

UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI
INSTITUTE OF DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
MA RESEARCH PROJECT

**THE CHALLENGES OF IMPLEMENTATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES
IN THE 21ST CENTURY GLOBALIZATION: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF KENYA
AND MOZAMBIQUE**

OGUTU CAROLYNE ADHIAMBO

REG NO: R50/39041/2021

SUPERVISOR: DR. SHAZIA CHAUDHRY

**A RESEARCH PROJECT SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT FOR
REQUIREMENT FOR DEGREE OF MASTERS IN INTERNATIONAL STUDIES AT
THE INSTITUTE OF DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (IDIS),
UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI**

01/04/2021

DECLARATION

I, **Carolyne Adhiambo Ogutu** hereby declare that this project is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other University.

Signed 

Date..... 06/12/2021

Carolyne Adhiambo Ogutu

R/50/39041/2021



This research project has been submitted for examination with my approval as University Supervisor;

Signed

Date..... 7/12/2021

Dr. Shazia Chaudhry

University of Nairobi

DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to my family who believed in me and gave me support and unfailing love, through the duration of my studies, even when I was not available for them. To my friends, for their encouragement - I really appreciate. God bless you!

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

First and foremost, my gratitude to God Almighty, for provision of grace and good health during my studies. I wish to give special appreciation to my Supervisor Dr. Shazia Chaudhry for her guidance and invaluable support through all the stages of this Thesis. I also thank my employer for according me the opportunity to attend the course. Special mention goes to Nyochi and Mbock who contributed to the success of this work and finally to NDC Faculty & Fraternity and Course 23/2020-2021, I extend my gratitude to you all.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DECLARATION	ii
DEDICATION	iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENT	iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS	v
LIST OF FIGURES	viii
LIST OF TABLES	ix
ABSTRACT	x
ACRONYMS	xi
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND	1
1.0 Introduction	1
1.1.1 Determinants of Kenya’s national security policy	3
1.1.2 Determinants of national security in Mozambique.....	6
1.2 Statement of the Research Problem.....	6
1.3 Research Questions	8
1.4 Study Objectives.....	8
1.4.1 General Objective	8
1.4.2 Specific Objectives	9
1.5 Literature Review	9
1.5.1 Introduction	9
1.5.2 National Security Review in Kenya: Key Threats and Responses	9
1.5.3 National security review in Mozambique.....	13
1.6 Literature Gaps	15
1.7 Theoretical Framework.....	16
1.7.1 The Traditional Security Paradigm (State-Centric Security)	17
1.9 Hypotheses	19
1.10 Research Methodology	19
1.10.1 Research Design	19
1.10.3 Data Collection Procedures	20
1.10.4 Target Population	21
1.10.5 Sampling Method and Sample Size.....	22
1.10.6 Data Analysis.....	23
1.10.7 Validity and Reliability of Data Collection Instruments	23

1.10.8 Legal and Ethical Considerations	23
1.11 Chapter Outline	23
CHAPTER TWO.....	25
CHALLENGES CONFRONTING IMPLEMENTATION OF KENYA’S NATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES	25
2.1 Introduction	25
2.2 Response Rate	25
2.3 Demographic Information of the Respondents.....	25
2.3.1 Gender of Respondents.....	25
2.3.2 Age of Respondents.....	26
2.3.3 Occupation of Respondents	27
2.4 Study Findings.....	27
2.4.1 Challenges Confronting Implementation of Kenya’s National Security Policies	27
2.4.2 High levels of Youth Unemployment (Youth Bulge)	28
2.4.3 Poor working Conditions for the National Police Service	29
2.4.4 Slow pace of security sector reforms.....	31
2.4.5 Increase in non-core policing Responsibilities	32
2.4.6 Politicization of Security Policies	33
2.4.7 Corruption and Non-conformity to the Rule of Law	35
2.4.8 Lack of Coordination among security Agencies	37
2.4.9 Inertia among the Security Agencies.....	38
2.4.10 Resource-driven Conflicts	39
2.4.11 Aid Dependence	39
2.4.14 Climate Change	42
2.15 Conclusion.....	43
CHAPTER THREE.....	45
CHALLENGES CONFRONTING IMPLEMENTATION OF MOZAMBIQUE’S NATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES IN THE 21ST CENTURY	45
3.1 Introduction	45
3.2 Security related Socio-Economic Challenges in Mozambique	45
3.3 Political Dominance and Instability	48
3.4 Security Sector Reforms threatening National Security	49
3.5 Violent extremism threatening National Security	51
3.6 Elements of Resource Curse.....	52

3.7 Terrorism in Mozambique	53
3.8 Cyber Crime in Mozambique	54
3.9 Climate Change	55
3.10 Conclusion	56
CHAPTER FOUR	58
POLICY REFORM INTERVENTIONS IN SECURITY SECTOR IN BOTH KENYA AND MOZAMBIQUE	58
4.1 Introduction	58
4.2 Policy interventions in Kenya	58
4.2.1 Proper Inclusivity in Security Sector.....	58
4.2.2 Mapping out the Context	59
4.2.3 Arming the Private security Sector.....	60
4.3 Policy Interventions in Mozambique.....	62
4.3.1 Comprehensive Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Process.....	62
4.3.2 De-politicizing Security Sector Reforms.....	63
4.3.3 Entrenching Cultural Aspects in Security Sector Policies.....	64
4.4 Conclusion.....	64
CHAPTER FIVE	66
SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ..	66
5.1 Summary of the Findings	66
5.1.1 The challenges that confront implementation of Kenya’s national security policies in the 21 st century	66
5.1.2 Challenges that confronts implementation of Mozambique’s national security policies in the 21 st century	68
5.1.3 Policy interventions that can be applied to security sector reforms in both Kenya and Mozambique	70
5.2 Conclusion.....	71
5.3 Recommendations	72
REFERENCES	74
APPENDIX 1: KENYA QUESTIONNAIRE.....	86
APPENDIX 11: MOZAMBIQUE INTERVIEW GUIDE.....	90
APPENDIX 111: RESEARCH PERMIT

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 2.1 Gender of Respondents	26
Figure 2.2 Age of Respondents	26
Figure 3.1 Security Sector Reforms	50
Figure 3.2 Terrorism in Mozambique	54
Figure 3.3 Climate Change as a challenge of National security in Mozambique	56
Figure 4.1 Comprehensive Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Process as a policy intervention in Mozambique.....	63

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.1 Target Population Distribution in Kenya and Mozambique.....	21
Table 1.2 Sampling Method and Sample Size.....	22
Table 2.1 Occupation of Respondents	27
Table 2.2 Unemployment and Increased Insecurity	28
Table 2.3 Poor Pay and Working Conditions	30
Table 2.4 Slow Pace of Security Sector Reforms.....	31
Table 2.5 Police Participation in Non-Core Policing Responsibilities.....	32
Table 2.6 Politicization of National Security Policies.....	34
Table 2.7 Rampant Corruption and Non-Adherence to Rule of Law.....	35
Table 2.8 Inadequate Coordination among Security Agencies	37
Table 2.9 Inertia to Change	38
Table 2.10 Political Influence in Resource Access	39
Table 2.11 Cyber Crimes.....	42

ABSTRACT

This study assesses the challenges confronting implementation of national security policies in both Kenya and Mozambique in the 21st century. The challenges in Kenya are as a result of gaps in the national security architecture as well as influenced by socio-economic fabric of Kenya's economy and require institutional reform and political will to address. The factors challenging implementation of Mozambique's national security policies are institutional and inherent in the country's governance style and structure. These threats have continued to hinder achievement of peace, security and stability in both countries. The following objectives guided the study and they include; to examine the challenges that confront implementation of Kenya's national security policies in the 21st century, to assess the challenges that confront implementation of Mozambique's national security policies in the 21st century and to propose policy reform interventions that can be applied to security sector in both Kenya and Mozambique. The study was premised on two hypotheses which stated that, successful implementation of national security policies depends on effective management of security threats in both countries and successful implementation of national security policies in both countries does not depend on effective management of security threats. Further, the study utilised realist theory to conceptualize the study of national security in both Kenya and Mozambique. Descriptive research design and exploratory research design combined with a case study analysis, which involves investigation of given individual, institution or phenomenon to conceptualize challenges of national security in Kenya and Mozambique was adopted. Primary data was gathered through use of questionnaires and interview guide from targeted respondents in both countries. From the findings obtained, it is clear that there are several factors which hamper successful implementation of national security policies in both countries. They include; climate change, high levels of youth unemployment, high levels of poverty, cyber related crimes, terrorism; rampant corruption, non-adherence to the rule of law, impunity among security agencies, poor remuneration, politicization of security policies, youth bulge, slow pace of security sector reforms, political and resource-driven conflicts, income inequality and illiteracy, lack of enough funding, proliferation of weapons from overseas markets, among others. It is evident that, these factors are inter-linked and they collaboratively hinder the government from instituting a comprehensive national security policy which can address national security threats holistically as affirmed by majority of the respondents. The study established policy interventions such as; ensuring representation and inclusivity of all communities in the security sector, mapping out the country-specific context before implementing security reforms, arming the private security sector, comprehensive Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) processes, cooperation with international partners, enhancing local funding of the security sector, combating corruption among others as viable options which can be incorporated in the broader security sector reform process. Various recommendations can be deduced from the findings and they include; need for both countries to adopt community policing initiatives in their security sector reforms and strengthen Ten Household ('Nyumba Kumi'). There is also need to review security training curriculum to equip the Police, the Intelligence Officers and other domestic law enforcers with up-to-date skills. Lastly, both countries need to conduct a comprehensive DDR process in order to flush out illegally acquired weapons from the civilians and also enhance cooperation with international partners.

ACRONYMS

ADB-African Development Bank

AMISON- The African Union Mission in Somalia

AP-Administration Police

ASWJ- Al Sunnah wa Jama'ah

ATLAS-Thought Leadership and Assessments Project

ATM-Automatic Teller Machine

AU -African Union

DDR-Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

DoD -Department of Defense

FRELIMO- The Mozambique Liberation Front

GPA- General Peace Agreement

HDI-Human Development Index

HDR-Human Development Report

IPOA-Independent Policing Oversight Authority

KDF-Kenya Defense Forces

KNCHR-Kenya national commission on Human rights

KPS-Kenya Police Service

KSIA-Kenya Security Industry Association

LPG-Liquefied Natural Gas

MDT-Mutual Defense Treaty

MRC-Mombasa Republican Council

NACOSTI-National Council of Science and Technology

NATO- The North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NFD-Northern Frontier District

NGO's- Non- Governmental Organizations

NIS- National Intelligence Service

NPS- National Police Service

NRCC- National Research Crime Centre

OAU -Organization of African

PRC-People's Redemption Council

PSC-Private Security Companies

PSIA-Protective Security Industry Association

RENAMO- The Mozambican National Resistance

SALW- Small Arms and Light Weapons

SMEs-Small and Medium Size Enterprises

SRIC-Security Research and Information Centre

SSR-Security Sector Reform

T.I-Transparency International

UDHR-Universal Declaration of Human Rights

UNCTAD-United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

UNOMOZ-United Nations Mission in Mozambique

UN-United Nations

USAID-United States Agency for International Development

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

1.0 Introduction

This study assesses the challenges confronting implementation of national security policies in both Kenya and Mozambique in the 21st century. These challenges range from political, social and economic factors which still hamper the realization of national security objectives in the respective countries. The introduction section contains “the background of the study, statement of the problem, research objectives, questions, study hypotheses, justification and significance of the study, literature on relevant studies as well as the methodology used to conduct the study”.

1.1 Background of the Study

There is no single definition of the concept of national security. While it is a key concept used in international relations and foreign policy, it has a different meaning and scholars have not agreed on an outstanding meaning of the concept. Anorld Wolfers noted that national security is an ambiguous symbol.¹ The traditional approach emphasizes on protection and survival of state as the main actor from external threats which disregards human security, but this does not offer a comprehensive and exhaustive meaning of the concept. The ambiguity surrounding the concept stems from a number of different factors. First, because the concept itself is associated with other concepts such as power. Barry Buzan corroborated Wolfer’s assertions by arguing that national security is an underdeveloped concept.² Scholars have debated on whether security is limited to military concerns or whether other issues such as health, economics and environmental concerns should be included in the definition of national security. From a foreign policy perspective national security is defined in reference to; nation-states, individuals, regions, society of nations and on processes such as globalization. The traditional definition which refers to the nation-state has been expanded to inculcate human security taking the reference of national security to

¹ Wolfers, A. (1962). *Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics*. Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, pp. 252-283

² Buzan, B. (1967). *People, States & Fear .2nd Ed. An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War era*. University of Essex-Wivenhoe Park: ECPR Press, p.318

individuals.³ The adoption of human security in national security definition stemmed from the realization that the state can manifest threats to an individual through abuse of their human rights.⁴

According to the Canadian National Defence College, national security is the preservation of a way of life which includes freedom from military attacks or coercion, freedom from internal subversion and freedom from the erosion of the political, economic and social values which are essential to the quality of life.⁵ Bock and Berkowitz say that national security refers to the ability of a state to protect its domestic values and norms from threats emanating from within and outside its boundaries.⁶ It is therefore generally understood that; national security refers “to the preservation of a country’s highest values as they are threatened from abroad, primarily by other states and other external actors as well”. National security threats originate from outside the state territories and from the anarchic international system which lack a central authority to dictate the behavior of states.⁷

As Buzan posits, fear is the deeply subjective factor which motivates states to secure themselves.⁸ The military means which the state uses to defend itself from external threats particularly a rival state, can be a threat to both national security and human security. The most debatable notion among scholars who study national security is; what constitutes the most significant security threat? According to the traditional realists, threats emanate from use of military by state on another state. In the 21st century globalization, national security threats are being conceptualized to include; transnational terrorism, climate change, environmental

³ Schmidt, B.C. (2008). *The Primacy of National Security*. New York: The Oxford University Press, p. 206

⁴ Riccardo, T. (2013). *How Should National Security and Human Security Relate to Each Other?*. London: CO and Lynne Rienner, pp. 37-54

⁵ Canadian National Defence College. (1991). *National Security*. Montreal: CNDC Press, p.34

⁶ Bock, P.G., & Berkowitz, M. (1966). *The emerging Field of National Security: World Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 122 - 136

⁷ Katzenstein, P. (1996) (ed), *The Culture of National Security*. New York: Columbia University Press

⁸ *Ibid*, p. 560

degradation, cyber-warfare, communicable diseases such as Ebola, Zika virus, Covid-19 (coronavirus) and HIV/AIDS pandemics and economic stagnation.

Therefore, this study will focus on the concept of national security provided by Lefflers, which takes national security as safeguarding the domestic core values from external threats.⁹ According to Lefflers, national security policy entails the decisions and actions deemed imperative for the protection of domestic core values from external threats where power plays a key role in the behaviour of nation-states and the functioning of the international system.¹⁰ The study therefore focuses on the determinants of national security in both Kenya and in Mozambique and utilizes the concept of national security provided by Lefflers,

1.1.1 Determinants of Kenya's national security policy

According to the Constitution of Kenya 2010, national security is understood as “the protection against internal and external threats to Kenya's territorial integrity and sovereignty, its peoples' rights, freedoms, property, peace, stability and prosperity, and other national interests”.¹¹ Despite the historical implementation of various national security policies and interventions, the state continues to face considerable security threats which challenge both national security and regional security. To better understand the determinants of national security in Kenya, it is imperative to understand the key national security organs and key national security policies, rules and regulations. The Constitution of Kenya 2010 categorically highlights the national security organs as constituting of; Kenya Defense Forces (KDF), National Police Service (NPS) and National Intelligence Service (NIS).

Kenya's national security is influenced by economic determinants such as equal distribution of resources, access to finances and availability of markets which have the capacity to sustain the

⁹ Leffler, P.M. (1990). National Security. Washington D.C: Oxford University Press. *The Journal of American History*, 77, 1

¹⁰ Ibid, p. 143

¹¹ GoK. 2010. *Constitution of Kenya 2010, Chapter 14*. Nairobi: Government press

state and its population.¹² Economic security ensures everyone can acquire basic income which will enable them to meet their needs. According to Gikonyo, national insecurity is caused by factors such as “unemployment, diseases, low food productions, low incomes, high interest rates” among others.¹³

After independence Kenya presented key principles which would guide its own national security and foreign relations with other states. These norms included; “respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of other states and preservation of her national security while maintaining good neighborliness and peaceful coexistence, non-interference principle in the internal affairs of other states and adherence to the Charters of the United Nations (UN) and the African Union (AU)”.¹⁴ Concerns over territorial integrity and secessionism also made Kenya a leading supporter of the AU’s principle of the non-violation of territorial borders inherited at independence.¹⁵

This was aimed at protecting its own national sovereignty and national security. Kenya entered into a military alliance with Ethiopia in order to protect itself from the security threats posed by Somalia. Its security policy is based on fundamental nationalistic and continental aspirations.¹⁶

When Kenya gained independence, President Kenyatta identified national interests which would dictate national security considerations. Initially, his administration faced a myriad of challenges such as land problems, poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, diseases and uniting the 42 tribes as well as ensuring economic growth and development.¹⁷

Social determinants to a greater extent influence the societal security which is included in the broader definition of security provided for by Leffler. According to Buzan, the sustainability of

¹² Ogolla, F.O. (2014). *The Determinants of Kenya’s National Security Policy since Independence*. Nairobi: University of Nairobi Press, pp. 20-124

¹³ Gikonyo, J. K. (2012). *The Illicit Proliferation and Use of Small Arms and Light Weapons and Human Security in East Africa: A Case Study of Kenya*. Nairobi: University of Nairobi press

¹⁴ Ibid, pp. 1-142

¹⁵ PMRK-UN. (2012). *International Politics: Power and Purpose of Global Affairs*. Boston: Wadsworth

¹⁶ Achieng, S.G. (2017). *The principle of territorial integrity as a determinant of Kenya’s National Security Policy 2002-2016*. Nairobi: USIU-Africa Press, p.23

¹⁷ Kanyinga, K. (2000). *Re-Distribution from Above: The Politics of Land Rights and Squatting in Coastal Kenya*, Nairobi: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, Stockholm, p.126

traditional patterns of language, culture and religion, national identity as well as custom constitutes societal security.¹⁸ This broader concept of security is derived from the need to secure individuals rather than the state which therefore includes threats to persons and not to states. Apart from military threats which challenged state authority, social threats such as food insecurity, health insecurity, corruption, criminal gangs created by politicians, drug trafficking and proliferation of small arms and light weapons, constitute other national security threats in Kenya.¹⁹

Political threats continue to affect Kenya's security policy. They disrupt the governing systems and inhibit freedom and expression of human rights. Achieving political security means being able to safeguard national and human security, as well as handling threats to state sovereignty.²⁰ Political insecurity was one of the threats that faced the new independent state due to political differences that engulfed the post-independent Kenya. Due to the ethnicized politics which pitted predominantly two of Kenya's largest tribes, a security policy was developed to address political violence which mostly characterized Kenyan politics.

Through the National Security Council, Kenya has responded to various national security threats militarily, through intelligence and through maintenance of domestic law and order mandated to the National Police Service. Currently, Kenya's defense forces have intervened militarily in Somalia under the AMISOM in pursuit of national security interests. The National Intelligence Service is legally mandated to gather information important to national security.

¹⁸ Ibid, p.128

¹⁹ Nganga, J. (2016). *National Security and Legal Protection of Refugees in Horn Of Africa: A Case Study of Kenya's Dadaab Refugee Camp*. Nairobi: University of Nairobi Press, pp.1-114

²⁰ Buzan, B., Weaver, Ole., & De Wilde .(1998). *Security: A Framework for Analysis*. Boulder: Lynne Reinner, p.239

1.1.2 Determinants of national security in Mozambique

Mozambique is one of the ten fastest growing economies in Southeastern Africa.²¹ The country is still confronted by increasing levels of poverty, economic inequality, unemployment, illiteracy among others which affects majority of the population. Half of its population lives on less than \$1.25 a day.²² According to Adedokun, one of the key threats to the national security is land insecurity as majority of the population live in the rural areas and depends on agricultural activities for their livelihood.²³ Mozambique also faces security challenges characterized by political conflict which escalates violently. The country is grappling with impacts of the conflict between the ruling party FRELIMO and RENAMO which continue to deter economic growth and development. The conflict however, ended with signing of a treaty between the two parties which ended hostilities, but the parties continue to incite their supporters, a factor which continues to threaten security in the country.²⁴ According to the 2019 Human Development Report (HDR), “Mozambique scored Human Development Index (HDI) value of 0.446 for 2018 - which put the country in the low human development category, positioning it at 180 out of 189 countries and territories on human development indices”.²⁵ Descriptively, the country remains among the poorest in the world.²⁶ The unending political tensions caused by the two parties, dominance of the ruling party, the limitations of the security sector reform and the natural resources boom are core challenges at the forefront of Mozambicans’ national security structure.

1.2 Statement of the Research Problem

Despite the enormous resources and efforts directed towards implementing national security policies in both Kenya and Mozambique, there still remain stringent impediments to the

²¹ Adedokun, A. (2017). "Emerging Challenges to Long-term Peace and Security in Mozambique," *The Journal of Social Encounters*, 1(1), 37-53

²² Arndt, C., Jones, S., & Tarp, F. (2015). *Mozambique Off-track or temporarily sidelined?* UNUWIDER Working Paper 2015/044

²³ Op cit, p.43

²⁴ CRS. (2019). *Mozambique: Politics, Economy and U.S relations*. Washington D.C: CRS Publication

²⁵ UNDP. (2019). *Human Development Report in the 21st Century*. Washington D.C. UNDP Publication

²⁶ UNDP. (2016). *Mozambique. Human Development Report*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

realization of national security objectives in the respective countries. The political, social and economic situation in both Kenya and Mozambique is dynamic and its interaction with national security is therefore constantly changing in a globalizing world. As Astill-Brown and Weimer Markus asserts, majority of challenges to human and national security both in Kenya and Mozambique have their roots in poverty-inclined social economic policies and presence of the porous boundaries.²⁷

Porous maritime borders have enabled insecurity threats such as terrorist groups based in other countries to enter territorial borders of both Kenya and Mozambique consequently harming their national security. Additionally, both countries lack human security which constitutes national insecurity, a fundamental human right enshrined in the UDHR in which both countries (Kenya and Mozambique) are state parties' signatories to the Banjul Charter which established people's rights as stipulated in the Africa Charter. This research makes a critical examination of the respective adherence by both countries to the stipulations of the Banjul Charter on human rights, to conceptualize human security situation in both countries which informs national security in this academic debate.²⁸

Some studies have shown a close co-relationship between national insecurity and political patronage which manipulate ethnic disadvantages based on socio-economic differences among the populace to create insecurity and instability. For instance, Opondo interrogates Kenya's security trajectory of ethnic-based politics since independence and establishes a close relationship between ethnic politics and ethnic violence which characterized the disputed 2007/2008 post-election violence.²⁹ For instance, Opondo adds that; the election violence in 1992, 1997 and 2007 was as a result of institutional weakness coupled with ethnic-centric

²⁷ Weimer, M., & Astill-Brown, J. (2010). *Mozambique; Balancing Development, Politics and Security*. London: Chatham House

²⁸ Dersso,s. (2008). *Interface between human security and human rights: A conceptual overview*. Pretoria, South Africa: The Institute for Security Studies

²⁹ Opondo. P.A. (2013). *Ethnic Politics and Post-Election Violence of 2007/08 in Kenya*. Eldored: Moi University

politics resulting from poor governance.³⁰ Similarly, Mozambique national security challenges are primarily tied to the threats to human security itself. These threats are manifested by the socio-economic disadvantages, politically manipulated. Therefore, the primary threat to the state (Mozambique) derives from the fundamental *lack of human security* as a concept of national security, manifested through the localized conflicts, violence and political instability occasionally facing the country.³¹ A case of reference is the politically manipulated national riots on February 2008 sparked by the rise in fuel prices. This study establishes a research gap on the security sector institutional and policy challenges facing the two countries. This study assumes there exists an entrenching culture of national insecurity in both countries politically manipulated in non-conformity to the Banjul Charter. Hence, the study seeks to examine the challenges of implementation of national security policies in both Kenya and Mozambique in the 21st century.

1.3 Research Questions

The following general research questions apply to this study;

- i. Which challenges confront implementation of Kenya's national security policies?
- ii. Which challenges confront implementation of Mozambique's national security policies?
- iii. Which policy interventions can be applied to security sector reforms in both Kenya and Mozambique?

1.4 Study Objectives

This study is guided by the following general objective and specific study objectives

1.4.1 General Objective

To establish the challenges of implementation of national security policies in both Kenya and Mozambique in the 21st century.

³⁰ Ibid

³¹ Bukarti, A., & Munasinghe, S. (2019). *The Mozambique Conflict and Deteriorating Security Situation*. London: IGC

1.4.2 Specific Objectives

The following specific objectives guide this study;

- i. To examine the challenges that confront implementation of Kenya's national security policies in the 21st century
- ii. To assess the challenges that confront implementation of Mozambique's national security policies in the 21st century.
- iii. To propose policy interventions that can be applied to security sector reforms in both Kenya and Mozambique.

1.5 Literature Review

1.5.1 Introduction

The following literature review focuses on scholarly publications done previously which relate to national security in both Kenya and Mozambique. In addition to Journals and online sources, this study will review policy documents drafted by competent national authorities and scholars on national security in both countries. Later, the literature review will establish literature gaps inherent to national security policies.

1.5.2 National Security Review in Kenya: Key Threats and Responses

After gaining independence in 1963, Kenyan President, Mzee Jomo Kenyatta embarked on a journey of building a nascent state after a long violent struggle with British colonialists which had instituted a state of security emergency in the country from 1952. The post-independence security environment of the government was characterized by internal security challenges as well as external threats presented by the bipolar world order which featured competing ideologies pursued by western powers (US and Soviet Union). In principle, the Kenyatta government adopted a non-aligned and non-interference policy to navigate the murky security environment which characterized the international system during the Cold war.

The internal security environment was depicted by past series of events in the divided colonial administration which had adverse implications on security, peace and stability. The Kenyatta government was confronted by security threat posed by the residents of the formerly North Frontier District (NFD) comprising of today's Garissa, Wajir, Mandera and Isiolo counties who demanded for secession and self-administration from the rest of the country.³² They described themselves as "Farson" meaning "one half of Kenya about which the other half knows nothing and seems to care even less".³³

According to Nzau and Guyo, Kenya claimed Somalia violated its sovereignty and territorial integrity by allowing the secessionist move in what it referred to as "a Shifta war (bandits, rebels)".³⁴ Declaring a State of Emergency by the government provided an opportunity for the security officials to arrest, detain, and commit other human rights abuses. The conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia provided an avenue for Kenya to sign a "Mutual Defense Treaty" (MDT) with Ethiopia in 1964.³⁵ However, the continued war reached a mutual hurting stalemate where no country benefited and thus, they decided to end the hostilities.³⁶

In 1967, Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda mediated peace talks between Somalia Prime Minister Mohamed Egal and President Kenyatta. In October 1967 Kenya and Somalia signed a "Memorandum of Understanding" (the Arusha Memorandum) which ended the hostilities. Despite the agreement, this threat has continued to define the relations between the two countries, especially due to the fact that, terror group known as Islamist Jihad group-Al shabaab resides in Somalia and continues to launch attacks on the Kenyan soil.³⁷

Political insecurity has also characterized post-independence Kenya. The government securitized political dissent and threatened political opposition. According to Branch and Cheeseman,

³² Nzau, M., & Guyo, M. (2018). *The Challenge of Securing Kenya: Past Experience, Present Challenges and Future Prospects*. Nairobi: University of Nairobi Press.

³³ Farson, J. N. (1950). *Last Chance in Africa*, New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company

³⁴ Ibid, p.41

³⁵ Ibid, pp.41-42

³⁶ Op cit, p.42

³⁷ Felter, C., Jonathan, M., & Aly Sergie, M. (2020). *Al-Shabab*. New York: The Council on Foreign Relations

political dissidents were exiled while other politicians such as “Pio Gama Pinto, Tom Mboya, Josiah Mwangi Kariuki and Robert Ouko” were politically assassinated.³⁸

Kenya’s internal security was also challenged in 1967 when the Ugandan President Idi Amin Dada claimed a huge swathe of Kenya’s territory. Idi Amin claimed that some parts of Nyanza, Rift Valley and Western Kenya belonged to Uganda before the colonial administration demarcated the existing boundaries. The parts of Kenya’s territory claimed by Idi Amin stretched up to Naivasha, 80 kilometers distance from Kenya’s capital, Nairobi. According to Oluoch, Amin claimed that there was a map and a written agreement signed by the “British Colonial Secretary of State, Herbert Asquith, who had authorized transfer of Uganda to Sudan in 1914 and to Kenya in 1926”.³⁹

Uganda responded by amassing large military troops along Uganda-Kenya international boundary. Kenya trooped large military personnel along the border and closing the international border for the land-locked Uganda. Jomo Kenyatta sent a sound warning that: Kenya would not lose an inch of her territory.⁴⁰ On that occurrence, Kenya cultivated a strategic security alliance with Israel and Britain based on the provocations that Uganda had implicated on Israel following the hijacking of an aircraft from France by terrorists and it was directed to land in Entebbe Airport.

President Moi took over from Mzee Kenyatta as the second president of the republic after Kenyatta’s demise. He referred to himself as “*Nyayo*”, “Swahili name for footprints” promising to take over Kenyatta’s footprints in his new administration. Moi’s administration also faced a

³⁸ Branch, D., & Cheeseman, N. (2006). The politics of control in Kenya: Understanding the bureaucratic-executive state, 1952–78. *Journal Review of African Political Economy*, 33 (107), 11-31

³⁹ Oluoch, F. (2013). Kenya, Uganda on Brink of War. In *Daily Nation*, September 8, 2013, Nairobi. NMG Publication

⁴⁰ *Ibid*, p.43

security threat during the 1982 attempted coup by a group known as People's Redemption Council (PRC).⁴¹

National security in Kenya was threatened by spillover effects of the conflicts witnessed in the neighbouring countries such as "Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia and Uganda" largely due to increased proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALWs), increased illegal immigrants, cross-border banditry and human trafficking among others. This also led to increased insecurity in the cities like Nairobi which witnessed a rise in criminal activities such as robbery and hijackings.⁴²

During President Kibaki's era, security challenges were characterized by political competition featuring division in political parties due to ethnic based power competition. This had negative impacts on the security and stability in the country. Divisive politics within the NARC government provided an avenue for political polarization in the repeated 2007 general elections. The presidential results of 2007 were challenged by ODM - the opposition Party to PNU-led by President Kibaki and skirmishes erupted into political violence which would end up claiming the lives of 1,339 people and displacing more than 600,000 others.⁴³

According to Nzau and Guyo, the Kibaki administration also confronted an illegal group that emerged in 1999 known as Mombasa Republic Council (MRC), which demanded secession and self-administration of Mombasa from the rest of the country.⁴⁴ The motto was a saying that stated "*Pwani Si Kenya*" "The Coast is not part of Kenya". Due to fears of posing a security threat in the country the Kibaki administration pronounced the group as illegal in 2010.⁴⁵ The Migingo island boundary debacle between Kenya and Uganda presented yet another security challenge to the Kibaki administration. According to Oduntan, the Migingo border dispute

⁴¹ Associated Press. (1982, August). President of Kenya Announces Crushing of Attempted Coup. *The New York Times*

⁴² Ibid

⁴³ Katumanga, M. (2011). Security in Kenya's New Constitutional Order. *SID Constitution Working Papers No. 6* Nairobi: Society for International Development.

⁴⁴ Ibid

⁴⁵ Mukinda. (2010, October). All out against Organized gangs. Nairobi. *The Daily Nation*. Available at <http://www.nation.co.ke/News/All+out+war+against+organised+gangs/-/1056/1037000> Accessed on 22/8/2020.

worsened due to harassment of Kenyans residing in the area by their Ugandan counterparts who requested them to buy special fishing permits from Ugandan authorities.⁴⁶ The security challenge between the two countries is still on since the two countries reached a consensus to anticipate the final results of the joint boundary verification exercise.

After the March 2013 general elections, a new political administration led by the ruling Jubilee Party rose to power, led by President Uhuru Kenyatta. Currently, the Jubilee government continues to experience global and local security challenges largely inherited from previous government. The country has continued to witness incessant terror attacks from terror groups such as Al-Shabaab Islamic terror group based in Somalia which have claimed dozens of lives, caused injuries and destruction of property as well as posing threats to both human and national security.

The northern region of Marsabit and Mandera has continued to witness inter-clan conflicts, the same to areas of Kitui and Tana River Counties. In addition, Kiambu County is currently embroiled in a boundary dispute with Kajiado County. “Samburu, Kapedo, Baragoi, Turkana, and West Pokot” Counties have also battled incessant cases of cattle rustling which pose both human insecurity and national insecurity. The national security in Kenya therefore, may be construed to signify adopting all mechanisms for survival of a certain regime, inclusion and exclusion of certain individuals from political positions and existing regional and international security dilemma.

1.5.3 National security review in Mozambique

Mozambique gained independence in 1975 within a security complex context where *zero-some* approach was part of the survival tactic under the international political and ideological competition presented by the Cold War. In immediate post-independent Mozambique, the most serious security threats emanated from South Africa Apartheid regime and Rhodesia. This

⁴⁶ Oduntan, G. (2015). *International Law and Boundary Disputes in Africa*. London and New York: Routledge

mandated the country to develop security structure regime primarily led by strong military institutions and robust intelligence agency (police state) in order to tackle both internal and external threats in anticipation of a conventional attack from these two neighboring states.

The adoption of single party state (FRELIMO) which has governed the country for many years presented a complex security context. The party was also responsible for designing all public policies and supervising state agency activities, including that of the Ministry of Security. The Ministry of National Defence has the overall task of organizing the defense and protection of vital organs, for the functioning of the State pursuant to Article 3 of Decree 17/75 of July 27.⁴⁷

The security environment in the country can be described as influenced by political competition driven by external and internal considerations. This is characterized by the Mozambique civil war initiated by RENAMO fighting the government of FRELIMO with the support of the Apartheid government in South Africa. The General Peace Agreement (GPA) signed between the Mozambican Government and RENAMO, in 1990, led to cessation of hostilities and marked the end of the civil war.⁴⁸

According to the congressional report of 2019, between 2013 and 2016 Mozambique witnessed violence resulting from political dispute between FRELIMO and RENAMO⁴⁹, the latter is a former armed rebel group that fought the FRELIMO government during the civil war. The dispute led to decline in economic growth and development. However, the conflict ended with signing of permanent cease-fire between the two parties in 2019.⁵⁰

Currently, Mozambique faces Islamic violence as one of the threatening security challenges in the country. The Islamist extremist group has launched attacks in Muslim coastal districts of Cabo Delgado Province, adjacent to Tanzania. The group refers to itself as Al Shabaab. According to Zitamar News, the group is locally known as *Al Shabaab* (“the youth in Arabic,

⁴⁷ Government of Mozambique. (1975). *The Mozambican Constitution*. Maputo: Government Press

⁴⁸ Gasper, A. (2013). *National Security and the right to information: the case of Mozambique*. Maputo: CEEI

⁴⁹ CRS. (2019). *Mozambique: Politics, Economy and U.S relations*. Washington D.C: Congressional Research Service. Summary NO. R45817

⁵⁰ Ibid

and also the name of a separate Al Qaeda-linked Somali group”) and as *Ansar al Sunnah* (“Defenders of the Sunnah” [“Islamic prophetic tradition”]) or “*Al Sunnah wa Jama’ah*” (ASWJ, “Adherents of the Sunnah”).⁵¹ The attackers have used arson to cause massive destruction to villages and crops. They have also massacred people through beheadings and used crude weapons and explosives.⁵² The group primarily targets state security agencies and those seen to be cooperating with the state security.

According to Astill-Brown, the incessant terror attacks in Mozambique continue to pose a threat to national security and sustainable peace.⁵³ These groups are funded by some corrupt leaders, politicians and security officials who create a fertile ground for them to thrive in the country. As a consequence, they fail to fulfill their mandate of protecting the rule of law as provided for by the Constitution. This therefore, impacts negatively on the capacity of state to provide security to its people. Other sources of local tension are rivalries, including land ownership issues especially among the ethnic communities.⁵⁴

1.6 Literature Gaps

Upon review of literature in this study, a number of gaps have been established in the national security architecture of both countries since they gained independence. The available literature fails to explain why more focus laid on the state has not been able to secure national and human security. The dynamics of security in both countries are overzealously protected by the state centric machination which presents a gap in knowledge concerning the role of other non-state actors in maintaining national security in respective countries. In both countries, the state is the central subject of reference which eliminates other actors engaged in national security policies. There are also literature gaps in the realignment of national security responses to emerging

⁵¹ Zitamar News. (2019, June). Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED); CRS communication. *Zitamar News*

⁵² Ibid

⁵³ Op cit, p. 6

⁵⁴ Habibe, et al. (2019). *Radicalização and Africa Mozambique: Special Report: Islamist Insurgency Resumes in Northern Mozambique After Cyclone*. Maputo

global security threats. This literature has discovered presence of unchanging security institutions and structures, obsolete security policies which are not addressing the global security concerns of the 21st century. There is also limited literature in the implications of security sector reforms initiated in both countries, which calls for further research. While security sector reforms are critical elements in aligning national security with other international best-practices, these reforms have resulted to varied security implication which affect the state not well articulated in the available literature. There is also scanty information relating to insecurity in both countries presented by disputed international boundaries.

1.7 Theoretical Framework

This study is guided by the realist theory to conceptualize the study of national security. Realism describes an anarchical international system characterized by competition for power as an end in itself as well as a means to an end. Realism theory takes states as the primary actors in the conduct of international relations and is responsible for national security of its population as well as survival in the anarchy. The theory has been propagated by theorists such as Morgenthau and Carr, E.H who posit that; national security problem turns out to be a systematic security problem in which states and the system both play part.

Realism is the dominant theory of international relations which can explain the behavior of a state in regards to securing itself. Statism is the cornerstone of realism where state security is quite emphasized. The Westphalia treaty of 1648 presented states as the dominant actors in international relations capable of pursuing their national security and exercising sovereignty. Classical realist for instance; Machiavelli and Hobbes described the international system as archaic arena “*Joseph Nye describes international system as ‘anarchic in the sense that there is no higher government’*”⁵⁵ where states strive to achieve their survival, *Statism* and their own

⁵⁵ Nye, J. S. (2009) *Understanding International Conflicts: an Introduction To Theory and History* 7th Edition London: Pearson Longman.

security at the expense of others.⁵⁶ The traditional security approach focuses on the state as the main actor and the one that provides security and its sovereignty as the main issue.

1.7.1 The Traditional Security Paradigm (State-Centric Security)

The realist construct of security describes a traditional security paradigm in which the State is the referent object. In this approach (realist construct) security relations among sovereign States and the State's efforts to secure itself from threats dominate the paradigm. This approach assumes that; if the State is secure then those who live within it are also secure (national security).⁵⁷ This paradigm emphasizes on the military power of a State in securing its sovereignty and balance of power. The Cold war presented the peak of realist perspective when the US and the Soviet Union competed ideologically and expanded their military might in pursuit of national security.

The state-centric approach to security was central to the military formations of NATO and Warsaw Pact military alliances which seek collective security of member states. Since tradition States have always been considered as the main actors in the anarchic international system and they can only survive by increasing their military might. A military capability is a primary indicator of the power of a State and plays a significant role in the operationalization of the national security interests.

The traditional approach to security in a realist construct started being critiqued by neo-realist theorists, for instance Barry Buzan, who challenged the traditional perspective and broadened the security concept, arguing that; security should not primarily refer to military security. Buzan argued that; other aspects of security are important to state security including economy, politics, environment and the health of the population.⁵⁸ Buzan posits that, the Westphalian nation-state power is reducing and non-state actors have also taken a step in safeguarding security.⁵⁹

⁵⁶ Baylis, J. (2001). *International and Global Security in the post-cold war era*. In J. Baylis, & S. Smith, the Globalization of World Politics (pp. 253-276). Oxford: Oxford University Press

⁵⁷ Bajpai, K. (2000). *Human Security: Concept and Measurement*. Notre Dame: Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies.

⁵⁸ Buzan, B., Wæver, O., & de Wilde, J. (1998). *Security: a New Framework for Analysis*. London: Lynne Rienner.

⁵⁹ Ibid

This study utilizes the neo-realist approaches to security provided for by Barry Buzan to examine security policy challenges and the globalization factors responsible for such challenges in the 21st century. Henry Kissinger, a neo-realist and former US Secretary of State asserts that; “how realistically we perceive our national interests’ is a core security concern”.⁶⁰ This places the State at the core of security and as the guarantor of security. National security in both Kenya and Mozambique is understood within the language of insecurity and threat to the nation state.

1.8 Justification of the Study

This study seeks to provide policy interventions directed to reforming security sector in respective countries. The study realizes that; the convergence of human insecurity and protracted political violence in both countries has produced an upward trajectory of national insecurity which continues to threaten sustainable peace and stability. It is clear that, the emerging security threats have not been matched by equivalent optimal security sector policy interventions, structural reforms and overall security architecture implementation at both levels to curb the emerging security threats in the 21st century. The findings of this study shall inform policy interventions aimed at improving implementation of security sector reforms in both countries. The study provides comprehensive policy interventions aimed at protecting fundamental human rights which are a prerequisite for an effective national security strategy.

Whereas several studies have been produced on the subject of national security, there remains a panacea of knowledge relating to the emerging threats to national security resulting from globalization. This study seeks to provide complimentary information relating to implementation of national security policies in the 21st century applicable to both countries. There are many emerging security threats in the 21st century which have not been matched by the optimal academic discourse which comprehensively explains the security challenges faced by the two middle income countries. Future scholarly works on the challenges of implementation of national

⁶⁰ Kissinger, H. (1976). ‘Documentation: Foreign Policy and National Security’ *International Security* 1/1. pp. 182-191

security policies in the 21st century can refer to this study if interested in informing security dynamics in these two countries.

For any student of international relations and security studies, this research constitutes an ideal source of information worthy of such reference. This study comes in handy for scholars interested in knowledge on overcoming national security policy implementation challenges as well as obtaining empirical evidence rooted in extensive research. To better comprehend national security challenges, it is imperative for this study to conceptualize it theoretically.

1.9 Hypotheses

H₁ Successful implementation of national security policies depends on effective management of security threats in both countries.

H₀ Successful implementation of national security policies in both countries does not depend on effective management of security threats.

1.10 Research Methodology

This section focuses on the methodological approach of the study to be adopted to achieve the objectives stated earlier. It focuses on the study design, area of study, target population, geographical location and physical characteristics, data collection instruments, data collection procedures, data analysis and presentation.

1.10.1 Research Design

A research design refers to a “plan, structure, and strategy to be utilized in investigating the research problem and obtaining answers to research questions”.⁶¹ It entails a blue print under which a study is conducted, ensuring there is maximum control over factors that had potential influence on the validity of the findings.⁶² This study adopted descriptive research design and exploratory research design combined with a case study analysis, which involves investigation of

⁶¹ Kothari, R C, (2003). *Research Methodologies*, 3rd Edition. New Delhi: WishwaPrakashan

⁶² Ibid.,

given individual, institution or phenomenon to conceptualize challenges of national security in Kenya and Mozambique.

These methods also enable the identification of salient characteristics and unique features of the target population to acceptable degree. They are also used in describing characteristics of the relevant groups, determining the degree to which independent variables affected a dependent variable, estimate the percentage of units in a specified population that exhibited the same behavior. Additionally, the methods are used when prior knowledge of the problem and information needed was clearly defined.⁶³ Therefore, this study design is deemed as the best to fulfill the objectives of the study.

1.10.2 Study Area

The study was conducted in capital cities of both Kenya and Mozambique. Both countries have experienced varying challenges in implementation of national security policies which impedes the realization of national security objectives. Questionnaires were distributed to the targeted respondents in Nairobi. However, due to Covid 19 pandemic, the researcher conducted interviews with the respondents in Maputo using Google zoom, WhatsApp Video and through telephone calls.

1.10.3 Data Collection Procedures

The study employed both primary and secondary data. A questionnaire and interview guide were utilized in collecting primary data.⁶⁴ The purpose of using questionnaires is that it achieves two broad purposes - it allows the respondents to freely give their opinion and at the same time, restricts them to certain predetermined form of responses, which ultimately avails data that is rich and diverse.⁶⁵ The questionnaires were used to collect data from target respondents in Nairobi. The interviews were conducted through telephone from the selected interviewees in

⁶³ Mugenda, A.G. (2011). *Social Science Research, Theory and Principles*. Nairobi: Applied Research & Training Services.

⁶⁴Frankfort-NachmiasC., Nachmias,D., & DeWaard, J. (2015). *Research Methods in the Social Sciences*. New York: Worth Publishers.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

Mozambique where the researcher got an in-depth understanding of the subject areas through further probing of the respondents. This ensured that they gave honest, factual and valid information.

1.10.4 Target Population

Target population refers “to the specific group that is relevant in a study. It is the group of individuals or participants with specific attributes of interest and relevance to a study”. The study targeted officers in the security sector, academics and NGO’s in both Kenya and Mozambique that are concerned with implementation of national security policies. The main respondents in Kenya were selected from military officers who included the Kenya Navy, Kenya Air force and Kenya Army, National Intelligence Service, National Police Service, AP, DCI, and ATPU, Academics and NGO’s PeaceNet Kenya, Safeworld. In Mozambique the respondents were selected from Military - Mozambique Air force, Navy and Army, National Police, Public order and security police, CIP and SFP, academics and NGO’s such as Security and Safety Advisor. Table 1.1 below shows the stratification of the targeted group.

Table 1.1: Target Population Distribution in Kenya and Mozambique

Target Population	Kenya	Mozambique
Military Department	The Kenya Navy, Airforce and Kenya Army	The Mozambique Navy, Airforce and Mozambique Army
Security Agencies	NPS, DCI, NIS, RP, ATPU	CIP, SFP and POSP
Academics	Professors,	Professors

	students and Lecturers	
NGO's	PeaceNet Kenya, Safe world	Security and safety advisor

Source: Researcher, 2020

1.10.5 Sampling Method and Sample Size

Stratified random sampling was utilized in this study to select the required sample size.⁶⁶ The respondents were divided into smaller units according to their departments and random sampling was adopted to select the participants that would represent the other subgroups.⁶⁷ This guaranteed that all the population was well represented and avoided biasness.⁶⁸ The study targeted 80 respondents using stratified random sampling drawn from both countries on equal basis (Kenya 40 and Mozambique 40 respectively) as shown in table 1.2 below.:-

Table 1.2: Sampling Method and Sample Size

Target Population	Kenya	Mozambique
Military Department	9	9
Security Agencies	11	11
Academics	10	10
NGO's	10	10
Total	40	40

Source: Researcher, 2020

⁶⁶Ibid, p 46.

⁶⁷Frankfort-NachmiasC., Nachmias,D., & DeWaard, J. (2015). *Research Methods in the Social Sciences*. New York: Worth Publishers.

⁶⁸Bryman, A. (2012). *Social Research Methods*, 4th Ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 186-187.

1.10.6 Data Analysis

Qualitative data analysis involves the process of examining qualitative data to derive an explanation for a specific phenomenon. The primary data gathered through the research tools was analysed using content analysis. It was later presented using tables, charts and figures. Later, from the findings ⁶⁹the study was able to draw conclusions and deduce recommendations.

1.10.7 Validity and Reliability of Data Collection Instruments

Validity and reliability of the research instruments were assured by conducting a pilot study on 10 participants who were not interviewed during the main data collection process. This ensured that the questions answered the study objectives. The researcher also sought assistance from her Supervisor in order to improve the quality of the research instruments.

1.10.8 Legal and Ethical Considerations

The researcher endeavored to maintain ethical manner by seeking relevant documentations such as a permit from the National Council of Science and Technology (NACOSTI) to conduct the research. In addition, the study guaranteed the confidentiality and security of data gathered from the respondents. In this regard, the researcher assured the respondents that the information they provided was to be used for academic purpose only and their names would never be mentioned without their consent. All other documents relevant to the study were also sought.

1.11 Chapter Outline

Chapter one gives a general introduction to the study. It provides “the background of the study, the problem statement, objectives, hypothesis, theoretical framework, literature review and methodology”.

Chapter two presents the challenges that confront implementation of Kenya’s national security policies in the 21st century.

⁶⁹Mugenda, A.G. (2011). *Social Science Research, Theory and Principles*. Nairobi: Applied Research & Training Services.

Chapter three assesses the challenges that confront implementation of Mozambique's national security policies in the 21st century.

Chapter four examines policy interventions that can be applied to security sector reforms in both Kenya and Mozambique.

Chapter five presents the summary of the key findings, conclusions and recommendations of the study findings.

CHAPTER TWO

CHALLENGES CONFRONTING IMPLEMENTATION OF KENYA’S NATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES

2.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the findings on the first objective which sought “to examine challenges confronting Kenya in the implementation of its national security policies”. This chapter explores if security is a dynamic aspect experiencing complexity of emerging threats which form part of the security challenges experienced in the country. Security challenges are influenced and shaped by actors and drivers at local, national and global levels. In a nutshell, this chapter therefore explains these challenges and how they influence security sector policies. Further, the chapter begins with the response rate of the study; a description of the demographic characteristic of the respondents and findings from the five (5) Likert-type statements that were presented to the study participants. In this regard, the findings obtained are discussed against the literature reviewed in chapter one. A conclusion section is finally presented.

2.2 Response Rate

A survey was conducted on purposive sample of 80 respondents drawn from the Military Department, Security Agencies, Academics and NGOs. From these, 73 responded. These were 37 from Kenya and 36 from Mozambique. The response rate obtained was thus 91.3%. This was considered enough for analysis.

2.3 Demographic Information of the Respondents

The respondent demographic information which includes; “gender, age, level of education and occupation” is presented in the following section.

2.3.1 Gender of Respondents

Most of the respondents were male 53%. Females followed closely at 47%. This shows that both genders were well represented in the study.





Figure 2.1 Gender of Respondents

Source: Field data, 2021

2.3.2 Age of Respondents

Most of the respondents, more than three quarters, were aged between 36 and 50 years at 77%. These were followed by those aged 18 to 35 years at 12% while the least were aged 51 and 65 years at 11%. The respondents were from different age groups and could make significant contributions to the subject under investigation.



Source: Field data, 2021

2.3.3 Occupation of Respondents

The respondents were drawn proportionately from different occupations. The least from both groups were drawn from NGOs and academics at 13.5% and 13.9% from Kenya and Mozambique respectively. The military and police were the greatest contributors at 24.3% and 25% from Kenya and Mozambique respectively. The respondents were from different occupations and provided balanced information on the subject under investigation.

Table 2.1 Occupation of Respondents

Occupation	Kenya		Mozambique	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
Military	9	24.3	9	25.0
Police	9	24.3	9	25.0
Intelligence Service	9	24.3	8	22.2
Academics	5	13.5	5	13.9
NGOs	5	13.5	5	13.9
Total	37	100.0	36	100.0

Source; Researcher, 2021

2.4 Study Findings

This section presents the study findings in line with the objectives of the study.

2.4.1 Challenges Confronting Implementation of Kenya's National Security Policies

The respondents were presented with selected statements regarding challenges confronting implementation of Kenya national security policies. They were asked to indicate their level of agreement with the statements on a scale of 1-5 where: "1=Strongly Disagree; 2= Disagree; 3=Neither Agree nor Disagree (Neutral); 4=Strongly Agree and; 5= Agree". Weighted Means (M) which show the point of convergence on the scale were used to indicate the level of agreement with the statements. The findings obtained are presented in the following section.

2.4.2 High levels of Youth Unemployment (Youth Bulge)

According to the 2019 census, the youth (15-35 years) constituted 75.1 per cent of the total Kenyan population of 47.6 million people.⁷⁰ Of this component 51.2 per cent of the population comprise of 24, 014,716 females and 23, 548,056 males. Among this population, the youth were the majority. For this reason, the youth make up 51 per cent of the country’s labor force which is either under-employed or completely unemployed. Despite being the majority in the population, the level of unemployment among the youth has been the highest confirming the marginalization and their exclusion from national labor market. The net consequence has been creation of a fertile ground for the emergence of organized criminal gangs. This study found out that, the unemployed youth often become vulnerable and the politicians use this opportunity to incite them in conflict and other criminal activities.

According to the findings, the respondents strongly agreed where (Weight Mean (WM=4)) that, high youth unemployment contributed to increased insecurity. With a Likert scale of “1=Strongly Disagree; 2= Disagree; 3=Neither Agree nor Disagree (Neutral); 4=Strongly Agree and; 5= Agree”. This means that, the respondents strongly agreed that, high youth unemployment has led to increased criminal activities such as fraud, robbery with violence, hijackings among others, especially in the cities such as Nairobi and Mombasa as shown in Table 2.2 below.

Table 2.2 Unemployment and Increased Insecurity

Statement	Rating					Total	Weighted Mean
	1	2	3	4	5		
High youth unemployment contributes to increased insecurity	3	2	5	4	23	37	4

⁷⁰KeNBS. (2019). *2019 Kenya population and Housing Census Report*. Nairobi: Government Printer

Source; Field Data, 2021

This agrees with a recent study done by KNCHR in Mombasa which revealed that, there is a strong relationship between unemployment and radicalization of the youth to engage in terrorist activities.⁷¹ Unemployment is also attributed to the rise of the extortionist groups for instance; Mungiki and other organized criminal groups which have wreaked havoc in the country for a considerable period of time characterized by extortion, killings and rape. These groups have posed great security challenges in the country despite the concerted efforts employed to secure the country. Unemployment of the youth in Kenya, therefore presents a policy challenge which hampers realization of security in the country.

2.4.3 Poor working Conditions for the National Police Service

The police in Kenya have endured a long period of poor working conditions and poor terms of service for the officers serving in the NPS, the AP and the regular police. Apart from poor remuneration which has not been reviewed in the recent past, the police officers in Kenya live in poor housing conditions which demoralize them, consequently, encouraging professional misconduct which challenges the realization of security sector reforms in the country. Like other people in the country, the police are supposed to enjoy their rights as well as living in dignity as provided by the Constitution. The National Police Service has severally topped the corruption index in the country as the most corrupt institution.⁷²

This ranking of the police as the most corrupt institution stems partly from the poor remuneration and poor working conditions which the officers are subjected to. The police are constitutionally mandated with the maintenance of law and order which is greatly challenged by the poor salaries and poor working conditions thereby challenging the effective implementation of security policies in the country. They are therefore, reluctant to dedicate their energies in the commission

⁷¹KNCHR. (2014). *A country under siege: The state of security in Kenya an occasional Report (2010-2014)*. Nairobi: KNCHR Publication

⁷² Tembur, A. (2017). *Factors Affecting Job Performance in National Police Service. A Case Study of Nairobi Area County*. Nairobi: The Management University Of Africa

of security reforms which target implementation of national security policies particularly in the harsh parts of the country.⁷³

Table 2.3 Poor Pay and Working Conditions

Statement	Rating					Total	Weighted Mean
	1	2	3	4	5		
Poor working conditions for the police service influence the implementation of Kenya’s national security policies	4	4	7	6	16	37	4

Source; Field Data, 2021

According to Table 2.3 majority of the respondents agreed that poor pay and working conditions among the police service were responsible for the delay in security sector reforms, consequently hampering effective implementation of Kenya’s national security policies. This could contribute to challenges in the implementation of security policies since even though the police are constitutionally mandated with the maintenance of law and order, they are often confronted with poor salaries and harsh/non-conducive working conditions which limit their productivity.⁷⁴

The Ransley’s report on police reforms provided a raft of recommendations which among others, called for the improvement of police working conditions and a pay rise, availing medical cover, provision of adequate housing and life insurance if the police service was to deliver on its mandate, particularly that of implementing security policies in the country.⁷⁵

⁷³Barasa, S.(2017). Influence of Work Environment on Performance in the Public Security Sector with a Focus on the Police in Nairobi Kenya. *OIDA International Journal of Sustainable Development*, 10 (11), 49-64,

⁷⁴ Ibid

⁷⁵ Transparency International Kenya (2016). *Kenya police service satisfaction survey and needs analysis report, A focus on Kisumu and Nairobi counties*. Nairobi: TIK

According to Ogolla, rampant corruption in Kenya is a national problem which derails the attainment of national security and other development projects in the country.⁷⁶ The police have been accused of extra-judicial killings which contradict the security expectations in the country. Closely related to poor pay and living conditions of the police in ensuring security, is the issue of clientelism which emphasizes more on the survival of a political regime rather than the security policies of the state.

2.4.4 Slow pace of security sector reforms

The Constitution of Kenya 2010 stipulated for the enactment of a legal framework to help in implementation of security sector reforms in the country. This entails legislation to guide the vetting of Magistrates and Judges Act 2011, the National Police Service (NPS) Act 2011, the Independent Police Oversight Authority (IPOA) Act, 2011 all which sought to ensure security sector reforms in the country.

Table 2.4 Slow Pace of Security Sector Reforms

Statement	Rating					Total	Weighted Mean
	1	2	3	4	5		
The slow pace of security sector reforms influences the implementation of Kenya's national security policies	3	3	6	6	19	37	4

Source; Field Data, 2021

According to Table 2.4 above, majority of the respondents agreed (WM=4) that, the slow pace of security sector reforms influences the implementation of Kenya's national security policies. Whereas majority of the respondents agreed on the slow pace of the police sector reforms, a section of the respondents remained neutral, while the rest disagreed on the statement. Although

⁷⁶Ogolla, F.O. (2014). *The determinants of Kenya's National Security Policy since Independence*. Nairobi: University of Nairobi

some progress has been realized, the pace at which the reforms are being implemented is very slow.

The process of selection of magistrates and judges has been specifically very slow, thereby slowing the implementation of security sector reforms. The constitutional petitions which have challenged the process of vetting both the police and the Magistrates have dwelt a stumbling block to the attainment of security sector reforms. The vetting of the police and the Judges was envisioned to “establish a democratic National Police Service, capable of discharging its mandate in the security sector”. The slow pace through which the vetting of police officers is happening is a policy challenge, to the realization of an efficient and democratic police service, capable of instituting security sector reforms needed in the country.

2.4.5 Increase in non-core policing Responsibilities

The respondents agreed that, (WM=4) the police participation in non-core policing responsibilities influenced the implementation of Kenya’s national security policies. Although, the National Police Service Act, 2011 section 24 and 27 clearly spells out the mandate of the National Police as “the protection of life and property, investigation of crimes, collecting criminal intelligence, prevention and detection of crimes among other responsibilities”, the number of police officers performing non-core duties has increased with a majority of them being assigned to the protection of V.I.Ps. There was a marked increase in the number of constitutional office holders who demand V.I.P protection, particularly after the adoption of devolution and expansion of the executive.

Table 2.5 Police Participation in Non-Core Policing Responsibilities

	Rating						
Statement	1	2	3	4	5	Total	Weighted Mean

Police participation in non-core policing responsibilities influences the implementation of Kenya's national security policies	2	3	0	27	5	37	4
--	---	---	---	----	---	----	---

Source; Field Data, 2021

As indicated in Table 2.5 above, majority of the respondents strongly agreed that police participation in non-core policing responsibilities, influences the implementation of Kenya's national security policies, however neither of the respondents remained neutral. A section of the participants was of the contrary opinion. According to Maiyo, the creation of county governments has created another layer of executives composed of politicians and administrators who demand protection from the state. According to the Ministry of Interior, more than 10,000 police officers have been assigned to protect the ruling class.⁷⁷

The assignment of police officers to protection of government officers such as judges, parastatal chiefs, governors and members of constitutional commissions, speakers of both parliaments "National Assembly and the Senate" put a strain on the already insufficient police service thereby compromising the achievement of police-public ration recommended by the United Nations of one police officer to four hundred people. Whereas it is essential to provide security to people who hold specific responsibility in the country, it is imperative that; lack of clear policy and criteria on the issue of V.I.P protection reduces the number of officers on the ground to offer protection to the Kenyan people thereby challenging the realization of effective implementation of security policies in the country.

2.4.6 Politicization of Security Policies

When posed with the question of "politicization of security policies" majority of the respondents strongly agreed that, politicization influences the implementation of Kenya's national security policies. 25 of the respondents agreed that politicization of the security reforms by the

⁷⁷Maiyo,R.K. (2015). *Strategic responses to security challenges by ministry of interior and coordination of national government in Kenya*. Nairobi: University of Nairobi Repository. Available at: www.uonbi.co.ke Accessed on 27/10/2020

politicians and other leaders hampers successful implementation of security policies. However, only one respondent remained neutral on the statement and 5 respondents disagreed on the assertion as shown in Table 2.6 below. This was detrimental to the effective implementation of national security policies in Kenya.

Table 2.6 Politicization of National Security Policies

Statement	Rating					Total	Weighted Mean
	1	2	3	4	5		
Politicization influences the implementation of Kenya's national security policies	3	2	1	25	6	37	4

Source; Field Data, 2021

This happens when politicians politicize security policy implementation with incitement which negatively affects the implementation of the security policy. For instance; disarmament operations in the country have been marred with allegations of incitement from politicians calling their ethnic communities not to cooperate with the security agencies during the disarmament operations which target their communities.

In the banditry prone areas, particularly those straddled by the vast Karamoja cluster, disarmament operations have been challenged by the politicization of the processes where politicians have often called their communities to hide their SALWs. According to a report by the NRCC, the security challenge of SALW is compounded by the involvement of politicians in the security operations without a clear policy of engagement.⁷⁸ Politicians have been accused of utilizing organized criminal gangs to meet their political ends which threaten national security and compromise the implementation of national security policies. Several organized criminal gangs have been profiled which are patronized by politicians and which have greatly challenged

⁷⁸National Crime Research Centre. (2012). *Summary of a study on organized criminal gangs in Kenya*. Nairobi: GoK

national security with impunity. The dismantling of such criminal gangs has attracted fierce criticism from the politicians on the grounds of human rights violations where politicians employ both corruption and criminal gangs to achieve their political interest.⁷⁹ Politicization of security has been counter-productive where political leaders have actively and directly purchased SALWs for their communities to participate in insecurity practices such as cattle rustling and banditry.

2.4.7 Corruption and Non-conformity to the Rule of Law

According to Roebuck and Baker, police corruption can be explained to refer to “any type of proscribed behavior engaged in by a law enforcement officer who receives or expects to receive, by virtue of his official position, an actual or potential unauthorized material reward or gain”.⁸⁰ The entrenched culture of endemic corruption among the security agencies has greatly challenged the implementation of security policies and reforms in the country. Corruption among the security agencies has been established as the greatest impediment confronting the government’s efforts of securing the nation. This agrees with Ogolla, who pointed out that corruption was a national problem in Kenya, which derails the attainment of national security and other development projects in the country. The findings also agree with Kimeu who elicits that corruption remains the main challenge to policing in Africa.⁸¹

Table 2.7 Rampant Corruption and Non-Adherence to Rule of Law

Statement	Rating					Total	Weighted Mean
	1	2	3	4	5		
Rampant corruption limits the implementation of Kenya’s national security policies	5	4	6	10	12	37	4

Source; Field Data, 2021

⁷⁹Idris, M. (2013). Corruption and Insecurity in Nigeria, *Public Administration Research*; 2 (1), 59-66.

⁸⁰Roebuck, J.G., & Baker, T.A. (1974). Typology of police corruption. *The Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology*, 93 (2), 29-48

⁸¹Kimeu, S. (2019). *Soaring Levels of Corruption*. Nairobi: Transparency International-Kenya

Majority of the respondents agreed that, rampant corruption was a major factor limiting the implementation of Kenya's national security policies. This was indicated by 10 respondents who supported the statement, while 6 remained neutral and 9 were of the contrary opinion as shown in Table 2.7. Corruption has significantly eroded the public confidence of cooperating with law enforcement agencies in combating insecurity and crime in the country. Corruption in the security agencies has been reported from the recruitment process up to the execution of duty of security officers. According to Transparency International (T.I.) corruption perception indices, the KPS has been ranked the most corrupt government institution for five consecutive years from 2013-2018.⁸²

According to a global survey done by the T.I. global corruption barometer, 2017/2018, the citizens rate the police as the most corrupt national institution in majority of countries surveyed.⁸³ Kenya police sector has continued to maintain the worst record as the most corrupt institution in the country's ranking. The fight against narcotics in the country has been challenged specifically by corruption among the police who upon receiving bribes allow traffickers into the country's backstreet market. For instance, the fight against narcotics in Hong Kong was won after the formation of anti-corruption agencies to check police corruption. The challenge posed by corruption in Kenya hampers service delivery and entrenches impunity in the country.⁸⁴

Non-adherence to the rule of law has been cited as a challenge inherent in security sector agencies personnel in the commission of their responsibilities. Impunity has characterized the security agencies *modus operandi* where extra-judicial killings and human rights abuses are reported occasionally, implicating police officers in the crimes. Torture and violence have been

⁸² Transparency International. (2018). *Corruption perceptions Index*. Nairobi: TI

⁸³ T.I. (2012). *Arresting corruption in the Police*. Transparency International UK. London: T.I Publication

⁸⁴ Cytonn. (2018). *The Fight Against Corruption in Kenya...Yet Another Chapter*. Nairobi: Cytonn

reported severally by victims handled by police officers.⁸⁵ The disappearance of lawyers, witnesses and innocent victims of police brutality has increased in the recent past.

2.4.8 Lack of Coordination among security Agencies

Failure to coordinate among the security agencies and other stakeholders mandated with provision of security has negatively impacted on how information is shared and other joint operations such as policing as pointed by majority of the respondents as shown in Table 2.8 below. It is speculated that, lack of coordination between the two police formations led to massive killings of the security officers in Baragoi.⁸⁶ There is need for the NPS, KDF and NIS to coordinate so that they can share information which will assist in safeguarding the country's security, as this is their mandate, as set out in chapter fourteen of the Constitution of Kenya.⁸⁷ Lack of coordination and joint approach by the security agencies threatens national security and challenges protection of Kenyans at the grass roots as security officers point fingers at each other on failure to carry out their mandates.

Table 2.8 Inadequate Coordination among Security Agencies

Statement	Rating					Total	Weighted Mean
	1	2	3	4	5		
Inadequate coordination among security agencies limits the implementation of Kenya's national security policies	2	5	1	22	7	37	4

Source; Field Data, 2021

According to the table above, majority of the respondents strongly agreed that inadequate coordination among security agencies limits the implementation of Kenya's national security

⁸⁵T.I. (2016). *How to put an end to police Corruption in Africa*. Nairobi: Transparency International

⁸⁶Available at www.knchr.org Accessed on 28/10/2019

⁸⁷ Constitution of Kenya (2010).

policies. A section (7 respondents), affirmed that lack of coordination among the agencies hamper successful implementation of the security policies, one respondent remained neutral and 7 respondents disagreed with the statement.

2.4.9 Inertia among the Security Agencies

Inertia is understood as the inability to accept change. Change can be positive or negative and can result to changes in perception, *modus operandi* and in ideology. In regards to Kenya’s security sector, certain changes brought by the security reforms have not been embraced in totality by the security agencies in the country. For instance; the changes in the police uniform have not been embraced by all police units after the merging of the various police agencies. The new police uniform is not approved positively in comparison to the previous uniform, a move which signifies resistance to change-inertia. Whereas, inertia attributed to police uniform has insignificant influence on the implementation of security policies, it has a profound influence on the morale and confidence of the security agencies in the commission of their duties. This was also affirmed by the findings from majority of the respondents who also agreed that, inertia to change confronted the implementation of Kenya’s national security policies (WM=4). This limits the success of the implementation of security policies. Consequently, 6 remained neutral and the rest of the respondents disagreed that reluctance to change deterred implementation of security policies as shown in Table 2.9.

Table 2.9 Inertia to Change

Statement	Rating					Total	Weighted Mean
	1	2	3	4	5		
Inertia to change confronts the implementation of Kenya’s national security policies	5	5	6	7	14	37	4

Source; Field Data, 2021

2.4.10 Resource-driven Conflicts

The respondents strongly agreed that political influence in resource access and ownership has thwarted the implementation of Kenya’s national security policies (WM=4) as shown in Table 2.10 below. A section disagreed on the statement while 4 respondents were neutral. In this regard, it is apparent that, politics on who should control, access and ownership issues as well as unequal distribution of revenue generated from the resources has been key drivers of insecurity in the country.⁸⁸ These conflicts have become increasingly common in Baringo, Tana River, Lamu, Marsabit, Isiolo and Trans-Nzoia, Kiambu and Kajiado counties. These conflicts have taken a political dimension particularly those which entail counties and boundaries.

Table 2.10 Political Influence in Resource Access

Statement	Rating					Total	Weighted Mean
	1	2	3	4	5		
Political influence in resource access and owner ship has thwarted the implementation of Kenya’s national security policies	1	2	4	7	23	37	4

Source; Field Data, 2021

2.4.11 Aid Dependency

Countries have criticized foreign aid due to its ineffectiveness and undesired results. According to some findings, they state that good policies cannot be bought by foreign aid.⁸⁹ Although Kenya is dependent on aid, compared to her neighbors the country is marginally dependent. Since 2003 the Department of Defense (DoD) has received an increase in foreign aid. The funds

⁸⁸ Branch, D., & Cheeseman, N. (2006). The politics of control in Kenya: Understanding the bureaucratic-executive state, 1952–78. *Journal Review of African Political Economy*, 33 (107), 11-31

⁸⁹Mwega, F.M . (2016). *A case study of Aid Effectiveness in Kenya; Volatility and fragmentation of foreign Aid with focus on health*. Nairobi: Wolfenshon Centre for Development.

have often been mismanaged and overspent leading to wastage.⁹⁰ The main challenge with aid dependence is the volatility which accompanies it. For a country to secure itself utilizing foreign aid is inappropriate as it is difficult to predict the volume of the aid, commitment by the donor and the timing on when to receive it.⁹¹

It was also made manifest that, the dependence on foreign aid limits Kenya's ability to adequately finance the implementation of Kenya's national security policies (WM=4). Extant literature shows that there is high level of dependence on foreign aid in Kenya which could affect the implementation of national security policies in the wake of insufficient funding.⁹²

2.4.12 Weak regulation and Monitoring of Private Security Companies (PSC)

The country has approximately 2,000 Private Security Companies that operate and generate an annual turnover of 3.2 billion Kenya shillings.⁹³ According to survey conducted by the Kenyan based Security Research and Information Centre (SRIC), the sector has provided jobs to almost 50,000 people, who work as unarmed guards to businesses, banks, embassies, international organizations, NGOs and private residence. However, despite the expanded nature of the PSC in the country, the security market is occupied by minimal key players. In Kenya the largest private security company is *Group4securicor* with over 68 branches spread countrywide. Others include; *KK Security* and *Security Group*.

While these private security groups play a critical role in the country's security sector, there lacks a regulatory framework which specifies the requirements for recruitment, registration licensing or training for the guards. Due to lack of a regulatory framework, the country has witnessed a proliferation of unprofessional PSC which offer very poor service despite their

⁹⁰Bonn International Center for Conversion. (2005). *Security Sector Reform in Kenya, Inventory of security sector reform (SSR) efforts in partner countries of German development assistance*. Bonn: International Center for Conversion

⁹¹ Ibid

⁹² Ibid

⁹³KIPPRA. (2004). *Security Risk and private sector Growth in Kenya: A survey Report No.6*. Nairobi: KIPPRA Publication

importance in securing the country.⁹⁴ In addition, the respondents agreed (WM=4) that, weak regulation and monitoring of PSC challenges Kenya's ability to implement national security policies. There has been limited coordination between the police and the PSCs which make them operate only as guards in unstructured and ineffective manner. This denies Kenya the synergy in security provision and opens avenues for unqualified personnel working in the security sector. Such shortcomings have been acknowledged by the government.

2.4.13 Cyber Crime

Cybercrime is defined as "a criminal act conducted by use of devices like mobile phones, computer and use of internet to harm companies or people's reputation".⁹⁵ Cybercrime is committed over the internet where computers are used to commit forgery, identity theft, phishing, online gambling, pornography, fraud, and Cyber defamation, cyber stalking and other types of internet crimes. Generally, cybercrime implies all activities which are committed involving the use of a computer and the individual as a victim depending on who is the victim. It entails unauthorized access to computer networks, electronic information, malwares, email bombing and Trojans. According to Onchomba, cybercrime is a humongous threat to national security which specifically threatens financial institutions in a given country.⁹⁶ Banks have been the target of cyber-attacks and have lost billions of funds as a result of cyber-crimes.

In Kenya the most prevalent cyber-crimes include; hacking, money laundering, economic espionage and sending of malwares.⁹⁷ Majority of the respondents who participated in this study posit that, the security agencies in Kenya lack adequate capacity to trace and handle cybercrimes and criminals who pose a threat of exposing important and confidential security information.

⁹⁴Wairagu, K., Singo, A. (2004). *Private security in Kenya*. Nairobi: Security Research and Information Centre (SRIC)

⁹⁵ Kamini, D. (2011). Cyber Crime in the Society; Problems and Preventions. *Journal of Alternative Perspectives in Social Sciences*. 3(1), 123-150

⁹⁶ Onchomba, S.N. (2018). *The Challenges of Cybercrimes in International Business Operations among Commercial Banks in Kenya*. Nairobi: University of Nairobi.

⁹⁷ Mwai, M.N.(2015). *Factors contributing to the occurrence of cybercrime on E-banking in Commercial Banks in Kenya*. Nairobi: United States International University

According to Muhati, cyber threats have increased tremendously and the Kenyan economy stands to be negatively impacted by cyber-threats which mainly target Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) and banks coupled with weak surveillance systems among the security agencies in the country.⁹⁸ Kenya has a cyber-security strategy known as “National Cyber Security Strategy” established in 2014 which among others, aims at enhancing the nation's cyber security posture.

Table 2.11 Cyber Crimes

Statement	Rating					Total	Weighted Mean
	1	2	3	4	5		
Cyber Crimes challenges Kenya’s ability to implement national security policies	5	4	7	7	14	37	4

Source; Field Data, 2021

Table 2.11 demonstrates that respondents strongly agreed that cybercrimes derails implementation of national security policies, while 9 respondents who participated disagreed on the statement. However, 7 respondents remained neutral on the influence of cybercrimes on national security policies.

2.4.14 Climate Change

The cost of development especially in the developing countries increases as a result of climate change.⁹⁹ Climate change has had adverse impacts on the environment and has led to economic disruption globally. Further, according to “*Kenya’s National Climate Change Action Plan 2018-2022*”, implications of climate change such as heat, drought and floods have led to health

⁹⁸ Muhati, E. (2018). *Factors affecting cyber-security in Kenya-a case of Small Medium Enterprises*. Nairobi: Strathmore Business School-Strathmore University

⁹⁹ Kyte, R. (2014). *Climate Change is a challenge for sustainable development*. Moscow: Russian Federation/World Bank

problems among many Kenyans.¹⁰⁰ The economy of Kenya largely depend on agricultural activities which are influenced by change in climate, which enhances vulnerability and both food and human insecurity. Climate change in Kenya is characterized by increase in temperatures, unpredictable rainfall patterns, increase in floods and droughts as well as rising sea levels. According to the findings, majority of the respondents argued that, climate change causes droughts, floods and other disastrous natural calamities which have a different impact on conflict dimensions, particularly resource-based conflict. As a result of the drought, cattle rustling increase so does the proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW). Disarmament operations are security policies adopted when the root cause of the problem is naturally and climate induced. According to Eckstein *et al.* change in weather pattern in years 1997-2016 led to an increase in mortality rates and decrease in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) which led to losses of 0.362% per year.¹⁰¹ Droughts also led to increase in food prices, reduction in pastures and water for livestock, increase in poverty levels, pollution and environmental degradation.¹⁰²

2.15 Conclusion

This chapter has explored some of the challenges confronting the implementation of national security polices in Kenya. The challenges have exposed some of the shortcomings of the national security architecture and therefore attract detailed research to mitigate the threat posed by such challenges. Some of the challenges pointed out by the respondents confronting the security policies in the country are rooted in the socio-economic fabric of Kenya's economy, which require broader and extensive multi-agency approach in solving, for instance; youth unemployment. Other challenges established in this chapter require institutional reform and political will to address. Corruption was one of the key challenges which hampered service delivery and entrenches impunity in the country.

¹⁰⁰ Government of Kenya (2018). *National Climate Change Action Plan (Kenya): 2018-2022*. Nairobi: Ministry of Environment and Forestry.

¹⁰¹ Eckstein D., Kunzel, V. and Schafer, L. (2017). *Global Climate Risk Index 2018: Who Suffers Most from Extreme Weather Events? Weather-related Loss Events in 2016 and from 1997 to 2016*. Bonn: German watch.

¹⁰² Ibid

Given the expansion of Kenya's governance structure, it is imperative for policy makers to institute security policies which conform to the current security demands of the country. This chapter has established other challenges as pointed out by majority of the respondents which to a greater extent, hinder effective security sector policy implementation. These challenges can be summarized as; corruption, non-adherence to the rule of law, impunity among security agencies, poor remuneration, politicization of security policies, slow pace of security sector reforms and grand corruption bedeviling the security agencies particularly the National Police Service. Additionally, other challenging factors such as inertia, political and resource-driven conflicts coupled with slow psyche among the security agencies, constitute policy challenges which confront security sector in Kenya. The respondents also pointed out other domestic and external threats to national security which include; lack of funding, drug and human trafficking by international syndicates as well as terrorism together with proliferation of small arms from neighbouring countries.

CHAPTER THREE

CHALLENGES CONFRONTING IMPLEMENTATION OF MOZAMBIQUE'S NATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES IN THE 21ST CENTURY

3.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses the findings on the socio-economic and political challenges confronting the implementation of the national security policies. The chapter discusses the economic challenges, presence of the ruling party, the institutional challenges and natural resource curse which continue to pose a threat to Mozambique's peace and stability in the long term. These challenges mentioned in the introduction are not comprehensive but consist of some of the emerging threats which needs to be addressed if Mozambique is to consolidate peace and security. The findings presented were derived from interviews conducted from the respondents drawn from the Military Department, Security Agencies, Academics and NGO's in Mozambique. These challenges were identified after a rigorous literature review.

3.2 Security related Socio-Economic Challenges in Mozambique

After undergoing a civil conflict and numerous natural disasters from 1977 to 1992, the socio-economic development has been impressive compared to other countries in Africa which have suffered from long standing conflicts. According to a World Bank report issued 2016, the country's GDP increased from "\$ 176 in 1992 to \$ 585 in 2015".¹⁰³ At the same period, the poverty index improved by 54.9 per cent.¹⁰⁴ Also there was decline in infant mortality attributed to increased immunization and maternal and birth attendance.¹⁰⁵ Despite these notable achievements many constraining socio-economic challenges remain in Mozambique which threaten peace and security in the country. Specifically, one of the respondents argued that,

¹⁰³ World Bank. (2016). *Accelerating Poverty Reduction in Mozambique: Challenges and opportunities*. Washington, D.C., United States: WB Publication

¹⁰⁴ Ibid

¹⁰⁵ Arndt, C., Jones, S., & Tarp, F. (2015). *Mozambique Off-track or temporarily sidelined? UNUWIDER Working Paper 2015/044*. Helsinki, Finland: UNUWIDER

“Rampant unemployment, illiteracy and low levels of education, high levels of income inequality, land insecurity, rapid urbanizations and child malnutrition remain unresolved challenges which have curtailed the implementation of security policies”.¹⁰⁶

According to Adedokun Ayokunu, two possible explanations exist which offer insight into the socio-economic stagnation of the country.¹⁰⁷ First, the capital-intensive production methods adopted by the megaprojects have contributed very little to the alleviation of poverty because only a few people are employed by the megaprojects.

The notable megaproject initiated during the post-civil war period was the Mozal Aluminium smelter established as a joint venture between the government of Mozambique (3.9 per cent), Mitsubishi Corp (25 per cent), Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa (24 per cent) and the BHP Biliton (47.1 per cent).¹⁰⁸ The challenge arises from the lack of trickle-down economics - where revenue from the megaprojects is not adequate and rarely gets to the domestic economy in comparison to what foreigners reap from the same. According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) report issued in 2016, the megaprojects utilize capital-intensive techniques of production focusing mainly on foreign markets, thereby experiencing limited linkages with local industries which have limited capacities.¹⁰⁹ This has created massive unemployment in the country which is projected at 26 per cent by the African Development Bank (ADB).¹¹⁰

Additionally, the Gini co-efficient which measures income inequality shows increase in inequality in Mozambique.¹¹¹ Wealth in the country is not evenly distributed, with southern parts of the country and in Maputo being wealthier than the rest of the country. The uneven

¹⁰⁶ Respondent A, Mozambique, November 23, 2020

¹⁰⁷ Adedokun, A. (2017). Emerging Challenges to Long-term-Peace and Security in Mozambique. *The Journal of Social Encounters*, 1(1), 37-53.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid

¹⁰⁹ UNCTAD. (2016). *Mozambique: Investment Policy Review*. Maputo: UNCTAD Press

¹¹⁰ ADB/ADF. (2018). *Mozambique Strategy Paper 2018-2022; Supporting Mozambique towards the High5S*. ADB/ADF Publication. Tunis, Tunisia: ADF

¹¹¹ IMF. (2015). *Republic of Mozambique: Fourth Review under policy support Instrument and request for modification of Assessment Criteria-Staff Report*. IMF Country Report No. 14/20. Washington, DC :IMF

distribution of income in the country has been cited as a driving factor which constituted a protracted grievance in the civil conflict. The rural areas in Mozambique experience absolute poverty with lack of basic infrastructure. Income inequality coupled with high levels of poverty unchecked by the FRELIMO government has made the implementation of national security policies fall behind the policy expectation.

As Adedokun posits; “there is so much politics and social difference between the haves and the have nots”.¹¹² There is a close relationship between poverty levels and insecurity which potentially hampers the implementation of national security policies. The nexus between poverty, inequality and insecurity is explained by Boix, who argues that; increases in levels of poverty and reduced income can result into political instability as people agitate for access to economic opportunities, an economic issue which has become prevalent in Mozambique in the recent past.¹¹³ The high levels of rural poverty coupled with widespread income inequality, has greatly hampered the implementation of growth and development policies which are closely intertwined with security policies. Closely related to the above challenges is the problem of rapid urbanization which potentially threatens long term peace and security in Mozambique. Rapid urbanization has seen urban population grow at an average rate of 4 per cent annually, majority of the immigrants being youths seeking economic opportunities in the capital Maputo.¹¹⁴ One of the respondents argued that;

*“Limited job opportunities in the urban centers expose crime among majority of the youths and other economic depravities have provided conducive environment for indulgence into criminal ventures which further challenge national security and stability”.*¹¹⁵

¹¹² Ibid

¹¹³Boix, C. (2015). *Political Order and Inequality: Their Foundations and Their Consequences for Human Welfare*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

¹¹⁴ARUP International Development. (2016). *Mozambique-Growth Corridors*. Available online at www.arupinternational.org Accessed on 30th Nov. 2020

¹¹⁵ Respondent B, Mozambique, November 23, 2020

The government has responded to this challenge in a proactive approach realizing minimal success going by the crime statistics in Maputo. Therefore, rapid urbanization not accompanied by corresponding economic support systems complicates national security policies. According to Chatham house report issued in 2019, urbanization is associated with organized crime particularly during election years which challenge national security policies.

3.3 Political Dominance and Instability

Like other African countries, Mozambique is considered an exceptional case of post-war democratization. Having been a fragile society, Mozambique has instituted democratic governance reforms which have seen the country hold five successful presidential and parliamentary elections. Despite the notable political achievements, democratization in the country is weak and according to the Freedom House the country is a partly free state.¹¹⁶ The Freedom House ranks Mozambique position 45 out of 100 countries scoring 14/40 on political rights and 31/60 on civil liberties.¹¹⁷ This is explained by the political centralization and control of the state by FRELIMO which regulates the state media and obstructs political opposition. The opposition gets minimal media coverage as reported by the African media barometer.¹¹⁸ This was affirmed by one of the respondents who said that;

*“Political centralization and control of the state by the ruling party (FRELIMO) limits the implementation of Mozambique’s national security policies. “Despite notable political achievements in Mozambique, democratization in the country is weak”.*¹¹⁹

During the era of President Joaquim Chissano, the country witnessed relative stability because the roles of the state and the ruling party were distinguished. According to Nuvunga and Siteo, the political administration of President Armando Guebuza took a different trajectory where

¹¹⁶ Freedom House.(2019). *Freedom in the World-Mozambique*. Available online at: <https://freedomhouse.org/country/mozambique/freedom-world/2020> Accessed on 01/12/2020

¹¹⁷ Ibid

¹¹⁸ Friedrich-Ebert, S. (2019). *African Media Barometer Publications; A home-grown analysis of the media landscape in Africa*. Madagascar : Windhoek. Fesmedia Africa

¹¹⁹ Respondent C, Mozambique, November 25, 2020

FRELIMO was instituted as the state and controlled every aspect of the state, particularly revitalization of party cells within state machinery.¹²⁰ FRELIMO's tendency to centralize political power has caused protracted conflicts including the long-drawn political civil war.

Political dominance of FRELIMO has entrenched the ruling party in the state and eliminated dissent and political opposition, a factor which has created sporadic violent protests in the recent past. For example, violent protests erupted in 2014 between the supporters of FRELIMO and those of RENAMO following the rise in fuel prices. Whereas, FRELIMO and RENAMO signed an agreement in 2014, there is a growing speculation that Mozambique could fall back to large-scale civil war which threatens national security and sustainable peace and stability in the region. According to *Europe Aid* report issued in 2014, the violent clashes between the FRELIMO and RENAMO could subject the country to another political instability which potentially rolls back the security gains made since the 2014 Agreement.¹²¹ In this regard one respondent posited that; *"The political dominance of the ruling party and the threats directed towards the opposition party in the country is a factor responsible for hindering implementation of security policies"*.¹²²

3.4 Security Sector Reforms threatening National Security

FRELIMO and RENAMO signed a peace agreement which led to the state embarking on a journey towards DDR process of ex-combatants in Mozambique. While these processes have been successful, with no possible evidence of returning to civil war, both parties have continued to incite their supporters thereby threatening national security and peace and resulting to many fractures and tensions.¹²³ According to Burkati and Munasinghe, the riots witnessed in early 2014 were as a result of party affiliations but assuming economic considerations.¹²⁴ Both parties

¹²⁰ Nuvunga, A. (2014). *From the Two-Party to the Dominant-Party System in Mozambique, 1994– 2012: Framing Frelimo Party Dominance in Context*. PhD Thesis Submitted to Erasmus University Rotterdam, Netherlands.

¹²¹ EuropeAid Cooperation Office. (2007). *Evaluation of the European Commission's support to the Republic of Mozambique*. Country Level Evaluation. Final Report 20

¹²² Respondent D, Mozambique, November 20, 2020

¹²³ Ibid.,

¹²⁴ Burkati, A.B, & Munasinghe, S. (2020). *The Mozambique Conflict and the Deteriorating Security Situation*. London: Tony Blaire Institute for Global Change

have failed to adopt a common and holistic political relationship required for holistic security sector reforms as evidenced by majority of the respondents (who answered in the affirmative).




Figure 3.1 Security Sector Reforms

Source; Field data, 2021

According to the figure above majority of the respondents 97% agreed that the parties have been reluctant in engaging in a cordial relationship which will provide an opportunity for them to address their grievances as well as promote implementation of security policies. However, 3% of the respondents were of the contrary opinion and argued that, the hostile relationship between the two parties does not affect successful implementation of national security policies.

Both parties accuse each other particularly, the ex-combatants of leaking intelligence reports, a move which compromises national security policies. Within the security agencies there is limited cooperation with each side complaining of favoritism and negligence on matters related to military appointments and promotions as well as on retrenchment. For instance, the RENAMO political party accuses FRELIMO of having numerous opportunities within the police and also within the military, while the RENAMO officers are denied promotions and are retrenched early in their security careers. Such division is proving very costly and adds difficulty on the

implementation of national security policies.¹²⁵ Particularly, insecurity is threatening peace agreement especially in the Northern region due to incessant terror attacks which have continued to cause fear among the civilians residing in the area.

3.5 Violent extremism threatening National Security

Violent extremism refers to advocating, engaging in, preparing or otherwise supporting ideologically motivated or justified violence to further social, economic or political objectives.¹²⁶

Violent extremism and terrorism are synonymous in use. Violent extremism has led to the identification of two sets of drivers that can contribute to an individual's support for violent extremist agendas and participation in extremist groups. One includes structural factors also known as push factors such as underdevelopment, lack of access to job opportunities and social marginalization. The other set of drivers is referred to as pull factors such as issues that make violent extremist ideas or groups appealing, including the attraction of charismatic individuals, powerful strategic communications and compelling messaging, financial or other material benefit. Both countries - Kenya and Mozambique, have been victimized by terrorist acts, whether perpetrated by and against a country's nationals for a domestic cause or focused on extra national or extra regional targets, for example, embassies of Western states. The 1998 Bombing of Nairobi and Dar es Salaam constitute violent terrorism which targeted foreign countries' embassies and interest in these countries but inflicted pain in the host countries. Since then, Nairobi has suffered several attacks attributed to violent extremism with the recent one being the Dusit2 Hotel attack in the heart of Nairobi in 2019. These attacks continue to pose a threat to both national and human security.

¹²⁵ PSC Report. (2019). *New Threats to Peace in Mozambique*. Available Online at:

<https://issafrica.org/pscreport/psc-insights/new-threats-to-peace-in-mozambique> Accessed on 01/12/2020

¹²⁶ Glazzard, A. Zeuthen, M. (2016). *Violent Extremism*. GSDRC Professional Development Reading Pack no. 34. Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham.

3.6 Elements of Resource Curse

The discovery of liquefied natural gas in Cabo Delgado province of Mozambique has placed the country on the international radar. With billions of Dollars being expected to flow from the natural resource boom, elements of resource curse have started to be visible in regards to the serious insecurity incidents which have been noticed in the Cabo Delgado province. According to ISS/PSC report issued in 2019, the violence is attributed directly to the natural resource discovery.¹²⁷

According to Mathews, Al Walker, Chairman of Anadarko, the operator of the gas-rich Offshore Area 1 block remarked that; *“the massive natural gas discoveries have the potential to elevate Mozambique to the world’s third-largest exporter of natural gas and the largest African natural gas producer”*.¹²⁸ In this regard, Mozambique is compared to Qatar for its rich deposits of natural gas and petroleum products. Whereas it is good news for the discoveries made in the country, the resource curse attributed to such discoveries is threatening the peace, security and stability of the country just like it happened in Angola and Nigeria, a phenomenon which is feared in Mozambique.

The threat posed by the new discovery of natural gas resources partly originates from the natives who are protesting against inequality in the distribution of revenues realized from the sale of natural resources. According to the respondents who participated in this study;

“The discoveries of natural resources in Mozambique have largely been unproductive to the local people in Mozambique, only benefitting the political elites instead of the whole population. Such instances are the red flags responsible for the recurrence of resource-led conflicts and challenging national security and success of security policies”.¹²⁹

¹²⁷ Ibid

¹²⁸ Mathews, C. (2014). *Investing in Mozambique: Gas Fired Economy*. Financial Mail. London: Overseas Development Institute

¹²⁹ Respondent E, Mozambique, November 28, 2020

3.7 Terrorism in Mozambique

The terror group known as “*Ansar al-Sunna*” has continued to launch attacks in the country especially in the Cabo Delgado region. According to Chatham House report issued in 2019, the extremist group launched its first attack in 2017 in Macimboa de Praia killing dozens of civilians.¹³⁰ Since then, the group has launched an average of 20 attacks every month covering nine towns along the Cabo Delgado coastline. In one remarkable instance which happened in 2020, the government forces engaged the *Ansar al-Sunna* terrorist in a fierce offensive which killed 78 insurgents in one of the most notable counter-insurgent operation ever carried out in the country.¹³¹ The emergence of such terrorist group has challenged national security in the region and caused terror and fear among civilians.

One of the respondents pointed out that;

*“The group uses kidnapping, torture, looting and massive killings to create fear and terror among the civilian population, a move which has displaced thousands of people and left several nursing multiple injuries resulting from explosives and gun-shots. These actions in return have led to serious security challenges”.*¹³²

There are possible cooperative alliance with other several terrorist organizations operating in the “Lake Chad basin”- the “*Jamma Nusrat al-Islam wa al-Muslimin*” and the Boko Haram group operating in Northern Nigeria as well as Al-shabaab based in Somalia. The expansion of the group has created a security threat which haunts Mozambique each and every day equally, challenging the implementation of national security policies as affirmed by 98% of the respondents who participated in the study (green) while 2% (white) were of the contrary opinion, as indicated in the pie chart below:-

¹³⁰ Astil-Brown, J., Weimer, M. (2019). *Mozambique: Balancing Development, Politics and Security*. London: Chatham House Report

¹³¹ ISS/PSC. (2020). *Mozambique Deteriorating security situation*. Available online at <https://institute.global/policy/mozambique-conflict-and-deteriorating-security-situation> Accessed on 01/12/2020

¹³² Respondent F, Mozambique, November 28, 2020




Figure 3.2 Terrorism in Mozambique

Source; Field data, 2021

3.8 Cyber Crime in Mozambique

In Mozambique cyber security capabilities are still in infancy and currently in the development stage a factor which has challenged the implementation of national security policies and successful security reforms. As one of the respondents said;

*“There is lack of adequate skilled personnel to investigate and prosecute cyber related crimes and offenders as the country is still on the process of adopting more advanced technology which will facilitate in these operations”.*¹³³

The National Institute of Communications is the institution mandated with boosting and refining the cyber security infrastructure. Financial and other public institutions have also enhanced their capacity through adoption of advanced technology and innovation in order to detect these crimes which are a threat to the country’s national security.¹³⁴ According to a study done by Goredema on the effects of cybercrimes he notes that, cyber-crimes experienced in Mozambique include ATM fraud, credit Card fraud and online money laundering.¹³⁵

¹³³ Respondent G, Mozambique, November 30, 2020

¹³⁴ OSAC. (2019). Mozambique 2019 Crime & safety Report. Available at; <https://www.osac.gov/Content/Report/7a5af4be-45b7-4cd1-8cf8-15f4aed3554e> Accessed on 10/2/2021

¹³⁵ Goredema, C. (2013). *A case study of Mozambique in Kavanah, C.: Getting smart and scaling up: Responding to the Impact of Organized Crime on Developing Countries*. New York: NYU

3.9 Climate Change

Climate change is the most significant challenge affecting nearly all the countries in the 21st century. As Feulner posits, it is one of the calamities affecting the world in the 21st century.¹³⁶

The climate change challenge is compromising the ability of countries to achieve developmental goals in the long term as well as pushing the world into grinding poverty.

In Mozambique climate change adversely affects the agricultural activities which are a source of livelihood for majority of the households. Floods and droughts have led to reduction in food production thereby threatening food security and leading to increase in malnutrition cases, hunger, and poverty among others. It has led to reduced pastures and water for the livestock and this has resulted to conflict especially among the pastoralists community due to competition over the scarce resources. According to a document produced by *Chemomics* for Thought Leadership and Assessments Project (ATLAS) task order for review by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in Mozambique, the adverse implications of the climate change such as floods and drought affects the economic growth and livelihood of the vulnerable, and older persons in the country.¹³⁷ The climate change vulnerabilities in Mozambique pose security threats to human security which constitute adverse threats in the 21st century. This statement was affirmed by 97% of the respondents interviewed as shown in the figure below: while 3% were of the contrary opinion.

¹³⁶ Feulner, G. (2015). *Global Challenges: Climate Change*. Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research. Potsdam, Germany: John Wiley & Sons Ltd

¹³⁷ USAID/ Chemomics International Inc. (2018). *Climate Change and Health in Mozambique: Impacts on Diarrheal diseases and Malaria*. Washington D.C: Chemomics International Inc.




Figure 3.3 Climate Change as a challenge of National security in Mozambique

Source; Field Data, 2021

3.10 Conclusion

This chapter has established several factors responsible for impeding the implementation of national security policies in Mozambique. While some of the factors established are institutional and inherent in the country's governance style and structure, majority are aligned to the country's socio-economic and political nature. Among the socio-economic factors impeding successful implementation of security policies as pointed out by the respondents include; rampant unemployment among the population; income inequality; land distribution inequality; rapid urbanization; illiteracy; political centralization and dominance; inadequacies related to security sector reforms; elements of resource curse, climate change, cyber-crimes and terrorism. Summarily, higher levels of income inequality, incidence of poverty and lower elasticity of poverty to growth have hindered implementation of security policies and attainment of sustainable peace in the country.

While these factors are inter-linked, they collaboratively hinder the government from instituting a comprehensive national security policy which can address national security threats holistically. In both countries, youth bulge constitutes a fundamental security challenge which has threatened sustainable development. Youth bulge is an emerging security challenge which is socio-economic in nature due to the risks associated with unemployment and lack of opportunities for such demographic categories. Other emerging security concerns confronting both countries include; climate change and cybercrimes which have threatened traditional security structures. Both countries lack institutional capacities for effective surveillance of cyber-crimes and for mitigation of climate change vulnerabilities. The respondents also pointed out other domestic and external threats to national security which include; negative ethnicity, political divisions, centralization of power on one party, increase in cases of terrorism, poor funded security agencies also challenged policing of the whole country, international terrorism, international interference owing to the newly discovered natural gas resources, proliferation of weapons from overseas markets and inadequate funding.

CHAPTER FOUR

POLICY REFORM INTERVENTIONS IN SECURITY SECTOR IN BOTH KENYA AND MOZAMBIQUE

4.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the policy reform interventions which can be applied to security sector to improve reforms in both Kenya and Mozambique. This entails the constitutional, legal and policy changes which are deemed necessary to ensure accountability, transparency, professionalism as well as effectiveness the in Security Sector Reforms (SSR). Additionally, policy interventions advanced in this chapter attempts to bring SSR under civilian control and inculcate in them international best practices, transform the underlying norms, values and politics.

4.2 Policy interventions in Kenya

4.2.1 Proper Inclusivity in Security Sector

The Kenya Police is regarded and perceived as the most corrupt institution marred with cases of brutality, incompetence and one that lacks transparency and accountability.¹³⁸ This perception has prevailed for quite a long period of time without any substantial institutional change. According to reports by Waki and Ransley, there are several key principles which should be included in Kenya security agencies, particularly the Kenya Police. Among the policy reform interventions identified by the two reports included; representativeness to ensure the police and the entire security sector reflect an equitable mix of Kenya's communities. Lack of inclusivity was identified by the two reports as a factor which had derailed effective reforms citing domination of the security sector by the four largest ethnic tribes in Kenya (Kikuyu, Luhya, Kalenjin, Kamba).

¹³⁸Transparency International-Kenya. (2001-2010). *Kenya Bribery Index*. Nairobi: Transparency International-Kenya

This study identifies justice, fairness and inclusivity as a policy intervention which needs to be incorporated into security sector where the representation of all ethnic communities is guaranteed. One of the respondents who participated in the study from Nairobi said that;

*“A comprehensive security sector reforms in Kenya cannot be effected without the input of the diversity of Kenya’s ethnic communities. Kenya’s security Sector needs to reflect the face of the country where all the ethnic communities are appreciated and incorporated into the broader spectrum of security sector in the country”.*¹³⁹

Further, according to Muthondeki, the ethno-regional diversity in the security sector should be prioritized due to the multi ethnic nature of Kenya especially within the Kenya Police.¹⁴⁰ Security agencies must represent the broad ethnic diversity to promote chances of establishing legitimacy and public trust that makes their actions more efficient.

4.2.2 Mapping out the Context

Before undertaking or initiating any security reforms, there is need for an in-depth understanding of the human security needs and prospects of the area the operation is taking place.¹⁴¹ For instance, in conflict related areas which are often marred by human right abuses carried out by the security officers, it is imperative to start anew with a freshly created organization. There should not be one model of security sector reform that should be targeted by these activities because different countries have different contexts and realities. It is important therefore that, policy makers understand the context and human needs of an area before initiating the reforms.

For instance, in Kenya, several communities are prone to banditry attacks which are conducted by cattle rustlers particularly in the Karamoja cluster which straddles Kenya and Uganda. These communities have traditionally practiced nomadic transhumance, occasionally attracting armed

¹³⁹ Respondent H, Nairobi, November 1, 2020

¹⁴⁰Muthondeki, D.K. (2017). *Security Sector Reforms Influencing Transformation of National Police Service, Nairobi and Kiambu Counties, Kenya*. Nairobi: MasindeMuliro University of Science and Technology

¹⁴¹Piza-Lopez, E., Van de Goor, L., & Eavis, P. (2002). *Towards a better practice framework in security sector reform*. Netherlands: Saferworld/ Clingendael

attacks aimed at stealing livestock, hence the justification for possessing SALWs.¹⁴² The continued disarmament operations conducted by the security agencies in both countries (Kenya and Uganda) need to take into consideration the security realities facing such communities. While disarmament in the Karamoja cluster has improved human security in the region, it has potentially increased community vulnerability when attacks are externally generated.¹⁴³ According to this study, it is important to initiate a security reform at the right time and comprehend the context before engaging in any security sector reforms. It is also advisable for the policy makers in the security sector to map out the geographic, political and economic spheres of a given society so as to comprehend the effects of the SSR. Further, it is important to understand the demands characterizing a given society before initiating security sector reforms. Therefore, a better understanding of such parameters helps the policy makers to domesticate (local ownership) the security sector reform in a context which best suits the local community and drive an attitudinal change desired by such reform.

4.2.3 Arming the Private security Sector

Private security refers to different entities which provide security in collaboration with the government but at a cost.¹⁴⁴ They assist government in providing security in the country.¹⁴⁵ There are 23 listed security firms under the Kenya Security Industry Association (KSIA) and 44 under the Protective Security Industry Association (PSIA) – and an estimated 67 security firms in Kenya.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴²Wepundi M et al. (2012). *Availability of Small Arms and Perceptions of Security in Kenya: An Assessment*. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies

¹⁴³Mkutu, K.A. (2016). *Pastoralist Conflict, Governance and Small Arms in North Rift, North East Africa: The cases of Karamoja, Uganda; West Pokot; Dol Dot, Laikipia; and Baragoi, Samburu*, Nairobi: Political science Department, University of Bradford

¹⁴⁴Mkutu, K., & Sabala, R. (2007). Private Security Companies in Kenya and Dilemmas for Security. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 25(3), 391-416.

¹⁴⁵Githimi, S. K. (2016). *Private Security Services and Crime Control in Karen Location Nairobi County, Kenya*. Nairobi: Egerton University, Njoro

¹⁴⁶Mbuvi, C. (2015). *The Development and Growth of the Kenyan Private Security Sector: Its Role and Impact on Safety and Security*. Johannesburg: University of South Africa

According to the ICTJ-Kenya; the industry has been expanding at a very high rate and providing jobs to many of the unemployed youths in the country.¹⁴⁷ However, most of the companies are largely located in the urban areas and majority of the local and international investors depend on these companies, to provide security for their investments. Unending debate has raged for a considerable length of time, whether the officials working in these security companies should be armed by the government and the effects of the same on the national and human security.

Private security firms are regulated by the private security regulation Act No. 13 of 2016.¹⁴⁸ Under this Act, the use of firearms by the private security sector is still unlawful in Kenya. Specifically, section 53 of the Act makes it an offence for anyone to use firearms to provide security services.¹⁴⁹ In the course of their operations and duties, private security firms are often confronted by armed criminals who typically challenge their responsibility and, in several instances, lives are lost. This happens often during the transportation of cash and other valuables from one place to another. *Armored Transportation Services* entails transportation of huge sums of cash (Cash in Transit) and other valuables which constitute prime target of armed organized criminals who often hijack, kidnap and also kill private security personnel. Since the security guards are not armed, they are easily overpowered by criminals and often killed in the line of duty. According to newspaper headlines carried by the *Standard* newspaper, private security guards are the first line of defense and majority have been killed by armed robbers totaling 56 in number.¹⁵⁰ It is upon such background that this study deems it appropriate for the arming of security guards who constitute an integral part of security sector as a security sector intervention.

¹⁴⁷ Op cit. p.8

¹⁴⁸Nkaari, M., & Jones, J.A .(2019). *Kenya's Private Security Regulation; Handbook*. Nairobi: Elite Academy

¹⁴⁹ Ibid

¹⁵⁰The Standard. (2019). *Guards to carry guns and make arrests in new rules*. Nairobi: Available online at; <https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/kenya/article/2001333876/new-rules-allow-guards-to-carry-guns-make-arrests> Accessed on 11/1/2021

4.3 Policy Interventions in Mozambique

4.3.1 Comprehensive Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Process

A close examination of security sector reforms in Mozambique reveals a number of policy gaps found in practice, polity and in governance which challenge security architecture in the country. According to Lala', policy gaps are eminent in the entire integration process of the security sector reforms in the areas of defense and police.¹⁵¹ Lala asserts that; the government did not respond to the whole process of integration of the security sector reforms which largely led to their failure. The DDR process was marred by myriad of challenges due to reluctance of the ex-combatants to surrender their weapons and relay information on the location of the depots.¹⁵² This study calls for a comprehensive disarmament of all former combatants, holistic demobilization and all-inclusive reintegration into the national armed forces of former RENAMO militia men for a comprehensive security sector reform.

Some of security reforms instituted in the defense sector were the integration of the Government and RENAMO troops as one entity though the process did not consider the changing organizational culture that would handle the emerging challenges. This was evidenced during the reintegration of ex-combatants into civilian life which was facing great challenge due to mistrust that characterized the relationship between RENAMO and the ruling government of FRELIMO.¹⁵³ A comprehensive DDR process of ex-combatants is the first step towards a broader governance reform and should be fast-tracked in the security sector reforms for realization of sustainable security of Mozambique. This statement was affirmed by 99% of the respondents who agreed that it will lead to a successful and a comprehensive security sector reform.

¹⁵¹Lala'A, A., (2006). *Democratic Governance and Security Sector Reform; realities from post-war Mozambique*. Maputo: African Security Dialogue and Research (ASDR) Publication

¹⁵² Ibid

¹⁵³Hutton, L. (2010). *GFN-SSR Regional Guide: Security Sector Reform in Southern Africa*. Pretoria: Institute of Security Studies




Figure 4.1 Comprehensive Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Process as a policy intervention in Mozambique

Source; Field data, 2021

4.3.2 De-politicizing Security Sector Reforms

There is an urgent need to limit the use of security agencies for advancing political agenda in Mozambique. Specifically, there is an urgency of depoliticizing security sector and refraining the security organs of the state from political repression and serving the interest of the ruling elites. According to Weimer, ever since 1975, sometimes it is not possible to distinguish the difference between the state and FRELIMO.¹⁵⁴ Although the state and the ruling party (FRELIMO) seem the same, their interests vary. The state sometimes is viewed as a subsidiary of the ruling party. As Weimer and Astill-Brown Posit; FRELIMO interests vary from those of the state despite appearing similar.¹⁵⁵ In regards to the security sector reforms in Mozambique, it is imperative for the policy makers to recognize the importance of the ruling party (FRELIMO) and separate it from the state while at the same time supporting the security sector in order to safeguard security and stability in the country.

¹⁵⁴ Weimer, M., & Astill-Brown, J. (2010). *Mozambique; Balancing Development, Politics and Security*. London: Chatham House

¹⁵⁵ Ibid, p.7

4.3.3 Entrenching Cultural Aspects in Security Sector Policies

Cultural aspects constitute an integral element that should be integrated in level of policy, particularly at the practice of policing. According to a national survey undertaken by *EticaMocambiquea* national NGO, majority of the people prefer to report issues especially related to conflict to the community elders because they are solved faster and in a cordial way.¹⁵⁶ Due to the slow process of justice in the country, majority of the people in Mozambique preferred to solve their conflicts utilizing the traditional channels (informal means of community conflict resolution). According to a similar survey conducted by Institute for Security Studies group, most of the respondents preferred to report cases first to the community elders, then to the local authorities and lastly to the Police.¹⁵⁷

While this resembles Kenya's community policing, in Mozambique, it is embedded with cultural orientations which deter people particularly in the rural areas from reporting their kinsmen to official authorities, hence the use of traditional authorities to settle disputes and for conflict resolution which is part of the broader security sector reform. In such regard, this study calls for the entrenching of traditional cultural orientations to the broader security sector reforms in the country to improve on the local ownership of the reforms and instill attitudinal change desired for sustainable national and human security. This is because, a successful security sector reform (SSR) is people centered.

4.4 Conclusion

This chapter has established that a successful security sector reform upholds the primacy of the rule of law and assumes international best practices. Whereas Kenya and Mozambique exist in different geographic, legislative and political contexts, they share almost similar security concerns which have necessitated security sector reforms in respective countries. The clamor for constitutional changes occasioned by multi-party politics in 1992 in Kenya can be cited as the

¹⁵⁶EticaMocambique . (2001). *Mozambique corruption report 2001*. Maputo: EticaMocambique

¹⁵⁷ Lea, A. (2004). *Weapons in Mozambique, Reducing Availability and Demand*. Maputo: ISS Group Publication

genesis of security sector reforms in the country while the independence of Mozambique in 1975 can be referred to as the golden age of security sector reforms.

While both countries have tried security reforms with varied degree of success, notable interventions have been established by the respondents which can improve reforms in both countries. They include; ensuring inclusivity in national security organs; mapping out the country-specific context before implementing security reforms; arming the private security sector; comprehensive Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) processes, cooperation with international partners, enhancing local funding of the security sector, combating corruption, strengthen international protocols on control of illicit proliferation of small and light arms, depoliticizing the security sector reforms. Measures for controlling the resource curse should be checked through the appropriate national legislation and robust resource sharing framework as well as entrenching traditional practices in the broader security sector reform. While these are not the only interventions, they constitute viable options which can be incorporated in the broader security sector reform process.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Summary of the Findings

This section presents a summary of the study findings. This is done in line with the study objectives which were: To examine the challenges that confront implementation of Kenya's national security policies in the 21st century, to assess the challenges that confront implementation of Mozambique's national security policies in the 21st century and to propose the policy reform interventions that can be applied to security sector in both Kenya and Mozambique. The study was guided by two hypotheses which stated that; successful implementation of national security policies depends on effective management of security threats in both countries and successful implementation of national security policies in both countries does not depend on effective management of security threats.

5.1.1 The challenges that confront implementation of Kenya's national security policies in the 21st century

This study presents findings in line with the first objective of the study which was, "to examine the challenges that confront implementation of Kenya's national security policies in the 21st century." The findings show that, Kenya is faced by myriad of security challenges which are influenced and shaped by actors and drivers located at all levels. These challenges range from socio-political and economic sphere and hinder successful implementation of national security policies. They include; high levels of youth unemployment which creates a fertile ground for the emergence of organized criminal gangs. Majority of the idle youths are radicalized into illegal groups with promises of getting more money as they continue to engage in criminal activities which threatens both national and human security. These youths are also utilized by leaders to

perpetrate violence and ethnic conflict for their own self interests.¹⁵⁸ Therefore, as affirmed by most of the participants in this study, high levels of unemployment especially among the youths have posed a security challenge which hinders realization of security in the country.

Poor working conditions and poor terms of service for the police service have also posed security challenges which deter realization of security sector reforms in the country. Poor remuneration, poor housing conditions and poor working conditions have demoralized the police service and forced them to engage in illegal activities such as corruption in order to cater for their needs. As agreed by majority of the respondents, this situation has also rendered them reluctant to relay their efforts in the commission of security reforms, which target implementation of national security policies.¹⁵⁹

Another security challenge is slow pace in adoption and implementation of the security reforms despite the efforts by the government. Majority of the security agencies are yet to conform and adopt these reforms. Engagement of police in non-core policing responsibilities also presents a security challenge, as there are inadequate police officers at the grassroots to carry out core duties mandated by the constitution of protecting Kenyans as well as maintaining law and order thereby, challenging the realization of effective implementation of security policies in the country. Politicization of national security polices by leaders such as the DDR process which aims at flushing out illegally acquired SALW from the civilians which threatens the national and human security also challenges effective implementation of national security policies. More so, majority of the respondents also affirmed that, increased rates of corruption especially among the security agencies and failure to conform to the rule of law have also challenged successful implementation of security policies.¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁸ KNCHR. (2014). *A country under siege: The state of security in Kenya an occasional Report (2010-2014)*. Nairobi: KNCHR Publication

¹⁵⁹ Tembur, A. (2017). *Factors Affecting Job Performance in National Police Service. A Case Study of Nairobi Area County*. Nairobi: The Management University Of Africa

¹⁶⁰ Ibid

Additionally, lack of coordination among security agencies has adversely impacted information sharing and cooperation in other joint operations between the agencies which also deters successful implementation of security reforms. Resource based conflicts have continued to threaten national security, especially in the northern region thereby, thwarting the implementation of Kenya's national security policies as posited by majority of the respondents. Other challenges include; high level of dependence on foreign aid in Kenya, lack of a regulatory framework of monitoring private security companies which renders them to offer very poor service despite their importance in securing the country. Adverse impacts culminating from cybercrime and climate change also deter successful implementation of security policies in the country.¹⁶¹

5.1.2 Challenges that confronts implementation of Mozambique's national security policies in the 21st century

The second objective of the study was, "to assess the challenges that confront implementation of Mozambique's national security policies in the 21st century". It is clear that, there are several socio-economic and political threats that hamper successful implementation of national security policies in Mozambique. These threats include security related socio-economic challenges such as income inequality, poverty levels and insecurity, unemployment, illiteracy and low levels of education as well as problem of rapid urbanization which deters long term peace and security in Mozambique. These factors have rendered many unemployed people, to join criminal gangs and groups and venture into crime activities, thereby challenging national security and stability. Unemployment is a socio-economic factor which to a large extent has hampered the implementation of national security policies. According to Almeida *et al.* over 87 per cent of people in Mozambique are under-employment, while the country receives over 300,000 new job

¹⁶¹ Mwega, F.M . (2016). *A case study of Aid Effectiveness in Kenya; Volatility and fragmentation of foreign Aid with focus on health*. Nairobi: Wolfenshon Centre for Development.

seekers annually.¹⁶² The only sectors of economy which provide employment for people in the country are; agriculture and SMEs.¹⁶³

Agriculture is primarily subsistence with minimal mechanization and limited value addition which offers limited job opportunities for the country's job seekers. As a result of rampant unemployment, the ruling elites politically manipulate the jobless youths to advance their rational interests which contradict the security environment in the country. Illiteracy and low levels of education constitute socio-economic challenges with a direct implication on the country's security policies. According to the African Development Bank, Mozambique has one of the highest illiteracy levels in the world with an average of 1.2 years of formal education.¹⁶⁴ Whereas education is free in the country, auxiliary costs associated with education such as school uniforms, textbooks and other school supplies present a socio-economic burden to households making many learners drop out of school. This has led to decline in skilled labor force forcing foreign firms to out-source labor from other countries. Industrial unrests attributed to foreign workers in the country's economy has been a silent security threat, with just a matter of time before it explodes as witnessed in South Africa's xenophobic attacks in late 2019. Summarily, illiteracy exacerbates the unemployment challenge which increases hostility towards foreigners thereby challenging national efforts to offer sustainable security and stability.¹⁶⁵

Further, political centralization and control of the state by the ruling party (FRELIMO) which has undermined democracy in the country also limits the implementation of Mozambique's national security policies. Notably, majority of the respondents 98% affirmed that, the two parties FRELIMO and RENAMO have been reluctant to adopt a unified and holistic political

¹⁶²Almeida S., Roffarello, L., & Filipe, M. (2015). *Mozambique: African Development Bank Report*. Tunis, Tunisia: ADF

¹⁶³ Ibid

¹⁶⁴ ADB/ADF. (2018). *Mozambique Strategy Paper 2018-2022; Supporting Mozambique towards the High5S*. ADB/ADF Publication. Tunis, Tunisia:ADF

¹⁶⁵ Ibid

relationship which will provide a fertile ground for successful implementation of security sector reforms.¹⁶⁶

Additionally, discoveries of resources in Cabo Delgado province continue to threaten peace and stability in the region largely due to inequality in the distribution of revenues realized from the sale of natural resources. The country has also experienced emergence of Islamic terror groups who continue to launch terror attacks on its soil, thereby killing dozens of people and leaving others badly injured. This continues to threaten national security in the region, thereby causing terror and fear among civilians as posited by 98% of the respondents. Cyber-crime has also threatened national security as the country is still at the infancy and currently in the development stage in cyber security and lacks adequate skilled personnel to investigate and prosecute cyber related crimes. Lastly, climate change continues to pose *security* threats to human security which hampers realization of security sector reforms as affirmed by 97% of the respondents.¹⁶⁷

5.1.3 Policy interventions that can be applied to security sector reforms in both Kenya and Mozambique

The third objective sought, “to propose the policy interventions that can be applied to security sector reforms in both Kenya and Mozambique”. It is imperative to note that, there are various policy interventions which can be applied to the security sector to improve reforms in both Kenya and Mozambique. One of the policies in Kenya is proper inclusivity in security sector which ensures representation of all ethnic communities is guaranteed. There is need for the relevant security agencies to map out the geographic, political and economic spheres of a given society so as to understand the impact of the security sector reform. Arming of private security sector who constitute an integral part of security sector as a security sector intervention. This

¹⁶⁶ Boix, C. (2015). *Political Order and Inequality: Their Foundations and Their Consequences for Human Welfare*. Princeton: Princeton University Press

¹⁶⁷ USAID/ Chemonics International Inc. (2018). *Climate Change and Health in Mozambique: Impacts on Diarrheal diseases and Malaria*. Washington D.C. Chemonics International Inc.

sector deals with matters which are paramount to the national security and therefore their self-security should also be guaranteed.

Further, policy interventions in Mozambique include; comprehensive Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) process which will assist in flushing out illegal weapons especially from the combatants that continue to pose a threat to national security. A comprehensive DDR process of ex-combatants as affirmed by 99% of the respondents will lead to a successful and a comprehensive security sector reform. There is need to de-politicize security sector reforms and refrain from using security agencies by the leaders to pursue their self-interests. Lastly, there is need to entrench cultural aspects in security sector policies as more people in the country are more inclined to their culture especially in conflict resolution.

5.2 Conclusion

In conclusion, and emanating from the first objective of the study which was to examine the challenges that confront implementation of Kenya's national security policies in the 21st century, it is evident that, several threats have hindered successful implementation of security policies in the country despite the efforts by the government. These threats have portrayed the existing shortcomings of the national security architecture and therefore require institutional reform and political will to address them. Notably, based on Kenya's governance structure, it is important for policy makers to institute security policies which conform to the current security demands of the country. This therefore, confirms the first hypotheses which states that, successful implementation of national security policies depends on effective management of security threats in both countries and opposes the second hypotheses which states that successful implementation of national security policies in both countries does not depend on effective management of security threats.

In line with the second objective of the study which was, "to assess the challenges that confront implementation of Mozambique's national security policies in the 21st century", it can be

concluded that, several inter-linked threats continue to hamper effective realization and implementation of security policies in Mozambique. These factors hinder the government from instituting a comprehensive national security policy which can address national security threats holistically. Therefore, there is need for FRELIMO and RENAMO to cooperate and derive a common and holistic cordial relationship that will lead to successful implementation of these policies which will promote national security, peace and stability.

Based on the last objective of the study which was, “to propose the policy reform interventions that can be applied to security sector reforms in both Kenya and Mozambique,” it is evident that, the two countries have faced a myriad of challenges that continue to hamper implementation of national security policies and this can be overcome by adopting constitutional, legal and policy changes which are deemed appropriate for principles accountability, professionalism and efficiency in the security sector. The policy intervention adopted by these countries will bring security sector reforms under civilian control and inculcate in them international best practices, transform the underlying norms, values and politics. Further, the security reforms will uphold the primacy of the rule of law and assume international standards.

5.3 Recommendations

From the findings established above, this study recommends the following:

1. There is need for both countries to adopt community policing initiatives in their security sector reforms and strengthen Ten Household (‘Nyumba Kumi’).
2. This study recommends for increase in ratio of security personnel to internationally recommended standards.
3. There is also need to review security training curriculum to equip the police, the intelligence officers and other domestic law enforcers with up to date skills and competencies.

4. There is need to strengthen the counter- terrorism strategies in both countries in order to combat terrorism as well as provide the security agencies with skills and knowledge on how to counter cyber related crimes.
5. Both countries need to conduct comprehensive DDR processes in order to flush out illegally acquired weapons from civilians and also enhance cooperation with international partners.

REFERENCES

Books

- Achieng, S.G. (2017). *The principle of territorial integrity as a determinant of Kenya's National Security Policy 2002-2016*. Nairobi: USIU-Africa Press
- ADB/ADF. (2018). *Mozambique Strategy Paper 2018-2022; Supporting Mozambique towards the High5S*. ADB/ADF Publication. Tunis, Tunisia: ADF
- Almeida S., Roffarello, L., & Filipe, M. (2015). *Mozambique: African Development Bank Report*. Tunis, Tunisia: ADF
- Arndt, C., Jones, S., & Tarp, F. (2015). *Mozambique Off-track or temporarily sidelined?* UNUWIDER Working Paper 2015/044. Helsinki, Finland: UNUWIDER
- Astil-Brown, J., Weimer, M. (2019). *Mozambique: Balancing Development, Politics and Security*. London: Chatham House Report
- Astill-Brown, J., & Weimer, M. (2010). *Mozambique: Balancing Development, Politics and Security*. London: Chatham House-The royal institute of International Affairs
- Bajpai, K. (2000). *Human Security: Concept and Measurement*. Notre Dame: Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies.
- Baylis, J. (2001). *International and Global Security in the post-cold war era*. In J. Baylis, & S. Smith, *the Globalization of World Politics Oxford*: Oxford: Oxford University Press

Bock, P.G., & Berkowitz, M. (1966). *The emerging Field of National Security: World Politics*.
New York: Cambridge University Press

Boix, C. (2015). *Political Order and Inequality: Their Foundations and Their Consequences for Human Welfare*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Bonn International Center for Conversion. (2005). *Security Sector Reform in Kenya, Inventory of security sector reform (SSR) efforts in partner countries of German development assistance*. Bonn: International Center for Conversion

Bryman, A. (2012). *Social Research Methods, 4th Ed.* Oxford: Oxford University Press

Burkati, A.B, & Munasinghe, S. (2020). *The Mozambique Conflict and the Deteriorating Security Situation*. London: Tony Blaire Institute for Global Change

Buzan, B. (1967). *People, States & Fear .2nd Ed. An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War era*. University of Essex-Wivenhoe Park: ECPR Press

Buzan, B., Wæver, O., & de Wilde, J. (1998). *Security: a New Framework for Analysis*. London: Lynne Rienner.

Canadian National Defence College. (1991). *National Security*. Montreal: CNDC Press

- CRS. (2019). *Mozambique: Politics, Economy and U.S relations*. Washington D.C: CRS Publication
- EticaMocambique . (2001). *Mozambique corruption report 2001*. Maputo: EticaMocambique
- Farson, J. N. (1950). *Last Chance in Africa*, New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company
- Frankfort-Nachmias C., Nachmias, D., & DeWaard, J. (2015). *Research Methods in the Social Sciences*. New York: Worth Publishers.
- Friedrich-Ebert, S. (2019). *African Media Barometer Publications; A home-grown analysis of the media landscape in Africa*. Madagascar : Windhoek. Fesmedia Africa
- Gasper, A. (2013). *National Security and the Right to Information*. Maputo. Centre for Strategic and International studies: ZERO DRAFT
- Gikonyo, J. K. (2012). *The Illicit Proliferation and Use of Small Arms and Light Weapons and Human Security in East Africa: A Case Study of Kenya*. Nairobi: University of Nairobi press
- Githimi, S. K. (2016). *Private Security Services and Crime Control in Karen Location Nairobi County, Kenya*. Nairobi: Egerton University, Njoro
- GoK. 2010. *Constitution of Kenya 2010, Chapter 14*. Nairobi: Government press

- Government of Mozambique. (1975). *The Mozambican Constitution*. Maputo: Government Press
- Habibe, et al. (2019). *Radicalização and Africa Mozambique: Special Report: Islamist Insurgency Resumes in Northern Mozambique after Cyclone*. Maputo: CEEI
- Hutton, L. (2010). *GFN-SSR Regional Guide: Security Sector Reform in Southern Africa*. Pretoria: Institute of Security Studies
- ICTJ-Kenya. (2010). *Security Sector reform and transitional justice in Kenya*. Nairobi. International Center for Transitional Justice
- IMF. (2015). *Republic of Mozambique: Fourth Review under policy support Instrument and request for modification of Assessment Criteria-Staff Report. IMF Country Report No. 14/20*. Washington, DC : IMF
- Kanyinga, K. (2000). *Re-Distribution from Above: The Politics of Land Rights and Squatting in Coastal Kenya*, Nairobi: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, Stockholm
- Katumanga, M. (2011). Security in Kenya's New Constitutional Order. *SID Constitution Working Papers No. 6* Nairobi: Society for International Development.
- Katzenstein, P. (1996) (ed), *The Culture of National Security*. New York: Columbia University Press

KeNBS. (2019). *2019 Kenya population and Housing Census Report*. Nairobi: Government Printer

Kimeu, S. (2019). *Soaring Levels of Corruption*. Nairobi: Transparency International-Kenya

KIPPRA. (2004). *Security Risk and private sector Growth in Kenya: A survey Report No.6*. Nairobi: KIPPRA Publication

Kissinger, H. (1976). 'Documentation: Foreign Policy and National Security' *International Security* 1/1.

KNCHR. (2014). *A country under siege: The state of security in Kenya an occasional Report (2010-2014)*. Nairobi: KNCHR Publication

Kothari, R C, (2003). *Research Methodologies*, 3rd Edition. New Delhi: WishwaPrakashan

Lala'A, A., (2006). *Democratic Governance and Security Sector Reform; realities from post-war Mozambique*. Maputo: African Security Dialogue and Research (ASDR) Publication

Lea, A. (2004). *Weapons in Mozambique, Reducing Availability and Demand*. Maputo: ISS Group Publication

- Maiyo, R.K. (2015). *Strategic responses to security challenges by ministry of interior and coordination of national government in Kenya*. Nairobi: University of Nairobi Repository.
- Mathews, C. (2014). *Investing in Mozambique: Gas Fired Economy*. London: Overseas Development Institute
- Mbuvi, C. (2015). *The Development and Growth of the Kenyan Private Security Sector: Its Role and Impact on Safety and Security*. Johannesburg: University of South Africa
- Mkutu, K.A. (2016). *Pastoralist Conflict, Governance and Small Arms in North Rift, North East Africa: The cases of Karamoja, Uganda; West Pokot; Dol Dot, Laikipia; and Baragoi, Samburu*, Nairobi: Political science Department, University of Bradford
- Mugenda, A.G. (2011). *Social Science Research, Theory and Principles*. Nairobi: Applied Research & Training Services.
- Muthondeki, D.K. (2017). *Security Sector Reforms Influencing Transformation of National Police Service, Nairobi and Kiambu Counties, Kenya*. Nairobi: Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology
- Mwega, F.M. (2016). *A case study of Aid Effectiveness in Kenya; Volatility and fragmentation of foreign Aid with focus on health*. Nairobi: Wolfenshon Centre for Development.

- National Crime Research Centre. (2012). *Summary of a study on organized criminal gangs in Kenya*. Nairobi: GoK
- Nganga, J. (2016). *National Security and Legal Protection of Refugees in Horn Of Africa: A Case Study of Kenya`s Dadaab Refugee Camp*. Nairobi: University of Nairobi Press
- Nkaari, M., & Jones, J.A .(2019). *Kenya's Private Security Regulation; Handbook*. Nairobi: Elite Academy
- Nuvunga, A. (2014). *From the Two-Party to the Dominant-Party System in Mozambique, 1994– 2012: Framing Frelimo Party Dominance in Context*. PhD Thesis Submitted to Erasmus University Rotterdam, Netherlands.
- Nye, J. S. (2009) *Understanding International Conflicts: an Introduction to Theory and History* 7th Edition London: Pearson Longman.
- Oduntan, G. (2015). *International Law and Boundary Disputes in Africa*. London and New York: Routledge
- Ogolla, F.O. (2014). *The determinants of Kenya's National Security Policy since Independence*. Nairobi: University of Nairobi
- Opondo. P.A. (2013). *Ethnic Politics and Post-election violence of 2007/08 in Kenya*. Eldoret: Moi University

- Piza-Lopez, E., Van de Goor, L., & Eavis, P. (2002). *Towards a better practice framework in security sector reform*. Netherlands: Saferworld/ Clingendael
- PMRK-UN. (2012). *International Politics: Power and Purpose in Global Affairs*. Boston: Wadsworth
- Schmidt, B.C. (2008). *The Primacy of National Security*. New York: The Oxford University Press
- T.I. (2016). *How to put an end to police Corruption in Africa*. Nairobi: Transparency International
- T.I. (2012). *Arresting corruption in the Police*. Transparency International UK. London: T.I Publication
- Transparency International-Kenya. (2001-2010). *Kenya Bribery Index*. Nairobi: Transparency International-Kenya
- UNCTAD. (2016). *Mozambique: Investment Policy Review*. Maputo: UNICTAD Press
- UNDP. (2016). *Mozambique. Human Development Report*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- UNDP. (2019). *Human Development Report in the 21st Century*. Washington D.C: UNDP Publication

- Wairagu, K., Singo, A. (2004). *Private security in Kenya*. Nairobi: Security Research and Information Centre (SRIC)
- Weimer, M., & Astill-Brown, J. (2010). *Mozambique; Balancing Development, Politics and Security*. London: Chatham House
- Wepundi M et al. (2012). *Availability of Small Arms and Perceptions of Security in Kenya: An Assessment*. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies
- Wolfers, A. (1962). *Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics*. Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press
- World Bank. (2016). *Accelerating Poverty Reduction in Mozambique: Challenges and opportunities*. Washington, D.C., United States: WB Publication

Journals

- Adedokun, A. (2017). "Emerging Challenges to Long-term Peace and Security in Mozambique,". *The Journal of Social Encounters*, 1(1), 37-53
- Branch, D., & Cheeseman, N. (2006). The politics of control in Kenya: Understanding the bureaucratic-executive state, 1952–78. *Journal Review of African Political Economy*, 33 (107), 11-31

- Idris, M. (2013). Corruption and Insecurity in Nigeria. *Public Administration Research*, 2 (1), 59-66.
- Leffler, P.M. (1990). National Security. Washington D.C: Oxford University Press. *The Journal of American History* 2(3), 77, 1
- Mkutu, K., & Sabala, R. (2007). Private Security Companies in Kenya and Dilemmas for Security. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 25(3), 391-416.
- Nzau, M., & Guyo, M. (2018). The Challenge of Securing Kenya: Past Experience, Present Challenges and Future Prospects. *The Journal of Social Encounters*, 2 (1), 37-59.
- Roebuck, J.G.,& Baker, T.A. (1974). Typology of police corruption. *The Journal of criminal Law & Criminology*, 93 (2),29-48

Internet Sources

- ARUP International Development. (2016). *Mozambique-Growth Corridors*. Available online at www.arupinternational.org Accessed on 30th Nov. 2020
- AU. (1982). *African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights*. (Adopted 27 June 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982), entered into force 21 October 1986). Available at <https://www.achpr.org/legalinstruments/detail?id=49> Accessed on 17/8/2020.

Available at www.knchr.org Accessed on 28/10/2019

Freedom House.(2019). *Freedom in the World-Mozambique*. Available online at:
<https://freedomhouse.org/country/mozambique/freedom-world/2020> Accessed on
01/12/2020

ISS/PSC. (2020). *Mozambique Deteriorating security situation*. Available online at
[https://institute.global/policy/mozambique-conflict-and-deteriorating-security-](https://institute.global/policy/mozambique-conflict-and-deteriorating-security-situation)
situation Accessed on 01/12/2020

Mukinda. (2010, October). *All out against organized gangs*. Nairobi.Available
at[http://www.nation.co.ke/News/All+out+war+against+organised+gangs/-](http://www.nation.co.ke/News/All+out+war+against+organised+gangs/-/1056/1037000)
[/1056/1037000](http://www.nation.co.ke/News/All+out+war+against+organised+gangs/-/1056/1037000) Accessed on 22/8/2020.

PSC Report. (2019). *New Threats to Peace in Mozambique*. Available Online at:
<https://issafrica.org/pscreport/psc-insights/new-threats-to-peace-in-mozambique>
Accessed on 01/12/2020

The Standard. (2019). *Guards to carry guns and make arrests in new rules*. Nairobi:
Available online at;
[https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/kenya/article/2001333876/new-rules-allow-](https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/kenya/article/2001333876/new-rules-allow-guards-to-carry-guns-make-arrests)
guards-to-carry-guns-make-arrests Accessed on 11/1/2021

News letters

Associated Press. (1982, August). President of Kenya Announces Crushing of Attempted Coup.

The New York Times

Oluoch, F. (2013, September). Kenya, Uganda on Brink of War. In *Daily Nation*

Zitamar News. (2019, June). Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED). CRS communication. *Zitamar News*

Reports

EuropeAid Cooperation Office. (2007). *Evaluation of the European Commission's support to the Republic of Mozambique*. Country Level Evaluation. Final Report 20

APPENDIX 1: KENYA QUESTIONNAIRE

Introduction

Dear Respondent

My name is **Carolyn Adhiambo Ogutu**, currently undertaking an MA in International Studies at the University of Nairobi. Part of my course requires me to conduct a research study. Therefore, I am carrying out one and my research topic focuses on; **The Challenges of implementation of National Security Policies in the 21st Century Globalization: A comparative study of Kenya and Mozambique**. The overall objective of this study is to determine the challenges of implementation of national security policies in both Kenya and Mozambique in the 21st century. The questionnaires are designed for this research purpose only. You are kindly requested to fill in the questionnaire for Academic purposes only. I assure you that the information gathered will be used for the purpose of this research only and will be treated with strict confidentiality. Thank you in advance for your cooperation.

Part A: Demographic Information

Tick the appropriate answer to your level best in the Boxes provided

1. What is your gender? Male Female
2. Indicate your age? Age 18-35 36-50 51-65 Above 65
3. What is your level of education? Primary Secondary College/Technical Institute University
4. Occupation (Tick Appropriately)

Occupation	Kenya	Mozambique
Military		

Police		
Intelligence Services		
Academics		
NGOs		

Part B: Challenges Confronting Implementation of Kenya’s National Security Policies

5. Indicate your level of agreement or disagreement with the following listed statements on a scale of 1-5 where: 1=Strong Disagree; 2= Disagree; 3=Neither Agree nor Disagree (Neutral); 4=Strongly Agree and; 5=Strongly Agree.

Statement	1=SD	2=D	3=N	4=SA	5=SA
a) High youth unemployment contributes to increased insecurity?					
b) Poor working conditions for the police service influence the implementation of Kenya’s national security policies?					
c) Rampant corruption limits the implementation of Kenya’s national security policies?					
d) The slow pace of security sector reforms influences the implementation of implementation of Kenya’s national security policies?					
e) Police participation in non-core policing responsibilities influences the implementation of Kenya’s national security policies					
f) Politicization influences the implementation of Kenya’s national security policies					

g) Inadequate coordination among security agencies limits the implementation of Kenya's national security policies					
h) Inertia to change confronts the implementation of Kenya's national security policies					
i) Political influence in resource access and ownership has thwarted the implementation of Kenya's national security policies					
j) Dependence on foreign aid limits Kenya's ability to adequately finance the implementation of Kenya's national security policies					
k) Weak regulation and monitoring of private security companies (PSC) challenges Kenya's ability to implement national security policies					

6. What are the most important domestic threats to national security?

.....
.....
.....

7. What is the most serious external threat to national security?

.....
.....

Part C: Policy Interventions that can be applied to Security Sector Reforms in both Kenya

8. Propose sustainable security sector interventions applicable to security sector reforms in

Kenya?

.....
.....
.....
.....

9. Any other comments?

.....
.....

THANK YOU FOR YOUR CONTRIBUTION

APPENDIX 11: MOZAMBIQUE INTERVIEW GUIDE

1. Which security threats have hampered successful implementation of national security policies in your country?
2. Do socio-economic challenges threaten the implementation of Mozambique's national security policies?
3. Does political centralization and control of the state by the ruling party (FRELIMO) limits the implementation of Mozambique's national security policies?
4. Do you agree that the security sector reforms have not been successful in enhancing national security?
5. How has conflict over natural resources threatened the implementation of Mozambique's national security policies?
6. How has terrorism, climate change and cyber crimes hampered implementation of Mozambique's national security policies?
7. What are the most important domestic threats to national security?
8. What is the most serious external threat to national security?
9. Propose sustainable security sector interventions applicable to security sector reforms in Mozambique

Telephone: 254-2-3884036
Fax: 254-2-3884036
E-Mail: info@ndc.go.ke



National Defence College
71 Warai North Road
P.O Box 24381
Karen
Nairobi

When replying please quote

Ref: NDC/A/172

20 January 2021

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

RE: INTRODUCTION TO CONDUCT THESIS RESEARCH INTERVIEWS
MS CAROLINE ADHIAMBO OGUTU ID NO 8243376

The above named is a Participant at the National Defence College enrolled in the 2020/2021 class pursuing a Masters of Arts Degree in International Studies which is conducted in collaboration with the University of Nairobi. The Participant is working with the National Intelligence Service.

She is currently undertaking a research on a thesis entitled: "*Challenges of Implementation of National Security Policies in the 20th Century Globalization: A Case Study Of Kenya And Mozambique.*"

The purpose of this letter therefore, is to request you to allow her conduct the interview during working hours. The information to be collected will be strictly for research purpose and shall be treated with the confidentiality it deserves.

We hope that our request will meet your highest consideration.

E P LOPOKOIYIT
Colonel
for Commandant



REPUBLIC OF KENYA



NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR
SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY & INNOVATION

Ref No: 462193

Date of Issue: 15/January/2021

RESEARCH LICENSE



This is to Certify that Ms.. CAROLINE ADHIAMBO OGUTU of National Defence College Kenya, has been licensed to conduct research in Nairobi on the topic: THE CHALLENGES OF IMPLEMENTATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES IN THE 21ST CENTURY GLOBALIZATION: A CASE OF KENYA AND MOZAMBIQUE for the period ending : 15/January/2022.

License No: NACOSTI/P/21/8515

462193

Applicant Identification Number

Director General
NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR
SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY &
INNOVATION

Verification QR Code



NOTE: This is a computer generated License. To verify the authenticity of this document,
Scan the QR Code using QR scanner application.

PROJECT

ORIGINALITY REPORT

12% SIMILARITY INDEX	10% INTERNET SOURCES	3% PUBLICATIONS	5% STUDENT PAPERS
--------------------------------	--------------------------------	---------------------------	-----------------------------

PRIMARY SOURCES

1	digitalcommons.csbsju.edu Internet Source	1%
2	erepository.uonbi.ac.ke:8080 Internet Source	1%
3	erepository.uonbi.ac.ke Internet Source	1%
4	Submitted to University of Nairobi Student Paper	1%
5	hdl.handle.net Internet Source	<1%
6	Submitted to University of St Andrews Student Paper	<1%
7	ir.mu.ac.ke:8080 Internet Source	<1%
8	Submitted to Kenyatta University Student Paper	<1%
9	fas.org Internet Source	<1%