




No Postage Stamp
Necessary if Mailed
in the United States

BUSINESS REPLY CARD

FIRST CLASS PERMIT NO. 1129 NEW BRUNSWICK NJ

**AFRICA
REPORT**

Transaction Periodicals Consortium
Rutgers University
New Brunswick, New Jersey 08903



NOVEMBER-
DECEMBER 1981

AFRICA REPORT

AMERICA'S
LEADING MAGAZINE
ON AFRICA

VOLUME 26, NUMBER 6

A Publication of the
African-American Institute

The African-American Institute

Chairman

George N. Lindsay

President

Donald B. Easum

Publisher

Ronald E. Springwater

Editor

Anthony J. Hughes

Assistant Editor

Margaret A. Novicki

Washington

Correspondent

Richard Deutsch

Editorial Secretary

Ellen E. Brown

Interns

Valerie Atkins

Laurie Derby

Peter McKillop



IN THIS ISSUE

Angola, the cover topic, is an African country with which the United States has a complex relationship. It is a major source of oil, a trading partner accorded Export-Import Bank guarantees, and a key participant in multifaceted discussions concerning the future of Namibia. It is also a state whose government is not recognized by the U.S. There are those within the Reagan administration who would destabilize the Luanda regime through the UNITA guerrillas, whom they view as freedom-fighters and whom the Angolans regard as terrorists.

Congressman Howard Wolpe, chairman of the Africa subcommittee of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, answers questions on Angola from *Africa Report*, following his visit to southern Africa. This is followed by documents containing statements of the Angolan and American government positions.

Other articles examine the situation in three African states — Togo, Congo, and The Gambia — and their respective relations with the United States.

The former prime minister of Zaire, Nguza Karl-I-Bond, delivers a criticism of his country's present system under President Mobutu. We also publish a State Department comment. The Zairian government did not respond to an invitation to reply in *Africa Report*.

A former AID official, Goler T. Butcher, discusses the relationship between assistance to Africa and American foreign policy goals, while writer Peter Marshall takes a look at Tanzania's politically controversial plans for its tourist industry.

The issue also contains the Update section, covering recent developments throughout the continent in detail, and book reviews.

Angola Interview

Congressman Howard Wolpe

Interviewed by Anthony J. Hughes

4

Angola Documents

Reaction to the South African Invasion

*By José Eduardo dos Santos,
President of Angola*

9

Namibia/Angola Linkages

By Chester A. Crocker

10

The American Veto

By Charles M. Lichenstein

10

U.S./Congo

Pragmatic Relations

By Alexandre Mboukou

12

Documents

The Situation in Zaire

By Nguza Karl-I-Bond

19

U.S. Policy Toward Zaire

22

African Update

Editor: Joseph Margolis

Associate Editor: Margaret Novicki

Editorial Assistant: Michael C. Beaubien

23

Togo

Trade, Tourism, and Mild Repression

By F.S.B. Kazadi

39

Development

Aid as Foreign Policy

By Goler Teal Butcher

43

The Gambia

After the Rebellion

By Sulayman S. Nyang

47

Tourism

Tanzania's Controversial Industry

By Peter Marshall

52

Books

56

Circulation, Subscriptions,
Advertising, Management,
and Production Services by
Transaction Periodicals Con-
sortium:

Art Department

Richard J. Levins
Judith Martin Waterman

Production Editors

Alex Fundock III
George P. Bassett

Africa Report, a nonpartisan magazine of African affairs, is published bimonthly in July-August, September-October, November-December, January-February, March-April, and May-June, and is scheduled to appear at the beginning of each date period at 833 United Nations Plaza, New York, N.Y. 10017. Editorial correspondence and letters to the Publisher should be sent to this address. Correspondence regarding subscriptions, distribution, advertising, and other business matters should be sent to Transaction Periodicals Consortium, Dept. 8010, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey 08903. Telephone: (201) 932-2280. Subscription rates: *Individuals*: U.S.A. \$18, Canada \$21, air rate overseas \$42; *Institutions*: U.S.A. \$24, Canada \$27, air rate overseas \$48. Second-class postage paid at New York, N.Y. and at additional mailing offices. Telephones: Publisher (212) 949-5717; Editor (212) 949-5731. Copyright © 1981 by the African-American Institute, Inc.

Photo Credit:

The cover photo of a demonstration in Luanda was taken by Jason Laue/Woodfin Camp.

Congressman Howard Wolpe


INTERVIEWED BY ANTHONY J. HUGHES

AFRICA REPORT: Congressman, what principles and interests should govern United States policies in southern Africa?

WOLPE: I think a variety of strategic, political, and economic interests should govern our policy toward southern Africa. In economic terms, there is dependence upon a number of strategic minerals that are vital to the American economy and without which our economy will be in difficult straits. Those minerals are located not only in South Africa, but in such states as Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Angola. We have a growing investment in southern Africa, again centered not only in the Republic of South Africa, but throughout the region. In political terms the instability of the southern Africa region has ramifications for our relationships throughout the continent. Unwise policies toward the southern African region could impact negatively on our relationships with countries such as Nigeria, which is today America's second-largest source of foreign oil. We receive 15 percent of our oil from Nigeria—three times as much as we ever received from Iran. If we were to find that oil supply interrupted for whatever reasons, it would have a much greater impact upon the American economy than the Iranian oil interruption had. Our position in world forums could well be affected by our policies toward southern Africa. About one-third of the United Nations are African states, and we need to be very attentive to African sensitivities and concerns if we hope to attract African support on issues of concern to us in international forums. Finally, our economic relationship with the rest of the continent, in terms of trade and our desire to expand our export markets, may well be affected by our policies toward southern Africa. So politically in terms of strategic interests, in terms of dependency on oil, and economically in terms of investment and trade, these are all considerations that we need to have very much in mind as we approach the African continent and the southern African region. One final comment I

would make is that our policy toward southern Africa should be consistent with American historic principles with respect to self-determination and human rights. It turns out, contrary to what some ideologues on the right would offer, that there is no inconsistency whatsoever between a strong human rights posture on the southern African region on the one hand and American self-interest on the other. Indeed, to the extent that we appear to moderate our insistence upon the elimination of the system of apartheid in South Africa,

SOUTHERN AFRICA



we are seriously compromising American strategic, economic, and political interests not only in southern Africa but throughout the continent.

AFRICA REPORT: There is some conflict between the principles and interests when one is looking at the situation vis-à-vis Angola, a country that is politically allied with the Soviet Union, which itself clearly threatens American interests in southern Africa. How would you apply the principle interests you now mention, specifically with regard to bilateral relations with Angola?

WOLPE: I do not think that an enlightened policy toward Angola would be inconsistent with either the interests or the principles that I enunciated. Our goal should be to eliminate the presence of Cuban troops in Angola; it should be to block the expansion of Soviet influence, not only in Angola, but throughout the southern African region. I would argue that the best means of achieving those objectives would be by working to eliminate the illegal South African occupation of Namibia; second, to block South African aggression into Angola and into other southern African states; and third, to press for the elimination of the system of apartheid in South Africa. It is South Africa's occupation of Namibia, it is South Africa's aggression across sovereign boundaries into other African states, and it is South Africa's adherence to the system of apartheid that creates the conditions of instability that provide opportunities for the expansion of Soviet influence. There would not be guerrilla operations taking place, based within Angola, directed toward the achievement of Namibian independence, if South Africa's occupation of Namibia were to cease. There would not be the danger of growing violent conflict in South Africa, which the Soviets will no doubt tend to take advantage of, if the system of apartheid were to be eliminated and the government were to move toward a genuine power sharing that would involve all the elements of the South African population. From my perspective, the policy of the United States ought to be one of reducing the reliance of the Angolans on the Cubans and the Soviets by eliminating conditions that provide the opportunities for the Soviet Union and for Cuba.

AFRICA REPORT: In more precise policy terms, would you prefer to see the United States move toward immediate recognition of the MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] government?

WOLPE: Yes, and I think it's instructive that virtually all of our Western allies that are involved in the Namibian peace initiative—Germany, France, Great Britain, Canada—and almost every country in the African continent has recognized the MPLA government. This is not because they are terribly comfortable with everything that government represents, but because they recognize that it is in fact a de facto government and a sovereign government. They have expressed surprise at American policy, at our failure to recognize the Angolan government. I think it is important to note that the Angolan government, despite its claim to Marxist orientation, has been extraordinarily pragmatic in its approach to the West. There has been recognition on the part of the government that they need Western technology and capital in the exploitation of their oil resources. They

have reached out to the Portuguese, the former colonial power, and to the British and Europeans generally. We had the Gulf Oil Company testify before our subcommittee some months ago. In effect, what was suggested by representatives of the oil company was that these were the most capitalist Marxists that they had ever seen. When the government was entering into negotiations with the oil companies, with respect to the oil contracts, they decided that they should hire a consultant. Who did they hire? The Arthur D. Little Corporation, of Boston, Massachusetts. Gulf Oil went beyond that to indicate that their relationships with this Marxist government were as good as their relationships with any government on the face of the African continent. Beyond that, the Angolans have made it very clear that they want further American investment and will continue to reach out to us.

Despite the presence—and, I think many people would argue, because of the presence—of Cuban troops, Soviet advisers, and East German advisers, the Angolans have been




Photo: Angola Info

U.S. oil rig in Angola: Relations between American business and the Luanda government are good

making a variety of initiatives toward the West. I think we are insane if we do not encourage their effort at development of Western links. I think they are making very clear that they are not under the control of the Soviets or the Cubans. They are attempting to maintain an independent posture, and I think they don't want to be controlled or manipulated by anyone. It is in American interests to encourage that pragmatism and to encourage that reaching out. It also needs to be stressed that despite the fact that America does not presently have dip-

omatic relations with the government of Angola, the Angolans have nonetheless been enormously helpful in the Namibian discussions. It was the Angolan government that secured SWAPO's [South West Africa People's Organization] agreement to the UN plan for Namibian independence. In addition, the Angolan government was helpful in moderating the tension on the Zairian-Angolan border, working with the United States in the process. They were very cooperative with respect to American efforts to secure a settlement of the conflict in Zimbabwe. The United States has allowed the consummation of a major Export-Import Bank guarantee for the Angolan government. There are Angolan technicians



Photo: Albert Black/Photo Trends

President dos Santos: The Angolan government is pragmatic in its approach to the West

being trained in the United States right now. I think it is foolish that we have not moved toward the normalization of formal relationships with the Angolan government.

AFRICA REPORT: Apart from the presence of Russians and Cubans, another reason the administration gives for non-recognition is the position of UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola]. There is still some form of civil war in progress. What role if any should the United States have vis-à-vis UNITA or in pressing the Angolans to form a government of national unity?

WOLPE: American policy ought to be directed ultimately toward the achievement of conditions of internal stability toward the holding of democratic elections within that country. I think there is an awful lot of mythology in the United States regarding what UNITA is or represents. Frequently, Jonas Savimbi is portrayed as a strong, anticommunist figure who is very supportive of American interests. The reality is that there is very little difference ideologically between the various factions that comprise the nationalist movement in Angola. Holden Roberto, Jonas Savimbi, Agostinho Neto previously, and now dos Santos were all socialist in their orientation to varying degrees. Savimbi in the past used to talk about "those American imperialists." He is obviously a rather pragmatic individual who now finds it more convenient to be anticommunist, to receive support from South Africa. I suspect that Savimbi does have some constituency, and at some point, I hope, there would be efforts internally to bring all the elements of the Angolan population into a stable relationship with one another. But that is a task for the Angolan government to resolve. It is both impossible for America to impose its wishes in this regard and unwise, in terms of our relationships and our interests with respect to the Namibian conflict and with respect to the broader regional concerns, to make that objective the center point of our policy. Whatever sympathy may exist for Jonas Savimbi in our administration or government should not be a controlling consideration in our relationship with the government of Angola.

AFRICA REPORT: You mentioned the Angolans' helpful attitude regarding Namibia. What is the relationship between an internationally recognized settlement in Namibia and the matter of Cuban troops and Russian advisers in Angola itself? Should there be a linkage?

WOLPE: The Angolans have stated repeatedly that once the South African threat is eliminated and the conflict in Namibia is resolved, we will see the departure of the Cuban troops. I certainly hope that does in fact occur. I think the administration has been correct in backing off from its original insistence that the Cuban troops be removed in advance of the settlement of the conflict in Namibia.

AFRICA REPORT: Is there a quid pro quo there, perhaps diplomatically behind the scenes?

WOLPE: I am certain that that whole question is part of the discussions that are in process, not only between our government and the Angolan government, but between the other African states and the Angolan government. I think it has been made equally clear to the Angolans that presence of Cuban troops is not viewed as a constructive factor and that once the security threat is eliminated, then it makes a lot of sense for Africa to see the removal of all external forces.

AFRICA REPORT: Congressman, what is your position on the proposed repeal of the Clark Amendment, which denies U.S. assistance to groups within Angola opposing the Angolan government?

WOLPE: I think it would be a very serious mistake to repeal the amendment at this time. Such a repeal would be viewed as a very threatening gesture by the Angolans themselves and would be viewed by the entire continent of Africa

as an intention to interfere in Angolan internal affairs. So, I believe it would seriously complicate our efforts to secure a settlement to the conflict in Namibia. I think it would be precisely the wrong signal that we ought to be sending to the South African government, which right now is operating under the assumption that we will continue to be supportive of South African diplomacy and military activity within the region. I am sure the South Africans would read the repeal of the Clark Amendment at this point as further evidence of a new American accommodation to the South African perspective on regional matters. That would be a most unfortunate signal. It would only further encourage South African aggression and intransigence, both with respect to Namibia and with respect to the issues of internal change in South Africa itself. It is important to emphasize that the question of the Clark Amendment repeal really cuts across party lines within the Congress. My subcommittee was unanimous in recommending opposition to the administration's proposal to repeal the Clark Amendment. The full Foreign Affairs Committee of the House upheld the position of our subcommittee, in an overwhelming 19-to-5 bipartisan vote. I believe that our position will be sustained on the floor of the House if and when the foreign assistance bill comes before the House for consideration. There is some question that we will ever reach that legislation this year. If we do not, there will be no vehicle for debate on the Clark Amendment before the House.

One interesting development has occurred with respect to the Clark Amendment. Originally the proposed repeal was offered up in the context of statements by representatives of the administration indicating an intention to support Savimbi and UNITA in a very active way. In recent months the administration has backed away from that rationale for repeal. They have argued more recently that there has been no policy decision whatsoever to give active support to Jonas Savimbi. Now they argue that as a matter of principle the Clark Amendment should be repealed because it represents an unwarranted restriction on executive freedom of action. I am encouraged by the change in rationale. I think the administration recognizes that its intention to support Savimbi was unwise from the standpoint of American national interests in the southern African region. On the other hand, diplomacy is very much a matter of perception; and the administration's protestations notwithstanding, I know on the basis of conversations that we have had inside South Africa and in Angola, Somalia, Kenya, and Nigeria that a repeal of the Clark Amendment without a prior resolution on the Namibian conflict, without a prior normalization of our relationships with Angola, would be seen as a very threatening, unfriendly gesture toward the African continent. Once those issues are resolved, once we have more normal relations with the Angolan government, once we have a settlement of the Namibian conflict, then repeal of the Clark Amendment would be viewed simply as a technical cleaning of the books and would not have the same import.

AFRICA REPORT: Congressman, how would you like to see bilateral relations between Angola and the United States develop?

WOLPE: I would like to see the United States recognize the Angolan government, in the same way we have recognized almost every other government on the African continent, including the government of Ethiopia, where there is also a continuing presence of the Cuban troops. I think that makes sense in terms of American prospects within Angola for expanding our commercial and economic activity and of our vital interest in the exportation of resources from Angola. Our own interests would be better protected and advanced if we have more normal relationships. I also think that it would be a constructive gesture toward the general stabilization of the southern African region. I had the op-



Congressman Howard Wolpe: Recognition of Angola would be "a constructive gesture toward the general stabilization of the southern African region"

portunity during a recent visit to southern Africa, along with Congressman George W. Crockett Jr. [D-Mich.] and Congressman Gus Savage [D-Ill.] to meet with President dos Santos. He affirmed very clearly once again the Angolan desire to have normal diplomatic relations with the United States. He indicated that he could not understand why the United States was establishing a prior condition for establishing those relationships. To use an analogy, he asked, "What if the Soviet Union had stated to the Angolans that, as a prior condition to Soviet diplomatic relations with the

Angolan government, all the American business interests would have to first be expelled? How would the United States respond to such a demand?" He indicated that he felt that the reverse was equally true. It was simply unwise and incomprehensible that prior conditions should be imposed for establishing diplomatic relationships. He listed the variety of contacts that are already in place, from Export-Import Bank relationships and the American business activity taking place with Angola to the training of Angolan students and technicians within the United States. He reaffirmed their desire to have normal diplomatic relations with the United States. He also described the whole history of Cuban involvement in Angola, emphasizing that from the perspective of the Angolan government, the Cuban troops were introduced as a counter to the South Africans. He repeated the position of the Angolans, as stated both privately and publicly on a variety of other occasions, that the departure of the Cuban troops would accompany the elimination of the South African threat. He added that the Angolan government was not in the business of exporting revolution. He affirmed that they had no intention of operating outside of Angolan borders, of encouraging revolution in other countries.

AFRICA REPORT: A few weeks back, Congressman, the United States vetoed a UN Security Council resolution condemning South Africa for its incursion into Angola. What is your view of the vote cast by the United States?

WOLPE: I was terribly disappointed with the exercise of the veto by our government. That veto meant that the United States was extraordinarily isolated in the eyes of the entire world. The best face that can be put upon that action is the proposition that our administration believes it will enhance the prospects of a settlement of the Namibian conflict by expanding American leverage and influence with the South African government. I certainly hope that objective is realized. If we are not successful in securing a Namibian settlement, then the U.S. veto of the resolution of condemning the South African invasion into Angola will be read in the context of the other initiatives we have taken toward the South African government, which are increasingly perceived as a growing accommodation of the American government with the Afrikaner regime and with the system of apartheid. If that perception takes root, then, I think, American interests will be seriously jeopardized in the southern African region and throughout the African continent. □

New Perspectives on Africa

THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND SOUTH AFRICA

Publics, Elites, and Policymaking Processes
 edited by **Alfred O. Hero, Jr.**, World Peace Foundation, and **John Barratt**, South African Institute for International Affairs
 This book assesses the pressures brought by Americans on both U.S. and South African leaders by examining the reactions of influential organizations, the media coverage, the magnitude of U.S. investments and trade, and the processes that determine foreign policy.
 240 pp. ISBN 0-669-04320-6 \$21.95

CONFLICT AND COMPROMISE IN SOUTH AFRICA

edited by **Robert I. Rotberg**, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and **John Barratt**, South African Institute of International Affairs
 Active participants in South African politics discuss specific options to revolution, in this investigation of the contemporary political environment.
 244 pp. ISBN 0-669-03205-0 \$23.50

COPPER AND ZAMBIA

An Econometric Analysis
Chukwuma F. Obidegwu, The World Bank, and **Mudziviri Nziramasanga**, Washington University
 Foreword by **F. Gerard Adams** and **Jere R. Behrman**.
 The Wharton Econometric Studies Series
 By constructing a theoretical model to account for employment generation, per capita income, and inflation, the authors assess the performance of the Zambian copper industry and its effect on economic policies.
 240 pp. ISBN 0-669-04659-0 \$26.95

COFFEE AND THE IVORY COAST

An Econometric Study
Theophilos Priovolos, Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates, Inc.
 The Wharton Econometric Studies Series
 Priovolos examines the sensitivity of this developing country's economy to monetary, trade, and income policies and to the fluctuations of commodity markets.
 240 pp. ISBN 0-669-04331-1 \$24.95



LexingtonBooks
 D. C. Heath and Company
 125 Spring Street
 Lexington, MA 02173
 (617) 862-6650 (212) 924-6460
 Call our toll-free number
 800 428-8071

from **LexingtonBooks**

Reaction to the South African Invasion

BY JOSÉ EDUARDO DOS SANTOS, PRESIDENT OF ANGOLA

As an OAU and UN member state and in its capacity as a neighbor of Namibia, Angola has been doing all it can do to comply with UN and OAU resolutions in the way of giving material and moral support to the freedom fighters in Namibia, as would naturally have been given by any other country in a similar geographical position. I must add that the South African invasion of Angola is, on this occasion, more ferocious than those carried out at various times against other countries of this area. This demonstrates that the South African racist regime continues to be the principal factor of destabilization in southern Africa. As long as the Namibian problem remains unsolved in terms of Security Council Resolution 435, and as long as the anachronistic and pernicious apartheid system remains alive, peace and international security in the southern part of our continent will continue to be threatened.

We have said on a number of occasions that Angola is prepared to cooperate with other countries to arrive at a negotiated and internationally accepted solution to the Namibian problem. We made great efforts in 1979-80, in addition to efforts made by the UN and the Frontline states, as a result of which it became possible to identify on the one hand SWAPO as being the sole legitimate political organization struggling for the true independence of the Namibian people, and the representatives of the South African government, in-

cluding elements of puppet factions and alternative internal parties; on the other.

The meeting failed because South Africa asserted that conditions were not conducive to the signing of a cease-fire. Meanwhile, aggression against the Namibian people on the one hand and against the Angolan people and other independent southern African states on the other escalated with the aim of liquidating the SWAPO guerrilla forces. We believed, and accordingly declared, that the South African racist government's policies were bound to fail. Nothing can stop the Namibian people from becoming independent. This is not only because they are waging a just struggle but also because they are defending their right to self-determination and freedom.

As a Frontline state, we have combined our efforts with those of other states because we believe that Namibia is specifically an African problem and not, as claimed by some news agencies, a conflict between the Western and the socialist blocs. The Namibian independence issue must be viewed as being within the framework of the decolonization of Africa, an issue concerning Namibia and the last remnants of colonialism, with South Africa illegally occupying Namibia in defiance of UN and OAU resolutions. It is a fact that the present South African attack has forced us to mobilize most of our financial and human resources in defense of our territorial integrity, sovereignty, and independence, but, in the meantime, we will not fail in our duties as a member state of the OAU and of the UN.

We accordingly believe that we should receive material and financial

support to enable us to continue the dignified defense of the Angolan people and to sustain our active solidarity with our African brothers' liberation struggle in Namibia.

It is sometimes alleged that occupation of Namibia is due to the presence of Cuban, Soviet, and East German troops. I wish to state that there are no East German or Soviet troops in Angola. We have never denied the presence of Cuban internationalist units in Angola, but we say now that their number has declined since 1975 in conformity with the growing strength of our national army. We have certainly said that we have signed cooperation agreements with the U.S.S.R. under which we have instructors helping to train our cadres and armed forces, but we have signed agreements not only with the U.S.S.R., but with other countries, even with Western countries, in other fields of national life. We have always maintained that this argument is used as a means of delaying Namibia's independence.

It is only fair to stress that we engage in substantial economic and commercial cooperation with the United States. Examples are Gulf Oil, which is exploring in the Cabinda area, and we have Boeing and many others operating in the country. By way of such cooperation we naturally receive assistance from foreigners and various Western nationalities, including Americans. One can see in Luanda and in other cities large numbers of foreigners and expatriates working in Angola in various economic, social, and other fields. We are of course prepared to cooperate as equally with countries of the socialist camp as with Western states.

This is part of the text of a statement made in Portuguese to a press conference in Luanda by President José Eduardo dos Santos on September 9, 1981.

Namibia/Angola Linkages

BY CHESTER A. CROCKER

A Namibia settlement is, we believe, desirable and obtainable at an early date. To succeed, it must be internationally acceptable — under UN auspices and in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 435, which must form the basis of a settlement. That framework, in our view, can and should be supplemented by additional measures aimed at reassuring all Namibian parties of fair treatment and at answering certain basic constitutional questions prior to elections that will lead to independence. A Namibia settlement, to be successful, must offer a genuine and equitable resolution of the conflict and lead the way toward an independence that strengthens, not undermines, the security of southern Africa.

Our diplomacy recognized openly

This is an extract from a speech delivered to the American Legion meeting in Honolulu, Hawaii on August 29, 1981 by Dr. Chester A. Crocker, assistant secretary of state for African affairs.

the intimate relationship between the conflicts in Namibia and Angola. We have repeatedly made clear our position that progress toward a Namibia settlement could set the stage for withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola. There is little debate about the logic of this proposition, which the Angolan government itself accepts in part. But we do not share the view that there is anything automatic or predictable about that relationship, as some would argue. The assumption that Cubans will depart — or that UNITA will evaporate like the morning dew — as South Africa withdraws from Namibia is problematic. What if the civil strife in Angola continues after Namibia's independence? We also wonder how a young government in the fragile new state of Namibia can be expected to survive and prosper with a seemingly endless civil war on its northern border, with substantial Soviet-Cuban presence nearby and with the consequent prospect of a new sequence of intervention involving perhaps both South Africa and communist forces.

Clearly, the relationship between

Namibia and Angola cuts both ways. One of our first priorities has been to inject some greater logic and candor into this discussion, and to stimulate creative thinking about how progress on each front might contribute to progress on the other. I would like to emphasize that we are not laying down preconditions to any party. But there is a factual relationship on the ground that cannot be denied. We believe that movement on Namibia can reinforce movement toward Cuban withdrawal and vice-versa. Furthermore, we are convinced that a satisfactory outcome can only be based on parallel movement in both arenas. In our dialogue with the Frontline states, including the MPLA government in Angola, we have repeatedly underscored our sincere commitment to a process with benefits for all — one that need threaten no one. Thus, as we make clear our view that UNITA represents a significant and legitimate factor in Angolan politics, we have also maintained our mutually fruitful commercial ties with Luanda as a symbol of the future relationship that could one day be possible.

The American Veto

BY CHARLES M. LICHENSTEIN

My government has long opposed violent solutions to the problems of the southern African region. Such violence only creates an atmosphere that undermines serious negotiations. We deplore the recent South African action into Angola just as we deplore any other escalation of violence from

any quarter and, indeed, have been prepared from the beginning of these proceedings to vote for a resolution so based.

There is little doubt that South Africa's resistance to granting the people of Namibia the right to self-determination, as this Council has

called on it to do, is a basis for the tension and instability that exist in the region today. At the same time it is clear that the presence of foreign combat forces in Angola, particularly the large Cuban force, and the provision of Soviet-originated arms to SWAPO (and the presence of Soviet military ad-

visors) fuel the explosive atmosphere of confrontation and violence that daily plagues the people of Angola, Namibia, and indeed the entire region. As a result, the United States had to vote against the resolution under consideration today, a resolution that places blame solely on South Africa for the escalation of violence.

How, then, can we bring about a solution to the conflict in the region? My government's approach is not one that provides or promises quick or easy answers to this complex situation. It is one, however, which is shared by those who stand for cooperation over confrontation, and by those who will seriously consider the settling of differences through negotiations, as difficult as that process might be. These negotiations must, of course, be on the basis of Resolution 435 of this Council. With our Contact Group partners, we aim to bring these negotiations to fruition. The result must command international acceptability, take into account the interests of all parties involved, and impart to them confidence to proceed with implementation. Such a result will alleviate tension in the area to the advantage of all southern Africans. Without addressing in a balanced way the underlying sources of conflict in the area, on the other hand, it is unlikely that any well-intentioned effort can bring about an end to the resort to violence.

The United States will continue to work with the Contact Group to advance proposals that are consistent with the resolutions of this body and that promote the settlement in Namibia we all seek. We will continue to act as an honest broker, and we will deny ourselves the indulgence of taking sides in the public war of words that accompanies this most crucial issue. Our focus will remain at the bargaining table where we can most effectively pursue the struggle for peaceful settlement through negotiation.

This is the text of the statement made by Ambassador Charles M. Lichenstein, alternate United States representative to the United Nations for special political affairs, in the Security Council, on the complaint by Angola against South Africa on August 31, 1981.

NOW is the time
to enter or renew your subscription to



AFRICA TODAY



A Quarterly Journal

Editors: George W. Shepherd, Jr., Tilden J. LeMelle, Edward A. Hawley

Four thematically arranged issues per year
Articles by leading scholars
Competent and comprehensive book reviews
Descriptions of new publications

Effective November 1, 1981, our rates will increase by 20%.

Need we say why? Avoid the impact of inflation by ordering now.

If we receive your order before November 1st —

an Individual subscription

for 1 year will cost only **\$10.00** instead of \$12.00
for 2 years will cost only **\$19.00** instead of \$22.00
for 3 years will cost only **\$26.00** instead of \$31.00

and an Institutional subscription

for 1 year will cost only **\$15.00** instead of \$18.00
for 2 years will cost only **\$27.50** instead of \$33.00
for 3 years will cost only **\$37.50** instead of \$45.00

Student subscriptions are now \$7.50 but will rise to \$9.00

Subscribers with addresses outside the Pan American postal union zone must add \$2.00 per year for surface post or \$8.00 per year for air mail. The air mail charge is an increase, and is effective now, due to a sharp rise in overseas air mail printed matter rates that went into effect January 1, 1981.

AFRICA TODAY
C/O GSIS, University of Denver
Denver, Colorado 80208

Please enter/renew my subscription to AFRICA TODAY for 1 yr _____ 2 yrs _____ 3 years _____

At the institutional _____ individual _____ student _____ rate _____

(If student, where enrolled _____ remaining years of study _____)

My payment is enclosed _____ Please bill me _____

Name _____

Address _____

City _____ State _____ Zip _____

Country _____

Cheques should be payable in U.S. dollars

Pragmatic Relations

BY ALEXANDRE MBOUKOU

Relations between the People's Republic of the Congo and the new Reagan administration got off to a positive start with the April visit of Dr. Chester Crocker, assistant secretary of state for African affairs, to Brazzaville. Dr. Crocker offered assurances of American good intentions to President Denis Sassou-Nguesso, describing the Congo as an important actor in equatorial Africa and by no means a forgotten country.

The tone set by Dr. Crocker represents not a departure but a continuation of the Carter policy initiated in 1977 with the resumption of diplomatic ties, which had been severed in 1965.

Although apparently contradictory to the strident anticommunist, antisocialist rhetoric emanating from the Reagan administration, U.S. State Department African experts explain that the U.S. government is pursuing a policy of pragmatic realism in Africa.

Relations between the U.S. and African Marxist states will rest on real

mutual benefits and a lack of policies or actions that threaten national interests. The Reagan administration does not intend to institute a policy of destabilization in Africa, although recent ac-



tions against the Qaddafi government in Libya seem to belie this statement.

Several political decisions and actions taken by the Reagan administration since January 20, 1981 indicate how their policies apply. First, the Reagan administration continued the Carter administration's \$5 million food aid program for Mozambique until April 1981 when the Samora Machel government expelled four American diplomats from Maputo on CIA spy charges. Even then, the administration

only suspended the program without resorting to retaliatory measures.

Second, the Reagan administration has pledged \$225 million for an international fund to rebuild Zimbabwe, despite pressures from hardliners in the White House and conservatives in the Congress who staunchly opposed giving aid to "gray area" Marxist states such as Zimbabwe. Third, during his April Africa tour, Assistant Secretary Crocker visited both old friendly countries, such as Kenya and Zaire, as well as radical and Marxist states, such as Angola and the People's Republic of the Congo.

In Angola, Crocker suggested that Angolan authorities find a political solution to the military stalemate between the MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) government backed up by Cuban Troops and Jonas Savimbi's UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) supported by South Africa.

The Reagan administration has asked Congress to repeal the Clark Amendment, a statutory restriction against providing military assistance to factions in Angola. Although this initiative put the Marxist African states on guard, the primary purpose in seeking to repeal is, according to administration officials, to redress Congress's usurpation of the constitutionally granted execu-

Alexandre Mboukou, a Congolese citizen, teaches at the Career Education Institute of the University of the District of Columbia, and is vice-president of the Organization of African Economic Development.

tive branch control over the formulation and conduct of foreign policy. The Clark Amendment has allowed the Congress to impose restrictions and conditions on how the president of the United States conducts foreign policy. Far more fundamental is that recently the Reagan administration agreed to a \$85 million loan to Angola by the U.S. Export-Import Bank.

Bilaterally, the U.S. and the Congo can accommodate respective political, economic, and commercial interests. The U.S. seeks unimpaired operation of private corporations, such as Texaco and Mobil, and access to Congolese markets for American goods. The Congo welcomes the revenues resulting from commercial exploitation of its resources and the introduction of technology to increase agricultural productivity and to improve health standards.

State Department sources have indicated that politically, the U.S. does not object to countries in Africa with socialist economies and Marxist politics that do not export revolution, engage in ideological warfare, or destabilize their regions. The Congo has judiciously avoided all three of these actions.

However, on certain Pan-African issues and other issues involving socialist and Marxist principles, the Congo and the United States stand apart. The Congo recently joined other members of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in unanimously condemning U.S. policy toward South Africa. In addition, the Congo recently joined socialist France, the Soviet Union, Cuba, and other progressive nations in criticizing the U.S. military posture toward El Salvador. By this action, the Congolese authorities sent the American government the message that they do not share the view that all trouble-spots in the world are the handiwork of the Soviet Union and its so-called satellites.

Whether such issues can disrupt good relations between the U.S. and the Congo remains to be seen. What is most significant, however, is that the Congo has carefully pursued a policy of independence in the East-West bloc confrontation, particularly in recent years. In mid-May, President Sassou-Nguesso finally signed a 25-year treaty

of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union in Moscow. The treaty ended two years of strained Soviet-Congolese relations caused by, among other things, the Congolese authorities' refusal to permit the U.S.S.R. to establish a naval base at Pointe-Noire.

U.S.-Congo relations divide into three distinct historical periods, reflecting domestic political vicissitudes within the Congo and changing U.S. foreign policy: 1960-63 (friendly), 1963-1977 (unfriendly), and 1977 to the present (mutually accommodating).

Known as Congo-Brazzaville until 1969, the People's Republic of the Congo became independent on August 15, 1960. Under its first president, Abbe Fulbert Youlou, the Congo opted, like many other former French colonies in Africa, to remain in *la Communauté Française* (the French Community). Guinea rejected the idea in 1958, becoming the first French colony in black Africa to become independent.

In this early part of the independence movement (1960-1963), the nations of Africa were divided into two major and diametrically opposed camps. The first camp — the Casablanca Group — comprised the so-called radical states: Algeria, Egypt, Ghana, Guinea, and Mali. Leading personalities in this camp were Ahmed Ban Bella, Abdul

Gamal Nasser, Kwame Nkrumah, Ahmed Sékou Touré, and Modibo Keita. Theirs was a political philosophy geared toward the eradication of the forces of neocolonialism and Western imperialism in Africa.

Although calling upon other emerging nations to follow a policy of nonalignment in the East-West conflict, they did not hesitate to espouse certain causes advocated by members of the socialist bloc. They looked at these socialist nations as representatives of the progressive forces in a world long dominated by Western imperialism.

The second camp — the "Monrovia Group" — included 13 former French colonies (Cameroon, Chad, Central African Republic, Congo-Brazzaville, Dahomey (now Benin), Gabon, Ivory Coast, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Senegal, Togo, and Upper Volta), along with Ethiopia, Liberia, and Nigeria. Leading personalities in this group were Abbe Fulbert Youlou (Congo-Brazzaville), Felix Houphouët-Boigny (Ivory Coast), Leopold Sedar Senghor (Senegal), W. Tubman (Liberia), and Nnamdi Azikwe (Nigeria).

Not only did they advocate close ties with their colonial powers, they also staunchly opposed what they saw as the ever growing communist menace. To



The late Angolan President Neto with President Sassou-Nguesso: During the Angolan civil war, the Congo aided the MPLA

Photo: Congo Info



Photo: Maurice Sorrell

President Abbe Youlou visited President John F. Kennedy: Congo under Youlou was "a bastion for the defense of Western interests"

them, communist forces represented the greatest threat to their newly won political freedom. During the early part of the Katangese secession against the central government, Radio Brazzaville, one of the most powerful stations in Africa, broadcast anticommunist programs continually.

In the 1960-63 period, in fact, Congo-Brazzaville, under Abbe Fulbert Youlou's leadership, played a leading role in the fight against the "forces of communism," becoming a bastion for the defense of Western ideas and interests against Soviet adventurism in black Africa. At the United Nations, during the Congo (now Zaire) crisis, Youlou's regime supported the

"Monrovia Group" (nonsocialist countries) against the "Casablanca Group" (socialist countries) over whether the Lumumba government or the Kasavubu government was the legitimate government of the former Belgian Congo. The votes at the United Nations defeated the pro-Lumumba forces and the socialist bloc, declaring Kasavubu's government the sole and legitimate representative of the people of Congo-Leopoldville (now Zaire).

Except for President Youlou's continued support for Moise Tshombe's Katangese secessionists, contrary to President John F. Kennedy's policy supporting the central government of Congo-Leopoldville during this period,

relations between the United States and Congo-Brazzaville were good. Successively called Congo-Leopoldville, Congo-Kinshasa, and Zaire, the United States has historically considered the former Belgian Congo of great political, economic, and strategic importance.

On August 15, 1963 a coalition of trade union leaders, students, and military officers overthrew President Youlou, accusing him of an extravagant lifestyle, an extremely reactionary policy, and of rampant corruption in the government. The coming to power of President Massamba-Debat and the MNR (National Movement of the Revolution) began the deterioration of U.S.-Congo relations.

The new Congolese leaders, in an effort to consolidate their revolution and break away from what they perceived as neocolonial arrangements, established diplomatic relations with all the countries of the socialist bloc. At the same time, they adopted and proclaimed scientific socialism as their main national ideology.

During this period, a number of coups against the Massamba-Debat government were attempted. In official statements, the Congolese authorities attributed these attempted coups to machinations by Western powers, France, and the United States in particular. Once, in 1967, President Massamba-Debat declared after such an attempted coup that he knew precisely which Western power was involved, but made it clear that it was not the United States.

In an interview with *Africa Report* (May-June 1980), President Sassou-Nguesso, commenting on the U.S. severing of diplomatic ties with Congo-Brazzaville, said: "The Congo and United States had good relations until our revolution of the Three Glorious Days in August 1963. These relations were suspended for reasons best known to the government of the United States" (*Africa Report*, May-June 1980).

According to the U.S. State Department sources, Congolese authorities detained some U.S. diplomats, holding some incommunicado for 24 hours. As a consequence, the United States withdrew its staff from Brazzaville until the

Congolese government could assure American diplomats the protection called for by international law and convention.

Between 1963 and 1965 a number of incidents occurred that adversely affected U.S.-Congo relations. In one such incident, Congolese leaders accused the United States, in concert with other Western powers — France and Britain in particular — of trying to destabilize their government. Although never substantiated, the accusations did not conflict with the African domino theory current in the U.S. State Department, the White House, and the Pentagon.

In the early part of 1977 the Brazzaville government sent strong signals to the Carter administration of a desire to resume diplomatic relations with the United States, when two major conditions were met: not propping up minority (white) regimes in southern Africa (U.S. efforts in the resolution of the struggles in Zimbabwe and Namibia were being fully noted), and accepting the established order in Angola (the MPLA victory).

Sources at the State Department indicated that the United States would agree to resume talks with the understanding that the resumption of diplomatic ties would have to move gradually, using a step-by-step approach based on specific areas of mutual interests. During the discussions that took place in Berlin, the United States and the Congo agreed to cooperate in agriculture and health areas. In July 1977 full diplomatic relations were restored.

When the Congo proclaimed scientific socialism as its national ideology in 1964, the emphasis of its foreign policy moved from close ties with the West to nonalignment. In other words, the Congolese leaders joined members of the former "Casablanca Group" in the definition of their foreign policy goals, assigning great priority to relations with the countries of the socialist bloc.

Until the advent of the Sino-Soviet dispute, both China and the Soviet Union enjoyed close ties with the Congo on an equal footing. With the deterioration of relations between the two socialist giants, however, a new

pattern emerged. Depending upon the faction in power in the Congo, either China or the Soviet Union had preference.

Although committed to scientific socialism as the main political ideology, the new leaders of the Congolese government, a majority of whom had their political views shaped during their stay in France as students, divided into two major camps: the Maoists and the Sovietophiles.

When Dr. Pascal Lissouba was prime minister (1963-66), the Congo gave greater importance to its relations with the People's Republic of China. On the other hand, when Ambroise Noumazalaye replaced Dr. Lissouba as prime minister (1966-67), the Congo laid greater emphasis on its relations with the Soviet Union.

During both of these periods, the Congo maintained normal relations with France. Like most former French colonies, the Congo receives three-quarters of its foreign assistance from France. According to *Africa Report* (April 1971), President Massamba-Debat's government was strongly supported by French technicians and the private French commercial community, despite its professed ideology — scientific socialism. In 1970, following the nationalization of French assets by the Marien Ngouabi government, relations between the Congo and France reached a low ebb, although France continued to provide foreign assistance to the Congo. In an effort to redress the situation, both Presidents Yhomby-Opango (1977) and Sassou-Nguesso (1978) made their first state visits to France to discuss the state and future of Franco-Congo relations.

In Africa, the Congo has given staunch support to progressive causes. In 1976, during the Angolan civil war, the Congo gave its all-out support to the MPLA and the Neto government, and allowed the Cubans the use of its port facilities in Pointe-Noire for the transport of troops to Angola. For reasons of solidarity, Congolese authorities saw a duty to assist the MPLA, their sister ideological party in Angola. In addition, Congolese authorities have always sought an ally close enough to Zaire and big enough to counterbalance

the sporadic military threats against the Congo. Patrice Lumumba, Moïse Tshombe, and Mobutu Sese Seko have all, at one time or another, made the statement that their army could take over the "petit Congo" (small Congo) in 48 hours.

The Congo, unlike many other Marxist and radical states, has consistently pursued a "good neighbor policy" with all the surrounding states in equatorial Africa (Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Gabon, and Zaire), opting not to export its revolution and ideology.

Congolese authorities have strived to present themselves to the world community as peacemakers in the region. In 1970 the reestablishment of relations with Zaire led to the resumption of normal ferry traffic between the two capitals (Brazzaville and Kinshasa) across the Congo River. In July 1978 the Congolese government arranged to convene a conference at Brazzaville that allowed Zaire and Angola to reconcile their differences following the second invasion of Zaire's Shaba Province in May 1978. Finally, in early 1980, the Congolese government responded to the OAU's call for peacekeeping troops in Chad, ultimately the only country to do so. Sources at the State Department have indicated that in their conversations with President Sassou-Nguesso, U.S. officials have been most struck by his overwhelming concern and great attention to issues affecting the equatorial region (Angola, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo, Gabon, Chad, and Zaire).

Experts at the U.S. Department of State agree that the Congo has all the resources needed to build a strong and viable economy provided the government makes good planning and administrative decisions. As with most countries of the developing world, agriculture, the backbone of the Congolese economy, needs mechanizing to reach full potential. At present, production is still at the subsistence level.

In fact, most of the population is engaged in the production of crops for domestic consumption such as corn, bananas, cassava, yams, rice, peanuts, and tropical fruits. Among the leading cash crops are palm-nuts, tobacco,

sugar cane, bananas, peanuts, coffee, and cocoa beans. What is surprising to note is that only two percent of arable land is presently under cultivation. In addition to these crops, Congolese farmers raise goats, pigs, and chickens. In recent years the Congolese government, with Cuban assistance, has initiated a program of cattle breeding.

Before 1966 wood was the major foreign exchange earner for the Congo, accounting for 60 percent of exports of goods and services. Contrary to what French colonial experts had always claimed, the Congo is not without significant mineral resources.

Since independence, important high-grade iron ore and potash deposits have been found. Iron ore production is expected to reach 70,000 tons per year and last 25 years. On the other hand, potash production, which started in 1975 with a yearly output of 430,000 tons, came to a complete halt in mid-1977 when the mine was flooded. This dealt a near death blow to the Congolese economy.

The Congo also produces oil — discovered in 1966 — and production rose steadily until 1970 when output at the Ponte-Indienne field onshore decreased rapidly. The output from 1966 to 1970 was estimated at 15,000 tons per year. A new oil field at Emeraude, discov-

ered in 1971, produced 50,000 tons initially, then over one million in 1973. By 1974 total production reached an estimated 2.5 million tons.

Offshore exploration continues to make new finds, although experts at the State Department estimate that the Congo's oil reserves will last only between 10 and 15 years. Finally, like most of the developing nations, the Congo has no heavy industry. However, because the capital of French Equatorial Africa (AEF) was in its territory, the Congo housed a number of light industries such as wood processing, soap, sugar, palm oil, beer, cement, textiles, and cigarettes.

Like the economies of many developing countries, the Congolese economy suffers from a severe balance of payments deficit, mostly with France, the Congo's major trading partner. Estimated total foreign debt grew from \$296 million in 1976 to \$756 million in 1978, and reached \$1 billion in 1980.

This unfavorable payments balance has three major causes. First and foremost is mismanagement and the high cost of state enterprises. The lack of dedicated trained personnel and widespread embezzlement in state enterprises have turned the Congolese public sector into an economic liability.

At a month-long conference on the

state sector in 1979, the *Parti Congolais du Travail* (Congolese Workers party) came to three conclusions: the state sector was the least efficient part of the economy, government policy would continue to emphasize state enterprise, and a secure place for private enterprise would be maintained in the economy. Thus, last year, the government decided, by way of compromise, to use the new oil wealth (which doubled to \$170 million in 1980) to boost the public sector further, along with increased Western assistance.

A second cause of the payments deficit is excessive government spending and rising import costs. In the early 1970s, overly optimistic projections for oil and potash revenues led to inflationary spending and a run up in the public debt. As in the past, imports continually exceeded exports, causing the gap between debt and service to widen.

The third cause is the government policies toward foreign investors and operators. In a purely political sense, the ideology of scientific socialism adopted by the Congolese leaders served as an important vehicle for truly asserting the Congo's independence. In the purely economic sense, it has proved to be a serious liability. Eighteen years of anti-Western rhetoric has led to a flight of Western businessmen and investors.

Somewhat ironically, throughout this whole period the Congolese economy has remained closely tied to the West through monetary links with the Franc Zone and the Central Bank of France, and through financial arrangements with multilateral organizations, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

In 1969, President Ngouabi declared that no country was really independent until it had created its own money, then, in March 1970, he gave assurances that Brazzaville had no intention of leaving the Franc Zone. A year later, he nationalized a number of French enterprises, including SIAN, a French sugar manufacturing plant; Radio-Brazzaville, a powerful station installed during World War II to broadcast the propaganda of Free France; the Congo-Ocean, a railroad linking Brazzaville to Pointe-Noire on the coast; and



An American delegation to Brazzaville's 1980 centennial greets President Sassou-Nguesso

ATEC, a trans-equatorial communications agency. These measures alienated the French government and business community, and served further to scare away would-be Western investors.

To combat the debt-servicing problem, the Congo signed a standby agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in April 1979. IMF experts advised the Congolese authorities to reduce imports, increase their exports, and cut government spending. Congolese party leaders instituted the motto: "Live austere today to live better tomorrow." By January 1980 the balance of payments situation improved significantly, and a second standby agreement was signed with the IMF in April 1980.

Politically, attempts by Congolese leaders to consolidate the Revolution of the Three Glorious Days (*Les 3 Glorieuses*) have taken a toll. Since 1963 a series of attempted coups have taken place, creating a climate of political instability. Serious tensions have existed and continue to exist within the party (known first as the *Mouvement National de la Revolution* (MNR) during President Massamba, and later as the *Parti Congolais du Travail* (PCT) under President Marien Ngouabi).

During their years in office, former Presidents Massamba-Debat and Marien Ngouabi made great efforts to achieve a balance by accommodating both factions of the party: the moderates and the radicals (*ideologues*). The current president, Colonel Sassou-Nguesso, is doing the same. He has placed some colleagues, more radical than he, in positions of importance (e.g., Thystere Tchicaya as Politburo vice-president), and given ministerial portfolios to a number of moderate elements (e.g., Colonel Louis Sylvian Goma as prime minister). In the recent cabinet reshuffle, however, the radical elements (*ideologues*) seemed to gain the upper hand over the moderate elements, with the appointment of Le-Koundzou-Ithi Ossethoumba as finance minister (replacing Henri Lopes) and Bernard Combo Matsiona as minister of employment and social services.

The circumstances that brought President Sassou-Nguesso to power are themselves closely tied to party poli-

tics. In the wake of mounting criticism against what the Congolese press has termed "right-wing deviation" and "bourgeois lifestyle," then President General Yhomby-Opango unilaterally convened the PCT for an extraordinary session in December 1979. On Feb-



Photo: Camerapix

Relations with France worsened under former President Ngouabi

ruary 5, the same year, however, the Party Military Committee decided instead to convene the PCT Central Committee. During the session, President Yhomby-Opango handed in his resignation, hoping that his allies within the committee would persuade the other members to reject the offer. On February 8, party members opted instead to dismiss him. Colonel Sassou-Nguesso became head of state and party leader.

As in many other African countries, ethnic and regional cleavages continue to work against the cause of socioeconomic development in the Congo. While Presidents Youlou and Massamba-Debat, both civilian, were from the South; Presidents Ngouabi, Yhomby-Opango, and Sassou-Nguesso, all three military officers, come from the North.

Since coming to office, President Sassou-Nguesso has made some efforts to bridge these gaps. He has travelled extensively throughout the country,

carrying his message of national unity. In addition, he has sought to steer a careful course among the factions that provide him support: the northern elements in the armed forces and in the party; the Congolese Workers' party (PCT) itself, the various groups of intellectuals, like the ex-student (February 22, 1978) movement; and other ethnic groups from the South, like the Vili and the Lari. Ultimately, however, his success depends on those with whom he surrounds himself, particularly in the face of the argument that the ideology of scientific socialism is being used as a weapon by the northern elite (military and civilian) in order to retain the reins of power in the Congo. Indeed, one of the major reasons the governments of his two predecessors, Youlou and Massamba-Debat, failed is that their inner circles tended to cater to the points of view of particular ethnic groups (Lari and Kongo, respectively).

In spite of these economic and political weaknesses, the business climate in the Congo today is exceptionally good. The Congolese government has gone all-out to attract foreign investment by distinguishing between areas under state control and those not. At the same time, it has implemented a liberal investment code offering tax incentives, notably for minerals and petroleum exploration, timber production, and certain kinds of agricultural activity.

U.S. State Department officials describe relations with the Congo as good. The Congolese government has taken several initiatives to promote this. In 1974, the Congo expropriated the assets of Texaco and Mobil after the government accused them of making illegally large transfer payments and of refusing to train or promote sufficient numbers of Congolese technicians. The Congolese government has since signed an agreement with Texaco to reimburse the company for appropriated assets, and has also reached an agreement with Mobil.

In addition, the Congolese government has entered negotiations with a U.S. consortium that has offered to reopen the flooded potash mine, a \$100 million (U.S.) project.

Eighteen years of experience with domestic and international economic

realities has taught Congolese leaders a new understanding of how to handle the pressing problems of development and nation-building. Pragmatism within the ranks of the Congolese leadership is growing. In October 1980, Congolese leaders celebrated the centennial of Brazzaville, and thereby also the memory of the founding father of French colonialism in the Congo in particular and in equatorial Africa in general, Monsieur Savorgnan De Brazza.

The Carter administration flew a special delegation, led by Overseas Private Investment Corporation President J. Bruce Llewellyn, to Brazzaville in a presidential plane.

Speaking as the president's personal representative, Mr. Llewellyn said: "This gesture on the part of our president underlines the importance that the United States has attached to its relations and continued friendship with your country. Our delegation is not only made of political and economic figures, but also cultural and sports personalities alike. The composition of our delegation was intended to emphasize the diversity and pluralism of America, its genuine interest in the image that our country wishes to project and to foster with the people of the Congo, and its

desire to cooperate on the basis of reciprocal interests in all areas." President Sassou-Nguesso thanked the delegation and noted that his country welcomes stronger commercial ties with the United States.

From a 1981 perspective, the present American policy of pragmatic realism will govern U.S.-Congo relations for the duration of the Republican party incumbency. This approach supports continuation of the Carter administration policy of friendly, mutually beneficial cooperation.

However, certain contrasts do emerge between Reagan and Carter policies. The Reagan administration espouses the cause of anticommunism, therefore anti-Sovietism, while the Carter administration stressed human rights and accommodation with communist states. The Carter administration rejected on human rights grounds the credentials of Congo Ambassador-designate Jacques Okoko, because of his prominent role in the questionable trial of former Congo President Massamba-Debat.

U.S.-Congo relations may rest on more tenuous ground with Reagan than with Carter. The Carter foreign policy, with its human rights baseline, pro-

vided a known, reasonably consistent set of criteria for assessing the compatibility of a state's actions with the U.S. position. The Reagan policy of pragmatic realism in contrast lets every situation define its foreign policy impact according to prevailing circumstances and attitudes. The one approach is more volatile than the other.

The Congo has certain moral commitments that can have precedence over good relations with the United States. First, in addition to its Marxist-Leninist commitment, the Congo is deeply attached to Pan-Africanism. As an ideologically radical state, it would be among the first to oppose United States' neglect of the rights of black Africans in either South Africa or Namibia. Second, as a Marxist state, the Congo would strongly oppose any U.S. support, covert or overt, of the UNITA forces in Angola.

Notwithstanding these considerations, U.S.-Congo relations under the Reagan administration hold great promise. Although ideologically allied with the communist world, the Congo displays a great deal of independence. Unlike Mozambique, alleged by some to be close to the Portuguese Communist party, which itself has strong ties with the Soviet Union, the Congo has never been considered an appendage of the French Communist party which, also, has substantial ties with the Soviet Union.

Moreover, although a champion of the revolutionary cause, the Congo has always considered its political, economic, and social revolution a purely internal matter. Unlike Libya, which went against the OAU Charter by violating the territorial sovereignty of Chad, the Congo has not sought to export its ideology or its political and economic system to neighbors such as Gabon and the Central African Republic, despite its greater military strength. No UDEAC (Central African Customs Union) member has ever questioned Congo membership.

As long as the Congo adheres to its good neighbor policy and does not allow its territory to serve as a foreign military base, relations with the United States should continue on a positive basis. □



Presidents Sassou-Nguesso and Mobutu of Zaire: Congo has adhered to a good neighbor policy

Photo: Congo Info

The Situation in Zaire

BY NGUZA KARL-I-BOND

I thank you very much for this opportunity to attend this hearing and to appear before you to tell you my knowledge and understanding of the situation in Zaire. I have come here because my country, the Republic of Zaire, is now in grave danger. It is my profound belief that the danger is not only for the people of Zaire but also for the interests of the United States.

I am happy to be here, first to thank the American government and people for the fact that I am still alive. As a result of the direct intervention of the American president and your State Department in 1978, the Zaire president, Mr. Mobutu, was forced to release me from prison or face serious disruption in the relations between his government and yours.

The American government and people intervened in this way because I was known personally, through my past functions as ambassador and cabinet minister, by the highest authorities of your country. But millions of my countrymen, who are unknown to you and to the authorities who saved my life, are today suffering, desperate, hopeless, and enslaved in Zaire. It is my duty to them to come here and describe to you their inhuman situation.

I will have achieved my objective if, after my testimony, your country, which has for many years befriended Zaire, begins to understand that it must cease its continued uncritical support of the Mobutu regime.

As you can appreciate, my position is a delicate one: there are some people who have tried to intimidate me into not attending this hearing; some others may try to gain from what I have to say some advantage for their own manipulative purposes. To both of these, I must declare that I have welcomed this opportunity to be heard as an opportunity not only for me but for many living in Zaire who know the situation, who understand what is going on, but who cannot speak out without risking their lives.

This is the testimony of Nguza Karl-I-Bond before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, on September 15, 1981. Nguza Karl-I-Bond resigned from the post of prime minister of Zaire in April 1981, a position he had held since 1980. Since his resignation, he has been living in Brussels, Belgium.

There is no doubt that the United States is very much interested in many countries of the Third World; but one could say that over the last two decades Zaire has in effect become one of the privileged client states of the United States and the Western world. Without the Western countries' intervention in Zaire, Mr. Mobutu's regime would not have survived the armed uprisings that took place during the events known as Shaba I, in 1977, and Shaba II, in 1978.

It is my duty as a patriot and a national political leader to take the opportunity offered to me to repeat here in the U.S. Congress the warning I gave to Western countries in Europe a few weeks ago.

Today, September 15, 1981, I can state firmly that the situation in Zaire, my country, is ripe for a Shaba III — that is, a third uprising starting in Shaba — or a "Kinshasa I," an uprising starting directly in the capital, Kinshasa.

Let me explain the equation: the people are suffering; we have misery and starvation in the country. The people know that Mobutu is personally responsible for this. And our people know Mobutu was placed in power and remains in power today because of the continued support he is given by the Western nations, particularly by the United States. You must understand that in the eyes of the people in Zaire the United States is ultimately responsible for the suffering and oppression brought on them by Mobutu.

In fact, this is not the first time you have heard this. It may be the first time you have heard it from a former prime minister of Zaire, but it was said before this same subcommittee on April 1 of this year by Mr. John C. Pritchard of the Presbyterian church of the United States. Let me quote from Mr. Pritchard's testimony:

The people of [Zaire] have suffered and are suffering disastrously under the leadership of President Mobutu. . . .

The United States is so closely identified with President Mobutu that we will also be thrown out in that inevitable change. U.S. policy should, therefore, be searching for some way in which to create distance between us and the president of Zaire. . . .

Our policy should be one of disengagement and of disinvolvement because in the minds of the Zairian people he is our puppet. To them, we put him in power, and we have maintained him. . . .

It is remarkable that our people are so well aware of this. They are not aware of the five conditions imposed on Mobutu by the Western countries in return for their continued support after Shaba II. This took place while I was in prison in 1978, but it has been confirmed to me personally by cabinet-level officials from the West.

These five conditions were:

1. Control of the activities of the Bank of Zaire, the central bank, by the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
2. Control of the activities of the Ministry of Finance through the appointment of IMF experts to key positions in the Ministry.
3. Reconciliation with neighboring Angola.
4. General amnesty for political prisoners, exiles and refugees.
5. National reconciliation, liberalization and democratization of the political institutions.

Because he had no alternative, Mr. Mobutu accepted these five conditions and gave the impression of sincerely implementing them. But I would like to tell you what actually happened, and what is still going on today.

From the start, the IMF experts found numerous obstacles to achieving these first two conditions. At the beginning of his tenure in 1978, Mr. Erwin Blumenthal, the chief IMF expert at the Bank of Zaire, cut off further credit to 50 private companies, which were in complete violation of banking regulations regarding loan repayments and the repatriation of foreign exchange earned by these companies abroad. The Bank of Zaire has estimated that these companies illegally withheld abroad approximately \$300 million in 1978 alone.

Eight of these companies are owned by Mr. Mobutu himself and his immediate family, and a number of others by his close associates and friends. This group, known in Zaire as *les barons du regime*, got their companies during the so-called Zairianization, or nationalization of the private sector. Mr. Mobutu owns many, many companies, but one of the eight cited by Mr. Blumenthal, CELZA, is actually a conglomerate of 14 companies expropriated by Mobutu from Belgian nationals.

I was released from prison in July 1978 and persuaded by several Western governments to serve again in the government of Zaire, taking the post of foreign minister for the third time in March 1979. I found Mr. Blumenthal totally discouraged and tried to convince him to continue his work. He told me it was useless. I discovered then what Mr. Blumenthal, a respected international civil servant, could not tell me: that any effort to implement the IMF program of reforms would inevitably lead to confrontation with the personal interests of the president of the country. Mr. Blumenthal left Zaire in frustration and disgust.

While some of us in the cabinet were struggling to gain the credibility and respect of the international community and, by the same token, to improve the social, political, and economic well-being of our population, Mr. Mobutu was continuing his old policy of mismanagement and greed. After silencing the Parliament by creating a central committee with power to overrule the Parliament, Mr. Mobutu extended his autocratic control over the major state economic and financial enterprises.

He placed the Bank of Zaire; SOZACOM, the state trad-

ing company; and GECAMINES, the national mining company, under the trusteeship of the office of the president. The governor of the Bank of Zaire, the chief executive of SOZACOM, and the general manager of GECAMINES now report directly to the president. This has allowed Mr. Mobutu to continue, as he did before Shaba I and Shaba II, to misuse at will the state funds, especially the foreign exchange reserves, of these three enterprises, vital to the economy of the country.

I can give you a small example of the widespread embezzlement practiced by the Zaire president. Based on the records of the Bank of Zaire, a parliamentary investigation conducted in mid-1979 revealed that Mr. Mobutu regularly withdrew foreign exchange from the bank for his personal accounts abroad. The investigation, covering the period from January 1977 through March 1979, revealed that over \$150 million in Belgian, French, and Swiss francs, and in U.S. dollars, were withdrawn for Mr. Mobutu and several members of his immediate family. I am submitting for the record an extract from the report to the Parliamentary Commissions of Inquiry for the 1977, 1978, and the first quarter of 1979, budget years.

Despite these corrupt practices, which of course took place in secrecy, Zaire's credibility in the international financial community appeared to improve. To attract further assistance from the donor nations and international institutions, I was appointed prime minister and leader of the team of ministers negotiating and working closely with the IMF. By the end of 1980, this team was able to achieve a measure of economic and financial stabilization. This was recognized by the IMF, which has subsequently extended to Zaire a \$1.1 billion three-year credit facility.

But knowing of my continuing concerns about the economic and financial situation, Mr. Mobutu intentionally undermined my efforts and those of my colleagues by appointing one of his inner circle, Mr. Bomboko, to be deputy prime minister and foreign minister. He was given specific instructions to act on behalf of the president in relation to the Bank of Zaire, SOZACOM, and GECAMINES.

Before I left Zaire in April 1981, I was officially informed by a report of the Bank of Zaire that Mr. Mobutu directed that approximately \$30 million in Belgian francs be transferred to his personal account. I was also officially informed that Mr. Mobutu arranged for GECAMINES and SOZACOM to export and sell privately 20,000 tons of copper for his benefit. In addition, an unknown quantity of cobalt and diamonds was exported by chartered aircraft to European countries with the proceeds of these sales deposited directly into Mr. Mobutu's personal accounts abroad.

Mr. Mobutu also encouraged high-ranking military officers and administrative officials to "help themselves" in becoming as rich as possible before it was too late. This explains the open and fraudulent trade by many military officers and other Zairian authorities in the urban and rural areas. As an example of this institutionalization of corruption, I would like to submit for the record a report prepared secretly by members of the armed forces, which explains in detail the systematic fraud prevalent throughout the government.

In addition, I would like to submit to you a declaration made by the Permanent Committee of the Roman Catholic Bishops of Zaire, dated June 23, 1981. This declaration describes the widespread corruption—as well as the social

conditions, the inhuman sufferings, the lack of human rights, and the general situation—that prevails in Zaire. As you do understand, the Kinshasa regime would not dare to arrest Catholic bishops, since this action would cause the outcry of the whole world. But the document published by the bishops was not made available outside of Zaire.

As you know, I have served my country in many capacities: as a diplomat, as foreign minister, as director of the Political Bureau of the Ruling Party (the second-ranking official after the president), and finally as prime minister. This is not my first visit to Washington, but this is the first time I have been free to speak to the American people with candor and honesty.

My various functions have allowed me to know the facts from within the regime and to state, without hesitation, that only change in the Zairian national leadership can bring about hope and progress in the country. If for nothing else, for the sake of millions of suffering people, it has become necessary to stand up, to make known to the entire world the unbelievable situation in my country.

There was official reconciliation between Angola and Zaire. But this does not mean that real confidence has been restored to relations between the two countries. I know this from the continuing suspicion and mistrust I have witnessed as foreign minister.

Political prisoners were supposed to have been released, and Zairians living as refugees in neighboring countries were due to come back home. Other Zairians living in exile were expected to return if they wanted to.

Thanks to the condition imposed by the Western powers regarding general amnesty, I was released from prison after one year. I would like to point out to you that I am a living example of the inhuman torture and humiliation that are common in Zaire. I hope you will understand, without my saying any more at this point, that I am at your disposal to answer any questions you may have concerning the details of my arrest, imprisonment, and torture when I was allegedly accused of treason.

It is a fact that even today there are still many political prisoners in Zaire. The most well-known of them are the 13 members of Parliament, who publicly criticized the regime during what was supposed to have been the period of liberalization of political institutions. Also well known is Professor Dikonda, arrested and still in prison for speaking critically of the regime during an interview with Belgian Radio. His case has been well documented by Amnesty International.

I would like to confirm to you here today publicly that every report written and published by Amnesty International that I have read regarding arrests, tortures, and deaths in prison is true. I say this despite the denials I was forced to issue officially as foreign minister and prime minister.

Many refugees and other Zairians living in exile did return home, but some were arrested, tortured, and killed. This does not encourage other refugees to come back. In fact, the number of Zairians in exile has been increasing, not decreasing, since 1978. It may surprise you to know that the families (women and children) of the majority of high-ranking civilian and military officials of Zaire are now living in Europe or America. Clearly, this is not a sign of internal stability or personal safety in my country.

In his public statements after Shaba II, Mr. Mobutu accepted the principal of control of the government by Parlia-

ment. For a few months, the general impression in Zaire was that elected members of Parliament enjoyed the freedom to criticize, and to control the actions of the government. Given this apparent openness, many inquiries were begun by members of Parliament into government activities. These inquiries led to the discovery of details of gross mismanagement and widespread abuses of power by the regime.

But Mobutu could not tolerate a situation whereby the Zairian public and the international community became aware of the findings of the parliamentary inquiries. Mr. Mobutu realized then that liberalization and democratization would speed up the downfall of his regime.

He silenced the elected Parliament by setting up the Central Committee of the Ruling Party, which I mentioned earlier, comprised of 120 members chosen and appointed by Mobutu personally. This, in fact, became an institution above the elected Parliament and overruling its decisions. It is nothing more than a rubber stamp for the autocratic actions of Mobutu. To insure the allegiance and loyalty of the members of the Central Committee, they have been given enormous salaries by the president. Whereas medical doctors and high-ranking civil servants are paid 500 to 800 zaires per month, every member of the Central Committee receives at least 15,000 zaires per month. The top leaders of the Central Committee are paid between 24,000 and 28,000 zaires per month.

At the time President Mobutu signed the instruction granting these salaries on March 31, 1981, one U.S. dollar was equivalent to three zaires. Members of the Central Committee have been receiving salaries of \$5,000 to \$9,000 per month (while medical doctors earn \$200 to \$250)—this despite the fact that there was no provision whatever in the 1981 government budget for the salaries of Central Committee members.

I know that the subcommittee is interested in why I left Zaire. I hope that after what I have just told you, you will understand. After my arrest I was persuaded, although reluctantly, by many friends in power in America, in Europe, and in Africa to return to Zaire to continue working to bring about the improvements that all of us recognize as essential. I did that at grave peril to my own life because I believed then that it was still possible to bring peaceful change to the leadership from within.

Let me declare publicly and with no equivocation that the Mobutu regime has reached the point of no return and that no Zairian or Zairians can succeed in implementing a sound program of recovery and reconstruction as long as Mobutu is in power. And yet change must occur and must occur soon. For the deterioration is so rapid and the danger is so grave that those who would benefit from the destabilization of my country are anxiously waiting to take advantage of the final crumbling of the present regime. The argument alleging that the removal of the present leader of my country would automatically bring chaos to Zaire has no sound and objective basis. Are we to assume that Mr. Mobutu is immortal?

As the conditions in the country worsen, the risk to Western interests in Zaire is increasing. But by your blind and uncritical support of Mobutu, you may leave the people of Zaire with no alternative but to rise up, to have a Shaba III or Kinshasa I. I cannot tell you what must be done, but I can assure you that the people of Zaire will soon take action. □

U.S. Policy Toward Zaire

Former Prime Minister Nguza Karl-I-Bond has declared himself the leader of the opposition to the present government of the Republic of Zaire. His accusations and the counteraccusations generated by his public remarks are an internal, Zairian matter. We do not intend to comment, except to state that we fully support the legitimate and recognized government of the Republic of Zaire. Our policy towards Zaire follows.

The administration welcomes this opportunity to discuss its policy toward Zaire, a nation whose vast size, large population, important geographic position, strategic mineral wealth, and support of the United States in international fora make it one of the most important countries to us in Africa.

Zaire can be characterized as having enormous human and economic potential whose development has been held back by a difficult transition from colonial rule that included almost a decade of civil conflict and chaos; by internal inefficiencies, mismanagement of resources, regional and ethnic differences, and external threats. Our goal in Zaire has been to promote internal stability and enhance its defense capability by linking our public support and material assistance incentives to the Zairian government's efforts to institute and carry through needed military, financial, and social reforms. The effectiveness of our policy should be judged by these objectives.

Our assistance to Zaire began immediately after independence as part of a multinational, UN effort to save the country from falling apart and give it a chance to survive as a nation. Today, our bilateral program has development and security assistance components. Total 1960-80 economic assistance for Zaire from the United States amounted to \$562.9 million. U.S. security assistance from the time period 1962 to 1980 totaled \$156.9 million, with \$8 million allocated for 1981. Our military assistance, part of a multinational cooperative effort including France, Belgium, the People's Republic of China, and the Federal Republic of Germany [West Germany], will continue to focus on improving the Zairian armed force's ground transport

and air and communications capabilities so that they can better react to external threats.

In regard to our economic assistance, we have programmed \$24.2 million in economic assistance for 1981. Further, even with the prospect of no future increases in such assistance reflecting current budgetary constraints, it is still a vital tool in our relations with Zaire.

As to the charges of diversion of our assistance funds, there are only a few cases that are well documented and corrective action has been taken. We are not aware of any other diversions. Furthermore, we are pleased at the increasing effectiveness of our assistance in reaching the poor, in meeting basic human needs in a country where these needs are immense, and in convincing other donors and the government of Zaire to allocate more resources for rural development. This was recognized at the June meeting of the IBRD Consultative Group on Zaire.

Multilaterally, the United States and the other creditor states, under the aegis of the Paris Club, expressed satisfaction in July with Zaire's economic stabilization program and stressed the importance that we attach to the continuing and full implementation of the IMF arrangement. In this context, the U.S. and the other creditor countries agreed that debt relief was essential to the viability of Zaire's stabilization effort. We will undertake bilateral negotiations with Zaire later this year to implement the provisions of the multilateral understanding reached in the Paris Club.

Obviously, not everything that needs to be done has been done. The government of Zaire is well aware of this. Years of neglect, poor management, and misallocation of resources cannot be reversed overnight. But we believe that the government of Zaire's performance over the past year demonstrates that it has and will continue to make an effort to improve its military, economic, and social performance. The maintenance of Zaire's internal stability over the past three years has been very important in creating conditions for economic, social, and political improvement—not only for Zaire itself but also for neighboring countries in central and southern Africa. Zaire's policies on African issues have also contributed to the resolution of conflicts in the region. We conclude, then, that the interests of the American and Zairian peoples, as a whole, will be best served by the continued adherence to our present policy.

This statement was issued by the Department of State on September 15, 1981.

U.S. negotiates with Pretoria on modified UN plan for Namibia

Behind South Africa's intensive negotiations of a U.S.-modified UN plan for Namibia's independence are apparently two major factors.

Number one is the new administration in Washington.

"South Africa realizes it has 18 months to take advantage of the most favorably disposed administration in the U.S. towards it in the last two decades," said one South African analyst. The plan, which accommodates some of Pretoria's objections that led it to reject Security Council resolution 435 after ini-

tially approving it in 1978, was put together in July.

"There is nothing new in this package," one Western diplomat said. "It is just that the South Africans feel in the present U.S. administration they have the most favorable confluence of forces they are likely to get."

The other factor is the South African army's belief that the Namibian guerrillas, the South-West African People's Organization, will need more than a year to recover from attacks on their bases in Angola.

Disabling of SWAPO militarily, the South Africans believe, will also reduce the organization's political influence.

There is also the expectation that the South African-backed Unita guerrillas fighting the Luanda government in southern Angola "will try to capitalize" on the raids, in the words of Pretoria's top army officer, Gen. Johannes Geldenhuys.

However, Pretoria still faces a major obstacle—the likelihood that SWAPO will win free elections no matter how much time the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) in Namibia is given to improve its position. The DTA, virtually running Namibia for months, has waged an intensive propaganda campaign about the dismantling of apartheid in the territory. But according to the *Windhoek Observer*, most "so-called 'changes' are an illusion and meaningless to the majority of the population." (London *Times*, September 21, 1981; London *Guardian*, September 16, 1981; Johannesburg *Star*, September 12, 1981; *Economist*, September 12, 1981; *Windhoek Observer*, August 22, 1981.) □

Bigger role for Unita sought by Pretoria

Angolan officials, some Western diplomats and South African analysts believe that a major aim—perhaps the major aim—of South Africa's incursion into southern Angola was to increase the influence of Unita, the anti-MPLA guerrillas operating there with Pretoria's help.

The South Africans have said they want an internationally recognized role for Jonas Savimbi's Unita and may intend to create a Unita-controlled buffer zone along the northern Namibia border to help prevent infiltration from Angola by the Namibian insurgents, the South-West African People's Organization.

Gen. Magnus Malan, the South African Defense Minister, said after the raid that Unita might "capitalize on the situation immediately." He added, "The Angolan government does not want to admit to the world that it is involved in a civil war."

The view that Pretoria wants to create a Unita buffer zone is shared by Angolan President José dos Santos. He said this month that "the strategy of the enemy is perhaps that of leaving some of these border areas in the hands of the puppet

group of Unita in order to hamper the application of UN resolution 435 (the Namibia independence plan)."

Reportedly, South Africa used its temporary control of southern Angola to restock Unita supply dumps. Angolan soldiers involved in battles with the South African troops reported that Unita guerrillas fought alongside the South Africans.

Even if Pretoria agrees to a Namibia settlement, the presence in southern Angola of a strengthened Unita is certain to complicate the issue. Savimbi said recently he did not expect a military victory but believed that the Angolan government "will eventually enter into negotiations with us." The Reagan administration view, as put forth by Chester Crocker, is similar. The assistant secretary of state for African affairs said in a policy speech last month that resolution of this conflict militarily was "unlikely" and that Unita "represents a significant and legitimate factor in Angolan politics." (Financial *Times*, September 14, 1981; London *Observer*, September 6 and 13, 1981; Luanda Radio, September 10, 1981; Johannesburg *Star*, September 5, 1981.) □

U.S. ties expanded to post-Sadat Egypt

Following the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in early October allegedly by Moslem fundamentalists angered over his recent crackdowns on religious and secular opponents, the U.S. government moved rapidly to uphold security and stability in the area, promising speedy weapons deliveries to Egypt and Sudan and "extensive joint exercises" with the Egyptian armed forces in November.

After Sadat's funeral, American

Continued on next page

Further arrests of unionists by homeland

Ciskei homeland security police arrested 205 black trade unionists on September 6 as they returned home in buses to a black township in Ciskei following a meeting in East London. Eleven days later, all but 24 unionists were released on \$54 bail and apparently will face charges under the Riotous Assemblies Act.

The union members belong to three militant independent unions that have been active in the area—the South African Allied Workers' Union (SAAWU), the General Workers' Union and the African Food and Canning Workers' Union. This is not the first time Ciskei—which is the site of the black townships around East London—has acted against the unions.

SAAWU, one of the fastest-growing unions in South Africa, has been a particular target, not surprisingly since the government last year distributed copies to employees of a document that spelled out plans to "break the power" of SAAWU following a surge of unrest in the East London area. This year, at least 80 SAAWU officials and members have been detained at one time or another by the Ciskei police. In Au-

gust, thousands of copies of a pamphlet critical of SAAWU were distributed in the area.

The 205 arrested unionists were alleged by the head of the Ciskei Central Intelligence Service to have been "singing freedom songs, denouncing the present system of government and waving black power salutes." SAAWU's president, Thozamile Gqweta, who has been in detention several times, including 117 days last year, said East London workers were "sick and tired of harassment and intimidation by the Ciskei police. The time has come when we will not tolerate such actions."

Ciskei authorities are apparently angered by SAAWU's use of the homeland's approaching "independence" on December 4 as an organizing tool. Pretoria's granting of "independence" to Ciskei is extremely unpopular after the homeland authorities conducted a referendum on the proposal last December in which prospective "no" voters were threatened with imprisonment. (*Financial Times*, September 9 and 18, 1981; *Rand Daily Mail* August 21, 1981; *East London Daily Dispatch*, August 21, 1981.) □

'Conspiracy' to encourage squatters; Bishop Tutu criticized, banning hinted

The South African government has charged that there is a "conspiracy" by certain people and organizations to "embarrass the government" by busing squatters deported to the Transkei homeland back to Cape Town.

Dr. Piet Koornhof, the minister in charge of black affairs, told parliament that 229 buses and eight other vehicles carrying squatters from Transkei had been stopped by police. He said the squatters rode free and were given \$21 pocket money as part of an "organized and orchestrated" campaign to "incite civil disobedience." Koornhof named the Women's Movement for Peace and the Border Council of Churches as two of the organizations involved.

Afterwards, Bishop Desmond Tutu, general secretary of the South African Council of Churches

(SACC), said his group had given money to help feed the squatters sent back from Cape Town.

Government criticism of the outspoken bishop then stepped up, with Police Minister Louis le Grange charging that SACC supports "subversive elements" and attacking Tutu for encouraging "a revolutionary climate" in South Africa. Observers said the government may be preparing to ban Tutu, but the bishop said if he were banned he would ignore the order.

Koornhof said of the busing: "We are not dealing here with an ordinary squatting situation, but really with a situation of confrontation . . . We cannot allow in this country a flouting of law and order or civil disobedience, because where will it end?"

Koornhof was criticized by oppo-
Continued on next page

Egypt continued

Secretary of State Alexander Haig held discussions with former Vice President Hosni Mubarak, nominated by the Egyptian parliament as Sadat's successor and confirmed in a national referendum, during which he was given assurances that Egypt under its new President will remain stable and will honor and implement all of Sadat's policies.

However, the situation in the area was still tense in the aftermath of Sadat's death. The U.S. government was concerned over what it perceives as two serious threats to stability—internally, the activities of the Moslem fundamentalists, and from outside Egypt's borders, potential actions by Libya's Col. Muammar Qaddafi.

Sadat's arrests of Moslem fundamentalists and other government opponents in September, continued violence in the town of Asyut following his death in which over 100 people died, and reports of scattered violence in Cairo all highlighted a critical issue with which Mubarak will have to deal adroitly—sectarian tensions and the rise of Islam as a potential source of social upheaval.

Also recent reports of Libyan military incursions in Sudan from their bases in Chad, coupled with Sadat's death, have accelerated U.S. plans to bolster militarily the area. The U.S. government announced plans to provide Sudan with new shipments of weapons including F-5 jets and tanks, and American advisers to accompany the arms. But President Reagan said the advisers are not meant to do combat with the Libyans should an opportunity arise. Egypt and Sudan have a defense agreement under which Cairo would intervene to defend Sudan's territorial integrity.

Meanwhile the Soviet Union reacted to Sadat's death with a statement "to the government of the United States" which said that events in Egypt affect Soviet security and accused Washington of applying "gross" and "unlawful" pressures on the Cairo government. (*New York Times*, October 11 and 12, 1981.) □

WESTERN AFRICA

Benin

● President Mathieu Kérékou paid his first official visit to France since he came to power in 1972 in late September, during which he held discussions with President François Mitterrand. Relations between France and Benin had previously been tense as a result of an attempted coup against Kérékou in 1977, which Benin authorities alleged was masterminded by a French citizen, Bob Denard, with the involvement of French mercenaries.

Kérékou left his talks with Mitterrand "confident in the future of relations between our two countries." He expressed his appreciation for French development aid and said he hoped France would play a more determined and active role in economic cooperation with African countries. He praised Mitterrand's "courageous and constructive" position toward Third World development, exemplified by the French President's remarks during the UN conference on less-developed countries in Paris in early September. (*West Africa*, September 28, 1981; *Le Monde*, September 25, 1981.)

Chad

● The September visit of President Goukouni Woddeye to Paris to confer with President François Mitterrand resulted in what observers characterized as a major reversal in French policy toward Chad. Following the meeting, France agreed to a substantial "unconditional" aid package for Chad, meaning the as-

Squatters continued

sistance will not be tied to the departure of Libyan troops from the territory, a pre-condition for aid set by former President Giscard d'Estaing.

Jean-Pierre Cot, the French Minister for Cooperation and Development, said: "We owe a debt to Chad. The government is determined to help Chad's recovery and to rediscover its political unity, territorial integrity and independence."

France's new policy toward Ndjamená is believed aimed at moderating Libyan influence with the Chad government, already said to be on the wane. Talks on the coordination of French and Nigerian policies toward Chad were held in August during Cot's visit to Lagos. Woddeye, in response, has assured the French government that the proposed merger between Chad and Libya has been rejected.

During the long civil war, previous French governments had demonstrated their preference for southern Christian forces in Chad and supported them with French troops. When Woddeye's northern rebel troops seized power in 1979, Woddeye was able to gain the loyalty of the southern leader, Col. Wadal Kamougué, now Chad's Vice President. France in response demonstrated what was described as a thinly disguised preference for the Armed Forces of the North (FAN), led by the former Defense Minister, Hissene Habre.

In 1980, French troops withdrew from Chad, after which Libya filled the vacuum by providing the military assistance which enabled Woddeye's government forces to defeat Habre's and thereby end the civil war.

The Mitterrand government has apparently accepted the view that Woddeye offers the best chance of reconciling the rival factions in Chad, due to his support from the southern leader, Kamougué. Élysée also apparently agrees with Chad's Planning Minister, Taher Suleiman, who said that France must provide both political and financial support to the Ndjamená government in order to persuade other countries to participate in an aid program to the war-torn country. France has already offered fi-

ancial and logistical support for an African peacekeeping force to replace the Libyan troops, which, Woddeye has said, will leave as soon as internal stability is assured.

However, fighting was continuing in September in northern and eastern Chad. The private army of Ahmat Acyl, the Foreign Minister, backed by Libyan troops, has been attempting to gain control of the northern half of Chad. Habre's rebels attacked the towns of Abeché and Guerreda from their base in Sudan, expelling both the Libyans and Acyl's forces from most of eastern Chad. Woddeye's forces, however, did not join the Libyans in fighting.

And in the south, mutinies among Kamougué's forces in garrisons in Moundou, Sarh, Doba and Koumia in early September were said to have been instigated by the Libyans, according to the southern leader. (*Economist*, September 26, 1981; *Christian Science Monitor*, September 22, 1981; *West Africa*, September 21, 1981; *London Guardian*, September 17, 1981.)

The Gambia

● Following the military intervention by Senegalese troops to crush a coup attempt in the Gambia in August, the Presidents of the two countries announced plans to form a confederation, to be called Senegambia.

During a joint press conference in Dakar in late August, Presidents Abdou Diouf of Senegal and Dawda Jawara of the Gambia made public their aim to forge a closer alliance, details of which will be worked out by a panel of experts and then presented to the two countries' parliaments for ratification.

Jawara said the coup attempt "opened our eyes to the need to go further" in joining Senegal, than merely the integration of the Gambia's 500-man paramilitary field force with that of Senegal, as originally proposed.

Diouf had justified his country's intervention in the Gambia, in accordance with a mutual defense pact, by alleging that the rebels threatened Senegal's security. "You just have to look at a map to be aware that both countries are very entangled," he said.

Diouf noted that the two countries should have no difficulties in confederating, despite the fact that the Gambia is English-speaking and Senegal is French-speaking. "I am convinced that if tomorrow we were to achieve Senegambia, Gambians would certainly benefit from it in terms of liberty, democracy, dignity and justice," he said.

Prior to the coup attempt, Jawara had opposed the idea of a merger between the two nations. However, having changed his position, he was still stressing an arrangement which will "respect the sovereignty of each nation," perhaps along the lines of the Tanganyika-Zanzibar union which formed Tanzania in 1964.

Diouf has already placed 50 presidential guards and security agents at Jawara's disposal. And, a Senegalese army officer, Maj. Amadou Nourou Silla, was appointed to coordinate the integration of the two countries' security forces.

In the meantime, a total of 814 people, including 118 of the field force, were being held in connection with the abortive coup. Judges from other countries are to be invited to conduct the trials, as the Gambia does not have the requisite number of its own.

Kukor Samba Sanyang, the coup leader, was arrested in Guinea-Bissau in late August, along with nine others, and the Gambia has requested their extradition. (*West Africa*, September 14 and 21, 1981; *Kenya Weekly Review*, August 28, 1981; *London Guardian*, August 28, 1981; *Le Monde*, August 25, 1981; *Washington Post*, August 21, 1981.)

Ghana

• A proposed merger of four of Ghana's five minority parties into the All People's Party was given impetus in September when a meeting of the parties' leaders took place in Takoradi and a party constitution was adopted.

The merger was to have included Col. Frank Bernasko's Action Congress Party, but the group withdrew "in view of recent political developments." The four other parties which are uniting to form an alternative to the ruling People's National Party are: the Popular Front Party, the United National Convention,

the Social Democratic Front, and the Third Force Party.

The parties were scheduled to elect a joint leadership in late September. Observers indicated that the ACP withdrew from the coalition plan because the leader of the PFP, Victor Owusu, was expected to beat out Bernasko as president of the new party, and thus be the party's candidate for Ghana's presidential elections in 1983. Owusu was elected leader of the All People's Party on September 26. (*West Africa*, September 28, 1981.)

Ivory Coast

• The Ivory Coast's budget for fiscal year 1981 was presented to the national assembly in August by Henri Konan Bédié, the legislature's president. The \$1.35 billion budget was a reduction in real terms from the 1980 one, and was combined with the introduction of a retrogressive law to control spending, as the 1979 and 1980 budgets were overspent.

According to Bédié, the new budget has three overall aims: to conserve the budgetary equilibrium, maintain the level of public saving, and to direct funds to activities such as the training of personnel.

Only four categories of expenditure—water, electricity, post office and food production—have been increased, to be paid for by an increase in consumer prices for electricity and certain basic foodstuffs. The expenditures on productive sectors and education are maintained and defense and cultural activities are slightly reduced.

And in an interview in Paris in early September, the Minister of Planning and Industry, Maurice Seria Gnolera, said the Ivory Coast will remain mainly a coffee- and cocoa-producing nation, despite its newly discovered oil wealth. He said revenues from oil production, which is estimated to reach 10 million tons annually by 1985, would be used to finance agro-industry.

"Our development goal is to industrialize our agricultural sector. We think these objectives must be achieved by private interests. The state can provide stimulants, but the real effort must be made by the private sector," he said.

Gnolera said that the Ivory Coast also welcomes foreign investment, particularly if it creates means of production. He added that highway-building, port improvement, hydroelectricity, telecommunications and housing were also priority sectors. (*West Africa*, August 31 and September 14, 1981.)

Liberia

• A leading civilian member of the ruling People's Redemption Council (PRC), Togba-Nah Tipoteh, Liberia's Minister of Economic Planning, resigned from the government in late August. Tipoteh cited suspicion and rivalry among the leadership while "the old order slides right back again in some dressed-up form to fool the Liberian masses," in his resignation letter to Master Sgt. Samuel Doe, the head of state.

Tipoteh was out of the country when he heard of the executions of the deputy head of state, Maj. Gen. Thomas Weh Syen, and four other members of the PRC, for their alleged roles in an assassination and counter-coup plot against Doe, the fourth coup attempt reported by the government since it came to power in April 1980. Tipoteh resigned shortly after the executions.

Syen, 29, was the second most powerful man in Liberia, and he and the other men executed had reportedly represented the "hard line" in the PRC, criticizing what they perceived as the Doe government's "errand boy" relationship with the U.S.

Syen was one of the members of the original group of 17 who overthrew the government of William Tolbert. It was said that without the five men, the ruling council "no longer has any backbone" to challenge Doe.

Tipoteh, who was replaced in his post by S. Byron Tarr, was branded a "defector" and "deserter" by the PRC. Doe had sent a delegation to Abidjan to persuade Tipoteh to reconsider, but when the effort failed, the government issued a statement which read: "The defection of Dr. Tipoteh had many implications, basic among which was his fear of consequences since his name was principally linked with the recent abortive coup attempt led by former

vice-head of state, the late Thomas Weh Syen."

And in early September, the Justice Minister, Chea Cheapoo, was dismissed by Doe because "his behavior was inconsistent with the administration of justice in the country." He was also regarded as one of the government's leading hard-liners. (*West Africa*, August 17, September 7 and 14, 1981; London *Guardian*, August 15 and September 2, 1981; *Washington Post*, August 15, 1981.)

• In late August, the International Monetary Fund approved a \$62 million economic stabilization loan to Liberia, to be drawn over the next 12 months. The loan replaced one of about \$36 million approved last year, but never used.

Liberia adopted an IMF economic stabilization program in September 1980, under which the government was required to tighten spending through the introduction of new revenue measures and reductions in government budget outlays.

The Liberian head of state, Master Sgt. Samuel Doe, in accordance with the program, lifted a \$9 million yearly subsidy on rice prices in July, under IMF and U.S. State Department pressure, raising the price from \$20 to \$24 per 100-pound bag. He also raised income taxes, adding 2 to 10 percent to them, as well as boosting the gasoline tax by 20 cents to \$3 per gallon. All the measures were designed to reduce the government's annual deficit of \$100 million.

The IMF has supported Doe's efforts to reschedule a large amount of its debt repayment. The U.S. government notified Doe that unless the IMF strictures were adhered to, the second half of a \$25 million economic support grant would not be provided.

Doe additionally ordered an extensive reform of the customs duty collection at Monrovia's port, described as "the most corrupt operation in Liberia." He announced a modest four-year \$615 million development plan in July, but said "The fact must not be hidden that our economic and financial condition remains grave. As your leaders, we the members of the People's

Redemption Council have had to make some difficult choices among unpleasant and difficult alternatives." (*West Africa*, September 7, 1981; *Wall Street Journal*, August 28, 1981; *Washington Post*, August 18, 1981.)

Mali

• President Moussa Traore paid an official visit to China in September, during which he held talks with Premier Zhao Ziyang on international affairs and on "further friendly cooperation" between China and Mali. (*West Africa*, September 7 and 14, 1981.)

Mauritania

• A report by the London-based Anti-Slavery Society to the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva in August maintaining that 100,000 people, or about 10 percent of Mauritania's population, are slaves, was denied by the Nouakchott government.

Mauritania had issued a decree in July abolishing the practice of slavery, but officials conceded in September that "we are aware that the weight of psychological and individual relations resulting from a 1,000-year social practice cannot be removed at the stroke of a pen." Nevertheless, the Mauritanian embassy in Paris described the report as "tendentious, erroneous and malicious."

According to Peter Davies, secretary-general of the London organization, government efforts to ban slavery had thus far "little or no practical effect." He said that in addition to the 100,000 in servitude, a "further 300,000 are part-slaves or ex-slaves." Former slaves are "subjected to discrimination paralleling for example that against the untouchables in India," he maintained.

The slave-holders are the predominant Moors in Mauritania and their victims primarily blacks, according to the study. Men, women and children are reportedly bought and sold clandestinely and traded from one master to another. The report said, "Nothing has been done by the government" to implement its order abolishing slavery. Indeed, "the upper and middle officials of the government, the judiciary, the

police and the rest of the civil service mostly have slaves." (*West Africa*, September 7, 1981; *New York Times*, August 26 and 27, 1981; *Kenya Weekly Review*, August 14, 1981.)

Niger

• Niamey authorities confirmed in late August that uranium is being sold to Libya and Iraq. According to the *Official Journal*, a record of all uranium sales, Libya bought 1,212 tons of the strategic material in the first six months of 1981, six times more than its 1980 acquisition.

Iraq purchased its first order of uranium from Niger in 1981, 100 tons, and the sale together with that to Tripoli, accounted for nearly 25 percent of Niger's uranium exports this year.

Despite opposition to sales of uranium to Third World countries because of its potential use for nuclear energy purposes by nations such as the U.S., Nigerien President Seyni Kountche has maintained that he will sell uranium to any country that can pay the price and meet the purchase conditions set by the international commission in Vienna.

Niger has also sold uranium to France, Spain, West Germany and Japan this year. In September, the Japanese government offered Niger a \$7 million grant for expansion of a Niamey power plant which supplies electricity for uranium mining.

An agreement was also reached in September allowing a Japanese company to prospect for uranium in the Anou Makarem region and in a national reserve south of the Arlit and Akouta deposits. The quality of the uranium is expected to be high and exploration slated to begin in October. (*West Africa*, September 14, 21 and 28, 1981; *Jeune Afrique*, September 14, 1981.)

Nigeria

• Vice Presidents Alex Ekwueme of Nigeria and George Bush of the U.S. met in Washington in early September for the sixth of a series of annual economic meetings between the two nations. Two technical assistance accords were signed—one for the training of 260 Nigerian technical educators in the

U.S. each year, and the other providing for projects in public health, including statistics, education, food and drugs, nursing and disease control.

Other areas of cooperation were also discussed, particularly in the field of agriculture. Ekwueme urged American investors to participate in Nigeria's fourth national development plan, and called for increased American investment in food production and processing in Nigeria. Both vice presidents praised the activities of the Joint Agricultural Consultative Committee (JACC), scheduled to hold its next meeting in Washington in September.

Nigeria will ease some restrictions to encourage foreign business to cooperate in its development plans. Business travelers will henceforth be issued multiple entry visas and the lengthy licensing procedures will be expedited. Nigeria will also set up trade and investment centers in the U.S.

Political issues were also touched on in Ekwueme's discussions with Bush. The Nigerian Vice President emphasized Africa's concern over South Africa's recent forays into Angola and the continent's hopes for progress toward Namibia's independence. He noted that the U.S. has the greatest leverage on South Africa and should bring it to bear on the Namibia issue.

No agreement was reached, however, on the price of liquefied natural gas (LNG) that Nigeria hopes to sell to the U.S. when its liquefaction facilities are completed.

In a related event, it was announced in late September that the American company, **Phillips Petroleum**, technical leader of a six-company international consortium developing the \$14 billion LNG industry in Nigeria, will drop out of the project in early 1982.

No reason was given for Phillips' pull-out from the consortium company, called Bonny LNG. The company is 60 percent owned by the state-run Nigerian National Petroleum Corp., with Shell and British Petroleum with 10 percent each, Phillips and Agip each with 7.5 percent and Elf Aquitaine with 5 percent.

The Nigerian government said it would continue with the project and was consulting with the four Euro-

pean companies to appoint new technical managers. Phillips had developed the liquefaction process to be used in the Nigerian plant near Port Harcourt. (*Financial Times*, September 30, 1981; *Wall Street Journal*, September 29, 1981; *West Africa*, September 21, 1981; *New York Times*, September 10, 1981.)

- The Nigerian government introduced a series of **austerity measures** in September designed to cut public expenditure and save foreign exchange as revenues from oil production continued to decline.

Nigeria relies on oil for nearly 90 percent of its foreign exchange earnings and for 80 percent of its government revenues. Oil output in 1980 averaged 2.1 million barrels per day, but dropped to 1.3 million in June, 770,000 in July, 640,000 in August and 500,000 in September. The government introduced a \$4 discount per barrel in August, lowering the price from \$40 to \$36 to make its sales more attractive, but it was not expected to have a major effect on the volume of oil sales. Oil consumers have been opting to draw from their huge inventories rather than purchase high-priced crude, such as Nigeria's.

Nigerian dependence on oil revenues for funds for development makes the country's economy vulnerable to changes in world demand and price pressures. Therefore the austerity package was introduced to belatedly curb spending.

Funds for one-third of the projects in the \$108 billion fourth national development plan will be "withheld." Foreign deals, including trade agreements, will be closely scrutinized and signed by Nigerian diplomatic representatives abroad. Spending by the civil service will be sharply curbed, vacancies will be left unfilled and a ban on overseas travel implemented. The measures are designed to withhold 30 percent of capital expenditures in line with the anticipated shortfall in oil revenues. (*West Africa*, September 28, 1981; *Economist*, September 19, 1981; *Financial Times*, September 15, 1981; *Business Week*, September 7, 1981.)

- The Nigerian government cracked down on the **opposition**

press in August, arresting five senior editors on charges including conspiracy, sedition, and knowingly publishing false information likely to disturb the peace.

The editor-in-chief and editor of the *Nigerian Tribune* were arrested and charged with sedition after a front-page story accused President Shehu Shagari of bribing opposition members of the legislature.

The editor-in-chief and editor of the *Nigerian Standard* suffered a similar fate. They were arrested and their offices raided after an article quoted an opposition leader from Gongola state who said Shagari's National Party was plotting to assassinate its rivals in the state. The Gongola leader was also arrested and charged with incitement against the government.

Then the editor of the *Daily Sketch* was detained and charged with knowingly publishing false documents—a story that activities along the lines of the Kano riots in July were being planned in Kaduna.

Opposition parties accused the President of gagging the press and imposing a dictatorship. Shagari subsequently defended the arrests saying he believed Nigeria has the freest press in Africa. He denied that the government "had directed the police to harass anyone." "Whenever they see anything that can lead to a breakdown of law and order, it is their duty to act and where the police do act, it is done as a normal routine job," he maintained.

Shagari, however, reportedly told a group of journalists that although he would allow criticism of himself or his policies, "I will not tolerate anybody questioning my personal integrity."

In mid-September, the Lagos high court threw out the criminal charges brought by the government against the African Newspapers of Nigeria, Ltd., publishers of the *Nigerian Tribune*, and its editor-in-chief and editor. The others were still set to face charges. (*West Africa*, August 17, September 14 and 21, 1981; *Economist*, August 22, 1981.)

Senegal

- Two "old school" cabinet ministers were sacked in a **reshuffle** undertaken by President Abdou Diouf

in August. Adrien Senghor, Minister of State for Equipment, and Louis Alexandrenne, Minister of Plan and Cooperation, had both served under former President Leopold Senghor, and were replaced by Assane Seck, formerly Minister of State for Culture, and Mamoudou Toure, respectively. (*West Africa*, August 17, 1981.)

● In August, the Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS), the parliamentary opposition to the ruling Socialist Party, criticized Senegal's military intervention in the **Gambia**. President Abdou Diouf had sent in Senegalese troops to assist the 500-man Gambian paramilitary field force in quashing an attempted coup against Gambian President Dawda Jawara. The PDS said the principle of non-interference in other countries' affairs had not been respected.

And in September, 15 PDS members were arrested following information given to Senegalese authorities by another PDS member, Amadou Fall, who had been arrested on fraud charges.

Fall allegedly made "grave revelations" about various party members, causing police to search the homes of PDS secretary-general Maitre Abdoulaye Waye, and member of the PDS secretariat, Alassane Cissokho, for weapons caches.

Five of the arrested were Wade's aides and others were party members from regions outside Dakar. The Ministry of Justice said the party members were detained for "attempts against the security of the state."

A spokesman for the PDS denied that any members were in the possession of arms. He said, "We only oppose the government by democratic means." (*West Africa*, August 17 and September 28, 1981.)

Sierra Leone

● A state of emergency was declared by President Siaka Stevens in early September as Sierra Leone's trade unions participated in the second general strike since August. The confrontation between labor and government began in late July with a decision by the 250,000-member Sierra Leone Labor Congress (SLLC) to take action if something was not done to ameliorate

the state of the country's economy.

Sierra Leone's first general strike was called by the SLLC on August 14 to force the government to take action on a range of issues, principal among them the price of rice, the nation's staple food. Strikers ignored a government ban on demonstrations and massed at SLLC's Freetown headquarters to hear speeches criticizing government policies.

Stevens met with union leaders and was given a list of demands including a reduction in the price of rice, price controls on other staple foods and school textbooks, prompt payment of wages, rent subsidies, and better health facilities. Stevens eventually acceded to a 55 percent cut in the price of rice, however the unions were demanding a 67 percent reduction. Strikers returned to work while negotiations continued, but the SLLC later withdrew from the talks and said a second general strike would be called on September 1 if the demands were not met.

Workers walked off their jobs for a second time, closing down not only Freetown, but the country's diamond and coal mines. The government responded with the imposition of a state of emergency, during which detention without trial is permitted under law. Stevens said, "Government . . . will not tolerate a grouping of so-called workers' representatives at the top holding the country to ransom."

Looting and sporadic violence reportedly broke out in Freetown and the northern provincial capital, Makeni. Many deaths and injuries were reported in the unrest accompanying the strike, and Sierra Leone authorities detained nearly 100 people, including SLLC secretary-general James Kabia and other union leaders.

Some reports indicated that other government critics, including employees of *The Tablet*, Freetown's independent newspaper, were also rounded up. Pios Foray, the paper's editor, was said to have either gone into hiding or was arrested after the building housing the paper was attacked and the printing machinery destroyed.

The government was also cracking down on alleged rice profiteers, searching stores and seizing goods

believed hoarded by the traders. Hundreds of bags of rice were seized and sold to the public at controlled prices.

In mid-September, a strike called by the Sierra Leone Teachers' Union to protest the detention of SLLC leaders was called off after a week in the interests of "peace and order in the country." As of late September, reports indicated that all striking laborers had resumed work and the country was returning to normal. (*West Africa*, September 14, 21 and 28, 1981; *London Sunday Times*, September 20, 1981; *Financial Times*, September 2, 1981; *Kenya Weekly Review*, August 21, 1981.)

Upper Volta

● Reacting to Col. Saye Zerbo's May Day address in which the Upper Volta head of state called on the country's trade unions to accept constraints on their freedom of action and speech, three of the four Voltaic labor associations met in mid-August and condemned "any government action aimed at intimidating workers and their organizations, or taking away union rights won at such a cost."

The powerful trade associations present at the meeting in Bobo-Dioulasso included the National Confederation of Voltaic Workers, the Voltaic Organization of Free Unions and the Labor Union of Voltaic Workers. Their decision to take whatever action required to secure their aims was seen as a direct challenge to the President's call for the formation of a "social contract" between the unions and the government.

The Bobo-Dioulasso meeting focused on two specific grievances. The unions had presented a 27-point list of complaints to the ruling Military Committee earlier in the year, among which was the demand for an immediate 50 percent increase in the minimum wage. None of the points had been addressed by the government as of August.

The second point of contention was based on measures Zerbo had undertaken in June against a group of civil servants who participated in an "illegal" strike. The trade associations called the government ac-

tion a serious threat to trade union freedom, which had been guaranteed by the military when they took over in November 1980.

Upper Volta's trade unions are considered the most significant legal political force in the country with the exception of the military, and labor unrest contributed to the overthrow of President Sangoule Lamizana by Zerbo's Military Committee. (*West Africa*, September 14, 1981.)

EASTERN AFRICA

Comoros

- According to a report in *New African*, there is a strong **South African connection** with the Comoro Islands. The magazine claims that the white mercenaries who helped put President Ahmed Abdallah in power in 1978—officially there are only 11 mercenaries left in the elite Garde Presidenciel—may be paid by South Africa, which has seen its trade with the Comoros climb to \$27 million annually.

The magazine claims that Bob Denard, the mercenary who led the coup and shortly thereafter left the country, owns jointly with the government a company which imports meat from South Africa. Another mercenary runs the national shipping company, which runs a regular service to South Africa. (*New African*, September 1981.)

Djibouti

- The government of Djibouti, which refused to allow an **opposition party** formed in August, arrested two leading members of the party in September.

The two, former Prime Ministers Ahmed Dini and Abdallah Kamil, were arrested following distribution of a pamphlet by the Djiboutian People's Party (PPD).

In a communique issued in Paris, the PPD claimed that "our party is legally constituted," after the government of Hassan Gouled had ignored its registration application. A government minister said later that "neither illegal activities nor disrespect for regulations will be tolerated."

The opposition apparently quickened after Gouled ran unopposed

for President in June. Since then, at least ten members of parliament have defected from Gouled's party to join the PPD. Dini, a PPD executive, has accused Gouled of repression and torture of political prisoners and of following tribal policies. (*Kenya Weekly Review*, September 11, 1981; *Le Monde*, August 26, 1981.)

Ethiopia

- **Eritrean insurgents**, who marked the 20th anniversary of the conflict against the Ethiopian government in September, charged that government forces were massing in the province for another offensive in October.

The Eritreans reportedly now control most of the rural areas of the province, while the government holds the major towns, including Asmara and the two Red Sea ports of Massawa and Assab.

The main guerrilla organization, the Eritrean People's Liberation Front, has stepped up its campaign for peace negotiations. In August, the EPLF called on Western nations, the Soviet Union, which backs Addis Ababa, and the UN to push the Ethiopian regime to start negotiations to end the war.

And in late September, an EPLF official in Abu Dhabi appealed to the OAU to discuss the issue, noting the organization's efforts to end the Western Sahara conflict. The Eritrean question, however, was not even on the agenda at the OAU's Nairobi summit in June. (*Gulf News Agency*, September 28, 1981; *London Guardian*, September 2, 1981; *London Observer*, August 9, 1981.)

- More than 500 **prisoners** were released in Ethiopia in September in an amnesty marking the seventh anniversary of the 1974 overthrow of Haile Selassie.

Those freed included 55 former officials of the emperor's government who had been detained since 1974, several Ethiopian Orthodox Church officials, two bankers and several left-wing opponents of the present government.

The rest of the prisoners released were apparently people convicted of non-political crimes. A government official said the crimes were "occasioned by desperation caused

by unemployment and the brutal exploitation and oppression practiced under the discredited regime." (Nairobi Radio, September 16, 1981; Addis Ababa Radio, September 5, 1981.)

Kenya

- President Daniel arap Moi made an **official visit to the U.S.** in September where he met with President Reagan.

The State Department described the talks as "very fruitful" but did not elaborate. Publicly, Reagan thanked Moi "for Kenya's continued cooperation with the U.S." For his part, Moi said, "We have reached some understanding on some matters."

The issue of Namibia's independence was expected to have taken up a great part of the discussions. As chairman of the OAU, Moi was expected to emphasize Africa's position on the problem and to convey Africa's disappointment with what it perceives as a U.S. tilt toward South Africa. (*Kenya Sunday Nation*, September 27, 1981; *Kenya Weekly Review*, September 18, 1981.)

- Kenya devalued its currency in September by some 18 percent, following an earlier **devaluation** in February of 5 percent. The Kenya shilling now equals about 10 cents.

The devaluation is aimed at stimulating exports, which will now be cheaper, and curtailing imports, now more expensive. The Vice President and Finance Minister, Mwai Kibaki, said the balance of payments position had steadily deteriorated and Kenya had been forced to draw on reserves of foreign currency to pay for necessary imports, such as oil.

The devaluation increases the competitiveness of Kenya's exports, such as coffee and tea. It is hoped that the lower prices will eliminate a huge one million bag surplus of coffee.

Kenya also announced it will borrow \$100 million over eight years from European banks, its first venture into the European capital markets in two years. (*World Business Weekly*, September 28 and October 5, 1981; *Kenya Weekly Review*, September 25, 1981.)

Mauritius

• With a general election expected in December, the likely winner, Paul Berenger of the opposition Mauritian Militant Movement (MMM)—a coalition of leftists and liberals—said in July he does not foresee any **interference by the U.S.** if the MMM should win.

However, Berenger made the statement before the August disclosure that there was, or is, a covert CIA plan to slip money to the ruling party in order to counteract alleged financial aid to the MMM by the Libyan leader, Col. Muammar Qaddafi.

Berenger said that State Department officials visiting Mauritius near the end of the Carter administration "gave us the assurance that the Americans would not get involved in our local politics between now and the general elections. But we do not fool ourselves that the Americans will gladly see our party come into government."

Apparently, some conservative U.S. Congressmen fear that Libyan influence on the Indian Ocean island nation could lead to a Soviet base being established there.

Although it is not clear whether the CIA is in fact funneling money to the present government of Prime Minister Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam, the South African government reportedly is. The South Africans have supplied the ruling party with paper, printing presses, and on one occasion printed election posters which were airfreighted from South Africa. Berenger claims that the government has tried to make Mauritius dependent on South Africa through tourism and imports and he has vowed to reduce the links sharply. (*Africa Now*, August 1981; *Washington Post*, August 15, 1981.)

Somalia

• Relief workers trying to feed the hundreds of thousands of refugees in Somalia have charged that the **Somali army** steals the food once it reaches warehouses at some 30 refugee camps.

The workers say the food, donated by the U.S. and the EEC countries, is used to feed the army and Somali government-supported

guerrillas fighting in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia. The workers claim that armed men arrive at night with trucks and cart away 30 to 70 percent of the food meant for refugees.

"This stealing is official policy from the highest levels," a Swiss relief worker said. "We've found that there is nothing we can do at the local level to stop it. The only way would be for the U.S. and the EEC to go right to President Barre, and this they seem unwilling to do." (*London Guardian*, August 24, 1981.)

Tanzania

• President Julius Nyerere retired or dismissed some ten public officials in August and September "in the public interest," apparently as part of a continuing crackdown on **corruption**.

In August, three senior police officials in Shinyanga region were retired and a special commission of inquiry was set up. Also, an economist and a planning officer in the Prime Minister's office were dismissed for absenteeism and neglect of duty.

In September, Nyerere retired five Dar es Salaam city officials, in connection with "acts of economic sabotage." The government said there had been misuse of public funds, including irregular hire of vehicles and purchases of books, bricks and cement for unexplained purposes. (Dar es Salaam Radio, August 19 and September 3, 1981.)

• The 94 nations which belong to the non-aligned group at the UN endorsed **Salim Salim** for the post of UN secretary-general in September.

Salim, Tanzania's Foreign Minister and the former chief representative to the UN, was endorsed by the OAU in June. Kurt Waldheim, the incumbent, is running for a third term.

If the non-aligned support is binding, Salim would win more than the simple majority needed in the General Assembly. However, the Security Council vote is the key and Waldheim is believed to have the support of four of the five permanent members—the U.S., Britain, France and the Soviet Union. (*Kenya Sunday Nation*, August 16 and September 27, 1981.)

• Tanzania is to buy **oil** directly from Angola, following an agreement between the two countries in August to set up a joint commission on trade and economic cooperation.

Tanzania will also import from Angola animal feed, oil seeds, marble, hides, steel sheets and glue. Angola will buy bicycles, textiles, meat and beans. (OPEC News Agency, August 31, 1981.)

Uganda

• Uganda's President Milton Obote has pledged to end "the cult of rampant killing" in Uganda, which he attributed to gangsters, bandits, terrorists, opportunists and former soldiers of Idi Amin, but which most observers blame on the country's undisciplined troops, the **Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA)**.

The security situation in Uganda has deteriorated recently with UNLA forces going on rampages of murdering, looting and raping. Hundreds of civilians have been killed.

In August and September, UNLA troops began carrying out attacks on police stations. One such incident near Kampala occurred after police caught soldiers looting, tried to arrest them and killed four in a shoot-out. Shortly afterwards, a group of soldiers drove to the police station in army jeeps and opened fire with automatic rifles and rocket-propelled grenades. The attacks on the police have apparently outraged Tanzanian policemen, several hundred of whom remain in Uganda to help train the police force.

Leading officials of Catholic, Protestant and Moslem churches met with Obote at the end of September and strongly criticized the army and the government. Obote was reported stunned by the harshness of the criticism, which included the remark that "the Uganda you lead is bleeding to death."

Government critics have also lashed out at the alleged torture and murder of people arrested by the army. In September, four Kenyans who drove long-distance trucks regularly from Mombasa to Kampala were dumped at a hospital in the capital following a week in army custody. Three of them were dead,

including one who had been hammered to death, according to witnesses.

Opposition leader Paulo Ssemogerere charged that "soldiers on official duty go to an area and indiscriminately shoot every human being in sight."

Meanwhile, guerrillas trying to topple Obote's government have begun a new campaign, after a three-month lull. They have been provided with weapons from foreign countries, with Libya reportedly being the main source. (London *Sunday Times*, October 4, 1981; London *Guardian*, August 28, September 10, 14, 22, 23 and 30, 1981; Kenya *Weekly Review*, September 11, 1981.)

CENTRAL AFRICA

Central African Republic

● President David Dacko was removed from power in September by the army nearly two years after he overthrew Emperor Jean-Bedel Bokassa. Gen. André Kolingba, commander of the 1500-man Central African army, took over the positions of head of state and government, Minister of Defense and Minister of War Veterans and Victims after Dacko relinquished power without a struggle. Kolingba said Dacko resigned voluntarily because of ill health and due to "political tension" in the country.

Several reports speculated however that the power turn-over was less than a coup d'etat as originally reported, meaning that it was planned by Dacko and Kolingba in order to circumvent constitutional arrangements under which power would have passed to Dacko's Prime Minister, Simon Narcisse Bozanga, after Dacko decided to resign.

Both Dacko and Bozanga were unpopular with the country's opposition leaders. Dacko had declared a state of siege in July and banned the opposition parties—notably Dr. Abel Goumba's Patriotic Front and the Movement for the Liberation of the Centrafrican People, led by Ange Patasse. Tensions in the Central African Republic between the government and opposition had been high since the March presiden-

tial election, which Dacko won by a narrow margin, and the ensuing unrest over the voting results. Legislative elections scheduled for June were canceled. The desperate state of the economy was fueling additional discontent and the opposition appeared to be gaining in support, leaving the situation untenable for Dacko.

The 1,300 French troops stationed in the Central African Republic offered no resistance to the change in government and the French government of President François Mitterrand appeared relieved and satisfied with the situation, saying the coup was "an internal matter which concerns only the Central Africans."

French paratroopers had put Dacko in power in 1979 under President Giscard d'Estaing. The Mitterrand government had decided to maintain the French force in the country, fearing a power vacuum ripe for destabilization should it withdraw precipitously. However, the policies toward the Central African government inherited from Giscard's presidency had been an embarrassment to the socialist government in Paris. Mitterrand had expressed displeasure with Dacko's crackdown on the opposition after having pledged multi-party elections, and with his apparent inability to improve the state of the economy.

Meanwhile, opposition leaders Goumba and Patasse appeared pleased with the removal of Dacko. Patasse said his resignation was "a logical outcome of a situation born out of Giscardian neo-colonialist policy, which imposed an anti-democratic and unpopular regime on the Centrafrican people." Goumba expressed his "qualified approval" of the takeover, but said he would not forget "the sad history of military takeovers in the Central African Republic."

It is believed that Kolingba will have to come up with a means of accommodating the opposition given its influence among the people. Kolingba formed a cabinet composed completely of members of the military, but said they would not stay in power for more than one year. He said elections would take place, but did not specify when. For

the time being, the constitution and political parties have been suspended. In the meantime, Kolingba has appealed for \$400 million in international assistance to stave off the economy's collapse. (*West Africa*, September 14, 1981; Kenya *Weekly Review*, September 4 and 11, 1981; *Economist*, September 5, 1981; *Financial Times*, September 2 and 3, 1981; London *Guardian*, September 2 and 3, 1981.)

Equatorial Guinea

● Sources in Madrid reported in September that a meeting was recently held in Equatorial Guinea by **opposition groups** against the rule of President Teodoro Obiang Mbasogo. M. Oyono, formerly Secretary of State for Economics and Finance, was chosen as president of the newly formed Revolutionary Council. Present at the meeting were said to be representatives of the exiled National Alliance for the Restoration of Democracy and the Guinean Revolutionary Front.

Spain's police chief, Gen. Saenz de Santa Maria, then arrived for talks with Mbasogo in mid-September on increasing the presence of Spanish national police in the country. Mbasogo maintained that the increased presence was warranted to counter Soviet influence in Equatorial Guinea. Elements still present in the country and once close to former dictator Macias Nguema were allegedly trained in the Soviet Union.

The government denied reports that the detachment would replace the Moroccan forces currently serving as presidential guards. Arrangements were to be made for a Guinean unit to train in Spain, with the aim of replacing the Moroccans, but under the command of Spanish officers.

As a result of the talks with de Santa Maria, Mbasogo lifted a ban implemented in August on all Spanish publications. *Cambio 16*, *Interviu*, and *Diario 16* were forbidden after having published what Equatorial Guinean authorities referred to as "tendentious and subversive" articles. The stories in question were said to have covered reports of growing opposition to Mbasogo's rule. Spanish journalists had also been banned from entering the

country. (*West Africa*, September 7, 14, 21, and 28, 1981; Madrid Radio, September 15, 21, 22 and 23, 1981; London *Guardian*, August 24, 1981.)

Gabon

● In late August, President Omar Bongo announced that the Prime Minister, Leon Mébiame, had assumed the duties of **head of government**, functions previously exercised by Bongo. Mébiame, who became Prime Minister in 1975, will therefore be responsible to the President, central committee and national assembly. The move leaves Bongo as head of state, but with no ministerial portfolio.

Mébiame's promotion was part of a cabinet reshuffle designed to implement Bongo's "democratization" process. Several other new ministerial appointments were made, including Martin Bongo as minister for Foreign Affairs, Mbouy Boutzit as Minister of State for Justice, and Julien Mpouho-Epigah as Minister of National Defense.

The major tasks for the new government, according to Bongo, are implementation of an austerity budget and negotiation of more state involvement in Gabonese companies. The Economic and Social Council will be enlarged and its powers increased to coordinate Gabon's economic and financial systems.

Bongo said that increased commercial activity has resulted in a reduction by one-half of the public debt and a balance of payments surplus. Priorities of the national development plan, to apply until 1983, are: agriculture and rural development, energy production, and transport, particularly the completion of the trans-Gabon railway.

And in late September, Bongo lashed out against what he characterized as "the campaign of calumnies against my person and my government" by the French press. Praising the level of economic development in his country, where "the rights of man are fully respected and there is not one political prisoner," Bongo asked what France was seeking in the campaign of "provocation" against him. "To destabilize my regime?" he asked.

He said "the stability of a regime

depends not on its alliance with foreign powers, but on the legitimacy the regime can claim from its internal policies. My detractors should come to Gabon and judge the situation honestly . . ." (*Le Monde*, September 24, 1981; *Africa Research Bulletin*, September 15, 1981; *Jeune Afrique*, September 9, 1981; *West Africa*, September 7, 1981.)

Zaire

● **Nguza Karl-I-Bond**, the recently resigned Prime Minister of Zaire, was in Washington in September to warn the U.S. government that Zaire will soon fall into violence and anarchy if something is not done to halt the West's "blind and uncritical support" of President Mobutu Sese Seko, who heads "the most corrupt regime in Africa."

While Nguza got no official hearing with the Reagan administration, he was able to testify before the House subcommittee on Africa. He told the subcommittee that without Western assistance, Mobutu would never have survived the armed uprising in Shaba province in 1977 and 1978.

Nguza alleged that Kinshasa, the capital, is ripe for an uprising like the two previous ones, because of the misery and starvation of the Zairian people. He presented documents revealing Mobutu's personal finances, accusing him of embezzlement of millions of dollars of Zaire's foreign exchange, and of selling copper, cobalt, and diamonds for his personal financial aggrandizement.

He said no financial assistance programs will succeed in Zaire as long as Mobutu is in power. "Change must occur and it must occur soon. For the deterioration is so rapid, and the danger is so grave that those who would benefit from the destabilization of my country are anxiously waiting to take advantage of the final crumbling of the present regime."

Nguza, who is living in exile in Brussels, Belgium, said he will not lead a revolt against Mobutu if there is a popular uprising. But "I will be behind my people and will assume my responsibilities to the bitter end," he said.

He urged that the West withdraw

support for Mobutu or the country will collapse politically and economically. "It will be terrible, terrible. Just like Iran," he maintained.

The State Department issued a statement which said that Nguza's remarks are "an internal, Zairian matter" and that "we fully support the legitimate and recognized government of the Republic of Zaire." The statement concluded that "the interests of the American and Zairian peoples as a whole will be best served by the continued adherence to our present policy (see also p. 19).

Observers indicated however that the Reagan administration may have to go it alone in providing future military assistance to defend Mobutu against attacks such as the Shaba I and II invasions. While French military assistance was provided to put down the two revolts, the French socialist government of President François Mitterrand does not favor military interventions as solutions to Third World problems. He believes that Africa's vulnerability to destabilization is rooted in its economic underdevelopment, warranting increased development assistance. (*New York Times*, September 21, 1981; *Washington Post*, September 15 and 17, 1981; *Christian Science Monitor*, September 1, 1981.)

Zambia

● The **treason trials** of 13 people, accused of plotting to overthrow Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda late in 1980, were continuing in Lusaka in September. But in August, charges against former air force commander Christopher Kabwe were dropped in a surprise move. No official explanation was given for his release, but it was believed that he agreed to give evidence against the others, who include prominent Lusaka lawyer Edward Shamwana and ex-central bank governor Valentine Musakanya.

Shamwana, Musakanya and others were accused of having tried to persuade Kabwe to divert a plane carrying Kaunda to an unauthorized place where he would have been forced to resign at gunpoint. (*Financial Times*, September 2, 1981; *Kenya Weekly Review*, August 21, 1981.)

NORTHERN AFRICA

Algeria

● In late September, rioting **Islamic fundamentalists** took over a mosque at Laghouat, an oasis town 250 miles south of Algiers, the first officially publicized incident of tensions between the government and the Algerian branch of the Moslem Brotherhood.

A belated report in the official Algerian paper, *El Moudjahid*, in October said the fundamentalists were ousted from the mosque by police after three days of clashes which left one officer dead and several others wounded.

The Moslem Brotherhood is illegal in Algeria and is opposed to what it characterizes as the "godless materialism" of Algeria's socialist system.

Rioting reportedly began after the arrest of the head of the Laghouat branch of the Brotherhood, who was accused of desertion from Algeria's conscript army. Thirty members of the group then occupied the mosque, calling the town's 60,000 inhabitants to a "holy war" against the authorities. When efforts at negotiation failed, the police were summoned to remove the militants from the mosque.

An emergency session of the Superior Islamic Council, the highest authority of Algeria's Moslem establishment, condemned the occupation of the mosque and accused the Brotherhood of "distorting the teachings of Islam, spreading a false faith, inciting disorders and desecrating a holy place." (Washington Post, October 6, 1981.)

● There were some new developments in September and October in Algeria's continuing negotiations with foreign buyers over raising the export price of its **liquefied natural gas** (LNG).

Talks between Sonatrach, the state oil and gas corporation, and three U.S. natural gas companies—**Consolidated Natural Gas Co, Columbia Gas System Inc., and Southern Natural Resources Inc.**—were said to be progressing in late September. The three companies intend to take over LNG imports previously destined for El Paso Gas

Co. Deliveries were halted and the arrangement subsequently canceled when Sonatrach and El Paso failed to conclude an agreement on a new price for the LNG.

Algeria reportedly offered an important concession to France in its LNG dispute, dropping its insistence that any rise in the price be backdated. Sonatrach resumed gas deliveries to Gaz de France in September 1980 after a six-month interruption, but has been billing the utility \$6.11 per million British Thermal Units (BTU). Gaz de France has only been paying \$4.35 per million BTU, ignoring the increase.

The British Gas Corp., however, stopped its LNG purchases in early October after failing to reach agreement on a new contract price. British Gas was paying \$4.80 per million BTU beginning in July, a price higher than the French are paying, but lower than the price negotiated with Belgium's Distrigaz.

Algeria's oil production has fallen off significantly since the beginning of 1981 because of the current oil glut and the \$40 per barrel price of the crude. Algeria has begun seeking oil-for-goods barter deals to delay lowering its price of oil, but has met with little success thus far. Algeria offered to exchange oil for 15,000 Honda automobiles, but the Japanese company spokesman said the \$40 a barrel price was too high, particularly in light of Nigeria's recent \$4 discounting of its oil to \$36 per barrel. (*Financial Times*, August 24, 28 and October 5, 1981; *Economist*, October 3, 1981; *Wall Street Journal*, August 28 and September 21, 1981.)

Morocco

● Five leaders of the Moroccan **opposition party**, the Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP), including its secretary-general, Abderrahim Bouabid, were arrested in September for issuing a statement critical of King Hassan's acceptance of a referendum to decide the future of the disputed Western Sahara.

The USFP has said the referendum should not be restricted to the population of the Western Sahara, but should also allow Moroccans to have a voice in the territory's fu-

ture. Hassan had agreed to OAU proposals for a ceasefire and "controlled referendum" for the Western Sahara at the organization's summit in Nairobi and participated in an implementation meeting in August. The Moroccan government alleged that the USFP statement violated the nation's "dignity and morale."

After standing trial in Rabat in mid-September, Bouabid and two other USFP leaders were each sentenced to one-year prison terms. The two others were given one- and two-year suspended sentences.

Observers were surprised by the severity of the sentences, given the crime for which they were charged. The French Socialist Party condemned the Rabat court's verdict against the men, calling it a repression of opinion, which "in a democracy is unacceptable."

The USFP reacted with a communique which said, "The repression can only be explained as the deliberate aim of the reactionary Moroccan power to liquidate the USFP and the Democratic Confederation of Labor (CDT), that is, all the real opposition to [the government's] policies . . ."

Trials in Casablanca against six other USFP and CDT leaders, including Noubir Amaoui, CDT secretary-general and Mustapha Karchaoui, editor of the daily socialist *Al Moharrir*, were continuing in late September. The men were arrested in the wake of the June general strike against rising food prices in Casablanca. According to government figures, over 60 were killed and 100 injured in the rioting, looting and burning touched off by the strike. Opposition leaders maintained that over 600 were killed, many by police and army gunfire, and 2,000 arrested, the latter figure acknowledged by the government. (*Le Monde*, August 20, September 24, 26 and 28, 1981; Rabat Radio, September 10, 1981.)

Sudan

● In early October, President Gaafar al-Nimeiry dissolved Sudan's two parliaments in order to **decentralize power** further, according to Sudanese officials. New elections for the National People's Assembly in the north were sched-

uled to take place within 60 days. The Southern Region People's Assembly, the legislative body governing southern Sudan, has six months in which to call elections. Nimeiry also replaced Abel Alier, the senior official in the predominantly Christian/animist southern region, with a southern Moslem, Gen. Gasmallah Rassas, as president of a transitional government in the area.

The dissolution of the two assemblies was said to be aimed at cutting the size of the People's Assembly from 366 to 151, to reduce its responsibilities in areas such as health, education and welfare, and transfer them to the five regional assemblies set up in the north last year. Nimeiry said elections in the south will determine whether the residents there want to follow the north's decentralization plan.

There was no official indication as to whether the decentralization plan was connected to Sudan's recent troubles with Libya and its concerns over its internal security. In September skirmishes along Sudan's border with Chad, Sudan claimed that its air force shot down a Libyan bomber with the assistance of the Chad guerrilla group, Armed Forces of the North (FAN), led by Hissene Habre. FAN soldiers took refuge along the Sudan-Chad border after having been defeated in Ndjamena by President Gokouni Woddeye's forces with Libyan military assistance.

Sudan lodged a complaint with the UN Security Council in mid-September about "Libya's continued aggression against Sudanese territory and the overflights over Sudanese territory by its planes which are dropping bombs on its citizens."

The Khartoum government said it would "take the appropriate measures" against Libya if Tripoli's air raids on Sudanese towns did not stop.

The late Egyptian President Anwar Sadat sent his Vice President, Hosni Mubarak, to the U.S. in early October to convey to President Reagan an urgent request for American assistance to bolster Sudan's military forces in the face of the growing Libyan threat. Egypt has a defense agreement with Sudan

and fears that Libya might directly intervene in Sudan. Egyptian Defense Minister Mohamed Abu Ghazala said Sudan needs a rapid shipment of anti-aircraft missiles to defend itself against Libyan attacks.

The Sudanese government has also claimed that Libya is setting up an underground army called the "Libyan Salvation Army for the Liberation of Sudan," with revolutionary committees in Khartoum. Some members were among the 8,000 people detained last month in a security sweep. In addition, thousands of Sudanese workers have reportedly been expelled from Libya for not joining the liberation army.

The assassination of Sadat in early October has reportedly fueled fears by American officials that Sudan may become the target for increased Libyan activities. In the aftermath of Sadat's death, U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig said he did not want to exaggerate the possibility of a Libyan invasion of Sudan from Chad, but added, "I would be more concerned with internal mischief-making by Libya in Sudan proper as the most imminent danger, and there has been some activity assessed already in that direction." (New York Times, October 3, 6 and 8, 1981; Financial Times, October 6, 1981; London Guardian, September 17 and 30, 1981; Khartoum Radio, September 16, 1981.)

Tunisia

• In early September, over 100 members of the **Tunisian Islamic Movement** (MTI) were sentenced to jail terms of up to 11 years for a range of offenses, including illegal association, affronts to the dignity of the head of state and propagation of untruths. The Islamic fundamentalists were arrested in July. Thirty others were tried in absentia, six given suspended sentences and two acquitted. Rashid Ghannouchi, MTI president, and Abdelfattah Mourou, secretary-general, received 11- and ten-year terms respectively.

The fundamentalists have been demanding that Islam be established as a public institution dominating government and public life and that President Habib Bour-

guiba's secular reforms be overturned.

The MTI had applied to be registered as a political party with the aim of "reviving Tunisia's Islamic character" when the government announced the inauguration of the multi-party system in June. But the movement does not meet the government requirement that parties must "comply with the constitution, reject fanaticism, violence and ideological dependence on foreign powers." The government has accused the movement of using Islam "to camouflage its true wish to destabilize the nation."

The arrests of the MTI leaders came after a series of incidents, including a June attack during the Moslem holy month of Ramadan, on foreign tourists at the Club Mediterranean, and violence in schools and university campuses.

Meanwhile, the Tunisian government is committed to hold its first multi-party legislative elections in early November. The previously banned Communist Party has been legalized and, after initial hesitance, has announced that it will run a limited number of candidates in the election. The Democratic Socialist Movement, also initially reserved about participation, has agreed to take part in the elections. (Washington Post, October 6, 1981; Jeune Afrique, September 16, 1981; London Guardian, August 31, 1981.)

Western Sahara

• The OAU committee on the Western Sahara, composed of the heads of state of Guinea, Mali, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Sudan and Tanzania, meeting in Nairobi in August under President Daniel arap Moi's chairmanship, came up with a **compromise plan** for a ceasefire and referendum, which it is hoped, will put an end to the war in the disputed Western Sahara.

King Hassan of Morocco and Polisario secretary-general Mohamed Abdelaziz, as well as Algerian President Chadli Benjedid and Mohamed Khouna Ould Heydalla of Mauritania, also participated in the meeting.

The compromise plan worked out took into account both Moroccan

and Polisario prerequisites for agreement and attempted to narrow the differences between the two parties' positions. The first step will involve negotiations for a ceasefire between Morocco and Polisario under the OAU committee's aegis. After the ceasefire, both sides will be confined to their bases. An impartial interim administration of police, civilians and military, assisted by an "adequate number of OAU and/or UN peacekeeping forces," will work with existing Moroccan authorities in the region to create conditions for the referendum.

The basis of voter eligibility for inhabitants of the Western Sahara will be the 1974 Spanish census, but exiled Sahrawis will be eligible after having been vetted through the UN High Commission for Refugees.

Hassan gained on one point at issue by having the committee's approval to keep his troops and administration in the area, to which Polisario had raised strong objections. Morocco had previously refused to negotiate directly with Polisario on the ceasefire, but according to the compromise plan, the two adversaries will have to negotiate directly through the committee.

On the number of eligible voters for the referendum, Polisario has gained, as Morocco claimed to recognize only the 74,000 counted in the Spanish census as bona fide Sahrawis. Polisario claims that there are nearly one million Sahrawis, but the UNHCR number of 230,000 will be used as a reference, to be adjusted to take into account "an internationally recognized rate of population growth."

Observers regarded the Nairobi meeting as a substantial success for the OAU. Tanzanian Foreign Minister Salim Salim said following the meeting that a great deal remained to be done before the Western Sahara problem is resolved. He said, "This was a very difficult meeting dealing with an extremely complex issue," and it is believed that the most difficult part of the negotiations lies ahead—face-to-face discussions between Polisario and Morocco on conditions for the ceasefire. (*West Africa*, August 31, 1981; *Kenya Weekly Review*, August 28, 1981.)

SOUTHERN AFRICA

Angola

● In late September, the U.S. Senate voted to repeal the **Clark amendment**, adopted in 1976 to outlaw American assistance to the Unita rebels led by Jonas Savimbi and who are waging a guerrilla war to overthrow the Angolan government of President José Eduardo dos Santos.

An amendment authored by Sen. Paul Tsongas (D-Mass), which would have kept the Clark amendment in force until March 31, 1983, or until a ceasefire is attained in Namibia, was defeated in a 66-29 vote.

Debates in the Senate on the amendment centered on what type of signal its repeal would send to Africa and how it would affect the negotiations over Namibia. Opponents of the repeal said it might anger the Angolan government and discourage it from assisting in a peaceful solution to the Namibia conflict.

Supporters of the repeal said the amendment was an unnecessary restriction on the President's ability to conduct foreign policy, and by tying his hands, was an invitation for continued Cuban and Soviet intervention on the continent. Sen. Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz) said, "If we're a world power—and I think we are—we need muscle in the President's office to act like a world power."

Author of the repeal amendment, Sen. Nancy Landon Kassebaum (R-Kan), said its implementation in 1976 was an "extraordinary measure" enacted during an "extraordinary time," the era after Watergate and Vietnam.

Republicans were quick to point out that the Reagan administration has no current plans to supply aid to Angola. The Kassebaum amendment would permit such aid, but not without prior Congressional approval. It was attached to the foreign aid authorization bill, but there are doubts as to whether the House of Representatives will pass a foreign aid bill this year. The version of the bill approved by the House contains the Clark amendment and Democratic leaders said they will

not bring the full bill to the House floor until 125 Republicans agree to support it. They currently lack the necessary votes to enact the bill.

● The U.S. vetoed a UN resolution in August condemning South Africa's recent raids into Angola, claiming that the invasion had to be seen in the wider context, stressing a link between the South African incursion and the presence of Cuban troops in Angola, along with Soviet and East German advisers and equipment.

However, in early October, the Foreign Minister of Angola's former colonial power, Portugal, in Washington for talks with American officials, said it would be "suicide" for Angola to ask the Cubans to leave unless its southern border was secure against South African invasions.

Andre Gonçalves Pereira said the Reagan administration had assured him that no military action "or even direct military help" to the Unita rebels was being considered in Washington.

He said that many Angolans regard the Cubans as a costly and disruptive presence in their country and most moderates in Angola want to see them leave. Additionally, the Cubans are a drain on hard currency, costing Angola \$250 million a year.

"The Angolans know they are no match for the South Africans," Pereira said. "...Recent events, mainly the South African raid this summer, have not helped. The Cubans and Soviets have more influence in Angola now than they had two months ago." (*New York Times*, October 1 and 3, 1981; *Washington Post*, October 1, 1981.)

Lesotho

● A series of **explosions** rocked Maseru in early September, resulting in extensive damage and injuries to several people. The Maseru airport, the American Cultural Center, the Hilton Hotel and Holiday Inn, a bar owned by the Minister of Transport and the car of the West German ambassador were all targets of the bomb attacks, responsibility for which was claimed by the Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA), the military wing of the outlawed Basotho Congress Party (BCP).

The attacks are believed to be an escalation of the low-level guerrilla war waged by the LLA to force the Prime Minister, Chief Leabua Jonathan, to hold the first open election in 11 years. Elections in 1970 were canceled and the BCP outlawed when preliminary results suggested that Jonathan's Basotho National Party would be defeated by the BCP.

The bombings have been accompanied by disappearances and murders of several influential opposition supporters. Edgar Motuba, editor of Lesotho's ecumenical newspaper, *Leselinyana*, was kidnaped from his home in early September and later found murdered. Four others have been abducted, of whom two were found dead. Ben Masilo, head of the Lesotho Christian Council, and Odilon Seheri, a close associate of King Moshoe-shoe II, were still reported missing.

The government's paramilitary force, the Police Mobile Unit, or vigilantes disguised as the police but acting on the regime's behalf, are suspected of carrying out the kidnappings and murders. However, the government agreed to allow Amnesty International to investigate Motuba's murder and Masilo's abduction.

Jonathan has claimed that South Africa is providing support for the LLA, allowing it to operate from bases in the Orange Free State. The chief of the South African security police, Lieut. Gen. Coetzee, recently warned Lesotho that two could play at the game of allowing free passage for rebels—implying that South Africa might turn a blind eye to use of its territory by the LLA. South Africa claims Lesotho allows the African National Congress to store arms and infiltrate them into South Africa.

Lesotho's Minister of Information, Charles Molapo, said recently that the leader of the LLA, Ntsu Mokhehle, is directing his guerrilla campaign from the Qwa Qwa homeland in South Africa. Molapo added that Lesotho would not stop giving humanitarian aid and sanctuary to opponents of apartheid. (*Sowetan*, September 19 and 24, 1981; *Economist*, September 19, 1981; *New York Times*, September 17, 1981; *London Observer*, September 13,

1981; *Financial Times*, September 11, 1981; *London Guardian*, September 11, 1981.)

Mozambique

● Activities of the **Mozambique Resistance Movement (MRM)**, a South African-backed guerrilla force formed in opposition to the Machel government, were stepped up in September, with heavy clashes reported between the guerrillas and Mozambican armed forces in the Manica and Chicualacuala provinces, near where the borders of Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe meet.

In late August, six electricity pylons supplying the port of Beira were blown up near Chimoi, in Manica province. Then Beira's power supplies were hit again with an attack on a power station. Reports in early September indicated that the Mozambican army had cleared the rebels from an area in southern Manica, but by that action had pushed the guerrillas into previously unaffected parts of neighboring provinces.

Mozambique has been concentrating activities on protection of the Beira-Umtali corridor, which provides Zimbabwe with critical road, rail and oil pipeline links to the sea.

And in September, the Mozambican government accused South Africa of increasing its military forces, including tanks and heavy artillery, on the frontier and of ferrying supplies to the MRM rebels. The Defense Ministry said South African aircraft had violated Mozambican airspace 40 times since last year, frequently to parachute arms to the guerrillas.

In late September, five Mozambicans were sentenced to death by a military tribunal in Chimoio after having been convicted of voluntarily joining the MRM. The men are from Manica province and were said to have participated in attacks on shops, villages, and Mozambique army positions.

The rebels broadcast for the first time their political program in August over "Voice of Free Africa," which, it is said, transmits from South Africa. The main aim of the MRM is the "extinction of the communist system" in Mozambique and the formation of a "national

reconciliation" government to be charged with holding elections. It said all nationalizations carried out by the Maputo government will be reviewed and the private sector must be "the dynamizing sector of the economy." (*London Guardian*, September 8, 14 and 29, 1981; *Kenya Weekly Review*, September 18, 1981; *Johannesburg Star*, August 19, 1981.)

South Africa

● Four men armed with AK-47 automatic rifles and grenades attacked a **police station** in the homeland of BophuthaTswana on September 3, killing two policemen and a civilian.

The attack was in Mabopane, a black township only about 20 miles from Pretoria, but inside the boundaries of the homeland made "independent" by the South African government.

Since February 1978, there have been seven attacks on police stations, a favored target of guerrillas belonging to the banned African National Congress. South African police immediately set up roadblocks after the attack, which was apparently carried out by men in a Johannesburg-registered car. (*Sowetan*, September 4 and 9, 1981; *Johannesburg Star*, September 4, 1981.)

● An official of the black consciousness Congress of South African Students (Cosas) was released from **detention** in September after 108 days in security police custody.

Wandile Zulu, 25, called his imprisonment "an ordeal in a rathole and an experience under the Terrorism Act that nobody would wish to undergo." Zulu was detained May 16 during the period that Cosas and other organizations were organizing anti-Republic Day boycotts. He said police interrogated him extensively about his and Cosas' activities. (*Sowetan*, September 3, 1981.)

● The "illegal" drinking places in black townships called **shebeens**, usually run out of residents' homes, have been declared by the South African government "an acceptable social phenomenon" and can now be legalized.

For years, shebeen owners—who buy their liquor from the government-run stores—have complained

of police harassment and have campaigned for legalization.

The licenses will be issued by the government-set up community councils that nominally run the black townships, provided that applicants meet certain restrictions, among them that rooms must be set aside for the public and not be used as part of the residence. This provision will probably disqualify most shebeen license applicants.

The government official in charge noted that "the conditions of many of the shebeens make it impossible to issue licenses in respect of all shebeens." The official added that "an opportunity is . . . being provided for black people to establish hotels, restaurants, etc."

Shortly after the legalization announcement, police mounted massive raids on Soweto shebeens. "As long as they are still illegal they will be raided," said a police spokesman, (*Sowetan*, September 3 and 9, 1981.)

- The controversial **President's Council**, composed mostly of National Party parliamentarians and a group of Coloureds (mixed-race people) and Asians—but no blacks—has indicated it may not be so tame as thought.

The 60-member council in September repudiated the forced removal of blacks from so-called "white" areas under the Group Areas Act, a cornerstone of apartheid. Specifically, the council said the government should give back the District Six area of Cape Town to the 65,000 Coloureds and Asians who once lived there but were forcibly removed to make the neighborhood all-white. Also, the council recommended that the Group Areas Act should be investigated because of the "racial antagonism" it causes. (*Christian Science Monitor*, September 18, 1981.)

- A gold and precious metals **investment** company has been formed in London to capitalize on investors who shun South African investments because of apartheid.

The company, Precious Metals Trust, has been structured to suit local British authorities, pension funds, trust companies and individual investors "who have taken their own decision to have nothing to do

with South Africa," according to David Montagu, a company director.

Ironically, Montagu and another director, Robert Loder, have close links with South Africa. Montagu is former chairman of the Samuel Montagu bullion firm in South Africa and Loder is a former executive director with the giant Anglo American Corp. conglomerate.

Precious Metals Trust will avoid companies incorporated in South Africa or "having a major part of their activities" there and will instead focus on gold companies operating in Canada, Australia and the U.S. (*Johannesburg Star*, September 12, 1981.)

- The subsidiary of a British multinational, Chloride Batteries, has recognized the unregistered **Metal and Allied Workers Union** at its Benoni factory after a referendum showed that 70 percent of the black work force wanted the union.

Earlier, Chloride recognized the militant South African Allied Workers' Union after referendums at two eastern Cape plants.

The Metal and Allied Workers' Union is affiliated with Fosatu, the Federation of South African Trade Unions. (*Johannesburg Star*, September 12, 1981.)

Zimbabwe

- There have been increasing **rifts** between Zimbabwe's ruling party, Zanu-PF, and the minority parties, particularly Zanu's coalition partner, Joshua Nkomo's Zapu party.

Recently, Prime Minister Robert Mugabe has stepped up his talk about having a one-party state, to the concern of Nkomo and the smaller parties. Nkomo is also worried about the training by North Koreans of a 5,000 man brigade. The Zapu leader, who has denounced the brigade at every opportunity, describes it as a Zanu private army and reportedly fears it may be used to impose a Zanu one-party state.

Similar objections have been voiced by Bishop Abel Muzorewa's party, which holds three seats in the 100-seat parliament, and by the 20-seat all-white party of Ian Smith.

Mugabe has made no secret of his wish that Zimbabwe eventually become a one-party state but insists it should be achieved through popular

consent rather than by government decree.

However, the strains between Zanu and Zapu got worse in October when Dr. Eddison Zvobgo, the Minister of Local Government and Housing, said Zanu is "losing patience" with Zapu. He said that if Zapu wanted to remain in the coalition, it must support Mugabe's policies completely. "If Zapu wants to quit and be in opposition, let them be our guests," Zvobgo said.

Previously, the Home Affairs Minister, Richard Hove, had said the government might curb political rallies by the minority parties.

Mugabe has also ordered the restructuring of Zanu. Zvobgo said in a radio broadcast that the reorganization is to give the party "a mammoth outlook" that will result in "other puppet parties finding it difficult to exist." (*London Guardian*, September 16, 30 and October 3, 1981; *London Times*, September 22, 1981; *Salisbury Radio*, September 6, 1981.)

- Zimbabwe's huge **maize surplus** of about 700,000 tons is being exported to its neighbors. However, because of transport problems caused by the decline in relations between Zimbabwe and South Africa, the country is having trouble meeting its export commitments.

Earlier this year, South Africa abruptly withdrew 25 locomotives loaned to Zimbabwe, severely disrupting the country's rail network. The withdrawal also reduced Zimbabwe supplies of diesel fuel, which are imported from South Africa by rail. The diesel shortage has endangered Zimbabwe's expected 6,000-ton coffee production.

To help alleviate the problem, Zimbabwe has borrowed 19 locomotives from its neighbors—nine from Mozambique, four from Zambia and six from Botswana, which ironically were on loan from South Africa.

By the end of the year, Zimbabwe hopes to end its dependence on South Africa for fuel, by refurbishing the pipeline from Beira in neighboring Mozambique to Umtali. (*London Guardian*, September 30, 1981; *Africa Research Bulletin*, September 30, 1981; *London Times*, September 24, 1981; *Financial Times*, August 18, 1981.)

Trade, Tourism, and Mild Repression

BY F.S.B. KAZADI


At the 1981 Organization of African Unity summit in Kenya, as heads-of-government debated the numerous disputes on the continent, the name of one mediator, Togo's President Gnassingbe Eyadema, surfaced repeatedly.

In fact, the frequency with which President Eyadema has moderated Africa's regional disputes has led to his characterization in international circles as an arbiter, and to the dubbing of his small West African nation — the site of many international conferences — the "Switzerland" of Africa.

President Eyadema has been a principle mediator in the Chad civil war. In the spring of 1980 he crossed the Chari River from Cameroon to Ndjamea under fire to meet with Chadian President Goukouni Woddeye and former Prime Minister Hissen Habre. At a conference in Lomé he succeeded in persuading the two rivals to sign a ceasefire agreement that was implemented but eventually broke down.

President Eyadema also has mediated in the five-year-old Western Sahara conflict, the border dispute between Mali and Upper Volta in the mid-1970s, and the dispute between Benin and Gabon a few years later.

F.S.B. Kazadi is an American freelance writer with 20 years experience in Africa who recently visited Togo.



In addition, the president has been a strong proponent of regional cooperation, encouraging West Africa's French-speaking nations to join the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); seeking to correlate the activities of the West African Entente group with other regional organizations; and organizing with the Benin government the Mono River hydroelectric scheme, which is designed to reduce the two countries' dependence on electric power from Ghana.

These activities have enhanced President Eyadema's standing throughout Africa and to a lesser degree in the French-speaking world and the Third World.

Another result of these activities has been the rise of Lomé (population 250,000) as a major conference center and regional headquarters for West Af-

rica. The ECOWAS Fund, the West African Monetary Union, and the West African Development Bank are based in Lomé. And the city was the venue for a major international trade and development agreement, the Lomé Convention, signed in the early 1970s between the European Economic Community and over 50 developing nations in Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific.

Lomé boasts a half-dozen luxury hotels that lie near the beach. The newest of these, the 35-story Hotel Deux Février, offers several restaurants, a theatre, conference halls, 400 guest rooms, and 52 presidential suites. Two kilometers down Lomé's coastal boulevard, a compound of cozy villas houses the permanent council of the Entente.

The government encourages international conferences in Lomé and it promotes tourism. The relatively low cost of living — when compared, for example, to Abidjan or Lagos — draws thousands of visitors each year from Western Europe and Scandinavia. And the availability of low-cost imported goods draws shoppers from Ghana, Benin, Upper Volta, and Nigeria.

The government's drive to expand tourism can be seen elsewhere in the country. A resort, complete with paddleboats and sail-equipped surfboards, operates on Lake Togo. A replica of a medieval castle near Kpalime is being renovated. And plans

have been announced to build hotels on the coast near the border with Benin, in the north near the border with Upper Volta, and in a number of provincial cities.

The Togolese government estimates that the number of hotel beds has increased from several hundred in the mid-1970s to 3,000 in 1980. Nearly 100,000 tourists have reportedly visited Togo in the past year or so. And the hotel industry, which now employs 3,000 persons, has reported an annual income that increased from \$4 million in 1976 to \$10 million in 1979.

Tourism, however, has been a relatively minor source of foreign exchange for the Togolese government. Historically, the nation of 2.5 million people has depended primarily on its exports—phosphates, coffee, cocoa, cotton, and cloth.

Phosphates account for 40 percent of Togo's export earnings. With an annual production of approximately three million tons in recent years, phosphates remain the backbone of Togo's economy. Although prices on the world market have been low since 1976, they have been increasing lately. As a result, the Togolese government is adding a fifth treatment line and a second recovery plant to its processing facilities on the coast, some 15 miles east of Lomé.

Coffee and cocoa revenues, which

account for one-third of export earnings, have been declining since the late 1960s. A government project to replant and rehabilitate the groves, begun in 1975, has brought an increase in coffee production — from 4,800 tons in 1978 to 6,000 tons in 1979, for example. Despite similar efforts in the cocoa industry, however, production has declined from a high of 18,700 tons in 1969 to 12,500 tons in 1979.

The palm oil industry has suffered a serious decline, but cotton has risen from 6,000 tons in the mid-1970s to 22,000 tons in 1979. The increase in cotton production has prompted plans to build a second textile plant in northern Togo to increase production of the high-quality cloth for which the country is renowned.

In the mid-1970s, when the price for phosphates reached a record high of \$65 per ton, the Togolese government embarked on a number of ambitious projects to develop secondary industry. These projects, however, have met with little success.

A cement cliner plant, built in cooperation with Ghana and the Ivory Coast, has been losing money, and an oil refinery, which processes Nigerian crude and sells it on the spot market, showed a profit when spot market prices were high, but has been hard hit by the oil surplus on the world market. Two other projects, a steel mill and a thermal power plant, have been victims of high petroleum prices and are not expected to operate economically.

In the agricultural sector, the Togolese government is seeking self-sufficiency by the mid-1980s. It has launched a mass education program aimed at training farmers and discouraging them from migrating to the city. It is planning to build, with assistance from the World Bank, a plant to make fertilizer from low-grade phosphates. And it has engaged in a number of smaller projects with foreign organizations, such as a hog farm in southeastern Togo operated in cooperation with the U.S.-based Opportunities Industrialization Centers (OIC).

Despite the efforts in development and partly because of them, Togo continues to suffer economic problems similar to those afflicting many Third World countries.

When the prices for its exports slumped in 1976 and 1977 the government faced a severe debt burden, the repayment of which was exacerbated by the rising cost of imported oil.

Togo's external debt reached \$1 billion by the late 1970s, more than its yearly gross national product. Thirty percent of export earnings were being used for debt servicing. The government's budget and balance-of-payments ledgers were recording deficits of \$30 million and \$10 million, respectively. And the economic growth rate had dropped from approximately 7 percent in 1975 to 2 percent in 1979.

The Togolese government negotiated several agreements with the International Monetary Fund in the late 1970s, under which it agreed to reduce its budget and balance-of-payments deficits, restrict growth of credit and money supply, and maintain its debt repayments. The government had fallen some \$100 million in arrears, but its creditors, reacting favorably to Togo's liberal trade policies and open economy, rescheduled the debt. Economists predict that a solution to Togo's debt problem primarily depends on a rise in commodity prices.

By 1980, rising government revenues resulting from increased taxes and rising prices for exports, coupled with the austerity measures, had reduced the budget and balance-of-payments deficit by half. A visit to Togo this year revealed that despite the high cost of living, the markets of Lomé, Aneho, and other Togolese cities were filled with goods: local produce and meat, imported watches, fans, wines, cheese, and canned goods; the streets and roads were clogged with motorcycles and taxis; and the sidewalks were often blocked with vendors selling goods ranging from Dutch powdered milk to Ghanaian toilet paper.

Indeed, the traditional market in Togo is challenging the American-style department store. In Lomé the main market is housed in a three-story cement building the shape and size of a parking garage. Next to it, the local authorities are building a five-story annex with show windows and granite facades.

Togolese long have been known for their free-marketing, and their free-



The 35-story Hotel Deux Février in Lomé is said to be losing \$1 million per month

Photo: F. S. B. Kazadi

marketing has caused friction at times with their neighbors.

In 1976, for example, relations with Ghana soured over accusations that Togolese authorities were allowing farmers to smuggle Ghanaian cocoa and coffee into Togo and were running a black market in Ghanaian currency. Togo denied the charges.

Trade and money also have caused internal problems. The inhabitants of the southern, coastal region have traded and mixed with Europeans and Asians for centuries, whereas the agrarian northerners historically have traded primarily with the merchants of the Sahel and Sahara.

The north-south dichotomy of the territory was further complicated after World War II, when the former German possession was partitioned by Britain and France under a United Nations mandate. In 1957 the residents of British Togoland voted to join what was then the Gold Coast to become the independent nation of Ghana. On April 27, 1960 the residents of French Togoland, in an especially smooth transition, severed their ties with France and became fully independent.

During the colonial era, many southerners received Western-style educations and entered professions and the civil service, while the northerners continued their subsistence farming or entered the army.

In elections prior to Togo's independence, Sylvanus Olympio, a member of a wealthy southern trading family, won 90 percent of the vote and became president. His *Unité Togolaise* (UT) party won all 51 seats in the national assembly. However, President Olympio was assassinated on January 13, 1963, and then Lt. Col. Etienne Eyadema took temporary control. The following May, Togolese voters adopted a new constitution, elected new assemblymen from the four major parties, and chose Nicholas Grunitsky, the late president's brother-in-law, to be prime minister.

During the mid-1960s, the Grunitsky government was criticized by northerners for favoring the coastal groups, and its ministers were accused by opposition politicians of corruption and elitism.

On January 13, 1967, Lt. Col. Eyadema took power in a military



Photo: Camerapix

President Eyadema has moderated many of Africa's regional disputes

coup. He suspended the constitution and the assembly, and ruled by decree through the Committee of National Reconciliation until 1972, when he was elected president. In December 1979, Togolese voters elected President Eyadema to a second seven-year term and adopted a new constitution. The constitution established a strong executive and one-party government under the president's *Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais* (RPT).

President Eyadema, whom diplomats characterize as the "strong, silent type," is a professional soldier from the north who makes no attempt to hide his admiration for his friend, Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire.

President Eyadema banned all opposition parties, established RPT cells in most villages, and embarked on an authenticity movement, which among other changes caused Togolese to drop their Western names.

Eyadema also has instituted a "cult of the president." Whenever he appears publicly in Togo, the "Helmsman" or "Guide" is cheered by hundreds of RPT animators who — in coordinated uniforms — dance and chant the praises of Togo's "savior."

The president's activities are reported daily on the front-page of Togo's main newspaper, *La Nouvelle Marche*. His photograph appears almost daily on the front page, above the fold. And Eyadema's life and exploits are recounted in a glossy comic book that begins, "Once upon a time, there was Eyadema."

The president is depicted in the local media as a demigod who escaped unscathed from an airplane crash in 1974. The crash killed four passengers and wounded many others. One week later the president reappeared in Lomé dressed in white. He blamed the crash on "international high finance" and nationalized Togo's phosphate industry. The site of the crash has been enshrined and the date of Eyadema's triumphant reappearance is now a national holiday.

President Eyadema is credited with bringing greater northern representation into the government. He has improved Togo's infrastructure, particularly its roads, to strengthen commercial links between the coastal areas and the north. And he is said to have kept his country relatively free from the corruption that has damaged the

economies of a number of other African nations.

Despite its liberal economic and trade policies, Togo's political system is severe and permits no dissent. A diplomat with years of experience in the country characterized Togo as a "mild police state." Eyadema, he said, "doesn't execute or hold large-scale roundups of his enemies. He has too much political savvy to be too repressive, but he is as repressive as he has to be."

The U.S. State Department estimates that Togo's prisons hold 100-200 political prisoners. As one American living in Togo said, "People disappear for a time. The authorities detain them and pretend to throw away the key." A number of Togolese journalists have also been detained in recent years. They have been held for several months and released, without ever being charged. One Lomé resident called it treatment designed to demoralize and humiliate.

President Eyadema shuffles his cabinet frequently to prevent his subordinates from building power bases. High functionaries are often fired without warning and remain unemployed for months before being reassigned to low-level jobs at considerably lower salaries. The official media tells the public they have been "called to other duties."


President Eyadema faces a persistent opposition, centered primarily around Gilchrist Olympio, jetsetting son of the former president of Togo and leader of the exiled Movement for Togolese Democracy.

In October 1977, in an operation that the Togolese government says was financed by Olympio and other exiled Togolese families, a group of mercenaries attempted to assassinate President Eyadema and engineer a coup d'état. The coup was foiled by a tip from the British Foreign Office transmitted through the American ambassador in Lomé. On the basis of testimony by two participants captured in Togo, the government tried 10 participants, eight of them in absentia, and sentenced them to death. The execution of the two prisoners was stayed in 1979.

In mid-1980, Olympio mounted a public relations campaign against

President Eyadema. He told syndicated columnist Jack Anderson that the president had rounded up entire tribes and held them incommunicado from the outside world. In an interview with reporter Bernard Nossiter, Olympio compared Eyadema to former Ugandan President Idi Amin, saying that President Eyadema used torture in his jails and took commissions on development projects.

The Togolese government countered with half-page advertisements in major U.S. newspapers to deny the charges and accuse Olympio of seeking to reestablish the Olympio regime, calling it "the perfect model of an oligarchy run by the Afro-Brazilian bourgeoisie whose sole ambition was to loot the riches of the country."



Phosphates refinery: Phosphates account for 40 percent of Togo's export earnings

Photo: F.S.B. Kazadi

When tensions flare in Togo, the country bogs down in road blocks and security checks. Most suspected are the Togolese elite and the country's substantial European population, which suddenly appears more "mercenary" than usual.

As one critic said, "Eyadema's problem is that he has no vision. He doesn't listen to Togo's considerable intelligent population, preferring instead to listen to sycophantic advisors. He seeks pan-African status to use to political advantage at home. He throws money at friends and calls it development."

Despite his reputation, Eyadema can

count on long-standing, friendly ties with West Germany, the United States, and a number of other European nations.

West Germany continues to invest significant sums — both private and public — into the Togolese economy. The excellent Togolese brewery outside Lomé is one example of the fruits of this friendship. Critics note, however, that Bonn does not seem concerned about human rights violations in Togo.

In fact, the European community views Eyadema rather favorably and is according his government a broad spectrum of aid.

The U.S. "profile" is far lower in Togo than that of France or West Germany. American diplomats have voiced concerns in private about the authoritarian nature of the regime. Publicly, however, the State Department sees Eyadema's authoritarianism and human rights record as an "internal matter." As one official said, "Eyadema's strict, but that's his business."

Washington could adopt a tougher stance on human rights problems in Togo with very little risk to its all-pervasive "interests." That it has not done so is attributed most often to Togo's moderate (if not anticommunist) stance and Eyadema's influence in regional affairs.

The new government in France, however, is said to be causing the Togolese leader some worry. The son of French President François Mitterrand was the French Press Agency's correspondent in Lomé for two years. He has returned home and, as one foreigner said, "There's no telling what skeletons he has hauled out to show daddy."

The French connection, however, is a major one for Lomé and as long as Togo's problems remain off the front page, the connection is likely to remain.

Continued economic hardship among the masses and political dissatisfaction among the elite could give Eyadema some problems at home; and his authoritarianism could produce problems abroad. However, for the moment, neither of these is likely to happen. □

Aid as Foreign Policy

BY GOLER TEAL BUTCHER

The preoccupation of policymakers and some columnists with the Soviet threat in Africa is distracting the United States from its real interests in the region. Africa is too independent for external designs and cold war scenarios to form the basis for U.S. concern. The recurring obsession with Soviet machinations in Africa prevents us from taking note of the forces of political and economic crises on the African scene today. The internal elements of political combustion are being heated up in southern Africa by the implacable violence of a repressive minority regime, comforted by the current U.S. policy of "constructive engagement" toward Pretoria. The gravitational pull of chronic economic crises and malfunctioning economies can only be toward political instability. Insolvency and poverty, disease and

Goler Teal Butcher is a professor of law at Howard University, Washington, D.C. She was formerly assistant administrator for Africa at the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID).



In Africa, struggles against the deprivation and disabilities of underdevelopment continue

Photo: Alain Noguea/Syoma

famine in societies caught up in the vortex of global inflation and recession augur endemic turmoil. We ignore these portents at our peril, whether our African policy derives from a regionalist or globalist framework; that is, whether we are focused on the U.S. interest in a healthy African policy or we are propelled by an East-West viewpoint and a determination to root out the seeds that spawn Soviet-influence. We need a foreign policy embracing both a realistic political response to the erupting drive of the people of southern Africa against oppression and an economic response commensurate with Africa's needs.

After two decades of political independence, the uphill struggle of the Af-

rican countries against the deprivation, diseases, and disabilities of underdevelopment is imperiled by a complex of factors—internal, external, and global. We need to pause and view the picture of the African economies today, for that canvas holds the story that would, were we to assess it, impel us to see its implications not only for Africa but for U.S. interests.

Notwithstanding abundant mineral and oil resources, more arable cropland than any other developing region, and mighty rivers with the world's greatest hydroelectric potential, the economic scene in Africa today is sobering, with the partial exception of the oil-producing countries. The deteriorating economic picture is a widespread phenomenon, even though African countries are diverse in economic structure, income levels, development policies, physical differences, and political characteristics accentuated by both different colonial heritages and post-colonial approaches to development.

If we pause to study the African scene, we see, first, that it is overcast by the faltering growth of the African countries in the 1970s. Although overall data mask substantial variations

among individual countries, growth in sub-Saharan Africa during the decade lagged behind that of the other parts of the Third World and was at a slower rate than in the first decade of independence. This was true across all sectors. If we use figures available at the beginning of the year, the following picture emerges (here, we use "Africa" to refer to sub-Saharan Africa): For the 1970s, aggregate gross national product (GNP) rose in Africa only about 3.4% a year (down from 4.5% in the 1960s), and there was only about 1% GNP growth in per capita terms. This contrasts with the 5.3% annual average rise in GNP for all developing countries in the last decade. Agricultural growth in Africa was only 1.1% a year compared with 2.9% for all less-developed countries. In the 1970s, African growth in manufacturing averaged 3.05% as compared to the Third World average of 5.5%, down from the figures of 9.78% for less-developed countries (LDCs) and 7.85% for Africa in the 1960s. Africa's growth in export volume averaged only 0.11% from 1970 to 1978.

Secondly, when we look at the picture of the African economies, we see the balance of payments spectre in immediate stark relief. For, as the decade of the 70s ended, industrialized and developing countries alike were confronted by changes in the international economic situation, such as the 1978-79 rise in the price of oil, exchange rate fluctuations, global inflation, and slow growth in the industrialized countries echoing their stagflation in the developing countries. In turn, this affected the export volume of the African countries as well as the terms of trade between the African exports of raw materials and their imports of manufactured goods and petroleum products. Although the terms of trade for the non-oil-exporting African countries varied considerably, their purchasing power has been markedly falling.

These factors, compounded by the earlier slowdown in growth, were precursors of the present financial crises afflicting Africa continent-wide. Approximately half of the declining trade receipts are being utilized for debt ser-

ving and increasingly costly food imports. Oil imports take a significant part of the remaining half, as compared to 1973 when such imports took less than 10% of foreign exchange earnings. Now, most countries pay about one-fourth of their earnings for oil and, for some, oil gobbles up 40% or more of their trade earnings. Yet, although the development process itself requires increasing use of commercial energy, some of these countries, constrained by cost realities, are using less oil now to meet their energy needs than they were using before in the first half of the 70s. In simple terms, this means not only a setback in the ability of the governments to implement their national development plans across all sectors, but the progress they have already achieved may be negated. For example, people living in remote villages who, because of the deep drilling of oil powered wells, benefited and gained reasonably close access to clean water are now, because of the skyrocketing cost of oil, forced to re-learn old ways of getting water.

The African picture clearly reveals the wave of deficits across Africa in Anglophone and Francophone countries. An increasing number of countries have or are considering agreements with the International Monetary Fund. I have attended a number of consortium meetings called by the World Bank, at the request of a nation, for donors to meet with government officials to consider both the factors contributing to their instant financial plight and projected donor support as the government moves to tighten its belt and reverse the downward slide. Some of the countries who used short-term borrowings on the commercial markets (in addition to IMF aid) to tide them over, are now coming to the ends of the grace period and the time for repayments in foreign exchange is almost upon them.

The ramifications both of these negative economic indicators and of the belt-tightening programs for the development progress of the countries are stark. Especially acute are financial crises when food larders and shelves are empty because of failed harvests or other setbacks and the money for food

imports and shipping costs must be found.

Thirdly, if we zoom in on this picture of Africa, we see the intractable problems of underdevelopment aggravated by natural and political factors. We see whole regions afflicted. In 1980 drought stalked East Africa. In 1981 floods were causing human and agricultural havoc. Out of this pattern of recurring natural disasters has come traumatic migrations of people. We see further the human toll from political conflict and minority rule in massive displacement of peoples. The UN high commissioner for refugees has referred to the situation of five million refugees as the worst refugee situation in the world. This figure includes the two million persons internally displaced because of drought or natural disaster. Their condition is precarious and remains dependent upon continuous relief efforts. Moreover, refugees place a burden on the countries of refuge. African host countries take care as well as they can of refugees, but this in turn lessens their ability to address the development constraints facing their own people.

Fourth, we see that all of these crises indicators, juxtaposed on the general background of underdevelopment in Africa, where two-thirds of the LDCs are found, is crippling the effort of the countries to continue to make outstanding advances in raising their low health indicators for infant mortality, life expectancy, and literacy. Their ability to maintain their considerable rate of progress here is severely threatened.

Further, the African governments are being disabled from further progress in providing the infrastructure that is the prerequisite for continuing development. Africa, with its 14 landlocked countries and heritage of a transportation system designed for the use of colonial powers and not for internal and intra-African development, must continue its remarkable progress in building roads for the movement of people, goods, and services. Still, too often crops rot because the dirt roads to the market are impassable much of the year, including harvest time.

Fifth, on the near horizon, we see the most serious harbinger of crises: the picture of falling food productivity on a continent where population growth is outstripping agricultural growth and where agricultural yields are among the lowest in the world. African cereal yields are about half, and root crops about two-thirds those of Asia. A 12-million metric ton food deficit is projected by 1990. Africa is the only area of the world where agricultural productivity declined over the past two decades. The economic cost is a rising food import bill that exacerbates the foreign exchange scarcities: Cereal imports tripled from 1960 to 1979. Even more, because of rising food prices, the cost of food imports is now double that of 1970. The decline in agricultural output, both food and cash crops, can be seen as the most serious internal cause of poverty. The World Bank, in its *Annual Report 1980*, finds that for West Africa, "poor agricultural performance remains the main cause of persistent poverty," calling it the "heart of the development problem for eastern Africa." Moreover, the nutritional implications are vast.

Despite the veritable array of natural problems, including fragile soil, drought-prone climate, seasonal and cyclical floods, and disease-carrying insects, Africa with its unmatched agricultural-land acreage and its significant endowment of river basin resources has the potential for dramatically increasing its agricultural production in a relatively brief span. The development of this potential is premised, among other things, on the transfer, development, or application of technology for agronomic advances, for labor aids, for utilizing simple and advanced irrigation, for treatment of crop diseases, and for the prevention of the ravages of pestilence: Programs to control the tsetse fly—which, by carrying trypanosomiasis or sleeping sickness, prevents livestock and crop protection over an area the size of the continental United States—would mean considerably greater grain and meat production.

The peasant man or woman, who is the major producer of food in Africa,



Africa has the worst refugee situation in the world

Photo: Arlud Voliam/Unicef

frequently toils in the fields without inputs of fertilizer or locally tested seeds, and muscle power provides the energy component for the tilling, planting, weeding, and harvesting. The plow and animal traction are yet to be introduced in many areas. The human labor capacity of the family sets the limits of production.

Africa's ability to expand its agriculture is hampered by the low level of technology, the need for applied research, the paucity of institutional, transport, and irrigation infrastructure as well as by the need for improved government pricing policies. The lack of adequate progress in agriculture, though multifaceted, is related to the fact that the resources have not been marshalled to lay the base for a "green revolution" in African agriculture as there was, for example, with India, which had become largely self-sufficient in food production. The problem is circular. Low food yields mean increased dependence on imports, which further strains the precarious balance of payments situation and, in turn, means fewer available commercial inputs, such as fertilizer. This in turn means still lower yields. Similarly, low yields of cash crops mean fewer exports, thereby reducing the available foreign exchange, and the circle begins again.

In the Lagos Plan of Action, which the OAU adopted in 1980, major emphasis for achieving self-reliance is placed on food production.

Finally, in the picture of the African scene on the far horizon, we see foreshadowed in Africa the ecological crises of man/land imbalance portended for the globe circa the year 2000. On a continent with considerable potential for the development of new and renewable energies, such as solar, wind, biogas, and even coal, the present energy situation in the traditional sector, which accounts for the great preponderance of energy needs, is critical. For example, the unplanned use of wood, the traditional fuel for cooking the evening meal, and the inefficient use of wood-derived charcoal are resulting in massive deforestation.

A study by the *Club du Sahel* and the Permanent Inter-State Committee on Drought Control in the Sahel (CILSS) concluded that at the present rate of tree cutting, not a tree would be left standing in the Sahel at the end of the century. The interplay of the ecological, environmental, and agronomic factors here make urgent programs of reforestation.

Although Africa is now the least urbanized continent, it has the highest growth rate of urbanization with its at-

tenant pattern of unemployment, slums, and the increased necessity for agricultural efficiency to feed a larger urban population.

All of the above scenes form the picture of the present critical condition of this giant continent whose agricultural potential could feed Africa and supply needed agricultural exports all over the world. And more, this is the continent that holds the resources essential to our industrial economy and has in some cases the only sizable land deposits of indispensable minerals outside of the Soviet Union. This is the picture of the continent that has been the fastest growing market for U.S. goods. Such a picture clearly presages the kind of political disarray that is the breeding ground for new "isms" and that an alert foreign policy would spot and address. The humanitarian, political, and self-interest aspects intersect.

Accordingly, we turn to the picture of the American response to countries gripped by macroeconomic, agricultural, and ecological crises and to peoples caught in drought, poverty, disease, and recurrent famine.

First, a historical reading shows that during the 70s the amount of aid to Africa rose markedly. From 1948 to 1972 U.S. aid to Africa averaged five percent of total U.S. bilateral aid worldwide. The interest in targeting aid on meeting the basic needs of the world's poorest people and the surge in assistance to Africa at the height of the Sahelian drought in 1973 resulted in a dramatic increase in aid to Africa. This has continued so that in 1980, aid to Africa was 13% of the total economic assistance budget. Even so, in real terms the picture is different. In constant dollars, U.S. assistance to Africa has not caught up to aid dollar levels in the Kennedy era. In fiscal year (FY) '81 our aid in real terms is still lower than the levels we provided in 1962, and this remains true for the FY '82 projected aid levels. Of the FY '82 \$553 million request for refugees worldwide, only \$77 million is for African refugees where the numbers, rudimentary infrastructure system, and shattered economic capabilities of African governments all result in a most difficult refugee situation.

The administration has announced its intention to honor its commitment to

the fifth replenishment for the International Development Association (IDA), the soft-loan window of the World Bank group. Yet the holding back and parceling out of our payments on this pledge to IDA, a significant part of whose resources address some of the underlying causes of the problems discussed in this paper, raises a question of good faith.

In overall bilateral aid the United States had plummeted in 1979 even further down on the scale of aid donors, and ranked 15th. The timing of our FY '80 payment on our IDA contribution raised us to a tie for 12th place. The overall picture of U.S. aid response reveals a lack of understanding of the reciprocity in the relationship between the Third World and the United States. Growth in developed countries both is a major determinant of the growth prospects of the developing countries and is affected by the growth rate of the developing countries. Trends in each group directly affect the other. Rising U.S. exports for the developing world played a significant role in pulling the U.S. economy out of the recession of the early 70s. The Third World is the largest growing market for U.S. exports. The president of the Overseas Development Council, John W. Sewell, has projected that an increase of 3% in the growth of the non-oil-producing, less-developed countries could result in an increase of 1% in the growth rates of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries. Such an improvement would expand revenues by \$45 billion and would significantly increase jobs, with a consequent five-year U.S. GNP gain of \$255 billion and a corresponding employment increase. Certainly, we as a nation fail to comprehend the mutuality of economic development.

The picture of the United States reveals a people who view aid in general as only humanitarian rather than as one of our foreign policy tools for winning friends and economic opportunities, and averting future crises of instability. For the grim situation of deterioration depicted on the African canvas translates into a magnitude of human problems. The potential for chaos is inherent in nearly one-third of a billion peo-

ple's living on the fringe of existence. Policy planning should include action to ameliorate these gloomy prospects.

In regard to the impending food crunch, the United States, with a relatively small amount of money, could begin a course of action, in concert with the African countries and other donors, to address the agricultural problems central to Africa's food needs, its cash crop production for export earnings, and its development of agro-processing capability. The Carter administration's FY '82 budget contained special proposals for assisting in food production. The revised budget of the Reagan administration eliminated entirely this special emphasis for Africa, an emphasis long and carefully planned as the minimum required. The U.S. response to the call of the independent Brandt Commission of International Statesmen to the world community for a five-year action program of emergency and long-term measures at the level of at least \$4 billion dollars additional assistance per year for the poverty belts of Africa and Asia is discouraging.

Not surprisingly, this year of unparalleled domestic budget cutting is a time of extraordinary difficulty in getting any foreign aid bill through the Congress. For the past two years, aid has been subsisting on a continuing resolution because of the lack of an appropriations bill. This year the climate is such that there is a real question as to whether the authorizing legislation will also be put on hold. Meanwhile, the executive branch is reducing Agency for International Development (AID) budgetary levels.

Our failure to respond to the crises in the African economies and in particular to press forward on the special agricultural initiative is myopic in many ways. The United States enjoys a clear advantage over the Soviets in development cooperation generally, and particularly in agriculture. Economic support is critically needed by the African countries, and development assistance, not arms sales or military assistance, is our best short- and long-term strategy. Even at a time of budgetary penury we should avoid economies that jeopardize our chances of obviating future chaos-triggering situations, whose advent is foreseeable. □

After the Rebellion

BY SULAYMAN S. NYANG

For 16 years, The Gambia enjoyed the distinction of being one of the most stable and democratic states in Africa. This image was recently shattered by the abortive coup in July led by a young man named Kukoi Samba Sanyang, a native of Wassadou, Foni District, in the western division of The Gambia. Sanyang's coup attempt cost the lives of 1,000 Gambians and led to the arrest and detention of another 1,000 believed to be fellow conspirators in the incident. As a microstate with a population of half a million and an area of about 4,000 square miles, The Gambia deserves attention in order to explain why it has managed to maintain a viable political and economic order for the last 15 years in a continent ridden with coups d'etat and political turmoil.

In order to put recent events in perspective, it is necessary to review briefly the last three decades of Gambian political development. Party politics came to the country in 1951, when the British colonial authorities decided

to give the franchise to the residents of Banjul and its environs. As a result of this constitutional advance, three political parties emerged: the Gambia Democratic party (DP), the Gambia Muslim Congress (GMC) and the Gambia United party (UP). By 1960, when another constitution came into being, the Peoples Progressive party (PPP) of Dr. Dawda K. Jawara entered the ring and soon became the most powerful party in the country. Dr. Jawara's party is now facing serious political and economic difficulties in The Gambia, partly because of the socio-economic and political changes in the country since 1962, when Jawara formed the first African majority government and assumed the post of premier.

The PPP suffered its first internal crisis in 1968, when Sheriff Sisay, currently the governor of the Central Bank, broke away from the party and formed his own Progressive Peoples Alliance. Sisay's efforts to replace Jawara failed, and he returned to the PPP fold in 1972. In 1975, another breakaway party, the National Convention party (NCP) of former vice-president Sheriff Mustapha Dibba, came into being. Dibba's party was formed almost at the same time as the National Liberation party of Gambian lawyer Paps-Cheyassin Secka. These two parties joined the United party in opposition to the Jawara regime. In the 1977 general elections, Dibba's NCP

became the most formidable opposition party, but it was not strong enough to gain power.

In 1980, two opposition parties representing the youthful radical strain in Gambian politics emerged. The Socialist Revolutionary party and the Movement for Justice in Africa, dissatisfied with the status quo and concerned about alleged government corruption, launched a campaign to discredit the Jawara government, shortly after which they were banned. The banning coincided with two major developments — the breaking of diplomatic relations with Muammar Qaddafi's Libya and the slaying of Eku Mahoney, deputy commander of The Gambia Field Force, by one of his junior officers. These events were given greater dramatic significance when, in response to The Gambia's invitation, Senegal sent troops to strengthen the Jawara regime. The Senegalese military presence then raised many issues in the minds of politically conscious Gambians, but all speculation regarding the political implications of Senegalese involvement in Gambian politics was dismissed by the Gambian government as idle talk.

The recent coup attempt and the decisive role of Senegal have changed everything. Senegambian unity, never taken very seriously as a political reality by many Gambian leaders, was soon thrown onto their laps. The gravity of the situation and the growing political

Sulayman S. Nyang, a Gambian citizen, is an associate professor of government and public administration in the Center for African Studies at Howard University, Washington, D.C. He previously served as a diplomat in Saudi Arabia and has written extensively on Gambian politics.

insecurity of the Jawara regime combined to make Senegambia an attractive proposition. During a visit to Senegal in August, the Gambian president told his Senegalese hosts that he wished to see a confederation of the two countries. This confederation, according to Jawara, calls for the integration of the security forces of the two countries, but it does not necessarily mean that they would lose their political independence and sovereignty. To achieve their common objectives, the two governments will soon meet to work out the framework for unity and cooperation and to harmonize their constitutions.


In analyzing the recent coup attempt in The Gambia and its effects on the future of Gambian politics, one could say that the real threat to the political system has always been socioeconomic in nature. The growing scarcity of resources, a crowding of the grazing grounds, and a rural exodus to urban areas, as well as a materialistic dog-eat-dog philosophy found in the rising Gambian bourgeoisie, have made life difficult for many young men and women in search of the good life in the urban areas of the country. Urban migration has caused a serious juvenile delinquency problem as more and more jobless youth concentrate in certain sectors of the urban areas. Largely unskilled but trapped in a world of rising expectations, many young people are attempting to leave the country to seek employment abroad. Gambians have found their way to Scandinavia and have become seamen on foreign merchant vessels, and some, with strong Islamic background, have migrated across the Sahara to Libya, where employment opportunities and higher salaries offer attractive incentives.

All of these developments have been exacerbated by the lack of foreign exchange, resulting from poor harvests. The bitter and seemingly unending drought in the Sahel zone, together with a sharp increase in white-collar crime in government circles, has made a mockery of the call for collective belt tightening that is now known as the "Tesito" philosophy of President Jawara. He has labored very hard to see it concretized, but the depleting resources and foreign exchange, in addition to

unscrupulous civil servants, have conspired against his objectives.

Another problem of the Gambian political system has been the informality of government practice. Unlike the colonial period, when civil servants took their positions seriously and made sure that the public reciprocated ac-

finities between the Senegalese and the Gambian people, was engaged in military recruitment of many of the young Gambians bound for Libya. This evidence was the last straw, and the Gambian government set in motion the processes and measures designed to contain what some of its officials per-



ordingly, in the postcolonial era the civil service began to lose that element of administration that formalizes the relationship between the boss and his subordinates — hence, the absence of discipline and the lack of productivity among responsible persons in key positions.

The unfortunate turn of events and the crass materialism among certain elements of the educated elites in the Gambian republic exposed the political system to grave dangers. The only safety valve was to let many of the jobless youth drift out of the country and seek their fortunes elsewhere, an old tradition in the region. Yet, this search for fortune can also be dangerous if it is not properly guided by the government.

Until 1980 the Gambian government took no steps to monitor the movements of Gambian young men heading for the Mediterranean ports in search of job opportunities. Things came to a head only after the Senegalese government cracked down on a Moslem fundamentalist group led by the Senegalese religious leader Ahmed Niassé. Following Niassé's flight to Libya in the early part of 1980, news began to reach Gambian authorities that Niassé, capitalizing on the cultural, social, and political af-

ceived as "Libyan Virus." Prior to the coup attempt, this development was the most significant event in recent Gambian history.

Having examined briefly the factors and forces acting within the domestic political system of The Gambia, let us focus attention on the country's foreign policy. Though one may be very skeptical about the reality of the Marxist claims of the coup plotters in The Gambia, one can still assume that the foreign policy of the Jawara regime has not been enthusiastically supported by the militant and radical youth in the country. The Marxist tag was used by the plotters to distance themselves from the government they attempted to replace. They assumed that the Western world was deeply involved with the Jawara government. If they had expressed themselves as pro-West, they would have been defeating their own purposes.

The past 15 years have witnessed two important stages in the evolution of Gambian foreign policy. The first stage was characterized by cautious and conservative diplomacy. The Jawara regime argued for fiscal control and against spending on prestigious projects. As a result, it opened a high com-

mission in London with multiple concurrent accreditations in several European capitals. To cover the circle of African diplomacy, the Jawara government set up an embassy in Senegal with Alieu Badara Njie, the minister of state for external affairs, serving as head of the mission. New missions were later established in Freetown, Sierra Leone, and in Brussels, Belgium. The Freetown mission was created largely to service the needs of the significant number of Gambians in the Sierra Leone/Liberia area. This population of overseas Gambians comprises some of the most productive Gambians living outside the country. Their contributions to the country and the longstanding relationship between their host countries and The Gambia combine to influence the policymakers at home. The Brussels mission came into being because the government wanted to establish closer and more friendly relations with the European Economic Community.

British-Gambian relations have been cordial since independence. Some have explained this phenomenon as a clear indication of residual Anglophilia among members of the ruling circles in the country; others have seen this relationship as one of helpless dependence, because The Gambia has no choice and no bargaining chip to increase its stocks in the international diplomatic community. However, the fact remains that up until 1975, 80% of the foreign aid received by The Gambia came from the United Kingdom. In fact, 70% of approximately \$10 million allocated for the first development program, covering the period from January 1964 to June 1967 (three and a half years), was from Colonial Development and Welfare Funds (CDW), and 10% represented a loan from the United Kingdom. This heavy subsidy of the Gambian budget and development program was in keeping with British commitment to the independence agreement reached in London prior to independence. The Gambian government is very proud of its ties with Britain, and the British in return have continued to lend a helping hand to their former colonial "possession."

During the first phase in the devel-

opment of Gambian foreign policy, the leadership paid greater attention to Commonwealth and African affairs. At the United Nations The Gambia's voting record suggested that it was pro-Western. Evidence for this pattern can be gleaned from The Gambia's voting record on the China issue, the Korean issue, and the Middle East crisis. On the question of admitting the People's Republic of China (PRC), the Gambian government opted for a "Two-China" policy. This commitment of the "Two-China" policy led The Gambia to vote with the United States consistently. This pattern changed during the second phase, which dates back to 1972-73. The Gambia also embraced the "Two-Korea" policy and supported the idea of peaceful coexistence of the two countries until the time when they can be reunited under an acceptable regime.

One of the most interesting aspects of Gambian diplomacy during the first phase was its relations with the Middle Eastern states. From the time of independence until the breaking of diplomatic relations with the state of Israel by the African states, The Gambia had no meaningful relations with any of the Arab countries. Israel, though, has commanded the attention of The Gambia. Israeli-Gambian relations, according to Gambian sources, date back to the 1966 Treaty of Friendship signed by the two countries. During those halcyon days of Israeli-Gambian relations, the Israeli government provided technical assistance in the fields of agriculture and population census.

Increased ties with the Arab world marks the second phase of the development of Gambian foreign policy, which can be traced back to a series of speeches made by President Jawara and his vice-president and foreign minister. In 1972 President Jawara told his countrymen that The Gambia should reexamine its role in the world and broaden its contacts overseas. This view was echoed by Assan Musa Camara, the vice-president and foreign minister at the time, when he told his parliamentary colleagues that The Gambia intended to get out of its isolationism and strengthen its image abroad. Soon the Arabs began to woo

The Gambia. In January 1974, President Jawara visited the late King Faisal of Saudi Arabia, and diplomatic relations were soon established between the two nations. This was followed by other Arab connections, and today The Gambia is very much in the mainstream of African-Arab relations. Evidence can be derived from the growing number of political links between The Gambia and the Arab world. The Gambian venture into the Arab world has resulted in its membership in the Islamic Conference and the Islamic Development Bank. Presently, almost 30% of its foreign aid comes from the Arabs.

When The Gambia became independent in February 1965, its economy was almost entirely based on a single cash crop, the groundnut. Since then, measures have been taken to diversify the economy. Today, expansion of the tourist industry, which has brought thousands of tourists from western and northern Europe, and growing production of cotton, vegetables, fish (bonga), lobster, shrimp, shark fins, and bladders for export are being attempted.

Though diversification has paid off in certain areas, the Sahelian drought has wrought havoc throughout the economy, revealing its structural weakness. The drought has reduced almost to one-third the total amount of groundnuts produced a few years ago. The 1980-81 crop has already been estimated to be about 46,000 tons, significantly lower than the 75,000 tons for 1979-80 and the 151,000 tons for 1978-79. The impact of the drought becomes evident when it is noted that The Gambia depends on groundnuts for over 70% of its export earnings.

High fuel costs have also contributed to the foreign exchange problem by lowering the total number of tourists and by increasing the cost of certain imported items. According to the 1980 budget speech, gross domestic product fell from about \$126.5 million in 1978-79 to about \$100 million in 1980. The per capita income estimated at \$220.11 in 1980 has decreased compared with \$263 in 1978-79. External trade for the same year was estimated at \$20 million, a rise of 27.6% over 1979 figures. Exports for that year rose as a result of the rise in the value of fish,

which climbed by 56%. The deficit in visible trade has also risen from approximately \$95 million to \$113.5 million. One of the reasons given by the government is the deteriorating terms of trade. Because of these unfavorable developments in the economy, foreign assistance has become very important. In March 1979, the government received \$4.6 million under the Stabex Scheme of the Lomé Agreement between the European Economic Community and the African-Caribbean-

Pacific countries. This scheme is designed to reduce the harmful effects of the instability of export earnings. Measures to minimize the adverse effects of the drought have included greater coordination with other drought-stricken countries in the Sahel through the established regional mechanisms, appeals for aid from potential bilateral or multilateral donors, and the formulations of future agricultural strategies. The most significant measure in this respect is the decision of President Jawara

to protect the environment through the banning of the use of charcoal obtained from the threatened forestlands of the country and to encourage Gambian farmers to devote greater energy and resources to irrigated agriculture. The government has already committed itself to a multisectoral approach to rural development, and it is hoping that the completion of a barrage on The Gambia River would make available 24,000 hectares to an estimated 165,000 modern farmers.

Between 1964 and 1975, approximately \$50 million was available for investment from two principal sources, namely, the British government and the World Bank. The first three development programs (1965-1975) were primarily concentrated on development projects relating to communications and construction; however, both the Gambian government and its critics recognize the limitations of those programs. Reporting to his party's second congress, the president told his audience that "one major characteristic of the pattern of development between 1964 and 1975 has been the concentration of development in the Banjul area... over two-thirds of expenditure on water supply was concentrated in the urban area, and relatively limited funds were spent on boreholes located in Basse, Mansakonko, Bansang, and Georgetown." This realization of past errors has led President Jawara and his planners to discuss a new development plan, which is rurally oriented. To this effect, the government has sought and obtained funds from European, Arab, and international organizational sources to finance its rural development programs under the first national development plan.

To strengthen the hand of The Gambia Produce and Marketing Board in its drive to provide better services to the farming population in The Gambia, the government has undertaken the modernization of its groundnut-processing sector. Approximately \$5,572,000 has been given out as a loan from the African Development Bank to modernize the groundnut-processing sector.

The Gambian government's attempt to diversify its monocultural economy through cotton and rice development




Photo: William Campbell/Sygnia

Banjul, August 1981: Military patrols restoring order after the coup attempt

schemes has received some support from donors abroad. Rice production for local consumption and export is a top agricultural priority. Self-sufficiency in rice has remained the official watchword, but recently, government officials have acknowledged some difficulties in realizing this goal. In spite of the technical assistance from the two Chinas over the last decade or so and the financial and material support from the United Nations Capital Development Fund, the level of rice development is still below the original goal. Government officials now say that until the Pachar-Jachali swamps are developed and the construction of the barrage is completed, imports of rice will continue.

In addition to cotton and rice development, efforts are being made by the Gambian government, with support from the World Bank, the Arab Bank for African Development, and the Food and Agricultural Organization, to improve the fishing and livestock industries. The government has also created the Livestock Marketing Board, which directs the export of suspension-dried cattle, sheep, and goat hides to African and other foreign markets. The fishing industry has been aided by the European Development Fund, which has made a \$2 million grant for the development of the artisanal fisheries sector. The Danish government has also helped on this project, and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) are expected to contribute funds.

As part of the rural development program, the Gambian government has paid attention to the needs of the farmers in its formulation of development projects for the rural sector. The government is currently engaged in the development of The Gambia River Basin, a major project jointly undertaken by The Gambia and Senegal under the framework of the Organization for the Development of The Gambia River (OMVG). It is expected to provide irrigation facilities, hydroelectricity and other opportunities for the inhabitants of the area. Its successful completion will not only improve the chances for irrigated agriculture for the Gambian

farmer, but it will increase the volume of trade and commerce within the Senegambian region — hence the Gambian government's determination to build feeder roads linking the main arteries of commerce and trade with the small villages and towns in the hinterlands. To finance such a project, it has received \$2 million from the UN Sahelian Office among many other donors.

American foreign aid to Africa since the days of the Kennedy administration has always been token and insignificant in proportion to the overall foreign aid package. In 1974, for example, the Nixon administration requested from Congress \$419 million, and of this figure, \$250 million went to Egypt and only \$169 million to sub-Saharan Africa. In fact, for the 19-year period ending in June 1973, only 5% of the \$6.3 billion in food given away by the U.S. government went to Africa. Between 1973 and 1979, the pattern of aid distribution, whether for individual countries or for drought-stricken areas or for refugees, still favored regions and countries other than Africa. Figures from the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) show that Africa received \$320 million in 1978, \$321 million in 1979, and \$422 million in 1980. These figures represent the total for all loans and grants in all categories of aid given by the U.S. to Africa.

The case of U.S. aid to The Gambia dramatizes the paucity of aid to African states, especially those south of the Sahara. U.S. aid to The Gambia has generally been keyed to minor infrastructural low-cost projects. U.S. AID, for example, is currently providing technical assistance to the Ministry of Agriculture's soil and water management unit. It has granted the sum of \$1 million for the planting of fast-growing trees and for the purchase of milling and logging equipment; it also plans to collaborate with the Gambian government in the afforestation program by cultivating 1,500 Gmelina trees along with West German assistance.

American involvement in Gambian development is also symbolized by the presence and activities of Peace Corps volunteers. These Americans work mainly with development projects such as the adult literacy program.

Besides the Peace Corps, there is the Gambia Opportunity Industrial Center (GOIC), which is a local branch of the American parent body in Philadelphia. This organization is currently operating a center at Chamen on the north bank of The Gambia River. Situated at one of the rapidly urbanizing areas of the country, the GOIC teaches skills to young people who after graduation can go back to their respective areas and apply the training. The Gambian government seems to be pleased with the performance of the center, which is likely to play an important role in the realization of the objectives recently stated for the newly formed Gambia Training Board.

In conclusion, one could say that the recent coup attempt in The Gambia has destroyed its impressive image as Africa's peaceful state, and the bloodbath that accompanied the coup is likely to affect the political climate for many years to come. The ongoing trial of the conspirators may help explain more deeply what actually occurred, but the agony of legal questioning and the pangs and misery of detention could heighten the tension between families and political factions in the country. The coup attempt has also led to what certain segments of the Gambian population have always resisted — the fulfillment of the Senegambian dream through political confederation or total union of the two countries. Another conclusion that can be drawn is that the coup attempt puts in jeopardy The Gambia's vast investment in tourism. Unless the Jawara government produces evidence of total control over law and order, the chances are the tourists will stay away.

To avoid repetition of the July incident, the Gambian leadership will have to carry through its program of extending the fruits of economic and social development to the rural inhabitants. Plans must be made to stop the rural exodus, and skills and opportunities must be made available to young people and enterprising individuals from the hinterlands and urban areas. With the benefit of the July experience, the Gambian leadership, one hopes, will take more corrective and precautionary measures in the future. □

Tanzania's Controversial Industry

BY PETER MARSHALL

Tourism in developing countries recovering from colonialism is becoming increasingly controversial. While it can be an important earner of foreign exchange, it has the peculiar property of an export that is consumed in the country of origin.

In Tanzania it has become the subject of an extremely heated and polarized debate. After the Arusha Declaration on Socialism and Self-Reliance in 1967, the government, intent on developing its peasant agriculture and embryonic industrial base, at first gave it scant attention. The recent economic crisis triggered by the deteriorating terms of trade with the North, the serious drop in productivity following the resettlement of the population into villages, and the war in Uganda has forced the government to look again at its considerable tourist potential.

Until the breakup of the East Africa Community, 90% of Tanzania's tourists used Nairobi as their starting point. Since the closure of the border

with Kenya in 1977, however, the government has given its full support to the development of tourism, and the Tanzanian Tourist Corporation (TTC) has mounted a vigorous campaign to make the country a destination in its own



right. At first there was a drop of nearly 50% in tourists, but steadily they have increased to about 175,000 in 1980, mostly from West Germany, Britain, North America, Scandinavia, and Italy. Although it receives only about half as many tourists as Kenya, Tanzania's tourist trade is about seven times that of Zambia. In the coming years, the government would like to see tourism move

from the sixth to the first position in foreign exchange earnings.

Certainly Tanzania has the raw materials in abundance for the tourist industry. Its natural features demand superlatives: Mount Kilimanjaro, the highest mountain in Africa; Lake Tanganyika, its deepest and longest lake; Lake Victoria, the world's largest lake; Ngorongoro, its second-largest crater; the Selous, its most extensive game reserve; and the Serengeti, with the greatest concentration of plains game. It has an impressive record in wildlife conservation. At independence one national park existed, whereas now there are 16, plus 57 controlled areas, making up 25% of the total land surface. Although sorely pressed to provide food, health, and education to its people, it devotes 4% of its national budget, one of the highest contributions in the world, to preserve its natural inheritance.

In addition, it has 800 kilometers of coastline, with palm-fringed silver sands and undersea coral gardens. Zanzibar has been called the "island of sensations," with the smell of cloves and lemons filling the air; and although the town needs a coat of paint, the revolutionary government welcomes tourists. Mafia Island also caters particularly well for the deep-sea fisherman or underwater diver.

Peter Marshall is a freelance journalist based in Britain who writes on development issues. He recently visited Tanzania.

On the mainland, Dar es Salaam may no longer be a "haven of peace" in a hot and humid climate, but it is a cosmopolitan city with picturesque architecture along tree-lined avenues. Its nearby beaches are unspoiled and spotless. Two hours away by road is the haunting village of Bagamoyo, which used to be the main trading center. Its name means "here I lay down my heart": from the marketplace, slaves were shipped up the coast by the Arabs. It was also the starting point for the explorers Livingstone, Stanley, Speke, Burton, and others.

Apart from the natural and historical assets of Tanzania, there is the additional interest, for some, of a unique social experiment. The government stresses that any person "advocating human equality and justice" is an automatic friend of the country. It is ready to show the visitor its achievements in Ujamaa villages, in education for self-reliance, and in industry. There is an open and upright friendliness in the people.

Yet for all its potential, there have been sharp disagreements about the economic benefits and cultural effects of the tourist industry. Its supporters argue not only that it is an important source of foreign exchange but that compared with other export industries it has a higher rate of increase in demand, greater stability in prices, and denser linkage effects in the economy. They say it offers employment, stimulates secondary industries, and helps develop the country's infrastructure.

As for the cultural side, it is argued that contact with foreigners promotes world peace through better understanding. Large-scale tourism can operate successfully in socialist countries — as in Poland and Yugoslavia. Moreover, in Tanzania its effect will be kept at a minimum, since tourists are primarily interested in the game parks and the beaches, which are far away from the main centers of population. Even where the tourists are visible, claim the supporters, local residents will soon learn to regard them with indifference, amusement, or cynicism. Since tourism is lucrative, it should at worst be considered a necessary evil.

TABLE 1
Visitors to Tanzania

1975	210,000
1976	168,000
1977	118,000
1978	148,000
1979	156,000
1980	175,000

TABLE 2
Visitors to Tanzania, Kenya, and Zambia

	1976	1977	1978
Kenya	424,000	344,000	333,000
Tanzania	168,000	118,000	148,000
Zambia	56,000	49,000	22,000

*excluding last 3 months

TABLE 3
Visitors to Tanzania by Nationality
(based on bed nights)

	1979	1980
West Germany	39,000	45,000
U.K.	38,000	44,000
U.S.A./Canada	32,000	52,000
Scandinavia	25,000	32,000
Italy	18,000	24,500
France	14,000	18,000
Japan	14,000	14,000
Switzerland	13,000	17,000
Others	49,000	46,000

Figures made available by the Tanzanian Tourist Corporation.

The critics of tourism in Tanzania will have none of this. On economic grounds alone they feel serious misgivings. Philip Thresher has estimated that out of every dollar spent in East Africa by tourists, 40% goes on im-

ported items (benefiting foreign traders), 40% into private pockets (hotel owners, tour operators, souvenir manufacturers, and so on) and only 20% to government. Though it might stimulate enterprises such as handicrafts, provisions, and construction, it remains a service industry that does not offer a base for industrial development. Critics admit it might encourage the development of communications but add that these tend to be in urban areas that are already better off. To satisfy the taste of the visitors, a great deal of foreign exchange is used to import consumer and nonproductive foods.

Not only does it fail to bring structural changes in the economy, but tourism is a highly risky industry vulnerable to fickle tastes and even minor political changes. If anything, it can increase economic dependence through its necessary imports rather than help in self-reliance. In short, its chief beneficiaries seem to be the international bourgeoisie and the local entrepreneurs who organize centers of relaxation and pleasure for their Western counterparts.

But even if it could be proved that tourism was economically beneficial to the country, the critics would find an insurmountable objection in its social and cultural effects. Looking to Kenya, they argue that it will introduce false consumer desires and only hinder the creation of an egalitarian, democratic, and self-reliant society. They question



Tanzania has Africa's most extensive game reserves

Photo: Tanzanian Tourist Office

whether it is right to preserve millions of game animals while the people are continually threatened with famine. They do not want to see their villages turned into human zoos with the inhabitants passively awaiting the arrival of busloads of tourists in search of snapshots of their "exotic" and "primitive" style of life. They see little value in the shoeshine boys, fenced beaches, casinos, and brothels of the Coca Cola resorts. Above all, they feel tourism would continue the colonial mentality that made them despise their own culture and wish to be in their colonizers' shoes — a tradition of subordination, submission, and aping summed up in Swahili as *kasufmba*.

In fact, their case is confirmed by the conventional wisdom of Western tour operators who insist on the need for European standards and African exoticism. The affluent who can afford to come usually want to stay in luxury hotels, be treated like colonial administrators, and witness the wild beauty of nature from the safety of their cars. Most tourists in East Africa, according to surveys, are interested in its "mystery," its animals, and its people — in that order.

Tourism, a vociferous lobby argues, therefore does more harm than good to Tanzania. People need good wells and latrines, roads and houses — not swimming pools, golf courses, and night clubs for a tiny elite. There should be campaigns to educate the public in hygiene and farming, not on how to receive tourists. No peasant, the vast majority of the nation, will ever be able to set foot in the towering glass and concrete monuments to conspicuous consumption. It follows that limited resources should be used to modernize agriculture, the mainstay of the economy, or to develop industries like textiles, which process local commodities, satisfy basic needs, and foster broad industrial development and a nationally integrated economy.

The response of the Ministry of Tourism in the early 1970s was to stress the pure economic rationale for tourism as a ready source of foreign exchange. In its guidelines, it urged the use of local resources in furnishing and servicing and encouraged hotels to grow their own food. It was determined to place the industry under the leadership of Tanzanians. It hoped that personnel would explain the behavior and cus-

tombs of the country so that the well-guided tourist could build a proper understanding of their policies. At the same time, the minister called for the isolation of the tourists, the rejection of tourism for home consumption, and for "correct socialist discipline" to decline "bourgeois consumer tastes." "*Entre-cote sauce maison*" might be for visitors, but Tanzanians would have to put up with "*sembe*" — maize meal. Peniless travelers would not be welcome.

This of course has not happened, and the contradictions of a socialist country offering luxury tourism remain. I recently stayed in Hotel '77 in Arusha, the starting point for the northern safari circuit near the Kilimanjaro International Airport. The hotel was built originally to house the nonaligned conference. Tourists, local businessmen, and officials on a seminar from the Rural Development Bank enjoyed an excellent meal or listened to Westernized music. At the end of the evening, the Seychelles pop group played in Swahili: "Tanzania is building socialism." The next morning a file of militia ran past chanting slogans. Children in their near-blue uniforms carried young plants as part of a national afforestation campaign.

In the town, Masai women tried to sell their beads without the middle men. They were prepared to make deals with photographers over their souls as well. Whites were constantly approached to change their hard currency on the black market at three times the official rate. The young, perhaps half of them unemployed, sauntered by in bell-bottom trousers and platform shoes aping the Western fashion of five years ago. And then there were the shoeshine boys, the curio boutiques, the animal trophies, and the beggars.

Nor has tourism been able to escape the problems of the national economy. The Tanzanian Tourist Corporation inherited a string of luxury hotels and lodges that are difficult and expensive to maintain. In some beach hotels only 30% of the rooms are usable, while in the game lodges, the water system is corroded and the wood beginning to rot. The transport network is under severe strain. The roads are deteriorating, and Air Tanzania, rocked and de-



Beach at Bagamoyo: Ready for tourist exploitation?

Photo: Tanzanian Tourist Office, London

moralized by scandals, has ceased international operations and offers a limited and erratic service at home. It has been nicknamed "Air Uda," after the village bus that fails to turn up. The passenger services on the Tanzania-Zambia Railway, the great monument of Chinese friendship, have recently been suspended. With oil taking up 60% of foreign exchange, and gasoline stations open only three days a week, rented cars are very expensive. In one of the poorest countries in the world, shortages inevitably abound.

The general manager of the TTC, Esrom Maryogo, is well aware of the criticism and difficulties facing the tourist industry. He freely admits that a few years ago he was not one of the faithful. But he has recently rejected in a speech the "hopeless and endless" moral debate on tourism and takes a "cold and simple" utilitarian approach. He believes — albeit tenta-

tively — that carefully handled tourism should "result in net gain in foreign currency which we can utilize in economic development in accordance with our socialist policies." Tourism then should merely be treated as a means to an end: "In fact, for a poor country like ours, it is the only sensible way to treat tourism; in other words, we go in for it in a big way if its activities result in net gain in foreign currency, or we simply abandon it if it lands us in the red each year."

But whether tourism is actually making money in Tanzania is difficult to establish. The Kilimanjaro, the principle hotel in Dar es Salaam, has paid for itself and is making a handsome profit, but its 90% occupancy is almost entirely made up of businessmen. In some of the beach hotels and in the northern circuit hotels and lodges less than 35% of the rooms are filled each year; the break even point is the 45%

mark. In fact, Maryogo openly acknowledges that the absence of data in the industry means that "you cannot undertake any kind of meaningful analysis." He further estimates that with local tour operators only 60% of the foreign exchange earnings probably remain in the country. In the end, he is forced back on faith rather than hard evidence in his view that tourism economically benefits the nation.

Clearly the debate on tourism in Tanzania is far from over. If tourism succeeds, it will become more visible. Although the government and the local bourgeoisie are both in its favor, there may well be a grass-roots reaction against the social inequality and conspicuous consumption it entails. With the cost benefit unclear and the adverse cultural effects more evident, traditional tourism in a fiercely socialist Tanzania might still prove unacceptable in the long run. □

In the following interview by the author in April 1981, Mr. Esrom Maryogo, the general manager of the Tanzanian Tourist Corporation, outlined its present and future policies.

AFRICA REPORT: You have the attractions, but do you have the facilities to expand tourism?

MARYOGO: There are problems, I admit. We have inherited old stock, transportation can be difficult, and there have been complaints about the service. It would be quite wrong to deceive people about our shortcomings, and a shining report only raises unfair expectations and creates dissatisfaction. But we are doing our best to improve things. The World Bank has made a loan of \$10 million to refurbish the hotels—a job which should be complete by 1982. Air Tanzania is admittedly in trouble, but we are negotiating internal flights on some international airlines. There has been a decision to improve the roads. And as for services, we have engaged some U.K. expatriates for technical assistance and on-the-job training.

AFRICA REPORT: What is the role of the private sector?

MARYOGO: The TTC is responsible for external marketing for the whole of Tanzania. We own fifteen hotels, which account for about 45% of the total bed nights. The private sector is not discriminated against, and we would welcome foreign investors to take the TTC as a partner.

AFRICA REPORT: Do you still want to isolate the tourists?

MARYOGO: No. Change is inevitable. Besides it is always dangerous when people think they are unique: we saw what happened to the Germans and the Japanese in the last world war. The more contact there is, the greater

the understanding. We would therefore like to move away from natural attractions to man-made ones by bringing people together in our villages and cities.

AFRICA REPORT: What are your policies for the future?

MARYOGO: We hope to make tourism the second- or first-most-important earner of foreign exchange. To this end, we must extend our marketing abroad and educate the tour operators as much as possible. We intend first to develop the southern circuit, which includes the Selous and Mikumi game reserves, Dar es Salaam, and Zanzibar. Second, we shall move away from luxury hotels to a more economical and functional base. I would like to see a lot more local flavor and more local materials in use. Third, we are offering local subsidized programs so that our people can get to know and appreciate their own country and therefore feel more responsible for its preservation; otherwise, poaching will only increase. Above all, our industry must be carefully planned and monitored. The trouble with tourism is that the more you succeed, the more you are destroyed. We have seen what has happened in Spain, and we don't want that to happen here.

AFRICA REPORT: How do you compare with Kenya, your main competitor?

MARYOGO: I'm pleased you asked that. They have nearly twice as many visitors and the same three "S" products as us—safari, sun and sand. But our attractions are obviously superior to those of our neighbors! There is the Selous, the largest game reserve in the world, the famous Serengeti, the unique Ngorongoro crater, and Mount Kilimanjaro, to name but a few. Our ground transport is more expensive, but the hotel rates are lower and the overall package is cheaper. You get more, and better, for your money in Tanzania. □

Books

THE TWO SENSES OF ETHNONATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION

Yonah Alexander and Robert A. Friedlander, eds., *Self-Determination: National, Regional, and Global Dimensions*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1980, xv, 392 pages, \$27.50.

Ndiva Kofele-Kale, ed., *An African Experiment in Nation Building: The Bilingual Cameroon Republic Since Reunification*, Boulder: Westview Press, iii, 369 pages, \$26.50.

Dov Ronen, *The Quest for Self-Determination*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979, 144 pages, \$15.00.

At best, national self-determination — a cultural-political consciousness on the part of a "people" that seeks actively to enter into autonomous relations with other peoples — is a most ambiguous concept. To be sure, it provided a political and legal justification for challenges by African nationalists to the colonial system; however, in the postcolonial phase it represents an uncertain principle on which to reorder the linkages among peoples as well as between a people and its legally constituted state. The concept remains imprecise when it comes to identifying the people and unit that can legitimately lay claim to separate political identity, the process by which these claims can be advanced, or the reasonable limits that the integrity of an established state can place upon this change process. In the contemporary African context, a number of specific questions may also be raised about the practical application of the self-deter-

mination principle: Is an African people/unit "colonized" by another African people, as alleged in the case of the Somalis in the Ogaden, any less entitled to self-determination than those previously controlled by European metropolises? Is Eritrea, formerly a separate political unit under Italian colonial rule, in a better position to demand self-determination than the Ogaden, which was incorporated into Ethiopia by Emperor Menelik? If self-determination is legitimate when a geoethnic group can, in President Nyerere's words, "no longer feel safe" in a state as constituted, who is to decide at which point separation becomes necessary and what geoethnic minorities can be included in the newly created state entity? Given the subjective and fluid nature of ethnic identities in the modern African context, what measure is to be used to indicate fitness for longstanding political self-rule? Are foreign influences decisive in the political process leading to separatist demands (i.e., in Katanga)? Is the demand for self-determination a free expression of majority sentiments, or is it merely an indication of dominant minority interests, as in the case of Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence? If a referendum is set to determine local opinion on the issue, who is to be eligible to cast ballots, and how is the area to be divided for voting purposes? These and other questions about ethnic self-determination point out the difficulties encountered when one is setting out guiding principles for testing the appeal made by peoples and units for political autonomy. Self-determination is, in fact, an indeterminant and inconsistent concept: no precise yardsticks are readily at hand for determining the size and composition of groups or the circum-

stances giving rise for its use. The result of this general ambiguity may well be to make the concept relevant only to the strong, leaving the remaining peoples with little option but to accommodate themselves as best they can to the existing multiethnic state. This is an ironical conclusion indeed for a guiding principle so closely connected with the thrust toward international human rights!

Another important area of ambiguity surrounding the concept of self-determination is its identification with the sole outcome of state independence, or, in addition to this alternative, with various forms of autonomous integration within the state. This, indeed, represents the two senses (i.e., the external and the internal) in which the self-determination idea has possible relevance. Certainly in modern Africa, state leaders, with a few notable exceptions, express a clear preference for the internal interpretation. Their determination to preserve intact the state borders inherited from colonialism leads to a firm rejection of the unqualified right of all peoples to political sovereignty — contrary UN declarations on this subject notwithstanding. Hence, if the self-determination idea is to retain any practical meaning in the present-day African international context, it must be interpreted more broadly than the demand for the cultural-political state alone. As I view the concept, then, it is essential in postindependence times to go beyond its restricted application to the cultural-political state and to include a geoethnic people's autonomous control of its own cultural institutions within a multiethnic state setting as well. By widening our notion of self-determination in this manner, we enhance the possibilities for the peaceful management of conflict.

In which sense, the external or the internal, have contemporary analysts addressed the issue of self-determination? The three books, and their various authors, under review here represent a cross-section of orientations on this question. In this, perceptions are inevitably influenced by their situations: i.e., the proponents of Biafran, Eritrean, or Western Saharan political independence tend to view self-determination in an external sense, whereas the analyst concerned with Cameroonian or Ghanaian national integration inclines toward an internal perspective. Even so, unless some transcending meaning can be attached to this term, its practical utility in the modern African state context will most likely prove limited indeed.

How, then, have the authors of our three volumes perceived the self-determination idea? Dov Ronen, in a thought-provoking interpretive essay, gravitates toward an externalist interpretation. Men aggregate around their ethnic identity in an effort to escape external domination; the consequence, he argues, "is a pressure toward secession and new states" (p. 14). Ronen regards the quest for self-determination as non-compromising in nature and therefore leading to the proliferation of many, smaller states, rather than achieving some form of reconciliation with the multiethnic state structure. Adapting a grim, zero-sum view of the conflict between ethnic peoples, he stresses the polarization of identities and the potential for state disintegration, not the rapprochement of peoples through the use of new public formulas. The bright side he presents in this otherwise bleak picture is a dynamic tendency toward a new internationalism. Thus, Ronen anticipates "ethnic self-determination result[ing] in a kind of disintegration that permits a kind of wider integration toward a new world order." And he therefore foresees "a fundamental structural change in the international system" (p. 100). *The Quest for Self-Determination* is an imaginative but at times chilling scenario grounded, somewhat mistakenly I feel, upon an externalist set of assumptions. Certainly state disintegration has occurred and will occur again (propelled as much by foreign intervention as by

ethnonational activation). However, the destructive processes at work here seem to me overemphasized; and Ronen fails to discuss the very forces for creative intergroup accommodation that seem to me to continue to be present in the existing international state system.

That men can display a greater measure of statesmanship than this would suggest is indicated by Ndiva Kofele-Kale's interesting (but repetitious) volume on Cameroonian nation building. The contributors to this book, for the most part adopting an internalist perspective on self-determination, show the administration of President Ahmadou Ahidjo progressively increasing central authority at the expense of the regions. Although the Francophone elite was prepared to make limited and temporary concessions of a federalist nature at the time of the 1961 reunification, these initial constitutional moves were motivated largely by tactical considerations: i.e., to encourage Anglophone support for the plebiscite locally and to assure opinion in the United Nations abroad. Once reunification was achieved, it became only a matter of time before a powerful central president, strengthened by the influence that his single-party machine could bring to bear upon the society as a whole, would act to limit legislative autonomy at the center as well as regional autonomy at the periphery. For Ahidjo and his lieutenants, federalism was considered financially burdensome, administratively inefficient, and a cause of "cleavages and conflicts between Anglophones and Francophones who belonged to separate states" (p. 144). Not surprisingly, therefore, the Cameroonian electorate, in the 1972 referendum, gave its overwhelming support to a proposal to abolish the federal structure in favor of a unitary form of government.

Given such a concentration of power in state hands, what adjustments have been put into effect since 1972 to meet the demands for self-determination (or "autogestion")? Anglophone West Cameroon, heavily dependent as it is on the central government for economic support, is in no position to insist upon coordinate governmental authority. Nevertheless, cautious initiatives to

secure West Cameroonian (now South-West and North-West provinces) good will have surfaced: Ahidjo has officially undertaken to respect bilingualism (although in practice such institutions as the civil service, the army, and the press have openly favored the use of French); English-speaking interests are given some recognition in the way that spokesmen for the west are recruited into high public positions; and some interregional fiscal reallocation has occurred to the benefit of the less-advantaged western areas through the centrally administered grant-in-aid program (however, some of the benefits from the process have been offset by the loss of purchasing power caused by the transfer of civil servants and politicians from Buea). In brief, unitary rule has spurred society-wide integration at a cost in terms of ethnonational self-determination. Cameroonian integration no doubt represents "a triumph over Balkanization" as Kofele-Kale contends (p. 6), but in its totality it is a somewhat unusual victory nonetheless. Other African self-determination movements, particularly those seeking the establishment of separate cultural-political states, are not likely to emulate a process that minimizes their prospects of self-realization in the immediate term. Hence the Cameroonian experiment may well be viewed as "a living expression of the very essence of pan-Africanism" (p. 6) by some internalist-minded analysts intent upon building effective state orders, but certainly not by their externalist-oriented counterparts, who focus on effective group self-expression in a wider international state order.

Our final work, the volume edited by Alexander and Friedlander, shows an evident awareness of the double sense of the self-determination concept. However, the legalistic training and orientation of the contributors, combined with a somewhat skewed selection of case studies (a heavy emphasis in the non-European analyses upon such intense confrontations as the Arab-Israeli, Bangladesh, and Biafran disputes), influences the authors to adopt an essentially externalist outlook on the process at hand. Even so, the volume is useful. It presents a stimu-

lating and wide-ranging discussion of the critical issues that the self-determination movements pose for the stability of the international order. (On the question of stability, by the way, it is significant that the volume is part of a Westview series on national and international terrorism!)

The two senses of self-determination emerge in the discussion over definitions at the volume's outset. Self-determination, states Ray S. Cline in the foreword, embodies "the idea that a homogeneous people has the 'right' to determine its own destiny as a distinct sovereign nation [externalist] or the 'right' to maintain its own national traditions within a larger political entity [internalist]" (p. xi). Similarly, Jordan J. Paust observes: "What is most relevant is the free determination of the political status, not the particular form of that status. Thus, self-determination may result in the formation of a new state [externalist], a new bloc of states, or 'any other political status' and, thus, implicitly the change of state, regional, and substate territorial boundaries [in-

ternalist]" (p. 5). Such a recognition of both the external and internal senses of self-determination is clear and unambiguous.

Yet when it comes to a matter of content, the Alexander and Friedlander volume in fact gives only marginal attention to the internal dimension. To be sure, the essay by Ilya Levkov carefully scrutinizes the Soviet system from an internalist perspective, but, on the whole, the book concentrates on the emergence of sovereign states, not the forms of ethnic integration into established states. Various authors in this work refer to United Nations resolutions and documents to demonstrate that the self-determination doctrine has primary relevance for peoples seeking independence from the defeated powers following World Wars I and II as well as from colonial domination generally; the "rights" of peoples to secede from a recognized state, however, are only ambiguously touched upon in these international deliberations — and then with minimal sympathy and encouragement. UN Secretary-General U

Thant undoubtedly expressed the sentiments of most delegations when, on January 4, 1970, he declared: "As an international organization, the United Nations has never accepted and does not accept and I do not believe it will ever accept the principle of secession of a part of its Member State" (p. 314).

Not surprisingly, then, the multiethnic state, for all its difficulties, remains the norm in Africa today. Except in extreme circumstances, Africa will have to accommodate itself as best it can to the state borders inherited from colonialism. This means rejecting the unqualified right of all peoples to political sovereignty while at the same time searching out new formulas endeavoring to unite culturally diverse peoples within the multinational state framework. In view of this, a better balance between the externalist and internalist orientations on the self-determination issue seems long overdue.

Donald Rothchild
University of California, Davis

AFRICAN STUDIES from HOOVER INSTITUTION PRESS



Communist Powers and Sub-Saharan Africa

edited by Thomas H. Henriksen

The essays in this volume present an up-to-date analysis of the communist influence of Cuba, Eastern Europe, China, and the Soviet Union in Africa below the Sahara. The contributors point to Africa's chronic political instability and valued resources as inducements for expanded control by these nations and predict communist strategies toward this goal.

\$9.95 ISBN: 0-8179-7522-5 1981 155 pages

The Middle East and North Africa The Challenge to Western Security

by Peter Duignan and L. H. Gann

This new publication describes the diplomatic, military, and economic assistance required of the United States to rebuild a Western alliance in the Middle East and gives special attention to Middle Eastern oil.

\$9.95 ISBN: 0-8179-7392-3 1981 160 pages

Africa South of the Sahara The Challenge to Western Security

by L. H. Gann and Peter Duignan

In this new book, the authors analyze the progress of Afro-Marxism and Soviet imperialism, and examine Africa's mineral and military potentials region by region.

\$9.95 ISBN: 0-8179-7382-6 1981 128 pages

Thomas George Lawson African Historian and Administrator in Sierra Leone

by David E. Skinner

Skinner's study is both a narrative and an analytical account of Lawson's family and his career as the primary advisor to the governor of Sierra Leone on African affairs from 1846-1889.

\$10.95 ISBN: 0-8179-7221-8 1980 254 pages

HOOVER INSTITUTION PRESS

Dept. 8099

Stanford University • Stanford CA 94305

New Toll-Free Order Number: 1-800-227-1991
inside California: (415) 497-3373

VISA and MasterCard orders accepted by telephone.

Special card for gift subscriptions

INDIVIDUALS

(no institutional orders on this card, please)

\$18/1 year

—Regular Mail to Canada/Overseas: Add \$3 per year.

\$34/2 years

—Air Rate Overseas: Add \$24 per year.

\$48/3 years

—First-class within USA: Add \$7 per year.

NAME _____

ADDRESS _____

CITY _____ STATE _____ ZIP _____

Send a gift subscription in my name to the following address (a card will be sent notifying recipient of your gift):

NAME _____

ADDRESS _____

CITY _____ STATE _____ ZIP _____

Message to recipient _____

The total amount of my order is \$ _____

My check is enclosed (Make checks payable to Transaction Periodicals Consortium).

Please bill my: MasterCard VISA

--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

Expiration Date _____ Interbank No. _____

Signature _____




No Postage Stamp
Necessary if Mailed
in the United States

BUSINESS REPLY CARD

FIRST CLASS PERMIT NO. 1129 NEW BRUNSWICK NJ

**AFRICA
REPORT**

Transaction Periodicals Consortium
Rutgers University
New Brunswick, New Jersey 08903



World Development Report 1981

THE WORLD BANK

Adjustment, global and national, to promote sustainable growth in the changing world economy—this is the main theme of *World Development Report 1981*, the fourth in an annual series from the World Bank. Recession and inflation in the industrial countries, together with the rise in oil prices, have been the main forces at work in the world economy in the 1970s. The *Report* examines their effect on developing countries to see how adjustment has been managed and what lessons may be learned for the 1980s. Chapters present global and regional projections for the 1980s, consider international aspects of adjustment in trade, energy, and finance, and explore adjustment problems in different groups of developing countries and the prospects for human development. The *Report* also includes the 1981 World Development Indicators, a set of 25 tables of economic and social indicators for 124 countries. *World Development Reports 1978, 1979, and 1980* are also available from Oxford.

1981

200 pp.; 36 tables, 80 color charts, 38 text boxes

cloth \$16.00 paper \$6.95

CONTENTS

Definitions

- 1 Introduction
- 2 A ten-year perspective
Growth in the 1970s. Prospects for the 1980s. Implications for poverty. Interdependence.
- 3 Growth through trade
Trade in the 1970s. Developing-country trade policy and growth. Industrial-country policy. International cooperation.
- 4 Energy: a new era
The energy transition. The special problems of traditional fuels. Energy and growth. Energy policy.
- 5 External finance for adjustment and growth
External finance in the 1970s. Financial adjustment. Prospects.
- 6 Country experience: managing adjustment
The oil-importing developing countries. Structure and policy. External shocks and modes of adjustment. Middle-income oil importers. Low-income oil importers. *China: adjustment and reform.* The need for adjustment. Prospects and options in the 1980s.
The oil-exporting countries. The capital-deficit oil exporters. The capital surplus oil exporters. Oil-exporting countries' prospects.
Nonmarket industrial countries: the "intensive strategy." A changing strategy. Relations with developing countries.
- 7 Human development: a continuing imperative
Human development and adjustment. Food and nutrition. Population. The role of external assistance.
- 8 Overview
The nature of interdependence. Developing countries in the 1970s and 1980s. Global adjustment. Agenda for growth.

Technical appendix

Bibliographical note

Annex World Development Indicators

From comments on *World Development Report 1980*:

"An authoritative and deeply illuminating summary of worldwide progress against poverty, and of the intricate relationships—not all of them economic—on which it depends."—*The Washington Post*

"An ambitious analysis of the international aspects of 'adjustment and growth' in the 80's, a didactic treatise on poverty and 'Human Development,' and a handy annexure of world development indicators."—*The Hindu*, Madras

"Essential reading for any individual or organization interested in or involved with developing countries."—*The Sudan Progress*

Oxford University Press

200 Madison Avenue • New York, New York 10016

Bargain for a beautiful Dan mask in the morning and enjoy a delicious martini in the evening. The excitement, beauty and sophistication of West Africa is waiting for you.

The African mask is not a disguise. Nor is the wearer a man pretending to be a god. Rather, mask and man become a god who is visible in its real form.

Music and dance were the first African arts to attract the attention of travelers and historians. A shield from ancient Greece depicts an African trumpet player. African sculpture was not appreciated until the end of the 19th century.

Among the Dan people who live in the Ivory Coast, the importance of a mask is in proportion to its size. The biggest, most impressive ones, the "Masks of Peace," are sufficiently powerful to end hostilities between villages.



Much of the great African art comes from West Africa, and the best way to get to and around West Africa is to fly Air Afrique. We have the most complete schedule of interconnecting flights between West African cities, New York, Europe and the rest of Africa.

Part of the fun of West Africa is bargaining. So here are the rules of successful bargaining: 1. Start at half the price you're willing to pay. 2. Never hurry. 3. Always keep your sense of humor.




While African food is both varied and delicious, you'll be pleased to know that should you get a craving for Italian food, or French food, or Oriental food, you can usually find instant gratification in any major city.

By the way, if you like hotels with air conditioning and swimming pools, you will find a hotel to your liking in virtually every West African capital city.

Masks & martinis.

The Cross of Agadez, one of the most famous silver jewelry designs in all of Africa, is worn by the Tuareg people of the south Sahara desert in Niger.



The Bateke people of the Republic of the Congo have a tradition where, upon the birth of a boy child, a statue is carved by a talented villager. The purpose of this statue is to protect the boy until he reaches puberty. Although the quality of these statues is very inconsistent, the best of them are worthy of a place among the great works of African art.

Ancestors appear frequently in the sculpture of the West African people. This emphasis reflects a basic fact about the nature of African existence, that is that each African is what he is and has what he has as a member of a family, i.e., the descendant of an ancestor. It is this ancestor sculpture that so amazed European cubists at the beginning of this century.

The great wealth of West African art is just seven hours away on a luxurious, non-stop Air Afrique jet from JFK. For more information write: Marketing Manager, Air Afrique, 683 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10022. Or call your Travel Agent or your nearest Air Afrique/Air France ticket office.

Traditional African cultures use basketry for a wide variety of purposes. Everything from houses to milk bottles are woven in beautiful designs from plant materials.



Africa begins with Air Afrique. And it's just seven hours to the New Sun... West Africa.

1981 Index

AUTHOR INDEX

- Arnold, Guy, "New directions for the 1980s", May-Jun 58
 Ballance, Frank C., "Rural reform in Zimbabwe", Jul-Aug 9
 Beaubien, Michael C., "Dr. Nathan Shamuyarira, Zimbabwe Minister of Information and Tourism" (interview), Jul-Aug 48
 Butcher, Goler Teal, "Aid as foreign policy", Nov-Dec 43
 Carter, Gwendolen M., "Southern African reactions to Reagan", May-Jun 43
 "Zimbabwe: The first year", May-Jun 62
 Cook, Gayla, "Working with African women: Options for the West", Mar-Apr 43
 "Teurai Ropa Nhongo, Zimbabwe Minister of Community Development and Women's Affairs" (interview), Mar-Apr 49
 Crocker, Chester A., "The United States and Africa" (document), Sept-Oct 6
 "Namibia/Angola linkages" (document) Nov-Dec 10
 Crocker, Chester A., et al., "Southern Africa: a U.S. policy for the '80s", Jan-Feb 7
 Deutsch, Richard, "Reagan and Africa", Jan-Feb 4
 "Thozamile Botha, South African trade union leader" (interview), Jan-Feb 42
 "Africa from a strategic perspective", Mar-Apr 47
 "Reagan's unruly review", May-Jun 23
 "Building an Africa policy", Jul-Aug 44
 Dos Santos, José Eduardo, "Reaction to the South African invasion" (document), Nov-Dec 9
 Easum, Donald B., "Nigerian-American relations", (document), Jul-Aug 52
 Gray, William H., "Major policy issues for the 1980s", (document), Mar-Apr 22
 Gregory, Carole, "Who will speak for the African woman?" (book review), Mar-Apr 60
 Grenville-Grey, Wilfrid, "South Africa: What prospects for human rights?" Sept-Oct 41
 Greznis, Mario et al., "Southern Africa: a U.S. policy for the '80s", Jan-Feb 7
 Gusau, Alhaji Ibrahim, "Nigeria's green revolution", Jul-Aug 19
 Harfoush, Samira, "Non-traditional training for women in the Arab world", Mar-Apr 51
 Hartling, Poul, "An African tragedy", Jan-Feb 39
 Henderson, Robert et al., "Southern Africa: a U.S. policy for the '80s", Jan-Feb 7
 Holdcroft, Lane E., "Agriculture: The role of external aid", Jul-Aug 15
 Hughes, Anthony J., "Reagan and Africa: Policy options in the Horn", May-Jun 4
 "Dr. Mohamed Sheikh Aden, Somali Minister of Information and National Guidance" (interview), May-Jun 12
 "Mohamed Diriye Urdoh, secretary-general of the Western (Somali Liberation Front)" (interview), May-Jun 15
 "Senator Nancy Landon Kassebaum, chairman, Senate subcommittee on Africa" (interview), Jul-Aug 35
 "Donald B. Sde, South African ambassador to the United States" (interview), Sept-Oct 14
 "Oliver Tambo, president of the African National Congress of South Africa" (interview), Sept-Oct 20
 "President Moi's delicate mission", Sept-Oct 50
 "Nairobi press notebook", Sept-Oct 55
 "Congressman Howard Wolpe" (interview), Nov-Dec 4
 Isaacman, Allen, "Response to Luis Benjamin Serapiao", Jan-Feb 56
 Isaacman, Allen, and Barbara Isaacman, "Mozambique: Creating a new legal system", Jan-Feb 19
 Jackson, Henry F., "South Africa: Reagan's policy rupture", Sept-Oct 9
 Johns, Sheridan, "South Africa: A new direction?" (book review) Sept-Oct 58
 Kaba, Lansine, "Guinea: Myth and reality of change", May-Jun 53

- Kazadi, F.S.B., "Zaire 1981: Recovery or relapse?" Jul-Aug 40
 "Trade, tourism, and mild repression", Nov-Dec 39
 Kraus, Jon, "The multinationals controversy: Exploitation or development?" (book review), Jan-Feb 52
 Lichenstein, Charles M., "The American veto" (document), Nov-Dec 10
 Lycett, Andrew, "New hope for the Sudan", Jul-Aug 37
 Marshall, Peter, "Tourism: Tanzania's controversial industry", Nov-Dec 52
 Mazrui, Ali A., "Africa between Republican and Democratic administrations" Jan-Feb 46
 Mboukou, Alexandre, "U.S./Congo: Pragmatic relations", Nov-Dec 12
 McCaffrey, Kathleen, "African women on the screen", Mar-Apr 56
 Mkapa, Benjamin, "Major policy issues for the 1980s" (document), Mar-Apr 24
 Mortimer, Robert A., "Politics in trans-Saharan Africa", May-Jun 47
 Nguza, Karl-I-Bond, "The situation in Zaire" (document), Nov-Dec 19
 Norman, David, "Agriculture: Progress or catastrophe in Africa?" Jul-Aug 4
 Nyang, Sulayman S., "The Gambia: After the revolution", Nov-Dec 47
 Okeyo, Achola Pala, "Reflections on development myths", Mar-Apr 7
 Parry, John, "The search for commodity stability", Jan-Feb 15
 Rothchild, Donald, "The two senses of ethnonational self-determination" (book review), Nov-Dec 56
 Seiler, John, "Reagan and Africa: Which way in southern Africa?", May-Jun 17
 Serapiao, Luis Benjamin, "Letter to the Editor", Jan-Feb 55
 Tau, Mildred Malineo, "Women: Critical to African development", Mar-Apr 4
 Thompson, Carol B., "U.S. companies in South Africa" (book review), Jul-Aug 54
 Tinker, Irene, "Policy strategies for women in the 1980s", Mar-Apr 11
 Tsongas, Senator Paul, "Time is running out", Sept-Oct 39
 Tutu, Bishop Desmond, "The future of South Africa", Sept-Oct 4
 Uys, Stanley, "South Africa: Is partition the answer?", Sept-Oct 45
 Whan, Linda L., "Perspectives on third world women" (book review), Mar-Apr 59

SUBJECT INDEX

Agriculture

- African Update, Jan-Feb 27, 28, 32, 35; Mar-Apr 31, 37, 42; May-Jun 30, 31, 33, 35
 "Progress or catastrophe in Africa?", by David Norman, Jul-Aug 4
 "Rural reform in Zimbabwe", by Frank C. Ballance, Jul-Aug 9
 "The role of external aid", by Lane E. Holdcroft, Jul-Aug 15
 "Nigeria's green revolution" (document), by Alhaji Ibrahim Gusau, Jul-Aug 19
 African Update, Jul-Aug 25, 26, 28
 "New hope for the Sudan", by Andrew Lycett, Jul-Aug 37
 African Update, Sept-Oct 26, 27, 29, 31, 36; Nov-Dec 26, 27, 30, 33, 38

Aid

- African Update, Jan-Feb 25, 28, 30, 32, 35, 38
 "Refugees: An African tragedy", by Poul Hartling, Jan-Feb 39
 African Update, Mar-Apr 30, 39, 40
 "Working with African women: Options for the West", by Gayla Cook, Mar-Apr 43
 African Update, May-Jun 27, 29, 30, 31, 33, 34, 35, 37, 42
 "Agriculture: The role of external aid", by Lane E. Holdcroft, Jul-Aug 15

African Update, Jul-Aug 26, 31; Sept-Oct 28, 29, 33, 36; Nov-Dec 27, 31

"Aid as foreign policy", by Goler Teal Butcher, Nov-Dec 43

Books

Alexander, Yonah, and Robert E. Friedlander, eds., *Self-determination: National, Regional and Global Dimensions*, reviewed by Donald Rothchild, Nov-Dec 56

Biersteker, Thomas, *Distortion or Development?: Contending Perspectives on the Multinational Corporation*, reviewed by Jon Kraus, Jan-Feb 52

Bledsoe, Caroline, *Women and Marriage in Kpelle Society*, reviewed by Carole Gregory, Mar-Apr 60

Carter, Gwendolen M., *Which Way is South Africa Going?* reviewed by Sheridan Johns, Sept-Oct 58

El Saadawi, Nawal, *The Hidden Face of Eve: Women in the Arab World*, reviewed by Carole Gregory, Mar-Apr 60

Kofele-Kale, Ndiva, ed., *An African experiment in nation building: The bilingual Cameroon Republic since reunification*, reviewed by Donald Rothchild, Nov-Dec 56

LeVine, Sarah and Robert, *Mothers and Wives: Gusu Women of East Africa*, reviewed by Carole Gregory, Mar-Apr 60

Lindsay, Beverly, ed., *Comparative Perspectives of Third World Women: The Impact of Race, Sex, and Class*, reviewed by Linda L. Whan, Mar-Apr 59

Ronen, Dov, *The Quest for Self-Determination*, reviewed by Donald Rothchild, Nov-Dec 56

Schmidt, Elizabeth, *Decoding Corporate Camouflage*, reviewed by Carol B. Thompson, Jul-Aug 54

Strobel, Margaret, *Muslim Women in Mombasa*, reviewed by Carole Gregory, Mar-Apr 60

Urdang, Stephanie, *Fighting Two Colonialisms: Women in Guinea-Bissau*, reviewed by Carole Gregory, Mar-Apr 60

Weinrich, A.K.H., *Women and Racial Discrimination in Rhodesia*, reviewed by Linda L. Whan, Mar-Apr 59

Rogers, Barbara, *The Domestication of Women: Discrimination in Developing Societies*, reviewed by Linda L. Whan, Mar-Apr 59

Development

"Africa in world development" (document), Jan-Feb 48

"The multinationals controversy: Exploitation or development?" by Jon Kraus (book review), Jan-Feb 52

"Women: Critical to African development", by Ambassador Mildred Malineo Tau, Mar-Apr 4

"Reflections on development myths", by Achola Pala Okeyo, Mar-Apr 7

"Policy strategies for women in the 1980s", by Irene Tinker, Mar-Apr 11

"African Training and Research Centre for Women: Its work and program", by the staff of ATRCW, Mar-Apr 17

"Working with African women: Options for the West", by Gayla Cook, Mar-Apr 43

"New directions for the 1980s", by Guy Arnold, May-Jun 58

"Progress or catastrophe in Africa?", by David Norman, Jul-Aug 4

"Rural reform in Zimbabwe", by Frank C. Ballance, Jul-Aug 9

"Nigeria's green revolution", by Alhaji Ibrahim Gusau, Jul-Aug 19

"New hope for the Sudan", by Andrew Lycett, Jul-Aug 37

"Trade, tourism, and mild repression", by F.S.B. Kazadi, Nov-Dec 39

"Aid as foreign policy", by Goler Teal Butcher, Nov-Dec 43

Economics see also African Update

"The search for commodity stability", by John Parry, Jan-Feb 15

"U.S. Firms and South African divestment" (document), Jan-Feb 45

"The multinational controversy: Exploitation or development?" (book review), Jan-Feb 52

"New directions for the 1980s", by Guy Arnold, May-Jun 58

"Zimbabwe: The first year", by Gwendolen M. Carter, May-Jun 62

"Zaire: Recovery or relapse?", by F.S.B. Kazadi, Jul-Aug 40

"U.S. companies in South Africa" (book review), by Carol B. Thompson, Jul-Aug 54

"U.S./Congo: Pragmatic relations", by Alexandre Mboukou, Nov-Dec 12

"After the rebellion", by Sulayman S. Nyang, Nov-Dec 47

Human rights

African Update, Mar-Apr 29; May-Jun 31

"What prospects for human rights?", by Wilfrid Grenville-Grey, Sept-Oct 41

African Update, Nov-Dec 27

International Monetary Fund

African Update, Jan-Feb, 35; Mar-Apr 40; May-Jun 29, 31; Jul-Aug 31, 32

Agriculture: New hope for the Sudan", by Andrew Lycett, Jul-Aug 37

African Update, Sept-Oct 31, 33; Nov-Dec 27

Interviews

"Thozamile Botha, South African trade union leader", Jan-Feb 42

"Teurai Ropa Nhongo, Zimbabwe Minister of Community Development and Women's Affairs", Mar-Apr 49

"Dr. Mohamed Sheikh Aden, Somali Minister of Information and National Guidance", May-Jun 12

"Mohamed Diriye Urdoh, secretary-general of the Western Somali Liberation Front", May-Jun 15

"Senator Nancy Landon Kassebaum, Chairman, Senate Subcommittee on Africa", Jul-Aug 35

"Dr. Nathan Shamuyarira, Zimbabwe Minister of Information and Tourism", Jul-Aug 48

"Donald B. Sole, South African ambassador to the United States", Sept-Oct 14

"Oliver Tambo, president of the African National Congress of South Africa", Sept-Oct 20

Media

African Update, Jan-Feb 27, 28, 37; Mar-Apr 27, 28

"African women on the screen", by Kathleen McCaffrey, Mar-Apr 56

African Update, May-Jun 36; Jul-Aug 28, 31

"Dr. Nathan Shamuyarira, Zimbabwe Minister of Information and Tourism" (interview), Jul-Aug 48

African Update, Sept-Oct 28, 29, 30, 37, 38; Nov-Dec 28, 29, 32

Military aid and equipment

African Update, Jan-Feb 25, 29, 31, 33, 34, 35, 36; Mar-Apr 30, 32, 40, 41, 42; May-Jun 29, 31, 32, 33, 34, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41; Jul-Aug 23, 24, 26, 29

"South Africa: Reagan's policy rupture", by Henry F. Jackson, Sept-Oct 9

African Update, Sept-Oct 23, 25, 26, 29, 30, 31, 35, 38; Nov-Dec 23, 24, 31, 32, 33, 35, 36, 37

Mining

African Update, Jan-Feb 38; Mar-Apr 29, 40; May-Jun 29, 37, 41; Jul-Aug 25, 26; Sept-Oct 27, 33, 34, 38; Nov-Dec 29, 38

Nuclear power

African Update, Jan-Feb 29; May-Jun 38, 39; Sept-Oct 38

Oil

African Update, Jan-Feb 28, 29, 33; Mar-Apr 28, 31, 38; May-Jun 30, 33, 36, 37, 39, 42; Jul-Aug 27, 31, 32; Sept-Oct 29, 30, 31, 32, 35, 36; Nov-Dec 28, 31, 34

Organization of African Unity

African Update, Jan-Feb 26, 30, 35, 36; Mar-Apr 28, 29; May-Jun 29; Jul-Aug 23, 24, 25, 32; Sept-Oct 25, 28, 30, 31, 34, 35

"President Moi's delicate mission", by Anthony J. Hughes, Sept-Oct 50

"Nairobi press notebook", by Anthony J. Hughes, Sept-Oct 55

African Update, Nov-Dec 30, 35

Refugees

African Update, Jan-Feb 32, 35, 38

"An African tragedy", by Poul Hartling, Jan-Feb 39

African Update, May-Jun 35; Sept-Oct 37; Nov-Dec 31, 36

Tourism

African Update, May-Jun 35; Nov-Dec 35

"Myth and reality of change", by Lansiné Kaba, May-Jun 53
African Update, Jul-Aug 26; Sept-Oct 27, 36; Nov-Dec 35

Guinea-Bissau

African Update, Jan-Feb 24; Mar-Apr 30; May-Jun 29, 30; Jul-Aug 26; Sept-Oct 25; Nov-Dec 26

Ivory Coast

African Update, Jan-Feb 27; May-Jun 30; Jul-Aug 26; Sept-Oct 27; Nov-Dec 26

Kenya

African Update, Jan-Feb 31; Mar-Apr 37, 38
"Policy options in the Horn", by Anthony J. Hughes, May-Jun 4
African Update, May-Jun 34; Jul-Aug 23, 24, 28; Sept-Oct 30, 31, 34, 35
"President Moi's delicate mission", by Anthony J. Hughes, Sept-Oct 50
"Nairobi press notebook", by Anthony J. Hughes, Sept-Oct 55
African Update, Nov-Dec 30

Lesotho

African Update, May-Jun 41; Sept-Oct 36; Nov-Dec 36

Liberia

African Update, Jan-Feb 27; Mar-Apr 30; May-Jun 31; July-Aug 26; Sept-Oct 27; Nov-Dec 26

Libya

African Update, Jan-Feb 25, 26, 34, 36; Mar-Apr 28, 30, 31, 32, 41; May-Jun 29, 31, 38
"Politics in trans-Saharan Africa", by Robert A. Mortimer, May-Jun 47
African Update, Jul-Aug 25, 27, 32; Sept-Oct 25, 34; Nov-Dec 24, 25, 27, 31, 32, 34, 35

Madagascar

African Update, Mar-Apr 38; May-Jun 35; Jul-Aug 29

Malawi

African Update, Mar-Apr 42; May-Jun 42; Jul-Aug 33; Sept-Oct 36

Mali

African Update, Jan-Feb 28; Mar-Apr 30; May-Jun 31; Sept-Oct 28, 36; Nov-Dec 27, 35

Mauritania

African Update, Mar-Apr 30; May-Jun 32, 40; Jul-Aug 24, 27; Sept-Oct 28, 36; Nov-Dec 27, 35

Mauritius

African Update, Jan-Feb 31; May-Jun 35; Sept-Oct 30; Nov-Dec 31

Morocco

African Update, Jan-Feb 35, 36; Mar-Apr 42; May-Jun 32, 38, 39, 40
"Politics in trans-Saharan Africa", by Robert A. Mortimer, May-Jun 47
African Update, Jul-Aug 24, 32; Sept-Oct 28, 35, 36; Nov-Dec 32, 34, 35

Mozambique

"Creating a new legal system", by Allen and Barbara Isaacman, Jan-Feb 19
African Update, Jan-Feb 25, 36
"Serapião criticizes review" (letter), Jan-Feb 55
African Update, Mar-Apr 42; May-Jun 42; Sept-Oct 23, 37; Nov-Dec 37

Namibia

"A U.S. policy for the '80s", by Chester A. Crocker *et al.*, Jan-Feb 7
African Update, Jan-Feb 23; Mar-Apr 29
"Which way in southern Africa?" by John Seiler, May-Jun 17
African Update, May-Jun 27; Jul-Aug 23, 24, 33

"In Washington: Building an Africa policy", by Richard Deutsch, Jul-Aug 44

African Update, Sept-Oct 23

"President Moi's delicate mission", by Anthony J. Hughes, Sept-Oct 50

"Congressman Howard Wolpe" (interview), Nov-Dec 4

"Reaction to the South African invasion" (document), by José Eduardo dos Santos, Nov-Dec 9

"Namibia/Angola linkages" (document), by Chester A. Crocker, Nov-Dec 10

"The American veto" (document), by Charles M. Lichenstein, Nov-Dec 10

African Update, Nov-Dec 23, 28, 30, 36

Niger

African Update, Mar-Apr 31; May-Jun 32; Jul-Aug 27; Sept-Oct 28; Nov-Dec 27

Nigeria

African Update, Jan-Feb 28, 35; Mar-Apr 31; May-Jun 32
"Nigeria's green revolution", by Alhaji Ibrahim Gusau, Jul-Aug 19
African Update, Jul-Aug 25, 26, 27
"Nigerian-American relations" (document), by Donald B. Easum, Jul-Aug 52
African Update, Sept-Oct 28, 32, 36; Nov-Dec 25, 27, 35

Portugal

African Update, Jan-Feb 33; Jul-Aug 26; Sept-Oct 38; Nov-Dec 36

Rwanda

African Update, Jul-Aug 30, Sept-Oct 31

Sao Tome and Principe

African Update, Jan-Feb 33; Sept-Oct 33

Senegal

African Update, Jan-Feb 26, 29, 35; Mar-Apr 32, 41; May-Jun 32, 33; Jul-Aug 28; Sept-Oct 25, 29; Nov-Dec 25, 28

Seychelles

African Update, Jan-Feb 31; May-Jun 35; Jul-Aug 29

Sierra Leone

African Update, Jan-Feb 30; May-Jun 34; Jul-Aug 25, 28, 32; Sept-Oct 29, 36; Nov-Dec 29, 35

Somalia

African Update, Jan-Feb 30, 31, 34; Mar-Apr 38
"Policy options in the Horn", by Anthony J. Hughes, May-June 4
"Dr. Mohamed Sheikh Aden, Somali Minister of Information and National Guidance", (interview), May-Jun 12
"Mohamed Diriye Urdoh, secretary-general of the Western Somali Liberation Front" (interview), May-Jun 15
African Update, May-Jun 34, 35; Jul-Aug 28, 29; Sept-Oct 31; Nov-Dec 31

South Africa

"A U.S. policy for the '80s", by Chester A. Crocker *et al.*, Jan-Feb 7
African Update, Jan-Feb 23, 24, 25, 29, 33, 37
"Thozamile Botha, South African trade union leader" (interview), Jan-Feb 42
"U.S. firms and South African divestment" (document), Jan-Feb 45
African Update, Mar-Apr 27, 29
"Which way in southern Africa?", by John Seiler, May-Jun 17
"Reagan's unruly review", by Richard Deutsch, May-Jun 23
African Update, May-Jun 27, 38, 35, 41, 42
"Southern African reactions to Reagan", by Gwendolen M. Carter, May-Jun 43
African Update, Jul-Aug 23, 24, 33, 34
"In Washington: Building an Africa policy", by Richard Deutsch, Jul-Aug 44
"U.S. companies in South Africa", by Carol B. Thompson (book review) Jul-Aug 54

"The future of South Africa", by Bishop Desmond Tutu, Sept-Oct 4

"Reagan's policy rupture", by Henry F. Jackson, Sept-Oct 9
"Donald B. Sole, South African ambassador to the United States" (interview), Sept-Oct 14

"Oliver Tambo, president of the African National Congress of South Africa" (interview), Sept-Oct 20
African Update, Sept-Oct 23, 24, 37

"Time IS running out", by Senator Paul Tsongas, Sept-Oct 39
"What prospects for human rights?", by Wilfrid Grenville-Grey, Sept-Oct 41

"Is partition the answer?", by Stanley Uys, Sept-Oct 45
"President Moi's delicate mission", by Anthony J. Hughes, Sept-Oct 50

"South Africa: a new direction?" (book review), by Sheridan Johns, Sept-Oct 58

"Congressman Howard Wolpe" (interview), Nov-Dec 4
"Reaction to the South African invasion" (document), by José Eduardo dos Santos, Nov-Dec 9

"The American veto" (document), by Charles M. Lichenstein, Nov-Dec 10

African Update, Nov-Dec 23, 24, 28, 30, 31, 36, 37

Spain

African Update, Nov-Dec 27, 32

Sudan

African Update, Jan-Feb 35; Mar-Apr 41; May-Jun 39; Jul-Aug 28

"New hope for the Sudan", by Andrew Lycett, Jul-Aug 37
African Update, Sept-Oct 30, 35, 36; Nov-Dec 23, 34, 35

Swaziland

African Update, Jan-Feb 38

Tanzania

African Update, Jan-Feb 32; Mar-Apr 38; May-Jun 35; Jul-Aug 29; Sept-Oct 30, 31, 36, 37; Nov-Dec 31, 35

"Tourism: Tanzania's controversial industry", by Peter Marshall, Nov-Dec 52

Togo

African Update, Jan-Feb 26, 27

"Trade, tourism, and mild repression", by F.S.B. Kazadi, Nov-Dec 39

Tunisia

African Update, Jan-Feb 36; Mar-Apr 41; May-Jun 40; Jul-Aug 33; Sept-Oct 35; Nov-Dec 35

Uganda

African Update, Jan-Feb 32, 33; Mar-Apr 38; May-Jun 35; Jul-Aug 29; Sept-Oct 30, 31; Nov-Dec 31

United States

"Reagan and Africa", by Richard Deutsch, Jan-Feb 4
"A U.S. policy for the '80s", by Chester A. Crocker *et al.*, Jan-Feb 7

African Update, Jan-Feb 27, 28, 31, 32, 34, 36

"U.S. firms and South African divestment" (document), Jan-Feb 45

"Africa between Republican and Democratic administrations", by Ali A. Mazrui, Jan-Feb 46

"Major policy issues for the 1980s" (excerpt from a speech), by Congressman William H. Gray, Mar-Apr 22

African Update, Mar-Apr 30, 31, 37, 41
"African from a strategic perspective", by Richard Deutsch, Mar-Apr 47

"Policy options in the Horn", by Anthony J. Hughes, May-Jun 4
"Dr. Mohamed Sheikh Aden, Somali Minister of Information and National Guidance" (interview), May-Jun 12

"Which way in southern Africa?", by John Seiler, May-Jun 17
"Reagan's unruly review", by Richard Deutsch, May-Jun 23

African Update, May-Jun 27, 29, 31, 32, 37, 38, 39, 40, 42
"Southern African reactions to Reagan", by Gwendolen M. Carter, May-Jun 43

African Update, Jul-Aug 23, 24, 26, 29, 31, 32, 33, 34

"Senator Nancy Landon Kassebaum" (interview), Jul-Aug 35

"Building an Africa policy", by Richard Deutsch, Jul-Aug 44

"Nigerian/American relations", by Donald B. Easum (document) Jul-Aug 52

"The United States and Africa", by Chester A. Crocker (document) Sept-Oct 6

"Reagan's policy rupture", by Henry F. Jackson, Sept-Oct 9
"Donald B. Sole, South African ambassador to the United States" (interview), Sept-Oct 14

African Update, Sept-Oct 23, 30, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 38
"Time IS running out", by Senator Paul Tsongas, Sept-Oct 39

"President Moi's delicate mission", by Anthony J. Hughes, Sept-Oct 50

"Congressman Howard Wolpe" (interview), Nov-Dec 4
"The American veto" (document), by Charles M. Lichenstein, Nov-Dec 10

"U.S./Congo: Pragmatic relations", by Alexandre Mboukou, Nov-Dec 12

"U.S. policy toward Zaire" (document), Nov-Dec 22
African Update, Nov-Dec 23, 27, 30, 31, 33, 34, 35, 36

"Aid as foreign policy", by Goler Teal Butcher, Nov-Dec 43

Upper Volta

African Update, Jan-Feb 30; Mar-Apr 32; Sept-Oct 29; Nov-Dec 29

USSR

"A U.S. policy for the '80s", by Chester A. Crocker, *et al.*, Jan-Feb 7

African Update, Jan-Feb 25, 31, 37, 38; Mar-Apr 39
"Policy options in the Horn", by Anthony J. Hughes, May-Jun 4

"Dr. Mohamed Sheikh Aden, Somali Minister of Information and National Guidance" (interview), May-Jun 12

African Update, May-Jun 29, 38, 39; Jul-Aug 27, 28, 30, 32; Sept-Oct 23, 26; Nov-Dec 24, 30, 31, 32, 36

Western Sahara

African Update, Jan-Feb 35, 36; Mar-Apr 40, 41; May-Jun 32, 38, 39, 40

"Politics in trans-Saharan Africa", by Robert A. Mortimer, May-Jun 47

African Update, Jul-Aug 24, 27, 32; Sept-Oct 28, 35; Nov-Dec 34, 35

Yemen

African Update, Jul-Aug 28

Zaire

African Update, Jan-Feb 33; Mar-Apr 39; May-Jun 37; Jul-Aug 31

"Recovery or relapse?", by F.S.B. Kazadi, Jul-Aug 40
African Update, Sept-Oct 33

"The situation in Zaire", by Nguza Karl-I-Bond (document), Nov-Dec 19

"U.S. policy toward Zaire" (document), Nov-Dec 22
African Update, Nov-Dec 33

Zambia

African Update, Jan-Feb 33; Mar-Apr 40; May-Jun 37; Jul-Aug 29, 31; Sept-Oct 23, 33; Nov-Dec 33

Zimbabwe

"A U.S. policy for the '80s", by Chester A. Crocker *et al.*, Jan-Feb 7

African Update, Jan-Feb 23, 36; Mar-Apr 27, 42
"Teurai Ropa Nkhono, Zimbabwe Minister of Community Development and Women's Affairs" (interview), Mar-Apr 49

African Update, May-Jun 27, 42
"Southern African reactions to Reagan", by Gwendolen M. Carter, May-Jun 43

"The first year", by Gwendolen M. Carter, May-Jun 62
"Rural reform in Zimbabwe", by Frank C. Ballance, Jul-Aug 9

African Update, Jul-Aug 23
"Dr. Nathan Shamuyarira, Zimbabwe Minister of Information and Tourism" (interview), Jul-Aug 48

African Update, Sept-Oct 23, 24, 37, 38; Nov-Dec 37, 38

"Trade, tourism, and mild repression", by F.S.B. Kazadi, Nov-Dec 39

"Tanzania's controversial industry", by Peter Marshall, Nov-Dec 52

Trade unions

African Update, Jan-Feb 29, 30, 37

"Thozamile Botha, South African trade union leader" (interview), Jan-Feb 42

African Update, Mar-Apr 40, 41; May-Jun 40; Jul-Aug 25, 27, 28, 31, 33; Sept-Oct 29, 30, 32, 33, 38; Nov-Dec 24, 29, 38

Women

"Women: Critical to African development", by Ambassador Mildred Malineo Tau, Mar-Apr 4

"Reflections on development myths", by Achola Pala Okeyo, Mar-Apr 7

"Policy strategies for women in the 1980s", by Irene Tinker, Mar-Apr 11

"African Training and Research Centre for Women: Its work and program", by the staff of ATRCW, Mar-Apr 17

"Working with African women: Options for the West", by Gayla Cook, Mar-Apr 43

"Teurai Ropa Nhongo, Zimbabwe Minister of Community Development and Women's Affairs" (interview), Mar-Apr 49

"Nontraditional training for women in the Arab world", by Samira Harfoush, Mar-Apr 51

"African women on the screen", by Kathleen McCaffrey, Mar-Apr 56

"Perspectives on Third World women" (book review), by Linda L. Whan, Mar-Apr 59

"Who will speak for the African woman?" (book review), by Carole Gregory, Mar-Apr 60

COUNTRY INDEX

Algeria

African Update, Jan-Feb 34, 36; Mar-Apr 40, 41; May-Jun 37, 40

"Politics in trans-Saharan Africa", by Robert A. Mortimer, May-Jun 47

African Update, Jul-Aug 24, 27, 31, 33; Sept-Oct 34, 35, 36; Nov-Dec 34

Angola

"A U.S. policy for the '80s", by Chester A. Crocker *et al.*, Jan-Feb 7

African Update, Jan-Feb 36; Mar-Apr 42; May-Jun 40; Jul-Aug 23, 33

"Nigerian-American relations" (document), by Donald B. Easum, Jul-Aug 52

African Update, Sept-Oct 23, 36

"Congressman Howard Wolpe" (interview), Nov-Dec 4

"Reaction to the South African invasion" (document), by José Eduardo dos Santos, Nov-Dec 9

"Namibia/Angola linkages" (document), by Chester A. Crocker, Nov-Dec 10

"The American veto" (document), by Charles M. Lichenstein, Nov-Dec 10

African Update, Nov-Dec 23, 28, 31, 36

Belgium

African Update, Mar-Apr 39; May-Jun 37; Sept-Oct 33

Benin

African Update, Jul-Aug 25, 26; Nov-Dec 25

Botswana

African Update, May-Jun 41

Britain

African Update, Jan-Feb 30, 32; May-Jun 31, 32, 38; Jul-Aug 24, 25, 29; Sept-Oct 23, 30, 31, 32, 38; Nov-Dec 31, 34, 38

Burundi

African Update, Sept-Oct 31

Cameroon

African Update, Jan-Feb 32; May-Jun 36; Sept-Oct 32, 33

"The two senses of ethnonational self-determination" (book review), by Donald Rothchild, Nov-Dec 56

Canary Islands

African Update, Sept-Oct 25

Cape Verde

African Update, Jan-Feb 24, 25; Mar-Apr 29, 30; May-Jun 29; Sept-Oct 25

Central African Republic

African Update, Jan-Feb 32; Mar-Apr 39; May-Jun 36; Jul-Aug 30; Sept-Oct 32; Nov-Dec 32

Chad

African Update, Jan-Feb 25; Mar-Apr 28, 32, 41; May-Jun 29, 33, 38

"Politics in trans-Saharan Africa", by Robert A. Mortimer, May-Jun 47

African Update, Jul-Aug 24, 25, 27; Sept-Oct 25; Nov-Dec 24, 25, 35

China

African Update, Jul-Aug 23; Nov-Dec 27

Comoros

African Update, May-Jun 34; Nov-Dec 30

Congo

African Update, Jan-Feb 26; Mar-Apr 39; Jul-Aug 30

"U.S./Congo: Pragmatic relations", by Alexandre Mboukou, Nov-Dec 12

Cuba

African Update, May-Jun 41; Jul-Aug 23, 33; Sept-Oct 25; Nov-Dec 36

Diego Garcia

African Update, Sept-Oct 30

Djibouti

African Update, Jan-Feb 30; May-Jun 34; July-Aug 28; Sept-Oct 30; Nov-Dec 30.

Egypt

African Update, Jan-Feb 34; Mar-Apr 41; May-Jun 29, 38; July-Aug 32; Sept-Oct 34, 35; Nov-Dec 23, 35

Equatorial Guinea

African Update, May-Jun 36; Jul-Aug 30; Sept-Oct 32; Nov-Dec 32

Ethiopia

African Update, Jan-Feb 30, 31; Mar-Apr 37

"Policy options in the Horn", by Anthony J. Hughes, May-Jun 4

African Update, May-Jun 31, 34; July-Aug 28; Sept-Oct 30, 31; Nov-Dec 30

France

African Update, Jan-Feb 32, 33, 36; Mar-Apr 28, 32; May-Jun 36, 38; Jul-Aug 26, 29, 30; Sept-Oct 23, 27, 28, 32, 33, 38; Nov-Dec 25, 27, 31, 32, 33, 34

Gabon

African Update, Jan-Feb 32, 33, 35; May-Jun 36; Sept-Oct 32; Nov-Dec 33

Gambia

African Update, Jan-Feb 26, 35; Mar-Apr 29, 41; May-Jun 29; Sept-Oct 25; Nov-Dec 25, 29

"After the rebellion", by Sulayman S. Nyang, Nov-Dec 47

Ghana

African Update, Jan-Feb 26, 35; Mar-Apr 29; May-Jun 29; Jul-Aug 25, 26; Nov-Dec 26

Guinea

African Update, Jan-Feb 26, 27; May-Jun 30