

UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI

INSTITUTE OF DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

MANAGING DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION OF EX-COMBATANTS IN AFRICA: A CASE STUDY OF BURUNDI)

By

Pierre Claver NZISABIRA

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**A RESEARCH PROJECT SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
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DECLARATION

I declare that this research project is my original work and has not been presented for academic award or qualification in any institution of higher learning.


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Signature Date /05/2017

This research project has been submitted for Academic examination with our approval as the assigned University supervisor.

Dr Patrick Muthengi MALUKI

Signature Date ~~20/02~~ 2017

DEDICATION

To my beloved family

To the 'Zulus' who fell on the battlefield

5

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My sincere and deepest gratitude first and foremost goes to God, the Almighty, for His Great Love, protection and strength; He has enabled me to studies and complete my studies at university of Nairobi under the umbrella of the National Defence College after so many years of trying in vain.

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Sincere deep thanks and acknowledgements go to my dear wife Révocate NKUNDIMANA and my cherished children for their patience and every night prayers throughout the whole time spent at the National Defence College which will never be forgotten.

Last but not least, my sincere special thanks go to my fellow participants, 'The Sages', I am truly grateful for their understanding, prayers, support, encouragement and friendship.

May God richly bless you all and be with you always

ABSTRACT

Managing Disarmament, Demobilization and Reinsertion of Ex-Combatants at the term of an armed conflict reveals itself to be an imperative step to a strong process in peace rebuilding of a society torn by an internal war. The results of a successful procedure are crucial to recover and consolidate the peace and achieve socio-economic development of both the demobilized persons and the entire society. On the contrary, the failure of a DDR process leads to serious consequences such as a resurgence of violence, a return to hostilities and certainly the annihilation of a peace process already in place. Shortly after demobilization process in Burundi, a number of demobilized personnel became a lour unto themselves, languishing in poverty. This idleness was due to their laziness on the one hand and on the negligence of their former commanders on the other hand. Demobilized persons' unemployment and poverty was the cause of involvement of some of them in peace breach especially during electoral periods. This research work examines the extent to which DDR programs were conducted in African countries after an armed conflict. It focuses particularly on the behavior showed by Burundian politicians on both sides-the governmental party as opposed to the former fighting parties in the electoral period of 2005, 2010, and 2015; each side threatening to break into violence counting on a military force hanging somewhere in the civil population. The recall to demobilized personnel as a military force was also due to the fact that some politicians doubted of the future management of the public affairs for their proper interest, and that of their either ethnic group or political formation. The research was conducted in the light of the Conflict Transformation theoretical framework because the ultimate finality of a DDR program is to transform a bellicose behavior into a peaceful mindset, conflicts into a world of peace, reconciliation and hope for the future. Apart from secondary data in which this study resourced on the conduct of DDR programs in several African states, the questionnaire was used as a research instrument to collect information from Burundi demobilized Ex-Combatants. Qualitative and quantitative methods were applied to examine the views of the respondents on how they estimated the success and the failure of the program. The findings of the research revealed that firstly, some weapons were not handed in during the disarmament phase and were used later after the program in insecurity acts. Secondly, some of the demobilized personnel, who were not fully trained to conduct a survival business spoiled their allowances and soon sunk into need and poverty to the point of recurring to unorthodox means to earn a living. Finally, this study recommends to Ex-Combatants to transform their mindset and take full advantage of facilities offered by the DDR program. It recommends governments to carefully monitor the program on long and short periods because the failure of it may lead to recourse to violence. Recommendations go also to the implementation organs to consider the geostrategic setting where they are conducting the program, and give to the demobilized person the minimum to begin afresh a livelihood.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ADF:	Alliance Defending Freedom
ADRP:	Association of Donor Relations Professionals
AG:	Armed Group
APF:	Agence France Presse
BINUB:	UN Integrated Bureau in Burundi
CNDD-FDD:	National Council for the Defence of Democracy-Force for Defence of Democracy
CNDP:	National Congress for the Defence of the People
CONADER:	National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DRC)
DDRR:	Disarmament, Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration
EDRP:	Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (Bosnia)
Ex-FAR:	Ex-Forces Armées Rwandaises
FAB:	Burundi Armed Forces
FARDC:	Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo
FDLR:	Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (Former Rwandan Interahamwe)
FDN:	Force de Défense Nationale (du Burundi)
ICISS:	International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
IDDRS:	Integrated DDR-Standards
IPA:	International Peace Academy
ISS:	Institute for Security Studies (South Africa)
MC:	Militant Combattant
MDRP:	Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program

MDNAC:	Ministère de la Défense Nationale et des Anciens Combattants (or the Ministry of National Defence and War Veterans)
MODEL:	Movement for Democracy in Liberia (Liberian rebel movement)
MONUC:	Mission des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo
NDAP:	Nigeria Delta Amnesty Program
NDF:	National Defence Force (BURUNDI)
ONUB:	Operations des NU au Burundi
PBPU:	Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit (of the UNDPKO)
PMPA:	Partis et Mouvements Politiques Armés
PNB:	Burundi National Police
RCD/DRC:	Rally for Congolese Democracy
RDRC:	Rockaway Development & Revitalization Corporation
SMO:	Service Militaire Obligatoire
UNMIL:	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMIS:	UN Mission in Sudan
UNOSOM:	UN Operation in Somalia

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.0 Introduction

Good management of DDR of former fighters at the term of an armed conflict consists of collecting armament from unofficial holders, both organized militias and civilians who illicitly acquired them. After collection and disposal of the dangerous materials, the former holders are either integrated in the governmental defence and security bodies or resettled and rehabilitated into civilian life. DDR is a delicate process that requires attention of the implementing institution, the beneficiaries and the government in place. It also requires a payment of a certain allowance be it in cash or in-kind beside a promise to the ex-combatants of a better living away from fighting. DDR was carried out in several states including Burundi, Rwanda, DR Congo, Uganda, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Russia, India, and Bosnia Herzegovina; and has facilitated to manage armed conflict and sustain peace recovering and hence socio-economic development could be easily launched.

The program succeeded in some countries while it failed in some others. The significance of success refers to the fact that demobilized Ex-Combatants melted into the civil population and the former conflict is transformed into dialogue, understanding, reconciliation and full peace that allows socio-economic development. On the contrary, failure of the program leads to a revival of violence and the complete breakdown of the peace process. It is in this sense therefore that DDR as a delicate program of achieving peace has to be handled with care.

1.1. Background of the Study

Since independence (1962), Burundi, like some other African nations was devastated by civil wars that left her in a desolate situation at the turn of 2004. Even the elections that ensued thereafter did not show significant progress in the socioeconomic angle. In effect, it was the Global Ceasefire Agreement that was concluded in Tanzania on November the 16th 2003 between the Burundi Transitional Government and the principal armed movement, the CNDD-FDD which put an end to the fighting and marked the commencement of the official program of DDR. However, this procedure was initiated shortly before, in mid-June 2003 with the opening of the first cantonment.

The implementing institution was good to go although a common understanding and plan for restructuring the new defence and security corps and the demobilization process between the government and the rebel movements were not in place yet. Nonetheless, the agreement of the 2nd December 2002 when the first ceasefire was signed in Arusha stated that:

“The ceasefire is established throughout the territory of Burundi between belligerents as defined. The ceasefire will take effect on 30 December 2002. The first 14 days up to the day of the signing will allow belligerents to communicate their decisions to stop fighting to their troops from top to bottom of the hierarchy. On the 30 December 2002, all fighters would have completed their moves to the assembly areas”.¹

This calendar concerned however the signatories to the then peace agreement since the principal armed group CNDD-FDD signed the Global Ceasefire Agreement later in November 2003. Thus, the other smaller factions could not assemble alone since fighting was going on. They waited until relative security could allow settlement under auspices of the Africana Union peacekeeping contingents.

¹ Art I of the Ceasefire Agreement signed in Arusha on December 2nd 2002

The beginning was really challenging, but with the pressure of the actors in place and the will of the concerned parties, combatants gathered in the agreed locations so that the procedure could begin. Among other problems, the identification of the real combatants was challenging: for each party had the tendency of inflating the number of belligerents and the amount of weapons was very low compared to the number of fighters, specifically among the rebels. Step by step, the process went on, selections were conducted; ex-rebels were assembled in designated areas and governmental forces resumed their barracks. Healthy volunteer combatants integrated into the newly created National Defence Force and National Police, while disabled-physically and mentally- and others less interested in the army voluntarily submitted to the program, of demobilization and reinsertion into the civil economy.

Likewise, the governmental defence force had to clear its troops up. Indeed, the long civil war killed many soldiers of the Forces Armées Burundaises (FAB). Apart from soldiers who were buried -well or bad- several others were physically disabled, moving either on crutches or wheelchairs, and mentally disabled who had to be put outside the active fighting forces, and be reformed. At that time, some were permanently admitted in different state hospitals especially the Military Hospital; others were living in military camps where they could receive medical care with less hope for tomorrow. Nevertheless, at least they continued to get their monthly salary, while their counterpart, the ex-rebels were in total desolation, their poor bosses busy with other crucial matters, principally the execution of the ceasefire and the related formalities.

Apparently, almost all combatants were so tired that the cantonment procedure for demobilization was conducted without significant puzzles even if the nature, the quality and quantity of allowances to demobilized personnel remained at the discretion of the mediation and the donors. In other words, combatants of both sides had no more will to see the peace agreement

move backwards. Concerning the ex-rebels, around ten cantonment camps were settled, where aged men and women were living together, young men and girls including 'Kadogos'² who grew up on the battlefield, and who could not integrate into a professional life. UNICEF was prepared to take care of the younger persons notwithstanding the continuance of the process of DDR in general.

The problem of management of the demobilized persons was perceived in advance, and that was the reason why the department in their charge was put within the MoD. The scope was rather persuasive in the logic that ex-combatants could feel that they were still under martial rule and hence still behave like soldiers with strong discipline and respect towards order and hierarchy. In the first days, this policy seemed to work as relationships remained, on the one hand, between the demobilized living in the barracks and their former chiefs because the first were afraid being expelled from their shelters. On the other hand, ex-rebels were somehow ignorant of how the process was being conducted; they probably expected some allowances from the donors as convened, some incentive from their former authorities in reward of a struggle well fought to elevate them in power, and thereafter some other privileges that should be granted by the public administration via the MoD, their new sponsor.

Another problem that rose was that of the students of some universities who had also been on the battlefield to stand against the enemy. Indeed, when President Buyoya came again to power in 1996 after overthrowing President Ntibantunganya -elected by the parliament, he issued a decree that all students had to execute a compulsory military service before beginning university studies. When the students knew that manna was being distributed by the program of

² The term Kadogo, which means very small (Swahili-English Dictionary online) refers to child soldier since the wars in Uganda (1978-86), Rwanda (1991-94) and DRC (1996-98)

demobilization, they raised their noses and prepared demonstrations so as to claim their rights as former combatants. However, their voices could not go farther because the regulations of the Obligatory Military Service (SMO) were clear, yet that was not the time to put more fire on the ardent fire.

1.2. Statement of the Problem

Soon after the demobilization process, most of Burundi ex-combatants became a lout unto themselves as they were languishing in poverty. Some combatants resorted to unorthodox means of living and were often clashing with police while selected criminality based on armed robbery and revenge rose within the community. Most of everything, ex-combatants have showed great involvement in disrupting the electoral process, particularly in the 2015 unrest that preceded the general election. Therefore, there was a number of questions that needed to be clarified. The questions included weapons which were not surrendered at the disarmament stage; dissatisfaction of certain demobilized combatants as well as some of the politicians concerned with the peace process. Moreover, distrustful citizens still doubted in durable stabilization of the entire nation and better future for all even though there was no sign of another pretext to take up weapons.

This study seeks to know at what extent DDR was conducted in several African countries and, specifically in Burundi, to evaluate to what extent DDR played its core role of transforming the conflict into a long term consolidation of peace within a post-conflict peacebuilding framework. The study also intends to analyze the case of Burundi, that is the procedure itself and the repercussion of the program on the political and the socio-economic situation thereafter, so as to draw conclusion useful for an improved running of the program in the future.

1.3. Research questions

To study was steered by three research questions stated below:

1. To what extent DDR was conducted in Africa: successes and challenges.
2. How was DDR managed in Burundi: expectations, challenges and the way forward?
3. How should DDR be managed for the interest of the combatants and state?

1.4. Objectives of the research

Extensively, the objective of this research work is to analyze the extent to which Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants was conducted in Africa and in Burundi in particular.

The specific objectives are:

1. To identify the extent to which DDR was conducted in some African countries
2. To evaluate the extent to which DDR was managed in Burundi
3. To determine better ways of conducting DDR programs for the interests of both the state and the demobilized personnel.

1.5. Justification of the study

1.5.1. Academic justification

A great number of scholars have written about the subject of DDR, but it sounds important to shed a light to a deep examination of the insecurity situation that prevailed in Burundi in the last two years, where demobilized ex-combatants were pointed at for involvement in the unrest.

1.5.2. Policy justification

The ideal final objective of a well conducted DDR procedure is the restoration of peace lost because of an armed conflict, reconciliation among the component of one society, yesterday

however torn by hatred and misunderstanding, and logically socio-economic development which is supposed to follow afterwards. Therefore, the findings of this study will be very important to the society in that sense that governments and decision makers will have an added value to the planning and implementation of such a delicate procedure in the future, and concerned people will take cognizance about how they should claim their rights.

1.6. Literature review

The purpose of this section is to examine some important writings which are intimately correlated to this research work. This literature will help to understand the research work theoretically and to practically implement the results drawn out later in the conclusion. This section will cover the literature about conflict and conflict management, literature about DDR program and readings from Burundi DDR history.

1.6.1. Literature on conflict and conflict management

If only conflict was avoidable! Yet, parties to the conflict often know in advance that a conflict may arise at any time, so prevention would be the best solution, if only stakeholders should seriously consider the warning signs. Indeed, “early warning is a prelude to the identification of threats to the global peace and security, and this is necessary as early information would play a very vital role at preventing a conflict and averting threats to breach of peace and maintain security”.³

This sub-section gives a snapshot of writings related to the genesis and the evolution of a conflict, how scholars defined the concept, how they tried to set their propositions to end it as conflict and conflict management are both sides of the same coin. In effect, it would be absurd to

³ Boutros Boutros Ghali. *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peace Making, Peace Keeping*. New York, UN. 1992.

speak of DDR without showing that the process occurs at the term of or within a conflict. And then, it would not be enough to talk about a problem without proposing some ways to resolve it.

Mwagiru Makumi (2000) defines conflict as a consequence of the incompatibility of goals of different parties about a particular thing;⁴ or else, it is a state of affairs characterized by incompatible aspects of relationship that creates boundaries among communities.⁵ Steadman specifies that “conflict in Africa arises from troubles basic to all populations, distribution of resources, distribution of resources, access to power, different identities and thus when individuals and groups turn to violence with conflict taking the aspect of security and survival”.⁶

While William Zartman (2012) argues that conflict stems from human interdependency because for individual persons to satisfy to their elementary needs, they must rely on the active involvement of other persons,⁷ Dougherty and Pfaltzgraf (1981) point out that conflict is a condition in which one identifiable group of human beings, be it natural or superficial, is engaged in cognizant disagreement to one or more other particular groups because these groups are pursuing what are or appear to be incompatible goals.⁸ Machira Apollos (2012) speaks on the same wavelength. In his *Armed Conflict and the Law*, he notes that conflict may also refer to different things to distinct people. It often occurs when two or more parties believe that their interests are incompatible. And when this incompatibility is not reconciled positively, it most often leads to violence.⁹

⁴ Mwagiru, M. Conflict, Processes, and International Management, (Nairobi: Watermark, 2000)

⁵ Rahim, M.A., Managing Conflict in Organizations. Transaction Publishers. 2010. P. 16.

⁶ Steadman, R., The Joke's over. William Heinmann editions. 2006. P.4.

⁷ Zartman, W., The Slippery Slope to Genocid: Reducing Identity and Preventing Mass Murder. Oxford Scholarship online. 2012.

⁸ Dougherty, J.E. and Pfaltzgraf, R.Jr. Contending Theories of International Relations: a Comprehensive Survey. 2nd Ed. New York: Harper and Row. 1981. P181.

⁹ Machira, A. Armed Conflict and the Law. 2012

From the independence all the way to the 1993s, there was in Burundi, misunderstanding about issues related to security, individual identity, welfares, refugees, justice, inequality in the educational system, unclear past kept like a taboo, distribution of resources, brief the country's socio-political life among the different social classes. This confusion was exacerbated by a generalized anger among certain social classes to constitute the cause of conflict leading to the grabbing of weapons.

Hatungimana (2011) argues that the Burundi conflict main cause is poverty. He asserts that in a society where the great number of the populace hardly find their daily meal and where the youth cannot go to school for the reason that they are not able of financing their studies, they stand geared to do whatever thing so that they can buy their foodstuff. Political players who want to come to power take advantage of the youth in need and employ them in insurrection and rebel movement claiming tribal disagreement while their aim is really reaching power of ethnic conflict, while in reality the objective is to reach power and get rid of poverty. Statesmen who desire power maximize their efforts to keep on activating panic among members of the two principal ethnic groups: Hutu and Tutsi.¹⁰ Therefore, poverty activated by the thirst of power made the conflict grew so bigger that of the compromise, a peaceful solution was not possible.

Occasionally, as Hugh Miall cited by B.A. Okonofua (2012) posits that it may sometimes be possible to reach a historic appeasement resulting in the temporary abandonment or suspension of violence to allow peace to thrive temporarily.¹¹ This happens in case parties to the conflict reach an agreement before the conflict spreads. Such a case did not happen in Burundi although some approaches had been done namely the National Unity Accord of 1991.

¹⁰ Hatungimana, J., *The Cause of Conflict in Burundi*, Hoggskolan Dalarna University, 2011, P. 14

¹¹ Benjamin, A. Okonofua, I,2. *The Niger Delta Amnesty Program: The Challenges of transitioning from Peace Settlements to long Term Peace*. April-June 2016: 1-16.

There is recognition on the involvement of diverse actors in a conflict and conflict management. Wallenstein (2002) clarifies that the creation of social and political system that provides for a sensible social and political space to all groups in a society is crucial in the resolution of internal conflicts. Such creation is essential in internal conflicts concerns power distribution within the state.¹² Wallenstein's view point challenges the realist perception of politics that state are the only dominant actors with all the coercive powers to make other actors within their jurisdiction to comply with their dictates. It is not force that make peace, but the correction of the social and political structures.¹³

According to Cilliers (2013), regional organizations are the best suited arrangements for conflict prevention and management as they would confine prevention to that particular conflict locality, as they understand more about the conflict environment. This is because in the wake of inadequate and declining rapid response capability by the UN to conflicts in Africa, there is a need for a more localized approach to conflict prevention in Africa.¹⁴

In December 2015, Maluki gave an analysis on the unrest of Burundi following a crisis around a polemic of opposition parties hidden behind the civil societies that President Nkurunziza was illegally campaigning for a third term. The scholar argued that this (the crisis) was evident in the high number of who have aligned themselves with key actors across the political divide. The buildup of youth militia, leading to a highly militarized society, has created a tinderbox.¹⁵ Further, he observed that rising militarization of ethnic based militias, especially among youths

¹² Wallenstein, P., *Understanding Conflict Resolution*. (London: Sage Publishers, 2002). P. 133

¹³ Magero, P.L.K. *Refugees and Cross-border Political Conflicts*. Lambert Academic Publishing. 2010. P.11.

¹⁴ Cilliers, J., *Improving Africa and International Capabilities to Prevention and Resolving Violent Conflicts*. The GLR Crisis (2nd International Berlin Workshop 3-5 July 2013, Stifting Wissen)

¹⁵ Maluki, P., *Burundi Crisis Calls for Immediate Action*. December 9, 2015. The New Age

allied to rival Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups, is a clear indication of Burundi's possible descent into the club of failed states.

In his paper about the situation in Burundi in the mid 2015, the term youth referred to people who made use of fire weapons whether to attack their –so called enemies or protect themselves and their ethnic class. In that country of a thousand mountains and specifically in that period, youth included ex-combatants, both from ex-rebel movements and governmental forces demobilized ten years before, and those who regularly retired from the defence force. Moreover, youth had abandoned school in order to satisfy to political leaders' needs, and some members of civil societies who persuaded them that nothing should work if the President had not given up his project of remaining on power. Certainly, the “quick fix” nature of the Arusha Peace Accord seemed to have come back to haunt Burundi. The United Nations Refugee Agency estimated that by November, more than 200.000 people had fled Burundi in anticipation of ethnic conflict.¹⁶

However, as morality encourages anyone to him himself up whenever he falls, it shall be assumed that the end state of conflict management is to realize political settlement empowering the means of some key factors that are sufficiently strong to exercise pressure on the parties to the conflict to resolve or to direct the unavoidable disagreement into suitable channels.¹⁷ In addition, efforts of management should be directed towards maximizing its prospective gains and minimizing its distractive consequences.¹⁸ Henceforth, all parties to the Burundi conflict had accepted DDR as one of the means to definitely end with the nightmares of an intestine war,

¹⁶ Ibid

¹⁷ Benjamin, A. Okonofua, I,2. The Niger Delta Amnesty Program: The Challenges of transitioning from Peace Settlements to long Term Peace. April-June 2016: 1-16.

¹⁸ Bercovitch, J. and Houston, A., “The Study of International Mediation. Theoretical issues and Empirical Evidence” in J. Bercovitch (ed) Resolving International Conflicts: the Theory of Practice of Mediation, (London: Lynne Rienner Publ., 1996), PP11-35.

forget about bitter past and just focus on the future, a promising future for peace and reconciliation through a pact of living together and sharing the best and the worst.

1.6.2. Literature about DDR

The concept of DDR refers to a number of systematically conducted actions generally after an armed conflict with the aim of peace recover and subsequent socio-economic development. The main actions are Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration. Over the last two decades, DDR programmes were conducted in more than thirty countries. Above two million and a half people were scheduled and participated in some form of demobilization all over the world since 1989. Such operations cost more than 600 million dollar per year.¹⁹

Globally, demobilization shall be comprehended as the opposite of recruitment (which refers to mobilizing) of combatants for an AG which militarily requires either disbanding the armed unit, downsizing its combatants' number; thus the procedure stands for a provisional phase before the whole of the armed forces, whether regular or irregular are reassembled. Disarmament then refers mainly to the fact of removing weapons used by those personnel, and the arms have to be given back to the authorities who generally are in charge of their storage, redistribution or obliteration. Reintegration on the other hand deals with the process by which ex-combatants obtain civilian status and are admitted to civilian type of employment and revenue. Notwithstanding that reintegration is part of each state's responsibility, it often necessitates external assistance. Assessing the process of that program, Crocker argues that "The central part of the trouble is to substitute the rule of men and weapons by the rule of law and institutions".²⁰

¹⁹ Muggah, R., *Security and Post-Conflict Reconstruction. Dealing with Fighters in the Aftermath of War.* Routledge, New York, USA, 2009.

²⁰ Crocker, (2005).P. 60

In the same perspective, Ban Ki-Moon proposes that to step forward from ceasefire agreement also requires keeping, enforcing and building peace.

For Abdullah, a soldier to be demobilized is to handle with care from the beginning of the process to further time until he is completely integrated in his new environment. He explains that demilitarization processes extremely threaten fighters and generate worry; produce fear and insecurity for those processes destroy the community system the combatant has for long been relying on. The loss of this societal network gives birth to a great sense of insecurity for former fighters. Therefore, by the DDR course, former soldiers drop down their social status, their common logic of belonging, their sense of greatness, their earnings or access to basic needs, their supporting network and their identity.²¹

That is the reason why the DDR process should not stand alone without other subsequent measures to support it and hence avoid a return of ex-combatants to grab again weapons and resume fighting. This is what Allan Bryden explains in differentiating DDR from SSR (Security Sector Reform), pointing that beside DDR process, SSR aspires to transform institutions of government and even notions of security. In his view, the DDR and SSR programs offer opportunities to design and mutually reinforce early peace building interventions which augment capabilities to achieve more with less.²² Gleichmann's statement is more explicit on this point: Security Sector Reform "is fundamental to the DDR process... Obviously, disarmament procedures must go together extra programs that offer enlarged security with the goals of SSR being the creation of effective accountable forces and supporting structures to provide security to

²¹ Abdullah, I., Youth, Culture and Rebellion: Understanding Sierra Leone's Wasted Decade, *A Journal of South-North Cultural and Media's Studies*: 16(2) 2002. Pp. 19-37.

²² Bryden, A. and Scherrer, V., *Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration and Security Sector Reform*. (DCAF). 2012. Pp. vii-viii

people”.²³ Logically, former combatants have to be able to earn a livelihood throughout lawful means²⁴ otherwise they are more prone to return back to the state of warfare in the absence of gainful employment opportunities.²⁵ Moreover, it is the strong conviction of the UN that there is a dire need to switch combatants who track the objectives through force into civilians who chase their objectives through other means.²⁶

1.6.3. Literature about Burundi Combatants and DDR program

This subsection consists of two parts: one giving an insight of Burundi combatants in the ancient times and an overview of the national army after the 1962 independence. It describes the involvement of the governmental defence force in several massacres of hundreds of citizens under three different republics. The second part sheds a light on the profile of the combatants after the Arusha Peace Accords. These include ex-rebels, referred to as ex-PMPA, and the governmental called FAB.

1.6.3.1. Historical background of combatants in Burundi

The history of Burundi combatants dates from the pre-colonial period. Even though Hutus and Tutsis were living together in harmony, they naturally felt they were different as per their ethnic essence. This study finds it very important to give an overview of the history of Burundi Armed competition which culminated in cyclical fratricidal wars, even genocide. Dr Rene Lemarchand (2009) accuses Rwandans of having sowed the bad seed of killing. He writes:

²³ Gleichmann, C., Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: A Practical Field and Classroom Guide. Frankfurt a M., Germany. Pp 21-43.

²⁴ Ballentine, Karen and Nitzchke. The Political Economy of Civil War and Conflict Transformation. Berghof Research Center for constructive Conflict Management. Berlin. 2005. and Kingman(2000: 183)

²⁵ Collier, P., and Anke, H., Greed and Grievance in Civil War. Oxford Economic Papers 56 No 4 (2004)

²⁶ United Nations, 2000: 11. US.

Between 1950 and 1960, the Belgian colonizer left their colonies which comprised Burundi, Rwanda and Congo-Kinshasa, mass and then a revolution led by Hutus broke in Rwanda. Hordes of Hutus did away with the Tutsi monarchy and with the support of Belgium, held democratic elections. The newly elected Hutu in Rwanda massacred some 50,000 Tutsis and as a consequence, destabilized Burundi²⁷.

This happened just two years or so before the independence of Congo (Kinshasa), Burundi and Rwanda. Shortly after the Burundi flag had replaced the Belgian one Rwagasore Louis, the Prince and hero of the independence was murdered by his fellow Tutsis, helped by Belgians who were persuaded that he was not eager on the one hand to let Belgians neo-colonize that country, on the other hand, facilitate Tutsis dominate Hutus. At that time, King Mwambutsa IV (Rwagasore's father) was ruling Burundi from Switzerland and his successor Ntare V Charles Ndizeye was assassinated younger.

Elderly Burundians acknowledge that in the 1965, Hutu officers were more numerous than Tutsi in the army, but wonder how they disappeared. René Lemarchand argues that in October 1965, Hutu officers were accused of attempting a coup, and thus, hundreds of them were massacred by Tutsis who then took complete control of the army and police. In 1966, Captain Micombero conducted a military coup which removed the monarchy; and his regime was naturally brutal. In September 1969, the remaining of Hutu officers were again accused of attempting a coup. In response, around fifty thousand people of the Hutu ethnic group who were associated with the political movement that was accused of attempting the coup were slaughtered by the members of

²⁷ Lemarchand, R., *The Dynamics of Violence in the Central Africa*. University of Pennsylvania Press. 2009. P 2.

the army and police, together with the entire Hutu political leadership that was executed.²⁸

Scenarios that followed were amazing rather than terrifying. Kiraranganya describes the facts:

“In May 1972, the small, overpopulated and poverty-stricken Burundi state experienced massive bloodletting ... however, the degree of the carnage of 1972 is incomparable in the tumultuous history of that country. Despite the fact that the number of victims shall be never revealed, they were comprised between a hundred and fifty thousand and three hundred thousand, so as to lessen a confusing dramatic scene to its simplest common denominator. Almost all of those massacred originated from the Hutu ethnic group representing nearly 80%, while their tormentors were minutely selected from the minority Tutsi group that represented only 15% of the whole Burundian population. In that time, were holding the entire command of the army and control of the government.”²⁹

The massacre was followed by massive refugee flows to Rwanda, Zaire, Tanzania and other countries. It is then in refugee camps that were born Hutu political party allegiance with military branch such as Frolina and Palipe Hutu.³⁰ These AGs ‘without weapons’ attempted to attack governmental defence forces several times, but repeatedly failed. The Frolina was based in Tanzania’s refugee camps, was dominated by people from the Southern Burundi, and likely used to attack from the Southern regions of the country. On the other side, Palipe Hutu was prosperous in Rwanda and seemingly was more nationalist, used to attack from the North.³¹

However, when President Melchior Ndadaye (a Hutu and the first President to be democratically elected) was elected in June 1993, he made a mistake to assure Tutsis-who had just ceded him power- that he mastered those AGs; or rather, those groups had no real clout to undermine the security of the Burundian nation. On that chapter, Perpétue Nshimirimana later noted that from the murder of October 21, 1993 of the first President democratically elected in the history of

²⁸ Ibid. P.2

²⁹ Kiraranganya, B.F.? *La Vérité sur le Burundi*. 1985. P. 79.

³⁰ Frolina is the abbreviation for National Liberation Front, and Palipe Hutu stands for Party for the Liberation of the (Hutu) People.

³¹ Hatungimana, J., *The Cause of Conflict in Burundi*, Hogskolan Dalarna University, 2011. P. 14

Burundi, Melchior Ndadaye, mass killings have targeted many people of Hutu origin, in particular, executives of this group.³² Benjamin Mokoena wrote that some Burundian politicians think that the discrediting of the Palipe Hutu as a political and armed movement was one of the numerous reasons of the assassination of the President, because there no one else to fly to his rescue.³³ Later after the massacres, with the support of the soldiers who had deserted the army and training centers as well as some elements of the national intelligence service, the traditional rebels, including the Palipe Hutu and the Frolina constituted a strong combat unit. Unfortunately, the newly formed coalition split into smaller groups over time because of misunderstanding in leadership and ideology.

1.6.3.2. Literature on Burundi combatants and DDR program

Documentation on Burundi DDR process can be found in various reports of the United Nations and African Union through their missions for monitoring ceasefire agreement and subsequent accords. Beside some scholars who tried their best to give their perception about the process, from its roots up to the challenges it experienced, Allan Bryden and Vincenza Scherrer gave a succinct overview of the conduct depicting successes and failures to DDR in general and major challenges the process underwent in Burundi in particular.

Among others, the main defy of the DDR practice in Burundi were the absence of a peace agreement and a ceasefire framework that integrated all the conflicting parties. Although military disarmament and demobilization had been a great achievement, still economic concerns, regional insecurity and the pending full political arrangements hampered the long term reinsertion and reintegration of former fighters.

³² Nshimirimana, P., *Assassinat du Président élu Melchior Ndadaye : Vingt Ans après le Carnage Ignoré des Cadres de la Démocratie Naissante*, Novembre 2013. P.1.

³³ Mokoena, BPO., *The Conflict and Peace in Burundi: Exploiting the Causes and Nature of the Conflict and the Prospects for Peace*. 2006. P. 30.

Delays in conducting the DDR procedure put indeed many ex-combatants in debts; and as a consequence, demobilized personnel resolved to not only sell their reintegration packages for cash, but also to contribute to acts of insecurity at the community level leading to some demobilized combatants to join other armed groups that had not yet joined the ceasefire agreement-namely the FNL, while others were reported by security organs to be causative of the violence in North Kivu in neighboring DRC.

DDR in Burundi and other countries where the program has taken place was meant to resolve the conflict for a more or less long term. But surveys on that matter by scholars including Allan Bryden et al, Nicole Ball et al and others found the results were quite different. Gilligan asserts that by exploiting a disruption in the DDR transfers in Burundi, the in-kind allowances permitted beneficiary ex-combatants to alleviate poverty and improve their livelihoods. Even though their conclusion was that the program was a success to achieve economic reintegration, yet they mentioned no outcome on ex-combatants' general fulfillment and attitudes towards norms.³⁴

1.7. Theoretical framework

The study employed *Conflict Transformation theory* to appraise the management of DDR in Africa. The DDR program refers to a process of demilitarizing official and unofficial armed groups by controlling the possession and use of small arms, by disbanding non-state AG and rightsizing state security services. It also assists former combatants to integrate whether the national defence force, or reintegrate into civilian life. On the whole, the aim of this assistance, in addition to the demilitarization and civil reintegration of a former combatant is a shift from a

³⁴ Gilligan, M., Mukiyeh, E., and Samii, C., Reintegrating Rebels into Civilian Life: A Quasi-Experimental Evidence from Burundi. *Journal of conflict Resolution*. 57(4). Pp. 598-626

domain to another through a series of transformational procedures. The Berghof Foundation defines Conflict Transformation as a broad, comprehensive term that refers to actions and processes looking for modifying the various characteristics and manifestations of violent conflict by addressing the original sources of a particular conflict over the long term. Conflict transformation intends to transform negative destructive conflict into positive constructive conflict and deals with structural, behavioral, and attitudinal aspects of conflict.³⁵ The concept refers to both the process and the completion of the process. Once As such, it incorporates the activities of processes such as conflict prevention and conflict resolution and goes beyond conflict settlement or conflict management.³⁶ According to Mulu, the concept of conflict transformation denies to put forward the idea that we simply eliminate or control conflict, but rather recognize and work with its dynamic nature. When it occurs, it changes or transforms those events, people, and relationships to the conflict and back to the people and relationships.³⁷

The Institute for Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding (ICP) believes that:

In contrast to conflict resolution, conflict transformation doesn't simply aim at resolving the disagreement in a conflict background. It seeks as well to address structural and social deep roots of the conflict by notorious inequalities and the restoration of good relations among human beings, and it makes use of ethical and value-based dimensions. As conflict transformation is primarily a mindset rather than only a tool or an approach, it needs to be, as of our three "Cs", Comprehensive, Compassionate, and Creative".³⁸

The definition of the theory of Conflict Transformation logically espouses they motto of Burundi politicians in the post-conflict period, that '*the force used to destruct the country would be tenfold to rebuild it*'. The choice of this theory was mostly inspired by academics and practionners Galtung and Lederach.

³⁵ Austin, Alex, Fischer, M., and Ropers, N., (eds) Transforming Ethno-political Conflict. The Berghof Handbook, Wiesbaden. 2004464-466.

³⁶ Ibid

³⁷ Mulu, The Role of Regional Organizations in Conflict Management: IGAD and the Sudanese Civil War. 2008. P x

³⁸ ICP: About Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding at ICP web icp.ch.

In his transcend hypothesis, Galtung proposes twelve actions to be taken into account for the conflict transformation theory, practice and processes. Concretely, the first thing to do would be mapping the conflict formation; this means that all parties, all goals and all issues have to be identified. Then, parties put aside however with important stakes in the conflict should be brought tom stage, in a manner or another, so that no party, even the less significant to be left behind. After identifying all the parties to the conflict, the following step would be to drive extremely empathic talks with all parties singly. At this level, each conflict worker may specialize on one conflict party. For Galtung, a worker refers to the conflict transformation agent, the third part to the conflict who plays the role a preserver. The workers will then, in these dialogues identify acceptable goals in all parties and bring in forgotten goals that may open new perspectives. The academician hopes to arriving at overarching goals acceptable to all parties and at short, evocative, goal-formulations. The next step would be helping define the tasks for all parties with that goal in mind; disembedding the conflict from where it was, embedding it elsewhere, bringing in forgotten parties, goals. At this level, shall follow verifying how realizing that goal would realize parties' goals. Definitely, all the process would have helped parties meet at the table for self sustaining process before withdrawing from the conflict, go on to the next, being on call.³⁹

According to Search for Common Ground, conflict transformation initiatives are often characterized by longtime horizons and interventions at multiple levels, aimed at changing perceptions and improving communication skills addressing the roots of conflict, including inequality and social injustice⁴⁰ whereas Transconflict regards conflict not as an isolated event,

³⁹ Galtung, J., *The Transcend Method at a Glance (P5) In: Conflict Transformation by Peaceful Means*, United Nations. 2000. (at Transcend.org)

⁴⁰ Search for common Ground

but as an integral part of the transformation of the whole range of societal relationships. Therefore, the concept of Transconflict endeavors to respond to the changing social, regional and international context and their implications for the dynamics of conflict.

The latter institution proposes a set of principles of conflict transformation, but the first six suit to help to define the theory. It explicates that conflict should neither be looked up on as a cut off event that can be resolved or managed, but an integral part of society's on-going evolution and development.

Advocates of the theory consider that conflict transformation surpasses a simple search of means of containing and managing a conflict, but rather a way of transforming instead the basic foundations of a given conflict in a long term, gradual and complex process, that necessitates in addition constant commitment and interaction. They believe indeed that this theory is a mode of thinking, a manner of trying to understand the conflict itself as it is principally not just an approach and set of techniques, but a way of thinking about and understanding conflict itself as it is particularly intended for uncompromising conflicts, in which entrenched concerns fuels protracted violence.⁴¹

The conflict transformation theoretical framework was preferred to other theories including the conflict theory and other more theories because the best finality of the DDR program should be the transformation of the torn society into a hub of peace. The conflict theory refers in fact to perspectives in sociology and social psychology that highlight the social, political, or material inequalities of a social group, that critique the broad socio-political system, or that detract from structural functionalism and ideological conservatism.⁴² This one just cites sources and causes of

⁴¹ Mial, H., *Conflict Transformation: A Multi-Dimensional Task*. Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation.

⁴² Marx, K., *Social Conflict Theory*. (1851) edited by M. Dobb. London: Lawrence & Wishart. 2010

conflict but doesn't propose a remedy to them. On the contrary, the conflict transformation theory, especially in the Islamism approach, refers to the strength deriving from submitting together to a common goal, including the concrete responsibility for the well-being of all.⁴³ therefore, in a setting of conflict management such as in the present study, the most difficult matter was to make the parties to the conflict to get a common sense on the significance of the theory so as to effectively help to transform a devastative conflict into a hub of peace, and to endorse peace rather than violence, and the principle of hope.⁴⁴

1.8. Hypotheses

The study was conducted on basis of the following assumptions:

1. The success or failure of DDR program directly impinge on the long term peace building prospects for any society in a post armed conflict period.
2. Well conducted DDR and its achievements led to security recovery in African countries.
3. The insecurity that prevailed in Burundi from 2005 up to date is partly due to gaps in the management of DDR.

1.9. Research methodology

1.9.1. Introduction

This section describes the structure, the tools and the methods that were used in the present research work. A suitable research methodology is based on a precise set of principles and aspects. The aim of this section is hence to assess and choose the most appropriate methodologies suitable to the needs dictated by the objectives of the research. And as stated

⁴³ Op cit

⁴⁴ Galtung, J., The Transcend Method at a Glance (P5) In : Conflict Transformation by Peaceful Means, United Nations. 2000. (at Transcend.org)

above, the core objective of the study is to examine the extent to which DDR was conducted in various African countries and especially in Burundi.

1.9.2. Research design

Research design is a detailed plan outlining how the research assumptions can be tested or the method used to test the assumptions. The activities and steps that were taken in this study were based on the questionnaire as a research instrument. The questionnaire was directed to demobilized personnel and administration officers in a case study design. In effect, the case study design permitted the researcher to emphasize on a full contextual analysis of fewer condition or events, and their interactions⁴⁵ in this particular context of Burundi. As of Bennet and Elman, a case study design is preferably used in social sciences because it provides a good plan for responding to the research question. Therefore, respondents to the questionnaire in the present study were able to give insights of their real life and occupation that helped to deeply understand the problem under study.

1.9.3. Target population

According to Mugenda and Mugenda, a population is defined as an aggregate of all cases that conform to some designated set of specification".⁴⁶ In the present study, the target population was on the first level demobilized ex-combatants, and their administrative managing board, that is the Direction General of War Veterans of the MDNAC. Other interesting persons were the official of the BINUB AU as well as the ministry in charge of vulnerable persons. Their reports appear amply rich as they were written in time and place of the DDR process.

⁴⁵ Cooper, W. & Schender, D., *Approaches to social Research*. New York: Oxford University Press. 2006.

⁴⁶ Mugenda, O. and Mugenda, A. *Research Methods: Quantitative and Qualitative Approach*. Nairobi: ACTS Press Publisher.

1.9.4. Sample and sampling techniques

Dealing with all the target population is not an easy task; that is the reason why working on a sample is better and practical for any research work. Since the study is about managing demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants in Africa in general and Burundian ex-combatants in particular, sampling departed from the total number of 56,000 estimated former fighters, to interview 1/1000, that will make 56 people, plus 4 Officers from the MDNAC. The aim was that all the classes were consulted, that is, former fighters who have several physical handicap, those who are members of associations that still work to date, women and ex-child soldiers and others.

1.9.5. Data collection method

Primary data was collected from ex-combatants who were beneficiaries of the DDR program, and officers of the managing board, along with secondary data that was collected from books, journals, and other published reading materials such as done in the literature review. Primary collection method was conducted using both qualitative and quantitative research methodologies, through a well elaborated questionnaire. Secondary data was supposed to help the researcher to understand more broadly about the subject matter and narrow his scope straight to the specific goals of the present study. Primary data constituted the building blocks of the research in that sense that it was obtained from the directly concerned persons and hence, it is meant to inspire more confidence to the reader and the final user.

1.9.6. Validity and reliability

For an instrument to be valid, it must be reliable, meaning that, the instrument should measure exactly what the researcher investigates. Here, measuring refers to the number of persons who

will adhere to the idea that will be launched in the question they would be answering to as the researcher would have set it.

Validity refers to the extent to which the information that the researcher would have collected truly reflects the phenomenon being studied.⁴⁷ Hence, in the present study, validity is attested by the persons who provided the information; that is, those who experienced the procedure of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. Reliability on the other hand is the extent to which research findings would be the same would if the research would be repeated at a later date or with different sample of subjects. Therefore, the information gathered with the aid of a questionnaire responded to the problem under study, that is the ups and downs of the DDR program in Burundi.

1.9.7. Data analysis and presentation

According to Mugenda and Mugenda, data analysis is the bringing of order to the information collected''.⁴⁸ The researcher analyzed the collected data using document analysis and thematic analysis techniques founded on present and coming up issues in the research. The document analysis, which refers to a qualitative approach, helped the researcher to discover how well or bad the whole procedure was conducted, how the beneficiaries themselves took profit from the program, at what extent the national institutions can evaluate today the procedure in terms of successes and failures. Moreover, the thematic analysis will be useful to give meaning to different aspects of the subject matter under study. The results of the research were clearly presented, both in tables and prose and in a flow that facilitate the reader to understand the content of the whole work.

⁴⁷Golafshani, N. Understanding Reliability and Validity in Qualitative Research, University of Toronto, Canada, 2003.559

⁴⁸Op cit

1.9.8. Ethical consideration

The present study process is founded on theories learned through everyday lectures and theoretical writings, and firmly adheres to norms and rules acknowledged by teaching institutions. The researcher commits himself to apply the theory of research methods and methodologies, and to take seriously into account the instructions and observations of the supervisor.

The researcher commits himself to be in physical contact with the resource persons, that is, the respondents to the questionnaire so as to give them directives to answer to questions, to assure them of the confidential character of their identity as related to the answers given, and to persuade them of the utility of such an academic work.

1.10. Scope and limitation

The scope of this study will be limited to the content of the management of the process of DDR in Africa in general and Burundi in particular. Ways of a better process will be proposed as from the conclusions drawn from the lessons learnt. However, according to Mugenda and Mugenda, researchers should never hesitate to state limitations because there is no study that is as perfect as it never lacks limitations.

The present research was limited by:

The lack of enough adequate data related to the subject. After visiting several libraries and several internet sites, the researcher found that a few people have worked on the subject in complete works, specifically on Burundi DDR process.

It was obviously difficult for the researcher to work on a good sample because the demobilized persons are scattered throughout the country and the researcher could not summon all of them at a time and in one place as the distance between the institute and the field is quite long.

Communication also posed a great challenge to the study because the majority of those unfortunate people speak less English or are simply illiterate to give wanted and satisfactory considerations; that is the reason why the questionnaire was translated into Kirundi language for a better communication and comprehension.

Chapter outline

This section states how the different chapters making this work are constructed. The first chapter presents the background of the study, states the problem of the research, highlights the objectives, records the supporting literature, and refers to a theoretical framework that shapes the study and the research methodology. Chapter two is concerned with the demobilization process as conducted in some African countries such as Nigeria, Uganda, Rwanda, Somalia, and Liberia. Chapter three enters inside the matter, showing the insights of the DDR process in Burundi in the 2004s, how it was conducted, and the expectations of the demobilized, the forces and challenges as well as the actual situation after ten years. In chapter four, the study critically analyses the lessons learnt in DDR programs particularly in Burundi, and gives propositions of better managing DDR. Finally, chapter five summarizes the findings, concludes the whole research work and provides recommendations.

CHAPTER TWO

MANAGING DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION IN AFRICA

2.0. Introduction

The process of disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration generally takes place after an armed conflict period. In that sense, DDR is part and parcel of peace recovering processes and peacekeeping operations. Nicole Ball and Luc van de Goor (2006) argue that, DDR should be viewed as part of a wider security, stabilization, and recovery strategy, rather than an unconnected intervention.⁴⁹ In case peace doesn't hold in a country, former fighters may rapidly return to fighting for they can take advantage of the program. On the other hand, the involvement of the international community is important for both material support and technical assistance. Dimitry Titov (2015) argues that a successful DDR program depends on obvious and concise political information which has to be sustained by outfitted coherence, and that expresses the international will to provide with help and the ability to scheme its potentials on diverse fronts instead of simply relying on military operation.⁵⁰

As a matter of fact, the program has to be monitored and sustained for a relatively longer time to avoid back recourse to the conflict. In addition, the implementation agents have to pay attention to neighboring countries which can derail the process. Nicole Ball et al give the example of South Sudan where, while phase one of DRR was going on after Comprehensive Peace

⁴⁹ Ball, N. & V. Goor, L., Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: Mapping Issues, Dilemmas and Guiding Principles. CIP, Netherland's Institute of International Relations. Aug 2006. P. 5.

⁵⁰ Mr. Titov? D., in a Preface of Cockayne: UN DDR in an Era of Violent Extremism. UN University. 2015.

Agreement was signed in 2005, cross-border recruitment of Sudanese child soldiers by Uganda's Lord's Resistance Army was still continuing.⁵¹

This study took interest to work on African DDR program because the continent suffered-and still suffers from wars more than other areas of the world. The Hawkins publications state that by 2007, war on earth had such rates as: 2% in Europe, 1% in the Middle East, 8% in Asia and 88% in Africa.⁵² The publisher informs that it is not surprising that the most fatal conflicts of the beginning of the 21st century were taking place in the African continent including Angola, the DRC, Sierra Leone and Ethiopia-Eritrea. He is disappointed that the repercussions of those quarrels have never been covered by any media. James Cockayne and Siobhan O'Neil state that most of current conflicts hit the world's poorest countries which, in addition to economic challenges, endure fragile governmental capacity.⁵³

Hence, this chapter analyses how the process of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration was conducted and managed in some countries of the African continent, and attempts to assess the degree of success that this program has achieved. Specific countries that grabbed the attention of the researcher include Angola, Nigeria, DRC, Liberia, Rwanda, Somalia and Uganda. The study of management of DDR in African countries after conflict was conducted in the framework of conflict transformation, and shows how ex-combatants have to change their vision and their behavior, shifting from living in the name of weapons to finding a legitimate livelihood, once reintegrated into the local economy.

⁵¹ Op cit

⁵² Hawkins, 2008, New World Map. US. Posted on 30 December 2008 and visited on 22 October 2016.

⁵³ UN DDR in an era of Violent Extremism: Is it Fit for Purpose? United Nations University. 2015

2.1. DDR in Rwanda

The Rwandese Demobilization and Reintegration Commission (RDRC) was established in 1997 by the government of the Republic of Rwanda. Its mandate was to oversee the planning and implementation of Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Program (RDRP). Actually, the RDRP is still busy with its 3rd phase that commenced in early 2009. The program is concerned with about 42,500 persons. Its objectives are to demobilize and reintegrate certain soldiers of its defence force, members of former armed groups (AG) including adults, women combatants and child soldiers, support reintegration of the former Forces Armées Rwandaises (ex-FAR) sustain the social and economic reintegration of vulnerable former fighters, ease reallocation of the public sector expenses from defence sector to socio-economic sectors; and prop up the reinsertion of dependents of members of former AGs.⁵⁴ In this way, it appears that RDRC went beyond the general mission of such a commission because it also touched families of ex-armed groups' members as they were demobilized.

Rwanda conducted the program in the view of contributing to peace and stability in the Great Lakes Region (GLR), particularly in Rwanda and DRC, through the completion of the DDR process or the rest of the Rwandan AGs and the further downsizing of the RDF. It is important to note that ex-FAR and other armed groups refer to combatants who were caught in the Eastern DRC during the expeditions of Rwandan forces to hunt down the rebels who were on the Congolese territory in the 1996-1998 years, ready to carry out incursions in Rwanda.

The program of DDR in Rwanda was launched by the country itself in 1997 before international organizations ingested in the process. Indeed, the program didn't begin immediately with the end of the internal war of 1994; it however took place within the process of forced repatriation of

⁵⁴ Rwanda Ministry of State in Charge of Community Development and social Affairs(Report of 30/9/2016)

members of militias and ex-FAR from the eastern DRC where they had fled to escape from Rwanda justice.

The particularity of Rwanda DDR was that it was extended beyond the country boundaries, and concerned ex-combatants together with members of their respective families. It also went beyond the general meaning of the concept of demobilization as it concerned pure civilians, with the aim of curing them the animosity of genocide and inculcate into them the (RPF) Rwanda Patriotic Front's ideology. Therefore, every person who had to be demobilized had to attend a special program conducted in what is known as '*Ingando*' solidarity camps. Chi Mgbako argues that the Rwanda Patriotic Front ruling party has recourse to the use of '*Ingando*', meaning 'solidarity camps' with a double objective: that of sowing seeds of pardon and reconciliation, and that of disseminating pro-RPF dogma employing political indoctrination. The government encouraged or required Rwanda nationals from diverse walks of life- students, politicians, church leaders, ex-combatants, ex-soldiers, prostitutes, genocidaires, 'gacaca' judges and other citizens to take part in *Ingando* for periods ranging from days to several months, to learn about government planning and programs, Rwandan history, and unity and reconciliation.⁵⁵

The distinctiveness of Rwanda DDR also goes hand in hand with the principles of conflict transformation in the sense that it advocated for change. Indeed, Search for Common Ground posits that conflict should not be comprehended exclusively as an inherently negative and destructive occurrence, but rather as a potentially positive and productive force for change if harnessed constructively.⁵⁶ In this regard, forced repatriation of Rwandese 'negative forces'

⁵⁵ Mgbako, C., *Ingando Solidarity Camps: Reconciliation and Political Indoctrination in Post-Genocide Rwanda*. Harvard Human Rights Journal, 2005. Vol.18, P.202.

⁵⁶ Search for Common Ground

aimed at changing their fears into hope, calling them to go back to their native country to reconstruct it and reconcile with their kinsmen.

However, Chi Mgbako is afraid of the future outcome of that other form of reintegration. Persuaded that a successful reconciliation program has to take place in a society that values human rights, she notes that “we cannot evaluate Ingando in isolation from human rights developments in Rwanda. Ingando will fail as reconciliation mechanisms so long as the government of Rwanda goes on to bother public sphere of independent opinion and criticism.⁵⁷ Indeed, the program was designed and tailored to the measure of the “*defeated*”, that is, those ex-FAR soldiers who were accused of genocide from inside the state and tried by the ‘gacaca’ courts, those rebels who were captured in DRC, and those who surrendered to the Rwandan government and sought protection and job. Moreover, weapons were not handed in voluntarily by combatants, but were seized by the defence forces at the battlefield. If the DDR program succeeded inside the country, it may be assumed that it is because the RPF neutralized the rebels in DRC and put them out of harm’s way, otherwise, if fighting should resume, the program is likely to resume too.

2.2. DDR in Uganda

In Uganda, the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Program commenced with the 2000 Amnesty Act: an act to provide for a reprieve for its citizens who took part in activities of warfare nature in several areas of the Ugandan territory and for other connected purposes.⁵⁸ The program targeted about 28,800 rebels from AGs namely the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF). Here again, the demobilization process took place within

⁵⁷ Ibid, P203.

⁵⁸ The Amnesty Act. 2000. Pl.

the war, instead of occurring at the end of the armed conflict, in contrast to the definition of Muggah that, the concept of DDR refers to a number of systematically conducted actions generally after an armed conflict with the aim of peace recovery and subsequent socio-economic development.⁵⁹

While the Word Bank defines DDR program as “the ultimate solution for an efficient transition from war to peace,”⁶⁰ the Ugandan process consisted in just appealing to rebels to surrender and report to administrative board and receive amnesty in counterpart. The Ugandan government adopted the 2000 Amnesty Act to grant amnesty to any combatant or collaborator who accepted to renounce to rebellion as it had failed to completely defeat the rebels, and even several attempts to peaceful managements of the conflict have been unsuccessful.

It seems that the Ugandan government used the policy of least effort in applying the theory of conflict transformation. In fact having failed to completely dismantle the rebel group of Joseph Kony, it called the fighters to surrender. As conflict transformation is particularly intended for intractable conflicts, where deep-rooted issues fuel protracted violence; a durable solution should not be of simply to interest rebels with a dark amnesty, but a continued and tireless approach to understand the root causes of the LRA’s stubbornness in order to assess a clear and veritable remedy. Therefore, the approach of helping parties meet at the table for self sustaining process⁶¹ proposed by Galtung was not applied.

Like Rwanda, Uganda also demobilized combatants captured on the battlefield both in DRC and in the Northern Uganda, the hub of LRA and ADF. In effect, the Ugandan People’s Defence

⁵⁹ Op Cit

⁶⁰ Anderlini, SN. And Conaway, CP., Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration. Washington University in Saint Louis. 2001. P.2.

⁶¹ Op Cit

Forces (UPDF) entered the DRC in 1998 to support Congolese rebels groups and further secure Uganda's borders. The operation was meant to fight Ugandan rebels so that they should no more lead incursions into the country from the Congolese territory. Then the rebels who were captured were repatriated and reeducated before they integrated into the civilian life.

European countries such as Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom contributed to the Uganda DDR program through the World Bank with an \$8.2 million trust fund. Social reintegration was the central component of the project approach as a prerequisite for post conflict recovery. Therefore, the project aimed at five major targets including demobilization and repatriation of LRA members for assembly, food, shelter, medical care, registration, information, sensitization, and transfer to Uganda. After reeducation, the next step was the reinsertion of cases of local reporters along with provision of basic items, cash grants, and interim care to facilitate re-entry of reporters. A special emphasis was put on socio-economic support for 28,800 reporters, including counseling, education, and other services, with an emphasis on the needs of women, children and the disabled. The fund was also used in disseminating information about the amnesty process to encourage social reintegration, reconciliation and trust-building. Besides, the project had to contribute to the program's administration, technical preparation, and planning for demobilization of the LRA.

As of July2011, the project had achieved meaningful results including demobilization of reporters from various armed groups, granting reinsertion assistance to demobilized ex-combatants. The project also supported the Amnesty Commission to refer 6,030 reporters to rehabilitative and socio-economic opportunities over the process. Nevertheless, the theory of conflict transformation didn't help either the government or AGs since the latter are still fighting.

2.3. DDR in Liberia

The DDR program in Liberia came within the context of a Comprehensive Peace Agreement that was signed in Accra, on August 2008, between the Government of Liberia the Liberian United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), and other officially recognized political movements. The objective of the program was complex, including multiple and massive disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation and reintegration (DDRR), targeting a variety of groups of combatants, with particular attention paid to child soldiers and the redistribution of political power. It aimed at more than a hundred thousand members of different AGs and militias for a budget of around \$110 million and for a period of five years. As for Caramés and Eneko of the Catalan Agency for Development Cooperation, the process has been long and entailed with irregularities involving funding, corruption, etc.⁶²

The Liberian DDR process was conducted by the National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (NCDDRR). The commission included four hundred staff and representatives from the Liberian government, AGs, the ECOWAS, the African Union, the UN and the International Contact Group for Liberia. It also strongly relied up on the support from the UNMIL-DDRR Unit and the UNDP.⁶³ In that process, the UNMIL had the task of conducting Disarmament, stationing and associated operations, while other organizations that were partook in the process such as the WFP dealt with provision of foodstuffs, the UNDP treated orientation and transport, the WHO naturally provided medical acts whereas the UNICEF took care of child soldiers.

⁶² Boada Caramés, A. & Eneko S., *DDR 2009: Analysis of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programs in the World during 2008*. Bellaterra: School for a Culture of Peace, 2009. P.2.

⁶³ *Ibid.* P. 3

The total number of combatants to be demobilized was never precisely given, but it was estimated between 103,000 and 107,000 soldiers, depending on the sources. Nichols is amazed by the trend of Liberia's demobilization. He argues that the percentage of combatants relative to the total population was around four: was the second highest after Eritrea of the programs which were subjects of study in UN reports, and the highest among intra-state conflicts.⁶⁴ However, the program recognized both female combatants and child soldiers as groupings of particular needs. As a matter of fact, the number of women was of 22,456 while children were 11,282 including 2511 minor female combatants.

Furthermore, Gracie Brownel, a student who conducted a study on the outcomes of the DDR program in Liberia states that the DDR program was unsuccessful in helping participants reintegrate in the Liberian society and return to civilian lives. However, participants were willing to seek the help they needed, optimistic about the future and willing to work toward reintegration.⁶⁵

In this study, failure of the DDR Liberia can as well be featured to violation of the principles of conflict transformation theoretical framework. Transconflict posits that conflict should not be regarded as an isolated event that can be resolved or managed, but an integral part of society's ongoing evolution and development.⁶⁶ Therefore, since former combatants were willing to integrate the civilian life, the Liberia's government should have eased the process for the sake of a durable peace social reconciliation.

⁶⁴ Nichols, R. "Disarming Liberia: Progress and Pitfalls", in N Florquin and EG Berman eds. *Armed and Aimless: Armed Groups, Guns, and Human Security in the ECOWAS Region*. Geneva: Small Arms Survey.

⁶⁵ Brownel, G., *Helping ex-combatants Reintegrate into the Liberian Society*. Baylor School of Social Work. 2012. P.4.

⁶⁶ Op Cit

Besides, Amnesty International regrets the fact that in Liberia, female combatants participated more actively in the conflict than in other countries. The organization states that thirty to forty per cent (that is 25,000-30,000) of the whole number of combatants during Liberia's 14 years of conflicts were girls and women. Most of them were forced to participate particularly in the first conflict, but in the second conflict (that took place between 1999 and 2003), female combatants reportedly volunteered to adhere to rebel movements in order to protect themselves from sexual violence and to take revenge on the killing of the members of their families, driven by peer pressure, for mercantilist interests or for survival.⁶⁷

Festus Aboagye and Martin Rupiya align Liberia's program among those which failed. They explain that Liberia, as several other states of the African continent where protracted conflicts have been terminated by peace agreements has once more exploded into an internal armed conflict. The reasons, according to them, are on the one hand the weakness of the government in place to exert full authority throughout the post-conflict period. On the other hand, former rebels or ethnic groups have kept a propensity to preserve residual military clout, that they were quick ready to make use of against generally fragile institutions, if their demands—mostly economic—were not fulfilled or were not at hand in the newly formed state.⁶⁸

Further, assessing the challenges related to SSR in Liberia another issue is in regard with 'exportable or hired guns' in the Mano River basin, and by extension, Côte d'Ivoire. As for the HRW, conflicts which had been terminated in Liberia, in Sierra Leone, and in Guinea "have forced thousands of young men and boys to become mercenaries"⁶⁹, otherwise, when a conflict in one country, combatants are likely to 'apply for a job' in another rebellion in the same region.

⁶⁷ Amnesty International, February-March 2009

⁶⁸ Aboagye, F. and Rupiya R. M., Enhancing Post-Conflict Democratic Governance through Effective SSR in Liberia, ISS, 2006.

⁶⁹ Human Rights Watch, 2014.

As a result, this mercenary system fuels the conflict cycle in a region and reduces the chances of solving them.

2.4. DDR in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)

The DRC's national DDR program that closed in September 2011 had commenced in November 2004 following the signing of two peace accords: the Global and Inclusive Agreement on Transition in the DRC (2002) and the Dar-es-Salaam Accord (2003). Ten AGs had signed these two accords and were favorable to take part in the DDR program. When the Congolese government fashioned its National Plan for DDR in May 2004, it estimated that 330,000 combatants, principally from those ten groups, would be processed. However, in early 2008, 22 more AGs signed peace agreements which were known as the Acts of Engagement, and were also incorporated under the DDR framework outlined in the government 2004 National Plan.

The DDR program was conducted by the Commission Nationale de Désarmement, Démobilisation and Réinsertion (CONADER). The conditions, as set out by the national plan were, among others, Congolese citizenship, ability to confirm membership of an AG acknowledged by the central government, and either bearing a weapon or possessing a certificate of disarmament. In other words, if combatants were not able of meeting the criterion 'One weapon, one combatant' they were theoretically not able to be admitted to the advantages on offer, including the choice of integrating into the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC) or not.⁷⁰

The MONUSCO gives a summary of the identification of the Armed Groups, their sizes, their respective areas of operation, and their main aim. These AGs included the RCD/RCD Goma

⁷⁰ Armed actor Issue Brief Number 1 . Demobilization in the DRC: Armed Groups and the Role of Organizational Control. April 2013.

which had a number of fighters comprising between 17,000 and 20,000. It was operating in the Eastern and Southern regions of the country and its aim was to remove President Laurent Kabila; with the objective of establishing a democratic regime founded on popular legitimacy. The second AG was the CNDP whose combatants were estimated at 6,000, was controlling the Masisi highlands, and its main objective was to protect Tutsi community and the interest of local elites (land, cows and businesses).⁷¹

Other groups such as the PARECO, APCLS, Mai-Mai Kifuafua, Mai-Mai Simba, were less numerous, less organized and scattered throughout the territory. Their aim was to fight against foreign invaders and protect indigenous interests against perceived interests, especially those of the Rwandophones.⁷² In short, the war in DRC was, and still is between the indigenous populations and the so-called Rwandophone invaders fully sponsored by multinational corporations which exploit natural resources including minerals and wood.⁷³

The ratio '*Combatant-Weapon*' refers to the number of combatants, especially AGs fighters who are assigned to one weapon. Since rebels do not use only conventional weapons and most of the time their groups do not have enough weapons for each combatant, government and demobilization institutions impose regulations so as to reduce the number of people to serve. The ratio weapon-combatant is therefore one of the strong exclusive conditions because, logically, a combatant is a person who carries a weapon to fight during a war. However, there is a need to well define the kind of weapon used in a certain setting.

The observance of the criterion 'one weapon one combatant' was received with much disagreement in the DRC as indicated in the Conference of Goma of January 2008. As a matter

⁷¹ MONUSCO Report 2012

⁷² Internal MONUSCO Document, September 2011. Visited on 20 October 2016

⁷³ Ibid

of fact, ex-combatants found that that issue was unfounded, and considered that it was a pure pretext to remove from the list some of them. In effect, most of the groups, especially those in the disorganized Mai-Mai movements, were not in possession of the requisite ratio of weapons to fighters to make certain of the eligibility of most of their combatants. For example, the report gave a situation of 30 combatants who might have had only ten fire arms between them. Weapons in the hands of combatants included Katyusha rocket launchers, armored cars, machine guns, Uzis, rifles (including Kalashnikov, R4s, M16s), light artillery, rockets, rocket propeller, grenades (RPGs), rocket launchers, multiple rocket launchers, portable MAGs Mini assault rifles, revolvers, machetes, knives, spears and arrows.

It is then that the DDR in the DRC is one of the procedures that have most failed. Indeed, fighting resumed mainly to the East of DRC only four years after the process had begun, while the wounds of the war had not yet healed. Charlotte Cosset, an AFP journalist states ten key points to explain the war in North Kivu.⁷⁴ Among other reasons, although the CNDP was integrated into the regular army, it still wanted to see commitments with Joseph Kabila met. Yet, President Kabila was torn between international pressure that weighed against Bosco Ntaganda wanted by a warrant of the ICC and the difficulty to abandon his ally.

The journalist further explains the reasons for the support of Rwanda to the M23 Rebels whose majority are of Rwandan origin Congolese. Beside the contentment of maintaining an undermined DRC, Rwanda sees its economic interests: instability on the border eases trades and especially those of minerals such as cassiterites, but also the passage of all kinds of goods namely crops and livestock.⁷⁵ Thus, it is clear and logical that the fighting takes place in Kivu, an

⁷⁴ <https://www.google.com>: RDC: Dix Points Cléf pour Comprendre la Guerre au Nord Kivu. Published Aug 22, 2012, visited on October 20, 2016.

⁷⁵ Ibid

area with large mineral resources including gold, cassiterites, methane gas, oil, agriculture wealth and precious woods.

In this case, one of the very first principles of conflict transformation theory should have been applied, that is helping conflicting parties meet at the table of self-sustaining process.⁷⁶ A new DDR program should be envisaged thereafter, when the various actors would have finished their 'self-service' exploitation, and real peace process put in place in that 'other part of the world'.

2.5. DDR in Nigeria

The Nigerian DDR program was established in Aug 2015 in an effort to end the violence that was the outcome of the deterioration of the living condition of people living in oil-rich areas. Tensions between local communities and Foreign Oil Corporations in that region came up in the 2000s as some ethnic groups took conscience of their exploitation and realized that they could not benefit from the production of oil in the area. In fact, the oil produced an important part of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The main ethnic groups were the Ijaw and Ogoni concerned in that conflict. Therefore, President Yar'Adua's government was persuaded that the continued deployment of soldiers and reliance on force to control opposition to the prevailing oil regime, including the system of production that was polluting the Delta ecology, allocation of oil mining rights, and distribution of oil revenues and profits, would be ineffectual, it established, in place of force, the NDAP, a comprehensive system of dialogue, rehabilitation and development.⁷⁷

The Nigerian DDR program analysis fits in the conflict transformation theoretical framework as this theory offers a space to discuss the causes of the Niger Delta quarrels together with the appropriate mechanisms to change the complex conflict dynamics of the Delta. Specifically, the

⁷⁶ Op Cit

⁷⁷ Ryan, J. and Thiaw, I., *The Role of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: Addressing Risks and Seizeng Opportunities*. UNDP&UNEP. Nairobi-Kenya. 2013.

NDAP had the mission of demilitarizing the Niger Delta by encouraging militias to surrender their arms and weapons, break the links between fighters and their militias, reintegrate combatants into civilian life by offering them appropriate socio-vocational skills endow the entire region with social and economic infrastructure so incomplete if not lacking, and restore full oil production activities in the Niger Delta in order to avoid the alarming national economic disaster.⁷⁸ In this context the government expected to transform the belligerents' behavior of militiamen into social skills to permit them to survive by their own in the civilian society.

Ofonufua (2016) argues that even though the Nigerian government DDR program is capable of engaging the wider context of the conflict, the framing and conceptualization of the program and economic reconstruction were ambiguous and contradictory in theories of peacebuilding. The scholar acknowledged however that the NDAP has today achieved little success but shows that the possibility for violence to return is high. He bases his explanations on unemployment situation of about 90.6% of the youth, and most of ex-combatants believe that the current unemployment condition in the Delta region is worse than before the NDAP was instituted. Therefore, if violence returns, many former fighters who are presently participating in the NDAP will get involved.⁷⁹

The road is still long for completion of DDR program in Nigeria. Indeed, the Niger Delta conflict is not resolved on the one hand, and on the other, the security of the country is nowadays undermined by the insurrection of the Boko Haram terrorists. Henceforth, the Government of Nigeria is neither ready to grant amnesty to the violent extremist, nor these ones are ready to cease their barbaric actions. Nations together with the international community have a tough task

⁷⁸ Okonofua, B.A., *The Niger Delta Amnesty Program: The Challenges of Transitioning From Peace Settlements to Long-Term Peace* SAGE Open April-June 2016: P3

⁷⁹ Ibid

to imagine other theories applicable for the management of violent combatants such as Boko Haram, al Shebab and al Qaeda.

2.6. DDR in Angola

The Angolan DDR program was instituted in the subsequent structure of the Luena Memorandum of Understanding, which was itself built on the Bicesse Accords. This means that the process has theoretically followed the scheme of a well conducted program, even though it reflected the central government's military and political supremacy rather than the needs of the ex-combatants themselves, or the implication of the International Community. In fact, after the failure of the cease fire agreement of the 15th May 1991 in Portugal, the Lusaka peace accord of 20 November 1994, and other militaro-political processes, the conclusive peace accord was that of Luena signed on the 4 April 2002. This Memorandum of Understanding was hastily concluded while Jonas Savimbi was finally shot down On 22 February 2002, during an assault of the government army. The Savimbi's death officially and definitively ended 27 years of conflict (1975-2002), which made almost five hundred thousand deaths and the displacement of four million people.⁸⁰

The government of Angola decided to conduct the DDR program alone in contrast to the Lusaka Protocol which had requested the participation of the United Nations. The government took complete responsibility for administering and financing the demobilization and disarmament process worthy US \$187 million and scheduled to be ended by January 2004. The program initially aimed at 50,000 UNITA ex-combatants, but in reality, only around a half reported to the Quartering and Family areas also known as Gathering Areas (GA). Gathering of combatants also

⁸⁰ Khalid,S.M., Sudden-Death Overtime: The Last Days of Jonas Savimbi and the End of the Angolan Civil War, in "The Land of My Fathers", Angola. February 15, 2003.

concerned civilians, specifically fighters' families and supporters.⁸¹ The program was monitored by the Joint Military Commission and comprised military official representing the government and UNITA, with military observers from the UN and Troika permitted.

In the management of DDR process, the Joint Military Commission separated GAs for military and non military personnel to be demobilized. However, as there was no clear delimitation between the two settlements, movements between them were so common. Parsons is astonished the grouped combatants progressively transformed their settlements into almost permanent homes, with functioning markets, schools (elementary), and health centers.⁸² Moreover, newly arriving UNITA ex-combatants from other areas wanted to know the physical position of their relatives. In order to encourage this program, agencies and churches proceeded to distributing agricultural tools and seeds for subsistence. Public opinion as well as the international community present in Angola was afraid that former fighters would be less motivated to go back to their original areas and that a "Mini UNITA" enclave would be created. However, the settlements were gradually dismantled, even though the ongoing crop growing has slowed the homecoming of the defeated and IDPs in several regions.⁸³

African Recovery outlined the difficulties that the government of Angola had faced in getting the necessary funds for the continuation of the program. The institution posits that later in 2004, the Angolan government expected to get funds from the World Bank to complete the DDR process. However, negotiations between the ADRP and the International Institutions much delayed its

⁸¹ Parsons, I., *Beyond the Silencing of Guns: Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration from Military Peace to Social Justice? The Angolan Peace Process*. 2004.

⁸² Ibid

⁸³ African Recovery, *Angola: Aid for Combatant Demobilization*. 2003. www.africanrecovery.org. Posted May 2003, visited November 2016.

financial management.⁸⁴ The program at last started in April 2004, but disbursement of funds was very slow. The money was finally disbursed and was projected to serve around slightly more than a hundred thousand former combatants of UNITA and 33,000 government soldiers who had to be demobilized in the view of downsizing the total number of the new defence force. Moreover, some other donors accepted to fund specific projects, namely the USA which alone injected US \$54 million.⁸⁵

To sum up, Angola has been one of the few countries to have developed and conducted a DDR program without directly involving the international community. This was an outcome of the sudden death of Savimbi; the government of Luanda took advantage of this event to finish with the old plight of UNITA. Quick and successful DDR implementation was also facilitated by the fact that rebel combatants were so tired that they did not care for the accomplishment of all the procedures to begin a new life. However, Angola experienced several challenges in implementing an effective DDR program. Indeed, at first, the governmental institution wanted to play the role of the mediator that brought much negative effects on the outcomes of the DDR policy. Also, deficiency of adequate planning and impractical time tables produced such consequences that a big number of former rebels did not get the essential provisions and materials or attention, a fact that amplified criminality among the communities. Nevertheless, the United Nations, the WFP and other IOs had nothing to do without a prior permission from the Angolan government; yet, no prerequisite accord had been put in place to disarm the civilian population.

⁸⁴ Ibid

⁸⁵ Report of the Secretary General of the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA), UN. Secretary Council, November 23, 2004.

2.7. DDR in Somalia

In their edition at the United Nations University, James Cockayne and Siobhan O’Neil (2015), situate the DDR process in Somalia in ‘*an Era of Violent Extremism*’ and wonder if ‘*Is it fit for purpose?*’.⁸⁶ There are in fact many questions to be raised in the framework of the process in Somalia, because the civil war in that country has much evolved to take a terrorist dimension. Therefore, the DDR process in that context must consider the emerging fields of violent extremism. The implementing organization has first and foremost to find the suited program for violent extremist combatants, proper approaches for violent extremist and terrorist rehabilitation to be incorporated into DDR efforts. In that sense, the UN DDR has the task of assisting Member States in developing effective programs outside conflict perspective because, as Fink asserts, “it is purely normal to acclimatize best practices and lessons from the CVE and terrorist rehabilitation domains to DDR backgrounds.”⁸⁷

The great challenge in the Somalia’s DDR process is that the government is conducting the program hand in hand with combating the jihadist terrorist group Al-Shabaab with the United Nations military support. UN officials believe that even though the Somali government should have the political motivation to drive a DDR program for non-terrorist armed actors, the country will never be able, soon or later, to recover peace if these target groups are not too demobilized and reversed into the Somali civilian society, and are recognized as part of the political program of non-violence. Therefore, DDR programs would better take them into account as well.⁸⁸

⁸⁶ Cockayne, J. and O’Neil, S., UN DDR in an Era of Violent Extremism: Is It Fit for Purpose? United Nations University 2015.

⁸⁷ Naureen Chowdhury Fink, Something Old, Something New: The Emergence and Evolution of CVE Effort. 2014. P5. The Global Center On Cooperative Security.

⁸⁸ Brown, F.B., A Bridge Not To Far: A Field Report from Somalia, in the UN DDR in an Era of Violent Extremism; Is It Fit for Purpose? United Nations University. 2015. P. 109.

Unlike other countries which were concerned with such a program, DDR efforts in Somalia offered by UNSOM and UNSOA support are under the mandate of the UNSC. In 2014, DDR process was being operated in three areas and by different contractors. The first facility was established in the town of Baidoa and was subsidized by the Germany government through the IOM, in partnership with Somali officials of the ISWA. Secondly, there were two DDR facilities in the city of Mogadishu, both operating by private international contractors, with funding from bilateral governmental funders. One site was what was known as the Serendi Camp, the other was in the city of Belet Weyne. The Serendi Camp was operated by the 'Serendi Group'- a consortium of three contractors: a Danish counterterrorism expert, Michael Taamby; a Danish former officer of the Special Operations Forces, and the director of the Somali Diaspora in Denmark.⁸⁹ However, the DDR programs that were being conducted at Serendi and at Belet Weyne were not included in the official national DDR program of Somalia. The third stand of DDR program in Somalia was in Kismaayo where defectors and prisoners were being kept and operated by the Juba Intelligence and Security Agency (JISA). The UN has helped provide emergency funding for foodstuff and shelter, and convinced JISA to monitor human rights in the holding facility.

In reality, the DDR program in Somalia was and still is undermined by many challenges, specifically the identity itself of combatants to be demobilized. Indeed, there are many militias that are fighting in various areas of the country, at the same time pursuing various objectives. Bruce Oswald (2010) classifies them in two main tendencies. On the one hand, there is an even more than nationalist and clan tendency whose leaders wish the birth, one day, of a Somali Emirate. These leaders are distinct from internationalist jihadists close to Al Qaeda who are

⁸⁹ Report from SAACID: Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) Composite Story. July 2010

leading a global war.⁹⁰ On the other hand, within the Shura (Assembly of leaders), the hard fringe is more Islamist and jihadist than nationalist. This fringe is undoubtedly the majority. Advocates of this wing including Ali Mohamed Rage, spokesman of al Shabaab, claim that the fight will stop only when the entire world will be converted to Islam. There are also civilians who possess weapons just for their protection and not for the purpose of combating other armed groups or the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). Therefore, given the fragile security situation in Somalia, the government is moving forward with caution and rather than implementing a traditional DDR program right away, it is focusing its effort primarily on building the capacity and the technical expertise of its institutions.

2.8. Conclusion

Nations and the international community helped to conduct DDR programs in various African countries so as to recover order and transit from war to full peace. DDR succeeded in some countries and failed in others. Indeed, there is no universal framework to be applied to all countries as these differ in habits and customs, and contexts in which conflicts occurred. However, the common theory for DDR program is to transform the negative and destructive conflict into positive constructive conflict as it aims at long term conflict resolution. Hence, as DDR is traditionally subsequent to peaceful conflict resolution, often monitored by UN or international/regional mechanisms to implement peace agreements marking the end of an armed conflict, transformation must aim at the souls themselves of the combatants, to encourage and help them to abandon old destructive thinking to a cured peaceful mind.

It is in that context that Rwanda organized 'ingando' solidarity programs for former combatants and genocidaires tried by the 'gacaca' tribunals in order to teach them government programs and

⁹⁰ Oswald, 'Ossie' B., *DDR and Detention in UN Peace Operations*. Oxford University Press. 2010.

inculcate in them themes of unity and reconciliation. Uganda called LRA combatants encouraging them to surrender and report to military or administrative posts, and get amnesty in exchange. Liberia is said to have demobilized the second greatest number of Combatants after Eritrea, and its particularity was the very important attention paid towards female combatants and children. It can be assumed without doubt that the program that took place in DRC was not the real one. Not only was it wrongly executed, but also demobilized combatants returned to armed groups whose war is not expected to take an end in the near future.

If Angolan demobilized ex-combatants cried, no one heard them. Indeed, the government of Luanda did not follow the traditional regulations of DDR to 'send home sheep without shepherd' as Savimbi had been killed. As the Angolan government was rushing to implement the Lusaka Accord, yet ignoring the participation of the international community, the UNITA ex-combatants were so tired and demoralized that they accepted the process to be conducted in the ease of the government.

The Nigerian DDR success or failure strongly relies on the economic situation of the country in general and the Niger Delta in particular. In fact, the parlous economic conditions of the Niger Delta people are caused by oil excavation procedures that pollute the Niger Delta ecology. Nonetheless, the generalized poverty and unemployment in addition to the explosion of the violent extremist movements will hardly allow effective management of ex-combatants and, therefore, the country as a whole to attain durable peace and sustained socio-economic development.

Finally, given the controversial situation in Somalia, the country finds it difficult to execute a DDR program in its real sense. The presence of international extremists and terrorists is an issue

that deserves to be seriously tackled by the entire humanity before implementing DDR processes. Another problem in Somalia is that, because of poverty, some demobilized ex-combatants prefer to rejoin terrorist movements in order to earn a living beside the proliferation of small arms in the region whose trend worries the entire humanity.

CHAPTER THREE

MANAGING DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION IN BURUNDI

3.0. Introduction

At the turn of the Cold War, the UN undertook several multidimensional peacekeeping operations which were designed and conducted to ease transition from war to peace in countries which experienced internal wars, especially in Africa. For this purpose, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration programs have been an essential component of these processes. Generally, these programs aimed-and still do- at disarming armed group fighters, taking them out of the military structures, and socio-economically integrating them into the civil society.⁹¹

Kingma and Pauwels (2000) acknowledge that not all DDR programs are conducted within the context of Peace Agreement. In a certain number of cases, for example in Ethiopia and Rwanda, the DDR program was carried out at the term of a military victory of one side. Also, in Colombia, the program started on while the civil war was still going on.⁹² Sometimes such programs are implemented as part of the process of reforming the army, the example given is that followed the WWII and the Cold War. Contrast to this assertion, the DDR program was conducted in Burundi from 2004 to 2010 as the country was recovering from an internal armed conflict which lasted slightly more than ten years. This means that the second wave of DDR program was undertaken in the 2009s with the dismantling of the last Hutu AG, the Palipe Hutu-FNL. However, a half decade before, other Hutu underground movements including the CNDD-

⁹¹ World Bank. 2009.

⁹² Kingma, K. & Powels, N., Demobilization and Reintegration in the 'Downsizing Decade', in Powels N. ed. War Force to Work Force: Global perspectives on Demobilization and Reintegration. Baden-Baden: Nomos 2000. P 17.

FDD and others had benefited from the same allowances, and in addition obtained in-kind payments. In exchange to surrendering their weapons, former fighters obtained reinsertion allocations equivalent to an 18 month salary in the defence force.⁹³

In Burundi, the DDR program followed the traditional process, as defined by Kostner and Wiederhoefer, that is, three distinct phases internationally recognized.⁹⁴ Indeed, combatants were disarmed, and then demobilized before they were integrated into the civilian life; and these steps were accomplished prior to orientation and counseling. Traditional process refers to the fact that the program was conducted after negotiations to reach a peace agreement between the parties in conflict. As a matter of fact, the program was recommended by the Arusha Peace Agreement and other related accords concluded between the then Burundian government and the fighting AGs. Moreover, the program concerned combatants from both sides, that is, the ex-rebels and members of the then national army.

Given the fact that the program took place at the turn of a long civil war that killed more than 250,000 people and caused flight of around a million, it was managed without major incident. In total, a number of 56,000 ex-combatants were expected to be demobilized, including aged persons, female combatants, child soldiers, disabled combatants and obviously healthy soldiers volunteer to the program of demobilization. It is important to note that cantonment and demobilization sites were designed for ex-rebels whereas governmental soldiers directly to the demobilization camps from their respective barracks.

In the perspective DDR in Burundi, reintegration had a double meaning. It referred primarily to selecting healthy and volunteer combatants from both the FAB and the ex-rebels, designated to

⁹³ Gilligan, M., Mvukiyehe, E. & Samii, C., *Reintegrating Ex-rebels into Civilian Life: Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment in Burundi*. Columbia University. May 5, 2010.

⁹⁴ Kostner, C., & Wiederhoefer, 2004: 170, WB 2001:15, Hitch-Cock, 2004:37 Özerdem, 2002:963

build up the new defence force. In the second time, disabled, aged persons, women with particular problems, child soldiers and volunteers were to be referred to the DDR program to be integrated into civilian life. Further, despite voluntariness, members of the FAB were encouraged to be demobilized for the purpose of downsizing the number to integrate into the newly formed National Defence Force (FDN). When that process of voluntariness failed to reach the wanted number, the military health service proceeded to identify soldiers who had more or less handicaps and reformed them. Some ex-FAB soldiers refused to be demobilized because at that time, the salary was increased while the ex-PMPA combatants agreed to be 'down-ranked' in order to integrate the newly formed security organs.

Some scholars have written about the DDR program in Burundi, stating its advantages in the society, identifying several challenges that undermined the processes, and criticizing the behavior of various stakeholders during and after the implementation of the procedure. Among others, Olivia d'Aoust et al of the WB led an empirical analysis to highlight the positive and significant impact of DDR on demobilized persons' families in the short run.⁹⁵ Alan Bryden and Vincenza Scherrer debated the fact that the program of DDR provides with opportunities of the concerned state to mutually reinforce early peace building interventions that boost capacities to attain more success with less effort.⁹⁶

This section provides details on how the DDR program was conducted in Burundi in the years of 2004 to 2010. It comprises a brief history of wars and combatants in Burundi old times, clarifies the profile of the different combatants who benefited from the program, describes the DDR process that included the cantonment, the disarmament, the demobilization and the reintegration,

⁹⁵ D'Aoust, O., Sterck, O. & Verwimp, P., Who Benefited from Burundi's Demobilization Program? Policy Research Working Paper 7732. June 2016.

⁹⁶ Bryden, A. and Scherrer, V., (eds) Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration. (DCAF). 2005

either in the governmental army or into civilian life. Further, it helps to discover the outcomes of the DDR program, be they socio-economic, political and the added value achieved in terms of security, all in the framework of the transforming ethnically based conflict into a reconciled society, where sisters and brothers have to live in harmony, to achieve durable socio-economic development.

3.1. Background of the combatants after Ceasefire and Peace Agreements

Before analyzing how DDR was conducted, it is important to describe the profile of the combatants who were the key stakeholders to the program. As the mediation was conscious of all the stakes of a conflict of very long dates, it preferred to exhaust all the questions with a view to ending the problem once and for all. It is for this reason that the mediation had conveyed to the negotiation table any group and any person who could, at that time or later, claim anything that could infringe on the peace process. Henceforth, the mediation was eager to apply the very definition of the conflict transformation theoretical framework which posits that conflict transformation is the process by which conflicts, such as ethnic conflicts, are transformed into peaceful outcomes.⁹⁷

It is then in this circumstance that several opportunists slipped into the peace process, often persuading the mediation that only themselves were the principal masters of the ongoing war and that their involvement was inescapable in the search of a lasting peace. Yet, beside the national army (FAB), the principal armed groups were the CNDD-FDD and the Palipe Hutu-FNL which were separately fighting the governmental forces. Other groups were dissidents of these principal

⁹⁷ Miall, H., Conflict Transformation: A Multidimensional Task. Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation. P4.

movements led by silly and dishonest politicians who believed they could get more advantages if they presented some troops.

3.1.1. The FAB

The Burundi Armed Forces (Forces Armées Burundaises / FAB) were also concerned with the DDR program in the letter of the signed accords and agreements. The armed conflict which had lasted more than a decade had left the FAB with deep wounds. Some of its soldiers had lost their lives on the battlefield; others seriously disabled beside cowards who preferred to desert the battle and hid in the remote villages. Politicians of the opposition wing used to qualify the FAB as a 'Tutsi mono-ethnic and regional army'. The army was indeed dominated by Tutsi officers from the Southern regions of the country, but with the trend of the fighting, it had applied an 'on-the-job' recruitment so as to bring under control the threat of several armed groups on the battlefield. Hence, the government had instituted a policy of recruiting every young man in the IDP settlements who willingly and unwillingly deserted school, and a mandatory military service (SMO) for all laureates of secondary schools was put into force.

At the end of the hostilities, the FAB had got many difficulties: elderly soldiers could not retire because the army still needed them in various tasks, youngest were less experienced in terms of war craft, barracks had changed into IDP settlements as soldiers had brought in their families and relatives in fear of revenge of the rebels among other challenges. The command was also divided between fundamentalists who were angry of sharing power with rebels and those who were favorable and compliant with the end of the war despite the commands of the former rebels groups and radical political formation of the opposition.

Therefore, demobilization in the ranks of ex-FAB meant also to facilitate the older soldiers retire in dignity, to rehabilitate the morally and physically afflicted, to remove civilians from the barracks and rehash the premises, but mostly, transform their psyche and prepare them to live together with their former enemies. The army counted around 25,000 men and according to the MOU, only 14,000 had to remain as the base number the newly formed NDF. In other words, it was not an easy task for the army to decide to send back to the village persons who had been living and enjoying free facilities of the barrack including shelter, foodstuff, safe water, and electricity. It is important to note that in the census of the soldiers, the FAB deliberately ignored six hundred students who were in the cadet school and who later came to inflate the number of integrated combatants on the other side of the ex-FAB.

3.1.2. The CNDD-FDD

The CNDD-FDD was the most important and special political armed group. It comprised an armed wing and political leading section whose members bore military ranks as well. Most of them had been in the bush for years, and their task was to inculcate the movement's ideology in the population. CNDD-FDD's workforce was around 20,000. Its combat unit were scattered all over the country.⁹⁸ By 2004, leaders went to Bujumbura (from the bush) the capital city to implement the ceasefire and agreement as well as to prepare elections as the transitional period was heading to the end. Hence, political and military leaders worked in the scope to neatly separate vocational fighters from politicians. A congress was held in Gitega (central province) to determine the combatants who were to stay in the political party, those who were to integrate the

⁹⁸Gilligan, M., Mvukiyeye, E. & Samii, C., Reintegrating Ex-rebels into Civilian Life: Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment in Burundi. Columbia University. May 5, 2010.

defence force and those who had to be demobilized. At the term of the congress, around 10,000 soldiers were designed to be part of the NDF, while the rest were to embrace the DDR program.

Little by little, constituted units were sent to chosen barracks where they met their counterparts from the FAB to be taught how they shall live together. The integration of the newly formed defence was monitored by officers of the United Nations Missions in Burundi (ONUB) the National Commission for integration plus officials of the mediation team. The remaining soldiers were transferred to cantonment camps ready to be disarmed and demobilized.

The CNDD-FDD combatants caused no challenge to the processes as they were an organized and united group, under the same and homogenous command. Up to the last moments, the combatants were obeying their leaders, hoping that they should have more advantages if they continued to behave well.

3.1.3. The Kaze CNDD-FDD

This armed group was headed by General Jean Bosco NDAYIKENGURUKIYE. He was the Chief of the Defence Force of the FDD, the fighting branch of the CNDD between 1995 and 1999. In that period, the CNDD movement was distinct from the military wing and comprised all the political formation of the late President Ndadaye's coalition. In 1998, he overthrew his uncle NYANGOMA, unified the two wings and gained the confidence of President KABIRA who requested his help in the war against the Rwandophones.⁹⁹ As he left in despair the major part of his army in Burundi, he was dismissed by Pierre NKURUNZIZA in 2000.

At the term of peace negotiation, his army consisted of elements that were described as coward and regionalist because, after his dismissal, he attempted to rush to the battle field in Burundi. He

⁹⁹ Ibid

was in total incapability of accessing frustrated fighters and failed in Tanzania, losing both Burundi and RDC battlefields. Therefore, some tired soldiers preferred to stay with him as he hoped to take part in the peace talks which were going on in Arusha. At the demobilization phase, the number of his soldiers was around 2000 and he had few to claim in the context of peace accords implementation as his force was not considerable. Some were integrated in the NDF but mostly in the Police Nationale du Burundi (PNB). However, many of his combatants could not benefit from either program because of the ratio ‘three men, one weapon.’

3.1.4. The CNDD Nyangoma

The CNDD Nyangoma (as it was denominated by the mediation) refers to combatants who accessed the DDR program simply by the fame of their leader. Leonard Nyangoma was the founder of the coalition CNDD, a movement that assembled members of most of the political parties of the Hutu obedience. He played an important role in the resistance against the massacres that followed the assassination of President Ndadaye in October 1993 while he was his minister of External Relations. The mediation judged he was a great figure in Burundi conflict although he was no more together with the armed group he had created ten years before. When came the time to implement the Arusha Accord, he collected combatants who had deserted the battlefield and other civilians living in refugee camps and presented them as combatants to be integrated into the security organs and/or to be demobilized.¹⁰⁰ His faction counted less than a thousand men and many of them were not taken into accepted for the reason of the ratio ‘men-weapon’. Only around 200 were integrated into the defence force and police with a few of them in the category of officers.

¹⁰⁰ Op cit

3.1.5. The FNL Mugabarabona

Alain Mugabarabona, the leader of a small wing of the traditional Palipe Hutu-FNL was an eminent member of that non-registered political party who had beneficated from a political asylum in Europe. He succeeded to convince the mediation that he was capable of bringing the fighting group –that was actively fighting in Burundi- on the negotiation table. When the veritable FNL fighters refused to participate in the peace talks of Arusha, he got a chance of coming to Bujumbura with a group of about 500 combatants. Most of those combatants were members of his family and relatives. They were less trained and looked civilian; a great number of them were interested in the DDR allowances.

3.1.6. The Palipe Hutu FNL

These were the veritable war veterans. The Palipe Hutu underground movement was born in 1981 and its ideology was fundamentally ethnically-based. For this faction, the conflict transformation theoretical framework was ‘mise en cause’. They should at least have adopted the Judaic thought that the truth lies less in a verbal formula than in the dialogue to arrive at the formula because dialogue has no beginning and no end. They believed that peace would be recovered in the country with the extermination of the Tutsi ethnic group or their total removal from power. As a matter of fact, they were absent on the table of negotiation at once.

The Palipe Hutu FNL was the second biggest rebel movement in number. Its combatants’ fear to integrate the army was so great because on the one hand, they had fought the power since long but never won, on the other hand, they had also fought the CNDD-FDD which, at that moment was probably going to take the power in the country by the force of the polls. Nonetheless, the mediation convinced them to join others in the peace process. The demobilization of that movement was planned later in the 2009 after official formalities.

3.1.7. Female combatants

Female combatants played an important role in Burundi rebel movements. Apart from the everyday's tasks assigned to a soldier, women and girls executed other discreet missions such as spying, delivering couriers, shopping in enemy's markets, among others. Some female combatants were found within the rebel movements and served as house maids of chiefs. Some were wives of soldiers and at the end of the conflict, a great number of them preferred to be demobilized or to be integrated in the police service. The reason was that many of them were less educated and thus did not expect to get a high rank in the army. Nonetheless, some female combatants were abandoned by their husbands who preferred to marry more 'civilized' ladies rather than those peasants who were almost public women, at the mercy of every commanding chief.

Female combatant beneficiaries of the DDR program included also widows of former combatants who were inserted in the list of veritable fighters so that they could benefit from the demobilization allowances. Pia Peeters and colleagues plead for women combatants, arguing that they should be encouraged to create associations so as to prevent from them from being lonely and better defend their rights, because their tears and their worries should be major burden on human conscience.¹⁰¹

3.1.8. Child Soldiers

At the demobilization-integration phase, there were few child soldiers in the rebellion movements. Many of them grew up under fire, had abandoned school long time ago and practically, their knowledge was limited to the arms. Michael Gilligan who conducted a research on the Burundi DDR program focused on former rebels who were aged 18 years or older as of

¹⁰¹ Pia Peeters, Emilie Rees. S., Correia, M. (AFTCS): World Bank. 2009. P.50

fieldwork in 2007. He acknowledges that some of them were recruited before adulthood, but they were all adults at the time of their demobilization.¹⁰² However, those who were younger needed a special care because the war had certainly left them with psychological wounds that necessitated a peculiar treatment. Koffi Annan regrets the use of children in combats: “The plight of child soldiers is an issue that concerns all of us, wherever we may live. For far too long, the use of child soldiers has been as merely regrettable”.¹⁰³ That is the reason why child soldiers programs must be tailor-made to meet specific regard, to meet the specific requirement of children, with special view to limiting their futuristic chances of recruitment back into the conflict situation.¹⁰⁴ Therefore, Burundi child soldiers were taken to special programs by the UNICEF independently of the normal process of the DDR.

3.2.The DDR process

The DDR process as such was conducted in two waves: the first one concerned the rebel movements as well as the governmental army as per the Arusha peace agreements. The second concerned the FNL as the movement joined the peace process a bit later. Despite continuation of fighting by FNL movement in the 2007s, DDR process was carried out without a problem. The first wave process followed the three distinct phases namely the cantonment, the demobilization and the integration-reintegration. Every phase was managed in a different area and by all stakeholders to the peace process, including the government, representatives of each rebel movement, official of the United Nations Peacekeeping Mission, officials of the African Union

¹⁰² Gilligan, M., Mvukiyehe, E. & Samii, C., Reintegrating Ex-rebels into Civilian Life: Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment in Burundi. Columbia University. May 5, 2010.

¹⁰³ Annan, K., Addressing General Assembly Special Session of Children (UNGASS), May 2002.

¹⁰⁴ Spear, J., Disarmament and Demobilization, Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreement. 2002.

and some international organizations such as the GTZ which had the task of feeding the combatants and the Red Cross that was in charge of the health service.

3.2.1. The cantonment

The cantonment was systematically organized per AG and per combating unit. Certainly the CNDD-FDD had many cantonment settlements because it had a bigger number of combatants. The main cantonment camps were at Karindo in the East, Gashingwa in the center, the third at Buramata, Rugazi, and Ntamba in the West, in Bujumbura town, at Kabonga in the South, Kibago in the South-East. Other movements had just one settlement each as the numbers of their soldiers were not so big.

In the cantonment camps, soldiers continued military training to prepare themselves for the identification of combatants. This training was important for them because the government was accusing Political Armed Parties and Movements (PMPA) of recruiting civilians in order to inflate the number of their groups as this counted so much for acceptability. Nevertheless, cantoned combatants were free of movement; they could go home to visit their relatives despite rivalries between the various rebel movements and the fact that the FNL militiamen were still active in certain areas of the country.

3.2.2. Combatant identification

Combatant identification consisted of elementary military skills. It was monitored by military experts together with all the teams designed for that purpose. Combatants executed the disassembly-reassembly of light weapons, parade steps, and command exercises for warrant officers and officers. Identification consisted of more exercises of formality than of practice. This stage was conducted together with the setting of lists of veritable combatants who were

eligible for either the demobilization program or the integration into the bodies of defence and security.

Combatant identification was conducted along with verification of the ratio 'three men-one weapon'. The concept of weapon had been a subject of controversy as rebels possessed various types of them, including light weapons referred to as 'individual arms', heavy weapons', ammunition reserves and other fighting equipments.¹⁰⁵ An agreement was made by stakeholders as to the definition of the term to facilitate the counting of all armament of each group. Nonetheless, some combatants could not be eligible to the program because they did not fulfill the condition in the ratio.

Moreover, some combatants were not accepted because they had deserted their faction for a reason or another. In a survey conducted by the World Bank on Burundian youth, the author states bitterly the words of Jean, an ex-combatant who could not get the chance to access the program.

"I stayed in hospital for four months and healed. I returned in August 2003. When I returned here, I learned my former colleagues were already assembled in settlements and had received a registration number. I and other friends in the same situation... 15 of us ex-combatants...we went to claim our case to get a registration number like all the others to be either reintegrated or demobilized, but the response was negative: our commanders would not even listen to us. Jean becomes visibly distressed as he talks about this".¹⁰⁶

Jean was not alone, other combatants were absent at the moment of identification because of reason yet well known by their respective movement leaders, including imprisonment, local or external hospitalization among others. When they reappear, the processes of DDR and formation of the NDF were over, leaving them in total embarrassment. Some of them decided to join the

¹⁰⁵ Report of Carolyn McAskie, Special Representative of the UN Secretary General. March 2005.

¹⁰⁶ World Bank. *Voices of Youth in Post-Conflict Burundi: Perspectives of Exclusion, Gender, and Conflict*. Washington DC. 2012. P. 50.

FNL movement which was still reluctant to join the negotiation table while others returned home disheartened.

3.2.3. The disarmament Process

Caramés, A. and E. Sanz write that the disarmament is the rarely detailed since it is seen as a implicit part of demobilization and worthy of specification on its own. Peace agreements normally specific the need for a DDR program and outline the groups that require demobilization, while the number of combatants that require demobilization and the means to achieve it are brought up in later planning. The authors give the cases of Angola, Nepal, Afghanistan, Burundi, Chad, the DRC, Côte d'Ivoire, and Liberia.¹⁰⁷ Nevertheless, in the current cases of Burundi, disarmament was conducted reference done to memoranda of understanding. All the stakeholders had been involved and all attention paid for well done action.

Arms in good conditions were taken to be part of the new defence force arsenal while the surplus including weapons in bad conditions were destroyed. Some funny weapons were kept in a safe place for the purpose of war heritage and were kept in the defence museum. Disarmament is a crucial phase of combatant mutation¹⁰⁸ and hence an important application of the conflict transformation of the conflict transformation theoretical framework. Indeed, it is in that time where former fighters transform into civilians

The disarmament phase occurred when leaders of political armed movements and parties were very busy with many tasks, both military and political, and could not therefore fully control the handing in of weapons. As a matter of fact, tricky combatants would have succeeded to hide

¹⁰⁷ Caramés, A. and E. Sanz, DDR 2009. Analysis of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programs in the World during 2008. Bellaterra: School for a Culture of Peace, 2009. P.2.

¹⁰⁸ Munive, J., Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration in South Sudan: The Limits of Conventional Peace and Security. Templates. DIIS Report. 2013.

some arms for purpose just known by them. Besides, there were, in a moment or another, weapons which were hidden for purpose of reserve. So as time was rushing, leaders didn't remember to unearth the buried arms. Therefore, soldiers who hold the secret could take the weapon and make them proper.

3.2.4. Demobilization

After weapons were removed from combatants and handed over either to the FDN for further use phase of demobilization is very important for 'professional' combatants. It looks like the traditional marriage, where a young lady abandons her parents, brothers, sisters and relatives to go to live far from that place where she was born and grew up, to live in a new family, a new environment, with new tasks; to change a living. Certainly, there were among combatants those who were born in refugee camps and thus didn't know where to go, as they had never known that country. At least those who were integrated in the army had barracks as shelters. Nonetheless, the mediation sorted out the challenge by providing them with provisional homes, mostly for the seriously handicapped.

The process of demobilization was carried on in places different from those of cantonment. Final release of demobilized was issued in prior to a post-discharged orientation. Massimo Fusato states that the action of orienting ex-combatants ready to be demobilized is very important for establishing and reinforcing their beliefs that DDR offers practical alternatives to conflict as a livelihood. He distinguishes two steps or orientation, namely a 'pre-discharge'.¹⁰⁹ For the scholar,

"Pre-discharged orientation has important practical and psychology function. Practically, it provides ex-combatants and their dependents with the basic information about the DDR program. Psychologically, it empowers DDR beneficiaries as free citizens, by addressing needs and doubts and asking for their

¹⁰⁹ Fusato, M., DDR of Ex-Combatants, July 2003

interactive participation. On the other hand, Post-discharge orientation is the first step in the social and economic reintegration of ex-combatants. It provides information about the place of relocation, economic opportunities, and relevant local institutions and social networks, including religious groups, NGOs, veterans associations, farmers associations, women's groups and others".¹¹⁰

As a matter of fact, the demonization mechanism had prepared two settlements to serve as centers for orientation namely Gitega and Muramvya in the center of the center of the country. The center was also preferred for the strategic purpose of equal transportation return fare. As the facilities could not receive all the combatants at a time, the commission proceeded by installments. Each contingent had a limited time of two weeks to be provided with general information regarding how they should reintegrate the civil life: education and employment opportunities, health issues, conducting small projects, access to land and credit among others. They also attended lessons about how to run a business, being either alone or associated with others.

Beside the fact that DDR program in Burundi aimed mainly at ex-combatants, it also included the disarmament of civilians and the dismantling of militias. These local defence armed units were built by communities to help the factions, especially in terms of communication and logistics. The members of these groups were known as Militants Combatants (MC) if they belonged to the CNDD-FDD movement, Adultes Associés (AA), if they supported the FNL and Gardiens de la Paix (GdP) who helped the FAB in various activities including night guard in areas not covered by the governmental forces, transport of logistics, and mobilization of youth for recruitment among others. Militiamen received FBu 100,000 (equivalent to USD91) as compensation.¹¹¹

¹¹⁰ Ibid

¹¹¹ ICG (2000); HRW (2009); Steams (2010)

3.2.5. Reintegration

Nicole Ball and Luc Van Goor (2006) distinguish two phases of reintegration, based on longer or short time. According to them, as reintegration is a long term, continuous, social, economic process of development, reinsertion is a short-term material and/ or financial assistance to meet immediate needs and can last up to one year.¹¹² In this study, reintegration bears two different meanings as stated earlier. Indeed, on the one hand, the mediation adopted the term '*reintegration*' to refer to the formation of a new National Defence Force. That definition has been a great subject of controversy as the armed political parties and movement wanted a simple terminology that could be easily understood by even the less educated people. Hence, rebel movement leaders preferred '*fusion*' or '*mixture*', because, apart from some fundamentalist persons, the state end of the fight was the mixture of the army, based on quotas to be negotiated and implemented to solve the issue of the Defence and Security Forces, on one occasion for all. The necessity of the right terminology subscribes into the conflict transformation theoretical framework since the end state of the whole peace process was a sustainable peace. In this regard, the Hindu approach of is a specific as that the conflict transformation worker has the third role as a preserver, transforming the conflict by avoiding violence and promoting development.¹¹³

Obviously, the second meaning is that given by the DDR context: "reintegration is the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. Reintegration is essentially a social and economic process with an open time frame, primarily

¹¹² Ball, N. & V. Goor, L., Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: Mapping Issues, Dilemmas and Guiding Principles. CIP, Netherland's Institute of International Relations. Aug 2006. P. 5.

¹¹³ Galtung, J., The Transcend Method at a Glance (P5) In: Conflict Transformation by Peaceful Means, United Nations. 2000. (at Transcend.org)

taking place in communities at the local level. It is part of the general development of a country and a national responsibility and often necessitates long term external assistance".¹¹⁴

The identification of combatants was a very important phase in that sense that it allowed leaders of rebel movements to separate soldiers to integrate into the security organs from those to demobilize. It was also an occasion to select weapons in good condition to keep from those to destroy. In fact, immediately after combatants were identified, the chosen were sent to military barracks while others were taken to demobilization settlements. Besides, there are people who were present at the demobilization place but who could not be considered because they did not qualify for either next step. The reasons of their unacceptability included non-recognition by movements' leaders, failure to the criterion 'one weapon, three combatant', failure to the knowledge of basic military skills, severe disability, to name but a few. Miserably sent away, the unfortunate ex-combatants returned swearing.

On the other side of the NDF, things happened amazingly well. If integrated soldiers did not sleep the very first night together, that was quite normal. Mutual confidence could not be built in a single night. But the fusion as per fifty-fifty of combatants from both sides of ethnic groups was carried on with no incident, except minor difficulties of housekeeping.

Little by little, ex-rebel soldiers get used to the regulations of regular army. At the end of the month, they perceived their salary. The lower ranked soldier a worth twelve thousand Burundi Francs (at that time, it was equivalent to USD15). Some soldiers could not believe their eyes. And some of them had a family. Their salary was less than a bag of beans, a ration of one month.

¹¹⁴ Andersen, V., Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants in Angola. Why did DDR only succeed in the third and last of the three peace processes? The University of Bergen Institute of Comparative Politics. November 2011. P. 19.

What about other food? What about children's school needs? What of other items? The salary became a great challenge among newly integrated soldiers who were wondering how they could live with such a small amount of money. Some of them preferred to desert the defence force and went to search for other means to survive with.

3.3.The outcomes of the DDR program in Burundi

After demobilization and reintegration, life in the whole country began to take its normal trend. Soldiers were in their respective barracks, beginning a new career, while demobilized had gone home in their respective families to begin a new life. In other words, a part of ex-rebels had been transformed into real governmental soldiers while the other part became pure civilians prepared to live like other citizens in the nation. Shift from a behavior to another is not so automatic: it requires individuals to take time to get acquainted to the new situation. In the first instance, demobilized were supposed to live on allowances they had been granted by the DDR program while soldiers had to rely on their salary.

However, Olivia d'Aoust et al (2016) argues that by exploiting a disruption in the DDR transfers in Burundi, Gilligan et al (2013) found that in-kind allocation led to a decrease in poverty and improved livelihoods among beneficiary ex-combatants. While they concluded that the program was successful in terms of economic reintegration they found no effect on ex-combatants' overall satisfaction and attitudes towards norms.¹¹⁵ Henceforth, neither demobilized ex-combatants nor those reintegrated in the army could satisfy their needs by the so low salary. This sub-section will focus on the security, social, economic and political impacts of the both processes and will try to link them to the problem under study.

¹¹⁵D'Aoust O, Sterck O Verwim, P., *Who Benefited from Burundi's Demobilization Program?* Policy Research Working Paper 7732. June 2016

3.3.1. Social outcome

For some people in the community, demobilization and reintegration were seen as the return of the prodigal son that had still to be handled with care, while others were happy to celebrate the return of the hero. Nevertheless, the Burundian society as a whole was happy to see the end of the civil war and the recovery of peace and security. Despite the general agreement that former combatants are the ultimate objects of the DDR program, it is desirable to expand the span of the program to include both community rehabilitation and development as the major mechanisms of reintegrating former fighters rather than targeting only combatants and their dependents.¹¹⁶ In that scope, politicians changed their language to reassure to the most resistant that the demobilized had buried the hatchet of war and were ready to mutate from destroyer to builder. Ex-combatants really felt happy to be back home and committed themselves to consolidate peace and rebuild that country torn by war.

With allowances offered by the commission for demobilization, ex-combatants began to rehash their shelters and helped their families not only financially, but also morally. They drove busy with activities to earn a living: some of them working in associations, while skilled younger people had returned to school. Healthy ex-combatants were recruited in guard companies because they had more skills in defence and security domain; others were employed as junior office workers.¹¹⁷ It is worthy to remember that many former combatants had less attended school if they were no completely illiterate. Nonetheless, in the inner thought of each former fighter, more advantages were expected in the future. They had indeed been heroes of a war for justice and equality, hence were expecting to get a job or lucrative occupation.

¹¹⁶Ball, N. & V. Goor, L., Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: Mapping Issues, Dilemmas and Guiding Principles. CIP, Netherland's Institute of International Relations. Aug 2006. P. 5.

¹¹⁷D' Aoust O, Sterck O Verwim, P., Who *Benefited from Burundi's Demobilization Program?* Policy Research Working Paper 7732. June 2016

3.3.2. Economic impact

Christiana Solomon and Ginifer (2008) note that “the reintegration aspect of the DDR program aims at facilitating ex-combatants’ reentry into civilian social, economic and political life”.¹¹⁸

They explicate that without a comprehensive reintegration component, disarmament and demobilization can become a wasted effort as impoverished, unskilled and disgruntled former combatants are prone to taking up arms once again. In the same sense, effective reintegration refers to providing alternative economic lifestyle for ex-combatants and helping communities become economically productive, key criteria for peace recovery and reconciliation. Acceptance

Therefore, the DDR program in Burundi had been conceived in the scope of providing ex-combatants with training for vocational skills and formal education opportunities that would enable them to engage in sustainable livelihoods and employment, access to micro enterprise schemes, tools for a variety of trades and farming, all to support recognition through social reconciliation. Moreover, households where ex-combatants returned enjoyed, although for a few days, the cash and in-kind transfers that were granted to demobilized ex-combatants. According to d’Aoust et al (2016), DDR program generated as well positive spillovers in the villages where FNL combatants returned. Indeed, former combatants spent a large portion of their allowances on consumption goods and clothing, thereby generating a short-run economic boom in villages.¹¹⁹ In other words, families celebrated the return of the lost son.

3.3.3. Political and security outcome

With the signature of the Ceasefire Agreement between the government of Burundi and the CNDD-FDD AG and later political party, peace and security were almost total on the entire

¹¹⁸ Solomon, C., Ginifer, J., Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration in Sierra Leone. University of Bradford. July 2008. P. 14.

¹¹⁹Ibid.

republic. Certainly, the CNDD-FDD was the principal political movement, and its combatants were scattered all over the country. Combatants and their counterpart of their government army were very happy that the, hostilities finally took an end. In political sector, the end state of DDR is reestablished of democracy and good governance. Democracy includes regular and transparent election as well as power sharing, while good governance implies consensus oriented politics participation in a nation's matters observance of the rule of law, effectiveness and effectiveness and efficiency in economics policies, accountability, responsiveness and transparency of leaders among other qualities.

Therefore, in 2005, the country held general election, that implied several levels. First, there was a referendum on the newly set constitution, which stood for a general framework of the conduct of the whole state business. After, leaders were elected on all levels, namely the local government, the members of the bicameral parliament, and the President of the Republic. The cabinet, the public service and the parastatal services were built in accordance with quotas as specified in the constitution.

3.3.4. Conclusion

The year 2005 marked a major turn in the field of Burundian society and politics. Indeed, a new defence force was put in place, the designated combatants were demobilized, general elections were organized prior to a constitutional referendum, and all process were conducted major incidents. Everything was going as planned and in the schedule time. Apart from the FNL movement which had not yet adhered to the global cease-fire agreement and other subsequent accords, there was a relative peace country as all citizens were returning to the reconstruction of the nation within the conflict transformation theoretical framework. The election were won by a majority of ex-rebels movements, the CNDD-FDD, but the division of power was done in accord

with of the new constitution: the ethnic composition of the National Assembly would be set at 60% Hutu and 40% Tutsi, with three additional seats reserved for Twas. In the senate seats would be split 50-50 between Hutus and Tutsi, with three seats reserved for Twas. Military posts would be shared equally between two groups.¹²⁰

The demobilized have returned home, each for himself. They arrived in their respective families and most of them forgot the rules of the game. They spent everything they had received as demobilization allowances; they even forgot that they had formed association ... Life began to be tougher for them. Moreover, as they belonged to different political formations however without being on good terms one with the other, each side thought its counterpart was treated better and they hence began to suspect each other.

Certainly, defy didn't face all the demobilized because some of them had been appointed in some service, while others were more or less satisfied as they had been recruited in the fighting movements just for getting allowances. Besides, the groups of combatants that had not been taken into account by the program felt excluded and hence had to find other means of earning a living, nonetheless feeling shameful and abandoned. Disarmament had truly been conducted in transparency, yet some weapons were not handed in as tricky combatants had hidden one or more light arm or grenade.

Apart from demobilized ex-combatants, some integrated soldiers were not satisfied with this salary. Some of them compared the legal monthly earning to the former style of living-that was mainly based on pillage- and realized it was amply insufficient. Henceforth, a certain number of combatants deserted the NDF and either joined the FNL still fighting or formed armed gangs for

¹²⁰ Construction of the Republic of Burundi, Art 129; 130; 164; 241; 257(2). 2004.

robbery rather than armed group with a political aim. Other combatants who joined FNL were those whom, at the integration in the defense and security bodies, were given ranks far below the one they had in the rebellion, and therefore opted to be demobilized. In addition to frustrated former combatants, some members of the political formation were angry with their leaders, or were just impatient to wait for their turn to gather the fruit of their fight.

The elections of 2010 were held in such climate that people feared a breach of peace. On the one hand, the leaders of FNL thought he could win the elections like the previous one; on the other hand, ex-combatants were not happy with their current socio-economic situation. Moreover, old politicians of the Tutsi obedience began to realize that the power had fallen to the mercy of Hutu ex-rebels, while the other wing of Hutu politicians were in total ambiguity, ignoring if they could join the powerful CNDD-FDD or not.

CHAPTER FOUR

A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF LESSONS LEARNED IN DDR PROGRAMS

4.0. Introduction

This chapter presents the analysis of the findings and the interpretation of the results. Analysis of the results relies on the theoretical framework of conflict transformation, especially in the Hindu approach of a conflict the destroyer and the conflict the creator.¹²¹ The Hindu approach presents the conflict transformation as having the third role as a preserver, that of transforming the conflict by avoiding violence and promoting development. This chapter also draws the lessons learnt and, from them proposes improved approach in conducting a DDR program for the interest of both the authority and the ex-combatants. The data to be analyzed was gathered from primary as well as secondary sources. The first source refers to information got through the questionnaire, and the oral information gathered directly from the persons concerned with the program including the staff of the then board of demobilization (CNDRR), and the demobilized individuals. Secondary data is the information read in reports and other writings about the core program.

The analysis and interpretation refer to an attempt of answering the question in relation to the conception and implementation of the DDR process in Burundi between 2004 and 2011. The examination of the results in this study provides an insight of the life of ex-combatants after demobilization and the effects of the allowances on their living thereafter. The period covered by the study should be extended to current days where several demobilized persons live under poverty and need, for the reason that whether the demobilization program was not favorable for their long-term living or haven't they adopted a behavior to not take full advantage of the

¹²¹ Galtun, J., *The Transcend Method at a Glance*. United Nations. 2000. P. 5.

program benefits. The state of things raises an interrogation on the significance of conflict transformation theoretical framework following the Islamic thought as stated before in the theoretical framework together with the tangible accountability for the wellbeing of the concerned persons was taken into account.

As per the questionnaire and other information gathering tools, the data analysis focused on the actual standing of ex-combatants their motivation to demobilization, their current occupation vis-à-vis the vocational training they got before they integrated into the civilian life, the success and/or failure of disarmament, the participation of ex-combatants in insecurity acts and especially the 2015's unrest. On the part of the administration, light was shed on issues regarding ex-combatants who missed the chance of being demobilized, current assistance provided to ex-combatants, what became ex-child soldiers and female combatants, and who is to blame and/or to congratulate for the failure or success of the whole program. Here again, it appears that some demobilized persons did not experience the transformation herein brought by the process as clearly defined by the scholars.

4.1. Data analysis and interpretation

The subsection presents the answers to the questionnaire and other information gathered from resource persons. Interpretation refers to understanding the views of the respondents. From the current condition of the demobilized to the participation of some of them in breach of peace, the following paragraphs link with the assumptions about the benefits of a well managed DDR program and the dangerous consequences of a failed one.

4.1.1. Synopsis of the respondents

Ex-combatants were easy to trace in town despite the fact that it was difficult to get views from those who were in the remote villages. Some are employed like guards by diverse companies while others work as drivers, mechanics or shopkeepers. A few of the ex-combatants look happy with their everyday occupation, while most of them are unemployed and pitiable.

Table 1: Information about Respondents and their Gender

Gender	Ex-combatants	Officers of the DGAC	%
Female	22	2	33.3%
Male	32	4	66.7%
Total	54	6	100%

Source: Field research

Out of 54 former fighters plus 6 officials that the study targeted, all needed respondents were found using the 'snowballing method'. They included 20 female ex-combatants, 2 female civil servants and 32 male ex-combatants plus 4 male officers of the DGAC. Mugenda and Mugenda note that the few identified subjects name others that they know have the required characteristics until the researcher gets the number of cases he or she requires.¹²² Hence, those found at the office of the Direction General of War Veterans-where they regularly come to seek for assistance- indicated to the researcher where others could be met. Still other ex-combatants were met at their place of work and almost all of them were eager to express their feelings about the success and failure of the DDR program. Therefore, the views and feelings contained in this section are original and real, even though they may be biased as it is the case of purposive

¹²² Mugenda, O. & Mugenda A.G., *Research Methods: Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches*. ACTS Press. Nairobi, Kenya. 1999. P. 51.

sampling. Indeed, cases of subjects were handpicked because they were informative since they were believed to possess the required characteristics.¹²³

4. 1. 2 The current status of ex-combatants

Table 2: Information about Respondents (ex-combatants) and their age.

Gender	Ex- Child soldiers	Adults	Total
Female	2	20	22
Male	6	26	32
Total	8	46	54
%	14.8	85.2%	100%

Source: Field research

Respondents to the questionnaire included 2 female and 6 male child soldiers thus representing 14.8% of the whole number of the target personnel to be demobilized. Adults represented 85.2%. However currently, almost all the ex-combatants are aged above 25 years, including those who had joined the fighting groups at a minor age. Many of them are married except those who went back to school, single mothers and those who were strongly disabled. Some of the latter benefited from a supplementary program of the government which provided them with shelter in addition to a monthly incentive which allows them to survive. Some of the students have completed studies and are now employed somewhere; while others are still in either secondary or tertiary education. A certain number of female ex-combatants who were abandoned by their (not legal) husbands could not get married again for many reasons. They explained that some men are afraid of marrying an ex-soldier because she might be dangerous; other men sully them because they consider that they have been sexually spoiled by their colleague combatants.

¹²³ Ibid

4.1.3 How demobilized endured life in the first days of demobilization

When ex-combatants went back home 'in hero', their families were delighted, but not all of them. At that time, most of families were just returning home from refugee or IDPs camps and, therefore, they were languishing in poverty. Indeed, their belongings had been spoiled by the atrocities of the conflict and the long period they had been out of the country or village. The populations were deprived of almost all. More than ten years out of home, they were foreigners in their own homes and were to begin life afresh. However, as for the philosophy of conflict transformation theory, conflict should not be regarded as an isolated incident which may be resolved or managed, but as an essential part of the society's ongoing evolution and development.¹²⁴ Therefore, even if they were solely relying on aid granted by UNHCR and other NGOs, they had to work hard to improve their living.


The challenge of beginning life afresh was mostly pronounced for PMPAs. These had indeed to spend the major portion of their incentives in buying primary items of the house. Michel lamented: "When I reached my home after demobilization, I had nothing other than the allowance. Therefore I had to buy elementary household needs including a stool to sit on, a mat, decent clothing..."¹²⁵ They had to begin thinking about reconstructing their house, children's education among many necessities. This was so hard for the 'hero' who had to show the different personality he had acquired in his old profession and from the reorientation program.

¹²⁴ Search for Common Ground: Putting an End on Violent Conflicts.

¹²⁵ Source: *Field research*

4.1.4. Motivation to demobilization

Figure 1: Motivation for demobilization. Source: Field research



On the question about what motivated certain ex-combatants to be demobilized, 46 out of 54, that is, 85% ex-combatants acknowledged that they preferred to be demobilized because the task of soldiers was not their vocation.

“I had been recruited in the CNDD-FDD by force”, Joseph explains. “I just accepted the fate because choices of survival were limited during the war. Schools had closed and we had nothing else to do”¹²⁶. The forced enrollment was applied by both the national defence force and the armed movements. Obviously, at the end of the struggle, the disabled had no other option to join the civilian life since the evenly motto of the training center posits that it is the place of ‘those who want and who can’. However, other ex-combatants complained that the authorities compelled them to quit the armed forces in the intent of downsizing its body. As a matter of fact, they could not find another job because employers often find it difficult to take into service someone whose training is exclusively military. As the country was in a war, the majority of the youth abandoned schools and enrolled in either regular army or rebel movement, and at the end of the hostilities, they failed to resume studies or to do business.

¹²⁶Source: Field research

4.1.5 Current occupation

Ex-combatants acknowledged to have benefited from a vocational training prior to their demobilization. However, the training was so short –less than ten days- to the extent that it was not enough to allow someone to begin a durable business. The major problem was that when the former fighters obtained their cash allowances, they quickly spent their money in household items and stayed poorer.

Figure 2: Occupation in relation to the training received




Figure 2 shows that among 54 respondents, 35 (66.8%) admitted exercising an occupation as they were trained in the demobilization camp, while 19 respondents representing 33.2% did not keep their promise but went down town to look for a job.

In reality, the newly invested civilians had got an allowance of more or less US\$515 cash depending on the rank beard by each combatant, and installed over a year and a half period. Besides, they received a reintegration grant worth USD545 and distributed in-kind. Michel specifies what kind of in-kind allowances was granted, depending on the wish of each ex-combatant: “some of us chose to breed cows, while others preferred small livestock. Technicians

received tools and materiel while shopkeepers were granted shop items depending on what kind of merchandises they intended to sell".¹²⁷ But some of them failed to start a lucrative business. Moreover, their allowance was not of a significant advantage for the demobilized. Olivia D'Aoust et al (2016) wrote that: they realized that demobilization donations positively impacted on economic improvement of the FNL recipients in the short run. In contrast, CNDD's combatants spoiled their allowances on non-food items.¹²⁸ That money could neither constitute the minimum to survive nor to start a serious business. Therefore, ex-combatants contracted many debts, sometimes being obliged to sell the in-kind allowances and get even poorer than before.

However, d'Aoust acknowledges that despite 'prodigal' ex-combatants who irrationally spent their allowances, others invested the money in durable small business which impacted on their economy in the long run. She writes:

DDR beneficiaries also put in part of their allowance in prolific proprieties. More than a half of them invested in land ownership 23% of them worked on small business 19% in working equipment, and others in cattle. This productive investment expected to increase their production capacity as well as improving their livelihood in the short and long run..¹²⁹

4.1.6 Associations of demobilized

Before ex-combatants were sent home, the staff members of the demobilization board had encouraged them to work in associations. The respondents to the questionnaire acknowledged that ex-combatants resolved to form agricultural groups, breeding associations, masons and carpenters groupings and mechanics decided to work together in order to alleviate poverty. Associations were built in consideration of people who knew each other, who lived in the same

¹²⁷Source: field research


¹²⁸D'Aoust O, Sterck O Verwim, P., *Who Benefited from Burundi's Demobilization Program?* Policy Research Working Paper 7732. June 2016

¹²⁹ Ibid

village or neighboring villages, who in a certain way had similar skills about the chosen area of operation among many conditions.

However, that sort of joint task didn't last long. Currently, a number of associations exist only by name rather than functioning small enterprises. Soon after demobilized ex-combatants had exhausted their allowances together with their families in their respective villages, they went down town in quest of employment. "Cultivates who cultivated"¹³⁰, assured Minani, an aged demobilized man. Of the 54 respondents, only 21 continued to work in associations while more than 61% abandoned.

Figure 3: Working in associations.



Source: Field research

Respondents to the questionnaire argued that for a reason or another, they gave up working in associations and sought employment or undertook other different business. In fact, most ex-combatants who remained in the village were those adult men and women who joined the rebellion when they were simple peasants while most of younger people rushed to town. For this special case, going to town for war veterans also meant not to conduct the project of DDR, but

¹³⁰Source: Research on field. Minani is a fictive name as of keeping discreet the identity of the respondent.

also the abandonment of working in association. This kind of immigration may be explained by many factors. First, the ex-combatants were not morally prepared to run their own business, or work hard to earn a living. Secondly, the in-kind allowances they had got did not constitute a consistent capital to start a business in addition to an insufficient training they had benefited from in the transitional settlements. Thirdly, they expected to get an honest and lucrative employment from their respective former commanders. In other words, they did not realize that the war was over, and hence they could no more live by the fruits of the weapon.


Dislocation of associations was associated with such factors as bankrupt, bad governance, theft, laziness and negligence. Bankrupt was obvious as ex-combatants implemented projects that they had not enough planned. In other words, since it was a requirement of the authority to form associations, beneficiaries made them just to satisfy the will of the program, without being serious. Although members of each association were people who pretended to know each other, there was a tendency of making the activity a family business. Hence, some demobilized realized they had not a place in the cooperative and left. Economic governance was another not negligible issue among “equals”. The question here was ‘who has to do what?’ especially, who had to manipulate the cash. In addition, despite laziness of some members who did not have the will of working, working well and in good time, other ex-combatants robbed the possessions of the association and ran away.

Associations of women and child soldiers

Pia Peeters and friends who conducted a research on demobilized youth in Burundi acknowledge that the socio-economic reintegration of former fighters and former child soldiers has been

positive overall.¹³¹ More specifically, reintegration of ex-child soldiers has been positive overall with more than 90 percent living with their biological families. Staying with his biological family for a child soldier means that he was still in school or had less ambition to migrate to town.

Figure 4: Child-soldiers migration



Source: Pia Peeters et al (2007) p. 21.

Whilst education levels are low amongst former child soldiers, the difference with their civilian counterparts is not significant. In fact, after demobilization, ex-child soldiers formed youth associations, but these could not stand because these young people were exercising dissimilar occupations and thus, occasions to meet were few. Also, some of them had returned to school while other stayed in their villages for rural work. Further, the author explains why a certain number of young people migrated to town. He posits that the majority of rural youth are discouraged with agriculture. This is because of the lack of land, which is not surprising in a country where 57 percent of the households live a plot of less than one hectare.¹³² In addition,


¹³¹ Peeters, P., Smith, C., & Maria, *Voices of Youth in Post-conflict Burundi: Perspectives on Exclusion, Gender and Conflict*. Post Conflict and Social Development Unit. Sub-Saharan Africa. 2007. P21.

¹³² Ibid

certain young men got married and felt adult enough and thus could not continue working together with the youngest.

Likely, demobilized women formed an amalgam of associations. These groupings were built according to the wealth of the members, the social or political position of the husband, the marital status as some women were widower, abandoned or single mothers. Women associations faced a great deal of challenges as the members lived a life more or less instable. For example, if one lady got married, she preferred to leave the association. In case she went with her husband in his new work place, she lost the availability to fully participate in her association project. “Our association could not last longer”, complains Marie. “Firstly, our representative was a wife of an army officer. When her husband was transferred in the northern region, she joined him taking with her the funds of the association and we could not continue working”.¹³³

Figure 5: Female ex-combatants currently working in associations.



Source: Field research

Fifteen women out of twenty two who were eager to respond to the questionnaire admitted that they no more work within associations. They put forward such explanations as mistrust among members, movements from regions to others, change in lifestyle among other reasons. Most of women associations worked in farming, tailoring and breeding small cattle. Moreover, in a poor

¹³³ Source: Research on field.

country like Burundi, women are afraid of supporting a living alone, especially when they are married and are afraid of losing a husband.

4.1.7 Relations among former battle friends

In the process of DDR, there was a nuance between reintegration into the civilian life and integration into the new security bodies. If the reintegration in the new army insisted on the principles of mutual forgiveness, reconciliation, and common understanding on the issue of 'mixture' of the army for soldiers who were going to form the same security body, the CNDRR didn't take into account that practice. Indeed, ex-FAB and ex-PMPA didn't go together in the demobilization settlements. Likely, ex-combatants of different movements were not mixed up during either the disarmament or the demobilization process. This means also that demobilized personnel didn't have a chance to meet in peacetime and know each other or interact. Therefore, the ultimate aim of conflict transformation, defined as a long term, gradual and complex process, requiring sustained engagement and interaction¹³⁴ could not be attained.

Figure 6: Interactions among ex-combatants




Figure 6 shows that on a total number of 54 ex-combatants, 24 respondents representing 42.8% still met with their old friends, while 57.2% have lost the traces of their battlefield colleagues.

¹³⁴ Galtung, J., *The Principles of Conflict Transformation*. Transconflict. 2008.

After demobilization, ex-combatants went to their respective villages. Urgency in that time was to return to their family, some of which didn't expect that theirs would escape from the fighting. Each combatant had got his friends from the battlefield, personal friends, blood friends. Obviously, some have got a job in town, and others stayed in their village. If their relations have decreased since then, they still however could meet in associations. Nevertheless, the mostly busy rarely joined others in such frameworks because they shared no more the same problems and hence the same vision in addition to job requirements.

On the issue about relations among old friends, most respondents to the questionnaire stated that ex-combatants often meet but better relations exist among the members of the same ex-fighting group. Therefore, ex-FAB kept closer with themselves. This also means that as the army was formerly denoted as Tutsi dominated, demobilized from the FAB formed their own associations and worked together rather than uniting with ex-PMPAs. Ngendakumana, an old veteran of the ex-FAB notes that:

“Many of the former rebels were younger people from the Western region of the country whom I had never met before, and I was a native of the Southern region. We all were demobilized in different waves and each went back to his native village. I don't see any single occasion that we should have interacted”.¹³⁵

On the other side, ex-PMPA stayed interlinked apart. Since the latter included many factions, groupings were formed according to movement belonging and areas of origin. In effect, these former combatants kept expecting more advantages from their former commanders, since the latter were part of the state leadership and every opportunity could be opened to them. And really good occasions occurred but in all manners, all the ex-combatants could not have a chance. This denotes also that conflict transformation had effects among ex-combatants who knew each other

¹³⁵ Source: Research on field. Caporal Chief Ngendakumana retired at the age of 63 years, while the regulation states retirement at 45 years only. The reason was that during the war, the need of manpower made to ignore the law on retirement. Answer to the questionnaire, the 22nd December 2016

before and not between former antagonist groups; for Galtung argues in the Christian thought that “ Ultimately, the responsibility for Conflict Transformation lies with individuals and their individual responsibility and decisions to act so as to promote peace rather than violence and the principle of hope”.¹³⁶

4.1.8 Conduct of the disarmament

In his paper on disarmament in Burundi, Nelson Alusala notes that other tasks that were part of ONUB’s mandate included promoting the re-establishment of confidence between the Burundian forces. This requires the monitoring and the provision of security at the assembly sites of pre-disarmament of militias, as called for in the ceasefire agreement.¹³⁷ This means that the core objective of disarmament was built within the framework of conflict transformation, on two humanitarian roles including the protection of civilians who were under imminent threat of physical violence and assuring the protection of United Nations personnel, amenities, equipments and installations in addition to the security and freedom of movement of the ONUB workforce. Disarmament included also mine clearance activities, but there was not much ado as at this point, because of the lack of will on the side of the government and the UN mission. Therefore, little would have been realized within the framework of mine clearance activity.

Alusala insists on how serious the UNSC mandated the peacekeeping mission to conduct the disarmament operation with diligence. In that regard, the UNSC had endorsed the ONUB to make use of all possible ways to guarantee the strict respect of the ceasefire accord “throughout the supervision of their execution and inspect their infringement or abuse, to conduct the

¹³⁶ Op Cit

¹³⁷ Alusala, N., Disarmament and the Transition in Burundi: How Soon? Paper 97, 2005. P. 5.

disarmament and demobilization phases of the DDR Program and to continue to monitor the illicit flow of weapons across the national borders".¹³⁸

Most of the respondents to the questionnaire acknowledged that by distraction of certain authorities and/or dexterity of the combatants, some weapons remained in the hands of the demobilized. Furthermore, the various origins of combatants were another challenge. At the moment of ceasefire and beginning of DDR, assorted persons took advantage of the lack of vigilance of some AGs commanders and joined the fighting groups with objectives of whether stealing a weapon or getting the program allowances, without being veritable combatants. Leaders of smaller fighting groups could not avoid that on-the-job recruitment as they were also in need of increasing the size of their factions. Moreover, hasty and incomplete disarmament was exacerbated by proliferation of SALW in the region.

On their side, military authorities refrained from saying anything about arms surrendering during disarmament. Nevertheless, what was true is that between 2004 and 2010, several citizens were killed with either fire weapon or grenades, yet the authorities could not affirm with certitude where those arms came from as they were all supposed to have been removed from ex-combatants who had been demobilized and civilians who used to hold them illegally.

4.1.9 Unlucky combatants

As stated earlier, the mediation had tried to include in the peace talks all possible fighting groups and all political movements and parties so as to find a durable remedy to the conflict that had lasted nearly a half century. And when the ceasefire was issued, all the combatants were assembled in designated areas, disarmed and demobilized. However, for various reasons, there

¹³⁸ Ibid

were combatants who did not have the chance to benefit from the DDR program. These included those who could not qualify to the requirements as set by stakeholders to the process, those who were in prison but yet being recognized by their former commanders, those who were in hospitals while the process was being carried on, and those who misbehaved in either the assembling settlements or demobilization camps.

Respondents blamed all stakeholders because one or the other played a certain role in the misfortune of those soldiers. First, some identifying officials appeared wicked as if their objective was to make combatants fail the test and miss the chance. Second, some rebel leaders failed to advocate for their former soldiers who were in an irregular situation, yet known by their chiefs. “I was in prison since two years and a half”, Isaac regrets. “When the DDR program started, I had just been released. However, because my Commandant had been killed on the battlefield, chiefs in place could not recognize me. Then, I decided to join another armed group in search of a chance to the demobilization allowances”.¹³⁹ It is indeed important to state such cases because a nervous combatant could act dangerously and be a source of insecurity in a society.

4.1.10 Involvement of ex-combatants in insecurity acts

Burundi population expected to recover peace and security at the end of the armed conflict. Movements of travelers were safe throughout the country in day time as well as at night. IDPs were returning to their native villages without fear of being aggressed or persecuted. Citizens were enthusiastically attending their daily activities. In general, life had regained its normal trend and people were ready to go back to their respective work to reconstruct the nation and alleviate

¹³⁹ Source: Research on field. Isaac was a batman of a Battalion commandant. He was sent to town to deliver a message to the family of his boss and he was caught by the police.

poverty. Certainly, conflict transformation was taking its effects since it aimed at actions to promote peace rather than violence. However, the signature of peace accords, the demobilization of non-state AGs and the termination of war did not provide any guaranty to cutback violence.¹⁴⁰ This was evident since the administration provided neither a clear framework for interaction of ordinary ex-combatants among themselves, nor any agenda for communication between former combatants and the ordinary civilians.

Respondents were asked about ex-combatants who were the most active in the insecurity acts, among ex-rebels and ex-governmental troops. Twenty of them answered they did not know, 14 pointed both, 11 accused the ex-FAB, 6 blamed the ex-PMPAs, while 3 said no demobilized was involved. It is obvious that from the results in the table below, most of the respondents did not want to accuse their fellow demobilized to have participated in insecurity acts, especially in relation to political issues.

Table 3: Involvement of ex-combatants in breach of peace

Party's participation	Number of respondents	Percentage
Ex-PMPA	6	11.11%
Ex-FAB	11	20.37%
Both	14	25.92%
Don't know	20	37.03%
None	3	5.55%
Total	54	100%

Source: *Field research*

In the particular context of Burundi, sporadic killings continued to be reported in one village or another. Enzo Nussio and Kimberly Howe (2014) try to explicate the reason why rates of violence can quickly augment in a post-demobilization period. They use the method of process

¹⁴⁰ Muggah, R. & Keith, K., *Closing the Gap Between Peace Operations and Post-Conflict Insecurity: Towards a Violence Reduction Agenda*. 2009. Pp. 136-150.

tracing to explore the case of Córdoba Department, in Colombia, where rates of violence have increased after the demobilization of the paramilitary militias in the 2005s. They argue that as the AUC¹⁴¹ had formed and uphold an illegal protection system, criminality increased shortly after the DDR procedure.¹⁴²

In the same line of thought, such kinds of killings were carried on by former fighters who had kept their weapons. Acts of violence were based principally on armed robbery, retaliation against an old court affair or an old social conflict, an unrestrained visceral hatred, accusation of sorcery, among many.

Reports from the police said that most of the time, ex-combatants were reportedly caught in flagrant offense of violence, in commission of such acts of vandalism. Officials precised that these weapon holders were acting either on their own, or were hired by third persons to commit such crimes. The trend of armed retaliation had become a business since the executors sought for new weapons, finding them either internally or from neighboring countries including Tanzania and mostly the DRC.

Social violent retaliation seems to be a quite normal phenomenon especially after an armed conflict. However, the most dreadful thing was the case where the combatants, even after counseling lessons for disarmament and demobilization did not take conscience of what there were going to become so as to completely bury the war hatchet. This automatically leads to the rise of violence and there is a risk of calling into question all the process already under way.

¹⁴¹ ACU: Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, meaning United Self-Defence of Colombia

¹⁴² Nussio, N. & Howe, K., When Protection Collapses: Post-Demobilization Trajectories of Violence.

The revival of violence was in fact a failure for a number of institutions and groups of individuals who were counting on peace and security. These include at first the regional and/or international mediation team, whose mandate is to transform the situation of disagreement into a climate of mutual understanding and to set mechanisms of ending the conflict in favor of a durable peace. Re-rise of violence is also a shame to the state who seeks restoration of security on its territory and beyond. Interpretation by third party may be that perhaps the conflict had not yet attained its stalemate; that the parties involved in the hostilities were not satisfied with the outcomes of the agreements, and therefore they have to fight again to appease their frustration. Thirdly, revival of violence puts civilian populations in great desolation, and such a deception may lead to a loss of trustworthiness in either opponents. On the one hand, their government doesn't care about its citizens, and on the other, the rebels that they have been praising and supporting for long feel no more mercy for the people they are supposed to fight for. Finally, revival of fighting is a heart breaker for the combatants on both sides. Armed conflict or, in proper terms, war is not a game of ping-pong where the players exchange the ball. It is on the contrary a game of life or death where players exchange deadly spears, bullets and bombs. So, when soldiers are called again to return to the killing ground or in the trenches, it is not for glory, but for shedding more blood.

A few cases

Beside acts of vengeance that were carried by gun shot or grenade explosion, there was also formation of organic armed groups intended to steal. These groups of armed bandits were mostly targeting passenger transportation cars, important businessmen, bank agencies and big shops. There was an important gang led by a certain Bitaryumunyu, who was a dissident of the Palipe Hutu FNL. He never adhered to the peace process led by the mediation. After his original armed

group had subscribed to the ceasefire accord and other peace agreements; subscription which gave the party access to reintegration in the defence and security corps and the demobilization program, Bitaryumunyu turned back to the bush arguing that the salary in the defence force was amply insufficient, and that he deserved a higher rank than that was proposed for him.

Another group was under the command of a named Nzabampema. He was integrated in the NDF with the rank of Major. When he received his first salary, he could not believe it. He cried: 'this cannot allow me to build a house in any way'.¹⁴³ He deserted the army, leaving together with some soldiers whom he convinced they should survive otherwise. He then called upon some other guys who were demobilized and formed a stronger armed robbery group operating in Burundi and the neighboring DRC.

These two principal groups and other ex-combatants operating individually left little after the DDR process, while other groups were created later with exclusively a political connotation. A certain Kabirigi crept the country by the East, from Tanzanian forests, with a group of about forty armed men in April 2012. Other politicians including Nyambariza, Nzambiyakira, Carmel among many, were-and still are- talking from abroad that they have got fighting groups. However, what is true is that whenever there is an important political event, such as an election or an international conference on Burundi, politicians of the opposition make these gangs theirs with a view of threatening the government that if their issues are not dealt with peacefully, they are ready to engage a military force.

In fact, what was common for these groups which were born after demobilization program and the Security Sector Reform is that they comprised ex-soldiers of the governmental defence force

¹⁴³MDNAC, *Rumurikirangabo* monthly Journal N° 58 March 2012

and former militiamen. These demobilized persons were either idle or were paid allowances to work in satisfaction of their new commanders. The second characteristic was that in the beginning, their scope was just armed robbery without a single political motivation. The weapons used came from several sources including the arms they had dissimulated during the disarmament process, their individual allocation that they got when they were integrated, those that they hired from active soldiers and policemen, and other arms that they easily bought from various owners thanks to the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the region.

The views of the respondents to the questionnaire were divergent because each ex-combatant responded in the shell of his or her former political formation. The 2015 unrest was formally attributed to former combatants, Hutu supporting the political party on power, and Tutsi acting on behalf of opposition parties. Yet, all the groups were ethnically mixed. Therefore, as President Buyoya used to say, the *'troublemakers have no other ethnic identity than that of wrongdoers'*.

4.2. Lessons learnt and way forward

4.2.1 Lessons learnt

The complexities of DDR process after an armed conflict, the challenges that faced the demobilization body and dilemma in which ex-combatants left the military service to embrace the civilian life made it imperative for practitioners and the concerned institutions to dedicate some time for a study of the situation, with a view to finding better ways of handling such a program. Demobilized themselves have learnt by groping that when change occurs, one must take it seriously and try to cope with the new situation.

The DDR program in Burundi was a bit different from those that had taken place in the world and especially in Africa. That one was part and parcel of the ceasefire agreement and the subsequent accords. Combatants and their commanders were showing their good will towards the process, and the society as a whole was morally ready to receive the returnees. Contrary to some other cases where demobilized were caught on the battle field like in Rwanda or in Uganda, DDR for Burundian former fighters was concerned with volunteers, obviously with a few cases of exception.

By analyzing the timing of operations between the day of the signing of the ceasefire agreement and the date of demobilization of the first wave of combatants, it may be asserted that the program has been a hasty process. Indeed, the ceasefire was signed in November 2003 and the first demobilized ex-combatant reached his home in May 2005, only one year and a half later, without ignoring that that year was very charged with many activities related to the implementation of the cease fire. This means that the time for planning was so short for a so important event. This also explicates that the period was so short for the principles of the conflict transformation got gravely planted in the minds of the former belligerents. 18 months are in reality not enough to plan the assembling of more than 40,000 combatants, their disarmament, counseling, vocational training and demobilization.

Eighteen months were insufficient for commanders of armed groups to closely monitor the demobilization process while they were also participating in several other operations where it was necessary to be as vigilant as possible. As a matter of fact, combatants who were not directly present were forgotten, including women who were heavily pregnant, those who had just given birth, combatants who were in medical treatment, in prison or elsewhere. That time was also short for the staff of DDR body to be fully trained for the conduct of the action.

Commanders of armed groups were not enough skilled to know exactly the ways and means of a DDR program. Apart from considering it as a discharge of weapons and allocation of allowances, they didn't know exactly what amount of money or what sort and quantity of in-kind allowances their combatants were going to receive. Moreover, combatants were offered a so short time to getting enough skilled so as to be able to run a business of their own. In other words, if leaders have been enough serious on the outcomes of the demobilization, and if combatants were conscientious of the situation afterwards, then they should less regret of lacunas that showed off shortly after the process.

To that end, ex-combatants were discharged without a clear idea in their mind about what they were going to become, thinking at every moment that they were still with their former leaders. They were almost distracted during counseling sessions and vocational training to say that they did not attend the training with interest. Likely, their leaders were more concerned with combatants who were selected to form the defence and security forces rather than those 'cowards, useless civilians' who had to be demobilized. Further, the demobilizing personnel were more interested in their incentives-which were a bit higher than that of regular civil servants- rather than doing their job correctly. These had been hired on the job and had received inadequate training while the country was experiencing a period of great poverty; they have therefore shown less effort to help their comrades ready to be demobilized.

The lack of resources is also a great challenge while conducting a DDR process. In this same sense, David Zounmenou of the Institute of Security Studies of Pretoria asserted that there is no shortage of African troops to join the AU brigades, the challenges is providing troops with

vehicles aircrafts weaponry, communication equipment and other items that cost money.¹⁴⁴ In the case of Burundi, that commitment on the side of the sponsors was clearly lacking. Moreover, there was a difference in payment amount. Real combatants got 600USD, 330 for the child soldiers and just a 100 for the militiamen including the Jeunes gardiens de la Paix (GdP) the Militants Combatants (MC) and the Adultes Associés (AA). Lastly, with regard to financing, payments by the EU and the WB to rural development were remarkable for their delays. This increased the feeling of inequality between communities and ex-combatants. Consequently, many ex-combatants have gone into debts or resorted to acts of banditry.

It is also important to note that the institutions working under the UN authority, including those in charge of the DDR program use a considerably excessive amount of money that should profit to the process itself. For example, the peace keeping force utilized helicopters to take some combatants from a place to another in a small (in size) country like Burundi instead of using vehicles as the roads were not so bad. The GTZ utilized more vehicles than needed to convoy food and other materials to the combatants' settlements while security was not a big issue. Moreover, the staff working for those institutions was paid higher incentives as compared to the general salaries of the country; that resulted to a race to seeking of job there to the point of recourse to corruption.

4.2.2. Way forward

Actually, it is no more use of crying over spilled milk. The demobilisation programme took an end since more than half a decade and ex-combatants have to be on their own. Moreover, the high authority of management of war veterans has changed; from an institution that was directly

¹⁴⁴ Clare Sort, Jack Strauw et al, The causes of conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa. Cited in Hassan, AA W, "African Union and challenges of Conflict Resolution: The Need for a Standby Force". 206. P. 45

under the authority of the presidency, to a department of the Ministry of Defence. Therefore, Ex-combatants have to be on their own, and live life as it is.

However, Nicole Ball and Luc van de Goor (2006) nuance two concepts: reinsertion and reintegration on base of short and long terms. They precise that:

“Reintegration is a long-term, continuous socio-economic process of development, whereas reinsertion is a short-term material or financial assistance to meet immediate needs, and may last more or less one year”.¹⁴⁵

In this sense, nothing is lost at the present moment. As the government of Burundi has already noted that demobilized personnel constitute a serious threat to security because of their idleness and poverty, there is still a way to do something to remedy this situation. It should provide with them a consistent occupation to prevent them from being idle, as Voltaire asserts it that "Work removes from us three great evils: boredom, vice and need".¹⁴⁶ The government should first and foremost remind the ex-combatants the lessons they learned in the demobilization camps where they were vocationally trained to run a business. Then, through its known organs, the government should revive in them the esprit de corps as they were encouraged to work in associations to fight against laziness and get usefully busy.

4.2.3. Conclusion

This chapter went deep into the real current situation of ex-combatants in the context of social, economic, political and security conditions. The analysis was based on statistics showing how respondents expressed their views about the extent to which DDR was planned and executed in Burundi. In fact, demobilized got insignificant allowances that could not allow them to live worthily in a society that they had left for years, together with people who considered them as

¹⁴⁵Ball, N. & V. Goor, L., Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: Mapping Issues, Dilemmas and Guiding Principles. CIP, Netherland's Institute of International Relations. Aug 2006.

¹⁴⁶Voltaire, *Candide; or the Optimism*. Sirène in Paris, 1759. p.46

heroes. Certainly, some ex-combatants were integrated in their former occupations; others went back to school and later got an honest employment. Those who could not get a job or go to school were supposed to run a business, either within an association or individually. Unfortunately, most of the associations stopped because of the disinterest of the members, some ex-combatants preferring to migrate to towns in quest of a less onerous but more lucrative job.

Likely, associations of child soldiers and female combatants couldn't function properly for the reason of their instability. The change of their status could result into shift of working place, school; or the feeling of belonging to a superior class; for example when a former young person or single gets married, or when after completing studies, the laureate prefers to embrace a different career. Other workshop groupings were bankrupted because of theft or dishonesty among members.

Burundian ex-combatants were legally sent to the DDR program, except a small number of soldiers who were forced to join the process in the view of downsizing the number of men to integrate in the new armed forces. Both the groups found hard life in their new positions. On the one hand, those new members of the NDF found their salary so low to permit them to join both ends of the month, and the demobilized spent their allowances within a short time to remain empty handed, to the point of going to nibble on what they had been granted as capital of a project in execution.

After demobilization, ex-combatants were meeting in groups of old friends. Certain used to meet in their respective native areas or job frameworks and exchange views, while others preferred to keep lonely. Some ex-combatants had been arrested while committing crimes and are actually languishing in prison without a clear future. Other demobilized have disappeared from the clubs,

busy with unknown businesses. It is probably among the latter that ambitious politicians have recruited 'new generation fighters' to form new armed groups whose aim was and still is to disturb the order so as to claim rights in the political space.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMANDATIONS

5.1. Introduction

Well-managed disarmament and demobilization are indispensable elements of a successful peacebuilding for a nation emerging from an armed conflict. Reinsertion and reintegration of former combatants and their families into civil society is the critical next step following the combatants' abandonment of military status to embrace civilian life. If the whole process does not succeed, then, demobilized ex-combatants can entail in internal security risks in addition to being a burden unto the society. In effect, demobilized former combatants are in need of support, for instance in the job training, health services, education, housing and credit among many necessities.

5.1. Summary

This research was guided by three objectives which sought to examine the extent to which DDR was conducted in Africa in general and Burundi in particular. The study employed conflict transformation as a theoretical framework, which implies transforming an animal behavior into a purely human conduct. The findings were discussed in the previous chapters, in line with the three objectives which were to identify the extent to which DDR was conducted in Africa, to evaluate the extent to which DDR was managed in Burundi and to determine better ways to conduct DDR programs for the interest of both the state and the demobilized personnel.

In Africa, most of the countries which have experienced the atrocities of war organized a DDR program. Most of the African countries that this study focused on are today relatively peaceful and stable, which validates the second assumption of this study that well conducted DDR and its

achievements led to security recovery in African countries. The research also permitted to know that there is a neat difference between the conduct of the program from a country to another. This is because the Demobilization program is a complex process which entails social, economic, humanitarian, political, military and security dimensions. Hence, since habits and practices vary from a region to another, the implementing body must take into consideration morals and customs of the concerned society to better conduct a process that aims at addressing the post-conflict security challenges. These challenges are posed by former fighters who find themselves deprived of subsistence or support networks other than those of their former comrades during the critical transition from war to peace and development.

In Countries such as Rwanda and Angola, demobilization program concerned both the combatants and their families. This was so because for those special cases, some families participated quite actively in the fights. For example, the Rwandese ex-FAR and Interahamwe who were captured in DRC or those who surrendered were living together with their families in the Congolese forests. Therefore, all had to attend the Ingando centers to learn new theories of pardon and reconciliation, and the pro-RPF ideology through political indoctrination. Here also, DDR was somehow forced since the combatants to be demobilized and reintegrated were defeated fighters. The combatants who included ex-FAR and the Interahamwe were all accused of having participated in the perpetration of the 1994 genocide. Some of them were captured together with their supporters and families, and then were repatriated to Rwanda to be slightly tried and reversed into civilian life. Nonetheless, scholars including Chi Mgbako scored DDR Rwanda as one of the most successful programs. This statement lines with the first hypothesis of the present study that the success or failure of DDR program directly affects the long-term peacebuilding of any society in a post-armed conflict period.

In others cases, subscribing to DDR is an act of voluntariness. Particularly for combatants who have been tired by the fighting, soldiers prefer abandoning the military service to deal with different civil occupation. Moreover, the literature review revealed that DDR program is a sine qua none condition for social reintegration and economic development for countries emerging from an armed conflict. The program is more successful when conducted within the framework of conflict transformation which aims at transforming negative destructive conflict into positive constructive conflict development efforts.

In Burundi, DDR program was conducted prior to the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement in Burundi, which was the legal framework of the program. Former combatants assembled in designated areas to be disarmed. After disarmament, the candidates to the demobilization were transported to centers which were prepared for that issue. There, they benefited from counseling about how, behind the curtain of the armed forces, life continues otherwise. Combatants who were selected to form the new defense force were oriented to specific centers for integration before transfer to respective barracks.

Information from respondents to the questionnaire revealed that a great number of former combatants were challenged to begin life in their new settings because the allowances they were granted from the program were insufficient. It is true that the majority of them were volunteers to the program, including physically disabled, but some were forced to quit the armed forces for the purpose of ethnic equilibration of troops to integrate in the national defence force. Demobilized persons formed associations for small and local development occupations. But most of these cooperatives could not standstill because of little skills, bad management, theft and instability of the members, as some of them got a job in a different setting, hence leaving little room for carrying on with the activities of the association. Likely, most associations of former child

soldiers and female combatants failed because of instability in their new fashions of life. It is also important to mention that a small number of ex-combatants were not eligible to the program for various reasons.

Respondents acknowledged a good conduct of the disarmament but regretted that several weapons slipped from the supervision to remain in the hands of bad intentioned ex-fighters. These weapons were later used in criminal activities including theft, retaliation and armed violence related to politics. The salient barbarous acts were associated with electoral periods where young people appeared with fire weapons to threaten the political followers of the opposed wing. Worse, the insurrection of May 2015 saw an important participation of an armed youth whose majority were former combatants. That was a testimony that there were loopholes in the disarmament process and that some demobilized persons were not very happy with their new socio-economic position. The answers of the respondents to the question of involvement of ex-combatants in peace breach justify the third assumption of this research work that states that the insecurity that prevailed in Burundi from 2005 up to date is partly due to gaps in the management of DDR.

5.2. Conclusion

The present study was conducted in the light of the conflict transformation theoretical framework. The theory aims indeed to transforming negative destructive conflict into positive constructive behavior. In this regard, ex-combatants were committed to shift the force they used to fight and to destroy to working hard to catch up on lost time in developing the nation. In reality, and particularly for the Burundi case, the peace agreement was concluded to the satisfaction of the main parties to the conflict. Therefore, the majority of ex-combatants were eager to join the national defence force or the demobilization program.

The intricacies of a DDR process after an armed conflict, the challenges that often face the demobilization body and the dilemma in which ex-combatants leave the military service to embrace the civilian life are the most salient cause of a bad management of the program. The lack of finance, and funds not delivered in good time, little involvement of the stakeholders both slow the process and make it fail if the governmental and monitoring institutions don't pay enough attention. In this regard, DDR program was challenged by lack and/or delay of funds; namely in Angola and Nigeria, and combatants almost broke into violence like the current case of Cote d'Ivoire where integrated soldiers are conducting a mutiny because of a cash promise that was not honored.

5.3. Recommendations

In the present research work, recommendations are directed to ex-combatants, the implementing and monitoring institutions, the social and/or political movements that the demobilized persons originated from, and the government, which is the primary beneficiary of a good procedure. The society is also recommended to take great responsibility in terms of welcoming the war 'heroes', avoiding marginalization of former combatants especially those who were 'civilianized' against their will, and those who have severely been disabled. The society should reserve them regards and respect as well as providing them with necessary help whenever they shall deserve it. In addition, local communities should be keen to denounce to the legal institutions former combatants who go back to their village with weapons, since a weapon in wrong hands constitute a danger to the community and a source of insecurity.

Ex-combatants should at first reconcile with their former opponents. They should behave in the line of the conflict transformation by reshaping their relationships with people and restoring ethical and value based dimensions, as well as confidence in their community. Ex-combatants

should understand that 'there is no false profession, there are only false people'. In this view, they should be aware of the change of the trend of their life, in terms of social interactions and subsistence, and behave accordingly.

With regard to the DDR implementing institutions, the members of the staff should first and foremost bear in mind that they are dealing with people who have been physically and mentally affected by the atrocities of war. Hence, the counseling they should plan to deliver should be organized in a manner of transforming the hearts and minds of the ex-fighters into a more human soul. On the economic side, they should seriously need to look closer at what kind of economy was prevailing during and after the armed conflict, so as to adapt to the development projects to recommend to demobilized personnel.

So often, at the turn of an armed conflict, the underground movement splits into three main parts including the political wing, soldiers to integrate into the security forces and those to demobilize. The politicians play a critical role on the future of their former combatants since the latter continue to count on them for the political and security events that follow the agreements. In this regard, they should share the minimum of the wealth with their former companions so that the latter do not get discouraged, discouragement that may conduct them to insurrection and recourse to violence. Likely, the former commanders must ensure, in the period close to the integration, that each and every one of the integrated and demobilized persons have reached a destination and how they are coping with the new settings.

The government is the one institution that gathers the good fruits of a well managed DDR program or endures the challenges born from a failed process. It is the reason why leaders must conduct a skillful monitoring of an effective disarmament, and a sustainable socio-economic

integration of former combatants. It should allocate supplementary funds to more or less satisfy the needs of the demobilized persons in order to prevent them from recurring to violence again in claiming unsatisfied needs and unfulfilled promises. Together with the international sponsors, governments should keep in place a monitoring body which shall ensure a homogenous reintegration of former fighters in the civilian society.

5.4. Further Research

5.4.1 Managing Child soldiers and ex-female combatants in Africa.

5.4.2 Managing disabled former combatants after an armed conflict in Africa.

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Annex 1

1. Questionnaire for Demobilized

Section A: Information about the Respondent's background:

Please answer by ticking X to the right casing

Q1. What is your gender?

Masculine	<input type="checkbox"/>	Feminine	<input type="checkbox"/>
-----------	--------------------------	----------	--------------------------

Q2. What is your age?

20-30	<input type="checkbox"/>	30-40	<input type="checkbox"/>	40-50	<input type="checkbox"/>	Over 50	<input type="checkbox"/>
-------	--------------------------	-------	--------------------------	-------	--------------------------	---------	--------------------------

Q3. What was your age when you joined the fighting movement?

Less than 18	<input type="checkbox"/>	18-30	<input type="checkbox"/>	30-40	<input type="checkbox"/>	40-over	<input type="checkbox"/>
--------------	--------------------------	-------	--------------------------	-------	--------------------------	---------	--------------------------

Q4. What is Your Marital status?

Single	<input type="checkbox"/>	Married	<input type="checkbox"/>	Separated	<input type="checkbox"/>	Divorced	<input type="checkbox"/>	Abandoned	<input type="checkbox"/>
--------	--------------------------	---------	--------------------------	-----------	--------------------------	----------	--------------------------	-----------	--------------------------

Section B: Information about the respondent's on involvement factors:

Q4. What was the motivation for your demobilization?

Voluntarily	<input type="checkbox"/>	Handicap	<input type="checkbox"/>	Advised	<input type="checkbox"/>	Forced	<input type="checkbox"/>	Others	<input type="checkbox"/>
-------------	--------------------------	----------	--------------------------	---------	--------------------------	--------	--------------------------	--------	--------------------------

Q5. What is your everyday's occupation? :

Private	<input type="checkbox"/>	Applicant	<input type="checkbox"/>	Trading	<input type="checkbox"/>	Jobless	<input type="checkbox"/>	Other (TBS)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
---------	--------------------------	-----------	--------------------------	---------	--------------------------	---------	--------------------------	-------------	--------------------------	-------	--------------------------

Q6. Before demobilization, you were trained to found and conduct a project. Are you exercising today an activity as you were thought at that time?

Yes	<input type="checkbox"/>	No	<input type="checkbox"/>
-----	--------------------------	----	--------------------------

Q7. Did you get interest from your lucrative activity?

Yes		No		Somehow	
-----	--	----	--	---------	--

Q8. Before demobilization, you were motivated to work together in associations. Did you join any group?

Yes		No	
-----	--	----	--

Q9. If yes, do is your association still working?

Yes		No	
-----	--	----	--

Q10. If no, what was (were) the cause(s) of dislocation?

Bankrupt		Mismanagement		Theft		Laziness		Disinterestedness	
----------	--	---------------	--	-------	--	----------	--	-------------------	--

Q11. At the moment of demobilization, you had friends demobilized living in your area. Do you still meet and exchange views?

Yes		No		Somehow	
-----	--	----	--	---------	--

Q12. If yes, do you still reason on the same wavelength?

Yes		No		Somehow	
-----	--	----	--	---------	--

Q13. If no, where do you think they are?

Died		Home/Village		Job		Don't know		Other	
------	--	--------------	--	-----	--	------------	--	-------	--

Q14. At what extent did DDR succeed according to you?

Very good		Good		Average		Bad		Very bad	
-----------	--	------	--	---------	--	-----	--	----------	--

Q15. According to you, at what extent did demobilized profit from the DDR process?

Very much		much		Average		A few		Very few	
-----------	--	------	--	---------	--	-------	--	----------	--

Q16. Who profited much from the process?

Demob		Government		Businessmen		NGO in charge		None	
-------	--	------------	--	-------------	--	---------------	--	------	--

Q17. Demobilization was shortly preceded by disarmament. Do you think all the weapons were collected and handed in?

Yes		No		Don't know	
-----	--	----	--	------------	--

Q18. How some weapons remained in the hands of ex-combatants?

Purposefully		Error		Forget		Do not know	
--------------	--	-------	--	--------	--	-------------	--

Q19. According to you, what was the finality of those weapons kept?

Self-Guard		One never knows		Theft		Revenge		Do not know	
------------	--	-----------------	--	-------	--	---------	--	-------------	--

Q20. Who were the most active demobilized to have take part in the insecurity acts among ex-rebels and ex-governmental troops?

Ex-PMPA		Ex-FAB		Both		None		Don't know	
---------	--	--------	--	------	--	------	--	------------	--

Section C: Open-ended Questions:

Kindly make a short comment in the space provided

Q21. Some demobilized became very poor shortly after the process. What do you think happened to them?

.....
.....
.....

Q22. Some demobilized persons have been arrested or killed carrying weapons. What is your view about that?

.....
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.....

Q23. Some demobilized persons have participated in the insecurity acts around election periods. Some were killed and/or captured by the security forces. What do you think about that?

.....
.....
.....

Q24. As a demobilized, what is your plan for the future?

.....
.....
.....

Q25. Please suggest some possible ways of improving a DDR process from the lessons you learned through experience.

.....
.....
.....

II. Questionnaire for the Staff(Staff refers to the Direction General of Ex-Combatants in the Burundi Ministry of Defence and War Veterans)

Q1. What is your gender?

Masculine		Feminine	
-----------	--	----------	--

Q2. What is your position?

DG		Director		Chief of service		Secretary		Other	
----	--	----------	--	------------------	--	-----------	--	-------	--

Q3. How many times do you receive demobilized in your office?

Everyday		Often		sometimes		Rarely		Never	
----------	--	-------	--	-----------	--	--------	--	-------	--

Q4. Did you take part in the disarmament process?

Yes		No	
-----	--	----	--

Q5. Do you think all the ex-combatants handed in their weapons?

Yes		Somehow		No	
-----	--	---------	--	----	--

Q6. Were there any ex-combatants who did not beneficiate from the program?

Yes		Somehow		No	
-----	--	---------	--	----	--

Q7. If yes, who was responsible for that misfortune?

The NGO in charge		Himself		None		Don't know		Other	
-------------------	--	---------	--	------	--	------------	--	-------	--

Q8. Do you think your intervention is enough, that is, does it touch all the persons in need?

Yes		No		Somehow		Don't know	
-----	--	----	--	---------	--	------------	--

Q9. What category of demobilized are coming to seek your services?

All		disabled		Women		Ex-child soldiers		Don't care	
-----	--	----------	--	-------	--	-------------------	--	------------	--

Q10. What are your monitoring mechanisms?

Often		Sometimes		Never	
-------	--	-----------	--	-------	--

Section C: Open-ended:

Just make a brief comment about each statement in the space provided

Q12. What became child-soldiers who were demobilized? What about demobilized women who were abandoned by their former husband? Do you monitor where they are and what they became?

.....
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.....

Q11. Express your feelings about the conduct of DDR in Burundi.

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Q12. As an administrator, what are the challenges that DDR program left with the demobilized ex-combatants?

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Q13. What are your propositions and recommendations you should formulate to different actors involved in a DDR process?

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14. Who are to blame among the demobilizing board, the government and the demobilized themselves? Give reasons.

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15. According to you, what are other factors that can make a DDR process fail?

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Thank you for your time and patience

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