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
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The United Nations and Decolonization

For many African countries, this year marks a quarter-century of independence. The United Nations' resolution on colonialism provided the political framework for the decolonization process which swept the African continent in the late 1950s and early 1960s and revolutionized the international political arena.

BY DONALD F. McHENRY

Twenty-five years of African independence falls significantly short of the 40-year history of the United Nations. Yet African independence cannot be reviewed without noting the crucial role the United Nations played in bringing it to fruition. Nor can one review the past or look to the future of the United Nations without taking into account the impact African independence movements and independent states have had and will have on the organization. Indeed, the future of the UN may depend heavily upon how its new offspring learn to use it to resolve their complex development problems and political disagreements facing the community of nations which still too often lead to armed conflict.

For colonial Africa and for colonial peoples around the world, the promise of the United Nations outshone that of its predecessor, the League of Nations. Much of the wartime rhetoric—of the United States at least—portended a

world of people responsible for their own government. Indeed, one could hardly conduct the war in pursuit of the "four freedoms" without contemplating extensive changes in the international arena. Yet the U.S. envisioned a post-war world markedly different from that perceived by its allies. At Casablanca, Dumbarton Oaks, San Francisco, and the sites of other high-level meetings of World War II, these differences came to the fore and the philosophical frameworks which resulted from these talks were to reflect extensive compromises.

The League of Nations first introduced the concept that the international community had some oversight responsibility for the manner in which colonial peoples were treated by the country which claimed sovereignty over them. Such a concept was consistent with the views of the idealistic Woodrow Wilson who held that "the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization." Indeed, the League of Nations structure itself was a marked departure from the concept that to the victor goes the spoils.

The "spoils" of the losing side in World War I were placed under international oversight through the League of Nations' mandate system. Australia, Belgium, France, Japan, New Zealand, South Africa, and the United Kingdom

were given the responsibility for administering former German territories. And, indeed, whatever else may be said of the League, it seemed to have taken seriously its responsibility to look after its new wards—at least under the norms which existed in the 1920s and 1930s.

But the League had a limited vision of these territories. The mandates were divided into three classes: Class A, formerly part of the Turkish Empire, consisting of Palestine, Iraq, Syria, Transjordan, and Lebanon; Class B, former German territories, consisting of Cameroons, Ruanda-Urundi, Tanganyika, and Togoland; and Class C consisting of South West Africa and small territories scattered in the South Pacific.

The Class A mandates were provisionally recognized as independent, needing only advice until they were able to stand alone. Class B needed to be fully administered by the responsible country. Sparseness of population, remoteness from the centers of civilization, geographic contiguity to the responsible country, and other factors justified administration of Class B mandates as if they were an integral part of the administering country. In reality, few in the League ever envisaged an independent status for C mandates. Although there had been considerable dis-

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discussion of the future of colonial territories prior to the San Francisco conference at which the UN Charter was signed, that subject was one of the few on which a draft provision was not prepared for conference consideration.

Feelings regarding the disposition of colonial territories after World War II ran strong. Franklin Roosevelt was appalled by what he saw in British-ruled Gambia when he stopped there briefly on his way to Casablanca. Much to Charles de Gaulle's dismay, Roosevelt also reacted negatively to the idea of returning Indochina to French rule once the area was liberated. De Gaulle and Winston Churchill, of course, had other ideas. Churchill bluntly stated that he had not become the King's first minister to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire. Later, after Roosevelt's death, the United States was to continue its advocacy of self-determination, particularly for the Pacific islands.

The compromises which produced the trusteeship system were closely tied to the fate of other colonial territories and ironically were a precursor of the debates which were to dominate early UN discussions of colonialism. The final compromise called for "self-government or independence" for those territories placed under trusteeship and simply "self-government" for those colonial territories—now called non-self-governing territories—which were not placed under trusteeship. In either event, however, the United Nations and its member nations assumed an unprecedented responsibility for non-independent territories.

United Nations oversight was more extensive for trust territories. The Trusteeship Council, a principal UN organ, met regularly in order to look after their welfare. Those colonial territories not placed under the trusteeship system had less stringent oversight but in an advance over the League, the general obligations of their administrators were enumerated. Chapter XI of the Charter, the Declaration Regarding Non-Self-Governing Territories, required colonial powers to promote self-government and to regularly transmit information to the UN secretary-general on the economic, social, and educational conditions in the territories. Significantly,

submission of information on political conditions was not required.

In Africa, only Egypt, Ethiopia, and Liberia were independent at the founding of the UN, and hence among its original members. It was another 11 years before other African countries—Morocco, Sudan, and Tunisia—were added. However, this was not a period of inactivity in the UN with regard to the



Julius Nyerere addresses Tanganyika's independence ceremony, December 1961: "The decolonization process took place with little controversy in most former colonies"

United Nations/PT

continent. The Trusteeship Council regularly and systematically discussed countries in its system, including Ruanda-Urundi, Cameroons, Tanganyika, and Togoland.

Slowly but surely, the principal issues and procedures in the process of self-determination began to emerge. The Trusteeship Council examined reports submitted by the administering authority; received petitions orally and in writing directly from the inhabitants or from persons appearing on their behalf; regularly dispatched visiting missions to the territories; made recommendations; and sent its reports and recommendations to the General Assembly.

A Trusteeship Council special visiting mission to British Togoland ultimately recommended the holding of a plebiscite under UN supervision to ascertain

whether the people wished to remain under trusteeship or join in union with the Gold Coast, their soon-to-be independent neighbor. General elections under UN supervision resulted in a government favoring independence rather than autonomy within the French Union.

The UN was also involved in a complicated series of plebiscites to determine what would happen to the people of Kamerun, a former German colony administered by the UN as if it were part of Nigeria. In the final analysis, the majority of northern Cameroon decided to join the newly independent Federation of Nigeria, while the southern inhabitants decided to join with French Cameroon, also under trusteeship and soon to be independent. The UN also played an important role in the independence of the remaining African trust territories.

Procedures with regard to the non-self-governing territories began to be hammered out shortly after the UN's formation. 1946, the General Assembly prepared a list of dependent territories and reminded members of their obligations to submit information on those under their administration. Whereas submission of political information was optional, as early as 1947, the UN had taken the position that since the goal of dependent territories was self-government, it was necessary for the UN to receive information on political developments in the territories. An ad hoc committee consisting of both administering and non-administering members was established. Finally, the Assembly decided to determine when members were obligated to submit information and when that obligation ceased. Early positions which were taken on these procedures were to provide the substance for UN debate both before and after the great influx of African countries in 1960.

In 1946, South Africa sought to incorporate South West Africa (Namibia). Rebuffed by the General Assembly, South Africa was advised to place the mandated territory under the new trusteeship system. South Africa refused and stopped submitting information on the territory, and thus began the dispute over the fate of Namibia which has lasted to the present day.



United Nations/SC

UN observer explains ballot to elders in British Togoland, April 1956: "A Trusteeship Council mission had recommended a plebiscite under UN supervision"

Spain and Portugal were not original members of the United Nations; thus their colonies did not appear on the original list of territories for which information had to be submitted to the UN. Both countries were admitted to the organization in 1955, and Spain's colonies were voluntarily listed in 1960. However, the Assembly itself supported the Portuguese contention that its territories were overseas provinces and therefore an integral part of the Portuguese nation.

The UN Charter contained the same mixture of idealism, pragmatism, and compromise found in the American constitution. The concepts of international oversight and decolonization were a part of the new system; however, the traditional concept of sovereignty was also to be respected. Almost from the outset, a kind of working compromise was reached: Criteria were set under which the UN could fulfill its oversight responsibilities, but actual observance was to be voluntary for the colonial power.

For most of the original members of the UN, this pragmatic approach was acceptable. However, it would prove objectionable to the territories seeking independence and to newly independent members anxious to champion the cause for those still under colonial status. The new countries came to reject

the idea that one country could be sovereign over another and saw the procedures as legal niceties, used by some to delay self-determination.

The question of South Africa's apartheid policy was not on the UN agenda until 1952. As an original member of the United Nations, South Africa undertook a general obligation under Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter to promote the human rights of its citizens without regard to race, sex, language, or religion. However, sovereignty as interpreted at the time prevented discussion of internal policies unless a dispute between states or a situation likely to threaten international peace and security was involved. Initial discussions of South African issues were introduced by India and Pakistan in 1946 on behalf of their nationals residing in South Africa. The item remained on the agenda until 1962 when it was combined with a more general discussion of the issue of apartheid.

In 1957, Ghana—in colonial times known as the Gold Coast—became the first colony in black Africa to gain independence and UN membership. (Liberia was never a colony and was an original member of the United Nations.) Guinea followed in 1958; however, 1960 was the decisive year. In a speech before the South African parliament, British Prime Minister Harold MacMillan warned South Africa that the "wind of change"

was blowing through the African continent and that nationalism was a political reality which could no longer be ignored. Although MacMillan's message went unheeded in South Africa, 17 African countries attained their independence and were admitted to the UN in 1960. An additional 10 countries, including two from the Caribbean, were to be independent by the end of 1962.

Just as India and Pakistan had initiated the consideration of South Africa and the Arab countries had introduced the consideration of Morocco and Tunisia at the UN, the newly independent countries became leading advocates within the UN for independence for the remaining dependent areas. The major step in this direction took place at the 1960 UN session in which a large number of former colonies were admitted to membership and which passed the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Resolution 1514—the Colonialism Declaration as it was to be called—declared that the subjection of peoples to alien domination and exploitation constituted a denial of fundamental human rights.

Contrary to the principles of both the UN Charter and the Covenant of the League that dependent areas should be prepared for self-determination, the Colonialism Declaration held that inadequacy of political, economic, social, or educational preparedness could not serve as a pretext for delaying independence. It called for immediate steps to transfer all powers to the territories without regard to distinctions of race, creed, or color. Finally, the declaration expressed a distinct preference for independence as the outcome of self-determination, using the two terms interchangeably.

The Colonialism Declaration was not supported by the principal colonial powers, nor by the United States, which abstained. Not only was tutelage rejected in the declaration, but the Assembly seemed to be asserting powers which belonged to sovereign countries. And the principle of self-determination seemed to be tainted by predetermining the political status—*independence*—which could be chosen.

Prior to the adoption of the Colonialism Declaration, the question of decolonization had become entangled in the

East-West conflict. New to United Nations politics, African delegates rejected versions of the declaration put forward by the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the Colonialism Declaration became a ready vehicle for political conflict. In 1961, the Soviet Union noted that the year-old declaration had not been implemented and proposed that the Assembly elaborate practical measures and target dates for its implementation and provide measures for supervision and control of acts of self-determination.

The General Assembly passed a resolution sponsored by 38 African and Asian states noting that the declaration had not been implemented, referring mostly to the Portuguese territories, which were being subjected to increasing ruthlessness. The Assembly also established a 17-country committee to keep implementation under review. Later expanded by 17 additional members, the Committee of Twenty-Four was to play a major role in decolonization. It was largely controlled by Africans and Asians who could count on the support of Eastern European members. The Committee traveled widely, heard petitioners, and issued recommendations to the Assembly. Priority was given to the larger African territories. In addition, the Committee advocated measures thought by some members to be the responsibility of the Security Council.

Despite the enormous changes which were to result from decolonization, the process took place relatively peacefully and with little controversy in most of the former colonies. However, Southern Rhodesia, the Portuguese territories, and South West Africa proved difficult and led to bloodshed and calls for coercive action. Most of the political discussions took place in the Committee of Twenty-Four, the General Assembly, and the Security Council. Usually the Committee of Twenty-Four recommended to the General Assembly that the Security Council institute some kind of sanctions because continuation of the situation threatened international peace and security.

Here too, the UN found itself embroiled in a debate about its own procedures. Most European members questioned the authority of the Committee of Twenty-Four to identify a threat to in-

ternational peace and security, holding that only the Security Council could do so. Moreover, they questioned whether a threat existed and opposed the application of economic sanctions as illegal, inappropriate, and likely to be ineffective. For African and Asian members, these were legalisms, calling into question the West's commitment to decolonization. And the fact that white settlers dominated each of the controversial areas led to charges of racism.

It was clear, however, that southern Africa represented a special case. Portugal wanted to hang on to its empire; South Africa continued to seek legal title to South West Africa, later to be called Namibia; and the whites in Southern Rhodesia wanted legal title to independence without taking into account the wishes of the black African majority. These areas, along with South Africa itself, came to be known as the "White Redoubt," and their governments actively cooperated with one another even though, arguably, their racial attitudes differed. The entire UN system, including the specialized agencies, became consumed with consideration of the issue of self-determination for the Redoubt.

Independence was to come to the Portuguese territories and to Southern Rhodesia, but not until after frequent consideration by various UN bodies and an exacerbation of the differences be-

tween the newly independent countries and the Western powers including the colonialists. Fighting along a broad front in the Portuguese territories represented a considerable strain to poverty-stricken Portugal. UN resolutions grew ever sharper in their denunciation first of Portugal and later of NATO members, particularly the United States.

Calls for assistance to those fighting Portugal appeared in two resolutions. Sanctions were demanded and passed in the Committee of Twenty-Four and the General Assembly, only to be voted down, usually by veto, in the Security Council. Again the argument was sharply divided between those who thought almost any measure should be used to end Portuguese colonialism and those who believed that however much they disliked Portuguese policy, the UN Charter and practical considerations restricted what the UN could do.

In the end, independence for the Portuguese territories came with stunning swiftness. The Portuguese military overthrew the government which had been seriously weakened by political restrictions at home, military demands on the country's scarce resources, and casualties in the far-off war. Further, the political opprobrium proved too great and the new government immediately announced its intention to grant independence to its African territories.

Unfortunately, the divisions which



A column of freedom fighters in the Mozambican bush: "In the end, independence for the Portuguese territories came with stunning swiftness"

United Nations/Van Lierop

had been poorly concealed during the liberation struggle against Portugal now surfaced—with the assistance of South Africa. Conflict among contending groups was to delay Angola's admission to the UN until 1977, for the Soviet Union and Cuba had come to the aid of the MPLA, which today governs Angola and is recognized by most major countries except the U.S., and the United States supported the opposition. Angola still appears frequently on the Security Council agenda, but in connection with South Africa's use of Namibian territory to attack Angola, to support Angolan factions, and to retain its illegal hold on Namibia.

Independence in Angola and Mozambique had a profound effect on the situations in Southern Rhodesia and Namibia. The White Redoubt had been greatly reduced in size and the protection previously provided by a sympathetic Portuguese administration was lost.

Southern Rhodesia had been under UN discussion since 1962 when the General Assembly requested the Colonialism Committee to consider whether or not that territory was self-governing and therefore exempt from the requirement that information be submitted to the United Nations. The United Kingdom maintained that the territory, though under British sovereignty, had been self-governing since 1923. The Committee and later the General Assembly declared the territory non-self-governing and began periodic consideration of the failure of the United Kingdom to comply with the Colonialism Declaration.

In the meantime, developments within Southern Rhodesia fueled increasing racial discrimination and conflict. Southern Rhodesia sought independence from the United Kingdom without meeting the democratic requirements which were considered essential by the British. The result was Southern Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965, leading the British to seek UN assistance in bringing its rebellious colony back into line.

For the first time in its history, the UN crossed the legal lines which the United Kingdom and other Western countries had so strongly resisted. First

voluntary, then selective mandatory, and finally comprehensive mandatory sanctions were placed on Southern Rhodesia. But Southern Rhodesia was not to become independent Zimbabwe until 1980. In the meantime, large-scale military action undertaken by the liberation movements reinforced the economic and political pressures placed on Southern Rhodesia.

It can be argued that the rebellion in Southern Rhodesia would have been bloodier and even more prolonged without sanctions and that the international community, faced with the Rhodesian decision, could not afford to sit by. However, the imposition of sanctions may

“Prior to the adoption of the Colonialism Declaration, the question of decolonization had become entangled in the East-West conflict.”

have had lasting effects on the UN's ability to enforce its decisions. Sanctions against Rhodesia were widely violated, and UN efforts to curtail violations were ineffective. Indeed, the UN refrained from taking action against Portugal and South Africa despite their open violations of sanctions. Whereas the feeling is widespread that sanctions cannot work, in reality, the UN has never instituted sanctions in the manner in which its own studies suggested they be used, largely because of resistance from some of its members who feared the effects on their own interests.

As indicated earlier, Namibia has been a UN concern from the outset. Even when African membership in the UN was limited to South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Liberia, the organization refused to agree to South African requests to annex the territory, instead insisting on placement of the territory under the trusteeship system. South Africa's refusal to do so, its introduction of apartheid into the territory, and its refusal to submit information to the United Nations led to a long series of

challenges in the International Court of Justice which repeatedly affirmed UN authority over the territory, even though the Court ruled that South Africa was not obligated to place the territory under trusteeship.

When in 1966, the International Court of Justice refused to rule that South Africa had violated its mandate on the grounds that the parties bringing the case did not have standing to receive judgment, the General Assembly, in a decision later upheld by the Court, decided to revoke South Africa's mandate and to assume direct responsibility for the territory. This decision remains unenforced—South Africa refuses to abide by the Assembly's action and numerous Security Council meetings have failed to produce an agreement on a course of action to force South African compliance.

Repeatedly frustrated in their efforts, African delegations, supported by other non-Western countries, turned to the path which they had followed on Southern Rhodesia. Resolutions supporting armed struggle received approval, usually despite the reservations or opposition of some Western delegations. Moreover, the General Assembly “recognized” the South West Africa People's Organization as the sole legitimate representative of the Namibian people.

Efforts to resolve the Namibian question without further violence continued, notably through the work of the Contact Group consisting of the representatives of five Western countries. After long and arduous negotiations, agreement on a framework for a settlement was reached in 1978 and incorporated in Security Council resolution 435. However, South Africa has refused to go ahead with implementation, providing numerous excuses, including the charge that the UN is biased. However, that same bias, if indeed it exists, must have been present when South Africa agreed to the settlement. Later, South Africa, with the support of the Reagan administration, made implementation conditional upon the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola. No mention of Cuban forces was made at the time of South Africa's initial agreement to resolution 435.

It is obvious that South Africa has not yet decided to relinquish its control over

Namibia except under favorable conditions, and that the UN is unwilling, indeed unable, to dislodge South Africa. It is equally clear that the UN, which championed the cause of Namibia long before its inhabitants and newly independent countries were able to, will continue to press for Namibian independence under conditions which guarantee freedom of choice.

The question of apartheid in South Africa has probably consumed more time and generated more emotion than any topic discussed in the UN with the possible exception of the Middle East. Apartheid presented the United Nations with political and legal problems from the outset. But given the repressive policies implemented by the National Party when it took power in South Africa in 1948 and the admission of African countries to the United Nations, sharp differences were inevitable. At every General Assembly session, South Africa's policies have been on the agenda.

Over the years, various special commissions or committees of individuals, experts, or countries have met to consider the question.

The Security Council became involved in 1960 after South African police fired upon unarmed demonstrators peacefully protesting against pass laws in Sharpeville. The subsequent Security Council meeting led to the first of several visits by secretaries-general to South Africa to discuss either apartheid or Namibia. Nevertheless, the South African government moved ahead to implement its plans and repressed all opposition.

Inevitably, African and Asian members of the UN began to call for measures to isolate South Africa, and to force it to abandon apartheid and abide by United Nations resolutions. Resolutions introduced to that effect passed in the General Assembly, but the Assembly could only make recommendations. Attempts to pass similar resolutions in

the Security Council failed until August 1963, when the Council decided to impose a voluntary embargo on the sale of arms, ammunition, and military equipment to South Africa in order to avoid contributing to a situation which might threaten international peace and security.

Consideration of apartheid in the UN has led to deep frustration among the African nations. Again, the Western countries have been accused of hiding behind legalisms, racism, and placing commercial interests in South Africa above human rights. African frustrations have been exploited by the Soviet Union in its criticism of the West and later by Arab countries which deliberately phrased their own resolutions on the Middle East to appeal to African sensitivities on apartheid.

The fact that South Africa and Israel cooperate militarily and that Africans sympathize with the Palestinians' desire for self-determination has done little to



Togoland under French administration: Crowd at political rally on election eve, Lomé, April 1958

help keep the issues separate or the debate rational. Both the African and the Arab states have adopted a practice of introducing these concerns in almost every part of the UN system.

Despite constant consideration of apartheid, including the establishment of a special committee which concentrates solely on the issue, and a widespread information campaign to spread word about its evils, the UN has not taken coercive action against South Africa apart from the arms embargo.

In 1977 reacting to the torture death of Steve Biko while he was in police custody, the Security Council made the arms embargo mandatory. South Africa was thus cut off from states such as France and Israel which had loosely observed the voluntary arms embargo. The other action which ought to be noted here concerns South African representation in the General Assembly and the specialized agencies. The Algerian president of the assembly in 1974 ruled that South Africa's credentials were not in order, thus preventing it from taking a seat. The ruling remains in effect. Similar action was taken by vote in the International Labour Organization.

The question of whether the UN has had any effect in ameliorating conditions in South Africa continues to be debated. Apartheid remains, but in some respects it has been changed substantially. One can argue that South Africa's desire to avoid political, cultural, and economic isolation has led to a rounding of the edges of apartheid, which might not have occurred without UN pressure. On the other hand, it can be argued that as a result, South Africa has developed its own arms industry and become less dependent on others, although the costs have been high. One can speculate that the costs in the broad sense of the word might reach the point where they might lead South Africa to make structural changes in apartheid, particularly when combined with the inevitable violence.

This review of Africa at the UN would be incomplete without some reference to the Congo, now Zaire. Belgium abruptly granted the Congo independence on June 30, 1960. Unlike France and the United Kingdom, Belgium had done little to prepare its colonies for independence. Education was woefully in-

adequate; participation in government was nonexistent. When within a week of independence, the army mutinied, Belgian administrators and settlers left hurriedly, Belgian troops intervened, and the Katanga province sought to break away, the UN was asked by the new "government" to dispatch military assistance.

On July 12, 1960, the Security Council agreed, authorizing the secretary-general, Dag Hammarskjöld, to establish a peace-keeping force. It was a fateful decision. Before UN forces withdrew in 1964, the Soviet Union had

"For colonial Africa and for colonial peoples around the world, the promise of the United Nations outshone that of its predecessor, the League of Nations."

ceased to cooperate with the secretary-general and refused to pay its share of the costs of the operation; the UN forces, which eventually numbered 20,000, were engaged in fighting aimed at preventing civil war; and Dag Hammarskjöld was killed in a plane crash while en route to the area. The effect on the UN was long-lasting. A financial and constitutional crisis grew out of the Soviet failure to pay its bills, and the authority of the secretary-general was undermined for some time.

While the consequences for the UN were far-reaching, some good may have come out of the Congo fiasco. UN civil personnel worked alongside the troops to provide training and human infrastructure for the Congolese government; the first of what might have been a series of secessions throughout Africa was prevented; and superpower rivalry was kept out of Africa—at least temporarily.

In the first 25 years of African independence, the UN has played the role of mid-wife, doctor, educator, and policeman. It has provided a platform where African concerns could be taken beyond the regional reach of the Organization of African Unity or the geographical limitations of the Commonwealth of Nations.

Indeed, both of these organizations were used to add force to UN proposals. Particularly in the early years, the UN provided a training ground for African statesmen and even a respectable exile for political foes on occasion. Many early African diplomats at the UN became well-known beyond their country and were mourned when disfavor led to their imprisonment or death.

The UN has also played a role in African economic and social development, especially through the Economic Commission for Africa, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund. World Health Organization programs have been instrumental in eradicating diseases such as smallpox and the Food and Agriculture Organization has provided both food and technical assistance.

These substantial UN programs receive too little attention and are passed over too briefly here. Undeniably, however, the first 25 years of African independence were focused on political questions involving decolonization and, to a lesser extent, on consolidation of statehood. The next 25 years must concentrate on economic development, free of the abortive rhetorical efforts surrounding the so-called new international economic order.

It is not clear what role the UN will play in assisting African economic development and the inevitable pushes and pulls of further political development. The UN itself has not fared particularly well in the wake of its enormous success in bringing about a largely peaceful revolution. The breakdown of the delicate compromise between idealism and sovereignty has led to inevitable strains, frequently made more difficult by the East-West conflict. The African approach to decolonization shook the status quo, and neither states nor institutions fare very well under rapid change.

The time has come to tone down the rhetoric, to decrease the frequency of resolutions, and to work cooperatively and sensitively with other nations. In the final analysis, African states are weak and impoverished; and it is the weak and impoverished who most need the United Nations, both as a platform and as an instrument to protect their sovereignty and promote their development. □

Brian Urquhart

United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs

While the United Nations may be powerless to resolve the crises of a world dramatically different from that which its founders envisioned, it has provided a framework upon which to build in both the political and economic spheres. The UN's 40th anniversary should be used to reflect on where the organization is outdated and to encourage a new generation of activity based on the evolution of a strong, moderate political mainstream in the Third World.

INTERVIEWED BY MARGARET A. NOVICKI

Africa Report: In an address marking the 40th anniversary of the signing of the UN Charter, U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz called the UN a troubled organization. He said few of the goals that were proclaimed 40 years ago had been achieved due to the breakdown of the international consensus under which it was formed. The factors which contributed to this breakdown, he said, were: the predominance of non-democratic states in the UN, the obstructive role of the Soviet Union, the division of states into blocs, and the failure of the U.S. to take the UN seriously. What is your view of his assessment?

Urquhart: I think this is a very ex post facto, unrealistic view of what the world is like. The world is not Wisconsin or South Kensington or California. It's a very much more complicated place and it's no good supposing it's going to be orderly or all work beautifully. As far as the UN not reaching its goals is concerned, one of the remarkable developments in the first 40 years of the UN is that we have reached the goal of decolonization something like a hundred years earlier than anybody foresaw, incidentally, very largely due to the initiative and drive of the United States. It's a little late to regret that we have now this extremely varied large group of sovereign states, some of whom are certainly not democratic in the

American or the British sense. I cannot help feeling that this is slightly beside the point. I don't think it was ever foreseen in the Charter that the world would consist entirely of democratic states—how could it? We weren't democratic states until quite recently, so why would people at an earlier stage of political development be?

I don't agree with Mr. Shultz's evaluation of the failures. I think the worst failure of the UN has been the breakdown from the very beginning of the unanimity of the Great Powers which was to be the driving force of the new organization and what was going to make it different from the League of Nations. I don't think there is any point in ascribing fault in any of that; it's just something that has happened and we have had to improvise around that stumbling block for 40 years. Personally, I happen to think that if everyone would exercise a tiny amount of patience and foresight, they would see the Third World or non-aligned bloc as politically a very desirable depolarizing constituency. Of course, these countries—the bulk of whom missed the greatest economic boom in history, the industrial revolution—are a little bit in a hurry and a little unreasonable. And we have to adjust to that and get used to it, but it's a matter of leadership and patience and a matter of the fortunate and the rich having at least a tiny tolerance for the poor. If you don't have that, you don't have a civilized society.

So I think it is true that the UN's performance is disappoint-

ing in one way—that the whole notion of international authority as represented especially by the Security Council has more or less lapsed. Now whether that was inevitable or not, I don't know, but it was the great thing that was going to make the UN different from the League of Nations. Nevertheless, the UN is very different from the League in a lot of ways. It is a universal organization which is already something completely new. It's an organization that nobody has ever wanted to leave, which is completely new. It's an organization that deals with the most incredible variety and width of subjects. Whether it works or not is another question.

Africa Report: When the UN was founded, it was a dramatically different world. Has the UN really been able to adapt to the changing times?

Urquhart: I think it partly has and it partly hasn't. Any political institution with very high aims and principles is liable to be a disappointment. We are no exception. The Charter was written at the optimum time when people had just been through six years of war. They were horrified by everything that had happened and they were desperate to do something new. It was a very high point in terms of human aspirations and I think that quite often things that have come out of it have been somewhat of a disappointment.

But when you look at the change there has been—first of all, there has been a fundamental change in the nature of war, which has completely revolutionized the whole concept of authority and power because the main means of warfare can't be used. So most powerful countries are paralyzed. Then, there has been a total change in the map with decolonization—an absolutely revolutionary geopolitical change. Nothing like that has ever happened before. Then there has been a complete radical change in the way people live, think, and relate to each other, the technological revolution—something so radical that nobody's been able to understand what it really means. Everyone's bewildered.

This organization has had to grow up in this period of flux, and I would say that the way it has adapted in one area has been remarkable. I think it has tried to latch on to the essential political fact of our time—that we've now got a series of problems which are way beyond the capacity of individual sovereign states to deal with. So something new will have to be developed. This is a very long-term political evolution, but as a start on that, the UN system, with a lot of help from the outside, has made a sporting attempt to at least really consider what these problems are. Thus far, we are in the consciousness-raising and informational period—trying to develop some kind of approach to things like population, food, water, desertification, and so on. But it's at least a start and I don't think that's so bad. On the contrary, even though we haven't got very far with the environment, for example, at least we've got something in place and there's something to build on.

I maintain that the system set up by governments after the war was already obsolescent because it actually reflected the ministerial structure of sovereign states in pre-war times, which in the long-run is going to prove to be a terrible hazard. Our structure of specialized agencies, which reflects the rivalries between ministries in a national government, is probably not relevant to the kinds of problems we now have which

cross all boundaries. You can't have one agency dealing with all the problems of Africa. You've got to have the political as well as economic and social agencies; otherwise you won't get anywhere.

I think this is an obsolescence in the structure and how we will ever change it God only knows. On the economic side, we are probably already outmoded because it's one thing to put all the international economic and financial activities in the World Bank and the IMF, but it is now becoming extremely clear that the Bank and the Fund are out of their depth too. These are not solely economic and financial problems—they are social, political, and even military. Therefore you can't deal with them all in a nice tidy little box.

Instead of saying how wonderful it all was, I wish the 40th anniversary of the UN would be used to really think where it is that we are out of date. I happen to think that the emergence of the Third World is a tremendous plus in the long-run, provided that people are prepared to see it for what it is and not get the heebie-jeebies about Marxism, which is mostly irrelevant in the Third World anyway. But as long as we persist in living out our own nightmares in Third World countries, we are going to fail. But I don't think that's a long-term thing either. I happen to think that the old idea of previous years in Washington that what we have to offer is leadership and a lot of good advice and help was the right one. The Third World is not looking to 1848 for ideological inspiration—it looks to 1776. It was the Declaration of Independence that sparked all of this off. I don't know why people aren't proud of that instead of constantly looking under the bed for Marxists.

Africa Report: Critics of the UN system say that the UN is powerless to deal with most issues of war and peace because the superpowers prefer to deal outside the UN framework.

Urquhart: But the superpowers are powerless too! What can they do if one of them runs into somebody else's backyard? Nothing. Could they do anything when the Soviet Union went into Hungary or Afghanistan or the U.S. ran into Vietnam? No, not a bloody thing. I think it is true that there is a great vacuum of authority in the world. Whether there ever was one, I'm not so sure. I think what people are talking about is the imperial age when one country was much stronger than all the rest. That's a nice concept and that's what people nostalgically think of, but you can't do that now. We have a world of independent sovereign states—163 of them. I think politically that's an advance, but it doesn't make things so tidy.

Whenever there's a new war or a terrorist incident or some appalling disaster of some kind, the first thing the *Wall Street Journal* and the *New York Times* always say is that the UN doesn't have any authority and can't do anything. What they fail to add is, nor does anybody else! The reason the UN was set up was to develop a new system of cooperative authority which was relevant to what we were all facing. And I think that's the point. Up until the 1960s, the U.S. did miracles in the world—it rescued the world out of World War II with UNRWA, Point Four, the Marshall Plan, etc., but I don't think any country can do that anymore. That was the last glorious thing of that period. Now we're stuck with the new one and we've got to do something else. People should realize that there's quite a lot to be done right here at the UN, but it requires leadership, a great deal of patience, and an absence

of shortcuts of an ideological nature, which are the end as far as getting anything done is concerned.

Africa Report: If the idea behind the UN was to set up a new system of authority for the world, has it been able to fulfill that?

Urquhart: No, I think the UN has the basis to do it if everybody wants to, but it's got to get its act together to a far greater extent than it has. It's got to get away from automatic bloc voting on particular issues. It's got to stop all this rhetorical nonsense which has nothing to do with real life whatsoever. For example, I'm sometimes amazed how people are always going on about how bad the Arabs and the PLO are, but they always seem to forget that the Palestinians, who are co-equal in terms of historical age with the Israelis, have totally lost not only their 4000-year old birthright, they've lost a lot of people, they are scattered. They do have a rather considerable historical grievance, but you'd never know it sometimes to read the newspapers. And I think that it has been very unfortunate that in trying to make that point, the UN has gotten into the self-defeating politics of liberation struggles, which is very messy. One of the worst things as far as the United States is concerned is the public perception of the UN's role in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Considering that the UN gave birth to Israel and protected it religiously in its early years at rather considerable cost and was hated by the Arabs for doing so, it is a little ironical to learn now that we're anti-Israeli.

I feel very strongly that a lot of much more serious clear thinking needs to be given to issues. Obviously it's true now with regard to apartheid in South Africa. It isn't just a matter of demonstrating at Columbia University for or against divestment. In fortunate, intelligent countries, one has to devote far more thought to what the issues are and not be quite so influenced by good public relations. That's particularly true on African issues and very much so on the Middle East. What is marvelous in the U.S. is that there is this incredible infrastructure of well-organized research and people who are actually prepared to write about issues, but the trouble is that it doesn't reach many people. Now we've gotten to the period where nothing can be reported in more than 15 seconds on the television. That really is disastrous and means that nobody is ever going to be able to understand anything.

Africa Report: Given your long experience at the United Nations, could you provide your reflections on how African issues have been addressed over the years by the UN system?

Urquhart: I don't think we gave enough thought at the beginning to what the real problems of Africa were going to be or in fact were. The only person who did try to do that curiously enough was Dag Hammarskjöld, who made a very long trip to Africa at the dawn of its independence in early 1960. He came up with some extremely sensible and fundamental points. One was that there was going to be a terrible personnel problem, that the colonial infrastructure would be removed, and however bright the young leaders were, they weren't going to be able to fill the gap. He even set up a scheme to try to help with that, but it bogged down after he died.

The other thing he was impressed by was the appalling ravages on Africa done by the Treaty of Berlin, the way the

continent had been divided up, and that almost all the boundary lines which were sacred to Africans ran the opposite way to the natural lines of communications so that at the very best, there were going to be terrible economic and social problems on which sovereign states would be built. Nothing that he thought then hasn't proved to be right and he was about the last person who really thought about it in those terms in the UN. I don't think, however, that he anticipated the extent to which the immediate post-independence period was going to be politicized both on ideological and East-West lines. Nor did he foresee the various forms of London School of Economics Marxism that would get in, not to mention the East-West struggle for some areas like Ghana or the Congo.

When we got to the Congo, we were babes in the woods. We thought we were going in there to rescue this ex-colonial country and we were all horrified when it suddenly became not only a major East-West problem with people running around doing the most amazing things—both the CIA and the other lot—but also it became a bone of contention between African countries themselves. It was a nightmare. I think the bloom was very much off the rose when that happened. I suppose it would have been anyway, but I think we were all to some extent very innocent about what we were getting into. Hammarskjöld's great idea was that we in the Secretariat were going to be a bridge between the old colonial days and the new days of independence and across this bridge were going to cross freely the newly independent and the old colonialists. It was a nice idea, but it wasn't quite that simple.

I am incapable of commenting on the mistakes that were made with regard to economic development, though I imagine



UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld reviews UN force in the Congo: "Hammarskjöld was the only one who tried to think at the beginning what the real problems of Africa were going to be"

they were colossal. It always seemed to me that what was going on in the Congo was quite a considerable warning. I am sure that due to a lack of clear analysis, a great deal of what was done with the best possible intentions had some fairly indifferent results.

But on the plus side, the UN has been very important for the Africans as a place where they can come to forge a relationship with the outside world and I have to say that they have done marvelously. On the political level, I think they are really remarkable and they don't get half enough credit for it either. They are so sensible by comparison with other groups and have a huge political potential. The trouble is that they've got to solve their problems on the governmental, administrative, and economic level. So the picture is not all negative. The UN has been very important to Africa and to the whole

down and do all the boring, back-breaking things that are going to have to be done to turn it around. If we don't, we'll just have piles of stuff rotting on the docks in Djibouti and a whole generation of famine. If a vast dimension of international public service could be added and the food surpluses and all the expertise that are going to waste in our countries now could be used in Africa, then you might have something. It's certainly something the Soviet Union and the United States can do. I think where we've made a terrible mistake in the UN is in not trying to breed people who would find international public service a terrific profession. But unfortunately it isn't very glamorous.

I think that what the European colonial powers did in Africa was grotesque. In the first place, they bumbled in there by mistake—it was royal competition really. Then in 1885, they divided up Africa arbitrarily. On top of that, they unleashed two forces which were bound to be disruptive—in the British case, the British civil service, which is fine provided it goes on, not if you don't maintain it because it supplants everything else. Then they unleashed the missionaries and religion, so they broke up the healthy animist basis of life. The tribal system of authority, which was actually quite efficient, was lost, as was the general societal basis. Then suddenly in a fit of conscience 50 years later, they all got up and left. Then on top of that, they sent the best and brightest to the London School of Economics and they got all filled up with impractical ideas. I think we do have an awful lot to answer for, particularly in the conscience part of it. I don't think it was very clever.

Africa Report: At the UN in the 1970s, there were very strong calls on the part of the Third World for a new international economic order, but one doesn't hear much about that anymore.

Urquhart: When the Third World found things were not working too well, they went to a largely rhetorical concept, the new international economic order, and discussed it at a place where nobody who could make it work was present. The finance ministers or the chairmen of the central banks weren't at the General Assembly—they were all safely protected at the Fund and the Bank and they were certainly not likely to get mixed up with rhetorical nonsense like that. The Third World saw the crash coming. They hadn't managed to sort out a lot of fairly academic notions in their heads and they went for this thing. I think that was a great mistake and a gesture of despair.

But the Third World is coming along. Yet they have so many things to do all at once—they've got to get used to independence; they've got to get their economic situation adjusted which is particularly difficult at this point. Then they've got to become non-aligned and keep out of the way of the East-West, which is very difficult. Then they've got to deal with all sorts of insurgencies in their own countries and the risk that friendly foreigners will support their opposition. It's a pretty heavy agenda and they have to do it all at once.

I don't know if the UN is a help or a hindrance. I think on balance it's a help because it gives the Third World a place where it can rally. I think that they are getting much more realistic now and perhaps they're through with the rather gusty rhetoric of the 1970s. I think they're also extremely



United Nations

Brian Urquhart: "One of the remarkable developments in the first 40 years of the UN is that we have reached the goal of decolonization a hundred years earlier than anybody foresaw"

emerging world. You've got to try to understand what it is like to come from nowhere; otherwise you can never understand why people attach importance to being able to get up and address everyone at the General Assembly. It is a very important psychological factor.

I don't know about the tactical matters on the ground. I'm inclined to think that one of the worst things that's likely to happen to Africa is the kind of attention that they're getting with these rock concerts and everything. I think this is the most ephemeral, exculpatory conscience-assuaging thing. What we need is to get a generation of people in the U.S. or Europe who are prepared to go there for 20 years and settle

disillusioned with the Soviet Union. That's why I think it is so foolish not to recognize Angola, because Angola could be had on a plate tomorrow.

Africa Report: The UN has been seized with the Namibia issue since the very beginning of the organization but with little success. Why did the UN allow the U.S. to hijack the Namibia negotiations?

Urquhart: I have very strong feelings about this because just before the U.S. elections in 1980, the South Africans were complaining on and on about impartiality. I said, 'We'll get the Africans to come to a meeting in Geneva, and you can have all your internal parties and let's have the whole shooting match.' The idea was to have them all meet in one place and if we could do that, we'd call it the pre-implementation conference, with a view to setting the date for starting on the implementation of resolution 435, which I now think is as dead as a doornail, but it wasn't then. So to everybody's amazement, the South Africans agreed. But then about 4 weeks later, the Reagan administration was elected. Of course, we had to go and have the conference anyway in January, and it all went splendidly up to a point. Then I said, 'We've gotten rid of all the points on the agenda. There's just one more point. Let's set the date—31 March,' whereupon the South Africans got up and walked out. Of course, they wouldn't have gotten up and walked out had the Carter administration and the Contact Group been really sitting on them, but they weren't, because by that time, the constructive engagement policy had already been announced. The Carter administration was regarded as having a disastrous record in foreign policy, and such is the power of media and of suggestion that the whole thing fell apart.

I don't know when it's ever going to be settled. I suppose it is conceivable, with the South African economy going steadily down and Namibia being a tremendous military and financial drain that the South Africans one day may decide to throw the Namibians to the wolves. It is the only conceivable reason why they would do it. It seems that we are further from implementing resolution 435 than we've ever been. I'm beginning to wonder myself if it isn't a little outmoded anyway. From a broader political point of view, the injection of the whole Cuban troop issue wasn't necessarily the smartest thing to do either.

The trouble with the UN when faced with an issue like that is that we don't have the prerequisite assumed in the Charter to be the basis of all serious work—the unanimity of the five permanent powers. In fact on the contrary, if one votes for it, the other vetoes it. It's true on a whole lot of other issues as well. I still think, however, that what is done here is infinitely worth doing for completely different reasons, but when it comes to settling an issue of that kind, we can't do it.

Africa Report: In terms of African issues, the Congo crisis seemed to be the best example of when the UN and the secretary-general played a very activist role in conflict resolution.

Urquhart: But you couldn't do that now. The Congo crisis practically busted the organization too, not to mention killing the secretary-general. But although the UN's operations in the Congo were widely believed in the Western world to have been an unmitigated failure, it was just about the only opera-

tion we've ever done where we actually carried out the entire mandate. Probably the mandate was wrong in the first place, but nonetheless, we got the Belgians out; we established a central government; we got rid of the secessionist movements; and we maintained the territorial integrity of the entire area—at great cost incidentally. Whether it was the right thing to do is another matter, but it was what we were told to do and we did it.

“As long as we persist in living out our own nightmares in Third World countries, we are going to fail.”

Africa Report: Is there a way to put more teeth into the Security Council?

Urquhart: I don't think so until the relationship among the permanent members changes. Especially now, when quite apart from a political collision between East and West, you have a head-on ideological collision as well which is much more acute than it's ever been. In trying to make this kind of thing work, it's like going back to the Middle Ages—we have a full-scale ideological schism in the world and this wasn't foreseen in the Charter. On the contrary, all that stuff was supposed to be in the past. I think that rather than looking at how far the UN has fulfilled its original purpose, one has to look at how skillful the organization has been in picking its way around this dinosaur-like situation in the middle. Short of an invasion from outer space, I can't think of a single contingency in which the Soviet Union and the United States would vote together to use enforcement measures. And that's really where we are.

Africa Report: Some people would say that the last time the office of the secretary-general of the United Nations was a very activist one was under Dag Hammarskjöld.

Urquhart: I don't think that's quite fair either. Actually U Thant in his own way was a great deal more dashing than Hammarskjöld. U Thant's efforts in the Cuban missile crisis and on Vietnam went very far. U Thant is a very much underestimated figure. Actually Hammarskjöld was rather cautious and he was absolutely out of action for the last year of his life because of the Congo crisis. He couldn't do anything. He got clobbered first by the Americans, then by Khrushchev, then by de Gaulle, and the British didn't like him. I have a great admiration for him, but I think the reading of his actual performance is extremely simplistic. And he knew it too. He was going to leave on the grounds that he had become too controversial and couldn't function. He was going to try to settle the Katanga problem, which he probably would have, and then he was going to hand over to somebody else, but unfortunately he was killed.

After the Congo experience, the caution of the member-states was very much greater. They were never going to get into anything like that again. They went zooming into the Congo, which had the full support of everybody. The Soviet Union was flying UN troops into the Congo initially. It was a most amazing feat. Then it all went horrendously sour. And it

was a traumatic experience. After the Congo, the Russians were incredibly critical of anything the secretary-general did, and we spent about ten years laboriously tiptoeing around the Russians because anytime U Thant did anything, they immediately questioned it.

But I think what we have to look for is a completely different generation of activity here which will have to be based in the first place on the evolution of a very strong, positive, and moderate political mainstream in the Third World and medium-power world. I think that is the only hope for the UN, though it will have to be balanced by some kind of slight modification of the relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States, because at the moment, you simply can't use the Security Council. Nobody wants to go there because they get into this struggle of elephants every time they do.

Africa Report: But among Third World countries at the UN, there seems to be a trend toward moderation, which was particularly evident at the last General Assembly session, and which has been characterized by former American ambassador to the UN Jeane Kirkpatrick as "the revolt of the moderates."

Urquhart: I think that is to some extent true and I think it was inevitable anyway. A lot of the Third World countries have an awful lot to lose from ideological or political immoderation. They can't do it. You've got some enormously intelligent people in those Third World countries, and I think that we've got to try to build on those people. But I have to admit that it is amazingly frustrating. I grew up in the 1920s and 1930s when we had everything we have now except that the world was a more dangerous place. But all the cynicism, the return to good old realpolitik, and the attitude that you can't trust anybody, therefore go it alone—that nonsense was going on in the 1930s and that's how we got into World War II. When Mussolini invaded Abyssinia, all the great European powers simply fell apart.

Africa Report: What can the UN realistically do about the situation in South Africa?

Urquhart: On the Namibia issue, I think the UN has already done quite a bit because the issue has been kept alive here. That alone is something. It doesn't solve anything, but at least nobody's been able to sweep it under the rug. It's better that people have been aware of it all this time. With regard to South Africa, I don't know what we can actually do—perhaps very little. With the stage that has been reached in South Africa, I can't see that they will be able to avoid a bloodbath. I think it's just too late. Given the psychology of the Afrikaner and the absolutely monstrous nature of the problem, it's just too late. They've been going steadily in the wrong direction for nearly 40 years. If they had gone in the right direction in 1948, they might have had a chance. But now they've built up such a terrible reservoir of hatred on both sides, and I don't see what the UN can really do about that.

Africa Report: Do you think economic sanctions have ever worked?

Urquhart: I have never believed in sanctions—I think all you do is strengthen the people. I think these kinds of exclusive efforts are psychologically and politically hopeless. For example, I think what they tried to do with Israel is a disaster. All it did was to strengthen the extremes to the exclusion of all the

extremely moderate Israelis. And you miss every opportunity by doing that. My strategem for South Africa or for anywhere else would be to flood them with symphony orchestras, academics, journalists, and fill the place up. Actually we've done the opposite and you've got a very reclusive Boer mentality in an exceptionally strong form now.

Africa Report: You sound like a proponent of constructive engagement.

Urquhart: No, I'm not. I think what was wrong with constructive engagement was a complete misreading of the Afrikaner mentality. Anybody who has dealt with the South Africans could have told them that it wasn't going to work because the moment you are nice to the South Africans, they take your arm off and take it home and say they may give it back later. They are not prone to reciprocating kindly gestures. I think it was politically an inept concept. I never thought it would work. But I think that's different from cutting them completely off. I would have thought that a very tough governmental policy but also an effort to get inside the South African society. . . . but then again, maybe it would have been impossible. They are extremely self-sufficient and tough, and certainly not very easy to deal with. There are two forms of sanctions which could conceivably work in certain circumstances, but not in South Africa. One is an arms embargo and the other, an absolute trade embargo, but that is for a country which has a single main export like oil. South Africa is a very evolved economy; it's not easy to do that.

Africa Report: But even though there have been some circumventions of the arms embargo against South Africa, it certainly has had some effect on the South African economy.

Urquhart: But probably in the end, it makes them more self-sufficient than they would have been before. I think the whole argument about sanctions is a very difficult one. I can imagine countries which would be highly susceptible to sanctions, but I don't think a very highly evolved industrial country like South Africa would be.

Africa Report: The sanctions that are currently being considered in the U.S. Congress are very moderate, but it is more the message that is being sent than the actual economic impact of the measures themselves.

Urquhart: I imagine that the political and psychological message is very important because I would imagine that, after all that has happened, to suddenly lose the love of the United States is a tremendous blow. But the South Africans don't really register things in that way.

Africa Report: Ultimately aren't sanctions the only thing that the United Nations can do to influence the situation in South Africa?

Urquhart: I think that is probably true. But I have always doubted the actual political and psychological effect of sanctions unless you really are zeroing in on a target which is susceptible to the kind of thing you are going to do. I think Iran and Iraq would be highly susceptible to sanctions because they are one-commodity economies in the first place, and they don't have any arms industry. But a country like South Africa, which is a large industrial power, is a little bit different. But every time I see those pictures on the television, I have a horror about what is going to happen. Nobody is going to come out right. □

A Forum for Africa

The African group may be the only truly non-aligned voting bloc in the United Nations. By virtue of its size, it can play a significant role in moderating the conflicts between the major powers which often paralyze the organization.

BY OLARA OTUNNU

The United Nations means many things to the African countries, but first and foremost, decolonization. When the United Nations was founded in 1945, there were three African members out of a total membership of 51—Egypt, Ethiopia, and Liberia. Today, out of a membership of 159, 51 are from the African continent. Africa now constitutes roughly one-third of UN membership and is the largest single regional group. This dramatic change from 1945 to today is thanks to the process of decolonization, which must remain one of the more outstanding historical achievements of the United Nations. In fact, for many African countries, 1985 represents not the 40th anniversary of the UN, but rather 20 to 25 years of African membership in the organization.

African participation in the UN began especially actively after the independence of Ghana in 1957. The former colonies that became United Nations members made it their priority to work within the organization to ensure independence for the other colonial countries. 1960 was a watershed in this process with the adoption of resolution 1514, the declaration of the General Assembly on the granting of independence to colonial peoples and countries.

The process of decolonization, roughly speaking, was completed in

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Olara Otunnu: "I believe that the African nations at the UN are going to play a very important role in forging a more constructive and cooperative spirit within that house"

1960—with the bulk of Africa independent and most other colonial countries outside Africa also independent. We must not forget the role which the United States played historically in the process of decolonization. Of the early major powers within the United Nations, none stood out so resolutely and

in such a very principled way in supporting the process of independence as the United States. Not only did the U.S. government support the process of independence, but also individual intellectuals from this country played leading roles within the U.S., Europe, and Africa in forging an independence movement for the continent. Leading names who originate from this country are part and parcel of the fabric of the struggle for independence in Africa.

Indeed, the origins of the very notion of pan-Africanism, the umbrella under which African countries fought for independence, are to be found in the U.S. and in the Caribbean, with such intellectuals as W.E.B. Du Bois, George Padmore, Sylvester Williams, and C.L.R. James, who together with Kwame Nkrumah, Jomo Kenyatta, and others, forged the concept of pan-Africanism and organized the conferences in Europe which set in motion the process of African independence.

I mention this fact out of a fidelity to history, but also, because it provides a very useful pointer to the sort of collaboration which can develop and which can be realized between Africa and the United States—not only on southern African issues, but also in the area of economic and social development.

The second issue which has preoccupied African countries at the UN is the question of apartheid, which has three dimensions: the system of apartheid in South Africa itself; the way in which that system has been extended next door to

the colonial territory of Namibia and has continued its illegal occupation of Namibia; and thirdly, the way in which South Africa has sought to make the whole region of southern Africa safe for apartheid by conducting a campaign of aggression and destabilization in the independent neighboring states. The United Nations has played a very crucial role in this issue, first, by sensitizing the international community to what apartheid is. This is very significant, because on their own, the people of southern Africa could not do it, nor do the African countries have the means to do it.

Beyond sensitizing international public opinion, the United Nations has been active in mobilizing the international community for action against apartheid. Both the sensitization and the mobilization of the international community are important prerequisites for the eradication of apartheid. Within the United Nations system today, we have specialized committees whose full-time responsibilities include precisely these activities. The Special Committee Against Apartheid and the UN Council for Namibia are the two main instruments within the United Nations which are doing the business of sensitizing the international community and mobilizing that community to help eradicate apartheid.

This task will remain a priority as long as the system of apartheid exists, as long as Namibia remains a colonial territory, and as long as South Africa continues its campaign of aggression and destabilization against the neighboring independent states.

The third issue which has been of particular concern to the African countries is a very logical one. We achieved independence for a purpose—to enable our societies to realize a higher level of economic and social development. The United Nations has therefore been an important forum for discussing economic development for African countries. It has been important in exposing the conditions which exist in Africa—the conditions which are of our own making, the conditions which are part of our colonial heritage, and the conditions which exist as a result of the present system of international economic relations—to the international community.

Within the United Nations in the economic context, the specialized agencies

have been partners with us in development. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), for example, is involved in the process of economic and social development in every single African country. UNDP is heavily supported by the United States and is headed by a very distinguished American citizen, Bradford Morse. UNICEF's work in child and maternal health care,

“For the first time, on any issue affecting the international community, an African country had a voice, had an opinion, could influence others, and in turn be influenced.”

through various programs of immunization and nutrition, is fighting infant mortality in every African country. That too is very heavily supported by the United States, and is headed by James Grant, a U.S. citizen.

The World Health Organization, through its work in the area of public health, was able to make the very revolutionary announcement that smallpox—a scourge to many in Africa—had finally been eradicated in 1980. This achievement was nothing short of a miracle for many people in developing countries, and especially in Africa. The various UN agencies involved in the areas of economic and social development and humanitarian assistance have been working with us as partners in the process of economic and social development.

There is yet another role the UN plays which has been extremely important to African countries and has to do with our very membership in the organization. At the UN, the whole world gathers, forming a microcosm, and it is important for us as newly independent states—having been dominated for most of our existence by other powers or colonizers—to be recognized as independent, sovereign members of the international community. For us, belonging to the international community is very significant.

Secondly, being in the UN enables us

to be not merely objects of international politics and relations, but to be participants for the first time. Again, perhaps this is not important for countries who had been involved in this process for centuries—making alliances and breaking them, making wars and colluding against each other—but it's our very first experience. For the first time, on any issue affecting the international community, an African country had a voice, had an opinion, could influence others, and in turn be influenced. This has been a very important possibility for us.

Being at the United Nations has been a learning experience, especially during the era which is ending now. We had to learn how the international community operated and how international diplomacy was conducted. Also, we used the opportunity to learn about other countries. The colonial experience left many of us with a somewhat lopsided awareness of the international community, geared toward the colonial power. Coming from Uganda, for example, most of our awareness revolved around Britain and the British sphere of influence.

At the United Nations, we took advantage of the opportunity to learn about the entire world and were able to broaden our horizons beyond the confines imposed upon us by our colonial experience. And in turn, we were able to tell the rest of the world about ourselves, about our countries, our background, our cultures, our concerns. It is not surprising, therefore, that the agenda of the United Nations has grown so enormously from what it was in 1945. Along with the original concerns brought by the founding fathers and mothers of the organization have been added our own concerns. The United Nations now discusses and debates a truly universal agenda.

On another perhaps more practical level, many African countries which are not in a position in terms of finance and manpower resources to be represented around the world are able to use the organization as a means of tuning into the rest of the globe. For most Western countries, this is not a handicap. The United States, for example, is represented in virtually every country of the world. On the other hand, Uganda has representation in only 20 capitals, and

many of those capitals are located around the Atlantic basin.

The United Nations, therefore, assumes a particular significance for many African countries, because here everyone is represented, enabling us to transact business which otherwise we would not be able to conduct. For example, Uganda does not have a single representation in the whole of Latin America. It is at the United Nations that we can tune in to Latin America, talk to the Latin American representatives about their concerns, and get an understanding of what is happening in that very important part of the world. We hope in time and with more resources, we shall be represented in those parts of the world as well.

These, then, are a few of the things that the United Nations has meant for us in the first 40 years of its existence, or more accurately for many African countries, in the last 25 years. What will the picture look like in the period beginning at the end of this year? What is in store for the future?

First, we must continue to focus on southern Africa. As long as the current situation continues, southern Africa will constitute the single most important item on the foreign policy agenda of every African country, and will continue to be a priority of the African states at the United Nations. We shall explore the ways in which we can work better, more cooperatively, and more positively with other UN members. In this regard, the U.S. is especially important in achieving the liberation of southern Africa.

Secondly, since decolonization is behind us, our focus is likely to concentrate on issues of economic development. A very interesting beginning was made at the last General Assembly which passed a rather important document by consensus—the declaration on the economic and social situation in Africa. This year, the July OAU summit meeting focused on the economic problems facing Africa. The question of development in all its aspects will continue to be a particular priority to the African countries.

In this regard, we are very concerned that the spirit and practice of multilateralism is translated in concrete terms into a more vigorous support for the special-

ized agencies. This is a very important issue for us because many of our countries are too small and too weak to be able to fend for themselves independently in the marketplace. Moreover, there are many issues of development which cannot be tackled individually. They need to be tackled on a group basis, on a regional basis, and at the international level.

The role of the specialized agencies will continue to be very important. But they cannot perform the functions for which they were founded unless there is continued and increasing support for the spirit and process of multilateralism. This, of course, should not detract from the age-old process of bilateral relations and aid, which also must continue and increase. The two can complement each other in a harmonious relationship.

Thirdly, there is the UN's role as peace-keeper. Many small and militarily weak African countries look to the United Nations to maintain their national peace and security. They look to the umbrella of the collective security system—which is provided for within the charter—to insure their independence, their security, and to prevent them from being drawn into a polarized world of rivalry between major powers, especially between the Soviet Union and the U.S. In the absence of the collective security provided by the United Nations, all of these small and weak countries would have no choice but to be drawn in one direction or the other. No doubt this would not be good for them, and it certainly would be bad for the world as a whole.

Finally, I believe that the African nations at the UN are going to play a very important role in forging a more constructive and cooperative spirit within that house—in all fields. We have the advantage of numbers and of diversity. Of all the regional groups, I can say without fear of contradiction that no group is more truly non-aligned than the Africans. It is a very diverse group where few countries are strongly aligned with one or the other super-power. The African group is well-placed to play a moderating role within the organization, and to forge a spirit of better cooperation, understanding, and progress within the United Nations in particular and the international community in general. □

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Bradford Morse

Director, United Nations Office for Emergency Operations in Africa, Administrator, United Nations Development Programme

The current drought and famine are only the latest in a sequence of events over the last ten years which have set back Africa's economic progress. Bradford Morse, who has worked within the UN system for the past 13 years, urges donors to look beyond the immediate crisis and begin addressing the continent's long-term development needs.

INTERVIEWED BY MARGARET A. NOVICKI

Africa Report: Although the decolonization of the African continent is regarded as one of the United Nations' most outstanding achievements, political independence has not brought about economic independence, despite the substantial efforts of the UN system in this regard. How effective has the UN system been in addressing African emergency and long-term economic needs?

Morse: First, we've got to make a distinction between the achievement of political independence and the achievement of economic independence. The United States achieved its political independence during the Revolutionary War, culminating in a state established by the constitution in 1787, but it took another war to achieve some semblance of economic independence—the War of 1812. The people of the United States have forgotten that that war did have something to do with economic independence for the United States.

How effective has the United Nations been in bringing economic independence to Africa? I would guess probably that were anyone to ask whether that is something the UN could

do, one would probably have to answer that it is beyond its competence. I think what we have to understand is what Africa itself has done over the last 30 years and not give credit to any external force.

Let's look at what's happened in the developing world in the period from 1950 to 1980. The world has been in recession since 1980, so it isn't fair to look at any of the records for the last five years because they are all distorted. The developing countries' share in international production in that 30-year period went from 5 percent to 20 percent. Not bad. Industrial output increased 10-fold in 30 years. Not bad. Capital formation in that same 30-year period increased by a factor of 12. Skills formation—technical and academic degrees—increased by a factor of 16. This is a set of achievements by the Third World as a whole that is greater than the achievement of any industrialized country, including Japan, in any 30-year period of technological transformation.

In the poorest countries which have a per capita GNP of under \$410, literacy in that same 30-year period went from 22 percent to 48 percent. Life expectancy went from 41 years to 57 years. The record is extraordinary. So the question isn't what the United Nations has done or what the U.S., France,

or Japan has done, it's what the developing countries have done and it is an extraordinary achievement.

Africa Report: What led the UN secretary-general to set up the Office for Emergency Operations in Africa?

Morse: The important thing for us to understand here is that the situation that exists in Africa today is not the result exclusively of drought. What's happened in the 25-year period since Africa achieved independence? There has been political instability—that happens in almost any country that achieves independence. There has been a faulty set of development standards, based on urban industrialization, suggested to and adopted by African countries. Population has been a major factor—the average population growth in Africa is still close to 3 percent and higher in some countries.

Let's also think for a moment about what has happened in African countries in the last 12-13 years. First, the oil price increase had an enormously negative effect. Secondly, the oil price increase, which affected the entire world, meant that the cost of developing countries' imports were inflated and Africa had to import that inflation. Third, we had a world recession that began in 1979-80, which had enormous effects in our society and in Africa as well, not least reflected in the depression in commodity prices. It also was reflected in a reduction in external assistance because with the recession, every industrialized country which was a major aid donor started looking at its internal activities and asked, "What do we do about this? We reduce public expenditures." And what's at the top of the list? There has been a very substantial decrease in real terms in public support for development assistance in the last several years. This has meant in turn that African and other countries have had to go to borrow money to meet the gap and the debt of Africa today is something on the order of \$175 billion—greater on a pro rata basis than in any other part of the world including Latin America. That has created a debt-service burden of \$7-9 billion today.

Right now, the Office for Emergency Operations in Africa has identified needs of \$1.5 billion, something that the Africans could have handled readily but for their enormous debt burden. Sure there has been civil strife, some of it resulting from ethnic competition, some of it from economic and social injustice, some of it in the southern part of the continent the spill-over from apartheid. There has also been desertification. Let's not forget that Africa today is threatened by a glacier of sand.

But on top of all of these things, add drought. Don't start out with drought—think about the whole sequence of events over the last ten years and then add drought to it and you'll understand what a crisis situation it is. So why did the secretary-general ask me to put together an office for emergency activity? Because this is an extraordinary situation that needs an extraordinary response. This has never happened in human history—30 million people whose lives are at risk and 10 million people who have lost their homes. In the United States or Canada, let's assume that there were 5 million people whose lives were at risk. . . in Africa, there are 30 million. So what we are trying to do is to mobilize the competence of the international community through the United Nations system, to bring in the bilaterals to help these African countries. Don't forget—Africa fought this alone for a long while before there



Office for Emergency Operations in Africa

Bradford Morse with Gambian President Jawara: "Most of the factors that have contributed to this crisis are beyond the control of African leaders"

was any awareness in Europe, Japan, the United States, or Canada.

A lot of us who have taken an interest in Africa—certainly the secretary-general, the director-general of FAO, and myself—have been saying since 1983-84, "Look, this is coming, it's predictable." And it had already come, but people didn't pay much attention until television got it well into 1984. Right now, we are having massive problems with logistics, and the world is saying, "What happened?" Absolutely predictable—in January and February this year, this office predicted that one of the urgent needs in 1985 would be capital equipment for transport—trucks, port equipment, and so forth. And we said several months ago \$85 million worth was required. If those funds had been forthcoming then, we wouldn't have the logistical problems now. But people don't react until it's a crisis.

Africa Report: Certainly Africa has been suffering from drought and famine conditions for at least the last ten years, but why does the international community only respond when the situation reaches absolute crisis proportions? Why did the UN secretary-general form this office this year and not ten years ago?

Morse: He did. It happened to be a different secretary-general, but under the auspices of the secretary-general at that time, the United Nations Sahelian Office was created and it's operated to this day. The Sahel goes from West Africa—Mauritania, Senegal, the Gambia, Cape Verde—right across the continent to Sudan and Ethiopia. Why nobody paid any attention to the crisis is another question. I think that people who have known affluence all their lives are not aware of the relevance of development. It's that simple and that tragic. Apart from the humanitarian and moral issue, it is a very simple thing.

It is incomprehensible to me that the world can live one-third rich and two-thirds poor. But even if people in the affluent countries were to look at it totally selfishly, people don't realize that until this recession came about around five years ago, more of U.S. exports went to the developing countries than to Western Europe, Eastern Europe, and Japan combined. People don't believe that. People don't realize how

dependent the U.S. and every other industrialized country is for the materials upon which our industry is based. Why? Because people just don't want to think beyond tomorrow.

During this 10-year period, the Sahelian office has done some terribly important things. The UN has supported the African countries' efforts and never let that go unnoticed. It's the African countries that have done it with our support. They have constructed hundreds of miles of all-weather roads in the Sahelian countries. If the money had been present, we could have built thousands and thousands of kilometers and lives would have been saved. Lives have been saved, but not enough. But people's attention span isn't long enough. It's sad because if the kinds of things that could have been done over these last 10 years had been done, then we wouldn't have had this kind of situation. As I said, this is a crisis of development, not an emergency caused by drought. But we forget that. People who have known affluence like to be generous. It makes us feel good. But when we think in terms of development, we say, "We did it by ourselves. You do it by yourselves." Well, of course, no industrialized country ever did it by itself. We just don't think of development as a major priority.

Let me just offer one modest thesis. All of us abhor the possibility of nuclear war. I am told that since the end of World War II, there have been some 200 different wars—all of them in the Third World. Some have been big wars, some small, but almost all of them have been rooted in economic imbalance and injustice. Recently, in Washington and many other parts of the world, there were demonstrations against nuclear weapons. Thank whatever providence there is, there has not been

one human being whose life has been lost as a result of nuclear weapons since Hiroshima and Nagasaki. But in these 200 wars, there have been tens of thousands of people who have been killed. I am told that there are 40 wars going on right now, and of these 40, most have their roots in economic and social injustice. The only imperfect instrument to do something about economic and social injustice that the world has yet discovered has been development. It's not very perfect, but if tens of thousands of people have died, if within these small wars, there is the possibility of an explosion into a big war which will involve everything, and if development is the only imperfect instrument to do something about the cause of most of these wars, where are the demonstrations for development? People should be demonstrating on the streets for development! I have been sitting at this desk for ten years trying to make people in my country and others understand this.

Africa Report: How would you assess the drought situation and how long will emergency assistance be required?

Morse: I don't think the questions are related because how long the drought persists won't give you the answer as to how long emergency assistance will be necessary. It is conceivable that there will be the need for emergency relief assistance even after the drought has gone because in many parts of Africa, the entire infrastructure has been destroyed and the capacity to reinvigorate agriculture has been impaired. So the two are not necessarily related.

The drought situation has improved in Kenya, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Burundi, and Rwanda. I hope it improves in many other places. But that doesn't mean the emergency is gone



United Nations/John Isaac

Karai Region, Chad: "This has never happened in human history—30 million people whose lives are at risk and 10 million people who have lost their homes"

because this is a crisis of something more than drought. I think there can be no doubt that there will be a significant emergency through 1986 and the effects of the emergency will be felt in many parts of Africa long beyond that, if we understand that it involves more than drought. I may be repeating this too much, but just go through the factors that have contributed to this crisis and drought becomes the last one. Just put drought on top of all these other factors and you have a real awareness of what the situation is. Most of the factors I described are beyond the control of African leaders. This is not to say that the African leaders haven't made mistakes. They have, but the factors that I identified have been pretty much beyond their control.

Africa Report: How do you respond to critics who say that the international donor community has poured money into the African continent since independence and has very little to show for it?

Morse: The problem as I see it is that all too many people have thought about development in terms of an investment in physical capital and part of this goes back to the success of the Marshall Plan. After World War II, all of the capital in the world was vested in North America. There wasn't anything left in Europe; there wasn't anything in Japan. All the capital was here and it became very apparent that if the world was going to survive this, somebody had to figure out how to do it. So George Marshall had a great idea—the Marshall Plan, which involved only the transfer of capital from North America to Europe. That's all, because in Europe, the human infrastructure and the capacity to build the institutional infrastructure that was necessary to accommodate the capital which was transferred was already there.

Now development involves building the human infrastructure and the institutional infrastructure—the toughest part. So as I frequently say, it is as though I were to teach you Greek and examine you in Latin. You'll fail. The toughest part of development is not transferring the physical capital; it is building up the human capital and the institutional structures. That's what development is all about.

Now what's happened? Over these last 30 years, there has been an emphasis on investment in physical capital, and not on investment in human capital—not that there hasn't been anything done, but it hasn't been done effectively and the balance hasn't been right. In 1980, John Lewis, then the chairman of the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD in his report about sub-Saharan Africa wrote something like this: "The astonishing thing is that there has not been greater progress in Africa in view of the enormous investment that has been made over the previous years. The principal proximate constraint to development in sub-Saharan Africa is human resource development." So that's what it is all about. Not that you can ignore the importance of the investment in physical capital, but you've got to achieve a better balance. Why is Switzerland a rich country? Its resources? Why is Japan a rich country? Its physical resources? No, if we could only learn that simple lesson—the importance of human resource development—then we'll find the proper equation.

Africa Report: It seems that a consensus has developed that the solutions to Africa's problems do not simply lie in pouring in financial resources, but rather in addressing long-term de-

velopment. Yet Africa will require substantial resources to do so and one can't help but be pessimistic about a more long-term approach coming out of the major donors. How can the international community in practical terms overcome this tendency to come up with short-term solutions to long-term development issues?

Morse: Why did it take this kind of a crisis for people to understand the importance of development? I don't believe there is any such consensus regarding long-term development. You just try to make people understand that they've got to do things in terms of self-interest. We've somehow got to persuade people who have known affluence all of their lives that they've got a stake in a better balance between rich and poor than exists now.

Africa Report: Can your office effectively streamline the flow of aid to Africa or is it adding another bureaucratic layer to the aid process?

Morse: No, of course not. I don't know how a few of us can add another bureaucratic layer. Nothing is going through us; we've haven't been trying to raise money for our office. We've been trying to raise money for and mobilize interest in Africa. We're not playing that kind of game at all, so that it isn't one of the dangers or one of the prospects.

Africa Report: How difficult is it in coordinating all the various organizations and bilateral donors?

Morse: Nobody likes to be coordinated, least the bilateral donors. We've had massive cooperation from the elements of the United Nations system—UNICEF, UNDP, FAO, World Food Programme, and High Commissioner for Refugees. But there are others who don't like to be coordinated.

Africa Report: How did you view the recommendations which came out of the recent Organization of African Unity summit on economic issues?

Morse: Unlike many people in this part of the world, I've been following the recommendations of the OAU for many years, and I was heartened by these, as I have been by almost every other set of recommendations that they have made. They make sense. The Lagos Plan of Action made sense.

Africa Report: Yes, but the continent hasn't made many strides in achieving the goals of the Lagos Plan of Action.

Morse: Of course it hasn't. We in our country have laws against crime, but we have crime. We have all sorts of standards which have not been achieved. We have had ideals in the United States about economic balance and greater justice. They haven't been achieved. We've had laws in our books about civil rights which we haven't achieved, but that doesn't mean that the goals are wrong. And you have to keep fighting, just as the Africans are fighting. Of course they haven't achieved a number of things that they would like to achieve, but let's not forget that given the kind of circumstances that I described a while ago that have created this emergency, and recognizing as we must recognize that the situation is longer-lived than a drought which has been going on since 1982-83, the African countries are going to need an awful lot of external support. And people get worried about external support. We talked about the Marshall Plan a little while ago. I don't remember anybody in Europe or the United States saying that the external support provided to Europe wasn't a good and healthy thing and so it must work the same way for Africa. □

Idealism and Realism

The United States' failure to take the United Nations seriously is one of the factors contributing to the breakdown of the international consensus its founders had envisioned. In an address marking the 40th anniversary of the UN Charter, Secretary of State George Shultz outlines the new forceful role the U.S. will play in the UN in the coming years.

BY GEORGE P. SHULTZ

This occasion is meant as a celebration, but it should also be a time for reflection. We celebrate the UN Charter, completed here 40 years ago. And we reflect on the record of four decades—on the world's successes and failures in abiding by the Charter's principles. As citizens of this planet we have some reason for satisfaction; clearly we also have much reason for disappointment.

The United Nations is a troubled organization; we should not kid ourselves. But, as is often said, it mirrors the world we live in. Just as American foreign policy strives globally to advance our objectives in a turbulent world, so our policy toward the United Nations must be to hold it to the high standards enunciated here in San Francisco. Our job is not to despair or take refuge in cynicism, but to labor constructively to make the UN better serve its original goals. In a world of sovereign nations, of competing interests and clashing philosophies, those mechanisms of international cooperation that exist are inevitably imperfect—but all the more necessary.

I want to talk about the United Nations, its goals and its difficulties, its weaknesses and its strengths, and

about American policy in the organization. I want to leave you with one clear message: The United States is going to stick with it. We will fight for peace and freedom and for our interests—in the UN as we do everywhere else.

And we will do our part to make the UN work as a force for security, for human rights, and for human betterment. President Harry Truman said it 40 years ago: "We have solemnly dedicated ourselves and all our will to the success of the United Nations Organization." Today, with our hopes tempered by realism, I can tell you on behalf of all Americans: Our will has not flagged, and our dedication has not wavered.

At the time of the San Francisco conference, the world had barely begun to recover from one of the most horrendous struggles in history. In Europe, the Nazi surrender left the peoples of that continent facing the enormous task of reconstruction. And in Asia, the war with Japan continued to rage.

Those who had helped preserve free society against the threat of Nazism—men like Roosevelt, Churchill, and Truman—sought to build a new and better world on the ashes of the old. They recognized and honored the heroic contribution of Soviet forces in defeating Hitler and hoped that the post-war world would bring cooperation for

peace. But they remembered as well that similar hopes for peace after the end of World War I had been shattered by Hitler's aggression and by the disunity and weakness of the democracies.

They remembered the failure of the League of Nations to bring harmony to a war-torn world not 30 years before. And Americans in particular recalled sadly that their country's retreat into isolation after that first great war was in no small measure to blame for the eruption of the second. The phrase on the lips of all Americans, and all peoples everywhere was: "It must not happen again."

So the goals and purposes of the United Nations were lofty and noble. The United Nations organization was to be a place where disputes among nations could be settled through reasoned debate and discussion and negotiation, without resort to force. But armed aggression by nations in defiance of the Charter would be met and defeated by the concerted efforts of the world community, which would contribute resources to the cause of collective security.

The Charter also embodied great hopes for bettering the human condition. The rights of all men and women to determine their own destinies free from tyranny and oppression, to vote, to

think, to worship as they choose, to form labor unions and independent political organizations—in short, to live their lives by the principles espoused in the American constitution, Bill of Rights, and Declaration of Independence—all these were to be protected and promoted by the United Nations.

Today, few of the goals proclaimed here 40 years ago have been realized. The birth of the United Nations certainly did not transform the world into a paradise. Divisions among nations and peoples persisted, and these differences did not always prove soluble by reasoned discussion and negotiation. The United Nations did not put an end to war or tyranny or the widespread denial of human rights. Its institutional safeguards did not protect against the historical tendencies of nations toward selfishness and sometimes violence. The goal spelled out in the Charter's preamble—"to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war"—has not been fulfilled.

Perhaps the founders 40 years ago were somewhat naive. I am not so sure. But as we reflect on the failures of the past 40 years, we must not fall prey to that error ourselves. Disillusionment itself may be naive. Idealism must always be combined with realism—today, as then.

The hardest thing for human beings to do is to set lofty goals and work hard for them while recognizing that they may never be fully realized. Yet that is what the United Nations is really all about. In fact, most men and women of good sense knew 40 years ago that the UN was not a panacea for the world's ills.

They knew that pursuing the ideals of the UN would be an endless task. But they were convinced that it was important to set down these ideals in concrete form, to give all nations goals to aspire toward and work for. They knew that the Charter provided a standard against which to measure the conduct of nations. If nations failed to live up to those ideals, perhaps that was to be expected in this imperfect world. But as long as the world continued to measure the behavior of nations against these high standards, progress toward a better world could be made.

This is the test by which we should

realistically judge the United Nations today. And in retrospect, we can see many successes. The UN's peace-keeping and peace-making efforts have been valuable at many critical times—in Korea, in Congo, in Cyprus, and on the Golan Heights. Several of its specialized agencies have well served the purposes for which they were intended. The World Health Organization, for instance, has been largely responsible for the eradication of smallpox throughout the world; the International Maritime Organization has consistently maintained technical standards for maritime safety and pollution control; the International Civil Aviation Organization has worked for 38 years for the safe and orderly growth of civilian air travel.

“We began to lose sight of the UN's importance as a place to promote the principles of freedom and democracy.”

Other UN bodies, like UNICEF, have also performed valuable humanitarian service. The office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, which receives more American aid than any other voluntary UN organization, provides relief to millions of refugees throughout the world. And there are others. These organizations have remained true to the principles of the Charter. They represent the United Nations at its best.

These successes have unfortunately been matched by many failures. Some agencies, like UNESCO, have strayed so far from their professed purposes that the United States has been compelled to withhold support. When in October 1982, Israel's credentials for participation in the International Atomic Energy Agency were denied, the United States suspended its own participation in protest, under the principle of universality, until Israel's right to participate was reaffirmed.

Indeed, the United States has promised to walk out and withdraw its support from any body that votes to exclude

Israel, including the General Assembly itself. The campaign to delegitimize Israel has been a persistent black mark on the United Nations. The appalling resolution 10 years ago equating Zionism with racism was a singularly vicious part of this campaign. It stands as the darkest and most damaging evidence of the failure of the United Nations to live up to its purpose and our hopes.

How can we account for these failures? In the early years, there was broad agreement among the majority of member-states on the basic principles of the Charter, particularly on the principle of collective security against aggression. The Atlantic alliance system and the Western hemisphere collective security system were the reflection of Article 51 of the UN Charter, which proclaimed the right of individual and collective self-defense.

When Communist North Korea invaded South Korea, it was the Security Council that officially ordered the forces of the United States and other nations into the region to check the aggression. American troops and those of other nations fought in Korea under the flag of the United Nations; indeed, President Truman considered the invasion of South Korea not only a threat to American interests, but also a deadly challenge to the United Nations itself and to the principles of the Charter.

Never before—or since—has the United Nations acted so boldly in defense of its proclaimed goals. The days of UN intervention into such trouble spots as Korea have passed. Today, UN peace-keeping missions can succeed, but only when the world's great powers and the states immediately involved agree.

All these conditions were met in the Golan Heights, for instance, where the UN's contribution to peace has been substantial. When these conditions have not been met, as in the Sinai, nations have had to resort to their own agreed methods for keeping the peace. We would all prefer that the UN could always play the role of peace-keeper. But we have had to accept the limitations of the real world: The international consensus which the founders hoped for has broken down.

Many factors contributed to the breakdown of the international consen-

sus. I would like to discuss three of the most significant. The first development has been the gradual transformation of the membership of the United Nations. Decolonization, which the United States rightly welcomed and encouraged, has brought many new nations into the United Nations, and the majority of these new members are not democratic. We hope this trend has reversed, and that the tide of freedom will continue to bring more and more nations into the family of democracies. As I said here in San Francisco four months ago, America has a moral duty to further the cause of freedom and democracy. We will lend our support to those struggling for freedom around the world, and that is why we will continue to defend and uphold democratic values in the UN.

Yet we must recognize the fact that the swelling ranks of non-democratic nations in the UN have diluted the original consensus that gave meaning to the Charter. Nations that are not democratic often will not support measures in the UN that would call them to account for violations of freedom and human rights, even though these are precisely what the United Nations was meant to do. As then-UN ambassador Daniel Patrick Moynihan said in 1975, "The crisis of the United Nations is not to be found in the views of the majority of its members. Rather, it resides in the essential incompatibility of the system of government which the Charter assumes will rule the majority of its members and the system of government to which the majority actually adheres."

A second problem has been the Soviet Union. We know that the Soviet leaders never shared the original ideals that gave impetus to the United Nations. But there were hopes that the Soviet Union might evolve and play a responsible part in the post-war international system. Certainly their sacrifices in the great Allied struggle to defeat Nazism led people to that hope. In any case, in those early days, the Soviet Union was consistently out-numbered and out-politicked by the Western democracies. Since that time, regrettably Soviet policies have continued to threaten the international order.

And the Soviet Union has added steadily to the number of votes that it can count on to support its actions both

inside and outside the United Nations. While other countries, including the United States, have been unfairly singled out for condemnation by various UN bodies, the Soviet Union has never been named, not even for its invasion of Afghanistan.

A third problem has been the division of the UN into blocs, indeed into an overlapping series of blocs: the so-called Non-Aligned Movement, the Organization of African Unity, and the Islamic Conference, to name a few—adding up to what Ambassador Moynihan has called the UN "party system."

"Our withdrawal from the United Nations, in spirit if not in fact, itself was a disservice to the original goals of the Charter."

Idealists may have hoped that the member-states of the United Nations would always cast their votes purely on the basis of reasoned, disinterested judgments of the merits of each individual case. Some hopefully compared the UN General Assembly to a global "town meeting," where the general public interest would always be in the forefront of all the voters' minds.

Yet, as some wise observers have pointed out, town meetings and democratic legislatures don't quite work that way either. Organized parties and voting blocs inevitably emerge. Members influence by marshalling support for their positions. And they do not always seek that support merely through the reasoned articulation of elevated principles.

The reality of the General Assembly, in any case, is as President Reagan has said: "The body established to serve the goals of the UN Charter is increasingly becoming instead a body whose members are dedicated to the goals of the majority." The contest for political influence within the UN, swayed by ideological fashions and manipulated by pressure tactics, has superseded the broader sense of community and the search for ways to fulfill the goals of the Charter.

We may lament the practice of bloc

voting that has emerged in the UN, but our disappointment is no answer to the problem. Politicking is a fact of life in the United Nations. Those who do not support the principles of the Charter have learned to use the "party system" to their own advantage. We have no choice but to respond in kind. We must use the system to defend the Charter and our own values.

This brings me to the final reason that the United Nations has not made progress toward its proclaimed goals over recent decades. And it is a problem that the United States can do, should do, and is doing something to correct. For years, the United States failed to take the United Nations seriously. Disillusionment with the way the organization seemed to be evolving led us, in a sense, to withdraw. When the UN failed to meet our sometimes excessive expectations—when the successes we enjoyed in the first years after the birth of the UN began to fade—we began to lose interest in the institution.

We were right to fear that the UN was heading in the wrong direction. But we were wrong to believe that there was little or nothing we could do to turn it around. Perhaps the lofty goals originally proclaimed for the UN made us overlook the more limited, practical aims that the UN could achieve, if we continued to play a forceful role.

As a result of our withdrawal, we failed to take part in the "party system" that was developing inside the United Nations. While others worked hard to organize and influence voting blocs to further their interests and promote their ideologies, the United States did not make similar exertions on behalf of our values and our ideas. Indeed, we began to lose sight of the UN's importance as a place to promote the principles of freedom and democracy. We often acted as if another nation's behavior toward our values and interests inside the United Nations was not relevant to its relationship with us outside the organization.

Our withdrawal from the United Nations, in spirit if not in fact, itself was a disservice to the original goals of the Charter, goals which we after all had played a major role in articulating here 40 years ago. By turning away from the UN because of its obvious failures, we neglected our duty to do the hard work

needed to achieve what could be attained. In the process, we were not only failing to promote progress in the United Nations, we were taking a short-sighted view of our own national interests.

For the truth is, despite its failings, the United Nations has a unique influence on global perceptions. The UN defines for much of the world what issues are and are not important and of global concern. Cuba worked hard in past years, for example, to have Puerto Rico on the agenda of the General Assembly as a problem of "decolonization" to embarrass the United States and to create a problem where none exists. Other states, in order to avoid such embarrassment, try to keep off the agenda such subjects as the repression in Poland, the Libyan invasion of Chad, the downing of the Korean airliner, and the Rangoon bombing. The constant assault against Israel in the United Nations is part of an effort to delegitimize the Jewish state and to evade the necessity of peace.

As Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick has said, "The decisions of the United Nations are widely interpreted as reflecting 'world opinion' and are endowed with substantial moral and intellectual force. The cumulative impact of decisions of UN bodies influences opinions all over the world about what is legitimate, what is acceptable, who is lawless and who is repressive, what countries are and are not capable of protecting themselves and their friends in the world body."

When other nations wield influence in the United Nations, when they can pass resolutions with the sole intent of harming other nations, when they can shield themselves or their friends from criticism—even for flagrant violations of the Charter—they accomplish two things: First, they build a reputation as useful and influential friends, outside as well as inside the United Nations. And second, they make a mockery of the Charter itself. For what can the Charter mean if violations of it cannot even be denounced within the United Nations?

On the other hand, when the United States cannot protect itself or its friends from unfair attacks in the United Nations, we appear impotent, hardly a useful ally. To quote Jeane Kirkpatrick again: "UN votes affect both the image

and the reality of power in the UN system and beyond it."

What all this tells us is that the United States must play a forceful role in the United Nations to protect our interests, to promote our democratic values and our ideals, and to defend the original principles of the Charter. We cannot let our adversaries use against us, as a weapon of political warfare, our own devotion to international law and international cooperation. We should use these instruments ourselves as they were intended—as a force against aggression and against evil, and for peace and human betterment.

Today, we are doing just that. The United States and its representatives make clear to other nations that we take their votes and the decisions of UN bodies seriously, and that our bilateral relations with other nations will be affected by their behavior in international forums. We now participate actively, confidently, and vigorously in the political process as it has evolved inside the UN.

But above all, we continue to proclaim proudly our values and ideals and those of the Charter. We are working hard to lead the United Nations back to its original goals, to make it a major positive force in world affairs. As our new ambassador, Vernon Walters, said here two days ago, we will not "abandon the effort to achieve the original vision. Our goal remains the strengthening of a world order based on reciprocal rights and obligations—both among states and within states. We remain committed to the capacity for freedom."

The true lesson of experience, therefore, is a lesson of continued hope. The United Nations has done important work; there is much it can do to help the world maintain peace and improve the human condition. Progress toward the goals of the Charter has been possible where idealism and realism have been harnessed together. The failure of the United Nations to meet all its lofty aims is no cause for despair. We should continue to set high goals that inspire us to work harder and to persevere. □



UN forces in the Congo: "The UN peace-keeping and peacemaking efforts have been valuable at many critical times"

Defining a New Role

While it may be popular to deride the United Nations system, the United States has an obligation to maintain its involvement in the organization. Expanding public awareness of the substantial contributions to economic and social progress made by its specialized agencies may help in improving the UN's image in the United States and in renewing our commitment to its goals.

BY CHARLES McC. MATHIAS

Although the billboards that read, "U.S. out of UN" are but a distant memory these days, it is still fashionable to belittle and berate the United Nations as a failed institution. Our leaders thrive on criticism of its shortcomings. Respected academics, many of them supporters of the UN and its goals, score points on its many failures as a force for peace and security. Popular columnists continually deride the UN and some of its controversial agencies.

At the age of 40 years, it may be normal for an institution to experience an identity crisis. The United Nations started to go through its mid-life crisis well before age 30. To a great extent, the crisis is justified. The UN today is a shadow of the moral and political force its adherents envisioned in 1945. Its primary purpose—"to maintain international peace" in order to "save succeeding generations from the scourge of war"—is mocked by dozens of regional conflicts that never seem to end. The arms race runs out of control. At the UN itself, member nations often seem more interested in excessive rhetoric and lavish lifestyles than the tough tasks of in-



Senator Mathias: "The UN will only be as effective as its members want it to be, particularly its most powerful members"

a more accurate assessment of the organization reflects a far more balanced record of successes and failures.

As a war-shattered world's hope for an international means of collective security, it has indeed failed. Yet our idealism led us to expect more than was possible. Few could foresee the fundamental changes generated by the collapse of the war-time alliance, by Soviet expansionism, and by the rapid decolonization of the Third World. As fora for diplomatic exchange and initiative, the General Assembly and the Security Council have fallen considerably short of their goals. Yet these organizations and other agencies offer rare vehicles for discussion, peace-keeping, and other humanitarian efforts.

If the General Assembly often resembles what one observer called "a tumultuous and scandalous forum of discord," it remains a forum nevertheless and there are too few of them in a fragmented and hostile world.

But there is much more to the United Nations. It is like an iceberg, and the American public sees only its tip on the blips of a television screen or in the brief notices of a newspaper story. The public is largely unaware of the work of less visible but highly effective agencies such as UNICEF, the World Health Organization (WHO), and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

An important distinction must be made between the political and non-po-

international diplomacy and technical assistance.

But as popular and politically profitable as it may be to deride the UN today,

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tical UN, or at least less politicized UN. UNICEF, UNDP, WHO, the International Labour Organization, and other agencies perform hundreds of thousands of tasks that help countries all over the world, including our own. They immunize children, care for refugees, build housing, study weather patterns, preserve archaeological sites, and teach small farmers how to get the most out of their land.

UNDP, for example, is the best expression of what the United Nations can do when it is organized and operates in an enlightened, business-like manner. Funded totally by voluntary contributions, UNDP supplies everything from experts to equipment. Since its founding in 1959, the agency has, among so many other things, devised flood control works out of termite hills in Botswana, eradicated the desert locust in the Middle East, and reorganized Costa Rica's national debt. With little rancor, 80 percent of its \$700 million now goes to the poorest nations.

The International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), set up in 1977, effectively aids small farmers in Africa. It is the only international organization that focuses on increasing food production in the poorest countries. This year IFAD, which spends only 5 percent of its funds on administration, is supporting 62 projects in sub-Saharan Africa. IFAD figures show that while it costs \$400 to send one ton of famine relief, for half that amount its projects can enable farmers to grow one ton of food each year for the rest of their lives.

UN health programs in immunization, oral rehydration, and other areas reach millions of people in countries whose political and economic problems divert attention from the youngest and poorest citizens.

There are, of course, more controversial agencies in which the political divisions of the UN meet the least resistance from the immediacy of practical, life-and-death problems. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) is one of them.

The crisis at UNESCO is serious. The bill of particulars of mismanagement is long and well-documented. Instead of focusing on literacy and scientific work, the agency too often con-



UNDP/Ruth Masssey

Well-digging crew on UN project near Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso: "Development and technical assistance are the most effective features of the UN"

ducts fuzzy studies aimed at denigrating one country or another or embraces ideologically slanted positions under the guise of promoting "peace and friendship." The proposal to establish a "new world information order" to license and "protect" journalists is one example.

As distorted as some UN programs become in practice, we still cannot walk away from them. Even if things do not always go our way, we must continue to be an influential team player, not an outsider. Too often in recent years, the United States has turned away from UN programs or initiatives. Rejecting the Law of the Sea Treaty was one disturbing example. Slackening support for multilateral development assistance through the World Bank was another.

Withdrawal from UN agencies may satisfy political lobbies but it hardly enhances our international stature. Our friends want more American presence, not less. As Jean-Pierre Cot, the French representative to UNESCO, put it last year, "If the United States thinks it can get more for its money by bilateral action, it is negating the whole spirit of an international community."

Isolation or withdrawal—what we call poor sportsmanship in athletic contests—reflects an impatience with the world's diversity and our frustrations with the shift in the relative weight of the United States at the UN. Unfortunately, many people treat the UN the way a lawyer treats a court after he loses a case. They curse it, instead of re-examining the entire proceedings, including their own conduct.

That's why I welcome the assessment of Jeane Kirkpatrick before she completed her term as our permanent representative to the UN. Irritated as

she often was by UN activities, Kirkpatrick studied and restudied our role. She concluded that "the United Nations is an important body worthy of our best attention"—not major, not significant, but best attention.

As we try to define the most promising role for the United Nations in the last decade and a half of the 20th century, I would like to stress four particular areas in which the organization can improve, expand, and intensify current efforts that range from constructive to disappointing.

- **Development and Technical Assistance:** Already the most effective feature of the UN, the variety of programs in this area must grow and improve, or millions will suffer. There is no substitute for the centralized organization and distribution of short-term relief and long-range development programs. There is no sensible alternative for the collection of non-political research and statistics on topics such as weather, population, and environmental problems.

Furthermore, we need to expose more of this "iceberg" of achievements to the public by timely promotion. As Edward C. Luck, president of the United Nations Association of the United States wrote last year in *Foreign Policy*, we can "gradually lengthen the UN list of success stories and rebuild its credibility and vitality."

- **Allocation of Resources:** Unlike the past, we face a future in which problems of oversupply may disrupt the world economy. A noble goal for the United Nations will be to address the inequities in the allocation of resources and basic foodstuffs.

The current famine in Africa illus-

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trates all too dramatically the disparities in essential life-sustaining goods and services. The new UN Office for Emergency Operations in Africa coordinates emergency relief, in this case to an unprecedented, continent-wide crisis. It is one program we should do our best to put out of business—by redoubling more long-term efforts.

● **Peace-keeping:** Depending on perceptions, this function of the UN is the proverbial half-full glass. To its credit, the UN has mobilized peace-keeping forces and successful mediation in a dozen or so conflicts. Some of these successes remain part of the unseen iceberg. For example, every six months, Israeli and Syrian officials renew an agreement to keep a UN force in the Golan Heights, assuring one often unnoticed island of stability for the last 10 years.

Yet despite the dedication of many honorable and intelligent men and women, the UN remains largely ineffective in keeping warring parties apart. The Center for Defense Information in Washington counted 40 armed conflicts in 1983, involving 4 million soldiers.

Given the deep divisions of the UN, it is possible that we expect too much of the organization in resolving intense rivalries within and across borders. To be sure, however, there are few alternatives, so member-states must bolster their support in funds and personnel for this activity.

The UN does not need to limit itself to regional wars. The nuclear balance of terror between the U.S. and the Soviet Union warrants our concern. Creation of a full-fledged mediation service would fill one void. William Ury, in "Beyond the Hotline," suggests the organization of a UN-sponsored crisis control center and formation of a permanent peace-keeping force.

If such services are possible, they must not be treated as earlier UN bodies have been treated by the Soviets, the Third World, and the United States. In his memoir, *Diplomat Among Warriors*, Robert Murphy recalled how his own superiors viewed the UN: "[John Foster] Dulles respected the UN but he also regarded it at times as a receptacle where almost any thorny problem could be unloaded and stored away for a year or longer."

● **Nuclear Non-Proliferation:** The gap between goals and performance is particularly wide in this most critical of roles. But the danger stems from the same problems that block formation of more effective peace-keeping forces—sharply divergent interests of the nations and blocs that make it up.

Valuable time has been lost. Not until a decade after the Baruch plan was offered and after both the U.S. and the Soviet Union had amassed huge nuclear arsenals did they agree to form the International Atomic Energy Agency. Now the superpowers and other members of the nuclear club find themselves in a similar predicament with the emerging nuclear nations.

Another update of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is expected this fall, and the most sensible result—renewed commitment to a workable system of safeguards and cooperation—looks remote. A real advance in UN cooperation, on the other hand, could lead to creation of neutral inspection teams for verification of any U.S.-Soviet accords in Geneva.

Many other features of the UN system too complex to enumerate here need revision. One of the most urgent is to establish more consistent funding for UN agencies. In this regard, the U.S. Congress can do its share by resisting the temptation to tie U.S. contributions to favorable and unfavorable votes. We have treaty obligations with the United Nations which should not be undercut just because we do not get our way on votes "x" or "y." We should not chisel on our commitment, nor can we allow other members to do so.

Like any multilateral organization, the United Nations will only be as effective as its members want it to be, particularly its most powerful members. It would be a shame if the UN became little more than a conduit for aid and technical advice in an unsettled world of regional wars, growing arms transfers, and proliferation of nuclear weapons.

While expanding that network of assistance, we must rededicate ourselves to the original vision of San Francisco—the maintenance of peace and a strengthening of the web of mutual respect among all nations. We must find again what Adlai Stevenson called "that bright blue dawn of a new day." □

Harry Belafonte

Long involved with African issues, Harry Belafonte has used his influence within the American entertainment community to mobilize interest and involvement in Africa's food crisis. The founder of USA for Africa believes, however, that the public's good will must be translated into pressure on our political processes if a lasting contribution to African economic development is to be made.

INTERVIEWED BY MARGARET A. NOVICKI

Africa Report: What has motivated your long-standing interest and involvement in African issues?

Belafonte: My first real consciousness of Africa was back in the 1940s when I was serving in the United States Navy and I was given a book written by Dr. W.E.B. Du Bois called *The World and Africa*—a rather heavy piece of reading for somebody who knew very little about Africa. Then, a progression of life experiences and various events that took place in Africa in the post-World War II period periodically grabbed my attention. My first really consistent involvement with Africa was when Tom Mboya came here before Kenyan independence when the rebellion was still going on and Jomo Kenyatta was under house arrest. Mboya had arranged for scholarships for Kenyan students at a number of American universities, but could not find the resources to sustain them here. So he sought out myself and an American athlete, Jackie Robinson, and the two of us agreed that we would take care of getting the resources to sustain the students. They had a great deal of difficulty getting visas and assistance from the British government and other sources, so we had to send the first airlift. We brought some 180 students and sustained them while they went to school. That started a whole chain of events, with African students coming to the U.S. I worked through a foundation I had created and some other sources to keep them funded while they were here.

By the 1960s, when America held forth a promise of a new day, I was one of the people involved with the Peace Corps from the very beginning and helped work with the Peace Corps' Africa policy. I went around the country recruiting students from universities, speaking on Africa, and then went to Africa to speak to African heads of state on a host of related issues. We had high hopes for the Corps' involvement with

Africa and Africa's involvement with the Peace Corps. Beyond just lending assistance to the needs of African communities, I was also particularly interested in the idea that if we could mobilize hundreds of thousands of Americans to go to the Third World and become immersed in Third World problems, then we would have a highly informed American community, which would make us a more enlightened people overall.

And then with my interest in African music and African art, I assisted in getting Miriam Makeba here, and we worked together for almost six years. I also helped put Hugh Masakela through school. Then as wars of liberation erupted in Africa, everything began to focus very fully on South Africa. Through Miriam Makeba and South African students, I began to know more about apartheid and learned about Sisulu and Mandela. I felt that one of the major ways to help stabilize the African continent would be to deal with South Africa and what its presence was doing to the whole continent, not only because of the inherent cruelty of that government in relationship to its 22 million black people, but its relationship, for instance, to Zaire and so many of the oppressive forces on the continent. South Africa is not just a local problem, but a nation whose bestiality supports a lot of negative characteristics in the entire African continent.

The more I became involved in South African issues, the more I began to understand that the United States of America was very key to that country's existence, and therefore something had to be done to change American policy and the American citizen's view, particularly of South Africa. So I was one of the founders and still serve as co-chairman of TransAfrica, the black political lobbying organization. I worked with not only funding TransAfrica, but helping with its policy formulation and in carrying forth the message. I worked for a number of years trying to get through on Capitol Hill and trying to break through the barriers in universities to influence people

who would be very strategic in assisting in changing American policy.

All of that led up to the Free South Africa aspect of the TransAfrica plan, which gave us an opportunity to call upon prominent people in American life—politicians, educators, artists—to get arrested and go through the whole process of civil disobedience. We used some of the techniques we had learned in the civil rights and anti-war movements to bring pressure to bear on the political process in this country. We were not very sure how far this would go, but we knew that we had nothing to lose by doing it, so we went around to campuses and other places talking and trying to gain support for it. Eventually it was my turn to get arrested, and we saw evidence of our program having an impact not only on global opinion, but on domestic opinion.

Africa Report: What in particular inspired you to launch the USA for Africa effort?



Dan Farrell/USA for Africa

Harry Belafonte at graveyard in Ethiopia: "The enormity of the problem was way beyond anything I had really comprehended"

Belafonte: I always saw the famine as a cruel circumstance and a tough issue for Africans to have to bear, but I was also somewhat confident that the global community would rise up and use its resources to turn it around. I was amazed in fact when that did not happen, and the famine began to escalate into the kind of crisis we now know it to be. I felt that the political problems would always be there, but it had to be made clear that this was an emergency where lives are being lost every day. That process had to be curtailed. So I thought that I would use whatever resources were at my disposal to try to have an impact and that led me directly to the arts community.

I made a couple of phone calls—a key one being to a man by the name of Ken Kragen. Being guided by what Bob Geldof and Band Aid had done, I was convinced that we in the United States could do it. My first feeling was that if we could get to the black artists in America who represent a very large percentage of the leading voices in American popular music—if the top ten record sellers in the country, six or seven are black—if I could impact upon this constituency, I would then have the path of least resistance to white artists.

Ken Kragen had a background in African relief programs through his relationships with Harry Chapin, who put the World Hunger Project together, and Kenny Rogers, who he represents and who is very much involved in hunger programs, especially in the U.S. Each year, Ken holds the World Hunger Awards at the United Nations, which are given to journalists who do the most to enhance the cause of the elimination of world hunger. Ken Kragen became the most strategic person, since he also represents Lionel Richie. Once that call was put in, we didn't even have to go by that whole racial dimension of getting blacks first. The response was so immediate, with one artist calling another and putting together that part of it. So it not only mobilized itself fairly swiftly, but the intensity of its impact caught us a little off guard.

We figured we would be able to raise about \$5 million, but to get ten times that much in such a short period of time, to have this kind of global response, and to have all the media so hyped, we then had to reshape our whole look at what USA for Africa could do. We decided that we would not be an agency in the field, but would service existing agencies and work through the UN, not only building on the expertise of non-governmental organizations that have long histories of working in Africa, but dealing with the African nations themselves, talking with the leadership, and then out of that, deciding how best to use our resources.

When we put all that together, it became evident that we had to go to Africa to familiarize ourselves and to have a deeper understanding than we had developed just through reading. When I got to Africa with our team, the enormity of the problem was way beyond anything I had really comprehended. The harshness of nature was only a part of a much larger deterioration, locked in with human decisions which were just so wrong.

One of the things that I began to understand early on was that the problems could not be solved by artists continually fund-raising, although I think we should continue that commitment. But I think we have to somehow encourage the constituency that we can impact upon—which is fairly vast—to action that will have an impact upon the political process, that

would make the Congress and the executive branch and the agencies begin to create a policy that would be very effective in dealing with African issues and not just the famine issue. And our links with Bob Geldof and Band Aid and other artists elsewhere in the world made me look at our ability to impact globally on both East and West and hopefully at some point get the world community to come together around the issue of famine and hunger and to do it in a way that transcends ideology.

“If there is to be any moral correctness in this country, it will have to come from an America that makes the commitment to go beyond just benevolence, but genuinely rolls up its sleeves and helps with the development of the African continent.”

Now that's very complicated and I don't mean to suggest that it's not. But it seems to me that in a time when the world is busy lining itself up for war—the trillion dollars a year spent by the world economies toward war—if they could suspend munitions making for just three years, we could effectively turn around and divert those funds toward world hunger. What a wonderful poetic way for the Soviet Union and the United States to use their resources, manpower, and their individual strategies to come together to make sure that the hungry of the world are fed, that famine is ended, and that they use their technology to irrigate, to build bridges, to make roads, and to do things that will make Africa a healthy continent.

If Africa, Latin America, and Asia become healthy, self-sufficient societies, then the ideological conflicts in which America and the Soviet Union find themselves will be dramatically reduced and there will be nothing in that area to fight over and to constantly keep the world so destabilized that war can erupt. John Kennedy once said that we already know the areas in which we have vast disagreements. Can we put our efforts to work in the areas where we have a lot in common and perhaps find out that there is more that can be accommodated rather than continuing to escalate the alienation? I think if we came together and used the resources of those two world powers in particular, and certainly those of the rest of Europe and the industrialized world, it would probably put the world into a different mood.

A lot of people would call this a wonderful, romantic, artistic dream. As I said before, I am not unaware of how complicated it is, but if millions of people can come together and say, “We represent the people of the earth and that's what we want,” we will begin to impact upon our governments. When I went to Ethiopia and Sudan and saw Warsaw Pact nations working with NATO nations to make an airlift and airdrop—Polish helicopters helping to locate areas for the Royal Air Force to drop goods donated by the United States, and people from

Finland, Ireland, England, and all over on the ground helping to regulate and assist, plus the African countries themselves—it's a wonderful commitment of humans in service of humans. So I don't think the idea is so far-fetched. It can certainly start in small ways and there is some of that going on now anyway. But instead of just one plane and two helicopters, we need 100 planes and 400 helicopters.

It would be nice to imagine that even the petroleum-producing nations would allow some adjustments in world prices for these underdeveloped nations, because certainly, as Julius Nyerere says, a healthy, consuming, and productive Africa is going to be in need of much more fuel than an Africa that has no trucks, no roads, and limps along. Certainly a productive and consuming Africa is going to place more demands on American production to deliver goods, services, technology, and communications. I believe that if any of these places can get a healthy footing and really begin to develop, it can only be good for the world because it will help production, help communications, help end war, pestilence, disease, and put an enormous pool together to begin to clean up the globe and make it a healthy, safe place to live.



Recording session for “We Are the World:” “I thought I would use whatever resources were at my disposal to try to have an impact and that led me directly to the arts community”

I will not adopt a hard line on any country, whether marxist or non-marxist—that has already gotten us into too many intransigencies that are causing too much death and destruction. We've got to recognize the genuine aspirations of people who have a right to their own destiny and to make decisions that they think are the best for them. That has to be respected. We should rather try to find out what role we had in the pain and oppression that these people felt and the things that they were denied in their own development for us to put an end to that negative continuum and put ourselves into a positive relationship with the globe. I think America can do it. **Africa Report:** Ultimately then, the key is in the involvement of the average American citizen and the pressure he or she is able to exert on the leadership of this country with regard to this issue.

Belafonte: Yes, and that's why I think that the artists can be very effective, because we have an impact on the minds of many young people. A lot of people listen to us and to a degree, we are trusted. Maybe people might doubt whether we are the most sophisticated and knowledgeable in terms of the complicated world, but I think most people trust our

hearts and our instincts and they know that we do not come with a political or a monetary vested interest in trying to bring a truth to the world. That was certainly manifested by our involvement in the civil rights movement and the anti-war movement. We can do it also in this movement. We as artists must understand our power and use our resources to help impact upon the political process.

Africa Report: Do you think that the interest in African issues that has been generated by USA for Africa and others can be sustained and if so, how? Within the artistic community itself, how difficult was it to get people involved and do you think their involvement will go beyond the present crisis toward long-term assistance in Africa?

Belafonte: Well, let me answer the question in two ways. First of all, I think the arts community is very effective in getting the information across because it was an artist by the name of Mohamed Amin who did a one-hour documentary on the famine that the BBC and then NBC picked up and broadcast. For years, the information had been around, but this film came out and sent a ripple throughout the world. Artists then got involved and we were amazed to find that the constituency was as vast and as willing as it was. So obviously, since no polls had been taken, since nobody had a way of measuring what was the public will in relationship to this issue, because nothing was around to give them the conduit to be able to make this commitment—I'm not dismissing Oxfam and Save the Children and the existing organizations that have been working courageously and actively for a long time to try to develop this consciousness—but it was the arts community that provided a direct way for people to express themselves on this issue.

I think it is not possible to sustain the interest on *that level*, because the immediacy is the crisis itself, but the problem is so long-term, it will take years and years to solve. People are just not going to be crisis-oriented for years and years. But the second part of my answer is that the interest will sustain itself because the crisis is not just confined to Africa. As Maurice Strong said, "An Africa in crisis is an America in crisis." There is just no way that we are going to get away from it, because any nation that is underdeveloped and in crisis is going to be angry about its position. African leaders and people are willing to admit that they have mismanaged and that demands were placed on them to do things in response to the industrialized world that they just did not have the wherewithal or the ability to do. But that does not exempt the fact that Africa was raped by Europe and America and by the colonial period and part of what Africa suffers is the result of that ingredient as well. For example, you can dismiss the Lebanese hostage crisis by saying it was those irate fanatics, but those irate fanatics came from a condition that embittered people and drove them to fanatical extremes in their social conduct. If America feels it can escape that, it must look at how often it has been the victim—almost unlike any other country in the world.

Also we have to look at the economics—we fix the prices on copper and uranium that make these countries reel under the debts that they must pay because they cannot get a decent price on the marketplace for what they are able to dig out of the ground. It is just too one-sided, and when a continent

becomes bitter about that, they are not just going to languish and die. Whether or not we of the arts community are able to sustain the consciousness of what is going on in that continent will not dismiss the fact that there is going to have to be an American consciousness of what goes on because we will be sucked into it in ways that are going to be much more cruel, polarized, and racist. If there is to be any moral correctness in this country, it will have to come from an America that understands this and makes the commitment to go beyond just benevolence and immediate short-term donations of food and medicine, but genuinely rolls up its sleeves and helps with the development of the African continent and its people, because as I said before, the profit for this democracy called America that loves the whole free enterprise system will be far greater than from an Africa that is as crippled as it is today.

Africa Report: Could you explain how USA for Africa works, how much money has been raised, and how decisions are made to allocate the money?

Belafonte: In the beginning, we always knew that we would work with the existing agencies in the field. We thought we'd raise maybe \$5-6 million and that would go fairly swiftly, but we would try to be astute as to which groups we gave to because we didn't quite understand how all the governmental and non-governmental organizations worked in the field. We have to date raised over \$50 million—separate from the \$70 million which was just pledged to Live Aid. I would say within the arts community globally this year, we have tapped \$140-150 million.

The Board of USA for Africa decided that the first 35 percent would go toward immediate emergency relief—medicines, food, clothing, protection against the elements. The second 35 percent would be for intermediate needs such as irrigation, well-digging, seed planting—helping in those areas which would give Africa the crops needed to begin to feed itself and to no longer rely on the emergency aid. Twenty percent would be used toward long-range solutions, and the last 10 percent would be used toward hunger at home in the U.S. That is the financial breakdown. We also agreed that we would not make any outright financial contributions—we only give goods and services to organizations who identify for us what is needed. We then shop for the medicines, trucks, bandages, food, seed on the global market, purchase it, and deal with the logistics to see that it is delivered.

When I talk about artists impacting on the political process, though, it will not necessarily be through USA for Africa, but through a whole new political entity that will involve artists who feel the commitment to continue with this effort. But as the global community's efforts begin to take effect, as the dynamics begin to shift, and as the harvest in Africa begins to come, then obviously the priorities as we have now identified them will have to shift. We will have to stay abreast of the ever-shifting situation in Africa and make our policy according to how best to impact on it.

Africa Report: Did your experiences in Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Tanzania force you to reevaluate how you had conceived of USA for Africa's response to this crisis?

Belafonte: Yes, I myself had thought that we would go ahead and be nonpolitical and bypass all the bureaucracies and get the goods and the food there. But when you understand that

\$50 million is like a grain of sand in the desert and it really isn't an awful lot of money—I don't mean to make the public who gave us that money feel that it is impotent. Quite the contrary, it has done a marvelous strategic thing and we still need to do that. But there's just no question that it's going to require massive political commitment on the part of sovereign states to adjust their internal and foreign policies to change the whole course of history. In order to do that, there must be committed people sitting in places where political decisions are made.

When I got to Africa and saw the enormity of Sudan and how minimal the infusion to cure the long-range problems, there was no question in my mind that political commitments are required. People who say they don't want to deal with the politics are going to have to give some thought to the fact that politics play a very significant role in the degree to which this crisis will be abated.

Africa Report: What has been the response of both African governments and the American government to your efforts?

Belafonte: We have had no response from the Reagan administration, nor have we solicited one. They have chosen to take a standoff position. If they were to become involved, there would have to be some mutuality on how that involvement would work. We certainly would not want to place ourselves in a position where the administration would capitalize on what we are doing unless that administration was prepared to demonstrate its will and its power to do with itself what we are doing with ourselves, and therefore we would find the basis for an honorable union. So we don't write it off. We just say that until there is some evidence that the administration has the will to do something, then there won't be any relationship. Certainly the governments we visited appreciated our presence in Africa. Beyond just the countries themselves, we had a chance to visit with the Organization of African Unity in Addis, and that body, which represents the continent, expressed its appreciation for our presence and not only gave us its blessing and honored us with all kinds of wondrous words, but made us feel that if people think we are meddling in Africa, then a lot of Africans think we are meddling in the right way.

Africa Report: Based on your experiences during your trip, how would you assess the official U.S. government response to the drought and famine?

Belafonte: Statistics will tell you that the United States is making the single largest contribution to the relief of the African famine, roughly 40 percent of all contributions. This, however, could be quite misleading, as one has to ask 40 percent of what? There are those who will tell you that billions and billions of dollars, not only from the United States, but from all over, have been poured into Africa in the name of development and yet there is this crisis. I think one has to ask several questions in order to come up with the right answers. First of all, were all those billions directed toward the proper use in Africa? People have to understand that Africans did not have as much control over how all those billions were applied as people have assumed. It was industrialized nations that determined how Africa should use this money and they made their commitments based on Africa submitting to those policies which we dictated. And when those policies were bankrupt, no one was willing to take the blame for a misappropriation or miscalculation. Rather, they all blamed it on Africa.

Therefore the perception is that we have given all this money, goodwill, and resources, and the Africans just don't know how to handle it. Well, that's just not quite the truth. On the other hand, there are large portions of that money that have been used very effectively. Africa is just not totally on the decline; there are a lot of positive things that have happened and there are societies that are productive. But you have to understand that you can only view Africa and its present position if you understand what Africa was before. For 300 years, Africa was the center of the slave trade of the world, with its resources and manpower being depleted in order to service the coffers of Europe and North America and to help create the United States. And 70 of the last 90 years have been under colonialism, and the last 20 under various forms of neocolonialism, so Africa's never truly had its independence. It is still a victim of this massive exploitation. When Tanzania became independent, it had two engineers, but after 20 years, the country now has 1,084 engineers. So one cannot say that there has not been progress. Even though it still limps along and is still desperately trying to strengthen its legs, it is a miracle that Africa even walks.

I believe that we have to change the manner in which we have directed our aid to Africa. The grain that we send, which comprises the bulk of our assistance, is not having as big an impact as it could because we have not made the commitment to help build the railway and to put roads in where roads have never been so that the food can reach the people. It isn't that the roads and the trucks exist and the Africans just won't do it, it's that these areas of crisis are where roads have never been, where there are no airfields, technology, or electricity. If you do not send assistance in addition to food—the trucks and technology to deliver it—what's the point in sending all this grain? And then when it sits on the docks rotting, turn around and cruelly mislead the public by saying it sits there for ideological reasons. . . It's just not true.

I'm not suggesting that there are not ideological differences with some of these countries and that there isn't civil war and strife that fuels the problem, but to suggest that the bulk of the problem is because of this is just not accurate. When this kind of misinformation becomes the dominant interpretation, it then relieves this country from the responsibility of making



The Live Aid concert: "We have to date raised over \$50 million—separate from the \$70 million which was pledged to Live Aid"

the moral and humane commitment to do what must be done, because then we don't have to face the responsibility. We have misled the public. We've given them another thing to distract them from what the truth really is.

So it is true that the United States and the volunteer agencies especially are doing a wonderful job. The volunteer agencies are staffed by very dedicated young men and women, but there is an absence of political will in this country to provide the goods and technology so that these doctors and volunteer agencies can have a lot to work with to help Africa get on its feet. U.S. AID is beginning to do a good job. It certainly does what it does at the behest of the administration. But even in Sudan at this very moment, the administration has made a commitment to do certain things, but AID in Sudan refuses to adhere to the directives from the main office. Now why is there that bureaucratic bottleneck? Who is impeding that process? Because while all this infighting goes on, there are a few thousand more people dying.

I think that any new assistance should be undertaken with much richer counsel, with Africans being involved in the process. Let them help interpret how they see their destiny rather than dictating to them. Let us listen to them. They are men and women of great wisdom. We certainly have this first

half-century of a fiasco. Can we now look to the 21st century with a new sense of hope and mutuality and a new sense of humanity and partnership that we haven't seen before?

Africa Report: Do you have plans to visit other African countries?

Belafonte: Yes, I'm sure I'll be making many more trips to the west and central parts of Africa. I'd also like to encourage a number of my colleagues to go because nothing will ever be as touching or revealing as their presence there to feel, see, taste, and smell first hand what it is all about. I think that in itself will be the most convincing proof that not only are we doing the right thing, but that we should be extending ourselves a little more.

Africa Report: Where is USA for Africa going to focus its efforts in the future?

Belafonte: I don't know. We are going to have some meetings to determine that. We are very young, just a few months old. After what we discovered in Africa, we have to sit down and redefine who and what we are and how best to use this power that we have. It has to be more than just the delivery of goods, because I don't know how long we can sustain that. We have to talk about ways to help impact upon political and other processes which will be more effective over the long-term. □

Partnership for Africa's Future

The businesses of America—both large and small—have responded generously to the famine in Africa.

Private citizens and businesses have contributed in unprecedented numbers to Catholic Relief Services since last October, with scores of industries and companies also donating essential gifts of products and services to assist in this crisis.

This support has enabled CRS to distribute these items, as well as more than 30 thousand tons of foodstuffs provided through the U.S. Government Food For Peace Program to an estimated 950,000 men, women and children in famine-stricken Ethiopia alone who are threatened by death from starvation.

CRS thanks American business for its critical partnership.

Emergency food is still the highest priority—but a

long-term solution *must* be secured for Africa. Farmers must have tools and supplies to work the land—seeds, fertilizer, enough water, draft animals and handplows to start over in the long and difficult task of feeding their families and in gaining a measure of self-sufficiency.

Catholic Relief Services, with more than 25 years' experience in 30 African countries, is at work now designing long-range development initiatives. Our experienced ground staff is in place at the grassroots level, ready to teach farming techniques such as improved irrigation and water management, reforestation, seed cultivation, nutrition and diet and new agricultural technologies appropriate for regions recovering from prolonged drought.

Catholic Relief Services needs the continuing partnership of American business to be able to make a real difference in the coming months.

If you or your company would like to join with so many others in the private sector helping CRS, please contact Mary Alice Price, Development Officer for Corporations and Foundations, Catholic Relief Services, (212) 638-4700. Catholic Relief Services provides aid without regard to race, creed, or political belief.

UPDATE

Guerrillas can make or break Uganda's new regime

Leaders of the National Resistance Army (NRA) have spurned the conciliatory initiatives of Uganda's new rulers, after failing to show up for peace talks in Tanzania on August 13. The rebels' reluctance to negotiate has dimmed hopes that the military regime, which seized power from President Milton Obote on July 27, would be able to unify and stabilize the strife-torn nation.

A delegation of Ugandan leaders had gathered in Dar es Salaam, where they met with Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere but waited in vain for NRA leader Yoweri Museveni to arrive from Nairobi. NRA spokesmen said their plane was denied clearance to land in Tanzania.

Museveni did meet with newly-appointed Foreign Minister Olara Otunnu, who expressed optimism for reconciliation with the guerrillas. But the NRA is apparently standing by its demand for half the seats on the ruling Military Council. According to the NRA, the demand for representation is only secondary—a means of guaranteeing implementation of its goals to end corruption and indiscipline in the army, and establish democracy, respect for human rights, and a decent standard of living for all Ugandans.

NRA leaders are also protesting the composition of the new administration, including head of state Lt.-Gen. Tito Okello, who was Obote's armed forces commander, and coup leader Brig. Basilio Olara Okello, an army commander under Obote and now a member of the Military Council. They strongly oppose the appointment of Paulo Muwanga as prime minister to head the new civilian cabinet. As minister of defense under Obote, Muwanga allegedly sanctioned the routine torture of prisoners and massacres of civilians that characterized the deposed president's rule. A powerful figure in Ugandan politics since the 1950s, Muwanga is believed to have orchestrated the coup. Although he

was closely associated with Obote, a rift had reportedly developed between the two last year.

Museveni has threatened to end the ceasefire that has generally been observed since the coup and to take over the country if talks with the new regime continue to prove unsuccessful. The NRA already claims to control a major portion of western Uganda. The towns of Fort Portal and Kasese were seized during battles before the coup. The NRA allegedly now holds Busheenyi, Kabale, Mbarara, Masaka, and Masindi, which it occupied with little resistance from army troops.

Estimates of the NRA's strength range from 4,000 to 15,000 troops. It is considered a well-disciplined and committed force, but seriously deficient in arms. NRA guerrillas began their struggle against the government after declaring that the 1980 elections—in which Obote won the

presidency—were rigged and fraudulent.

The NRA is considered indirectly responsible for bringing down the Obote regime, although the major impetus was rivalry between the Acholis and the Langis, the two main ethnic groups in the Ugandan army. The Acholis resented Obote's appointment of a fellow Langi, Smith Opon Acak, to head the army two years ago and the subsequent favoritism shown the Langis. The coup was led by Acholi army officers who now hold five of nine seats on the Military Council. Rivalry between the two groups as well as years of guerrilla warfare seriously weakened the government, which was allocating an estimated 50 percent of the national budget to the war, but could not adequately pay or supply the army.

Most of the other opposition parties
Continued on next page

Botha's speech elicits angry reactions

Bitter disappointment over President P.W. Botha's August 15th speech has further hardened opposition to Pretoria in both South Africa and the international community.

South African diplomats and the media had raised high expectations earlier in the month, with hints that the speech would be a major policy statement, revealing new directions and major reforms. Instead, Botha castigated his critics and defiantly insisted he would not be pressured into reform.

He also reiterated vague promises including that blacks living outside the homelands should have South African citizenship, and that they should be allowed to own land in urban areas. But he rejected the concept of one-man, one-vote, stating, "That would lead to the dominance of one group over others, and it would lead to chaos."

Observers speculated that pressure from the extreme right had forced Botha to delete major concessions from his speech, including offers to reincorporate the "independent" homelands into South Africa and to restore South African citizenship to their residents.

Bishop Desmond Tutu expressed his disappointment by refusing to join a delegation of church leaders who met with the President several days later. "Chances of peaceful change are now virtually nil," he said, adding, "Our last hope is the intervention of the international community."

South African business leaders seemed particularly incensed. In a front page editorial, *Business Day*, the English language daily that reflects corporate views, called on Botha to resign, commenting, "With the eyes of the world on
Continued on next page

GUERRILLAS... continued

ties and guerrilla groups have made peace with the new regime. A large regiment of Amin's army has even returned from Sudan. Democratic Party (DP) leader Paul Ssemogerere, an outspoken critic of human rights abuses, was appointed minister of the interior, a post that entails supervision of the police and security forces.

On August 10, the Kampala town square was the scene of jubilant celebration as more than 2,200 political prisoners were freed, including many DP members as well as journalists and former cabinet members. The new regime vowed that human rights would be respected, yet an estimated 1,000 persons have been detained since the coup—mostly members of Obote's security police and bodyguard. The 250 North Koreans who had been training Obote's army were also detained.

The freed prisoners gave fresh evidence of the routine torture of political prisoners under Obote. In June, Amnesty International had published a report based on evidence collected during the past four years and recent medical examinations of 16 former political prisoners living outside Uganda. The report documents torture and massacres on a monumental scale and cites mass graves at 36 locations in the Luwero triangle and around Kampala.

Obote, who allegedly took a large portion of Uganda's foreign currency reserves as he fled the country, has now been overthrown twice by the military. After regaining power in 1980, he made very little progress toward rebuilding the country, which had been devastated under the ruthless eight-year regime of Idi Amin. Obote became increasingly dictatorial and gradually lost control of the army, which went on rampages throughout the countryside. Many Ugandans charge that human rights abuses were even worse under Obote than under Amin. In a recent press conference, Museveni charged that some 300,000 Ugandans lost their lives during the Obote regime. ■

Buhari overthrown in bloodless coup

The revival of the Nigerian economy is the top priority of Maj.-Gen. Ibrahim Babangida, who seized power in a bloodless coup on August 27.

Babangida told Nigerians that his predecessor, Maj.-Gen. Muhammadu Buhari, had failed to end economic mismanagement in the government and had caused "intolerable suffering" in the country. A loan agreement with the International Monetary Fund is expected to be one of the first initiatives of the new government. Buhari has struggled to improve the economy without IMF assistance. Under his economic austerity program, inflation and unemployment have surged, and shortages of consumer goods are widespread.

The new president also promised to reform the security police, release journalists from prison, and review the cases of other political prisoners detained during the past 20 months. Restrictions on freedom of speech and the press, which were partly responsible for the decline in Buhari's support over the past year, may also be relaxed.

Babangida, 44, who was Buhari's chief of army, is known as a courageous and confident military leader, but has no experience in government administration. A northern Muslim, he was viewed as a national hero for his prominent role in quelling a 1976 coup attempt in which Gen. Murtala Muhammed was assassinated. ■

BOTHA... continued

him, he behaved like a hick politician."

The rand initially plunged to a record low of 38.5 cents, reflecting negative international reaction. The Australian government endorsed economic sanctions against South Africa, and Canada withdrew its ambassador, a step taken earlier by the U.S. and several European na-

tions.

In the U.S., members of Congress predicted that dashed hopes would ensure Senate passage of legislation imposing sanctions on South Africa, which the House of Representatives had already approved. As a result, pressure on President Reagan to sign the bill has intensified. Both houses of Congress would almost certainly override a presidential veto. ■

WESTERN AFRICA

Espionage case underscores Ghana's allegations of CIA involvement

CIA employee Sharon Scranage and Michael Soussoudis, a Ghanaian citizen to whom she passed classified information while working in Accra, pled innocent to charges of espionage in mid-August, after their indictment by a U.S. federal grand jury. Both had been charged on multiple counts of espionage, a crime that carries a maximum penalty of life imprisonment. Their trials are scheduled for October.

In Ghana, the case substantiated allegations repeatedly made by Ft.-Lt. Jerry Rawlings' government that the CIA had infiltrated military and civilian circles to destabilize or

overthrow the government. In 1983, Kojo Tsikata, who heads the Ghanaian intelligence operation, publicized an alleged coup attempt involving the CIA and then American Ambassador Thomas Smith, who was abruptly recalled from Ghana. The U.S. attempted to discredit Tsikata and blamed the affair on misinformation fabricated by Soviet intelligence.

Earlier this year, a Ghanaian intelligence officer had confessed his CIA connections to the Ghanaian government, which demanded that the U.S. withdraw the head of CIA operations in Accra. He discreetly

returned to CIA headquarters, and the Ghanaian government did not publicize the incident.

In the U.S., a CIA analyst described the espionage case as "a disaster for CIA operations in Ghana," and said it would be interpreted as a message to Africans not to work for the CIA. The case is also said to be damaging CIA operations in Liberia, Ivory Coast, Nigeria, and Togo.

The 18-count indictment against Scranage, 29, alleged that she revealed the identities of 11 CIA informants and five CIA employees in Ghana as well as other classified information, including Ghanaian dissidents' plans for a coup against Rawlings. She pled guilty to only two charges of disclosing the identities of covert agents.

Scranage gave the information to Soussoudis, who is Rawlings' first cousin, with whom she had a close personal relationship during her two-year stay in Accra. They had dated for eight months before he learned that she worked for the CIA. A lie detector test uncovered evidence of her revelations after she was called back to the U.S. in May.

Soussoudis, 39, was charged in a separate eight-count indictment with seeking information from Scranage about Ghanaians who were cooperating with the CIA and opposing the Rawlings government. Soussoudis has permanent residency status in the U.S. but had returned to Ghana after Rawlings came to power in 1979. However, under U.S. law, Soussoudis can be tried for espionage in the U.S. if the charges include an overt act in this country and if the initial arrest occurs here. After agreeing to cooperate with the investigation, Scranage had arranged a rendez-vous with Soussoudis at a Springfield, Va., hotel, where he was arrested.

Scranage was released on bail in her parents' custody, but Soussoudis was being held in prison, although the Ghanaian ambassador to the U.S. offered to take him into custody at the embassy in Washington while he awaited trial. The Ghanaian government categorically denied that its agents ever sought information from Soussoudis. His

lawyer claims that he should not be charged with espionage because he did not seek information about the U.S., but only about Ghanaians cooperating with the CIA or opposing the government.

After the CIA's Ghanaian operation unraveled, the Rawlings government detained certain prominent Ghanaians while others fled the country or went into hiding. The government froze the assets of various individuals, including Navy Commodore D.J. Oppong and Samuel Okudzeto, a lawyer who headed the Association of Recognized Professional Bodies. Oppong had left the country, and Okudzeto has been detained without trial for alleged connections to the student strikes of 1983.

Both countries have issued state-

ments claiming that the episode has not damaged their relations, which had been improving in recent months. The U.S. State Department said that relations with Ghana are good and "we assume they will continue to be." It also described as "quite inaccurate" media reports that had linked Ghana's foreign policy to the Soviet Union or Libya. And the Ghanaian government declared it wanted to maintain good relations with the U.S. However, the case has clearly renewed tensions between Ghana and the U.S. The Ghanaian government deplored the CIA's "flagrant interference in the internal affairs of Ghana," and reported that thousands of workers in Accra had demonstrated against the CIA following the arrests. ■

Aborted coup strengthens Conté's hand

Following Col. Diarra Traoré's foiled coup attempt, President Lansana Conté is expected to take advantage of his sudden surge in popularity to push through long-awaited measures to revive the economy.

Traoré and his supporters had gained control of Conakry radio station on July 4 in a bid to oust the head of state while he was attending the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) summit in Lomé. Traoré informed the nation that he was seizing power because the Conté government was responsible for the "disintegration" of the country in the face of a "major economic crisis." The coup was necessary, he added, "to put an end to all the footdragging in making political, economic and, in particular, monetary decisions which are to launch the development of our country."

Troops loyal to Conté, led by Maj. Ousmane Sow, the secretary of state for defense, recaptured control of the radio station after several hours of fierce fighting. According to official accounts, 19 people were killed and 229 injured. An estimated 200 people were subsequently arrested, including Traoré and six other government officials. Six of eight regional governors, and six of

35 prefects were also detained.

Upon his triumphant return to Conakry, Conté was promoted to brigadier-general for "services rendered to the nation." He told the tens of thousands of supporters who greeted him that Traoré and his accomplices would be tried swiftly and then executed.

Conté acknowledged that ethnic rivalries played a role in the putsch. For the most part, those involved, including Traoré, were Malinke, the largest ethnic group which dominated Guinean politics for more than 20 years under the rule of the late President Ahmed Sékou Touré. Conté, who belongs to the Soussou, revealed that he had detained about 30 individuals associated with the Sékou Touré regime who took part in the plot.

Following Traoré's radio announcement of the coup, many people in Conakry took to the streets to demonstrate in favor of Conté. Shortly after the coup was crushed, there were revenge attacks on Malinke-owned homes and shops, while Traoré's own villas were vandalized and stripped bare. Authorities appealed to the population to "go to work calmly and avoid any acts of looting."

The coup attempt by the highly

ambitious Traoré came as no surprise to many observers. Traoré, one of the key officers who seized power in April 1984 shortly after Sékou Touré's death, had been at odds with Conté for many months. He was demoted from the post of prime minister last December but remained in government as minister of education.

Upon his return to Conakry, Conté claimed that he had advance knowledge of the plot and had even obtained a list of the main conspirators before leaving for Lomé. Traoré and his accomplices had apparently overestimated their support within the army.

With his position strengthened in the army and his popularity enhanced, Conté has renewed his commitment to tackling the country's economic problems. Until the coup attempt, he had been unwilling to push through the potentially unpopular economic measures demanded by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for fear of social unrest.

Conté may now agree to devalue the non-convertible syli which changes hands on the black market at one-twelfth of its official value. He may also trim the inflated civil service which has a reputation for corruption and inefficiency and constitutes a powerful obstacle to economic reform. The IMF has made both these measures a precondition for agreement on a standby credit and recovery program which would allow the country to reschedule its estimated \$1.5 billion external debt. ■

BENIN

The backlash commences

President Mathieu Kérékou dismissed two cabinet ministers and several high-ranking university officials in mid-June in response to the earlier student unrest that led to two deaths and the closing of the National University of Benin (UNB).

Lt. Col. Michel Alladayé, minister of secondary and higher education, and Moussa Ali Traoré, minister of culture, youth, and sports, were demoted after the National Revolutionary Assembly met to as-

sess the failure to contain the student disturbances. Prominent in national politics for many years, Alladayé was the last remaining member in government from the group of four officers who planned the 1972 coup which brought Kérékou to power.

Other casualties of the protest included the president, deputy president, and secretary general of UNB. All those dismissed by Kérékou were also suspended from the country's sole political party, the People's Revolutionary Party of Benin (PRPB).



Kérékou: Expelling "anarchists and leftists"

Concurrently, 18 university students, branded as "anarchists and leftists" were expelled from the university for engaging in "blatant subversive activities." The students were further warned to stay away from all educational institutions and forbidden to use state buses and vehicles.

The student unrest was prompted by increasing economic woes. After widespread student allegations of governmental corruption and calls for economic liberalization, the disturbances broke out when the Council of Ministers terminated the policy of guaranteed civil service employment for university graduates.

Although the cabinet shift seems designed to do little more than allay tensions, the consequences of the unrest are likely to become clear only at year's end when the Party Congress is due to take place. ■

BURKINA FASO

A dam good start

As the government of President Thomas Sankara celebrated the second anniversary of its August 4 revolution, a key component of its ambitious development plan to combat drought and famine finally got under way. Work on the Komienga hydro-electricity and irrigation project began in earnest with construction of what the government hopes will be the country's largest dam, capable of partially covering the energy needs of Ouagadougou.

A \$14.1 million grant from West Germany in early July, covering 18 percent of the construction costs of the \$78.8 million project, completed the financing of the dam. Until recently, some backers of the Komienga works had been reluctant to pledge the requested funds, claiming that because of the drought, the dam, located near the border with Benin and Togo, would be able to operate at only 40 percent of capacity. The Sankara government, however, succeeded in obtaining the support of other sources, including the African Development Bank, the Central Fund for Economic Cooperation, and the Canadian Agency for International Development.

The government views completion of the dam—which is expected to take 26 weeks—as a major priority in its long-term struggle to survive the drought. Last year, the drought left the country with a cereals deficit of 300,000 tons. To emphasize the importance it attaches to grappling with this problem, the ruling National Council of the Revolution established a ministry of water resources—the first in Africa.

To overcome the financial constraints of such development projects, the government has attempted to mobilize voluntary labor. As a result, people from all walks of life have turned their energy to another national priority—what has become known as the "Battle of the Railway."

The government's decision to go ahead with the proposed railway line, which will link Ouagadougou to the northern region, has several

objectives. The completion of the 225-mile track would not only open the north to greater trade and communication, improve the distribution of food aid, and facilitate linkages with neighboring countries, but also provide the necessary transportation to the large manganese deposits in Tambao.

Skeptical donors, however, have held back on financing. Despite a favorable study of the joint railway and manganese venture by a Canadian consulting firm with assistance from the United Nations Development Programme, donors such as the World Bank and the European Development Fund have questioned the viability of the project.

They point to declining world prices for manganese and likely competition from coastal countries like Ghana and Gabon. Furthermore, the World Bank objects to the scheme because it considers two other transportation ventures to be more worthwhile: the construction of the Ouagadougou-Niamey road, which runs in the same direction as the railway line, and improvements to the Ouagadougou-Abidjan railroad, which is seriously indebted and mismanaged.

The Sankara government, however, insists that the projects complement each other, and continues to seek donor support for the "Battle of the Railway." So far, only Romania and Yugoslavia have indicated interest in funding the project. ■

IVORY COAST Campaigning in succession

Campaigning is well under way for presidential, legislative, and municipal elections projected for October and November when President Félix Houphouët-Boigny will name his vice-presidential running mate and likely successor. The nomination is expected to be made at the forthcoming eighth congress of the ruling Democratic Party of the Ivory Coast (PDCI).

Houphouët-Boigny, who will celebrate his 80th birthday in October, has long tried to downplay the issue of his successor. As he said during a visit to the southwestern town of

The Pope's religious safari to Africa

Pope John Paul II embarked on a 12-day shuttle to seven African countries in mid-August, aiming to reconcile Christianity with local beliefs on a continent where animism and Islam predominate. Although Catholicism is growing faster in Africa than in any other part of the world, fears that it is adapting to regional traditions prompted the Pope's third tour of Africa in five years.

As Vatican spokesman Joaquin Navarro Valls pointed out, "Along with Latin America, Africa is considered one of the reservoirs of world Catholicism for the future." Vatican officials estimate that 16 percent of Africans are now Catholic, compared to only 1 percent at the turn of the century. Anticipating 2 million converts per year, they predict that by the year 2000, about 100 million Africans will be Roman Catholics.

Such rapid growth, however, has put a strain on the Vatican's ability to control doctrine at the local level. In rural communities in particular, people adapt their Catholicism to meet African conditions—drawing on their social and religious experience.

Throughout his trip, the Pope repeated that the Roman Catholic Church was open to traditional customs and sought to preach a faith that was "authentically Christian and authentically African." But he reminded a large crowd in Cameroon, "Have faith in the Church. Never abandon the canoe that got you to the other side of the river."

During his hectic religious mission, the Pope ordained several priests in Togo and arrived in Ivory Coast in time to consecrate a new cathedral. While in Cameroon, he took the opportunity to condemn apartheid, declaring that the church's "repudiation of any form of racial discrimination is forceful and total," and called for "an end without delay to all discrimination."

Following a brief stay in Central African Republic and a two-day visit to Zaire, the Pope attended the 43rd Eucharistic Conference in Kenya whose theme, "The Eucharist and the Family," provided him with a ready-made forum for the most controversial message of his tour—his views on family planning and population control. Only weeks after women from all over the world had gathered in Nairobi to discuss their rights at the UN Decade for Women Conference, the Holy Father urged Africans to reject Western ideas of limiting families through contraception and abortion.

The Pope reiterated his support for the rhythm method as the natural way to regulate fertility. He condemned the "powerful anti-life mentality" prevailing in developed nations which he said is being transmitted to developing countries, and concluded, "Without a healthy family life, there can be no stable social life in any country, nor vigorous life in the Church."

His stand on birth control put the Vatican squarely at odds with many African countries. Kenya, in particular, has been encouraging people to have fewer children and to use family planning in its struggle to reduce its 4 percent population growth rate—believed to be the highest in the world.

The Pope concluded his tour with a brief stop in Morocco, his first official visit to a Muslim country, in hopes of strengthening the Roman Catholic Church. Accepting an invitation from King Hassan, he gave an unprecedented papal address to a predominantly Muslim audience in Casablanca which the Vatican viewed as a major step toward improving Muslim-Catholic relations.

Gagnoa in mid-July, it was "unfortunate to note that newspapers reduce Ivory Coast's major preoccupations to the issue of Houphouët's succession." He did add, however, that he had no intention of "avoiding his responsibilities." "We are thinking on the subject, and we will inform the country of the choice of a

successor."

Houphouët-Boigny stressed that he was more concerned with the country's economic recovery, which he said was a source of considerable optimism. According to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, GDP is expected to rise by between two and

five percent in real terms this year after three years of decline.

The primary impetus for renewed growth comes from bumper cash crops which rebounded after successive years of drought. The 1984-85 cocoa output spurred by good rainfall and attractive producer prices totalled a record 528,000 metric tons, compared to 376,000 metric tons last year, strengthening the country's position as the world's largest producer. The volume of another key export crop, coffee, trebled to 270,000 metric tons.

A recent crude oil agreement between the Ivory Coast's Oil Refining Company (SIR) and Chevron, the U.S.-based oil group, is also seen by observers as a sign for optimism. The regional vice president of Chevron International Trading, Mark Elliott, claimed that the deal was a decisive step toward making Abidjan the "Rotterdam of West Africa."

The contract calls for the processing of 16,000 barrels of crude oil per day, doubling the tonnage in the original agreement signed in March between SIR and Gulf Oil, which has since merged with Chevron. The arrangement calls for much of the oil to come from Chevron's Nigerian operations in what is said to be the first deal of its kind in West Africa.

Elliott said that the refined products would be exported exclusively to countries in the region which sorely need the high quality product that SIR can provide. In the longer term, this would allow Ivory Coast to supplant European and Caribbean refineries. ■

LIBERIA

Parties plead with president

Five political parties have publicly appealed to President Samuel Doe to remove the barriers to the registration of political parties for the elections scheduled for October and November.

The appeal, issued in mid-July in a joint communiqué, also called on the president to repeal the notorious Decree 88A which stifles criticism of the government, and to release political prisoners. Special mention

was made of five student leaders still detained in Bell Yella prison for allegedly distributing leaflets criticizing the government.

Only days later, the government charged three prominent citizens with treason—Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, Togba-nah Tipoteh, and Patrick Seyon. Tipoteh, former minister of finance and economic planning under Doe, and Seyon, former vice-president of the University of Liberia, now live outside the country. Johnson-Sirleaf, former finance minister under Tolbert and a Harvard-trained development economist who has worked for the World Bank, was first placed under house arrest and then transferred to a military stockade on August 9. She is also an executive in the Liberian Action Party, which Doe has accused of plotting to overthrow his

claimed they had visited the embassy to inquire about attending a youth festival in Moscow and to watch a film about the USSR.

Arrests continued with the detention of two journalists in late July—Monulu Sackor Sirleaf, president and publisher of the independent *Footprints Today*, and the newspaper's sports editor, Kon Hinneh.

Dusty Wolokolie, deputy chair of the Liberian People's Party (LPP), was re-detained in July for criticizing the government. Only a few weeks earlier, he had been released after a year in prison when a court ruled that his detention was illegal. A number of other LPP leaders remain in detention, while the party's leader, Amos Sawyer, has faced an assassination attempt. Concern is growing for LPP's public affairs officer, journalist Tom Kamara, who



Demonstrating outside the Liberian mission to the UN, NYC, August 24: A small group of members of the Union of Liberian Associations in the Americas and Canada chant slogans against President Doe.

government. Justice Minister Jenkins Scott said she would be tried for criminal sedition or libel for comments expressed in the U.S., where she has recently been speaking to government officials and Liberians about the election process and economic reforms needed in Liberia.

In late July, the government also arrested 14 students at the Russian embassy in Monrovia for allegedly passing classified military information to the Soviets. Liberia charged the Soviet Union with gross interference in its internal affairs and severed diplomatic relations. The Soviets retaliated by sending home Liberian diplomats. The students

was detained when he visited the Special Elections Commission to inquire about party registration last March. Repeated inquiries have failed to yield information regarding his whereabouts, although the government claims he has escaped.

Besides Doe's National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL), only two parties have been allowed to register for the elections: the Unity Party, led by Edward Kessely, formerly a minister in the Tolbert regime, and the United People's Party, headed by Baccus Matthews. Both parties endured legal and financial struggles to register. Observers note that Doe probably approved these registrations be-

Paula Hirsch

cause he needs token opposition. The UP is not expected to pose much of a threat. The NDPL is withstanding the challenge from UPP with verbal attacks on Matthews for his "socialistic tendencies."

Meanwhile, public confidence in the Doe government is at a very low ebb. Paychecks for employees of the civil service and the military are subject to lengthy delays. Unemployment is at an all-time high, due to major government staff reductions. Management of the banking system and the civil service has seriously deteriorated. Doe, who reportedly dislikes the daily tasks of government administration, gives his ministers free rein in running their departments. ■

SIERRA LEONE

Army chief to replace Stevens

Maj.-Gen. Joseph Saidu Momoh was unanimously selected as the presidential candidate by the All People's Congress, the country's sole political party, in early August. The election is scheduled for October, and Momoh will take over from the aging President Siaka Stevens in December.

The party's choice was no surprise, as Stevens had made clear that Momoh was his designated successor several months earlier. The transfer of power is unusual, involving a civilian leader voluntarily handing over the government to a military ruler. Observers speculate, however, that Stevens will use his influence to retain control over the country. Because of his reluctance to relinquish power, the selection of a successor has preoccupied the national political scene for years.

In June, Stevens reshuffled his cabinet to prepare for the transfer of power. Finance Minister Abdulai Conteh was sacked only the day before he was to deliver the budget for the coming fiscal year and reportedly fled the country. Conteh was said to favor first Vice-President Sorie Koroma for the top spot. Koroma was a top contender to succeed Stevens, but the president undermined his credibility by casting doubts on his health. Koroma was

OAU vows to tackle economic crisis

Calls for debt relief and agricultural self-sufficiency dominated the 21st summit of the Organization for African Unity (OAU), held July 21-23 in Addis Ababa. Sidestepping the wrangling over political issues that has dominated past summits, the African leaders adopted a plan to deal with the continent's economic crisis.

The Addis Ababa Declaration, as the plan is known, sets forth measures to achieve food self-sufficiency and proposes a long-term dialogue with the West and its financial institutions on economic recovery for Africa. The statement will enable African heads of state to present a united front to the rest of the world, particularly in their efforts to deal with the debt crisis. More importantly, it will serve as a guide in their efforts to revive national economies, provided their commitment to action can be sustained. To this end, the summit established a permanent committee to monitor implementation of the plan.

OAU delegates placed much of the blame for the economic crisis on the "unjust and inequitable" international economic system and natural calamities like drought, but acknowledged that their own policies have also contributed to Africa's external debt, which is expected to reach \$170 billion by the end of the year.

They rejected a call by several nations (Angola, Burkina Faso, Mozambique, and São Tomé) for a moratorium on national debts to Western institutions. But they agreed that some debts should be written off or converted into grants, and that developed nations should increase their concessionary spending in Africa. The declaration calls for the urgent convening of an international conference on Africa's foreign debt.

The OAU also reiterated the call for self-sufficiency in food production that was part of the 1980 Lagos Plan of Action, adopted at the only previous OAU summit focusing solely on economic matters. To meet this objective, members made a commitment to increase governmental investments in agriculture to 20 or 25 percent of national budgets by 1989. Adebayo Adedeji, executive secretary of the UN Economic Commission for Africa, remarked that while this goal was actually quite low, it was more than twice the level currently devoted to the agricultural sector by some African countries.

Among other matters on the summit agenda was the \$13.5 million arrears in the 1984-85 OAU budget, a problem arising in large part from members' failure to pay dues. Only three nations are not in arrears. Low attendance at the two-day summit was also cited as a problem. Only 18 of the 51 OAU member-nations were represented by their heads of state.

President Abdou Diouf of Senegal was elected to succeed President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania as OAU chairman. And the delegates elected Idé Oumarou, foreign minister of Niger, to a four-year term as secretary-general, after having failed to gain the necessary two-thirds majority vote at previous summits. Oumarou, a novelist and former journalist, succeeds Peter Onu of Nigeria who had held the post for two years on an interim basis.

persuaded to abandon his plans to challenge Momoh only a couple of days before the party convention. Second Vice-President Francis Minah was earlier persuaded to step aside, although his recent appointments as minister of justice and attorney general boosted his power.

Momoh, 48, who has headed the 3,000-man army for 14 years, is generally considered a qualified and disciplined leader. He was selected despite recent revelations of wide-

spread corruption in the army and ongoing investigations of senior military officers. Stevens appointed him to be a minister of parliament in 1973 and a member of the cabinet in 1978. Observers say that Momoh is respected by most Sierra Leoneans, but that he may have problems within the military. The Nigerian *Concord Weekly* commented, "General Momoh does not appear to enjoy full support of the army's top brass."

After his election, Momoh declared his intention to impose military discipline on national life but warned that the military was not going to be involved in forming the new government.

At the convention, the party also appointed a new central committee and a governing council with Stevens as chairman, Momoh as secretary-general, and Koroma and Minah as first and second vice-chairmen.

Meanwhile, former military head

of state Andrew Juxon-Smith has called for the replacement of the current government, according to *West Africa* "because Sierra Leone is finished and desperate." He said that the country needs "to start all over again because there is hardly anything to reform at present." Juxon-Smith, who had not spoken publicly since his government was overthrown in 1968, issued the challenge after being elected to head the National Alliance Party, an opposition group based in New York. ■

EASTERN AFRICA

Birthrate overburdens Kenyan economy

The government is projecting a 5 percent growth in GDP in the coming year—an optimistic economic outlook which would outpace population growth for the first time in several years. The forecast is part of the 1985-86 budget that Finance and Planning Minister George Saitoti presented to Parliament in June. Economic recovery with a strong emphasis on agricultural production was the major budgetary theme.

Improving on Kenya's 1984-85 economic record should be a relatively easy task. GDP registered an almost imperceptible increase of only 0.9 percent last year, the lowest rate in two decades. The major cause was the worst drought in 50 years, which resulted in a 3.7 percent decline in agricultural production after three years of satisfactory growth. Economic growth is expected to rebound this year, with satisfactory rainfall enabling the agricultural sector to produce a surplus.

But keeping ahead of Kenya's exploding population growth is another matter. At 4.1 percent, the country's growth rate is the highest in the world. A Kenyan woman has an average of more than eight children during her lifetime, compared with the worldwide average of 3.5. Nearly 52 percent of the population is under 15. No other country in the world has more than half of its population in that age group. Kenya's population, currently estimated at 20 million, is expected to double by

the year 2000.

President Daniel arap Moi recently forecast social and economic upheaval if Kenya fails to curb its population growth. And the government noted in the 1984-85 development plan that it is "acutely aware of the incipient imbalance between food supply and demand caused by the pressure of a rapidly increasing population." Parliament is considering proposals on how to tackle the problem. Kenyan government officials encourage family planning, and the 1985-86 budget triples the allocation for family planning services. Yet the country had only 11 family planning clinics and 35 mobile units in early 1985, and many of those were understaffed and short of supplies. In most of rural Kenya, contraceptives are simply unavailable.

The major obstacles to the expansion of birth control are the Catholic church [a large proportion of Kenyans are Catholic] and deeply entrenched public attitudes. Kenyan men take great pride in having large families, and children are still the only form of social security and the only means of gaining status in the community for most Kenyan women. ■

ETHIOPIA
Protests in the Promised Land

Thousands of Ethiopian Jews who were flown to Israel in a secret rescue operation from refugee camps in Sudan late last year have

strongly protested demands by leading rabbis that they undergo full ritual conversion to reaffirm their Judaism.

Questions over their Jewishness have caused some of them to insist that they might as well return to their famine-stricken birthplace. As one African Jew said, "We want to go back to Ethiopia. There's the humiliation of hunger, but at least we were proud Jews."

At first, the rabbis had argued that newly-arrived Ethiopian men would require a symbolic circumcision, using a needle to make a tiny cut. Widespread opposition to this practice forced the rabbis to replace it with a ritual bath for both men and women. "We recognize the Ethiopian Jewish community as Jewish, but over thousands of years there was a lot of mixing [intermarriage with non-Jews] and the immersion assures they are totally Jewish," said Chief Rabbi Avraham Shapira.

The dispute came to a head when more and more Ethiopians sought to get married, but were prevented from doing so by the rabbis. Hundreds of Ethiopian Jews refused to work or attend Hebrew classes at immigration absorption centers to protest the rabbinical position. Several immigrants even went on a hunger strike.

In mid-July, more than 600 African Jews began a protest march from the immigration center in the northern city of Afula to the airport in Tel Aviv. "We have many of our people who lost their wives on the march out of Ethiopia," said Shimon Asher, "and now they want to re-marry and the rabbis won't let them. Some Ethiopians did the immersion when they arrived, but that is because they were few and were not organized. Now we are many and we are organized and we won't do it."

Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres intervened on their behalf and met with Shapira and Chief Rabbi Mordechai Eliahu. The religious leaders conceded that the ritual bath would no longer be required for the entire community of Ethiopian Jews. But the new immigrants, like others whose Jewishness was still in doubt, would have to do the

immersion before being allowed to get married. It is not yet clear whether the compromise decision, however, will be sufficient to satisfy the Ethiopian Jewish community. ■

MADAGASCAR

The art of living dangerously

Government troops in armored vehicles raided the headquarters of an underground kung fu sect in early August, leaving 19 dead and 31 wounded in the island's latest bloodbath involving martial arts fanatics. Another 208 members were arrested. Last December, a youth gang's kung fu attack against the government-organized youth movement known as TTS left over 50 dead and many injured.

Kung fu "Grand Master" Pierre Mizael Andrianarijaona, who was an outspoken critic of the government of President Didier Ratsiraka, died in the recent clash. In past months, he and his followers had repeatedly attacked TTS squads, which he accused of physically intimidating the government's political opponents.

The government said it was forced to intervene against the kung fu group because it virtually had formed a "state within a state" and was threatening to seize control of the island by force. The kung fu sect is still believed to have more than 10,000 adherents, particularly in the country's main cities. ■

MAURITIUS

Sugar industry turning sour

Prime Minister Anerood Jugnauth's coalition government is coming under heavy criticism from the country's trade union movement for its Action Plan to restructure the sugar industry. As a key sector of the island's economy, the industry accounts for 20 percent of GDP and more than 60 percent of export earnings.

The plan, which is expected to cover a five-year period, was developed following an inquiry into the industry and is to be overseen by the Sugar Authority established last year. It proposes fiscal incentives of up to \$12.6 million to small planters

and sugar industry owners and a \$50 million investment program.

The major purpose is to allow Mauritius to maintain its competitive position on the world market by rationalizing industry operations: cutting production costs, modernizing equipment, and investing in new technology. These measures, the government claims, are essential if the industry is to survive competition from sugar substitutes.

In line with this strategy, the plan proposes to close five production units, provoking strong resistance within the workforce. These include the Reufac and Solitude units which are already shutting down, wiping out thousands of jobs.

While trade union leaders acknowledge that the plan may boost the industry, they point out that it fails to safeguard workers' interests. Jugnauth, however, has remained unimpressed by their appeals. At a recent public rally, he said, "I shall have the fingers of those trade union leaders amputated whose actions will tend to disrupt the economic activities." ■

SOMALIA

Doctoring the figures

A cholera epidemic in northwestern Somalia had claimed more than 1,000 lives among famine victims by early July at Ganed, the largest refugee camp in the country.

Ahmad Sharif Abbas, director general of the contagious diseases department of the Somali health ministry, revealed at a press conference in late June that the epidemic had already killed 1,262 people and was spreading to out-lying refugee camps in Hargeisa and Borama. The camp in Ganed, whose existence was ignored by the government of President Siad Barre for many months, has an average death rate of 19 per day, which exceeds those of the more widely publicized famine camps of Ethiopia.

The government claims that the cause of the outbreak was transmission by refugees from Ethiopia rather than official negligence. Cholera is reported to have reached epidemic proportions in both Ethiopia and Sudan, with an estimated

Vanilla: is it the real thing?

Coca-Cola's announcement in July that the "real thing" would soon be back on the shelves due to overwhelming public demand may have come as a relief to many Americans, but for the Malagasy government of President Didier Ratsiraka, far more was at stake. When the new formula Coke was brought onto the market, it excluded vanilla, a classic ingredient and Madagascar's leading export. The change in formula at Coca-Cola—which consumes 30 percent of the world's vanilla—threatened to take the fizz out of the Malagasy economy.

During the 1970s, output of vanilla had plummeted from nearly 8,000 tons per year to about 2,000 tons because of growing competition from synthetic substitutes and poor maintenance of plantations. The island now produces only about 1,500 tons of vanilla, but still accounts for three-quarters of the world's total supply. As a report in the *Wall Street Journal* pointed out, "The change in Coke's formula could have been the last straw for Madagascar's vanilla beans which have already lost sales to cheaper synthetic vanilla flavoring."

While Madagascar successfully survived the Coke challenge, synthetic substitutes are likely to pose a longer term problem. One such rival is a Philadelphia food additives company, David Michael & Co., which is sponsoring a three-year research program by Dietrich W. Knorr of the University of Delaware in an effort to break Madagascar's monopoly on the expensive flavoring.

According to *Business Week*, Knorr is using biotechnology in hopes of producing a cheaper flavorful chemical in the laboratory. Success in this field could pose a serious threat to Madagascar, which is still fondly known in food processing circles as the "OPEC of vanilla." ■

300 new cases a day in Addis Ababa alone. Both regimes hotly deny the existence of cholera, despite doctors' reports that cases have been spotted since January. Hospital workers have allegedly been instructed not to speak of the epidemic "under threat of imprisonment."

Similar obfuscations have occurred in Somalia. The international response to the crisis has been complicated by the Somali government's distortions of the refugee situation. Until 1981, refugee figures provided by the Somalis were accepted by international aid organizations and Western governments as a basis for determining aid levels.

But recurrent charges of statistical exaggeration compelled the Somali government to take a census in 1982. Western experts were as skeptical of the resultant claim of 700,000 total refugees as they had been of the earlier estimates.

The government has done little in recent years to dispel such suspicions. No scientific count of refugees has been undertaken in the last three years. And while the Somalis have claimed that 150,000 Ethiopian refugees have entered the country in the past year, they have made no mention of the tens of thousands who left the camps to return home in 1983 and 1984.

Most established camps actually have the capacity to house additional refugees but are discouraged from doing so by the government. One camp, Dari Mane, has an estimated population of 25,000, while the official figure is three times greater. To accept more refugees at such a camp would expose the inaccuracy of official figures. Hence, the Barre government continues to declare that all camps are full, to turn refugees away, and to urgently request aid for the construction of new camps.

Because of such government practices, the UN and other organizations are now reluctant to construct new sites. The result is spontaneously settled and poorly planned sites like Ganed, with a host of concomitant problems such as lack of proper health, sanitation,

or housing facilities, which have fostered the rapid spread of infectious diseases. ■

TANZANIA Island leader to be president

Zanzibar President Ali Hassan Mwinyi has been chosen to succeed President Julius Nyerere when the elder statesman steps down in October. Elections are scheduled for October 27.

Mwinyi, who also holds the post of vice-president of Tanzania, was the overwhelming choice of delegates to a special congress of Chama Cha Mapinduzi, the country's sole political party.

Prime Minister Salim Ahmed Salim, who achieved an outstanding record as Tanzania's ambassador to the UN, had earlier been the front-runner among presidential candidates. However, questions were raised about his qualifications to lead the country, his commitment to socialism, and his Arab background. Salim became prime minister in 1984 after the death of Edward Sokoine, who was widely regarded as the most qualified and popular candidate to succeed Nyerere. Rashidi Kawawa, secretary-general of the party, was another top contender for the presidency.

Mwinyi was thrust onto the national scene when he replaced Zanzibar President Aboud Jumbe, who resigned in January 1984 after a po-

litical crisis involving Zanzibar's demands for greater autonomy for the island. Mwinyi, who is a strong supporter of Zanzibar's union with the mainland, has introduced measures similar to Nyerere's recent economic reforms. Nyerere has taken steps to shift some sisal estates and other enterprises from public to private ownership, and last year he liberalized import policy. Mwinyi is returning property that was seized after the 1964 rebellion to private hands and is liberalizing trade laws. Mwinyi, 60, a former school teacher like Nyerere, held several cabinet posts and an ambassadorship before becoming president of Zanzibar.

Although Nyerere is retiring from the presidency after 24 years of leadership, he will retain the influential post of party chairman until 1987. In early August, he made a final address to Parliament as president, reviewing Tanzania's progress since independence in 1961.

"The most important task... was that of building a united nation on the basis of respect and equality of men," he said. The nation inherited "a racial and religious discrimination built by law and practice," which permeated everything from education and health services to representation in Parliament, Nyerere said. According to the president, "On this major and basic goal more than all others, Tanzanians have the right to be proud." ■

CENTRAL AFRICA

Threats spur military buildup in Zaire

A rebel attack in Shaba Province and threats from Libyan leader Col. Muammar Qaddafi have prompted President Mobutu Sese Seko to significantly expand his military forces.

The plan to increase the Zairean Armed Forces (FAZ) from 70,000 to 100,000 troops was announced after the guerrilla strike on Moba, a town in Shaba Province, in mid-June. Two Zairean officers and four rebels were reportedly killed during a five-hour battle. Suspecting that the attack had been launched from Tanzania, Mobutu ordered his

troops to pursue the rebels to Kigoma, a Tanzanian town that lies across Lake Tanganyika from Moba.

The mineral-rich region of Shaba has been the scene of several clashes between Zairean and rebel forces in recent years. After guerrillas connected with the Parti de la Revolution Populaire (PRP) attacked Moba last November, government forces reportedly launched military operations in the four districts bordering the lake. Amnesty International reported that they killed more than a dozen townspeople.

ple and detained many others suspected of collaborating with the PRP.

Threatening pronouncements made by Qaddafi during his visit to Rwanda and Burundi in May may also have influenced Mobutu's decision to strengthen the military. Qaddafi warned that leaders who cooperate with Israel would be ousted, like the Shah of Iran and former President Gaafar al-Nimeiry of Sudan, or be killed like former President Anwar Sadat of Egypt. The warning closely followed Mobutu's six-day visit to Israel in May which strengthened existing ties between the two states.

Mobutu's Opponents

Opposition to Mobutu's rule is divided among a number of dissident groups based in Western capitals, as well as among guerrilla forces within the country. In addition, students have held anti-Mobutu demonstrations in recent months, provoked by government cutbacks at post-secondary institutions.



Nguza: The prodigal son

Opposition groups suffered a setback, however, with the homecoming of former Prime Minister Nguza Karl I Bond, considered the only Mobutu opponent of international stature. Nguza timed his return to coincide with celebrations marking the 25th anniversary of Zairean independence on June 30. In 1977, he had been condemned to death for high treason, but was pardoned two years later. After falling out of favor

again in 1981, Nguza went into voluntary exile in Belgium, where he headed the Congolese Front for the Restoration of Democracy, a coalition of opposition parties.

Two of the groups, the National Congolese Movement and the Congo National Liberation Front, condemned his return as "an unconditional rallying to Mobutu," whose credibility was strengthened by the homecoming of the "prodigal son."

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC Diamonds are forever

Jean-Bedel Bokassa, the self-proclaimed emperor and deposed leader of the Central African Republic, "declared war" on former French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing in late June as he watched his newly-published autobiography go up in smoke. Nearly 30,000 copies of *My Truth* were burned in garbage cans by government employees following a Paris court ruling that the book contained passages that defamed the former president.

Bokassa, who lives in his chateau at Hardicourt near Paris with 15 of his 55 children, had apparently hoped that proceeds from his book would help pay for some of his exorbitant bills. Last December, his water was cut off temporarily because the bill had not been paid in six years. A few months later, he got into further trouble with the French authorities when his gas, electricity, and telephone were disconnected.

Judge Pierre Orai upheld a civil action by Giscard d'Estaing who had argued that passages about him were "extravagant, mad, and even grotesque." The judge agreed that some sections of the book infringed on Giscard d'Estaing's personal life. The court found that 18 pages of Bokassa's chef-d'oeuvre contained "inadmissible violations of privacy and extremely serious offenses against the character of the former president of the French Republic." Added Orai, "If a political fight is to take place in the framework of press freedom, it should not refer to any fact or even be directly linked to the intimacy of private and

family life."

Upset to see the story of his life relegated to the dustbin of history, Bokassa vowed, "The destruction of this book is the political destruction of Giscard d'Estaing. For 12 years we were friends. I welcomed him to my home. I gave him diamonds. He has cheated me, chased me from my country."

Bokassa, who was overthrown in 1979 in a French-backed coup and sentenced to death in absentia by a Central African court, was the central figure in the political scandal involving Giscard d'Estaing that had erupted before the coup. Disclosures that the French president had received diamonds and other gifts from Bokassa proved to be exceedingly embarrassing for Giscard d'Estaing, forcing him to state publicly that he had sold the diamonds and allegedly given the money to charity.

Despite the setback of seeing his book reduced to ashes, Bokassa has promised to set straight the record of his rule. He also has vowed to return to the Central African Republic: "I am the Emperor for life of Central Africa. My people are waiting for me."

CHAD Habré's diplomatic shuttle

President Hissène Habré has embarked on a diplomatic campaign to drum up external support for his struggle against Libya, following a successful tour of southern Chad which enhanced his authority within the country. In early July, Habré visited Zaire where he held talks with President Mobutu Sese Seko and reiterated his view that the presence of Libyan troops in the north was "Chad's basic problem."

In an earlier diplomatic initiative, Habré signed an economic, scientific, and cultural cooperation agreement with King Hassan, signaling a rapprochement between the two countries. Relations had cooled noticeably when Morocco signed the Oujda treaty of union with Libya in August 1984.

During his trip to Rabat, Habré reportedly met with a Libyan envoy, while Hassan indicated a re-

newed willingness to use his influence on his Libyan ally, Col. Muammar Qaddafi, during a forthcoming visit to Tripoli. Qaddafi is the main backer of Habré's ousted predecessor, Goukouni Oueddei, leader of the Transitional Government of National Unity (GUNT).

While Habré was in Libreville in late June, Gabonese President Omar Bongo⁴ arranged a secret

meeting with Col. Wadal Abdel Kamougué, GUNT vice-president. Kamougué's willingness to negotiate directly with Habré is seen by many observers as the first step toward bringing the diverse and fragmented anti-Habré opposition factions to the negotiating table.

Thiam Tidjani, the European representative of the Democratic and Revolutionary Council (CDR),

which represents the largest opposition faction within the GUNT, revealed in July that the CDR is also seeking direct negotiations with the Chadian president. Tidjani denounced Libya for arresting CDR leader Acheikh Ibn Omar, who has not been seen since last November following a dispute with Goukouni. "We condemn Libyan policy toward Chad in general and toward the CDR in particular. We have been betrayed by the Libyans. We want to negotiate directly with His-sène Habré."

Tidjani repeated the CDR's refusal to recognize Habré as the legitimate head of state, but said that resolving this issue would no longer be a precondition for beginning negotiations. "The main enemy," he added, "are those Chadians who refuse to negotiate and those who seek to find solutions for the Chadians." A decision by the CDR to formally turn its back on Libya would greatly strengthen Habré's hand if another roundtable conference on national reconciliation is convened. ■

Resilient parasites foil malaria battle

Dr. Adamu had just concluded another medical out-patient clinic in a large African general hospital. As usual, about 50 percent of the patients, complaining of a variety of ailments, were diagnosed to be suffering from malaria. Dr. Adamu had distributed the popular anti-malaria drugs like chloroquine, proquanil, and pyrimethamine but he knew that his efforts would be ineffective for at least a quarter of the patients. They would return to the clinic, still suffering from the same debilitating symptoms.

This is due to an ominous development in the battle to treat the disease: the predominant species of the malaria parasite—the plasmodium falciparum—has developed an immunity or resistance to commonly used anti-malaria drugs, particularly chloroquine.

The caseload of Dr. Adamu typifies that of clinics throughout sub-Saharan Africa. Vast areas of the continent are infested by the anopheles mosquito, which transmits the malaria parasite into the human bloodstream through its saliva. Every year, nearly one million African children under 14 die from the disease. Countless millions of adults and children suffer from malaria symptoms, including recurring bouts of fever, aching, sweating, and shivering. The monumental social and economic costs to African nations are expected to intensify.

The first authenticated accounts of the chloroquine-resistant parasite in Africa appeared in 1978 and 1979 in Europeans and Americans who had been to Kenya and Tanzania, and it rapidly spread inland. The federal Center for Disease Control (CDC) in Atlanta, Georgia, has confirmed chloroquine resistance in Burundi, Sudan, Uganda, and Zambia, with apparent cases also reported in Malawi, Mozambique, Somalia, Rwanda, and Zimbabwe. No cases have yet been confirmed in West Africa, but evidence of chloroquine resistance has been found in Nigeria and Ivory Coast.

The incidence of malaria is increasing in Africa, not only because of the spread of the drug-resistant parasite but also because of a growing immunity to chemical insecticides in the anopheles mosquito. Other factors encouraging its spread include the inadequacy and increasing cost of control programs and poor water management on agricultural lands, which leads to the growth of breeding sites.

Research into the development of a vaccine to immunize against malaria shows potential but much work still needs to be done. New drugs, including mefloquine and enpiroline, have been developed to replace chloroquine. The World Health Organization's Special Programme for Research and Training in Tropical Diseases is working on a drug called qinghaosu, made from a Chinese medicinal herb. Fortunately, the plasmodium falciparum is still the only known resistant species.

In the meantime, the spread of resistance to drugs and insecticides underlines the need for individuals to increase their personal protection from mosquito bites, and for medical personnel and researchers to take adequate controls to help check the spread of resistant species.

—Dr. Olawale Okediran
Ibadan, Nigeria

CONGO Refueling the economy

"The crisis is worsening and oil continues to give us unpleasant surprises," confessed President Sassou-Nguesso in a late June address to the central committee of the ruling Congolese Labor Party (PCT). "The only thing left for us to do is tighten our belts to ensure that the independence of our country is not put at risk, to protect our people's revolution," he said, implying that the government is determined to cope with its financial difficulties without recourse to the International Monetary Fund.

The party adopted a structural adjustment program and decided to shave government spending this year by 6.5 percent of budgeted expenditure, or \$43.2 million, as part of a two and a half year austerity plan.

An official communiqué stressed that the program "does not imply an imminent political, economic and social catastrophe" but rather that the government is intent on acting

before the economic difficulties get out of hand. The program would give priority to improving the effectiveness of investment in productive sectors, as the performance of public enterprises was "below the level of achievement expected by the people." As a result, several projects in the ambitious \$2.8 billion 1982-1986 development plan are likely to be scrapped, while no new projects will be launched for the remainder of the year.

Oil output is expected to fall by 10 percent this year, after seven consecutive years of growth in which volume trebled to six million tons. As a result, the government has been forced to revise its development targets, given that oil revenues were expected to finance the majority of the expenditures.

Oil accounts for 90 percent of export earnings and at least two-thirds of government revenue, but since 1983, growth has leveled off due to the depressed world oil market and high production costs. The strength of the dollar and the lower costs of French imports which dominate 50 percent of the Congolese market, have helped to cushion the fall, however.

To bolster the economy, the Sassou-Nguesso government has made a determined effort to woo U.S. oil companies by offering more concessions in offshore areas. In May, Conoco became the second major U.S. company to sign an exploration agreement, joining Amoco which is expected to invest \$16.5 million in oil exploration this year. Recent oil discoveries by Agip of Italy and Elf Aquitaine of France are likely to help boost production substantially over the next five years. ■

EQUATORIAL GUINEA Loan boosts slow recovery

President Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo's efforts to ease the country's economic plight have been bolstered by a standby arrangement of SDR 9.2 million from the International Monetary Fund.

It has been five years since the country signed its last agreement with the IMF—shortly after Obiang

seized power from his uncle, Macias Nguema, whose repressive 11-year reign had driven the once-prosperous country close to bankruptcy. Obiang's government has been burdened with high deficits, heavy debt service, persistent inflation, arrears in both foreign and domestic payments, and a generally depressed level of economic activity. Its external debt was estimated at \$150 million at the end of 1984—95 percent of the country's export revenues.

The new IMF agreement will support the government's 1985 economic stabilization program. The most critical factor influencing the IMF approval was the country's de-

cision to join the CFA franc zone and the Bank of Central African States.

An important element in the economic program is the overhaul of the export tax and producer price systems. Increases in prices paid to farmers are expected to stimulate cocoa production, which is slowly reviving after dropping to 5,000 tons in 1980 from 40,000 tons at independence in 1968. A \$2.8 million loan agreement, signed in July with the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA), is expected to help rehabilitate the cocoa industry on Bioko Island, where most of the plantations are located. ■

NORTHERN AFRICA

Bourguiba plays hardball with the UGTT

Relations between the government and the powerful General Union of Tunisian Workers (UGTT) have hit rock bottom. Marking the latest phase in its offensive against the trade union confederation, the government of President Habib Bourguiba announced in mid-July that it was suspending the UGTT's official newspaper, *Ach Chaab*, for six months. Authorities said that a highly critical article on government officials appearing in the publication a few days earlier was responsible for the ban.

The UGTT leadership, headed by Habib Achour, however, claimed that a front-page commentary denouncing the 10-15 percent increase in the price of bread prompted the government action. *Ach Chaab* deplored the further deterioration in the purchasing power of workers whose salaries have been frozen over the last two years.

The suspension of *Ach Chaab*, which had recently turned from a weekly to a daily, deprived the trade union of its official mouthpiece—a similar measure to that imposed on the press of legal opposition groups earlier in the year. Achour vowed to "defy this situation which shows contempt for trade union rights."

A showdown between the government and the UGTT has been

looming for some time. Salary negotiations, ongoing since the beginning of the year, broke down altogether in early June. The UGTT blamed Prime Minister Mohamed Mzali for taking a "hard line" in the negotiations by making wage rises in public enterprises dependent on their financial situation and increased productivity. Only then would increases in the index-linked guaranteed minimum wage and salaries in the private sector and civil service be negotiated.

The UGTT rejected all responsibility for the breakdown in the talks and indicated that it would resort to widespread strike action in the coming months. "We have done everything to reach a reasonable solution by avoiding numerous strikes, sincerely believing in finding a result through negotiations," said Achour. "Unfortunately the government's position has obliged us to seek solutions which will be more effective in achieving our claims."

During the negotiations in May, the UGTT had called off a number of planned strikes that would have coincided with the country's municipal elections in hopes of improving the chances for an agreement. The government instead hardened its position and has sought to exploit growing divisions within the trade union confederation.

Internal tensions came to a head when Achour sacked Taieb Baccouche, the editor of *Ach Chaab*, for publishing an article that was very critical of the government. Achour, claiming that it could jeopardize the negotiations, intervened to stop distribution of the issue and fired other members of the editorial board. The paper, said Achour, was becoming the "meeting place of left-wing extremists and their spokespersons," at the expense of other political currents within the trade union body.

The success of government policy, however, and the dismissal of Baccouche have encouraged rank and file opposition to Achour. He has already indicated on more than one occasion that he plans to retire from public life in the not too distant future. ■

ALGERIA Clampdown on Rights League

Abdenour Ali Yahia, prominent lawyer and president of the Algerian Human Rights League, was detained in mid-July as he was preparing to defend some 20 members of an organization called the Sons of Martyrs of the Revolution. A few days before his detention, Ali Yahia had sent a telegram to President Chadli Benjedid protesting "the oppressive campaign of arrests," after members of the group were apprehended when they tried to lay wreaths at five cenotaphs on Independence Day, July 5, in defiance of official ceremonies.

Ali Yahia, who has been one of the government's harshest critics, was already detained without trial for eight months before his release in a presidential amnesty in May 1984. His latest arrest is apparently linked to the formation of the league, which was established in early June to protest "the considerable shortcomings in the defense of human rights in Algeria."

Following months of preparation and semi-clandestine meetings, the organization was launched along similar lines to an existing league in Tunisia. Its statutes and objectives set out to "defend fundamental liberties" and to "condemn human



Chadli: Detains critics

rights violations." ■

Composed mainly of intellectuals, the league released a circular providing an initial list of 40 of its founding members, including singer Ferhat Mehenni who was also detained in mid-July. The Chadli government, which evidently sees the league as a potential source of opposition, has let it be known that in future, supporters of the new body will be considered "declared opponents" of the regime. ■

EGYPT Bumper sticker battle quashed

Vowing to crush any group that attempts to foment public unrest, President Hosni Mubarak cracked down on Muslim fundamentalists in July.

Demonstrations advocating the imposition of the *sharia* were banned. Efforts were made to put mosques under the government ministry for religious endowments, and a number of agitators were arrested, including Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman, a militant cleric, and Sheik Hafez Salama, the leader of the Nour Mosque, which is the center for fundamentalist activity in Cairo. Police raided Salama's office and claimed to have found leaflets advocating anti-government demonstrations. Salama countered that the government had planted the subversive materials.

A ban was imposed on one of the more visible signs of growing fundamentalist fervor—bumper stickers and window decals with religious

slogans or symbols. Such signs had become widespread recently in Egyptian cities. The Coptic Christians—a minority of from four to six million people in a population of 40 million—had started decorating their cars with decals depicting their pope and the Coptic cross. The Muslims retaliated with signs that said, "There is no god but Allah, and Mohammed is his messenger," and "Islam is the real religion." The ban apparently succeeded in ending the bumper sticker war.

The strongest criticism of the past two regimes in Egypt has emerged from the religious right. Former president Anwar Sadat was assassinated by fundamentalists in 1981, but until recently, Mubarak had attempted to avoid using the harsh tactics that his predecessor employed to suppress dissent. This leniency seems to have led the fundamentalists to increasingly open and confrontational activities. In addition to demonstrating for the *sharia* as the national code of law, many are also calling for the imposition of Islamic taxation and banking systems. In Parliament, conservative Muslims are pushing a proposal to ban alcohol. The *sharia* prohibits Muslims from consuming alcohol and imposes lashes and fines for drinking, producing, selling, or transporting it. In the past, efforts to ban alcohol have failed, in part because Egyptians do not want to discourage tourism.

Meanwhile, in early July, Mubarak's national Democratic Party succeeded in gaining passage of a marriage law to replace the one imposed by Sadat in 1979. An Egyptian high court had invalidated the 1979 law a few weeks earlier because it was never properly legislated by Parliament. For the benefit of the fundamentalists, who oppose any liberalization of marriage law, Mubarak promised not to encroach on Muslims' practice of polygamy. The new law gives women the right to file for divorce when a husband takes another wife if a judge determines that the second marriage will cause her moral or material harm. She cannot, however, file for divorce simply because of polygamy as she could under the 1979 law. ■

SUDAN

Diplomacy fails to defuse war

Government efforts to sever guerrilla supply lines through diplomacy with Libya and Ethiopia have not checked the war in the south.

The Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) continues to claim victories over government forces. In mid-July, the rebels announced they had halted a major government offensive, killing hundreds of troops. Government forces had been attempting to open the road between Juba and the town of Bor—the stronghold of SPLA leader Col. John Garang.

The guerrillas also shot at a government Boeing 707 attempting to land in Juba with troops to relieve the army garrison at Bor. The pilots' union subsequently banned all flights into Juba, which had already been without road, rail, or river links for six months.

The hope that the SPLA's major supply source would be terminated was a key reason that Sudan strengthened ties with Libya. Under a military agreement announced in July, Libya promised to help initiate peace talks with the SPLA, to stop supplying the rebels, to provide Sudan's oil for three months, and to finance a large agricultural project. In addition, Libya will provide training and arms for the Sudanese army and assistance to the navy and air force. The agreement was negotiated in Tripoli by Defense Minister Osman Abdullah, who subsequently was placed on extended leave, reportedly because he failed to seek authorization for the military protocol from government leaders.

In response to the Reagan administration's criticism of the move, Sudanese leader Gen. Fahman Sawar-Dahab said that the protocol was not a defense pact and that he saw no reason why closer relations with Libya should weaken ties with the U.S. The U.S. has already taken precautions to protect its diplomats in Khartoum, citing the number of Libyan agents who have entered Sudan since the two countries resumed relations in April.

In late June, Ethiopia also agreed

to cut off support for the SPLA as part of the resumption of diplomatic relations between the two states. Sudan, in turn, made a commitment to stop financing the war of Eritrean secession in northern Ethiopia. Sudan's Foreign Minister Ibrahim Taha Ayyub is also seeking to reestablish normal relations with the Soviet Union.

Ties with Egypt have not been rejected either, despite President Hosni Mubarak's refusal to extradite former Sudanese leader Gaafar al-Nimeiry. Hundreds of demonstrators marched on the Egyptian embassy in Khartoum in mid-July, demanding the return of the ousted Sudanese leader. Mubarak, who met with Sawar-Dahab in Khartoum in June and at the OAU summit in July, said Egypt's constitution and tradition forbid extradition of political fugitives. The ruling Provisional Military Council has said Nimeiry will be tried in absentia if he is not returned. ■

WESTERN SAHARA

The wall keeps getting longer

The construction of the fifth section of Morocco's security wall through the Western Sahara is expected to thwart Polisario's military initiatives.

The new wall extends south from the Amgala region, close to and par-

allel with the Mauritanian border. It then turns west toward the Atlantic Ocean, eventually reaching the coastal town of Dakhla.

This 600-kilometer segment of the wall is designed to block Polisario's access to the Western Sahara. In order to resupply from its bases south of Tindouf, Algeria, and to launch attacks on the southern flank of the new wall, Polisario will have to advance from deep within Mauritanian territory. In addition, the new fortification will remove Polisario's prospects of being clandestinely supplied by its backers in the Canary Islands.

During construction of the electronically-monitored earth wall in June and July, Polisario claimed that it repeatedly attacked Moroccan forces, inflicting heavy casualties.

Construction of the wall and continuation of the war have been a heavy drain on the Moroccan economy, estimated at a cost of \$1.5 million per day. The forces that will be needed to guard the new fortification are expected to increase the costs significantly.

To meet the additional expense of development projects in the Western Sahara, the government recently announced another issuance of three-year government bonds. A bond issue last March for the same purpose brought in \$44.3 million. ■

SOUTHERN AFRICA

Congress vote irks Angolan government

Angered by the U.S. congressional vote to repeal the Clark amendment, which banned covert aid to Angola's Unita rebels, the government of President José Eduardo dos Santos has suspended all negotiations with Washington on the Namibia independence plan.

Although the mid-July breakdown in the talks represents still another setback for the Reagan administration's policy of "constructive engagement," the State Department maintained that it "does not close the door to a negotiated settlement." Administration officials said they intended to continue diplomatic efforts that hinge on with-

drawing the estimated 25,000 Cuban troops from Angola and South Africa agreeing to the UN plan for Namibia's independence.

The unofficial U.S. talks with Angola have been stalled since South African commandos staged an abortive raid on Angola's Cabinda Gulf Oil complex in late May. The captured commando leader said that Unita would have taken credit for the attack, had it succeeded.

The 236-185 vote in the House came on the heels of a Senate vote in June to end the nine-year ban on U.S. military and financial covert aid to Unita rebels. The Clark amendment had been imposed in

1976 following the U.S. fiasco in Vietnam and revelations in 1975 that the CIA had been secretly funding Unita and other groups fighting the MPLA.

The Angolan foreign ministry said the repeal left the "American executive with a free hand to intervene openly and directly in Angola." Reagan can now request funds to assist the anti-government rebels, although the State Department insists it has no plans to aid Unita, which is financially and militarily supported by South Africa.



dos Santos: Suspends talks with U.S.

The dos Santos government, however, charged the U.S. of complicity with South Africa and its "Unita puppets," which are "desperately attempting to destabilize" the Angolan economy. The repeal was further proof of the "lack of sincerity of the present tenants of the White House," said the foreign ministry communiqué, which went on to accuse the Reagan administration of "moving from camouflaged military support to open support for armed subversion and state terrorism."

The diplomatic rift has not prevented American and other Western oil companies from continued cooperation with Angola. A subsidiary of Texaco discovered oil off the northwestern coast in July, while production at the giant Takula oil field is to double to 16,000 barrels

per day with the help of a \$91 million loan managed by the U.S.-owned Bankers Trust Company. The credit raised by Sonangol, the national oil company, and Cabinda Gulf Oil Company, a subsidiary of Chevron, will strengthen Angola's position as the biggest oil producer in sub-Saharan Africa after Nigeria. Oil already dominates the economy, providing the country with 90 percent of its foreign exchange. ■

ZIMBABWE

Taking the bull by the horns

Prime Minister Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) is more determined than ever to introduce a one-party state following its landslide victory in the country's first post-independence elections in early July. ZANU gained 77 percent of the national vote—up from 63 percent in 1980—and feels confident this represents a solid mandate for its political goals.

Despite Mugabe's overwhelming electoral triumph, in which ZANU won 64 of 80 black seats, Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) remains a major stumbling-block to a one-party state. ZANU was unable to make any inroads in Matabeleland against the country's only viable opposition party, which swept all 15 seats. Although ZAPU received only five percent of the vote outside its Matabeleland stronghold, Ndebele-speaking people unequivocally rejected the ruling party.

This has prompted the ZANU government and its supporters to step up their offensive against the opposition. In mid-August, Mugabe delivered what he called a "final warning" to ZAPU leaders whom he accused of responsibility for armed dissident activity against the government in Matabeleland. He defined such activities as "treason, in capital letters," and warned that "unless they take immediate positive steps to mend their ways and put an end to the banditry they deliberately created, my government will have no alternative but to take very stern measures against them."

The warning came shortly after police confiscated Nkomo's pass-

port and carried out several raids on his homes in Harare and Bulawayo, seizing documents and legally held weapons belonging to his bodyguards. More than 30 opposition members were detained, including Nkomo's 11 bodyguards and ZAPU's chief parliamentary whip, Sydney Malunga. The government said the arrests were made because the weapons used by dissidents in Matabeleland were being stockpiled in urban areas.

The mounting campaign against ZAPU is seen by many observers as the first overt sign that the newly-appointed minister of home affairs, Enos Nkala, is carrying out his promise to crush Nkomo. Nkala, who assumed responsibility for maintaining law and order in the post-election cabinet reshuffle, is known as ZAPU's fiercest foe in the ZANU government. As one ZANU supporter said, "I think Nkomo and ZAPU will see much more of this kind of thing, plenty more. It is what Nkala is there for."

In the election aftermath, jubilant ZANU women and youth gangs ransacked about 600 homes belonging to suspected ZAPU supporters in Harare's townships and the Midlands town of Kwe Kwe. At least six people reportedly were killed during three days of post-election fever in which members of the opposition were evicted from their houses and their belongings piled in the streets. "Bull-eating parties" also were organized in several townships to symbolize ZANU's triumph over ZAPU's charging bull emblem used during the election.

Shortly thereafter, many victims publicly renounced their ZAPU allegiance and joined ZANU. Government officials from Mufakose township in Harare claimed that 1,500 people signed up as ZANU supporters. The new converts organized a large bonfire, burning T-shirts, banners, literature, and uniforms of their old party. Mugabe acknowledged that the violence had been "unfortunate and out of step with party principles" but warned that those who remained "unrepentant" after ZANU's election victory would discover that "things will get tough." ■

Paul J.F. Lusaka

President of the 39th Session of the United Nations General Assembly

Zambia's permanent representative to the United Nations has occupied the presidency of the General Assembly during a year when Africa's economic crisis and the continuing turmoil in southern Africa have been central in UN debates. As his term draws to an end, Paul Lusaka discusses the outlook for Africa at the UN over the coming year.

INTERVIEWED BY MARGARET A. NOVICKI

Africa Report: What were the major accomplishments of the 39th General Assembly session with regard to Africa? By virtue of your position, were you able to bring African issues more to the forefront of UN concerns?

Lusaka: I assume that when you speak of African issues, political, economic, and otherwise, you mean issues that are of most direct interest to African states. I say this because, strictly speaking, in an interdependent world where the network of relations among peoples and states is so complex, one should not differentiate between African and European issues or between Asian and non-Asian issues. The issue of Central America is of direct interest to the countries of that sub-region, but it is also of concern to the countries of southern Africa, or Europe, or Southeast Asia. Similarly, the obnoxious policy of apartheid is of most direct interest to the oppressed people of South Africa, but it is also an international issue. Furthermore, the issue of disarmament, the threat of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, is not a European issue or a superpower issue. It is of direct concern to all states of all regions. If it is on the agenda of the United Nations, an issue is international.

The critical economic situation in Africa was, relatively speaking, one of the major issues on the agenda of the 39th session of the General Assembly. It was an African issue only in the sense that African states were the first and most directly affected victims of the crisis. However, the response of

the General Assembly underlined the international dimension of that unfortunate situation. The matter was tackled not in the Assembly's Economic and Financial Affairs Committee, which traditionally discusses such issues, but in the plenary itself. The declaration which was adopted by consensus could be described as one of the major accomplishments of the 39th session. We have already seen the practical results of that action, at least as far as the emergency situation is concerned.

Africa Report: The primary role of the UN in the early years was the forum it provided for Africa's struggle against colonialism. What is its primary role with regard to Africa today?

Lusaka: It is true that the United Nations was instrumental in the process of decolonization, and that the early years of the organization appear to have been dominated by activities aimed at speeding that process. Indeed, the decolonization of Africa—the emergence of such a large number of dependent territories to nationhood and membership in the United Nations—was the greatest political transformation the world has witnessed in this century. Can you imagine what the United Nations would have been with the absence of what today constitutes about one-third of the membership of the organization?

The UN did provide a forum for the articulation of the right of colonial peoples to self-determination. It still does. In terms of the number of hours of debate, it appeared that decolonization was, as you suggest, the primary role of the UN in the early years. However, economic and social development was also an important preoccupation of the organization. What has

happened is that as the number of newly independent countries increased, most of them developing, the agenda of the UN shifted from decolonization to development issues. These new states, particularly those from Africa, brought with them their priority problems, namely those of an economic and social nature. The number of economic and related issues on the agenda of the General Assembly has increased considerably.

Africa Report: It appears that the UN's ability to resolve the problems of South Africa and Namibia are held hostage to the foreign policy considerations of the big powers. What kind of pressure other than moral exhortation can the United Nations actually bring to bear in resolving these issues?

Lusaka: Can the United Nations actually bring to bear pressure other than moral exhortation in resolving the issues of apartheid and Namibia? Let me put it this way. Moral pressure or exhortation can be effective if states have the will to

“People should not make speeches in the General Assembly unless the speech contains a proposal as to how we can make our organization stronger and more effective.”

implement the resolutions of the organization. Considering the number of instances in which governments have used armed force and coercion to resolve issues, one can imagine that if the United Nations were a government or a state, it would have taken similar action to resolve the long-outstanding issues of Namibia and apartheid. Although there are relevant and appropriate measures in the Charter which the UN can take when its principles are violated, such as in the case of Namibia and apartheid, these issues are still unresolved. We can at this stage rely on moral force or exhortation as you put it. I believe, however, that we can resolve those issues through the peaceful measures which the General Assembly has been advocating over the years, such as mandatory economic sanctions as an appropriate response to the defiance of the apartheid regime.

I don't believe personally in reforming anything that is a crime. Terrorism is a crime. Apartheid has been defined as a crime, so there is no difference between the two. We have said that terrorism must be eliminated from the face of the earth. We should say the same thing about apartheid. Why do we say there should be a change, a reform in apartheid? You can't reform injustice! And I don't want to hear that if sanctions are applied, it is the Africans and neighboring states which are going to suffer. The countries that apply sanctions are afraid they are going to suffer economically. The black African in South Africa and the neighboring countries, including my own, Zambia, would like to suffer temporarily for lack of bread or sugar rather than have the perpetual suffering of injustice, subjugation, oppression, repression, murder, and

terrorism. Therefore sanctions must be applied to change the situation. It is a moral way, a peaceful way. It is not a declaration of war.

Africa Report: Critics maintain that the UN General Assembly is nothing more than an influential debating society and that it lacks the muscle to put its resolutions into practice. What is your response and how do you think the General Assembly can be made a more effective body?

Lusaka: The UN has been in existence for 40 years and many people have called it a talking club. I am very happy that they call it a talking club and not a fighting club, because through talking, perhaps we have been able to avoid a global war for 40 years. Imagine where we would be today if we had stopped talking in 1946! If it is a talking club, the fault is not with the UN per se, but with those that compose it, because the UN is not an utopia. It is composed of member-states.

There is a tendency to underrate the role and function of the General Assembly vis-à-vis the Security Council. The Assembly represents the conscience of the international community. It has defined issues and prepared the groundwork and responses to all the problems that mutually confront humanity today. From drugs to nuclear weapons, from torture to new sources of energy, from hijacking to mercenarism, from peace-keeping to drought and desertification, the General Assembly has come up with resolutions and plans dealing with many of those problems. It is not the Assembly which should put its resolutions into practice as such, but rather the member-states individually and collectively. Let me add that one of the ways in which the Assembly has increased its own effectiveness in terms of adopting resolutions which will have greater chances of implementation is the trend toward the principle of consensus.

Perhaps one thing that is needed is for the Security Council members to look at their primary responsibility—that they are there not to promote their limited national interests, but rather they are a collective body to respond to issues not after they have taken place, but before they take place and try to avoid their escalation. It must work together first of all to maintain international peace and security. One other area is to allow the secretary-general to use his good offices where the Security Council perhaps cannot itself go, to try to work on its behalf. With regard to the General Assembly itself, my own view is that people should not make speeches in the Assembly unless the speech contains concrete proposals as to how we can make our organization stronger and more effective.

Africa Report: How would you characterize the cohesiveness and influence of the African Group at the UN?

Lusaka: The African Group is a cohesive and influential group. In the first place, it constitutes about one-third of the United Nations membership. Secondly, the Group has the advantage of belonging to an active continental political organization, the OAU, whose aims and objectives are consistent with those of the UN. Thirdly, a substantial number of issues on the UN agenda are of direct interest or concern to the African states. Fourth, most of the least-developed countries of the world are in Africa. Accordingly, the UN is inclined to devote appropriate attention to their needs.

Africa Report: The American government has made it clear that how a country votes in the UN will be a factor in its policy

toward that nation. How should African countries respond to this?

Lusaka: The question of U.S. relations with African states and their voting pattern should be answered from the point of view of principle. African states do not vote against the United States; they vote for measures to uphold the principles and purposes of the Charter. No African state has a veto power. In that sense, their political power is in most cases weaker than that of the United States. It does not seem fair to focus attention on the voting patterns of relatively powerless states and ignore the voting patterns of the politically powerful ones. I would like to see publications about the number of times the U.S. or the United Kingdom does not vote with the Africans. If political analysts and others expect African states to vote with the U.S. on most or all occasions, why shouldn't the Africans expect the U.S. to vote with them in not only condemning apartheid, but also in advocating a peaceful means such as sanctions to eliminate that system? Africans voted with the U.S. or the U.S. voted with Africans for Security Council resolution 435 in 1978, the plan for Namibia's independence initiated by the Western Contact Group including the United States. Where do we stand today on that resolution?

The most challenging question today is not merely who votes with whom or against whom, but the determination to implement those resolutions which were adopted unanimously and by consensus. This is where we should focus our attention, not on unilaterally penalizing those who we think voted against us. For one thing, Africa and the majority of member-states do not have the means of hitting back at those who may not have voted with them on such burning issues as apartheid, nuclear freeze, nuclear testing, and the Law of the Sea.

The United Nations is a center for harmonizing the interests of nations, not an observation gallery for identifying those who do not agree with us on certain issues for unilateral penalty.

Africa Report: What African issues do you expect to dominate the 40th General Assembly session?

Lusaka: I believe that since the 39th session highlighted the critical economic situation in Africa, this also will come up in a number of statements by the heads of state and government who are going to address the 40th anniversary session of the General Assembly. Naturally the question of apartheid, especially with regard to the recent developments, will feature among the African issues. There will be a lot of disappointment on the impasse with regard to Namibia's independence. There is also a lot of destabilization and aggression by South Africa against independent states, so the question of peace and security in the area might also feature.

In a nutshell, we will talk about peace, development, decolonization, and the promotion of human rights and freedoms. When I speak of economic matters, I am also speaking of shelter, social problems, health, removal of illiteracy, food, to which people are entitled. It is a right to have food. If people don't have food, first of all, they steal from their own mothers' houses, then from another house, then from another village, then they cross the border and steal from another country and war starts. Having food is important because without it, it could disturb peace. So we must have all these things to make for the totality of peace. These issues will not be issues solely of the African Group; they will be issues of the General Assembly as they have been in the past, because the General Assembly and the Security Council and other organs of the United Nations are still seized with these problems. □



United Nations/Turkula-Niigata

Ambassador Paul Lusaka (center) during 39th General Assembly session: "The UN is a center for harmonizing the interests of nations, not an observation gallery for identifying those who do not agree with us"

Decades of Resistance

Since its creation, the United Nations has upheld the unalienable rights of South Africa's black majority and focused world attention on the evils of apartheid. The UN can help avert further bloodshed if its instruments for applying pressure on the South African government are utilized and supported by the international community.

BY ENUGA S. REDDY

Four decades of discussion and action on the problem of racism in South Africa provide perhaps the best illustration of the limitations as well as the potentialities of the United Nations for the promotion of freedom and human rights in the world. They are also indicative of the response of the community of nations to the aspirations of the African continent—above all, for the dignity of the African person—which have emerged from centuries of humiliation and oppression.

The United Nations has been seized with the problem since the first General Assembly session in 1946, when India complained of discrimination against people of Indian origin in the Union of South Africa, and particularly since 1952, when in the wake of the non-violent defiance campaign in South Africa, Asian and African states requested UN consideration of the "question of race conflict resulting from the policies of apartheid." Since then, the matter has been discussed in many organs of the United Nations and its specialized agencies, resulting in a record number of debates, reports, and resolutions.

Apartheid is far from abolished. Indeed, there has been no diminution of

racist oppression, but growing tension and polarization in South Africa, resulting from the stubborn determination of the authorities to consolidate and perpetuate white domination; the forcible removal and resettlement of 3.5 million Africans, Coloureds, and Indians; and the enactment of draconian repressive laws. Massacres of peaceful demonstrators at Sharpeville in 1960, Soweto in 1976, and Uitenhage in 1985 have shocked the world. The freedom movement in the country, which inspired the world by its non-violent resistance against a ruthless regime and was honored by the award of two Nobel Peace Prizes in a generation—to the late Chief Albert J. Luthuli in 1961 and Bishop Desmond Tutu in 1984—was reluctantly obliged to resort to armed struggle.

Moreover, South Africa has been engaged in a colonial war in Namibia since 1966 when the United Nations terminated Pretoria's mandate over that territory. It has committed aggression, terrorism, and subversion against neighboring independent African states, causing enormous human and material losses and undermining the hopes of the newly independent countries for economic and social development.

It has built up a powerful military machine, increasing its military budget a hundred-fold since 1960 and acquiring nuclear capability. It seeks not only to maintain white domination in most of the

country by creating caricatures of independent states for the African majority, but also to be recognized as the dominant power in the region.

The achievements of the United Nations in dealing with the problem are less tangible. Apartheid is now universally condemned, but there has not been sufficient international pressure even to persuade the regime to initiate discussions with the genuine leaders of the black majority on transition to a non-racial system. But it would be shortsighted to conclude that the United Nations has failed.

The United Nations has been a significant factor in ensuring that the balance of forces steadily turned against the racist regime and in favor of the movement for freedom and in enabling the latter to secure the widest international support from governments and organizations. It has helped avert a bloody racial conflict which would have shattered all hopes for a non-racial society in South Africa.

Despite its military power, the Pretoria regime has been unable to suppress the resistance of the black majority or enforce its master plan for perpetual white domination. It has been forced to recognize the need for a change of course, although it resorts to maneuvers to preserve the essence of white domination. It is now confronted with a grave political and economic crisis, while the resistance is stronger and more determined than ever.

Enuga S. Reddy, formerly Assistant Secretary-General of the United Nations for the Centre Against Apartheid, is a Senior Fellow at the United Nations Institute for Training and Research.

There is a grave danger that in its desperation the regime may precipitate a catastrophic conflict. But this crisis also represents an opportunity and a challenge to the United Nations which has helped over the decades to develop an international consensus for the elimination of apartheid.

An Affirmation of International Concern

The United Nations is an organization of sovereign states created primarily to deal with disputes and conflicts among states and maintain international peace and security. Only in the case of threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression is the Security Council authorized to decide on coercive measures, with the concurrence of its five permanent members, and make them binding on all member-states. Although born at the end of a ghastly world war amid hopes for a new world order and a desire to eliminate the causes of war, the organization could only promote economic and social development, freedom, and human rights through the slow and laborious process of the development of norms of international law and cooperation. The principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of states has remained almost sacrosanct.

South Africa was a founding member of the United Nations and its prime minister, Jan Christian Smuts, played a significant role in drafting the UN Charter. It was influential in the British Commonwealth and had developed extensive economic and other relations with Britain and the U.S., as well as with other colonial powers in Africa. Africa, on the other hand, was mostly under colonial rule and had little influence within the international community.

The National Party, which came to power in South Africa in 1948 with apartheid as its policy, tried to overcome its unpopularity in the West by participating in the Berlin airlift in 1948 and the Korean War in 1950. It was invited to discussions on military, economic, and other cooperation in Africa and the Middle East, and signed the Simonstown military agreements with Britain in 1955. It could thus count on the Western states as dependable allies.

When India's complaint against South Africa was brought up in the United Na-

tions in 1946, many countries supported the South African contention that the question should be referred to the International Court of Justice. Even in 1952, a number of countries were wary of specific criticism or condemnation of the South African government and preferred a general declaration against racial discrimination.

For many years, therefore, the main task was to affirm the jurisdiction of the United Nations to consider the situation in South Africa as a political problem of international concern rather than one of many human rights violations in the world, and to develop an international

“The UN has defined its objectives as the total elimination of apartheid and the establishment of a non-racial democratic society in an unfragmented South Africa.”

consensus against apartheid. While Asian and African states argued that the situation was bound to lead to internal conflict and international friction, they asked for no more than universal condemnation of apartheid and diplomatic pressure by the Western states on the South African government. The annual discussions in the United Nations, however, played an important role in promoting sympathy and support for the freedom movement in South Africa.

From Condemnation to Concrete Measures

The Sharpeville massacre of 1960, followed by a nation-wide upsurge of the black people and massive repression by the regime—including the outlawing of African liberation movements, the declaration of a state of emergency, and the detention of thousands of people—aroused world opinion and heralded a new stage in the UN deliberations. For the first time, the situation was considered by the Security Council as one likely to cause international friction.

With the admission of many African states to the UN, there was pressure for a move from appeals and condemnations to concrete measures against the South African government.

A turning point was General Assembly resolution 1761 of November 6, 1962, sponsored by the African states, which urged member-states to impose economic and other sanctions against South Africa and established a Special Committee (now the Special Committee Against Apartheid) to keep the situation under constant review.

Many African, non-aligned, and socialist states had already imposed diplomatic and economic measures against South Africa, which was obliged to leave the Commonwealth in 1961. Since then, their main role has been to provide material assistance to the liberation movements, to promote wider support to the liberation struggle and, above all, to press for action by the Western states and other main trading partners of South Africa.

The debates in the United Nations became increasingly focused on demands that the Western powers and Japan recognize the situation as a threat to international peace and support universal sanctions against South Africa. Behind the assertions that those states were responsible for the perpetuation of apartheid through their “business as usual” relationship with the racist regime was the recognition that only they could exert sufficient economic and other pressure to oblige the Pretoria government to seek a peaceful solution and thereby avert immense suffering.

At the same time, the UN has been actively engaged in promoting a variety of measures to develop international norms against apartheid, to isolate the authorities in South Africa, and to assist the victims of apartheid and their liberation movements. It has done this not only through resolutions, declarations, and diplomatic measures, but also by efforts to reach public opinion and encourage action by public organizations all over the world. In fact, on no other issue has the UN been as activist, and its initiatives on apartheid have created many precedents for the functioning of the organization. Its efforts have been supplemented by those of many of its specialized agencies.

The failure to reach agreement on mandatory economic sanctions, primarily because of the opposition of the three Western permanent members of the Security Council, has tended to obscure progress in other areas and undermine the image of the UN. While sanctions are the strongest measures under the UN Charter, it should be recognized that they cannot by themselves solve the situation. Sanctions should rather be seen in the context of other means to lend encouragement and support to the struggle in South Africa.

Progress in International Action

In a series of unanimous resolutions, the UN has condemned apartheid as a crime and recognized that the elimination of apartheid is of vital concern to the international community; called for the release of Nelson Mandela and all other political prisoners and for an end to repression; and recognized the legitimacy of the struggle of the oppressed majority for its inalienable rights. It has denounced the so-called "independence" of bantustans and no state has recognized those entities, thus undermining Pretoria's plans to deprive the African majority of its citizenship and create a *fait accompli*. Both the General Assembly and the Security Council have declared the 1984 constitution, which excludes the African majority, invalid.

The United Nations has defined its objectives as the total elimination of apartheid and the establishment of a non-racial democratic society in an unfragmented South Africa in which all its people would enjoy human rights and fundamental freedoms irrespective of race, color, sex, or creed. It has called for consultations among the genuine representatives of all South Africans and offered appropriate assistance toward that end. In resolutions adopted by large majorities, it has recognized the right of the liberation movements to resort to armed struggle, declaring that "freedom fighters" are entitled to prisoner-of-war status.

The South African government has been excluded from the General Assembly since 1974 when its delegation's credentials were rejected. It is also excluded from other UN organs and conferences, as well as from most special-

ized agencies and inter-governmental organizations. Only about a score of the 157 members of the United Nations maintain diplomatic missions in South Africa.

On the other hand, the liberation movements of South Africa were granted observer status by UN organs in 1974 and recognized by the General Assembly in 1975 as the authentic representatives of the overwhelming majority of the people of the country. They attend UN meetings and other international conferences, and exercise considerable influence on decisions concerning South Africa.

The United Nations and its specialized agencies have developed extensive information programs to inform public opinion of the inhumanity of apartheid and to promote support for the struggle against apartheid. The persistent efforts of African and other states in the UN have led to some progress even on sanctions and related measures.

The Security Council called for an arms embargo against South Africa in a non-binding resolution in 1963. In the aftermath of the Soweto massacre, the death in detention of Steve Biko, and the banning of the black consciousness organizations, it decided unanimously on a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa, the first against any country.

Several smaller Western countries began taking action to prohibit loans and new investment in South Africa. Sweden has also banned the transfer of technology to South Africa. Most of the oil-exporting countries, including Norway, have prohibited the supply of oil. Beginning with the Nordic states in 1966, some Western countries began to support sanctions in principle and they now constitute a large majority of the Western and other states.

The non-economic measures—especially the sports and cultural boycotts—have been effective in demonstrating abhorrence of apartheid. They have involved millions of people in many countries and have helped to educate public opinion.

Equally important is assistance to the victims of apartheid and their liberation movements. The United Nations has set up funds and programs for this pur-

pose and has constantly encouraged bilateral and multilateral assistance through other appropriate channels.

Set up in 1965 to assist political prisoners and their families, the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa now receives nearly \$2 million a year in voluntary contributions from governments. The United Nations Educational and Training Programme for Southern Africa, which provides scholarships for higher education abroad, receives over \$3 million a year. Both programs have unanimous support in the General Assembly. Assistance programs have been established by the United Nations Development Programme, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, UNESCO, the International Labour Organization, and other agencies.

Assistance by governments, through national programs and non-governmental agencies and direct grants to liberation movements, encouraged by the UN, is even larger in scope, as is assistance to the African frontline states which have suffered grievously because of their support for the liberation of South Africa and Namibia. No freedom movement has ever received moral and material assistance from so many governments and organizations all over the world.

Unanimity has been achieved on three levels: the condemnation of apartheid, the arms embargo, and humanitarian assistance to the victims of apartheid. Overwhelming support, including that of a majority of Western countries, has been given to the principle of sanctions against the apartheid regime and on non-military assistance to liberation movements. Lastly, a number of states—although not the Western powers—have endorsed the legitimacy of armed struggle by the liberation movements and supported assistance to that struggle.

Growing Crisis

International action, however, has proved far from adequate in dealing with the determination of the South African regime to defend and consolidate white domination. Utilizing its control over the economic and other resources of the country and the continued cooperation of various foreign interests, it has been

able to build up its military repressive apparatus and resist demands for the abandonment of apartheid.

The international community, moreover, missed opportunities to exert decisive influence when the South African regime was confronted with serious problems with the independence of Mozambique and Angola in 1975, the independence of Zimbabwe in 1980, and the resurgence of resistance by the black majority.

Hopes that the mandatory arms embargo of 1977 would be followed by other sanctions were frustrated as the major Western powers opposed any coercive action on the grounds that they sought to persuade the Pretoria government to facilitate the independence of Zimbabwe. Expectations that the independence of Zimbabwe would help focus attention on pressure against the South African authorities to secure the independence of Namibia and the elimination of apartheid proved illusory with the espousal of the policy of "constructive en-

agement" by the new American administration in 1981.

This policy is essentially antithetical to the UN strategy of pressure against the minority regime, support to liberation movements, and encouragement of world public opinion toward these ends. It has been a source of distress to those who had expected the United States to be more responsive to appeals for action against apartheid than the major Western European powers because of its own historical experience with racism. Instead, they see a new "American dilemma."

The U.S. has not hesitated in opposing many resolutions on apartheid. With the support of conservative governments in the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany, it has retarded progress on international pressure against the authorities in Pretoria.


The South African regime proceeded to blackmail neighboring African states with impunity in an effort to establish its hegemony in the whole region and un-

dermine the liberation movements. While professing readiness to abandon some apartheid measures in response to persuasion by the U.S., it imposed a new racist constitution in the hope of dividing the blacks and consolidating white supremacy.

In fact, the new constitution led to the unprecedented mobilization of the black people against the regime, an escalation of repression and resistance, and large-scale violence. The unwillingness of the major powers to exert the strongest pressure on Pretoria appears to have increasingly persuaded blacks that their only hope is massive and violent resistance.

The regime has been unable to control the situation despite its recent imposition of a state of emergency, its show of force against the townships, and its mass detentions. There is a grave danger that unless the UN can respond with a new level of international action against apartheid, the situation in South Africa will become explosive.

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A New Level of Action

Fortunately, the developments of the past year have led to greater public support and pressure in the West for effective measures to persuade the South African regime to end repression and seek a solution by negotiations with the genuine leaders of the majority of the population.

At last fall's General Assembly session, several Western countries joined African and other states in co-sponsoring a resolution calling for sanctions and other measures against South Africa, which obtained an overwhelming majority of votes, including a substantial majority among Western states.

More recently, after the state of emergency was proclaimed in South Africa in July of this year, France took the initiative to convene a meeting of the Security Council to decide on a series of voluntary sanctions against South Africa. A number of Western countries—Australia, Canada, France, and the Nor-

dic countries—have announced concrete, albeit limited measures in the past year without waiting for mandatory decisions by the Security Council.


At the same time, pressure for divestment and other measures has greatly increased in the U.S., reflected by the actions of a number of states and cities, as well as legislation in Congress. It is most encouraging that proposals for such action have received bipartisan support. While limited sanctions that are not universally implemented are hardly adequate, these initiatives give hope for concerted international action.

The potentialities of the UN as a forum for harmonizing the attitudes of states must be utilized with a sense of urgency to prevail upon the major Western powers to cooperate in all appropriate and feasible pressures on the South African regime to persuade it to end repression, release political prisoners, and negotiate with the genuine representatives of the black majority on a program

for the elimination of apartheid and the establishment of a state in which all of the people will enjoy equal rights. So-called changes or reforms by that regime, imposed unilaterally or with the support of its hand-picked black leaders, are totally irrelevant.

There should be no illusions that change will come easily, even with economic sanctions. But the South African regime is highly vulnerable to pressure, especially from the United States, the United Kingdom, and West Germany on which it has become dependent. It is also dependent for its economic strength on black labor. With the rising resistance of the black majority and effective international action, a negotiated solution in the interests of all the people of South Africa may come sooner rather than later. The United Nations may contribute not only to the demise of an evil system, but also to averting immense bloodshed and suffering in the process of change. □

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Kenneth K.S. Dadzie

High Commissioner for Ghana to the Court of St. James

The UN's first director-general for development and international economic cooperation believes that the UN has sharpened its focus on the economic and social crises that have affected sub-Saharan Africa in recent years, in part due to the efforts of the Group of 77. But at this juncture, it is up to the donor community to support African reform efforts if the current crisis is to be overcome.

INTERVIEWED BY MARGARET A. NOVICKI

Africa Report: Could you provide a brief analysis of the manner in which the United Nations system has addressed African economic issues over the past years? In the wake of the major decisions taken by the General Assembly on the new international economic order and on the restructuring of the United Nations system, African nations were very hopeful that African development issues would be brought more to the forefront of UN concerns. This does not seem to have happened. How can the limitations on what can be achieved by the UN in this area be eased?

Dadzie: Many of the issues which you described as African economic issues arise from problems which African countries share with the majority of other developing countries. In addressing these issues, therefore, organizations of the United Nations system have tended in the past to adopt a focus that extends beyond Africa. Such is the case with a wide range of activities from which African countries, along with others, have derived much benefit: the normative and standard-setting work of a number of these organizations, research and policy analysis, operational activities for development including technical cooperation, as well as development finance and balance of payments support as far as the World Bank and the IMF are concerned. A number of international conferences in recent years—for instance, on population, science and technology, new and renewable sources of energy, and the least developed countries of which the majority are located in Af-

rica—have also given serious attention to issues of this type and have set in motion programs which are yielding some fruit.

Those issues that can be described as specifically African normally come up for consideration in the context of reports submitted to the Economic and Social Council and the General Assembly by the Economic Commission for Africa, which, established two and a half decades ago, is the main general economic and social development center within the United Nations system for the region. In recent years, reflecting the serious concerns of the international community about the deep economic and social crisis that has engulfed sub-Saharan Africa, the United Nations has sharpened its focus on such issues. Last year, the General Assembly adopted an important declaration on the subject for action by member governments and by international organizations. It is expected later this year to review the situation in light of the decisions taken by the Addis Ababa OAU summit meeting last July.

Thus, African economic issues have by no means been neglected by the United Nations system. On the contrary, they have moved somewhat closer in recent years to the forefront of the concerns of United Nations organizations. What impact the programs put in place by these organizations have had on African economies is of course another matter. They have clearly not succeeded in averting the African economic crisis or in setting the sub-Saharan African countries firmly on the road to self-reliant and sustained development. Their emergency problems are far from being resolved and



United Nations/Miguel Jimenez

Twenty-year commemorative meeting of the Group of 77, June 15, 1984: "The Group of 77 can indeed look back on some concrete achievements"

their longer-term development aspirations have yet to receive the major international support needed.

African governments have always acknowledged that the development of their countries is their own primary responsibility and have been making serious efforts at great economic and social costs to improve their domestic policies. But a renewal of international commitment to assist their efforts to help themselves and to make the external environment more supportive of the development process is indispensable. As far as the United Nations system is concerned, the perceived weaknesses of some of its organizations will have to be systematically addressed if the apparent decline in their credibility is to be reversed and if a firmer basis is to be provided for more generous, far-sighted, and concerted international responses to the problems we have been discussing.

Africa Report: Many regard Africa's decolonization as the crowning achievement of the UN, yet political decolonization hasn't brought about economic independence. What has Africa achieved from the UN system in concrete terms in advancing its economic independence?

Dadzie: While the central role in the struggle of colonial countries for freedom and independence was played by the colonized peoples themselves, the United Nations can properly claim credit for giving considerable impetus to the decolonization process by means of its political pressures on the colonial powers and its moral and material assistance to those peoples. Likewise, as I have already indicated, the United Nations system has an impressive record of assistance to African countries through its normal development-oriented activities and through Africa-specific programs.

This being said, it must be noted that for most economies in sub-Saharan Africa, the period since 1979 has been one of sustained or isolated crisis and of stagnation or decline; for many, it has been one of economic disaster. The sharp deterioration during this period is mainly the product of adverse climatic conditions and external shocks, encompassing a slump in commodity prices, oil price increases, high real interest rates, and a dwindling of capital flows. The record for the 1960s and 1970s was more diverse. As a whole for the 1960s, gross domestic product was about 3.8 percent, or 1.3 percent per capita, and for the 1970s, it was about 3.6 percent or 0.7

percent per capita; the period 1976-79 showed an above average rate of growth even though this was at the cost of increased external indebtedness and internal strain.

In assessing the factors that have advanced or set back Africa's search for economic independence, it is difficult to assign precise weight respectively to the direct contributions of the United Nations system, bilateral assistance, changes in the world economy, the existing framework of international economic relations, and the efforts of the African countries themselves to resolve their structural problems and to accelerate their development. To disentangle the impact of the United Nations system from these various interacting factors is therefore difficult, but it can be described as supportive and constructive, even if it has not necessarily been decisive for better or worse.

Africa Report: The 1970s was a period when Third World economic demands dominated UN debates through the efforts of the Group of 77 and the calls for a new international economic order [NIEO]. What became of the Third World's apparent unity on economic issues, as one hardly hears mention of the NIEO within the UN today? Were any concrete achievements registered by the Group of 77, or was the NIEO a largely rhetorical and in the end, divisive concept?

Dadzie: In view of the differences in their stage of development and in resource endowments and capacities, the Group of 77 has understandably encountered some difficulties over the years in translating its united stand on the broad principles of the declaration and program of action on the new international economic order into common positions on specific issues. But this has not—or so it would appear—eroded either these nations' world view founded on their disadvantaged position in the international economy as compared with that of the industrialized countries, nor the philosophy deriving from their perception of causes of this disparity, nor their commitment to effect through negotiation such changes in the external environment as would give more effective support to their development efforts.

The Group of 77 can indeed look back on some concrete achievements. First, new international institutions have been created to deal with problems of particular concern to developing countries—commodities, food, science and technology,

transnational corporations, the least developed countries, and the Law of the Sea.

Second, some changes have been made or are underway in the "rules of the game" for international economic cooperation—new norms to provide a viable setting for the functioning of key international markets and to enhance their contributions to development. This may be seen in a number of areas affecting international trade, the control of restrictive business practices, transfers of technology, the industrial property system, transnational corporations, and maritime transport. Thirdly, a few institutions, notably the international financial and monetary institutions, have made some helpful even if limited adaptations in their modes of operation and practices.

Nevertheless, on the majority of key issues covered by the text on the NIEO, the Group of 77 will probably take the view that negotiations have yielded little results or have produced outcomes that fall considerably short of their initial targets. Moreover, recent developments in the international economy and in international cooperation have not been altogether favorable for the near-term prospects of negotiations in these areas.

Africa Report: The UN and multilateral and bilateral donors have channeled substantial resources to the emergency in Africa over the past year. But the current drought and famine crisis is only symptomatic of longer-term structural economic problems. Does the attention given to the emergency detract

from the long-term economic issues? Are Africa's long-term economic needs being given sufficient attention by donors and is the UN better suited to deal with emergencies than with long-term development questions?

Dadzie: Emergency assistance, essential as it now is, can have but limited impact on the deeper forces of the current crisis in sub-Saharan Africa. It can only achieve the limited, if crucial, task of alleviating the most acute aspects of the famine. The driving force behind this assistance has been the generosity of countless individuals and voluntary organizations, as well as the United Nations. While many industrial country donors have responded impressively to this crisis, the conviction that the structural problems of the African countries deserve no less attention has yet to be fully translated into supportive action. The question is perhaps academic whether the United Nations is better suited to deal with emergencies than with long-term development questions. It is engaged in both sets of activities and needs to make a continuing effort to enhance its effectiveness and its capacity to respond to changed circumstances. Furthermore, just as development is the primary responsibility of the government concerned, so is the affected government the first line of defense when an emergency occurs. The United Nations is guided by the principle that emergency activities must take place within the broader framework of development efforts.

Africa Report: The recent OAU summit and the last General Assembly session highlighted an emerging consensus on

Revival and Rebellion in Colonial Central Africa

Karen E. Fields

"This important and provocative work argues that Watchtower, an 'archaic' form of political expression, contended with an 'archaic' state. Fields collapses artificial boundaries between social sciences and humanities. In her hands social history is an essential part of sociology."
—George Bond, Columbia University

To reveal the political uses of millenarianism in Central Africa from 1900 to 1925, Karen E. Fields examines an African version of the Watchtower movement that repeatedly undid the calm of colonial Malawi and Zambia. She draws novel conclusions about mission endeavor (presumed to be conservative), British governance (presumed to be modern), and millenarian prophecy (presumed to be irrational). Given the British system of indirect rule, missions were inherently subversive, she contends, whatever the missionaries' intent. \$38.50

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the part of Africa's leadership to tackle the continent's economic ills through structural reforms with a focus on agriculture. This approach is also at the heart of the Lagos Plan of Action. Yet the problem always arises in translating good intentions into practice. What can the international community do to assist Africa in going beyond the rhetoric of reform to actual implementation? What do you see as the critical steps to be taken at this juncture by multilaterals and bilaterals and by African governments themselves?

Dadzie: These are questions which have preoccupied African governments and engaged their collective attention at the recent OAU summit. They have repeatedly called for reforms which would make the framework of international economic relations and particularly the trade and payments system more equitable and more supportive of the development process.

“The United Nations system has an impressive record of assistance to African countries through its development-oriented activities and Africa-specific programs.”

Unfortunately, no far-reaching changes of this type are within immediate reach. But there is a growing consensus as to how a serious beginning can be made in the meantime to rebuild the foundations for sustained development over the next few years. Most African countries recognize that the way out of the malaise at the national level must cover not merely the achievement of stabilization and adjustment in the sense of a restoration of external balance; it must extend to the rehabilitation of eroded capacity, it must include a strong recovery effort, and it must lead to patterns of production growth consistent with internal as well as external balance.

To these ends, domestic policy reform and improved external support make up an inseparable package of means. The required domestic policy changes should by and large center on increased support for agriculture, through restructured institutions and incentives compatible with their development plans and priorities, as well as with their chosen economic and social systems. The essential external requirement should comprise a reversal of the current pattern of net resource outflows and expanded levels of official assistance in more appropriate and flexible forms, including improved access to international liquidity. In addition, donor countries should fulfill their undertaking to write off or grant substantial relief on official development assistance [ODA] debt.

African governments have shown that they are prepared to meet the challenge of securing a minimally tolerable future for their countries over the next decade. Many of them have begun to implement major structural changes. Others would be ready to begin if they were assured of the necessary additional resources and technical support.

The challenge to the governments of the industrialized countries on the other hand is to commit themselves to their share of this endeavor. They must extend the needed exter-

nal assistance and do so in the context of a longer view than that which characterizes their responses to the current famine. And they must take the lead in transforming public support for emergency relief into support for efforts to avert such disasters in the future.

If they fail to meet this challenge, they will seriously prejudice the prospects of success for current domestic policy reform in several African countries and discourage others. They will also put at risk the credibility of the advice so persistently pressed on African countries by multilateral institutions.

Africa Report: What is your view of the specific recommendations which came out of the OAU summit calling for an international conference of creditors to discuss ways of alleviating Africa's debt burden and for a special General Assembly session to focus on the continent's economic situation? Are these likely to achieve any real results in ameliorating Africa's economic crisis?

Dadzie: A special session of the General Assembly to focus on the continent's economic situation could generate the necessary impulses for the kinds of policy actions just mentioned on the part of the international community and donors. The suggestion to hold such a session was given a rather lukewarm reception, one gathers, at the recent Economic and Social Council meeting in Geneva.

The OAU proposal for an international conference of creditors to discuss ways of alleviating Africa's debt burden will probably give rise to even stronger reservations. Such a conference is indeed desirable. Yet even if it fails to take place, it will remain necessary to take serious account of the qualitative differences between the debt problems of sub-Saharan and other low-income developing countries, and those of the middle-income major debtors.

First, most of the debt of the African countries is official, owed to the governments of industrial countries and multilateral institutions and arising from past official development assistance and guaranteed export credits. While the total is small in global terms and does not pose a threat to the international financial system, it is beyond the capacity of many of the countries to service it; debt service constitutes just as strong a brake on their development efforts as it does for those middle-income countries whose debt is primarily owed to commercial banks.

Second, sub-Saharan Africa has suffered from declining ODA in real terms and rising debt service obligations. This contraction of net flows coincided with a collapse in primary commodity prices and reduced market assets. In these circumstances, the borrowing of the countries in the region was mainly a response to adverse movements in their terms of trade, including increases in the price of oil and food imports, their dependence on which was of course aggravated by the prolonged drought.

Their debt situation will accordingly need to be dealt with by means of a special set of measures, especially increased concessional flows from official sources, and including debt write-offs and other types of substantial relief, medium-term low-interest balance of payments finance, and other external finance better suited to the long-term structural character of the adjustment required in these countries. □

Ending the Impasse

The United Nations has brought Namibia from the status of a peripheral issue in world affairs to a major question debated annually by the General Assembly. However, the United States now must play a leading role in support of UN efforts if Namibia's independence is to be secured.

BY BRAJESH MISHRA

Namibia was colonized rather late in the European powers' 19th century scramble for Africa. It was not easily occupied; the Germans encountered determined resistance and there were several armed uprisings by the people—the last from 1904 to 1907—which led the administrator of the newly-created German South West Africa to issue an "extermination order." By the end of the 19th century, the colonial administration had succeeded in establishing itself in the territory by military means and in bringing organized resistance to an end.

That situation continued until World War I when Namibia was occupied by South African forces acting on behalf of the British Empire. At the end of the war, it was decided that the victorious countries should not simply take over the colonial territories of Germany as prizes of war, but should rather place them under a system of mandates which would be supervised by a new organization, the League of Nations.

In Namibia's case, the mandate was given to the British Crown, to be administered by South Africa which eventually became the mandatory power. While South Africa was allowed to apply its own legislation in Namibia, the territory was not to be regarded as a part of South Africa; rather, its administration was to be considered "a sacred trust of

civilization" for the benefit of the indigenous inhabitants.

The League of Nations established a body known as the Permanent Mandates Commission to review the quality of administration in all the mandated territories. Criticism was expressed in the Permanent Mandates Commission regarding the practices which were being followed in Namibia; even by the utterly discriminatory standards of those years, these practices were found to be undesirable.

However, these concerns were soon overshadowed by the approach and outbreak of World War II and Namibia receded from international concern. In 1945, when the League of Nations was replaced by the United Nations, it was again decided that dependent territories should be placed under some kind of international supervision. Accordingly, the Trusteeship Council was created as one of the principal organs of the United Nations to oversee the territories previously under the League of Nations mandate together with the dependent territories which were detached from enemy states as a result of the war.

The only exception was Namibia, where, perhaps because of the participation of South Africa in World War II and the personal role played by its prime minister, Gen. Jan Smuts, in the founding of the United Nations, the major powers did not insist that a trusteeship agreement be drawn up, although it was agreed that this would be a desirable goal.

In the early years after World War II, the General Assembly rejected a South African proposal to annex Namibia. Subsequently, as dissatisfaction grew among the indigenous inhabitants over the conditions of South African administration, they began to send petitions to the United Nations. South Africa disputed their right to do this and the matter was referred to the International Court of Justice. In 1950, the Court ruled that petitions from Namibia could be considered by the United Nations on condition that the UN's examination of these petitions did not lead to obligations on South Africa more onerous than those which had prevailed during the mandate. Thus it came about that the question of Namibia was discussed from the earliest days of the United Nations and that even in the late 1940s, the practices of the South African administration in Namibia had become the object of questioning and criticism.

Throughout the 1950s, the concept that all dependent territories should eventually accede to self-determination, which had been recognized as an important principle in the Charter of the United Nations, gained increasing momentum. This concept was given further recognition by General Assembly resolution 1514 in December 1960, which declared that all peoples had the right to self-determination, that the subjugation of peoples to alien rule constituted a denial of fundamental human rights, and that the inadequacy of political, economic, social, or educational

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preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence.

This resolution gave expression to views which had already gained widespread currency in the international community and in turn provided a powerful impulse to the process of decolonization, both among governments—most of whom heeded its call—and among peoples who were inspired to intensify their own efforts to achieve independence.

the former League, did not have a sufficient legal interest in the mandate over Namibia. Consequently, the Court did not take up the substance of the case. While the announcement of this decision led to rejoicing in those districts of Windhoek inhabited by South Africans, this respite was brief.

Continuing the legal approach, the international community, acting collectively rather than through individual countries, then gave consideration to

the mandate. The General Assembly decided that the mandate was terminated and that Namibia would come under the direct responsibility of the United Nations.

The General Assembly's decision was disputed by some countries, including South Africa, which felt that it was not legally sound and that the General Assembly had possibly gone beyond its powers. Consequently, the Security Council requested an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice. In its 1971 opinion, the Court declared that as the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia was illegal, South Africa was under obligation to withdraw its administration from the territory. Member-states of the United Nations were obliged to recognize the illegality of South Africa's presence in Namibia and to refrain from any acts implying recognition of the legality of, or lending support or assistance to such presence and administration. In 1971, the Security Council endorsed this opinion in resolution 301. France and the United Kingdom abstained on this resolution, expressing legal doubts about the Court's opinion. The United States voted for the resolution.

The advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice and Security Council resolution 301 set in motion an important legal and political current. While in the early years some legal doubts were expressed, by 1985, all member-states of the United Nations, including France and the United Kingdom, with the exception only of South Africa, have publicly indicated by their votes in the General Assembly and elsewhere that the presence of South Africa in Namibia is illegal. No governmental voice expressing a dissenting view can be found in the international community.

Other important currents in the international arena had already been set in motion. In 1967, in order to give effect to the concept of United Nations responsibility for Namibia, a special session of the General Assembly decided to create the United Nations Council for Namibia to administer the territory until independence with the maximum participation of the people. Later, when South Africa refused to allow the Council to enter Namibia, the General Assembly gave it the additional responsibility of or-



March in New York City, August 13: "There is unanimous international agreement that the presence of South Africa in Namibia is illegal"

In Namibia, however, there was no progress. Petitions became more numerous and descriptions of abuse by the South African administration became more detailed and better documented. Two African countries, which had not been colonized in the 19th century and had thus been members of the League of Nations, decided to bring proceedings against South Africa before the International Court of Justice regarding its mandate over Namibia.

In 1966, after several years of deliberation, the Court decided by a tie-breaking vote of its president that Ethiopia and Liberia, as individual members of

the principle in international law that when the terms of a treaty are not honored by one party, that party cannot claim the benefits which flow to it. The member-states of the United Nations examined the South African mandate over Namibia and in resolution 2145 of 1966, the General Assembly stated that it had studied the reports of the various committees which had been established to exercise the UN's supervisory functions over Namibia, expressed its conviction that the administration of the territory had been conducted in a manner contrary to the mandate, and declared that South Africa had in fact disavowed

ganizing a campaign to bring about a withdrawal of South Africa from Namibia. It was also decided that the Council should entrust executive and administrative tasks to a United Nations Commissioner for Namibia who would be responsible to the Council in the performance of his tasks.

In 1966, the Namibian people, who for over 20 years had suffered armed repression at the hands of the South Africans and who had confined themselves during this period to submitting petitions to the United Nations, concluded that all avenues of peaceful protest were blocked, that they themselves were being dealt with by violent means, and that therefore they should take up arms. They were given moral support for their decision by the international community. While they were not immediately supported by the General Assembly, which would have preferred a peaceful solution, by 1971, the Assembly felt that peaceful means were not adequate. By resolution 2871, it reaffirmed the legitimacy of the struggle of the Namibian people by all means against the illegal occupation of their territory by South Africa.


The United Nations Council for Namibia carefully followed the General Assembly's injunction to function with the maximum possible participation of the people of Namibia. In 1973, following a determination by the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the General Assembly recognized the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) as the authentic representative of the Namibian people. In addition to supporting an OAU determination, this resolution was also a recognition of the factual situation on the ground.

In 1976, as SWAPO gained strength in its struggle against the illegal South African occupation and as it became clear that no other political party in Namibia possessed any broad-based support, the General Assembly recognized SWAPO as the sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people and decided to grant to SWAPO the status of observer in its deliberations and in all conferences convened by the General Assembly.

In an unanimous resolution in 1976, the Security Council declared that free elections under the supervision and con-

trol of the United Nations should be held for the whole of Namibia as one political entity. The same year, five Western countries which were then members of the Security Council—Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States—prepared a detailed plan for Namibia which represented a compromise between the positions of the United Nations and South Africa. When

implemented to this day. Shortly after Ronald Reagan was elected president of the United States in 1980, a new element was introduced—that the implementation of the UN plan for Namibia should be accompanied by a withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola. This notion was warmly embraced by South Africa, but condemned by the General Assembly and rejected unanimously by the Security Council. In resolution 566 this



SWAPO secretary-general Toivo Ya Toivo opens General Assembly debate on Namibia, November 1984: "Through the UN, the international community provides moral and political support to SWAPO"

United Nations/S. Lwin

it was approved by Security Council resolution 435 in 1978, it was adopted by 13 votes to none with two abstentions, Czechoslovakia and the USSR. The plan also represented SWAPO's willingness to put to the test of elections the statement that it was "the sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people." The five Western countries responsible for the plan, who soon became known as the Contact Group, held private consultations with SWAPO, with the frontline states, with other African countries, and with South Africa.

The UN plan for Namibia was not implemented within the time frame envisaged by its authors and by Security Council resolution 435 and remains un-

year, which had two abstaining votes (United States and Great Britain), the Security Council took a first step toward sanctions against South Africa.

In this seeming impasse, the question is frequently asked: What has the United Nations done for Namibia and what is it able to do now?

The United Nations has brought Namibia from the status of a minor issue on the periphery of world affairs in 1945 to a major question which is debated annually by the General Assembly. The fact that South Africa was in breach of the terms of the League of Nations mandate is now widely recognized. There is unanimous international agreement that the presence of South Africa in Namibia

is illegal and even South Africa itself has dropped attempts to annex the territory, does not maintain that Namibia is in any way a part of South Africa, and does not disagree that the goal for Namibia should be independence. Along with recognition of the illegality of South Africa's presence in Namibia, the international community also accepts the legality of the liberation struggle in Namibia against South African occupation.

Through the United Nations, the international community provides moral and political support to the liberation movement, SWAPO, in its struggle. This support will not subside, and, as in the case of some other colonial struggles, it can be said that the United Nations has helped most in those cases where there was a strong liberation movement on the ground. The United Nations Council for Namibia represents Namibia in the UN's specialized agencies and at numerous international conferences. Attempts by South Africa to obtain recognition of its own regime in Namibia have failed.

In addition, the United Nations has set up extensive programs of technical cooperation and refugee assistance to help the Namibian people. Since the termination of the mandate when not a single Namibian had graduated from a university, great strides have been made in education. Extensive programs of education and training as well as planning for a future independent Namibia continue to go forward.

Looking back on the past 40 years of UN activities on Namibia, it can be said that while ultimate success has not yet been achieved, tremendous progress has been made. Regarding what the United Nations might do to continue to promote the cause of Namibia, principally it should continue to support the activities of the UN Council for Namibia which may be grouped in five areas:

- the representation of Namibia in international fora and the prevention of participation of the racist regime of Pretoria or the fraudulent regime in Windhoek in any international activities on behalf of Namibia;
- study of the situation inside Namibia, the preparation of reports thereon, and the wide dissemination of this information;
- the protection of the interests of the

Namibian people, notably by efforts to protect the natural resources of Namibia, by the provision of travel documents to Namibians, and by other legal and political activities;

- the provision of assistance to the Namibian people, including education and training programs, the preparation of a comprehensive economic plan for a future independent Namibia, emergency assistance, and other activities;
- a wide-ranging campaign to mobilize support for the cause of Namibia and to disseminate information on this question

“Through the UN, the international community provides moral and political support to the liberation movement, SWAPO, in its struggle.”

to governments, non-governmental organizations, and individuals.

In these domains, the Council assisted by the United Nations as an organization. Governments in their capacity as UN members should continue to support the cause of Namibia and to urge those governments which are not yet fully committed to the goal of Namibian independence to change their policies. In addition to pressing for action in the General Assembly and the Security Council to implement resolution 435, governments should at the same time give full support to the United Nations Council for Namibia.

While this task falls equally upon all members of the international community, it can be said that as a practical matter, a special responsibility falls upon those five governments which prepared a plan for the independence of Namibia, brought this plan to the Security Council, and in Security Council resolution 435 obtained approval of this plan. Among these five countries, a particularly important role can be played by the government of the United States.

The U.S. is by far the most important

among those countries which have been reluctant to support strong actions in support of the cause of Namibia and which have prevented measures such as sanctions from being adopted by the United Nations. It is also one of the two countries (the other being the United Kingdom) which are the biggest investors in South Africa and in Namibia. At present, the policies of the United States are out of step with the positions of the General Assembly and of the Security Council. Even within the Contact Group, published reports indicate a divergence between the United States on the one hand, and Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the United Kingdom on the other.

The U.S. government's policy of "constructive engagement" has not produced the desired results; indeed, it has been counter-productive. In the conditions prevailing in South Africa, such a policy cannot work. In terms of bringing about change in South Africa's external (or for that matter internal) policies, the white leadership is now trapped in its own structures. At one stage in South Africa's history, the participation of the black population in the electoral process—although highly circumscribed—did lead to a certain influence. As a result of the total disenfranchisement of the black population, political debate inside the white ruling circles of South Africa is not between the government and a slightly more liberal opposition, but between the government and a more extreme group completely opposed to any change. Even this is more an exchange of diatribes than a debate or dialogue. It is thus clear that the policies of the white minority can only be modified by means of pressure exerted from outside or through a bloody revolution from within.

In terms of exerting pressure for change in South Africa, the principal instrument which has been called for repeatedly and for many years by the international community remains economic sanctions. Sanctions are a means short of war to influence the behavior of a country which is engaged in extreme policies and may also help in the prevention of a bloodbath. However, sanctions have been used with insufficient frequency. The number of instances in which economic sanctions have either

been called for by the United Nations or applied by single states or groups of states since World War II is far overshadowed by the number of cases in which war has been employed. The results of this tendency are visible to all.

The record of sanctions when they have been applied is mixed but on the whole positive. The economic sanctions applied by the League of Nations against Italy for its occupation of Ethiopia did not achieve their goal, but they were applied with reasonable diligence by most governments. While Southern Rhodesia busied itself with circumventing sanctions, it did so only at high cost. In the end—although the time frame proved much longer than had originally been hoped for—the joint burden of the sanctions and the liberation struggle forced the illegal regime to capitulate. As South Africa has consistently violated international law with regard to Namibia, there is no reason why sanctions should not be applied.

The arms embargo against South Af-

rica has been reasonably well, although not perfectly applied. While it has not prevented South Africa from arming itself, South Africa has achieved this goal only at tremendous cost.

With respect to Namibia, the international community should continue to press for sanctions, isolation, cessation of new investment, and withdrawal of existing investments. The international community should insist upon strict implementation of Security Council resolutions 276, 283, and 301, which called upon all states to terminate dealings between state-controlled enterprises and Namibia, to discourage other enterprises from such activities and, in general, to abstain from all economic dealings which might entrench South Africa's authority over Namibia. In this connection, it should be noted that the government of Canada announced in July that it would terminate the processing of Namibian uranium.

If these three resolutions were strictly applied trade in goods whose ori-

gin was manifestly Namibian would on the whole be terminated. Many products destined to and from Namibia would travel via South Africa. The cost of this would be enormous, particularly in the case of mineral exports. A situation similar to that of the last years of the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia would be created. A beleaguered regime with no international recognition would be carrying the twin costs of attempting to circumvent sanctions and the prosecution of a war against a population strengthened in its will to resist by the moral and political support of virtually the entire international community.

The Reagan administration must be persuaded to desist from linking the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola to the implementation of the United Nations plan for the independence of Namibia. If South Africa was to continue to insist upon the linkage, it would then stand alone, deprived of any support in the international community for its intransigence. □



SECOND INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ORAL REHYDRATION THERAPY ICORT II

ICORT II, SECOND CONFERENCE PLANNED FOR DECEMBER

The Second International Conference on Oral Rehydration Therapy (ICORT II) will be held December 10-13, 1985 in Washington, D.C.

Over 700 leading scientists, physicians, policy makers, and health professionals from over 90 countries will meet to exchange information about the problems, issues, and lessons learned in establishing and implementing ORT programs. Professionals from over 30 African nations are expected to participate in the conference as panel members and country poster presenters.

The conference is sponsored by the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) in cooperation with the International Centre for Diarrhoeal Disease Research/Bangladesh (ICDDR/B), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the World Bank, and the World Health Organization (WHO).

Topics for discussion at the conference include: Communications and Social Marketing;

Distribution and Logistics; Health Personnel Training; Supervision and Monitoring; Evaluation and Cost Issues; and Integrating ORT With Other Health Activities. The topics for plenary sessions include New Understanding of the Diarrheal Disease Process and New Therapies; Interventions to Prevent and Control Diarrheal Disease; and Diarrhea, Nutrition, and Other Interventions.

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Those wishing registration material or further information, please write to: Ms. Linda Ladislaus, ICORT II Conference Staff, Creative Associates, Inc., 3201 New Mexico Ave., N.W., Suite 270, Washington, D.C. 20016, or telephone Ms. Atoussa Davis at (202) 966-5804.

Sponsored by the Agency for International Development in cooperation with ICDDR/B, UNICEF, UNDP, World Bank, and WHO

A Challenge to Multilateralism

The Reagan administration's decision to withdraw from UNESCO poses a broader threat to the multilateral approach of the entire United Nations system. In the face of this controversy, UNESCO has implemented structural reforms while strengthening its commitment to its original goals.

BY HERSCHELLE S. CHALLENGOR

Despite its pivotal role as a founder of the United Nations and many of its specialized agencies after World War II, the United States has begun to challenge these structures of multilateral cooperation. The U.S. withdrawal from UNESCO in December 1984 can best be understood within the context of changing American attitudes toward the UN system and the dramatic evolution of the international community in the 40 years since its founding.

At the heart of the U.S. decision is the concern that the "political majority"—a minority of rich and powerful industrialized member-states—pays the largest share of the UN's budgets, but no longer automatically controls the outcome of debates due to the numerical majority of developing countries whose different needs and interests have shifted the direction of these institutions. In recent years, concern over the alleged "tyranny of the majority" has combined with a renewed American anxiety over Soviet influence in the UN system.

The world has changed markedly in

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the 40 years since the United Nations and UNESCO were founded. Fifty-two nations signed the UN Charter in 1945 and 28 attended the founding meeting of UNESCO in London that same year. Today the UN and UNESCO have 159 and 160 member-states respectively. Of these, 50 are African, constituting a blocking third in all international fora. UNESCO is currently the only UN specialized agency whose director-general, Amadou Mahtar M'Bow, comes from sub-Saharan Africa. As a result, the African countries have a special interest in the successful stewardship of the organization and form a cohesive, influential group within it.

The end of colonial rule and the appearance of over 100 new states has changed the complexion of the family of nations, altered the style of diplomacy, and reordered the priorities of international discourse. Multilateral diplomacy is now at least as important as bilateral relations, and economic justice has become a factor in the maintenance of peace.

In this fundamentally altered global community, the United Nations system is a pivotal forum and a leveller based upon the principle of sovereign equality. However, the "bicameral" solution in the United Nations, which provides for both equality through one-nation, one-vote provisions in the General Assem-

bly and equity via veto powers for the five permanent members of the Security Council, has no equivalent in the specialized agencies.

Within the specialized agencies, new member-states are challenging the status quo in a number of technical areas. Just as technical questions in the U.S. Congress, such as acid rain or competency-based teaching, became hotly contested issues because of divergent positions of states or interest groups, issues such as direct satellite broadcasting or infant formula marketing in developing countries are politicized in the UN agencies. UN agencies are by definition political, since positions articulated in them represent the official stand of a diverse group of states who often have competing national interests.

These, then, are some of the main factors that have brought about the conflict between bilateral and multilateral diplomacy. But there will always be some natural tension between sovereign member-states and international organizations, since the latter necessarily operate on the principle of the greatest good for the greatest number.

UNESCO and the United Nations have changed, but only because the family of nations has changed. Lamenting this new reality is not likely to modify it. For example, in the U.S. Congress, since the Republicans captured control

TABLE 1
Regional Composition of UNESCO Executive Board

Group	Staff in professional and higher categories						General Service Staff		Grand Total	
	Posts subject to geographical quotas		Non-geographic posts		Total					
	no.	%	no.	%	no.	%	no.	%	no.	%
Group I	338	39.7	218	47.4	556	42.4	1,203	78.5	1,759	61.8
Group II	64	7.5	32	6.9	96	7.3	12	0.8	108	3.8
Group III	107	12.6	47	10.2	154	11.7	90	5.9	244	8.6
Group IV	126	14.8	56	12.2	182	13.9	72	4.7	254	8.9
Group V	217	25.4	107	23.3	324	24.7	156	10.1	480	16.9
Total	852	100	460	100	1,312	100	1,533	100	2,845	100

of the Senate in 1980, the old Democratic leaders have had to adapt to the sharing of power. Now they work harder to obtain support for their views, strike new alliances, and sometimes change their policies, but they do not walk out or withhold their state's tax revenues from the government's coffers.

Over the past five years, the United States has embarked upon a program of rapid military buildup and a scaling down of multilateral cooperation, even though U.S. participation in all 32 agencies, programs, and funds of the UN system, including the World Bank family, costs under \$1.5 billion a year—a fraction of the annual multi-billion dollar defense budget and less than half of this year's bilateral aid to Israel.

Since 1981, the executive branch of the U.S. government has:

- reversed the previous administration's decision to sign the Law of the Sea Treaty;
- withdrawn temporarily from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) following its rejection of Israel's credentials and threatened to leave the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) when that agency questioned Israeli credentials;
- castigated the World Health Organization when it approved a resolution calling upon the Nestlé Corporation to stop its aggressive sales of infant formula to developing countries;
- reduced by 25 percent its expected contribution to the seventh replenishment of the International Development Association (IDA), the soft loan facility of the World Bank, and refused to participate in the proposed energy affiliate

of the World Bank and its Special Fund for African economic recovery;

- announced its decision not to support the reelection of Gamani Corea of Sri Lanka, the secretary-general of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), an agency that has advocated international commodity agreements and improved trade relations for developing countries;
- indicated its unwillingness to accept any advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) with regard to the mining of the harbor of Nicaragua;
- threatened the existence of the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) because of the delayed negotiations over the proportionality of voluntary contributions to that body;
- not provided any contribution to the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) although funds were subsequently appropriated by the Congress;
- withdrawn from UNESCO.

If the Reagan administration has been critical of the UN system, it seems to have harbored special antipathy for UNESCO, even though Americans exerted considerable influence over the organization's management and programs. The late Archibald MacLeish, head of the U.S. delegation to the London Conference in 1945, contributed the moving and most frequently quoted passage of the UNESCO constitution: "Since wars are created in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defenses of peace must be constructed."

Echoing this spirit in a message to Congress in 1946, Secretary of State James Byrnes stated: "In a world where nations may arm themselves with weap-

ons against which there is no physical defense, basic security lies in the creation of mutual trust and confidence among the peoples of the world. If UNESCO can bring that goal nearer by one step, it deserves our prompt and wholehearted participation."

For 11 of its first 12 years, UNESCO's director-general or deputy director-general was an American citizen. Indeed, there has been a U.S. national in at least one of the top three ranking posts for 32 out of UNESCO's 40-year history. Moreover, a U.S. citizen served as the editor of *The UNESCO Courier*, the agency's general audience magazine, for about 30 years prior to his retirement in the late 1970s, and the last three editors of UNESCO's science journal, *Impact*, over the past 19 years have been American. Americans still hold the largest number of professional posts, 83, subject to geographic distribution in the secretariat. The Soviets, who are the second largest contributor to the organization's budget, have only 55.

Although the current rupture is the most serious crisis in the U.S.-UNESCO relationship, there have been three major critical points in the past. During the McCarthy era between 1951-53, a group of citizens in Los Angeles accused UNESCO of trying to influence school children through its publication, "The E in UNESCO." As it turned out, this publication had been produced by the curriculum division of the Los Angeles school system as an instructional guide for teachers and had no UNESCO origins whatsoever.

Around the same time, the American Flag Committee of Philadelphia accused

TABLE 2

Composition of the UNESCO Secretariat by groups (31 March 1985)

Region	Region	No. of States
Group I*	North America and Western Europe	27
Group II	Soviet Union & Eastern Europe	11
Group III	Latin American & the Caribbean	33
Group IV*	Asia & the Pacific	27
Group V	Africa & Arab States	62
Total	<i>Executive Board approval in May 1985</i>	161
<small>*Since the US withdrawal and the Australian and New Zealand decision to join the Asian and Pacific Group, Group I has lost 1 seat on the Board and an extra seat has been added to Group V. Therefore Group I now has 26 seats and Group IV has 9.</small>		

UNESCO of teaching world government, and of being Marxist and atheistic. Ironically during this period, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary withdrew from UNESCO, accusing it of being dominated by American imperialists. A series of investigations of UNESCO by the White House, Congress, and private voluntary organizations, and particularly the Murphy Commission of the American Legion, exonerated the organization on all charges.

Between 1974-77, Congress decided to withhold all funds from UNESCO because of the General Conference's approval of anti-Israel resolutions. At the 18th General Conference in 1974, Israel was not admitted into the European group and was sanctioned for its continued excavations in Jerusalem which allegedly endangered Islamic monuments. Israel joined the European group in 1976 and full U.S. funding was restored in 1978.

From 1976-80, tensions and strong media criticism of UNESCO's activities resulted from the debate over a new world information and communications order. These crises in the U.S.-UNESCO relationship made the agency particularly vulnerable. However, it is significant that a Gallup poll in June 1984 indicated that of the 36 percent of persons interviewed who were aware of UNESCO, 48 percent opposed U.S. withdrawal, while only 34 percent favored such a move.

Early in President Reagan's first term of office in late January 1981, the *Washington Post* leaked what became known as the "Stockman Memorandum," which proposed withdrawal from

UNESCO as a budget-saving device. This document by the former director of the Office of Management and Budget stated: "Alternatively, the impact of voluntary contributions could be lessened by announcing the withdrawal from UNESCO at once because of UNESCO's pro-PLO policies and its support for measures limiting the free flow of information. Withdrawal could reduce 1981 and 1982 budgets by \$25 and \$62 million respectively if the United States refused to pay its legally binding assessments in those years."

By the spring of that year, Elliott Abrams, then assistant secretary of international organization affairs at the State Department, warned that the U.S. would leave UNESCO if it took any actions to restrict the freedom of the press. By summer, perhaps coincidentally, Senator Moynihan, for whom Abrams had worked prior to his new post in the administration, introduced and won approval of an amendment to prohibit the use of any contributions to UNESCO if that body took action to restrict the freedom of the press. In January 1982 for the first time in history, the government did not request any funds for the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO, a statutory body created when Congress authorized U.S. membership in UNESCO in 1946.

In mid-1982, Gregory Newell, the new assistant secretary, initiated a review of the more than 90 multilateral organizations to which the U.S. belongs. These institutions were to be judged on the extent to which their activities were consistent with five policy objectives established by the adminis-

tration: reasserting American leadership in international organizations; maintaining zero net growth in the assessed budgets of the UN and the specialized agencies; reducing the size of U.S. delegations to international conferences by 30 percent; increasing the number of Americans in policy-making positions; and increasing the role of the private sector.

Then on December 29, 1983, the State Department announced its intention to leave the organization effective December 31, 1984. This decision followed the 22nd General Conference in Paris, at which the United States achieved most of its objectives. It was made after discounting the advice of the 13 U.S. government agencies who participated in a State Department review and the resolution of the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO opposing withdrawal.

Alan Romberg, the State Department spokesman, attributed the decision to three factors: the politicization of virtually every subject dealt with; hostility toward the basic institutions of a free society, especially a free market and a free press; and unrestrained budgetary growth. A few months later, at the initiative of Rep. James Scheuer (D-NY), Congress called for a General Accounting Office (GAO) study of the budget, management, and personnel practices of UNESCO. The GAO found no smoking gun.

There is reason to believe that these challenges to the United Nations system will continue and perhaps intensify. Early this year, the House of Representatives Republican Research Com-

mittee published a study of its policy goals for the 99th Congress in which it enunciated the following objectives:

- to curb U.S. contributions to the UN perhaps to 1980 levels;
- to link foreign aid to UN members' voting records;
- to stem spying by Soviet bloc employees;
- to work with other free nations to study the formation of a UN of the democracies;
- to review the option of capping U.S. contributions to the World Bank and IMF;
- to refrain from returning to UNESCO until it adheres to its original purposes and principles.

The Congress has passed legislation which imposes serious challenges to UN agencies. An amendment introduced by Senator Nancy Kassebaum will reduce the U.S. assessed contribution to UN agencies to 20 percent if those agencies do not provide for a weighted system in which a member's voting power depends on its contribution to the budget. Other provisions call for a study of UN salaries and pensions; restrictions on the activities of UN employees in New York; a reduction of the U.S. contribution to the UN or to specialized agencies by 8.34 percent a month if an agency expels Israel or rejects that nation's credentials; prohibitions on the use of U.S. contributions for the construction of an Economic Commission for Africa conference center in Ethiopia; and prohibition on the use of U.S. contributions for activities benefiting the PLO and other national liberation movements.

To the extent that member-states continue to pursue their interests in international organizations, these bodies will always be political. All sovereign nations have the right to advocate their points of view, but not the right to impose their political or economic system on others. Americans should recognize that the U.S. is unique even in the Western camp. Most UNESCO member-states, including those from Western Europe, have ministers of education and culture, directly or indirectly subsidize the press, and wholly underwrite local television. In most countries, it is a technical arm of government—the ministry of education—that coordinates that government's relations with UN-

ESCO, whereas in the U.S., it is the State Department.

Despite the U.S. accusations, UNESCO has made no decision to interfere with a free market, restrict the flow of information, or license journalists. Statements by member governments or proposals that are not approved should not be confused with the actual decisions of the general conference. Furthermore, the UNESCO programs criticized by the U.S. government account for less than 5 percent of the organization's activities.

The charge of unrestrained budgetary expansion is the least comprehensible. In 1982-83, UNESCO's budget was \$430.6 million. The budget approved for 1984-85 was \$374.4 million, nearly \$57 million less than the previous biennium.

“The current challenge is broader than UNESCO for it represents a threat to multilateralism and the entire UN system.”

In addition, as a result of savings gained from currency fluctuations, UNESCO returned \$17.7 million to the United States. Therefore the U.S. reduced its normal annual contribution to UNESCO of about \$43 million to \$25.3 million in 1984.

These savings were made possible not just because of a strong dollar, which affected all UN agencies, but more importantly because of a series of devaluations of the French franc. Since more than 60 percent of the Paris-based organization's expenditures are in francs, it was able to buy more for less dollars. Moreover, at the time the U.S. was criticizing UNESCO as the only UN agency to ignore its admonition against exceeding zero budget growth, a GAO report revealed that the UN and three of its agencies had higher budget growth rates between 1980 and 1984 than did UNESCO.

Largely as a response to the concerns expressed by the U.S. and certain other member-states, UNESCO has been engaged in a two-year process that

has brought about significant changes in its budget, administration, and programs. Although the program and budget changes sought by the American government can only be taken up by the General Conference which meets for the first time since the U.S. withdrawal announcement this October 8 through November 12 in Sofia, Bulgaria, a number of modifications already have been instituted following action by the director-general and the executive board. The director-general has:

- strengthened the decentralization process which delegates more program and administrative authority to regional offices;
- delegated responsibility for personnel appointments at lower levels to the deputy director-general and the assistant director-general for administration;
- established a central evaluation unit and relocated the office of public information in a restructured sector of external relations;
- established a new bureau for development to better coordinate operational activities with the regular programs in education, science, culture, and communications;
- imposed program cutbacks generating savings of about \$10 million in 1985;
- initiated a process to reduce staff by 300 by 1986;
- prepared a more “transparent” draft program and budget reflecting a number of personnel policy changes to speed up the recruitment process.

The 51-member executive board has met four times in the past 18 months to prepare measures aimed at strengthening the operation of the organization. It recommended zero budget growth for 1986-87 even prior to the actual U.S. withdrawal and recommended a draft program which modifies some of the controversial programs in the areas of reflection on world problems, communications, human rights and peace, which reflects a one-third reduction in program activities in anticipation of lower revenue in 1986-87.

The Board has demonstrated its willingness to strengthen UNESCO in ways that are consistent with the organization's constitution, but it has not endorsed proposals which violate it in spirit or substance. Therefore, a U.S. proposal in May 1984 to introduce a sys-

tem of weighted voting on the budget and several other recommendations which challenged the fundamental principle of sovereign equality were not supported.

Although its member-states have resisted such policy changes, there are UNESCO practices which take into consideration the view of more powerful states. Over the past 10 years, UNESCO has tried to resolve all controversial issues on the basis of consensus. This process serves to compensate for the different strengths of the political and numerical majorities, for consensus decision-making can be viewed as granting veto power to the minority.

In 1974, the director-general created the Drafting Negotiating Group (DNG) to handle controversial resolutions at the General Conference. The DNG is composed of equal representation from the five regional electoral groups: Group I—Western Europe and North America, Group II—Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, Group III—Latin America and the Caribbean, Group IV—Asia and the Pacific, and Group V—Africa and the Arab states. The record of the 22nd General Conference in 1983 is typical. Out of 134 resolutions tabled, 132 were approved by consen-

sus and only two had to put to a vote after hours of negotiation failed to reach a compromise. Therefore, the "general will" that prevails in UNESCO is more than the sum of its philosophically diverse parts and tends to reflect the different political influence of its member-states.

This DNG model now operates within the Executive Board. As indicated in table 1, the regional composition of the 51-member board already gives a slight representational advantage to the industrialized states.

This pattern is even more pronounced in the 13-member Temporary Committee created by the Executive Board to guide the reform process. Here, the Western European states have three members, while the other five regional groups have only two each. Furthermore, Table 2 shows that the 27 states of North America and Western Europe control 42.4 percent of all the professional posts subject to geographical distribution in the Secretariat and 61.1 percent of all staff positions in the organization.

The data simply does not support the contention that UNESCO has been taken over either by the Soviets or the Third World. By the end of the year, we

shall know if the United Kingdom and Singapore will join the U.S. and withdraw from the organization. The current challenge is broader than UNESCO for it represents a threat to multilateralism and the entire UN system.

Clearly 1985 is vastly different from 1945. We live in an increasingly interdependent world. Although the nation-state remains the principal actor in international affairs, we are witnessing the emergence of global problems that require multilateral solutions. Intercontinental ballistic missiles have the capacity to traverse the world. Pollution and disease do not respect boundaries. The massive migration of refugees generated by war, political repression, and economic deprivation has created an international problem of colossal proportions.

Words are still cheaper than war. The United Nations system, as the world's forum for dialogue and international cooperation, must be strengthened, for however strident the tones, however divergent the views, the UN and its specialized agencies are the listening posts of the world. To abandon them will not silence those voices. At best, it will only impair America's ability to understand the world it must share with others. □

Books Received

(Inclusion in this list does not preclude the review of a book at a later date.)

- Akagha, Fedelis S.E. *Strategies for Economic Development in Africa: Theory and Policies*. New York: Vantage Press, Inc., 1985, 134pp., \$13.95.
- Binsbergen, Wim van, and Schoffeleers, Matthew (eds.). *Theoretical Explorations in African Religion*. Boston, Mass.: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985, 365 pp., \$49.95.
- Cartwright, John. *Political Leadership in Africa*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983, \$27.50.
- Danaher, Kevin. *The Political Economy of U.S. Policy Toward South Africa*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985, 212pp. \$30.00.
- Ellis, Stephen. *The Rising of the Red Shaws: A Revolt in Madagascar 1885-1899*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985, 166pp., \$44.50.
- Emecheta, Buchi. *Double Yoke*. New York: George Braziller, Inc., 1985, 163pp., \$5.95.
- Falola, Toyin, and Ihonvbere, Julius. *The Rise and Fall of Nigeria's Second Republic, 1979-84*. Totowa, N.J.: Biblio Distribution Centre of Zed Press Ltd., 1985, 265pp., \$30.95 cloth, \$12.15 paper.
- Kavanaugh, Robert Mshengu. *Theatre and Cultural Struggle in South Africa*. Totowa, N.J.: Biblio Distribution Centre of Zed Press Ltd., 1985, 215pp., \$26.25 cloth, \$10.25 paper.
- Kodjo, Edem. . . . *et demain l'Afrique*. Paris: Editions Stock, 1985, 353pp.
- Kwitny, Jonathan. *Endless Enemies: The Making of An Unfriendly World*. New York: Congdon & Weed, Inc., 1984, 435 pp., \$19.95.
- Meredith, Martin. *The First Dance of Freedom: Black Africa in the Postwar Era*. New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1984, 377pp., \$23.95.
- Media Network. *Guide to Films on Apartheid and the Southern African Region*. New York: Media Network, 1985, 12pp., \$2.50.
- Moorsom, Richard. *Wolvis Bay: Namibia's Port*. London: International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa in cooperation with the UN Council for Namibia, 1984, 88pp.
- North, James. *Freedom Rising*. New York: MacMillan Publishing Co., 1985, 336 pp., \$19.95.
- Richards, Paul. *Indigenous Agricultural Revolution: Ecology and Food Production in West Africa*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985, 171pp., \$22.50.
- Taiwo, Oladele. *Female Novelists of Modern Africa*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985, 219pp., \$22.50.
- Ugboajah, Frank Okwu (ed.). *Mass Communication, Culture and Society in West Africa*. New York: K.G. Saur Inc., 1985, 329pp., \$36.00.
- Wills, A.J. *An Introduction to the History of Central Africa: Zambia, Malawi, and Zimbabwe* (fourth edition). New York: Oxford University Press, 1985, 487pp., \$36.00 cloth, \$17.95 paper.

After the Decade

National machineries for the advancement of women have been one of the concrete achievements of the UN Decade for Women. While the Decade ended officially with July's Nairobi conference, the national structures set up under its aegis must be strengthened if the status of African women is to be enhanced in the coming years.

BY JILL RIZIKA

When the final conference of the United Nations Decade for Women came to a close, it was heralded as a hard-earned victory for the international women's movement whose very existence was viewed with skepticism until the meeting's final moments. Describing the meeting as a resounding success, Dr. Julia Ojiambo, leader of the delegation from Kenya, the host country, said: "This was a victory for women of the world, not of any particular delegation at all. It was a clear fact of this conference that governments have realized that for their own development and political stability, they must take women's concerns seriously."

A decade ago, women were able to convince the United Nations that their concerns should be taken seriously. 1975 was proclaimed International Women's Year, followed by the General Assembly's declaration of 1976-1985 as the UN Decade for Women.

The United Nations has played an active role throughout the decade in raising awareness of the essential contributions women make to society and in drawing a more realistic portrait of their lifestyle through new research. It has

established two new agencies within its own system to assist women: the UN Development Fund for Women (formerly the UN Voluntary Fund for Women), which provides financial and technical assistance to women's projects with particular emphasis on those benefiting rural and urban poor women; and the International Institute for Research and Training for the Advancement of Women (INSTRAW), which works to strengthen the resources, skills, and abilities of women worldwide. In addition, special units, such as the Office of Women Workers' Questions of the International Labour Office (ILO) and the Interdivisional Working Group on Women and Development of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), have been set up in existing UN agencies to increase the flow of resources to women's projects in all sectors.

Although the UN Decade For Women is over, most women feel that it is really the end of the beginning. The Forward Looking Strategies document, adopted by consensus in Nairobi, presents an ambitious plan of action at the international, regional, and national levels through the year 2000. Now that the Decade "global machinery" operations have been dismantled, how well-prepared are governments to deal with the task before them? Have women ad-

vanced enough to take advantage of the opportunities offered them on paper? And perhaps most importantly, have attitudes changed sufficiently to allow them to do so?

At the national level, the UN has encouraged governments to establish official bodies to oversee the implementation of the Decade's goals. In 1985, 90 percent of governments represented in the UN have national machineries for women, 50 percent of which were established in the past 10 years. "The national machinery is the focal point of governmental efforts to improve the status of women; its existence is a critical institutional achievement of the Decade," according to the UN secretary-general's report on the Decade. Nine developing countries have established full-fledged ministries for women's affairs; seven are located in Africa.

While a specific agency for women's affairs may be useful in gathering data and initiating small-scale projects largely ignored by other development efforts, some argue that this approach tends to marginalize women, undermining efforts to integrate them into the mainstream development projects of other ministries. In addition, given the serious economic difficulties of many African countries, resources are extremely limited. The mandate of the women's unit is often much larger than its budget.

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Ghana: Ten Years of Experience

Ghana's National Council on Women and Development (NCWD) was established in 1975, shortly before the first World Conference on Women held in Mexico City. The Council advises government on issues related to women in development, reviews the status of Ghanaian women, and acts as a liaison with international and national organizations working on women and development projects. Headed by a national secretariat, it has branches at the regional and district levels.

NCWD policy is guided by an advisory committee consisting of 30 members, 10 of whom represent ministries related to the Council's work in education, health, agriculture, foreign affairs, labor, and social welfare. The initial NCWD focus was the eradication of illiteracy; however, the emphasis later shifted to the support of income-generating projects. This move was prompted by feedback from rural women who were not interested in literacy for its own sake, but rather in acquiring the skills necessary to improve their living conditions. In each income-generating project, NCWD attempts to incorporate other educational skills such as home management, literacy, nutrition and child-care.

According to Grace Naatey, NCWD executive secretary, Ghanaian women have benefited from a significant flow of UN resources, including inputs from UNICEF, ILO, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), WHO, and UNESCO. The grants are usually project-specific and are administered by the Council, which plays a coordinating role—lacking the budget to initiate many projects of its own. "We focus on workshops which teach new skills or improve existing ones," she commented. As she spoke, she was preparing her opening statement for a local FAO-sponsored workshop, "Village Level Training for Promotion of Women's Activities in Marketing," co-sponsored by the NCWD and the Ministry of Agriculture. Women are a dominant force in the marketplace, responsible for 88 percent of all farm and fishing produce bought and sold in Ghana.

The fish sold by market women is usually first preserved through smok-

ing. Ghana has gained much recognition for introducing a more efficient fish-smoking technique to rural women. The technique, consisting of rectangular ovens which burn firewood more efficiently, uses wooden trays with wire mesh stacked 15 on top of each other. This allows women to smoke six times more fish over the same fire, reducing the amount of time needed to collect firewood. The NCWD displayed the technique at the "Tools and Tech" Fair, an exhibit of appropriate technologies and labor-saving devices held in Nairobi during the NGO Forum of the Decade Conference. UNICEF and the UN Development Fund are providing funds to introduce this technology to neighboring countries. The Council held a workshop in August to train a group of Togolese women.

Women's participation in liberation struggles has helped to change attitudes regarding traditional roles and to give women new confidence.

In the village of Akplanbanyo, northeast of Accra, NCWD helped organize AGALOFISO, a fishmongers society. Edith Osabutey, secretary of the society, explained the smoking technique as we walked through the village. We crossed an open space in front of a hut, where hundreds of tiny fish were spread on the ground to dry in the sun. A man on the stoop of the hut stopped us. Pointing to his wife, he asked, "Why don't you help her get some wire like the others?" The NCWD representative asked why his wife had not joined AGALOFISO. She had been away from the village for some time, and had not learned about the project yet, he replied. Osabutey explained that each woman pays membership dues to the society and in return, receives the wire mesh and help in building her oven. The society has done well and the women have used some of the profits to build the village's first latrine.

While this project can be considered a "success," its impact on the wider social setting is limited. For example, the women have little incentive to use their extra time or income to attend the village health post, as it has no regular supply of medicines. The nearest health clinic is five miles away. Traditional attitudes and lack of resources render the national policy of free and compulsory education virtually meaningless. The village school is short of paper, pencils, chalk, chairs, and books. Only 14 students out of a population of 5,000 had completed secondary school in the village. All 14 were boys. "The children get used to helping around the house and when it is time to go to school, they don't see any use for it," Osabutey pointed out. "The mothers also need to be taught the importance of school so they can influence the children."

The NCWD is one of the oldest national machineries for women in Africa and has helped establish similar structures in two other African countries. However, lack of finances inhibits it from carrying out its mandate. As a result of general government cutbacks, its budget has been reduced to cover administrative costs only. In the beginning of August, the national secretariat had no vehicles in working condition, curtailing its ability to monitor projects in the rural areas. This may be a factor in the criticism that the Council's outreach and administration is over-centralized.

Selina Opong-Ntim, who worked with the NCWD in its early days, said, "Initially the council was set up to raise awareness that women should be active in social, economic, and political affairs. Recently, there is a feeling that NCWD is not action-oriented. There is too much emphasis on studies and seminars." Although the NCWD is a governmental body with representatives from ministries on its board of advisers, she said these links were too weak to effectively influence policy.

One reason may be the lack of enthusiasm for NCWD's approach among some government officials. As governments change, so do priorities. The three-year-old Rawlings government sees raising political consciousness as a priority in the process of integrating women into the mainstream. While the NCWD is involved in lobbying to change

discriminatory legislation and educating women on their legal status, it does not see itself as a political machinery.

That is not to say the government has not been supportive of women. There are two women members of the ruling Provisional National Defense Council, one woman minister and two women deputy ministers. New legislation has indeed been passed concerning intestate succession, head of family accountability, and widowhood rights.

The task of mobilizing and raising women's political consciousness is the primary responsibility of a non-governmental organization, the 31 December Women's Movement. Nana Rawlings, president of the Movement, cited three major obstacles to women's advancement: their high illiteracy rates, traditional practices, and their heavy work burdens due to their double role as producers and keepers of the home. But

underlying each of these problems, she explained, is the need to change attitudes—men's "macho" attitudes and women's lack of confidence. While her organization's activities focus mainly on the women, she noted that men are affected as well. "When a woman leaves the home to go to meetings or to organize projects, the man eventually learns to fend for himself!"

Mozambique: After the Revolution

The Mozambican Women's Organization (OMM) has a broader political role than the NCWD as it is both the women's arm of the ruling party, FRELIMO, and the national machinery responsible for women's affairs in Mozambique. It is a grassroots organization, founded in 1973 during the struggle for independence. "The liberation of women was taken by FRELIMO as an important

part of national liberation in Mozambique," said Salome Moiane, OMM secretary-general. Thus, improving the status of women is, in theory, inextricably linked to the successful implementation of the revolution's goals. "The antagonistic contradiction is not between women and men at whose side they fought colonialism. Rather, it is between women and the system of exploitation of man by man," according to a FRELIMO document.

Women's participation in liberation struggles has helped to change attitudes regarding traditional roles and to give women new confidence. In Zimbabwe, Sally Mugabe, wife of Prime Minister Robert Mugabe, cited the role played by women during the struggle for independence as a major impetus for improving the status of women in her country. The Zimbabwean Minister of Community Development and Women's Affairs is a



Margaret A. Novicki

Market women in Burkina Faso: "Governments should recognize the positive contributions of women traders"

celebrated ex-combatant, Teurai Ropa Nhongo.

In Mozambique, however, some feel that the revolutionary momentum has slowed. According to Moiane, women "can't have real equality if they stay at home—they must get out and work." And yet, the constitution defines the family as the basic unit of society and women's role as primary caretaker for the family—concepts that for the most part remain unchallenged. While nearly

all Mozambican women work in agricultural production as well as in the home, only 3 percent are engaged in salaried employment.

When asked to outline her delegation's priorities for the Decade, Moiane cited achieving peace, first and foremost, and then increasing women's participation in decision-making. Mozambique has a relatively good track record in this regard. Of 227 members in the National People's Assembly, 12 percent

are women, all elected, and 13 of the 130 central committee members are women.

According to Gita Honwana, a judge and head of the Department of Research and Legislation in the Ministry of Justice, one-third of Mozambique's 60 legally-trained judges are women. Constitutionally, women are accorded equal rights with men, and new legislation provides two months of maternity leave and time off to breastfeed during work. Divorce procedures have also been liberalized. Honwana's department currently is working on a new family law, which will address certain traditional practices such as *lobolo*, polygamy, and inherited marriages.

Although the OMM and FRELIMO have denounced these practices, they remain the norm, particularly in rural areas. Moiane emphasized the need to change both male and female attitudes. "A woman feels she has no value without brideprice. . . marriage has many more aspects than the natural process of love and affection."

Much of the international assistance involving women and community development is channeled through the OMM. Over the past decade, the UN—through the UN Development Fund, FAO, UNESCO, and particularly UNICEF—has provided training, study grants, technical assistance, and infrastructure for a variety of projects.

Given women's primary role in food production, UNICEF and other agencies provide support to a number of agricultural cooperatives in the "Green Zones," an area surrounding Maputo, the capital. The government is encouraging intensive farming in this area to increase the city's food self-sufficiency. The Ministry of Agriculture provides technical and material support through the Cabinet of the Green Zones, which is the center for all planning, supply of goods, and marketing for the cooperatives, private, and family farms in the zone.

The cooperatives, often situated on abandoned Portuguese farms, have approximately 15,000 members—95 percent of whom are women. On a cooperative in Mahotes, the women work three to four days a week. This is one of a growing number of cooperatives that has a creche. Inside bamboo walls cov-



Margaret A. Novicki

A weaver at work: "The UN has played an active role in raising awareness of women's essential contributions to society"

ered by a corrugated roof, the children sat in disciplined silence while waiting for their morning tea. The cooperatives have received food subsidies so mothers can be sure that their children will eat a nutritious meal. Although the system is severely handicapped by shortages of trained workers and materials, it does provide a place for children during work hours other than on their mothers' backs.

"The cooperatives have brought us liberation as women, in addition to material gain," said Albertina Damau, vice-president of the General Union of Cooperatives. "We have gained more respect from our husbands and confidence to speak, lead, and organize." When asked why women predominated in the Green Zone cooperatives, she replied that most men were employed in factories in Maputo and, perhaps more importantly, that most of the workers had to begin as volunteers until the cooperatives started making a profit. Many are still unable to pay their members. Wages for women's labor is a bonus, because the attitude that men will provide the income for family needs is still pervasive.

As in all countries, women's development in Mozambique is tied to the level of development of the country as a whole. The end of the UN Decade coincided with Mozambique's first decade of independence. Ten years of fighting for independence, coupled with the harsh colonial policies of the Portuguese, left Mozambique with virtually no infrastructure or trained personnel in any sector. The illiteracy rate was 90 percent and fewer than 100 doctors served the entire country. With the country devastated by drought and then floods and the condition of the global economy worsening, the Mozambican government has been working against tremendous odds.

Development efforts are severely hampered by terrorist attacks of the Mozambican National Resistance (MNR), the South African-backed rebel group. The rebels are active in all 10 provinces, making travel outside of Maputo dangerous. In her opening statement at the UN Decade conference, Minister of Education Graça Machel cited South Africa's destabilizing actions as the major obstacle preventing Mozambique from implementing the rec-

ommendations of the Decade. "Without peace, there can be no development or equality," Moiane added. "The majority of our human and material resources are going to defend our revolution."

While FRELIMO has made tremendous strides in some areas, life has changed little in the rural villages, where 80 percent of the women live. Female illiteracy remains over 85 percent, and women's nutritional status is generally poor. Limited access to basic services increases the woman's workload. Up to 90 percent of the population has no access to a protected drinking water supply near the home.

The OMM works at the community level to mobilize women to take advantage of services. It works with the Ministry of Health to encourage women to attend pre-natal clinics and participate in vaccination campaigns. OMM workers organize talks on family planning and nutrition, and help establish and operate the creches. They also work with the Ministry of Education on literacy campaigns; with the Ministry of Agriculture on cooperatives; and with the Ministry of Justice on educating women about their legal rights. Needless to say, they are overextended. One of the greatest problems is the lack of experienced managers and trained cadres to oversee and implement their projects. "The OMM is overloaded," says Josie Schuurman, a Dutch woman working with members of the Green Zone Cooperatives in setting up creches. "They simply can't achieve everything they've been asked to do."

UNICEF is revising its approach to working with the OMM. "We do not agree that the OMM should become a technical assistance agency that duplicates the work of other agencies. We will provide institutional support to the OMM for the mobilization of women [to participate in development projects]," said Marta Mauras, UNICEF country representative to Mozambique and Swaziland.

As an arm of the party, the OMM is quick to point out that improving the status of women is not a matter of capacity but of political possibility. "We are lucky that we have it with FRELIMO," said Moiane. Mauras agrees that despite limited resources, the FRELIMO government does have the "political will" to

improve the health and well-being of women and children. But in terms of revolutionizing the traditional roles of men and women in society, the OMM is still under the wing of a predominately male party structure, as Joseph Hanlon points out in his book, *Mozambique: Revolution Under Fire*. He quotes Graça Machel: "The party thinks that because it created the OMM, it can direct it. So the OMM will have problems when it begins to threaten the privileges of men."

Botswana:

An Integrated Approach

While the Mozambican and Ghanaian organizations have existed for 10 years or more, Botswana's Women's Affairs Unit in the Ministry of Home Affairs is only four years old. Although it can learn from the experience of others, the Women's Unit faces many of the same problems as its more established sister organizations.

The Women's Affairs Unit was established in 1981 to address women's needs and problems in order to integrate them fully into the development process. It also serves as a liaison between non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the government. The unit has been involved in disseminating information on women, organizing workshops and seminars, and preparing the country report for the UN Conference. Because of its role as an advocacy group, a section specifically relating to women's concerns has been included in the country's new five-year plan.

However, with a staff of two and a limited budget, the unit is having difficulty setting priorities and fulfilling the high expectations placed on it, particularly by the NGOs. Even after two years, one senses that the unit's coordinator, Elsie Alexander, is not certain how it can be most effective. NORAD, the Norwegian international development agency, is eager to support women's projects in Botswana. "But we've been waiting for a memo from the unit on funding needs," explains A. Eik, NORAD director. "They are so short of staff, they don't even have the time to do what they need in order to get more resources," he added.

In Botswana's statement to the UN Conference, B.K. Sebele, permanent

secretary in the Ministry of Home Affairs, described the country's development priorities as rural development and employment creation. "Women constitute a large percentage of the rural population and the introduction of positive policies and programs in the rural areas. . . has benefited women and will continue to increase their participation in the development process."

The Financial Assistance Program, run by the Rural Industries Unit of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, is designed to provide low-interest capital for starting businesses and is described as "biased for women." However, other

programs, such as the Arable Lands Development Program, designed to help small-scale subsistence farmers, have not been effective in reaching rural women. While women comprise a large portion of the target population for the project, they represent only 10 percent of the program's participants. Alexander admits that rural women, particularly single heads of households, are faced with special problems on their farms. For example, cattle-raising is traditionally a male occupation. Since most plowing is still done by draft animals, female-headed households must pay men to prepare their fields. In addi-

tion, men are busy with their own fields during the prime time for plowing, which delays the planting of women's fields.


"The major obstacle to the integration of women is the cultural/social system," asserts Alexander. Thus, changing attitudes is the unit's primary focus. The major emphasis so far has been on women's legal status. A study titled "Women's Guide to the Law" has been published to teach women about their legal rights. The unit would like to publish a simpler, condensed version in Setswana for dissemination in rural areas.

While women's legal rights have received a great deal of attention, the government has not ratified the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. "Ratification which is not immediately followed by action, strictly in compliance with it, is meaningless," explained Sebele. Since a large percentage of the population is traditional and therefore not receptive to rapid change, there is little chance of compliance.

Despite this cautious approach, the government has taken a positive step within its own cabinet by naming a woman as minister of foreign affairs, a ministry usually inaccessible to women. G.K.T. Chiepe, the country's first woman cabinet minister, speaks approvingly of the government's integrationist approach and warns against focusing too much on women. In an interview published in the March-April issue of *Africa Report*, she noted "If there is an over-concentration on projects specifically for women, they may be left out of other very important national issues and that would be a pity."

Like Ghana's NCWD, the unit has established an intergovernmental advisory group, the Women's Development and Planning Committee (WODPLAC). Each member represents a department in a ministry—such as the Renewable Energy Project, the Family Health Division, or the Rural Sociology Unit—that doesn't have "women" in its title, but that addresses areas in which women play a major role. Through WODPLAC, the unit hopes to encourage the ministries to consider the special needs of women in designing their projects. The

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best method of addressing these needs is still being studied.

Nana Kgosiditsi, a young woman from the Family Health Division, opposes the proposal that all health education programs should be directed toward women because of the role they play in providing health care. She argued that this would isolate men and reinforce women's traditional role of bearing all responsibility for family health care. "The men must be educated about health care, so they can take on some of the responsibility," she said. However, without changes in cultural attitudes, programs directed at men may never benefit the rest of the family.

It is true that if a woman were relieved of some of her domestic responsibilities, she would have more time to get involved in mainstream activities. The UN State of the World's Women Report 1985 suggests that the fundamental obstacle to the advancement of women is that "a woman's domestic role as wife and mother—which is vital to the well-being of society and which consumes around half of her time and energy—is unpaid and undervalued."

But in 10 years, women's domestic role, especially in the rural areas, has changed little. Over the past decade, the world, including governments, donors, and husbands, has been made more aware of what "women's work" entails. But the second step—a fairer distribution of those responsibilities between men and women—has yet to occur on a large scale. Instead, women are being asked to take on additional responsibilities—in the community, in the marketplace, and even in the home.

According to the report, "The scales of world equality are out of balance. The side marked 'woman' is weighed down with responsibility, while the side marked 'man' rides high with power." The Forward Looking Strategies document contains recommendations for equalizing the burden. Included are the following recommendations:

- marriage agreements should be based on mutual understanding, respect, and freedom of choice—careful attention should be paid to equal participation and valuation of both partners so that the value of housework is considered equivalent to financial contributions;
- wage differentials between women

and men performing work of equal value should be eliminated;

- governments should recognize the positive contributions of women traders and should design innovative mechanisms to provide them with access to credit;
- special remedial measures to relieve the burden placed on women by the task of fetching water should be applied and more women should be trained to take responsibility for the management and maintenance of hydraulic infrastructures and equipment.

As with any other UN document, there is no obligation for governments to enforce the recommendations approved at the conference. In fact, expectations were low among many of the conference participants that the strategies would be implemented. Yet the document, strengthened by its unanimous adoption, serves an important purpose. "It can be used as a yardstick to measure progress," explained Dr. Ojiambo. "It gives women a mandate to push the government to address their concerns."

And the message from Nairobi is that women will have to continue to push, not only their governments but each other. In the country reports presented to the main plenary, heads of state and leaders of delegations from all over the world described the achievements of

the Decade, tacking on various structures, laws, and institutions that had been created, changed, or made accessible to the women of their countries.

Despite the differing priorities and approaches, there was a consistent theme. Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi expressed it well: "While governments are obliged to take the necessary measures to promote the advancement of women, the onus remains on the women themselves to unite and take full advantage of the opportunities so created." Sally Mugabe, leader of the Zimbabwean delegation, cited the establishment of the Ministry of Community Development and Women's Affairs and the passage of the Legal Age of Majority Act as major steps her government has taken in support of the Decade goals. But she echoed Moi by saying, "It is now left to the women to use these opportunities to accelerate their involvement [in the development process]."

Beatrice Damiba, a high commissioner from the Bazega district of Burkina Faso and a participant in the NGO Forum, was already pushing. While she praised her government's support for the advancement of women, she encouraged the Burkinabe woman to speak up for herself. "Because if she doesn't do it, nobody will speak up for her. It is up to the women to fight and liberate themselves." □



Forum '85 draws to a close: "Although the UN Decade For Women is over, most women feel that it is really the end of the beginning!"

Toward Constructive Disengagement?

Although the Reagan administration remains officially committed to "constructive engagement," congressional initiatives and events within South Africa have altered the dynamics of American policy, auguring an erosion of U.S. influence in the region.

BY ROBERT A. MANNING

A new U.S. policy toward southern Africa appears to be emerging, due to a combination of obstinate behavior by South Africa and unprecedented popular and congressional initiative. The defiant major policy speech by South African President P. W. Botha on August 14 ruling out any major changes in the structures of apartheid underscored the limits of change on the horizon and crystallized the issue on all sides.

Officially, the Reagan administration maintains that it has not abandoned its policy of friendly persuasion. In early August, when asked if he would continue with "constructive engagement," President Reagan said, "I believe that the results that we've had on this constructive engagement with South Africa justify our continuing on this score." But South Africa's actions in recent months—the aborted commando attack on Gulf Oil Corporation installations in Angola, the raid into Botswana, the appointment of an interim regime in Namibia, and the growing cycle of violence and repression inside South Africa—have dramatically altered the political

dynamic in the region. As Pretoria has adopted a unilateralist approach, discarding any semblance of cooperation, the American Congress has seized the initiative, rebuffing the administration in ways that reflect two disparate aspects of a new mood on foreign policy.

Most dramatic has been the consensus reached by both houses of Congress to adopt sanctions against South Africa in the Anti-Apartheid Act of 1985. At the same time, however, the repeal of the 9-year-old Clark Amendment and the rejection of an administration request for aid to Mozambique underscore a new militant, anti-Communist sentiment. These moves by Congress have begun to alter the course of U.S. diplomacy in southern Africa, leading the administration to distance itself from the apartheid regime and stalemating U.S.-led negotiations on Namibia.

The genesis of the unprecedented anti-South Africa consensus over the past year is in large part a response to developments in the region prior to events which have unfolded in southern Africa since last March. Pretoria had displayed an ambiguity with regard to both the Namibia talks and internal reform. While negotiating with Angola—with the U.S. as intermediary—on a package deal that sought the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola in tandem

with independence for Namibia and a South African withdrawal from the territory, Pretoria continued its occupation of southern Angola. South Africa also continued to cultivate internal parties in Namibia. At home, modest reforms such as the new constitution and the abolition of interracial sex laws were combined with repression in the face of growing black unrest.

Retreat to the Laager

The wave of violence which began in September last year and continued intermittently until a state of emergency was declared seems to have precipitated a different posture on the part of the South African government. "The Botha government appears to have made a major decision sometime between last November and March," says a State Department official. "We began to see a change in attitude. They misjudged what the black reaction would be to the new constitution. The continued recession, the anti-South Africa movement here, and the onset of endemic, random violence were also factors."

The first in a sequence of events demonstrating its new go-it-alone stance was South Africa's aborted covert attack against Gulf Oil installations in Angola's northernmost province of Cabinda in late May. The unprecedented

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move, say U.S. officials, came as a complete shock and contravened the Lusaka accord signed last year, in which Pretoria had pledged to withdraw its troops from southern Angola in exchange for Angola's curbing of SWAPO guerrilla activities. The commando raid came shortly before South African and Angolan foreign ministers were to meet to discuss a new U.S. compromise proposal on Namibia which the U.S. had delivered in March. The meeting was cancelled. The Cabinda raid quashed whatever trust had been built by U.S. negotiating efforts and was a definitive move away from regional détente. "Cabinda," said a U.S. official, "was a statement that they [South Africa] want to get rid of the MPLA regime in Luanda."

Several weeks later, South Africa conducted a cross-border raid into Botswana's capital of Gaborone against alleged safe houses of African National Congress (ANC) guerrillas. That action led the Reagan administration to recall U.S. Ambassador to South Africa Herbert Nickel in protest. Within days of the Gaborone raid, South Africa made another bold move, appointing an interim regime in Namibia with increased local authority.

Along with continued violence within South Africa, these steps demonstrated a new confrontational mood which reached its apogee in July when the Botha regime declared a state of emergency. Some 2,000 black South Africans have been arrested. The administration responded by calling on Pretoria to end the state of emergency. After an hour-long National Security Council (NSC) meeting presided over by President Reagan, the White House issued a statement which said that apartheid "is a basic cause of the violence South Africa is witnessing today."

Pretoria's posture was most dramatically spelled out in Botha's August speech, which he called his "manifesto." Bombastically proclaiming that "we have never given in to outside demands and we are not going to do so," Botha ruled out one-man, one-vote. In addition, he ruled out the creation of a fourth chamber of parliament for blacks and the possible release of ANC leader Nelson Mandela. Instead, Botha put forth a vague "co-responsibility of participation" for blacks in urban areas and an

offer to negotiate with "leaders from the national states [homelands]."

U.S. Response

While taking a tougher stance on the situation in South Africa, the NSC meeting and subsequent statements by administration officials have reaffirmed the policy of constructive engagement. U.S. officials said that no major review of the policy was planned. But the tough statement on apartheid, along with actions such as the withdrawal of Ambassador Nickel and the refusal to accept the credentials of South African Ambassador-designate to the U.S. Herbert Beukes, reflect at least a tactical retreat from constructive engagement.

**"Bombastically
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Botha ruled out
one-man, one vote."**

After two months of non-recognition, Pretoria withdrew Beukes from Washington, another sign of the subtle war of nerves.

In the aftermath of Botha's speech, the administration again reaffirmed its commitment to constructive engagement. Privately, senior officials expressed disappointment with the limited reforms outlined by Botha. In an unprecedented meeting prior to the speech between South African Foreign Minister Pik Botha and a top-level U.S. delegation led by National Security Council adviser Robert C. McFarlane, the administration was given the impression that more fundamental reforms would be forthcoming.

However, the administration praised the modest reforms offered by Botha, downplaying the combative tone of the speech. Assistant Secretary of State Chester Crocker said the Botha speech was important "in that it discusses some issues that are at the core of the problem of apartheid." He added that the speech was "but an element in an ongoing process." Along with his cautiously optimistic assessment of Botha's

speech, Crocker repeated U.S. opposition to disengagement and explained, "It won't be effective to walk away and sever our contact. We don't intend to do so."

Congressional resolve was not weakened by Botha's speech. A number of conservative Republicans, such as Rep. Mark Siljander (R-MI), said: "This doesn't give us the ammunition to back a veto." Nancy Landon Kassebaum (R-KS), chairman of the Senate Africa Subcommittee, said Botha presented "vital issues in a very unclear manner. . . I fear it will only add fuel to the fire."

South Africa's policies in the region have been marginal to the congressional moves to adopt sanctions. Rather, the continued sporadic violence which has left more than 500 dead over the past year has fueled the anti-South Africa movement. Since last November, there have been daily demonstrations in front of the South African embassy in Washington resulting in 3,000 arrests, including many prominent personalities and 22 congressmen. In addition, the divestment movement continues to mushroom in more than six states, 22 cities, and dozens of university campuses.

Congressional action appears to be little more than the recognition that apartheid has become a popular national issue. Newt Gingrich (R-GA), one of a bloc of younger neo-conservatives who have endorsed sanctions, said recently: "Apartheid has become a permanent issue for the foreseeable future in this culture. It has replaced civil rights as the key vote on racial issues."

Congressional Initiatives

On the eve of its August recess, the House and Senate worked out the differences between their respective versions of anti-apartheid legislation, reaching a compromise on a modest program of sanctions. Both bills had passed overwhelmingly—by 295-127 in the House and 80-12 in the Senate. The key trade-off made by the conferees was Senate adoption of the House ban on the sale of kruggerand gold coins in exchange for the House deferral of a proposed ban on new investment.

The package of anti-apartheid measures includes:

- a ban on new bank loans to the South

African government and government-owned or controlled corporations.

- a ban on the import of krugerrands, which could be waived by President Reagan if he determines that at least one of eight conditions for progress are met and Congress enacts a joint resolution approving that determination. It also mandates the U.S. to mint gold bullion coins to substitute for the sale of krugerrands.

- a ban on the export of computers, software, or other technology to service computers used by the South African military, police, prisons, national security agencies, ARMSCOR or its subsidiaries, or any other entity which implements restrictions on non-whites.

- a ban on licenses for the export of goods or technology used in nuclear production facilities, for the export of component parts or substances used for nuclear explosive purposes, and on the transfer of nuclear goods or technology to South Africa. The nuclear ban may be waived if the secretary of state certifies that South Africa has signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

- mandatory compliance with the Sullivan Principles on fair employment practices.

Further, the president must submit an annual report to Congress on progress toward ending apartheid. If insignificant progress has been made, after 12 months the president must recommend additional sanctions—a ban on new private investment, denial of most favored nation trade status, or other measures. The president is also required to negotiate multilateral sanctions with U.S. allies and submit a report to the Congress on the progress of such talks.

The conditions for progress are defined in the bill as: eliminating restrictions based on race, eliminating forced removal of the black population, entering into meaningful negotiations with representative leaders of the black population, achieving an internationally acceptable settlement in Namibia, and freeing all political prisoners. The bill also includes contributions for South African blacks, such as a \$35 million three-year program through fiscal year 1988 to provide scholarships and an annual \$1.5 million fund to provide assistance for human rights activity, 20 percent of

which is reserved for the legal defense of political detainees.

The final bill puts Congress on record in opposition to apartheid. Representative Stephen Solarz (D-NY) described the legislation as representing "a new congressional consensus that the only way to bring about change in South Africa is through the application of pressure." If President Reagan signs the bill, it would represent the toughest policy statement with regard to South Africa.

"In light of economic sanctions adopted against Nicaragua, vetoing sanctions against South Africa would be politically inconsistent."

since apartheid was instituted in 1948. Senate Foreign Relations Chairman Richard Lugar (R-IN) praised the bill as "designed to aid an ailing country. It is also a bill that speaks a great deal about our compassion for blacks in South Africa. . . this is a bill that preserves the right to invest."

The bipartisan congressional mood on this issue was reflected in the 380-48 vote. Many House Republicans who had opposed the original House bill supported the final compromise. A group of 30 House conservatives who switched their votes—including Newt Gingrich—wrote a letter to Reagan urging him to sign the bill. "The persistent and escalating violence in South Africa requires our country to respond immediately to this crisis," the letter said.

The bill did not gain final approval in the Senate before Congress recessed on August 2nd. After a group of eight conservatives led by Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC) threatened to filibuster, Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole (R-KS) limited the debate to two days and tabled the bill. However, the Senate should pass it in September and it should land on President Reagan's desk by the end of the month. White House officials

have sent out mixed signals as to whether or not Reagan will veto the bill.

But with 22 Republican senators up for re-election next year and with sufficient votes in both houses to override a veto, the president may have to reconsider his opposition to sanctions. At an August 5th news conference, he refused to reveal his hand. While the president said, "Some of the things in that legislation could be helpful," he also defended his policy of constructive engagement, arguing that "continuation of our present program, I think, is the best way that we can be of help to the black citizens of South Africa."

In light of economic sanctions adopted against Nicaragua—another country whose policies Reagan finds repugnant and whose behavior toward its neighbors the U.S. also considers destabilizing—vetoing sanctions against South Africa would be politically inconsistent. Moreover, the measures proposed by Congress are actually several steps short of the posture already adopted by the U.S. business community and the divestment movement.

The protracted recession and political instability in South Africa, plus the negative reaction in the U.S. to doing business in South Africa, have created a business climate where modest divestment is the norm. Since 1983, 16 American firms have ceased operations in South Africa. Pan Am has suspended flights to South Africa; Ford and Coca-Cola have reduced their interests in South African companies to less than 50 percent.

A number of major American banks including Citibank and Morgan Guaranty Trust have adopted policies of not making bank loans to the public sector in South Africa. Earlier this year, the American Banking Association passed a resolution recommending that banks not lend to any South African government body. In early August, Chase Manhattan, the third largest U.S. bank, adopted even tougher policies, ceasing loans to private firms operating in South Africa. A number of other major banks are reviewing their policies and may adopt similar measures. Close to 50 universities have sold holdings in firms that do business in South Africa as well. And krugerrand sales in the U.S., which last year totalled \$685 million, are projected

to drop by more than two-thirds this year.

Challenges to Regional Policy

Congress' challenge to the administration's Africa policy is not confined to South Africa, however. Maintaining that the constructive engagement policy applies to all of southern Africa, the administration improved ties with Angola and Mozambique, while playing a key broker role in fostering the fragile regional détente embodied by the Lusaka agreement and the Nkomati Accord between South Africa and Mozambique. The repeal of the Clark Amendment, which had banned CIA aid to anti-government guerrillas in Angola, and the rejection of an administration request for \$1.5 million in military aid to Mozambique reflect another bipartisan current in Congress—militant anti-communism and support for "anti-Soviet" guerrillas in the Third World.

"Congress," said a congressional staffer referring to the smash box office hit, "is in a Rambo mood. They want to get tough everywhere." The Clark Amendment, which ended CIA covert involvement in the Angolan civil war in 1976, had been a symbol of congressional reaction to the Vietnam war and signalled a reluctance to intervene in the Third World. Both the Carter and Reagan administrations opposed the legislation as a congressional check on executive authority.

Overturing the Clark Amendment had been a *cause célèbre* for conservatives. Samuel Stratton (D-NY), who sponsored the move in the House said, "We are providing help to those who are fighting the forces of communism in every area of the world. . . even Cambodia," so why not Angola? Barely a month before the House joined with the Senate to repeal the amendment, Lewis Lehrman, former gubernatorial candidate in New York and head of the conservative lobby group, Citizens for America, had sponsored a meeting in the Unita-held area of southern Angola to forge a unity pact between anti-Soviet rebels from Nicaragua, Afghanistan, Laos, and Angola. President Reagan sent Lehrman a letter expressing support for the meeting, a move which would seem to undermine U.S. claims of being an honest broker.

A State Department official said that Reagan's letter did not jeopardize U.S. mediation efforts "because national reconciliation has never been part of the Namibia package." State Department officials say the U.S. has "no plans" to provide any aid to Jonas Savimbi, the Unita leader. But U.S. officials fear that Congress may take the initiative and propose aid, as was the case with regard to Cambodia. U.S. officials say such a move would be the nail in the coffin of the U.S. dialogue with Angola and would push the government, which received \$850 million in Soviet military hardware last year according to U.S. officials, even closer to the USSR and Cuba.

The day after the House repealed the Clark Amendment, however, the Angolan government announced it was breaking off talks with the Reagan administration on Namibia, and denounced the Congress' action as part of a U.S. and South African effort to "destabilize the legitimate governments of southern Africa." A State Department official said that "the door is still not closed" to dialogue with Angola. But combined with South Africa's belligerence, the repeal of the Clark Amendment appears to mark the demise of any good faith the U.S. had built up with Angola over the past four-and-a-half years.

Similarly, congressional action with regard to Mozambique casts a pale over what have been successful U.S. efforts to boost ties with that nation. Mozambique had implemented a series of economic reforms over the past several years which had caught the eye of U.S. policy-makers. Last year, the Reagan administration restored ambassadorial-level ties with Mozambique. American businesses have shown a new interest in investing there, as underscored by the June visit of an American business delegation to Maputo led by former Defense Secretary Melvin Laird. In an effort to reduce Mozambican dependence on Soviet and Cuban military aid, the administration sought a modest military training program. The move outraged hardline conservatives who demanded the ouster of AID administrator Peter McPherson.

A successful effort to block the requested aid was led by Jesse Helms, who sponsored an amendment banning military aid until a number of unlikely

conditions have been met. To be eligible to receive U.S. military aid, the president must certify that Mozambique has reduced the number of foreign military advisers to no more than 55, is respecting human rights, holds internationally supervised free elections by September 30, 1986, and eliminates all restrictions on opposition political parties. In addition, the new foreign aid bill calls for all economic support fund (ESF) money and development aid to be used for the private sector "to the maximum extent practicable."

Taken together, congressional activism appears to be transforming U.S. policy toward southern Africa. The emerging posture bodes an erosion of U.S. influence in the region. Recently concluded CIA and State Department intelligence studies conclude that South Africa will be less likely to pursue détente with Angola and Mozambique and will be more confrontational at home. Such realities suggest that however the administration labels its policy toward the region, in practice it is likely to be a policy of constructive disengagement. □

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