

**UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI**

**DEPARTMENT OF DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES**

**A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE OF EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS IN  
PREVENTING CONFLICT IN AFRICA: CASE STUDY OF THE ILEMI TRIANGLE**

**BONARERI MAUREEN ABIERO**

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**SUPERVISOR**

**DR. PETERLINUS ODOTE**

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## DECLARATION

This dissertation is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other university.

MAA

30/11/2022

**Bonareri Maureen Abiero**

**DATE**

**(Candidate)**

This dissertation has been submitted for examination with our approval as the University of

Nairobi supervisor:

For  
[Signature]

2/12/2022

**Dr. Peterlinus Odote**

**DATE**

**(Supervisor)**

## **DEDICATION**

This work is dedicated to my Parents Gilbert Osoro and Mary Kisio; and to my daughters, Nina and Salma.

## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

I am grateful for several people who have supported me in the accomplishment of this work. Foremost I am deeply thankful to God for His grace and opportunity through the journey. I thank my daughters, parents, siblings and friends, for their support and constant encouragement. I gratefully recognize the unrelenting and brilliant guidance and support of my Supervisor, Dr. Peterlinus Odote which has seen me through to its successful completion. I also wish thank the entire Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies (IDIS) community staff for their support through my coursework and research work.

## ABSTRACT

Discussions on peace and war have dominated African discourse amid protracted violent conflicts and the impact such have had on the continent's stability and ability to attain its developmental objectives. Persisting civil wars and novice conflicts linked to resource, political and ideological differences continue to plague the continent. Notably, as global and continental discourse on the preference for conflicts prevention against attempts to manage those that have already flared takes cognizance, Early Warning and Early Response (EWER) mechanisms at continental, regional and state level have also become instrumental to Africa's conflict management efforts. Such has been necessitated by the shortcomings of the reactionary rather than proactive approaches of conflict management. In Africa, such EWER mechanisms have developed under the AU, and regional groupings like ECOWAS, and IGAD. However, the presence of these conflict early warning and prevention measures has yielded mixed results across the continent, aiding the prevention of conflict, though with various forms of conflicts in the continent still persisting. Similar to the global level, these outcomes have yielded debate on regarding the effectiveness of these mechanisms. Towards addressing a deeper understanding and contextualization of the of Africa's Early Warning systems, this study examines the role of the continent's EWER mechanisms in forestalling conflict in Africa. On this subject, the study looks into the role various actors in the operationalization of the EWER mechanisms, as well as the factors influencing their effectiveness of these mechanisms in Africa. The study bases its theoretical standing on Michael Lund's Conflict Prevention theory as its analytic framework; drawing on its key assumptions that early response to signs of conflict, coordinated approaches to address rising tensions and efforts to transform the root causes of conflict can mitigate the escalation of conflict into overt violence. Towards this the study examined the empirical case of conflict prevention measures in the Ilemi Triangle which has continued to be characterized by inter and intra- state conflicts amidst existing regional and continental EWER mechanisms geared at managing the conflicts. The study conducted interviews with selected actors involved in the region's EWER system towards its objectives and analyzed the collected data using a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods. Study findings identify competition for scarce resources, longstanding hatred amongst different ethnic communities and marginalization by authorities as the main drivers of persisting conflict Africa. Additionally, revenge and disputed borders are also catalyzers of conflict. The findings point to the significance of EWER mechanisms in facilitating peaceful co-existence and driving collective responsibility for security through trust-building and enhancement of possibilities for mediation and negotiation in resolving conflicts. The study establishes an array of actors EWER, playing both enabling and off- setting roles to their implementation and that an array of structural, institutional and political factors which were promoting and antagonistic to the effectiveness of early warning mechanisms. Accordingly, the study recommends enhanced incorporation of grassroots actors in the implementation of conflict early warning mechanisms alongside state support for separate conflict resolution mechanisms such as DDR and border demarcations to complement the ability of early warning mechanisms in averting conflict in Africa.

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## **ABBREVIATIONS**

**AU**- African Union

**APSA**-Africa Peace and Security Architecture

**Apad** – Agency for Pastoralists Development

**CEWARN**- Conflict Early Warning and Response Network

**COMESA**-Common Market for East and Sothern Africa

**COMWARN**-COMESA Early Warning System

**CSO's**-Civil Society Organizations

**EWER**-Early Warning and Early Response

**ECOWAS**-Economic Community of West African States

**ECOWARN**-ECOWAS Conflict Warning and Response Mechanism

**EACWARN**-East Africa Community Conflict Warning System

**IGAD**-Inter-Governmental Authority on Development

**NSCPCM**-National Steering Committee on Peace building and Conflict Management

**RECs**-Regional Economic Communities

**SCCRR** - Shalom Center for Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation (SCCRR)

**UNSC**-United Nations Security Council

## CHAPTER ONE

### INTRODUCTION

#### 1.0 Introduction

Globally, conflict prevention mechanisms have become prominent amidst recognition of the devastating and destabilizing effects of conflict. Proactive as compared to reactionary approaches to conflict management have risen alongside notions of human and collective security under the global liberal order. Accordingly, the application of Early Warning and Early Response (EWER) mechanisms for conflict prevention is gaining prominence across a range of actors charged with conflict management including states, international organizations and NGO's<sup>1</sup>. Primarily, EWER systems are intended to recognize and analyze conflict risk factors, alert on the same and inform policy decision-making to initiate timely responses for the prevention of violent conflict,<sup>2</sup> with a view to averting their occurrence and destabilizing implications.

In Africa, the persistence of conflicts amid the presence of continental and regional conflict management mechanisms calls for a deeper examination of the most effective framework that can be applied in averting conflict or its escalation. This study sought to critically analyze the role of conflict Early warning systems in preventing conflict in Africa. In this, line, this chapter

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<sup>1</sup>Matveeve Anna, Early Warning and Early Response: Conceptual and Empirical Dilemmas. (European Centre for Conflict Prevention, 2006).

<sup>2</sup> Peace Infrastructures, Early Warning and Early Response  
(<https://peaceinfrastructures.org/>: Peace Infrastructures, Accessed 23 March 2022).

will give a background on the topic area and statement of the research problem. Additionally, the theoretical underpinning and justification for the study will be put forward. Literature reviewed on the topic will be detailed. A section on the methodology of the study will elucidate the study design, data collection and, sampling methods as well as and the modes of data analysis applied.

## **1.2 Background**

Globally, the development of systems of conflict Early Warning bear root in emergence of notions of human security and collective security<sup>3</sup> which center on protection against threats to security and collective responsibility towards this. Similar to other areas of the globe, the disruptive and severe effects of violent conflict, like the Rwanda genocide of 1994 pointed to the importance and need of applying Early Warning systems to forestall conflicts in Africa. Consequently, international organizations, development agencies, civil society groups and governments have increasingly shifted from a culture of reaction to proactive prevention in management of conflicts<sup>4</sup> and sought to develop and integrate early warning mechanisms into their policies and mandates<sup>5</sup>.

EWER consists of measures aimed at identifying prevailing trends and dynamics at various levels of society to aid implementation of appropriate preventive actions or early responses

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<sup>3</sup> Cillier Jakkie, Towards EWER Systems in Africa (Institute for Security Studies, 2005).

<sup>4</sup> Peace Insight, Conflict Prevention and Early Warning (Peace Direct, 2021).

<sup>5</sup> Defontaine Catherine, Setting Up Early Warning and Response Systems to Prevent Violent Conflicts and Save Lives (Development for Peace, 2019).

against conflict.<sup>6</sup> Specifically, Early Warning mechanisms seek to alert decision makers of the potential outburst, escalation or resurgence of violent conflict, besides enhancing the understanding of the characterizations and impacts of violent conflicts in specific areas or settings<sup>7</sup>. Early Response mechanisms on the other hand involves initiatives to manage, resolve, or prevent occurrence of violent conflict that occurs upon identification of threats or indicators<sup>8</sup>.

Despite the existence of these Early Warning and Response mechanisms, violent conflicts continue across various regions in the world such as between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the interstate border, the Israel Palestinian conflict along the Gaza, terror-based conflicts in Syria and Afghanistan in the Middle East with similar ones in Somali and Mali within Sub Sahara Africa. Notably, resource-based conflicts are prevalent in Africa Notably, within the DRC and the Central Africa Republic. These persisting conflicts have, amidst new security threats; challenged the viability and effectiveness of EWER mechanisms<sup>9</sup>.

Following the revitalization of the continental agenda and transition of the OAU to the AU, approaches to conflict shifted from ‘non-intervention’ policy to proactive and collaborative

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<sup>6</sup>Peace Infrastructures, Early Warning and Early Response (Peace Infrastructures, 2022).

<sup>7</sup> Defontaine Catherine, Setting Up Early Warning and Response Systems to Prevent Violent Conflicts and Save Lives (Development for Peace, 2019).

<sup>8</sup> Ibid

<sup>9</sup> Peace Insight, Conflict Prevention and Early Warning (Peace Direct, 2021).



efforts to thwart the occurrence or intensification of conflict.<sup>10</sup> Consequently, the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) was developed under the AU's Africa Peace and Security Architecture as the continent's initial conflict prevention and resolution mechanism. Sub regional mechanisms were also developed, including the), the Early Warning and Response Network of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWARN) and the East Africa Community Early Warning Mechanism (EACWARN), and the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) under IGAD.<sup>11</sup>

Notwithstanding the presence of both continental and regional EWER systems in Africa, conflicts have persisted in most regions of the continent whilst new dynamics such as global terrorism have intensified existing conflicts or led to the rise of new ones. Consequently, similar to the global arena, the impact of such EWER systems in addressing conflict within the continent has been varied<sup>12</sup> amidst the rising conflicts in the continent.<sup>13</sup> Amid persisting conflicts in parts of the continent, majority of Africa's EWER mechanisms have been faulted for having weak predictive capacity and timely implementation of appropriate responses to

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<sup>10</sup>Gnanguenon Amandine. *Pivoting to African Conflict Prevention? An analysis of continental and regional early warning systems.* (Institute for Security Studies, 2021).

<sup>11</sup> OSAA, *Regional Economic Communities and Conflict Prevention in Africa; An Overview of Capacity Gaps and Priority Needs* (OSAA, 2017).

<sup>12</sup> Gnanguenon Amandine. *Pivoting to African Conflict Prevention? An analysis of continental and regional early warning systems.* (Institute for Security Studies, 2021).

<sup>13</sup>Williams Paul, *Continuity and Change in War and Conflict in Africa* (PRISM, 2017) 32-45.

contain conflict situations<sup>14</sup>. Lackluster political will, technical capacity, funding and coordination within and amongst the Early Warning mechanisms have also impacted their role<sup>15</sup> and the continued prevalence of conflicts in warrant a deeper examination of the mechanisms.

Notably, ECOWAS early warning mechanism, ECOWARN, is considered as being the most successful, a factor linked to its ability to foster strategic partnerships and cooperation with a community based civil society organization with grassroots presence for conflict data gathering and analysis- WANEP, - a factor which has contributed ECOWARN's success noting its comprehensiveness and integratedness in facilitating conflict prevention and management in Africa<sup>16</sup>. Consequently, through its early warning system and political structures, ECOWAS has been effective in averting or resolving intra-state tensions, more so in the recent, incidents of democratic transition crises. Under IGAD, CEWARN's combined partnership with civil society, community organizations and state-based early warning structures has also shaped its

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<sup>14</sup>OSAA, Regional Economic Communities and Conflict Prevention in Africa; an Overview of Capacity Gaps and Priority Needs (OSAA, 2017).

<sup>15</sup> Ibid

<sup>16</sup> Chukuemeka Eze and Osei Baffour. "Contributions of Early Warning to the African Peace and Security Architecture: The Experience of the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP)". *The State of Peace building in Africa*. 181-194. (Plagrave Macmillan, 2020).

successes in preventing the escalation of violent conflicts amongst pastoralist communities and attempts to resolve cross border conflicts in the region.

The persistence of conflict within the continent points to weaknesses in its EWER systems; thus, calling for a deeper examination of how they can be applied in averting conflict or its escalation. In this regard, this study proposes to examine the role of EWER mechanisms in forestalling conflict in Africa, towards a deeper understanding and contextualization of the of Africa's EWER mechanisms. The study proposes to examine the EWER mechanism within the Ilemi Triangle where conflict has persisted despite the presence of one of the continent's advanced regional Early Warning systems, CEWARN in addition to the domesticated efforts of the states within its geographical area.

### **1.3 Statement of the Research Problem**

As compared to other regions in the world, violent conflicts in Africa have risen over the recent past<sup>17</sup>. Africa has experienced growing presence of local, regional and international interventions to mitigate conflicts in the continent<sup>18</sup>. Despite the interventions, conflicts remain prevalent across the continent. In their typology, the conflicts, have adopted less of an inter-state dimension, instead being characterized by intra-state disputes over resources, ethnic, political and religious identities have persisted in countries like Kenya, Ethiopia, Sudan, the,

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<sup>17</sup>Hoeffler Paul. On the Incidence of Civil War in Africa. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* (2002) .

<sup>18</sup> Williams Paul, Continuity and Change in War and Conflict in Africa (PRISM, 2017) 32-45.

Central African Republic Mali and Democratic Republic of Congo<sup>19</sup>. Conversely, a heightened continental agenda driven by increased political and economic integration, has increasingly geared the conflict mitigation mechanisms in the continent towards pre-emptive measures to forestall these conflicts and minimize their disruptive impacts. In this regard, Africa's conflict intervention measures, since the late 1990's have increasingly adopted Early Warning and Early Response (EWER) mechanisms to avert their escalation into disruptive violence<sup>20</sup>.

Amidst the rising conflicts, Africa's Early Warning mechanisms, such as those under regional bodies like the AU, ECOWAS, and IGAD have yielded mixed results and differed across contexts within the continent<sup>21</sup> mostly, yielding minimal success in preventing conflict. Diverse focus of the different early warning mechanisms in the continent has yielded mixed results towards its conflict management efforts and security. For instance, ECOWARN's focus on human security has greatly differed from CEWARN's focus on pastoral conflicts, the National Early Warning System (NEWC) under SADC focus on threats emanating from socio-economic factors and EACWARN's focus on inter-state defense. Such has led to differing conflict management experiences and outcomes within the continent. In the recent, the rise of armed groups, terrorism and the increasingly transnational nature of these threats has also

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<sup>19</sup>Ibid

<sup>20</sup> Peace Insight, Conflict Prevention and Early Warning (Peace Direct, 2021).

<sup>21</sup>Ikhalid, Hassan, The Effectiveness of Conflict Early Warning and Early Response Mechanisms in Africa: A Comparative Study of ECOWAS and IGAD, Masters Thesis (University of Nairobi, 2017).

stretched the initial prescriptions, capacity and ability of EWER systems in the continent<sup>22</sup>. Despite the REC's early warning systems being challenged by differentiated levels of advancement and the diverging areas of focus, their general utilization of overarching conflict indicators premised on security and peace as provided by the continental body, AU and their subsequent contextualization of the indicators according to the prevailing realities of their region has aided their success.

Towards addressing a deeper understanding and contextualization of the of Africa's conflict Early Warning mechanisms, this study examined their role in forestalling conflict in Africa. On this subject, the study sought to examine the role of various actors in the operationalization of the early warning and response mechanisms in Africa. Additionally, the study also sought to examine factors influencing the effectiveness of conflict early warning mechanisms in Africa and propose recommendations for their enhanced contextualization and application. This to cross examined conflict early warning and prevention mechanisms within the Ilemi Triangle, an area in which conflict has persisted amid various conflict mitigation measures and conflicts characterized by socio-economic, human security and both intra and inter-state dynamics, as a way of providing a contextualized assessment of early warning mechanisms in Africa.

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<sup>22</sup> Chukuemeka Eze and Osei Baffour. "Contributions of Early Warning to the African Peace and Security Architecture: The Experience of the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP)". In *The State of Peacebuilding in Africa*. 181-194. (Plagrave Macmillan, 2020).

### **1.3.1 Research Questions**

The research question guiding the study were:

1. What is the role of conflict Early Warning systems in preventing conflict in Africa?
2. What are the roles of various actors involved in the operationalization of Early Warning systems within the Ilemi Triangle?
3. What factors influence the effectiveness of Early Warning systems within the Ilemi Triangle?

## **1.4 Research Objectives**

### **1.4.1 Overall Objective**

The overall objective of this study was to critically assess the role of conflict Early Warning systems in preventing conflict in Africa, taking Ilemi Triangle as a case study.

### **1.4.2 Specific Objectives**

The specific objectives of the study included:

1. To examine the role of Early Warning systems in preventing conflict in Africa.
2. To examine the role of various actors involved in the operationalization of Early Warning systems within the Ilemi Triangle;
3. To examine factors influencing the effectiveness of Early Warning systems within the Ilemi Triangle.

## **1.5 Literature Review**

This section details literature on conflict early warning mechanisms and their impact on preventing conflict. Specifically, it will be focused on the historical trends of conflict in Africa, EWER Systems in Africa as well as actors involved in the systems and the factors

influencing their effectiveness. Additionally, the theories underpinning the study will be expounded.

### **1.5.1 Historical Trends of Conflict in Africa**

Africa is amongst the regions most affected by conflict. An early characterization of Africa's conflicts by Kreiseberg<sup>23</sup> as cited by Achankeng<sup>24</sup> places the as broadly inter-state or intra-state with each adopting dimensions of "issues in contention (resources and interests or values and ideology), the arenas in which the conflict is waged (families, communities, countries, or regions) and the contending parties (persons, organizations, classes, or peoples). In line with this, Achankeng<sup>25</sup> considers African conflicts as being of six types: "inter-ethnic conflicts, inter-state conflicts, liberation conflicts, civil rights conflicts, annexationist conflicts, and political transition conflicts."

Despite the reduction in inter-state conflicts, intra-state conflicts have persisted across the continent, with the most common being those linked to colonial factors<sup>26</sup>, resources conflicts, civil wars, secessions and governance crises<sup>27</sup>. Notably the Rwanda conflict of 1994 in which

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<sup>23</sup>Kriesberg, Louis, *Social Conflicts*. (Prentice Hall, 1982).

<sup>24</sup>Achankeng, Fonkem, *Conflict and Conflict Resolution in Africa Engaging the Colonial Factor.* " *Africa Journal of Conflict Resolution* Vol 13 (2013).

<sup>25</sup> Ibid

<sup>26</sup> Ibid

<sup>27</sup> Ikejiaku, Brian. *The relationship between Poverty Conflict and Development*, *Canadian Journal of Sustainable Development*. Vol 2 (2009)

about one million people were killed remains the most dominant<sup>28</sup> and one which the international community was blamed untimely response.

Currently, Africa continues to experience conflicts in varying levels and linked to different actors. In the DRC, conflicts linked to competing interests over the country's mineral resources has persisted. Civil and political conflicts have persisted in Somalia, CAR, Mali, Nigeria with the most recent being the Tigray Conflict in Ethiopia. Notably, colonization and subsequent decolonization processes are recognized as key contributors to Africa's conflicts. Accordingly, Cohen<sup>29</sup> as quoted in Achankeng<sup>30</sup> rightly argues that 'the sources and consequences of Africa's internal conflicts have their roots in colonialism, the subsequent processes of de-colonisation and state formation, and the ensuing crisis of nation building' which he further argues as having yielded inherently conflictual states by virtue of 'gross inequities in power relations, and in the uneven distribution of national wealth and development opportunities'.

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<sup>28</sup>Paul, Williams. *The African Union's Conflict Management Capabilities*. (Council of Foreign Relations, 2011).

<sup>29</sup> Cohen, Herman. *What Should We Do When Nations Get Angry?* *Nexus Africa*, Vol 1 (1995)11.

<sup>30</sup>Achankeng, Fonkem, *Conflict and Conflict Resolution in Africa Engaging the Colonial Factor.* *Africa Journal of Conflict Resolution* Vol 13 (2013).



Additionally, new dynamics including global terrorism, regionalism and nationalism<sup>31</sup> have risen to escalate existing conflicts in the continent or trigger new ones such as in the cases of Jihadism in the Sahel and East and Central Africa Regions, contention over the recognition of Western Sahara as a state and secessionist struggles in Nigeria, Sudan and Ethiopia.

Amidst the persisting and novice conflicts that have characterized Africa, various mechanisms to forestall and resolved have been developed at continental, regional and state levels. Following the Rwanda conflict, a continental EWER system, the Africa Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) under the African Union (AU) was developed. Preceding this, the Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution under the AU's parent organization, the Organization of Africa Unity worked to replace ad hoc and uncoordinated responses to conflicts in the continent. These efforts have largely been inspired by the rise in intra-state conflicts, ,Africa's desire to internally determine its own affairs and maintain the sovereignty of member states and the predominant laxity and partisanism of the international community in effectively responding to conflicts in the continent.

### **1.5.2 EWER Systems in Africa**

Conflict Early Warning refers to the examining and tracking of early indications of impending conflict, with a purpose of foreseeing possible dangers in time and acting

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<sup>31</sup>Bell, Corall. 'Power and World Order.' in Edward Newman, *Multilateralism Under Challenge? Power, International Organization and Structural Change* (UN, 2006) 77-94.

effectively<sup>32</sup>. Operationally, Early Warning entails methodological gathering and synthesis of information so as to anticipate and identify emerging, recurring or deteriorating humanitarian issues<sup>33</sup> including those induced by conflict. Early Response mechanisms on the other hand involves initiatives to manage, resolve, or prevent occurrence of violent conflict that occurs upon identification of threats or indicators<sup>34</sup>.

In Africa, EWER mechanisms have emerged as central to the continent's conflict management and resolution efforts. The AU's Constitutive Act and its Protocol on the Peace and Security Council (PSC), assigned the AU a role to undertake in the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts as compared to the preceding Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution mechanism under the OAU<sup>35</sup>. Accordingly, Article 12 of the PSC Protocol provides for the establishment of a Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), to facilitate the anticipation and prevention of conflicts in Africa based on provision of timely information on evolving violent conflicts linked to on specifically developed conflict indicators<sup>36</sup>. The CEWS links the EWER mechanisms of the various Regional Economic Communities (RECs), with the most developed and functioning mechanisms including IGAD's

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<sup>32</sup> Odote, Petrolinus. Role of Early Warning Systems in Conflict Prevention in Africa. Phd Thesis, (University of Nairobi, 2016).

<sup>33</sup> Defontaine Catherine, Setting Up Early Warning and Response Systems to Prevent Violent Conflicts and Save Lives (Development for Peace, 2019).

<sup>34</sup> Ibid

<sup>35</sup> Cillier Jakkie, Towards EWER Systems in Africa (Institute for Security Studies, 2005).

<sup>36</sup> AU, 2018. The Continental Early Warning Systems, (AU, 2018)

Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN), the ECOWAS Early Warning and Response Network (ECOWARN). Others include the East Africa Community Conflict Warning System (EACWARN) and the COMESA Conflict Early Warning System (COMWARN). These regional EWER mechanisms have been instrumental in the implementation of the continental visions, agendas and frameworks for the prevention of conflicts and sustenance of peace. They are also and will be pivotal in attainment of the AU's proposed Agenda 2063, and its Silencing the Guns initiative and the UN-AU's Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security<sup>37</sup>.

The effectiveness of these regional EWER mechanisms has been varied<sup>38,39</sup>. Generally, capacity constrained linked to lack of sustainable financing, staffing and coordination between the central AU CEWS those of the RECs and also amongst the RECs has undermined the effectiveness of regional EWER mechanisms in conflict management and resolution<sup>40</sup>. Gaps between early warning and early action characterized by delays in transforming Early Warning

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<sup>37</sup> OSAA, Regional Economic Communities and Conflict Prevention in Africa; an Overview of Capacity Gaps and Priority Needs (OSAA, 2017).

<sup>38</sup>Wulf Herbert and Tobias Debiel, Conflict Early Warning And Response Mechanisms: Tools for Enhancing the Effectiveness Of Regional Organisations? A comparative study of the AU, ECOWAS, IGAD, (Research Gate,2010).

<sup>39</sup> OSAA, Regional Economic Communities and Conflict Prevention in Africa; an Overview of Capacity Gaps and Priority Needs (OSAA, 2017).

<sup>40</sup> Ibid

recommendations into policy<sup>41</sup>. Specifically, weak relations between EWER officials and policy decision makers, and the political dimensions of conflicts including the diverse interests of varied actors have undermined action in forestalling or managing conflicts<sup>42</sup>.

Despite challenges, some of the regional EWER mechanisms have achieved reasonable success in resolving conflict situations. The ECOWARN's decentralization of its EWER units to national centers and the mechanism's proximity to Civil Society Organizations (CSO's) has enhanced its presence and action in member countries<sup>43</sup>. CEWARN's grassroots initiatives and attempts to draw lines of authority and interaction between governments', civil society and policy decision makers has also aided its effectiveness in containing conflict within the Horn of Africa Region<sup>44</sup>.

Given the rising conflicts within the Africa, especially in the Western and Horn of Africa regions, the importance of EWER mechanisms continues to grow in line with realizations of the lesser costs of averting potential conflicts as compared to managing those that have already erupted. There are ongoing efforts to advance Africa's EWER mechanisms continue to albeit challenges linked to resource, coordination and political will challenges. Notably as

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<sup>41</sup> Gnanguenon Amandine. *Pivoting to African Conflict Prevention? An analysis of continental and regional early warning systems.* (Institute for Security Studies, 2021).

<sup>42</sup> Ibid

<sup>43</sup> Ibid

<sup>44</sup> Ikhalid, Hassan, *The Effectiveness of Conflict Early Warning and Early Response Mechanisms in Africa: A Comparative Study of ECOWAS and IGAD*, Masters Thesis (University of Nairobi, 2017).

Gnanguenong<sup>45</sup> analyses, despite the technical challenges facing Africa's EWER mechanisms, lies political issues or interests which continue to make responses ad hoc, of a militaristic approach and dependent on the capacity to mobilize member state support for each case of conflict or preventive intervention. In this regard, the role and effectiveness of existing EWER mechanisms are likely to be further challenged amidst the rise of novice threats linked to religious ideology and illiberal tendencies inspiring a reversion to inward looking nationalism or regionalism as against unified continental or global efforts.

### **1.5.3 Actors in EWER Systems**

EWER systems in Africa involve a range of actors with differing roles and impacts on their processes and outcomes. The multiplicity of actors in conflict management and EWER systems in Africa has served to advance it though their pursuit of different of purposes and interests has also served to undermine by virtue of myriad and contradicting processes and policies.<sup>46</sup> This has been viewed as contributing<sup>47</sup> to the persistence of many African conflicts.

External Actors are crucial to EWER systems in Africa. Primarily, external actors especially from the west provide significant funding to most mechanisms. For instance estimates showcase that majority of the UNSC budget and time is spent on conflict mitigation efforts in

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<sup>45</sup> Gnanguenon Amandine. *Pivoting to African Conflict Prevention? An analysis of continental and regional early warning systems.* (Institute for Security Studies, 2021).

<sup>46</sup> Cohen, Herman. *What Should We Do When Nations Get Angry? Nexus Africa*, Vol 1 (1995)11.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid

Africa.<sup>48</sup> The significant involvement of external actors in Africa's conflicts and EWER systems has raised contention over their sustainability especially in terms of financing and appropriateness of their influence and actions in lieu of their interests.<sup>49</sup> OSSA<sup>50</sup> for instance identifies the lack of predictability and sustainability of donor funding as having led to the termination or scaling down of some important conflict prevention programmes in Africa.

Political actors also bear significant impact on EWER systems. Their role as policy decision makers impacts the sustainability of EWER systems and their conflict prevention measures especially through resource allocation. Notably, disconnect between EWER personnel and political actors has been identified as undermining conflict response measures proposed by EWER personnel.<sup>51</sup> Gnanguenon, 2021<sup>52</sup> for instance points those Competitive relations amongst heads of states within some RECS and competitive relations between RECS and the AU as demonstrative of the political issues underlying and impeding the execution of conflict resolution mechanisms in Africa.

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<sup>48</sup> Ajibogun, O. Causes of Conflict in 21<sup>st</sup> Century Africa (Scribd,2009)

<sup>49</sup> Cohen, Herman. What Should We Do When Nations Get Angry? *Nexus Africa*, Vol 1 (1995)11.

<sup>50</sup>OSAA, Regional Economic Communities and Conflict Prevention in Africa; An Overview of Capacity Gaps and Priority Needs (OSAA, 2017).

<sup>51</sup> Cillier Jakkie, Towards EWER Systems in Africa (Institute for Security Studies, 2005).

<sup>52</sup> Gnanguenon Amandine. Pivoting to African Conflict Prevention? An analysis of continental and regional early warning systems. (Institute for Security Studies, 2021).

Despite conflicts emanating and affecting the grassroots populations, lacking involvement of the grassroots actors has also been identified as impacting EWER systems. For instance an audit of EWER systems in Kenya revealed that despite involvement with grassroots organizations, there was need for involvement of the informal networks of men, women, youth and other actors.<sup>53</sup> Additionally, the assessment pointed against hierarchical information collection and analysis in favour of multi-dimensional or horizontal EWER information gathering and to avert institutionalization of some class, social order and gender structure norms which contribute to conflict.<sup>54</sup>

Amidst rising acknowledgement of the significant contribution of women in various aspects of society, literature and practice on EWER systems points to the wanting involvement of women in the systems. In the words of Arnado points to the gender-blindness of EWER mechanisms and their rare involvement of women, thereby missing out on conflict information provided by women and their instrumental contribution to conflict prevention processes.<sup>55</sup> In this line the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 calls for the increased participation of women in conflict prevention and peace-building. This calls for appreciation of the differential

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<sup>53</sup>Government of Kenya. Draft National Policy on Peace-Building and Conflict.  
(Government of Kenya, 2011).

<sup>54</sup> Ibid

<sup>55</sup> Arnado. M, Women's Involvement in Conflict Early Warning Systems: Moving from rhetoric to reality in Mindanao (Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2012).

experience of conflict by women and men at different stages of conflict and as such influencing their differential experiences on the processes and outcomes of EWER mechanisms.<sup>56</sup>

CSO's largely contribute to Africa's EWER systems. The CSO's close links with the grassroots, wider reach and consequent accessibility to information has made them instrumental to the conceptualization and operationalization of Africa's EWER mechanisms.<sup>57</sup> This is owed to their close, networked and wider reach the grassroots populations which enable their easy access information, thus the need to strengthen their involvement in EWER.<sup>58</sup>

Rising integration of different parts of society has also called for similar integration of actors and their roles in conflict management and EWER systems. Accordingly, a framework by de Jong<sup>59</sup>, shows how the integrated application of preventive interventions involving various sectors such as the economy, government, military, criminal justice, human rights, diplomacy, and journalism can be applied for the promotion of peace and prevention of violence.

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<sup>56</sup> Government of Kenya. Report on Engendering Conflict Early Warning and Early Response Mechanism in Kenya. (NSCPBCM, 2016).

<sup>57</sup> Olumuyiwa. B et al. Revisiting the Utility of the Early Warning and Early Response Mechanisms in Africa: Any Role for Civil Society? Peace and Conflict Review, 2016.

<sup>58</sup> Cillier Jakkie, Towards EWER Systems in Africa (Institute for Security Studies, 2005).

<sup>59</sup> De Jong. A public health framework to translate risk factors related to political violence and war into multi-level preventive interventions. *Social Science & Medicine* Vol 70 (2010) 71–79.



Notably, despite the significant potential technology has for conflict data warning and prevention, as pointed out by Pham and Vinck<sup>60</sup> advancements in and the use of technology in EWER systems are likely to not only impact the roles and relations between actors but also create room for new roles and actors including amongst the perpetrators of conflict; a situation which is likely to introduce further challenges to EWER processes.

#### **1.5.4 Role of Conflict Early Warning Mechanisms in Africa**

Similar to other parts of the world, Early Warning systems have gained prominence in the management of conflicts in Africa. Concerted efforts at early warning systems as part of conflict prevention measures in the continent were informed by recognition of the devastating and destabilizing effects of conflicts, which intensified in scale and gravity following at the end of the cold war and an accompanying necessity to rethink the continent's security approach.<sup>61</sup> Consequently, in the 1990's African Early Warning systems housed under the AU, regional bodies like the ECOWAS were developed to address human security<sup>62</sup> and drive a renewed approach to security which was focused on collective responsibility as opposed to the premise non-interference in the internal affairs of states besides constituting the foundational basis of the continent's EWER mechanisms. Such include the Continental Early Warning Systems (CEWS), Panel of the Wise, Africa Stand by Force and Peace Fund mechanism under

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<sup>60</sup> Pham, P. & Vinck, P. Technology, Conflict Early Warning Systems, Public Health, and Human Rights. *Health and Human Rights Journal*, Vol 14 (2012) 106-117.

<sup>61</sup> Gnanguenon Amandine. Pivoting to African Conflict Prevention? An analysis of continental and regional early warning systems. (Institute for Security Studies, 2021).

<sup>62</sup> Ibid

the Africa Peace and Security Architecture of the AU, which were formed with the aim of enabling African countries to enhance their ability to prevent and resolve conflicts.

Generally, conflict early warning are designed to identify conflict risk factors and prompt relevant action to reduce the onset, duration, intensity and effects of conflict and violence.<sup>63</sup> In Africa, conflict Early Warning Systems have been applied in as a peace and security tool to prevent crises<sup>64</sup>. Accordingly, Africa's Conflict Early Warning mechanisms which are mostly embedded within the framework of continental and regional organizations have been envisioned as a tool for predicting and containing conflict situations or alleviate negative conditions of conflict.

Additionally, the AU's constitutive RECS developed their early warning mechanisms such as the ECOWARN, CEWARN and EACWARN. A 2008 memorandum of understanding and cooperation between the AU and the RECS on peace and security provided for the harmonization and coordination of these conflict early warning mechanisms across the continent.<sup>65</sup> The AU's CEWS liaises with the regional Early warning systems and acts as a

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<sup>63</sup> Muggah Robert and Mark Whitlock. Reflections on the Evolution of Conflict Early Warning. *International Journal of Security and Development* Vol. 10 (1) (2022).

<sup>64</sup> Wulf Herbert and Tobias Debiel. *Systematic Disconnects: Why Regional Organizations Fail to Use Early Warning and Response Mechanisms*. (Global Governance, 2010).

<sup>65</sup> AU. Memorandum of Understanding and cooperation in the area of Peace and Security between the Africa Union, the Regional Economic Communities and the Coordinating Mechanisms of the Regional Standby Brigades of East and Northern Africa. (AU, 2008).

center for collection, analysis and exchange of conflict information towards shared policy and response options.<sup>66</sup> Effective collaboration in conflict Early Warning between the AU and various RECS has been hampered by differential institutional capacities of the RECS, overriding political considerations<sup>67</sup>, multiple state membership to RECS, resource shortages and unclear division of roles between the AU and RECS. Despite existing challenges regional mechanisms such as ECOWARN AND CEWARN have attained successes in preventing and managing conflicts in the West and Horn of Africa regions. Importantly, despite predominant proclamations of the centrality of conflict prevention measures, action by the CEWS and RECS has remained reactive and more concerned with overt conflict situations as opposed to addressing indicators of conflict.<sup>68</sup> Additionally, the disconnect between warning and response, is also typified by the disconnect between the local level where conflicts occur and the where the early warning and monitoring mechanisms are located<sup>69</sup> a factor that has also largely challenged the effectiveness of early warning systems in Africa.

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<sup>66</sup> AU. Africa Union Continental Early Warning Systems: The CEWS Handbook. (AU, 2008).

<sup>67</sup> Gnanguenon Amandine. Pivoting to African Conflict Prevention? An analysis of continental and regional early warning systems. (Institute for Security Studies, 2021).

<sup>68</sup> Ibid

<sup>69</sup> Wulf Herbert and Tobias Debiel. Systematic Disconnects: Why Regional Organizations Fail to Use Early Warning and Response Mechanisms. (Global Governance, 2010).

## **1.6 Justification of the Study**

This study on the role of conflict early warning mechanisms in the prevention of conflict in Africa can be justified on academic and policy fronts:

### **1.6.1 Academic Justification**

There are few empirical studies to situate dynamics with a given Early Warning system and thus provide context specific assessment and advice. This study addresses this through a contextualized assessment of the conflict early warning and prevention system within Ilemi Triangle. Additionally, few empirical studies showcase why there is divide between conflict warning and response in Africa's conflict prevention measures. The study sought to elucidate this through, examination of factors influencing the effectiveness of the early warning and prevention measures and the role different actors play in their operationalization-within the system in the Ilemi Triangle. This was aimed at facilitating deeper understanding and contextualization of the relationship between conflict early warning and response measures and their role in mitigating conflict in Africa.

### **1.6.2 Policy Justification**

Through elucidation of context specific factors driving conflict within the Ilemi Triangle and cross examination of the existing conflict prevention mechanisms in the area, the study identified consequent policy implications and provided guidelines for policy action, toward the advancement, modification or creation of relevant policies for the Ilemi Triangle or other conflict theatres in the continent.

## 1.7 Theoretical Framework

The study adopted the Conflict Prevention Theory<sup>70</sup> as its theoretical framework. The theory contends that conflict progresses through stages and that in the initial latent phases, overt conflict is preventable through; timely response to manifestations of danger, inclusive and coordinated approaches to prevent the advancement of threats to violent conflict and wholesome efforts to address and transform the root causes of violence. This assertion fed into the presumption of the study that violent conflicts can be forestalled through early detection and the application of appropriate preventive measures and that poor or uncoordinated EWER efforts lead to escalation of conflict. The theory justifies the prevention of prevailing tension or disputes from escalating into overt or violent conflict to avert of its disruptive implications. Notably the theory categorizes conflict prevention measures in forms that are direct or operational- characterized by short-term interventions to impede an imminent outbreak of violence such as the use of mediators or negotiators and long-term or structural measures geared at addressing the primary causes of conflict and instituting foundational changes to prevent the resumption of conflict or facilitate sustainable peace.

In its premise, the theory also presupposes the divide between theory and the practical pursuit of conflict prevention thus providing for the examination of the linkages between

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<sup>70</sup> Lund, Micheal, 'Conflict Prevention: Theory in Pursuit of Policy and Practice' in V.Kremnyuk and W.Zartman J. Bercovitch, Handbook of Conflict Resolution, (SAGE,2009) 288.

analysis of the factors predisposing conflict and the implementation of response mechanisms in EWER systems and by extension facilitate devising recommendations for improved practice as proposed by this study.

In addition to the Conflict Prevention theory, the study also applied the Democratic Peace theory which mainly contends that democracies are hesitant to engage in armed conflict with other identified democracies and that structural constraints against war assist in maintaining peace<sup>71</sup>. This is as recently witnessed in the Russia Ukraine conflict where the US implored Russia against violating international principles of peace and security through attempts to reject Ukraine's independence. The theory's tenets will provide for the analytical examination of Early Warning systems as a restraining factor to war or contributor to peace, especially among communities emanating from the countries (Kenya, Ethiopia and South Sudan and) along whose borders the Ilemi Triangle is located. The theory assisted in situating the regional EWER system present in the area, CEWARN alongside its domestications by the states. The theory will also provide a basis for the understanding of the contested territorial claim of sections of the Ilemi Triangle by the countries and their communities.

### **1.8 Hypotheses of the study**

The hypotheses tested in the study are:

1. Conflict early warning systems have a positive role in preventing conflicts in Africa.

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<sup>71</sup> Huth, Paul and Todd L. *The Democratic Peace and Territorial Conflict in the Twentieth Century*. (Cambridge University Press, 2002).

2. Various actors involved conflict early warning systems have a positive role in their operationalization.
3. Various underlying factors influence the effectiveness of Early Warning in preventing conflicts in Africa.

## **1.9. Methodology**

### **1.9.1. Introduction**

This section details the methodological approaches applied in the study. It details the population the sampling design and technique. It also lists the data collection methods and instruments applied in the study. Additionally, the section details the modes of data analysis applied.

### **1.9.2. Study Design**

The study applied a case study design in order to facilitate deeper examination and contextualization of the dynamics of the study subject as envisioned in its objectives, justification and theoretical underpinning. In this regard, the study examined EWER systems through a case of the Ilemi Triangle which is characterized by both inter and intra conflict and conflict management and resolution effort by CEWARN. The study examined the issues under study through cases provided by grassroots community members, civil society and Non-Governmental Organizations in operation within the area including relevant government agencies and officials whose cases can shed light into the role of the existing EWER system in forestalling conflict in the Ilemi Triangle, what factors influence the effectiveness of the EWER mechanism and what role different actors play towards its effectiveness.

The study applied both quantitative and qualitative methodologies towards achievement of the objectives. Quantitative approaches will be applied in the gathering and analysis of

descriptive and explanatory data towards the research objectives. Qualitative designs will be applied to facilitate deeper exploration and understanding of emerging issues and to aid contextualization of the cases.

### **1.9.3. Sampling Design**

The study applied non- probability sampling techniques, specifically, purposive and snowballing sampling to aid in the identification of respondents capable of giving information relevant to the study objectives.

### **1.9.4. Data Collection Methods and Instruments**

The study gathered data through semi-structured questionnaires with close and open ended question. The questionnaires will be applied in the in-depth interviews.

### **1.9.5 Data Analysis**

The study analyzed the collected data using a mixture of quantitative and qualitative methods. Quantitative techniques will be applied towards the examination and presentation of descriptive and cause-effect variables under study. Quantitatively analyzed data will be presented in form of tables, charts and graphs. Qualitative analysis will be applied in analyzing qualitative data from open ended questions in questionnaires. These will be put forward in narrative form with the aid of tables, charts and graphs.



## CHAPTER TWO

### THE ROLE OF EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS IN PREVENTING CONFLICT IN AFRICA.

#### 2.1 Introduction

This chapter gives details on the concept of conflict early warning; elucidating its definitions, historical background and situation in Africa. Additionally, it gives an overview of conflict in the continent and existing early warning mechanisms. Further, the chapter describes the characterization of conflict and conflict early warning mechanisms within the Ilemi Triangle detailing the drivers and dynamics of the conflict including the early warning mechanisms present and their role in mitigating the conflict in the area.

#### 2.2 Conflict and Conflict Early Warning

Conflict primarily involves a value-based struggle over scarce resources, status or power with intentions of injury or elimination amongst conflicting parties.<sup>72</sup> Africa has experienced several conflicts, both intra and inter- state conflicts pitting state entities or rival factions within a state against each other respectively.<sup>73</sup> Mostly, intra-state conflicts have predominated the continent, manifested by economic or military hostilities amongst groups within the state.<sup>74</sup> In the recent, these intra-state conflicts in Africa have adopted the form of groups opposing and

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<sup>72</sup> Aremu, Johnson. Conflicts in Africa: Meaning, Causes, Impact and Solution. *Africa Research Review* Vol. 4 (4), (2010) pp 549-560.

<sup>73</sup> Holsti K. *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis*. London: (Prentice Hall 1983).

<sup>74</sup> Ibid.

seeking to overthrow governmental authorities in their territories. Such conflicts have increasingly become internationalized, listing the involvement of international sponsors and having far reaching destabilizing effects, such as in the Central Africa Republic, DRC and Mali. In this line, Goldstein<sup>75</sup> further characterizes the nature of internationalized conflicts as territorial disputes, control of governments or economic conflicts.<sup>76</sup>

Conflict Early Warning and Response involves a systematic collection and analysis of conflict information and formulation of policy recommendations in the latent phases of conflict. It involves the assessments of risks, sharing of information and implementation of early response measures in the early stages of conflict, with the aim of reducing, resolving or transforming conflicts.<sup>77</sup> Further, CEWR mechanisms are geared at analyzing the nature of the threats to conflict and communicating the same to decision makers. Early Warning mechanisms are implied to tackle threats against human security including through armed conflicts, wars, state failure, genocide or natural disasters.<sup>78</sup>

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<sup>75</sup> Goldstein, J. *International Relations*. International Conflict. (Pearson Education, 2006).

<sup>76</sup> Ibid

<sup>77</sup> Alexander Austin. *Early Warning and the Field: A Cargo Cult Science?* (Berghof Conflict Research, 2004).

<sup>78</sup> Wulf Herbert and Tobias Debiel. *Systematic Disconnects: Why Regional Organizations Fail to Use Early Warning and Response Mechanisms*. (Global Governance,2010).

### 2.3 Historical Background of Conflict in Africa

Conflict has dominated African discourse owing to the regularity of conflicts across the continent.<sup>79</sup> Both intra-state and inter-state conflicts have and continue to be experienced in Africa, and worked to evoke predominant perceptions of a persisting conflict crisis and obscured prospects of their resolution as allude in Aremu, Johnson's<sup>80</sup> preposition that, to outsiders Africa is viewed as being in crisis caused by war and corruption. Historically, most of Africa's contemporary conflicts are not so much as a result of indigenous factors in as much as the impact of foreign interference in the continent.<sup>81</sup> Notably the colonization process and its after-effects remain a key cause of conflicts in Africa. As argued by Aremu, 2010, most of Africa's challenges including its conflicts are outcome of political and economic colonial practices, more so during the as cemented during the decolonization and post-independence periods<sup>82</sup>.

Elsewhere the intransigence of the colonial factor has been linked to the ineffectiveness of conflict management efforts in the continent.<sup>83</sup> In the contemporary, Africa's conflicts have

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<sup>79</sup> Aremu, Johnson. Conflicts in Africa: Meaning, Causes, Impact and Solution. *Africa Research Review* Vol. 4 (4), (2010) pp 549-560.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid.

<sup>81</sup> Ajibogun, Olatubosun. *Causes of Conflict in 21<sup>st</sup> Century Africa* (Scribd,2009)

<sup>82</sup> Aremu, Johnson. Conflicts in Africa: Meaning, Causes, Impact and Solution. *Africa Research Review* Vol. 4 (4), (2010) pp 549-560.

<sup>83</sup> Achankeng, Fonkem, Conflict and Conflict Resolution in Africa Engaging the Colonial Factor." *Africa Journal of Conflict Resolution* Vol 13 (2013).

adopted various typology. Civil wars have been predominant in the continent including; Angola since 1974, Chad (1965-85), Nigeria (1967-70), Sudan (1995-1990), Liberia (1980- 2003), Somalia (1999-93) and Burundi, Rwanda and Sierra Leone (1991-2001). Additionally, inter-state conflicts majorly associated with border disputes have occurred such as the Algeria-Morocco conflict over the Atlas Mountains area in 1963, Eritrea- Ethiopian crisis between 1962 and 1979, Nigeria- Cameroon dispute over Bakassi peninsular since the 1970's, Chad- Libya crisis of 1980- 1982 and the Kenya- Somalia border war of 1963 -1967 in which Somalia aimed at recovering its lost territories including the Northern frontier district of Kenya<sup>84</sup>. Importantly, Aremu, 2010 recognizes an additional type of conflict; internationalized armed conflict such as that in the DRC, which is motivated and funded by the interests of other states. In this line Goldstein identifies 3 types of internationalized conflicts namely, territorial disputes, control of governments or economic conflicts.<sup>85</sup>

Beyond the colonial factor, other causes of conflict in Africa include negative ethnicity, poverty, inequality and incompetent leadership. Notably, continuing conflicts in Africa have had a negative impact on its socio-economic development through the poverty, refugee and reconstruction challenges brought by conflict. <sup>86</sup> State fragility has also largely contributed to the incidence and persistence of conflict in the continent by providing vacuums for rebel

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<sup>84</sup> Aremu, Johnson. Conflicts in Africa: Meaning, Causes, Impact and Solution. *Africa Research Review* Vol. 4 (4), (2010) pp 549-560.

<sup>85</sup> Goldstein, J. *International Relations*. International Conflict. (Pearson Education, 2006).

<sup>86</sup> Aremu, Johnson. Conflicts in Africa: Meaning, Causes, Impact and Solution. *Africa Research Review* Vol. 4 (4), (2010) pp 549-560.

groups, Islamic militants, organized crime syndicates and other negative forces to create conflict, violence and sustain instability<sup>87</sup>.

On the incidence of conflicts, the continent has experienced a high number of armed inter and intra state conflicts estimated to be about 630 between the conclusion of the cold war in 1990 and 2015 according to Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)<sup>88</sup>. The incidences and intensity of conflicts reduced between the 1990s and the late 2000s, but surged since 2010 due to rises in state-based armed conflicts, deliberate state-sponsored violence against civilians, popular protests against governments and the rise of religious and resource/ environmental as drivers of armed conflicts. Additionally, terrorism has also introduced new forms of conflict in the continent.<sup>89</sup>

Within the Horn of Africa region, as in the rest of the continent, intra-state conflicts are the common type of conflict in the region. These are mostly based on resource, ethnicity and political factors. In West Africa, intra-state conflicts are majorly driven by ethnic, religious, and resource contestation. Additionally, the region is characterized by prolonged civil wars.<sup>90</sup> Similarly, Central and Southern Africa are also characterized by prolonged civil wars and

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<sup>87</sup> Hassan Khalid. *The Effectiveness of Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanisms in Africa: A Comparative Study of IGAD and ECOWAS (2005-2015)* (University of Nairobi, 2015).

<sup>88</sup> Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) at <<http://ucdp.uu.se/>>.

<sup>89</sup> Williams Paul, *Continuity and Change in War and Conflict in Africa* (PRISM, 2017) 32-45.

<sup>90</sup> Kuerscshner Mareike. *Conflict in West Africa States*. (E International Relations, 2013).

internationalized conflict based on mineral resources in the DRC, CAR and recently, Mozambique. A recent typology of conflict that cross cuts the other typologies; terror-based conflict, is also being witnessed in the Horn, Central, East and West Africa regions.

#### **2.4 Conflict Early Warning Mechanisms in Africa**

Similar to other parts of the world, conflict early warning mechanisms have gained prominence in the management of conflicts in the continent. Concerted efforts at establishing early warning systems as part of conflict prevention methods in the continent were informed by recognition of the devastating and destabilizing effects of conflict which intensified in scale and gravity following the culmination of the cold war and the resulting need to rethink the continent's approach to security.<sup>91</sup> Consequently, in the 1990's African Early Warning systems housed under the OAU, AU regional bodies like the ECOWAS were developed to address human security<sup>92</sup> and drive a renewed approach to security which was focused on collective responsibility as opposed to non-interference in the internal affairs of states besides constituting the foundational basis of the continent's Early Warning and Early Response mechanisms. Such include the Continental Early Warning Systems (CEWS), Panel of the Wise, Africa Stand by Force and Peace Fund mechanism under the Africa Peace and Security Architecture of the AU, which were formed with the aim of enabling African countries to enhance their ability to prevent and resolve conflicts.

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<sup>91</sup> Gnanguenon Amandine. Pivoting to African Conflict Prevention? An analysis of continental and regional early warning systems. (Institute for Security Studies, 2021).

<sup>92</sup> Ibid

Additionally, the AU's constitutive RECS developed their regional Early Warning mechanisms such as the ECOWARN, CEWARN and EACWARN and a 2008 memorandum of understanding and cooperation between the AU and the RECS on peace and security provided for the harmonization and coordination of conflict Early Warning mechanisms across the continent.<sup>93</sup> The AU's CEWS liaises with the regional Early warning systems and acts as a center for collection, analysis and exchange of conflict information towards shared policy and response options.<sup>94</sup> Effective collaboration in conflict early warning between the AU and various RECS has been hampered by differential institutional capacities of the RECS, overriding political considerations<sup>95</sup>, multiple state membership to RECS, resource shortages and indistinct division of roles between the AU and RECS. Despite existing challenges regional mechanisms such as ECOWARN AND CEWARN have attained successes in preventing and managing conflicts in the West and Horn of Africa regions respectively. Importantly, despite predominant proclamations of the centrality of conflict prevention

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<sup>93</sup> AU. Memorandum of Understanding and cooperation in the area of Peace and Security between the Africa Union, the Regional Economic Communities and the Coordinating Mechanisms of the Regional Standby Brigades of East and Northern Africa. (AU, 2008).

<sup>94</sup> AU. Africa Union Continental Early Warning Systems: The CEWS Handbook. (AU, 2008).

<sup>95</sup> Gnanguenon Amandine. Pivoting to African Conflict Prevention? An analysis of continental and regional early warning systems. (Institute for Security Studies, 2021).

measures, action by the CEWS and RECS has remained reactive and more concerned with overt conflict situations as opposed to addressing indicators of conflict.<sup>96</sup> Additionally, the disconnect between warning and response also typified by the disconnect between the local level where conflicts occur and the early warning and monitoring mechanisms are located<sup>97</sup> has also largely challenged the efficiency of early warning systems in Africa.

#### **2.4.1 ECOWAS Early Response Mechanism (ECOWARN)**

ECOWARN, within the West Africa region, is credited as having amongst the most comprehensive and effective conflict prevention mechanism in the continent.<sup>98</sup> Within the ECOWAS system, all the members of the body have ratified the 1999 Protocol on conflict prevention, thus facilitating the implementation of peace and security mechanisms including conflict prevention, management and resolution by states in the region.

The 1999 protocol provides for cooperation amongst its member states on preventive diplomacy, early warning, promotion of democratic governance and peacekeeping. This capability was further enhanced by the adoption of the 2001 protocol on good democracy and good governance, which also established the critical linkage between governance and conflict. Through its range of institutions and cascaded decision making and conflict monitoring mechanisms, including the Council of Elders, Defense and Security Commission, Cease Fire

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<sup>96</sup> Ibid

<sup>97</sup> Wulf Herbert and Tobias Debiel. Systematic Disconnects: Why Regional Organizations Fail to Use Early Warning and Response Mechanisms. (Global Governance, 2010).

<sup>98</sup> Cillier Jakkie, Towards EWER Systems in Africa (Institute for Security Studies, 2005).



Monitoring Group and four observation and monitoring centers spread across the region ECOWAS' Early Warning system has not only been effective in addressing conflict and governance issues in the region but also showcased political commitment and conceptual maturity.<sup>99</sup>

The comprehensive structure of ECOWAS has also enhanced its ability for the articulation of policy frameworks and establishment of institutions towards conflict prevention.<sup>100</sup> Additionally, ECOWAS' focus on to domesticate conflict prevention mechanisms within its member states has further enhanced its Conflict Early Warning and response capabilities. Further, ECOWARN's incorporation of both governmental and NGO's into its early warning data gathering and response mechanisms has also aided its coverage and presence<sup>101</sup>. Amid ECOWARN's successes, resource capacity, political interference and lack of a shared analysis framework are hampering its effectiveness.<sup>102</sup> The nascent threat of jihadist and its inter-linkages with the political and social rubrics of the member states is increasingly complicating ECOWARN's conflict management efforts.

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<sup>99</sup> Ibid

<sup>100</sup> OSAA. Regional Economic Communities and Conflict Prevention in Africa; An Overview of Capacity Gaps and Priority Needs (OSAA, 2017).

<sup>101</sup> Forum on Early Warning and Response (FEWER). Conflict and Peace Analysis and Response Manual. (Relief Web,2009)

<sup>102</sup> OSAA. Regional Economic Communities and Conflict Prevention in Africa; An Overview of Capacity Gaps and Priority Needs (OSAA, 2017).

#### **2.4.2 IGAD Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN)**

IGAD's conflict Early Warning Mechanism (CEWARN) is also regarded as being among the most effective in the continent,<sup>103</sup> granted its operation in the Horn of Africa region which remains riddled by long-drawn conflicts over resources, ethnic and inter-state rivalry. Over the recent past, the region has also been subject to terror- based conflict, especially in Somalia. Over the years, the horn of Africa region has experienced endemic insecurity drawing from cross-border conflicts, cattle rustling, human and drug trafficking, and illicit arms trade<sup>104</sup>. This insecurity and its consequences have continuously undermined the development of the region and threatened livelihoods. In line with its objectives of establishing peace and stability in the region, through sub-regional mechanisms for the prevention, management and resolution of inter and intra-state conflicts, IGAD states adopted the Protocol for the establishment of the CEWARN mechanism in 2002<sup>105</sup>. In its initial phases, the mechanism focused on addressing cross-border pastoralist conflicts and advanced to an interwoven framework of governmental and non-governmental organizations with complementary mandates in peace and development at local, national and regional levels.<sup>106</sup> CEWARN's central Unit located in Addis Ababa

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<sup>103</sup> Cillier Jakkie, *Towards EWER Systems in Africa* (Institute for Security Studies, 2005).

<sup>104</sup> Mwangi Macharia. *Engaging the Right Security Actors in the Horn of Africa: The Case for CEWERU in CEWARN in the IGAD framework.* (2003).

<sup>105</sup> IGAD. *Protocol on the Establishment of an Early Warning and Response Mechanism for IGAD member states.* (IGAD,2002).

<sup>106</sup> CEWARN. *CEWARN Brochure.* (CEWARN, 2002).

facilitates the exchange and distribution of information to the Conflict Early Warning and Response Units (CEWRU) of each IGAD member state.

CEWARN's conflict data gathering, analysis and response is enhanced through the use of a unified set of indicators and elaborate network of representatives from selected humanitarian, research and civil society organizations in each member state.<sup>107</sup> Additionally, CEWARN's clear distinction of the mandated lines of authority between its governmental and non-governmental constituents and decision making powers has aided its effectiveness. CEWARN has registered success in advancing its operational scope, and its methodological and structural approaches to the management of conflicts amid resource and governance challenges that persist in the Horn Region.<sup>108</sup> Additionally, CEWARN's structure based on a mix of state-led coordination and grassroots community participation has enhanced its Conflict Early Warning and response activities, besides gearing its incremental transition into managing other forms of conflict beyond pastoralist or resource-based conflicts.<sup>109</sup> Majorly, CEWARN conflict prevention capacity is challenged by inadequate funding<sup>110</sup>, lack of policies devoted to addressing the structural causes of conflict and lack of political resolve from member states.<sup>111</sup>

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<sup>107</sup> Cillier Jakkie, *Towards EWER Systems in Africa* (Institute for Security Studies, 2005).

<sup>108</sup> CEWARN. *Conflict Early Warning in the Horn: CEWARN'S Journey*. Relief CEWARN, 2002.

<sup>109</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>110</sup> OSAA. *Regional Economic Communities and Conflict Prevention in Africa; An Overview of Capacity Gaps and Priority Needs* (OSAA, 2017).

<sup>111</sup> Cillier Jakkie, *Towards EWER Systems in Africa* (Institute for Security Studies, 2005).

## **2.5 Conflict in the Ilemi Triangle**

The Ilemi triangle is a territory sandwiched along the border of Kenya, Ethiopia and South Sudan.

Conflict in the Ilemi Triangle, is inherent in the territorial claims involving the three countries and to a lesser degree, Uganda. Despite numerous attempts to resolve the conflicting territorial claims, through the demarcation and delimitation of the borders, disarray and contention has persisted amongst the states, leading to interethnic conflicts fueled by mainly by competition for natural resources, institutional vacuums and politics. The Ilemi Triangle is straddled by five ethnic communities; Turkana of Kenya Didinga, the Dassenach, in Ethiopia, Toposa in Sudan and the Nyangatom, who inhabit areas between Sudan and Ethiopia and.

Traditionally, the communities which are predominantly pastoralist have engaged in cattle rustling amongst themselves though dwindling natural resources, mainly pasture and water has led to intensified conflicts amongst themselves. Additionally, the underlying resource conflicts amongst the communities have been exploited for political mileage and to advance the territorial claims of the different states. The spread of small arms and light weapons has also aggravated the nature of inter-communal conflicts in the area. Lack of state- presence and corresponding institutional vacuums and under-development have also predisposed the communities to conflicts.

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In the present, conflict in the Ilemi Triangle persists, amid attempts to situate the pastoralist communities' interests and border demarcation process within the broader context of regional and national government interests<sup>112</sup>, with a seemingly untenable resolution. The already noticeable effects of climate change, Nile politics and the recent discovery of oil in the area are likely to further exacerbate the conflict.

## **2.5 Chapter Findings**

### **2.5.1 Demographic Characteristics**

#### ***2.5.1.1 Gender of Respondents***

As in Figure 2.1 below, the study had a total of 80 sampled respondents. 60% of the respondents were male while female interviewees represented 40% of our sampled population. This can be attributed to the fact that the set-up in the Ilemi Triangle is majorly traditional, and male chauvinistic and domineering traits are still evident. This constitution of male and female respondents served to provide a fairly balanced view of the topic area in lieu of the existing marginalization of women in the socio-economic existence of pastoral communities such as those within the Ilemi Triangle. Study findings incorporating a share of female respondents will aid insight incorporate insights of women in conflict management and early warning, amid recently rising recognition of their significance in the same.

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<sup>112</sup>Eliza Snel and Lotje de Vries. 2022. The Ilemi Triangle Understanding a Pastoralist Border Area. Pax for Peace.




Figure 0.1: Gender of Respondents

Source: Field Data

### ***2.5.1.2 Age of Respondents***

The respondents were between the ages of 26 to 65 years, with the skewed to the left, indicating that there were more respondents close to age 26 than to age 61 as in Figure 2.1 below. A majority of 66% of the respondents were between the ages 24-45 years, with a mean age of 39 years reflecting the productive age groups of individuals engaged in herding, cattle ownership, conflict and decision making in the pastoralist community as indicated in Table 2.1 and 2.2 below.




Figure 0.2: Age distribution of respondents

Source: Field Data

Table 0.1: Respondents Age Distribution

<b>Ag Group</b>	<b>Upper Class Limit</b>	<b>Number</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
26-35	35	24	30%
36-45	45	42	53%
46-55	55	11	14%
56-65	65	3	4%
<b>Total</b>		<b>80</b>	<b>100%</b>

Source: Field Data

Table 0.2: Respondents' Age Descriptive Statistics

Minimum	Maximum	Average		
		Mean Age	Median Age	Modal Age
26	61	39.9	3	4
		3	9	0

Source: Field Data

### 2.5.1.3 Education Levels of the Respondents

The study reveals that majority of the population in the Ilemi Triangle have completely no education. Very few have basic education, that is primary and secondary levels of education and much fewer go past that level, an issue that can be attributed to the conflicts, drought and other calamities that befall the region. In this study, 75% of the respondents had no education, 13.75% had primary education, 5% had secondary education, and 6.25% had tertiary education. This is illustrated in Table 2.4 and Figure 2.3 below. The findings indicate high levels of illiteracy within the target population and is linked to their capabilities to understand and implement conflict early warning mechanisms.






Figure 0.3: Respondents' Levels of Education

Source: Field Data

Table 0.3: Respondents' Levels of Education

Level of Education	Number	Percentage
Primary	11	13.75%
Secondary	4	5.00%
Tertiary	5	6.25%
Informal	60	75.00%
<b>Total</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>100.00%</b>

Source: Field Data

#### 2.5.1.4 Occupation of the Respondents

Findings showed that the respondents were distributed across various occupations. Similar to education levels, majority of the respondents said they had no unemployment of any form. In this study, 63% were unemployed while 32 percent were engaged in informal employments like farming, livestock herding, pastoralism, housewife, village eldership, and small businesses. Only 4% were teachers and 1% nurses. Majority of the respondents (72%) engaged in pastoralism which is the major economic activity in the area. 8% of the respondents were engaged in business, 6 percent were village elders, 5% farmers, 4% teachers and another 4% being housewives. This is illustrated in the following Figure 2.4 below summarizes the distribution of respondents across the different occupations.




Figure 0.4: Distribution of Respondents Across Various Occupations

Source: Field Data

## **2.6 Dynamics of Conflict and Conflict Prevention in the Ilemi Triangle**

In regard to conflict dynamics within the Ilemi Triangle, majority of the respondents reported the occurrence of conflict in the area. 45% and 38% of the respondents indicated that conflict occurs moderately to rarely respectively in the area, with only 6% indicating very frequent occurrence of conflict as shown in Figure 2.5 below. The moderate occurrence of conflict could be attributable to ongoing implementation of early warning and other conflict resolution mechanisms in the area. However, further analysis reveals a significant relationship between getting signs of impending conflict and the frequency thereof. The research found that 53% of the people in Ilemi Triangle get signs of impending conflict sometimes and 39% always get the signs. Only 2% indicated that they never get any signs at all, while 6% were unsure. This is illustrated in figure 2.6 below. Similar to other studies reviewed <sup>113</sup>there is prevalence of early warning information on impending conflicts at the community and grassroots level.

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<sup>113</sup> Odote, Petrolinus. Role of Early Warning Systems in Conflict Prevention in Africa. Phd Thesis, (University of Nairobi, 2016).




Figure 0.5: Frequency of Conflict within Ilemi Triangle

Source: Field Data




Figure 0.6: Respondents' reception of information on signs of impending conflict

Source: Field Data

Correlation analysis after coding both frequency of conflict and whether there was receipt of signs of impending conflict into ordinal data reveals that there was low but significant negative correlation as seen in Table 2.5 below.

Table 0.4: Correlation Analysis between frequency of conflict and signs of impending conflict

		conflict_frequ ency	signs
conflict_frequency	Pearson Correlation	1	-.053
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.654
	N	80	75
signs	Pearson Correlation	-.053	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.654	
	N	75	75

Source: Field Data

The Pearson correlation coefficient for the relationship between the two variables is -0.053, with a significance level of 65.4%. This means that the more frequent someone reports to have witnessed conflict in the area, the less likely it is that they received any signs of impending conflict at all. Thus, about 5% of the time, getting signs of impending conflict in Ilemi area significantly reduces the actual conflict from taking place based on this result. This, however, leaves 95%, which could be explained by other issues like preventive measures taken the early warning systems employed in the area.

## 2.7 Root Causes of Conflict in the Ilemi Triangle

The root causes of conflict in the area identified in the study were: competition for scarce resources, longstanding hatred between ethnic communities, poverty, marginalisation by authorities, revenge, disputed territories, lacking state presence and availability of small weapons, in order of commonness among the respondents, as indicated in the chart below.




Figure 0.7: Root Causes of Conflict in the Ilemi Area

Source: Field Data

Since the questionnaire was open ended and allowed respondents to add more factors that had been listed, it was necessary to run factor analysis to see if it is possible to make use of factor scores to determine which of the factors listed by the respondents most define the root causes of conflict in the Ilemi area. The results are in Table 5 below.

Table 0.5: Factor Analysis for the root causes of conflict in Ilemi area

		Correlation Matrix						
		hatred	state_absence	marginalization	disputed_territory	arms_access	revenge	poverty
Correlation	hatred	1.000	.235	.103	.387	.258	.074	.041
	state_absence	.235	1.000	.227	.598	.009	-.081	-.046
	marginalization	.103	.227	1.000	.066	.192	-.416	-.234
	disputed_territory	.387	.598	.066	1.000	.042	.024	-.120
	arms_access	.258	.009	.192	.042	1.000	-.063	.053
	revenge	.074	-.081	-.416	.024	-.063	1.000	.562
	poverty	.041	-.046	-.234	-.120	.053	.562	1.000
Sig. (1-tailed)	hatred		.018	.182	.000	.010	.258	.358
	state_absence	.018		.022	.000	.470	.236	.343
	marginalization	.182	.022		.279	.044	.000	.018
	disputed_territory	.000	.000	.279		.357	.417	.144
	arms_access	.010	.470	.044	.357		.289	.319
	revenge	.258	.236	.000	.417	.289		.000
	poverty	.358	.343	.018	.144	.319	.000	

Source Field Data

From the factor analysis, it was evident that there was significant positive and negative correlation between a number of the factors, which means that the causes of conflict can always be explained by one of the correlating factors. To determine which of the factors to retain, the scree plot (Figure 2.8 below) and rotated component matrix below will be useful. The scree plot's point of inflection is after three points, indicating that only three factors are sufficient to illuminate the root causes of conflict in Ilemi area. However, it is important to note that one factor – competition for scarce resource – was eliminated from the factor analysis, because it had a zero variance, as all the respondents in the survey cited it as a root cause of conflict in the area. It was therefore not possible to weigh it against other factors to see if it scores more in the factor analysis, hence was carried as is. Therefore, from the rotated component matrix, we can justify retaining three factors: revenge; disputed territory and border; and access to small arms, as they score the most in explaining each component. (Table 2.6 below). Thus, we can conclude that the foundational causes of conflict in Ilemi Triangle are competition for scarce resources; revenge; disputed territories and borders, and access to small arms in the area.




Figure 0.8: : Scree Plot for root causes of conflict

Source: Field Data

Table 0.6: Rotated component matrix for the root causes of conflict in Ilemi area

**Rotated Component Matrix<sup>a</sup>**

	Component		
	1	2	3
revenge	.881		
poverty	.788		.193
marginalization	-.634	.113	.384
disputed_territory		.893	
state_absence	-.130	.839	
arms_access			.883
hatred	.125	.512	.559

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.

a. Rotation converged in 4 iterations.

Source: Field Data

## 2.8 Conflict Prevention Measures in the Ilemi Triangle

The study findings revealed the presence of various conflict prevention measures in the Ilemi Triangle. Peace dialogues, awareness creation of on the benefits of peace and conflict resolution including the employment of CEWR mechanisms were listed as the most applied prevention measures. Additionally, the sanctioning of conflict perpetrators and efforts by the public administration such as through Chief’s barazas to educate and enforce conflict prevention and religious intrventions were also listed as important in preventing conflict within the Ilemi as showcased in Figure 2.9 below.






Figure 0.9: Conflict preventive measures taken in the Ilemi Triangle

Source: Field Data

Upon further factor analysis, only four of the seven factors could justifiably be retained as the main preventive measures the people in Ilemi area, as indicated by the scree plot in Figure 2.10 below. These factors have the most factor score and best respond to the question asked. From the rotated component matrix on Table 2.7. The factors are: early warning and response systems; religious interventions; awareness creation and chief's forums.




Figure 0.10: Scree plot for preventive measures taken against conflict in the Ilemi Triangle

Source: Field Data

Table 0.7: Rotated Component Matrix for preventive measures taken against conflict

**Rotated Component Matrix<sup>a</sup>**

	Component			
	1	2	3	4
early_warning	.786	-.132		-.216
santions	.760	-.250	-.315	-.185
peace_dialogue	-.748	-.237	-.373	-.291
religion		.845		
trade	-.312	.720		-.157
awareness_creation		-.141	.945	
chiefs_forum	-.144	-.101		.943

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.

a. Rotation converged in 8 iterations.

Source: Field Data

However, correlation analysis between the various preventive measures found from the survey revealed a more negative relationship between peace dialogues and religious interventions than any of the other measures (See Table 8). Arguably, it is expected that any of the preventive measures would have a significant negative correlation with the frequency of conflict in the area. That is, if a respondent mentioned a particular preventive measure and still said there is frequent conflict in the area, it is likely that the measure is particularly not effective in preventing conflict in the area. Therefore, early warning and response systems, awareness creation and sanctions fail this test, as they were more often than not mentioned by respondents who said they experience conflict frequently and very frequently in the area. Thus, it is justifiable to retain, peace dialogues and religious interventions as highly important measures against conflict in the Ilemi area alongside early warning mechanisms, awareness creation and Chiefs' forums.

Table 0.8: Correlation analysis for conflict frequency and preventive measures

		Correlations							
		conflict_frequ ency	peace_dialog ue	trade	early_warning	chiefs_forum	awareness_c reation	santions	religion
conflict_frequency	Pearson Correlation	1	-.318**	-.026	.473**	-.276**	.074	.293**	-.090
	Sig. (1-tailed)		.002	.408	.000	.007	.256	.004	.214
	N	80	80	80	80	80	80	80	80
peace_dialogue	Pearson Correlation	-.318**	1	.101	-.401**	-.035	-.203*	-.297**	-.118
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.002		.186	.000	.380	.035	.004	.148
	N	80	80	80	80	80	80	80	80
trade	Pearson Correlation	-.026	.101	1	-.198*	-.078	-.137	-.322**	.316**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.408	.186		.039	.245	.113	.002	.002
	N	80	80	80	80	80	80	80	80
early_warning	Pearson Correlation	.473**	-.401**	-.198*	1	-.214*	.050	.503**	-.113
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.000	.000	.039		.029	.330	.000	.160
	N	80	80	80	80	80	80	80	80
chiefs_forum	Pearson Correlation	-.276**	-.035	-.078	-.214*	1	-.088	-.198*	-.078
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.007	.380	.245	.029		.218	.039	.246
	N	80	80	80	80	80	80	80	80
awareness_creation	Pearson Correlation	.074	-.203*	-.137	.050	-.088	1	-.146	-.118
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.256	.035	.113	.330	.218		.098	.148
	N	80	80	80	80	80	80	80	80
santions	Pearson Correlation	.293**	-.297**	-.322**	.503**	-.198*	-.146	1	-.102
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.004	.004	.002	.000	.039	.098		.185
	N	80	80	80	80	80	80	80	80
religion	Pearson Correlation	-.090	-.118	.316**	-.113	-.078	-.118	-.102	1
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.214	.148	.002	.160	.246	.148	.185	
	N	80	80	80	80	80	80	80	80

\*\* Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).

\* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed).

Source: Field Data

## 2.9 Early Warning Indicators

Amid the preventive apparatus put in place to deal with conflict in the Ilemi Triangle, the survey shows that there are some signs of impending conflict in the area. Figure 2.11 shows that 73% of the respondents cited signs as the rise of hate speech and intentional misinformation as the leading signs of conflict in the area. This could be linked to the primarily competitive nature of relations amongst the ethnic groups in the area. 65% said when competition for scarce resources starts growing or when people start behaving differently, conflict is most likely to

follow. 48% cited the burning of grass or pasture in shared lands while 44% said the interpretation of livestock intestines by seers will most likely be followed by conflict.

Regrouping of warriors and livestock theft were also mentioned as signs of impending conflict by 38% and 36% of the respondents respectively. The scarcity of resources like water and pasture during the dry seasons was also a significant sign of looming conflict, having been cited by 23% of the respondents. Price discrimination in shared markets and unnecessary migration were both cited by 13% of the respondents as signs of impending conflict in the area. The signs of impending conflict are particularly important as it is upon these that CEWR systems are employed to avert looming conflict in the area.




Figure 0.11: Signs of impending conflict in Ilemi area

Source: Field Data

## 2.10 Early Warning Measures in the Ilemi Triangle

The study revealed that more than 95 percent of the respondents reported awareness of the existence of early warning mechanisms in the Ilemi area and further indicated that the mechanisms aid their knowledge of impending conflicts in the area. In this regard, 97.5% of respondents stated that the systems give sufficient information on impending conflict in the area, with 99% holding that the existing systems aid in preventing conflicts in the area. This finding was in line with the assertion of the conflict prevention theory that early warning mechanism can be useful in identifying and forestalling impending conflicts.

In this regard, most respondent reported access to early warning information on impending conflict, with 53% indicating that they sometimes get signs of impending conflict and 39% indicating that they always access information on the same. Only 2% of the respondents indicated that they do not access information or signs of impending conflict as in Figure 2.12. Similar to other studies reviewed <sup>114</sup>there is prevalence of early warning information on impending conflicts at the community and grassroots level. However, despite this high awareness, 11% of respondents still reported very frequent conflicts and 6 percent reported fairly frequent conflict occurrences, pointing to a disconnect with the early warning systems available in this area and their effectiveness in conflict prevention and sparking appropriate

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<sup>114</sup> Odote, Petrolinus. Role of Early Warning Systems in Conflict Prevention in Africa. Phd Thesis, (University of Nairobi, 2016).

response, an outcome as similarly identified and assessed by others such as by other works by Odote<sup>115</sup> and the International Peace Institute<sup>116</sup>.

Conflict information sharing and awareness creation by various agencies, presence of frameworks for dialogue and mediation, existing links for information sharing and coordination with security agencies and the creation of pasture sharing plans were listed as the types of early warning mechanisms present in the area as shown in Figure 2.13. Spreading of information and creating awareness was found to be the most common form of conflict early warning mechanism in the area, having been cited by 74% of the respondents in the area. 60% cited negotiations and dialogue while 53% and 51% cited mediation and informing or coordinating with local administrators, respectively as forms of conflict early warning present in the area. Compensation of aggrieved parties and creation of a resource-sharing plan during dry seasons were also cited by 9% and 3% of the respondents respectively.

Study respondents variously rated the effectiveness of these existing mechanisms in averting conflict in the area as illustrated in figure 2.14 below. The effectiveness of the early warning mechanisms in forestalling conflict was gauged by majority (30%) of the respondents as “Good”, while 26% gauged it as “Fair” and 24% said it’s “Very Good”. Further, 5% said it is “Very Bad” and 15% gauged it as averagely effective. This means that nearly half the respondents have little to no confidence in the existing early warning systems to help

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<sup>115</sup>Ibid

<sup>116</sup> IPI. Preventing Conflicts in Africa: Early Warning and Response. (IPI, 2012).

preventing conflict in the area. Thus, for 46% of the Ilemi residents, there will be conflict irrespective of the presence of the early warning systems in the area.




Figure 0.12: Access to Conflict Early Warning Information in Ilemi Triangle

Source: Field Data




Figure 0.13: Conflict Prevention Measures in the Ilemi Triangle

Source: Field Data






Figure 0.14: Effectiveness of existing early warning systems in averting conflict

Source: Field Data

In further qualifying the effectiveness of each of the early warning systems cited by the respondents, they were correlated with the score given for effectiveness in prevention and implementation of preventive measures against looming conflict. The results are in Table 2.9 below:

Table 0.9: Correlation between effectiveness score and early warning systems

		Correlations							
		impliment_eff ect	prevention_eff ectiveness	negotiation	mediation	compensatio n	sharing_plan	information_s pread	coordination_ admin
impliment_effect	Pearson Correlation	1	.875**	.557**	.618**	-.144	.171	.003	-.114
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000	.000	.000	.206	.133	.977	.318
	N	79	79	79	79	79	79	79	79
prevention_effectiveness	Pearson Correlation	.875**	1	.456**	.497**	-.103	.205	.130	-.139
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000		.000	.000	.364	.069	.252	.218
	N	79	80	80	80	80	80	80	80
negotiation	Pearson Correlation	.557**	.456**	1	.807**	-.018	.131	-.081	-.184
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000		.000	.874	.248	.474	.103
	N	79	80	80	80	80	80	80	80
mediation	Pearson Correlation	.618**	.497**	.807**	1	-.148	-.008	-.112	-.227 <sup>†</sup>
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000		.189	.944	.321	.043
	N	79	80	80	80	80	80	80	80
compensation	Pearson Correlation	-.144	-.103	-.018	-.148	1	.234 <sup>*</sup>	.084	-.052
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.206	.364	.874	.189		.037	.458	.647
	N	79	80	80	80	80	80	80	80
sharing_plan	Pearson Correlation	.171	.205	.131	-.008	.234 <sup>*</sup>	1	.096	-.164
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.133	.069	.248	.944	.037		.399	.146
	N	79	80	80	80	80	80	80	80
information_spread	Pearson Correlation	.003	.130	-.081	-.112	.084	.096	1	.100
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.977	.252	.474	.321	.458	.399		.377
	N	79	80	80	80	80	80	80	80
coordination_admin	Pearson Correlation	-.114	-.139	-.184	-.227 <sup>†</sup>	-.052	-.164	.100	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.318	.218	.103	.043	.647	.146	.377	
	N	79	80	80	80	80	80	80	80

\*\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Source: Field Data

Results pointed to a significant relationship between the prevention and implementation effectiveness score and most of the factors. For the creation of sharing plan and information spreading, there was a highly significant positive correlation with both, implying that those who cited them mostly ranked the success of the existing early warning systems in prevention of and implementation of measures to avert conflict higher. Peace dialogues and negotiations, and mediation were also found to be positively correlated with the effectiveness, but the correlation coefficient was insignificant at 1% significance level. On the contrary, compensation of aggrieved parties and coordination of local administrators exhibited a negative correlation with the both effectiveness scores, indicating that they are associated with lower scores for effectiveness. Going by that, it is evident that these two are the least effective early

warning systems employed in the Ilemi area. This is consistent with the explanations that respondents who gave a low score for effectiveness of implementation of prevention mechanisms.

A vast majority of the respondents (73%) said the existing early warning systems were crucial in facilitating a peaceful coexistence in society, hence the scores they gave. Those who felt the existing systems don't do enough to facilitate peaceful coexistence gave a lower rating for the effectiveness. Generally, the role or significance of early warning systems in preventing conflict in Ilemi area can be summarised in Figure 2.15 below:




Figure 0.15: Significance of early warning mechanisms in the Ilemi Triangle

Source: Field Data

In further qualifying their reasons for the significance existing early warning measures in the area, 73% and 33% of the respondents stated that the mechanisms have to an extent facilitated the peaceful co-existence and trust-building amongst local communities and in the Ilemi triangle. Additionally, the measures were regarded as having enhanced possibilities for mediation and negotiation and collective responsibility for security by 36% and 33 % of the respondents respectively. The significance of the mechanisms in reducing stock theft and other crimes and facilitating the conduct of business activities were also listed as in the figure.

## **2.11 Conclusion**

The persistence of conflict in the Ilemi triangle as established by previous studies continues to be driven by resource competition, ethnic hatred and disputed territorial claims by communities in the area. Notwithstanding, the persistence, the presence of conflict early warning mechanisms such as pasture sharing plans, information sharing, peace dialogues, mediation and negotiation have aided the forestalling and resolution of conflict in the area in the Ilemi Triangle. These mechanisms have had a positive impact on the reduction of conflict, co-existence of communities, creation of an enabling environment for business besides reducing stock theft and other forms of crime. These findings affirm the study's primary hypothesis that CEWS have a positive impact on prevention of conflict in Africa, and Lund's assertion that conflict can be prevented through early detection and application of preventive responses such as dialogues and negotiations as demonstrated in this study of the Ilemi.

However, as pointed in previous works, this positive impact is limited by persisting challenges of situating the territorial and resource interests such as of the different ethnic communities in the Ilemi and exploitation of the conflict situations for political mileage.

Additionally, weaknesses in channels for sharing of gathered early warning information to security agencies in the Ilemi undermine the achievement of coordinated action as under the Conflict Prevention Theory's suggestions towards the effectiveness of CEWS in preventing conflicts besides demonstrating the common challenge of addressing the gap between existing early warning and the implementation of appropriate response mechanisms.

## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **ACTORS INVOLVED IN THE OPERATIONALIZATION OF EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS WITHIN THE ILEMI TRIANGLE**

#### **3.1 Introduction**

This chapter examines the role of different actors in conflict early warning systems, detailing their impact on the systems and wider conflict resolution. In this regard, the role of international organizations, Non-Governmental Organizations, faith-based actors, states, indigenous communities and spoilers are examined in detail.

#### **3.2 Actors in Conflict Early Warning Systems**

Various actors are involved in operationalization and improvement of CEWR systems. Across board, states, international organizations, research institutions, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO's) have been at the center of most EWER initiatives, with an array of other stakeholders linked. Initially, state-based actors as opposed to non-state actors were central to championing the EWER agenda, though progressively, the latter are increasingly assuming the role amid rising preference for the initiatives to closely involve grassroots communities targeted. Along with this recognition of the role of women and other minority groups such as the youth in conflict has led to their inclusion in early warning initiatives. This chapter details literature reviewed on various actors in conflict early warning mechanisms, especially in Africa.

##### **3.2.1 International Organizations**

Drawing from the increasing interconnectedness of the globe, the international community is increasingly predominated with the prevention of armed conflict in order to avert the damage

and disruption caused by such conflicts.<sup>117</sup> Consequently international players such as the UN and regional organizations have assumed major roles in armed conflict prevention and management.<sup>118</sup> In their examination of international actors in conflict prevention Othman et al<sup>119</sup>, give greater credence to regional organizations in conflict prevention owing to their strength in timing of conflict events, context specificity and coordinating multilateral action towards conflict prevention, as compared to global multilateral bodies, such as the UN, which however play a big role in global conflict management and prevention. The authors point out resource-capability challenges as being the major impediment to the implementation of conflict prevention strategies and actions by international organizations. Further, several initiatives by these organizations have failed to prevent the outbreak of armed conflict or unintentionally yielded negative outcome in some instances.<sup>120</sup> Conclusively, to overcome this shortcoming and enhance preventive measures, Othman et al argue for regional organizations.

Other international preventive agents such as NGOs, educational institutions, and the media are also important, but have limitation in taking initiative due to lack of political leadership.

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<sup>117</sup> Ackermann, A. *The Idea and Practice of Conflict Prevention*. (Journal of Peace Research 2003), 40, pp 399-347.

<sup>118</sup> Othman, Jamilah, Azahari Ismail, Jinwon Kim, and Jeffrey Lawrence D'Silva. 2013. "International Actors for Armed Conflict Prevention: A Conceptual Exploration. (*Asian Social Science*) 9 (15) pp. 199.

<sup>119</sup> Ibid

Therefore, to enhance the effectiveness of preventive strategy, regional organizations should take initiative, interacting with other international preventive agents and incorporating their actions. Wedgwood (1996) also emphasized five advantages of regional organizations in conflict management: rapid action; facilitating to build confidence; avoiding to raising unnecessary tensions; preventing misperception among conflict parties; and minimizing mistakes such as condescension or colonialism. Charter of the UN, Chapter VIII, also explicitly highlight the importance of regional organizations and arrangements and encourages their development.

In a whole and with realization of their central role, international organizations have made reasonable progress in conflict early warning and response through the integration of early warning mechanisms into their policies and strengthening of their institutional mandates for early responses<sup>121</sup> including through intellectual and financial investments. In Africa, this is exemplified in the incorporation and progressive development of the conflict early warning in the AU peace and security architecture through the regional CEWS and cascading of the same to regional and state levels. International Organizations have also been recognized as providing significant funding, experience and legitimacy to conflict management and early warning through their huge memberships, expertise and extensive bureaucratic frameworks. The UN spends a significant portion of its budget on peacekeeping missions across the globe with the largest being to Africa. In its 2022-2023 peacekeeping budget, of t \$6.45 billion, the

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<sup>121</sup> OECD. Preventing Violence, war and State Collapse the Future of Early Warning and Response. (OECD, 2009).



organization's four peacekeeping mission in Mali, CAR, South Sudan and DRC are set to consume about seventy percent of this budget.<sup>122</sup>

Despite their central role and notable progress in conflict early warning, international organizations have been criticized for their failure to detect and act upon signs of conflict and state fragility as was in the case of the Rwanda genocide of 1994, where the United Nations was accused of a slow response.<sup>123</sup> Lack of political will of amongst members of international organizations has also been key in determining their action or inaction over indicators of impending conflict or ongoing conflict situations.

### **3.2.2 State Actors in Conflict Early Warning Systems**

Despite the overarching dominance of international organizations in conflict management and conflict early warning, states are increasingly adopting larger roles in the initiatives. Essentially, with the growth of statehood, conflict resolution and early warning have become part of state-building and preservation efforts. Within the Ilemi, the presence, interests and activities of the different states surrounding the area have shaped the conflict. The Ilemi dispute is to a large extent regarded as a territorial dispute between Kenya and South Sudan on the one hand and also as a border dispute between Kenya, Uganda, South Sudan and to an extent

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<sup>122</sup> Relief Web. The 2022 UN Peacekeeping Budget: Signs of Progress or a Fleeting Moment of Consensus? (Relief Web. 2022.)

<sup>123</sup> Maritz Dominique. Rwandan Genocide: Failure of the International Community? (E-International Relations. 2012).

Uganda.<sup>124</sup> Notably, the somewhat multilateral dispute has gained traction in recent years and dominating regional discourse. The persisting border problem of the Ilemi is linked to the failure of the various treaties that delimited the Kenya-Ethiopia, Ethiopia-South Sudan and Kenya-South Sudan boundaries.<sup>125</sup> to demarcate its precise location.

Alongside the border demarcation process, pastoralist interests has also fed into the broader context of regional and national government interests in the Ilemi conflict<sup>126</sup>. State weaknesses characterized by state absence- of absence of governance and administration official indifference, disregard of duty have also led to an institutional vacuum, which has also to an extent fueled conflicts in the Ilemi and undermined efforts to contain them.<sup>127</sup>

### **3.2.3 Faith-Based Actors**

In their analysis of local religious institutions in conflict environments, Thomson<sup>128</sup> argue that religious leaders, faith-based organizations and local faith communities play a major role in the protection of those affected by conflict. In this line, they also contend that the role of

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<sup>124</sup> Kibon, John. *Examining the Sustainability of Ethiopia's Embryonic Territorial Claim on the Ilemi Triangle*. The International Journal of Humanities & Social Studies, 2019) Vol 7 (8) 10. (IJHSS, 2019).

<sup>125</sup> Ibid.

<sup>126</sup> Eliza Snel and Lotje de Vries. 2022. *The Ilemi Triangle Understanding a Pastoralist Border Area*. Pax for Peace.

<sup>127</sup> Charles Haskins. 2009. *The Ilemi Triangle: A Forgotten Conflict*. (Shalom Centre for Conflict Resolution & Reconciliation, 2009).

<sup>128</sup> Thomson, J. "Local Faith Actors and Protection in Complex and Insecure Environments." (Forced Migration Review, 2015) 48: pp. 5–6

these faith-based actors has neither been fully appreciated nor its interrelationships with the wider peace process uncovered. Nwaka<sup>129</sup> similarly argues that the role of religion in peace building and conflict prevention which has been occasioned by the rising entanglement of conflict with religion, has not been mainstreamed despite growing interest in religious peace building over the last two decades, as they were initially centered on the humanitarian needs of the victims. Their work on the role of faith-based conflict peace building points to their leaning on bottom-up and collaborative approaches, which lend to their success.

Elsewhere Hayward<sup>130</sup> notes that religion's role in peace building has significantly advanced in recent decades, emerging as a specialized sector in conflict management. The author however observes that its role has continues to be marginalized and resisted especially by the West. Consequently, Hayward notes the challenges faced by religious actors in conflict peace building as being in the fostering integration with secular peace building efforts, engagement of women and youth and addressing their priorities, addressing religious diversity and measuring the effectiveness and strengthening religion in peace building. Hayward demonstrates in their introspection of the role of religion in the spurring and resolution of the Arab spring conflict, the central role of religion in peace processes.

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<sup>129</sup> Nwaka Jacinta. Faith-Based Actors and Post-Conflict Peace building in Jos and Kaduna, Nigeria. (*African Conflict & Peace building Review*, 2020). 10, No. 1: 50-71.

<sup>130</sup> Hayward, Susan. Religion and Peace building Reflections on Current Challenges and Future Prospects. (United States Institute of Peace, 2012).

Specific to CEWR systems, Palihapitiya<sup>131</sup> argues that formal faith-based associations are emerging as front actors in conflict early warning and peace building, proposing the need to mobilize local intra-faith and inter-faith mechanisms for the prevention of violence at the grassroots. To this end the author points to the usefulness of faith-based organizations in sustaining local or community-based EWER mechanisms towards identifying early signs of violence and quelling violence in deeply divided societies.

### **3.2.4 Civil Society**

Similar to faith based organizations, CSO's have been relegated in conflict management and early warning systems and their contribution to peace building and conflict transformation less recognized.<sup>132</sup> In the arena of conflict management, civil society is recognized for its ability to gather widespread grassroots perceptions as opposed to the usual attempts of gathering and addressing the views of immediate conflict perpetrators and victims, however requiring their inclusion in all process and stages of conflict.<sup>133</sup> Importantly, they are also practical avenues to incorporate the views of marginalized groups such as women and youth who have remained excluded in conflict management and early warning in Africa. Regionally, the success of ECOWAS' early warning system WANEP is largely attributable to its utilization of CSO's in

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<sup>131</sup> Palihapitiya, Madhawa. "Faith-based conflict early warning: Experiences from two conflict zones." *Journal of Interreligious Studies* 24 (2018) pp 61-77.

<sup>132</sup> Fischer, Martina. "Civil society in conflict transformation: Ambivalence, potentials and challenges." (Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, 2006).

<sup>133</sup> Ibid

early warning information gathering and endorsed their intervention in community or national level conflicts.<sup>134</sup>

### 3.2.5 NGO's

Amid their proliferation in the post-cold war environment of Africa and other regions of the world, NGO's have assumed roles in the continent's conflict prevention and peace building landscape. In the areas of conflict management and early warning, NGO's play a critical role in dissemination of information and humanitarian intervention, more so in remote areas where they operate. Additionally, their engagements in rights campaigns, humanitarian assistance, political and environmental activism, indirectly contribute to conflict management and early warning measures.

Further, NGO's contribute to track two diplomacy efforts through their facilitation of informal engagements with middle and low-level community members, spearheading mediations amongst adversarial parties and carrying out sensitization and training on conflict prevention and resolution.<sup>135</sup> Notably, Krumm, 2000 points out that a major challenge for NGO's in the dissemination of early warning information is determining the threshold of

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<sup>134</sup> Opuko, John Mark. West African Conflict Early Warning and Early Response System: The Role of Civil Society Organizations. (Africa Portal, 2002).

<sup>135</sup> Ibid.

Rotberg, R. (1996), 'Conclusions: NGOs, early warning, early action, and preventive diplomacy', in R. Rotberg (ed), *Vivilance and vengeance. NGOs preventing ethnic conflict in divided societies*, 15 Brookings Institution Press, Washington D.C., pp. 263-268. Schennink, B. (1999), 'Vrede en Mensenrechten', *Internationale Spectator*, Vol. 53, pp. 81-85

information acceptable to government and international organizations' acceptance as actionable or warranting action. Additionally, in their involvements in conflict resolution and early warning process, similar to CSO's, NGO's risk the double edged sword of failing to be incorporated in them or being overburdened with expectations of conflict information gathering and other peace building measures by governments and other external actors.

### **3.2.6 Indigenous Communities**

Indigenous communities play a role in conflict early warning systems through their traditional or cultural practices. In Africa indigenous conflict warning mechanisms (ICRM) have been applied by communities in past societies and are still applicable as mainstream methods of early warning or used to compliment modern methods.<sup>136</sup>For instance, within the Ilemi Triangle, indigenous conflict early warning mechanisms are applied by the Turkana community, though more in a fashion to prepare attacks against opponents as opposed to as a tool for conflict prevention.<sup>137</sup> Consequently in their study of indigenous conflict early warning mechanisms among Turkana pastoralists, Nyambura 2003, notes their significance in providing avenues for the incorporation of indigenous actors and knowledge in contemporary early warning and recommends their integration with conventional mechanism towards their enrichment of each other. The author also advocates for their formal recognition and linkage with the formal institutions involved in conflict resolution and early warning such as

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<sup>137</sup> Nyambura, Simon. "Traditional conflict early warning systems: a case study of Turkana among Karamoja cluster pastoral communities." PhD Thesis. (2003).

government and intergovernmental organizations, security agencies and courts. Notably as pointed by the UN, indigenous peoples are overrepresented as victims in conflicts, with lacking consideration of their role as stakeholders in peace building process and by extension in conflict early warning.<sup>138</sup>

### **3.2.7 Spoilers**

In conflict actors, spoilers refer to groups and tactics individuals apply to attempt to obstruct or undermine conflict settlement through a variety of means, including terrorism and violence.<sup>139</sup> Similarly, Bilbil,<sup>140</sup> defines spoilers as warring parties and their leaders opposed conflict settlement and to peace processes owing to their vested interests, which can be political, financial ethnic or security in nature, thereby use different means to undermine the processes. The author further clarifies that spoilers could also join the processes but withdraw or hinder their fruition or have no commitment for their success.

In the context of conflicts in Africa, spoilers who are mainly the warring parties in the protracted South Sudan conflict have undermined peace processes in the country, with the AU and IGAD being blamed for enabling the activities and tact of the spoilers through failure to

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<sup>138</sup> UN. *Indigenous Peoples: Conflict, Peace and Resolution*. Concept Note of the 15th session of the Permanent Forum. (UN. 2016).

<sup>139</sup> Edward Newman and Oliver Richmond. *Challenges to Peacebuilding: Managing Spoilers during Conflict Resolution*. (United Nations University Press, 2006).

<sup>140</sup> Kastrati, Bilbil. *Methods Used to Deal with Peace Process Spoilers*. ILIRIA International Review. 343 Vol.4 (Research Gate, 2014).

implement proposed sanctions against the spoilers.<sup>141</sup> In another prominent case of protracted conflict within the continent, the highly fragmented and volatile conflict in the DRC has a wide range of local, national, and international, spoilers who have and continue to significantly undermine peace efforts and fuel the continuation of violence in the restive Eastern parts of the country<sup>142</sup>. The major spoilers in the conflict consist of proxy rebels of the DRC's neighbouring states who spur continuation of the conflict to advance their economic and political interests.<sup>143</sup>

Spoilers present a challenge to peace processes, and thereby point to the importance of inclusivity of all conflict stakeholders in peace building processes as the exclusion of interest groups is likely to present opportunity for spoilers to undermine peace processes as well as the the acceptability and sustainability of peace agreements.<sup>144</sup> In managing the challenge posed by spoilers to conflict management, application of inducement, sensitization and socialization in conflict management, and coercive measures can be used to reduce the negative impact of spoilers and improve the chances of negotiated peace deals.<sup>145</sup>

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<sup>141</sup> Adebaba Brian and Prendergas John. Spoiler Alert: The African Union's and IGAD's Contribution to South Sudan's War. (Enough Project, 2018).

<sup>142</sup> Horn Institute. *Managing Spoilers in the Democratic Republic of the Congo*. Horn Policy Brief No. 11 (2018)

<sup>143</sup> Ibid

<sup>144</sup> Kastrati, Bilbil. *Methods Used to Deal with Peace Process Spoilers*. ILIRIA International Review. 343 Vol.4 (Research Gate, 2014)

<sup>145</sup> Horn Institute. *Managing Spoilers in the Democratic Republic of the Congo*. Horn Policy Brief No. 11 (Horn Institute, 2018)



### 3.3 Findings

The study established the presence of an array of actors involved in conflict early warning within the Ilemi Triangle. The actors ranged from Non-governmental organizations, namely the Agency for Pastoralists Development (APaD) and the Shalom Center for Conflict Resolution and Reconstruction (SCCRR) and Peace Committees. Local Elders, reformed warriors and local administrators are also involved. Notably, the study also established the involvement of women's groups in the initiatives; an indicator of progress in the recognition of their significance and presence to conflict management and early warning, areas in which their contribution has been long sidelined.

Findings from the study revealed that local administrators, community elders and peace committees played the most significant role in the implementation of CEWR mechanisms to avert conflict within the Ilemi Triangle as in Table 3.1. Local administrators were seen to have the most important role to play in the implementation of the area's early warning and response mechanisms in addition to being considered as the most crucial to their effectiveness in preventing conflict. Elders were also considered to play an important role in implementation, though majority consider them to be only moderately effective at the task, and only a few considered them to be quite or very effective in the task. Peace committees came third based on the responses, with many considering them only moderately effective. Reformed warriors were considered to have the fourth most important role, and were generally viewed as effective in that. Organizations – Agency for Pastoralists Development (APaD) and Shalom Centre for

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Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation (SCCRR) were also mentioned, and widely considered to be moderately effective. Despite the findings showcasing the women's involvement in early warning, their contribution was rated as the least significant by study respondents and was also opined as having marginal importance towards the success of the mechanisms as compared to that of the other players as seen in Table 3.1 and Figure 3.1 respectively below.

**Table 0.1: Actors involved in the implementation of conflict early warning and early response mechanisms within the Ilemi triangle and significance of their roles in the same.**

	Very Effective	Effective	Moderate	Poor	Very Poor	<b>TOTAL</b>
Local Administrators	33	36	8	1	0	<b>78</b>
Elders	17	19	30	9	2	<b>77</b>
Peace Committees	20	17	24	1	0	<b>62</b>
Reformed Warriors	10	16	4	4	1	<b>35</b>
Agency for Pastoralists Development (APaD)	6	5	14	3	5	<b>33</b>
Shalom Centre for Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation (SCCRR)	5	9	18	1	0	<b>33</b>
Women Groups	1	1	3	2	1	<b>8</b>

Source: Field Data




Figure 0.1: Effectiveness of the role of different actors towards the success of early warning and response mechanisms in the Ilemi Triangle.

Source: Field Data

Further factor analysis, however, revealed that only three of the above actors play a significant role in implementing early warning systems to avert conflict. This is evident from the scree plot - Figure 3.2- that only three components had Eigenvalues of at least 1.00, which together explain 66.22% of the variations in the roles, as indicated in the total variance explained as in Table 3.2 below. Thus, the Rotated Component Matrix Table (Table 3.3), showcased that elders, peace committees and reformed warriors play the central role in the implementation of early warning mechanisms because they are the ones that most explain the three components in question. This goes to explain the position that grassroots actors, who are in close touch with the community, are regarded to be most effective in understanding the community's conflict dynamics, the signs and means of averting its occurrence.




Figure 0.2: Scree Plot for Role of Actors in Implementing Early Warning Systems

Source: Field Data

Table 0.2: Total Variance Explained for Role of Actors in Implementing Early Warning Systems

Component	Total Variance Explained								
	Initial Eigenvalues			Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings			Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	2.034	29.051	29.051	2.034	29.051	29.051	1.985	28.353	28.353
2	1.390	19.860	48.911	1.390	19.860	48.911	1.382	19.739	48.092
3	1.212	17.315	66.226	1.212	17.315	66.226	1.269	18.133	66.226
4	.812	11.599	77.825						
5	.665	9.504	87.330						
6	.505	7.210	94.539						
7	.382	5.461	100.000						

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Source: Field Data

Table 0.3: Rotated Component Matrix for Role of Actors in Implementing Early Warning Systems

### Rotated Component Matrix<sup>a</sup>

	Component		
	1	2	3
sccrr	-.828		
reformed_worriors	.822		
apad	-.650	.188	-.424
women_groups		-.821	.275
elders		.760	.328
peace_committeees	.276	.224	.679
local_admins	.352	.197	-.663

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. <sup>a</sup>

a. Rotation converged in 4 iterations.

Source: Field Data

Conversely, the study also established the presence of actors who undermine the implementation and effectiveness of conflict early warning and response mechanisms in the Ilemi Triangle. Notably, politicians and community elders were listed as of having the highest negative impact on early warning mechanism in the area. Politicians led the fold of actors who negatively impact the implementation of conflict early warning systems in the Ilemi Triangle, having been cited by 51% of the respondents. 38% cited elders and 31% women groups, who are seen to exert more negative than positive impact on the implementation. Unreformed warriors and local administrators were cited by 30% and 23% of the respondents respectively as negatively impacting early warning mechanisms, while seers and the poor were similarly cited by 18% and 5% respectively as demonstrated in Figure 3.3 below.




Figure 0.3: Actors negatively impacting implementation of Conflict early warning mechanisms in the Ilemi Triangle.

Source: Field Data

A factor analysis of the variables pointed to elders as having the most negative effect on the implementation of early warning mechanism.as they had the highest communality as revealed in. Table 3.4 below, explaining 81.3% of the variance in this particular variable. Local administrators come next, explained 65.5% of the variations, and unreformed warriors explained 64%. Women groups and seers explained 58.8% and 58.1% respectively. Politicians explain 55.2% and the poor explain 40.6%.

Table 0.4: Communalities for Actors with negative impact on implementation of early warning

**Communalities**


	Initial	Extraction
local_admins_neg	1.000	.655
unreformed_worriors	1.000	.640
women_groups_neg	1.000	.588
politicians	1.000	.552
seers	1.000	.581
the_poor	1.000	.406
elders_neg	1.000	.813

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Source: Field Data

In further exploration of the factors motivating the negative action of the preceding actors, political and cultural factors were listed. Majorly, search for political mileage such as popularity and influence as listed by 49% of respondents and cultural factors such as inclinations of warriors to defiance as a form of exhibition of courage which is admirable in society and to women suitors listed by 44% of respondents. Additionally, culturally pinned motivations to own several herds of cattle as a sign of wealth and for dowry payment were also listed by 38% of respondents as encouraging cattle rustling and undermining the acceptance and implementation of conflict early warning mechanisms in the area. This was also linked to the inadvisability of unreformed warriors who still hold on to the traditional cultural beliefs, thereby remaining uninformed on the negative impacts of conflict and importance of adopting early warning mechanisms to avert conflict.

Further, similar to previous studies, this study also established that community elders and spiritual seers negatively influenced the implementation of early warning mechanisms through exerting influence and pressure on the warriors to partake cattle rustling against rival ethnic communities. Lack of cooperation by local administrators in terms of taking required action against signs of impending conflict as reported by locals also acted to undermine early warning information sharing and the execution of conflict prevention measures such as deployment of security and holding of dialogue as per 23% of respondents. The preceding is illustrated in Figure 3.4 below.



Source: Field Data

Figure 0.4: Factors motivating negative action against implementation of early warning mechanisms in the Ilemi Triangle.



Notably, the study findings indicate that certain actors play both enabling and diverting or off-setting roles to the implementation of early warning mechanisms and the forestalling of conflict in the Ilemi Triangle. For instance, majority (49%) of the respondents cited political interests such as pursuit for popularity or influence as a reason for their response, while 51% mentioned politicians among the actors with negative impact. 44% also cited cultural inclinations to view defiance as courage, encouraged by both women and a sect of elders, was actualized by unreformed warriors engaging in cattle rustling in the area. Community leaders, local administrators and warriors who were listed by respondents as playing central roles in the implementation of conflict early warning mechanisms, were also listed as impeding the same. This could be attributable to the level of sensitization and awareness of the negative impacts of conflict and the centrality of early warning in forestalling the same. For instance, unreformed warriors-hereby indicative of those un-sensitized on conflict and early warning- were listed by 65% of respondents as contributors to conflict as opposed to their reformed counterparts who were listed by 35% of the respondents as facilitating the successful implementation of conflict early warning mechanisms. The negative impact of unreformed warriors on the implementation early warning was associated to their inadvisability on its significance and also the hold on cultural beliefs encouraging of cattle rustling and ethnic rivalry.

Similar to this, community elders who were listed as the second most important actors towards the successful implementation of early warning mechanisms by 77% of respondents. They were also listed by 65 % of respondents as negatively influencing the implementation of the mechanisms. Here again, the levels of sensitization and awareness creation amongst the community leaders could be the differentiating factor in their behavior and action towards conflict early warning and conflict prevention efforts. A similar trend was also observed with

the spiritual seers who were listed as both enabling and impeding implementation of the mechanisms. The three players as established by other studies, are key in shaping the opinion and participation of community members in conflict. Community elders and seers are for instance mentioned as encouraging warrior participation in raids to gain part of the proceeds of the raids as alimony by the warriors.

The central role of local administrators as among the primary formal actors in conflict warning and prevention was also demonstrated by the study. As opined by 78% of study respondents, local administrators were listed as the most important actors towards the successful implementation of early warning mechanisms in the Ilemi Triangle. Conversely, they were also listed as undermining the implementation of the mechanisms by 55% of study respondents, a factor linked to their lack of coordination and cooperation towards addressing the issues raised by the early warning mechanisms in the Ilemi. This can also be linked to their lack of sensitization and awareness on the significance of the mechanisms. Additionally, low levels of literacy amongst the communities in the Ilemi as established by the study could be informing their low levels of awareness and appreciation of the importance of conflict early warning and conflict prevention.

Despite indications of the involvement of women in conflict early warning mechanisms in the Ilemi, as elucidated before their participation is marginal and regarded by respondents as bearing little significance on the implementation of early warning. Their marginal participation could be informed by the predominance of cultural beliefs and practices limiting their overt participation in decision making roles and their lower literacy levels as compared to men as is found in pastoralist communities. Worth noting is that women are also both enablers and impediments to the implementation of early warning and conflict prevention measures. The

women could be enabling the mechanisms owing to their growing sense of awareness on the significance of averting conflict through early warning, but un-sensitized women enable conflict and undermine implementation of early warning through their indirect roles of emboldening warriors to participate in cattle rustling or ethnic rivalry as a form of their admiration of the masculine traits underpinned in their culture.

### **3.4 Conclusion**

A wide array of actors are engaged in the implementation of conflict early warning mechanisms in the Ilemi Triangle. elders, local administrators, peace committees and warriors are central to the successful implementation of the mechanisms in their respective orders as per the study. Notably the same actors are listed as impacting the implantation of the initiatives. These chapter findings reveal that various actors involved in CEWS have a double-edged impact on the operationalization of CEWS, one that is not entirely positive as postulated by the second hypothesis of this study. This double-edged impact has been linked to the lack of sensitization and awareness on the significance of conflict prevention and the application of early warning towards the same amongst some of them. The predominance of cultural practices encouraging cattle rustling and ethnic rivalry including low literacy levels amongst the communities could also be factors informing this.

Despite the study showcasing the involvement of women in the implementation of the initiatives their role is marginal and though sections of them act facilitate the successful implementation of the initiatives, they majorly impede the processes through their indirect promotion of cultural practices encouraging of cattle rustling and ethnic rivalry as admirable masculine traits amongst warriors. Summarily, sensitization and awareness creation on the benefits of averting conflict as opposed to encouraging it as underpinned in cultural preferences

and the significance of early warning towards the same are central to shaping the impact of lead actors in the successful implementation of early warning mechanisms in the Ilemi Triangle.

Study findings pointing to community elders, local administrators, peace committees and warriors as central to the successful implementation of the mechanisms is linked to assertions of previous studies that indigenous communities are best aware of the conflict dynamics affecting them and are best placed to address them through early warning mechanisms to avert their escalation. This is further evident in the findings which place local NGOs as playing the next central role vis a vis the state administration and security agencies which come in after. This is so in light of the higher proximity of the NGOs to the grassroots and community members as opposed to the state agents. These findings situate the significance of the grassroots in aiding early detection of signs of conflict which the Conflict Prevention theory argues aids the effective forestalling of impending conflict.

The findings also point to the detrimental effect of spoilers to the success of early warning and wider conflict resolution mechanisms based on their interest. The underlying interests of community leaders, spiritual seers and local administrators for wealth, financial or social clout benefits have been established as negating their contribution to the effective implementation of early warning mechanisms in the Ilemi area, despite their recognition by respondents as being among the most important actors in towards implementation of the initiatives. The negative impact of spoilers also negates the hypothesis that various actors involved in CEWS, have a positive impact on their operationalization and effectiveness in averting conflict.

**CHAPTER FOUR**  
**FACTORS INFLUENCING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF EARLY**  
**WARNING SYSTEMS**

**4.1 Introduction**

This chapter seeks to assess factors affecting the effectiveness of conflict early warning and response mechanisms. The persistence of conflict and other crises like civil conflicts, spread of terrorism and refugee crises albeit the existence of conflict prevention measures, has levelled criticism over the concept and existing early warning systems in the national, regional or global levels.<sup>146</sup> Against contrary expectations, some scholars have argued against the array of conflict prevention and early warning mechanisms, particularly pointing to the inability of the international community to prevent the Rwandan genocide, with some like Dabelstein<sup>147</sup> arguing that little preparation exists for the prevention of a similar genocide and other international crises EWER mechanisms have be criticized for being reactive, mostly simulating crisis management, instead of preventive actions<sup>148</sup>, with most shortcomings being linked to technical and political issues. Along with a review of previous works on factors impacting the

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<sup>146</sup> Martineau S. Red Flags: A Model for the Early Warning of Refugee Outflows, “Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies”. Vol 8(2). (Researchgate, 2010).

<sup>147</sup> Dabelstein N. Evaluating the International Humanitarian System: Rationale, Process and Management of the Joint Evaluation of the International Response to the Rwanda Genocide, Disasters. (Researchgate, 1996).

<sup>148</sup> Ibid

effectiveness of conflict early warning systems, the chapter also details findings on factors impeding the effectiveness of such systems in the Ilemi Triangle.

#### **4.2 Warning-Response Gap**

The gap between conflict warning and response has significantly impaired the effectiveness of CEWS in averting conflict.<sup>149</sup> Majorly, this has been attributed weak synergy between early warning mechanisms and policy decision makers. Similarly, in their examination of examples of early warning mechanisms in fragile states at brink of instability and violence, Rohwerder,<sup>150</sup> observes that the greatest challenge in conflict early warning systems is their inability to translate into preventive responses or actions. Primarily, early warning mechanisms operate on the assumption of a forthright link between warning and response action. However, the theoretical assumption that early warning analysis and risk indicators necessarily translate into practical action does not always hold. Such as Stepka<sup>151</sup> have attributed it to intelligence failures, international crises and genocides and pointed to the imperfection of conflict prevention policies, including early warning mechanisms. Generally, successful prevention has been linked to identification of potential conflict situations, proper analysis of risk indicators,

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<sup>149</sup> IPI. Preventing Conflicts in Africa: Early Warning and Response. (IPI, 2012).

<sup>150</sup> Rohwerder, Brigitte. 2015. Conflict Early Warning and Early Response. Governance, Social Development, Humanitarian. Conflict Organization (GSDRC).  
<http://www.gsdr.org/docs/open/hdq1195.pdf>

<sup>151</sup> Stepka, Maciej. 2016. "Assessing Risks. A Critical Perspective on Conflict Early Warning Systems." *Studies in Politics and Society* 4(14): 114–25

and the political will to take the right action when it is needed including synergy in actions between regional, continental, and international early-warning structures<sup>152</sup>.

The warning-response gap has also been amplified by the stipulated threshold set for early warning material to warrant political action. In this regard for instance, early warning work by NGO's, CSO's and other non-state actors is required to meet higher thresholds to warrant consideration or political action by state or governmental authorities. On the contrary, owing to efficient state machinery, state sponsored early warning data collection and accompanying policy response through government agencies is prompt.

In the context of the AU and its linked CEWS, the linkages between early warning and response is influenced by the political will of decision makers, compatibility of the organizational cultures of the respective CEWS vis a vis the AU as well as the degree to which the conflict risk indicators emerging from CEWS are de-politicized.<sup>153</sup> Further, Maru<sup>154</sup> identifies the limited collaboration between decision-makers at the AU and conflict early warning experts in the CEWS as restraining the flow of early warning information between the two and thus impacting the effectiveness of response measures to be taken.

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<sup>152</sup> IPI. Preventing Conflicts in Africa: Early Warning and Response. (IPI, 2012).

<sup>153</sup> Maru, Makda, "Conflict Early Warning and the Response Nexus: The Case of the African Union-Continental Early Warning System" (2016). *Doctoral Dissertation*. (Kennesaw State University, 2016).

<sup>154</sup> Ibid.

### 4.3 Political Will

Despite the prevalence of the foregoing in undermining synergy between early warning and response, more importantly the lack of political will on the part of the policy decision makers to implement needed responses. In this regard, it has been argued that despite the accuracy of early warning mechanisms in assessing the risk of overt conflict, complimentary response measures are dependent on the effective utilization of the risk indicators by the decision makers at the political level, such as in the UN Security Council or AU Council.<sup>155</sup> Rohwerder<sup>156</sup>, similarly argues that adding onto the challenge of making accurate predictions from the risk information collected, is persuading appropriate response actions from political leaders and the public. The practical application of early warning mechanisms is pegged on the political will of policy makers to implement needed responses, with the failure of early warning systems or global conflict frameworks to stall conflicts being linked to this. The foregoing also explains the involvement of early warning institutions in lobbying varied political actors and even grass-roots actors to implement or accept their recommendations. For instance <sup>157</sup> Stepka points to the efforts of international NGO's involved in early warning in applying an array of lobbying to encourage rapid responses of their conflict risk assessments and proposed policy

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<sup>155</sup>Zartman I.W., *Conflict Management as Cooperation*. (Pearson, 2010).

<sup>156</sup> Rohwerder, Brigitte. 2015. *Conflict Early Warning and Early Response*. Governance, Social Development, Humanitarian. Conflict Organization (GSDRC).  
<http://www.gsdrc.org/docs/open/hdq1195.pdf>

<sup>157</sup> Stepka, Maciej. 2016. "Assessing Risks. A Critical Perspective on Conflict Early Warning Systems." *Studies in Politics and Society* 4(14): 114–25



recommendations through engagements with both grass-root and high political-level actors. This understanding on the importance of political will can be extended to the efforts of regional early warning mechanisms in interacting with and incorporating the actions of their international counterparts; the reverse of which equivocally holds, in a bid to consolidate political will and action to support early warning and response in prominent conflicts and global crises.<sup>158</sup>

In understanding the loop between early warning reporting and the appropriate action under the political will of policy makers, two explanations have been fronted; with the first linking it to the technicality with which the early warning material or content is presented and delivered to policy makers and secondly with on the way the warnings perceived by the policy makers including politicians.<sup>159</sup> In the first instance, recommendations are for the writing of early warnings in a manner tailored to elicit specified actions by the policy decision makers, including through putting forward recommendations and policy guidelines beyond the prognosis and analysis of risks, lack of which results in non-action by the policy makers. In this regard, Odote<sup>160</sup> states that the collection and analysis of risk data are very crucial in

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<sup>158</sup> Othman, Jamilah, Azahari Ismail, Jinwon Kim, and Jeffrey Lawrence D'Silva.

*International Actors for Armed Conflict Prevention: A Conceptual Exploration*. Asian Social Science. Vol (9)15 (Researchgate, 2013).

<sup>159</sup> Stepka, Maciej. 2016. "Assessing Risks. A Critical Perspective on Conflict Early Warning Systems." *Studies in Politics and Society* 4(14): 114–25

<sup>160</sup> Odote, Petrolinus. *Role of Early Warning Systems in Conflict Prevention in Africa*. Phd Thesis, (University of Nairobi, 2016).

supporting the anticipation of a disaster and also importantly in shaping the suitable early response that seeks to avert particular conflict situation. In the latter case, the psycho-social position of the policy makers is thought to influence their willingness and ability to act on early warning. Such could include the perception, interests, politics and organizational culture of individuals and institutions in the policy making environment. Consequently as argued by Meyer and others,<sup>161</sup> early warning assessors need to acknowledge the mundane factors associated with potential policy actors, particularly as regards their risk appetite, policy priorities, personal and institutional agenda, instruments at disposal for preventive action including costs and lead-time, including the effects of their electoral cycles, in a bid to better tailor risk communication and proposed policy action for them.

Another notable explanation for political inaction against early warning is offered by ‘the by-stander effect’ theory of Levine and Thompson<sup>162</sup> which links political inaction by policy decision makers towards early warning or conflict prevention measures to intimidating circumstances, personal or group inclinations and the perception of insufficient benefits of the intervention. The theory lists interests and motives as the main inhibitors to political action and

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<sup>161</sup> Meyer C. Otto F. Brante J. Franco C. 2010. *Recasting the Warning-Response Problem: Persuasion and Preventive Policy*. International Studies Review. Vol12 No (4). (Research gate, 2010).

<sup>162</sup> Levine M. Thompson K. Identity, Place, and Bystander Intervention: Social Categories and Helping After Natural Disasters. *The Journal of Social Psychology*, Vol 144(3)Pp 229-245. (Researchgate, 2004).

associating lack of international response to some conflicts or crises to the multiple interests of different policy makers which do not align with requisite conflict prevention actions.

Such understanding has informed efforts to lobby action on early warning based on the interests of potential policy actors, including through the securitization of issues or angling of potential conflict situations or crises as national or international security issues in line with the political agenda security culture or concrete political interests of a specific country or organization,<sup>163</sup> in a bid to elicit their action. This has however been criticized for shifting focus from conflict prevention to the negative implications of the conflicts or crises. Summarily, unpacking the political will of policy decision makers thereby remains crucial for the effectiveness of conflict risk assessments and early warning mechanisms in averting conflicts or crises.

In Africa, commitment and consensus or political will among policy decision makers within the AU and constituent CEWS and the de-politicization of early warning indicators as critical for triggering early response decisions to emerging conflicts. Consequently, an analysis of the influence of political will on AU decisions to implement responses to early warning indicators of conflict indicates the decision makers' reluctance to deliberate early warning signals of powerful African countries and placed preference for continental welfare over national

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<sup>163</sup> Stepka, Maciej. 2016. "Assessing Risks. A Critical Perspective on Conflict Early Warning Systems." *Studies in Politics and Society* 4(14): 114–25

interests.<sup>164</sup> Their lack of authority to impose decisions on member states also demotivates formulation of response policies.

#### **4.4 Timeliness and Proximity**

The timeliness of early warnings and the proximity of the risk assessors to both the conflict theatres and policy decision makers impacts the effectiveness of early warning mechanisms in forestalling conflict. In their review of research on conflict prevention Ackermann<sup>165</sup> identifies timeliness as one of the conditions necessary for preventive action, enlisting similar views by Zartman<sup>166</sup> who argues that the right preventive action should be accompanied by right timing. In Africa, achieving timeliness in some instances has been difficult, with most early-warning mechanisms identifying signs of violence retrospectively after the outbreak of violence. In the same line, Odote<sup>167</sup> points to the limited ability of already functional early warning systems in Africa to recognize areas of imminent dangers in good time for successful preventive measures to be assumed.

In explicating proximity, geographical and political proximity have been identified as influencing the effectiveness of early warning mechanisms. This is as illustrated in rising

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<sup>164</sup> Maru, Makda, "Conflict Early Warning and the Response Nexus: The Case of the African Union-Continental Early Warning System" (2016). *Doctoral Dissertation*. (Kennesaw State University, 2016).

<sup>165</sup> Ackermann, A. *The Idea and Practice of Conflict Prevention*. Journal of Peace Research, Vol 40. Pp 399-347. (Research Gate, 2003).

<sup>166</sup> Zartman I.W. 2010. *Conflict Management as Cooperation*. Pearson. New York.

<sup>167</sup> Odote, Peterlinus. *Role of Early Warning Systems in Conflict Prevention in Africa*. Phd Thesis, (University of Nairobi, 2016).

preference for and development of security architectures which call for the employment of preventive strategies and actions by regional and nation-state mechanisms which enjoy geographical and decision making proximity to potential conflict theatres as opposed to initial arrangements which placed the UN at the center stage, instead focusing its attention on preventing conflicts which can bring out large-scale international ramifications such as the Rwanda genocides and issuing technical assistance to the former when needed.<sup>168</sup>

The disconnect or distance between local communities and early warning risk assessors on the one hand and policy decision makers on the other has also impacted effectiveness of early warning mechanisms. Owing to the predominance of governments or international organizations in CEWR, the initiatives are usually designed at national or global level. Such design, driven by policy decision makers, often lacks touch with the local contexts to which they should be applied, negatively impacting their successes, specifically, in the areas of risk knowledge, monitoring, warning communication and response capability.<sup>169</sup> Additionally, minimal incorporation of local participation and indigenous knowledge in the initiatives also complicates their effectiveness in forestalling conflict.<sup>170</sup>

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<sup>168</sup> United Nations, General Assembly, Security Council. (2001). Prevention of Armed Conflict: Report of the Secretary-General.

<sup>169</sup> Macherera Margaret and Chimbari Moses. *A Review of Studies On Community Based Early Warning Systems*. (Jamba, 2016) Vol 8 (1)

<sup>170</sup> Ibid.

## 4.5 Structure

In Africa, the presence or lack of structure or methodological mechanisms for the collection, analysis and dissemination of conflict indicators has been assessed to impacts the effectiveness of early warning mechanisms. Inadequacies of early warning methodological frameworks have resulted in ad-hoc responses or tactical as opposed to long-term strategic responses to conflict<sup>171</sup> As such de-linked early warning structures have resulted in uncoordinated and ineffective responses to conflict situations. In this regard, coherence and coordination between state, regional global level early warning frameworks and also their cooperation with non-state actors such as CSO's and NGO's involved in early warning.

In the case of Africa, hierarchical organizational structures, limit the sharing conflict early warning information between CEWS and policy makers in the AU.

## 4.6 Findings

In this section, the study sought to establish factors that play an active role in promoting and inhibiting the implementation of the early warning mechanisms for the aversion of conflict and the factors which facilitate the implementation thereof within the Ilemi Triangle. The section did not involve deductive analysis as the questions were limited to a set of choices and there were few factors involved. It sought to discover the popular opinion on what promotes the occurrence of conflict; what facilitate the implementation of the conflict early warning systems;

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<sup>171</sup> Odote, Peterlinus. Role of Early Warning Systems in Conflict Prevention in Africa. Phd Thesis, (University of Nairobi, 2016).

and the factors that constrain the implementation thereof. Despite reckoning that the existing early warning systems in the area are crucial in facilitating peaceful coexistence between communities in the area, respondents listed various factors which were promoting and antagonistic to their purpose.

The elucidation of factors promoting the occurrence of conflict sought in this section were not necessarily the causes of the conflict in the area, but the catalytic factors that fuel the incidence of conflict when the root cause of the conflict is already apparent. The study found that just like the causes of conflict, competition for scarce resources was cited by a vast majority (99%) as a major promoter of the occurrence of conflict in the Ilemi Triangle. 98% cited long-standing hatred between ethnic communities; 89% accessibility to small arms; 86% marginalisation by authorities; 78% disputed territories; and 69% cited the lack of state presence as a promoter of conflict in the area as shown in Figure 4.1. In this regard, some discrepancy in comparing the above listed catalysers of conflict with the previous findings on the causes of conflict in the area, for instance, revealed that while accessibility to small arms was considered by the least proportion of the respondents as a source of conflict in the Ilemi area, 89% consider it to be a promoter of conflict. This implies that even though the accessibility to small arms does not instigate conflict most of the time, it builds confidence in warriors and can easily start a violent conflict if other causes are involved.




Figure 0.1: Factors Promoting Conflict in Ilemi Triangle

Source: Field Data

Information sharing and inter-agency cooperation were found to be the most cited factors facilitating the implementation of early warning systems, each mentioned by 99% of the respondents. 98% listed inter-communal peace pacts; and ongoing 94% disarmament and demobilization; while 78% said border determination and demarcation mechanisms as facilitating the implementation of early warning systems. This is detailed in Figure 4.2 below.

On the other front, poor information sharing and weak institutional capacity were recognized as the main impediments to the ability of early warning systems to avert impending conflicts in the area by 98% and 96% of respondents. Additionally, absence of state structures and compromised security agents were also listed by 93% and 81% of respondents as negatively impacting the mechanisms as showcased in Figure 4.2 below.






Figure 0.2: Factors facilitating the implementation of early warning systems

Source: Field Data

Conversely, weak information sharing was the most cited factor in constrain or inhibit the implementation of early warning systems, mentioned by 98% of the respondents. Weak institutional capacity came next, having been cited by 96% of the respondents; and the absence of government was cited by 93%; while compromised security agents was mentioned by 81% of the respondents. Figure 4.3 below showcases these.




Figure 0.3: Factors constraining the implementation of early warning systems

Source: Field Data

#### 4.7 Conclusion

The study findings point to the presence of both enabling and impeding factors towards the effectiveness of existing early warning systems, confirming the study hypothesis that various underlying factors influence the effectiveness of CEWS in Africa. Notably, several factors which were also considered to be the causes of conflict in the area also appeared as catalyzers of conflict and thereby impediments to the success of early warning mechanisms. In this regard certain factors such as the accessibility to small arms was considered by the least proportion of the respondents as a cause of conflict in the Ilemi area, 89% consider it to be a promoter of conflict after it has broken out, hence impeding the success of CEWS. This implies that even though the accessibility to small arms does not instigate conflict most of the time, it builds confidence in warriors and can easily start a violent conflict if other causes are involved. Caution is thus needed in distinguishing the conflict root causal factors and conflict catalysers towards the appropriate implementation of early warning and conflict prevention measures.

Structural, political and institutional factors have been identified as such by both reviewed works and the findings of this study. Specific to this study, structural factors related to capacities for information sharing and interagency cooperation and were listed as affecting the ability of early warning systems to avert conflict pointing to shortcomings of coordinated approaches in the Ilemi CEWS, a factor the Conflict Prevention Theory cautions as likely to result in the escalation of conflicts.

Further, the study identified lack of state presence and political goodwill for implementation of supportive initiatives such as disarmament and demobilization and the demarcation of borders as other structural factor undermining CEWS. This points to the centrality of the state in the implementation and sustainability of CEWS in Africa. Additionally, success of grassroots early warning and conflict prevention measures such as those championed by community leaders and Non-governmental are linked and dependent on wider policy and structural support by states and their linked interests, also demonstrating the need for coordinated approaches for the success of CEWS in Africa. Consequently, the study findings point to the apparent central role of the state in implementing relevant structural and institutional mechanisms to augment early warning systems and conflict prevention in Africa.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### 1. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### 5.1 Introduction

This study sought to contribute to knowledge on conflict management, specifically on the role of early warning systems in Africa. The study endeavored to explore and contextualize the links between early warning and conflict prevention within the Ilemi Triangle, an area which has been long typified by conflict, notwithstanding similar presence of conflict early warning and prevention measures and suitable to yield on the study objectives. The study's overall objective was to critically examine the role of conflict early warning mechanisms in forestalling conflict in Africa. This was achieved specifically through an assessment of the perceived role existing early warning systems play in preventing overt conflict in the Ilemi Triangle, the impact of various actors on the operationalization of the mechanisms and the factors influencing the effectiveness of the early warning systems in preventing the impending conflicts.

#### 5.2 Summary of Key Findings

In regard to dynamics of conflict and conflict prevention within the Ilemi Triangle the following was noted;

**Conflict and conflict early warning measures:** the presence of conflict was noted with moderate occurrence, with competition for scarce resources, longstanding hatred amongst different ethnic communities and marginalization by authorities identified as the main drivers of conflict in the area. Additionally, revenge and disputed borders were also listed as catalyzers of conflict. Alongside the presence of conflict, various conflict prevention measures are present

in the Ilemi Triangle. Peace dialogues, awareness creation and implementation of CEWR measures were listed as the most applied conflict prevention measures.

Prevalent knowledge of early warning as a way of conflict prevention was noted with 95% of respondents indicating such awareness and about 92% indicating that they actually get access to early warning information regarding possible conflicts in their areas. Hate speech, and intentional misinformation or disinformation against rival groups are the major signs of impending conflict in the area. Behavioral change of rival groups including the regrouping and isolation of warriors, imminent resource scarcity, burning of pasture, livestock theft and unexplained migration of people and livestock are also ranked signs of conflict.

With regard to conflict early warning, information sharing and awareness creation by various agencies, presence of frameworks for dialogue and mediation, existing links for information sharing and coordination with security agencies and the creation of pasture sharing plans were listed as the forms of conflict early warning mechanisms present in the Ilemi Triangle. The effectiveness of these mechanisms in averting impending conflict was averagely rated with 30% rating the effectiveness as very good and 24% as fair. These early warning mechanisms played a significant role in facilitating peaceful co-existence and the building of trust amongst communities in the Ilemi triangle, enhancing possibilities for mediation and negotiation in resolving conflicts, driving collective responsibility for security by different parties in the area besides curbing stock theft and other forms of crime and fostering a conducive environment for business.

Assessments on the role of various actors on the operationalization of conflict early warning mechanisms in the Ilemi Triangle are detailed below.

**Role of Actors in implementation of conflict early warning:** The study established the presence of an array of actors involved in conflict early warning within the Ilemi Triangle. local administrators, community elders and peace committees played the most important actors in the implementation of CEWR mechanisms. Reformed warriors and the two NGOs, SCCRR and ApaD were listed as the next important in the implementation of early warning mechanisms in the Ilemi Triangle. Despite the findings showcasing the women's involvement in early warning, their contribution was rated as the least significant by study respondents and was also opined as having marginal importance towards the success of the mechanisms as compared to that of the other players.

Politicians and Community Elders were listed as of having the highest negative impact on the implementation of early warning mechanism in the area, as regarded by 70% and 65%, of study respondents respectively. Certain actors play both enabling and off- setting roles to the application of conflict early warning mechanisms and in the Ilemi Triangle, over political, cultural and economic motivations. Notably, community leaders, local administrators and warriors who were listed by respondents as playing central roles in the implementation of conflict early warning mechanisms, were also listed as impeding the same. Women were also established as both enablers and impediments to the implementation of early warning owing to prevailing Cultural underpinnings that determine their social roles and preferences.

In an assessment of issues that impact the success of conflict early warning systems in forestalling conflict within the Ilemi Triangle the below was established by the study;

**Factors affecting effectiveness of early warning mechanisms in averting conflict:** The study identified factors which were promoting and antagonistic to the effectiveness of early

warning mechanisms in forestalling conflict in the Ilemi Triangle. On the enabling front, information sharing, and interagency cooperation were listed as most enabling to the effectiveness of early warning mechanisms in averting conflict in the area as listed by 99% of study respondents. Ongoing disarmament and demobilization initiatives and efforts to delimit and demarcate borders in the areas were also highly regarded as aiding early warning and conflict prevention. Poor information sharing and weak institutional capacity were recognized as the main impediments to the success of conflict early warning systems to avert impending conflicts in the area by 98% and 96% of respondents. Additionally, absence of state structures and compromised security agents were also listed by 93% and 81% of respondents as negatively impacting the mechanisms.

### **5..3 Conclusion**

Similar to other regions in the world, the change to proactive as compared to reactionary approaches to conflict management have risen in Africa, with conflict early warning and systems taking root as one of the forms of conflict prevention mechanisms. The systems are intended to identify and analyze conflict trends, alert decision makers on the risk of conflict towards informing timely responses to prevent violent conflict<sup>172</sup> with a view to averting their occurrence and destabilizing implications. Specifically, Early Warning mechanisms seek to alert decision makers of the potential outbreak, escalation and resurgence of violent conflict

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<sup>172</sup> Peace Infrastructures, Early Warning and Early Response

(<https://peaceinfrastructures.org/>: Peace Infrastructures, Accessed 23 March 2022.

besides promoting understanding of the nature and impacts of violent conflict<sup>173</sup>. However, despite their presence, they have yielded mixed results, amid the persistence of conflicts in parts of the continent

In the Ilemi Triangle, incidences of conflict persist as corroborated by this study. Additionally, structural, political and institutional factors have been identified as impeding the effectiveness of existing conflict early warning systems in the area. Such have been determined by other studies listing, structural challenges uncoordinated response, the role of conflict entrepreneurs<sup>174</sup>, lackluster political will, technical capacity, funding and coordination challenges as impacting the role of early warning mechanisms in the region.<sup>175</sup> Recognizing the predominant awareness and significance of early warning mechanisms have had in forestalling conflict in the Ilemi Triangle as established by this study, efforts to address established challenges against their effectiveness by policy makers are paramount.

### **5.3.1 Conflict dynamics in the Ilemi Triangle:**

The continued presence of conflict in the Ilemi Triangle points to the need for similar presence of early warning mechanisms. Predominant levels of awareness of the negative impacts of conflict, signs of conflict and the significance of early warning mechanisms in

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<sup>173</sup> Defontaine Catherine, *Setting Up Early Warning and Response Systems to Prevent Violent Conflicts and Save Lives* (Development for Peace, 2019).

<sup>174</sup> Odote, Petrolinus. *Role of Early Warning Systems in Conflict Prevention in Africa*. Phd Thesis, (University of Nairobi, 2016).

<sup>175</sup> OSAA, *Regional Economic Communities and Conflict Prevention in Africa; An Overview of Capacity Gaps and Priority Needs* (OSAA, 2017).



averting the same point to rising acceptance and entrenchment of the mechanisms in the area. Additionally, the preceding is supported by Lund's theoretical propositions on recognition of signs in the initial phases to avert the threat of conflict. The persisting challenges of positioning the territorial and resource interests and claims of the different ethnic communities in the area and exploitation of the conflict for political mileage, including weak channels for information sharing of early warning information to security agencies continue to undermine the effectiveness of early warning mechanisms in preventing conflict and ensuring in the area despite the recognition of signs of conflict.

Similar to Lund's assertion that despite the vitality of early warning signs and indicators towards conflict prevention, such prevention through early warning becomes impossible if such signs are ignored, and if inclusive coordinated approaches to address the threats are absent. Similar to the findings of other studies, the persistence of parallel resource interests and lack of effective channels for the sharing of early warning information between the grassroots and policy makers have sustained conflict situations and gaps between early warning and response. In this regard, enhanced efforts to towards addressing resource sharing and coordination challenges are needed towards narrowing the gap between the identification of early warning and early action to prevent overt conflict in the Ilemi Triangle.

### **5.3.2 Actors in Conflict Early Warning**

A wide array of actors involved in the implementation of conflict early warning mechanisms in the Ilemi Triangle and impact their outcomes in averting conflict. The involvement and centrality of community elders, local administrators, peace committees and warriors to the successful implementation of the early warning mechanisms in the Ilemi, supports prepositions

for the instrumental role grassroots actors in the contextualization of early warning signs and appropriate response measures to avert conflict. The role of actors in early warning mechanisms is heavily impacted by their underlying interests. As such, considerations of the economic, political and cultural motivations of the above grassroots actors including women and warriors, are central in identifying their facilitating or ‘spoiler’ roles the implementation of early warning mechanisms. Relatedly, sensitization and awareness creation amongst these actors is useful in tailoring their understanding and roles in facilitating the mechanisms. The overarching and coordination roles of NGO’s and state-based agencies are important in supporting grassroots early warning information gathering and appropriate response.

### **5.3.3 Role of Early Warning systems in Forestalling conflict:**

Conflict early warning systems have yielded mixed results in forestalling conflict within Africa amid their rising application as a peace and security tool. Specifically, the mechanisms have had moderate effect in averting conflict in the region. These early warning mechanisms played a significant role in facilitating peaceful co-existence and the building of trust amongst communities affected by longstanding inter-ethnic rivalry and conflicts as in the Ilemi Triangle. Additionally, enhancing possibilities for mediation and negotiation in resolving conflicts, driving collective responsibility for security by different parties in the area besides curbing stock theft and other forms of crime and fostering a conducive environment for business. Broadly, structural, political and institutional factors impact the role of these mechanisms. Weak information sharing, coordination and cooperation including lack of institutional frameworks to support these functions of early warning systems weaken their effectiveness in forestalling conflict. Notably political goodwill is paramount for the implementation and

success of the early warning systems including supporting initiatives such as the disarmament and demobilization and the delimitation and demarcation of borders in the Ilemi and similar contexts. Consequently, the central role of the state in implementing relevant structural and institutional mechanisms to augment early warning systems in conflict prevention is apparent. Recognizing the predominant awareness and significance of early warning mechanisms have had in forestalling conflict efforts to address established challenges against their effectiveness by policy makers are paramount.

## **5.4 Recommendations**

Drawing from the preceding findings of the study the following research and policy recommendations would contribute to the advancement of the application conflict early warning systems in forestalling conflict in Africa.

### **5.4.1 Academic Recommendations**

Revelations of the study point to these academic and research recommendations:

- The study reveals that despite the ability of existing early warning mechanisms to identify signs of conflict within the Ilemi Triangle, weak and uncoordinated structures for the relaying of this information to policy actors, specifically, security agencies have undermined effective action against the impending conflicts. Exploration of ways of enhancing information sharing for timely response action in early warning mechanisms within Africa is needed.
- The study pointed to the double roles of certain grassroots actors of conflict early warning systems, including community leaders, warriors, spiritual actors and women as both facilitating and impeding to the success of their effectiveness in forestalling

conflict. Further research of the economic, political and cultural motivations for their antagonistic roles is needed towards further understanding and placement of their impact on the success of early warning mechanisms in Africa.

- Relatedly, despite the study revealing the participation of women in Africa's early warning systems, their participation and impact on their success in forestalling conflict remains marginal and undermined by socio-cultural factors. Further, exploration of the factors impeding the contribution of women and especially of cultural underpinnings which instead turn them into 'spoilers' in conflict early warning and prevention measures would aid the placement and enhancement of their role.

#### **5.4.2 Policy Recommendations**

The study derives the following recommendations for policy:

- There is need for enhanced involvement of grassroots actors in the implementation of conflict early warning mechanisms in the Ilemi Triangle, to harness local knowledge on conflict and appropriate response for their successful implementation. The study identified grassroots actors including community leaders, warriors, spiritual actors and women as being the central in the implementation of early warning functions especially in the identification of signs of impending conflicts.
- Recognizing the possibility of these grassroots actors adopting both enabling and impeding roles to the success of conflict early warning systems in forestalling conflict owing to economic, political and cultural interests, application of sensitization and awareness creation campaigns could aid the tilting of their contribution towards the success of these mechanisms.

- Towards supporting the central role of grassroots actors, state authorities in collaboration with NGO's which have close proximity to the community need to enhance the structural and institutional mechanisms for the coordination and cooperation of early warning functions and actors, such as through linkages between the information gathering by community leaders, NGO's and national or regional actors.
- Similarly, state support and sustainability of separate conflict resolution mechanisms such as the ongoing DDR and border demarcations are needed to complement the ability of early warning mechanisms in averting conflict.

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## APPENDICES

### APPENDIX I

#### QUESTIONNAIRE

##### A. Respondent Information (Tick as appropriate)

1. Age

2. Gender Female  Male

3. Ethnicity

Dassenach	<input type="checkbox"/>
Inayangatom	<input type="checkbox"/>
Didinga	<input type="checkbox"/>
Toposa	<input type="checkbox"/>
Turkana	<input type="checkbox"/>
Other	<input type="checkbox"/>

4. Education Primary  Secondary  Tertiary

5. Occupation.....  
...

**A. Role of Early Warning System in Preventing Conflict in the Ilemi Triangle**

1. In your opinion, how frequent is violent conflict in this area? (Please tick as appropriate)

Very frequent  Moderately Frequent  Rarely occur  Never Occur

2. What are the root causes of these conflicts in your area?

Long standing hatred between ethnic communities  Lack of official state presence

Competition for scarce resources (land, water, pasture)

Marginalization by authorities  Disputed territory and borders

Accessibility to Small arms and Weapons  Others [Briefly list]

3. What are some of the preventive measures taken by the community against these conflicts?

.....  
.....  
.....

4. Do you or your community get signs of impending conflicts in this area?

Yes  No  Sometimes



5. In your opinion what are the major signs of impending conflict in this area in order of priority?


6. Have you heard of the term Conflict Early Warning Systems?

Yes  No

7. Which Conflict Early Warning Systems exist in this area?

Yes  No

8. If yes, do the existing Conflict Early Warning systems give information on impending conflicts in the Ilemi Triangle?

Yes

No

9. In your opinion have existing conflict Early Warning systems aided the prevention of conflict within this area?

Yes

No

10. How would you rate the effectiveness of the conflict Early Warning systems in the prevention of conflict within this area?

Very Bad

Fair

Average

Good

Very Good

11. Give examples for your response above

.....  
.....  
.....

12. How would you rate the effectiveness of the above listed conflict Early Warning systems in implementing appropriate response measures to avert looming conflicts within this area?

Very Bad

Fair

Average

Good

Very Good

13. Give reasons for your response above.

.....

.....

.....

**B. Role of Actors in Conflict Early Warning Systems**

1. In your opinion which persons or organizations play the most important roles in the implementation of conflict Early Warning and Early Response mechanisms within the Ilemi Triangle?

1.....

2.....

3.....

4.....

5.....

2. In your opinion how would you rate the effectiveness of the above 5 persons or organizations in the performance of their roles in the implementation of conflict Early Warning and Early Response mechanisms within the Ilemi Triangle?

	Very Effective	Effective	Moderate	Poor	Very Poor
1					
2					
3					
4					
5					

3. In your opinion which persons or organizations prevent or negatively impact the implementation of conflict Early Warning and Early Response mechanisms within the Ilemi Triangle?

.....

.....

.....

4. In your opinion, why do the mentioned persons or organizations listed above negatively affect the implementation of conflict Early Warning and Early Response mechanisms within the Ilemi Triangle?

.....

.....

.....

.....

**C. Factors Influencing the Effectiveness of Conflict Early Warning Systems**

1. Which of the below factors promote the occurrence of conflict within the Ilemi Triangle?

Long standing hatred between ethnic communities  Lack of official state presence

Competition for scarce resources (land, water, pasture)

Marginalization by authorities  Disputed territory and borders

Accessibility to Small arms and Weapons  Others [Briefly list]

2. In your opinion what factors facilitate the implementation of conflict Early Warning and Early response mechanisms within the Ilemi Triangle?

Information Sharing

Interagency Cooperation

Border delimitation and demarcation mechanisms

Inter-communal peace pacts

Disarmament and demobilization mechanisms

Others [Briefly list]

3. Which factors constrain the implementation of conflict Early Warning and Early response mechanisms within the Ilemi Triangle?

Weak information sharing []

Compromised security agents []

Weak Institutional Capacity []

Absence of Government []

Others [Briefly list]