

**THE ROLE OF EXTERNAL ACTORS IN AFRICA'S INTERNAL
CONFLICTS: THE CASE OF SUDAN CONFLICT (1983-2004)**

BY

KIBON JAMES KIPRONO

**A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI,
IDIS IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR
THE AWARD OF THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS IN
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES.**

NOVEMBER 2009

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
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DECLARATION


I declare that this research is my original work and has not been presented in any other University for academic credit other than the University of Nairobi for the award of Master of Arts (MA) Degree in International Studies.

Name of Student: James Kiprono Kibon

Signature: 

Date: 15th November 2009

Name of Supervisor: Professor Makumi Mwagiru

Signature: 

Date: 18/11/09

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

As I reflect on this project, there several individuals and institutions for which I am highly indebted for the support and assistance they accorded me during the course of my research work. While acknowledging the fact that it would be very difficult to thank them individually in this small space, there is no doubt their individual and collective contributions were critical to the successful completion of this research work. I would like to express my sincere appreciation to all these incredible persons for their overwhelming support and encouragement.

There are however, few persons and institutions I would like to give special mention. First and foremost, special gratitude and appreciation goes to Professor Makumi Mwangi, the Director of the Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies (IDIS) for not only accepting to supervise my work, but also for his forthright, thorough and well intentioned academic advice and guidance. It was a humble privilege to have been supervised by a person of renowned academic excellence as Professor Makumi Mwangi and there is no doubt I learned a lot from him.

My gratitude also goes to the academic and non academic staff of IDIS and Jomo Kenyatta Memorial Library (JKML) for the invaluable support they accorded me during the entire period of my studies and especially during the research phase.

Last but not least I would like to express sincere gratitude to my fellow student colleagues and my family for their encouragement. For my family in particular, I will never forget the incredible role you have played in my academic advancement.

Abbreviations

IGAD: Inter-Governmental Authority on Development

IGAD-PF: Inter-Governmental Authority on Development Partners Forum

OLS: United Nations Operation Lifeline Sudan.

GoS: Government of Sudan

GoSS: Government of South Sudan

SPLM/A: Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army

NCP: National Congress Party

NIF: National Islamic Front

NGOs: Non-Governmental Organizations

MNCs: Multi-national corporations

INGOs: Inter-Governmental Organizations

UN: United Nations

OIC: Organizations of Islamic states

SSDF: South Sudan Defence Forces

CPA: Comprehensive Peace Agreement

USAP: Union of Sudan African Parties

DoP: Declaration of Principles

SRRA: Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Agency

NDA: National Democratic Alliance

DUP: Democratic Unionist Party

Abstract

Many countries in Africa have experienced internal conflicts some of which have undermined their viability or existence as states. Whereas the causes of these conflicts are to be found within the inherent weaknesses of post-independence African states, the role played by external actors has been substantial. Zartman argues that no internal conflict is really internal. This study explores the factors, motives and interests that attract external actors into conflict and their subsequent impact. The study concludes that the involvement or entry of external actors into conflict brings new issues and interests, which makes the conflict more complex.

This study has endeavored to examine the involvement and role of external actors in internal conflicts in Africa. It reviewed the 1983 to 2004 conflict in Sudan pitting mainly the south against the north with the aim of establishing the role played by external actors in the conflict. It found out that several external state and non-state actors were involved in the Sudan conflict and played a central role in the actual war and in conflict resolution phases.

It established that the entry of external actors into a situation of internal conflict could arise due to two reasons. External actors can either enter into a conflict situation to promote their interests through support of belligerent parties or by invitation of belligerent parties seeking support. In either situation, it emerged that external actors bring into the conflict new interests. Given the contrasting and divergent nature of the various actors' interests, their involvement makes the conflict more complex and protracted.

Based on the above, the study made several conclusions. It concluded that external actors play a crucial role in a conflict situation just as internal

actors. The study therefore saw the need to distinguish between the real issues in the conflict if any meaningful resolution is to be achieved. That there may be need to address the issues and interests of external actors or less they may undermine any mediation effort. The study further observed that external actors had the potential of undermining the implementation the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. It thus recommended the need to guard against external interferences or manipulation.

1.0 CHAPTER ONE

Background to the role of external actors in Africa's internal conflict

1.1 Introduction

There is a strong external dimension in Africa's internal conflicts due to the intervention of external actors. Indeed, internal conflicts in Africa not only attract neighbouring states but also draw in many state and non-state actors from within and beyond the region. While there is no doubt the role of external actors has been evident in most of Africa's internal conflicts, their intervention in Sudan's many conflicts has been more pronounced.

Mansour ¹ argues that the Sudan conflict is an entangled political, cultural and social weave with equally intricate international ramifications. The first flares of Sudan's civil war were rekindled nearly half a century ago in a conflict that has pitted the south against the north. In all, Sudan has experienced two internal conflicts pitting the south against the north. The first of these conflicts broke out in 1955 and escalated after the north assumed the leadership of the country following independence from Britain on 1st January 1956. This marked the first phase of a protracted north-south conflict, which was only interrupted by the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement signed by the Sudanese government and the southern rebels led by General Joseph Lagu's South Sudan Independence Movement.² The Addis Ababa agreement brought a decade of relative peace and

¹ See. Mansour Khalid, *War and Peace in Sudan: A Tale of Two Countries*, Kegan Paul, London, 2003, pp ix

² See. *The search for peace in Sudan, A Chronology of the Sudanese Peace Process 1989-2001*. The European Sudanese Public Affairs Council p2

stability between the north and the south. The conflict however resumed in 1983 following the abrogation of the Addis Ababa Agreement by President Jaafar Numeiri. The resumption marked the second phase of the north-south conflict, which ended with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in January 2005. This phase of the conflict (1983-2004) is the focus of this study.

Gatkuoth³ blames the conflict on the politicisation of national, racial and religious issues by the dominant ethnic group. The underlying issues in both phases of the north-south conflicts in Sudan can be attributed to governance. *Sharia* and oil have however provided the second phase of the conflict with more issues of contestation. Ethnicity, competition for control of resources and religious factors are some of the key factors responsible for the entry of the many external state and non-state actors into the conflict.

1.2 Research Problem

The involvement of external actors in internal conflicts is significant as it introduces new dynamics into the conflict. External actors alter the structure of internal conflict by bringing in new issues that make the situation more complex. External actors are driven into internal conflict by self-interest, which revolves around ideological, political, socio economic and security issues. Determining the interests and the role of external actors is critical as it provides a wholistic picture of the conflict. The resolution of internal conflict is contingent on addressing the interests of internal players and the role of internal actors. Thus conflict

³ See Gatkuoth J.M. "*Ethnicity and Nationalism in Sudan: A Challenge to Churches*". The Ecumenical Review, Vol. 4/1/1995 pp 3-5

resolution efforts must take into account the role of external actors if it has to succeed. There has however been a tendency to over look the role of external actors in internal conflict.

Many external actors were involved directly or indirectly in the Sudan conflict in support of the conflict parties or in conflict resolution efforts. The role and interests of these actors has had major consequences for the conflict. For instance, foreign oil companies motivated by economic and profit interests in Sudan's oil have been supporting the Sudanese government and hence perpetuating the conflict.

This study examines the role of external actors in Africa's internal conflicts with an emphasis on the Sudan conflict. In doing so, the study will be guided by the question why Africa's internal conflicts attracts many external actors. The study will also explore the prospects of establishing mechanisms to reduce external actors' intervention in Africa's internal conflicts.

1.3 The objectives of the study

Generally, the main objective of the study is to examine the role of external actors in Africa's internal conflicts. Specifically the study has the following objectives: -

- a) Identify external actors in the north-south conflict in Sudan.
- b) Examine the role of external actors in the north-south conflict in Sudan.
- c) Examine the connection between the external actors' role and those of the parties to the conflict.

d) To establish mechanisms of mitigating the role of external actors in internal conflict.

1.4 Hypotheses

a) External actors have played a critical role in sustaining the internal conflict in Sudan.

b) External actors have played no role in sustaining and perpetuating the internal conflict in Sudan.

1.5 Justification of the study

The role of external actors in Africa's internal conflicts has grown significantly. Virtually, all internal conflicts in Africa have witnessed the participation of external actors. This attests to Zartman's argument that no internal conflict is really internal.⁴

The role of external actors in internal conflict has been on the rise given the permeability of borders and effects of globalization. The involvement of external actors in conflict poses challenges as they bring new issues that make the situation more complex. Understanding the role of external state and non-state actors in internal conflict is thus crucial in determining the pressures to be applied and formulation of appropriate conflict resolution strategies. In the case of the Sudan conflict, several external state and non-state actors were involved directly or indirectly in support of the belligerent parties. The involvement of these actors had a significant role in the overall conflict. An analysis of their role

⁴ See Zartman W (ed), *Evasive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil Wars*, Brookings Institution, Washington DC, 1995. P.79

is critical as their involvement in internal conflict can be too powerful to be ignored.

The study will provide data on the role played by external actors in internal conflict. This data will be useful to policy makers involved conflict management and resolution. At the academic level, the study will contribute to existing literature and data, which will be useful to researchers and students of the Sudan conflict. It will also lay the basis for further studies of similar nature.

1.6 Literature review

The literature review will be divided into two broad parts: literature on conflict, and literature on the role of external actors in internal conflict. Some aspects of Sudan conflict (1983-2005) will also be reviewed.

General literature on conflict

Loisel⁴ has defined conflict as the incompatibility of subject positions. It is a situation in which two or more parties desire goals which they perceive as obtainable by one or the other but not by both. Mitchell⁵ asserts that a conflict exists when parties whether as individuals, social groups or organizations possess mutually incompatible goals. Adebayo⁶ concurs with Mitchell⁷ that conflict involves goal incompatibility, but adds that it arises when individuals,

¹ See Loisel Sebastien, European Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Policies in African Regional conflicts. European Foreign Policy Conference, London School of Economics and Political science, London (2nd –3rd July 2004), p.4.

⁵ See Mitchell C R, *The Structure of International Conflict*. St Martin Press, New York, 1981. p.18.

⁶ See. Adebayo A (ed), *Comprehending and Mastering African Conflicts: The search for Sustainable Peace and Governance*, Zed Books, London, 1999.p.10

⁷ Ibid

groups or states pursue goals simultaneously. Mwagiru⁸ supports the view that conflict involves goal incompatibility and identifies two types of conflicts, violent and non-violent or structural. To him not all conflicts are bad as some act as an early warning of impending violent conflict. Conflict is thus only bad when it triggers mechanisms of identity, exclusion and violence.⁹

Mitchell¹⁰ argues that conflict involves goals, attitudes and behaviour all of which are inter-related and each of which plays a crucial role in the conflict. Conflict attitudes are exacerbating factors and involve parties' evaluations, perceptions, emotions and psychological states that accompany involvement in conflict. Conflict attitudes play a critical role in sustaining the conflict particularly when the original situation has altered such that it no longer seems sufficient for continuing the conflict.

Conflict behaviour consists of those actions taken by one party in the conflict to force the other party to abandon or modify its goals. Conflict behaviour consists of deliberate actions pursued by a party in the conflict intended to raise the costs to the adversary for continuing to pursue its own goals.¹¹ This arises as conflict situations involve conditions of scarcity and values, which places a premium on the possession of the same resources or positions.¹²

⁸ See, Mwagiru Makumi, *Peace and Conflict Management in Kenya*, Catholic Justice and Peace Commission, Nairobi. 2003. p.9.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ See Mitchell C R, *The Structure of international conflict*, Opcit, p.25.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid.

There have been many attempts to explain the causes of conflict. Collier¹³ and Hoeffler¹⁴ have explained conflict from an economic perspective, arguing that economic factors play a critical role in sustaining conflict. They argued that rebels for instance are likely to wage war if the perceived benefits exceed the cost of rebellion. Azar¹⁵ has also emphasized the role of economic factors in conflict, arguing that protracted social conflicts are linked to patterns of underdevelopment and uneven development. Tilly¹⁶ has propounded the collective action theory in which he argues that politics is central to conflict, portraying it as a continuous struggle pitting those with decision-making power against those without. His assertion is that conflict escalates if government institutions are repressive, authoritarian, discriminatory or exclusionary thus creating and increasing the chances of conflict. Davies¹⁷ and Gurr¹⁸ have argued that conflict arise due to deprivation owing to structural imbalances disadvantaging one group relative to the other in the distribution and access to national resources. According to them deprivation is the most important factor creating grievances and mobilizing people for conflict.

Adebayo¹⁹ argues that conflict reflects the consequence of the future lived through the past. He argues that conflict is triggered by collective fear of the

¹³ See Collier P & Hoeffler A, cited in Lind Jeremy & Sturman Kathryn (eds), *Scarcity and Surfeit. The Ecology of African Conflicts*, Institute of Security Studies, Pretoria, 2002, p.15.

¹⁴ Ibid

¹⁵ Ibid

¹⁶ Ibid

¹⁷ Ibid

¹⁸ Ibid

¹⁹ See Adebayo Adedeji (ed), *Comprehending and Mastering African Conflicts: The Search For Sustainable Peace And Governance*, opcit. P.10.

future based on a history of social uncertainty due to failure of the state to arbitrate justly or provide credible guarantees of protection for groups leading to anarchy and societal fractures:

Literature on external actors in internal conflict

Keller and Rothschild²⁰ have argued that connectivity between internal conflict and external dimension shapes the posture of external actors and prospect of conflict resolution. Understanding the motivation of external actors in conflict is as important as tendency of warring parties to look for support beyond the nation's borders. Zartman²¹ has pointed out that the attitude of a neighbouring state to a conflict may either be friendly or hostile but scarcely indifferent. Mwagiru²² has identified two types of actors, visible and invisible actors. Invisible actors are primary actors involved in conflict while visible actors are more often ignored in conflict management because they are not easily noticeable. The invisible actors are however, important in conflict due to their support to visible actors. Therefore, the outcome of conflict depends on visible actors as much as the invisible.

External actors are drawn into conflict due to the need to protect or promote particular interests²³. The identification of these interests enhances the chance of successful conflict resolution. This is because most internal conflicts are sometimes difficult to resolve due to the role and influence of external

²⁰ See Keller J K & Rothschild R, *Africa in New International Order: Rethinking State Sovereignty And Regional Security*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, London 1996.p.102.

²² See Mwagiru Makumi, *Peace and Conflict Management in Kenya*, Opcit.p.11

²³ See. Mwagiru M (ed), *African Regional security in the Age of Globalization*, Heinrich Boll Foundation, Nairobi. 2004. p.16.

actors. Understanding the role and interests of external actors is thus crucial given the influence it has on the overall conflict. The entry of external actors introduces external factors into internal conflict, which makes it more complex. Modelski²⁴ argues that every internal war creates demand for foreign intervention. Internal conflict always draws in neighbouring states especially in states where regime legitimacy is under challenge and borders are porous. This is because fragile politics are easily permeable and internal issues get transformed for instance into inter-state issues. Generally, external actors get involved in situation of goal incompatibilities because they possess complementary goals or interests, which dictate that they support one side rather than the other. External actors are attracted into conflict as protagonists through the process of searching for allies or because objectives coincide with those of one of the parties in the conflict. Regional involvement in internal conflict triggers conflict triangulation, which worsens the chances for negotiations and makes conflict more intractable. Azar²⁵ has argued that regional effects of conflict are both outwards and inwards and takes the form of spillover, contagion, diffusion and influence, interference and intervention respectively. These linkages play a key role in the process of conflict escalation.

There have been attempts to examine the nexus between internal and external aspects of conflict. This reflected the growing significance of state

²⁴ Ibid

²⁵ See Azar Edward cited in Miall Hugh, Ramsbotham Oliver & Woodhouse Tom: *Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1999. P 78

supported and state-sponsored insurgency and other forms of low-intensity conflicts. Arguably contemporary conflicts develop within a new globalized war economy and characterized by dependence on external resource support from neighbouring states. External actors provide funding, logistics and technical assistance or direct military involvement. Mpangala²⁶ has argued that the role of external forces in internal conflict has been on the increase. He argues that even after the Cold War, foreign power complicity in internal conflicts still looms large. Adedeji²⁷ argues that there is a growing tendency in Sub-Sahara's conflicts for neighbouring countries to intervene directly in their neighbours' internal affairs. He cites the conflicts in Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa and argues that a number of linkages bind different conflicts to national, regional and international contexts. The argument is that if a state is weak or expected to be weak, the incentive for external actors to intervene grows.

The influence of external actors in the Sudan conflict has been enormous as indicated by the number of state and non-state actors involved directly or indirectly in support of belligerent parties or in conflict resolution efforts. Keller²⁸ and Rothschild²⁹ argued that Sudan's physical location and internal configurations played a crucial role in determining external alignments of the parties and factions in the civil war. The porous nature of borders in the Horn of

²⁶ See Mpangala Gaudens P, *Ethnic Conflicts in Region of The Great Lakes: Origins and Prospects for Change*. Institute of Kiswahili Research, Dar es Salaam, 2000, p .14.

²⁷ See Adebayo Adedeji (ed), *Comprehending and Mastering African Conflicts: The search for sustainable peace and governance*, Opcit p.102.

²⁸ See Keller. J. K & Rothschild. R, *Africa in New International Order. Rethinking State Sovereignty and Regional Security* opcit p .102

²⁹ Ibid

Africa means that conflict in one state has spillover or ripple effects in neighbouring countries.

Many countries including Sudan's neighbours were involved in the conflict driven by various interests. From the mid -1990s Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda gave assistance to SPLM/A as a means to counter the Sudanese government. The three countries were alarmed by Sudan's scheme to destabilize them and intransigence in the peace process³⁰. The support of external Arab and Muslim actors was instrumental in the Sudanese government's success in reversing SPLM/A's gains of 1980s. The conflict drew in several Middle East countries and major world powers among them Iran, Egypt, Libya, US, China, Russia, Malaysia, Sweden and India. The interests of these states in the conflict varied but centered on economic and humanitarian considerations. The alignment of states actors in the conflict showed tendencies to shift in response to interests. For instance, in early 1990's Ethiopia and Eritrea discontinued support for SPLM/A to reciprocate the Sudan government's assistance against Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam's regime. The two countries however shifted support to the SPLM/A when the Sudanese government started to undermine them. In a similar case, since 1994 Sudan supported the LRA in retaliation against Kampala's support for the SPLM/A.³¹ This web showed that the conflict had increasingly becoming linked to internal conflicts in Ethiopia, Uganda and Eritrea.

³⁰ See *New African*, No. 352, May 1997, P.21

³¹ See *The East African*, May 31st - June 6th 2004, p 44

Just as state actors, several non-state actors like multi-national corporations (MNCs and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) played a key role in the Sudan conflict driven by economic and humanitarian interests. The role and alignment of these actors have mainly mirrored that of the home government's.

Literature on the Sudan conflict

The Sudan has been in conflict since independence except between 1972 and 1983 when the Addis Ababa Accord helped maintain uneasy peace between the north and the south. The second round of the civil war in Sudan erupted in 1983, when the south rose against Numeiri's regime under the Sudan People's Liberation Movement /Army (SPLM/A).³²

The causes of this conflict are complex and deeply rooted but the South's feelings of systematic marginalization and the role of external actors have been critical factors sustaining it. Deng³³ traces the roots of the conflict to colonialism and argues that at independence in 1956, Sudan was burdened with a legacy of colonial rule that had fashioned contrasting visions for the nation that set the stage for civil war.³⁴ This situation has persisted as the south and the north have espoused contrasting visions. This has given the conflict a north-south context in which the social realities of cultural diversity are struggling against the ideals of

³² According to the Economist, August 19-25th 2000 Sudan People's Liberation Movement was founded in 1983 as a movement to establish a united, democratic and secular Sudan

³³ See Deng Francis Mading, *War of Visions: Conflict of Identities in the Sudan*, Brookings Institution, Washington DC, 1995, P.9.

³⁴ See Keller. J. K & Rothschild. R. *Africa in New International Order; Rethinking State Sovereignty and Regional Security* opcit p .102

unity³⁵. The driving force behind the war is the sharp division in Sudan over economic control, political power, state and religion and the status of the south³⁶.

Sudan's central position as a bridge between sub-Sahara Africa and the Middle East has given the conflict an ethnic-religious dimension by nurturing an identity crisis in the country. While the north viewed itself as Arab and seeks to identify with the Arab world and the Middle East, the south has always sought to maintain its African identity. Deng³⁷ argues that the historical process that has separated the Arab Muslim north and the African south has its roots in Arabization and Islamization of the north and the resistance against these forces in the south.

The north and the south have different views about the root causes of the conflict. The north blames colonial powers especially Britain for administering the south as a separate entity and nurturing secessionist tendencies. Bashir³⁸ supports this position and argues that the Anglo-Egyptian policy of 1900 to 1946 and 1946 to 1953 stipulating separate administration for southern provinces was a bad omen in north-south relations as it set the stage for suspicion between the two regions. Deng and Oduho³⁹ argued that the root cause of the war lies in the

³⁵ Ibid

³⁶ See, International Crisis Group, *God, Oil and Country, Changing the Logic of War in Sudan*, ICG Press. Africa Report No 39, Brussels/Nairobi, 28th January 2002, p. 93

³⁷ See Deng Francis Mading, *War of Visions, Conflict of Identities in the Sudan*, Opcit. p.9.

³⁸ See Bashir Mohamed Said, *The South Sudan, Background to Conflict*, Hurst & Company, 1968.

³⁹ Ibid.

north's subjugation and domination of the south. Davidson⁴⁰ has argued that a federal system could have helped prevent conflict and quest for separation in Sudan. He argues that if the south could run its affairs within a federal Sudan, old differences with the north could have gradually been overcome.

Machar Riek⁴¹ also blames the conflict in Sudan to colonial policies arguing that the cumulative effects of migration, trade laws and language policy were to maintain south as a separate country from northern Sudan. Deng⁴² argues that at independence the north was preoccupied with attempts to correct the effects of separate policies by forcing unity with the south through assimilation by Arabization and Islamization. The south saw the move as replacing British colonialism with Arab hegemony. Thus at independence the north and the south were artificially united with the north imposing its own vision resulting in the first and the current war.⁴³ Independence to the south Sudanese did not create a feeling of common citizenship with the northern Sudanese or feeling of nationalism and patriotism.⁴⁴ The result was an identity crisis culminating in dualism reflecting radical models on both sides, one Arab –Islamic and the other African –secular.⁴⁵ Deng⁴⁶ has argued that the non-Arab population has been subordinated and marginalized by the Arab dominated concept of national

⁴⁰ See Basil Davidson, *Modern Africa; A Social and Political History*, Long man Group Ltd, Essex, 1983, p.206.

⁴¹ See Machar Riek, *A History of Political Domination; A Case of Self-Determination*, University of Pennsylvania University, November 1996.p. 2.

⁴² See Deng Francis M, *War of Visions: Conflict of Identities in the Sudan*. Opcit, p. 12

⁴³ See Machar Riek, *A History of Political Domination, A case of Self-Determination* Op cit p 3

⁴⁴ See Deng Francis Mading, *Dynamic of Identification, A Basis of National Integration in Sudan*. Khartoum University Press, Khartoum, 1973, p. 101.

⁴⁵ See Zartman William (ed), *Traditional Cures for Modern Conflicts, African Conflict Medicine*. Lynne Rienner, London, 2000.p. 125.

⁴⁶ See Deng Francis Mading, *War of Visions, Conflict of Identities in the Sudan*, Opcit. 12

identity despite constituting the majority both in the north and south. Since independence, northern politicians monopolizing the political and economic power have sought to mold the state along Arab/Muslim character. While northern Sudanese were inventing their identity in opposition to British and Egyptian rule, a competing African identity looking towards sub-Saharan Africa was coalescing in the South fuelled by the fear of re-introduction of Arab domination

Competition for resources and ecological issues are critical factors fuelling the conflict in Sudan. It has been argued that the emergence of new issues, particularly oil, complicated the conflict. Ethnically differentiated access to resources, wealth and power has been entrenched in Sudan since pre-colonial times.⁴⁷ It is however the division over control of oilfields, political power and religious issues that has worsened the situation.⁴⁸ Ecological issues are also intricately linked to the historical and political context of the Sudanese civil war.⁴⁹ Sudan consists of two fundamentally different ecological zones, the north and the south, which have persistently been in conflict with each other. The disparities in natural ecological systems between the north and the south have led to a predatory relationship. The south claims to be the victim as its resources have been appropriated to develop the north. The struggle over environmental

⁴⁷ See Griggs A R, *Geo-strategies in the Great Lakes Conflict and Spatial Designs for Peace*, Durban, 1994-1999, p.93.

⁴⁸ See *The East African*, 7-13th June 2004, P. 4.

⁴⁹ See United Nations for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Integrated Regional Information Network, <http://www.reliefweb.int/w/Rwb.nsf/o/ffo8eib pp1>

resources, land, water and minerals has driven the war to deeper level than the question of religion.⁵⁰

The north has always resisted separatism tendencies in the south due to the fear of losing control over natural resources. This is demonstrated by the fact since independence, rival northern parties have vied to control the country and dominate the south.⁵¹ This attempt by the north to control and dominate the south and its resources is critical to understanding the north-south conflict. Central to the current conflict is oil, prime agricultural land and water of the vast Sudd Swamp and the River Nile.⁵² Apart from oil, the other contested resource is water, which the south insists on utilizing hence its strong opposition to the Jonglei Canal Project. The SPLM/A insists that it will not tolerate any plan that deprives the inhabitants of the Sudd their livelihood.

The discovery of oil in commercial quantities in Bentiu, southern Sudan between 1977 and 1979 by US multi-national oil company, Chevron jolted the uneasy peace between the north and the south. Seymour⁵³ argued that oil production created new structures of profit, power and political control that reshaped the capabilities and incentives of key actors in conflict. Oil introduced new players, resources and agendas, which shifted the parameters of north-south conflict in Sudan giving rise to new configurations of power amongst

⁵⁰ See Oil, The Big Turn-on, <http://www.sudanupdate.org/> Sudan Update

⁵¹ See Human Rights Watch Report, 1998, <http://www.hrw.org/reports98/sudan/> sudarm, p 1

⁵² See International Crisis Group, *God, Oil and Country, Changing the Logic of War in Sudan*, Op cit p. 99

⁵³ See Seymour I. J M., *The Oil Conflict Nexus in Sudan: Governance, Development and State Building*, North Western University, Illinois, June 2001, p. 4

factions in the north and the south⁵⁴. Politics and economics of oil replaced politics of governance as the central issue shaping the Sudan conflict. Vick⁵⁵ has argued that while religion and race have fuelled the conflict, nothing had inflamed it quite like oil.

The oil factor was one of the key factors behind Numeiri's abrogation of the Addis Ababa Accord, which, under the Southern Provinces Self-Government Act⁵⁶ had given the South autonomy and aspects of economic control including share of revenue from natural resources of the region.⁵⁷ The north however reneged on the peace pact after discovering oil in the south⁵⁸. Goldsmith⁵⁹ has argued that of Sudan's contested natural resources, the most critical is oil whose discovery added a new dynamic to the conflict. While acknowledging that the Sudan conflict could continue even if oil production was halted, they have argued that its discovery and subsequent exploitation become a major issue in the conflict. Oil raised the stakes of the war by giving both sides commitment to the battlefield⁶⁰. Danforth⁶¹ acknowledges the crucial role played by oil in the Sudan

⁵⁴Ibid

⁵⁵ See Vick Karl, *Oil money super-changes Sudan's war*, International Tribune, New York, 13th June 2001

⁵⁶ See Henze Paul B, *The Horn of Africa, From War to Peace*, Macmillan, London, 1991, p. 3.

⁵⁷ See *The New York Times*, 5th May 2002, P.1.

⁵⁸ See Connell Dan, *Sudan: Recasting US Policy*, Foreign Policy in Focus, Volume 5, Number 40, November 2000, pp1-8

⁵⁹ See Lind Jeremy & Sturman Kathryn (eds), *Scarcity and surfeit. The Ecology of African Conflicts*, op cit p.228

⁶⁰ See International Crisis Group, *Oil, God and Country, Changing the Logic of War in Sudan*, Op cit p. 100.

⁶¹ See Danforth John C, *Report to the President of the United States on the Outlook of Peace in the Sudan*, April 26 2002, p.23

conflict and argued that no enduring settlement will be achieved unless the oil dimension is effectively addressed.⁶²

Conflict over oil contest has been made difficult by the parties' monopolistic tendencies. The Sudanese government considers oil as a national resource while the southerners consider it a southern resource⁶³. The government has always maintained that oil is a national wealth, which cannot be an object of compromise. The degree of stability and control enjoyed by the Sudanese government in the north is a function of southern resources it controls⁶⁴. Seymour⁶⁵ has argued that the discovery of oil introduced one more token of schism something for the north to claim and the south to contest. The distributive issues associated with oil revenue replaced the conciliatory politics of the 1970s with new modes of uncompromising political conflict. It re-ignited in the south a separatist sentiment while in the north it nurtured a new sense of confidence and a strategy to ensure exclusive control of oil. The failure of the Sudan Peace Agreement (1997) signed between the Sudanese government and seven southern Sudan factions can partly be blamed on the agreement's inability to adequately address the issue of wealth sharing especially oil. The agreement ignored the south's concerns and placed the mining industry in which oil fell

⁶² See *The New York Times* 5th May 2002.

⁶³ See Lind Jeremy and Sturman Kathryn (eds), *Scarcity and Surfeit: The Ecology of African Conflicts*, Opcit. p. 218

⁶⁴ Ibid

⁶⁵ See Seymour I. J M, *The Oil Conflict Nexus in Sudan: Governance, Development and State Building*, Opcit. P.4

under federal jurisdiction.⁶⁶ Control over oil resources became a focal point for the conflict along with the demands for separation of state from religion and self-determination for the people in Southern Sudan.⁶⁷

The application of Islamic penal code was one of the most controversial issues in the north-south conflict in Sudan. Deng⁶⁸ has argued that religion has been a central factor in the conflict since 1983 as it defines the identity of both Sudan's north and south. The introduction of Sharia by Numeiri proved to be the most divisive and emotive issue that gave the conflict a religious basis. The south saw the introduction of Sharia and the entrenchment of Islam as part of plans for further marginalization. This and other longstanding grievances triggered the resumption of the civil war. The north has however always denied that religion has been a factor in the conflict. Mohammed⁶⁹ has argued that contrary to widespread view in the west, religion has never been a chief incendiary in the civil war. He maintains that the denial of autonomy to the south and lack of equitable distribution of national wealth were the real causes. Mohmoud⁷⁰ supports this perspective and argues that in trying to justify their legitimacy; the regimes in the north have made the conflict in the south a rallying factor by Islamizing and thrusting it on northern public as *Jihad*

⁶⁶ See *Sudan Peace Agreement signed between Government of Sudan and Seven Southern Sudan rebels on 21st April 1997*

⁶⁷ See *Sudan Inter-Agency Reference Group* February 13, 2001, p2

⁶⁸ See. Deng Francis Mading cited in *The Middle East Quarterly Volume VIII No 1.* p. 5

⁶⁹ See Mohamed Mohamoud Ibrahim, *Sudan: The Authentic Portrait*, US Institute of Peace, Washington DC, September 17, 1997 p7

⁷⁰ See Mohmoud Mohammed, *Islam and Islamization in Sudan: The National Islamic Front*, US Institute of Peace, Washington DC, September 17, 1997, p. 6.

Deng⁷¹ has equated Sharia to apartheid and argued that Arabism in Sudan discriminates those who are not arabized or Islamized and involves assimilation, which implies rejection of non-Arab and non-Muslim elements. The main northern Sudan political parties, the Umma, Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and National Islamic Front (NIF) are Islamists in orientations and roots. The Umma and the DUP the oldest parties in Sudan are organized along religious sects, the Ansar and the Khatimiyya respectively. For instance in 1986 general elections, the Umma party unveiled its programme *Nahj al- Sahwa*, the party's manifesto for Islamic reawakening which sought to make Islam the basis of national co-existence and identity. It advocated the supremacy of Islam arguing that not even a parliamentary majority should be allowed to transgress or undermined it.⁷² The DUP has always advocated for an Islamic state and remains committed to the 1968 Islamic Constitution. The party's programme states that its commitment to Islam represents a unilaterally binding covenant from which it would never retreat or retrogress.⁷³ The NIF has been the most radical of the parties and was instrumental in the promulgation of the September Laws. It based consistently been opposed to efforts to reverse the status of Islam in the political life of the Sudan with its leader, Hassan al- Turabi warning the TMC in 1985 against cancelling what he called God's law.

⁷¹See Deng Francis Mading, *War of Visions: Conflict of Identities in the Sudan*, Op cit .p. 15.

⁷² See Abdelmoula Adam M, *An Ideology of Domination and the Domination of an Ideology: Islamism. Politics and the Constitution in Sudan*, US Institute of Peace Washington DC September 17, 1997, p. 4.

⁷³ Ibid

Since 1985 no serious attempt has been made to repeal the September Laws by successive regimes. Abdelmoula⁷⁴ has argued that the politically dominant elite in northern Sudan has increasingly found in their shared version of Islam an ideology that readily serves their hegemony and gives that hegemony the sanctity of religion. For instance, the Transitional Constitution promulgated in 1985 failed to repeal the Sharia with Sawar al-Dahab leader of Transitional Military Council (TMC) arguing that repudiating the Laws was blasphemous. In December 1985, the cabinet voted to retain Sharia as the basis of Penal Code and to maintain *hudud*.

1.7 Literature Gap

Many studies on the broad aspects of the Sudan conflict have been carried out. However, there have been few in-depth studies on the role of external actors and their interests in the conflict. This study will therefore attempt to fill the existing gap.

1.8 Theoretical Framework

Dougherty and Pfaltgraff have defined theory is a systematic reflection of a phenomena designed to explain patterns of behaviour in an intelligent and coherent manner. Viotti⁷⁵ and Kauppi define theory along the same line. They define theory is an intellectual construct that helps to select and interpret facts and facilitate explanation and prediction of observable phenomena. There are several theories that explain external actors and conflict among them realism, idealism and pluralism.

⁷⁴ Ibid

⁷⁵ See Viotti Paul R & Kauppi Mark V, *International Relations Theory: Realism, pluralism. Globalism and Beyond*. Allyn and Bacon. 1999, p. 3.

Realism is one of the theories that seek to explain actors and their behavior in the international system. Some of prominent proponents of realism include Morgenthau⁷⁶ and Carr⁷⁷. The central theme of realism is that states are the main actors in international relations and all other actors are subordinate. To realists states have interests and these interests dominate state behaviour. Thus international relations are relations between states pursuing self-interest in an anarchic international system characterized by self-help in which security defined as survival remains the primary concern⁷⁸ The other basic assumption of realism is that states seek power in order to protect self-interests.

The other theory, which attempts to explain the role of actors, is Idealism. Idealism became prominent immediately after the First World War and is a direct anti-thesis of realisms. Idealists reject the emphasis that realists give to states arguing that states are one of the many actors albeit important one. It places emphasis on open diplomacy and rule of law in resolving international conflicts. While idealists agree with realists' argument that states interests at times conflict, they argue that it is a product of distortions. They argue that a situation of harmony of interests does exist. Idealists also reject realists' argument that foreign policy decisions are made by states as unitary actors. They argue that decisions are made within a complex bureaucratic structure in which individuals or groups play an important role.

⁷⁶ See Morgenthau Hans cited in Brown C and Ainley K, *Understanding International Relations*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2005

⁷⁷ Ibid

⁷⁸ See Dougherty & Pfaltgraff, *Contending Theories of International Relations, A Concise Survey*. P 66.

Realism and Idealism however have shortcomings in explaining the role of external actors in internal conflict. This study will therefore use Pluralism as its theoretical framework as it is best suited to explain the role of external actors in internal conflict. Pluralism owes its emergence among others Laswell⁷⁹ who believed in common good inherent in global community. McDougal and Falk expounded pluralism further and put forward the concept of complex interrelationship in which states are not the only actors.

Pluralism views the international system as characterized by many actors. The states are not the only actors as non-state actors such as transnational organizations like MNCs and human rights groups play important role in world politics⁸⁰. To pluralists these actors these organizations are actors in their own right and are supplanting state authority. Pluralists support argument realists' argument on the role of states in understanding international relations. However, they reject the significance given to them arguing that states are only one of the many actors albeit important ones⁸¹. Pluralists not only stress the importance of other actors such as Multi-national Corporations (MNCs), they are sceptical of emphasis realists give to state power and security within the international system arguing that other issues such as economic and environment are important⁸². To pluralists, the international system is a complex one consisting not only of states with geographic and political boundaries but also interactions and behaviour of

⁷⁹ See Laswell H & McDougal, *Jurisprudence for a free society*, Yale 1992, p.248.

⁸⁰ See Viotti Paul R & Kauppi Mark V, *International Relations Theory: Realism, pluralism, Globalism and Beyond*, opcit, p. 199.

⁸¹ See Nicholson, M (ed), *International Relations; A concise Introduction*, Palgrave Macmillan, 1998, p 91

⁸² Ibid

non-state actors such as MNCs, international organizations. They argue that taking a holistic view of all actors and interests is important in explaining international phenomena.

The concept of complex interdependence is central to pluralism. Complex interdependence involves interaction of multiple actors, states, transnational groups, interest groups and public opinion⁸³. The interests of these actors are inter-connected due to continuous close interaction and their influences go beyond the territorial boundaries of the state. The greater the interdependence among states, the greater is the loss of control of decision-making.

Like realists, pluralists emphasize the importance of decision making in understanding behind actors behaviour. However, they accuse realists of being too narrow and single-minded in their approach if not absolutistic and simplistic⁸⁴. Pluralists argue that foreign policy decisions are not taken by states as unitary actors but by groups or individuals who act with authority from states. Moreover, Pluralists contend that many significant decisions are undertaken outside the framework of nation-state by international organizations, international regimes or multinational corporations, which pursues different policies from those of the state⁸⁵. For instance MNCs can serve the foreign policy interests of their host governments just as they can contravene those interests⁸⁶

⁸³ See Viotti Paul R & Kauppi Mark V, *International Relations Theory: Realism, pluralism, Globalism and Beyond*, opcit p.200

⁸⁴ See, Sarah Owen-Vandersluis: *The State and Identity Construction in International Relations*, London, Macmillan 2002, p30

⁸⁵ Ibid

⁸⁶ See, Dougherty J. E. & Pfaltgraff R.L *Contending theories of international relations, A Comprehensive opcit p 245*

Pluralism takes cognizance of emerging global forces and transnational pressure groups⁸⁷. The unpredictability of global politics predicated on diversity is one of the key tenets of pluralism. It rejects the notion of republication of actor behaviour propounded by the realists. Pluralism assumes that all actors are rational otherwise they would not be participating in the international system.

Proponents of Pluralism argue that international activity is not just a matter of states. There is freedom of individual actors and a web of common activity in which governments as well as interests groups get caught and in which a number of groups may be acting in broadly the same direction even if not in actual coalition⁸⁸. They argue that states are not security or power conscious as realists posit but economic actors such as MNCs make decisions which sometimes conflict with what any state would want in what the decision makers would see in an ideal world.

1.9 Research methodology

This research will rely mainly on secondary data. It will entail reviewing books by various authors on the subject matter, papers by expert panels, commissions and investigative committees as well as journals or periodicals and other data. Some primary data from informal interviews will be used to supplement secondary data.

⁸⁷ See *ISA Convention March 2002 (New spaces, new places: solidarism, pluralism and territoriality)*, New Orleans p 1

⁸⁸ See Hill Christopher, *The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy*, Palgrave MacMillan, New York, 2003 p271

CHAPTER OUTLINE

Chapter one discussed the background of the study. Chapter two examines the Sudan Conflict (1983-2004) with emphasis on Issues and internal negotiations to end the conflict. Chapter three explores the involvement of external actors in the Sudan conflict (1983-2004). Chapter four is a critical Analysis of the role of external actors in the conflict. Chapter five gives the conclusion and recommendation.

2.0 CHAPTER TWO

Issues and parties in the Sudan conflict (1983-2004)

2.1 Introduction

Chapter One discussed the background of the Sudan Conflict 1983-2004 and concluded that it was a continuation of the 1956-1972 conflict. It also reviewed the general literature on conflict, the Sudan conflict and the involvement of third parties.

This Chapter will explore the issues behind the Sudan conflict 1983-2005 with emphasis on proximate and trigger factors as well as the main parties to the conflict and internal negotiations. It examines how deep-rooted historical factors combined with emergent issues to make the resolution of the conflict difficult.

2.2 Issues in the Sudan conflict

Several factors were at the centre of the 1983-2005 north-south conflict in the Sudan. Mazrui¹ argues that the causes of the north-south conflict in Sudan are rooted in history and opines that the 19th century slave trade contributed in sowing the seeds of suspicion and hostility between Arab speaking north and the south. The failure of the northern politicians and departing British to provide for the south's interests in post independence arrangement worsened the situation. As discussed in Chapter One, some of the issues that caused the conflict can be traced to the first conflict. The failure of the Addis Ababa Agreement (1972) to resolve the grievances of the south or allay the fears of the north was central to

¹ See Mazrui Ali. A. & Tidy Michael (eds), *Nationalism and New states in Africa from About 1935 to the Present*, East Africa Educational Publishers, Nairobi, 1984. p. 195.

the conflict. The emergence of new issues, oil and *Sharia* widened the differences between the north and the south and made the conflict more intractable by introducing strong external or third party dimension.

Katendeko² argues that despite its rich cultural diversity and abundant natural resources, Sudan had endured Africa's longest conflict and attributed the conflict to economic, political, social ethnic and religious factors, which successive Sudanese governments have exploited and transformed them into source of division and violence. The north-south civil war in Sudan is a product of ethnic and religious differences³. Overall, there were several issues behind the 1983-2005 conflict in Sudan but the main ones centered on governance, competition for resources, and conflict over the identity of the Sudanese state and the role of religion.

Problem of marginalization

Marginalization is one of the main underlying causes of the Sudan conflict. Whereas the roots of marginalization of the south can be traced to Egyptian and British colonial rule in the Sudan, the consistent failure of the post-independence governments to remedy the situation key to the south's discontent and apparent feeling of discontent. El-Battahani⁴ argues that economic development between Sudan's various regions have been uneven since colonial era but blames successive national governments for deepening the disparities. British

² See, Katendeko Ferdinand, Sudan's Fifty- Year war, *Peace and Conflict Monitor*, University of Peace, San Jose, 29th September 2003. p. 1.

³ See Gordon David F, Miller David C jnr. & Wolpe Howard. *The United States and Africa: A post- Cold war perspective*, W.W.Norton & Company, New York, 1998. p. 74

⁴ See El-Battahani Atta, A Complex Wed: Politics and Conflict in Sudan, *World Politics Review* 2006 pp-

administration invested heavily in political, economic, social and cultural development in the north while the south remained isolated and under-developed. The northern two-thirds of the country have been favoured in terms of allocation of development projects and investments. This unequal access of resources is not confined to the south but also within the north.

The same disparities and discrimination existed in government appointments. Most ministerial appointments since 1956 have favoured the Muslim-Arab minority in the north and neglected the majority Africans making them second-class citizens⁵. The Addis Ababa Agreement had called for the reconstruction of the south to bridge development disparities with the north. The post-Addis Ababa agreement period saw little development in this direction. Duany Wal⁶ has argued that few of the planned reconstruction and development projects were ever implemented. A conference convened in June 1983 to evaluate the outcome of the economic plan for the south concluded that not more than twenty percent of aid earmarked for the region had reached the intended destination. The south remained stagnated at the same level of development as when the war ended, the north exploited its resources. The marginalization of the south continues to be at the core of southern grievance and reason for separatism. The situation has been worsened by the fact that the north's attempt to remedy the problem through its model of Arabism and Islamization.

⁵ See Ayittey, George. B. N, *Africa Betrayed*, St Martin's Press, New York, 1992. p.126

⁶ Duany Wal & Duany Julia, *The Genesis of the crisis in the Sudan in Spaulding Jay & Beswick Stephanie (eds) White Nile Black Blood (War, leadership and Ethnicity from Khartoum to Kampala*, Red Sea Press, Asmara, 2000, p.75.

Competition for resources

The struggle of the peripheries against the centre has characterized much of Sudanese history.⁷ This struggle has manifested itself in the competition for the control of Sudan's natural resources. UNEP in its assessment report cites oil, Nile waters, hardwood timber and rangeland and rain-feed agricultural land as natural resources linked to the conflict.⁸ Johnson⁹ traces the historical pattern of the Sudan conflict to pre-colonial period where successive states based in the north treated the south as a source of resources, a perception that has endured strong. At the centre of the 1983-2005 conflict in Sudan was the struggle between the north and the south for control of resources particularly strategic fuels and minerals and the Nile waters. The contest for these resources is best illustrated by the fact that the first attacks by SPLA in 1983 targeted Chevron's oil installations in Bentiu and the Jonglei Canal. The south viewed the two projects as symbols of economic deprivation and marginalization. The South's resources have always acted as magnet for northern Sudan but the south as always resisted. Katendeko¹⁰ argues that the common factor that sparked Sudan's two conflicts, 1955-1972 and 1983-2004 was the north's attempt to control the south's resources.

⁷ See Zoellick Robert B, *Sudan; The Hard Work to Peace*, Position Paper presented to the University of Khartoum 9th November 2005. p. 3

⁸ United Nations Environment Programme, *Assessment Report on Conflict and the Environment*, June 2007

⁹ See Podur Justin, *Sudan's Forgotten Wars*, Review of Johnson DH: *The Root of Sudan's Civil Wars*, *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 2002, P. 3.

¹⁰ See Katendeko Ferdinand, *Sudan's Fifty-Year war*, op cit .p. 1

The decision by President Numeiri to dissolve the Addis Ababa Agreement was influenced mainly by the desire to control the newly discovered oil in Bentiu to enable it repay US\$ 8 billion debt his government owed to IMF and other donors for the development projects undertaken in northern Sudan. Under the Addis Ababa Agreement, the southern regional government was to receive revenues from mineral deposits, agriculture and commercial activities in the south. The government and Chevron were determined to ensure total control of the newly discovered oil resource. Martin¹¹ argues that because the oilfields lie almost exclusively in the south, the government needed to institute measures to reduce resistance and consolidate control. This could only be achieved by changing the north-south border. As part of the control measures, Numeiri's government carved off a new administrative region, the Unity State and transferred it to the north and replaced southern troops in the area with northern troops. It went further and renamed the area where oil was discovered Heglig.¹²

Similarly, through unilateral action, copper and uranium -rich regions of Hofrat al-Nhas, and Kafia Kingi were transferred to White Nile in the north. Klein¹³ has observed that the People's Regional Governing Act (1980) that changed the borders was intended to deprive the south its mineral and agricultural resources. Johnson¹³ while arguing that there was an economic logic

¹¹ See Katendeko Ferdinand, *Sudan's Fifty- Year war*, op cit .p. 1

¹² See Waihenya Waithaka, *The Mediator, General Lazaro Sumbeiywo and the Southern Sudan Peace Process*, Kenway Publications, Nairobi, 2006, p 64.

¹³ See, Klein Axel, *Politics, Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the Horn of Africa (Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan)* op cit. P25.

¹³ Johnson Douglas cited in Podur Justin, *Sudan's Forgotten Wars*, op cit. P.6.

in the conflict cites oil as a strategic resource, which all sides especially the government sought to control at all cost. Goldsmith¹⁴ supported this view and argued that oil exploitation pushed the predatory relationship between the north and the south into a new height and brought a new twist to the conflict characterized by international capital.

The scheme by the north to control the south's resources was not confined to oil and other strategic minerals. It involved massive grabbing and transfer of rich agricultural land to the north in a scheme, which many Arab Sudanese equated with the 19th century American's westward expansion and conquest. Suliman¹⁵ citing the case of Nuba Mountains argues that there is relationship between conflict and access to resources arising from economic and ecological distortions. In his opinion the causes that precipitate conflicts in the Sudan results from denial or limitation of access to renewable natural resources and the growing environmental degradation. While ethnic and religious issues played an important role in the 1983-2005 conflict, ecological degradation resulting from climatic changes did add a new dimension. The disruption of ecological equilibrium in northern Sudan led to the destruction of the Sudan-Sahelian ecosystem resulting in mass displacement. This transformed the nature of the war from a classic ethnic strife into a resource struggle triggered by ecological scarcity.

¹⁴ IRIN, *Ecological Aspects of Conflict*, 15th September 2004, <http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/s/>.

¹⁵ See Suliman Mohamed, *Resource Access: A Major Cause of Armed Conflict in Sudan; The Case of the Nuba Mountains*, Institute of African Alternatives, London, p.1.

The Sudan conflict demonstrated the lack of a critical factor to translate resource wealth into a widely shared peace and prosperity. Switzer¹⁶ argues that ideally abundant valuable natural resources should provide the basis for peace but the opposite situation often applies. The argument is that natural resource wealth does not often translate into prosperity mainly due to the inadequate distribution of benefits and consequences.¹⁷ This situation prevailed in Sudan where the south was marginalized as its resources were used to develop the north.

Imposition of religion on the State

The role of Islam in the state was one of the most contentious issues in the north-south conflict in Sudan. Martin¹⁸ has argued that it will not be complete to discuss Sudan's civil war without looking into the role of Islam. Deng¹⁹ while supporting this view has argued that the relationship between the state and religion was the most controversial factor in the Sudan conflict as it embodied elements of all the other issues. The fusing of religious affairs with those of the state would naturally determine national identity, the hierarchy of shaping and sharing power and distribution of resources. Under such a framework, non-believers including Christians and members of other religions could not rule over believers. *Sharia* laws closed off all the higher echelons of government to non-

¹⁶ See Switzer Jason, *Armed Conflict and Natural Resources: The Case of the Mineral Sector*, Discussion Paper presented to workshop of experts July 11th 2001, www.iisd.org/natres/security

¹⁷ Ibid

¹⁸ See Martin Randolph, *Sudan's Perfect War*, *Foreign Affairs* vol.81, Number 2 March/April 2002, *Council for Foreign Affairs*, pp1-3

¹⁹ See Deng, F M, *War of Visions, Conflict of identities in Sudan*, Brookings Institution Washington DC. 1995, P. 12

Muslims. This meant that southerners had little hope of ascending to higher positions of leadership.²⁰

As stated in Chapter One *Sharia* gave the conflict a religious dimension and transformed what was initially a conflict over resources and governance into a religious conflict. According to Salih²¹ religion, which was not a decisive factor in 1972, was transformed into a major constraint to peace. Prior to resumption of the conflict there had been mounting campaigns for the introduction of Islamic law. For instance in 1977 proponents of *Sharia* led by Sadiq al- Mahdi advocated for the review of the Addis Ababa Agreement especially the provisions dealing with culture and religion. The spirited agitation culminated in the introduction of *Sharia* as the basis of Sudanese laws through the September 1983 Decree. By so doing, Numeiri subsequently dichotomize the country into two, believers and infidel southerners and used *Sharia* to subjugate them.²²

Zartman²³ has argued that the nature of northern Sudanese politics characterized by strong religious brotherhoods made compromise on the issue of *Sharia* very difficult. By pursuing a policy of Islamization, Numeiri gave the conflict a religious grievance as it entailed imposing *Sharia* and other aspects of Arabization on the mainly non-Muslim south. It was informed by the north's determination to reconfigure the state in its vision of Islam. The religious

²⁰ See Waihenya Waithaka, *The Mediator, General Lazaro Sumbeiywo and the Southern Sudan Peace Process*, Kenway Publications, Nairobi, 2006, p 63.

²¹ See Salih M.A Mohammed, "Tribal Militias, SPLA/SPLM and the Sudanese state: New Wine in New Bottles", in Ahmed Abdelghaffar M & Sorbo Gunner M, *Management of the crisis in Sudan* Op cit,

²² See Waihenya Waithaka, *The Mediator, General Lazaro Sumbeiywo and the Southern Sudan Peace Process*, op cit p 65.

²³ Zartman

cleavages in Sudan reinforced ethnic divisions²⁴ as many northern Sudanese were unwilling to treat the southern Sudanese as equal citizens. This ethnic – religious conflict as will be seen later in this chapter was complicated by oil.

Khartoum's insistence that Islamic law governs Sudan antagonized the south as it prevented non-Muslim from becoming the president of Sudan. The sense of grievance felt in the south over persistent attempts to impose *Sharia* intensified when the religious hard-line National Islamic Front (NIF) took over power from the moderate government of Sadiq al-Mahdi in 1989. The new regime set out a policy aimed at imposing *Sharia*, which had already become the main factor sustaining the conflict. The Charter promulgated by NIF in 1989 stated that the country was a Muslim majority and proclaimed Islamic jurisprudence as the source of law as it expressed the wishes of democratic majority.²⁵ The revival of Islam in northern Sudan in early 1990s reflected the growing influence of fundamentalism throughout the Muslim world. In 1991, *Sharia* was strengthened further and *Jihad* was declared throughout the south with renewed vigour with PDF providing innumerable martyrs.⁸⁹ It assumed that coercion would subdue the resistance in the south, a view that has persisted.

To the south, the 1983-2005 conflict in Sudan was just as much about cultural freedom as it was about sharing of national resources. The most serious consequence of the introduction of *Sharia* in 1983 was to transform the civil war

²⁴ Payne Richard J & Nassar Jamal R, *Politics and Culture in the Developing World; The impact of Globalization*, Pearson Longman, New York, 2006, p. 285.

²⁵ See, *Sudan Charter: National Unity and Diversity*, National Islamic Front, Khartoum, Jan 1987.

⁸⁹ Peterson Scott, *Me against My Brother, At War in Somalia, Sudan and Rwanda, A Journalist Reports from the Battlefields of Africa*, Routledge, London, 2000, p. 174

into a jihad, throwing in the full weight of the northern passion and identity into a struggle to keep the people and resources of the south under their control.²⁷

Goldsmith²⁸ argues that the north is a united front held together by Islam while the south has an asymmetrical system that takes people apart. The union of religion and identity has shaped Sudan's institutions, international relations and internal problems. Goldewijk²⁹ expounds on the role of religion in conflict situation and opined that it is part of the problem and way out as it can be abused to increase hatred, intolerance and violence. It can also be used to mobilize people, manipulate and obscure legitimate political interests. In the Sudan conflict violence was an intrinsic part of religion and religion was part of violence as it impacted on other conflict variables such as resource distribution and governance. As in the case of most intra-state conflicts, the Sudan conflict was certainly strengthened by ethnic and religious divides. Religious identities and grievances, values and institutions stoked further the violent character of the conflict. This is because when religion becomes involved in conflict, its dynamic changes and hence the character of violence itself changes and become harder, more brutal and cruel.³⁰ Arguing that the conflict in Sudan was an extension of

²⁷ See South Sudan Friends International, <http://www.southsudanfriends.org/southern Sudan.html>

²⁸ See Goldsmith Paul, Abura Lydia A & Switzer Jason, Oil and Water in Sudan in Lind Jeremy and Sturman Kathryn (eds): *Scarcity and Surfeit, The Ecology of Africa's Conflicts*, Institute of Security Studies, Pretoria, 2002, p 189

²⁹ See Goldewijk Berma Klein, *Religion and International Relations; Global Justice, Rights and Intercultural Agreements on Dignity*, Society for International Development, The Hague, November 2002,

pp1-31

³⁰ See Goldewijk Berma Klein, *Religion and International Relations, Global Justice, Rights and Intercultural Agreements on Dignity*, Society for International Development, The Hague, November 2002,

pp1-31

collision between Islam and Christianity, Peterson³¹ maintains that when the war began, religion was not a factor but religious aspects have turned into critical issues sustaining the conflict and both sides in the conflict used religion to mobilize troops and resources.

Contested identity within the Sudanese state

Deng³² argues that the civil conflict in Sudan erupted despite great promise as a microcosm of Africa and a bridge between the continent and the Middle East. The identity crisis in Sudan manifests itself in discrepancies among self-perceptions of identity, realities of identity and how the national framework is defined. The two competing identities in Sudan is Arabism in the north and Africanism in the south. The two identities have into sharply contrasting racial, cultural self-perceptions. The struggle for national identity is reflected in two principal levels, configuration of Sudanese state in light of historical process and repercussions of unity in a pluralistic modern nation-state in which there is conflict between identities that gives the country its geo-political significance. Young³³ blames the north-south conflict to the failure of northern elites to acknowledge the cultural divide that separates the north for which Arabism and Islam are the asserted national identity and a south whose multiple ethnic sensibilities were deeply threatened by such dominant vision.

³¹ Peterson Scott, *Me against My Brother, At War in Somalia, Sudan and Rwanda, A Journalist Reports from the Battlefields of Africa*, Routledge, London, 2000, p. 174

³² Deng Francis F, *Self --Determination and National Crisis: The case of Sudan in Danspeckgruber Wolfgang. Self-Determination of Peoples; Community, Nation and the State in an Independent World*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, 2002. p.253.

³³ Young Crawford, *Contextualizing Congo Conflict; Order and Disorder in postcolonial Africa* in Clark John F (ed), *The African Stakes in the Congo War*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2002, p.18

Since independence mutually antagonistic perceptions between the north and the south over the identity of the state have threatened to split the country apart. Nantulya³⁴ has argued that at the heart of the conflict in Sudan are the clash of two competing identities, a predominantly Arab-Islamic identity in the north and an equally predominant African nationalist identity in the south. While the clash of identities can be traced to the 7th century, it had over the years been transformed into an inseparable part of the conflict. The north's domination and perception of the south as African and inferior has been stoking the identity crisis in Sudan. Deng³⁵ has further argued that the identity problem in Sudan is compounded by the difficulty of managing the African and Arab dimension of the country's national character and achieving equitable balance between African and Arab dualism. The stronger the Islamic identity of the north becomes, the stronger the nationalism of the south grows and the more irreconcilable the differences that promote the civil war become.³⁶

Ylonen³⁷ has argued that lack of a common national identity has been a problem in Sudan, as people prefer to identify with ethnic groups as opposed to a larger entity like the state. The northern identities have been shaped by Islam and Arabism while those of the south has evolved in response to resistance

³⁴ See Nantulya Paul, *Sudan: Causes of Conflict, and the Peace Process, Electronic Briefing Paper, No.55/2004, Centre for International Political Studies, pp1-6*

³⁵ See Deng Francis Mading, *What is not Said is what Divides Us* in Ahmed Abdelghaffar M & Sorbo Gunner (eds), *Management of the Crisis in Sudan*, Centre for Development Studies, Bergen, 1989 See Deng Francis Mading, *What is not Said is what Divides Us* in Ahmed Abdelghaffar M & Sorbo Gunner (eds), *Management of the Crisis in Sudan*, Centre for Development Studies, Bergen, 1989

³⁶ See Zartman. I. W. (ed), *Collapsed States; The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, London, 1995 p 240.

³⁷ See Ylonen Aleks, *Conflict, its Sources and Evolution: The Case of Sudan Revisited*, ECPR joint Sessions Workshops, Uppsala, April 13-18 2004, <http://www.essex>

against the north and external domination. These opposing visions have mutually exclusive perception of each other that a slight provocation provides justification for retaliation. Garang³⁸ former chairman of SPLM/A blamed identity crisis as one of the national crisis afflicting the Sudan as Sudanese people had failed to reconcile themselves with cultural and ethnic realities that make them a nation. SPLM/A's accuses successive regimes in Khartoum of propagating domestically and projecting externally the image of an exclusive Arab-Islamic Sudan. There are contradictions between the projected homogeneity as an Arab state and its reality as a multi-national state.

Closely connected with the identity crisis in Sudan is the issue of ethnicity and race. The two groups in opposition to one another are the Arab-Muslims in the north and the African-Christians in the south. Ulph³⁹ argues that race was the common denominators in 1983 -2004 conflict and the on-going conflict in Darfur conflict revolving on Arab ethnicity against black African ethnicity. The ruling northern elites have always manipulated these two issues in rallying the north against the south. The same is the case with the south where the rebels have used them to galvanize support for resistance. Ethnicity, race and religion have invariably natured a national vision based on exclusion, which in turn fuelled and sustained the conflict.

³⁸ See Garang John, *The Call for Democracy in Sudan*, Keagan Paul International, London, 1992, p 18.

³⁹ See Ulph Stephen, *Jihadist Overtones in Sudan*, Terrorism Focus, Vol 1, Issue 2, August 2004, Jameston Foundation Washington DC pp1-4.

The historical situation in Sudan has been marked by hostility among a culturally diverse population in which ethnicity and religion play a crucial role. Each has a conflicting value system and fight to preserve its identity. The south's fight for Africanism gives no room for the north's assimilationist policy. The nationalism felt by southern Sudanese is built on the basis of their indigenous religions and common historical experience of Arab domination. The northern Sudanese on their part view their nationalism through Arabism and Islamism, which permeates their individual and collective consciousness. They seek to identify with the Arab-Muslim world and attempt to preserve their culture and remain exclusive from the south. Johnson⁴⁰ argues that since 1956, successive military and civilian governments in Sudan have pursued a policy of Arabization and Islamization of the south. The attempt to create a monolithic Arab-Islamic society governed by *Sharia* implies ethnic cleansing or extinction of diverse cultures and ways of non-Arab communities.

The north has always sought hegemony over a unified Sudan while the south has fought for self-determination either in the form of autonomy or independence.⁴¹ The south's resistance has always been motivated by the fear that the north was seeking to impose its will, a perception reinforced by Numeiri's radical shift and declaration of Arabic as the official language in 1983.

⁴⁰ Johnson 7

⁴¹ See, *Slavery, War and Peace in Sudan*, A Washington Office on Africa Briefing Paper, Washington DC. 16th November 1999, p. 2.

Fazal ⁴² has argued that the Addis Ababa accord was undermined by the same reasons that had inspired southerners to rebel in the 1960s, which is the north's determination to force Arabization and Islamization on them. The recognition of Sudan's diversity and dual identity by the Addis Ababa Agreement was viewed in the north as inconsistent with its goal, which envisioned a Sudan in which the north with its Arab-Islamic identity and vision predominated. This contradiction has continued to divide Sudan into two antagonistic regions where even a slight disagreement could easily provoke conflict.

Issues that triggered the conflict

Whereas the marginalization of the south by the north, competition for the control of resources and the question of identity of state underlies the Sudan conflict, several other issues combined to re-ignite and sustained the conflict.

The abrogation of the Addis Ababa Agreement

The Addis Ababa Agreement was as a product of negotiations between the Sudanese government and the South Sudan Independence Movement (SSIM) and hence had several weaknesses or shortcomings, as it could not wholly satisfy the interests of the parties. The agreement did not only fail to resolve the grievances and concerns of the south, it was unable to placate the fears of the north. Podur⁴³ has argued that there were fundamental flaws in the Addis Ababa Agreement, which undermined it as a framework for a lasting

⁴² See Fazal M.A., A Federal Solution to the conflict in Sudan, 2002, <http://www.angelfire.com/or/mafazal/sudan.html>

⁴³ See Podur Justin, *The Forgotten Conflicts in Sudan*, A Review of Johnson D H, *The Roots of Sudan's Civil wars*, Znet March 14th 2004. p. 3.

peace. At its inception there was gap between the north and the south expectations. The south wanted a federal structure that could guarantee autonomy, but the agreement gave less of it. On its part the north was opposed to a federal system granting autonomy to the south, fearing that it could lead to the fragmentation of Sudan.

What however pushed the south to the conflict were not actually the weaknesses in the agreement but the decision by President Numeiri to abrogate it all together. Numeiri's government considered the agreement a short-term mechanism to be discarded as soon as the conditions become favourable. This explains why Numeiri begun to systematically undermine the agreement immediately after it's signing, that in just slightly over a decade all the few gains made by the south had disappeared. By giving in on the issue of local autonomy and religious pluralism, Numeiri's government had managed to secure political unity and peace.⁴⁴ However, just as the immediate post-independence northern Arab dominated leadership failed to honour the south's request for the creation of a federal system of government and hence setting-off a 17-year conflict (1955-1972), Numeiri failed to respect the south's aspirations as reflected in the Addis Ababa Agreement. Numeiri's government reverted to the tactics of his predecessors and fell into the same problems

Numeiri's determination to scrap the Addis Ababa Agreement gained momentum in the late 1970s after consummating an alliance with the National

⁴⁴ See, Klein Axel, *Politics, Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the Horn of Africa (Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan)*, IFAA, p.2

Islamic Front (NIF), a Muslim brotherhood party led by Hassan al-Turabi. The withdrawal of support by the communists and the trade unions had left Numeiri with no alternative but to embrace the NIF. The cost of this alliance to Numeiri's government included the reputation of the south's autonomy, which the NIF was opposed to. In 1981 Numeiri conceded to NIF demand and dissolved the southern regional assembly in contravention of the Addis Ababa Agreement and the permanent constitution of 1973.

Through the Republican Order Number One in June 1983, Numeiri abrogated the Addis Ababa Agreement and returned regional powers to the central government.⁴⁴ According Duany⁴⁵ fighting in the south begun when Numeiri revoked the Addis Ababa Agreement in contravention of the Regional Autonomy Act of 1972 that stipulated that the agreement could be modified by three-quarters majority of elected members of national assembly and two-thirds of the people of southern Sudan in a referendum. The decree divided the south into three weak administrative regions, abolished powers over regional finance and declared Arabic the official national language. Harir⁴⁶ has argued that the move served the government's plans to weaken the south and appease some political leaders. The few gains the agreement had made in bridging the north-south grievance divide ended with its abrogation. The south viewed the

⁴⁴ See, International Crisis Group, *God, Oil and Country, Changing the logic of war in Sudan, Changing the Logic of war in Sudan*, I CG Press, Africa Repot No.39, Brussels/Nairobi, 28th January 2002, P. 13.

⁴⁵ See. Duany Wal & Duany Julia, *Genesis of the Crisis in Sudan* in Spaulding Jay and Beswick Stephanie., *White Nile Black Blood (War, leadership and ethnicity from Khartoum to Kampala*, The Red Sea Press, Asmara. 2000 p 175

^{46, 42} Harir, S. *Recycling the Past in the Sudan: An Overview of Political Decay* in Harir and Tvedt T (eds), *Short-cut to Decay, The Case of The Sudan*, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, Uppsala, 1994. p.13.

abrogation as a plan by the north to re-impose its vision and revert to the pre-1972 status quo. Essentially this is one of the factors that triggered the resumption of conflict and Numeiri's ultimate downfall.

Numeiri's government in an apparent effort to weaken the south's leadership stoked ethnic and personal differences. It played the Dinka against Equatorians and Abel Alier against Joseph Lagu. The government instigated Equatorians to demand re-division of the south to escape perceived domination by the Dinka. The advocates of re-division and anti-Addis Ababa agreement joined hands to frustrate south's autonomy. In 1982, Numeiri called for a referendum on the issue but was defeated. In the subsequent elections held in the south and won by Joseph Tambura southerners wanted devolution of power not regionalism. Despite this and opposition by OAU, Numeiri went ahead and dissolved the autonomy.

Unilateral introduction and application of Sharia

By propagating religious equality, the Addis Ababa Agreement acknowledged the multi ethnic and multi-religious character of the Sudanese state and helped remove one of the grievances that had perpetuated suspicion between the north and the south through maintenance of a balance between respective religious interests. This situation did not however last as many forces in the north viewed the country as Islamic to govern by Islamic laws. All the main northern Sudanese political parties the Umma party, DUP and the NIF were Islamic in character and pursued Islamic agenda though in varying degrees. As earlier as 1966 Sadiq al-

Mahdi for instance underscored the dominant role of Islam in the Sudanese state and called for its rival alongside Arabism. It was however the NIF which pressurized Numeiri to make *Sharia* the source of law in the country, it's long held ambition. NIF was Numeiri 's key ally and when its Secretary General Hassan al-Turabi was named the Chairman of national reconciliation committee, he used the position to accomplish his long held ambition; to bring the laws of Sudan in accordance with the rules of Islam.⁴⁷ Numeiri's Islamic agenda led to.

Though the war between the south and the north had already begun when *Sharia* was declared Sudan's basic law through the promulgation of September 1983 laws, it gave it further momentum as it alienated the south. As discusses earlier in the chapter *Sharia* increased the level of hatred between the north and the south and became one of the most contentious and controversial issues. *Sharia* limits the civic and political rights of those that do not belong to the Islamic faith.⁴⁸ The main consequence of September laws was to re-institute Islam in a more intransigent form as a Sudanese identity. The contest between the north and the south on the role of *Sharia* in the Sudanese state led to escalation of the conflict. Islam also came to play a perpetuating role in the conflict. Bashir's regime ensured rigorous application of *Sharia*.⁴⁹

⁴⁷ Duany Wal & Duany Julia, Genesis of the Crisis in Sudan in Spaulding Jay and Beswick Stephanie (eds), White Nile Black Blood (War, leadership and ethnicity from Khartoum to Kampala, The Red Sea Press, Asmara. 2000 p 175

⁴⁸ Ayittey George. B. N. Africa Betrayed, St Martin's Press, New York, 1992. p.125

⁴⁹ Tordoff William, Government and Politics in Africa, (4th edition), Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2000, 218.

Discovery of oil in the south

As observed in the beginning of the chapter, the north's quest to control the south's resources was a major factor in the Sudan conflict. It was however the discovery of oil in Bentiu that re-ignited the conflict between the south and the north in 1983. President Numeiri was determined to ensure that the north control the oil by carving a new province, Bentiu and transferring it to northern Sudan. To strengthen control, Numeiri's government passed the People's Regional Governing Act (1980) changing the north-south border. The south viewed the scheme as calculated to deprive them their oil and hence the resistance. Though Numeiri had already set in motion plans for the resumption of the conflict, it was the discovery of oil and northern response that jolted the peace. Seymour⁵⁰ has argued that oil introduced new players, resources and agendas, which shifted the parameters of north-south conflict and replaced politics of governance as the central issue shaping the Sudan conflict. Vick⁵¹ has opined that while religion and race have fuelled the conflict, nothing had inflamed it quite like oil. Wheeler⁵² has argued that the struggle for the control of oilfields in the south led to intensification of the conflict in late 1990s as successful exploitation assisted the government in funding the war.

⁵⁰ See Seymour L J M., *The Oil Conflict Nexus in Sudan; Governance, Development and State Building*, North Western University, Illinois, June 2001, p. 4

⁵¹ See Vick Karl, *Oil money super-changes Sudan's war*, International Tribune, New York, 13th June 2001

⁵² See Wheeler Andrew C, *Finding Meaning Amid the Chaos; Narratives of Significance in the Sudanese Church* in Kastfelt Niels(ed) *Religion and African Civil War*, Hurst & Company, London, 2005. p.54.

The Jonglei canal

The construction of the Jonglei canal was one of the issues that sparked the conflict in 1983. The project first conceived in 1901 was intended to drain the Sudd swamp and increase the volume of the water flow to northern Sudan and Egypt to cater for rising irrigation needs. Johnson⁵³ has argued that the proposal for the construction of the canal was consented by the Higher Executive Council in 1974 through pressure and manipulation by the central government. Henceforth the survival of southern politicians depended on their support for the project. The government responded to any slight opposition to the project with force. For instance the police violently suppressed a popular demonstration in Juba against the project in 1974 where several southern Sudanese politicians were arrested while others fled to exile.

The project was conceptualized without the involvement of the Dinka and Nuer pastoralists whose livelihood depended on the Sudd ecosystem. Many in the south felt that the project was part of systematic plunder of their resources. In particular, it was felt in the south that the project was meant to benefit the north and Egypt at their expense.⁵⁴ Again the conduct of Numeiri's government on this issue demonstrated that the development of southern Sudan was not an equal priority. As with oil, so was water, Khartoum proved itself to be more concerned with the extraction of southern resources with minimum returns for

⁵³ Johnson D H .p 48

⁵⁴ see Goldsmith, Abura & Switzer, Oil and water in Sudan p 205

the region. This explains why the canal was one of the first targets of the SPLA's attacks, which led to the suspension of constructions work.

2.3 Parties to the Sudan conflict

The two principal parties to the Sudan conflict were the government in Khartoum and the SPLM/SPLA. There however several secondary parties that supported either of the two main parties as will be seen in chapter three.

SPLM/SPLA

As a rebel movement, the SPLM/SPLA and its leadership evolved Ethiopia in July 1983 and its nucleus comprised the remnants of *Anyanya 2* who rejected the Addis Ababa Agreement and the southern troops from the 105 Battalion garrisoned at Bor, Pibor and Pochalla that resisted transfer to the north. The SPLM/SPLA was basically a southern Sudanese movement dominated by the Nuer and the Dinka. It did not officially pursue a separatist agenda but advocated the resolution of the problem of southern Sudan within the framework of a united Sudan. This informs why in its manifesto released in July 1983; SPLM/SPLA dedicated itself to a united, democratic and secular Sudan in which racial, ethnic and religious equality exist. Young⁵⁴ asserts that SPLA's official platform was the re-conception of Sudan as a secular state in which the south could share but secession remained an implicit option and real preference for most of SPLA's following. Secession was however a strategic option.⁵⁵ This was

⁵⁴ Young Crawford, Contextualizing Congo Conflict; Order and Disorder in postcolonial Africa in Clark John F (ed), *The African Stakes in the Congo War*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2002, p.19

⁵⁵ Payne Richard J & Nassar Jamal R, *Politics and Culture in the Developing World; The impact of Globalization*, Pearson Longman, New York, 2006, p. 285.

because of existence of a strong pro- secessionist constituency within its ranks and leadership feared such a position could undermine alliances with political parties in northern Sudan and Ethiopian interests. To broaden its national appeal, SPLM/SPLA needed to project an image of a national movement dedicated to resolving the national problem in Sudan. Also to the extent that Ethiopia's Mengistu wanted Numeiri out of power, he did not want to be seen as supporting secessionist movements which he himself was fighting against. Ideologically SPLM/SPLA pursued a Marxist policy due to the influence of Ethiopia.⁵⁶

The SPLM/SPLA drew much of its support from the south and had little northern representation. It was basically a southern Sudanese movement pursuing a national agenda due to expediency. Its main external backer was Ethiopia which under Mengistu gave both political and military support as retaliation for Sudan's support for Eritrean People's Liberation Front and the Tigrean People's Liberation Front. In the formative years of its existence, Libya and Egypt supported the SPLM/SPLA but suspended it after the overthrow of Numeiri in 1985. The external backing and massive recruitment enabled SPLA to build a strong force which by 1989 controlled a large part of southern Sudan including some strategic towns leaving government forces confined mainly to major towns and military garrisons.

⁵⁶ See. Hutchinson Sharon Elaine, *Spiritual Fragments of an unfinished war in* Kastfelt Niels(ed) *Religion and African Civil Wars*, Hurst &Company , London, 2005, p.56

From late 1989 however SPLM/SPLA was undermined by leadership struggles pitting its chairman, Dr. John Garang against Dr. Riek Machar. The struggle took an ethnic dimension as the south's two main tribes, the Dinka and the Nuer jostle for control.⁵⁷ In 1991 SPLM/SPLA split into two, SPLM/A Torit and SPLM/A Nasir factions under Garang and Machar respectively following the latter's unsuccessful coup. The change of regime in Ethiopia following the overthrow of Mengistu by Sudan-supported rebellion severely affected SPLM/SPLA's operations as it lost its bases in southwestern Ethiopia. Further split within SPLM/A Nasir faction resulted in the formation of SPLM/A United of Dr Lam Akol. Machar renamed his faction South Sudan Independence Movement. The split enabled the Sudanese government to roll back SPLA's military successes of the late 1980s that by 1991 it had military advantage in the conflict. As will be seen later, this situation made the government reluctant to negotiate seriously with the rebels.

From 1994, re-alignment among Sudan's neighbours witnessed a shift towards SPLM. Sudanese government support to LRA pushed Uganda to retaliate by backing the SPLA enabling it to re-establish bases near its border and opening a new front in Equatoria. The situation played further in favour of SPLM/SPLA following straining of relations between Sudan and its former close allies Ethiopia and Eritrea. The two countries accused Sudan of interference in internal affairs and supported SPLM/SPLA in retaliation. The support enabled SPLA to penetrate

⁵⁷ See Adwok Nyaba, *The Politics of Liberation in the South, An Insiders View*, Fountain Publishers, Kampala p 40.

Southern Blue Nile, and from 1995 was able to challenge the government in the east.

In 1995, the SPLA with internal and exiled opposition parties in the north and the south among them the DUP and Umma formed National Democratic Alliance (NDA).⁵⁸ The NDA opened a northeastern front in the civil war transforming the conflict into centre-periphery conflict rather than a north – south. Grass roots reconciliation by NSCC between various southern ethnic groups enabled SPLA to penetrate areas hitherto hostile and jolted the government policy of instigating inter-ethnic feuds. The rapprochement between the Dinka and the Nuer in the mid 1990s was significant as it enabled the SPLA to recapture several areas including those proximate to oil-rich Upper Nile.

Government of Sudan

The other main party to the Sudan conflict was the Government of Sudan (GoS) represented by the various successive civilian and military regimes. The first of these regimes was that of President Numeiri under whose reign the conflict in the south erupted. Numeiri's regime was replaced in 1985 by a military Junta, the Transitional Military Council led by Gen. Swar-al-Dhahab. The council did not make serious attempt to resolve the conflict as it was constrained by its inability to compromise of the issue of *Sharia*.

National elections were held in April 1986 and won by the Umma party. Given its thin majority, Umma party was forced into a power sharing deal with

⁵⁸ See International Crisis Group, *Sudan: Towards Incomplete Peace*, ICG Press, Brussels/ Nairobi, 11th December 2003. p. 17.

DUP with Sadiq al- Mahdi as prime minister. The Umma party and DUP with their Islamic orientations were only ready to compromise on other issues other than *Sharia*. Rivalry within the government also undermined its ability to negotiate with SPLM/SPLA. Under the two parties, Sudan strengthened defence pacts with Egypt and Libya initiated by TMC. The government of Sadiq al-Mahdi was overthrown in a NIF- backed military coup led by General Omar al-Bashir in 1989. On coming to power NIF reinforced the Islamic laws. The division within the SPLM/A enabled it to accelerate its strategy of southernizing the war by arming groups opposed to Garang. It pursued an aggressive military solution to the conflict and sought the support of radical Arab and Muslim countries particularly Iran which offered military and financial support. Iran as will be seen in the next chapter was instrumental in building the Popular Defence Forces (PDF) modeled on its own Mujahidden.

The government also created and armed several ethnic militias among them the Baggara and Misiriyya Arabs as part of strategy to contain SPLA. By mid 1990s the conflict took a religious dimension following al-Bashir and Turabi's declaration of the war in the south as a jihad. Several Muslims seeking martyrdom joined the PDF to fight alongside government forces.

2.4 Internal negotiation efforts to resolve the Sudan conflict

Since the outbreak of the civil war in 1983 several negotiations between the successive Sudanese governments and the SPLM-SPLA and other splinter groups

took place inside and outside Sudan. In particular, the main political parties and groupings in northern Sudan attempted to negotiate with the SPLM/SPLA.

Transitional Military Council 1985-1986

The Transitional Military Council (TMC) took over power in April 1985 in a popular uprising sparked by worsening economic conditions and the conflict in the south, which many northern Sudanese blamed it on Numeiri. On coming to power the TMC reluctantly suspended the application of *Sharia* in an effort to create favourable conditions for negotiations with SPLM/ SPLA. The TMC was however only ready to restore the Addis Ababa Agreement and the Higher Executive Council but was undecided on the issue of *Sharia* as it feared been viewed as anti- Islam. Harir⁵⁹ argues that not only did the TMC failed to abrogate the September Laws it was determined to consolidate the place of Islamic. SPLM-SPLA on its part wanted the abrogation of *Sharia*, the annulment of military pacts, which previous regimes had entered with Libya and Egypt. It also viewed TMC as illegitimate and demanded its dissolution and replacement with an interim government of national unity.

According to Anderson⁶⁰ SPLM/SPLA's uncompromising position and expansion of objectives beyond what any northern Sudan government could accept particularly demands for dissolution of the TMC and TMC's inability to act on *Sharia* contributed to lack of progress. The perception of both the SPLM/SPLA

⁵⁹ Harir S, *Recycling the Past in the Sudan: An Overview of Political Decay* in Harir and Tvedt T (eds). *Short-cut to Decay, The Case of The Sudan*, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, Uppsala, 1994. p.13.

⁶⁰ Anderson G Norman, *Sudan in Crisis: The Failure of Democracy*, University Press of Florida, Gainesville, p.73

and TMC of each other contributed the failure of negotiations. The SPLM/SPLA viewed TMC as an extension of NIF as it was dominated by pro—NIF elements among them its Chairman, Gen. Swar-al-Dhahab, Transitional Prime Minister El Gazouli Dafallah and Attorney General Omer Abdel Ail. The TMC on its part regarded SPLM/SPLA as a stooge of Ethiopia. This state of affairs led to the failure of negotiations. The north's pre-occupation with elections in 1986 further undermined the prospects of meaningful negotiations to end the conflict.

The Koka Dam Conference 1986

The first real attempt to resolve the Sudan conflict came in 1986 following a meeting between SPLM/SPLA and fourteen Sudanese political parties and twenty-two trade unions operating under the umbrella, National Alliance for National Salvation (NANS) in Koka Dam, Ethiopia. The four-day conference, which began on 20th March 1986, came up with the Koka Dam Declaration. The declaration acknowledged the existence of a problem in Sudan and agreed to convene a national constitutional conference to discuss it. The declaration called for the lifting of the state of emergency, repeal of the September Laws and the reinstatement of the 1956 Constitution as amended in 1964, and incorporating the regional government of southern Sudan and abrogation of military pacts that impinge on Sudan's sovereignty.⁶⁰ It further called for the establishment of a new Sudan based on equality.

⁶⁰ Garang John: *The Call for Democracy in Sudan*, Op cit, p.166.

The declaration took into consideration SPLM/SPLA's Five Point pre-conditions for ending the conflict. Most of the Sudanese parties and movements including Umma party, Sudanese Communist Party, Baathists, Pan Arabists, southern Sudanese political parties and trade unions signed the declaration.⁶¹ The DUP and NIF, which together controlled more than 50 percent of the seats in parliament did not participate and hence were not signatories to the Koka Dam Declaration.⁶² This undermined plans for the convening of a national constitutional conference. Through a series of meetings held in Addis Ababa, Kampala and Nairobi in 1987, South Sudan African parties supported the Koka Dam Declaration.

Sadiq al-Mahdi undermined the declaration on becoming the prime minister three months into the signing.⁶³ Like the TMC al-Mahdi's government feared being seen as undermining Islam hence the demand for the revision of the agreement to reflect Sudan's Muslim majority. The deep Islamic roots within the Umma party hardened al-Mahdi's unwillingness to reverse *Sharia*. Umma drew most of its support from the Ansar Muslim sect whose objective was to establish an Islamic state in Sudan. Al-Mahdi even joined forces with NIF and discarded the idea of national unity as manifested in the National Charter.

⁶¹ Anderson, G.N. Sudan in Crisis; The Failure of Democracy, University Press of Florida, Gainesville, 1999.p.73

⁶² See Bagadi Hamad Omar, "A review of the peace efforts since April 1985" in Ahmed Abdelghaffar & Sorbo Gunnar M (eds), *Management of Crisis in South Sudan*, op cit p,

⁶³ See Information and Press Library August 4th 1998

DUP-SPLM/SPLA Accord 1988

The SPLM/SPLA and DUP maintained a contact with each other throughout much of 1986-7 despite the latter's failure to participate in the Koka Dam negotiations. The contacts culminated in a meeting in Addis Ababa in mid 1988 between a high level DUP delegation led by Sid Ahmad Hussain and Gen. Yusuf Ahmad Yusuf and SPLM/SPLA officials. The talks culminated in the signing of a DUP-SPLM/A Accord in November 1988 signed by Mohammed al-Mirghani and John Garang.⁶⁴ The accord endorsed the Koka Dam Declaration and called for the freezing of all clauses related to the application of *Hudud*. It however deferred the issue of *Sharia* until the convening of a constitutional conference in July 1989. The national assembly endorsed the accord in April 1989 but Sadiq al-Mahdi could not implement it due to dissent within his party and its coalition partner the NIF.⁶⁵ The Umma party and NIF went further and voted against it by 136-77.⁶⁶ The subsequent withdrawal of DUP from the government weakened the peace process. It was however NIF coup of June 1989 which pre-empted the initiative only four days before the commencement of conference.⁶⁷

Another internal effort to resolve the conflict undertaken before 1990 was initiated by the Union of South Sudan African Parties (USAP) led by Eliaba Surur,

⁶⁴ See Institute of Security Studies. *The Sudan IGAD Process: Signposts for the way forward.*, ISS, Pretoria, 13th February 2004, p. 3.

⁶⁵ Ibid

⁶⁶ see Anderson, G. Norman. *Sudan in Crisis: The Failure of Democracy*, University Press of Florida, Gainesville. 1999.op. cit p. 156.

⁶⁷ see Kwaje Samson, *The Sudan Peace Process from Machakos to Naivasha* in Makumi Mwangi (ed) *African Regional Security in the Age of Globalization*, Heinrich Boll Foundation, Nairobi, p 97

the leader of Equatoria-based Progressive Peoples' Party. The parties endorsed the Koka Dam declaration and drafted a Transitional Sudan Charter confirming the dual character of Sudan and calling for equitable power sharing.

SPLM-Umma accord

Throughout much of the 1990s, the SPLM/SPLA and northern opposition political parties continued with efforts to resolve the conflict. Notable among these efforts was the SPLM- Umma Accord signed in Chukudum in December 1994. Under its terms, the Umma party accepted SPLM's principle of conditional unity and self-determination. The Accord opened opportunity for northern political parties under the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) co-ordinate strategy with SPLM resulting in the Asmara Declaration of December 1994, which acknowledged the multi-cultural nature of the Sudan.

NIF Government Initiatives

From 1990s the Sudanese government took advantage of splits within the SPLM/A to undermine peace efforts. It pursued a two-pronged strategy involving aggressive military campaign and playing southern Sudanese factions against each other. Between 1996 and 1997, it signed a series of agreements with several rebel southern factions under the framework of peace from within. The first such initiative was the proclamation of a political charter in 1996 between the Sudanese government and several southern rebel groups including the South Sudan Independence Movement (SSIM) and the Sudan People Liberation

Movement (Bahrel Ghazal Group). The charter was never approved by the SPLM/SPLA, but it became the basis of subsequent peace talks.⁶⁸

The Sudanese government signed another peace agreement in April 1997 with seven southern rebel factions including the SSIM, South Sudan United Democratic Salvation Front and Equatoria Defence Force. The parties agreed on fourteen principles of which the most important was the pledged to safeguard the unity of Sudan within a federal system. It acknowledged Sudan was a multi-racial, multi-ethnic and multi-cultural society.⁶⁹ The agreement was augmented by an agreement on the cessation of hostilities and cease-fire signed between the Sudanese government and South Sudan Defence Force on behalf of South Sudan Co-ordination Council (SSCC). The agreement however failed to resolve the issue of *Sharia* as it retained the status quo.

The Sudanese government also signed the Fashoda Peace Agreement in September 1997 with SPLM-United of Dr Lam Akol. Under the agreement SPLM-United undertook to support the Khartoum Peace Agreement signed earlier in the year. In 1999, the Sudanese government and the Blue Nile Citizens Front signed the Blue Nile Peace Agreement whose key elements included the establishment of democracy in Sudan, preservation of unity and equitable distribution of resources.

Most of these initiatives collapsed immediately after their signing because they failed to address the main issues in the conflict. The NIF government just like its

⁶⁸ See, South Sudan Friends International, <http://www.southsudanfriends.org./southern Sudan.html>

⁶⁹ See Sudan Peace Agreement April 1997

predecessors was only ready to compromise of peripheral issues and not the core issues. It was keen to negotiate the resolution of the conflict in the south as far as it was on its own terms. Its strategy of manipulating the various southern rebel factions also proved to be counter productive in the long run as the latter came to adopt the same strategy against the NIF.

SPLM-PNC Memorandum 2002

Another internal effort can be seen in the MOU between the SPLM/A and the Popular National Congress (PNC) negotiated and signed in Geneva on February 2001. The MOU addressed the substantive issues in the north-south conflict and acknowledged the pluralistic nature and religious diversity of the Sudan. It affirmed the right of self-determination as a human right and that unity must be based on voluntary will.⁷⁰

2.5 The Effects of the conflict in regional international relations

The resumption of the conflict between the north and the south had several effects on Sudan's neighbours. First, the effects of the resumption of the conflict combined with the residual effects of the first conflict to make the situation complex. Other than the issue of refugees, which affected many of Sudan's neighbours with Ethiopia being the most affected, the conflict triggered re-alignment within the region. The conflict entangled most of Sudan's immediate neighbours in support of either of the parties or in the mediation.

⁷⁰ *Memorandum of Understanding between the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the Popular National Congress (PNC)*, February 2001.

In the first years of the conflict, regional re-alignment was influenced by the cold war politics with Sudan's neighbours allied to Soviet Union backing the SPLM-SPLA. Within the Horn of Africa, the conflict shaped inter-state relations. According to Clapman⁷¹ Ethiopia supported the SPLM/SPLA through provision of military, logistical and diplomatic support. Ethiopia under Mengistu allowed the SPLM/SPLA to establish bases in southwestern region of Gambela from where it was able to launch attacks against Sudanese government forces. The Ethiopian support to SPLM/SPLA was a response to President Numeiri's backing for EPLF and TPLF rebels which were to Mengistu's regime. Sudan retaliated by increasing support for EPLF and TPLF by allowing them to establish strong presence in Khartoum including offices from where they coordinated anti- Ethiopia activities. EPLF in particular maintained a major supply lines into northern Eritrea from Port Sudan.⁷²

In 1989, power in Sudan shifted from the moderates to radicals following the overthrow of al-Mahdi in NIF-backed military coup. Miller⁷³ argues that NIF pursued a radical agenda dictated by the strong pro-Islamic and anti-west elements. Sudan adopted antagonistic policies towards its neighbours involving active support to Islamist movements particularly in Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda. In Uganda, Sudan supported the Lord's Resistance Army, Allied Democratic Front and Western Nile Bank Front. In 1996 relations between Sudan

⁷¹ Clapman Christopher, Foreign policies of Ethiopia and Eritrea in Wright Stephen (ed), *African Foreign Policies*, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1999.p.90.

⁷² *ibid*

⁷³ See Miller David C & Wolpe Howard (eds), *The United States and Africa*, W. W. Norton Company, New York, 1998, p.74.

and Uganda deteriorated further after Sudanese air force bombed Moyo, Uganda. In the case of Eritrea and Ethiopia, Sudan supported the EPLF and Al-Itihad respectively prompting two countries to sever ties and resuming assistance to SPLM/SPLA. This policy placed Sudan in conflict with many of its neighbours.⁷⁴ Lederach⁷⁵ argues that Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda concerned about NIF interferences in their countries and intention towards radical Islamization adopted a three- pronged policy of supporting IGAD initiative, increasing multi-lateral pressure on Sudan through UN sanctions and co-ordination among themselves and Sudanese opposition military efforts to defeat NIF.

The north-south conflict in Sudan also affected relations with Libya and Egypt. The two countries, especially Egypt had strategic interests in Sudan, which it feared it could be endangered in situation of conflict. When the conflict resumed in 1983, Libya supported SPLM/SPLA to retaliate against Numeiri's alignment with the US, which under President Ronald Reagan was hostile towards Tripoli. The overthrow of Numeiri in 1985 led to some shift in Libyan policy towards Sudan. Libya commenced military assistance to Sudan with some of its pilots being directly involved in the fight against the SPLA in the south. Despite this change, Libya adopted a policy of supporting both the Sudanese government and the SPLA. Despite concerns about the conflict in the south,

⁷⁴ Chazan Naomi, Lewis Peter, Mortimer Robert, Rothchild Donald & Stedman Stephen John (eds), *Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, 1999, p.383.

⁷⁵ See Lederach John Paul, *Building Peace, Sustainable Reconciliation in divided societies*, United States institute of peace press, Washington DC, 1997, P.155.

Egypt viewed it as an internal Sudanese problem.⁷⁶ It maintained relations with Sudanese government and the SPLM/SPLA as evident by the strong presence of the former in Cairo. The ascendancy to power by NIF its subsequent adoption of an antagonistic policy strained Sudan and Egypt relations. Egypt accused NIF regime of supporting the Muslim Brotherhood, which was intent on overthrowing President Mubarak. Relations between Sudan and Egypt reached the lowest level in 1997 when the two countries nearly went to war following attempted assassination on President Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa.

When the war broke out in 1983 the US supported the Sudanese government on ideological grounds. SPLM/SPLA's close ties with Ethiopia were viewed by the US as support for USSR's agenda in the Horn of Africa. US' support for Sudan continued until 1989 when the democratically- elected government of al-Mahdi was overthrow by NIF. The US halted support to the new regime and instead pursued a policy aimed at containing and isolating it within the Arab world accusing it of supporting extremists. In 1998, the US government gave non-lethal military aid to Uganda, Ethiopia and Eritrea as part its anti NIF policy. US involvement in Sudan was however constrained by the need to maintain a delicate balance between Egyptian interests and the south's interests.

Other than support to the parties, the other international response to the conflict took the form of mediation. Several third parties driven by competing

⁷⁶ Anderson G Norman Sudan in Crisis: The Failure of Democracy. op cit p. 95

interests and agendas attempted to mediate in the conflict. The first such effort was Abuja talks mediated by the Organization of Africa Unity (OAU) held in May-June 1992 and April-May 1993. The talks failed to make progress due differences between the main parties and competing and divergent regional interests. The Abuja process was followed by IGAD peace initiative, which came to be the most significant attempt to resolve the Sudan conflict. The conflict had adverse effects on Sudan's neighbours particularly Kenya, Ethiopia and Uganda intervention on humanitarian grounds. Some of the IGAD member states were forced to intervene as a way of containing the spread of political Islam.⁷⁷ Between 1993 and 1994 the Sudanese government, SPLM and SSIM held several meetings under the auspices of IGAD, culminating in the adoption of the Declaration of Principles (DOP) as the framework for resolving the conflict. The DOP reaffirmed the unity of Sudan, the multi-racial and multi-ethnic and religious nature of the Sudan but gave the right of self-determination for southern Sudan.⁷⁸ This process culminated the signing of a Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed in April 2005 by the GOS and the SPLM/A.⁷⁹

Egypt and Libya also attempted to mediate in the Sudan conflict by launching the Egypt and Libya initiative to counter the IGAD initiative. The initiative was designed to protect the two countries' strategic interests in Sudan and was premised on the unity of Sudan. The Arab League and the Organization

⁷⁷ Ibid

⁷⁸ See, *IGAD Declaration of Principles*, 20th May 2004 Nairobi

⁷⁹ See *Comprehensive Peace Agreement between The Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLM/SPLA)*, Nairobi 9th January, 2005

of Islamic Countries (IOC) supported the initiative due to the fear that the IGAD initiative was aimed at fragmenting Sudan. While the initiative recognized the racial, religious and Sudan's cultural diversity it failed to address the fundamental issues in the conflict including religion, self-determination and resource sharing which were at the centre of the conflict and hence the reluctance by SPLM to fully embraced it.⁸⁰

The other notable interventions to resolve the Sudan conflict were undertaken by the United States, the European Union and Eritrea. The US under Clinton and Bush administrations intervened actively in the Sudan and appointed special envoys among them Harry Johnson and Sen. John Danforth who were instrumental in brokering a humanitarian pact in the Nuba Mountains, which was a major confidence building measure to SPLM/A and GOS. With some western countries, the US was an important member of the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF). The group facilitated the IGAD mediation by providing funding and reconstruction. Eritrea attempted to mediate between the GoS and NDA on framework similar to IGAD initiative but failed due to lack of international support.⁴

2.5 Conclusion

The underlying issues in the north –south conflict in Sudan were complex. Just as the issues were emotive and galvanizing in the south, they were divisive in the north as it was between the north and the south. The fact that none of the

⁸⁰ See, Text of Egyptian-Libyan Memorandum on the Sudanese Reconciliation.

parties in the north and the south were willing to compromise showed depth of the division and enmity between the two contending parts of the Sudanese state. The involvement of third parties particularly external actors brought new issues into the conflict competing regional and international political and strategic considerations.

3.0: Chapter Three

The involvement of External actors in the Sudan conflict (1983-2004)

3.1 Introduction

Chapter two looked into the causes of the 1983-2005 conflict in Sudan as well as internal negotiations to resolve it. It also looked into the effects of the conflict in the international relations particularly of the Horn of Africa. It concluded that several issues were at the centre of the conflict. In particular, it examined how these issues made the conflict more intractable as none of the parties were willing to compromise. This chapter will examine the involvement of the external actors in the conflict. Specifically, it will explore the interests of the third in the conflict and the affects on the structure of the conflict.

3.2 The involvement of external state actors and interests in the Sudan conflict

The 1983-2004 conflict in Sudan attracted large number of external third party actors as evidenced by the large number of state actors, international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) and multi national corporations (MNCs) manifesting various interests. The entry of state actors in the conflict was driven by specific foreign policy objectives and strategic considerations. Ezzat Dina¹ has argued that the involvement of third parties in the Sudan conflict led to changes in inter-state relations in the Horn of Africa and Nile Basin.

¹ See, Ezzat Dina, Protecting Egypt's Back, *Al-Ahram Weekly*, 25th –March 1999, Issue No. 422

States' involvement and interests in conflict

Sudan's strategic location in the Nile Basin and the Horn of Africa, its unique position as a bridge between the Arab-Muslim world and the mainly Christian sub-Saharan Africa as well as its vast natural resources meant that internal conflict issues could easily be externalized and hence attracting intervention of external third parties both state and non-state actors. The nature of internal Sudanese politics and structure of the state as in most African states made it susceptible to international intervention.² State involvement in the Sudan conflict was not confined to immediate neighbours, most of which were directly affected by the conflict but also attracted many Middle Eastern, Western and Asian states. States' involvement in the conflict included the supply of arms to the belligerent parties, aiding in extraction of resources and humanitarian activities.

Involvement of Sudan's neighbours in conflict

Prunier³ has argued that the war in the Sudan was an undeclared regional conflict as its national and regional dimensions are intimately intertwined. According to Rogier⁴ most of Sudan's neighbours were involved directly or indirectly in the conflict by supporting the parties. The involvement of Sudan neighbours can be viewed from two perspectives, the interventions of Sudan's

² Ibid

³ See, International Crisis Group, *Power and Wealth Sharing: Make or Break time in Sudan's Peace Process*, ICG Press, Africa Report, No 55, Brussels/Nairobi, p. 12.

⁴ See, Rogier Emeric, *No More Hills. The Sudan's Tortuous Ascent to Heights of Peace*, Netherlands Institute of International Relations, August 2005, p. 30.

southern and eastern neighbors within the Horn of Africa and Arab neighbours to the north particularly Egypt and Libya.

Basically all of Sudan's neighbours in the Horn of Africa and the south played an active role in the conflict. Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, Uganda and Djibouti, were the most affected by the conflict due to proximity to the conflict's epicentre in the south. But of all these countries, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya and Uganda were the main actors in the conflict within the Horn of Africa sub-region. Whereas these countries were engaged mainly in mediation, in many occasions they took sides in the conflict and gave military, logistical and diplomatic support to either the Sudanese government or the SPLM/A. Young⁴ argues that the eruption of conflict in Sudan in 1983 provided Ethiopia opportunity to counter the threat posed by Sudan which was supporting several Ethiopian and Eritrean secessionist rebel groups. This position is supported by Clapman⁵ who argues that the SPLA was allowed to operate openly from Ethiopian territory by Mengistu as retaliation for Sudanese support for EPLF, TPLF and EPRDF. Under Mengistu Haile Mariam, Ethiopia assisted the SPLA to build its military capacity without which the rebels could not have captured such a large territory in the south as it did at the height of its success in 1989⁶. Ethiopian support to the SPLM/A came to an abrupt end in 1991 following the overthrow of Mengistu by Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) led by Meles Zenawi.

⁴ Young John, John Garang's Legacy to the Peace Process, the SPLM/A and the South, *Review of African Political Economy*, No.106, 2005. pp 535-548

⁵ Clapman Christopher, *Africa and International System: The Politics of State Survival*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996. p. 220

⁶ *ibid*

President Bashir's NIF had actively supported Ethiopian and Eritrean insurgencies and when Mengistu was overthrown in May 1991 one of EPRDF's actions was to reciprocate the Sudanese government support by expelling the SPLA from Ethiopia. But hitherto to 1991 foreign countries intending to transact business with EPLF or EPRDF and SPLA did so in their respective embassies in Khartoum and Addis Ababa.

The termination of support by Ethiopia to SPLM/A was however short lived. After the exit of Mengistu, Sudan immediately began to undermine Meles Zenawi's nascent regime by supporting the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and Ogaden National Liberation Front, two key movements which pulled out of TPLF-led coalition. This prompted the new leadership in Ethiopia to retaliate by resuming support to SPLM/A. It provided extensive military support to SPLA and was instrumental in its military resurgence and successes in 1996/7, which played a major role in forcing the Sudanese government to accept IGAD's DOP. Together with Eritrea, Ethiopia was also assisted the SPLM/A opening an eastern front in the Sudan conflict. One would therefore conclude that Ethiopia's support to SPLM/A was always a consequence of Sudanese provocation.

The breakout of a border dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea which led to a two-year conflict and war and Sudan's emergent status as an oil exporter led to new dynamics in Sudan-Ethiopia relations. These imperatives forced Ethiopia to moderate its policy towards Sudan due to interests in Sudan's oil, access to the sea and a secure western border. While content in having parts of

Sudan under rebels, like Eritrea and Uganda, Ethiopia was reluctant to topple Bashir for fear of being replaced by a regime more controlled by Egypt. Ethiopia's greatest fear is a government in Khartoum controlled by Egypt⁷.

The involvement of Eritrea in Sudan conflict mirrors that of Ethiopia. As stated earlier in this chapter Sudan's support for EPLF, one of Khartoum-based anti- Mengistu rebels provoked Ethiopia to support SPLA. As far 1974, Numeiri harboured EPLF but it was not until 1977 that Sudan became more open. From 1989, Sudanese support to EPLF intensified following the ascendancy to power in Khartoum by NIF-led government of Bashir. The relations between the two countries however deteriorated and reached an all time low immediately after Eritrea's independence. The NIF regime began to undermine Eritrea by supporting the Eritrean Islamic Jihad leading to severance of diplomatic ties in 1994. Eritrea viewed Sudan as a national security threat given the vulnerability of its population, which is evenly divided between Muslims and Christians.⁸ Eritrea responded to Sudan's actions by supporting NDA and SPLA. So open was the Eritrean support to SPLM/A that in 2002, Sudan demanded the withdrawal of Asmara's representative to the IGAD mediated talks in Machakos claiming that his contribution was negative⁹.

Uganda supported SPLM/A in the conflict including the provision of bases and safe havens following the overthrow of Mengistu's regime by Sudan-

⁷ ibid

⁸ Ibid

⁹ See, International Crisis Group, *God, Oil and Country, Changing the Logic of War in Sudan*, ICG Press, Africa Report No. 39, Brussels/ Nairobi, 28th January 2003, p.165.

supported EPRDF. Uganda's supported SPLA as retaliation against the Sudanese government support for the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). Uganda-SPLM/A cooperation was made even strong due to the personal friendships between Museveni and Garang. At its height in mid 1990s, it involved joint covert operations inside Sudan in support of SPLM. Uganda was also an important actor in US strategy to contain Sudan involving Ethiopia and Eritrea. Even after 1998 when Ethiopia and Eritrea relaxed their hard-line stance towards Sudan in the face of intense border conflict, Uganda continued its support to the SPLA.

Kenya's involvement in the Sudan conflict took the form of mediation with personal interest from President Moi¹⁰ Kenya pursued a delicate neutrality between the Sudanese government and the SPLM/A which endeared her as a neutral mediator. From 1989, Kenya consistently mediated the Sudan conflict sometimes in collaboration with such institutions as the Atlanta-based Carter Centre. In 1994, Kenya was selected the chair of IGAD Sudan peace talks a position it held until the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005. Despite the non-partisan role in the conflict, at times Kenya's stance was to the contrary. Other than Ethiopia, Kenya was the main conduit for arms to SPLA and Nairobi was its main logistical base. Though Kenya did not aggressively support SPLA as did Uganda and Ethiopia or joined the US containment initiative against Sudan, Kenya's leadership had strong ties with the movement's leadership especially Dr. Garang.

¹⁰ Ibid

Arab and Middle East states role in the Sudan conflict

The Sudan conflict attracted much attention in the Arab world and the Middle East spurred in part by suspicion that the United States and Israel were supporting the SPLM/A. This suspicion forced many Arab countries and governments especially the radical regimes to support the Sudanese government. After the 1989 NIF coup, Sudan drifted towards extremism and embraced radical Arab and Muslim regimes or groups. Sudan became an important destination of many radical Arab and Muslim groups. In 1992 Hassan al-Turabi convened an Arab-Islamic Congress that brought together the leadership of radical Islamist movements from Iran, Lebanon, Palestine and Algeria.¹¹ Most Arab countries help a unified position on the Sudan conflict which became an important agenda after the Palestine and Iraq crises. Other than giving diplomatic and political support to the Sudanese government, Arab states through the League of Arab States attempted to mediate in the conflict and supported the Joint Libyan Egyptian Initiative. It also appointed a special Envoy to the Kenya-mediated IGAD Sudan peace talks with the aim of influencing the process in Sudan's or Arab favour.

Despite the apparent common stance in support of the Sudanese government, each country had its own agenda and interests. Most of the policies of the Gulf States towards Sudan were shaped by the strong influence of Muslim brotherhoods which viewed the north-south conflict in Sudan as part an agenda

¹¹ See, Phares Walid, The Sudanese Battle for American Opinion, *The Middle East Quarterly*, March 1998, Vol. V. No. 1 pp.1-19

to propagate Islamic and Arab interests. The groups viewed southern Sudan as part of the arena for conversion where Islam and Muslim world versus Christianity and the west were in competition and hence a frontier to be won for Islam and Arab culture. These groups even supported the forceful conversion of Southern Sudan as a defensive move to safeguard legitimate interests within an accepted sphere of influence¹². This pro-Islamic and Arab view was best articulated by Iraq and Libya, which together with Sudan were under international isolation. These aspirations contrasted with that of Egypt, which viewed Islam and Arab culture as secondary to the pragmatics of survival, stability and cooperation across the Nile basin. To understand Arab/Muslim interests in Sudan one may need to look into the involvement of Egypt, Libya, Iraq, and Iran and to a lesser extent Saudi Arabia. Sudan Council of Churches accused Arab countries of negatively interfering with the internal affairs of Sudan¹³.

Egypt involvement in the Sudan conflict

Egypt has always been involved in the Sudan as part of a strategy aimed at protecting its strategic interests. Egypt regards Sudan as an integral part of its Horn of Africa and Nile Basin strategic framework, crucial for the protection and promotion of its vital interests. At the centre of these interests are the protection of Nile water and the stability of the Indian Ocean and southern entrance of the

¹² See, International Crisis Group, *Sudan's Best Chance for Peace: How not to lose it*, ICG Press, Africa Report No. 51, 17th September 2002, p. 17

¹³ See, Sudan Council of Churches Speaks out on Peace Process, *Catholic Information Service for Africa*, Nairobi, 20th July 2003, <http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/2000307200023.html>

Red Sea¹⁴. According to De Villiers¹⁵ Nile is critical to Egypt as it is entirely dependent on it due to insufficient rain. Klare¹⁶ further argues that control of the Nile and its headwaters is essential to the survival and well being of Egypt which views the Nile Basin as a single hydrological entity which must states in upper must not use selfishly. For this reason, Egypt has been opposed attempts to revise the 1959 Agreement which gave her and Sudan the monopoly on the use of Nile waters. The use and control of Nile waters has been the source of tensions between Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia with Egypt at times threatening to go to war. After signing peace treaty with Israel in 1981, Egyptian President Awar Sadat indicated that the only war which his country would face will be over water. These sentiments were reiterated by Boutros Boutros Ghali when he said that the next war Egypt will wage would be over waters of the Nile not politics¹⁷. Other than in mid 1980s when it threatened to attack Sudan, conflict over the Nile waters has been avoided as Sudan and Ethiopia have been engulfed by civil war to pose any threat to Egypt's interests on the Nile. Egypt's strategy to protect its interests in the Nile has entailed support for rebels in within the Nile basin countries like the irredentists in Ethiopia's Ogaden and Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army in Southern Sudan.

¹⁴ See, African Perspective, Second Issue, summer 2000, pp1-4

¹⁵ see De Villiers Marq, *Water: The fate of our most precious Resources*, Houghton Mifflin Company, New York, 2000, pn219.

¹⁶ see Klare Michael T, *Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict*, Henry Holt & Company, LLC, New York, 2001, 151

¹⁷ Ibid

The inauguration of construction of the Jonglei Canal, which was supposed to add an additional 4 to 5 billion cubic metres of water, was part of the plan. Egypt involvement in Sudan increased tremendously following the resumption of the north-south conflict in 1983. Ezzat¹⁸ has argued that it is not in the interest of Egypt to have continuous problems to the south of its borders as such a situation would make its interests in the Nile Waters and access to the Red Sea vulnerable. Egypt regards the protection of these interests as inseparably linked to the preservation of the unity of Sudan. It is out of this that together with Libya, Egypt launched Egyptian Libyan Initiative¹⁹ to counter IGAD, which they feared could lead to the fragmentation of Sudan.

The Egyptian strategy in the Sudan conflict involved maintaining a balance between the government and the rebels. This was evident by its support to southern rebels.²⁰ Egypt also hosted several conferences for Sudan's opposition and SPLM/A had a strong presence in Cairo. Egypt's support to SPLM/A was calculated to ensure it never became too strong to undermine the unity of Sudan or endanger her interests. Through the influence of Egypt, Garang was forced to propagate a vision of united Sudan despite overwhelming support for independence in the south. In July 2003, while on a visit to Sudan, Egyptian Prime Minister Atef Obeid reiterated Egypt's backing of united Sudan

¹⁸ See Ezzat Dina, Protecting Egypt's Back, *Al-Ahram Weekly*, *opcit*

¹⁹ See The Text of the Egyptian Libyan Joint Initiative.

²⁰ See Alterman Jon B, *Sudan might emerge as an irritant to US-Egyptian relations*. *Policy Watch*, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Number 311 17th April 1998

and opposition to division²¹. In the mid -1990s, Egypt's presence in Sudan increased compelled by the need to counter the threat of growing influence of Iranian-driven extremism in the Nile Valley and the Horn of Africa. Like the US, Egypt feared Iran-friendly Khartoum would destabilize the region by exporting Islamic extremism.

Whereas Egypt was against NIF's extremist policies and support for the Muslim Brotherhood, it was wary of SPLM/A hence inclination to favour of stability and status quo.²² This could be seen in its handling of the UN sanctions imposed on Sudan for its support for international terrorism and involvement in the attempted assassination of President Hosni Mubarak. Despite the danger NIF posed to its interests, Egypt appeared reluctant to see its exit. When sanctions appeared to hurt the NIF and strengthened SPLM/A, Egypt campaigned for their lifting. The sanctions were subsequently lifted in October 2001 on Cairo's initiative.²³

Libyan role in the Sudan conflict

Throughout much of 1980s, Libya supported SPLM/A due to ideological reasons and regarded it as revolutionary movement. Libya gave SPLM/A both political and diplomatic support with military assistance being channeled through Ethiopia. Like Egypt, Libya hoisted a SPLM/A liaison office. The move was aimed at countering US- Sudanese-Egyptian influence in the Horn of Africa. Libya

²¹ See, *Egyptian delegation in Sudan for talks on bilateral relations*, Associate Press, 19th July 2003.

<http://www.sudan.net/news/posted/6967.html>

²² See, Phares Walid, *The Sudanese Battle for American Opinion*, The Middle East Quarterly, Op cit pp.1-19

²³ See, Self determination conflict profile, *Foreign Policy in Focus*, <http://fpif.org/selfdetermination/conflicts/sudan-body.html>

viewed Sudan under Numeiri as an obstacle and worked for his downfall. To achieve this objective Libya enhanced its ties with Ethiopia and Uganda²⁴.

The shift in US' support to SPLM/A in 1989 following the overthrow of el-Mahdi's government by Islamic-backed junta led to change in Libya's position in the conflict. Libya found in the new Sudanese regime an important ally in its confrontation with US. In 1990, Bashir and Gaddafi signed a declaration calling for alliance between Libya and Sudan²⁵. This enabled Sudan to get free or subsidize oil from Libya and Iran. Despite the cooperation, Libya remained ideologically opposed to Sudan and Iran's fundamentalist orientations. The only bond between Libya and the two countries was mutual hatred to the US. The relations between the two countries deteriorated rapidly that by 1993 shipment of subsidized oil ceased. The fear of Islamic extremism prevented Libya from fully embracing the NIF and encouraged its continued support for the SPLA.

Just like Egypt, Libya supported the unity of Sudan under Arab leadership and never envisioned the ascendancy of a non-Arab regime in Khartoum. It supported the SPLA to the extent that it weakened the NIF but not strong enough to ascend to power. Together with Egypt, Libya strongly supported the unity of Sudan and was instrumental in launching LEI. The signing of the

²⁴ see Chazan Naomi, Lewis Peter, Mortimer Robert, Rothchild Donald & Stedman John (eds) *Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa*, Lynne Rienner publishers, Colorado, 1999, p.369

²⁵ See, Donald Peterson, *Inside Sudan, Political Islam, Conflict and Catastrophe*, Westview Press, Colorado, 1999. p 41.

Machakos Protocol caused concerns in Egypt and Libya prompting President Bashir to personally contact Gaddafi and Mubarak²⁶.

Other Middle Eastern involvement

In addition to Libya and Egypt, several Middle Eastern and Muslim states were drawn in the conflict through their support to the parties particularly the Sudanese government. The strong perception in many Middle East countries that the conflict was a proxy war by US and Israel against Arabs and Islam stirred public opinion into supporting the Sudanese government. The active involvement of Uganda, Eritrea and Ethiopia in the conflict raised concerns in the Middle East pushing governments to support Sudan government's cause. The three countries were accused of being used by Israel to push Zionist interests by staging a conspiracy against the unity of the Sudan.²⁷

Among the Middle East states, the involvement of Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia in the conflict stands out. Saudi Arabia prompted by religious considerations and concerns for Sudan's unity provided financial assistance to the Sudanese government. Iran and Iraq provided military and logistical support to the Sudanese government with the aim of countering US and perceived Israeli support for SPLM/A. Specifically, Iran provided Sudan with military, logistical and training support to the Popular Defence Forces or the *Mujahidden*. High-level contacts between Sudan and Iran took place throughout much of the 1990s

²⁶ See, Kamau John, *Sudan Talks: Why Sudan is unhappy*, *Daily Nation*, 21st August 2002, p.9.

²⁷ See, Phares Walid, *The Sudanese Battle for American Opinion*, *The Middle East Quarterly*, March 1998 op cit .p.8.

culminating in the high profile visit by Iranian President Hashemi Rafasanjani to Sudan in September 1992 where he called for Pan-Islamic Jihad to defend Sudan.²⁸ Iran was also instrumental in guaranteeing credit to Khartoum government for the purchase of Chinese arms while Iraq, isolated in the Arab world following its invasion of Kuwait, found in Sudan an important ally. To Sudan, Iraq was a foremost friend among the radical regimes in the Middle East. Iraqi state owned media frequently accused the US of attempting to fragment Sudan and called for unified stance to protect the Arab identity of the country²⁹. The Gulf war and its aftermath effects however undermined any substantial Iraqi military and economic assistance to the Sudanese government.

Despite the cooperation between Iran, Iraq and Sudan, there were deep differences and its continuity was linked to the threat posed by the US. Iran and Iraq remained enemies over unresolved issues of the 1980-88 Gulf war. Sudan and Iran while espousing extremist and fundamentalist tendencies had different Islamic orientations, Sunni and Shiite respectively.

Western countries intervention in Sudan conflict

Many western countries among them the US were involved in the Sudan conflict in support of either the Sudanese government or SPLM/A or in conflict resolution. The west's involvement in the Sudan conflict was influenced by many considerations key among them economic opportunities particularly oil and humanitarian concerns.

²⁸ Ibid

²⁹ See, Foreign Media Reaction Daily Digest, *US Information Office, 2nd March 1997*

United States engagement in Sudan conflict

Gambari³⁰ opined that US intervention interventions in Africa ranged from geo-strategic to humanitarian considerations. In the earlier phase, the US considered African conflicts from the perspective of the cold war and the need to forestall Soviet expansion in Africa. The United States was very much involved in the Sudan conflict having initially supported the Sudanese government because of SPLM/A's connections with Ethiopia, which was a key ally of Soviets in the Horn of Africa. The US however shifted its support from Khartoum following the overthrow of al-Mahdi's democratically government in 1989 by NIF. Although Sudan was far from presenting a major item on Washington's foreign policy agenda, when NIF came to power in 1989 with strong Islamic stance, it proved destructive to US-Sudanese relations. Patey³¹ opines that Sudan's open door policy to Islamic militants including Osama bin Laden, support to Iraq, links to attempts to bomb the World Trade Centre and attempted assassination against President Mubarak placed Sudan on US lists of states sponsoring terrorism and US/UN regime. From 1990 the US implemented several economic and diplomatic measures to weaken the Khartoum government. The measures included the designation of Sudan as state sponsor of terrorism 1993, formation of an anti-Sudan coalition in the Horn of Africa 1995, supporting UN economic

³⁰ see Gambari Ibrahim A, *The Role of Foreign Intervention in African Reconstruction* in Zartman I.W (ed) *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restorations of Legitimate Authority*, Lynne Publishers, London . 1995, p 224

³¹ see Patey Luke Anthony, *States Rule: Oil Companies and armed conflict in Sudan*, *Third World Quarterly*, Vol.28, No 5, 2007 pp 997-1016.

sanctions (1996) and imposing bilateral sanctions in 1997³². These measures coincided with the emergence in the US of a strong constituency, which advocated the overthrow of Sudan's Islamic government. By late 1990s US policy in Sudan had gone from reactionary to coercive. The NIF misadventures prompted Clinton to impose sanctions in 1997, support Sudan's regional enemies in an effort to bolster SPLA/s position in hopes of regime change. Following the election of George W Bush in 2000, Sudan assumed new importance in Bush's foreign policy agenda given the interests of conservative Christian republicans and the Black Congressional Caucus in seeing the end of the conflict.

The US – SPLM/A ties improved further in 1990s following the latter's granting of humanitarian access in areas under its control³³. By 1997, the relations had improved significantly that Secretary of State Madeline Albright met the Dr Garang in Kampala and expressed support for SPLM/A. A similar meeting took place in 1999 between Albright, SPLM/A and the NDA leaderships in which resulted in further US support. To underlie US' commitment for the south's cause, the Congress with the backing of the religious lobby approved direct assistance to opposition forces and SPLM/A. Two legislations targeting the Sudanese government were also enacted within a span of two years through the sponsorship of Christian right lawmakers and the Black Congressional Caucus. The Brownback Amendment on Foreign Operation and Export Financing and

³² See, Mirak-Weissbach Muriel, Is Sudan Bush Policy becoming a colonial grab for oil? *Executive Intelligence Review*, March 30, 2001, pp 64-66

³³ See, United States 'Humanitarian Diplomacy' Policy in South Sudan, The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance, Severine Autesserre, Jan 2002 pp 1-18, <http://www.iha.ac/articles/ao85.html>

Related Programs Appropriations Act 2000 and the Sudan Peace Act of January 2001 were enacted. The Brownback Amendment authorized the US President to provide direct food aid to SPLA while the Sudan Peace Act allowed for the provision of non-lethal aid to rebels. Under the Act, rebel-held areas were to receive US\$ 100m spread over a period of three years³⁴. The enactment of the two Acts indicated the rise of a strong constituency in the US committed to the resolution of Sudan conflict. The same group campaigned to block relief aid to the Sudanese government. The two legislations and the emergence of a strong anti-Khartoum lobby made SPLM/A to believe that it had US support and hence became an impediment to peace.

Despite US support for SPLM/A its Sudan policy was torn between conflicting economic, political and geo-strategic imperatives. Its food aid to the rebels was aimed at counteracting Khartoum's strategy to starve the south into submission and assisted the rebels win domestic and international legitimacy³⁵. For many years the US supplied money and arms to Garang³⁶. The US' backing of SPLM/A was however not open or strong enough to enable win the war.

The pro-SPLM/A stance of the US government was not without opposition. There were several economic, strategic and diplomatic constraints. US Gum Arabic and oil companies had interests in Sudan and were opposed to the bilateral and UN sanctions and lobbied successfully for exemption to import the commodity. Several American states also had stakes in oil exploitation in Sudan

³⁴ See, Self-determination, conflict profile, Sudan Foreign Policy in Focus, <http://fpif.org/self-determination/conflicts/sudan>

³⁵ Ibid

³⁶ See Mulaa John, *Oil key to US peace initiatives in Africa*, Sunday Standard, 25th August 2002, p.19.

through investments in Talisman and were opposed to bilateral sanctions on Sudan. Even the Congress was not unanimous in its support for sanctions and some viewed the sanctions as giving China a freehand in Sudan. Engdahi³⁷ argues that competition between US and China in Sudan revolved on oil, which the two countries were eager to control. The Sudan government was also not without support in the US. Louis Farrakhan and his movement, Nation of Islam defended Khartoum claiming allegations against Sudan were part of a concerted Zionist campaign against an African country³⁸.

European Union involvement in Sudan

The European Union unlike the US kept a low profile in the Sudan conflict and generally favoured engagement with both sides as a means of ending the conflict. Throughout much of 1980 and early 1990s, the only visibly involvement of Europe in Sudan was in development activities spearheaded by the European Commission (EC) which were suspended in the aftermath of Bashir's coup and subsequent establishment of Islamic government. In 1999, EU started political dialogue with Khartoum with the aim of improving human rights but stood clear of direct involvement in the conflict. While it avoided being closely involved in the conflict itself, it was compelled by its humanitarian activities to take sides against the SPLM/A and to an extent the US³⁹. It withdrew from SPLA-held areas when the latter attempted to force NGOs operating in areas under its control to sign MOUs on humanitarian relief.

³⁷ See, Engdahi William F. *The Oil Factor in Bush's War on Tyranny*, Asian Times, 3rd March 2005

³⁸ See, Phares Walid, *The Sudanese Battle for American Opinion*, The Middle East Quarterly, opcit .p.8.

³⁹ See, Sebastien Loisel, *European Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Policies in African Regional Conflicts*, Paper presented on European Foreign Policy Conference, London School of Economics and Political Sciences, 2nd to 3rd July 2004, sebastien. Loisel. @ sciences-po-org.

Some European states however took sides in the conflict due to divergent interests. Britain and Norway took a position similar to that of the US while France backed the Sudanese government. In contrast to active role of the US in the conflict and the lowly engagement by the EU, humanitarian considerations defined Canada's involvement in the Sudan conflict and entailed minimal engagement with the Sudanese government. Canada supported the UNSC Resolution 1054 of 1996 calling on member states to limit diplomatic links with Sudan. As a member of IPF, Canada was a key supporter of IGAD peace process to resolve Sudan conflict. Talisman's engagement in the exploitation of oil in Sudan however created suspicion that Canada was abating the conflict with Inter-Church coalition on Africa accusing it of corporate complicity. The accusation forced the Foreign Minister, Lloyd Axworthy to appoint John Hacker to look into Talisman's adherence to international code of Ethics for Canadian Business⁴⁰.

Asian connection in Sudan conflict

The main difference between the first and the second conflicts in Sudan was the strong Asian factor in the latter. Asian countries became increasingly involved in the Sudan from mid 1990s due to economic interests specifically oil, which entangled them in the north-south conflict. The acquisition of stakes in the Greater Nile Operating Company by Chinese, Malaysian and later Indian government-owned oil companies drew these countries into the conflict. China's

⁴⁰ See Inter-Church Coalition on Africa, *Canada Encouraging Corporate Immunity in Sudan*, ICCF Media Release March 2, 2000, [http://WWW.Web.net/ICCF/human rights/Sudan into/media marker html](http://WWW.Web.net/ICCF/human%20rights/Sudan%20into/media%20marker.html)

strong interest in Sudan's oil was informed by the fact that Sudan accounts for 5% of all its oil imports. China developed a close political, economic and military relationship with Khartoum by investing in various economic sectors in Sudan oil industry, providing soft loans and giving greater access to military arms. China also frustrated and stalled western efforts at UN Security Council to apply economic and political sanctions against Khartoum. It invested \$2 billion in Sudan ignoring US sanctions and divestment campaign by NGOs making it the largest foreign investor. Chinese investments funded arms imports and the local arms industry, which was based on Chinese technology⁴¹. China's National Petroleum Corporation holds 40% in GNPC⁴². Sudan's oil was extracted, transported, refined and consumed by China in exchange of hard currency, which Khartoum needed to finance arms purchases mainly from China. China came to be Sudan's largest supplier of arms to protect Chinese oil interests in Sudan⁴³.

Malaysia was a key financier of Sudan's arms purchases from China in exchange of oil. In 1999, Malaysia helped Sudan underwrite US\$200m worth of arms owed to China in exchange of oil⁴⁴. It should also be noted that the first consignment of Sudanese crude oil destined for Malaysia coincided with arms deliveries from Poland, China and Russia. The acquisition by Indian state-owned subsidiary, Oil and Natural Gas Corporation of Talisman's stake in GNOPC for US

⁴¹ See Ben Schiller, *The China Model of Development*, *Ethical Corporation Magazine*, December 2005

⁴² See Eisenman Joshua & Rogn Joshua, *China must play by the rules in oil rich*, *The Straits Times*, 21st July 2003, <http://straitstimes.asia/sg/commentary/story/u4386200688.00html>.

⁴³ See Eisenman Joshua & Rogn Joshua, *China must play by the rules in oil rich*, *The Straits Times*, 21st July 2003, <http://straitstimes.asia/sg/commentary/story/u4386200688.00html>.

⁴⁴ See Christian Aid, *The scorched Earth: Oil and War in Sudan*, Aid Media Report March 2001, p 20.

\$ 758m brought India into the Sudan conflict⁴⁵. Russia was also actively involved in the conflict as it was among the main suppliers of arms to the Sudanese government. One of its companies, Slavfnet was awarded oil concessions in central south Sudan.

3.3 The involvement of Multinational oil companies in the Sudan conflict

One of the underlying causes in Sudan's first civil conflict was the struggle over resources. It was however the entry of foreign oil companies into the Sudan and southern Sudan in particular that the conflict between the north and the south became clearly a struggle over resources. The history of foreign oil companies in Sudan can be traced to 1959 when Agip of Italy secured concessions in the Red Sea area to explore oil. It was however the exploration of oil and subsequent discovery in the south that fueled and sustained the conflict. This involvement by foreign oil companies in the south can be categorized in two phases, 1977 –1984 and 1999 to date. The first phase associated with Chevron's discovery of oil in Upper Nile began in 1977 and lasted up to 1984. Exploration and exploitation of oil was dominated mainly by two foreign oil companies, Chevron of the US and Total Oil of France. The second phase began in 1999 with the entry of Chinese and Asian oil companies into Sudan.

⁴⁵ See Coalition for International Justice, *Soil and Water: Dirty Business in Sudan*, opcit, p. 23.

The discovery of oil in Upper Nile opened a new chapter in the north - South conflict. It added to the growing list of factors that hastened the slide to conflict as the central government and the Regional government in the south disagreed on sharing the new resource as each was intent on monopolizing. Numeiri's abrogation of the Addis Ababa Agreement and subsequent introduction of Sharia was part of the strategies to control the oil. The competition that ensued between the central and the Southern governments spill out into the operations of Chevron and Total oil. For instance, during Chevron's presence in the Sudan (1977 – 1984), its relations with the central government and the regional government revealed, a conflict between a profit-motivated multinational, a central government desirous to control oil revenue and a regional government intent on securing local benefits. The situation dictated that where disputes between the central government and the Regional government arose, Chevron had to take sides⁴⁶. Chevron always sided with the central government and hence creating enmity with southern Sudanese. To many southerners Chevron was an ally of a repressive government in the north⁴⁷. In 1984, Chevron's installations were attacked by SPLA leading to suspension of operations. Chevron's stance contrasted with Total Oil's, which maintained contact with the South's Regional Government even when under threat from Khartoum.

⁴⁶ Ibid

⁴⁷ Patey Luke Anthony, States Rules: Oil companies and armed conflict in Sudan, *Third World Quarterly*, 1st July 2007, pp997-1016.

From 1984 to 1997, foreign oil companies shunned Sudan because of risks posed by rebels to the oil fields of Upper Nile. However, taking advantage of divisions within rebel movement, the Sudanese government was able to recapture the strategic oil regions of western upper Nile and in 1997 it formed Greater Nile Petroleum Operation (GNPOC) to exploit oil in the concessions previously held by Chevron. Four oil companies, China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), Talisman Energy, Petronas and Sudapet acquired stakes in GNPOC marking the return of foreign oil companies into Sudan. CNPC and Petronas acquired 40% and 30% stake in GNPOC while Talisman and Sudapet had 25% and 5% respectively⁴⁸. This marked the second phase of involvement in Sudan by foreign oil companies.

This phase was characterized by strong involvement of state-owned Asian oil companies and private investment from the west with little or no American presence. The companies in the GNOPC consortium held concessions in several exploration blocs in the southern Sudan. Other than majority stakes in Heglig and Unity, CNPC held significant shares in eastern Upper Nile while Petronas had 28.5% in Block 5A, in an international consortium whose major share holding was Lundin Oil Ab of Sweden⁴⁹. The entry of these companies into the Sudan triggered interests of other foreign companies mainly from Western Europe and the Gulf. By 2000, Lundin of Sweden, OMV of Austria, Total Fina Elf, Gulf Oil Corporation (Qatar) and Slavfnet of Russia and Royal Dutch were involved

⁴⁸ See, Oil firms facing heat from Rights Groups, 22nd March 2001, <http://sudan.net/news/posted/1853.html>.

⁴⁹ See, Yunus Kamarul, *Petronas and Partners strike oil in Sudan's Thar Jath Side*, Business Times (Malaysia) March 19,2001 <http://www.sudan.net/news>

directly in oil exploitation in Sudan. Other foreign companies that participated though indirectly included British Petroleum, Roll Royce and Glasgow-based Weir Group. The two companies provide engines and pumps for the 1600km oil pipeline⁵⁰.

Consequences of foreign oil companies involvement

Most of the operational oilfields and concessions were situated in south particularly the Upper Nile while others straddle the north-south borderline, which happens, to be the epicentres of the conflict. Exploitation of oil in these zones entangled foreign companies in the conflict and transforming them into key actors. Hursh⁵¹ has observed that the conflict in Sudan could have ended earlier were it not for oil revenues generated by foreign oil companies. The commencement of oil exports in 1999 gave the Sudanese government a sense of confidence and tendency to favour military solution to the conflict.

International interests on Sudanese oil compounded the situation. Several companies became Sudan's partners in crime as they provided the market and therefore the finances needed for Sudanese government to continue with war. The oil revenue generated through the assistance of foreign companies enabled the government to undertake massive military modernization and acquisition of advance weapons Eastern Europe and China. From 1999 Khartoum undertook aggressive re-armament programme. In 2002 for instance, Sudan signed a US \$

⁵⁰ see. Coalition for International Justice, *Soil and Water: Dirty Business in Sudan*, op cit p. 20

⁵¹ See. Hursh Holly, *Oil fuelling the war in Sudan: Talisman energy role in Sudanese genocide*. International Christian Concern, Washington DC, 2002.

400m agreement with Russia for the supply of MiG-29 and several advanced helicopter gunship to the Sudan Armed Forces. The purchases were financed from foreign oil sales. Chinese arms sales to Sudan increased significantly following the commencement of oil exports. Since 2000 Sudanese Air Force has acquired US \$ 100m worth of Shenyang jet fighters, doubling the combat size of the air force⁵². Oil revenue generated through foreign oil companies enabled Sudanese government to increase its military expenditure from US\$ 162 in 1998 to US\$ 327m in 2000⁵³. From 1999 when the oil exports began to 2000, the Sudanese government was able to establish several military industries among them Military Manufacturing Complex and GIAD to produce heavy weapons⁵⁴.

The role of foreign oil companies in the Sudan conflict has been a controversial issue. The stance of Sudanese government and the oil companies were more less the same and centred benefits with Talisman Energy insisting that remaining in Sudan was moral. This position contrasted with that of Human rights and church groups, which saw foreign oil firms as fuelling the conflict by funding the government's war effort. Gerhart Baum, the UN Commission on Human Rights Investigator on Sudan articulated this position observing that exploitation of Sudan's oil reserves had led to worsening of the conflict, turning the conflict into a war for oil⁵⁵. Despite the debate, there is no doubt that the entry of foreign oil companies into the Sudan was a key factor perpetuating the

⁵² See, Charles R. Smith – Russian MiG in Sudan Jan 4 2002

⁵³ See, Christian Aid, *The scorched Earth: Oil and War in Sudan*, Opcit p.

⁵⁴ Ibid

⁵⁵ See, Arieff I, *Sudan Civil war Becoming war over Oil- UN*, Reuters October 10th October 2001 p.1

<http://www.iabolish.com>.

conflict by making the parties to the conflict more belligerent. As stated earlier, the discovery of oil re-shaped the capabilities and incentives of key actors in the conflict by creating new structures of profit, power and political control.

3.4 The involvement of NGOs in the Sudan conflict

Though NGOs involvement in Sudan to mitigate the effects conflict may have started in 1983, it was however not until the 1988-1989 war-induced famine which killed several hundred thousands mainly in the south that their presence increased significantly. The horrendous consequence of the famine triggered international response with the UN being on the spotlight for failing to act fast. In 1989 the UN, Sudanese government and the SPLM/A signed a tripartite agreement allowing access to UN –led consortium of NGOs operating under the umbrella Operation Lifeline Sudan to rebel and government- controlled areas in southern Sudan. Since then OLS has been synonymous with NGO activity in Sudan. The OLS was made up of five UN agencies and 41 international and local NGOs making it one of the largest UN-led relief operations in the world. By 2002, the OLS-NGOs were providing assistance to 2.5 million people in southern Sudan with annual budget of US \$ 50 m. Some of the OLS- NGOs were also members of Nairobi-based NGO Forum and Washington- based Sudan working Group⁵⁶. The NGOs working under the umbrella of OLS have been instrumental in providing relief food to millions of internally displaced persons.

⁵⁶ See International Crisis Group, *Ending starvation as a weapon of war in Sudan*, Africa Report No.54 ICG Press, 14th November 2002, p.16

The other category of NGOs providing humanitarian relief was the non-OLS NGOs. These NGOs operated outside the OLS Codes stipulated in the tripartite agreement. The NGOs in this category included International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Norwegian People's Aid, Christian Aid and Concern. The activities of these NGOs were concentrated mainly in the rebel-held areas where they at times ignored government veto power on access flights. The GOS frequently accused these NGOs of supporting the SPLA.

The operations of these NGOs were susceptible to manipulation by both the GOS and rebels. The GOS frequently interfered with OLS humanitarian and relief programs both the north and the south as it view activities as undermining it. Relations between conflict parties and the OLS NGOs were sometimes characterized by mistrust. The World Vision (US) was declared persona non-grata by the GOS in 1988, forcing it to concentrate activities in rebel-held south⁵⁷

As in the case of other external actors, the influence of NGOs in the conflict increased with decline of power of the Sudanese state. Their activities have centred mainly on the provision of humanitarian and relief assistance to both government and rebel-held territories. Norwegian People's Aid was sympathetic to the southern cause. Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association were in charge of coordination of NGOs relief activities in the SPLA-held areas.

⁵⁷ See Kate Almqvist's testimony on *The Prohibition on Financial Transactions with countries supporting Terrorism Act 1997*, US congressional sub-committee on Crime House committee on the Judiciary June 10 1999

The Sudanese government and rebels viewed NGOs aid resources as economic wealth and political power, which should be controlled to increase resources to perpetuate the conflict.

3.5 The engagement of Inter-Governmental Agencies

The role of inter-governmental agencies more often mirrored that of member states. The IGAD and Arab League are the two agencies that played critical role in the Sudan conflict. The two agencies particularly IGAD were involved in conflict resolution efforts. Despite their mediation roles, these agencies took sides in the conflict. For instance IGAD appeared to be partisan towards the SPLM/A as indicated by the positions taken by most of the member states. The same was the case with Arab League, which supported the Sudanese government position. The alignment of these agencies in the conflict indicated the position of the dominant state or group of states.

3.6 The involvement of Religious organizations

The religious factor in the conflict inevitably brought into play external religious actors. Other than the presence of numerous religious-based NGOs, many Christian and Islamic charities were involved in the conflict. Their alignment in the conflict was as distinctively divided as the conflict. Almost all Christian charities supported the SPLM/A directly or indirectly while the same was the case with Islamic agencies. Islamic fighters *Mujahideen* mainly from the Middle East some including Afghan war veterans fought alongside the Sudanese

government forces. They were also instrumental in giving inspiration to PDF and transforming the conflict into a *Jihad* or holy war. The Christian charities identified with the southern cause and gave the southerners including SPLM/A material and monetary support.

4.7 Conclusion

The large number of external third party actors in the Sudan conflict indicates the complex and conflicting array of interests. As seen above the third party interests transformed the conflict by bringing in new issues into the conflict. This situation raises the fundamental question of inquiry as to whether external actor involvement in Sudan may have made the conflict more intractable or no. This will be the question, which the next chapter will attempt to answer.

4.0 Chapter Four

The Role of external actors in Conflict: A Critical Analysis

4.1 Introduction

The preceding three chapters discussed the background of the study, issues underlying the Sudan conflict (1983-2004), conflict resolution efforts and external actors' involvement respectively. Chapter one set the broad objective that the study intends to achieve, the role of external actors in Africa's internal conflicts with the case study of the Sudan conflict. Specifically, it set to look into the interests or motives behind external actors' involvement in internal conflict.

Chapter two discussed the underlying issues behind the 1983 — 2004 conflict in Sudan and subsequent internal and external efforts toward its resolution. In the chapter it became apparent that there was strong links between the 1956 to 1972 conflict and the 1983 to 2004 conflict. It also emerged that due to the external dimension of some of the issues underlying the conflict particularly oil and religion, the 1983 to 2004 conflict attracted numerous external actors.

Chapter three examined the involvement of external actors in the Sudan conflict and their interests. It identified economic, political, ideological, security and religious motives as the principal interests behind external actors' involvement in the 1983-2004 conflict in Sudan. It was further observed that external actor alignment in the conflict was never static but shifted according to interests.

This chapter seeks to undertake a critical analysis of the role of external actors in internal conflict with the aim of confirming the relevance and application of the selected theoretical framework, testing the hypothesis and validating the objectives. In doing so the following three issues will form the basis of the critical analysis: -

- Role of external actors' interests in the escalation of internal conflict,
- Role of external actors' interests in conflict resolution and
- The future of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement

4.2 The role of external actors interests in escalation of Internal Conflict

In chapter three it was observed that rarely are internal conflicts without external interferences. Zartman¹ observed that few internal wars are purely internal. Azar² argues along the same line and maintained that sources of contemporary conflicts lie as much outside the state as inside due to increasing interdependence. Modeleski³ assumes the same position and argues that no internal conflict is internal as every internal conflict invites international intervention. Just as there are internal factors that internationalize internal conflict, there are external factors that worsen the protracted nature of conflict. Cartzke and Gleditsch argues that third parties many intervene to shorten on-going conflict by increasing the likelihood of victory and settlement or try to

¹ See Deng Francis Mading, *Negotiating a Hidden Agenda: Sudan's Conflict of Identities* in Zartman William (ed), *Elusive Peace. Negotiating an end to civil wars*. Brookings Institution, Washington DC, 1995 PP77-102

² See Azar Edward cited in Lind Jeremy & Sturman Kathryn (eds), *Scarcity and Surfeit, The Ecology of African Conflicts*. Institute of Security Studies, Pretoria p.27

³ See Modeleski cited in Richard Jackson, *Violent Internal Conflicts and the African states: Towards a Framework Analysis*, Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 20th Jan 2002, pp 1-16

intervene to balance or promote outcome or settlement that are favourable to one of the parties⁴.

The entry of external actors into a situation of internal conflict gives it an external dimension and introduces new issues that escalate the conflict. For instance, as argued by Gleditsch⁵ the linkages between states actors affect the conduct of internal conflict owing to spillover and contagion effects. Many civil conflicts become internationalized through direct intervention by neighbouring states. The consequence is that conflict in one state can induce spillover effects and alter the prospects of violent conflict in other states. This scenario was the case in the Sudan conflict. It attracted multiple state and non-state actors, which brought with them complex and divergent interests. At state-actor level, basically most of Sudan's neighbours both IGAD member states and Arab states specially Egypt and Libya were entangled the conflict. At the global level, United States, China, Russia, European Union, Malaysia and India were key players in the conflict. On the non-state actor level, several multi-national oil companies, NGOs and INGOs were and continue to be crucial players in the conflict. Intractability and escalation of the conflict due to competing external actors' interests confirm the research hypothesis that the involvement of external actors led to escalation of the conflict. Strengthening further the hypothesis is the fact that external actors have been critical in sustaining the conflict. But before arriving at this conclusion, examining external actors' interests is crucial to testing the above

⁴ See Gleditsch Kristian Skrede, *Transnational Dimensions of Civil War*, 22nd March 2002 <http://www.duke.edu/ugelpi/transnational>

⁵ Ibid

assertion. As discussed earlier in this chapter there were several motives behind external actors' involvement in the Sudan conflict. A look into some of these external actors' interests is critical to this study.

The oil interest in Sudan conflict

In chapter two the control of resources mainly found in southern Sudan was identified as a key factor in the conflict. The struggle for the control and exploitation of resources particularly oil and the Nile waters⁶ was at the centre of the conflict. Unlike the first conflict access to water contributed immensely to this phase of conflict⁷. But it was however the contest for the control of oil that fuelled and sustained the conflict the most. According to Lewis⁸ continued instability in the Middle East led to consistent rise in international oil prices forcing oil companies to explore deposits in areas hitherto considered inaccessible and marginal. This shift in focus for new oil sources transformed Sudan from a net importer of oil to an emerging exporter. It brought into the conflict new external issues that complicated the conflict and contributed to its intractability and escalation.

Several countries invested in Sudan's oil with China and Russia being the leading. The two countries invested heavily in Sudan's oil industry through extensive exploration and investment in oil infrastructure⁹. Investment in Sudan's

⁶ See Lind Jeremy & Sturman Kathryn (eds) *Scarcity and Surfeit, The Ecology of African conflicts*, opcit p.187

⁷ See *Oil will inexorably feature both as an obstacle and opportunity to achieve peace*

⁸ See Lewis Scott, *Rejuvenating or Retraining Civil war, The Role of external Actors in War Economies of Sudan*, Bonn International Centre for Conversation, 2004, Paper 37, pp 1-45.

⁹ Ibid

oil was not confined to China and Russia but also included Canada, United Kingdom, Sweden, Austria and Malaysia. Foreign oil interests played a significant role in the overall conflict in the Sudan. As has been noted, whereas it is true that the conflict was on even before oil production resumed in 1998, it gave it further momentum by introducing new actors and interests. From 1997, the conflict intensified as the government undertook to secure areas around the oilfields of western Upper Nile for oil exploration and exploitation. The areas witnessed unprecedented military build-up by the belligerent parties especially the government forces supported by strong foreign actors. Oil exploration and exploitation was preceded by massive displacement of civilian populations. The connection between oil and Sudan's military modernization is direct¹⁰. The Sudanese government undertook aggressive modernization of its forces with the aim of securing more territory around areas with potential oil reserves for exploration and exploitation. Oil sales provided the Sudanese government with the tools to raise the level of intensity of fighting. Lewis¹¹ argued that the intensification and geographically focused conflict witnessed in late 1990s was linked to oil development driven by external interests of MNCs. Accordingly oil could not have played such a big role were it not for the assistance of external actors. Oil and war were mutually reinforcing. Oil revenue funded the Sudanese government military activities, which in turn used the new military hardware to secure oilfields so as to produce more oil and revenue. Through the collaboration

¹⁰ Ibid

¹¹ Ibid

of foreign oil companies led by Talisman, China National Petroleum Corporation and Petronas, Sudan's oil production reached 250000 bpd earning the government over US\$ 1 billion annually, which corresponded to its war expenditure.

China and Russia played a major role in assisting in the modernization of Sudanese military. They provided the Sudanese government with military equipment in return for oil concessions. China provided Sudan Armed Forces with military equipment including fighter aircraft while Russia apart from supplementing Chinese efforts was instrumental in making Sudan self sufficient in the production of medium- sized arms. The transfer of Russian arms technology to Sudan could not have been possible without foreign-driven proceeds from oil. The extraction of natural resources in conflict situation is bound to escalate the situation. Ballentine¹² and Nitzschke¹³ writing on the motives or incentives of external economic actors' participation in war economies argues that economic actors like MNCs seek to manipulate situation created by the conflict to advance their interests. This was the case in Sudan as foreign-aided extraction of oil fundamentally changed the character and intensification of Sudan's war.

Religious interests in the Sudan conflict

Islam was identified as one of the factors that sparked and sustained the conflict. As discussed in Chapter two, the introduction of *Sharia* in September

¹² See Ballentine Karen & Nitzschke Heiko, *The Political economy of civil war and conflict transformation*. Berghof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management. <http://www.bcrhof-handbook>

¹³ Ibid

1983 was one of the issues that drove the south into conflict with the north. Since then the contest over the status of Islam and *Sharia* within the Sudanese state remains one of the key factors in the conflict as both parties seeks to manipulate it to serve their interests. With Islam came the contest over the vision of the Sudanese state with north consistently trying to fashion the Sudanese state along Arab-Islamic vision while the south pursued an equally exclusive African vision.

By declaring the supremacy of Islam within the Sudanese state, the north hoped to use it to determine the hierarchy and distribution of resources. Religion was used to obscure legitimate political interests. Adar¹⁴ argues that the central locus of the conflict in Sudan is embedded in the concept of *Jus naturale* with socio-economic and econo-political rights of which the control of the state became a prerequisite. This in turn made the state the centre of contestation with divergent implications. The ruling elite in the north used the state as an instrument to control and promote their socio-economic and political interests. For their survival *Sharia* and its colloraries, Islamization and Arabization were adopted officially and unofficially as rallying points¹⁵. It was used as a source of strength and unity at home and a means of securing support from Muslim countries. It is worth noting that various Sudanese administrations used Jihad to mobilize against the south in a scheme, which engendered marginalization and oppression in the name of promoting *Sharia*. This created a wedge between

¹⁴ See Adar Korwa G. *Sudan: The Internal and External Contexts of Conflict and Conflict Resolution*. Centre for Documentation and Research, July 2000. WRITENET Paper No.06/2000. pp.1-31

¹⁵ Ibid

Muslims and non-Muslims leading to a clash between Muslim Sudanese nationalism and secular nationalism. Zartman¹⁶ has argued that the stronger the Islamic identity grew in the north, the stronger the African nationalism in the south became and differences became more irreconcilable. Garang¹⁷ shares same view and argued that the failure of the Sudanese people to reconcile themselves with their cultural and ethnic diversity is central to the conflict.

Whereas the internal dimension of religious interests was critical, there is no doubt that subsequent externalization contributed in worsening the situation. As in the case of oil, the effects of externalization of *Sharia* introduced external religious interests in to the conflict. It attracted various Islamic movements from the Middle East and the Arab world including the Muslim Brotherhoods to the side of Sudanese government. In the West and United States in particular, the effects of the conflict in the south attracted the sympathy of the Christian right, which perceived the conflict as persecution of their brethren. Some Christian charities and organizations in the west were instrumental in shaping or influencing their respective governments' policies in favour of SPLM/A and the southern Sudan cause in general.

Just like other non-state actors including the MNCs, religious groups played a central role in the Sudan conflict by influencing international and national opinions. In the United States and Europe, Christian groups particularly the Christian Right portrayed the conflict as between Christians and Muslims. The

¹⁶ See Zartman I W. *Collapsed States. The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority*. Lynne Rienner Publishers, London. 1995. p.240

¹⁷ See Garang John, *The Call for Democracy in Sudan*, Keagan Paul International, London, 1992, p.18

Geneva-based Christian Solidarity International organized field visits to southern Sudan in 1998 while Illinois-based Coalition for the Defence of Human Rights under Islam raised the issue of Southern Sudan within the context of protecting minorities in Muslim world. In the US, the evangelical Christians rallied their members by creating awareness of persecution of Christians in Southern Sudan. Muslim radicals in the Arab world and Iran blamed the west for the conflict in Sudan and sided with the Sudanese government. Some even participated in the war as they regarded it a religious duty to defend Islam. The involvement of the Christian Right and Muslim extremists brought into fore competing religious interests in the Sudan conflict. This situation added to the competing external actors' interests, which in turn led to the escalation of the conflict

Unlike oil, Sharia proved more contentious and complex as each party with the support of external actors struggle to control the state to the total exclusion and disregard of the other party. The north worked to maintain religious status quo created by the September laws while SPLM/A used it to galvanize support in the south against the Sudanese government by portraying it as marginalizing. As was seen in chapter two, the contentious nature of *Sharia* can be seen in its divisiveness even within the northern political elites and parties. None of the key politicians or main political parties in the north was ready to abrogate the September Laws. This explains why the various peace initiatives including the Koka Dam conference failed to resolve the conflict.

Human rights groups like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch also mobilized and re-directed opinion to the conflict in Sudan. Some of the activities of these organizations at times escalated the conflict due to their biasness. For instance, most of the reports of Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch blamed the Sudanese government for human rights violations and appeared to absolve SPLM/A. Closely associated with the contest over religious orientation of the Sudanese state was an equally divisive struggle over the identity of the country. Two competing and antagonistic identities emerged in Sudan, an Arab-Islamic identity in the north and African identity in the south. This situation created an identity crisis and contradictions in Sudan that left a big fissure as the two sides competed for control and dominance of the Sudanese state. It fostered a relation between the north and the south characterized by mutual antagonism and exclusion. Deng¹⁸ maintains that as a result of the internal contradiction, the Sudanese state was pulled in two directions as attempts to balance the interests of the two competing identities proved futile. The north and its ruling elite who controlled the Sudanese state were overly determined to move the country along Arab-Islamic path and looked to the Middle East and Muslim world for support. In contrast, the south viewed the Sudan as an African country whose destiny lies within the continent

¹⁸ See Deng Francis Mading. *What is not said is what divides us* in Ahmed Abdelghaffar M & Sorbo Gunner (eds) *Management of the Crisis in Sudan*, Centre for Development Studies, Proceedings of the Bergen Forum 32-24 February 1989, Forskningsdokumentasjon ved Universitetsbiblioteket i Bergen

In conclusion the struggle for the control and exploitation of resources mainly oil and the introduction of *Sharia* gave the second conflict additional issues to sustain it. Oil and *Sharia* not only internationalized the Sudan conflict by bringing in external economic and religious actors, it made it more protracted. Oil became an element of Khartoum's external partnerships with states of Corporations¹⁹. Oil added to the parties' intransigence while *Sharia* provided further stimulus to sustain the conflict. The numerous external actors and multiplicity of interests accompanying their involvement in the conflict worsened the situation. It made what was already complex more complex. This situation can effectively be explained by the pluralism theory.

4.3 External actors' interests in conflict resolution

The role of external actors was not confined to the actual war but cut across the whole conflict spectrum including conflict resolution. Adar²⁰ argues that the situation in Sudan as in other conflict prone areas in Africa acquired inter-locking regional, continental, and global dimension, which complicated conflict resolution efforts. As stated above external actors had interests in the conflict and its outcome. The moment the strategy shifted from armed conflict-to-conflict resolution, external actors' interests also shifted. The strategy was to secure what they failed to achieve through their support of the parties to the conflict by influencing the outcome conflict resolution.

¹⁹ See Waish Declan, *If oil is Africa's, money and management is China's Khartoum Refinery (CNPL) first outside China, Sudan at the Head of Global sweep to mop up world's oil resources*, Guardian, November 9 2005

²⁰ See Adar Korwa G, *A state under siege: The Internalization of the Sudanese Conflict*, African Security Review, Vol.7.No.1, 1998, pp43-44

As it has become clear, internal conflict creates international linkages as parties to conflict seek to strengthen their positions by building external networks of support. Whatever the actor, the overriding objective of involvement in conflict is the promotion or articulation of self-interest. This creates a convergence of convenience of internal actors' interests and those of external actors. Adar²¹ argues that internal policy perspectives pursued by belligerent parties are made more complex by involvement of external actors. Supporting this view, Azar²² and Brown²³ argues that the attitude of neighbouring states to conflict is never neutral as they are likely to be involved in one way or another. The foregoing strengthens the hypothesis that external actors lead to escalation or conflagration of internal conflict.

For the full impact of external actors' interests in the resolution of the Sudan conflict, one needs to look into the role they played in the various conflict resolution efforts. The conflict in southern Sudan ended in 2005 with the signing of the CPA between the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A²⁴. This landmark agreement was however preceded by several other internal and external mediation efforts or initiatives by individual or group of external actors with vested interests and agendas in the conflict. Mwangi²⁵ argues that every actor involved in conflict has certain interests, which it seeks to protect. These

²¹ See Adar Korwa G, *The Internal and External Contexts of Conflict and Conflict Resolution*, opcit pp1-31

²² See Lind Jeremy & Sturman Kathryn (eds), *Scarcity and Surfeit. The Ecology of African Conflicts*, opcit p.27

²³ Ibid

²⁴ See, *Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of Sudan (GOS) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLM/SPLA)* 9th January 2005

²⁵ See Mwangi. M (ed), *African Regional Security in the Age of Globalization*, Heinrich Boll Foundation, Nairobi. 2004. p.16.

initiatives were thus more of a product of compromise of divergent external actors' interests than genuine interests of the primary parties to the conflict. External actors were determined to achieve the goals, which they failed to secure in the conflict by pushing them into the negotiations. As in the conflict, the entanglement of external actor interests in the negotiations undermined the underlying issues and made negotiations more protracted.

In the case of the Sudan conflict, complex and competing interests of external actors mired resolution efforts. The interests of states, nongovernmental organizations, humanitarian agencies, religious and human rights groups slowed-down conflict resolution efforts. As the number of external actors involved in the negotiations increased, the more complex and protracted the process became. As discussed earlier in this chapter the involvement of Sudan's neighbours in the conflict gave it a regional dimension by introducing divergent interests, which were subsequently transferred to the negotiations. To understand the impact of external actors' interests in the resolution of the Sudan conflict, one has to appreciate the number, complexity and the protracted nature of the various initiatives both internal and external. In all, there were many internal and external conflict resolution initiatives of which the most prominent were the Abuja talks (1992-1993), IGAD Peace process (1994-2005), and Libyan-Egyptian Initiative (2002).

Whereas these efforts were predicated on the need to resolve the conflict, which had killed over 2million people, the interests of the countries or

actors behind them were paramount. Ethiopia, Eritrea, Uganda and Kenya, Sudan's neighbours to the east and south respectively supported IGAD framework. These countries viewed Sudan particularly under NIF as a security threat due to its support for opposition elements. Prendergast²⁶ commenting on the IGAD peace process has asserted that the war was consistently supported and fuelled by interventions of the same neighbouring states that were now pushing for peace. Efforts by IGAD to mediate in the conflict were however not only undermined by the belligerent positions of the government of Sudan and the rebels but by competing interests of external actor's particularly Egypt and Libya.

The two countries opposed the IGAD process and sided with Sudan notwithstanding their hostility to the Islamic fundamentalist character of the NIF regime. To counter the perceived threat posed by IGAD process to their interests, the two countries mooted the Libyan-Egyptian Joint initiative, whose gist was the preservation of the unity of Sudan. To Egypt, the unity of Sudan was paramount to its security interests on the Nile Waters. A disintegrated Sudan through secession or self-determination could have long-term negative effects on Egypt²⁷. This situation created competing interest or agendas of state and regional interests. At the regional states' level for instance, the historical competition and rivalry between Egypt and Ethiopia was played out in the

²⁶ See. Prendergast John, *Love Thy Neighbour. Regional Intervention in Sudan's civil war*. Harvard International Review, vol.26 (1) spring 2004. pp1-5

²⁷ Adar Korwa G, *The Internal and External contexts of conflict and conflict resolution*, opcit pp 1-31

negotiations. As witnessed in the conflict, the same behavior was replicated at the negotiations with most IGAD states supporting the SPLM/A while Arab states backed successive regimes in Khartoum. Most Arab states supported Libyan-Egyptian initiative while African countries backed IGAD framework. This undermined any effort to build consensus between Sudan's northern and southern neighbours leading to the emergence of parallel and competing initiatives. Even within IGAD or Arab League states there was lack of strong group consensus as each state was intent on promotion of self-interest.

The above situation was replicated at the international level where great power interests undermined conflict resolution efforts. It is now clear that most of the major world powers were entangled in the Sudan conflict motivated by the need to protect and promote their interests. China, Russia, Malaysia, western countries and several Gulf countries had interests in Sudan's oil industry and their companies, private and state-owned were engaged in oil exploration and exploitation. These countries feared losing their concessions in Sudan's burgeoning oil sector. These countries favoured the maintenance of status quo and were opposed to any process that failed to address or tended to undermine their oil interests. Realpolitik and national interests prevented or slowed down the realization of peace by undermining mediation efforts. Similarly, United States and Egypt's interests in Sudan were divergent despite the two countries being close allies in the Middle East. The United States supported IGAD Peace process, which Cairo saw as a threat to its strategic interests in Sudan. Even as

members of IPF, the US and Egypt pursued conflicting agendas. When it became apparently difficult to push its interests, Egypt joined Libya to form LEJI to counter IGAD initiative. Egypt supported LEJI to ensure the unity of Sudan and hence guaranteed its security interests in the Nile waters. Egypt even tried to secure Arab consensus on the future of Sudan by taking advantage of strong Arab perception of the conflict as one against Arabism and Arab-Muslim encroachment into Sub-Sahara Africa. Pro-Sudanese government sentiments were consistently high in Arab world even in countries whose governments were opposed to Khartoum's policies. Egypt even attempted unsuccessfully to link its support for US-led Middle East agenda to reciprocal gesture by Washington in Sudan.

In conclusion, antagonistic and divergent external actors' interests and agendas obscured real issues in the negotiation. The core issues in the conflict were relegated as external actors' interests took the centre stage. The consequence was lack of unified international effort hence propagation of competing peace initiatives. Competition between the IGAD peace process and Libyan-Egyptian Joint Initiative (LEJI) can be viewed within the context of competing initiatives reflecting competing state, regional and global interests' falls within the realm of the objective of the study.

4.4 Future of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement

The twenty one year old north-south conflict in Sudan nominally ended with the signing of the CPA by the Sudanese government and the SPLM/A on 9th

January 2005 in Nairobi. The CPA was a culmination of more than two and half years of negotiation between the SPLM/A and the National Congress Party (NCP)²⁸. The CPA comprises several accords, the Machakos Protocol of 20th July, 2002, Agreement on Security Arrangements signed on 20th September, 2003, the Protocol on the Resolution of the conflicts in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States, Protocol on the Resolution of the conflict in Abyei Area and the Protocol on Power Sharing, all signed on 31st December, 2004²⁹. It also contains two annexes on permanent cease-fire and implementation modalities of each separate agreement³⁰.

Rogier³¹ argues that the CPA brought to an end Africa's oldest civil conflict triggered by Khartoum's abrogation of the Addis Ababa agreement in 1983 but rooted in Arab elites' domination of the Sudanese state since independence in 1956. Natsios³² argues that by integrating groups that have been marginalized since independence in 1956, the CPA has the potential of bringing peace to the country, which has been in conflict for years.

Sustainability of the CPA

The sustainability of the CPA rests on its strengths, the goodwill of the parties and the support of the international community. Natsios³³ argues that

²⁸ See International Crisis Group: *Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement: The Long Road Ahead*. Africa Report No.106 31st March 2006. p.1

²⁹ See Rogier Emeric. *No More Hills, The Sudan's Tortuous Ascent to Heights of Peace*, Netherlands Institute of International Relations, August 2005, p.105

³⁰ Ibid

³¹ See Rogier Emeric. *Spoilers and Perils in post settlement Sudan. Moving beyond the North-South Paradigm: The CRU Policy Brief*. Netherlands Institute of International Relations. March 2005. pp1-4

³² See Natsios Andrew. *Implementing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan*. Yale Journal of International Affairs. Summer/Fall pp.89-97

³³ Ibid

there has been no shortage of peace initiatives in Sudan but what has been lacking is the will to sustain them. In evaluating CPA's sustainability, it is necessary to see the degree to which it addresses the root causes of the north-south conflict and replication to other similar situations in Sudan, its inclusiveness, mechanisms for implementation, institutional guarantees and external dimension.

The CPA was basically an agreement between the south and the north aimed at addressing decades of conflict between two antagonistic parts of Sudan. As far as the south is concerned, the CPA addresses most of the south's complaints and *raison de etre* for war. As stated in the preceding chapters, one of the main causes of the north-south conflict is the problem of marginalization of the south, which northern-dominated post-independence regimes perfected. The protocols on wealth sharing and power-sharing were designed to reduce north-south economic and political disparities, which were fundamental issues that sparked and sustained the conflict for not only twenty-one years but since independence. The two protocols are fundamental gains for the south. The CPA provides for an autonomous government of southern Sudan and referendum for self-determination after six and half years³⁴. Rogier³⁵ argues that the agreement constitutes a fair settlement of the conflict as it addresses the core grievances of southern Sudanese.

³⁴ See International Crisis Group. *Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement: The Long Road Ahead*. opcit p.3

³⁵ See Rogier Emeric. *Spoilers and Perils in post settlement Sudan. Moving beyond the North-South Paradigm*. opcit pp1-4

The CPA has strong in-built institutional guarantees to safeguard against unilateral abrogation. It institutionalizes during the interim period two separate armed forces, Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) for the north and the South respectively operating as equal components of Sudan's National Armed Forces. The two armies are supposed to be deployed to the north and south respectively of the 1st January 1956 north-south border. The concept of two armies enables the south to preserve a self-defence capacity and leverage to ensure implementation of the peace provisions³⁶. This is a marked departure from the 1972 Addis Ababa Accord, which integrated the Anya- Nya into northern-led national army, leaving the South without a deterrent. The provision for Joint Integrated Forces (JIUs) consisting of equal number of SAF and SPLA to be deployed in southern Sudan, the three conflict areas and Khartoum are symbols of unity depending on the outcome of the referendum. The JIUs will form the core of the national army should the referendum confirms unity.

Another critical element of the CPA is the issue of self-determination. The agreement gives the south an opportunity to exercise its right of self-determination in an internationally supervised referendum at the end of the six-year interim period. The south is supposed to either vote to remain in a united Sudan or secede and form a separate state. This gives the south an opportunity to determine its future, a principle it has always fought for. The referendum and

³⁶ See. Rogier Emeric, *No More Hills. The Sudan's Tortuous Ascent to Heights of Peace*, opcit p 121

separate armies are two major mutually reinforcing safeguards. The threat of secession in the referendum compels the GOS to abide by and implement its commitments and while the security deal, ensure that the outcome of the referendum will be respected. Rogier³⁷ argues that the south is insured against a new dishonoured agreement.

Within the security arrangement, there are several mechanisms to guide the implementation and sustainability of the agreement. There are multiple ceasefire provisions and monitoring structures among them the Joint Military Teams, Ceasefire Joint Military Committees (CJMC) and the Ceasefire Political Commission (CPC). The first committees will be constituted by equal number of SAF and SPLA members and UN monitors with the mandate to report any violation to CJMC, chaired by UN Force Commander which will then report to CPC, the main political decision making body comprising of senior political and military representatives of the parties, special representatives of the UN Secretary General and observers from the IGAD and IGAD Partners Forum.

There are also international guarantees to safeguard the CPA. To the extent that the primary responsibility of safeguarding the CPA rests on the Sudanese especially the NCP and the SPLM, international role remains very critical to the success of the agreement. In any case, the agreement could not have been possible were it not for the high level engagement by IGAD and the quartet of US, UK, Norway and Italy. At the regional level, IGAD with strong

³⁷ Ibid

support of the US will continue to play a major role. At the continental level, the African Union which was an important witness and signatory of the agreement has a role to safeguard against relapse to war while at the global level, the involvement of the US and the UN is very important in ensuring that the parties uphold their commitments. More importantly, the CPA calls for the deployment of 10,000 strong UN Mission to Sudan (UNMIS) to support and monitor implementation of the agreement³⁸. The agreement also creates an Assessment and Evaluation Commission (AEC) consisting of representatives from the parties, IGAD and the Quartet with the UN and EU having overseer status³⁹.

Despite the apparent strengths in the CPA, there are several weaknesses, which could undermine its implementation and sustainability. The CPA is a long and complex agreement, which is difficult to monitor effectively. In all, more than 50 National Commissions and bodies will have to be formed to operationalize the agreement. So far only CJMC and AEC have been formed. There are also multi systems and levels of governments⁴⁰. The slow or lack of progress in this field could bring into question the implementation of the agreement and prolong the interim period. There is also the problem of commitment of the parties to the implementation of the agreement particularly following the death of Garang in 30th July 2005.

³⁸ See International Crisis Group; Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement: The Long Road Ahead, opcit

p.3

³⁹ Ibid

⁴⁰ Ibid

To allay fears that the CPA was on the verge of collapse, the Sudanese government released progress report on its implementation on May 2006 indicating that 42 processes had taken place since the signing of the agreement⁴¹. But the situation on the ground is different as the implementation has been slow and deadlines have not been met. The Government of National Unity was constituted in 20th September 2005 but it has not hastened the formation of the various commissions and committees including the Electoral Commission, which is crucial for the implementation of the CPA. The commission is to prepare the mid transitional period elections scheduled for 2009 and which are crucial in broadening the legitimacy of the CPA. The situation in the south has been worsened by the absence of credible functional structures upon which to build a government. The Southern Sudan Assembly and GOSS were inaugurated on September 2005 and 22nd October 2005 respectively but continued to face serious challenges from unmet expectations and rising frustrations.

Security and wealth sharing provisions particularly on oil poses the greatest challenge to CPA and unless the two are implemented, they have the potential to unravel the agreement. Disengagement of forces, disarmament, demobilization and withdrawal of SAF from the South and SPLA from the north respectively is behind schedule. Even the Sudanese government acknowledged that disengagement of forces was a major stumbling block to the smooth

⁴¹ See. Fred Oluoch. *Sudan peace deal still on course says government*. The East African. May 22-28 2006. No.603. p.17

implementation of the agreement⁴². According to UNMIS only about 2000 of the estimated 70,000 SAF troops in Southern Sudan have withdrawn. SPLA even accuses SAF of strengthening its positions in Renk and Melut⁴³. SPLA itself is yet to withdraw from the east and insists that NCP should first commence negotiations with Eastern front. There is also the problem posed by the presence of armed militias which the parties accuses each other of supporting. Estimates put the number of armed groups and militias in southern to 32. These groups are the most unpredictable security element and arguably the greatest threat to the peace accord. The NCP retains the capacity to use SSDF to undermine the implementation of the peace agreement using its well-perfected strategy of divide and rule. Already indications points to possible SAF support for SSDF splinter factions opposed to the Juba Declaration between GoSS President Salva Kirr and SSDF leader Gen. Paulino Matip.

Like security, the question of oil management poses serious challenge to the CPA. Under the agreement, GOSS is supposed to get 50% of all oil revenue produced in the south. There have however been a myriad of problems, which threatens to unravel it among them the failure of the parties to agree on mutually acceptable parameters of calculating oil wealth or ascertaining which oil lies in the South. This situation has been hampered by lack of progress in determining the North-South border, as the Adhoc North-South Border

⁴² Ibid

⁴³ See International Crisis Group; Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement: The Long Road Ahead, opcit p.3

Commission is yet to meet⁴⁶. The SPLM has persistently complained that it is being denied access to information on oil production and existing contracts. The Oil Minister, Awad al-Jaz has been uncooperative and the National Petroleum Commission is currently stuck in procedural problems. This situation has prompted the GoSS and the First Vice President, Salva Kiriir to complain that it was not receiving its rightful share of oil revenue.

The CPA has been labeled as a bilateral agreement between two dominant military parties, the NCP and the SPLM/A. It is exclusive in nature and suffers from the problem of inclusivity. Prunier⁴⁷ opines that the CPA was a result of improbable negotiations as it excluded greater sections of the Sudanese in the south and the north. According to Natsios⁴⁸, equity issues and feelings of exclusion could undermine the agreement if these excluded groups perceive to have been marginalized and may resort to armed resurrection and derail the implementation process. In Kordofan and Eastern Sudan for instance, there is potential of outbreak of conflict, a situation that could be replicated in southern Blue Nile, Nuba Mountains and Abyei.

The signatories especially the NCP, the successor of National Islamic Front (INF) have very limited support. In 1986 elections, it managed only 7%⁴⁹. The SPLM, the sole partner of NCP in the peace agreement, is not in total control of the south and some continue to view it as a Dinka entity not representative of

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⁴⁷ Prunier Gerard. *Sudan Peace Accords Won't end war*. Le Monde Diplomatique. 15th February 2005

⁴⁸ See Natsios Andrew. *Implementing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan*. Yale Journal of International Affairs. opcit pp 87-99

⁴⁹ Prunier Gerard. *Sudan Peace Accords won't end the war*. Le Monte Diplomatique. opcit pp

the 25-30 % of the southern Sudanese. Prunier⁵⁰ ponders of the 70% excluded and argues that they represent a major unknown factor in the elections. The Darfur conflict and the escalating situation in Eastern Sudan in addition to the three conflict areas has shown that the problem in Sudan is larger the north-south. Jooma ⁵¹argues that the north-south paradigm is largely outdated as it fails to recognize dissenters in the north and the south. Snyder⁵² argues that the unrelenting extreme violence in Darfur and the lingering tensions in central and eastern Sudan cast a shadow over the CPA. Frustrations over IGAD peace process and its outcome are growing in the northeastern Sudan where since 1990s the Beja Congress and Rashida Free Lions fought alongside the SPLA as part of NDA. There are frustrations in the east that SPLM committed to withdraw without taking into consideration the Beja interests.

There is also the question of commitment by the parties to the agreement. Already there are concerns that the parties are not only moving slowly but are putting obstacles. The NCP has been accused of systematically undermining, delaying or ignoring elements of the CPA with the aim of ensuring the status quo. According to the CPA, major decision-making responsibility rests in the institution of the presidency, which encompasses the President, First Vice President and the Second Vice President. This has not been the case as the President as opposed to presidency has monopolized decision-making process.

⁵⁰ Ibid

⁵¹ See Jooma Mariam. *Feeding the Peace: Challenges facing Human Security in Post-Garang Sudan*. ISS. Pretoria. August 2005. p.4

⁵² See Snyder Charles. *Mapping the Challenges to peace implementation: Sudan at the Crossroads*. Presentation at the Fletcher School, March 12 2004

President as opposed to presidency has dictated the implementation scheduled and agenda⁵³. The death of Col. Garang has had significant impact on the agreement. Since the death of Garang, NCP strategy is to delay the implementation than proceeding in good faith. Some of the decrees are direct contradiction to the CPA⁵⁴. The move by NCP to relegate all those who participated in negotiating the agreement among them Mutrif Siddiq, Yahya Hussein Bakri and Mohammed Didhery raises concerns about its commitment. Salva Kiri is also yet to find willing partners in the presidency. Overall there are concerns about the sustainability of the NCP-SPLM partnership. The partnership between NCP and the SPLM, which existed before Garang's death is disappearing. Distribution of seats in the GNU in which most Southerners felt that NCP never acted in good faith illustrates the fragility of the agreement⁵⁵ just as the violence that broke out following the death of Garang is a manifestation of continuing high level of mistrust between the south and the north.

Other than internal threats, external threats are abound especially by actors who feel that their interests were not taken into consideration or will be undermined. These groups may try to slowdown the implementation process or work against the agreement. If not checked external foreign interests in the Sudan poses a serious challenge to the agreement. Egypt which has significant interests in the Nile never supported the CPA whole-heartedly fearful of the

⁵³ International Crisis Group. *Sudanese Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The Long Road Ahead.* opcit p.3

⁵⁴ Ibid

⁵⁵ Ibid

prospects of emergence of another state in Sudan which could lead to the re-negotiation of the Nile Waters. This has become more apparent due to growing calls by Nile Basin countries for the re-negotiation of the agreement. The oil concession rights are another important factor as it is tied to the peace agreement.

5.0 Chapter Five: Conclusions and Recommendation

5.1 Introduction

Chapter four dealt with the analysis of the research with the aim of proving or disproving the research hypothesis, validating the theoretical framework informing the study and confirming the research objectives. It validated the research hypothesis that the involvement of external actors in situation of internal conflict brings with them new interests and issues, which leads to escalation of conflict. It was confirmed the Pluralism was the most-suited theoretical framework applicable to the study of involvement of multiple external actors in internal conflict.

5.2 Conclusions

The study concluded that Sudan has been embroiled in a north and south conflict for most of its post –independence history due to the failure of the Sudanese state to be accommodative. The Sudanese state as controlled and dominated by the north has been characterized by politics of exclusion and lopsided development, which has failed to integrate country into one united entity. The failure of the post-independence leadership to address the grievances of southern Sudanese and the South's perception of the north as domineering and worse colonizers has nurtured a relation characterized by mutual suspicion and conflict. The consequence has been failure to evolve a common Sudanese identity and vision that is critical to overcoming these deep-rooted misperceptions. This is a challenge that must be addressed as it has serious

implications to sustainability of long-term peace between the south and the north. The conflict in Sudan is a function of underdevelopment characterized by political and economic marginalization

Resolving the core issues in the conflict to ensure sustainable peace between the north and southern Sudan calls for the restructuring of the current national framework. The IGAD mediated CPA is premised on this goal. It establishes a strong framework for a radical socio-political and economic restructuring and transformation of the Sudanese state by creating mechanisms to ensure equitable political participation and development. The CPA it was observed was guided by the need to address historical marginalization of the southern Sudan. In conclusion the Sudan peace process offers basic solution by restructuring the state to address economic and political marginalization of the Sudan.

The survey concluded further that involvement of external actors led to the escalation of the conflict. It identified that external actors bring new interests into the conflict, which makes it more complex and protracted. In the case of the Sudan conflict, the resumption of oil production through the assistance of foreign oil companies in mid1990s led to intensification of the conflict as seen by the dramatic shift of the conflict's epicentre to the oil- rich western Upper Nile. The engagement of external religious actors had the same impact. Just as economic actors represented by foreign oil companies, external religious actor interests attempted to link domestic religious aspects of the conflict to regional and

international factors. The consequence was that the conflict became more intractable and gained new momentum fuelled by external religious interests. It can thus be argued that the involvement of external actors into a conflict situation creates complexity of interests and issues, which in turn fuelled the situation.

It was observed that no internal conflict is actually internal. This is due to the fact that parties to an internal conflict build networks of external support and alliances that brings in external actors. This leads to the broadening of the conflict with increase in the number of actors and issues. It also emerged that due to permeability of national or territorial borders conflict in one state can have adverse effects on neighbours due to the ease at which issues can be transformed. Internal conflict creates conditions that may necessitate humanitarian interventions by outside state and non-actors.

The study surveyed the various conflict resolution efforts and concluded that the external interests undermined or slowed-down the efforts. The addition of external actor's interests to those of the primary actors made the mediation efforts more difficult. Various countries had different interests in the conflict, which they wanted to be taken into consideration. The consequence was the proliferation narrow -based peace initiatives with competing and antagonistic objectives. It was observed that competition between various external actors undermined attempts to forge a common stance crucial for forcing the parties to commit themselves to peace. Calls or efforts to merge or harmonize IGAD and

JLEI initiatives failed due to divergent interests of respective proponents. It was observed that lack of consensus by due differences in interests enabled the parties to the conflict to manipulate and divert pressure. The parties backed the peace initiatives or process that best served their interests at a particular time. In any case division among the main powers constrained any meaningful application of pressure on the parties to compromise.

It was observed that despite its weakness particularly the failure to address the overall Sudanese problem and absence of inclusiveness, the CPA addresses most of the key issues underlying the north-south conflict. It emerged that the CPA offers the best framework for resolving the problems within the Sudanese state as it can be replicated to other on-going conflicts in the Darfur and the east. It also emerged that the sustainability of the CPA and its successful implementation depends as much on the Sudanese particularly the two parties, SPLM and the GOS as the external actors and interests. It was noted that strains were already evident in the implementation of the CPA and the NCP-dominated Sudanese government has been showing signs of reluctance to implement the agreement since the death of SPLM leader Garang in July 2005. Some within Sudan are already questioning the sustainability of the agreement given its institutional and structural difficulties and weaknesses.

It was also observed that while the CPA had strong support base in the south, the situation in the north is quite different. Unlike the SPLM in the south, the NCP, which negotiated the agreement, has weak support base and hence the support of the agreement in the north is weak. The exclusion or late selective

inclusion of pro-government splinter factions Umma and DUP in the peace negotiations did not enabled the Sudanese government to widen the appeal for the agreement as these parties were already working with the government.

5.3 Recommendations

From the survey, external actors just like internal actors have a lot at stake in conflict and the success of any peace effort depends as much on the pressure of the parties as guarding against derailment by the interests of external actors. In the Sudan situation, there are several internal and external threats to the CPA concluded between the Sudanese government and the SPLM-SPLA. Within the Sudan there are a lot of actors or parties who feel excluded in the process. These parties must be brought on board as part of efforts to widen the support base for the peace agreement. The elections scheduled for 2009 are more of a referendum on the CPA and its architects. Unless there is clear peace dividend and immediate inclusiveness, there is a possibility of the emergence of Sudan wide anti-peace campaign.

There is also an all-important need to ward-off the interests of external actors from derailing the implementation of the peace agreement. This is very critical as external actors may be inclined to take advantage of internal dissatisfaction to undermine the implementation of the agreement. A strong institutional and legal framework needs to be established to monitor the operations or activities of external actors especially the economic actors as represented by foreign multinational oil companies and prevent them from working against the spirit of the agreement.

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