composition of the batts, Col. Théniger suggested that the Nyasaland men were far superior to those recruited in East Africa, but neither the Governor nor Col. Kirkpatrick agreed with him in this view. But even supposing it to be

Sound

Second, the fact that only 200 out of the 800 troops are from Nyasaland makes it a matter of not sufficient importance to outweigh the considerations of economy and efficiency.

Both Col. Thompson and Col. Kirkpatrick agreed that there should be 6 companies on the frontier and that this would be sufficient, but of the present East African Battalion remained at 6 companies this could leave nothing over for Nairobi. Sir P. Girouard thought that 200 police would do as well as 2 companies of E.A.P. troops at Nairobi, but in deference to military advice was prepared to take the 2 companies and raise the Battalion to 8 companies.

I therefore recommend that the following arrangements should be carried out:—

The 3rd Battalion to be recruited up to 8 companies (with the corresponding complement of officers) of which for the present 6 would be on the frontier and 2 at Nairobi. All the Nyasaland troops to be returned to Nyasaland, and that Protectorate to furnish the garrison of two companies at Longibar so long as this is considered necessary. — I should add that in

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my judgment these proposals are
 more than adequate, but in view of
 Murchison's illness it is perhaps as well
 not to make any reduction in the total
 number of troops in the East Africa
 Protectorate.

J.S.
 31.11

H. 1.4.11

Military Situation in East Africa

1. During the last year or eighteen months local opinion both civil and military has undoubtedly changed regarding the likelihood of a serious rising in Sulaland. We have come more in contact with the Chiefs and a widespread combination of the principal tribes against us appears most unlikely.

Our latest information regarding the most important tribes and leaders is as follows.

A. The Mahommed Zulcir 5000 are as far as can be foreseen favorably inclined to the Government

Ahmed Mergan the hereditary Sultan of the Opaden, has been reinstated in Government employ and has been doing well. He is however spoken of as a weak man.

Abdi Salana, a man who has sprung from nothing, was put in his position by Government. He has now influence and would support the Government -

Ali Jibril a paid Government Agent
Probably a fool

Ali Aldi Liban and Omar Aldi Liban

sons of Aldi Liban deceased, rich and
possess influence. It would not
pay them to make trouble. They are
reported as shopping well -

"B" The Aulikan (3000) Are no lovers of
the Government and if they saw
a chance would probably go against
us. They are unfriendly to the
Mahamed Zuleir and have had
disputes and some fighting with
the Marachan.

Haji Abdurrahman Marsal is a clever
and strong man and is now a
Government Agent at Serenbi. Would
side with us as far as his people
would allow him.

Dualha Ali [Chief of the Aulikan of
the Wama. Do not to be relied
upon -

"C" Ald Wak (1000) Unfriendly to the
Government and would probably
go against us if they saw a
good chance -

Hassar Andel Has been giving trouble and has been intriguing against the head chief of Sambaul who has given up and seems a good lad.

"D" Moghalul (500) Are far us and their chief Shik Egalleh Hassan is a shrewd sensible old man.

"E" The Abdullah (1000) are not favorable to us. They have been having trouble lately with the Mahomed Zubier.

"F" Little is known of The Marchan and the Somalis at Goydu, the former are reputed to be 4000 strong and to have 1000 rifles. but the information is very vague. It is however certain that rifles have gone in being imported for some considerable time. All authorities are agreed that the Marchan must be disarmed. It seems to be the opinion in some places that they will give up their rifles without fighting. Judging from our past experience of our idolatry superstitions of The Marchan Somalis, "I should think this most unlikely", unless they saw sufficient force at hand to make resistance useless. Somalis who give up to us

much as the cause for a rifle are scarcely likely to be shuffled into giving them up. If they might and probably would cross over into Italian territory.

4. The Rev Affal are an Arab tribe who have crossed over and are still crossing the river above Lugh. They have had fighting with the Marahan. They have horses and some 400 rifles.

2. Although therefore widespread trouble is inevitable, (though given the leader and a wave of fanaticism by no means impossible) it would be culpable to ignore the fact that once we start administering the country, dissolving tribes, and adjusting inter-tribal disputes we may have to undertake punitive expeditions employing say 500 men or even more.

In 1896 we employed over 700 men against the Ogaden Somalis afterwards reinforced by over 400 men.

In 1900 we employed some companies, cavalry and artillery against Afraad and accomplished very little —

Unless we are prepared to deal quickly and effectively the risks of trouble spreading are greatly increased. It must be remembered that information as to the plume

with which the Somalis will welcome an administration comes from somewhat tainted sources inasmuch as it is given by men and others who if not directly in our pay are largely interested in our favour. Furthermore Somaliland has shown that Somalis are prepared to tolerate our control and interference so long as it pays them, but if it runs counter to what they consider their interests they quickly turn round, and even if not actively hostile become passively so. I would therefore most strongly urge that before doing anything else, we establish our posts, put them in a state of defence and get our supply and transport arrangements into working order; then if anything happens we shall be in a position to deal with it. It is also quite possible that by being prepared we may avoid trouble altogether.

3. The posts I would recommend as a start are

Yanti - Galdwen - Afmahu - Sereuli - Dala

The question next arises in what strength should these posts be held. This will depend on the following factors.

- (a) On the strength of the whole force it is decided to keep up. Our present force in E.A.P. consists of 8 Companies (including the Camel Company) Out of

this force we have at present what may be called actively employed two and a half companies, i.e. half a company at Mt Kutak, Turkwell and Moyale, and the Camel Company at Serole and Moyale. This gives us 5½ companies to play with, of which one (The Abyssinians) cannot be employed, for various reasons, in the frontier.

It can scarcely be contemplated to effectively control 400 miles of frontier and an additional 100,000 sq. miles of territory without some addition to our present force. Although we have now been ^{for} over a year, by way of taking over this new territory, I have never seen this question fairly faced or any estimate put forward as to what expense will be entailed.

(b) The posts when finally decided on must be held in sufficient strength to allow of their holding them our until reinforced, and at certain places such as Afmadi, Yanti-Dalo and possibly Serole, there must be a force capable of taking the field.

(c) Subject to the above limitations it is undesirable to keep a larger force than

is absolutely necessary owing at such stations owing to the extreme difficulties of supply and transport health and training -

What Plan are the forces required

Afmadu Although the importance of this place may not be as great has it has been considered heretofore, since from our latest reports it appears that the Sumeris have not been there for the last two years and the wells are filled up, it is still a place of considerable strategical importance. By occupying it we shall be in rear of the Sumeris at the Deshek Wama and with a mobile force we could control a large area. I would suggest half a company of Infantry as the permanent garrison, and the Camel Corps as the Mobile Force. Afmadu is 70 miles from Yanti, 30-35 miles waterless. When occupied it should be put in a state of defence, at least three months supplies collected there and the road to Yanti improved. A field well would be a useful addition -

Yanti as at present would be the Headquarters. Though I should prefer to have a larger force I am afraid one and a half companies are the most we can spare. This would normally give a company to take the field.

Golwan would be merely the Depot for 103 Camel and Mule Company, a few infantry would be required there as at present they could be furnished from Yanti.

Serent Half a company of infantry. This place is approximately 200 miles from Yanti. Ordinarily speaking the river is not navigable from December to April. In the event of operations against the Marchans it would probably prove the advanced base for the troops operating from the river.

Dala One company of infantry. The NE corner from Dala - Serent is now the most likely place for trouble to occur, there are many turbulent spots constantly crossing over from the Italian side trying to stir up our hills. West of this line are the Marchans. Eventually it may be found that there is some place further south than Dala which would be more suitable -

The distance from Serent to Dala is roughly 130 miles

The river is not navigable. We have no information about the place itself -

1

4. Turning now to the Northern Frontier District
or to a more accurate that portion of
the Abyssinian border line which runs
from Dolo - Moyale.

Administrative officers with a few soldiers
have now been there for over a year.
The policy laid down is one of observation
only and the troops are to be regarded
as personal escorts to the civil
officials. The difficulties of maintaining
such a policy are obvious and both
Captain Bennett and Mr Hope, the civil
officials, have pointed out
the difficulty of acting on the lines
of Mr Zolhira and his irregulars,
viz a policy of bluff without
committing the Government. Mr Hope in
asking for more troops to be sent (Jan 1911)
has stated that the tribes are getting
more and more dissatisfied with our
powerlessness to enforce our demands, or
stop raids by their neighbours. The
maintenance of such an attitude
cannot but fail to damage our prestige
not only with the tribes there, but
also with the Abyssinians and the
Somalis. The longer such a situation
continues the greater is the danger of
trouble arising.

5. The distance from Moyale - Dola is 20 days by mule or burden camel 12 days by riding camel or 260 miles approximately.

With half a company at Moyale and half a company at Jara, which is about midway between Moyale and Dola, we should, from small but under the circumstances sufficiently large posts from which to patrol the country both east and west and also to the south.

This patrolling should be done by a mule company which should be financed for the purpose. Such a company would be far more efficient and in the long run more economical than giving out a certain number of mules to whatever troops are there. A mule company requires training and looking after and the officers must be selected so that they can teach the men. We could I understand purchase mules up there & they would come in every way most suitable. We should require 5 sections of 25 men; 4 for the field and one for the Depot. The question of enlisting some of the best men of the late 6th Buff should be considered —

- 6 We have now disposed of the following troops
- | | |
|-----------------|-------------------------------|
| Moyale and Jaja | One company |
| Dalo | One company |
| Dalo - Moyale | One company (Mules) |
| Serenti | Half company |
| Yanti | One & half companies |
| Ajmadu | One & half companies (Camels) |

This makes a total of $6\frac{1}{2}$ companies and with Mr Kulal and Turkwell $7\frac{1}{2}$ companies

7. The question of reliefs is a most difficult one. It is further complicated by the fact that we do not at present know what resources these posts have, and how far it will be possible to send the women there. In any case you cannot keep troops indefinitely at such places as Mr Kulal and Moyale. They must also be trained and the wanted troops cannot be kept indefinitely garrisoning the two companies garrisoning Zanyilan must be relieved every six months or so on account of the climate. I should be strongly opposed to the Nyaland Battⁿ permanently garrisoning the garrison, each Battⁿ should take its turn as has been the custom hitherto.

We have at present available for relief according to the above scheme $1\frac{1}{2}$ companies at Yanti and $1\frac{1}{2}$ companies at Nairobi

8. At Nairobi we must keep the relief for the Kuloh Detachment and we ought in my opinion to have a company available for such affairs as the recent Turkwell patrol.

9. For the present and until matters are somewhat clearer I would suggest sending the Headquarters of the 5th Battⁿ to garrison Jubaland and the Northern Frontier, but I would keep at Nairobi the recruits, sick and the half company of this Battⁿ which we have available, and they would only take such stores etc as we actually required. They would in fact go on an active service scale.

I would suggest forming a Depot company with a small establishment say 50 which could be commanded by a subaltern as I would leave the 2nd in Command at Nairobi. We should then have the following distribution when the 1st Battⁿ comes in May -

Jubaland & N. Frontier	6½ Coys 3 rd B ⁿ
Nairobi	1½ Coys 2 nd B ⁿ : includes Depot Coy.
Zanzibar	2 Coys 1 st B ⁿ
Turkwell & M. Kuloh	1 Coy 1 st B ⁿ
	1 Coy 1 st B ⁿ
	<u> </u>
	units including

The expense of the Depot Company would be nearly if not entirely met by the savings on the Band #647. A Band would of course not be required in Subaland -

10. It is absolutely essential that a proper organized transport should be formed immediately. Even if it is not proposed to send another man to the Funtica, such a scheme is necessary. When I was inspecting in Subaland there was absolutely no transport in the country. To such a pitch had they been reduced that in Subaland, and I believe also on the Moyale route they had actually been using riding camels to transport stores. I would recommend that a transport officer and N.C.O. be sent out to organize the transport both in Subaland and Moyale. The annual expenditure would be approximately \$3500 a year. In a scheme drawn out by Lt Colonel Kirkpatrick he reckoned it at \$900 per annum for the present garrison, this was hiring camels which we cannot apparently do. In a scheme

worked out by Major Broadley he calculated that if Mayala was supplied from Nairali, & properly organized transport in Dalaland would cost \$3000 per annum at a minimum -

The transport question is a most complicated one as we do not know for certain the limits of the dry belt, and how far camels can be used in the rainy season. In going from Afmahu to Serenli, the camel corps traversed 150 miles of waterless country through dense bush.

11. The question of officers is a most important one. It is not possible in my opinion to carry out the work with the present establishment. Take the posts which I propose at first the 3rd Bⁿ should garrison

At Mayala	1	Officer
" Jara	1	"
" Dala	2	"
With Camel Company on Dala Mayala line	2	"
At Serenli	1	there should be two
" Afmahu	3	ie 2 with Camel Company
" Yandi	3	
" Golwan	1	
" Nairali	2	
Total	<u>16</u>	

These numbers only refer to company officers
and are a bare minimum.

Our present establishment is 16, out of
which 4 at present are sick, 2 at
home, 2 at Harroli.

During the present year there are three
for leave 5 Captains & 2 Subalterns -

It must be remembered that officers
going on leave from frontier stations
add in quite two months to their
ordinary leave, during which they are
unavailable for duty, i.e. the time
taken on the road.

The minimum establishment that we
can do with is I consider 3 Officers
a company and one for the Depot
Company. The Officer with the Depot
Company I would call Assistant
Adjutant & give him 350 a year +
48 duty pay.

This would give us an establishment
of 22 Company Officers, this gives a
practically no margin for sickness.

In any case something must be done
immediately. When I left East Africa
there were only 9 Company officers
available for duty -

12. I have endeavored in the above scheme to outline what I consider are our minimum requirements for ordinary garrison work. That the situation even then will be entirely free from anxiety I do not think any military adviser would maintain. Our force for active operations would take a considerable time to concentrate and we should almost certainly have to call on Uganda for troops. No arrangements have been made for relief of mounted troops or for the necessary training. These are matters which must be worked out later. In writing this report I have consulted both Civil and Military authorities who should know the requirements best and although they may differ in details they are all agreed on the main principles; i.e. that a larger force is required, that transport must be provided, that more officers are necessary.

J. H. King Colonel
I. G. King African Rifles

January 15th 1911

12. I have endeavored in the above scheme to outline what I consider are our minimum requirements for ordinary garrison work. That the situation even then will be entirely free from anxiety I do not think any military adviser would maintain. Our force for active operations would take a considerable time to concentrate and we should almost certainly have to call on Uganda for troops. No arrangements have been made for relief of mounted troops or for the necessary training. These are matters which must be worked out later. In writing this report I have consulted both Civil and Military authorities who should know the requirements to best and although they may differ in details they are all agreed on the main principles; i.e. that a large force is required, that transport must be provided, that more officers are necessary.

J. H. King
1st Lt. King's African Rifles

January 15th 1911

C.O.

E.A.P

3419

Parathese explain
11 45 am
1770
6/2
EE

DRAFT.

Telegram
(Cuffher)

16 February
Communicate this to

Jackson

Girouard immediately

Minute

MINUTE.

on arrival. Begins

Mr. Butler. Feb. 15

Mr. Read. 15

* Mr. Fiddes. 15
at once

Mr. Just.

Mr. Cox.

Sir C. Lucas.

Col. Seely.

Mr. Harcourt.

I approve of E.A.P.

being garrisoned in
future ^{only} by 3rd Battalion

of eight companies.

Presume you are
satisfied that your
military forces will be

fully adequate between

4 d/5.

departure of 2nd

Battalion and

completion of 3rd

Battalion to eight

companies by local

recruiting. On what

date are 2nd Battⁿ?

due to leave?

I have given notice to

Foreign Office that

K.A.R. cannot supply

Zanzibar garrison after

June next. Can you

arrange to retain

in Zanzibar till end

of June two companies

now there? If

necessary small 113

bonus might be offered

to induce them to

accept extension.

Colonel reports

have been requested

to suspend negotiations

for transport for 1st

and 2nd Battalions

for April May next

pending further

instructions.

C.O.

E.A.P.

3419

HT

Paraphrase cyphers
12. 8 km
MCM
16/2

2

16 January

DRAFT.

Telegram
(cypher)

With reference to my
confidential despatch

Manning.

Zomba

(on 2464/10) of 13th September

MINUTE.

Mr. Butler. Feb. 15.

Mr. Read, 15

Mr. Fildes. 15

Mr. Just.

Mr. Cox.

Sir C. Lucas.

Col. Seely.

Mr. Harcourt.

I have approved of
proposal that E.A.P.

should be garrisoned
in future, ^{only} by 3rd

Battalion, ^{K.A.R.} of eight

companies, and have

given notice to Foreign

Office that K.A.R. cannot

4 d/5

supply Jangiar

garrison after June
next. This makes at
least one Nyasaland
Battalion redundant.

Please inform me
as fully as you can
by telegraph ^{on following} ~~by what~~
points. (1) By what
means and at what
rate ^{you} could effect
reduction ^{of one Battalion} so as to
involve as little
hardship as possible
to native rank and
file and at the same
time avoid undue
expense (2) What is
in your opinion,
strength and annual

cost of military force
115
required by Nyasaland
for solely for her own
needs in the altered
circumstances.

Crown Agents have
been requested to
suspend negotiations
for transport for
1st and 2nd Battalions
to
Lafail May next
pending further
instructions.

16

116

C.O.
3419

East Africa Pte.

Downing Street,

16 February, 1911.

DRAFT

THE CROWN AGENTS
FOR THE COLONIES.

Gentlemen,

MINUTE.

- Mr. Butler, Feb. 15th
- Mr. Read 15
- Mr. Fiddes. 15/2
- Mr. Just.
- Mr. Cox.
- Sir C. Lucas.
- Sir F. Hopwood.
- Col. Seely.
- Mr. Harcourt.
- Lord Creave.

And 6/4/3 K...
15/2

I am directed by Mr. Secretary Harcourt to inform you that he understands that, acting under instructions from the Governments of the East Africa Protectorate and Nyasaland, you are making arrangements with the Union Castle ^{team ship} Company for the return of the 2nd Battalion of the King's African Rifles from the East Africa Protectorate and Zanzibar to Nyasaland in April and May next and for their replacement in the East Africa Protectorate and Zanzibar by the 1st Battalion

from

already told me
by telephone to
send regulations.
15/2

(2 drafts)

17/1 tel. signed J.
Feb. 16/11

from Nyasaland.

2. Mr. Marcourt has ^{approved of} ~~under his con-~~
~~sideration~~ a re-arrangement of the military
forces of the East Africa Protectorate and
Tasaland which may result in an alteration
of the dates at which the 2nd Battalion should
return to Nyasaland, ^{which} and will in any case ren-
der it unnecessary for the 1st Battalion to
proceed to the East Africa Protectorate and
Zanzibar. I am, therefore, to request that
you will at once suspend all negotiations
for the transport of the troops, and take
no further action in the matter until you
receive further instructions from this Office.

3. I am to enquire what is the latest date at which
the arrangements with the Steamship Company
should be completed if it were eventually de-
termined that the 2nd Battalion should re-
turn to Nyasaland on the dates originally
fixed.

I am, &c.,
B. V. FRODIP

C.O. East Africa Protectorate
3419

Russell

Dewning Street,

16 February, 1911

DRAFT.

The Under Secretary of State,
FOREIGN OFFICE.

Sir,

MINUTE.

Mr. Butler, Feb. 15th.

Mr. Read 15

Mr. Fiddes 15

Mr. Just 20

Mr. Cox 16/5/11

Sir C. Lucas.

Sir F. Hopwood.

Col. Seely.

Mr. Marcourt.

~~Lord Cromer.~~

With reference to your letter
(no. 170/2/10) of the 4th of June last
and the reply from this Office of the
23rd of June, I am directed by Mr.
Secretary Marcourt to request you to
inform Secretary Sir E. Grey that he
has approved of a rearrangement of the
military forces of the East Africa
Protectorate and Nyasaland which makes
it necessary to reconsider the ~~sug-~~
~~gest-~~ ed arrangements for the garrisoning of
Zanzibar.

4 drafts)
12/2/11 Mr. Dickson J.
16/5/11

2. The effect of the rearrangement which has been approved is that henceforth the military force of the East Africa Protectorate shall consist of one Battalion (the 3rd) of the King's African Rifles, comprising eight Companies, and that that Protectorate shall no longer be required to maintain a foreign service Battalion from Nyasaland. It will necessarily result ^{from} this arrangement, that one of the Nyasaland Battalions (the 1st or 2nd) will be redundant and will have to be abolished or reduced. The eight Companies of the 3rd Battalion will be fully occupied with garrisoning the East Africa Protectorate itself, and there will be no surplus ^{strength} available for garrisoning Zanzibar. The cost of garrisoning Zanzibar from Nyasaland would, it appears, be prohibitive, owing to the

the length of the land journey and the sea voyage involved and the frequency with which reliefs would have to be carried out. In these circumstances, Mr. Harcourt regrets that he sees no alternative but to terminate the arrangement by which the garrisoning of Zanzibar is at present furnished by a detachment of the King's African Rifles. It will be remembered that the present arrangement was ^{attained} by mutual agreement for a period of one year, which will expire on the 31st of March next. In his despatch of the 21st of April last, a copy of which was enclosed in your letter of the 4th of June last, His Majesty's Agent and Consul General at Zanzibar stipulated that it should be understood that, in the event of the agreement not being prolonged beyond the 31st of March next,

† It is clear from the marked enclosure in 7.0. that the 31st of March is the date, not the end of June; but we cannot very well suggest anything earlier than the end of June.
H.A.B.

there-
after

should be allowed
~~There should be ample time~~ to make

other arrangements. Mr. Harcourt would

be glad to be informed at the earliest

possible date how long a period will

be required during
be necessary for framing and carrying

out such arrangements as may be deemed

necessary for garrisoning Zanzibar

on the withdrawal of the detachment of

the King's African Rifles.

3.4. That detachment is at present
furnished by the 2nd Battalion, King's

African Rifles, which is due to return

to Nyasaland in April and May next.

Mr. Harcourt is enquiring of the

Governor of the East Africa Protectorate

whether it is possible to *retain* ~~increase~~ the

detachment to ~~remain~~ in Zanzibar until

the end of June, but he *does not consider that* doubts whether

it will be possible to prolong their

service there beyond that date. He would,

therefore be glad to ~~know~~ that the Zanzibar

Government

Government will be in a position to

dispense with the detachment by the

end of June *at the latest*

DRAFT

I am, &c.