




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New Brunswick, New Jersey 08903



SEPTEMBER-
OCTOBER 1981

AFRICA REPORT

AMERICA'S
LEADING MAGAZINE
ON AFRICA

VOLUME 26, NUMBER 5

A Publication of the
African-American Institute

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Africa Report, a nonpartisan magazine of African affairs, is published bimonthly in July-August, September-October, November-December, January-February, March-April, and May-June, and is scheduled to appear at the beginning of each date period at 833 United Nations Plaza, New York, N.Y. 10017. Editorial correspondence and letters to the Publisher should be sent to this address. Correspondence regarding subscriptions, distribution, advertising, and other business matters should be sent to Transaction Periodicals Consortium, Dept. 8010, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey 08903. Telephone: (201) 932-2280. Subscription rates: *Individuals*: U.S.A. \$18, Canada \$21, air rate overseas \$42; *Institutions*: U.S.A. \$24, Canada \$27, air rate overseas \$48. Second-class postage paid at New York, N.Y. and at additional mailing offices. Telephones: Publisher (212) 949-5717; Editor (212) 949-5731. Copyright © 1981 by the African-American Institute, Inc.



IN THIS ISSUE

This issue of *Africa Report* is devoted almost entirely to South Africa. It brings together a wide range of American, South African, and other points of view on the country's future and its implications for United States foreign policy.

We begin with an overview from Bishop Desmond Tutu who believes that international pressure could still be an element in bringing the Pretoria regime to the negotiating table "before it is too late."

For a Reagan administration position we produce the text of an address on Africa policy given by the assistant secretary of state for African affairs, Dr. Chester Crocker, followed by a critical appraisal of that policy as it relates to South Africa, by Henry F. Jackson.

The symposium continues with views from opposite ends of the South African political spectrum, in interviews with the South African ambassador to Washington and with Oliver Tambo, president of the African National Congress. United States Senator Paul Tsongas (D-Mass.) reviews the Rockefeller Commission Report, *South Africa: Time Running Out*. South African journalist Stanley Uys discusses proposals for partitioning South Africa while Wilfrid Grenville-Grey looks at the state of human rights in the country.

Editor Anthony J. Hughes provides some notes on the OAU Nairobi Summit and in a separate article looks forward to the visit to Washington of the OAU chairman, President Daniel arap Moi of Kenya. African Update, as usual, comprehensively reviews developments throughout the continent.

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The cover picture of riot police in Johannesburg arresting a student demonstrator in 1976 is by Alon Reinger of Contact.

The Future of South Africa

BY BISHOP DESMOND TUTU

Hope, they say, springs eternal in the human breast. After all the buffeting that the black community has taken from over 30 years of nationalist apartheid rule, you would have thought the stuffing would be knocked out of the blacks and that by now they would have become seasoned cynics. Vorster had proclaimed that he needed six months to transform the political face of South Africa. Pik Botha, who was at that time his ambassador at the United Nations, had also declared with a great flourish that South Africa was moving away from racial discrimination. And what happened? Nothing more than the intransigence that had led to the June 16, 1976 uprisings and the orgy of bannings and detentions without trial capped by the death in detention of Steve Biko, a death that had left the then minister of justice and police, Jimmy Kruger, cold, as he had stated to a cheering Nationalist party Congress.

Clearly nothing was about to change. The white oligarchy was determined to cling to power at all costs — that these costs included black lives and black freedom did not seem to cause many too much insomnia. And yet when P.W. Botha came on the scene, hopes began to run high again. Here was a man who appeared quite decisive, no ditherings

Bishop Desmond Tutu is general secretary of the South African Council of Churches.



Bishop Desmond Tutu: "We who are oppressed will be free"

Photo: Geoff Dalglis/Photo Trends

with him. He knew white South Africa must adapt or die. He was speaking in a way that we had not expected to hear from a nationalist prime minister. He seemed to have set his sights on reform and realized he would need new allies, hence traditional supporters of his party would be appalled at having to give up so much of white privilege. A recent survey showed that 60 percent of the blacks thought P.W. Botha was doing a good job as prime minister. That is how high hopes were flying.

THE REALITY

It is nearly two years now and there has been little more than reformist rhetoric that has not yet been translated into reality. There has been the "Info Scandal" that has kept rearing its ugly head. While Botha has made a valiant

effort to streamline government bureaucracy, he has also been concentrating power more and more in his hands. He is increasingly seeking to pass by government, as witness the abolition of the Senate and the new scheme for nominating parliamentarians. He has to be given credit for the advent of the President's Council, which represents revolutionary thinking on the part of the nationalists, for up to this point it was taken for granted that only whites would decide the future of South Africa, constitutional or otherwise. The President's Council says other races (excluding Africans) will join the whites in this exercise. Having gotten so far, one wonders in exasperation why, oh why, did he have to vitiate this potentially revolutionary move by two fatal flaws: the nominated rather than an elected membership and the exclusion of Africans.

Even after this setback, many people hoped against hope that change, real fundamental change that has to do with political power-sharing, still might happen. So far we were being regaled with a diet of fine rhetoric and little else. Botha, people were beginning to suspect, however, was going to be hoisted on the petard of Afrikaner unity, for like all his predecessors he did not want to have the dubious honor of going down in history as the man who split the Nationalist party and so also Afrikanerdom — never mind what happened to the country that would be held to ransom.

The prime minister was humiliated by Dr. Andries Treurnicht, the arch-conservative leader of the Transvaal Nationalist party, on the question of whether school boys of different races could play rugby together during Craven Week. Dr. Treurnicht declared in public, contradicting the prime minister, that it would not happen. Botha learned that if he took this momentous issue to the party caucus he would lose to Dr. Treurnicht, and so he backed down.

For various reasons, Botha decided to call an election some two years before he needed to. Perhaps he wanted his own mandate from the people and not Vorster's. Perhaps he hoped to wipe the floor with the right wing and so be rid of them forever. And he might have done both these things had he gone boldly for a reformist platform. Unfortunately, he retreated into the laager of well-tryed traditional Afrikaner policies and predictably this time he lost to both the right and the left. He was not conservative enough for the right and not reformist enough for the left (if these terms mean anything in South Africa). If he were bright he would realize that he has been relieved of the albatross of Afrikaner unity, for it no longer exists.

TWO OPTIONS

I have spent time on P.W. Botha because he holds the key to a peaceful future for South Africa. The point that is indisputable is that we who are oppressed will be free. That is not in question. The logic of history, even Afrikaner history, dictates that this is so. All that the whites can do is to decide whether they want freedom to come reasonably and peacefully, or through bloodshed and an armed struggle. Those are the only options available. Botha can play a decisive role by opting for a bold policy of change. Anything else will fail. He won't ever satisfy the right wing. Thus, he should go all out to win the world and the rest of South Africa by opting for political power-sharing.

Apartheid, we were told by Dr. Koornhof, is dead. Sadly, we have not been invited to the funeral nor have we seen the corpse. Nothing short of moves toward dismantling apartheid will bring true security and peace to this land. Multinational corporations, with

the small step of codes of conduct, are not yet involved in the business of helping to destroy apartheid. They have done some good things for their employees but all within the framework of apartheid and really no more than what a good employer should have been doing. Ultimately their efforts result in improvements, but not changes. They are making apartheid more comfortable rather than dismantling it. But as Mrs. Motlana said, "We don't want our chains made comfortable. We want them removed." They are investing in what I call the most vicious system since nazism, where two million blacks have been forcibly uprooted and dumped in the Bantustans into which South Africa is being Balkanized — Bantustans that are ghettos of poverty and misery as well as reservoirs of cheap black migratory labor that plays havoc with black family life.

Unrest, in the schools and on the labor front, is endemic in our country and will continue to be so until political power-sharing becomes a reality. More and more blacks are becoming disillusioned as those of us calling for change by peaceful means have our credibility eroded by the authorities' often brutal and excessive action. Calls for peaceful change are being answered by tear gas, police dogs, bullets, ban-

ning orders, and detention without trial. We are back in the dark ages of Mr. Kruger. The authorities are growing in intransigence — witness Botha demonstrating that he is tough and cannot be trifled with.

He is too late because he has not come to terms with the determination bordering on fanaticism of black youth who flaunt African National Congress (ANC) emblems openly. He cannot control the militancy of black labor unions, which are going to be the power to watch.

There will be more and more police harassment, bannings, and detentions, but these will not deter those who are determined to become free. The international community must make up its mind whether it wants to see a peaceful resolution of the South African crisis or not. If it does, then let it apply pressure (diplomatic, political, but above all, economic) on the South African government to persuade them to go to the negotiating table with the authentic leaders of all sections of the South African population before it is too late. Maybe it is too late judging from the conduct of the Reagan administration; if so, then what Mr. Vorster called the "alternative too ghastly to contemplate" is upon us. But hope springs eternal in the human breast. □



Botha's 1981 re-election campaign: "He was not conservative enough for the right nor reformist enough for the left"

The United States and Africa

BY CHESTER A. CROCKER

The subject of this conference, the attention it has drawn, and the degree of participation it has attracted are, I believe, directly related to the goals which we in the Reagan administration want to achieve in our policy towards Africa.

In foreign policy as in domestic policy, President Reagan has set some tough goals for this nation. To achieve them will require first that the American people understand them. And it will require a shared sense of what our nation's interests and priorities are, at home and abroad. To rebuild the image and, more important, the reality of a strong America also requires the cooperation of a broad spectrum of those institutions and groups that can draw upon the vitality and genius of individual Americans. And just as certain sacrifices will be necessary to achieve the domestic economic reforms we need, so must we make choices in the allocation of resources abroad. We live in an age where such choices cannot be avoided. But the challenge the president has set for us all is, I believe, both a necessary challenge and one that we can meet.

This conference is making a significant step in these directions. It has brought us together to enhance our understanding of a continent that is becoming increasingly important to the United States in the pursuit of our global objectives. It has brought us in the Reagan administration together with our African friends and the business community

Chester Crocker is the U.S. assistant secretary of state for African affairs. This paper was presented before a conference entitled "Kansas and the Midwest's Economic Relations with Africa," in June 1981 in Wichita, Kansas. The conference was cosponsored by the African-American Institute and Senator Nancy Landon Kassebaum (R-Kans.), chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Africa.

of the heartland of this nation. We wish to work together to achieve our and Africa's objectives. We aim to be better prepared to meet the challenges to our shared interests in the decade of the 1980s. And we seek to harness with skill, creativity, and purpose the human and material resources of America and Africa.

To do so will require a renewed sense of purpose in our foreign policy so that we may project in Africa the same principles that govern our policies elsewhere. As Secretary of State Alexander Haig has stated them, those principles are: consistency in the pursuit of U.S. interests, reliability as a force for peace and stability, and balance in our approach to individual issues and the orchestration of policy. As a nation we can no longer afford a foreign policy that confuses the American public because it lacks coherence, that confounds our allies because it lacks consistency, or that comforts our adversaries through its vacillation or ineptitude.

While certain African problems and issues are unique to that continent, we ignore to our own—and Africa's—peril the geopolitical and economic realities that tie Africa to the international community in which we all exist. Africa is an integral and increasingly important part of the global competitive system. We did not cause this to happen. It is a reflection of the reality of African independence and a result of the abiding characteristics of world politics. Africa's leaders can have little confidence in an America that speaks with the condescension or paternalism of a bygone era. A mature U.S. relationship with African states can be an important force for international as well as U.S. national security.

We began this administration by setting forth what U.S. objectives in Africa should be:

- We seek to promote peace and regional security and deny opportunities to those who seek contrary objectives.
- We will support proven friends and be known as a reliable partner, in Africa as elsewhere.
- We want to maintain open market opportunities, access to key resources, and contribute to expanding African and American economies.

- We support negotiated solutions to the problems of southern Africa.
- We seek to expand that group of nations whose development policies produce economic progress and which have flourishing democratic institutions.
- We shall do our part in meeting Africa's humanitarian needs and in fostering basic human liberties in keeping with both our principles and our interests.

Meeting these objectives is, of course, no easy task. But we begin with several advantages. First, we have laid out objectives that we can all understand. Second, these objectives are in keeping with basic American values. The policies we implement will not conceal them. To do so would indicate our own lack of confidence in those values and principles for which we as Americans have long been admired. They are an integral part of the comparative advantage we as Americans and the Western world in general have in Africa.

Africa and Africans are already largely oriented toward the West. Yet that orientation, that advantage, cannot be taken for granted. Events of the last decade have proven only too clearly that the objectives we seek in Africa are increasingly threatened by political instability, external intervention, and declining economic performance. Soviet/Cuban and Eastern bloc intervention in African affairs, the presence of thousands of Cuban troops in Angola and Ethiopia, the presence of Libyan troops in Chad, and the massive transfers of arms by Eastern bloc nations all serve to undermine U.S. and Western interests in Africa and to thwart our—and Africa's—objectives. The globe's leading sources of destabilization are active in Africa. This administration has no hesitation in stating that—frankly, categorically, and for the record.

Nor do we hesitate in our belief that economic development, a central imperative for a continent that contains two-thirds of the world's poorest nations, cannot take place in an environment of instability or insecurity. In this respect, African nations are no different from other developing nations. Roads cannot be built, railroads cannot transport goods, wells cannot be dug, nor crops harvested when a nation is at war with itself or its neighbors. We will do our part in addressing Africa's security needs. We have already proposed to the Congress increased levels of security assistance to certain key African nations in support of our objectives in Africa and in the Persian Gulf. By defining carefully our interests and commitments and by backing them up in credible ways, we believe the United States, in concert with our major allies, can play a significant role in addressing Africa's security problems. We will stand together with our proven friends in Africa, offering them assistance and counsel rather than turning our backs on them in their time of need. To do otherwise would do injustice to our own values as a people, and it would prevent us from achieving our goals of peace, regional security, economic progress, and the expansion of human liberties.

But let me make it quite clear that we do not *choose* nor have we any *mandate* to be the policeman of Africa. No nation has such a mandate. Our preferred choice is to foster and help implement, where we can, diplomatic solutions to Africa's conflicts. In southern Africa, as in the Horn of Africa, we seek a reduction of regional tensions. Those who

characterize this administration's goals differently are, simply put, wrong. We are committed to playing our proper role in creating a context for successful negotiations leading to internationally recognized independence for Namibia. We believe it is the task of the Western world to encourage purposeful, evolutionary change in South Africa towards a non-racial society. And we believe that all those who share our opposition to foreign intervention on African soil will acknowledge the need to find means to remove any pretexts for the presence of foreign troops in Angola.

Our concerns with southern Africa, from Zaire to the Cape, are born out of our recognition of the strategic, political, and economic importance of this region to the United States and the Western world. Southern African nations play an important role in meeting U.S., European, and Japanese requirements for critical minerals such as chrome ore, cobalt, industrial diamonds, manganese, platinum, vanadium, copper, tin, and asbestos. The Western world must remain engaged in this geopolitically important region during periods of strife and uncertainty. Southern African states form the littoral to one of the vital lifelines of the industrial democracies. We must work actively and play our proper role—diplomatic, strategic, commercial, and economic—in this key arena to prevent destabilization and economic decline, and to foster a secure and prosperous regional order. Failure to be an active participant in the affairs of southern Africa can only lead to heightened regional tension, polarization, and Soviet-backed adventurism. That is why we have not shied away from the difficult negotiations on ~~Angola~~ we have not abandoned South Africans of all races who are seeking constructive changes and who are committed to purposeful movement away from apartheid; and why we have not been dissuaded from pursuing an end to the internationalized strife in Angola. The stakes are too high, the threats to our mutual interests too great, and, above all, the costs to the peoples of southern Africa too heavy for us to turn away from the challenges of this region.

I mentioned at the beginning of my remarks the tough goals that President Reagan has set for us, in restoring our own economic well-being and in contributing to development efforts in Africa as elsewhere in the Third World. In an interdependent world, the trends that we see in Africa today should cause us alarm: declining per capita food production, falling per capita growth rates for most nations; staggering import bills for non-oil exporting nations, desertification, high rates of inflation and deteriorating terms of trade, and population and urbanization growth rates which are the highest in the world. Already fragile economies are being undermined steadily by these developments. Even more fragile political systems, some of which are struggling to provide greater human liberties and broadened political participation, are being undermined by these economic trends. It is a vicious circle, one which has a decidedly negative impact upon our efforts to expand the linkages between our own and African economies and upon our shared goals of economic progress.

To break this cycle will require a concerted effort on our part, on your part, and on the part of Africans themselves. It will require some sacrifices, closer attention to priorities, specific definition of objectives, and better coordination of our assistance programs with our foreign policy goals. We are not ashamed to back winners. We want to expand that group of African nations whose development policies pro-

duce economic progress. We want to help those who help themselves and want to work with us on the basis of mutual respect and common interests—like Malawi and Kenya, Sudan and Cameroon.

But our official assistance resources and those of our allies are not infinite. We want to engage the American private sector more fully in the economic development process—in the creation of jobs, in overall growth, and in establishing a sustaining source of revenue. We recognize that the private sectors of other industrial democracies are already competing aggressively in Africa, yet we believe that U.S. firms have a comparative advantage in some critical areas, such as agri-business activities. We plan to do our part to assist you, by reexamining present government policies that act as an unnecessary disincentive to business activities abroad, by exploring ways in which our own Agency for International Development and other government agencies can support your activities, and by coordinating our trade, aid, and investment instruments in supportive ways.

In a larger sense, we believe that our own policies at home and abroad will create the environment in which U.S. business can operate more effectively. This administration seeks to rely more on market forces at home and to encourage the growth of market economies abroad. We can set an example on both fronts, one which when weighed together with the dismal results of government-run enterprises in Af-

rica, as elsewhere, will encourage the trends we seek. At the same time, African governments themselves will need to make certain changes—in management, in commodity pricing policies, in resource allocation, and in economic planning. We can no longer afford to provide scarce bilateral assistance, to encourage multilateral lending, or to promote private sector investment in countries whose policies do not produce results. To do otherwise would undermine our foreign policy goals and lose us your support and the support of the American people.

Yet there are reasons for optimism. Some African governments have already begun an agonizing reappraisal of their economic performance and policies. There is a new determination to reverse deteriorating economic conditions. U.S. private investment is more actively being encouraged and the opportunities for U.S. firms are there—in food processing industries, telecommunications, irrigation, mining, construction and medical equipment, earth satellite stations, and computer technology. You have this administration's pledge that we will work towards creating a more favorable environment in Africa for private-sector initiatives. We believe that Africans, if given the choice, will seek strengthened relations with us and with you. We have shared goals. We have the wherewithal to produce results. The values and institutions upon which the greatness of this country was built offer a solid basis for the continued strengthening of African-American relations. □

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Reagan's Policy Rupture

BY HENRY F. JACKSON

The established framework for defining U.S. policy toward South Africa has been ignored and breached by the Reagan administration in its sympathetic approach toward the apartheid regime. The Reagan approach has also seemed indifferent to the effect South African developments could have on American domestic and security interests: mass violence in South Africa could trigger a racial conflict of disastrous consequences within the United States, and it could also hasten a dangerous confrontation with the Soviet Union in the region of southern Africa that Moscow now identifies among its vital interests.

What is now needed, as an alternative to the Reagan approach, is an American policy that takes realistic account of the increasing insurrectionary violence in South Africa, as well as the



Photo: Michael Evans/The White House

"The Reagan administration seeks to revise the 20-year trend in U.S. policy toward South Africa"

impact of policy on American society. The African resistance to apartheid domination that erupted with the Soweto riots of June 1976 has intensified lately; the likelihood that it will become an element of future American-Soviet competition has increased the urgency of a final, definitive U.S. position consistent with American ideals and values. As suggested by the recent Rockefeller report, *South Africa: Time Running Out*, American policymakers may no longer ignore South Africa's racial conflict, which may still be amenable to the application of peaceful measures.

The Reagan administration meanwhile has entered a path leading away from a realistic policy as it seeks to revise the trend and intent of U.S. policy toward South Africa developed over the last 20 years.

THE ESTABLISHED POLICY CONTEXT

A basic framework for U.S. policy was introduced in 1962 when the Kennedy administration unilaterally declared an embargo on the sale of American arms and military equipment that the white-minority dictatorship could use in the enforcement of apartheid. The United States further endorsed the United Nations voluntary embargo of 1963. The embargo prohibited the sale and shipment of arms, ammunition, and military vehicles to South Africa, as well as equipment and materials for the manufacture and maintenance of arms and munitions there.

The new American policy, as implemented by the Johnson administration during 1964, imposed two important guidelines: a prohibition on the sale of all military equipment of significant value to military, paramilitary and police forces in training or combat; and a prohibition and maintenance of arms and munitions. A major loophole was corrected in 1968 by a third guideline that outlawed the use of American components in the foreign manufacture

Henry F. Jackson taught political science at Columbia University in 1980. A specialist in African and Middle Eastern affairs, he is author of *The FLN in Algeria: Party Development in a Revolutionary Society, 1954-1962* (Westview Press, 1977), and various articles. His latest book, *From the Congo to Soweto: U.S. Policy Towards Africa from Kennedy to Reagan* (William Morrow Press), will appear in March 1982.

of arms, ammunition, and other weapons-related items for South Africa.

A related aspect of the new policy concerned limitations on U.S. naval visits to South African ports, and on contacts with American officials or visits to the United States by South African military officials. Washington suspended U.S. Navy visits to South Africa in 1967. The Navy, which sometimes traversed South Africa's Cape route, had previously made stopovers at its Simonstown naval base, where black American sailors encountered racial harassment on shore leave. Thus, the naval restrictions represented a protest against both apartheid and South African racism directed at Americans.

The Carter administration amplified the basic policy in 1977 by endorsing the UN vote to make the 1963 arms embargo mandatory. The Department of Commerce in 1978 further expanded U.S. export restrictions by prohibiting all exports an American exporter either knows, or has reason to know, are destined for use by the South African military or police. The latter prohibition was clearly the most comprehensive because it was not limited to weapons and other military equipment but applied to every item exported from the United States to South Africa.

America's policy on arms restrictions to the white-supremacy distastefulship, now in effect for nearly two decades, has curtailed drastically South Africa's acquisition of U.S. military equipment. But the policy has not blocked South Africa's access to all American equipment. Numerous loopholes existed in the restrictions. For instance, the guidelines exempted preexisting contracts for military items completed by August 1963, with the result that the South African government obtained roughly \$30 million in U.S. military supplies from 1963 until April 1973. The 1963 UN embargo, moreover, did not specify so-called dual-purpose equipment — items such as noncombat aircraft, computers, and electronic equipment that can be used for both civilian and military purposes — and sales of this unspecified material continued despite its obvious utility to the South African security forces. The

Johnson administration sought to close this loophole in 1964 by limiting sales of dual-purpose equipment to civilian users.

The Nixon administration deliberately relaxed certain restrictions on arms to South Africa in accordance with National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) 39, issued under National Security advisor Henry Kissinger. The NSC report recommended that the United States "enforce" [the] arms embargo against South Africa but with liberal treatment of equipment which could serve either military or civilian purposes." President Nixon approved the recommendation in January 1970, paving the way for the most permissive interpretations that tended to violate the spirit, if not the letter, of the 1963 embargo.

Whereas the 1964 guidelines of the Johnson administration prohibited exports of dual-purpose equipment without strong assurances that it would not be used by South Africa's military, the Nixon policy permitted such exports to both civilians and the military in the absence of strong evidence of an explicit combat-related use. This change amounted to a convenient device for Americans to supply Pretoria with certain equipment that otherwise would have been denied by the guidelines. In fact, the Nixon administration did not publicly admit the existence of any guidelines for enforcing the embargo.

In an extraordinary shift from the Nixon policy, Carter's regulations embargoed not only military-related commodities, but all items under the Commerce Department's jurisdiction, including technical data and consumer goods that an exporter knows, or has reason to know, are to be purchased or used by South Africa's military or police. The regulations applied both the exports and re-exports, and therefore prohibited the export of items that passed through third countries en route to South Africa. These amendments constituted the most definitive interdiction of U.S. supplies to South Africa since the embargo of 1963.

Strict as the Carter regulations were, they did not cause an absolute termination of American military-related equipment shipped to South Africa because of residual loopholes in the re-

strictions as well as outright legal violations by a few American exporters. For example, the regulations administered by the Commerce Department did not ban sales of noncombat military equipment and dual-purpose equipment to civilians and governmental agencies excluding the military and police; these sales pertained to such items as computer technology, civilian aircraft, and airborne and ground-based communications equipment that South African importers could easily convert to military uses.

Intelligence cooperation between the United States and South Africa constituted another significant aspect of U.S. military policy not covered by the embargo of 1977. This omission pertained to exchanges of information between the CIA and the Bureau of State Security (BOSS), the espionage apparatus organized by South Africa in 1968. The two agencies maintained extremely close contacts. South Africa had facilitated the CIA's development of a mercenary army to suppress the Congo rebellion, and South Africa's subsequent intelligence network shared the CIA's violent antipathy toward communism. The CIA's role also involved South African race relations, and this particular collaboration has been sharply criticized by C. Clyde Ferguson, a deputy assistant secretary of state for African affairs under Nixon: "It is incomprehensible that the United States should be cooperating with South Africa's intelligence operation organization, knowing that its main job is to keep the Africans in check."

American companies have provided South Africa with arms in flagrant violation of State Department restrictions and the UN embargo. For example, Colt Industries and the Winchester Group of Olin Corporation manufactured and exported small arms together with ammunition to South Africa via third countries from 1971 to 1975. Similarly, the Space Research Corporation shipped 55,000 long-range (155-millimeter) artillery shells to the South African government during 1977-1978; the company further equipped the South African army with the GC-45 howitzer, a cannon reported to be the most advanced artillery piece in the world. Although the U.S. govern-

ment prosecuted the violators, their infractions exposed the relative ineffectiveness of existing prohibitions.

The Carter regulations applied only to an American exporter who knows, or has reason to know, that a dual-purpose item in question will be utilized by South Africa's military or police. They did not apply if the exporter did not know, or had no reason to know, that the exported item would ultimately be obtained by the military or police. Such loopholes permitted, if not encouraged, legalistic legerdemains for U.S. exporters to flout the law. American exporters escaped all penalty if South African purchasers simply provided no clue or information that the equipment would be transferred to the forces of coercion.

South Africa has clearly flouted certain features of U.S. military policy through trade with America's allies. France, the main source of South Africa's arms imports until 1975, provided a variety of sophisticated equipment, some containing U.S. components, such as the Cessna Model-337 Skymaster aircraft that is adaptable to military use. Using American engines, an Italian company built the Piaggio P-166 patrol plane, which was built for passengers and cargo but can be armed

with a variety of bombs. Israel, the world's biggest recipient of U.S. economic and military assistance, has been another dominant supplier of military assistance to South Africa; Israel's Uzi submachine gun, for instance, is standard equipment in the South African army. Without the cooperation of its allies, the United States can neither prevent South Africa from obtaining American-supplied equipment and materials nor deny it the benefits of American foreign assistance.

PATH TO INFAMY: THE REAGAN POLICIES

The Reagan administration has formulated its evolving policy toward South Africa almost exclusively within the context of American economic and strategic stakes. The fundamental economic stake, of course, consists of about 373 U.S. companies in South Africa, with aggregate direct investments of \$2 billion in 1980. South Africa's trade with the United States — including such minerals vital to American industry such as chromium, manganese, and platinum — amounts to \$3.4 billion annually. The searoute around the Cape of Good Hope is per-

ceived as both an economic and strategic interest because it is the maritime passageway for Middle Eastern petroleum destined for Western Europe and the United States. For Reagan policymakers, South Africa is especially valued as a pro-Western bulwark against Soviet-bloc expansion in the whole rim of southern Africa, and is also welcomed as a potential ally in the administration's boisterous cold war policy.

The cold war fixation of Reagan's foreign policy has taken precedence over Washington's most concern for the racist domination of South Africa's black majority.

After only two months in office, President Reagan moved in a sudden new direction, which suggested U.S. support of the apartheid regime and a retreat from official policy of the last two decades. In reference to South Africa's rigid system of racial segregation, the president defended U.S. support on both moral and strategic grounds: "As long as there's a sincere and honest effort being made [by the apartheid regime], based on our own experience in our own land, it would seem to me that we should be trying to be helpful . . . Can we abandon a country . . . that strategically is essen-



An American policy taking realistic account of increasing insurrectionary violence in South Africa is needed

tial to the Free World in its production of minerals we all must have and so forth?"

The first evidence of rupture from established policy followed when five South African military officers, including the chief of military intelligence, secretly arrived in the United States and consulted officials at the National Security Council and the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency. Jeane Kirkpatrick, holding a policy-level position in the administration as Reagan's ambassador to the United Nations, received the South African intelligence chief, General P.W. Van der Westhuizen, in New York. The South Africans' visits and consultations with U.S. officials violated longstanding policy outlawing official business visits to this country by members of South Africa's armed forces. Although the White House expelled the South Africans and attempted to excuse the infraction by stating that they had


obtained visas by concealing their identity as military leaders, the disingenuous excuse glossed over the chilling fact that they had completed their clandestine consultations before the expulsion.

The administration's willingness to align with the apartheid dictatorship was confirmed finally in May by the disclosure of State Department briefing papers affirming Washington's readiness to "open a new chapter" in bilateral relations in exchange for South Africa's cooperation in combating Soviet influence in southern Africa, notably in Angola, and Pretoria's support for an "internationally acceptable" solution in Namibia. (When Assistant Secretary of State Chester A. Crocker visited several African states during April, he attempted to win support for a negotiated Namibian settlement that proposed constitutional guarantees for Namibia's white minority as a precondition of independence.)

Not since Kissinger's ill-conceived NSSM 39 had Washington manifested such an explicit embrace of South Africa.

The new approach ignored the negative impact of such a policy on America's relations with independent African states. This was significant because the United States now has more economic stakes with these countries than with South Africa, amounting to \$4.5 billion in direct investments and annual trade of \$13.7 billion. Nigeria, the dominant African opponent of apartheid, is also the second largest supplier of petroleum to the United States. By aligning with South Africa, however marginally, the Reagan administration indicated the priority of its Africa policy at the risk of alienating such states as Nigeria. Not surprisingly, the recent OAU conference in Nairobi condemned the Reagan policies.

At home, the administration has



Mirage fighters built under French license: South Africa has been able to skirt the UN arms embargo



Photo: Tiuu Lukk

Ford, South Africa: U.S. corporations should scale down operations in strategic sectors

seemed oblivious to the potential domestic reaction to its new approach toward South Africa. In addition to considerable anti-apartheid sentiment in the universities and in various organizations, black Americans became alienated by what they regarded as insensitivity or indifference to the interests and welfare of black South Africans. TransAfrica, the black American lobby on African affairs, articulated such dissent, and its director, Randall Robinson, was responsible for exposing the briefing papers that linked administration policy to the apartheid regime. More significantly, the Reagan administration failed to perceive that its sympathetic approach to the white supremacists could intensify racial antagonisms in American society.

A POLICY PROPOSAL: THE CASE FOR VOLUNTARY WITHDRAWALS

African resistance to apartheid quickened even as the Reagan team rejected U.S. policy. For example, forces of the African National Congress operated underground guerrilla organizations seeking change through armed insurrection. Police stations, banks, an oil refinery, and other apartheid facilities were hit by the African insurgents in urban localities once regarded as invulnerable to black revolt. In the fiercest assault, African saboteurs

bombarbed a Durban power plant in April, forcing hundreds of businesses to close.

Nearly 4,000 young Africans who fled South Africa in the aftermath of the Soweto uprising of 1976 constituted the main columns of the paramilitary organization in their exile to neighboring countries like Mozambique. The march toward mass upheaval in South Africa has thus begun in earnest, and the prospect of widespread racial confrontation there threatens to involve the United States and the Soviet Union on opposite sides.

What then should be the proper response of U.S. policy under conditions of approaching revolution in South Africa? The United States is in the strongest position of all the Western powers except Great Britain to influence the white minority along the path of peaceful accommodation with the black majority. This is so because American governmental and business relations with South Africa are in reality no more than a series of relations with the ruling whites. Under such conditions the United States might successfully promote what can be termed a policy of voluntary reversals — or actions by the U.S. government and corporations to unilaterally reverse the existing pattern of political and corporate cooperation with the apartheid

state. Washington, for example, could begin by prohibiting the sale of dual-purpose equipment, and eliminating military and intelligence collaboration of all kinds. The corporations, which would be as likely to deal with South Africa under black majority rule as under white domination, could phase down operations in such strategic sectors as heavy engineering and the automobile industry.

A policy of voluntary reversals would permit Americans to take the initiative in reducing ties with South Africa before these are reversed by changes now being wrought by African revolutionaries. It would also reduce the risk of Soviet-American confrontation in an upheaval where South African whites are likely to fight to the end to preserve their power and privileges. Unlike the Reagan approach, such a policy would place the United States on the side of a country that seems destined to become the most powerful nation on the African continent. □

SOUTH AFRICA: TIME RUNNING OUT

THE REPORT OF THE STUDY COMMISSION ON U.S. POLICY TOWARD SOUTHERN AFRICA

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Donald B. Sole

South African Ambassador to the United States

INTERVIEWED BY ANTHONY J. HUGHES

AFRICA REPORT: Mr. Ambassador, what do you see as your major focus of activity in the United States?

SOLE: In the narrower intergovernmental sense my principal objective in the last six months has been to do all I can to restore mutual credibility between the United States and South African governments. In this respect I would say there has been good progress. The credibility chasm that characterized relations between the two governments under the Carter administration has been narrowed to a gap under the Reagan administration—a gap that is certainly bridgeable and which, in fact, is being bridged in certain sectors. In the wider sense my major focus of activity in the United States has always been combating ignorance, prejudice, and stereotyped views of South Africa; promoting understanding of the simple truth that we are a people who share much of the cultural heritage of the American people, even as we are rooted in Africa; and who seek earnestly to bring into existence in South Africa a political system that provides for broad-based participation by all our peoples, while respecting their differing cultural heritages and providing for sufficient economic opportunities to meet their aspirations.

AFRICA REPORT: What is South Africa's reaction to the first months of the Reagan administration's foreign policy, especially in your region?

SOLE: The Reagan administration has recognized the reality of the Soviet threat to the security of southern Africa and other parts of the world, and has begun to develop policies that take cognizance of the dimensions of this threat. It recognizes clearly that it can best promote the freedom of Africa's peoples by reducing the threat to that

freedom posed by Moscow's hegemonic ambitions. By refusing to be held captive by the negative clichés that characterize the rhetoric employed in the United Nations, it has made it clear that it is not prepared to be blackmailed into a spurious choice between South Africa and the rest of Africa. The administration has displayed a real interest in the economic welfare of African countries, an interest made manifest in increased aid to Africa in a year in which expenditures in most other areas have been sharply pruned, and has been direct in rejecting hypocrisy and self-serving rhetoric. Most African leaders will come, I believe, to respect this frankness on Washington's part. Before we can all begin to address the root causes of Africa's problems, it is necessary to dispel the ridiculous myth that they are somehow to be laid at Pretoria's door.

The South African government certainly has a better sense of where it stands vis-à-vis Washington. The Reagan administration has made it clear that it wishes to promote the resolution of the Namibian question as swiftly as possible and has sought, in our opinion, to address the concerns of the democratic Namibian parties in an honest and open fashion, thereby advancing the prospect of an equitable settlement. It has made it clear that it accepts the good faith of the South African government in its efforts to eliminate hurtful discrimination, to promote the economic welfare of all in South Africa, and to devise political structures that are responsive to the aspirations of all its peoples. And it has emphasized that it stands ready to assist as we move along this challenging path.

We do not see eye to eye in all respects with this admin-

istration, and it would be naive to expect to do so, but we welcome and respect the honesty that we have encountered.

AFRICA REPORT: What do you think of the role of the Soviet Union and its allies in Africa?

SOLE: We have no illusions on this score. Moscow has made no secret of its interest in destabilizing both the oil-fields of the Middle East and the mineral-rich area of southern Africa. Given the potential impact of even a short-term interruption of the supply of critical minerals to the industrialized nations, it ought to surprise no one that this is an important aspect of its international strategy. The Soviet Union has made no contribution to Africa's development needs and provided no succor to the victims of drought or disease. It has no role to play in promoting human freedom. It is a tragic commentary on man's ability to deceive himself that the Soviet Union and its East German and Cuban allies should be seen by some in Africa—and elsewhere in the developing world—as agents of liberation.

AFRICA REPORT: How are your relations with your neighbors in southern Africa?

SOLE: The Organization of African Unity's special summit in Lagos last year called for the urgent intensification of regional economic cooperation. Meaningful regional development is recognized as being of crucial importance both for economic development at the national level as well as for the merger of economically viable subregions into a continental common market.

Southern Africa, with South Africa at its core, already constitutes such a subregion. If we could break down the political and ideological barriers that presently separate the Republic from the rest of southern Africa, which in developmental terms stretches as far as Tanzania, southern Zaire, and Angola, one of the most powerful regional economic groupings not only in Africa, but in the whole of the Third World, would emerge.

The region presently has about 60 million inhabitants. It is particularly rich in minerals, has an ample supply of water and considerable hydro-electric potential, and a good road, railway, and communication infrastructure. And two countries, Zimbabwe and South Africa, with their own market economies, can supply to the rest of the region not only agricultural surpluses but also certain kinds of industrial equipment and manufactured goods at considerably lower prices than would obtain if these commodities had to be imported from outside Africa.

There is of course a movement among African states to the north of South Africa to lessen their economic dependence on us through the establishment of closer economic cooperation among themselves. Nine African states have grouped themselves together into the so-called Southern African Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC), which has succeeded in raising about \$700 million in foreign capital mainly for the improvement of railway and harbor facilities. This development need not impair subcontinental economic integration, even if there is a temporary reduction in trade between South Africa and the SADCC

states. The more the nine black southern African states are able to increase their economic development and cooperation, the easier it will be for South Africa to cooperate with SADCC once the political obstacles have been removed.

Our trade with Africa has increased greatly over the past decade. In 1980, exports to some 48 African states amounted to over \$1.2 billion. This makes South Africa by far the largest single partner in intra-African trade, as no African country maintains such extensive trade relations with the rest of the continent as the Republic.



Donald B. Sole: "The South African government has a better sense of where it stands vis-a-vis Washington" under the Reagan administration

In Africa our economic contribution is of enormous importance. South Africa, with little more than 20 million people out of a total African population in excess of 460 million, accounts for 75% of the southern African region's gross domestic product (GDP) and for one-quarter of Africa's total GDP. Although South Africa covers only 4% of the continent's surface area and has only 6% of the continent's inhabitants, it produces over 85% of the steel manufactured in Africa and uses over 50% of the continent's

electric power. It accounts for 40% of Africa's industrial production, for 60% of its rail goods traffic, 45% of Africa's telephones, 39% of all motor vehicles, and 30% of all medical doctors.

In southern Africa we render invaluable transport and technical services. Without the South African railways and harbors, the landlocked countries of the subcontinent could probably not survive, because as long as the Benguela Railway Line remains blocked and the rail links to the facilities at the Mozambique ports of Beira and Maputo (as well as the ports themselves) remain unreliable and in urgent need of repair, the availability of the South African transport infrastructure is critical to the economic development, if not the economic survival, of southern African states.



Strip mining for coal near Johannesburg: South Africa's most important fuel export is steam coal

The Southern African Customs Union moreover provides the smaller black member states with a considerable part of their total revenue — in the case of Swaziland it amounted to almost 50% in 1978. Although the number of black workers from neighboring states who are in wage employment in South Africa has declined in recent years, there are still about 300,000 foreign workers recorded as being in the Republic at present (the unofficial estimate is close to half a million). From Lesotho alone there are about 150,000 in permanent wage employment in South Africa, as against the only 25,000 at home. More than one-quarter of the earnings of these men is remitted to their families in Lesotho, thus providing that country with considerable revenue support without which Lesotho would face financial ruin. The Republic's role as a provider of food is increasing steadily in the light of the continuing decline in agricultural performance in the countries north of the Zambesi. Our maize

surplus this year amounts to well over six million tons, much of which is available to needy African countries.

Despite the existing political differences and despite efforts to isolate South Africa even further, the country will continue to play a vital economic role in the southern African subregion.

AFRICA REPORT: What is your country's attitude towards the possession of nuclear weapons? What could you do with them if you had them? Why deny yourself such weapons?

SOLE: It is generally accepted that South Africa has the capability to produce nuclear weapons. The technology is known, we have the uranium, and we have the industrial base. But we ourselves are exposed to no nuclear threat and our conventional arms capability is more than enough to enable us to deal effectively with any threat to our frontiers. As long as this position continues there is no justification to divert energies and resources into the manufacture of nuclear weapons. But we shall of course continue with our program of nuclear energy development for peaceful purposes, a program that is liable to be accelerated to the extent that other countries may renege on supply contracts for our nuclear power facilities under international safeguards. It is perhaps relevant that the greatest stimulant to the development of self-sufficiency in the conventional arms required for South Africa's defense was provided by the institution of the arms embargo, first by the United States and later by the United Nations.

AFRICA REPORT: Does South Africa want the Namibian people to freely choose their own future, whoever that might bring to power?

SOLE: Prime Minister P.W. Botha made it clear in a major address to the South African Parliament in 1979 that South Africa would be guided in respect to the future of Namibia by the wishes of the people of that territory. Botha has also stated explicitly that if SWAPO were to come to power in free and fair elections, South Africa would abide by such an outcome. But the South African government is not prepared to go along with a fraudulent electoral situation in which persons comprising the supervising body are clearly identified both by themselves and by SWAPO, as SWAPO supporters. SWAPO has conducted a campaign of physical intimidation, murder, and mutilation in parts of Ovambo and the Eastern Caprivi for the past several years. It has threatened the most horrible retribution against those who do not support it, if—or as its spokesmen have put it—when, it comes to power. Among its propaganda claims has been the boast that at some future time it will succeed in driving out the South African forces, who will be succeeded by United Nations troops that will have come to install SWAPO as the government of Namibia. Against the background of the United Nations identification with SWAPO (and its refusal to recognize the other Namibian parties) and SWAPO's own campaign of intimidation, it is obvious that elections under the highly visible supervision of the United Nations, as envisaged in 1978 by Security Council Resolution 435, would in no sense have provided a setting in 1980

or 1981 in which the Namibian people could have freely chosen their own future.

It is our hope that a formula that will permit the people of Namibia to exercise a free choice will soon be agreed upon.

AFRICA REPORT: Why is a democratic solution appropriate for Zimbabwe and Namibia and not for South Africa itself?

SOLE: Your question fails to recognize the central truth about democracy—namely, that it is a particular system of government, not an ethical ideal. As a system of government, it is the product of a particular political culture and relies for its sustenance on the existence in a society of certain shared values, cultural traditions, and socioeconomic conditions. John Stuart Mill went so far as to remark: "Free institutions are next to impossible in a country made up of different nationalities. Among a people without fellow feelings, especially if they read and speak different languages, the united public opinion, necessary to the working of representative government, cannot exist." Those who decry the failure of democracy to take root in most Third World societies ignore the fact that one cannot impose upon a society a system of government that is at once at variance with its—frequently diverse—political cultures, and which relies for its operation on the participation of its people.

All that the policy of the South African government seeks to do is to accord due recognition to this reality. It does not seek to impose on peoples with different cultural heritages a system of government that grew from the political culture of European nations and was further developed in the United States of America. It seeks rather to promote their political independence of one another so that each is free to develop those political institutions that are responsive to its own

culture. At the same time the white group, whose political culture is that of Europe, clings jealously to the democratic institutions with which it is familiar. To suggest to it that it ought to place those institutions at risk by surrendering its control to a far larger culturally heterogeneous group is like suggesting that citizens of the United States ought to agree to surrender control over the institutions of their government in favor of a system of world government, in which the will of the majority of the citizens of the world would be dominant. Who can doubt that such a suggestion would be violently resisted? Who can believe that the institutions of American government would survive for long in so heterogeneous an environment? Why then demand of South African whites what Americans would not be prepared to do?

AFRICA REPORT: If the answer to South Africa's racial problems is partition into homelands, how do you arrive at a democratic and equitable division of the country?

SOLE: The twin pillars of the policy of the present South African government are political decentralization and economic coordination. Inasmuch as cultural and ethnic heterogeneity and socioeconomic disparity dictate fragmentation of political power, the government's policy has sought to provide for the optimal measure of decentralized political authority extending even to independence. Recognizing, however, that in most of the developing world economic independence has not followed political independence, the government has proposed the creation of a Southern African Confederation, a close-knit grouping of independent states bound together in their joint economic interest. This approach takes account of the economic and infrastructural unity of much of southern Africa and permits an optimal decentralization of political power without the creation of economically stunted ministates.

AFRICA REPORT: Mr. Ambassador, that reply seems to confirm the view of those critics who say that homeland independence is a sham.

SOLE: That is not so. The concept is that countries such as the Transkei, Bophutatswana, and Venda, whose political independence we have already accepted and which is fully recognized as far as South Africa is concerned, should come together with a confederation. They would come in as fully independent states and would voluntarily surrender certain of their sovereign powers to the confederation. I don't want to overplay historical parallels, but you will recall that Bismarck's confederation was formed from an amalgamation of states that were recognized as politically independent at the time. Similarly, the whole objective of the European Economic Community has been to work towards a confederal structure.

AFRICA REPORT: The key word in my question was "equitable." The black four-fifths of the population is allocated some 14% of South Africa under the homelands division and even less of the nation's economic resources and facilities.

SOLE: In respect to that question, I would refer to the cliché that government rests on the consent of the governed.



Photo: Jerry Frank/United Nations

Johannesburg: "South Africa accounts for 75 percent of southern Africa's gross domestic product"



Photo: Peter Marlow/Sygma

South African troops patrolling the Namibia-Angola border

Territorial partition in South Africa would be largely dependent on the consent of the governed. If you look at your own history in the United States, everyone will agree that there is no equity attached to the territorial division of the country, as far as the indigenous population is concerned. This is something that is now accepted, with minor qualifications, because it rests on the consent of the governed. Around the time of the arrival of the *Mayflower* there were some two million indigenous inhabitants of North America. That is more than the number of indigenous people in southern Africa—including what are now Lesotho, Swaziland, and Botswana—at the time of the arrival of Jan van Riebeck one generation later. If you look at the numbers of our indigenous people today, and compare them with the numbers of your own indigenous people today, you will see the difference.

AFRICA REPORT: How do you envision South Africa developing over the coming several decades and into the 21st century?

SOLE: I have already dealt with much of this in my answers to the last two questions. Broadly speaking, South Africa will be transformed into a confederation founded on the two principles of political decentralization and economic

coordination. The so-called 'coloured' and Asian communities, whose political cultures, as a result of earlier urbanization and acculturation, approximate closely to those of the white groups, will be progressively incorporated into common political institutions with the whites. There is little doubt that those institutions will themselves undergo certain changes as a consequence. The other states of the confederation will engage with the South African state (perhaps renamed) as sovereign equals in cooperative economic development projects based on regions defined without undue attention to national boundaries. A high degree of coordination of fiscal and monetary policies and an improved system of revenue sharing will emerge.

Education opportunities will be vastly expanded. The Human Sciences Research Council was entrusted in 1980-81 with the task of undertaking the first comprehensive official investigation of the education of all population groups in South Africa. In appointing the commission, the prime minister instructed that it should propose programs to achieve equality in the educational services available to all groups. Great strides have already been made—the budget for black education has increased over the past three years by 20%, 42%, and 50% respectively. Parity of salaries has

already been achieved for fully qualified white, coloured, and Asian teachers, and this goal will soon be realized in respect of black teachers also. Twenty-five percent of all whites, 29% of the coloured and Asian population, and 18% of all blacks are now at school. We are already experiencing a dramatic increase in the numbers of black students graduating from high school and anticipate vastly greater numbers of black students in tertiary educational institutions (universities, colleges, and technicons) in the years ahead. In fact, 155,000 whites, 28,500 coloureds and Asians, and 33,000 blacks are presently enrolled in tertiary institutions.

The individual's opportunities for economic advancement will depend exclusively on himself. The government is committed to the elimination of hurtful and unnecessary discrimination and has made the greatest strides in the economic sector. Trade union rights for all South Africans, as well as nationals of other states that previously constituted part of South Africa, have been established. Statutory job discrimination has been eliminated. Opportunities for apprenticeship now exist for all. Evidence of the enormous strides made in this area appear from the shift in the relative percentage increases of black and white wages in recent years: Over the decade of the 1970s black wages rose by more than 50% while white wages rose on average by less than 4%.

This process of educational and economic advancement, coupled with the shared experience of intergovernmental and interpersonal negotiation, bargaining, and conflict management provided for by cooperation on a personal level in the workplace and on a governmental level within the confederation, will promote the emergence of shared values and increasingly similar lifestyles and political cultures among the peoples of southern Africa, thus ensuring even closer collaboration in pursuit of common goals.

AFRICA REPORT: Is there any subject we have not covered to which you would like to address yourself?

SOLE: In the context of these questions I think it relevant to refer to southern Africa's role in the so-called resource war between the United States and its allies and the Soviet Union and its allies. It is not for nothing that southern Africa has been termed the Persian Gulf of nonfuel minerals. As recently as 1973 Leonid Brezhnev is reported to have told President Barre of Somalia in Prague: "Our aim is to gain control of the two great treasure houses on which the West depends. The energy treasure house of the Persian Gulf and the mineral treasure house of central and southern Africa."

The implications of this threat, also as far as southern Africa is concerned, are now clearly recognized by the United States, thanks in particular to the studies initiated by such congressmen as Democrat James Santini of Nevada. It was on the basis of such studies that Secretary of State Alexander Haig on September 18, 1980, in testimony before Congress, was able to state: "Should future trends, especially in southern Africa, result in alignment with Moscow of this critical resource area, then the U.S.S.R. would control as much as 90% of several key minerals for which no substitutes have been developed and the loss of which could

bring the severest consequences to the existing economic and security framework of the Free World."

The United States is not so vulnerable as its allies, but even in the case of the United States the degree of import dependence is illustrated by the following percentages from South Africa alone: platinum group, 82%; vanadium, 87%; ferrochrome, 80%; antimony trioxide, 50%; chromite ore, 48%; and ferromanganese, 45%; to which should be added 51% of its cobalt needs from Zaire.

Nor should one overlook the importance of South Africa's most important fuel export, steam coal, of which we shall be the major external supplier to the European Economic Community from 1982 onwards, replacing Poland. Indeed, we are even supplying the United States with this commodity. In terms of adequacy of the resource base to support long-term export supply capability, availability of the resources as far as geostrategic distribution is concerned, and secure and continuous access, South Africa has no rival in respect of the nonfuel minerals I have listed. □



Transkei, the first homeland to be declared "independent" by the South African government

Photo: William Campbell/Sygnia

Oliver Tambo

President of the African National Congress of South Africa

AFRICA REPORT: To many critics, the African National Congress (ANC) looks like a failure. After 70 years, racism is more entrenched than ever. What is your response to those criticisms? Why does the ANC appear to be relatively inactive? Why are there not 20 bombings a day, 10 trains derailed, 50 policemen killed? Why are you responding to the violence of apartheid with isolated half measures?

TAMBO: There is a misleading appearance of apartheid that is painted by the amount of repression meted out against the people by the regime. It is a deliberate show of power intended to convince onlookers that apartheid is safe and sound. But it is this very repression that points to the fundamental weakness of apartheid. Apartheid can only survive through violence. Apartheid is cracking. Prime Minister Botha cannot use the same language used by former Prime Minister Strijdom some years ago when addressing his supporters. Today, rather than say, "I stand on the kaffir's neck," he is forced to say that they must be prepared to adapt or die. And this is the result of the 70 fighting years of the ANC and the people of South Africa. The broad political front whose creation has always been central to the objectives of the ANC has today managed to divide and weaken the ruling clique. There is a political crisis within the ruling party on matters of policy. The ANC will continue to widen this rift. The pace of the struggle is not going to be determined by the ANC alone. There are two forces pitted against each other.

The amount of resistance by the apartheid regime is also a determinant of the tempo of the struggle. The intensity of the resistance of the apartheid regime and the depth of its support from the West are what they are exactly because the

benefits of liberation will for us be as substantial as are the benefits of our oppression to the racist white minority and its Western allies.

We are active and not half-active, both militarily and politically. We have launched successful campaigns within the country. The most recent one was the anti-Republic May struggles when the apartheid regime wanted to demonstrate that it has succeeded over the past 20 years to unite the people of South Africa behind its reactionary program. We said no. South Africa is not united at all; any celebrations will be celebrations of our oppression, our exploitation, our humiliation. We called on the people to reject this insult and they responded by not only boycotting the festivities, but by going still further. They burned the so-called Republican flag, and defiantly hoisted the ANC's national flag. Is this inaction? Are these half-measures? You talk of isolated military operations; the effects of these operations have not been isolated at all. The military budget of Pretoria is rocketing and security activity has reached psychotic dimensions. On the military front, the frequency of our operations is markedly rising to the consternation of the regime and its forces. We have concentrated not so much on the number of operations, but on their success and effect. We have succeeded and we mean to keep an improved record. We are making advances on the industrial and educational fronts. Are these indeed half-measures? The wrath of the people is growing and certainly in time, there will be more than 20 policemen and soldiers killed every day. We have warned that the people's patience is not endless.

AFRICA REPORT: How has the ideology of the ANC developed? There were traditional links with the South African communist party; are they still extant? How would you describe your relations with the socialist countries?

TAMBO: The ANC was born as a parliament of the African people. The delegates at its founding conference in 1912 represented the entire spectrum of the South African, and the southern African, indigenous population, including the kings or paramount chiefs of the day, the intellectuals, workers, peasants, women, and so on. In time, the ANC has

These written replies were provided by Oliver Tambo in response to questions submitted by *Africa Report* editor Anthony J. Hughes.

developed toward where it is becoming the parliament of all the oppressed people and the democratic forces of our country, without distinction of race or color. Our people regard and speak of the ANC as the "motherbody" of the liberation movement of South Africa. It is in this context that we must understand the ideology of the alliances it enters into. Our ideology is reflected in the Freedom Charter. One of our tasks as a political organization is to popularize the demands contained in the charter, to unite the people of South Africa in struggle for the realization of those demands. To the extent that various individuals and sections of our community hold communist, Christian, Moslem, or other views, should one therefore expect to find that the Freedom Charter is supported by communists, Christians, Moslems, etc., and similarly that all these people are united within the ANC by the fact that they are fighting for a common cause, clearly and publicly defined in the Freedom Charter? The South African Communist party supports and actively fights for the realization of the demands contained in the charter. It accepts the leadership of the ANC and therefore cannot but be an ally of the ANC as would any other organization that adopts the same position.

Official contact between the ANC and the Soviet Union goes back as far as 1927, when a delegation of the ANC, led by its president, Josiah Gumede, visited the Soviet Union and came back convinced of the support that our struggle enjoys from the Soviet government and people. Practical experience has shown our people and the ANC that President Gumede was not wrong in his assessment of 55 years ago. We stood together with the Soviet Union and the allied forces in fighting nazism during the Second World War. True to those positions, the Soviet Union and other socialist countries stand with us to this day fighting the apartheid system, itself and its leaders direct pawns of nazi ideology and practice. Having endorsed the armed struggle being waged by the oppressed people in Africa, including South Africa, the Organization of African Unity has made repeated appeals to the socialist countries for the type of assistance proposed in numerous UN resolutions. The ANC will continue to work for the unity of the greatest possible number of people at home and abroad for the destruction of the apartheid regime and for the birth of a democratic, non-racial, and united South Africa. The greatest possible number will include South African communists and those of other lands, including South African Christians as well as the world Christian community. The greater that number and the firmer the unity among these diverse ideological strands in their opposition to the apartheid system, the closer the prospect of our victory becomes.

AFRICA REPORT: What are the basic aims of the ANC?

TAMBO: As we have said, the basic aims of the ANC are contained in the Freedom Charter. In brief, we can say that we fight for a genuinely democratic, united, and nonracial South Africa in which every adult person will have the right to vote and be elected to any and every organ of government, and in which we will use the wealth of our country and the diligent labor and expertise of its citizens to wipe out the terrible legacy of hunger, disease, and ignorance that the apartheid system has imposed on the majority of our



Photo: Camerapix

Oliver Tambo: "The people's patience is not endless"

people. We struggle for a South Africa that will uphold the course of peace, live in harmony, and engage in mutually beneficial cooperation with its neighbors and the rest of the world.

AFRICA REPORT: How do you view other organizations—white establishment liberals, the Pan-Africanist Congress, Inkatha, the Black Consciousness Movement, trade unions?

TAMBO: The ANC continually encourages the people of South Africa to engage in struggle, to become, as has been said, their own liberators. We encourage resistance and activity around all issues, be they broad national or local and immediate questions. We therefore expect that in response to this direction, our people will form organizations to translate their hostility to the apartheid system, in all its manifestations, into practical activity. Consequently, we welcome the formation of any organization whose aim is to oppose oppression and racism, even if that opposition is in the first instance confined to specific issues such as high rents, low wages, inferior education, land hunger, the pass laws, the absence of freedom of worship, and the right to conscientious objection.

Our attitude to the organizations you mentioned is determined by these positions. For example, as early as 1973, our National Executive Committee issued a public statement welcoming the formation of the "black consciousness" organizations although we differed with them on certain questions. But we welcomed them because we were convinced

that they see themselves as centers for the activation of our people into struggle against the Pretoria regime. We welcome and encourage the development of a democratic trade union movement for exactly the same reasons, in the conviction that the mobilization of workers into united struggle is an important condition for the further advance of our struggle and indeed for our victory.

AFRICA REPORT: Doesn't the bickering among such groups strengthen apartheid? What are the chances of your getting together with the Pan-Africanist Congress?

TAMBO: It is not correct to say that there is bickering among groups fighting for the overthrow of fascism in South Africa. If there is any bickering at all, it is between those groups that seek to hamper the process of the people's struggle and the democratic front that continuously strives to point the way forward. We constitute part of this democratic front, and a leading part at that, and we say the people are not divided and are not bickering among themselves. This was proved in the month of May, when the people united in anti-Republic demonstrations. Anybody outside this front becomes irrelevant, and at times becomes part of the problem. The ANC will strive to maintain and to nourish this unity. The ANC believes that any meaningful unity must be based on action and principle. We have never been opposed to anybody fighting for the overthrow of the apartheid regime. One of our basic aims has always been to unite the oppressed majority and other democratic elements in South Africa. Our success in this regard cannot be overemphasized. Once more, we say the people are united and the ANC has a historic mission to lead this united force to ultimate victory. This would include the PAC if the PAC were part of this force.

AFRICA REPORT: The United States has its own concerns in international affairs. It fears losing access to South African raw materials and is afraid of Soviet political influence in southern Africa. How do you respond to those feelings?

TAMBO: U.S. concerns in international affairs should be freedom, social progress, and peace, and it should align itself with all the forces that strive to achieve these goals internationally. The ANC is fighting for the destruction of a violent and antihuman regime in our subcontinent, whose history is one of aggression and oppression not only against indigenous South Africans, but also against neighboring states. Can the U.S. really be part of international concern, particularly in southern Africa, to strengthen and provoke aggression against those who fight for peace? What the United States should consider, and very carefully, is whether its role in that area is to get rid of racism as represented by Pretoria, or to sup with the devil in the interests of profit and raw materials. Indeed, the U.S. must accept that the Soviet Union is striving to liquidate the crime of apartheid in keeping with the OAU and UN resolutions and is supporting us in fighting for a southern Africa that will become a haven and a bastion of peace. U.S. access to raw materials in South Africa and indeed to the hearts and minds of our people can never be guaranteed by forming alliances with those who treat our people as animals and wild beasts.

AFRICA REPORT: What about American investment in South Africa? What will happen if the ANC has a dominant position when majority rule is established?

TAMBO: The broad basic positions of the ANC concerning the South African economy in all its major parts after liberation are contained in the Freedom Charter. What we say to foreign investors today is that they must pull out of South Africa because their investments inevitably help to strengthen the apartheid regime. We would therefore expect that if U.S. corporations have any regard for our voice, there will be no U.S. investments in South Africa on the day of liberation. If there are, that will mean that such investors will have elected to side with the minority racist regime against the democratic majority. They will have elected to become and stay friends with the enemy of our people. Consequently, when their friend goes, as he surely will, so will they be obliged to go. As for other investors who would want to participate in the reconstruction of South Africa, they would of course be welcome to join us as equal partners in arrangements that are mutually beneficial both to themselves and to us. South Africa is today part of the world economic system. After liberation it will continue to have international economic links, but no longer as a supplier of commodities rendered cheap and competitive by virtue of cheap black labor, and a source of disproportionately high profit because of the inhuman exploitation of our people.

AFRICA REPORT: What policy toward South Africa in 1981 is likely to serve the long-term interests of the United States? What can American individuals and organizations do to help?

TAMBO: We would like to see the American people categorically reject the positions taken by the Reagan administration of dragging the U.S. into an ill-conceived and disastrous alliance with the racist regime of Pretoria. This is a principal challenge that confronts all right-thinking Americans. We believe that there are many initiatives that individuals and organizations in the United States can take to expose the actual brutality of the apartheid system, without waiting for Washington to impose sanctions against the regime that upholds and implements this system, and to render assistance to us who are not merely the daily victims of racism, applied as a matter of state policy, but also the main force that must wipe out this cancerous growth in world politics. In short, what we would like to see from the American people is practical action to isolate the apartheid regime and to support the ANC. Surely it ought to be obvious that the long-term interests of the U.S. in South Africa lie in making common course with the democratic antiracist majority of our country, against the racist and antidemocratic minority. Considerations of "realpolitik," "power politics," or whatever, cannot justify the formation of an alliance with the self-proclaimed heirs of Hitler's Reich. The American people who take pride in their Constitution, their democratic traditions, and their willingness to go to war for their own independence and freedom surely need no lectures from us about their obligation to stand on the side of the forces that fight for democracy, freedom, and equal constitutional rights in South Africa. □

Africa remains skeptical as West works on UN Namibia plan

African nations concerned about the four-year-long deadlocked plan to achieve internationally acceptable independence for Namibia generally remained skeptical over U.S. efforts to resolve the impasse.

The five-nation Western "contact group"—the U.S., Britain, West Germany, France and Canada—met in Paris on July 31 and pledged "to intensify efforts to find a common stand" before their next meeting in New York in September.

Africa's concern about Namibia was underscored in August when Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, who visited Washington to discuss Mideast issues, said he had also urged the Reagan administration to increase pressure on South Africa to end control of Namibia.

Lagos Radio said in August that the sincerity of the Western five "has always been in doubt," and that "whatever goodwill the contact group initially had has now considerably petered out." The Nigerian government-run radio also accused the Reagan administration of "openly fraternizing with the racists."

Zambian Foreign Minister La-

meck Goma called on France's socialist government "to prevail upon those" in the contact group "who doubt the adequacy of UN Security Council resolution 435 not to do anything that would slow down further the independence of Namibia."

An exception to the hard line was Zimbabwean Prime Minister Robert Mugabe, who said the Reagan administration was in a better position than the Carter administration to exert pressure on Pretoria be-

cause the South Africans had "set their store" on Reagan. Mugabe added, "One would want to see something done in the next six months or so."

In the meantime, South Africa has been increasing pressure on Angola, which hosts the South-West African People's Organization guerrillas fighting the South African army in Namibia.

On July 30, Angola charged that South Africa had built up its troop

Continued on page 25

ANC's sabotage campaign increases

Within a week of the South African army commander's dismissing sabotage efforts of the banned African National Congress as "generally unprofessional," in July, the ANC blew up two coal power stations in the eastern Transvaal and one in Pretoria, knocking out electricity for several hours.

The power stations are designated strategic "national key points" by the army and presumably are heavily protected.

(On August 13, ANC guerrillas fired four Soviet-made rockets at a

military base near Pretoria.)

Six explosions destroyed three transformers at the Arnot plant near Middelburg, nine explosions wrecked two transformers at a plant near Ermelo and one blast damaged a substation near Pretoria. The bombings were well-coordinated, occurring within 20 minutes at sites dozens of miles apart.

Escom, the government agency which provides all of South Africa's power, said, "only a fraction of our generator capacity has been affected" but acknowledged that the damage was "considerable." Escom is currently having difficulty meeting the midwinter peak demands for electricity, primarily because of recent sabotage of the power lines from the Cabora Bassa hydroelectric scheme in Mozambique.

Experts say that because of these power shortages, the power stations are probably more important strategic targets than the Sasol coal-into-oil plants which the ANC damaged last year. (Johannesburg *Star*, July 25 and August 1, 1981; *Christian Science Monitor*, July 23, 1981; *Sowetan*, July 22, 1981; London *Guardian*, July 22 and 27, 1981.) □

U.S. tops in South Africa's 1980 trade

The U.S. was South Africa's number-one trading partner in 1980 for the third year in a row. But for the first time ever, the U.S. led in both exports and imports, a two-way trade worth 3.5 billion rands, about \$4.2 billion compared to \$3.4 billion in 1979, an increase of 24 percent.

American companies sold South Africa \$2.28 billion worth of goods, a 42 percent jump over 1979 (\$1.6 billion). Imports from South Africa were worth \$1.92 billion, compared with \$1.82 billion in 1979.

All of South Africa's foreign markets showed substantial gains in 1980, with Japan registering the largest increase in exports, up 61 percent to \$1.56 billion. South Africa's biggest trading partners after the U.S. were West Germany and Britain.

South Africa officially showed a balance of payments surplus for 1980. Its non-gold exports were \$11.64 billion, plus \$13 billion in gold, for a \$24.64 billion total. Its import bill rose 47 percent to \$17.16 billion but that excludes the cost of armaments and oil. (*Financial Times*, May 20, 1981.)

Botha's 'reformer' image tarnished

Prime Minister Pieter Botha's failure to discuss reforms at the August opening of parliament is being interpreted as a sign that he has caved in to the ruling National Party's far right wing and postponed or scrapped his public promises to change.

Some observers suggested that Botha is genuine about the need for some relaxation of apartheid—within strict limits—but that he is hobbled by the right-wing backlash that was demonstrated in the April election when an unabashedly racist party received an unexpectedly large white vote but no parliamentary seats.

The leader of this party pointed out in an interview with the *Washington Post* that his party had reduced the majorities of 22 Nationalist MPs to between 400 and 2,200 votes, a move which has "the psychological effect that, in order to protect their own interests, they must show resistance against Mr. Botha."

However, South Africa's major businessman, Harry Oppenheimer,

chairman of the \$18 billion Anglo American Corp. conglomerate, has said he believes the government is "honestly seeking" a method of limited power-sharing for all races.

An indication of the government's backtracking was the statement in July by a cabinet minister with the chief "reformist" image that the government is investigating the "crowding out" of whites by blacks in urban areas. This statement by Dr. Piet Koornhof, who is in charge of black affairs, was seen as a response to white prejudices. Koornhof added, "When 90,000 blacks, for instance, have to walk over the same bridge as 1,000 whites, unpleasant incidents can occur. It might be a solution to give each [race] its own bridge." He also suggested that parks and other facilities used by both blacks and whites could be segregated on certain days. Koornhof was criticized even by pro-government newspapers for advocating "old-style apartheid." (*Financial Times*, July 16 and August 7, 1981; *Johannesburg Star*, August 1, 1981.) □

Squatter evictions provoke criticisms

The South African government's move in July to enforce its influx control laws and evict "illegal" black squatters in the Cape Town area has upset many white South Africans and generated bad publicity overseas.

At least 1,000 people, mostly women, have been arrested for pass law violations in July and August. For their crimes—being in the Cape Town area without written authorization—they are fined between \$25 and \$70, or jailed, or deported to the impoverished homelands of Transkei and Ciskei. The women say they cannot survive in these remote rural areas and that they wish to be with their husbands who are often migrant workers on two-year contracts living legally in the black townships.

South Africa's anti-government English-language press has criticized the evictions, as have opposition MPs, clergy and welfare workers. The *Cape Times* said, "When a parent has to choose be-

tween 'legality' and food in his child's stomach, the option becomes academic." The government-owned South African Broadcasting Corp. tried to justify the policy as pragmatic: "If the newcomers—or the relatively newcomers—are allowed to stay [in the cities], they and many others suffer. If they are returned home [to the homelands] the hardship is limited to them—and in an environment not so degrading. To return them home is therefore the lesser of two evils, but nonetheless tragic."

Adding to the bad publicity over the evictions, the magistrate appointed to preside over the pass law cases made some offensive remarks. He told one woman charged with being in the Cape Town area illegally: "I suppose you sleep with a different man every night." (*Johannesburg Star*, July 25 and August 1, 1981; *Sowetan*, July 21, 1981; *South African Broadcasting Corp.*, July 20, 1981; *Cape Times*, July 18, 1981.) □

Zimbabwe budget up

Zimbabwe's new budget, introduced at the end of July, raises spending 37 percent, mostly on schooling and social services.

By increasing taxes, the budget will lower the standard of living of the country's 180,000 whites, while improving conditions and opportunities for the eight million black majority. For the first time, unearned income is taxed and luxury items are taxed 15 percent. However, there are across-the-board increases in sales tax (up 2 percent) and gasoline (30 percent) that will affect everyone.

"Whites shouldn't moan too much about this budget," said Moven Hahachi, deputy minister of lands. "It just helps redress the injustices of the past, when fiscal policy was directed at maintaining privilege."

The budget, unveiled by Finance Minister Enos Nkala, also sets aside \$28 million so that the government can continue its policy of buying up stakes in private companies. (*Economist*, August 8, 1981; *Wall Street Journal*, August 3, 1981; *London Times*, July 31, 1981.)

- Prime Minister Robert Mugabe fired the controversial Edgar Tekere from his powerful position as secretary-general of the Zanu (PF) party. Tekere, 44, was dismissed shortly after he criticized the government, an action which drew a sharp rebuke from Mugabe, who said "rotten seeds" would have to be dealt with. (*Washington Post*, August 9, 1981.)

- Mugabe appointed a white general who had led the former Rhodesian army against the Prime Minister's guerrilla forces as head of Zimbabwe's military force. Under this general, Alexander Maclean, are Lieut. Gen. Rex Nhongo, former leader of Mugabe's guerrillas, as army commander. Nhongo's deputy is the man who headed the guerrilla forces of Joshua Nkomo. (*London Guardian*, August 8, 1981.)

- In August, about 100 North Korean military advisers arrived to train a 5,000-man brigade in the use of tanks and other weapons supplied by the Pyongyang government. □

WESTERN AFRICA

Canary Islands

● The OAU secretary-general, Edem Kodjo, following a June visit to the Canary Islands, reported to the OAU Council of Ministers in Nairobi that the majority of political parties on the islands favor **autonomy**.

The parties expressed their desire, however, to retain some type of political association with Spain, as more than 88 percent of the population is of Spanish ancestry. (*West Africa*, July 6, 1981.)

Cape Verde

● The government of Cape Verde found itself holding the same position as that of Guinea-Bissau with regard to the proposed formation of a West African joint **defense pact**, debated at the ECOWAS summit in June. The two former Portuguese colonies and Mali were the only members of the 16-nation organization that did not sign the protocol on the defense treaty.

Namibia continued

strength on the Namibian border to 40,000 and was carrying out a large-scale invasion and occupation of southern Angola. The South African army, which has conducted raids into Angola to strike at SWAPO bases for several years, dismissed the claim as "propaganda."

The war threatened to intensify with the report in August that Angola has installed an early warning radar system and anti-aircraft missiles in the southern part of the country. South African Defense Minister Magnus Malan said that South Africa had to be prepared for an "expansion of the conflict" by Angolan and Cuban troops.

The South African army, which previously had enjoyed complete control of the airspace in southern Angola, repeated assurances that it was operating only against SWAPO guerrillas and not against Angolan or Cuban troops. (*New York Times*, August 12, 1981; *Washington Post*, August 4, 1981; *Lagos Radio*, August 3, 1981; *Luanda Radio*, July 30, 1981; *Times of Zambia*, July 15, 1981.) □

Political relations between the two countries were severed after the military coup that brought Gen. João Bernardo Vieira to power in Guinea-Bissau in November 1980. Both countries had been governed by the African Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde (PAIGC), but Cape Verde has since formed its own party, the PAICV.

There have been no significant attempts at reconciliation between the two countries since the coup, although Pedro Pires, the Cape Verdean Prime Minister, said that "a different situation" in their relations had resulted from the ECOWAS summit. "Many affinities remain between the political forces that govern Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde," he said.

Observers indicated that the two nations' hesitance to sign the defense pact was a result of the nature of their military forces. Until the coup, both countries maintained joint military forces—essentially a liberation army—under the PAIGC. They had been in the process of reorganizing the army when the coup occurred. The armed forces, with traditional ties to socialist nations because of the liberation struggle, would have had difficulty integrating with the other more conventional armies of ECOWAS member states. (*Afrique-Asie*, July 20, 1981; *West Africa*, June 15 and 22, 1981.)

Chad

● Libya escaped condemnation for its military intervention in the Chad civil war from the African heads of state who attended the OAU summit in Nairobi in June. To the contrary, the OAU **resolution** on Chad was regarded by the Libyans and Chad President Goukouni Woddeye as a diplomatic victory, for it permitted the Libyan military presence to remain in Chad until a pan-African peacekeeping force is formed to take over, or until Chad forms a national army capable of ensuring the country's defense.

Observers indicated that some African leaders looked favorably on Libya's role in establishing calm in Chad, a country which had been torn by civil war for over a decade. Libya's 12,000 troops had enabled Woddeye's forces to defeat rebel

Hissene Habre's Armed Forces of the North in December 1980. Libya's Foreign Affairs Minister, Ali Treiki, even claimed that except for Egypt and Sudan, "all other African countries thanked Libya for establishing peace in Chad."

The OAU pledged assistance to Woddeye's transitional government in establishing a national army and administrative machinery and in raising funds for the financially strapped government. Issues such as reconciliation of the rival groups and elections to choose a permanent government were not specifically dealt with at the Nairobi summit, however.

Since March, Libya has reportedly withdrawn three contingents of troops from Chad. And Woddeye announced in late May that leaders of all the rival factions with the exception of Habre had agreed to put down their arms and place their forces at the disposition of the transitional government. Woddeye said these forces would be brought together into a "national integrated army," to replace the Libyan troops.

Both the Chad leadership and many African governments reportedly fear that a precipitous withdrawal of Libyan troops from the country would shatter the fragile peace and plunge the country back into civil war. (*West Africa*, July 6, 1981; *Kenya Weekly Review*, July 3, 1981; *Le Monde*, June 2, 1981.)

The Gambia

● President Dawda Jawara is back in Banjul as the Gambia's head of state after an **attempted coup** against him while he was attending the royal wedding in London in late July was put down with the assistance of Senegalese troops. An obscure leftist politician, Kukli Samba Sanyang, led members of the Gambian paramilitary Field Force in the rebellion, taking over the radio station and airport, and capturing hostages, including one of Jawara's two wives and several of his children.

For the first three days of the uprising, the rebels held Banjul and the outlying suburbs. At the start of the revolt, they released hundreds of criminals from jail, captured the Field Force's armory and passed out weapons to the freed convicts.

Sanyang, who described himself and the rebels as "Marxist-Leninist revolutionaries," then announced the formation of a 12-member National Revolutionary Council, and said he was suspending the constitution, dissolving parliament and banning political parties.

Jawara returned from London to Dakar, Senegal, and then to Banjul after asking President Abdou Diouf of Senegal to send in troops to put down the rebellion in accordance with a 16-year-old defense pact. The troops were able to gain control of the capital and the rebels holed up in a military barracks six miles outside Banjul, holding 30 hostages taken from the presidential palace whom they threatened to kill if the Senegalese troops were not removed. They also seized 70 European hostages.

The week-long uprising ended when the Senegalese troops took control of the barracks and found the rebels had fled into the bush leaving the hostages unharmed. But more than 500 people died in the fighting which surrounded the rebellion and Banjul was in a state of ruin after looting and burning carried out by the freed criminals. Millions of dollars of destruction were estimated in the capital alone.

It was reported that some of the rebels were captured in the Senegalese attack on the barracks, but Sanyang was able to escape. Gambia was remaining under a state of emergency and an 11 p.m. to 7 a.m. curfew was in effect. The 1,500 Senegalese soldiers were continuing to hunt out the rebels, and it was not known when they would withdraw from the country.

Jawara alleged that the rebels were trained and armed by an outside force, although he would not name a specific country. Senegal, however, claimed that Russian AK-47 rifles were captured from the rebels and that they had used Russian Lada four-wheel drive cars in the uprising, but observers indicated that allegations of Soviet involvement were without concrete proof. The Gambian armory contained Soviet weapons, and the cars had been delivered four days prior to the coup attempt.

The rebels initially seemed to garner some public support, probably

stemming from the country's deteriorating economic situation and the austerity budget introduced in July. However, popular support ebbed when the criminals were released and went on a looting and burning rampage in Banjul.

Jawara said he was considering integrating the Gambia's 500-man paramilitary force with that of Senegal. While Senegal's opposition parties condemned the military intervention, several African heads of state, including Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere, Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi, Sierra Leone President Siaka Stevens, and Guinea-Bissau's João Bernardo Vieira, sent messages of support to Diouf. (*Washington Post*, August 7, 10 and 13, 1981; *Economist*, August 8, 1981.)

- The Gambia's Minister of Finance and Trade, Saihou Sulayman Sabally, presenting a new budget to the parliament in June, said the country's **agricultural production** slumped to its lowest level in 30 years in the 1980-81 fiscal year.

Highly erratic rain fall and the prevalence of insects and pests were blamed for the low production level. A severe decline in the production of groundnuts, Gambia's main agricultural crop, "had an extremely adverse effect on the whole economy through a sharp decline in foreign exchange earnings," Sabally said. An increase in taxes was announced to generate additional revenues.

The Minister of Economic Planning and Industrial Development, Dr. M. Manneh, said that agriculture will be given top priority in Gambia's second five year plan, and an agricultural development bank is to be established to provide loans for farmers and special facilities for women. He added that some mechanization will have to be introduced into Gambian agriculture to achieve self-sufficiency in food production. (*West Africa*, June 22 and July 20, 1981.)

Ghana

- Over 1,000 people may have been killed and thousands more left homeless as a result of an outbreak of ethnic violence in northern Ghana in April which continued through June. Fighting between the Kon-

kombas and Nanumbas in the Bimbilla area began, according to local sources, as a result of a dispute between youths from the two groups over a girl.

Later reports indicated that the Konkombas, who migrated to the region during the Second World War and were laborers for the land-owning Nanumbas, had claimed they were being suppressed by the other. The Nanumbas in turn alleged that their customs and traditions were not being respected and decided to expel the Konkombas, who maintained that Ghana's constitution protects them from such action.

According to eyewitnesses, the Konkomba warriors stormed the village of Wulensi in June, killing more than 500 of the Nanumbas and burning their homes. People fled their villages in the ensuing fighting, and chiefs in the area said there was danger of famine in 1982, as the planting season was disrupted.

President Hilla Limann visited the area in July and achieved a reconciliation between the two groups. The government declared the area a disaster zone and the air force flew in emergency supplies. The carrying of arms in the area was banned. (*Economist*, July 25, 1981; *West Africa*, July 13 and 20, 1981; *London Times*, July 10 and 16, 1981.)

- The government of President Hilla Limann presented its 1981-82 budget in early July, an economic plan which indicated the desperate state of the Ghanaian economy. Ghana's annual inflation rate is 70 percent, and according to the budget, the estimated budget deficit for the fiscal year is \$1.5 billion, about 30 percent of gross national product.

Government spending in 1980 increased after the minimum wage was tripled to head off strikes. However, indirect taxes have offset the wage increase—oil prices have gone up 10 percent and higher taxes have been introduced on rice, sugar and other consumer goods. To offset shortages in essential goods, the government has permitted businesses with their own foreign exchange to import under special license. A new 20 percent tax on importers was levied.

Income taxes were cut slightly in

the new budget and the export bonus for producers of gold, diamonds, bauxite, manganese and timber was doubled to 20 percent. The corporate tax on mining companies was cut from 50 to 45 percent. Exporters were also allowed to retain 20 percent of their foreign exchange to buy imports, up from 2.5 percent.

The budget came under attack in parliament from minority parties, led by Jones Ofori-Atta of the Popular Front Party, who described it as one of "forlorn hope." He maintained that the budget failed to deal with Ghana's fundamental and urgent economic problems. The budget was defeated in parliament in late July in a 54-51 vote. The government is planning to re-introduce the budget in a modified form. (*West Africa*, August 3, 1981.)

Despite criticism of the government's new investment code, the measure was approved in parliament in July. The code revised the old formula whereby new ventures had to have majority Ghanaian shareholding. Instead, there is no limit for Ghanaian participation in ventures and each new investor must negotiate with the newly created Investment Center, chaired by the Minister of Economy and Finance.

The code is designed to provide generous concessions to attract new investment in hopes of boosting the Ghanaian economy (*West Africa*, July 13 and 27, 1981; *Financial Times*, July 17, 1981; *Economist*, July 4, 1981.)

Guinea

- Earlier in the year, President Sekou Toure reshuffled his cabinet, shifting the leadership of the ministries related to the economy. Soriba Toure, former Minister of External Trade, was replaced by Mamouna Toure, former ambassador to the Congo.

Boubacar Diallo, Minister of Audits and Accounts, was named to head a new Ministry of Economic and Financial Affairs. He was replaced by Sekou Barry, formerly governor of Guinea's central bank. Mohamed Lamine Toure was named to the top position at the bank.

President Toure also announced

a change in Guinea's currency, withdrawing all money in circulation since 1972 and replacing it with a new one so that the people should "know the precise value of the paper currency."

Toure referred to the "systematic hoarding" of money which had resulted in a scarcity of funds in the banks. He said that Guinea's economy was suffering from illegally inflated prices, illicit exports of goods, and devaluation in real terms of the currency due to illegal foreign exchange deals. The monetary reform was the fourth in the country's history. (*West Africa*, June 8, 1981; *Africa Research Bulletin*, May 31, 1981.)

Ivory Coast

- President Felix Houphouët-Boigny was the first African head of state to be received by the recently elected President of France, François Mitterrand, in early July. The visit was intended to repair the relationship between the two countries which had cooled considerably under Giscard d'Estaing's presidency.

Franco-Ivorian economic cooperation has been very substantial over the years (one-third of the French cooperation budget goes to the Ivory Coast), but toward the end of Giscard's presidency, a distance between the two heads of state developed from differences on various issues. Houphouët-Boigny was said to have been displeased over France's failure to contain Libyan subversion in Chad and other parts of West Africa, while maintaining close links with some less respectable African governments.

The French government had also decreased credits to the Ivorian economy and failed to support the Ivory Coast's withdrawal from the international cocoa market.

It was believed that Mitterrand would attempt to persuade Houphouët-Boigny to accept the International Cocoa Agreement, scheduled to come into force with or without Abidjan's agreement in early August. However, the Ivory Coast, the world's leading cocoa producer, continued its opposition to the pact, saying that it does not guarantee producers a fair price for the commodity.

Despite the depressed world cocoa market, the Ivory Coast is expected to produce a record crop of 400,000 tons in the 1980-81 season and plans to boost production even further. Since 1978, the country has been suffering from a sharp drop in revenues from its principle export commodity, but from 1985, oil production is expected to take over as the main propellant of the Ivorian economy.

Houphouët-Boigny said he was pleased and comforted by the talks with Mitterrand, whom he has known for 30 years. Mitterrand said, "We talked man to man for more than three hours and had a lot to say about the future of our two countries, of Africa and Europe, and of peace in the world." (*Financial Times*, July 28, 1981; *Jeune Afrique*, July 22, 1981; *West Africa*, July 20, 1981; *London Times*, July 10, 1981; *World Business Weekly*, June 29, 1981.)

Liberia

- Thirteen soldiers were executed in June for allegedly plotting a coup d'état against the Liberian head of state, Master Sgt. Samuel Doe, while he was attending an ECOWAS summit in Freetown, Sierra Leone, in May. Two other soldiers tried by a special military tribunal were acquitted for lack of evidence.

Three civilians, J.C.N. Howard, a former member of the now banned House of Representatives; Professor Patrick Seyon, vice president of the University of Liberia; and Samuel Butler, editor of *Inaugural* newspaper, were found not guilty of complicity in the coup attempt and were released from detention.

The announcement of the coup plot and sentences by the special military tribunal coincided with a government report that six out of nine senior army officers involved in a previous alleged coup attempt in May 1980 were sentenced to ten years in jail. The three others were acquitted and reinstated in the army.

And in late June, Commany Wisseh, president of the Liberian National Students' Union, was arrested for violating a government decree forbidding "political activity". He was also accused of being "counter-revolutionary."

Kenneth Best, editor of the *Daily Observer*, and most of his staff were then arrested after having published letters protesting Wisseh's arrest. Prior to the student leader's detention, Doe had publicly denounced him and banned him from leaving the country, talking to the press or making political statements. He was dismissed from membership in the recently formed commission to draft a new constitution and lost his job at the Liberia Electricity Corp.

Observers indicated that Wisseh was detained, on the eve of Doe's departure for the OAU summit in Nairobi, because several university students called the Young Militant Brigade distributed a tract asserting that Doe's action was "an act of unprecedented aggression against the students of Liberia," and said they were ready to die for his cause.

Wisseh and the editorial staff of the *Observer* were released in July. (*West Africa*, June 22 and 29, July 6 and 13, 1981; *Kenya Weekly Review*, June 12, 1981.)

In mid-August, the deputy head of state, Maj. Thomas Weh Syen, and four other members of the ruling People's Redemption Council were arrested on charges of attempting to overthrow the government. All five military men involved in an alleged assassination attempt on Doe and three other high government officials had been among his supporters in the original coup. (*Financial Times*, August 11, 1981.)

Mali

● In July, President Moussa Traore announced a reprieve for all teachers and students who were jailed or transferred during unrest in the 1979-80 academic year.

He said transferred teachers could return to their posts, detained teachers would be freed and students suspended for a year would not have it against them on their records. (*West Africa*, July 27, 1981.)

Mauritania

● Mauritania and Morocco restored diplomatic relations in late June, a result of reconciliation efforts launched by Saudi Arabia's King Khalid. King Hassan of Morocco and Mauritania's President Mohamed Khouna Ould Heydalla flew to-

gether to Taif, Saudi Arabia, from the OAU summit in Nairobi after a meeting between the two countries' foreign ministers in Riyadh in May.

Relations between the two nations, previously allies in the Western Sahara war, deteriorated in 1979 when Mauritania withdrew from the war and abandoned claims to the southern portion of the Sahara territory. Diplomatic ties were broken in March when Mauritania accused Morocco of having launched an abortive coup against the Nouakchott government.

Saudi Arabia has been a consistent financial supporter of the Moroccan war effort in the Western Sahara, but has also been involved in behind-the-scenes efforts to achieve peace for the region. (*Washington Post*, June 29, 1981.)

Niger

● Niger's President Seyni Kountché paid an official visit to Paris in early July to discuss economic development and aid issues with the recently elected President of France, François Mitterrand. Kountché was the second African head of state to meet with Mitterrand, following an earlier visit by President Felix Houphouët-Boigny of the Ivory Coast.

The Nigerien President characterized relations between Niger and France as "full of hope and promise." Mitterrand, after praising Niger's efforts at stabilizing its economy, commented on the "menaces" weighing on the West African country, such as "speculation in raw materials and the general disequilibrium in the international monetary system." He assured Kountché that closer relations between the Niamey and Paris governments would result, to the benefit of the peoples of both nations. (*Le Monde*, July 13, 1981.)

Nigeria

● The governor of Kaduna state, Alhaji Balarabe Musa, was impeached in June by the state assembly, which is controlled by President Shehu Shagari's National Party of Nigeria (NPN). Musa, from the opposition People's Redemption Party (PRP), was sacked after a seven-man committee of inquiry found him guilty of eight out of ten

charges of gross misconduct.

Observers indicated that the impeachment was a distortion of the spirit of the Nigerian constitution, which provides for such removals only on grounds of gross misconduct. The charges brought against Musa were not for personal improprieties; rather it appears that he was removed strictly for political motivations—the inability to get legislation passed in an NPN-dominated legislature with a PRP governor.

According to provisions in the constitution, the deputy governor, Alhaji Abba Rimi, took over the vacated position. But it is believed that he may face a similar fate, as he too represents the PRP.

Following the impeachment announcement, the eight governors of the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN), the Great Nigerian People's Party (GNPP) and the PRP issued a condemnation of the action, and sent a message to Shagari on "protecting the constitution and rule of law."

And in early July, the working coalition between the NPN and the Nigerian People's Party (NPP), formed after the election in 1979 to enable Shagari's party to have an assembly majority, was terminated. The NPP used Musa's impeachment as a pretext for ending the coalition. However, relations between the two parties had been tense since debates over the revenue allocation bill in January, during which members of the NPP voted against the President's plan.

All NPP ministers in the federal cabinet resigned from their posts, but Ishaya Auda, the Foreign Minister, and Ademola Thomas, Minister of State for Finance, also resigned from the NPP because of disagreement with the decision to break the working coalition. Shagari accepted the resignations of the ministers, with the exception of Auda and Thomas, who subsequently agreed to continue working in the government. (*West Africa*, July 6, 13, 20, 27, and August 3, 1981; *Financial Times*, July 16, 1981; *London Observer*, July 12, 1981.)

● Violence flared anew in Kano, Nigeria's northern Moslem city, in mid-July, following moves by the

state governor, Alhaji Abubakar Rimi, to cut back the influence of the traditional ruler, Emir Ado Bayero. Rioting launched by a fundamentalist Islamic sect in December last year had caused 1,000 deaths in the city.

The violence began in July after Rimi delivered an ultimatum to the emir demanding explanations for alleged disrespect to his elected government and threatening to remove the emir from office. More than ten people were reported killed, including Rimi's political adviser, Bala Muhammed, and his brother, who were stoned to death, and several injured when the emir's supporters went on a rampage. They damaged and destroyed several government buildings, including the state assembly, as well as the homes of government officials.

Police were called in and were able to bring the situation back to normal and an investigation into the disturbances was being held. Only seven people were arrested.

Rimi was attending a meeting of opposition governors in Maiduguri when the rioting began. He returned to Kano under heavy police guard and he and his cabinet officials were reportedly going into hiding every night for fear of reprisals by the emir's supporters.

The state government maintained that the riots were not a spontaneous popular uprising in support of the emir, but rather a calculated political vendetta organized by Rimi's opponents. Rimi, like his former colleague from Kaduna state, Alhaji Balarabe Musa, who was voted out of office earlier in July, represents the dissident wing of the People's Redemption Party (PRP).

Rimi had broken with the "old guard" of the PRP a year ago for supporting other parties in opposition to the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) of President Shehu Shagari. The NPN issued a statement condemning those who alleged it had masterminded the rioting in Kano. The party described as unfortunate and malicious claims in the House of Representatives and by the nine "progressive governors" that it had anything to do with the rampage. (*West Africa*, July 20 and 27, 1981; *London Sunday Times*, July 26, 1981; *Economist*, July 18, 1981;

Kenya Weekly Review, July 17, 1981.)

Senegal

• A national oil company, Petrosen, has been created in Senegal to exploit the recently discovered deposits of light crude off its southern coast. The company is 90 percent owned by the state and the remaining 10 percent is shared equally by the Senegalese National Development Bank and the Senegalese Finance Company for Industrial and Tourism Development.

For the next year, the company will finalize geophysical studies and make two test drills on the Casamance offshore field, discovered through a \$5 million loan from the World Bank and exploration by the French Total Oil Co.'s West African subsidiary.

Petrosen will also work on improving Senegal's oil laws and train employees. After July 1982, the company will begin commercial drilling in collaboration with other companies. (*West Africa*, June 8, 1981.)

• As of early August, there were ten legally registered political parties in Senegal, a result of President Abdou Diouf's liberalization measure which lifted restrictions limiting the number of parties to four.

Of the six newly registered parties, the National Democratic Rally, led by Sheikh Anta Diop, is considered to be the most important, acting as an umbrella organization for several smaller parties. It was formed in 1976, but has been illegal up till now.

The Democratic and Popular Movement, led by former Prime Minister Mamadou Dia, advocates independent socialism. It produces a monthly newspaper, *Ande Sopi*, which is highly critical of government policy.

The other new parties include: the Revolutionary Movement for a New Democracy, the Work and Independence Party, the Democratic League—Movement for Party and Work, and the Union for Popular Democracy.

Elections are scheduled for 1983, but unless coalitions are formed among the smaller parties, the ruling Socialist Party is expected to win another sweeping victory. (*Le*

Monde, July 11 and 22, 1981; *West Africa*, June 29 and July 20, 1981.)

Sierra Leone

• The principle of freedom of the press won a victory in Sierra Leone in July when Pios Foray, editor of *The Tablet*, the most spirited and independent of Freetown's papers, was charged with having committed contempt of parliament, but was released from the body with only a mild rebuke.

Foray had printed an article criticizing a speech by Brig. J.S. Momoh before the parliament. Momoh had deplored the low standards of journalism in Sierra Leone, a point of view with which *The Tablet* was in concurrence, but the paper expressed doubts about the officer's qualifications to criticize.

Foray was summoned before the parliament to face charges that he had committed contempt, but was only served with a warning by the speaker, Justice Singer Betts, who told him to be cautious about what he writes on the contributions of members in parliament. (*West Africa*, July 13, 1981.)

Upper Volta

• Col. Saye Zerbo finally announced the outline of the ruling Military Committee's program in May, nearly six months after having come to power in a military coup against the government of President Sangoule Lamizana.

Among the programs to be introduced are: a controlled and planned economy, a national aid program to peasants, and a national commission for agrarian reform and rural development. Zerbo said emphasis would be placed on processing industries for raw materials and on industries related to agriculture.

The "autonomous development" of Upper Volta and the "elimination of all foreign domination" are major objectives of the program to increase the country's self-reliance and rid it from dependence on foreign aid.

On the domestic front, Zerbo called for the formation of a "social contract," in which the trade unions, responsible for Lamizana's downfall, will accept some constraints on their freedom of action and speech. The unions responded

to this request by saying "for workers, democracy and liberty are fundamental exigencies."

Unionists who went on strike in late May demanding political rights were placed on forced sabbatical without pay for periods ranging from three to six months. The government said the strikers had overstepped "the established rules for trade union liberty." (*West Africa*, July 13, 1981; *Africa Research Bulletin*, June 15, 1981.)

EASTERN AFRICA

Djibouti

● Djibouti held its first presidential election by popular vote since the former French colony became independent. In the June balloting, President Hassan Gouled, the only candidate, received 85 percent of the vote, with 15 percent of voters abstaining.

Gouled, aged 65, was elected for a six-year term. A dissident political organization, in a statement issued in Ethiopia, called the election a "comedy" because no one but Gouled was allowed to run for president. (*Africa Research Bulletin*, May 15 and July 15, 1981.)

Ethiopia

● Talks between Ethiopia and Sudan have been continuing on cooperation between the two nations. The talks probably also included Sudan's peacemaking overtures to try to settle Ethiopia's conflicts in Eritrea and other provinces.

Sudanese President Gaafar al-Nimeiry told the Associated Press recently: "The Ethiopians have started to become convinced that war all the time will not solve their problems, but that they can solve them by imitating us. Here in Sudan we have solved similar problems by regionalization and decentralization. This is what the Ethiopians want to do in the Ogaden, Eritrea, in Tigre and other provinces." (Sudanese news agency, May 30, 1981.)

Kenya

● In late July, the presidents of Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya met for the third time this year, in Nairobi, and said they had reached "complete understanding on bilat-

eral, sub-regional, regional and global issues."

Diplomatic officials said the leaders, Milton Obote of Uganda, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and Daniel arap Moi of Kenya, had achieved a "new rapport" and that the Kenya-Tanzania border, closed since the collapse of the East African Community in 1977, might be reopened "fairly soon." However, the thorny question of the distribution of the assets of the community was not resolved.

Moi, who is the current chairman of the OAU, said regional meetings among East African heads of state "would help consolidate the economies, stability and security of the neighboring states." Moi has also held talks with the presidents of Somalia and Rwanda. (*Financial Times*, July 29, 1981; *Kenya Daily Nation*, July 25, 1981; *Kenya Standard*, July 25, 1981.)

● Less than two months after he was detained briefly along with four editorial staff members of the *Daily Nation*, editor-in-chief Jawaharhal 'Joe' Rodrigues, an Indian-born Kenyan citizen, was replaced.

Strong Arab pressure on the Aga Khan, majority shareholder in the *Nation* group of publications, was reportedly behind the sacking of Rodrigues, who had antagonized the Kenyan government recently, particularly for criticizing the decision of Kenya's only political party, Kanu, barring former Vice President Oginga Odinga from running for parliament. The government accused the *Nation* of seeing itself as an opposition party. President Daniel arap Moi threatened to ban the paper and the five staff members were detained.

The *Nation* initially aroused the government's ire, and that of Arab states, in January when it strongly attacked a Palestinian group accused of blowing up the Norfolk Hotel with a loss of 18 lives.

Rodrigues was replaced by Peter Mwaura, former director of Nairobi University's School of Journalism and currently a doctoral candidate at Howard University in Washington.

Some other Kenyan media have recently run afoul of the government. Some television crew mem-

bers of the government-owned Voice of Kenya were questioned by security police after a TV transmission of President Moi's speech at the OAU summit was interrupted due to technical problems.

And the group managing editor of the *Standard* newspapers, Michael Kabugua, reportedly was fired for what observers called "much more than professional considerations." Kabugua was fired shortly after Kenyan MPs questioned his March visit to South Africa, in which he interviewed officials of the government and wrote a story suggesting that Pretoria was about to make racial reforms. (*London Observer*, July 19, 1981; *Kenya Weekly Review*, May 29, June 12, July 10 and 17, 1981.)

● A consortium of three American oil companies began exploring for off-shore oil in Kenya in August.

Kenya currently spends 35 percent of its foreign exchange earnings on oil imports—more than earnings from coffee, Kenya's chief crop. Part of the country's problem is that it is extremely oil-dependent, with only 15 percent of its energy generated by other means than oil.

Kenya-Cities Service, Inc., the subsidiary set up by Cities Service Co. of Tulsa, Union Oil of California and Marathon Oil of Texas, plans to spend \$100,000 a day looking for oil off the Kenyan coast. (*Christian Science Monitor*, July 14, 1981; *New African*, June 1981.)

Mauritius

● Talks between Mauritius and Britain over compensation to meet the costs of settling in Mauritius residents from Diego Garcia, now a U.S. military base leased from Britain, collapsed in July.

Since 1975, Britain has settled about 2,000 people from the Chagos archipelago in the Indian Ocean, mostly from Diego Garcia, in Mauritius. A 1973 British offer of \$1.2 million was rejected. In July, Britain offered \$2.4 million but Mauritius said it was unacceptable because the displaced people in Mauritius were causing serious economic and social problems. Mauritius is seeking about \$14 million. (*Africa Research Bulletin*, July 15, 1981.)

Somalia

● Somalia's President Mohamed Siad Barre, spent a good part of June and July mending fences with his neighbors and other African countries.

After the OAU summit in Nairobi, Siad Barre and Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi issued a joint communique pledging themselves to try "to promote better understanding and collaboration." Kenya Airways then resumed its service to Mogadishu, the Somali capital.

In an interview with the *New York Times*, Siad Barre said Somalia's "relations with Kenya won't be brotherly" until the Somalia-Ethiopia conflict is settled. Siad Barre said he wanted to hold "peace negotiations" with Ethiopia over the disputed Ogaden territory in southern Ethiopia. The President also tried to defuse the issue of Somali irredentism. "Somalia already has a very big territory," he said. "We don't want expansion."

In May, Siad Barre was in Washington and had talks with Caspar Weinberger, the Defense Secretary, according to Mogadishu Radio.

Subsequently, Siad Barre visited Nigeria, where President Shu Shagari noted that "the long misunderstanding between Somalia and Ethiopia in the Ogaden region needed an urgent settlement." The Somali leader also visited Togo, Senegal and Romania.

The Somali Salvation Front, an increasingly active anti-government group, claimed that Siad Barre's "sudden conversion to the peaceful solution of African disputes fooled no one but himself." (*Economist*, July 11, 1981; *New York Times*, June 30, 1981; Mogadishu Radio, May 29, June 14 and 17, 1981; Lagos Radio, June 3 and 5, 1981.)

Tanzania

● The International Monetary Fund's latest negotiations to bail out Tanzania's faltering economy broke down in July.

For extending some \$475 million, the IMF demanded that Tanzania devalue its currency, reduce import controls, raise bank interest rates and abolish price controls. Presi-

dent Julius Nyerere called these requests "foolish ideas [that] would hurt the poor people in our country."

The country's economic crisis is marked by an acute foreign exchange shortage, a trade deficit last year of about \$550 million and some \$285 million in arrears to foreign suppliers.

Nyerere pins the main blame on the price of oil. Now, 60 percent of export earnings pays for the 700,000 tons of imported oil annually, but in 1973 only 10 percent of exports paid for the country's oil needs. While oil has risen in cost, the price of commodities, Tanzania's main exports, has dropped drastically. Thus, where in 1972 it took five tons of tea to buy a tractor, today it requires 13 tons.

However, foreign economists also blame mismanagement by the government-owned crop authorities, which are spending more money with fewer results. (*Financial Times*, July 7 and 18, 1981; *New African*, July 1981.)

● Tanzania's Foreign Minister, **Salim Salim**, got the nod from the OAU in June as Africa's nominee for the post of UN secretary-general.

Kurt Waldheim, the undeclared candidate for a third term, was reportedly lobbying at the OAU summit in Nairobi.

Salim served from 1970 to 1980 as Tanzania's chief UN representative in New York. He chaired the special committee on decolonization and served one year as president of the General Assembly. (*London Guardian*, July 29, 1981.)

Uganda

● Britain may train Uganda's undisciplined army, which was responsible for several massacres in June. The soldiers ran amok in West Nile province, apparently because they are seldom paid or fed by the government, and killed 86 civilians among refugees at a Catholic mission.

President Milton Obote has requested 150 British officers and NCOs to help train the army of about 10,000 troops. The last of the 10,000 Tanzanian troops left in July, leaving behind about 1,000 Tanzanian policemen reportedly to act as

bodyguards for senior government officials.

Obote's plan is to confine the army to barracks while the Ugandan police force is expanded and trained. Royal Canadian Mounted Police are undertaking the training.

The internal security problems are causing many foreign donors and investors to hold back. After negotiations with the International Monetary Fund, the government floated the Ugandan shilling and trebled the prices of cotton and coffee. Coffee accounts for virtually all Uganda's foreign exchange earnings. The IMF has agreed to provide about \$200 million. (*Financial Times*, July 31, 1981; *London Observer*, July 12, 1981; *Kenya Weekly Review*, July 10, 1981; *London Guardian*, July 4 and 6, 1981.)

CENTRAL AFRICA

Burundi

● Leaders of Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi met earlier in the year in the Burundi capital of Bujumbura for the third summit of the Organization for the Development of the Kagera River Basin. The meeting focused primarily on the trade and transportation problems of landlocked Rwanda and Burundi.

Burundi depends on a rail and lake link through Tanzania for most of the transportation of its exports and imports, and has become increasingly concerned over Tanzania's inability to handle more than a quarter of its monthly 13,000 tons of traffic.

To improve transportation, Tanzania signed an agreement with the European Development Fund to modernize its lake port of Kigoma. A 350-ton French container ship is being built in Bujumbura, and though air transport is more expensive, Burundi is modernizing its main airport to accommodate jumbo jets.

Recent actions by foreign interests to develop nickel and peat deposits have increased Burundi's desire to improve its transport links to world markets. Currently, Burundi must rely chiefly on its coffee exports as a source of foreign capital. (*West Africa*, July 6 and 13,

1981; *Africa Research Bulletin*, June 30, 1981; *London Times*, May 19, 1981.)

Cameroon

● Long-standing border tensions between Cameroon and Nigeria which erupted into the open in late May when a Cameroon patrol fired on and killed five Nigerian soldiers and injured three others appeared to have been paved over with the Yaoundé government's offer in July to pay compensation for the deaths.

Forces from the two nations had been patrolling the river border between Cameroon and Nigeria when the incident occurred and both governments maintained that their respective territorial waters had been violated by the other.

The western region of Cameroon along Nigeria's border has long been a source of contention, mandated to Britain after World War I. In a 1961 plebiscite, the population narrowly voted to join Cameroon instead of Nigeria. Oil has recently been discovered in the southern end of the area, adding a potential source of tension.

The Nigerian government demanded an immediate apology after the shooting and warned that drastic action would be taken if the terms of the apology were not met. The Cameroonian response, expressing "regret" at the incident, was deemed insufficient by the Lagos authorities and tensions heightened when President Shehu Shagari refused ECOWAS mediation and stayed away from the OAU summit in Nairobi in June because the incident was not placed on the agenda.

Despite calls for military retaliation within Nigeria against Cameroon and reported "stepped-up vigilance" by the Nigerian army along its borders, the incident was resolved peacefully when Cameroon President Ahmadou Ahidjo offered to pay reparations to the family of the soldiers killed. He also accepted Shagari's invitation to visit Lagos. (*West Africa*, May 25, June 6 and July 27, 1981; *London Times*, June 4 and July 25, 1981; *New York Times*, July 22, 1981; *London Guardian* July 20, 1981.)

Central African Republic

● Following a grenade attack on a Bangui cinema in July in which three people died and 22 were wounded, President David Dacko ordered a **state of siege** in the capital, banned the country's opposition parties and arrested some opposition leaders. Responsibility for the grenade attack was claimed by the Centrafrican Movement for National Liberation, led by Iddi Lala. The opposition group was banned along with the Oubangui Patriotic Front led by Abel Goumba, and the Movement for the Liberation of the Centrafrican People, led by Ange Patasse, who was placed under arrest.

The French government of President François Mitterrand expressed "surprise" at Dacko's actions, as the Central African Prime Minister, Simon Bozanga, had visited Paris in early July and had assured the government of the continuation of the multiparty system.

Mitterrand's government had decided to maintain its strike force of 1,400 paratroopers in the Central African Republic, a move initiated under the presidency of Giscard d'Estaing. Officials said the fear of outside interference by Libya justified the troops' continued presence, particularly after the grenade incident. Mitterrand's government was reportedly bringing diplomatic pressure on Dacko to withdraw the measures against the opposition parties.

Dacko, however, said in late July that he would issue international arrest warrants for Goumba and Lala. Earlier in the year, Dacko had begun what appeared to be a crack-down on opposition movements by canceling legislative elections scheduled for June 15, expected to have been hotly contested by the parties. The opposition leaders had condemned the election's postponement.

He also dissolved the 15,000-member General Union of Central African Workers in May, after the union called for a general strike in solidarity with workers who had been victims of arbitrary arrest. The government authorized the formation of the National Confederation of Centrafrican Workers to replace it, headed by Jean Richard Sandos,

who, it is said, is close to high level government officials. (*West Africa*, July 27, 1981; *Economist*, July 25, 1981; *Le Monde*, May 21, July 18, 21, and 22, 1981; *London Guardian*, July 14 and 21, 1981.)

Equatorial Guinea

● In June, heavy sentences were levied against army officers and civil servants who allegedly participated in an **unsuccessful coup attempt** to overthrow the government of Col. Teodoro Obiang Mbasogo in April. The trials, held by a military court, took place in Molabo.

One soldier, Damion Owono Mituy, the only defendant to receive the death sentence, was convicted of allegedly accepting money for his participation in the plot, and was executed several days later. Four civil servants, including one woman, and seven junior officers were sentenced to 30 years in jail for "corruption and injury to national reconstruction." Thirty other army officers and Gabriel Andombe, manager of the Equatorial Guinean Development Bank, received six-month terms.

Moses Mba, a wealthy local businessman in exile in Madrid, was sentenced in absentia to 30 years for "misappropriation of funds and destabilization of the state." Some 30 other accused were acquitted, including two ministers from the cabinet of the country's previous ruler, Francisco Macias Nguema. (*Africa Research Bulletin*, July 15, 1981; *London Times*, June 22, 1981; *Le Monde*, June 6, 1981.)

Gabon

● President Omar Bongo was the first African head of state to meet with President Reagan while on a private **visit to the U.S.** in June. Besides meeting with Reagan for over an hour, Bongo also conferred with Vice President Bush and other senior officials. Topics of discussion included bilateral cooperation, security, and the establishment of Gabon "trade days" in California.

According to *Afrique-Asie*, Bongo was in Washington to gain U.S. support to "ensure the security of Gabon," as France had provided during the presidency of Giscard d'Estaing. Bongo may have been concerned that the change in gov-

ernment in France would cause a re-evaluation of Elysée's military relationship with Libreville. The magazine reported that American officials were not responsive to Bongo's requests. (*West Africa*, July 13, 1981; *Afrique-Asie*, July 6, 1981; Radio Libreville, June 16, 1981.)

- **Anti-Cameroon rioting** in Libreville and Port Gentil following a controversial soccer match in late May left several people dead, scores injured and strained relations between the two countries.

Though neither country broke off diplomatic relations or expelled expatriates, many of the 20,000 Cameroonians living in Gabon were airlifted out of the country. Hundreds of Gabonese students and workers also left Cameroon.

The loss of the substantial Cameroon work force could have severe consequences on Gabon's economy, as could the possible suspension of food imports from Cameroon, which supplies 75 percent of Gabon's requirements. (*West Africa*, June 1, 15, and 29, 1981; *London Times*, May 25, 1981.)

Sao Tome and Principe

- Miguel Trovoada, former Prime Minister who had been detained since December 1979 for his alleged role in a plot to overthrow the government of President Manuel Pinto da Costa, was freed from prison in July on the sixth anniversary of Sao Tome and Principe's independence from Portugal. (*Le Monde*, July 21, 1981.)

Zaire

- Following a June decision by the IMF to lend Zaire a record \$1.06 billion, the nation's major creditors met in Paris in mid-July to reschedule a portion of Kinshasa's heavy debt burden. The 14 lending nations, known as the "Club of Paris," rescheduled \$300 to \$400 million for each of the next two years, representing more than 75 percent of the payment on official debts due during that period.

Zaire has an external debt of over \$5 billion, of which \$2.2 billion was due over the next two years. Under Zaire's current balance of payments situation, only \$335 million was available for debt servicing.

The IMF loan, the largest ever received by an African country, will be drawn in several installments over the next three years. The credit line available represents 400 percent of Zaire's quota in the fund. The loan is part of a comprehensive economic stabilization program adopted by Zaire in mid-1979, along with internal measures which aim at concentrating imports on essential items and limiting the growth of domestic consumer demand.

In addition to gaining control of the loan and debt rescheduling, Zaire devalued its currency by 40 percent in late June. Two years ago, Zaire was close to bankruptcy and the IMF was called in to assist in its recovery. Since then, the country has made some progress, with inflation down to 47 percent as compared to 100 percent in 1979. The gross domestic product has grown after several years of decline. But, according to the IMF, "acute structural maladjustments" persist in the economy.

Zaire was encouraged to continue improving economic management, particularly in the mining sector. However, the fund expressed concern that large fluctuations in the price of copper, Zaire's leading source of external capital, could have damaging results on its economic recovery. (*West Africa*, July 6 and 20, 1981; *Financial Times*, June 24, 1981; *Wall Street Journal*, June 24 and 26, 1981; *Washington Post*, June 24, 1981.)

- Zaire recently sold 5.2 million pounds of cobalt to the U.S. in the first significant addition to the U.S. stockpile of strategic metals in 20 years. The purchase price for the metal was \$78 million, 25 percent below the current world market price for cobalt. Even with the reduced price, Zaire was expected to turn a profit.

With the purchase, the U.S. achieved 53 percent of its goal to acquire 86.4 million tons of cobalt. The target is estimated to be enough to satisfy domestic consumption needs for three years. Cobalt is used primarily for defense-related purposes, to make high temperature alloys for jet engines and parts for missile guidance systems. Over 90 percent of cobalt used by defense contractors is imported, most of it

from Zambia and Zaire. (*West Africa*, July 13, 1981; *Wall Street Journal*, June 26, 1981; *Washington Post*, June 26, 1981.)

- In late June, the Zaire government threatened to sever diplomatic relations with its former colonial power, Belgium, if action was not taken to curb statements by Zairian dissidents exiled in Brussels. The threat was invoked primarily in hopes of silencing Nguza Karl-I-Bond, the recently resigned Prime Minister, who published a pamphlet in Brussels calling for the overthrow of Zaire's President Mobutu Sese Seko. Nguza has also made numerous public condemnations of alleged widespread corruption in Zaire.

A trip to Brussels scheduled for Zaire's Foreign Minister, Bomboko Lokumba, to discuss the matter was cancelled by Mobutu. The Belgian ambassador in Kinshasa was summoned to Mobutu's office, however, to "furnish explanations on the subversion developing in Belgium against Zaire."

The Belgian government initially responded to Mobutu's threat by indicating its interest in maintaining relations in strict respect for individual sovereignty and non-interference. A spokesman from the Belgian Foreign Ministry emphasized that Belgium had a tradition of welcoming exiles and of valuing free speech. In early July, however, the Belgian Prime Minister condemned attacks by the Zairian exiles on Mobutu's government and said they were against the law. Nguza was called to the Justice Ministry in Brussels and was told to cease his verbal attacks on the Zairian President.

There are 20,000 Zairians resident in Belgium, and 11,000 Belgian nationals in Zaire. (*Le Monde*, July 4 and 6, 1981; *London Guardian*, July 4, 1981; *Kenya Weekly Review*, July 3, 1981; Brussels Radio, July 1, 1981; Kinshasa Radio, July 1, 1981.)

Zambia

- Frederick Chiluba, chairman of the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), was jailed in late July, along with four other colleagues, in what was characterized as Zambia's most serious political

crisis in its post-independence history. President Kenneth Kaunda issued the arrest orders after a series of strikes seriously disrupted copper production for the third time this year. Workers had, however, returned to work at Zambia's two largest mines, Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines and Roan Consolidated Mines, in late July.

At an emergency meeting of the ZCTU, a motion for a general strike to protest the arrests was put aside for the time being, and instead the Congress demanded the immediate unconditional release of Chiluba, secretary-general Newstead Zimba, his deputy, Chitala Sampa, the vice chairman of the Mineworkers Union of Zambia, Timothy Walamba, and a Copperbelt businessman, Chama Chakomboka.

The arrests followed the late June expulsion of two American diplomats and the declaration of four other American's as *persona non gratae*, all of whom were recently accused of connections with the CIA. According to the Lusaka government, Zambian security forces uncovered the second coup plot against Kaunda in ten months in June. Kaunda charged that the CIA, with the assistance of a South African commando force, was planning to install "an alternative leadership in the country," said to consist of Chiluba and a senior army officer, Webster Kayi Lumbwe, a high level official in the Zambian Foreign Ministry, was also arrested for alleged spying for the CIA.

The government reportedly believed that there was a connection between the latest coup plot, scheduled to have taken place in July, and last year's, for which 13 people are still being held. The possible coup attempt and the developments in the Copperbelt caused Kaunda to miss the OAU summit in Nairobi in late June. (London *Times*, June 24, July 31 and August 2, 1981; *Financial Times*, July 28, 1981.)

NORTHERN AFRICA

Algeria

● President Chadli Benjedid's two main political rivals—Abdelaziz Bouteflika, a former foreign minister, and Mohamed Salah Yahiaoui, for-

mer head of the ruling National Liberation Front (FLN)—were dismissed from the Algerian politburo in early July, marking what was characterized as the debut of the post-Boumedienne era.

After President Houari Boumedienne's death in 1978, Bouteflika and Yahiaoui had been the two leading candidates to succeed to the presidency. Chadli, the army's compromise candidate, won out after a deadlock developed between the supporters of the two men.

Chadli had embarked on a gradual program of eliminating his rivals' bases of support, culminating in his proposal to the FLN central committee to remove them from the politburo. They will retain their membership in the central committee.

The politburo was increased in size from seven to ten members. Five government officials were appointed to join the four others, plus Chadli, on the governing body: Mohamed Ben Ahmed Abdelghani, Prime Minister; Boualem Baki, Minister of Justice; Mohamed Cherif Messaadia, secretary general of the central committee; Mohamed Benyahia, Minister of Foreign Affairs; and Mohamed Yala, Minister of Finance.

The removal of Bouteflika and Yahiaoui followed the suspension from the FLN central committee of Col. Ahmed Bensherif, former national gendarmerie commander, Tayebi Larbi, former agriculture minister, and Mahmoud Guennez, ex-national assembly vice president. The men, members of the former Revolutionary Council under Boumedienne, were removed for alleged corruption and misappropriation of government property. (*Economist*, July 11, 1981; *Le Monde*, July 4, 1981; London *Times*, July 4, 1981; Kenya *Weekly Review*, July 3, 1981.)

Egypt

● Sectarian tensions between the Coptic Christian community of Egypt, representing 15 percent of the population, and the Moslem majority flared in June in Cairo in the bloodiest clashes since the 1977 food riots.

Violence broke out in the Zawia el-Hamra area of northeast Cairo,

reportedly over a Moslem plan to build a mosque on land designated for a Coptic church. At least 14 people died, and scores others were injured during three days of looting, burning and rioting.

Interior Minister Nabawi Ismael sent in thousands of riot police and troops to quell the disturbances in the overpopulated Cairo slums, and warned that agitators would be shot on sight. Police seized 77 firearms and arrested 200 people.

President Anwar Sadat blamed "communist" agitators for sparking the unrest, but relations between the two communities have been uneasy for over a year. The two groups were involved in rioting in Alexandria in early 1980, and the latest outbreak appeared to have its roots in the poverty of Cairo's slums.

Although police were able to put a lid on the June violence, tensions remained high and in early August, an explosion at a Coptic wedding in Cairo killed three and injured 56, renewing fears of another outbreak of violence.

The Egyptian government, in attempts to defuse the tension, blamed the bombing on the Arab "rejectionist front," those countries that opposed Egypt's signing of the Camp David peace accord with Israel. (*Wall Street Journal*, August 7, 1981; *Economist*, June 27, 1981; London *Times*, June 22, 1981.)

Libya

● Tripoli, Libya, will be the setting for the 1982 OAU summit with Col. Muammar Qaddafi as the organization's chairman for one year, it was decided at the OAU summit in Nairobi in June. Despite some disapproval over the proposal voiced by several African countries, the heads of state at Nairobi agreed to Libya's hosting of the meeting, as it had been first put forth at the 1979 OAU summit in Monrovia, at a time when Qaddafi was a less controversial figure.

Libya also announced at the Nairobi meeting that it was undertaking a "peace initiative" to end the conflicts in the Western Sahara, in Lebanon, and between Iran and Iraq. Abdelati Obeidi, head of the Libyan foreign ministry, said his country

was restoring diplomatic relations with Morocco, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, and would start a new initiative aimed at achieving a settlement to the Western Sahara conflict.

Morocco broke off relations with Tripoli when Qaddafi began to arm and finance its adversary in the desert war, Polisario. Libya was also one of the first countries to recognize the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic, proclaimed by Polisario. (*West Africa*, June 29, 1981; *Economist*, June 27, 1981; *New York Times*, June 20, 1981.)

● Chester Crocker, the U.S. assistant secretary of state for African affairs, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in early July that the **Reagan administration** will increase aid to African countries that resist Col. Muammar Qaddafi's efforts to "absorb his Arab and Moslem neighbors in a Libyan dominated state."

He said that while it is up to African countries themselves "to stand firm against further Libyan efforts at subversion . . . we recognize that African nations need assistance against Qaddafi's diplomacy of subversion and support for international terrorism."

Military aid to Tunisia and Sudan has been increased because they are "two countries directly threatened by Libya," Crocker added. The Pentagon announced in July that it was selling Tunisia \$92 million worth of tanks. He also said that the administration had not ruled out the possibility of a cutoff of U.S. oil purchases from Libya. The State Department had earlier advised U.S. oil companies to withdraw their personnel from the country following the expulsion of Libyan diplomats from Washington.

However, the six American companies there have ignored the advice and have continued business as usual. The companies account for about two-thirds of Libya's 1.6 million barrels of daily production.

On his return from a visit to Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Sudan and Egypt, the deputy defense secretary, Frank Carlucci, said that the nations of north Africa are concerned about Libyan intentions and reportedly assured them that the Reagan administration is willing to

aid any country friendly to the U.S. and opposed to Qaddafi.

In late July, *Newsweek* magazine reported that CIA director William Casey had approved an agency scheme to topple Qaddafi, which drew a written protest to Reagan from the House Committee on Intelligence. Administration spokesmen subsequently denied the *Newsweek* report, saying Mauritius, not Libya, was the intended target of the proposed covert operation. (*Washington Star*, July 12 and 27, 1981; *Wall Street Journal*, July 14, 1981; *Washington Post*, June 17 and July 9, 1981.)

Tunisia

● A confusing series of events continue to cloud the nature of the first multi-party elections to be held in Tunisia, scheduled for November 1. As it currently stands, only the Tunisian Communist Party and the ruling Socialist Destour Party (PSD) will participate in the election as legally constituted parties. Many other political groupings have announced that they will not contest the elections in the wake of a June ruling that only groups receiving more than 5 percent of the vote in November will be legally considered political parties.

Further, in a surprise move, President Habib Bourguiba announced in mid-July that the Tunisian Communist Party, which had been banned since 1963 for allegedly trying to overthrow the PSD, was authorized as a legal party and could take part in the upcoming elections. The TCP had planned to boycott the elections.

Smaller parties oppose the 5 percent ruling and other requirements placed on them by the PSD in April as anti-democratic, and said that Tunisia is taking a step backwards in its attempts at modernizing the political system. The official news agency, Tunis Afrique Presse, explained that the 5 percent ruling was instituted because of concern that the country would be inundated with a vast number of parties.

Opposition movements, though, are requesting legal recognition before the election. According to the Democratic Socialist Movement, "For the legislative election to be a valid test of democracy, there must

be a favorable political climate," whereas the PSD stated, "Recognition of a party can only be required if that party submits itself to the test of the peoples' vote."

Then in July, the leading members of Tunisia's Moslem groups, the Islamic Movement (MTI) and the Islamic Progressive Movement (MIP) were arrested on charges of carrying out activities against mosques and state-appointed imams, and for inciting disorder. The government, like those of other moderate pro-West Arab nations, is reportedly increasingly concerned over the question of the division of church and state in a overwhelmingly Moslem country. The MTI and MIP leader were arrested following reports that their groups were involved in disorders during several weeks of conflict over government decrees regarding the observance of Ramadan, the high holy month of fasting and prayer for Moslems.

The MTI condemned "this new offensive which is aimed at decapitating the Islamic movement." Some observers believe the arrests were politically instigated. The registration of the Communist Party and the arrests of the Moslem fundamentalists may have increased tensions between various parties that were planning to run against the PSD thus dividing and weakening the opposition. (*Le Monde*, July 21, 22, and 27, 1981; *Washington Post*, July 19, 1981; *Africa Research Bulletin*, July 15, 1981.)

Western Sahara

● At the June OAU summit in Nairobi, King Hassan of Morocco accepted proposals for a ceasefire and a "controlled referendum" to determine the future of the disputed Western Sahara territory. The monarch's reversal of position on the two proposals, previously recommended as a means to achieve peace in the region by the OAU ad hoc committee on the Western Sahara, was believed intended to forestall the admission of the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic as the OAU's 51st member state.

The SADR, Polisario's self-proclaimed independent state, had gained the requisite support of 26 member nations at the 1980

Freetown summit for its entrance to the organization. A compromise postponed the SADR's admission, however, and it was expected that the issue would come to a showdown at the Nairobi summit unless some progress at solving the conflict were made.

The resolution on the Western Sahara passed at the Nairobi summit and endorsed by Hassan, called for "a general and genuine referendum on the self-determination of the Saharan people," and an immediate ceasefire. It also asked the UN to join the OAU in sending a peace-keeping force to the territory, and set up a committee of African heads of state, including those on the ad hoc committee, from Guinea, Mali, Nigeria, Sudan and Tanzania, plus Sierra Leone with Kenya as the chair. The committee is to decide how to carry out the referendum.

While Hassan originally stated that the referendum could take place within the next three to four months, he subsequently qualified his commitment to the vote, saying it would be "consultative" and that he would not consider the Sahara's self-determination as an option.

Few observers expected that Hassan would accept a referendum that would challenge Morocco's long-standing claim to the phosphate-rich Sahara. The major snag in implementing the poll is determining who is eligible to vote. Hassan wants to use a 1974 Spanish census which counted 75,000 Saharans, while Polisario maintains that there are 750,000 people in the region, or nearly a million if refugees, most of whom live in Algeria, are included. Hassan's figure includes Moroccans of Saharan origin who now reside in Algeria or Mauritania.

It is believed that Hassan may be buying time to consolidate his position militarily in the Sahara by offering the referendum at this time, as it is expected that arrangements for the vote will be bogged down in lengthy negotiations.

Polisario originally condemned the Moroccan offer at Nairobi, but later announced acceptance of the principle of a referendum. A statement released by the commanding revolutionary council of the SADR in mid-July set forth its conditions for agreement to the vote. They in-

clude: withdrawal of all Moroccan forces and administration from the Sahara to 90 miles inside Morocco; the repatriation of all Saharan peoples to the territory and a three-month period prior to the vote to create a proper climate; installation of a provisional international administration created by the UN and OAU; and liberation of all Saharan detainees held in Moroccan prisons. (*West Africa*, July 13 and 20, 1981; *London Guardian*, July 18, 1981; *Kenya Weekly Review*, July 10, 1981; *New York Times*, July 7, 1981.)

SOUTHERN AFRICA

Angola

- The U.S. Export-Import Bank extended \$85 million in credits to Angola in early July to finance an offshore oil development project. The loan agreement was the first Ex-Im funding extended to the former Portuguese colony since its independence in 1975.

The funds are to be used to help finance a \$160 million project which is expected to double oil production from two main wells off Cabinda to about 200,000 barrels per day by 1985. A **Gulf Oil Corp.** subsidiary and Angola's state-run oil company, Sonangol, are working jointly on the development of the oil fields.

The Ex-Im credits had been approved under the Carter administration, but implementation had been delayed because of "complexities" in arranging additional funding from commercial banks to complete the package. However, in late June, a commercial syndicate led by **Morgan Guarantee Trust** agreed to provide \$50 million in private loans.

State Department officials were quick to state that the loan should not be interpreted as any change in U.S. policy toward Angola. The U.S. has not yet recognized the Angolan MPLA government, led by President Jose Eduardo dos Santos, and the Reagan administration maintains it will refrain from doing so until the estimated 20,000 Cuban troops present in the country are removed.

The administration has also asked Congress to repeal the Clark amendment, which outlaws assistance to the Unita rebels led by

Jonas Savimbi who are waging a guerrilla war to overthrow the Luanda government. Some observers indicated, however, that the extension of the credit may indicate a softening of the administration's tough line with regard to Angola.

Gulf Oil has been encouraging the U.S. government to take a more pragmatic approach to Angola and extend recognition, as the Luanda government has "been responsive and supportive as a business partner."

Rep. Howard Wolpe (D-Mi), chairman of the House subcommittee on Africa, said: "There is a certain irony in that while we are facilitating private sector American investment, which makes sense from the standpoint of American business interests and energy requirements, we still maintain a posture of non-recognition." (*Economist*, August 1, 1981; *Washington Post*, July 10, 1981.)

Lesotho

- The Lesotho Prime Minister, Chief Leabua Jonathan, announced earlier in the year that a **referendum** will be held to determine whether the Basotho people are ready for a general election—the first since 1970. Details of the terms of the referendum will be determined by the government.

Recent reports from the *Rand Daily Mail* disclosed that the leader of the opposition group, the Basotho Congress Party (BCP), Ntsu Mokhehle, had slipped back into Lesotho from exile in Zambia. Jonathan dismissed the report as a "dream and figment of the imagination of the reporter." An amnesty declared for all BCP members who allegedly engaged in subversive activities against the government resulted in the return to Lesotho in May of 13 of the group from their exile in Botswana.

The BCP has carried out a low-level guerrilla war against the government since 1970 when the constitution was suspended and the movement outlawed. (*Africa Research Bulletin*, May 15, June 15, and July 15, 1981.)

Malawi

- Reports of acute maize shortages

in Malawi, a nation said to be self-sufficient in food, were denied by President Kamuzu Banda. According to newspapers in Zimbabwe and Tanzania, South Africa is planning to send 50,000 tons of maize to Malawi where shortages of the staple crop have caused random looting, assaults and even murder. Banda ordered any discussion of food shortages to "cease forthwith."

And from outside Malawi, exile groups are reportedly planning a "unity congress" to be held before the end of the year in Dar es Salaam. The groups opposed to Banda's rule which are expected to take part in the meeting to form an alliance are: the Socialist League of Malawi (Lesoma), headed by Attati Mpakati; the Malawi Freedom Movement (Mafremo), led by former Justice Minister and Attorney General Orton Chirwa; the Congress of the Second Republic of Malawi, led by former External Affairs Minister Kanyama Chiume; and a movement led by ex-Malawi Congress Party Youth Wing leader Crispin Chindongo, who is campaigning for the presidency "after Dr. Banda's retirement." (*Africa Now*, June 1981; *Africa Research Bulletin*, May 15, 1981.)

Mozambique

- President Samora Machel met with Prime Minister Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe in mid-July in the Zimbabwe border town of Umtali for discussions on the activities of the **Mozambique Resistance Movement (MRM)**. The MRM, a South African-backed guerrilla force formed in opposition to the Machel government, has been carrying out attacks in the western border region, causing a flow of refugees into Zimbabwe.

Zimbabwe is concerned that the guerrillas will threaten its transport routes to Mozambican ports, which have become increasingly important to the Salisbury government as it tries to reduce its dependence on South African outlets.

More than 1,200 Mozambican refugees who fled the fighting were reported living in camps near Chipinga, south of Umtali, and many are reluctant to return home, despite Maputo's requests that they do so. The guerrillas have been targeting communal villages, set up by

the Frelimo government, for attacks in the southern regions of the Manica and Sofala provinces.

Zimbabwe and Mozambique signed a defense agreement in January to combat the rebels and Zimbabwe troops have been operating inside Mozambique. The MRM allegedly receives assistance from South Africa and is believed to be led by Portuguese ex-colonialists.

According to a related report in the London *Guardian* in early August, colonial secret police agents maintained effective control of one of Mozambique's main railway centers, Inhaminga, for almost six years after independence. A recent visit to Inhaminga, a remote center eight hours by train from Beira, by the Surface Transport Minister, Alcantara Santos, resulted in his discovery of the continued role of the much-hated colonial Voluntary Police Organization (OPV) in maintaining control over the railway system there.

The OPV director had remained in Inhaminga after independence in 1975, although the majority of the members fled. Railway workers who had been co-opted into the OPV during the liberation war had participated in a massacre of hundreds of suspected Frelimo supporters just prior to independence. The OPV director, through intimidation and a system of rewards and privileges, was able to maintain control over the workers.

The OPV members prevented the introduction of Frelimo's collective work methods on the railway and encouraged low worker productivity, rather than launching overt sabotage attacks on the system. Railway service became increasingly disorganized over the years, resulting in the near collapse of the system, the root of which was only discovered during Santos' visit. (*London Guardian*, July 16 and August 4, 1981; *Economist*, June 27 and July 18, 1981; *London Times*, July 14, 1981.)

South Africa

- A **black journalist** prominent in the Media Workers' Association of South Africa (Mwasa) has been banned, just six weeks after the detentions of Zwelakhe Sisulu, former Mwasa president, and Thami Maz-

wai, a *Sowetan* reporter and Mwasa national secretary.

The gagged journalist is Charles Nqakula, 38, Mwasa's president and a senior reporter for the East London *Daily Dispatch*. On July 31, he was served a 30-month banning order that prevents him from working as a journalist and confines him to house arrest between 6 p.m. and 6 a.m. (*Washington Star*, August 2, 1981.)

Former Mwasa president Sisulu, son of imprisoned African National Congress official Walter Sisulu, was detained on June 20 and is now held under the notorious Section Six of the Terrorism Act, the law used to hold people incommunicado indefinitely for purposes of interrogation. A report from Reuter said the Reagan administration is considering making a diplomatic representation to the South African government over Sisulu's detention after receiving "numerous inquiries" about the journalist. (Reuter, July 20, 1981.)

- A well-known South African **black activist**, Mrs. Albertina Sisulu, 64, has been unbanned for the first time since she was silenced in 1964.

Mrs. Sisulu is the mother of Zwelakhe Sisulu, the detained journalist, and wife of Walter Sisulu, the imprisoned nationalist.

The expiration of her banning order meant that Mrs. Sisulu could be quoted by the South African press for the first time in 17 years. She said she strongly supported her son, who is banned besides being in police custody. "He has been a source of inspiration to us."

Mrs. Fatima Meer, 52, a Durban sociologist, had her ban, imposed in 1976, renewed. (*Voice*, August 4, 1981; *London Guardian*, August 4, 1981.)

- The Zimbabwean government has blamed South Africa for the **assassination** of a prominent South African nationalist in a Salisbury suburb earlier this month.

The bullet-riddled body of Joe Gqabi was found in his car outside his home. Gqabi, 52, a senior executive member of the African National Congress, which is banned in South Africa, was the top-ranking ANC leader in Zimbabwe. He had been

considered a possible successor to acting president Oliver Tambo.

Zimbabwe's Information Minister, Dr. Nathan Shamuyarira, said, "This brutal act was the dirty work of unscrupulous agents of the racist South African regime." The assassination occurred at a time of increasing tensions between Zimbabwe and South Africa. (*Financial Times*, August 3, 1981; *Washington Post*, August 2, 1981.)

- A Portuguese weekly newspaper has uncovered what it claims are regular shipments of **weapons** to South Africa by way of Portugal.

The arms allegedly are transported by four ships from a Danish company. The weekly *Expresso* said that between 1976 and 1980 at least 30 shipments passed through Lisbon en route to South Africa from Belgium, Italy, Poland, Canada, the Netherlands, Romania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, apart from sales by the Portuguese government and private companies.

The ships, ostensibly bound for African or other countries, change their destinations en route to South African ports. One ship, headed for Argentina, took on ten tons of machine pistols in Italy, ten Alouette-3 helicopters in Lisbon (sold by the Portuguese air force) and traveled to Cape Town via the Canary Islands. (*London Guardian*, July 15, 1981.)

- **France** reportedly is seeking ways to reduce its reliance on South Africa for coal, and is exploring the possibility of buying coal reserves in the U.S.

Last year, one-third of France's coal imports, 9.2 million tons, came from South Africa, which counts on France to buy one-half its exports of coal to Europe.

Compagnie Francaise des Petroles, the Total oil company, is considering investing about \$286 million in a Kentucky coal operation, as well as equipping a U.S. port for efficient exporting of coal to France and the rest of Europe.

The socialist government of President Francois Mitterrand is strongly opposed to apartheid but France relies on South Africa for several strategic metals, notably titanium and chrome, and for a large chunk of its coal.

However, the Mitterrand government has said it will honor its existing contracts and is delivering a 900-megawatt nuclear reactor for the Koeberg power plant. The \$1.6 billion deal, concluded several years ago, is controversial because the South African government has refused to sign the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, which is supposed to provide safeguards to prevent nuclear plants from being used for anything but peaceful purposes. (*Johannesburg Star*, July 18 and 25, 1981.)

- **Colgate-Palmolive's** Boksburg factory was still seething in July even though the American multinational had agreed to recognize the unregistered black union.

More than 500 black workers struck for one day, claiming that Colgate had reneged and refused to let the Chemical Workers' Industrial Union function. But management and union representatives decided to have further talks, ending the industrial action. (*Sowetan*, July 15 and 16, 1981.)

- South Africa's drive to recruit **white skilled labor** overseas is finding success in Britain where 120,000 Britons are expected to apply by the end of 1981. About 20,000 British immigrants will be accepted, compared to 8,700 last year.

Despite the government's campaign to recruit whites, a government agency recently pointed out that whites simply cannot meet South Africa's growing needs for skilled labor and that blacks will have to be trained.

White Britons and others under age 25 who immigrate to South Africa automatically become citizens after two years and then must serve two years in the army.

- In a further economic blow to **Zimbabwe**, the South African government has announced it will not renew the work permits of 20,000 Zimbabweans legally employed in South Africa. The Zimbabweans will have to return home to seek work when the permits expire in 12 to 18 months.

Relations between Pretoria and Salisbury have steadily worsened since the government of Prime Minister Robert Mugabe came to power

N.Y.C.-owned stadium denied to Springboks

New York City's Mayor Ed Koch has reversed his approval for the South African national rugby team to play a match at a city-owned stadium on Randalls Island in September.

Koch said he changed his mind after Police Commissioner Robert McGuire warned there might be disruptive anti-apartheid protests and that security for the game would cost about \$400,000.

In Chicago, the Springboks team will play a match in secrecy because of anti-apartheid opposition, according to the American hosts of the South Africans.

In their tour of New Zealand, the Springboks fueled unprecedented demonstrations, sometimes violent, in that tiny island nation. The tour prompted the Commonwealth to change the venue of its September finance ministers' meeting from New Zealand to the Bahamas. (*Financial Times*, August 11, 1981; *New York Times*, August 8, 1981.)

last year. In what was probably the worst blow to Zimbabwe, South Africa said last May that its preferential trade agreement with Zimbabwe would not be renewed next year. Diesel fuel supplies in Zimbabwe have been cut by 20 percent because of delays in delivery from South Africa.

Apparently, though, South African businessmen are not in complete agreement with their government's policies toward Zimbabwe. Late in July, two top officials of the business-funded South Africa Foundation visited Zimbabwe and held confidential talks with Mugabe and other Zimbabwean officials. Some observers suggested that the role of the mission, headed by the deputy chairman of the giant conglomerate Anglo American Corp. was to gauge Mugabe's views on economic issues between the two countries and then pass those on to Pretoria in the hope of defusing the growing tension. (*Financial Times*, July 30, August 3 and 7, 1981.)

Time IS Running Out

BY SENATOR PAUL TSONGAS

An informed reader of the Rockefeller Commission Report recently told me that his first impression was not enthusiastic. Then he read the report again and then a third time. At each reading, his assessment changed. His final judgment? He called the report a deeply thoughtful analysis coupled with solid policy recommendations. I agree. The commission's work is deceptively straightforward and concise. It deserves a close and careful reading to fully appreciate its depth. Beneath the well-publicized recommendations on the glamour issues — investment, strategic minerals, and the Cape route — there is a comprehensive, systematic, and integrated analysis of one of the most vexing policy questions of our time.

More than a dry policy study, the commission's report will serve as both a general text on South Africa as well as a sophisticated policy framework for analysts and decision makers. The background chapters are reliable, forthright, and up to date. The concluding chapters are carefully drawn and consistent with the facts. Of particular interest and merit are the highly revealing interviews with South Africans that appear at various junctures in the text.

The report comes to us at a pregnant moment in the evolution of U.S. policy. A new American president with

very precise views on human rights, the Third World, and the Soviet threat is in the process of redefining American policy for South Africa. The commission, composed of established corporate, academic, and philanthropic figures, has struck a decidedly moderate tone on a number of key issues. The report recommends a moratorium, not a withdrawal, of U.S. investment in South Africa, is for the Sullivan principles, against trade embargoes, for evolutionary change, and against rigid one-man, one-vote formulas. Yet the commission finds itself perched well to the left of President Reagan's emerging policy. The differences are instructive.

The commission calls for extending the U.S. arms embargo to include U.S. corporate subsidiaries operating abroad. The administration publishes new regulations weakening the arms embargo and hold official meetings with South African military intelligence personnel. The commission recommends a flexible policy of rewards and sanctions keyed to progressive or regressive steps taken by the South African government. The administration, faced with an avalanche of bad news from South Africa, welcomes Foreign Minister Pik Botha to Washington, allows the national South African rugby team to tour the U.S., offers concessions on the Namibia negotiations, and takes a hard-line approach to South Af-

rica's Cuban antagonists in Angola. Rewards for bad behavior are not what the commissioners had in mind.

Why is a middle of the road policy study suddenly irrelevant in the White House? What separates two corporate chief executive officers, two university presidents, and the presidents of the Ford Foundation and Carnegie Corporation from Ronald Reagan on the South African issue?

The easy answers come to mind first. Reflexive anticommunism and a de-emphasis of human rights certainly were not part of the commission's assumptions. And the commission's doubts about the strategic minerals issue and the Cape Route thesis have not endeared their work to the "realists" of the administration. But there is more to the chasm than those differences create. At the heart of the issue is South Africa itself.

Outsiders, and frequently Americans, have failed to break through a veil of myths surrounding South Africa. The first might be titled the myth of voluntary reform. Outsiders are always struck by the vast scope and opportunity for practical reforms in South Africa. With the apartheid structure so rigid and so outmoded, it is assumed that piecemeal yet cumulative change cannot help but take place. All that Pretoria need do, is act. It does not. As one South African black told the com-

missioners, "Change is like love in this country; it's in the eyes of the beholder."

The glacial progress is not due to a lack of ideas. And there is considerable pressure from blacks. The hitch is the white electorate, which according to a second myth is more liberal and change-oriented than the government. It is not. The commission stumbled on this point, arguing that Prime Minister Botha could establish a new political base on this growing *verligte* ("liberal") constituency. The polls from South Africa encouraged that judgment. But Botha's recent election rhetoric was anything but reform oriented. He talked tough on apartheid, on Namibia, on black Africa, and the African National Congress (ANC). The electorate, however, remembered his earlier calls for pragmatic change and deserted him in large numbers for the rigidly pro-apartheid *Herstigste* National party. The issue, as always, was survival. And the South African white electorate is very much a single-issue constituency. That one issue, if invoked, will exert inordinate influence on voter behavior. We have the single-issue phenomenon here in the United States as does Prime Minister Menachem Begin in Israel. In South Africa, that single issue of survival throws the democratic process back on itself and frustrates political evolution.

I am reminded of an American parallel. Anti-Soviet fears and anxieties run deep here. They are politically useful. The debate on nuclear arms control has been a major arena for exploiting such fears. Therefore, when the SALT treaty came before the Senate after years of tough negotiation with the Soviets, it was branded as a concession to the communist enemy. The arms-control process was thrown back on itself, just as *swart gevar* ("black fear") paralyzes the South African electorate and its representatives.

The Reagan administration has embarked on a policy of "constructive engagement" with South Africa. That policy assumes that the carrot will generate far more South African progress and cooperation than the stick. The policy implicitly accepts the myth of voluntary reform. There are no crip-

pling upheavals in the administration's view of the South African future.

The commission to its credit refrains from choosing any one scenario over another. On the one hand, it identifies an evolutionary, erratically violent, but essentially progressive scenario toward a negotiated transition to majority rule. The report also sets out a second scenario of escalating guerilla sabotage and violence in the face of an intractable, repressive minority regime. The end of that track is a violent transition, a victory for Soviet-supported forces, and a high risk of damage to U.S. interests. Underlying the commission's assessment of trends and prospects, however, is one key conclusion: "Whatever the South African government does to reinforce the status quo, black forces inside the country will alter it."

On that point, the commission penetrates a third enduring myth: that the South African military will insure the survival of the present regime. Any visitor to South Africa or reader of *The Military Balance* is convinced of South Africa's extraordinary military strength. The country is a fortress to its neighbors and the commission sets out exactly why. There is, however, no

precedent in history for a military solution to a profoundly internal crisis. The intimate and growing ties of blacks to the South African economy and society are not signs of racial harmony, but of a remorseless modernization process equipping the disenfranchised with new levers of power. Each year, the vulnerabilities of the present regime multiply. Each year, tactical options for blacks proliferate. Behind the walls of the fortress, the structure is less secure.

On this question, the commission again collides with the present administration, which accepts the fortress myth, at least for the short term, and interprets American interests in South Africa accordingly. It is, perhaps, a bit early to criticize the new administration on South Africa. And, in Reagan's defense, it can be said that President Carter's policies did not produce the desired results. A new approach may be required. But with Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe under majority rule, and with the ANC growing in sophistication and support, one would expect most policymakers to acknowledge the commission's conclusion that in South Africa, "time is running out." □



Senator Paul E. Tsongas: The commission report is "a comprehensive, systematic, and integrated analysis of one of the most vexing policy issues of our time"

What Prospects for Human Rights?

BY WILFRID GRENVILLE-GREY

At the Human Rights Conference held in Capetown in 1979, Professor John Dugard said that discussions on this subject might well follow the lines of a study on animal life in Ireland which, under the chapter heading "Snakes in Ireland," simply states "there are no snakes in Ireland." John Dugard then goes on to argue that there are a few "snakes" in existence, but unless their friends rally round, they could well soon become extinct. And in May 1980, Patricia Derian, former assistant secretary for human rights and human affairs, seemed to support this same verdict when she stated to a House Committee on Foreign Affairs, "South Africa's policy of institutionalized and legalized racism is one of the cruelest forms of human rights abuses in the world today."

Now, however, in 1981, the era of the new U.S. government policy of "constructive engagement" with

South Africa — to use Dr. Chester Crocker's expression — the mood is very different. Mixed marriages may still be forbidden but more theatres and beaches are becoming multiracial. Thus, there is, it is argued, some freedom of movement. The African newspapers, the *World* and the *Post*, may be banned, but Bishop Tutu and members of the Azanian People's Organization (AZAPO), though constantly harassed, are able to speak out from inside the Republic and vigorously criticize their government. There is, then, some freedom of speech and association. The iniquitous Terrorism and Internal Security Acts may still be in place, but the death sentence passed on James Mange was recently commuted. So the judiciary remains independent. Nelson Mandela may still be in prison, but over 70,000 people inside South Africa were able to sign a petition calling for his release without prosecution. Maybe there is a new tolerance for the liberation movements? In his recent article in *Foreign Affairs*, Dr. Crocker calls for "publicly expressed encouragement and support for positive steps," and he has himself met recently with Foreign Minister Botha to discuss with him prospects for more revolutionary change. The new plan is that constructive engagement will keep the South

Africans moving forwards — slowly yes, but still moving.

Others see no signs at all of "positive steps." But neither do they see the South African situation as special or urgent. Their argument goes, "of course human rights are in a bad way under apartheid, but what about Ethiopia, Chile, and the Soviet Union? Why do we have to consider South Africa as so special?"

But the argument for treating South Africa as a special case in foreign policy is a formidable one, and it is not usually strongly enough stated. Consider the number of special links. The first is language. The English language and culture daily create a web of contacts between the two countries — newspapers, books, plays, films, educational contact. The exchange is enormous and growing.

Black South Africans look much more to America than Britain for cultural inspiration. The private enterprise ethos, too, is identical in the two countries. Read the South African *Financial Mail* to prove it. Indeed, Sir Ernest Oppenheimer called his great mining conglomerate the Anglo-American Corporation because he wanted to draw attention to the business traditions he had gratefully absorbed from England and the United States. The Protestant heri-

Wilfrid Grenville-Grey was director of the Center for International Briefing, Farnham Castle, Britain, from 1973 to 1977. Since 1978 he has worked with the International Defense and Aid Fund for Southern Africa and currently represents the Fund at the United Nations. He has lived and worked in Africa for 17 years.



Photo: J. Seymour/IDAF

Child farm labor: Because 87 percent of the South African population is restricted to 13 percent of the land, it is impossible for African farmers to emerge or survive

tage influences the Afrikaaner community just as it does the English speakers. This religious link extends to the black community as well. At least three South African ministers of religion have settled down happily into work in American cities. Then there are sporting links, with tennis and boxing usually the most prominent. One could say much more — and shortly we shall examine our common legal heritage — but is it necessary?

South Africa, even though many speak Afrikaans as their first language, is an integral part of the English-speaking world and of Western civilization, and the South Africans themselves never tire of saying that this is how they wish to be regarded. How ridiculous it would be to try to argue that, investments and strategic considerations apart, South Africa should be regarded on a par with, say, Japan, Pakistan, or Brazil.

It was surely this complex network of links and values to which Senator John

Tower (R-Texas) was referring when he said that South Africa is “philosophically” related to the United States. Historically and economically, links with Great Britain may be stronger — there are, for instance, under 400 U.S. firms with direct investments in South Africa as against over 1000 British companies — but the growing personal contacts between black leaders in the United States and South Africa and the grass-roots awareness being fostered by TransAfrica make the “special” connection with the United States at least as close and important for the future.

If these mutual bonds run so deep and wide then the question of the state of human rights in South Africa acquires a special urgency and importance. The South Africans, like ourselves in North America, are heirs to a common heritage of civil and political liberties. If the limits of one part of the body politic are out of joint, the effects will be felt throughout the English-speaking world. The continuing furor over the

sports boycott proves it. Further massacres on the scale of Soweto in 1976 would create festering anger in North America and Britain. South Africa is then not just another far away country of no particular significance for Americans.

Africans themselves see no sign of improvement and they have never been more determined to protest against the prevailing injustices. Let Dr. Nthato Motlana of the Soweto Committee of Ten speak for the Africans inside South Africa. In 1980 he said:

There is all this talk of change in the air. The trouble is: it is all talk. And talk by whites. So where's the change? Has there been any real recognition of the implications of a multiracial society? No, nothing but a vague general convention that it's no longer acceptable as it once was to kick the Kaffir. That's the change. It's the difference between iniquity and mere awfulness. We haven't reached base point in the scale of moral justice. We're still below justice.

“To reach base point in the scale of moral justice” — by at least being able to point to real improvements with regard to the fundamental freedoms of association, assembly, speech, and movement. There changes are, for the Africans, the central issue.

An analysis of these four central human rights confirms Dr. Motlana's verdict. Since 1960 Africans have been prevented by law from joining the political organizations that most of them wished to join — the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC). Other organizations have sprung up *faute de mieux* during these 20 years, but they, too, — as happened when 18 organizations were banned simultaneously on October 19, 1977 — have been nipped in the bud. Penalties for continuing to support any banned organization are of the severest kind. Magistrates are nowadays compelled to give a minimum sentence of five years for many political offenses. As Professor Dugard has pointed out, “the person who in two minutes becomes a member of the ANC, puts on a membership badge, and makes a contribution to the organization, commits three separate offenses, which expose him to 30 years imprisonment.”

Freedom of choice in political association, with the assumption of the right to vote and sit in Parliament and make the laws under which they live, is the most important of all rights for Africans. The present repression is even harder to bear because as far back as 1853 Africans did have the right to vote at least in a part of South Africa. In 1910 the right to sit in Parliament was taken away from them and in 1936 Africans in Cape Province were removed from the Common Voter's Roll. Finally, token indirect representation by three white representatives and four white senators in Parliament was abolished in 1959. After 48 years of struggling and failing to achieve political representation by democratic means, Nelson Mandela was finally compelled to cry out, "Our choice is either to fight or submit!" One hundred fifty years earlier the English radical William Cobbett had proclaimed, "The great right of all, and without which there is, in fact, no right, is the right of taking part in the laws by which we are governed." Who dares to say that the black majority, nurtured, as Mandela explained in the Rivonia Trial, on English and American political traditions, is asking for too much too soon?

The ANC and the PAC, although they have been banned for more than 20 years, were once mass movements and could become so again. Both are still recognized and supported by the Organization of African Unity. Neither party would have been banned if they had not had widespread grass-roots support. Undoubtedly both are mainstream liberation movements.

Yet all too often it appears that the Western governments pretend to themselves that the real, the authentic, liberation movement has yet to emerge. All options, they repeat, must be kept open. For instance, the report of the Study Commission on U.S. Policy Toward Southern Africa, entitled *South Africa: Time Running Out*, put it this way: "The U.S. Government maintains informal contact with black South Africans, including the church, labor, business leaders, and representatives of the African National Congress." Now why should the political parties be listed last? The report goes on to recom-

mend that this contact be maintained and expanded. But why not offer help as well as contact? If the U.S. government, and the Western governments generally, want to win the hearts and minds of the majority in South Africa — and incidentally make a real impression on the Nigerians — they must begin to show active support for political leaders. Funds must be given for their publications; their offices overseas need assistance; their refugees need support. The only way the U.S. government has so far given any direct help to the liberation movements is to support organizations that provide funds for the legal defense of political prisoners in South Africa. Though the sum involved is very small, the U.S. government is leading where the British and other Western governments so far fear to follow. The Nordic governments have been giving humanitarian political aid on a vastly greater scale for a number of years. They give with the conviction that their funds do not go to buy bombs and bullets. Why does a nation that itself came to birth in a rebellion against unreasonable colonialism find it so difficult to take this step? If you believe in majority rule, then help the majority to rule.

If and only if the Africans' participation in the political process can begin — and with about 500 of their best and most experienced leaders in prison, they need all the help they can get — will they be able to, in Dr. Motlana's phrase, "reach base point in the scale of moral justice."

Freedom of assembly (the right to hold meetings, gatherings, and processions) has been relentlessly constrained. In 1956 the Riotous Assemblies Act provided for control of 12 or more persons, but in 1974 an amendment extended control to two or more persons. For processions, the organizations must always have the consent of a magistrate as well as of the local authority.

Freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention (Article 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights) is the human right most highly prized in the Western scale of civil liberties. Yet the key South African laws, the Internal Security Act and the Terrorism Act,

permit indefinite detention (with the option of solitary confinement, to be authorized by a police officer of the rank of lieutenant colonel or above). Thus, the precious English right of *habeas corpus* is expressly excluded, and this right to appear in court is equally an offense to the Afrikaaner Roman-Dutch tradition that affords the same protection by the *interdictum de homine libero exhibendo*. Interrogation can then continue for months at a time.



Dr. Nthato Motlana: "We have not reached base point in the scale of moral justice"

In 1979 the average length of detention for those held under the Terrorism Act was 85 days. Professor Dugard has chillingly called this "inquisitorial" rather than "accusatorial" procedure "The Drastic Process." Furthermore, the minister of justice is not obliged to provide information relating to the identity or number of persons held under the Terrorism Act, so that persons may quite simply disappear.

Although at first sight the press may seem to be vigorous, varied, and critical of some government policies, freedom of speech — or more specifically, freedom of expression and information — is drastically curtailed in South Africa. At the Human Rights Seminar at Cape Town University in 1979, the

Photo: Geoff Daughlish/Photo Trends

following legal restrictions on press freedom were delineated: "350 leading cases, 40 statutes, the common law, government notices, newspaper press union agreements, and the prohibition concerning the quoting of banned and restricted persons." Then there is the Publications Act of 1974 which, by 1979, had declared 1,326 items "undesirable" (excluding films and plays);



Photo: S. Coetzer/Sygnia

"Further massacres on the scale of Soweto in 1976 would create festering anger in North America and Britain"

about half of these were political publications. At the Cape Town seminar, Anthony Lewis hinted that the following words of U.S. Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart on press freedom might fall on deaf ears in South Africa: "Newspapers, television networks, and magazines have sometimes been outrageously abusive, untruthful, arrogant, and hypocritical. But it hardly follows that elimination of a strong and independent press is the way to eliminate abusiveness, untruth, arrogance, or hypocrisy from government itself."

The abuses of human rights we have

so far described fall, in theory, equally on people of all races, but there is one particular right where the African people are subject to separate and unequal treatment: freedom of movement. One legal expert has said, "In general, the African requires some form of authority or permission for any journey of consequence within the Union." In particular, there is a complicated structure of laws known as "influx control" to prevent Africans, except those who have lived there for more than 10 years, from coming to the big cities with their families and moving about to find work. This restriction would surely be particularly offensive to people of English descent who have restlessly moved about, not only within their native land, but also around the whole world. For Americans, a Supreme Court decision in 1849 declared, "for all the great purposes for which the Federal Government was formed, we are one people with one country. We are all citizens of the United States: and as members of the same community, must have the right to pass and repass through every part of it without interruption." Imagine what would have happened if in America in 1978, as in South Africa, 278,000 people were fined or imprisoned for not having, or not having in proper order, their travel documents or passbook for travelling inside, not outside, the land of their birth.

Finally, a word about the most fundamental human right of all, the right to life. Because since 1914 South Africa has been divided on the basis of 87 percent of the population being restricted to 13 percent of the land, it is virtually impossible for African peasant farmers either to emerge or survive. In the Bantustans there are now some 10 million Africans, whereas the Tomlinson Commission reported that unless these areas were expanded they would only support three million. Meanwhile, thousands, not hundreds, of Africans are involved annually, against their will, in resettlement in barren overcrowded areas far away from their ancestral homes. And in the urban areas the position is just as disturbing. It is calculated that half the population of Soweto lives below the poverty datum

line, and that the population density is five times higher than in New York, Chicago, or Los Angeles. Anger will fester in this congestion and stable government will be at risk.

At least it is heartening to note that a great deal of the trenchant criticism made about the state of human rights in South Africa today comes from South African lawyers themselves. A few years ago Mr. Sydney Kentridge gave a memorable address to the New Zealand Bar Association expressing his deep concern at the present unjust state of affairs. Professors B. van Niekerk and J.D. van der Vyver have spoken out about their particular concerns. Prof. John Dugard, in his major study entitled *Human Rights and the South African Legal Order*, has summed up the present grave situation by concluding that only a bill of rights — copied, he suggests, from the Canadian model — can put South Africa back on the path of sanity. J.M. Didcott, a justice of the South African Supreme Court, has recently given stinging evidence to the Hoexter Commission against the government proposals to establish a new system of intermediate courts that would enable the Department of Justice to undermine the status of the Supreme Court. Encouragingly, in June 1980 over 400 South African lawyers joined in the establishment of a new Lawyers Association for the Protection of Human Rights.

Enough has now been said about the almost total abuse of human rights in South Africa today to demonstrate that Dr. Motlana did not speak too strongly when he said that if there has been change in South Africa over the past two years, it is merely a change from "iniquity to mere awfulness."

If, as the South Africans continually repeat, they wish to be considered as part of the Western alliance, then there are dues to be paid to the Western (and particularly English and American) tradition of human rights. Surely a priority of "constructive engagement" must now be to work out how to help the South Africans to restore to life the tattered remains of the human rights that the government has destroyed so comprehensively since coming to power in 1948. □

Is Partition the Answer?

BY STANLEY UYS

From time to time in South Africa, political scientists and others, surveying the bleak wasteland of the racial conflict and concluding that the solution does not lie in the creation of a common society, have come up with the idea that the country should be radically partitioned — that there should be a geographical cleavage of immense proportions that would put 20 million Africans on one side of a great divide and the rest of the population (4.4 million whites, 2.5 million coloureds of mixed race descent, and 780,000 Indians) on the other.

This "solution" explicitly rejects the unitary state and a racially integrated society on the grounds that the Africans, by sheer numbers, would swamp everyone else. Partition is also implicit admission of the failure of government policies: the more doctrinal apartheid is seen to falter, the more frenetic the search becomes for alternative policies. Geographical partition is the "solution" of last resort — when everything else has failed, the remedy is to erect a physical barrier between the races.

The most despairing, and recent, of

the partition ideas has come from the South African Bureau of Racial Affairs, a pro-government think tank which for three decades has labored to provide some kind of intellectual legitimacy for the apartheid ideology. The plan envisages the withdrawal of whites into a white heartland or homeland in the somewhat arid area along the Orange River, encompassing the sparsely populated districts of the Free State and Cape Province near a major hydroelectric project called the Verwoerd Dam. The plan is called Project Oranje.

Perhaps not unexpectedly, two of the main exponents of the idea are the son and son-in-law of the late Dr. Hendrik Verwoerd, architect of the black homelands policy and an apartheid fanatic (he was assassinated in 1966). The son, the Rev. Hendrik F. Verwoerd, has given up missionary work to become head of a new organization called Friends of Oranje, which will draw up plans to demonstrate that the "homelands" can be made to work for whites, too. The son-in-law is Dr. Carel Boshoff, professor of theology at the University of Pretoria, chairman of the South African Bureau of Racial Affairs, and head of the Broederbond, the immensely influential Afrikaner secret society to which most important Afrikaners, including cabinet ministers and members of Parliament, belong. Dr. Boshoff told the *New York Times* recently that he saw little chance of "white supremacy" remaining perma-

nent in areas where blacks were a permanent part of the economy. He saw the future of South Africa's big urban and industrial areas, therefore, as problematic. If a secure white majority area was established, however, the industrial areas could be viewed as "areas of cooperation."

The man who helped to put the whole idea of partition on the map was Dr. Jannie Graaff, economist brother of the former leader of the parliamentary opposition in South Africa, Sir de Villiers Graaff. He proposed a plan for a radical partition of the country in 1963. At the time, papers were circulating privately in the U.S. State Department and Britain's Foreign Office discussing partition as a solution to the race problem in South Africa. The discussion centered on Dr. Graaff's plan for the partition of South Africa into two areas along a 2,000-mile wriggling "demotonic line," which looked like a crumpled hairpin fitted over the top of the country with one end at East London and the other in the middle of the eastern border of South-West Africa (Namibia). It would divide South Africa and the Protectorates (now Lesotho, Botswana, and Swaziland), if they were willing, into two areas: one of 8 million people, with a white majority, and another of roughly the same number with an overwhelmingly African majority (the population of South Africa was 16 million then compared with 28 million now — an index of how more intractable the problem has become). The western

Stanley Uys is the London editor of the *South African Morning Newspaper Group*. Until 1977, he was the South African correspondent of the London *Guardian* and *Observer*. He is a regular contributor to the BBC and other broadcasting networks.

section of this partition would accommodate about 3.3 million whites, 1.8 million coloureds and Indians, and some 3 million permanently settled Africans, most of them in the urban areas. In the "African" section, there would be some 7.5 million Africans with perhaps 300,000 (English-speaking) whites and 400,000 Asians, mostly of Indian descent.

The key question of who gets the gold mines would be settled in favor of the whites under this plan. The great industrial Pretoria-Johannesburg-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging complex would lie well behind the western or white line. If the (mainly English-speaking) whites of Natal could be persuaded to accept this partition, and throw in their lot with blacks, the port of Durban, probably the best in Africa, would be in the African-dominated area. So, too, would be the greater part of the best-watered and most fertile agricultural land in South Africa, and a potentially rich industrial area, with coal, water, services, and labor in abundance, namely, the Natal Midlands.

The powerful links which knit South Africa together, it was claimed, were unlikely to be severed by such a partition. The wealth provided by gold and diamonds and other minerals would continue to provide work and economic

opportunity for many people in the "African" section. Hopefully, the two sections would soon see that they were bound together indissolubly by economic ties, and South Africa would find its unity again, starting as a southern Common Market. The theory was that once respective fears of political domination had been removed, the vast economic potential of both sides would be realized and everybody would work together in cooperative endeavor. Under such a division of land, either a one-man one-vote policy could be introduced, or a qualified franchise (although the qualified franchise has since fallen out of favor even among whites). The white-Indian minority on the African side would be political hostages for fair treatment of the African minority on the western side, and vice versa.


The concept of partition, of course, is embodied in the South African government's own homelands policy. Under this policy, 10 African homelands or Bantustans have been created out of the remnants of the old tribal reserves. Independence is available to all of them for the asking: some (Transkei, Bophuthatswana, etc.) have accepted it; others (like Kwazulu) reject it, because they refuse to forfeit their stake in South Africa as a whole. The total area of the 10 homelands is 12.7

percent of the surface area of South Africa, a pitifully small area for 20 million Africans, who constitute 70 percent of the population. The motivation for the homelands policy was to siphon all 20 million Africans (politically, not physically) out of "white" South Africa, transform them into citizens of one or another homeland, and then permanently deny them participation in the whites' political institutions. The homelands idea is failing, however. Prime Minister Botha has admitted, for example, that it is not possible to consolidate the homelands geographically (most are broken up into fragments) and therefore make them viable economically. Also, 22 years after the introduction of the homelands policy, Africans have become more, not less, clamorous in their insistence on having political rights in "white" areas.

Prime Minister Botha is moving now towards "regionalism" and possibly even confederalism: maximum autonomy for ethnic areas, plus cooperation in "common areas." Shortly after becoming prime minister, he presented the concept of a "Constellation of Southern African States," which would begin with South Africa and the black homelands, and ripple out in concentric circles to include Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland, Namibia, and possibly Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Malawi, Angola, Zambia, Zaire, and Tanzania. The government has been vague, however, about the extent of the "Constellation." Foreign Minister Pik Botha spoke of "7, 8, 9, 10 states," south of the Kunene and Zambezi Rivers, with a total population of 40 million; but at an official "Constellation of Southern African States" exhibition in Johannesburg last year, large maps and elaborate diagrams were on display that included 22 homelands and independent black countries. Regionalism, confederalism, federalism — this appears to be the mainstream of political thought in white circles in South Africa, and even in some black circles.

African leaders, in the main (at least the militant ones), are still determined to go for the main chance — the unitary state, in which their numbers will guarantee them control.


In *Plural Democracy* (published by the South African Institute of Race Re-




lations in 1977), Professor Wolfgang Thomas, now of the University of Transkei, suggested six reasons why partition keeps presenting itself as a possible solution of the race problem: (1) the fundamental differences between the aspirations of Africans and whites in South Africa; (2) the potentially explosive situation if Africans continue to be dominated by whites; (3) the difficulty of resettling more than a fraction of the white population outside Africa; (4) the demands by Africans for large-scale consolidation to create viable homelands; (5) the difficulty of

aganda services that Africans and whites arrived in the country at the same time: that when Africans were crossing the Limpopo River in the north and entering what is now South Africa, whites were landing in the south at the Cape (1652). This is just not true. Research has shown that by 1652 there was not a single part of South Africa that was not already occupied, thickly or sparsely, by indigenous people. Bantu-speaking African tribes are conservatively estimated to have settled in the Transvaal, Orange Free State, Natal, Transkei, and Ciskei by the

near the Verwoerd Dam. Another attempt to sketch a partition scenario and define boundaries was made in 1967 by Edward Tiryakian of Duke University. Against the failure of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (now Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Malawi), and the civil war in Nigeria, he considered that partition into two separate states would be a more realistic solution than a federal arrangement. Under his proposal, the black state would comprise most of the Transvaal, Natal, Lesotho, and Swaziland, either as a federal republic or a more centralized state, while the



JAN LOMBARD'S PLAN



BLENCK AND VAN DER ROPP PARTITION

creating a multiracial state if the numerical relation between the dominant whites and the African majority is as uneven as it is at present; (6) the belief that (for whites) the social cost of large-scale resettlement may be less than the social cost of racial conflict or African domination.

Partition would raise the emotive question of historical claims to land, and here the claims of Africans outweigh the claims of whites. It is a familiar assertion of South Africa's prop-

eleventh through to the sixteenth centuries, while in the Western Cape Province (where the first white settlement was established) Khoisan (Hottentots) and San (Bushmen) were already present, tending their herds and hunting the game.

This is the background against which partitionists have suggested their various scenarios. I have referred already to the contribution of the early liberals, to Dr. Jannie Graaff's "demotomic" line, and to the fantasy of a white homeland

white republic would consist of the Orange Free State and Cape Province, excluding a consolidated Transkei, Ciskei, and Bophuthatswana, which would be added to the black state.


Half of the Witwatersrand area, including Pretoria, would be in the white state. Johannesburg and the West Rand would be in the black state, which would have a diversified economy based on the Witwatersrand mining area under its control, on Johannesburg's heavy industry, and on the Dur-

ban and East London maritime complexes. Many of the white farmers in the Transvaal and Natal could be transferred to the white state, while the settled white population of Johannesburg and its environs would have the option either of remaining as permanent citizens of the black state or as expatriates on temporary visas (vice-versa for blacks in the white state). Provided the Cape coloured population were once again placed on the common voters' roll with whites, universal adult suffrage could operate in both states. Tiryakian made it clear that unrestricted


mixed state to take up residence in another, predominantly white, state. Nor are blacks generally interested in the idea. All along, they have seen their destiny as lying in a unitary state. They see no reason why they should give up a major share in South Africa now, when they confidently believe they can control the whole country in due course.

It is to the mainstream regional-confederal-federal concepts that one must return, therefore, to see where future white thinking will lie, and here one of the most interesting ideas has come from Professor Jan Lombard,

gestions for a complete restructuring of South Africa into a confederation of eight units. They spelled out their concept in *Focus*, compiled by the university's Bureau of Political and Economic Analysis. The eight confederal regions would be multiracial, necessitating large-scale restructuring of present provincial boundaries, with massive decentralization of government to regional authorities. The regions include four metropolitan areas surrounding Durban, the Johannesburg-Pretoria complex, Port Elizabeth, and Cape Town. There are also a number of



TIRYAKIAN'S PARTITION



JAN GRAAFF'S PARTITION

adult suffrage would be a *sine qua non* for international acceptance of partition.

Whichever way one looks at partition, the idea seems to be a dead duck. As Professor Welsh perceptively points out, by the time an apocalyptic situation has been reached where whites are ready to support partition, their capability to enforce it will be almost nil. No significant number of whites are seriously thinking of giving up their privileged way of life in the present racially

head of the Department of Economics at Pretoria University. Professor Lombard is the author of a controversial plan to transform Natal, with its huge Kwazulu homeland, into a highly autonomous multiracial region. In a report compiled with some of his academic colleagues, he said a regional approach was needed to solve the problem of political accommodation in South Africa.

Subsequently, Professor Lombard and his colleagues submitted sug-

“rationalized” provinces — the Cape, the Eastern Cape (including Transkei and Ciskei black homelands), the Free State, Natal (including Kwazulu), the Eastern Transvaal (including the black homeland of Kangwane), the Northern Transvaal and its homelands, and the Western Transvaal (including Bophuthatswana).

The inhabitants, black and white, of each confederal unit would reach consensus on an acceptable form of regional authority to take over many of

the functions of the present central administration. Implied in the suggestion is the belief that whites in the metropolitan areas are more flexible and will opt for a nonracial system in which no race bars exist. Once constitutional change has taken root on a regional basis throughout the country, the regions can agree on a restructuring of the central government. Though the suggestions do not spell out the powers of the central government, it is believed these would be limited to such issues as defense, foreign affairs, and transport, with local governments taking over such functions as community development, school health care, manpower, and influx control.

In such a system, it is claimed, a meaningful redistribution of wealth can be made, not through coercion by a distant central government, but on the basis that local government run on market principles by a multiracial authority encourages the channeling of resources to satisfy the most urgent needs of the community. The suggestions do not go into detail, but economists who support the idea argue that the rich would voluntarily satisfy the needs of the disadvantaged, either through private enterprise or local taxes, because they have first-hand evidence that their welfare is dependent on that of the less-privileged communities that live in close proximity and share the same government platforms. Change from the bottom up is considered a far more viable proposition, because "the possibility of consensus among people of a region is higher than it would be on a national level." These economists see Natal as the ideal region in which to begin this program.

The Lombard report merits particular attention, because Professor Lombard is a key adviser to Mr. P.W. Botha's government and chairman of one of the special committees appointed by the prime minister in July of last year to help develop the "constellation of states" idea. It is widely believed that in his Natal plan and in his all-race blueprint for South Africa, Prof. Lombard flew a kite for Mr. Botha. The ball is now in Mr. Botha's court. He has no shortage of "solutions" for the race problem. What he has to do now is to start implementing some of them. □

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President Moi's Delicate Mission

BY ANTHONY J. HUGHES

Visits to Washington by Kenyan delegations are usually characterized by cordial exchanges. The moderate East African state has been one of the West's most dependable friends in the Third World.

The meeting this fall between President Reagan and the man who succeeded Jomo Kenyatta three years ago may be a little more difficult for both sides, for Daniel arap Moi comes not only as president of Kenya but also as chairman of the Organization of African Unity.

The Republican administration's policies of confrontation with the Soviet Union have led the United States to adopt positions perceived by the nations of Africa as hostile to their own interests. This was made most apparent at the OAU Summit in Nairobi this June, which passed resolutions more critical of the United States than ever before, particularly with regard to southern Africa.

Resolutions on southern African issues made up about a quarter of the more than 80 passed at the summit. The resolution on Namibia, for example,

accused the United States of obstructing efforts aimed at Namibian independence. It expressed "profound dismay at the emerging unholy alliance between Pretoria and Washington, characterized by baseless hostility against Angola, and their collusion in intensifying acts of destabilization in that country." The resolution went on to condemn the "misrepresentation of the nature of the colonial conflict in Namibia as one of global considerations." A cross section of African leaders interviewed during the summit unanimously declared that African-American relations are at a low ebb. All those I questioned stated Reagan administration policies with regard to southern Africa as the reason for the poor state of relations.

A Kenyan view was put by the industry minister, Munyua Waiyaki: "The United States is concerned about obtaining minerals and believes that South Africa, run by a racist type of regime, is a bastion against communism. The obvious question is, would it not be more of a bastion against communism if it was run in a more democratic way?"

The strongest criticism of U.S. policies regarding southern Africa came from representatives of the three liberation movements. Sam Nujoma, president of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), alleged before the heads of state that the United States had elected to use "blackmail, threat, and might" against the people of Namibia and called upon peace-loving people to "wage a war against the alliance between Pretoria and Washington."

A few weeks before the OAU Summit, Oliver Tambo, president of the African National Congress of South Africa, told a meeting in Paris: "With the advent of the Reagan administration, we are now faced with a major effort to roll back the tide of liberation in Africa. Africa needs to defend its independence and to assert its sovereign right to determine its own policies and priorities. The United States administration behaves as if the whole continent of Africa was but a pawn; and it tries to assert the paramountcy of the United States' interests in Africa, the Indian Ocean, and the South Atlantic."

Henry Isaacs of the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (South Africa) told delegates at the OAU:

The U.S. administration has offered overt support to the apartheid regime which it has described as an ally and a supplier of strategic materials, which as such cannot be isolated. The trend in U.S. policy is evidenced by the visits to Washington of senior military officials from Pretoria in March of this year and of the racist foreign minister, Pik Botha, in May. The assistant secretary of state

resolutions on Namibia and South Africa contained "serious distortions of the policy that we are actually pursuing in those areas." He continued, "It should be absolutely clear from our actions in recent months that the United States is firmly committed to pursuing an internationally recognized independence for Namibia. Our contacts with South Africa on that issue and on other matters of common interest should in no way serve as the basis for sug-

dangers, he said, of losing time through initiatives outside the framework of the United Nations. There were countries currently supporting the South African regime, he continued, on the pretext of containing communism in Africa and protecting sea lanes to the West. "But they should clearly understand that the South African situation can no longer sustain any meaningful safeguards for what they refer to as their vital economic interests."



Photo: Camerapix

Oliver Tambo of the ANC greeting Sam Nujomo of SWAPO at the Nairobi summit: Strongest criticism of U.S. policy came from the liberation movements

for African affairs has euphemistically termed this approach "constructive engagement." This policy of the U.S. administration has been rationalized on the grounds of global and strategic considerations. The danger in this introduction of cold war politics is that it will obfuscate the issues involved in the liberation struggles in southern Africa. The danger also is that it may remove from the hands of the oppressed peoples in southern Africa the right to determine their own future.

The tone of OAU Summit declarations and resolutions drew a sharp response from State Department spokesman Dean Fischer, who said the OAU

gestions, as those in the OAU resolutions, that the United States is pursuing policies supportive of South Africa's racial policies or of its continued control of Namibia. Such suggestions are untrue, unhelpful, and do not advance in any way our mutual efforts in pursuit of peace and stability in southern Africa."

In his opening address to the OAU Summit, President Moi himself said with regard to Namibia that whereas Africa in the past had tolerated the initiative by the "contact group" of Western powers, that group appeared to have lost proper contact. There were

When President Moi visits Washington, the growing military cooperation between the United States and Kenya and the African state's relatively privileged status as a recipient of development assistance and other support will no doubt provide points of easy agreement. But when he raises Namibia, South Africa, and related issues, which as OAU chairman he must, he will be entering on matters that are highly emotional for both sides.

Moi's chairmanship of the OAU may, however, help to protect Kenya against African criticism for its military ties with the West. The June issue of the




Photo: Camerapix

The port of Mombasa is useful to U.S. Indian Ocean strategy

London-based, African-owned *Africa Now* commented that these links "put Kenya more openly than ever into the Western rather than the nonaligned camp." The magazine suggested that although OAU Summit participants refrained from raising these issues, they did tend to isolate Kenya.

Kenyan vulnerability in this regard in Third World circles makes it all the more likely that Moi will emphasize southern Africa issues during his visit in order to stress his pan-African credentials.

Some signs of this have already appeared. In July, President Moi said at a public meeting in Kenya attended by the U.S. ambassador to Nairobi, William Harrop, that Washington should understand African problems and not base its African policies on short-term self-interest. He hoped the United States, which had obtained its own independence, would help remaining African countries to gain freedom.

One has to ask how important is Kenya to the United States? Militarily, the port of Mombasa is useful in terms of the U.S. Indian Ocean strategy. It is

within three or four days' sailing of the Middle East and the Gulf. The airfields at Mombasa and Nairobi are too far from those potential crisis areas to be directly relevant, except in the sense of providing refueling and backup facilities. Political considerations might inhibit their use in an intra-African crisis, unless the United States found itself on the same side as Africa in general, and Kenya in particular.

As the best and most dependable port on the coast of East Africa, with unrivaled recreational amenities, Mombasa is more important than the Somali facilities at Berbera on the Gulf of Aden. The Reagan administration has the option of spending some \$80 million to make the Berbera port and airfield serviceable. When the Soviet Union pulled out of Somalia in the belief that supporting Ethiopia was a better option in the territorial dispute between the two socialist states, the Carter administration concluded agreements with President Siad Barre. Under the first of these, the U.S. is already providing defensive equipment and training to the Somali forces; but the

Reagan administration is apparently going slow in refurbishing Berbera. Although the port is much closer to the Middle East, it lacks Mombasa's recreational and general facilities. Besides, drought, the unsuccessful Ogaden war with Ethiopia, and the influx of refugees have brought Somalia's already pitiful economy almost to a standstill. Siad Barre's regime, narrowly based, still professing Marxism, can hardly be considered a stable or preferred partner for the United States.

There is one Somali factor that is directly relevant to U.S.-Kenyan relations. Somalia has traditionally laid claim not only to the Ogaden area of Ethiopia but also to large parts of northern Kenya, on the basis of ethnic affinity. In accepting an ad hoc committee report on the situation in the Horn, the 1981 OAU Summit once again implicitly criticized Somali irredentism. If the United States draws closer to Somalia, especially militarily, it could have a disturbing effect on America's relations with Kenya.

Nor is Kenya's importance merely military. Even smaller countries are of

some significance in modern diplomacy. Outside the West, many of America's friends are somehow tainted. Closeness to states such as Chile, Zaire, or the Philippines does little to make the United States an acceptable member of the broader international community. Friendship with notable pariah nations like Taiwan, Israel, and South Africa puts distance between Washington and most of the world community. With few warm and respectable ties outside the West, President Reagan's America needs acceptable friends like Kenya more than might at first seem apparent.

To be sure, African and Third World radicals do look somewhat askance at Kenya's conservatism, its capitalist economy, its close ties and military links with the West. But Kenya is no outcast. More heads of state and government attended the Nairobi summit than had attended any other. No doubt much of this had to do with nonpolitical factors — Kenya's climate, ease of access, modern facilities, shopping, and other delights. But part of the good turnout must have been due to the respect Kenya commands in pan-African circles. Kenya's stability since independence, the smooth transition from Kenyatta to Moi, its well-developed infrastructure — all add to its prestige and augment its ability to speak for Africa.

Not that the country is without problems. Largely dependent upon the production of primary products in recent years, it has seen the prices of tea, coffee, and other exports fall drastically, while the costs of oil, capital goods, and other manufactured imports have risen. Western recession, as well as uncertainties in the East African region, has prevented the projected increase in tourist receipts. The Kenyan authorities themselves forecast that the economy will get worse in the coming years. The record birth rates will lead to unsatisfied demands for social services, for employment, and for food.

In spite of such pressures, the Moi administration has maintained a constitutional framework. A one-party democracy still flourishes, modified more by manipulation and patronage than by coercion. Healthy political debate takes place on issues not directly

touching the presidency. The factions headed respectively by the vice-president, Mwai Kibaki, and the minister for constitutional affairs, Charles Njonjo, both Kikuyus, hammer away at one another in Parliament, in the press, and in public.

Radical populist pressures for a wider redistribution of land or against

leader, Oginga Odinga, barred from political participation, is one among many figures representing these ideas. Students and intellectuals have been disciplined for demonstrating in favor of such notions — an indication of the authorities' concern.

On the other hand, a pan-tribal elite in government, politics, business, and



Daniel arap Moi will come to Washington not only as president of Kenya, but also as OAU chairman

the white and Asian business communities are present. Critics suggest that discontent over prices, shortages, and inequalities could unite the unemployed and their relatively privileged brother and sister workers in opposition to the government. The veteran Luo

the services benefits from the existing system. Kenyans, at large can see among their neighbors the results of radical socialism and of civil war.

Even with political ambitions as well developed as they are in Kenya, many factors weigh against subversive

moves. Western diplomatic observers believe that it would have to get far worse before there could be a spontaneous uprising. The government believes that its own policies and its security services will forestall any of these happenings, and it has taken steps to reduce the likelihood of a military coup.

In short, President Moi comes to Washington as the leader of a moderate Africa state, a country whose policies have resulted in steady development in 18 years of independence, but one that currently faces economic and social problems that if unsolved could threaten its political and constitutional fabric.

He also comes as spokesman for a continent increasingly beset by many of these same problems, particularly the failure to feed itself and the inability to pay for its imports, which African leaders blame on worsening terms of trade. Africa is a continent that sees itself as a leading component of the South in confrontation with the North, which is epitomized by the United States.

At a time when Africa seeks to put the economic issues of North-South dialogue on the forefront of international debate, the Reagan administration has placed the political and military aspects of East-West confrontation at the top of its own agenda. Moreover, many of the points at which the Reagan preoccupations touch Africa involve issues on which the Reagan formulation places the United States in opposition to African interests, as Africans perceive them.

While President Moi may not be uncomfortable discussing bilateral relations within the framework of President Reagan's East-West preoccupation, the American leader may be less willing to accept Kenya's North-South formulations when it comes to broader African-American relations.

In any case, southern Africa in general and Namibia in particular will be the major areas of Moi's concern and provide the most notable potential for friction. Are there ways of mollifying the Kenyan leader and the 50-nation group for which he speaks? It would not be unhelpful to this friend of the United States if he could demonstrate that his links with the U.S. can bring positive developments in southern Africa. Nor

should it be forgotten that the 1982 OAU Summit is scheduled to be held in Libya. According to custom, the chairmanship will then devolve upon Muammar Qaddafi.

The years of the Carter administration saw progress toward internationally supervised independence for Namibia. With Britain preoccupied for most of that time with Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, the de facto leader of the Western contact group was Donald McHenry, who during that time succeeded Andrew Young as U.S. ambassador to the UN. Each time the contact group (Britain, the United States, France, West Germany, and Canada) seemed near to a solution acceptable both to the South African government and to SWAPO and its African supporters, the South Africans raised a new objection.

All seemed set for a solution at the Geneva talks last January, but these were wrecked by further stalling by Pretoria, believed by many to result from the Reagan victory two months earlier. Since then the assistant secretary of state for African affairs, Chester Crocker, has assumed McHenry's mantle with regard to Namibia policy. He persuaded the unwilling allies to accept modifications to Security Council resolution 435 of 1978, which they had themselves helped to craft. The hesitant allies were then led into a confrontation with Africa in the same council, with fellow permanent members Britain and France joining the United States in vetoing an African resolution calling for sanctions against South Africa because of its intransigence over Namibia. It might be politic at this point to permit de facto leadership of the contact group to pass to a Western ally. After all, the Reagan administration has paid its dues to the extreme elements in its own constituency by its tilt toward Pretoria. Crocker paved the way for a U.S. withdrawal when he told the House of Representatives Africa Subcommittee on June 18 that the United States would pull out of the negotiations "if we feel the prospects for success are bleak. This administration has a very full foreign policy agenda. The U.S. will not permit its energies, time, and credibility to be frittered away on a drawn-out and fruitless charade on South Africa."

Crocker subsequently denied that his testimony meant that the United States was removing itself from the Namibia negotiations "to encourage the South African government to retain control of Namibia." He added, "Those who would seek to interpret my remarks as an indication that the United States government is seeking to walk away from the Namibia problem in order to pursue closer relations with the government of South Africa are doing Africa and my government a most damaging disservice. We want an internationally acceptable settlement and are determined to pursue a settlement as long as there is a realistic possibility of obtaining that goal."

Notwithstanding that disclaimer, a return to a tougher line with the South African government by the Western contact group could be explained to the U.S. extreme right as the fault of Britain or France. Maintenance of good relations with European allies, U.S. conservatives could be told, is clearly a higher priority than peripheral issues, such as Namibia. It can be truthfully pointed out that the Europeans have greater stakes in Namibia than does the United States and will be looking just as carefully as the U.S. to protecting their own and Western interests.

The United States, as leader of the Western alliance, is properly concerned with the major issues in international affairs. There is considerable logic in allowing leadership of the contact group on this issue to pass to, say, Britain.

Whether such a stratagem is adopted, or some more substantial U.S. action is taken, it is highly desirable for the Kenyan leader to come away from Washington with some U.S. concession toward the OAU attitude on southern Africa, particularly Namibia.

The U.S.-Kenyan discussions are delicate for both sides and represent more than a routine visit from a friendly Third World leader. No doubt bilateral issues will go smoothly. Ironically, that is all the more reason for President Moi to be seen as having achieved something for Africa as a whole from his visit. Otherwise he could stand accused of selling out the OAU and its commitment to liberation in southern Africa for narrow Kenyan advantage. □

Nairobi Press Notebook

BY ANTHONY J. HUGHES

If Kenya had not won accolades for the best-organized OAU Summit, there would have been cause for questioning. Many of the factors that make the East African country a prime tourist destination and a commercial and communications center for a wide region also render Nairobi the obvious choice for holding meetings of the OAU.

Whereas other host countries have invested millions of dollars in building new presidential accommodations, Nairobi's hotels already had suites of a suitable standard for more than 50 delegation heads, several hundred more rooms to satisfy ministerial protocol, and thousands appropriate for delegation members, press, staff, and observers.

Elsewhere in Africa, it has been hoped that the hotels and bungalows built to accommodate visiting heads of state would afterwards be the basis of a tourist industry. Most lie barely used or empty or have been adapted at considerable expense for some other use. Those countries have found to their cost that it takes more than the one-shot effort of hosting the OAU to get a travel industry going.

Fortuitously for Kenya, the OAU Summit fell at a time when conventional tourism is in a fairly slow period,

when accommodations, transportation, and other services for visitors would be underutilized.

The Kenyatta Conference Center has already been the venue for larger gatherings and easily took the summit in its stride. Services from interpretation to telex, from security to travel arrangements, and mundane but essential matters such as cleaning and the provision of coffee and snacks for late-night sessions all went smoothly. According to most journalists, press arrangements were adequate but not up to the standard that might have been hoped for. Experienced reporters suggested that at Nairobi, as at other OAU summits, responsibility fell uncertainly between the OAU Secretariat and the host government's information services.

The OAU itself has the most limited information service of any institution of its size and prestige. The failure of most members to pay their dues means that the whole of the secretariat is kept to a bare minimum. Apparently, press and public relations are the last in line when it comes to funding.

Assistant Secretary General Peter Onu heads this department, in addition to his other duties. His daily briefings for the press are highly professional and

more frank and informative than those received from many other international organizations. His problems were underlined on the penultimate day of the conference. He announced that agreement had been reached on the texts of some 50 or so resolutions and declarations, and he read key passages from three or four of them. He was then embarrassed to announce that for the 300 or 400 journalists covering the meeting, texts were limited — one in English and one in French.

The failure of the Kenya government information services is less understandable. Much of it is due to the government's concern not to appear to be usurping the role of the OAU Secretariat. That does not explain, however, why one information officer was assigned to accredit all journalists, without even the aid of a secretary, a clerk, or any kind of assistant. It does not explain why obtaining copies of public documents was such a problem. Kenya has a large and able cadre of middle-level and junior officials who could have typed and reproduced them, and there is not a lack of suitable equipment.

President Daniel arap Moi, as incoming chairman, had to deliver some half a dozen set speeches during the meeting, but his major address was

given at the opening plenary session. It was an error of planning and public relations that this speech should come late in the evening of a busy and tiring day. It was doubly mistaken that it should follow four other keynote and news-worthy addresses.

Allowing representative schoolchildren and conference service staff to attend the opening was an imaginative gesture; less imaginative was that these invitees arrived early and filled up the press gallery, leaving standing room only for many writing journalists.

Most correspondents filed reports based on the earlier addresses during that session of UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim, of the outgoing OAU chairman, President Siaka Stevens of Sierra Leone, or of Arab League Secretary General Chadli Klibi. Moreover, it was two days before a printed text of President Moi's speech was available to the press. Advance copies were not even made available to Kenya's domestic media or to the Voice of Kenya radio and television services, a government department.

It cannot be ignored that there is a racial, political, and cultural divide between the OAU and the international media; but more than anything else, the inadequacy of press services (as opposed to facilities, which were excellent) springs from a fundamental attitude towards the press. In Kenya, as in much of Africa and the Third World, journalists are regarded and treated as lackeys by politicians and officials.

At the United Nations in New York and at many international gatherings, such as the meetings of Commonwealth leaders, journalists are treated as part of the political community, with a definite and appreciated role to play.

In Nairobi, there was a tendency to look upon the international press in the same way domestic journalists are regarded. There was little mutually beneficial interaction between journalists and participants. Reporters were summoned for conferences or briefings but otherwise confined to their well-organized and comfortable press area. To be fair, there was no restriction on journalists following up their own contacts away from the conference center.

Most were able to meet there with

their national delegations, if Africans, or with leaders known from previous contact in London, New York, Nairobi, or elsewhere. But journalists were not invited to any formal social functions. At one point a press conference to be given by President Moi was announced, and correspondents were asked to submit questions. Then, without explanation, the conference was canceled. Many journalists were heard muttering that the announcement had merely been a ploy to find out what was on the minds of the press.

The absence of good press relations, based on mutual trust and respect, is more surprising in Kenya than it might have been elsewhere in Africa. With its moderate image, capitalist economic system, and Western ties, Kenya is one of the most open societies in Africa. Its press activity reflects the national image.

The same attractions that made Nairobi an ideal venue for the OAU also render it the best base in Africa for foreign media. Specifically, it has excellent communications and telecommunications facilities. Its social and economic services, not to mention more basic matters such as utilities and food supplies, are excellent. It is not surprising that the foreign press club has over 80 members.

Kenya's own press is more varied and lively than that of all but two or three other African countries. Radio and television are run as government departments, with all the disadvantages that involves. Every newscast and public affairs program is broadcast within the framework of domestic politics. You can almost hear the minister of information breathing down the necks of the newsreaders and almost see him peering over his own shoulder to see how his cabinet colleagues are reacting.

Throughout Africa, there is a notion that whatever the head of state does that day is of national significance. The fact is that in any country, leaders spend time visiting the grass roots. Their visits are major events — in the localities. They make the same speech, with local variations, that they have made several dozen times. It is for parochial consumption.

To report those speeches day after

day as the lead item on the news is at best boring and at worst may detract from the dignity of the head of state. I have been in many Kenyan homes with the family in front of the TV set. The young children, after the martial music at the commencement of the news, know what is coming and mimic the announcer in unison: "Today His Excellency the President, Daniel arap Moi . . ." The unsophisticated and self-defeating approach is found throughout Africa.

Far from enhancing national consciousness, the information bureaucrats may be undermining the very things they are seeking to uphold. If the definition of TV news in the United States is something that happens when a camera is present, the apparent belief in Africa is that it is the participation of a cabinet minister that validates the newsworthiness of an event.

Western news values are often inappropriate in Africa, where development must be the most important story. Piped water for a village, a new housing project, agricultural advances, a factory coming into production: these are newsworthy in themselves, not because a minister is visiting. In fact, the presence of a VIP interferes with the telling of the real story. The camera must be on him or on her; the speeches and the protocol replace the development in the camera operator's viewfinder and in the mind of the editor.

Kenya is far from being the worst in this respect. Precisely because the country is so open and accessible, it is far easier to criticize; unfortunately, the same comments could be made about nationalized media throughout most of Africa.

Diplomatic and other observers suggest that the highly controlled system does have one advantage. Like Kremlinologists examining the lineup at a Moscow May Day parade, Kenya-watchers claim to be able to gauge the rise and fall of a minister's influence by monitoring his TV coverage.

There are two major private groups publishing newspapers in Kenya. Going back to colonial days, the papers have had their respective patrons in the government. Although there is nothing unusual in these arrangements, it is sur-



Photo: Camerapix

The Kenyatta Conference Center took the OAU Summit in its stride

prising in a Third World country that the system should be so widely known and discussed. The *Standard* group is known to be close to the minister for constitutional affairs, Charles Njonjo, whereas the *Nation* group backs the vice-president, Mwai Kibaki.

Five of the leading journalists of the *Nation* group were detained for two or three days shortly before the OAU and then released without being charged. This treatment did not appear to be directly related to the rivalry between their respective patrons but was generally believed to be connected with the *Nation's* call for a veteran politician, Oginga Odinga, long barred from politics, to be allowed to stand for a vacant parliamentary seat. The Kenya African National Union (KANU) leadership, in a divided and divisive ruling, had earlier decided not to lift the ban.

Their decision followed a rebuke, at a meeting that both attended, from Moi to Odinga for criticizing the late President Jomo Kenyatta for "land grabbing." The substance of the accusation is widely known in Kenya, has been reported in the foreign press, and is discussed in books on sale in Nairobi. Ap-

parently, the topic is still too delicate for public debate in the presence of the current leadership.

The whole series of events encapsulates much that is current in Kenya. It is an open and broadly democratic society. The limits are set and maintained by manipulation and, rarely, by coercion.

There are a score of magazines in Kenya in addition to those published by the two main groups. Most of them are specialized, catering to tourists, farmers, religious interests, or women. Among the news magazines, mention should be made of the *Weekly Review*, which together with the Sunday *Nairobi Times* is the main publication of publisher Hilary Ngweno. He does not support any faction, though in foreign affairs he sticks close to government policy, as do the other newspapers. By the quality of the writing, by leading the reader to an implicit conclusion that does not need to be spelled out, Ngweno provides an analysis of Kenyan and East African politics that is unrivalled. His coverage of the Odinga affair, for example, while expressing surprise at his political ineptitude,

demonstrated just how shabbily the old man had been treated. Ngweno did not, as the *Nation* group did, take the extra step of calling for a review of the decision — one in which President Moi apparently had had a hand. According to the style of the *Weekly Review*, that point did not need to be made explicit.

Given African realities — the fragility of political institutions, the divisiveness of ethnic rivalries, the need to concentrate national energies on economic development — Ngweno's approach may offer a pattern for a responsible but independent African press.

These impressions of the media in Kenya perhaps require two final notes. The author, a Kenyan citizen, has in the past worked for the private press, for the Ministry of Information, and for the KANU — all factors that may affect his viewpoint. Second, in a more authoritarian state, like many in Africa, much of the material for an analysis like this simply would not exist. It is precisely because Kenya is a pluralistic, open society with a democratic structure within the framework of the rule of law that an article of this kind becomes a possibility. □

Books

SOUTH AFRICA: A NEW DIRECTION?

Gwendolen M. Carter, *Which Way is South Africa Going?* Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980, 162 pages, \$10.95.

Longtime readers of Professor Carter's writings will be once again engaged, but not surprised, by her latest book, a slim volume both very personal and yet sensitively analytical.

The personal dimension is most striking in the four-page preface describing the nature of her extensive involvement in the study of South Africa, commencing in 1947, followed a year later by the first of seven research and study trips in the next 17 years. Placed on a "black list" by the South African authorities, Carter was denied a visa from 1964 to 1979 (except for two brief transit stops in Johannesburg in 1972 and 1974). In January 1979 she received a visa which allowed her to return in South Africa for an intensive two-month visit. With a vision sharpened by a 15-year absence, Carter travelled to the major cities of the country, sought old friends and new informants from all political persuasions and population groupings, and judiciously mixed their observations with the fruits of her continued reading "in exile" and her sense of the country acquired over the decades; the result is this book.

After an introductory chapter that smoothly informs the general reader with limited background while simultaneously signalling to already knowl-

edgeable observers themes she considers particularly salient today, Carter in the next six chapters deals compactly with Afrikaner nationalism, the "homelands," black consciousness and post-Soweto African nationalism, white political party opposition along with Coloured and Indian politics, "private" organizations (business, trade unions, press, and churches), and the formidable government security machinery. In these chapters, and the penultimate chapter delineating South African white and black strategies to maintain and destroy the existing system, Carter consistently offers balanced analysis pointing towards her deep wish that "it is barely possible . . . that more will be done to find some reasonable resolution between Afrikaner and black aspirations" (pp. 140-141).

Opening chapter 1 with the sentence, "change is in the air in South Africa," Carter starts her concluding ninth chapter with the four dominant impressions of her 1979 visit: (1) the extent and depth of divisions implicit in separate development, (2) the sharp change in black attitudes towards whites—"sterner, more self-centered attitudes [that] increasingly . . . half conceal a thinly veiled antagonism" (p. 143), (3) the basic assurance and determination of urban blacks, particularly Africans, that sooner or later they will succeed in obtaining their rights as citizens in an *undivided* South Africa, and (4) growing insecurity and questioning among whites. Carter's perception of change is not that envisaged by the nationalist government; instead, as Carter concludes: "Only

when the accepted leaders of both white and black sit down together, hammer out agreements on the kind of race relations that can satisfy both groups, and jointly put them into effect will peace and stability ultimately come to South Africa" (p. 148).

This volume fully meets the standards set in Carter's previous works. Through measured and informed political analysis, presented in lively and felicitous prose, Carter has reiterated her hope, but not optimism, that South Africa might somehow find a way to avoid racial civil war and move towards a more just nonracial society.

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
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


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
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