

AFRICA REPORT

MARCH 1976 FOUR COLLS

THE MANDELAS:
A PERSONAL VIEW
BY ANDREW YOUNG



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SOUTH AFRICA
The Year of the Amabulu



Sarah Breedlove was born to ex-slaves on a Louisiana farm in 1867. Orphaned at 7 and widowed at 20, this remarkable woman turned misfortune into success. Sarah became known as Madame C. J. Walker, legendary hair care business innovator and first Black woman millionaire. One day after Sarah discovered she was rapidly losing her hair, she prepared a secret remedy that not only cured her problems, but also gained immediate popularity. Madame Walker later designed more products for Black women's distinctive hair needs, including metal straightening combs. In 1910

MADAME C.J. WALKER

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
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The Year of the Amabuthu

With the youth's angry protests against apartheid being met by the harsh reprisals of the South African military, the conflict over the last year has become known as the "children's war." Are the country's youth mortgaging their future by forming the front line in the battle to liberate South Africa?

BY TOM LODGE
and MARK SWILLING

They call themselves the young lions, the comrades, the guerrillas, the soldiers, the Amabuthu—the Xhosa word for the warriors who resisted the settler invasion during the frontier wars of the 19th century. Their photographs appear almost daily in the press: ragged children clutching wooden models of AK-47s; kids playing "chicken" around a tear gas canister in one of the dusty battle zones of the townships; the halting orators, their voices as yet unbroken, signaling their readiness for death. They are known universally as "the youth," the legion of black teenagers who for the last two years have provided the shock troops of a nation-wide popular insurrection.

This has been a children's war. The youngest casualty is two-month-old Trocia Ndlovu, asphyxiated by tear gas when police attacked her home in Mamelodi, outside Pretoria, last December. Three months earlier in Soweto, police officers were claiming that ten-year-olds were joining the front lines in the street battles. That month they arrested 746 "scholars"—the entire en-

rollment of Hlengime high school—and held them in Diepkloof Prison. Of the 12 political detainees who died in police cells in 1985, three were age 16 or under and another four were not yet 21 years old.

Statistics do not yet reveal precisely how many of the 879 people killed in the 1985 unrest were children, but it seems likely that they number over half. Of the thousands detained under emergency regulations since July last year, 26 percent were under 18 and 61 percent were under 25 years of age. A 10-year-old boy, Fanie Godoka, was held for two months and children as young as seven have been arrested by the security forces. Some children claim to have been tortured by beatings, humiliations, and even electric shocks. The United Nations proclaimed 1985 as International Youth Year; in South Africa, soldiers and policemen celebrated it with a vengeance.

What has brought the children onto the streets? Demography is one reason. Half of South Africa's black population is under 21. The 6 million black children at school (or boycotting it) represent 24 percent of the population. Economics has also played a major role. Urban unemployment has reached 75 percent in small country towns, but even in the main industrial centers there are few

jobs for the ever-expanding flow of school leavers. Black unemployment in most regional centers seldom dips below 20 percent and is especially acute in the Eastern Cape where the recession has hit hardest. The latest unemployment figure for the Port Elizabeth region is 56 percent.

It is perhaps no surprise then, that Port Elizabeth, with 140 people killed in political violence in 1985, leads the township death toll. But not all young combatants have been drawn from the despairing casualties of South Africa's stalled industrial economy. In Cape Town, some of the fiercest fighting was in the Coloured suburbs of Athlone and Mitchell's Plain, where the middle class children of skilled artisans and clerical workers displayed the same ferocious street wisdom as their brothers and sisters in arms in the Eastern Cape shanty settlements.

For in the last 10 years, black South Africa has experienced a cultural revolution, a metamorphosis in values and conventions of the profoundest type. It is perhaps most evident in people's behavior at funerals, for on these occasions, the customary deference of the young to the old has been overturned. Time was when funerals commemorated the lives and achievements of the departed with solemn and timeworn rit-

Tom Lodge and Mark Swilling are lecturers in political studies at the University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa.

ual—speeches from peers, black suits, floral tributes, a hearse for those who could afford it, and almost universally, an elaborate religious litany.

Now things are different. Funerals are a time for looking forward, not back. The young predominate among the speech-makers, the time allocated to family grief and religious consolation is severely rationed, and the coffin is no longer borne away in a creaking Cadillac, but carried instead on the shoulders of young mourners wearing the bright tee-shirts of youth congresses, civic associations, and the African National Congress.

Since the Soweto uprising, when a classroom rebellion broke the intimidated silence of the older generation, young people have experienced an unprecedented moral ascendancy within the black communities of South Africa. "*Singa magwala*," wrote Aggrey Klaaste in *Weekend World* in October 1976. "We are not cowards." Today the shame and awe among the parent generation has lessened. It has been replaced with pride—and a bitter anger for the men in uniform who shoot their children outside their homes. On the first day of the fighting in Cape Town's Athlone during November last year, the parents were shouting at their children to get off the streets. By the second day, they were hauling out old tires and passing petrol to the student combatants.

None of the problems which underlay the Soweto uprising have since been alleviated by any actions of the authorities. Despite additional expenditure, classroom conditions remain appalling: overcrowding, unqualified teachers, venal and insensitive administrators, sexual harassment, material shortages, and at the end of it all, only the slenderest prospect of non-manual employment.

In the wake of the events of 1976, schools throughout the nation were rapidly politicized, and during the 1980s, increasingly well-organized. When the United Democratic Front (UDF) was launched in August 1983, its constituency was largely youthful, with a major proportion of its affiliates being school or church-based youth organizations, especially the swiftly expanding Congress of South African Students (COSAS).

But the revolt today does not draw its participants exclusively from the ranks of school children. The Amabuthu of the Eastern Cape—mainly boys between 12 and 16 years old—have had at best only a few years of primary schooling. They are unemployed, virtually illiterate, the offspring of broken or scattered families, living in packs 100 or 200-strong in what they call "bases" on the fringes of the poorer squatter camps.

leader, Nelson Mandela, are the liberators; but otherwise, their ideology is limited to a few basic slogans. They may not have a program, but they do have guns and grenades, some of which were captured initially from the South African Defense Force. However, if the arms caches discovered in Mdantsane in January are anything to go by, other weapons have been obtained more recently from the ANC as well.



Funeral, November 1985: "The youngest casualty is two-month-old Trocia Ndlovu, asphyxiated by tear gas when police attacked her home in Mamelodi, outside Pretoria"

They have little knowledge of the intricacies of formal political organizations. Instead, they have fashioned their own military structure. Emerging independently from other township associations, the Amabuthu declare their allegiance to the African National Congress. For them, the ANC and its imprisoned

Similar groups have emerged elsewhere in the country, for in every town the deprivations and restrictions of apartheid have produced bands of feral children. Some of the uglier excesses of last year—the "necklace" burnings of alleged collaborators and informers, for example—were attributable to Amabu-



P. Magubane/United Nations

Crossroads, South Africa: "Classroom conditions remain appalling. . . and at the end of it all, only the slenderest prospect for non-manual employment"

thu and their kind, products of a brutal and pitiless social environment, who behave accordingly.

The school movement is more articulate. The young leaders from COSAS and other student organizations can quote the Freedom Charter verbatim

and often demonstrate a sophisticated understanding of its clauses. Their advocacy of socialism may be informed by a concept of class struggle, as well as by an awareness of the outside world. Their iconography will include not only Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu, and

Govan Mbeki, but also Julius Nyerere, Samora Machel, Karl Marx, and even Vladimir Lenin. Unlike the Amabuthu, they will be consciously non-racist; for them the enemy is "the bourgeoisie," not just the "the Boer," and the student leaders will often have had a degree of contact with white "progressive" groups and individuals.

The other section of the organized youth movement is provided by the youth congresses, which began to be established after COSAS resolved in May 1982 to organize the youth excluded from schools by the age limit restrictions and barred from the job market by the recession. Twenty youth congresses were formed in less than a year, the most prominent being the Cape Youth Congress, the Port Elizabeth Youth Congress, and the Soweto Youth Congress. Since then, they have proliferated, the network today embracing even the smallest towns.

Their leadership tends to come from the ranks of former COSAS activists, with a sprinkling of veterans from 1976 who have either resurfaced or come out of jail. Young retrenched workers, sometimes with trade union experience, have provided another source of leadership. In the Eastern Cape, the youth congresses, together with women's organizations, provided the organizational backbone of the dramatically successful consumer boycotts.

Obviously, the youth revolt of South Africa's black townships is not a homogeneous movement, containing within it different social groupings and at least latent ideological variations. The question then arises to what extent "the youth" are susceptible to centralized leadership and what likelihood there is of young people forming a movement which could outflank and challenge the authority of the older political organizations.

Despite their loyalty to the ANC, the Amabuthu, obviously, are groups who might find it difficult to accept direction from the older generation of worker and middle class politicians who prevail in local affiliates of the UDF. Certainly during the consumer boycotts in 1985, there were indications that the teenagers manning the roadblocks which controlled the flow of commuters into the

townships after work acted as a law unto themselves, forcing women to drink cooking oil, shaving the heads of people with permanent waves, and destroying goods. In the Eastern Cape, community leaders have tried to disassociate themselves from the necklace burnings and there have been allegations that some of these savage executions were prompted by *agents provocateurs* working on the emotions of the wilder kids.

Then, at the beginning of this year, there was a sizeable minority who opposed the return to school called for by the relatively conservative Soweto Parents' Crisis Committee (SPCC), despite the endorsement of the latter's appeal by the ANC. By no means were all school children willing to reverse the terms of their 1985 battle cry, "Liberation now, education later." On the other hand, though, the majority of schools are functioning again, and the Amabuthu and similar groups in the Transvaal have to an extent been absorbed into the process of organizational reconstruction which has proceeded in reaction to the restrictions of the emergency.

In the Eastern Cape and more recently in Soweto, the civic associations have established street committees. Where these have taken hold, the Amabuthu have been enlisted as militias, each under the authority of a marshal who is usually a civic activist. Among other functions, they are used in controlling petty crime. Last year, the ANC began calling for the formation of youthful crime prevention units as one of the initial stages toward the establishment of an alternative popular government in the townships.

The elements of a new type of social order are beginning to be apparent, one whose spirit is essentially egalitarian rather than hierarchical. As the Reverend Molefe Tsele of the SPCC has pointed out, 1985 brought home a lesson to community leaders: "The youth are a joint and equal partner in all processes of community life. They emerged as a group not to be talked about, but to be talked to."

Today the loyalties of the youth are pure and simple: The youngsters are the frontline cadres in an army of freedom, led by Oliver Tambo in Lusaka and Nelson Mandela in Pollsmoor prison.

How the youth will respond if the fighting ever stops and the talking ever begins may not be such a simple question to answer.

South Africa's black teenagers have the least to gain from any concessions to white security and privilege. But unless the country's agonizing conflicts are to endure indefinitely, negotiation of one

form or another must occur. The more the revolutionaries have to depend on the reckless heroism of this lost generation of children, the less they will be able to offer their opponents at the negotiation table. For the comrades, the guerrillas, and the Amabuthu are sacrificing themselves for a different world, not the same one in different colors. □



"They are known universally as 'the youth,' the legion of black teenagers who for the last two years have provided the shock troops of a nation-wide popular insurrection"

Alan Iannenbaum/Sygm

“Liberation Now, Education Later?”

Student protest over the last year has become part of the wider struggle, as distinct from the 1976 Soweto uprising when the youth formed the vanguard of organized political protest. With the formation of the UDF and AZAPO, the student movement has found a broader organizational base from which to participate in the movement for freedom.

BY JAKES GERWEL

The education-based political upheavals which have become a regular feature of black South African life since 1976, when student-led political protest for the first time took on nationwide proportions, reached new dimensions in 1985. Already the year “1985” has assumed meanings and connotations over and above its literal connotation; like “1976” it has come to signify something historically marked and dramatic. References to the “crisis of 1985” have become common, indicating a popular perception of the year as in some sense extraordinary.

Since 1976, there has not been a year in which the functioning of black education—black is used here in its generic sense to include “Africans,” “Coloureds,” and “Asians”—has been trouble-free and completely uninterrupted. Schools and other educational institutions have become major loci of political protest. What primarily distinguished the 1985 student protests, however, was the intensity of political fervor and

consciousness accompanying them and the more violent nature of the conflict between protestors and state authority.

Black consciousness was the moving “theoretical” force behind the 1976 student protests. There was a certain spontaneity and naivete about ideological issues; the rationale was existential and experimental rather than strictly ideological. And because of this lack of firm ideology on the part of the actors, there was also a larger degree of theoretical unanimity, or perhaps more accurately put, less ideological debate and dissent.

Also, 1976 marked the *beginning* of open and popular black challenge to the authority of the white-controlled state. In spite of the anger and violence of the events that year, it was still tentative in its challenge, coming as it did after the decade-long void in extra-parliamentary opposition resulting from the banning of major black political organizations.

In 1985, more so than in any of the preceding years, the youth protest explicitly defined and acted itself out as part of the wider “struggle,” to use a term popularized by the student protest movement. This is partly explained by the upsurge of political movements, most notably the United Democratic

Front (UDF) and the Azanian People’s Organization (AZAPO).

Whereas in 1976, the youth movement could claim with some justification that it was playing an almost solitary role in organized political protest, since that time, the UDF and AZAPO have succeeded with significant political mobilization on a grassroots and adult level. Popular resistance has again become part of the South African political scene, providing youth with an “adult” reference point and a “movement” to fit into.

This is not, however, to suggest absorption of the student movement by any adult political organization, or even harmonious and complete concord between them and any adult movement. One feature of the student movement is its often-expressed insistence upon autonomy and the right to make decisions for itself on the course of any political action. In the future, it may in fact prove to be one of the problems of resistance politics in South Africa that the youth movement has developed a momentum of its own beyond the organized control of any adult movement—a development whose possible consequences become more profound in light of the increasingly violent nature of political protest.

State reaction to protests were sin-

Professor Jakes Gerwel is the vice-chancellor-designate of the University of Western Cape, due to be installed next year.

gularly repressive and lacking in efforts toward conciliation. 1985 may have left its most permanent mark in the collective black memory as a time of excessive coercive and militarist action against resistance politics. That youths and often very young children suffered these actions serves only to further implant this perception of the year. The state of emergency imposed in many areas of the country was merely the legal manifestation of the nature of state reaction, and in many cases became the stimulus for further protest.

The repressive nature of the state coupled with an intensified political consciousness and fervor among youth—manifested in a singular lack of awe at the might of state military and police power, as well as in a belief that dramatic change could be affected by their own political actions—led to an increasing level of political violence, as popular resistance and state domination sought to match one another in intensity.

It is in this area especially that the educational protest, so described because of the widespread involvement of school-going youth, manifests itself as a broader movement of popular resis-

tance. In these confrontations between policing authorities and protestors, educational issues are set against the entire socio-political system, with minority domination becoming the focal point.

On the strictly educational front, the protests took the form of class and school boycotts. In 1985, these boycotts were more sustained: In the Cape, from where this article is written, the boycotts were for the first time extended to examinations, with thousands of young people not taking their end-of-year examinations.

The debate over the wisdom of educational boycotts as a political tool is captured in two competing slogans which have gained currency: "Liberation now, education later" versus "Education for liberation." A third viewpoint, the traditional stance, de-politicizes education, regarding all education under any circumstances as intrinsically valuable and developmental.

The first slogan, if taken as descriptive of a particular persuasion, rests upon a widespread perception that the state is on the point of collapse and that therefore the deferral of education will not be that long-term. Those who hold

the second point of view do not necessarily dispute the likelihood of an imminent collapse of the state, but rather tend to challenge the class basis of a theory that implies that students can be the primary agents of political change. They argue that the "struggle for liberation" can be conducted simultaneously with education, which itself should be attuned to South Africa's developing political realities.

Whichever of these positions carry the day in the coming months and years, one thing is increasingly clear—what is perceived and described as an "educational crisis" is in fact a reflection of the wider societal crisis. The legitimacy of the South African government—if by legitimacy we mean consent of the governed—has reached a critical low.

Popular resistance develops a moral motor of its own, manifested in the readiness to bring sectors of the social order to a standstill. The educational sphere is one aspect of the social order that is vulnerable, given inequality between white and black education, the youthfulness of those in the educational sphere, and the disintegration of traditional "authority." □



Cape Town, September 1985: "In 1985, more so than in any of the preceding years, the youth protest explicitly defined and acted itself out as part of the wider struggle"

Organizing the Struggle:

Cyril Ramaphosa, General Secretary, National Union of Mineworkers

As leader of South Africa's largest union, Cyril Ramaphosa has played a key role in forging black trade union unity and broadening its involvement in the wider political struggle. In this interview with *Africa Report*, he argues that workers should take up leadership positions in all organizations fighting against the system.

INTERVIEW BY BARRY STREEK

Cyril Ramaphosa, 33, once chairman of the now-banned black consciousness student movement, the South African Students Organization (SASO), at the University of the North (Turfloop), has emerged as one of the most powerful figures in South Africa's non-racial trade union movement.

Not only is he the head of the country's largest trade union, the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), which less than four years since its formation has gained over 100,000 paid and about 250,000 signed-up members, but he was also a key figure in the formation of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) in December 1985.

Cosatu, the product of four years of tough and sometimes bitter negotiations, did not achieve complete black trade union unity. The Council of Unions of South Africa (Cusa) and the Azanian Confederation of Trade Unions (Azactu), which both insist on black leadership of trade unions, did not join the new grouping and have since an-

nounced their intention to form another trade union federation.

Reflecting Ramaphosa's commitment to working class unity across racial lines, NUM resigned from Cusa when it withdrew from the Cosatu negotiations. In the process, Cusa lost its most powerful affiliate, and the Cosatu strategy of forming super-unions in the major sectors of the South African economy was given a powerful boost.

Indeed, Ramaphosa was the convenor of the inaugural Cosatu congress in Durban and in a powerful opening address, he set the tone for the new trade union body. Cosatu symbolizes the end of the first phase of the growth of black trade unions in the wake of labor reforms introduced after the Wiehahn Commission report in 1979, when black unions were legally recognized for the first time in South African history. During this first phase, the new "emerging" unions concentrated on factory-floor issues, consolidating their position in the work place and establishing their base among workers.

Cosatu, however, was launched with

a much more overtly political message—and it was Ramaphosa who provided the framework. "We have recognized that working class issues are political issues," he told the 870 delegates from 32 unions at the congress. "When workers are paid their wages, it is not only an economic issue, it is a political issue. We have to make a link between economic and political issues. We all agree that the struggle on the shop floor cannot be separated from the wider political issues."

"What we are fighting for is not different from what people are fighting for in the cities. What we must ask ourselves is how Cosatu can contribute to the struggle for liberation. As unions we have a solemn duty to develop consciousness among workers of their exploitation as workers.

"As workers we have influenced the wider struggle. We have broadened the base for the wider political struggle. Our main task has been to develop worker organizations and worker leadership. Workers must play a leading role in the struggle, in the wider political events.

"We must win the confidence of the other classes of society and a strata of the ruling class. If we form alliances with progressive organizations, it must be on terms favorable to the workers.

"We must oppose the ungodly pass laws, the migrant labor system, and all the laws which divide us on grounds of race, color, or sex.

"We must meet with progressive political organizations and campaign against the emergency and the recession. Politics is not about the changing of governments. It is about eliminating poverty and unemployment. The wealth must be shared by all the people in this country. It is important for us to make our politics the politics of the oppressed people of this country," Ramaphosa said to loud applause.

It was a message which launched Cosatu—and which could well characterize trade union politics in 1986.

Ramaphosa was an untypical trade unionist when he was asked to head NUM's organizing committee in 1982. While a student, he was detained for 11 months and on his release was refused re-entry to the University of the North. He then enrolled at the University of South Africa, a correspondence university, and was detained again. After his second release, he re-registered and qualified as an attorney in 1981. By then, however, he was disillusioned with the law and began working with Cusa's legal unit, from where he was plummeted into the formidable task of organizing 500,000 black mineworkers.

Six months after NUM was formed, the Chamber of Mines, the powerful mine owners' body, recognized the union. It was the first time in 46 years that the chamber had officially recognized a black trade union for miners.

The growth of the union has been phenomenal and it has been involved in a number of strikes in the mines, a key industry which provides more than half of South Africa's exports. Its 100,000 fee-paying members voluntarily contribute their dues every month. The union will only have stop-order facilities if its application to be registered with the government is approved. Ramaphosa says there had been political objections to registration, but it has now been demonstrated that unions have not been

restricted by being registered and that there are indeed advantages for unions.

He says NUM has been growing "all the time," but admits that its weak points are the coal mines in northern Natal and the platinum mines in the Bophuthatswana homeland.

Ramaphosa has never had contact with the all-white Mineworkers Union (MWU), one of the most right-wing unions in South Africa. "They regard us as the enemy," he says. The only time he has "met" Arrie Paulus, the MWU general secretary, was on the ABC Nightline series last year—and they

were in different studios. He says that NUM does not regard white miners as the enemy and believes they share the same problems with management. "After all, they do not own the means of production."

He says quite emphatically that NUM has the power to organize a national strike and will not hesitate to do so if necessary. He believes that the union will be in a stronger position to organize a national strike in the mines by the end of 1986. "There will definitely be a national strike if migrant workers are repatriated," he said, in response to a gov-



Cyril Ramaphosa: "We should play a leadership role in organizations that champion the liberation of the people"

Barry Sireek

ernment threat to deport workers from neighboring countries if sanctions are imposed on South Africa.

NUM is not organized in the homelands or the neighboring countries, but "we are looking into this." The employment of migrant workers in the mines presents organizational problems, Ramaphosa admits.

Ramaphosa says the problems of mineworkers throughout southern Africa are the same, facing the same companies such as Lonrho and Anglo American in Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Botswana. "If the migrant workers are deported, miners throughout southern Africa will go on strike and this could cripple the economy of the region."

NUM has not taken a definitive stand on disinvestment, but supports Cosatu's position—that it welcomes all forms of pressure on South Africa.

Ramaphosa says American owner-

ship or shareholding of the mines has made no difference whatsoever to workers in South Africa's mines. Of the Sullivan Principles, he says, "They have had absolutely no effect. None whatsoever." He says that Union Carbide, a U.S.-controlled company, is "far worse" and less sympathetic to workers than the South African-controlled conglomerate, Anglo American. NUM has had dealings with Newmont, another U.S. mining company.

U.S. mineworkers, and some unions, have been "very supportive" of NUM, but his union will have nothing to do with the AFL-CIO which has played "a suspicious role in southern Africa for many years."

He believes foreign companies should leave their assets in South Africa to fulfill their stated commitment to uplifting the people, and that they should either sell their shareholdings to South African

companies or establish trusts for this purpose.

Ramaphosa says "the ultimate aim is a socialist state," and that in the end, workers should be in control of the South African economy, including its mines, but NUM was not pushing "at this stage" for foreign companies to hand over operations to the workers. But, he stresses, the goal must be increasing worker control over the mines.

In a recent interview in Johannesburg with *Africa Report*, Ramaphosa shows a determination for the trade unions to retain their independence from more political movements, such as the African National Congress and the United Democratic Front (UDF), despite their commitment to liberation, and for the experience gained in the unions—both in the practice of democracy and in learning how to engage the "enemy"—to be transferred to other organizations.

Africa Report: With the formation of Cosatu, it seems the unions are going to play a more overtly political role than in the past. Would that be a fair statement?

Ramaphosa: I don't know if one would put it that way. One should actually say that the congress is going to play a role in all issues that affect the workers. Be they issues at the workplace or in the townships, in issues that have to do with our liberation, Cosatu will be playing a role. The reasoning behind it is that we are part of the working class. Cosatu should be at the forefront of the struggle for liberation from the working class point of view.

Africa Report: At an earlier stage in the development of the black trade unions, the unions were concentrating more on labor issues.

Ramaphosa: Yes, that was the trend.

Africa Report: The formation of Cosatu symbolized that change.

Ramaphosa: Very much so.

Africa Report: Is it possible to isolate NUM's organizational priorities?

Ramaphosa: Organizationally, our priorities will be to consolidate our position, to make the union strong enough to withstand the attacks that the mining bosses may launch against us this year, and to be better prepared for the struggles that lie ahead of us—in July for instance, when the wage negotiations are due. To make sure we are strong and involved.

Africa Report: Is there evidence that management is being tougher now or is it more conciliatory?

Ramaphosa: In the mining industry, we cannot say they are being less tough. We have had an uphill battle all the time on virtually everything. We have never had it easy. And I think it's going to remain as it is. As we win victories, they become wiser and they are able to challenge us from a position of

greater wisdom. And we have to be alert at all times and be more prepared for them. Unlike in other industries where management in factories and so forth was either inexperienced or just overwhelmed by the presence of unions, we have never had such an experience in the mining industry.

Africa Report: Hasn't the recession and increasing unemployment increased management's hand by making it easier to replace unskilled workers?

Ramaphosa: It is easier to replace unskilled workers, but if there is a big general strike, I don't see how they can dismiss 500,000 workers and replace them immediately. That is just digging your own grave. You will destroy the economy in such a way that you are never really able to recover within, say a year, if you do that. In the light of the little victories we have won, such as the Marievale case, I think they are going to be a lot more cautious. Their wings are being clipped as we proceed with the little battles we fight so that when the real war comes, we too will be in a much stronger position.

Africa Report: You obviously learned a lot from last year's strike, because in the end I don't think you could describe it as a successful strike—it was half and half, wasn't it?

Ramaphosa: Yes, it was not as successful as it could have been if there were no threats of, say, arbitrary dismissals. You can commence a strike, but if the bosses still have the right to dismiss your members, then you don't have a strike anymore. But now we have established a precedent that if you are on a legal strike, you cannot just be chucked out of work as easily as all that. To us that was a victory because it prepares us better for future strikes that will take place, because we have stopped them in their tracks as far as dismissing workers who were on a legal strike. So, for us it was a worthwhile experience. We could never have had the Marievale case if we had pulled out the entire industry, because we would not have concentrated on one mine in the way we did on Marievale.

Africa Report: Is the issue of miners, particularly gold min-

ers, being entitled to go on a legal strike one of the items you are negotiating with management about?

Ramaphosa: Yes, that is one of the issues.

Africa Report: Has the state and in particular the police gotten tougher in the wake of the emergency and the formation of Cosatu?

Ramaphosa: Yes, they are worried about it. Quite a number of people are being asked what Cosatu's aims are and so forth. No action has been taken directly against any of the Cosatu people or against people associated with Cosatu. Fortunately, that is the case, but they are watching. It is still early.

Africa Report: Does it worry you though?

Ramaphosa: No, we are constantly prepared for anything they may do against us—you take it as it comes.

Africa Report: In your speech at the start of the Cosatu congress, you seemed to be saying that the working class should be controlling and playing a leadership role in the struggle. What exactly did you mean by that?

Ramaphosa: What we mean is that you have to look at the working class and maybe even try to come to a definition of 'working class.' By working class, we mean all those people who do not own the means of production. They may be working, or be unemployed or be in service organizations, like hospitals, and so forth. As far as we are concerned, they are part and parcel of the working class. Now, the organized workers should, say under the banner of Cosatu, be taking up the leadership positions in a concerted struggle to gain liberation in our country. We should be in the right places at the right time. We should get involved in all organizations, be they community organizations, student organizations, parents' organizations, that are involved in fighting against the system. We believe that the workers should take leadership positions because we would like to see a country that is going to be ruled in the interests of the workers who produce the wealth of the country.

Africa Report: This would tend to put trade unions in a very frontline position. Wouldn't that put unions in a more clear-cut leadership position than, say, unemployed people or students?

Ramaphosa: Not necessarily. Our view is that if one analyzes the organizations that exist today, you find a person is a worker in factory who is a member of a union and who acquires some leadership position in his union. He goes to the township and there is a parents' association that has been formed which is trying to make things better for their children in school. In the workplace, as a member of the union, he gets to learn the basic things about democracy and how a union operates and so forth. We would like to believe he should be able to get involved in the issues that are not only restricted to the workplace. His leadership capabilities should not only be restricted to the workplace. They should be transferred.

Africa Report: He wouldn't have any special position in the parents' body because of his union membership as such, but because of his experience he would be able to assist.

Ramaphosa: That is right. The main thrust of the whole thing is that workers who are part of the working class should play a more active role in the whole struggle for liberation in our country. Obviously, we would like to see the organized workers playing more of a leadership role in the struggle

because we are more organized. We would like to believe that because we are unions, we adhere more to the principles of democracy and worker control than most of the other organizations that exist, because we have a structure. And our structures are such that we can ensure that the will of the people is upheld at all times. We are not a populist type of organization. We are more cohesive in nature and operation, and many other organizations still lack that. Take, for instance, the UDF. It is more of a populist organization. It is not as structured and cohesive as, say for instance, a union.

Now, if people who are experienced in union affairs were able to get involved in organizations outside the workplace, we would be able to insist that there should be a structure, there should be good report-back, there should be democracy. Leadership should be accountable to the members of the

“Organizationally, our priorities will be to consolidate our position, to make the union strong enough to withstand the attacks that the mining bosses may launch against us this year.”

organization. Our belief is that the union is a unique organization. We have a very strong base, maybe even much stronger, for instance, than the ANC, which is a political party. We have a constitution which the members know and are aware of. We conduct educational seminars on things like constitutions, democracy, and so forth. So for obvious reasons, we pride ourselves on our good organization. If a union is well-organized, then the experience that the members acquire in the union should be able to be spread over to other organizations, and they should get involved in them. Hence, we say we should play a leadership role in organizations that champion the liberation of the people.

Africa Report: You are saying that the unions, because of their structure and membership, their accountability back to their members, the workers, in fact are more democratic than more populist movements such as UDF.

Ramaphosa: That's what we would say.

Africa Report: And you would hope that this democratic experience was then translated into other organizations in a far greater way. It seems to me that the populist movements have a weakness in those terms.

Ramaphosa: Yes, they do and I think it is a weakness they, too, themselves will acknowledge.

Africa Report: Is there evidence that people from the unions are taking that up?

Ramaphosa: Yes, there is.

Africa Report: It may be a fair statement to say that as a result of direct negotiations with management and sometimes the state in the workplace that there is a great deal more pragmatism among unions on specific issues than is reflected in some of the more populist slogans which come up.

Ramaphosa: Not only that, but also experience. Ordinary workers who have never even been to school are able to sit across the table with their enemy at the workplace and negotiate and reach agreements. If they don't get what they want, they are able to put pressure and use tactics to achieve what they want to get. So, there is a lot of experience-gaining on the shop floor because you learn to engage with the enemy.



John Seymour/IDAF

"The NUM has the power to organize a national strike and will not hesitate to do so if necessary"

Africa Report: In the schools crisis, for example, maybe up until the University of the Witwatersrand meeting, the level of engagement and tactical retreat hadn't really been picked up in the student and parent groups. Do you think that the union input may be to change that kind of thinking?

Ramaphosa: I wouldn't be able to say immediately that that is so. The mere fact that unions are involved in that type of activity is positive in itself.

Africa Report: What do you see as the relationship of Cosatu and NUM to the overtly political movements? Obviously, you have been talking about the struggle in broad political terms but more political movements have a different role from basic unions.

Ramaphosa: They do. Our view is that we will work and we will do what we have to do in alliance with other organizations which do not militate against the objectives which we uphold. For instance, if the UDF or any other organization which is progressive takes up an issue which we feel that we can join with them on, we will do that without any hesitation.

Africa Report: But that rather implies that if UDF takes up an issue and the unions believe it is in their interests, they will do so, but they won't necessarily follow UDF leadership on every issue.

Ramaphosa: No. We want to retain our own independence. It is very important for us to do so. And we will try to initiate issues and bring them in. And if they also take up issues we should support them on, we will. More likely than not, you will find that the issues they bring up will be issues that affect our membership and they are more likely to be brought up by ourselves.

Africa Report: The independence of the unions has been an element of conflict with the ANC. Is that still unresolved?

Ramaphosa: I wouldn't say it is still unresolved. They know our position. It was made clear to them. We explained to them that we want to retain our independence. I think the ANC recognizes Cosatu as a major force in the struggle for liberation in this country and they respect that position.

Africa Report: But they don't necessarily agree with it?

Ramaphosa: I wouldn't know whether they agree with it. I have not been involved myself in the discussions with them yet but that's the view that has been put to them.

Africa Report: What I am really getting at is that the demands of the workers for the right to be independent, in the long run, has the potential for conflict with political movements which are saying everything must fall under us.

Ramaphosa: It could.

Africa Report: I am aware that in some unions the progress toward mergers has gone quite a long way. Is it going fast enough?

Ramaphosa: Again, it's very difficult to answer that because at the executive meeting we are going to assess the progress that has been made and start making further plans for the process to move faster.

Africa Report: The mood certainly seems to be for mergers to take place. Is that broadly true for the whole country?

Ramaphosa: It should.

Africa Report: Do Chief Buthelezi's attacks on Cosatu worry you?

Ramaphosa: That doesn't worry us. I think at the end of the day workers will be able to see through a person like Gatsha Buthelezi. He is obviously not really part of the whole process to obtain liberation by progressive organizations in this country. So it does not worry us. □

Elijah Barayi

President, Congress of South African Trade Unions

In December, the biggest labor federation in South Africa's history was launched with an overtly political mandate. With his political outlook shaped by his early involvement with the ANC Youth League, Elijah Barayi describes Cosatu's goals of linking all progressive organizations in preparation for a non-racial South Africa.

INTERVIEWED BY PHILIP VAN NIEKERK

Africa Report: How did you get involved in the labor movement?

Barayi: It was immediately after the Wiehahn Commission report on the mines that we decided to form the National Union of Mineworkers [NUM]. Thus, from the outset I was a party to the formation of NUM in 1982. What really made me involved in the unions was because I was involved in the struggle, for the African National Congress, in the early 1950s. As a result, when the NUM was formed, I was very pleased. I said, now is my chance to at least stand up and show my experience. I was very active as the first vice-president.

Africa Report: Do you think your relatively few years in NUM have prepared you for the testing role of president of an organization such as Cosatu?

Barayi: I would put it this way: I have been the backbone of NUM because of my political experience. The NUM felt that as I have been involved in politics, I should be their candidate as president of Cosatu. They believed I would be a great benefit to Cosatu. It is a testing job and I am still learning the ropes. It is still early.

Africa Report: Can you describe anything about the Youth League which you were involved in during the 1940s? How would you say this has shaped your political views now?

Barayi: [Nelson] Mandela was really the backbone of the Youth League. I knew him and others who were involved in

those days. Let's put it this way: The Youth League really shaped my political awareness. While we were still young, we noticed that blacks were not treated as human beings. I said to myself that when I grew up I would go on fighting for the rights of the black man. I vowed I would fight for the rights of the



Union meeting: "The one wish we would like to see come true is for all unions to affiliate with Cosatu"

Philip Van Niekerk is a Johannesburg-based freelance journalist who has written for the Diamond Fields Advertiser, The East London Daily Dispatch, and the Rand Daily Mail.



Paul Weinberg/Alrapix

Hostel, Elandsrand gold mine, Transvaal: "Black people are the people who are digging up gold and in return they are paid peanuts"

black man for my whole life. That is how I became involved in the defiance campaign during the 1950s.

Africa Report: Tell us something about your background in the African National Congress in the 1950s.

Barayi: It was a great time then, during the defiance campaign. It was exciting to be involved in politics. You should remember that at that time we did not have a great number of political organizations. It was only the ANC. Whether one was a Zulu, Xhosa, Pedi, or any such, it was a great thing to be involved in the ANC. Then there was the split in 1959 when the PAC broke from the ANC, the mother body. That was the beginning of having a lot of political organizations in the country. I was with the ANC. I didn't break away.

Africa Report: At its inaugural conference, Cosatu made it clear that it would play a leading role in politics. How do you plan to do this in the months ahead?

Barayi: Well, the actual decision will have to come from the central committee on which policy we actually want to pursue. But you might have realized from the speeches at the launch in Durban that Cosatu will not just fold its hands. It's going to involve itself in the communities and link up with all progressive political organizations in the country. Cosatu is a federation solely for workers, but at the same time what is happening in the locations affects us all as workers. That is why we said we would surely involve ourselves in all that is happening in the communities and the locations. Cosatu is part and parcel of the liberation struggle.

Africa Report: Do you see a difference between so-called worker issues and broader political issues? If so, which is more important?

Barayi: I think Cosatu was formed to concentrate on the broader political issues. Of course, I do believe this should start from the point of view of the workers on the factory floor. Cosatu should not neglect issues such as wages and working conditions. That is where our strength comes from—democratic support on the shop floor. But Cosatu is going to involve itself politically in the struggle.

Africa Report: At the launching rally, you said that if the government did not scrap the pass laws after six months, you would start a pass burning campaign. Do you intend to carry this out?

Barayi: What I meant was that if the government does not at least abolish passes in the country, Cosatu will have to mobilize every person against them. We shall have to take action because we are sick and tired of these laws. They have gone on for long enough. We will go ahead with the campaign unless the government meets our demands and issues the same identity documents which black people must carry as for people of all other races. If the government remains adamant that black people must carry passes, we shall have no alternative but to burn the passes.

Africa Report: How do you see your relationship with other political groups on the left, such as the United Democratic Front? Does your presence not mean that they are now redundant?

Barayi: Not at all. We are specifically an organization of workers. We also have unions who are affiliated with the United Democratic Front, and who are quite free to do so. Cosatu would not like to dictate terms to other political organizations in the country. We would like to link up with those who share our aims for specific campaigns. I don't think that Cosatu as a whole will join the UDF or any other political organization. The one wish we would like to see come true is for all unions to affiliate with Cosatu. It grieves us that there are still so many different federations.

Africa Report: Two major black union federations are still out of Cosatu: the Council of Unions of South Africa [Cusa] and the Azanian Confederation of Trade Unions [Azactu]. Do you still plan to forge an alliance with them or are your differences, such as over non-racialism, irreconcilable?

Barayi: Cosatu is by far the biggest federation in the country. We have a half-million members in our affiliated unions and the support of many more. I would be very pleased if Cusa and Azactu could ultimately join forces with Cosatu. I've said on

several occasions that I'm prepared to sit down with Cusa and Azactu and sort out our differences, if there are any. We should not have many federations. We should have one big federation in the country—Cosatu, of course.

Africa Report: Your general secretary, Jay Naidoo, has already visited Harare where he met with the ANC. What is Cosatu's policy on the ANC?

Barayi: I would not like to comment on that.

Africa Report: Chief Buthelezi has strongly criticized Cosatu and claims it is a front for the ANC. What do you say to this allegation and why do you think he has displayed this hostility toward your organization?

Barayi: It is a pity that Chief Buthelezi has accused us of being a front for the ANC, and in reply we say he is a front for the Afrikaner government. He is making accusations against Cosatu because he's scared. He thinks he's supposed to be the only person who can speak on behalf of the millions of black people in this country. We as Cosatu say: No, you are wrong Chief Buthelezi. You were not democratically elected by the majority of the people in this country. He was elected by a certain clique in KwaZulu called the Zulus. So he's a self-imposed leader as far as the majority of blacks in this country is concerned.

Africa Report: Do you take seriously his threat to start a rival trade union federation against Cosatu?

Barayi: He is out of touch with reality. By starting a sweetheart federation he will be helping the bosses and dividing the workers. But I don't think he will succeed. The workers will see through him.

Africa Report: The recent sacking of 23,000 workers by Gencor at the Impala platinum mine has drawn attention to labor legislation in the homelands, where workers have fewer rights than in South Africa. At your inaugural conference, you said you would organize in the homelands regardless of hostile legislation. Do you intend to persist with this approach despite the difficulties?

Barayi: It is quite true that we would definitely try to mobilize all the black people in the homelands. We are quite aware that the homeland leaders are very scared by the unions. You take Chief Lucas Mangope who has openly stated that he does not want to see trade unions operating in Bophuthatswana. Gencor took advantage of that very block imposed by Bophuthatswana. Gencor is hiding behind the law in the homeland, but Cosatu has resolved to take action to counter them.

Africa Report: What action?

Barayi: We have compiled a list of all companies which fall under Gencor. What we're going to do is go right through South Africa and mobilize the workers in each group. We are prepared to see strikes taking place in such businesses as Sappi to put pressure on Gencor. That is the kind of strategy we are going to embark on. It will be Cosatu's first major action.

Africa Report: Both Cosatu and the National Union of Mine-workers, of which you are vice-president, have taken a strong line on disinvestment and economic sanctions. What exactly is your position on this key issue?

Barayi: This is a sore point. The Western countries say they are prepared to embark on constructive engagement with the

South African government. The question arises: Are they prepared to engage themselves constructively with the majority of the population or with the minority government? I would like to know. Above that, I do not think places such as Great Britain or America which are more than 6,000 miles away from here should liberate the black people of South Africa. We, the black people of this country, shall liberate ourselves.

Africa Report: What of the argument that sanctions will hurt black workers the most, as they will lose their jobs when companies pull out?

Barayi: I don't think it is the truth to say that when sanctions are applied to this country, it is the black people who will be hurt. Blacks have been suffering since the arrival of the Boers in this country as far back as 1652. We have massive and growing unemployment in this country, yet investment is still coming in. Where does that money go to? Why should we have big unemployment like this and be told we would suffer more if sanctions were applied? We are suffering right now while sanctions are not applied. The black man, of course, has been suffering for more than 300 years now.

Africa Report: What of the multinational companies? Do you not believe that with their codes and labor practices, they do better for workers in South Africa than local companies?

Barayi: I agree with that, partly. But this improvement happened only recently because of pressure from the black people. They just wanted to be seen to be helping the black people. But in real terms, they are helping the South African

“If the government does not at least abolish passes in the country, Cosatu will have to mobilize every person against them.”

government. It's a matter of them saying: Let us console them by doing this or that. Yet, it's very little. I don't think they're honest. There's no difference in what they pay their employees. When these companies get to South Africa, we are told in no uncertain terms they are going to pay at their rate—no more, no less.

Africa Report: The Impala sackings have to some extent made South African labor laws look good by comparison. Do you believe there has been progress in the field of labor reform since the Wiehahn report?

Barayi: Well, I would partially agree. A good example is the Marievale court case where we won the reinstatement of our members who had gone on a legal strike. South African labor laws are far better than those in the so-called bantustans.

Africa Report: In which areas is the labor dispensation still backward?

Barayi: Well, you take the mine bosses. They are still backward. They don't understand the labor laws. If workers go on strike, they must fire you like that. They still have to be educated about the difference between a legal strike and an illegal strike.

Africa Report: At the inaugural conference you said that a Cosatu government would nationalize the mines. Is that your personal view?

Barayi: That is correct. Black people are the people who are digging up gold and in return they are paid peanuts. Once we nationalize the whole industry, our belief is that everyone will reap the fruits of his sweat and toil, rather than a few individuals getting it all just for themselves from the sweat and toil of a black person.

Africa Report: Would you describe Cosatu as a socialist organization? And, if so, what model are you looking at?

Barayi: If I may express my own view, yes, Cosatu is a socialist organization. I would like to see a socialist state in South Africa. I speak of socialism as practiced by the Labor Party in England. What I mean is, first of all, this country is in a crisis because of capitalism. If we at least took the big firms, nationalized them, then the government would look after its people and the people would look after the government.

Africa Report: What sort of country would be your end goal in South Africa?

Barayi: If you read Cosatu's preamble, it contains five principles. One of them is non-racialism. I would be pleased to see South Africa run by white, green, black, yellow—it makes no difference. That is, I would be pleased to see blacks involved in the administration of the country. I favor a multi-party democracy. I don't want a one-party state. I believe that is a dictatorship of the worst kind.

Africa Report: How long can the South African government last?

Barayi: It's a difficult question, but I believe it's three to four years and the South African government is going to collapse. On the basis that even the majority of whites now are sick and tired of the National Party, I would say some white people are beginning to say: 'Please sit down with the black people, negotiate.' That is why I say three to four, maybe five years, before the government collapses. □



Garbage collectors' strike: "What we're going to do is go right through South Africa and mobilize the workers in each group"

Activism on Trial

The upsurge in the number of South Africans charged with treason is indicative of the growing crisis facing white rule. The treason charge levelled against political activists and unionists is being used by the South African government as a pretext to crush progressive organizations.

BY PATRICK LAURENCE

Treason trials have become almost commonplace in South Africa today, exciting little interest from the media, except perhaps when sentence is passed. At present, 32 people face charges of treason in four trials. In late February, another trial concluded in which the accused, a young white man and former student, Eric Pelsler, was found guilty of receiving military training in Angola for the outlawed African National Congress (ANC) and was sentenced to seven years in prison.

Last year, 56 people were charged with treason, all of whom were black, Coloured, or Indian. Eight of the 56 were convicted. One was given a suspended sentence of 12 months. The rest were sent to prison for between five and 15 years. Sixteen were acquitted, including 12 of the 16 people charged with treason in Natal Supreme Court in Maritzburg. Charges are proceeding against the remaining four accused in the Maritzburg trial, all of whom are trade unionists.

The upsurge in the number of people facing treason charges is a sign of the times, another indication of the crisis facing white rule in South Africa and a relatively recent development. After the marathon treason trial of 1956-61, in which all 156 people accused were ac-

quitted at various stages, not a single person was charged with treason until 1979, despite the large number of political trials during the same period.

The reason, according to John Dugard, director of the Centre for Applied Legal Studies at the University of the Witwatersrand, was that it was much easier to obtain convictions under statutory laws, of which the Sabotage Act and Terrorism Act (both now incorporated into the omnibus Internal Security Act) are perhaps the most important examples. These laws—Dugard refers to them as “statutory forms of treason” as distinct from common law treason—are characterized by widely defined crimes, in which the accused is often presumed guilty until proven innocent.

But if the state shied away from pressing charges under the common law of treason for 18 years after its defeat in the treason trial of 1956-1961, it changed tack in 1979 when 12 African National Congress guerrillas were charged with common law treason. All were found guilty and sentenced to long prison terms and in the case of one of the accused, to death. An appeal against the death sentence was upheld, however, and the sentence commuted to 20 years in jail.

A major factor in the decision to press treason charges against guerrillas and later even leaders of the extra-parliamentary opposition was that the white-controlled state hoped to discredit its radical political opponents by convicting them of common law treason. Indict-

ments for treason were associated with charges of murder and at one time, sedition, both common law rather than statutory crimes.

Thus, it was not coincidental that Solomon Mahlangu, the first student-turned-ANC guerrilla to be captured after the Soweto uprising of 1976, was charged, convicted, and eventually hanged for murder. But in pressing common law charges against its opponents, the state nearly always took the precaution of including alternative statutory law charges. It could fall back on them if it was unable to secure convictions for common law crimes.

The number of people charged with treason reached a high point last year. Apart from the 56 people arraigned, there were two major trials: the Maritzburg trial, in which 16 people, most of them leaders of the United Democratic Front (UDF), were charged with treason; and the “Delmas trial,” in which 22 men were charged with treason.

In December last year, the state withdrew charges against 12 of the 16 accused, largely because counsel for the defense, Ismail Mahomed, destroyed the credibility of one of the state's expert witnesses, Isaak de Vries of Rand Afrikaans University. During Mahomed's cross-examination of de Vries—who has been giving “expert” testimony for the state in many political trials—it became apparent that he was unsure about whether the Natal and Transvaal Indian Congresses existed between 1961 and 1971. Mahomed told the

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court: "It is an elementary fact of black politics in South Africa that from 1961 to 1971 there were no Indian congresses at all."

Later de Vries averred that he had never arrived at a final opinion as to whether the South African Allied Workers' Union—one of the country's biggest black trade unions, four of whose leaders were on trial at Maritzburg—was a revolutionary organization. But, Mahomed replied, in an earlier trial he had told a Ciskei court that the trade union was not a revolutionary organization.

Ironically, the four men whose charges were not withdrawn in the Maritzburg trial are all leaders of the South African Allied Workers' Union. They include its president, Thozamile Gqweta, who has been detained more often than any other South African, and Sisa Njikelane, vice-president of the union.

When the Delmas trial of the 22—so dubbed because the venue of the trial is Delmas, a farming town about 50 miles east of Johannesburg—resumed in January, it was in the shadow of the acquittal of 12 of the 16 in the Maritzburg trial. This acquittal was auspicious for the 22 defendants at Delmas.

The indictments in the two trials are

obviously not identical. But there is a strong overlap in the charges leveled against the Maritzburg accused and at least some of the Delmas defendants.

Patrick "Terror" Lekota, national publicity secretary of the UDF and number 20 of the accused in the Delmas trial, was specifically named as a co-conspirator in the Maritzburg trial. Popo Molefe, national general secretary of the UDF and number 19 at Delmas, spoke at meetings listed in the Maritzburg trial, where attempts were supposedly made to create a revolutionary climate in South Africa conducive to fulfillment of the aims of the ANC-inspired Revolutionary Alliance.

Further, some of the Maritzburg accused are cited as co-conspirators in the Delmas trial. Finally, many of the meetings at which the accused allegedly attempted to establish the right psychological atmosphere for the overthrow of the government are common to both trials.

But while there are strong similarities, there are also important differences between the two trials. In the Maritzburg trial, it was alleged that the Revolutionary Alliance, reputedly composed of the outlawed ANC, the prohibited South African Communist Party (SACP), and the externally-based South

African Trade Union Congress, tried to achieve its revolutionary aims by working through "underground structures" within the UDF. But in the Delmas trial, the charge is more direct: The ANC and the SACP are alleged to have worked through the UDF itself.

Another critical difference is that the Delmas accused—unlike their Maritzburg counterparts—are faced with five alternative charges of murder. These charges relate to the murder of five men, four town councillors and a chauffeur, in the upsurge of rebellion in townships in the Vaal Triangle, about 25 miles south of Johannesburg. The outbreak of violence there marked the start of the sustained rebellion which has characterized South Africa's black townships ever since.

Meanwhile in Delmas, the trial of the 22 continues. Each day a yellow police vehicle drives down the town's placid streets carrying 22 black men to the newly-built court complex. There they begin another day in what promises to be a long succession of days before their treason trial comes to an end.

The accused are escorted into the courtroom. An access road to the front of the court building is sealed off by armed policemen. Highly trained members of the riot police stand guard in the hall opposite the main entrance, in the passageway outside the court, and in the courtroom itself.

The men range in age from 20 to 61 years old. They include leaders of the UDF and its affiliate, the Vaal Civic Organization, as well as sympathizers of its ideological rival, the Azanian People's Organization. All have been in jail for months. Some have been there for more than a year. Bail has been refused. The 22 account for more than two-thirds of the 32 people facing treason charges in four trials.

The Delmas trial has drawn little attention from the media in South Africa. Perhaps it is a sign of the times. It is no longer unusual to be charged with the crime of treason. The routine newspaper reports are likely to become even shorter as the trial progresses. The published list of state witnesses runs to 220 names. But it does not include the names and addresses of all the witnesses the state plans to call.

Since January 20 when it began, a



Rally in Maritzburg, South Africa: "In the Maritzburg trial, 16 people, most of them leaders of the UDF, were charged with treason"

new feature of this trial has been the testimony of witnesses whom Judge K. Von Dijkhorst has forbidden the press to identify, directly or indirectly. Two have been renegade members of the banned African National Congress. The third is a renegade member of legal extra-parliamentary organizations.

Another distinctive feature of the Delmas trial is that the 22 face an alternative charge of murder. The charge concerns the killing of five men by enraged black crowds. In a separate trial, eight people have already been convicted of murder for killing one of the councillors, Khuzwayo Dlamini. Six of the eight have been sentenced to death. Ten others currently face charges for the alleged murders of another councillor, Caesar Motjeane, and his driver, Phineas Matibidi. Further trials are pending.

The murder charge against the Delmas 22—one of whom, the Reverend Geoffrey Moselane, is an Anglican priest—is that they incited “the masses” to attack and kill members of the government-sponsored town councils in black townships in the Vaal Triangle.

In Court Room D in Delmas, the third unidentified witness was cross-examined by the counsel for the defense, George Bizos, on the role of town councils. For the most part, he answered in short sentences of two or three words.

The fundamental objection to the councils from the black community was that they were offered as a substitute for meaningful participation in central government, Bizos said. “We agree on that,” replied the witness. Popular opposition to the black local councils created by the central government dated back for decades, Bizos said. “Yes,” responded the witness.

Whatever the councils were called, and under whatever law they were established, they were seen by blacks as the servants of white authority, Bizos continued. “That is so,” answered the witness. Later, reading from the findings of an official report on the Vaal Triangle revolt by Professor Tjaart van der Walt, rector of Potchefstroom University, Bizos said to the witness that rents in the Vaal Triangle were high even before the proposed new rents which sparked the rebellion in September

1984. “That is so,” the witness said. The same official report on the disturbances referred to persistent rumors of corruption and self-enrichment among the town councillors. “There were such rumors,” agreed the witness.

To the charge that it was impossible to get a house without paying a bribe, the witness said: “Yes.” He himself had been a victim, he added before concurring that, in Bizos’ words, there was “tremendous popular resistance” to the councils. (Since the rebellion in the Vaal Triangle, there have been 12 vacancies on the town council. The council has held by-elections on three occasions to fill the seats. But each time it failed to attract a single candidate.)

In the Maritzburg treason trial of the four remaining defendants, the defense

counsel has charged that the former minister of manpower, Fanie Botha, conspired with police and managers in the Eastern Cape to crush the South African Allied Workers’ Union. Botha, who publicly warned against the dangers of refusing to recognize black trade unions, is alleged to have advised managers to keep talking to the union officials but to refuse to recognize their union.

A security police officer, Major Phillipus Olivier, told the court that Botha had informed him that he wanted to ban the union—but because of external pressure, it would be better to secure a conviction against the union in a court of law before having it proscribed. The security police had consequently started collecting “incriminating evidence,” Olivier said. □



Funeral in Crossroads: “The accused allegedly attempted to establish the right psychological atmosphere for the overthrow of the government”



...great revolutions... *"We know lots of revolutions, great revolutions, and magnificent people, who after taking over power, produced systems that were much worse than the ones they destroyed. We don't want to make this mistake. We will not."*

--Polish Solidarity leader Lech Walesa in a "Morning Edition" interview in Gdansk, Poland, with National Public Radio's European correspondent Neal Conan.

"I never share blame, I never share credit, and I never share desserts. It's just not my style."

--Beverly Sills, New York City Opera general director, in an interview on National Public Radio's "Morning Edition."

"Drunk they (the Russians) defeated Napoleon. Drunk they beat Hitler. Drunk they could win against NATO."

--Edward Luttwak, defense analyst and author of "The Pentagon and the Art of War," talking with National Public Radio's "Morning Edition" host Bob Edwards about Soviet military strength.

"We are so different, and yet, we are all one." *"I've never seen so many women, of so many different ages, colors, sizes and shapes, and I think it's amazing. We are so different, and yet, we are all one."*

--A delegate to the United Nations' World Conference on Women, talking with National Public Radio's "All Things Considered" co-host Susan Stamberg in Nairobi, Kenya.



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Preparing for War

Although it appears clear that the solution to the South African crisis will only be found around a negotiating table with the country's legitimate black leadership, both the African National Congress and the Pretoria government seem prepared for the inevitability of an increasingly violent conflict.

BY BARRY STREEK

While 1985 was the bloodiest year in South Africa's recent history, the conflict-ridden country is likely to become even bloodier in the future. In the opening weeks of 1986, both the Nationalist government and the banned African National Congress (ANC) publicly confirmed their military strategies and pledged to escalate their campaigns.

And with continuing strife in the black residential areas—where, according to the South African Institute of Race Relations, 1,205 people died in unrest between February 1984 and January 28, 1986—prospects all point in one direction: more conflict and more violence.

Indeed, the scale and intensification of violence in South Africa today raises a major question: Is there really any alternative to a bloody and increasingly racial shoot-out between the government (and most whites) and the ANC (and most blacks)?

There is, of course, one obvious answer. The government and the ANC should start talking to each other. Yet, while domestic and international pressures mount for the obvious solution, the realistic possibilities of that happening are remote.

The surprise resignation in early February of Dr. Frederik van zyl Slabbert,

the leader of the opposition in the white house of Parliament who bravely tried to promote that obvious solution, was a dramatic illustration of just how remote the prospects of direct government-ANC talks seem at present.

Over the course of last year, Slabbert held numerous off-the-record discus-

sions with the government and flew to Lusaka to meet with ANC representatives. "He desperately tried to promote the politics of negotiation," his successor, Colin Eglin, said afterwards. "But, in the end, the two major parties just brushed him aside."

It has been argued that eventually the ANC and the government will be forced to negotiate with each other. That may be so. But at present, this seems highly unlikely—and a look at recent events shows why this is the case.

According to the Detainees' Parents Support Committee (DPSC), more than 10,000 people were detained under South African security laws and the state of emergency regulations in 1985. Minister of Law and Order Louis Le Grange told Parliament that 7,777 people had been detained under the state of emergency, which was declared on July 21 and extended to the Western Cape on October 25. Almost a third of these—2,106—were children under the age of 16.

The state of emergency incorporated three of South Africa's major urban complexes—the greater Johannesburg area, Cape Town, and Port Elizabeth-Uitenhage. DPSC estimated that 3,637 people were detained under other security laws, with more than 50 percent, 1,848, taking place in "independent" Transkei where a state of emergency has been in force continually since the early 1960s, except for a brief period in



ANC President Oliver Tambo: "Both the ANC and the government see the resolution of the South African conflict by victory on the battlefield"

Barry Streek is a journalist based in Cape Town, South Africa where he is a political writer for the Morning Group of newspapers.

1976. Last year, a tough curfew was also imposed on the Transkei.

DPSC also said that an estimated 25,000 people were arrested during 1985 on charges related to political unrest, and the Institute of Race Relations estimated that 694 people died in unrest after the first six months of the state of emergency between July 21 last year and January 2 this year.

A total of 349 died between November 2—when the government imposed stringent restrictions on press and television reporting of the unrest on the grounds that the presence of journalists was stimulating and provoking the strife—and January 28, 1986.

The 169 deaths in January this year was the second highest monthly total in nearly two years of urban violence and conflict, indicating that the temperature in the black residential areas has not declined in spite of the government's measures.

Because of conflict over the definitions of "unrest" and "riots," Le Grange's casualty figures were lower than those given by the Institute of Race Relations, but he did say that of the 955 who died between September 1, 1984,

and January 24, 1986, 628 had been killed "as a result of action by state bodies" and 327 "by their own civilians—their own people." He also said 2,229 people had been wounded or injured by state action and 1,429 "by their own people."

At the same time, 25 members of the security forces were killed and 534 injured. According to police calculations, damage totalling 138 million rands (about \$69 million) had been caused in the unrest.

Guerrilla activity also escalated dramatically in 1985. The University of Pretoria's Institute of Strategic Studies, a pro-establishment body, recorded 136 incidents—34 percent of all guerrilla incidents over the last 10 years. Institute Professor Wim Boooyse said that the East Rand in the Johannesburg area and the Western Cape had been revived as operational areas, rivalling Natal where 28 cases of guerrilla activity or violence were recorded.

Booyse said that the 1985 figures amounted to a 309 percent increase over 1984. Nearly half of last year's incidents involved hand grenades and in 37 cases, limpet mines. He noted a signifi-

cant shift in guerrilla activity toward murder or attempted murder of civilians, police, or legal witnesses, as well as a dramatic increase in bombings of business premises. There were 19 attacks against businesses last year compared to only one the previous year.

Le Grange told Parliament in February: "During the last few months of 1985, there were seven land mine, 67 hand grenade, and 37 limpet mine incidents." And *The Citizen*, the pro-government Johannesburg daily newspaper, quoted anonymous "intelligence analysts" as saying after "nine serious incidents of terrorism" in the first six weeks of 1986, they expected an intensified campaign of violence by the ANC to mark "the year of Umkhonto we Sizwe"—the military wing of the ANC.

Their assessment is certainly in line with the views expressed by Oliver Tambo, the ANC president, when he spoke at a press conference in Lusaka, during the ANC's 74th birthday celebrations. "We are now calling for a rapid, extensive escalation of our military offensive," Tambo said.

The war, he said, was being stepped up because President P.W. Botha "has

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"South Africa today is a violent society—and the levels of violence seem likely to intensify in the future"

no intention whatsoever to accede to the demands of the people. He is playing around with the idea of reforms. We say the apartheid system cannot be reformed. It must be abolished in its entirety."

ANC attacks would continue to be "directed and aimed at enemy personnel and strategic installations" and "in the cause of the spread of the people's war against apartheid, civilians will be caught in the crossfire. We do not derive any pleasure from this but it will have to be accepted as part and parcel of a war situation," Tambo said.

He did not mince his words and there can be little doubt about their meaning. Nor did Gen. Magnus Malan, the minister of defense, mince words about how the government would deal with the ANC.

Speaking in Parliament in February 1986, Malan said the government would have no alternative, for reasons of self-defense and self-protection, to take "effective cross-border operations against the enemies of South Africa, wherever they may be in our neighboring states in

this subcontinent" if those countries did not form a "permanent joint security mechanism [with South Africa] for dealing with matters of security."

He said, "The present intolerable actions of the enemies of South Africa, in that they act against us from neighboring countries, across the international borders, take place under the leadership and instigation of Russia, through the South African Communist Party. Their marionettes, their pawns, are the ANC, that permit these contemptible acts of terror.

"The ANC, as you know full well, is a Marxist-controlled terrorist organization. It acts across international borders—against all our inhabitants indiscriminately, blindly, and regardless of age, sex, or color. . . This government will not permit these murderous gangs to complete their planning, training, and preparation in the security and protection of neighboring states and from there act against South Africa.

"The Security Forces will hammer them, wherever they find them. . . we will not sit here with hands folded wait-

ing for them to cross the borders," Malan said.

Even allowing for political license, these bloodcurdling calls to arms by both the ANC and the government, can leave only one conclusion: Both see the resolution of the South African conflict by victory on the battlefield, both seem to think they will win this way, and both are preparing logistically and psychologically for war.

Although some people try to avoid this trend and there are many desperately trying to promote alternatives to intensified violence which could engulf the whole southern African sub-continent, the hard political reality is that both sides seem determined to fight it out.

In his two last speeches in Parliament, Slabbert succinctly analyzed the dilemma for white people. His desperate pleas, which were lost in the reverberations and recriminations surrounding his dramatic exit from active politics, highlight the problem.

In the first of the speeches, Slabbert said, "The most short-sighted thing this

government can do for the whites and everybody else in South Africa is to try to externalize the ANC as something foreign. They are not foreign, they have support inside this country and we have to come to terms with that political reality." He called on the government to remove the causes of the ANC's commitment to violence and the armed struggle, lift the ban on the organization, and release all political prisoners.

In a very real sense, Slabbert was advocating the obvious solution to South Africa's conflicts: "One thing is certain and that is that if the government continues acting the way it is acting now, there will be no uncertainties—conflict, siege, and escalating violence are inevitable."

He offered an alternative: "The government seizes the initiative where only it can act, removing legislation which is cited as the cause of violence. Secondly, the ANC will be faced with an entirely

new challenge—to move from being a charismatic movement in exile to a political organization with practical programs and principles in a domestic situation.

"That is a severe challenge. It is easy to be a charismatic movement in exile. It is far more difficult to come into the domestic situation."

By the end of the week, when he had already made the decision to resign from Parliament, Slabbert concluded that as far as Gen. Malan and President Botha were concerned, the ANC was "a group of alien terrorists under the control of communists who are financed and supported by Moscow—that is all. However, this is a misrepresentation in stark contrast with reality."

He said it was not the external ANC which was radicalizing the internal ANC, but the internal ANC which was radicalizing the external.

"That is our dilemma. What happened in South Africa in 1985 did more

to exert pressure on the external ANC than anything they themselves could have thought up.

"They were not involved in interactions with Casspirs. They did not begin fighting in the townships! They sit out there and are radicalized by what goes on here, in the interior. That is where our problem lies.

"Supporters and members of the ANC here in South Africa work in our kitchens, our gardens, our factories. We dare not mislead ourselves on this score," Slabbert said.

That clear analysis, summing up the political realities facing white South Africans and offering an option which at least had a chance of reducing the levels of violence, was ignored in the white house of Parliament, and Slabbert disappeared into the political wilderness.

There are many people, inside and outside South Africa, who abhor the use of violence as a political strategy. "The use of terror to achieve political objectives fills me with a deep sense of revulsion," Slabbert said. "The petrol bomb, the indiscriminate use of land mines, the torture chamber, the burnings of villages and houses, and the terrorizing of children are instruments of political thuggery which cannot be justified by any cause that I wish to support.

"If South Africa should become completely polarized between two opposites each depending on such methods to gain the upper hand over the other, there will be no winners, only losers."

Yet the abhorrence of violence, however depressing, should not disguise the fact that South Africa today is a violent society—and the levels of violence seem likely to intensify in the future.

There are many people courageously working for a new South Africa, often at considerable personal risk. One cannot—hope they succeed in averting the brutalized alternative of ever-increasing war. But if an Afrikaner like Slabbert can have so little impact on the white house of Parliament and if a respected black leader like Bishop Desmond Tutu, who says he supports the aims of the ANC but not its violence, can have so little impact on the trend of events in South Africa, the prospects of even relative peace are indeed distant. □



Vivienne Wall

"The 169 deaths in January was the second highest monthly total in nearly two years of urban violence and conflict"

Standing for Sanctions

Recently returned from a visit to South Africa, Congressman Gray, a leading proponent of economic sanctions against Pretoria, argues that the United States cannot be loyal to its own democratic creed and at the same time provide the economic fuel for apartheid.

BY WILLIAM H. GRAY, III

Ethnic division is not the only goal of apartheid, South Africa's peculiar institution of neo-slavery built on severe racial segregation. The ultimate motivation for apartheid, like most forms of oppression, is greed.

Consequently, it is a mistake for newly-sensitized Americans to view the struggle of the 27 million-strong black majority in South Africa to overthrow their brutal subjugation at the hands of 4.5 million whites only in moral terms.

Apartheid may have been nurtured by a degenerate theocracy born in the 17th century, but profits sustain it in the 20th century. If racism is not the most profitable industry in South Africa, no doubt it is one of the biggest. More than 40 percent of the white population is employed by the bureaucracy which maintains the complex legal and social infrastructure of apartheid.

It is upon this conceptual basis that I first made my decision to introduce sanctions in the U.S. House of Representatives against South Africa's white minority regime in 1982. As an opponent of apartheid, I decided that America cannot be loyal to its own democratic creed and at the same time provide the economic fuel for apartheid.

Moreover, during our congressional visit to South Africa in January, the majority of that country's anti-apartheid

Congressman William H. Gray III represents the Second District in Pennsylvania. He is chairman of the House Budget Committee.

forces pleaded with our delegation not only to strengthen America's economic sanctions, but at the same time, to aim new sanctions more accurately at the pressure points of South Africa's economy.

Those who would argue that sanctions won't bring down apartheid are right; they were never intended to do so. Effective sanctions, like those in my bill, as compared to the mild restrictions President Reagan invoked last year, would simply end American economic support for apartheid. The political issues will be decided by South Africans—either at the negotiating table or through violent upheaval—the choice is theirs.

Several American companies doing business in South Africa recently have begun discussing the possibility of selling a small number of shares to select Africans. They hope to invest in a small black middle class that will be able to negotiate with the angry black masses.

Regrettably, these American industrialists believe they can slow down the growing divestment fever by such sleight-of-hand. It is regrettable because, as one non-violent black activist whom we met so poignantly summarized the issue of sanctions, "How are my people to believe that America wants peaceful change in South Africa, when your government and your capitalist businessmen keep undermining the last means of peaceful change—sanctions?"

Cursed by nearly all humanity and unnerved by the mounting restiveness of the non-white majority that they oppress, white South Africans today are struggling to find a way to give up *most* of apartheid without relinquishing any of their power.

Power-sharing, the idea of whites allowing the majority to have a limited voice in the regulation of local institutions that directly affect their schools, city services, or transportation, is now the Afrikaner's favored defense against international condemnation.

"Now we have a message to sell," intoned the urbane, confident foreign minister, Roelof "Pik" Botha, during our three-hour meeting at government headquarters in Pretoria. "Our big dilemma now is how to implement the principle of power-sharing."

Translated into plain language, today's Afrikaner has reluctantly accepted the idea that original "grand apartheid" is no longer feasible because the minority cannot dominate the non-white majority without the assistance of a selected elite chosen from among compliant blacks. However, while the Afrikaner has accepted the idea of no longer singularly ruling blacks, he has not accepted the notion of blacks ruling Afrikaners.

The dominant constant which emerged from my recent trip to South Africa is that every faction agrees change is coming.

● Militant leaders of the newly formed

powerful anti-apartheid force in South Africa, emphatically lectured our delegation that they want a commitment to full economic sanctions against the apartheid regime and a deadline for total American disinvestment.

ment his promised reforms of the pass laws and property rights.

These markedly conflicting opinions about the who, what, when, and how change will come to South Africa are at the core of the unrest threatening to



Congressman William H. Gray, III: "The dominant constant which emerged from my recent trip is that every faction agrees change is coming"

● According to a moderate black leader, black anger can no longer be defused or checked. "We've got to get rid of this [Botha] government, put an interim government in office while all parties sit down to reach a negotiated settlement."

● The "comrades," or young street activists in the black townships who have spearheaded much of the spontaneous rioting and rock-throwing incidents, have vowed to make 1986 a "no-go" year for township schools in honor of the 10th anniversary of the Soweto riots.

● President Botha told us there would only be concrete legislative proposals in

unleash a holocaust of rage across this land of majestic geographical splendor where human savagery has been licensed by the state for almost a century.

If the Afrikaner—who has ruled by strict racial subjugation and economic exploitation since coming to power in 1948—has his way, change will come painfully slow, eked out bit by bit, emphasizing cosmetic reforms, such as last year's repeal of the ban on mixed marriages.

During the 90-minute conference our congressional delegation held with President P.W. Botha, he repeatedly

heeded promises, claiming his government was meeting with "responsible" black leaders that he declined to identify.

President Botha pointed to the three-tiered Parliament—one for whites, one for Coloureds, and one for Asians—set up in 1984 as proof of the Afrikaner's commitment to power-sharing. However, he failed to mention that the Asian and Coloured members of Parliament may not use the lavatory and dining facilities used by white lawmakers unless accompanied by a white MP.

But the absurdity of this notion of power-sharing under such an odious arrangement is most clearly demonstrated by the absence of Africans from all sectors of national government.

Clinging stubbornly to his view of separation of the races, President Botha categorically rejected the concept of a unitary state governed by representatives elected under a system of one-person, one-vote.

"One-man, one-vote is out," snapped Botha. "Blacks don't want it." With that repudiation of the key demand of black leaders, Botha revealed how out of touch he and most of his fellow South Africans are.

In all of our meetings with more than 200 persons, from moderate opposition leaders like Zulu Chief Gatsha Buthelezi to the more militant, all black, 230,000-strong workers of the Congress of South African Trade Unions, the refrain we heard is for government by one-person, one-vote, and the complete dismantling of race-biased institutions and privileges.

"I am committed to bringing about one country with one government and to eradicate ethnicity as a determinant of political structures," Buthelezi told our delegation during a breakfast session.

And only a few minutes later in a separate meeting with one of Buthelezi's harshest critics, the Reverend Allan Boesak, a key leader of the multi-racial anti-apartheid group, the United Democratic Front, told us, "A non-ethnic unitary state is what we are fighting for, we will accept nothing less."

It is this communication gulf that is most threatening to South Africa's immediate future. As long as the Afrikaners continue to delude themselves

with the belief that all of the unrest and violence is provoked by outsiders and communist agitators, they will fail to appreciate the urgency of the rage burning within the non-white majority that surrounds them. Such self-delusion is actually a precursor to renewed violence, because notwithstanding the more than 1,000 deaths in 1985, in Pretoria today there is no understanding, no dialogue.

The longer Afrikaners resist meaningful change, the more difficult it becomes for moderate non-violent leaders like Nobel laureate Bishop Desmond Tutu and the Reverend Boesak to hold the attention and respect of the impatient "comrades."

It is this intransigence that mandates tough economic sanctions against South Africa. Like the ostriches indigenous to South Africa, the Afrikaners have their heads deeply imbedded in the sand. If white South Africans cannot accept change, the United States and other Western nations must *at least* stop providing the economic fuel for the political engine of apartheid.

The staggering international profits that apartheid fosters are all too apparent when it is understood that South Africa mines about half the world's gold and that gold sales account for about one-third of the country's export earnings.

More than 80 percent of the world's diamond trade is dominated by one South African firm, De Beers, which is part of the Anglo American Corp. group, the largest company in South Africa.

In platinum mining, South Africa exports nearly 90 percent of the 2.86 million ounces annually consumed worldwide. A key element in the automobile, petrochemical, and electronic industries, slightly more than 1 million ounces of platinum were used by the United States and Japan each in 1984, according to industry experts.

When apartheid's pivotal role in South Africa's economy is exposed, it also reveals the impotence of one of the far right's key arguments against tougher trade sanctions—namely, that a strong vibrant economy will enable South Africa to "grow out" of apartheid.

In the meeting our congressional delegation held with Zach de Beer, one of the officers of the mammoth Anglo

American Corporation, he tried to persuade us that sanctions only slowed the economic growth needed to prod the ruling Afrikaners to loosen their grip.

"Stronger sanctions will only produce backlash from among those who are resisting reform," explained de Beer. "While I admit the government should be ready to take more risks to get negotiations started, I believe that sanctions will only stiffen their backs. Our best hope is a strong economy that can provide better opportunities for all ethnic groups."

Time has proven the fallacy of that argument. The South African economy grew by 6 percent annually through the 1960s, a high rate in comparison to other countries at similar levels of development. But apartheid only grew more intense. More recently, growth has continued: 8 percent in the 1980 boom, another 5 percent the next year. The fruits of that spurt, however, were not used to start reforming the migrant labor system, or to improve the appalling conditions in the bantustans, or even to upgrade the urban townships in any significant way.

Surely, the need for sanctions has not been obviated. In fact, recent hardline statements made by the apartheid regime demonstrate the urgency to better aim new sanctions at those industries which will have the most direct impact on the rand—mining and energy, for example.

In our meetings with government officials, we searched desperately for some sign that Botha's regime was contemplating fundamental change in apartheid, and specifically the elimination of the pass laws which require all non-whites to carry racial identification cards which must be presented on demand upon threat of arrest; repeal of the Group Areas Act which limits certain residential areas to specific races; repeal of the laws which permit the wholesale removal of non-white settlements; and permission for workers to reside near their place of employment with their families. We received Orwellian double-talk in response to our inquiries.

The human costs of such intransigence never left my mind as we talked, ate with, and walked among the many South Africans our delegation encountered.

Throughout my trip, I could not escape the fact that when the changes—demanded by so many and resisted by so few—finally come to South Africa, many of those we met will not be alive to share them. □

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Using Our Leverage

Among the aims of the Reagan administration's newly created Office of Public Diplomacy for South Africa are to forge shared interests with the black majority and provide the American public with a clear understanding of U.S. policy. Arguing in support of U.S. interests in the region, its director outlines the assumptions which underlie current American policy toward Pretoria.

BY J. DOUGLAS HOLLADAY

Few issues have stimulated a more highly charged and sensitive debate in the U.S. than apartheid in South Africa. It is an emotional subject which has become a partisan political issue not only in Washington but at the state and local levels as well. Everywhere troubled Americans are asking a similar question: How should the U.S. respond to the continued injustice in South Africa? The U.S. domestic debate does not concern whether apartheid must end—on that point Americans are in accord. The serious debate regards precisely what policies will accelerate reform and the ultimate demise of the pernicious system of apartheid.

For some, the answers are simple: punitive sanctions, disinvestment by American firms with operations in South Africa, and diplomatic and political isolation of South Africa. They would argue that the United States should turn its back irrespective of whether a racial confrontation of staggering dimensions might ensue.

By contrast, U.S. policy toward southern and South Africa rests on a number of basic assumptions that impel us to stay involved in that troubled re-

Ambassador J. Douglas Holladay was recently appointed by President Ronald Reagan as Director of the Office of Public Diplomacy for South Africa.

gion. The policies we adopt must be moral as well as practical. As a powerful leader of the free world, we must do all within our capability to end this system of institutionalized injustice, which stands as an abiding affront to humane sensibilities. We are likewise bound to use means which are consistent and appropriate to the ends we seek. Finally, we must be mindful of the sober realities of the South African situation, including the real limits on the leverage we possess.

Assumption One: South Africans will determine their own destiny. Whatever political arrangement emerges in South Africa, it must be the result of negotiation and compromise by the people most affected. It cannot be imposed from without. In discussions with the South African government, U.S. officials have assiduously avoided temptations to be prescriptive. We possess no instant formula beyond a belief that governance should rest with the consent of the governed. To that end, we have consistently recommended that the South African government begin negotiations with legitimate black leaders. We have urged the unconditional release of Nelson Mandela and other incarcerated political prisoners in order to promote a climate conducive to serious and meaningful dialogue.

But America's position has been ab-

solutely clear. South Africa *must* change. The change must come quickly to create a society and system of governance based on justice and equality, rooted in democratic principles.

Assumption Two: The South Africa problem is really a southern Africa problem. The term "economic interdependence" aptly describes southern Africa, where for reasons of geography, history, and economic realities, all nations in that matrix form a symbiotic relationship. Like it or not, South Africa is the economic nucleus of the region. Its mines, the well-developed industrial sector, and modern urban centers all serve as magnets that attract thousands of workers from Malawi, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, and other countries. The remittances from these workers play a considerable role in the economies of these neighboring states.

Likewise, southern Africa is linked—north and south—by a well-developed transportation network. Through the rail network and out through South African ports flow beef from Botswana, ferrochrome from Zimbabwe, and copper from Zaire and Zambia. On the return trip from South Africa, the trains transport food, industrial goods, petroleum products, and other necessities for developing economies. The neighboring states are inextricably bound by com-

mon economic, geographic, and historical realities to South Africa's own destiny. If South Africa's drama ends in a bloody racial conflagration, the violence and instability no doubt will profoundly and adversely affect South Africa's regional neighbors.

In recognition of these regional realities, U.S. foreign policy objectives for the whole of southern Africa include several other elements in addition to the intense pressure for real change that the U.S. is applying on Pretoria. We continue our efforts to bring independence to Namibia in accord with UN Security Council resolution 435. This has involved ongoing negotiations with the South African government concerning removal of its troops from that territory, and corresponding discussions with the Angolan government concerning withdrawal of Cuban forces.

Additionally, the U.S. has been actively involved in attempts to reduce the number of regional cross-border conflicts. We consider it equally unacceptable for guerrilla forces to cross borders and carry out acts of violence, as for South Africa to launch military assaults into neighboring states. We have urged restraint and emphasized diplomatic resolution of bilateral differences.

Assumption Three: U.S. leverage, while significant, is limited. Many Americans, and many South Africans, believe that U.S. power to effect change in southern Africa is virtually limitless. This misperception is not only naive, it is dangerous. Yet this claim is supported by citing the fact that 300 U.S. corporations operate in South Africa. However, this argument fails to consider that foreign investment accounts for a mere 10 percent of direct investment in that country. Ninety percent of South Africa's investment is South African. The U.S. portion is less than 2 percent of all investment in South Africa. This hardly represents the kind of economic leverage that could by itself bring apartheid to an end. Those who urge the pull-out of U.S. firms would have us reduce our limited economic leverage considerably.

It is important that 192 of the 300 American firms operating in South Africa have signed the Sullivan Principles, developed by the Reverend Leon Sullivan from Philadelphia. Signatories

agree to a labor code calling for desegregation within their firms, equal pay for equal work, a commitment to advance black employees, the establishment of training programs, and initiatives that better the lives of black workers outside of the work place.

U.S. companies have spent more than \$140 million since 1978 adding classrooms to schools, building health centers, awarding scholarships, and otherwise assisting their black employees. The activities of American firms have had a significant ripple effect in South Africa. Similar codes have been adopted by EEC firms and indigenous South African companies—all to the benefit of black South Africans.

Assumption Four: South Africa is not weak. South Africa is not an inconsequential third-rate power. It is a nation with vast natural resources and a highly developed infrastructure. South Africa is a resilient country which has prevailed against embargoes and trade restrictions before, particularly in the case of petroleum and arms. This nation consistently has acquired sufficient oil on the spot market to meet its expanding domestic needs, even at peak prices in the 1970s. Additionally, the government has stockpiled considerable quan-

ties of petroleum in the eventuality of an interruption in supply. Simultaneously, South Africa has become the world's technological leader in the production of oil from coal. This is not a description of a fledgling nation easily manipulated from without.

The United States unilaterally imposed an arms embargo on Pretoria in 1963 to demonstrate displeasure with that government's internal policies. In 1977, we joined with the United Nations in adopting a similar measure. In response to that ban on weapons, South Africa has developed a highly sophisticated arms and munitions industry. Today not only is it self-sufficient in weaponry, but it has become the world's ninth leading arms exporter.

These examples and others which might be cited only demonstrate the severe limitations of the international community, including the United States, when dealing with such a self-reliant country. The biggest and most effective pressure for change in South Africa is internal—as it should be. The challenge to U.S. policy-makers is how to use our limited leverage to assist those South Africans—of all races—committed to rapid and peaceful change.

Assumption Five: A growing



President Ronald Reagan and Bishop Desmond Tutu: "The U.S. intends to use its leverage to assist those laboring to produce an alternative vision for that society"

Bill Fitz-Patrick/The White House



Air Force base, near Pretoria: "In response to that ban on weapons, South Africa has developed a highly sophisticated arms and munitions industry"

United Nations

economy can be a force for change. The U.S. views a dynamic and expanding economy as one of the most potent foes of apartheid. A robust economy draws upon skilled labor, regardless of skin color. Such realities have prompted the South African authorities to increase investment in the education of blacks and have encouraged the formation of black labor unions. Job reservation for whites has been deemed impractical and unworkable and has been virtually eliminated. Economic growth does not inevitably produce political liberalization. But it can. In South Africa, we are hopeful that the pace and direction of change will be enhanced by the needs of a growing economy.

In recent years, the South African black consumer has assumed an increasingly important role in the economy. Greater purchasing power has meant that blacks buy more goods and services than do whites. Some would argue that the very success of recent black consumer boycotts stemmed from the fact that blacks had capital to withhold. As the economy grows, this power to consume or to withhold consumption should become even more significant as a lever useful in attaining other goals. The South African econ-

omy has been in recession for the past three years. Despite a languishing economy, the legal black trade union movement has emerged as a potent force for economic advantage and political change in South Africa.

Assumption Six: South Africa need not be destroyed to be saved.

Those who advocate punitive sanctions believe damage must be inflicted on the South African economy. The administration does not share this simplistic view that change will be brought about by destabilizing this economy. The history of economic sanctions is that they are slow to act, easy to circumvent, and usually ineffective. But if they were effective, damaging the economy would not only blunt economic growth, it would condemn a whole generation of South African youth already too familiar with the ravages of unemployment and despair.

Three years of economic recession within South Africa have exacerbated the problems of joblessness and deepened the sense of frustration among those most disadvantaged under apartheid. Significantly, our European allies, along with Japan which is one of South Africa's major trading partners, agree that sanctions are ill-advised and destabilizing measures.

Further, we do not believe they will achieve their intended purpose of forcing dramatic political change.

Assumption Seven: The U.S. should continue assisting the victims of apartheid. Diplomacy has long been defined as "getting others to see that it is in their self-interest to do what you want them to do." The U.S. firmly believes that the South African government must abandon the blind alley of apartheid. Specifically, it should negotiate with leaders from all sectors and communities in South Africa to design a society that accommodates the rich diversity of its population. The U.S. commitment to assist those most disadvantaged under apartheid is firm. For instance, the human rights fund of \$1.5 million supports community-based anti-apartheid groups working for social, economic, legal, and political change.

A second effort is a scholarship fund of \$10 million annually to assist black South Africans gain a university education. Additionally, a \$2 million program to help black high school graduates prepare for the university entrance examination is in place. Regardless of the political configuration that eventually emerges in South Africa, this nation will require a literate and trained black workforce to occupy positions in any post-apartheid society. The color of people's skin will not be as important as the skills they possess.

Another initiative funded by the U.S. government and administered through the AFL-CIO is a \$1 million project to train black labor union leaders in union management and other relevant skill areas. Finally, a \$3 million program is designed to train black entrepreneurs who are taking advantage of recent cracks in the apartheid laws and opening businesses in formerly white areas.

These programs are predicated on the notion that the U.S. can play a constructive role and that peaceful change is still achievable. Our approach is designed to place greater leverage in the hands of black South Africans through professional training. The aim is to foster fuller participation in South African life in anticipation of a racially open society where unjust policies and legal prohibitions currently bind the country's black majority.

Nothing more clearly reflects the gulf separating whites from blacks in South Africa as their respective perceptions of whether significant change has indeed occurred in recent years. Whites point to the quiet integration of private schools; multi-racial sports; abolition of the mixed marriages and immorality legislation; virtual elimination of the laws reserving certain jobs for whites; limited integration of hotels, restaurants, and theater facilities; legalization of black trade unions; and the seating of Indians and mixed-race people in Parliament. They conclude that such changes have been nothing short of monumental given the country's legacy of legally enshrined racial separation.

On the other hand, black South Africans perceive the situation quite differently. They see most recent changes as cosmetic, leaving intact the foundational pillars of apartheid. The issue of political power-sharing has yet to be broached. The atmosphere is more radicalized and polarized, making it increasingly difficult for blacks committed to negotiation to maintain their credibility while daring to enter into dialogue with the government.

It is fair to say that the South African government is under greater pressure to move away from apartheid than at any period since the National Party assumed power in 1948. Black communities have erupted in protest for more than a year. Emergency decrees and imposing displays of force by the author-

ities have failed to still mass demonstrations against injustice. Schools have been closed and businesses subjected to consumer boycotts. Businessmen have spoken out publicly urging fundamental modifications of South African government policies. Prominent white South African business and religious leaders have begun a dialogue with exiled African National Congress leaders in Zambia. The international banking community, fearful that continued government intransigence was increasing risk for their loan exposure, refused to reschedule South African loan payments. Previously credit-worthy South Africa suddenly joined the ranks of those countries with international debt problems.

On September 9, 1985, President Ronald Reagan issued an Executive Order to more forcefully underscore America's collective repudiation of apartheid. This order applied political sanctions on the South African government and was designed to send a clear signal to Pretoria that dramatic reform was long overdue. The measures outlined in the Executive Order were carefully aimed at the apparatus of apartheid rather than the victims of this odious system. This order banned bank loans to the government except in cases where disadvantaged blacks would benefit; prohibited computer sales to apartheid-enforcing agencies and security forces; stopped nuclear technology transfer; and prevented imports of South African arms. Its proposed ban on

the sale of krugerrands within the U.S. has already been implemented.

The president's order was not designed to destabilize the South African economy or harm individual South Africans. Its intention was to send a strong and unmistakable bipartisan message. In addition to its blunt tone, the Executive Order reflected U.S. resolve to sustain a strong presence in South Africa and encourage American companies to be aggressive instruments for change in that society. It also increased U.S. government funds for scholarships and human rights activities.

In our view, there is little morality in turning our backs or washing our hands of the complex problems faced by South Africans. The course of principle dictates that we assist the people of South Africa—all of them, black and white—through this transitional period in the life of their nation. The U.S. intends to use its leverage to assist those laboring to produce an alternative vision for that society. We believe U.S. companies can play a useful role along with our educational institutions, churches, and others in the private sector.

U.S. policy is aimed at making a difference in South Africa, not contributing to the escalating racial tension or economic hardship. We are attempting to provide help, not do harm; to promote a better South Africa, not make matters worse. This is a policy which is practical, moral, and faithful to the American tradition. □

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The Mandelas and the Future of South Africa

Reviewing two recent books on Winnie and Nelson Mandela, Andrew Young reflects on the role of South Africa's imprisoned and exiled black leadership in forging a non-racial democracy in this *Africa Report* exclusive.

BY ANDREW YOUNG

African leaders always confound our preconceptions. We read the fierce rhetoric of their speeches, view the photographs of the seemingly militant giants, and hear the charges of savage terrorism levelled against them in our Western press, so it is almost always a shock to get to know these larger-than-life giants of liberation as real men and women.

Oliver Tambo seems far too gentle to head the revolutionary African National Congress. His tone is too calm and reasoned; an almost casual objectivity pervades his spirit. His eyes glow with warmth and affection as he sits comfortably on the couch in President Kenneth Kaunda's private study during a midnight meeting with former President Jimmy Carter and myself.

Carter is disturbed by his laid-back assurances of victory, which seem to have no clear plan or detailed strategy. This is not a purely military struggle. It is a moral struggle, a battle of the spirit and character of a people in the face of Nazi-like racial oppression of a nation's majority.

Oliver Tambo was Nelson Mandela's

Andrew Young is mayor of Atlanta, Georgia. The books reviewed as the basis for this article are: Nelson Mandela: The Man and the Movement, by Mary Benson, New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1986; and Part of My Soul Went With Him, by Winnie Mandela, New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1985.

closest friend as they grew up in the South African Youth League of the 1940s and moved into the leadership of the ANC in the 1950s. Oliver, a young lawyer who had shared a law practice with Nelson Mandela and galvanized the ANC into an activist movement, was always as calm as Nelson was passionate. However, both lived by a strong inner confidence that victory is inevitable—whether in our lifetime or not, the people will prevail.

African leadership is an enigma for Americans. We tend to try to force them into our own intellectual East-West compartments and they just don't fit.

In February this year, this was apparent as Tambo gave his analysis of the South African situation. It seemed contradictory, but his insistence that the pressures would be escalating from within and without, along with his report of Nelson Mandela's concern about violence against civilians and the fact that even from prison, Mandela's wishes and directions guide ANC objectives and strategy, weave the paradox of African liberation leadership. It is a leadership that we must understand, for they are influencing both African and American politics from prison and exile.

Mary Benson, like Alan Paton, author of *Cry the Beloved Country*, is a long-time conscience of white South Africa. For several decades, she has moved freely among black South African

leaders. She has now given us an update on her earlier biography of *Nelson Mandela: The Man and the Movement*, and collaborated in an adaptation of Winnie Mandela's autobiography, *Part of My Soul Went With Him*.

These books are as timely and necessary as books on Benigno and Corazon Aquino would have been two years ago. Indeed, the quiet, shy young woman who has toppled Marcos and assumed the presidency of the Philippines is a story of the triumph of spiritual strength over personal tragedy not unlike the emergence of the shy social worker into the defiant tigress of Winnie Mandela, who intimidates the armed might of the South African government with her refusal to be enslaved, in spite of banings, imprisonment, and 23 years of loneliness due to Nelson's imprisonment.

In reading these accounts which have recently been published by W.W. Norton & Company, one is made aware of new dimensions of power and human existence. The beauty they share—although one is banned and the other is in prison—is a wonderful tribute to the "life of the spirit" which can prevail over untold amounts of human suffering. Indeed, it is clear that Nelson and Winnie Mandela are among the few "free" people in the country. They are certainly more free than those who have given the orders to ban and imprison them.

It always amazes me that so great a suffering produces so little hatred and bitterness. It is as though the prisoner learns to overcome his physical state by a kind of spiritual acceptance which transcends physical confinement.

I have talked at length with Robert Sobukwe, who founded the Pan Africanist Congress, Andimba Toivo ya Toivo of SWAPO, and Robert Mugabe, the prime minister of Zimbabwe, each of whom was imprisoned for close to a decade but who transformed their prisons into centers of learning—Mugabe earning four academic degrees in nine years—and emerged with a philosophical depth based on the certainty of victory of their cause.

Sobukwe, who was dying of cancer when released, actually directed my offer of sympathy and pity for his plight toward Kruger, then minister of justice in the South African government.

Any nation is fortunate to have leadership forged in the crucible of unearned suffering. The struggle in South Africa and in the United States derives much of its power from their uncompromising hold onto the dream of majority rule in a multi-racial society.

If South Africa has any hope of avoiding or surviving the looming holocaust, it is via the leadership of Nelson and Winnie Mandela.

The transformation of the son of a Xhosa chieftain into a lawyer and liberation leader by way of missionary schools and political struggles is a fascinating portrait of leadership development. His continued commitment to a multi-racial society, his wariness of violence against civilians, and his stature as a unifying figure in South Africa's deliberately divided society are the greatest and best hope for stable change with a minimum of destruction and chaos.

Here is a man capable of cradling the fragile future of a nation whose birth is both long overdue and yet premature, even as his daughter Zindzi portrays him holding and changing his grandchild on one of their rare contact visits.

Here is a man who has reared his children and sustained his wife through letters—as an imprisoned Nehru inspired Indira Gandhi to become the kind of woman capable of leading a nation.

To read excerpts from Nelson's letters to Winnie and the children is to

share in a great love which cannot be contained or destroyed by the separation of prison walls.

But as you become part of that loving family, you want to organize against the system of apartheid which continues to cause suffering for the Mandelas and an entire nation.

It is so complicated and yet so simple. Here is a man with whom a reasonable constitution could be negotiated. Nelson Mandela and Oliver Tambo are lawyers who understand that majority rule requires built-in protections for the rights of the minorities.

The release of Mandela, the cancellation of political bannings of black and white leaders, and the recognition of the ANC as a legitimate political participant in a constitutional process could put an end to South African turmoil and violence and begin the emergence of one of the world's potentially great democracies.

But time is running out. The tensions within the black townships and between black and white are proliferating rapidly.

The present race against time is also a race against despair, suicidal violence, and chaos.

The leadership being spawned by the present violence has none of the depth of vision and strength of character of Nelson and Winnie Mandela or Oliver Tambo. Only the daily heroics of Bishop Desmond Tutu and the Reverend Allan Boesak stand between the mobs and the military.

Recent history in the Philippines will be repeated in some sense. The mood of the people is toward democratization—"And before I'd be a slave, I'd be buried in my grave and go home to my Lord and be free." They are not likely to slow down. The pressures can only escalate.

The recent tragedies in Alexandra township have been much more serious than published reports. Burials in mass graves have been privately reported as having been carried out by the government as it attempts to cover up the horror of its brutality.

Without television coverage, the car-



"If South Africa has any hope of avoiding the looming holocaust, it is via the leadership of Nelson and Winnie Mandela"

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"The pressure of sanctions is our most moral and powerful weapon for change, while being the least destructive"

nage will continue and will only make the masses more hostile and more determined. As the leaders prove unable to offer either advancement or protection, their positions and even their lives will become more endangered.

The role of the United States is critical in this scenario. Moral pressure for justice must come from outside—as it has in the Philippines—but instead of giving a moral sense of direction to the southern African struggle, the Reagan administration fiddles with Jonas Savimbi while the continent starts to burn.

Courting Savimbi has made it impossible for even the most moderate black leadership in South Africa to maintain active ties with the American embassy. Bishop Tutu and the Reverend Boesak no longer attend U.S. embassy functions.

Still, we are a government of the people. Reagan's policies were no more enlightened toward the Philippines, but the American people, through our mass media and our Congress, moved our government toward a new level of sanity and political responsibility, and in the final analysis, we helped Marcos relinquish power.

South Africa is not as simple, but the

choices are just as clear, and the American people continue to speak through demonstrations and the divestment movement which can only escalate this spring.

The banking crisis can only expand, because it is just a matter of time before the Free South Africa movement begins to focus on financial institutions as targets for specific divestment through cancellation of credit cards and selling of stock.

The moral sophistry over divestment will give way to practical business judgments and others will follow the example of Solomon Brothers and withdraw from South Africa.

Remember the Shah of Iran? Concerted pressure on the Shah to move toward a constitutional monarchy would have empowered the American-educated middle class and forestalled the extremist takeover by the Mullahs.

The pressure of sanctions is our most moral and powerful weapon for change, while being the least destructive. Specific, multilateral sanctions instituted by the United Nations Security Council on a definite time schedule for withdrawal from Namibia and the beginning of real negotiations with all of the parties in South Africa, under the final threat of a

total embargo on air travel—the most potent and enforceable tactic which will cause minimum harm to black South Africans and neighboring states—will create the kind of pressure within the National Party that might encourage those enlightened Afrikaners who can “read the handwriting on the wall.”

Perhaps the most shocking thing about the conversation between Jimmy Carter, Oliver Tambo, Kenneth Kaunda, and myself was Tambo's casual remark that P. W. Botha is too weak to negotiate an end to the conflagration, but that he had more confidence in people even further to the right, in the Broederbond.

As long as there can be such hope—transcending the extremes in the South African situation—all is not lost.

The books on Winnie and Nelson Mandela ought to provide real knowledge of how a concrete bridge can be forged to hold the southern end of the African continent together.

If it is done, it will be the powerful Mandela character and spirit that makes it possible, through the example of his life, or even in his death. □

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White House rolls out red carpet for Jonas Savimbi

Jonas Savimbi, the UNITA rebel leader seeking to overthrow the government of President José Eduardo dos Santos, received the royal treatment in Washington usually reserved for a visiting head of state during his 10-day private tour in early February. With the help of a carefully orchestrated public relations blitz, Savimbi launched an intensive campaign to drum up material and moral support on Capitol Hill for his South African-backed rebel forces.

Savimbi was greeted with open arms by conservative lobbyists and right-wing think tank groups who have championed his cause as a test of U.S. resolve to deal with alleged threats to regional security posed by "communist-inspired" governments like Angola. U.S. administration officials were no less restrained. President Reagan himself said, "We want to be very helpful to Dr. Savimbi and what he is trying to do, and what we're trying to arrive at is the best way to do that."

Savimbi's visit thus brought into focus the Reagan administration's southern Africa policy dilemma. While providing substantial military aid to UNITA rebels is clearly on Reagan's agenda, many critics point out that it will only help to escalate the conflict in Angola, forcing the dos Santos government to ask for more Cuban and Soviet assistance. In addition, overt aid to Savimbi would likely shoot a hole through what is left of the U.S. government's policy of "constructive engagement," compromising its ability to continue as a negotiator in the Namibia independence plan.

Through the use of "covert" aid, the White House has attempted to maintain its image of "neutrality." After months of wrestling with the pros and cons of congressional bills on the one hand and covert aid through the CIA on the other, White House officials have stepped up pressure on Congress to confine its

actions to moral support, while leaving funding for UNITA to the administration. State Department spokesman Bernard Kalb said the White House is opposed to congressional proposals for up to \$50 million in overt aid because the administration "does not believe that legislation mandating aid to UNITA would be an effective way to proceed."

Following his meeting with Savimbi, Reagan acknowledged that the administration had secretly notified Congress that it was providing up to \$15 million worth of initial covert military assistance to UNITA. A formal finding was delivered to the intelligence committees of the Senate and House of Representatives, enabling the administration to tap existing reserve funds available to the CIA without explicit congressional approval. Assistant Secretary of State Ches-

ter Crocker said the aid would be "relevant, effective, and appropriate, and that means as soon as we can."

The two committees cannot block the operation, but they can refuse future funds once reserves are exhausted. Both committee chairmen have opposed a covert plan of paramilitary assistance, arguing that it represents a major foreign policy decision and should be openly discussed. They have instead urged the administration to seek to convince Congress of the need for an overt program. House Speaker Tip O'Neill (D-MA) said he is "absolutely opposed to covert aid to Savimbi," whom he characterized as "an agent of South Africa." To overcome this opposition, the administration has mounted a campaign to convince Congress to pass a resolution calling in principle for

Continued on next page

NRA struggles to subdue north as new government sets up in Kampala

The National Resistance Army of Uganda's new president, Yoweri Museveni, pushed northward in February, battling the remnants of the former government army led by Brig.-Gen. Basilio Okello.

After Museveni's takeover of Kampala in late January, an estimated 11,000 soldiers or approximately half the government troops reportedly surrendered. But the rest fled to the north, the home region of the Acholis and Langis who have traditionally been the backbone of the Ugandan army. Within days, they had regrouped around Gulu, the principal town of the Acholis. With a large cache of arms and a ready supply of young recruits, Okello—who led the coup that ousted Milton Obote last July—could hold out for some time against Museveni. NRA troops were play-

ing a waiting game at Karuma Falls—the western gateway to the north—hoping their opponents would surrender as soon as food supplies ran short.

In the meantime, a new government was being established in Kampala, which Museveni asserted would represent far more than "a mere change of the guard." The absence of looting on the streets of Kampala after the takeover—in marked contrast to the aftermath of earlier coups—provided striking evidence in his favor. Young NRA soldiers guarded buildings and provided civilians with assistance. Intensive training while in the bush instilled in them the belief that they are to be "servants of the people," rather than tyrants.

In his inaugural January 29 ad-

Continued on next page

Kampala . . . continued

dress, Museveni stressed that his government would protect the lives and property of Uganda's citizens. He denounced former Ugandan heads of state and other African leaders for their corruption and lack of concern for their people. While no elections are scheduled for at least three years, he described plans for a participatory democracy in which a multi-layered structure of citizens' committees, starting at the village level, will handle local problems and screen recruits for the national army.



Museveni: A soldier by necessity.

The new president also explained his failure to abide by the peace accord that he and the former head of state, Lt.-Gen. Tito Okello, signed December 17 in Nairobi: "The negotiations were very painful, because I was sitting there with criminals," he said, but he signed the accord because of international pressure. "I was being advised to be diplomatic. I thought it was a farce."

During the negotiations, Museveni was building his well-motivated and disciplined troops into a conventional fighting force through additional training and supplies. The government army was also being strengthened. Observers doubt that either Museveni or Tito

Okello—who has been invited to return to Kampala without preconditions—ever intended to follow the provisions of the accord.

Despite Museveni's stated intention to form a broad-based government, appointments to his cabinet and the National Resistance Council, which will serve as parliament and supreme political authority, primarily come from the south, southwest, and Buganda areas. One of the few exceptions is Finance Minister Ponsiano Mulema, a northerner and former professor of economics, who is said to advocate a mixed economy. The prime minister is Samson Kisekka, who was the NRA's chief coordinator outside Uganda and a key adviser to Museveni. Paul Ssemogerere, who was Democratic Party leader and minister of interior under Okello, was reappointed to that post. Leaders of Uganda's four political parties and

two smaller guerrilla groups are included on the council. Many of the appointees are the professionals who comprised the leadership core of Museveni's movement during its five years of guerrilla fighting.

Museveni considers himself an academic, he said, and a soldier only by necessity. After graduating from the University of Dar es Salaam in 1970 and training in guerrilla warfare with Frelimo forces in Mozambique, he taught in a technical college and served as a research officer in Obote's first administration. When Idi Amin seized power in 1971, Museveni fled to Tanzania. After Amin was ousted in 1979, he returned as defense minister and unsuccessfully contested the fraudulent elections the following year. Charging that Obote had stolen the elections, he then took to the bush with the 26 companions who were to become the core of the NRA. ■

Savimbi . . . continued

U.S. support for UNITA to give Reagan a broad endorsement for any aid program he chooses.

Angolan External Trade Minister Ismael Gaspar Martins made clear that whether overt or covert, the dos Santos government would consider U.S. aid to UNITA an act of war. Leaders of the frontline states have also condemned the shift in U.S. policy toward Angola—a development which has perplexed them. While the U.S. as part of its "constructive engagement" policy is stepping up its support to Mozambique—a "Marxist" government which is battling South African-backed rebels—with respect to "Marxist" Angola, the policy has rather turned into one of "destructive engagement."

The change in policy has put the spotlight on U.S. companies operating in Angola, particularly Chevron and its Gulf subsidiary as the largest producer and main source of Luanda's \$2 billion in annual oil revenues. Crocker, hinting at the prospect of U.S. business withdrawal from Angola, advised companies to "start thinking about U.S. national interests" as well as their own corporate concerns.

A group of Republican congressmen filed a lawsuit in federal court in early February to bar the Export-Import Bank from disbursing \$96 million in loan credits to U.S. oil companies in Angola. The petition contends that Angola is a communist country and that companies operating there should not be eligible for aid. The suit would prevent the agency, which makes loans to foreign buyers of American goods, such as Chevron, from providing any more funds under the loan package approved in June 1984 for a major offshore oil project in Angola.

Despite this pressure, spokesmen for Citibank announced that it had opened credit lines for Angola. As the principal supplier of funds to the oil sector, Citibank also sought to increase cooperation with Luanda in the agricultural and industrial sectors, they added.

During his visit, Savimbi accused Chevron of "making a lobby" against him and threatened attacks by UNITA forces unless the oil company reconsiders its stand. U.S. conservatives added that Chevron should pull out of Angola because it is helping to fund the continued presence of Cuban troops in the country. That Cuban troops are

currently defending the Cabinda oil installations from UNITA incursions is an irony that is lost in their demand.

Chevron has refused to be drawn into the debate, adopting a "we're staying out of politics" position.

But as one company official pointed out, if Chevron withdrew, it would not reduce the Luanda government's revenue, because "There are many British, French, and Italian companies with their tongues hanging out." ■

WESTERN AFRICA

A war beyond the Burkina-Mali border

The five-day Christmas war between Burkina Faso and Mali formally ended when Presidents Thomas Sankara and Moussa Traoré embraced at the first extraordinary summit of the Non-Aggression and Defense Assistance Agreement (ANAD) on January 18. They met with heads of state of other ANAD members (Ivory Coast, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Togo, and Benin—which has observer status) in Yamoussoukro to approve cease-fire terms pending a forthcoming ruling by the International Court of Justice (ICJ).

Sankara and Traoré agreed to withdraw their troops from the Agacher region—a disputed 90-mile strip of territory in northern Burkina Faso which Ouagadougou largely administers but which Bamako claims as Malian soil—until the ICJ issues a verdict demarcating the border between the two countries. The withdrawal of Malian forces, which had penetrated up to 60 miles into Burkina Faso and occupied much of the Agacher area, it was resolved, would be monitored by ANAD observers. Ouagadougou had already recalled its troops from the border area a week earlier. Sankara and Traoré also offered to release 16 Burkinabè prisoners and three Malians.

While Traoré portrayed the war as a simple territorial dispute caused by Burkina aggression, Sankara argued the border issue was "a pretext for war," an international plot by "imperialist forces" to overthrow his government. "Many countries, powers, have an interest in using Mali, or any other country, to try and bring problems to our regime," he explained, because "people find us disturbing." There is little reason for the two

countries to fight over a piece of land, he added, when large parts of their territories are not yet in productive use.

Foreign Minister Basile Guissou said the presence of mercenaries among Malian forces, which had recently received large supplies of French military aid, confirmed that the war was not merely a border dispute. "The fact that the fighting was along the full length of our frontier, that foreign elements in Mali, opponents of our government, were in Malian army ranks shows that the aim was to overthrow a political system."

Despite Western press claims that Agacher's potential mineral wealth provided the explanation for the war, a detailed report in *Le Monde* revealed that there is little likelihood of raw materials there and that in any case, the contested area is too remote for either country to exploit profitably. Moreover, even Malian maps of the region clearly indicate that three of the four villages claimed by Bamako are situated well inside Burkina Faso territory.

Bamako blamed the "occupation of Malian villages by Burkinabè troops" for sparking off the war. Ouagadougou had sent officials to

villages in the Agacher strip—after notifying its neighbors—to conduct a routine national census. They were attacked by Malian police. Burkinabè troops came to their defense but subsequently withdrew at the request of ANAD members. After their withdrawal, Mali began a full-scale military assault to "liberate the villages," bombing several towns deep in Burkina Faso territory.

The conflict with Ouagadougou came at an opportune time for Traoré, who was unable to attend the Franco-African summit in December because of unrest at home. Sweeping austerity measures to revive a crumbling economy, including a public sector wage freeze and a 25 percent cut in the civil service, combined with continued allegations of high level corruption, had led to open domestic criticism of his government.

Moreover, teachers in the Union of National Culture and Education (SNEC) threatened to strike, adding to the government's woes. Traoré accused SNEC of collaborating with the Sankara government to help topple his administration. Several SNEC leaders, he claimed, had received money from Ouagadougou to destabilize his government—an allegation Sankara dismissed as preposterous. "He knows we are an extremely poor country and that we do not even have enough money to solve our own problems." The war, nonetheless, gave Traoré a much-needed boost, diverting attention away from internal problems and uniting domestic support against a common "enemy," his neighbor. ■

More oil to offset price slump

In early February, the Nigerian government decided to boost oil production in an effort to counteract the price decline that threatens to unhinge its 1986 austerity budget. The Nigerian National Petroleum Organization set an ambitious first-quarter target of 1.9 to 2 million b/d. Petroleum experts doubt, however, that Nigeria has the capacity to

meet this goal, although the country has repeatedly exceeded its 1.3 million b/d allotment during the past two years under OPEC's 16 million b/d ceiling.

The price of Nigeria's low-sulphur Bonny Light crude continued to tumble in February along with the North Sea Brent crude which it closely resembles, as OPEC coun-

tries divided into splinter groups desperately searching for solutions to the world oil panic.

For heavily indebted oil producers like Nigeria, the crisis complicates relations with foreign creditors. Nigeria's new budget contains a debt service limit of 30 percent of export earnings—an estimated \$9.6 billion. In 1985, 40 percent of revenues went to debt service, a proportion which would have increased to an estimated 60 percent this year. Although government officials have emphasized that the 30 percent limit is negotiable, creditors fear that debt payments will dip with each subsequent decline in oil prices. The ceiling will allow some payments on interest but none on medium or long-term capital debts, which will thus have to be rescheduled.

Lagos was confident that the economic reforms introduced in the austerity budget would convince international bankers to embark on rescheduling discussions, despite Nigeria's rejection of an IMF deal in December. Several British and U.S. commercial bankers reportedly said they would consider rescheduling Nigeria's medium-term loans despite the absence of an IMF agreement, and the Paris Club was said to have agreed to debt talks as well.

IMF measures without the IMF

President Ibrahim Babangida's first budget since his August coup has been widely praised by economists and international bankers for encompassing most of the tough measures advocated by the IMF. A key reform was an effective devaluation of the naira—primarily through the adoption of a two-tier foreign exchange market. The central bank will specify the exchange rate for essential imports, while the market will determine the rate for non-essential goods. The official rate has been four times the black market rate—a discrepancy which depresses the prices of imported goods and makes Nigeria's exports uncompetitive on the world market. The introduction of a flat 30 percent surtax (in addition to current duties)

Maternal deaths judged needlessly high

An estimated one-quarter of deaths among African women of childbearing age occur during pregnancy and childbirth. Yet most of these deaths could be avoided by the adoption of existing medical technology, according to health professionals who attended a recent World Health Organization meeting on maternal mortality in developing countries.

Although no national surveys of maternal mortality have been undertaken in Africa, a number of studies in hospitals and communities reveal that African women face formidably high risks of death during pregnancy and childbirth, said Deborah Maine, a specialist in maternal mortality, who attended the Geneva meeting.

According to WHO, the maternal mortality rate in African nations ranges from 160 to 1,100 deaths per 100,000 live births, while the range is seven to 15 in North America. A Nigerian hospital study reported a rate of 1,050—more than one maternal death for every 100 live births. In urban Ethiopia and rural Tanzania, community studies placed the maternal mortality rates at 566 and 370 respectively.

The individual risk is actually greater than these figures indicate, however. A maternal mortality rate of 500 means that every time a woman gives birth, she stands a one in 200 chance of death. But if she has six children—the average for an African woman—then her lifetime risk is one in 33.

The major causes of maternal death in Africa are lack of access to maternity services, mistaken or inadequate medical treatment, and shortages of essential supplies and trained personnel. In Tanzania, for example, insufficient drugs, blood, and equipment contributed to more than half of the deaths reported in a 1983-84 survey on institutional maternal deaths.

Especially vulnerable are the rural poor, women in high risk age groups (35 and older or 18 and younger), and those who have already had four or more children. In addition, illicit abortion appears to be far more common in Africa than formerly believed. In one Ivory Coast hospital, an average of 13 women a day are admitted for treatment of severe complications from illicit abortions. In the Ethiopian study, abortion was the number-one cause of death. (Family planning services are not widely available in either country.)

Representatives at the meeting, held in Geneva in November, called on WHO to initiate a major international campaign to prevent maternal deaths, but they pointed out that its effectiveness would depend mostly on follow-through by respective governments. Their recommendations included the establishment of maternity waiting homes where women who live far from medical care could stay during their last weeks of pregnancy in case of last-minute complications. Such homes have been successful in Uganda and Malawi, where labor and supplies have been provided primarily by local communities. In addition, health centers must be upgraded to provide vital maternal services such as blood transfusions, anesthesia, and cesarean sections, they said.

on all imports was also expected to effectively devalue the naira.

The budget imposed a 100 percent price increase on petrol and 150 percent on diesel with the revenues earmarked to renovate thousands of miles of farm-to-market roads. Government subsidies to state-owned companies are to be cut in half, and non-oil exports are slated to contribute 17 percent of foreign exchange revenues, rather than the current 3 to 5 percent.

The budget imposes so many re-

forms that skeptics question whether the bureaucracy can begin to implement all of them this year, even if the boost in oil production adequately offsets the devastating price declines. ■

GHANA ERP draws praise

Ghana embarked on the second phase of its Economic Recovery Program (ERP) in January with a percent devaluation of the cedi

(from 60 to 90 cedis per \$1) and a 28.5 percent increase in the minimum wage (from 70 to 90 cedis a day). The devaluation, the largest in a series that began in April 1983, is intended to increase the competitiveness of Ghanaian products on the world market. Efforts to stimulate exports have been the driving force of the ERP since its inception three years ago.



Rawlings: Spelling out economic reforms

Signs of a modest economic recovery, including a 5 percent increase in production, prompted donors to increase their 1986 aid levels by 13 percent. At a recent meeting of the Consultative Group on Ghana, donors pledged \$517 million—\$67 million more than the 1985 level, though short of the \$600 million target set by Finance Secretary Kwesi Botchwey. Multilateral institutions will provide more than \$300 million, while bilateral donors have pledged the remainder.

The U.S. maintained its regular aid program at about the same level (\$18 million), though increases in other programs were put on hold in retaliation over Ghana's expulsion of four U.S. diplomats following revelations of CIA involvement in the country. Ghana is negotiating a \$194 million standby loan from the International Monetary Fund to re-

place the facility that expired in December.

Donors were encouraged by high praise from the IMF and World Bank officials who called Ghana's program one of the most impressive economic reform efforts in Africa. Progress has been made in rehabilitating Ghana's cocoa plantations and the mining industries—which have both increased their production—the timber industry, the road and railway infrastructure, and the ports of Tema and Takoradi. Inflation has dropped sharply, consumer product shortages have virtually disappeared, and new supermarkets, restaurants, and nightclubs are opening in Accra.

But Ghanaian officials are quick to point out that serious problems plague the economy, particularly the severe cash shortage resulting from the devaluations and other fiscal measures. City streets are bustling with traders selling a wide array of consumer goods, but Ghanaians have little purchasing power. Small and medium-sized businesses are unable to obtain bank financing. And most factories still operate at only 20 percent of capacity due to the scarcity of spare parts and other imported materials.

A longer-term problem that increasingly concerns private banks and multilateral institutions is Ghana's growing debt burden. Debt service payments are expected to consume more than 60 percent of export earnings throughout the second phase of the ERP (1986-88). The bulk of payments are to the IMF, and these will rise from \$19 million in 1986 to \$207 million in 1988. Moreover, the infusion of aid has overburdened banking and administrative facilities causing problems of disbursement and local project implementation. ■

GUINEA Putting its house in order

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) gave President Lansana Conté's government a major vote of confidence for its sweeping economic reforms by granting a loan of \$36 million in early February. It is expected to be the first part

of a \$150 million package deal involving a World Bank credit and financing from several countries.

The Conté government has long been under pressure from Western creditors to carry out a full-scale monetary and economic restructuring plan as a precondition for rescheduling the country's \$1.2 billion external debt. Earlier in the year, Conté announced that the syli would be replaced with the greatly devalued Guinean franc. Although Guinea's full reintegration into the franc zone may still be several years away, the decision to abolish the syli marked the end of an era. Former President Ahmed Sékou Touré had introduced the syli (meaning elephant in the Malinke language and occasionally used as a nickname for Touré himself) with much publicity in 1972, and it had come to symbolize the government's independence from France.

The currency change was preceded by a 93 percent devaluation of the syli with the exchange rate restructured from 24 sylis to 340 sylis for one U.S. dollar in private transactions. The devaluation put the Guinean franc at the level of the CFA franc in terms of official parities and brought it closer to the black market exchange rate.

The monetary overhaul was accompanied by a wider economic shake-up in the banking and industrial sectors. The country's six state banks, which had misappropriated the accounts of many clients in the past, were liquidated in favor of three French banking subsidiaries after their private creditors were compensated. In addition, the Conté government announced that 24 of 35 state enterprises were to be privatized or eliminated, and the number of civil servants would be halved to about 50,000.

To push through the reforms and to cope with the potential dangers of social discontent, Conté consolidated his authority via the first cabinet reshuffle since the bungled coup led by former Prime Minister Diarra Traoré last July. One of his most able and trusted followers, Maj. Jean Traoré, was named minister of foreign affairs—the second most powerful member of government. ■

IVORY COAST

Controversial diplomacy

Ivory Coast's resumption of official diplomatic relations with Israel after a 12-year hiatus raised eyebrows in Africa and the Arab world. President Félix Houphouët-Boigny's controversial decision—a major step in Israel's campaign to regain official recognition in black Africa—followed secret consultations in December with Prime Minister Shimon Peres in the Ivorian leader's private residence in Geneva.

The move had been anticipated for some time, however. At a press conference earlier in the year, Houphouët-Boigny declared, "Ivory Coast is a friend to all and an enemy to nobody," hinting that a resumption of relations with Tel Aviv hinged only on a formal request from Israel. He added that Africa's longstanding estrangement from Israel had not helped solve the Palestinian problem, while Egypt's renewal of ties in 1979 had removed the main obstacle to normalizing diplomatic links.

Prior to 1973, Israel maintained close relations with many black African states, but nearly all Organization of African Unity members severed those ties in solidarity with Egypt after the Yom Kippur War. Aside from South Africa, only Lesotho, Malawi, and Swaziland failed to follow suit, although Zaire in 1982 and Liberia in 1983 reestablished relations. Close links with South Africa have also reinforced Israel's diplomatic isolation although it succeeded in retaining strong commercial ties with much of the continent and established secret trade missions in at least seven African states.

Houphouët-Boigny's resumption of diplomatic relations with Israel came under fire from several quarters. The Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa announced in early January that it would suspend all aid to Ivory Coast, "because such behavior is equivalent to leaving the framework of Arab-African cooperation."

The Senegalese newspaper, *Le Soleil*, pointed out that there was

good reason for maintaining the break in relations and that African countries should rather work toward improving ties with Arab countries. Ouagadougou radio went further, accusing Abidjan of advancing lame excuses for renewing relations with the country which refused to allow Palestinians to live peacefully in their own country. Houphouët-Boigny's government, it added, had let its mask fall with this decision, which amounted to "a slap in the face of militant Africa."

Israeli officials responded enthusiastically to the restoration of ties. Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir hailed Israel's diplomatic success as "an important achievement in the process of resuming relations between Israel and all countries on the African continent." Peres revealed that Houphouët-Boigny "intends to persuade other African states to follow his example," adding that at least two other African countries were expected to restore relations with Israel in the near future though he refused to name them. "Moderate" African states, including Central African Republic, Gabon, and Togo, are the most likely possibilities. ■

LIBERIA

Congress presses to stop aid

The U.S. House of Representatives has strongly urged President Reagan to suspend aid to Liberia until progress is made toward the establishment of democratic institutions in that country.

In a resolution approved in mid-February, the House defined the components of that progress: the release of all political prisoners, a free press, an independent judicial system, the removal of restrictions on political organizing, and national reconciliation with all significant political groups. The U.S. Senate passed a similar resolution in December.

The resolution is not binding on the Reagan administration, which may dispense the aid against the wishes of Congress. Following the House vote, however, the administration cut military aid to Liberia from over \$13 million to \$4.7 million

for the current fiscal year, and explained that the funds would be used only for non-lethal goods—primarily materials to continue construction of a military barracks. Aid for Liberia is estimated at \$63 million this year—considerably less than the \$90 million initially requested. Binding legislation to prohibit release of the Liberian funds may be introduced in the House, depending on the administration's actions.



Doe: Keeps his fingers crossed for U.S. aid

The Liberian economy is far less viable now than it was in 1980 when the U.S. began a massive increase in funding to President Samuel Doe's administration, according to a witness at a House Subcommittee on Africa hearing in late January. "After six years and massive U.S. financing, the Liberian economy is in a shambles," said the Reverend Thomas Hayden, a Catholic priest who has worked in Liberia for many years. He noted that the external debt has grown from \$750 million to \$1.4 billion and that the budget has been burdened with a deficit of \$642 million during that period. Hayden also told the subcommittee that the Liberian army has become "a group of well-trained men who have almost absolute power to intimidate, arrest, beat, and even execute Liberian citizens."

The Reagan administration wants to continue the funding because of U.S. strategic interests there, including key communications facilities and because of "the moral responsibility of our historical rela-

tionship." Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester Crocker argued that cessation of aid would "sacrifice the tentative steps taken toward representative government in Liberia." He testified before the Africa Subcommittee that Liberia now has "a civilian government based on elections," though he acknowledged that political parties were banned and opposition leaders jailed prior to the elections, and that Decree 88A which forbids criticism of authorities "could inhibit open debate."

The treason trial of one citizen who criticized the authorities—Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf—was scheduled to open in mid-February. A candidate for the Senate on the Liberian Action Party (LAP) ticket, she refused to accept her Senate seat, charging that the elections were rigged. Treason charges against Jackson Doe, LAP candidate for president, were dropped in January, and he was released from prison but rearrested in February. Both had been accused of complicity in the November 12 attempted coup in which an estimated 1,500 Liberians were killed, according to diplomatic sources. ■

NIGERIA

Shagari declared innocent

Former Nigerian President Alhaji Shehu Shagari and former vice-president, Alex Ekwueme, were cleared of corruption charges by a special review board in late January. The panel, established to expedite cases of officials jailed since the fall of his government, recommended that the Armed Forces Ruling Council give "urgent consideration" to their release.

Shagari and Ekwueme have been under house arrest in Lagos since a military coup toppled the civilian administration on December 31, 1983. That government was ousted by another coup last August which brought Maj.-Gen. Ibrahim Babangida to power.

The most serious charge against Shagari was that his political associates profited from \$22 million in kickbacks from a \$329 million construction contract at the Ajaokuta

steel complex in Kwara State. The panel found no evidence that Shagari was aware of the illegal transactions and rejected the argument that the president should be held responsible for the corrupt practices of his lieutenants. Further evidence revealed that the only asset Shagari acquired during his four-year term was a bungalow for his wife.

Ekwueme faced charges that he skimmed funds from several government contracts. Financial records showed, however, that he left office with less money in the bank than when he entered.

Shagari's case has been a touchy political problem for the Babangida government. Many Nigerians still point to the brazen, wide-scale corruption and economic mismanagement of top officials in the former civilian regime, and remain convinced of Shagari's complicity. ■

TOGO

To tell the truth

A government-appointed commission of inquiry, set up amid Amnesty International allegations of widespread torture in Togolese jails, rendered its verdict in mid-January that prisoners were "generally well-treated." In its findings, the commission established only that suspects were being detained beyond the legal time limit, although this was apparently "necessary to police investigations." The report was produced shortly after three separate delegations investigated possible violations of human rights of prisoners detained after the bombings in Lomé last August and December.

A delegation of the Association of African Jurists visited Togo in mid-December with government approval, concluding that several of the 15 detainees arrested for distributing "subversive literature" required hospitalization for injuries caused by police brutality, but it was not government-instigated. They were, rather, the victims of "over-zealous interrogators" responding to the "psychological shock inflicted upon the Togolese people by the explosions."

Another commission, comprised

of two French lawyers sent by the Ecumenical Aid Service (CI-MADE) and the French Lawyers' Union, told a different story. They denounced prison conditions for political detainees and claimed as many as 50 people have been arrested since September—far more than the official figure.

According to their report, 12 prisoners charged with distributing anti-government tracts were severely beaten or tortured with electricity, requiring six of them to be hospitalized. Four detainees charged with "destruction of public buildings" could face the death penalty, said the lawyers. Finally, Homère Aka Adote, the prisoner who officially died from "hypertension" two days after his arrest in September, instead died of "electrical hypertension," otherwise known as torture by electricity.

These conclusions gave credence to Amnesty International's contention in October that "some if not all those arrested in August and September had been tortured." When a second Amnesty commission arrived in Lomé on December 31, authorities refused the three delegates entry into the country and with the assistance of airport police, held them in the VIP lounge until they could be put on the first flight back to Paris the following day.

Justice Minister Ayivi Mawuko Ajavon explained that the human rights organization had ignored a request to postpone the visit until after the New Year's festivities. In a letter to Amnesty, Ajavon also pointed out that the previous delegation had published its findings without first submitting them to the government as agreed. Consultations with the authorities would have avoided what he called "hasty conclusions" with which he strongly disagreed.

In mid-January, to mark the 19th anniversary of his coming to power, Eyadema announced an amnesty for 10 of those arrested for allegedly handing out tracts calling for an armed rebellion. The remaining five were released several days later, although human rights officials suspect many political prisoners are still in detention. ■

Mengistu, Barre plan to bury hatchet

Presidents Mengistu Haile Mariam and Mohamed Siad Barre took the first steps toward settling a 25-year feud between Ethiopia and Somalia in January. The occasion was an East African mini-summit in Djibouti, where six heads of state had convened to establish the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development designed to promote stability and economic recovery in the region.

Djibouti President Hassan Gouled Aptidon served as mediator, bringing the two leaders together for three lengthy sessions in which they agreed to continue the high-level dialogue and to set up a committee to devise solutions to the differences between their two countries.

The historical enmity centers on the Ogaden region in the southeastern corner of Ethiopia along the Somali border. The Somalis have claimed the territory since their independence in 1960 as part of a national policy to recover lands inhabited by ethnic Somalis in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti.

The Ogaden has been a source of constant tension, with clashes first escalating into an undeclared border war in 1964. A decade later, the Somali government stepped up military support to ethnic Somali separatists, leading to another war in 1977 when Somali forces crossed into Ethiopia. The war dragged on until Somalia was forced to withdraw from the territory in March 1978. No formal peace accord was ever signed, however, and Ethiopia continues to control the Somali towns of Balenbale and Goldogob, which it occupied during the war.

Although Ethiopia and Somalia are still technically at war, recent developments have diverted attention from their bitter border dispute. The effects of drought and famine have flooded Somali relief camps with an estimated 1.5 million Ethiopians. Providing for the refugees seriously taxes Somali resources, and improved relations with Ethiopia would help facilitate

their repatriation. President Aptidon, whose tiny country is sandwiched between the two adversaries, promoted the talks to avert further deterioration of the economies of the Horn. Italian officials had recently cautioned that continued hostilities in the region would jeopardize proposed economic development projects in Somalia and Ethiopia—estimated at more than \$300 million.

Military factors also favor rapprochement. Heavily outnumbered in population, troops, aircraft, and supplies, Somalia is ill-equipped to launch another invasion of the Ogaden. Mengistu has military concerns of his own which favor an easing of border tensions. Guerrilla warfare by Eritrean and Tigréan separatists in the north and other rebel groups in the central provinces and the Ogaden keep Ethiopian troops tied down in costly efforts. ■

ETHIOPIA Relocating the famine

Amid allegations that government policies are likely to cause more deaths than the famine itself, a new food crisis menaces Ethiopians in the large eastern province of Hararge. Drought and famine in Ethiopia have historically moved from the north to the south and east, a disaster relief official recently pointed out. "That is what we are seeing here," he said. "The drought is moving into the traditional food-producing areas."

According to the government's Relief and Rehabilitation Commission, crops in 22 of 39 regions of Hararge have almost totally failed. Famine is predicted within months unless some 240,000 tons of food aid are delivered. Hararge had largely escaped the famine, but this year agricultural production is expected to fall by 45 percent, threatening nearly 2 million people. In some areas, aid workers have reported that a growing number of people have already begun gathering at food dis-

tribution centers.

Unfavorable weather conditions have been the primary cause of the crisis in Hararge, but agricultural decline has been compounded by the policy of "villagization" whereby the government began moving peasants from their scattered homes to village-based centers last year.

Although this government plan is separate from the highly publicized program in which 1.5 million people are being resettled from the north to the south, it is no less controversial. Supporters of the villagization policy argue that the government—which eventually intends to relocate up to 30 million people—can provide better health and education services if people live together in villages.

While many relief workers agree that the move to villages makes sense in principle, some question the manner in which it is being implemented. The ruling Workers' Party of Ethiopia reportedly seriously hampered food output in the province by ignoring ministry of agriculture pleas to postpone the relocation until after the harvest.

A field worker with an aid agency summed up the problem: "A million people in Hararge were moved by zealous members of the ruling party at the very time when they were planting seeds. People hated it. Instead of growing crops they were forced to build new houses."

Officials of Médecins Sans Frontières, who were expelled from the country in December for their criticisms of government policy, have made similar accusations about the resettlement program in their recently published report, "Mass Deportations in Ethiopia."

The Paris-based group of doctors and nurses says that as many as 300,000 people are likely to die in the resettlement in "one of the most massive violations of human rights we have seen." Thousands of people have been resettled "at gunpoint," with many dying during transport and from widespread disease in makeshift camps, according to MSF. The report concludes, "The problem at the moment has not so much to do with the principle

of population transfer as with the atrocious conditions in which it is being done." ■

KENYA

Moi gives top spots to women

President Daniel arap Moi has decided to appoint women to head 20 parastatals in an effort to reduce the corruption and inefficiency that have plagued the organizations.

Announcing his plan in mid-January, the president described it as an effort to ensure that the parastatals turn a profit, according to *The Weekly Review*. He noted that the men who have managed them in the past have sometimes embezzled operating funds.

The need to eradicate the twin evils of corruption and inefficiency in the parastatals has been a recurring theme in the president's speeches, prompting him to attempt reforms by removing or reshuffling their executives. The new appointments, however, signal not only a renewed effort to clean up parastatal operations but a new commitment to bring women into leadership positions.

Less than two years earlier, Moi had firmly denounced a resolution calling for more women to be placed in top government positions. Participants at a workshop held in August 1984 to help plan the final UN Decade for Women Conference had resolved to campaign for greater representation of women in decision-making bodies, including Parliament and the cabinet. But Moi responded that Kenyan women were not denied anything, and that for them to ask to be equal to men was to imply that God had erred when he made man head of the family.

The Decade Conference held in Nairobi last year, however, helped focus the attention of the Moi administration on the low number of women in government. Only 10 women have served in Kenya's Parliament since independence, and only two have been assistant ministers. Yet many have developed political and administrative skills through their work with Kenya's two powerful women's organiza-

tions—Maendaleo Ya Wanawake and the National Council of Kenyan Women, which both operate programs for rural women. Moreover, the Kenyan women who played key roles in the success of the Decade Conference helped demonstrate that women constitute an untapped leadership resource.

Moi had started placing women in executive positions in the parastatals even prior to his announcement. Former Member of Parliament Grace Onyango heads the Kisumu Cotton Mills, and Leah Marangu, a Kenyatta University professor, chairs the Jomo Kenyatta Foundation. Two of the more powerful parastatals newly headed by women include Kenya Industrial Estates (Veronica

Nyamondi) and the Kenya Institute of Education (Leah Kipkorir). Other appointments include Julia Ojiambo, Pets Products Control Board; G.S. Wakhungu and Margaret Otega to executive positions at Kenya Reinsurance Corporation; Margaret Githaiga, Bomas of Kenya; and R.W. Kagia, Kenya Literature Bureau. ■

MAURITIUS

Coalition reels from overdose

The implication of several ministers in a major drug scandal has rocked Prime Minister Anerood Jugnauth's coalition government from top to bottom.

Four members of Parliament were arrested in late December af-

Coffee profits perking in Africa

Among African coffee producers, Kenya is best positioned to profit from the recent boom in world coffee prices. The East African nation is a major producer of high quality *arabica*—the type of coffee now in short supply due to the 1985 drought in Brazil. After filling its export quota from the 1984-85 crop, Kenya had a 50,000-ton surplus that it expects to sell before marketing the 1985-86 crop.

Although the three-month price surge faltered in late January after recent rains in Brazil, coffee prices are expected to remain relatively high, benefiting African countries that depend on the crop for much of their export earnings.

Coffee generates more foreign exchange for Africa than any commodity other than oil. And African producers, except for Uganda and Cameroon, anticipate that their upcoming crops will exceed their 1985-86 harvests. Ethiopian coffee earnings are expected to reach a record high this year. The West African coffee exporters that primarily grow the coarser *robusta* variety also expect to profit from the boom.

Eager to take advantage of the situation, members of the Inter-African Coffee Organization recommended an immediate suspension of all export quotas at an emergency meeting in Abidjan in January—a move rejected by the International Coffee Organization (ICO) at its subsequent meeting in London. However, the quotas—which constitute the mechanism for regulating prices—ended automatically on February 18 under a provision of the 1983 International Coffee Agreement (ICA)—a pact between producers and consumers intended to maintain a stable market. Without the quotas, exporters are free to dump as much coffee on the market as they wish.

Coffee producers are apprehensive about the long-term effects, noting that high prices could discourage consumption, depress production, and lead to a long-term decline in demand. The new ICO chairman, Kenyan Agriculture Minister Odongo Omamo, said he was worried that the ICA could crumble, heralding a nose-dive in coffee prices.

In the meantime, Africans are exporting as much as possible, not only for short-term profit but also in hopes that when quotas are reimposed, they will receive a fairer share of the market. Kenya's ICA quota was so low that it has had to sell about 42 percent of its crop on the uncompetitive non-quota market each year. The 1983 ICA gave African countries only 25 percent of the quota although they produce 30 percent of the world's coffee.

ter 44 pounds of heroin worth \$1 million were allegedly found in their luggage at Amsterdam airport. Although the four parliamentarians were travelling on diplomatic passports, Jugnauth refused to have them extradited, preferring to see justice take its course. As he pointed out, "It is shameful that MPs make themselves mercenaries, and traffic in death. I can have no pity on any of them, especially on MPs such as these who are supposed to represent the interests of the population. They do not deserve their seats in parliament."

In protest over the embarrassment caused by what Mauritians are calling "the scandal of the century," four senior government members resigned several days later, including Foreign Minister Anil Gayan, who claimed to have "fundamental differences" with the prime minister. They denounced Jugnauth's handling of the crisis and the "anti-democratic tendencies of the regime." They said they were resigning because "at present democracy is not working as the opposition is unable to play an effective role."

Shortly thereafter, the government's chief parliamentary whip, Harish Boodhoo—considered Jugnauth's closest political adviser—also resigned. He compounded the turmoil within the ruling coalition by presenting the prime minister with a 20-point memorandum calling for major changes in government policies.

The resignations forced Jugnauth to announce a full-scale cabinet reshuffle in mid-January, appointing Madun Dulloo as the new minister of foreign affairs. Several government ministers saw their portfolios changed while other ministries were reorganized.

The drug scandal prompted the Mauritian Militant Movement (MMM), the main opposition party, to call for the government's resignation and early general elections, even though its mandate is not due to expire until August 1988. The ruling coalition's standing had already been severely jolted by a humiliating loss to the MMM, led by Paul Bérenger, in municipal elections in

December.

The coalition government had upped the stakes in the election by appealing to the urban population for a vote of confidence for its "good performance since August 1983." Boodhoo had claimed that the coalition intended to meet the opposition's challenge in the election and to "destroy the myth that urban centers support the MMM."

The opposition party countered by asking the electorate to condemn government policies that infringe on democracy, national unity, and the individual liberties of the press and the trade unions. The government's troubles were exacerbated when the MMM gained 57 percent of the vote and won 118 of a possible 126 town council seats. ■

TANZANIA Plotters get life

Hatibu Gandhi, an airline pilot, and eight junior army officers were sentenced to life imprisonment in late December for attempting to overthrow the government and plotting to assassinate former Presi-

dent Julius Nyerere between June 1982 and January 1983.

Senior High Court Judge Nassoro Mnzavas, who presided over the 10-month treason trial, acquitted two army officers and four civilians for lack of evidence. Four other soldiers had been freed last August.

In sentencing those found guilty on three charges of treason, Mnzavas said he was convinced that they had conspired to overthrow the legitimately elected government after becoming dissatisfied with the country's deteriorating economy. Although he would have sentenced them to death, Mnzavas said he had taken into account that they were relatively young and that this was their first offense. All nine promptly filed notices of appeal to the High Court against both conviction and sentence.

Gandhi, also known as Hattie McGhee, allegedly masterminded the bungled coup attempt. He escaped from custody in 1983 and fled to Kenya where he was given political asylum, but was later returned to Tanzanian authorities to be tried. ■

GENERAL AFRICA

Home sweet home for Chadian exiles?

President Hissène Habré's national reconciliation policy finally appears to be paying solid dividends with several key opposition leaders rallying to the government side after years in exile.

Taking advantage of the opposition's bitter divisions, the Ndjama government has successfully presented itself as the sole remaining force capable of bringing about the ever-elusive goal of national unity. In this spirit, Habré proclaimed a general amnesty for all Chadian refugees and political exiles, releasing 122 political prisoners in mid-January.

Habré's government has scored its biggest success in southern Chad where its authority had steadily expanded in recent months. With the help of generous funds from France, Habré has allegedly bought the allegiance of many *codos rouges* guerrillas previously operating in

the region.

He consolidated these gains by wooing exiled opposition leaders, beginning with Mahamat Senoussi Khatir, head of the Coordination and Action Committee (CAC), a faction of Acheikh Ibn Omar's much larger Revolutionary Democratic Council (CDR). The agreement, signed in Libreville with Chadian Foreign Minister Gouara Lassou, was followed by Senoussi's French-orchestrated tour of several African countries to encourage Chadian exiles to return to Ndjama.

Habré, who has shown little interest in meeting with all Chadian factions at another OAU-sponsored conference in Brazzaville, has instead initiated a series of separate discussions with the rebel leaders. In late December, talks in Libreville with Gen. Djibril Djogo's Chadian Democratic Front (FDT) produced

a similar agreement.

Djogo, a former commander-in-chief of Goukouni Oueddei's Libyan-backed Transitional Government of National Unity (GUNT), came back to Ndjamená calling on other Habré opponents to bury their differences "in the name of peace" and "to unite to save Chad." Despite his lack of a military power base and waning influence in southern Chad, Djogo is a nationally known leader whose return gives Habré a lift in his attempt to further isolate and weaken his opponents.



Goukouni: Fights growing isolation

Habré's strategy continued to pay off when Col. Saleh Biani, former chief of army staff of the Chadian National Democratic Union—another GUNT faction—revealed in January that he also would join the Ndjamená government.

French troops also return

To counter Habré's gains, GUNT rebels renewed their offensive against government forces in mid-February, crossing the 16th parallel known as the "red line," which Paris has pledged to defend. France promptly came to Habré's rescue, engineering its fourth military intervention in the country since the civil war began in 1965.

Accusing Libya of providing GUNT with logistical aid, France

escalated the conflict by bombing a Libyan-built air base in northern Chad and dispatched 200 air commandos to Ndjamená. French Defense Minister Paul Quilès said the raid on Ouadi Doum air strip, which had been used as the springboard for GUNT's attacks on government positions, was necessary to help Chad resist "foreign intervention." In retaliation, a single Libyan jet bombed Ndjamená airport, temporarily putting it out of service.

It was the first return of French combat troops to Chad since 3,000 soldiers pulled out in the fall of 1984. French officials pointed out that the new "deterrent force" in Chad would consist primarily of air force units to reduce the risk of French casualties while relying mainly on Chadian troops for ground defense. If needed, a 1,500-strong French rapid deployment force is on alert in neighboring Central African Republic.

State Department spokeswoman Anita Stockman said Washington would expedite \$6 million in U.S. military aid to Habré. The U.S., she added, was also consulting with the French and Chadian governments "to coordinate our individual efforts," as well as "consulting to see what other efforts to make." ■

RWANDA Mystery envelopes murder

The murder of American gorilla expert Dian Fossey at the Karisoke Research Center that she founded near Kigali was still under investigation in February—nearly two months after her death.

For years Fossey had waged a personal battle against the poachers who hunt the rare species in the Central African forests—the last natural habitat of the remaining 240 mountain gorillas. Although she protected the gorillas with courage and persistence, she sometimes employed questionable tactics. After the murder, the media published reports that she once kidnapped the child of a suspected poacher intending to negotiate an exchange for a baby gorilla, that she had killed 30 head of cattle that were trampling gorilla feeding grounds, and that she

had fired warning shots at Dutch hikers who had ventured too close to her camp.

Because of her aggressive and often unorthodox tactics, observers speculate that poachers committed the murder. Though her cabin was ransacked at the time of the murder, only her passport and a small pouch that she had taken from a poacher a few months earlier were missing.

Fossey had become acquainted with anthropologist Louis Leakey in the early 1960s. At his suggestion, she began studying gorilla behavior in 1967 with funding from the National Geographic Society. Her first several years in Rwanda were devoted to winning the gorillas' trust by learning to mimic their behavior and vocal sounds. Subsequent research revealed the animals to be timid, intelligent vegetarians with a remarkably strong family and social structure and "almost altruistic in nature," according to Fossey. She disseminated her findings through lectures, articles, television programs, films, and a book, *Gorillas in the Mist*, published in 1983.

Many Rwandans credited her with increasing tourism and bringing publicity to their country while environmentalists regarded her highly for her protection of an endangered species. In the scientific community, her contribution to the study of animal behavior is well-respected. ■

ZAIRE Cloud with a copper lining

Zaire was singled out as one of two sub-Saharan countries where foreign companies will face "substantially lower risks" in the coming year in a recent continent-wide survey of the business climate by the New York-based firm, Frost & Sullivan. The primary reason for the improvement, the survey concludes, is that "President Mobutu Sese Seko's economic policies now conform to the suggestions of international financial institutions."

The World Bank has already announced that it will lend Zaire \$550 million between 1986 and 1988. The sum, which includes \$300 million

from the International Development Association and \$150 million from the World Bank's Special Facility for sub-Saharan Africa, is considered Zaire's reward for being a "model student" of the International Monetary Fund over the last two years.

Since mid-1983, the Mobutu government has pushed through an IMF-inspired economic reform program which involved a massive devaluation of its currency, cutbacks in the public sector, and restrictions on wage increases. During the past year, the IMF responded to those efforts by awarding a \$165 million standby loan, while the Paris Club of foreign government creditors agreed to reschedule Zaire's public debt obligations for 1985-86.

In the new World Bank package, \$100 million will be made available to Gécamines, Zaire's state-owned copper and cobalt mining company, to help finance its 1986-1990 investment program. The loan represents about half of the external funding sought by Gécamines for a \$750 mil-

lion rehabilitation project designed to keep copper output at 470,000 tons a year. The remaining external finance is expected to come from the European Economic Community and other aid donors.

Gécamines officials pointed out that the rehabilitation project is essential for maintaining current output, as depreciating equipment and a shortage of spare parts have made it increasingly difficult for Gécamines to meet recent production goals.

The influx of capital will be used to rehabilitate and modernize mining equipment and improve the transport infrastructure to help boost productivity. Zairean officials, however, stressed that the investment program would not increase total output, but rather would restructure existing capacity. This, they claim, is essential if the Zairean economy—heavily dependent on the mineral sector—is to remain competitive during the 1990s. ■

NORTH AFRICA

Charter reflects Algeria's political shifts

Algerians endorsed their new charter by a 98 percent majority in a referendum on January 16—after nearly a year of national debate on the revisions.

The "supreme source of Algerian policies and laws," as government officials describe the charter, places far more emphasis on Islam and less on doctrinaire Marxism than the original version, approved in 1976 under former President Houari Boumediene. The 234-page document endorses the gradual shift toward more pragmatic economic policies, which Chadli has pursued since taking office after Boumediene's death in 1978, and promotes the private sector as an active component in national development.

Chadli's reforms of recent years had encountered stiff resistance from opponents who claimed they violated the spirit of the charter. He thus set out to revise the charter—a process that involved a series of

compromises within the ruling National Liberation Front (FLN). Purists who struggled to retain the Marxist terminology of the original version were defeated, while those who pressed for a strong acknowledgement of Islam's role in society were accommodated in line with the growing political power of the fundamentalists.

A massive public campaign throughout 1985 was also a vital part of the process. The revisions were presented in plain language that was more comprehensible to the layman but also less precise—intentionally designed to give Chadli more flexibility in future policy-making. Thousands of citizens participated in debates—televised daily and widely covered in the press—which produced a public consensus against some of the more radical policies of the original charter.

The public mandate implied by the referendum was especially im-

portant to Chadli at a time of rising protest from religious fundamentalists, human rights activists, Berber nationalists, and agitators for a multi-party system. In mid-December, Ahmed Ben Bella, Algeria's first president, and Ait-Ahmed Hocine, another exiled activist, formed a united front opposing Chadli's one-party rule. At a press conference in London, the two exiles charged the Chadli administration with depriving Algerians of basic rights and liberties, including freedom of the press and due process of law. Later, they demanded an end to the "non-declared" war between Algeria and Morocco—claiming that it is not in Algeria's interests to "carve up Morocco."

Ben Bella, overthrown in 1965 by Boumediene, has been exiled in Europe since Chadli released him from detention in 1980. Ait-Ahmed escaped to Switzerland in 1966 after Ben Bella commuted his death sentence. Both were founders of the FLN's revolutionary council which launched the struggle against French rule.

The Chadli government has responded to the protests with arrests, trials, and harsh sentences. In late December, the Algerian State Security Court handed down prison sentences to 22 of 23 persons who were on trial for belonging to illegal organizations and related charges. Twelve were members of the Algerian Human Rights League and 11 belonged to the Committee for the Sons of Martyrs of the Revolution, an organization set up to defend the rights of the Berber-speaking minority. ■

MOROCCO

Sitting on a powder keg

Muslims in the Spanish-occupied enclave of Melilla on Morocco's northeast coast organized a general strike in late January to protest Madrid's proposed implementation of a new aliens law. The strike followed a series of violent clashes between Spanish troops and local Muslims who charge that the legislation is discriminatory and threatens to make them illegal residents liable for expulsion.

The aliens law, designed for the 100,000 Moroccans living in Spain, also affects the Muslim residents of Melilla as well as Ceuta—a second Spanish enclave on the Moroccan coast. As of January 31, all foreigners who had failed to qualify for a permit of residence risked being expelled with no chance for appeal. Half of the estimated 27,000 Muslims in Melilla are believed to be illegal immigrants of a total population of 60,000, including 12,000 Spanish troops.

Previously, most Muslims in the two territories possessed neither Moroccan nor Spanish passports but only local identity cards of no legal value. Although many were born in the enclaves or have lived there for years, they claim they have been denied both Moroccan and Spanish nationality and now will be unjustly classified as "aliens" in their own country. The introduction of the new law—which has stirred up discontent over job discrimination and poor housing conditions—will effectively ratify their position as second-class citizens, they argue.

According to Muslim spokesmen, Spanish authorities have sought to push through the aliens law to consolidate their hold over Ceuta and Melilla—territories claimed for years by Morocco. Madrid, they add, fears the enclaves are gradually being "Moroccanized" by the growth of the Muslim population. In the event of a referendum regarding the status of the territories, the Muslim vote in Morocco's favor could threaten Spain's control of the occupied areas.

As a result, virtually the entire Christian community of 30,000 in Melilla demonstrated in the streets in early December demanding that the law be implemented immediately and the bulk of Muslim "foreigners" expelled. Although direct confrontations were avoided, political tensions were raised a notch the following day when Muslim shopkeepers closed their stores and organized a one-day strike to express their disapproval.

As the date neared for implementing the new law in late Janu-

ary, Muslims in Melilla took part in unprecedented demonstrations culminating in the general strike. Violent clashes erupted as Spanish riot police baton-charged several hundred women and fired rubber bullets and tear gas to disperse the crowd.

To ease tensions, officials from Madrid met with Muslim leaders in mid-February. They agreed to form a joint committee to "study solutions favoring the full integration into Spanish society of the Muslim residents in national territory." The accord, however, is likely to be attacked by the Christian community which opposes the extension of Spanish nationality to Muslims, as well as by Morocco which disputes Madrid's claim to the enclaves. ■

SUDAN Found unfit for loans

The International Monetary Fund declared Sudan ineligible for new loans following the country's failure to meet an early February deadline to repay more than \$220 million. Major decisions on reviving the moribund economy now await the new government that will take over following the general elections scheduled for April.

IMF rulings of ineligibility apply to countries in arrears by six months or more on payments to the Fund. In early January, Sudan received an unusual one-month reprieve to obtain short-term "bridge" loans and to develop an economic policy package possibly leading to an agreement with the IMF but failed to meet the deadline. Following the declaration of ineligibility, government officials warned that Sudan might turn to the Eastern bloc as an alternative funding source.

Strong dissension within the leadership regarding cooperation with international financial institutions helped scratch an earlier agreement that Finance Minister Award Abdul Majeed had negotiated with the IMF. Majeed resigned in protest in mid-December after the Council of Ministers rejected the agreement that he had spent five months constructing. The council favored most

of the proposals, but reportedly opposed key elements, including a reduction in the money supply and relaxation of price controls.

Popular opposition to an IMF package of austerity measures was a key factor in the fall of President Gaafar al-Nimeiry last year. His moves to abolish subsidies on basic goods and devalue the currency sparked the protests by students and professionals that led to the military takeover in April. President Abdul Rahman Sawar-Dahab vowed to continue the IMF austerity program when he took over, but the leadership has remained divided on specific economic policies.



Sawar-Dahab: Searching for a solution

Meanwhile, relations with the U.S. have improved, after Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester Crocker pledged that the U.S. would continue long-term aid during his two-day visit to Khartoum in early January. The U.S. Agency for International Development subsequently approved a \$25 million soft loan to enable Sudan to purchase 121,000 tons of American wheat and earmarked \$7.6 million to help transport the stockpile of sorghum in Port Sudan to Darfur and Kordofan, regions where 4 million people are threatened by famine.

Crocker's visit was reportedly in-

tended to ease "misunderstandings" between the two countries stemming from the State Department warning to Americans in late November to stay clear of Khar-toum because Libyan terrorists were allegedly based there. Foreign Minister Ibrahim Ayong Taha later announced that half a dozen "undesirables"—believed to be Libyans—had been expelled from the country. ■

TUNISIA

Achour thrown behind bars

The year-long confrontation between President Habib Bourguiba's government and the powerful General Union of Tunisian Workers (UGTT) took a new twist when Habib Achour was sentenced to a year in prison for allegedly breaking into the premises of a workers' fishing cooperative in 1984. Achour, the long-time union secretary-general, had been placed under house arrest in November, accused of causing an "insurrectional atmosphere" by encouraging labor disorder.

While still under arrest in December, Achour was temporarily sacked from his post by the UGTT executive bureau in exchange for a government promise to release about 100 detained trade unionists and reinstate more than 400 workers dismissed for striking. He was replaced by Sadok Allouche, a moderate whom observers anticipated would redefine the UGTT's relationship with the government and steer the union away from the confrontational tactics of his predecessor.

Despite the labor confederation's concessions, the Bourguiba government, in line with its sticks and carrots strategy, renewed its offensive against the UGTT to take advantage of its state of disarray. Achour and four other union members were sentenced behind closed doors to prison terms—accused of breaking into the offices of the cooperative in Sfax 18 months earlier—even though the defendants claimed that the building was union property that had been "unjustly" confiscated.

The UGTT denounced the detentions and accused the government

of failing to honor the December accord. In protest, 17 union members initiated a hunger strike at UGTT headquarters before being forcibly evicted by the police a few days later.

The UGTT administrative commission responded promptly in mid-January by announcing that it had overturned the executive bureau's decision and reinstated Achour as secretary-general. The administrative body pointed out that the UGTT leadership had been willing to dismiss Achour in an effort to break the deadlock with the government but only if the authorities kept their side of the bargain.

The Bourguiba government has instead sought to exploit the present confusion within the UGTT to put the lid on social unrest in a time of rapid economic decline. Prime Minister Mohamed Mzali has pushed for an extraordinary UGTT congress whereby the labor body could be remolded and united under the guidance of the provisional committees promoted by the ruling Socialist Destour Party (PSD). As Mzali said, the goal is for trade unionists of the provisional committees to "reclaim the direction of the confederation so that destourians and patriots are represented to reflect their true numbers in professional institutions." ■

SOUTHERN AFRICA

Pretoria has its way in Lesotho

Maj.-Gen. Justin Lekhanya's bloodless military coup that abruptly ended Prime Minister Leabua Jonathan's 20-year tenure in mid-January was cheered by many in Lesotho, but it was Pretoria that gave the new government its stamp of approval. The coup, marking the first civilian government overthrown in southern Africa's post-colonial history, followed several days of mounting civil unrest instigated by South Africa's three-week economic blockade of the landlocked kingdom.

Pretoria had put the squeeze on Jonathan by strictly regulating the cross-border flow of people and goods—controls ostensibly intended to prevent arms from reaching African National Congress (ANC) insurgents based in Maseru. South Africa, in reality, was demanding much more of Jonathan: a full-blown security pact of the kind concluded with Mozambique and Swaziland in which Lesotho would promise to deny all support to the ANC and prevent its members from using the territory as a refuge or springboard for armed insurgency against apartheid.

In recent weeks, 13 white South Africans had died in landmine and bomb explosions allegedly caused by Lesotho-based ANC members. Under pressure, Jonathan had

agreed to establish a joint security committee with Pretoria but refused to hand ANC activists over to the South African regime. "Never in my life," said Jonathan just prior to being toppled. "I would rather die."

Severe shortages of consumer goods and other necessities brought about by the blockade exacerbated dissatisfaction among the people with Jonathan's autocratic and repressive rule and especially strengthened opposition within the military. The first signs of internal dissent came a week before the coup when units of the 1,500-strong Lesotho Paramilitary Force (LPF), headed by Lekhanya, surrounded Jonathan's home to "protect" him. Lekhanya allegedly told Jonathan of the military's discontent with his approach to the blockade and warned that the controversial youth league of the ruling Basotho National Party would have to be kept under control.

The LPF crushed a military mutiny several days later when 35 soldiers sympathetic to the North Korean-trained youth league and to the ANC rebelled at an army barracks south of Maseru. Officially four people were killed in the bloody confrontations, but the count was said to be much higher. The clash followed months of resentment

within the LPF and the police at the activities of youth league members who argued that Lesotho should resist South African demands to clamp down on the ANC and to weaken its diplomatic ties with Eastern bloc countries. Jonathan's recent decision to provide weapons to the youth wing also angered the army command who saw the move as a threat to its own position.

As soon as Lekhanya—who met with South African officials to resolve the security issue days before the coup—broadcast his victory, Pretoria showed its approval by allowing a trainload of supplies to enter Lesotho. The new government immediately demonstrated a more conciliatory policy toward South Africa by deporting 57 ANC supporters to Zambia "for their own safety." A further 50 political refugees were expelled a few days later, although Lekhanya resisted demands to hand them over to Pretoria. Lekhanya also indicated that he would drop the support for sanctions against South Africa which Jonathan had lately adopted, concluding, "After all, who gets hurt most by sanctions?"

Following a meeting with Lesotho officials, South African Foreign Minister Roelof Botha announced that the blockade had been lifted in exchange for a security agreement. "The two governments subscribed to the principle that neither would allow its territory to be used for the planning or execution of acts of violence or terror and that they would take steps to see that this principle is effectively applied," said Botha.

Ironically, South Africa was largely responsible for putting Jonathan in power in 1965, providing him with substantial financial and logistical support. When the opposition Basutoland Congress Party led by Ntsu Mokhehle was on the verge of winning the 1970 election, Jonathan declared a state of emergency, put King Moshoeshoe II under house arrest, and jailed all opposition leaders who did not flee into exile. In a bid to overcome his lack of popular legitimacy at home, Jonathan had undermined his relationship with South Africa since the

Iranians cook up a storm in Harare

Iran's President Ali Khamenei, on the final leg of a six-nation tour in mid-January, became embroiled in what the Zimbabwe *Herald* termed an "unprecedented diplomatic incident" when he refused to attend a banquet held in his honor by Prime Minister Robert Mugabe.

The Iranian delegation—engaged in a campaign to win new support among non-aligned countries—sparked the row when Khamenei objected on religious grounds to the presence of women at the head table, to wine being served at the reception, and to the musical offerings of a police brass band. When Zimbabwean officials remained unimpressed with the Iranian demand that women be shrouded in veils and seated separately at the table farthest from that of the visiting dignitaries, Khamenei and his 40-man entourage spent the evening ensconced in their hotel rooms. The banquet, which featured lamb ritually killed in strict accordance with Shiite dietary laws, proceeded without the guests of honor or the customary speeches.

Although Zimbabwean Foreign Minister Witness Mangwende expressed regret at this "unfortunate development," he reaffirmed Harare's unwavering commitment to women's equality. "The major role played by Zimbabwean women during the war of liberation and the role they continue to play in the overall development of our country entitle them to an equal status and standing in every respect with their male counterparts—a principle on which the government is unable and, indeed, unwilling to compromise."

According to a Zimbabwean official, the government was aware of the potential for discord prior to the Iranian delegation's visit as "we made it clear that we would not comply with Islamic fundamentalism for the three days they were to be here." Even though Mugabe arranged to have thousands bused to Harare airport to warmly welcome Khamenei, conflict arose immediately when the Iranian leader refused to shake hands with two female cabinet members in the official receiving line and demanded that women attending a scheduled press conference wear veils.

Khamenei attributed the diplomatic crisis to a "lack of attention by the protocol chiefs to certain considerations for the participation of a religious dignitary and his companions." He denied that his "non-participation" was a "boycott" of the dinner and emphasized that "minor misunderstandings" would not undermine "our genuine desire for the further extension of mutual ties." Khamenei concluded his visit by signing agreements with Harare on trade, technical cooperation, and supplies.

mid-1970s by tolerating an ANC presence in Lesotho and projecting himself as a leading opponent of apartheid.

In contrast to Pretoria's previous attempts to use overt military aggression against Lesotho and the ANC, including commando raids in 1982 and December 1985, South Africa this time flexed its economic muscle to destabilize a neighboring state. Bishop Desmond Tutu called Pretoria "the bully-boy of southern Africa," denouncing the government for holding "Lesotho to ransom" and for "flouting international law by refusing to let Lesotho give refuge to real refugees." Leaders in southern Africa unanimously condemned South Africa's role in staging the coup, which they point

out is a clear warning to other independent black governments to end support for refugees linked to the ANC. ■

BOTSWANA Blast sets off counter-charges

A mine explosion claimed the lives of two whites near the South African town of Ellisras and the Botswana border in January, aggravating tensions between the two countries that have been mounting since Pretoria's raid on Gaborone last June.

The latest explosion followed similar incidents close to South Africa's borders with Zimbabwe and Lesotho. Members of the African National Congress (ANC) claimed

responsibility for these explosions which killed 14 persons and injured 70 in December.

Following the blast near Ellisras, Pretoria accused Gaborone of harboring ANC guerrillas and allowing them to operate from bases in Botswana. The State Security Council issued a formal warning to Botswana, adding that South Africa would retaliate militarily against any neighbor who promoted terrorism or threatened its internal security.

President Quett Masire rejected the warning, describing it as "completely unwarranted." He denied aiding or harboring ANC guerrillas and reiterated his policy of not allowing Botswana to be used as a base for guerrilla activity. He invited South African officials to locate the alleged ANC bases and promised that if any were found, his government would take appropriate action against the freedom fighters. The government also reemphasized its opposition to the apartheid regime, describing it as "evil, immoral, and breeding violence."

Relations between the two countries were further strained when security forces in Namibia reported SWAPO insurgents were assembling in Botswana. Masire has repeatedly asked the people of Botswana to divulge any information leading to the apprehension of ANC and SWAPO members. The Gaborone police have already raided homes, arresting and deporting 11 persons suspected of belonging to the ANC. ■

MOZAMBIQUE

More villagers flee atrocities

An upsurge of rebel activity in border areas has swollen the stream of Mozambican refugees into South Africa and Zambia.

The largest flow is from southern Mozambique to Gazankulu in South Africa on the border of Kruger Park. The refugees, who speak the same language as the people of the Gazankulu "homeland," report repeated atrocities by Mozambique National Resistance (MNR) rebels, including torture and massacres of families. Prior to fleeing, many have

been forced to sleep in the bush to escape nighttime attacks on their villages. When questioned about their loyalties, they have generally expressed no preference for either the government or the rebel side in the war but merely to live in peace.

The week-long trek southwards is fraught with dangers, including MNR ambushes on the Mozambican leg of the journey and wild animal attacks on the outskirts of the park. The refugees generally travel by night to avoid detection by South African authorities who have been known to send them back to Mozambique.

Operation Hunger, a South African organization, is supplying them with food, while World Vision offers home construction materials. Gazankulu officials, who estimate the number of Mozambicans in their midst at 40,000, have provided some land so the refugees can grow crops. However, South African officials, who are alarmed at the steady influx, oppose assistance of a permanent nature.

A smaller flow of refugees crosses the border from northwestern Tete Province into Zambia's Eastern Province. Upon arrival, most of the children are found to be suffering from protein deficiency and other severe forms of malnutrition. Shipments of food to the northwest have been curtailed due to sabotage by the MNR. ■

SWAZILAND

Prince to be crowned king

The coronation of Crown Prince Makhosetive in late April is expected to end the fierce power struggles that have unsettled the kingdom since the death of King Sobhuza II in 1982. The prince is the son of ruling Queen Regent Ntombi and the late king, who reigned over the mountainous nation for more than 60 years.

The new monarch will rule directly through the prime minister and cabinet, bypassing the Likoqo, whose power has been diminished. The Likoqo is an advisory group of elders, princes, and a few commoners that had counseled the king. After his death, it had attempted to ei-

evate itself above the regency, becoming a powerful actor in the subsequent political intrigue and turmoil.

The Likoqo's reversal, which re-established the preeminence of the royal family, occurred when Queen Regent Ntombi "retired" its two most powerful members—Prince Mfanasibili Dlamini and Dr. George Msibi. Dlamini was subsequently arrested. The two had engineered the palace coup that brought Queen Regent Ntombi to power in 1983. Many Swazis disapproved of the move as a betrayal of the royal tradition holding that a queen does not assume power until her son becomes king.

The Likoqo was also stripped of its title as supreme council of state, which it had assumed after Sobhuza's death. Its headquarters—the traditional capital of Lobamba—is expected to decline in importance, while most government activities will be centered in Mbabane, the administrative capital.

As a result of the queen regent's moves, the powers of the prime minister and cabinet have been significantly expanded, although the monarch will still be able to overrule the prime minister. Prime Minister Prince Bhekimpi, who has built a reputation for ability and integrity, is likely to keep his post, although some support has surfaced for the reinstatement of former Prime Minister Mabandla Dlamini. A reformist who unsuccessfully tried to reduce the powers of the Likoqo several years ago, Mabandla was reportedly ousted by Mfanasibili and Msibi.

The future king, who is thought to be 18 or 19, has been attending boarding school in England. When he returned home for the August holiday, several attempts were made on his life, the most dramatic occurring just before the lion hunt that is considered the most important ritual leading to the declaration of a new king. He survived the attempt and participated in a successful lion kill. He can now be known by the traditional title of Swazi kings, *Ngwenyama*, or Lion of Swaziland. He will be the only ruling king in Africa. ■

Bishop Desmond Tutu

Unless the South African government responds positively to an end-of-March deadline by which to come forth with a concrete program for dismantling apartheid, Nobel Laureate Bishop Desmond Tutu plans to launch an international campaign for punitive sanctions.

INTERVIEWED BY MARGARET A. NOVICKI

Africa Report: The Kairos Document, signed by over 150 South African clerics and laymen, exhorted the churches to play a more activist role in the struggle, and was implicitly critical of the churches for not having taken a clear-cut position on developments in South Africa. How do you view that document and how would you assess the role of the churches in the struggle at this point, given that it has taken a very violent turn?

Tutu: First of all, I am basically in support of the basic thrust of the document, however, I would have wished for it to be less abrasive and not so easily dismissive of the white leadership because some of those people have been outstanding. But obviously when you are writing in a prophetic vein, you don't usually use language that is too dainty. It has been an interesting feature of our struggle just how Christians and often ordained people have been in the forefront of that struggle—Allan Boesak, Beyers Naude, Archbishop Hurley, Father Mkhathshwa, Frank Chikane—that is an interesting position, that a great deal of the leadership has tended to be in the hands of ordained people. I think that the church, being an institution, will tend to be a conservative one, and I would just say that the thrust of many of the churches which are members of the South African Council of Churches has been fairly radical. I suppose that you can always say about almost anything that they are doing well, but could do better and possibly that the church will have to be ready for a great deal more suffering as it aligns itself more and more with the poor and the oppressed.

Africa Report: You find yourself in the position of being regarded by some sectors in South Africa as too moderate because you continue to support non-violent means of change and by others as too radical. How do you see your own role within the struggle as it inevitably becomes more and more violent? What do you feel you have accomplished with your non-violent approach?

Tutu: I would say that perhaps one of the things that I may have accomplished is to have drummed up fairly considerable support for our struggle, that if someone like me says certain things, then perhaps more people take note of that in other parts of the world, like the United States. I would say that that has been an important role. My position about apartheid is one that will never change because it is based on the Gospel. It is strategies about how you get rid of apartheid which require adjustment and changing. I have constantly said that I am not a pacifist, I am a peace-lover, and will work as hard as I can for bringing about change in South Africa relatively peacefully.



"I am not a pacifist, I am a peace-lover, and will work as hard as I can for bringing about change in South Africa relatively peacefully"

Odette Lupis

But that doesn't mean that I would not accept the traditional position of the church which is to say that there come times when it would be justifiable to overthrow an unjust system violently. But I would need to keep having to underline that we musn't speak as if the South African situation was not violent until violence was introduced from outside by those who are called terrorists, because the primary violence, the primary terrorism is that of apartheid. Whether we have reached that position where one would say it is now justifiable to overthrow the system violently, I would say, I don't think so. We may be approaching it rapidly, but I think we need to give the international community yet another chance to help bring about the change by the least violent means possible.

The other thing that I did want to say is that within South Africa itself, I think that many of the young people would say—and I think they would be right—“You have achieved nothing.” And I have said that if I was young, I probably would have rejected me long ago. And it is just one of the remarkable things that the young and others still accept our leadership, but that can't go on for very long when we have nothing to show for our advocacy of non-violence.

Africa Report: Has the international community had any tangible success in bringing pressure to bear on the South African government?

Tutu: I don't think they have done as much as they should. Actually they have done very little. They have tried to get away with as little as possible and the action of Citibank has shown just how little they have done because with just its refusal to reschedule a loan, this bank has succeeded in bringing some of the most intense pressure on the South African government. Therefore, I would say that the international community has pussyfooted a very, very great deal.

Africa Report: You have given the South African government an end of March deadline by which to introduce major reforms. What reforms would satisfy you?

Tutu: We are not looking for reforms, we are looking for the dismantling of apartheid. Therefore, I would want to see specifically a commitment to dismantle apartheid completely and then for them to lift the state of emergency, remove the army

tainees, and let exiles come back and talk. Those steps would be toward the ultimate goal, but they could stop forced population removals; they could have a commitment in a very real sense to a common citizenship for all South Africans, and abolish the pass laws, detention without trial, and arbitrary bannings, and begin to talk about a uniform educational system.

These are things that we have said so many times since 1980 at the very least. They could have done those things in 1980. Now they want to introduce them piecemeal and be forced into doing them so they are doing them reluctantly. Now they are finding they are suffering from the syndrome of too little, too late, and when they announce certain things, nobody is particularly excited.

Africa Report: What will change in your approach if none of this occurs?

Tutu: All I would do is to make the specific call for punitive sanctions. It doesn't mean anything in a sense, because I can't force the international community. I would just do this, but it would be a gesture, knowing that it opens one up for facing charges. That would be all.

Africa Report: Do you detect any change in American policy, or has the U.S. government's position been so discredited as to make it largely irrelevant to what is going on in South Africa?

Tutu: I am not particularly impressed with them. They want to have business as usual. They have been compelled to take certain positions by the people. And until they jettison constructive engagement, they are just playing marbles. Now they are saying that they are on the side of Savimbi, another indication that they are aligned with racists. If they are aligned with racists, then they are racist because they do not really care too much about what happens to black people. If they were to apply a policy such as what they apply to Nicaragua, we would be rid of apartheid. And the fact that the American secretary of state has appointed an advisory committee on South Africa shows that they are aware that they do have a pivotal role to play. □

Document

A Challenge to Action

To say that the Church must now take sides unequivocally and consistently with the poor and the oppressed is to overlook the fact that the majority of Christians in South Africa have already done so. By far the greater part of the Church in South Africa is poor and oppressed. Of course, it cannot be taken for granted that everyone who is oppressed has taken up their own cause and is struggling for their own liberation. Nor can it be assumed that all oppressed Christians are fully aware of

the fact that their cause is God's cause. Nevertheless, it remains true that the Church is already on the side of the oppressed because that is where the majority of its members are to be found. This fact needs to be appropriated and confirmed by the Church as a whole.

The present crisis has highlighted the divisions in the Church. We are a divided Church precisely because not all the members of our churches have taken sides against oppression. In other words, not all Christians have united



Vivienne Wait

"Christians, if they are not doing so already, must quite simply participate in the struggle for liberation and for a just society"

themselves with God "who is always on the side of the oppressed" (Ps 103:6). As far as the present crisis is concerned, there is only one way forward to Church unity and that is for those Christians who find themselves on the side of the oppressor or sitting on the fence to cross over to the other side to be united in faith and action with those who are oppressed. Unity and reconciliation within the Church itself is only possible around God and Jesus Christ who are to be found on the side of the poor and the oppressed.

If this is what the Church must become, if this is what the Church as a whole must have as its project, how then are we to translate it into concrete and effective action?

Participation in the Struggle

Christians, if they are not doing so already, must quite simply participate in the struggle for liberation and for a just society. The campaigns of the people, from consumer boycotts to stayaways, need to be supported and encouraged by the Church. Criticism will sometimes be necessary but encouragement and support will also be necessary. In other words, the present crisis challenges the whole Church to move beyond a mere "ambulance ministry" to a ministry of involvement and participation.

Transforming Church Activities

The Church has its own specific activities: Sunday services, communion services, baptisms, Sunday school, funerals, and so forth. It also has its specific way of expressing its faith and its commitment, i.e. in the form of confessions of faith. All of these activities must be re-shaped to be more fully consistent with a prophetic faith related to the *Kairos* that God is offering us today. The evil forces we speak of in baptism must be named. We know what these evil forces are in South Africa today. The unity and sharing we profess in our communion services or Masses must be named. It is the solidarity of the people inviting all to join in the struggle for God's peace in South Africa. The repentance we preach must be named. It is repentance for our share of the guilt for the suffering and oppression in our country.

Much of what we do in our Church services has lost its relevance to the poor and oppressed. Our services and sacraments have been appropriated to serve the need of the individual for comfort and security. Now these same Church activities must be reappropriated to serve the real religious needs of all the people and to further the liberating mission of God and the Church in the world.

Special Campaigns

Over and above its regular activities, the Church would need to have special programs, projects, and campaigns because of the special needs of the struggle for liberation in South Africa today. But there is very important caution here. The Church must avoid becoming a "third force," a force between the oppressor and the oppressed. The Church's programs and campaigns must not duplicate what the people's organizations are already doing and even more seriously, the Church must not confuse the issue by having programs that run counter to the struggles of those political organizations that truly represent the grievances and demands of the people. Consultation, coordination, and cooperation will be needed. We all have the same goals even when we differ about the final significance of what we are struggling for.

Civil Disobedience

Once it is established that the present regime has no moral legitimacy and is in fact a tyrannical regime, certain things follow for the Church and its activities. In the first place, *the Church cannot collaborate with tyranny*. It cannot or should not do anything that appears to give legitimacy to a morally illegitimate regime. Secondly, the Church should not only pray for change of government, it should also mobilize its members in every parish to begin to think and work and plan for a change of government in South Africa. We must begin to look ahead and begin working now with firm hope and faith for a better future. And finally, the moral illegitimacy of the apartheid regime

means that the Church will have to be involved at times in *civil disobedience*. A Church that takes its responsibilities seriously in these circumstances will sometimes have to confront and to disobey the state in order to obey God.

Moral Guidance

The people look to the Church, especially in the midst of our present crisis, for moral guidance. In order to provide this, the Church must first make its stand absolutely clear and never tire of explaining and dialoguing about it. It must then help people to understand their rights and their duties. There must be no misunderstanding about the *moral duty* of all who are oppressed to resist oppression and to struggle for liberation and justice. The Church will also find that at times it does need to curb excesses and to appeal to the consciences of those who act thoughtlessly and wildly.

But the Church of Jesus Christ is not called to be a bastion of caution and moderation. The Church should challenge, inspire, and motivate people. It has a message of the cross that inspires us to make sacrifices for justice and liberation. It has a message of hope that challenges us to wake and to act with hope and confidence. The Church must preach this message not only in words and sermons and statements, but also through its actions, programs, campaigns, and divine services. □

The above is excerpted from the Kairos Document, a theological comment on the political crisis in South Africa, which has been endorsed by over 150 South African clergy and laymen.

Adopted by the Southern African Catholic Bishops Conference, St. John Vianney Seminary, Pretoria, January 31, 1986

The Southern African Catholic Bishops Conference adopts the following statement:

We are deeply conscious of our responsibility as leaders of the Church to give moral guidance and to play our part in attempting to arrest the rapidly escalating violence in our country.

Since it is a matter of utmost urgency, we find ourselves obliged to consider alternatives to such violence as a means of bringing about racial social change. While still open to dialogue, we see no choice but to envisage forms of non-violent action such as passive resistance, boycotts, and economic pressure to move our country away from its present state of racial conflict and set it on the road to justice and full participation of all its inhabitants in the structures of government. We reaffirm our total abhorrence of the system of apartheid which is directly opposed to the teaching of Christ and the God-given dignity of every human being and is the greatest single obstacle to peace in our land.

We make our own words of our Holy Father, Pope John Paul II: "Our repudiation of every form of racial discrimination is convinced and total: it is based on the awareness of the dignity common to every man, made in the image and likeness of the Creator, and called to the status of Son of God."

- Resolution One: In the light of this conviction, the conference instructs the administrative board to see that a statement is drawn up and published as soon as possible indicating that the conference has given full consideration to supporting economic pressures against apartheid in South Africa. That to the published statement be attached the text of the paper drawn up by the Justice and Reconciliation Commission entitled, "Economic Measures Against Apartheid and the Challenge of the Church," and further instruct the administrative board to make the necessary preparations for an extraordinary plenary session for May 1986 at which this subject is to be further discussed and decisions taken.
- Resolution Two: The conference resolves that a committee be formed to draw up a further response to the Kairos Document for presentation to the extraordinary plenary session in May 1986.
- Resolution Three: The conference resolves that a committee be formed to supervise the drawing up of a document setting up the conference reflection on the present South African crisis using the text compiled by Father Kevin Rai and that the document be submitted to the extraordinary plenary session in May 1986.

The Media Blackout

Arrested and charged under the Internal Security Act for publishing an interview with Oliver Tambo, the banned leader of the ANC, Anthony Heard faces up to three years in jail if convicted. In this discussion of Pretoria's restrictions on the press, the editor of the *Cape Times* presents his case for an unshackling of the South African media.

BY A.H. HEARD

It is frequently claimed by South African officials that the press in this country is free. This claim evokes something of a belly-laugh among many journalists who realize that their freedom is severely qualified. What freedom there is exists in spite of, not because of, government. The reality is that the South African press has been subjected to enormous pressures from government and security authorities over the years. With the declaration of a state of emergency last year, the situation has worsened and indeed become virtually intolerable for those who believe in free expression. But the fight goes on.

There are hundreds of journalists who continue their craft, using every inch of freedom they can squeeze out of a repressive system—in the process, ironically, making it possible for South African officials to claim locally and abroad that they have a free press. It is commonplace for South African newspaper editors and their senior staffs to meet and discuss with a procession of foreign visitors hosted by government or other agencies—to be paraded before the visitors as real, live examples of a free press. When the discussion turns to the numerous controls that inhibit the right of the press to publish freely, the visitors are often suitably surprised.

A.H. Heard is the editor of the Cape Town Cape Times, South Africa's oldest established daily newspaper.



A.H. Heard: "There are restrictions on quoting certain banned or listed persons, laws against inciting racial hostility, against promoting banned meetings or banned organizations, and so on"

The government's so-called reform program has brought about some changes in socio-economic policies, such as de-racializing sex and marriage, opening of some public places, and a promised end to the influx control or "pass" laws, which bear down heavily on blacks, but there has been no let-up in controls on the press. On the contrary, they have been reinforced and ex-

tended. This means that the room for creative maneuver for editors who want to maintain the ramparts of freedom has been narrowed.

In the 1950s, a South African editor, the late Horace Flather of the Johannesburg *Star* newspaper, in a celebrated remark, described editing a newspaper in South Africa as walking blindfolded through a minefield. Since then, laws and regulations have borne down on newspaper reporting and (to a lesser extent) commentary in ways which make Flather's newspapering days seem idyllic. For people in the United States who take for granted the protection of the first amendment and an alert public opinion in defense of free expression, the South African situation is unthinkable different and difficult.

Measures against the press have gone hand in hand with the increased militarization of South Africa. The government argues that the military should be seen as an apolitical shield which protects the environment in which legitimate politics can take place, yet the reality is that it instinctively tends to view the defense forces as part and parcel of the ruling National Party, and some utterances by defense chiefs have confirmed this blurring of the vital distinction between the two. The State Security Council, the shadowy body made up mainly of security ministers and officials under President Botha's chairmanship that arguably rules South Africa, is very

much in the driver's seat when it comes to measures of a security nature, including those against the press.

The only encouraging factors in this repressive situation are the courage of some journalists and proprietors, the considerable room for dodging bureaucratic decrees (whether by use of humor or direct or indirect challenge), and the incompetence of some of those attempting near-tyranny.

The top policeman of Cape Town, Brigadier C. Swart, who was transferred to this region last year after dealing pretty summarily with both unrest and press in Port Elizabeth (the east coast "Detroit" where the reputation of the police for toughness is notorious), recently gave a personal demonstration of how ludicrous attempted repression can become. Using the sort of sweeping emergency power that should never be vested in one police commander, he banned the display of all posters, tee-shirts, etc., "of a political nature" on the eve of the opening of Parliament—an unworkable ban which had to be immediately rescinded by higher authority after an outcry in the daily newspapers.

What then hampers the press most in going about its job? Firstly, numerous measures designed specifically to stop publication. The Defense Act and a statute on strategic fuels apply total restriction on publication without ministerial permission. The Police and Prisons Acts have almost the same effect, except for the rather shrewd and indirect way restriction is achieved: It is an offense to publish any false or untrue material about police or defense without taking "reasonable steps" to check (what, indeed, are reasonable steps and what are untruths in a subjective world?).

There are restrictions on quoting certain banned or listed persons (as is apparent in the prosecution pending against me for having quoted African National Congress leader Oliver Tambo); there are laws against inciting racial hostility, against promoting banned meetings or banned organizations, endangering state security or furthering a boycott. And so on.

Although there is no physical censor in any newspaper office, from the point of view of officialdom it is preferable to have a hard-working editor himself

checking lists and phoning lawyers than official censors doing the work themselves. Let the editor censor himself.

There is no state press disciplinary body. There is a voluntary Media Council, set up by newspaper proprietors and editors, complete with an admirable set of ethical rules, but the capacity to fine up to 10,000 South African rands (about \$4,500) for transgressions. This shifts the proceedings from the ethical and moral suasion of one's peers that one finds, say, in the British press council, to a potentially punitive situation.

All this takes place under the threatening eye of government, which might try to bring pressure to bear on the press behind the scenes to tighten up the rules here and there to suit its needs. If the government becomes dissatisfied with the way the Media Council is doing its job, it could proceed with plans to give the Media Council a statutory (government-controlled) basis. Indeed, legislation along these lines was passed a few years ago by Parliament, but it has not yet been brought into effect. Such a move would arguably end what remains of press freedom in South Africa at one stroke.

It must be said that the South African Media Council, headed by two former judges of considerable eminence and with a reliable and fair-minded mediator secretary, has done good work and has managed to maintain its dignity and independence, but for how long? For instance, what does the State Security Council think about the council's obvious tolerance for free expression and the rule of law, or its activities designed to check developments "likely to restrict the supply of information of public interest and importance," which under its constitution it is charged to watch?

Then there are liaison committees, made up of editors and proprietors, who meet regularly with defense and police authorities to iron out professional and other problems. Since the government, in fact, has all the cards to exact compliance because of the onerous provisions of the defense and police acts, there are some senior journalists who wonder what these committees are achieving. They reach agreements, e.g. on how the press will be treated by the police in an unrest situation, but there is no guarantee against violations of such agree-

ments in the field, and little can be done about it in retrospect in the tea-and-cake atmosphere of the liaison committees, however excellent the intentions all around.

The obvious question is: In a situation where the government holds all the cards, what can a committee like this usefully do, except endure with fortitude being misled (e.g. over the defense force breaking of the Nkomati accord between South Africa and Mozambique), soothed (where there are justifiable complaints) or even gently ignored? There are areas where straightforward cooperation between the authorities and the press can be achieved in routine matters, but that could be done whether or not such committees exist.

The existence of liaison committees can lead to a false sense of security in the press, for editors might believe that they have some protection from prosecution or official action flowing from these committees, but in fact they do not. In spite of the committees, editors and journalists are still prosecuted under onerous laws, they have to face court summonses to hand over photographs of demonstrations, their reporters are harassed and impeded in their duty in the field by police, etc. What critics would describe as a cordial minuet goes on, with much frustration among journalists. But little can be done about it by the press, except to take the drastic step of detonating the liaison committee system and exposing the press to the naked face of power, which many argue would be a worse state than the first.

The state of emergency has brought with it new pressures and pitfalls for the press. The government has refrained from introducing all-embracing censorship orders under the emergency, at the time of writing, except the important restrictions concerning access to and the taking of photographs in unrest areas. But the press is on trial, and any moment the government can extend the emergency orders to full-scale censorship under the Public Safety Act.

In the field, reporters doing their job have been detained, arrested, charged, whipped, moved off, and sometimes treated not as the independent observers they are but as activists who must

be curbed and even punished. It is difficult to convince young would-be journalists that there are hopeful career prospects in this situation. The police are, admittedly, thinly stretched and busy, but the persistent complaint is that the top political authorities do far too little to curb police excess.

There have been ingenious attempts to use the sub judice rule to stop publication. It works this way: A newspaper hears a complaint against the police; it goes to the police with that complaint; the police then say the matter is being investigated, with the possibility of a charge in court against the alleged culprit, so it will be contempt of court to publish the complaint. Catch 22! The way to deal with this is simply to publish both sides in the matter, for the sub judice principle applies only when there is a specific court process.

In Port Elizabeth, there is a case going on which has not enjoyed the attention it deserves. The editor of the *Eastern Province Herald*, J.C. Viviers, and one of his reporters stand charged with having published false information about police activities. The case should clarify what the courts will regard as taking "reasonable steps" to check information. If the judgment amounts to a situation in which newspapers in practice simply accept the police version as truth, then the reporting of police activities will be severely inhibited, as happened with jail abuse reporting in the early 1970s when Laurence Gandar, the editor of the *Rand Daily Mail*, lost his celebrated and costly trial which turned on similar questions. Jail abuse in South Africa is seldom reported independently in the press, but few people believe that it never happens.

Newspapers in South Africa are small, relatively undiversified businesses and cannot afford to be constantly in and out of court. Editors have tiny staffs and cannot spare the time to sit for months in court. So the effect of it all is to make them play safe, with only the odd exciting moment when they decide to challenge authority—as indeed they surely must if they are to retain self-respect and inform the public of at least bare essentials. But this has to be done with maximum prudence and use of street-wise skills built up over years of experience.

The issue facing an editor with some potentially dangerous copy on his desk is often not only whether publication will contravene the law, but whether in the particular circumstances of publication, the authorities will go ahead and prosecute. Often, the latter question is more pertinent than the former, but one needs steel on one's teeth working under these conditions. A bad error can sink a newspaper financially, or even lead to a jail term for an editor. Understandably, proprietors will not be amused.

The emergency measures banning journalists from photographing the unrest areas have, in the short run, achieved their objective of greatly cutting down the prominence and volume of coverage locally and abroad, yet they have had no noticeable effect on the crisis in the country. As time goes by, and the unrest continues because the root

causes have not been removed, the disadvantages of the quick-fix of hanging the messenger will surely become more apparent—sneaked film might be widely viewed abroad, there could well be more in-depth coverage of South African policies and reality (on which the government could be particularly vulnerable), and there could be a general tendency in the world to identify South Africa with closed societies. When an ostensibly Western country is trying to negotiate better terms for debt repayment, this is invidious.

If the country wants to return to anywhere near the place it deserves for all its people in the community of nations, it must not only reform society socio-economically and politically, but respect human rights and free expression. Then the public will have a realistic idea of the alternatives as the process of change gets under way. □



"Newspapers in South Africa are small, relatively undiversified businesses and cannot afford to be constantly in and out of court"

Miriam Jacob

The Economic Pressure Point

Pressured by consumer boycotts, the domestic corporate sector, and international financiers, the South African government has hired a Swiss banker, Fritz Leutwiler, to negotiate on its behalf with foreign banks. Ultimately, however, the economic balance lies within the country's riot-torn townships.

BY VIVIENNE WALT

At first, Terence Victor, owner of the Fathers and Sons clothing store on the main street of Cradock, Eastern Cape, was suspicious of the visiting journalist who dropped in on him one afternoon last November. The boycott of his store was dragging into its third month, and he was in no mood for genial conversation, let alone speaking for quotation.

But after the journalist's third attempt to ply him with questions, the hostility wore thin, and Victor displayed a need to get certain problems off his chest. The boycott was hurting. "The last black we saw in here was the day before the boycott started," he said. "Before that, half my customers were black. It's been quite an eye-opener for all of us. Before the boycott, we used to stock things that the Bantu wore—you know, like wide-bottom trousers. We just had to change. We don't stock those things anymore."

According to the town council's brochure on Cradock, the little settlement was established "as a garrison against marauding *kaffirs*." These days, it bears the mark of its military origins. On this

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"Consumer boycotts have been used with increasing effectiveness to win local, specific demands"

afternoon, the streets of Cradock were all but deserted, save for a few armed soldiers patrolling the main street "because there's the trouble," as one said. An army truck rumbled by with a group of white school students atop, off on an outing.

Everything, it seemed, changed in Cradock the day in late July when Mat-

thew Goniwe and his four colleagues from the Cradock Residents Association (Cradora) were found by the side of the road near Port Elizabeth, hacked and burned to death.

The next day, the 25,000 residents of the town's black township, Lingelihle, shocked and grieving at losing Goniwe, their beloved leader, harnessed the sharpest weapon they had and aimed it at the 5,000 conservative whites of Cradock. No black would buy any item from a white store until the murderers—widely believed in Lingelihle to be connected with the police—were brought to justice.

The effect was immediate and a revealing example of how thousands of whites, previously unconcerned with the realities of apartheid, have been mobilized over the past year to join anti-government protests and to wonder if Pretoria's policies are placing their business future in jeopardy.

In short, more than the political turmoil, it is the economic crisis of the past year which has shaken the white minority, who are sheltered from the township violence by residential segregation and the heavily-censored South African Broadcasting Corporation.

In Cradock, Faith Collett, whose fabric store lost 75 percent of its business during the five-month boycott, was

moved to form the Cradock Employers Association to lobby Pretoria and negotiate with Cradock about Lingelihle's demands.

"We're putting the blacks' requests to [Minister of Law and Order] Le G. ange." Among the demands were the lifting of the state of emergency, which was imposed July 21, the day Goniwe and his colleagues were buried at a giant political funeral; removing troops and police from the township; and, above all, finding the community leaders' killers. "Before the boycott," admitted Collett, "we were inclined to live without ever thinking about what was happening in the township."

As if to reassure Cradock's whites that their black neighbors are not part of the community, the visitor to Cradock drives out of the white town and just before the tarred road turns to dirt, passes a sign reading, "Thank you for visiting Cradock." Beyond that lies Lingelihle township.

There, Gladwell Makaula, one of the few remaining Cradock activists still alive and out of jail, explained that the consumer boycott was aimed at "breaking through to whites. We had to make them realize what was happening here in the township, so that they could use their votes in a different way."

* * *

No one knows exactly how much support the government has lost through the economic woes of 1985. In special elections in October, the government suffered a notable setback, losing the previously loyal Sasolburg constituency to the very right-wing Herstigste Nasionale Party (HNP) (Reconstituted National Party).

Although a local mixed marriage, made possible by President P.W. Botha's repeal of the Mixed Marriages Act, was cited as the main cause for the government's defeat, another factor was repeatedly added to explain why Sasolburg turned against its long-held protectors: The town, seat of parastatal energy industries, was the home of workers at plants which were suffering directly from the worst recession in several decades and were threatening to lay off hundreds of their staff.

The thinking among the white workers, made vocal in questions to the gov-

ernment candidate at a public meeting early in the campaign, was that the recession was directly related to the government's inability to quell more than a year of violent protest and demonstrations or to persuade Western creditors to continue financing the apartheid economy. Drawing on their political predisposition, Sasolburg's voters opted to switch loyalties to the HNP, which promised to crack down hard on blacks and secure whites their economic privileges.

Between the time the state of emergency was declared in July and the government tested its electoral popularity on October 31, certain significant events suggested that the recession was indeed related to the country's image as unstable and riot-torn.

In August, banks in the United States beginning with Chase Manhattan, finding themselves under increasing pressure from the divestment lobby at home and alarmed at the nightly images of rioting on American television, refused to roll over their short-term loans to South Africa. So began a process of financially squeezing Pretoria and forcing the rand to plunge to an all-time low of \$0.35.

South Africa's great vulnerability to the foreign banks was suddenly revealed—about two-thirds of the country's \$18.3 billion foreign debt matures before August 1986. Without new loans, Pretoria was immediately unable to repay \$14 billion in short-term debts. The government declared a unilateral moratorium, which is still in effect. And with extraordinary craftiness, Pretoria

hired Swiss banker Fritz Leutwiler, former chairman of the Bank of International Settlements, to negotiate an agreement with the banks.

From the start, Leutwiler made it clear that he could not forge any deal acceptable to South Africa unless Botha offered some visible political concessions. Although the banker has since softened his point of view, saying that the government this year has "a hell of a [reform] program," his initial approach added to the jolt already felt among big businessmen in South Africa.

In mid-September, within weeks of the banks' decision, a group of businessmen broke accepted protocol by flying to Lusaka for unprecedented talks with ANC executive members. The group included some of South Africa's most important corporate directors: Tony Bloom, chairman of the Premier Group; Gavin Relly, chairman of Anglo American Corporation; and Zach de Beer of Anglo American Properties [see box]. Although the businessmen insisted they were not viewing the talks as negotiations between the country's government of the near future and a party concerned with protecting their interests in that future, such an impression was unavoidably drawn by many people in South Africa and abroad.


Raymond Ackerman, chief executive of Pick 'n Pay supermarkets, said he thought the talks had been "an excellent idea," because the business community "doesn't want to see a Marxist state."

"We want to see the continuance of free enterprise within a socialist state,"



Soweto: "What's the use of a five-star canteen when you have to go home to the terrible townships at night?"

United Nations



Odette Lugin's

Citicorp building, New York: "Banks in the U.S., finding themselves under increasing pressure from the divestment lobby at home, refused to roll over their short-term loans to South Africa"

he said. "There's a feeling in the business community that we have a very short time to sort out a constitution."

Such seemingly radical talk came just a few days after 91 businessmen had signed a full-page advertisement which ran in all the major newspapers in South Africa. They called for "abolishing statutory race discrimination wherever it exists; negotiating with acknowledged black leaders about power sharing; granting full South African citizenship to all our peoples; and restoring and entrenching the rule of law."

Their demands were diplomatically worded so as to appeal even to those businessmen who number among the more enlightened government supporters. The move drew a sneering attack from the *Sowetan*, the major black newspaper, which said the initiative was "a public relations exercise designed to give blacks the impression that they identify with their plight."

Responding to the attack, Mias van Vuuren, chief executive of Burroughs South Africa, said, "Of course there is self-interest in our involvement. We're in business to make a profit, and our trade is being affected."

In tandem with the businessmen's effort, Van Vuuren's parent company, Burroughs Corporation, helped form the U.S. Corporate Council on South Africa at a meeting in New York last September. The council's member investors include General Motors, IBM, Johnson & Johnson, and Mobil. What they shared was concern about their standing in the United States at a time when the call for divestment from South Africa was being increasingly supported and anxiety about the future of business in an intensely volatile country.

The very day before the council was launched, President Reagan took the steam out of the American divestment lobby by announcing a package of economic measures against South Africa which added up to a negligible new threat to the apartheid economy. The Reagan plan comprised a ban on the sale of krugerrands in the United States; a ban on computer exports to the Pretoria government; prohibiting new loans to the government; and banning the export of nuclear technology. It was clear to the U.S. company executives that these measures were far harsher in bark than in bite.

The U.S. Corporate Council on South Africa decided they nevertheless needed to avoid alienating the black majority in South Africa. The Sullivan Code, first signed in 1977 by General Motors, committed U.S. corporations in South Africa to a policy of racial non-discrimination, but had failed to offset the demand for divestment from South Africa, and was regarded with some scorn by black workers in South Africa. GM's own shop steward, Cliffie Brainers, said in an interview in Port Elizabeth that the code "might as well be thrown out the window because it isn't working here at all. People are being trained as artisans [in accordance with Sullivan's emphasis on training programs for black workers] but there are so many retrenchments, they have to look for work elsewhere when they're finished."

Peter Williams, until recently shop steward at Ford's plant in Port Elizabeth, denigrated Sullivan's stipulation of racially mixed work facilities. "What's the use of a five-star canteen when you have to go home to the terrible townships at night?"

In the end, said Brian Matthew, director of the Midland Chamber of Industry in Port Elizabeth, "Divestment happens for economic and not political reasons. It's easy to bear the political pressures if you're making good profits, but with these enormous losses [as in the auto industry in Port Elizabeth] what's the point?"

* * *

When the negotiations between the bankers and Leutwiler resumed February 20, it seemed as though the government might pull through with at least the overt trappings of an economic recovery, with or without new loans from Western banks.

Leutwiler announced he wanted another year's moratorium on repayments of the short-term foreign debt, to be extended to March 1987, with South Africa meanwhile making a down-payment of 5 percent, or \$500 million, of the debt. A technical review will take place in February 1987, a kind of deadline for the South African government to put into effect its political reforms as outlined by Botha when he opened Parliament in Cape Town on January 31.

Meanwhile, the government is embarking on its giant Mossel Bay energy project, which will generate massive revenue, and inflation is predicted to reach 20 percent or more this year. South Africa has had an added windfall from the rising price of its gold exports and the falling price of oil imports, and growth is expected to be 2 percent this year, compared with last year's 1 percent contraction, allowing the government to start token repayment of the foreign debt.

But a New York banking official, who refused to be named, cautioned against too much optimism. "If there's not progress and some positive response from black South Africans [to reform moves by the government]," he said, "and the township violence doesn't abate and there's no evident progress on negotiat-

ing the future of South Africa, then there will be an increasingly negative country risk assessment."

Among the more visible moves the bankers and big businessmen in South Africa are pushing for is the release of Nelson Mandela, expected before the end of the year. "The banks believe that Mandela's release and the ANC's participation is necessary to achieve progress," said the New York banker, taking a position significantly different from that adopted by the West just a few years ago.

Ultimately, however, the economic balance lies within the country's restive black townships, and not around the boardroom tables of New York's financial institutions.

Township violence has increased, not abated. More than 100 people were

killed in the first seven weeks of 1986, compared with 1,000 people in the 16 months before that. When the bankers met the South African negotiators on February 21, the state of emergency was still in force, apartheid cornerstones like the pass laws and Group Areas Act were still in place, and up to 80 people had just died in three days of fighting at Alexandra, spitting distance from the homes of many company directors in Sandton, Johannesburg. Consumer boycotts such as that in Cradock have been used with increasing effectiveness to win local, specific demands.

The South African economy's full weakness has been laid bare over the past year. Now, said Brian Matthew, "No solution will have an impact on the economy as much as a political solution." □

Interview

Zach de Beer

Director, Anglo American Properties Former Member of Parliament, the Progressive Federal Party

INTERVIEWED BY VIVIENNE WALT

Africa Report: The business community has suddenly emerged as a major force pushing for change. Cynics say the reason is that business people are feeling the effects of the current recession.

De Beer: The economic crisis has certainly concentrated their minds wonderfully. But we are all corporate citizens, and we have certain motives: We have a desperate concern to achieve stability, and increasingly there's been a tendency for blacks to perceive the South African system as one and the same, indivisible. People must be made to realize that businessmen don't support the government or apartheid.

Business has had no part in forming apartheid. Business is

quite entitled to claim that it is separate. But blacks perceive of "the system" as one. Kids in the townships are tending to go for any black man who looks like a businessman, who wears a suit, and carries a briefcase. Any black who has a decent job is now at risk. What's all-important is the danger that when black people do get political power, they are going to throw free enterprise out with white rule.

Africa Report: Since you have now met the ANC in Lusaka, do you have some idea of what the future of free enterprise might be under their rule?

De Beer: Quite frankly, the ANC frightens me a lot less than a lot of the kids in the townships. People take up stands—like the ANC takes up Marxism—and they adhere to them, but will moderate their stands according to the needs of the sys-

tem. In Zimbabwe, almost nothing's been nationalized, and business has done remarkably well. We accept that the ANC is an actor of importance, but I will not say that it's inevitably the future government.

Africa Report: The declaration signed last September by yourself and 90 other business leaders, including some known Botha supporters, called for an end to statutory racial discrimination, negotiations with black leaders over power-sharing, restoration of the rule of law, and full citizenship for all South Africans. That seems tantamount to asking the government to resign. Would you say this is the feeling?

De Beer: Certainly nothing will do short of dismantling apartheid. We are asking for the government to resign. It's a terrifying prospect for the government to share power because it will mean they will all lose their jobs. Even if they abolish the pass laws, and the Group Areas Act, and power remains in the hands of the whites, there will still be huge obstacles.

Africa Report: How much support does the government need from big business, and consequently, how much impact can you have on government policy?

De Beer: The changes that have come about—the 99-year leaseholds for blacks, the improvements in education, the freeing of the trade union movement—none of this would have happened had business not been pressing for them, especially through the Urban Foundation (set up after the 1976-77 riots). I'm not saying it's the only factor, but definitely a necessary one. The report of the President's Council which recommended the end to the pass laws was lifted right out of the Urban Foundation.

As far as actual votes are concerned, big business has negligible votes. Shortly after Botha came to power in 1978, he called the Carlton Conference [to meet with business people], and that was followed by the Good Hope Conference in Cape Town. He made a totally inoffensive speech to businessmen, with a ringing commitment to free enterprise, privatization, etc. It was very well-received by the business community. He gained the support of a wide range of businessmen, including those who were Progs [official opposition Progressive Federal Party voters].

In the referendum, [for the new constitution, held in November 1983] about half the Prog members voted for the new constitution. And now, it's totally swung the other way. So, at the time of the referendum, government thought it very important to have the support of the business community. That support has been virtually unanimously lost now.

Africa Report: But as I said before, cynics would argue that support for the government will swing back as soon as there's an economic recovery.

De Beer: I think some of those people who signed that ad won't vote Nat [Nationalist Party] again, even though they've voted Nat all their lives. Much depends on what happens in the townships. It's quieted down a little, but it will come back very soon. I think that there's an awareness among business

people, at least a minimum of racial tolerance, which is probably greater now than at any time in my life. It will convert them into lifelong opponents of the government. Twenty years ago people were saying they couldn't believe people could live together, and now they are saying they have to learn to live together, and the government is saying so too. The Botha government is now taking the line that racial discrimination is bad, that if apartheid means the suppression of blacks, then we are against apartheid. But the government is also beginning to see that the logic of dismantling apartheid is that they will go out of power, and so they are saying, slow down.

Africa Report: Many of the government's comments are seen as empty rhetoric to satisfy the demands of their critics. And critics of big business argue that in fact, apartheid has suited you very well, providing you with cheap migrant labor. Could you explain in what concrete ways apartheid has been bad for business?

De Beer: First and foremost, we have to employ the products of the black school system. And it's bad. Second, the consumer population does not provide a market for the more sophisticated products which the country should be producing at this stage.

And then there are the enormous dangers in industrial relations. Having structured black trade unions makes our job easier. The unions have become vehicles of political change. But now business managers are finding themselves having to cope with unions which are like political parties. It's like in Britain, workers got union rights before they got the vote, and they have been politicized ever since. In the United States, they got the vote before they got union rights, and they have not been politicized. So, we went out and created politicized unions.

Africa Report: Is divestment a real threat to South Africa?

De Beer: The threat itself is more effective than the actual divestment. Reagan's move [last fall] was very good, because the threat of further sanctions exists. Of course, British sanctions would be much more serious, both for us and for them.

Africa Report: What would you like to see the government do?

De Beer: The short-term thing is the pass laws. For 50 years, the pass laws have been at the top of the list of grievances of blacks. For the black man in the street, this could be a real breakthrough. But Botha is running away from this. We don't like having our workers arrested because they have left their passes at home. But still, the real issue at stake is the quality of life in the townships. There are 1,000 pass law arrests every day.

Africa Report: Would this mean the end to migrant labor?

De Beer: I don't think migrant labor in the mines could ever be ended. This is the nature of mining; mines don't last forever, and it wouldn't be practical to build whole towns if the mine expires in 20 years. □

Business Bears Down

A business charter was recently published by the South African Federated Chamber of Industries, committing its members to universal human rights and outlining business' role in pressing for change. FCI's chief executive officer, representing the largest sector of the South African economy, explains why the corporate community is committed to power-sharing.

BY J.C. VAN ZYL

Despite the controversy and the rhetoric, the basic message from South Africa is rather simple and positive. Fundamental political realities dictate that there is no alternative for the people in South Africa but to negotiate about the constitutional future of their country. Whether the various political groupings involved wish to share power is irrelevant. They will simply have to. This basic truth applies as inevitably to black politics on the left as to the South African government on the far right.

In dynamic terms, an unstoppable process of transformation is occurring in South Africa, driven mainly by black aspirations and discontent which are generating powerful internal pressures for reform. Significantly, this demand for fundamental change is being supported by the South African business community both for reasons of enlightened self-interest and broader social responsibility. Collectively, these internal pressures are now sufficiently powerful to sustain the process whatever government does or whether overseas interests engage or disengage from the country. Thus, the real issue is not whether genuine reform will take place, but whether the road to power-sharing will be violent or at least relatively peaceful.

Why overt business involvement in

Dr. J.C. van Zyl is chief executive officer of the South African Federated Chamber of Industries.

politics? The South African business community has a deep interest in the outcome of this issue. This is why it has recently featured so prominently in promoting a process of political accommodation in the country. By all international standards, this is a very unusual role for any business community to assume. While the major national organizations in commerce and industry have indeed had many in-depth discussions with government over the years about the issue of apartheid, it is only during the past 18 months or so that they have publicly and jointly expressed their firm opposition. The main reasons for this major shift in stance are as follows:

- Business is deeply concerned that increasingly violent internal conflict between black and white may become institutionalized in South Africa. Because of the strength and the numbers on both sides, violence cannot resolve such a confrontation at all. In fact, in a full-scale race war, only death, bloodshed, and poverty can emerge as ultimate victors. This is why it is felt so strongly that the only realistic option for the country is to negotiate about its constitutional future. The costs of getting rid of apartheid in any other way, especially in terms of human life, are much too great.
- The traditional "business way of life," i.e. the private enterprise system, is fundamentally at stake. It is the perception of business that if South Africa's people lose control over the process of change, either white or black dominated

authoritarianism will result in which there will be little room for a market-oriented approach to economic life.

- If effective channels of political expression for blacks right up to the highest level are not developed, they will increasingly be forced to employ industrial relations mechanisms to voice their grievances. Such a development is fundamentally unsound and would put the business community in an untenable position.

- It is now a fact of life that the South African economy has become much too large to be managed by whites alone. Hence, in its own self-interest, business simply must get involved with black advancement in the broad sense and in particular in the sphere of promoting the rapid development of black skills and managerial expertise.

It is therefore self-interest combined with social responsibility issues which are driving the business community toward active promotion of the reform process in southern Africa and South Africa.

Business Reform Objectives

It has been very much the pressure of economic forces, whether diffused through the market place or articulated through business groups, which has promoted the process of black advancement, the rapid growth of black spending power, the emergence of black trade unions, and the development of a black business class. In many ways, economic

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
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progress has laid the foundation for the current intense debate about black political participation in South Africa.

Against this background, organized commerce and industry, representing the great majority of white and black business interests in the country, has stated clearly the reform objectives it regards as essential and urgent for South Africa. These are:

- the removal of statutory racial discrimination from all the affairs of state;
- negotiating a dispensation of genuine political power-sharing by all South Africans right up to the highest level on the basis of an open-ended agenda and participation by all accepted leaders;
- effective devolution of power to local levels of government with full participation by all local constituents;
- full and equal citizenship for all South Africans;
- full participation in a private enterprise economy by all South Africans regardless of race, color, sex, or creed;
- the further development of a strong, free, and independent trade union movement;
- equality of opportunity in the provision of education to all population groups as a matter of national priority.

Significantly, the South African government has already committed itself publicly to most of these objectives. In turn, business has pledged its full support and practical assistance in effecting rapid implementation in these crucial areas.

Yet the situation remains critical. South African society is riven by conflict and escalating violence and repression. Despite the significant political reforms introduced by the government, there is growing black frustration and agitation for political rights as reflected in rising protest and increased determination to secure fundamental change. Domestic unrest, consumer boycotts, and external sanctions and pressures have all taken their toll on the economy and in particular have seriously undermined local and international investment and business confidence.

As a result of these factors, South Africa is now facing a foreign financing crisis. Debt rescheduling is being negotiated by the monetary authorities, but in hard reality nothing short of normalizing external refinancing will permit con-

tinued economic growth which is so vital to the entire process of political and social change in the country.

What is now needed to restore credibility and confidence in the country is a realistic and visible program of political reform and economic reconstruction as a rallying point to promote internal unity as well as to address the international community. Concrete results must be produced urgently.

The unacceptable alternative is to retreat into growing economic and political isolationism and drift into a repressive siege society, necessitating greater government intervention and direct control over political expression, foreign exchange, prices, and wages. History has shown that economic and political stagnation is the inevitable outcome of such a negative reaction. It has to be recognized, however, that in some domestic circles, such an option not only appears attractive but seems to be gaining ground.

In the view of business, there is a growing international perception that the most important yardstick by which to measure real progress in domestic reform is the visible commencement of serious negotiation with all important South African political leaders. It is well understood overseas that once the process of negotiation is underway, it will be driven by South Africans in terms of their own agenda. For foreigners to interfere at this stage would be quite inappropriate.

There should be no overseas prescription for the outcome of the negotiation process—only that it must visibly and credibly start soon.

A major problem faced by the South African government up to the present is that urban blacks have been very reluctant to commence negotiations. The reasons are complex but include the fact that the credibility of many black leaders depends on their not accepting the apartheid framework. This means in turn that before beginning serious negotiation, they have to be assured that they will be negotiating as equal partners and that the constitutional framework of the country itself will be the true subject of negotiation and not merely the means of making the system of apartheid more acceptable to blacks.

In practical terms, South Africa is

therefore still in a pre-negotiation phase during which much essential homework needs to be done. The ultimate success of eventual formal negotiations depends on the success of largely private and behind-the-scenes discussion aimed at conciliation and confidence-building which is now occurring. This, however, will have to be considerably intensified and expanded to include all important black and white leaders and political groups in the country.

What Role for Business?

Government has already committed itself publicly to political power-sharing through negotiation, a politically unified South Africa, and full citizenship for all South Africans.

Surprising as it may seem, these fundamental democratic commitments have had little political impact. In many domestic and international circles, government is simply not being taken seriously. In fact, it clearly has a major credibility problem. This may not be entirely justified and there is little doubt that to an extent, incorrect perceptions lie at the root of this dilemma. Nevertheless, the facts speak for themselves. A considerable degree of polarization and a hardening of political attitudes have created a climate in which it will be very difficult to make public progress.

Under these highly strained circumstances, it is doubtful whether government alone can generate the necessary breakthroughs to establish a credible process of peaceful negotiation among all the major South African political interests. As a major negotiating party in its own right, government needs assistance which can be provided, *inter alia*, by the business community. Government has already acknowledged and accepted this offer.


Business at large is only too aware of the practical constraints under which it operates and has no wish to promise what it cannot deliver. Businessmen do not run the country and have no wish to do so. At the same time, business is not itself a negotiating party in the constitution-making process which is already in progress. Its main interest is therefore to act as a positive agent of change and to play a catalytic role, supporting and facilitating serious negotiation. In addition to this dynamic interaction aimed at

bringing the various parties closer together, business is making it clear where it stands in terms of fundamental democratic values and human rights.

To clarify both this basic position and the manner of interaction with the reform processes in the country, the South African Federated Chamber of Industries, with wide public support from major sister organizations, recently

work of universally accepted democratic principles and human rights. The business initiative as a whole therefore constitutes a principled agenda for implementation by all South Africans as a new rallying point in progressing toward serious negotiation about South Africa's constitutional future.

The substantive part of the charter is based on and employs the traditional



Johannesburg Stock Exchange: "The traditional 'business way of life,'—the private enterprise system—is fundamentally at stake"

published a business charter of social, economic, and political rights which commits members to universally accepted human rights. An accompanying action program outlines the catalytic mediating and conciliating role which business is playing as well as the need for some basic economic reconstruction.

The Business Charter and Action Program

The above initiatives are based on a deep conviction in the business community that the current crisis, marked by widespread lack of trust and negative perceptions both inside and outside the country, can indeed be overcome if the government should continue forcefully with its reform initiatives provided that these are firmly based on a basic frame-

rhetoric of the most widely accepted bills of rights in the Western world—from the Magna Carta to the UN International Declaration of Economic, Social, and Political Rights, and the European Convention of Human Rights. The acceptance and support of this extensive declaration of human rights thus links the business community in South Africa directly to the great traditions of Western democracy.

It should be noted that none of the principles involved contradict South African common law and they accord with the preamble of the South African constitution of 1983.

The final operative part of the business charter as well as the more specific action program are based on the principles in the substantive part of the charter. In practice, most of the intended

action on the political front is aimed at persuasion and conciliation. This confirms the essentially catalytic role of business as a mediator but at the same time as a strong supporter of a democratic, social, economic, and political order in South Africa based on fundamental human rights. Indeed, in this latter sphere, business is openly prescriptive: It is strongly challenging all South Africans to accept a bill of rights as the cornerstone of their future constitutional dispensation.

More particularly, the business charter and action program aim to break new ground by generating the following effects:

- Apartheid is being universally condemned on moral grounds because it flies directly in the face of basic human rights. Although clearly important, eliminating the policy of apartheid will not by itself be sufficient unless the new society in South Africa accepts a clear commitment to democratic values and universally accepted basic human rights. The statement of social, economic, and political rights supported by the business community as a whole aims to give direction and content to the crucial debate about a more just, post-apartheid society in the country.
- Government's own reform moves have up to now received little or no

credit internationally and among many South Africans. The business charter provides an internationally accepted set of values and therefore a fundamental benchmark against which the alternatives can be evaluated by independent observers to obtain a more balanced perspective on the overall process of change.

- A human rights charter and action program submitted by business as a non-negotiating but interested party could serve as a significant rallying point for negotiation and national unity in the present climate of widespread prejudice and distrust. Practical experience indicates that a set of basic principles and guidelines are needed to guide and discipline subsequent formal negotiation around the conference table. It is in this fluid and delicate area that business can play a catalytic role based both on its extensive industrial relations experience and its publicly declared principles and values.
- A statement of social, economic, and political rights supported by business at large would help to counteract a possible trend toward autocratic government.

Economic Reconstruction

On the economic front, the action program commits business to actively promote:

- opening the economy to all entrepreneurship regardless of race, color, sex, or creed;
- a more inward-looking development strategy built around positive urbanization which, it believes, is more in line with the economic realities and resources of the country;
- extended privatization and deregulation of the economy, especially in the spheres of housing, health, transport, and education;
- supply-side stimulation involving a cut in direct taxes and curbs on the share of government in the economy to create both the scope and the incentive for private entrepreneurship.

The above program of economic reconstruction is aimed at developing an overall strategy to open the South African economy to all, stimulate private enterprise, and relieve the country of an intolerable tax burden and a massively burgeoning bureaucracy. Only in this way can South Africa remain competitive in world markets while at the same time create employment opportunities in line with its growing labor supply.

The business community has considerable confidence in the fundamental desire of all South Africans to unite in an effort to reach genuine political accommodation in a more just and prosperous society. It believes that the government itself is on this track. In his recent address to open Parliament, P.W. Botha indicated at some length his government's commitment to the basic democratic values and human rights as contained in the FCI business charter. He pledged that South Africa will remain part of the international community of nations and that there can be no further moves into political and economic isolationism.

Nevertheless, the road of political negotiation which lies ahead will unquestionably be bumpy and difficult. But the outcome is certain. Too many powerful internal processes and developments are moving irreversibly toward fundamental shifts in the contours of power and a new non-apartheid society. Other interests would do well to join the South African business community in actively supporting these forces to ensure that the process of transition is as non-violent and non-traumatic as possible. □



Jason Laurre/Woodfin Camp

"Business must get involved with black advancement in the sphere of promoting the rapid development of black skills and managerial experience"

The National Party's Reform Program

In the wake of President Botha's January speech, the information officer of the National Party argues that the South African government is embarking on fundamental changes in apartheid which must be viewed in historical perspective and given support by the international community.

BY STOFFEL VAN DER MERWE

On January 31, President P. W. Botha made a strongly reformist speech in his opening address to the South African Parliament. Some critics tried to detract from its reformist character in light of later speeches by other cabinet ministers and the president's own rebuke of Foreign Minister P. W. Botha when the latter speculated about the possibility of a black president for South Africa somewhere in the future. Without arguing the point, I feel totally confident that President Botha's speech will prove to be a major milestone in the history of reform in South Africa.

Before turning to some specific details of what lies immediately ahead in terms of reforms, it will be useful to consider a broader perspective on the reform policy as such. In doing so, it is important to have an idea of where the South African government is coming from and where it is trying to go.

The problem facing successive South African governments over several decades has been to find a way in which to expand democracy to the whole population—especially the black people—without falling into the same pitfalls as

the rest of Africa, i.e. ending up with civil war, dictatorship, or the like.

It was—and still is—the conviction of successive governments that the mere introduction of the Westminster or any other Western model of democracy into the peculiar multicultural situation of South Africa would not bring democracy, but simply replace the existing white minority rule with some form of black minority rule—due to the variety of black power groups in South Africa. Even if genuine black majority rule could be effected, the danger is still very real that a power struggle could erupt and lead to the same bloody destruction as was witnessed too often in the rest of Africa.

The reaction of early South African governments was to deny the claim of blacks to political participation—and all sorts of racialist theories were imported (including from the U.S.) to support this position. We also expanded handsomely on these theories. All this started long before the National Party came to power in 1948, but it eventually formed the basis of what came to be known as "apartheid."

The injustices brought about by apartheid, the criticisms from abroad, and the rising tide of Uhuru that swept Africa in the late 1950s and early 1960s prompted the South African govern-

ment at the time to review its policies and to adopt the policy of "separate development" as its official dogma in the place of the more primitive apartheid.

There was an important difference between apartheid and separate development in that the latter made provision, in theory at least, for the development of black people at all levels, whereas apartheid had imposed a ceiling above which no black was allowed to develop. The catch in separate development, however, was that such unfettered development was only permitted in the black "homelands"—areas where blacks had settled in the previous centuries. In the rest of the country, the so-called "white South Africa," blacks would continue to be subjected to all types of limitations.

The theory was that with full freedom being allowed in the black areas (which were also to be developed economically) and very limited freedom in the "white" areas, blacks would naturally gravitate toward the black areas and therefore a natural separation could be effected.

The broad idea was to recreate the conditions in Europe where each nation inhabited its own geographic state so that interactions between groups could be conducted at the international level. In this way, it was thought, we could

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escape from the inevitable power struggle which follows when a state is inhabited by several different cultural groups that are in competition with one another.

Justice could then be done to everyone and the question of domination and oppression would disappear automatically. Therefore, the switch from apartheid to separate development was a conscious effort to escape from the inherent injustice of apartheid. Two problems arose, however. The first was that the black areas were too small, both for the black population explosion and for the envisaged development which did not occur at the required rate.

The second problem was that the "new approach" created circumstances where apartheid could persist in the "white" areas. In theory this did not matter, because the blacks could escape apartheid by moving, as was the idea, to the black areas where there was no apartheid. In practice, this proved to be a fallacy because blacks were not really able to move to the black areas as development was needed to provide jobs and a reasonable standard of living. The end result was that millions of black people were caught in a persisting apartheid situation.

It took some years before this fact was fully accepted by the government and by the supporters of the National Party. They had to abandon a dream into which a great deal of effort and money had been sunk. This does not come easily to a whole people. Just think about the trauma which the abandonment of the American war effort in Vietnam caused to the American people—even though it was thousands of miles removed from their daily lives.

The final abandoning of the idea to create an environment on the European model where justice for all could be ensured by the creation of full-fledged independent states for each group presented the ruling group in South Africa with a whole new ball game, for which the rules are not clear as yet.

But one thing was clear from the start: A new system would have to be created in which justice for all, irrespective of race, color, or creed, and the human rights and dignity of all individuals would be guaranteed.

To switch from one approach to another

which is radically different is not only a traumatic experience, but also an extremely complex process. When a particular law or system of related laws governing an issue such as influx control (the "pass laws") has to be changed, it is not merely a process of scrapping a few statutes from the books. Such laws have



Tannenbaum/Sygnia

President P.W. Botha: "The problem facing successive South African governments over several decades has been to find a way in which to expand democracy to the whole population"

far-reaching implications for other facets of life where uncertainties regarding law would then be created.

For instance, the "pass laws" not only limit the movement of black people but also accord differing status and rights to different classes of black people. A simple scrapping of the laws would affect

rights acquired by such black people and would thus create chaos in the area of the law. To remove a tumor without irreparable damage to the body is a process that requires meticulous planning and expert execution.

Also, to simply abandon one course of action without preparing the way for the setting of a new course at the same time would leave the society floundering and make it easy prey to the forces of chaos from which nobody but a very few revolutionaries would gain.

Another facet of the South African reality that should be borne in mind is the extremely complex ethno-cultural composition of the population. It does not merely consist of a recalcitrant group of white colonialists on the one hand and a single oppressed black group on the other hand, but rather upwards of 11 groups each with its own language, culture, and history. No one of these groups form a majority; each of them (including the whites who are not colonialists but rather settlers of more than 10 generations) have a historical right in South Africa and a history of fighting for those rights.

There is no clear majority. The largest group is the Zulus, comprising about 23 percent. In fact, all groups are minorities, and the protection of minority groups against domination by another group or combination of groups will have to be an important feature of any future political dispensation.

It is against this background that the government of President P.W. Botha has struggled for several years to introduce meaningful reform. Much has already been achieved. Today, a black person can do any job and receive equal pay for equal work. He can belong to any labor union of his choice. All discriminatory legislation affecting sports has been removed. He can join any (legal) political party, and marry (or sleep with) any person of his choice. Only political parties or movements with an express policy of overthrowing the government with violence (a basically undemocratic policy) remain on the prohibited list.

Many areas of discriminatory legislation still exist, notably the "pass laws" which inhibit the free movement of black people to some extent. The government has declared its intention to remove all discriminatory laws from the

statute books, but maintains that some (non-discriminatory) differentiation between groups will remain necessary in order to give adequate protection to minority groups. These will have to be introduced in the form of amending legislation in the current session of Parliament (i.e., before the end of June this year) and include:

- Restoration of South African citizenship (with its important implications for political participation) to black people permanently resident in South Africa and whose citizenship had been taken away before.
- Extension of freehold property rights to black people.
- Extension of the powers of existing institutions in which black people participate at lower levels of government.
- Removal of the "pass laws" and the introduction of a uniform identity document for all.
- Removal of discriminatory stipulations from the immigration laws.
- Inclusion of all groups in the system of provincial government.
- Legislation empowering the state president to lift unnecessary limitations on entrepreneurship which still inhibit the informal sector in which the black people are very active.

These are concrete steps which form part of an overall reform package and which can be monitored because a specific time frame has been attached to them. Of course, it is more difficult to attach a time frame to other facets of the process such as the involvement of blacks in the central decision-making process (voting rights) because these are the subject of painstaking negotiations with the leaders of the people involved. Would it be possible to attach a time frame to the negotiations regarding disarmament?

In order to provide temporary relief in this regard, the state president announced his intention to create a statutory council in which the leaders of all black communities can regularly meet with the government, under the chairmanship of the state president himself, in order to discuss any facet of government policy including legislation.

This means that if a sufficient number of black leaders of standing would accept this offer, such a council could start operating in the near future and give black

people a say (albeit only in an advisory capacity for the moment) at the highest possible level, until such time as more permanent structures with full participatory powers can be established.

The composition and functions of this statutory council have been purposely left vague in order to leave some room for flexibility in negotiation with the parties involved.



"The 'pass laws' not only limit the movement of black people but also accord differing status and rights to different classes of black people"

Another field that is of critical importance but where only a general commitment is possible at this stage, is education. The state president has committed the government to the ideal of equal education for all and is in fact at present creating an overarching education department that will ensure equal norms and standards for all branches of the decentralized education departments.

At present the state spends less money per capita on black education than for the education of whites, Coloureds, and Indians. This is partly due to historical factors, but the government has committed itself to move toward an equalization and the expenditure on black education has grown by leaps and bounds over the past few years. It is just not physically possible to rectify such a matter overnight. The impending budget (March 17) will show how much the government is prepared to move in this regard.

Some areas remain extremely complicated. Opponents of the government insist that apartheid will not come to an end until such time as separate residential areas, separate schools, and the Population Registration Act are scrapped. The government and its supporters maintain that these measures are necessary in order to afford adequate safeguards to at least the white community. It is a debate with many sides and many valid arguments. This debate goes on.

The important point is that the government and the National Party have committed themselves to the creation of a system that will afford justice to all, regardless of race, color, or creed.

And this commitment comes deep from the very soul of the Afrikaners who waged their own battle against colonial injustice for centuries. The only convincing that the vast majority of whites in general and Afrikaners in particular need is that a specific arrangement, whether on the social, cultural, economic, or political field, will bring a situation of greater justice to all, and will not require them to commit suicide.

President Botha stated in his address to Parliament: "We do not need pressure in order to travel the road of reform and justice. We do it from inner conviction."

This is true of the majority of South Africans. He also stated: "Let there be no doubt of our sincerity and dedication to fulfill our commitments in accordance with these norms and values."

If these sentiments could be accepted on face value by the outside world, even if only provisionally, the debate between it and the South African government could be conducted at a much more constructive level. □

The Soviet-South African Connection

While the Soviet Union and South Africa are outspoken antagonists on the international political scene, they have one interest in common—they share a secretive and profitable relationship for the marketing of gold and diamonds.

BY KURT M. CAMPBELL

The growing debate in the United States about the wisdom and morality of continued economic investment in South Africa has outraged the white leaders of Afrikanerdom. In the face of a growing movement in the U.S. to disassociate from the South African economy, President P.W. Botha has stated that the United States faces a choice between the continuation of "white civilization" and the spectre of "Soviet-backed godless communism."

Indeed, it is widely believed in South Africa that the Soviet Union, through its ties with avowedly Marxist governments in Angola and Mozambique and its aid to outlawed guerrilla organizations, is waging a "total onslaught" against the white republic. The USSR, a long-time supporter of the anti-apartheid movement and champion of the rights of the black majority in South Africa, has reaped considerable propaganda value from the U.S.'s close ties with the racist regime.

It is well-known that the U.S. is dependent on South Africa for supplies of certain imported minerals, principally chromium, manganese, vanadium, and the platinum group metals. These so-

called "strategic minerals" are vital to industry and often have military applications. This dependency has served to rationalize continued American investment and trade with South Africa. The Soviet Union has long been critical of these economic ties between the U.S. and South Africa and has supported economic sanctions against the republic in the United Nations. Soviet spokesmen point out that, in stark contrast with the United States, the USSR has no trade whatsoever with South Africa.

While the Soviet Union and South Africa are outspoken antagonists on the international political scene, they do have one interest in common—they share a secretive and profitable relationship for the marketing of gold and diamonds. In November 1980, Gordon Waddell, an executive director of the Anglo American Corporation of South Africa, was spotted at the Bolshoi Theatre by a BBC correspondent during a performance of Mussorgsky's Boris Gudonov. When asked what a South African citizen—a country reviled by the Kremlin and denied diplomatic recognition—was doing in Moscow, Waddell would say only that he was "passing through." The former deputy ambassador at the Soviet embassy in London, Vladimir Bykov, said that "perhaps he went there as a tourist, why not?" Waddell's appearance in the USSR spurred

speculation that South Africa and the Soviet Union were again conferring about their byzantine commercial relationship.

Through an accident of politics and geology, most of the world's reserves of gold, diamonds, and platinum are found beneath the earth of those two vehement enemies. The minerals are uniquely important to their respective economies, and both sides have a vital stake in keeping world prices as high as possible. Gold and diamond sales to the West have long provided the Soviet Union with hard currency for purchases of Western technology and grain. For South Africa, the price of gold determines its economic future. Given these realities, it is perhaps not surprising that a collusive relationship for the marketing of precious metals has grown between the two countries.

The explanation for the collaboration between the Soviet Union and South Africa lies in the operating practices of the vast Anglo American Corporation of South Africa. Anglo American and its sister company, De Beers Consolidated Mines of South Africa, control most of the Western world's gold, diamonds, and platinum. Harry Oppenheimer, builder of the Anglo American mining empire, is the chairman of De Beers and runs its affairs from his imposing offices at 44 Main Street in Johannesburg. De Beers, first under the direction of Sir

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Ernest Oppenheimer and later his son Harry, has proved to be the most successful cartel in the annals of modern commerce, handling over 80 percent of the world's gem-quality diamonds.

This ingenious scheme for creating and sustaining the value of diamonds was threatened by the discovery of diamonds in the Soviet Union. Large amounts of gem-quality stones from Siberian mines began to appear in international markets in 1956, and it seemed that South Africa's control of the world supply of diamonds would be destroyed. Harry Oppenheimer reasoned that if the Soviet Union ever attempted to market its diamonds independently of De Beers, the world price would plummet. He therefore moved boldly to bring the Soviet Union into the cartel arrangement.

It was 1957, and South Africa had just broken off diplomatic relations because of alleged Soviet complicity with the South African Communist Party. The prospects for an agreement were not promising. Oppenheimer dispatched his cousin, Sir Philip Oppenheimer, to Moscow to make the case for Soviet participation in the De Beers system. The South African proposal called for De Beers to buy up the entire Soviet production of gem quality diamonds for a price that would be renegotiated annually. These diamonds, in turn, would be marketed through the Central Selling Organization (CSO) network. This arrangement proved suitable to the Soviets, and Sir Philip returned to London with a secret contract to market all Soviet diamonds to the West, the full conditions of which have never been disclosed.

Since the official policy of the USSR supported the national liberation struggle against South Africa, the Soviet Union insisted from the outset that De Beers deny the existence of any commercial relationship, and Oppenheimer was only too happy to oblige. After the Sharpeville shootings in 1960, it was politically even more important for the Russians not to be seen doing business with South Africa. In the 1963 annual report of the chairman, Oppenheimer noted that "on account of Russian support for the boycotting of trade with South Africa, our contract to buy Russian diamonds has not been renewed."

In actuality, the marketing arrangement was never severed but continued unbroken in even greater sophistication and secrecy. In 1978, Oppenheimer stated that South Africa has "no reason for concealing this arrangement other than that the Russians prefer not to receive any public attention for obvious reasons."

Although the full provisions of the marketing arrangement are subject to speculation, much about the relationship is known. For instance, Soviet negotiators from the State Diamond-Trading Organization, along with officials of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade, meet yearly with De Beers executives to hammer out the terms of the diamond contract. These are often intense sessions during which the South Africans must establish the amount of Soviet diamonds which will be made available to the CSO and at what price. The Soviet officials refuse to offer any statistics concerning diamond production and will only make general corrections of erroneous De Beers estimates.

Philip Oppenheimer or his nephew Nicholas often take part in these proceedings, and on several occasions Sir Philip has visited Moscow on behalf of De Beers. Harry Oppenheimer too has been able to meet the Soviets secretly in London over private dinners at the Connaught, in the exclusive Mayfair district. The Soviets are often represented by Boris Sergeev, deputy president of the Diamond and Platinum Trading Organization in Moscow. A recent meeting between the Soviets and South Africans took place at Brougham Castle in Banbury, Oxfordshire, and senior Soviet officials have clandestinely visited De Beers headquarters in Kimberly, South Africa. Each year apparently, the USSR has demanded ever larger payments in exchange for its participation in the diamond cartel.

Soviet production is far greater than anyone at De Beers imagined, reaching from 2 million to 3 million gem-carats a year by 1965. In 1978, Harry Oppenheimer stated that De Beers had paid the Soviet Union more than \$500 million in 1977. By all accounts, De Beers' payments have increased in recent years to between \$600 million and \$700 million a year. The valuable foreign exchange generated by diamond sales has pro-

voked a Soviet official to boast of the diamond marketing organization as the "country's foreign exchange department."

Cooperation between the Soviet Union and South Africa over diamonds extends to exchanges of mining technology and mining experts as well. In 1976, a group of De Beers executives were allowed to examine a Siberian mine. The Soviets agreed to the visit on the condition that their geologists be allowed to observe De Beers' mines in southern Africa. Subsequently, a Soviet mining engineer named Georgi Smernoff was attached to a South African-run mine in Lesotho for two years as a "consultant" to De Beers.

In 1982, De Beers also blocked publication of British government figures on shipments of diamonds to London from Moscow, thereby wrapping another layer of secrecy around the highly discreet international movement of diamonds. Finally, there are persistent rumors that the marketing agreements specify that the USSR use its influence to persuade Angola to remain within the De Beers network to market its rough cut diamonds.

There has been wide speculation that, possibly because of the USSR's own ambitions in southern Africa, the Soviet Union might seek to upset the cartel and thus bankrupt De Beers. It is clear that the CSO and De Beers are extremely vulnerable to any change in Soviet policy, and it remains within the power of the USSR to preserve or destroy the South African-controlled diamond market. Yet Harry Oppenheimer has commented that he could "see no conceivable reason why Russia would want to abandon such a profitable arrangement." Indeed, one Soviet official, in response to a question about potential threats to the De Beers monopoly, went so far as to suggest that the Soviet Union "would never cut down the tree."

Collusion in mineral marketing between South Africa and the Soviet Union is not restricted to diamonds, but it is likely that contacts over gold and platinum grew out of those already established for diamonds. As with diamonds, the USSR and South Africa dominate production of these precious minerals, together supplying 80 percent of the world's gold.

Gold plays a unique role in the international monetary system, and despite the abandonment of the gold standard, it remains the only universally accepted medium of exchange. Gold also has important industrial applications, and more recently, its price fluctuations have served as a barometer of political tensions. This relationship was ironically borne out in August 1981 during a South African military incursion into Angola, when a number of Soviet advisers were killed in the fighting. The tensions resulting from the clash boosted both producers' fortunes as the price of gold increased.

The Soviet Union and South Africa provide the lion's share of gold traded each year on Western bullion markets. However, it would be going too far to suggest that there is outright collusion between the two major producers to in-

fluence the price of gold. Instead, there has been a history of covert contacts for the marketing of bullion which undoubtedly provide both countries with valuable information and contribute to what economists term "orderly marketing." Consultation between the two is far more discreet, and there is no formalized marketing arrangement for gold similar to the CSO for diamonds.

Since the appearance of large shipments of gold bars bearing the distinctive hammer and sickle inscription on the international bullion market after Stalin's death, there has been unceasing speculation in the West about the Soviet government's gold policy. Figures on the Soviet gold economy have been a closely guarded state secret for over 50 years, and to reveal information about any aspect of gold production in the USSR is an offense punishable by death.

What is known about Soviet gold production is pieced together from a range of published and unpublished sources by a host of individuals, intelligence agencies, Western mining companies, consulting firms, and bullion houses.

Gold mining in the USSR is overseen by the Ministry of Non-ferrous Metallurgy, of *Glavzoloto*. After the gold is refined, smelted, and poured into bars, it is sent to one of several banks attached to the Soviet Bank of Foreign Trade. The Moscow Narodny Bank in London and the Woschod Handelsbank in Zurich both handle Soviet gold sales. Presently, both South Africa and the USSR release their gold onto the market in Zurich through the Swiss Gold Pool, a collection of prominent Swiss banks. It is in Zurich where the timing of sales is crucial, and consequently where the two dominant producers meet.

Although there are strong incentives for the two countries to coordinate their marketing policies, they adopt different marketing tactics. The South African Reserve Bank, which is legally bound to sell all gold mined in South Africa, maintains a reasonably steady flow of supplies to the Gold Pool. The Soviet Union, however, often sells in sporadic bursts. Gold traders say South Africa provides the "hard core," while the Russians "play it at the top," as South Africa is far more dependent on bullion sales than the USSR.

The possibility of collusion between the two major producers has spurred considerable interest in the West. Herbert Baschnagel of the Swiss Bank Corporation has stated that "it is in the interests of the two major producers to find a common stand." Dennis Etheredge, director of Anglo-American's Gold Division, denies the existence of any sort of collusive arrangement, but pointed out, "If the bankers in Zurich or London were to say to the South African bank, 'Look, the Russians are heavy in the market,' that would cause the South Africans to hold back." In an in-house report compiled by the South African Chamber of Mines about Soviet foreign trade policy, this relationship between the gold sellers is referred to as "collusive price leadership," whereby market forces encourage the adoption of complementary sales policies. Some ana-



South African miners: "The USSR and South Africa together supply 80 percent of the world's gold"

lysts further speculate that the South African Reserve Bank handles some Russian accounts.

While there is no general consensus on the issue of coordinated gold marketing, there are numerous examples of communication between the Soviets and South Africans over gold. For example, Michael Beckett, executive director of Consolidated Gold Fields (in which Anglo American has controlling stock), visited Moscow in September 1980. Beckett and his associates were entertained by the Soviet Foreign Bank, and their stated goal was to accumulate information on Soviet gold activities for use in the company's annual bullion study. During these and subsequent meetings, there was considerable discussion about broadening contacts to include exchange of views on mining techniques and metallurgy. Anglo American has expressed an interest in obtaining a patent on a Soviet-perfected technique for separating gold from its by-products, and in the past there has been discussion about licensing transactions in Argentina to avoid detection. Furthermore, Soviet bank officials and economists and top executives from Anglo American have consulted regularly.

Despite the frequency of contacts between the Soviets and South Africans over gold, it is virtually impossible to document even one case of overt collusion. There is no doubt that the two countries consult on all aspects of gold exploration, production, and marketing, but the function of these meetings appears to have more to do with each side trying to determine the other's intentions than with codifying some sort of selling arrangement. Thus, the relationship between the two countries on the gold issue might best be termed "a meeting of competitors," whereby any contacts fostered in an atmosphere of mutual suspicion are limited by necessity and design.

Given the complete domination of the platinum industry by the Soviet Union and South Africa, it is not surprising that contact between the two evolved over time. Speculation about a possible marketing arrangement between these major producers was fueled when Gordon Waddell was seen in Moscow in the company of Soviet trade officials. Waddell is chairman of Rustenburg Platinum

Holdings of South Africa, the world's leading platinum producer. In the interests of achieving a stable market, Waddell is reputed to have sought a tacit agreement from the USSR not to accept a free market price substantially under the South African contracted prices. South African producers sell their platinum on a contract basis, often to industrial buyers, while the Soviet Union sells its product on the free market. For platinum as for gold, South Africa is generally considered a steady supplier in contrast to the Soviets' periodic and intermittent sales to the West.

The Soviet platinum industry is a subject of interest to South Africa, and recently Rustenburg Platinum convened a company study group to look at the future of platinum production in the USSR. In addition, mining executives from Rustenberg and the Soviet Diamond and Platinum Trading Organization in Oslo and Hong Kong have held a number of private meetings concerning the recent poor market for platinum.

Soviet and South African mining officials also meet annually each May at the Savoy Hotel in London for the Platinum Dinner. Waddell often attends these dinners, sharing the head table with Boris Osipov, the London representative of the Soviet Diamond and Platinum Trading Organization. Harry Oppenheimer was a dinner guest in 1981 along with Eugene Manakhov of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade.

Significantly, all major American automobile manufacturers have contracts with Rustenburg or Impala Platinum (South Africa) to buy platinum for use in catalytic converters. Because the USSR has been largely absent from the international platinum market since 1977, rumors persist that South African companies covertly market Soviet platinum to the West. Specifically, Ayrton Metals, a subsidiary of Impala Platinum, serves as a large trading house for the marketing of platinum, and many observers believe Ayrton has handled some Soviet production in the past.

The irony of this clandestine commercial relationship between the Soviet Union and South Africa is reflected by a curious coincidence which occurred during Waddell's stay in Moscow. While he was meeting with officials from the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade, former

President Leonid Brezhnev was playing host to Mozambican President Samora Machel, who was on an official visit to the Kremlin. The Soviet Union maintains a fantastically lucrative, yet secretive, business relationship with South Africa while, at the same time, the white regime in Pretoria is militarily destabilizing the USSR's foremost allies in southern Africa.

When the USSR was accused of maintaining commercial ties with South Africa in the British press a few years ago, Soviet newspapers and spokesmen reacted with unusual outrage. *Izvestia* stated: "Such reports [of collusion with South Africa] employ the techniques of Dr. Goebbels, who understood that a lie must be monstrous to be believed. These reports are cooked up in Western kitchens of disinformation on the orders of Western intelligence services to discredit the peace-loving Soviet Union in the eyes of Africa."

Lenin laid the foundations of Soviet trade policy when he observed in an essay published in 1921, "When we are victorious on a world scale, we shall use gold for the purpose of building public lavatories in the streets of some of the largest cities of the world." However, until that time, Lenin urged, "We must save the gold [in Russia], sell it at the highest price, buy goods with it at the lowest price. When you live among wolves, you must howl like a wolf." Thus, the USSR takes an exceptionally pragmatic view of its own economic self-interest.

While public debate about South Africa continues to heat up in the United States, the Soviet Union is left to quietly carry on its secret business with the white rulers of South Africa. The Soviet Union is aware of its pivotal position in the South African strategy to keep mineral prices high and Western governments dependent on their supplies, and it has shown no indication of wishing to change its profitable relationship with South Africa. Thus, it is not only the United States, but also the Soviet Union which maintains significant leverage on the South African mineral-based economy, for by simply bypassing the De Beers syndicate, the Soviet Union could conceivably bankrupt De Beers and do significant damage to the South African economy. □

The Second Decade of War

While Morocco continues its wall-building strategy to limit Polisario's base of operations, the implications of this war of attrition lie beyond Western Sahara's borders—in the financial burden on Morocco's economy and in strained relations between the governments of the Maghreb.

BY TONY HODGES

On November 14, Morocco celebrated the tenth anniversary of the Madrid Accords, the secret agreement by which the Franco regime surrendered its phosphate-rich colony of Western Sahara. Today the accords are of no more than historical interest—the instrument by which Spain ceded its administrative powers in the territory to Morocco and Mauritania, despite overwhelming evidence that the majority of Western Saharans, or Saharawis as they are known, wanted independence.

Formalized by treaty between Morocco and Mauritania in April 1976, the subsequent partition was shortlived. Mauritania abandoned its territorial claims in 1979, prompting Morocco to annex the Mauritanian sector too. Fighting has continued to this day between Morocco and the Saharawi nationalists of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Rio de Oro, the independence movement better known by its acronym, Polisario.

By stationing tens of thousands of troops in Western Sahara and building a series of fortified electronic warfare "walls," Morocco has been able to se-

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SADR President Mohamed Abdelaziz:
"Polisario sees no compulsion to renounce its goal of full independence"

cure physical control over roughly two-thirds of the territory. The wall-building strategy began in 1980-82 when a continuous defense line was built around the

territory's so-called "useful triangle" in the northwest, which includes the valuable phosphate mines at Bou-Craa, the old Spanish colonial capital of El-Ayoun and the second main city, Smara.

Since then, the walled-off zone has gradually been pushed outwards, toward the Algerian and Mauritanian borders. By September last year, when the fifth and most recent bout of wall-building was completed, King Hassan II's Royal Armed Forces (FAR) had a continuous 900-mile defense line stretching from the Algerian-Moroccan border in the north to the coastal city of Dakhla in the south.

Manned by tens of thousands of troops, with radar and sensors to detect approaching enemy vehicles, this colossal security belt has pushed Polisario far away from the territory's handful of urban settlements and the valuable phosphate mines, but it has not ended the war. Indeed, its very existence is a monument to the permanent security threat Morocco faces in the Sahara. Polisario remains a formidable fighting force, with up to 20,000 well-seasoned and highly motivated troops. Motorized and equipped by neighboring Algeria with relatively sophisticated military hardware, they repeatedly harass the Moroccan defense lines.

Small engagements take place more

or less daily along the wall. But it is the ever-present threat of an attack in force that obliges the FAR to remain permanently on guard. These larger attacks, which Polisario needs to stage only once every few weeks, have resulted in sections of the wall being briefly overrun on several occasions—most recently last August in the vicinity of Mahbes, in the northeast of the territory, near the Algerian frontier.

The scale of manpower required to defend, support, and supply a remote 900-mile wall in the Sahara desert can be imagined. It is currently estimated that Morocco has 120,000 troops (the bulk of its armed forces) in the Sahara. By adding more and more miles to defend, the progressive extension of the wall has increasingly stretched FAR's manpower resources, making it difficult to respond rapidly and in sufficient strength to guerrilla attacks.

Moreover, Polisario's use of SAM missiles appears to have made the Moroccan airforce wary of providing effective back-up to the ground forces deployed along the wall. During 1985, the guerrillas shot down about five planes, including two small civilian aircraft (one from Belgium, the other from West Germany) that overflew the war zone and were mistaken for Moroccan spotter planes.

Ultimately it is difficult to see what the wall strategy can achieve—except to push the front line deeper and deeper into the desert and tie down ever larger numbers of troops in defending fixed positions. Extending the walls right up to the Algerian and Mauritanian borders may be designed to force the guerrillas to attack directly from neighboring territories (they already traverse both countries to reach the unwallled zones of Western Sahara) and so allow the Moroccan government to "prove" external complicity in Polisario's war. But Algeria has never made any secret of its support for the Saharawi nationalists and in Mauritania's case, it is difficult to envisage what the Nouakchott government could do to stop the guerrillas from crossing the huge unpopulated desert expanses of northern Mauritania.

The Mauritanian government, which recognized Polisario's Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) in February 1984, still does so, despite the pal-

ace coup in December 1984, which was partially motivated by a desire to repair relations with Morocco and pursue a more "balanced" policy on Western Sahara. Though diplomatic relations with Morocco, which had been broken in 1981, were restored last year, Mauritania remains sympathetic to the Polisario cause.

As the Moroccan walls draw closer to the frontier of Western Sahara, the war could widen if clashes near Algerian or Mauritanian territory finally impel Morocco to stage its oft-threatened "hot pursuit" missions into the neighboring countries. A cross-border raid could rapidly degenerate into a broader regional conflict—a risk that has so far constrained King Hassan from embarking on such an escalation.

The wall strategy therefore does not give Morocco the prospect of a military solution to the war. Rather, it has resulted in a war of attrition, whose gravest implications lie beyond Western Sahara's borders—in the financial burden weighing on Morocco's weak economy and in the tensions straining relations between the states of the Maghreb.

Equally important is the fact that Morocco cannot gain international recognition of its claims to Western Sahara. Not even the Western powers that have armed the Moroccan forces, notably France and the United States, have been prepared to cross this Rubicon.

On the other hand, the list of countries recognizing the SADR has grown relentlessly since its proclamation in 1976. In 1985, three states from three continents took this step—Columbia, Liberia, and most influential of all, India bringing the world total to 63, of which 31 are in Africa, nine in Asia, 16 in Latin America, six in Oceania, and one in Europe.

Backed by the majority of African states, the Saharawi republic was admitted to the Organization of African Unity as a full member-state at its November 1984 summit in Addis Ababa. This reflected widespread African frustration at King Hassan's refusal to accept Resolution AHG104 adopted by the 1983 OAU summit, which called on Morocco and Polisario to engage in direct negotiations with a view to arranging a ceasefire and thereby creating conditions for

"a peaceful and fair referendum, without any administrative or military constraints, under the auspices of the OAU and the United Nations."

King Hassan's diplomatic isolation was evident when only one African state, Zaire, joined Morocco in walking out of the November 1984 OAU summit in protest over the SADR's seating. These two states alone also stayed away from the 1985 OAU summit, when the president of the SADR, Mohamed Abdelaziz, was elected one of the OAU's eight vice-presidents.

Polisario's support in the Third World was demonstrated again at the non-aligned foreign ministers conference held in Luanda in September 1985, which included a long passage on Western Sahara in its final resolution, endorsing OAU Resolution AHG104.

After the July OAU summit, Morocco's extreme isolation in Africa led King Hassan to attempt to draw the UN into a settlement plan that fell short of the OAU's insistence on direct negotiations with the Saharawi nationalists. The UN secretary-general, Javier Perez de Cuellar, was invited to Rabat in July, and on October 23 the Moroccan prime minister, Karim Lamrani, read a message from the king to the UN General Assembly offering an immediate ceasefire and a referendum under UN auspices in January 1986.

A resolution to this effect was introduced by Morocco and seven of its allies in the Fourth Committee of the UN General Assembly, the committee which debates issues pertaining to decolonization. However, Morocco withdrew its resolution on November 12, after failing to prevent its amendment to bring its provisions into line with OAU Resolution AHG104. Instead, a rival resolution, based on the OAU peace plan, was adopted the same day by an overwhelming majority of 91 votes to six with 43 abstentions.

The collapse of Morocco's attempt to counterpose the UN to the OAU occasioned an outburst from the Moroccan foreign minister, Abdellatif Filali, who told the Fourth Committee that Morocco would henceforth refuse to discuss "the so-called question of Western Sahara" in any UN body. "Good-bye, Mr. Chairman," he ended. "Good-bye forever." The resolution was ratified in

the UN General Assembly on December 2, by 92 votes to seven, with 39 abstentions.

Why is there this total deadlock? Polisario and its Third World allies evidently believe that without direct Moroccan-Saharawi negotiations, there would be no guarantee of the fairness of the referendum envisaged by King Hassan. They are encouraged in this view by substantial evidence that the king is merely seeking a means of international legitimation of his annexation of Western Sahara.

They point to the king's statement on March 3, 1985, in his annual throne speech, that "our sovereignty is one and indivisible" and "will continue to extend over the totality of our national territory, from Tangier to La Guera, and will never be the subject of negotiations, let alone concessions."

This declaration was followed by the king's celebrated tour of the occupied territories on March 13-18, when he paid his first-ever visit to El-Ayoune, accompanied by all his ministers and courtiers, as well as the entire Moroccan parliament, which held a special session in the Saharan capital and adopted a resolution reaffirming the "Moroccanity" of Western Sahara and stating that "the territorial integrity of Morocco is first and foremost among the sacred values of the entire Moroccan people."

Resolution of this conflict seems no nearer today than it did a decade ago. The protagonists are not prepared to succumb—or to find common ground for compromise. On May 20, 1985, the twelfth anniversary of the launching of its guerrilla war against Spain, Polisario declared the Saharawi people were "more determined than ever to pursue their struggle until total independence." The statement continued: "The Polisario Front and the government of the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic reaffirm that peace in the northwest African region depends obligatorily on the scrupulous respect of the SADR's frontiers and the Saharawi people's sovereignty over the entirety of their national territory."

There was no softening of Polisario's stand at the front's sixth congress, held on December 7-10 under the telling motto, "The entire homeland or martyrdom." Nor is there any sign of division

within Polisario ranks. All seven members of the front's leading body, the Executive Committee, were reelected at the congress, and Mohamed Abdelaziz was confirmed in his position as Polisario's secretary-general—and thus, under the SADR's current constitutional provisions, president of the Saharawi Republic.



King Hassan II "seems intent on struggling on in the Sahara in the hope that something will crack in the opposing camp"

Polisario sees no compulsion to renounce its goal of full independence, even though it does not expect to be able to drive the Moroccans out of Western Sahara militarily. By pursuing a war of attrition, it believes that King Hassan will ultimately have to cut his losses or risk losing his throne because of the destabilizing repercussions of this costly conflict within his kingdom.

On the Moroccan side, however, it is difficult to imagine King Hassan sanctioning a withdrawal from the Sahara, despite the enormous burden of maintaining his 120,000-strong garrison in the desert. Retreat after so many years of sacrifice for a cause with the status of a national crusade would shatter the king's credibility and prestige, while the return of his army from the Sahara in

such ignoble circumstances would be to virtually court the risk of a coup.

What makes the Western Saharan dispute particularly intractable is that it is hard to imagine a compromise that would satisfy both parties. Partition of the territory seems ruled out by the concentration of its phosphate resources, infrastructure, and population in one small zone in the northwest, the useful triangle. Likewise, proposals for Saharawi autonomy or de facto independence under nominal Alawite sovereignty have never made much headway. Such face-saving devices could scarcely obscure the key issue: Who holds real power? On April 19, a member of Polisario's Executive Committee, Bachir Mustapha Sayed, revealed that Morocco had rejected an Algerian proposal that King Hassan retain nominal sovereignty in an independent Western Sahara on the model of Queen Elizabeth II's sovereignty in Canada.

The king seems intent on struggling on in the Sahara in the hope that something will crack in the opposing camp. He may have anticipated that Polisario would be decisively weakened by his alliance with Col. Qaddafi, an axis that began to take shape in the summer of 1983 and culminated in the Treaty of Oujda in August 1984. But it was Algerian, not Libyan, territory that was contiguous to Western Sahara, provided rear bases for the Polisario guerrillas and gave sanctuary to the 150,000 or so Saharawi refugees. Libyan arms had been important, but their shortfall could easily be made up by the Algerians.

Ironically, the Moroccan-Libyan pact did King Hassan more harm than good. First, on the diplomatic front, it was Morocco rather than Polisario which thereafter suffered the costs of being the colonel's bedfellow. The annoyance of anti-Qaddafi African leaders was undoubtedly a supplementary factor in the SADR's admission to the OAU at its November 1984 summit. Second, by angering Algeria, which interpreted the Treaty of Oujda as an anti-Algerian pact, it redoubled President Chadli's determination to aid the guerrillas. The immediate upshot was the launching of Polisario's powerful and symbolically named Greater Maghreb Offensive in October 1984.

King Hassan's only salvation (one he

in an ideologically bizarre but tactically opportune embrace on one side, and Tunisia drawing closer to Algeria in self-protection from Libya on the other.

Early in 1985, worried by Libyan ambitions and fearful for its future after the departure of its octogenarian president, the Tunisian government endeavored to lessen regional tensions by offering to host a Maghrebi summit. But it was the war in Western Sahara which undermined Tunisia's efforts, just as it had earlier impelled King Hassan into alliance with Col. Qaddafi. Algeria said that it saw no point in holding the summit unless Morocco demonstrated willingness to tackle the root causes of the Saharan conflict. For Algeria, that above all required Moroccan acceptance of OAU Resolution AHG104 and talks with Polisario.

Since this was rejected by Morocco, the Tunisian government had to announce the postponement of the summit

March 13. According to the Tunisian foreign minister, Beji Caid Essebsi, successive rounds of consultations had failed to "remove the obstacles to the holding of this summit, notably because of a fundamental difference of approach on the Western Saharan affair." The Moroccan foreign minister, Mr. Filali, speaking in Paris the following April 16, remarked, that "This setback was due to Algeria's insistence on calling for a Moroccan-Algerian summit followed by a six party Maghrebian summit"—in other words a summit attended by the SADR as well as Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, and Mauritania.


In mid-1985, regional tensions sharpened—with Libya trying to cope with sharply reduced oil earnings by limiting the outflow of migrant remittances, expelling 30,000 Tunisians in August-September, Tunisia breaking diplomatic relations with Libya on September 26, Algeria cementing its ties with Tunisia and

moving troops close to the Libyan border, and King Hassan embarrassed by his alliance with Qaddafi.

It has since taken external military intervention in the region, by Israel against Tunisia, and the threat of further intervention, by Israel and/or the United States against Libya, to paper over these regional divisions and restore a sense of Maghrebi common purpose. A rapprochement between Algeria and Libya finally seemed to be underway when Col. Qaddafi held a summit meeting with President Chadli in the eastern Algerian town of In Amenas on January 28.

The Saharan-induced polarization between Algeria and Morocco has inevitably complicated policy-making for the two European states with the largest interests in the region, France and Spain. Over the years, under successive conservative and socialist governments, both have attempted, with vary-

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ing degrees of success, to accommodate the conflicting demands of the Algerian and Moroccan governments.

However, despite Algeria's much greater economic weight and thereby its greater attractions to the European (and U.S.) business world, strategic and other factors have compelled the socialist parties in power in Paris and Madrid to tilt toward Morocco, despite earlier sympathies for the Saharawi cause. Along with the Reagan administration, the French government is the main arms supplier to the FAR. And President François Mitterrand gave a very warm reception to King Hassan on his recent state visit to France, on November 27-29.

In Spain's case, the Gonzalez government's main concerns have been to safeguard Spanish sovereignty over the *presidios* of Ceuta and Melilla on Morocco's Mediterranean coast and secure access to the rich fishing resources off the Moroccan and Saharan coasts, a mainstay of the Canary Islands' economy for four centuries.

Meanwhile, Polisario has tended to alienate Spaniards by attacking Spanish fishing boats off the Saharan coast, a campaign justified by Polisario on the grounds that these boats fish illegally in the SADR's territorial waters and fly the Moroccan flag, as required by the 1983 Spanish-Moroccan fishing accords. All Polisario officials in Spain were deported at the end of September, following the death of a Spanish fisherman and a sailor in the Spanish navy when guerrillas attacked a Spanish fishing boat, the *Junquito*, and a warship that came to its rescue off the southern coast of Western Sahara on September 20-21.

Apart from Saudi Arabia, which has financed many of King Hassan's arms purchases since the Saharan war began, and some other Arab allies, Morocco's other main supporter has been the United States, which values the king's generally pro-Western policies (despite such aberrations as his pact with Qaddafi), Morocco's strategic location astride the entrance to the Mediterranean, and the transit facilities available to the U.S. Rapid Deployment Force at Moroccan air bases.

But the U.S. government appears to be pursuing several potentially divergent or contradictory policies in the re-

gion. While it hopes to maintain its traditional alliance with King Hassan, it is also attempting to nurture a closer relationship with Algeria, a country which, besides wielding great influence in the Third World, is seen by Washington as seeking more ties with the West. When President Chadli made the first visit by an Algerian head of state to Washington in April 1985, the Reagan administration announced that Algeria would become

roccan arms requests, although U.S.-Moroccan military cooperation remains close and important. U.S. military aid to Morocco is being kept more or less stable in FY 1986, despite Moroccan pressure to increase it at the last meeting of the U.S.-Moroccan Joint Military Commission, held in Washington in July 1985.

Financial pressures and greater reluctance by Saudi Arabia to foot his arms



Polisario guerrillas cut across uninhabited desert along the Mauritanian border

eligible to receive U.S. military equipment under the Foreign Military Sales program for the first time.

A third strand in administration policy is its resolute opposition to Col. Qaddafi—a stand which has put the United States at odds with King Hassan since the Treaty of Oujda. A fourth and even more confusing component of U.S. policy has resulted from Israeli intervention in the Maghreb. The Israeli air raid on Tunisia had the extraordinary consequence of the United States appearing to approve an attack on a pro-Western Arab ally.

In this confused policy framework, it would appear that the administration's aim to cultivate closer ties with Algeria and its annoyance at the Moroccan-Libyan pact have somewhat the United States' view of the meet Mo-

roccan arms requests, although U.S.-Moroccan military cooperation remains close and important. U.S. military aid to Morocco is being kept more or less stable in FY 1986, despite Moroccan pressure to increase it at the last meeting of the U.S.-Moroccan Joint Military Commission, held in Washington in July 1985.

After failing to buy 24 U.S. F-16s, the king lobbied to buy Mirage-2000s during his visit to Paris in November. It is not yet known whether the French government will provide the concessional finance denied by Washington. However, the king's arms purchase difficulties are testimony to the financial burden of the Saharan war and the regional arms race it has inevitably spawned, to the detriment of economic development. □

Letters

To the Editor:

In the course of our usual close reading of *Africa Report*, we came across a couple of Somalia-related items in your November-December issue that call for some further comment from our side.

I was concerned by Antony Shaw's article, "Barre's Balancing Act," which on page 26 repeated an unhelpful allegation that "the United States will dump nuclear waste in central Somalia." The origins of this entirely false story rest with a broadcast put out in early September by the Ethiopia-based Radio Hagan. As you may know, Radio Hagan is operated by anti-Siad dissidents who receive East bloc support. We have every reason to believe that the nuclear dumping story was a deliberate disinformation effort. We have publicly and categorically denied this story in Washington, Mogadishu, Nairobi, Lagos, and other cities where it has surfaced.

I think our ambassador in Mogadishu put it best when he cabled me: "The appearance of the nuclear dumping allegations, even with the disclaimer that they are unconfirmed, will probably give them greater credence in African eyes. . . we have enough trouble when the sensationalist press in Africa gets hold of this type of story—we do not need corroboration from the other side of the Atlantic." For the record, Mr. Shaw may wish to know that it is the public policy of the United States to store nuclear waste in its own territory. We have not approached any country to seek storage of nuclear waste outside U.S. borders.

In the "Update" section of the same issue, a brief article on page 42 again sets out some false allegations on the dumping of U.S.-origin nuclear waste in Somalia. There is no truth whatsoever to any of the article's statements that refer

to the United States or U.S. policy on nuclear waste. The article fails to mention, however, that U.S. government pollution experts joined their counterparts from Britain, France, and West Germany in responding to the Somali government's appeal for help in addressing toxic chemical hazards related to the shipwreck of the *Ariadne* in Mogadishu harbor.

James K. Bishop
Acting U.S. Assistant Secretary
for African Affairs

The author replies:

I am sorry that Mr. Bishop feels that mention of the allegation of nuclear-dumping is "unhelpful." The context of what I call "a rash of allegations" (nuclear dumping, a South African connection and a South African base, and Israeli training of security forces) was clear—that these were essentially unfounded. Specific reference was then made to the one such allegation which did have some validity—Somalia's connection with South Africa. Similarly, reference was made to the press reports that the president had been seriously ill, while it was pointed out that despite such allegations, he remained fully in control. Mr. Bishop and the U.S. ambassador in Mogadishu appear to give rather less credit to the intelligence of your readers than I would.

I should add that I am delighted to hear that the U.S. has "not approached any country" to store nuclear waste. This gives the denial to reports of U.S. involvement last year in an approach to Sudan in this respect. It was alleged that this was done by a West German company and that then-President Nimeiry had agreed to allow nuclear waste to be

stored in west Sudan in return for aid for 10 development projects, one of which was listed as a nuclear power plant, and the total value of which ran into the billions of dollars. The projects were listed in a letter from the office of the presidency, dated January 22, 1985, and addressed to F.J. Gattys, Industrial Enterprises, and published in the magazine *African Events* in June 1985. There have also been reports that the late President Sadat of Egypt briefly agreed to allow storage of nuclear waste in the Sinai desert in 1980, although he quickly changed his mind. There was no indication of which countries were supposed to be involved in this.

In the light of these and similar stories, such as the West German company Otrag and its rocket range in Zaire, it is a relief to have Mr. Bishop's categorical assurances over U.S. policy.

Antony Shaw

ERRATUM

The first sentence of the penultimate paragraph in Gerald J. Bender's article, "Angola: Friends and Enemies," [January-February 1986, page 7] should have read:

"If the Reagan administration truly is interested in mitigating the Soviet and Cuban presences in Angola it should continue on its present course of negotiations, not enter the war."

We apologize for the error.

Books

A Reporter's Journey

Joseph Lelyveld, *Move Your Shadow: South Africa, Black and White*. New York: Times Books, 1985, 390 pp., \$18.95

Joseph Lelyveld was a good reporter for the *New York Times* in South Africa from 1980 to 1983 and for a brief period in the mid-1960s. His reportorial instincts, illustrated by sharp vignettes of South Africans, prominent or otherwise, black and white, are the strengths of this book. Its weaknesses, and they ultimately pile up and overwhelm the reader, are Lelyveld's strong penchant for moralizing, philosophizing, and analyzing in the tradition of the American innocent abroad.

The first 100 pages of the book, including a sort of TV magazine sketch of South Africa—it was excerpted in the *New York Times Magazine*—and an entire, tedious chapter where the contentious justifications of Afrikaner academics and politicians are mildly mocked could be skipped completely. Lelyveld dips his foot in the muck of apartheid ideology with his protracted anguishes over the paradoxes and contradictions in the black-white conflict. He keeps saying he doesn't want to be taken for a wishy-washy white American liberal, but he is a wishy-washy liberal. Fortunately, he is also a good reporter.

When Lelyveld emerges from his study after a patch of moralizing and legs it out to the black townships, a trade union office, or a remote homeland, he is very good indeed.

His vignettes, short or lengthy sketches of people he has just met or known for a long time, demonstrate his evident compassion, empathy, and ability to draw people well with a few pecks on the type-

writer. Lelyveld lets you know whether he likes or dislikes these people. Particularly excellent are sketches of Malusi Mpumlwana, a colleague of Steve Biko in the black consciousness movement, now an Anglican priest; Credo Mutwa, a black seer with an ironic first name for a one-time state witness who is paid by the government because it likes his bogus interpretations of African history; and Philip Kgosana, the university student whose leadership of the March 30, 1960, pass protest gives insight, through Lelyveld's description, into the vision of Robert Sobukwe, the Pan Africanist Congress leader who was silenced for the next two decades.

One sketch, an entire chapter, could have been omitted: the rise and fall of Gen. Charles Sebe, the macabre security chief of the nominally independent Ciskei homeland. Lelyveld concedes he liked Charles Sebe.

There is not nearly enough on the black trade union movement. Lelyveld seems to have been put off by one union officer's not unreasonable suspicions about American reporters. There is only one brief mention of the United Democratic Front, which admittedly gained prominence after Lelyveld's tour ended. But it is disconcerting for a book on South Africa published in 1985 not to provide extensive coverage of this mass movement, or of black trade unions, or of the resurgent African National Congress, some of whose exiled members also seem to have put off the author.

For me, the best part of the book was Lelyveld's forays into the townships and homelands, especially his vivid rendering of the daily 2:30 a.m. bus ride by "commuters" from the KwaNdebele dumping ground to their jobs more than three hours away in Pretoria.

In keeping with the its moralist nature, the book ends with sketches of Afrikaners in Zimbabwe truculently adapting to black

majority rule. Is this really relevant to South Africa?

—Joseph Margolis

The Corporate Connection

Jonathan Leape, Bo Baskin, and Stefan Underhill: *Business in the Shadow of Apartheid: U.S. Firms in South Africa*, Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1985, 243pp. \$19.95.

Richard E. Sincere, Jr., *The Politics of Sentiment: Churches and Foreign Investment in South Africa*, Washington, D.C.: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1984, 164pp., \$8.00.

Proponents of divestment will find little support for their position in these two books. Almost all the contributors to both volumes explicitly endorse the continued presence of American corporations in South Africa. The differences between their arguments, however, demonstrate that those encouraging "constructive engagement" for American corporations in South Africa do not speak with a single voice.

Although all of the articles in *Business in the Shadow of Apartheid* were completed at about the time that South Africa's new constitution was introduced and before the late 1984 escalation of unrest, none of the contributors suggest that government-initiated reform would be sufficient to achieve racial accommodation. The two opening "overview" analyses—by John Kane-Berman, director of the South African Institute of Race Relations, and Herbert Adam, a Canadian sociologist—fore-

see contradictory trends, with Kane-Berman focusing on the "racial divisiveness" of the government's policy and Adam characterizing the new constitutional regime as "authoritarian corporatism."

The remaining eight authors, all South Africans, assess and in all but one case commend the more activist stance being taken by business to spur change. The exception, Halton Cheadle, assistant director of the Centre for Applied Legal Studies, paints a picture of trade union progress in which change came through determined grassroots worker organization, despite the opposition of government and capital. Leonard Mosala, chairman of the African Chemical Workers Union, depicts South Africa bleakly in more general terms, but contends that "the economic sector is the one area where structural changes could be made immediately if the owners and leaders of this sector would back their talk with action." Readers can assess the nature of business leaders' "talk" in the two pieces by Fred Ferreira, director of industrial relations for Ford Motor Company, who was directly engaged with his company's response to emerging black trade unionism, and by Tony Bloom, chairman of the Premier Group, and an early business critic of government policy.

ism, and by Tony Bloom, chairman of the Premier Group, and an early business critic of government policy.

Gatsha Buthelezi, chief minister of Kwa-Zulu, and his ministerial colleague, Oscar Dhlomo, provide spirited pleas for more business engagement, with Buthelezi urging a politics of protest combined with "an organization of people within the realities of the marketplace." Their pleas are complemented by the focused call of Griffiths Zabaala, director of Self-Help Associates for Development Economics, for business support of community development. It is the concluding article, originally presented to a Mobil southern Africa seminar by the Afrikaner historian, Hermann Gilomee, which makes this book particularly contemporary. Gilomee outlines his strategy for the necessary redefinition of the role of business as a mediator between black and white South Africa; his prescriptions anticipate some of the recent pronouncements of prominent American and South African corporate leaders.

In contrast, *The Politics of Sentiment* provides a backdrop to the debate between the Rev. Jesse Jackson and the Rev. Jerry Falwell over the proper role of

American business in South Africa. Its author, a research staff member of the Washington-based Ethics and Public Policy Center, critically evaluates the divestment arguments of the World Council of Churches, the South African Council of Churches, and the National Council of Churches, countering them with pronouncements of South African and American churchmen advocating a neutral stance or one of active involvement by American corporations. His conclusion: "American churches should . . . oppose actions by federal, state, or local governments to limit U.S. business in South Africa. On the contrary, they should encourage the expansion of U.S. business there because American firms contribute to productivity and prosperity and thus help create the climate for constructive change." Although many of the contributors in *Business in the Shadow of Apartheid* also endorse intensified engagement by American capital in South Africa, it is by no means certain that they would concur with Sincere's arguments for the same conclusion.

—Sheridan Johns
Duke University

Books Received

(Inclusion in this list does not preclude the review of a book at a later date.)

- Adedeji, Adebayo, and Shaw, Timothy M. (eds.). *Economic Crisis in Africa: African Perspectives on Development Problems and Potentials*. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1986, 280pp., \$27.50.
- Arlinghaus, Bruce E., and Baker, Pauline H. (eds.). *African Armies: Evolution and Capabilities*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1986, \$31.50.
- Asante, S.K.B. *The Political Economy of Regionalism in Africa: A Decade of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)*. New York: Praeger Publishers Inc., 1985, 208pp., \$37.95.
- Bardill, John E., and Cobbe, James H. *Lesotho: Dilemmas of Dependence in Southern Africa*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1986, 223pp., \$26.50.
- Bennett, Norman Robert. *Arab Versus European: Diplomacy and War in Nineteenth-Century East Central Africa*. New York: Africana Publishing Co., 1986, 254pp., \$49.50.
- Bienen, Henry. *Political Conflict and Economic Change in Nigeria*. Totowa, N.J.: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1986, 176pp., \$29.50.
- Bjerén, Gunilla. *Migration to Shashemene: Ethnicity, Gender and Occupation in Urban Ethiopia*. Uppsala, Sweden: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1985, 271pp.
- Catholic Institute for International Relations. *Sanctions Against South Africa*. London: CIIR, 1985, 22pp.
- Davies, Robert H.; O'Meara, Dan; and Dlamini, Siphos. *The Kingdom of Swaziland: A Profile*. Totowa, N.J.: Zed Press Ltd., 1985, 75pp., \$21.75 cloth, \$7.50 paper.
- Dickson, David A. *United States Foreign Policy Towards Sub-Saharan Africa: Change, Continuity & Constraint*. Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, Inc., 1985, 180pp., \$25.00 cloth, \$11.50 paper.
- Horowitz, Michael M., and Painter, Thomas M. *Anthropology and Rural Development in West Africa*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1986, 271pp., \$19.85.
- Jaffe, Hosea. *A History of Africa*. Totowa, N.J.: Zed Press Ltd., 1986, 145pp., \$23.25 cloth, \$9.95 paper.
- Lindsay, Beverly (ed.). *African Migration and National Development*. University Park, Pa.: Penn State Press, 177pp., 1986, \$22.50.
- Lipton, Merle. *Capitalism and Apartheid*. Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Allanheld, 1985, 376pp., \$19.95.
- Machel, Samora. *Samora Machel: An African Revolutionary*. Totowa, N.J.: Zed Press Ltd., 1985, 199pp., \$26.25 cloth, \$9.95 paper.
- Mayson, Cedric. *A Certain Sound: The Struggle for Liberation in South Africa*. Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1985, 145pp., \$8.95.
- Mehran, Hassanali. *External Debt Management: Papers Presented at a Seminar Organized by the IMF Institute and the Central Banking Department of the IMF*. Washington, D.C.: IMF, 1985, 312pp., \$17.50 cloth, \$11.50 paper.
- Monson, Jamie, and Kalb, Marion. *Women as Food Producers in Developing Countries*. Los Angeles: UCLA African Studies Center, African Studies Association, OEF International, 1985, 118pp., \$16.00.
- Onwuka, R.I., and Sesay, A. *The Future of Regionalism in Africa*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985, 257pp., \$29.95.
- Oyovbaire, S. Egite. *Federalism in Nigeria: A Study in the Development of the Nigerian State*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985, 275pp., \$35.00.
- Poats, Rutherford. *Twenty-five Years of Development Co-operation: A Review*. Paris: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1985, 289pp.
- Preeg, Ernest H. (ed.). *Hard Bargaining Ahead: U.S. Trade Policy and Developing Countries*. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1985, 182pp., \$19.95 cloth, \$12.95 paper.
- Sorbo, Gunnar M. *Tenants and Nomads in Eastern Sudan: A Study of Economic Adaptations in the New Halfa Scheme*. Uppsala, Sweden: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1985, 151pp.

see contradictory trends, with Kane-Berman focusing on the "racial divisiveness" of the government's policy and Adam characterizing the new constitutional regime as "authoritarian corporatism."

The remaining eight authors, all South Africans, assess and in all but one case commend the more activist stance being taken by business to spur change. The exception, Halton Cheadle, assistant director of the Centre for Applied Legal Studies, paints a picture of trade union progress in which change came through determined grassroots worker organization, despite the opposition of government and capital. Leonard Mosala, chairman of the African Chemical Workers Union, depicts South Africa bleakly in more general terms, but contends that "the economic sector is the one area where structural changes could be made immediately if the owners and leaders of this sector would back their talk with action." Readers can assess the nature of business leaders' "talk" in the two pieces by Fred Ferreira, director of industrial relations for Ford Motor Company, who was directly engaged with his company's response to emerging black trade unionism, and by Tony Bloom, chairman of the Premier Group, and an early business critic of government policy.

Gatsha Buthelezi, chief minister of Kwa-Zulu, and his ministerial colleague, Oscar Dhlomo, provide spirited pleas for more business engagement, with Buthelezi urging a politics of protest combined with "an organization of people within the realities of the marketplace." Their pleas are complemented by the focused call of Griffiths Zabalala, director of Self-Help Associates for Development Economics, for business support of community development. It is the concluding article, originally presented to a Mobil southern Africa seminar by the Afrikaner historian, Hermann Gilomee, which makes this book particularly contemporary. Gilomee outlines his strategy for the necessary redefinition of the role of business as a mediator between black and white South Africa; his prescriptions anticipate some of the recent pronouncements of prominent American and South African corporate leaders.

In contrast, *The Politics of Sentiment* provides a backdrop to the debate between the Rev. Jesse Jackson and the Rev. Jerry Falwell over the proper role of

American business in South Africa. Its author, a research staff member of the Washington-based Ethics and Public Policy Center, critically evaluates the divestment arguments of the World Council of Churches, the South African Council of Churches, and the National Council of Churches, countering them with pronouncements of South African and American churchmen advocating a neutral stance or one of active involvement by American corporations. His conclusion: "American churches should... oppose actions by federal, state, or local governments to limit U.S. business in South Africa. On the contrary, they should encourage the expansion of U.S. business there because American firms contribute to productivity and prosperity and thus help create the climate for constructive change." Although many of the contributors in *Business in the Shadow of Apartheid* also endorse intensified engagement by American capital in South Africa, it is by no means certain that they would concur with Sincere's arguments for the same conclusion.

—Sheridan Johns
Duke University

Books Received

(Inclusion in this list does not preclude the review of a book at a later date.)

- Adedeji, Adebayo, and Shaw, Timothy M. (eds.). *Economic Crisis in Africa: African Perspectives on Development Problems and Potentials*. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1986, 280pp., \$27.50.
- Arlinghaus, Bruce E., and Baker, Pauline H. (eds.). *African Armies: Evolution and Capabilities*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1986, \$31.50.
- Asante, S.K.B. *The Political Economy of Regionalism in Africa: A Decade of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)*. New York: Praeger Publishers Inc., 1985, 208pp., \$37.95.
- Bardill, John E., and Cobbe, James H. *Lesotho: Dilemmas of Dependence in Southern Africa*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1986, 223pp., \$26.50.
- Bennett, Norman Robert. *Arab Versus European: Diplomacy and War in Nineteenth-Century East Central Africa*. New York: Africana Publishing Co., 1986, 254pp., \$49.50.
- Bienen, Henry. *Political Conflict and Economic Change in Nigeria*. Totowa, N.J.: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1986, 176pp., \$29.50.
- Bjerén, Gunilla. *Migration to Shashemene: Ethnicity, Gender and Occupation in Urban Ethiopia*. Uppsala, Sweden: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1985, 271pp.
- Catholic Institute for International Relations. *Sanctions Against South Africa*. London: CIIR, 1985, 22pp.
- Davies, Robert H.; O'Meara, Dan; and Dlamini, Siphos. *The Kingdom of Swaziland: A Profile*. Totowa, N.J.: Zed Press Ltd., 1985, 75pp., \$21.75 cloth, \$7.50 paper.
- Dickson, David A. *United States Foreign Policy Towards Sub-Saharan Africa: Change, Continuity & Constraint*. Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, Inc., 1985, 180pp., \$25.00 cloth, \$11.50 paper.
- Horowitz, Michael M., and Painter, Thomas M. *Anthropology and Rural Development in West Africa*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1986, 271pp., \$19.85.
- Jaffe, Hosea. *A History of Africa*. Totowa, N.J.: Zed Press Ltd., 1986, 145pp., \$23.25 cloth, \$9.95 paper.
- Lindsay, Beverly (ed.). *African Migration and National Development*. University Park, Pa.: Penn State Press, 177pp., 1986, \$22.50.
- Lipton, Merle. *Capitalism and Apartheid*. Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Allanheld, 1985, 376pp., \$19.95.
- Machel, Samora. *Samora Machel: An African Revolutionary*. Totowa, N.J.: Zed Press Ltd., 1985, 199pp., \$26.25 cloth, \$9.95 paper.
- Mayson, Cedric. *A Certain Sound: The Struggle for Liberation in South Africa*. Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1985, 145pp., \$8.95.
- Mehran, Hassanali. *External Debt Management: Papers Presented at a Seminar Organized by the IMF Institute and the Central Banking Department of the IMF*. Washington, D.C.: IMF, 1985, 312pp., \$17.50 cloth, \$11.50 paper.
- Monson, Jamie, and Kalb, Marion. *Women as Food Producers in Developing Countries*. Los Angeles: UCLA African Studies Center, African Studies Association, OEF International, 1985, 118pp., \$16.00.
- Onwuka, R.L., and Sesay, A. *The Future of Regionalism in Africa*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985, 257pp., \$29.95.
- Oyovbaire, S. Egitte. *Federalism in Nigeria: A Study in the Development of the Nigerian State*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985, 275pp., \$35.00.
- Poats, Rutherford. *Twenty-five Years of Development Co-operation: A Review*. Paris: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1985, 289pp.
- Preeg, Ernest H. (ed.). *Hard Bargaining Ahead: U.S. Trade Policy and Developing Countries*. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1985, 182pp., \$19.95 cloth, \$12.95 paper.
- Sorbo, Gunnar M. *Tenants and Nomads in Eastern Sudan: A Study of Economic Adaptations in the New Halfa Scheme*. Uppsala, Sweden: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1985, 151pp.

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
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
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