

THE ROLE AND PERFORMANCE OF REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT  
AUTHORITIES: A CASE STUDY OF LAKE BASIN DEVELOPMENT  
AUTHORITY (LBDA) IN KENYA.

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
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DEDICATION

To:

Father : Late Ex-Chief Nying'uro Akala

Mother : Mrs. Norah Nying'uro

Uncle : Benjamin Otieno Okello

For their material and moral support throughout my  
academic life.

A B S T R A C T

The problem facing most of the developing countries today is that of the establishment of appropriate institutions that will optimally implement development policies. A number of development policies have often been inadequately implemented or if implemented, with negative consequences.

This study analyses the performance of one institution established to help in the implementation of regional development policy in Kenya. The Lake Basin Development Authority (LBDA) was created in 1979 by the Kenya Government to accelerate the development of the Lake Victoria basin region in Western Kenya as it was felt that the then existing institutions were not capable of treating the region as one comprehensive and integrated unit of development efforts.

The study examines the role of the Authority vis-a-vis other institutions in the area as far as the development of the region concerned. This is done in the light of the experience of the authority since its establishment. It is argued that despite the fact that the Authority has undertaken a number of projects which have undoubtedly made some impact, however dismal that might be, the role of the Authority vis-a-vis other institutions, particularly government ministries and departments in the region is far from

clear. Thus seven years after its establishment, there is still no concrete sign that the Authority will be able to fulfill the high hopes and aspirations that greeted its creation. The study, however, maintains that despite vagueness of its role, the *raison de'tre* of the Authority is unquestionable and that the Authority is absolutely necessary for the sake of a comprehensive and integrated development of the region. The study recommends, in the light of its findings, the measures that are to be undertaken to make the Authority play its expected role in the development of the region, the absence of which, the study further argues, will make the creation of the Authority be just another case of organizational proliferation with no meaningful impact on the region's development process.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS:

C.D.A.	-	Community Development Assistant
D.D.C.	-	District Development Committee
D.D.O.	-	District Development Officer
F.A.O.	-	Food and Agriculture Organisation (of the United Nations)
F.F.E.s	-	Fish Farming Extensionists
G.O.N.	-	Government of Netherlands
I.D.S.	-	Institute of Development Studies
K.V.D.A.	-	Kerio Valley Development Authority
K.I.A.	-	Kenya Institute of Administration
LBDA	-	Lake Basin Development Authority
M.D.	-	Managing Director
M.P.s	-	Members of Parliament
N.G.O.	-	Non-Governmental Organisations
R.D.A.	-	Regional Development Authority (or Agency)
RID	-	Royal Irrigation Department (of Thailand)
RDWSSP	-	Rural Domestic Water Supply and Sanitation Programme
TARDA	-	Tana and Athi River Development Authority
TVA	-	Tennessee Valley Authority
UN	-	United Nations
UNDP	-	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	-	United Nations Children's Education Fund.

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1: OBJECTIVE OF STUDY AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

In the recent past, there has been concern in the developing countries about the performance of institutions established to implement development policies. In most cases, the story about the performance of such institutions has been that of failure rather than success. The problem has been more pronounced in the case of parastatal organisations - those quasi-governmental organisations established to implement policies.

The objective of this study is to examine the role and performance of one such institution. The Lake Basin Development Authority (LBDA), our case study, is a Regional Development Agency (RDA) charged with the development of a water-catchment basin, the Lake Victoria basin in Western Kenya.

The Lake Victoria basin region is rich in very many resources whose exploitation would significantly contribute to the development of the region. Yet there is a huge discrepancy today between the potentiality of the region and its present state of development which is sadly very low with problems such as perennial

floods, recurring attacks of diseases, a high infant mortality rate, unemployment and under employment, and, most sadly, irregular supply and/or lack of clean water for domestic use, to mention just a few. The region is generally impoverished with most people languishing in poverty and hunger due to the low level of income. The problem becomes more pronounced when one realises that despite the fact that the area is better endowed with resources than many other parts of the country, it contains some of the least developed areas within the country and two of its leading provinces, Nyanza' and Western - which form the LBDA's "development area" rank among the least developed provinces in Kenya.

Given this glaring gap between the area's potentiality and its state of development, it is rightly assumed that there must have existed some policy gaps both at the level of formulation and at the level of implementation of development programmes. An important question, therefore, arises, namely, is the Lake Basin Development Authority capable of filling these gaps in order to achieve the desired level of development? In examining the role of the LBDA in the development of the region, this study will address the following problems:-

- (a) What was the LBDA meant to do?
- (b) What is it actually doing and how is it

doing it?

(c) With what results is it doing what it is doing?

and

(d) What can it do that other agencies cannot do?

## 1.2: THE SIGNIFICANCE AND JUSTIFICATION OF STUDY

Given the present debate among the policymakers and the public alike on the performance of public agencies many of which have been accused of failure to justify their existence, this study could not have come at a more opportune time. Since its inception, the LBDA, like other public agencies, has not escaped criticism from the public and policymakers. There is obviously the need to make the LBDA instrumental in the development of the region.

The significance of this study also manifests itself when one considers the fact that the idea of water-catchment development authorities or Regional Development Authorities is a fairly recent one in Kenya. To date, there exist only three: the Kerio Valley Development Authority (KVDA), the LBDA, and the Tana and Athi Rivers Development Authority (TARDA). The three were established more or less at the same

time with the first two being established in 1979 and the latter being formed in 1981 as an enlargement of the former Tana River Development Authority which was essentially a power generation company. Being a new idea, the role of the Authorities is still anything but clear. By focusing on one of them, this study hopes to contribute to a deeper understanding of their role in regional development and, ultimately, in overall national development. Its findings will help provide some policy insights for the country's policy-makers, particularly if and when similar institutions are proposed for other water-catchment areas in the country.

This researcher knows of no other study on the role and performance of any of the three RDAs in Kenya. The only study so far was C. Mwangi's analysis of LBDA's administrative set-up (1983).<sup>1</sup> Apart from the fact that this study was carried out when the Authority was still very young and had undertaken no major projects, the chief point of departure is that while it dealt with the administrative set-up, the present study concerns itself primarily with the Authority's role and impact in development.

The study also hopes to contribute to our general knowledge in development administration in

developing countries. and, therefore, add theoretical knowledge to the general Development Administration theory which has increasingly gained ground in the developing nations.

### 1.3: SCOPE OF STUDY

The scope of this study is determined by its control objective, namely, the examination of the role and impact of the LBDA. Since all this leads to the theme of performance of the Authority, it is important to identify what constitutes an examination of the performance of the Authority.

A workshop on "The Role of Public Enterprises in Development in East Africa" held at the University of Nairobi's Institute for Development Studies in 1982 recommended that any fruitful assessment of the performance of public agencies must be two-pronged, that is, involving examination of performance at both the micro-economic and macro-economic levels.<sup>2</sup> The micro-level analysis is limited to technological and administrative competence of the agency while the macro-level treats the issue of the agency's contribution to overall national development. As noted elsewhere, a study has already been carried out on the administrative set-up of the LBDA (micro-level analysis). The present study,

however, emphasises on the macro-level performance of the Authority. This means that issues such as the role of the Authority vis-a-vis other institutions in the region and the national policy-framework within which it is functioning are addressed. This does not, however, mean that the internal set-up of the Authority is ignored. What needs emphasis, however, is that the internal system of the LBDA is studied with a view to demonstrating how it contributes to its macro-level performance. Ultimately, the scope of the study is limited by the control question addressed by the thesis, that is, what can the Authority do that other agencies in the region have not done and cannot do?

The time limit within which the role and performance of the Authority is to be analysed covers the period between the birth of the Authority in 1979 and todate, 1986.

The areal scope of the study is limited to the part of the Lake Basin region defined by the LBDA Act as the "Development Area", that is Nyanza and Western Provinces because this is where the Authority is expected to carry out development projects. The interviews conducted were, however, not limited to respondents in the area (see section on Methodology) but included also government officers in the Central

Government headquarters in Nairobi. For the government officers the questions or discussions centred on their relationship with the Authority both generally, in terms of role differentiation with regard to specific projects that they have in common. However, for the government officers in the Central government headquarters, the discussions or interviews sought to determine how the LBDA's activities were integrated into national development policy. At the organisational level, interviews were held with the officers of the Authority.

#### 1:4: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

As is now evident, this is a study of an organisation as an agent of development. Students of organisation have adopted different approaches in studying the working of organisations. Until recently, however, most literature or studies have adopted the classical or traditional approaches chief among these have been the "Goal approach" and the "Functionalist approach". The most recent studies have, however, departed from these classical approaches, having found them inadequate in explaining the functioning of organisations. The most popular approach today is that generated by the "systems" theorists, known as the systems approach. Following is a brief analysis

of these approaches and whether or not (and why) they have been found useful for the present study.

Students who follow the Goal approach focus on the formal or stated purposes of an organisation and measure the organization's effectiveness against the achievement or non-achievement of these goals which are somehow prescribed. Most studies of organisational performance have been based on the goal approach in which the performance evaluation is, as A. Eli Mir<sup>3</sup> calls it, "summative", putting emphasis on goal attainment as the criterion for evaluating the organization's performance. This is not surprising given that the studies are based on classical organisation theories which presented organisational goals as "givens" which are to be treated as intact and ultimate, unbendable ends towards which the organisation has to work. They inherently assume that the organisation is neatly and perfectly designed to achieve perfect goals. In sum, most investigators who adopt the goal approach work under the assumptions that: (a) complex organisations have an ultimate goal ("mission", "function") toward which they are striving and, (b) the ultimate goal can be identified empirically and progress toward it measured.<sup>4</sup>

The chief objection to the emphasis on "goal



attainment" as the criterion for measuring organisational performance derives from the growing dissatisfaction with the classical theorists' treatment of goals as clearly set and agreed upon by every party concerned. Contrary to their assumption that the ultimate goal can be easily identified and progress toward it measured, it is now agreed among scholars of organisations that goal-setting is not a once-for-all exercise and that there is, in most cases, a glaring gap between the "official" or "stated" goals and what one would call "operative goals". As A. Etzioni argues that:

"the purpose set forth in charters and public statements may be very remotely related to the future states toward which a majority of the organisational means and major organisational commitments are directed, and which, in cases of conflict with goals which are stated but command few resources, have clear priority".<sup>5</sup>

The point of emphasis is that goals are never stable, nor are they clearly set. They are fluid and can be reset or even displaced according to circumstances. This is particularly true of situations of unstable and changing environments like the ones found in developing countries like Kenya. In such cases, as J.D. Thompson and W.J. McEwan notes that the

"Purpose becomes a thing to be decided rather than an obvious matter."6

The goal approach also presents problems due to the fact that, as inferred in the above quotation, goal definition is not always an easy task. The problem of goal definition is even more compounded in the developing countries where there may be conscious hesitation on the part of policy-makers in clearly stating the objectives of a policy or a programme. In some cases, precise definition of objectives is avoided when preciseness may lead to hostility to the programme or policy on the side of those whose participation in programme or policy implementation is crucial. All this means that more often than not objectives are set in very general terms leaving a student studying the performance of a programme with a situation where simple standards of measurement that follow the goal-approach become obsolete and irrelevant because, as John B. Bourn says:

"different sets of people-politicians, officials, pressure groups, the media and the public at large - often ascribe different meanings to the same activities and events."7

This is particularly true with public enterprises which

are subject to public scrutiny,

The goal approach to the study of organisational performance is also rendered inappropriate by the fact that in most cases, particularly in the public sector, the goals are set by non-actors. Ali El Mir dismisses the goal approach on this ground, arguing that

"those who state the objectives are not necessarily those who commit the means to pursue them, and without the actual commitment of means, objectives are useless, no matter how they are formulated." 8

Etzioni, one of the critics of the goal approach argues along the same line emphasising that:

"... goals as cultural entities arise outside of the organisation as a social system and cannot be arbitrarily attributed as properties of the organisation itself." 9

Other critics of the goal approach note that even at the internal level of the organisation, goals may not be easily agreed upon by its members. This line of argument is best put by Yutchman and Seashore who argue that:

"the organisation is composed of a large variety of individuals and groups, each having its own conceptions about any claims on the organisation. The managers of an organisation do not wholly agree among themselves about the organisational goals; in addition it's not certain that these goals even if agreed upon would prevail."10

In summation, the goal approach to the assessment of an organisation's performance is not only ineffective but may also be a hindrance due to the fluidity, multiplicity and unspecificity of goals. It is important to point out ~~at~~ this early stage that these limitations of the goal approach derive from non-cognizance of environmental forces that affect organisation's performance though this will be dealt with later. It should, however, be pointed out that as spurious and idealistic as it is, the goal approach cannot be dismissed in toto. For analytical purposes, it may be useful to use some goals as organisational properties. Thus the broad general objectives of an organisation may be used as some sort of guiding principles. For example, in our present study, the objectives of the LBDA are given broadly as "planning, coordination and implementation of development projects" in its area of jurisdiction. These three will provide the basis of our inquiry.

The other approach, Structural-Functionalism,

while not focusing on the charter of the organisation, concerns itself with how the various parts (structures) of an organisation perform "requisite-functions", functions which the investigator derives from his own (functional) theory. Essentially, the principal objective of functional (structural-functional) analysis is to determine the contribution which a social item (a structure or process) makes to the persistence of the system in which it occurs. Following Robert Merton<sup>11</sup>, one of the advocates of the functionalist approach, the logic of functional analysis involves the following sequence or steps:

1. Certain functional requirements of the organism (or the social system) are established, requirements which must be satisfied if the organism is to survive, or to operate with some degree of effectiveness.
2. There is a concrete and detailed description of the arrangements (structures and processes) through which these requirements are met in "normal cases".
3. If some of the typical mechanisms for meeting these requirements are destroyed, or are found to be functioning inadequately, the observer is sensitised to the need for

detecting compensating mechanism (if any) which fulfil the necessary function.

4. There is a detailed account of the structure for which the functional requirements hold, as well as a detailed account of the arrangements through which the function is fulfilled.

The structural-functionalist approach has been attacked by modern scholars as inadequate for a number of reasons, chief among which are, (a) it does not take the organisation as the frame of reference - society; the superordinate system, is taken as the point of reference, (b) it is too teleological and predictive to explain events as they occur and, most importantly (c) like the goal approach, it does not give adequate considerations to the issue of the relationship between the organisation and the government. Ultimately, it has been argued by some scholars that functionalism itself is not a theoretical scheme and that at best it is only an analytical conceptual scheme, useful for descriptive purposes but not itself an empirical or theoretical entity. For this study, the structural functionalist approach is found inadequate due to the same reasons cited above. Having painted the goal-approach also as inadequate, we are left with the "Systems approach" which is adopted

throughout the study.

The systems approach views organisations as systems. The main assumption that underlie the conceptualization of organisations as systems are (a) that they are composed of a set of interdependent parts, (b) they have needs for survival and (c) as systems they behave and take actions.<sup>12</sup> Generally speaking, the systems approach views organisations as systems at two levels, first, within the organisation there are sub-parts that form the whole, and secondly, the organisation itself is a sub-system of a wider system in which it co-exists with other subjects. It is underscored that the organisation interacts with other sub-systems in its environment and that this interaction determines a lot its effectiveness and efficiency. Hence by emphasising the interaction between the organisation and its environment, the systems approach recognises, unlike the other two approaches just discussed, the role played by extraorganisational factors in the organisation's performance. As one of the advocates of the systems approach notes,

"Any attempt to explain why organisations are as they are must (therefore) take into account the environment in which they are located."<sup>13</sup>

Scanning through the works of systems theorists, one can distinguish three strands of the systems' approach. Silverman distinguishes them as follows, (a) the closed system approach, (b) the partially open systems approach, and (c) the open systems approach.<sup>14</sup>

In the closed systems approach, extraorganisa-tional factors are almost ignored and the premise is that the structure of the organisation and the psycho-logical needs of its members determine its behaviour. Students who take this line of approach tend to assume that it is possible for the organisation to isolate itself from environmental influences and maintain an intact boundary by developing rational roles and relationships. The closed-system approach has been carried over from the physical sciences in which

"... relatively self-contained structures could be treated successfully as if they were independent of external forces."<sup>15</sup>

But that cannot be said as the social systems for  
as Katz and Khan say,

"... living systems, whether biological organisms or social organisations, are acutely dependent upon their external environment and so must be conceived of as open systems."<sup>16</sup>

In the partially-open systems approach, prior



attention and emphasis is given to the internal organisational variables with external factors being treated later, more or less as "control" to explain already established facts.

In the open-systems approach which the study seeks to employ, the environment or extraorganisational factors are introduced into the study from the beginning to the end.<sup>17</sup> It is assumed that the organisation has a more dynamic relationship with its environment which is in itself a collection of other subsystems. In other words, as E.F. Huse puts it, the open-systems approach recognizes that:


"... an organisation as an open system interacts with, influences and is influenced by the environment."<sup>18</sup>

For an organisation charged with the development of a particular area, like the LBDA, the subject of this study, the issue of environment becomes even more important. Of particular importance is the "task environment" which generally refers to "those parts of the environment which are relevant or potentially relevant to goal setting and attainment". David K. Leonard,<sup>19</sup> analysing organisational requirements for development institutions in the developing countries, contends that the choice of an organisational strategy

for the implementation of a program depends on the character of the "task environment" and mentions three variables as influencing programme implementation, namely, (a) the nature of local elites and their interests, (b) the nature and variability of interests of other agents in the environment, and (c) the distribution between the organisation and other local organisations of the capacity to meet the program's technical and administrative requirements.

For our study, the environment of the LBDA is divided into two, viz: (a) the "wider environment" (termed the "supra-system") which is used generally to refer to the national framework within which it operates and, (b) the "immediate environment" (termed the "sub-supra system") which refers to its defined area of jurisdiction which contains the LBDA's clientele and the other institutions participating in the development of the region. (see Figure 1 below). It is recognized, however, that these two interact and are not necessarily exclusive of each other.

LAKE BASIN DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY'S ENVIRONMENT



SOURCE: Drawn by Author.

KEY:

- (A) - Supra system or National Framework
- (B) - Sub-suprasystem or "Area of Jurisdiction"
- - Arrow signifying the two-way influence process between the LBDA and its two external environments, i.e. A and B
- D.D.C.s - District Development Committees.

Cardinal to the open-systems approach are the concepts input, throughput, and output.<sup>20</sup> The General systems theory emphasises the similarity of the processes occurring in different organisations as "systems". It therefore emphasises that in studying whichever kind of organisation, it is fruitful to use the idea of a supply of resources (input), a conversion process (throughput) and the production of an object or objects (output). The Input-Throughput-Output model underlines the dependence of the organisation for its survival and efficiency on an exchange of goods and services with its environment. At the level of input, the idea of "resources" is crucial. For a development organisation like the LBDA, these resources would fall under the three categories given by Whitby and Willis,<sup>21</sup> namely,

- (a) Natural resources - including all those gifts of nature such as land, air, water, minerals, forests, fish, quiet, pleasant landscape, etc.
- (b) Labour-all human resources, mental and physical inherited or acquired.
- (c) Capital-including finance and all equipment including man-made which is not consumed for its own sake, but which

may be used in the process of making other goods.

At the throughput level, the effectiveness of the organisation (LBDA in our case) is important. The output represents the services the LBDA offers to its clients and their impact.

For the LBDA, the inputs come from both the "immediate" and the "wider" environments towards which the "output" is also directed.

In sum, the open systems approach to the study of organisational performance suffices because, as Yutchman and Seashore<sup>22</sup> note,

- (a) it emphasises the distinctiveness of the organisation as an identifiable social structure or entity;
- (b) it emphasises the interdependency processes that relate the organisation to its environment;
- (c) it makes it possible, then to treat formal organisations as entities for analysis at their own level.

- (d) it points to the nature of interrelatedness between the organisation and its environment as the key source of information concerning organisational effectiveness.

### 1.5: PROBLEM OF MEASUREMENT OF THE PERFORMANCE OF DEVELOPMENT AGENCIES

That task of evaluating the performance of a public enterprise in a developing country is both gigantic and problematic. First a word on the concept of performance evaluation. The word evaluation is defined by Suchman as

"... making judgement of worths."<sup>23</sup>

Essentially, as depicted in the above definition, evaluation is a value-laden task. This value-ladenness is occasioned by the very nature of making judgements which in more cases than not involves some level of subjectivity. Performance evaluation therefore involves making judgements about the operations and activities of the organisation that is the target of such evaluation.

If performance evaluation is a difficult task,

this is because of/lack of uniform standards of /the measurement. The drought of uniform standards is more experienced by students of public enterprises charged with development policy implementation in the developing countries. For a long time, however, traditional evaluation methods and standards of measurement, nurtured and evolved in the developed countries whose socio-economic and political settings are sometimes, if not totally, different from those in the developing countries, have been used. These traditional evaluation methods thrived purely on economic models such as cost-benefit analysis, profit margin, etc.

Today, doubt has been cast upon the traditional evaluation methods as useful in assessing the performance of development organisations, particularly in the developing countries where new problems of development are being discovered. The emphasis has now shifted from economic growth to income distribution, from production to the satisfaction of human needs, from technology to the development of human resources. Specifically, the traditional models have been found to be partial, dealing with only certain (quantitative) aspects of development. There is therefore a need to adopt

"... a unified approach in which social, political and economic factors are considered within an inter-related systems framework." <sup>24</sup>

Within this new "integrated" approach, the tools for assessing the operation of impact of public programmes are not limited to such models as cost-benefit analysis which are economic-oriented but seek to treat political, social and economic results together as one package.

For this study, the traditional economic standards of measurements are even more inadequate. The "Profitability Margin", for instance, cannot constitute our sole yardstick for measurement because the LBDA was established with objectives that transcend profit-making in mind. Indeed, like other public enterprises, the LBDA's menu of objectives include employment generation, generation of social overhead capital, and sometimes inadvertently, socio-political or socio-economic objectives. G.K. Ikiara also reminds us that

"Generally, public enterprises in Kenya and many other developing countries were established not only for economic reasons but also for some political and social objectives." <sup>25</sup>

The LBDA, for example, has the important role of being a catalyst in development of the region and



in pursuit of this, it engages, as was found in the study, in some projects which are non-directly productive or in other words some of the projects are service oriented and aimed at laying the infrastructural foundation for development in the region.

This is not to say, however, that such models like cost-benefit analysis and profit margin are to be totally discarded. For example, where feasible, we are concerned with how much is spent on a project which is income-generating and how much output is received. The ultimate aim, however, is to demonstrate how these projects affect overall development of the region.

At the project level, the concern of the researcher was with the following questions:

- (a) Has the project met the goals as specified initially.
- (b) Has the project met the expectations of those involved? Of those administering it? Of those impacted by the programme?
- (c) Does the project contain sufficient flexibility to allow it to respond to new information?
- (d) What has been the pattern of distribution of benefits as a result of the project?

- (e) How successful has the programme been in reaching the intended population.
- (f) Who has been active?
- (g) Has the project been able to build on existing organisations and develop their capacities.
- (h) Are the participants planning to continue their involvement?<sup>26</sup>

What is evident in the above catalogue of questions is that, far from concerning itself with only administrative aspects or internal performance of programmes, the evaluation process here concerns itself also with the participatory and equity aspects of the projects. It does not stop at the question, "Did this project accomplish what it set to accomplish?" It goes much further.

#### 1.6: METHODOLOGY OF STUDY

Three methods were employed in this study, namely (a) the survey method, (b) the documentary method and (c) the observation method.

##### 1.6.1: The Survey Method

Questionnaires were administered to certain

respondents as will be shown below. Discussions - both formal and informal were also held with the relevant people, in or outside the organisation considered crucial as sources of information. All in all, the respondents were divided into categories, namely:

(a) Members of the Organisation

The emphasis was on those considered to be in positions which exposed them to the knowledge of the working of the Authority. The following were interviewed: the Managing Director as the chief executive, all the four heads of department and the deputy Managing Director. Open questions were administered to these people and the questionnaire was not standardized. (see appendix ). The interviews with these people were, however, mostly in form of discussions which proved to be richer as sources of information. Some heads were talked to more than once as the researcher sought to clarify some of the findings in the field.

The Authority, according to the organisation chart (see Chapter 3), has 14 divisions - planning and development department 6, Finance Department 3, Personnel and Administration department 3 and the Authority Secretariat 2. Not all divisional heads

were interviewed. Three - two in Authority Secretariat and one in Personnel Department had not been filled. The remaining 9 were interviewed. Non-standardized questionnaires were used, especially because each divisional head had different or unique information to give; particularly those heading the technical or line divisions.

Project leaders were also interviewed. For them there was a standardized questionnaire (see Appendix IV). These were actually project leaders at project sites. Discussions were also held with some employees at various project sites. Informal discussions with other employees also took place.

(b) Government Officers

These included officers at the Central Government headquarters at Nairobi with whom discussions were held regarding the LBDA within the national development framework, officers working for ministries at the district or provincial levels.

In the case of officers at the Central Government, the following were interviewed: one senior officer at the Treasury concerned with budget allocations and also

by virtue of having participated in the ground work preparations that led to the establishment of the LBDA (indeed, he represented his ministry at the LBDA Board Meetings for some time), one senior officer at the inspectorate of Statutory Boards concerned with matters pertaining to the LBDA, three senior officers at the Ministry of Energy and Regional Development, (the LBDA's parent ministry) whose offices dealt with matters pertaining to the LBDA, a senior officer at the Ministry of Health by virtue of his having represented his ministry at the LBDA Board Meetings and a senior officer at the Ministry of Agriculture.

At the regional level, only officers operating within the Authority's Development area - Nyanza and Western - were chosen for interviews. Discussions were held with the two provincial planning officers for Nyanza and Western. A standardised questionnaire was administered to six of the seven District Development Officers (D.D.O.'s) in the "development area". The seventh could not be reached by the researcher because of transport problems. A structured standardised questionnaire was administered to some district heads of departments chosen according to "function" - there was a bias towards development oriented departments - Agriculture, Fisheries, Livestock, Water, Health, etc.

(c) Project Clients

The clients of various projects were also interviewed. The clients were randomly chosen. For example, in the case of the shallow wells project, the clients were visited when they were drawing water and then they would be talked to both as a group and as individuals. Well Committee officials were singled out for in-depth discussions. In the case of some projects, special informants were chosen and these were chosen according to status in society and the degree of involvement with the projects and project clients.

(d) Other Respondents

Other respondents included heads of other institutions involved in the development of the area. They were chosen according to the functions of their institutions. The same standardised questionnaire administered to district heads were used here.

A number of ex-members of staff were also interviewed. Interviews were in form of open discussions. In total, three top and five junior ex-officers of the Authority were discussed with.

Local leaders where the LBDA had initiated

projects were also talked to. These included chiefs, and other opinion leaders.

#### 1.6.2: The Documentary Research Method

The significance of documents as sources of data in this type of research cannot be overemphasised. While some documents provided guidelines for what to look for in the field or what to ask respondents, some were useful in counter-checking the raw data collected from the field survey. Some were in themselves sources of data that were used in writing the thesis.

Among the documents perused were the Authority's Act which defined the role, powers and composition of the Authority, project plans and evaluation reports, feasibility studies' reports, the long-term and short-term plans of the Authority, project progress reports and other relevant documents that could be found at the Authority's headquarters in Kisumu.

The District Development Committee Meetings' minutes since the LBDA became a member of all the DDC's in its area of jurisdiction were also perused. They were useful in the area of functional differentiation between the LBDA and other institutions

operating within the Districts. They were also useful in the overall assessment of the working of the LBDA.

At the headquarters of the parent ministry of the LBDA (Ministry of Energy and Regional Development) documents that contained valuable information were perused. These included correspondences between LBDA and its parent ministry, between the Ministry and other organisations on matters pertaining to the LBDA.

### 1.6.3: The Observation Method

The greatest virtue of the observation method in any research project is that it gives one the chance to verify what one has heard or read about a particular situation. In pursuit of this, an on-the-spot observation technique was employed. Actual visits to project sites were made and sometimes the researcher had to stay overnight in certain project sites. Through observation, the researcher was able to make his own assessment of the situation, for example, the performance of the projects.

Participant observation was also used in some cases. For example, I attended some D.D.C meetings where LBDA was a topic for discussion - In the case



of the shallow wells project, for example, I participated in well committee meetings and helped draw water from the wells for the clients.

#### 1.6.4: Research Problems and Limitations

"To assess someone's performance is, potentially, threatening".<sup>27</sup>

The above quotation is attributed to a scholar writing on the "Performance Appraisal in the public sector". It summarises the chief problems that a study and research exercise like the one we are engaged in has to meet. To venture into the exercise of performance appraisal needs utmost care for the ones whose performance is being assessed automatically take a defensive position. Particularly this research project, carried out at a time when public enterprises were under severe attack by all sections of the society - press, public and government circles - for their dismal performance (some calling for the disbandment of some!) could not expect a smooth sailing. Indeed, the LBDA had just taken in a sizeable dose of this criticism. The end result was that there was too much sensitivity, especially on the part of the Authority members. The problems that accrued from this "sensitivity" are obvious: Unwillingness to give information, lack of

reliability and authenticity of information given and unwillingness to allow access to vital documents. I had to do a lot of cross-checking of information given. In the case of documents, extremely dangerous caution was exercised both at the parent ministry and the LBDA headquarters. At the Authority, the tendency was to regard almost all documents I requested for as confidential. I had to do a lot of lobbying to get even the ones that I got. Admittedly, therefore, I cannot claim to have exhausted all the documents that may have been critically relevant to this study. Indeed, even the decision to allow me conduct research on the Authority, despite my having been cleared by the Office of the President, was taken reluctantly by the Authority officers.

Also, due to the problems cited above, my methodology had to change in some instance. Due to the extra emphasis placed in confidentiality, I had to discard a questionnaire I had prepared for the members of the Authority after a pre-survey testing exercise revealed a high degree of poor response. I therefore resorted to asking open-ended questions and discussions.

Another problem encountered relates to projects. As has been demonstrated elsewhere in the Thesis, the Authority had just taken off. Some projects were not

yet complete, others were on-going, although they had begun serving clients, while most were still on the drawing board. There was therefore some general lack of output figures for some projects. However, implementation is an on-going process and no study can claim to cover all the necessary out-put figures. The lack of out-put figures can also not invalidate the study because, as has been hinted elsewhere, figures alone are not indices of performance measurement. The point, however, is that in projects where the impact could be assessed easily only in terms of figures (monetary) lack of out-put figures presents a problem.

## 1.7: BACKGROUND TO THE LAKE BASIN DEVELOPMENT

### AUTHORITY:

#### 1.7.1: Origins of LBDA

On 16th December, 1978, at a public rally in Kisumu, President Daniel Arap Moi of Kenya announced the government's intention to establish a Lake Basin Development Authority to spearhead development in the Lake (Victoria) region. He directed the Minister for Economic Planning and Community Affairs and the Vice-President who was also in charge of Finance, to start preparing the groundwork for the establishment of the Authority. Events moved so fast from this date

and in less than six months a Bill had been drafted and tabled in Parliament seeking to establish the Authority in pursuit of the presidential directive. The Act establishing the "Lake Basin Development Authority" was finally gazetted in the official Kenya Gazette on 31st August, 1979, having been promulgated by Parliament and signed by President Moi on 22nd August, 1979. The LBDA thus was born and became operational on 31st August, 1979. The objective of the Authority, according to the Act, was

"... to plan and coordinate the implementation of the development projects in the Lake Victoria catchment area and for matters connected thereto." 28

The Authority is headquartered in Kisumu, the Lake Port which also serves as the headquarters of Nyanza Province.

Although the LBDA was brought into being by an Act of Parliament it needs to be pointed out that it owes its origins not to the legislators but to the President. Before the presidential pronouncement on 16th December, 1978 nobody had anticipated its creation, at least at that particular time. That the pronouncement was a surprise can be evidenced by the wild ululations and cheers of excitement and joy that greeted the

President's directive at the Kisumu rally.

For the purposes of this study, the timing and place of the presidential announcement are crucial. It will be recalled that the President made the directive during a meet-the-people tour of Western Kenya immediately after taking over the reins of leadership following the death of his predecessor, the late Jomo Kenyatta some four months back. For the people of Nyanza province in whose headquarters (Kisumu) the pronouncement was made, the President's visit was important and historic for one particular reason, namely that this was the first time in almost ten years that they had had a President visit them. The last time they had hosted a President of the Republic was in late 1969 when the late Kenyatta <sup>a</sup> had gone to officially open the New Nyanza General Hospital in Kisumu. This presidential visit, however, turned sour as trouble ensued after a confrontation between the then Kenya Peoples Union (K.P.U.) - the now banned opposition party's supporters and the President. The President never returned to Nyanza <sup>befor</sup> before his death. Thereafter, there developed some strong feeling among the Nyanza people that their province was being neglected developmentwise by the government in punishment for the alleged "rebellious" attitude of the people of Nyanza epitomised by the inglorious Kisumu episode.

Seen against the foregoing, the presidential visit and pronouncement regarding the formation of the LBDA could only be viewed partly as a demonstration on his part that he was determined to remove the political stigma that had bottlenecked development efforts in Nyanza for long. As Oyugi notes, it was the desire of the new President that

"... a presidential visit should be seen in a new perspective".<sup>29</sup>

The above viewpoint is supported by the editor of a Kenyan "daily" who, two days after the pronouncement commented that the President's visit to Nyanza and Western Kenya

"... proved he was determined to wipe out petty differences from the face of Kenya and bring about development in all parts regardless of past political disagreements."<sup>30</sup>

It is also instructive to note that during the protracted meet-the-people tour of which the Nyanza visit was part, it was the President's practice to offer "gifts" - mostly directives aimed at the development of the areas he visited. For the people of Nyanza, the LBDA was therefore <sup>a</sup> a presidential gift.<sup>31</sup>

The point of emphasis is that the LBDA owes its origins to a presidential pronouncement and is,

in all ways, a child of the President himself. This is further evident in speeches made by either the top officers of the Authority or other public figures in which tribute always paid to the President for having established the Authority. What one is saying is that while it may be true that the idea of creating the Authority may have been quietly nurtured and entertained by some government officials and economists way back before 1978, it took a presidential pronouncement to bring it into being. Indeed, even the debates in Parliament, the consultative meetings that might have taken place between various government departments, and any other activity which may have preceded its official establishment in August 1979 were all in pursuit of the presidential pronouncement.

1.7.2: THE "SLEEPING GIANT" - THE LAKE BASIN AREA:  
ITS POTENTIALS AND PROBLEMS

Definition of the Area

The jurisdictional area of the LBDA is defined by its Act as "the Lake Victoria Catchment Area". Evidently, therefore, like similar ventures like the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) of the United States, the Gal-Oya Development Board of Ceylon, and the Multi-state Mekong Basin Development

# LAKE BASIN DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY AREA

FIG. 2 :



SOURCE: LBDA Development Plan, 1983-1988, p.9.



Committee of South Asia, the LBDA's area of jurisdiction is defined within a "water-basin" or "water-shed" framework which encompasses the water entity with all its feeders or drainers (rivers) and all lands drained by it. In the case of the LBDA, the "water-entity" or "common terminus" is the Lake Victoria itself. Its drainage or feeder system comprises six rivers, namely, the Kuja, and Sondu/Miriu, the Nyando, the Nzoia, the Yala and the Sio. (see Figure 2). The idea behind including the whole catchment area in the definition of a water-basin Authority area is that it allows a comprehensive, rather than a piece-meal treatment of the whole resource-base and its problems.

Politically and administratively, the area cuts across the boundaries of three provinces, namely, Nyanza, Western and (parts of) Rift Valley. The area, therefore, comprises all the three districts of Western Province (Bungoma, Busia and Kakamega), all the four districts of Nyanza (Siaya, Kisumu, Kisii and South Nyanza) and eight districts of Rift Valley (Kericho, Nandi, TransNzoia, Uasin Gishu, West Pokot, Elgeyo Marakwet, Nakuru and Narok). Ethnically, four major tribes fall within the Authority's Area of Jurisdiction. These are the LUO who occupy the largest part of Nyanza, the Luhya who occupy all the three districts of Western Province and some parts of Rift Valley, the

Kalenjin in the Rift Valley, and the Kisii in the Kisii district of Nyanza.

The total area of the Lake Basin region as per the water-catchment definition given by the Act is 47,709 square kilometres exclusive of the Kenya part of Lake Victoria which itself covers an area of 4,000 square kilometres. In total, the whole catchment area covers some 8% of Kenya's land area. The population that resides in the region comprises some 42% of the total national population and the area is relatively densely populated with a district such as Kakamega with an area of 3,520 sq.km. hosting 1,030,887 people with an average of 450 people per square kilometre. Some of the districts also boast of high population growth rates with Kisii scoring as high as 3.8%, the highest in the country.

The Act, however, makes a distinction between the general catchment area and what it calls the "Development Area". The latter comprises only Nyanza and Western provinces (a total area of 20,758 sq.km.). It is within the "Development Area" that the Authority is supposed to concentrate its development programmes. Obviously, the development area falls short of the entire catchment area by over half (a total of 26,960 sq.km. is excluded). Although according to the compre-

hensive approach to the basin development this may look problematic, it appears that the Act in delimiting the "Development Area" is aiming at administrative and managerial convenience. It would appear that to charge the Authority with the task of developing the whole catchment area would be too ideal given the scarcity of resources and insufficient administrative capacities, among other factors, which characterise Kenya's development process like in other developing countries. Lilienthal, noting that there had been calls for the inclusion of some areas such as the adjoining River Cumberland basin in the TVA programme, shares this view when he argues that enlarging the TVA's territorial scope might

"... impair rather than increase its effectiveness".<sup>32</sup>

It is noteworthy that this study restricts itself to the Authority's development programme in the "Development Area" for the obvious reason that the Authority's projects are concentrated therein. Cognizance is taken, however, of the fact that the Authority is carrying out some projects outside the development area.

#### The Area's Potential and Problems

As was hinted previously in this chapter, the

Lake Basin region contains a lot of potential resource endowments. A brief examination of these resources will go a long way to demonstrate the potentiality of the area and the role the LBDA can play in their exploitation for the betterment of the region.

Water is the major resource item. It has been noted elsewhere that there exist a lake (Victoria), which is the largest freshwater lake in Africa and six major rivers. The promise of development held by the water resources cannot be overemphasised. Experience elsewhere is replete with evidence that adequate and proper management and exploitation of such a huge repository of water could mean great strides in development in areas such as hydropower generation, rural electrification, irrigation, fishery, water transport, tourism, urban and rural water supply, and even recreation. However, the experience in the Lake Basin with regard to the management of water resources has been very disappointing. Many residents of the Lake Basin have for a long time been haunted by lack of or insufficient supply of clean water for domestic use. The hydro-electric power potential created by the numerous gorges and waterfalls on most of the rivers had been left idle and untapped. To the contrary, the water system itself has been causing havoc to the people in the form of floods which have continued to

disrupt the socio-economic life of the residents of the region from time to time. Far-reaching measures were therefore long overdue to exploit the water potential and control the floods and turn them into profitable use.

The Lake Basin lies at an altitude of between 900 and 1800 metres above sea level and it boasts of hot weather for most of the year with temperatures oscillating between  $27^{\circ}\text{C}$  in the hottest month (January) and  $18^{\circ}\text{C}$  in the coldest month (July). Rainfall is generally reliable with an annual mean of between 178 millimetres in the higher ground and 760 mm. on the lowland. It is also bounded by Mount Elgon, the Charangani Hills, the Western Mau and the Loita Hills. The region has a variety of soils. The highland region contains fertile volcanic soils. As one moves down one encounters sandy, sandy loam, clay loam, lateric and peaty soils. The climate and soils found in the region favours agriculture. The soils can support the production of a variety of crops both for cash and food. Thus tea, coffee, sugarcane, maize, sorghum, rice, cotton, horticultural crops, among other, would do well in different parts of the region. However, one major problem has been soil erosion which results from floods, improper cultivation and grazing practices which result in nutrient depletion.

The region is also known to have a significant mineral resource-base which consists of mettalic ores such as gold, iron ores and copper, base metals such as silver, arsenic, iron sulphide, etc. Non-metallic ores such as soapstone, building stones and brick clays and graphite also exist. These are just but a few of the many minerals that are found in the region. The exploitation of this resource-base would no doubt lead to the establishment of a strong industrial base in the region. For example, a cement factory can thrive in the area with supplies of limestone from Koru, Songhor and other areas. A glass factory could thrive on the iron stones while the iron sulphide could feed a sulphuric acid processing plant.

Another resource that is provided by the water system is fish. Although the lake itself is a major source of fish, the rivers too have a great fish potential. It has been estimated that the potential maximum sustainable annual yield from the Kenya waters of the lake (some 3,755 sq.km. or 10% of the total surface area) stands at 30,000 tonnes of fish.<sup>33</sup> Apart from the lake and riverine fish, the potential also exists for fish-farming, which with adequate extension service to fish-farmers, would augment the "catch-fish".

The region also holds substantial promise for

recreation and tourism. Its forest could be used as animal parks and for wildlife conservation to attract tourists. Sporting activities could go on in the lake waters.

The other notable resource-base is the region's population. It is noteworthy that the region produces some of the most qualified and skilled manpower that fills the industrial and government service in the country. However, the population resource has serious impediments whose elimination is a must if it is to be made instrumental in the region's development. One such impediment is population pressure eventuated by the high population growth rate and high population densities with some districts like Kakamega and Kisii exhibiting population densities as high as 262 per sq.km. and 338 per sq.km. respectively.<sup>34</sup> Man-land ratio is becoming an alarming policy issue. Population distribution is also anything but uniform with some places relatively sparsely populated due to reasons ranging from persistent flooding, especially in the lowlands, to tse-tse fly infestation. The population resource is also "sick" and this may render it unexploitable for development purposes. Human diseases such as sleeping sickness, cholera, malaria, bilharzia, etc. are common. It is sad that the region also boasts of an extremely high infant mortality rate which

averages about 175 per 1,000, comparing unfavourably with the national average of 125.<sup>35</sup>

All said, the Lake Basin is abound in plenty of resources that only cry for tapping. However, inspite of the development potential therein, the area is seriously underdeveloped and, as mentioned earlier, is one of the least developed areas in the country. Overall, it boasts of very little that could be termed sustained development. The low level of employment in the region is a testimony of lack of sustained development. Measured against the staggering number of people in the region, employment opportunities are too few. The per capita income of the two leading provinces, Western and Nyanza, has remained at its lowest with negligible increase over the years. These two provinces together account for 60.5% of Kenya's total poor.<sup>36</sup> With the per capita income in the lake region standing at KShs. 1,200 per year - way below the national average of KShs. 3,500. Most people cannot meet their basic needs and if the development level is not raised, the situation is bound to be even gloomier. What one is saying is that the potential exists and the task of the LBDA is therefore to turn this great potential into tangible results for the benefit of the people of the region.



CHAPTER TWO2.0. REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITIES IN PERSPECTIVE2.1: THE CONCEPT OF REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT

The concept "Regional Development", which has in the recent past permeated the literature on the development of developing countries, derives its importance from the realm of regional economics. Featuring prominently in public speeches by third world leaders, and in policy statements and declarations, the concept represents an attempt to tackle national development problems from a regional angle as opposed to the "wholistic" strategy which emphasises the whole nation as the development unit. The regional approach to development has gained ground increasingly because it has been realized that national development would be greatly accelerated if resources were identified and exploited on the regional basis. The argument is that resource endowments in a given country are often not evenly distributed. Some regions contain distinct and unique resources which if exploited within the regional framework would make a more impressive impact on national development than if they were developed from the national perspective of planning and implementation. As Hoover notes, the concept of Regional Development attempts to

to answer the question.

"...What is where and why  
and so what?"<sup>1</sup>

for the benefit of national development process.

The emergence of the concept of Regional Development has forced into the development process the concept of "Regional Development Policy", which would therefore be seen as part and parcel of the whole range of measures employed by government to manipulate the level and rate of growth of the economy by means of influencing efficient and effective exploitation of resources within a regional framework. Implicitly, therefore Regional Development Policy is not an alternative to "National Development Policy" but is part and parcel of it. It is noteworthy, nonetheless, that it is possible to find situations where regional development policies run counter to national ones. This means that the national government has the task of integrating regional development policies into the national ones. This can effectively be done by incorporating regional plans into national plans and vice-versa. Under perfect situations, therefore, regional development efforts will be seen as merely facilitating national development by bringing into play additional resources - resources that are exploited in the region in question. It is to be noted, however, that to integrate regional policies into national ones so that they smoothly

intersect is not an easy task. It requires a strong political will on the part of the national government to coordinate planning efforts and to ensure that all regional plans get fitted into a coherent national development plan. All said, regional development must be organized more firmly on a national basis so that the compatibility of a certain rate or form of development in one region with that in the economy as a whole may be known and assessed.

## 2.2: WHAT CONSTITUTES A REGION?

The word "Region" can be defined in as many perspectives as it can be used. It can be defined politically or economically or in both terms simultaneously depending on for what purpose it is being defined.

As varied as its definitions are, essential in the concept of "Region" is the geographical dimension. Generally, any mention of the word "region" reminds one of some geographical entity. Essentially, therefore, a region is a distinct objective reality covering some definite space within the universe. However, this geographical (or spatial) definition is too simple and ambiguous because just as a village can constitute a region, a group of nations too can constitute a region.

The way out of this ambiguity is, therefore, for one to manipulate the definition in accordance with one's objective of inquiry. Hence, the delimitation of a region varies with the purpose of one's study.

Chand and Puri have identified three methodological categories of delimiting a region, namely, homogeneity; nodality; and programming.<sup>2</sup> The first category delimits regions in accordance with some combination of physical, economic, social or other characteristics. The second stresses nodality or polarisation, usually around some central urban place. The third, programming, is policy-oriented and is concerned mainly with administrative coherence or identity between the area being studied and available political institutions for effectuating policy decisions. They say, however, that the three are not mutually exclusive.

For the purpose of Regional Development, which is the concern of this study, there are agreed prerequisites for delimiting a region within which comprehensive and meaningful planning and development programmes can be carried out. One of these is size. The region, it is argued, should be neither too large nor too small. Too large a region engenders administrative and managerial problems. Yet it has to be big enough

to necessitate exploitation of resources and to avoid duplication ( by way of partially used capacity in neighbouring regions). All in all, the size should be administratively convenient and, since regional development demands comprehensiveness in treatment of problems, it has to be small enough for planning problems to be viewed in toto.

The region should also exhibit some homogeneity with regard to topographical, economic, and even socio-cultural factors. Homogeneity engenders common problems which make the region some sort of a special problem area. In essence, this defines the region as a separate unit for research and other development purposes. Geographically, homogeneity would entail that the region is a contiguous unit bound by an interlocking web of related features, for example, a Lake Basin area. The stress on homogeneity does not, however, mean that internal differentiation within the region is not taken cognizance of. It is a statement of the obvious that variations in climate, topography, population distribution, resource-endowments exist even within very small regions. For the purposes of this study, the region, that is, the Lake Basin region, is defined by the homogeneity bequeathed by its natural resource characteristics, namely, water-basin resources. (See Chapter 1).

### 2.3: ORIGIN OF CONCERN WITH REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT

A close look at various development plans and documents in developing countries reveals considerable concern with the question of regional development represented by measures aimed at reducing the regional imbalances that exist in these countries with heavy concentration of development in certain regions and lack of adequate impetus for development in others. It has been sadly noted that some of the neglected regions contain resources that would, subject to optimal exploitation, make substantial positive contribution to the development of not only the particular regions but of the nation as a whole.

More specifically, the concern with regional development and the attendant upsurge of regional development policies has its origins in two factors: the economic and socio-political. The economic factor has to do with dissatisfaction with the performance or the national economies as far as the distributional aspects are concerned. Regional inequalities and persistent distortions and internal inconsistencies in the national economies have been noticed. Even in countries where good aggregate performance of the economy has been realised, this has been accompanied by growing inequalities among people and regions. In her study of Kenya, Arne Bigsten (1978) notes:

"Growth has in most cases been concentrated to the small modern sector and to certain regions, while the majority of the population has been left on a very low standard of living, in other words, the distribution of income has become more unequal."<sup>3</sup>

After a comprehensive study of Kenya, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) Mission to Kenya (1972) eschews the dismal attention given to the distributional aspect of development strategies by Kenyan authorities and, observing that there are large disparities in income among people and regions, stresses that to be able to reach the target groups, planning and policies must be more disaggregated than what had been the case before. The economic ministers of African States, too, in a resolution 218 (x) entitled "Africa's Strategy for Development in the 1970's"<sup>4</sup> underscored the importance of the locational and regional aspects of economic development in African states' development strategies. All said, what is emphasised is that national development cannot be meaningful and sustained when certain regions/stagnant; all regions of the country have to remain be integrated into the process of development.

The urgency with which regional development policies are today treated by policymakers in the developing countries has arisen, in part from the realisation that the "Growth Pole" approach adopted

earlier has failed to bring the expected results. Imported from the developed countries, this approach advocates concentration of development efforts and resources in selected areas called "Centres of Growth" (or poles) with the hope that the benefits and effects of development in the so-called centres would spread or "trickle down" to the "peripheral" areas. However, the experience with this approach has been disappointing. In fact, it has perpetuated the economic problems even more. The so-called "spread effects" have not been effective in staving off problems like rural-urban migration, rural unemployment and inter-regional disparities in general. Instead, the national economy has been polarised into a few pockets of "developing areas" (mainly urban centres) and numerous "stagnating areas" (mainly non-urban areas). As Fu-Chenlo and Kamal Salih say:

"Development poles, where they exist, have become an enclave without pole-periphery linkages or merely distort the pattern of regional development in an underdeveloped economy, and have led ... to the stagnation of the rural sector."<sup>5</sup>

In the case of Kenya, both in the colonial and immediate post-colonial periods, the above approach was employed. In the colonial period, development concentrated in the so-called "scheduled Areas" or the "White Highlands" where the white settlers carried out agricul-



rural activities. Infrastructural development was also concentrated here. The other areas, the so-called "African Reserves", were regarded merely as labour reserves. By the time Kenya got independence in 1963, the colonial policy of systematic discrimination in favour of the "Scheduled Areas" had established and perpetuated large inequalities among regions and groups of people in Kenya. The post-colonial government, therefore, inherited a lopsided economy consisting of relatively developed areas in Central and Rift Valley provinces and a few urban areas elsewhere on the one hand, and many underdeveloped, impoverished regions with a mainly subsistence production economies and poor infrastructure on the other.

After independence, Kenya's policy-makers and planners, despite a few cosmetic changes here and there, continued to pursue the same path of development.<sup>6</sup> Development efforts and resources were concentrated in areas that at the time of independence were already relatively developed. The 1972 ILO Mission Report referred to earlier in this chapter confirmed this. The situation was such that as late as 1976, glaring regional inequalities formed a significant impediment in Kenya's economic development. (See the Table below on regional inequalities in income per capita).

Table 1: PER CAPITA INCOME BY PROVINCE  
(In KSh p.a.)

Province	1967	1971	1976
Nairobi	281	338	540
Central	34	42	96
Coast	58	76	123
Eastern	20	24	52
North-Eastern	13	16	18
Nyanza	23	25	44
Rift Valley	34	40	73
Western	14	16	33
Total-Whole Country	40	49	90

Source: Bigsten A., Regional Inequality and Development: A Case Study of Kenya, Lindome, 1978, Table XI.13.

As can be deciphered from the above table, Nyanza and Western provinces, the "development area" of the IDDA, are among the provinces with the least average incomes. A closer observation also reveals that between 1967 and 1971, the two provinces recorded the least percentage increase in income per capita. Even the North-Eastern performed better despite the fact that, relatively, the province has less known resources than any of the two provinces, that is, Nyanza and Western. For a large part of the post-independence period, Kenya followed, therefore, to be following the dictum "Growth now - Regional Equity later".<sup>7</sup> Growth had to be maximised

at all costs.<sup>8</sup> Unfortunately, the distributional consequences of the growth pattern were not taken cognizance of, hence regional imbalances. Thus, Kenya, like other most developing countries, fell victim to the "Growth Pole" approach.

However, it has to be pointed out that despite the apparent lack of concerted efforts to wipe out the inequalities from the face of Kenya's economy, the government, in its official policy documents reiterated every now and then its avowed aim of redressing regional (and sectoral) imbalances in the economy and an attack on extreme imbalances and disparities is set forth as a policy objective. Nevertheless, the objective remained on paper for a long time. It was not until the 1970-1974 plan was produced that it became apparent that the government had realised that other areas of the country, mainly the rural areas were experiencing only small improvements. The plan therefore emphasised the concept of Rural Development but not with a direct aim of redressing regional imbalances - it was rather concerned with how to combat the increasing urban-rural imbalance and therefore reduce rural to urban migration.<sup>9</sup> The boldest policy statement on the issue of regional imbalances came with the 1979 KANU MANIFESTO in which the government stated clearly that it would henceforth take as its chief policy objective "a more balanced regional development", promising increased attention to

policies that would bring about a more equitable distribution of income.

The political origins of regional development policy are more obvious as in the developing countries, the concept "regional development" itself evokes a lot of politics.' This is partly due to the plural, multi-ethnic nature of most of these countries which engenders the problems of national disintegration and instability. Regional inequalities in such circumstances pose political problems. This is, however, not restricted to developing countries, The political "North-South" problems, as it has been called by others, has been experienced even in developed states like the United States of America, France and Italy. In particular, the riots by blacks in the United States of America in the late 60's were as a result of the feeling of neglect by the blacks who felt that their region was being ignored developmentwise.

In the developing countries, especially in Africa, where interregional conflicts easily take tribal dimensions due to the fact that regional boundaries normally coincide with tribal divides, if regional inequalities in terms of income and resource distribution are left unredressed, the consequences can even be more disruptive, threatening the socio-political stability of the fragile societies as continued neglect of some (or backward)

regions will enhance discontent. Hence, in an apparent move to eliminate chances and prospects for regional "agitation", policies have been deliberately enacted in these countries to redress adverse regional disparities which

"...contain seeds of tension, bitterness and dissatisfaction and are potentially expensive."<sup>10</sup>

It should also be added that in the newly independent countries, regional disparity is even more political in its sources as in most cases the colonial regimes deliberately neglected some areas. At the time of independence it was important that the new "indigenous" government commit itself to a stated policy of incorporating these "neglected" areas into the national development stream if it hoped to elicit support from the inhabitants of such areas and for the sake of unity.

#### 2.4: REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT AS A STRATEGY FOR DECENTRALIZATION:

The concept "decentralization" is part and parcel of the lexicon used in most literature on development. In its common perspective, it is "...an antidote for remote control"<sup>11</sup> and in development administration,

it is used to mean the dispersion and devolution of power and authority from the center to the field where development activities take place. Simply, it is the opposite of "centralization" whose results (of remote and absentee control) it seeks to undermine.<sup>12</sup> The need to "decentralise" development planning and administration is a theme that recurs not only in conferences but also in policy statements and plans in developing countries. The major advantages of "decentralisation" are given as follows: (a) it aids the accurate identification of problems and of practical ways of solving them because those on the spot have a more intimate local knowledge than central planners can aspire to; (b) it helps in coordinating, at regional and local level, the sectoral activities of national departments operating in the region and regional and local departments, and (c) it is a means of overcoming the red-tape and highly structured procedures of the central government administrative system which inhibit innovation, flexibility, and coordination in the development process.<sup>13</sup>

Regional Development Policy, by focusing on a part less than the whole nation, offers an excellent opportunity for decentralization of government functions maximising the fruits of such decentralization. As Lilienthal says,

"You cannot, of course, decentralise the functions of the (federal) government if the whole nation is the operating unit for the carrying out of national powers. Obviously, some smaller area than the whole country must be used."<sup>14</sup>

For Lilienthal, this is one of the main reasons for the establishment of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) which is the subject of his study.

In as much as the virtues of decentralisation have been emphasised, the actual operationalisation of the concept in actual development planning and implementation in the developing countries, in particular, has left a lot to be desired. Strong centralist tendencies have continued to be courted in the development process despite the so-called attempts to decentralise development planning and implementation. In particular, there has been reluctance in delegating genuine authority and power in the areas of decision-making and implementation to the local levels. Bigsten<sup>15</sup> blames the dismal performance of the rural industrialisation policy in Kenya partly on the unwillingness of the central government to part with real power and authority.

Regional Development, however, requires genuine transferring of greater responsibilities for development planning and administration from the capital of the

country to the Regional Authorities or organisations charged with overseeing the implementation of regional development policies. In other words, decentralization, in terms of regional development takes the form of "areal" decentralization which aims at transferring responsibility for public functions to organisations within well defined sub-national spatial or political boundaries - a province, district, or a geographical region such as a river basin. In this form of decentralization, an institution is established to operate within a specified region and to it authority to perform development functions is delegated. However, the pattern and limit of this delegation varies with the nature and purpose of the regional institution. If it is only a liaison agency, it would definitely not require authority and power, for example, to commit large funds on implementation of projects. On the other hand, a regional institution which is given not only liaison but also executive roles in development needs a greater amount of autonomy in choosing methods of operation and spending funds on projects it deems fit for the region.

The issue of decentralization as far as regional development is concerned engenders another important concept - autonomy. The existing literature on Regional Development Authorities or organisations devote plenty of space to the issue of autonomy. It is argued that



In order for a public agency, like the RDA to implement projects effectively and efficiently, it has to be granted a high degree of independence, particularly in the two spheres of planning and implementation. The scholars who have studied the TVA attribute its success partly to the high level of autonomy it enjoys from the federal government.<sup>16</sup> Dean E. Mellenry, J.R., after studying the fallen Nigeria's Cross River State Agricultural Development Corporation (ADC) concludes that most parastatals in Africa perform poorly due to too much government control.<sup>17</sup>

However, it is agreed by nearly all the scholars that decentralization should not mean lack of government or central control. The need for central government's control of say a Regional Development Authority arises because of two main reasons, namely, (a) the activities of the Authority must be integrated into the wider national development policies and, (b) it is the central government that provides the Authority with the funds it needs for its functions and as is always said, "he who pays the piper calls the tune". Experience with some parastatals has shown that lack of effective control by the center results in cases of reckless discretion and mismanagement. In the same vein, it is argued that too much control may throttle an agency's activities and create a dangerous dependence complex-situation. In order to strike a balance between autonomy and control,

it is necessary to:

"...establish the nature of control and autonomy that is desirable and feasible." 18

All said, the point of emphasis is that in order for regional Development Policy to be meaningfully implemented, institutions charged with its implementation ought to be delegated the authority and power from the center.

One other virtue of decentralisation which regional development policy seeks to maximise is local or popular participation. The literature on development administration lay emphasis on the fact that

"...implementation is not an automatic process that follows the elaboration of grand designs." 19

and note that the practice of development administration could be enriched and made more meaningful by

"...incorporating village-held knowledge into project designs and evaluations". 20

The concept of popular participation is inextricably linked with that of decentralisation. In terms of regional development, decentralising power and authority in the spheres of decision-making and policy

implementation to the regional level essentially means taking power and authority nearer to the people. The people, whose standards of living any development strategy seeks (or should seek) to raise are given a chance to take responsible decisions regarding their own future. Seen in this perspective, popular participation has been seen by most scholars as a means of ensuring "grassroots democracy"<sup>21</sup> in the process of development. Emphasising how the TVA was an embodiment of popular participation as a means of the democratization process, Lilienthal says:

"...I find it impossible to comprehend how democracy can be a living reality if people are remote from their government and in their daily lives are not made part of it, or if the control and direction of making a living—industry, farming, distribution of goods—is too far removed from the stream of life and from the local community."<sup>22</sup>

The literature on development administration agree on three broad advantages that local participation carry for the benefit of development planning and implementation. M.C. Bwalya<sup>23</sup> summarises these as follows:

- (1) it increases the quality and relevance of decisions since these are made with the specific needs of the locality in mind,

- (ii) it increases chances of success and of local mobilization since the local people are (or will tend to be) committed to their own decisions and see the activities deriving from such decisions as beneficial to themselves, and
- (iii) these in turn, will tend to motivate a sense of self-reliance and a wider and more efficient use of local resources.

In relation to Regional Development Policy, popular participation is both a sine qua non and a consequence of regional development policy. For while the policy's success rests largely upon the active participation by the local people in development programmes, regional development efforts offer an opportunity for such participation. Hence, institutions such as Regional Development Authorities play the role of ensuring local participation in the development process - they act as vehicles of decentralisation and by this they institutionalise popular participation. In sum, they reduce

"...the distance to the government by involving people in considerations that have immediate consequences for them." 24

## 2.5: THE ROLE OF REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITIES

It is against the foregoing background that we now wish to discuss below the role of the Regional Development Authorities as Regional policy instruments. It needs to be pointed out, however, that our conception of the Regional Authorities here is limited to the "Multipurpose River or Lake Basin Schemes" or "Water-Catchment Authorities". These are Authorities established to accelerate development in a region whose definition and delimitation are occasioned by a water-basin-river or lake catchments.

One of the first modern RDAs of this type to be established was the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), established by the Federal Government of the U.S.A. in 1933. Its broad objective, to use the words of one of its sponsors, the then U.S. President Roosevelt, was to:

"...plan for proper use, conservation and development of natural resources of the Tennessee River Drainage Basin and its adjoining territory for the general social and economic welfare of the nation..."<sup>25</sup>.

The TVA became the prototype of RDAs which emerged elsewhere in like situations all over the world. Examples include the Gal-oya Development Board in Ceylon, the Mekong Basin Development Committee in South Asia, the

Senegal Basin Development Authority in West Africa, Kenya's Tana and Athi Rivers Development Authority (TARDA), Kerio Valley Development Authority (KVDA) and now, the Lake Basin Development Authority (LBDA), the focus of our study.

However, it would be too much of a generalisation to equate the TVA with other like Authorities. This is not only because the former operates in a different socio-economic and political environment but also because, despite the commonality in the general objective, the immediate objectives of establishing them may differ from country to country. Variations in environments and immediate objectives granted the common impetus for the establishment of such Authorities derive from the general belief that,

"...the conspicuously under-used natural resources-water in this case- can be advantageously exploited with the application of new technology to provide substantial benefits in a multi-dimensional field."<sup>26</sup>

Underlying this general objective, however, are some specific reasons why such Authorities are considered necessary in water - catchment areas.

The need for a comprehensive and integrated development approach to the development of water-basin

resources has often defined the raison d'être of such Authorities. It is argued that in the area of planning instance, maximum returns can be assured only if a comprehensive and integrated planning approach, encompassing all major aspects of the regional economy and development activities with multiple aims of "... forstating .. different aspects or progress".<sup>27</sup>

The comprehensive and integrated approach is justified on the basis of the "unity of the water system" and the interrelationship of the basin's resources. As Lilienthal notes in his study of the TVA, the resources of the water basin are

"...not only to be envisioned in their entirety; they (are) to be developed in that unity with which nature herself regards her resources - the waters, the land, and the forests together, a "seamless web" - just as Maitland saw "the unity of all history" of which one strand cannot be touched without affecting every other strand for good or ill."<sup>28</sup>

As can be inferred from Lilienthal's assertion above, a water-basin area has to be treated as a single unit. The impression here is that the basin area has to be developed under the supervision and direction of a single agency, hence the need for an Authority.

There is also specific concern over the issue of

lack of geographical and functional congruity between water- systems and government institutions. In the face of the "geographic disorder and disequilibrium" it is an RDA, independent from and transcending the normal governmental machinery and administrative boundaries, that is appropriate. Of course, the water-basin resources cannot be developed comprehensively if the area remained divided into different administrative units, such as provinces and districts and development programmes effected within individual units separately. An agency which cuts across these political and administrative boundaries does the work better in a comprehensive manner.

Inherent in the arguments in favour of autonomous water-basin Authorities is the dissatisfaction with the central government machinery as an agent of development in the catchment areas. Chand and Puri, for instance, point out that

" - such areas require tasks such as research, survey, and carrying out entrepreneurial development programmes for the development infrastructure, tasks which are too complex for the normal governmental machinery." 29

The central government is unequal to the task because, it is argued, it normally divides responsibility for development of different resources among different government agencies or ministries, with each ministry



determining its own scale of priorities and distributing its budget and manpower among the development projects accordingly. As a result, as one would expect, some projects are given priorities in every ministry which engenders duplication of efforts and resources and negates the idea of "total resource development" which is needed in a water-basin region. The establishment of an Authority to coordinate, plan and implement development projects in the region avoids such duplication and 'peace-meal' approach to resource development. As Lilienthal argues, under the TVA's regime,

"...the development of the Tennessee Valley's resources was not to be dissected into separate bits that would fit into the jurisdictional Pigeon-holes into which the instrumentalities of government had by custom become divided." 30

It is also argued that since the traditional or conventional administrative set-up of the central government is vertically and hierarchically structured with a highly centralised decision-making process and power, its field agencies lack the innovative non-regulative behaviour and coordinated inter-agency activity, variables which are crucial in any attempt at developing an area such as a water-basin. An RDA, due to its location in the problem area, makes its decisions close to the people and by virtue of its autonomy from central government, it

chooses methods of solving problems as it seems fit according to immediate circumstances within its area of jurisdiction. The implementing officers do not have to wait for decisions to be made at the centre for them to act. The virtue of all this is summed up by Marguaret Owen thus: "... (when) the power to decide is close to the problems, action can be swift and sure."<sup>31</sup>

If the establishment of RDAs as instruments of development in water-basin areas has been justified on the basis of the incapability of the normal government machinery to engineer development in such areas, the private sector has also been found wanting in its ability to do the same. Responsibility for development projects in the water-basin areas cannot be left wholly in the hands of the private sector because, it is argued, private firms are more interested in profits and will show little interest in projects like roads, flood-control projects, health programmes and other programmes that do not generate immediate profit, yet crucial for the development of the region. The RDA, being a non-profit making body has the duty of implementing such programmes.

In sum, the RDA has a crucial role to play in

the development of water-basin resources. As can be inferred from the above, the need for the RDA is created by the need for a comprehensive and integrated approach to the development of the water-basin region.

## CHAPTER THREE

### 3.0 : THE LBDA'S INTERNAL SYSTEM

#### 3.1 : Introduction

The importance of a development agency's internal institutional and administrative practices cannot be over-emphasised. The recent literature on development administration, in particular, have emphasised the point that for a development strategy to succeed, there must be

"... a fit between the development strategy and the institutional and administrative structures through which it is implemented."<sup>1</sup>

Overall, the general concern has been with a development organisation that can cope with the demands of the present development ethos. In particular, the sad experience with the past bureaucratic, centralised and rigid administrative structures of development organisations in the third world has resulted in calls for decentralized structures capable of coping with the uncertainty engendered by the highly volatile and rapidly changing environments that characterize the developing world and of incorporating the people's ideas and values by offering avenues for their (people's)

participation in planning and implementation of programmes that affect their lives.

For the LBDA, as an instrument of Regional Development policy and implementation, its institutional and administrative capacity to discharge its functions assume even a more important place in the assessment of its role and performance given that, as argued earlier, other institutions or organisations were found to be unequal to the task of a comprehensive and integrated development in the region. Therefore, the central issue to be addressed in this chapter is whether the LBDA's internal institutional arrangements and administrative practices make it equal to the task it is charged with. In fact, the internal system of an organisation does, among other things, determine its effectiveness as an organisation. ?

Scholars of Regional Development, and of RDAs in particular, underscore the importance of internal organisational effectiveness of Regional Development Agencies as a determinant of their success. Menon, P.K. attributes the success of the Mekong Basin Authority to its organisational effectiveness.<sup>2</sup> In their study of the "Administrative and Organisational Problems of Regional Development Planning in Israel", Ranaan Weltz and Levia Applebaum say that bodies responsible for regional development ought to be organized in a

particular way; the organisational attributes and prerequisites for the Regional Development Agency are determined by the very nature of its task.<sup>3</sup> In her study of the TVA, Marguarite Owen<sup>4</sup> also notes that the success of the TVA had been due to its appropriate institutional and administrative capacity. All the above scholars specifically identify quantity and quality of staff and appropriate structural arrangements as important variables determining the success of RDAs.

While recognising the similarity in role and task of the LBDA with other agencies like the TVA and the Mekong Basin Development Committee it would be unrealistic for one to speak of a blue-print internal system for all Regional Development Authorities. This is cognizance of the contingency theory of organisation which underlines the fact that different organisations face different environments making organisational design and attributes environment-specific. This, however, does not mean that comparisons cannot be made. It is just to underscore the fact that the LBDA, for instance, is existing in an environment different from that of, say, the TVA or the Mekong Basin Development Committee.<sup>5</sup>

In studying the LBDA's Internal System, the Internal System is taken to encompass such variables

as the values, administrative practices, the human resources' and their management, and the organisational arrangements. The ultimate aim is to show how the internal system affects the functioning of the Authority as a Regional Development Agency.

### 3.2: THE STAFF: Their Recruitment, Quantity, Quality and Management.

It is a statement of the obvious that in order for an organisation to "get things done" it must have the necessary human resources to do so. The human resources (or staff) in an organisation is usually seen in terms of quantity and quality. In most developing countries of which Kenya is one, the problems facing most development institutions have been traced to lack of personnel who have the temperament and ability to fulfill the objectives of these institutions. This has been so pronounced in quasi-governmental institutions or parastatals. A workshop on Public Enterprises in Eastern Africa<sup>6</sup> identified poor staffing and recruitment procedures as constituting a major factor in the dismal performance of public agencies. In Kenya, the 1982 Ndegwa Report on Government Expenditure compiled by a working party appointed by the government attributed management problems in parastatals to the fact that

"...second level staff are often poorly selected and inadequately trained."7

The LBDA is a parastatal organisation and whether it can surmount the above staffing problems is therefore an important issue. For, as Ranaan Weitz says of a Regional Development Agency,

"...the ability of the team (staff) to fulfill (regional development functions) is contingent not only on a suitable organisational structure, but on the composition of such a team, the professional training of its members and the nature of its leadership."8

### 3.2.1: Recruitment

In keeping with the freedom that a "cooperate agency" is supposed to enjoy in the area of recruitment, section 9(1) of the LBDA Act bestows the Authority with the power to appoint

"...upon such terms and conditions as it thinks fit such other officers and servants as it considers necessary or desirable for the efficient conduct and operation of the Authority."

The implication is that the Authority has the right to decide who to recruit, at which position, and what



to pay him/her. At the organisational level, the power to recruit rests with the Board (referred to simply as the Authority), save the Managing Director (M.D.) who is appointed by the Minister, usually in consultation with the President.

The policy has been for the Board to recruit only senior and middle level staff, leaving the appointment of junior staff to the M.D. At least this has been the case since the appointment of the Board in April, 1981. Before this time, the M.D. and the parent Ministry exercised the power to recruit. Those who were recruited in the pre-Board period were mostly hand-picked individuals, though some senior officers were interviewed after posts were advertised.

If there is anything that has so much put the LBDA on its defensive for a long time, it has been accused of all sorts of wrongdoing ranging from nepotism, favouritism to sectionalism and tribalism. These accusations reached a climax in 1984 when two Members of Parliament representing constituencies within the "development areas" accused LBDA of recruiting most of its staff only from one tribe. In fact, one was even more specific: even from that one tribe, only a section of it was being favoured, South Nyanza district. The main charge was that the LBDA was "not national".<sup>9</sup>

in its recruitment denying other sections of the region the benefit of employment. The seriousness of these charges got expression when the parent Ministry of the LBDA made a ministerial statement in Parliament in defence of the Authority just after the above accusations had been made.<sup>10</sup>

The issue of unbalanced recruitment was a recurring one throughout the survey conducted by this researcher. Even among the employees of the Authority themselves, there was an apparent awareness about this issue. A group of the employees felt that their districts or ethnic groups had been discriminated against. In fact, unbalanced recruitment has even now become a major policy issue at the Authority. A very top official of the Board admitted that "the unbalanced regional and ethnic distribution of employees" was a source of concern to the Board to the extent that at present, the Board has adopted a policy of recruiting top and middle level staff and, to a certain extent, junior staff from the districts that have been "disadvantaged before". Here we witness the pervasiveness of socio-political, influences on the functioning of an organisation for now, ethnic and regional "arithmetic" is replacing merit and competence as a major criterion of recruitment.

The findings of this research reveal that while

the initial line-up or the top cadre of staff was to a large extent quite representative of the ethnic groups and districts in the "development area", the present line-up is not. After the appointment of the first Managing Director, a Luo living in Siaya district, the next major appointment was a Kisii by tribe from Kisii district. When the Board was appointed in April, 1981 its Chairman was a Luhya (a major tribe in Western Province) hailing from Bungoma district. In this initial line-up, Kakamega district was represented by the Ecologists, also a Luhya while Siaya was further represented by the Public Health specialist, a Luo. South Nyanza district was represented by the Administrative/Personal Assistant to the Managing Director. Busia and Kisumu districts were, however, not represented in the top cadre until 1983 when for Busia, the Marketing Expert/Economist was recruited. Even at the Middle and junior levels of staff, the districts, even those in Rift Valley, and the three major ethnic groups - Kisii, Luo and Luhya - seemed to be well represented.

However, the present picture portrays some imbalance in the top administrative staff. Out of the four heads of department, three hailed from one district (indeed one tribe). Out of the ten divisional heads (some divisions did not have heads yet), four hailed from one district, in fact the same district as the

three heads of department cited above. Ethnically out of the twenty-two top administrative officers (including the Chairman and the Managing Director) fifteen (about 68%) come from one tribe, eleven coming from one district alone!

In the middle and lower cadres of employees the imbalance spreads even more. Mwango, in her study of the LBDA 9(1983) notes that more than 75% of the "clerical officers, assistant fisheries statisticians Laboratory technicians and Fisheries Field Extension workers" recruited to the Fisheries Division came from one ethnic group.<sup>11</sup> At various project sites, despite the Authority's declared policy of recruiting three quarters of the project employees from the locality of the project, there were instances where this policy was being mocked. At the Yala Farm project, an on-the-spot check by this researcher revealed that even employees who would be called casual labourers like weeders, canal diggers, and so on, were being recruited from outside the division where the project is located, some from very far away. This practice has really dented the Authority's image as the local people find it difficult to be convinced that the recruitment system is fair. The overall impact on efficiency of the practice of transporting casual workers to projects located far away from their home locations is discussed

in chapter five.

Granted that there is some imbalance in recruitment, one would ask, where is the root of the problem? It is the argument of this researcher that the source of the problem lies in inadequate structural arrangements for recruitment. It was noted earlier that recruitment is the duty of the Board. It was also noted that in practice, the Board has only been dealing with the recruitment of the top administrative and technical staff, delegating the responsibility of recruiting other lower staff to the Managing Director. It was found during the survey that the recruitment of the lower level staff was quite haphazard, with no clear procedure. Any officer in the Authority can successfully lobby for his or her relatives, friends and peers to be employed. This was more rampant in the recruitment of employees at various projects. There is no coordination of recruitment of lower-level staff at various projects. Hence, the accusations of nepotism and favouritism. No wonder, among the extension staff, particularly in the Rural Domestic Water Supply and Sanitation Programme (RDWSSP) and the Fish Farming Project, there was widespread complaint from some employees that some of their colleagues were being given special considerations when it comes to allowances and other claims. One ex-Fish Farming Extensionist

claimed, for instance, that his colleagues coming from a particular district were having their claims processed without difficulty while others were facing problems. A divisional head at the Authority headquarters also talked of "a lot of insubordination" on the part of employees in his division. Asked to list down the most common types of indiscipline in his department, a head of department mentioned "Insubordination" as endemic. These problems, it is the contention of this researcher, are traceable to the above shortcomings of the recruitment procedure. It is evident that the delegation of the responsibility to recruit the Managing Director (who in turn delegates some of this responsibility to his juniors) is being abused. There should be a unit coordinating the recruitment of lower level staff, especially in various projects to ensure that only qualified and the right staff are recruited. The recklessness in recruitment has already contributed to over-establishment as will be discussed later.

The weaknesses of the recruitment system have also made it quite vulnerable to political influence. Accompanying the charge that the Authority was ethnically and sectionally biased in recruitment was another equally strong charge that certain politicians in the region were successfully lobbying for the employment of their supporters or potential supporters. A head of division

in the Authority agreed with this charge against the Authority. In fact, I personally witnessed an occasion when a politician from the region (who was also a Board Member) came to plead with a senior staff member for the reinstatement of one of the people he had brought but was sacked for "misappropriation of project revenue funds". Earlier, it was also claimed that a finger was being pointed at a district as having the an unfavourably high number of employees in the Authority. During the survey, this researcher came across several allegations attributing this to the influence of some powerful politicians from that district in the Authority.

The loophole in the Authority which gives room for politics to influence recruitment is two-pronged. The first aspect of the loophole has to do with the Board. The Board is composed of a number of politicians. <sup>has</sup> As it/turned out, out of the four Chairmen that the LBDA has had, two - the first and the third have been politicians, both of them losers in parliamentary elections though the first had been an M.P. and Cabinet Minister before his appointment. Most of the nine members appointed under section 4(1h) of the Act are also politicians. The implication of this for the recruitment system is obvious: if politicians are allowed to sit on the Board, they will want to recruit their friends and supporters into the Authority for

selfish political ends. Throughout the survey, there were several claims within the Authority that "so and so is a crony or such and such a politician". And, as the "Working Party on Government Expenditure (1982) notes such situations lead to circumstances where

"...Management and personnel decisions are often politically motivated to the detriment of parastatal efficiency. As a result, conflict among senior personnel occur more frequently over political matters than over issues of substance and the latter are often given only secondary attention."<sup>12</sup>

Charges of unbalanced regional implementation on the part of the Authority<sup>13</sup> have sometimes been based on political influence. It has been claimed by some that decisions to locate certain projects in certain areas have been guided by political motives. This claim seems to be strengthened by the fact that some of the members of staff of the LBDA are themselves politicians, having failed in recent parliamentary elections. It is with such claims that one may view, for example, the Rongo Fish Fry production centre which, as explained in the subsequent chapters, failed because of poor siting. Some claim that the decision to undertake the project was majorly political - either somebody at the Authority wanted to please some "godfather" or was trying to please his potential voters! The case of the Rongo-Nyagowa



Women group Vegetable project analysed in chapter four is also a possible example of political rather than technical decisions in project implementation. For underlying the differences that arose between the Women Group participating as beneficiaries in the project and the LBDA implementing team were political overtones. The latter accused the LBDA team as consisting of cronies of a powerful politician in the division where the project was located while the LBDA made counter-charges that the Women group was under the influence of another politician.<sup>14</sup> The withdrawal of the LBDA from this project was thus interpreted as political.

Political influence in the recruitment of personnel is not something new, nor is it, unique to the LBDA. The same can be said of tribalism and nepotism. But these vices have to be controlled and kept to a minimum. An organisation like the LBDA which is regional in function and whose functional jurisdiction cut across different ethnic societies, cannot afford to entertain, for instance, ethnicity. With regard to organisational efficiency, the unbalanced recruitment is detrimental to organisation stability. As Mwangi says, it has resulted into "interpersonal conflicts among the senior staff".<sup>15</sup> How can the organisation avoid these vices? This researcher argues

that the Board should be rid of politicians and the Act should be specific on recruitment procedures albeit without abusing the freedoms accorded to the Authority in the area of recruitment. While, for example, the TVA Act which in its Section 6 recognised the possibility of political considerations in recruitment and warned on this, apart from making the appointment of the Board directors subject to Senate confirmation, the LBDA is silent on this matter. It is also suggested by this researcher that the Authority should come out with recruitment methods which would at least insulate the recruitment procedure from the above abuses. For instance, junior level staff and casual labourers could be recruited by announcing vacancies in public barazas through Chiefs and even by declaring them in the various DDCs of which the LBDA is a member. The Labour offices in the districts could also be used.

A leaf can also be borrowed from the TVA, which its desire to keep politics out of recruitment and to appear to be fair to all, distributed its own application forms, the famous "Form 10-TVA" which were to be filled by all candidates who would then write examinations to test ability to follow written or oral instructions. The successful applicants would then be invited when and where work was available.

Quantity and Quality of Staff:

According to the government, LBDA is authorised to have a total of 171 established posts.<sup>16</sup> The Authority is, however, free to recruit other employees it needs from time to time, for instance, when it starts new projects. According to the April, 1986 payroll, the Authority had a total of 163 established posts and 1189 other employees (on projects). Overall, the Authority's staff establishment has grown from 25 by December, 1980 to some 1360 by April, 1986 as shown by the table below.

TABLE 2 : LBDA STAFF ESTABLISHMENT - 1979 - 1986:

DATE/YEAR	TOTAL NO. OF EMPLOYEES
30TH DECEMBER, 1979	1
30TH DECEMBER, 1980	25
30TH DECEMBER, 1981	54
30TH DECEMBER, 1982	141
30TH DECEMBER, 1983	608
30TH DECEMBER, 1984	755
30TH APRIL, 1986	1360

- Notes:
1. It is assumed that those who might have left the organisation have been replaced.
  2. The list excludes casuals.
  3. Source: LBDA Staff Lists and PayRoll.

Coming specifically to the technical staff - those on whom the ultimate development performance of the LBDA depends, their distribution among the Authority's divisions is given below.

TABLE 3 : LBDA TECHNICAL STAFF ESTABLISHMENT - 1985:

DIVISION	PERSONNEL
1. PLANNING	2 Regional Planners 1 Senior Planner 1 Planning Officer 1 Surveyor
2. WATER RESOURCES	1 Civil Engineer 1 Hydrologist 2 Irrigation/Drainage Engineers 1 Electrical Engineer 1 Water Resources Engineer (Chief Engineer)
3. FISHERIES	1 Fisheries Specialist 1 Agriculturalist 2 Technical Advisers
4. AGRICULTURE & LIVESTOCK	1 Agriculturalist 1 Horticulturalist 2 Farm Managers 1 Livestock Specialist 1 Agricultural Officer

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5. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND PUBLIC HEALTH	1 Public Health Specialist  3 Public Health Officers  1 Ecologist  1 Environmental Chemist  1 Aquatic Biologist  1 Chemist (Expatriate)
<hr/>	
6. INDUSTRIAL DIVISION	1 Industrial Economist  1 Geologist/Mineral Economist  1 Foreman  1 Bee Specialist  1 Economist/Marketing Expert
<hr/>	
7. UNDP STAFF	1 Chief Technical Adviser  1 Associate Expert - Data Interpretation  1 Associate Expert - Civil Engineering  1 Associate Expert - Hydrologist

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SOURCE: COMPLIED BY AUTHOR

A close and critical look at the Authority's establishment reveals there is definitely an over-establishment. This is evidenced by the existence of quite a number of employees whose job descriptions are not clear while there are some doing nothing at all. At the Authority headquarters in Kisumu, it is not uncommon

to find quite a number of employees around the offices and the corridors. In the Authority's documentation centre, there were at one time upto five employees who gave their job titles as library assistants yet the centre is so small that even one assistant would be enough. In fact, most of these employees admitted that they were bored, lacking something worthwhile to do. The offices of the managment staff are equally overcrowded with one office, during an on-the-spot check by this researcher, having one Secretary, one copy-typist and three other female employees who described themselves as "Messengers" - all these assigned to one officer's office!

A senior member of the Authority Board admitted, in response to a comment by this researcher, the existence of what he called "a small excess of girl workers in offices". Even more disturbing is the fact that some of the employees are recruited but take as long as three months to be allocated specific duties. One female employee told this researcher that she had been employed in September 1985 but had to wait until November 1985 to know her specific duties. This is definitely an anomaly: somebody is being recruited into a non-existent vacancy, and paid for two months for no specific job done! This is a case of utter inefficiency. The organisation cannot claim to be

using its financial resources economically in this case.

The effect of the over-establishment and "reckless" employment of the "minor" staff (minor staff refers to those whose services are not particularly "critical" to the Authority's overall goals) on the organisation's efficiency and effectiveness is that the Authority is denied a lot of money which could be spent on development projects. It is overspending on overhead costs in terms of salaries and maintenance of its staggering number of employees. As an ex-senior officer of the Authority admitted in a discussion with this researcher, by December, 1982 staff remuneration was becoming a burden and money allocated for projects were being diverted into paying employees. Eyebrows have also been raised at the Authority's parent ministry. One officer at the ministry, for instance, questioned the Authority's wisdom of employing so many casuals whose total wages alone worked out to be K£9,000 according to the June, 1983 payroll. Out of the K£422,710 allocated to the Authority in the 1983/84 as Development Funds, more than half was expected to be spent on overhead, mainly salaries and wages. Over the same period, out of the K£302,640 allocated under the Recurrent Vote, Personal Emoluments amounted to K£202,923 while Gratuity and Pension contributions amounted to K£10,160, and House

Allowances accounting for K£15,000. <sup>19</sup>

One contributing factor to the strain on the Authority with regard to overhead costs in terms of salaries is the idea of employing many people at top posts which carried heavy remuneration at a time when some were not even necessary given the age and size of the Authority. For example, by 1982, when the Authority was barely four years old, it already had a Financial Controller, a Chief Accountant, a Senior Accountant, two Accountants, two Accounts Assistants, a Cashier, seven Accounts Clerks, an Internal Auditor, three audit clerks and a Supplies officer in its Finance Department. What this researcher is questioning is the wisdom of having the first three top officers - the Financial Controller, Chief Accountant and a Senior Accountant whose <sup>total</sup> annual salaries amounted to K£11,396. The issue is whether at that early stage of organisational growth, the LBDA could have not done with only one of these officers supported by a few clerks. In any case, as shall be shown later, the role differentiation between these posts was very thin indeed. The same could be said of the Personnel/Administration department.

In the final analysis, one finds a case where the service departments (Legal, Finance and Personnel/



Administration) have "overgrown" and causing a lot of financial stress on the Authority. This contrasts with the Mekong Basin Committee which, for example, has a very small administrative unit headed by a junior staff member with the largest units being those of the technical staff whose services are critical to the organisation's role.<sup>20</sup> Even the growth of the TVA's staff was quite gradual with direct administrative responsibilities shared between the three Board Members for quite some time. Priority in recruitment was given to technical staff.<sup>21</sup>

With regard to the qualifications of the top and technical staff of the Authority, the following table depicts the calibre of its employees.

TABLE 4 : QUALIFICATIONS OF STAFF AS AT 31.12.1985

OFFICER DESIGNATION	QUALIFICATIONS
A MANAGING DIRECTOR	MASTER OF SCIENCE(M.Sc.)
B DEPUTY M.D./REGIONAL PLANNER/HEAD OF PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT DEPT	MASTER OF ARTS (ECON)
C PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGER	BACHELOR OF ARTS (B.A.)
D AUTHORITY SECRETARY/ HEAD, LEGAL DEPT	BACHELOR OF LAW (LL.B)

E	FINANCIAL CONTROLLER/HEAD OF FINANCE DEPT.	BACHELOR OF COMMERCE (B.COM.)
F	AGRICULTURALIST/HEAD, AGRICULTURE & LIVESTOCK DIVISION	MASTER OF SCIENCE (M.Sc.)
G	FISHERIES SPECIALIST/HEAD FISHERIES DIVISION	MASTER OF SCIENCE (M.Sc.)
H	CHIEF ENGINEER/HEAD, WATER RESOURCES DIVISION	MASTER OF SCIENCE (M.Sc.)
I	REGIONAL PLANNER/HEAD OF PLANNING DIVISION	MASTER OF ARTS (M.A)
J	GEOLOGIST/MINERAL ECONOMIST/HEAD, INDUSTRIAL DIVISION	BACHELOR OF SCIENCE (B.Sc.)
K	PUBLIC HEALTH SPECIALIST/ HEAD, ENVIRONMENTAL AND PUBLIC HEALTH DIVISION	
L	SENIOR ACCOUNTANT/HEAD ACCOUNTS DIVISION	BACHELOR OF COMMERCE (B.COM.)
M	SENIOR ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER/HEAD ADMINIS- TRATION DIVISION	BACHELOR OF ARTS(B.A.)
N	ECOLOGIST	BACHELOR OF SCIENCE, DOCTOR OF SCIENCE (B.Sc., D.Sc.)

One striking point to note is that according to available evidence, the Authority, contrary to claims from certain quarters, has not found it difficult to get highly qualified staff. The first to join the Authority was the first Managing Director, himself a man of proven academic excellence having served as a professor at University level for many years and at the time of appointment was an international civil servant with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Within a year, the Authority had recruited a Regional Planner, a man with wide experience in the civil service, a public Health specialist recruited direct from the University teaching staff, an Ecologist, a Water Resources Engineer and a Geologist/Mineral economist, all people with proven ability and experience. Although all but one of these officers have left the organisation, the fruits of their hard work based on mutual inter- and trans-disciplinary cooperation exist in the number of project proposals and feasibility studies they accomplished within a short time. Other issues notwithstanding, these gentlemen laid the foundation for the present phase of implementation. It is also important to note that even the present line-up of technical staff is one of highly qualified people. The point one is making is that it is not convincing for one to argue, like some of the top Authority officers and others elsewhere would, that the Authority has been "lagging" behind because of shortage of skilled

manpower. It is the argument of this thesis that the problem may be one of retaining the recruited staff and the creating of a conducive organisational environment within which they could put their expertise at the disposal of the development of the area.

### 3.2.3. : Training

This leads us to the consideration of the issue of the inculcation of values conducive to the Authority's goals' achievement among the staff. The recruits need to be incorporated into the organisation in such a way that they understand the objectives of the organisation and perfect their job competence accordingly. This can be done through training by way of in-service courses, seminars, conferences, workshops, study tours and, to some extent, sending employees overseas for further studies. The need for such training arises from two main considerations, namely, (a) the recruits may be fresh from school or college with no work experience elsewhere, and (b) those who have worked elsewhere before joining the organisation, their experience notwithstanding, may find that their new place of work demands different approaches and skills due to unique organisational goals. With regard to the latter the LBDA faces a gigantic task in training its personnel in order to inculcate in them values consonant with the demands

of a Regional Development Agency. Most if not all of the Authority's top and middle-level staff and to a certain extent junior staff are drawn from either the civil service or had worked there before or the private sector. Indeed, the test of the LBDA as a corporate agency lies, in part, in the manner in which it is different from the civil service, which in itself was found unequal to the task of comprehensive development of the region (see chapter 2). This, in part, depends on the values and attitudes cherished by its staff.

Hence, programmes used to be designed to broaden the employees' outlook to equal the task before them. Those who have worked in the civil service must shed the "bureaucratic tendencies" they had entertained in their previous places of work. Their decisions must be swift and sure. The rigid and hierarchical tendencies in the civil service must give way to lateral allowing for greater cohesion, teamwork, inter-and trans-disciplinary approaches to development. At the LBDA there were some complaints by some officers about some of them turning themselves into "small kings", something not unusual in the civil service. One officer who has since left the organisation was said to have been so "domineering" that a project he was coordinating with a government department in the region almost flopped. Such instances must be avoided. Perhaps one way of broadening the

staff's outlook and inculcating relevant skills and methods of work would be for the Authority to organise study tours to countries with similar RDAs like the TVA in USA, Gal-oya Development Committee in Ceylon, the Mekong Basin Committee, and others for its personnel to familiarize themselves with matters pertaining to RDAs.

The findings of this research showed that as at the end of 1985, the Authority had sent its Agriculturalist one Regional Planner, the Administrative/Personnel Manager, a planning officer, a District Fish Farming Coordinator, the Chief Engineer and One Irrigation/ Drainage Engineer on study tours abroad. Some other top management officers had also been sent to the Kenya Institute of Administration (K.I.A.) for short courses. Others who have benefitted include one Librarian, at least one Secretary, some Copy-Typists, a few Accounts Clerks, 54 fish farming extensionists and three Computer programmers. Workshops and in-service courses have also been organised.

However, it needs to be pointed out that to send personnel for training is one thing and to maximise benefits from such training is another. For instance, out of 54 fish farming extensionists trained by the ABDA, only 36 were still with the Authority by August, 1985. One of those who had left to join a College for

a different profession altogether told this researcher that he had left the Authority because his "future looks black with it" complaining that his training had had no meaningful impact on his terms and conditions of service and that he was in no way different from those who had not received the training. In a nutshell, the turnover rate among the FFEs is alarming and spells a loss to the Authority. Another way through which the Authority seems to be losing in terms of training is lack of "planning". Some people are trained at very high costs only to come back to the Authority to find that they have no jobs to do. Three members of staff who had just returned from a one-year training course complained of boredom as all of them had not been given duties because, as one of them put it, the machines they had been trained to handle had not arrived. In fact, one of them was given a two months' leave after spending endless days idling around with nothing to do. The rest had to ~~continue~~ idling around. This is obviously a waste for these staff members were paid for work not done for the more than three months before the expected "machine" arrived. It shows lack of forecasting in training. What if the employees could decide to leave the Authority to go and put their newly acquired professional knowledge, at the Authority's cost, at the disposal of other employers?

There also appears to be misprioritization in

training needs at the Authority. Given the nature of the task of the Authority one would expect it to give much priority to the training in technical fields, directly related to project implementation, especially at this initial period of its existence when financial resources are still meagre. The idea of spending resources on the training of the "minor" as opposed to "critical" staff should therefore be loathed for the time being. A list of the LBDA training requirements presented to its parent ministry for the fiscal year 1984/85 depicted this misprioritization. According to the list: 1 person was to be trained in criminal investigation, a senior personnel officer was to be given a postgraduate scholarship in manpower studies, Development planning and Administration, 2 people were to be trained in Accounts, 1 person was to be trained in printing technology, 1 person in Librarianship, 1 person in pollution and effluent monitoring and the Agriculturalist was nominated for conferences and seminars<sup>23</sup>. Apparently only the last two would be trained in fields directly relevant to the functions of the Authority in development. Not that the others should not be trained, but in view of the scarce resources the Authority has at its disposal - the Authority officers themselves sing about this scarcity of resources - one would question the wisdom of spending money on the training of a security officer in criminal investigation or even giving a personnel manager a 24



months' study leave at this time when the Authority is still very young, yet these areas are not critical to the organisation's overall objectives.

It is the submission of this thesis, then, that the Authority should organise study tours for its technical personnel to countries with similar ventures (RDAs) and concentrate on training staff for its technical needs rather than spending money sending Accounts Clerks, Copy-typists, Secretaries for short-courses or sending senior personnel to the K.I.A. where they learn nothing new.<sup>24</sup>

#### 3.2.4.: Terms and Conditions of Service

The Authority operated for some time without clear terms and conditions of service and this was a constraint in retaining high-level staff, although in their letters of appointment the staff were informed that they were on a three-year contract. It was not until December, 1982 when the terms and conditions of service were documented. It needs to be pointed out also that although the LBDA is given the power to set its own terms and conditions of service (see the Act sections 9(1) and 9(3), this has to be done in liaison with the central government through the parent ministry. This will continue as long as the Authority

remains dependent on the Treasury for financial needs and as long as the present government controls (discussed in the next chapter) over the Authority remain.

The "contract" system is applied in which the staff are employed on a three-year contract which is renewable. Although some have supported contract employment on the ground that it may contribute significantly to the effectiveness of the organisation, as it allows promotions and salary increments to be based on performance rather than on tenure, it is the contention of this researcher that this may only be applicable in the case of young employees. At the LBDA, most of the senior posts are held by people approaching retirement age and some of them may only be interested in the gratuity that accrues to anybody whose contract expires and decides not to continue. As Mwango reports in her Thesis,

"...One departmental head supported these (contract) terms of service with a view that it attracted many people who were interested in drawing personal gratuity after 3 years of service...The gratuity money helps the individual to invest in a personal project for self-advancement...."25

The Authority, in such circumstances may find itself in a situation where it pays a lot of gratuity everytime contracts expire, a drain on the meagre financial

resources at its disposal. For example, for the 1983/84 financial year, the Authority paid out gratuity amounting to KShs. 396,119.10, tripple what was spent on, say, the Sondu/Miriu project and almost twice what was spent on "inputs" for the Yala Farm project.<sup>26</sup> Yet at this time the Authority was just taking off. The argument is that if young people were employed, the benefits of the contract system could accrue to the organisation since such people hope for promotions and would therefore work hard to have their contracts renewed. If anything, the LBDA being a young organisation needs young people to grow with it.

While the terms and conditions of service for the top and middle cadres of staff are quite clear and understood by most of the staff, the lower cadre of staff do not have terms and conditions of service and many were found to be ignorant about their terms of service. Discussions and interviews with some of them also revealed a number of complaints that sometimes employees of the same cadre doing the same job were being treated differently when it comes to other benefits like house allowance, travelling allowance, hotel accommodation, excetera. These complaints were more rampant among those working at project sites or as extension workers (see chapter Five also). Each employee suspects that the other is getting benefits

which he/she does not get. It is the argument of this researcher that this situation exists because of the failure of the Authority to specify and make known the terms and conditions to the employees. For an organisation where, as hinted earlier in this chapter, ethnic, tribal and nepotistic feelings are rife due to imbalanced recruitment, the failure to make terms and conditions clear to all employees may further fuel speculation that some are rewarded on tribal, nepotistic or even personal lines.

The lack of a scheme of service for all categories of staff also poses problems for the Authority in terms of maintaining staff. As Mwango notes,

"...With no scheme of service, the Authority may not be an attractive place for employees who are interested in a career path."<sup>27</sup>

Coupled with the problem of job insecurity, especially for those employed in specific projects, particularly those projects sponsored by foreign agencies such as the Rural Domestic Water Supply and Sanitation Programme discussed in the next chapter, lack of a scheme of service may lead to a high labour turn-over rate, especially among highly qualified staff who can easily find employment elsewhere.

### 3.3.: DISTRIBUTION OF TASKS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

(See organisational chart, next page)

As Huse says,

"Every organisation faces two basic problems: the need to specialise, which creates a division of labour; and the need to coordinate these different units for the effectiveness and benefit of the whole."<sup>28</sup>

The concern of this section is therefore to analyse the organisational arrangements within the Authority with the ultimate focus being on how they affect the effectiveness of the Authority in discharging its role as a development agency.

Ideally, the Authority's structure is, and should be, determined by its functions and the guidelines stipulated in the Act though the Act does not go into detail regarding the arrangement of functional relationships within the organisation.

The Authority's structure has undergone a number of changes, changes which have been occasioned by the growth of the establishment and expansion of activities. Over the years, there has been more and more decentralization of units accompanied by redefinition of



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responsibilities and functions. Between 1979 and 1981 a lot of power and authority were concentrated in the hands of the Managing Director though the Authority's parent ministry assisted, particularly in policy matters. At the Authority, the Director and his skeletal staff performed functions as a team with very little specialization. But after the appointment of the Board in April, 1981 and recruitment of more staff coupled with expansion of activities, there was a clear need for a clear functional definition and differentiation within the organisation and by 1982, an organisational chart emerged depicting functional arrangements. This chart was however redesigned into the present one (see previous page) which consists of four departments, fourteen divisions and forty-one sections.

### 3.3.1.: Analysis of Functions and Job Allocation

In this section an attempt is made to analyse the functions of various departments and task distribution among the departments' and divisions' staff. The idea is to find out how these have affected the functioning of the Authority.

The major policy-making body of the Authority as has been hinted elsewhere is the Board or the

"Authority". Generally, the Board is supposed to give the Authority direction in all matters pertaining to its functioning. The execution or the supervision of execution of policies arrived at by the Board, however, is the responsibility of the Managing Director, - the Authority's chief executive.

The effectiveness of the LBDA's Board as the "steering wheel" of the Authority, according to the findings of this research, is questionable. In Section 3.2 in this chapter, it was argued, for instance, that the recruitment system has been so much vulnerable to various ills such as tribalism, nepotism, and so on. It was also noted that a high ranking member of the Board admitted the anomaly in recruitment. One would then ask the question: where has the Board been all this time? The argument of this thesis is that the problem is partly traceable to the composition of Board, which, as argued earlier, is full of politicians who "politicize" the decision-making process in matters of recruitment. The same can be said of the charge of unbalanced implementation of projects.<sup>29</sup> The other side of the problem is the fact that the Board does not appoint the Managing Director, who, when all is said and done, is the person who really matters when it comes to actual translation of policies into results. The Managing Director being an appointee of the Minister



cannot but owe more allegiance to his "mentor", the Minister. The Board lacks the power to control and check his activities. Though this researcher lacks hard data (due to restrictions of access to Authority files) to verify this, the unbalanced recruitment discussed in previous pages may be seen in this light.

The Board also appears to be too large for efficient and quick decision-making. It will be recalled that the TVA, for instance, existed for a long time with a three-member Board of Directors. This ensured swiftness and eliminated a substantial amount of conflict in the policy-making body notwithstanding the initial conflict between the first Chairman and his other two colleagues. The LBDA Board, on the other hand, has at least twenty-two members. It would appear that a lot of energy would be spent on solving conflicts between the various parties represented in the Board. This reduces efficiency and swiftness. Again, restricted access to Authority files, especially those containing Minutes of Board Meetings proved to be a handicap for this researcher in so far as citing cases of delayed decisions is concerned.

The most important department in the Authority is the department of Planning and Development in view of its role in the initiation and implementation of projects. Strictly speaking, the performance of the

Authority as a regional development agency depends on the efficiency and effectiveness of this department. One notable feature of the department is the combination of planning and implementation. The traditional method of seeing planning as an exercise removed from actual implementation of development projects is therefore rebuffed. This is an improvement on the initial set-up (see Mwango's Thesis) in which planning was a department on its own and implementation was the task of a different department, the "Operations" department. In the present set-up an opportunity exists for a frequent back-forward interaction between planning and implementation as the implementing personnel and the planning personnel act as teams in one department and answerable to one departmental boss who himself is a regional planner. Indeed, the major function of the departmental head is the co-ordination of "activities of all Technical professional staff in planning and implementation of development projects". He is also the Chairman of project committees in which both planners and implementors meet to initiate new and review the progress of on-going projects.

The importance of the projects committee has to be underscored. It can contribute to teamwork and inter-or cross-disciplinary approach to project management as various technical officers exchange ideas and experiences. However, the findings of this research

indicate shortcomings at the LBDA. There have been cases where some technical officers want to go it alone. The Authority had problems with one professional who, it was alleged, refused to cooperate with the rest with the result that the programme of which he was in charge flopped. Inter-disciplinary approach also seemed not to have been applied in the case of the Rongo Fish Fry Production Centre which had to be abandoned (see Chapters 4 & 5) because of lack of proper pre-implementation feasibility studies. The planning personnel must have not done their work adequately in this case. This also shows that mere organisational arrangements cannot ensure effectiveness. Much more depends on the temperament and willingness of the organisational staff to work together and diligently.

As per the job description of the head of the department, it is this department which is charged with the Authority's function of coordination of development in the whole region, that is, coordinating the efforts of other institutions through the various District Development Committees.<sup>30</sup> For example, the Chief Engineer's schedule of duties includes "Liaison and Coordination of activities of various institutions involved in water resources planning and development in the area". The Irrigation/Drainage Engineer also has one of his duties described as "Coordination and

Contribution to irrigation projects undertaken by various agencies, e.g. National Irrigation Board, Provincial Irrigation Units, and Non-Governmental Organisations within the Authority's area of jurisdiction." The head of the Industrial Division, the Geologist/Mineral Economist, apart from liaising with the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources" on matters relating to Geology and Minerals" is also charged with "initiation and co-ordination of mineral exploration programmes in the region".

The findings of this research, however, point to difficulties with regard to the function of coordination of other agencies' activities in the region. The cases of the Lambwe Valley Tsetsefly control programme and the Immunization programme analysed in chapter four testify to this. In both cases, the Authority's professional staff failed as coordinators. In both cases, the LBDA was accused of arrogance. The problem, stemmed from the fact that the LBDA technical staff involved in these programmes were given too much leeway to behave the way they wanted. They made decisions arrogantly without listening to others. These decisions may have not reflected the overall Authority position with regard to these programmes. To avoid such situations, a separate unit charged with "external" coordination

and liaison with other agencies is necessary. The case of the Rongo-Nyagowa Vegetable project, also analysed in chapter four, also shows how the department is finding it difficult to coordinate activities of other agencies. The Authority seemed not to know what was happening until it was too late. The links between the technical division concerned and the whole department and the Authority as a whole was weak.

The department of Finance, on the other hand, depicts a lot of duplication of duties and one would wonder as to whether some of the posts are even necessary in the first place. For example, the Accounts division has three senior staff members, namely, the Senior Accountant who is also the divisional head, and two other Accountants, designated Acct. A and Acct. B. assisted by a number of clerks. The job differentiation between the Senior Accountant and the two Accountants is very minimal. In practice, it was also found out that the Senior Accountant does almost everything that the Chief Accountant would do. It would also appear that there is role conflict between the Chief Accountant and the "Liaison Officer" who is placed under the department of Personnel and Administration with regard to liaison with ministries and other institutions. The Chief Accountant is the link between the Authority and the Treasury according to his schedule of duties yet

the Liaison Officer also has one of his duties touching on liaison with the Treasury. This is not only a case of duplication of duties but also mislocation of responsibility as the Liaison Officer is not answerable to the Chief Accountant, he is responsible to the head of Administration and Personnel department.

As hinted elsewhere in this chapter, the department is also overstaffed, especially the junior cadre of staff. It is noteworthy in this case that while each project has its staff dealing with financial issues, there are even more staff, especially accounts clerks at the headquarters. The latter are usually sent to project sites to do the same work being done by their counterparts, over whom they have no authority, at project sites. The result is that a lot of money is lost through the paying of "imprest" and "accommodation allowances" to the accounts clerks sent to project sites to "duplicate the duties" done by the clerks at various projects. It is the argument of this thesis that given that each project has its own Accounting Officer in view of the fact that each project has its own bank account, the numerous Accounts Clerks at the headquarters are unnecessary. Perhaps the departmental and divisional heads within the department only need a few clerks to assist them in overall financial management of the Authority funds.

With regard to efficiency, this researcher found that although the department exercises what is called "branch accounting" with regard to projects, cases where delays in orders of equipments and materials needed at projects exist. During a visit to the Yala Farm project, this researcher was told by some staff members in charge of the tree nurseries that some pesticides they had ordered for from the headquarters had not arrived two weeks after placing the orders. Yet the seedlings were being eaten away by pests. This is contrary to the principle of "financial bootlegging" which "branch accounting" is supposed to uphold by allowing the situation where funds in the project's accounts can be used to defray emerging expenses at project sites without necessarily following the long procedure of seeking authority from the headquarters.

It was also found that despite the staggering number of staff in the department of Finance, the department was still not successful in controlling the misuse of funds and malpractices in claims made by employees of the Authority. This is evidenced by an Internal Memo from the Authority's Chief Accountant with regard to "SAFARI IMPRESTS" in which he noted, inter alia,

"...This regulation notwithstanding, so many officers are noted to have

been issued with several imprests before they have accounted for the previous ones. It therefore implies that a number of staff members have misused the safari imprests that are purely meant for safaris and MUST be accounted for in full on return."31

It is very interesting that an organisation as young as the LBDA should have a problem in controlling imprests. The failure to control use of funds may be attributed to poor monitoring methods by the finance department.

The department of Personnel and Administration further demonstrates the problems of duplication of duties and overstaffing mentioned earlier. Apart from the Personnel and Administrative Manager who heads the department, there are in addition, a senior administrative officer, a Training Officer, a Liaison Officer, a Public Relations Officer, a Security Officer, a Transport Officer, an Assistant Workshop Manager, and Administrative Officer, and two executive officers. These officers who are classified as senior staff members on very high salary scales are again surrounded by numerous clerks based in the Authority headquarters while each project has its own administration component including clerical officers. It is quite unconvincing that the Authority needs all these staff members, especially at the headquarters where many employees



can always be seen to be idle with no work to do. In some cases, there is serious duplicating of functions in terms of job allocation per employee. For instance, there is very little difference, if any, in what the Executive Officer A (EO/A) and the Executive Officer B (EO/B)<sup>32</sup>. For example, in the official schedule of duties<sup>33</sup>, one of the duties of the latter is "supervision of junior staff and ensuring discipline among them", not in any significant way different from the former's duty of "supervision of clerical staff reporting to him."

Within the department of Administration, there is also the Liaison Office situated in Nairobi under the leadership of the Liaison Officer. The Liaison section as it is known, liaises "with both the parent Ministry and the Treasury on matters pertaining to Finance and policy, co-ordinates LBDA interactions with other ministries and institutions in respect of External Aid arrangements", co-ordinates LBDA Public Relations matters in Nairobi and follows up "on project papers submitted through the External Aid Division to Donor Agencies".<sup>34</sup> It is the submission of this researcher that as things stand at the moment, the Liaison office is not well staffed to cope with these responsibilities which are immense and very critical to the functions of the Authority. For example, it is this office, as indicated in the schedule of duties

of duties of the Liaison Officer, which comes into direct contact with foreign donor agencies on a daily basis (most, if not all, of these agencies are based in Nairobi). It also interacts with other resource getters for the Authority. It is obvious, therefore, that the ability of the Authority to attract financial and other forms of assistance depends to a considerable extent on the conduct of the Liaison Office. To an extent, too, the necessary cooperation between other agencies like ministries whose functions are relevant to the functioning of the Authority can be elicited by the Liaison Office. As of now, there are only two officers - the Liaison Officer and his assistant - apart from the four other junior members of staff, that is, one Secretary, one receptionist and two subordinate staff members.

It is suggested here that the Liaison Office be strengthened and staffed with strong team of officers who should also be people of impeccable character and integrity whose qualifications and competence are not in doubt. The Authority's bargaining power for resources depends on these characters and unless their capabilities and understanding correspond to the magnitude of the task before them, the Authority stands to gain very little in a field where other institutions are competing with it for

resources from the same sources.

The incidences of misunderstanding between the Authority and other ministries mentioned earlier point to the need for a strong Liaison Office. Some representatives of certain institutions in Nairobi indicated to this researcher that more often than not they had to ignore the Liaison office because of the weakness of the same. It was also found by this researcher that despite the fact that the Liaison office is charged with liaison with the Treasury on matters pertaining to Finance, more often than not officers from the Finance department in Kisumu have been forced to travel to Nairobi themselves even for simple matters. It is the contention of this researcher that this is due to the incapability of the Liaison office to discharge this responsibility. 7

With regard to liaison with the parent Ministry in matters pertaining to policy, the competence of the Liaison office is also wanting due to the above factors. The misunderstanding between the Authority and the Ministry of Agriculture with regard to utilisation of the Yala swamp is a case in point. The Liaison office was rendered impotent and it featured very minimally, if it did at all. The Ministry of Agriculture was in direct contact with the LBDA parent ministry, having by-passed the Liaison Office.

The fourth department, the Authority Secretariat is the smallest. It is headed by the Authority Secretary who is the Authority's Legal Adviser. The department takes care of the legal aspects of the Authority's undertakings both in the region and beyond. Apart from dealing with matters of litigation and giving advice to the Authority on legal aspects of its understandings it also participates in negotiations with donors and donor agencies.

The Legal department todate has only two lawyers, the Authority Secretary and the Legal Assistant. As yet, the Authority has not got involved in major legal battles, hence the department has for a long time played only an advisory role although it is true that some minor cases, have come up. However, in its advisory role, it was deciphered from an interview with an officer of the Authority, the department is sometimes overruled. As the officer put it, "expert advice is sometimes subordinated to the wishes of the Chief Executive, causing Court cases", especially in differences over terms of employment with employees.

### 3.3.2 Decentralisation through the Matrix System

Edgar F. Huse distinguishes two types of organisations namely (a) the functional and (b) the product organisation.<sup>35</sup> The former is the widespread organisa-

tional type in which the set up is subdivided into various functional units. It is argued that the advantage of this functional differentiation lies in the fact that resources that are similar - equipments and human - are centralised and grouped together for easy management. However, as Huse notes, the functional organisation has a weakness, especially in cases where the organisation is involved in "Multiple projects". He hints that:

"...When a functional organisation is involved with multiple projects, there are inevitable conflicts over the priority of different projects or tasks, with high competition for resources."<sup>36</sup>

He continues to assert that:

"...The functional department based on a technical speciality, often places more emphasis on its own speciality than on the overall goals of the organisation."<sup>37</sup>

The product organisation, on the other hand, groups together activities based on differentiation of goods and/or services according to similarities in their manufacture and/or in their end use.<sup>38</sup> These organisations are common in the world of business corporations. Their advantage lies in the fact that coordination and esprit de corps are maximised while

their disadvantage lies in the fact that they "reduce the ability of develop specialised experts."<sup>39</sup>

In order to trade off the disadvantages and advantages of either of the two types of organisations, other scholars have adopted the so-called "Matrix organisation" with a view to "maximising the strengths and minimising the weaknesses of both the functional and product (project) structures."<sup>40</sup> A matrix organisation does not supersede the two types mentioned above but is a hybrid of the two.

In the present LBDA structure, the matrix system is evident. There are a number of projects organised in their own ways. Project teams consist of members who come from across the departments of the organisation and who may at the same time belong to other project teams. In some projects, like the Immunization programme (see next chapter), team members are drawn even from outside the organisation from relevant institutions. The Rural Domestic Water Supply and Sanitation Programme (see chapter five) is an excellent example. The project team is composed of personnel from the Authority's Water Resources division, Public Health division and the Planning Division. The Yala Farm Project (also discussed in chapter five) also draws its team from various divisions and departments of the organisation. The

Irrigation and Drainage engineers from the Water Resource Division, the planners from the planning division, the Horticulturalist and the Agriculturalist from the Agriculture and Livestock division are all members of the project team. The department of finance commissions, from time to time, its personnel to deal with financial and accounting aspects of the project.

However, at the LBDA, as becomes evident in chapter five where various projects are discussed in detail, a problem does exist. It seems the matrix system is not being managed well and the virtues of the system are not being maximised. One aspect of the problem relates to an imbalance between the functional structure and the project structures. As hinted earlier in this chapter, there is an imbalance between project staffing and overall organisational staffing with more employees than necessary pooled at the headquarters. It was also observed by the researcher that some, if not most, of the technical personnel are so much involved with administrative work in the headquarters that they hardly find time to go to the field. A case in point is the head of Fisheries division, who although he is in the counter-part manager of the foreign aided small-scale Fish-Farming project has not been able to participate fully due to administrative duties (see chapter five).

Another aspect of the problem relates to members of project teams drawn from outside the organisation. As hinted in Chapter five — ? outsiders are not fully integrated into the project managements and from interviews with some of the outsiders it was quite clear that the Authority personnel like to go it alone. Cases in point are the failed Lambwe Valley Tse-tse Fly Control programme and the Immunization programme, both discussed in chapters four and five. In both cases, members of the project teams from outside were not meaningfully integrated into the project teams and the LBDA staff were accused of arrogance and aloofness.

Be it as it may, the Matrix system, if well managed, suffices as an appropriate method of project implementation for the Authority. One chief virtue that can be exploited is the opportunity the system affords for flexible use of manpower and free transfer of knowledge and experience from one project to another while retaining management consistency between projects.<sup>41</sup> It also helps cultivate an esprit de corps because the technical officers interact quite frequently. Add to this the fact that it ensures efficient use of resources by integrating the activities of several functions this being important for a young organisation like the LBDA which has not amassed enough resources, human and material.



### 3.2.3. : Conclusion

As was hinted in the opening passages of this chapter, the discussion on the LBDA's internal system was intended only as an aid to understanding how the organisational and administrative practices of the Authority affect its ability to perform its functions as a regional development agency. From the foregoing discussion it is quite clear that the Authority needs to perfect its internal system before it can hope to perform well at the Macro-level.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### 4.0. : THE LBDA'S EXTERNAL RELATIONS

The role of the LBDA as an agency of development becomes clear with an understanding of its functional relations with (a) the Central Government as the overall manager of national development and (b) institutions engaged in development activities in the region itself. It is in recognition of this fact that we proceed in this chapter to discuss LBDA's external relations. With regard to the LBDA's relations with (a), emphasis is made on the aspects of that relationship which promote or hamper the Authority's ability to perform its development/<sup>role</sup>while with regard to its relationship with (b), emphasis is laid on the functional, differentiation between the Authority and its counterpart institutions in the region.

#### 4.1.0. : Relations with the Central Government

To discuss LBDA's relations with the Central Government is to put the Authority in the national policy framework and to assess how this (national policy framework) affects its performance. As a parastatal organisation, the Authority has a special relationship with the Central Government which is also its creator.

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Like any other parastatal, the LBDA is supposed to be separated from the normal governmental administrative machinery. For the LBDA in particular, this separation derives from its "corporate" nature. Inextricably interwoven in the concept of "corporate" is "autonomy". This entails that apart from being separate from the normal governmental machinery, the Authority should have an autonomous administrative framework within which it conducts its affairs. This essentially means it has to enjoy freedom in fundamental areas such as recruitment of personnel and financial transactions. The powers and freedom of the Authority as a corporate body are enshrined in its Act which gives it its legal Authority.

Organisations charged with special development activities like the LBDA have been designed along these lines. The prototype of water-basin Authorities, the TVA, was a corporate body. To President Roosevelt of the U.S.A. who spearheaded the campaign for its establishment, the TVA was to be

"....a corporation clothed with the power of the government, but possessed of the flexibility and initiative of a private enterprise."<sup>1</sup>

As Finer says,<sup>2</sup> this means a number of things, namely:

- (1) That it should be endowed with certain specific powers in relation to persons and property and in relation to its own purposes.
- (2) That it should have succession in its corporate name; and the power to sue and the liability to be sued in its corporate name, to adopt and through the procedures provided in the statute, to make, amend and repeal by-laws to purchase or lease or hold real and personal property necessary for its business, and to dispose of any personal property, to exercise the right of eminent domain (that is, to take property compulsorily with compensation) in the name of the United States, and to proceed by condemnation where necessary for the purposes of the Act.
- (3) That it should be empowered to appoint its personnel with exemption from United States civil service rules and to organise its internal affairs with comparative freedom.
- (4) That, since the Authority must come under some superior national control, it should be assigned special relationships with various of the controlling departments of

the Federal Government designed to secure political responsibility, but without subjecting the Authority to a straitjacket.

In fine, the LBDA Act (see Appendix 1) seeks to fulfill the above conditions in the Kenya context which should in theory, govern its relationship with the Central Government. Under perfect circumstances, it is claimed the success of the Authority depends on the degree to which these conditions are fulfilled. Various scholars have attributed the relative success of the TVA to the fact that its relationship with the Federal Government has been governed to a greater extent by the principles of flexibility and autonomy. It, however, needs to be emphasised that the application of these conditions is sometimes so environment-specific that one cannot simply compare two RDAs operating under different circumstances.

The literature on RDAs and public enterprises or parastatals, however, point out that the flexibility and autonomy accorded the agency should not mean or lead to lack of control. Thus, for instance, although the TVA was endowed with these principles.

"...but since it is a public body with governmental purposes and powers and funds provided by the Government, it was not intended that it should be altogether

immune from external control."<sup>3</sup>

The need for control is, however, appreciated only when "control" is not viewed in its negative terms but positively. Hence "control" should not be seen as express restriction on freedom of action but as a way of ensuring that the freedom is positively and responsibly exercised and applied by the management of the enterprise.

All said, the need for control of public agencies arises from the desire of the national government to ensure that the enterprises are run in pursuit of the primary objectives determined at the time of their establishment. As Riyaz H. Bokhari says:

"..."Controlling" is the "steering" wheel or the "short-rein" which keeps the activities of the enterprises from wandering away from their primary objectives."<sup>4</sup>

Walter Ouma Oyugi justifies the need for control on the ground that there's need to be an "external stimuli"<sup>5</sup> from the Central Government in form of policy guidelines, the lack of which

"...leads to laxity in the organisation and eventually, the disintegration of the organisational system."<sup>6</sup>

In submission, therefore, control by the government is necessary in the interest of efficient management of the enterprise and to ensure that, since the enterprise is established to carry forward the national development policy, it works within the stipulated national policy framework.

In Kenya, the government clearly seeks to exercise control over its agencies and in particular, parastatal agencies have to undergo some checking system. For example, all parastatals are subject to control from above in financial matters, especially in the way they raise and disburse funds. Generally, the mechanisms for control in Kenya have been the Treasury, the Inspectorate of Statutory Boards, the newly created Parastatal Advisory Committee, the parent Ministry of the parastatal, the Controller and Auditor-General and Parliament.

It is against the foregoing background that the LBDA's relations with the central government and how it affects its performance is going to be discussed below.

#### 4.1.1: FUNDING AND FINANCIAL FREEDOM:

According to Section 11 of the LBDA Act, the funds of the Authority consist of money allocated by the



Treasury through Parliament (11(a)), money borrowed from elsewhere (11(b)) and any money accruing to the Authority from any other source (11(c)). However, for the period the Authority has existed, it has continued to depend on the Treasury more than any other source for funding since it has not reached the stage where it can generate its own income. Also, although it is allowed to borrow money or ask for loans from sources outside the country, it has not yet attracted would-be lenders, although a few donors have provided assistance as will be shown later.

The Authority's dependence on the Treasury's budgetary allocations reduces to a great extent its autonomy in financial matters and it is subjected to the same procedures that apply to other government departments. The implication is that the Authority cannot disburse funds as freely as it would wish as its budget is always dictated by external forces.

The placement of the Authority in a ministry further creates hurdles in the budgetary process. It is noteworthy that by virtue of its being under a ministry, it is accountable to the ministry and its budget has to be considered together with that of other departments in the ministry with which it competes for funds. Like these other departments, it has to undergo ministerial ceiling. The implication

of this for the performance of the Authority is obvious. Take, for instance, the fact that the LBDA is ideally charged with undertaking very large development projects. It is obvious that one large project may even have a larger budget than say, of six ministries put together, let alone that of its parent ministry. Yet here it is, fighting for one single ministry's budget allocation with two other Authorities (TARDA and KVDA) and other departments with which it exists in the Ministry. Even after defending its budgetary estimates at the ministerial budgetary committee, the Authority is still expected to defend the budget at the Treasury should it be required to do so.

The freedom to disburse funds is further hampered by the government budgetary procedure by which money is allocated on a project-by-project basis and accounting is also done on the project-to-project basis. This runs counter to the principle of "financial boot-legging" which the practice of decentralization demands, for funds cannot easily be diverted into meeting new problems that occur after the budgeting has been done.

The dependence on the treasury and the subjection of the Authority to the normal government procedure further hampers the freedom of the Authority in determining its priorities. It appears that the Treasury

has more leeway to determine which of the Authority's programmes is to be incorporated into the national budget. This is best demonstrated by a letter from the Office of the President, the then parent ministry of the Authority, signed on behalf of the Permanent Secretary in which the Authority was asked to submit its requirements to the treasury in anticipation of the 1981/82 budget. The letter said, inter alia:

"...I must, however, emphasise that your programme of work must be detailed enough and realistically costed, so as not to be sent down by Treasury officials." 7

The implication is that even if a project is desirable, its implementation can be withheld if the Treasury officials feel otherwise!

If the dependence on the Treasury subjects the Authority to a financial straitjacket and hence lack of freedom of choice of priority projects and disbursement of funds, the method of appropriation of even the meagre funds further hampers the application of the principles of flexibility and autonomy. The Authority reckons that there is an irregular pattern of release of funds further compounded by the frequent revisions of the budget in the course of the financial year which usually results in cuts in allocations. The impact of these revisions cannot be over-emphasised.

Obviously, there will be cases where projects cannot continue because of interruption in the funding and the Authority may have delays in project implementation resulting in incomplete projects just as the government ministries in the region have. In this case, then, the Authority cannot justify its existence as a leader in the region's development if, like other institutions it cannot complete its projects in time.

Funds allocated to the Authority are divided into two: (a) the Recurrent expenditure funds which go into meeting mainly overhead expenses like paying the salaries of the staff, buying office equipment, etc., and (b) Development funds which go into various projects to meet expenses on their management and other requirements. The Recurrent Expenditure funds are released monthly while the Development funds are released quarterly, that is, after every three months. This further renders the Authority impotent as far as coping with uncertainties is concerned. It also finds it difficult to exercise freedom and business latitude. There have been cases where the Authority has had to incur expenditure and pay later (leading to debt problem) as the Authority may require supplies which exceed the monthly appropriation. With regard to the project funds - Development funds - the quarterly release of funds makes it difficult for the Authority to adjust its plans in the process of implementation

should need arise. A leaf can be borrowed from the TVA in this respect.

In the case of the TVA, it was found appropriate to use the "lumpsum method" of appropriation in which the annual appropriations to the Authority are remitted as lumpsums in general terms. The Authority was given special treatment and was not subjected to the method of appropriation by minute itemisation of projects and funds for expenditure. The main virtue of the lumpsum method is that it allows what David C. Korten<sup>8</sup> calls "financial bootlegging" in which finances can be transferred from one projected purpose to another to meet certain immediate demands of the changing environment. In the case of the LBDA, for instance, the region whose development it is to spearhead has been experiencing intermittent floods which occasionally require relief programmes. May be before the Authority finds a permanent solution to the problem, the Authority could, when situation demands during flood periods, undertake emergency measures to deal with the problem. If it were given some lumpsum money with no itemised projects tied to it, it could use some of it to deal with such emergencies. Finer, in his study of the TVA, defends the lumpsum method of appropriation to the TVA on the ground that:

"...since the TVA is so much of a business enterprise and has so many experimental and developmental features it should be given a reasonable latitude".<sup>9</sup>

Unlike the traditional method of itemising allocations on a project-to-project basis that applies to government ministries, the lumpsome method gives the Authority, Finer continues,

"...a practical power of what is known in public financial parlance as virement, that is, diversion or moneys to and from the different items, to an extent never tolerated of the case of ordinary Government departments."<sup>10</sup>

Since the LBDA, by its very objective and nature as embodied in its Act, is designed along the TVA lines, environmental differences notwithstanding, it would appear that the non-lumpsome method adopted for its appropriations from the Treasury denies it the type of latitude and flexibility in its development programmes which its counterparts elsewhere like the TVA and even the River Valleys Development Authority in Ceylon enjoy and which have been partly responsible for the great strides of development achieved by such Authorities. It is even more interesting to note that although the LBDA is allowed to borrow money from outside the country, unlike other government ministries, even the aid got from foreign donors have to be

incorporated into the cumbersome and stringent budgetary process. All these encase the Authority in a strait-jacket and reduces it to the level of other government departments calling into question its difference from the same.

The application of the traditional budgetary process to the Authority may be justified by some as a method of controlling the Authority's expenditure! But there are provisions for control as stipulated in the Act. Sections 12 and 13 of the Act enjoin the LBDA to account for every single cent spent and requires that the Minister (of its parent Ministry) lay before the National Assembly for scrutiny its annual reports and financial state. In addition, like other bodies, it is subjected to scrutiny by the Controller and Auditor-General. With the proper functioning of the controlling mechanisms it would still be possible to use the lumpsome method and make the Authority account for every cent used.

As at the end of the 1983/84 financial year, the Authority had received a total of K£1,943,353, mainly in form of government grants-in-aid. Since the formation of the Authority in 1979 there have been occasions when the ideas of financial accountability and financial autonomy have clashed. Although the Authority did not go self-accounting until the 1983/84

financial year - before then, the parent ministry was responsible for LBDA's financial transactions - there is clear evidence that Treasury and even the parent ministry have questioned the manner in which the LBDA has been spending its funds. The Authority has been constantly reminded of the need for financial control as it has been felt that it has sometimes lavishly spent on activities least related to development. Some officers at the parent ministry of the LBDA, for instance, blamed the "sluggishness" of the Authority in the first four or so years of its existence on "financial misbehaviour" by its management. In particular, the Authority was accused of spending large sums of money furnishing its offices<sup>11</sup> and holding cocktail parties instead of going straight into project implementation. For instance, the Permanent Secretary in the Office of the President, the then parent ministry of the Authority, had to write a strong warning letter to the Authority's Managing Director in November, 1980, stressing the need for financial control after it was discovered that the Authority had spent some KShs. 12,649/25 on a Cocktail party it held in honour of what the Managing Director called "a distinguished Japanese guest."<sup>12</sup> The Controller and Auditor-General's report for the financial year ending 1982 also lamented that the Managing Director of the LBDA (together with that of KVDA) had spent as much as KShs. 10,534/75 on personal items and



beverages, an anomaly according to the report. There was also some discomfort in government circles about the number of luxurious vehicles the Authority was purchasing at the expense of "development activities which provide socio-economic infrastructure."<sup>13</sup> Yet another source of tension between the Authority and the Central Government over expenditure was the idea of spending "too much" money on feasibility studies. One Cabinet Minister from the Authority's development area, at a D.D.C. meeting in 1983 accused the Authority of "wasting (time) and resources on feasibility studies".<sup>14</sup>

The foregoing accusations against the Authority point to the need for "control" from above. Infact, the above accusations put the Authority so much on the defensive that it failed to convince both critics and friends that it was not "taking off" because of financial inadequacy. For no amount of explanations to the effect that the Authority lacked enough finances to begin projects could satisfy the people of the region when the Authority officers moved around in expensive and luxurious Authority vehicles and were furnishing their offices with the most expensive equipments (like carpets) which even some private enterprise offices did not have!

#### 4.1.2: THE ROLE OF THE PARENT MINISTRY OF LBDA

In practice, the government acts through a parent Ministry to discharge its role of general supervision, monitoring and evaluating the performance of a given parastatal body. Although there are other mechanisms through which the government exercises control over the parastatal, it is the parent ministry which gives policy-direction to the agency. This role is important given the need to integrate the agency's policies into the wider national policies. The parent ministry therefore acts both as a "watch-dog" and a "steering wheel". However, in terms of policy formulation and reformulation, it is only concerned with the macro- or national policy perspective of the operations of the parastatal. The general or detailed policies governing the daily operations of the agency, as noted elsewhere, is the responsibility of that agency's Board. All in all, the parent ministry is enjoined to ensure that the agency is well managed by availing guidelines and assistance where and when necessary. It has also been discussed how the ministry also plays the important role of resource (financial) getter for the Authority. On behalf of the State, the ministry also acts as a source of power and authority for the Authority since the head of the ministry is a Minister, thus a member of the powerful policy-making and governing body, the Cabinet, and by virtue of being

appointed by the Head of State, represents the power of the government.

Since its birth, the LBDA has had three different parent ministries beginning with the Ministry of Economic Planning, later moving to the Office of the President before settling in its current home, the Ministry of Energy and Regional Development.

The role of the LBDA's parent ministry is spelt out in its Act. Section 4(1)(J) provides for the membership of the ministry's permanent Secretary on the Authority's Board. This strengthens (in theory) further the ministry's role as a "guide" in policy-matters as the Board is the policy-making body of the Authority. The Minister's role is even more emphatic. He appoints the Managing Director (Section 10(1)). Section 4(4) empowers him to terminate the appointment of non-official members of the Authority. He also has a role to play in financial control over the LBDA. By section 12(1) he can "cause the Authority to present to him all books and accounts of the income, expenditure, assets and liabilities of the Authority". Together with the Minister for Finance, he, according to Section 11(b) approves the Authority's borrowing procedures at all times. At the Parliament, he represents the Authority and, according to Section 13(2) he lays the Authority's report and Controller and

and Auditor-General's report and other statements of accounts of the Authority before the National Assembly.

In the first three or so years, the Authority was run more-or-less like a department within its parent ministry. This was particularly so before the appointment of the Board in April, 1981, the period during which the policies governing the LBDA were determined by the ministry, though in consultation with the Managing Director. Of course, it will be remembered that LBDA became self-accounting only during the 1983/84 financial year implying that all the financial transactions were undertaken by the parent ministry.

The ministry, chiefly through the Minister, apart from playing the role of "resource-getter" (mainly finance) and "guide", has also on more than one occasion defended the Authority when the latter has been attacked both in and outside Parliament. In October, 1984, when the Authority was accused of malpractices such as tribalism and sectionalism in both recruitment and project implementation in Parliament, an Assistant Minister read a statement in defence of the Authority.<sup>15</sup> In July, 1985, the Minister publicly appealed to the "local politicians to abandon their "negative" attitude towards the

existence.<sup>18</sup>

In fine, the role of the ministry is clearly stated and, as hinted above, the powers of control and guidance it is given with regard to the LBDA are a manifestation of the desire on the part of the government to make the Authority accountable for all its activities for it is a public agency thriving on public money. Nevertheless, the issue of conflict between the principles of "accountability" and autonomy", a conflict which has continued to plague the minds of both scholars of parastatals and policy-makers alike, still rears its head in the relationship between the LBDA and its parent ministry.

Most scholars have eschewed the overriding control that the Minister usually has over parastatals that fall under his ministry and this has often been cited as a factor leading to inefficiency and dismal performance of parastatal bodies.<sup>19</sup> In particular, the role of the Boards has been questioned in view of the overriding ministerial role. The issue is posed by Briones thus:

"...The role of the corporation is not really determined by the Board. A lot of the corporations are attached to Ministries. So, in effect, the Minister defines the role of the Board and therefore

the question is asked, What use is the Board? Either you abolish the Board because in the final analysis, the Board just is the policy determining body and policy-determination is not done by the Board but the Minister to which the corporation is attached."20

Walter O. Oyugi<sup>21</sup> further argues that due to the fact that most board members occupy their positions at the pleasure of the Minister - for instance, see Section 4(4) of the LBDA Act - it will be asking too much of them to make independent decisions. The issue then is that if they cannot freely make decisions that govern the operations of the Authority, then the autonomy of the Authority is jeopardised.

It has been demonstrated above the magnitude of control that the ministry has over the Authority. To the extent that this control contributes to efficiency at the Authority, it is justifiable. But the story is different. On the issue of recruitment, for example, the LBDA Act is not specific on the qualification of the members of the Board and the Chief executive, giving the Minister wide latitude. In many cases, appointments have been made on patron-cliental lines with many chief executives being mere "cronies". The other hard fact is that the Minister is a politician and, given the patron-clientel relationships that characterise Kenyan politics, one cannot rule out the

fact that in giving policy directions to the Authority, the Minister may put his political interests before those of the Authority, especially in the area of recruitment of staff.

Whether the Ministry can effectively act as a "steering wheel" for the Authority is another issue. The doubt arises from two considerations. The first is that apart from giving attention to the LBDA, the ministry has the other two RDAs (KVDA and TARDA) under its jurisdiction, let alone the other numerous departments in the ministry. As things are now, it would appear that the ministry has too much on its hands and therefore cannot devote enough time and energy to matters concerning the Authority, especially with regard to monitoring its activities. The Permanent Secretary is an ex-officio member of many<sup>3/</sup> boards in the ministry and this further limits his capacity to devote time to one Authority. The second consideration is with regard to the professional capability of the ministry to give professional and technical advice to the LBDA. Although the ministry has assigned specific officers to the LBDA and other RDAs, most, if not all of them are career civil servants who have not had any experience with similar ventures (RDAs by their nature derive their uniqueness from their difference from the normal governmental machinery) casting doubt on

Authority, defending the LBDA from what was seen as an "onslaught" from the local politicians.<sup>16</sup>

To discharge its role at the policymaking and reformulation levels, the ministry has assigned two officers - one an Under-Secretary and the other an Assistant Secretary - to matters pertaining to the three Regional Development Authorities of which LBDA is one. They examine from time to time the operations of the Authority with a view to ensuring that it does not "go astray". For instance, when the LBDA was attacked and accused of duplicating the functions of other government departments in the region, the Ministry took keen interest to ensure that this does not happen. For example, when the Authority proposed in 1984 to undertake a Population Activities Programme, the Deputy Secretary in charge of Development wrote to the Authority officers asking them to:

"confirm that the project would not be a duplication of MOH (Ministry of Health) work on Rural Health and Family Planning".<sup>17</sup>

That the Ministry was not going just to sit and watch things go wrong was underlined by the action taken by it to call the new Managing Director in 1982 to a meeting where the Authority was advised to avoid "petty projects" which it was undertaking and go into large scale projects which were likely to legitimize its



their ability to appropriately monitor LBDA, KVDA and TARDA. They may in the end concern themselves only with the routine civil service regulations and procedures, sometimes applying them irrelevantly to the unique RDAs.

The implication of the foregoing is that if the Ministry is not capable of discharging its watch-dog role because of the two factors delineated above, then it can only be expected that the management of the Authority is left on its own, resulting in what Walter Ouma Oyugi calls:

"goal displacement, laxity and eventual disintegration of the organisational system."<sup>22</sup>

The Phillip Ndegwa Committee (1979) observed, in their report on parastatals in Kenya,

"The committee found instances of personalised institutions... and in addition there came to the notice of the committee cases where ministries had provided little guidance or expertise to parastatals and failed to take steps to enforce established operating procedures."<sup>23</sup>

In the case of the LBDA, the issue of unbalanced regional recruitment of staff discussed in chapter three and a problem now recognized by the Board and some officers

at the ministry may be linked with the failure of the ministry to monitor events at the Authority. The issue of duplication of other ministries' functions by the LBDA may also reflect the uncertainty about the role of the Authority at the ministry, again casting doubt on the competence of the ministry's staff as policy-guides for the LBDA.

Given this situation, the question that comes into mind readily is whether to remove the Authority from the ministry. But if it is removed from the ministry, how will the Central Government monitor its policies and ensure that they tally with national development goals? This researcher would recommend that the LBDA could still be put under a ministry provided that the relationship between the two are clearly defined and that the officers at the ministry concerned with LBDA's activities be trained through ventures such as study tours to similar ventures elsewhere in the world to equip them with the necessary knowledge of how an RDA should be run and made instrumental to development.

#### 4.1.3: OTHER GOVERNMENT ACTORS:

Like other quasi-governmental agencies the LBDA is also subjected to control and scrutiny by other government bodies apart from the Treasury and its parent ministry. These include the legislature, the

Auditor-General, Inspectorate of Statutory Boards and the Parastatal Advisory Committee.

First, the Legislature. In theory, by virtue of its legal identity bequeathed on it by the fact that it came into being by an Act of Parliament, the LBDA is supposed to be ultimately accountable to the National Assembly which is also theoretically its ultimate source of Authority and power. The limitation of the National Assembly as an effective monitoring and "watch-dog" mechanism over the LBDA cannot be overemphasised. The limitations derive both from government policy and the origins of the Authority. In terms of government policy, the inclusion of politicians in the Board of the Authority, some of whom are sitting Members of Parliament make them interested parties and therefore can seldom criticise LBDA's policies which they themselves formulate. It will be recalled that the Deputy Chairman of the LBDA is a Member of Parliament. There are others too. For instance, when the parliamentary Public Accounts Committee presents its report on the LBDA, like it does with other Statutory Boards, the MPs who are on the Authority Board cannot be expected to critically examine the report. In some cases, these same MPs may become members of the Public Accounts Committee. Also, the fact that LBDA was at best <sup>the</sup> child of the President himself, who decreed its establishment (Parliament only

hastily passed the bill establishing it with very little discussion) means that its links with Parliament are not as strong as say, those between the TVA and the U.S. Congress. In fact, it appears that even the Members of Parliament themselves may not know the proper role of the Authority. The tag of war which developed between the LBDA and some politicians (some MPs) coming from the region was partly traceable to the fact that there has been a misunderstanding between the two parties, not surprising in view of the fact that the MPs played a minimal part in its creation.

The role of the National Assembly is further neutralised by the fact that LBDA is directly responsible to its parent ministry and is only so to the Legislature through the Minister. This contrasts very much with the case of the TVA where the Authority's source of power and authority is, in every instance, the Congress. Thus the Congress takes a leading rôle in ensuring that all is well at the TVA. It can summon TVA officers for interrogation and questioning as it did when there was misunderstanding between the Chairman and other directors of the first Board of the Authority.<sup>24</sup>

Since its establishment, the LBDA has been subject of debate in Parliament only on a few occasions, especially during the routine annual debate on various

ministries expenditure estimates. The sharpest criticism of the Authority in Parliament came in October 1984 when some MPs from its "development area" accused it of sectionalism in employment and ineptness. With regard to the former accusation, one M.P. charged that the LBDA was "not national as it was "employing people only from South Nyanza district."<sup>25</sup> The same member demanded:

"...We want to see what the LBDA is doing...We want to see them active and doing something... We want them to begin sorking more seriously and show us what they are producing."<sup>26</sup>

However, some members have also supported the Authority and campaigned for it to be given more resources during parliamentary debates. For instance, when it was accused of sectionalism in employment, a nominated member from one of the districts within its development area defended it against the allegations and cited "financial strain" as the main cause of inactivity of the LBDA."<sup>27</sup>

The other monitoring mechanism which interacts with the LBDA, mainly in matters of expenditure is the Office of the Controller and Auditor-General, established by the Ex-chequer and Audit Act (Cap. 142) to audit the accounts of Statutory Boards in Kenya. The

relationship between the Office and the LBDA is defined by the policy laid down in the former's Act. It examines and audits its Accounts every year. It makes a public report on cases of mismanagement and misappropriation of funds and wrongful expenditure. However, this raises questions about the autonomy and efficiency at the LBDA. The Auditor-General treats all government agencies and departments the same, applying same procedures and methods of scrutiny. However, the LBDA is definitely different from, say, other government departments like Ministries, let alone other statutory bodies. Applying same procedures of audit and financial scrutiny undermines the difference of the organisation, Its financial freedom is impinged upon as it can disburse funds in ways beneficial to the Authority, yet inappropriate according to the Controller and Auditor-General's office. For example, although LBDA's purchasing and tender policies may generally conform to the overall government policies, its procedures may differ in detail. This may generate a lot of misunderstanding between the Controller and Auditor-General and the Authority.

However, the Controller and Auditor-General's office can still act as a watch-dog over LBDA so long as it recognizes that the latter is different and ought to be accorded special treatment. Its role became more crucial when, for example, in its 1980/81

report it revealed instances of "financial waste" at the IBDA accusing the management of lavish and luxurious spending in matters only remotely related to development. It particularly questioned the huge amount of money spent on hotel accommodation bills and beverages by some of the Authority's officers.<sup>28</sup> Be it as it may, however, the office may not play an effective role as a watch-dog because it is common for the government not to follow up cases brought up by the Controller and Auditor-General's reports. Identified culprits go unpunished and even when punished, this is always in form of transfer and retirement. So, the same mistakes are repeated over and over.

The other government actor is the Parastatal Advisory Committee. This committee acts as a supreme body on parastatal matters. It is a high-powered body chaired by the Chief Secretary. It is, however, its technical arm, the Inspectorate of Statutory Boards which interacts with the parastatal bodies. The latter, established by an Act of Parliament ( Cap. 412), is charged with the duty of ensuring that the statutory boards are functioning well. The Inspector, head of the inspectorate, is empowered under Section 30 of the Act to attend Board meetings of parastatals. Paragraph 3.5 of the Section also empowers the inspectorate to examine Board Papers and minutes, existing procurement

and tender procedures. It also examines the terms and conditions of service and is empowered to examine management practices and give guidelines to strengthen the parastatals.

All said, the institutions discussed above, that is the Treasury, the LBDA's parent ministry and the other government actors are supposed to ensure that the LBDA functions well and in line with government policy. In fine, they all aim at ensuring efficiency and effectiveness at the Authority so that it can achieve its goals. However, as pointed out in the foregoing, the role of these arms of the Central Government with regard to efficiency and effectiveness of the LBDA depends very much upon the structure and form of their relationships with the Authority. It also depends on their capability to monitor and effectively supervise the Authority.

#### 4.2.0. LBDA WITHIN THE REGION'S INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK:

The LBDA obviously did not jump into a vacuum: it was, in fact, a late comer on a scene dominated by many institutions and agencies some of which had a history dating back to pre-independence days. And when it was established, it was not expected, indeed the Act does not intend it to take over the activities



of all the agencies operating in its area of jurisdiction. Contrarily, it was intended to act alongside these institutions in a concerted, joint effort to accelerate the development of the region. How LBDA fits within the already existing institutional framework has got very profound effects on its role and performance. Moreover, given that one of its functions is to coordinate the development activities of various parties in the region, its relations with these agencies form an important dimension of its performance. Throughout the Act, there are specific references made to other institutions in the area, some specifically stipulating that the LBDA has to cooperate with other institutions.

It is in recognition of the importance of its immediate institutional environment that the Authority, in 1984, came up with a policy statement on "the general principles governing LBDA's relationship with existing structures" inside its development area. According to the policy statement, these principles are:

- (i) Domain Demarcation - the Authority is to branch out into areas of development and functions which the existing organisations have been unable to perform well, e.g. Irrigated agriculture, and secondly,

functions which have not been tackled at all;

- (ii) Declaration of Interdependence between the activities of the Authority and other government ministries and agencies;
- (iii) Strategy of cooptation: - the Authority undertakes to adopt the policy of "cooptation" instead of "coercion", in which the "established leadership can be assimilated into the new system of decision-making"; and
- (iv) Coordination and integration - the Authority sees its role as "to advise on, and harmonize the separate sectorally organised development activities on a regional level."<sup>29</sup>

At best, these four policy guidelines dovetail into one single catchphrase - "coexistence". Pursued to their logical ends and sincerely by the Authority, and, of course, well understood and appreciated by other agencies, the guidelines aim at staving off conflicts which would otherwise arise between the LBDA on the one hand, and other institutions in the region on the other. These conflicts are bound to occur whenever a new organisation, particularly those seeking to perform the same functions as the old ones

enter the development scene. As Albert O. Hirschman says,

"projects set up in such a way that they inevitably antagonize established agencies that have, or used to have responsibilities in the activity which the new project or rather the agency administering it now claims as its preserve must expect some counter-offensive and defensive behaviour from the "offended old-timers".<sup>30</sup>

He further warns against the "underestimation" of the ability of these old-timers to stage counter-offensives.<sup>31</sup> Hence, the LBDA rightly charts out the course to deal with the anticipated conflicts. Whether the LBDA has really followed the above policy guidelines in its operational interaction with the region's institutions is however, another issue altogether and is partly the subject of this chapter. But first, it is pertinent to discuss the LBDA within the new development policy of the "District Focus for Rural Development" as it has got very important implications for the Authority's relations with the regions' institutions and its performance as a whole.

#### 4.2.1: LBDA - D.D.C.'s RELATIONSHIP: THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE "DISTRICT FOCUS" FOR THE LBDA:

The "District Focus for Rural Development" policy

entered its implementation phase in the 1983/84 financial year. A strategy for decentralization of development and equitable distribution of development resources among districts in the country, the policy takes the district as the focal point of development planning and implementation. In fact, financial allocations for development purposes are done on a district-to-district basis. The major actor in the execution of the policy is the District Development Committee (D.D.C.) which, although was in existence before, is now stronger and more powerful than ever. It is charged with coordination, implementation, and overall evaluation of development projects in the district. It sets the development priorities for the district and all other organisations are to ensure that their programmes dovetail into these priorities. The DDC also has to approve every initiated project in the district. It can reject or sanction project proposals.

It is important to note that the new policy was adopted almost five years after the establishment of the LBDA and therefore its advent has had serious implications for the LBDA. The LBDA's area of jurisdiction contains 14 districts, 7 of which are within the "Development Area". The LBDA, like all other development institutions in the districts, is a member of each of these D.D.C.s and their executive arms,

the District Executive Committees (D.E.C.s). Although at surface level it would appear that there should be no conflict or problem of relations between the LBDA and the D.D.C.s because, as many government officers and the LBDA officers themselves argued, the LBDA cuts across district boundaries and that it is regional in character while the D.D.C.s are district-specific, the relationship seem not be harmonious all round.

The first problem relates to the role of "coordination" where the functions of both the LBDA and the DDC intersect. The DDC does the monitoring and evaluation of projects in the district. At the provincial level, too, there is a Provincial Monitoring and Evaluation Committee. The LBDA is a member of both committees; not as the overall incharge, but merely as a department. In fact, in D.D.C. meetings, the LBDA representative participates at an equal level with representatives from other departments. This reduces the Authority to the level of a government department with no authority over the other departments. Hence, the LBDA's role of coordination can only be confined to its own projects. That is to say, the LBDA can only coordinate its own projects in the region with surveillance from the various D.D.C.s under whose districts the projects fall rather than coordinate other agencies' activities. From interviews

and discussions with various heads of departments and agencies in the various districts the view that emerged was that the departments and agencies recognised only the D.D.C. as the final authority in terms of coordination and approval of projects and the LBDA was viewed as an equal partner "with no right to poke its nose on other agencies' activities".<sup>32</sup> The Authority itself seems to have succumbed to its "internalised" role of coordination. In its Development Policy statement issued in April, 1985, the Authority interpretes "coordination" as meaning:

"...sharing and harmonizing of our activities so as to act together in a smooth concerted way in the development of the great potential which exists in the Lake Basin Catchment area."<sup>33</sup>

It actually views the D.D.C.s only as forums where it meets with other departments with a view not to coordinating the development activities of the departments - the D.D.C.s do this - but rather, "coordinating its projects and programmes with other sectoral ministries and Non-Governmental organisations".<sup>34</sup>

The fact that the D.D.C.s, not the LBDA, are the overall development bosses is underlined by the Authority itself in its development policy where it pledges that as a member of the D.D.C. and its Executive Committee, the Authority will take steps to:

"...ensure that all projects and programmes undertaken by the Authority are subject to D.D.C.'s discussions in their respective areas," 35

and that:

"...in choosing and designing its programmes, the Authority will use the D.D.C. priorities as a guide in determining the type of programmes needed." 36

The argument is not that the Authority should not hold discussions with D.D.C.s or use their priorities for that matter: the issue is that the original objective as stated in the Act's preamble which viewed LBDA as the overall boss of development in the area has been stifled by the D.D.C.s' new role. Planning and coordination are done by the D.D.C.s and it remains to be seen whether when the Authority completes its Regional Master Plan, which is in progress, it will be the single plan to be used by the various parties in the districts. The thesis here that given the "impotence" of the LBDA as the single most authority over other government departments and agencies, it is not likely that its plan will be adhered to. This contrasts with the power of the Delaware River Basin Commission created in 1961 in the U.S.A., with regard to management of resources. In the case of the Commission,

"...with one exception (Federal Government), no new project may be carried out by any party, private or public, which substantially affects the waters of the Basin unless the project has been found by the Commission to be consistent with its comprehensive plan."<sup>37</sup>

Of course, this could only happen because the Commission does not lack the necessary powers and legal base for the exercise of the executive functions of management of the basin resources. In the case of the LBDA, due to the fact that the agencies in the region feel more responsible and answerable to the D.D.C., not LBDA, and the fact that they view LBDA as an equal partner, it remains to be seen whether the LBDA's planning powers can be exercised - in any case, it lacks the powers to enforce its plans which are in any case disaggregated and incorporated into the district plans, making the district plan the only authoritative plan.

The subjection of the Authority to the various D.D.C.s has another serious implication for the Authority's performance. This is in the area of budget allocation for projects. The Authority has been forced to disaggregate its budget on the district-by-district basis. It is evident that this has been due to pressure from various DDCs as they (the DDCs) fight for the financial resources of the LBDA among themselves. Each DDC has been challenging the LBDA



to show what it has done, has been doing, or plans to do in its district. The LBDA has been at pains to explain that it is regional in character and that its budget is done on a regional basis. However, it appears the Authority has yielded to the pressure from the DDCs. For example, in a D.D.C. meeting at Kakamega, the members observed that even if the LBDA had a Regional Master plan, at least in it should be projects for Kakamega District and therefore asked the LBDA's senior planner who was in attendance and had reiterated the regional nature of the LBDA,

"... to single out and prepare a list of those projects planned for implementation in Kakamega District." 38

Apparently yielding to this pressure, the Authority in its Development Policy document of April, 1985 states that it will

"...disaggregate its budget on District-by-District basis so that each DDC can anticipate the resources available for district-specific as well as the multi-district and national projects which will have local impact." 39

This District-by-District splitting of the LBDA budget poses two major problems for the Authority,

*This is what DDCs regional to do*

namely: (a) as each DDC struggles for a share of the LBDA's budget, the Authority will find itself making a lot of promises - if only to please the DDCs - which it will not be able to fulfill, leading to the DDCs' lack of confidence in LBDA. Already, the minutes of several DDC meetings are replete with complaints that the LBDA has promised a lot that have not been fulfilled; (b) the LBDA will be denied the chance to concentrate - in the interest of efficiency, meaning impact - on a few projects which it can manage well in view of the meagre funds at its disposal. Instead, it will divide its meagre resources - technical and financial - among districts and even have a number of same types of projects scattered all over the region but with little impact, leading to the "white elephant" situation. A senior officer at the Authority admitted that the Authority has had to use the "model of dispersion" in place of the "model of concentration" in geographical prioritization of projects in order to satiate pressure from districts for its projects. He further lamented that this has led to a lot of improperly managed projects.

The effect of the "district pressure" on the LBDA has started showing. Take, for instance, the Bricks and Tiles Project of the Authority. There is the RIAT BRICKS AND TILES PLANT near Kisumu town. Then, only a few kilometres away in Kakamega district,

there is the SOLONGO BRICKS AND TILES PLANT in Vihiga division. This researcher found out that the clay being used at RIAT for making bricks was being transported from the SOLONGO plant site. This finding poses two questions, namely, (a) why start a project in a poor site (RIAT does not have local material - clay) and, (b) why start two identical projects near each other? It is definite that this situation leads to inefficiency because, for instance, a lot of time and resources are wasted in transporting clay from SOLONGO to RIAT - why not concentrate all the resources on SOLONGO which has the needed material (clay)? Even SOLONGO was found to be operating under-capacity. The same situation applies to the four Animal Multiplication Centres at Alupe (Busia District), Muhoroni (Kisumu), Lichota (South Nyanza) and Sang'alo (Bungoma) where meagre resources have been scattered among the four projects with little impact.

The argument is that for a young Authority which has not accumulated enough human and material resources, there is need to use the available resources efficiently. One way of achieving this is to cut down on financial and administrative costs by concentrating on few but manageable and efficiently run projects whose cost of management is within the Authority's reach. Otherwise cases of abandoned projects will occur. Already, a fish breeding centre at RONGO in South Nyanza is

experiencing problems due to poor planning because no proper feasibility study was conducted before it was launched. It never functions the whole year because the water level is low and it has to depend on rain. Yet it had to be launched at this poor site because the authority had to show the residents of the district that it had some projects for them.

The submission, then, is that in terms of economical use of resources, the efficiency of the Authority is compromised by the policy of the district-by-district budget and the need to satisfy the interests of every district. The argument of this researcher is that it is not impossible for a district to benefit from a project located outside it. Benefits from a project in District A can still be shared among the residents of the whole region and even beyond.

The foregoing demonstrates the influence of the environment on an organisation's working. The pressures on the LBDA are a manifestation of this. For instance, the district boundaries in the region coincide with ethnic delimitations and therefore the inter-D.D.C. rivalry over the LBDA projects can be interpreted along socio-political lines. Add the fact that local politicians are members of the DDCs which means that political pressure on ethnic lines (ethnicity is a major element of Kenyan politics and

To argue this way, however, does not mean that the LBDA has outlived its usefulness in the era of the "District Focus" policy. The problem lies in the role and functional differentiation between the DDC and the Authority. As things are now, it would appear that the LBDA has just become another government department in the district, albeit appearing at once in all the districts in its area of jurisdiction, and one would wonder whether, if this is the case, its establishment was not just another case of the common phenomenon of the proliferation of organisations which duplicate each other's functions or what P.E. Ollawa would say is a situation "conducive to the operation of Parkinson's law: namely, the proliferation of organisational structures."<sup>40</sup> One would also wonder whether it is worthwhile to pump the meagre funds from the Treasury into the Authority when an alternative would have been to strengthen the existing structures to perform the functions better. It is posited here that in order for the Authority to be useful as the "boss" (albeit not a monster to other institutions) of development in the region, there is need for a re-examination of its relationship with the DDCs as it appears to be "impotent" before the DDCs. A case in point is where in 1984, the Authority wrote <sup>41</sup> to its parent ministry's Permanent Secretary, complaining that only one district had incorporated LBDA work programme in its plan and only three had

invited the Authority to present its annex to the DDCs. This shows the powerlessness of the Authority over the DDCs. In fact, one District Development Officer (D.D.O.) - D.D.O.'s are Secretaries to DDCs - dismissed the LBDA as an institution - which has outlived its usefulness due to the introduction of the "District Focus" policy. Asked why, he answered,

"...LBDA is responsible to me for any activity they do and not the other way round. LBDA is responsible to the DDC... the DDC is not responsible to the LBDA."42

4.2.2: LBDA'S RELATIONS WITH OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND OTHER ORGANISATIONS IN THE REGION.

If there is a problem of power relationship between the LBDA and the DDCs, the relationship between the Authority and other agencies, especially government ministries is even more problematic. In the LBDA Act, a number of subsections of Section 8 make references to other institutions. For example, Section 8(a) enjoins the Authority to work closely with the government ministries as it requires the Authority

"...to plan for the development area and initiate project activities identified from such planning in the development

area through the Government generally" (emphasis mine)

Section 8(j) gives one of the Authority's functions as,

"...to maintain a liaison between the Government, the private sector and other interested agencies in the matter of the development of the development area with a view to limiting the duplication of effort and to ensure the best use of the available technical resources."

Section 8(d) empowers the Authority to do the monitoring and evaluation of development projects in the area with a view to improving their performance while Section 8(f) enjoins it to coordinate and monitor the "abstraction and use" of the natural resources in the region. Both these underline the interaction with other agencies.

To say the least, these functions suggest that the Authority, as per the Act, is intended to be the overall development <sup>2</sup> seer in the region. In theory, then, the other agencies should be responsible to it. The research findings, however, paint a negative picture as most, if not all, of these agencies do not see the LBDA in this light. To find out whether the agencies saw the LBDA as the overall authority over development activities in the area, heads of departments

and other agencies in the region were given a list of bodies and asked to rank them in order of which one they were more responsible to in their operations. The bodies were

1. Parent agency/ministry
2. LBDA
3. D.D.C.
4. Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning
5. Other(s)

Out of the sixteen heads interviewed, three ranked LBDA third while the rest ranked it either fourth or fifth. All ministerial departments and foreign agencies indicated they were responsible to their parent ministries or agencies first, then to the DDC. LBDA was seen as an equal partner also responsible to its parent ministry and then to the DDC.!

This creates problems for the Authority for it cannot discharge its functions of being a "watch-dog" if it is not recognised as such by those it has to "watch". In normal circumstances, the Authority would have two options - either to use "persuasion" as a method of "directing" the other agencies into conforming to its policies or "coercing" them. While the Authority should not adopt the "Big Brother" and



a "Monster" attitude towards the other agencies, it is necessary to give it adequate legal and powerful base to carry out its "watch-dog" functions. The argument is that this base does not exist in practice in view of its position with regard to the new District Focus policy as discussed above.

As may have been expected, the Authority as a new comer met with resistance from some of the old established institutions, especially the government ministries operative in the region. Domain consensus and functional differentiation have been the major issues at stake. Quite a number of institutions have claimed that the LBDA is "duplicating" functions in the region and "interfering" in their work. A number of heads of departments, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), and even other government parastatals functioning in the region pointed out in the course of discussions and interviews with this researcher that, as far as they were concerned the LBDA was encroaching on their "territories" because the LBDA "was not supposed to implement" but "to coordinate and plan", justifying their contention by citing the preamble of the Act (see Appendix 1 ) which they claimed said nothing about LBDA implementing projects on its own. Indeed, Section 8(a) on the functions of the Authority implies that after planning and initiating projects, the role of implementation is left to government institutions

in the area, at least from the point of view of the Authority's critics.

The Authority, however, defends its role of implementation on the following grounds<sup>43</sup>:-

- (a) that it has to be an example of an implementation-oriented, action-oriented agency to the otherwise bogged-down, red-tape ridden and paralysed bureaucratic field agencies of central government;
- (b) that the Act gives the Authority power to implement some projects on its own;
- (c) that other institutions may fail to implement for one reason or another;
- (d) that it has to do some implementation to supplement other institutions, and
- (e) that it has to implement some projects in order to generate income for itself.

Although the Authority uses ground (b) as a legal base for implementation, the Act is far from clear on the role of implementation. Indeed, the Authority officers themselves found it difficult to cite Section:-

of the Act that clearly give them the mandate to implement. The sections that were cited (by them) such as Section 8(g) which stipulates that LBDA has

"... to cause and effect the construction of any works deemed necessary for the protection and utilization of the water and soils of the Area",

are open to different interpretations and are far from clear. Be it as it may, however, it appears that now it has come to be accepted that the Authority has all the same to implement projects as it is doing presently.

The issue of functional differentiation came to fore immediately the LBDA began project implementation. The LBDA, to the chagrin of other government ministries, embarked on projects that several ministries claimed to belong to their domain. The first projects that the Authority undertook included an immunization programme which fell within the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Health, the Shallow Wells programme which would be claimed by both Ministries of Health and Water Development, the Lambwe Valley Tsetse-fly Control Programme (Ministry of Livestock Development) and the Fish Farming Project (Fisheries department, Ministry of Wildlife and Tourism). The LBDA was said to have "gone astray" by duplicating functions of other

ministries. The Authority has defended itself by pointing out that the issue of duplication aside, there is nothing it can do which does not touch on the activities of one or two or more institutions in the area, especially government ministries. It therefore prays that its activities be seen as "supplementary" to the efforts of other agencies in the development of the region.

An example of conflicts between LBDA and other ministries is that which concerned the Yala Swamp in Siaya district. The conflict was over the utilization of the reclaimed part of the swamp for what purpose and by whom. The LBDA had proposed to start a "food production" project (seed bulking, fruit nurseries, vegetable plantations, etc.) in it while the Ministry of Agriculture wanted it for sugar-cane production. After a prolonged series of negotiations and discussions, it was decided that the Authority take over the land. However, the final decision had to be reached at a Siaya DDC meeting<sup>44</sup>, where the DDC exercised its new acquired powers under the "District Focus" policy to come to the aid of LBDA. The Ministry of Agriculture had been represented by none other than the Minister himself who incidentally was a member of the DDC by virtue of his representing a constituency in the district. The Minister had even pointed out that it had been decided by an inter-ministerial committee

that the reclaimed area be given to his Ministry. This was dismissed by the D.D.C. Even after this, the ministry did not give up, for it later wrote to the LBDA to give the Kenya Seed Company the role of seed bulking in the area, LBDA rejected. This incident reveals two things of importance. First, it demonstrates that the D.D.C. is a valuable asset to the LBDA. Secondly, it represents the desire to ward off interference from ministries, asserting the autonomy of the Authority from the Central government.

One major charge against the Authority that recurred in the discussions and interviews with other agencies' officers was that the LBDA had been "going it alone" in matters that needed closer cooperation with other agencies, casting into doubt the seriousness of the Authority about its stated policy of "cooperation" and "interdependence". A case in point is the Lambwe Valley Tsetse-Fly control programme. LBDA was thrown into conflict with the Ministry of Livestock Development Headquarters in Nairobi and the South Nyanza district Veterinary Department. This was when the LBDA, in 1981, against expert advice from the Ministry, used spraying methods which turned out to be a flop at a very high cost. Conflict arose over LBDA's aerial spraying method and the type of insecticide used. The Livestock department had recommended ground spraying which experts had found to be more effective. LBDA

"arrogantly" despised the advice and went ahead with aerial spraying. Then, again, in 1983, LBDA went ahead to use an insecticide which failed to have any effect. This was despite a letter written by the Director of Livestock Development in Nairobi <sup>45</sup> expressing doubts as to the effectiveness of the Pyrethrum the LBDA intended to use. He even gave reasons as to why he thought, according to his expert knowledge, the insecticide could not <sup>be</sup> effective. Although the LBDA tried to involve the officers at the district Veterinary department, the implementation was done solely according to the Authority's own plans. The result was that after using a huge sum of money, the programme failed to have any effect.

The Lambwe tsetse-fly control issue reflected the "arrogance" of the LBDA - wanting to go it alone without help from other agencies. The Livestock Ministry could rightly claim that the LBDA was interfering with its work in the region by introducing "obsolete" and "ineffective" methods of operation. This incident dented even further the Authority's image as a leader in development and shook its legitimacy. It was failing to justify its claim, cited earlier above, that it has to implement in order to be an example to other agencies. In this case, if it was an example, it was a bad and an expensive one! It also did not reflect the Authority's

policy of cooperation. The fact that the programme flopped brought back to the fore the issue of functional differentiation with the main question being as to whether it was appropriate for the Authority to perform functions which other agencies could perform even better. Perhaps the Authority could have participated only at the level of provision of a few personnel and some financial input but should have left the implementation to the Ministry since the latter had the experience and expertise.

Other charges of arrogance on the part of the LBDA do exist. For instance, there were complaints that the Authority officers engaged in the Immunization programme were not cooperating well with the Ministry of Health officers with whom the Authority jointly carried out the programme. Several other departments also complained that the LBDA did not consult them when the latter started projects that would need their participation.

One of the most humiliating cases for the Authority in terms of its public relations with other agencies in the area was the case where its disagreement with a Women's group over the implementation of a small-scale vegetable irrigation project culminated in a show down with the involved group writing a letter to the head of State alleging that the LBDA was arrogant.

Before writing to the Head of State (President) to come to their rescue, the Chairman of the Women's group had written to the Managing Director a letter headed "Robbing project properties by Director of LBDA's projects" after the Authority had withdrawn its equipments from the project site alleging that they were being misused by the officials of the group. This was a project sponsored by the Freedom from Hunger Council for National Development and the LBDA was the implementing agency with the Women group, as the beneficiary, also participating. The Ministry of Agriculture and livestock was also a party providing extension services. Problems began after the project was almost complete and all equipments had been installed. The Authority was "not satisfied" with the way the equipments were being used. It used the Chief of the location to withdraw the equipments. In her letter to the Managing Director, the Chairman wrote, inter alia:

"...Sir, we could not expect you to show the ordinary wananchi such powers because you know that they are weak, poor and helpless."

The Women's group incident shows that the Authority does not only have public relations problems with government ministries but also with local people's organisations. In the case of the Women group, although it would be prejudicial to accuse the



Authority, the quotation of the letter given above shows the magnitude the affair had assumed and this may not augur well for the LBDA's future as a vehicle for local participation in development.

All said, with regard to the ministries and other development agencies, the Authority seemed to have gone into activities which could easily antagonise other agencies, which, anyway, had to behave in a counter-offensive manner as they were bound to see LBDA as an intruder, wanting to challenge their legitimacy and domains. Opposition from established agencies has been experienced by a number of new agencies, especially those that seek to be multi-purpose in objectives. The TVA had a long drawn conflict with the private power companies and other agencies.

The best approach, this researcher contends, by the LBDA towards warding off this opposition would have been to identify specific, limited projects, unique in nature, for the start rather than appearing as if it was doing everything in the region. Albert Hirschman attributes the success of Thailand's Royal Irrigation Department (RID) and El Salvador's Lempa River Hydroelectric Commission (CEL) in dealing with opposition from other agencies to the fact that they started with specific limited projects.<sup>46</sup> RID began

by concentrating all its efforts for a long time on irrigation and navigation while CEL concentrated on Hydroelectric power generation. The IVA is also known to have concentrated first on Power - in fact, for a long time the word "power" became the acronym for the IVA. The advantage of concentrating on a limited task for the start is that, apart from ensuring economical and efficient use of the small amount of resources - technical and administrative - in a manner that considerable impact accrues from the project, it also gives the agency time to garner enough political support. With time, of course, the agency

"...acquires enough technical and administrative expertise as well as political connections and is subsequently able to branch out into new areas of activity."47

As Hirschman continues to argue:

"...A good way for an agency to become multipurpose is to be first securely and competently grounded in one purpose, starting out with a specific task to make itself strong enough to overcome the inevitable opposition that will arise when it finally does spread out into functions that overlap those of existing agencies."48

The LBDA, ignoring this "career of gradual expansion" started by being "loudly multipurpose",

wanting to do everything at a time when it did not even, in the first place, have a strong technical and administrative base leading to poorly planned and poorly executed projects - reference was made earlier to the failed Tsetse-fly control programme and an abandoned fish pond at Rongo, South Nyanza district. This put LBDA's role in the region to question and it may find it difficult to hold on to such functions. For a young organisation like the LBDA, this was surely a poor start!

Nevertheless, it seems the Authority is now taking the issue of poor public relations seriously. It holds and sponsors seminars in which participants may be drawn from the local organisations, government ministries and other agencies. It uses these seminars and conferences to state its position and to develop rapport with other agencies. Publicity, once ignored, is now taken seriously. The Managing Director has appeared on the National Television on more than one occasion to explain the LBDA's role. Articles on the Authority and its activities have started appearing in the newspapers. These will go a long way in explaining to the ordinary citizens what the LBDA stands for and gather support for it.

All said, the LBDA's role vis-a-vis that of other institutions is still far from clear. Its

functions ought to be clearly defined and spelt out. Its powers need to be specified, especially in relation to the DDC.'s. This may even necessitate the reviewing of the statutes of other agencies like the National Irrigation Board and the Kenya Power and Lighting Company Ltd. - the former because the LBDA has a role to play in Irrigation in the area - in fact, this is what majority of the residents of the region thought it could give priority - and the latter because LBDA is already engaged in preparations to launch a major power plant at the Sondu/Miriu River. In order to avoid conflicts between the Kenya Power Co. and the LBDA, it is necessary to start defining their "power" responsibilities and rights now so that the LBDA may be spared of the problems similar to those encountered by the IVA which spent so much time attending to conflicts with the other power agencies in the Tennessee Valley.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### 5.0. : PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION

This chapter's major concern is to assess the performance of the LBDA in project implementation. In doing so, four projects have been chosen for indepth analysis. However, before addressing the case studies, general issues regarding project initiation, and implementation at the LBDA are discussed.

#### 5.1.0. : LBDA'S PROJECTS IN PERSPECTIVE

In practice, the Authority has undertaken three major types of projects, namely (a) Service projects, (b) projects provided at cost price, and (c) Income-generating projects.<sup>1</sup>

##### 5.1.1. : Service Projects

According to the Authority, these are projects undertaken because other ministries or agencies are not providing for them for one reason tor another. Examples are the Shallow Wells programme, the Tsetsefly Control programme and the Immunization programme. They are provided at no cost to beneficiaries. According to the Authority's budget, this category of

projects is expected to constitute only about 15% of the overall Authority budget in the initial periods.<sup>2</sup>

5.1.2. : "Cost Price" Projects

This category includes projects undertaken by the LBDA as services to the people but at cost price. The intention is that after starting the project, the LBDA should hand it over to other institutions to continue with it. Examples are the Upland Rice project which involves distribution of rice seeds to farmers, the distribution of tree seedlings and groundnut seeds to farmers in the region. This category of projects is supposed to consume 25% of the LBDA budget, according to the 1984 development policy.<sup>3</sup>

5.1.3. : Income-Generating Projects

Consuming 60% of the Authority's budget, these are projects that are expected to generate revenue for the Authority with a view to making it self-reliant financially. They are also expected to broaden the region's wage-employment base by employing local labour. Examples are the commercial fish farms, hydropower projects, large-scale crop production and Industrial enterprises.

Initially, the emphasis was on the first two

categories, that is, the service projects and the projects provided at cost price. As pointed out elsewhere in the thesis, it appears that the decision to start with these categories was taken as a counter-offensive measure against accusations that the LBDA was "useless" and "doing nothing". In order to answer the question, "What are you doing?" the Authority, therefore decided to embark on projects that would "make it appear to be doing something" that directly affected the lives of the people. The feasibility studies which it had started with earned it the accusation that it was too theoretical and academic! In this light, the Immunization programme was publicised by the Authority as a programme aiming at eradication of the menace posed by malaria and other human diseases. The Authority was doing something about human health! The Shallow Wells programme was supposed to show the clients that the Authority was concerned about lack of sufficient clean water which was largely to blame for the recurrence of many water-borne diseases and the high infant mortality rate in the region. According to the LBDA, at least these projects would be more convincing to the residents of the region than the feasibility studies. The Authority would no longer be branded a "more academic institution" as some had argued!

However, most of the projects under the last

category, i.e. Income-generating are long-term which will take long to mature. If anything, most of them were still on the drawing board with others still at the feasibility study stage. This goes further to explain the reason behind the Authority's decision to start with short-term projects which could yield immediate results. For with the high hopes and unfathomed enthusiasm of the people of the region the Authority had to come up with projects with immediate impact, lest these hopes and enthusiasm turn into impatience and frustration. This is also another example of environmental influence on an institution's policies. For it is clearly apparent that the decision to undertake certain projects - sometimes hastily planned and implemented with dismal results, for example, the Lambwe Tsetsefly Control programme alluded to in Chapter four - was taken in response to the socio-political pressure on what the LBDA could do.

#### 5.1.4. : Project Identification and Prioritization

Generally, there are six main sources of project identification and initiation for the LBDA. These are (a) the Authority's own staff, (b) the government, (c) foreign agencies, (d) individuals, (e) popular organisations such as women groups, and (f) the D.D.C.s. Whichever the source, a project has to fit within the



regional and national priority lists. With regard to the national priorities, the Authority's parent Ministry is charged with the duty of ensuring conformity with national policies. The inclusion of other government representatives in the Authority Board also serves this purpose. Regionally, with the introduction of the "District focus" policy, the D.D.C.s ensure conformity with various districts' priorities. Indeed, the LBDA's project proposals are discussed and approved at the DDC meetings. It can also be argued that through the D.D.C., the local people, through their representatives (MPs, local group leaders, Party leaders and Councillors) who are also D.D.C. members, participate in project initiation and identification.

There are several projects that D.D.C.s have identified for the LBDA. For example, in<sup>3</sup> the Kisumu District 1984-88 Development Plan, the following LBDA sponsored projects were the Kisumu D.D.C.'s original idea: Commodity Aid, Irrigation and Drainage, and Flood Control.<sup>4</sup> However, some projects identified by the D.D.C.s may not reflect the LBDA's role and may not take into account the ability of the Authority to undertake them. Each D.D.C. wants the Authority to undertake projects in its district and any negative response may lead to charges that the LBDA is unfair in geographical distribution of its projects - we shall come to this later. This perhaps explains

Mwango's finding that the Authority was being accused of making promises it could not fulfill. Take for example, the suggestion by a Kakamega D.D.C. member that the LBDA take over health facilities like Maseno Hospital and develop a conurbation between Maseno and Luanda.<sup>5</sup> It is a statement of the obvious that this was asking too much from the young LBDA.

Foreign agencies have also identified certain projects they sponsor. Examples are the Shallow Wells programme otherwise known as the Rural Domestic Water Supply and Sanitation Programme (RDWSSP) initiated and identified by the Dutch agency, the DHV, and the Fish Farming Project identified and initiated by the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The problem with foreign initiated programmes is that sometimes, if not often, they rarely reflect the priorities of the region and in the case of those carried out under the auspices of the LBDA, where to place responsibility for any failure or success is difficult. For the local organisation, in this case the LBDA, is rarely in full control of the project. It is the common practice for the aid agency to put its own personnel in charge of the project. These are, however, the rights the donor or aid agency cannot be denied for it is the provider of resources and "he who pays the piper calls the tune". Hence, it may decide, and indeed it does, which project to aid,

where to locate it and, to a large extent, how it should be run. In any case, the personnel manning the project is first and foremost answerable to the donor or aid agency and not to the local organisation, that is the LBDA. The point here is that the role of the Authority as far as project identification and prioritization is concerned is muzzled, for it has just to accept the conditions laid down by the donor agency by virtue of the fact that the latter has the resources. Let us take one project to illustrate this.

The Fish Farming Project sponsored by the UNDP/FAO is a manifestation of misplaced priorities. It was the general feeling of quite a number of respondents interviewed, including fishermen, that although fish farming is a viable and meaningful activity, priority <sup>been</sup> should have been given to improvement of "catch-fish" methods and infrastructure, that is, as Mwangi recommends, the Authority should initially "concentrate on developing what comes from the Lake".<sup>6</sup> It was noted in chapter one that the fish production level at the lake is still below average and several problems were identified as hindering full capacity fishing at the lake. Much more clients would be reached if, for instance, the Authority could emphasise on improvement of fishing methods and the whole fishing infrastructure especially the marketing and storage system to boost fish production from the lake. The Authority would only be adding

input to the efforts of the fishermen around the lake. This could go a long way in increasing the income of the local fishermen and would make fishing a lucrative and productive exercise with considerable impact on employment and standard of living in the region, in fact, several times more than the small-scale fish farming would.

The role of the central government as a project initiator for the LBDA is rather minimal. In any case, it would be a mockery of the practice of decentralization which as noted in chapter two, is the pillar of regional development policy, if the LBDA would be receiving directives from the central government on which projects to undertake. However, the government, through the parent Ministry, still continues to give advice and suggestions on project initiation. But on the whole, government directives have been rare. The unwillingness of the central government to dictate terms to LBDA on project choice was demonstrated by the LBDA - Ministry of Agriculture struggle over the utilisation of the Yala Swamp, the saga referred to in chapter four. The point is that although the Minister for agriculture mentioned that an inter-ministerial committee was on the Ministry's side, the central government kept mum on the issue.

The Authority staff themselves have identified

and initiated projects such as the Isetse-Fly and Trypanosomiasis Control programme, the Bricks and Tiles project, the Livestock Multiplication programme, and the Yala Farm project.

Geographical prioritization, that is, the location of projects, has been a major policy issue at the LBDA. In a region so ethnically polarised, geographical distribution of projects becomes a matter of serious concern as administrative boundaries like divisions and districts coincide with ethnic, tribal and even sub-tribal confines. Ideally, the LBDA is regional in character and should not succumb to locational, divisional and even district pressures when deciding on the geographical location of projects. However, in practice, things have not been smooth going for the Authority in this respect. For the Authority has had to sacrifice "efficiency" with regard to some projects in favour of "equitable" geographical distribution of projects. For instance, according to a Senior Authority official, the LBDA has often been forced to adopt the "Model of Dispersion" in preference to the "Model of Concentration" in its geographical prioritization of some projects even when the latter model seems to be more efficient and viable both administratively and economically than the former. The "Model of Dispersion" dictates that a single

project be split and scattered in different parts of a geographical area while the "Model of Concentration" means concentrating a project in one locality.

An example of a project which has been established along the model of dispersion is the Livestock Multiplication Project. There are four multiplication centres at Lichota (South Nyanza district), Muhoroni (Kisumu), Sang'alo (Bungoma) and Alupe (Busia). It appears that these centres are operating under capacity and are not likely to make any considerable impact soon. The Sang'alo centre, for instance, had only 83 animals including heifers and bulls while the other centres had either less or the same number of animals. With the population of the region in mind, this is surely a negligible number of animals. If the Model of Concentration whereby one livestock farm could be established in the area in the centre of the region were adopted, the impact could be greater and financial and administrative efficiency achieved, particularly in view of the fact that the Authority was still a young organisation which had not yet built an adequate technical and financial base. The few technical personnel and the meagre financial resources could be concentrated on one multiplication centre rather than on four or more. Another example is the shallow wells programme which was initially spread all over Nyanza Province

with few wells here and there and the Authority found it difficult to administer them. However, the model of concentration has been adopted since in the Shallow Wells case.

In the final analysis, it is evident that geographical prioritization of project location has been in many cases dictated not by the economic viability and other important factors such as efficiency and administrative convenience but largely by political pressure and the desire to, as one officer of the Authority put it, "bring the cake to every district, division, location or ethnic group in order to stem off complaints that would otherwise be voiced that the Authority is ignoring some parts of the region.

The argument in this thesis contrasts with Mwango's contention that projects should be distributed district by district on a quota-system basis. In particular, Mwango argues that the quota system is

"... a fair system in circumstances where the benefits to be allocated to the clients are limited."

This thesis, however, contends that the impact would be greater if the projects are not split under such circumstances. Again, while some service projects can be

be split into districts or divisions - for example, the Immunization programme - most of other projects like income-generating projects such as the Sondu/Miriu Hydro-Electric Power project cannot be located in more than one place because, in the first place, the resource it is based on, that is river water, is not found in all parts of the region. There is only one Sondu/Miriu river in the whole region and its attributes are not necessarily found in any other river in the region!

It is also the argument of this thesis that although the LBDA is a regional development organisation and the whole region should benefit from its activities without any discrimination, this does not mean that the benefits cannot be spread all over the region if projects are not split into every district or division. The benefits of a project can still be spread all over the region even if it is located in one part of the region. Take, for example, the Yala Swamp which is a unique situation. While the reclaimed part on which the Authority is undertaking certain projects is in Siaya district, these benefits are supposed to accrue to the whole region. The seeds are sold through the Kenya Grain Growers Cooperative Union shops all over the region and even people from beyond the region buy them. During the drought of 1984, sorghum seeds from the Yala farm project were



distributed country-wide. Customers for the bricks manufactured at Solongo Bricks plant in Kakamega have come from areas beyond the district and even as far as Rift Valley Province. The Kibos Fish Farm in Kisumu district has been supplying fingerlings to farmers throughout the region including some areas that fall under the jurisdiction of KVDA. In all these cases, other parts of the region are benefitting from LBDA projects without necessarily having the particular projects located in them. Dispersing projects simply in order to please various districts is meaningless and may lead to proliferation of "white elephants" (patches of projects with no or little impact). Perhaps what is needed is a sound and fair distribution policy by the Authority to ensure that the benefits reach all parts of the region. Here, the Authority can borrow a leaf from the TVA's Cooperative system where the residents of the Tennessee Valley region were organised into consumer cooperatives for purposes of power sales.

TABLE 5:

DISTRICT-BY-DISTRICT DISTRIBUTION OF ON-GOING PROJECTS BY 1985.

<u>SIAYA</u>	<u>KISUMU</u>
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Yala Swamp Development Project               <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Cotton Production</li> <li>b. Rehabilitation of the feeder canal and intake works</li> <li>c. Horticultural project (LBDA Central fruit tree nursery)</li> </ol> </li> <li>2. Beekeeping project - Bondo Honey Refinery</li> <li>3. Fisheries Project-extension work and rehabilitation of fish ponds</li> <li>4. Groundnuts project-purchase and Distribution of dressed seeds at cost price.</li> <li>5. Upland Rice Project-purchase and distribution of seeds at cost price</li> <li>6. Siaya LBDA Seed Processing Plant</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Livestock development - Muhoroni Multiplication Centre</li> <li>2. Fisheries project-extension work and rehabilitation of ponds.</li> <li>3. Kibos Fish Farm</li> <li>4. Riat Bricks and Tiles Plant.</li> <li>5. Groundnuts project-purchase and Distribution of dressed seeds at cost price.</li> <li>6. Upland Rice project-purchase and distribution of seeds at cost price</li> <li>7. Beekeeping project-collection of and purchase of crude Honey for Refinery</li> </ol>
<u>BUNGOMA</u>	<u>KISII</u>
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Upland Rice Project</li> <li>2. Fisheries Project</li> <li>3. Horticultural Project - provision of seedlings from the LBDA Central Fruit Tree nursery. =</li> <li>4. Sang'alo Animal Multiplication Centre.</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Construction of Communal Wells</li> <li>2. Fisheries Project-Extension work and rehabilitation of fish ponds.</li> <li>3. Horticultural Project-provision of seedlings from the LBDA Central fruit Tree nursery at Yala Swamp</li> <li>4. Sironga Bricks and Tile Plant.</li> <li>5. Kisii Soapstone project-Feasibility study.</li> </ol>

<p><u>BUNGOMA</u> (Contd.)</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>5. Groundnuts Project.</li> <li>6. Webuye Hydropower Project - Feasibility Study Stage</li> </ol>	<p><u>KISII</u> (Contd.)</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>6. Beekeeping.</li> <li>7. Groundnuts Project - purchase and distribution of dressed seeds at cost price.</li> </ol>
<p><u>BUSIA</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Groundnuts Project</li> <li>2. Fisheries Project</li> <li>3. Horticultural Project</li> <li>4. Mudambi Irrigation Project</li> <li>5. Sisenye Irrigation Project</li> <li>6. Upland Rice Project.</li> </ol>	<p><u>SOUTH NYANZA</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Construction of communal Wells - Mbita, Macalder, Migori, Kehancha, Rongo and Rangwe Divisions.</li> <li>2. Upland Rice Project</li> <li>3. Groundnuts Project</li> <li>4. Lichota Animal Multiplication Centre</li> <li>5. Fisheries Project</li> <li>6. Horticultural Project - Provision of Seedlings from LBDA Central Nursery</li> <li>7. Construction of Ndhiwa Honey Refinery</li> </ol>
<p><u>KAKAMEGA</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Upland Rice Project</li> <li>2. Fisheries Project</li> <li>3. Horticultural Project</li> <li>4. Solongo Bricks and Tiles Project</li> <li>5. Beekeeping</li> <li>6. Groundnuts Project</li> </ol>	

Source: LBDA Development Programmes - Project Estimates for  
 Financial Year 1984/85 - Ministry of Regional  
 Development and Energy - D30, MFAD 478.

TABLE 6 : LIST OF ON-GOING DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS AND THEIR PROJECTED EXPENDITURE UPTO 1988

PROJECT	1982/83	1983/84	1984/85	1985/86	1986/87	1987/88	TOTAL
<u>Agriculture and Livestock</u>							
Upland Rice	200	350	2,200	1,300	1,350	1,400	6,820
Bee Keeping	122.5	100	150	250	300	300	1,222.5
Groundnut Project	12	20	50	70	90	120	362
Regional Horticulture	150	230	350	400	450	500	2,080
Livestock Development	50	1,120	1,330	1,250	1,125	1,125	6,000
Sub-Total	554.5	1,820	4,080	3,270	3,315	3,445	16,484.5
<u>Fisheries</u>							
Lake Basin Aquaculture	62	52.1	128.3	128.3	100	28.3	499
<u>Industry</u>							
Bricks and Roofing Tiles	48.4	195	244	305	230	115	1,137.4
<u>Energy</u>							
Wind Mill Demonstration	40	50	64	-	-	-	154
<u>Water Management</u>							
Catchment Development	200	1,061	232	-	-	-	1,493
Shallow Wells	79	200	600	600	300	300	2,079
Sub-Total	279	1,261	832	600	300	300	3,572
<u>Food Security</u>							
	300	300	300	300	300	300	1,800
<u>Effluent Monitoring</u>							
	20	200	153	50	40	50	514
<u>Public Health</u>							
Immunization	40	50	40.2	75	45	120	44.2
Water Supply	25	30	25	45	30	65	237

**TABLE 7:** PROGRAMME 1983-1990 (1990) (IN KENYA £'000)

SECTORS	1983/84	1984/85	1985/86	1986/87	1987/88	1988/89	1989/90	1990/91	TOTAL
<b>AGRICULTURE</b>									
Tobacco Production (Tree Nurseries Establishment)	113	66	66	66	65	-	-	-	375
Oil Seed Production	52	52	52	52	52	51	51	-	362
Robusta Coffee (Nursery Establishment)	30	35	25	25	30	-	-	-	145
Fruit Nurseries and Orchard Establishment)	175	175	175	90	90	90	90	-	885
Yala Swamp (Seed Bulking)	100	200	200	250	100	-	-	-	850
Kisii Valley Bottom	150	250	200	100	-	-	-	-	700
Small-Holder Rice Schemes	120	150	175	150	250	100	100	-	1045
Cotton Production	10	50	100	100	100	125	125	-	610
Commodity Aid	6000	9000	3000	3500	5000	-	-	-	20500
Lake Basin Land Use and Tenure System	0.34	0.45	0.31	0.14	0.28	-	-	-	1.52
Sorghum and Millet Production	50	75	105	150	175	100	100	-	755
Horticulture and Marketing	303	365	274	-	-	-	-	-	942
<b>Total</b>	<b>7103.34</b>	<b>418.45</b>	<b>4372.31</b>	<b>4482.14</b>	<b>5862.28</b>	<b>466</b>	<b>466</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>27170.52</b>
<b>LIVESTOCK</b>									
Poultry Demonstration (Hatchery)	10	15	25	30	40	-	-	-	120
<b>Total</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>120</b>
<b>FISHERIES</b>									
LBDA - Commercial Fish Farms	4000	8000	1000	1000	9000	9000	-	-	50000
LBDA Fry Production	6000	4000	3000	2500	2000	-	-	-	17500
Rehabilitation of Existing Ponds	200	250	270	275	200	105	-	-	1300
<b>Total</b>	<b>10200</b>	<b>12250</b>	<b>13270</b>	<b>12775</b>	<b>11200</b>	<b>9105</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>68800</b>
<b>INDUSTRY</b>									
Rice Mill	-	-	30	400	400	-	-	-	830
Maize Mill	27.5	474	450	-	-	-	-	-	951.5
Oil Mill	27.5	30	30	-	-	-	-	-	117.5
<b>Total</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>504</b>	<b>510</b>	<b>400</b>	<b>400</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>1889</b>

<u>HYDRO-ENERGY</u>									
Sondu/Mieju Project	5000	26100	18000	60000	50000	50000	50000	50000	314100
Wabuya Hydro Project	700	5000	4000	3000	3077	-	-	-	16485
Teremi and Mau Forest Falls	1250	1250	2128	-	-	-	-	-	4628
Irrigation and Drainage	10000	13000	20000	23000	23000	26000	-	-	115000
Total	16950	45350	44128	86000	76077	76000	50000	50000	450213
<u>Regional Master Plan</u>									
	300	450	300	100	136	-	-	-	1388
<u>HEALTH PROJECTS</u>									
Improvement of Health Care Delivery	65	1300	2500	2500	2000	2000	-	-	10365
Environmental Sanitation	500	1500	500	500	500	-	-	-	3500
Disease Control	40	30	30	30	30	30	-	-	190
Medical Research	50	30	20	20	20	-	-	-	140
Lake Basin Referral Hospitals	1500	2000	2500	2000	2000	-	-	-	10580
Nutrition Programme	1	2	2	6	6	6	-	-	23
Tropical Med./Hg. Institute	300	400	600	600	450	-	-	-	2350
Total	2456	5262	6152	6566	5086	2036	-	-	27148
<u>EDUCATION</u>									
Primary Schools	10000	10000	10000	10000	10000	-	-	-	50000
Secondary Schools	1000	1500	1500	500	500	-	-	-	5000
Polytechnic Institution	1000	1500	2000	2500	700	-	-	-	7750
Extension of Village Polytechnics	20	40	60	80	-	-	-	-	200
Total	12020	13040	13560	13180	11200	-	-	-	62950
<u>TOURISM</u>									
Development of Cultural Centres	200	200	200	200	200	-	-	-	1000
Tourist Road System	120	120	120	120	120	-	-	-	600
Sunset Hotel Extension	-	70	90	80	-	-	-	-	240
Homa Bay Hotel Extension	-	60	80	60	-	-	-	-	200
Infrastructure Development									
Kenanga National Park	50	50	50	40	-	-	-	-	190
Infrastructure Development									
Homa National Park	60	70	80	40	-	-	-	-	230
Lake Victoria Cruise	68	70	80	50	40	-	-	-	300
Communication Costs	35	35	35	35	35	-	-	-	175

5.2.0. : SELECTED PROJECTS

5.2.1.0. THE RURAL DOMESTIC WATER SUPPLY AND SANITATION  
PROGRAMME (RDWSSP)

5.2.1.1. : Background

One of the LBDA's full-fledged programmes for which it is now widely known is its Rural Domestic Water Supply and ASanitation Programme, initially known as the Shallow Wells Programme. Just as "Power" - because of the TVA's concentration on electricity supply initially - became the acronym of the TVA, "Shallow Wells" has become the acronym of the LBDA, particularly in South Nyanza district where the programme is currently concentrated though the project area includes Kisii, Kisumu, and Siaya districts as well.

The main objective of the programme is

"...to provide the population with safe domestic water supply at the lowest possible cost, using a technology which can be managed by the rural community." 8

Nationally, the programme is part of the broad government policy of providing clean water to rural homes with the target of clean water supply for each home by the year 2000. Another dimension of the programme's objective

is health. It is aimed at reducing the incidence of diseases caused by lack of clean water such as cholera. The LBDA development area sadly boasts of areas with the highest infant mortality rates in the country, a phenomenon which has been partly traced to lack of clean water for domestic consumption. The sanitation aspect of the programme is still "bracketed" and the emphasis is still on the water supply component.

The justification of the water supply programme rests on the water situation in the area. Take Nyanza Province, for instance, the main project area .94% of the 2.0 million people in Nyanza live in the rural areas with the majority relying on untreated surface water from Lake Victoria and a number of streams with water of doubtful quality as well as on water holes with even worse water quality. In fact, only 10% lived within "an arranged water supply" by 1984.<sup>9</sup> Specifically speaking, there existed only 52 piped water supplies serving approximately 260,000 people in the project area by 1981.<sup>10</sup> But even these supplies experienced several problems such as lack of spare parts, etc. In the light of this situation, clean water supply becomes a "felt need" as evidenced by the responses got from the sample of the respondents (clients) interviewed by this researcher.

The project was launched in 1982. The first phase




was the pilot phase whose aim was to establish the technical feasibility of the programme. The Dutch government, which was to become the sponsor of the main project, gave financial and technical assistance for a geosurvey of the areas for potential underground water shallow wells and boreholes. As a project under the auspices of the LBDA, the programme encompasses local production of pumps, spare parts and well construction. As of now, the concentration is still on well construction. The whole project is scheduled to be completed in five years beginning 1984/85 financial year and it is estimated that on the expiry of the five year period a total of 500 wells will have been constructed.

#### 5.2.1.2. : Organisation of the Programme

##### 5.2.1.2.1. : Structure

It was noted in chapter three that with regard to project management, the Authority has a matrix system for organisation in which each project has its own organisational arrangements though experts can be drawn from any department or division of the Authority any time when the project needs their services. The RDWSSP's organisation chart is presented on the next page.

As can be deciphered from the chart, there is



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a co-ordinator of the programme who is the project head and is responsible to the Managing Director of the LBDA and also to the Steering Committee which consists of officials of concerned Ministries and the D.D.C. However, in the course of this research, it was found out that in practice, the Co-ordinator works quite independently of the Steering Committee and even the Managing Director. Complaints from various ministries, especially Ministry of Health officials from the project area that the LBDA "is going it alone" were numerous.

The chart also provides for links with other agencies, that is, the ministries and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). The ministries are linked to the LBDA's RDWSSP through the Steering Committee. These are the ministries of Water Development, Agriculture, Health, Culture and Social Services plus the DDC.

As has been noted elsewhere, the success of the LBDA as a regional development agency depends on its relationship and cooperation with other development institutions in the area. In the Shallow Wells programme, there is what could be termed as an experiment on workable methods of cooperation with other agencies. In Ndhwa Division in South Nyanza District where the LBDA began executing the project (and which was studied

in detail in this thesis), the agencies significantly involved in the programme are the Provincial Administration, field ministries, and women groups. On the Provincial Administration side, chiefs have been used as vehicles of information. Chief's barazas at locational levels are normally used by the LBDA extension officers to explain the programme to the people. Occasionally, the Chiefs themselves act as spokesmen on behalf of the Authority. The LBDA extension workers are also co-opted members of the Sub-E.D.C. chaired by the area District Officer. At the Sub-D.D.C. meetings, the other government departments' representatives and the local leaders get the chance to exchange views with the LBDA extension officers. It was, however, learnt that the LBDA officers do not attend the Sub-D.D.C. meetings regularly and one senior member of the committee lamented the lack of decision-making power and ignorance of LEDA's policies on the part of the Authority extension workers.

The relationship between the RDWSSP staff and the relevant government departments is far from positive, something that does not augur well for the programme and the role of the LBDA as a coordinator of development programmes. There is a cry that the LBDA is an isolationist, cherishing to go it alone in the programme. This became even clearer when an LBDA extension officer in the RDWSSP remarked when asked by this researcher

whether she cooperated with other government officers  
that:

"They do their work. I do mine.  
There is no need to consult with  
them."

It was also found out that the locational Ministry of  
Health public health officers involved in more or  
less the same kind of work were working separately,  
sometimes visiting the same people the LBDA had visited  
and sometimes the advice they gave to the people was  
opposite that given by the LBDA extension officers.  
This made the whole exercise look like a competition  
between the MOH staff and the LBDA extension staff.

While the other government departments accused  
the Authority of isolationism, the Authority accused  
them of having no interest in cooperating with the LBDA.  
Particularly, the Authority gave as a testimony to this  
lack of interest the fact that representatives of the  
ministries represented in the RDWSSP steering committee  
did not attend committee meetings regularly.<sup>11</sup> The  
ministries, on their part claimed that they had no  
business attending such meetings because the LBDA acted  
as a bulldozer and their views were never taken seriously.

However, the relationship between the RDWSSP staff  
and the local women groups was not as bad. In actual

fact, women groups had been coopted into the programme as most well committees were run by the women groups. It is also intended that the administration of the wells will in the long run be handed over to the women groups by the LBDA. The idea behind using women groups is justified by the LBDA on the ground that women are the first hand users and beneficiaries of water supplies. In order to accelerate the involvement of women in the programme, the LBDA policy has been to recruit as many female extensionists as possible.

#### 5.2.1.2.2. : Staffing

The project team consisted of individuals drawn from various disciplines. The head of the project, the Interim Programme Coordinator is an expatriate seconded by the Dutch Government and he is a Hydrologist. The Dutch Government has also provided three other personnel, namely, a Civil Engineer, a Construction Engineer and a Sociologist. Apart from these, there is also a Foreman, a Public Health Officer and a Surveyor, all seconded by the LBDA. The Sociologist takes care of the sociological aspects of the programme, especially the mobilisation of the beneficiaries through extension work. There are various extension officers, each in charge of a location in the project area to help in mobilising the clients, the well-users and explaining to them the aims of the programme. The

Foreman takes care of machine and pump <sup>instalation</sup> instalation and maintenance. The Public Health officer deals with the health or hygiene dimension of the programme giving advice on sanitary implications of the programme. The technical surveyors do the systematic and comprehensive technical survey on all surface and underground water resources and the siting of the water supply points after establishing physical feasibility. There are also socio-economic surveyors from the socio-economic unit of the Authority's planning division who identify priority areas on a set of objective selection criteria such as health status, economic status, easy access to key public institutions, organisational capacity and the clients' willingness to maintain the wells so constructed.

The fact that there are different officers of different disciplinary training working together in the programme is a manifestation of the LBDA's commitment to unified approach to regional development which demands that people of different skills collaborate in administering a project. This is because the task of regional development is broader than one speciality. The inter-disciplinary approach to project implementation and administration of the project reduces the incidences of "unforeseen circumstances" as every possible component of the problem is covered. For it

would be meaningless to construct a well for a people if there is nobody <sup>to</sup> explain to them the need for such a well as far as their health is concerned, hence the need for the Public Health Officer. In the same vein, it would be futile to provide a well for a community which does not feel it needs it, hence the need for the socio-economic surveyor.

However, as Lilienthal notes in his study of the IVA, in order to ensure successful teamwork in such a project, there is need for the concerned organisation to build workable methods of teamwork, and also to select experts who are able to work as a part of a unified programme and who have

"...learned to subordinate (their) expertness to the common purpose."<sup>12</sup>

For simply ordering experts to work together is not in itself a guarantee that they will do so willingly. As Lilienthal continues to argue, the question is more of psychology.

"...A fundamental change in resource development (then) must begin at the beginning, in the minds of men, in the way men think and so thinking, act".<sup>13</sup>

In the RDWSSP the various officers work together, consulting each other and sometimes literally travelling



together when visiting wells and address seminars and workshops for the beneficiaries together. However, in the course of discussions with the LBDA staff in the programme, sentiments were raised about the "aloofness" of some of the expatriates working for the project, that is, those seconded by the Dutch Government. It is the contention of this researcher, however, that this problem might be partly due to the different terms and conditions of service between the local and expatriate staff with the latter being at an advantage over the former. As a Review and Appraisal Mission noted in one of their reports,

"...There is... an imbalance in programme as a whole. That part ..... of the programme directly affected by the GON (Government of Netherlands) financial aid is well staffed and equipped and finance is available as and when required."14

Because of the situation as described by the Mission, the expatriate staff enjoy better terms of service especially with regard to salaries and other benefits.

Perhaps one other interesting finding which cannot pass unmentioned is the fact that the Programme's Coordinator is an expatriate. Given that the Government of The Netherlands is due to withdraw after the expiry of

the five-year period, the problem of continuity might engulf the programme after the coordinator leaves. There is need for the post to be filled by a local staff counterpart who should have full grasp of the programme to insure continuity even after the expatriates shall have left. It seems this issue has started causing concern at the Authority itself although the argument by the programme's leadership that efforts to recruit a local replacement for the expatriate coordinator have been fruitless<sup>15</sup> is difficult for one to buy. The Authority has a number of qualified staff who can fill this post (see the staff list in Chapter 3, page ).

The other problem is that the extension staff seem to be working under very difficult conditions. Although the mobility problem has been partially solved by the provision of motorcycles to some extensionists, mainly the male ones, the terms of service are not very much commensurate with the demands of their work. An extensionist at the time of this research, was getting a net salary of KShs. 1,150/= per month. Most extensionists worked ever over weekends since the programme was becoming more and more popular. Quite often, the extensionist finds herself/himself spending the night away frsm his/her residential place. There is no special allowance for this just as there is no house allowance and the extensionists have to rent "rooms" in market

places.

Lack of job security is also a problem as most of the extensionists are fresh school leavers, mostly form six leavers with no training at all. Hence, most of them view the programme as a place where they work before, as most put it, "getting better employment" elsewhere. The fear of being laid off also looms large with the knowledge that the programme is sponsored by a foreign donor agency which will pull out soon. Given that the Authority is not yet generating enough income of its own, the continuity of the programme after the donor will have gone hangs in the balance. This lack of job security is affecting the morale of the extensionists.

The problem of poor terms and conditions of service for the extensionists and other junior personnel in the RDWSSP will be difficult to dispense with in the near future due to the financial limitations of the Authority which, in part, derive from the fact that LBDA still depends on the Treasury and will take a long time to be able to generate enough funds of its own. A senior officer in the personnel department acknowledged the problems the extensionists are facing but cited scarcity of funds as a major hindrance. In fact, in the course of the survey, the problem of poor terms

and conditions of service was a recurring one in other projects like the small-scale Fish Farming project. Perhaps one way of solving the problem would have been to recruit the extension officers and other junior staff from within the district or division or, even, location within which the programme is carried out. While this would minimise the administrative and overhead costs as these officers would be staying at their homes and working in familiar environments, this policy, however, also has its disadvantages chief among which would be bias and favouritism on the part of the extension staff.

#### 5.2.1.3. : Actual Implementation of the Project

##### 5.2.1.3.1. : The Process of Well Provision

One significant feature of the RDWSSP, is the predominance of popular (or community) participation in many levels of facets. In fact, community participation at the levels of construction and maintenance is integral to the programme. This becomes clear when we examine the process between the time of the identification of the need for a well and well construction.

Through seminars, workshops and public barazas, the LBDA officers, mainly extension officers publicise the wells programme. They explain the benefits and the aims of the programme. The people themselves may

request the LBDA extension officer (stationed at each administrative location) to arrange for a well to be constructed for them. Then the technical surveyor visits the location and takes samples of water from various points to the LBDA laboratory in Kisumu for testing. Depending on the results of the tests, the people are informed that they can receive a well. The extension officer then mobilises the people and advises them to form a Well Committee which will administer the well after its construction. As an indication that the people are willing to maintain the well, and to establish some responsibility on the part of the well users the committee is supposed to raise up to KShs. 2,000/= with which they (the committee) open a post office Savings Bank account which is registered in the name of the Committee itself. The committee also registers with the Community Development Assistant (CDA) at the divisional headquarters of the Ministry of Culture and Social Services. The KShs. 2,000/= is known as the Well Maintenance fund to take care of emergencies when the well is functional.

The committee's important feature is the non-involvement of the LBDA officers in the elections. The people themselves must exercise their rights of organisation! The Well Committee is elected in the absence of the LBDA officers who are only informed about the

outcome of the elections. This is very significant in that this policy makes the people identify more with the project as they will see it as theirs and not LBDA's.

One other significant feature of the committees is that most of them are dominated by women. In fact, this survey revealed that in one out of two committees, both the Chairman and Treasurer were women while overall women membership of the committees amounted to as high as 98% in many cases. Asked to explain this phenomenon, an extension officer told this researcher: "It is the women who in most cases draw water and therefore they are in a better position to know the problems of a well than men. However, there are cases where men take charge.

As of February, 1986, 40 Well Committees had been formed in Ndhiwa division in South Nyanza, our project study area. In the nearby Mbita division, the number was as high as 49. In fact, the committees have continued to mushroom and the community Development Advisers's office at Ndhiwa was finding it hectic as many committees were registering and asking for wells. The enthusiasm exemplified by the mushrooming of the committees is as a result of the realisation for the need for clean water which in turn is as a result of the work of LBDA extension officers. It, however, remains to be seen whether the LBDA will be able to cope with the increasing demand

for Wells. There were complaints, both from the Community Development office and the clients at Ndhiwa that even after registering and collecting the necessary KShs. 2,000/= as maintenance fee, it was taking too long to get the LBDA construct a Well for a community. It is significant in this case to note that as at March, 1986 only 67 new water points had been constructed in Ndhiwa and Mbita divisions while the number of Well Committees was as high as 101 in both divisions combined.<sup>15</sup> One reason cited by the extension officers for delay in Well construction is that the decision to construct wells lies with the officers at the headquarters in Kisumu and that the decisions take too long to be taken and sometimes the extension officer has to, under pressure from clients, go personally to the headquarters to press for quick processing of the decisions. This delay is soon going to have a serious negative impact. The enthusiasm of the people will go down and they will feel betrayed. When this researcher was completing the survey, the LBDA had planned to move from Ndhiwa to other divisions. Yet according to the Community Development Office at Ndhiwa, almost over 100 committees had not received Wells.

As far as actual management of the well is concerned the well committee takes full command. A well attendant, trained by the LBDA in matters concerning pump maintenance

is directly responsible for the day-to-day running of the well. Any mechanical problem the well attendant cannot deal with is reported to the LBDA foreman who stays within the project division. However, the foreman moves from the division as soon as the well construction team moves to another division and hence the future of the well depends very much on the ability of the well attendant to grapple with mechanical problems of the pump. Although the hand-pumped well is relatively easier to maintain, the problem of continuity after the withdrawal of the LBDA team still looms large. It is clear that the KShs. 2,000/= maintenance fee is not enough for overall day-to-day operation and maintenance. Repairing the pumps may also be a problem due to unavailability of individuals in the community who can repair them. The greatest dimension of the problem of continuity is the unavailability of spare parts. Although plans are underway to establish a local factory in Kisumu to manufacture the pumps, actual production of pumps will take a long time to materialise.

5.2.1.3.2. : Well Ownership

According to the LBDA official policy, individuals do not qualify for the LBDA assistance in installing a water pump. This policy is aimed at ensuring that



a majority benefit from the programme. Providing wells to individuals would hinder full community participation in reaping the benefits. Given that most people are in the low-income group, only a few individuals would afford the cost of installing the pump which averagely costs 40,000/=. If individual ownership is eschewed on the ground that it inhibits full community participation at the benefits level, LBDA ownership is also ruled out in favour of community responsibility. Since ownership implies responsibilities for operation, maintenance and rate collection, the community can willingly discharge these responsibilities diligently only if it feels it owns the wells. For the villagers will know that the future of the wells lies with them since they are the owners, the users and the beneficiaries, all at the same time.

Another form of ownership would have been institutional, that is, handing over the well to a church or a school. Initially, some wells were constructed on school or church compounds. Institutional ownership has now been dropped. This type of ownership places a lot of restrictions on users of the well since the schools, for instance, would not like their programmes to be interfered with just as churches are denominational and certain denominations may not allow non-members into their church compounds. All in all, institutional ownership would imply inequitable measures

of exclusion and restriction".

Even though the LBDA is not a pioneer in the "Shallow Wells" programme, its policy on well-ownership differs significantly from that of other agencies like government departments and foreign agencies such as the UNICEF that have also been involved in well construction in the area. In the case of the latter, there was no Well Committee and many water wells were situated either at individuals' homes or at institutions. The result was that many wells constructed by the Ministries of Health and Water Development and foreign agencies in the past became non-functional and abandoned. In fact, the LBDA undertakes to rehabilitate some of these wells. and two springs have already been rehabilitated in Ndhiwa Division.

#### 5.2.1.3.3. : Recapitulation

Although the target number of wells has not been met, the few that exist are making great impact. However, the problem of continuity (especially after the withdrawal of the LBDA team to other project areas) cited earlier has to be taken into account. All in all, for the time being, where women used to walk long distances to water points to draw dirty water fraught with the danger of disease, there now exists clean water wells at short

distances. The water coming from the wells are not used only for cooking or drinking purposes. It is also used for bathing - some "bathrooms" have emerged next to some wells and washing clothes. Another notable feature were the small vegetable gardens that have emerged to take advantage of the "waste" water that might spill over the ground when water is being drawn.

Despite some of the problems facing the project discussed in the fore-going, the RDWSSP stands tall as a project which has helped portray the image of the LBDA as an action-oriented agency. Although the programme is still concentrated in one district where it has been implemented, the recipients are seeing the difference. Of course, the Authority, in choosing South Nyanza district as the first recipient of the programme was guided by the principle of the "most needy district", and, of course, South Nyanza has the highest infant mortality rate in the country with Ndhiwa division topping the list in the whole country. However, to assess the extent to which the LBDA's RDWSSP has gone in lowering the mortality rate is not an easy task because it is still too early to judge and also, infant mortality is a function of multiple factors such as nutrition and not only clean water supply.

However, one of the most important achievement of the programme on which even other institutions in the region agree is that the LBDA has shown that popular participation, if properly applied, can yield tremendous results. We have seen how the people themselves participate in the management of the wells. The LBDA imposes no rules on the Well Committees. Nor does it influence the election of the committee members. The Extension officers are "teachers" rather than "bosses". The mushrooming well committees is an indication of the enthusiasm which has been aroused among the villagers. But, as was noted earlier, there is the danger of arousing enthusiasm to a point that exceeds the ability of the organisation to meet the demands created by this rising enthusiasm.

Finally, suffice it to say that a huge task still lies ahead for the programme. The date of expiry of the present phase of the programme is soon approaching, yet as at March, 1986 only 67 water wells had been sunk - the target has been put at 500 wells by end of 1989. The future of the RDWSSP (for it to have meaningful impact) depends on two factors namely, (a) the willingness of the local people to continue running the wells and their willingness to contribute towards the maintenance of the wells and, (b) the ability of the LBDA's department of Public and Environmental Health to continue with the project when the sponsoring

agency pulls out after the expiry of its contract by 1989.

5.2.2.0. : THE SMALL-SCALE FISH FARMING PROJECT.

Fish is one of the potential resources of any water basin and any basin development programme must design ways of exploiting this resource. The fish potential of the lake Victoria basin area has been discussed in chapter one. In its five-year development plan (See table 7 ) the Authority proposes to undertake a Fisheries' Project which consists of the following components: (a) LBDA Commercial Fish Farms which aims at developing 350 hectares of Fish Farms for commercial purposes and (b) Small-scale Fish Farming project, officially known as the "Development of Small-Scale Fish Farming in the Lake Basin", which has a long-term objective of increasing the fish production in the Authority's development area beside the provision of additional animal protein for human consumption and source of income for the fish farmers in the region. It is, however, the latter component, the Small-scale Fish Farming project which is operational. Commercial Fish Farms project is still on the drawing board. Hence our choice of the small-scale project as our case study.

### 5.2.2.1. : Background of the Project

The small-scale Fish Farming project is sponsored by the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) through the World Bank. The LBDA is the implementing agency (on behalf of the Kenya Government) while FAO is the executing agency. The project which became operational as from 1st January, 1984 and covers the whole of the development area has five main (specific) objectives, namely, (a) the rehabilitation of 2,000 existing ponds; (b) the establishment of seven fry production centres in all the seven districts; (c) periodical training of extension personnel through in-service refresher courses; (d) development of 1,000 new fish ponds; and (e) provision of external training to two senior government officers.

The first step was to make an inventory of existing ponds with a view to rehabilitating them. This covered all ponds, be they <sup>the</sup> ones constructed by the Government, other agencies or individual fish farmers. Most of the ponds in the region had become non-functional due to various reasons chief among which were poor siting and lack of extension service. Apart from the inventory exercise, as can be deciphered from projective objective (b) above, the project also set to establish fry production centres where fish farmers

could obtain young fish with which to stock their ponds. The aim was to establish one centre of 4 hectares per district. It is noteworthy that no facilities of this kind were available in the region.

#### 5.2.2.2. ADMINISTRATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROJECT

Like the RDWSSP of the Fisheries project also has an independent administrative framework. However, designed along the matrix organisation system (see chapter 3) the project is expected to be tied to the LBDA's overall institutional framework. Accordingly, the project is tied to the Fisheries Division of the Authority. The LBDA Fisheries Division is headed by a Fisheries Specialist who is supposed to be in control of the project as the Authority's linkman. However, in the course of the survey by this researcher, it was found that the project was rather being ran independently by the expatriate staff (one fish farming extensionist, one fish culturalist and three UN Volunteers (fish farmers) provided by the UNDP/FAO with no clear links to the Authority. It was found that some of the top officers at the Authority's Fisheries division were not as well versed with what was going on in the project as the expatriate staff. No wonder, the Managing Director, during a "Tripartite Review Meeting" on the Project's progress in Nairobi, denied knowledge of

the problems facing the project. He, for example, denied knowledge of the transport problems facing the fish farming extensionists despite FAO representatives' claims that the Authority had been given the information several times. This shows lack of effective links between the Authority's top management and the project's management. For the Managing Director should have been briefed by the officers in the Fisheries Division. It appears even the latter were ignorant of the problems.

What emerges clearly is that it appears that the Authority has almost abdicated responsibility for the management of the project, leaving the FAO personnel with literally the whole responsibility of executing the project. One possible explanation for this situation is the fact that the Authority's Fisheries Specialist is having too many administrative duties at the Authority headquarters while the other LBDA fishery experts are busy on the feasibility study on the Commercial Fish Farming project.<sup>18</sup> This creates a problem of continuity. The FAO personnel are on a five-year contract which is almost coming to an end. A situation will arise where when they leave there will be no local officer (LBDA's) in full grasp of the progress and managerial exigencies of the project to ensure its continuity. Cases of foreign-sponsored projects collapsing after the donors have left are not new in the third world, and in Kenya, in particular. Unless the LBDA staff gets



more involved in the execution of the fish farming project, the project may meet the same fate.

With regard to the total number of staff in the project, the agreement between FAO and the Government of Kenya with regard to the project stipulates that the LBDA provide two senior officers, seven trained field coordinators and 43 fish farming extensionists (FFE's). The UN/FAO is supposed to provide two experts (one fish farming extensionist and one fish culturalist) and three UN Volunteers (fish farmers). By April 1986, there were 32 FFE's in addition to the seven field coordinators who had received training and had been posted to each of the seven districts in the "development area" and the expatriates.

The project, however, as the findings of this research reveal, will have to grapple with the problem of retaining the FFE's most of whom, like their counterpart RDWSSP extensionists, lack job security and are complaining of poor terms and conditions of service. With regard to job security, the fear of being laid off looms large among the extensionists. This fear was even strengthened by an incident in which about 150 employees of the Fisheries project were threatened with "laying off" due to what the personnel and administrative manager called "unforeseen financial difficulties" in a letter dated October 31, 1983.

Although the threat was not carried out partly due to the publicity it invited both in public and in the press, the fact that the sponsors of the project - the FAO/UNDP - are soon leaving after the expiry of their contract raises the question as to whether the LBDA, depending almost entirely on external sources of finance, will be able to pay these extensionists on their own. Already, out of the 54 FFEs trained by the Authority in 1983, only 32 are still with the Authority.<sup>19</sup> The others have left the organisation to join other employers or training institutions. An FFE who left his job to join the teaching profession which he had left to join the project remarked in answer to a question (by this researcher) as to why he had changed his mind and left the LBDA, "My future looks dark with it". This "flight" of personnel who have been trained at considerable cost represents a loss for the Authority.

Compounding the turnover problem is the "poor conditions and terms of service" for the FFEs. Most of the extensionists interviewed deplored what they termed "unfavourable working conditions". For instance, they are provided with bicycles but due to bad conditions of the rural roads and paths, bicycles have not been all that effective particularly during rainy seasons. Some extensionists were even more dissatisfied with the LBDA's policy of providing these bicycles

on loan basis with the officer's salary being deducted monthly to pay the total cost of the bicycle. Further dissatisfaction derived from the fact that even the repairs on the bicycles are done at the user's own cost. This surely affects - negatively - the morale of the extensionists and hampers effective extension work. It was also learnt that the Authority was to buy seven motorbikes for the seven District Field Coordinators but by March, 1985 only two had been bought. Transport problems interfered with the supervision of the extensionists by the field coordinators.

With regard to remuneration and allowances, a lot of bitterness prevailed among the extensionists. Some even claimed that there was differential treatment as some get allowances while some did not. Although it was difficult to establish the truth of this claim, what emerged clear, however, was that most extensionists did not know their terms and conditions of service and this may have led to such suspicions that some were employed on better terms. The fact that the terms of service were not made clear to the extensionists may have also contributed to a sense of job insecurity. Add the fact that the extensionists and even the District Field Coordinators, their bosses, are employed under the Development Vote as opposed to the Recurrent Vote meaning that they can be laid off any time.


### 5.2.2.3 Organisation of the Project

As hinted earlier, (see the chart overleaf), the project has its own independent organisation, albeit linked to the Authority's Fisheries Division. Although the chart portrays the picture that the LBDA Fisheries Division and its Fisheries Specialist (who is also the Divisional head) are in overall charge, it was found out, as noted elsewhere in this section, that in reality it is the two FAO experts who are in charge. This finding is even strengthened by a project progress report prepared by the FAO/UNDP staff who noted that the "Management of the project depends mostly on the two FAO experts" although the LBDA Fisheries Specialist is the Co-Manager of the project. It was noted earlier that he has too much administrative responsibility to discharge at the Authority to get enough time to concentrate on the project.

Below the LBDA Fisheries Specialist and the Co-Managers, the two FAO experts, are two LBDA Provincial Field Coordinators (one for Nyanza and one for Western Provinces), two UN Volunteers and the District Fisheries Officers. The Provincial Field Coordinators are in-charge of the extension work in the particular Province and the District Field Coordinators report to him. At the district level, the District Field

FIG. 3 :

LAKE EASIN FISH FARMING EXTENSION SERVICE ORGANIZATION CHART 1984



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Coordinators are supposed to work alongside the District Fisheries Officers of the Government's Fisheries Department. In all the districts, the LBDA field coordinators were found to have been offered office accommodation in the District Fisheries offices. In one district, the researcher found out that the District Fisheries Officer and the LBDA District Field Coordinator used one book of record where they recorded the progress of extension work. At the divisional level, the LBDA extensionists, one per division, or, in some cases, two per division, are supposed to be working hand in hand with the government's own field extensionists. In principle, they should show the spirit of working together in pursuit of a common goal! Although the relations between the government extension officers and the LBDA's were initially strained due to "lack of understanding of the role of the other", the situation now seems to be improving as more and more inter-agency seminars and in-service courses offer meeting forums between the Authority personnel and those of the government's Fisheries department. They also ensure harmonisation of the activities of the two categories of personnel.

It is worth noting that the project was initially claimed by the government's Fisheries Department and it was only after the intervention of the central government that the project was handed over to the

LBDA. This might have created some misunderstanding between the Authority and the Fisheries Department but judging from the discussions held between this researcher and the Department's staff, the latter seems to have resigned to working together with the LBDA staff. One reason for this resignation may be the fact that the Department is having a useful partner in the LBDA. As one of the Fisheries officers noted, the LBDA FFEs are well equipped with modern equipment (which include a thermometer, PH paper, soil auger, Carpenter's level, bucket, spring scale) some of which the department lacks. The LBDA's Fry production centre has also proved useful as even the Department acquires fingerlings (young fish) from there to stock its ponds. The LBDA is complementing the Department's efforts!

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#### 5.2.2.4.: ACHIEVEMENTS (IMPACT) OF THE PROJECT

Although the project's implementation period has not expired, a few achievements can be cited here and there. After training 54 extensionists in October 1983, they were despatched to the rural areas where their major preoccupation has been giving advice to rural fish farmers. No doubt, the LBDA FFEs have made a difference as more fish farmers can now be reached. This is a case where the LBDA is successfully supplementing the efforts of other agencies, especially the

Fisheries Department.

The Fisheries Department's staff, especially the extensionists, have also benefitted from the LBDA-organised Seminars and refresher courses. The Department's practice had been to recruit school-leavers and leave them to learn on the job with no rigorous in-service training. Now, they can gain expert knowledge through the LBDA seminars and in-service courses and by exchanging views with the LBDA staff. Subsequently, their output is expected to rise as their clients will receive higher quality of advice. The fish farmers themselves also appreciate the work being done.

By March, 1985, 427 old ponds had been rehabilitated with the help of the LBDA FFEs and farmers had been assisted to build 423 new ones all over the region.<sup>20</sup> The enthusiasm on the part of the fish farmers is rising and demand for LBDA assistance is very high, particularly among women groups whose members are now digging even more ponds.

As far as a fry production centre is concerned, only one out of the seven in the plan, has been built and is functional. One was built in Kamagambo in South Nyanza but due to low water levels most of the time it has been abandoned. The functional one is



situated at Kibos near Kisumu town. The Kibos Fish Farm started supplying fingerlings in October, 1984, its phase One having been completed in July, 1984 and stocked with mature Tilapia Nilotica fish, the darling dish of most people in the region. By September, 1985, the farm consisted of three 300 square metre ponds and six 1,200 square metre ponds.

The fingerlings are sold to individual fish farmers and institutions, such as schools and the Fisheries Departments in the region. One kilogramme of fingerlings (125 in number) is sold at Kenya Shillings fifteen (KShs. 15/=). By July, 1985, 50,000 fish fingerlings had been distributed and stocked in 115 fish ponds belonging to various farmers in the region.

The Kibos Fish Farm is a unique project. Prior to its establishment, there was no Fry production centre of its type. In fact, even the Fisheries Departments of the Government are grateful at the availability of Fish fry is now no longer a problem, thanks to the Kibos Farm. Even they themselves get fingerlings for their ponds from the farm.

A significant feature of the fingerlings supply system is that the project officers are not only concerned with "selling the goods". After delivering

the fingerlings to the fish-farmers, transport cost being borne by the LBDA, the LBDA extensionists help in stocking their clients' ponds. They also assist the farmers in harvesting their ponds. Hence, it is more of a service rather than a profit-making venture.

However, the Kibos farm signifies some weaknesses at the LBDA, especially with regard to planning. The construction of the farm began in January, 1984 but could not be completed until July, 1984. The reason for the delay was the low water level and additional funds were spent on digging wells to supply water to the ponds. In his report in March, 1985, the FAO officer emphasised the need for proper choice of sites after noting that the Kibos Farm was operating at 90% of its capacity due to low water level. Earlier, we cited the case of the Rongo Fish Farm in south Nyanza, constructed by the LBDA which had the same problem. In fact, <sup>in</sup> the Authority's project progress reports of July, 1985 it is acknowledged that the Rongo Farm "has no permanent water supply" and "has become seasonal" because of "no sufficient rain to fill the six ponds".<sup>21</sup> The problems faced by both Rongo and Kibos farms dovetail into the issue of technical competence, especially at planning level at the Authority. For with proper planning and feasibility studies, it would have been noticed much earlier that the sites of the two farms were not viable. These problems reflect

poorly on the image of the LBDA as a planner and a leader in the development of the region and jeopardise its role significantly. Under such circumstances the LBDA cannot effectively exercise its "Authority" on other development institutions because these institutions' confidence in the Authority's experts will dwindle. It has therefore to avoid situations which could easily cast into doubt the competence of its experts. For without legal power to demand compliance to its guidelines for the development of the region, the LBDA's only source of power is an established respected cadre of experts who can influence the actions of other agencies through persuasion.

5.2.2.5. : Recapitulation

Earlier on, it was claimed that giving priority to Fish Farming over the "Catch Fish" from the Lake may have been a false start in the field of Fisheries developemst by the Authority. However, this notwithstanding, the small-scale Fish Farming project as it is now, is a promising one if properly implemented. It has been noted in the foregoing that it has supplemented the efforts of the Fisheries department of the Central Government by adding inputs - in form of finance and personnel - which have enabled more fish farmers to receive extension service. The Fry

production centre at Kibos has also assisted in supplying additional fingerlings.

Looking at the menu of the projects' objectives, it is doubtful, however, as to whether all will be achieved by the end of the 30 months period for which the project was to run. One factor contributing to this pessimism is the fact that the Authority was found to be using some of the equipment assigned to the project for other purposes.

#### 5.2.3.0. THE BEEKEEPING PROJECT: A False Start?

The Lake Basin has some potential for honey production. In particular, Siaya and South Nyanza districts have been found to be best suited for the honey production industry.<sup>22</sup> However, despite the potential therein, the efforts to tap it in the region have only been modest and mostly made by individuals on their own. The only refinery in the region was in Kisumu district - the AYIER REFINERY. Yet bee-farming can go a long way in improving the foreign-exchange earning power of the country as honey could be easily exported. A thriving bee-keeping industry would also create opportunities for employment in the region while acting as a source of income for the rural bee-farmer.

The Lake Basin Development Authority, in recognition of this potential has launched a bee-keeping project which, apart from aiming at organising bee-farmers into Cooperative societies, also undertakes to construct honey refineries. However, by the time of this research, only one refinery had been built at Bondo, in Siaya district. The Bondo Honey Refinery's construction began in September, 1984 but became operational in February, 1985.

Although the Beekeeping project at Bondo was not fullfledged by the time of this research, it had been operational for almost a year and this researcher, after <sup>a</sup> pilot survey, chose it as a case study for one particular reason: there were indications that the project was not doing well. In fact, as will be shown later, the Bondo Honey Refinery was at its best a "white lelephant". And even the efforts at offering extension service to beekeepers left a lot to be desired.

The Authority had employed three extensionists attached to the Bondo Honey Refinery. The extensionists visit bee-farmers with the aim of educating them on viable beekeeping methods. They also help in tending the beehives and harvesting the crude honey. The Authority, through a loan programme, provides the bee-

hives to farmers, especially women groups although some farmers have their own beehives. During visits made by this researcher to some of the clients (the bee-farmers) one point stood clear: the impact of the LBDA bee-farming extension service had been hardly felt, nor were there any indications that the situation would improve if changes were not immediately made. First, the three bee extensionists at Bondo were not properly trained and were therefore ill-equipped with beekeeping knowledge. Employed directly from school after sitting their Kenya Certificate Examination (Form Four level), the extensionists had received no formal training in beekeeping. As they themselves told this researcher, they were receiving on-the-job training by the Bee Specialist who himself appeared only occasionally as he was based in the Authority headquarters in Kisumu.

The implication of employing ill-trained extensionists for the project is that performance is negative. Indeed, nearly all the clients of the bee-keeping project lamented lack of technical knowhow among the extensionists. One bee-farmer, living just next to the refinery, showed me his beehives which were overflowing with honey and should have been harvested long time ago. He noted, "LBDA extensionists have let me down". The leaders of two women groups which

are also LBDA clients complained that the LBDA extension staff were quite "green" with regard to beekeeping and even noted that even the individual farmers are slightly better off than the extensionists. In particular, a foreign agency, CARE Kenya, which is also assisting the women groups in beekeeping was held to be better and more effective than the LBDA staff in extension service to the clients. Some farmers even complained that the LBDA staff were sometimes contradicting the established and proven principles of modern beekeeping, especially in the area of "harvesting". While the other agency's (CARE's) personnel were emphasising and advising on modern harvesting methods which are efficient during day-time, the LBDA staff were insisting on the traditional methods involving use of fire at night. The leaders of women groups loathed the idea of harvesting at night with the LBDA extensionists as this caused suspicion between the women and their husbands.

Apart from ill-trained extension personnel, there was also lack of understanding between the LBDA and its clients. The members of one women group complained that the LBDA was paying them too little for their crude honey. They claimed that there was a dealer at NYANG'OMA, a few kilometres from Bondo Refinery, who was paying them thrice what the LBDA was paying them. However, asked whether they would

prefer to sell to the Nyang'oma dealer instead of the LBDA, they said they feared that the LBDA people would take back their beehives which they had been given on loan basis.

Apart from being ill-trained, the extensionists also complain of poor working conditions. They have to visit clients during day time and harvest the hives at night, in fact, in the small hours of the night. They complained that they were not being given any allowance for night duty. This could result in low morale among them. For example, their failure to harvest beehives in time like in the case cited above, may be partly due to lack of enthusiasm on their part.

The end result is that, despite the high potential for beekeeping in the area and despite the mushrooming of beehives in the area, the refinery is operating under capacity. In fact, most of the days it does not operate due to insufficient supply of crude honey. For example, the target output as given by the Authority is 101 five hundred grammes bottles of refined honey per month, yet by the time of the research, the output was put at some 21 bottles per month. Sometimes it could be less. This calls for immediate improvements on the extension service if more crude honey is to be harvested and refined.



Another suggestion is that instead of constructing another refinery in the region - one was due for completion in South Nyanza at the time of this research - the Authority should for the start concentrate its resources - both financial and managerial - on the Bondo project in order to raise its level of performance before starting another. For it appears that the Bondo Refinery is at its best a "white elephant".

With regard to the objective of organising bee-farmers into Cooperative Societies, no effort had been made by the time of this research. In fact, despite the desire of the Authority, as stated in the project proposal, to use the Ministry of Cooperatives officials in this regard, the involvement of the district and divisional cooperative officers was almost nil. In fact, at the Siaya district cooperative headquarters, this researcher was informed that there has been very little or no contact between the Authority and the office on this matter at all, let alone on other activities.

In submission, then, one would say that the Authority has made a false start with regard to the Bondo Beekeeping project. This is due to the reasons cited above, namely, ill-trained personnel and lack of concentration on the project. This makes the Authority a poor example to other development institu-

tions in the region. Especially, the prevailing view that the CARE group is superior to the LBDA extensionists in Beekeeping knowledge only serves to degrade the Authority and further undermine its legitimacy.

It is, however, the submission of this researcher that this is a case where the Authority, for the beginning, should have just given assistance in form of finance or material to the existing institutions which were already involved in bee-keeping, say, for example, the relevant government department at the district or divisional levels. In any case, the Authority itself commits itself to working with other institutions in this respect. So, before amassing the necessary technical and administrative capabilities, it should channel the assistance to the women groups or individual farmers through the Ministry of Cooperatives and the Ministry of Livestock departments in the district or division.

#### 5.2.4.0. THE YALA SWAMP AGRICULTURAL PROJECT

The Yala Swamp, covering some 23,500 hectares of land in both Siaya and Busia districts is one of the unique development "problem" areas in the Lake Basin region. The dangers posed by a swamp to human

life are obvious: they are breeding grounds for disease carrying insects. Yet if reclaimed, the swamp can be a big development asset in that the drained land can be used for both small scale and large scale agricultural ventures, whether rainfed or irrigated. It can also help in settling the landless.

#### 5.2.4.1. : Background to the Project

Out of the 23,500 hectares, only 2,300 ha. have been reclaimed. In fact, the reclamation of this part was completed by 1970 by the Kenya Government through the assistance of the United Nations Development Programme. The reclaimed part constitutes project Area I of the LBDA which has been charged with the development of the whole swamp, although the Authority got the greenlight to take over the swamp after a long battle which has been discussed in detail in Chapter four. The remaining 21,200 ha., still unreclaimed, has been divided into two project areas- Area II covering 9,200 ha. and Area III covering 12,000 ha. At the time this research was being carried out, the engineering designs and tender documents for the reclamation of Area II had been completed with the assistance of the Dutch Government as an Aid agency. A consortium of donors were also being sought to join the Dutch in the reclamation exercise and, already

the European Economic Community (E.E.C.) was responding positively. The LBDA, however, has already embarked on development projects in Area I and it is the on-going projects on this reclaimed part which were studied.

After the completion of the reclamation of Area I in 1970, the land, in accordance with the law governing land rights, became state property. However, it remained under-utilised for a long period of time. Even though the Ministry of Agriculture established some research projects, especially in form of crop husbandry, the rest of the land was either idle or cultivated by the people living around the area. The local people, through a long association with the reclaimed part from which they made staggering harvests of maize, beans and sorghum year in year out, came to believe that they were the rightful owners of the land. This brought a lot of problems when the LBDA successfully requested to be given the right to undertake projects on the land. The Authority faced opposition not only from the local residents but also from the Ministry of Agriculture which, as hinted in Chapter four, claimed the whole of the swamp area, including the reclaimed part arguing that it wanted to start a White Sugar plantation project therein. However, after a series of meetings, most under the auspices of the Siaya D.D.C., it was finally decided

that the Authority have access to and undertake projects on the land.

The struggle between the Ministry of Agriculture and the local residents on the one hand and the LBDA on the other over access to the land emphasises one vital point: that the LBDA will not find it easy to acquire land for its purposes without opposition either from the local residents or other institutions. It will have to struggle for the land resource and its success in getting that resource may well depend on its bargaining power and/or the support it enjoys from other partners (like, in this case, the D.D.C.). The LBDA faced a similar situation in Muhoroni (Kisumu District) where "squatters" living on the 340 - acre plot allocated to the LBDA as part of its Livestock Multiplication Farm had refused to move.<sup>23</sup> In the case of the Yala Swamp, the local residents, as revealed by discussions with many of those who lived near the LBDA farm, are still very bitter that the LBDA has "grabbed" from them their "source of livelihood". Even though it may be true, like in the Yala Swamp case, that the land may be government-owned and therefore does not rightfully belong to the locals,<sup>24</sup> the LBDA, which needs the cooperation and participation of the local residents to ensure its success cannot

afford to use force or unpopular methods in asserting its rights over land. It has to use persuasive methods and, if possible, arrange for alternatives for the local residents rather than resorting to the law enforcement machinery and prosecutions or forceful methods like when it forcefully uprooted some of the crops belonging to the locals who had been cultivating part of the reclaimed land before the Authority moved in.

5.2.4.2. : Objectives of the Project

The objective of the Yala Farm project is to develop the 2,300 ha. for food production. This includes seedbulking for crops such as rainfed rice, maize, sorghum, beans and cotton, the development of an irrigated horticultural production scheme and the development of a central fruit tree nursery to supply seedlings to farmers throughout the region.

By July, 1985 the enterprise on the project area consisted of the following:

TABLE 8 ; YALA FARM CROP PRODUCTION AREA, 1985:

<u>Crop</u>	<u>Area (in ha.)</u>	<u>Expected Output (in tons)</u>
Maize	840	2142
Upland Rice seed Production	40	90
Irrigated Vegetables	20	260
Fruit Nursery	5	20,000(Seedlings)
Beans	100	90
Sorghum	1000	603
Cotton	300	180
Robusta Coffee Nursery (Bear Root)	2	1.2 million Seedlings

SOURCE: VARIOUS LBDA PROJECT DOCUMENTS.

The project was launched in 1983 and as a first step, a fruit tree nursery was established and some 420 acres were opened up for rainfed crop production.

#### 5.2.4.3. : Project Administration

The Yala Farm project is part of the matrix system of the Authority's organisation. It has its own head, the Farm Manager (who holds a Diploma in Agriculture) responsible to the Agriculturalist who heads the Agriculture and Livestock division of the Authority's main organisation. He is supported by a Technical Assistant (certificate level), a Horticultural Assistant, five junior Agricultural

Assistants, a Store-keeper and a General Clerk.

The project, like the RDWSSP, is an example of how, because of easy interaction opportunities for the technical staff an inter-disciplinary approach to project management can be achieved. Nearly all the related technical divisions of the overall Authority organisation are involved in one way or another in project implementation. The personnel from the water resources division (especially the irrigation engineers and hydrologists) constantly tend to hydrological issues such as canal construction. The planning divisions' personnel visit the project site quite frequently with a view to assessing plan implementation and making adjustments when and where necessary. At higher levels, the project is linked with the Authority's planning division through the projects committee, chaired by the Deputy Managing Director, himself a planner and head of the Planning and Development department. The Agriculturalist to whom the Yala Farm Manager is responsible is a member of the projects committee and during the committee meetings, matters pertaining to plan implementation are discussed and adjustments made. Through the Project's Committee forum, there is an opportunity for constant inter-change of information between the field and the planning unit. This is supplemented



by the provision for practical day-to-day contact between the technical staff at the project site and the planning unit. This researcher had an opportunity to accompany different experts travelling together in some of their visits to Yala Farm.

As a way of ensuring that the project management is given enough leeway to administer the project and to make it responsible for the progress of the project, certain authority and responsibilities are delegated to it. Financially, the Authority adopts the strategy of "branch accounting" in relation to its projects in which a project has its own account into which it deposits any proceeds that accrue from the sales of its produce. This also applies to the Yala Farm. The intention is that the project management should be able to use part of this money to solve problems that need immediate solutions without necessarily sending requests for funds to the Authority headquarters in Kisumu. However, to instill financial discipline and responsibility on the part of the project management, the Financial Department at the headquarters exercises control through its Accounts division whose officers do periodical auditing of the financial behaviour at the project.

However, weaknesses exist in the links between the project and the overall Authority institutional

framework which hinder effective integration of the project into the Authority's overall organisational framework and effective implementation of the project. The weakness becomes more apparent in the area of employment of project personnel of the lower levels. Although the head of the project, the Farm Manager and other personnel like the Technical Assistant, the Horticultural Assistant, the five junior Agricultural Assistants, the Store-keeper and the General Clerk are all employed by the headquarters, the line personnel like the casual workers are employed by the project management who notifies the headquarters after making such employment. It was noticed by this researcher that there exist no proper guidelines from the headquarters to be followed by the project management in employing the line workers. As a result of the lack of guidelines, employment procedures adopted by the project management were a source of tension between the project management and the local residents and even among the employees themselves. In fact, the employment procedures have been at the heart of the controversy between the LBDA and <sup>the</sup> local community leaders in Boro division where the project is located.

An on-the-spot check by this researcher discovered that apart from some weeders, canal diggers and other casual workers, a majority of the supervisory staff

hailed from outside the division or even the district where the project was located. Most of the local residents living around the project when confronted with the question, "In what ways do you individually hope to gain from it (the project)?" answered invariably,

"No way. Even employment they give to their own people".

"This is their project".

There was widespread complaint that local people were being given a raw deal in employment despite the Authority's stated policy of employing three quarter of the project employees from the project's locality. Some respondents, who had had the opportunity to be employed as casual workers narrated how the project management mocks the "Yes" and "No" method whereby candidates for employment pick cards - if one picks a "Yes" card, then one gets the employment. It was claimed by these respondents that most of the "Yes" cards were picked by relatives of the project officers living on the farm. As a result of this disenchantment with the employment procedures, the locals do not feel to be part of the project and see the project managers as aliens who have come to make profit out of the land where they (the former) used to earn their livelihood. No wonder, statements like "This is their project" are made. Perhaps if the ranks of supervisors, like

"Nyaparas"<sup>25</sup> were also filled with people from around the locals could feel to be part of the project and community or popular participation would be meaningful.

The problem of employment narrated above is further compounded by the fact that it is not uncommon for some officers at the headquarters to send their own people from their home areas far from the project to be employed in the farm. Hence overhead costs of the project increase as these people are to be housed by the project.

One other area in which there is structural weakness between the project and the headquarters is supply of equipments and materials needed at the farm. Despite the fact that the farm has its own store clerk, the personnel still talk of "frustrations when something is wanted from the headquarters".<sup>26</sup> One middle-level officer at the farm gave an example of how he had ordered for some pesticides to kill pests which were destroying vegetables but had not received any communication four weeks after making the request. He showed me the vegetables which were fast being destroyed by pests. Surely, this suggests some weakness in the links between the project and the main Authority organisation, especially, the supplies department. One would also wonder why the project Stores clerk is not given full mandate to have the

necessary supplies in his office at the farm.

Coming to the welfare of the employees at the project, problems appear to be immense. The most pressing one is related to accommodation. As was indicated earlier, the project has been employing people from areas outside the division and even the district. This implies that it has to find accommodation for these employees. Given the lack of financial resources, the Authority cannot afford to give adequate accommodation to all its employees. Most project employees stay at a small trading centre, Harambee Market, about eight kilometres away from the project site. Sometimes, they have to walk to and from the trading centre. A casual worker who worked at the farm for only 12 days and left because of hard conditions of work narrated how when he arrived at the farm to begin work he had nowhere to sleep and had to sleep on the Verandah outside the project office. Most casual employees gave similar stories. While the scarcity of resources at the Authority is appreciated as a factor contributing to this situation, one wonders whether such problems could not be minimised if, say, the Authority recruited for its casual work needs only people coming from around, those who can go back home after work. For a casual worker who cannot eat and sleep well cannot work well. A canal-digger

or a weeder who walks eight kilometres to the farm cannot dig or weed well. Therefore, instead of transporting casual workers from far and then fail to accommodate them on or near the farm, the project management should give priority to local residents. The importance of keeping a pleasant atmosphere of work among casual workers is underlined by Marguarite Owen (1973) when she appreciates the TVA's practice of even installing music systems all around the farms where casual workers dag and weeded - this was aimed at maximising the workers' contribution to the development of the region. Even cinema halls and sports facilities were installed by the TVA.

#### 5.2.4.4. The "Output" Performance of the Yala Farm

##### Project

The multi-crop seed bulking and the central tree nursery projects have produced some results. In Siaya town, there exist a seed processing plant where seeds produced at the farm are processed, treated and bagged for distribution to farmers in the region. The seeds include the Katumani maize, the 511 maize seeds, the Serena and Seredo seeds of sorghum, beans, groundnuts and peas.

The central tree seedlings nursery has produced

the much needed Robusta coffee seedlings which have been distributed to farmers in the region in a bid to encourage and boost coffee production in the region. In the second half of 1984/85 financial year, for example, 18,930 seedlings of Robusta were sold to farmers fetching the Authority some Kenya Shillings 40,309. During the same period, some 4,947 citrus seedlings were distributed to farmers fetching some Kenya Shillings 38,470 while vegetables, namely, carrots, tomatoes, onions and brassicas were also sold to the residents of the region fetching the Authority some KShs. 2,392.50.

The seedlings are sold at reasonable prices. For example, while one citrus seedling goes at KShs. 7/50 at the project's central nursery, a farmer buying the same seedling elsewhere would pay anything from KShs. 9/= and more. The Robusta coffee seedlings are sold at KShs. 2/50 per pot, this being the government controlled price, however. For vegetables, cabbages are sold at KShs. 1/50 per kilogramme at the LBDA farm while at the market it would go at KShs. 3/00. Tomatoes go at KShs. 6/= per 3kg. while onions cost KShs. 5.00 per kilogramme.

While the seedlings and the vegetables are sold direct to farmers and consumers, the crop seeds processed at the Siaya LBDA seed processing unit are

distributed through the local Kenya Grain Growers Cooperative Union (K.G.G.C.U.) shops where they are sold at the normal government market price. As at April, 1985 documented sales from the Katumani maize and sorghum seeds stood at KShs. 220,043 while a revenue of about KShs. 1.5 million was expected from the 500 ha. under crops for the 1985 season. The LBDA is also credited with having distributed seeds throughout the country during the 1984/85 season when seeds were in short supply due to the previous drought.

The contribution of the seedbulking project at the Yala Farm to farming in the region cannot be overemphasised though the project has just been launched. In particular, the introduction of the Robusta coffee seedlings and the Serena sorghum seeds are a great step forward. Siaya district, for example, has been found, through studies, to be suitable for Robusta coffee production. Although many farmers had shown interest, lack of seedlings had been a set back. Many farmers now buy the seedlings from the Authority and small coffee farms have started springing up. The Serena sorghum is reputed for its short-maturing period and drought resistance. Previously, sorghum was planted only once a year in the long rains season. The farmers are now assured of two sorghum harvests a year as the Serena type can do extremely well even in the short rainy season. Although the LBDA is not the



pioneer as far as introduction of the Robusta coffee seedlings and serena seeds is concerned, the seed-bulking and central tree nursery at Yala Farm project have significantly boosted the farmers' interest in coffee production and serena sorghum production in the region.

As far as employment generation is concerned, Yala Farm project has offered employment to young school leavers who would otherwise be unemployed. Even married men and women living around the farm can offer their labour in exchange of Shs. 20/= per day for casual work.

#### 5.2.4.5. : Recapitulation

In submission, then, the Yala Farm project is an important one in the area of supplementing the efforts of the Ministry of Agriculture. However, what is questionable is the "uniqueness" of the project. How "unique" is the central tree seedlings nursery, for example? How unique are the maize and bean farms? What is unique about selling maize and beans to residents? Despite the contribution of the project to farming in the area as is stated above, this researcher finds it difficult to find out how to marry the argument of the Authority and its parent ministry that the Yala Swamp area is a unique area

where it can undertake unique projects and the type of projects being undertaken in the reclaimed part. Perhaps, as the LBDA points out clearly that it is to supplement the efforts of other institutions, wouldn't it be more meaningful for the Authority to only give some input and financial aid to other institutions to carry out these projects? The LBDA, this researcher suggests, could concentrate on the reclamation of the unreclaimed part and later establish a big Irrigation and Settlement project. For it is the reclamation work which other institutions especially the government ministries, would not be in a position to do: the LBDA, as an independent authority, can attract financial aid from foreign donors, as it already has from the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) which in 1985 supplied equipment.

It is also the contention of this researcher that Yala Swamp being a unique problem area offers an opportunity for the establishment of a huge project with considerable forward and backward linkages for the economy of the Siaya district as a whole. It is to be noted that Siaya boasts of very little industrial development, if any. In fact, one would wonder as to whether the D.D.C. would have not sanctioned the Ministry of Agriculture's idea of establishing a white sugar plantation on the reclaimed part if these

"petty" projects are the ones the LBDA can undertake on it. The sugar industry would have more considerable multiple effects on the economy of the district than the projects being undertaken at present.

CHAPTER SIX6.0. : SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:6.1. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS:

"The LBDA formed in 1979 is something that has remained almost vague in the minds of critical observers...some MPs have expressed concern over lack of effectiveness and ambition in fulfilling main objectives".

- The Sunday Times,  
29th January, 1984  
Page 6.

It was this editorial comment by the official Party newspaper that inspired this study. It apparently attacked the ineptitude of the Lake Basin Development Authority, raising the issues of "vagueness" of role and the ineffectiveness of the Authority. The study seeks to establish the validity or otherwise of the editorial comment, that is, whether there was really a vagueness in role and effectiveness with regard to the LBDA's performance since its birth in 1979. The study is presented in six chapters.

Chapter One introduces the study and focuses on routine matters such as statement of the problem and the theoretical framework adopted in the study. The chapter also analyses the origins of the Authority and the socio-economic and geographical profile of its area of jurisdiction which is variously described

as "a giant asleep". The actual resources ranging from water, arable land, and mineral resources to forestry and fish have been hitherto left idle with only minimum exploitation, if any. It is emphasised that the great potential therein requires a more effective planning and implementation strategy than what has existed in the past. The LBDA could be the best framework through which this could be achieved.

In Chapter Two, the LBDA and its potential role is discussed within the context of similar water-basin schemes elsewhere. Taking the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) of the United States of America, the prototype of such Regional Development Authorities (RDAs), as a yardstick, the chapter drives the point home that the role of the LBDA could play in the development of the region is not in doubt at all: the LBDA remains the ideal organizational framework for the effective development of the region. The experiences of the Tennessee Valley and the Mekong Basin in Asia are brought into focus. It is argued that the uniqueness of the water basin calls for the creation of a unique organization in terms of structure and different from the normal government ministries and departments.

Chapter Three examines the internal structure and organization of the Authority and concludes that the Authority is lacking in its technological and

administrative capacities to discharge its unique role. Poor recruitment system coupled with external political influences, over-establishment and lack of clear delineation or responsibilities among departments, divisions, sections and even members of staff are some of weaknesses observed. In sum, the organizational environment is found wanting in two areas, namely, (a) the emerging organizational ethos can offer very little in the Authority's pursuit of its declared objectives, and (b) the technological capacity to attain objectives is hindered by lack of clear and meaningful recruitment pattern and misallocation of duties.

In Chapter Four, the main concern is twofold: (a) to put the LBDA within the national framework by examining its relationship with the national institutions that are relevant to its task, for example, the parent ministry, the legislature, the Treasury, excetra and, (b) to consider the institutional environment in the LBDA's operational region. The treatment of these two issues is considered pertinent if the role of the LBDA in the development of the region is to be clearly understood: the LBDA needs the support from the Central Government - its creator - and the cooperation of its counterparts in the region whose activities it is supposed to oversee and coordinate and with whom it shares resources.

The first part of the chapter analyses the

relationship between the Authority and the various relevant arms of the Central Government. It is discovered that there have been problems in the Authority's relationship with its Parent Ministry whose role has been seen as a hindrance and ineffective in terms of guidance in policy matters. The same can be said of other institutions such as parliament which, it is argued, cannot effectively discharge its role as a watchdog over the Authority since it had played very little role, if any, in its creation and also because some Members of Parliament are on its Board. The central issue in this section is, however, autonomy particularly in disbursement of funds and policymaking. It is, however, observed that the fact that the Authority has not become self-sufficient in its financial requirements, it is only obvious that it has to be subjected to control and scrutiny by the Central Government, its financial provider, however much such control and scrutiny could be detested.

In the second and last part of Chapter Four, the relationship between the Authority and other development institutions in the Lake Basin area is addressed. Cardinal issues considered are functional differentiation and power relationship between the LBDA and other institutions. Having considered these two issues against the background of the projects that the Authority has undertaken or is undertaking, it is

concluded that functional and/or role differentiation between the Authority and the other institutions are still far from clear. Cases of duplication of functions are cited. The relationship between the Authority and the District Development Committees (D.D.C.s) with regard to the new District Focus for Rural Development Policy is even more confusing. The confusion is detrimental to the LBDA's exercise of power over development organizations in the area. It is submitted that unless the relationship between LBDA and other development organizations in the area is clearly delineated and defined there is a danger that the creation of the Authority may turn out to be just another case of organizational proliferation.

Chapter Five addresses the question of project implementation. Problems are singled out, the major ones being: inadequate administrative infrastructure, continuity of donor-funded projects and lack of prioritization of projects. The question is raised as to whether, added just a little more resources, other non-LBDA institutions would not implement even better some of the projects being undertaken by the Authority. For example, the Immunization programme which was poorly coordinated by the Authority could have been implemented better by the Ministry of Health with just a little more input (financial) from the LBDA. The Lambwe Valley Tsetse Control programme which



was a complete flop could have been left to the then department of Livestock which had the expertise and necessary equipments.

One other major finding with regard to project implementation is that the Authority started doing too many things at the same time, yet it had very little resources at its disposal. This resulted in some "white elephant" projects; for example, the Riat Bricks and Tile plant and the Bondo Honey Refinery. Lack of ambition and poor planning are the Authority's main undoings that often lead to project failures. Some of the projects are also so petty that one wonders whether they need an organization of the magnitude of the LBDA in the first place.

In project administration, there is a missing link between the Headquarters in Kisumu and project sites, posing serious problems with the matrix system of management which seems to have been adopted by the Authority. In some cases, communication between Kisumu and various project sites is far from efficient leading to delays in problem-solving. Add the fact that most of the experts who really matter usually sit in offices in Kisumu, being only remotely attached to project sites. The Bondo Honey Refinery, for example, has been left in the hands of ill-trained school leavers with little or no expert knowledge in beekeeping and honey refinery.

The major conclusion of this study is that the LBDA

has yet to prove its raison de'tre and legitimacy despite the fact that it has been in existence for the last seven years. Yet similar schemes such as the TVA took lesser time to take off. The main reason for the delay in take-off in the case of the LBDA is that it has made a false start. The management of the Authority, it appears, has no clear sense of direction as to the major objective of the Authority and what it could do. Thus a pertinent and one of the biggest problems of the lake basin - the floods - has not been properly addressed. Hence the inhabitants who had rightly thought that the Authority's task was to tackle the floods problem which had cumbered the area for a long time, have been disappointed and are disillusioned. Given also that the Authority has become just like another government department, lacking the conviction, initiative and flexibility expected of such an organization, one would conclusively ask : Is the LBDA in its present state really necessary?

## 6.2 RECOMMENDATIONS:

In the light of the findings and conclusions of this study, the following recommendations are made:

### 6.2.1. Recommendations to the LBDA Management:

In order to make the LBDA instrumental to the development of the Lake Basin region and to make

it equal to the task it has been charged with, the following operational recommendations are made:

(i) The Authority should concentrate on major projects and leave the other "petty" ones to other appropriate institutions. More specifically, it should concentrate on the LAKE (Victoria) which gave it its name. For example, it should ensure proper utilisation of the water resources of the Lake. Major irrigation projects should be launched with a view to turning into use the floods that invade the area frequently. The development of the fishing industry should also be a priority. In doing this, the Authority should concentrate first on the "Lake fish" rather than going into small fish farming projects. As argued elsewhere in the study, there is a lot more promise in helping the fishermen improve the fishing methods than there is in the expensive small-scale fish farming project.

(ii) The recruitment system should be refined with a view to cutting down on the number of non-technical staff, that is typists, cleaners, clerks, and other officers whose duties are not directly related to the LBDA's development objectives. Emphasis must be laid on staff with the relevant skills needed to fulfill the development task of

the Authority. This step would help reduce overhead costs and give room for more of the scarce funds to be used in project implementation.

(iii) The Board, or the Authority, as it is called, must take a keener interest in what is going on in the Authority. The study found that the Board had delegated too much to the Managing Director, who even though is the Chief Executive, has to execute policies made by the Board. For example, it has been noted in Chapter Three that the anomalies in recruitment cited may be as a result of negligence on the part of the Board. Even duplication of activities and misprioritization of projects would have been curbed had the Board shown constructive interest from the start. In a nutshell, the Board must know that it is "the steering wheel" of the Authority.

#### 6.2.2. Recommendations to Government Policy-Makers:

The study has also found that some of the problems affecting the performance of the LBDA are related to overall government Policy, particularly with regard to Parastatals and Regional Development Authorities, in particular. This study, therefore has the following recommendations to make to the policy-makers if the LBDA and other existing or future Regional Development Authorities are to be

made instrumental to development:

(i) The role of the Authorities vis-a-vis other institutions such as Ministry departments, Parastatals, voluntary agencies, excetra, should be clearly defined. The lack of such clarity in the case of the LBDA has led to both power and operational struggle between the Authority and other institutions in the area. Charges of duplication would not have arisen had the LBDA's role been sharply defined.

This study recommends that the statutes of such institutions like the National Irrigation Board, the Kenya Power Company and the District Development Committees be reviewed with a veiw to eliminating any conflict with the LBDA. Even the LBDA's statute itself should be reviewed in order to make clear its role in planning, coordination and implementation.

The Regional Development Authorities should be accorded the necessary power to direct and supervise all aspects of related development activities in their areas of jurisdiction. It is submitted that without clear role definition, duplication of projects and role conflict between the Authorities and their counterpart institutions will continue.

(ii) It is also recommended that the Boards of Regional Development Authorities should be composed of committed and relevantly skilled individuals who can give the

Authorities' problems the attention they deserve. A leaf can be borrowed from the TVA whose Board of Directors was composed of distinguished individuals who had proved their worth in related and specific fields. Contrasting, the LBDA's Board, like those of TARDA and KVDA, is dominated by politicians, including sitting Members of Parliament. This not only politicises the Authority's undertakings but also contributes to the ineffectiveness of the Board because politicians may not concentrate on matters related to the functioning of the Authority.

(iii) It should also be the policy that the top management personnel do not engage in private business the nature of which would easily bring into question their honesty and straightforwardness as servants of the Authority. As least this was the case with the successful TVA in its early years of existence. This study found a case where a top Authority official owned a commercial fish farm - what guarantee is there that he would not divert the Authority's fish farming resources to his farm?

It is expected that the above three recommendations would help the policymakers in this country in ensuring that the Regional Development Authorities deliver the goods. They should also guide the policymakers when new Authorities are to be established. For example, when the proposed Uaso Nyiro Basin Authority is

established, it should not repeat the mistakes of the LBDA.

### 6.2.3. Recommendations to Scholars:

To scholars who may be interested in pursuing further research on the same topic, it is recommended that more emphasis be laid on the administrative set-up of the organisation which seems to be undergoing a lot of changes. An area of interest would be how the matrix system works. The Authority has just launched a few more projects in various districts and it would be interesting to find out how they are integrated into the whole organizational framework.

Apart from the organizational set-up, another area worth emphasising would be the OUTPUT performance of LBDA projects. As noted elsewhere in the study, most of the projects had not matured at the time of research and measurement of output could only be problematic. Yet it is the ability of the Authority to deliver the goods - or output performance - that matters.

Lastly, the power relationship between the District Development Committees (DDCs) and the Authority would also provide an illuminating area of research. This is because the District Focus for Rural Development Policy has been undergoing adjustments here and there. In fact, this study predicts that the more powerful the DDCs become, the more inept the LBDA will become in

its role as the overall planner and coordinator of development in the Lake Basin region if their relationship is not refined and made succinct.



APPENDIX I

THE LAKE BASIN DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY ACT

COMMENCEMENT: 31st AUGUST, 1979

AN ACT OF PARLIAMENT TO PROVIDE FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN AUTHORITY TO PLAN AND CO-ORDINATE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS IN THE LAKE VICTORIA CATCHMENT AREA AND FOR MATTERS CONNECTED THEREWITH AND INCIDENTAL THERETO.

This Act may be cited as the Lake Basin Development Authority Act.

In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires -

"Area" means the Lake Victoria catchment area;

"Authority" means the Lake Basin Development Authority established by section 3;

"chairman" means the person appointed as chairman of the Authority under paragraph (a) of subsection (1) of section 4;

"development area" means that part of the Lake Victoria catchment area situate within the Western and Nyanza Provinces;

"non-official members" means the chairman and the members of the Authority appointed under paragraph (h) of subsection (1) of section 4;

There is hereby established an authority which shall be a body corporate by the name of the Lake Basin Development Authority, with perpetual succession and a common seal, and which shall be capable in its corporate name of -

- (a) suing and being sued;
- (b) taking, purchasing or otherwise acquiring, holding, charging and disposing of property, movable or immovable;

- (c) borrowing and lending money;
- (d) entering into contracts;
- (e) doing or performing all such other things or acts necessary for the proper performance of its functions under this Act which may lawfully be done or performed by a body corporate.

Lake Basin Development Authority

4. (1) The Authority shall consist of the following members -

- (a) a chairman appointed by the President;
- (b) the Permanent Secretary to the Ministry for the time being responsible for economic planning;
- (c) the Permanent Secretary to the Ministry for the time being responsible for finance;
- (d) the Permanent Secretary to the Ministry for the time being responsible for agriculture;
- (e) the Permanent Secretary to the Ministry for the time being responsible for health;
- (f) the Provincial Commissioner, Nyanza Province;
- (g) the Provincial Commissioner, Western Province;
- (h) eight other members appointed by the Minister in consultation with the President, four of whom shall be appointed from the area affected by the operations of the Authority;
- (1) the managing director appointed under section 10.
- (2) Subject to this section, the non-official members shall hold office for a period of three years from the dates of their respective appointments.

(3) A retiring member shall be eligible for reappointment

(4) If the Minister is satisfied that any of the non-official members-

(a) has been guilty of improper conduct; or

(b) is incapacitated by prolonged physical or mental illness; or

(c) is unable or unfit, for any other reason to discharge the duties of his office, and it would be in the interest of the Authority so to do he may terminate the appointment of that member.

(5) The office of a non-official member shall become vacant -

(a) upon the expiry of his term of appointment; or

(b) upon the termination of his appointment under sub-section (4); or

(c) upon the expiry of one month, or such shorter period as may be mutually agreed, after the date upon which the Minister receives a written notice signed by the member of his intention to resign; or

(d) if he is absent without the permission of the Authority from three consecutive meetings of the Authority of which he had reasonable notice.

(6) The non-official members shall be paid by the Authority such remuneration and allowances as the Minister may from time to time determine.

5. (1) The Authority shall be convened by the chairman at least three times in every year.

(2) The Authority shall elect a vice-chairman from among its members.

(3) The chairman, or in his absence the vice-chairman, may at any time convene a special meeting of the Authority, and shall do so within fourteen days of receipt by him of a written requisition signed by at least three members.

(4) The quorum necessary for the transaction of any business of the Authority shall be ten members inclusive of the person presiding; and all acts, matters or things authorized or required to be done by the Authority shall be effected by a resolution passed by a majority of the members present and voting at a meeting at which a quorum is present.

(5) The chairman, or in his absence the vice-chairman, shall preside at all meetings of the Authority; except that in the case of the absence of both the chairman and the vice-chairman the members present shall elect one of their number to preside at that particular meeting.

(6) At every meeting of the Authority the member presiding shall have a casting as well as a deliberative vote.

(7) Subject to subsection (4), no act, decision or proceedings of the Authority shall be questioned on account of any vacancy in the membership thereof or on account of any defect in the appointment of any of its members.

(8) Subject to this Act, and to any general or specific directions of the Minister, the Authority shall regulate its own procedure.

1. (1) The common seal of the Authority shall be authenticated by the signature of the chairman and such other person as may be generally or specially authorized by the Authority

Lake Basin Development Authority:

(2) All documents, other than those required by law to be under seal, made by, and all decisions of, the Authority may be signified under the hand of the chairman, or in the case of a decision taken at a meeting at which the chairman was not present, under the hand of the person presiding at that meeting

7. The Authority may from time to time appoint such committees, whether of its own members or otherwise, as it may think necessary but no decision of any committee shall be effective unless it has been confirmed by the Authority.

8. The functions of the Authority shall be -

(a) to plan for the development of the Area and initiate project activities identified from such planning in the development area through the Government generally;

(b) to develop an up-to-date long range development plan for the Area;

(c) to initiate such studies, and carry out such surveys, of the Area as may be considered necessary by the Government or the Authority, and to assess alternative demands within the Area on the natural resources thereof, including agriculture (both irrigated and rain-fed), forestry, wildlife and tourism industries, electric power generation, mining, and fishing, and to recommend economic priorities;

(d) to co-ordinate the various studies of schemes within the Area such that human, water, animal, land and other resources are utilized to the best advantage and to monitor the design and execution

of planned projects within the Area;

- (e) to effect a programme of both monitoring and evaluating the performance of projects within the development area so as to improve that performance and establish responsibility therefor, and to improve future planning;
- (f) to co-ordinate the present abstraction and use of natural resources, especially water, within the Area and to set up an effective monitoring of abstraction and usage;
- (g) to cause and effect the construction of any works deemed necessary for the protection and utilization of the water and soils of the Area;
- (h) to ensure that landowners in the Area undertake all the measures specified by the Authority to protect the water and soils of the area;
- (i) to identify, collect, collate and correlate all such data related to the use of water and other resources and also economic and related activities within the Area as may be necessary for the efficient forward planning of the Area;
- (j) to maintain a liaison between the Government, the private sector and other interested agencies in the matter of the development of the development area with a view to limiting the duplication of effort and to ensuring the best use of the available technical resources;
- (k) to examine the hydrological effects and the subsequent ecological changes on the development programmes and evaluate how they effect the economic activities of the persons dependent on river and lake water environment;

- (l) to consider all aspects of the development of the Area and its effects on the lake inflow and outflow;
- (m) to monitor the operations and provide technical reports on the operations and prove technical reports on the operations of any agreement or other arrangements between Kenya and other states relating to the use of the waters of Lake Victoria or of the River Nile.

9. (1) The Authority may appoint, upon such terms and conditions as it thinks proper, such other officers and servants as it considers necessary or desirable for the efficient conduct and operation of the Authority.

(2) Every member of staff shall, subject to this Act, exercise such powers and functions and perform the duties assigned to him from time to time by the managing director.

(3) The members of staff appointed under section (1) shall be paid out of the funds of the Authority such salaries as the managing director, with the approval of the Authority, may from time to time determine and such travelling and other expenses as they may incur in the performance of their duties.

10. (1) There shall be an officer of the Authority to be known as the managing director, who shall be appointed by the Minister and who shall be responsible for the execution of policy of the Authority and for the control and management of its day-to-day business.



Lake Basin Development Authority:

(2) The Authority shall delegate to the managing director such of its functions under this Act as are necessary for the day-to-day business of the Authority, and in particular the Authority shall delegate to the managing director the power, subject to any instructions of a general nature as may be given by the Authority -

- (a) to control and supervise the acts of all officers and servants of the Authority in the matters of executive administration and in all matters concerning the accounts and records of the Authority; and
- (b) to dispose of all questions relating to the service of the officers and servants of the Authority and their pay and privileges.

11. The funds of the Authority shall consist of -

- (a) such moneys as may from time to time be provided by Parliament;
- (b) moneys borrowed by the Authority, on such terms and for such purposes as the Minister, in consultation with the Minister for the time being responsible for finance, may approve;
- (c) any moneys accruing to the Authority from any other source.

12. (1) The Authority shall cause to be kept all proper books and records of account of the income, expenditure, assets and liabilities of the Authority and shall prepare such other accounts as the Minister may require and, in addition, shall prepare yearly balance sheets made up to the end of each financial year.

(2) At the end of each financial year the accounts of the Authority shall be audited by the Controller and Auditor-General.



(3) The Authority shall produce and lay before the Controller and Auditor-General all the books and accounts of the Authority with all vouchers in support thereof, and all books, papers and writings in its possession or control relating thereto, and the Controller and Auditor-General shall be entitled to require from all members, officers and servants of the Authority such information and explanations as may be necessary for the proper performance of his duties.

(4) At the completion of an audit under this section, the Controller and Auditor-General shall make a report thereon to the Authority and shall at same send a copy of the report to the Minister.

13. (1) The Authority shall within a period of six months after the end of each financial year or within such longer period as the Minister may approve, submit to the Minister a report of its operations and activities during that year, together with the yearly balance sheet and such other statements of accounts as the Minister shall require, and the Authority shall publish the annual report and the yearly balance sheet in such manner as the Minister may specify.

(2) The Minister shall lay both the Authority's report and Controller and Auditor-General's report, together with the yearly balance sheet and such other statements of account as the Minister may deem appropriate, before the National Assembly as soon as reasonably practicable.

14. No act or thing done by any member of the Authority or by any officer or servant of the Authority shall, if

the Act or thing was done bona fide for the purposes of carrying this Act into effect, subject him personally to any liability, action, claim or demand whatsoever.

15. No duty shall be chargeable under the Stamp Duty Act in respect of any instrument executed by or on behalf of or in favour of the Authority in cases where, but for this section, the Authority would be liable to pay such duty. v

APPENDIX II

LIST OF JOB GROUPS AND SALARY SCALES (REGULATION  
6/1/1) AS AT AUGUST, 1985.

Job Group LB. O: K£. 300 x 12 - 324 x 15 - 399 x 18 -  
453 p. a.

Job Group LB. N: K£. 354 x 15 - 399 x 18 - 489 x 21 -  
531 p. a.

Job Group LB. M: K£. 434 x 16 - 489 x 21 - 594 x 24 -  
642 p. a.

Job Group LB. L: K£. 531 x 21 - 594 x 24 - 714 x 30 -  
774 p. a.

Job Group LB. K: K£. 690 x 24 - 714 x 30 - 864 x 36 -  
972 p. a.

Job Group LB. J: K£. 834 x 30 - 864 x 36 - 1044 x 42 -  
11770 p. a.

Job Group LB. H: K£. 1128 x 42 - 1254 x 48 - 1494 x 60 -  
1554 p. a.

Job Group LB. G: K£. 1494 x 60 - 1794 x 72 - 2010 p. a.

Job Group LB. F: K£. 1794 x 72 - 2154 x 90 - 2424 p. a.

Job Group LB. E: K£. 2154 x 90 - 2604 x 108 - 2928 p. a.

Job Group LB. D: K£. 2712 x 108 - 3144 x 132 - 3540 p. a.

Job Group LB. C: K£. 3408 x 132 - 3804 x 156 - 4428 p. a.

Job Group LB. B: K£. 3804 x 156 - 4584 x 186 - 4956 p. a.

Job Group LB. A: K£. 4584 x 186 - 5514 x 216 - 5730 p. a.

Managing Director: K£ 6946 x 216 - 6594 x 252 - 7350 p. a.

A P P E N D I X III

SCHEDULE OF DUTIES

Managing Director (MD)

- Chief Executive of the Authority
- Accounting Officer and authorised officer
- Responsible for the implementation of policy in consultation with the Authority
- Responsible for Administration and Organisation of Authority
- Member of all Provincial and District Development Committee
- Responsible for the negotiations of both local and external project funds
- Member of the Authority and all its Committees

PLANNING & DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT

Deputy Managing Director(DMD)

- Responsible to the Managing Director for co-ordinating the activities of all Technical Professional Staff in planning and implementation of development Projects
- Head of planning and development department
- Draft of project proposals and modalities of implementation
- Co-ordination of feasibility studies
- Discussion with the donor agencies
- Co-ordinate representations to the DDC and the Sub-Committee of the DDC and sectoral meetings
- Co-ordinating drafting of LBDA estimates both recurrent and development, and ensuring that these are done in good time
- Chairman of projects committee
- Any other duties that may be assigned to him from time to time by the MD

PLANNING DIVISION

Regional Planner (RP)

- Responsible to the MD through DMD for planning and identification of development priorities and co-ordination of feasibility studies
- Head of Planning Division
- Formulation of the Intergrated Regional Master Plan
- Formulation of strategies for implementation of projects
- Co-ordination, evaluation and monitoring of projects identification, planning and implementation
- Co-ordination of the preparation of forward budget and draft development estimates
- Contribution to aid negotiations and drawing project terms of reference
- District Development and Executive Committees, and any other committees related to planning and development
- Any other assignments by MD/DMD

Senior Planner (SP)

- Responsible to the Regional Planner for monitoring and co-ordinating regional planning activities
- Project proposals
- Preparation of Intergrated Regional Master Plan
- Any other duties assigned by DMD/RP

PLANNING OFFICER (PO)

- Responsible to the Regional Planner for project information
- Project summaries
- project data collection
- Compilation of statistical data
- Any other assignments that may be given by RE/SP

Surveyor

- Responsible to the Regional Planner for all matters relating to land, surveys, mapping contracts and other land transactions
- Head of Survey and Catagraphy Section in survey work of the Lake Basin Development Authority
- Demarcation of Project sites, bounderies
- Prepare action of topographical maps
- Any other assignment given by the RP

WATER RESOURCES DIVISION

Chief Engineer (CE)

- Responsible to the MD through DMD for Civil Engineering works and water related to projects
- Head of Water Resources Division
- Contribute to the formulation of the IRMP in respect of water resource construction works
- Construction and building works including quantity survey and cost analysis
- Liaison and co-ordination of activities of various institutions involved in water resources planning and development in the area
- Participate in the formulation of a comprehensive rural water master plan of the LBDA Area
- Formulation and monitoring water related studies and provide counterpart contribution to consultants involved in the studies
- Co-ordinate the designing and execution of approved water projects
- Any other assignment by MD/DMD

Hydrologist (HYDG)

- Responsible to the CE
- Head of water supply section

Co-ordinate studies and implementation of Hydro Electric power Development

Prepare material for hydrological surveys and reports and implementation of such survey

Water Resource Development Planning and Management

Collect and analyse hydrometeorological records and develop improved systems of recording data

Any other assignment by CE

Irrigation/Drainage Engineer IDE/A

Responsible to the Chief Engineer for planning design and follow-up implementation of irrigation projects within Authority Development Area

Head of Irrigation and Drainage Section

Initiate Water and Land use studies in the area on irrigated agriculture

Co-ordinate and contribute to irrigation projected undertaken by various agencies e.g NIB, (PIU'S) and NGO'S (KEFHC) within the Authority's area of jurisdiction

Act as counterpart to the various water resources/irrigation studies undertaken by consultants in the LBDA Area

Contribution to bilateral aid discussions affecting the LBDA area with particular reference to irrigated agriculture

Responsible for sectoral budgeting of irrigation and drainage projects

Contribute to the formulation of the Intergrated Regional Master Plan

Any other assignment by the CE

Irrigation and Drainage Engineer (IDE/B)

Responsible to the Chief Engineer through the

IDE/A for design and implement irrigation schemes in the Lake Basin Development Authority's area

Evaluate and monitor irrigated agriculture operated by other agencies within the LBDA Area

Contribute to the formulation of the Intergrated Regional Masterplan

Liaison with other government department and agencies on matters relating to irrigation development

Electrical Engineer (EE)

- Responsible to the Chief Engineer for co-operation of studies in respect of Hydro-power projects
- Head of Hydro-power section
- Co-ordination of High Voltage Hydro-Electric Installation works and power-line mapping within the LBDA Area
- Counterpart to consultants involved in Hydro-power development studies in the LBDA Region
- Liaison with other agencies involved in power development activities in the region
- Any other assignment by CE

Civil Engineer (CE)

- Responsible to the Chief Engineer for Civil Engineering Works
- Co-ordinating and implementation of projects related to Flood Control and Surface Water Management activities
- Head of Engineering and Construction Section
- Design and construction of dams and reservoirs
- Liaison with the Irrigation and Drainage Section on construction of irrigation works
- Any other assignment by Chief Engineer

AGRICULTURE AND ANIMAL PRODUCTION

Agriculturalist (AGRIC)

- Responsible for Managing Director through DMD for planning, co-ordination and implementation of agricultural and Livestock Projects of the Authority



- Head of Agriculture and Livestock Division
- Contribution to DCA and PAD meetings in the LBDA Area
- Initiation of programme for diversification and improvement of crop production, and animal husbandry
- Co-ordinate implementation of Intergrated Land use in the LBDA Area
- Contribute to the formulation of intergrated regional master plan in respect of the Agricultural sector
- Any other assignment by MD/DMD

### FISHERIES DIVISION

#### Fisheries Specialist (FS)

- Responsible to the MD through IMD for planning co-ordination and implementation of LBDA Fisheries Development Projects
- Head Fisheries Division
- Exploitation of Lake and Riverine Fisheries resources
- Fish farming development
- Liaison with fisheries department on matters related to overall fisheries development in the region
- Improvement of fish gear technology
- Contribution to the Intergrated Region Master Plan
- Project proposal and appraisal
- Any other assignment to him by MD/DMD

#### Agriculturist

Responsible to the Fisheries Specialist for planning and Execution of fish farming projects

- Head of Commercial Fish Farming Section
- Construction of fish ponds
- Implementation and monitoring of externally aided fish farming projects

- Stock and management of fish ponds
- Rehabilitation programme of existing fish ponds within the Authority Area
- Providing technical advice to fish farmers and monitoring the progress of fish farming extension staff
- Any other assignments to him by the Fisheries Specialist

Service

ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION AND PUBLIC HEALTH DIVISION

Public Health Specialist

- Responsible to the MD through DMD for planning, co-ordination and implementation of Public Health and Environmental Protection Programmes
- Head of Environmental Protection and Public Health Division
- Co-ordination of catchment conservation, rehabilitation reforestation and afforestation programmes
- Surveillance on tsetse fly and Trypanosomiasis and other diseases occurrences in the LBDA Area
- Co-ordination of Rural Primary Health Care Programmes
- Contribution to the Integrated Regional Master Plan in respect of Public Health and environmental protection
- Preparation and assessment of environmental impact statements on industrial and other projects within the Authority Area
- Monitoring adherence to established effluent standards by industries in the region
- Any other assignment by MD/DMD

Ecologist (Ecol)

- Responsible to Public Health Specialist for effluent monitoring and pollution control programmes of LBDA
- In-Charge of Effluent Monitoring and Pollution Control Section
- Organisation, collection and collation of all ecological information relating to water in LBDA Area
- Administration and maintenance of LBDA analytical laboratory
- Monitoring and analysis of chemical pollution of water, soil and the atmosphere in the Authority Area
- In-Charge of LBDA Water analytical laboratory
- Contribution to the Intergrated Regional Water Plan
- Liaison with UNEP and NES on Regional Environmental programme
- Any other assignment to him by Deputy MD/PHS

Ecologist Trainee (ET)

- Responsible to the Ecologist for monitoring pollution effects on aquatic biota
- Co-ordination of environmental impact studies
- Laboratory analysis of selected and representative water samples
- Collection, compilation and analysis of environmental data
- Development and consolidation of standard methods for reconnaissance and sampling
- Any other assignment by the Ecologist

Bio-Chemist (Bio-C)

- Responsible to the Ecologist for collection of water samples from bodies and rivers for laboratory analysis

- Running of pollution monitoring programmes
- Liaison with other Research Agencies and Departments in the Region
- Any other assignment by the Ecologist

#### Forester

- Responsible to the PHS for soil conservation and afforestation programmes
- In-Charge of Soil Conservation and Afforestation and catchment conservation programme
- Liaison with relevant Governmental and NGO's on matters related to soil conservation and afforestation and catchment conservation programme
- Liaison with relevant Governmental and NGO's on matters related to soil conservation and afforestation

#### INDUSTRIAL DIVISION

Geologist/, Mineral Economist (G/ME)

- Responsible to the Managing Director through Deputy Managing Director
- Director for planning co-ordination and monitoring of geological and mineral resources survey
- Head of Industrial Division
- Review of Geology and mining prospects in the Lake Basin Development Area
- Initiation and co-ordination of mineral exploration programmes
- Handling of geological problems in respect of site investigations for dam construction etc.
- Co-ordination of industrial mineral resources Exploitation in the area.
- Contribute to the formulation of the intergrated Regional Masterplan.

- Liaison with the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources on matters relating to Geology and Minerals
- Any other assignments by the Managing Director/ Deputy Managing

ADMINISTRATION/PERSONNEL DEPARTMENT

Administration/Personnel Manager

- Responsible to the Managing Director for all administrative and personnel management matters
- Formulation, interpretation and implementation of administrative and personnel policies
- Planning, programming and determination of requirements and priorities of the Authority's personnel services
- Recruitment of staff
- Deployment and advice on efficient utilisation of Authority's employees
- Formulation of training policy and manpower development
- Job analysis, evaluation and grading of posts in the Authority
- Staff Discipline
- Authority, security arrangements and their implementation
- Secretary, disciplinary committee
- Member Ministerial Training Committee (MERD)
- Co-ordination of staff appraisal reports
- Co-ordination of general office services
- Liaison with inspectorate of statutory Board and the DPM on matters pertaining to personnel Management
- Public Relations, Industrial Relation and Trade Union matters
- Co-ordination of draft estimates
- Any other assignment by the Managing Director

ADMINISTRATION DIVISION

Senior Administrative Officer (SAO)

- Responsible to the Managing Director through Administration/Personnel Manager for determination and implementation of general office services and accomodation. Directing and supervising staff discharging office duties
- Formulation and implementation of headquarters and field security arrangements
- Organisation and implementation of effective inter office and out posts communication system
- Acquisition and maintenance of residential housing
- Administration of office supplies and equipment
- Provision of protective wears and clothing to qualifying
- Administration staff welfare
- Co-ordination and staging of official reception
- Any other duties which may be assigned by her from time to time by Managing Director/Administration/Personnel Manager

Registry Superintendent (RS)

- Responsible to Senior Administrative Officer for maintenance and custody of all subject files
- Control of movement of files from registry to relevant officers and vise versa
- Opening and indexing of new subject files
- Ensure efficient control of incoming and outgoing mails
- Veting and supervision of registry staff
- Establishment of appropriate registries
- Improvement of the existing registry
- Ensuring safe custody and use of franking machine
- Use of duplicating machines and the photocopies
- Administration of registry standing imprest

- Any other duties which may be assigned to him from time to time by Senior Administrative Officer

Security Officer (SO)

- Responsible to the Administrative/Personnel Manager through Senior Administrative Officer for planning, organising and ensuring security of LBDA properties and premises
- Guarding arrangements
- Incident investigation and reporting in collaboration with other agencies which may be involved in close consultation with administration/personnel Manager
- Ensuring sound safety precautions in collaboration with both the Industrial/Public Relation Officer and the Training Officer
- Security of cash and cheques in transit from bank to pay points and vice versa
- Provision of First Aid
- Accident Investigation
- In collaboration with Training Officer organise and train security personnel on Authority policy and procedures
- Provision for adequate security measures coordination of investigative duties with police and other relevant organisation
- Any other duties which may be assigned to him from time to time by Administration/Personnel Manager/Senior Administrative Officer

Transport Officer (TO)

- Responsible to the Administrative/Personnel Manager through the Senior Administrative Officer for management of Authority's vehicles and plants
- Insurance and licensing of Authority's vehicles and plants
- Maintenance of up to date vehicles and registers

- Computation and completion of consolidated monthly vehicle returns
- Liaison with the Assistant Workshop Manager on diagnosis of defects and repair of vehicle and plants
- Availing appropriate and serviceable transport to all authorised LBDA staff on request
- Directing and control of drivers plant operators and turnboys in close consultation with the Administrative/Personnel Manager
- Ensure up to date maintenance of log books of all LBDA vehicles and plants
- Planning and projection of long term LBDA transport requirements
- Any other duties which may be assigned to him from time to time by Administrative/Personnel Manager/Senior Administrative Officer

Assistant Workshop Manager (Ass.W. M)

- Responsible to the Senior Administrative Officer for administration, co-ordination and overall work planning of all workshop operations
- Directing and control of all workshop personnel
- Cost estimates preparation for maintenance of LBDA vehicles and plants
- Preparation of fast moving parts inventory for all LBDA vehicles and plants
- Designs and working drawings for vehicle bodywork special purpose plants and equipment. Plant and vehicle modifications if and when feasible
- Preparation of overhaul and servicing work programme



Training Officer (TR.0)

- Responsible to Administrative/Personnel Manager for drafting of training policy programme and amendments when and if necessary
- Ensure consistent application of the training policy
- Co-ordination of seminars, workshops, conference etc
- Organisation of internal training programmes
- Developing materials for training and requisitioning for recommended training materials i.e books, periodicals, magazines etc.
- Identification and determination of relevant training opportunities for the Authority personnel
- Selection of suitable nominees in relevant institutions
- Monitoring progress and welfare of personnel undergoing training
- Any other duties which may be assigned to him from time to time by APM

Executive Officer (E.O.A)

- Responsible to the Administrative/Personnel Manager for preparation of draft personal emoluments estimates
- Staff complement control
- Day to day application of LBDA policy
- Initiation, collection and compilation of appraisal report from relevant Departmental/Divisional Heads
- Administration of leave, medical and other intermittent benefits
- Supervision of clerical staff reporting to him
- Receipt and process of requests for advances
- Declaration of secrecy on new appointment
- Any other duties which may be assigned to him from time to time by the Administrative/Personnel Manager

Executive Officer (EO/B)

- Shall be responsible to the APM for administration of remuneration and reimburseable allowances
- Staff records pertaining to statutory deductions
- Workman compensation
- Supervision of junior staff and ensuring discipline among them
- Salary administration
- Obseration of official working hours
- Any other duties which may be assigned to him by the Administrative/Personnel Manager

FINANCE DEPARTMENT

Chief Accountant (CA)

- Responsible to the Managing Director for overall and efficient management of the Authority's financial activities
- Head of the Finance Department
- Development and institution of sound and appropriate financial controls and procedures
- Periodocal and annual accounts and statements
- Preparation and submissions of annual financial estimates and budgets in consultation with the planning and personnel departments
- Liaison with the Ministry, Treasury and other relevant institutions on matters relating to finance
- Tender documents
- Investment portfolios for the Authority and advising management on matters related to long and short term financing policies and control
- Signatory to the Authority's bank accounts and other accounting documents
- Any other duties as may be assigned to him from time to time by the Managing Director

ACCOUNTS DIVISION

Senior Accountant (Snr.A)

- Responsible to the Managing Director through Chief Accountant of the Authority for the operation of the Accounts Division
- Overall expenditure control and proper accountability of the Authority's financial transactions, including general supervision of the Accounts Staff and training
- Preparation of budgetary estimates for the Authority
- Preparation of monthly and annual financial statements and returns, monthly cost and analysis and cash flow projections
- Signatory to the Authority's bank accounts
- Any other duties as may be assigned to him by the Managing Director/Chief Accountant

Accountant (ATT.A)

- Responsible to the Senior Accountant for the preparation of financial statements and cost accounting
- Authorisation of payment vouchers for development expenditure
- Co-ordination and assembly of cost data related to the Authority's projects and compilation of information for annual accounts
- Control of vehicle and tractor running expenses and preparation of appropriate returns
- Control of vehicle and tractor running expenses and preparation of appropriate returns
- Investigation of audit queries and reporting to the Senior Accountant
- Maintenance of the Nominal Accounting Ledgers and Assets registers
- Any other duties as may be assigned to him by the Chief Accountant/Senior Accountant

Accountant (Acct. B)

- Assisting the Senior Accountant and functionally responsible to him for staff supervision in the Accounts Division
- Responsible for the cash office transactions banking and related reconciliations
- Submissions of expenditure returns and voucher safing of expenditure vote book
- Responsible to creditors and debtors accounts, payment and reconciliations
- Responsible for the control and accounting of revenue collections and returns
- Responsibility for the co-ordination of payment of salaries and wages for staff at the Authority's headquarters and out-stations
- Signatory to the bank accounts
- Any other duties as may be assigned to him by the Chief Accountant/Senior Accountant

INTERNAL AUDIT DIVISION

Internal Auditor (IA)

- Responsible to the Managing Director through Chief Accountant as in-charge of the Internal Audit Division
- Establishing adequate internal controls and checks with regard to the Authority financial transactions
- Formulation and implementation of appropriate audit programme with a view of ensuring strict adherence to established policies and procedures
- Handling in consultation with the Chief Accountant matters of Audit queries
- Any other duties as may be assigned to him by the Managing Director/Chief Accountant

Cashier

- Responsible to the Accountant
- In-Charge of the cash office
- Any other duties as may be assigned to him by the Chief Accountant/Senior Accountant

ACCOUNTS ASSISTANT ( A. ASST.)

- Responsible to the Accountant
- In-Charge of the salaries section
- Any other duties as may be assigned to him by the Senior Accountant/Accountant

SUPPLIES AND PURCHASING DIVISION

Supplies Officer (SO)

- Responsible to the Managing Director through Chief Accountant for overall management of the Supplies Division
- Procurement of stores and services
- Implementation and enforcement of the Authority's regulations, policies, systems and procedures with regard to handling, issuing and efficient use of supplies
- Establishment of adequate perpetual inventory checks and stock verifications including storage and delivery to project sites
- Evaluation in consultation with the Chief Accountant supplier performance
- Preparation and disposal of unserviceable and/or other stores on the recommendation of the Board of survey
- Compilation of Tender Documents and quotations
- Any other duties as may be assigned to him by the Managing Director/Chief Accountant

AUTHORITY SECRETARIAT

Authority Secretary (AS)

- Responsible to the Managing Director for procedural matters relating to the meetings of the Authority and its committees
- Secretary to the Authority and all its Committees
- Responsible for follow-up actions of Authority and its Committees decisions
- Advises the Management of the Authority on all legal matters including preparation of agreements and related documents; and keeps custody of such documents
- Advises the Management of the Authority on the interpretation of Authority and Committee decisions
- Participates in negotiations with donors and donors agencies etc.
- A member of the Committee established by the Management on discipline

LEGAL ASSISTANT (LA)

- Responsible to the Managing Director through Authority Secretary for General litigation
- Head of Legal and Property division
- Preparation of agreements
- Advice on International commercial and industrial law
- Property Conveying
- Pensions and insurances
- Any other duties assigned by the MD

SENIOR SECRETARIAT ASSISTANT (S.S ASST.)

Responsible to the Managing Director through Authority Secretary for preparation in respect of Authority and Committee meetings

Head of Authority Board and Services Division

Preparation and compilation of Authority and Committee papers and documents

Follow-up actions and reports on Authority and Committee decision

Any other assignment by Authority Secretary

APPENDIX IV

QUESTIONNAIRES

QUESTIONNAIRE 1

OFFICIALS OF OTHER AGENCIES  
IN THE REGION.

NAME OF BODY.....

NATURE (e.g Govt. Ministry, Private, Foreign.....

RANK/TITLE OF RESPONDENT.....

1. What specific areas of development is your agency concerned with in the Lake Basin Area?

.....  
.....  
.....

2.(a) When did your agency begin operating in the region?.....

(b) If before the establishment of the Lake Basin Development Authority in 1979, can you tell me some of the most pressing problems that your agency experienced in its activities in the area?

.....  
.....  
.....

(ii) How many projects did your agency carry out before the coming of the LBDA? Name them and their locations:

<u>Project:</u>	<u>Location:</u>
.....	.....
.....	.....
.....	.....
.....	.....

(ii) How many are functioning todate

.....  
.....  
.....

(iii) How many are functioning todate?

.....  
.....  
.....

(iv) Did the agency start any project which it did not complete?

Yes/ No.

If yes, which ones and where?

.....  
.....  
.....

(b) What factors contributed to their non-completion?.....

.....  
.....

(v) (a) With the entrance of the LBDA, would you say the problems referred to in 2(b)(i) have eased?

Yes

No


(b) If yes, what has been LBDA'S role, if any in easing the problems?

.....  
.....  
.....

(c) If No, why do you think the LBDA has not been able to solve these problems?

.....  
.....  
.....

3 (a) What channels of communication exist between your agency and the LBDA?

.....  
.....



7. (a) Has LBDA, by itself, carried out any project (s) that would otherwise fall within your department's or agency's scope or activities?

1. Yes  2. No.

(b) If yes, name them  
.....  
.....  
.....

(c) Did the LBDA tell your agency of it's intention to start these projects?

.....  
.....

What role did you play in these projects?  
.....  
.....  
.....

8. To whom does your agency owe more accountability for it's activities within the area among the bodies given below. Rank them in order of importance from the point of view of your agency.

Rank e.g 1

- parent body/agency/Ministry
- The Lake Basin Devt. Authority
- The District Development Committee
- The Ministry of Finance and economic planning

other specify.....

Give reasons why for the two most important

- 1.....
- .....
- 2.....
- .....

(b) Which ones do you frequently use?

.....  
.....

4. Has there been any change in policy or method of operation in your agency since the establishment of LBDA? 1. Yes 2. No.

1. Yes  2. No.

If yes, specify the change(s)

.....  
.....

What necessitate these changes?

.....  
.....  
.....

5. (i) How many projects have you carried out

(a) On behalf of the LBDA:

.....  
.....  
.....

(b) in conjunction with the LBDA

.....  
.....  
.....

(c) Solely by your agency but approved by the LBDA

.....  
.....  
.....

6. (ii) Which ones have been most successful?

.....

What procedure does your agency follow if it intends to initiate a project in the Lake Basin region?

.....  
.....  
.....

9. (i) Do you think there are some specific activities that fall within your agency's area of interest that the LBDA

Can carry out better than your agency?

1. Yes  2. No

(ii) If yes (a) what are these activities?

.....  
.....  
.....

(B) What gives the LBDA advantages over you in these areas?

.....  
.....  
.....

(c) If No

(a) why do you think your department is more capable or just as capable as LBDA?

.....  
.....  
.....

(b) Then, would you say that the LBDA is unnecessary for your agency?

1. Yes  2. No

If No explain why it is necessary for your agency

.....  
.....  
.....

10. Reflecting on your past and present relations with the LBDA, what changes would you recommend in your relationship in order to make it more instrumental in facilitating your agency's role in development in the area:

.....  
.....  
.....

11. Foreign agencies only.

(a) What type of aid or assistance do you give the Lake Basin Development Authority?

.....  
.....  
.....

(b) Can you say how much of these you have given the LBDA since it was established.

.....  
.....  
.....

(c) Are you satisfied with the way the LBDA is using these aids or assistances?

1 Yes  2. No.  3. Both Yes and No

If (2) or (3) explain why you would say so?

.....  
.....  
.....

If (2) or (3) explain why you would say so?

.....  
.....  
.....

(d) Do you deal with the LBDA directly when you want to offer any form of assistance?

1. yes  2. No.

If No, state the various channels you use:

.....  
.....  
.....

(e) How would you describe your relationship with other agencies(including government agencies) but excluding LBDA) in the area?

.....  
.....  
.....

(f) What is the state of relations between your own staff(expatriate) and these LBDA?

.....  
.....  
.....

(g) (i) Are there any projects which you have carried out in this area which have stopped functioning?

1. yes \_\_\_\_\_ 2. No \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

(ii) If yes, which ones they and where exactly are they situated?

(iii) What do you think made them cease to function?

.....  
.....  
.....

QUESTIONNAIRE 2

PROJECT MANAGEMENT

PROJECT LEADERS

NAME OF PROJECT.....

TYPE.....

LOCATION.....

Who is/are the sponsor(s) of this project?.....

1. When was this project launched?.....

(b) When did it start functioning(serving clients)?

.....  
.....

(c) If on-going, when is it expected to start functioning?.....

2. (a) If completed, was it completed on schedule?

1. yes  2. No.

If No, what caused the delay?.....  
.....

(b) If on-going, what problems, if any, is the project facing.....

.....

3. (a) Is it A. profit making

tick  
B. non-profit-making  relevant  
box

(b) What is/was its estimated cost?.....

.....(Kshs)

(c) Would you say the project.

A. was completed at a cost lower than was estimated

B. Was completed at a cost over and above the estimate

C. was completed at a cost equivalent to the estimate

D. will cost more than the estimate when completed  
(for on going projects)

E. will cost less than the estimate when completed

If (B) by what margin?.....

.....

.....

What do you think was responsible for this?

.....

.....

.....

5. Did/do you receive any aid from other agencies  
or organisations to put up the project?

1. yes

2. No.

If yes,

Agency/organisation

Type of aid(a.g financial

1.....

2.....

3.....

4.....

6. What is/are/were this source(s) of funds for this  
project?.....

.....

.....

7. Can you please describe very briefly what haappe-  
ned between the time the idea of having this  
project was mooted and the time of its inception  
bringing out clearly any discussions that took  
place.....

.....

.....

8. What particular section(s) of the local community was the project intended to serve?

.....  
.....  
.....

9. Did they/are they participate/participating in the implementation of the project in any way?

1. yes  2. No.

If yes, in what particular way?

.....  
.....

10. Were they told of the idea to start the project?

1. yes  2. No.

If yes, what was their reaction?

.....  
.....  
.....

11. Is this the first project of its kind in the area?

1. yes  2. No.

If No,

(i) How many others exist in this area?.....

.....

Where particularly are they situated?.....

.....

.....

.....

(ii) Are they functioning well? 1. yes  2 No

If No, what problems do you think are they experiencing?.....

.....

.....



12. Did you/are you meeting any opposition to this project from within the local community or from any other organisation or agency within the Lake Basin region?.....

1 yes  2. No.

If yes, please specify the particular sections of the local community or agencies or organisations exerting this opposition?

.....  
.....  
.....

13. How did you/do you deal with this opposition?

.....  
.....  
.....

14. (a) What specific goals is/was this project set to achieve?

- 1 .....
- 2 .....
- 3. ....
- 4 .....
- 5. ....

(b) If the project is already functioning would you say these goals are being achieved?

1 yes,  2. No.

If No, why in your view?.....  
.....  
.....

15. (a) How did you recruit the labour needed for the project?.....

.....  
.....

(b) Who met or who is meeting the labour cost?

.....  
.....

(c) How many people did/do you employ full time?  
what do they do and what are they paid?.....  
.....  
.....

(d) How many employees of the project come from  
(a) within the locality .....  
(b) outside the locality.....  
(locality here means the Division in which the  
project is situated).

16. What problems if any, do you meet in the day-to-day  
running of the project?.....  
.....  
.....

17. Does this project serve clients from outside the  
region? 1. yes                      2 No.

If yes, can you name some of these clients(e.g orga-  
nisations, farmers) and from what particular areas of  
the country they come?.....  
.....  
.....

18. (a) If quantifiable, what is the average out put of  
the project in units(e.g.x tons of fish per month  
etc)

.....  
.....  
.....

(b) Is this below the original expectation?.....

.....  
If yes, what was the intended output?.....  
.....  
.....;

19. Have you received any complaints from the clients

regarding the quality of goods or services rendered by the project?

- 1. yes,
- 2. No.

If yes, what specifically do they complain about?

.....

.....

.....

What are you doing about these complaints?.....

.....

.....

Are there any external factors the management could blame for the poor quality of services?.....

.....

If yes, which ones:

- 1.....
- 2.....
- 3.....
- 4.....

20. Are these any side- effect of your project which you had not considered at the time of its initiation?

- 1 yes,
- 2. No.

If yes, specify

- 1.....
- 2.....;
- 3.....
- 4.....

What are you doing to minimize them?

.....

.....

21. Looking to the future, how do you assess the performance of the project in the.....

.....

.....

QUESTIONNAIRE 3

THE CLIENT'S QUESTIONNAIRE

District.....Division.....

Location.....Sublocation.....

Age of Respondent.....

Sex.....A. Male.....B. Female.....

1. (a) Did you receive any formal education?

A. Yes  B. No,

(b) If yes, what level did you reach?  
.....

(c) Can you read  
write

(d) What is your main occupation?  
.....

(c) Do you have any other source (s) of in come?

A. yes  B. No

If yes, name it/them  
.....  
.....  
.....

(f) Can you estimate your annual in come in Kenya shillings.....  
.....  
.....

(g) Do you own any piece of Land?

A. yes,  B. No.

If yes.

(i) What is the total area of land that you own (in acres?.....  
.....

(ii) How did you acquire this land?

A. By family inheritance

B. Purchased it

C. I rent it

D. Some by inheritance and some by purchase

If, D. specify amount inherited.....  
and amount purchased.....

(iii) Have you ever lost any piece of land?

A. yes.  B. No.

if yes, to whom.....

.....  
.....

(iv) Have you ever sold any piece of land to anybody or any organisation? A. yes  B. No.

If yes, why.....  
how many acres?.....

- (v) Of the total area of land you own, about how many acres are under the following
- crops.....
- pastures.....
- fallow.....
- Bush trees.....
- Unusable.....
- Lying idle.....

(iv) what is (are) your main agricultural activity(ies)

crop cultivation

Livestock husbandry

Fishing

other(specify).....

(h) What is the distance between your home and the nearestest:

	<u>Distance in Kms</u>
Health centre	.....
Hospital(private)	.....
Hospital(Government)	.....
Nursery School	.....
Primary School	.....
Secondary School (private/Harambee)	.....
Secondary School (Government)	.....
Murram road	.....
Tarmac road	.....
Cattle dip	.....
Market	.....
River. stream/well	.....
Sugarcane factory/ Jaggery	.....
Cotton ginnery	.....
Farmer's Training centre	.....
Town	.....
Co-operative office (specify)	.....

(i) The following is a list of some problems likely to hinder any region's development efforts; which ones do you think are most chronic in the area?

Rank them in order of  
importance/seriousness

PROBLEM	RANK
Drough	.....
Floods	.....
Lack of water	.....
Lack of clean water	.....
Livestock diseases	.....
Malaria and other human diseases	.....
Lighting	.....
Soil erosion	.....
Lack of transport	.....

(j) (refer to g (iv) what problems do you experience in under taking these activitives(e.g. marketing, lack of finance etc.)

.....  
.....  
.....

(k) What are you doing to solve them?

.....  
.....  
.....

(I) What help have you got or do you get from the following in solving these problems?

(i) Government officers(e.g extension officers)

.....  
.....  
.....

(ii) Other bodies/orgnisations/agencies?

(Name them)

.....  
.....  
.....

B.  
1. (a) Have you heard of a Government agency called the Lake Basin Development Authority?

A. Yes  B. No.

If yes, when did you first hear about it?  
.....from what source.....

(b) (If yes) According to your knowledge what is  
its main objective?.....  
.....  
.....

(c) In what ways can you individually and the  
area in general benefit from its services?  
.....  
.....  
.....

2.(a) The LBDA has launched an project here called  
.....(this will be filled in  
by interviewer)

Have you heard about it(the project?.....  
(Yes or No)

(b) (If yes) what and how did you come to know  
about it?  
When.....?  
How(source).....  
.....

(c) What is its objective(s)?  
.....  
.....  
.....

(d) In what ways do you individually hope to  
gain from it?  
.....  
.....  
.....



(e) As far as you can remember, did you know of the intention to establish the project before it was finally launched?

A. yes  B. No.

If yes, how did you come to know about it?.....  
.....  
.....

(f) Did the project initiators seek any help from the local community, and you, in particular in launching this project?

A. yes  B. No.

If yes, what kind of help?.....  
.....  
.....

(g) How did you learn about the fact that your help was needed?.....  
.....  
.....

(h) In the end, how did you participate in the project?

- A. I was employed as a wage labourer( specify ..... ) .....
- B. I offered voluntary service( specify.....)...
- C. I made financial contribution .....

3(a) Have you noticed any change(s) in the area since the inception of this project?

A. yes  B. No.

If yes, what change?.....  
.....  
.....

(b) Are you, personally, satisfied with the quality of service and good provided by the project?

A. yes,  B No

If No, state what causes this dissatisfaction....

.....  
.....  
.....

What according to you would rectify the situation?

.....  
.....

(c) From your own observation are these any adverse effects of this project on the lives of the local community?

A. yes  B. No.

If yes, what are they?.....

.....  
.....

(d) What do you think could be done to do away with these adverse effects?.....

.....  
.....

(e) Have you officially complained about them?

.....  
.....  
(yes or No)

If yes, with which Authority did you launch the complaints?.....

.....  
What was the response?.....

.....  
.....

(f) Is this the first time such a project has been launched in this area?

A. yes,  B. No.

(ii) If No, can you remember when and in which particular place a similar project was launched?  
When.....  
place.....  
sponsor.....

(iii) Is it still functioning(If of a permanent nature)?  
A. Yes,  B. No.

If yes, how would you compare its services with this particular one?

.....  
.....  
.....

If No, what do you think caused its failure?

.....  
.....  
.....

(g) If you were asked to enumerate at least three most important problems you would like solved for you, in particular and the local community in general, which ones would you mention

- 1.....
- .....
- 2.....
- .....
- 3.....
- .....

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