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MARCH-APRIL 1982

ISSN 0001-9836

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
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
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Africa Report, a nonpartisan magazine of African affairs, is published bimonthly in July-August, September-October, November-December, January-February, March-April, and May-June, and is scheduled to appear at the beginning of each date period at 833 United Nations Plaza, New York, N.Y. 10017. Editorial correspondence and letters to the Publisher should be sent to this address. Correspondence regarding subscriptions, distribution, advertising, and other business matters should be sent to Transaction Periodicals Consortium, Dept. 8010, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey 08903. Telephone: (201) 932-2280. Subscription rates: *Individuals*: U.S.A. \$18, Canada \$21, air rate overseas \$42; *Institutions*: U.S.A. \$24, Canada \$27, air rate overseas \$48. Second-class postage paid at New York, N.Y. and at additional mailing offices. Telephones: Publisher (212) 949-5717; Editor (212) 949-5731. Copyright © 1982 by the African-American Institute, Inc.



IN THIS ISSUE

This issue of *Africa Report* takes an in-depth look at Northeast Africa, a region of increasing concern to the Reagan administration, particularly in the wake of Anwar Sadat's death. We begin with an overview of American policy in the area written by Michael C. Hudson who proposes that a more balanced approach toward the issues and actors be adopted by Washington.

The Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi has recently been making world headlines and his regime has been targeted by the Reagan administration as the main source of international terrorism. Zdenek Cervenka analyzes the case against Qaddafi as covered in the Western press and concludes that the furor over the Libyan leader is exaggerated. Our In Washington columnist, Richard Deutsch, examines views of Qaddafi in the nation's capital and why Libya seems to have captured the attention of the administration.

René Lemarchand discusses the history of the conflict in Chad and the prospects for peace in the war-torn nation. Sudan's North-South tensions a decade after the end of the civil war are analyzed by Dunstan Wai. An Egyptian journalist, Ahmed Youssef al-Karie, looks at Mubarak's Africa policy, and the stability of the Siad Barre regime in Somalia is assessed by Paul Henze.

Also in this issue, Jon Kraus examines what led to the coup against President Limann of Ghana and what Jerry Rawlings faces as he returns to power for a second time. Tendaye Kumbula returns to Zimbabwe after many years and looks at Robert Mugabe's progress in his first two years as prime minister.

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The cover photo of Col. Muammar Qaddafi of Libya was taken by Henri Bureau/Sygma.

Reagan's Policy in Northeast Africa

BY MICHAEL C. HUDSON



American and Egyptian troops during last year's "Operation Bright Star" in the Egyptian desert

Photo: Rachad El Kouassy/Camera Press

If the Reagan administration so far has had a difficult time relating

Michael C. Hudson is director of the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies and Seif Ghobash professor of Arab studies at Georgetown University.

complex regional situations to its global ideological fixation on the Soviet threat, it is understandable that it should have found the area of Northeast Africa particularly awkward to deal with. The countries of the region — Libya, Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Djibouti — not only are a crazy quilt of ideological contrasts but are also suf-

fering from significant internal socio-political problems. Of course, it was not so many years ago that this region mattered relatively little to American policymakers and its problems elicited only routine attention, but those days are gone. Even without Washington's new sensitivities to the global Soviet competition, Northeast Africa has be-

come an important ideological testing ground for the Third World, and developments there now have ramifications in at least two adjacent major tension areas — Arabia and the Persian Gulf, and the Arab-Israeli conflict zone.

Recent events have accelerated the polarization of the area both in terms of ideology and superpower spheres of influence. The conclusion in August 1981 of a treaty of economic cooperation between Libya, Ethiopia, and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY, South Yemen) not only cemented a coalition of radical regimes but was also warmly welcomed by the Soviet Union, whose actual or potential strategic assets in all three countries are significant indeed. Another dramatic event — the assassination of Egypt's President Anwar al-Sadat in October — highlighted the precariousness of the conservative, pro-American states in the region. Egypt, the linchpin of American policy, was of course itself shaken; and inevitably questions have been raised, despite the relatively smooth transition, over whether his successor, Hosni Mubarak, can or will adhere to the role Sadat had carved out for himself as "protector" of Northeast Africa and the Asian Arab world from radicalism and Soviet influence. The leader of Sudan, Gaafar al-Nimeiry, was among the few regional or Muslim heads of state to attend Sadat's funeral, underlining his commitment to and dependence on the Sadat position. Immediately, the United States announced its intention to increase aid both to Egypt and to the Sudan, and during President Nimeiry's visit to Washington in November it reiterated its support, making Sudan Africa's major recipient of U.S. aid, apart from Egypt. Washington's third — but somewhat lesser — ally in the region, Somalia, was elevated in importance by its inclusion in the far-flung "Bright Star" military exercises of November, which were intended to demonstrate U.S. military intentions and capabilities for action in the Gulf and northern Africa.

Both big powers have had their fingers burned often enough by the instability and regime policy reversals in this

region that one might suppose they would tacitly limit their involvement; but the geopolitical stakes perceived by Washington and Moscow are now so high that involvement even to the point of confrontation seems more likely. For Washington, Col. Muammar Qaddafi's "mischief-making" (in the words of Secretary of State Haig), threatens Egypt and Sudan and, by extension, the American presence in the Fertile Crescent, Arabia, and the Gulf as well. Similarly, Ethiopia under Mengistu Haile Mariam, despite its internal troubles, is so strategically located that it offers the Soviets an opening into both Africa and (along with South Yemen) the Arabian peninsula. For the Soviets, on the other hand, an Egypt tightly aligned with the United States and supporting an anti-Soviet regime in Khartoum threatens the key African and Mediterranean access point offered by Qaddafi's Libya, while a reinforced coordination (militarily and diplomatically) by the United States with Somalia, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Sudan hinders the Soviets from exploiting their geopolitical assets at the Bab al-Mandab strait and in the Horn. Evaluated from a geopolitical point of view, in light of the Iranian revolution and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, the area around the Horn is not just part of "an arc of crisis" but a possible "stepping stone into central Africa and southern Arabia.

FRIENDS AND ENEMIES

To the Reagan administration, Egypt is the pillar of U.S. policy for northern Africa and the Middle East, while Libya is the *bête noire*. This is hardly new, inasmuch as it was the Carter administration that first succumbed to the wooing of Sadat and began to chill relations with Libya (the president's brother notwithstanding). The difference is perhaps one of emphasis and tone — a new warmth to our friends and toughness toward our enemies. The fluidity of the Northeast Africa situation, however, suggests that a more prudent approach might be to take a cooler stance toward "friend" and "enemy" alike.

THE EGYPTIAN-AMERICAN EMBRACE

The United States-Egypt relationship is the principal case in point. Geopolitical realities make Egypt the single most important state in the area: location, size, military power, and human and cultural resources endow Egypt with a preeminence that even the petrodollars of Arabia cannot surpass. Inasmuch as both superpowers have enduring and competitive interests in the Middle East, it is axiomatic that both will aim to cultivate the regime in Cairo; and this is what has happened since World War II. The question is whether the current "special" relationship ill serves both parties because of the excessive dependence and expectations that characterize it.

The love affair with Egypt that began under Carter yielded major benefits for both parties, at first. For Carter, Camp David emerged as his major foreign policy triumph; for Sadat, the return of the Sinai and the granting of vast American aid were served up with the unprecedented personal prestige that descended upon the Egyptian president from the Western world, especially through the American mass media. The man who in 1972 had thrown the Russians out had by 1979 successfully lured the Americans in. But infusing state-to-state relations with the warmth of personal leader-to-leader "friendship" eventually hurt both Egypt and the United States. It lulled Sadat into thinking that the United States would support Egypt much more strongly in the Camp David Palestinian autonomy negotiations than it did; but Carter's private promises were not transformed into effective pressure against Israel; nor so far have been the warm feelings expressed by President Reagan. Sadat hid his disappointment in the United States, but other high Egyptian officials have not hidden theirs.

For its part the United States was oversold on the value of Egypt's strategic assets. The Carter administration was persuaded, apparently by Sadat himself, that Egypt would bring the key moderate Arab states — Jordan and Saudi Arabia — into the Camp David




Photo: Bill Fitz-Patrick/The White House

Presidents Reagan and Nimeiry: The United States should be wary of major new interventions in Sudan's affairs

peace process. Neither Sadat nor Washington seems to have correctly evaluated the "kiss of death" effect of the U.S. and Israeli entente with Egypt upon Egypt's prestige and influence in the Arab and Muslim world. Thus, even though the Carter administration had come to understand the key importance of the Palestinian issue for American interests throughout the region, it was mesmerized by the cordiality of the Egyptian connection to think that Egypt, as spokesman for the Palestinians and the relevant Arab states, could engineer a peaceful settlement. The Reagan administration came to power ignorant of the complexities of the Palestinian issue in area politics, hostile to the Palestine Liberation Organization, and uncritically committed to Israel. It too was prepared to nurture the special relationship with Egypt, not so much because Egypt could deliver on the Palestinian issue (the Reagan administration had decided that the Palestinians could be placed on the back burner) but because it could serve as the centerpiece for a new U.S. military-strategic presence. From Ras Banas on the Red Sea (just opposite the new Saudi oil pipeline terminal at Yanbu) and other military facilities (not "bases," insisted the Egyptians), units of the Rapid Deployment Force could intervene, if necessary, in the Gulf, Arabia, and northern and central Africa. The stepped-up pace of military

assistance and joint military activities underlined the willingness of both governments to develop this starring role for Egypt in the new global design.

The problem, however, was a domestic and regional backlash against Egypt's American connection that neither government took seriously enough. The backlash has taken three forms. The deadlock on the Palestinian autonomy talks, seen as due to Israeli intransigence and American impotence, has given rise to a feeling that Egypt was tricked at Camp David; the United States is held accountable. The highly visible strategic-military coordination with the United States has fueled anti-imperialist feelings that run deep among Egyptians, most of whose modern history has been a struggle against Western domination, and whose most popular recent leader, Gamal Abdel Nasser, is revered mainly for his heroic struggle against British, Israeli, and U.S. "neo-imperialism." But the antipathy to great-power interference is not directed only against the West: Egyptians strongly supported Sadat when he expelled the Soviet military advisers that Nasser had brought in. The third form of the backlash is cultural. As a result of President Sadat's policy of *infitah*, or "opening," to the United States and the West, there has been an all-too-visible influx of Americans and things American. The U.S. Agency for International De-

velopment mission in Cairo is the largest such mission anywhere. Stories abound of the corruption and inefficiency that perhaps inevitably accompany any huge and hastily conceived development assistance program. The *infitah* has been welcomed by the wealthy business men who have profited from it, but it has generated hardship for the poor in the form of inflation and scarcities both of basic commodities and of inexpensive housing. Furthermore, conspicuous consumption by the wealthy has generated resentment among those who cannot partake and do not approve of such behavior. The growth of Muslim fundamentalist political movements has been stimulated by Sadat's embracing of the West in general and the United States in particular in virtually all fields — political, strategic, economic, and cultural. Islamic reform is a current that runs deeply in Egypt and has surfaced regularly in protest against the prevailing secularism and modernization. As the protests of the late 1970s escalated into serious conspiracies, the Egyptian president finally cracked down with a heavy hand, but it was too late. Washington may not yet understand the drawbacks to an overly close involvement with Egypt, but it will be surprising if the new regime in Cairo does not begin to take a more balanced position between the two superpowers and a more effective regional posture.

A TOUGH LINE TOWARD LIBYA

On August 19, 1981, U.S. fighters from the Sixth Fleet patrolling off the Libyan coast shot down two Libyan warplanes. The shootout was another dramatic event in the noisy war of invective between Washington and Tripoli that intensified with the coming of the Reagan administration. It reached an almost farcical level in the fall when widely publicized reports of a Libyan "hit team" heading toward Washington to assassinate high officials led to a flurry of conspicuous security measures. But a few weeks later the "hit team" story quietly disappeared amid sheepish admissions, even from the FBI, that the matter had been exaggerated. European and Arab diplomats, including representatives of conservative Gulf governments, were

bemused by the administration's high-profile tactics against Qaddafi, which left the United States looking foolish; and Arab observers were dismayed at the attention being devoted to Qaddafi while the Palestinian question was being relatively ignored. But there was no shortage of explanations for the administration's behavior. Obviously, any assassination threat had to be taken seriously, especially after the wounding of the president in March 1981. There was also evidence that Libyan hit squads had been operating in Europe and even the United States against Libyans opposed to Qaddafi. The origin of the story also suggests an explanation. One report attributed it to Israeli intelligence, leading some to wonder whether the Israelis might have reasons of their own for exacerbating the United States-Libya confrontation. Another theory held that the U.S. was trying to create a climate in public opinion to support some future action against the Qaddafi regime. Whatever the merit of such explanations, the Reagan administration apparently believed that a demonstration of toughness would win respect for the United States from adversaries as well as allies — that the Soviet Union would be intimidated, the conservative Arab states heartened, and our European allies impressed. Unfortunately, there is no evidence that any of these results were achieved. Certainly, however, it strengthened Qaddafi in his own country and throughout the Arab world. On the U.S. domestic front, it is safe to assume, the muscle-flexing generated support for Reagan's handling of foreign policy, particularly from his core constituency, the right wing. Furthermore, a strong stand against Qaddafi was one way of minimizing the damage from the Israel lobby over the danger it professed to see in the administration's softness of Saudi Arabia, following the great AWACS battle, and its hardness on Israel, following the annexation of the Golan Heights.

Policy toward Egypt and Libya exemplifies the "good guys-bad guys" approach of the Reagan administration to foreign policy. It reminds one of the approach of John Foster Dulles in the 1950s, except that the roles of Libya and Egypt were reversed. The Dulles

policy failed to contain anti-American Arab nationalism and the spread of Soviet influence in those days, but few in Washington remember that now.

CHOOSING SIDES IN SUDAN AND THE HORN

On the same day that the U.S. planes shot down the Libyan planes, Col. Muammar Qaddafi was in Aden concluding a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between Libya, South Yemen, and Ethiopia. This treaty establishes means of coordination in the



Photo: Camera

Ethiopia under Mengistu offers the Soviets an opening to Africa and the Arabian peninsula

"struggle against imperialism" in the political, economic, and military fields. It brings closer together three states whose only common characteristics are a militant anti-American stand and strong ties with the Soviet Union. The three are also "revolutionary" in their internal programs but differ widely in ideology: South Yemen and Libya are Arab but the former is secular and the latter Islamic. Ethiopia of course is not Arab, and its culture is predominantly Christian, although the regime is secular. The fact that such

disparate and geographically unconnected countries should come together underlines the extent to which superpower and regional rivalries are intensifying. In the eyes of the Aden conferees, the growing effort by the United States and its clients to dominate Egypt and Sudan was one of the immediate factors behind the treaty; and a general factor, according to the speeches of the three leaders, was the American threat to organize client states throughout the entire area — from Israel to northern Africa — for future U.S. military intervention — a reference to Washington's efforts to develop facilities in Somalia, Kenya, Oman, Egypt, and Sudan for prepositioning military material for the Rapid Deployment Force. The events of August 19 over the Mediterranean nicely underscored the apparent threat. Observers in the region also interpreted the treaty as a Soviet-inspired response to the establishment in May 1981 of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman). The council in turn is thought to have been blessed, at a discreet distance, by the United States. (Secretary of State Haig, in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in September 1981, spoke approvingly of Saudi Arabia's "key leadership role in the newly formed Gulf Cooperation Council.")

From the standpoint of the United States and its conservative friends in the region, the pact signaled a new effort by the revolutionary states to disturb the status quo. Libyan aid to South Yemen might strengthen the dormant insurgency against the sultan of Oman in Dhofar and the pressure on the weak government of North Yemen to tilt away from Saudi Arabia. Such a trend would be strengthened were Ethiopia — a state of 32 million people with armed forces of over 220,000, dwarfing all its Arab neighbors — to begin involving itself in North Yemen, just across the Red Sea. In that event would counterpressures from Eritrea and Somalia have a deterring effect, or might they stimulate an Ethiopian riposte in those places and, more important, against the vulnerable Sudan? In sum, the Libya-Ethiopia-South Yemen agreement is ringing alarm bells

not only in Washington but also in Cairo, where one of Sadat's last acts was to send Hosni Mubarak to the U.S. capital to urge more protection for the Nimeiry regime against Libyan-sponsored subversion; in Khartoum, where internal malaise in virtually every field was increasing Nimeiry's vulnerability to Qaddafi's hostility and Mengistu's studied coolness toward Sudanese reconciliation efforts; in Tunis, alarmed at past Libyan support for dissident movements; in Ndjamena, where the Libyan intervention on behalf of the forces of President Goukouni Woddeye until Qaddafi's withdrawal in November 1981 not only divided Chadians but generated ripples of concern throughout West Africa; and not least in San'a and Riyadh, where some observers foresaw a Soviet-dominated radical pressure on North Yemen, "the soft underbelly of Arabia."

Until recently the superpowers have been cautious because of the instability of governments in the region, which has led Tripoli, Cairo, Khartoum, Addis Ababa, and Mogadishu to switch superpower patrons. Libya abandoned the United States after the Qaddafi revolution of 1961. Sadat threw out the Soviets in 1972; Nimeiry seized power in 1969 as a nationalist hostile to the West and became friendly with Qaddafi and Nasser. But by 1972, after crushing the Communist-led coup attempt, he tilted in the other direction. Since then he has become even more "moderate," to the point of supporting Sadat over Camp David; but his present situation is precarious. Perhaps Washington, shaken by the disappearance of Sadat, a friend whose position was thought to be solid, ought to be circumspect in its involvement with another friend whose position appears more precarious. In Ethiopia, the United States also had a friend until he disappeared in the revolution of 1974, whereupon the Soviet Union assumed the favored position. Moscow, having previously obtained influence in Somalia, including a missile support base, was welcomed by the Dergue not only because of ideological affinities but also out of a strategic calculation that it could help curb Somali irredentism in the Ogaden. It was only three years until Somalia's leader, Maj. Gen. Mo-

hamed Siad Barre (who also had come to power in 1969 in a leftist-nationalist coup), reversed his ideological field, invited in the United States, and, upon receiving promises of U.S. military support, promptly invaded the Ogaden. Not wanting to be sucked into local quarrels that could lead to an unwanted superpower confrontation, the United States wisely held back until the setbacks in the so-called arc of crisis — beginning with the Iranian revolution—elevated great-power rivalry to a new level.



Photo: Camerapix

Anwar Sadat: There was a domestic and regional backlash against Egypt's American connection

TOWARD A MORE SOPHISTICATED APPROACH

Whatever the dynamics of confrontation on the global level may be, the states in Northeast Africa remain unstable and unpredictable. The question for U.S. policymakers, then, is whether it is best to bolster one's would-be "friends" with military and economic aid (bearing in mind the danger of the "kiss of death" effect) and vigorously to oppose one's "enemies" (with aerial shoot-outs and the like), or whether the more effective tactic might be to keep a certain distance from the "friends" (or at least support them more discreetly) and to keep one's options open vis-à-vis the apparent "enemies."

Official policy is clear enough, and it

does not suggest receptivity to a more nuanced approach. In Secretary Haig's Middle East policy statement of September 17, 1981, the distinctions are black and white. At the top of his list of "challenges" to the Middle East is the threat to the oil fields of the Persian Gulf from "the military presence of the Soviet Union and its proxies in Afghanistan, South Yemen, and Ethiopia — three of the Soviets' closest friends in the area — is only the most recent of many threats to the security of our friends in the region." To be sure, the secretary explicitly declares that American interests "can be protected only by a strategy that neglects neither regional complexities nor the threat of external intervention"; and the Camp David peace process is seen as "mutually reinforcing" with the effort to contain Soviet and regional threats. "Our broad strategic view of the Middle East," he goes on to say, "recognizes the intimate connections between that region and adjacent areas: Afghanistan and South Asia, northern Africa and the Horn, and the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean." To pursue American aims, the administration has proposed significant new assistance — economic, military, or both — for Sudan, Kenya, Somalia, Djibouti, Mauritius, and the Seychelles, along with continuing massive material support for Egypt, and military hardware and technical assistance for Saudi Arabia (funded, of course, by the Saudis).

DEALING WITH "FRIENDS"

Nobody would quarrel with the importance of recognizing regional complexities and the intimate connection between the various subregions of the Northeast Africa-Southwest Asia area. The important question, however, is whether actual policy behavior adequately takes these complexities and connections into account. For example:

- The magnitude and visibility of the U.S. relationship with Egypt, as already noted, does not appear to have taken adequate account of the sensitivity in Egyptian opinion to becoming the client state of a great power, the resentment of alien cul-

tural imperialism, and the corrupting effects of the surge of inegalitarian development. American policy-makers either miscalculated or ignored the negative repercussions of Camp David for the region as a whole in building the liaison with Sadat, or indeed, ironically, for Sadat himself. The secretary of state appears oblivious to the fact that Camp David is generally regarded throughout the region as a calculated U.S. blow against the Palestinians, the Arabs, and the Muslims. Worse still, American passivity on the Palestinian autonomy part of the Camp David accords, inadequate though they are perceived to be, seriously — perhaps fatally — weakened Sadat, the pillar of U.S. interests in northeast Africa.

- Increased U.S. economic and military assistance to Sudan may prop up an increasingly shaky regime, but it may also provide fuel for the Islamic, nationalist, and secular-radical elements, all of which are attempting to profit politically from the country's present crises. These crises include violent protests in the south over economic cutbacks and over the government's plan to weaken the autonomy agreement that ended the long civil war in 1972, riots in Khartoum over the increase in the price of sugar, unrest in the universities, arrests of many thousands of people in preemptive strikes against feared disturbances, vast unemployment, and, not least, troubles on the border with Libya abetted by Libyan military forces and subversive agents. With problems like these, President Nimeiry's invitations for a U.S. military presence and urgent requests for aid are understandable, but the United States should be wary that major new intervention into Sudan's affairs may do more to stimulate than to diminish Nimeiry's problems. As for regional complexities, does Washington appreciate the risks that its moves may exacerbate the tensions between Sudan and Ethiopia: which of the two regimes would be hurt the most by such a development? One reason for the Aden treaty, was the fear felt by some radical Arab and African

elements, as well as by the Soviet Union that Ethiopia and Sudan might reach a mutual understanding.

- New U.S. support for Somalia (upwards of \$40 million in economic and military assistance) may buy the United States military facilities at Berbera and strengthen Mohamed Siad Barre's overburdened government, but it also may reignite the Ogaden war and increase the risk of U.S.-Soviet confrontation on behalf of clients who want to settle local scores before supporting greatpower global strategies. How certain is it that the United States would be the net beneficiary from renewed warfare in the Horn?

DEALING WITH "ENEMIES"

If extending the hand of friendship too readily carries the risk of unwelcome regional repercussion, there can also be disadvantages — or at least opportunities lost — in pinning the label of "enemy" too firmly on regimes that are not friendly. Why give up states as irretrievably "lost" to the Soviet domination that might be induced to take a more nonaligned position? For example:

- Generating confrontation with Libya, as we have seen, serves certain ends, domestic and international; but the Reagan admiration has badly miscalculated the regional impact of this policy. It has interpreted the dislike of Qaddafi expressed by many conservative Arab leaders as a license to try to get rid of him. But its elevation of Qaddafi to the status of Very Important Adversary, and the aerial shootout, have markedly enhanced respect and sympathy for him in Arab opinion — including opinion in the conservative Gulf states. A view widely heard in the Arab and African world now is that although Qaddafi may be erratic in some policies and brutal toward his enemies, he is a sincere Arab and a Muslim, and one must take his side when he is attacked by the United States. Many in the Third World saw his intervention in Chad as statesmanship, not expansionism. During 1981, Qaddafi signaled his intention to move closer to the Soviet Union (despite his ideological antipathy to

Marxism), but was this a cause or an effect of the show of American hostility? In late June 1981, just a month before the aerial dogfight, Ahmad Shahati, a close adviser of Qaddafi, was in Washington, at Libya's request, discussing the possibility of repairing the two countries' tattered diplomatic relations. Gestures such as this as well as its efforts to develop commercial, cultural, and educational relationships with the United States (Libya still has some 2,000 students here) and repeated professions of nonalignment must be weighed against hostile actions like the sacking of the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli, the sending of hit squads to intimidate and murder Libyan dissidents in this country, the support for terrorist elements in the Palestinian movement, and the efforts to radicalize some conservative Arab states. Does outright hostility, however emotionally satisfying it may be for U.S. politicians, best serve overall American interests in the region?

- Similarly, the Mengistu regime in Addis Ababa is no friend, but identifying it as a particularly evil "Soviet proxy" does not necessarily advance the American position in the region. To be sure, there are formidable obstacles to a more balanced



Photo: Christine Spangler/Sygnia

U.S. demonstrations of toughness against Qaddafi have strengthened his position at home and in the Arab world

policy. Formal relations have been poor since the U.S. ambassador was asked to leave in May 1980. According to the *Guardian Weekly* (March 22, 1981) there are an estimated 300 East German security experts, 2,000 Soviet advisers, and 10,000 Cuban troops in Ethiopia. "Red Terror" of the middle 1970s killed between 5,000 and 10,000 young people in Addis Ababa, and there may be anywhere from 10,000 to 40,000 political prisoners. Even considering the substantial social reforms accomplished by the Dergue since 1974, especially compared with the old regime, this is not the kind of government with which an American administration might feel comfortable. Nevertheless, reports persist that the Soviets have not been totally successful in dominating Col. Mengistu and that Ethiopians have as little liking for the Soviet and East European advisers as the Egyptians had. Moreover, the value of trade between the United States and Ethiopia (in 1978) exceeded that of the entire Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon) group, and Ethiopian trade with Europe was greater than with the Soviet bloc by a factor of nearly nine and is continuing to expand. The prospects for influencing Ethiopia still seem marginal, yet if the Mengistu regime should adopt the kind of pragmatism that has been adopted in other states once thought "lost" to the Soviets, such as Egypt, Sudan, and Somalia, the lure of Western technology and trade could be perceived as useful in itself and also as a counterweight to Soviet domination. The recent U.S. cultivation of Somalia and a blistering attack by the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations on Ethiopia's human rights record does not suggest that a more flexible approach is at hand. However, a recent decision by the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service ordering thousands of Ethiopians who took refuge in the United States from the revolution to go home again "because of the stabilization of conditions in Ethiopia" might have been a signal to the Mengistu government that the U.S. is interested in normalizing

relations, or it might simply mean that the Reagan administration has not yet formulated a coherent policy toward Ethiopia.

- South Yemen is small, poor, and isolated, but it casts a long political shadow. As the only Marxist regime in the Arab world, it is notable; its dependence on the Soviet bloc in military and internal security matters is great; and its ability to project ideological radicalism beyond its borders continues to alarm its neighbors, North Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Oman. The United States has had no diplomatic relations with the PDRY since 1969; an effort to restore relations in 1978, midwived by Rep. Paul Findley (R-Ill.) was aborted hours before an official U.S. mission was to visit Aden, because of the overthrow and execution of the president, Salim Robaya Ali, and his replacement by a more hardline and pro-Moscow rival, Abdel-Fattah Ismail. Subsequently, Abdel-Fattah was replaced by Ali Nasser Mohammed, who is considered somewhat more pragmatic than his predecessor. The fact that the Libya-Ethiopia-South Yemen treaty was signed in Aden underlines the strategic significance of the PDRY as an Arabian peninsula state. Does a policy of no U.S. embassy in Aden and no official contact serve American, or for that matter South Yemeni, interests? Apart from the occasional vituperative word, the Reagan administration has little in the way of a policy toward the PDRY and even less access to what is going on there. Certainly the administration's posture augurs ill for a dialogue, but it would be interesting to know if Aden might be prepared for some sort of contact, as it was at the time of the Findley initiative.

Even North Yemen seems all too distant from the attention of U.S. policymakers, which is regrettable given the complex factors that link the two Yemens in conflict and integration — often simultaneously. In 1979, when South Yemeni forces overran several adjacent districts in North Yemen, the Carter administration belatedly dispatched military assistance. But because Saudi Arabia insisted on clearing

the kind of equipment to be sent, it arrived after the war had ended. The North Yemenis, who harbor various grudges against the Saudis, were outraged at the Saudi role and disappointed in the limited nature of the U.S. response. The Soviet Union quickly jumped in with a far more generous military supply offer, outbidding the Americans, and so further strengthened their position in Yemen. Some North Yemeni officials bitterly claim that the United States thus botched an opportunity to eliminate the Soviets from North Yemen altogether and ended up allowing the Soviets to become even more entrenched. The Soviet Union now is in the enviable position of possessing very great influence in South Yemen and growing influence in North Yemen. Thus, the Soviets are doubly well placed to try to wean North Yemen from the hegemony that Saudi Arabia has tried to exert, mainly through financial aid, ever since the end of the Yemen civil war in the late 1960s.

On its eastern border, South Yemen has long supported the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman in its efforts to "liberate" Dhofar province and ultimately all of Oman from the rule of the sultan. Oman was quick to denounce the tripartite treaty as "a spearhead of Soviet influence."

Inasmuch as the priorities of the Reagan administration Middle East policy are to uphold the security and territorial integrity of Saudi Arabia and Oman, it makes sense to try to gain some leverage in South Yemen. The means at hand are the familiar ones: commercial and cultural exchange, which might be the first stage toward offering the South Yemenis an opportunity to move toward nonalignment.

Under the Reagan administration, the lines between "good guys" and "bad guys" in northeastern Africa and southern Arabia are being sharply drawn, but U.S. interests might be better served by a policy of blurring them instead. Perhaps George Washington's famous stricture is still relevant: "... nothing is more essential than that permanent, inveterate antipathies against particular nations and passionate attachments for others should be excluded" in the execution of a wise American foreign policy. □

The World of Muammar Qaddafi

BY ZDENEK CERVENKA


On January 10, 1982, the Sudanese News Agency (SUNA) reported news of an alleged coup bid in Libya that had been crushed after fierce fighting between the Islamists and pro-Qaddafi forces, including Soviet, East German, and Syrian troops. SUNA reported that the uprising had erupted in Benghazi, and that the coup plotters — military men, civilians, and students — had seized important positions and major roads and had mounted barricades. There were said to have been heavy casualties on both sides, and 350 officers, 280 civilians, and 200 students were reported to have been arrested following the collapse of the insurrection. The impact of the attempted coup on Colonel Muammar Qaddafi, the agency continued, was so serious that he had been put under medical surveillance. The Libyan leader was said to have arrested his public intelligence director, Col. Yunis Balgasim, and the foreign operations director, Capt. Abudullah El-Sunousi. A nationwide search and arrest campaign had been launched, concentrating

on Benghazi, Tobruk, and Gouhboub, the report said.

A day after SUNA's dispatch, Libya's national news agency, JANA, called the Sudanese claims "lying rumors without any foundation." "Which should be believed," asked the Kenyan *Weekly Review* of January 15 that carried the above story, "SUNA

or JANA?" *Weekly Review* added: "In November, SUNA reported a Libyan arms buildup along Sudanese borders that was later found to be entirely groundless."

The crusade of the Western mass media against Libya and its leader Muammar Qaddafi has an interesting historical parallel with the campaign



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waged 20 years ago against the late Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, president of Ghana. In both cases, the importance of their countries was blown out of proportion and facts were distorted beyond recognition. Libya, a country with less than three million people, half of them living scattered over a vast area of desert seven times the size of Great Britain, has, despite its rich oil resources, only marginal importance to the world economy. From the point of view of the global nuclear strategy of the United

eight million people and cocoa beans as its only major asset. While Libyan oil is admittedly a more important commodity than Ghana's cocoa, the world can do without both. If the United States chose to "bomb Libya back to the Stone Age" to use the term favored by some U.S. generals, and wipe out its oil fields, gasoline would cost only a few cents more. In the case of Ghana, had the Central Intelligence Agency removed Ghana's cocoa plantations instead of Nkrumah, a bar of chocolate

raised their voices and arms against their colonial masters. Qaddafi, by deposing the Idris monarchy in 1969, transformed Libya from a rubber stamp of Anglo-American policy into a state with its own identity and national pride. In 1970, he broke the grip of the multinational oil companies over Libya's oil resources by compelling them to renegotiate the terms of their operations in Libya and by setting the price of oil himself. Other oil-producing countries followed his example, thus reversing



Soviet MIG-27 interceptors at the Benghazi air base

Photo: John Brant/Sygnia

States, backed by its naval force close to Libya's shore and military bases on territories of three of its neighbors, Libya could be ignored whatever the volume of its "cache of Russian arms." It requires a stretch of the imagination to believe, as the U.S. administration seems to, that Libya constitutes a "threat to world peace."

Similarly, the glare of world publicity that surrounded everything that Ghana did under Nkrumah bore no relevance to the strategic unimportance of this small West African country with

would have registered only a small increase in price. And yet 20 years ago the world public was asked to accept that Nkrumah posed a "serious threat to Western interests in Africa," exactly what the same press is claiming today about Col. Qaddafi.

The indictments of both men have the same roots. Nkrumah, by declaring in 1957 that Ghana's independence was meaningless unless it was linked with the independence of the whole of Africa, committed Ghana to active support for Africa's freedom fighters who

the international pricing policy and turning oil into a powerful weapon.

The insolence of small nations has always been insufferable to the great, hence the hatred of Qaddafi that has recently been whipped up by the Western mass media. Numerous charges were added to the list of Qaddafi's wrongdoings to make the Western case convincing. The *Washington Post* dubbed Libya "The Outlaw State," and in one of its 1981 editorials, entitled "The Nastiest Regime Going," wrote: "No leader in power has tried harder to hurt

U.S. interests and has used more unfair tactics than Col. Muammar Qaddafi. He has sponsored campaigns of terrorism in a dozen-plus countries and armed intervention in as many more. He has used the influence flowing from Libya's huge oil revenues and its radical ideology to fight against the Camp David peace process. He has served widely as a Soviet surrogate doing the Kremlin's dirty work freely, even while he professed to be acting in the name of a pure Islamic doctrine."

The *Washington Post's* view is shared by most Western papers and more alarmingly also by the White House. According to Secretary of State Alexander Haig, Qaddafi is the most dangerous man in the world and President Reagan is on record saying on television that Chad was invaded by the Soviet Union using Libya as a proxy.

It appears that U.S. policymakers ignore the fact that the U.S. anti-Libyan campaign is very little understood or supported in Africa, with the exception of few countries, such as Egypt and Sudan, which depend heavily on the United States.

An influential Nigerian writer and publisher, Peter Enahoro, in his editorial "Qaddafi and the Washington Sheriffs" in the January 1982 issue of *Africa Now*, wrote: "Precisely why President Reagan and his Secretary of State have decided that Libya must be a priority in their crusade to return the Third World to American bribery and corruption is difficult to ascertain. Libya is a rich country, true; but its influence as a Third World power is dubious. Qaddafi may harbor and be funding revolutionary gangs, but if you removed him tomorrow, the world would not automatically become a peaceful place." Enahoro continued, "On the personal level, Qaddafi's charisma does not carry beyond the desert limits of his ancestral Arabia... yet many Africans would be outraged should the present American campaign lead to a foreign-inspired intervention which overthrows Qaddafi. For make no mistake about this, the campaign which began with the full-blooded denunciation of Qaddafi by Haig is a fully orchestrated plan to bring about the fall of the Libyan leader. The days when the CIA decided who should rule small na-

tions are on their way back under an African leadership that has its ideas rooted in the legend of the do-gooder gunslinger riding into the sunset after spreading mayhem and wrecking the saloon bar."

And this is how the largest-circulation African monthly, *Africa*, commented in its October 1981 issue on the incident in the Gulf of Sirte in August 1981 in which two Libyan warplanes were shot down by two U.S. Navy F-14s: "Moderate oil states, many of whom Washington regards as 'good guys,' have been shown once again that Reagan, who protects the aggressive Israeli regime, is willing, for no particular reason, to use force against a Muslim country. African countries see the affair from a similar viewpoint: Washington protects and encourages the South African apartheid regime but roughs up the next OAU [Organization of African Unity] chairman."

To most Africans, Libya is a country that under the rule of Qaddafi rose from the poorest country in the continent to one of the richest in the world. They also remember that when Qaddafi launched his coup in 1969 against King Idris, he rode in a tank without an artillery shell and allowed the king to leave the country. Africans who take great care to sift facts from fiction noted the difference between the press reports on the "Qaddafi murder squad" that allegedly entered the United States in late November to assassinate President Reagan, and the plots to kill Qaddafi about which more evidence is available.

For example, on August 3, 1981, *Newsweek* disclosed details about the CIA plan which, according to the magazine, involved the assassination of Qaddafi: "The operation was a large-scale, multiphase and costly scheme to overthrow the Libyan regime of Muammar Qaddafi... The CIA's goal was Qaddafi's 'ultimate' removal from power. To members of the House Intelligence Committee who reviewed the plan, the phrase seemed to imply Qaddafi's assassination."

Another bizarre scheme was revealed by *Africa* in January in a remarkable story about how the French Documentation and Counter-Espio-

nage Service (SDECE) tried to draw France into a full-scale war with Libya. The magazine reported: "The Chad affair broke on October 28 with messages that President Goukouni Woddeye had been overthrown by the Libyans. Supposedly, a Libyan armored column had entered the capital, Ndjamen, and the president, who had been desperately trying to keep the various factions of his government together since the civil war ended in October 1980, was in flight." The story continued, "Later it was learned that the same sources had leaked information to Libya that the French were sending a strike force to Ndjamen to combat the Libyans. Had either government panicked, the tense situation would almost certainly have been exploited by the Sudan and Egypt who have been looking for an excuse to deal with Col. Qaddafi. Whether the French strike force was ever put on the alert has not been revealed but the conspiracy collapsed when President Woddeye telephoned Mitterrand to say that the whole affair was based on lies. Qaddafi was then contacted personally by Mitterrand and some nervous reassurances were given on both sides."

The Libyan "invasion of Chad" was seen rather differently in Africa. In a continent where secession is second only to the abhorrence of apartheid, the invitation of the Libyan troops by the legitimate government of President Goukouni Woddeye to help him fight off the rebel forces of Hissene Habré was endorsed, though reluctantly, by the OAU. President Woddeye confirmed this at the OAU summit in Nairobi last July when he said that he "called on Libya only after the plan for an OAU peace-keeping force, which was to be dispatched to Chad, collapsed because the OAU lacked the funds to pay for the expedition." As the *Nairobi Weekly Review* remarked, "The main reason for the acceptance of the Libyan presence in Chad was the calm which was restored through Libya's intervention. It was felt that it would have been pointless to undermine the peace in Chad regardless of the way it came." When President Woddeye asked the Libyans to leave in November, Qaddafi quickly obliged.

The permanent revolution instigated

by Qaddafi in Libya has never given rise to alarm in Africa. Although many Africans do not subscribe to Qaddafi's puritanism which made Libya a country without alcohol, nightclubs, sex-shows, and gambling they prefer his austerity to the ostentatious wealth of oil princes and emirs.

It is true that many Libyan businessmen and entrepreneurs who were trading with expatriates working in the country resent Qaddafi's measures, adopted in 1980, designed to "liquidate the middle class and its parasites." Their property was taken over, their bank accounts frozen, and many were put on televised show trials for corruption. While the degree of dissent among the middle class is difficult to establish, there is no doubt about the support shown by the youth for their "leader" and his equitable distribution of oil wealth. With an average of six hospital beds for every thousand people and one doctor for every 800, free medical care, modern housing, and the rise in university education from 400 students in 1970 to 10,000 in 1980, Libya has the highest standard of living in the whole of Africa.

Not all African leaders agree with every action Col. Qaddafi has undertaken over the years. His military support for the Ugandan dictator Idi Amin badly shattered his image in black Africa. Although Kenya rendered more substantial economic support to Amin's land-locked Uganda by allowing the free passage of goods (including Soviet

tanks) on the Kenyan railway connecting Kampala with Kenyan ports, it was Libya that received a thrashing from the African press.

The murders of Libyan citizens abroad may outrage many Africans, but they also remember that several great Africans such as Amilcar Cabral and Patrice Lumumba died by the hands of foreign agents, without arousing a similar wave of indignation in the West. Africans are far more upset about crimes of much greater magnitude, such as the raids by the South African army into Angola, activities they believe have a tacit U.S. approval.

Qaddafi's determination to eliminate the state of Israel makes many African countries, in particular those that used to be recipients of substantial Israeli economic aid, very uneasy. They disagree with Qaddafi's view of Israel as expressed to the General People's Congress in Tripoli on January 5, 1982, when he said: "Those who are now in Palestine forming the armed state of Israel are not the Jews we describe as cousins of the Arabs, the Oriental Jews, who have lived in the Arab East since old times. Not at all. These are Europeans, criminals, foreigners, mercenaries, and fighters who came and set up a criminal society that poses a grave threat to peace. World peace will be threatened by the Israeli actions. Those countries that support and arm them, will one day pay the price when a third world war breaks out, caused by the Israelis."

Qaddafi's search for a better society, as described in his *Green Book*, makes many African intellectuals bury their heads in their hands at the simplicity of his solutions. Yet in the Arab and African world, demoralized by the failure of nonalignment that in the course of its 20 years' existence lost its way from Belgrade to Havana, Qaddafi's ideas generate unexpected attention.

Although the model of a classless society of his Socialist Popular Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, run by Revolutionary Committees of the People's Congress, is practically untransferable outside Libyan borders, Qaddafi keeps trying. After the announced merger between Libya and Chad was thwarted by the change in mood of President Woddeye of Chad, he recently made a public approach to Algeria. In his address to the General People's Congress in Tripoli on January 5, 1982, he said: "I have submitted a program to Algeria, Libya, and Syria for the establishment of unity among these three countries. Let the Algerian people, the Libyan people, and the Syrian people unite. Work for such unity can begin with an action similar to the one proposed or recommended by the people's congresses. The internal arrangements now in existence in Algeria, Libya, and Syria do not conflict with the concept of unifying these countries. All administrative and political arrangements inside Algeria, inside Syria, and inside Libya could remain within the jurisdiction of each country." Qaddafi added: "As to the people's institutions or even the government institutions in other countries, together with the Libyan people's institutions, they could meet and adopt a single decision that is enforced in Algeria, in Libya, and in Syria — a unionist decision, a single decision. This realizes Arab unity."

The prospects of a Libyan-Algerian-Syrian alliance are likely to cause concern in the West but certainly not in Africa. Africans are more disturbed by the possibility that the anger which makes U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig's voice tremble whenever he pronounces Qaddafi's name, might prompt him into an adventure beyond the Gulf of Sirte incident, which in turn would plunge North Africa into a disastrous conflict. □



The Reagan administration believes Libya is "a threat to world peace"

A Precarious Peace Breaks Out

BY RENÉ LEMARCHAND

Everywhere in contemporary Africa the construction of workable polities has proved a formidable task; in Chad the job has been little short of Herculean. Twenty-two years after its independence from France the country has yet to claim the most elementary symptoms of statehood. The off-and-on civil war that has been going on since 1968 has given birth to a crippled polity, too weak to respond creatively to the challenge of nation building, yet strong enough to keep trying. The latest effort in this direction is also the most

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ambitious, if not necessarily the most promising; thanks to the intervention of the Organization of African Unity's (OAU) peace-keeping force, for the first time since the inception of the civil war a precarious peace threatens to break out. Given the long history of civil violence in Chad, and the sheer complexity of the political equations, the reasons for optimism are few.

Chad has experienced the longest civil war (13 years) in the history of independent Africa, and the wounds have yet to heal. Although it is impossible to say how many perished, the victims number in the tens of thousands; virtually every region, every ethnic group, has suffered severe losses, with the eastern and central region — essentially the Wadai and Batha prefectures — now emerging as the most likely arenas for a renewed bloodletting. To the human costs of civil violence must be added the widespread dislocation of domestic trade and communication networks; the sharp decline in agricultural output even in those prefectures least affected by the war (i.e. the southern region); the critical economic conditions of the rural sectors throughout the country; the destruction of much of the capital city (Njamena); and the massive exodus of refugees into Cameroon, as well as into Nigeria, the Cen-

tral African Republic, and the Sudan. When the Libyan tanks stormed into Ndjamená a year ago last December an estimated 110,000 Chadians fled across the Chari river to Kousseri (Cameroon); of these some 83,000 have returned to their homeland under the UN High Commissioner for Refugee's repatriation program, a move that has been characterized by some observers as premature and irresponsible. All this adds up to a state of social anarchy for which there are few parallels elsewhere in Africa; the closest analogy that comes to mind is that of Zaire in the years that followed independence.

THE ZAIRIAN PRECEDENT

The case of Zaire is a logical point of reference for assessing the chances of success of the inter-African peace-keeping operation currently under way in Chad: in each case the perversity of ethno-regional conflict has led to a situation of extreme political fragmentation, where the restoration of a modicum of "peace and order" proved totally beyond the capacity of the armed forces, the latter indeed being among the first casualties of ethnic strife; in each case the intrusion of external forces has greatly intensified the potential for conflict inherent in the domestic arena; and in each case recourse to international military assistance was eventually seen as the only remedy to bring relief from general anarchy.

On closer inspection, however, the situation in Chad appears even more intractable than in Zaire in the 1960s, and the prospects for peace, therefore, appear even more problematic. For one thing the parameters of conflict are more fluid, suggesting constant fusion and fission among rival paramilitary forces. Although ethnicity remains an important ingredient of collective identities, the claims of factionalism are much stronger in Chad than in Zaire. Factions are notoriously fluid and unstable: today's friend may be tomorrow's enemy and vice versa. Ideology and programmatic issues have relatively little to do with factional alliances. Much depends on the pragmatic choices made by faction leaders in their attempt to consolidate their power base and weaken that of their opponents.

Personalities are all-important, and so are the personal (as distinct from corporate) resources of individual leaders, which in Chad may range from cattle and cash to guns and ammunition.

In these conditions, discriminating between friend and foe may turn out to be an even more delicate proposition for the OAU peace-keeping force than was the case for the UN troops in Zaire. The



Photo: Camerapix

President Goukouni Woddeye: Chad has experienced the longest civil war in independent Africa's history

OAU-sponsored inter-African force currently numbers approximately 3,000 men, including two battalions from Nigeria, one from Senegal, and another from Zaire; further reinforcements are expected from Benin, Togo, and Guinea, which would bring up its total strength to about 6,000. Thus far, however, there is no indication that these states intend to live up to their commitments, the financing of the operation being a major point at issue. Gabon, meanwhile, has agreed to provide logistical support, a contribution that has yet to materialize.

There is little question that Hissene Habré's faction, the so-called Forces Armées du Nord (FAN), poses an extremely serious threat to President Goukouni's government; it is indeed a question whether, in the event of a confrontation between the FAN and the OAU force, the latter would come out

on top. The FAN, estimated at approximately 4,000 men, clearly outnumber the OAU force; what is more, they have at their disposal a large stock of sophisticated weapons, including multiple rocket launchers, and their previous record on the battlefield suggests that they are by far the toughest fighting force anywhere in the country. Even in the case of joint military operations between President Goukouni Woddeye's army and the OAU troops (which does not seem likely in the immediate future) one wonders whether the balance of forces would not turn to the advantage of the FAN. Where the situation in Chad appears decidedly more manageable than in Zaire is that it has thus far been relatively immune from the contamination of East-West rivalries; yet there is no gainsaying the existence of powerful outside pressures — from Libya, Egypt, and the Sudan, and France — and these, while operating with different degrees of intensity and in different sectors, may greatly complicate the quest for a negotiated solution.

THE POLITICS OF FACTIONALISM

Factionalism as a political phenomenon lies at the root of what is perhaps the most intriguing feature of Chadian politics: nowhere in Africa has any insurgency suffered as many splits in so short a time as the Front de Libération Nationale du Tchad (Frolinat) between 1975 and 1979. Until 1975, Chadian politics were essentially dominated by a North/South, or Muslim/Christian, polarization; and the Chadian state, such as it was, was largely the monopoly of Sara elements from the South. The systematic exclusion of northerners from participation in the political life of the country made their recourse to armed struggle inevitable, and in 1966 the northern opposition to the Sara-dominated regime of François Tombalbaye was channeled into an organized "liberation front," the Frolinat, initially led by Ibrahim Abatcha. From the very beginning, however, the movement was plagued by factional splits. By 1975 at least three rebel armies claimed the mantle of revolutionary legitimacy: Hissene Habré's Second Army (which later became the FAN);

Abba Siddick's Forces Populaires de Libération (FLP); and Mahamat Baghlani's Eastern Army. A year later Habré's Second Army suffered a major schism when his immediate rival and kinsman (and now president of Chad), Goukouni Woddeye, backed by Libya, asserted himself as the leader of the Forces Armées Populaires (FAP). By 1979 the rebellion has spawned a veritable alphabet soup of factions and "tendances"; no less than 11 such factions took part in the Lagos accords of August 1979 that led to the Transitional National Union Government (GUNT), nominally headed by President Goukouni Woddeye.

No less surprising than the proliferation of factions within the Frolinat is that in spite of this handicap they were able to score decisive victories against several units of the Chadian armed forces. In this, however, they derived considerable assistance from the intra-Sara rivalries that simultaneously came

to afflict the Chadian army. Thus the Compagnie de Sécurité Tchadienne (CST), once President Tombalbaye's much-vaunted "Praetorian Guard" were virtually wiped out in the course of the Sara-instigated April 1975 coup that led to Tombalbaye's overthrow and his replacement by Colonel Felix Malloum. A few years later, in 1978, the Garde Nationale et Nomade (GNN) was heavily decimated during the siege and capture of Faya-Largeau by Hisense Habré. Similarly, severe losses were suffered by the Armée Nationale Tchadienne (ANT) and the Gendarmerie Nationale, at the hands of Habré's FAN, during the first battle of Ndjamena in March 1979.

By then Habré had already emerged as France's favorite candidate and through Giscard's good offices was able for a while to hold office as prime minister while Malloum acted as president. The formula proved totally unworkable. As the events of March 1979

plainly demonstrated, what had begun in August 1978 as an incongruous political tandem ended up less than a year later in a trial of strength from which Habré emerged victorious. At this point Malloum had lost all credibility as the leader of the southern, Sara-dominated faction. Leadership eventually passed into the hands of Colonel Wadal Kamougué, until then head of the Gendarmerie; and what was left of the regular armed forces was merged with the Gendarmerie Nationale to form the Forces Armées Tchadiennes (FAT).

NDJAMENA AND AFTER

The murderous events of March 1979 ushered in a new and decisive phase in the history of the Chadian imbroglio. With the Sara forces now hastily retreating to the South — accompanied by thousands of Sara residents of Ndjamena — and Habré consolidating his positions in Ndjamena, the lines of conflict quickly shifted in the direc-



Photo: P. Ledru/Sygnia

Habré's Armed Forces of the North pose a very serious threat to the Chad government

tion of a major confrontation between the FAN and the FAP, that is, between Habré and Goukouni Woddeye. With the depressing ineluctability of a Greek tragedy, the first battle of Ndjameña led, through the logic of factional realignments, to the second and far more dramatic battle of December 1980, when, backed by Libyan tanks and units of Col. Muammar Qaddafi's Islamic Legion, Goukouni Woddeye's FAP were finally able to dislodge Habré from his Ndjameña stronghold.

As the guns fell silent, the GUNT (nominally headed by President Goukouni since the Lagos accords of August 1979) inherited a devastated capital, a state ripped apart by factional strife, and a crippled economy. It also inherited a Libyan presence on the ground of an estimated 12,000 men. Until their sudden and unexpected withdrawal from Chad, in November 1981, the Libyan forces played a decisive stabilizing role in the fluctuating power equation among the several Chadian factions. Not the least of the ironies attached to the Libyan pullout — for which much of the credit must go to Goukouni, once viewed as Qaddafi's man in Ndjameña — is that it has created in its wake a political vacuum that was immediately filled by Habré's forces. Habré, not Goukouni, is the one who gained the largest strategic dividends from the Libyan withdrawal.

Leaving aside the flurry of armed "groupuscules" spawned by the insurgency from 1978 onwards, many of which vanished as quickly as they sprang up, at least four distinctive "armies" are currently comprised within Chad's indigenous military forces: (1) Kamougué's FAT, representing the interests of the Sara people of the South, and numbering anywhere from 3,000 to 5,000 men; (2) Goukouni's FAP, concentrated in the capital city and parts of the Bornou-Ennedi-Tibesti (BET) region, numbering approximately 4,000 men; (3) Acyl Ahmat's Conseil Démocratique de la Révolution (CDR), perhaps 2,000 strong, and until recently engaged in vicious fighting against Habré's FAN in and around Abeche; (4) Habré's FAN, estimated to include approximately 4,000 battle-hardened guerillas and currently in control of much of the eastern region.

The first three are nominally supporting the GUNT, and are expected to provide the core of an integrated Chadian national army. The Habré faction, meanwhile, is firmly determined to hold on to its ground, and shows no sign of a willingness to compromise with the GUNT. Habré's presidential aspirations would seem to rule out all possibilities of a reconciliation with Goukouni, even though they share the same ethnic background (Toubou, or Teda).

THE HABRÉ ENIGMA

Although there is little doubt about Habré's vaulting political ambitions, the man remains an enigma — and the key to his remarkable staying power something of a mystery. To have taken on as many challengers as he did — first Malloum's National Army, then Goukouni's FAP (which would have never forced him out of Ndjameña without Libyan aid), then more recently Acyl Ahmat's CDR, and possibly in the near future Gen. Geoffrey Ejiga's Nigerian troops — and despite some calamitous setbacks, as happened in Ndjameña in December 1980, still to be able to operate a spectacular strategic retreat all the way into the Sudan, across 60 miles of parched savannah, and only weeks later to reemerge in control of some of the key towns of the eastern region, including Abeche, Oum Hadjer, Mangalme, and most recently Faya-Largeau in the BET, is mind-boggling. The Toubou leader is unlike any other Chadian warlord. He is undoubtedly an extraordinarily talented strategist. None of his opponents in the field have been able to match the mobility of his men, his skill at setting ambushes when they are least expected, or his political astuteness. He is also a man of great physical courage, who shares the characteristic endurance and tenacity of his group of origin. Above all, Habré's ambitions have been served by unusual strokes of luck.

The first and most decisive of these fortuitous circumstances was the Clausestre affair. The capture in Bardai, in 1974, of Françoise Clausestre, wife of the French director of the Mission de Réforme Administrative (MRA), along with several other hostages, including a German national, provided him with a unique opportunity to exact a substan-

tial ransom from the French and German authorities, partly in the form of cash and weapons, and partly in the form of a promise that several political prisoners in the custody of the Chadian government would be released from jail. The intricate negotiations that followed the capture of the French hostages brought to light his bargaining skills, and in the end made it possible for him to obtain the resources he needed to consolidate his position on the ground.

Another major windfall came about as a result of his ability to convince the French that he was the most qualified candidate to hold the position of prime minister in July 1978, at a time when the Malloum government was tottering on the brink, thus prompting the French to suggest the Habré-Malloum tandem as a possible *modus vivendi*. Once appointed to the job, Habré used the resources of his office as prime minister to place his supporters in key positions within the central and prefectural administration, while at the same time making a major effort to beef up his military forces. That he accomplished this task with a considerable measure of success was conclusively shown during the first battle of Ndjameña in March 1979. Then came the combined Libyan-FAP attack of December 1980, which brought his fortunes to their lowest ebb. In spite of this devastating setback, Habré managed to recoup his losses miraculously after seeking refuge in the Sudan. As Qaddafi's bitterest opponent, he had little trouble persuading Egypt and the Sudan to provide him with military and political assistance. During the crucial months that elapsed between the fall of Ndjameña and the Libyan pullout, Habré was thus able to replenish his arsenal and recruit new followers.

The next "break" came with the abrupt withdrawal of Libyan troops, which in effect cleared the way for a swift move into the eastern region. The weapons left by the Libyans, which are said to include 105-millimeter and 155-millimeter artillery and multiple rocket launchers, were immediately put to use to flush out the remnants of Acyl Ahmat's guerillas from their eastern strongholds. While the OAU force was still in the process of being assembled,

Habré was already moving his men into key positions.

THE OAU MANDATE IN QUESTION

With the fall of Faya-Largeau (initially intended to serve as the headquarters of the Zairian contingent), in mid-January, the threat posed by Habré to the Goukouni regime takes on a new dimension. What makes the threat especially ominous is not just that the OAU lacks the experience and mobility of the FAN, and that its 3,000 troops (about half of its projected strength) are clearly outnumbered by Habré's; an additional and even more crippling handicap stems from the current impasse over the mandate of the OAU force.

Goukouni makes no bones of the fact that he wants the OAU to get actively involved in the fighting; for the OAU, on the other hand, the peace-keeping force is meant to be just that. It must at all cost avoid direct involvement in the domestic rivalries of Chadian factions. In this reenactment of the dilemma that once faced the UN troops in Zaire lies the germ of a major crisis. A stance of passive neutrality is hardly more conceivable in Chad than it was in Zaire. The question is whether the dilemma can be resolved without triggering bitter quarrels between President Goukouni and members of the OAU administrative committee, perhaps causing some African states to recall their contingents before the job is completed.

Although the OAU force is formally under the authority of its secretary general, the Cameroonian Edem Kodjo, the day-to-day responsibilities of the peace-keeping operations have been entrusted to the Ethiopian Gebre Egziaber Dawit, who acts as chairman of an administration committee made up of representatives from Benin, Congo, Guinea, and Kenya.

Aside from "keeping the peace," the mandate of the OAU force includes two additional functions: to supervise national elections (when the circumstances will be deemed appropriate by the Chadian government) and to assist in the organization of an Integrated National Army (ANI), as the new army is to be called. The last of these functions, though vitally important, is the

least likely to be fulfilled in the immediate future. In the absence of an effective, disciplined army accountable to the central government, there is nothing the latter can do to prevent Habré from fighting his way back into Ndjameña except turn to the OAU or once again to Libya. The ANI, headed by Chief of Staff, Lt. Col. Ngolabay Alafi — a Sara known for his extreme brutality and thoroughly disliked by most northerners — consists of a few hundred men and was reduced to an even smaller size after its unsuccessful engagement against the FAN in Abeche last December. The ANI remains a paper tiger. Whether the OAU would fare better in the event of a confrontation with the FAN is debatable. What is clear is that the OAU troops cannot be expected to serve as a permanent surrogate for a Chadian army.



Photo: P. Ledru/Sygma

The key to Hissene Habré's remarkable staying power is a mystery

A major obstacle in the way of a reconstruction of the Chadian military is that none of the "loyalist" (i.e. anti-Habré) factions are sufficiently loyal to the GUNT to give up their political and operational autonomy. Each faction links its loyalties to a specific personality within the GUNT — the CDR to Acyl Ahmat, minister of foreign affairs; the Front Populaire de Libération (FPL) to Mahamat Abba Said, minister of interior; the FAP to President Goukouni; and so forth — and since each of these personalities in turn derives his social weight and legitimacy from his

ability to manipulate and control an armed following, the result, predictably, is total *immobilisme*. No one in the government is seriously willing to commit himself to a reorganization of the Chadian military; to do so would be political suicide. Hence the irony of the situation: while Habré is positioning himself for a kill — or for a compromise that would enable him to join the GUNT — each of the "loyalist" factions hangs on to its turf: Kamougue's FAT remains firmly entrenched in the South, Goukouni's FAP is "holding" the capital city and parts of the BET, and Acyl Ahmat's CDR lingers somewhere between the Batha and Kanem prefectures. The task of stitching these fragments together into a coherent military force has yet to begin.

Among the many "sick men" of Africa, Chad is the sickest of all; there is simply no end in sight to the Chadian crisis. No amount of external assistance from the OAU or any other source can help resolve Chad's internal problems unless the Chadians themselves are willing to take a fresh start. Of this, however, there is little encouraging evidence. No matter how desirable, a negotiated settlement with Habré seems out of the question in view of the intense personal hatreds between the FAN leader and his kinsman Goukouni. The alternative would be for the anti-Habré factions to desist once and for all from their mutual bickerings and inter-petitive quarrels and get on with the business of political, military, and economic reconstruction. But this is more easily said than done. The logic of factional ambitions is scarcely compatible with the exigencies of nation building. Nor does it provide the ideal setting for the emergence of a new leadership. Unless warlordism gives way to a different form of leadership — exonerated from the stigma of corruption and factional killings — the game of politics in Chad will belong to the kind of social universe described centuries ago by Ibn Khaldun: "When the strength of man and his character and religion are corrupted, his humanity is corrupted, and he becomes, in effect, transformed into an animal." The dog-eat-dog style of Chadian politics will probably persist long after the patience (and money) of the OAU has run out. □

Crisis in North-South Relations

BY DUNSTAN M. WAI

In March 1972, one decade ago, representatives of the Khartoum government of General Gaafar al-Nimeiry and of the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement concluded successful peace negotiations in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Hitherto, the 17-year civil war in Sudan was temporarily eased and politically transformed. The Addis Ababa Agreement granted the South autonomous status within a united Sudan. It was essentially a political and legal settlement providing the



root of the southern question and prescribing regional autonomy as a basis for negotiation between the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement and the Khartoum government, was premised on recognizing the southern provinces as constituting one region. The Addis Ababa Agreement subsequently affirmed that fact. Recently, however, Nimeiry has been persuaded to abandon the accord by its opponents, to create several regions in the South, and to give these regions the structure, power, and authority of regions in the North. Such an arrangement would eliminate further consolidation of the Addis Ababa Agreement and render the South powerless, placing it at both the indefinite control and mercy of the northern-dominated central government. It is inconceivable that the South will submit to such a drastic curtailment of its present margin of authority. Therefore, the time has come to review and analyze the Sudanese experiment in conflict accommodation.

governmental machinery through which the fundamental human rights of the southern Sudanese could be respected and expanded. It provided a framework for conflict regulation between the southern and northern Sudanese. The Addis Ababa Agreement is a unique document in the history of independent Africa, responding to specific historical circumstances and recognizing the African-Arab duality of Sudan and the various power configurations in the country.

President Nimeiry's historic Declaration of June 9, 1969 recognizing the

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REGIONAL AUTONOMY AND TERRITORIAL UNITY

The Addis Ababa Peace Accord preserves the territorial unity of Sudan but grants specific powers and functions to the southern region. Legislation in the South is exercised by a People's Regional Assembly, members of which are elected by Sudanese citizens residing in the South through direct secret ballot. The members of the Regional Assembly in turn elect one of their colleagues as speaker. Legislative authority in the South rests with the Regional Assembly and areas under its power for legislation include "preservation of public order, internal security, efficient administration, and the development of the southern region in cultural, economic, and social fields." Regional legislation, must, however, conform with national plans. Functions that are exclusively a preserve of the central government and are, therefore, outside the jurisdiction of both the People's Regional Assembly and the High Executive Council (HEC) include "natural defense, external affairs, currency and coinage, air and interregional river transport, communications and telecommunications, customs and foreign trade except for border trade and certain commodities that the regional government may specify with the approval of the central government, nationality and immigration, planning for economic and social development, educational planning, and public audit."

Business is conducted in the Regional Assembly in accordance with rules of procedure that are laid down by the assembly during its first meeting. The Regional Assembly has the legal authority to elect the president of the regional government (chairman of the HEC). The regional president and members of the HEC are answerable to two authorities: the national president and the People's Regional Assembly.

The central power of the state rests with the national president, who regulates the relationship between the HEC and the central ministries. However, the existence of the regional government in the South is guaranteed in the constitution and it cannot legally be altered unilaterally by the central gov-

ernment. The organic law that guarantees and protects the regional government "cannot be amended except by a three-quarters majority of the People's National Assembly and confirmed by a two-thirds majority in referendum held in the three southern provinces of Sudan." This legal provision distinguishes the southern regional government from a merely decentralized government whose local organs can be altered at will by either the national president or the National Assembly.

The Addis Ababa Agreement stipu-

tures that are narrowly adapted to the specific circumstances of the Sudanese situation. On balance, it is more than a simple decentralized arrangement subject to the unilateral whim of the central government and yet less than a full-fledged federal structure along the lines of the U.S. model, given the degree of control of internal affairs of the southern region by the national president. There is, therefore, the danger that if the national president interprets the document at will, the written guarantees may be rendered meaningless.



Photo: Camerapix

President Nimeiry: Persuaded to abandon the Addis Ababa accord?

lates that there should be a southern command of an army to be composed of 12,000 soldiers, half of whom would originate in the South and the other half from elsewhere in Sudan. Most of the troops from the South were drawn from the former Anya-Nya army. There is, however, a provision that there should be integration between the two halves.

The Addis Ababa Agreement is a hybrid of federal and nonfederal fea-

The successful conclusion of the peace negotiations between the North and the South and the ending of the military confrontation brought a considerable relief in Sudan, particularly in the southern region following the ratification of the agreement. In the short term, unity between the two disparate regions of Sudan is assured; in the long term, relations between the northern and southern Sudanese seem uncertain.

RECONCILIATION AND CONTINUING TENSIONS

During the 17 years of war, the northern Sudanese were divided into two camps on the southern question. There were those who genuinely believed that Sudan could not exist *without* the southern region, and there were those who suspected that the "nation" could not function properly and effectively *with* the southern region. The anti-southern region elements were mostly the Pan-Arabists (the Muslim Brothers, Arab Socialists, and traditional sectarians — the Ansar, and the Khatimiyah leaders). This group sought closer links with the Arab world and closer identification with the problems and fantasies of the Arab Middle East. They resented the perceived African orientation that the southern Sudan wanted to give the country as a whole. The other northern group that looked unsympathetically on southern concerns was the constitutional element. It argued that the granting of regional autonomy to the South would lead to the "Balkanization" of Sudan. Related to this group was one that claimed that the northern Sudan was subsidizing eventual southern secession by helping it to become a viable economic unit. And at the lowest level were those northerners who believed that the southerners are "just Africans" and would be better left to Africa.

Outside this anti-southern camp, there was another clique believing that the South and the North are both integral parts of Sudan and that attempts should be made to keep the South at peace with the North but without making it strong enough to challenge the perpetual hegemony of the North at the central decision-making level. This last camp won the argument and is credited with bringing about the regional autonomy agreement. The various elements within the anti-southern camp conceded, but remain skeptical of southern intentions and therefore have resorted to various manipulative strategies to render the regional autonomy arrangement ineffectual. They have created and contributed to some of the stress and strain in North-South relations since 1972 by sabotaging the effective institutionalization of autonomy in the South.

First, the overlapping of powers between the central and regional governments through the operation of the People's Local Government system has created some difficulties. For example, the provincial commissioners (PCs) in the South report directly to the national president even though their work necessarily concerns matters the Addis Ababa Agreement assigns to the region. Although they are nominated by the president of the HEC and appointed by the national president, their reports

sent directly to Khartoum are seen as potential threats to the regional policy-making discretion. So far their selections have been politicized to ensure that they are not stooges of the central government. Another related issue of overlapping of powers is the Public Service in the South, which is supposed to be administered by the regional government. Yet the assistant commissioner of police for the southern region (the highest-ranking police officer) reports to the commissioner in Khartoum. Although such reports are only routine and the security of the region is technically under the control of the president of the HEC, the position of the police chief in the South remains to be clarified within the Addis Ababa regional scheme.

Second, although Article 5 of the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement stipulates that English be the principal language for the southern region and Arabic the official language of the Sudan, more emphasis has been put on the teaching of Arabic in schools — at the expense, to be sure, of English and local languages. Related to the language issue is the resurgence of Islamic fanaticism and moves in the North to legislate Islam as the state religion in spite of explicit acceptance in both the Addis Ababa Agreement and in the permanent constitution that the Sudan will not project itself as an Islamic and Arabic state. Pursuit of Arabization and Islamization policies in the South have unfortunately surfaced, and the timidity of the southern leadership is being interpreted by Muslim fanatics as acquiescence.

Third, the southern region, one-third of the national population, is neither proportionately nor adequately represented at the national level. At the time of writing, the only southerner who is a member of the central cabinet is Vice-President Abel Alier. While Alier was also president of the HEC, he spent most of his time in the South managing the affairs of the region and occasionally attended cabinet meetings in Khartoum. Even if he wanted to attend all of them, he couldn't do so because more often than not there is no transport from the regional headquarters in Juba to Khartoum. Thus, at present, the



Photo: P. V. LeMay/Camera Press

Central Committee of the ruling SSU: The South is not receiving a fair share of revenues or development projects

North has exclusive monopoly and control of the critical decision-making process in the country. The South plays no role in the shaping, formulation, and implementation of domestic and foreign policies.

Fourth, the central bureaucracy is entirely northern Sudanese, so national planning and allocation of domestically generated revenue as well as foreign aid remains in the hands of the North, at both political and administrative levels. Also, state security organs and diplomatic service remain a preserve of the North. Southerners are recruited into the military and police academies, each of which takes 100 candidates annually — at an average rate of three per year, respectively.

Fifth, the southern region has not been receiving a fair share of revenue and development project allocation. Moreover, money allocated for the South is seldom released on time by the Central Ministry of Finance. In the mid-1970s, sugar projects in Mongalla and Melut in the South were abandoned in preference for Aalaya, West Sennar, and Kenana sugar schemes in the North. Also, Tonj Kenaf and the Wau fruit canning factories were replaced by the Abu Naama Kenaf project and the Karima fruit processing project in the northern region. The Kapoeta cement factory in Eastern Equatoria was abandoned when the central government built a series of cement factories in the North. The only development projects in the South are still at a pilot stage and are those sponsored and funded by the World Bank and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), whose respective representatives in Sudan are constantly under pressure from leadership in the North to reduce their activities in the South.

Thus, the South remains at the periphery of national decision making. A feeling of relative economic deprivation is growing, and the intransigent refusal of the northern Sudanese ruling elite to share real political power and revenue from within, and aid from without, with the southern Sudanese will gradually erode any desires in the South to identify with the "Sudanese state" to which they should rightly belong.

Yet, despite these shortcomings in the implementation of the regional autonomy in the South, and lack of sensitivity of the northern leadership to southern desire for participation in national issues, some northerners claim that the southern region has gained a privileged position in the Nimeiry regime and that decentralization should be extended to the North. Proponents for creation of regional governments in the North rested their arguments on the claims that the size of the country and its poor infrastructure militated against responsive and efficient administration from Khartoum, and that uneven social and economic development and ethnic



Vice-President Abel Alier, the only southerner in the national cabinet

Photo: Camerapix

diversity required a decentralized system to satisfy local demands. Above all it was argued that a decentralized political system would ultimately achieve political aims and meet democratic expectations by involving the public at large and thus weakening elements of opposition. It is worth recalling here that such arguments for devolution of power — regarded as dangerous to the national interest during the time of the war between the North and the South — gained credibility among most northern Sudanese elites. A long constitutional

procedure was followed by the central government before implementing the idea of decentralization. Five regions — northern, eastern, central, Kordofan, and Darfur were created in mid-1980.

The major difference between the regional autonomy in the South and the autonomy of the regions in the North lies in the fact that while the president of the High Executive Council is responsible to the southern Regional Assembly and can be removed from office by a two-thirds no-confidence vote of the same Assembly, the governors of the northern regions are at present presidential appointees. Opponents of the Addis Ababa Agreement in the North were not happy with this important difference between the southern region and the other five regions. They immediately embarked on a series of attempts to provoke a confrontation between the central government and the southern region.

In late 1980, the Northern members of the National Assembly connived with central government ministers and a few of Nimeiry's advisers to redraw the boundaries between the South and the North. In the South, major parts of the Gogrial district in Bahr el Ghazal province and all the "oil areas" in the Bentiu district of Lakes province were incorporated into Kordofan province in the North. Also, parts of Renk district in Upper Nile province were added to the adjacent northern provinces. The National Assembly, after a walkout by the southern members, passed legislation to validate the so-called new map. The southern reaction was instantaneous: there were mass demonstrations in the region against the new boundaries, and the People's Regional Assembly met in an emergency session and passed a resolution that condemned the new boundaries and affirmed the southern commitment to respect the provincial boundaries acknowledged at the time of independence and recognized by the Addis Ababa Agreement. The regional government in the South supported the southern stand and argued that it was unconstitutional for the North, through its members of the National Assembly, to alter the boundaries of the northern and southern regions. Furthermore, it



Photo: Camiraphix

Will southerners submit to a drastic curtailment of their autonomy?

was up to President Nimeiry either to uphold the constitution respecting the old boundaries and reverse the decision of the National Assembly or to support the new boundaries and explain his decision to the peoples of the South. Nimeiry was allegedly taken unawares by the actions of his ministers and of the northern members of the National Assembly. He acted swiftly to contain the growing tension between the South and the North by appointing a committee composed of both northerners and southerners to examine the boundary issue and make recommendations to him. The committee recommended the reversal of the decision of the northern members of the National Assembly and the president promptly accepted it.

In the spring of 1981, the Central Ministry of Energy and Mining decided — without consultation with the South — to direct Chevron Oil Company to commit itself to building an oil refinery in Kosti in the North instead of Bentiu in the South, where the company's prospecting had been most successful. The decision of the central government was unpopular in the South, and the regional government tried in vain to persuade President Nimeiry to reverse the unilateral decision of the Central Ministry of Energy and Mining. Instead

of responding to the appeals of the South to have the refinery constructed in Bentiu for sound economic reasons as well as to make the South feel pride in contributing to the national economy, Nimeiry threatened the use of military force to coerce the South to accept his decision. The southern regional government avoided confrontation and indicated that it would respect the decision of the president.

Failing to provoke a confrontation between Nimeiry and the South, opponents of the autonomous status of the South began campaigning for creation of more regions in the South. The idea of dividing the South into two or three regions was first suggested by northern political parties in the 1960s but was rejected by the southern parties. The North has always felt that treating the South as a single entity would eventually lead to development of a strong, cohesive, and progressive region that could easily secede to form an independent African state. President Nimeiry had ignored that line of reasoning and accepted the Addis Ababa Peace Accord as negotiated by both his own selected team and representatives of the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement. However, the critics of the Peace Accord are now Nimeiry's political allies

and hold key positions both in the central government and in the Sudan Socialist Union (SSU). They have successfully persuaded Nimeiry that redrawing the South and creation of regions out of the present region is necessary for perpetual control of the South by the North. They cited the South's assistance to the boundary question and location of the oil refinery in Kosti as indicators of growing southern intransigence to decisions emanating from the central government. To add political ballast to their argument, they persuaded a southerner, General Joseph Lagu, who had been living in Khartoum since Nimeiry removed him from the presidency of the South in January 1981, to spearhead the call for redrawing of the South. Nimeiry assured General Lagu that he fully supported the idea of creating several regional governments in the South that would have the same powers as those in the North. With alleged financial support and administrative facilities at his disposal, Lagu called for redrawing of the southern region on grounds that would save the South from institutionalized tribal domination by the Dinka (the largest ethnic group in the South) protect the Addis Ababa Agreement from politicians with tribal inclinations, effect decentralization of power in the South, and guarantee the concept of a united southern Sudan by accommodating the aspirations of the various communal groups in the South.

Lagu's call for creation of several regions in the South was received with shock and bewilderment. An overwhelming majority of the southern members of the Central Committee of the SSU cabled President Nimeiry requesting that he exclude the issue from discussion on grounds that it was unconstitutional. Nimeiry, ignoring the public outcry, included the issue on the agenda of the Central Committee meeting where it was sweepingly condemned, and referred it to the local SSU units in the South to discuss and settle it.

Meanwhile, attempts were made to amend the permanent constitution to enable the president to create more regions in the South. The regional government maintained that to amend the

permanent constitution, Nimeiry would have to comply with the provisions of Article 34 of the Self-Government Act of 1972, which specifically protects the South as a single region and stipulates that an amendment can be made only by a majority (three-quarters) of the People's National Assembly and the approval of a majority of two-thirds of the citizens of the southern region in a referendum to be carried out in that region. Nimeiry's legal advisers counseled adherence to the constitutional procedure. Proponents of redivision, however, began to urge Nimeiry to overlook the legal restrictions on his powers and to order the creation of more southern regions on grounds of public interest. Once again, in mid-1980, the southern regional government appealed to Nimeiry to protect and respect the permanent constitution of the country. After failing to maneuver the southern leadership on the sensitive issue of redivision of the South, Nimeiry summoned an emergency meeting of the SSU Politbureau to discuss the subject. For three consecutive days, September 15-17, 1981, the southern members won the overwhelming support of their northern colleagues against redivision of the South. It was bad economics, the southerners persuasively argued, because the central government was not in a financial position to maintain additional regional bureaucracies, and new regional governments in the South could not sustain themselves. It was bad politics, they maintained, because proponents of "redivision" were appealing to local sentiments among rival ethnic groups, and such politics would be detrimental to the health of the southern region and of the Sudan at large. The critics of redivision pointed out that implementation of decentralization programs (which have already been announced) within the southern region would accommodate the aspirations of the local communities and allay their fears of domination by larger ethnic groups. The overwhelming majority of the members of the SSU Politbureau appealed to President Nimeiry to abandon the idea of redivision completely. Nimeiry was reported to have assured his colleagues that he would appoint a technical committee to

examine the issue in detail and report back to the SSU Politbureau.

However, a few days later, Nimeiry dissolved both the National Assembly



General Joseph Lagu, a southerner, led the call for redivision of the South

and Regional Assembly, as well as the regional government in the South. His rationalization was that the establishment of five regional governments in the North required a change of regional representation in the National Assembly to reflect the new balance of power relationship between the regions and the center. Regarding the dissolution of the Regional Assembly, he argued that the issue of redivision of the South required public debate and that the southern masses should express their opinion through a referendum if the newly constituted National Assembly approved the proposition for redivision. Of course, there were no grounds at all for Nimeiry to dissolve the regional government. He lost southern trust and confidence overnight. The South, however, decided to avoid a confrontation with Nimeiry and pledged to follow the constitutional process to express its position on the diversionary issue of redivision.

After dissolving the assemblies and the southern regional government, Nimeiry appointed an interim military government in the South to supervise elections for a new National Assembly and a referendum on the proposition of redivision of the South. All the nominees for the interim High Executive Council headed by Major General Gasmallah Rassas were proposed by Lagu and are mostly from among his supporters for creation of several regions in the South. Nimeiry also reduced the southern representation in the National Assembly to less than one-fifth of the total membership (28 out of 151) to ensure passage of the redivision issue. These actions reinforced the impression that Nimeiry was set to create more regions in the South regardless of the overwhelming southern opposition to it. In order to mobilize effective defeat of the idea of redivision in the forthcoming referendum, its opponents formed the Council for the Unity of South Sudan in December 1981 under the chairmanship of the Sudanese elder statesman, Clement Mboro, and composed of people of different political persuasions. Its executive committee sent a letter to Nimeiry informing him of the formation of the council and assured him that the council would work within the organs of the SSU — after all, all of its members were prominent SSU members. Nimeiry reacted swiftly by ordering the arrest of the entire executive of the council (21 persons). Subsequent pressure and protest led to the release of 16 of those arrested, but five, including Clement Mboro, Joseph Oduho, and Samuel Arn Bol (all veteran politicians), are at the time of this writing still languishing in detention. Surprisingly, the South remained restrained in spite of all these provocations.

NIMEIRPHILIA, NIMEIRPHOBIA, AND KLEPTOCRACY

The present tension between the central government of the Sudan and Nimeiry's dissolution of both the Regional Assembly and the government does not provide an optimistic scenario. Moreover, the North-South crisis is taking place in the context of a fundamental malaise in the national polity.

Justification of power throughout Sudan under Nimeiry has been actively pursued through the state apparatus and through the SSU. Channels of propaganda have been developed to win the allegiance and participation of the elite. The widening of the economic gap between the state and commercial bourgeoisie, on the one hand, and the mass of the population, on the other, has spurred the evolution of a well-defined context for power relations centering upon Nimeiry. The rest of the population has been either intimidated by occasional shows of force or mystified by grandiose visions of a prosperous future and of Nimeiry's presumed "enlightened leadership." Presidential power has relied more on the valorization of authoritarian principles of rule than on the embodiment of impersonal principles in an institutionalized context for power relations. Communication, participation, and responsiveness revolve around the office of the president and are organized in a strict hierarchical pattern. Information is disseminated at increasing levels of generality as one

descends the political and social ladders, and payoffs vary proportionately to the quality of an individual's relationship with Nimeiry and his immediate entourage. If political development and legitimation lie in the creation of institutions transcending the temporally limited authority of individual politicians, it seems that the justification of the regime's power does not rest on a solid consensual foundation. Even though Nimeiry's position is so central and dominant that it creates conformity in political behavior and continuity in the pattern of power relations, the political system he has developed cannot stand on its own precisely because the hierarchy is not committed to the organization of its roles within a specific institutional framework, but rather to a single leader who can define to a large extent permissible forms of political interaction.

It is doubtful that the Sudan Socialist Union (SSU) could routinely handle the problem of succession or even survive without the central bond provided by the presidential office. Similarly, com-

petition for the economic benefits of political power would be unbridled were Nimeiry to disappear, since there are no solid national centers of economic policymaking. A new greedy, corrupt, and abundantly mediocre group has emerged which, through the mediation of Nimeiry, has been able to amass wealth. Without the extravagant use of patronage and coordination of parochial interests by Nimeiry through his network of protégés and informers in the national sphere and supporters in the foreign sphere, the Nimeiry regime would have probably collapsed by now. So far, no amount of SSU propaganda regarding the need to develop a national consciousness or rational progress toward the achievement of collective goals can deeply touch the various levels of the political hierarchy when modes of participation related to these ideas have not been established. Indeed, the life of the SSU depends on that of Nimeiry, for the political system that he has built has constantly sacrificed institutionalization for the maintenance of control over real or imagined opponents who pose personal threats to the president.

A political system that is held together by the authority of an individual presidential monarch, and by the mechanisms of consent offered by patronage, will inevitably be vulnerable to variations in the nature of foreign financial and military support and international political and economic trends. This weakness has definitely been manifested in the Sudan partly as a result of Nimeiry's zigzag foreign policy and partly as a result of foreign actors shifting and readjusting their interests and strategies accordingly. Major challenges to the regime bring with them an increased need for coercive security measures and further imperil the possibilities of developing a broad consensual context for the definition of "state coherence" and the exercise of power. Creative change must be continually postponed because of the need to reconsolidate power and authority. Henceforth, the relationship between the state and the governed remains one between domination and, alternatively, submission, acquiescence, or rebellion. □



Photo: Camerapix

Southerners are recruited into the military academy at an average rate of three per year

Mubarak's Africa Policy

BY AHMED YOUSSEF AL-KARIE



Egypt's interest in and involvement with Africa is apparent by its geography alone. Situated at the intersection of three continents, how could Egypt disregard Africa, of which it is a part? An Africa policy has always been one of the most important planks in Egypt's foreign policy, if for no other reason than that Egypt belongs to the African continent and is one of the founder states of the Organization of African Unity (OAU).

Egypt has gone through various historical periods, each of which has left its impact on the dimensions, methods, and aims of its Africa policy. For example, in the early eighteenth century under Mohamed Ali Pasha's rule, Egypt concentrated its efforts on expanding its power to the south until it reached the source of the Nile to secure water supplies. The same interest led Egypt under monarchic rule to help Abyssinia (Ethiopia) during the Italian

invasion (1935-36). After the July 1952 revolution, Gamal Abdul Nasser established a new three-plank foreign policy based on concentric circles: the Arab dimension, the African dimension, and the Islamic dimension. Accordingly, under Nasser, Egypt actively pursued an open-door Africa policy.

During the Nasser period (1954-1970), one of the main objectives Egypt pursued in Africa was to curb Israel's infiltration in the continent. The best way to fulfill that aim was believed to be by promoting common Arab-African interests; however, the attempts failed to stem Israel's influence. When Nasser died in 1970, many African states, including radical ones, had established close relations with the Zionist state at all levels — diplomatic, political, and economic. Even Guinea, under the rule of Sekou Touré, broke its relations with Israel only after the June 1967 war.

During Anwar Sadat's era (1970-1981), strong African solidarity with Egypt was expressed during and after the October 1973 war, which caused many African states to break diplomatic relations with Israel. Egypt was seen as the link to the formation of a sound Arab-African relationship that could provide Africa with financial and development assistance from wealthy Arab oil countries. With this form of cooperation in mind, the first Arab-African summit was held in Cairo in March 1977.

After Sadat's peace initiative to Israel in November 1977, Egypt faced attempts from the Arab rejectionist states to isolate it and to condemn its action; however, many African states stood on Egypt's side. Among the factors that enhanced African solidarity with Sadat's regime was that the revolutionary wave that had spread over the continent during the 1960s was gradually becoming more moderate, as was the case in Egypt.

In contrast to Egypt's ostracism from the Arab League and the Islamic Conference, Egypt has been able to preserve its membership in the OAU. At the Heads of State Summit held in

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Monrovia, Liberia in 1979, Egypt succeeded in preventing the adoption of a resolution condemning openly the Camp David peace agreement with Israel. The resolution on the Middle East crisis that came out of this meeting was confined to generalities and only condemned "any accords that violate the national rights of the Palestinian people or contradict the bases for an overall and just settlement of the Middle East crisis."

After the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, the contraction of Egypt's Arab and Islamic role led it to concentrate more on Africa to compensate for its losses on the Arab scene. Therefore, during the last three years, Egypt has displayed a greater interest in


attended many African summits as a special delegate of the late President Anwar Sadat, and having paid many visits to African capitals. Although the new Egyptian president has proclaimed his commitment to the guidelines established by Sadat, he has also specified that his foreign policy style will differ, favoring a "cool diplomacy" approach. With regard to Africa, this new style can be seen in Egypt's handling of problems where Arab and African interests intertwine, such as the Chad crisis, the Horn of Africa, and the Western Sahara war.

THE CHAD CRISIS

Prior to Libyan involvement in Chad, Egypt had proclaimed its support

for Egypt and Sudan of aiding Hissene Habré's rebel forces, the Armed Forces of the North (FAN), against those of the government led by President Goukouni Woddeye. In January 1981, Egypt approved the resolution condemning the Libyan military intervention in Chad adopted at the Lomé conference.

Egypt's position toward the Chad crisis is influenced by two factors: its tense relationship with Tripoli and its special one with Khartoum. Therefore, coordination in policy between Egypt and Sudan led both countries to stand on the side of Habré's forces and to reinforce their defense lines on the Libyan border. Last October, during his visit to Washington just before Sadat's



Sudanese President Nimeiry with Sadat: Egypt's position on Chad is influenced by its "special relationship" with Khartoum

Photo: Camerapix

African issues, and an Egyptian Fund for Technical Assistance to Africa has been created.

EGYPT'S AFRICA POLICY UNDER MUBARAK

President Hosni Mubarak is well acquainted with African issues, having

for the Lagos agreement concluded in 1979, a formula accepted by all factions in Chad to achieve reconciliation and to prevent any foreign intervention in the country. Therefore, Libya's military involvement in Chad was perceived by Egypt as part of a Soviet plan. Tripoli and Ndjamená for their part have ac-

assassination, Mubarak urged the American administration not to delay arms shipments to Sudan.

In November 1981 at the Franco-African summit held in Paris, Egypt expressed its support for the proposed solution to the Chad crisis because it was seen as an African solution, with

France assuming only a complementary role. The Libyan decision to retire its troops from Chad was viewed in Cairo as a Libyan attempt to pave the way for the 1982 OAU summit-scheduled for Tripoli.

In mid-December, Mubarak expressed his views on Egypt's relations with its neighbors as follows: "We have no intention to declare any war on any neighboring country after the October 1973 one. There are no concentrations of armed forces on the Egyptian-Libyan frontier, as some like to imagine. We will not declare war against any Arab country. I am not in favor of war."

THE HORN OF AFRICA

In the Horn of Africa region, the situation is more complicated because of the international implications. With regard to the Ethiopia-Somalia confrontation, the Addis Ababa regime appears to be in a better position, having succeeded in isolating its opponent either by victories won on the battlefield or by gains at the OAU, which confirmed that "the Ogaden is an integral part of Ethiopia." Moreover, Ethiopia's move toward normalizing relations with its neighbors — Sudan, Kenya, and Djibouti — was regarded by Mogadishu with a certain concern.

These developments led Somalia to declare its readiness to enter into unconditional negotiations to restore peace in the region. Somalia has already agreed to a form of self-determination for the Ogaden under Ethiopian sovereignty for a limited period to be followed by a referendum. Somalia may be obliged to make further concessions in the near future.

Egypt's position on Somalia's side is justified by the fact that the latter is an Arab and Islamic state fighting for the integrity of its territories and to safeguard its independence, that relations between the two countries have been cemented by ancient historical links, and finally that Mogadishu stood on Egypt's side when faced by the Arab rejectionist front after the Camp David agreement. Despite the close links, however, Egypt does not condone any Somali expansionist moves in the Ogaden province or in any other region claimed by Somalia, because Egypt is committed to OAU resolutions; because it is anxious to protect its interests with Ethiopia, particularly those related to the Nile waters; and because it wants to maintain good relations with the host country of the OAU.

Egypt's policy toward the crisis in the Horn can be characterized as being



President Hosni Mubarak was Anwar Sadat's delegate to many African summits

Photo: Rachad El Koussy/Photo Trends



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in conformity with the American position of having a balanced relationship with both Ethiopia and Somalia. Taking this view, Washington signed an agreement with Somalia for military facilities in August 1980 and has undertaken to supply Mogadishu with arms for its defense. At the same time, the United States is trying to disengage Ethiopia from the Soviet orbit by helping it to be less dependent on Moscow.

THE WESTERN SAHARA WAR

The Western Sahara question is a well-known one to President Mubarak, for in January 1976 he acted as a mediator between Morocco, Mauritania, and Algeria. After a 60-hour shuttle between Algiers and Rabat, Mubarak was able to declare that Egyptian mediation had succeeded in freezing the military conflict between Algeria and Morocco. A few months later, at the 1976 OAU summit in Mauritius, Mubarak continued efforts to contain the Algerian-Moroccan dispute. In June 1977, and February 1978, he paid additional visits to Rabat.

Egypt's position concerning the Western Sahara war is that while it sup-

ports self-determination in principle for the Western Sahara, it believes that the problem must be settled through negotiations involving all concerned parties, including Morocco and Algeria. In this regard, Egypt approved the resolution adopted by the Nairobi OAU summit in 1981 pledging to put an end to hostilities and to hold a referendum in the disputed territory. In the event that the referendum does not take place, the Western Sahara will once again be discussed at the 1982 OAU summit and it is likely that Egypt will abstain from voting on the admission of the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic to the organization as a member state.

THE NAMIBIAN PROBLEM

Egypt's keen interest in Namibia, an issue concerning the right to self-determination of the African majority, has continued since the early 1960s, when Nasser provided the Namibian people with military and material assistance. Since 1967, Egypt has been a member of the UN Council for Namibia. Due to its commitment to African solidarity, Egypt favors a peaceful settlement of the Namibian question in line with UN Security Council Resolution 435. Since the res-

olution was put forth in 1978, Egypt has worked actively through its contacts with the United States, United Kingdom, and France to accelerate the implementation of a peaceful settlement in Namibia.

In conclusion, Egyptian diplomacy under Mubarak will have to tackle two additional, vitally important, problems during the coming months: (1) the resumption of diplomatic relations between African governments and Israel, and (2) the second Afro-Arab summit in Libya. All African states with the exception of Swaziland and Lesotho cut off relations with the Zionist states after the October 1973 war, although some maintained trade and cooperation agreements with Israel. The signing of the Camp David accords has led some African states to consider resuming diplomatic relations with Israel. Therefore, Egypt has intensified its diplomacy, explaining to African states that the Israeli-Egyptian treaty is only the first step down the road of peace and that Egypt still needs African support and pressures on Israel for further steps to fulfill the aspirations of the African community as well as the international one.

The Egyptian position is based on the Arab pressures exerted namely by Algeria and Libya on African states, and also by recent Israeli actions such as the raid on the Iraqi nuclear reactor in Tammuz and the annexation of the Golan Heights. Egyptian diplomacy appears keen to maintain the status quo in African-Israeli relations, despite Israeli efforts to improve them.

As for Libya's hosting of the 18th OAU summit and the second Afro-Arab summit, Egypt is taking into account the evolution in Arab positions and the Arab-Egyptian rapprochement initiated slowly since Mubarak's accession to the presidency. Egypt and Sudan both opposed the resolution passed at the Nairobi OAU summit to hold the next meeting in Tripoli. However, Egypt's policy will be clarified after April 1982, when for the first time Egypt will not attend an OAU conference. Only then will we have a clearer picture of the Africa policy to be pursued by Egypt under Mubarak, who in the meantime is required to place a high priority on internal problems. □



Photo: Mary Anne Fackelman/The White House

Mubarak and Reagan: Egypt's policy in the Horn of Africa conforms with the American position

Pretoria accepts Namibia vote system questioned by Africans

South Africa has unconditionally accepted the first phase of the Reagan administration's initiative on Namibian independence. But objections to the proposed election system by the South-West African People's Organization and the African front-line states could snarl the negotiations.

A senior U.S. official said the Africans are willing to negotiate the issue but that working out a compromise might take months. However, U.S. officials were said to be the most optimistic about an internationally recognized settlement since the Reagan administration took office.

What the Africans object to is a system intended to assuage South

African fears that SWAPO would win the election in a walk. Half the constituent assembly seats would be chosen by proportional representation and half in straight contests between SWAPO and Pretoria's protege, the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance, the idea being that SWAPO would thus be blocked from winning an outright two-thirds majority necessary to approve the constitution.

As difficult as phase one has proved to be, phase two is considered even tougher. It involves determining the size and composition of the UN supervisory force to be stationed in Namibia as well as measures to overcome Pretoria's often stated objections to what it calls the

UN's "lack of impartiality."

In publicly announcing acceptance of phase one, South Africa's state president Marais Viljoen said the UN's lack of impartiality "diminished the possibility of holding free and fair elections."

Earlier, Foreign Minister Roelof Botha had blasted UN secretary-general Javier Perez de Cuellar for his "inability to act in a just and unbiased manner," after de Cuellar had criticized apartheid. Even South African opposition newspapers called de Cuellar's remarks "ill-judged." (*Christian Science Monitor*, February 1, 1982; *Washington Post*, January 30, 1982; *London Times*, January 29 and 30, 1982.) □

Foreign business upset as Zimbabwe seeks greater control

Zimbabwe's Prime Minister Robert Mugabe has dubbed 1982 the year of "national transformation"—not nationalization of business but more state participation and control. Mugabe has often said that political power is meaningless without economic control, which has always been in the hands of Zimbabwe's tiny white minority.

Foreign business has been especially upset by the Minerals Marketing Corporation Bill, which is designed to transfer control of the mining industry's marketing from the foreign-owned multinationals—American, British and South African—to the Zimbabwe government. Mugabe said the mining multinationals were "milking" the country by "selling minerals abroad at unacceptably low prices," and by withholding information about exports from the government.

The mining companies have argued that, despite the allegations, there is no proof, and they claim the state-owned marketing board will discourage and possibly even elimi-

nate new investment as well as adversely affect customer willingness to buy. However, since independence two years ago, the industry, whose mineral exports were worth \$525 million last year, has invested \$187 million.

Mugabe also announced plans for the government to buy selected white-owned mines, farms, factories and other businesses in order to transfer control to black workers. The Prime Minister told a political rally in January, "The reason you complain about rising prices at the introduction of each wage rise is because business people want large profits regardless of the consequences to the ordinary man or woman." (*Financial Times*, January 25, February 1 and 9, 1982; *London Guardian*, January 18, 1982.)

Recently, Mugabe has been talking about the threat of a coup against his government. "I feel that there are groups of people who would want to attempt a coup," he said.

One such group allegedly is the political party of his rival and coalition partner, Joshua Nkomo.

In February, 70 arms caches were found on farms owned by Nkomo's party and Mugabe said it was plotting an armed takeover, a contention Nkomo strenuously denied. Earlier, Mugabe held talks with Nkomo on the possibility of merging the two parties so that Zimbabwe can become a one-party state. On February 17, Nkomo was dismissed from the government.

Mugabe has accused Ian Smith and Bishop Abel Muzorewa, two former Prime Ministers, of plotting with South Africa to overthrow the government.

At least 15 whites, including one MP, have been detained by security police in connection with alleged coup plots. Another white MP was being sought in February but he apparently fled to South Africa. (*Financial Times*, February 9, 1982; *London Times*, January 28 and February 8, 1982; *London Sunday Times*, January 31, 1982.) □

WESTERN AFRICA

Chad

● Early in 1982, two big questions were looming over the ability of the OAU peacekeeping force to maintain peace in Chad—whether it would receive urgently needed funds to enable it to continue policing the vast country, and whether rebel Hissene Habré and his Armed Forces of the North (FAN), already in control of eastern Chad, would confront the troops in the west and south and advance to Ndjamena.

Reign of terror rules Venda homeland

Opposition politicians in the Venda homeland made "independent" by Pretoria in 1979 say they are in constant danger following the massive clampdown on suspected subversives. At least two people have died in detention and the opposition leader, Baldwin Mudau, also died under mysterious circumstances.

The crackdown has focused on the Evangelical Lutheran Church, four of whose nine full-time pastors in Venda have been detained. They were arrested after conducting funeral services for a detainee who died, Tshifhiwa Muofhe. A 27-year-old Lutheran lay preacher, Muofhe died in November two days after his arrest.

Faure Louw, a South African dominee of the Dutch Reformed Church, who was working with the Lutherans, was deported immediately after the funeral.

Dr. H.C. Mngadi, arrested on a firearm charge, also died in detention, reportedly from internal bleeding. A third man, D. Ralushai, a member of the Lutheran church, was also reported to have died in security police custody. The dean of Venda's Lutheran church, T.S. Farisani, was transferred from detention to a hospital for treatment of "critical head injuries."

The Venda crackdown has outraged the Lutheran church and Amnesty International has said it will investigate. Even the pro-government South African newspaper *Die Vaderland* was extremely critical.

In the U.S., the Rev. Paul Wee, general secretary of the national

In February, it was estimated that the undermanned OAU force of 3,000 soldiers from Nigeria, Senegal and Zaire would need \$163 million to sustain itself over the next year. President Daniel arap Moi of Kenya, current OAU chairman, appealed to member states and to the international community to provide money for the force. The U.S. and France had reportedly given \$12 million each, but it was not known if more aid would be forthcoming. The OAU was said to be planning to ask the UN for funding, an unprecedented move because the UN has

committee of Lutheran World Ministries, said the clergymen had been subjected to "brutal torture." Wee spoke to Donald Sole, the South African ambassador to the U.S., who said afterwards he would "convey the expressions of concern" but that Pretoria does "not intervene in the domestic affairs of independent countries."

Bishop Desmond Tutu, general secretary of the South African Council of Churches, visited Venda in late January in an effort to see the detainees. He was summarily expelled from the homeland.

The repression was attributed to a panic reaction by the Venda authorities after a suspected African National Congress rocket attack on October 26 against a police station in the main town of Sibasa. Two policemen were killed. Since then, there have been numerous telephoned threats of further ANC attacks.

Opposition Venda politicians have accused the authorities of other "terror tactics" besides detentions, including sweeping arrests at roadblocks for "nonpayment of taxes."

Baldwin Mudau, the opposition leader who died on January 1, and his party twice defeated in general elections the party of Venda's leader, Patrick Mphhephu, who retains power thanks to the South African police and 42 nominated tribal chiefs. (*Christian Science Monitor*, February 2, 1982; *Sowetan*, January 18, 22 and 25, 1982; *Johannesburg Star*, January 23, 1982; *Rand Daily Mail*, January 9, 1982.) □

never financed a force not under its auspices.

Meanwhile, in a six-week offensive, Habré's 4,000-man FAN moved from their bases in western Sudan, where they were forced to take refuge when Libyan troops intervened in the conflict, throughout eastern Chad, one-third of the country, occupying the towns of Abeche, Faya Largeau and Oum Hadjer. If not for the fact that most of the OAU force is stationed at Ati, it is believed that Habré's men would have easily advanced onward to Ndjamena.

Chad President Goukouni Woddeye has threatened that if the OAU force will not fight FAN (it is not empowered to do so), its presence is pointless and he will be required to call upon "extra-African" forces. In January, Woddeye was able to gain cooperation from Sudanese President Gaafar al-Nimeiry, who pledged he "will not allow any person to launch action against Chad from Sudanese territory," a reference to FAN.

According to a February report in the *New York Times*, Habré was said to be awaiting the outcome of an OAU meeting on Chad in Nairobi to determine his next moves. If no progress toward a settlement of the conflict (implying negotiations between Habré and Woddeye) is made during the meeting, it is believed that Habré will begin attack toward the capital—either through or around the OAU peacekeeping lines. The Chad government has said it is prepared to negotiate with FAN, but not with its leader, Habré. (*New York Times*, February 11, 1982; *London Times*, January 30, 1982; *Washington Post*, January 16 and 20, 1982; *London Guardian*, January 14, 1982.)

Ghana

● Flight Lieut. Jerry Rawlings returned for a second time as Ghana's head of state after overthrowing the civilian government of President Hilla Limann on New Year's Eve. Rawlings had relinquished power to the elected Limann government in October 1979 after ruling Ghana for three months, with a warning that the government would be overthrown if it became corrupt.

Early in January, Rawlings sus-

pended the constitution, banned political parties and declared a "holy war" on corruption. A seven-member Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC) to run the country was appointed, including four military men and three civilians—a radical Catholic priest, a trade unionist and a student leader. Brig. Gen. Joseph Nunoo-Mensah, retired by Limann over two years ago, was named chief of defense staff and a PNDC member. Late in January, Rawlings also formed a 15-member cabinet composed entirely of civilians.

"People's tribunals" were to be convened to try former officials of the Limann government and others for corruption and "crimes against the people." More than 100 persons, including Limann and most of his cabinet ministers, were reportedly detained. Rawlings also called on all members of Limann's secret service, military intelligence and "all thugs and activists" of Limann's banned People's National Party to turn themselves in to authorities. Failure to do so would be "a declaration of war on the revolution."

The main challenge faced by the Rawlings government will be to put a halt to the deterioration of the Ghanaian economy. Although no specific economic program has been formulated, Rawlings said in late January that a "comprehensive review" of the economy was being carried out "to initiate plans for the elimination of corruption and inefficiency and to build the basis of a sound and sustained economy." Individual foreign investment agreements are to be examined "if they turn out to be inimical to our interests."

One problem area may be Ghana's relations with Nigeria, which provides the country with nearly all its oil supplies. Ghana owes Nigeria some \$90 million for oil, and Limann had gone to Lagos just before the coup to request an extension of credit. When Rawlings seized power the first time in June 1979, and executed three former heads of state, the then military government of Nigeria cut off oil supplies. Nigeria's attitude towards the second Rawlings administration has not yet been made clear.

However, Rawlings could seek alternative supplies of oil from Libya, with which he restored diplomatic relations shortly after the coup. Ties between the two countries were severed in November 1980 by Limann, who accused Col. Muammar Qaddafi's government of subversive activities in Ghana. Libya reportedly promised financial aid and food supplies to the Rawlings government. (London *Times*, January 4, 12, 13, 29 and February 1, 1982; *Financial Times*, January 8 and 20, 1982.)

Guinea

- Late last year, Guinean President Sekou Touré paid an official visit to West Germany marking a reconciliation between the two countries after years of strained relations. Touré's trip was his first to West Germany since 1959. Diplomatic relations were broken between 1971 and 1975 over Guinean allegations of West German involvement in a coup attempt in 1971. Although diplomatic ties were restored in 1975, West German economic aid to Guinea was not resumed until 1979.

Touré held discussions with Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher and Development Minister Rainer Offergeld. An \$8.8 million aid agreement was signed, providing funds for the expansion of Conakry's harbor facilities and for the financing of scholarships for Guinean students. The aid is part of \$12 million which West Germany pledged to Guinea in 1981.

Following discussions with Touré in Bonn, Offergeld said: "We have made a clear break with past events. What is important now is the future. Hence we are giving aid. With it we shall strengthen the stability, independence and true non-alignment of Guinea."

Trade between Guinea and West Germany has been increasing and Touré reportedly held talks with private German firms in hopes of attracting additional investment. Chancellor Schmidt, applauding Touré's discussions with private business, said: "Cooperation with firms appears to me to be the best and quickest way of transferring technology to the Third World and at the same time expanding employ-

ment in the Third World." (*West Africa*, December 7 and 21-28, 1981.)

Guinea-Bissau

- Former President Luis Cabral, under house arrest since the coup which ousted him in November 1980, was released in late December and allowed to go into exile in Cuba. The freeing of Cabral was one of the outcomes of the November congress of the ruling African Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde (PAIGC) in Bissau.

The congress' decision to retain the name and stature of the PAIGC as the ruling party of Guinea-Bissau (despite the fact that the Cape Verde section of the party split off following Cabral's ouster by Maj. João Bernardo Vieira) while expelling all Cape Verdean founding members from its ranks was criticized by the Cape Verde government.

The African Party for the Independence of Cape Verde (PAICV) said that the PAIGC congress transformed the party into something "completely foreign to Cape Verde and Cape Verdeans in its composition and program," and that therefore it should not include Cape Verde in its title. The PAICV said it was trying to resolve the differences with Bissau, but the congress indicated Guinea-Bissau's aim to continue to act provocatively.

Cape Verdean President Aristides Pereira said that the PAIGC meeting had indefinitely postponed opportunities for normalization of relations between the two countries.

And in late 1981, the formation of an opposition party, the Front for National Unity and Development, which includes members of the Cabral government removed by Vieira, was announced. The party accused Vieira's government of "incompetence" and said it was bending to "external pressures." The new group claims allegiance to the principles of the PAIGC as put forth by its founder, Amílcar Cabral. (*West Africa*, January 11, 1982; *Le Monde*, January 6, 1982.)

Ivory Coast

- In late December, Phillips Petroleum announced that it expects to

begin oil production from the Ivory Coast's offshore Espoir field between July and October. Oil production at the smaller Belier field began in 1980, providing between 10,000 and 12,000 barrels per day, or one-third of the Ivory Coast's domestic needs.

However, the four-company consortium led by Phillips believes the Espoir field to be much larger, with the potential to make the Ivory Coast self-sufficient in oil by the end of the year and a net exporter by 1985. It is estimated that Espoir could yield a potential production level of between 200,000 and 400,000 barrels per day, which would make the Ivory Coast sub-Saharan Africa's second largest petroleum producer after Nigeria.

Substantial natural gas reserves were discovered by the Phillips-led consortium late in 1981 at five exploratory wells in the Espoir field. Gas, however, takes a longer time to exploit as special facilities are required for its liquefaction and transportation.

Oil production is expected to be the major growth area of the Ivorian economy. The growth rate is hoped to pick up from mid-1982 and reach 6 percent by 1983. The Ivory Coast's foreign exchange earnings could double over the next five years.

However, President Felix Houphouët-Boigny has been downplaying the significance of the oil finds so as not to disrupt the country's thriving agricultural sector. As was the case in Nigeria, news of looming oil wealth could lure farmers from agriculture in hopes of cashing in on the boom.

Meanwhile, a U.S. trade delegation led by Agriculture Secretary John Block and Secretary of Commerce Malcolm Baldrige stopped in the Ivory Coast in January, part of a four-nation tour of Africa. The officials met with Houphouët-Boigny who used the opportunity to explain his policy on commodity prices.

The Ivory Coast, the world's largest cocoa producer and Africa's leading coffee producer, has been at the forefront of the fight for high minimum prices for its major exports in international commodity negotiations, as it must rely on the

products for foreign exchange. The U.S., as a leading consumer of the products, has argued for a lower price.

World cocoa and coffee prices fell sharply in 1981, causing Houphouët-Boigny to remark to the American trade delegation: "You cannot trade with poor people." Block responded: "When you peg prices at a high level, you encourage excessive production and then what do you do with the products?" (*West Africa*, December 14 and 21-28, 1981, and January 25, 1982; *London Times*, December 22, 1981; *Financial Times*, December 17, 1981; *New York Times*, December 16, 1981.)

Liberia

- In his Christmas address to the nation, the Liberian head of state, Samuel Doe, set April 12, 1985 as the target date for the return to civilian rule and declared an **amnesty** for all political prisoners and exiles.

Doe said he was confident that Liberia would be ready within the next three years for the emergence of "a government by the people, of the people and for the people," although no date for elections was announced.

According to Doe, 19 political prisoners stood to benefit from his amnesty measures, but A.B. Tolbert, son of the former President William Tolbert, and former Police Chief Varney Dempster were not among them and were "presumed dead."

Doe said an investigation revealed that Tolbert and Dempster had been removed from their prison cells under orders of former Vice President Thomas Weh Syen (himself executed in August for allegedly plotting against Doe) and had not been heard of since. (*West Africa*, January 4, 1982; *Kenya Sunday Nation*, December 27, 1981.)

- The major Western creditor governments, the "Paris Club," agreed in December to **reschedule payments** on Liberia's long-term and medium-term official debts over the next year and a half, amounting to \$100 million.

The agreement allows repayment over a nine-year period with four years' grace, covering debts ac-

rued before January 1980. Debt servicing accounts for 28 percent of Liberian government revenues, and oil imports another 29 percent.

In December, the U.S. government granted Liberia \$10 million to maintain economic and political stability, although purchase of any military or paramilitary equipment is barred. The agreement was signed by U.S. Ambassador William Swing, who said the grant was "in recognition of Liberia's difficult financial obligations." He called on the government for "continuing fiscal discipline, and an end to corruption, harassment and other forms of arbitrary action." (*West Africa*, December 7 and 21, 1981; *Financial Times*, December 17, 1981.)

Mali

- Contrary to what had been expected, Mali was not re-admitted as a member of the West African Monetary Union (UMOA)—the **franc zone**—during the organization's meeting in Dakar, Senegal in December. The UMOA members—Ivory Coast, Benin, Upper Volta, Niger, Senegal and Togo—delayed decision on Mali's candidacy.

If Mali had been admitted to the organization, it would have meant the abolition of the Malian franc, to be replaced by the CFA franc, as well as the absorption of the central bank of Mali into the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO). Negotiations for Mali's return to UMOA were begun in early 1981 on President Moussa Traoré's request, with strong French backing.

According to observers, the UMOA governments were wary of having to absorb the heavily indebted Mali, for which France has taken on responsibility over the years, into their financial system, which is governed by strict financial regulations.

In addition, Upper Volta took advantage of the UMOA negotiations to raise a long-standing border dispute with Mali, which was allegedly resolved after an exchange of visits by the Malian President and Upper Volta's head of state, Col. Saye Zerbo.

Zerbo, however, at the Dakar meeting in December said: "If Mali is so indebted, it's because it spends too much money on purchases of

Soviet arms to launch aggressions against us."

For his part, Traore did not appear very anxious to join UMOA, according to observers, as membership would result in effect in a 50 percent devaluation of currency. One CFA franc replaces two Malian francs, a measure not likely to be popular with the Malian people. (*Jeune Afrique*, December 16, 1981 and January 13, 1982; *West Africa*, December 21-28, 1981; *Le Monde*, December 18, 1981.)

Nigeria

● President Shehu Shagari introduced an **austerity budget** for 1982 to the national assembly in December, aimed at stemming the decline in foreign exchange reserves resulting from a slump in oil production in 1981 because of the world oil glut.

Foreign reserves rose from \$4.95 billion at the end of 1979 to \$8.4 billion at the end of 1980, but as of September 1981, reserves fell to \$6.75 billion, at which point Nigeria, outside the aegis of OPEC, began unilateral discountings of its oil, as well as an extension of credit from the normal 30 days up to 120 days.

Nigeria's balance of payments deficit in 1981 was \$2.3 billion; therefore total spending in the 1982 budget is being cut back from the 1981 level of \$18 billion to \$16.5 billion, to be trimmed from the government's capital spending program.

Foreign borrowing will increase by 30 percent to more than \$3 billion. A renewed effort to combat smuggling, which has affected the government's import bill, will be launched. Raw materials and spare parts, previously exempted from the strict pre-shipment inspection system for all manufactured goods, will now be subject to the scheme, to curb smuggling.

Other budget measures included cutbacks on travel allowances and consultancy fees. Shagari said some causes for optimism were a growth in the agricultural sector in 1981 and an improvement in the gross domestic product over 1980.

And the controversial Revenue Allocation Bill, which governs the distribution of the federal government's funds to the 19 states, was finally passed by the joint finance committee in December. The su-

preme court had annulled the bill in October because it had not been brought before the committee for approval. The allocation formula adopted provides for 55 percent of the funds to the federal government, and 35 percent to be divided among the states. (*West Africa*, January 4 and 11, 1982; *London Guardian*, December 19, 1981; *Financial Times*, December 17, 1981; *Lagos Daily Times*, December 17, 1981.)

● According to a late January report, Nigeria's four **opposition parties** have proposed to form a merger in order to contest the candidacy of President Shehu Shagari in the 1983 elections.

The Nigerian People's Party (NPP), the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN), the Great Nigeria People's Party (GNPP) and a wing of the People's Redemption Party (PRP) also reportedly agreed to run Chief Obafemi Awolowo, leader of the UPN, as their candidate to the presidency. Nnamdi Azikiwe, head of the NPP, who would have posed a threat to Awolowo's candidacy, said he would not run.

Representatives of the four parties met in January and set up a committee to work out terms of the alliance. (*West Africa*, January 25 and February 1, 1982.)

Senegal

● First steps toward a normalization of relations between Senegal and Angola were taken late in 1981 when the presidents of the two nations met for discussions initiated by Cape Verde President Aristides Pereira in Praia.

Senegal is the only African country which has not recognized the MPLA government led by President Jose Eduardo dos Santos. The Senegalese policy was initiated by former President Leopold Senghor because of his objections to the presence of Cuban troops in Angola and because neither the FNLA nor Unita, the two opposing guerrillas groups, were included in the government at independence in 1975.

Following the meeting with Senegalese President Abdou Diouf, dos Santos said: "After several years without the existence of formal relations, due to factors completely alien to the will of . . . Angola, the

establishment of a process which may lead to diplomatic relations based on universally accepted principles of mutual respect, reciprocity of interests and non-interference in internal matters of each state, has finally been initiated." (*Jeune Afrique*, December 23, 1981; *Afrique-Asie*, December 17, 1981.)

● In late December, both the Senegalese and Gambian parliaments approved the agreement joining their respective nations into a confederation to be known as **Senegambia**.

A treaty to set up the confederation had been signed in mid-December by Presidents Abdou Diouf of Senegal and Dawda Jawara of the Gambia. The confederation agreement, scheduled to go into force as of February 1, 1982, provides for integration of the two countries' armed forces and security forces, an economic and monetary union, and coordination of foreign policy.

Both countries will, however, maintain their own parliaments and their "independence and sovereignty." Diouf is President of the union and Jawara, Vice President.

Although both parliaments ratified the measure, some opposition to the move was expected. According to observers, a major sticking point with Gambians was likely to be the economic and monetary union, which would end the "transit trade" of goods imported at a low cost into the Gambia and then smuggled into other neighboring countries. In addition to the profits made by local traders, the Gambian government reportedly receives two-thirds of its revenues from import duties, a sum destined to decline when the transit trade is abolished.

Meanwhile, seven Gambians were sentenced to death in December for their part in the abortive coup against Jawara last July. The coup attempt caused Jawara to call in Senegalese troops, the reason behind the decision to proceed with the confederation. (*Financial Times*, January 26, 1982; *West Africa*, January 4 and 25, 1982.)

Sierra Leone

● Over 100 civil servants were arrested in Sierra Leone in December after "serious financial irregulari-

ties" were uncovered. Senior civil servants were alleged to have misappropriated millions of dollars destined for the provinces of the country and for the government's consolidated revenue fund.

President Siaka Stevens said, "Those who betray the public trust and engage in the misappropriation of public funds will face drastic action by the government." In reaction to the scandal, Stevens took over the portfolio of Minister of Finance and declared a state of emergency, the second since September when emergency measures were introduced as a result of the general strike called by the Sierra Leone Labor Congress. A commission of inquiry was also set up to investigate the scandal.

All government ministries were issued a moratorium on all spending with the exception of salaries, pensions, food, fuel mileage allowances and drugs. A 25 percent reduction in fuel consumption was also ordered.

Meanwhile, observers indicated that the first general elections in five years, scheduled for April, might be jeopardized by the state of emergency. Primary elections in preparation for the parliamentary races are provided for by the constitution. However, it is believed that "an atmosphere conducive to free and fair elections," as pledged by Stevens, is unlikely given the current political atmosphere in Sierra Leone. (*West Africa*, December 7, 14, 21-28, 1981; January 11 and 18, 1982.)

Upper Volta

• Col. Saye Zerbo, Upper Volta's head of state, dissolved the powerful Voltaic Trade Union Confederation (CSV), led by Soumane Toure, in early December, but said that individual trade unions would retain "their own judicial personalities."

The CSV had called for a general strike for early December if the government did not rescind its ban on strikes, implemented in November. Relations between the government and organized labor had been deteriorating steadily during the first year of Zerbo's rule. Zerbo overthrew President Sangoule Lamizana in November 1980, guaranteeing the rights of the country's trade unions following a series of protracted strikes.

In December, members of the Upper Volta General Students Union distributed pamphlets in Ouagadougou attacking the government's "vast fascist plot" and urging Voltaics to "abandon legality" in the wake of the strike ban and CSV dissolution. (*West Africa*, December 7 and 14, 1981.)

EASTERN AFRICA

Comoros

• President Ahmed Abdallah dissolved the government and assembly in late January and announced that the civil service would be reduced by one-third as of March 1.

Abdallah said he would re-form the government to give it a "a new policy direction." The 38 members of the assembly had been elected in December 1978 for five-year terms. (*Le Monde*, January 27, 1982.)

Ethiopia

• Lieut. Col. Mengistu Haile Mariam, the head of state, outlined an ambitious plan for the development of Eritrea in a radio broadcast from Asmara, the provincial capital, on February 1, less than two weeks after the Ethiopian government had announced that the Eritrean secessionist movement had been "effectively smashed" after 20 years of fighting.

However, just a few days before Mengistu's speech, the Eritrean People's Liberation Front said they had shelled Asmara's airport and attacked Ethiopian troops. The EPLF claimed that the government was preparing an all-out offensive against the guerrillas and reports confirmed that perhaps 140,000 troops were stationed in Eritrea and Tigre provinces for another attempt to crush the guerrillas. There were indications, though, that the areas are under more effective Ethiopian control than ever and that the level of guerrilla activity is down to where it was in the 1960s. In December, Ethiopian forces had cleared areas south of Massawa port, where guerrillas had been in control for a decade.

In his Asmara speech, Mengistu said homes, factories and schools will be rebuilt and jobs will be created. But he acknowledged that "parasitic, treacherous, secession-

ist bandits" still had to be dealt with. (Addis Ababa Radio, February 3, 1982; *Economist*, January 30, 1982; *Financial Times*, January 26, 1982.)

• Some 2,400 Ethiopians who were issued temporary special status visas to enter the U.S. have had them revoked by the Immigration and Naturalization Service "because of the stabilization of conditions in Ethiopia."

Those Ethiopians whose visas are revoked could face deportation hearings unless they successfully applied for political asylum. But a State Department official estimated that less than half would meet the standards for political asylum.

The official said the reason for the revocation of the special status visas was to dissuade Ethiopians from trying to come to the U.S. simply because they wanted jobs or disliked their government. He said the change was made to "discourage further abuse." There are an estimated 25,000 to 40,000 Ethiopians in the U.S. (*Washington Post*, January 26, 1982.)

Kenya

• In February, President Daniel arap Moi made a bitter denunciation of Asian businessmen in Kenya, who, he said, were "involved in almost all social evils in the country."

He accused Asians of hoarding and smuggling and said any Asian found doing this will be "deported immediately regardless of whether he is a citizen or not." Africans found guilty of hoarding and smuggling will have their licenses canceled, he said.

Kenya's 80,000 Asians, in a country of 17 million people, were described as shocked and dismayed by Moi's attack, which reportedly reflects public sentiment against the Asian traders. Kenya's economy has deteriorated largely because of low prices for its exports and high prices for imports, particularly oil. Recently, there have been shortages of such staples as rice and flour.

Moi said the government would not "not sit back and see its economy ruined by greedy and selfish people. We want Kenyans to get essential goods and not be cheated."

The economic situation has

prompted the Central Organization of Trade Unions (Cotu) to attempt to get wage guidelines sharply revised upwards in its negotiations with employers and the government. A Cotu report in January suggested that the minimum monthly wage in Nairobi of \$43 did not reflect the actual cost of living, which it put at \$304 for a family of six, a 600 percent increase. (London *Times*, February 8, 1982; Kenya *Sunday Nation*, February 7, 1982; Kenya *Weekly Review*, January 22, 1982.)

Madagascar

- A senior army officer, two priests and several other people were arrested in January in connection with an **alleged plot** against the government of President Didier Ratsiraka.

Mercenaries from South Africa were also allegedly involved in the plot. Ratsiraka said, "Several of the mercenaries who recently operated in the Seychelles had often been to Madagascar. They were certainly planning operations here." (Le *Monde*, January 29, 1982; London *Times*, January 28, 1982.)

Seychelles

- Seven foreigners accused of participating in the **abortive coup** on November 25 have been charged with treason and face the death penalty if convicted.

The seven defendants—four South Africans, two white Zimbabweans and a Briton—are also charged with waging or preparing to wage war against the Seychelles. (London *Times*, February 6, 1982.)

Somalia

- Somalia's **refugee emergency** has ended, according to relief agencies, and some people have left the country's 44 camps for refugees from the Ogaden conflict.

Many relief agencies reportedly believe that the emergency aid should be transformed into development projects to benefit both refugees and Somalis. But the Somali government maintains that there are too many refugees for the Somali economy to absorb and they may have to stay in the camps for years.

There have been no signs of an imminent settlement of the conflict,

in which Ethiopian troops have been battling guerrillas for the Western Somalia Liberation Front, backed by Somalia.

A reforestation program is under way, directed by the U.S., several UN agencies and Western European nations, with Washington providing \$6 million for planting trees. The Save the Children Federation is operating six projects, including reforestation and vocational training. Peter Parr, director of Save the Children, said, "It is important to cooperate with regional health, agricultural and educational services so as to create an infrastructure that will remain intact once the voluntary agencies leave and the Somalis can take over on their own." (Financial *Times*, January 13, 1982; *Christian Science Monitor*, December 8 and 15, 1981.)

Tanzania

- Expected widespread **food shortages** and possible famine have brought offers of nearly 260,000 tons of emergency food aid from Western nations.

Tanzanian officials said in October that food stocks would run out in January and also said nothing had been done to seek aid. The problem was attributed by observers to lack of rain and agricultural mismanagement. Agriculture Minister Joseph Mungai said in late January that Tanzania would need 300,000 tons of food aid in 1982 and would produce on its own about 2.7 million tons.

On February 4, Mungai was dismissed from the cabinet by President Julius Nyerere and replaced by John Machunda, formerly an assistant professor of agriculture at Dar es Salaam University. Other cabinet posts were reshuffled as well. (Dar es Salaam Radio, January 23 and February 4, 1982; Kenya *Sunday Nation*, December 27, 1981.)

Uganda

- As Uganda's economic recovery has been taking hold in recent months, President Milton Obote has been working to ease the political climate by releasing **political detainees**.

Pressure on the government from religious leaders, humanitarian organizations and Western diplomats

has also been a factor as has the effect of Western confidence in Uganda, which has led to the holding up of international aid.

In January, Obote freed 190 political detainees, including four opposition Democratic Party MPs. The President called for national unity and appealed to his opponents to join in a new era of national reconciliation. Since then, six MPs of the Democratic Party defected to Obote's ruling Uganda People's Congress and several hundred members of opposition parties have also joined.

However, in mid-January, the Democratic Party's acting secretary-general, Anthony Ocaya, was arrested and charged with possession of seditious material, a charge which carries a minimum sentence of seven years. There was also a report that an exiled former lieutenant colonel in Uganda's liberation army, responding to Obote's offer of amnesty, had been arrested on his return to Uganda. In February, unknown gunmen assassinated George Bamuturaki, the Democratic Party's shadow minister of lands, minerals and water resources.

Guerrilla attacks were reported continuing in areas near Kampala, following the linking up in early January of three groups seeking to topple Obote. The Uganda Popular Front includes factions led by two former Presidents, Godfrey Binaisa and Yusuf Lule. (London *Times*, January 8, 20 and February 6, 1982; Kenya *Weekly Review*, January 22, 1982; London *Guardian*, January 6 and 16, 1982.)

CENTRAL AFRICA

Cameroon

- President Ahmadou Ahidjo of Cameroon paid an **official visit to Nigeria** in January, apparently to shore up relations between the two nations after a long-standing border dispute which flared into the open last May when five Nigerian soldiers were killed by Cameroon border guards.

Ahidjo and Nigerian President Shehu Shagari issued a joint communique expressing their regret over the incident and resolving not

to let it affect cooperation between them. Agreements on telecommunications, extradition and administrative cooperation were concluded, and the Nigeria-Cameroon joint commission is to be re-activated to strengthen relations in all areas. Nigerian Foreign Minister Ishaya Audu and his Cameroonian counterpart, Paul Dantsop, also initialed a trade agreement.

Ahidjo said: "I hope that the present visit will be the expression of the often-renewed desire of our two governments to further strengthen and deepen the cooperation and age-old dynamic ties woven by history, geography and the cultural affinities of our two peoples."

Nigeria and Cameroon have had a border dispute since independence in 1960, and the May incident caused a serious deterioration in relations. The *Lagos Daily Times*, commenting on Ahidjo's visit, said, "We do not feel all that optimistic that the border problem will soon be over, knowing how shabbily Ahidjo has treated the issue in the past."

And in early January, the Nigerian News Agency reported that Etuk Udo, an administrator in an area of Cross River State where the disputed border lies, alleged that Cameroonian gendarmes had "annexed" 11 Nigerian villages and incorporated them into the southwest province of Cameroon. (*West Africa*, January 25, 1982; Nigerian News Agency, January 13, 1982; Lagos Radio, January 13, 1982.)

Equatorial Guinea

- President Teodoro Obiang Mbasogo carried out an extensive **cabinet reshuffle** which affected nearly all government ministries in early December, the third such action since his military government came to power in the 1979 coup.

For the first time, four civilians joined the cabinet, including Andres Ncua as Finance Minister and Federico Mes Bill as Minister of Planning. The renowned sculptor Leandro Mbomio was named Minister of Culture.

Mbasogo appointed Capt. Cristino Seriche Biako as the second vice president of the Supreme Military Council and Minister of Health. Lieut. Marcos Mba Obando replaced Florencio Maye Ela as

Minister for External Affairs, while Ela, also former first Vice President, is now ambassador to the UN. The new Interior Minister is Felipe Ewuna, who took over from Felix Mba, now envoy to the OAU.

- The Ministers of Agriculture, Information and Tourism, and Labor retained their posts. About 50 senior civil servants were sacked or changed to other posts. (*West Africa*, December 21-28, 1981; Malabo Radio, December 8 and 9, 1981.)

Gabon

- **Students** returned to classes at the University of Libreville in mid-January after it was closed for a month by Gabonese President Omar Bongo and payments of maintenance grants to students were suspended. They were permitted to go back to school only after signing pledges not to further disrupt classes.

According to *Afrique-Asie*, unrest in Libreville began in late November with the sackings of seven officials including an ambassador, Jules Mba, a presidential counsellor and a deputy, for allegedly distributing pamphlets. Their arrests triggered demonstrations in early December in which grievances against the one-party system and against Bongo's alleged accumulation of personal wealth were aired.

Over 300 were detained as a result of the demonstrations, among them the University of Libreville rector, Nzogue Nguema, many professors and students. Following the arrests, students of the university went on strike, prompting Bongo to issue an ultimatum ordering the students back to class. When they failed to respond, security forces expelled the students from occupied buildings and Bongo ordered the university closed.

Bongo ruled out a multiparty system as "resurrecting tribalism and endangering Gabonese unity." He replaced the university rector with Moise Oliviera, alleging that Nguema had tried to secure university posts for "incompetents" from his own tribe and Gabon's largest, the Fang. (*West Africa*, January 4 and 25, 1982; *Le Monde*, December 17, 1981 and January 13, 1982; *Afrique-Asie*, December 21, 1981.)

Sao Tome and Principe

- In late December, **food riots** on Principe reportedly followed the distribution of leaflets complaining of food shortages and alleging that the authorities in the capital, Sao Tome, were deliberately withholding supplies from the island.

Several people, including the "provocateurs" who passed out the leaflets, were wounded in clashes with the police who were called in to put down the unrest.

A government communique said the December food shortages resulted from delays in the arrival of a supply ship and that "internal reactionary forces" were behind the riots.

President Manuel Pinto da Costa reshuffled his cabinet in the wake of the unrest, assuming the Ministry of Defense and National Security portfolio himself. Former Secretary of State Joaquim Rafael Branco was named Minister of Education, a post previously held by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Maria do Nascimento Amorim. The Ministry of Fisheries was incorporated into the Ministry of Agriculture, headed by Arlindo Gomes. (*West Africa*, January 11 and 18, 1982; Angola News Agency, December 29, 1981 and January 2, 1982.)

Zaire

- President Mobutu Sese Seko reportedly came away from his meeting in Washington with President Reagan late last year assured of a "modest" increase in **American aid**. The majority of U.S. assistance to Zaire is military aid. Mobutu's visit was also believed to be aimed at reinforcing American support for his regime, particularly in light of the trip to Washington earlier in the year of the exiled former Prime Minister, Nguza Karl-I-Bond.

According to Nguza, who was interviewed by the Belgian newspaper *Libre Belgique* after Mobutu's trip to Washington, the Zairian head of state has become one of the "essential pawns" in American strategy in Africa to halt communist expansion by the formation of a Tel Aviv-Kinshasa-Pretoria axis.

Mobutu had announced during his visit that he was prepared to restore diplomatic relations with Is-

rael, and according to Nguza, Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon visited Kinshasa and Pretoria during his recent secret tour of Africa.

Nguza said: "I believe the U.S. and the West are committing a gross error by relying on an unpopular dictatorship. Zaire is becoming more and more of a powder-keg."

According to *Afrique-Asie*, Moutu denounced "the communist regime in Paris" in virulent terms during his talks with Ronald Reagan. "I have no confidence in him," he said of French President François Mitterrand, and if an internal uprising in Zaire erupts "provoked by international communism," France will not send troops to save "Zairian democracy." (*West Africa*, December 14, 1981 and January 4, 1982; *Afrique-Asie*, December 21, 1981.)

Zambia

- Zambia's two largest copper mining companies, the state-controlled Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd. and Roan Consolidated Mines Ltd., were scheduled to merge into one company by the end of March. The new company, Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd., will be among the world's largest copper mining concerns, producing 600,000 tons a year. (*Wall Street Journal*, December 23, 1981.)

- In mid-January, Newstead Zimba, general secretary of the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions, was sacked from his seat in parliament because, according to the ruling United National Independence Party constitution, only party members can be MPs.

Zimba was expelled from the party with several other trade union leaders over a year ago. President Kenneth Kaunda also fired two cabinet ministers, Nephas Tembo, Lands and Natural Resources, and John Chafwa, Labor and Social Services, for "anti-party activities" and "inefficiency," respectively.

NORTHERN AFRICA

Algeria

- Two of the leading figures of the

government of the late President Houari Boumedienne, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, Algeria's Foreign Minister for 15 years, and Belaid Abdesselam, Minister of Industry and Energy from 1965 to 1977, were "suspended" from the central committee of the ruling National Liberation Front (FLN) in December. The suspensions of the two men, along with that of Ahmad Ghazali, former director-general of Sonatrach, the state oil and gas corporation, because of "detailed reports from the central disciplinary commission" of the FLN, were seen as a further effort by President Chadli Benjedid to distance himself from the rigid socialist line of his predecessor.

Observers indicated that while the official policies of the Algerian government are still socialist, Chadli has been moving toward a more pragmatic approach with regard to the economy, promoting private investment.

The influence of Bouteflika, who had been Chadli's rival to the presidency upon Boumedienne's death, has been on the wane. He was replaced in the post of Foreign Minister by Mohamed Benyahia in 1979 and named "minister adviser to the head of state." That position was taken away in January 1980, and in July 1981, he was sacked from the FLN politburo.

Abdesselam and Ghazali had led the program of rapid high-level industrialization under Boumedienne, now under fire for having caused excessive foreign borrowing and waste.

A cabinet reshuffle in mid-January followed the removal of the men from the central committee. Mohamed Yala, Minister of Finance and Boualem Benhamouda, Minister of Interior, exchanged portfolios. Abdelmalek Benhabyles was replaced as secretary-general of the presidency by Col. Larbi Belkheir, and Col. Kasdi Meibah was named Minister of Heavy Industry, in place of Mohamed Liassine. Liassine, along with Abdesselam and Ghazali, was part of the "clan of industrialists" currently in disfavor with the Chadli government. (*Economist*, January 16, 1982; *Le Monde*, December 24, 1981 and January 14, 1982; *London Guardian*, December 24, 1981.)

- After two years of negotiations, France and Algeria agreed on terms for liquefied natural gas (LNG) contracts in early February. Negotiations between Sonatrach, Algeria's state-owned oil and natural gas company, and Gaz de France had been deadlocked over Algeria's insistence on aligning the price of its LNG to that of its crude oil.

Under the new contracts, France will be buying more LNG—321 billion cubic feet annually compared to the current 140 billion—and at a higher price. Although the price was not made public, it was believed to be about \$5.20 per 1,000 cubic feet, up from \$4.28 France paid to Algeria last year.

The agreed price, well above the current world market cost of LNG, is tied to French plans to aid in Algeria's industrial development. According to Claude Cheysson, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, in return for the higher price, Algeria has agreed to place orders worth \$2 billion in France for automobile assembly plants, new airports and railways, a subway system for Algiers, and other steel projects. (*New York Times*, February 4, 1982; *Wall Street Journal*, February 4, 1982; *Washington Post*, February 4, 1982.)

Egypt

- In early January, President Hosni Mubarak dismissed the cabinet he inherited from the late President Anwar Sadat and named first deputy prime minister Fuad Mohieddin as Prime Minister.

Mohieddin subsequently formed a new government, replacing nine cabinet ministers and one deputy minister, but maintaining the Foreign Minister, Kamal Hassan Ali; Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Boutros Ghali; and Defense Minister Lieut. Gen. Abdel Halim Abu Ghazala in their posts. The three men have been heavily involved in the Camp David peace agreement implementation.

Mohamed Nabawi Ismail, Minister of Interior since 1977, was replaced by his key aide, Hassan Abu Basha, apparently because of Mubarak's dissatisfaction over security matters prior to and following Sadat's death. He was in charge of

the crackdowns on Sadat's opponents and on Moslem fundamentalists.

Almost all of Sadat's economic team was replaced, including the ministers of industry, finance, tourism, economy, agriculture and health. The deputy prime minister for economic affairs, Abdel-Razzak Meguid, and the parliamentary affairs minister, Hilmy Abdel Akher, both of whom were implicated in an alleged corruption scandal, were sacked. Meguid was succeeded by Central Bank governor Mohamed Abdel Fattah Ibrahim, whose three deputy ministers of finance, planning and economy are all university professors.

Mubarak swore in the cabinet, exhorting it to focus on internal calm and economic and social stability, and to show "no privileges, no favoritism and no exceptions." Prime Minister Mohamed said that the first task of the new government will be to revamp the "open door" economic policy of Sadat to make the economy more productive and responsive to the poor. Sadat's policy encouraged Western investment, which according to critics, resulted in massive imports of luxury goods and the decline of the industrial sector.

And in late January, Foreign Minister Ali asked the Soviet Union to send 66 technicians to help in economic cooperation, but "only for a specific period—to install equipment that had been contracted for before they were expelled." Last September, Sadat had expelled the Soviet ambassador, six of his envoys and about 1,000 technical experts. The technicians are to return to work on the Aswan high dam, an iron and steel complex near Cairo, and an aluminum plant in upper Egypt.

Other signs of improvement in relations between Cairo and Moscow included government approval to two more Soviet diplomats to join the 32-person mission and the visit to Moscow of an Egyptian trade mission. Ali said, however, that it was unlikely that ambassadors would be exchanged soon. "It will not be in the near future, but of course, when you sever relations with a country, it cannot also last forever." (*Financial Times*, Janu-

ary 26, 1982; *London Times*, January 26, 1982; *Washington Post*, January 4 and 5, 1982; *New York Times*, January 3 and 5, 1982.)

Libya

● **Exxon**, the largest American oil company, was reportedly paid \$95 million by the Libyan government in compensation for its assets after it abandoned its operations in the country last November. The book value of Exxon's assets in Libya was estimated at \$120 million, but the payment was seen as significant because it had been believed that the corporation would receive no compensation.

The Libyan government had strongly condemned Exxon's departure from the country after 25 years there, Exxon's move was believed to be caused both by worsening relations between the U.S. government and Tripoli and falling oil production there.

Exxon's assets in Libya included four oil concessions, a small refinery and a natural gas liquefaction plant. Observers indicated that the payment was a sign of Libya's intentions to maintain good relations with the international oil companies operating there, despite their respective governments' policies.

American oil companies in Libya are reportedly trying to recruit Canadians to take the place of American citizens since President Reagan requested that the estimated 1,500 U.S. oil company employees return home. (*Wall Street Journal*, January 26, 1982; *Financial Times*, January 20, 1982.)

● The official Libyan news agency, JANA, and that of Sudan, SUNA, traded reports in January that the other country's head of state was the target of a **coup attempt**.

On January 9, SUNA reported that an unsuccessful coup attempt against Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi took place earlier in the month in Benghazi. Fierce fighting between the plotters, who reportedly included soldiers, civilians and students, and government troops, including Soviet, East German, Cuban and Syrian soldiers, resulted in many deaths and the arrests of nearly 800 people, including the director of intelligence, Col. Yunis

Balgasim and director of foreign operations, Cpt. Abdullah al-Senousi.

JANA responded to the Sudanese story by characterizing it as "lying rumors without any foundation," part of "an underhanded campaign of propaganda and poisoning against Libya by American imperialism."

Then, in mid-January, JANA reported that President Gaafar al-Nimeiry of Sudan had been shot during a military uprising when "indiscriminate firing broke out within the ranks of army personnel" in Khartoum. The report was denounced by a Sudanese official as "Libyan lies and fabrications." (*New York Times*, January 17, 1982; *Kenya Weekly Review*, January 15, 1982; Sudanese News Agency, January 9, 1982.)

Sudan

● President Gaafar al-Nimeiry's regime was rocked by a series of **internal crises** in January which resulted in some heavy-handed measures by the Sudanese head of state.

Early in January, riots broke out in Khartoum, Omdurman and other cities over a 60 percent increase in the price of sugar as its government subsidy was cut—one of the terms required in return for a \$250 million loan from the International Monetary Fund. The adoption of measures required for the loan enabled Sudan to have its commercial bank debts rescheduled by Western creditors in late December.

Nimeiry shut down Sudan's four universities as well as many secondary schools because of student rioting, in which fires were set to shops and gas stations. The elimination of the subsidy on gasoline caused a 30 percent increase in its price. Several people were reported killed and many injured by anti-riot police. Nimeiry, however, said he would resign rather than rescind the economic measures. He said more subsidies would be removed and there would be no increases in salaries.

On the political front, tensions between Nimeiry and the southern region reached a peak in January, nearly one decade after the signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement,

which ended the civil war between the North and the South.

More than 20 leading southern politicians, including Clement Mboro, former speaker of the southern regional assembly, were detained after they formed the Council for the Unity of the Southern Sudan to resist central government measures to subdivide the semi-autonomous South into three smaller regions. Five of the men are to face trial on charges of forming a political party, contravening the one-party constitution. The others were released.

Mboro had informed Nimeiry of the formation of the council, claiming that government moves to divide the South into three regions were contrary to the provisions of the Addis Ababa accord. Nimeiry had dissolved both the people's assembly in the North and the regional assembly in the South last October. He said the proposed re-division issue would be decided by a referendum.

Those opposed to the South's re-division believe that the proposal is designed to break up the South's strength and the hold of the Dinka people, in the majority in the South, over the political machinery. Proponents of the plan say it will guarantee political power for the region's different ethnic groups.

In late January, Nimeiry undertook a major shake-up in the political leadership by sacking his first Vice President and Defence Minister, Abdel-Magid Hamid Khalil, and the central committee and politburo of the ruling Sudanese Socialist Union (SSU), and retiring 22 other army officers. A 41-member popular committee headed by Nimeiry was named to replace the SSU structures, to reorganize the party "at all levels" and to review its charter "to ensure effective participation by the masses." Nimeiry himself assumed Khalil's posts. Observers indicated that the leadership of the SSU was fired because of its alleged failure to curb the riots earlier in the month. (London Times, January 26, 1982; Washington Post, January 26, 1982; London Guardian, January 13, 14, 19 and 20, 1982; Economist, January 9, 1982.)

Western Sahara

● The Polisario Front will open an official bureau in Paris. Fadel Ismail, its European representative, announced in early February. Polisario, backed by Algeria, is fighting Morocco for control of the Western Sahara.

Ismail said the French government led by President François Mitterrand had approved the opening of the Paris office. The announcement came one week after King Hassan of Morocco held discussions with Mitterrand in Paris. Ismail said he hoped that Polisario would be considered by the French government as "on the same equal footing as Morocco."

The Moroccan Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mohamed Boucetta, paid a private visit to Paris in mid-January, during which he said he hoped the referendum for the Western Sahara would take place before the next OAU summit, scheduled for Tripoli in June.

Seven African foreign ministers met in Nairobi in early February to discuss the Western Sahara and drafted a ceasefire for the territory involving troops from the UN and the OAU. A conference of heads of state was to follow. Boucetta and Algerian Foreign Minister Mohamed Benyahia were reportedly to hold discussions during the Nairobi meeting. Rabat has repeatedly refused to enter into direct negotiations with Polisario, holding that discussions with Algeria were the key to solving the Western Sahara issue.

However, according to a late report, the heads of state meeting broke up without reaching any agreement on the timing of a ceasefire or the referendum. (Washington Post, February 8, 1982; New York Times, February 7, 1982; London Times, February 3, 1982; Le Monde, January 15 and February 1, 1982.)

SOUTHERN AFRICA

Angola

● In mid-January, U.S. assistant secretary of state for African affairs Chester Crocker held discussions with Angolan Foreign Minister

Paulo Jorge in Paris on both "bilateral and regional matters." Hopes were raised that the talks could pave the way for American diplomatic recognition of the Angolan government.

Last December, Angolan President José Eduardo dos Santos called for direct meetings with the Reagan administration to lead to "the normalization of relations." Dos Santos' offer to the U.S. was made just after the visit to Washington of Jonas Savimbi, leader of the anti-government guerrilla group, Unita. Savimbi held talks with high-level American officials because the Reagan administration considers Unita "a legitimate political force in Angola."

State Department spokesman Dean Fischer said that the Crocker-Jorge discussions were "part of a continuing dialogue between the two countries and the door remains open for further discussions in the near future."

The independence plan for Namibia was also a topic of discussion, as Washington has been trying to link the securing of South African withdrawal from Namibia with the departure of Cuban troops from Angola. Dos Santos has repeatedly stated that Cuban troops will leave his country when Namibia becomes independent. He is, however, reportedly supportive of the Western initiatives on Namibia and is urging other southern African states to back the plan.

While the Angolan government has denied recent reports that it was prepared to open discussions with Savimbi, unless he renounces his "alliance with South Africa," a late January report in the London Observer said that Crocker had been involved in setting up a deal whereby two Russian soldiers held by Unita were to be exchanged for two American prisoners held in Luanda. The International Red Cross was to carry out the exchange some time in February with the cooperation of the Angolan government and Unita.

Dos Santos' softening of his position toward the West and in particular toward the U.S. is believed based on his view that Western aid is vital to Angola's stagnating economy. Other prominent government

members, such as secretary-general of the MPLA, Lucio Lara, favor closer relations with the Soviet Union. Lara, Defense Minister Pedro Maria Tunha, and other officials visited Moscow in late January and concluded a new ten-year economic cooperation agreement.

Soviet Premier Nikolai Tikhonov told the Angolans to be wary of "a broad plot of international imperialism," whose purpose is "to intimidate the people of the young state, to return it to the sphere of [Western] influence and to make it renounce support for the just struggle by the people of Namibia for its liberation." (*Economist*, January 30, 1982; *London Observer*, January 17 and 24, 1982; *Washington Post*, January 22, 1982; *New York Times*, January 19, 1982.)

Botswana

● President Quett Masire said in December that South Africa is deliberately exaggerating the presence of Soviet personnel in Botswana and purchases of Soviet arms in order to destabilize the Gaborone government. South African press reports had described Botswana as "our own Cuba" which had swung from its moderate course under the late President Seretse Khama to a more radical, pro-Soviet stance.

Masire said there is a 31-member staff at the Soviet embassy in Gaborone, not 208 according to the South African reports which claimed that many of the Soviets were "known members of the KGB." While he confirmed that Botswana had purchased Soviet weapons, some of which were delivered in January, because the price and delivery dates were better than those offered by the West, Masire said the equipment is maintained by a team sent by the Indian government, not by Moscow. Most Western observers concurred with Masire's explanations.

The Soviet weapons are used by the Botswana Defense Force (BDF), expanded from a mobile police unit to secure Botswana's borders during the Rhodesian war.

Masire said he believed South Africa was exaggerating Soviet influence in Botswana "as a pretext for some mischievous undertaking." "We have the experience of the

South Africans going into Mozambique on the pretext of pursuing or destroying Soviet or Cuban agents," he added.

Masire reiterated Botswana's policy of forbidding the use of the country as a launching pad for the African National Congress insurgents, citing Botswana's economic dependence on South Africa. He said his government was very disturbed about "inventions of attacks" by the BDF into South Africa, "which we know to be sheer fabrication." (*London Guardian*, December 22, 1981; *Financial Times*, December 18, 1981; *Salisbury Herald*, December 3, 1981.)

Lesotho

● Ben Masilo, head of the Lesotho Christian Council, escaped to South Africa and then to Kenya late in 1981 after an assassination squad broke into his Maseru home in September and killed his three-year-old grandson.

Masilo, a critic of the government of Prime Minister Leabua Jonathan and supporter of the outlawed opposition Basotho Congress Party (BCP), said he was certain his assailants were members of the government's Police Mobile Unit (PMU), which is suspected to be behind the deaths and disappearances of other prominent Lesotho citizens.

Among those who are believed to have been victims of the murder squad are:

● Odilon Seheri, former secretary to King Moshoeshoe II, abducted from his car and found dead;

● Edgar Motuba, editor of the ecumenical newspaper *Leselinyana*, kidnapped from his home and found dead;

● Osiel Mohale and Lechese Koeshe, friends of Motuba who were killed with him;

● Michael Ramorotholo, opposition supporter who was abducted, but his body was never found.

The Lesotho government denies that it is its paramilitary force, the PMU, that is behind the murders and disappearances. Foreign Minister Mooki Molapo said: "Masilo and Motuba constituted no threat to the Lesotho government. Motuba was a critic who used the pen. If we were the type of government which

kills critics, we would kill other persons such as Godfrey Kolisang and other BCP executives in Maseru as they constitute a threat in that they aspire to be the government." (*Sowetan*, January 22, 25 and 26, 1982.)

Malawi

● On Christmas eve, Orton Chirwa, one of President Kamuzu Banda's leading opponents, was arrested along with his wife and son and is expected to face charges of murder and treason. Chirwa, 63, a former Minister of Justice and founding member and vice president of the ruling Malawi Congress Party (MCP), was fired by Banda in 1964. He went into exile in Tanzania and became the leader of the opposition Malawi Freedom Movement (Mafremo), formed in 1977 in order to "restore democracy, justice and liberty" to Malawi.

Government reports alleged that Chirwa and his family were detained inside Malawi in the town of Mchinji. However, Chirwa's relatives and others claim that he would never have entered the country, where he knew he was a marked man, and was tricked into attending a meeting in the Zambian border town of Chipata, from where he and his family were abducted.

Blantyre Radio said the three would face criminal charges, and added that Chirwa was "clearly connected with the tragic death of the late Chief Timbiri . . . in 1964." Chirwa had repeatedly denied any involvement in the death of Timbiri, a Banda supporter who died in mysterious circumstances.

Mafremo officials contend that the Chirwas will not get a fair trial in Malawi. Amnesty International has launched an "urgent action" campaign urging that they either be charged or released. The human rights organization had also called for an inquiry into the circumstances of their arrest.

The Chirwas' detention follows other efforts by Banda to eliminate rivals or possible successors. In 1977, the MCP's secretary-general, Albert Muwalo, was hanged for treason. In 1979, Attati Mpakati, the exiled leader of Lesoma, another opposition movement, had his hands blown off by a parcel bomb in Maputo, an act for which Banda

claimed responsibility. Last year, Gwanda Chakuamba, a senior government official considered the second most powerful man in Malawi, was sentenced to 22 years in jail for "uttering seditious words" and possessing documents connected with dissidents. Most recently, Bakili Maluzi, considered the likely successor to the aging President, was demoted from MCP secretary-general and Minister without portfolio to Minister of Transport and Communications. (London *Observer*, January 10 and 24, 1982; London *Guardian*, January 8, 9 and 19, 1982; Blantyre Radio, January 8, 1982.)

Mozambique

• In late December, President Samora Machel carried out a cabinet reshuffle with the aim of "strengthening leadership in the state apparatus," particularly in two of the areas where Mozambique faces the most serious problems—the economy and internal security.

Sergio Vieira, formerly governor of the central bank and one of Frelimo's leading theoreticians, was named Minister of Agriculture. Vieira won praise for improving the efficiency and management of the bank and will now be responsible for the "socialization of the countryside." Improvements in the agricultural sector have been neglected over the years: the productivity of the mechanized state farms has been low and little progress has been made on the formation of agricultural cooperatives.

The political commissar of the armed forces, Armando Guebuza, was appointed minister-resident of Sofala province, where the anti-government guerrilla group, the Mozambique Resistance Movement (MRM), has been very active recently. The MRM has increased its attacks in the province, the capital of which, Beira, is Mozambique's second largest city and an important port.

Both Vieira and Guebuza took over their new positions from ministers who held two portfolios. Mario de Graca Machungo remains Minister of Planning and Mariano Matsinhe retains the Interior portfolio,

but relinquishes responsibility for Sofala province.

And in mid-December, Mozambique forces captured the main MRM base in southern Manica province, 12 miles from the Zimbabwe border. Captured documents provided evidence of South African support for the MRM, and South African, Portuguese, Soviet and Chinese weapons were found.

Records of meetings between MRM commander Afonso Dlakama and a South African army colonel reportedly revealed that South Africa gave the guerrilla group a plan for 1981 which included attacks on the Beira-Umtali road, railway and pipeline. The South African colonel guaranteed continued South African support, including arms, ammunition and radios, for the rebels. South Africa has consistently denied giving any assistance to the MRM. (London *Guardian*, December 14 and 30, 1981; *Financial Times*, December 30, 1981.)

South Africa

• Official security police figures released to opposition MP Helen Suzman show that 159 people were in detention without trial in January.

Unofficial figures, however, put the number now detained at 180, or possibly higher.

According to the security police tally, 90 people are held under Section Six of the Terrorism Act, the indefinite detention law used for interrogation; 55 are detained in solitary confinement for forthcoming political trials as state witnesses under the Internal Security Act; and 14 were being held under the 14-day detention law.

One year ago there were officially only 92 people in detention.

Unofficial statistics compiled by Dr. Max Coleman, member of the Detainees' Parents' Support Committee, reveal that 620 people were detained in all of South Africa in 1981. That figure includes 249 in the Ciskei homeland, 17 in Transkei and 14 in Venda.

Of the total, 95 have been released, 226 have been charged with crimes and face trial, 180 are in detention, and 297 are unaccounted for—they may have been released, or charged, or they may still be held.

Because of the strict security laws, it is almost impossible to obtain accurate figures on detentions. (Johannesburg *Sunday Express*, January 3, 1982.)

• Three men who were held in January under the 14-day detention law and then released were subsequently redetained under the indefinite detention law used for interrogation, Section Six of the Terrorism Act.

They are: Ralph Wortley, a white academic who heads the University of Witwatersrand's counseling and careers unit; Michael Jenkin, brother of Timothy Jenkin, who escaped from Pretoria Central Prison in 1979; and Sarish Nanabhai, former political prisoner and ex-secretary of the Transvaal Indian Youth Congress.

A fourth man, Vuyisile Mdeleleni, banned former member of the banned Black People's Convention, was detained for ten days in January under the 14-day detention law, the General Laws Amendment Act.

Five men from the Cape Town area were being held under the 14-day law: Frederick Hendricks, a high school teacher; Benjamin Julius, Lionel Scholtz and Tom Barends, all students at the University of the Western Cape; and Johannes Mannel, a Bellville Technikon student.

Three more Cape men are detained under Section Six: Frank Anthony, a former Robben Island political prisoner; Roger Galant and Julian Sauls, both University of the Western Cape students.

The head of the Black Students' Society at the University of Witwatersrand, David Johnson, was served in January with a five-year banning order. Johnson became the society's chairman last year when his predecessor was banned for five years (*Sowetan*, January 6, 12, 22, and 29, 1982.)

• Trade unions around the world have protested the detentions in November and December of more than a dozen black South African trade union leaders.

AFL-CIO president Lane Kirkland sent a telegram to South African Prime Minister Pieter Botha, saying, "These and previous ar-

rests, are serious violations of trade union rights, and will help to fuel the fires of violence and unrest, the consequences of which no one can foretell."

The trade unionists now being held under Section Six of the Terrorism Act, the indefinite detention law used for interrogation, include: Sam Kikine, general secretary of the South African Allied Workers' Union; Emma Mashinini, general secretary of the Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers' Union; Samson Ndou, president of the General and Allied Workers' Union; Thozamile Gqweta and Sisas Npkelanavere, president and vice president of the South African Allied Workers' Union.

The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions and the International Labor Organization have both cabled the UN secretary-general, asking him to look into the detentions. In addition, the International Federation of Commercial, Clerical, Professional and Technical Employees, which is affiliated with Mrs. Mashinini's union, sent a telegram to the UN. The general secretary of the Geneva-based union said he had received information that the South African government may be preparing to try Mrs. Mashinini under the Terrorism Act. (*Voice*, January 24, 1982; *AFI/CIO Free Trade Union News*, December 1981.)

- Police carried out three raids in as many days on a **squatter camp** near Cape Town at the end of January. Nineteen residents of the 70-member squatter community were arrested on influx control violations and will probably be "endorsed out" to the Transkei homeland.

Four people were reportedly wounded in the last raid, apparently by police gunfire. In each of the three raids, police destroyed the plastic shelters put up by the squatters outside the black township of Nyanga.

Last August, police deported hundreds of squatters who had settled near Nyanga, sending them in trucks to Transkei. Many subsequently returned.

A government representative told a meeting of the squatters after the raids that "we have all seen

enough of unnecessary confrontation." He said the authorities were prepared to give the men legal employment under 12-month contracts provided they find "approved accommodation." (*Sowetan*, January 27 and 29, 1982; *London Times*, January 28, 1982.)

- **Black unions** in the auto industry fear that more manufacturers will lay off workers in the months to come following dismissals in January by Sigma Motor Co.

Sigma—25 percent-owned by **Chrysler Corp.** and 75 percent by the Anglo American Corp. conglomerate—fired 507 workers and furloughed 348 until the end of January, citing higher productivity and the phasing out of components manufacturing.

The auto industry enjoyed its best year ever in 1981, despite a series of strikes, but both unions and employers expect the market to drop off in 1982.

The black union at Sigma, the National Automobile and Allied Workers' Union, negotiated with the manufacturer for months in advance, but was unable to persuade Sigma to opt for short time instead of lay-offs. However, relations be-

tween Sigma and the union were amicable and unionists throughout the industry are calling for dismissal procedures to be included in future agreements with employers. (*Johannesburg Star*, January 7 and 9, 1982; *Rand Daily Mail*, January 7, 1982.)

- The South African government will extend **compulsory military service** in an effort to contain an expected increase in guerrilla activity by the banned African National Congress.

Instead of serving 30 days a year for eight years after the initial 24-month call-up, white male draftees will probably have to serve for ten years or even longer. Home guard commando units will also be strengthened, according to the army chief, Gen. Constand Viljoen, who said the ANC is "going to fight an area war."

Viljoen said the white home guard would have to be organized to provide "the first line of defense," while the army will be used as "a reaction force to deal with the insurgents."

The extension of conscription may spur more young whites to leave South Africa. Already, a sig-

Pretoria blamed for student failures

Black parents have blamed the government for the poor showing of black high school seniors on their final examinations as well as administrative mix-ups that require many of those who did pass to re-take the graduation exams.

Parents said the government had tried to frustrate students from studying for the exams, called matriculation and which enable students to go on to university, and was trying to create the impression that blacks were generally unable to pass the tests.

In Soweto, only 57 percent passed the exams, compared to 87 percent in 1976 and 71 percent in 1979. Coloured (mixed-race) students had similar results, which some attributed to the prolonged boycott of classes in the Cape in 1980. In contrast, 93.6 percent of whites in Transvaal province, which includes Johannesburg and

Soweto, graduated from high school.

The 1976 revolt by black youngsters was spurred by their complaint that black education is vastly inferior to that for whites. The government spends \$1,103 a year on each white child and \$116 on each black child.

Mrs. Sally Motlana of the Black Housewives' League said the government "had made no effort to retain qualified competent teachers after 1976" and never tried "to move away from Bantu education, except to give it a fancy name."

In Soweto, a city of more than a million, only 29,952 high school seniors took the exams and 5,812 of those who passed will have to take them all over again. Graduating from high school does not automatically ensure entrance to a university. (*London Observer*, January 17, 1982; *Sowetan*, January 7 and 12, 1982.) □

nificant number have fled to avoid the draft, although there are no precise figures. In January, the Australian government said it had granted political asylum to at least a dozen South African draft dodgers. (*London Times*, January 15 and 20, 1982; *Natal Witness*, January 8, 1982.)

- **Harvard University** is considering altering its policy of automatically selling off bonds and certificates of deposit in banks that lend money to the South African government.

Harvard's committee on shareholder responsibility in January agreed to consider special circumstances surrounding these loans. The policy re-think was prompted by last February's divestment of \$51 million in **Citibank** investments because the parent, Citicorp, had participated in a \$250 million loan to Pretoria.

That loan was used by the South African government to finance housing, electricity and hospitals in the segregated townships run by the government. Citibank had criticized Harvard's action, contending the loan was for humanitarian purposes. (*Washington Post*, January 23, 1982.)

- **Kraftwerkunion** of West Germany, a subsidiary of Siemens, has won out over **General Electric**, **Westinghouse** and other companies in the bidding to supply six turbines for a power plant 60 miles from Pretoria.

Kraftwerk has signed a letter of intent with the government-owned Electricity Supply Commission to supply six 60 megawatt turbines at a cost of \$100 million.

- **Combustion Engineering** of Stamford, Conn., was tapped to supply the six coal-fired boilers which will run the turbines to generate electricity at a cost of \$750 million, among the larger contracts ever awarded an American company by South Africa. (*Financial Times*, January 18, 1982.)

- South Africa's mainly foreign-owned **auto industry** had its biggest year ever in 1981, with sales of 301,528 passenger cars and 152,014 trucks, a total increase of 12 percent on 1980.

The previous record, 277,058, was set in 1980 and last year's sales exceeded even the optimistic forecasts by the industry, the fastest-growing sector of the economy (*see also Labor*).

The biggest share of the market was held by Toyota with 20 percent, followed by the **Ford Motor Co.** subsidiary with 14.7 percent, Datsun (14.4 percent), Sigma, part-owned by **Chrysler Corp.** (14 percent), and Volkswagen (13.4 percent).

In passenger car sales the leaders were VW, Sigma, Ford and Toyota. (*Johannesburg Star*, January 23, 1982.)

- South Africans of all races had the biggest percentage increase in wages in 1980 in almost ten years, but whites were still earning more than four times as much as blacks.

According to figures compiled by the Stellenbosch Bureau for Economic Research, the average annual earnings in 1980 in the non-agricultural sector were:

- Rands 2,269 (about \$2,337) for blacks, up 20.5 percent over 1979.

- R3,042 for Coloureds (mixed-race people), up 21.3 percent.

- R4,035 for Indians, up 21 percent.

- R9,214 for whites, up 17.2 percent. (*South African Digest*, January 8, 1982.)

- South Africa is building a huge new prison at Walvis Bay, a part of Namibia the government intends to keep no matter the outcome of the Namibian independence negotiations.

There is speculation that the new prison, with 231 units, will be used to house political prisoners from notorious Robben Island, off Cape Town. The prison is due to be closed so the armed forces can use the island as a naval base.

Among Robben Island's most famous prisoners, serving life sentences with no chance for parole, are the leaders of the banned African National Congress, Nelson Mandela and Walter Sisulu, and Herman Toivo Ja Toivo, a former leader of the South-West African People's Organization (SWAPO). (*Sowetan*, January 22, 1982.)

- South Africa has barred a proposed fact-finding visit by a group of **Dutch parliamentarians** because of the Netherlands government's critical attitude.

The parliamentary delegation, made up of members of the four main political parties, had planned to hold talks with a "typical cross-section of South African society," and to visit several political prisoners, including Nelson Mandela, head of the banned African National Congress. The group was scheduled to continue its African tour, however, visiting Ethiopia, Nigeria, Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe.

The Dutch government is currently examining the idea of imposing a unilateral oil embargo on Pretoria and recently canceled its cultural treaty and imposed a visa requirement on South Africans visiting the Netherlands. (*Financial Times*, January 21, 1982.)

- Last year, like 1980, saw increasing militancy by the emergent **black trade unions** which increased their membership to an estimated 150,000 and were responsible for some 200 strikes, all of them technically illegal.

According to figures compiled by the Federation of South African Trade Unions (Fosatu), an umbrella organization for about a dozen predominantly black unions, there were 90 strikes by Fosatu-affiliated unions in 1981 and 53 were settled on terms favorable to the union. Possibly because of its willingness to confront management for better working conditions, Fosatu membership leaped last year from 59,500 to 95,000.

Fosatu is less openly political than some of the other new black unions, concentrating on organizing individual factories before moving on to recruit elsewhere. It also emphasizes its nonracial aspect and has won some success, with Coloured (mixed race) workers in the Eastern Cape resigning from the white-dominated Trade Union Council of South Africa and joining nonracial Fosatu unions and Indian workers in Natal joining the National Union of Textile Workers.

Not surprisingly, the fiercest opposition to the emergent black

unions has come from the conservative black homelands, which have embraced South Africa's draconian security laws on being given their "independence" by Pretoria.

The BophuthaTswana authorities have broken up meetings of striking BMW workers and prosecuted officials of the Fosatu-affiliated National Automobile and Allied Workers' Union for "illegal gatherings." In East London, the South African Allied Workers' Union, which is unabashedly political and also the fastest growing black union in the country, was the target of massive repression by Ciskei and South African security police. Its leaders have been jailed several times and are currently in South African security police detention.

Fosatu's strategy is to make plant by plant contracts with management, by-passing the official Industrial Council machinery, which it considers cumbersome and bureaucratic. Fosatu's breakthrough occurred in a dispute by its Chemical Workers' Industrial Union with the Colgate-Palmolive subsidiary. Colgate refused to negotiate outside of the Industrial Council, and even though the American company pays wages far above the South African minimum, the union threatened a boycott of Colgate products and a strike if the company continued to refuse to recognize the union.

Eventually, the union won recognition. (Johannesburg *Star*, January 2, 1982; *Sowetan*, December 18 and 28, 1981.)

● **The Israeli Defense Minister**, Ariel Sharon, made an unpublicized ten-day visit to South Africa in December and declared afterwards that Pretoria needed more weapons, despite the 1977 mandatory UN arms embargo. Sharon visited the South African forces in Namibia along the border with Angola.

He also secretly visited Zaire, Gabon, the Ivory Coast and the Central African Republic. Sharon reportedly offered economic aid in return for restoration of diplomatic relations with Israel, cut off after the 1973 war.

Swaziland

● According to a December report in the London *Guardian*, Pretoria is proposing that its **Kangwane homeland**, inhabited by South Africa's 750,000 Swazis, be incorporated into Swaziland, presumably as leverage to force the Swaziland government into taking a tougher line against African National Congress (ANC) insurgents. "Border adjustment" talks were reportedly held in Cape Town between the foreign ministers of South Africa and Swaziland.

However, in December, the chief executive of Kangwane, Enos Ma-

buza, called the unification attempt a "subterfuge" to deprive South African-born Swazis of South African citizenship, just as Pretoria has done to blacks deemed to belong to one of the "independent" homelands. Mabuza said Pretoria has repeatedly refused to grant Kangwane "self-government" because it would be inimical to plans for a merger with Swaziland.

Pretoria is apparently using the carrot of more land to win Swaziland's cooperation in closing its borders to the ANC. The fighters have used Swaziland as a route from their bases in Mozambique to targets in South Africa.

In late December, reports indicated that Swaziland was cracking down on the ANC, by increasing arrests and raids on ANC houses. Earlier in December, Swazi soldiers shot two unarmed ANC members near the Mozambique border, the first such incident. South Africa was said to have threatened to use Swaziland as an "operational area" like Angola if a tougher line against the ANC were not adopted. Also, by withholding passes required to move from one district to another, the Swazi security police have imposed an effective travel ban on the ANC. (London *Guardian*, December 19 and 29, 1981; Johannesburg Radio, December 17, 1981.)

Zimbabwe

● South Africa plans to renegotiate its **preferential trade agreement** with Zimbabwe—which it had precipitously announced would end March 24—apparently under pressure from the Reagan administration.

The *Washington Post* said Pretoria's seemingly hostile attitude began to alter shortly after Chester Crocker, the assistant secretary of state for African affairs, visited South Africa and Zimbabwe in November for discussions on the Namibia independence plan.

South Africa had earlier reversed its sudden withdrawal of 25 leased locomotives to Zimbabwe. In November, Pretoria agreed to lend 26 locomotives that Zimbabwe desperately needed for maize transport. (*Washington Post*, January 7, 1982; London *Observer*, December 20, 1981.)

The strange case of Steven Kitson

Steven Kitson, 25, a British engineer for Rolls Royce, was detained by South African security police in Pretoria for six days in January.

Kitson was on an annual trip to South Africa to visit his father, David Kitson, a member of the banned African National Congress who was imprisoned for 20 years in 1964. Norma Kitson, mother of Steven and husband of David, is also an ANC member, but she said Steven was deliberately kept out of politics so he could make yearly trips to see his father. Mrs. Kitson has campaigned for years in Britain on behalf of South African political prisoners.

On his release, apparently obtained by British diplomatic pressure and a furor in the British media, Kitson alleged he had been tortured by the South African security police. He said he was interrogated continuously for 24 hours while forced to stand up, slapped on the face till his nose bled, shaken violently and had buckets of cold water thrown over him to keep him awake.

Within hours of Kitson's release, his aunt Allison Weinberg—Norma's sister—was found brutally murdered in her Johannesburg apartment. Norma Kitson said: "The killing was the work of one of those freelance assassination squads. The government knows of their existence; it connives at what they do." (London *Observer*, January 17, 1982; London *Guardian*, January 14 and 15, 1982.)

Dealing with Qaddafi

BY RICHARD DEUTSCH

Reagan administration officials, members of Congress, and a broad range of interested observers widely agree that Libyan actions run counter to U.S. objectives in Africa and the Middle East. There is also strong conviction in Washington that Libya represents a strategic threat to the United States and that Libyan support for international terrorism must be thwarted. Opinions diverge, however, on the wisdom of the administration's response to Libya, and on the actions the United States should take to neutralize Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi.

The case against Qaddafi is viewed as unassailable in Washington. Libyan involvement in international terrorism has grabbed the headlines, but U.S. military planners are far more concerned over what is perceived as a long-range strategic threat posed by Libya's relationship with the Soviet Union. Such concern centers at present on Soviet "pre-positioning" or stockpiling of far more weapons in Libya than the small, 40,000 man Libyan army can possibly use.

"Libya has signed more than \$12 billion in military agreements with the Soviet Union between 1976 and 1980. Libya has been transformed, in effect, into a Soviet weapons depot and is able to promise and deliver Soviet-origin weapons to states and factions friendly to the Soviets and inimical to our interests," Assistant Secretary of Defense Francis J. West told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in mid-1981.

Soviet weapons shipments have been accompanied to Libya by more than

5,000 Soviet and East-bloc military and technical personnel, according to U.S. and Western intelligence sources.

However, the major strategic concern is not the use of these weapons against Libya's neighbors, but against Israel and Western Europe. "In Libya, the Soviet Union has been effectively building a potential military threat to southern Europe and to U.S. Mediterranean air and sea communications," reports the *Washington Post*.

U.S. strategic planners are particularly concerned about the potential use of Libyan airfields and ports by the Soviet Union. The Congressional Research Service, considered a highly objective source, reports that "the use of Libyan ports could give the Soviet navy a Mediterranean base that would be extremely useful in challenging U.S. naval power in the area. Even if permanent Soviet bases were not allowed, agreement on the use of Libyan facilities by Soviet forces could significantly upset the calculations of Western strategic planners and Israel."

The *New York Times* adds: "In the view of Western planners, the deployment of a mixed force of Backfire bombers, Sukhoi fighter-bombers, and MiG fighters on Libyan airfields would shift the balance of power in the Mediterranean to the Soviet Union. The consensus of intelligence analysts is that Colonel Muammar Qaddafi would grant the Soviet Union use of bases in an East-West military confrontation."

The extent of Qaddafi's connection with the Soviet Union is unclear. So far, Libyan base rights have not been extended, although Soviet naval vessels paid their first visits to Libyan ports

during 1981. Since taking power in a 1969 coup, Qaddafi has shied away from formal treaties of cooperation and defense. But U.S. wariness increased last year because of Qaddafi's April visit to Moscow on undisclosed business, and a subsequent visit by his second in command, Major Abdulsalam Jalloud.

Not even hardline conservatives in Washington see Qaddafi as a Marxist. He is seen by liberals and conservatives alike as a radical Arab nationalist. Most top officials of the former Carter administration saw Qaddafi as an irrational dictator, as an opportunistic, self-proclaimed Islamic "messiah," intent on spreading Libyan influence wherever possible. Qaddafi was seen as acting mostly on his own. The Soviets were thought to find the Libyan leader as unpredictable as other nations found him, and were thought to be skittish of an alignment.

The prevailing view among top Reagan administration officials is that Qaddafi serves as a partner in the Soviet worldwide game plan. Secretary of State Alexander Haig has referred to Libya as a Soviet "proxy force," and President Reagan has branded Qaddafi a Soviet "surrogate."

However, some Reagan officials and many independent analysts with experience in Middle East and African affairs take a somewhat more qualified view of the Soviet-Libyan connection. Questioned on this point during his Senate confirmation hearings in early 1981, Assistant Secretary of State Chester Crocker stated: "It would seem to me there is some overlap in the interests and motivations of the Soviets and

the Libyans. I do not believe the Soviets would claim to have control over Colonel Qaddafi, and I am certain the Libyans would not accept that formulation. But their purposes may well be compatible in a number of situations, and they wind up achieving results which are not helpful to our interests."

Certainly Qaddafi's actions directly conflict with U.S. goals in the Middle East. Libya, as a leading member of the Arab rejectionist nations, consistently calls not only for Palestinian rights and the return of Arab lands as mandated by the United Nations, but for the total elimination of Israel. Speaking to the Libyan General People's Congress early this year, Qaddafi said typically: "Israel's existence conflicts with the presence of the Arab nation. Either we stay or Israel stays, anything else is nonsense." Qaddafi is also known to be supplying sophisticated weapons to Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) factions in Lebanon.

Qaddafi has stood squarely against the Camp David peace accords, accusing Egypt of betraying the Arab cause by its participation. The Libyan leader is suspected of funding Islamic fundamentalist groups in Egypt, neighboring Tunisia, and the Sudan, and has called repeatedly for the overthrow of these pro-Western governments. Qaddafi is thought to have financed and sent Libyans to join in an aborted rebellion in the Tunisian town of Gafsa in early 1980. In the past, Libya has also called for the overthrow of the government of Saudi Arabia. "The Arabs who are friends of the U.S. constitute more danger to us than Israel or the U.S.," Qaddafi recently told the People's Congress.

In the Horn of Africa-Persian Gulf region, the United States has been giving increased attention to securing access to the area's oil supplies, especially since the 1979 revolution in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. U.S. officials maintain that Qaddafi funds a "liberation" movement in Oman, and is the principle backer of the Somali Salvation Front that seeks the overthrow of President Siad Barre. Last year, Libya, Ethiopia, and the Marxist state of southern Yemen signed a mutual defense treaty, said by U.S. officials to be bankrolled with Libyan

money. One stated purpose of the alliance is to counter U.S. use of military facilities in Oman and Somalia.

In Northwest Africa, Libya has been a major backer of the Polisario guerrilla movement, fighting for the independence of the Western Sahara. A 1980 mission by the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee to Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco, a U.S. ally that claims the Western Sahara, concluded that "Libya is the primary source of political and military efforts to destabilize North Africa."

According to Assistant Secretary Crocker, Libyan actions in sub-Saharan Africa "strike at the heart of U.S. and Western objectives."

Two recent Libyan adventures appeared particularly ill-construed in Washington. Qaddafi sent Libyan troops to Uganda in 1979 in an abortive attempt to prop up Idi Amin against invading forces from neighboring Tanzania. In 1980, within days of the overthrow and murder of former Liberian President William Tolbert, Qaddafi is said to have offered assistance to coup leader Sgt. Samuel Doe.

In November of last year, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Princeton Lyman characterized Libyan aims in Africa before the House Africa subcommittee: "It would appear that the Libyans have objectives in Africa that do not bode well for the region. These goals seem to include establishing, without regard for existing national boundaries, an Arab-Islamic bloc including Muslims of the Middle East and Africa. It would appear that Qaddafi envisions the elimination of these boundaries in the creation of a 'super-Libya' with Qaddafi as its spokesman. He also appears ready to work actively against any country that resists his ambition."

U.S. officials say that numerous African governments have quietly expressed their concerns about Libyan "subversion" to Washington. Several of these governments have gone public as well: "Libya has been charged by the presidents of Niger, Mali, and Sudan with attempts to overthrow their governments, and by the Senegalese and Gambians with imprisoning their nationals and putting them into military training against their wills....

Senegal, Equatorial Guinea and The Gambia broke diplomatic relations with Libya in 1980. Nigeria, Ghana, and Niger objected to the establishment of People's Bureaus last year and expelled the Libyan diplomats from their countries. Liberia, Sudan, and the Central African Republic followed suit this year [1981]," Lyman told the African affairs subcommittee.

Libya has also been accused by some in Washington with engineering civil disturbances in the Central African Republic. As a result, President David Dacko was forced to step down in July 1981 after handing over power to Gen. Andre Kolingba. In December 1980, some Nigerian officials charged Libyan involvement in riots in the northern city of Kano that reportedly left thousands of dead and wounded.

On New Year's Eve of last year, the freely elected government of Ghanaian President Hilla Limann was overthrown by Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings, said to be an admirer of Libyan leader Qaddafi. As members of the Limann regime were being arrested, a Libyan delegation flew into Accra with food supplies and offers of oil shipments. Even before Rawlings announced the formation of a provisional government, he re-established relations with Tripoli. Rawlings then began setting up Libyan-style "People's Revolution" committees around the country. "The quickness that Libya moved to give aid after the coup has made some people here nervous," admits a key U.S. official.

Far more nerves in Washington have been set on edge by Libya's involvement in Chad's long-running civil war, a conflict that has raged intermittently almost since France granted that nation independence two decades ago. Originally the war pitted northern Muslim forces against African groups in the south of Chad. In recent years the conflict has involved numerous armed factions, supported at various times by France and Libya, which has long claimed and occupied a uranium-rich section of northern Chad known as the Aouzou strip. An attempt by African heads of state to settle the dispute resulted in the Lagos agreement of 1979. That accord brought together 11 armed Chadian factions with Goukouni Wod-

deye as president and Hissene Habre as defense minister in a provisional national government. Elections were supposed to be held by that government in 1980.

But when the Lagos agreement fell apart in early 1980, heavy fighting broke out between the Habre and Goukouni forces. The capital at Ndjamená came under siege, diplomatic missions pulled out, thousands of refugees fled the country, and there seemed to be no end to the fighting. Late in the year, Goukouni asked for Libyan assistance. Libyan troops flew into Chad, backed by a column of heavy armor that moved in overland from the north. By the end of the year Habre had been driven east into neighboring Sudan. With arms sent from Egypt, Habre launched a guerrilla campaign against the Libyan forces in Chad. In early 1981, just before the Reagan administration took office, Goukouni and Qaddafi announced their intention to merge Chad with Libya.

The Reagan administration came to power acutely aware of a Libyan threat to U.S. interests. The day Reagan became president the American hostages were released from captivity in Teheran. Only a few days after the seizure of the hostages in Iran in late 1979, a mob stormed and burned the U.S. embassy in Tripoli, prompting the Carter administration to pull U.S. diplomats out of Libya. In 1978, Carter ended the sale of U.S. military supplies and spare parts to Libya, and blocked the delivery of military aircraft already purchased by Tripoli. These actions were taken in response to Qaddafi's support for international terrorism, including reports from intelligence sources that he had ordered the assassination of U.S. diplomats.

Over the years Libya has been accused in Washington and various European capitals of backing the activities of numerous terrorist organizations, including radical factions of the PLO, the Irish Republican Army, Basque nationalist groups in Spain, the Japanese Red Army, the Red Brigades of Italy, and German terrorist groups.

Libyan exiles at odds with Qaddafi have been murdered, allegedly on his orders, in Europe and the United States. Libya has also allegedly given

sanctuary to terrorists involved in operations around the world, most notoriously in its sheltering of those responsible for the attack on Israeli athletes at the 1972 Munich Olympics.

Intelligence services have charged Libya with using diplomatic pouches to transport weapons for terrorist operations, and with the provision of diplomatic cover and passports for terrorists. Former American intelligence operatives have been linked to the training of terrorists in Libya and the sale of weapons and explosives to Qaddafi.

Most if not all of these charges are accepted as fact in Washington by officials and analysts across the political spectrum, who tend to agree with a 1980 CIA assessment: "The government of Colonel Qaddafi is the most prominent state sponsor of and participant in international terrorism." One U.S. official sums up the attitude of many: "I'm usually skeptical about these things, but I've seen all the classified reports and I'm convinced that Libya supports international terrorism. Qaddafi has trained hundreds of terrorists and provided hundreds of millions of dollars in financing."

A key source in the House with a liberal record on foreign affairs adds: "It's been well documented over the years that Qaddafi is widely involved with terrorism." Opinions differ, however, over whether Qaddafi is a leader of a Soviet-designed international terrorist organization, or whether the Libyan leader simply exploits opportunities as they arise to attack his enemies and vulnerable governments.

A Senate staff source who has watched Libya for years comments on the possibility that Western intelligence agencies have planted charges of Libyan terrorism to discredit Qaddafi: "I've considered that and rejected it. In addition to all the public evidence, Qaddafi has said he's backing some of these groups." For the Western media, however, Qaddafi usually denies any involvement in terrorism. He claims, for example, that the murder of Libyan exiles is simply the execution of traitors ordered by the people of Libya.

During its first year in office the Reagan administration promised that a strong response to terrorism would be a

high foreign policy priority. Welcoming home the American hostages from Iran, President Reagan declared: "Let terrorists beware that when the rules of international behavior are violated, our policy will be one of swift and effective retribution." Reagan's words were echoed by other high U.S. officials. At the same time, a high-level review of U.S. policy towards Libya was launched.

Undersecretary of State Richard Kennedy explained to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: "International terrorism is an assault on civilization itself. Governments such as the Soviet Union, Cuba, and Libya, which directly or indirectly sponsor, train, finance, and arm the terrorists, must be clearly told their behavior is unacceptable. We will use all appropriate resources at our disposal, be they diplomatic, political, economic, or military to respond to such acts of international intimidation and extortion."

In the case of Libya, the administration soon had an opportunity to make good on its promises. In late April 1981, a former U.S. Green Beret was held on charges of shooting a Libyan student in Colorado, amid speculation that the attack was part of Qaddafi's campaign to intimidate Libyan dissidents abroad. In early May, the State Department closed the Libyan Embassy in Washington and deported Libya's diplomats, citing charges of "Libyan provocations and misconduct" in the United States. The same month the State Department warned all U.S. oil company employees and their families to make preparations to leave Libya. The companies generally ignored the warning.

Speaking in St. Louis, Secretary Haig told a town meeting: "The resources received by Qaddafi from his oil are almost exclusively diverted to the purchase of armaments, the training of international terrorists, and the conduct of direct intervention in the neighboring states of North Africa, the most recent of which being the invasion of Chad."

The administration was becoming increasingly concerned over the situation in Chad. Although Libya and Chad backed away from their pledge to merge, many influential African gov-

ernments considered Goukouni completely beholden to Qaddafi. Hissene Habre stepped up his attacks along Chad's eastern border, while Nigeria and other governments agitated for the Libyan forces to withdraw.

Assistant Secretary Crocker announced in early June that the administration would support all African nations requesting assistance to resist Libyan "interventionism." The administration also let it be known it would not let Libyan oil, then 10 percent of U.S. imports, get in the way of its move to confront Qaddafi. U.S. officials revealed a diplomatic campaign was underway to isolate Libya and to press African states to go public with their hostility towards Qaddafi. However, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), holding its annual meeting in Nairobi, declined to reconsider its decision to hold the 1982 summit in Tripoli. Hosting of the meeting would make Qaddafi chairman of the organization for the coming year.

Crocker also requested and received congressional consent to step up U.S. economic and military aid to countries threatened by Libya. Fifty-four M-60A main battle tanks would be sent to Tunisia at the request of the Bourguiba government. Congress also approved a substantial increase in U.S. assistance to Egypt, and military aid to Sudan more than tripled for 1982.

In August, Crocker took a harder tack. Speaking in Honolulu, the assistant secretary contended: "Libyan arms and cash are at the center of a sinister and skillful campaign of subversion that has become a major source of African instability. The activities of the Soviets and their partners threaten the security of Africa in every corner of the continent. In accordance with our objectives, the United States is working to frustrate these activities and to help African states resist them."

In Northwest Africa the United States took a stronger stand by providing increased public support for King Hassan of Morocco. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger and other top U.S. officials visited Rabat to assess Moroccan defense needs and to survey the situation in the Western Sahara. Early in 1981 the U.S. agreed to sell Morocco M-60 tanks, and stepped up ammuni-

tion deliveries. But aside from these moves, the Reagan administration continued the Carter policy on the Western Sahara, which was to reserve judgment on the sovereignty of the territory while the OAU tried to settle the dispute.

Shortly before the June OAU summit, Morocco and Libya resumed diplomatic relations. U.S. officials say the rapprochement was based on a Libyan pledge to cut off arms supplies to the Polisario, and a Moroccan agreement not to oppose Libyan assumption of OAU leadership in 1982. In Washington the agreement is considered mainly a "tactical maneuver." One U.S. official says: "Both countries had irons in the fire in Nairobi and didn't want trouble with each other."

The OAU, with ostensible agreement from all parties to the conflict, settled on a call for a cease-fire and referendum in the Western Sahara. But it was soon clear that Morocco and the Polisario each had their own ideas about the terms of the agreement. A few months later at Guelta Zemmour, a Polisario attack using sophisticated surface-to-air missiles brought down five Moroccan planes in 10 days. Morocco charged Algeria and Libya with supplying the missiles and appealed to Washington for aid. The United States responded by providing increased training for the Moroccan air and ground forces, and by promising "electronic countermeasures" to help defend the Moroccan planes.

In August, the U.S. also responded to a Libyan claim that the Gulf of Sirte lies within its territorial waters—a contention held to be without substantiation under international law by the U.S. and many other nations. Libyan threats of retaliation had caused the Carter administration to cancel planned naval exercises in the Gulf. The Reagan administration announced similar exercises despite Libyan objections and threats. On August 19, U.S. Navy F-14s from the aircraft carrier U.S.S. *Nimitz* engaged Libyan fighters 60 miles off the Libyan coast. Two Libyan planes were shot down with no American losses.

Common judgment on the incident in Washington is summed up by a congressional aide: "We went in there not

seeking a fight, but not to step back from one, not to let Qaddafi push us around. We figured we're going in there, we have a right to be there, and if the Libyans are going to muck around, we'll give them a pasting."

Other sources point out, however, that the incident was widely perceived in parts of the Arab world as "David" Qaddafi standing up to "Goliath" America. Qaddafi, these sources say, gained sympathy among African governments as well for being a "victim" of American "muscle-flexing."

In late September, Arab rejectionist states met in Libya and called for the use of oil and Arab funds in U.S. banks as a weapon against the United States. Syria, Libya, the PLO, Algeria, and South Yemen also called for closer relations with the Soviet Union. The same day, Sudanese officials accused Libya of setting up military bases in eastern Chad in preparation for an invasion of the Sudan. President Gaafar al-Nimeiry's government also charged at the United Nations that Libyan planes were bombing Sudanese villages along the border with Chad. Egyptian president Anwar Sadat sent then Vice-President Hosni Mubarak to Washington with an urgent plea for U.S. military aid to protect Sudan.

Sadat was assassinated during the first week of October. Speculation was rife in the U.S. that Qaddafi had dispatched the gunmen who killed Sadat, although no evidence for this surfaced. But Qaddafi's conspicuous gloating over Sadat's murder, and his call for popular revolts in Egypt and Sudan, aroused fury in Washington. The United States announced significant expansion of "Operation Bright Star," a previously scheduled military exercise involving U.S. troop maneuvers in Egypt, Oman, and Somalia. Washington also dispatched AWACS aircraft to patrol the Libyan-Egyptian border, and promised accelerated delivery of military supplies to Sudan.

The new French Socialist government of President François Mitterrand moved quickly to head off the possibility of major warfare in the region. At the Cancun North-South summit in mid-October, French officials announced readiness to provide financial and logistical support for an inter-

African peace-keeping force in Chad. The OAU had recommended such a force to replace Libyan troops, but lacked the funds to get the mission underway. The French also began supplying military assistance to Chadian President Goukouni. The Chadian leader, also under pressure from many African governments, soon asked the Libyans to pull out. Within days Qaddafi ordered the immediate withdrawal of his forces without waiting for the inter-African force to arrive in Chad.

Over the next several weeks, the United States and France sent crucial financial support and logistical backing to Chad for the arrival of troops from Zaire, Senegal, and Nigeria. Presidents Goukouni and Nimeiry resumed relations, with the Sudanese leader pledging an end to support for rebel leader Habre. But the precipitous Libyan withdrawal had created a power vacuum. The inter-African force arrived too late to prevent Habre from capturing important regional centers in eastern Chad. President Reagan's first year in office ended with a standoff in Chad between the Habre and Goukouni forces, with the inter-African force sitting uncomfortably in the center.

Qaddafi's withdrawal from Chad also eased the threat of a direct Libyan invasion of Sudan, although Sudanese and U.S. officials predicted further Libyan efforts to stir up a revolt against President Nimeiry. In Egypt, new President Hosni Mubarak took power smoothly, putting Egyptian-Libyan hostility on the "back burner." The threat of war in the region eased.

But in Washington resentment of Qaddafi reached the boiling point soon after the Sadat assassination. "There is wide agreement that Libya has as purely evil and mischievous a leader, Muammar Qaddafi, as exists anywhere. Why is he the menace that he is? Part of it is his Soviet connection, but a large part is his American connection. As the single largest purchaser of Libyan oil, the United States is the leading financial sponsor of Libyan adventurism and terror," commented the *Washington Post*. "It will be said that Libya can sell its oil elsewhere, that the Soviets will move in more deeply, that there will be costs. But none of these arguments can outweigh the advantages

of ending American equivocation, and putting the U.S. squarely on the opposite side of the fence of a gangster regime."

Much of the U.S. Congress seemed to agree. By mid-1981, the recession and a worldwide oil glut had cut Libyan oil down to 7 percent of U.S. imports. By year's end the Libyan input had fallen to about 3 percent. Some observers argued that Libya would counter a U.S. cutoff of oil imports by turning to Europe or the Soviets, or that an end to the glut would make further purchases from Libya necessary. But the issue was an emotional and symbolic one in Congress. Members of Congress pointed out that the United States bought 35 to 40 percent of Libya's total oil output, and if nothing else, a U.S. embargo would force the Libyans to switch markets and perhaps take less for their oil.

In the House, some 40 Congressmen signed up to sponsor a bill mandating a cutoff of U.S. oil purchases from Libya and an end to American exports to that country. The effort was bipartisan with liberals Tom Downey (D-N.Y.) and Edward Markey (D-Mass.), and conservatives Dave Dreier (R-Calif.) and Jack Kemp (R-N.Y.) leading the fight. Some members expressed exasperation over what was seen as a failure by the Reagan administration to take forceful action against Qaddafi. One congressional source explains: "The feeling was that Reagan was just fooling around and by the time he got around to doing anything, it would be too late."

House sources say the measure probably would have passed had the administration not objected. The State Department wrote the Foreign Affairs Committee requesting more time to study the issue, and, because of a procedural dispute, a vote was never taken on the House floor.

In the Senate, a similar measure introduced by liberal senators Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.) and Gary Hart (D-Colo.) was backed mainly by liberal and moderate senators, including African subcommittee chairman Nancy Kassebaum (R-Kans.) and Rudy Boschwitz (R-Minn.), the chairman of the Near Eastern subcommittee.

Senator Hart, calling Qaddafi "one of the most feared and despicable de-

spots on the face of the globe," told the Senate: "There comes a point where some principles and some interests are more important than pure economics and pure profits. What does this country stand for? Do we stand for profits over morality? We have a chance here to demonstrate some leadership both to the American people and to the people of the Free World." Hart admitted that the U.S. embargo would not have the desired effect if it went unsupported by European countries that import Libyan oil. "At the same time," he said, "we cannot go to our allies seeking their cooperation unless we are willing to take the first step."

Senator Kennedy expressed the feelings of many in the Senate: "It is immoral and inexcusable for the United States to pay billions of dollars a year for Libyan oil. The fact of the matter is, our dollars speak much louder than words. Now is the time for us to take firm and clear action. Oil from Libya is tainted with the blood of Libyan terror, Libyan murder, and Libyan assassination. Unquestionably, Libya stands in violation of the most fundamental canons of decency and justice in the world."

Senators Hart and Kennedy were opposed in debate mainly by Foreign Relations Committee chairman Charles Percy (R) of Illinois, who sought to support the administration's desire for more time before taking action: "The United States is not without power. But we can exercise that power much more effectively if we do not do it precipitously. We should make certain when we move, that we know the consequences of our move, what adverse fallout there may be. But also when we move, we should move in such a way that what we do is effective, does have power, does have impact..."

Percy introduced a substitute amendment condemning "the Libyan government for its support of international terrorist movements, its efforts to obstruct positive movement towards the peaceful resolution of problems in the Middle East, and its actions to destabilize and control governments in neighboring states in Africa." The Percy measure also called upon President Reagan to "conduct an immediate review of concrete steps the U.S.

should take, individually and in concert with its allies, to bring economic and political pressure on Libya to cease such activities." The review was to include the possibility of a mandatory U.S. trade boycott against Libya and was to be completed by mid-1982.

In late October, by a scant three votes, the Senate decided to accept the Percy measure instead of the one offered by Hart and Kennedy. Not without irony, hardline conservative senators found themselves voting for the more moderate Percy measure favored by Reagan. Many of the more "internationalist" liberals and moderates stood behind the stiffer Hart-Kennedy motion. Kennedy vowed to continue to press for mandatory congressional action against Libya and twice in subsequent weeks entered similar bills.

The House accepted language identical to the Percy measure and it was signed into law as part of the Foreign Assistance Act in December. A bipartisan group of congressmen also continued to push for stronger action in the House. But most observers felt that Congress would hold its fire until the administration completed its review.

Conspicuously absent from the congressional debate was the position of the oil companies. Key congressional sources report little or no lobbying by those companies doing business in Libya. A spokesman for the Petroleum Industry Research Foundation says: "Regardless of what they really think, the oil companies are between a rock and a hard place in taking a strong stand. If they want to protect their investments in Libya then they can't speak out against the Tripoli government. On the other hand, they don't want to support Qaddafi or defend doing business in Libya and appear as disloyal citizens." The spokesman also says that if the United States imposes a trade embargo against Libya, "I wouldn't be surprised if Qaddafi nationalizes our holdings there."

Of the major American oil companies in Libya only Exxon took immediate heed of the congressional warning. In mid-November, Exxon announced it would cease operations in Libya, began to negotiate with the Tripoli government for the sale of its

holdings, and prepared to evacuate its American executives. As an Exxon spokesman said, "It's not in our interest to do business there anymore. It's a good business decision to get out now."

Throughout November, prompted by Congress, the Reagan administration considered what "sanctions" to apply against Libya. Officials were said to be considering a range of options, from more rhetoric to a demand for Americans to leave Libya and a boycott of Libyan oil. President Reagan was reported to feel that such a boycott would have to be worldwide to be effective, and U.S. allies were reported to be unwilling to cooperate because of a need for Libyan oil and better relations with the Arab world. The Europeans were said to feel that strong action against Qaddafi would not force him to change his policies, and, at the same time, would increase his stature in the Arab world.

The issue came to a head unexpectedly in early December. A news leak revealed that the administration had been warned that Qaddafi had ordered assassination squads to kill President Reagan. The White House bolstered security, and the FBI and border patrols were dispatched on a nationwide hunt for the Libyan "hit squads." Accusations and countercharges flew back and forth between Tripoli and Washington. The incident captured headlines and remained a focus of national television news for weeks.

President Reagan claimed the United States had evidence against Qaddafi, but primary information on the assassination attempt was said to have come through intelligence sources from a defector whose identity had to be protected and kept secret. The source of the key information was never publicly revealed, and although the news media scrambled to prove or disprove the story, it succeeded in doing neither. By mid-January 1982 the threat of the alleged attempt to kill President Reagan was reported to have eased.

In the midst of the clamor, President Reagan ordered all Americans to leave Libya and invalidated U.S. passports for further travel to that country. However, no oil embargo was imposed, and Washington did not move to formally

cut relations with Tripoli. These and other measures against Libya were said to be under continuing consideration. All the U.S. oil companies doing business in Libya soon announced they were pulling out their American employees and began to do so. Most of the companies also indicated they would continue doing business in Libya with European replacements for the departing Americans.

Libya reacted by calling the Reagan move "an act of aggression" and asked OPEC to retaliate against the United States, a request the oil organization turned down. Libya also began patching up relations with some of the heads of state Qaddafi had alienated. Niger and Libya resumed relations after a period of strain, as did Libya and Saudi Arabia, although that rapprochement was said to be based on a need for "Arab unity" following Israeli annexation of the Golan heights. A similar Libyan effort was made to strengthen relations with Algeria and Tunisia. Qaddafi also signed an agreement for Iranian technicians to run Libyan oil fields.

In Washington, Libyan moves to repair relations with neighboring countries and moderate Arab nations, and Qaddafi's quick withdrawal from Chad, were attributed to two factors: a desire to keep the Europeans from backing the United States and a need to appear moderate enough to lead the OAU in 1982.

Meanwhile, rhetoric against the U.S. ran high in Tripoli. Qaddafi claimed solidarity with the people of Poland and blamed the Soviet-inspired crackdown in that country on the United States. Crowds demonstrated against the U.S. in Benghazi, while Tripoli Radio declared: "The Libyan people will not be intimidated by the U.S. fleets, nor by its terroristic plots and provocations. They will rise in utmost courage to check the U.S. administration's arrogance and terrorism." And Qaddafi told the People's Congress: "At a time when the enemies want the Arab homeland to be engulfed by despair, there is an Arab people who are saying no to reaction, no to the United States, no to the Israelis, no to capitulation."

Traveling in Europe in December, Secretary Haig sought Allied support

for the U.S. moves against Libya. Haig linked American actions to "moral anger" at Libyan terrorism. The European reaction was tepid at best. British Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington said, "Our relations with Libya have gone through a difficult period, but they're alright now." German Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher was said to feel the U.S. was wrong in trying to isolate Qaddafi and depict him as a pawn of the Soviet Union.

French Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson said the Libyan withdrawal from Chad had shown Qaddafi was following a more moderate course and that this should be encouraged. The French government said it no longer considered Libya a subversive international force, and that it intended to gradually resume normal relations with Qaddafi.

In Washington, the European reaction was seen as based on a need to maintain secure oil supplies from Libya, and on a willingness to accept assurances received from Qaddafi that he would no longer try to kill his opponents on European soil. The *Washington Post* commented: "Europe seems to accept the occasional Libyan outrages as the necessary price of not doing anything about them. Most Americans would probably be inclined to a different response. Mr. Reagan has now properly withdrawn American support for the business that pays for the Libyan gunmen's bills."

The *Post* called for a U.S. oil embargo against Libya, a position the *New York Times* declined to endorse: "The unhappy truth is that an oil embargo can't work. At best it would force Libya to pump a little more oil. At worst it would cast Colonel Qaddafi as the victim of Western imperialism, strengthening his position at home and in the Third World."

Current opinion in Washington also appears divided about how to control Qaddafi. One congressional analyst says: "Economic sanctions are pressure points that keep Qaddafi from getting all he wants. They may not bring him down, but will slow him down and make him think twice about supporting terrorism. Tough rhetoric isn't bad either: he's not immune to world opinion."

Another point of view is expressed by a prominent Africanist: "I wouldn't jump to the conclusions that Qaddafi's rhetoric often leads one to. I would more closely follow the European way of dealing with this, which is to put tongue in cheek, see what's really going to happen, and then turn these issues into regional issues to be dealt with by diplomacy in concert with our allies."

Looking back on the events of the first Reagan year, a key congressional staff member asks a question posed by many observers: "What have we gotten out of this year of confrontation with Libya?" Most analysts, including some who see such a confrontation as inevitable and even necessary, agree with *New York Times* columnist Flora Lewis, who wrote recently: "We make too much noise."

As President Reagan began his second year in office, Washington held its breath for the next act to begin. The administration continued to consider a range of "further options" to deal with Colonel Qaddafi. Congress waited for the administration to complete its review and act.

A recent administration crackdown on official contact with the press complicates the efforts of analysts to make informed judgments on the issue of U.S.-Libyan relations. According to one U.S. official, "There are indications the Libyans may offer the Soviets temporary access to their ports and airfields." Few observers expect the growing U.S.-Libyan confrontation to be sorted out amicably, although at present there is scant talk of U.S. military moves against Libya. But this may change. □

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How Stable is Siad Barre's Regime?

BY PAUL B. HENZE

On October 21, 1981, Mohamed Siad Barre celebrated the twelfth anniversary of his military government in Somalia with ceremonies attended by Admiral Charles Guegney, who commands the U.S. Middle East Squadron based in Bahrain. In his speech, Siad attacked the Soviet Union and Libya but made no mention of the pact he signed with the United States in August 1980. The pact has not produced the aid or American military presence he expected. A U.S. admiral was small consolation.

Paul Henze has been a student of Horn affairs for 20 years, having paid many visits to all the countries in the area. He was responsible for Horn affairs in the National Security Council from 1977 to 1980. He is now a Wilson Fellow at the Smithsonian in Washington, where he is working on a modern history of the Horn.



Siad was protected by elaborate security arrangements — a double row of armed guards and a concrete barrier separating the reviewing stand from the marchers. Soldiers in the parade had both the bolts and the ammunition clips removed from their rifles. Siad was taking no chance on a repeat of the circumstances under which his friend Anwar Sadat had been assassinated in Cairo two weeks before.

Internally, the most significant aspect of the anniversary celebrations was the amnestying of 5,000 prisoners. They were almost all petty criminals and black marketeers. Siad explained that "those convicted of treason, endangering the security and unity of the Somali people, espionage, murder, and armed robbery" were not being released. In other words, the amnesty signified no political relaxation.

Beset by increasing economic and political strains, Siad in his thirteenth year of power is farther than ever from stabilizing his leadership. Clearly, for Siad, 1981 was not a good year. Neither was 1980. He had promulgated a new constitution in August 1979 and set up a popular assembly in December. These steps were advertised as leading the country onto a democratic path of development that would make Somalia more attractive to Western supporters. But they were short-lived. By Revolu-

tion Day in 1980, declaring that Somalia was being "weakened by opportunists." Siad had to announce a state of emergency and suspension of the constitution and assembly, which had never really begun to function.

To guide the country through its emergency, which has become chronic, he reestablished his Supreme Revolutionary Council. During the first seven years of his revolution, this group had been his main device for exercising power. It was dissolved in 1976 when the Soviet-style Socialist Revolution party of Somalia was set up to fit the classic model people's democracy Siad was then trying to build in the framework of a friendship pact with the Russians. This party, which had evolved into a massive, unproductive bureaucracy, had increasingly come to be seen by Siad as both useless and potentially threatening, for it could have sheltered disgruntled elements plotting against him. The state of emergency continues, but the Supreme Revolutionary Council has also proved unstable. Siad expelled 10 of its 17 members six months after it was set up.

Though Siad is now well into his thirteenth year of power, it is evident that he has made little progress toward institutionalizing his revolution. Since his defeat in the Ogaden in early 1978, he has retreated into reliance on his own clan links. His earlier vision of a Somalia rising above tribalism has faded into invisibility. And the socialist economic system that he has claimed would provide the basis for sustained economic growth and improvement in the welfare of his people has become a mockery. Corruption of all kinds is now more rampant in Somalia than it was during the pre-1969 parliamentary period.

When Siad broke with the Russians in November 1977, he did not abandon either the economic structure or the security apparatus they designed for him. There was a brief period of a few months when a decisive change of direction might have been possible. Siad preferred, even after defeat in the Ogaden, to keep his country mobilized for resumption of the effort to wrest Somali-populated territory from Ethiopia and perhaps from Kenya as well. Relaxation of security controls would have en-

couraged political ferment. Restructuring of the economic system could have been undertaken only by a strong and confident governmental apparatus that enjoyed wide popular support, had a reputation for integrity, and had time to concentrate on the economy. These prerequisites for real change have never been established. A 100 percent devaluation in Somalia's currency was decreed in July 1981; but essential imports have been exempted from the effects of the devaluation, and the country exports too little to gain much from the change in exchange rate.

If the great majority of Somalis were not still accustomed to living at or near subsistence level, and if the surviving traditional economy supplemented by corruption and black marketeering did not compensate for the inability of the ramshackle socialist system to provide for the elementary needs of the people, Siad's government might already have collapsed. Politically, the absence of a clear-cut alternative to Siad has helped keep him in power.

Ironically, the principal factor that has exacerbated Somalia's economic plight has also been the source of partial relief for it: the Ogaden refugees. During the past year Somalia benefited

from at least \$135 million in emergency food, medical, and material aid for these tragic victims of Siad's irredentist ambitions. Refugee aid is equal to more than one-third of the country's GNP — variously estimated at between \$360 and \$400 million per year. Half this aid probably never reached any refugees at all. It went directly into the Somali economy. Stories abound of truckloads of food and medicine that disappear as soon as they leave the docks — trucks and all! U.S. and UN officials maintain that as of early 1982 "supply losses" have been reduced to about one-third of deliveries at ports.

The number of refugees in Somalia is unlikely ever to be established accurately. Somali officials continue to cite figures as high as 1.5 million. Aid officials say camps contain about 650,000, but populations fluctuate. There are many parallels with Palestinian refugee experience. Once registered, refugees stay on lists forever, no matter what actually happens to them. Bad as conditions are in the camps, they still represent a dependable source of basic food and medical service that these still largely nomadic herding people had not previously known on either side of the border. While men are away on guerrilla



Emergency aid for Ogaden refugees accounts for one-third of Somalia's gross national product

Photo: Anild Vohlan/UNICEF

operations, or simply tending flocks, women and children remain in camps. Traditional migration patterns are thus changing. If donor countries, especially the U.S. (which provides over half the food), and the UN do not temper their humanitarianism with foresight, a permanent Palestinian-type situation could be duplicated in the Horn, with a dependent refugee population inhibiting eventual settlement of the problems that gave rise to the refugees in the first place.

Though Siad's government made noteworthy progress in settling nomads and turning them into farmers and fishermen in the mid-1970s, there has been little desire to see Ogaden refugees resettled. To assert the claim to the Ogaden, they must be held ready to return. They bring a massive inflow of food and supplies that benefit the whole national economy. Refugee housing developments and development of subsistence agriculture have been discouraged by central government officials. Appalling environmental degradation has resulted. For miles around camps, not only the few remaining trees but all bushes and even grass and roots have been collected for fuel. Aid officials working in Somalia realize that continued aid must be linked to food-for-work programs and efforts to encourage

reforestation, irrigation, and agricultural development. But little has been done. Siad's government, weakened by defections and brain drain abroad, lacks officials who can implement programs even if they are planned for them.

The Ethiopian government claims that increasing numbers of refugees are returning to Ethiopian territory, where a major rehabilitation effort is under way. The Ethiopians have consistently claimed that Somalia refugee statistics are greatly exaggerated. The Somalis, on the other hand, have in the past maintained that the Ethiopians were driving out ethnic Somalis to make room for settlement of highlanders. These allegations are now heard less frequently. As with so many claims and counterclaims in the Horn, it is impossible to establish facts objectively. Recent visitors to the area believe that it is possible that movement across the border may now be primarily in the direction of Ethiopia.

Enthusiastic Siad supporters are hard to identify in Somalia. Internal opposition is growing. Siad's main reason for declaring a state of emergency a year and a half ago, and his principal motive for measures to tighten his hold on the government since that time, is fear of the Somali Salvation Front (SSF), which has recently added Democratic

to its title, becoming the SDSF. This group was organized in Ethiopia several years ago and originally appeared to be little more than a propaganda gimmick with little capacity to gain a mass following in Somalia. Long known primarily through radio broadcasts, it is now led by Siad's former education minister, Hassan Ali Mirrah, and by Somalia's former ambassador to Kuwait, Mussa Islah Farah. In the past two years the SDSF appears to have developed an underground network in Somalia through tribes increasingly disenchanted with Siad's narrow rule.

Opposition to Siad has always been present in the formerly British-administered north. The Issas, whose traditional territory extends deep into east-central Ethiopia, have never been inalterably opposed to cooperation with Addis Ababa. The success of their compatriots in Djibouti in maintaining this tiny republic's independence vis-à-vis both Somalia and Ethiopia provides a much more attractive example to them than Siad's discredited attempt to expand by conquest.

The SDSF has recently been making efforts to shed the image of being a group of Ethiopian puppets. While Ethiopian rhetoric against U.S. military involvement with Somalia has intensified — no doubt in part as justification for the questionable alliance signed in Aden in August 1981 with Qaddafi and South Yemen — the SDSF has voiced approval of military cooperation with the United States and maintains that its only concern is that a U.S. military presence not be exploited by Siad to maintain his own hold on power. Only by Siad's replacement, the SDSF maintains, can a democratic and peaceful order be restored to Somalia and the Horn.

The SDSF has been vague about Ogaden claims. The implication is that it would content itself with a Somalia within its present boundaries. Siad has meanwhile taken pains to foster the impression of distance between his government and the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF). WSLF spokesmen publicly maintain they are seeking only self-determination for the people of the Ogaden, not merger with Somalia. This has failed to win any OAU support. Reduced to occasional hit-and-run opera-



Photo: Cernerapix

Western Somali Liberation Front: "Its only source of support is Siad Barre"

tions in Ethiopian territory and with little hope of large-scale resumption of guerrilla operations — the Somali armed forces are simply too weak and could not resist Ethiopian retaliation — the WSLF has no source of support other than Siad.

Little is now heard of the so-called Somali Abo Liberation Front (SALF), symbol of Siad's excessive appetite for expansion. It had staked claims to the Oromo (Galla)-inhabited region in Ethiopia far beyond those inhabited by Somalis. Mengistu has been plagued by dissidence among the Oromo, who were originally among his strongest supporters, but this dissidence seems to be declining and has never been oriented primarily toward Somalia. The SALF was a high risk and a bad bet.

Siad expelled the Libyan Embassy from Mogadishu a few days after the Qaddafi-led tripartite alliance was signed in Aden on August 18, 1981. His relations with conservative Arab states remain good but less productive of material support than he would like. The Saudis, for example, have never abandoned their skepticism about Siad's economic and religious policies. No change in the warm relationship with Egypt is evident since the death of Sadat. There has been a slight reduction in coolness in relations with Kenya since the Moi-Siad meeting at the OAU summit in Nairobi in September 1981, and some increase in trade, but Kenyan suspicions of Somali intentions run deep. The predominant feature of Somalia's position in Africa continues to be isolation.

When he broke with the Russians in November 1977, Siad was optimistic about large-scale U.S. and Western military backing. The United States was unwilling to underwrite invasion of Ethiopia. Some help was sent to Somalia by Sadat and little from the Shah of Iran, but it was not sufficient to stave off defeat at the hands of the Cubans and Soviets, who had come to the rescue of the badly battered Ethiopians. Siad's decision to continue massive guerrilla operations inside Ethiopia with large numbers of thinly disguised Somali army regulars cost him the opportunity of getting a favorable aid decision from the Carter administration until its final year.

In the wake of the collapse of Iran and the invasion of Afghanistan, an agreement for the use of Somali ports and airfields was finally worked out in return for a promise of \$42 million in defensive military aid over a two-year period (fiscal years 1980 and 1981), but on condition that Somali support of Ogaden insurgency cease. It was only in his final days in office that President Carter was willing to assure Congress that all Somali military effort beyond the country's borders had been suspended.



President Siad Barre: "Farther than ever from stabilizing his leadership"

Photo: Camerapix

Meanwhile, Siad's sagging hopes had been buoyed by Henry Kissinger. In response to urging from Sadat, Kissinger at the beginning of January 1981 called for full backing of Somalia against Ethiopia. Siad was not the only one who assumed Kissinger was speaking for the incoming Reagan administration. When the Somali leader came to the United States in May 1981, he had his worst fears confirmed: Kissinger had spoken for no one but himself. The Reagan administration had not focused on Somalia at all.

Indefatigable as he has been in maneuvering to bolster his position, Siad has little basis for high hopes as he comes to the United States for a second

visit, which is supposed to include a meeting with President Reagan, in March 1982. The Reagan administration sought, and Congress approved, only \$20 million in new military aid for Somalia for FY 1982. Somalia has meanwhile canceled its order for Vulcan anti-aircraft missiles, which were still far from delivery because of the long lead time required by the U.S. manufacturer and competing priorities. A radar system remains on order. The composition of the aid to be provided under the current year's allocation as well as amounts remaining from the two previous years (all Foreign Military Sales loans, requiring eventual payment) is under negotiation between Somalia and the U.S. government. Offensive weaponry remains forbidden. Somalia has no chance of getting help for rebuilding its air force, such as Sudan and Kenya are receiving. Somalia is currently said to favor using U.S. aid for trucks, communications, and engineering equipment — items that can be useful in economic development as well as for military purposes. This is an encouraging shift from Siad's preoccupation with rebuilding offensive military capacity, and long overdue.

Siad has encouraged his officials to express annoyance at the small scale and slowness of U.S. military aid. It contrasts with Soviet generosity in the early- and mid-1970s, when the Somali armed forces were built up rapidly to a level almost equal to those of Ethiopia and no limitations were placed on offensive weapons. Four thousand Russians came to Somalia as trainers and advisers — proportionately a far larger group than has ever been assigned to Ethiopia since the break.

Siad would like to have a substantial U.S. military presence in his country. The United States sent 250 troops to Berbera in connection with the "Bright Star" exercises in November 1981. They were warmly welcomed by local officials and merchants, who were disappointed when they departed as soon as the exercises were over. Periodic Ethiopian allegations notwithstanding, no permanent U.S. military presence has been established at Berbera, and little has been spent on upgrading facilities there. The U.S. Navy esti-



Photo: Camerapix

Little U.S. military aid has been forthcoming for the Soviet-trained Somali army

mated in 1979 that rehabilitation of the Berbera port and airfield would require an initial investment of at least \$100 million. Current plans envision outlays of \$25 million during the coming year, but it is still not clear that demands for military construction at higher-priority locations in the Middle East may not cause further postponement.

The Reagan administration has been cautious about the Horn of Africa, continuing the Carter policy of refusal to sever links with Ethiopia in hope that the Russians and Cubans may eventually wear out their welcome there. For all the strain it has undergone, Ethiopia is in much better economic condition than Somalia. It is attracting more development aid from the West than from the Russians, who have little to offer Ethiopia except arms. Strategically, return of Ethiopia to a position of neutrality or to a pro-Western stance would be a far greater gain than Somalia can ever hope to be. There continues to be little enthusiasm for deep entanglement

with Somalia among serious military planners and strategic thinkers in the United States. Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Oman, and the Gulf states as well as Pakistan all have much higher priority for military aid. Uncertainty about Siad's ultimate intentions, were he to be treated as a serious military ally, combined with doubts about his ability to maintain himself in power, will continue to argue for caution. However fine a face he puts on it, Siad is likely to return home disappointed from his forthcoming visit to Washington.

Siad's plight and that of his country demonstrate the woe that can come from too warm a Soviet embrace as well as the folly of subordinating all other goals to irredentism. His problem now is that he cannot escape from the consequences of his mistakes. The Somalia people, both within the country's borders and beyond them, have suffered severely from all this politico-military adventurism and will continue to pay a

high price for a long time. Long on talent, hardened by centuries of living in a harsh environment, patient and persevering, they deserve better leadership.

If the money and material all her friends have given Somalia over the past dozen years for military adventurism and the resources that have recently poured into the country to aid the refugees who are the result of those misguided policies could have been utilized for rational and sustained economic and social development, Somalia could have been on her way to becoming a showplace among African countries. Democracy may not have worked well in Somalia during her first decade of independence, but it at least prevented the excesses and tempered the misjudgments that have characterized Somalia's experience since it fell victim to authoritarian military leadership. The lessons of recent history need to be pondered not only by Somalis, but by all who wish to work for their genuine interest. □

Rawlings' Second Coming

BY JON KRAUS

December 31, 1981 marked the second coming to power in Ghana of Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings. He had been catapulted to power on June 4, 1979 by a mutiny launched in his name by other ranks and a few officers in the air force and army who rebelled against the existing military leadership and freed Rawlings from military custody, in which he was being held for an attempted coup two weeks earlier.

The Rawlings-led Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) ruled for a tumultuous three and a half months marked by radical populist purges and a housecleaning of state institutions, as well as a painful attempt to restore a moral economy to force down prices of essential commodities and local food to a level where the inflation-ravaged people of Ghana

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Photo: Ghana Info

Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings must regenerate the economy and build a stable power base

could feed themselves. The extraordinarily popular and youthful (32 years old) Rawlings and a now faction-riven AFRC surrendered power on September 24, 1979 to an elected civilian government led by President Hilla Limann and the People's National Party (PNP), whose previously scheduled elections AFRC had permitted to take place. In handing over power in the National Assembly in 1979, Rawlings had warned the assembled politicians that if they used their offices to pursue


their own self-interests, they would be resisted and removed from power. Rawlings has now ousted the Limann/PNP government whose two years and three months of rule was characterized by economic regression, hyperinflation, elite privilege, emerging corruption, scandals, great ineptitude, and a relatively noncoercive democratic rule; the exception to the last was its hounding and harassment of Rawlings, whom it dismissed from the military, and his remaining AFRC associates and sympathizers.

Economic stagnation, an impoverishing inflation, and an extreme shortage of consumer and other goods constituted the economic background to both of Rawling's ascents to power. Other factors in the two coups distinguish them from one another. With regard to immediate causes, in June 1979 an outraged Flight Lieutenant Rawlings and primarily noncommissioned officers and rank-and-file soldiers mutinied against their officers and rebelled against Gen. Akuffo's caretaker military regime that had permitted the now-ousted Gen. I.K. Acheampong (1972-78) and his senior officers to escape unpunished for their corrupt looting and mismanagement of the

Ghanaian economy and the coercive use of the military to sustain itself in power, both of which had brought the military into disgrace in Ghana. In December 1981, Rawlings and his supporters within and outside the armed forces ousted a civilian democratic government of sharply declining popularity but with some legitimacy in a country where the people still harbor a profound dislike of and contempt for the capabilities and honesty of the military. Ghanaians have not forgotten that Acheampong's regime destroyed the Ghanaian economy. The immediate targets of the mutiny-coup in 1979 were senior military officers, eight of whom (including three former heads of state) were executed, and then other senior state officials who had engaged in corruption and malfeasance. And AFRC leaders were limited in their ambitions and short-term goals to punish severely all those who had ravaged the economy and exploited their positions to loot the public coffers, for which there was overwhelming, joyful popular support. Legitimate authority was bestowed upon AFRC for its rapid cleansing of the fouled state and other public institutions, which gave renewed birth to the hope that the powerful could be rendered accountable and that justice would prevail, and by AFRC's promise to surrender power swiftly to elected civilians.

In some contrast, the immediate target of Rawlings' 1981 coup and the establishment of the Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC) was the removal of a government apparently wholly helpless to prevent Ghana's deepening economic regression, 120% inflation rate, and endless, debilitating shortages of essential consumer and production goods, spare parts, and inputs. Rawlings' ambition now is long-term: "I ask for nothing less than a revolution — something that will transform the social and economic order of the country." This time Rawlings intends to wield power to mobilize an intense, self-reliant effort, with broad citizen involvement, to prompt economic recovery. Among immediate measures to be taken are the evacuation to the ports for export of the massive amount of cocoa still stored

upcountry (55% at least of the 1980-81 crop remained unevacuated in October 1981); the repair, through a mobilization of resources, of the many vehicles, bridges, and roads necessary for this and other urgent transport tasks that have badly disrupted the economy; and the manufacture through a concentration of skills of the spare parts necessary to put Ghana's largely idle factories back into production. These similar reconstruction tasks are infinitely more difficult than those undertaken by AFRC in 1979 and involve severe structural disequilibriums in Ghana's economy that Rawlings did not recognize in 1979 and does not now.



Rawlings intensely and accurately believes that by his actions and behavior in 1979 he and AFRC had aroused among many Ghanaians, although not among the managerial and commercial bourgeoisie or farmers, a will to participate directly in Ghana's economic and political recovery and that the PNP and President Limann's government permitted this enthusiasm and anger to slip away. Discounting those who rallied to Rawlings' PNDC in early 1982 from opportunism or to deflect criticisms and attack, it appeared that Rawlings initially enjoyed far less legitimacy for his effort in 1982 than he did in 1979. In 1979, too, Rawlings and the AFRC needed only a

broad and diffuse public support for the housecleaning and purges, although many thousands participated by rebelling against their leaders in state and other institutions and by demanding accountability. And even then AFRC's legitimacy was slipping away rapidly as soldiers acted aggressively towards the public, caned market women and traders for alleged hoarding and selling above control prices, and drove commodities and local foods from the market by severe efforts to enforce price controls. AFRC was unable to retain cohesion even within its own ranks and was, by September 1979, riven by cleavages and factions along lines of ethnicity, attitudes toward senior officers, how far to go in purging public institutions, and whether to retain or give up power. Thus, Rawlings and the PNDC are confronted with the tasks of creating a cohesive governing body, while retaining the active support of a military whose lines of authority have again been shattered, and, under desperate economic conditions, generating a broad, stable coalition of support among crucial socioeconomic groups and institutions.

The political experiences of the civilian Third Republic under President Limann must be assessed, as well as Ghana's economic condition and the policy dilemmas and choices that were made and contributed to its violent removal. These are of critical importance in understanding both the failure of one of Africa's few democracies to sustain itself and the political and economic choices that confront its successor, Rawlings' PNDC.

THE LIMANN/PNP REGIME

The AFRC assault upon the military and civilian state leadership and wholesale purging of public boards and corporations, its unleashing of an angry and abused populace upon those who had enriched themselves, and its handing down of severe penal sentences to "big men" (often in violation of basic due-process notions) in order to demonstrate that retributive justice was still possible in Ghana were morally indispensable, but they inflicted a heavy material and institutional cost that the Limann government inherited in 1979.

The demands, decrees, daily summonses to Burma Camp (military headquarters in Accra), seizures of assets, and secret trials frightened the Ghanaian bourgeoisie and managerial-administrative elite more than any previous experience. AFRC also aroused popular expectations that economic conditions could be better if only there was the will — "romanticism," Limann called it — while it actually exacerbated the economic crisis. Nigeria's oil boycott created a severe shortage in gasoline, available commodities were sold off at undervalued control prices, and farmers withheld food from the market.


Seldom has a new democratic government entered office under such dismal circumstances. Apart from the severe and highly disrupted economic conditions, the economic and social infrastructure (roads, schools, hospitals, railroad, all public facilities) had deteriorated severely from years of lack of investment, in part because of foreign exchange constraints. Many government institutions were in a state of disarray or collapse and had manifested a declining competence to fulfill their roles. Many state boards and corporations made only a pretense of fulfilling their tasks and had not been compelled to render their accounts for years. The Cocoa Marketing Board (CMB), a state within a state, had been steadily losing its ability to purchase and evacuate cocoa to the ports or distribute supplies to farmers. Thousands of educated and skilled Ghanaians had left Ghana to escape the inflation and absence of commodities, reducing sharply Ghana's ability to renew its capacities. The military mutiny against the officer corps that had launched the AFRC, in addition to lower-level attacks upon senior police officials, had left both the military and the police without much discipline. Officers were demoralized and left with little authority. It is understandable that the Limann government became preoccupied with "stability" and rebuilding government institutions.

The Third Republic established a presidential system, with a National Assembly with a strong committee system and an independent judiciary.

Limann's People's National Party (PNP) held a bare majority in the National Assembly, 71 of 140 seats, and was joined by the United National Convention (UNC) in a quasi-coalition during the first year.

The PNP was composed of several very distinct parts, and President Hilla Limann, a political newcomer and career foreign service officer, always occupied a weak position in the party. He was selected as the PNP's presidential candidate by his uncle, Imoru Egala, who, with other "old guard" Convention People's Party (CPP) leaders who held office under Kwame Nkrumah, founded the party and dominated most party positions. Limann relied upon them for support. In contrast, most of the PNP Members of Parliament (MPs) were younger and new to politics, as were many of those whom President Limann chose as his ministers. Within the "old guard" CPP,

there was a constant struggle between Nana Okutwer Bekoe, the national chairman and a rich businessman, and Imoru Egala. While the Egala wing of the CPP "old guard" continued to celebrate Kwame Nkrumah and "socialism," they were primarily involved in using their PNP positions to gain access to state patronage and contracts. Only four younger and more educated members of the "old guard" were initially in Limann's cabinet, but the "old guard" exercised a great deal of power in government appointments and, apparently, in contracts. A remnant wing of younger ideologues, organized through the Kwame Nkrumah Revolutionary Guards, attacked Limann fairly constantly for abandoning Nkrumah's socialist path. There was a sustained struggle for power within the PNP between the "old guard" who were close to Limann and exercised the most direct power, Nana Okutwer Bekoe and Kofi



Accra: Rawlings' 1979 housecleaning extended to market women and traders

Photo: Ghana Info

Batsa, and the "old guard" who had been Nkrumah's closest lieutenants and who sought to wrest power from Limann after Egala's death in 1981. The conflict climaxed in public in late 1981 with accusations of corruption and the misuse of funds against Limann's supporters, and a series of court cases in which Limann's lieutenants were compelled to leave PNP office and submit reports on all party accounts to the national treasurer. One allegation involved the kickback of \$5.2 million from a currency printing company in London, while an Italian businessman residing in South Africa sued in a London court to recover a loan of \$980,000 made to two "old guard" PNP leaders for unspecified purposes shortly after Limann took office. The scandals assumed a dramatic significance in contrast with Ghana's impoverishment and, with the inner party struggle, diminished the Limann government's status.

Apart from restoring the economy and dealing with public economic demands, the most pressing problem the Limann government confronted was an interrelated series of issues involving the prevention of another military coup and military violence. First, the military, government, and public strongly felt that the shattered and highly tenuous officer authority within the military had to be restored, and military violence against the public curbed. Senior officers, the 1979 mutiny's primary target, had been executed, arrested and beaten, humiliated, and were still subject to NCO and rank-and-file power. The public's, not just the elite's, experience with armed and coercive soldiers in recent years had been a fearful one, which some AFRC officers understood more fully than Rawlings. Second, the government felt compelled to cope with the AFRC members and their associates within the armed forces. Not all AFRC members had favored a return to civilian rule, which Limann knew; having exercised ultimate authority and put the Limann regime "on probation" pending good behavior, AFRC leaders and their associates preoccupied the PNP in its early months as sponsors of a potential coup; and the return to ranks of AFRC leaders who were junior officers or rank-and-file soldiers raised prob-

lems regarding their acceptance of a normal command structure under senior officers. The PNP government was extremely nervous, some of its members obsessed, about a possible coup; Limann remarked in 1980 that every night he went to bed expecting a coup. Third, the looming presence of Fl. Lt. Rawlings and several of his closest associates, who refused to go on leave abroad and remained in Ghana "to monitor" PNP performance and



Under President Limann, the economy deteriorated further

the completion of AFRC prosecutions and investigations, was felt by the government to constitute a standing threat, both before and after Rawlings was unceremoniously "retired" in November 1979. Fourth, the "transitional provisions" negotiated between the outgoing AFRC and the incoming Limann government in September 1979, and inserted into the constitution by AFRC fiat, required not only the continuation of prosecutions launched by AFRC (but now under a judge in a special tribunal) and efforts to restore the military's status, but also made it illegal for the government or judiciary to review AFRC Special Court convictions of those persons then in jail or "tried" in absentia and abroad. It was soon confirmed publicly by ex-AFRC associates

that AFRC Special Court procedures had violated any notion of due process and convicted and sentenced many civilian and military leaders without trials or evidentiary proceedings. Some of the 23 incarcerated senior officers whose appeals were made public were related to other military officers, including some AFRC leaders.

The responses of the Limann government to these issues tended to be regarded by many ex-AFRC leaders and their many civilian sympathizers in symbolic terms as either supporting or undermining the gains of the June 4 "revolution."

With respect to reviewing AFRC Special Court convictions, the Limann government tended in court appeals to uphold the letter of the "transitional provisions" and leave it to the judiciary, which rendered a series of conflicting decisions. By late 1981, when the Supreme Court did uphold the convictions as unreviewable under the constitution, the Limann government had already quietly released or pardoned a large number of the AFRC prisoners.

With regard to ex-AFRC leaders and military associates who held key positions, Brigadier Joseph Nunoo-Mensah, chief of the defense staff, and the Limann government sought quickly to dispatch them to postings or advanced training courses abroad; some went willingly, others under compulsion. Rawlings and several of his closest lieutenants, including Capt. Kojo Tsikatu (who had been tried and convicted for a 1976 coup attempt, fought with the MPLA in Angola, and had been a PNP member), refused to leave and regarded the government wish as an attempt to prevent ex-AFRC leaders from "monitoring" the good behavior of the PNP and its government. (The "old guard" CPP leaders who dominated the PNP leadership were regarded as highly tainted with corruption, as indeed they were.) In a sudden move in November 1979, the Limann government "retired," and banned from all military installations not only Fl. Lt. Rawlings but also Defense Staff Chief Brig. Nunoo-Mensah and Army Chief Brig. Arnold Quainoo. The public reason offered for dismissal (that they quarreled with one another) was spe-

Photo: Camerapix

acious and denied publicly with scorn by both brigadiers. They were highly professional and had labored courageously to restore a semblance of order and command within the armed services and to sustain civilian authority. (Nunoo-Mensah had been accepted by the other ranks after some had initially shaved his head with a broken bottle during the mutiny. Many officers had withdrawn and retired after facing the beatings, humiliation, and rejection of their authority during and after the June mutiny.) Perhaps the government feared Nunoo-Mensah's and Quainoo's relationship with Rawlings — whose first move in his December 1981 coup was to restore both men to their previous offices. It is also possible that the government responded to strongly held perceptions within the military and among some AFRC leaders that senior command appointments under AFRC were disproportionately given to officers of Ewe ethnic background (both brigadiers were reported to be half-Ewe).

In a series of moves in 1980 and 1981, the government harassed, interrogated repeatedly, and arrested many officers and other ranks closely associated with the AFRC who had remained in Ghana. In the effort to discredit the AFRC within and outside the armed forces, Military Intelligence (MI) and other security agencies undertook repeated smear campaigns through widely distributed anonymous leaflets that warned of coup plots by Ewe officers. In June 1981, all AFRC members and associates, in Ghana or abroad, were summarily retired. Rawlings, his lieutenants, and many sympathizers ordered this — in tandem with the government's hostility to the purported gains of June 4 — as a pernicious betrayal of the meaning and reality of the AFRC's effort. Rawlings was particularly incensed at the harsh repressive treatment meted out to the rank-and-file soldiers who, in launching the AFRC and carrying out its housecleaning of corrupt and malevolent military and civilian leaders had, he believes, performed an invaluable public service. His fury at these actions led him to denounce Limann government repression as his major indictment of the regime in his coup announce-

ment, although the government's harshness was devoted exclusively to these AFRC activists. Rawlings' loyalty to the ranks is powerful and reciprocated by many.

Efforts to recreate order and discipline in the armed forces included measures to reinforce officer authority, improve pay and conditions of service, retraining programs, and extensive MI surveillance of officers and other ranks. The several major instances of army and air force officer and other rank violent attacks upon police and civilians in the last months of 1979, prompting a four-day police strike in protest, did not reoccur. Rawlings denounced the equality and purposes of the reimposition of officer authority over other ranks, calling it a "master-slave relationship." Rawlings had learned, he said, that the maintenance of master-slave relationships in the armed forces enabled governments to use the military to repress ordinary Ghanaians.

Rawlings' second coup, December 31, 1981, was a manifest measure of the failure of the government and the military to remove AFRC sympathizers or to rebuild a cohesive military organization with a resurrected officer authority and confident relations between officers and other ranks. It was a coup initiated by Rawlings and some ex-AFRC associates outside the military

that drew upon men from the same units that launched the June 4, 1979 mutiny — the Fifth Battalion, Reece (armored car) Squadron, and the air force. The degree of officer, as distinct from other rank, involvement in support of Rawlings is not known. But there is evidence that there was a fear among some officers of a repetition of the June 4 anti-officer hostility of other ranks and that officer-led opposition to the coup was negligible.

Lastly, the Limann government sought increasingly through calculated press and MI campaigns of rumors, lies, and harassment to sharply diminish the public support for and image of Fl. Lt. Rawlings. This reflected the government's fear of Rawlings and a response to Rawling's frequent public criticisms of the Limann government's unsuccessful efforts to hold down prices, check black market sales, make available essential commodities, deal with strikes reasonably, and otherwise restore the economy. Rawlings pointedly expressed his disappointment with the PNP's disinterest in mobilizing Ghanaians: "We had converted a craving for blood [of administrators, businessmen] into a poised-to-be-productive state" — Limann just defused it. Neither Limann nor Rawlings was able to attribute good faith and good intentions to one another. Limann was orderly, methodical, slow, and ap-



Drying cocoa beans: Farmers have been smuggling cocoa abroad for higher prices

Photo: Ghana Info

parently undynamic in trying to rebuild the capabilities of Ghana's public institutions, whose qualities of debility, incompetence, lethargy, and resource scarcity are apparent to all Ghanaians. Rawlings, in contrast, is exhortative, impatient with institutional incompetence, and antagonistic to Ghana's lawyers, professionals, managers, and merchants who profited while others suffered. Rawlings possesses an apparently genuine populist faith in the ability of Ghana's popular classes to overcome Ghana's degeneration and make the economy work. The two years out of power have further radicalized Rawlings. It is a measure less of rhetoric than of his vision of change that he speaks regularly of the need of Ghana's youth, skilled students, workers, soldiers, and police to mobilize themselves, although Rawlings continues to identify overwhelmingly with the military. In 1980, he launched a "June 4th Movement" to mobilize students and workers at the grass-roots, which had been able to gather some activists, but not a mass following. Despite government efforts, Rawlings out of power was enormously popular among Ghanaians, and the military was decidedly not.

THE ECONOMY: DEPRESSION AND THE DILEMMAS OF CHOICE

The most critical choices facing the Limann/PNP government during 1979-81 involved how to generate recovery in Ghana's highly depressed, hyperinflationary economy while coping with multiple contradictory policy pressures from the consuming public, party leaders and MPs, armed and civilian bureaucrats, farmers and wage/salary workers, and unions. Under Limann, the economy deteriorated still further by all measures. Given the disastrous state of Ghana's economy in 1979, any policy choices the Limann government took would have increased near-term crises in some economic sectors and eroded urban living standards. Some choices were more costly in political and economic terms than others, however. The PNP government selected a series of moderately reformist, expansionary policies without dealing with Ghana's severe structural imbalances; it avoided high immediate political costs but made medium-term prospects worse. Tougher short-term policy choices would have risked more rapid urban price increases but have permitted medium to long-term eco-

nomie recovery. The government felt that it was not strong enough to correct the corrosive overvaluation of the cedi that generated black marketeering and smuggling, a bias against exports and for imports, and a redistribution of incomes from productive to trading activities. A corrective policy would have generated a flow of hard currency credits and grants to finance the imports needed to increase Ghana's depleted productive facilities and physical infrastructure (e.g., roads). Rawlings and the PNDC face precisely the same choices, although Rawlings appears less willing to recognize and act on them than did the Limann government.

The sources of Ghana's economic malaise are multiple and interrelated. First, economic growth was negative during 1970-79. Gross domestic product per capita declined on average over 3% per year. Secondly, there were sustained balance-of-payments deficits, with persistent arrears in short-term debts, which rose from \$376.8 million in late 1978 to \$438.5 million in late 1979, reducing Ghana's ability to obtain private credit abroad. Third, a sharp decline in the production of major exports — cocoa, gold, diamonds, and timber — occurred in the 1970s, sharply reducing Ghana's ability to import capital equipment, spare parts, and essential consumer goods. Severe persistent shortages of them have sharply reduced Ghana's domestic production. Fourth, there was a persistent decline in the volume of cocoa production available for purchase, in large measure because of the decline in real prices offered by the state monopoly buyer. Average cocoa purchases during the four crop years 1969-1973 were 419,000 metric tons; during 1976-1980, 288,000 metric tons. In 1972, cocoa farmers were paid per load 78% of what they received in 1963; in 1979, only 49%. Farmers have thus smuggled cocoa abroad for higher prices, with large losses to Ghana in foreign exchange, or shifted permanently into higher priced food production.

Fifth, official indices indicated an average increase in inflation of 116% in 1977, 74% in 1978, and 54% in 1979. Under Limann, prices increased by 88% in the 12 months prior to December 1980, and by 121% in the 12



Photo: Ghana Info

In the 1970s, a sharp decline in production of major exports including gold reduced imports of essentials

months prior to August 1981. Inflation had shifted income massively not into more productive hands but largely to traders and food farmers, who benefited from local food cost increases. Sixth, inflation was largely generated by chronic government budget deficits financed by money supply increases. Deficits as a percentage of revenue were 136% in 1977-78, reduced to 46% in 1978-79. Seventh, Ghana has experienced one of the lowest rates of gross domestic savings and investment among developing countries — 6% and 5% of gross domestic product, respectively, in 1978, making real increases in production impossible. Ghana has also had difficulty attracting foreign aid to supplement low domestic savings. However, even aid offered could not be absorbed or used productively because of deterioration in the economy and the lack of skilled personnel to prepare projects, due in part to Ghana's massive brain drain. Ghana was offered \$140 million during 1976-80 under the European Economic Community's aid program, but by mid-1981 only 25% of it had been put to use, though 90% had been allocated. Lastly, the terms of trade were moving against Ghana in the late 1970s, as world prices for gold and cocoa declined sharply. Cocoa prices reached their peak in 1977; the average world price declined by 41% during 1977-79 and, under Limann, another 36% from 1979 to 1981.

Under the best of conditions, the Limann government could have done relatively little over the short-term to reactivate the Ghanaian economy after a decade of decline in productive capacities, hyperinflation that fed continuing wage demands, and deterioration in all public services and physical infrastructure. Moreover, the government was under strong public and party pressure to expand economic activity and employment, contain price increases, import consumer goods for the totally depleted stocks of Ghana's stores and markets, and import capital goods and spare parts for industries that were shut down or running at 25% of capacity.

Government policies were initially not disastrous; they sought to increase foreign aid flows; find foreign private investment for industries in which there




Photo: Ghana Info

Limann's agricultural program quickly fizzled

had been, in effect, low or negative investment for years, as in the gold mines; reduce or contain subsidies to some unproductive state corporations; expand government budgetary allocation to agriculture and transport; allocate scarce foreign exchange to priority productive sectors; and contain government employee wage demands that could only be met by larger budget deficits (hence illusory wage gains).

But the Limann government also made crucial misjudgments, some under strong political pressure. When the Limann/PNP government came to office in late 1979, instead of emphasizing the sacrifices that would have to be made, it promised to "flood the market" with consumer goods, thus providing needed supplies and reducing prices through ending scarcities. It had no resources to do this. By catering to political demands when it was still strong, it became entangled in the politics of distribution, undertaking, for instance, to distribute some essential commodities through MPs and "constituency allocation committees," a procedure that was inherently inefficient and magnified opportunities for corruption.

Because of the institutional weakness in the Ministry of Agriculture, it was mid-1980 before an agricultural program could be designed and it quickly fizzled. Much higher levels of production in cocoa, coffee, and rice could have been achieved through in-

creasing producer prices, which the Limann government declined to do until November 1981. By 1980, cocoa farmers were being paid in real terms per load 33% of the price they received in 1963; in 1981, only 14%. The 1980-81 cocoa crop, at 258,000 metric tons, was Ghana's lowest since the late 1950s. Many farmers just declined to harvest their crops. And the effect of the overvalued cedi had so starved the Cocoa Marketing Board of funds that it no longer had the equipment to evacuate the crop, over half of which had not been removed by the beginning of the 1981-82 season. This, with low world cocoa prices, led to an estimated 40% decline in Ghana's 1981 export earnings and a 32% decline in its imports, thus aggravating still further shortages, black-marketeering, and inflation.

Despite strong civil servant pressures and industrial strikes, the Limann government had been able to resist large increases in government wages until it was made public in September 1980 that the MPs had determined to award themselves annual incomes of \$18,000 per year, roughly 38 times the \$1.50 per day minimum wage or 13.5 times the entering civil service salary for a college graduate. Shortly thereafter, the government was compelled to announce a tripling of the minimum wage, which drastically inflated the budget deficit, compounding inflationary impulses. Substantial ministerial

incompetence and lack of intergovernmental coordination turned the Black Star Line marine officers' strike in 1980 into a prolonged idling of the entire fleet. Limann himself, through CPP "old guard" pressures, was responsible for some appointments to state corporations of people of proven incompetence.

Ultimately, however, the Limann government's greatest failure was its refusal to acknowledge the perverse impact of the continued drastic overvaluation of the cedi and partially effective price control on the distribution of resources. (The official exchange rate of the cedi in 1979 was \$1 = c2.75; actual market exchange rate in 1980 was \$1 = c20-25; in July 1981, \$1 = c30, in December 1981, \$1 = c40-42.) These in tandem contributed to the continuing collapse or underutilization of existing industries, massive smuggling of goods abroad for higher prices, shortages, and a flourishing black market. The latter reduced greatly the legitimacy of the Limann government and democracy, not only because of high prices but because Ghanaians could see that profiteering was rampant. Price controls on wholesale industry prices shifted income massively to traders, who could not be taxed and whom it was almost impossible to deter because of the windfall profits.

Factories had to sell products at wholesale control prices; the goods were frequently diverted to black market trade in Ghana, or smuggled to Togo, as were Firestone tires (Firestone left its business in Ghana in 1981). Traders profited. Factories had to pay inflated costs (relative to earnings) for labor and domestic and imported inputs, and lost money consistently and could reinvest nothing, as had been the case with Ghana's timber factories.

The argument for devaluation is not that it would increase international demand for Ghana's major exports, but increase the effective price to local producers, providing incentives for reinvestment and production. Equally the argument for lifting price controls that are ineffective at the retail level is to give profits to producers, not traders. Even medicines were diverted to the black market so that patients at Korle

Bu hospital in Accra had to bring them with them or purchase them from traders in the hallways. The arguments against devaluation were that it would increase too drastically prices of imported goods and those with import components, generating public outrage and a coup. Ghana got both anyway. Ghanaians argued frequently that their past devaluations had been ineffective and always generated coups. Ghana has had three devaluations — mid-1967, December 1971, and July-September 1979. Only the 1971 one resulted in a coup.

RAWLINGS' SECOND COMING

Rawlings confronts two essential tasks: (1) to regenerate the Ghanaian economy, which, as noted, will be neither simple nor painless to Ghanaians; and (2) to build a stable power base for this task and a broad coalition of support to carry it out.

Rawlings' "moral economy" approach lays more stress on tolerable prices and the availability of commodities than on structural and financial conditions conducive for production. Rawlings and the PNDC have initially emphasized a mobilizational approach to coping with Ghana's central problems: coordinating students, workers, and soldiers to evacuate cocoa, repair vehicles, make spare parts for idled machinery, control prices, monitor distribution of commodities, guard the border against smuggling, and induce producers and those engaged in services (e.g., drivers) to reduce prices. The central facet of Rawlings' message since 1979 is that Ghanaians must directly "take over the destiny of this country, your own destiny," through direct involvement. Rawlings' approach suggests a total disinterest in a stabilization program whose immediate consequences would involve a real decline in urban incomes.

Rawlings does not possess a stable power base, despite the initial support he can anticipate from many Ghanaians. He seized power with the assistance of ex-military associates and other ranks from several military units. The absence of any officers except Rawlings and his appointee as chief of the defense staff, Brig. Nunoo-Mensah, on the PNDC suggests the ab-

sence of a prominent role of serving officers in the coup. Rawlings is a committed military man, and through Brigadiers Nunoo-Mensah and Arnold Quainoo the armed services will be a basic and active, if unstable, bulwark of the regime.

Rawlings clearly envisages a central role for civilians in the regime. Moreover, through the June 4th Movement and local Defense Councils, he evidently intends to seek a mobilization "from below" of activist supporters among students, workers, and others. Two civilian members of the PNDC are a radical university student from Kumasi and an ex-GIHOC worker who was dismissed following the 1980 GIHOC workers' strike. Rawlings has not demonstrated an interest in seeking to build support through established organizations. He is very dubious about the representativeness of leaders of the trade union movement, despite their demonstrations on his behalf in early January 1982. However, the support of secondary and university students and unorganized workers is a weak reed on which to build a sustained attempt to mobilize socioeconomic change. More than most military men, Rawlings has the inclination to organize a broad political movement or party as a stable base for his regime. The appointment of civilians as ministers (called secretaries by the PNDC) to head government departments, PNDC membership, and the creation of local Defense Councils all indicate the desire to develop a civilian base. However, if Rawlings ignores or bypasses the powerful existing organizations of workers, teachers, businessmen, and professionals (who brought down Gen. Acheampong's government), he will activate significant opposition.

Rawlings' enormous popularity among some sectors of Ghanaians will enable him to generate enthusiasm and strong support for a while. The Ghanaian economy, however, has an unerring capacity for dissipating public support for rulers. Fl. Lt. Rawlings may then regard more soberly his declaration to Ghanaians on December 31, 1981 that "I am prepared to face a firing squad if what I try to do for the second time in my life does not meet the approval of Ghanaians." □

Mugabe's Balancing Act

BY TENDAYE KUMBULA

Shortly after independence on April 18, 1980, Cecil John Rhodes' once-dominant statue in downtown Salisbury was torn down and carted away. This, it turned out, was more than just a symbolic lashing out at a hated colonial reminder — as a Zimbabwean returning home for the first time in 17 years recently found out. Rhodesia — whose name honored the British mining magnate, empire-builder, dreamer, and the man whose will established the Rhodes scholarship — was renamed Zimbabwe at independence, signaling the end of a long and bloody struggle to eliminate repressive white minority rule in this idyllic southern African country.

That, however, was only the beginning of the changes that have engulfed the country within the past 21 months. Salisbury, the tree-lined capital whose blooming lavender jacaranda flowers have inspired many a writer to wax poetic, is getting a facelift, as it experiences an unprecedented boom resulting

from the end of the war and the advent of black rule.

There is a construction boom as hotels, houses, apartments, and office buildings go up. The once-serene capital, with its provincial airs, is being transformed into a bustling metropolitan center with a budding diplomatic community and endless foreign visitors. It has also become a required stopping center for those involved in trying to bring peace to Namibia or promoting the end of apartheid in South Africa.

The streets are filled with imported cars, as well as some rather ancient-looking British models. Salisbury now has its first black mayor and a black-dominated municipal council, whose membership embraces the city, the suburbs, and the formerly excluded and ignored townships. Before long, Salisbury, named after a former British prime minister, will lose its colonial name and be renamed Harare in honor of a former African chief.

At Zimbabwe House, official residence of the prime minister, Robert Mugabe and his Ghanaian-born wife Sally are the new occupants. They live in the same house once occupied by Bishop Abel T. Muzorewa, whose ill-fated premiership lasted only seven months, and before that, Ian Smith, the country's last white prime minister.

The elegant Meikles Hotel, where whites once enjoyed their daily sun-downers in quiet comfort and where the only blacks who were allowed were waiters, maids, janitors, and delivery personnel, has become a favorite watering hole for well-dressed blacks, some with bulging briefcases, wearing three-piece suits and imported shoes.

Across from the Meikles Hotel is Cecil Square, a popular park, which is equidistant from the hotel, Parliament House, and the Herald House, home of the country's major newspapers, the daily *Herald* and the *Sunday Mail*. Today more blacks than whites are found lounging in the park, and the police no longer harass blacks found in the formerly white park.

The society pages of the *Herald* and the *Sunday Mail* now hold pictures of newlywed blacks side-by-side with those of the whites, previously taboo, as African weddings were hardly acknowledged. Both the *Sunday Mail* and the *Herald*, as well as most other newspapers in the country that are under the parastatal Mass Media Trust, now boast black editors. Blacks have also moved up the ladder at the country's three radio stations and at the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation's lone television station, where black and white, male and female news anchorpersons have become an established way of life.

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At Meikles and its cousin, the newer Monomotapa Hotel, or at Jameson Hotel and at the numerous bars and nightspots, the sight of interracial dancing, dating, or drinking no longer turns heads. During the Smith days, a white woman found talking to a black man who was not her domestic servant was likely to be subjected to scorching racial epithets and obscenities.

Much of the credit for this emerging racial tolerance belongs to Prime Minister Mugabe. He shows no bitterness toward Ian Smith, the man who kept him and his colleagues in detention from 1964 to 1974, and even longer for some of Mugabe's cabinet ministers and members of Parliament. While Mugabe was in prison, his only son died, but Smith would not allow him to go to the funeral services. Yet today Mugabe meets with Smith and has made no effort to seek revenge. Smith leads the 20-member white opposition in the 100-member Parliament. He has mellowed in the things he says about Mugabe.

When Mugabe was leading the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (his party's military wing) from

exile in Mozambique, Smith and the Rhodesian whites generally described Mugabe as a "murderer," a "terrorist," and a Marxist ogre guilty of atrocious crimes. Today it is not unusual to hear whites who are laudatory about Mugabe and say they would not mind voting for him. Some of his strongest white supporters are farmers who have benefited tremendously from the country's agricultural boom.

Since becoming prime minister Mugabe has preached racial, ethnic, and partisan reconciliation, surprising those who had thought he would seek revenge if he came to power. During a recent interview at his official residence, he said his government's "most spectacular achievement" was the realization of peace and national reconciliation in a country that lost more than 27,000 people during the long guerrilla war. "We started with a situation replete with danger, under dangerous circumstances. There were three armies: that of ZANU, ZANLA, and that of ZAPU, ZIPRA, and that of the former Rhodesian regime, the Rhodesian Army. And so the main exercise," Mugabe said, "was really to establish a

single army out of these three disparate forces." He continued: "And of course we used definite tactics to allay the fears of our population, to create greater confidence, to assure those who thought that we wanted to cut off their heads, that we didn't mean any such thing," said Mugabe with a chuckle. Today there is a united Zimbabwe National Army.

The prime minister said his government tried to get the message across to everyone that there was no time for vindictiveness and that there would be no measures taken to "decapitate former enemies" or to seek revenge and reparations for "the evils done by the regime."

Mugabe said Zimbabwe had "excellent bilateral relations with the United States, even after the Reagan administration came to power. However, he was critical of what appears to be a Reagan tilt toward South Africa: "During the Carter administration, we established favorable relations with the United States, principally due to the participation by U.S. officials in the Anglo-American proposals, and also due to the fact that the U.S. was offering aid for rural development in the event of the achievement of independence in the country. However, after the Carter administration was thrown out of office and Reagan came to power, the Americans informed us that they were prepared to pursue the policy that had been pursued previously, that aid to Zimbabwe was going to continue, and that in respect to their southern African policy they would be pronouncing themselves in due course. But they told us they were opposed to apartheid," Mugabe said.

The Zimbabwe government, he said, was critical of the U.S. veto last September on a Security Council resolution to condemn South Africa for its August invasion of Angola. But Mugabe said Zimbabwe would suspend judgment because of assurances from Chester Crocker, the U.S. assistant secretary of state for African affairs, and William Clark, former deputy secretary of state and now national security adviser, that the Americans were not tilting toward South Africa and also that the American policy would be one of continued sup-



Photo: Margaret A. Novicki

Prime Minister Mugabe believes his "most spectacular achievement" is national reconciliation



Photo: Contact/United Nations

Zimbabwe's bumper maize crop is now feeding countries formerly dependent on South African exports

port for a Namibian settlement within the framework of UN Security Council Resolution 435.

Mugabe said that even if the Reagan administration wanted to, it could not successfully impose a Namibian settlement that was favorable to South Africa because of expected opposition from the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the African Frontline states (which now include Zimbabwe), the United Nations, the Commonwealth Conference, and the other members of the Western Contact Group — Britain, France, West Germany, and Canada. "And so, against that background, I can say that our policy, in spite of what has happened by way of indications that the Reagan administration seems to side with South Africa, has continued to be one of friendly bilateral relations with the United States," he said.

Mugabe said his country's relations with South Africa — its militarily, politically, and economically more pow-

erful neighbor to the south — were complicated by South Africa's racist policies and the country's destabilization attempts against Zimbabwe. These attempts include the training of about 5,000 dissidents, formerly members of Bishop Muzorewa's auxiliary forces, who will be used in an attempt to weaken or overthrow his government. Despite South African denial of the charges, Mugabe said some of the dissidents had in fact infiltrated back into Zimbabwe and had engaged in "acts of sabotage."

Mugabe said Zimbabwe, in concert with other members of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), is attempting to reduce its dependence on South Africa, increase its dependence and cooperation with other SADCC members, and switch more of its imports and exports from South African railways and harbors to Mozambican outlets. He explained: "We inherited certain histori-

cal ties of an economic nature with South Africa. We were not able to sever these relations immediately without incurring disaster here," Mugabe said. "All the oil that this country was getting came from South Africa. South Africa also had the routes and the harbors that this country was using for purposes of exporting her products and importing those wares that it needed. We also inherited certain relationships in regard to the transport system. South Africa had given to the Rhodesian railway system 25 locomotives [which have since been withdrawn]. They have betrayed favorable agreements they had gone into with Rhodesia. This is a sum total of the situation we inherited. And we couldn't be expected to sever relationships with South Africa overnight."

Reports persist that South Africa has deliberately slowed Zimbabwe imports and exports and reportedly keeps the country supplied with no more than a

five-day supply of oil. An attempt to reopen Zimbabwe's refinery pipeline in December was delayed when dissidents in Mozambique (said to be supported by South Africa) sabotaged the railway system that would have transported crude oil into Zimbabwe. Some Zimbabwe officials have charged South Africa with making it impossible for Zimbabwe to export its record corn crop, thereby depriving the country of badly needed foreign currency.

Zimbabwe would like to export at least 85 percent of its goods through Mozambican ports, as was the case in the 1970s before Mozambique imposed economic sanctions against the Smith regime.

Relations between Zimbabwe and South Africa have deteriorated steadily since the Mugabe government came to power. Diplomatic relations were severed. A preferential trade agreement between the two countries will lapse this year. Trade representatives in each other's country serve as the only formal link. And Zimbabwe's support of South African and Namibian liberation movements is hardly likely to endear the two countries to each other. The African National Congress of South Africa has an office, but no military bases, in Zimbabwe. South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) President Sam Nujoma visited Zim-

babwe in 1981 and participated in activities marking solidarity week with Namibia.

"And we ourselves are raising a Namibian fund, which we shall place at the disposal of SWAPO. We support, as I said, the liberation movements in South Africa and we make our contribution through the OAU. This is as far as we have gone and as far as we can go at the moment. There is tension between us and South Africa, tension arising out of South Africa's aggressive actions in the region," Mugabe said.

Overall, the prime minister said he was pleased with his first 21 months in office. He ticked off some of the achievements: peace throughout the country, a 14 percent rate of economic growth in 1980, the institution of a minimum wage for blacks, free health care for those earning \$150 a month or less, free primary education for all, increased secondary school opportunities, acquiring land to resettle those dislocated by the war, the end of all forms of racial segregation, the promotion of blacks into higher civil service positions, and record agricultural production.

"This year, agriculture is bound to be the main factor in the growth rate that we hope to achieve. We have had a bumper maize crop, bumper cotton crop, and a bumper tobacco crop, so ev-

everything is bumper. We are very happy about it and the countries of the world are delighted," Mugabe exclaimed. "In fact, they marvel at the manner in which we have gone about things here, and that within just one year of our independence, we have managed to feed countries to the north of us. Our maize now goes as far as Senegal, Zambia, Zaire, Kenya, and Tanzania. So we have done well."

During the Commonwealth conference in Melbourne, Australia, Mugabe said he asked Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher for more money to buy land to resettle landless blacks. He said Thatcher was going to review the situation.

"The way we look at it is as we resettle our people, give them land, we should ensure that in addition to getting more arable and grazing areas, the social services go alongside that. Education must play its part, the social services must come in, and water development must also take place. It is that global approach that delays things, but we are doing our best," he said.

When he led ZANU (Zimbabwe African National Union) from exile, Mugabe frightened white Rhodesians with his Marxist rhetoric and threats to turn the country into a socialist state. But since coming to power, the ascetic, intellectual former schoolteacher has proved to be a pragmatist. His Zimbabwe donors' conference early in 1981 attracted widespread support and netted the country more than \$1 billion in aid pledges.

He has not confiscated or nationalized white-owned land, preferring instead to buy and redistribute the land among land-hungry blacks. During the waning days of the Smith regime, land was equally divided between blacks and whites, even though there were more than 6.5 million blacks to about 270,000 whites. Segregationist land laws have been eliminated.

Both in the public and private sectors, the government is pushing Africanization and private companies have been told there must be localization. In government, there are now 14 African permanent secretaries, the highest civil service position, but they are still



Photo: Camerapix

Salisbury, to be renamed Harare, is enjoying a construction boom

slightly outnumbered by white permanent secretaries. However, expected retirements of some of these white civil servants should correct that problem by March or April, Mugabe said.

The prime minister has said he would not impose a one-party state without a referendum. A referendum may in fact be unnecessary because for all practical purposes, Zimbabwe is a de facto one-party state. In the 1980 elections, ZANU won 57 of the 80 black seats, 20 went to Joshua Nkomo's ZAPU, while Muzorewa's UANC could manage only three.

For all practical purposes, Muzorewa's party is finished. Barring unforeseen changes, ZAPU is not likely to provide much of a political challenge to ZANU. Support for Smith's party is limited to the remaining 180,000 whites, whose numbers are decreasing at the rate of about 1,500 a month, as more of them head south to the land of apartheid.

Mugabe still identifies himself as a socialist, but said he was taking a gradual approach. "Now with respect to our own political, socialist policies, we have hardly started implementing them. We believe that we should first lay a basis for this implementation and the basis is in the industrial sector, the sector that employs labor. We must develop our working class," Mugabe said, "and raise its consciousness and ensure that conditions of service that apply to workers are favorable. We want to build the working class, therefore, because it is the working class that we hope will in the future acquire the means of production in the various sectors."

Towards that goal, workers are being organized into workers' committees and councils, and management is being sensitized so that it can be responsive to worker demands, complaints, and grievances. Peasants are being offered plots of land where they can farm together and sell their products through cooperatives. Mugabe hastened to add, "This policy is not by compulsion. It is by persuasion and education."

Zimbabwe today is a happier, quieter, and safer place than it was during the war. The scars from the war are being quietly erased. But there are ob-

stacles ahead. Zimbabwean women who participated in the struggle are unlikely to agree with being shunted aside now that freedom has come. There are women in the cabinet and in Parliament. During my five-week stay in



Joshua Nkomo's party holds only 25 percent of the black seats

Photo: Camerapix

Zimbabwe, women participated quite freely in newspaper columns and other fora on such topics as the payment of *lobola* (bride price), working outside the home, and sex discrimination on the job.

Last October, there were scattered protests and a strike in Salisbury and other cities by teachers and nurses demanding more money and better working conditions. Some of the strikers even based their grievances on the ZANU election manifesto's promises.

With the exception of modified gasoline rationing (service stations were restricted to selling gas between 6 a.m. and 6 p.m. daily and up to noon on Saturdays), there was no visible shortage of consumer goods. Stores and supermarket shelves were bulging with sugar, tea, corn meal, beef, pork, chicken, eggs, cooking oil, bread, and margarine. Prices were generally reasonable, except for gasoline, which was going for about \$4 per gallon.

However, some of the recalcitrant

whites could yet sabotage the prime minister's reconciliation campaign. Some diehard whites have proclaimed that as far as they are concerned, Rhodesia lives on and they have even attempted to save souvenirs commemorating Smith's illegal November 11, 1965, unilateral declaration of independence.

There are some whites unwilling to give up their former supremacy. They are unwilling to send their children to the same schools as blacks, to have black neighbors in the suburbs, to accept blacks as equals, to be treated by black doctors or attended by black nurses in integrated hospitals, to have black supervisors, no matter how qualified, or to accept black members in their clubs.

Some whites who in the past supported free education and free health care for whites are up in arms at the idea of paying higher taxes to support free primary education for blacks and free health care for those earning \$150 a month or less.

In Salisbury, there are frequent complaints that some real estate agents are refusing to rent apartments to black tenants, often by claiming that the units have been taken, then turning around and accepting white tenants.

Some blacks, especially on farms, have complained that they have been derogatorily referred to as "kaffirs" and they have been insulted by whites who claim not to accept Mugabe's government as the legitimate government of Zimbabwe. An angry Mugabe has reportedly said blacks should not tolerate being called "kaffirs" by anybody.

While the overall racial climate has improved — partly because many whites know the standard of living that they enjoy in Zimbabwe cannot be duplicated elsewhere — there are some right-wing diehards who will never accept black rule. But as Zimbabwe completes its second year of independence, such recalcitrant whites are likely to come up against an increasingly assertive black population and a black government that is determined to demonstrate that Zimbabwe is not South Africa, and that Mugabe, not Ian Smith, is the prime minister and the official occupant of Zimbabwe House. □

Black Politics in South Africa

BY JOHN SEILER

Images come first when dealing with South African black politics. Steve Biko, near death, naked under blankets in the back of a police Land-Rover en route from Port Elizabeth to Pretoria. Hector Petersen, the first black youngster killed in Soweto's 1976 violence, held like a baby in the arms of a weeping young woman. The archetypal scene at political trials, in which the defendants raise clenched fists and cry "amandla" to which the black audience responds "ngawethu." Masses of blacks walking to work in gray industrial areas. Black families living in crowded, impoverished townships houses.

Repression. Unpredictable and often mindless police torture. Legal and economic intimidation. An enormous potentiality to be tapped by black nationalism. Any adequate analysis must take these human images into account, but it must also ask some basic questions about the evolution of black nationalism in South Africa. Why has it survived so long? Why did it fail to attract active support from any significant number of urban blacks — those presumably most attracted to its arguments — until Soweto and its aftermath? What is its present state and its foreseeable future? The various books and monographs cited at the end of this article contribute to a better understanding of these questions.

The long history of black nationalism in South Africa demonstrates that the continued frustration and humiliation of educated blacks has been the most important impetus for their involvement in nationalist activities. It is not surprising, when the origins of nationalist movements elsewhere in Africa up to the end of World War II are recollected, that South African black nationalism was led by moderate or even conservative men and had little ideological content. As Gail Gerhart points out,

even in the socially volatile years at the end of World War II, the ANC Youth League remained a tiny organization that never succeeded in controlling the parent movement, although its ideas influenced the PAC's founding and have found a new home in the current black consciousness movement.

The ANC itself never secured continuous active support from urban black workers, even at the height of its popularity in the 1950s. The regime's thorough repression of black political activity cannot explain entirely this failure. Significant variations in regional support for ANC activities during both the 1950s and 1960s also need explanation. The Eastern Cape, in particular the Port Elizabeth and East London industrial areas, had by far the greatest activity, far outpacing the much-larger Witwatersrand. The long-term influence of mission education might account best for both the extent of participation there and the extraordinary quality of regional nationalist leadership, but even in the Eastern Cape occasional leadership naiveté and incompetence made police infiltration and destruction of active nationalist organizations far easier.

Throughout both decades, mass political activity was expressed almost always in sporadic and spontaneous strikes or demonstrations that nationalist leaders never succeeded in capturing and channeling. The 1973 Durban strikes fit this pattern. According to the sympathetic analysis done by the Durban-based Institute for Industrial Education, neither the traditional ANC nor its newer competitors, the black consciousness groups and Gatsha Buthezi's KwaZulu government, played a significant role in the origins or the evolution of the strikes.

Even the 1976 Soweto student strikes, as reported by John Kane-Berman, began without direction from

ANC or other established black leaders. Subsequently, the ANC tried to take credit for the strikes and to utilize them and their student leaders for ANC political purposes. In fact, student leadership gave credibility to the Black Parents Association and its successor, the Committee of Ten.

Steve Biko's extended public testimony for the defense at the South African Students' Organization-Black People's Convention (SASO-BPC) trial in early May 1976 must have had some impact on Soweto students. And once the strikes began, ANC encouragement might also have served as a significant factor, but the continued strike focus on the language issue and the Soweto Students' Representative Council (SSRC) statements suggest strongly that broader nationalist political goals were almost irrelevant compared to the immediate educational issues and student outrage at police violence on June 16 and subsequent days.

Although student strikes were successful in most major cities (but were not tried in Durban) and in many smaller towns, student efforts to generate work boycotts usually fell apart after one or at most two partially successful days. Despite strenuous organizing effort and occasional intimidation, most employed blacks were primarily sensitive to their job security. Urban black preoccupation with immediate economic issues remains a primary explanation for their reluctance to give any active support to black nationalist activities. Periodic opinion surveys done since 1973, including one reported in the Johannesburg *Star's* international weekly edition of December 20, 1980, testify to the impact of upward or downward economic shifts on black attitudes about their personal and familial prospects.

Despite this evidence of limited success in the organization of black

nationalism, black consciousness has brought black politics in South Africa (as Gerhart concludes) a new and not altogether predictable phase. Starting on black university campuses at the end of the 1960s as a protest against the equivocation of cooperative ventures with white liberal students, SASO was its first organizational context and Steve Biko, among a group of outstanding students, its embodiment. More than anyone else among his contemporaries, and more than most South Africans, Biko projected an openness and creativity of spirit, a lucidity in expression, and simple human courage. His impact was enormous. By the early 1970s, black consciousness dominated student thinking in universities, seminaries, and schools throughout the country. It underlay student protests at Turfloop in 1972 and 1974. It fueled student activities at the Federal Seminary in Alice, which in turn led to government eviction of the seminary and its troubled removal first to Transkei and then to KwaZulu. It took a variety of intellectual forms. Among them, in works cited here, are Bengu and Buthelezi's emphasis on the reinvigoration of traditional Zulu cultural and political forms, Boesak's exploration of its theological implications, and Manganyi's analysis of its psychological and psychiatric aspects. Its organizational evolution was almost as widespread, starting with the 1971 formation of the Black People's Convention (BPC) and the organization of the South African Students' Movement (SASM) and the Black Community Programs. The BPC, in particular, in its brief legal life, published a number of insightful essays by blacks and established a model health center in King William's Town. Biko, banned to that town from 1973 until his final arrest in 1977, played an active role in setting the spirit of that center which still serves as a prototype for similar development projects elsewhere in rural South Africa.

But at least until 1980, black consciousness had little impact on black workers, perhaps because of their failure to recognize its relevance to their situation or the inability of students to successfully convey that relevance. Only with the relatively concerted

strikes in the last half of 1980, and the current efforts by black unionists to organize in a way that combines attention to immediate issues with a broader preoccupation with traditional nationalist aims, has black consciousness begun to win a wider black audience.

It is at this uncertain point that the dilemmas and the hope for black politics rest. The traditional assumption — ironically shared by the ANC and the South African government — that a causal link existed between nationalist goals and black political activity has been convincingly repudiated. Nor is there much persuasion to the liberal hope that black political activity will be totally confined to essentially peaceful methods leading to evolutionary social change. Neither the means nor the out-

come of black politics can be altogether clear, and given the divergent interests of the ANC, the government, and business elites, and the remarkable continuing upsurge of new black leaders in every conflict situation, *control* of black politics will remain a contentious issue for a long time.

My own hope is that the new leaders gain and keep maximal control of their own political situations, because South African politics can only benefit from a strong infusion of issue-oriented, community-centered, modernizing black leaders. Despite the difficulties for U.S. government policy and for the policies of U.S. corporations and private organizations in deciding at what points and to which people to give support, the existence of this new leader-

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ship provides an element of hope for constructive political change not existent before Soweto.

Of course, this self-generated increase in black political participation cannot in itself bring about longer-term political change. It depends in large part on the responsiveness of the South African government and the South African business community. Both need to be far more trusting — in their own self-interests — than they have been to date. And this focus on incremental local change is not intended to obscure the goal of effective black participation in national political life. Nonetheless, that such hope can reasonably exist, growing out of Soweto's ashes and the tragedy of Steve Biko's death, is in itself remarkable and worthy of full encouragement and support.

Books and Monographs Reviewed

Millard Arnold, editor, *Steve Biko: Black Consciousness in South Africa* (New York: Random House, 1978).

Arnold provides a useful introduction to the full text of Biko's testimony for the defense at the 1976 SASO-BPC trial, an occasion that he used for an extraordinarily frank public presentation of the concept and practical implications of black consciousness.

S.M.E. Bengu, *Chasing Gods Not Our Own* (Pietermaritzburg: Shuter & Shooter, 1976).

The published version of Bengu's Ph.D. thesis for the University of Geneva focuses entirely on the impact of colonial institutions and culture on Africans in pre-independent Ghana and Nigeria, but it is a useful guide to the attitudes that he later brought to his work as the first secretary-general of Inkatha and a professor at the University of Zululand.

Black Community Programs: Durban. Before its proscription and eventual dissolution, the BCP published a number of monographs that reflect views critical of white-dominated policies and institutions in South Africa. Among them are the following: B. S. Biko, editor, *Black Viewpoint*, 1972; Thoko Mbanjwa, editor, *Black Review 1974/1975*; Thoko Mbanjwa, editor, *Black Viewpoint No. 2: Detente*, 1975; Thoko Mbanjwa, editor, *Black Viewpoint No. 3: Apartheid—Hope or Despair for Blacks?*, 1976; *Black Viewpoint No. 4: Transkei Independence*, 1976.

Allan Boesak, *Farewell to Innocence: A Social-Ethical Study of Black Theology, and Black Power* (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1977).

Although a scholarly theological discus-

sion, the language is accessible. Boesak sees the heart of black theology in an African proverb: "One is only human because of others, with others, for others."

Barney Desai and Cardiff Marney, *The Killing of the Imam* (London: Quartet Books, 1978).

A retelling of the detention and death under torture of Imam Abdulla Haron, leader of Cape Town's Muslim community, in 1969. Although much of the dialogue and the presentation of the imam's thoughts during detention are fictional constructions, the basic facts and the mood conveyed appear accurate and chilling.

Gail M. Gerhart, *Black Power in South Africa: The Evolution of an Ideology* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978).

An intriguing and well-written analysis of the origins and development of the "Africanist" thread in black nationalism, which began with the ANC Youth League, evolved into the PAC, and intellectually influenced the black consciousness movement. Extraordinarily good research.

John Kane-Berman, *Soweto: Black Revolt, White Reaction* (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1978).

A very close examination of the events leading to the Soweto student riots and the subsequent developments, in which government policy and its administration gets the basic blame. Although written in a prosaic way and not well organized, the very absence of an analytical focus leaves the facts more apparent and makes convenient ideological explanations more awkward. One important fact: despite its criticisms of Pretoria, this book was widely sold in the Republic, including a number of the major bookstores in Pretoria itself.

N. Chabani Manganyi, *Being-Black-in-the-World* (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1973).

***Mashungu's Reverie and Other Essays* (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1977).**

Manganyi, a clinical psychologist who did his postdoctoral work at Yale and is now dean of arts at the University of Transkei, explores in a variety of ways — some very personal, some very abstruse — the nature of black frustration and alienation and the potential healing impact of black consciousness.

P.G. Maré, editor, *The Durban Strikes, 1973* (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1974, published for the Institute for Industrial Education).

By far the most thorough and insightful description and analysis of the strikes that spread through Natal with almost no influence from nationalist organizations.

G.M. Nkondo, editor, *Turfloop Testimony* (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1976).

Nkondo, who was in 1974 chairman of the black academic staff association at Turf-

loop, provides a brief introduction and the text of the testimony given by the BASA to the Snyman Commission investigating the student disturbances at Turfloop in September 1974. The testimony makes painfully clear the range of discriminatory practices toward both students and staff, now eased very much by the appointment of blacks as rector and as members of the university council.

South African Institute of Race Relations: *Johannesburg, South Africa in Travail: The Disturbances of 1976/77, 1978.*

The testimony of the SAIRR to the Cillie commission of inquiry into the riots at Soweto and elsewhere in June 1976.

Aelred Stubbs, editor, *Steve Biko: I Write What I Like* (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1978).

A very useful collection of speeches and articles (mostly reprinted from the SASO Newsletter) starting with his speech to the 1969 formation conference of SASO and ending with an informal interview about facing death, given shortly before his final detention in 1977. In addition, Stubbs, an Anglican priest who served in the Eastern Cape, provides a very personal memoir of his recollections of Biko that gives an extra dimension of insight into his situation, his attitudes, and his work.

Ben Temkin, *Gatsha Buthelezi: Zulu Statesman* (Cape Town: Purnell, 1976).

A prosaic and overly adulatory biography, obviously written with Buthelezi's cooperation, which does provide a great deal of useful information about the man's background and general development.

Thoahlane Thoahlane, editor, *Black Renaissance: Papers from the Black Renaissance Convention, December 1974* (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1975).

A number of vigorous papers by blacks on the general theme of black consciousness.

J.G.E. Wolfson, editor, *Turfloop at Turfloop* (Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1976).

A summary of two important reports bearing on the governance of the University of the North: the Jackson report which focused on the Africanization of the University; and the Snyman report of the official commission appointed by the government to investigate Turfloop student unrest in September 1974.

Donald Woods, *Biko* (New York: Vintage Books, 1979).

A useful memoir, taken together with the Arnold and Stubbs books cited above. Woods knew Biko for only a few years, unlike Stubbs, and tends often unconsciously to project naive notions of black life characteristic of South African white liberals. In short, the reader may learn more about Woods than he requires and less about Biko than from Stubbs. □

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
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
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