

UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI
DEPARTMENT OF DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

**CROSS BORDER KINSHIP AND PROTRACTED RESOURCE-BASED
CONFLICTS IN THE HORN OF AFRICA: THE CASE OF BORANA AND
GABRA IN KENYA AND ETHIOPIA.**

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DECLARATION

This research project is my original work and has not been presented for the award of a master's degree in this University or any other Institution of higher learning for examination.


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Declaration by the university supervisor

This project has been submitted for examination with my approval as university supervisor.

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DR. ANITA KIAMBA

DEDICATION

I am happy to dedicate this study to both Borana and Gabra communities encouraging them to live in harmony as true brothers and sisters.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

With immense gratitude and joy, I acknowledge God for life. I also thank my supervisor, Dr. Anita Kiamba for her good supervision and support.

ABBREVIATIONS

DYP	Democratic Union Party
EPR	Ethnic Power Relations
IGAD-	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
KDP	Kurdish Democratic Party
MAR	Minority at Risk
MP	Member of Parliament
PJAK	Party of Free Life of Kurdistan
REGABU	Rendile Gabra Burji alliance
SALWs-	Small Arms and Light Weapons
UCDP/PRIO	Uppsala Conflict Data Program/Peace Research Institute
US-	United States

ABSTRACT

Resource-based conflicts are rife within the Horn of Africa. These conflicts pose significant hurdles towards the continued prosperity of the region. While a majority of these conflicts are intrastate, some have become transnational, affecting communities and regions in neighbouring countries. These take the form of ethnic conflicts over the control of resources such as land and political offices. This study focuses on the Borana and Gabra conflicts in Marsabit County. Many researchers exploring the nature and causes of conflicts between these two pastoral communities have ignored the transnational dimension in the conflict. The study aims to bridge this gap by assessing the influence of cross-border ethnic alliances and marginalization in the conflict. It explores the social and economic consequences of this conflict. The proposal is pegged on primordial and instrumentalist theories of ethnic conflict. The research design employed in this study was a cross-sectional design involving the collection of both qualitative and quantitative data. The study was carried out in southern parts of Ethiopia and northern parts of Kenya-key areas where the two communities reside. The results showed that cross-border ethnic kin play important roles in the escalation of the conflict. They sell and share arms with their Kenyan counterparts. They are also involved in reinforcing their kin, manipulating elections. Hiding persons wanted by police and in forceful eviction of rival communities on the border. Ethnic marginalization due to nepotism and biased disruption of county government resources was also blamed for the animosity between the two communities. Half the respondents participated in peace meetings between the two communities. The major resolutions passed were; return of livestock stolen, compensation for loss of lives, arrest and prosecution of offenders and disbarment. Lack of support from both political and communal leaders and ineffective policing were the main challenges hindering the effectiveness of these resolutions. The study recommends an investigation of the role of the past and presents county governments on the conflict, arrest, and prosecution of wrongdoers and increased surveillance and disarmament operations in both the two countries.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

1.1 Background of the Study

The prevalence of protracted conflicts in developing countries and more so in Africa is a cause of regional and global concern. These conflicts have caused loss of human life, massive destruction of property, the flow of refugees into neighbouring states, and environmental degradation. Conflicts in Pakistan and Afghanistan have also frequently promoted the build-up of terrorist cells that torment international security¹. Whilst there are various causes of conflicts, structural conflicts arise due to people competing for scarce resources².

Human needs are inherently insatiable and people often desire to possess more and more resources for their use. The struggle to have sufficient resources builds tensions that in turn create environments that form breeding grounds for conflicts. In recent times, there have been cases of violent conflicts with some escalating to genocides and massacres attributable to fights for resources in Somalia, Rwanda, and Burundi. The conflicts in these three cited locations have spilled across the borders with ethnic affiliations appearing to influence them raising a need for scholars to elucidate on if cross-border ethnic ties fuel protracted conflicts.

¹ Z. Najafov, "Internationalization of Ethnic Conflicts and Impact on Regional and International Security," *Journal of Political Science Affairs* 5, no. 4 (2017).

² Olusunkanmi, A. Interrogating structural conflicts and constitutionalism in Nigeria. *Open Access Library Journal*, 6, no.e (2019):1-13. doi:10.4236/oalib.1105488

Protracted resource-based conflicts are long-term. Some of these conflicts can last for more than 10 years. The cause of the conflicts is partly attributed to the scramble for scarce resources as elucidated by Coleman³. These conflicts are characterized by mutual grievances by the parties in conflict. Thus, these conflicts recur due to the cycle of revenge by parties. Protracted conflicts are also considered delusional in that interventions to reduce or stop such conflicts are stubbornly hard to formulate. In addition, Coleman argues that protracted conflicts are violent aggressions by people in pursuit of the acquisition of resources to meet basic human needs such as the right to political participation, economic safety, security, and recognition needs. Ideally, therefore, most of the conflicts in the current world can be said to be protracted conflicts as they are resource-based conflicts.

Communities living on either side of national boundaries share many commonalities including ethnic ties, religion, culture, and political orientations. For example, long outstanding conflicts in Hungarian-Romania can be attributed to allegiance to cultural, ethnic, and linguistic relations that have fuelled tensions among the people living at the border. The argument is that inter-community conflicts in one country tend to spill over to the other rather peaceful country. The warring communities in one country entangle the other parties across the border.

Africa was partitioned by European countries during the early 19th century in which boundaries were set by the colonial powers to reap economic benefits. These demarcations meant that people of the same tribe, linguistic background, religion, culture were alienated

³ Peter T. Coleman, "Characteristics of Protracted, Intractable Conflict: Toward the Development of a Metaframework," *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology* 9, no. 1 (March 1, 2003): 1–37, https://doi.org/10.1207/S15327949PAC0901_01.

from each other⁴. For instance, the Hausa of Niger and Nigeria share similar cultures and thus have kinship ties. This means that even though they are citizens of different countries, the Hausa have allegiance to each other across the national borders. Similarly, the Somalis were separated into citizens of Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia, and Kenya. This also occurred, among the Tesos, Pokots, and Luhya who were separated by the national boundaries of Kenya and Uganda; the Kuria and the Maasai who were subdivided between Kenya and Tanzania. Additionally, the Anyuaa and Nuer were split between Ethiopia and South Sudan while the Afar people of Ethiopia were split amongst Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Djibouti, and the Oromo, Gabra, and the Borana between Kenya and Ethiopia.

This study focuses on the protracted resource-based conflicts among the Borana and Gabra of Kenya and Ethiopia. The Borana and Gabra are traditionally pastoralist communities that reside at the borders of these two countries. The kinship ties for members of these two communities are strong irrespective of the fact that they are citizens of different countries. The hypothesized ethnic relationship between Borana of Ethiopia and Borana of Kenya creates bonds of unity in intercommunal conflict with the Gabra. The same case is hypothesized for the Gabra community.

These cross-border ethnic ties are likely to occasion and escalate conflicts in the region leading to civil wars and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALWs) across the already porous border. For example, Huka examined the dynamics of conflicts in the Horn of Africa, and Conflicts in the Horn of Africa exhibits dynamics such as spillovers

⁴ Erika Forsberg, "Transnational Transmitters: Ethnic Kinship Ties and Conflict Contagion 1946–2009," *International Interactions* 40, no. 2 (March 15, 2014): 143–65, <https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2014.880702>.

across borders⁵. The motivation of this study is therefore embedded in the need to ascertain whether cross-border ethnic ties have prolonged the resource-based conflicts at the Kenya-Ethiopia border.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Conflicts in the Horn of African are of enormous concern to national, regional, and international policymakers. These conflicts are usually deadly resulting in significant loss of lives, livelihoods, and infrastructural developments. These conflicts are significant obstacles towards the achievement of national and regional goals on sustainability, economic empowerment, and the eradication of poverty. Finding ways of understanding and alleviating the main causes of these conflicts is, thus, a matter of national, regional, and global concern.

The protracted resource-based conflict between the Borana and Gabra is one of the conflicts in the horn of Africa that has persisted for too long. This conflict has been attributed to ethnic rivalry, competition for resources especially livestock and land, and political entrepreneurs⁶. Researchers such as Witsenburg and Adano⁷ have assessed the effect of climatic variability on livestock raids in the county of Marsabit. However, no research has attempted to investigate whether cross-border ethnic ties have a role in these

⁵ Huka, B. D. Dynamics and spillover of regional conflicts in the Horn of Africa ;A critical analysis of Turbi massacre. *Unpublished Thesis submitted to University of Nairobi*, (2014):1-137.

⁶ Wario Malicha, "The Politics of Violence in Marsabit County | The Elephant," July 19, 2021, <https://www.theelephant.info/features/2021/07/19/the-politics-of-violence-in-marsabit-county/>.

⁷ Karen Witsenburg M. and Wario Adano R., "Of Rains and Raids: Violent Livestock Raiding in Northern Kenya," *Civil Wars* 11, no. 4 (2009): 514–38.

conflicts. The hypothesis is that the allegiance to culture and religion and societal affiliations spills across the border and fuels the conflict.

In this study, two cross-border kinship constructs, namely ethnic allegiance and ethnic marginalization across the border in respect to the protracted resource-based conflicts in the county will be examined. The basic argument of this study is that the Borana of Ethiopia and Borana of Kenya frequently team up to fight against the Gabra community due to resource scarcity at either side of the Kenyan-Ethiopian border or vice versa.

1.3 Objectives of the Study

In a broad term, this study investigates the influence of cross-border ethnic allegiances and the consequences of protracted resource-based conflicts among the Borana and Gabra.

1.3.1 Specific Objectives

- i. To assess the influence of ethnic allegiances and ethnic marginalization on protracted resource-based conflicts between Borana and Gabra in the Horn of Africa.
- ii. To assess the social and economic consequences cross border conflicts among Borana and Gabra in the Horn of Africa
- iii. To examine the various conflict resolution mechanisms being used in resolving the conflict and their effectiveness.

1.4 Research Questions

- i. To what extent do ethnic allegiances and ethnic marginalization influence protracted resource-based conflicts between Borana and Gabra in the Horn of Africa?
- ii. What are the social and economic consequences of the cross-border conflicts between Borana and Gabra in the Horn of Africa?
- iii. What are the conflict resolution mechanisms being utilised in resolving the conflict and how effective are they?

1.5 Literature Review

This section presents a brief discussion on the topics of national and international conflicts, resource-based conflicts, and the influence of cross-border ethnic allegiances on conflicts. This review provides both theoretical and empirical studies intending to elucidate the gaps present in the current literature.

1.5.1 Cross Border Kinship

In general, terms, kinship refers to relatedness among members of a group of people or society. Kinship, therefore, is the relationship that exists between people who have common descent, ancestry, culture, language, or tribal affiliation⁸. Kinship bonds tie members of an ethnic community together. These bonds are so strong that they resemble family bonds⁹. Members of this bond have a duty and responsibility to each other in the

⁸ Darius, R. Different levels of ethnic kinship: The next step in cross-border minority issues? *International Journal on Minority and Group Rights*, 1, no.1 (2021):1-24.

⁹ Erika Forsberg, "Transnational Transmitters: Ethnic Kinship Ties and Conflict Contagion 1946–2009," *International Interactions* 40, no. 2 (March 15, 2014): 143–65, <https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2014.880702>

present and also or in the future. In the present, for instance, members can provide refuge to fellow kin or to be abreast of the welfare of other kin members¹⁰. The bonds can also be relied upon in the future to offer support during conflicts or communal disasters. Kinship is not only confined to a specific geographical boundary but also transverse borders. Cross-border kinship exists where people from different countries share kinship ties. According to Ganguly, cross-border kinship was created as a consequence of three processes. The first was the demarcation of boundaries that went across ethnic communities during the colonial era in the 18th Century. As a result, an ethnic community found itself subdivided into two different states. For example, the Luo of Kenya and Luo of Uganda have kinship ties as it is for the Borana and Gabra of Kenya and Ethiopia. Native governments later maintained these boundaries after independence without correcting this anomaly. Secondly, the migration of ethnic communities over centuries also contributed to the scattering of communities of similar ethnicity in different states. For instance, the Tamils of India migrated into the eastern and northern islands of Sri Lanka. These maintain strong bonds with the Indian Tamils. Lastly, transnational ethnic ties were also created as a result of the collapse of states. The collapse of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union form prime examples. The imposition of a state boundary does not negate the kinship bonds between the ethnic communities¹¹. These ties make them identify themselves as one community albeit being citizens of different countries.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid.

The separation of an ethnic community in two or more states creates scenarios where an ethnic community can be a majority in one state and a minority in another state or vice versa. The ethnic community can also be a minority in two or more states. The Kurds, for example, are a small ethnic community located within the borders of Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey. These can potentially present challenges to regional, inter, and interstate security¹². In conflicts occurring within state borders, kinship ties traversing state boundaries provide refuge for ethnically organized rebels or combatants. As such these rebels can employ guerrilla-like tactics within the state boundaries and blend in with their ethnic kin outside the state to avoid detection and repression. Additionally, cross-border kinship ties provide the human and economic resources needed to accomplish the goals of the conflict. Their cross-border sanctuary can assist in the collection of intelligence. These advantages accorded to rebels can substantially increase the cost and duration of conflicts. An example case is the insurgency in Afghanistan done by the Taliban and has prolonged due to ethnic assistance obtained from the Pashtuns in Pakistan¹³.

1.5.2 The Definition and Reasons for the Occurrence of Conflicts

A conflict is a situation that exists when individuals or groups of people are involved in the pursuit of interests and goals that are dissimilar from those of another individual or group of human beings. This definition indicates that conflicts are always in existence as far as there is a divergence of goals between people or societies. Conflicts typically indicate a situation where human beings pursue incompatible interests from those of other people.

¹²ibid

¹³ Mehmet, G. Transnational ethnic kin and civil war outcomes. *Political Research Quarterly*, 68 no (1) (2015),142-153.

Conflicts do not necessarily infer violence or wars since they are intrinsic and natural to human beings. However, conflicts can lead to violence especially where the tensions escalate between the parties involved. Prolonged conflicts lead to disputes and this can in turn occasion violence that ultimately breeds wars. Mehmet argues that conflicts have existed since the beginning of time and will continue to as long as there are incompatible interests among groups of people. It is violent conflicts that are worrisome as they can lead to civil wars¹⁴.

There are various reasons put forward to explain the occurrence of conflicts. Structural theory, for example, indicates that conflicts are caused by tensions that exist where people are in pursuit of their needs by competing for scarce resources. Moreover, this proposition views that structural deficiencies in the society as evidenced by the mismatch in resource allocations, economic and political participation are subtle causative reasons for violent conflicts. Violence conflicts erupt when people are seeking change due to feelings of deprivation either real or perceived. In this respect, therefore, violent conflicts are caused by the failure of people to access scarce resources. In addition, political exclusion, poverty, and inequality are possible reasons for conflicts.

1.5.3 Conflicts in the Horn of Africa

The Horn of Africa is widely regarded as the most conflict-prone region on African on the African continent. Countries in this region comprise Kenya, Ethiopia, Somalia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Sudan, Uganda, and Southern Sudan. All of these countries are frequently characterized by conflicts. These conflicts occur at different levels; interstate, intrastate

¹⁴ Ibid

and intercommunal conflicts. The horn of Africa has experienced a minimum of three violent conflicts and four interstate conflicts since the post-independence era as reported by Mengistu. These wars have mainly been fought over territories and borders¹⁵. For instance, the Somalia- Ethiopian war of 1960 to 1991 was fought over the ownership of the Ogaden region while the Southern Sudanese war was fought over regional autonomy and inclusion in government. The former started as a small nonviolent conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia. It generated a fully scaled war that caused the collapse of the state of Somalia, the formation of the Transitional Federal Government, and the insurrection of Al Shabab¹⁶. The latter has become an Achilles heel in regional and global efforts to resuscitate the state of Somalia. Not all the intrastate conflicts in the region have turned violent. The current conflict between Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan over the Grand Renaissance Dam is an example of a nonviolent conflict. The maritime dispute between Kenya and Somalia is also another example.

Apart from interstate conflicts, all of the Horn of Africa countries have experienced intrastate civil wars. These have been occasioned as a result of the escalation of conflicts between states and militia groups supported by the state or other sub-state actors. Intestate civil wars can also be attributed to inter-state conflicts as often neighbouring states may support militia groups against an adversary state. The Shifta wars in Kenya, for example, were supported by the state of Somalia to put all Somali-speaking regions under its control. Sudan also actively supported liberation insurgency groups in Eritrea against Ethiopia. The

¹⁵ Muhabie Mekonnen Mengistu, "The Root Causes of Conflicts in the Horn of Africa," *American Journal of Applied Psychology* 4, no. 2 (2015): 28–34, <https://doi.org/10.11648/J.AJAP.20150402.12>.

¹⁶ Kidane Mengisteab, "Critical Factors in the Horn of Africa' Raging Conflicts" (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2011).

latter on other hand reciprocated by supporting the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) against the Sudan government. The majority of intrastate conflicts are driven by the perceived inequality and repression in resource allocation and development, the ethnic characteristics of the state, and power struggles between the elites in these countries. One can also not rule out the role of poverty, unemployment as causative agents for these conflicts¹⁷. As enumerated earlier external interventions by foreign elements can also result in these conflicts.

Intercommunal conflicts in the Horn of Africa are mostly fought between clan and ethnic groups over the control of resources such as water, land, and livestock. The majority of these conflicts revolve around the diverse pastoral communities in the region. However, conflicts between pastoral and farming communities are also rife. An in-depth examination of these conflicts by Mengisteab reveals that Ethiopia has experienced more intercommunal conflicts than any other country in the region. The country has had 24 intercommunal conflicts between the years 2002-2008. Kenya on the other hand has experienced nine conflicts over the same period. The majority of these conflicts occurred during the 2007 to 2008 post-election violence¹⁸

¹⁷ Muhabie Mekonnen Mengistu, "The Root Causes of Conflicts in the Horn of Africa," *American Journal of Applied Psychology* 4, no. 2 (2015): 28–34.

¹⁸ Kidane Mengisteab, "Critical Factors in the Horn of Africa' Raging Conflicts" (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2011)

1.5.4 Conflicts involving Cross Border Ethnic Alliances

Two types of cross-border ethnic conflicts arise from the extensive literature conducted by the researcher. The first and most dominant usually pits a state against an ethnic community fighting for secession from the government or the latter's interference in an inter-ethnic conflict. The second involves two warring ethnic communities both located near the borders of two or more countries. One or both of these ethnic communities derive an advantage from their cross-border kin.

The resurgence of Kurdish in Syria, Iraq, Iran, and Turkey can be attributed to the immense advantages of having transnational ethnic kin in all the borders of these countries that neighbour each other. The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) would have been obliterated by the Iraqi government were it not for the support and reinforcement from other cross-border Kurdish groups in the neighbouring countries¹⁹. Likewise, Kurds in northern Iraq provided refuge for Turkey's Kurdistan Workers Party after the 1999 arrest of their leader, Occalan. As a result, they narrowly escaped annihilation from the Turkey government hell-bent on breaking their rebellion. This refuge enabled KDP to later regroup as the Democratic Union Party (PYD) in Syria and Party of Free Life of Kurdistan (PJAK) in Iran. Mehmet attributes the success of the Kurds to cross-border ethnic relations that have greatly increased the cost of repression by these states. This has made the complete eradication of the Kurds unachievable. As a result, the Kurds have largely achieved their aims in a majority of these countries. They have received, for instance, formal recognition

¹⁹ Ibid

in the constitution of Iraq while Turkey has made some steps to recognize the Kurdish identity in its education and national policies.²⁰

Aside from the Kurds, the resurgence of the Taliban movement in Afghanistan can be attributed to the conflicts between Pakistani and Afghanistan. The Pashtuns' who reside on the borders of these two countries have been actively involved in these conflicts as the key players and agitators. Assisted by the Pakistani government, the Pashtun formed the Taliban in Afghanistan to take over the control of the war-ravaged country. The American war in Afghanistan failed to exterminate the Taliban because they fled and found refuge with their neighbouring kin in Pakistan. From these hideouts, the Taliban have regrouped and been involved in myriads of conflicts and terrorist activities outside and within Pakistan²¹. The withdrawal of the American soldiers from Afghanistan has enabled them to retake control of large parts of the country with ease.

The conflict between India and Sri Lanka in 1987²², just like in the preceding example, is a prime example of how states can be influenced by their resident ethnic tribes to intervene in a cross-border conflict involving an ethnic community related to their citizens. In this example, India intervened after the Sri Lankan government compromising of the dominant tribe Sinhalese launched a blockade against its resident minority tribe, Tamil. The latter wanted to secede from Sri Lanka due to perceived exclusion from the government. The heavy fighting resulted in a high civilian death toll that infuriated their co-ethnic relatives

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Meirav Mishali-Ram, "When Ethnicity and Religion Meet: Kinship Ties and Cross-Border Dynamics in the Afghan-Pakistani Conflict Zone," *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 17, no. 3 (July 2011): 257–75, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13537113.2011.600101>.

²² Huma Baqai, "Role of Ethnicity in the Conflict Spectrum of South Asia," *Pakistan Horizon* 57, no. 4 (2004): 57–68.

in India. The Indian Tamils exerted pressure on the Indian government to intervene in the conflict and protect their cross-border kin. India responded by sending 45,000 troops into Sri Lanka. This example shows that during civil conflicts, neighbouring states are likely to intervene in a conflict if it involves an ethnic community that is related to or is similar to an ethnic community inside its borders. The vice versa is also true. States usually intervene or start such conflicts to either appease their dominant ethnic majority or to prevent the demands of secession from excluded ethnic minorities. In this case, of India, its intervention in the conflict was mainly to appease its resident Tamil community to distract them from their secession demands²³.

Within the study area, the Gabra, Borana, and Garri, which are dispersed between the borders of Kenya and Ethiopia frequently, participate in conflicts. While they are all pastoralists, the Garri is of Somali descent while the Gabra and Borana speak the Oromo language. In Ethiopia, conflicts between the Gabra and Garri have intensified over the unimpeded expansion of Garri into Gabra territory. This expansion has been perceived, as explained by Asebe²⁴, to be supported by the Ethiopian federal government which most of the time has been reluctant to address the grievances of the Gabra community. On the Kenyan side, conflicts between the Borana and the Gabra have also been on the rise. They are mostly being fuelled by political competitions. Even though Gabra and Borana live harmoniously in Ethiopia, the frequent fights within the Kenyan border have increased the

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Regasa Debelo Asebe, "Competing Orders and Conflicts at the Margins of the State: Inter Group Conflicts along the Ethiopia- Kenya Border," *African Journal on Conflict Resolution* 16, no. 2 (57-83): 2016.

level of mistrust. As result, they frequently cross the border to be enjoined in conflicts with their kin.

1.5.5 Protracted Resource Based Conflicts

Resource-based conflicts are structural conflicts as they arise due to competition for scarce resources among groups of people²⁵. Resources are materials, natural or otherwise that are valuable in meeting the needs of people. Human needs are necessities that people require to lead a comfortable life. Thus, where it is hard for people to meet these needs and this failure is attributed to inequality in resource allocation, this forms an environment for conflicts. Resource-based conflicts are structural crises that arise due to marginalization in access and use of resources. It is true to suffice that resources are scarce and therefore distribution ought to be fairly done by those in charge of sharing them. Whilst this is the ideal goal, the reality is quite to the contrary since there is unfair distribution due to racial, tribal, or religious differences et cetera leading to conflicts as people attempt to satisfy their basic needs²⁶.

Resource-based conflicts exacerbate when the political class deliberately formulate exclusionary political and economic practices and puts them into action thus alienating a section of people from enjoying the resources. This economically and politically discriminated section of the people feel repressed, aggrieved and this can cause violent

²⁵ Sheriff, G. I., Abba, S., & Bibi, F. Resource based conflicts and political instability in Africa: Major trends, challenges and prospects. *International Journal of Humanities Social Sciences and Education (IJHSSE)*, 1 no(2014), 71-78.

²⁶ Ibid.

conflicts²⁷. For instance, the Israel-Palestine conflict is partly attributable to the need of each state to own and control scarce natural gas deposits at the Gaza strip. Japan and China have engaged in protracted conflicts in the quest to acquire Senkaku islands that offer fertile fishing resources.

Resource-based conflicts turn protracted when they become prolonged and intractable rendering common policies used to solve them ineffective. This is usually the case where resources are critically scarce and the scarce resources are in the hands of a section of few people. This inequality exacerbates resource-based conflicts. Protracted resource-based conflicts are hardly solvable since the underpinning causes of the conflicts are challenging to solve. Moreover, abject poverty escalates resource-based conflicts especially when the marginalized violently react in response to the perceived prejudices.

1.5.6 Influence of Cross-border Kinship on Protracted Conflicts

Mehmet hypothesized that civil conflict involving rebels with cross-border kinship ties resulted in war outcomes favourable to the rebels. His results show that Trans border kinship increases the probability of the government and rebel forces settling than by the government becoming winning the conflict. This is because benefits that accrue to the rebels from having transnational kinship ties increase the duration and cost of the conflict beyond the government can sustain. The government, therefore, is forced to negotiate with the rebels. He utilized data from Uppsala Conflict Data Program/Peace Research Institute (UCDP/PRIO), Minority At-Risk dataset (MAR 2009), and Armed Conflict Dataset, these

²⁷ Sara Parvello, “Pastoralists’ Vulnerability in the Horn of Africa: Exploring Political Marginalization, Donors’ Policies, and Cross-Border Issues - Literature Review | Prevention Web” (Humanitarian Policy Group, 2016)

datasets contained entries of ethnic civil conflicts that occurred from the year 1950 to 2006. He set the outcome of the conflict as the dependent variable (either government victory, rebel victory, or settlement). The absence or presence of ethnic kin in neighbouring states was set at the dependent variable. Variables such as group size and concentration, income, type of regime, army size among others were used as control variables. He utilized the Multinomial Logit model and Weibull regression to test his hypotheses. He observed a significant relationship between transnational ethnic kin and the probability of a conflict ending in a negotiated settlement. The presence or absence of cross-border ethnic kin, however, was not significant when the conflicts ended with a victory for the rebels. The researcher also observed that armed conflicts involving transnational ethnic ties lasted longer (6.34 years) compared to those conflicts without cross-border kinship ties (3.85 years)²⁸.

Cederman *et al*²⁹ theorized the existence of a canon linear relationship between transnational ethnic ties and the probability of conflict. He proposed that as the power and size of transnational ethnic kin increases the likelihood of conflict increases. The probability of conflicts, however, reduces when the kinships ties are stronger. Their results established that the probability of conflict is greater in transnational ethnic groups with intermediate sizes. The probability of conflict increased when the ethnic kin controlled or was included in the government and increased when the ethnic kins were excluded from the government. In their analyses, the authors showed the existence of a curvilinear

²⁸ Mehmet, G. Transnational ethnic kin and civil war outcomes. *Political Research Quarterly*, 68 no (1) (2015),142-153

²⁹ Lars-Erik Cederman, *et al.*, “Trans border Ethnic Kin and Civil War,” *International Organization* 67 (2013): 389–410.

relationship between the size of cross border ethnic sizes and the probability of conflict, However, the presence of transnational ethnic kin did not significantly influence the probability of conflict from ethnic groups who were politically relevant (part of governance or faced discrimination from the government) in the years 1946-2009. Large cross-border ethnic groups who were part of the government had a lower propensity to cause conflicts than those excluded from government. The authors gave an example of the large ethnic groups in the Russian diaspora that have largely remained peaceful. Stateless ethnic groups, for instance, the Kurds had a higher propensity to cause conflicts. The results were based on data collected by the Ethnic Power Relations dataset (EPR) while logit models were used to test their hypotheses³⁰.

To establish if cross-border ethnic relations influenced the domestic politics of neighbouring states and especially their ability to intervene in conflicts, Condra³¹ utilized four variables as a proxy for cross-border ethnicity. These were; the linguistic resemblance between the foreign ethnic community and its cross border counterpart, the random linguistic resemblance between the rebelling ethnicity and the citizens of the intervening state, the ethno-lingual similarity between the rebelling group and its cross border counterpart, and the presence or absence of a true co-ethnic community across the border of an intervening state. He theorized that the closer the rebelling ethnic community was to the citizens and the senior government officials of the neighbouring state, the higher the probability that the state will intervene and assist it in its conflict. Other variables used

³⁰Ibid

³¹ Condra, Luke. "Ethnic Group Rebellion in Civil War." Doctoral Dissertation, Stanford University, 2010. 1-215. <https://searchworks.stanford.edu/view/8714816>

for his analysis included; distance to the capital city, the share of the population, and area, which he used as indicators of a state's ability to manage rebellions. The dependent variables were all rebellion, state takeover rebellion, and territorial rebellion. He utilized data from 48 ethnic communities in Africa collected over 25 years³². The four measures of cross-border kinship ties, however, did not significantly affect the probability of rebellion by a cross-border ethnic community. The measures of the state's ability to manage rebellions such as population share and distance to the capital were all significant. The inclusion of these variables in the analysis might likely have overshadowed the significance of the cross-border ethnic kin variables. Tatrai and Kovalyk focused on Hungary's and Ukrainian conflicts in which ethnic ties were examined³³. The study was motivated due to rising migrations in the region particularly in Central and Eastern Europe. Of importance to discourse on conflicts is the fact that the movement does not cut kinship ties, which then presents an avenue for conflicts. In turn, this has the effect of internationalizing conflicts that were previously thought to be domestic. Results of the study pointed that kinship ties in conflict-infested regions played a role in fuelling conflicts. The conflict in Transcarpathia had disintegrated and spilled to other Visegrad nations. Further results pointed that kin affiliations were strong across neighbouring countries and this impacted conflicts since people of common kinship engaged in conflicts

³² Ibid

³³ Tatrai, P., Eross, A., & Kovalyk. Kin-state politics stirred by a geopolitical conflict: Hungary's growing activity in post-Euromaidan Transcarpathia, Ukraine. *Hungarian Geographical Bulletin*, 66 no.(2017): 203-218.

that did not originate with them. Consequently, kinship does contribute to protracted conflicts.

1.6 Justification of the Study

As this research is academic, the following justifies the study for academic reasons.

1.6.1 Academic Justification

Whilst many researchers such as Gurse³⁴, Condra³⁵, and Cederman *et al.*³⁶, as reviewed in the last section, have assessed the impact of cross-border or transnational ethnic ties, significant gaps remain. The majority of analyses of the role of cross-border ethnicity on conflicts have largely been conducted in Europe and Asian Countries. Condra³⁷ was the only researcher as per our literature review who assessed its roles in African conflicts. Unfortunately, like most of the other European researchers, they utilized historical datasets collected by foreign universities and researchers. These datasets include the Uppsala conflict database and the MAR dataset. Their analyses do not provide the current state of conflicts and do not benefit from the input of local communities who engage or become victims of these conflicts. As per the literature review conducted by the author, no one has documented the role of transnational ethnic bonds on the Borana and Gabra conflicts in Marsabit County and solutions to the conflict.

³⁴ Mehmet, G. Transnational ethnic kin and civil war outcomes. *Political Research Quarterly*, 68 no (1) (2015),142-153

³⁵ Condra, Luke. "Ethnic Group Rebellion in Civil War." Doctoral Dissertation, Stanford University, 2010. 1-215. <https://searchworks.stanford.edu/view/8714816>

³⁶ Lars-Erik Cederman, et al., "Trans border Ethnic Kin and Civil War," *International Organization* 67 (2013): 389–410.

³⁷Condra, Luke. "Ethnic Group Rebellion in Civil War." Doctoral Dissertation, Stanford University, 2010. 1-215.<https://searchworks.stanford.edu/view/8714816>

1.7 Theoretical Framework

Ethnic conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa and other parts of the world continue to pose serious challenges to the security and economic development of these regions. Two fundamental theories have been proposed to explain how these conflicts arise. These are primordialism and instrumentalism.

Primordialism regards ethnicity as a phenomenon that is organically or naturally formed over time. The foundation of primordialism was laid by the seminal work of Pierre van den Berghe. He viewed ethnic groups as having a common belief in the uniqueness of the group (endogamy) and the desire to safeguard its purity. This desire leads to ethnocentrism, which is viewed by primordialists to promote group cohesiveness, cooperation, and hospitality. It also explains why members of different ethnic identity are treated with suspicion and sometimes hostility. Geertz noted that people who share the same cultural beliefs, language, and blood are bound to each other. These social attachments are deep-rooted, immutable, inescapable, and passed on from one generation to the next. As a result, ethnic conflicts under the primordial view occur because of historical resentment against the opposing community and the fear of domination or extinction. Primordialist, therefore, infer that states with many ethnic communities will ultimately experience conflict. These have, however, not occurred in ethnically diverse countries like Botswana and Cameroon.

Instrumentalists, on the other hand, posit that ethnic identities have an indirect effect on conflicts. They argue that ethnic identities only become relevant in conflicts when they are activated by political agents. Brass, for instance, argues that political elites select

components of a group's beliefs, attach meaning and value to these beliefs. They then utilize them as symbols to mobilize the group members to achieve a particular objective. This means that ethnic identities are not fixed as argued by primordialists, but can be socially constructed to suit different objectives. Thus ethnic conflicts cannot be wholly attributed to the perceived ethnic loyalties between the warring communities. Proximate factors such as security, inequality, greed, and discontent can lead to conflicts. These issues can explain the temporal and spatial characteristics of ethnic conflicts, which primordialism cannot explain. This gives instrumentalism an edge when assessing ethnic conflicts.

This research study utilizes both these theories in explaining the persistence of conflicts between the Borana and Gabbra. Primordialism will be used to explain how ethnic identities and historical relationships between the two communities have promoted the conflict. It will also be used to explain how cross-border ethnic kins influence the conflict. Instrumentalism, on the other hand, will be used to explain how political agents have utilized grievances such as economic and political marginalization between the two communities to mobilize the communities against each other.

1.8 Research Hypotheses

- i. Ethnic allegiances influence protracted resource-based conflicts among Borana and Gabra in the Horn of Africa.
- ii. Ethnic marginalization influences protracted resource-based conflicts among Borana and Gabra in the Horn of Africa.

1.9 Research Methodology

This section presents the practical study activities and tasks that will be undertaken to achieve the study objective on the study that broadly seeks to investigate the influence of cross border kinship on protracted resource-based conflicts in the Horn of Africa region: The Case of Borana and Gabra in Kenya and Ethiopia. The section entails a discussion on research design, area of study, data collection, data analysis, data analysis, and ethical considerations.

1.9.1 Research Design

A plan that specifically outlines arrangements of conditions to adhere in research is known as a research design³⁸. A research design outlines how and in what parameters are data to be collected and analyzed to appropriately gather the information that can validly provide answers to the broad research question. This study will use a descriptive research design to examine the influence of cross-border ethnic ties on protracted resource-based conflicts in the Horn of Africa region: The Case of Borana and Gabra in Kenya and Ethiopia. Two reasons make the descriptive research design appropriate for this study. To begin with, it entails a form of a description of how variables relate³⁹. In this study, the link between ethnic ties and protracted resource-based conflict will be examined. Secondly, a descriptive research design is not experimental as observations are recorded, as they are to describe the phenomenon.

³⁸ Cooper, D., & Schindler. *Business Research Methods*. Boston: Macgraw-Hill/Irwin. 2014

³⁹ Creswell, J. (2013). *Qualitative inquiry & research design: Choosing among five approaches (3rd ed.)*. California: Thousand Oaks.

1.9.2 Study Area

The study will be carried out in southern parts of Ethiopia and northern parts of Kenya-key areas where the two communities reside. Purposive sampling will be used to pick the named areas this is because areas in the periphery of both Ethiopia and Kenya such as Moyale, Forolle, and Shurr are always experiencing conflicts. Similarly, areas of focus will include Turbi, Horrander (mostly Gabra), Koobi (Borana area), Marsabit town in regions such as Gabra scheme and Sagante which is populated with the Borana are prone to conflict and proliferation of weapons between the Borana and Gabra people that are cross the Ethiopia-Kenya border. Lastly, these are the regions mostly populated with the two communities and where they have traditional attachment.

1.9.3 Population

In this study, the population will be members of Borana and Gabra household members in Southern Ethiopia at the Oromia region and Northern Kenya at Marsabit County at the Kenya Ethiopia border. The region is selected since it is largely inhabited by these two communities on either side of the border. The target population will be 100 subjects that will be selected from the border region. The sample size will be equally divided among the two warring communities. Additionally, key informant interviews will be utilized to provide more information on the research questions. Key informants will mostly comprise members of the county, national government, and Non-Governmental Organizations.

1.9.4 Sample and Sampling Procedure

A sample is part of the target population from which data is sourced. The sampling procedure is a process the researcher will use to come up with the people to be interviewed and places to find them. This study will be a survey of all the 100 respondents identified in the study area. This study will use purposive sampling by using a snowball or chain sampling approach.

Snowball sampling is best suited for this research as it aims at examining past and present events affecting the Borana -Gabra relations, the proliferation of weapons, and the transformation of regional bodies over time. Secondly, issues to do with weapons and conflict between the Borana and Gabra is sensitive, therefore, some of the targets might refuse to cooperate, hence infuse of probability. Thirdly, people like those who participate in the defense of the community and are involved in the proliferation of weapons would need a referral for confidentiality.

1.9.5 Data Collection

According to Lewis, data collection is a process of obtaining insights from respondents⁴⁰. In this study, both primary and secondary data will be used to gather information on cross-border ethnic ties and their role in resource-based conflicts in the Ethiopia-Kenya Border. Primary data being first-hand in nature will be gathered from respondents in the study area. The data will be sourced from participants through interviews and observations. The use of in-depth interviewing in gathering first-hand data is important as it ensures that a wide

⁴⁰ Lewis. Qualitative inquiry and research design: Choosing among five approaches. *Health Promotion Practice*, 16 no 4(2015):473-475.

array of data is sourced from respondents⁴¹. The interview guide will be structured in a way that appropriate information regarding the objectives of the study will be collected.

Secondary data will be sourced from documented sources. These sources will include journals, books, reports, newspapers articles, and documentaries on the Borana-Gabra conflicts at the Kenya-Ethiopian border. The use of secondary data is equally pertinent in this study as it ensures that what others have identified as causative elements to the conflicts are put into consideration in reporting of results. Moreover, secondary data is advantageous in that it informs on new dimensions that research should take in an attempt to avoid duplication of research⁴².

1.9.6 Data Analysis

This study will adopt qualitative content analysis considering that qualitative data will be sourced from the area of study. Before data analysis is done, the interviewing notes will be cleaned and checked for completeness. The responses will then be interpreted and inferences made.

1.9.7 Data Presentation

Data presentation entails showcasing results of data analysis in forms and formats that are relevant in providing answers to research questions. Qualitatively analyzed data is foremost presented in a summary of statements that have inferences in respect to the objectives of

⁴¹ Williamson, C., & Graeme, J. (2013). Questionnaires, individual interviews and focus groups. In *Research Methods* (pp. 349-372). Prahran, VIC: Tilde University Press.

⁴² Ibid.

the study. Where data will be quantified more so from secondary sources, presentation of findings will be done in tables, pie charts, and graphs.

1.9.8 Ethical Considerations

This study will be undertaken under the best tenets of ethical considerations that are generally expected to be adhered to in research. Foremost, the researcher will treat all data and information obtained during the study as confidential during data collection and even after the study is done. Secondly, participants in this study will be selected on a convenience basis and no compensation, monetary or otherwise will be awarded. Thirdly, the identity of the participants will remain anonymous. Moreover, the researcher will adhere to the University of Nairobi's Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies 'guidelines that requires all quoted materials to be cited appropriately. Field data will be carried out after a permit is obtained from the National Commission for Science, Technology, and Innovation (NACOSTI).

1.10 Chapter Outline

The rest of the research project proposal will proceed as follows; chapter two will highlight the influence of natural resources and ethnicity on conflicts. As the current conflicts between the two warring communities are about the control of county resources, we focus on literature that highlights how resource abundance leads to conflicts. Chapter three provides a detailed but brief examination of the impacts of conflicts on society, the economy, and security.

CHAPTER TWO

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NATURAL RESOURCES, ETHNICITY, AND CONFLICT

2.1 Introduction

This chapter provides the linkages between natural resources, ethnicity, and conflict. It begins with the analysis of the various mechanisms that have been hypothesized and or empirically tested to influence how the presence of natural resources promotes conflict. It ends by explaining how ethnicity affects natural resource conflicts.

2.2 Natural Resources and Conflicts

Most countries that are highly endowed with natural resources in Africa, Asia, and South America have been characterized by persistent conflicts. These countries have been described as having a resource curse. Researchers have pondered on why this is so and how the presence of natural resources affects the incidence, duration, and intensity of conflicts. The following subsections provide a concise review of the most important linkages that explain this disparity.

2.2.1 Greed and Opportunity as a Cause of Conflicts

Answers to these questions began with the seminal work of Collier and Hoeffler⁴³. The two authors put forth the renowned greed vs grievance hypothesis in explaining the relationship between natural resources and conflict. They posited that the availability of natural resources provides opportunities for rebels to loot and enrich themselves. The resources

⁴³ Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War," *Oxford Economic Papers* 56, no. 4 (2004): 563–95, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/3488799>.

also provide rebels with the financial muscle needed to recruit soldiers, procure weapons and fund the start-up costs of a rebellion. These rebels can subsequently launch attacks against government forces. Collier and Hoeffler argue that if rebels extort or loot money from manufacturing companies, the firms may move to safer areas or cease operations. However, resource firms can still make a profit while giving money to rebels. Thus countries that have many resource firms than manufacturing firms should in theory face more conflicts.

Similarly, Ross⁴⁴ posits the looting mechanism that the existence of primary commodities such as oil, diamonds increases the likelihood of conflict by enabling rebels to directly extract and sell the commodities or to extort money from those who mine and sell them. The looting or opportunity mechanism apart from causing the incidence of conflict can also have an impact on its duration. Ross argues that resources under the control of rebels enable them to continue financing the violent conflict and repel initiatives by the state to force a negotiated settlement. He uses the accounts of journalists on the prolonged wars in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Angola, and Congo to elucidate this mechanism. He hypothesizes in his work that the presence of resource wealth can shorten or lengthen a conflict depending on the strength of the warring parties. If rebels are weaker and they gain access to resource wealth then the conflict will be longer while if the state is stronger and it receives revenues from the resources, then the conflict will be short-lived⁴⁵.

⁴⁴ Michael L. Ross, "How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War? Evidence from Thirteen Cases," *International Organization* 58, no. 1 (2004): 35–67.

⁴⁵ Ibid

Other researchers such as Sherman⁴⁶ have proposed that the presence of resource wealth can discourage and curtail peace agreements if the looting and extortion activities being conducted during the conflict are profitable for the commanding officers or their soldiers. Fearon also observes that resource wealth can increase the ability of soldiers to accumulate personal wealth and thus make them less likely to follow the instructions from their commanding officers⁴⁷ this would make negotiated agreements untenable. He also argues that the duration of conflict can also depend on the confidence that rebels have in the ability of the government to grant regional autonomy to a disputed region having the resources. He opines that the loss of the finances arising from the resources would make it unlikely for the state to grant such a demand. This will thus lead to a prolonged conflict.

Collier and Hoeffler established that a model for the opportunity provided a significant explanation of the onset of conflicts in resource-rich nations. He utilized proxies such as the export prices of the primary commodities to measure the abundance of resources in a country. He noticed that when the export of primary commodities was 33% of GDP, the risk of conflict in the country increased by 22%. Additionally, countries that did not have any export of primary commodities had a 1% risk of conflict. The relationship between the export of primary commodities and conflict was significant. Ross also observes the presence of resource wealth explained the onset of civil conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, Indonesia, Congo Republic, and Sierra Leone. He, however, failed to establish a link between looting and the incidence of conflict in Angola, Burma,

⁴⁶ Jake H. Sherman, "Profit vs. Peace: The Clandestine Diamond Economy of Angola," *Journal of International Affairs* 53, no. 2 (2000): 699–719, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/24357771>.

⁴⁷ James Fearon, "Do Some Civil Wars Last so Much Longer Than Others?," *Journal of Peace Research* 41, no. 3, accessed September 22, 2021

Afghanistan, Columbia, or Cambodia. He also found no evidence of the greed or looting mechanism as proposed by Collier and Hoeffler.

Sherman in his analysis of the civil war in Angola observed that the National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola (UNITA) utilized black markets to sell diamonds within its region and procure weapons that facilitated the start of the conflict⁴⁸. Ross also established that in 10 of the 13 case studies he selected in his analysis, civil conflicts were prolonged as a result of the financial benefits of resources. Fearon also established that the contraband sale of cocaine, opium, and diamonds prolonged civil conflicts in Colombia, Burma, and Angola⁴⁹. In Liberia and DRC, conflicts were also prolonged because resources gave combatants an incentive not to sign or s or adhere to peace deals with the government. Resource wealth, however, shortened civil wars in DRC and Cambodia in 1997 by allowing the rebels to enter into peace agreements with the state⁵⁰.

Ross in his analysis also noticed that the presence of resources incentivized neighbouring countries to join in civil conflicts. He observes that Charles Taylor of Liberia supported rebels during the Sierra Leone civil war to profit from the diamonds field in the country. Similarly, Uganda and Rwanda supported rebels in the DRC so that they could gain access to resource-rich regions⁵¹. He also observes that some conflicts in Congo and Sierra Leone were started by rebels with the expectation of ceasing resource-rich areas during the war. The rebels in this case did not have access to resource wealth before the onset of war. They

⁴⁸ Jake H. Sherman, "Profit vs. Peace: The Clandestine Diamond Economy of Angola," *Journal of International Affairs* 53, no. 2 (2000): 699–719, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/24357771>

⁴⁹ James Fearon, "Do Some Civil Wars Last so Much Longer Than Others?" *Journal of Peace Research* 41, no. 3, accessed September 22, 2021.

⁵⁰Ibid.

⁵¹ Michael L. Ross, "How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War? Evidence from Thirteen Cases," *International Organization* 58, no. 1 (2004): 35–67.

could, however, sell these future rights to mining companies and willing governments. He coins the term ‘booty futures’ to describe this mechanism.

2.2.2 Natural Resources and Grievances

The grievance mechanism was also proposed by Collier and Hoeffler⁵². They proposed that the extraction of resources can lead to personal and communal grievances associated with the unfair appropriation of land. Grievances can also emanate from social disturbances associated with the migration of people into communal lands looking for jobs, limited availability of job opportunities to the local population, and environmental externalities. The unequal distribution of resource revenues may also lead to grievances. As postulated by behavioural theories, these grievances can induce feelings of deprivation which initially commences as a personal concern and is later expressed by communal members through collective action⁵³. Inequality in the distribution of resource wealth has been cited to have promoted civil wars in Chad, Sierra Leone, and Nigeria⁵⁴. Ross also notes that environmental externalities and the loss of land in the extraction of timber in Papua New Guinea led to conflict.

The grievance mechanism has, however, suffered setbacks empirically. Ross did not find any link between the presence of grievances and the onset, duration, and intensity of conflicts. Collier and Hoeffler established that the grievance model did not perform well as compared to the opportunity model. The latter utilized four variables to measure

⁵² Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” *Oxford Economic Papers* 56, no. 4 (2004): 563–95, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/3488799>

⁵³ Faith Osasumwen Olanrewaju and Segun Adekunle Joshua, “Natural Resources, Conflict and Security Challenges in Africa,” *India Quaterly*, 2020, 1–17.

⁵⁴ Marcatan Humphreys, “Natural Resources, Conflict, and Conflict Resolution: Uncovering the Mechanisms - Macartan Humphreys, 2005,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49, no. 4 (2005): 509–38, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0022002705277545>.

grievance. These were; religious or ethnic hatred, economic inequality, political exclusion, and political repression. All these were insignificant in the final model.

The lack of empirical tests to prove how grievances lead to civil wars in resource-rich nations has led to a shift in the greed vs grievance debate. Contemporary researchers such as Korf⁵⁵ have sought to unite these two mechanisms to explain conflict. Korf argued that the greed of rebel groups and their leaders in accumulating resource wealth at the expense of the rest of the population can lead to grievances which eventually can give rise to civil wars. These inequalities are exacerbated during the war as proponents of the war discriminate against people in access to resources based on their support for the war. These increases grievances which in turn increases the duration of the war.

2.2.3 The Relationship between the State, Natural Resources, and Conflicts

The role of weak states who cannot repress rebellions has long been observed to contribute to national conflicts⁵⁶. In natural resource conflicts, the relationships between the state and its citizens have been theorized to contribute to civil conflicts. This occurs in a variety of ways. First, the availability of resource wealth relieves the state from the burden of collecting taxes from the citizenry. As a result, the citizenry may have less control and information about what the government does. They may have no power or incentive to audit government activities and even to withdraw their support to the government. Conversely, such states may become less responsive to the needs of their citizens. They

⁵⁵ Benedikt Korf, "Rethinking the Greed-Grievance Nexus: Property Rights and the Political Economy of War in Sri Lanka," *Journal of Peace Research* 42, no. 2 (2005): 201–17, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/30042274>.

⁵⁶ James Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War | American Political Science Review | Cambridge Core," *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 1 (2003): 75–90.

will also have less incentive to create democratic and bureaucratic institutions that can enhance revenue collection or provide engagement structures with the population⁵⁷. This hampers the ability of the state to resolve social conflicts and in turn increases the likelihood of state conflict and can thus be described as being weak. Oil-producing countries in the Middle East have been noted to be affected by this problem by Fearon and Laitin⁵⁸. Humphreys also observes the weak state mechanism in conflicts in Zaire during the tumultuous reign of Mobutu⁵⁹.

2.2.4 Resource Type and Conflict

The greed and grievance theory has not been adequate in explaining the reasons why some resource-rich countries have conflicts while others do not. Snyder and Bhavnani wondered why countries rich in diamond such as Brazil, Indonesia, Ghana, and Namibia remained largely peaceful from 1990 to 2002 while countries such as Angola, DRC, India, Sierra Leone, and Liberia were engulfed in conflict⁶⁰. The authors formulated a revenue-centered framework for explaining this disparity. The framework is built on a revenue background. It posits that states require revenues to strengthen national defenses, improve the welfare of the people, and also repel rebellions. These avoid grievances associated with resource exploitation. The lack of revenues from resources will thus cause state collapse. The way

⁵⁷ Humphreys, "Natural Resources, Conflict, and Conflict Resolution: Uncovering the Mechanisms - Macartan Humphreys, 2005."

⁵⁸ James Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War | American Political Science Review | Cambridge Core," *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 1 (2003): 75–90.

⁵⁹ Humphreys, "Natural Resources, Conflict, and Conflict Resolution: Uncovering the Mechanisms - Macartan Humphreys, 2005."

⁶⁰ Richard Snyder and Ravi Bhavnani, "Diamonds, Blood, and Taxes: A Revenue-Centered Framework for Explaining Political Order," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49, no. 4 (2005): 563–97, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/30045131>.

a state extracts resources and utilizes the revenues will largely determine if conflict will follow or not.

The authors differentiate between lootable and nonlootable resources. The latter requires large investments to extract them. These costs are beyond the reach of many rebels. Thus they cannot be easily exploited by rebel forces. They include Copper, kimberlite diamonds, petroleum, and Bauxite. In contrast, lootable resources such as alluvial diamonds and gold can easily be extracted by artisans. Thus, they can easily be accessed and easily controlled by rebels. The state with financial muscle can establish a monopoly in the exploitation of nonlootable resources which can then help it control the extraction of lootable resources.

While Snyder and Bhavnami focus on alluvial diamonds in their paper, other researchers focusing on other resources have also made similar conclusions. Ross for instance also asserts that the presence of alluvial gemstones has prolonged conflicts in Congo, Afghanistan, Liberia, and Sierra Leone⁶¹. Fearon and Latin have utilized these conclusions to disapprove the resource opportunity model proposed by Collier and Hoeffler. They advocate for a state capacity model to explain the occurrence of conflicts in resource-rich nations. Their inferences acknowledge that both rebels and the state are to be blamed for the incidence and persistence of conflicts. Lujala has also introduced the role of location into the discourse. He assessed the relationship between the location of hydrocarbon resources and conflict regions across the planet. He observed oil resources influenced the movement of rebels and that oil resources located outside conflict regions did not promote conflict. The presence of oil and gas in a state was also observed to have a higher

⁶¹ Michael Ross, "A Closer Look at Oil, Diamonds, and Civil War," *Annual Review of Political Science* 9, no. 1 (2006): 265–300, <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.9.081304.161338>.

probability of conflict. Additionally, onshore production of oil increases the probability of conflicts whereas offshore production did not⁶².

2.3 The Role of Ethnicity in Natural Resource Conflicts

The last sections have assessed the divergent mechanisms that try to link natural resources to conflicts. The question of ethnicity has been deliberately eliminated from these discussions. This section devotes the preceding paragraphs to elucidate how ethnicity is associated with natural resource conflicts.

Ethnicity in combination with the presence of natural resources has been linked to the severe onset of debilitating conflict. Three mechanisms have been linked to the dark combination⁶³. First, ethnicity provides the human resources that can be exploited by rebels in their pursuit of insurgency. When ethnic communities feel marginalized from resource exploitation, they feel aggrieved and can thus be easily coerced to join rebel or militia groups. The war in Congo had ethnic overtones as the rebels recruited members of their ethnic community⁶⁴. Ross demonstrated that resources such as gas, oil, and diamonds can create social, economic, and political inequalities due to forceful eviction of the local population, environmental degradation, and the unfair distribution of oil revenues. This can ferment ethnic disaffection and thereby increase the probability of conflicts⁶⁵. Scott-

⁶² Päivi Lujala, "The Spoils of Nature: Armed Civil Conflict and Rebel Access to Natural Resources," *Journal of Peace Research* 47, no. 1 (2010): 15–28, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/25654525>.

⁶³ T.C Wegenast and M. Basedau, "Ethnic Fractionalization, Natural Resources and Armed Conflict," *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 31, no. 4 (2014): 432–57.

⁶⁴ Ibid

⁶⁵ Ross, "A Closer Look at Oil, Diamonds, and Civil War."

Villiers⁶⁶ and Czuba⁶⁷ attribute the increased intensity of conflicts between the Borana and the Gabbra to marginalization and the fight to control the County's resources.

Stewart also argues that the presence of pre-existing ethnic differences can combine with resource inequalities leading to enhanced grievances. This can disrupt group cohesion and thus facilitate conflict mobilization⁶⁸. The presence of resource wealth as explained by the opportunity model by Collier and Hoeffler can provide the finances needed to escalate the conflict. Wegenast and Basedau also posit that ethnic communities that feel marginalized can use the resources located within their regions to launch secessionist movements. They use the example of the Cabindans in the civil conflicts in Angola who wanted regional autonomy and a greater share of oil revenues⁶⁹.

To assess how ethnicity empirically affects natural resource conflicts, researchers have utilized several indices to measure ethnicity. Collier and Hoeffler, in their pioneering research, measured the degree to which the various ethnic communities in the conflict states are polarised. They argued that countries with fractionalized ethnic communities with divergent interests suffer from ethnic antagonism more than countries that have homogenous ethnic communities⁷⁰. The risk of civil violence is, therefore, greater in these countries. Fearon and Laitin⁷¹ used the Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization index that

⁶⁶ Patta Scott-Villiers, "Small Wars in Marsabit County: Devolution and Political Violence in Northern Kenya," *Conflict, Security and Development* 17, no. 3 (2017): 247–64.

⁶⁷ Karol Czuba, "Ethnic Politics in Marsabit," 2018.

⁶⁸ Francis Stewart, "Root Causes of Violent Conflict in Developing Countries," *BMJ* 324, no. 7333 (2002), <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1122271/>.

⁶⁹ T.C Wegenast and M. Basedau, "Ethnic Fractionalization, Natural Resources and Armed Conflict," *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 31, no. 4 (2014): 432–57

⁷⁰ Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War," *Oxford Economic Papers* 56, no. 4 (2004): 563–95, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/3488799>

⁷¹ James Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War | American Political Science Review | Cambridge Core," *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 1 (2003): 75–90, <https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/abs/ethnicity-insurgency-and-civil-war/B1D5D0E7C782483C5D7E102A61AD6605>

computes the likelihood that two randomly selected individuals in a country speak two different languages.

To measure ethnic domination, they used the proportion of the state population belonging to the largest ethnic community. Domination has been hypothesized by Collier and Hoeffler to lead to higher chances of a conflict. Militia will typically recruit members from their ethnic communities to promote social cohesion within the group. Additionally, states with an ethnic majority and a minority experience the most violence⁷². Unlike the other indices, extreme ethnic fractionalization is believed to contribute to peaceful societies. A society can be described as being ethnically fragmented or diverse if it consists of several ethnic communities. Ethnically diverse societies can reduce the probability of conflict by reducing the recruitment pools for the militia⁷³.

Empirical results on the role of ethnicity in natural resource conflicts have been inconclusive and divergent. Collier and Hoeffler, in their grievance model, established that the ethnic domination variable did not have a significant relationship to the onset of conflicts. However, ethnic fractionalization was significant at the 0.01 confidence interval. Whereas ELF had the anticipated positive sign, denoting, a positive relationship, ethnic polarisation had a surprising negative relationship with the onset of conflict. Both of these variables were, however not important in explaining the onset of conflict. Fearon and Laitin's results also showed that the three indices measuring ethnicity were insignificant and also incorrectly signed in his model.

⁷² T.C Wegenast and M. Basedau, "Ethnic Fractionalization, Natural Resources and Armed Conflict," *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 31, no. 4 (2014): 432–57

⁷³ Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War," *Oxford Economic Papers* 56, no. 4 (2004): 563–95, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/3488799>

These inconclusive results have been blamed on the inability of the ethnic measures to account for the political character and relations between the various ethnic communities in conflict regions. Wezenast and Basedau utilized a revised ELF index that captured the political relevance of ethnic groups. He also counted the number of ethnic groups that were excluded from the central government in his analysis. They also identified a total of 88 case studies that involved rebels that followed an ethnic agenda in oil conflicts. His first model that included all countries regardless of the abundance of their oil resources showed a positive link between ethnic fractionalization and resource conflict. The other models also showed that ethnic fractionalization enhanced violence in countries with more oil resources than those with scarce oil resources. Standardized coefficients also demonstrated that ethnicity had the second-highest effect on the onset of civil conflict. Population size had the highest effect. The odds ratio showed that a 1% ethnicity was associated with a 14% increase in conflict risk in the model that did not distinguish between the abundance of oil resources in all countries and a 24% risk in countries with the largest oil resources.

2.4 Conclusion

Ethnic conflicts in resource-rich states pose significant challenges towards the quest for a united Africa. National and international agencies must find ways to minimize the grievances associated with resource extraction and utilization. This can be done by ensuring that resources are shared among the various ethnic communities in an equitable manner. All communities must also be involved in how the local and national governments collect and utilize national resources. Ethnic diversity should also be addressed in regards to political appointments and the governance of states and regions.

CHAPTER THREE

THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF CROSS BORDER CONFLICTS IN THE WORLD

3.1 Introduction

This chapter provides a review of the impacts of conflicts on human lives, the economy, and the security and stability of nations. The section starts by explaining the impacts of conflicts on human deaths in the study area.

3.2 Civilian Casualties

The loss of human life is particularly catastrophic in ethnic conflicts where killing sometimes takes the form of cleansing or the complete eradication of particular people from an area. In the study area, The KHRC report documents a lot of killings between the various communities residing in Marsabit. The majority of these killings occurred in the 1990s as a result of intercommunal raids and retaliatory attacks. Some of these conflicts can be best described as massacres. The Kokai massacre, for instance, of 1997 involved a conflict between the Gabra and the Dassanetch. The conflict led to the killing of 36 Gabbra people and 19 security personnel during a dawn attack near the borders of Kenya and Ethiopia by the Dassanetch⁷⁴. The Bagalla massacre, on the other hand, saw more than 100 Degodia people killed by the Borana during an early morning attack⁷⁵.

⁷⁴ Yattani Isacko Diba, "Inter-Ethnic Conflicts between Gabra and Dassanetch Communities of Marsabit County 1960-2011" (Master thesis, Nairobi, Kenya, Kenyatta University, 2007).

⁷⁵ KHRC, *The Forgotten People Revisited: Human Rights Abuses in Marsabit and Moyale Districts* (Nairobi, Kenya: Kenya Human Rights Commission, 2000)

Cross-border conflicts in other regions of the world have also been associated with high human casualties. Ethnic conflicts in East Pakistan, for example, have been estimated to have led to the death of over a million people. The Tamil and Sinhalese conflicts in Sri Lanka have also resulted in the death of over 60,000 people⁷⁶. The loss of human lives is catastrophic to the community and households. Communities may lose influential members such as professionals and young people. Households, on the other hand, may lose their key members such as household heads. This may destabilize the household and by extension the community. In addition, household and communal members may be left traumatized.

3.3 Displacement of People

Violent confrontations between ethnic communities always lead to the displacement of people. Most people are usually forced to flee from their homes due to the fear of impending attacks. These people may become displaced in their home countries or may flee to neighbouring or distant countries. The latest report from the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC)⁷⁷ shows that 8.5 million new people were displaced in 2019 across the globe as a result of conflicts involving violence and the use of arms. The total number of IDPs as of 2019 stands at 45.7 million people. Most of the IDPs were displaced from conflicts prone countries such as Syria, Libya, Yemen, Ethiopia, and Nigeria. Sub-Saharan Africa had the highest number of new IDPs.

⁷⁶ Baqai, Huma. "Role of Ethnicity in the Conflict Spectrum of South Asia." *Pakistan Horizon* 57, no. 4 (2004): 57–68.

⁷⁷ IDMC, "Global Report on Internally Displaced People," 2020.

IDPs and refugees experience a lot of hardships as a result of violent conflicts. They are forced to escape from their homes traumatized and with little or no possessions. As a result, they lack necessities such as food, shelter, and access to health. They are also vulnerable to sexual and physical attacks from rival groups and communities.

In Marsabit County, the frequent violent clashes always prompt some movement of people. Gakuo reported that the Turbi massacre and the ensuing retaliatory attacks led to the displacement of 6200 people including 1200 children⁷⁸. Scott-Villiers also notes that an estimated 8000 people fled to Ethiopia following deadly clashes in the border town of Moyale in December 2011. The clashes continued and in 2012 and 2013, prompting the migration of 20,000 people into Kenya from Ethiopia. Safe world, reported in their brief⁷⁹ that the violence that broke out after the election result of 2013 in December led to the displacement of 8,521 households from Funanyata, Heilu, Marsabit central, Marsabit town, and Butiye areas. Entire villages were deserted while others had their homes torched. Most escaped to villages where their ethnic kin were dominant for security.

3.4 Consequences of Conflicts on the Economy

Violent conflicts have a direct and indirect effect on the economy. Though research is slowly building in this area, the current literature is populated with studies that assess the impacts on the national economy as measured by various econometric indices such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the value of exports, and imports among others. Ibanez identifies four channels by which conflicts affect households and other economic agents.

⁷⁸ Oscar Gakuo Mwangi, "Kenya: Conflict in the 'Badlands': The Turbi Massacre in Marsabit District," *Review of African Political Economy* 33, no. 107 (March 1, 2006): 81–91,

⁷⁹ Safe world, "Marsabit Conflict Analysis," 2015.

These are the destruction of assets owned by people, erosion of human capital, reduction of market efficiency, and altering the economic behaviour of agents. These are explored below in the preceding paragraphs.

3.4.1 Destruction of Assets

Apart from causing loss of lives and injuries, violent conflicts also led to the loss of household, communal and private assets. In most conflicts, affected communities usually get their houses burned and crops destroyed. During the Rwandan genocide, for instance, 12% of the households lost their homes and other productive assets. The Tajikistan civil war of 1992 and 1998 destroyed the house of 7% of the households. Within the study area, many researchers such as Scott-Villers and Czuba noted that many houses belonging to the opposing communities were torched. Frequent conflicts involving raids and retaliatory attacks also lead to a considerable loss of household livestock herds. The loss of livestock in addition to other household assets greatly undermines the ability of affected households to recover from the impacts of conflicts⁸⁰. Without assets, the affected household may lack avenues to earn incomes or also gain access to loans needed to restart their lives. They may be forced to reduce their consumption patterns and look for other sources of income. In Colombia, Ibanez observed that displaced households ate only two meals a day. The people causing the conflict or in this case stealing livestock will, however, gain household assets. They can also gain other household assets like land or crops if they manage to completely dislodge the opposing community from an area. However, it is not certain, from current

⁸⁰ Patricia Justino, "The Impact of Armed Civil Conflict on Household Welfare and Policy," Working paper, 2011.

literature, who gains from the raids or conflicts, whether it is the entire community or individuals actively involved in conducting or planning the attacks.

The destruction of infrastructures like schools, roads, and hospitals can also have a direct and indirect impact on households. The destruction of roads and hospitals can increase the cost of getting healthcare particularly if other functioning hospitals are located far away, or in enemy territory. Injured people or infants can easily succumb to their injuries or common illness. The breakdown of social and health services in refugee camps leads to an increase in infant and maternal mortality. It also means that cost of recovery will be high following the conflicts. The state will spend a lot of resources reconstructing the infrastructure. It will thus have little funds to assist households and communities with aid and subsidies⁸¹.

3.4.2 Erosion of Human Capital

The death of household members due to homicide, diseases, and injuries is particularly catastrophic to the household economy and welfare. This loss especially of members of working age deprives the household income. The loss of the head of the household may force women to become breadwinners. Older children may be forced to drop out of school to also look for income-earning activities. Households may be forced to utilize their savings to cater to their necessities. This would also be spent on medical bills for household members who have suffered injuries as a result of the conflict. Overall households will become increasingly dependent on their relative and foreign aid to survive if they are unable to raise sufficient income.

⁸¹ Ibid

3.4.3 Reduction in Markets Efficiency and Changing the Behaviour of Economic Agents

The loss of infrastructure like roads will affect the supply of finished goods and raw materials in and out of a conflict zone. Depending on the state of security and infrastructure suppliers can decide to stop the supply of goods or impose extra charges. This will mean that households will pay higher to get goods during and after conflict.

The tense environment can also suppress economic activity as fewer people will be willing to venture out of safe areas to look for products. Bar-Nahum⁸² assessed the economic impacts of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and established that the number of apples sold daily declined by 25% during days that there was conflict. The parties to the conflict can also contribute to market inefficiency by exhibiting bias in their market transactions. They can choose to buy or sell to the members of their community and also restrict access to other parties to the conflict. Scot-Villiers⁸³ established that soon after the 2013 elections, some Borana leaders in Marsabit town advised their community members to avoid selling or buying goods and providing any other services to businesspeople allied to the REGABU (Rendille Gabbra and Burji) coalition. As a result businesses from the affected communities began to dwindle and close. The author, however, was not investigating the effect of conflicts on the businesses in Marsabit town but rather as a conduit of violence and tension.

⁸² Ziv Bar-Nahum et al., “Effects of Violent Political Conflict on the Supply, Demand and Fragmentation of Fresh Food Markets,” *Food Security* 12, no. 3 (June 1, 2020): 503–15, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12571-020-01025-y>.

⁸³ Scott-Villiers, “Small Wars in Marsabit County: Devolution and Political Violence in Northern Kenya.”

In terms of altering behaviour, the environment created by conflicts forces people to shift from saving their incomes to utilizing their savings to survive. As a result, the quantity of saving drops. Depleted savings will untimely affect the capacity of a community or state to recover from conflicts. Both internal and external investors would shield away from making any investment due to the high risks involved. This would affect both private and public budgets with deficits expected. The conflict would also force the government to divert funds meant for the provision of public goods like education and health into military activities. This in the long run may have deleterious effects on the health and productivity of the inhabitants of a conflict zone⁸⁴.

Decreased investment in combination with the loss of human capital, the destruction of public and private assets and the decline in productivity and trade will untimely impact the Gross Domestic Product of a country. In a counterfactual analysis of 45 countries in sub-Saharan Africa from 1989-2017, the International Monetary Fund (IMF)⁸⁵ established that the presence of conflict in a country reduced GDP per capita by 15-20%. The impact of armed conflicts, however, depends on the intensity and duration of the conflict. Simulations based on the UPCD/PRIO armed conflict database by Mueller⁸⁶ showed that a four-year civil war led to an 18% annual decline in GDP. The fall in GDP persisted 6 years after the conflict (GDP at 15% decline). The simulations by Mueller also assessed the role of different conflict intensities on GDP. The intensity of conflict was proxied by the total

⁸⁴ Thomas Höhne-Sparborth, “The Socio-Economic Spill-over Effects of Armed Conflict on Neighbouring Countries” (PhD, The London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), 2018), <http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/3691/>.

⁸⁵ IMF, “The Economic Consequences of Conflict,” in *Sub-Saharan Regional Economic Outlook Africa: Recovery amid Elevated Uncertainty* (IMF, 2019), 25–38.

⁸⁶ Hannes Mueller, “Growth and Violence: Argument for a Per Capita Measure of Civil War,” *Economica* 83, no. 331 (2016): 473–97, <https://doi.org/10.1111/ecca.12193>.

number of battle fatalities per capita. His results showed that a one-year conflict with an intensity of 0.079 deaths per population of 1000 people resulted in the decrease of GDP by 3.5%. Conflict intensities lower than 0.049 deaths per population of 1000 people had no discernible impact on GDP.

Conflicts do not only impact the country or countries hosting the conflict. They can have some spillover effects which can impact neighbouring countries as well. The disruption in trade and the flow of goods between countries is one of the ways that conflicts can have economic spillovers to neighbouring countries. This disruption can have negative consequences on the growth rate of neighbouring countries. The presence of conflict especially in countries with transnational kin can increase budgetary allocation to defense. The flow of refugees can also force neighbouring countries to offer humanitarian assistance to them as part of their international obligations. This will untimely affect service provision to the citizens of the country hosting the refugees. Conflicts can also generate some positive impacts on the economies of neighbouring countries. This is attributed to the increase in the number of investors who may want to shift their investments from the country or countries in conflict. Neighbouring countries hosting refugees also get an increase in labour services⁸⁷.

⁸⁷ Höhne-Sparborth, "The Socio-Economic Spill-over Effects of Armed Conflict on Neighbouring Countries."

3.5 Consequences of Conflicts on State Security and Stability

3.5.1 The Proliferation of Small Arms and Weapons

The easy access by communities in conflict-prone countries to modern guns and ammunition is an international and national security concern. In the Horn of Africa, decades of conflicts and the militarization of communities have left many weapons in the hands of communities who have received adequate training on how to use them. The proliferation of arms in the northern counties of Kenya is attributed to the prolonged conflicts in Somalia and Ethiopia. The close relationship between some of the communities in Marsabit County and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) resulted in easy access to modern weapons by the regional pastoral communities. Additionally, The KHRC report also accused some senior officers in the Kenyan Army of selling government weapons to the Degodias.⁸⁸ On the Kenya, Uganda border, the proliferation of small arms has been attributed to the extended conflicts in Sudan and the internal conflict in Uganda caused by the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)⁸⁹.

The accumulation of weapons by pastoral communities results in the intensity, frequency, and cost of conflicts between these communities. Guns have become a weapon of choice in most cattle raids in these areas. Communities openly procure these weapons using their livestock. They have also become integral when defending oneself and protecting one's family and community members during attacks. The existence of gun markets also possess

⁸⁸ KHRC, *The Forgotten People Revisited: Human Rights Abuses in Marsabit and Moyale Districts* (Nairobi, Kenya: Kenya Human Rights Commission, 2000)

⁸⁹ Sarah Bancie, "Effects of Cross Border Ethnic Conflicts on Social Economic Security of Pastoralists Leaving along Kenya Uganda Border: A Case of Turkana Community 2000-2018" (Master thesis, Nairobi Kenya, The University of Nairobi, 2018).

security challenges in urban centres and cities of these countries. Most of the criminal activities conducted in these towns are believed to originate from these pastoral areas.

3.5.2 Refugees and Conflicts

The displacement of people is a consequence of conflicts. It can however also lead to conflicts. Refugees can affect the security and stability of the hosting country. According to Ruegger⁹⁰, the presence of refugees in a state where their coethnic are marginalized can contribute to intrastate conflicts linked to rebellion. The presence of refugees increases the population size and bargaining strength in the politics of the host country. The refugees can also import weapons and rebellious ideologies to the host country. This can be perceived as a threat by the dominant countries thus leading to conflict. The entry of Afghan refugees into the Pakistan province of Balochistan led to ethnic conflicts in the 1980s. Similarly, the arrival of Hutu refugees in Zaire during the Rwandan genocide led to conflicts between the local, Tutsi, and Hutu communities⁹¹.

3.6 Conclusion

Ethnic conflicts result in massive loss of lives, destruction of public and private assets, and ethnic tension. The horrendous experiences can leave survivors with lifelong scars. These can create feelings of resentment and fear against the opposing community. These feelings can be passed down from one generation and the next leading to the persistence of the conflict. Additionally, the loss of economic assets and the ability to earn income at the

⁹⁰ Seraina Ruegger, "Refugees, Ethnic Power Relations, and Civil Conflict in the Country of Asylum," *Journal of Peace Research* 56, no. 1 (January 1, 2019): 42–57, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343318812935>.

⁹¹ Sarah Lischer K., "Causes and Consequences of Conflict-Induced Displacement," *Civil Wars* 9, no. 2 (2009): 142–55, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13698240701207302>.

hands of a rival community can greatly affect the coping strategies of survivors. These can create grievances of marginalization especially if the rival community controls political power and is economically well off. If these grievances are not adequately addressed, then the conflict will persist.

CHAPTER FOUR

DATA ANALYSIS, PRESENTATION, AND INTERPRETATION

4.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the data analysis, presentation, and interpretation. The chapter is divided into four sections. The first section describes the demographic data of the respondents. The second section summarises the result on the cross-ethnic allegiance and marginalization. The fourth and the last sections present the impacts of the conflicts and the findings on the conflict resolution mechanisms respectively.

4.2 Demographic Data of the Respondents

4.2.1 Gender of the Respondents

A majority of the respondents were from households headed by a male (84%). Only 16% of the total respondents came from a household headed by females. There was an almost equal distribution of the sample size among the two communities, Gabra and Borana. Table 4.1 highlights the gender variations among the two communities.

Table 4.1: Gender of the Respondents

Gender	Borana	Gabra
Male	41%	44%
Female	9%	7%
Sample size	104	

4.2.2 Age of the Respondents

Almost half the respondents were between the ages of 24 and 34, while less than 20% were above the age of 60 years. The mean age was 41 years with a standard error of 10.0. This shows that the data is in tandem with the youthful population of Kenya as shown in Table 4.2.

Table 4.1: Respondent's Age Category

Age Bracket	Frequency	Percentage
24-34	45	44.6%
35-45	26	25.7
46-56	12	11.9%
57-67	11	10.9%
68+	7	6.9%
TOTAL	103	100%

There was no significant difference in age between the two communities at 0.05 confidence interval(chi-square p-value of 0.555) However, the Borana community had a slightly higher proportion of respondents in the 24-34,46-56 and 68+ age groups as shown in Figure 4.1.




Figure 4.1: Age Groups of the Two Communities (Source: Author)

4.2.3 Respondent's Level of Education

The majority of the respondents had attained a diploma level of education and above. About a fifth, however, did not have any formal education while less than 4% had attained the primary school level as shown in Table 4.3.

Table 4.1: Level of education (Source: Author)

Education level	Frequency	Percentages
None	22	21.4%
Primary education	4	3.9%
Secondary education	7	6.8%
Diploma	57	55.3%
Graduate	10	9.7%
Postgraduate	3	2.4%
Total	103	100%

Significant differences were observed between the education levels between the two communities. This was confirmed by a significant chi-square test (less than 0.0001). Respondents from the Gabra community had slightly higher education levels than the respondents from the Borana community as shown in Figure 4.2.




Figure 4.1: Ethnicity and education level (Source: Author)

4.2.4 Respondent's Main Income Activity

Employment was the dominant main income (57%) generating activity among the respondents. This was followed by livestock rearing (35%) as shown in figure 4.3. This shows that a substantial part of the community is moving away from depending on only pastoralism as the main means of generating income. The high number of respondents with tertiary education and above has been linked to the increase in conflicts between the two communities, especially over county resources.




Figure 4.2: Main Income Activity (Source: Author)

There was no significant difference between the main income activity in the two communities from the chi-square test ($p = 0.8999$). However, more Gabra (40%) respondents practiced livestock rearing than the Borana (30%). On the other hand, More Borana respondents were employed than the Gabra. Figure 4.4 highlights these differences. Significant differences were also observed between the income activity and age groups ($p = 0.000089$). While youthful respondents aged 45 and below had employment as their main sources of income, the older respondents aged 45 and above were mainly aged in livestock rearing. This is understandable as the youthful respondents were more learned than the older respondents. They could thus be able to take employment opportunities in the county or other parts of the country.




Figure 4.3: Ethnicity and main income activity (Source: Author)

The average household size was six members, consisting of 2.7 female members and 3.3 male members. In terms of employment, the average household had 1.7 people employed and 2.85 people unemployed. The average household had 1.7 members being students. The Gabra community had an average of three members unemployed while the Borana community had two members being unemployed.

4.3 Cross Border Ethnic Allegiance

The majority of the respondents (78%) were in agreement that their ethnic community was united against the perceived injustices being committed by the rival community. Less than 10% however, stated that they believed that there was no unity while less than 1% did not know of the existence of any unity. There were few variations between the two communities in terms of this view. More respondents from the Gabra community, however, expressed the existence of unity in their community (85%) than respondents from the Borana community (71%). These differences, however, are not significant among the two communities ($p = 0.3177$) and are highlighted in Figure 4.5.




Figure 4.5: Perceptions on Ethnic Unity (Source: Author)

The unity against the rival community was mainly attributed to the loss of assets such as livestock and land (37%) and the loss of loved ones due to the conflicts between the two communities (36%). Some respondents perceived that the current conflicts and increased civilian casualties on their ethnic community have the potential to lead to the extinction of the community. Other respondents blamed political mobilization and cultural beliefs as the reason for the increased unity in their community against the rival community. Figure 4.6 highlights these perceptions.

Mobilization of community occurs mainly during attacks by the rival community. According to some of the respondents, community members are mobilized based on their clans. Community leaders, village elders, and political leaders conduct secret meetings to plan on how to take stock of the number of community members killed and assets stolen. They then hatch plans to retaliate for the deaths and loss of assets. Calls for unity are issued to community members through village barazas. The youths are called to volunteer to take arms to defend the community. Foodstuffs and other necessities are mobilized to be

distributed to the affected households. In cases of injuries, the community members fundraise money to cover the cost of treatment. Political and communal leaders and community members also mobilize vehicles, fuel, bullets, and guns to be used in defending the community and also in revenge attacks.

Ethnic mobilization also occurs during elections. This is mainly spearheaded by political leaders and sometimes by community leaders. Political leaders utilize past attacks to construct narratives meant to endear themselves to the community. They mainly advise the community to unite behind them to ensure that the community gets political offices like the governor, senator, women representative, and Member of Parliament. This ensures that the community will have the financial and security resources to defend itself against future attacks by the rival community. Mobilization occurs during village barazas and watering points. The youths who have turned 18 are implored to register as voters. During elections, politicians in association with local leaders contribute funds to ferry community members to polling stations to vote. This mobilization does not stop after the final ballot is cast. It continues if the community fails to get a victory. The youth are mobilized to cause violence and create ethnic tension that ensures members of the rival community moves away from areas perceived as the strongholds of the community.

4.3.1 Cross Border Ethnic Kinship Ties

The success of community mobilization either for defense and or revenge attacks is heavily reliant on the ethnic kin in Ethiopia. The majority of the respondents (82%) kept close ties with their ethnic relatives in Ethiopia. There were no significant differences ($p = 0.9626$) between the two communities on the existence of cross-border ethnic ties. The strong ties

between the two communities and ethnic kin in Ethiopia were mainly kept as a result of customary and religious obligations (44%) that made it necessary to keep in touch and follow up on the ethnic kin despite the differences in nationhood. Others attributed the strong ties to trade and other economic opportunities that exist between the borders. The two communities also depended on the cross-border kin for support during conflicts with the rival community (26%) and access to pasture and water especially during the dry months (16%). This is summarized in figure 4.6




Figure 4.6: Significance of cross border ethnic ties (Source: Author)

The cross-border kin supported the community during conflicts by assisting them with their firearms so that they are not subdued by their rival community. Arm sharing means that members of their ethnic kin can borrow arms from across the border and use them during conflicts with the rival community and afterward return them to the owners. One respondent noted that; *“We share arms with my ethnic community in Kenya to ensure that*

they are not subdued by their ethnic rival. We also link them up to reliable arm dealers in Ethiopia who can supply them quality firearms at a reasonable price”.

The arm sharing was only done on ethnic lines. Additionally, the cross-border ethnic community members also assisted members of their ethnic community in hiding arms during disarmament exercises in the county. Usually, elites working in various national security forces and government agencies alert the community before the start of any disarmament exercise. The community thus has ample time to hide their firearms with their ethnic kin in Ethiopia before the exercise begins. Afterward, the guns are returned to their owners at no cost. Additionally, weapons that have been involved in deaths during the conflicts with the rival community can be exchanged at the border to avoid the detection and arrest of the owner by the security agencies. This makes it hard for persons accused of killing people in the county to be arrested and prosecuted.

Aside from providing arms to the Kenyan community, the ethnic kin in Ethiopia also provided manpower and reinforcement during intercommunal clashes between these two communities. The existence of external forces has long been highlighted to promote the persistence of the conflict. Wittenberg⁹² report notes that the Borana was accused of utilizing militia from the Oromo Liberation Front in Ethiopia during the Turbi Massacre in 2012. The KHRC report also lamented the increased use of foreign militia in domestic conflicts in the county⁹³. A key informant observed that the OLF militia is always involved

⁹² Karen Wittensburg M., “Ethnic Tensions in Harsh Environments: The Gabra Pastoralists and the Neighbours in Northern Kenya,” in *Spaces of Insecurity: Human Agency in Violent Conflicts in Kenya* (Leiden, Netherlands: African Studies Centre, 2012), 120–40.

⁹³ KHRC, *The Forgotten People Revisited: Human Rights Abuses in Marsabit and Moyale Districts* (Nairobi, Kenya: Kenya Human Rights Commission, 2000).

in causing conflicts and tension along the Kenyan border in response to internal clashes between the two communities in Kenya. Militia from the border is also hired to cause violence in Marsabit town at the behest of political leaders. These militias are usually accommodated by members of their ethnic kin when in the country. There is always a flow of information on the happening of the community inside and outside the border. The cross-border kin are always alerted whenever there is an impending attack on a rival community so that they can prepare to bring reinforcements when needed. Surprisingly, the two communities seldom attack each other when in Ethiopia. The deterioration of relationships between the Kenyan kin of both the communities has however soiled relationships between the two communities in Ethiopia. They don't attack each other but they live in fear and resentment of each other.

The cross-border ethnic community also provided shelter and refuge for persons accused of engaging in violence in Kenya. These ensured that the member was not arrested by the Kenyan police. The community also contributed food and shelter to their counterparts in Kenya who had been affected by the conflict. They also contributed to hospital bills and other expenses to their kin affected by the conflict.

The community in Ethiopia was also actively involved in elections in the county. Politicians and local leaders mobilize their ethnic kin in Ethiopia to take up national ID cards and register as voters in the county. They are then mobilized during the ballot day to vote in some areas perceived to contain a large population of the ethnic community. A respondent notes that, " *Our leaders and our kin's leaders meet and strategize how to ferry us initially to get ID cards then during elections we are given free transport to and from*

election place and more so our needs are catered for during those times.” This was meant to water down their numerical superiority and thus ensure victory for elective posts. These people are usually transported from the border in Lorries after bribing the border officials. Additionally, the kin are used to cause violence to disrupt the elections in areas perceived to be strongholds of the rival community. As explained by a respondent, “At times our youth are taken to cause insecurity and thus disrupt voter turnout in some places, for example by raiding and taking livestock so that the attention of the rival community is divided between voting and securing their livestock.”

In recent times. The cross-border kin are being invited by political leaders at the county to forcefully evict members of the rival community in areas of the county and take up residence. A key informant notes that “*The politicians, particularly from Saku and Moyale, has been using this for political mileage. This is evident when they settled foreigners from Ethiopia at the border at the expense of county funds and some celebrated in audios circulating in the county..... This is evident during attacks in Horonder and Shurr. The attackers used the slogan 'Aboti lafa (the owners of the Land)'*”.

More than two-thirds of the respondents (68%) agreed that the benefits accruing from their ethnic community from their cross-border kin were also enjoyed by their rival community. Thus in terms of these benefits, the two communities can be perceived as having equal strength and no community is disadvantaged during the conflict. This, however, also explains why the conflicts between these two communities have become protracted.

4.3.2 Ethnic Marginalization

On ethnic marginalization, the household interviews sought to elicit the perceptions of the respondents on three aspects of marginalization; access to pasture, the existence of nepotism in the distribution of county jobs and contracts, bias in the distribution of county funds, ethnicity in land and market transactions. The key informant interviews sought a deeper understanding of marginalization, its historical and present roots, and how it impacts the conflicts between the two communities.

The 23 key informants were all in consensus that roots of marginalization in the county were planted by the previous national presidents of Kenya. They treated the northern lands as a wasteland with little value to contribute to the national economy. These lands were thus forgotten and received little support in development. The result was limited and dilapidated infrastructure. The communities were also left to fend for themselves. The conflict started as competition overgrazing pasture and water. People were mainly killed as the communities fought over pasture and raided each other's livestock. This changed over time as Kenya got independence and the introduction of constituencies and their leadership. The happenings in other parts of the county and the leadership style of former presidents of Kenya taught the communities the importance of having their leaders. Residents witnessed how leaders could institute development programs and even change land boundaries to suit their personal and communal interests.

The promulgation of the 2010 constitution removed the veil of national marginalization from the county. The resources and powers that the county promised under the leadership of the governor increased competition among the two communities. A new and deadly

dimension of the conflict developed as result. This has seen an increase. Indiscriminate killing with an advanced weapon never seen before as the two communities fight to control the county's resources. The county government was seen by the most key informant as promoting the new culture of marginalization and bias. This was by intentionally sidelining members of the rival community from development funds, employment and county contracts.

The majority of the household respondents strongly agreed and agreed that the access to pasture and watering points by livestock was determined by one's ethnicity as shown in Figure 4.7. Less than 10% of the respondents were however of the contrary view that access to pasture was not based on one's ethnicity. These views did not greatly differ among the two communities. No differences were recorded in the chi-square test ($p = 0.9653$).




Figure 4.7: Perceptions on Bias in Access to Pasture and Water (Source: Author)

On nepotism in county opportunities particularly in jobs and tenders, almost all of the respondents strongly agreed and agreed that there is nepotism in the county government of Marsabit. This view was similar across the two communities even though the current governor hails from the Borana community (p-value = 0.8411). The results are visualized in Figure 4.8.




Figure 4.8: Perceptions on Nepotism in the County (Source: Author)

In terms of the distribution of development funds and projects, the majority of the respondents also agreed that this was biased based on the ethnicity of the governor. The majority of the development in the county was undertaken in areas perceived to be inhabited by the ethnic community of the governor. More respondents from the Gabbra community strongly agreed on the partiality in county development than Borana respondents. These differences were however insignificant ($p = 0.1254$) and are highlighted in Figure 4.9.




Figure 4.9: County Bias in Development (Source: Author)

Most of the respondents from both communities disagreed that people buy and sell to only members of their ethnic community in the markets in the county. More Gabra respondents than Borana respondents strongly disagreed and disagreed with this view than Borana respondents. More Borana respondents agreed that markets transactions were biased than Gabra respondents as shown in figure 4.10. These differences were, however, not significant among the two communities ($p = 0.4029$). In contrast, Scott-Villiers⁹⁴ observed that soon after the REGABU (Rendille, Gabra and Burji) coalition won the gubernatorial and senate elections in 2013, political leaders from the losing side mandated their community members to stop buying and selling items to community aligned to the coalition. It is likely that the perceived biasness in business activities in market were as a result of this coerciveness.

⁹⁴ Patta Scott-Villiers, “Small Wars in Marsabit County: Devolution and Political Violence in Northern Kenya,” *Conflict, Security and Development* 17, no. 3 (2017): 247–64.




Figure 4.10: Ethnic Bias in Markets (Source: Author)

Lastly, opinion was divided over ethnicity and land purchases. While about 40% of Borana respondents disagreed that buying and selling of land were restricted to members of their ethnic community. Only 34% of Gabra respondents had this view. An almost equal number of Borana and Gabra respondents agreed that all transactions involved were ethicized. Despite the diversity of responses on this question as shown in figure 4.11, there were significant differences between the responses of the two communities.



Figure 4.11: Bias in Land Transactions (Source: Author)

4.4 Impacts of Conflicts

4.4.1 Death of Household Members

The majority of the respondents (80%) stated that they had not lost a household member due to the conflict. The remaining 20%, comprising of Gabra (13.6%) and Borana (6.8%) recorded the death of household members due to the conflict as shown in figure 4.12




Figure 4.12: Death of Household Member (Source: Author)

The mean number of deaths per household in these households was 2.3 with a standard deviation of 2 deaths. In the whole sample, Borana households recorded the death of 19 male household members while Gabra recorded 21. This resulted in a mean of 3.2 for Borana households and 1.9 for Gabra households. Greater variation was recorded in the Borana households over the death of male household members than in Gabra households as shown in Figure 4.13.




Figure 4.13: Variation in Death of Household Members (Source: Author)

In comparison, 11 households (8 Gabra and 3 Borana) reported the loss of female household members due to the conflict. The total number of female household members lost due to the conflicts was 25(Gabra 16, Borana 9). The mean number of deaths was 2.3 with a standard deviation of 2. As with deaths of male respondents, greater variation was recorded in Borana households than in Gabra households as shown in figure 4.14.




Figure 4.14: Variation in Death of Female Members (Source: Author)

The total number killed as reported by the households was 65. Considering that that average household size was 3.32, a kill rate (annual number of deaths per a population of 100,000) as defined by Wittensburg⁹⁵ is 950. This rate is 26 times more than the 36 reported by Wittensburg in from 2002 to 2008. This explains why some authors have suggested that the current conflict is nearing genocidal levels⁹⁶.

The loss of a loved one due to the conflict harmed the mental state of the respondents and household members. The majority reported experiencing trauma and anxiety. A widow stated;

“The loss of my husband create mental illness for me. As his death shocked me because I never expected him to be killed on that day. His death traumatized me and affected me both mentally and socially”. Others live with the fear of reprisals over the killings. This creates tension as people aren’t aware when they will be attacked or who will be killed. This tension leads to depression and the development of deep hatred among the two communities. One respondent and his household had decided not to participate in communal events meant to bring unity in preparation for such attacks. However, the fear of attacks and that they could lose another household member forced them to continue participating in communal activities. A key informant noted that this tension and bad blood had led to the collapse of many romantic relationships between Borana and Gabra youth.

⁹⁵ Karen Wittensburg M., “Ethnic Tensions in Harsh Environments: The Gabra Pastoralists and the Neighbours in Northern Kenya,” in *Spaces of Insecurity: Human Agency in Violent Conflicts in Kenya* (Leiden, Netherlands: African Studies Centre, 2012), 120–40.

⁹⁶ Wario Malicha, “The Politics of Violence in Marsabit County | The Elephant,” July 19, 2021, <https://www.theelephant.info/features/2021/07/19/the-politics-of-violence-in-marsabit-county/>.

Apart from psychological problems arising from the loss of their loved ones, the household also reported facing a lot of financial challenges. These ranged from the inability to afford basic needs and education. A widow lamented that” *My husband was the breadwinner for my family and my home. Since he died, because of traditional rituals, we couldn’t sell our animals therefore financially we faced a lot of challenges in meeting basic needs.*” Key informants also noted that the escalating violence between the two communities had resulted in a lot of orphans and widows. These become vulnerable to financial challenges without the support of the extended family and wider community. The community also took care of the livestock of the fallen member to ensure that the family had some assets that they could depend on. To deal with trauma, few respondents, engaged in retaliatory attacks on the rival community to compensate for the loss of their member. Others turned on religious teachings on forgiveness while others considered migrating to other counties to escape the endless cycle of conflicts and deaths. Only one respondent sought guidance and counseling.

4.4.2 Physical Injuries

Only 16 households reported having household members who suffered serious injuries due to the conflict, 9 households from the Borana community and 7 from Gabra. In total households from the Borana community spent K.S. 2,030,000(a mean of Ksh. 39,804 for all the households) in hospital bills due to this injury. The Gabra households, on the other hand, spent a total of Ksh. 5,492,000 (a mean of Ksh. 105,615 per household). This is summarized in Figure 4.15.




Figure 4.15: Variation in Cost of Injuries (Source: Author)

On average, those injured took almost seven months (205.3 days) to recover from these injuries. This placed a significant burden on the household members who were forced to take time from the household and economic activities to tend to the wounded. Respondents lamented the loss of labor force for herding livestock as well as the draining of family finances to take care of the injured. The households reported that 15 people also became permanently disabled due to the injuries. Gabra households reported six members became disabled while Borana household reported nine

4.4.3 Loss of Livestock

More than half of the respondents (58%) reported that the household did not lose any livestock as a result of the conflicts since 2017. However, 42% had livestock raided and taken away. The Gabra households with livestock formed 51% of these households while the Borana formed 49%. Table 4.4 summarizes the total and the mean number of livestock stolen from these communities since 2017.

Table 4.4: Number of Livestock Lost (Source: Author)

	Borana	mean	Gabra	mean	Total
Cows	1198	23.5	5674	109.1	6872
Camels	160	3.1	1620	31.1	1780
Sheep	1176	23.1	6222	119.7	7398
Goats	2409	47.2	5204	100.1	7613

The loss of this livestock greatly affected the welfare of the household. Households reported experiencing financial problems leading to the reduced ability to meet their basic needs. Others noted that poverty levels had increased. Some households reported that their children dropped out of school due to the financial hardships posed by the loss of livestock.

4.4.4 Displacement of Households

Displacement occurred in 24% of the interviewed households. Out of this 11.7% were from Borana households, while 12.6% were from Gabra households. The Gabra were mostly displaced from Yabalo, Saku, Moyale, and Shurr. The Borana were displaced mainly from Badassa and Forrole, Hurri hills, Gorai, and Moyale. This is summarized by Figure 4.16.




Figure 4.16: Conflict zones (Source: Author)

Hurri hills is a conflict hot spot between the two communities. Both communities claim ownership of the arable lands below the hills. The eviction of Borana residents by the dominant, Gabra community, assisted by the Kenyan army was perceived to have contributed to the Turbi massacre in 2005⁹⁷. Saku, on the other hand, is dominated by the Borana community. Wittensburg, observed increased attempts by Borana leadership to dislodge the Gabra minority, especially during elections, to reduce political competition for constituency seat⁹⁸. Those displaced suffered challenges such as getting suitable places to accommodate their families (32%), food shortages (32%), hostility from neighbours (16%) as summarized by Figure 4.17.

⁹⁷ Karen Wittensburg M., “Ethnic Tensions in Harsh Environments: The Gabra Pastoralists and the Neighbours in Northern Kenya,” in *Spaces of Insecurity: Human Agency in Violent Conflicts in Kenya* (Leiden, Netherlands: African Studies Centre, 2012), 120–40.

⁹⁸ Ibid




Figure 4.17: Challenges faced by IDPs (Source: Author)

4.5 Conflict Resolution Mechanisms

The two communities rely mostly on traditional conflict resolution mechanisms involving the use of the council of elders from both Ethiopia and Kenya. The elders meet sometimes under the directions of the government and the local security committees to arbitrate over conflicts. In these meetings. The elders can summon and fine the offending parties. Resolutions passes are by mutual agreement. In some circumstances, the elder can curse the accused persons involved in fueling the conflict. Elders play a great role in resolving the conflicts between the two communities. As it was clear from the key informants that the youths from both communities usually act in their volition in causing violence between the communities. The elders play in advising the youth on ways to prevent the further spread of the conflict. Peace caravans are also organized in the county and also involve religious leaders from both communities.

The study established that only half of the households (53%) participated in conflict resolution meetings between the two communities. Borana households that took part in conflict resolution meetings formed 27% of the total respondents while Gabra formed 26%. An almost equal number did not participate in any conflict resolution meeting as highlighted by Figure 4.18.




Figure 4.18: Attendance to Peace Meetings (Source: Author)

The major conflict resolution mechanisms discussed from these meetings as reported by the households were; the return of livestock stolen (46%), the arrest and prosecution of all persons accused of engaging in the violence (24%), disarmament (13%), and compensation (14%). The results are highlighted in Figure 4.22.




Figure 4.19: Conflict Resolution Mechanisms (Source: Author)

Half of the respondents were not satisfied with the conflict resolution strategies put forth in these peace meetings while 42% were satisfied. Issues that were satisfactorily dealt with was how disarmament exercise would be conducted to ensure success. Some respondents wanted the exercise to extend to Ethiopia to ensure that all firearms were ceased. The meetings, according to some respondents failed to discuss the political aspect of the conflict including those who incite the communities to attack each other and those who finance and plan the conflicts. The security lapses at the border and in the failure to arrest accused persons before they escaped to Ethiopia was also found to be wanting. The ineffectiveness of security organs was not completely dealt with at these meetings. The issues of land boundaries that were also a cause of the enmity between the two communities were seldom discussed according to some respondents.

The major challenges preventing the implementation of conflict resolution strategies included; lack of political will in implementing resolutions (44%), inefficient enforcement by police (30%), and lack of support and goodwill from community leaders (25%). These challenges are summarized in Figure 4.20. The state was also accused of sometimes taking sides in the conflict and thus affecting the work of the police. The traditional conflict resolution mechanism was found to be ineffective by 15 of the 23 key informants. They decried that the youth nowadays are mainly controlled by politicians and seldom listen to their elders. Conflicts in the county also occur spontaneously, without even the knowledge of the elders. Figure 4.20 present these challenges.




Figure 4.20: Challenges Facing Resolution Mechanisms (Source: Author)

The imposition of fines for example compensating the aggrieved community for the killings done or livestock stolen was found to be ineffective in stopping further spread of the conflict. A key informant explains, " Because *the penalties are never effectively applied. When occasionally effort is made to implement them, the community of the*

wrongdoer contributes the fine through harambees, such that the fine paid does not meet the purpose of teaching the perpetrator any lesson. s/he does not feel the impact of the penalty. Other times when perpetrators are imprisoned, politicians bail them out for the selfish reason of seeking approval and support from the individual, family, region, and larger community. Another informant also accused the council of elders of being partisan and under the control of prominent politicians in the county. He observed that conflicts sometimes occur immediately after peace meetings are held in the county.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

This study sought to establish the impact of Cross Border Kinship, ethnic marginalization on protracted resource-based conflicts between the Borana and Gabra in Kenya and Ethiopia. The study was guided by three objectives: To assess the influence of cross border ethnic allegiances and ethnic marginalization the conflicts between the two communities, to explore the social and economic impacts of the conflicts on the households, and to investigate the conflict resolution mechanisms used in ending the conflict and their effectiveness.

5.2 Summary

The study established that cross-border ethnic kin in Ethiopia plays a pivotal role in the conflict. They provide the means through which small arms and light weapons are ferry weapons are ferried into the county to be used in conflicts. They also provide manpower to be used for reinforcement for their Kenyan counterparts and also for directly starting conflicts on communities living near the border. The OLF militia from Ethiopia has been actively involved in the conflicts. The manpower is also used by politicians to disrupt elections and also to increase their numerical superiority during the vote. In recent times the Ethiopian community is being used to forcefully displace communities from certain regions and take up residence.

Ethnic marginalization was also observed by most key informants and respondents to being fuelled by the county government. This is through side-lining the rival community from employment, development programs, and county tenders. The side-lined community then resorts to violence to push its agenda. This marginalization also affected the access to pasture and watering points by livestock of the various communities. These resources once shared between the two communities, have become ethnicized. Each community has its places for grazing livestock and watering point. Trespass causes conflicts. As a result of these resources both in the county and in the communal lands have become hotly contested between the two communities. Politicians utilize these emotive issues to incite the communities against each other. Both the conflicts in recent are being characterized by political dominance and ethnic expansionism.

Conflicts between the two communities have resulted in massive loss of lives, destruction of public and private assets, and ethnic tension. The death of household members as a result of the conflict was reported by 20% of the households interviewed in the study. A key informant also reported that during the data collection phase, 16 people had lost their lives through the clashes in the county. Physical injuries were reported in 24% of the households. This in addition to the loss of household members led to a decline in household welfare. This is due to the loss of income-generating members, exhaustion of household finances on hospital bills for the injured. Households also lost labour for manning livestock. The majority of the affected households also reported suffering physical trauma, depression, and feelings of revenge. These contributed to ethnic tension and deep resentment of the rival community by some household members. Very few households had gone through counselling services to deal with the trauma. The loss of livestock was reported by 42% of

the households interviewed. The loss of livestock further aggravated the household income earning potential and led to an increase in poverty rates in the county

Almost half of the respondents participated in conflict resolution meetings. These were organized by the council of elders from both communities, the government, religious leaders, and opinion leaders in the county. As the two communities still follow their culture, traditional conflict resolutions mechanisms were always used in resolving conflicts. The elders meet and deliberated on the conflicts and issued penalties. The major conflict resolution mechanisms discussed from these meetings as reported by the households were; the return of livestock stolen (46%), the arrest and prosecution of all persons accused of engaging in the violence (24%), disarmament (13%), and compensation (14%). Lack of goodwill from politicians and communal leaders were the main reasons blamed for the ineffectiveness of the resolutions. The country security personnel were also blamed for the inefficiency in arresting and prosecuting perpetrators of the violence.

5.3 Conclusion

The two communities are involved in an endless cycle of conflicts due to competition over county resources. As posited by the instrumentalist view of ethnic conflict, politicians have utilized ethnic grievances on marginalization to sow seeds of discord between these two communities and thus further aggravate the conflict. The cross-border kin in Ethiopia has also become key actors in the conflict. Their actions are in line with the primordial view of ethnicity. They fight to ensure their kin are not subdued and dominated by their rival community. The impact of the violence affects households adversely. The resultant resentment following the loss of household members and assets feeds into this cycle. As a

result, conflict resolution mechanisms have become ineffective as no side is ready to take accountability for their actions.

5.4 Recommendations

5.4.1 Policy Recommendations

The study makes the following policy recommendations:

- The national government should look into the dealings of the county government (both current and past) to ascertain their role in the conflict. As the county has become central to the conflict, the national government should look into ways of ensuring that leaders of these two communities are included in the running of the county government on an equal basis. This can be either through amending the constitution to ensure counties with deep heated ethnic conflicts can have the county leadership equally vested in the two communities. If these cannot be achieved, then the president should consider disbanding the county government.
- The government should collaborate with the Ethiopian government to ensure that disarmament activities are concurrently carried out on both sides of the border.
- The Ethiopian and Kenyan governments should beef up their border patrol activities to stem the illegal flow of migrants and militias into and out of the border points. All foreigners in Kenya should be repatriated and monitored to ensure they do not come back.

- The county security apparatus should increase surveillance to stem hate speech and the inciting of communities by politicians. Arrest and prosecution of all offenders should be done swiftly and without bias.
- The county should develop and fund that and take care of the welfare of households adversely affected by the conflicts especially widows, widowers, and orphans.

5.4.2 Research Recommendations

Further research should be carried out on the following issues;

- The role of Gabra and Borana youth in the persistence of the conflicts and conflict resolution process.
- The impacts of the conflicts on the natural resources in the county

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ANNEXE I: HOUSEHOLD QUESTIONNAIRE

- Household I.D: _____
- Location: _____
- Interviewer ID: _____
- Date and time: _____
- GPS: - _____

CONSENT:

Hello! My name is _____. I am a student at the University of Nairobi undertaking a course in M.A International Conflict Management. As part of my degree requirements, I am undertaking a research in this county on the causes and impacts of the conflict between the Borana and Gabra. This research will help in ensuring that the conflict is resolved and peace returns to this land. In achievement of this purpose, I would like task you some questions regarding your understanding of the conflict, its impacts on your household and potential ways you think, the conflict can be resolved. The interview will take 10-15 minutes. All your answers will be kept confidential and will only be used for academic purposes. Your personal details will not be captured anywhere. **All questions will refer to the conflicts between the Borana and Gabra in Kenya and Ethiopia**

SECTION A: SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

- 1) Gender of household head: Male [] Female []
- 2) Gender of main respondent: Male [] Female []
- 3) Age of HH head. _____
- 4) Highest level of Education for HH head:

○ None

- Primary
- Secondary
- Tertiary
- Other, please specify _____

5) Main income activity of the household:

- Livestock rearing
- Agriculture
- Agro pastoralist
- Employment
- Self-employment

6) Number of people in the household: - _____ Males _____ Females

7) Number of people in the household who are:

- a. Employed _____
- b. Students _____
- c. Unemployed _____

8) Location of household: Kenya [], Ethiopia []

9) What is the dominant ethnic community found in the locality of the household?

- Borana
- Gabbra
- Rendille
- Burji
- Other, please specify _____

SECTION B: ETHNIC ALLEGIANCE

10) Do you think that members of your community are all united against the perceived atrocities being committed against your ethnic kin in Kenya by the other community?

- Yes, I think so
- No, there is no unity
- Am not Sure
- I don't know

11) If yes, what do you think has contributed to this unity.

- Cultural beliefs
- The loss of loved ones due to the conflict
- Loss of cattle, land and other assets due to the conflict
- Political mobilization
- Others, Please Specify _____

12) In your understanding, how is the community mobilized;

- a. During and after attacks on your ethnic kin by the rival community in Kenya? _____
- b. During and after elections in Kenya? _____

SECTION C: CROSS BORDER KIN RELATIONS

13) Does your household maintain strong ties with your ethnic kin in Kenya and across the border? Yes [] No []

14) In your opinion, what is the importance of maintaining these ties?

- Maintaining of customs and beliefs
- Provision of water and pasture

Trading and other economic opportunities

Support during conflicts with rival communities

15) Others, Please Specify_____

16) Looking at the past conflicts with the rival community from 2017 to date, have you helped your ethnic kin in Kenya and across the border:

a. Acquisition of weapons? Yes [] No [] if yes please explain how you helped_____

b. Provision of manpower to fight in the conflict? Yes[] No[] if yes please explain how you helped_____

c. Provision of refuge for persons accused of participating in violent acts? Yes [] No [] if yes please explain how you helped_____

d. Mobilization of voters? Yes[],No [] if yes please explain how you helped_____

17) Do you think that the rival community of your ethnic kin in Kenya also enjoys these benefit from their ethnic kin in Ethiopia? Yes[] No []

18) How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The presence of our ethnic kin at the border has helped in fueling the conflict.

Strongly agree

Agree

Disagree

Strongly disagree

SECTION D: MARGINALIZATION

19) How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statements regarding your ethnic kin in Kenya?

No.	Statements	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree
#a	The livestock of our ethnic kin in has been denied access to pasture and water in areas dominated by the rival community				
#b	One can get job/lose job opportunity based on ethnicity				
#c	County government resource allocation is biased based on the dominant ethnic community of the sub-county or ward				
#d	In the Kenyan markets, People buy or sell goods only to members of their ethnicity				
#e	My ethnic kin in Kenya cannot sell land to members of the rival community				

SECTION E: IMPACTS OF THE CONFLICTS

20) In relation to the conflicts between the two communities from 2017 to date:

- a. Has your household lost any member? Yes [] No [] **skip to Q.17**
- b. How many members did you lose during this period? _____ Males _____
females
- c. How did the loss affect the mental state of the household members?
 - members became traumatized
 - fear and anxiety on their safety
 - financial and emotional stress
 - other, please specify _____
- d. As a result of this loss, did your household face any financial challenges?
Yes [] No [] **please explain if Yes** _____
- e. How did you cope after the loss of these members?
 - Asked for support from the community and extended family
 - Planned/participated in retaliatory attacks
 - sought counselling
 - Sought aid from government or NGOs
 - Other, please specify _____

21) Were any persons in your household seriously injured during these conflicts?

Yes [] No **skip to Q.18**

- a. What was the approximate money in treating the injuries?

- b. How many days were they hospitalized or immobilized?

c. How many were left permanently injured or disabled?

d. How did this(ese) injuries affect your household?

- Spent a lot of time taking care of member
- Loss of manpower for herding livestock and other activities
- Exhausted family finances
- Other, please specify_____

22) As a result of these conflicts, did you lose any influential relative or community member (**non household member**)? Yes [] No[] **SKIP TO Q.19.**

a. How did this loss of the **non-household member** affect your household?

- Loss of economic opportunities
- Loss labour/Manpower for herding and other economic activities
- Household finances used to support family
- emotional trauma
- Brought fear and anxiety
- Other, please explain_____

b. How is the household coping with following this loss?

- Asked for support from the community and extended family
- Planned/participated in retaliatory attacks
- sought counselling
- Sought aid from government or NGOs
- Household struggling to make ends meet
- Other, please specify_____

23) As a result of these conflicts, did the household, lose any livestock? Yes [] No

[] **IF NO SKIP TO Q.20**

a. How many livestock did the household lose as a result of these conflicts?

_____cows, _____camels, ___sheep, _____goats

24) Did the household host any displaced people from Kenya or Ethiopia as a result of these conflicts? Yes[] No[] **IF NO SKIP TO Q.21**

a. Where were the members of the household displaced from? _____

b. What are some of the challenges you encountered while seeking for refuge or hosting the refugees/IDPs?

- Food shortages
- Diseases
- Hostility from neighbours
- Limited finances
- Accommodation challenges
- Others, please specify_____

SECTION F: CONFLICT RESOLUTION

25) Have you or any other member of the household participated in conflict resolution/peace meetings with the rival community of your ethnic kin in Kenya or across the border? Yes [] No [] **IF YES SKIP TO Q.23**

26) Have you been made aware of any peace meetings meant to resolve the current conflicts between the two communities? Yes [] No [] **IF NO SKIP TO Q.25**

27) What were some of the resolutions passed during these meetings?

- Return of livestock stolen
- Compensation for injuries and killings

- Arrest and prosecution of perpetrators of violence
- Eviction of antagonizing community
- Disarmament
- Other, please specify_____

a. Did the resolutions address your major concerns? Yes [] No [] **SKIP IF YES To q.24**

b. What are some of the issues that were not addressed by the peace resolutions?

- Disarmament and the prevention of inflow of arms from the border and other regions
- Arrest and prosecution of the perpetrators of the violence
- Lack of participation from people accused of engaging in violent acts
- The safe return of IDPs
- Land and boundary grievances
- unfair country resource allocation
- Arrest and prosecution of political leaders
- Other, please specify_____

28) Why are resolutions not being followed?

- Lack of political will
- Lack of support from community leaders
- Inefficient enforcement by police
- Other, please specify_____

29) In your opinion, how can the current conflict be brought to a sustainable end?

ANNEXE II: KEY INFORMANT QUESTIONNAIRE

- Household I.D: _____
- Location: _____
- Interviewer ID: _____
- Date and time: _____
- GPS: - _____

CONSENT:

Hello! My name is _____. I am a student at the University of Nairobi undertaking a course in M.A International Conflict Management. As part of my degree requirements, I am undertaking a research in this county on the causes and impacts of the conflict between the Borana and Gabbra. This research will help in ensuring that the conflict is resolved and peace returns to this land. In achievement of this purpose, I would like task you some questions regarding your understanding of the conflict, its impacts on your household and potential ways you think, the conflict can be resolved. The interview will take 10-15 minutes. All your answers will be kept confidential and will only be used for academic purposes. Your personal details will not be captured anywhere. **All questions will refer to the conflicts between the Borana and Gabra in Kenya and Ethiopia**

SECTION A: SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

30) Gender of the respondent: Male [] Female []

31) Age of the respondent. _____

32) Highest level of education of the respondent:

- None
- Primary

- Secondary
- Tertiary
- Other, please specify _____

33) Occupation/Role in the community _____

MAIN QUESTIONS

- 1) What the main causes are of cross border conflict between the Borana and the Gabra communities living along Kenya-Ethiopian border? look out for grievances such as marginalization and expound
- 2) Is the current conflict different that the past conflicts between the two communities? If yes how so?
- 3) a) Are there influential people who play role in fuelling this conflict? Yes[]
No [] **IF NO SKIP TO Q.5**
b) If yes, what are the motivations behind their involvement?
- 4) What role do the cross border kin in Ethiopia play in the continued persistence of the conflict? Acquisition of Arms, refuge to accused persons, abour for fighting etc.
- 5) What are some of the social, economic and political impacts of the conflicts)
- 6) a) What are some of the traditional conflict resolution mechanisms used in mitigating the Borana and the Gabra conflict?
b) Are the traditional conflict resolution mechanisms effective? Yes[]
No [] c)State the reasons for your answer _____
- 7) Do you think cross border disarmament can be effective in reducing violent conflict? Yes[] No []
- 8) Is there adequate border patrolling along Kenya – Ethiopia border? Yes[] No []

9) Have you witnessed any government intervention in countering inter-ethnic conflict between the Borana and the Gabra? Yes[] No [] **IF NO SKIP TO**

Q.8 if yes,

a) how did the government intervene?

b) Has this intervention(s) worked?

c) Why do you think so? _____

10) State some of the measures that the state can take to boost security in this area? _____

11) What are your recommendations about possible resolution measures to this conflict? _____

----- END, THANK YOU -----

ANNEX III: TURNITIN REPORT

CROSS BORDER KINSHIP AND PROTRACTED RESOURCE-BASED CONFLICTS IN THE HORN OF AFRICA: THE CASE OF BORANA AND GABRA IN KENYA AND ETHIOPIA.

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