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## Editor's Note

In the week of December 14, 1984, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution SC 4670, again calling on all nations to refuse to trade in arms with South Africa, but posing no penalties or sanctions for non-compliance. Andrew Terrill's paper had just come back to us from the evaluators, and the U.N. vote convinced us that it should be published with as little delay as possible. George Shepherd's analysis of U.S. policy in the first Reagan term and his projection of future options made a natural companion piece. As you see, an impressive collection of theme-related book reviews were in hand. Volker Weyel's report from Kampala is outside the framework of the theme, but its timeliness also called for prompt publication.

We expect our next issue, "Libya: Unpublicized Realities," to be ready in record time. All manuscripts and book reviews are in hand and will be dispatched to the printer as soon as this issue is off the press. The articles, by Mohamed El-Khawas, Abdelwahab Hechiche, Sami Hajjar and R. Kieron Swaine, will help us bridge the wide gap between perception and reality created by the almost exclusive focus in the popular press on the more bizarre aspects, both real and imagined, of Libyan foreign policy. The philosophical roots of policy, the internal social transformation, and the working out of international policy will be explored.

Even though six months have elapsed since the previous issue appeared, and our financial and staff base is as shaky as ever, we have five additional issues blocked out and in preparation. Our hope is to produce them at two month intervals for the remainder of the year to get back on schedule. Thank you for your patience and your continued support.

Edward A. Hawley

## South African Arms Sales

### and the Strengthening of Apartheid

W. Andrew Terrill

The South African arms industry has presently reached a level of sophistication that has enabled it to meet ninety-five percent of South Africa's domestic military needs.<sup>1</sup> This accomplishment can be credited to a determined South African drive to be completely independent of the need to obtain weapons from foreign suppliers who do not approve of the policies of white supremacy practiced in that country. An important side effect of this drive for military self-sufficiency has been the development of a weapons industry capable of exporting a wide variety of weapons systems to countries with highly diverse military needs.

The purpose of this paper will be to examine the capabilities of the South African military production industries to meet the needs of foreign customers interested in obtaining weapons for their own militaries. Upon doing this, an assessment will be made as to how such sales can increase South Africa political influence and economic strength. Finally, an additional assessment will be made as to how such trends can be blocked and South African political and economic gain resulting from this situation correspondingly limited.

## Development of the South African Arms Industry

In order to analyze the potential impact of the South African arms industry on the world arms trade, it is necessary to make some sort of assessment of the actual condition of that arms industry in terms of its products, volume, and interest in international markets. This will be done by examining how that industry came to flourish and expand. Such an assessment

1. Michael Sullivan, "S. Africa's Armament Output Growing," *Washington Times* (November 22, 1984) p. 5.

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must also include the degree to which South African weapons can be used in a variety of conflict situations ranging from conventional warfare to the suppression of guerrilla movements in an unconventional warfare setting. The ability of modern weapons to function efficiently in either or both of these environments is directly related to their marketability.

At the present time South Africa appears to have an arms industry that has reached a crucial stage in its own development. South Africa has, as noted, come very close to its goal of complete self-sufficiency in arms. This goal was formed as a response to a long series of events beginning with the United Nation's 1963 voluntary arms embargo on weapons export to South Africa and culminating with the U.N.'s more sweeping mandatory embargo of 1977. Since the former event anticipated the latter, the South Africans had some clear warning that they could eventually become isolated from Western sources of weaponry. They therefore utilized the more than thirteen years between the two events to ensure that a total cutoff of Western military sales would not result in the collapse of their military capabilities.

The South Africa response to the 1963 voluntary embargo was swift. In 1964, they established the Arms Production Board to acquire military information abroad. Four years later, in 1968, the South Africans established the Armaments Development and Production Corporation to engage in research and development for domestic defense production. The actual production of weapons was centralized through ARMSCOR (Armaments Corporation) in 1976 as a result of the merger of the two bodies noted above. This state-owned corporation uses centralized planning to ensure that no duplication of effort occurs in the country's weapons industry.<sup>2</sup>

The South Africans had some clear advantages in the beginning of their struggle for military self-sufficiency. One of the most important of these advantages was an economy that was at a high stage of industrialization and had previously produced weapons as part of the British war effort during World War II. These weapons included large numbers of mortars, light-medium artillery pieces, radio sets, armored cars, and ammunitions. Additionally, the South Africans retained access to Western technology from a variety of countries that chose to ignore the 1963 embargo. Among the most important of these countries were France, Italy, and Israel. Finally, the South Africans were often able to circumvent the voluntary embargo through illicit transactions or the purchase of civilian equipment with military applications. By the time a full scale embargo was implemented in 1977, the South Africans were already producing 75 percent of their own weapons needs (excluding naval craft).<sup>3</sup>

It is also significant that many of the Western companies that did leave South Africa turned their facilities over to firms such as the South African companies of Grenaker and Barlow. Such actions were usually the result of the fear of potential problems with anti-apartheid pressure groups, rather than fear of the embargo, which could probably have been at least partially circumvented. Most Western companies also made an effort to leave their factories in good condition when they were turned over to South Africa. In some cases, they even left behind experienced "consultants" to help the South Africans in their self-sufficiency drive which continued to progress without serious hindrance.<sup>4</sup>

Additionally, the arms embargo did not totally halt all direct forms of South African military cooperation with the West. The most important example of this involves France. While the French did stop the delivery of two submarines and two corvettes, they nevertheless drew a sharp distinction between weapons produced in France and French weapons produced in South Africa under previously granted French licenses. The French government maintained that it had no legal authority to interfere with licensing arrangements that South Africa had previously negotiated with private French firms. This effectively meant that South Africa could continue domestic production of advanced Mirage F1 fighter aircraft. A similar Italian interpretation of the embargo allowed South Africa to continue constructing Impala I and II trainer and light strike aircraft. These French and Italian decisions left South Africa with the capability of maintaining a modern air force for the foreseeable future.

The 1977 mandatory arms embargo was therefore too little and too late. South Africa was already three-quarters of the way to weapons self-sufficiency by the time it was applied. Throughout the years following 1977, ARMSCOR continued to grow at a rapid pace. It presently is comprised of eight autonomous manufacturing subsidiaries which employ approximately 33,000 personnel. These subsidiaries utilize approximately 700 private sector suppliers, who, in turn, employ between 80,000 to 100,000 employees.<sup>5</sup> For a country the size of South Africa, this represents a staggering investment. It is, however, an investment that has paid off, since South Africa presently produces about 95 percent of its own weaponry and has therefore, on a practical level, obtained military self-sufficiency. Not surprisingly, the South Africans now claim to be the non-Communist world's tenth-largest arms producer.<sup>6</sup>

4 A. Fall, "The Pirated Exocet," *Afrique-Asie*, July 18-31, 1983, pp. 40-41 (in French).

5 *Expresso* (Lisbon), October 22, 1983, in Joint Publication Research Service (JPRS), *Sub-Saharan Africa Report*, December 15, 1983, p. 61.

6 Allister Sparks, "South Africa Promotes Sale of Modern Arms," *Washington Post*, September 27, 1982, p. 1.

2 Harold Nelson (Ed.), *South Africa: A Country Study* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981), p. 344.

3 L. Gann and Peter Daigman, *South Africa: War, Revolution or Peace* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1978), p. 26.

## South African Weapons Systems

In meeting such a far reaching goal as weapons self-sufficiency, the South Africans have had to produce a variety of different systems that would be required in a major war. These include modern aircraft, ground based unconventional weapons, ground based conventional weapons, and multi-mission weapons.

The most important weapons system that South Africa manufactures is undoubtedly the Mirage F1 fighter aircraft, which is produced under French license. The capabilities of these aircraft are presently being enhanced with components domestically produced by the Atlas Aircraft Corporation, which is an ARMSCOR subsidiary. This corporation is undoubtedly earmarked to begin eventual production of a South African designed aircraft that will have to replace the Mirages as they become obsolete. When this occurs, South African aircraft exports will not be affected by French or Italian licensing agreements. The previously utilized French technology and the superb airframe of the Mirage F1 also offer a good beginning for future efforts that the South Africans might take in eventually designing and producing their own fighter aircraft.

Furthermore, while the Atlas Aircraft Company might still be years away from producing South African-designed fighter aircraft, it appears it is on the verge of producing combat helicopters. An August 1963 ARMSCOR announcement assigned a very high priority to the construction of these systems, which South Africa clearly has the technological capacity to build.<sup>7</sup> The present scarcity of such helicopters in the South African inventory has been commented upon in the South African press and is known to have caused South Africa problems and casualties during the recent fighting in Namibia and southern Angola.<sup>8</sup> It is, therefore, quite logical for the South Africans to have focused on this problem and their current effort may come to fruition in the very near future.

The ground combat systems that are most prominent among South African weapons now being designed for unconventional warfare are the fast and durable armored personnel carriers (APCs) and other tactical vehicles produced by ARMSCOR. These vehicles were designed to move across vast amounts of area in fast-striking attack groups. These groups will, as a rule, cover a vast amount of territory after the sun sets, make a night attack, and then return to their bases before sunrise.<sup>9</sup>

Vehicles designed for such a purpose include the Ratel 20 infantry combat vehicle, the Ratel 90 light tank, and the Samil 20 troop carrier (Bulldog). All of these vehicles use wheels rather than tracks and are designed with mobility as one of the key features. While such vehicles could be used in conventional warfare, their true value is in guerrilla-type conflicts. In particular, the silhouette of these vehicles tends to be too high for optimal use in conventional warfare.

South African weapons that could be especially useful for conventional warfare are the G5 and G6 long range howitzers and the Valkiri multiple rocket launchers. Both of these were produced as the result of South African experience in Angola in 1975-76 where Cuba's Soviet-made artillery proved vastly superior to anything in the South African arsenal. In the case of the Valkiri system, the design of this weapon was based on captured Soviet-made BM 21s (known in the West as "Stalin's pipe organ"). The increased South African emphasis on conventional warfare can also be seen in a new stress on training for this kind of combat (as exemplified in the 1984 Division level "Exercise Chariot Thunder").<sup>10</sup>

Despite the above factors, it would be a mistake to assume that South African conventional warfare weapons are emphasized to the same degree as unconventional weapons. One of the most important weapons of conventional warfare — the main battle tank — has been very much ignored by ARMSCOR, while anti-tank guided missiles are still subjects of research rather than items of production in South Africa.<sup>11</sup>

Other systems that South Africa manufactures resist classification into categories as weapons of conventional or unconventional warfare. These include a frequency-hopping radio, the Scorpion surface-to-surface missiles, the Kukiri air-to-air missile, the 60mm Commando MK 4 mortar, various radars, and a variety of small arms and munitions. These latter items include Napalm and 143 types of ammunition.<sup>12</sup> Additionally, the South Africans are also planning to expand their navy with domestically produced submarines and corvettes.

Many of the above systems represent copies of the technology of other nations rather than South African innovations. The Scorpion, for example, is based on the Israeli Gabriel missile while the G5 and G6 howitzers are based on stolen American and Canadian designs. The Cactus surface-to-air missile is based on the French Crotale and the Eland APC is a copy

7. Johannesburg Domestic Service, August 29, 1983, in Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS), *Sub-Saharan Africa Report*, September 14, 1983, p. 31.

8. John Reed, "Frontline: Southwest Africa," *Armed Forces*, February 1984, p. 60.

9. "Industry Interview — Commandant Pieter Marais," Chairman of South Africa's ARMSCOR," *International Defense Review* (October 1984) p. 1566.

10. Michael Parks "S. African Maneuvers Showcase Upgraded Defense Force" *Los Angeles Times* September 20, 1984.

11. "Industry Interview — Marais," op. cit. p. 1567.

12. "Big Interest in South African Arms," *South African Digest*, March 16, 1984, p. 1.



of the French Panhard. Yet, while these systems are basically copies, they are good copies that are the products of a highly developed military infrastructure.

As the South African arms industry grows, its talent for copying is increasingly becoming supplemented by more originality in production. The Kukri air-to-air missile system, for example, has been paired with a South African-developed "look and shoot" helmet which enables the pilot to direct a missile to a target merely by looking at it. The South Africans have stated that they believe this system to "be ten years ahead of anything produced in either the West or the East."<sup>13</sup> South Africa is also working on a new, more advanced version of its sea-skimming missile, the Scorpion. This new system could very well rival the French Exocet.<sup>14</sup> Since South Africa is by no means short of talent or resources that can be applied to weapons development, there is no reason to assume that this later trend will not continue.

### South Africa as an Arms Exporter

There can be no doubt that South Africa is planning to break into the world market for arms in a very meaningful way. At the present, ARMSCOR has announced plans to increase its sales from approximately \$10 million to between \$100 and \$150 million per year.<sup>15</sup> In order to do this, ARMSCOR President Pieter G. Marais has announced that South Africa is prepared to export such key systems as missiles, tanks, armored personnel carriers, and naval craft. Marais has also announced that South Africa does not consider itself to be legally bound by licensing agreement involving the production of foreign weapons. He claims that this is a consequence of the 1977 Security Council resolution banning military exports to South Africa. South Africa is, therefore, according to Marais, free to export even weapons produced under license.<sup>16</sup> On a practical level this is, however, bound to be affected by a desire for good relations with a variety of Western companies and their governments.

ARMSCOR's policy is to sell arms to any country except "the communist countries and the anti-South Africa countries."<sup>17</sup> This could include a variety of Latin American countries as well as other conservative Third World

nations, such as Taiwan, Indonesia, Morocco, and South Korea. It could also include some nominally hostile countries that would agree to buy arms on a covert basis. Even Israel with its own fairly developed weapons industry could develop some interest in key South African systems, and it is possible that some division of labor might develop between these countries. Israel's renewed success in pursuing friendly relations with some black African nations may, however, give the Israeli leadership second thoughts about these types of transactions.

The South African campaign to market their systems has involved a noteworthy effort to acquaint the world's potential arms purchasers with the capabilities of South Africa's military equipment. Part of this effort is in terms of outright advertising. Thus, a reader of the prestigious and authoritative *International Defense Review* is, for example, informed in full page ads, that "When buying arms, the least obvious source may present the most strategic opportunity." This, of course, is indicating South Africa. Furthermore, in these ads, South Africa can and does make the claim of "combat-proven reliability." Ads of a similar nature have also been published in Jane's series of defense magazines, as well as other literature of a similar nature.<sup>18</sup> Furthermore, ARMSCOR produces its own magazines and brochures which can be provided to prospective customers to familiarize them with the highlights of the systems South Africa is presently producing. These publications, with titles such as "This is ARMSCOR" and "Salvo," represent an additional source of information for prospective buyers. While "Salvo" can be seen as a predominantly in-house journal, "This is ARMSCOR" lists almost two dozen systems in a fairly undisguised sales effort. It should be noted that while this is not the first South African advertising campaign to sell weapons abroad, it is by far the most serious and dwarfs all previous efforts.

Another way in which South Africa markets its weapons systems is through participation in international weapons expositions. This started with an attempt to impress international customers with a large scale air show in the Transvaal.<sup>19</sup> The actual participation in the international expositions began with South African surprise participation in the Greek Defendory Exposition in 1982 and was followed up by South Africa's participation in the FIDA 84 International Air Show in Chile.<sup>20</sup> Although the South Africans

13 *Ibid.*, p. 1

14 Fall, *op. cit.*

15 *Expresso* (Lisbon), in JPRS, *Sub-Saharan Africa Report*, December 15, 1983, p. 61.

16 "Industry Interview — Marais," *op. cit.*

17 *Expresso*, *op. cit.*, p. 61.

18 *Johannesburg Star*, August 30, 1983, in JPRS, *Sub-Saharan Africa Report*, September 14, 1983, pp. 14.16, 31.32.

19 Peter L. Bunce, "The Growth of South Africa's Defense Industry and Its Israeli Connection" *RUSI* (June 1984) p. 48.

20 On South Africa's participation in these events, see *Johannesburg Domestic Service*, March 2, 1984, in JPRS, *Sub-Saharan Africa Report*, 21 March 1984, p. 72, and especially Robert Boyle, "South Africa Starts Arms Export Drive: A Photo Report," *International Defense Review*, Vol. 6, No. 3 (March 1983), p. 268-272.

were eventually asked to leave the Greek expo, they did have ample opportunity to make the capabilities of their weapons systems known, since they participated in all but the last day of the event. Additionally, the arms show in Chile was particularly important for the South Africans since Latin America represents a special target market for the South Africans. While to date these are the only two international weapons exhibitions that South Africa has used to exhibit its weapons, it is clearly interested in participating in more of these events in the future. Indeed, South Africa has even informed Chile that it is prepared to provide it with technological aid in what may partially be a reward for allowing South African participation in the air show.<sup>21</sup>

### The South African Arms Industry and the Strengthening of Apartheid

The significance of the rise of a strong and viable South African arms exporting industry can only be understood by examining how this situation can lead to increased South African political influence and economic strength. In particular, ways in which South Africa could use its arms industry to weaken its international isolation are significant because this isolation was imposed to compel domestic reform. Likewise, ways in which the South African economy can be strengthened are also important since an economically secure South Africa could resist outside economic pressure. Such a strengthening of the economy would also allow the South Africans to raise their military and internal security budgets. Repression could therefore be increased without economic hardship for the white minority.

South Africa could reasonably hope to influence the political positions of a variety of countries through its policies regarding arms sales. In trying to exert this influence, South Africa would have two types of targets. These would be (1) the actual arms recipients, and (2) other nations that have an interest in the global arms trade but would not be, themselves, interested in buying arms from South Africa.

South Africa could seek to exercise influence over arms recipients in a variety of ways. The most obvious way is for the South Africans to build up a strong supplier-recipient relationship and then to hedge on military cooperation until political relations are improved or criticism is muted. In this way, South Africa could exploit a dependency on South African arms, which it had helped to create. Even without overt pressure, there would be a natural compulsion by an arms recipient to maintain good relations with an arms supplier to ensure fewer problems with issues such as continuing flow of weaponry, as well as spare parts for previously procured systems.

A second way in which the South Africans may seek to gain influence over arms recipients is through the use of South African experts who could be sent to foreign countries in order to provide advice on transferred weapons and their associated tactics. These experts could establish strong and significant links to the defense establishments of the countries receiving arms. In such a way, they would be in a position to win supporters within that part of the government entrusted with national defense. In the case of Third World governments, such a situation would be especially important since military officers have often assumed direct political power.

Other states that South Africa might try to influence would include nations, such as the U.S., that have global interests that could be affected by the influx of South African arms into regions where they maintain such an interest. In this regard the South Africans could attempt to establish a coordinated relationship with the extra-regional powers by either (1) supplying regional nations that are friendly to the extra-regional power, or (2) withholding weapons from nations that the extra-regional power does not wish to see armed.

In the U.S. case, both of the above factors are important and could be exploited by a shrewd South African government. The U.S. has, for example, shown interest in using middlemen to arm certain allies whom the U.S. government wishes to support while maintaining some political distance. The U.S. has also at various points in time shown interest in isolating certain regimes and in retarding regional arms races. Such situations could present opportunities for the South Africans to attempt to influence the U.S. by using their arms industry to help meet U.S. needs or threaten U.S. interests.

The most obvious way the South Africans could strengthen their economy through arms sales involves an improvement in the South African balance of payments. While the South Africans are presently planning a ten-to-fifteen fold expansion of their sales of weapons abroad, this is by no means ARMSCOR's final goal. As the South Africans continue to expand their military production capabilities, they will also undoubtedly seek to expand their sales accordingly.

In addition to strengthening the South African balance of payments, arms sales could also improve the efficiency of ARMSCOR. This is because many ARMSCOR factories are not producing at 100 percent capacity. According to Pieter Marais, some factories are producing goods at only about 70 percent capacity. Some production lines are therefore idle at least part of the time. This reduces the efficiency of ARMSCOR. Foreign orders could reverse this trend and make less productive factories more profitable.

21 Sunday Times (Johannesburg), March 11, 1984, in JPRS, Sub-Saharan Africa Report, April 9, 1984, p. 78.

## Potential Global Responses to South African Arms Export Policies

This paper has shown that the rise of the South African arms industry with its export potential can present South Africa with new opportunities to influence a variety of countries, including the United States, and thereby render these countries more reluctant to exert any serious pressure on the South Africans. The strengthening of the South African economy has also been shown to be a possible consequence of increased South African arms sales abroad. This situation may lead the South Africans to the conclusion that they can maintain some variation of the apartheid system through the shrewd management of their arms export policies.

There are a variety of plausible responses that the global community and particularly the United States can engage in to prevent the above scenario from being played out. These responses require a degree of global and American commitment that may not be forthcoming. Nevertheless, these options are worth exploring and commenting upon, given the seriousness of the problem. In examining such, the pivotal role of the U.S. in making any form of response effective is something that becomes readily apparent.

One fairly predictable way the global community will respond to the threat of South African military exports will be to initiate actions to impose a United Nations mandatory purchasing embargo on South African weapons. This idea has already been discussed within the U.N. and its passage through the Security Council would be almost certain unless the U.S. chooses to veto such a resolution. This, unfortunately, is a distinct possibility, given the Reagan administration's policy of "constructive engagement."

In enacting a global purchasing embargo, the U.N. would place each country of the world in a position where it would feel pressure to announce whether or not adherence to such a policy would be forthcoming. In order to openly purchase South African arms, a country would therefore be compelled to declare a willingness to work with South Africa and a willingness to flout international law by ignoring a binding Security Council resolution. The alternatives would be to purchase South African weapons covertly or to find a new weapons supplier. Covert arms purchases (such as a Moroccan purchase of 80 Ratel APCs) do, however, have a way of becoming public knowledge, since major weapons systems cannot always be hidden.<sup>22</sup>

While a U.N. mandatory purchasing embargo will require American acquiescence to a policy supported by most of the world, any further step would require a degree of American commitment going substantially beyond mere acquiescence. One form of such a commitment would be for the U.S. to resist any temptation to use South Africa as a middleman arms supplier


for other nations. This should not be a severe problem since other middleman arms suppliers could be found. Furthermore, any South African attempt to threaten U.S. interests with their arms industry should be met with prompt threats to South African interests. The disparity in economic power between the two nations should become readily apparent at this point.

Another way in which the U.S. (and other Western states) could reduce potential South African leverage, is for embargo legislation to be enforced more seriously. While it is true that the embargo is very largely responsible for South African self-sufficiency, it is also true that this self-sufficiency is now an accomplished fact that cannot easily be undone. By slowing the flow of technical data from the U.S. and its allies, there is some potential for reducing the quality (and hence the export potential) of South African weapons. In particular, the U.S. must vigorously enforce its own embargo legislation as well as convince U.S. allies, such as Israel, of the inadvisability of cooperating with South Africa on military matters, since it remains one of the few countries that may still be doing so in a serious way. At this point in time, one of the most important ways in which the West is considering cooperation with South Africa is through the sale of intelligence gathering aircraft to replace the aging British Shackletons. This is a very dangerous precedent and could represent the beginning of a process of unraveling the embargo.

The steps noted above could make an impact on South African sales of military exports in two ways. By reducing the volume of sales, the arms purchasing embargo could keep the per-unit price of South African weapons higher than they might otherwise be. A U.S. and Western attempt to control technology flow more carefully might also, as noted, reduce the quality of South Africa's weapons. By reducing a weapon's quality and raising the price, they can be made less competitive in a highly competitive market. This could lead to other countries cutting into sales that would otherwise go to South Africa. The net result of this situation would be a contraction of the South African arms industry and perhaps a permanent crippling of the ability of South Africans to effectively compete for substantial global sales of their weaponry. Without some kind of steps such as those noted above, the life expectancy of apartheid or some variant of apartheid can reasonably be expected to increase, as a result of the political and economic benefits that South Africa will reap from the sale of arms.

<sup>22</sup> On the sale to Morocco, see Sullivan, *op. cit.*

## Resistance & Resettlement in Southern Africa



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## ***The United States' South Africa Policy: The Failure of "Constructive Engagement" and the Emergence of New Options***

George W. Shepherd, Jr.

All recent U.S. administrations have stated their policies toward Africa, especially South Africa, in terms of human rights. The Johnson Administration revoked Navy stopovers in Capetown because of racism;<sup>1</sup> the Nixon Administration rejected apartheid;<sup>2</sup> the Carter Administration backed self-determination for Namibia;<sup>3</sup> and the Reagan Administration has portrayed itself as "against injustice." In his 1984 Human Rights Day speech President Reagan stated, "The U.S. regards racism with repugnance" and called on South Africa to end its removal of blacks policy.<sup>4</sup>

However, these largely symbolic stances are not the essence of a great power's policy. The nature of that policy is derived from the way in which it perceives a regional power like South Africa serving its global interests of dominance.<sup>5</sup>

Two basic positions characterize U.S. conventional thinking about South Africa. The first is the view of South Africa as a major sub-imperial power in the struggle with the USSR for control of strategic points and access to vital minerals and trade. This view seeks token change in apartheid to make the present South African government a more acceptable and a supportable ally. The second view sees South Africa as a powerful regional leader which

1. Despite option 2 in NSSM 39, the basic rejection of apartheid was there. See Mohamed El-Khawass and Barry Cohen eds. *The Kissinger Study of Southern Africa*. Nottingham, Spokesman Books, 1975.

2. David Johnson, "Troubled Waters for the U.S. Navy," *Africa Report*, January-February, 1975.

3. Interview with Dean McHenry, *TransAfrica Forum Notes*, December 1982.

4. *Africa News*, December 17, 1984.

5. This is the tributary state system that the author has outlined in *Independence and Global Dominance*, forthcoming, 1985.

George W. Shepherd, Jr. is Professor of International Relations at the Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver, and an editor of *Africa Today*. This paper has been revised and updated from a presentation at a conference on American Foreign Policy towards Africa at The University of Kansas at Lawrence, sponsored by Senator Nancy Kassebaum.

can provide stability and development in Southern Africa of Western interests. This can only be achieved, it is believed, if apartheid is dismantled in favor of a multi-racial constitution in which the African majority rules and continues close Western ties.

The crucial differences between the two are many since they involve perceptions of power, basic stability, the potential for real change in South Africa, and a judgment about development capability and costs in black-run African states, as well as a basic interpretation of the key elements of Western security. These form essentially the differences of strategy between neo-conservatives and liberals in U.S. policy.

An alternative view perceives the possibility of a decline of U.S. dominance and the achievement of regional self-reliance led by a democratic South Africa. This alternative is also presented as in the interests of the U.S., which clearly will not be served by chaos and war. However, the objective is provision of basic human rights and fulfillment of the historical promise of a free Africa in the world.

### The Southern Africa Regional Context

U.S. policy in southern Africa has faced difficulties in establishing sound relations with the new governments because of the role the U.S. played, largely through NATO, in support of settler and colonial regimes against the struggles of the liberation movements.<sup>6</sup> Therefore, after the victories of the MPLA in Angola, FRELIMO in Mozambique, and the Patriotic Front in Zimbabwe, the U.S. has failed to establish good working relationships with the emerging new governments because of built-in mistrust, and because of the continuing challenge to U.S. dominance that the non-aligned stance of these regimes poses.

The Ford Administration was the first to undertake limited recognition of the rise of liberation movements and to assist in forcing the white settlers to accept the inevitable over Rhodesia. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's ultimatum to Ian Smith in 1976 was the result of a deal with South African Prime Minister John Vorster. Kissinger's objective was "reform before the Marxists take over." However, this stance came much too late to neutralize the effect of previous policies. The U.S. attempt to intervene in the Angolan civil war on behalf of an alternative to the MPLA became confused with South African objectives and backfired. The CIA role of support for FNLA and UNITA, both of whom lost out in the initial struggle, continues to hold down U.S. policy with the millstone of overt South African and covert U.S. support for Jonas Savimbi's UNITA.

<sup>6</sup> William Minter outlined the history of this colonial support in *Portuguese Africa and the West*. New York, Penguin, 1974.

The Carter Administration appeared at first to be turning over a fresh page in the history of American relations with southern Africa. The strong pressures exerted on behalf of a free and fair election and settlement in Rhodesia helped bring about the All Parties Conference in London and the U.K. agreement to opt for something beyond an internal settlement with Bishop Muzorewa.<sup>7</sup> While Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and the State Department failed to support the recognition of Angola, they won the cooperation of the Front Line States in a concerted attempt to obtain the independence of Namibia. The failure of the UNTAG policy of the UN Security Council in 1978 was due more to the intransigence of the South African right wing and the military than lack of commitment by the U.S. and its Western allies.<sup>8</sup> African states have faulted the U.S. for failure to bring sufficient pressure to bear on South Africa at the time.<sup>9</sup> There is, however, reason to doubt that token sanctions at that time would have worked, given the rising star of Prime Minister Pieter Botha, who was as determined to seek a military solution then as he is today.

Relations with South Africa under Carter were ambiguous and contradictory, vacillating between upholding the principles of racial equality and self-determination and continuing the pursuit of economic and security interests. While Vance, UN Ambassador Andrew Young and his associate Dean McHenry did not resolve this ambiguity, they at least demonstrated their awareness of the dilemma and raised expectations for the first time that the U.S. might adopt a serious anti-apartheid policy.<sup>10</sup> Vice President Walter Mondale angered Prime Minister Vorster when he called for "one man, one vote" as the principle for South African politics. The administration went further and supported a compulsory arms ban against South Africa at the United Nations and placed on the list of prohibited exports several para-military commodities such as aircraft and advanced computer technology. The U.S. Embassy in South Africa stated publicly its shock at the brutal repression of the Soweto uprising in 1976 and later attended the funeral of the Black

<sup>7</sup> Alex Callinicos, *Southern Africa After Zimbabwe*. London, Pluto Press, 1981, p.14; Robert S. Jaster, "A Regional Security Role for Africa's Front Line States: Experience and Prospects." London, International Institute for Security Studies, Adelphi Papers #180, 1983, pp. 11-15. The Carter Administration assisted in the key decision to hold an all parties conference in London, rather than recognize Muzorewa.

<sup>8</sup> George W. Shepherd, Jr., "No Free and Fair Settlement in Namibia: The Collapse of the Western Five Plan." *Africa Today*, Vol. 26, No. 2, 1979, pp.7-22.

<sup>9</sup> Davidson Nichol, "Africa and the USA in the United Nations." *Cambridge Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 16, No. 3, 1978, p.378.

<sup>10</sup> Hunt Davis, Jr. argues that President Carter set a new tone for U.S. policy toward Africa but failed to support liberation and basic change: "U.S. Policy Toward South Africa: A Dissenting View" in Rene LeMarchand, ed., *American Policy in Southern Africa*. Washington, D.C., University Press of America, 1981, pp. 320-23.

Consciousness leader, Steve Biko, after his death by torture at the hands of the South African police. Financial support for South African refugees through the UN and the Namibia Institute in Lusaka, staffed largely by SWAPO, were further indications of U.S. sympathy and desire for change.<sup>11</sup>

Numerous critics from Tom Karis to Robert Fatton have pointed out that the Carter Administration did not support divestment by U.S. industry nor did they directly apply a total ban on arms and nuclear energy.<sup>12</sup> Cyrus Vance and Andrew Young promoted a policy based on persuasion and peaceful change that proved to be ineffective. It did not bring about the freedom of Namibia nor did it introduce significant change for the black population of South Africa in terms of less repression, better jobs, housing, and education, or the extension of the franchise to Africans. The abolition of separate toilet facilities and the acceptance of the right of workers to organize were so limited as to be meaningless. Moreover, the general deterioration of standards for the underemployed and the rural poor continued despite the protests.<sup>13</sup> The verdict of history will probably be that the Carter Administration dealt with some marginal moral issues while avoiding the central problems in order to protect so-called American interests.

The Reagan Administration which came into office in 1981 has been no less firm in its declared support for the principles of equality and self-determination, utilizing new concepts variously stated as "constructive engagement," "power projection," "communist linkages," "reciprocity," and "peaceful change." Today, the region is in crisis, facing continued warfare over Namibia, growing conflicts between South Africa and the Front Line States, and efforts at internal destabilization of existing neighboring African governments by South Africa. Economic dislocation and even starvation have grown. And within South Africa itself, the country has been rapidly polarized between a white position and an African one, with increasing violence on all sides. Reagan Administration policy is not alone responsible for the war, counter-revolution, starvation, refugee exodus, and racial extremism; but it has contributed to the rising level of violence and the crisis of the region.

The problem has been that the Reagan policy views South Africa as central to its objectives throughout the region, despite the Afrikaner pariah status. The principal priority has been to block all further expansion of Soviet influence in the region and therefore to defeat or contain all possible allies

11. Lawrence Litvak, Robert DeGrasse and Kathleen McTigue, *South Africa: Foreign Investment and Apartheid*, Washington, D.C., Institute for Policy Studies, 1978, pp. 64-66.

12. Thomas Karis, "Revolution in the Making: Black Politics in Southern Africa," *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1983/84, Robert Fatton, "The Reagan Foreign Policy Toward South Africa," *African Studies Review*, March 1984, Vol. 27, No. 1.

13. Stanley B. Greenberg, "Economic Growth and Political Change: The South African Case," *Cambridge Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 19, No. 4, 1981. See also article by Christopher Cohen, "The Role of U.S. Corporations in South Africa," *ibid*.

of the rival power.<sup>14</sup> It has made southern Africa a primary security zone in the global security system. They also view South Africa as a candidate for "dynamic democratic capitalism" in the campaign to support "market systems" throughout Africa. Other administrations have stopped short of embracing South Africa as a Southern Atlantic and Indian Ocean military ally, nor have they consistently regarded the Soviet Union as a direct military threat to U.S. and Western core power interests in the region. While supporting economic expansion in the region, past presidents have used cautious restraint such as the Carter-supported policy of discouraging further U.S. investment in Namibia. But the Reagan Administration has gone out of its way to assist investment and even pushed through a \$1.1 billion loan from the IMF to South Africa, over the objection of other members.<sup>15</sup> Moreover, they have established closer military ties with South Africa than any previous U.S. administration.<sup>16</sup>

The evidence indicating the nature of the new relationship is extensive and includes South African intervention in neighboring African states. The attempt of the Reagan Administration to repeal the Clark Amendment is related to the fostering of an alternative to the MPLA government in Luanda. South Africa has openly assisted UNITA with arms and equipment in its drive to replace the Marxist Angolan regime.<sup>17</sup> Evidence of U.S. complicity in this objective came not only with the continuing refusal to recognize the President Eduardo Dos Santos government but by the feting of UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi in Washington, D.C. The concerted attempt of the U.S. and South Africa to remove the Cuban military presence from Angola is generally presented in terms of a settlement in Namibia. But the Angolans have made it clear that they regard the Cubans as necessary support against the interventionary military policies of South Africa in support of UNITA and the protection of the oil supplies of Cabinda against Savimbi's attempts to disrupt the wells. Curiously, most of this oil is shipped to the U.S., which is Angola's major trading partner. The grounds on which this policy of support for Savimbi is based is probably that UNITA would, in the view of the Reagan people, provide a pro-Western government and more assured supply

14. Numerous statements of this goal have been made. Reagan himself called South Africa a "friendly country" and spoke of its support "in every war we have fought," in an interview with *Wall Street Journal* on TV, March 3, 1981.

15. Jim Morrel, "The International Monetary Fund and Namibia," *Africa Today*, Vol. 30, Nos. 1 and 2, 1983, pp. 17-22.

16. The re-establishment of military attaches at the U.S. Embassy, the agreement to train the South African Coast Guard and the continuing talks over a Southern Atlantic Treaty Organization all support this conclusion. The restraints under the Carter and Ford Administrations have been outlined by Robert Price, *U.S. Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa*, Berkeley, Institute of International Affairs, 1979.

17. Operation Protea in 1981 by South Africa into Angola "was more than a pre-emptive incursion or a hot pursuit; it was an occupation." "Destabilization in Southern Africa," *Economist*, July 16, 1983.



of oil. This is a very risky policy that could well lead to general war in the region and assure Cuban presence for an indefinite period of time.

### Linkage and Reciprocity in Namibia

One of the major self-chosen points of demonstration of the Reagan foreign policy in southern Africa has been Namibia. The Reagan Administration confidently announced its intention to resolve this conflict but for four years the world has held its breath waiting for that to happen. It has not, for a number of reasons. Important among these is the faulty analysis presented to the administration by Reagan security and regional specialists.

The primary assumption has been the linkage of the Namibian question to over-all security issues in southern Africa, particularly the presence of Cuban military forces in Angola. The Reagan Administration came into office convinced that the major problem in southern Africa and the Namibia impasse was the Soviet Union and its surrogate, Cuba. They believed the key to a settlement was satisfying South African fears over Cuban presence in Angola. Assistant Secretary of State Chester Crocker denied that this meant a tilt toward South Africa, but was based on developing a U.S.-South African dialogue of mutual trust.<sup>18</sup> Others in the Administration saw the Cuban linkage over Namibia as an opportunity to wage the Cold War. UN Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick's phrase summed it up, "the enemy is not racism, it is Communism." Thus, the major objective became the removal of Cuban troops from Angola, as a price for the South Africans' withdrawal from Namibia. This is said to have been originally the brilliant insight of such strategists of the National Security Council as Judge William Clark who visited South Africa in 1982 with Chester Crocker and is credited with first suggesting the linkage to the South Africans, who apparently had not thought in quite these bold terms.<sup>19</sup> The South African military and political leaders were not slow in adopting this strategy, as they realized more quickly than the "Reagan brain trust" that this provided them with an excuse to remain in Namibia as long as they kept sufficient pressure on the Angola government, thus requiring them to keep the Cubans to help with internal security. They therefore stepped up assistance to Savimbi and his UNITA, enabling them to provide increasing guerrilla harassment of roads, railways and villages.<sup>20</sup>

18. Hon. Chester Crocker, Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, Testimony, Sub-Committee on Africa, House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, Washington, D.C., September 16, 1983.

19. Congressman Howard Wolpe, Chairman of the Africa Sub-Committee, in questioning Assistant Secretary Crocker, stated: "You are the people who made the linkage... it was the United States, was it not, that raised the Cuban troop issue as a matter of formal linkage to the question of Namibian independence settlement?" Hearing, February, 1983, p.32.

20. *Africa News*, August 29, 1983, p.12

All the shuttle diplomacy has failed to persuade Angola or the other Front Line States that this linkage strategy did not put the cart before the horse. An attempt by Undersecretary of State Lawrence Eagleberger to demonstrate U.S. opposition to apartheid and to present linkage as "reciprocity" also failed.<sup>21</sup> Angola, other African states closely aligned with the U.S., such as Kenya, and the Contact States (particularly France), attempted to persuade the Reagan Administration to withdraw its linkage provision but to no avail. The Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, under fire from a Congressional committee for this policy, stated:

"We have, for more than a year now, been engaged in intensive discussions with the Angolan Government in an effort to reach a broadly acceptable formula for parallel withdrawal of foreign forces from Namibia and Angola."<sup>22</sup>

Congressman Howard Wolpe quoted Angola and Cuban statements that Cuban forces would be withdrawn "once each and every eventuality of acts of aggression or armed invasion ceased to exist."<sup>23</sup>

However, Crocker continued to insist that Angola and Cuba were involved in an "equal action" of aggression. This view of the Cuban-Angolan "aggression" against Namibia is the unique contribution of the Reagan Administration to the debate. If it had produced a practical settlement, this distortion of international law and truth would not be so tragic. But the effect seems to have been, as Wolpe and other critics have pointed out, to take the pressure off South Africa because they do not fear the Cuban presence as much as sanctions by Western powers. As James Mittelman, a specialist on southern Africa, stated in reply to former U.S. Ambassador Marion H. Smoak:

"Our policy in Angola tells us more about anti-Communist preconceptions in the U.S. than it does about problems in the sub-continent. A careful examination of the policy demonstrates that American insistence on linking South African and Cuban troop withdrawals from Angola gives South Africa a pretext to linger in Namibia."<sup>24</sup>

Other aspects of the Namibian policy that have further weakened the earlier U.S. position are the downgrading of the UN and the Council for Namibia and the cutting off of assistance to the Namibia Institute. By catering to the South African suspicion of the UN, the Administration has moved the primary negotiations outside into the jurisdiction of the Contact Group of Five: Canada, the United Kingdom, France, West Germany and the United

21. *New York Times*, June 24, 1983.

22. Chester Crocker, *Hearings*, February 1983, op. cit., p.15.

23. *Ibid.*, p.53.

24. "Correspondence," *Africa Today*, 1983, Vol. 30, No. 3, p. 75.

States. This group, for two years, attempted to use the principles of UN SC resolution 435 for negotiations, but it did not succeed and finally abandoned its efforts in favor of U.S.-sponsored talks between South Africa, Angola, and SWAPO.

The results of these talks in Lusaka, Luanda, and Lisbon have been greatly exaggerated by Crocker and the South Africans.<sup>25</sup> There has been no cease-fire or complete withdrawal of South Africans from Angola. Nor has there been any timetable agreed to by the Angolans for withdrawal of Cuban forces. The so-called accord between South Africa and Angola was never signed.<sup>26</sup> U.S. complicity with South Africa has grown through the establishment of a U.S. office in Namibia, the Joint Monitoring Commission, to monitor the border once the troops are withdrawn. Statements by President Sam Nujoma of SWAPO and President dos Santos indicate that neither trust the South Africans to accept self-determination, and they expect President Botha will continue to provide arms to UNITA while obstructing SWAPO and the UN.

The sum total of this linkage policy has been to convince South Africa that they have nothing to fear from the U.S. and other core powers if they do not leave Namibia. And they have become convinced, for other reasons, that the U.S. indeed favors an aggressive counter-liberation policy on the part of South Africa against the revolutionary movement in Namibia and the revolutionary governments of Angola, Zimbabwe and Mozambique. This may not be the announced policy of the Reagan Administration but it is the South African reading of the signals. As the Defense Minister Magnus Malan told a Johannesburg audience, "The fact that the Reagan Administration is acting in a more accommodating manner toward The Republic . . . is indeed a ray of light on the dark world of condemnation in which we find ourselves."<sup>27</sup>

The real obstacle to Namibian independence is South African fear and intransigence, according to the Council of Churches of Namibia in a statement to European churches on the eve of Prime Minister Botha's May 1984 visit to the continent:

"Namibia has become a kind of 'military camp' with the failure of the Lusaka talks, the continued linkage of the Cuban issue and the recent incredible denial of recourse to justice for those held in detention at Mariental. Since the Cassinga raid into Angola in 1978, it is hard to perceive good intentions being made

by South Africa for an honest and serious search for peace."<sup>28</sup>

The Botha "Chequers Talk" during that trip with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of Great Britain confirmed the Namibian suspicion that the U.K. had bought the Reagan view that strategic considerations came first above human rights.

## Power Projection on the Cape Route

The idea that South Africa is in some way an important base for Western and American interests in southern Africa and the Indian Ocean is a popular idea in South Africa; but it is not one that any Western power, before the Reagan Administration, accepted. The South Africans have argued since the 1950s that the Cape Route was absolutely essential for Western shipping and oil supplies.<sup>29</sup> Since the Soviet squadron entered the Indian Ocean in the early 1960s they have maintained that the USSR might try to interdict shipping off the Cape. This idea of a threat to Western interests in the Cape is generally more broadly drawn, as in the statement of the NATO nations meeting in Williamsburg, Va. in 1976:

"If Southern Africa is separated from the West, not only will we be deprived of essential minerals; but that would also mean that we have lost a strategic position which is vital to the West."<sup>30</sup>

However, the suggestion of a Cape interdiction by the USSR, short of total war, has not been taken seriously by American strategists until the Reagan Administration.<sup>31</sup> Through the "power projection" thesis of Assistant Secretary of State Crocker, the notion has been legitimized. While the U.S. would not directly use South African bases, South Africa could project its power into the Indian Ocean and along the Eastern coast of Africa, presumably on behalf of U.S. and Western interests. Crocker first expounded this idea before he became Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. It is an ambiguous idea; but appears to mean that the South Africans and the West should hold the Cape by power projection into Africa and the Indian Ocean. He is convinced this must be done because, "To me, there is no debate, that the security of the Cape Route is by far the most important

25. Update, September 1984, Vol. 8, No. 9.

26. The South Africans in November 1984 rejected an Angolan plan to withdraw all Cuban forces 3 years after Namibian independence, and in turn demanded a 12 week period, with no re-supply and no guarantee to stop assisting UNITA. Thus the major issue remained South Africa rejection of SWAPO and continued support for UNITA and not the Cuban presence. Update, December 1984, Vol. 8, No. 12.

27. Quoted in *Washington Notes on Africa*, Winter, 1981.

28. Newsletter, Episcopal Churchman for South Africa, July 1984.

29. Patrick Wall, *The Indian Ocean and the Threat to the West*, London, Stacey International, 1975, pp. 21-22.

30. Quoted by Patrick Wall in "Where NATO Must Not Drop its Guard," *To the Point*, December 20, 1976.

31. Larry Bowman, "The Strategic Importance of South Africa to the United States: An Appraisal and Policy Analysis," *African Affairs*, Vol. 18, No. 323, 1982.



Western interest in the African region."<sup>32</sup>

The South Africans have a similar conviction that they face "a total onslaught" from the Communist world<sup>33</sup> and that they must mobilize internally and initiate action externally to counter this threat. Thus, a land and sea strategy thrusting up the Mozambique channel and into the Horn of Africa is the counterattack measure described by James Rhority.<sup>34</sup> In the meantime, they seek to overthrow and destabilize the Marxist governments of Angola, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique and, of course, the troublesome Seychelles and Tanzania. All of these they regard as bases of Soviet action against them for the ANC and the Cubans. South African perspectives differ; but the Botha view of the way to deal with the threat is primarily by force and not compromise. During the previous administration of Vorster, when Botha was Minister of Defense, he repeatedly undertook interventionary action with the military against Zimbabwe, Angola and Mozambique. On several occasions such actions were derailed only by the last minute intervention of the intelligence services, then under more liberal direction, according to Kenneth Grundy's study of the security system of South Africa.<sup>35</sup> Since Botha has risen to power, the system has slipped entirely into his hands and that of the South African Defense Force (SADF), and there are no restraints.

Thus, a pattern of events has unfolded. The active support of the South African reserve forces for the abortive coup in the Seychelles, the supply of UNITA in Angola and the continuous support of the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR) has been extensively documented by specialists.<sup>36</sup> And the continuing obstruction by South Africa of a reasonable negotiated settlement over Namibia only adds evidence of the widespread expansionist initiative of South Africa.

The 1984 Nkomati Accord ostensibly put an end to intervention against each other by Mozambique and South Africa. This has not been seriously implemented by South Africa, as the MNR has continued its activity with supply from Malawi. Not all arms are South African. Saudi Arabia has been accused of supplying them through the Comoros. Members of the South African reserves and former Rhodesians, resident in South Africa, provide

leadership.<sup>37</sup> South Africa could prevent most of these actions but does not because they have not accepted the permanence of Marxist regimes as neighbors. It is this indirect aggressive anti-Communist policy that finds strong rapport in the Reagan Administration and fuels South African expansionism.

South Africa's internal repression has been continuously escalating ever since the nationalists came to power.<sup>38</sup> An ever-increasing pattern of arrests without charges, imprisonment, torture, and even death of those suspected to be in opposition led to increasing unrest in 1984. Trade union leaders, churchmen, and educators who have engaged in peaceful strikes and boycotts have been arrested and held often without trial.<sup>39</sup> Violent repression of protests against those excesses resulted in scores of deaths. To be in any way associated with the growing internal resistance of the ANC, which has become the primary opposition force internally as well as externally, invited relentless repression. What they hope to do is to root it out.<sup>40</sup> The bombing attacks on military and police installations demonstrate that this objective has failed and as Joseph Lelyveld reported in the *New York Times*, the signs of ANC support are found from the slogans of the newly-created United Democratic Front to the song the young Blacks sing. "We shall follow Slovo, even if we are detained. Even if we are hung."<sup>41</sup> Those like Bishop Desmond Tutu or the Rev. Alan Boesak, who try to reach a compromise before it is too late for anything but chaos and revolution, are ridiculed and branded as subversives.

It is into this context of expansion, disguised by South Africans as "peaceful co-existence," in southern Africa that the U.S. has thrust a proffered hand of friendship to South Africa. To describe it as an alliance in any legal terms is perhaps excessive but to see it as support for South African aggressive expansionism is precisely what is happening. George Houser has described this as support for an "intensifying cycle of violence. . . . The United States refused to hold the guilty party, the South African state, responsible for the wholesale regional destruction of peace and stability."<sup>42</sup> Encouraged

37. *Ibid.*, Spring/Summer 1984.

38. *Newsletter, International Dialogue and Aid*, Cambridge, Fall 1983.

39. *Update*, December 1984, *op. cit.*

40. David Winder, "Waging a War of Sabotage in South Africa," *Christian Science Monitor*, September 16, 1983.

41. Joseph Lelyveld, "Black Challenge to Pretoria," *New York Times*, October 23, 1983. Joseph Slovo is a white lawyer who has a leading part in the sabotage campaign of the ANC.

42. George Houser, "Relations Between the United States of America and South Africa," North American Regional Conference for Action Against Apartheid, UN, New York, June 1981.

32. Chester Crocker testimony, Hearing, Sub-Committee on Africa, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, October 19, 1980, p.129.

33. *Ibid.*, p. 128.

34. James Rhority, "Beyond Limpopo and Zambesi: South Africa's Strategic Horizons," in *The Indian Ocean: Perspectives on a Strategic Arena*, eds. William Dowdy and Russell Trood, Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press (forthcoming).

35. Kenneth Grundy, "Day of the Generals," South Africa, *Sunday Express*, September 11, 1983.

36. See *Washington Notes on Africa*, Washington, D.C., Winter 1981.

they then launched a vigorous campaign to create a "Cordon Sanitaire" and to destroy the bases of independence of the newly independent states while talking in terms of peace and "a constellation of states."

The U.S. support pattern has taken the form of welcoming military and intelligence officers from South Africa to the United States for the first time, the re-establishment of military aides at the U.S. Embassy in Pretoria, and the releasing for sale to South Africa of previously banned commodities which could be utilized for military purposes.<sup>43</sup> The utilization of the communications facilities of South Africa for military surveillance purposes throughout Africa and the Indian Ocean continues.<sup>44</sup> Arms transfers to South Africa through third parties such as Israel have been expedited. Perhaps most important, technical aid to South Africa in the development of nuclear power, which is generally agreed to have reached weapons capability levels, has grown.<sup>45</sup> Attempts to repeal the Clark amendment, prohibiting covert U.S. activity in Angola, and the collaboration with South Africa in the support of UNITA and perhaps other counter-revolutionary movements, are additional elements in the policy.<sup>46</sup> The failure to condemn the direct use of force in attacks on Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe by South African forces has further fueled suspicions.<sup>47</sup> Power projections from South Africa may not mean the direct use of American forces but it certainly means that the South Africans are equipped and encouraged to use their force northward on behalf of joint policies which the U.S. publicly disavows.

These policies are questionable enough in themselves, but there are those who believe they give the U.S. some leverage over internal reforms, in terms of the doctrine of "constructive engagement."

### Constructive Engagement

The idea of constructive engagement was coined to counter the proposals for disengagement from South Africa that have gained wide popular support in the West. It assumes that the forces of reform in South Africa must be strengthened by continuing economic ties and cultural links. The

43. *Africa News*, October 22, 1984, reported on the extensive strategic sales from the U.S. to South Africa. "Licenses issued in 1984 by the Commerce Department for such sensitive items as aircraft, computers and communications equipment are up almost 100%." The South Africans desire the Lockheed P-3C Orion to replace the aging Shackleton coastal surveillance planes, and have had some encouragement.

44. Robert Jaster, "South Africa's Narrowing Security Options," London, Adelphi Papers, No. 159, IIS, 1980.

45. Ronald Walters, "The United States and the South Africa Namibia Uranium Option" *Africa Today*, Vol. 30, Nos. 1 and 2, 1983, pp. 51-59. Also, *Washington Notes on Africa*, op. cit., Winter 1983.

46. "Africa: Observations on the Impact of American Foreign Policy and Development Programs in Six African Countries," Congressional Study Mission, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, June 1982, pp. 44-45.

47. The U.S. vetoed a condemnation of South Africa for its invasion of Angola, in the Security Council on August 31, 1981. *New York Times*, September 1, 1981.

South Africans themselves were the initiators of this idea through advocates of reform programs which included professional, business, and educational groups. The most famous of their theories was propounded by M.C. Dowd, an economist with the Oppenheimer Anglo-American complex in South Africa. He maintained that South African industrialization was the key to modernization and racial equality.<sup>48</sup>

The argument has been especially directed at the disinvestment campaign in the West which opposes continued economic collaboration with apartheid. Voluntary reform programs such as the Sullivan Principles for American corporations operating in South Africa emerged from this point of view. The Reagan Administration, when it came to power, decided that American business should be encouraged to remain in South Africa and to assist in the process of gradual change of the South African society. Several reports have been issued by groups supporting the Sullivan Principles and these have argued that the Botha Government was moving toward change in favor of Africans and other non-whites.<sup>49</sup> The State Department, under the Reagan Administration, has shifted from the wait and see attitude of the Carter Administration to a direct advocate of the view that external industrial pressure is working and that South Africa has begun to redistribute the wealth among all races as well as dismantling apartheid discriminatory laws.<sup>50</sup>

This is a large debate and many different elements need to be considered. However, several studies and commissions of outside observers have concluded that the change is a facade and that constructive engagement is not working.

Elizabeth Schmidt has carefully considered the six Sullivan Principles and the several reports of the corporations themselves regarding the application of these principles to working conditions and employment in South Africa.<sup>51</sup> She concludes:

"In a few brief lines, the fundamental weakness of the Sullivan Principles is revealed; the Principles address corporate employment practices as if they occur in a vacuum, as if the bottom line is the desegregation of toilets and recreation areas,

48. M.C. Dowd, "The Stages of Economic Growth and the Future of South Africa" in Lawrence Schlemmer and Eddie Webster, *Change, Reform, Economic Growth in South Africa*, Johannesburg, Raven Press, 1974, p.45.

49. The principal reports are from the U.S. corporations themselves, see "Sixth Report on the Signatory Companies to the Sullivan Principles," Cambridge, Arthur D. Little, Inc., November 1, 1982.

50. Chester Crocker, "The Reagan Administration's African Policy: A Progress Report," University of Kansas, Lawrence, November 10, 1984.

51. "Reports on the Signatory Companies to the Sullivan Principles," Cambridge, Arthur D. Little, Inc., 1978-82.

52. Elizabeth Schmidt, "One Step in the Wrong Direction," revised edition, New York, Episcopal Churchmen for South Africa, March 1983, p.14.

rather than U.S. corporate support of Apartheid structures. The Sixth Report ultimately exposes the Sullivan Principles for what they are — absolutely irrelevant to the struggle for freedom and justice in Africa.<sup>52</sup>

A major indication of the extent of ultimate commitment of American industry to the support of apartheid is the South African National Key Points Act which requires key industries to cooperate with South African defense in the event of an emergency.<sup>53</sup>

Advocates of constructive engagement have been silent concerning the growing repression in South Africa of the non-white communities which have opposed the system. This has been indicated by the growing number of arrests without warrant and the confinement and even death of political prisoners without trial. No protest was made by the Reagan Administration over the death of the trade union leader, Dr. Neil Aggett, who was killed in 1982 by the security police in prison.<sup>54</sup> A related act of callous disregard for the human rights of South African resistors was the case of Dennis Brutus, a South African poet, who had applied for asylum in this country. The State Department advised the immigration court that he should first be deported to Zimbabwe and then later argued for sending him back to the U.K.. Finally, the Immigration Court itself determined that he had a right to asylum and overruled the deportation order.<sup>55</sup>

Archbishop Dennis Hurley, President of the S.A. Catholic Bishops, is to be tried for accusing S.A. forces in Namibia of committing atrocities. The Association of South African Chambers of Commerce and the Federated Chamber of Industries protested the detention of the leaders of the two largest black unions, Chris Dlamini and Pivoshaw Camay.

The riots, strikes, and boycotts of 1984, leading to thousands of arrests and at least 160 deaths are not an indication that conditions have improved for Africans. Even American businesses protested the strike-breaking, mass arrest policies of the South African Government.<sup>56</sup> In its retaliation against the two-day work boycott in November 1984 that closed down virtually all industry, South Africa used its army for the first time.<sup>57</sup> The conclusion of the extensive two-year Carnegie Commission study, headed by Prof. Francis Wilson, a Capetown University economist, showed the impoverishment of the African majority has worsened, especially in the

homelands, under recent industrialization. The promised reforms of influx control, citizenship laws, and land tenure legislation have not taken place.<sup>58</sup>

Yet the Reagan Administration has turned its back on the massive protest movements like the United Democratic Front (UDF). Several of their leaders were refused asylum in the U.S. Consulate in Johannesburg so they went to the British, where they stayed until assured they would not be re-arrested. The Rev. Alan Boesak, the President of the UDF, has been threatened with arrest by the Minister of Law and Order as "a liar and slanderer" against the police.

There is little indication that any of this friendship for South Africa has fulfilled the expectation of change in their policy which the constructive engagement policy has assumed. Much has been made of the new multi-racial legislature authorized by the Nov. 1983 referendum. As many of the internal critics of this so-called reform have pointed out, the failure to allow for African representation nullified what marginal gains have been made by giving Coloured and Asians separate representation on the President's Council and creating separate parliamentary bodies for them.<sup>59</sup> The Progressive-Federal opposition party among the white population as well as the ANC and the United Democratic Front have opposed this "reform" on the grounds that it leaves out the majority of the population. When the U.S. cites such a charade as progress, it places itself against real change.

### Front Line Relations

The Front Line States of southern Africa, which include Tanzania, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Botswana, and Angola, have been the primary advocates of liberation and social change in the region. They regard South Africa as the major obstacle to the peaceful settlement of outstanding issues and major road-block to the development of their economies. Their relations with the United States have in most instances deteriorated in direct relation to the rise of U.S.-South African collaboration.

The most serious deterioration has taken place with Angola which has been under pressure to remove the Cuban military advisors and has been refused diplomatic recognition. The Angolans believe that the U.S. has been engaged in a CIA scheme to destabilize their Government through collaboration with South Africa in support for UNITA and other dissident groups such as the Military Committee of the Angolan Resistance (COMIRA). Jack

53 *Ibid.* p.15

54 *Africa Research Bulletin* (Political) London, 1982, 6350C.

55 David Margolick, "Decision on Brutus," *New York Times*, September 28, 1983.

56 *Update*, December 1984, *op. cit.*

57 *New York Times*, November 9, 1984.

58 Alan Cowell, *New York Times*, April 22, 1984.

59 Joseph Lelyveld, *New York Times*, October 10, 1983.

Anderson, in his column, referred, on August 26, 1981, to a "Draft Covert Operations Planning Document Africa-Middle East" dated May 9, 1981, which suggested "improving capability of the agency (CIA) to rapidly escalate existing aid to anti-Communist forces." The coordinated campaign to repeal the Clark Amendment by the Administration with a visit from Savimbi seemed to confirm that the policy was in place.<sup>60</sup> A report of a visit of U.S. "advisers" to UNITA forces has appeared. South Africa's invasion of Southern Angola in August of 1981 was universally condemned except for the U.S. which insisted, in the words of Assistant Secretary of State Crocker, "We will not permit our hand to be forced to align ourselves with one side or another in these disputes."<sup>61</sup>

While posing as the mediating agent between South Africa and Angola in the cease-fire agreement and the establishment of the Joint Monitoring Agreement (JMC) by mid-1984, the U.S. had simply aided South Africa's objective of a "Cordon Sanitaire". The JMC had only restricted SWAPO forces without similar restraints on UNITA and the withdrawal of all South African forces from Angola.<sup>62</sup>

A similar destabilization campaign against "the Marxist regimes" of Mozambique and Zimbabwe by South Africa has been covertly supported by the U.S. and has resulted in increased deterioration of relationships between the U.S. and these countries. While there is little evidence of dire CIA involvement in these campaigns, there is ample proof concerning the objective of South Africa. The attacks by South African forces on an ANC residence in Maputo in October 1983 and their support of the MNR insurgency was the staging ground for the Nkomati Accords. This agreement (Mar. 16, 1984) was fostered by the U.S. as a peace arrangement which the South Africans used to dictate terms to a greatly weakened Mozambique. These terms went far beyond the restriction of ANC activity. Mozambique has become a financial and trading dependency of the U.S. and South Africa, forced to accept Western policies and even military aid in return for financial and food assistance. The impact of the drought and the failure of several farming schemes have aggravated the disruption caused by the MRN and put FRELIMO in a weakened bargaining position. In short, the impact of U.S. policy, rather than helping them toward independence and a capacity to feed their own people, has forced them into a subordination to South Africa.<sup>63</sup>

The U.S. over the past several years has turned down many of Mozambique's requests for food and agriculture assistance which normally would have been met.<sup>64</sup> Zimbabwe had surplus maize at the time which could have been air-lifted to the drought stricken peasants of southern Mozambique and today the disaster has spread threatening lives of hundreds of thousands.

At the start of the Reagan Administration there was a genuine desire to help the Government in Zimbabwe, led by Robert Mugabe, to succeed.<sup>65</sup> A conference was convened of several prospective donors and over \$1.4 billion in aid was pledged, of which the U.S. promised \$225 million over a three year period. However, most of this has not been forthcoming from the U.S. and others, because Zimbabwe has made it clear that it wishes to disengage from its economic dependence on South Africa. Moreover they have refused to accept the U.S. position in the U.N. Security Council on Grenada and Nicaragua. Under-Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger persuaded Congress to punish Zimbabwe by cutting aid over 50% in 1983.<sup>66</sup>

Mugabe has refused to yield to this pressure and has continued to organize the various economic commissions, in cooperation with 9 other African states of the Southern Africa Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC). These aim at joint trading, transportation and investment policies of southern African States, which exclude South Africa. If successful, Zimbabwe and Zambia would replace South Africa as the hub of industrialization of the region. These objectives of SADCC are contrary to the Reagan conception of South Africa as the sub-imperial center of Western interests in the region, regardless of its racial policies.

The Afrikaners have from the beginning of the Mugabe Government attempted to undermine the Zimbabwe economic self-determination plans. One step was the sudden withdrawal of engines from the railways South Africa owned. Later 24 diesel engines were returned on the condition that they be used in trade with South Africa.<sup>67</sup> Nevertheless, the SADCC program has proceeded with considerable assistance from Europe, especially Scandinavian states.

Other Front Line States, such as Tanzania, have been gravely damaged by diminishing of U.S. economic aid, despite their increased needs, particularly for food assistance in the face of continuing drought. Conflicting

60. *Washington Notes on Africa*, op. cit., Winter 1981.

61. Speech by Assistant Secretary of State Chester Crocker to the American Legion in Honolulu, August 29, 1981.

62. Cason and Fleishman, op. cit.

63. Allen Isaacman, "Pretoria's War Against Mozambique," *Washington Notes on Africa*, op. cit., Spring 1983.

64. *Ibid*.

65. "Africa Observations on the Impact of American Foreign Policy on Development Programs in Six Countries," op. cit., p. 7.

66. Washington has kept Zimbabwe on a short leash, *Washington Notes*, op. cit., Winter 1981, and during Mugabe's visit to the U.S. in the Fall of 1983, his refusal to support the U.S. in the National Security Council over the Korean Air Line incident brought demands for aid reduction. *Africa News*, October 24, 1983.

67. Congressional study mission, op. cit., pp. 9-10.

policies over the nature of internal programs have led to even less multi-lateral assistance through the World Bank.<sup>68</sup> Their impression is that the U.S. is interested now primarily in military aid for the building of an anti-Soviet coalition. The contribution of U.S. policies to economic failures, now complicated and multiplied by the drought is one of the major reasons millions now face starvation in Africa.

The effect of this southern African policy of support for South African expansionism and the withdrawal of assistance to struggling independent African governments, together with recent divisive military actions in northern Africa over Chad, the Sudan and the POLISARIO of the Western Sahara have been to weaken a number of African states in their capacity to meet their own economic needs. Not since the nadir of the Kissinger policy in Africa in 1975 when the Nigerians refused U.S. Secretary of State landing rights, has there been such widespread hostility against American objectives. No amounts of humanitarian aid, as desirable as this is, can change this relationship unless the basic divisive and expansionist support for South Africa is ended.

### Alternative

The alternative as seen by Africanists, Congressional Committees, and political leaders, is to return to the principles of American policy in the area of self-determination and racial equality and apply them in an effective manner. The results would be, according to Randall Robinson, the Director of TransAfrica, to turn around overnight our relations with the African states and produce a real change in South Africa.<sup>69</sup>

A general agreement exists among a wide variety of organizations that the U.S. should support the self-determination of the newly-independent states of southern Africa through recognizing Angola and extending significant assistance to those areas that have been newly liberated and are struggling to exert their independence from South Africa.<sup>70</sup> These are objectives that have been endorsed by Congressional Committees and Presidential candidates.<sup>71</sup>

The independence of Namibia should not be subordinated to the issue of Cuban forces nor should it be a question of South African security. The

right of the Namibians to their own freely determined self-rule has been accepted by the world community and now needs to be implemented. If South Africa fails to cooperate then sanctions under Article VII should be supported, as proposed by many church and Africanist organizations.

The collective self-reliance objectives of the southern African states should be respected and supported as a means of dealing with long-term poverty and the need to develop their own resources. As the House Subcommittee on Africa has said, SADCC is a major instrument for this, and should be supported.<sup>72</sup>

South Africa is the key to most of this new policy. The principle of racial equality is one that cannot be qualified in dealing with this apartheid regime. Engagement has not worked and therefore disengagement should be tried in several forms. Its basic objective should be first to end the aggressive expansionism of the current leadership. Their withdrawal from Namibia and the end of any destabilization of their neighbors is a first condition of any further trade and investment. A second condition is the acceptance of the African majority into their political system by some method defined by them but acceptable to the representatives of African opinion. The ANC is clearly the major spokesman of this opinion; and should not be left out of the deliberations. Leaders like Nelson Mandela of the ANC should be released, as many white and black groups in South Africa have said.

Undoubtedly, internal turmoil and even external conflict lie ahead for the South Africans.<sup>73</sup> We, on the outside, need to use what influence we have to obtain a settlement among the contending parties that will be just and restore stability.

### Growing Africa Consciousness

The prospect of a major change in U.S. policy in southern Africa is not as remote as some believe as the late 1984 protests at the South African Embassy in Washington, D.C. and elsewhere have shown. The security problem has been vastly exaggerated by the Reagan Administration and the interests of the U.S. in black Africa are becoming much stronger in the long term than any possible gain from an aggressive white South Africa.

South Africa and the Southern African states are not a major security zone for the Soviet Union, as the Reagan Administration has made this region

68. *Africa News*, February 28, 1983.

69. Address to the International Seminar on "The role of transnational corporations in Namibia," November 29 to December 3, 1982, Washington, D.C., papers through American Committee on Africa, New York, 1982.

70. "Namibia: The Crisis in United States Policy Toward Southern Africa," signed by 23 church, civic and black organizations.

71. Five of six major Democratic Presidential candidates responded to a poll of *Africa News* that they favored the recognition of Angola and some action against South Africa if she did not withdraw from Namibia, *Africa News*, September 12, 1983.

72. Congressional Study Mission, *op. cit.* p. 13.

73. "South Africa" in *World Political Risk Forecasts*, New York, Frost and Sullivan, eds. William Coplin and Michael O'Leary, 1983. South Africa ranks with El Salvador and Iraq.

for the U.S. This is in sharp contrast to the Gulf and the Horn of Africa, where the two superpowers stand in major confrontation with each other over both regional issues and the over-all strategic struggle of the Indian Ocean zone. The Soviet Union has and will continue to support liberation movements in southern Africa, notably the ANC and SWAPO, and it will continue to arm southern African states opposing South African expansion. It is not likely, however, that they will encourage or support a direct attack on South Africa, as the South Africans talk about, and some U.S. strategists seem to expect. The USSR can wait for "the revolution to ripen," as they say, and for the Africans to undermine the system through internal resistance, sabotage, strikes, and slowdowns. Nor is the Soviet Union or its allies particularly dependent upon the mineral resources or trade of the region. Certainly the Cape is unimportant to them in terms of their shipping through the Suez Canal. To surmise that they intend to interdict Western shipping around the Cape is to assume that they intend to start World War III and destroy themselves as well as the rest of the world. These are not fears based on understanding but a strange paranoia of the right wing which is becoming increasingly suspect in the West, even among conservatives, such as the senior don of realism in U.S. policy, George Kennan.

Thus, South Africa is not a necessary ally. In fact, she is a major liability, since she provokes conflict, particularly over Namibia and with other African states. It is within this context that new security considerations are being developed which isolate and force the SADF back within their own borders.

There is widespread support in the U.S. for such steps as indicated by the passage in the House of Representatives of a number of Amendments concerned with the prohibition of the export of weapons technology to South Africa, and investment restrictions. While the strong lobbies of South Africa and the vested interests of the Reagan Administration may retain this military support policy for a time, a Democratic Administration will doubtless reverse this tide.

In the longer term, a major change concerning South Africa is under way. This is an option of disinvestment and economic sanctions. Widespread grassroots support has emerged in the U.S. for the withdrawal of economic relations that might encourage or strengthen the apartheid system.<sup>74</sup> This is tied to a strategy of forcing South African withdrawal from Namibia and a broad concern for fundamental racial redistribution of political and economic privileges within South Africa. Legislation has been passed in the House of Representatives (but not the Senate) to mandate compliance with

the Sullivan Principles and to restrict the importation of Krugerrands, and similar bills have been introduced in the new Congress. Rep. William Gray has introduced legislation that would ban any new investment in South Africa. The House has also sought to prohibit any further IMF loans to countries that discriminate, as well as Communist countries. However, in the country at large, there is a broadbased disinvestment campaign under way in State Legislatures and through universities and churches to withdraw investment from corporations and banks that deal with South Africa. Several communities as well as state legislatures have acted in regard to their pension funds. One of the most notable has been Washington, D.C. The scope of this campaign is having a major effect on corporate and investment thinking as well as the public and is arousing the public consciousness, on which a new policy can be built by another Administration with a Democratic majority in both Houses of Congress.

These same groups will also support a new development and human rights program that will give priority to the strengthening of SADCC and direct assistance to states struggling for self-reliance such as Mozambique and Tanzania. This entails a shift away from the Reagan military priority to economic aid that is directed into programs of responsible self-development. American investment is encouraged to shift from South Africa into the black states to the North. Severe sanctions will be taken against South Africa if it continues destabilization and sabotage intrusions against these states.

These ideas have given impetus to a revised liberal alternative to the failed policies of the past. They are now gathering unexpected momentum and support among a wide and diverse constituency in the U.S. This is the meaning of the campaign against the South African Embassy in Washington and the announced opposition of dozens of Republican Congressmen to U.S. South African policies that Reagan no longer can ignore. The explanation is not simply the new black votes at stake, but a moral chord in American consciousness has been struck by the tragic plight of millions of Africans and the South Africans are a part of this. The U.S. public wants a policy to help save lives, rather than one that for misconceived ideological reasons, contributes to their suffering and humiliation.

74 Wolfgang Saxon, *New York Times*, January 9, 1985





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## Correspondent's Report from Kampala

### Who Is To Blame for

### Africa's Predicament?

Volker Weyel

"The rural poor possess no effective legal rights. When charged with any crime, they are simply arrested. There is no trial, no lawyers, no judges, nothing. One can say without any exaggeration that what characterizes the legal position of the bulk of the peasantry is a blanket practice of detention-without-trial. When a body like Amnesty International decries such a practice, it is only when it appears in urban areas and affects the well-to-do classes at that. The rural poor, it would seem, are beyond the pale not only of what rights are guaranteed in law but also the attention of both the mass media and human rights agencies."

This description by a participant based on his research work in a village in Northern Uganda might be considered one of the highlights of a get-together of social scientists recently held in Kampala, the capital of Uganda. The remarks just quoted demonstrate that this was not the type of academic encounter which detaches itself from the social reality surrounding it. In fact, the analysis put forward by the people meeting at Kampala can be characterized as a critical approach directed towards both the external and internal factors seen as inhibiting the real liberation of Africa.

And liberation was the theme of that workshop; taking into account the historical significance of the year 1884, its full title read: "A Hundred Years after the Berlin Conference: Perspectives on Africa's Liberation." The conveners of the meeting consisted of the members of the editorial committee of MAWAZO, a journal of the faculties of Arts and Social Sciences at Makerere University Kampala, published twice a year. "Mawazo" is a Swahili word; it covers comprehensively all intellectual pursuits that go under the terms "meditations," "reflections," "thoughts," "opinions" and "ideas." The

Dr. Volker Weyel is a West German scholar whose paper "Ideology and Strategy: German Africa Policy and its critics, 1884 and 1984" was among those discussed at the Mawaz conference described in this report. He is the author of *Interaktionen von Politik und Religion in Uganda nach 1885* (Munich: Kommissionsverlag Klaus Renner, 1976) and since 1977 has been Editor in Chief of *Vereinte Nationen*, a bimonthly periodical on the United Nations and International Affairs.

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journal already has a tradition which was interrupted in 1975 and resumed in 1983. So far it has held three workshops, the inaugural workshop in June 1983 concerned with the highly topical subject of "Instability and Change in Africa," the second in February 1984 dealing with the no less pressing question of "The Agrarian Question in Developing Countries," and eventually the third one which was held in Makerere University's main hall from October 12 to 14, 1984. Apart from scholars from Uganda itself, participants came from Dar-es-Salaam and Khartoum Universities as well as from the Federal Republic of Germany. Further papers presented on behalf of scholars unable to attend came from Nairobi, Addis Ababa and Michigan Universities. The workshop was opened by the Minister of Housing, the Honorable Abraham Waligo, who made the point that scientific pursuit has to be practically oriented and to serve the needs of the country.

Since according to its editorial board's definition "MAWAZO aims to be present both at the frontiers of knowledge and in the midst of important controversies," controversial discussion was to be expected. And this happened to be the case, even more so since the workshop was open to the whole Makerere academic community including the students. To the outside observer it was amazing to experience what one could term academic culture at its best: the willingness of the audience to listen attentively to very controversial or minority points of view, the preparedness to judge each argument on its merits and not according to preconceived ideas. Equally impressive and perhaps surprising was the genuinely free atmosphere of discussion. This might not have been expected in view of conditions prevailing in Uganda today, and it does not mean that freedom of expression is matched by similar freedom of association. But with regard to the campus, the atmosphere characterizing the workshop augurs well for recapturing Makerere's former reputation.

Papers presented to the workshop, for instance, dealt with "Class and State in the Political Economy of Ghana," the "Privatization of the Post-Colonial State," the "Changing Position of Women" and "Accelerated Development and Industrialization in Africa: A Critique of the World Bank." Discussion revolved around the question of who bears the responsibility for the malaise Africa at present is facing: Is the state of affairs to be blamed on colonial legacy and the machinations of neo-colonialism, or does one, as one participant put it, have to look to ourselves first? From the Marxist point of view, Mahmood Mamdani, as Associate Professor in political science, spoke of a "second colonialism," by the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the United States as the force behind these institutions, being directed to economic control, whereas the political repression is to be carried out by the African governments themselves. Though the

IMF policy also found its defenders in the discussion, the audience was overwhelmingly critical of it. There was ample evidence quoted from the Ugandan experience with regard to the effects of IMF policies, and it was argued that despite the huge influx of foreign currency at present, no really productive capital is coming in and that there are no new investments. Eventually, so the argument runs, Uganda as well would be caught in the IMF's debt trap, and in five years from now industry — poor as it is at present — will have collapsed completely and only export-oriented agriculture would remain. To quite a number of participants, self-centered indigenous development appeared to be the alternative.

Though the workshop did not address itself specifically to the Ugandan situation, examples for more general tendencies frequently were drawn from the day-to-day experience in the country. So with regard to the position of women in present-day Africa, attention was drawn by a female discussant to the plight of many women in the country. She cited the numerous acts of rape carried out by soldiers since 1980 and the fact that none of the rapists so far appears to have been put on trial.

The dialectics of internal repression and external subjugation were focused in many contributions. Critical as many participants were of what they described as the ruling classes of the present neo-colonial states, in their critique of the whole set-up they sometimes tended to attribute all the misdeeds of these ruling classes to the influence of external factors. Precisely those papers presented to the workshop dealing with concrete case-studies impressed hearers the most, not those sharing the approach of criticizing imperialism or neo-colonialism in general terms. So it was a timely warning which came from Professor Gingyera-Pinywa, deputy Vice-Chancellor of Makerere University, in his closing statement, when he cautioned against attributing each and everything to external forces instead of taking a look inside first. He called for more concrete case-studies like those which in fact had been before the workshop.

The sympathetic observer of MAWAZO's endeavors hopes that this paternal advice will be heeded, because otherwise the next workshop to be held in April 1985 might be in danger of generating mere rhetoric. And this would be deplorable indeed in face of next year's subject: The theme is nothing less than the question, "Which Way Africa?"