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SOUTHERN AFRICAN MIGRANT LABOUR SUPPLIES IN THE PAST, THE PRESENT AND THE FUTURE, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE GOLD-MINING INDUSTRY

by

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A. FOREWORD

This is the forty-first paper to appear in the World Employment Programme research working paper series of the Migration for Employment Project. The aim of the Project is to investigate the implications of international migration movements from low-income to high-income countries for economic and social policy-making.

In this paper - the seventeenth to be concerned with the region of southern Africa (see appended list) - the author chiefly seeks to explain the varying recourse of South African employers to supplies of black labour from outside the country. In doing so, he concentrates on the gold-mining industry as the key employer of foreign Africans, and on the changes in the 1970s. The latter seem to have ushered in a long-term trend of gradual replacement of foreign by local Africans. In the short term, this will make still more difficult the already overwhelming development problems of South Africa's neighbours.

August 1979

W.R. Böhning

B. SOUTHERN AFRICAN MIGRANT LABOUR SUPPLIES IN THE PAST, THE PRESENT AND THE FUTURE, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE GOLD-MINING INDUSTRY

by

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I. THE FORMATION OF AFRICAN LABOUR SUPPLIES AND THE ROLE OF FOREIGN LABOUR

(a) INTRODUCTION

Labour migration in southern Africa finds its origin in the discovery of the vast mineral wealth of South Africa in the latter part of the last century. The exploitation of that mineral wealth required enormous supplies of labour. Heavy demands were also placed on agriculture to support a rapidly expanding urban population. The process of commercialisation of agriculture likewise required large amounts of labour.

The labour demands of a rapidly expanding economy in a relatively underpopulated southern Africa manifested itself in initially growing labour shortages. In this first section we investigate how South Africa in general, and the gold-mining industry in particular, responded to shortages of African labour, how labour supplies were formed and what changes occurred in the African labour market over time. Concentration on the gold-mining industry derives from the fact that, historically, it has been the largest single employer of foreign African labour.

(b) SOUTH AFRICA PRIOR TO THE MINERAL REVOLUTION

In the 1860s, on the eve of the discovery of the vast mineral wealth of South Africa, the territories comprising the country were almost totally dependent upon agricultural production. The poorer of the four white-dominated territories were the Afrikaner republics of the Orange Free State and the Transvaal. In the latter territory, subsistence-agriculture was largely the economic base for the great majority of Europeans and Africans. The Orange Free State, with its extensive pasture land, was conducive to raising sheep; and its inhabitants maintained some contact with the exchange economy of the coast by selling or bartering wool with itinerant or resident traders (Neumark, 1956). The British colonies of Natal and the Cape Colony were at the time somewhat better off than the Afrikaner republics, although still poor. Natal, with its generous rainfall, had experimented with various export crops and had finally settled on sugar. Since Africans did not prove to be amenable to working on the sugar plantations, indentured Indian labourers were imported beginning 1860. Along the coastal belt of the Cape Colony the climate was particularly suitable for the production of wheat, fruit, butter and maize which were marketed internally, along with hides, wine and ostrich feathers for export. The proximity of the coastal belt farming area to the sea permitted transport of produce by ship at reasonable cost, whereas transport from the interior of South Africa was prohibitively expensive. That transport between the coast and interior was of the most rudimentary form, and hence expensive, is reflected by the fact that it took three months for goods to reach Bloemfontein in the heart of the Orange Free State from Port Elizabeth, only 400 miles away (Wilson, 1971, p. 108).

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The previous 200 years in South Africa had seen a slow expansion of the eastern frontier about the Cape settlement. Growth of the European population was insignificantly reinforced by immigration, unlike the cases of North America, Australia and New Zealand. Indeed the great 19th century wave of immigration from the British Isles and Europe simply passed South Africa by. By the middle of the 19th century the estimated European population of South Africa was approximately 200,000. In 1854, the white population of the Cape Colony was 140,000, and that of the Orange Free State, 15,000. In 1872 the Transvaal had 30,000 and in 1865 Natal enumerated 8,500 (Houghton, 1971, p.7). No figures with respect to the number of Africans are available.

The Afrikaners, as the predominantly Dutch and French settlers came to be known, were never amenable to the controls to which the colonial governing authorities attempted to subject them. Their resentment of colonial authority became even more pronounced when the British assumed control over the Cape in the early 19th century. The comparatively liberal racial attitudes brought to the Cape along with British control conflicted with a basic philosophical tenet of the Afrikaner race, that of white supremacy. Their use of Hottentots, imported slaves and Bantu to perform manual labour on their farms left the Afrikaner with the attitude that menial physical labour on the part of whites was degrading. No white was to perform physical labour for another. These attitudes were to have a considerable impact on the political economy of resource allocation throughout South Africa's development. It was these doctrines which were to be most fundamental to Afrikaner political ideology which in the final analysis was to prevail against the integrating tendencies of competitive market forces. When the British emancipated slaves in the Cape in 1834 the reaction by the Afrikaners was predictable. Herding their cattle and transporting their few household effects by oxwagen, the "Voortrekkers" in great numbers moved out of the Cape colony.

As a result of their comparative isolation from the economic and social influences of a changing Europe, the Afrikaner frontiersmen, or trekeboeres as they were called, underwent a process of economic and social retrogression concomitant with their penetration of the vast interior "platteland" of South Africa. Pushing into the Cape interior they became, for all practical purposes, subsistence farmers and graziers with minimal contact with the exchange economy of the coast. Their right to settle these new lands was hotly contested by the many indigenous African tribes (see Robertson, 1934-5, and Thompson, 1971). But by the 1860s they had secured this area, carving out huge farms on which to graze their cattle and grow what crops they required for subsistence.

Many Africans, dispossessed of their land, went into the service of whites or squatted on white farms. Since land was plentiful for the whites, but capital and labour scarce, the majority of Afrikaner farmers did not discourage such squatting. Indeed, they charged such Africans rent payable in labour services, crops or both. Thus, in the Orange Free State and to a considerable extent in the Transvaal, the relationship between African and Afrikaner had all of the economic markings of feudalism.

In the African territories (the most important of which, measured in terms of population density, were Zululand, Basutoland, Swaziland and the Transkei), the trekeboeres initially had little social or economic impact, except to increase the population density by containing African movement and pushing Africans off white land. Agricultural production was still subsistence-oriented.

On the eve of the mineral discoveries which were to transform South Africa, the economy was entirely based on agriculture. Farming was extensive and largely for subsistence, and in no way was ready to satisfy the demands of the incipient urban-mining town market.

(c) MINERAL DEVELOPMENTS AND THE FORMATION OF LABOUR SUPPLIES

In 1867 an event occurred which was to transform the economy of South Africa and move it along the road toward industrialisation. Diamonds were discovered in what was to become the eastern Cape frontier after the British annexed the diamond producing area. By 1869 the first diamond rush was on, with diggers pouring into the area along the Orange and Vaal rivers to work alluvial deposits. Several years later diamonds were discovered where the mining city of Kimberley is now located. The diamonds there were found in four large volcanic pipes. Such deposits were unique in the history of diamond mining; previously, diamonds all over the world had been found in alluvial deposits. At Kimberley deep-level mining became necessary and hence established the basis for an urban mining complex.

By 1877 the population of Kimberley was estimated to be 45,000, comprised of 15,000 whites, 10,000 coloured and 20,000 Africans (Knowles, 1936, p. 206). This was a concentration of population second only to that of Cape Town. Of the Africans employed on the digging, a large proportion were brought in by recruiters and supplied to the companies for a capitation fee. Once the level of demand for labour stabilised, this practice became unnecessary as sufficient labour came to the diggings voluntarily.

The deep-level mining of diamonds ran into technical difficulties in the first years at Kimberley. Thousands of individual claims within the small area of the pipes made excavation exceedingly difficult as the depths of the diggings increased. However, by 1888 the financial and administrative power of Cecil Rhodes had prevailed and consolidation of the many diamond mining companies was completed (van der Horst, 1942). The consolidation permitted the application of machinery which on smaller holdings was uneconomical. From there on, de Beers Consolidated Mines Limited dominated the South African diamond mining industry. Output was reduced - as was demand for labour - and was henceforth adjusted to world demand so as to stabilise world diamond prices: a classic case of market strategy by a monopolist. However, the Kimberley diamond mining industry was to be completoly overshadowed by the discovery and development of the Witwatersrand gold fields.

In 1886 the Witwatersrand gold fields were proclaimed. Located where Johannesburg now stands, the Witwatersrand lay deep in the Transvaal, the poorest and most backward of the four white South African territories at that time. Foreigners poured into the Transvaal, bringing the skills needed by the many gold-mining companies. The period 1890-1913 saw an average annual white immigration of 24,000 (Houghton, 1969, p. 13). Demand for labour by the rapidly expanding industry was insatiable. From its beginning, production was based on a relatively small number of skilled workers in combination with large quantities of unskilled African labour. The latter were recruited from all over southern Africa, both inside and outside of South Africa, at considerable expense to the mines.

By 1889 only about 6,000 Africans were employed in the Witwatersrand mines; a decade later they numbered approximately 97,000 (Transvaal Chamber of Mines, Annual Report, 1889 and 1899). The growth of employment of white workers was equally as great. Table 1 provides details of the average number of white and black workers employed by the gold mines in selected years.[1]

Wages for the skilled labour were necessarily high, in order to attract experienced miners from overseas. But skilled labour has always been but a small fraction of the total labour force employed in the mines. Given the distribution of various grades of ore and the desire to maximise profits over time, the gold-mining industry has always relied heavily on African labour and hence has always been concerned with the terms on which it could secure their services. In its infancy the industry experienced rapidly rising costs, as competition for a limited supply of African labour among the mining companies resulted in rising wages for black labour. To prevent further increases in this significant cost component, many of the companies recommended the elimination of wage competition for African labour. It appears that this was a fundamental reason behind the creation of the Chamber of Mines in 1889, as evidenced by the following quotation from its sixth annual report published in 1895:

> "Since formation of the Chamber continuous attention has been given to the subject of devising means by which the supply of labour could be made to meet the constantly growing requirements of the mining industry, and by which also wages could be reduced to a reasonable level".

With regard to recruitment of labour, it was recognised by the Chamber that the outlay of considerable sums for labour recruitment would not be justified unless the individual firms were assured that recruited workers could not legally break their contract by moving on to another mine, or perhaps to another industry. To ensure the firms an adequate return for their recruitment expenditures, the Chamber formulated a "pass law" adopted and enforced by the Transvaal "Volksraad" in 1894. Reference to this law was made in the sixth annual meeting, held in 1895:

> "... the Chamber drafted a set of Pass Regulations, which provided means for the proper registration and identification of natives, and for compelling them to fulfill contracts voluntarily entered into. With these regulations in force the companies would be warranted in incurring the very considerable expense of bringing 'boys' from a distance; as, though the initial cost would be heavy, full compensation would be found in the reduced rate of wages". (Transvaal Chamber of Mines, Annual Report, 1895).

During the decade prior to the turn of the century, the Chamber was not completely successful in achieving its objectives. In periods when demand for African workers was greater than supply, competition for the limited supply forced up wage rates. It was not until after the South African War (1899-1902) that the Chamber was successful in reducing the cost of black labour while, at the same time, increasing its supply. This was primarily achieved by centralising the recruitment of African labour. In 1900 the Chamber established the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (WNLA) for this purpose, hoping to reduce recruitment cost. Its regulations stipulated that:

> "No Company, whilst a member of the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association, will be allowed under any circumstances to engage any but white labour, except through the agency of the Association. This will apply: (1) to all natives who, from having previously worked on your mine, or who from any cause may come forward and seek such work voluntarily; (2) to those who have been recruited within or without the Transvaal - in fact to all natives or coloured men employed either above or below ground on your property". (Transvaal Chamber of Mines, Annual Report, 1900-01, p. 112).

This was to have significant repercussions in the market for African labour. Clearly, by acting in concert with respect to the recruitment and distribution of labour the industry would be able to derive the profits associated with being a perfectly discriminating monopsonist.[2]

In addition to centralising the recruitment and distribution of black labour on a non-profit basis, the Chamber also attempted to reduce wages. In this it was not successful. Social dislocations caused by the South African War, together with alternative wage-employment opportunities for Africans (on infrastructural projects at higher rates of pay), caused the number of Africans recruited to work in the mines to fall far below pre-war levels. In general, there were complaints by many that there was not enough black labour in southern Africa to fulfill the labour requirements of South African industry and agriculture - an opinion which was confirmed by the 1904 report of the Transvaal Labour Commission. The Commission was especially influenced by testimony from the Chamber of Mines. However, two members of the Commission dissented from the Majority Report, noting their belief that the shortfall in the mining sector's labour requirement was largely a result of the Chamber's abortive attempt to reduce wages. Nonetheless, the end result was that the mines were allowed to import indentured Chinese labour. Humanitarian opposition in Britain soon brought an end to this importation, and in 1907 the legislation permitting it was repeated. The mines were, however, able to maintain their supplies of labour as a result of intensified recruitment and a fall-off in the post-war boom which reduced the demand for labour in other sectors.

Thus, in little more than a decade after development of the gold fields had commenced, the many firms comprising the industry were acting in concert on the market for African labour. Recruitment had been completely centralised, and the firms' wage rates were being dictated by the Chamber, using the system of fixing a maximum average wage. Fixing a maximum average rather than a simple maximum rate was designed to achieve a dual purpose: to prevent individual mines from bidding up average rates of pay, while permitting individual mines some degree of flexibility with regard to organisation of their work force through adjustment of wages to reflect differing degrees of productivity among individual workers (van der Horst, 1942, pp. 165-6).

The Chamber has displayed keen awareness of the importance of having recruitment area size as a choice variable in its efforts to obtain the labour requirements of its members. The geographic area over which it has spread its recruitment of African labour increased considerably with time. Table 2 provides information with respect to the changing sources of African workers obtained from various countries within southern Africa over time.

(d) LEGISLATED LABOUR SUPPLIES IN THE FIRST DECADES OF THE 20TH CENTURY

(1) LEGISLATION AND AFRICAN AGRICULTURE

The major purpose of the formation of the Chamber of Mines was to prevent wage competition among individual mines by centralising labour recruitment. Although it was not initially successful at achieving desired reductions in wage rates, the organisation was successful at preventing further wage increases. As indicated by Table 3, in spite of a significant growth in labour demand, wages did not increase. In the early part of the 20th century the agricultural sector of South Africa also exhibited an insatiable growth in demand for African labour without forcing up wage rates.

Some scholars have argued that the lack of growth of wages derived from a division and specialisation of labour in the African subsistence-agricultural sector which results in redundant male labour, i.e. "surplus labour". If surplus labour exists, then redundant workers can seek temporary employment outside the subsistence sector without reducing output on (family) agricultural holdings. However, if the withdrawal of a worker reduces farm output, i.e. if surplus labour is exhausted, then additional wages will have to be offered to compensate the worker and his family for such a loss. Thus, so long as there exists surplus labour, the modern sector can continue to expand, withdrawing labour from the subsistence sector, at a non-increasing wage rate.

According to Barber (1961), it was the existence of redundant male African labour in the subsistence sector which explained the non-increasing wage trend in the Rhodesian modern sector from 1929-45. However, Arrighi (1970) has cast serious doubt on the validity of Barber's analysis and, consequently, on the whole notion of endemic surplus labour. According to Arrighi, the explanation of the non-increasing wage trend in Rhodesia lies in prior changes in the African subsistence sector which made it increasingly necessary for Africans to undertake wage employment. Basically, these changes were a rising conventional subsistence level, which increasingly included non-traditional goods requiring cash for their purchase, and a decreased capacity of Africans to obtain these goods through the sale of agricultural commodities. The latter was in turn traceable to the displacement of African agriculture by state-subsidised white agriculture and the voluntary and involuntary removal of Africans from white agricultural areas, near transport routes, to the rather inaccessible "reserved" areas where over-stocking and crowding led to a deterioration of African agricultural productivity. In a nutshell, the increasingly uncompetitive position in which African agriculture found itself increased the "effort price" of securing cash through the sale of agricultural commodities relative to the "effort price" of securing cash through entering wage employment.

For South Africa, Clarke (1977b) sees a similarity between the Rhodesian and South African experiences in the proletarianisation of African labour supplies. He lays great stress on the role of the colonial administration undertaking or backing measures which virtually force African workers into wage employment. These measures essentially are asset confiscation of both land and cattle, and the taxing of Africans. Also important to the proletarianisation process is the subsidised development of white agriculture and the neglect of African agriculture. By these actions, Clarke argues, the "natural economy" of the traditional African peoples is subordinated to the imperatives of the dominant sector(s) of the economic system with the result that its self-reproductive capacity is impaired and oriented to a new set of requirements. The transformation of the "natural economy" creates a surplus of labour, given that adequate means of subsistence necessary to "reproduce the labour supply" cannot any longer be guaranteed after land and cattle assets have been expropriated. Thus, surplus labour finds it necessary to migrate to wage employment to obtain part of its subsistence. However, since part of the migrant's subsistence is drawn from traditional agriculture, the capitalist employer only has to pay a wage equal to the difference between total subsistence requirements and that portion of subsistence requirements derived from traditional agriculture in the so-called Labour Reserve. Through this "primitive accumulation", the capitalist sector reaps large profits. "Accumulation assumes the form of a labour transfer below its costs of reproduction ... So it is the <u>indirect</u> use made of the social means of subistence, continuously reproduced within the Labour Reserve, which forms the foundation for accumulation of a large element of the stock" [of capital] (Clarke, 1977b, p. 18). Not only are short-run labour supplies secured, however. Capitalist penetration results in a process of "disinvestment" and a "restructuring of the asset base" of the labour reserves which leads to their agricultural deterioration. "Asset appropriation and erosion in asset values, combined with primitive accumulation based on migrant labour, work to reduce the productive capacity in the reserve economy" (Clarke, 1977b, p. 24). This, in turn, ensures continued and increased supplies in the long-run. Eventually this process can lead to a "structural labour surplus" in the labour reserve.

Thus, Clarke would attribute increasing labour supplies principally to political manipulations of the labour supply through the arrogation of African rural assets and concomitant erosion of African agricultural productivity. Unlike Arrighi, whose analysis he draws heavily upon, Clarke neglects the importance of rising <u>conventional</u> subsistence requirements of Africans, which increasingly required cash to fulfill, on the supply of African wage labour. Instead, he holds to the thesis advanced by Wolpe (1972) that wages paid by capitalists will tend to adjust to the partial subsistence derived from agriculture in the labour reserve in such a way that the sum of the two sources of income fulfill <u>basic</u> subsistence requirements. Yet, there is abundant evidence that the <u>conventional</u> subsistence income level of South African Blacks has risen considerably over time, principally through participation in wage employment. Further, Clarke fails to recognise that, in part, declining agricultural production in the labour reserve is a response to rising wages in the industrial sector which results in a greater level and intensity of migration. In short, the deterioration of African agricultural productivity is both a cause and effect of migration.

This is not to argue that the use of political measures to generate labour supplies was not an important feature in the early political economy of South Africa. They were. It is, however, to argue that the history of the formation of African labour supplies is more complex than Clarke's interpretation would suggest. However, let us continue by reviewing the evidence on the political manipulation of labour supplies. We will later analyse the effects of the "colour bar" in holding down the wages of administratively induced labour supplies.

The north and eastward expansion of the Cape frontier and the trekker occupation of the Transvaal and Orange Free State left the indigenous African peoples in those areas dispossessed of their land. Many remained in the newly white-owned areas, others remained in what is now Natal and Eastern Cape Province; there they were able to maintain control of the land - as a combined result of tribal military strength, treaties and British intervention. At the time of Union in 1910, African areas comprised about 7 per cent of territorial South Africa, and 60 per cent of the African population resided in those areas. The remainder were living on European-owned land, both occupied and unoccupied (Native Land Commission, U.G. 26, 1916). Of those living on white-owned land, a considerable portion were sharecroppers. This type of arrangement was especially characteristic of the Orange Free State, where only 244 square miles out of 50,000 were reserved for Africans, whose numbers were something over 440,000. Another type of relationship between Africans and white farmers was that of "squatting". If an African was a squatter he was required to provide each year some quantity of labour services to the owner of the property. In return, the tenant was allowed to raise enough crops for his family's subsistence and perhaps to run a few head of stock. These arrangements were severely criticised by many. The basis of their objections was that such arrangements served to diminish the supply of African labour. Complaints were also registered against "free-traffic" in land, which permitted Africans to purchase land from whites. What was happening was that Africans were using the money they had acquired by selling agricultural surpluses and working in wage employment to buy up white-owned land.

In 1903, just after the British defeat of the Boers, the British High Commissioner, Lord Milner, appointed a commission for the purpose of adopting a common policy on the relationship of Africans and whites in all of colonial southern Africa. Labour utilisation on white farms and free traffic in land occupied much of the Commission's attention, and their conclusions and recommendations were to provide the basis for legislation that was, in time, to have a substantial impact on productivity of African agriculture and, hence, on the supply of African labour to the industrial and the white agricultural sectors. The Commission's opinion with regard to the continuation of free traffic in land is illuminated by the following excerpt from its report:

> "If this process goes on, while at the same time restrictions exclude Europeans from purchasing within Native areas, it is inevitable that at no very distant date the amount of land in Native occupation will be undesirably extended. Native wages and earnings are greater than they used to be, their wants are few, and their necessary expenses small. They will buy land at prices above its otherwise market value, as their habits and standard of living enable them to exist on land that is impossible for Europeans to farm on a small scale. There will be many administrative and social difficulties created by the multiplication of a number of Native lands scattered through a White population and owning the land of the country equally with them. It will be far more difficult to preserve the absolutely necessary political and social distinction, if growth of a mixed rural population of land owners is not discouraged ..." (Report of the South African Native Affairs Commission, 1906, paragraph 192).

The Commision's recommendations exemplify the way in which the white polity was to subordinate market choices to ideological imperatives in the development experience of South Africa. It was unanimously recommended that:

> "it is necessary to safeguard what is conceived to be the interests of the Europeans of this country, but that in so doing the door should not be entirely closed to deserving and progressing individuals among the Natives acquiring land ..."

and resolved:

(a) "that the purchase (of land) by Natives should be limited to certain areas to be defined by legislative enactment;

(b) that purchase of land which may lead to tribal, communal or collective possession or occupation by Natives should not be permitted" (op.cit., paragraph 193).

With respect to squatting and sharecropping, the Commission recommended the stringent enforcement of existing laws against squatting, the taxation of Africans living on Crown lands, and the enforcement of anti-vagrancy laws. It is clear that in this latter recommendation the Commission was responding to those of the white polity who had complained that the existing institutional arrangements with respect to African land occupation and utilisation were interfering with supplies of cheap African labour.

In 1913 the first Union government responded to the findings and recommendations of the Commission by enacting the Native Land Act, which stipulated that no African could, without special permission of the Governor-General, purchase or hire land in other than "scheduled areas", i.e. those traditionally held by Africans as a result of the combined effects of military might, diplomacy and treaties. Almost without exception, it was acknowledged by members of parliament that the fraction of land allocated for African occupation was unjust and inadequate; therefore, the bill was passed with the added stipulation that a commission be created to investigate and recommend what further amounts of land should be released for African occupation in order to achieve a more "equitable" distribution of land between the two races. But nearly 25 years passed before any further land was "released" for African occupation. Under the Native Trust and Land Act of 1936 provision was made for an additional six per cent of territorial South Africa to be added to the reserve areas and purchased with funds voted by Parliament for that purpose. Parliament, however, stopped voting funds as of 1940 with the result that, to date, the government has purchased only one-fifth of the land released for African occupation. The market still operates in the remainder of the released areas, although virtually all land is owned by whites. The 1936 Act also was severe with respect to squatting and sharecropping; it caused the eviction of many thousands of Africans from white farms and their transfer to the reserve areas or their placement as full-time agricultural labour.

Thus, in present day South Africa, the African population owns about 8 per cent of the land and cannot legally increase this share beyond 13 per cent. (Seven per cent of the land is in the reserves and the remaining 6 per cent in released areas). Consequently population density has been increasing in the reserve areas, accompanied by fragmentation of land holdings, overstocking, soil depletion and erosion. The land allocation under the 1913 Act has contributed to falling per capita productivity in agriculture.

The sorry state of agriculture in the African reserves was emphasised by the Tomlison Commission, which in 1955 was to conduct an exhaustive enquiry into the condition within the "Native areas" and suggest a scheme for their rehabilitation (Report, 1955, p. XVIII). The Commission expected that, by planned development, the agricultural sector of the African reserves could reach a carrying capacity of 2.4 million persons. At that time there were 3.6 million Africans domiciled in the reserves. At present, there are over 8 million Africans domiciled in the reserves.

Thus, growing population pressures in the reserves, the under-development of reserve agriculture and rising conventional subsistence requirements, which increasingly required cash to fulfill, help explain the ability of the Chamber and white farmers to satisfy their ever-growing labour demands without having to rely on wage increases.[3]

(2) THE INDUSTRIAL COLOUR BAR AND AFRICAN WAGE RATES

The arrogation of African lands by whites in southern Africa and the severe limitation placed on the acquisition of land by Africans largely precluded the development of commercial agriculture by Africans in South Africa. With rising cash requirements, Africans accordingly took up wage employment and migration. However, the pressure to migrate from overcrowded and inaccessible reserves was not the only factor operating to depress real wages in the gold-mining industry.

It was in the gold-mining industry that the integrating effects of uncontrolled competitive market forces first threatened to upset traditional notions of what was supposed to be the white man's work and what was Africans' work. Africans had come to the mines as unsophisticated and unskilled industrial workers, but in the short span of a decade were being substituted for expensive white labour. Reacting to this aspect of the profit-maximising behaviour of the Chamber of Mines, the Parliament enacted the Mines and Work Act in 1911. One section of this act regulated the issuance of certificates of competency in skilled occupation by imposing the restriction that such certificates were not to be granted to "coloured persons" in the Transvaal or Free State. Certificates issued in the Cape Province or Natal were not to be recognised in the Transvaal or Free State (cf. Doxey, 1961, and Hutt, 1964). Thus, an African who might have received a certificate of competency in the more socially liberal Cape Province or Natal would not be able to use it in the former Boer Republics of the Transvaal and Free State where the gold and coal mines of the Chamber's members were located.

With the onslaught of World War I, the mines were faced with an insufficient number of white workers because of their enlistment in military service. With the consent of the government and white mineworkers, Africans were then used in positions previously reserved for whites. After the war the white miners' union pressed the Chamber to draw the job colour-line where it at that time existed. This was done under what came to be called the Status Quo Agreement, 1918. However, within a few years inflated costs of mining, combined with a falling price of gold, were threatening to close marginal mines. The reaction of the Chamber was to broaden the scope of its use of cheap African labour by placing Africans in jobs traditionally performed by whites. White labour was understandably upset that its monopoly position was being encroached upon by the mines' substitution of black for white labour. Negotiations between the miners' union and the Chamber over a fixed employment ratio of blacks to whites and over job reservation for whites broke down, precipitating the famous Rand strike of 1922. For over two months a minor civil war flared on the Witwatersrand. Interestingly enough, the slogan of the striking white mine-workers was "workers of the world unite for a White South Africa" (see Walker and Weinbren, 1961).

The strike failed. Thousands of white mine-workers were laid off and replaced with African labour. The Chamber of Mines had won the battle, but the polity was soon to ensure that the Chamber would lose the war. Two years after the strike the "Pact" government of Afrikaner ideology (personified by General Hertzog) and British trade unionism (represented by Creswell) was elected (Hertzog became Prime Minister and Creswell Secretary of Labour). From 1924 onwards the polity was in indisputable control of the market. The Pact government immediately turned on the Chamber of Mines by enacting the Mines and Work Amendment Bill of 1926 which made a detailed listing of all jobs that could not be performed by Africans. Thus, white labour in the South African gold-mining industry acquired a perpetual lease on all jobs designated as white. In addition to securing job reservation, the white union won its demand that a fixed ratio of eight blacks to one white worker should obtain throughout the industry.

The implications of this "colour bar" and the fixed employment ratio for the pricing and employment of African labour in the gold-mining industry should be clear. Black wages are held down by legislation restricting Africans to jobs of low productivity. The growth in demand for African labour is stifled by four factors: (i) it is a function of the scarce supply of skilled whites; (ii) it is limited by the inability of the mines to substitute low-cost African labour for high-cost white labour; (iii) because of the colour bar and fixed employment ratio, output is less than it would be in a competitive labour market; and (iv) it leads to the adoption of black labour-saving techniques of production so that the use of expensive white labour can be reduced (cf. Wilson, 1972).

(e) THE PERIOD OF INCREASING LABOUR IMPORTS

By 1940 the forced industrialisation of the South African economy was under way. Diversification of the economy required massive public and private capital formation. This investment was reflected in a rapid expansion in employment in manufacturing as well as public and private construction. The percentage increase in private manufacturing and private construction employment between 1950-1970 was 143 per cent and 242 per cent, respectively; that for mining was 27 per cent.

This large increase in labour demand was also associated with rising African wages in the newly emerging sectors. As can be discerned from Table 4, in 1935-6 the gold-mining industry offered wages which were equivalent to those offered in manufacturing. However, with the very rapid rate of growth of manufacturing and other sectors we find wages offered by those sectors rising. Between 1936 and 1973 current average annual earnings in manufacturing increased by 925 per cent. In gold-mining, over the same period, current average annual earnings rose by 391 per cent. Thus, the difference in average annual earnings between the two sectors increased from 18 per cent to 147 per cent over the same period. Agriculture, which draws heavily on foreign African labour, was also able to maintain its historical low wage position. In 1973 wages in manufacturing were 466 per cent of those in agriculture.

Such substantial sectoral wage differentials caused South African blacks to abandon mining employment in great numbers. As can be determined from Table 2, between 1936 and 1973 South African blacks as a proportion of the mining labour force declined from 52 per cent to 20 per cent. In terms of absolute numbers this amounted to a decline from 165,932 to 86,172.

The Chamber of Mines responded in a predictable fashion to its increasing inability to secure domestic supplies of Africans. Rather than compete with the secondary and tertiary sectors for domestic African labour, the Chamber simply went further outside South Africa to find its labour force. In particular, the Chamber began recruiting "tropical" Africans.

These were recruited principally from Malawi. Tropical African labour became so important to the gold-mining industry that by 1973, 127,000 or over 30 per cent of the Chamber's African labour force was recruited from tropical areas.

Only by use of its recruitment area size variable was the Chamber able to maintain and expand its labour supply without incurring increased wage costs. Whereas most South African blacks had access to the higher paying secondary and tertiary sectors, foreign blacks were largely excluded from these sectors by legislative measures and distance. Such a division of the migrant labour force helps explain the persistence of substantial wage differentials between mining and other sectors since, in theory, labour competition between industries, over time, tends to reduce wage differential between sectors.

(f) SUMMARY

In this section we have learned that actions by the Chamber of Mines in the African labour market, in combination with political factors affecting labour supplies, have generated two distinct phases in gold-mining labour supplies. The first phase runs from the turn of the century to around 1940. It is characterised by a massive increase in the number of South African blacks seeking employment in gold-mining, despite stagnant money wages and declining real earnings. The second phase begins around 1940 and runs through 1973. It is characterised by a large decrease in the number of South African blacks willing to work on the mines, despite a growth in money wages which prevented real earnings from declining. This phase is also characterised by very substantial increases in the number of foreign Africans employed in gold-mining.

The explanations of the first phase line in (a) collusion in the African labour market by affiliates of the Chamber and Mines, and (b) changes in the African subsistence sector which led to increasing cash requirements of the African population while there was a concomitant decline in the ability of the African peasantry to secure that cash through the production of agricultural surpluses. The second phase, that of an increasing relative reliance on foreign African labour, is ascribed to the ability of the Chamber of Mines to extend its labour recruitment area, thus avoiding wage competition with other sectors of the rapidly expanding South African economy.

II. RECENT CHANGES IN THE DEMAND FOR FOREIGN AFRICAN LABOUR IN SOUTH AFRICA AND FUTURE PROSPECTS

(a) INTRODUCTION

Inspection of recent data on the volume, sex and occupation of foreign Africans in South Africa indicates substantive changes in all three since the advent of independence in the migrants' countries of origin in the 1960s. The purpose of this section is to investigate the reasons underlying those changes and to explore their implications for future foreign labour demand in South Africa. Understanding this process of change and its implications for future foreign labour demand is directly relevant to the development strategies of the labour-exporting countries.

Recent changes in South African legislation have increasingly and effectively relegated foreign blacks to a supplementary supply position vis-à-vis South African blacks. Combined with this development, there has been rising African unemployment in South Africa.

This has been due to cyclical and structural factors that have operated on both the demand and supply side of the South African black labour market.

Not all of the changes in the volume of foreign migration to South Africa stem from developments within South Africa. Actions by Malawi and Mozambique significantly reduced their volumes of migration to South Africa and forced the gold-mining industry to look at its labour supply strategy. The result was what has been called the "internalisation" of mine labour supplies.

(b) CHANGES IN THE VOLUME, SEX COMPOSITION AND INDUSTRIAL DISTRIBUTION OF FOREIGN AFRICANS

Table 5 provides information on the volume of employment of foreign Africans in South Africa since 1964. It is important to bear in mind that an undetermined number of these foreign Africans, especially from Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, are for all practical purposes permanent residents of South Africa.[4] Thus, the data give us pictures at various points in time of a volume which is partly comprised of "stock", viz. permanent migrants, and partly comprised of a "flow", viz. temporary migrants.

Inspection of the data from Table 5 reveals a considerable decrease in the number of foreign Africans finding employment in South Africa. Between mid-1964 and 1977 the drop was of the order of 120,000 or 25 per cent. However, these figures understate the impact of the decline on supplier countries. Using Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland as an example, if we were to assume that the same proportion of the citizens of those countries who worked in South Africa in 1964 would have been free to work in South Africa in 1977, then we could have expected 558,000 to be employed in South Africa in 1977, rather than 218,000.

Whereas employment from Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland in South Africa has declined since 1964, the figures for Malawi show an increase in employment from 1964-1970 followed by a significant decline. The growth and decline of Malawian employment, as well as Mozambican, is related to changes in these countries' contributions to gold-mining labour supplies and reflects causal factors different from those resulting in the Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland reductions. These will be discussed separately.

Southern Rhodesia/Zimbabwe (in contrast to the trends in employment of Africans from Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, Malawi and Mozambique) shows an initial decline from 1964-1970 followed by an equal rise between 1970-1977. (Zambian figures reflect a 1966 decision by President Kaunda that Zambians were not to work in South Africa). Combining all other countries (which are essentially Angola, Namibia, Tanzania and Kenya), we first see a small rise and then a decline in employment from 1964-1977.

To determine the number of foreign workers one cannot use data on "foreign-born" Africans because of large discrepancies in numbers from various sources and because recent South African legislation has increasingly and almost wholly excluded the entry of dependents of foreign workers. As of July 1963, no women or families could be recruited from Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, nor accompany male recruits to South Africa (Breytenbach, 1972, p. 42). Neither, after 1966, could any domestic servants be recruited from these countries.

In 1960 a substantial proportion of "foreign-born" Africans must have been dependents of employed foreign Africans. This would have certainly been the case for Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland whose citizens found it relatively easy to bring dependents to the locality of their work prior to the legislative changes of 1956-1966. The 1960 Census enumerated some 586,000 foreign-born Africans and yet, based on reasonable assumptions, it is unlikely that employment of foreign Africans exceeded 410,000 (see Table 6).[5] Thirty per cent of "foreign-born" Africans would have been economically inactive. However, according to the 1970 Census, only 7 per cent of "foreign-born" Africans were listed as not being economically active (Population Census, [02-05-01], Pretoria, 1971). The reduction in the number of dependents was one of the objectives of South African legislation over that period. The welfare implications of prohibiting foreign employees from bringing their famlies to the locality of their work need no elaboration.

Data on the sex composition of migration since 1970 is not available. It is undoubtedly the case, however, that the forces which gave rise to the changes in sex composition of migration between 1960 and 1970 have continued to operate. It could be expected that up to the present there have been further absolute and relative declines in the number of foreign African females migrating to South Africa.

Thus, not only has the volume of migrants changed substantially over recent years, but the sex composition of that migration has been radically altered. In fact, it appears that women migrants have borne a very great proportion of the decline in the volume of migration to South Africa over this period.

Information on the industrial distribution of foreign Africans is provided by Table 7. The information clearly indicates a basic trend - an increasing concentration of foreign Africans in mining employment and a large decline in non-mining employment since 1964. Between 1964 and 1978 total employment of foreign Africans decreased by one third from 484,000 to 327,000. However, over the same period non-mining employment decreased by two-thirds. Thus, whereas in 1964 mining accounted for 58 per cent of total foreign African employment, today it accounts for about 80 per cent of the total.

Undoubtedly, mining has become the most important employer of foreign African labour since 1964. In fact, South African mining, in general, relies heavily on foreign African labour. In 1964, more than half of all African miners were foreigners while in 1978 the figure was around 45 per cent. With regard to the total non-agricultural African workforce, foreigners accounted for 14 per cent of African employment in 1964 and 9 per cent in 1978.

(c) DETERMINANTS OF CHANGING PATTERNS OF DEMAND FOR FOREIGN AFRICANS

There are essentially three substantive and, to an extent, interrelated determinants of the recent changes in the demand pattern. The first explanation is to be found in legislation which has fundamentally altered the legal status of foreign Africans vis-à-vis employment in South Africa, particularly those Africans from Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. Secondly, changing conditions in the South African black labour market and changes within the South African "homelands" have reduced the need for South African industry to rely on foreign African labour. Thirdly, much of the change in the volume of foreign African employment was forced upon South Africa by actions on the supply side of labour market by Malawi and Mozambique.

(a) THE IMPACT OF SOUTH AFRICAN LEGISLATIVE CHANGES

The Changing Legal Status of Migrants from Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland: An Alienation of Historical Rights

Until the 1960s there was practically no statutory difference between South African Africans and those from Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. All Africans from Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland were subject to the same draconian laws controlling the movements of blacks. So open were the borders between the then High Commission Territories and South Africa that it has been estimated that between 1911-1956 some 262,000 Basotho were permanently absorbed into South Africa (Leistner, 1967, p. 4).

Prior to mid-1960s, unrecruited Africans from Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland seeking work in South Africa either found their own way, obtaining necessary documentation after they found employment, or registered with a District Labour Office in order to obtain a "pass" to seek employment.[6] Also, those who recruited Africans from these countries were not legally required to repatriate their recruits after the completion of their contract. As a result, many Africans from Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland used the mines as an avenue to employment in the higher paying industrial and tertiary sectors.

In 1958, probably as a result of the realisation by the Nationalist Party that the British Labour Party would not allow the incorporation of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland into South Africa as originally planned, Africans from these countries were declared prohibited immigrants. The Bantu Laws Amendment Act No. 76 of 1963 prohibited Africans from Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland from entering South Africa except for work in specified industries - essentially mining and agriculture. The Aliens Control Act No. 30 of 1963 made it an offence for any such citizen to enter South Africa without a travel document issued by his own country, which meant that they could no longer obtain South African travel documents. (The deadline for the issuance of passport was, however, extended to 1966). In addition to this legislation, as of 1963 employers entering service contracts with Africans from Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland had to undertake their repatriation.

Thus, after 1963-66 entry of Africans from Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland into South Africa was severly circumscribed. This is not to argue that much "clandestine migration" did not take place after this date. Yet, the effect of this legislation has been to reduce considerably the level of migration, to alter its sex composition and to narrow its industrial diversity.

The South African Census of 1960 estimated the number of Africans from Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland residing in South Africa at 295,100 (Table 6). This amounted to approximately 20 per cent of the estimated combined population of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland in 1960. In its report the Froneman Committee claimed that 431,000 Africans from these countries were in South Africa in 1960.[7] Thus, based on the Froneman Committee's estimate, the percentage of the population from Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland residing in South Africa in 1960 would have been 28 per cent. In 1970 it was estimated that 219,000 Africans from these countries were in South Africa (Table 6). As percentage of the combined 1970 population of the three countries, this amounted to about 11 per cent. If one were to presume that the same proportion of the combined workforce which migrated to South Africa in 1960 felt compelled and were free to migrate in 1970, then (based on the more believable Froneman Committee's estimates of foreign Africans in South Africa in 1960) the numbers of migrants enumerated in 1970 would have been 584,000. It seems fair to say that, without immigration restrictions, and given the progressively deteriorating rural conditions in Botswana, Swaziland and especially Lesotho over this time, the number of citizens of those countries which would have chosen migration would have certainly been at least 584,000, and probably much greater.

Inspection of changes in Lesotho's rate of population growth between various censuses is also revealing in this regard. Between 1936-1956 population growth in Lesotho averaged 0.7 per cent per annum. Between 1956-66 the average annual rate of growth was 2.9 per cent (IBRD, 1975). Although the usual caveat applies with regard to population data, the difference between these two growth rates is quite considerable. It can be deduced from this difference that between 1936-1956 considerable numbers of Basotho were permanently absorbed in South Africa. The large increase in population growth between 1956-1966 must in part be explained by 1952-1963 South African "pass" legislation which made it increasingly difficult for Africans from Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland to settle in South Africa.

It would appear that the radical change in the status of Africans from Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland as regards employment in South Africa, and corresponding legislation controlling their movements, is at least partly responsible for the reduced numbers from those countries able to obtain employment in South Africa, as indicated in Table 5.

Malawi and Mozambique Pre-1974 Migration: Business as Usual

Citizens of Malawi and Mozambique have always been "prohibited immigrants". Consequently, they have never been permitted to seek work in South Africa on their own initiative. Employers of labour from these countries have always had to repatriate contracted workers upon completion of their contract, unless that contract was extended and the extension conformed to legislation regarding maximum length of stay.

In 1936 an agreement was concluded between the Government of Nyasaland (Malawi) and the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (WNLA) under which WNLA was given permission to recruit labour for work in South African mines. At that time no other South African industry was allowed to recruit in Malawi. Initially, the agreement provided for an annual quota of 8,000 recruits on one year contracts with an option to extend for six months. In 1946 the annual quota was increased to 12,750 and continued to rise over time. By 1973 over 120,000 Malawians were employed on the gold mines.

Interestingly, whereas Africans from Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland were after 1963 relegated to employment in "specified industries", namely agriculture and mining, Malawians were in 1967 given the opportunity to enter a wide spectrum of occupations.[8] The 1967 inter-governmental agreement aimed at increasing employment of Malawians in diverse sectors of the South African economy, provided that a shortage of indigenous labour existed. Whereas in 1960 virtually no Malawians found employment outside the mining industry, by 1970, 23,000 Malawians, comprising 22 per cent of the number of Malawians working in South Africa, found employment outside mining. Yet, because of the supplementary character of foreign migrant labour, and given increasing unemployment in South Africa, this number has almost certainly declined since 1970.

In the year of its formation, 1902, WNLA managed to obtain a monopoly from the Portuguese authorities for recruiting Mozambican Africans. The 1902 agreement was revised on numerous occasions and culminated in the Mozambique Convention of 1928. This latter agreement specified a minimum level of recruitment of 65,000 per year and a maximum level of 100,000. In 1964 another agreement was concluded with the Portuguese authorities with regard to the recruitment of Mozambican labour by WNLA. WNLA still remained the only South African company which could recruit in Mozambique (Breytenbach, 1972).

Prior to 1956 recruitment of Mozambican labour was prohibited except for mines affiliated with the Chamber. However, as of 1 July 1956, any South African employer (except employers in the Western Cape, manufacturing and domestic services) could use Mozambican labour but could not itself recruit that labour. Rather, recruitment was undertaken by agents in Mozambique on behalf of South African employers. Although after 1956 the employment of Mozambican labour outside gold-mining became legal, it was not to have a positive impact on occupational diversity. Between 1960 and 1970 the number of Mozambicans employed outside of gold-mining declined in both relative and absolute terms. In reality, the 1956 legislation only affected agricultural enterprises in border areas and legalised what had been going on for decades.

The legislation emanating from the foreign African paranoia reflected in the Froneman Committee's recommendations has undoubtedly caused a severe short-run reduction in the current welfare of the labour-exporting countries. That reduction continues today and derives from two interrelated factors. First, with the 1963-66 legislation, the South African authorities became serious about the "supplementary" nature of foreign African labour. Secondly, unemployment among South African blacks has been on the rise. Years of frequent sectoral labour shortages in South Africa are giving way to labour surpluses. As the Government accords a preference to South Africans, the implications of this growing labour surplus within South Africa for the labour-exporting countries is obvious.

(2) CHANGING CONDITIONS IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN LABOUR MARKET

In the preceding discussion the "supplementary" nature of foreign Africans was emphasised. In theory, domestic South African blacks get first preference for employment. Excepting the Chamber of Mines, any firm wanting to employ foreign blacks has to seek approval of the relevant government labour office in South Africa. That office has to be satisfied that no South African workers are available before it will issue a "no objection" notice. Under these legal provisions it becomes apparent that conditions in the South African black labour market have a bearing on the volume and characteristics of foreign African migrants. Let us now review these conditions.

Cyclical Unemployment in South Africa and the Demand for Foreign Labour

South Africa has been suffering from a recession since 1974. Severe balance of payments difficulties, due in part to politically motivated capital flight, and continuing inflation have been met by conservative monetary and fiscal policy. These constraints have exacerbated the employment situation.

Under these circumstances we could expect a rise in the rate of unemployment amongst South African blacks. Both official statistics on unemployment and other independent studies of African unemployment present strong evidence of a rising rate of African unemployment in the last few years. (The official estimates in the South African Bulletin of Statistics undoubtedly understate the level of black unemployment. For recent attempts trying to estimate more accurately South African unemployment, see Simkins, 1976; Knight, 1976; and Loots, 1976).

To an extent, the recession and its concomitant black unemployment must be viewed as one factor underlying the decline in the volume of foreign migration. Moreover, given the mining companies are not subject to the "no objection" procedures of the labour bureaux, it becomes evident that this fact, combined with the recession's implications for foreign migration, to a large extent explains the recent narrowing of the occupational distribution of foreign migrants.

Structural Unemployment in South Africa and the Demand for Foreign Labour

It could be argued that if the African unemployment rate were brought down to its past average, as a result of a cyclical upswing, then demand for foreign African workers would be revived. According to this line of reasoning, not only would the volume of employment of foreign Africans increase, but its occupational distribution and sex composition could begin to reflect the migration patterns prevailing in the 1960s.

Such an argument implicitly assumes that rising African unemployment in South Africa during the 1970s is essentially short-run cyclical unemployment. Yet, it has been suggested that the unemployment rate in South Africa has shown a secular rise. A proportion of the rise in the unemployment rate over recent years can be attributed to growing structural unemployment which will not be easily mitigated by short-run expansionary forces (see Simkins, 1976; Legassick, 1974; and more recently Clarke, 1977b).

Structural unemployment and underemployment have manifold sources. First, and perhaps foremost, past legislation restricting African agricultural holdings to "homeland" areas and the removal of many Africans from "white" areas to the "homelands" in the 1960s (cf. Desmond, 1971) has greatly increased population/land and labour/land ratios in the "homelands". In view of the lack of development of "homeland" agriculture (which is itself a result of complex socio-politico-economic factors), the rising labour/land ratio has reduced agricultural productivity per capita and has resulted in increases in the proportion of the African labour force finding it necessary to migrate in search of wage employment. This is a standard argument and is undoubtedly quite valid. Secondly, and something which appears to have been disregarded in most studies related to this question, African conventional subsistence levels have risen considerably over the last few decades, beyond levels necessary for basic physiological requirements essential to "reproduce the labour supply". Africans have come to expect higher standards of living. But given the manifest inability of the "homelands" agriculture to develop, this has necessitated a higher rate of migration. Thirdly, rising wage rates in all sectors of the South African economy have increased the monetary rewards of migration while concomitantly making owner-agriculture labour relatively less attractive. Such changes in the relative returns to time spent in wage employment and time spent in agriculture have undoubtedly exerted an upward pressure on the supply of labour wanting to take up wage employment.

The effect of these structural changes in the African labour market is to make the supply of African labour increase at a rate which exceeds the natural rate of increase in the labour supply.

There are also structural factors which have come to bear on the demand side of the labour market which have operated in such a way as to reduce the rate of growth or demand for African labour. Essentially, these have resulted in increases in the capital/African labour ratio. Firstly, the migrant labour system has been inimical to the formation of the many types of skills needed in modern industry. The system has given rise to a relatively high rate of turnover of African employees and extended periods of voluntary unemployment. In addition, the industrial colour bar has served to exclude Africans from access to many skilled occupations. This contrived shortage of skilled labour has impeded the development of skilled labour-intensive industries (e.g. machine tools manufacturing, and engineering and fabrication) which could have augmented growth in labour demand. Secondly, the imperatives of modern manufacturing are such as to encourage the adoption of technologies and processes which maintain uniform quality of product. Often, this is most easily achieved by mechanised production processes as opposed to labour-intensive capital-saving processes. Thirdly, South African industry has had to rely on imported technology purchased from countries whose factor endowments dictate relatively capital-intensive production processes. This reliance must, to some extent, be a result of South Africa's failure to develop its own alternative techniques for the reasons outlined above which have prevented the development of skilled labour-intensive industries.

Thus, there has been and continues to be a combination of factors working on the demand and supply side of the labour market to generate growing structural unemployment in South Africa. Given the supplementary nature of foreign African labour, the declining demand for this labour in South Africa and the changes in its occupational distribution becomes understandable. Further, it becomes highly problematical as to whether future growth in labour demand will ever be sufficient to reverse the trend of decreasing foreign labour demand.

(3) MALAWI AND MOZAMBIQUE SUPPLY REDUCTIONS SINCE 1974

We have been concentrating on developments internal to South Africa which have resulted in reductions in the demand for foreign African labour. However, there have been considerable changes on the supply side of the foreign African labour market which have been imposed on South Africa. These changes have altered both the volume and sources of foreign labour supplies. This has particularly affected the gold-mining industry (see Table 8).

In April 1974 a plane carrying Malawian recruits for the gold mines crashed in Francistown, Botswana, killing 74 recruits. Life-President Banda of Malawi reacted by prohibiting further South African recruitment of Malawian labour. In the course of the next two years, practically all Malawians employed by the South African mines returned to their country.

The sudden loss of a labour reserve which supplied the gold-mining industry with 25 per cent of its African labour input had significant repercussions. At 31 December 1973, the gold-mining industry was employing 422,181 African workers. Such numbers permitted the industry to work at maximum capacity and, given the cost structure of the industry, most profitably. However, one year later the industry employed 364,658 African workers. Only by pulling substantial numbers off development work and putting them on to current production was the industry saved from very serious disruption and significant financial losses. Also, a significant increase in the price of gold of 65 per cent in 1974 certainly helped compensate for the cost increases associated with decreased labour inputs. If the price of gold had remained at its 1973 level, then working profit per ton of ore milled would have been R7.70 in 1974, compared with a 1973 working profit per ton of R13.42. However, the large increase in gold prices in 1974 permitted working profit per ton in that year to be recorded at R21.52 (South African Chamber of Mines, Annual Report, 1974).

The point to be emphasised is the significant contribution which Malawian labour made to the gold-mining industry by virtue of their large numbers. It took the gold-mining industry at least two years to close the supply gap created by the withdrawal of Malawian workers.

The volume and origin of foreign labour in South Africa was similarly affected when, in 1974, Portugal relinquished Mozambique to the strongly socialist-oriented Frelimo. The export of labour to apartheid South Africa has been viewed by Frelimo as inconsistent with self-reliant socialist development. Actions taken by the new Mozambique Government and the turmoil following defeat of the Portuguese have served to reduce the supply of labour emanating from that country to South Africa. As can be seen from Table 8, after a time lag, there was a radical drop in the number of Mozambicans contracted to work on the gold mines. However, part of this reduction is a reflection of a decreased demand by the Chamber of Mines for Mozambique labour. It seems readily apparent from the Chamber's viewpoint that it would not want to rely heavily on such an insecure source of labour. Also contributing to the Chamber's reduced demand for Mozambique labour was the South African Government's decision in 1977 to make the individual mines (rather than the pooled resources of the Central Bank) responsible for the gold to be transferred to Maputo to cover the deferred pay of Mozambican miners. This became an obvious disincentive for employing Mozambicans until the special gold agreement was ended in 1977.

(d) THE IMPLICATIONS OF "INTERNALISATION" FOR FOREIGN SUPPLIERS

(1) BACKGROUND TO "INTERNALISATION"

The "supply side" actions by Malawi and the newly introduced uncertainty surrounding Mozambican supplies forced the Chamber of Mines to adopt a policy of "internalisation", i.e. increasingly to draw its labour supplies from within South Africa. Admittedly, there had been a lengthy debate in the industry over internalisation prior to the 1974 changes. In the late 1960s the "rich" gold-mining groups, in particular Anglo-American, were arguing for internalisation and the black wage increases necessary to effect such a policy. The main thrust of their argument was that the industry was making itself strategically vulnerable by relying increasingly upon foreign labour supplies. Of course, the reversal of this trend would require substantial African wage rises, given the very large differences between wage levels in gold-mining and other sectors. The mines with relatively low grade ore hotly opposed wage increases because they saw their financial viability threatened. However, the debate was to be resolved for the Chamber by a set of events such that one prone to belief in divine intervention could but conclude that the gods were on the side of the gold-mining industry.

Malawi's action created a considerable supply gap which was not to be filled until well into 1976. The political uncertainty surrounding Mozambique placed great doubts in the Chamber's collective mind as to the reliability of future supplies from that country. Thus, the industry was virtually forced to internalise. The policy instrument it wielded to effect internalisation was, of course, wage increases (see Table 3). Nominal African earnings (annual averages) quadrupled and real earnings trebled since 1972. What permitted the industry to impose upon itself such large increases in production costs which were so strenuously opposed several years earlier? Quite simply incredibly large rises in the price of gold (see Table 9). Since 1972 the price per fine ounce has climbed from less than R40 to well over R100 in the middle of the decade and still higher subsequently. This pushed up profits per African employee from about R1,000 at the beginning of the 1970s to R4,000 in later years, even taking into account the large rises in African wages over the same period (see Stahl and Böhning, 1979, p. 48).

Interestingly, the wage increases up to 1974 were associated with virtually no increase in the number of South African blacks taking up mine employment. Reflecting on this fact in the light of the Malawi-Mozambique supply reductions, the Chamber must have been in a quandary. Again, however, events were to occur which were to "bail out" the gold-mining industry. The continuing recession in South Africa was beginning to manifest itself in growing black unemployment. This unemployment was beginning to do for the gold-mining industry what the 1972-4 wage increase could not - increase the number of South African blacks taking up the least desired occupation in South Africa, gold-mining. The situation continues in spite of the very much smaller increase in wages since 1976 (Table 3). According to the South African Star "the mining industry is experiencing ' an almost embarrassing flood' of black work-seekers owing to rising unemployment" (18 March 1978). The paper reports the Chamber as saying that "It is obvious that this oversupply of labour can mainly be attributed to the current economic recession in South Africa which has led to growing unemployment and a shortage of job opportunities in most sectors".

(2) "INTERNALISATION" AND THE CHANGING ORIGIN OF FOREIGN LABOUR

The impact of the Chamber's internalisation policy on the volume and origin of foreign African labour employed in South Africa reflects the forced character of that internalisation process. As can be seen from Table 8, the volume of foreign African labour employed by affiliates of the Chamber declined sharply over the period 1973-77 - from 335,900 to 203,500. Predictably, the countries accounting for the brunt of this reduction were Malawi and Mozambique. Between June 1974 and December 1975 the decline in the number of Malawians was approximately 110,000. Fortunately, for the Chamber, the decline in the number of Mozambican workers did not coincide with the Malawian withdrawal; otherwise, the supply gap indicated by the fall in total employment from 422,200 in December 1973 to 363,500 one year later would have been even greater, adversely affecting profit rates in the industry. In fact, the reduction in numbers from Mozambique did not commence until 1976. Whereas at 31 December 1975 there were 118,030 Mozambicans employed in the mines, at 30 June 1976 they numbered 72,315, and by the end of 1976 the number had declined to 48,565.

The decline in labour supplies from Malawi and Mozambique have been offset, to some extent, by increased labour exports from Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. In 1973 these countries supplied a combined total of 108,500 workers. By April 1977 that figure stood at 136,600. Another source of labour to fill the supply gap created by Malawi and Mozambique has been Southern Rhodesia/Zimbabwe. By agreement, prior to 1975 the Chamber was not allowed to recruit labour from Southern Rhodesia/Zimbabwe. In 1975 this position was reversed leading to a rapid increase in the number of Africans from that country (cf. Clarke, 1978).

It should be noted that in 1977 the Chamber arrived at an agreement with the Malawian Government which permits it once again to obtain labour supplies from Malawi (Böhning, 1977). It was reported that at the end of 1977 some 17,600 men from Malawi were employed in the mines. It is expected that this figure will stabilise for some time at around 20,000 (Clarke, 1977a, p.24).

(3) LIKELY FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS WITH REGARD TO "INTERNALISATION"

Given the gold-mining industry is at present by far the largest employer of foreign African labour, the current welfare of the labour-exporting countries is inextricably bound up with the internalisation policy of the Chamber of Mines. Two questions which loom large are how far does the Chamber intend to pursue internalisation and over what length of time?

The Chamber is on record as assigning itself a 50 per cent internalisation target (Clarke, 1977a, p. 24). This target was decided upon early in 1976 and was realised by the first quarter of 1977. On year later, about 53 per cent of the 421,000 Africans employed on the mines were from within South Africa (including the Transkei and Bophuthatswana) (Mining Survey: Supplement to [South African], Financial Mail, 28 July 1978). At the same time it was claimed that the mines were turning away "considerable numbers" of black work-seekers (The Star, 18 March 1978).

If the Chamber is in fact turning away "fit" South African blacks, then several things are implied which bear upon future internalisation. First, the Chamber must be turning away South African "novices" in preference for experienced foreign miners.[9] Hence, it might be argued that the Chamber has internalised as far as it intends for the short-run. That is to say, it no longer intends to replace experienced foreign miners with novice South Africans. This strategy makes economic sense in light of the dislocations and inefficiencies suffered by the industry during rapid internalisation between 1975 and 1976. During this period the turnover of African labour rose dramatically (see Table 10). Specifically, this was a reflection of shorter contracts, many more broken contracts and greater numbers of medical rejects. In general, it was a reflection of a less stable labour supply which manifested itself in less efficiency and hence greater costs. Thus, for the next few years at least, the present level of demand for foreign African labour is likely to remain steady.

Second, given the oversupply of novices in South Africa, it is most likely that the Chamber, as stated, will give them preference over foreign novices. Hence, over time, as experienced foreign mineworkers retire they will be replaced by South African novices. Without an exceptionally strong and extended economic recovery in South Afric-, it is unlikely that the level of demand for foreign labour will ever return to its pre-internalisation level.

In addition to substituting local for foreign labour over time, the gold-mining industry is attempting to mechanise production, thus reducing its overall labour demand. According to the 1975 President of the Chamber of Mines:

> "A Programme of research and development with emphasis on the mechanisation of gold mining was begun in July 1974, a few months after the air accident (in which 74 Malawian mineworkers were killed) when it began to look as if this event might cut off Malawi as a source of labour, and at a time when events in Portugal and Mozambique made it clear that in the long term the industry might not be able to rely so heavily on foreign labour. Future expansion will require an increased labour force and the Chamber of Mines is doing all in its power to develop new recruitment areas and to safeguard the regularity and volume of labour supply from existing recruitment areas. However, it is clear that a reduction in labour dependency will be in the best interests of the gold-mining industry". (Schuman, 1975, p. 4).

If the industry is successful in mechanising aspects of the production process, labour will most likely be displaced. One might speculate that foreign workers would most likely be the first to find that they cannot obtain further contracts on the gold mines. This in spite of the fact that the greater skill requirements that tend to go with mechanisation (Bardill et al., 1977) might favour experienced foreign miners.

Finally, these developments must be viewed in the light of a projected incipient decline in gold production beginning in 1980. It is estimated that employment in the industry will decline to 148,000 or less by the year 2000 (Fromberger, 1979). Estimates of future employment in other sectors of the mining industry leave little hope that their expansion would be sufficient to maintain even current levels of foreign African labour demand.

Evidence also indicates that commercial agriculture, once a major employer of foreign African labour, reached its employment peak at the end of the 1960s. As a result of mechanisation and other changes, employment in that industry will decline. It is possible, but not likely, that opportunities for foreign migrants would spring up elsewhere in the meantime.

Thus, the prospects for increased labour exports are dismal, and it is most likely that demand for foreign labour will decline. However, some countries may be subjected to greater reductions than others. The distribution of the industry's demand across supplier states is not easily clarified. It will be influenced by political factors as well as variations in recruitment costs.

(e) CONCLUSIONS

We have attempted to explain recent substantive changes in international migration patterns within southern Africa and to explore the implication of those changes for future migration. Abstracting from the Malawi and Mozambique supply-side actions, it is abundantly evident that recent developments in South Africa have been responsible for the large reductions in foreign labour demand in South Africa, as well as substantial changes in the sex composition of migration and its occupational diversity. These changes can be attributed to: (i) growing cyclical and structural unemployment in South Africa, and (ii) legislative changes which have increasingly and effectively relegated foreign blacks to the position of being a labour supply supplementary to the South African black labour force. Given the structural nature of an increasing amount of South African black unemployment and declining future employment prospects in primary industries, it is unlikely that demand for foreign African labour will return to past levels. In fact, assuming that the supplier states can do nothing to control future demand for their labour, that demand will most likely continue to subside.

What are the implications of these past and likely future changes in the South African labour market for the supplier states? The governments of those supplier states have little choice but to become serious with respect to designing and implementing development strategies which will generate greatly increased employment opportunities, both urban and rural. Total commitment to comprehensive development has become imperative.

There is much which can be done to generate local employment opportunities in the present supplier states. Agriculture can be diversified toward more labour-intensive crops of high nutritional value with large yields per hectare. Crops can be introduced which have forward linkages in terms of processing. Animal products such as wool, mohair and hides can be locally processed and transformed into final consumer products. For example, the Botswana and Lesotho weavers produce beautiful mohair and wool carpets and weavings, and yet import all of their wool and mohair inputs from South Africa. Although Botswana slaughters hundreds of thousands of cattle each year, no factory exists to process the valuable hides. Leather for Botswana's growing leather handicrafts industry is imported from South Africa. Much labour time can be productively employed in infrastructural projects in towns and villages. In Botswana much land is unutilised and virtually all is under-utilised. Many workers could be productively employed clearing thorn-bush and other scrub from potentially productive land. Hills in Lesotho's village areas, which are presently deemed uncultivable for the purpose of growing traditional crops, could be terraced with the many rocks now combined with productive soil and the terraces could undoubtedly support vine crops, fruit trees or even olive trees whose oil could be locally processed. The many creeks and small and large rivers in Lesotho could be dammed to provide reserve water for irrigation of vines and fruit trees in periods of drought. Fish could be planted and harvested in such reservoirs.

Employing imagination and initiative there are innumerable small and large projects which could pay for themselves and employ much labour in their creation and maintenance. But this is not to say the governments should be the national employer of tens of thousands of wage labourers working on projects which the workers cannot envisage as being of longer-run benefit to themselves. Plans and projects must be decided upon at the village level. People must see that improvements in their living conditions are a direct result of decisions which they individually and collectively make. The Governments must assume the role of a provider of information as to projects which can be done and how they can be done. Yet, information should flow both ways. The village should be able to tell the Government what it thinks needs to be done and how it should be done.

Much can be achieved within the constraint of existing institutional structures. Yet, more can be achieved where these structures can be improved. Land tenure systems need to become more flexible to permit communal development of certain types of crops, e.g. fruit trees and vine products, with future individual rewards based on current investments of labour time and future labour inputs into cultivation.

The functional allocation of currently communal grazing lands, as well as the maximum number of cattle per household, should be decided by the village. Individuals should be permitted to withhold their personal land from communal winter grazing if they intend to crop it. Individuals should be allowed to fence their land if the household undertaking the fencing reduces its cattle holding to compensate for the loss of communal winter grazing.

In short, with the loss of the labour-export "safety valve", the governments of present labour-exporting countries must become effectively committed to the implementation of a development strategy aimed at satisfying the basic needs of their citizens. In particular this will mean pursuing a development strategy which will benefit the broad masses. That, in turn, implies meaningful broadly based rural development.

III. NOTES

1 In addition to absorbing huge quantities of labour, the industry also attracted massive amounts of capital into South Africa. Foreign investment mainly stemmed from Britain, with some coming also from France and Germany. From the period 1887-1932, the industry absorbed over R296,000,000 (Frankel, 1967, pp. 88-9). The importance of foreign capital in the development of the mining industry is highlighted by the fact that, over the same period, roughly 75 per cent of the dividends paid by the gold-mining industry went to overseas investors.

2 Ordinarily, to attract more workers a monopsonist must pay a higher wage. But the Chamber could now use the additional choice variable of recruitment area size in its quest for the optimum amount of labour. Under normal circumstances it would have had to increase wages continually in order to attract workers at increasing distances from its location. But by incurring the expense of the workers' travel, the Chamber could exercise its power with respect to price discrimination. Workers residing farther away could receive the same wage as those nearer the gold mines but, implicitly, would receive a higher subsidy to offset the expense of travelling farther.

3 It should be noted that the failure of the reserves to develop agriculturally is not purely a reflection of increasing population pressures in combination with customary land tenure systems. One of the principal reasons for their failure to develop was their inability to compete with heavily subsidised white farmers. Lesotho, a long-term exporter of labour to the mines, also suffered from the subsidised development of white agriculture. Before the aided development of white agriculture, that country was a net exporter of grain. With a loss of its comparative advantage, but a continued need for cash, it had to increasingly rely on migrant labour. In Swaziland and Botswana the virtual confiscation of prime agricultural land also reduced the ability of the peasantry to satisfy conventional subsistence requirements through agricultural production.

4 For the purpose of simplification, data on migration from Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland has been combined. As the story unfolds it will become evident that treating them jointly or separately will not alter the analysis or conclusion.

5 As of 30 June 1964, total employment of foreign Africans was 497,000. Hence, the implicit assumption is that employment growth of foreign Africans from 1960-1964 was around 5 per cent per year. Given the rapid expansion of the South African economy over this period and the fact that controls over Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland Africans were not really consolidated until 1965-66, this would appear to be a defensible estimate.

6 After 1952 foreign Africans, as domestic Africans, found their movement into employment in urban areas circumscribed by strict enforcement of urban influx control legislation. After this time labour bureaux were set up and Africans from Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, as well as domestic Africans, had to obtain permits from District or Local Labour Bureaux to seek work in urban or proclaimed areas. The legislation giving rise to further "influx control" was the Bantu (Abolition of Passes and Co-ordination of Documents) Act 67 of 1952.

7 The Froneman Committee believed the discrepancy between its estimates and those of the Census was due to foreign Africans concealing their true origins during the 1960 Census. The Committee "pointed out that urban influx control regulations became applicable to Africans from the High Commission Territories for the first time after 1952 and that this could have prompted

many foreign Africans to conceal their identity out of fear that the system would be extended to rural areas". (See Owen, 1964, p.5).

8 Agreement between the Government of Malawi and South Africa Relating to the Employment and Documentation of Malawian Nationals in South Africa, 10 May 1967

This agreement came into effect on 1 October 1967. (Breytenbach, 1972).

9 Indeed, the General Manager of the Chamber's recruitment arms revealed in March 1977 that: "We (are) filling all vacancies for novices with South Africans and Transkeians while restricting foreign recruitment to the experienced men who have served the industry loyally in the past" (The Star, 10 March 1977). The Financial Mail reported "bad news for foreign miners" on 10 June 1977 and, based on an interview with the General Manager of the Mines Labour Organisations (MLO) and other MLO personnel, also related that "novices are no longer being recruited from neighbouring countries".

Table 1: Average numbers employed in gold mines. European and African, 1889-197

Year	Europeans (000s)	Africans (000s)	Foreign Africans as % of all Africans[1]
1889	-	6	-
894	6	43	-
1899	12	97	-
1906	11	81	77
1911	25	190	60
1916	22	204	56
1921	21	173	61
1926	20	182	62
1931	23	210	50
1936	35	297	48
1941	41	368	52
1946	40	305	59
1951	44	299	64
1956	49	336	65
1961	49	399	64
1966	43	370	66
1970	39	401	76
1971	38	386	78
1972	37	414	[illegible]
1973	37	422	80
1974	37	364	75
1975	37	365	67
1976	38	361	56
1977	-	422	49

[1] End-of-year foreigners in total number employed at end of year.

Sources: Mine Labour Organisations (WNL), Annual Reports (various), ; Mine Labour Organisations (NRC), Annual Reports (various).

Table 2: Sources of African labour by country of origin, employed by affiliates of Chambe of Mines (expressed as a percentage of the total number employed at 31 December)

	1966	1911	1916	1921	1926	1931	1936	1941	1946	1951	1956	1961	1966	
South Africa	22.80	40.32	44.32	38.69	41.22	49.80	52.18	48.17	41.26	35.29	34.71	36.46	34.04	
Botswana	0.40	0.49	1.68	1.11	1.01	1.49	2.25	2.51	2.30	2.69	3.10	3.19	4.95	
Lesotho	2.60	3.82	7.63	10.56	10.93	13.62	14.46	13.10	12.49	11.67	11.93	13.02	16.77	
Swaziland	0.70	2.07	2.05	2.28	2.12	2.24	2.21	1.93	1.81	1.84	1.61	1.57	1.13	
Mozambique	70.79	51.59	43.73	47.08	47.54	32.71	27.83	27.00	31.54	34.45	30.78	24.22	28.43	
Tropicals[1]	2.47	1.66	0.58	0.27	0.17	0.14	1.07	7.29	10.60	13.45	17.87	21.54	14.68	
Total no. employed ('000)	81	174	191	188	203	226	318	372	305	306	334	414	383	3

[1] Africans recruited from North of latitude 22° South, chiefly from Malawi (in 1976, 17,300 rec from Zimbabwe).

Sources: Mine Labour Organisations (WNLA), Annual Reports (various); Mine Labour Organisations (NRC) Reports (various).

N.B. D'screpancies between total ~~numbers~~ employed in Tables 1, 2 and 3 (a) reflect different times dur enumeration; and (b) figures in this Table also include Africans employed by coal mines affiliate Chamber of Mines.

Table 3: Average annual earnings, current and real, and Africans employed in the gold-mining industry (1881-1966 = base year 1938 = 100; 1969-1977 = base April 1970 = 100)

Year	Current Rands	Real earnings (Rand)	Number employed (000s)
1885	72		6
1889	72	84	51
1906	68	80	81
1911	60	72	190
1916	65	70	204
1921	69	58	173
1926	71	67	182
1931	69	69	226
1936	71	75	297
1941	71	67	368
1946	88	67	305
1951	110	64	299
1956	133	64	336
1961	146	64	399
1966	183	70	370
1969	199	209	371
1970	208	207	401
1971	221	208	386
1972	257	227	414
1973	350	282	422
1974	565	408	364
1975	947	602	365
1976	1,103	631	361
1977[1]	1,140	612	422

[1] First quarter.

Sources: Mine Labour Organisations (WNLA), Annual Reports (various); Mine Labour Organisations (NRC), Annual Reports (various); South African Statistical Yearbook and Bulletin of Statistics (for consumer price index).

Table 4: Average annual African earnings by sector, 1935-1973 (Rand per annum)[1]

Industry[2]	1935-36	1945-46	1954-55	1964-65	1971	1976
Manufacturing	84	192	294	471	667	1,497
Construction	-	-	262	341	628	1,346
Transport	-	-	-	379	611	1,300
Motor trade	-	-	-	-	643	1,251
Wholesale and retail trade	-	-	-	-	597	1,153
Public authorities	-	-	-	396	655	1,291
Gold-mining	71	88	132	176	221	950
Agriculture	-	-	70	81	119	-

1 Cash earnings only. Payment in kind is an important source of earnings in both mining and agriculture.

2 Industries selected were the largest employers of African labour outside agriculture. Average wage calculated by dividing total African wage bill in each industry by the corresponding number employed.

Sources: Republic of South Africa, Yearbook of South Africa. Department of Agriculture, Publication No. 39 (1972). South African Chamber of Mines, Annual Reports (various) Industrial Census of the Bureau of Census and Statistics quoted in Steenkamp (1962).

Table 5: Numbers of foreign Africans employed by country of origin - 1964, 1970 and 1977 (in thousands)

Country	1964[1]	1970	1977[2]
Botswana, Lesotho and Swaiiland	227	219	218
Malawi	101	107	36
Mozambique	121	145	76
Southern Rhodesia/Zimbabwe[3]	22	12	24
Others	5	7	3
Total	476	490	357

[1] Figures for 1964 are from Leistner but are corrected for his understatement of mining employment.

[2] 1977 country figures are an estimate while the aggregate figure is official. Country figures for that year were obtained by adding numbers employed in gold-mining by country to estimate of non gold-mining employment by country. The latter figures were obtained by assigning a non gold-mining employment estimate to each country according to each's proportion of total foreign African employment outside gold-mining in 1970.

[3] Including Zambia (nil in 1970 and 1977).

Sources: Leistner, 1967, p. 49; Mine Labour Organisations, Annual Reports, 1964, 1970 and 1977; Republic of South Africa, House Assembly Debates, 3-7 April 1978, pp. 555-56; Republic of South Africa, Department of Statistics, Population Census [No. 02-05-01] (Pretoria, 1971).

Table 6: Volume and sex composition of migrant population by country of origin, 1960 and 1970 (in thousands)

Country	1960			1970		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
Botswana, Les., Swazil.	203.6	91.4	295.1	175.6	43.4	219.0
Malawi	60.9	1.4	62.3	106.6	0.1	106.7
Mozambique	157.0	5.2	162.2	142.8	2.1	144.9
Southern Rhodesia/Zimbabwe[1]	31.5	2.2	33.7	11.1	0.6	11.7
Others	30.9	2.2	33.1	6.6	0.3	6.9
Total	483.9	102.4	586.4	442.7	46.5	489.2
Females as % of males		21.16%			10.50%	

[1] Including Zambia in 1960.

Sources: Republic of South Africa, Department of Statistics, Population Census, 1960 (Pretoria, 1961); Republic of South Africa, Department of Statistics, Population Census, 1970 [02-05-01], (Pretoria, 1971).

Table 7: Sectoral distribution of foreign African workers in South Africa 1964/1970/1977/1978 (in thousands)

Sector	1964	1970[1]	1977 (30 June)	1978 (30 June)
Mining	281	352	288	258
- affiliates to Chamber of Mines	231	267	208	-
- non-affiliated mines and quarries	50	85	80	-
Agriculture	144	45	16	18
Manufacturing	23	12	10	10
Construction	4	6	9	8
Commerce	3	5	4	4
Government service	7	10	10	8
Domestic service	8	21	14	13
Other	14	4	6	7
Annual totals	484	455	357	327
Mining as % of total	58%	77%	81%	79%
Percentage change in non-mining since 1964		-49%	-66%	-66%

[1] The discrepancy in Tables 5 and 7 between the 1970 data is accounted for by foreign Africans listed in the 1970 census as "not economically active", "not specified" or "unemployed".

Sources: Leistner, 1967, p. 49; Mine Labour Organisations, Annual Reports, 1964, 1970 and 1977; Republic of South Africa, House Assembly Debates, 3-7 April, 1978, pp. 555-556 and 7-11 May 1979, p. 794; Republic of South Africa, Department of Statistics, Population Census [No. 02-05-01], (Pretoria, 1971).

Table 8: Sources of African labour, by country of origin, employed at end of each year by affiliates of the Chamber of Mines (in thousands)

Country	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977[1]	1978[2]
Botswana	19.0	16.0	15.6	14.8	16.3	16.0	17.5	16.8	14.7	16.6	15.5	19.7	21.0
Lesotho	64.3	59.7	65.1	65.0	71.1	68.7	78.5	87.2	78.3	85.5	96.4	103.2	97.5
Swaziland	4.3	3.8	4.5	5.0	5.4	4.8	4.3	4.5	5.5	7.2	8.6	8.1	9.3
Malawi[3]	53.3	56.9	61.7	69.9	98.2	107.8	129.2	128.0	73.1	8.5	6.9	14.2	21.6
Mozambique	109.0	105.7	105.8	99.8	113.3	102.4	97.7	99.4	101.8	118.0	45.6	41.4	33.9
Southern Rhodesia/ Zimbabwe	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7.0	26.9	21.4	13.0
Total foreign	252.8	242.2	252.7	254.6	304.2	299.7	327.2	335.9	273.4	242.9	202.8	208.0	196.3
South Africa	130.5	126.2	129.9	116.5	96.9	86.5	87.2	86.2	90.0	121.8	158.6	214.2	224.7
Overall total	383.3	368.4	382.6	371.1	401.1	386.2	414.3	422.2	363.5	364.7	361.3	422.2	421.0

1 Separate figures for Malawi and Zimbabwe not available for 1977. The figures are estimates.

2 End of first quarter.

3 Malawian figures include a relatively small number of people recruited North of 22° South from countries other than Malawi, perhaps 10 per cent on average.

Sources: Mine Labour Organisations (WNLA), Annual Reports (various).

Table 9: Price of gold, 1970-1977

Year	Rand/Fine Oz.	Change in price over previous year (per cent)
1970	25.80	-4
1971	28.60	+11
1972	39.70	+39
1973	65.10	+64
1974	107.40	+65
1975	111.62	+4
1976	103.77	-7
1977[1]	136.04	+31

[1] Estimate based on first quarter reports of six gold-mining groups.

Source: South African Chamber of Mines, Annual Reports (various).

Table 10: Total net wastage.[1] Average number of Africans employed by members of the Chamber of Mines[2] and net wastage as a proportion of average number employed 1971-1976

Year	"Net wastage"	Average number employed	Wastage/ employment
1971	330,591	406,066	0.814
1972	337,862	411,192	0.822
1973	354,708	435,671	0.814
1974	387,170	414,232	0.935
1975	472,135	385,160	1.226
1976	562,036	409,134	1.374
1977	584,684	435,024	1.344

[1] Net wastage is the sum of workers discharged after completion of contract, medical rejects, absconders, and those who died.

[2] The number employed by the Chamber of Mines is slightly larger than the number employed by the gold-mining companies who are its members.

Source: Mine Labour Organisations (WNLA), Annual Reports (various).

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in terms of dependants. The mean number of dependants for domestically employed workers was 6.9 with a median of 5.8. The respective numbers for returned miners was 4.5 and 3.4. These figures largely explain the differences in attitudes towards the geographic location of work and family commitments.

(4) Remittances

Remittance flows from the two types of migrants reflected to a certain degree the responsibilities borne by them. Those working in Swaziland, contrary to popular belief, tend to provide a much more regular maintenance of their families through remittances than their external compatriots. Almost three-quarters of the Swaziland-based workers sent home more than E 15 per month, and about half remitted more than E 25 per month. Comparing these remittances and those claimed to be received by rural households (see table 10), the average remittance was in the region of E 30 per month for each homestead with a worker employed inside the country or outside.

Remittances sent home by miners (as distinct from deferred pay) were much more erratic: more than 40 per cent of the returned miners had not sent any remittances during their contract. Only 15 per cent sent in excess of E 100, and the modal group (apart from zero remittances) was E 50-100. On the basis of an average contract of 6-7 months, this does not compare favourably with local worker remittances. Looking at tables 12 and 13, some interesting patterns are evident but not readily explicable. Remittances in proportion to deferred pay collected at the end of the miners contracts have hovered around the 40 per cent level between 1966 and 1971, but decreased noticeably in the years 1972-1975 (years during which wages substantially increased) and then climbed to almost 50 per cent during 1976 and seemingly so for 1977. Looking at per capita remittances by recruitment center (table 13), the jump in remittances is clearly evident in 1976. There also appears to be a clear pattern of very different levels of per capita remittances between centers; with some centers having a consistently high average remittance for its recruits, while others are consistently low. These patterns may reflect

Table 12. TEBA payments: disbursements made to Swaziland recruits (Rands)[1]

	Voluntary deferred pay (VDD)	Remittance orders (RO)	RO/VDP	Cash recruiting advances (CRA)	Total VDD + RO + CRA
1966	235,408	91,487	0.39	57,933	442,498
1967	227,414	85,494	0.375	36,790	436,394
1968	230,412	98,624	0.42	51,073	479,484
1969	244,707	122,722	0.498	56,472	523,817
1970	343,773	131,722	0.383	67,190	656,718
1971	368,219	124,054	0.336	50,708	670,357
1972	473,646	101,289	0.2138	51,968	785,932
1973	621,666	134,980	0.2171	59,646	974,775
1974	920,930	190,521	0.206	71,714	1,374,138
1975	2,612,78	415,785	0.159	126,267	3,450,353
1976	2,925,333	1,397,735	0.48	156,739	4,479,807
1977 (first 6 months)	1,513,895 vs. 895,873 for 1976 - 6 months	673,799 vs. 552,823 for 1976 - 6 months	0.45	125,488 vs. 100,573 for 1976 - 6 months	-

[1] Payments made to Swazis while on the gold mines not available yet.

Source: TEBA, Siteki.

different homestead requirements of the areas or simply the influence of office policy and worker guidance, but merit further study.

Table 13. Average remittance per recruit by center (Emalangeni/Rands)

<table>
<tr><th>TEBA Center[1]</th><th>1972</th><th>1973</th><th>1974</th><th>1975</th><th>1976</th></tr>
<tr><td>Siteki</td><td>14.1</td><td>12.3</td><td>16.0</td><td>23.1</td><td>83.2</td></tr>
<tr><td>Manzini</td><td>13.4</td><td>11.5</td><td>17.8</td><td>21.9</td><td>93.5</td></tr>
<tr><td>Mankayane</td><td>23.4</td><td>21.7</td><td>17.3</td><td>25.2</td><td>72.2</td></tr>
<tr><td>Mbabane</td><td>9.7</td><td>10.8</td><td>12.4</td><td rowspan="2">12.4</td><td rowspan="2">79.9</td></tr>
<tr><td>Piggs Peak</td><td>10.0</td><td>6.1</td><td>7.9</td></tr>
<tr><td>Nhlangano</td><td>30.8</td><td>26.9</td><td>38.9</td><td>44.2</td><td>111.6</td></tr>
<tr><td>Hluti</td><td>29.6</td><td>33.9</td><td>36.4</td><td>47.4</td><td>77.5</td></tr>
<tr><td>Hlatikulu</td><td>25.8</td><td>19.5</td><td>29.8</td><td>39.1</td><td>116.0</td></tr>
</table>

[1] See also figure 1, above page 2.

Source: TEBA, Siteki.

(5) Expenditure patterns

Another distinguishing characteristic between internal and external migrants is the starkly contrasting patterns of expenditures between the two groups. Looking back at table 8 it is immediately obvious that mineworkers tend to accumulate a proportion of earnings for "investment" into cattle, as evidenced by the intentions of both outgoing and returned miners. What is of particular interest is the perceived expenditure of miners as cited by Swaziland-based workers, which shows a remarkably accurate reflection of the actually intended expenditures by the miners. Swaziland-based workers appear to have very little surplus earnings available for cattle or agricultural equipment.

(6) Agricultural ties

The agricultural ties to the land of both the domestically-based workers and mineworkers are strong, but the pull back to the rural home takes on different dimensions according to the nature of employment. When Swaziland-based workers were asked if they returned home for ploughing or agricultural reasons, 31 per cent said they did, a surprisingly high 26 per cent said they did not, specifically because they hired tractors, while the rest depended on relatives or hired help. Outgoing miners (survey 11) were asked if they were required at home for agricultural purposes: 74 per cent said they were, while most of those who said they were not claimed that there was sufficient labour at home. Swaziland-based workers would, on the whole, find it difficult to leave work for any extended period of time. They limit their rural activities to weekends and given holidays. The mineworker on the other hand, as indicated earlier, usually has several months at his disposal before contemplating return to the mines or seeking work elsewhere. The level of investment into agricultural equipment by both types of migrant is disappointing. Only 1.5 per cent of the locally-based workers mentioned agricultural equipment as one of their main expenditure items; miners on the whole were more interested with answers ranging from 8 per cent to 28 per cent (see table 8).

(7) Attitudes towards external migration and migrants

Working in Swaziland by no means indicates complacency on the part of locally-based worker. Asked if they would want to work in South Africa, 42 per cent of the Swaziland-based workers said they would, citing higher wages as the principal reason. Mining was the work preferred by 28 per cent, while 21 per cent were willing to do any type of work. The main reason for not having gone to South Africa was that the respondent was in the process of getting a travel document or was impeded by the necessity of obtaining one[33] (mentioned by 42 per cent of those who wanted to go to South Africa); 15 per cent claimed to be held back by family commitments; and 22 per cent said they would go when convenient. Of those who did not want to go, distance from home and/or family commitments were mentioned by half, the age constraint (too young or too old) by 15 per cent, and a dislike for South Africa by 13 per cent.

General knowledge of sectoral employment opportunities was rather poor. Three-quarters of the Swaziland-based workers did not know or did not hear about conditions of employment prevailing on South African farms and forests, and almost half did not know about conditions on the mines. The most outstanding characteristic about the mines by those who had an idea, was the high pay; while opinion was split about pay on the farms and forests, with equal numbers claiming high and poor pay.

Swaziland-based workers were asked very general questions about miners to provide some insight in evaluating miner behaviour. When asked if they respected mineworkers, 60 per cent said they did, principally because of their high earnings; 10 per cent said they did not because mineworkers squandered their money; and a further 5 per cent said they did not because mine work was hard and menial. When asked if they thought mineworkers earned much money, 88 per cent felt they did and 9 per cent did not know. Finally, when asked if they thought mineworkers maintained their families properly, 53 per cent felt they did; 19 per cent felt that they neglected their families during their absence; and 17 per cent did not know.

(e) Opinions of secondary school students

A further perspective on work and workers in South Africa was provided by the secondary school students. Only 15 per cent of the students felt that jobs would be difficult to find in South Africa, and 42 per cent specifically stated that there were plenty of opportunities and jobs were easy to find. Only 9 per cent felt that wages in South Africa were poor; while 20 per cent specifically noted that wages would be higher than in Swaziland. Asked if, unable to find suitable work in Swaziland, they would seek work in South Africa, three-quarters of the students responded positively. Surprisingly, many of the students were willing to consider the mines, and even more were prepared to work on farms if necessary.

To give a very basic impression of attitudes, students were asked to circle extreme stereotype characterisations of miners. There appeared to be little condescending feeling towards the miners. 71 per cent felt that miners were "brave and deserve respect" to work on the mines, as opposed to the 7 per cent who felt they were "foolish"; others did not know. In relation to the wages for "the type of work they do in the mines", half the students felt that they earned "much money", 31 per cent "fair money", and 12 per cent "too little money". Finally, when asked how the miners maintained their families while working on the mines, 71 per cent indicated that they "send home money to maintain their family", while 11 per cent felt they "neglect their families".

V. THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF MIGRATION

(a) Migration and the labour market

(1) Labour supplies

Events during the past three years have exposed the sensitivity and vulnerability of the labour market to the whims of exogenous policy decisions. Within a year, labour shortages were transformed into substantial surpluses. Early shortages and capricious movements of labour caused some of the major industries to introduce technology incompatible with the intrinsic factor endowments of Swaziland. Thus, the sugar industry planned for a highly mechanised third sugar mill with subsequent plans to mechanise current operations. Unfortunately, the sudden shift in labour availability is unlikely to stimulate industry to redress their technology towards more appropriate factor ratios, in light of the fluidity of the recent past.

Complacency towards the impending unemployment situation and continuing dependence on the safety-valve feature of South African employment opportunities has led to a labour market structure which, according to Wingfield-Dingby (1978), will lead to a surplus of working-age adults in terms of wage employment of between 3-4,000 per annum - many of whom will have had some formal education. However, short of "efflux" controls, the Swaziland Government has been limited in its capacity to stem external migration. At the same time, with the earlier prevailing labour shortages, it was ostensibly difficult to expand internal labour-absorptive capacity. One positive aspect arising from restrictions imposed by the South African Chamber of Mines is that, without the cushion of unlimited recourse to the mines, the Government must now squarely face the open unemployment problem.

Our employer survey provided direct insight into the problems arising from migration as perceived by the employers. The more salient results are produced in table 14. The sample contained a fairly representative group of industries, particularly those who are most affected by both internal and external migration.[34]

The survey was undertaken at the end of the year 1976 when mine recruitment peaked at more than 20,000 and domestic companies suffered considerable shortages of labour. Shortages were fairly widespread in agricultural and agro-based firms. Of the 17 companies in this category, 13 had suffered from labour shortages over the previous 5 years and most suffered a seasonal labour shortage in 1976. There was a fairly split response as to whether the situation was worse, static or improved. The citrus industry was so badly affected in recent years that it had to resort to hiring old women and school children on holidays and free afternoons. Eleven of the 18 agricultural or agro-based firms thought they were adversely affected by recruitment of Swazi labour to South Africa and a further 11 of the 15 who responded felt some sort of control on migration should have been imposed by government. As regards wages and salaries in South Africa, 7 of 10 sugar companies said they did not affect their firms, claiming that their rates were competitive; those who were affected alleged that they were hurt by the recently increased mine wages.

(2) Seasonal fluctuations and labour stability

One of the striking features of external migration to the mines and, to a certain extent internal migration, is the distinct seasonal patterns arising from the close ties to rural

Table 14. Main results of employer survey for Swaziland Federation of Emplo

Issue	Industry	Agriculture and agro-based industry: Sugar	Citrus	"Other" farms	Forestry	Mining	Manu-facturing
1a Labour shortages over the past 5 years?	Yes	5	2	5	1	1	1
	Incomplete	0	0	0	0	0	0
	No	3	0	1	0	1	4
1b Positions improved?	Improved	2	2	0	0	1	0
	static	3	0	4	1	1	4
	worsened	1	0	2	0	0	1
2a Turnover - A significant problem?	Yes	5	1	4	1	1	1
	Incomplete	0	0	0	0	0	0
	No	3	1	2	0	1	4
2b Turnover improved?	Yes	3	0	0	1	0	0
	Incomplete	1	1	1	0	0	0
	No	6	1	5	0	2	5
3. High absenteeism?	Yes	8	1	4	1	1	1
	Incomplete	1	0	0	0	0	0
	No	1	1	2	0	1	4
4a Adversely affected by recruitment of Swazis to S.A.?	Yes	7	1	2	1	1	0
	Incomplete	0	0	2	0	0	0
	No	3	1	2	0	1	5
4b Adversely affected by wages and salaries in South Africa?	Yes	3	2	2	1	1	0
	Incomplete	0	0	2	0	0	0
	No	7	0	2	0	1	5
4c Aware of any tendencies of better productivity from those with previous employment in S.A. (particularly gold mines)	Yes	4	2	3	1	2	3
	Incomplete	1	0	2	0	0	2
	No	5	0	1	0	0	0
4d Should Swaziland Government control the outflow of labour to South Africa?	Yes	8	1	1	1	0	0
	Incomplete	1	1	2	0	0	3
	No	1	0	3	0	2	2

* Includes Garages, Hotels, Banks, Services, etc.

l Federation of Employers

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Mining	Manu-facturing	Misc.*	Total
1	1	4	19
0	0	0	0
1	4	8	17
1	0	1	6
1	4	2	15
0	1	2	6
1	1	1	14
0	0	0	0
1	4	12	23
0	0	1	5
0	0	7	10
2	5	5	24
1	1	1	17
0	0	0	1
1	4	12	21
1	0	1	13
0	0	1	3
1	5	11	23
1	0	1	10
0	0	1	3
1	5	11	26
2	3	3	18
0	2	7	12
0	0	3	9
0	0	2	13
0	3	5	12
2	2	2	10

agricultural requirements. Figure 5 shows that January and February are peak recruitment months for the mines, while November-December are trough months when traditionally many mines suffer labour complements as low as 65 per cent. Domestic companies also face considerable seasonal fluctuations in numbers of employees: the total number of employees of companies covered ranged from a low of 12,646 to a high of 15,615 in the year 1975. Much of the fluctuation is accounted for by the changing seasonal requirements for labour, but a noteworthy proportion is due to the seasonal subsistence requirements of the workers themselves. Although few companies in the manufacturing or "other" sectors (relatively high-wage sectors) considered turnover or absenteeism as a problem, 5 of the sugar companies complained of high turnover with rates of about 12 per cent per month, peaking up to 35 per cent during October-December (i.e. ploughing months for subsistence crops). The one timber company responding, having in excess of 1,500 employees, claimed to have suffered from a turnover rate of 85 per cent in 1976.[35] Smaller farms did not seem to be seriously affected by turnover but did complain of the debilitating effects of absenteeism, which was also mentioned by the larger agricultural and agro-based industries. In addition to absenteeism near weekends and after pay day (largely the result of incapacitation through drink) seasonal absenteeism was fairly prevalent as workers would simply leave for home to attend to agricultural requirements for 3-4 weeks, hoping to be re-engaged on their return.

Few of the underlying factors explaining the differences in turnover and absenteeism are immediately evident, but there is little doubt that relative wage levels and the nature of the work have an important bearing. Humphreys and McClelland (1964, p. 291) observed: "... when the labour force in general has a relatively high average period of employment, the wage level, too, tends to be above the average". Most employers dismiss turnover and absenteeism as inevitable when traditional rural ties are so strong, but there is sufficient evidence that many Swazis are not averse to abrogating much of their rural ties and are willing to reduce the degree of



Fig.5 Monthly Recruitment of Swazis for South African Gold Mines: 1970, 1974-76.

Source: TEBA, Siteki.

oscillation between traditional and modern sectors - given the right conditions. These conditions include proper family housing, a permanent job and attractive infrastructural facilities.

Two of the largest forestry companies with similar working conditions and wage rates have diametrically opposite turnover rates: 85 per cent vs. 1 per cent. The one with a high turnover rate provides barrack-style housing for 90-95 per cent of its employees in dispersed units throughout the forest, while the company with low turnover offers married housing for most employees in a township with centralised social amenities. Havelock Mine was the first major industry successfully to stabilise its labour force, despite its isolated position. The larger sugar estates are now also attempting to stabilise their labour force through the provision of permanent employment to many former seasonally employed workers and with improved housing and social facilities; furthermore, the sugar industry is considering the introduction of a deferred pay scheme. It seems fairly clear that, by offering working conditions which enable detachment from the dual income patterns of subsistence peasants, oscillating migration can be effectively dampened. It must be noted that regardless of the type of work, many Swazis maintain rural ties or homesteads, but personal involvement in agricultural production will depend on its necessity.

(3) Migration and the quality of labour

Not only does migration usually reduce the amount of labour offered during a migrant's working career through oscillation and inter-contract sojourns, but Natrass (1976a) also found that migrant workers in South Africa tend to retire earlier than their "stabilised" counterparts. She found that of the migrants entering the labour force at 20 years of age, half will retire before they reach 40 and three-quarters by 50. The average length spent in the modern sector by a migrant is 19 years, whereas a "stabilised" worker averages 23 years - an increase of 20 per cent.[36]

Men with greater initiative and ambition have a higher propensity to migrate. This not only applies to those who are physically and psychologically more adaptable, but also to those with better educational and skilled background - especially prior to influx controls. Leistner and Smit (1969, p. 49) noted: "According to some observers, many Swazis prefer employment in the Republic where wages are usually higher and where there is wider scope for the exercise of their talents". The same sentiment was echoed by the ILO/JASPA report Reducing Dependence (1976). Recent reports have shown shortages of black technicians in South Africa (Bloch, N., 1976), and from the student survey it was obvious that there are still a number of skilled and educated Swazis working in South Africa.

The skill drain, whatever the extent, is somewhat counter-balanced by the positive effects of working experience derived in South Africa. The survey for the Swaziland Federation of Employers showed that about two-thirds of the respondents felt that those returning from South Africa will be noticeably more productive. Students who conducted interviews also generally agreed that, although the type of work done on the mines is largely irrelevant for subsequent employment in Swaziland, the work discipline and experience with the consent of production targets, teamwork, etc., contributed to the improvement of an industrial labour force. Stahl (1975) pondered the idea of using the South African mines to circumvent the considerable costs of internal industrial training. In addition to normal work experience, most mines offer free training courses in various fields such as masonry, carpentry, literacy, apprenticeship in various artisan trades. Unfortunately, largely because of fatigue at the end of the work shift, few miners take advantage of these programmes. The extent of skill and training is restricted by the enforcement of colour bars imposed by the Mines and Works Act and, in effect, enforced by the powerful white Mine Workers Union.

(b) Migration and agriculture

There has been considerable debate over the cause and effects of migration in relation to the subsistence sector: is migration the result of a deteriorating or inadequate subsistence base, or does migration lead to a disintegration and stifling of the rural sector? There is of course interdependence of causality, and applicability will vary by region and magnitude of migration. In spite of the apparent discord between capitalist and subsistence production, they are mutually "supporting": Clarke's concept of "primitive accumulation" underscores the relationship. Even the recent increases in mine wages are only barely adequate for the maintenance of the family during the duration of employment[37], but certainly, inadequate to cover the life afterwards. Thus, although the tie to the land is undoubtedly traditional in nature, it is also an inescapable necessity for many.

(1) Opportunity costs

Because of the ambiguity of alternatives, the opportunity cost of migration is difficult to gauge. If we assume that a potential migrant will continue with the subsistence production of maize, his opportunity cost will be zero (Low, A.R.C., 1977). On the other hand, if the peasant is forcibly deprived of the option to migrate, then many are likely to turn to the cash cropping of cotton, tobacco, vegetables, etc., which offers potentially high income. As pointed out later, migration is likely to have impeded the development of cash crops because the intensive labour requirement make these crops incompatible with continuing migration.

(2) Investment of "surplus"

For those with a relatively productive peasant base and/or few dependants, mine earnings often provide a surplus for "investment". In the Mozambique study there was considerable evidence that for peasants in other than the very poorest homesteads, much of the surplus was used for expanding the productive capacity of their land or for the necessary capital requirements for establishing an artisan trade, etc. Swazi miners, on the other hand, regardless of their relative welfare, show comparatively little inclination to invest into their crop base. Surpluses or "target incomes" are almost invariably used for purchasing cattle which, from the macro perspective, is clearly detrimental to Swaziland's already heavily over-grazed pastures.

Rutman (1974) points out that this type of "wealth formation in indigenous economies" is perfectly rational; he feels that the use of funds is restricted by the attitudes prevailing in that particular environment. Thus, in traditional communal societies with usufruct agreements, there will be little incentive to improve the capitalised value of land through, for example, irrigation and the planting of trees and other perennial crops. Although there appears to be some contention over the issue, agricultural officials have drawn attention to cases of chiefs expropriating or "reallocating" land from farmers who have "done too well". Spaarman and Diphoorn[38] have noted a distinct reluctance amongst more motivated farmers to plant trees and put substantial investments into their crops because of insecurity of tenure. Proceeds from the modern sector from less ambitious and submissive worker peasants are confined to the strictures of the institutional framework of traditional society. The continuing purchase of cattle - virtually the only realisable investment - growing population-land pressures, and poor land management of the communal tenure system leads to the degeneration of the rural sector, thus aggravating the push for migration and causing a vicious circle.

(3) Migration and cropping patterns

Agricultural improvement is not only impeded by institutional factors, but by the very nature of migration itself. **Doran (1977) and Low (1977) have pointed out that** traditional subsistence crops, maize in particular, are much less labour-intensive than alternative cash crops such as cotton and tobacco (by one-half and one-fifth, respectively). Low, having investigated task distribution and timing, concluded that migration has probably had no adverse effect on subsistence production: labour inputs are very seasonal, with 94 per cent of the labour input occurring between October and May (maize) and with the "traditional" male tasks concentrated in the pre-planting stages.[39] The complementarity of short mining contracts and subsistence requirements may therefore have perpetuated traditional cropping at the expense of higher income crops. This would seem to dispell the myth (a misapplied lesson of modern formal sector employment) that migrants -

particularly those with relatively high incomes - are harbingers of change. For external mineworkers the opposite seems true: the nature of their contracts contributes to the perpetuation of traditional crops by allowing ample time to tend to the usual agricultural requirements. Internal migrants have shown more adaptability, for instance, by their tendency to hire tractors during absence.

In conclusion, it would appear that external migration (basically to the gold mines) seems to have adverse effects on the agricultural base. Firstly, most miners buy cattle, thereby aggravating the serious over-grazing problem. Secondly, migration is likely to have obstructed change in improved cropping patterns. And thirdly, there is also little evidence of noteworthy trends in productive investment to improve the crop base with the earnings from migration.

(c) Migration and the state sector

The Swaziland Government has been surprisingly apathetic to the potential of migration for revenue purposes. While other countries have attestation fees of R10 or more, Swaziland's fee remains at R1. More than a year ago, private negotiations with TEBA officials in South Africa indicated that they would hardly be averse to increasing the fee to R10, and in fact were surprised that this had not already occurred. A fee of R10 would result in a direct increase of government revenue in the region of E150,000-200,000.

Rand earnings of Swazi miners in South Africa for 1976 were placed at E12.9 million by the Monetary Authority of Swaziland. If the MAS figure is to be believed (felt by TEBA officials to be too high), then a considerable amount of goods tend to be bought externally as only about E4.5 million was deferred or remitted. Survey results show that main expenditure items in South Africa are clothing, radios, trunks, blankets and food. It is likely that records of these expenditures - entitled to a considerable rebate according to the customs union revenue sharing formula - are grossly understated, if at all.

Swazi miners working in South Africa have not as yet paid income tax to the South African Government. Although legally the Swaziland Government cannot impose income tax on earnings derived in South Africa, there is nothing preventing the introduction of a levy on returning miners. This will not only provide a very considerable contribution to revenue, but will reduce relative income differentials - the main pull factor.

VI. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

(a) Conclusions

Migration in South Africa has been described by Houghton (1960, p.189) as "an evil canker at the heart of our whole society, wasteful of labour, destructive of ambition, a wrecker of homes, and a symptom of our fundamental failure to create a coherent and progressive society" - strong words, but apt for a system where the movement of labour is circumscribed by discriminatory laws and involuntarily disunites the family. However, in countries such as Swaziland, where domestic conditions are considerably more accomodating than in "typical" labour reserves, work in South Africa, in light of the other reasonable internal alternatives, is a conscious choice and migration therefore cannot be so easily characterised.

Prolonged apathy towards the nature of the migrant labour system by supplier states has resulted in the loss of much leverage for reform. With the recent internalisation of South Africa's labour potential and subsequent disengagement from external labour reserves, supplier stages have had to retreat into a defensive position. Thus, issues such as the underlying particularly those with relatively high incomes - are harbingers of change. For external mineworkers the opposite seems true: the nature of their contracts contributes to the perpetuation of traditional crops by allowing ample time to tend to the usual agricultural requirements. Internal migrants have shown more adaptability, for instance, by their tendency to hire tractors during absence.

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Swazi miners working in South Africa have not as yet paid income tax to the South African Government. Although legally the Swaziland Government cannot impose income tax on earnings derived in South Africa, there is nothing preventing the introduction of a levy on returning miners. This will not only provide a very considerable contribution to revenue, but will reduce relative income differentials - the main pull factor.

VI. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

(a) Conclusions

Migration in South Africa has been described by Houghton (1960, p.189) as "an evil canker at the heart of our whole society, wasteful of labour, destructive of ambition, a wrecker of homes, and a symptom of our fundamental failure to create a coherent and progressive society" - strong words, but apt for a system where the movement of labour is circumscribed by discriminatory laws and involuntarily disunites the family. However, in countries such as Swaziland, where domestic conditions are considerably more accomodating than in "typical" labour reserves, work in South Africa, in light of the other reasonable internal alternatives, is a conscious choice and migration therefore cannot be so easily characterised.

Prolonged apathy towards the nature of the migrant labour system by supplier states has resulted in the loss of much leverage for reform. With the recent internalisation of South Africa's labour potential and subsequent disengagement from external labour reserves, supplier stages have had to retreat into a defensive position. Thus, issues such as the underlying motives and economic effects of migration - traditionally eclipsed by more topical and emotionally sensitive aspects - have become more relevant for policy considerations. This paper has attempted to reveal those features of migration which are felt to be necessary in understanding the implications of any future political strategy.

One of the dominant themes arising from this and other papers emanating from the Swaziland project, is the powerful influence that relative income differentials has on the level of external migration. Migration levels prior to 1974 may have been largely the result of exigency, but even then there was evidence of wage differentials and conscious choice, such that Swazis preferred minework to menial domestic employment undertaken by imported labour. Although external migration as a proportion of population and domestic employment has shown a distinct secular decrease, its sensitivity to wage differentials has caused justified fears of a major labour exodus. These have been relieved only by externally imposed restrictions.

External migration has played the role of a "safety valve" in terms of residual unemployment and has provided a seemingly popular source of quick savings, but not without notable costs: recent labour shortages have led to the introduction of inappropriate technology, while complacency towards migration has precluded any serious policy for improving the labour absorptive capacity of the economy. Furthermore, expenditure patterns by external migrants with accumulated "surpluses" - contrary to popular opinion - have shown little evidence of productive investment. Rather, they exacerbate the serious over-grazing problem through the extreme proclivity for purchasing cattle. There is also no indication that external migrants have improved their cropping patterns; in fact there seems much support for the hypothesis that migration stultifies the development of cash cropping because of the nature of the migrant contract which perpetuates the patterns of subsistence agriculture and works against the relatively labour-intensive cash crops.

From the (internal) political perspective, perhaps the most important consideration is the individual himself. Suggestions that migration to South Africa can be diverted by simply supplanting migrant income or by somehow satisfying basic needs or by providing domestically-located employment are naîve. Most external migrants have shown themselves to be discriminating and income oriented. They tend to be young, with relatively few dependants and able to gain surplus funds. The nature of the mine contracts and the deferred pay scheme is appealing to those with seasonal agricultural commitments and wanting to amass earnings for use between periods of wage employment. Our findings have shown that the characteristics, attitudes and economic impact of internal and external migrants are distinct. To supersede external migration with any simple form of internal work - an improbable short or medium term prospect - is unlikely to satisfy those who have opted for temporary but renewable employment in South Africa.

A natural absorption of external migrants - i.e. the voluntary choice of the individual to work in Swaziland - will require attractive conditions such as family housing, competitive wages (which may be difficult in low wage sectors such as agriculture) and possibly innovations such as deferred pay and short-term renewable contracts for those with strong rural commitments.

(b) Policy recommendations

There has recently been an upsurge in interest relating to migrant labour in Southern Africa with the dominant theme focussing on a concerted strategy of suppliers: since the autumn of 1976 the ILO (with the financial support of UNFPA) promotes action-oriented research under the theme "Towards Planned Labour Migration in Southern Africa"; in November 1977, Ministers and Labour Commissioners from supplier states met in Lesotho and produced a paper entitled "Migrant Labour to South Africa: The Need for a Common Approach";[40] and in April 1978, the Economic Commission for Africa will stage a conference centered on the topic "Towards a Common Labour Policy in Southern Africa". Unfortunately, this awakening to the problems and potentials of the migratory labour system is not so much the result of predictive acumen as tardy after-thought. South Africa took the strategic initiative through internalisation and subsequent restrictions on supplier states - the exigency for reciprocal strategy then became obvious.

Overdue manoeuvering by supplier states has forced them into an uncomfortable position, having lost their initial bargaining advantage. Nevertheless, the proposals emanating from the 1977 meeting of representatives of Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique and Swaziland had a reasonably aggressive tone. The major proposal concerned the establishment of a permanent joint consultative machinery to meet at least annually and to discuss contractual arrangements; general conditions of employment; redistribution of benefits from the migratory system; the securing of markets for commodities produced in supplier countries; the general treatment of migrant workers in South Africa; and research into the migratory labour system. Further proposals recommended inter alia the "payment of compensation analogous to that under the Customs Agreement" and negotiations for better working conditions and rates of pay.

The potency of concerted supplier state policies will of course hinge on the unity of participants. This was in fact explicitly recognised in the Ministers' paper which stated: "there is a risk of South Africa playing one country against another in individual country negotiations..."

Because of the complexity of the issues involved, it may be worthwhile to separate recommendations and considerations into three distinct (but certainly not mutually exclusive) levels: the national economic and social perspective; individual welfare considerations; and moral-political issues of immediate withdrawal. The recommendations are based on the underlying assumption that withdrawal - by which peripheral states can reduce their migration dependence on the South African economy and policies - is a desirable medium-term objective over a period of, say, 10-15 years, unless a major political upheaval occurs in the meantime.

(1) National economic and social policies

Revenue

The Swaziland Government has every reason to seek to increase the revenue from migration accruing to it directly. Moreover, the disparity in common policy is obvious when looking at attestation fees. Swaziland should raise fees to be at least in line with those of Botswana and Lesotho. Because of the high regard for Swazi miners and relatively low transport costs, there will not likely be adverse effects on recruitment.

The Government might justifiably consider imposing a surrogate tax in the form of a levy after returning from the mines or to be collected by the Swazi Labour Representative based in South Africa.

Better records of external migrants' spending in South Africa are likely to have a noticeable effect on Customs Union Revenue (which is calculated on the proportion of goods imported by the country or purchased in South Africa by its nationals).

It is unlikely that compensatory payments for the use of migratory labour as suggested by the Ministers' meeting will be realisable as long as there are plenty of labour reserves in Southern Africa that remain underutilised.

A schedule for withdrawal

The Chamber of Mines and the South African Government should be informed of the aim of gradual disengagement from the migrant labour system. Irrespective of whether or not a scheduled withdrawal would receive their consent, it should be implemented as planned. This would provide supplier states with a concrete guide for labour absorption. At the same time, the schedule would constitute a kind of guarantee of employment for the residual numbers still migrating during the transition period and it clearly signals the desire to avoid abrupt retrenchment.

Supplier state "cartel"

It is unlikely that a cartel for the purposes envisaged by Stahl (1977) will be feasible as elasticities of demand for mine labour and internal supply appear higher than estimated. Nonetheless, the moves towards a cartel should be intensified as it will ensure greater leverage in negotiations for better conditions of workers and strengthen defensive strategies such as employment guarantees and quotas.

Domestic labour absorption policy

Fiscal policy in Swaziland currently promotes capital-intensive modes of production through various inducements such as generous capital cost allowances. Furthermore, due to erratic fluctuations in labour supplies, some major industries are introducing incongruous technology. Greater effort should be made in stimulating labour-intensive modes of production and the provision of facilities that will stabilise the labour force.

Input supply agreements with the South African mines

In contrast to outright compensation, marketing agreements between the mines and supplier states appear feasible for the provision of various types of inputs such as timber, meat, vegetables from peripheral economies at initially sub-optimal cost for the mines (World Bank, 1977). Guaranteed markets may stimulate economies of scale and externalities, but may advance rather than diminish trade dependence on South Africa.

Agricultural and rural income policies

To stem the outflow of migrants from rural areas, government policy should consider increasing the opportunity cost of migration. The successful promotion of high income, labour-intensive cash crops will reduce the push/pull factors. However, the proposed maize self-sufficiency scheme in Swaziland is likely to exacerbate migration as maize cropping patterns are amenable to external seasonally contrived migration: reduced dependence on food supplies will simply be substituted by greater dependence on employment absorption.

Withdrawal

Disengagement of migrant labour supplies should be roughly in line with the absorptive capacity of the formal sector and acceptable rural agricultural alternatives. An oversimplified basic needs approach that relates withdrawal to the satisfaction of the needs of the population dangerously overlooks that many migrants (as opposed to many non-migrants) not only satisfy their basic needs but gain surplus funds for the purchase of cattle or other investments.

(2) Improved welfare for the migrant worker

Assuming that complete withdrawal is the ultimate goal, there should be pressure to improve the welfare of residual migrants during the interim period, i.e. while gradually breaking away from the migrant labour system. Pushing towards the limits of change should not be discredited as accepting to work within the system: the perspectives are completely different. By definition, one does not accept what one wants to change. Conversely, not to push for changes means accepting the consequences of apartheid without contributing to any change in the system.

Conditions on the South African gold mines[41]

Supplier state monitoring team

Regular surveys of mines by research teams selected by supplier state governments could be conducted along similar lines as the recent student survey of Swazi miners. These teams should liaise directly with country labour representatives who could submit the findings and recommendations to the Chamber of Mines, the individual mines surveyed, and the Labour Departments of supplier states.

The voluminous studies on black worker conditions and attitudes undertaken by the Human Resources Laboratory of the Chamber of Mines are internal confidential documents but invaluable for those planning the course of improvement. Supplier state governments should be given access to these documents for guidance in their demands while guaranteeing confidentiality if so desired by mining companies.

Liaison

Much greater consultation should be promoted between Government representatives from supplier countries, their respective workers on the gold mines, and mining employers. Meetings of this nature could, inter alia, help prevent incidents resulting from misunderstandings such as the riots and subsequent temporary withdrawal of Basotho miners in 1974.

The Basotho Government is pioneering this approach through its inception of biannual meetings with the TEBA executive and representatives from other mines employing Basotho. Meetings are attended by members of the Basotho

Labour Department, permanent secretaries of affected ministries and Labour Representatives stationed in South Africa. Negotiations have covered and made significant progress in such issues as workman's compensations, inter-mine record transfers, family visits and paid leave. These meetings should of course be attended by all supplier states and not give national preferences in their resolutions.

Career guarantees and the centralisation of records

Evidence has shown that in spite of the oscillating nature of their work, many Swazis and other ethnic groups (because of pride and regularity in their work) should be regarded as professional miners. Withdrawal should therefore initially phase out casual miners and continue to sift out according to experience, while those defined by selected criteria such as skill and regularity of work should fall out by attrition only. This proposal implies the availability of centralised records of miners which at the moment is a source of bitter contention between the relatively progressive and most reactionary of mining companies within the Chamber of Mines. To date any black miner who wishes to transfer from one mine to another - even if an intra-company transfer - revokes previous work records. This is grossly unjust and, because of the adverse implications on the ability to retain one's previous work/pay status and on long service awards (a type of pension), workers are discouraged from moving from unpopular mines to those with superior conditions. The system is not only an affront to the black's professionalism but also reduces the incentive to improve conditions.

Training programmes

Educational and vocational courses are not as popular as was envisaged by the mines, but if miners become aware of the implications of an official withdrawal policy, the mines can perhaps more usefully be exploited as training centres to disseminate vocational skills and agricultural programmes to help ease the transition. Domestic employers would be spared some training costs and provided with more skills.

(3) Moral and political considerations of immediate withdrawal

With 1978 having been declared the "International Year Against Apartheid" supplier states should at least voice their declaration of intent to strive towards a concerted effort to abolish the strictures and inhumanities inherent in the migratory labour system on which the perpetuation of apartheid is so heavily reliant.

Immediate withdrawal as an anti-South African sanction can only be reasonably effective if undertaken as a concerted policy. With the growing South African labour reserve (albeit largely unskilled and without previous mine experience), coupled with the mounting unemployment in the supplier states, the internal social and political costs are likely by far to outweigh the anticipated benefits.

A downwardly imposed political-moral dictate to impede individual freedom of choice will negatively affect the income level of approximately 20,000 (Swaziland) and at least 40,000 dependants (assuming a low average of 2 dependants) - a disarming prospect for a politically already very cautious government.

Premature withdrawal will probably lead from one form of dependence to another, i.e. to a dependence on foreign aid that might tend to linger on indefinitely providing basic needs and other requirements for adjustment.

If migratory labour is the target for withdrawals on political grounds, serious thought should be given to other forms of mutual cooperation and dependence that affect, in particular, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. A more comprehensive approach embracing the Customs Union, the Rand Monetary Agreement, communications, etc. is necessary to avoid the hypocrisy of discrete sanctions.

IX. FOOTNOTES

[1] The issue of migration in Southern Africa as a strategic instrument has recently led the Economic Commission for Africa Multinational Programming and Operational Centre for Eastern and Southern Africa (ECA/MULPOC) in Lusaka to mount a major conference on the theme "Migratory Labour in Southern Africa".

[2] From The Mozambican Miner, an as yet unofficially released study produced by the Centro de Estudos Africanos, Universidade Eduardo Mondlane (Ruth First, Director of project) which, in addition to comprehensive socio-economic studies, provides a good historical review of the labour supplying contracts between Portugal and the South African mining industry.

[3] Completed working papers include:

- M.H. Doran, Swaziland Labour Migration - Some Implications for a National Development Strategy, Geneva, ILO, August 1977; mimeographed World Employment Programme research working paper [WEP 2-26/WP 12]; restricted; and

- A.R.C. Low, Migration and Agricultural Development in Swaziland: A Micro-Economic Analysis, Geneva, ILO, August 1977; mimeographed World Employment Programme research working paper [WEP 2-26/WP 13]; restricted.

Planned working papers include (working titles):

- Fion de Vletter, Migrant Labour on the South African Gold Mines: An Investigation into Black Worker Conditions and Attitudes; and

- F.A. Prinz and B.D. Prinz, Migrant Labour and Rural Homesteads: An Investigation into the Social Implications of the Migrant Labour System for Swaziland.

[4] TEBA is the recently introduced acronym for the Employment Bureau of Africa, formerly the Mine Labour Organisations (MLO) and known as the Native Recruitment Corporation (NRC) prior to the MLO.

[5] The serious extent of overgrazing and prevalence of cattle ownership in Swaziland was formally raised as early as 1932 by Sir A. Pim in the Report on the Financial and Economic Situation of Swaziland.

[6] Up to 1940, 3-4,000 Mozambicans were recruited annually in Swaziland, thereafter tailing off to less than 1,000 until 1960 and increasing to 4,251 in 1964 - the year before WNLA operations in Swaziland closed.

[7] H. Kuper (1947, p.14) found that in 1938 Public Works labourers earned between 27s 6d to 40s per month, most domestic workers earned less than 30s per month, farm labour 15s to 40s per month, and local mineworkers earned between 8d and 2s per day.

[8] The deferred pay system in Swaziland enables the worker to draw a specified monthly allowance (most choose R10 per month) while accumulating the rest to be collected at the mine with the termination of work (not necessarily contract) or at the TEBA office where recruited. 95-99 per cent of Swazi recruits elect for the system.

[9] "Machine boys" are drillers at the stope face who in addition to a base rate earn bonuses according to the number of holes drilled per day. According to both local employers and mining officials, Swazis show a strong preference for task work. Task work is a set amount of work which is paid a basic rate; any work or production thereafter is paid according to bonus rates.

[10] P. 17. See also table 2 below.

[11] The national borders of Swaziland do not reflect what could be considered a Swazi tribal area which protudes extensively into the Eastern Transvaal. Ethnic affiliations across borders account for much of the mobility and presence of Swazi nationals in South Africa.

[12] Minimum earnings per shift for blacks increased from R0.42 per shift in 1972 to R2.50 in 1976, while average earnings per shift increases from R0.77 in 1972 to R3.38 in 1976. The most notable increase occurred in 1974 when earnings increased by more than 100 per cent over the previous year. Wages in 1977 were increased by only about 6 per cent over those in 1976.

[13] Two types of re-engagement certificates are issued: the 26 weeks and the 45 weeks certificates. The first is issued at the discretion of the mine concerned to those who have worked underground for a period of between 26-45 weeks and allows the miner to stay at home one week for every four worked. If he stays longer than the entitled period, the privilege of re-employment on the issuing mine expires. The 45 weeks certificate allows the miner to stay home for 6 months on completion of 45 weeks service.

[14] Our survey of 35 unsuccessful recruits showed that only 11 had no previous gold mining experience.

[15] Many rurally-based employers in the employer survey indicated that there was a notable trend for more school leavers to apply for work in the past few years.

[16] Clarke (1977b) notes that reinvestment in an economy reliant on labour reserves not only occurs on the basis of surpluses arising from within the capitalist sector, but that it is also dependent on the labour supply conditions, especially when labour can be obtained at below the cost of reproduction. He writes: "The overall level and rate of reinvestment in such

16 (cont'd)
economies is thus a function of two forms of accumulation. The form which is dependent on intersectoral articulation can be understood as primitive accumulation." (p. 11). In relation to "primitive accumulation" he continues: "... the following points appear essential: firstly, labour must exchange at a wage below its cost of subsistence and reproduction, and secondly, means for meeting the labour costs of subsistence and reproduction which are not provided from wage-labour must exist and be directed towards this purpose." (p. 12).

17 The Mozambique study <u>The Mozambican Mines</u> noted: "The weakening of the economic base of the peasant society due to the extraction of labour power from it on the one hand, and the creation of new consumption habits on the other, gradually turned the migrant labour system into a system reproducing itself and one of economic necessity." Nevertheless, it did find that for the peasants other than the very poorest, agriculture has improved and some of this improvement has been the result of accumulating mine earnings, not being possible for the very poor due to the fundamental nature of "primitive accumulation".

18 Although the lack of job opportunities was mentioned by many of the respondents in the various surveys, it seemed fairly clear that the lack of jobs related to jobs comparable to minework, particularly in relation to remuneration.

19 Personal communication from David Massey who is currently working on the National Migration Project in Botswana.

20 Personal communication from L.J.M. Van Drunen, engaged in an M.A. thesis based on a socio-anthropological study of migration in Lesotho.

21 There appears to be a peculiar economic relationship between the traditional cattle requirement and the cash "equivalent". In terms of cash value, cattle in the traditional agreement is much more than the acceptable cash substitute. This will obviously bias the younger, less traditionally inclined, towards paying a cash bride-price.

22 A strong factor in the decreasing length of contracts for the industry in general can be attributed to the changes which have occurred in the composition of mineworkers and their respective contract lengths. Malawian and Mozambican workers who have had the longest minimum contracts in the industry have been replaced by South African blacks with the shortest contracts (6 months).

23 The Rosen-Prinz Prinz study found that only 18 per cent of the migrants were household heads. One factor explaining some of this discrepancy is that the smaller NRDA homestead survey took place where much local work was proximate to home allowing regular return to homesteads over weekends.

[24] An interesting behavioural pattern has been noted by various researchers who claim that the propensity to exchange cattle into cash varies by district, thus in the southern part of the Shiselweni district, cattle tend to be more convertible than in northern Hho-Hho.

[25] The Human Resources Laboratory Monitoring Division of the Chamber of Mines Research Organization has over the past few years conducted continuing surveys of what now amounts to more than 2,000 mineworkers on the various groups' mines. The first results have been released (restricted) in Vol. 1, No. 1 "The Black Mineworker: Some of his characteristics and how he reacts to certain aspects of life on a mine". (July 1977).

[26] Recruitment by Swaziland employers through advertisement in the press or by radio has not proven very effective. University students when asked to comment on this behaviour said that little faith is attached to promises and some even protested that a description of wages and benefits as advertised by a prominent employer were "pure lies". It seemed that the only way to attract labour was for the tangible benefits of employment (e.g. increased wage packets for returned mineworkers) to percolate through the potentially mobile labour force in the rural areas. This may be an important explanation for the lagged response to improved conditions and wages in various sectors (particularly the South African mines and the Swaziland sugar industry).

[27] Van der Wiel found that the average length of time the Basotho migrant worker (mostly miners) spends outside Lesotho is between 13 years (for those in the Mountain zone) and 16 years (for those from the lowlands). The Mozambique study found that, in their samples, the worker-peasants, on average, spent 42-49 per cent of their working lives on the mines with only about one-quarter spending less than 30 per cent and another quarter spending nearly two-thirds of their working lives on the mines.

[28] The HRL report found that the more experienced a man was in mining, the more likely he was to have a larger number of dependants.

[29] The only mines which are known to have Swazis who fairly regularly return to Swaziland during contracts are in the Evander area, approximately 200 km. from Swaziland. Other "popular" mines for Swazis are too far for brief visits.

[30] Personal communication.

[31] This issue, which involves traditional rights to land, conditions on the mines and attitudes towards South Africa will be further discussed in my planned paper <u>Migrant Labour on the South African Gold Mines</u>, op. cit.

[32] The importance might be higher than these figures suggest because among the various reasons offered by some of the miners, high wages were invariably mentioned first.

[33] Those who are recruited to work on the South African mines have necessary travel formalities arranged for them by recruiting offices. Those who wish to work in other sectors must obtain passports to travel to South Africa, find an employer who will attest that a South African cannot be found to fill that position and then return to Swaziland for attestation with the Labour Department before being legally employed in South Africa.

[34] The survey covered 10 sugar plantations (including 2 mills), 2 citrus plantations, 1 forestry concern, 6 "other" farming establishments, 2 mining companies, 5 manufacturing firms, and 13 miscellaneous companies including hostels, banks, garages and other services.

[35] "Turnover" in this case also includes absenteeism where workers leave for ploughing and return with the hope of obtaining their previous employment.

[36] Nevertheless, the savings on infrastructural investment, family housing, etc. has made the perpetuation of the migratory labour system worthwhile for many employers.

[37] For Lesotho, A.C.A. van der Wiel (1977, p. 90) wrote: "The starting point paid by the mines is about 70 per cent of the income an average rural household requires per annum to satisfy their basic needs. It is estimated that approximately 55 per cent of mine labourers in 1976 received a salary in cash and kind below the poverty line."

[38] M.A. students from University of Utrecht attached with the University College of Swaziland for six months while working on a marketing survey of agricultural produce.

[39] One of the problems with this analysis is the difficulty of defining "traditional" roles, as it is virtually impossible to determine how adjustment to the effects of migration has influenced task distribution.

[40] The recommendations of the Ministers Meeting in November 1977 were to have been ratified in a subsequent meeting in February 1978 but so far the latter meeting has not yet been convened - thus the joint strategy still stands as a proposal.

[41] The policy recommendations under this heading will be detailed in my planned paper on Migrant Labour on the South African Gold Mines ..., op. cit.

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