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3rd Quarter, 1983

Editor's Note

When four articles on the current situation in Zambia became available to us within a few months of one another — and all received positive response from our editorial consultants — we were delighted at the prospect of providing an in-depth look within a single issue at a country which, except for Tim Shaw's article on Zambian foreign policy in Vol. 26, No. 4, we have sorely neglected in recent years. All four were set in type, but to our initial regret there proved to be space for only three. The dilemma was resolved when we realized that one of the four, an article by Guy Gran on rural development, could appropriately be coupled with a report by Frank Holmquist on changes in rural development policy in neighboring Tanzania. Look for them in our next issue, which we expect to have in your hands before the first of March.

In this issue we present James R. Scarritt's article first because it contains a comprehensive survey and evaluation of the literature in the field over the past decade, including many journal articles and several books not previously reviewed in our pages. Jane L. Parpart and Timothy M. Shaw follow with a thoughtful and provocative analysis of class struggle in Zambia since independence, and Klaas Woldring surveys the problems of inefficiency and corruption, and discusses the resulting social unrest.

As we look ahead to 1984 we see issues developing on Rural Resettlement Policies for Refugees in Africa, Urbanization in Africa, and on Libya, one of Africa's most-maligned nations. Other possible themes are emerging from papers presented at the December meeting of the African Studies Association in Boston and several manuscripts now in the review process. And, without scrimping on article space, we hope to see in print a considerable backlog of important book reviews.

As ever, we need your continued support. Gifts are always welcome, and are tax-deductible. Prompt renewal and new subscriptions are appreciated. More importantly we urge those who teach, wherever possible, to forego the temptation to submit our pages to the ubiquitous copy machines and instead to send us bulk orders for back issues for use in the classroom. We believe this issue and the preceding double issue on Namibia are especially adaptable for this purpose.

We also call your attention to the inside of the back cover, where you will find an announcement of AFRICA TODAY's 1984 summer tour to Egypt and Kenya. Please inform your students and your friends of this opportunity. We will be happy to supply reprints of this announcement in any quantity you might care to request for posting on bulletin boards or inclusion in departmental newsletters, etc. Please note that our ad in the last issue incorrectly listed the starting date as June 6 rather than Jan. 16. The ad in this issue has been corrected.

Edward A. Hawley

The Analysis of Social Class, Political Participation, and Public Policy in Zambia

James R. Scarritt

In the last few years there have been a number of studies dealing with the processes of class formation and conflict in Zambia and the interaction between these processes and both political participation and public policy. This body of literature is now sufficiently large and diverse that it merits a detailed examination to acquaint readers with its scope, to determine the significance of the theoretical and empirical disagreements within it, and to pinpoint specific topics which merit further research. After a brief theoretical introduction, this article will survey first the different conceptions of class structure and processes in Zambia which have been presented in recent studies, and then, more briefly, the findings of these studies on the interaction among class, political participation, and public policy.

Stating the most important theoretical issues involved in conceptualizing class processes and in specifying the relationships among class, participation, and policy in Zambia at the outset will provide a useful structure for the discussion which follows. First, there is the nature of class, involving several more specific issues. There is a widespread consensus that a potentially dominant class is in the process of formation in Zambia, but there is less agreement on the social base of this class. Although classes have traditionally been identified with economic production relationships and the distribution of wealth, some recent class analyses of Zambia and other African countries have emphasized the primacy of power and the polity as the basis of the emerging dominant class in economically dependent African societies.¹

There is further disagreement over how exactly the Zambian class structure can be specified at this time. Since this structure is not fully formed and is changing relatively rapidly, it is sometimes suggested that sec-

1. This point is made forcefully in Richard L. Sklar, "The Nature of Class Domination in Africa," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 17 (December 1979) pp. 536-37.

tions, fractions, or elements within classes are more significant determinants of behavior than classes themselves, but there is also no consensus on whether these subdivisions of classes can be specified. These uncertainties lead many analysts to focus on organized groups, which may or may not represent distinct classes or subdivisions thereof. Class theorists generally agree that classes involve dynamic relationships rather than static positions, and some believe that any attempt to specify classes, sections, etc. will distort or fail to capture this dynamic and relational nature of class phenomena.

Differences over the nature of class conflict and class alliances follow from those disagreements already discussed. It is sometimes suggested that conflicts among subdivisions of the only partially formed privileged class, or among organized groups within it, are more important conflicts between this class and subordinate classes. The former type of conflict may lead to alliances, probably temporary, between dominant class fractions and specific subordinate classes.

There is substantial agreement in the literature under review that mobilization of individuals and groups for political participation is the most important technique for gaining and exercising power in Zambia, where incomplete class formation limits the effectiveness of class hegemony — the ability of a dominant class to control through socialization the implicit limits which both policy-makers and citizens place on the range of policy alternatives that they consider. Participation usually takes place within groups, and whether or not groups pursue class or subclass goals depends upon the class composition and class consciousness of their leadership and membership. Groups whose membership is drawn from both the emerging dominant class and other classes may serve as instruments for restricting mass political participation and fostering the interests of the emerging dominant class. Extensive participation by the less privileged classes in conscious pursuit of their class interests has not occurred in Zambia to any significant extent. Many members of these classes are difficult to mobilize because they are unaware of opportunities to participate or do not believe that it is possible to attain their goals through participation. Mobilization of the less privileged classes would be likely to result in countermobilization by those in support of the existing order and, consequently, in severe conflict.²

2. Patrick E. Ollawa points out that the concept of participation as it is understood by the ruling party in Zambia and other African one-party states is broader and, at the same time, more focused than participation as it is understood in Western capitalist democracies. It is broader in that it includes all activities of citizens in which public policies are implemented rather than including only attempts to influence government; it is more focused around the ideological goals of the regime and policies designed to implement these goals. The generalizations made about participation in the preceding paragraph are applicable to participation defined in this way, although the specific conditions which affect the variables contained in them are different. The significance which Ollawa attributes to differing definitions of participation is not clear. See his *Participatory Democracy in Zambia: The Political Economy of National Development* (Iltiscombe, Devon, England: Arthur H. Stockwell Ltd., 1979), pp. 25-50.

Public policies are binding rules which are applicable to all members of a society; they almost inevitably involve the allocation of rewards and costs among various categories of citizens. If policies and the ideological pronouncements associated with them meet the demands of classes, subdivisions of classes, or organized groups and, in the long run, contribute to class and group formation, these policies will generate support from the benefitted classes and groups for the polity which produces them. Support from those classes and groups which control the greatest amounts of wealth and power, and with which policy-makers identify, is more important to the latter than support from other classes and groups. These generalizations are exemplified repeatedly in the literature on Zambia, although there is disagreement within that literature over which fractions of the emerging dominant class receive the highest rewards from the overall pattern of public policy and pay the lowest costs relative to their rewards.

Class Structure and Processes

A number of authors offer general conceptualizations of class structure and processes in Zambia. Robert Molteno and William Tordoff state, in the conclusion of *Politics in Zambia*, the most significant study of the country's first eight years of independence, that

... classes obviously do exist in Zambia, both objectively and as subjectively conscious groups. The new middle class which has grown up since independence is largely the product of the Africanization of the civil service. Its numbers and power were significantly swelled by the economic reforms. The latter benefitted particularly those few educated Zambian civil servants who switched to lucrative posts in the expanding parastatal sector and those emerging Zambian businessmen who were shielded by the State from foreign competition.³

Tordoff and Molteno also indicate that President Kenneth Kaunda's interpretation of "Humanism clearly damages the interests of this new middle class . . . Kaunda is conscious of the threat which this class therefore poses to Humanism."⁴

A few pages later, however, these same authors invoke general social values as an additional explanation for the opposition to Humanism. "The problem of institutionalizing Humanism is compounded by the fact that its values run counter to the dominant values in Zambian society. Among all classes materialism is more firmly entrenched than ever before as the

3. Robert Molteno and William Tordoff, "Conclusion: Independent Zambia: Achievements and Prospects," in Wm. Tordoff (ed.) *Politics in Zambia*, (Berkeley and Los Angeles University of California Press, 1974), p. 394.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 393. See also Robert Molteno, "Zambian Humanism: The Way Ahead," *The African Review* 3, 4 (1973), p. 551.

supreme ethic."⁵ This non-class explanation is consistent with Molteno's analysis in an earlier chapter in the same book, where he indicates that "... in Zambia neither leaders nor followers have perceived class membership as a variable relevant to their political behavior" in spite of "objective" antagonistic class interests. Molteno suggests that the irrelevance of class consciousness to politics can be explained by the high salience of race; widespread and rapid social mobility; redistribution of income through the extended family; the absence of exploitative landlords, money-lenders, or private marketing agencies in the countryside; and the absence of either an organization or an educated leadership representing the poor.⁶

In his 1976 monograph, Timothy Shaw emphasizes the significance of a ruling class in Zambia politics, reinforced by a high level of dependence on international capitalism and an alliance with the labor aristocracy of unionized workers. For Shaw, the ruling class is composed of senior officials in the government and the parastatals. "Entrepreneurs, farmers and professionals outside of the state capitalist system may at times identify with the ruling elite and participate in demands for continued privilege..." but "State capitalism has... largely prevented the rise of a Zambian entrepreneurial class outside the parastatal sector." This is because "The present regime can better advance its own affluence and control through the extension of state corporations than by the encouragement of Zambian capitalism."⁷

Yet Shaw also recognizes that the ruling class is divided, that the President is ambivalent toward it, and that social cleavages other than class are also important, especially among the less privileged workers and peasants.⁸ More recently, in an analysis coauthored by Shaw and Douglas Anglin, it is stated that:

The center of gravity of power lies... in State House (the Office of the President and his special advisors), the bureaucracy including the burgeoning parastatal sector, and potentially the military and the party, as well as in the business and professional community, Zambian and expatriate. These constitute the "modern sector" of society, the preserve of a competent, confident, and cosmopolitan coterie of managers and technocrats who largely guide the destiny of the nation. Whether this elite can yet be designated a distinct class and, if so, whether class has now superceded ethnicity, provincialism, and the

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6. Robert Molteno, "Cleavage and Conflict in Zambian Politics: A Study in Sectionalism," in Tordoff, *Politics in Zambia*, pp. 80-84. The quote is from p. 80.

7. Timothy M. Shaw, *Dependence and Underdevelopment: The Development and Foreign Policies of Zambia* (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Center for International Studies, Papers in International Studies, Africa Series No. 28, 1976), pp. 8, 13, 14. An abbreviated version of this monograph appeared in "Zambia: Dependence and Underdevelopment," in *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 10, 1 (1976), pp. 3-22.

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urban-rural gap as the predominant cleavage in Zambian society are the subject of lively controversy inside the country and outside it, in both activist and academic circles. Much analysis of class formation in Zambia has to date tended to be rather nonempirical and polemical, and the perceived consequences of inter- or intra-class conflicts projected beyond what the available evidence would seem to justify. Nevertheless, it is undeniable that class divisions in some sense of the term are real, growing and increasingly significant in Zambian social formation. At the same time, a convincing case has yet to be made that class interest offers a definitive explanation of all of Zambia's foreign policy behavior.⁹

Most recently, in the article in this issue of *Africa Today* coauthored with Jane Parpart, Shaw indicates that, in the last ten years, intra-class antagonisms between bureaucratic and national bourgeois fractions and between labor aristocrats and unemployed or under-employed workers and the trans-class coalition between the national bourgeoisie and the labor aristocracy may explain more, at least about politics, than do inter-class conflicts. He emphasizes that the opposition of both the national (local private capital) fraction of the bourgeoisie and the skilled, unionized workers (formerly the bureaucrats' ally) has increased substantially since the time of his earlier writing. In the period of economic recession since the mid 1970s these segments of the Zambian social structure have suffered intensely, while the bureaucratic bourgeoisie has used government to protect itself to a considerable extent. This common suffering, plus the fact that the bureaucratic bourgeoisie and foreign capitalists rather than the national bourgeoisie are the employers of unionized workers, and the capitalistic conception of the role of unions held by Zambian trade union leaders, account for the trans-class alliance between skilled workers and the national bourgeoisie. This alliance is viewed by the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, with considerable justification, as opposition from the right.

Ian Scott suggests that, with the decline of support from the lower levels of the ruling United National Independence Party's (UNIP) organization, Zambian political leadership has come to rely almost exclusively on "its natural and only alternative base of support, the middle class." He uses Richard Sklar's definition of the "bureaucratic bourgeoisie" to define the middle class: "businessmen, bureaucrats, leading politicians, and members of the learned professions (who) constitute a new ruling class." Although it is tiny, "this class is not monolithic and... its members may have conflicting interests."¹⁰ Scott indicates that parts of this middle class have

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sometimes opposed UNIP, and that there is some residual support for the party in the urban squatter areas and rural villages. He also indicates that both middle class businessmen and former middle level UNIP officials, whose class membership varies, supported the opposition United Progressive Party (UPP) during its short life in 1971 and 1972. But he fails to relate these data on the complex, tenuous, and unstable bases of party support to his thesis of a middle class base of support for the regime and, presumably, lower class alienation from it. Scott's analysis of the weakening of party structure and the changing bases of party support is, however, a major contribution to the study of Zambian politics.

Patrick Ollawa prefers the term "ruling class" to the term "elite," because the former is more dynamic and flexible, taking into account the historical impact of internal and external economic forces on changes in social groups and the relationships among them. He defines the ruling class as:

... all those persons occupying strategic positions within the Party/government structures (including the police and the armed forces) and the parastatal organizations as well as within the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), who have the formal right to and who actually do participate in (i.e. those who, depending upon their individual political capacities defined in terms of the amount of power resources at their respective positional commands exert varying degrees of influence on) the policy and decision-making process of Zambia's Second Republic.

In his surveys of rural areas, Ollawa expands this definition to include "Chiefs, members of the district and Ward Development Committees, village-headmen, local businessmen, large-scale commercial farmers, schoolteachers such as headmasters and other local *notables*, who possess secondary education and above. . ."¹¹

Ollawa points out some differences among professional politicians, the bureaucratic class in government and parastatal bodies, top members of the defense force and the police, and self-employed businessmen and large-scale commercial farmers, conceived as the major segments of the ruling class, but also notes that these segments are closely interrelated. He states that "... the political class has been able to maintain itself in power precisely because it has succeeded in building supportive coalitions and specific alliances with the bureaucratic-military, and the business and agricultural bourgeois class through its astute manipulation of the inherited peripheral capitalist economy," but also that control of political and economic patronage "... coupled with the highly eclectic nature of the official ideology of Humanism permits the ruling class to make widely divergent, and, indeed at times, contradictory alliances in various policy issues with differing social classes," and that "a major consequence of

11. Ollawa, *Participatory Democracy in Zambia*, pp. 55-56.

these ambiguities has been widespread frustration among members of the political and bureaucratic class."¹²

Tony Southall is another author who recognizes that the 1968-73 economic reforms constituted "... a key stage in the development of a new class of Zambian capitalists." He also sees a dramatic change in the orientation of rural development policy from paying the political debt owed to UNIP's rural supporters to being "... almost solely responsive to the needs of the new class of commercial and emergent farmers while disregarding those of the peasant masses."¹³ For him, there are two strands of opposition to President Kaunda's policies, one explicitly capitalist and the other populist but not explicitly anti-capitalist, with some politicians switching back and forth between the two strands. Southall believes that the explicitly capitalist group has been more influential, and that the President and others resist this group, not in order to implement Humanism for the benefit of the masses, but in order to protect the declining but nevertheless still significant party machine and the lower ranks of the bureaucracy, which provide the President's popular support and the livelihood of his followers. "It is the tension between the ones who have made it and those who aspire to do that is at the root of the political differences we have described."¹⁴

Gilbert Mudenda believes that:

... a realistic discussion of the process of class formation and class struggle in contemporary Zambia ought to do two things. First, it ought to employ a dynamic notion of class which accepts the fact that social classes are configurations of various sections, fractions, and elements that are variable over time. Second, it ought to recognize the fact that the character of class struggle is largely determined by the nature of the class alliances that are forged in the struggle and by the goals the struggle sets for itself.¹⁵

Following this prescription, Mudenda presents the most detailed scheme of the Zambian class structure yet developed. He designates three classes: the bourgeoisie, the working class, and the peasantry. The bourgeoisie has five sections: imperial, comprador, national, bureaucratic, and petty. The last of these, which is the largest, is divided into old and new (business and salaried) fractions, each composed of several elements.

12. *Ibid.*, pp. 336-37.

13. Tony Southall, "Zambia: Class Formation and Government Policy in the 1970s," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 7 (October 1980), pp. 97, 102.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 107. See also Tony Southall, "Zambia: Class Formation and Detente - A Comment," *Review of African Political Economy* No. 12 (May-August 1978), pp. 114-19.

15. Gilbert N. Mudenda, "Class Formation and Class Struggle in Contemporary Zambia," in Bernard Magubane and Nanzolejo Ntsele (eds.) *Proletarianization and Class Struggle in Africa*, (San Francisco: Synthesis Publications, 1983), pp. 97-98.

Three sections of the working class are differentiated in terms of the sector of the economy in which they are employed: modern, agricultural, and informal. The first section has five fractions: mining, manufacturing, construction, power and transport, and services, all but the relatively homogeneous mining group containing a number of diverse elements. Plantation and seasonal workers are the two fractions of the agricultural section of the working class, and the seasonal fraction can be divided into migrant, seasonal, and itinerant elements. The informal section of the working class has two fractions: highly marginalized (domestic servants, market vendors, and self-employed craftsmen) and wholly marginalized (criminals). Rich, middle, and poor comprise the three sections of the Zambian peasantry; they are often called improved, emergent, and subsistence farmers respectively.¹⁶

To further implement his prescriptions, Mudenda then describes three periods of class struggle and alliances since independence. The first of these lasted from 1964 until 1971, and can be characterized as a period of adjustment from the preceding nationalist period, in which an alliance of classes, led by the African petty bourgeois elite, fought against colonialism and various forms of racial discrimination. In the readjustment period this alliance began to split as the petty bourgeoisie consolidated its control of the state and thus became a bureaucratic bourgeoisie. In order to consolidate their power further they adopted Humanism as the national ideology, combining elements of nationalism, socialism, Christianity and "tradition," and they enacted an economic nationalization program which attempted to satisfy their interests and those of multinational capital, while at the same time conforming to widespread nationalistic sentiments.

The second period lasted from 1972 until 1978. It was characterized primarily by the use of the one-party system, incorporating official party dominance over government and a constitutional status for Humanism, to conceal from the public the concessions that were being granted to foreign monopoly capital and contain class struggle by appearing to make popular mass interests dominant. This strategy for ruling class consolidation could not contain increasing class formation, especially given sharp economic decline and the end of the intense external threat from Rhodesia. The current period, which began in 1979, is characterized by open class struggle, in which other sections of the bourgeoisie, as well as workers and peasants, advocate alternatives to the present organizational bourgeois leadership, their policies, and the form of government they have evolved.¹⁷

16. *Ibid.*, pp. 98-105.

17. *Ibid.*, pp. 109-14.

The most detailed and sophisticated discussion of class formation in Zambia is found in the work of Carolyn Baylies and Morris Szeftel. Much of their research was conducted collaboratively, they adopt the same theoretical framework, and they have published one important article under joint authorship. Most of their work has appeared under single authorship, however, and points made therein will be attributed to the appropriate individual author.

For Baylies and Szeftel class "... refers to a collectivity of individuals sharing a common position in the production process relative to ownership of the means of production. It does not necessarily imply consciousness of collective position nor political behavior based on such consciousness."¹⁸ They specify four classes in Zambia, each comprised of positions with carefully specified characteristics: capitalist owners, petty bourgeoisie, proletariat, and peasantry, each of which is internally divided either vertically or horizontally. They present a substantial amount of data which show that the size of the former two classes has grown substantially since independence, and especially since the economic reforms, even though the true bourgeoisie is still minute (91 identifiable households in the mid-1970s). Members of these classes tend to come from relatively privileged social backgrounds.¹⁹

Following Erik Olin Wright, Baylies emphasizes the importance of transitional or intermediate positions between these basic classes, and places those who are unemployed or are outside of productive relations for other reasons outside the class structure. She indicates that high level bureaucrats are neither automatically members of the bourgeoisie nor comprise a class or even a fraction of their own, although they may use their bureaucratic positions to acquire capital and thus become members of the bourgeoisie. Top parastatal officials occupy intermediate positions between regular state bureaucrats and the bourgeoisie. Their enterprises, although government-owned, are managed in accordance with capitalist principles; yet control of these enterprises does not allow their managers to reproduce themselves as a class.²⁰

Given their concept of class firmly rooted in production Baylies and Szeftel assume that the relationship between economic class and politics may vary widely within theoretically determined limits.

18. Carolyn Louise Baylies, "The State and Class Formation in Zambia," Ph.D. thesis, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1978, p. 28.

19. *Ibid.*, pp. 496-505, 677-828; Morris Szeftel, "Conflict, Spoils and Class Formation in Zambia," Ph.D. thesis, University of Manchester, 1978, pp. 416-432; and Carolyn L. Baylies and Morris Szeftel, "The Rise of a Zambian Capitalist Class in the 1970s," *Journal of Southern Africa Studies* 8 (April 1982), pp. 189-96.

20. Baylies, "The State and Class Formation in Zambia," pp. 28-29, 66-74, 965-68.

In a fundamental and ultimate sense political relations are a reflection of relations of dominance in production. But in each individual instance and in manifestation of political activity, there is no necessary *identity* of political and production relations. It is this precise manifestation of the relations between class structure and political activity which must be the subject of analysis, not assumed.²¹

Or, put in another way:

And when a dominant class is the subject of analysis, criteria for its identification are not always explicit or uniformly applied. Certainly, there is little agreement about whether or not dominance should be taken to refer to economic or political position or leverage, or to some combination of them. Indeed it is precisely confusion on this point which has led to the formulation of polyglot categories which combine together a number of strata on the basis of life style, proximity to the state or orientation to public policy, and infer from these a common class position. We would suggest instead that the analytical separation of economic and political position and influence for purposes of investigation of the precise manner in which they interact is essential for an understanding of the ongoing process of class formation and an assessment of the social and political importance of class forces.²²

Baylies and Szeftel ask to what extent the Zambian owning class is a ruling class, to what extent it is tied to and dependent on the state, and to what extent the state is autonomous from it or any other class. They find that the owning class is highly influential in determining the pattern of public policy, as will be discussed in the following section of this article, but falls short, by a substantial margin, of being a ruling class. Dependence on the state is "by far the most important" relationship characterizing this class,

... both in the sense that a substantial proportion of those with the most extensive holdings had come from, or continued to occupy, the upper ranks of the Party, Government and parastatals, and in the sense that many had benefitted as recipients of loan funds from government institutions.²³

Baylies and Szeftel also find that state autonomy, while declining from its early post-independence high point, is still relatively great in comparison with the late colonial period in Northern Rhodesia-Zambia or with advanced capitalist societies. Baylies suggests that relative autonomy can be measured in terms of a combination of: the origin of state funds, formal pressure by interest groups representing a potentially dominant class, informal pressure exerted through individual contact by prominent members of such a class, the location of effective decision-making power, the strength of neutral bureaucratic norms, and the class membership of state personnel,²⁴ and both authors present data on the values assumed by these variables in Zambia.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 63.

22. Baylies and Szeftel, "The Rise of a Zambian Capitalist Class in the 1970s," p. 188.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 200.

24. Baylies, "The State and Class Formation in Zambia," pp. 17-21.

John Courtney Saxby's analysis parallels that of Baylies and Szeftel with regard to the petty bourgeoisie, the proletariat, and the peasantry, but instead of capitalist owners he sees the top class as a "political class" or "ruling petty bourgeoisie," defined primarily in terms of political practice within the interventionist state of the post-independence period. This class is divided along several overlapping dimensions, but

... Kaunda and a coterie of supporters (the latter, too, diverse and changing) have remained the dominant fraction, enjoying control of the highest echelons of state power ... These tendencies ... have emerged from intense political competition between and within the different classes of Zambian society.²⁵

Several writers do not attempt to delineate Zambian class structure and processes in their entirety, but focus instead on the formation and subdivisions of one class and the conflicts and alliances in which this class and its subdivisions are involved. Ronald Libby and Marcia Burdette focus on fractions of the bourgeoisie. Libby argues that:

there is a major division within Zambia's dominant class between a political or a state bourgeoisie and a subordinate, indigenous capitalist-owning class fraction and that MNCs allied to the dominant state bourgeoisie are able to outcompete MNCs allied to the indigenous capital-owning bourgeoisie in terms of receiving preferred government treatment.²⁶

In Libby's analysis the two copper mining companies long involved in the ownership and management of Zambian mines fall into the former category, while all other MNCs fall into the latter category. This distinction appears to be highly arbitrary, as many other MNCs are also in partnership with the Zambian government, usually through parastatal corporations, but Libby raises the significant question of the differing transnational alliances of fractions of the Zambian bourgeoisie and their relation to fractional conflict.

Burdette also specifies two fractions of the Zambian bourgeoisie, which she labels the "political class," but her division of this class is different from Libby's. Focusing on the negotiations with the international copper companies for the initial nationalization of the mines in 1969 and for greater control of their operations by the Zambian government in 1973, she distinguishes between "nationalist" and "technocrat" fractions of the political class. The former is composed of individuals who are usually employed by the bureaucracy or the party and thus, being strongly depen-

25. John Courtney Saxby, "The Politics of Education in Zambia," Ph.D. thesis, University of Toronto, 1980, pp. 515-38. The quotations are from pp. 536 and 538.

26. Ronald T. Libby, "Transnational Class Alliances in Zambia," *Comparative Politics* 15 (July 1983), p. 379.

dent on the state, have strongly nationalistic orientations. The latter is composed of individuals who frequently have direct relationships with international capital as employees of multinational or parastatal corporations, and who have a relatively high level of technical skills and a strong commitment to capitalist values and norms. Conflict between these two fractions accounted for sudden shifts in the Zambian government's position in their negotiations with the copper companies: "... the decision and style of the second nationalization stemmed more from a heightened level of intra-class conflict within Zambia than from any desire to gain greater autonomy from international capital, even though the latter goal was generally acknowledged as desirable."²⁷

Michael Burawoy, Jane Parpart, and Mai Palmberg focus on divisions within the working class, and especially on the possible existence of a labor aristocracy among the mineworkers, an issue which is also addressed by some of the authors discussed above. While there is no consensus on the applicability of this term to some or all Zambian miners, Parpart's conclusion, made with reference to the colonial period, that "Rather than behave consistently as labor aristocrats, these miners changed tactics depending on what would be most effective in their struggle with capital," is also probably valid for the post-independence period.²⁸ Sources which support this hypothesis will be cited in the next section of this article.

Much consensus and some significant areas of disagreement are revealed by this survey of conceptions of class structure and processes in Zambia. There is consensus that class formation, especially for formation of an emerging dominant class, is taking place but is incomplete, that the emerging dominant class is divided, and that sections or fractions of this class make alliances with other classes or their subdivisions. There is disagreement over the base of the emerging dominant class; the nature of its subdivisions, and the exact nature of class conflicts and alliances in Zambia.

The most significant disagreement is between Baylies and Szeftel, who define class exclusively in terms of roles in production, and virtually all the other writers, who define the emerging dominant class as being based

on crucial political roles in combination with closely interrelated economic roles. It can be argued that this difference in definition does not lead to significant differences in empirical findings, since Baylies and Szeftel emphasize that most members of the owning class have acquired much of their property in one way or another from holding political office. Yet, although this point is not recognized by a number of authors who quote Baylies and Szeftel in support of their own position, this definitional difference does open up the possibility of significantly different empirical findings in the future. For Baylies and Szeftel political positions or roles, unlike those in production, do not constitute a class because they are not capable of reproducing themselves. These roles have been used to create, or at least greatly expand, an indigenous owning class which has the potential to reproduce and augment itself, and will try to do so, continuing to use state power as an important resource. In their analysis, whether this class will become dominant and reduce state autonomy to an absolute minimum is an empirical question. For other analysts, a bureaucratic-political class, section, or fraction, variously conceived, controls the state by definition, and uses its control in conflicts with other classes or fractions; the state can never be meaningfully autonomous from class forces.²⁹ Most of these analysts see the owning class or fractions (national and petty bourgeoisie) as subordinate to the bureaucratic-political class or fraction, while Baylies and Szeftel see the former as inherently more likely to become dominant because it is a true class.

The Relationship of Class to Political Participation and Public Policy

Almost without exception, the works cited above go on to relate their conceptions of class structure and processes to political participation, public policy, or both. A number of other works which do not present explicit conceptual formulations also deal with these topics. The findings of these authors can only be summarized briefly here.

Between 1975 and 1977 Patrick Ollawa conducted the most extensive survey to date of mass and ruling class political attitudes and participation in Zambia. His data were gathered in six towns: Lusaka, Luangwa, Mazabuka, Mongu, Kitwe, and Kasama, varying greatly in size and located in six of Zambia's nine provinces. Although this is by no means a representative national sample, and Ollawa's work is not without methodological flaws, these data are the best available. Forty-six percent of his mass sample identified the existence of and difference between the upper class and the working or lower class, while only four percent denied the existence of

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27. Marcia M. Burdette, "The Dynamics of Nationalization Between Multinational Companies and Peripheral States: Negotiations Between Amx Inc., the Anglo American Corporation of South Africa, Ltd., and the Government of the Republic of Zambia," Ph.D. thesis, Columbia University, 1979, p. 464. See also Burdette, "Nationalization in Zambia: A Critique of Bargaining Theory," *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 11, 3 (1977): 471-96.

28. Jane L. Parpart, "The Labor Aristocracy Thesis Considered Once Again: The Northern Rhodesian Copperbelt 1926-1966," Boston University, African Studies Center, Working Paper No. 55, 1982, p. 16. See also Michael Burawoy, "Another Look at the Mineworker," *African Social Research* No. 14 (December 1972), pp. 276-80, and Mai Palmberg, "The Political Role of Workers in Tanzania and Zambia," in Mai Palmberg (ed.) *Problems of Socialist Orientation in Africa*, Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1978), pp. 202-05.

classes in Zambia. Fifty percent did not have any perceptions about the Zambian class system. Almost half of those who identified differences among classes were able to specify one or more bases of these differences, including wealth, education, power, urban residence, and "vested interests."²⁹ Ollawa does not present data on individuals' consciousness of their own class membership, but the responses to a number of items in his survey indicate low levels of participation and high levels of disaffection among those who, based on objective measures, are not members of the emerging privileged class.

Ollawa's data are similar in many ways to the findings of Tony Seymour's study of a squatter settlement in Lusaka. A majority of the squatters whom he surveyed felt that privileged class members deserved their wealth and luxuries, that squatter children would probably experience upward mobility, and that squatters' conditions had improved in the last five years. But sixty percent also recognized the existence of classes, a substantial minority viewed inequality as unfair, and there were signs of decreasing political participation and increasing disaffection.³⁰

If there is a mobilized group consciously pursuing class interests of less privileged classes in Zambia, it would have to be the trade unions. In addition to the sources already cited, the writings of Robin Fincham and Grace Zulu, Cherry Gertzel, Peter Harries-Jones, and Richard Sklar, and additional works by Michael Burawoy deal with the class nature of union political participation.³¹ What emerges from this relatively large body of literature, as indicated above, is a complex pattern of shifting tactics, changing alliances, and fractional-organizational conflicts, all taking place within the context of a continuous effort by at least many elements of the union movement to further the interests of those sections or fractions of the working class represented in their membership. As data presented in the articles by Parpart and Shaw and by Woldring in this volume indicate, the economic crisis of the last few years has intensified the class conflict aspects

29. Ollawa, *Participatory Democracy in Zambia*, pp. 379-80.

30. Tony Seymour, "Squatters, Migrants and the Urban Poor: A Study of Attitudes Toward Inequality with Special Reference to a Squatter Settlement in Lusaka, Zambia," Ph.D. thesis, University of Sussex, 1976, pp. 371-79, 437-49, 509-32, 546-49.

31. Robin Fincham and Grace Zulu, "Labour and Participation in Zambia," in Ben Turok (ed.) *Development in Zambia: A Reader*, (London: Zed Press, 1979), pp. 214-25; Cherry Gertzel, "Labour and the State: The Case of Zambia's Mineworkers Union - A Review Article," *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics* 13 (November 1975), pp. 296-303; Peter Harries-Jones, *Freedom and Labour: Mobilization and Political Control on the Zambian Copperbelt* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1975), pp. 154-72; Richard L. Sklar, *Corporate Power in an African State: The Political Impact of Multinational Mining Companies in Zambia* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1975), pp. 96-125; Michael Burawoy, *The Colour of Class on the Copper Mines: From African Advancement to Zambianisation* (Manchester: Manchester University Press on behalf of the Institute for African Studies, University of Zambia, Zambian Papers, No. 7, 1972); and Burawoy, "The Hidden Abode of Underdevelopment: Labor Process and the State in Zambia," *Politics and Society* 11, 2 (1982), pp. 123-166.

of union behavior and the unions' search for alliances against those who control the government.

A relatively class conscious mobilizing group such as the unions is conspicuously absent among Zambian peasants. Although there is considerable disagreement over the nature and extent of class formation among peasants in various Zambian rural areas, there is a broad consensus that it is at least beginning to take place, that peasant class consciousness is low, and that peasant political participation is quite limited and is declining further in the absence of either consciousness or organization.³²

More has been written on political participation by members of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, the political class, or the owning class, and by the petty bourgeoisie. Baylies and Szeftel provide the most detailed overview of owning class participation viewed as class action, including the activities of groups representing various fractions and elements of this class, the relationships that its members have with parastatal corporations, and their increasing occupancy of party and legislative roles. Szeftel gives special emphasis to explaining factionalism and spoils as types of class action.³³ (The latter theme is also addressed by Woldring in this volume.) More than most other authors, Baylies and Szeftel emphasize the extent to which participation by this class is in opposition to government policies; this emphasis is another significant consequence of their definition of the emerging dominant class exclusively in terms of its members' roles in production. Briefer but useful discussions of some of these themes are found in the previously cited works of Ollawa, Parpart and Shaw, Southall, and Scott.

Participation by specific groups within the emerging privileged class has been studied by a number of other authors. Businessmen have been studied by Andrew Beveridge and Anthony Oberschall, civil servants by contributors to a volume edited by William Tordoff, university students by

32. Robert H. Bates, *Rural Responses to Industrialization: A Study of Village Zambia* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1976); Carolyn L. Baylies, "The Emergence of Indigenous Capitalist Agriculture: The Case of Southern Province, Zambia," *Rural Africana* 4-5 (Spring-Fall 1979), pp. 65-81; Baylies, "The State and Class Formation in Zambia," pp. 765-91; Michael Bratton, *The Local Politics of Rural Development: Peasant and Party-State in Zambia* (Hanover, New Hampshire: University Press of New England, 1980), esp. pp. 274-83; Ollawa, *Participatory Democracy in Zambia*, pp. 174-78, 361-433; and Jan Kees van Donge, "Politicians, Bureaucrats and Farmers: A Zambian Case Study," *Journal of Development Studies* 19 (October 1982), pp. 88-107.

33. Baylies and Szeftel, "The Rise of a Zambian Capitalist Class in the 1970s," pp. 201-11; Baylies, "The State and Class Formation in Zambia," pp. 849-900; Baylies, "Zambia's Economic Reforms and Their Aftermath: The State and the Growth of Indigenous Capital," *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics* 20 (November 1982), pp. 238-60; Szeftel, "Conflict, Spoils and Class Formation in Zambia," pp. 252-406, 433-57; Szeftel, "Political Craft and the Spoils System in Zambia - The State as a Resource in itself," *Review of African Political Economy* No. 24 (May-August 1982), pp. 4-21; and Szeftel, "The Political Process in Post-Colonial Zambia: The Structural Bases of Factional Conflict," in *The Evolving Structure of Zambian Society* (Edinburgh: Centre of African Studies, University of Edinburgh, 1980), pp. 64-95.

Michael Burawoy and Y. G-M. Lulat, and teachers by Jenny Martin.³⁴ Although the introduction to the Tordoff book describes the emergence of classes, this theme has minimal influence on the otherwise excellent descriptions of bureaucratic behavior found in subsequent chapters. The other works cited above demonstrate that the political behavior of these relatively privileged groups reflects the contradictions found in Zambian society and involves numerous fractional and group conflicts which are part of the class formation process.

General overviews of the influence of class structure and processes on public policy are presented in the previously cited works of Baylies and Szeftel, Ollawa, Parpart and Shaw, Shaw and Anglin, and Southall.³⁵ They focus on the formulation and elaboration of the ideology of Zambian Humanism; institutionalization of "one-party participatory democracy"; administrative decentralization; enactment of a leadership code which officially restricts the participation of a wide variety of political leaders in private economic activities; nationalization or indigenization of wholesale and retail trade, mining, manufacturing, newspapers, and some financial institutions, and the placement of the larger of these operations into parastatal corporations; introduction of works councils in larger firms accompanied by intensified efforts to control trade unions; increased government control over land; attempts to increase and redistribute wealth in the rural areas through several rural development programs; creation of a National Service obligation for most citizens; far reaching proposals for educational reform; a foreign policy of relatively firm, although sometimes equivocating, opposition to white minority regimes in southern Africa; and, in recent years, attempts to escape from the severe economic crisis which is caused by the low price of copper and Zambia's continued dependence on that single export commodity and is exacerbated by rising prices for most of Zambia's many imports.

Although there is disagreement over the nature of the emerging dominant class, as we have seen, there is substantial agreement that while this class has neither the unity nor the strength to achieve dominance over all policy at this time, sections or fractions of this class have substantial influence in most policy areas. While the President and his advisors, and oc-

34. Andrew A. Beveridge and Anthony R. Oberschall, *African Businessmen and Development in Zambia* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979); William Tordoff, ed., *Administration in Zambia* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1980); Michael Burawoy, "Consciousness and Contradiction: A Study of Student Protest in Zambia," *British Journal of Sociology* 27 (March 1976), pp. 78-98; Y. G-M. Lulat, "Determinants of Third World Student Political Activism in the Seventies: The Case of Zambia," in *Student Politics: Perspectives for the Eighties* (Metuchen, New Jersey and London: Scarecrow Press, 1981), pp. 234-66; and Jenny Martin, "The Social Corpes of the Nation: An Account of Feelings of Relative Deprivation Amongst a Group of Zambian Primary School Teachers," *The African Review* 6, 3 (1976), pp. 313-27.

35. See also Timothy M. Shaw, "Zambia After Twenty Years: Recession and Repression Without Revolution," *Issue: A Journal of Africanist Opinion* 12 (Spring/Summer 1982), pp. 53-58.

asionally units within the bureaucracy, have substantial autonomy in making policy proposals, class forces are more determinative in policy implementation. There is a continuing struggle over the definition of Humanism. "One-party participatory democracy" has reduced rather than increased participation, and has tended to exclude those classes or fractions who would benefit most from its effective implementation. Administrative decentralization has been incomplete, has recently been reduced, and has done little to stimulate popular participation. The leadership code has not been effectively enforced. Nationalization has led to state capitalism because most parastatals tend to pursue profit rather than public needs and are thoroughly incorporated into the multinational capitalist networks.³⁶ The transfer of smaller businesses to Zambians has greatly accelerated class formation. Works councils have not been implemented in all sectors of the economy, and are less effective than unions in protecting worker interests.³⁷ The ninety-nine year leases now in effect on state land have not yet resulted in any significant changes in practice from that prevailing under the freehold tenure which they replaced. Rural development programs have resulted in several major failures and have stimulated rural class formation.³⁸ The original education reform proposals were

36. On the interaction among class processes, the nationalization process, and the operation of the nationalized sectors of the economy, see the works cited in footnotes 26 and 27, as well as Baylies, "Zambia's Economic Reforms and Their Aftermath," Robin Fincham, "Economic Dependence and the Development of Industry in Zambia," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 18 (June 1980), pp. 297-313; Ronald T. Libby and Michael E. Woakes, "Nationalization and the Displacement of Development Policy in Zambia," *African Studies Review* 23 (April 1980), pp. 33-50; Ben Turok, "Control in the Parastatal Sector," *Zambia, Journal of Modern African Studies* 19 (September 1981), pp. 421-45; and Turok, *Development in Zambia: A Reader*, pp. 49-86, 100-27.

37. On the effects of government policy on class processes among workers, see the works cited in footnotes 28, 31, as well as Bill Daniel, *Africanization, Nationalization and Inequality: Mining Labour and the Copperbelt in Zambian Development* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); Charles Pottings, "A Moment in the 'Proletarianization' of the New Middle Class: Race, Value, and Division of Labour in the Copperbelt, 1946-66," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 6 (April 1980), pp. 183-213; and David M. Todd and Christopher Shaw, "The Informal Sector and Zambia's Employment Crisis," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 18 (September 1980), pp. 411-25. Daniel's book provides a wealth of data on wages and wage policies.

38. Among the many works on Zambian rural development policy, those which deal with its impact on class processes include works cited in footnote 32, the contribution of Gan to this volume. M.C. Bwalya, "Rural Differentiation and Poverty Reproduction in Northern Zambia: The Case of Mpika District," in *The Evolving Structure of Sambian Society*, pp. 151-86; W.J. Cowie, "Rural Underdevelopment in an Urbanized Mining Economy," *Rural Africana* 4-5 (Spring-Fall 1979), pp. 49-63; Robert Klepper, "The State and Peasantry in Zambia," in *The Evolving Structure of Zambian Society*, pp. 120-50; Maud Shimwayi Mutemba, "Expectations Unfulfilled: The Underdevelopment of Peasant Agriculture in Zambia: The Case of Kabwe Rural District, 1964-1970," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 5 (October 1978), pp. 59-85; James Reed Pletcher, "Agricultural Policy and the Political Crisis in Zambia," Ph.D. thesis, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1982; Stephen A. Quick, "Bureaucracy and Rural Socialism in Zambia," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 15 (Sept. 1977), pp. 373-400; Quick, *Humanism or Technocracy? Zambia's Farming Co-operatives, 1965-1972* (Manchester: Manchester University Press on behalf of the Institute for African Studies, University of Zambia, Zambian Papers No. 12, 1978); Quick, "The Paradox of Popularity: Ideological Program in Zambia," in *Politics and Policy Implementation in the Third World*, ed. Marilee S. Grindle (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980) pp. 40-63; Quick, "Socialism in One Sector: Rural Development in Zambia," in *Socialism in Sub-Saharan Africa: A New Assessment*, ed. Carl G. Rosenberg and Thomas M. Callaghy (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1979), pp. 83-111; Donald Ian Ray, "Administering Rural Development: The Role of Settlement Schemes in Zambia," Ph.D. Thesis, University of Toronto, 1979; Turok, *Development in Zambia: A Reader*, pp. 37-48, 137-69. "Deferred to next issue. See p. 4. - Ed.

watered down considerably prior to implementation.³⁹ White minority regimes in Rhodesia and the Portuguese territories have disappeared, but Zambia continues to vacillate in its policy toward South Africa.⁴⁰ Finally, economic crisis has intensified the struggle for privilege, which in turn makes it more difficult for the government to combat the crisis.

39. See Dan O'Brien, "Party, Polity, and Bureaucracy: The Zambian Education Debate, 1974-77," *African Affairs* 81 (April 1982), pp. 207-30; and Sasby, "The Politics of Education in Zambia."

40. On the interaction between class and foreign policy, see Kren Eriksen (pseudonomic article by Carolyn Bayles), "Zambia's Class Formation and Detente," *Review of African Political Economy*, No. 9 (May-August 1978), pp. 4-26; Southall, "Class Formation and Detente -- A Comment"; Shaw, "Dependence and Underdevelopment"; and Shaw and Anglin, "Zambia: The Crisis of Liberation."

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Contradiction and Coalition:

Class Fractions in Zambia, 1964-1984

Jane L. Parpart and Timothy M. Shaw

"Development is a cruel process with no great happy ending, no limitless progress . . . as the new African countries settle into patterns that will prevail for generations to come, the process of development might become crueler still."

— Irving Leonard Markovitz¹

" . . . in the Second Republic the Party must move swiftly to vest and entrench power in the peasants and workers . . . The social value of the message of Humanism is the sharing of wealth on the basis of equality and the prevention of the creation of classes. Communocracy . . . provides a basis for waging a struggle against class distinctions in any shape or form."

— Kenneth D. Kaunda²

"The period from independence in 1964 and especially the decade of the seventies saw the emergence of a recognizable indigenous owning class, its rapid growth and its forceful assertion of its own interests . . . The failure of many development programs, exacerbated by the severity of the economic recession and the collapse of the copper mono-economy, has acted to strengthen the appeal of elements calling for a freer role for the business community and a relaxation of 'socialist' policies . . . The influence of indigenous capital was enhanced also by the weakness of other class forces in Zambia. Organized labor, despite a relatively high level of organization, has represented a reformist and economic, rather than radical voice in the country."

— Carolyn L. Bayles and Morris Szaftel³

The post-independence political economy of Zambia is characterized by significant changes in relations of production even although the dominant mode of production, extractive capitalism, has continued largely unchanged. This apparent paradox — how can superstructure evolve

1. *Power & Class in Africa*, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1977) p. 24.

2. Kenneth D. Kaunda, "Communocracy: a strategy for constructing a people's economy under Humanism" (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1976) pp. 12 and 20.

3. Carolyn L. Bayles and Morris Szaftel, "The rise of a Zambian capitalist class in the 1970s" *Journal of Southern African Studies* 8(2), April 1982, p. 212.

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Zambia constitutes, then, a classic case of dependence and underdevelopment: dependence on one export, copper, and on one interrelated set of trading partners, the settler-metropole chain of production from Copperbelt through Salisbury (now Harare) and the Witwatersrand to London; and underdevelopment characterized by growth on the Copperbelt, Lusaka and the line-of-rail and stagnation and exploitation in the rural areas.¹¹ Although the nationalist movement reacted to this general pattern of uneven and dependent development, its own class bases in the petty bourgeoisie and labor aristocracy¹² affects its priorities and purposes. However, the post-independence "honeymoon" period soon saw the opening skirmishes between labor and the new state, later to be joined by increasingly alienated non-official bourgeois fractions.

Nevertheless, UNIP did come to power in 1964 on a populist platform with a broad base of support from the people. Kenneth Kaunda, the new president of Zambia, promised that the party and therefore the government would create a better life for all Zambians. He attacked racism, tribalism, and class inequalities, and called on Zambians to help develop the national economy for the benefit of all. This philosophy was formalized four years later as *Zambian Humanism* (see opening citation) in which UNIP expressed its commitment to the development of a "man-centered society . . . in which there is a continuous striving for full human life," and to the elimination of the exploitation of man by man "through the liquidation of socio-economic classes."¹³

Kaunda especially called on the copper miners to sacrifice for the national good, since the copper industry was the main source of revenue for the creation of a new Zambia. In order to ensure mine worker discipline, UNIP and the government tried to take over the African Mine Workers' Union and to control the workers through the UNIP-dominated *Zambian Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU)*. Kaunda tried to soften the impact of these actions by claiming, in populist vein, that government and worker interests were identical. As he put it idealistically in 1965, "being the head of a workers' government makes it impossible for me or my colleagues to be

10. On changes in the definition and direction of the state as well as in its relations with labor, with a caution about the correlation between political situation and state character, see Jane L. Parpart "The Colonial State and Labor Control on the Northern Rhodesian Copperbelt, 1926-1964" paper presented at the African Studies Association, Washington, November 1982.

11. See Timothy M. Shaw, *Dependence and Underdevelopment: the development and foreign policies of Zambia* (Athens: Ohio University Papers in International Studies, 1976. African Series Number 28). Cf. William Tordoff "Zambia: the politics of disengagement" *African Affairs* 76(502), January, 1977, pp. 60-69.

12. See Jane L. Parpart, "The Labor Aristocracy Thesis considered once again: the Northern Rhodesian Copperbelt 1926-1966" (Boston University: African Studies Center, 1982. Working Paper Number 56).

13. Bastiaan de Gans Fortman (ed.), *After Mulungushi* (Nairobi: EAPH, 1969) p. 3 and Timothy K. Kandeke, *Fundamentals of Zambian Humanism* (Lusaka: Nezam, 1977), p. 21.

against the legitimate interests of the workers."¹⁴

Instead of cooperating with UNIP in its corporatist scheme, however, the miners rejected UNIP's bid to take over the union leadership, a position which they have subsequently maintained, despite frequent attacks from the state.¹⁵ UNIP candidates were decisively defeated in the 1966 union elections. Notwithstanding a concerted campaign, and even threats from Kaunda, UNIP candidates received only 12% of the total vote. Only 12 UNIP candidates won, and those had the support of leading elements in the union's own hierarchy.¹⁶ That same year, the union defied the government and struck for higher wages. Ignoring those few high level union officials who cooperated with the government, the branch leaders and the mine workers, bridging the labor aristocracy-proletariat divide, came out on strike against the local-expatriate wage structure established two years earlier at independence. The striking miners accused the government, the mining companies, and top union leaders of colluding against them. They rejected party rhetoric and revealed a clear understanding of the class alliance between UNIP leaders and the corporations,¹⁷ even before subsequent parastatal partnerships.

The miners won a pay raise in 1966, but after the strike, UNIP and the government continued their efforts to control the union. This became even more crucial after Kaunda announced the partial nationalization of the mining companies at Mulungushi in April 1968. Armed with the *Turner Report*,¹⁸ the state blamed decreasing productivity on the mine workers and froze wages. Miners were accused of absenteeism, failing to obey instructions, sleeping at work and drunkenness, all old colonial allegations. Future pay raises were to be tied to increased productivity, an old management axiom. Strikes were declared an act "against the people," and workers were told at all costs they must "not . . . endanger the smooth and efficient workings of industry."¹⁹ In 1971, the amendment to the Trade

14. President Kaunda, "Speech to the Governing Council of the Zambian Congress of Trade Unions," Press Release, Zambia Information Services, 29 November 1965, p. 15.

15. See Timothy M. Shaw, "Beyond neo-colonialism: varieties of corporatism in Africa" *Journal of Modern African Studies* 20(2), June 1982, pp. 239-261.

16. Anandhaji Gupta, "Trade Unionism and Politics on the Copperbelt" in William Tordoff (ed.) *Politics in Zambia* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1974), p. 301.

17. Michael Burawoy, *The Colour of Class on the Copper Mines: from African advancement to Zambianisation* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1972. Zambian Papers Number 7), Chapter 6.

18. Report by H.A. Turner (UNDP, Technical Assistance Section/ILO Office), Report to the Government of Zambia on Incomes, Wages, and Prices in Zambia: Policy and Machinery (Lusaka, 1969).

19. Kaunda, "Governing Council," (op. cit. fn. 14) p. 23; Republic of Zambia Towards Complete Independence. Address by His Excellency the President, Dr. K.D. Kaunda, to the UNIP National Council held at Matero Hall, 11 August 1968 (Lusaka, n.d.).

Union and Trade Dispute Ordinance of 1965 and the Industrial Relations Act No. 36 made most strikes illegal. Only the ZCTU had the authority to hold a strike ballot.

The new African union — the Mine Workers' Union of Zambia (MUZ) — now representing all Zambian miners, was brought more directly under the control of the ZCTU and the Minister of Labor. To tie high level union officials more tightly to party and government, the president of MUZ, David Mwila, became a director of Zambia Industrial and Mining Corporation (ZIMCO), the holding company for all state enterprises. His secretary-general was placed in the second most powerful state enterprise, the Industrial Development Corporation (INDECO). To mollify the miners, and to help "put Humanism into practice in the work place," worker councils were set up to give workers more say in industry. Kaunda then announced that "For Zambia, it is ridiculous for workers now in the light of these reforms to feel that they are a distinct class pursuing distinct interests."²⁰ The corporatist imperative of the state to reflect and consolidate its class support and hegemony became both clear and possible as the copper market continued to be buoyant.

It appears that the head office officials of MUZ accepted government's point of view for a time. The corporations and the state protected their positions. Union dues were collected straight from the workers' pay checks. Promotions came rapidly within industry. In return, the head office of the union supported the government's wage policy, and asked the workers to restrain their demands for the good of the country. In 1967 Mwila made his position quite clear: "The union cannot have the idea that its duty is to do something for the members alone. The duty of the union is to a wider field, to develop the country as Zambia is . . . as a new nation, we must adopt a program that will benefit the country as a whole and not just our members."²¹ Senior officials ruthlessly disciplined uncooperative branch officials and mine workers. When in 1970 branch officials protested that their leaders had sold out and ceased to represent the workers' interests, the MUZ head office simply stripped them of their positions.

Despite this coercion, most mine workers grew steadily more dissatisfied with the union leadership, now coopted into the state nexus. In a 1969 survey by Michael Burawoy, 50% of the mine workers under 26 years of age and 73% of the miners over 26 years felt unhappy with the union.²² As a former union leader told Robert Bates in 1968, "the union is no good. There used to be big names there. Now this is not true." The

20. *Ibid.*, p. 46.

21. Robert Bates, private papers, interview with David Mwila, Kitwe, 27 May 1967.

22. Burawoy, *The Colour of Class on the Copper Mines*, (op. cit., fn. 17), p. 79.

company is "buying out the unions."²³ Anirudha Gupta reported similar findings in 1974,²⁴ and one of the co-authors heard the same opinion in 1976.

Many mine workers viewed the partial nationalization of the mines with cynicism as well. According to Burawoy, the miners saw the "parastatal" strategy "as a means of cementing management and the government together in opposition to themselves." Thus, by the late 1960s, the miners clearly perceived the alliance between three of the most powerful groups in Zambia — the government (and therefore UNIP), the mining companies, and high level MUZ officials. They also understood the collective desire of these groups "to exploit him [the miner] and suppress his demands and complaints."²⁵

Instead of bowing to government pressure the workers continued to conduct in the late 1960s and early 1970s wild-cat strikes, although no industry-wide strikes occurred after 1966. The industrial legislation of the early 1970s hampered collective action against the companies, and therefore the state; if cooperation was not enough then coercion was added. For example, in 1971 the government arrested 100 miners, and 15 "rebel" leaders were restricted. The state made it increasingly clear that labor protest would be severely punished. By the mid-1970s, as global recession and inflation undermined Zambia's economic *raison d'être*, the mine workers appeared to be pretty well under the thumb of management and the state — willing to concentrate on winning occasional pay raises rather than push for more dramatic or structural changes.²⁶ However, the rationality and acceptability of such cooptation eroded along with the price of copper through the second half of the 1970s, undermining the security of the corporatist state.²⁷

From nationalism to Humanism: class formation

The transition from nationalist exuberance to governmental exertion involved the twin processes of exclusion and consolidation, exclusion of opposition and consolidation of organization. This involved the rapid embourgeoisement of the new class which quickly acclimatized to the new

23. Robert Bates, private papers, local party notes, 5 February 1968.

24. Gupta, "Trade Unionism and Politics on the Copperbelt," (op. cit., fn. 16), p. 309.

25. Burawoy, *The Colour of Class on the Copper Mines* (op. cit., fn. 17), pp. 81 nd 109.

26. Ian Scott, "Middle Class Politics in Zambia," *African Affairs* 77(308). July 1978, p. 329.

27. See Shaw, "Beyond neo-colonialism," (op. cit., fn. 15).

prerogatives of power. The inclusive nationalist coalition was demobilized as the political and bureaucratic elements of the indigenous bourgeoisie came to claim the spoils of office. In the Zambian case this process was facilitated by the prevailing high price of copper until the early 1970s and was legitimized through the one-party state ideology of Humanism. The class interests of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie and the national interest could coexist better when the price of copper was high; thereafter, and as the dialectic became more antagonistic, the coexistence evaporated although Humanism still claimed to contain populist sentiments. As Carolyn Baylies and Morris Szeftel suggest in their own analysis of the ambiguities of the new class in the 1970s:

... the interests of emergent Zambian capital were expressed through demands to modify policy and policy initiatives advanced by the political leadership but they did not displace all elements of the populist program enacted after independence. The 'class project' of the new bourgeoisie did not attain a general legitimacy and the class lacked the power to impose it through the state.²⁸

The need for such a class project did not intensify until the recession of the mid-1970s by which time the state's concern for ideological leadership and need for legitimacy had decreased significantly.

In the first flush of independence, with the price of copper remaining buoyant, it seemed that most social formations might benefit from the fruits of independence. But as structures became institutionalized, positions became established, and expansion became problematic, the prospects of "mixed-sum" development seemed to recede. Along with them went the peoples' dreams at independence, wild though they may have been. But the "zero-sum" character of growth without equity was disguised for a while by a combination of economic good fortune and political false consciousness. Moreover, despite recent increments²⁹ our data on both parastatal and private investment and profit in Zambia are deficient, pointing to the need for more research on the place and privileges of African businesses in the post-independence dispensation.³⁰

In the Zambian case, after the establishment of a one-party state, UNIP and the growing bureaucratic class gradually widened control over the government. Despite continued populist rhetoric, and the undoubted commitment of Kaunda and some of his followers to nationalist goals, UNIP increasingly came to reflect the interests of the bureaucratic fraction

28. Baylies and Szeftel, "The rise of a Zambian capitalist class in the 1970s" (op cit., fn. 3), p. 207. Cf. Tony Southall, "Zambia: class formation and government policy in the 1970s" *Journal of Southern African Studies* 7(1), October 1980, pp. 91-108.

29. See, for instance, William Tordoff (ed.), *Administration in Zambia* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1980) especially pp. 68-138, and Ben Turok "Zambia's system of state capitalism" *Development and Change* 11(3), 1980, pp. 455-476.

30. See Markovitz, *Power and Class in Africa* (op cit., fn. 1), p. 229.

which runs the government and the parastatals.³¹ After the establishment of a one-party state, senior civil servants, especially those in the parastatal sectors, drew together to the point where a number of positions became interchangeable. These civil servants were permitted to join the inner circle of UNIP as well, and a number were appointed to the Cabinet and Central Committee. Despite the publicly acknowledged inefficiencies of the civil service, especially the parastatals, Kaunda has defended this class against recent attacks by the growing indigenous business class and others. He ignored the Mwanakatwe Report's conclusion that "the political superstructures are a serious constraint to efficiency"³² and has done little to alter either the organization of the party or its position in the economy. Indeed, Kaunda has systematically increased his own power and that of the party on which his political base continues to be founded, at the expense of other social forces, by extending effective state control over the means of production.

Copper companies and the mine workers: class contradictions

"Proletarian" forces concentrated on the Copperbelt played a major part in the successful nationalist coalition, as we have noted. But their treatment by the new indigenous ruling class was small improvement on the rate of exploitation maintained under colonial or federal rule. Indeed, concentration of decision and accumulation under a one-party state system was almost indistinguishable in content and impact from that under pre-independence conditions. To be sure, certain fractions of the working class received relatively better treatment, but the presence of a labor pool of under-employed and unemployed served to keep real incomes down. And the essential "corporatism" of the one-party structure coopted labor leaders while controlling the rank-and-file; at least until the dramatic decline in the demand for and price of copper from the early 1970s onwards.

The major losers in the initial period of political optimism and economic expansion were those elements of non-bourgeois forces outside the mineral or manufacturing sectors. The relatively high price of copper and the initial growth in the import-substitution phase generated surplus sufficient to placate the more skilled workers, especially in the mines. But

31. See Shaw, *Dependence and Underdevelopment* (op cit., fn. 11) and M.R. Bhagavan, *Zambia: Impact of industrial strategy on regional imbalance and social inequality* (Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1978, Research Report Number 44).

32. See National Assembly, *Report of the Special Parliamentary Select Committee* (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1977) (Mwanakatwe Committee), p. 11.

the extractive and manufacturing bias perpetuated, even reinforced, the neglect and impoverishment of the peasantry. Despite Zambia's substantial agricultural potential, and the need for cheap food to feed the burgeoning urban population, the rural areas continued to be neglected and exploited. During the first decade of independence, the impact of exploitation fell on the countryside;³³ only later, as recession succeeded expansion, did it come to fall on non-bourgeois urban formations as well.

The logic of partial nationalization in the decade 1965 to 1975 was inescapable. Only with the loss of profitability of mineral extraction and the decline of mutuality of interest between international corporations and the host state, both results of the continuing global recession, did corporate-host state collaboration lose some of its lustre. In the second half of the sixties, the Zambian bureaucratic bourgeoisie offered political protection to foreign companies in exchange for enhanced income and influence. As Markovitz suggests, the crucial element in such a situation is the "balance" between corporation and bureaucratic bourgeoisie:

The issue . . . is one of the degree of cooperation and integration. Indeed, a high degree of national autonomy would produce mutual benefits — increased profits for the indigenous bourgeoisie, and increased efficiency through decentralization for the MNCs.³⁴

The initial bargain included the labor aristocracy in its calculations; only with hard times did workers get excluded from the bureaucratic bourgeoisie-transnational corporate nexus. In the recession of the seventies the class bases and benefits of the Zambian state with its corporate linkages became clarified.

Until the recession, this bargain between the miners and UNIP successfully stifled most opposition to UNIP. Union leadership supported the stated national goals of the party, and the workers raised little overt objection. The workers appeared to be interested primarily in the wage settlements of 1973 and 1976 and in promoting their own prosperity. Thus, during this period the Zambian miners fulfilled the classic definition of labor aristocrats: relatively privileged and incorporated workers. Very little protest occurred anywhere in Zambia at this time. In the five years after the establishment of a one-party state, the articulation of opposition became considerably more dangerous. People that opposed UNIP were liable to find themselves in jail. At the same time, the rhetoric of Humanism continued to mystify the emerging class structure during this period, encouraging the less fortunate in Zambia to believe that the government was dedicated to their advancement.³⁵

The quiescence of labor produced its antithesis: the aggression or ad-

33. See Markovitz, *Power and Class in Africa* (op cit., fn. 1) p. 271.

34. *Ibid.*, p. 95.

35. See Jane L. Parpart, "African Labor and Human Rights: Zambian copper miners in the global political economy" *Canadian Journal of African Studies* (forthcoming).

vance of capital. Moreover, any demands from workers, at least as articulated by the leaders of organized labor, were specific rather than broad-scale. The rise of the bourgeoisie in the sixties was, in part, then, by default of other forces and demands, as Baylies and Szeftel indicate:

The influence of indigenous capital was enhanced also by the weakness of other class forces in Zambia. Organized labour, despite a relatively high level of organization, has represented a reformist and economic, rather than radical, voice in the country . . . The peasantry too has been politically weak, lacking organization and a voice in the political process. . . .

In contrast with these other classes, the bourgeoisie has great influence in the political process. But its source of strength — access to the state — is closely related to its major weakness — dependence on the state and state benefits . . . It articulates opposition to the government but it is unlikely that the class would be willing to face foreign and settler capital without state protection.³⁶

The ambiguities of certain bourgeois fractions — how dependent or national could they become? — multiplied from the mid-1970s as recession increased and labor abandoned acquiescence. Relation to the state was central to both bourgeois and proletarian responses given the growing centralization and concentration of decision making and property.

For an explanation of the change in worker consciousness and behavior through the decade we must examine worker experiences at the point of production. Partial nationalization of the mines at the end of the 1960s injected the state directly into the copper production process. Despite populist government rhetoric, the mine workers increasingly experienced the post-colonial state as an oppressive force in the work place. Government officials joined with corporate management to tighten the noose around the mine workers. Even worker councils were admittedly created to encourage production rather than participation. In the early 1970s, Burawoy and Bates document considerable disenchantment with UNIP, and a belief that UNIP, management and high level officials were in collusion against the workers. Since a similar opinion, this time shared by top trade union leaders as well, reemerged in the late-1970s, we see no reason to assume that the miners had lost their class consciousness for such a short time, particularly since state power continued to be exercised against the workers in the work place during this period.

The extension of industrial peace up to the mid-1970s, we would suggest, was not due to the mine workers' aristocratic pretensions, nor to their faltering class consciousness, which was in any case reformist rather than revolutionary,³⁷ but to a number of factors external to the Copperbelt. For

36. Baylies and Szeftel, "The rise of a Zambian capitalist class in the 1970s" (op cit., fn. 3) pp. 212-213.

37. See Jane L. Parpart, "Class consciousness among Zambian copper miners, 1950-1966" *Journal of Work and Society* 1, Fall 1982.

one, the industrial legislation of 1971 impeded collective action and the government let it be known that illegal strikers would be punished. Government coercion was made all the more certain by the cooperation between leading trade union officials and the government. This coercion, combined with government promises to increase Zambianization in the mines and other industries, encouraged a "wait and see" attitude among the miners and other industrial workers.³⁸

The first post-independence decade was characterized, then, by a relatively high level of cooperation among bourgeois forces and the co-optation of some elements in the working class. However, as classes formed and the economy stagnated more antagonistic contradictions became apparent. The rate of production and innovation during the initial period diverted attention away from more fundamental factors. Already, as the parastatal nexus expanded, the bureaucratic bourgeoisie became more than "comprador"; they evolved into a set of "major decision-makers" who could innovate and exploit directly as well as collect "rent." Until the strictures of Humanism and the constraints of recession, the Zambian ruling class fitted well with Markovitz's characterization:

The organizational bourgeoisie, therefore, coheres around certain fundamentals: the nation-state and capitalism, individual gain and profit. The organizational bourgeoisie acts as a class in pursuit of an interest that is in conflict with the interest of other classes.³⁹

This class project was ascendant as the 1960s turned into the 1970s: the period of the proliferation of parastatals.

Parastatals, profit and the proletariat: class consolidation

The initial steps towards partial state control of the Zambian economy were justified in terms of economic nationalism with the additional element of disengagement from dependence on southern, especially South, Africa. But by the end of the 1960s and the independence honeymoon not only was Zambia's sprawling parastatal "system" largely in place; the post-war Bretton Woods order was also coming to an end. The decade of the 1970s marked, then, an extension and intensification of class consciousness and contradiction in the Zambian political economy.

First, it became apparent that the effects of economic nationalism coincided with the class interests of the emerging bureaucratic bourgeoisie concentrated in party, bureaucracy and parastatals. Second, privileges and prerequisites of such office were seen increasingly to be superior to and at the expense of other classes, including those elements of labor and

38. On the background to this caution see Jane L. Parpart, *Labor and Capital on the Copperbelt: African labor and corporate strategy on the Northern Rhodesian Copper Mines, 1924-1964* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1983).

39. Markovitz, *Power and Class in Africa* (op cit., fn. 1), p. 210.

peasantry which had been supportive of the nationalist movement. And third, redistribution of profit and property towards non-bourgeois classes became unlikely as boom yielded to bust and Zambia's copper-bottomed economy revealed the difficulties of dependence on one vulnerable and high-cost extractive industry. These three issues — concentration, exclusion and dependence — constitute the basis of the crisis in the Zambian state which intensified throughout the seventies notwithstanding progress towards liberation in neighboring white-ruled states.

Moreover, the relentlessness of the "external" global crisis and its apparent non-cyclical but structural character served to exacerbate "internal" antagonisms which regular appeals for national unity and personal production did little to ameliorate. The diplomacy of "detente"⁴⁰ provided frequent diversions and occasional hope but the underlying trend was towards economic depression and political exclusion. Criticism of international capitalism, regional conflict and national indolence did little to halt the seemingly ineluctable decline. Almost continuous renegotiations of parastatal agreements, reorganizations of the state sector, and re-assignments of senior technocrats did little to attack the roots of the problem, an expensive superstructure of state capitalism imposed on an uneconomic substructure of capital intensive, high-cost copper extraction. The kingly of the whole structure was state-corporate cooperation in the copper mines.⁴¹

This cooperation in a corporatist nexus had profound implications for workers, especially as it coincided with the beginning of the decline of copper demand and prices as well as of higher energy and food prices. The mine workers and MUZ officials have become much less supportive of the corporatist state over the last ten years. By the end of the decade, in 1979, Kaunda complained of "incessant attacks on the leadership of the nation" by union leaders.⁴² That same year the wives of the miners took their empty pots, pans and plates before government offices on the Copperbelt and demanded that they be filled with food. In 1980 there were over 120 strikes or go-slows and in July of 1981 a massive strike broke out on the Copperbelt. The skilled workers demanded the same pay as Europeans doing similar work, and all the miners struck in sympathy. The president of MUZ insisted that "these strikes are symptoms of the peoples' growing

40. See Douglas G. Anglin, "Zambia and Southern African 'detente'" *International Journal* 30(3), Summer 1975, pp. 471-503. Cf. Karen Eriksen, "Zambia: class formation and detente" *Review of African Political Economy* 9, May-August 1978, pp. 4-26.

41. See Marcia Burdette "Nationalisation in Zambia: a critique of bargaining theory" *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 11(3), 1977, pp. 471-496.

42. *Times of Zambia*, 12 October 1979.

disenchantment with this government's economic policies."⁴³ Another union leader warned that "the mood of the worker is grim, their living standards are falling fast and we may not be able to hold them back much longer."⁴⁴ This mood had not changed by early 1982 when Newstead Zimba, secretary-general of ZCTU, blamed the government and UNIP, claiming that the workers "had been taken for a ride as all their meagre earnings were swallowed up in high prices of basic essential commodities."⁴⁵ By contrast with state-proletarian strains, state-corporate relations remained essentially cooperative.

Notwithstanding continual pressures and negotiations, the relationship between the indigenous bourgeoisie and the multinational corporation has been characterized by symbiosis: partial ownership (but not control) has been exchanged for political protection. The local bureaucratic fraction has become a cooperator in the exploitation of Zambian labor while external capital has been protected against the threat of "nationalization" either by the state or by indigenous entrepreneurs or by local labor. In short, a calculating coalition has been formed to the advantage of the state and corporation at the expense of alternative bourgeois fractions and non-bourgeois classes, except, perhaps and then only for a short while after independence, the Zambian trade union leadership.

The essentials of the trade-off became clearer at the third major post-independence restructuring of the industry in May 1981. As the problems of copper continued into the new decade, American investors reduced their involvement. Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM) is not only more centralized and corporatist than ever, a single company for the whole industry, it also constitutes a return to the essential South African-Zambian condominium characteristic of colonial and federal days, for Anglo-American is by far the major foreign partner in ZCCM. Although ZCCM was designed to salvage Zambia's primary, albeit ailing industry, the world's fifth largest copper producer and second largest cobalt producer still faces short-term recessionary and long-term structural difficulties. As the World Bank indicates, the industry on the Copperbelt is "at a mature and fully developed phase, cannot be expanded and, therefore, cannot maintain its share of the world market."⁴⁶ Industrial decline has exacerbated tensions on the Copperbelt, especially party-union antagonism.

In the last few years, the Copperbelt has become a focal point for opposition to UNIP's growing power. In 1978, Musonda Chambeshi, a UPP member, won a clear by-election victory in the mining town of Luanshya,

despite a fierce campaign against him. During his brief spell in Parliament (he was suspended from the party in June 1978), Chambeshi denounced corruption and soaring prices, both issues dear to the hearts of the mine workers.⁴⁷ In that same year, Kapwepwe tried to resurrect an opposition group within UNIP, basing his challenge on considerable support among educated Zambians and on the Copperbelt. He promised to concentrate more on economic reconstruction and less on international politics, a position popular with miners and the indigenous business fraction.⁴⁸ Changes in the constitution disqualified the primary opposition (Kapwepwe and Nkumbula) in the presidential race of 1978, but did little to reduce Kaunda's worries about opposition. He still felt compelled to employ a British campaign consultant to oversee a high-powered publicity campaign to sell the president to a "weary and unhappy nation."⁴⁹ Kaunda also arrested a number of Kapwepwe's supporters in September 1979 after they called on Kaunda to resign. Significantly, the people arrested came from the mining centers of the Copperbelt.⁵⁰

Neither the elimination of political opposition in 1978 nor Kapwepwe's death in 1980 halted worker opposition to growing UNIP hegemony. ZCTU and MUZ condemned UNIP's proposed control over local electoral candidates. The unions saw this as an attempt to further UNIP's power while curtailing their own. ZCTU called on union members to boycott the elections and, in January 1981, dismissed those union officials who stood for election. In retaliation, UNIP expelled 17 trade union leaders from UNIP, including Frederick Chiluba, Newstead Zimba and Chilata Sampa of the ZCTU, David Mwila, President of MUZ, and other MUZ leaders.

This action provoked serious industrial unrest on the Copperbelt. All the miners, along with other important sectors, including banking and education, went on strike to protest UNIP's behavior. The unions contacted world labor organizations to censure UNIP as well. Workers on the Copperbelt made it clear that they would not tolerate a direct attack on the unions, nor would they cooperate with UNIP's attempts to gain greater control over the nation.

The vulnerabilities of a very dependent and centralized state were revealed dramatically at an aggregate level in the mid-1970s, paving the

43. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 13 November 1981, p. 31186.

44. *Ibid.*, p. 31186.

45. *Times of Zambia*, 14 January 1982.

46. World Bank, *Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: an agenda for action* (Washington, 1981), p. 20.

47. *Times of Zambia*, 24 January 1978.

48. *Africa Research Bulletin* (Political, Social and Cultural Series) 15(8), 15 September 1978, p. 4957.

49. *African Recorder* 18(5), 26 February-11 March 1979, p. 5027.

50. Keesing's Contemporary Archives 27 February 1981, p. 30738.

disenchantment with this government's economic policies."⁴³ Another union leader warned that "the mood of the worker is grim, their living standards are falling fast and we may not be able to hold them back much longer."⁴⁴ This mood had not changed by early 1982 when Newstead Zimba, secretary-general of ZCTU, blamed the government and UNIP, claiming that the workers "had been taken for a ride as all their meagre earnings were swallowed up in high prices of basic essential commodities."⁴⁵ By contrast with state-proletarian strains, state-corporate relations remained essentially cooperative.

Notwithstanding continual pressures and negotiations, the relationship between the indigenous bourgeoisie and the multinational corporation has been characterized by symbiosis: partial ownership (but not control) has been exchanged for political protection. The local bureaucratic fraction has become a cooperator in the exploitation of Zambian labor while external capital has been protected against the threat of "nationalization" either by the state or by indigenous entrepreneurs or by local labor. In short, a calculating coalition has been formed to the advantage of the state and corporation at the expense of alternative bourgeois fractions and non-bourgeois classes, except, perhaps and then only for a short while after independence, the Zambian trade union leadership.

The essentials of the trade-off became clearer at the third major post-independence restructuring of the industry in May 1981. As the problems of copper continued into the new decade, American investors reduced their involvement. Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM) is not only more centralized and corporatist than ever, a single company for the whole industry, it also constitutes a return to the essential South African-Zambian condominium characteristic of colonial and federal days, for Anglo-American is by far the major foreign partner in ZCCM. Although ZCCM was designed to salvage Zambia's primary, albeit ailing industry, the world's fifth largest copper producer and second largest cobalt producer still faces short-term recessionary and long-term structural difficulties. As the World Bank indicates, the industry on the Copperbelt is "at a mature and fully developed phase, cannot be expanded and, therefore, cannot maintain its share of the world market."⁴⁶ Industrial decline has exacerbated tensions on the Copperbelt, especially party-union antagonism.

In the last few years, the Copperbelt has become a focal point for opposition to UNIP's growing power. In 1978, Musonda Chambeshi, a UPP member, won a clear by-election victory in the mining town of Luan-

shya, despite a fierce campaign against him. During his brief spell in Parliament (he was suspended from the party in June 1978), Chambeshi denounced corruption and soaring prices, both issues dear to the hearts of the mine workers.⁴⁷ In that same year, Kapwepwe tried to resurrect an opposition group within UNIP, basing his challenge on considerable support among educated Zambians and on the Copperbelt. He promised to concentrate more on economic reconstruction and less on international politics, a position popular with miners and the indigenous business fraction.⁴⁸ Changes in the constitution disqualified the primary opposition (Kapwepwe and Nkumbula) in the presidential race of 1978, but did little to reduce Kaunda's worries about opposition. He still felt compelled to employ a British campaign consultant to oversee a high-powered publicity campaign to sell the president to a "weary and unhappy nation."⁴⁹ Kaunda also arrested a number of Kapwepwe's supporters in September 1979 after they called on Kaunda to resign. Significantly, the people arrested came from the mining centers of the Copperbelt.⁵⁰

Neither the elimination of political opposition in 1978 nor Kapwepwe's death in 1980 halted worker opposition to growing UNIP hegemony. ZCTU and MUZ condemned UNIP's proposed control over local electoral candidates. The unions saw this as an attempt to further UNIP's power while curtailing their own. ZCTU called on union members to boycott the elections and, in January 1981, dismissed those union officials who stood for election. In retaliation, UNIP expelled 17 trade union leaders from UNIP, including Frederick Chiluba, Newstead Zimba and Chilata Sampa of the ZCTU, David Mwila, President of MUZ, and other MUZ leaders.

This action provoked serious industrial unrest on the Copperbelt. All the miners, along with other important sectors, including banking and education, went on strike to protest UNIP's behavior. The unions contacted world labor organizations to censure UNIP as well. Workers on the Copperbelt made it clear that they would not tolerate a direct attack on the unions, nor would they cooperate with UNIP's attempts to gain greater control over the nation.

The vulnerabilities of a very dependent and centralized state were revealed dramatically at an aggregate level in the mid-1970s, paving the

43. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 13 November 1981, p. 31186.

44. *Ibid.*, p. 31186.

45. *Times of Zambia*, 14 January 1982.

46. World Bank, *Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: an agenda for action* (Washington, 1981), p. 20.

47. *Times of Zambia*, 24 January 1978.

48. *Africa Research Bulletin* (Political, Social and Cultural Series) 15(8), 15 September 1978, p. 4957.

49. *African Recorder* 18(5), 26 February-11 March 1979, p. 5027.

50. Keesing's Contemporary Archives 27 February 1981, p. 30738.

way for this subsequent major shift in class relations. As the World Bank notes, "Zambia's terms of trade deteriorated by 52 percent between 1974 and 1978. From a peak in 1974, copper prices fell by 40 percent in 1975, while import prices rose by an average 16 percent a year."⁵¹ One result of such excessive commodity dependence was a precipitous economic decline which affected almost all Zambians except the bureaucratic bourgeoisie. In response, disaffected bourgeois and labor fractions discovered both common cause and new strength; for them the enemy was the "bureaucratic bourgeoisie" rather than "international capitalism."

Labor aristocrats and bourgeois fractions: class coalitions

The development of corporatism in Zambia in the seventies produced not only the exclusion of non-bourgeois' interests but also the alienation of certain bourgeois fractions. The concentration of decision-making in an increasingly isolated State House led to initial scepticism and later opposition among a cluster of more *laissez-faire* members of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie as reflected in the report of the Mwanakatwe Committee.⁵² Unwilling to be sycophantic and reshuffled *ad nauseam*, and not unaware of the imponderables facing the regime, a growing number of senior ministers and officials opted out of the corporatist system for what remained of the private sector. This abandonment of the Humanist state involved risk — would they be able to survive without official support and sanction? — but also opportunity, accumulation unfettered by the rules and obligations of the one-party state. It also offered the prospect of a partial revival, without Kaunda and UNIP being involved of course, of the coalition of the nationalist era.

The non-bureaucratic fraction, an embryonic national bourgeoisie, was free to review its association with non-bourgeois interests now excluded and alienated by corporatism. Not that the relationship would be either equal or comprehensive — the national bourgeoisie would accumulate more than labor and its large-scale agricultural elements would compete with small-scale and peasant farmers — but the non-bureaucratic fraction would offer a class ally to disaffected and impoverished non-bourgeois elements. This is especially so for the labor aristocracy which has lost status and access as well as income as the recession continues. Moreover, it has always had a free trade orientation, a position it shared with the national bourgeoisie. And by the mid-1970s both were critical of two dominant strands in the Humanist state, support for the liberation movements in

51. World Bank, *World Development Report, 1981* (Washington, 1981), p. 78.

52. On the Mwanakatwe Committee and its significance, see Timothy M. Shaw "Dilemmas of dependence and (under)development: conflicts and choices in Zambia's present and prospective foreign policy" *Africa Today* 26(4), Fourth Quarter 1979, pp. 53-58.

Southern Africa and constraint on the scope of private capital.

By the opening of the 1980s, widespread support among various sectors of organized labor against UNIP signaled a growing solidarity among Zambian workers in political matters. ZCTU leaders increasingly threatened a general strike with the full knowledge that they could organize one. Rather than retreat before UNIP threats, labor leaders have been confidently calling for discussions, but only between equals. So in January 1982, Newstead Zimba, general-secretary of ZCTU, informed UNIP that "We would like to declare this year the year of frankness and open-mindedness among the leaders in the labor movement and those in the Party and the Government."⁵³ What this portends for future political action by Zambian workers is not certain, but it does indicate a growing political consciousness among the Zambian worker force and an awareness of the need to organize broadly-based worker coalitions to protect the political rights of workers and other Zambians.

Thus, the injection of the state directly into the copper industry in Zambia has had important implications for miner consciousness of and commitment to basic political rights. UNIP's early meddling in union affairs, the partial nationalization of the mines, and subsequent actions by the state against labor have clarified the alliance between the state, UNIP, and the copper companies. Worker consciousness of this alliance did not change during the relatively peaceful and prosperous late 1960s and early 1970s. What has changed since then has been the perception of the degree and nature of the opposition between workers and this alliance, and the willingness to act on that perception. The global recession finally stripped the mine workers of any illusions that they might benefit from cooperation with the Zambian ruling class. As worker conditions deteriorated, the contradictions between reality and rhetoric gradually clarified the class bias of the UNIP regime.

The fight to protect worker interests from the mid-1970s onwards has of necessity been transferred to the political arena, as workers came to recognize the links between politics and production. And in that process, Zambian miners and other workers have come to understand the link between their particular interests and the rights of Zambians as a whole, and the need to fight for those freedoms. Hitherto non-antagonistic relations have become increasingly antagonistic for both short-term (inflation) and long-term (class formation) reasons.

The efforts of the mine workers and organized labor to act on this new understanding of the national division of labor have varied with the historic

53. *Times of Zambia*, 14 January 1982.

circumstances shaping the class struggle within industry, the nation, and the global economy. So, throughout much of the early 1970s, the miners responded to government threats and promises by curtailing large-scale collective labor protest, assuming the political gains from compromise outweighed the costs of confrontation during this prosperous period. The union leaders, with their close connections to government, were particularly optimistic about the rewards for cooperating with the state and party.

It was only when the global economy changed, with profound implications for the position of Zambia's economy in the world system and the position of the proletariat within it, that this cooperation became less attractive. And, as we have seen, the mine workers and their union leaders responded to this change by becoming more militant in both the industrial and political spheres. Organized labor is currently demanding greater protection for individual rights, a fairer distribution of the national wealth, and limitations on state power: a direct response to the demise of human rights and needs as political centralization and economic contraction have undermined both over the last decade.⁵⁴

The political economy of peripheralization: class struggles

The marginalization of the Zambian economy, with ten years of poor prices for copper, has led to the peripheralization of the Zambian state; it has slipped downwards from the semi-periphery into the Fourth World of Most Seriously Affected and Least Developed States. At the diplomatic level this means that Zambia is no longer a major actor in either continental or regional affairs; and at the economic level neither its product nor its market are well-regarded.⁵⁵ The demise of the copper industry is only partially due to the recession, resulting in reduced demand and consequently lower prices in the advanced industrialized states; it is also a function of technological change — other materials such as glass-fiber optics and plastic pipes are replacing it in the crucial communications and construction industries.

Although certain Zambian leaders were well aware of the dangers of dependence on copper and the imperatives of diversification into agriculture, little was done after independence: copper remained the shining focal point of the political economy and both political culture and

political discourse centered around the distribution of its income. Although the mining industry retains its centrality in the Zambian popular mythology as well as political system, and some debates and decisions have an unreality about them for reflecting this, it is now at best *primus inter pares*; and national bourgeois and skilled worker interests well recognize this even if the regime is reluctant or unable to admit it.

The demise of copper has served to transform relations if not the mode of production: the bureaucratic bourgeoisie has protected itself from inflation and recession through increases in income in cash and in kind (the perks of office such as housing, car, servants, allowances, etc.); but the workers, even skilled ones, have suffered from minimal salary settlements, large subsidy reductions, and increased costs for shelter, clothing and schooling. In short, the minority of interests advanced through the corporatist nexus have been protected at the expense of the majority of extra-corporatist classes and groups. The latent opposition of the latter has become manifest; contractions have become more antagonistic and less subject to reconciliation.

In response to general difficulties and labor resistance the regime increasingly blames the workers for economic problems which are essentially structural in character, portraying opposition as unjustified and "political" rather than reasonable and "economic." In the wake of increasing industrial unrest in 1980, for example, Kaunda announced that "In the name of the people, I will act decisively on any irresponsibility from any worker or section of workers."⁵⁶ In July, 1981, he arrested four senior trade union officials and a businessman for inciting illegal strikes on the Copperbelt with the eventual aim of overthrowing the government. The ZCTU threatened a general strike, and eventually the leaders were released, but tension between government and the workers continued. Kaunda has tried to convince the unions to cooperate with UNIP. However, it is clear that he still regards Zambian workers, particularly the mine workers, as a selfish lot who threaten Zambian prosperity and national development goals.⁵⁷

If it can be proved that the mine workers have been getting an excessive share of the national surplus, while producing less, then these accusations make sense. However, this has not been the case. As Philip Daniel points out, "when corrections were made for the fall in milling grades, and the recovery rates, output per worker tended to rise until 1969, and then to remain on a plateau until reduced by the exceptional

54. See Parpart, "African Labor and Human Rights" (op cit., fn. 35) and Timothy M. Shaw, "The political economy of Zambia" *Current History* 81(473), March 1982, pp. 125-128 and 144.

55. See Timothy M. Shaw and Douglas G. Anglin, "Zambia: the crises of liberation" in Gwendolen M. Carter and Patrick O'Meara (eds.), *Southern Africa: the continuing crisis* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982. Second Edition) pp. 199-222, and Douglas G. Anglin and Timothy M. Shaw, *Zambia's Foreign Policy: studies in diplomacy and dependence* (Boulder: Westview, 1979).

56. *Africa Research Bulletin* (Political, Social and Cultural Series) 17(6), 15 July 1980, p. 5717.

57. *Africa Research Bulletin* (Political, Social and Cultural Series) 18(7), 15 August 1981, p. 6119.

transport and price problems of 1975." In contrast, the real wages of mine workers fell between 1967 and 1975.⁵⁸ Nor were the Zambian miners the wage leaders any more. Between 1964 and 1974, copper miners' real wages rose 35%, while those of workers outside the mines, i.e., in import-substitution sectors, rose by 52%.⁵⁹ Unskilled and semi-skilled miners were particularly at a disadvantage, especially after 1975 when promotion opportunities began to taper off. Even the 1976 wage settlement, which tried to help lower-priced labor, did little to improve matters, especially after the devaluation of the kwacha in 1976.⁶⁰

At the same time, the incomes of the Zambian bourgeoisie and expatriate workers have steadily increased. European mine workers earned K7600 per year as compared to K789 per year for Zambian miners.⁶¹ More important, after the Mulungushi Reforms of 1968, the Zambian middle class grew rapidly in size and wealth. A recent study by Rene Dumont reveals that the wealthy in Zambia have seen their incomes increase by 50% or more, while the poor are much poorer.⁶² An ILO report has similar figures — the top 2% of all households have 20% of the national household income and the top 10% claim 46.5% of the total income.⁶³ These figures suggest that the Zambian mine workers have not been "milking the economy." Rather, the data support Richard Sklar's conclusion that "Thus far the redistributive policies of the Zambian government have appeared to make far greater demands upon the wage earning class than the bourgeoisie."⁶⁴

What does this behavior tell us about worker consciousness and action among Zambian mine workers since independence? Are they still self-interested — "a militantly economic lot . . . whose political potential at best remains ambiguous?"⁶⁵ — or have they recognized their role as advocates and defenders of the urban poor and rural peasants against encroachment and exploitation by the burgeoning bureaucratic bourgeoisie?

58. Philip Daniel, *Africanisation, Nationalisation and Inequality: mining labor and the Copperbelt in Zambian development* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979) pp. 88 and 151.

59. International Labor Organization, *Jobs and Skills Program for Africa, Narrowing the Gaps: planning for basic needs and productive employment in Zambia. Report to the Government of Zambia by a JASPA Employment Advisory Mission* (Addis Ababa, January 1977), p. 9.

60. Daniel, *Africanisation, Nationalisation and Inequality*, pp. 164 and 166-167.

61. *Statistical Year Book*, Central Statistics Office (Lusaka, 1970).

62. *Africa Research Bulletin* (Economic, Financial and Technical Series) 16(12): 31 January 1980, p. 5363.

63. *Narrowing the Gaps* (op cit., fn. 59) pp. 1 and 68.

64. Richard L. Sklar, *Corporate Power in an African State: the political impact of multinational mining companies in Zambia* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975) p. 211.

65. Richard Sandbrook, "The political potential of African urban workers" *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 11(3), 1977, pp. 411-433 and, with Jack Am, "The Laboring Poor and Urban Class Formation: the case of greater Accra" (Montreal: Centre for Developing Area Studies, 1977. Occasional Monograph Number 12).

Evidence of recent worker protests suggests a continuing awareness among the miners of the alliance between ruling class and management in opposition to workers at the point of production. We would suggest that the quiescent period up to the mid-1970s was not due to a lack of such consciousness, but to pressures from government and union leaders and, perhaps as well, to a hope that cooperation with UNIP would ultimately benefit the miners. When benefits were not forthcoming, and when national and global economic conditions deteriorated, the miners never had any doubt who to blame.

The gap in real income between the workers and management has visibly increased on the mines. The miners recognize that government as well as corporate officials are responsible for this situation, particularly since the nationalization of the industry. They accuse both the mining companies and the Zambian government, and therefore UNIP, for their oppression. Thus, the Zambian miners exhibit the same awareness, even more sharply understood, of the class structure and class opposition in the work place today as they did at the beginning of the independence period.

More, significantly, in the last few years, as the price of copper continued its seemingly ineluctible downward trend, leading trade union officials have adopted the more militant consciousness of less privileged workers: the labor aristocracy has become less distinguishable from other proletarian forces. These leaders now recognize that an unhealthy economy hurts workers as well as management, and they, like the World Bank, increasingly blame Zambia's economic decline on the inefficiency of the government-run parastatal sector "which is smothering not only the mining corporations, but the entire economy."⁶⁶ They have also expressed a growing concern about the oppressiveness of state capitalism, which in 1976 Mwila asserted "was more brutal than individual capitalism and resulted in the creation of bureaucracy, where economic power was entrusted in the hands of the few."⁶⁷ And they are less willing to trust UNIP and the government to be fair and objective about miner wage demands.⁶⁸ Thus while union leaders today clearly recognize the alliance between management and the state against the workers, they almost seem to fear government combined with state capitalism more than private capital alone.

As we have seen, mine workers, including union officials, are not only

66. *Africa Index* 4(20), 3 December 1981; David Mwila, interviewed by Chipasha Luchembe, 15 April 1979. David Mwila said "We want to ensure that the economy is not dependent on copper. We want to see an economy which is sound . . ."

67. *Zambia Daily Mail*, 9 July 1976.

68. *Keating's Contemporary Archives*, 13 November 1981, p. 31186.

clearly aware of the oppressive nature of the alliance between management and state capital in the copper industry but are also increasingly willing to organize collectively against this coalition to defend worker interests. They believe, rightly so, that the workers are bearing a disproportionate burden of Zambian development plans and problems, and they are no longer willing to accept this. The bureaucratic bourgeoisie may succeed in buying off the mine workers for periods of time, but this will have to be more than mere "window dressing" to satisfy the miners. And the continued ability to do so is increasingly in doubt as the recession extends into the future. Conversely, union unity is augmented as the labor aristocracy becomes "proletarian" once more.

This unity, along with the size of ZCTU and MUZ membership, plus the undoubted ability of the workers, especially the copper miners, to damage Zambia's precarious economy, extracted some compromises from the government after the 1980 arrests. In January, 1981, UNIP and the government promised ZCTU leaders that only the Labor Minister in future would act on behalf of UNIP and the government in case of further industrial unrest. The 17 trade union leaders were readmitted to UNIP in April, and Chiluba and others, detained in July, were released from detention in October 1981. In an effort to placate the labor movement, Kaunda promised to review salaries and wages in August, and indeed he used IMF money to help ease worker economic woes in 1982. On 29 October 1981, Kaunda offered a truce to the unions, and publicly admitted that "only we in the labor movement and UNIP can solve the country's problems." He called for cooperation, claiming as he had done before that UNIP and the labor movement are "two sides of the same coin."⁶⁹

What does this behavior tell us about the political consciousness of the mine workers, and indeed, much of the Copperbelt work force? Kaunda clearly believes that organized labor, especially the mine workers, and MUZ and ZCTU officials, are politically motivated; that they want to destroy his government and UNIP. In 1980 he insisted that it was no accident that an October coup attempt occurred at the same time as widespread unofficial strikes and soon after Chiluba had warned that he would call a general strike before the year was out unless the government responded to worker demands for an improvement in living standards. Kaunda also claimed that one of the two factions involved in the coup was based in the Copperbelt. He vindicated his arrests on the Copperbelt in July 1981 by claiming that the arrested labor leaders were using strikes "to take over the leadership of the Zambian government."⁷⁰ Chiluba was also

accused of conspiring to humiliate the Minister of Labor and Social Services, Basil Kabwe, and of advocating a change of government.⁷¹

Is Kaunda right? Do the Zambian workers, especially the mine workers, have a revolutionary political consciousness? Do they really want to take over the government and restructure Zambian society? To the question of a revolutionary political consciousness, we can safely answer no. Although the president of ZCTU, Fred Chiluba, is considered by many to have taken over Kapwepwe's mantle, he, and the workers he represents, do not seem to have any clear revolutionary vision. They are not calling for a radical reorganization of Zambian society; indeed they tend to call for a retreat away from Zambia's brand of "African socialism."

However, Zambian workers do perceive an alliance among UNIP, the organizational bourgeoisie, foreign capital and, to a lesser extent, the indigenous capitalist class. Furthermore, they are increasingly aware that any growth in UNIP's power is a victory for the middle class rather than for the workers. They are opposed to that trend, and they are willing to fight it by organizing labor action for political goals. As Mwila put it recently,

Apart from improving the welfare of miners, we have other objectives . . . We want to see an economy which is sound and we want to see freedom of expression. We would like to see freedom of expression because if we only concern ourselves with conditions of service and freedom is curtailed our achievements of better working conditions will be curtailed as well. We have seen what has happened elsewhere whenever the ruling class has tended to demoralize the people: the standards of living of individuals have gone down.⁷²

Thus, although organized labor in Zambia is not about to lead a revolution, recent behavior suggests that it does recognize the need to defend worker interests in the political arena, and that this entails protecting the political rights of all the dominated classes against UNIP encroachment; i.e. a worker-led transclass coalition.

The ideology and polity of Humanism no longer serve, then, the interests of those they claim to represent, the Zambian people, yet the infrastructures of "state socialism" such as educational, health and welfare services remain available to the new class. The state continues to pour scarce resources into facilities for the bourgeoisie in the urban centers while disregarding demands from non-bourgeois forces in the countryside. Despite growing alienation and opposition, the president preaches stability, warning people not to "rock the boat. If the boat capsizes everyone will suffer and chaos will follow."⁷³ But as Markovitz notes, "Stability in Africa,

69. Africa Research Bulletin (Political, Social and Cultural Series) 18(10), 15 October 1981, p. 6229.

70. African Recorder 19(25), 2-15 December 1980, pp. 5516-5517; African Recorder 20(18), 27 August-3 September 1981, p. 5722.

71. Africa Confidential 22(22), 28 October 1981.

72. David Mwila, interviewed by Chipasha Luchembe, 15 April 1979.

73. Africa Research Bulletin 18(2), 15 March 1981, p. 5962.

as elsewhere, is in the interest of those who control power and of those who receive a disproportionate share of benefits made possible by collective effort and social organization."⁷⁴ The excluded elements in Zambian society, which now include labor aristocrats, have come increasingly to appreciate the ambiguities of stability and their limited association with such a condition; hence the struggles of the 1980s.

Economic decline and political decay: class repression

The demise of the copper industry, exclusivism of the corporate state, and alienation of various bourgeois and proletarian interests, mark a fundamental transition in the political economy of Zambia. Notwithstanding similarities between the 1981/2 treason trials and the 1982 university closure and earlier crises for the regime, the 1980s are dramatically different from the 1960s.⁷⁵ First, real national income continues its ineluctable decline. Second, the regime is more isolated and intolerant than ever. Third, the opposition is more conscious and determined, albeit leaderless, than before. Fourth, regional change is unlikely to realize significant national gains. And fifth, orthodox ideological and institutional responses are unlikely to gain much support or more time. In short, the regime confronts a crisis of fundamental proportions at the levels of both sub- and super-structure. Its response has been class repression rather than cooptation, a significant contrast to the post-independence period, despite the misleading rhetoric about "scientific socialism" and Humanistic development. The gap between ideology and reality, State House and the country is wider than ever as real change is avoided rather than accepted, let alone advanced.

Despite international assistance involving bi- and multi-lateral aid and a massive IMF \$1 billion SDR loan in May 1981 — the largest yet in Sub-Saharan Africa, constituting \$165 per person — on top of an earlier three-year SDR tranche of \$300m in 1978, Zambia has declined to make the "structural adjustments" which either the World Bank or Rene Dumont have advocated. Whilst the former *laissez faire* advice encourages "market forces" such as dismantling parastatals, reducing food subsidies and reviving agriculture, the latter proposes more rural cooperative production. Meanwhile, the latest 5 year plan maintains the myths of expansion: \$5 billion investment before 1983 to facilitate the "transition from capitalism to socialism" plus, under a 10-year agricultural plan, nine 50,000 acre state farms before 1990. In practice neither agribusiness nor cooperatives are

74. Markovitz, *Power and Class in Africa* (op cit., fn. 1) p. 346.

75. On this see Timothy M. Shaw "Zambia after twenty years: recession and repression without revolution" *lessee* (forthcoming). For a thoughtful theoretical review of changes among labor, state and political economy with an emphasis on evolving production relations see Bursawoy, "The hidden abode of underdevelopment" (op cit., fn. 4) pp. 129-163.

developed; instead a black landed bourgeoisie forces up the price for basic products to make its role as successor or adjunct to the white settlers profitable, and investment continues to pour into capital-intensive copper and infrastructural projects. The cost of such unreality grows exponentially, with its impact falling ever harder on non-bureaucratic bourgeois forces, particularly the workers and peasants.

Zambia's position as a copper-producing economy at the international periphery is the root cause of its current difficulties and dilemmas: copper prices fell another 20% in 1981.⁷⁶ As the World Bank indicates, Zambia can do little about this inheritance in the world system other than diversify rapidly away from its internal and external constraints:

Since the world copper price peaked in 1974 (never again reaching as much as 60 percent of its peak level in real terms), Zambia has fallen into a prolonged slump characterized by falling real output, inflation, declining foreign exchange reserves, and a large amount of arrears in payment for imports.⁷⁷

With different policies, Zambia would have been able to slow the decline in incomes after 1974 . . . even with . . . optimistic assumptions, two-thirds of the fall was unavoidable given Zambia's structural dependence on copper.⁷⁸

The internal repercussions, in terms of declining incomes and increasing antagonisms, are even clearer than the external although their political impact is muted by one-party state structures and seeming opposition leaderlessness.

Nevertheless, popular alienation and regime isolation continue to grow with labor being one of the few visible and viable centers of discontent other than fractions within the national bourgeoisie itself. The bureaucratic bourgeoisie protects its income and privilege from both, yet it is increasingly insecure and paranoid. As *The Economist* comments, trade union leaders, even if they had the will, now lack the means to mediate capital-worker accords:

The fact is, as almost everybody in Zambia (outside the ruling party's Central Committee) recognizes, that labor discontent is growing so fast that the union leadership cannot always keep abreast of it. In a one-party autocracy like Zambia, industrial action is one of the few means of expression for political dissatisfaction. This gives men like Mr. Chiluba much quasi-political power; but as (the) . . . detentions show, they are exposed to retribution from an increasingly alarmed administration. Mr. Kaunda's administration has failed to deliver the goods, and people want food, jobs, medical care and education, not just rhetoric about the evils of international capitalism.⁷⁹

76. See World Bank Annual Report, 1982 (Washington, 1982) p. 62.

77. *Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa*, (op cit., fn. 46) p. 29.

78. World Development Report, 1981 (op cit., fn. 51) p. 79.

79. "Zambia: a coup in every plot" *The Economist* 1 August 1981, p. 38.

Thus far, regime repression has contained disorganized opposition but a real national bourgeois-labor aristocracy coalition might pose greater problems for the remnants of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie. The silent class struggle is relentless but, thus far at least, containable, with World Bank and Anglo-American support for State House. Regional as well as global changes threaten to undermine such association, however.

Paradoxically, the transformation in Zambia's economic fortunes, towards decline and marginalization, coincided with an improvement in its regional position, away from confrontation with Rhodesia and towards cooperation with Zimbabwe. However, the latter transition also resulted in peripheralization at the level of both politics and economics and produced further ambiguities and stresses in regional relations: the uncomfortable coexistence of liberation support with economic detente.⁸⁰ Moreover, despite a decade of presidential claims to the contrary, the ending of the war over Rhodesia did not lead to an improvement, dramatic or otherwise, in Zambia's economic situation. Instead, the election of Robert Mugabe left Zambia more marginal and less influential, without an external threat to unify domestic antagonists. Michael Holman has pointed to this ambiguous result:

President Kaunda has shown himself adept at balancing tribal and factional rivalries, shifting the holders of senior positions and supporting the Southern African liberation movement despite the cost. The seven-year war in Rhodesia helped to unify Zambia as well as to highlight its economic problems. It would be ironic if peace in Zimbabwe allowed President Kaunda's opponents to fan domestic discontent.⁸¹

The artificialness of Zambia's import-substitution policy had already been exposed by the high price of oil and low value of copper: industrial as well as extractive output has declined fairly consistently since the early 1970s. The revival of Harare as the regional industrial and communications center merely exacerbated the problems of high costs and small markets. Participation in the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) and Preferential Trade Area (PTA), with its headquarters in Lusaka, will not halt the decline, which is the product of global (structural) dependence not regional (strategic) change. National rather than regional self-reliance remains an imperative, involving a set of policies which are continually avoided despite the associated imperative of control to ensure "stability."

The exacerbation of class differences and the intensification of class oppression do not mean, of course, that antagonistic contradictions will

either develop or produce a new synthesis. The dialectics of class and fractional relations are too complex in a post-independence and post-industrial world for that. Moreover, continual forms of class and fractional collaboration and coalition serve to ameliorate and complicate simple contradictions. The "left" in Zambia is weak and leaderless: potential challenges in the mid-term future come not from the proletariat or peasantry but from the military, the national bourgeoisie and the labor aristocracy, acting either alone or in concert. The class composition of the 1981 and 1982 treason trials suggests that this "middle class" grouping is the main locus of opposition, not that it is either particularly well-organized or well-supported. Landed and labor aristocrats do not make "good" revolutionaries. Moreover, the president and party retain enough resources and intelligence to be able to divert and distract, if not contain, potential class antagonists. Nevertheless, the trend is towards exclusion and opposition rather than towards cooptation and collaboration.

The growing self-consciousness of an excluded national bourgeoisie and labor aristocracy has led to a clarification in the class bases and biases of the Zambian state. Neither claims of national unity — Humanism — nor class cohesion — stability — have the persuasive force they once possessed among a disillusioned as well as dispossessed and impoverished population. Rather, the essential characteristics and contradictions of the political economy have been revealed as recession and differentiation proceed. The trend away from state-dominated class alliances to fractional fragmentation and coalition is symptomatic of a continent-wide evolution towards complexity as well as ambiguity.

Both the Zambian and African situations call for a new sophistication in perspective, both theoretical and political.⁸² The straightforward comprador role played by the bureaucratic bourgeoisie has been superseded by a range of fractions and directions opening up the prospects of change but also reducing the possibilities of revolution. The dialectic is too complex for a simple antithesis and thesis.

Conclusion

The evolution of Zambia's political economy — from expansion to contraction, from inclusion to exclusion, and from class alliance to antagonism — is suggestive, we would argue, of general trends on the continent. Although the basic mode of production remains essentially unchang-

80. See Shaw and Anglin "Zambia: the crisis of liberation" (op cit., fn. 55). For a comprehensive and critical review of current contradictions see Marcia Burdette, "Zambia" in Timothy M. Shaw and Cláudia Aluko (eds.), *The Political Economy of African Foreign Policy: comparative analysis* (Aldershot: Gower, 1983).

81. Michael Holman "Zambia" in *Africa Guide, 1981* (Saffron Walden: World Information, 1980) p. 402.

82. See Bjorn Beckman, "Imperialism and the 'national bourgeoisie'" and Jacques Depelchin, "The transformation of the petty bourgeoisie and the state in post-colonial Zaïre" *Review of African Political Economy* 22, October-December 1981, pp. 5-41.

ed, relations of production have evolved significantly: the bureaucratic fraction has alienated the national bourgeoisie and the labor aristocracy while the latter pair have begun to recognize the salience of a trans-class coalition. Whether this still elitist association is able to bring about a transformation of the state — towards more privatization, agriculture and regional cooperation — remains in doubt. In any event the pressure is towards more capitalism, not socialism, so the advantages for most proletarian and peasant interests are dubious at best, although successful private capitalism undoubtedly has more appeal than Zambia's present economic plight, even for non-bourgeois interests.

Nevertheless, just as class relations continue to evolve in advanced industrialized states so they do in peripheral formations. Neo-Marxist methodology advances explanation but orthodox Marxist theoretic prescriptions or projections remain as controversial as ever. It remains a cruel irony, for instance, that the inheritors of the colonial estate have become "colonialists" themselves. As Markovitz laments:

The ideology of the technocrats, their mode of operation and their class interests — in conjunction with the political alliances of other elements of Africa's organizational bourgeoisie — threaten the interests of the dispossessed. What a tragedy if encadrement ends only in the firmer entrenchment of the bureaucrats in their offices. Foremost among the political obstacles to real economic development therefore, may well be the 'developers' themselves.⁸³

In the Zambian context, the real problem lies with the originators and claimants of the Humanist State. Although they are increasingly embattled they are by no means defeated. The struggle in Zambia as elsewhere will be protracted and problematic.

83. Markovitz *Power and Class in Africa* (op cit., fn. 1) p. 341.

Corruption and Inefficiency in Zambia — a survey of recent inquiries and their results

Klaas Woldring

At the end of 1981, Zambia's system of public administration left much to be desired. Scholars who have recently worked in Ghana, Nigeria and Kenya, however, state that the situation in those countries is worse, especially as far as corruption is concerned. On the other hand, these colleagues report that you can "get things done there" if you play the game and offer suitable bribes to appropriate persons. Not so in Zambia, where bribery does not appear widespread, and one attempts to work with and through the bureaucracy, an arduous, time-consuming and sometimes simply impossible task. Frequently, I felt that Kafka's Castle had come to Zambia; one goes round in circles, has to wait long periods for services and must fill in numerous forms for a minimum of output. The impression is of a bureaucracy understaffed or of officials too frequently absent; but the reverse, in fact, is true. There are far too many clerks and administrators, but they are unproductive, and too many administrative steps must be taken before any service is delivered. There are, of course, exceptions. It is a hopeful sign that the long awaited Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Civil Service is soon to be released (July, 1983?). But over recent years several reports have cited large-scale mismanagement and inefficiency, so a pressing question must be: What happens to the recommendations?

When gathering data for his *Second Report to the Government of Zambia on Incomes, Wages and Prices in Zambia*,¹ Prof. H.A. Turner found that the problem of finding the data was a great obstacle. He com-

1. *Second Report to the Government of Zambia on Incomes, Wages and Prices in Zambia: Part I: General Review and Recommendations*. I.L.O. Geneva 1978.

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plained to the Minister for Finance:

There are several points I should like to make on statistics. It is a repeated difficulty with this kind of policy problem that, although everybody feels strongly that the situation is serious and something should be done, it is impossible to make precise suggestions because one does not know exactly — or even approximately — what is actually happening. *Which means statistics: and especially, as up-to-date statistics as possible . . .* There have certainly been some substantial improvements in economic data generally since then, but it is said that in respect of the vital matters with which the present Mission is concerned, it should arrive to find the Government little better equipped than in 1969.²

In 1969, Turner had recommended certain policies for increasing employment and raising productivity, especially in rural areas. But in 1978 he noted that the reverse had happened "largely (but not entirely) because of external circumstances." To the extent that it was seen as an internal problem, however, paragraph 3 of the Introduction is revealing:

The other central message of this report, however, is that a main reason for the delays in dealing with these problems since 1969 was the complacency and inefficiency induced in leading circles by another development. Since 1969, Zambia has become what we would call a "social bureaucracy."³

When I was teaching at the University of Zambia (mid-1979 to mid-1981), I found that the students were keen to learn and unquestionably intelligent. Almost all were concerned with their country's deteriorating administrative and economic situation. The brightest were seeking scholarships abroad rather than join a complacent, inefficient and sometimes corrupt bureaucracy or parastatal organisation. A few still believed that the malaise could be contained and improved from within; most students, under such conditions, tend to favour radical solutions, based on radical explanations. But this tendency was tempered by the realisation that, wherever this had been attempted in Africa, the aftermath had been painful and productive of further instability. In addition, the radical left at UNZA, throughout the 1970s, could not be regarded as a vanguard of a popular movement of the left. The attempted coup in October 1980 was not inspired by the left, but seems to have been an attempt by persons with quite solid entrepreneurial, managerial and professional backgrounds to remove a sluggish administration unable to promote true development in Zambia. Their backgrounds and statements suggested a strong capitalist orientation.

The reasons for Zambia's sluggish administration and imperfect implementation of policies are complex and manifold. Before briefly surveying the most glaring examples of bureaucratic and parastatal misdeemeanours, I would like to offer four comments.

2. Op. Cit. pp. 10-11.

3. Op. Cit. p. 1.

First, the problem has little to do with the ideological orientation of the Government (whether one wishes to call that socialist, humanist or *de facto* capitalist) except that the uncertainty of that orientation has led to a degree of unproductive confusion.

Second, the tendency for some Zambian intellectuals to blame historical and external factors (colonialism, imperialism and the liberation wars, etc.), while essentially justifiable, is not helpful. Solutions to these problems require long-term, external strategies. There are, however, several domestic problems that can be tackled, at least in the short run, without reference to them.

Third, to the extent that Zambia can alleviate the present situation internally, management skills, attitudes and financial practices must be greatly improved if better use is to be made of existing resources and possibilities. Among major problems Zambia can tackle immediately are those to do with management, particularly the management of manpower utilisation and finance. The *Zambia Managerial Manpower and Training Needs Survey of the Private and Parastatal Sectors* (April, 1977) revealed great gaps to be filled. I was surprised to learn how few students had graduated in the natural sciences and, in particular, from the School of Mines, mining being Zambia's bread-and-butter industry. The majority of graduates were from the School of Humanities and Social Science and from Education. The restriction of intakes into natural science appears to have been aimed at the achievement of high academic performance. Yet, one may ask: Why did this argument not apply to the other Schools? The policy is both mystifying and suspect, especially in the light of persistent complaints by Zambian graduates in the mining industry who allege salary discrimination by top expatriate management. It is to be hoped that, during the 1980s, the University is stepping up its intake into the natural sciences, including Mining and Agriculture.

Fourth, the first post-colonial development phase has been dominated by the nationalist leaders who delivered political independence to Zambia. The dominance of these men has continued rather longer than elsewhere in Africa because the pre-1964 liberation drive was externalised to the whole of Southern Africa. But these men, who were then approximately 40 years of age, are now nearing or past 60; their day is drawing to an end. Their values, experience, age and skills are, in the main, not suited to the promotion of successful development. As developers they have largely failed. They did their best, of course, assisted by the mere 100 graduates that Zambia could boast in 1964, but without an adequate awareness of the problems. The early years of independence did not severely test them and when the test did come (from about 1974

onwards), they faltered on all sides as administrators and financial managers. Their lifestyle had, in part, been modelled on that of the colonisers (What other model was there?), an inappropriate one for a developing country. It is not strange therefore that President Kaunda had to divest himself, most reluctantly, of the services of some of his most brilliant lieutenants in the independence struggle because of inefficiency and/or scandal. Not only were their complacency and self-seeking practices obstacles to the promotion of successful development strategies, they were also a hindrance to the promotion of a new generation of development-oriented, bright young men and women, because they blocked the top positions. As a result, where young people have risen to prominence, they have found themselves in a context of non-supportive incompetence. This has been compounded by a cultural component which dictates that younger personnel should not take issue with their seniors, especially not those who had successfully delivered Zambia from colonial bondage. This cultural factor is also frequently mentioned as the cause of failure of Zambia's experiments in industrial democracy. During my two years at UNZA I gained the impression, however, that Zambia is reaching the end of this first post-colonial phase. This manifested itself in the strong urge, even impatience, of many students to get to the top and to put matters right. Doubtless, they will invest much energy in that effort and, given half a chance and support, that they will succeed.

The following catalogue of irregularities and inefficiencies makes sad reading, but they were aired quite openly and extensively by the highly critical press. Several leaders also persistently called for inquiries and action to be taken against culprits.

Corruption and inefficiency — the State of Mismanagement

"Is the Government of Zambia slowly disintegrating?" This leading question was put in a Sunday Special of the *Sunday Times of Zambia* early in February 1981.⁴ A week later, the Speaker of the National Assembly (Mr. Robinson Nabulyato) revealed that the Budget had been passed unconstitutionally, and that the Secretary to the Cabinet had had to cancel the announced milk price, because it had not been gazetted. Such machinery-of-government errors were, in fact, only a symptom of a grosser malaise. Hence, not surprisingly, the Speaker felt justified in calling for the resignation of incapable ministers.⁵ Backbenchers, all UNIP

4. *Times of Zambia*, 8 February 1981 (hereinafter quoted as ToZ).

5. ToZ, 6 February 1981.

members, supported him, shouting "Sack the lot, fire the Government." The situation became so untenable that President Kaunda decided to change his numbers two and three (Party Secretary Mainza Chona and Prime Minister Daniel Lisulo) and replace them by appointing Humphrey Mulemba and Nalumino Mundia, respectively. These changes proved positive, and some confidence in the Government returned.

Speaker Nabulyato was not alone in urging the resignation of what he called "dead wood" with which, he believed, Zambia was well-endowed. This questioning of incompetence and corruption went on continuously in the period during which I observed Zambian Government in action. For example in a speech on Zambian Humanism, Mulala Sikota, a National Guidance Political Secretary, stated:

The Civil Service, the Parastatal Organisations and the lot are all beginning to squeak. There are signs of rust. All of us must find answers to this malaise. What has gone wrong with us?⁶

And veteran politician Reuben Kamanga, the respected Chairman of the Political and Legal Affairs Sub-committee of UNIP's Central Committee, remarked:

True enough, corruption, nepotism, tribalism and such forms of behaviour exist at every level in Zambian life. It is also equally true to say that, when those at the top have something to hide, it becomes increasingly difficult for them to check on the activities of those at lower ranks. For indeed, another reality of life is that an administrator who is himself corrupt would find it hard to declaim the same fault in someone else.⁷

The President, too, has frequently deplored corrupt tendencies amongst Zambians. In May, 1980, for example, he disclosed that some hospital staff members were stealing medicine to sell to private practitioners:

Whoever is involved in this dirty behaviour, I say, please stop this corrupt practice. Corruption in the Civil Service, Parastatal Companies and quasi-Government institutions should be fought with vigour.⁸

In October, the President stressed the need to amend the law "to make it more effective in dealing with corruption, tribalism and nepotism now sweeping the nation." This law (The Corrupt Practices Act) was passed in October 1980. (Its provisions will be discussed briefly later).

The High Commissioner to Nigeria, Andre Mutemba, is one who recognizes the shortcomings of the older nationalists. In an Open Letter to the *Times of Zambia* (May 6, 1981), the envoy argued that some Party

6. ToZ, 18 November 1979.

7. ToZ, 3 February 1980.

8. ToZ, 3 May 1980.

and Government leaders had outlived their usefulness and should retire. Mutemba (then 52) considered that he himself was over his peak and that "Failure by some leaders was one of the reasons why the country was facing some problems." In his view:

The Party and its Government are too sensitive to simple criticism even if the criticism is constructive and as a result most of our mistakes which we should have rectified have been swept under the carpet. I was not in a position to see this mistake until I was out of very active central power corridors. I feel guilty, honestly, about this discovery. The coordination is very poor, the right hand seems not to know what the left hand is doing. Accountability is negligible. Some of us are too hypocritical.⁹

The French agronomist Dumont was reported as saying that President Kaunda "had the right ideas for his people but that he was hampered by a clique of profiteers who surrounded him."

There is an urban elite of Party officials cruising the road in chauffeur-driven Mercedes and peasants working two days to afford a bag of salt. 20% of Zambia's gross national product goes to the 2% of the population who wield power.¹⁰

In the *Voice of the Arab World* newspaper, he was reported to have recommended that Arab leaders not give President Kaunda any more loans under these circumstances.

Railways

Some particular cases were widely reported. The first major inquiry into corruption and inefficiency was conducted by the Commission of Inquiry into the Affairs of Zambia Railways, under the Chairmanship of the Hon. J.C. Mumpanshya, M.P. (then Minister of State for Power, Transport and Commerce). The initial request for a Commission came from Zambia Railways' Political Committee in 1975, suggesting investigation of a long list of malpractices. In 1977 the Zambia Railways Amalgamated Workers Union joined the push for its establishment. The Union's Executive Committee (as explained in Chapter 1, sections 2 and 3 of the Mumpanshya Report) spurred by reports of tribalism, nepotism, corruption and thefts from employees, which they found to be essentially correct, called on the minister to institute proceedings under the Inquiries Act.¹¹

The Commission's comprehensive and revealing Report (March 1978), confirmed virtually all the allegations. Indicative of the highly unsatisfactory situation it found were these comments:

Wherever we went, we received repeated allegations of the practice of tribalism in Zambia Railways. We received widespread complaints to the following effect: (a) that in Zambia Railways it is not what you know but whom you know that counts; (b) that merit and qualifications do not count for appointment in Zambia Railways; (c) that certain tribes were entrenched in certain departments on Zambia Railways; (d) that members of "small tribes" who were without "full-backs" had no future on the Railways; (e) that disciplinary measures were corrupted by tribal favouritism; (f) that advertisements for vacancies were mere formalities while positions and promotions were filled by unfair preference; (g) that certain allegations were born of malice on the part of certain tribes who considered themselves aggrieved by the dismissal of their tribesmen.¹²

The conclusion left no room for doubt:

Our recommendation presupposes that since we have found that (a) tribalism, nepotism and corruption are practised in Zambia Railways; (b) the incidence of thefts in Zambia Railways is alarming; (c) Mr. Mwale's dismissal was not effected on sound principles of management; positive remedial action should be taken to (i) undo what has been done through the practices of tribalism, nepotism and corruption; (ii) check the incidence of thefts; (iii) settle the Mwale affair in pursuance of sound administrative principles.¹³

Parastatal Bodies

The generally unsatisfactory performance of Zambia's parastatals was first investigated by the Kayope Committee on Parastatal Bodies which was appointed on 31 January 1978. Its terms of reference were:

- (a) to examine reports and accounts of the parastatal bodies;
- (b) to examine the reports, if any, of the Auditor-General on parastatal bodies;
- (c) to examine, in the context of the autonomy and efficiency of the parastatal bodies, that they are being managed in accordance with sound business principles and prudent commercial practices; and
- (d) to exercise such other functions vested in the Public Accounts Committee as are not covered by paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) above and as may be allotted to the Committee by the Speaker from time to time.¹⁴

In its investigations, the Committee restricted itself to "Familiarisation Tours," in the first instance, to selected parastatals, e.g., Zambia Daily Mail, Cold Storage Board, National Agricultural Marketing Board, Rural Development Corporation and United Bus Company. In almost all cases, losses were largely attributed to poor management practices. Subsequent

9. ToZ, 6 May 1981.

10. National Mirror, November 21-December 4, 1980.

11. Republic of Zambia, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Affairs of Zambia Railways, Lusaka, March 1978.

12. Op. Cit., pp. 11-12. Zambia Railways Police Commandant Bartholemew Mwale, who was quite unfairly dismissed, was subsequently re-instated and promoted to the rank of Assistant Commissioner in the Zambia Police. He was then instructed to resume his investigations into Zambia Railways but by mid-1981, surprisingly, no formal charges had been laid.

13. Op. Cit., item 169, p. 161.

14. Republic of Zambia, Report of the Committee on Parastatal Bodies (for the fifth session of the third National Assembly — appointed on the 31st January, 1978), 1978.

Reports by the Auditor-General¹⁵ and by the Committee itself (reconstituted)¹⁶ confirmed this. In 1979, the Committee, which had conducted 29 Familiarisation Tours, drew attention to some extraordinary difficulties it had to contend with:

- (a) late presentation by the Executive of the Action-Taken Report on the Report of the Committee on Parastatal Bodies for the Fifth Session of the Third National Assembly;
- (b) non-presentation by the Auditor-General of a report on parastatal bodies on which the Committee could firmly base their inquiries;
- (c) failure by most parastatal organisations to present their annual reports to Parliament as required by provisions of the Standing Orders;
- (d) victimisation of employees by certain parastatal organisations such that they were afraid to give evidence before the Committee;
- (e) the belief of some top executives that they could not be disciplined for their misdeeds in their companies because of the support they enjoy from top leadership in the Party and its Government hierarchy and in some cases interference by some top officials in the work of your Committee and apparent lack of understanding of the Committee's terms of reference, powers and privileges.¹⁷

Other Instances

A number of problems concerning inefficiency of Government Departments and Local Authorities were aired in the press during my period of research. Some of the more significant examples follow:

More than 5000 government vehicles, 32% of the total, were reportedly off the road in January 1981 because of lack of spare parts and poor maintenance. According to Patrick Chiwenda, Permanent Secretary of the Ministry for Works and Supply, more than 400 government vehicles were discarded each year on account of accidents, lack of spare parts and old age.¹⁸ The dismal scene of the Government wreckyard along Old Mumbwa Road in Lusaka confirms this sorry tale. Why is it that, 17 years after Independence, Zambia should have a shortage of motor mechanics as is claimed?

Evidence of wastage of funds by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was contained in the Report of the Auditor-General for the year ending 31 December 1979.¹⁹ Clearly, some Zambian diplomats had a totally ir-

responsible attitude towards public funds and property, and a lifestyle even more out of step with the situation in Zambia than that of some Party leaders. Several entries record substantial and apparently unrecoverable staff advances, expenses for long-term hotel accommodation without a warrant, unnecessary or extravagant property deals and free transport for Party leaders to tour missions. In March 1981 *The Sunday Times* reported that "the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had failed to tell the Auditor-General what progress was being made to recover nearly K500,000 owed by diplomats in loans and salary advances."²⁰ At that time only K14,000 had in fact been recovered. The most damaging charge concerned Zambian diplomat Mr. Marshall Khulila. Reportedly, in January 1981 he provided two British journalists, posing as non-government arms dealers, with a bogus "end-user certificate" to collect a £1000 bribe. The envoy was suspended (June 1981) while "investigations were being continued."²¹

Lusaka's telephone system is a case of much confusion and speculation. When I arrived in Zambia, it was obvious that in some parts of Lusaka the system did not work at all, and in other parts ineffectively. During 1977, backed by a K32 million World Bank loan, the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation (ITT) was contracted by Zambia's Post and Telecommunications Corporation (PTC) to install a new advanced telephone system in Lusaka. By December 1980, it had become clear that the new system could not be made to work, and PTC sued ITT for K320,000 in lost revenue.²² By mid-1981, a partial return to the old system, however inadequate and difficult, was recommended. Many conflicting opinions were offered for this delay but no official explanation. "Kapelwa Musonda on Tuesday" suggested that it could be a multi-national trick to ensure that Zambia remained dependent on ITT for additional high technology parts or that (as this gifted and humorous commentator argued) it was arranged to facilitate the work of security agents who would have fewer telephone calls to handle. Alternatively, he asked if it might be the work of political malcontents seeking to create industrial chaos to justify the overthrow of the Government.²³ Most informed commentators blamed the complexity of the new equipment. If they were

15. Republic of Zambia, Report of the Auditor-General for 1979 on the accounts for the financial year ended 31st December 1979, Lusaka, 1980.

16. Republic of Zambia, Report of the Committee on Parastatal Bodies (for the first session of the fourth National Assembly — appointed on the 16th January, 1979), 1980.

17. Op. Cit., item 14.

18. ToZ, 18 January 1981.

19. Republic of Zambia, Report of the Auditor-General on the accounts for the financial year ended 31st December 1979, Lusaka, 1980.

20. *Sunday Times*, 15 March 1981.

21. *Zambia Daily Mail*, 21 January 1981; ToZ, 4 February 1981.

22. ToZ, 9 December 1980.

23. Kapelwa Musonda regularly writes a Tuesday column in the *Times of Zambia*. He is believed to be a high Party official writing under a nom de plume. In 1979 the Zambian publishing house NEZCAM published *The Best of Kapelwa Musonda* covering a 10-year period of ridiculing at Zambian weaknesses.

right, a pertinent question would be: Is it wise to introduce such advanced equipment into a developing country? Does it not guarantee technological dependency? If Zambia has such difficulty in maintaining a fleet of Government cars, how is it going to maintain a complex telephone exchange?

A similar drama is presented by Lusaka's Mass Media Complex which, when finally operational, would qualitatively improve broadcasting, and cover virtually the whole of Zambia. The Japanese-backed project was to have started in 1970, but its foundation stone was laid only in 1979. The original estimate of K11 million grew to K50 million in 1980. By mid-1981, the project was still far from completion because of interminable delays caused by transport, staff and management difficulties, in spite of frequent inspection tours by Ministers and their aides.²⁴

In March 1981, the so-called Thomas Alexander Wood (TAW) scandal came to a head. Backbenchers wanted the details of the abortive contract with that American leasing company which resulted in Zambia paying K4 million compensation after cancelling the contract without sufficient notice. (The trucks arrived regardless.) The Special Investigations Team for Economy and Trade (SITET) uncovered irregularities committed by civil servants in 1973 which eventually resulted in the loss.²⁵ Legal Affairs Minister Chigaga, under pressure, disclosed that the Education and Culture Permanent Secretary (Peter Siwo) and former Legal Affairs Ministry Permanent Secretary (Sebastian Zulu) had "connived to swindle the Government over the TAW contract." According to Chigaga's statement in the National Assembly, Siwo had signed two waiver letters sent to Wood (in 1973/4) confirming the contract and even dispensing with a delivery deadline, contrary to Government instructions to rescind the contract forthwith. This leaves much to be explained in a court of law, though at the time of writing the case appears still to be *sub judice*.

An instance of attempted personal corruption was provided by the "Winegate" scandal. 10,000 cases of South African wine, K250,000, suddenly arrived at the Lusaka airport. An apparent attempt was being made to import this wine, without licence, in the name of M.P. John Kalenga. SITET investigated and even went to South Africa to talk to the exporters, who claimed two other dealers were involved with profits to be shared among the three.²⁶ Wine being rare and expensive in Zambia, Kalenga and his partners would have made substantial profits. Since the transaction involved evading the import license and, payment in foreign exchange, one can only conclude that he intended to use his public office for irregular purposes.

24. ToZ, 30 November 1980.

25. ToZ, 13 March 1981.

26. ToZ, 12 April 1980, 23 April 1980 and 19 February 1981.

More serious was the TIKA affair. TIKA (Technical Industrial Kulum-bila Associates, Ltd.), planned for Mumbwe in Solwezi from 1972, was to have been a K122 million iron and steel complex providing up to 1,000 jobs. It never got underway, but cost Zambia at least K15 million. This matter was brought to a head when M.P.'s began to ask probing questions about Zambia's reported obligation to compensate the various partners and consultants. It was not publicly known until December 1979 that the TIKA venture had come to nothing.²⁷ A long series of penetrating questions in the National Assembly (1974 and 1975) revealed that the consultants were Swindell Dressler, an American Company. Other companies involved were Energoprojekt of Yugoslavia, Denag of West Germany, and various local contractors.

By 1979, the then Minister for Mines, Newstead Zimba, stated in Parliament "that TIKA was too sensitive to be discussed and that some of the partners would be sued by the Zambian Government."²⁸ Furthermore, mysteriously, "the Government knew fully that feasibility studies which had been conducted on TIKA advised the authorities not to go ahead with the project because it was not going to yield any benefits for the nation." Speculation on the project's unfeasibility centered on oil as the energy source. Robby Makayi, an investigative Zambian journalist argued, however, that the plant could easily have been converted to electricity, cheap and readily available in Zambia. Makayi concluded "that it could not have been completely written off had it not been for political intrigues in Zambia and international business manoeuvres." By mid-1981, Energoprojekt (with a long experience in Zambia) as well as the Zambian partner and sub-contractor ZECCO still had not been paid. What seems most lacking in this venture was the political will and ability to succeed.

Many smaller cases of corruption can be cited. The Kanyama Fund, which President Kaunda set up in 1978 to help people whose homes had been wrecked by floods, was partially misappropriated. Items donated to the Fund by the public were "bought" at giveaway prices by a Cabinet Minister, a Provincial Secretary, a Governor and a District Secretary.²⁹ An attempt was made to recover the shortfalls.

Another was the Barnett affair, which came to light when Titus Mukupo alleged in Parliament that the First Secretary of the Zambian Embassy in Bonn, Dick Litana, was implicated in an international scandal in-

27. Patti Simoko, "Down TIKA Memory Lane" in Times Review, 1 March 1981.

28. Op. Cit.

29. ToZ, 4 December 1980.

volving pay-offs on aid intended for Zambia.³⁰ He said that an international broker/financier was being detained in Zambia for asking to be paid his fee. That man, Constantine Joel Barnett, a Jamaican-born British citizen (reportedly) claimed to have organised a loan of 500 million French Francs (K83.6 million) towards the K400 million Operation Food Programme, and had been promised a one percent "finder's fee," half to be surrendered to two top leaders, in clear violation of the Leadership Code. Attorney-General Chigaga disputed the claim and announced that the Government had not sought Barnett's services and would not pay him.³¹ Barnett retorted that the loan had already been released. When President Kaunda announced 'Operation Food Production' in October 1980, Barnett's Technology Transfer Consult firm was on the list of organisations involved in the ten-year programme. Further investigations revealed that another eight companies had been formed by Barnett between December 1978 and February 1980, all registered with the Ministry of Commerce and Industry.³² Several Zambian leaders were listed as Directors, e.g., Dr. Leonard Chivuno (Director of the National Planning and Development Commission), Fred Mwananshiku and Dick Litana. Chivuno and Mwananshiku subsequently dissociated themselves. Allegations were made in the press that Zambian leaders were trying to use these funds, raised for the Food Programme, for private commercial purposes. A further innuendo was that some of them had made a seemingly official deal with Barnett (presumably so that the finder's fee could be paid from public funds) but which was not, in fact, official at all. The Barnett case was to be heard in open court later in the year. Why Barnett was kept four months in detention was not cleared up.

Law Enforcement

Another area of concern is the rise of crime in Zambia. Increasing unemployment, urbanisation and poverty on the fringes of cities have given rise to highly organised gangs of thieves from whom little is safe. During the first three weeks of my contract, I heard first-hand of 12 burglaries in staff houses on campus. Two were virtually emptied of furniture, equipment and personal belongings. Mr. Wilted Phiri, Minister of Home Affairs, informed Parliament (August 7, 1980) that "The crime rate in the first half of 1980 had risen between 150 and 500 percent."³³ Compared with the same period in 1979, felonies rose by 300 percent, or-

30. ToZ, 12 March 1981.

31. ToZ, 24 April 1981.

32. ToZ, 21 June 1981.

33. ToZ, 8 August 1980.

inary robberies by 400 percent and white collar crime by 500 percent. Similar evidence for armed robberies and theft of motor vehicles made it clear that Zambia was in the grip of an unprecedented crime wave with high increases in all urban enclaves. The Minister advanced the following as causal factors: high unemployment, more grade seven school leavers, and the continuing rural-urban drift. The availability of guns left behind by the Zimbabwean freedom fighters, the unfavourable economic climate in neighbouring countries and police under-staffing were also cited.³⁴ By all accounts, this situation did not improve during 1982 and, unless the employment situation eases, will probably continue through the 1980s.

Corruption amongst leaders can, of course, only encourage potential law-breakers and criminals. People will put up with poverty as long as they trust their leaders and believe in them, but trust was seriously lacking in Zambia during this period. An entire generation is growing up accustomed to a life of robbing or being robbed. Nearly all houses of any consequence are barricaded behind high walls, burglar bars, security guards and dogs. The security industry is one of the few that are flourishing. Not unlike the whites in South Africa, the Zambian elite and most expatriates are living in a virtual prison.

By July 1980, according to Commissioner of Prisons, Jonathan Mwanza, the Prison Department was housing an average of 10,000 inmates a day.³⁵ He compared this with "less than 2,500" at Independence. Naturally the Police Force has come under great strain. It is understaffed and continuously plagued by transport difficulties.³⁶ Morale is not helped by corrupt practices at the top. In December 1979, for example, Commissioner of Police Jeffrey Munalala was suspended for alleged misconduct. In October 1980, Munalala was found guilty of stealing a K1100 Toyota Land-Cruiser gearbox donated to the Police Force by the Japanese Overseas Corporation Volunteers and sentenced to seven years imprisonment. In May 1980,³⁷ five more Police Chiefs (amongst them a Deputy-Commissioner) were suspended and put on half salary. A year later in-

34. ToZ, 8 August 1980.

35. ToZ, 28 July 1980.

36. The bizarre case of the Lusaka stranger, who in the first half of 1980 killed 29 young women before he was apprehended, comes to mind. A further display of inefficiency occurred when the Australian journalist Tony Joyce was shot at the Chongwe Bridge whilst in Police custody. Although this was an unfortunate accident that the Police cannot be blamed for, the subsequent handling of the affair was unsatisfactory and rightly dismayed Australian authorities and Joyce's relatives. The rough treatment meted out to the six UNZA lecturers in April 1982, notably the Dutch Philosophy Professor Lolle Nauta, was highly inept also, but in this case at least public apologies were tendered afterwards.

37. ToZ, 9 October 1980.

vestigations were still going on.³⁸ In May 1981, Crispin Katukula, former Inspector-General and newly appointed diplomat, was sentenced to three years imprisonment for theft while a public servant. He was accused of having stolen a steering rack worth K2000 from a Government car.³⁹

The University

The University also came in for its share of criticism. UNZA's relatively congenial atmosphere hides a very slow-moving and top-heavy bureaucracy. While there are some outstanding administrators in UNZA, they have to carry the burden of many incompetent supervisors and clerks. What is incomprehensible, therefore, is the authorities' reluctance to discipline inefficiency and wrong-doing.

In August 1981, UNZA auditors Coopers and Lybrandt revealed that nearly K10 million could not be accounted for by the University authorities. A month earlier, President Kaunda, who is also Chancellor of UNZA, had appointed a Commission of Inquiry to inquire into the effectiveness of the administration and administrative structures under the new federal organisation of the University, encompassing two campuses, one in Lusaka and one in Ndola.⁴⁰ Other matters included in the terms of reference were staff and student attitudes and the effective utilisation of resources. Students were quick to welcome the new inquiry. They criticised the deteriorating condition of the student residences, threats to academic freedom by the presence of Special Branch men on campus, and the irrelevance of the new posts of Principal on each campus.⁴¹ They also requested vacation employment for every student and a course in political economy in all faculties. The Inquiry does not seem to have had much immediate impact since, in April 1982, students protested strongly about the Administration of the newly established Institute of Human Relations as well as about conditions generally. This led to the expulsion of some students followed by new demonstrations, but just when the Administration was ready to compromise on the proposed disciplinary action, the police and the military suddenly moved in. Six foreign lecturers were searched, some taken for questioning and four deported for what were regarded as subversive activities. The University was closed and re-opened only in June 1982.

38. ToZ, 27 April 1981.

39. Zambia Daily Mail, 5 May 1981.

40. ToZ, 10 August 1981.

41. ToZ, 12 August 1981 — letter by Chamina Mulofwa.

Proposals of The Committee of Inquiry

on Salaries & Alternative Options

With the efficiency and integrity of civil servants so much in question, it is not surprising that in November 1980 the general public, although politically rather powerless, did not welcome substantial salary increases for several categories of civil servants, proposed by a Committee of Inquiry of top public servants, who sat for a mere four months.⁴² Further increases were back-dated to 1 August 1980. The two main terms of reference had been:

1. To make recommendations on salaries, salary structures and conditions of service . . . having particular regard to: (a) the rise in the cost of living since the last review which set the present salary levels and conditions of service; (b) the effects of the Turner Report; (c) the need for stability, efficiency and continuity in the Public Service; (d) the need to provide adequate incentives to professional and technical categories of staff and to persons serving in rural areas; (e) the need to re-adjust salary structures in order to allow for flexibility and rationalisation; and (f) the date of implementation of the recommendation.
2. To examine ways and means of meeting the increases that may result from any recommendations under the first terms of reference with special emphasis on the need to reduce the size of the Public Service without impairing operational efficiency.⁴³

Apart from the relative upgrading of a few lowly-paid job categories, wage differentials either remained the same (in effect, were restored) or were increased. The recommendations of the First and Second Turner Reports, therefore, were ignored. Even within the Service itself, the highest paid servant receives nearly 20 times as much as the lowest paid before tax. When a comparison is made with rural workers, the gap is wider still.⁴⁴

Three of the principal recommendations, from the 116 presented, should be noted here:

1. Efficiency has fallen to an unacceptable level. Government should therefore institute an in-depth study of the operational efficiency in the Public Service;
4. There is no need to introduce incentives for persons serving in rural areas;
5. The Public Service is not overstaffed in view of the increasing demand for professional and technical staff. However, a manpower audit of posts should be carried out to determine its optimum size.⁴⁵

42. Republic of Zambia. Summary of the Main Recommendations of the Administrative Committee of Inquiry into the Salaries, Salary Structures and Conditions of Service, together with the Party and its Government's Reactions to the Recommendations, Government Paper No. 3 of 1980.

43. Summary, Introduction.

44. ToZ, 29 March 1981.

45. Summary, Section A.

Recommendation 1 led to the formation of the Civil Service probe team, which completed its report at the end of 1982.

Recommendation 4, to my mind, is in grave error. It was argued that, in rural areas, there were already incentives, such as cheaper food, lower costs (e.g., for housing and land) and less hectic and dangerous living conditions. Yet, the rural-urban drift continues, and continues to add to the problems of unemployment, poverty and crime. In 1979, of 20 UNZA scholarships in Medicine, only three were taken up because students were required to practice for some years in rural areas. What would happen, on the other hand, if a loading of, say, 25% to 50% were to be paid to civil servants and professionals who moved to rural areas? Not only would candidates be eager to get out of the cities (especially Lusaka) but they would stimulate local purchasing power and inject new ideas into the rural scene. They would, moreover, create new demands and import more sophisticated lifestyles. To my mind, nothing would be more effective in stimulating decentralisation and the economy while at the same time alleviating, possibly eliminating, the overwhelming problems now poisoning urban life.

Recommendation 5 also runs counter to the Turner Report. Arguments against reducing the size of the Civil Service often heard in Zambia are that the rejects will be unable to find work in the private sector, that it would have an adverse effect on spending power, and add to the problems of unemployment and crime.

I wish both to take issue with these arguments and to emphasise the applicability of my counter arguments to most developing countries, where the Civil Service and the Parastatals together are frequently by far the most important employers.

There are two quite opposite positions or models to be identified in this matter: In Model 1 (which applies to Zambia) the Government sector is seen primarily as an employment agency whose hierarchical structure functions to reward party faithfuls. Merit is less significant than reward for party loyalty, the provision of employment and the maintenance of fractional (and ethnic) harmony, all of which govern appointment and promotion policies. When misdemeanours are brought to light, there may, at first, be much concern expressed, but there is an overriding tendency not to punish too severely, if at all. Instead, personnel are moved laterally or re-appointed after the dust has settled. In this way, the same people are kept in employment and gradually the merit principle and general performance are adversely affected. The incentive to do well in such a system is very weak, and officials easily fall prey to foreign companies and unscrupulous profiteers. Mediocre personnel drift to the top, and so-called leaders tend to become agents for their interests rather than the nation's.

In Model 2 the Government sector is seen as primarily an engine of growth, taking command of developing the country and stimulating the economy. It ruthlessly adheres to the merit principle and does not operate as an employment agency. It tolerates neither inefficiency nor corruption. Its size is no greater than it needs to be, since it is realised that unproductive or idle workers are, in fact, counter-productive elements. Such a sector is guided by a strict and strictly enforced leadership code, and leaders project a very independent and tough negotiating position with foreign interests.

In spite of the shortcomings of some of the recommendations of the Committee of Inquiries into Salaries, there is perhaps reason to believe that Zambia is in transition from Model 1 to Model 2. The Civil Service probe may reveal such a trend, and the Corruptive Practices Act (No. 14 of 1980) also suggests this. Understandably Zambia, having had no experience with the workings of bureaucracy in a developing country prior to 1964, and being short of skills, the first post-independence phase could only have yielded the results it did. The colonial administration, then the only model, represented the opposite of a respected indigenous meritocracy aiming at balanced national development. Neither can western bureaucracies and parastatals be models, because these are still largely appendices of and supports for the private sectors in which 80% of the workforce is employed. The general level of skills in such bureaucracies, moreover, is much higher than in a developing country. Undoubtedly, the socialist models offer more relevant experience to draw on, although the extensive interaction with multi-national companies and the aftermath of the colonial experience (common to most developing countries) were absent in those models. The situation, therefore, is unique, and progress can only be made by experiment and, inevitably, by making mistakes. The socialist models, however, demand a high degree of discipline if they are to produce engines of development. Such discipline levels have not always been achievable or acceptable.

I am not convinced that developing nations should be entirely bureaucratized or that the private sector should remain insignificant or dominated by parastatals. The change in direction in Mozambique achieved by President Samora Machel by 1980 suggests a scope for a flourishing private sector, provided it is largely in the hands of domestic entrepreneurs. I believe, however, that the state should remain the main instrument of control of the economy and represent the people rather than foreign interests. Economic independence is not incompatible with an enterprising domestically owned private sector. This may be achieved more effectively by a small productive bureaucracy, efficiently organised, unencumbered by unnecessary and/or incompetent staff. It is therefore

much more desirable, even for Zambia now, to reduce the size of her Government sector and pay the redundant staff a full salary for, say, five years and 80% of full salary for another five years, and so on, than to continue in the present fashion. This scheme could also assist in stimulating the private sector, especially the development of small business enterprises by ex-Civil Service personnel who, with security of income, would be in a favourable position to re-direct their careers.

Now that so many glaring mistakes have come to light, the time has come not just to improve the efficiency of the Government sector, but also to drastically re-orient its character and direction. If this were to happen, the 1980s may turn out to be the decade of the Management Revolution!

The provisions of the Corrupt Practices Act, thoughtfully put together after considerable research by SITET overseas, are encouraging in this respect. The **Zambia Daily Mail** drew attention to an important novel feature of the legislation:

Under the Corrupt Practices Act, new rules of evidence have been considerably changed: The accused will have to prove his innocence unlike previously when the prosecution had to prove the accused guilty beyond all reasonable doubt. And if a person is convicted of corruption he shall be liable to a five-year mandatory sentence.⁴⁶

The introduction of this Roman/Dutch procedure (in section 46.4) has potentially strengthened the hand of the Executive, at least in corruption cases.

Part II of the Act outlines the establishment of an Anti-Corruption Commission "which shall be a Government Department under the control and supervision of the President."⁴⁷ Only those qualified to be Judges of the High Court may be Commissioners.

Part III deals with the extensive functions of the Commission, which include even the active education of the public to counter corrupt practices.

Part IV provides a comprehensive list of punishable offences.

The passing of this Act nevertheless had a somewhat lukewarm response in the **Zambian press**. The **Zambia Daily Mail** article sounded this warning:

However, much as some legal experts say about its success, some laymen show hopelessness in the effectiveness of the Act. It is feared that the Act will affect only those at the nadir of society as it alleged that people in the top hierarchy of the Party and its Government will not be affected; rather have been exempted. This conclusion that certain leaders have been exempted stems from what has been happening lately. It is argued that several leaders and leading figures in the country, despite having committed offences, have allegedly escaped trial just because of their status in society.⁴⁸

46. **Zambia Daily Mail**, 20 November 1980 (based on Section 46.4).

47. **Zambia Daily Mail**, 20 November 1980.

Political Activity

The multiplying economic and management problems which the **Zambian Government** was facing by the end of the 1970s resulted in two kinds of political action (in 1980 and 1981) aimed at shifting the balance of power in the country. In October 1980 there was an attempt to overthrow the Government, and throughout the period there was heightened strike and other political activity by the **Zambian Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU)**, under the leadership of Frederick Chiluba.

The first rumblings were heard in April 1980, when the then Chairman of the **Standard Bank Zambia (Ltd.)**, Elias Chipimo, publicly expressed the view that the "multi-party system was the surest way of avoiding coups and eliminating the disgraceful tendency of presidents ending up with bullets in their heads."⁴⁸ The President responded at some length, stating that: "dissidents led by former Cabinet Ministers are behind a plot to incite the army into overthrowing the Government and to assassinate me."⁴⁹

Dr. Kaunda named the dissidents as Elias Chipimo, Valentine Musakanya (a former Minister for Technical Education and Vocational Training and Bank of Zambia Governor) and Andrew Kashita (former Minister of Mines and Industry). Others implicated in "this vicious and deliberate campaign against the Party and its Government" were Barclays Bank Zambia Manager Francis Nkhoma, and former Minister of Education and Finance Justice Mwanakatwe. Chipimo, an old adversary of "KK," later resigned his post and, after the accused had publicly re-affirmed their support for the President, there the matter seemed to rest.

On 16 October 1980 **Zambian security forces** exchanged fire with a group of about 50 **Zairean mercenaries** on a deserted farm at Chilanga, 15km south of Lusaka.⁵⁰ Two of the mercenaries were killed and most of the others were captured, together with substantial quantities of AK47's and ammunition. Within a week, seven prominent **Zambian citizens** were arrested: Chipimo, Musakanya, Patrick Chisanga, Edward Shambwana (a lawyer, former High Court Commissioner and Manager of ITT) as well as three senior army officers. At a press conference held on the lawn of State House (October 27) President Kaunda revealed how the alleged coup had been planned but had folded 24 hours before it was to take place.⁵¹ He ex-

48. ToZ, 21 April 1980.

49. ToZ, 23 April 1980.

50. ToZ, 17 October 1980.

51. **Zambia Daily Mail**, 28 October 1980.

plained that the plot had been hatched "by a clique of Zambian elements aided by mercenaries and fascist South Africa." The link with South Africa was attributed to contacts that South African forces had attempted to forge in Sesheke (Western Province), but what bearing this had on the coup was not clear. Many details were left unexplained because "the matter was under investigation," the President said. Chipimo and Chisanga were soon released, but several others were arrested and, on May 28, 1981, thirteen people, four of them army officers, were committed to summary trial on treason charges.⁵² It was alleged that the nine persons constituting the core of this group conspired with a Lusaka lawyer, Pierce Annfield, to overthrow the Government. (Annfield left Zambia, escaped arrest and was tried *in absentia*.) The trial dragged on until January 1983, when eventually seven were found guilty of the main charge and received the mandatory death sentence.

A trial of strength has developed between the ZCTU and the Party and its Government. The ZCTU leadership is convinced that the Government has failed to respond to workers' demands to improve their standard of living, although several secondary issues have emerged as well. This clash is likely to dominate Zambia's political scene through the 1980s because the ZCTU has a substantial power base of 16 affiliated unions, including the Mineworkers Union of Zambia (MUZ) which represents some 55,000 Copperbelt miners who produce 95% of the country's exports. Although formerly a branch of UNIP, the ZCTU has, in fact, adopted the role of an opposition party outside the parliamentary sphere. In September 1980, ZCTU Chairman Frederick Chiluba announced that "industrial workers had to brace themselves for industrial action" and that he was "ready to press the button at any time for a national strike before the end of the year. It is time for us all to unite," he urged, "and be prepared to die." Denouncing the high crime rate, deteriorating economic conditions and the privileged lifestyle of the elite, Chiluba added that "we must be prepared to suffer, to be prosecuted and to be jailed to bring about improvements."⁵³

The strike threat seemed to surprise the Government and was portrayed as "political" by the Minister of Labour and Social Services, Joshua Lumina. The immediate issue was the rejection by the ZCTU of the Local Government Administration Bill, ostensibly aimed at more effective decentralisation of power. The ZCTU argued that it would, instead, take away voting rights and would require paying more than K500,000 a month in

salaries and allowances to 20 more councillors and local administrators in each district.⁵⁴

The first round of industrial action occurred when 600 railway men struck (1 October 1980) in Kabwe, Zambia's main railways depot. The Railways Workers Union of Zambia (RWUZ) demanded the removal of the Works Manager David Chibula who, it claimed, "had been sacking people indiscriminately." Minister Lumina rushed to the scene but the RWUZ refused to see him, on instructions from the ZCTU. At the same time, the Zambian National Union of Teachers (ZNUT) threatened to strike on the Copperbelt and in Kabwe over promised better conditions and salaries. A national teachers' strike, however, was averted.

In a major *Times Review* article, Zambia was publicly lectured by Basil Kabwe, a former General Secretary of the ZCTU, on the role of the trade unions.⁵⁵ He claimed that the ZCTU leadership "was going too far in ridiculing the Party leadership." Their constant criticism of Party leaders was unfair and divisive. Why, he asked, should the ZCTU leadership fear to be arrested? Perhaps Chiluba's expectations were more realistic than Kabwe's rhetoric. In the first week of November, the Party probed ZCTU activities for "foreign infiltration," and the withdrawal of the passports of Chiluba, General-Secretary Newstead Zimba and assistant General-Secretary Chitalu Sampa followed. Further probing led to the expulsion (January 16, 1981) from the Party of 17 ZCTU and MUZ leaders. The Central Committee claimed that the Party had thereby asserted its supremacy over the ZCTU in order to prevent anti-Party and destabilising activities by ZCTU leaders. In the same breath it assured the labour movement that it has no intention of interfering in trade union affairs.⁵⁶

The response was quick. On January 20, more than 5,000 miners from Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines (NCCM) downed tools and production at No. 1 Shaft came to a halt. The strike spread next day to Mufulira, Chibuluma, Chambeshi, Ndola Copper Refinery and Rokana Mines. Reuben Kamanga (senior Member of UNIP's Central Committee) warned the "disgruntled labour leaders" that the strikers were "illegal as no industrial dispute had been declared." It was, he said, "a coup plot."⁵⁷ Two days later Bank and Zambia State Insurance Company clerks went on strike in Zambia's five major towns, protesting against poor conditions and

⁵⁴ ToZ, 30 September 1980.

⁵⁵ Sunday Times, 2 November 1980.

⁵⁶ Zambia Daily Mail, 17 January 1981.

⁵⁷ ToZ, 22 January 1981.

52. ToZ, 29 May 1981.

53. ToZ, 29 September 1980.

the beating up, in Lusaka, of one of their officials by "Party militants." Meanwhile, the Chairman of the MUZ, David Mwila, began to call for the miners to return to work when the Ministry of Labour and Social Services "clarified" the position of the expelled trade union leaders in that "they continued to hold their leadership position in the respective unions." The ZCTU executive then called off the eight-day strike. It had cost Zambia about K20 million in foreign exchange.

By the end of April, the Government responded favorably to the appeal by the ZCTU to re-instate the leadership to Party membership. The ZCTU insisted that the charges against them (involvement in a coup) were false.⁵⁸

The peace was short-lived. At the end of June the Government appointed Basil Monze as the new General Manager of Zambia Railways. With the mood of the workers already hostile over low salaries and conditions, the appointment of Monze was quite unfortunate. According to a *Times of Zambia* editorial "Monze was involved in the Mumpanshya Report, has been tainted with the negative aspects of that Report and, for all his virtues, is a misfit."⁵⁹ According to the Union, Monze was the architect of "all the trouble in the system and his appointment showed that the effect of the Mumpanshya Report had been absolutely nil."⁶⁰ In this explosive situation, both the ZCTU and the Government called on the men to return to work, especially in view of the essential services provided by the Railways (the most important means of transport in Zambia) and to sort the matter out afterwards.

Before anything could be settled, however, the Government suddenly detained Chiluba, Zimba and Sampa, one MUZ senior official and a businessman for allegedly inciting workers to disrupt industrial peace and eventually overthrow the Government.⁶¹ The President addressed the nation to explain why the Government had acted and to inform the people that 205,681 man days had been lost through wildcat strikes since Independence, detailing that "this year there had been no fewer than 84 illegal strikes involving 46,399 workers." In the ensuing Court proceedings, the same charges that the President had made were laid: the ZCTU's political objective was to topple the Government.

It would seem, however, that the Government had over-reacted, as the charges were thrown out by the High Court as being "too general and lacking specificity and, in one aspect, demonstrably incorrect." What Chiluba had said was that, the way the country was going, the President would be

"toppled within five years," though he did not say by whom or how. Chiluba and three others were released on October 28, 1981 and Zimba on November 10, 1981.

There is much speculation in Zambia that Chiluba has Presidential ambitions, but under the present constitution it is difficult for an alternative candidate to muster sufficient party support to gain official endorsement. Although 1982 was a relatively peaceful year in industrial relations, miners can soon be expected once more to put the Government to the test, as the new International Monetary Fund deal has necessitated an emergency austerity programme and a 20% devaluation in January 1983. This means that in the short run at least real wages are more likely to fall than to rise, although the consequences of this may not be felt until after the 1983 elections.

Conclusion

Progress toward development and economic re-orientation in Zambia is hindered by an inefficient administration and creeping corruption amongst some high officials and politicians. Donor agencies operating in Zambia frequently try to work around the bureaucracy rather than with it. Often this is impossible. Permits must be granted, licenses issued, goods cleared through customs and transport arranged. Foreign companies may try to do likewise or may resort to bribery, sometimes merely to speed up services. The deficient operation of the state's machinery dismays many Zambians and there is no shortage of criticism. Analysis of the managerial and administrative problems is adequate and public exposure and discussion of them is as intense as in Western countries, at least in the short run. Formal recommendations to remedy deficiencies are usually on target and legislation has been passed to deal with corrupt practices.

The problem lies in the frequent non-implementation of the recommendations and the legislation. In Zambia the way to Kafka's Castle is paved with good intentions. In fact, it has become a maze of good intentions. The reasons why measures to counteract inefficiency and corruption don't have the desired effect are complex. Lack of political will is an obvious one but why there is this lack of political will is not so easily answered. It cannot be argued that cultural factors preclude Zambians from being severe on their compatriots. One only has to witness the sometimes very rough treatment members of the Zambian Police Force dish out to suspects — let alone the 'justice' administered at times by angry crowds — to appreciate that this explanation is inadequate. More likely, it is related to the collective interest of the political elite or social bureaucracy, as Professor Turner calls it, as a class. Members of this class, which Marxists describe as a quasi-

58. ToZ, 25 January 1981.

59. ToZ, 20 June 1981.

60. Basil Monze had recently retired as Permanent Secretary of the Lands and Natural Resources Ministry.

61. ToZ, 28 July 1981.

bourgeoisie, tend to cover up one another's misdemeanours in the interests of the class as a whole. A show is made of the wrongdoings but exemptions and loopholes are usually available to excuse the culprits.

Seen in this light it is highly unlikely that the six plotters, convicted to the mandatory death sentence in January 1983, will in fact be put to death. With a Presidential election coming up in October such treatment would be politically undesirable in any case but even after President Kaunda's almost certain re-election it would be contrary to class interest to carry out the sentence. One might add that to carry it out would also be a waste to the nation because the managerial, entrepreneurial and administrative talents of these convicted men are quite considerable. Their behaviour in 1980 should be seen as a consequence of highly unsatisfactory Government practices, which they rightly criticised and from which they deliberately dissociated themselves. Rather than criticising their capitalist orientation it would make more sense to respect their abilities as managers and entrepreneurs and to recognise that they appear to have been motivated primarily by their patriotic concern for the slide in standards and living conditions in Zambia.

The Treason Trial (1981/82) has brought to a head the very precarious internal state of affairs the country is faced with in the early 1980s. One hopes that the President sees his way clear to re-integrate the convicted men into Zambian society rather than to eliminate them — either by death sentence or imprisonment for life.

A secondary conclusion should be that the ZCTU has emerged as a viable *de facto* opposition party. Although in the main still concerned with working conditions and wages the ZCTU has increasingly pronounced on and often criticised general political matters. Reluctantly, the leaders of the political elite have accepted this new role. What remains to be seen of course is whether or not this new dimension of Zambian politics will provide the framework, within UNIP, for significant change.

Letters to the Editors

An Exchange of Views on Namibia (concluded)

The Editors, Africa Today:

In a letter of August 23, 1983, published in *Africa Today*, Vol. 30, Nos. 1 & 2, I criticized an article by Dr. James H. Mittelman on the subject of U.S. policy in southern Africa which appeared in Volume 29, No. 3 of *Africa Today*. I called the article "a pure piece of propaganda." Now, after a lapse of time and the opportunity to study the article in greater detail, I find that I must adhere to my former opinion.

There are several reasons for this conclusion:

First, the article is biased, presenting only one side of the Namibian question for the purpose of making a case against South Africa. It condemns the defense of Namibia with such "buzz" phrases as "children were tortured and killed" and "African civilians . . . were slain indiscriminately during raids," all without documentation, while it never mentions the hundreds of civilians murdered or blown up by land mines by the Communist forces of SWAPO (286 in 1982, 142 through September 1983). While the author is critical of the "militarization" of Namibia, he omits any reference to the absence of any democratic process in Angola or the fact that a National Assembly was elected in Namibia in 1978. This is the same National Assembly that abolished all apartheid in the country on July 11, 1979 (P.L. No. 3, "Official Gazette" 1979). Or, it might have been mentioned, in fairness, that South Africa has allowed this law against any discrimination to stand, although it had veto power over its passage. It certainly seems prejudicial, therefore, for the author to refer to the "apartheid regime" in a context including Namibia under these circumstances.

Second, the article contains inaccuracies such as the statement that South African troops attacked Angola before Cuban troops arrived. The facts are the reverse as indicated by my previous reference to Cord Meyer's book.

In paragraph 4 of the article, it is stated that there are "over 100,000 South African troops stationed in Namibia." This is a false assertion. No one knows exactly how many South African troops are guarding the border of Angola but certainly 25,000 is a much better educated guess, which I make after visiting Namibia five times in the last 24 months.

It is also stated that there are "an estimated 2,000 to 3,000 foreign mercenaries, some of them Americans" in Namibia. I would like to know what the authority for this statement happens to be? The forces employed by South Africa are either drawn from their regular military establishment or they are territorial troops (Namibian citizens) trained within Namibia for service with the South African military.

The author cites as a "watchword" of the Administration "friendship with authoritarian (rightist) but not totalitarian (leftist) regimes." This biased statement indicates a total lack of appreciation for the hundreds of millions of U.S. dollars, in which every country in sub-Sahara Africa is participating with the exception of South Africa and Namibia. The United States Government repeatedly reaches out to these regimes, whether they are Communist or not.

In Dr. Mittelman's response to my letter, he appears to take great offense to the fact that I served in the Department of State and he obviously feels that anyone who has ever been connected with the Government is suspect, biased and unqualified. For the same reason, he will not accept as authority Cord Meyer, the author of *Facing Reality From World Federalism to the CIA*, whom I cited. It is interesting to note, however, that four paragraphs later, Dr. Mittelman uses Nathaniel Davis (with whom I served in the Department of State) as authority for his statement that "South African troops occupied the Cunene Dam complex in southern Angola" apparently feeling that it is appropriate to use former U.S. Government officials only if it supports his argument. One should also note that the Cunene Dam complex is not "in southern Angola" as stated, but rather on the border between the two countries. The dam was built at a cost of \$250 million by South Africa under an agreement with Angola, and accordingly it does not appear accurate to refer to the stationing of a relatively small contingent of "guards" at this site as an occupation.

Obviously the argument over Dr. Mittelman's article could be extended on both sides ad infinitum and probably with little purpose.

I would like therefore, to move on to the core of the article and subsequent correspondence. Dr. Mittelman is all against his country's efforts and its policy of "constructive engagement" in southern Africa. I feel that this policy is a basic, common sense approach to the problem and the only approach under which the great problems of the area, both social and economic, may ultimately be allowed to work themselves out to a reasonable conclusion.

To take the approach which Dr. Mittelman suggests is to add fuel to the fire, to gradually polarize all elements in conflict, to bring to the fray great numbers of people who presently are not in favor of violent action and to finally bring on open warfare which must be avoided at all costs.

Contrarily, if the evolutionary process that is gaining momentum in southern Africa* is nurtured and allowed to grow, we may yet see the evolution of a political structure representative of the many ethnic groups, living and working for the common good.

This is what U.S. Government policy hopes to accomplish. This is the aim of "constructive engagement." Anything else will bring on unimaginable destruction, death and misery.

Marion H. Smoak
Ambassador of the U.S. (Ret.)

* Editor's Note: Ambassador Smoak appended what he calls "a partial list of recent improvements in the status of blacks in South Africa," which space precludes including. The 16 items mentioned include six relating to education, two on housing, three on aid to the Bantustans, two on labor, two on government — black local authorities and the new constitution, and one on admission of black women into the police force. Copies of the complete list can be supplied to interested readers who send a stamped, self-addressed envelope.

The Editors, Africa Today:

In opening fire at my article, "The Other War in the South Atlantic," (*Africa Today*, Vol. 29, No. 3) in his letters to the editors in Vol. 30, Nos. 1 and 2 and in this issue, former Ambassador Smoak misses the target altogether. He does not respond to the substance of my analysis, presenting instead a brief for South Africa, a formula for aligning with Pretoria and ignoring black Africa.

Although a letters-to-the-editors column is not the place to rehearse bibliography, it does seem appropriate to point out that the evidence sustaining my position is a matter of public record. Even if Mr. Smoak is unfamiliar with the systematic research on southern Africa, as apparently is the case, he should at least follow the media. The *Sunday Telegraph* (London, June 15, 1980) and the *Guardian* (Manchester, January 29, 1981, and June 15, 1981), for example, carried extensive coverage of an estimated 2,000 to 3,000 foreign mercenaries serving alongside South African forces in the campaign against SWAPO. Two deserters appeared on television programs, one in Britain and the other in the U.S., describing the military activities of overseas "volunteers" who engaged in combat in the operational areas. On April 29, 1981, a reporter who interviewed an American officer concerning his involvement in Namibia told a CBS news audience that the recruit "insists he is not a mercenary, just a soldier who has found a war he can be comfortable fighting."

Similarly, one might anticipate that a former State Department official would inspect government documents: Contrary to Mr. Smoak's vague statement that the U.S. government "reaches out" to all states in sub-Saharan Africa save South Africa and Namibia irrespective of their ideological stripes, Sections 512 and 513 of the Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriation Act, 1982 prohibit development assistance to Angola and Mozambique. Not only is the congressional ban on development assistance (though not food aid) still in effect, but former Secretary of State Kissinger's promises to Zimbabwe remain unfulfilled.

More importantly, the problem with the tired argument that we must nourish an evolutionary process in southern Africa is that for the heavy-weight in the region, South Africa, the stakes are non-negotiable. What is at issue is something more than racial ideology, for the ideology itself is a vehicle of economic exploitation. Apartheid is a vast system of labor control. Whereas the dominant classes might compromise on some matters — political representation, for example — they cannot negotiate the basis of apartheid: cheap labor. To do otherwise would be to commit class suicide. In the final analysis, one cannot reform apartheid anymore than one can liberalize colonialism or nazism. The naive claim of significance for window-dressing legislation declaring apartheid illegal in Namibia ignores the fact that the labor control aspects of apartheid — vast wage and benefit differentials, segregated urban housing and inequities of land distribution — remain as firmly entrenched in Namibia as in South Africa itself.

One might expect a former chief of protocol in the U.S. Department of State to be above name-calling, which is his style in buffeting my article. On closer inspection, however, this type of broadside is not surprising, for Smoak is a registered foreign agent paid handsomely by the Administrator-General of South

West Africa/Namibia. As well as representing South Africa's interests in the U.S., he is a self-declared, professional propagandist. Asked by the U.S. Department of Justice whether his organization, the U.S.-Namibia/SWA Trade and Cultural Council, Inc., has disseminated political propaganda, Smoak divulged, "yes." The following passages, drawn from a contract between the council and the Administrator-General of South West Africa/Namibia, give a flavor of that propaganda:

we will emphasize to the American leadership group that SWAPO, as a Soviet puppet, has become the vehicle by which the Soviet-bloc, which dominates the United Nations General Assembly, intends to drag SWA/Namibia behind the iron curtain — another step toward closing the ring and shutting the U.S. and the West out of Black Africa . . .

We will let U.S. taxpayers know that their taxes are used to support a U.N. General Assembly controlled by Marxist-Third World countries, which with Soviet guidance, support SWAPO as a terrorist puppet, and that the U.S. taxpayer is, as a consequence, helping finance his own destruction.

Smoak's letter to *Africa Today* is but one more shred of tangible evidence of South Africa's crude efforts to shape public opinion in the United States.

James H. Mittelman

Dean, Graduate School of International Studies,
University of Denver

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A Look at Books



Unity and Diversity at a Glance:

The Sweep of Africa

Ilsa Schuster

Jocelyn Murray, ed. **CULTURAL ATLAS OF AFRICA** (New York: Facts on File Publications, 1981) pp. 240; \$29.95.

This is a highly competent and welcome survey of Africa. Particularly pleasing is the focus on the entire continent, providing a feeling for threads of unity amidst amply illustrated diversity. Such a broad survey is bound to frustrate the specialist in any particular discipline: as an anthropologist, I personally would have wished for more illustrations of racial variation, more data on ethnicity, and more detailed population and economic statistics. I was puzzled by the word

Ilsa Schuster, Ph.D. is an anthropologist at the University of Haifa in Israel.

3rd Q 1983

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"Cultural" in the title. It is odd that the atlas on Africa should include "Cultural" while others in the series are titled by areas only. The minor nit a reviewer finds to pick indicate a fine piece of work! Intended for the general public and the "serious student and traveller," scholars can benefit from the comprehensiveness of this work as it painlessly seduces us away from the narrow vision of our disciplines into an introduction to a wide range of issues and regions. It is one of those rare books in which carefully selected, often brilliant and uncommon photographs, and well done maps, are complemented by well written text densely packed with basic information. It would be a welcome addition to the Africanist's library.

Part I concerns geography, including geology, climate, soils, population distribution, mineral resources and energy, and transportation and communication. Illustrative maps are of continental scale. Part II is the cultural background. In three pages of text and three maps Africa's languages are considered, following Greenberg's classification; one page is devoted to widespread cultural features and only a few paragraphs to human physical variation. The pages on religion cover the historic spread of Islam and Christianity, illustrated by an interesting map, and basic features of sub-Saharan tribal religions. There are beautiful photographs of a Mali mosque, a special feature on Yoruba, and one on the Ethiopian church, with photographs of Lalibela. The evolution of man and tools are clearly presented. A section on kingdoms and empires is illustrated by classic shots of the Great Zimbabwe ruins, less interesting ones of modern Asante, and the cotton-quilted Niger cavalry. Europe in Africa is well discussed and illustrated; a marvelous Zairean carving of a Belgian official in his chauffeur-driven car merits special mention. Short features on the mapping of Africa and railroads are followed by the important subject of the African diaspora; it is good to see this subject come of age in a volume on Africa. Next follows fine sections on urbanization and architecture. Art, music and dance are illustrated by sub-Saharan forms. While these are very good, there certainly should have been some attention given to the rich traditions of North African crafts and art forms. Education and literacy are followed by a feature on health and healing, a more human than animal oriented one on game parks and conservation, and good shots of the copper industry.

Part III groups the nations of Africa in eight regions: North, West, West Central, Northeast, East, Southeast Central, Southern, and Indian Ocean islands. Each country within the region is the subject of a compact political history up to 1980. Since each is granted more or less equal space, the results are inevitably uneven. The price for compacting Egypt from Pharonic times to Sadat in not much more space than is devoted to the Comoro Islands is that we have the opportunity to learn about fairly obscure countries. Sometimes controversial, the level of synthesis is very high. A section called "Africa in the World" briefly considers the OAU, the League of Arab States, the ECA, Lome Convention, and Africa's involvement in UN agencies. The book concludes with a list of contributors, most of whom are historians, a list of sources for the illustrations, a bibliography for further reading, a gazetteer, and an index.

The Utility of Ideology as an Explanatory Factor for Policy and Performance in Africa

David W. Loebbeck

Crawford Young, *IDEOLOGY AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA* (New Haven: Yale, 1982) pp. xvii + 376, \$11.95 (paper).

Crawford Young is one of the most accomplished Africanists in the field of the politics of ethnicity. Therefore, it is somewhat of a surprise to see him writing about the role of ideology in the African development process. Fortunately for the reader, Young displays the same kind of breadth of knowledge in this endeavor as he has in his previous works.

While acknowledging the crucial importance of external and internal socioeconomic constraints confronting Africa, Young nonetheless contends that leaders do have an opportunity (albeit a limited one) for choice regarding development strategies. At the level of choice-making, ideology seems to have served as a contributing factor. "This in turn, in complex patterns, has an impact over time on development outcomes" (p. 9), both domestic and external.

Young identifies three basic ideological approaches in Africa: (1) capitalist states such as Nigeria, Kenya and Ivory Coast; (2) populist socialists such as Tanzania and Algeria; and (3) Afro-Marxists such as Benin, Congo-Brazzaville, and the former Lusophone colonies. Countries are classified according to leaders' official pronouncements and part of the evaluation of the actual impact of ideology includes the extent to which governments' actions match their pronouncements. Performance criteria include economic growth, distributional equality, autonomy relative to foreign political and economic actors, respect for human dignity, public participation, and "the expansion of societal capacity" (p. 19). Young argues that "all six of these criteria are multiplex and not — in my judgment — reducible to valid measurement by a single numerical indicator, or even a cluster of them" (p. 20). Hence, his analysis is interpretive and subjective, drawing upon not only scholarly and governmental sources but also his own wealth of experiences as an observer of African politics for over two decades.

Young's findings, however, are ambiguous at best. The Afro-Marxist states talk a good game but rarely live up to their rhetoric. This is especially evident in the Francophone countries of Benin and Congo-Brazzaville who have maintained extensive links with the former metropole and received little from the Soviet Union. Perhaps as an indication of the problematical significance of

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ideology, Young concludes that in the 1980s, Mozambique may offer the only unfettered (by civil war or other intervening variables) example of Afro-Marxism. The populist-socialist experiments have likewise had mixed results. Tanzania is given high marks for its leadership's ability to recognize policy misdirections (e.g., *ujamaization* during the 1973-75 period) and to consider alternatives. And there is evidence of genuine redistribution in some of these countries. Externally, however, dependence continues and Algeria prospers (as of 1980) mainly because of its revenues from oil and gas. Finally, the capitalist states do exhibit substantial growth rates but not necessarily at the expense of equality, as Nigeria's emphasis on education and Kenya's and Ivory Coast's rural growth strategies indicate.

Yet perhaps at the outset one could have expected only a partial link between ideology and both policy and performance. After all, in the mid- and late-1960s Africanists realized that "mass-mobilizational" and "revolutionary" regimes were usually so in rhetoric only. Moreover, one must question the utility of ideology as an explanation of Africa's continued link to the international capitalist political economy. While Young rightly points out that these links are not the sole determinants of Africa's political or economic performance, he nonetheless fails to show any *systemic* relationship between ideological preference and policy outcomes in this area.

Finally, many will find Young's "subjective" treatment of the role of ideology somewhat disconcerting. In particular, there is no reason to accept *a priori* that quantitative approaches to policy analysis rely upon "apparently rigorous but really quite unreliable mathematical indicators" (p. 20). I would submit that a better approach might be to employ some rather rudimentary statistical techniques such as grouping the countries according to ideology and perhaps comparing mean scores on growth and other variables. It is quite possible that had Young utilized more quantitative indicators and even such basic statistical methods as these, his analysis might have proved more "rigorous" and less ambiguous.

These caveats aside, this study represents an admirable attempt to contribute to the school of thought that rejects dependency theory's contention that elites in the periphery have few if any policy alternatives. This is a book that would contribute significantly to an upper level class on African politics.

Leadership or Social Process —

Which Effectuates Change?

Otwin Marenin

Bernard Magubane and Nzongola-Ntalaja, editors, **PROLETARIANIZATION AND CLASS STRUGGLES IN AFRICA** (San Francisco: Synthesis Publications, 1983). 184pp. \$8.95.

John Cartwright, **POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IN AFRICA** (London: Croom Helm, and New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983). 310pp. \$27.50

On the face of it the only common link between these two books is the word Africa in their titles. It would be difficult, if one knew little about Africa, to gain a comprehensive understanding of the problems faced by African nations, the goals they pursue or the political and social processes at work. Yet both books are competently done and even impressive in their own way. Both exemplify the good scholarship of their genres and show the limitations of their approaches — a Marxist and an orthodox (bourgeois) look at things — by their very competence. It would seem time for a dialectical synthesis. The route for a synthesis is indicated by both books, by what is left out, by a question not directly confronted: what determines choices in Africa and how determining in the making of choices are social conditions and individual experience? Cartwright stresses the importance of the individual; Magubane and Nzongola-Ntalaja the determinative nature of class structures. Each neglects the potential link between the two — the dynamics of consciousness.

Proletarianization and Class Struggles in Africa contains a selection of five articles from the 1983 spring issue of *Contemporary Marxism*, plus two short pieces by I. Wallerstein and P. Waterman and introductions by Rod Bush and the editors. Given the reputations of the editors and the source of most articles, one can suppose these articles to represent the best in current Marxist thinking on the origins and prospects of class struggles in Africa. The best has its moments yet also suffers from common contradictions in Marxist analyses.

Prospects for the class struggle are seen to be good. Together, the articles create the clear impression that the socialist revolution is coming to Africa (though great resistance by the bourgeois allies of the world capitalist class is to be expected) and that the proletariat in alliance with the peasantry and aware and committed intellectuals will lead Africa out of the current wilderness of racism, exploitation and oppression. The crisis is deepening; revolutionary pressures are building; class alliances are being formed; the system reacts, as

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3rd Quarter, 1983

it must, oppressively and thereby, dialectically, increase tension and create the conditions for further revolutionary progress.

Magubane's contribution is by far the best. He provides a succinct and excellent overview of the origins and current status of class relations in South Africa and the process by which the white working class came to accept white bourgeois domination against its black proletarian brothers. Magubane's historical descriptions ring true. It is the implication he draws — namely that the black working class, now engaged in economic, therefore political, agitations against white rule (clearly a revolutionary stance given South African realities) wants a socialist revolution — which is doubtful, is more hope than prognosis. He perceives an emerging alliance between an aware political leadership, the ANC, and the growing power of the proletariat which will lead beyond a mere trade union consciousness. Little in the evidence he cites — trade union activities, strikes, political actions — indicates more than the desire by the black proletariat for its rightful share, perceived as the removal of the "exploitative racist system" (p. 52). The key word is racist. What the working class wants is to be treated equally and fairly with white workers. What the ANC wants, in its rhetoric, is a socialist construction. Who will determine the future of post-white rule — whether the proletariat or the intelligentsia — is not yet clear.

Nzongola-Ntalaja conceptualizes the class structure of Zaire in detail and describes historical events leading up to independence and the rise of Mobutu's family state. The first half of his essay rewords the argument he made in his 1970 *Journal of Modern African Studies* (8, 4) article; the second half brings the analysis up to date. Interestingly, the five classes he discerned in 1970 have given way to seven now (though his time frame is the same); his somewhat positive assessment of the national bourgeoisie as a vehicle for change has yielded to a clearer estimate of its exploitative, corrupt and dependent nature. Little, though, of the precise class analysis in the first section carries over into the second. The variety of classes, sub-classes and factions is subsumed under the struggle between the 'masses' and Mobutu's ruling clique. When first mentioned, Patrice Lumumba is part of the elitist *evolue* faction of the petty bourgeoisie; when seen again he had to be eliminated because of his genuine commitment to independence and social welfare.

G.N. Mudenda describes the formation and current role of class struggles in Zambia; Makjidi-Ku-Ntima those of Angola; T.A. Aidoo wonders about the possibilities of socialist construction under Jerry Rawlings' rule in Ghana. The last two articles are somewhat specialized. I. Wallerstein says a few words on the movement of the world class struggle during the current transition to a socialist world order, and P. Waterman refines a definition of the 'semi-proletarianized peasantry' concept advanced by G. Arrighi and J.S. Saul.

The articles as a whole raise more questions than they settle. Some arguments may be dismissed quite easily. Rod Bush's view of world events is heavily informed by a perception of (one must use an awkward phrase here) "the planeness of events," by the notion that the world capitalist class has the will and the power to order history to its liking. His view is epitomized by his straightforward statement that "Rockefeller can let Reagan and the South Africans take the rap for being brutal" (p. 9) so that the world capitalist system can protect its investments. This statement cannot be meant as an accurate description; its meaning as allegory, through, is unclear.

I. Wallerstein operates on a theoretical plane not accessible to most of us. His contribution shows the exhaustion which reputation and demands can bring

to original minds as they spread themselves thin. (His article was delivered as a paper for the Simposio Amilcar Cabral, at Praia, Cabo Verde, in January 1983.) A somewhat Olympian detachment and long range view mingles uneasily with exhortations to continue the struggle. Some of his statements would be laughed out of academic court had they not the label 'made by Wallerstein' attached to them (one can imagine grading a graduate student's paper which said these things). E.g., he states that the world system has been in a transition from the capitalist to the socialist system "for more than 50 years already and we shall be in it for at least 100 more." (p. 169) We shall all be dead by then so that's a safe prediction. (Actually, I wish I had the guts to say something like this and then have it printed as a scholarly and scientific conclusion.) He continues that the "world class struggle has never been more intense than now, during the transition." (p. 169) Clearly, this is an assertion existing socialist states would find interesting. Also, since the transition covers at least 150 years, from the 1930s (a curious starting point) to at least 2080, that 'now, during the transition' phrase is not a very precise delimiter. Lastly, he concludes that "nothing is inevitable" (p. 170) and that other outcomes to the transition than a socialist world order are possible. So the transition is not, after all, the one he initially defined.

The articles, generally, suffer from a variety of defects, arising mainly from unreconciled contradictions in Marxist analyses and the difficulties posed by historical appearances which do not fit the concepts being used. The first contradiction may be labelled the 'case of the missing class.' E.g., Nzongola-Ntalaja argues that the Kwilu rebellions of 1963-65, despite the fact that they were led by an intellectually bankrupt elite and fragmented by ethnic and regional consciousness were, nonetheless, and "above all a clear manifestation of the class struggle." (p. 83) One wonders what a really clear class struggle would look like. Similarly, Mudenda argues that pre-colonialist agitations and protests, despite their incoherence, lack of organization and a failure to articulate class interests, were nonetheless "essentially class based." (p. 107) These arguments may be correct, but one does Marxist analysis a disfavor by redefining as class consciousness and action what by historical evidence was not. The better approach would be to incorporate other expressions of interested actions, e.g., ethnic or regionalist or nationalistic consciousness, into a general scheme.

The second contradiction may be called the 'necessity of the proletariat.' E.g., Aidoo states that the "history of socialist revolutions throughout the Third World amply shows that only the working class, in close alliance with the peasant majority, and under the organizational and ideological direction of a proletarian party, is capable of leading a national democratic or anti-imperialist struggle to the building of socialism. A petty bourgeois-led anti-imperialist struggle is never capable of such achievement." (p. 151) This is simply incorrect for Africa; the examples of Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique or even Ethiopia belie the claim that the working class is the necessary if not sufficient condition for revolution or socialist construction. Of course, we will have to wait and see how really socialist these states turn out to be in the long run.

The third contradiction is the identification of revolution with socialism. The history of revolutionary socialist states should caution against undue optimism. As another example, one can think of a revolution in South Africa without socialism being the end result; in fact, the most likely outcome after the overthrow of white rule is a regional hegemony by black-ruled South Africa over its

neighbors. Makidi-Ku-Ntima's lamentation that the MPLA in Angola, though theoretically correct is pragmatically wrong (they still deal with Gulf Oil), points to the likely trend. New regimes, whatever their ideologies, live within a world system which they have little power to change and which channels their aspirations into nationalist expressions.

Fourth, a number of ambiguities arise from the unresolved dilemma of consciousness, that is, whether consciousness reflects objective conditions directly or whether it has a more autonomous status. Nzongola-Ntalaja seems to incline to the first stance. "With one exception," he writes, "no revolutionary ideas existed in the Belgian Congo between World War II and 1956" since, as Marx and Engels pointed out, "the existence of such ideas presupposes the existence of a revolutionary class." (p. 74) There was no such class then; where that one revolutionary idea came from, or what made it revolutionary, is left open. Makidi-Ku-Ntima, on the other hand, argues that "nothing could be more fallacious than that," namely, "one's color or ethnic background or social origins necessarily determine one's political position." (p. 131) Linking consciousness to objective conditions is the crucial dilemma for Marxist thought, normally resolved, as it is in these articles, by allowing some choice to slip in unacknowledged (individual skill, commitment, patriotism, loyalty) or by arguing the essentially proletarian class nature of correctly thinking intellectuals (which these authors see themselves to be), whatever their social origins. Yet what's good for intellectuals is good for proletarians and peasants.

Disagreements and contradictions are useful and progressive and indicate a healthy struggle for a correct theoretical consciousness. Their existence, though, undermines some of the claims for the correctness of a Marxist analysis, or at the very least introduces new dilemmas. Disagreements point to unresolved questions and, unfortunately, the authors of these papers little use their skill and information to further refine the approach. They are content to apply received concepts, unreflexively, to what they perceive and what they do for.

Cartwright's book is more systematic and comprehensive. He focuses on one theme — the place and importance of the individual, of leadership, in African development. His book, in effect, plays the intellectual parlor game of 'what would have happened if someone else had come to power, . . . how would things have become other than they did?' He argues that choices exist, that different leaders will make different choices, that social development has been and will be influenced by the choices made; that 'nothing is inevitable.' Constraints which arose from the colonial inheritance and current weaknesses of institutions, the absence of shared values, poverty and international dependence limit but do not eliminate choices. (He discusses these constraints in chapters 1 and 2.) Chapters 3 and 4 demarcate the rise of African leaders during the struggle for independence and lay out two basic developmental strategies available to leaders — accommodation or transformation. Chapters five through eleven present short histories of Ghana, the Ivory Coast, Senegal, Tanzania, Guinea, Uganda, and Ethiopia and show the choices made by the powerful and the reasons they gave and the explanations which can be adduced for their decisions. Cartwright ends each of these chapters with a review of critical choice points to indicate how things could have been different. In short, he argues, there is no one way through history. In the last chapter he presents a short theory of leadership, namely that leaders must

use coercion but need trust as well. "A coercive regime institutionalizes a pattern of popular withdrawal and alienation, of distrust between government and people, and of continuing governmental coercion." (p. 297) Unfortunately for Africa, the pressures have been more for coercion than persuasion and leaders have fallen into the trap of promoting the public good, or their own interests, through force.

The book is nicely written, well informed and well argued. It could be a text as it quickly summarizes current conventional thinking on the problems faced by African states and the choices open to them. The book works as description; it works less well as theory. Cartwright's theory of leadership is rather underdeveloped. Other than some general statements on the need for both force and trust, he really says nothing about why choices were made. He gives us nice lists — of factors which constrain, of factors which channel choice, which clarify goals, which led to the emergence of certain leaders, of pressures tending to the selection of developmental strategies. He does not give us a theory which explains the leaders or their choices. His discussion of Senghor, or Nkrumah, or Toure are replete with statements that these men could have done something else than what they did — that Senghor could have been more radical or Toure more conservative. He cannot, and one isn't sure that anyone can, explain why they acted as they did. His is a game without rules, for it is not clear what counts when arguing that a leader could have chosen differently. All one does is make the argument; and others could make other arguments.

A theory of leadership would require two elements which Cartwright simply does not present — a discussion of the psychological dimensions by which leaders are what they are, perceive the possibilities they see and choose among these; and a systematic linking of leadership styles to social conditions, a discussion of how individual characteristics and social conditions interact to produce both the constraints which limit choice and the will which struggles against constraints.

A synthesis, or at least an opening of dialogue between these two paradigms is needed. There is more to social reality than the modes of production and their class reflections; there is less to choice than the individual's capacity to perceive and select alternative courses of actions. There is the production of consciousness, of interests perceived or neglected, of knowledge gained or foregone. The consciousness of observers and of actors, at all levels of social life, is neither determined completely by conditions nor determines conditions. Consciousness contains, in principle, leeway, choice, an area of autonomy between what is determined and what can be changed. A comprehensive theory will need to explain the degrees and varieties of autonomy and the impact of autonomy on social development. Neither of these books takes us closer to this goal, closer to the answer to the question posed by both: what really determines social conditions in Africa. Both travel well trod paths.

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Slavery, Prazos, and Forced Labor: The Capitalist Legacy of Socialist Development

Sanford Wright

Leroy Vail and Landeg White, **CAPITALISM AND COLONIALISM IN MOZAMBIQUE** (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981) pp. 419. \$45.00

Leroy Vail, Professor at Ohio University and Professor Landeg White, who has taught at several universities and has also been a lecturer and researcher at the University of Kent at Canterbury, present an incisively detailed and documented historical analysis of the effects of capitalism on the Quelimane District of Mozambique from the mid-nineteenth century until independence in 1975. Documentation is primarily provided by utilizing the extensive archives of the coconut and sugar plantations of the region, which is supplemented by a presentation and analysis of native work songs and protest songs, adding a new and valuable dimension to the African Studies literature. For example, the Mazaro boatman had a song 'Sina Mana': "I have no mother/I have no father/I have no mother to nurse me/Senhora Mariya is my mother." Senhora Mariya was a principal slave trader, and her stockade offered protection to a large retinue of slaves. This song reflects the condition of society in Zambezia during the second half of the nineteenth century.

The book begins with a description of the slave trade and the prazo system, a means of establishing Portuguese rule by legitimizing the claims of land they had seized for themselves.

A review, enhanced by data, of how and why Quelimane was transformed into an important slaving port includes an analysis of the pattern of international commerce, the increased demand for slaves in Brazil and the giant profiting from the sugar industry, and reveals that the prazos were the main source of human fodder for the slave trade through Quelimane.

This description is followed by a critique of Portuguese policies and the popular resistance to these policies from 1875-1890, including the dilemma of the government in depending upon the prazo holders for the maintenance of whatever authority it enjoyed while trying to dismantle the prazo system.

The next sections analyze the transition from peasant to plantation agriculture, including the role of labor codes, foreign investment, and the preference for migrant labor rather than a stabilized work force. The African response to the labor levies and to the quasi-military routine of cultivation, which

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varied from minor revolt to mass migration, is presented. By persistence, it ultimately succeeded in breaking down the prazo system by 1930, which was replaced by the establishment of a more centralized and codified administration consistent with Salazar's visions of a Portuguese empire.

The next section concerns the African reaction to forced labor from 1930 to independence in 1975. Popular songs and song-dramas are extensively utilized to describe the discontent and complaints of the workers.

This history of an important phase of Black African life concludes with a chapter describing the Quelimane district in 1975, the year of independence. Longstanding dependency upon the district's companies and a bureaucratic control over most aspects of the lives of the natives are presented as the major contributing factors for their dependency condition and lack of initiative.

The racial and ethnic class hierarchy is vividly described, including an analysis of how it functioned to maintain the system; for example, they describe how the English occupied the best houses and earned the best salaries, and were privately scornful of the Portuguese staff, who were below them. The next group was the English speaking coloreds, who would sing 'My bonnie lies over the ocean.' Next were the Portuguese-speaking coloreds, and then the *moçabos*, who were the labor aristocracy. The chain continues with each ethnic group filling a separate place, and each one directing its discontent toward the group directly above it.

This section is followed by a review of factors affecting the operations of the many companies by default, and actions of the government to this regard.

This is one of the few books on African countries that contains a wealth of data that has been translated into English. Mozambique's main commodity was its labor, closely researched by the authors. The systematic failure of reform schemes and the various forms of exploitation.

The authors' description of the history of Mozambique leads to an understanding of why Frelimo is so successful in implementing its policies and programs for a social revolution in production. Failure to comprehend this legacy of the gap between peasants and party, the role of the series of *senhores*. This condition would have been the opposition groups that are presently causing Frelimo's problems at a time when Mozambique is experiencing drastic changes in its politics.

This book would be particularly useful to those interested in a well-documented localized study that effectively combines historical/analytical method.

The Demise of the East African Community Analyzed

Frank M. Chiteji

Christian P. Potholm and Richard A. Fredland (eds.), *INTEGRATION AND DISINTEGRATION IN EAST AFRICA* (Washington, D.C., University Press of America, 1980) pp. v + 219, \$10.25.

Integration and Disintegration in East Africa is based on the proceedings of the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association held in March, 1979. This volume is edited by two noted Africanists with long research experience in East Africa: Christian A. Potholm and Richard A. Fredland. Incorporated in this volume are the research findings by participants to the convention. Allen Springer writes on the history of the East African Community, discussing the many years of regional cooperation between Uganda, Tanzania, and Kenya and arguing the degree to which the Community machinery was instrumental in uniting the states in this region. In making this argument, Springer points to the important implications of the many observers of East Africa, that white settlers in particular had on the region's history in stimulating the development of the Community system. Springer further examines the evolution of the Community from the informal mechanisms created by the colonial powers to the East African High Commission and the unsuccessful attempts to unify the region under a central govern-

ment. The political and economic arrangement that has emerged in this condition as being responsible for the region's present state might have been the best planned Third World arrangement and space to what is perhaps a major area of impact of the Treaty of the East African Community between Kenya and Tanzania (p. 48). The Community's favorable trade condition was responsible for the fact that "when" the East African Community was formed.

The Community's extending over fully half a century has not been untroubled. It succumbed in mid-1977. Richard A. Fredland, who killed the East African Community, has uneven levels of development. The political and economic views of the Community are pursued by Kenya and Tanzania. The importance of the

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3rd Quarter, 1980

Kenyan capitalist economy and the internal considerations of the ruling elites in all three countries, which forced them to place their national priorities and demands ahead of those of the Community, and that these were responsible for the failure of the Community.

The demise of the East African Community, this volume points out, put an end to one of the oldest, more sophisticated and relatively successful attempts at regional cooperation among developing countries. In Chapter V, Domenico Mazzeo discusses, among other things, the consequences of the collapse of the East African Community to each of the partner states. He points out that, in the short run at least, the loss of the common market opportunities hurt Kenya the most, while Tanzania and Uganda seem to have lost more from the termination of financial and technical institutions. He sees as the most dangerous consequences of the collapse of the Community the possibility of a development of an arms race, due to Kenya's fears of being surrounded by ideologically incompatible regimes. (p. 107)

In chapter VI, Arthur Hazlewood attempts quite ably to prove that it was the failure of the policy instruments successfully introduced to satisfy the member states which may have been seen as the fundamental reason for the failure of economic integration in East Africa. He concludes, therefore, that the East African Community was not, as Fredland points out in chapter IV, killed, but rather it died from lack of interest in keeping it alive.

A number of observers have argued that the East African Community was "destined" to fail once the three partner states moved in widely different ideological directions: Kenya into an Africanized version of international capitalism, Tanzania into socialism and Uganda moving from a mixed to a proto-socialist economy and then to a praetorian despotic one. (p. 148) Christian Potholm, in chapter VII, sees ideological differences, the failure of political leadership, economic realities, foreign intervention, changing times and bureaucratic rivalries as having contributed to the final rupture of the East African Community.

Hrach Gregorian, in chapter VIII, is analyzing the underlying factors within Uganda and Tanzania which contributed to the outbreak of hostilities. He attempts rather well to determine what linkage, if any, existed between the East African Community experience and the 1978-1979 crisis and the short-term impact for East Africa, as well as more general lessons of the war. He concludes that the collapse of the Community undoubtedly aggravated the already strained relations between the three countries, but argues that Amin and Nyerere would have gone to war even if the East African Community had remained intact.

This volume is important in that it has been able to gather those divergent views on integration and disintegration in East Africa and still come up with certain common observations. Of special significance are the authors' analyses of the lessons learned from this experience. The authors seem to agree, as does this reviewer, that enough has been learned that the Community would be able to begin again in another manifestation free of many of the political and economic albatrosses which brought about its demise.

This volume is a valuable study of integration and disintegration in developing countries. The authors have made available to students of East Africa information rarely available from general text books. This study is highly recommended for libraries and institutions concerned with the study of East Africa and for graduate as well as undergraduate students of East Africa.

A Critical Guide to Audiovisual Materials on Africa

Nancy J. Schmidt

David S. Wiley, editor, *AFRICA ON FILM AND VIDEOTAPE 1960-1981* (East Lansing: African Studies Center, Michigan State University, 1982) 551 pp. \$35.00 paper + \$3.00 postage.

Africa on Film and Videotape is a media catalogue with a difference — it includes detailed descriptions of the content of 688 films and videotapes about Africa currently available for rental or purchase in the United States, as well as critical evaluations of the accuracy, balance, organization, and objectivity of the materials. Although not an exhaustive listing of audiovisual materials available for classroom instruction, it will serve as a basic reference tool for many years to come. It supplants both special film catalogues such as *Africa From Real to Reel, An African Filmography*¹, which provides brief descriptive annotations taken from film distributors' catalogues for 1300 16mm films, and general film compendia, such as the *Educational Film Locator*², since such sources lack both critical evaluation of films and detailed information about their content.

Africa on Film and Videotape developed from a film evaluation project that David Wiley conducted while at the University of Wisconsin. The published product of this earlier project, *Films About Africa, An Educators Guide to 16mm Films Available in the Midwest*³ included critical evaluations of the films only in the form of lists of films recommended for specific purposes, such as to provide an overview of African history or to show the complexity and dynamics of indigenous African societies. The lists of recommended films were compiled from questionnaires submitted to Africanist educators in colleges and universities in the Midwest. From this project Wiley learned not only that Africanist educators differ greatly in their evaluation of films, (some of the films on the recommended lists were considered objectionable by other evaluators), but

1. Steven Ohrn and Rebecca Riley, *Africa From Real to Reel, An African Filmography*. (Waltham, Massachusetts: African Studies Association, 1976.)

2. *Educational Film Locator*, (New York: Bowker, 1980.)

3. *Films on Africa, An Educators Guide to 16 mm Films Available in the Midwest*. (Madison: African Studies Program, University of Wisconsin, 1974.)

Dr. Schmidt is Librarian of Touzer Library, Peabody Museum of Archaeology and Ethnology, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

also that most Africanists are unfamiliar with the wide range of films available in the United States.

The method of evaluating films and videotapes for Africa on Film and Videotape involved bringing films and videotapes to Michigan State University where small teams of Africans and Africanists viewed and evaluated them, recording their responses on a standard form, reproduced in Appendix F. The materials were evaluated for technical quality, audience level, subject and conceptual content, need for special introduction before viewing, factual accuracy, being up-to-date, conceptual clarity, filmmaker's viewpoint, balance of presentation, strengths, weaknesses, and overall evaluation on a five point scale ranging from poor (1) to excellent (5). In the "Introduction" Wiley notes that the evaluators usually were in agreement, but when they were not, he attempted to reconcile their differences in the published critiques. Since Wiley's evaluators were all Africanists or Africans, it is not surprising that their responses were highly similar. My own attempt to get multiple evaluations of children's audiovisual materials and books on Africa⁴ resulted in radically different evaluations from Africanists and teachers, the audience for whom Africa on Film and Videotape was prepared. It will be interesting to see whether American teachers will accept the evaluations in Africa on Film and Videotape or whether they will continue to select audiovisual materials for classroom use based on other criteria. Africanists probably will welcome the evaluations of colleagues for films and videotapes which they have not seen.

The entries in Africa on Film and Videotape include basic information such as date, producer, length, black and white or color, and symbols for accuracy, organization, photography, sound, and editing with a number 1 to 5 (poor to excellent) for each. This is followed by a one sentence statement on the content of the film or videotape and a list of the topics it covers. Next comes a detailed summary of the content, indicating the number of minutes devoted to each major topic. These summaries of content are far more detailed than those found in distributors' catalogues, Africa From Real to Reel, and Films About Africa. The audience level and a statement of several sentences about the uses of the film or videotape are followed by a one or two paragraph critique. If critical reviews were located in published sources, these are listed. Distributors are identified by symbol, and the price range for renting and purchasing the material is given. Films and videotapes which were not viewed are listed. These are clearly marked and the source of information on their content is indicated. There are cross-references for films found in the same series.

A Directory of Distributors follows the annotated film entries. It includes the addresses of nearly 600 academic and commercial distributors listed by state or foreign country (only seven of the latter are included). A useful feature of the directory is the inclusion of regional offices of major national distributors.

Four appendices list films withdrawn from circulation, for which no distributor was located, available only from foreign distributors, and feature and fiction films. The latter categories of films were excluded from the annotated guide. A fifth appendix lists filmographies. This appendix excludes

4. Nancy J. Schmidt, editor, *Children's Literature and Audio-Visual Materials in Africa*, (Buffalo, N.Y.: Coach Magazine Ltd., 1977.)

some useful sources that were included in the filmography of Africa From Real to Reel, such as Gertrude Kurath's annotated list of films on African dance⁵ and Karl Heider's *Films for Anthropological Teaching*⁶. There are other omissions including catalogues from Pennsylvania State University⁷ and filmographies that have appeared in *L'Afrique littéraire et artistique* and *Cinema Quebec*⁸ which are more substantive than some filmographies included in Appendix A. In the composition of the filmography pages 434 and 435 were reversed, thus placing the materials on page 435 in incorrect alphabetical order.

The index of titles of films, videotapes, series of films, and topics covers the annotated list and the appendices. It was computer-compiled, thus permitting greater depth of access than would have been possible if it were compiled manually. The index reinforces the evaluations in the annotations by listing the item numbers in accordance with the evaluations, those with 5 (excellent) first and those with 1 (poor) last. Films that were not reviewed are so designated in the index.

An examination of the index indicates that the topics most frequently covered in films and videotapes on Africa are agriculture, art, contemporary history, cultural anthropology, dance, ecology, economic development, education, families, health, music, political leaders, race relations, religion, rural life styles, social customs, and wildlife. In contrast, very few films and videotapes are available on such contemporary issues as African socialism, drought, migration, neocolonialism, and refugees. The topical emphasis is not surprising when one considers that the materials were produced from the 1930s until the 1960s. The topics simply reflect American interests in Africa during these five decades.

The countries which are most frequently depicted in films and videotapes are all in English-speaking Africa: South Africa, Egypt, Nigeria, Kenya, Ghana, and Tanzania. Ivory Coast is the French-speaking nation most frequently depicted, followed by Zaire and Senegal. However, the number of materials on these three French-speaking nations combined is less than the number available on South Africa! These are the same kinds of geographic biases found in books, school curricula, and the mass media in general.

A survey of the topical and geographic biases found in the index supplements the biases discussed by David Wiley and Robert Cancel in the "Introduction." They explain that the annotated guide was prepared to help

5. Gertrude P. Kurath, "Special Bibliography: Films of Dance," *Ethnomusicology* 7, 1 (1963), p. 46; 7, 2 (1963), p. 125.

6. Karl Heider, *Films For Anthropological Teaching*. (Washington, D.C.: American Anthropological Association, 1977.)

7. The *Visualization of Anthropology* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University, 1960) includes annotations for most films and a complete list of Encyclopaedia Cinematographica films. Africa on Film and Videotape does not list all the Encyclopaedia Cinematographica films. Most films in this series are not reviewed in Africa on Film and Videotape. Therefore, the *Introduction to Encyclopaedia Cinematographica* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University, 1973) is useful since it explains the purpose of the films in the series and the filmmaking criteria.

8. For example, the special issues on African filmmakers and their films: *Afrique Littéraire et Artistique* 49 (1978) and *Cinema Quebec* 3, 9/10 (1974).

counteract biases and stereotypes about Africa prevalent in the United States by providing educators with an authoritative guide to available films and videotapes. But can Africa on Film and Videotape accomplish this task?

In the "Introduction" it is acknowledged that it is not the school which is primarily responsible for stereotypes and biases about Africa, but the mass media, especially commercial television. The quality of audiovisual materials available for classroom use to counteract stereotypes and biases is poor indeed. A summary of the evaluations of the 688 films and videotapes provided in the "Introduction" shows that only 6.3% of the materials were rated excellent and 21.1% were rated very good. Therefore, over 70% of the materials have serious weaknesses — the majority of materials available. When one examines the number of distributors for poorly rated materials, one is appalled at the large number of distributors which still have available out-of-date, biased, stereotyped films like *Pygmies of Africa* (1938) and *Life of a Primitive People* (1957). Although the correlation is not precise, in general it appears that the most widely accessible materials are those with the lowest ratings. Conversely, most of the excellent materials are available from less than half a dozen distributors — not really very accessible, if one is interested in their being frequently used nationwide.

The task of evaluating films and videotapes begun by David Wiley, carried out by many scholars listed in the "Acknowledgements," and financially supported by Michigan State University, the National Endowment for the Humanities, and the U.S. Department of Education needs to be expanded and continued. Regular revision of this compendium is needed to expand its coverage, keep it up-to-date, and to correct errors and omissions resulting from its computer composition. Hopefully, the next edition can be financially underwritten at a level that will permit it to be sold at a more reasonable price.

Africa on Film and Videotape should be on the desk of everyone who teaches about Africa, whether in elementary school, university, or nonformal educational settings. This compendium also belongs on the desk of every person who selects materials for film rental libraries, media and curriculum centers. If this valuable guide is to achieve its goal, however, reinforcement will be needed from other sources. An authoritative guide to films and videotapes on Africa cannot alone reduce the misconceptions about Africa that are prevalent in the United States.

Publications

1. The most recent *United Nations Centre Against Apartheid* publications include: no. 15/83 "Mission to Moscow by the Chairman of the Special Committee Against Apartheid" 11 pp.; no. 16/83 "Register of Sports Contacts with South Africa 1 July 1982 — 31 December 1982" 25 pp.; no. 17/83 "Sportsmen and Sportswomen who participated in Sports Events in South Africa: Consolidated List 1 September 1980 — 31 December 1982" 28 pp., and a special issue, "Publications List & Comprehensive Indexes (1962-1982)" 75 pp. Orders for specific titles or requests to receive the series should be directed to your nearest UN Information Centre. In the U.S. the address is 2101 L Street NW, Washington D.C. 20037.

2. The *United Nations Development Programme* is one of the largest organizations working on development today. Their brochures, "UNDP at a Glance" offer a sanguine overview of their various development projects, in which the rural sector receives particular attention. To get on their mailing list write: UNDP, Division of Information, One UN Plaza, New York, NY 10017.

3. **THE LAGOS PLAN OF ACTION VERSUS THE BERG REPORT: Contemporary Issues in African Economic Development** by Robert S. Browne and Robert J. Cummings, analyzes two serious efforts that have been mounted to address economic catastrophe on the continent of Africa. The Lagos Plan of Action, undertaken by Africans themselves, is a call for a totally new approach to the development of African economies and a generalized listing of actions to be taken to bring about a reversal in Africa's economic deterioration. The Berg Report, prepared by the World Bank, accepts the validity of the existing approach to African development but highlights the deficiencies in the manner in which it is being carried out. The Berg Report precipitated a storm of controversy, especially from some African leaders who felt it ignored the African perspective on the Continent's development as reflected in the Lagos Plan. **THE LAGOS PLAN OF ACTION VERSUS THE BERG REPORT** sketches the historical background of the debate, provides a comparative analysis of the two documents and places them within the current political-economic framework. This book can be ordered for \$10.50 paperback, \$20.00 hardcover plus \$1.50 mailing and handling from African Studies and Research Program, Howard University, Washington, D.C. 20059.

4. The *Catholic Institute for International Relations* has just published **MINES AND INDEPENDENCE**, an up-to-date study of the mining sector in Namibia. It discusses at length the constraints and options that would face a future independent Namibian government, including an examination of the principles presented by SWAPO, and consideration of the experiences of other countries. The study concludes that mining is likely to be encouraged as a source of revenue for wider development programs, but in almost all other respects the mining sector will pose considerable difficulties for a government seeking to meet the basic needs of the people as a whole. Foreign partners would continue to be needed after independence. Alternative partners may be sought to the present companies, though this would inevitably cause considerable disruption. Order for \$5.00 from Africa Fund, 198 Broadway, New York, New York 10038.

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5. **APARTHEID — THE FACTS** is a new book which aims "to give the facts about apartheid: how it came about; how it operates; what it means for the exploited black majority population; how it's being defended by the white minority government; and the struggle being waged for liberation." It is a concise, accurate overview of this timely subject. 112 pp., with photographs, maps and graphs. It may be ordered for £3 from the publishers: *International Defence and Aid Fund for South Africa*, 104 Newgate St., London EC1A 7AF, or for \$7.00 from IDAF-NA, P.O. Box 17, Cambridge, MA. 02138.

6. The *U.S. Committee for Refugees*, marking their 25th anniversary, has published the **WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY 1983**, the latest issue of an annual publication providing world statistics and country reports on refugees in need and settled, resettled and repatriated refugees. An updated directory lists organizations and resource centers actively involved with refugee assistance and information. Write to USCR, 20 West 40th St., New York, New York 10018 or call (212) 396-9142.

7. **MOVING ON: THE HUNGER FOR LAND IN ZIMBABWE** is a 52 minute color documentary from the *Southern African Media Center*. Winner of the Blue Ribbon and John Grierson awards at the 1983 American Film Festival, it uses rare archival footage to recount the history of Zimbabwe's rich agricultural land, from before the arrival of the Europeans to the post-independence era of today. Skillfully using the music and culture of the country, the filmmakers make the story personal and real through portraits of two families, one white and one black. The film provides an in-depth case study of the complex legacy of colonialism. The cost is \$750; it rents for \$75. To order (prepaid) contact: Southern Africa Media Center, California Newsreel, 630 Natoma St., San Francisco, California 94103, (415) 621-6196.

8. The Episcopal Churchmen for South Africa have a 24-page pamphlet, **ONE STEP — IN THE WRONG DIRECTION**, a critique of the "Sullivan Principles." The Rev. Leon Sullivan of Philadelphia drew up a set of criteria for U.S. businesses in South Africa, by which one may judge their progress in undoing apartheid. In this article Elizabeth Schmidt analyses the reasons why the Sullivan Principles are yet another detriment to the cause of black freedom. It may be ordered for 50¢ each (to cover postage and handling) from: Episcopal Churchmen for South Africa, 853 Broadway, room 1005, New York, New York 10003.

9. We have received a new publication from the *News and Letters Committee*, "Marx and the Third World: New Perspectives on His Writings from His Last Decade" by Peter Hudis. This 42 page pamphlet costs \$1.00. To order write: *News and Letters Committee*, 2832 E. Grand Blvd., Detroit, Michigan 48211.

10. New in the **RESEARCH REPORT** series of the *Scandinavian Institute of African Studies* are no. 69 "A Survey of Workers' Education Activities in Zimbabwe, 1980-1981" by Meshack Jongilanga Matshazi and Christina Tillfors (85 pp.) and no. 70 "Migration and Change in Rural Zimbabwe" by Hans Hedlund and Mats Lundahl (107 pp.). The cost for no. 69 is Skr. 20.-; No. 70 is Skr. 40.-. To order Reports or to request information about the series write: SIAS, P.O. Box 2126 S-750 02 Uppsala, Sweden.

11. We have received **U.S. EDUCATIONAL ASSISTANCE IN SOUTH AFRICA: CRITICAL POLICY ISSUES**, a report of a staff study mission to South Africa by the House Foreign Affairs Committee. This publication evaluates a wide variety of educational programs in South Africa presently supported by the U.S. government. This is valuable reading, given the strong criticism of the Reagan Administration's "constructive engagement" policy toward South Africa by the House Sub-Committee on Africa. Copies of this and other reports of the Subcommittee on Africa can be obtained through its Chairman, Representative Howard Wolpe, 527 Longworth H.O.B., Washington, D.C. 20545.

12. **CLASS AND COLOUR IN SOUTH AFRICA 1850-1950**, by Jack and Ray Simmons, is a critical analysis of the Labour and Nationalist Movements published by the *International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa*. The authors, both prominent members of the Communist Party of South Africa until it was banned in 1950, have first-hand knowledge of many of the events described in this 702 page book. \$12 from IDAF U.S. Committee, P.O. Box 17, Cambridge MA 02138. Readers in Europe and Africa may wish to order from the London address in item 5 above, but we do not have the price in British pounds.

13. UNESCO has awarded a very modest grant to Howard University for the production of an **AFRICAN DIASPORA STUDIES NEWSLETTER** which will appear in English, French, Portuguese and Spanish. The main purpose of the Newsletter will be to provide an international medium for the discussion of theoretical issues, research findings, curricular development, general trends and information pertaining to the relationship between Africa and Communities of African descent abroad. For more information write: Joseph E. Harris, Department of History, Howard University, Washington DC 20059.

14. The *Africa Fund* has a 4 page paper entitled "Human Rights Violations in Apartheid South Africa," which succinctly describes human rights violations in terms of political control, land, citizenship, pass laws, influx control, detention, torture. Contact: The Africa Fund, 198 Broadway, New York, NY 10038.

15. *Studies in Third World Societies* is devoted to the study of cultures and societies of the Third World. Each publication contains papers dealing with a single theme or area, addressed to both scholars and laymen as well as teachers, students and practitioners of social science. Address all inquiries to The Editors, *Studies in Third World Societies*, Dept. of Anthropology, College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, VA 23185.

16. "Dealing with International Crises: Lessons from Zimbabwe" is the title of Occasional Paper 34 of the Stanley Foundation in Muscatine Iowa. The author, Jeffrey Davidow, concludes that the Zimbabwe experience can provide insight to other nations, including the United States, in their handling of international problems. The paper first briefly explains the struggle that turned Rhodesia into Zimbabwe and then develops a series of lessons concerning the nature of political leadership, the role of mediators in conflict resolution, the utility of international economic sanctions and the problems of ethnic tensions which can be garnered from the Zimbabwe experience. This 23 page paper is available free of charge from: The Stanley Foundation, 420 E. Third Street, Muscatine, Iowa 52761.

Coming Events

In a major exhibition opening Nov. 30 and continuing through April 22, 1984, the National Museum of African Art demonstrates the interaction of Islam and traditional African life. More than 100 fine examples of African art, dating from the 19th and 20th centuries, have been selected for the exhibition, "African Islam." The objects on view, drawn from private collections and museums in the United States, include textiles, charms, amulets, jewelry, koranic and writing boards, sculpture, horse trappings and puppets. Rene Bravmann, professor of art history at the University of Washington, Seattle, is guest curator of the exhibition and author of the catalog bearing the same title. For more information contact: The Office of Public Affairs, Smithsonian Institution, Washington, D.C. 20560, (202) 357-2700.

The Southeastern Regional Seminar for African Studies and the Center for African Studies at the University of Florida announce their joint annual conference entitled **AFRICAN HEALING STRATEGIES** Wednesday, March 7 through Friday, March 9 at the University of Florida. Four sessions are planned: Islamic Adaptations to African Healing Strategies, Medical Technology Transfer, Women and Healing, and African Responses to Western Medical Systems. Brian du Toit (Anthropology, University of Florida) and Ismail Abdalla (History, William and Mary College) are coordinating the conference. For further information contact: Brian du Toit, 350B GPA, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida 32611, (904) 392-2031 or the Center for African Studies, 470 Grinter Hall, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida 32611, (904) 392-2183.

The Program of African Studies at Northwestern University announces a three day conference on "Islam in Africa: the Changing Role of the 'Ulama'" to be held March 29-31, 1984. This is part of a larger effort to develop a program at Northwestern for basic collaborative research in this field. Much of the rationale for the larger program is relevant to the program's need for a research conference, but its basic purpose is to bring together scholars from the United States, Africa and Europe, who have closely related interests in this emerging program.

The purpose of the conference is to identify state-of-the-art parameters to both the conceptual and methodological aspects of research on Islam in Africa and to explore particular regional modules of inquiry. This research has frequently fallen between scholarship which takes an "African" focus and that which takes a "Middle Eastern" or "Islamic" focus. The three major problems to be focused on in the conference are as follows: (1) sources of data on the 'ulama and their writings in Africa; (2) the changing role of the 'ulama in historical perspective; and (3) the changing role of the 'ulama in the modern period.

Working papers, not to exceed six typed pages (single-spaced), ready for photocopying, should be submitted for consideration by January 15, 1984. For further information contact Professor John O. Hunwick at the Program of African Studies, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL 60201.

Coming Events

The *Sudan Studies Association* will hold its annual meeting at Fordham University's Center at Lincoln Center in New York on Friday-Saturday, March 30-31, 1984. For information about registration and hotels, contact Dr. Constance Berkeley, SSA Secretariat, Room 414A, Fordham University CLC, New York, NY 10023. For information about and submission of papers, contact Dr. Carolyn Fleuhr-Lobban, Dept. of Anthropology, Rhode Island College, Providence, RI 02908. The Association plans to hold its 1985 meeting in Khartoum, Sudan in January, 1985. For information, contact Dr. James Hudson, Dept. of Geography, Morgan State University, Baltimore, MD 21239.

The annual meeting of the *Western Association of Africanists* will take place at the University of Colorado in Denver (Auraria Campus) April 19-21, 1984. Proposals for papers and panels should be sent no later than February 29, 1984 to Prof. Babalola Cole, Dept. of Political Science, Howard University, Washington, D.C. 20059. (Telephone 202-636-6720 or 6846). Student papers are welcome, and the Association presents its Lambert Award for the best student paper presented each year. While the Association always meets in the Rocky Mountain-Western Plains area, participation (as the address of the program chairman suggests) is not limited geographically.

The *African Students Organization* at the University of Denver is sponsoring a conference on the theme "African Development Prospects by the Year 2000" for May 17-18, 1984 at the University of Denver. The three sub-themes are "Strategies for African Development," "Technical Assistance," and "Human Rights and The Role of Women." Registration will be \$5.00 for students and \$15 for others. Send proposals for papers or write for more information to Benson Onyeji, African Students Organization, Graduate School of International studies, University of Denver, Denver CO 80208.

The *Seventh Annual Third World Studies Conference* will take place at the Peter Kiewit Conference Center, Omaha, Nebraska, October 18-20, 1984. Proposals for papers (including an abstract) should be sent to Dr. Daniel Boamah-Wiafe, Co-Director, Third World Studies Conference, University of Nebraska at Omaha, Omaha, Nebraska 68182. (Phone 402-554-2412 or 2376).

A special exhibit of large silkscreens by Belgian artist Marc Cammaert with the theme *Impressions of Francophonic Africa* is being presented at the French Library in Boston from January 18th through the 31st. For more details phone 617-266-4351.

Announcements

A trust fund is being established in honor of Ruth First, the well known Africanist and revolutionary who was assassinated in Maputo on August 17, 1982, and an appeal for donations is being issued. The purpose of the Ruth First Memorial Trust Fund is to create a resource centre to service and support the study of history, economics and sociology of South Africa and other countries of Southern Africa. The centre will accomplish the following: 1) transmit materials concerned with such studies to institutions in Africa and make them available to scholars and others who are not affiliated with universities; 2) act as a trustee for the papers of Ruth First and other papers or documents lent to or purchased for the centre; 3) establish the centre initially at a university in Britain until circumstances permit its transfer to South Africa; 4) organize occasional lectures in the name of Ruth First; 5) provide travel and research grants for suitable candidates to study at the centre; 6) fund suitable projects and, as appropriate, publish their findings. The Trust was launched in late April 1982. It has so far collected £11,400; of which only £350 have been spent on costs, mainly the printing of appeal brochures. It is the firm intention of the Trustees to keep costs at this level, of between 3 and 4 percent. Enquiries about the siting of the centre, with some expressions of interest have come from several British universities, including Sussex and Durham. The Trustees are postponing all negotiations until they have a clearer idea of the capital they are likely to raise by the end of 1984, when it is hoped to end fundraising. To send a donation or to obtain more information, write: Ruth First Memorial Trust, 121 Southfield Road, Oxford OX1 4NY, England.

Severe drought has hit Eritrea once again. It is undoubtedly the worst drought in many years. Unlike past droughts, the current one has affected virtually every part of Eritrea. The number of people most severely affected by the drought is estimated to be near one million. The severity of the situation is such that it calls for immediate attention of the international community. For more information contact: Eritrean Relief Committee, Inc., P.O. Box 18866, Denver, Colorado 80218 (303) 825-3651.

Books Received

Starred titles have been sent to reviewers. Others may be requested by qualified reviewers.

Political Science/Area Studies

CHANGE IN SOUTH AFRICA: *Blind Alleys or New Directions?* Christopher R. Hill (Barnes & Noble Books, 1983) 224 pp. hardcover, \$27.50.

COLONIAL RULE AND REGIONAL IMBALANCE IN CENTRAL AFRICA. Bruce Fetter. (Westview Press, 1983) 223 pp. paperback, \$17.00.

IMPERIALISM AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA: *The Dialectics of Mass Poverty.* Bade Onimode. (Zed Press, 1983) 258 pp. paperback, \$10.95.

IN THE TWILIGHT OF REVOLUTION: *The Political Theory of Amílcar Cabral. Jock McCulloch. (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983) 159 pp. paperback, \$12.95.

THE PATTERN OF SOVIET CONDUCT IN THE THIRD WORLD. Walter Laqueur, ed. (Praeger, 1983) 250 pp. hardcover, \$24.95.

SOUTH AFRICA IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: *The Intensifying Vortex of Violence.* Thomas M. Callaghy, ed. (Praeger, 1983) 420 pp. hardcover, \$45.00.

SOVIET AND AMERICAN INFLUENCE IN THE HORN OF AFRICA. Marina Ottaway. (Praeger, 1982) 187 pp. hardcover, \$21.95.

THE USSR AND AFRICA: *Foreign Policy Under Khrushchev. Dan C. Heldman. (Praeger, 1981) 187 pp. hardcover, n.p.

ZIMBABWE: *A Revolution That Lost Its Way?* Andre Astrow. (Zed Press, 1983) 254 pp. hardcover, \$34.00.

History/Geography

HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF SOUTH AFRICA. Christopher Saunders. (Scarescrow Press, 1983) 271 pp. hardcover, \$19.00.

MOZAMBIQUE: *From Colonialism to Revolution, 1900-1982.* Allen Isaacman and Barbara Isaacman. (Westview Press, 1983) 235 pp. hardcover, \$25.00; paperback, \$11.95.

PAST AND PRESENT IN ZIMBABWE. J.D.Y. Peel & T.O. Ranger, eds. (Manchester University Press, 1983) 128 pp. paperback, \$9.95.

TRANSFORMATIONS IN SLAVERY: *A History of Slavery in Africa.* Paul E. Lovejoy. (Cambridge University Press, 1983) 349 pp. hardcover, \$39.50; paperback, \$12.95.

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THE UNITED STATES, SLAVERY AND THE SLAVE TRADE IN THE NILE VALLEY. Ahmed E. Elbashir. (University Press of America, 1983) 189 pp. hardcover, \$22.00; paperback, \$10.50.

Economics/Development

ALCOHOL FUELS: *Options for Developing Countries*. National Research Council. (National Academy Press, 1983) 109 pp. paperback, \$8.95.

THE ALUMINIUM INDUSTRY AND THE THIRD WORLD: *Multinational Corporations and Underdevelopment*. Ronald Graham. (Zed Press, 1982) 278 pp. paperback, \$12.50.

ARAB AID TO SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA. Robert Anton Mertz & Pamela MacDonald Mertz. (Westview Press, 1983) 287 pp. paperback, \$21.00.

BLACK GOLD: *The Mozambican Miner, Proletarian and Peasant*. Ruth First. (St. Martin's Press, 1983), 256 pp. hardcover, \$30.00.

THE FUND AND CHINA IN THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM. A.W. Hooke, ed. (International Monetary Fund, 1983) 187 pp. paperback, n.p.

GOVERNMENT BUDGETING AND EXPENDITURE CONTROLS: *Theory and Practice*. A. Premchand. (International Monetary Fund, 1983) 530 pp. paperback, n.p.

NO SHORTCUTS TO PROGRESS: *African Development Management in Perspective*. Goran Hyden. (University of California Press, 1983) xv + 223 pp. cloth, \$35.00; paperback, \$9.50.

Sociology

WOMEN OF AFRICA: *Roots of Oppression*. Maria Rosa Cutrufelli. Translated by Nicolas Romano. (Zed Press, 1983) 186 pp. hardcover, \$28.50; paperback, \$10.95.

WOMEN IN TANZANIA: *An Analytical Bibliography*. Ophelia Mascarenhas and Marjorie Mbilinyi. (Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1983) 256 pp. paper, n.p.

Literature

BARREL OF A PEN: *Resistance to Repression in Neo-colonial Kenya*. Ngugi wa Thiong'o. (Africa World Press, 1983) 103 pp. hardcover, \$15.95; paperback, \$6.95.

MANICHEAN AESTHETICS: *The Politics of Literature in Colonial Africa*. Abdul R. JanMohamed. (University of Massachusetts Press, 1983) 384 pp. cloth, \$25.00.

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