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PUBLIC PERCEPTION ON STATE PREPAREDNESS TO PREVENT AND RESPOND TO TERROR ATTACKS IN KENYA: A CASE STUDY OF THE NATIONAL POLICE SERVICE IN NAIROBI COUNTY, KENYA.

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
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DECLARATION

DECLARATION BY CANDIDATE

I hereby declare that this Research Project is my original work and has not been

presented for any other academic award at the University of Nairobi or any other

institution.

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DEDICATION

This research project is dedicated to all those who have suffered terror attacks, men, women and children who bore the brunt of insecurity, through the cruel hand of terrorists' heinous and despicable acts, of painfully cutting short lives, dreams and support to dependants and family members and to all counter terrorism and fallen heroes, men and women who put their lives on the line to counter terrorism.

Secondly, to my family members: brothers Donald Nyang'aya and Victor Nyang'aya for supporting my education; my Children Victor Mosweta, Salome Moraa, Ruth Mosweta and Pauline Nyang'aya for their warm encouragement and to Isabella Nyang'aya for her support. Last but not least, to my loving parents, Peris and Mzee Nyang'aya for their socialization in all aspects of my life.

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ABSTRACT

Terrorism has become a major disaster that is unpredictable and devastative in nature. It has become a common occurrence in Kenya during the past decade. This study examined perceptions of Kenyans on the preparedness of the National Police Service (NPS) to prevent and respond to the terror attacks in Nairobi. The NPS is regarded as a vital security institution charged with the responsibility of preventing terror attacks and safe guarding lives. The broad objective of the study was to examine the public perceptions of Kenyans on the preparedness of the NPS to prevent and respond to terror attacks in Nairobi County of Kenya. The study used purposive research sampling. The study collected quantitative and qualitative data through a structured questionnaire and key informant interviews to gauge public perception on terrorism prevention and response. The study respondents were Kenyans living in Nairobi County for at least 6 months, purposively sampled from churches, shopping malls, open markets and hotels.

The study found that there was low motivation among the National police service personnel, a factor that negatively affected service delivery by the police service. Majority of respondents indicated that the National Police Service preparedness to effectively respond to terror attacks needs improvement. Police service effectiveness in the area of prevention and response to terror attacks was below expectations of most respondents given the frequency of terror attacks, recorded during the period under review. Collectively the resources were considered inadequate and increased budgetary allocations are suggested to strengthen NPS capacity in terrorism control. Services of the police could improve with enhanced equipment supply, motivation of officers, modernized training techniques and cooperation among NPS units. Unethical practices associated with the NPS that have affected the fight against terror attacks included skewed treatment of police units. Major challenges within the NPS that affect response to terror attacks have been identified. They include lack of adequate police vehicles to carry out faster response. Police numbers were way below standard recommendations by UN while corruption at the national police service was endemic.

From the findings the public perception was that NPS should Endeavour to eradicate unethical practices including bribery, corruption and favoritism. The public sentiments were that anti-terrorist agencies need to enhance community participation of citizens as a community policing strategy. The public anticipates that the state should consider building forensic science laboratories at county levels to facilitate timely, effective and efficient processing of evidence. This is in line with robust police reforms of equipping the NPS and other security institutions with efficient facilities of carrying out anti-terrorism tasks. This will boost police capacity to satisfactorily carry out its primary mandate of protecting the country against terror attacks and general crimes.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ATPU	Anti-Terrorism Police Unit
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
AP	Administration Police
AU	African Union
CBD	Central Business District
CCTV	Closed Circuit Television
CID	Criminal Investigation Department
CITAM	Christ Is the Answer Ministries
DOD	Department of Defense
DNA	Deoxyribonucleic acid
GOK	Government of Kenya
GTD	Global Terrorism Database
GSU	General Service Unit
GTI	Global Terrorism Index
ICU	Islamic Courts Union
ICT	Information Communication and Technology
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IGAD	Inter Governmental Authority on Development
OSAC	Overseas Security Advisory Committee
EWARN	Early Warning Systems
KDF	Kenya Defense Forces
KFS	Kenya Ferry Services
KPA	Kenya Ports Authority
KPC	Kenya Pipeline Corporation

KPLC	Kenya Power and Lighting Company
NCTC	National Counter Terrorism Committee
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NIS	National Intelligence Service
NPS	National Police Service
PLO	Palestinian Liberation Organization
SDA	Seventh Day Adventist
SME	Small and Medium Enterprises
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UXO	Unexploded Ordinance
UNODC	United Nations Office for Defense Committee

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

Terrorism is an international disaster that afflicts many states of the global community. Over the years, the world has experienced tragic losses of life and property through acts of terrorism (Institute of Economics and Peace, 2012). Terrorism has therefore become a major disaster that is unpredictable and devastative in nature. According to Green (2007), terrorists' strategy employs various forms of extermination including assassinations, kidnapping, bombings and explosions. Every terrorist act is criminal and a form of political violence. He further posits that to punish the terrorists, governments need to identify who the members of the terrorist group are and where they are. Here lies the mandate and duty of the National police Service. The use of terror usually requires a willingness to kill innocent civilians for a specific purpose. A handful of terrorist organizations are responsible for the majority of terrorist attacks globally. They include the Taliban, ISIL, Boko Haram and Al Qaida and its affiliates (Global Peace Index, 2015).

As a regional concern, the African Union has recognized terrorism as a major disaster and a threat to peace and development (Rukato H., 2004a). Occurrence of disasters such as terrorism makes Africa the only continent where the regional share of reported disasters in the world total, has increased during the last decade. This contention is supported by the African Regional Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction, which cautions that regional development is at risk from disasters mainly because of gaps in institutional frameworks, risk identification, knowledge management and emergency response (Rukato H., 2004b).

Kenya is a developing country and majority of deaths from terrorism have occurred in the developing world including Sub-Saharan Africa (Global Peace Index, 2015). At the national level, terrorism in Kenya has gained prominence as a national concern that significantly affects citizens' safety. Given the high frequency of terrorist attacks in Kenya, the disaster has become a major worry and a challenge to national development (Government of Kenya, 2012). The rising spate of terror attacks is emerging as a thorn in the flesh of Kenya's development agenda. In the face of near weekly terror attacks, the question that begs is: whether Kenya as a state has security institutions that are equal to the task of protecting citizens from terror attacks? Kenya has been on the receiving end while Human Rights groups accuse Kenya's police agency of arresting and handing over terror suspects to Western countries (Human Rights Watch, 2012). This has attracted animosity among terror groups such as al Qaeda and Al Shabaab militants. Terrorists groups are also driven by revenge reasons particularly against the police. Prior to Kenya's entry into Somalia in 2011, the National police had been overwhelmed (KDF, 2014). Kenya's resolve to militarily pursue the terror gangs into Somalia is arguably the main reason behind the consistent terror attacks that have befallen her social centres like Churches, malls, Mosques, business hubs, and bus termini. Secondly, Kenya hosts scores of thousands of refugees mainly from war-torn Somalia and South Sudan. Kenya is largely Christian and her main terrorist attackers comprise of Al Shabaab militants whose motive is to "fight the enemies of Islam" which include Somalia, Ethiopia, the US and Kenya (Institute of Economics and Peace, 2012).

Kenya's history of terror attacks demonstrates that terrorism has been a threat to the security and safety of citizens during the past decade. Terror attacks in Kenya were first recorded in 1980 when Norfolk hotel, at the heart of the capital city, was hit by a terrorist explosion. This was followed by the 1998 US embassy bombings in Nairobi. Others

include suicide car bombers at Kenya's coastal Paradise Resort; aerial bombings targeting an Israeli passenger aircraft and a number of aircraft accidents. During, the past four years, a number of grenade explosions and Improvised Explosive Devises (IED), have been associated with terrorist activities in Kenya. In October 24th, 2011 a grenade attack took place in Nairobi's CBD at Mwaura's Pub injuring fourteen personnel. Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility (KDF, 2014). During the months of November and December 2012, the Eastland commercial hub of Eastleigh, in Nairobi suffered four successive terrorist attacks in thirty days. The terror explosions occurred at St. Polycarp Church (30/09/12) in Nairobi. Other attacks occurred at Joska area and its environs at various dates (including 11/10/12, 6/11/12, 14/11/12, 17/11/12, 05/12/12, 07/12/12 and on 17/12/12 ;) where civilians, businessmen, transporters, a legislator and police officers were targeted.

Against these atrocities, Kenya can draw inspiration from states that have learnt to fight terrorism with remarkable success. These include the USA, which registered the biggest falls in terrorism between 2002 and 2011. Kenya entered into bilateral and multi-lateral agreements with African Union member states and the United Nations members to fight terrorism (UN Resolution, 1373:2001). Through bilateral, regional and international cooperation, states seek united front to reduce their sense of vulnerability to the potential actions of terrorism. Additionally, Kenya passed the anti-terrorism bill 2012 into law after a decade of false starts, followed by frustrations (GOK, 2012). It is yet to be seen how the outcome will support the National police service agency's prevention and response structure.

Steiner acknowledges that "the primary function of a state is the maintenance of order and security by means of law backed by force, an act that naturally entails a number of permanent institutions"(Steiner H. J., Alston P., & Goodmans., 2007). Kenya's permanent institutions include the National Police Service (Government of Kenya, 2012). Key to protecting citizen rights, the state has a duty to sensitize citizens against internal and external threats. Steiner et al (2007) point out that effective protection of citizens must come from within the state. The question that comes up is; what challenges lie on the way of the Kenyan police agency to protect citizens from terror attacks? If for instance challenges abound, how satisfied is the citizen regarding individual safety and protection from eminent terrorism?

Steiner et al (2007) are emphatic that the state is responsible for providing security to its citizens through its monopoly of legitimate use of police force. The Kenyan state is no exception in the protection of her citizens. When the state fails to provide this basic right, society is rendered vulnerable to calamities and disasters including terrorism. States provide protective security as a social safety net for preventing populations from being reduced to abject misery, starvation and death. In this context, each state must rely on its own capabilities to protect its national interests and remain secure (Steiner et al, 2007).

Many of the terrorist attacks that have occurred in Kenya's urban estates point to questions in preparedness levels by institutions to curb terrorism. The study looked into Kenyans' perception of the existing anti-terrorist strategies and mechanisms. The researcher went out to evaluate the challenges the police agency experiences. The overall preparedness of the police to terror attacks influences the perception of citizens on safety from terror attacks. The researcher sought to investigate the matter with, among others, the aim of getting suggestions to improve preparedness and protection against the attacks.

1.2 Problem Statement

Terrorist attacks have become a common disaster in Kenya during the past decade. During the past two years the attacks have become routine and on the increase. The Anti-terrorist- police unit (ATPU) has confronted the menace without clear success. Urban and rural Kenyans are increasingly prone to many incidents of grenade attacks and unexploded ordnance (UXO) from terror groups, including Al shabaab and Al Qaeda terrorists (Shauri, 2007). The frequent grenade attacks have been systematic targeting specific and selected urban social and business sites such as Eastleigh, Westgate Shopping Mall, and Gikomba Open market. The terrorists hit Kenyans with precision targeting popular sites like bus stations, places of worship, hotels, bars, security transport vehicles, shopping centers, passenger vehicles and learning institutions. Some of the targeted places in the country have the services of state security personnel yet the terrorist attacks have not been deterred. In its first attacks on Kenyan soil, the Somali based Al Shabaab militants sprung an ambush at a national police station in Liboi in 2008. A keen analysis of the terrorist attacks on Kenya shows that between October 2007 and 2011, Kenya experienced a total of 34 terrorist attacks that resulted in 108 deaths (GPI, 2015).

In September, 2013 terrorists attacked Westgate Mall claiming lives of 72 and wounding 201, rendering the Mall as among the worst attacks worldwide in 2013. A year later, in June 2014 during the Mpeketoni attack, Al Shabaab militants claimed innocent lives of at least 48 people. In November, 2014 attack on a Mandera bound bus, experienced sprays of bullets on Kenyans who could not recite verses from the Quran. The attack claimed 28 people including teachers (GPI, 2015).In April 2015, Al Shabaab militants attacked Garissa University College where 148 mainly students lost lives. Three months later, in June 2015, Kenya suffered another attack in a Mandera Quarry attack where 64

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people were brutally butchered (GPI, 2015). This suggests that the state has challenges in preparation of resources to prevent terror disasters. In places where the state has deployed security personnel, as in the case of Garissa terror attacks, and Mpeketoni, police officers have been attacked by terrorists unawares as will be discussed in this research paper. In other incidents of terror attacks, where explosions targeted trucks as in Mandera, Wajir and Liboi, the security personnel landed on explosions without prior warning or suspicion. In March 2013, an attack on a passenger vehicle in Eastleigh estate in Nairobi, further reinforced the argument that both civilian and security operators are vulnerable to terror attacks in the country. These attacks have attracted delayed responses by police rescue and emergency operators.

Despite the efforts by Government, the terror attacks are on the increase with consistent change of the mode of operation. The Anti-Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU) consisting of personnel from all security agencies was established in February, 2003 to fight terrorism (Government of Kenya, 2003). The penal code of the laws of Kenya, the Banking law, the Prevention of terrorism Bill, 2012, make it an offence for any actor to engage in terrorist acts. The National Police Service seems not to be at pace with the prevention of the planning and execution of the terror attacks. The citizenry feel insecure and cast doubt at the level of preparedness of the police force to conclusively deal with terrorism. United Nations surveys in Kenya have shown that over half of the population worries about crime constantly and roughly 75% feel unsafe while at home (UN-Habitat, 2012). Further, the lack of training and low pay for the Kenyan police causes a considerable level of corruption and a general lack of aggressive policing, with 98% of Kenyans believing there is some level of corruption in the force (Transparency International, 2013).

This study attempted to find out the public perception on the preparedness of National police service to curb terror attacks and analyze the effectiveness of the existing police response strategies, ways of strengthening the NPS, challenges and solutions as perceived by the Kenyan public.

1.3 Main Research Question

What is the public perception on the National Police Service anti-terrorism preparedness in Nairobi County?

1.3.1 Specific Research Questions

i.   What is the perception of Kenyans on the National Police Service Preparedness to prevent terror attacks in Nairobi County?

ii. What do Kenyans perceive as the main challenges to the National Police service preparedness to prevent and respond to terror attacks in Nairobi County?

iii. What do Kenyans perceive as the best approaches for strengthening the National Police Service in Preventing and responding to terror attacks in Nairobi County?

iv. What do Kenyans' perceive as solutions to the challenges facing the National police service to prevent and respond to terror attacks?

1.4 Objectives of the Research Study

The overall objective of the study was to examine Kenyans' perceptions of the National Police Service Preparedness to prevent and respond to terror attacks in Nairobi County.

1.4.1 Specific Objectives of the Research

The study had the following specific objectives

i.   To examine Kenyans' perception of the National Police Service preparedness to prevent terror attacks in Nairobi County?

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ii.   To explore Kenyans' perception on the best approaches of strengthening the national police service preparedness to prevent terror attacks in Nairobi County.

iii.   To document Kenyans' perception on the challenges of the national police service preparedness to prevent terror attacks in Nairobi County.

iv.   To find out possible solutions to challenges facing the NPS in preventing terrorism.

1.5. Significance of the Study

The National police service and other security agencies are fighting a pressing societal monster of terrorism. The attacks are on the increase, posing eminent challenges to requisite security organs with a call for preventive and response preparedness answers by the state anti-terrorism structures. This study is of great importance to Kenyans of all walks of life, and particularly stakeholders in the security docket. There have been concerted efforts by the Kenyan government and the international community to harness resources to empower vulnerable state anti-terrorist policing agencies. This study is useful in evaluating National police preparedness to prevent and contain terror attacks in Kenya.

In spite of the national and international efforts to utilize the police service to stem terrorism, increasing incidents of terrorist attacks continue to occur. This has generated diverse perceptions from the public regarding state police preparedness to prevent terror attacks.

This study is of utmost importance as it attempts to inform the security sector on the approaches to strengthen police service preparedness to prevent rising terror attacks. It also evaluates the prevailing anti-terrorism challenges from the perspective of security managers, and attempts to provide viable suggestions to curb the menace.

Against a background of increased budgetary funding on the security sector, the state security agencies need answers to the rising attacks. The agencies are yearning for new knowledge to unravel the rising riddle of terrorism using current best practices on terrorism prevention. It is on this premise that the study is justified both in its contribution to the existing body of knowledge, in strengthening the security and disaster mitigation fields, and its contribution to the on-going police reforms and the wider disaster policy debate in Kenya.

1.6 Scope and Limitations of the Study

The study focused on the perceptions of the public on the preparedness of the National Police Service to prevent terror attacks in Nairobi County. Owing to the limited time frame and the nature of the data required to address the research problem, the research faced a number of limitations. Firstly, the issue of the National Police Service preparedness to prevent terror attacks is considered a very sensitive or confidential matter by many citizens. Thus, certain data may have been withheld or given with a certain bias which may affect the analysis of the results. To address this challenge, assurance was given to the informants that the information will only be used for academic purposes. Secondly, it was not possible to interview all the stakeholders in Nairobi County. This challenge was mitigated by interviewing the few sampled key stakeholders. For example, church leaders, mall operators, shoppers at open markets and opinion leaders selected in the area of concern in Nairobi County.

1.7 Definition of Key Terms

Disaster: Something (such as a flood, terror attacks, explosions, fire, plane crash, etc.) that happens suddenly and causes much suffering or loss to many people

Terrorism: The use of violence and intimidation to kill, harm or destroy persons and property, in the pursuit of political aims.

Functionalism: The belief in or stress on the practical application of a thing, in particular. The doctrine, that the design of an object should be determined solely by its function.

Al Shabaab: (Arabic for "the youth"), an Islamic militant group that seeks to create an Islamic state in Somalia, formed in 2004 as the militant wing of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), a network of Islamist militant tribes that controlled southern and central Somalia.

Structuration: The state or process of organization in a structured form, then emphasizing on agency and structure.

Proliferation: A rapid and often excessive spread or increase e.g. nuclear proliferation.

Grenade: A small bomb thrown by hand or launched mechanically. A glass receptacle containing chemicals that are released when the receptacle is thrown and broken, used for testing drains and extinguishing fires.

Prevention: The action of stopping something from happening or arising, using pro-active means, measures as mitigation efforts. Anti-terrorist actions to detect deter or apprehend terrorist attacks, explosions. These are prevention actions by agencies such as the police, the military, intelligence and the local community.

Insecurity: The state of being open to danger or threat; lack of protection by the state security agencies both at the county and national levels.

Preparedness: A state of readiness, especially for war. Preparedness entails prior planning to prevent actions such as terrorist attacks. Provision for adequate resources, up to date training, equipment supply and requisite tools to respond to emergencies are aspects of preparedness.

Explosion: A violent and destructive shattering or blowing a part of something, as is caused by a bomb or series of explosive ordinances, terror, or improvised explosives

Al-Qaida: A network comprising both a multinational, stateless army and a Muslim movement calling for global jihad and a strict interpretation of sharia law. It has been designated as a terrorist organization by the United Nations Security Council, the European Union, the United States, Russia, India and various other countries

Counter-terrorism: Are political or military activities designed to prevent or thwart terrorism. It is a counter-terrorism effort to prevent and respond to terrorist threats and activities at all levels of governance. Counter terrorism calls for cooperation of states and United Nations members

Anti-terrorism: The prevention or abatement of terrorism as addressed by state institutions such as the police, military, immigration, judiciary, aviation and banking sectors.

Perception: A way of regarding, understanding, or interpreting something; a mental impression, as influenced by the print media, television or physical interaction.

Nyumba kumi: An administrative security concept used at the community level meaning ten households in which members of each cell is known by others while new members are introduced to cell leaders. It is an integrated security framework which involves active participation of citizens, to weed out criminal elements that may spring up in the community.

Vulnerability: Lack of ability or capacity to resist, cope with and recover from a potentially damaging hazard such as grenade (terror) attacks.

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Introduction

This chapter covers terrorism and how it is encountered in Kenya, terrorism incidents in Kenya, terrorism Disaster Management in Kenya, terrorism Early Warning Systems (EWARN), State's responsibility to Protect Citizens, agents of Anti-terrorism Preparedness in Kenya, police preparedness against terror attacks, limitations of the National Police Service, and Anti-terrorism legislation in Kenya. Also the chapter covered into theoretical framework.

2.1.1 Terrorism in Kenya

The Institute of Economics and Peace (Institute of Economics and Peace, 2012)defines terrorism as "the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation". This definition recognizes that terrorism is not only the direct physical act of an attack, but also the psychological impact it has on society. Acts of terrorism sought by this research are those considered to be intentional acts of violence by non-state actors such as al Qaeda, al Shabaab and Taliban.

Terrorist acts require three criteria in order to qualify as terror acts. For terror acts to be encountered, the incident must be intentional-the result of a conscious calculation on the part of the perpetrator. Terror incidents entail some level of violence or threat of violence such as against people and destruction of property. Violent acts of terrorism are aimed at attaining political, economic, religious or social goals. The acts aim to coerce, intimidate or send a message to the larger audience other than the immediate victims.

According to Williams and Head (2006) terror attacks take the form of violent bombing explosions at installations , throwing of grenades and firing of missiles at aircrafts. Other methods of encountering terror attacks include suicide bombing of targeted installations, murder of civilian populations to create fear, brutal attacks on economic targets such as tourists, and carrying cross-border revenge attacks such as those by al Shabaab extremists against Kenyans and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) members, hijacking, hostage taking, kidnapping and arson.

In Kenya, terror attacks are encountered when buildings are bombed and brought down by explosions, when grenade attacks are hurled at religious congregations, shopping malls, educational centers, business centers and moving vehicles. Other terrorist attacks have been encountered at border towns targeting security personnel, refugees, and humanitarian agencies. Government administrators and equipment have also been targeted as discussed and illustrated in this paper. The researcher acknowledges that terrorism is planned, staged and encountered clandestinely, stealthily and without warning.

2.1.2 Terrorism Incidents in Kenya

Kenya has been the scene of various attacks attributed to terrorist elements. In 1980, the Jewish-owned Norfolk hotel was attacked by the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). In 1998, the US embassy in Nairobi was bombed, as was the Israeli-owned Paradise hotel four years later. In July 1976, during the Operation Entebbe hostage crisis, Kenya briefly served as a refueling stage for the Israeli C-130 Hercules transport planes. Perceived as an ally of Western interest and Israeli support, Kenya attracted the wrath of terrorists groups.

In 2012, Al-Shabaab attacks continued to hit a number of urban as well as the sparsely populated towns in North Eastern parts of Kenya. In October 2011, a coordinated between the Somali military and the Kenyan military began against the Al-Shabaab group of insurgents in southern Somalia. Since then, a series of explosions rocked various areas in Kenya, bombings which are believed to be retaliatory attacks by Al-Shabaab. According to Institute of Economics and Peace (Institute of Economics and Peace, 2012) there have been at least 17 attacks involving grenades or explosive devices in Kenya during the years 2011 and 2012.

At least 48 people died in terror attacks, and around 200 people were injured. Nine of the attacks occurred in North Eastern Province, including locations in Dadaab, Wajir, Mandera and Garissa. At least four attacks occurred in Nairobi, and four others in Mombasa. In Nairobi county, terrorist assailants attacked Westgate shopping mall, held patrons hostage and causing 201 injuries and 72 fatalities (Institute of Economic Affairs, 2013). Viewed generally, targets included police stations and police vehicles, night clubs, bars, churches, religious gatherings, business buildings, shops, a bus station and the common man. These attacks suggest that there exist gaps in the anti-terrorist protection institutions. This is a research gap, which this study attempted to investigate. Kenya is listed among the twenty worst attacked nations of the world and ranks eighth globally as indexed by (Institute of Economic Affairs, 2013). In 2015, it was ranked 18th globally. This chronology of attacks suggests that many Kenyans including religious congregations have been killed and many more injured, yet there are a number of anti-terrorism institutions meant to protect individuals from such attacks.

The vulnerable individuals are either poorly prepared to defend themselves from terror attacks or the anti-terrorist institutions have not been adequately prepared to protect and defend the citizenry. This suggests gaps in the anti-terrorism structures, resources or capacity. Given these gaps, the research attempted to investigate citizens' perceptions of state anti-terrorism preparedness to protect them, against existing institutional structural functionalism.

2.1.3 Terrorism Disaster Management in Kenya

Terrorism mitigation refers to anti-terrorism measures organized to prevent, prepare for, respond and recover from disaster situations (Shauri, 2007). The researcher is critical to the existing counter-terrorism management, its independence to undertake organized analysis, planning, decision making and assigning of available resources to mitigate terror disasters. The goal of disaster management during terror attacks is to save lives, prevent injuries and protect property and the environment (IGAD, 2012; Seaman, 1984). Seaman advocates for an elaborate counter-terrorism management which entails the managing of terror disasters using a multi-sector approach. The task involves coordination and management of resources from the central government, local, urban authorities, business industries, non-government organization (NGOs) and international organizations.

Rosand, Millar and Ipe (2007) have observed that most anti-terrorism efforts have focused on short-term security and law-enforcement efforts, which have affected long-term measures to address primary conditions, favorable for the increase of terrorist activities. There is apparent capacity, policy and resource gaps as suggested by United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee of 2001.

In addressing the gaps, the government of Kenya has embarked on diverse efforts to stem terror attacks. These internal and external efforts range from enacting a legal framework, political actions, police reforms, police and intelligence leadership changes as well as engaging the UN and other international partners for support in fighting terrorism. Kenya enacted the Prevention of Terrorist Act (Government of Kenya, 2012a), a legal framework that supports the anti-terrorism efforts. Administratively, the state restructured the command and leadership of the National Intelligence Service by appointing a new intelligence chief in 2014. He became the Director General of the Intelligence service. To harmonize the anti- terror operations by both the NPS and the KDF, the state undertook police reforms and appointed intelligence trained strategist as Inspector-General.

At the grass-roots level the government appointed a county commissioner for each of the forty seven administrative regions to coordinate security management. The "Nyumba Kumi" concept of community policing, monitoring and surveillance is geared at managing community based terrorism and other serious crimes. The initiative means "ten specific households" and is a model to strengthen community policing (Government of Kenya, 2013).

Budgetary allocations for the police, the military and intelligence agencies were dramatically increased commensurate with the increasing threat of terror attacks (KDF, 2014). The increase of security budget is attributed to the October 2011 entry of Kenya Defense Forces into Somalia in pursuit of the Al Shabaab terrorists, based on the just war theory. From a religious perspective, the country has mobilized resources to fight radicalization of the youth by religious extremists. The state has organized international conferences for Muslim and Christian scholars to counter radicalization. This is a strategy that employs anti-extremism materials, comprising of literature to curb radicalization and violence of youths in universities, mosques and other social places.

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To check the unmonitored incursion of Al shabaab terrorists from Kenya-Somalia border, the state commenced the building of a physical barrier along the common border. The physical structure stretches for 700 km along the border. It is not only deterrent but also a strategic security barrier to be reinforced with increased surveillance, patrols and custom checks. The wall has drawn immediate criticism of the heavy financial burden that goes with the building of the long wall. From a critical perspective, the wall project appears displaced and an unnecessary expenditure in this digital era. Kenyans are already, badly experiencing very high taxation rates and the situation is likely to worsen if the 700 km wall is to be erected. To physically monitor the long wall, the country will need to employ thousands of security officers, in addition to procuring new surveillance equipment including aircrafts for aerial monitoring. The erection of the expansive wall further worsens social and international relations between the neighboring states. According to Huntington border families do spread across common borders. This is the case with the Somalis in Kenyan /Somalia border. Separating such closely related kinsmen by a wall is not only anti- social but also anti-economic and politically segregating. While such practices have been installed between Israel and Palestine, US and Mexico and between North and South Korea, the separation has prompted strained relations between the separated families.

To strengthen NPS capability, the government of Kenya published The KDF Amendment Bill 2015 in the Kenyan Gazette supplement No. 115 (National Assembly Bills No.41), dated July 2015. The government effort was meant to increase state capacity to fight terrorism by enhancing KDF effectiveness to assist police in combating terrorism.

Although the building of the wall has the intention of "enhancing GOK capabilities, to maintain domestic peace and fight terrorism", it is doubtful that the wall will prevent terrorist elements that are already within Kenya. Arguments against the building of the wall point out that the state has alternative and sufficient provisions to manage terrorism. These include the enacted NPS Act of 2011, and the 2012 KDF Act, where provisions of command relationships of the National police Service were emphasized. What critical minds prefer is full implementation of the NPS Act to prevent terror attacks. The researcher notes that there are implementation gaps involving the NPS Act of 2011, KDF Act of 2012, and KDF Bill of 2015. What needs to be done is a collaborative effort to collectively implement the anti- terrorism measures by respective security agencies. The concept of erecting the 700 kilometre wall appears expensive, behind current technology and against sociology of the kin-country linkages.

2.1.4 Terrorism Early Warning Systems (EWARN)

In Kenya, the function of providing terrorism early warning information lies with the National Intelligence Services (NIS).They come in the form of periodic intelligence briefs. Early Warning Systems are tools of providing, predicting and analyzing information on a diversity of sectors and subjects including impending disasters and emergencies. IGAD (2012) has observed that in Africa, the extent and effectiveness of Early Warning systems, for the public is not adequate. When terror attacks are wedged in society, the acts create conflict among humans. Mwaura and Schemeidal (2002) avert that conflict has always been part of human history and that prevention of conflicts remains one of the key global challenges that human beings face.

Given the immense human suffering that come with violent terror attacks and post-disaster emergency requirements, Kenya needs a humanitarian Early Warning System that is proactive. Such a system will employ strategies which prevent and limit the destructive effects of terror attacks. It will be a useful anti-terrorism tool for the National police and the entire security structure.

The existence of EWARN should assist individual Kenyans, anti-terrorism institutions and the Kenyan state in general, to adequately prepare for and protect Kenyans against terror attacks. Although the EWARN exist, there is still a gap in protecting the many Kenyans that have lost lives while others have been injured and property lost. These prevention and protection gaps by the National Police Service need to be interrogated by this research.

2.1.5 State's Responsibility to Protect Citizens

The cardinal responsibility of any sovereign state is to protect the lives and property of its people and ensure that they attend to lives in a safe and secure environment (Government of Kenya, 2001). The state has a duty and mandate to offer security, fight social and economic insecurity. To fight terror attacks, the state employs anti-terrorist institutions such as the police, anti-terrorism structures and coordinates private security companies to complement the public security agencies. Steiner et al (2007) argue that terror disasters can infringe on citizen rights. They contend that human rights violations occur within a state, rather than on high seas or in outer space outside the jurisdiction of any one state.

The United Nations cautions that the responsibility to protect means not just the "responsibility to react" but the "responsibility to prevent" as well. Actions in support of the responsibility to protect involve a broad range and wide variety of assistance, actions

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and responses. The actions include both long and short term measures. Pro-active state policies should be geared at preventing human security-threatening situations such as terrorism from occurring (Gareth, 2001). They suggest that effective protection of citizens must come from within the state.

According to the World Bank (2004), the state has the responsibility of providing safe environments, provide anti- terrorism resources, motivate anti- terrorism personnel and enhance the capacity to curb terrorism. The state enacts a legal framework as the basis for mobilization of resources and capacity. The provision of security is a cardinal duty of the state while lack of adequate security poses threats to life, health and property. The state also has a duty to eradicate poverty and provide social services to the citizens. Crime and violence including terrorism and piracy are among the primary concerns of the poor. Failure to provide physical security on the part of the government, may lead to an upsurge in private security activities.

The provision of security is negatively affected by the number of illicit or surplus weapons from across borders. Although the Kenyan state has endeavored to protect its citizens, there are challenges facing citizen protection and curbing of terrorism owing to the many terror attacks witnessed in urban areas. This research will attempt to interrogate the perceptions of Kenyans' satisfaction on police protection from terror attacks by the state.

2.1.6 Agents of Anti-terrorism Preparedness in Kenya

The key players for enhancing security in Kenya consist of the National police service, Kenya Defense Forces, the Kenya Airports Authority and the Kenya ports Authority. According to the GoK briefing by the Ministry of state and national security of 2004 and

UN counter-terrorism Committee (2001), the security net expands further to the immigration department, the ministries of Tourism, Information and Education, the Customs and Excise department and the National Intelligence Services. Other agents of security enhancement include the ministry of Foreign Affairs, Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions, the National Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC) and the Kenya Wildlife Service. The foregoing security agencies are tasked with undertaking anti-terrorism disaster preparedness. These security structures call for a well-structured disaster management agency to coordinate the various structured members of counter-terrorism agency (Giddens, 2011).The Agency and micro-implementing members need a coherent coordinating body to implement the diverse functions by ministries.

According to Shauri (2007), the most vital areas of preparedness are public information, evacuation plans, and monitoring of disaster early warning systems. Since terror attacks are on the increase in Kenya, there is a gap of effective preparedness to prevent the attacks by the Anti-terrorism institutions.

Shauri (2007) acknowledges that, Kenya, like other developing nations, handles disaster in an ad hoc manner, through government ministries, departments and parastatals. These include the Ministry of Health and Ministry of Agriculture. The other departments include those of Local Government, Public Works, Environmental Conservation and Transport and Communications. The other departments closely associated with mitigating disasters include Kenya Power and Lighting Company (KPLC), Kenya Pipeline Corporation (KPC), Kenya Ferry Services (KFS) and Kenya Ports Authority (KPA). The Kenya Red Cross leads among the Non-governmental organizations that respond to terror disasters in Kenya. This study attempted to find out how the police and other anti-terrorism institutions have dealt with the apparent gaps of coordination and

anti-terrorism preparedness. Key informants, grounded in counter-terrorism and information security surveillance provided insights into the anti-terrorism preparedness, existing gaps and country's disaster management.

2.1.7 Police Preparedness against Terror Attacks

Terror preparedness consists of a wide range of measures designed to save lives and limit damage caused by events such as terror explosions. Preparedness is not limited to the short term measures taken immediately before the attack but ought to be continuous. Preparedness entails the acquisition of security resources, capacity building of security institutions, personnel and equipment.

Preparedness to deal with events such as terrorism should not be restricted to the National level but should be decentralized to the lower levels up to the village level. In many cases, it is the masses at the local level that bear the brunt of the initial impacts of terror attack disasters. Institutional preparedness against terrorism is for the public as well as for the private sector, including churches, mosques, and business networks. The Kenya National Police Service is expected to be fully prepared to protect and defend Kenyans from terror attacks.

As a mitigation strategy, Kenya has stepped up security measures including the launching of the Operation Linda Nchi by Kenya Defence Forces against the Al Shabaab in Somalia, (KDF, 2014). Its forces carried out daring missions that managed to snatch some terrorist suspects from Somalia (Soke, 2003). Border patrols along the troublesome Kenya-Somalia border and joint Kenya-U.S. navy patrols of Kenya's Indian Ocean territorial waters (Wabala & Wandera, 2003) have been enhanced in order to stop the infiltration of terrorists from Somalia and to curb illegal immigration and the smuggling of narcotics and other contraband goods like weapons along the coast.

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From a functionalist view, Wabala and Wandera contend that the government has taken a number of measures aimed at strengthening the institution's ability to fight terrorism (Wabala & Wandera, 2003). According to the police Act, 2011, policing function in Kenya is supported by the National Police Service (NPS), Administration police (AP), the National Intelligence Service (NIS), and the Kenyan Defense Forces (KDF). The Kenyan police are the lead agency in policing duties within the borders, as stipulated in the Police Act, 2011. This study attempted to investigate how effectively the NPS as a security institution is prepared to protect themselves and Kenyans from terror attacks in urban areas.

2.1.8 Limitations of the National Police Service

The Kenya police service is a key stakeholder in the anti-terrorism preparedness in Kenya but experiences a number of limitations. According to Transparency International Global Barometer report 2013, the police was ranked as the most corrupt institution in Kenya. The NPS takes the lead as the sector most affected by bribery in the country. The service has come under severe criticism and accusations of ineptitude, unprofessionalism, corruption, laxity and many other unpleasant descriptions. Its members belong to a service organization, which though funded and supported by the public, does not deliver. The NPS has been rated as the highest corrupt body in Kenya, holding an aggregate index of 70.7 percent (Transparency International, 2013).

The Kenyan Police Service is almost solely a reactive force and demonstrates moderate proactive law enforcement techniques or initiative to deter or investigate crime. Police often lack the equipment, resources, requisite competitive training, and personnel to respond to calls for assistance or other emergencies (OSAC Kenya, 2014). According to Oversees Security Advisory Committee, the national police service has a poor record of investigating and solving serious crimes.

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The stated limitations have a bearing on the performance of the NPS. Consequently, the likelihood of the police responding to an incident would depend on availability of personnel and fuel for police vehicles. This hinders NPS service, prompting the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) to observe that Kenyan police needed reform implementation programmes to transform the NPS into an effective, efficient, accountable and trusted institution for Kenyans. The reforms would focus on establishing effective, efficient and sustainable reformed institutional structures enhance professionalism, integrity and accountability of the NPS.

Such reforms would also strengthen operational preparedness and logistical capacity and capability of the National Police Service (UNODC, 2009). UNODC observed that the police sector institutions in Kenya in need of this support include: NPS, National Police Commission (NPSC) and Independent Policing Oversight Authority (IPOA). The corruption contention on NPS is supported by Transparency International (TI), Kenya who contends that the NPS remains the most corrupt-prone public institution (TI Kenya, 2013).

The other limitation affecting police service delivery is limited police officers. This citizen-police gap is not limited to Kenya alone. The ratio of police to citizens throughout Africa is roughly half of that in North America and Europe, with rates of 180 per 100,000 compared with 346 and 325 in North America and Europe respectively (UNODC, 2009). The United Nations recommends that there should be 220 police officers for every 100,000 people and this translates to one officer for every 454 Kenyans. Kenya's police citizen ratio is one police officer for every 1150 Kenyans. This falls far below the United Nations recommendations. The Kenyan government is still struggling to achieve this

benchmark. This ratio gap translates to inadequate numbers of police officers which affects the perception of the police abilities to protect them against terror attacks (Otieno, 2013). This shows a pronounced police service capacity gap.

The Bureau of Counter-terrorism (2013) reveals that Kenya has many deficiencies including adequately criminalizing terrorist financing, ensuring a fully operational and effectively functioning financial intelligence unit. The other deficiencies include establishing and implementing an adequate legal framework for the identification and freezing of terrorist assets, as well as implementing an adequate and effective supervisory program for all financial sectors.

The UN report further blames poor coordination and general lack of preparedness by the Kenyan Security organs including the police, as some of the key obstacles hampering efforts to root out terrorism in the region. This suggests that "Operational effectiveness is sometimes impeded by poor coordination among and within police, intelligence, and military forces as well as lack of clear chain of command, control and overt political interference," the UN states.

In its' Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper the Government of Kenya states that the delivery of internal security services has not been satisfactory as security personnel face a number of constraints in the course of discharging their duties, including but not limited to low staff motivation, inadequate skills and outmoded equipment and method of fighting crime, (Government of Kenya, 2001).

2.1.9 Anti-terrorism Legislation in Kenya

The history of ant-terrorism legislation in Kenya has lasted at least a decade years having started in 2000. There has been marked opposition from Muslim, NGO and human rights groups to previous bills aimed at allowing police to tap private communications, seize property and access the bank details of suspected terrorists. Kenya' President approved the Prevention of Terrorist Act 2012, and Kenya's first piece of anti-terrorist legislation in October, 2012. It is expected that the legal framework should have reinforced the fight against terrorism.

In November 2014, further legal efforts were attempted by the Kenyan state when a new security bill was passed into law. The legislation effectively set to establish a new counter-terrorism centre with the express mandate of coordinating state anti-terrorism response against all terrorist threats. This law gives the security actors a firm institutional framework for coherent cooperation and synergy within the counter –terrorism centre. For the legislation to be effective, the synergy is expected to be cascaded from the highest level of implementation to the lowest level of the national government security structures responsible for fighting terrorism (GoK, 2014).

In spite of the enactment of the new security bill, terror attacks continued to be registered in the country. Further criticism of the new security bill is that it violates freedom of expression as guaranteed in articles 33 and 34 of the Kenyan constitution. Hence, the Supreme Court declared the new anti-terrorism bill unconstitutional (Supreme Court of Kenya, 2015). While the security law was labeled unconstitutional, terror attacks continued to occur in the country as evidenced by the Garissa college attack of early April, 2015 where 148 lives were lost.

2.2 Theoretical Framework

Any study into the behaviour of people, structure and functions of institutions must be guided by theories that have been expounded to explain given phenomena. Two theoretical positions central to the study are suggested to inform this study namely; Theory of structuration and Theory of functionalism. The theories inform the research on how security agents and the embedded agencies are structured in the security mandate to effectively carry out anti-terrorism preparedness to protect citizens. The theory of functionalism informs the research on how institutions function (pro-actively or re-actively) to curb terrorism.

2.2.1 Theory of Structuration

The theory of structuration is a social theory of the creation and reproduction of social systems that is based on the analysis of both structure and agents. It was proposed by sociologist Anthony Giddens and examines phenomenology, and social practices at the inseparable intersection of structures and agents. Structuration is a two way process by which we shape our social world through our own actions and are ourselves reshaped by society. The theory grasps the importance of action highlighting the structural components of social institutions, (McLean, 1996). Structuration sees agents as active participants. Agency is the capacity of individuals to act independently and to make their own free choices. The theory seeks to reinforce the importance of the concept of time and space in social analysis.

Central to structuration is the notion of the duality of structure in which all social action consists of practices located in time and space which are the skillful, knowledgeable accomplishments of human agents. The formulation of structuration theory is an attempt to reconcile theoretical dichotomies of social systems such as agency/structure,

subjectivity/objectivity, and micro/macro perspectives. Structuration looks at the relationship between agency and structure. Structure is defined as "rules and resources connected in social reproduction. Structure therefore refers to those factors of influence (such as social class, religion, gender, ethnicity and customs) that determine or limit an agent and his or her decisions. Institutionalized features of social systems have structural properties in the sense that relationships are stabilized across time. Structure can be conceptualized abstractly as two aspects of rules-normative elements and codes of signification" (Giddens, 2011).

Human agency is the 'capacity to make a difference' or have the 'transformative capacity'. Human agents are enabled to have the transformative capacity to exploit resources. In this formulation, resources are viewed as 'structured properties of social systems drawn on and reproduced by knowledgeable agents in the course of interactions. In application, the human agency is the security personnel who receives anti- terrorism training and in turn gains the transformative capacity to strengthen anti-terrorist skills.

In the theory of structuration, structure and agency are a duality. Social structure and human agency have a strong relationship and cannot be separated from one another. This is because structure is implicated in agency and agency in structure. In anti-terrorism, duality is critical in the sense that institutions of counter- terrorism and preparedness act in a mutual way. For instance, the National Police Service institution (structure) and Anti-terrorism police officers (agents) act for the same goal. Their goal is to prevent terror and ensure security prevails. The counter-terrorism organizations are an integral part of passing the skills and information to the vulnerable people who in turn support the public and private institutions in Kenya. The state agents are shown skills and then advised to be prepared in exhibiting anti- terror practice.

The theory of structuration attempts to show how the knowledgeable actions of human agents indirectly and recursively form the set of rules, practices and routines which over time and space constitutes the conception of structure. This is critical in anti-terrorism in that, it is the skills acquired by the security agent that help preparedness and create stronger anti-terrorism preparedness and not the humanness aspect only. This indicates that anti-terrorism skills are paramount for human beings to be able to build up preparedness against terror attacks.

Sociologists suggest that structures such as institutions are produced and reproduced by the knowledgeable human agency's actions repeated over time and space. This means there is a social structure (security institutions, financial institutions, Judiciary, international protocols, moral codes), that is established by way of doing things. Social structuring practices are therefore rooted in face to face encounters, but those encounters never take place in some kind of structure less void. They are mediated by resources that already have social, economic, political and cultural significance.

Structure is therefore a process where people's practices are also what they construct. Anti-terrorism structures create preparedness as counter- terrorism skills cannot be impacted by states alone. It requires that the citizens own the organizations for effective change. However, looking into the Kenyan scene, this study suggests that there is a disconnect between the vulnerable people and the counter- terrorism agents. Since most of the encounters are unplanned, rarely do we have the face to face interaction between the people, the attackers and the anti-terrorism agencies on the ground.

Thus the theory of structuration implies that the involvement of the vulnerable people and anti-terrorism institutions is a duality which strives to create a secure environment. The duality of structure and agency cannot be conceived apart from one another. The structures are neither independent of actors nor determining of behaviour, but rather sets of rules and competencies on which actors draw. Gibbs (2011) acknowledges that structuration offers perspectives on human behaviour, based on synthesis of structure and agency effects, known as "duality of structure". Actors create society, at the same time, they are created by it. Thus for counter-terrorism institutions and the vulnerable citizens, there is a duality in that the state sets counter- terrorism institutions and actors who then prepare to protect citizens against terrorism, through pro-active preparations (prevention) and reactive response after terror attacks.

Prevention and response actions call for judgment and decision making processes. From an evolutionary perspective, the illusion of agency would be beneficial in allowing social animals to predict the actions of others. Since the nineteenth century, philosophers have argued that the choices humans make are dictated by forces beyond their control. Nietzsche argued that man makes choices based on his own selfish desires (Karen et al 2009).This is true with terrorists whose motivation is selfish driven based on religious extremism.

2.2.2 Theory of Functionalism

Functionalism holds that society is a complex system in which various parts work together to produce stability and solidarity. Parsons (1937) explains that society has certain needs just like an organism has. His contention is that if the needs are not fulfilled, society collapses. Therefore, each institution in society fulfils these needs. For instance the institution of education system provides a trained and skilled workforce of willing

people. Society is structured into institutions such as religion, education, security and the polity. Any facet of society can be reviewed in terms of the function it provides for the continued existence of society (Moore, 1995).

Durkheim had pointed out that even crime is in a sense good for society, by providing a common enemy for law abiding members and thus binds them together. In this argument, the crime of terrorism is seen as bringing the vulnerable populations together who seek then for solutions collectively. The members of our structured society have patterned individual actions such as those of preventing terror attacks.

At the structural level, Parsons (1937) explained the origins of the social institutions, reasons for institutions' continued existence and their relationships to each other. Using the theory of social action, the study analyzed the National Police Service anti-terrorism institution, showing how it functions and how the agency relates to other security institutions within the state and amongst the different anti-terrorism state security structures. At the structural level, the NPS is structured into agencies that are designed to investigate while others prevent crime by foot patrolling, vehicular and aerial patrolling. The disciplined force of NPS, from the perspective of social action provides individual preventive actions such as responding to anti-terror activities.

This theoretical perspective shares the approach of Durkheim who emphasized the importance of viewing society as a whole and of studying the inter-relationship of institutions in terms of the functions they performed in society. He viewed the composition of the human body with its different organs, each of which needs the others to function and the inter-relationship between different institutions of society. In application, the NPS comprising of different members, are specifically skilled to provide

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specified services, necessary to confront terrorists as one strong policing body. In order for the NPS to adapt well to the security environment and secure Kenyans, its individual and corporate members must adapt to the institutional culture and ethical values (GOK, 2010).

Functionalists, including Merton (1968) and Durkheim used an organic analogy to compare the operation of society to that of a living organism. They contend that parts of society work together, for the better of society as a whole. To analyze the function of anti-terrorism institution, we attempted to show the part the institutions (NPS) play in the continued existence and stability of a secure society. At the macro level anti- terrorism institutions such as the KDF, the NIS, Banking sector, the Immigration, and the INTERPOL all work together, at national and global levels, to secure a stable society.

Functionalists like Kingsley Davis and Wilbert Moore (1945) argued that inequality is functional because it motivates the best in society to compete for the most important jobs in society. They suggest that competition guarantees the best people to fill the best jobs. This research notes that it is not always the case in our society which is open to power, money and other factors of influence. Critics of functionalism claim that it is mistaken to compare society with a living organism. This is due to the consideration that organisms have specific, identifiable needs compared to societies. Powerful individuals in societies can sway directions of populations irrespective of the needs of particular societal needs. Functionalism emphasizes the importance of moral consensus, in maintaining order and stability in society.

Sociologists contend that moral consensus exists when most people in a society share the same values. The question that the researcher poses is whether the terrorists share same values as the Christian–dominated Kenyan urban population? Functionalists regard order and balance as the normal state of society. The social equilibrium is grounded in the existence of moral consensus of society. Durkheim believed that religion reaffirms people's adherence to core social values which contribute to the maintenance of social cohesion. This theory contributes to the understanding on how the National Police Service, as the leading anti-terrorist institution, functions within the larger security institutions and State system. Based on how the NPS institution functions with or without ability and stability, Kenyans drew perceptions of the NPS preparedness to protect and respond to terror attacks.

2.3 Conceptual Framework

This is the development and clarification of concepts. The conceptual framework attempts to show the relationships between variables, with the directional arrows leading from the independent variables to the dependent variable. This indicates the causal relationship between variables. The conceptual framework for this study is on terrorism prevention and response to the attacks, and is an illustration of the causal relationship between NPS preparedness and terror attacks. Preparedness includes prevention and response to the terror attacks.

Figure 2.1: Conceptual Framework

Deterrence Preparedness
Inter- agency cooperation
Planning
Counter- terrorism
Counter indoctrination
Poverty eradication

Intelligence Preparedness

Intelligence sharing by Interpol. Early warning, Community Policing, Aerial patrols

Prevention Preparedness
Arrests before attacks
Recruitment & Training
Border control management
Surveillance planning- inter-agency operations

Response by: Intelligence, KDF, NPS, Community initiatives, Security operations, Rescue teams, County commissioners

Terror attack
Crisis management
Explosions/scene management
Evacuation systems

Citizen perception on NPS terror prevention and response- informed by Social media, Newspapers, TV, Internet, Direct talk with NPS, Observation, Interaction, Work stations
Overall satisfaction/lack of satisfaction

Explanation of the Conceptual Framework Terms

Mitigation: The elimination or reduction of the magnitude or frequency of terror attacks, thereby reducing the risk or loss from the occurrence of terrorist acts. Mitigating terrorism involves information sharing, taking action on warnings, formulation of anti-terrorism and disaster policies, and acquisition of necessary equipment.

Detection. This involves noticing or discovering of terrorist acts, plans, through security intelligence sharing, community policing, physical facility patrols, technical surveillance and routine screening of personnel and machinery.

Deterrence. These are measures taken by state agencies to prevent terrorist activities from being planned and /or executed, so as to explode, injure, and cause death or destruction to property. Deterrence includes punishing criminals apprehended before causing terrorist activities. Deterrence is achieved through inter-agency cooperation, pro-active planning of counter-terrorism by security agencies and communities via information sharing and prosecutions.

Response. This is the state security inter-agency actions to counter terrorist plans and acts by employing security operations to manage the terror plans and attacks. Efficient response is undertaken by combined agencies from the intelligence, military, NPS, communities and county security commissioners.

Prevention. This involves state action to prevent terrorist planning and acts from happening within its borders. Prevention of terrorist activities encompasses elimination and mitigation efforts by relevant security and administrative state departments. Prevention is a safety component that eliminates threats so as to guarantee security and

safety. In the above framework, prevention entails arrests of terrorists, adequate recruitment and training of security officers, efficient border control and surveillance management.

In every terrorism prevention and response activities, in Kenya, the NPS is a key participating institution that positively or negatively influences the deterrence, prevention, detection, and mitigation of terror attacks. The manner in which the NPS handles the preventions and responses influences the overall perception of citizens on police anti-terrorism performance.

CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

This chapter shows the research methodologies used. They include research design, study site description, target population, sample size and sampling techniques, unit of analysis and unit of observation; data collection methods, research instruments, ethical considerations and data analysis.

3.2 Research Design

Kerlinger (1964:275) defines a research design as "the plan, structure and strategy of investigation conceived so as to obtain answers to research questions and to control variance." A research design guides the research in collecting, analyzing and interpreting observed facts. This study adopted a cross sectional descriptive study which collected quantitative data and qualitative information from respondents of Nairobi County, purposefully selected from study sites including churches, open markets, malls, supermarkets and hotels.

3.3 Study Site Description

The study area was Nairobi County .The County has attracted increasing terror attacks during the past five years. The study targeted several sites purposefully selected to include churches; (Holy Family Basilica, All Saints Cathedral Church, Nairobi Central SDA and CITAM Valley Road); Hotels; (Nairobi Serena Hotel, Hilton Hotel and Ambassadeur Hotel); open markets (Kenyatta Market, Kariokor Market, Gikomba Market, Maasai Market capital centre); supermarkets (Uchumi capital centre Mombasa road, Nakumatt Mega Nyayo Stadium, Turskys T-Mall Langata Road). These selected sites have the common factor of being vulnerable to terror attacks during the past five years. In the recent past, terror attacks in Kenya have been registered during social places such as churches, hotels, open markets, shopping malls and bus stations.

3.4 Target Population

According to Borg and Gall (1983:241), a target population refers to all the members of a real or hypothetical set of people, events or objects to which the researcher is to generalize the results of the study. The target population for this study was Nairobi county residents. The target places (accessible population) included churches, hotels, open markets and shopping malls. These places were selected because they were considered to be among the most vulnerable places to terror attacks in Nairobi County.

Key informants were selected from the target places. They included administration heads, security managers, intelligence (information) managers and counter- terrorism personnel. Other key informants comprised of church presiding pastors, church elders, and security team leaders guarding social amenities. The purposively selected informants were well informed and exhibited deep knowledge and clear understanding of security matters and the menace of terrorism. Singleton (1988) defines a key informant as a contact who helps a field researcher gain entry to, acceptance within, and information about the research setting.

3.5 Sampling Procedure and Sample size Calculation

According to Singleton (1988:137), sampling procedure is that part of the research plan that indicates how cases are to be selected for observation. The researcher used simple random stratified sampling method in selecting the sites as strata and identified respective security department as sampled area of study. Then the research selected respondents purposively from selected security departments on the basis of availability and willingness of respondents. This study employed purposive sampling where the researcher used his judgment to pick respondents who best met the purpose of the study, and to determine study site. The researcher interviewed security personnel from

respective security departments. Interviews with 8 such individuals were completed from each of the 16 sites. This method aided the researcher in selecting 112 respondents and 16 key informants, knowledgeable in anti-terrorism, intelligence and information security management matters. The design also helped in the selection of the targeted vulnerable places.

Nachmias et al (1996:179) state that it is often impossible, impractical, or extremely expensive to collect data from all the potential units of analysis covered by a research problem. A sample which is a subset of the population accurately representing its relevant attributes can serve as the basis for generalization. Since the target population for this study was quite large, the researcher purposively selected churches; (Holy Family Basilica, All Saints Cathedral Church, Nairobi Central SDA and CITAM Valley Road); Hotels; (Nairobi Serena Hotel, Hilton Hotel and Ambassadeur Hotel); open markets (Kenyatta Market, Kariokor Market, Gikomba Market, Maasai Market capital centre); supermarkets (Uchumi capital centre Mombasa road, Nakumatt Mega Nyayo Stadium, Turskys T-Mall Langata Road). The total sample size was 112 respondents that include 8 respondents from each study site and 16 Key informants one from each study site.

3.6 Unit of Analysis

According to Baker (1994:102) units of analysis are "the social entities whose social characteristics are the focus of the study. Also singleton 1993:241 defines a unit of analysis as "the entity about who or which a researcher gathers information. Barbie (1995:193) adds that a unit of analysis is that which the study attempts to study". In this study the units of analysis were the public perception on NPS preparedness to prevent and respond to terror attacks in Nairobi County.

3.7 Unit of Observation

Unit of observation refers to the sources of data. In this study the unit of observation was the respondents from churches, hotels, open markets, shopping malls and supermarkets.

3.8 Data Collection Methods and Research Instruments

The study used survey method and key informant interviews. The advantage of using both methods is that while survey deal with quantitative approaches, key informant interviews complement the survey method with qualitative information. The researcher used questionnaires and key informant interview guide as research instruments. According to Orodho (2004), questionnaires have the ability to collect a large amount of information in a reasonable space of time. The interview guide and guiding questions enable one to collect qualitative data required to meet the specific objective of the study (Mugenda and Mugenda, 1999).

3.8.1 Survey Method

Survey method was used to collect desired information in an organized and methodical manner about characteristics of interest, from units of population using well defined concepts, methods and procedures. Survey involves interviewing the respondents in order to gather required data in any study and on phenomena that cannot be directly observed. The survey enabled the researcher to collect data which cannot be directly observed like feelings, facts, opinions, attitudes, beliefs and characters of the respondents. In survey method, the researcher used questionnaire as a research instrument.

Questionnaire is a research instrument consisting of a series of questions for the purpose of gathering information from respondents. The questionnaires measure separate variables with questions that are aggregated into index or scale. Questionnaires are

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typically made up of close- ended questions with specific response categories. Questionnaires enabled the researcher to gather information from the desired sample in the selected areas. Questionnaires were sharply limited by the fact that respondents must be able to read questions and respond to them. Those who could not read were assisted by the researcher to understand the questions. The close ended questions enabled the researcher to administer without elaborating the questions.

3.8.2 Key Informant Interviews

Key informant interviews are qualitative in -depth interviews with respondents who are well knowledgeable and have first-hand knowledge on a given subject matter. Key informants provide a researcher with detailed qualitative information, experiences and opinions.

Key informants offered specific, specialized knowledge on the subject of terrorism prevention and response. They offered particular perspectives on the NPS anti-terrorism prevention and response. The informants fill information gaps that the research had regarding NPS terrorism prevention and response. They helped to get honest and in-depth responses to questions on NPS prevention and responses to terrorism.

Key informant interviews were conducted to well informed and key resourceful individuals in the urban community and had valuable insights and resourceful specialized knowledge on the topic of study. For this study the researcher was concerned with public perception on state preparedness to prevent and respond to terror attacks in Kenya. The KI interviews filled the information gaps that the researcher encountered in the course of the research.

The key informants were a good source of first-hand knowledge from the identified study community. They provided honest information, sensitive and confidential issues which cannot be discussed in focus group discussions. In this study Key Informants included; Church security administrators, hotel security managers, open market security care-takers, super market security managers, shopping malls security supervisors and counter-terrorism security managers. The researcher interviewed a total of 16 key informants. In the interviews, the researcher used key interview guide as the research instrument.

The guide enabled informants to fill the information gaps that a research may have identified in the course of the field study observations. The KI interview guides helped the researcher to gather neutral information in the study topic. The researcher administered KI interview guides to Church security administrators, hotel security managers, open market security care-takers, super-market security managers, shopping malls security supervisors and counter- terrorism security managers.

3.9 Ethical Considerations

The researcher observed ethical research practices throughout the study. Permission to carry out research within the study area was sought from the relevant authorities. Confidentiality of the respondents' identity was observed by way of concealing their names and recording only their station, designation, gender, age, educational qualifications and ranks. Key informants who took part in the research maintained their right to privacy. The interview schedules were distributed to respondents and all the data collected from respondents was securely kept by the researcher who assured respondents that the findings of the study was purely for research purposes.

3.10 Data Analysis

Analysis refers to examining the coded data critically and making inferences. Analysis is the process of summarizing the collected data and putting it together so that the researcher can meaningfully organize, categorize and synthesize from the data collecting tools.

Quantitative data from questionnaires was analyzed by the researcher using the statistical package for the social sciences (SPSS) software and presented in tables, graphs, charts and narratives so as to answer the research questions. In coding, the researcher used descriptive statistics which involves frequencies and percentages. This entails classifying information and organization of data according to research questions from which conclusions were drawn.

Qualitative data was organized into themes and patterns, categorized through content analysis to capture emerging thoughts. They provided rich descriptions in response to the research questions and conclusions drawn, featuring on the effectiveness of the National police service, challenges, strengthening the NPS and seeking solutions to improving National Police Service preparedness to prevent terror attacks.

CHAPTER FOUR: DATA ANALYSIS AND PRESENTATION

4.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the demographic information, national police service preparedness to prevent terror attacks in Nairobi county, Kenyans' perception on the best approaches of the national police service in preventing and responding to terror attacks in Nairobi county, Kenyans' perception on the main challenges to the national police service preparedness to prevent and respond to terror attacks in Nairobi county, the possible solutions to the challenges facing the National Police service to respond to terror attacks. Further the chapter presents a summary of the findings and conclusion of the chapter.

4.2 Demographic Information

The study undertook to identify certain socio-demographic characteristics of respondents that could have the effect of understanding the subject of terrorism prevention and response by the National Police Service. These include age, sex, occupation, education, marital status, religious affiliation and residence of respondents.

4.2.1 Distribution of Respondents by Age

The study listed the age of the respondents. The age distribution is shown in Table 4.1 below.

Table 4.1 Age of the Respondents

Age of respondents	Frequency	Percentage
21 – 30	25	22
31 – 40	40	36
41 – 50	26	23
51 and above	21	19
Total	**112**	**100**

Source: Research (2015)

The study found out that 36% of the respondents were aged between 31-40 years, 23% of the respondents aged between 41-50 years, 22% of the respondents were aged between 21-30 years while19% of the respondents were above 50 years of age. The other group of respondents was in 41-50 year bracket adding up to 26 respondents. This group comprised of security managers, surveillance personnel, police junior and middle level supervisors, supermarket and open market caretakers and religious elders among many more urban residents.

The age distribution of respondents above, suggest that many respondents (36%) were between 31-40 years. This bracket represents the population in the urban setting that have flooded the city county in search of white-collar jobs, having completed university education or middle level colleges for close to 24 years, possibly worked on part-time jobs for 2 to 6years before joining the security related jobs of the military, police, or private security providers. Since they comprise the youthful and employable population, these members of society attended churches for religious nourishment, visit hotels for food and refreshment, enter shopping malls for household restocking and open markets among other social centers. Respondents above 51 years numbered 19% only, an indication of a diminishing trend of the aging population from of the urban social and economic activities.

4.2.2 Distribution of Respondents by Sex

The study keenly endeavored to describe the sex of the respondents and analyzed the results as shown in Table 4.2 below.

Table 4.2 Sex of the Respondents

Sex	Frequency	Percentage
Male	49	44
Female	63	56
Total	112	100

Source: Research (2015)

The research found out that fifty six percent of the respondents were female while 44% were male.

The data shows that female respondents dominated the population in the city's religious, hotel staff and clients, shopping mall and supermarket workers and clientele, and security surveillance protective service providers. That female respondents outnumbered male respondents confirms the social demographic reality in Kenyan society; that the female population exceeds male population in Kenya, a matter that portends relationship imbalances in the sociology of the family. This is supported by results of the Kenya population census of 2009.

In matters security, women are good listeners, keen traders, good mall receptionists, and excellent managers in the shopping and food industry. They flood the social urban centers while men stay back to secure the homes. Thus, the female gender dominated the respondents by more than half (56%) of the sampled population.

4.2.3 Marital status of the respondents

The study analyzed the marital status of the respondents and this is shown in Table 4.3 below.

Table 4.3 Marital Status of the Respondents

Marital Status	Frequency	Percentage
Single	27	24
Married	53	47
Separated	19	17
Divorced	6	5
Widow	4	4
Others	3	3
Total	112	100

Source: Research (2015)

The study established that 47% of the respondents were married, 24% single, 17% were separated, 5% were divorced, 4% widowed while others constituted 3% who were 2 nuns and one priest.

The data from the table above has vital indications of respondents (47%) who indicated great affinity to the call for the social institution of marriage. Those who were single by religious vocation included a priest and two Nuns. The percentages that are recognizable by marital separation add up to 17%. Respondents who could be identified by the divorce attribute are a mere 5%.

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4.2.4 Respondents' Occupation

The study sought to determine the occupation of the respondents. The findings from the study are shown in Table 4.4 below.

Table 4.4: Distribution of Respondents' Occupation

Occupation	Frequency	Percentage
Formal Employment	22	20
Informal Employment	42	38
Business (both formal and informal)	38	34
Others (religious vocations)	10	9
Total	112	100

Source: Research (2015)

The study established that 38% of the respondents were in informal employment, 34% were business persons (both formal and informal), 20% formally employed and 9% in other occupations such as house wives and religious vocations (nuns and priests).

The informal sector of occupation attracted the highest (38%) number of respondents. The private security companies that attract many security managers in hotel, supermarket, church and shopping malls fall into the informal occupation. Respondents, who associated their occupation as business, can be associated with the stalls, open market liberalized industry and small and medium level businesses. Respondents from the formal sector comprised of police officers on protective duties, counter-terrorism managers, and former military security managers and information security system managers. Only 9% of the respondents came from other occupations such as leisure, media, surveillance industry and other sensitive occupations that remain anonymous.

49

4.2.5 Respondents' Level of Education

The study required to determine the education level of the study respondents. The results are shown in Table 4.5 below.

Table 4.5 Respondents' Level of Education

Education level	Frequency	Percentage
University Level	32	29
College Level	40	36
Secondary	28	25
Primary	8	7
No formal Education	4	4
Total	**112**	**100**

Source: Research (2015)

The study found that 36% of the respondents had attained college level of education, 29% university level, 25% secondary, 7% primary while 4% had no formal education. The majority of security managers that cut across the institutions under study had obtained the minimum qualification of secondary level (25%).They were armed with many years of experience in the security and investigative docket. The respondents with university degrees (29%) were relatively young information security supervisors.

4.2.6 Respondents' Religious Affiliation

The study considered religious affiliation of the respondents. The various denominations are shown in the Table 4.6 below.

Table 4.6 Religious Affiliation

Religion category	Frequency	Percentage
Protestant	58	52
Catholic	38	34
Muslims	11	10
Others	5	4
Total	100	100

Source: Research (2015)

The study established that more than half of the respondents (52%) were Protestants, 34% were Roman Catholics, 10% Muslims while 4% were affiliated to other religious groups.

The majority of respondents were affiliated to the combined denominations of protestant Christians in Nairobi. This category professes the protestant spirit and work ethic and is followed by Catholics. The Catholic denomination respondents (34%) were not necessarily few, but rather the sampled catholic members came from one Catholic Church. Many Muslims were sensitive and declined to be associated with the subject of terrorism.

. **National Police Service Preparedness to Prevent Terror Attacks in Nairobi**

unty

ᴣ study examined Kenyans' perception of the National Police Service preparedness to

ᵥent terror attacks in Nairobi County. The results are shown in the table 4.7 below.

ble 4.7 National Police Service Preparedness to Prevent Terror Attacks in Nairobi County

reparedness to prevent ᵣror	Frequency	Percentage
₁adequate	78	72
.dequate	31	28
'otal	109	100

urce: Research (2015)

ᵢe findings indicate that 72% of respondents said that National Police Service was

ₐdequately prepared to prevent terror attacks in Nairobi County since they had failed

prevent the increasing terror attacks. Twenty eight percent of the respondents said that

₁lice preparedness was adequate given that they had managed to kill and capture a

ᵢmber of terrorists and their sympathizers. Those who said that the police preparedness

ₐs inadequate made reference to the inordinate delays exhibited by the anti-terrorism

ₐms who responded to the past grenade attacks in Nairobi Central Business District

ᵣBD).The respondents explained that the coordination was frustratingly poor noting

at:

> *"This is what demoralizes the youthful police constables who join the police only to witness great levels of inadequate training standards, depreciating equipment, and deplorable houses for both married and single officers. There are scanty resources for investigating crimes, while transportation facilities are without the necessary ingredients such as fuel and vehicle spare parts. "*

existing age old administrative and command structures call for a drastic overhaul the National government needs to open up the resource taps so that the police tution can regain its lost operational strengths. It needs jump starting and steadily eve the desired standards of preparedness to contain the threat of international irism.

ce preparedness will cut across every aspect of the service. Individual officers desire rational advancement to keep pace with the evolving digital migration in crime rol and management. They need emotional preparation by provision of prehensive insurance for individual family dependents in addition to operational paredness.

28 % who responded positively to police preparedness considered the factors under ch the police operate, yet they still can be seen to be reacting to the many attacks with le minimal degree of control.

I, (aged 55 years old male and former security operative and logistician) reckoned

> *"While the officers are overstretched throughout the republic, with the diminishing available resources, the officers have been totally overwhelmed by the internationally networked terrorists who pose threats even to the militarily super powers, the financially potent and politically powerful dominating nations of the world."*

s indicative that police overstretching has weakened NPS response time owing to the le dispositions of police outposts across the country. Diminishing resources imply t the NPS needs extra resources for prevention which the state has not provided. ving been overwhelmed implies that the NPS will need support, national, bilateral or h to handle the international threat.

Another KI. (male aged 57 years and formerly a regional security peace maker in the 1orn of Africa gave the following concerns):

> "What the police need is international support, national political goodwill, structural strengthening, and community religious strategies to fight radicalization of the vulnerable youths. These resources are what will define whether or not the NPS becomes resilient in times of disaster".

his key informant suggests that the NPS requires more than national support, prevention if radicalization of the youths goes beyond the NPS mandate. Structural strengthening nd community religious strategies is a function of relevant national department. There s thus a defined role for community involvement in assisting NPS accomplish terrorism revention and response.

.3.1 Victims of Terrorist Attacks in Nairobi County

he respondents were asked if they were victims of terror attacks in Nairobi or non-ictims. The results are as shown in Figure 4.1 below.

igure 4.1 Victims of Terrorist Attacks in Nairobi County

33%

67%

▫ victims of terror   ▫ non victims

)urce: Research findings (2015)

54

₂ study found out that majority of the respondents (67%) were victims (those who lost

ed ones or have suffered injuries following a terrorist attack) of terrorist attacks in

irobi County either directly or indirectly, while 33% felt that they were not victims

₂se respondents who have never suffered injuries or lost loved ones in a terrorist

ιck).

spondents who suffered victimization from terror attacks recounted bitter memories

the death, harm or loss of some kind of social or financial support of their kin, friend,

₂ociate or security provider. We are all victims of the terror attacks, directly or

lirectly. As a nation, we have committed huge sums of national resources to procuring

ιra anti-terror equipment to revamp the existing ones. Such amounts could be used in

velopment projects to uplift the social and economic wellbeing of citizens. There are

₂se who have lost their loved ones while fighting alongside the AMISOM troops.

milies have lost fathers, bread winners, husband, a daughter, son or source of income.

'ery Kenyan should consider oneself a victim of terror attacks, either directly or

lirectly.

₂ the national and macro level, Kenya has lost a number of its gallant soldiers,

ιlicemen, captains, commanders, foot soldiers and expensive fighting tools that have a

ιaring to the country's wage burden and tax burden on individual tax payers. Internally,

e country has lost scores of experienced policemen who have and continue to bear the

unt of terror attacks. Installations of defense and police posts have come under terror

tacks and officers and men have paid the ultimate sacrifice. We have all been victims

⁺ terror attacks. Police officers as well as soldiers have shed blood while family

embers have shed tears and continue to suffer grief leaving the sociology of the family

a loss as counselling services became handy.

.2 Citizen satisfaction with National Police Service response to terror attacks

ljority of respondents were satisfied with the way the National Police Service

ponded to terrorist attacks in Nairobi County. This is illustrated in Figure 4.2 below.

jure 4.2 Satisfaction on National Police Service Response following The

rrorist Attack

⊞ satisfied   ⊡ not satisfied

urce: Research (2015)

e study indicates that 55% of the respondents were satisfied with the National Police

rvice response while 45% were not satisfied with the NPS response.

ıta from the KI (a female security manager aged 46 years with intelligence background

d security training) indicated that:

> "*Police response can be enhanced by increased budgetary allocations to boost equipment, intelligence utilization and training. The Informant felt that the ability of NPS to carry out immediate and effective response to attacks will depend on the level of training in overall prevention preparations and corresponding rehearsals*".

ıe informant has introduced the necessity of more financial muscle as a pre-requisite

r equipment access, boosting information access and more accessible training in the

atre of terrorism prevention.

ιe respondents emphasized that for effective response, the vast majority of NPS efforts

ιst be devoted to prevention and preparations "Train hard, fight easy" is what the police

eds. The dissatisfied group of respondents heaped blame on poor tools held by NPS,

ιdequate transportation facilities, corruption, mode of intelligence given to NPS and

:k of community participation and cooperation with the police.

$.3 National Police Service Preparedness to Prevent Terror Attacks in Nairobi
ιunty

ιe National Police Service preparedness to prevent terror attacks is a continuous

ɔcess by the state and the NPS institutional agencies.

:spondents were asked to state their views on the state of NPS preparedness. The results

:re in two levels as indicated in figure 4.3 below.

ɡure 4.3 National Police Service Preparedness to Prevent Terror Attacks in
ιirobi County

45%

55%

☐ Prepared   ▣ Not Prepared

urce: Research (2015)

n the findings, the study shows that majority of the respondents (55%) were of the

ion that the National Police Service was not well prepared to prevent terror attacks

lairobi County. The attacks could have been prevented if the NPS was well prepared.

y explained that there were many and frequent terror attacks on Kenyans in Churches,

oping malls, and open markets, within Nairobi County. However, 45% of the

iondents felt that the Police Service was well prepared to prevent terrorism, adding

terrorism was a complex matter, global in scope and an evolving threat that is not

ventional, and is therefore beyond the jurisdiction of a policing service. Key

irmants indicated that NPS has done well to the extent of curbing numerous attacks

: go unreported. It is not always in the state security sectors' interest to report attacks

: might eventually compromise impending security operations. Police are not obliged

eport operational occurrences that would subsequently compromise operations.

:a from KI (a male intelligence officer aged 43 years old) indicated as follows:

> *"The security system has rules that govern the sensitive docket that believes in releasing anti-terrorism information that will be functional rather than create fear to the public. This has given room to members of the public who think that NPS is not working well since they don't understand operational matters and structures. Globally, the trend is that intelligence is released on the need to know basis"*

e above information brings to fore the need for periodic briefing of the public by the

'S spokesperson. It will suffice for the public to receive general briefings by the state

long as specifics of operational matters are left out. Briefings are the meat and flesh

public perceptions.

.4 Kenya Defense Forces Support to National Police Service in Fighting rrorism

spondents were asked what they thought of KDF support for the NPS and the results

: shown ion table 4.8 below.

ıble 4.8 Kenya Defense Forces support to the Kenya National Police Service in e Fight against Terrorism

ĨDF support to NPS	Frequency	Percentage
ιdequate support	77	69
nadequate support	35	31
ʾotal	112	100

ıurce: Research (2015)

ıe study indicates that, majority (69%) of the respondents were of the opinion that the enya Defense Forces satisfactorily supported the National Police Service in the fight ı̧ainst terrorism. Further, the study found out that 31% felt that the National Police ɜrvice receive inadequate support by KDF.

he majority view was that the police needs closer cooperation from and with the KDF ıd other security agencies so as to convincingly curb terror from within the Kenyan ɔrders. The key informants agreed that the NPS was an institution that receives support ʾom other security agencies like the Kenya Defense Forces. Majority of the respondents ɜlt that the KDF supports the Kenya National Police Service in the fight against ɜrrorism.

5. Joint Response to Terror attacks by Kenya Defense Forces and National

ce

study investigated the joint response to terror attacks by Defense forces and NPS.

results from the respondents are shown in table 4.9 below

le 4.9 Joint Response to Terror Attacks by both Kenya Defense Forces and the
ational Police Service

int support	Frequency	Percentage
nt support	73	68
) joint support	35	32
ital	108	100

irce: Research findings, 2015

; study indicates that, majority (68%) of the respondents supported joint response to

or attacks by both Kenya Defence Forces and the National Police Service, while 32%

not support the view that NPS got support from KDF.

;pondents pointed out that where such cooperation between the two security entities

; registered, terror threats were neutralized in minimal times and with minimal

ualties. Informants acknowledged that joint operations between NPS and KDF pulled

ources together. The common argument was that a joint response by the two yielded

itful outcomes as opposed to police operating separately. Informants affirmed that

nity is strength!" Joint anti-terrorism responses however call for sufficient logistical

nning as well as coordinated and sound communications.

are occasions when police operations against terror demand a joint response with KDF and other counter- terror entities. The findings indicated that Majority of the pondents confirmed they had witnessed joint response to terror attacks by both Kenya fense Forces and the National Police Service. They gave the example of Westgate or attack of 2013.Others made reference to the 1998 US Embassy bombing in Nairobi which the operations were led by KDF with support of the police.

y informants expressed the view that NPS and KDF can work jointly in harmony and der a strong anti-terrorism response against extremism. What they need is more learsals, build confidence and develop better working relationships. Data from KI (a le liaison officer, aged 40 years experienced in national defense matters) indicated as lows:

> *"The reasons for joint responses included the view that the KDF can provide the much needed aerial support to the NPS. The expert termed the joint working together as "mutual support" The NPS will tap from KDF the versatile air transport capability and air surveillance needed to support road operations. The informants however, expressed the need for streamlining of leadership issues as well as joint rehearsals ahead of any planned operations."*

le informant introduces the fact that institutions are endowed with specific roles and pabilities. He adds that leadership matters such as command levels, and joint trainings ive to be harmonized if the menace of terrorism is to be struck with a combined force mutually supporting anti-terrorism institutions.

.6 Citizen satisfaction with joint Kenya Defense Forces and National Police vice Response to Terror Attacks

: study sought to know the Citizen satisfaction with joint Kenya Defense Forces and ional Police Service response to terror attacks and the results are shown in figure 4.4

ure 4.4 Citizen Satisfaction with joint Kenya Defense Forces and National ice Service Response to Terror Attacks

Not satisfied
40%

Satisfied
60%

rce: Research findings, 2015

study established that majority 60% of the respondents indicated that they were ѕfied with joint Kenya Defense Forces and National Police Service response to terror ᴄks while 40% were not satisfied. The dissatisfied group said that the two security ᴨcies have different training backgrounds defined by respective roles. They thus have ned capacities, equipment and operational capabilities.

findings the respondents observed that the two services need to merge and establish ɛ anti-terrorism force that will train jointly and gain international exposure relating ɪe war against terror. They noted that this is what has been the missing connection.

7. Competing Interests between the Kenya Defense Forces and National Police

vice

study established that in the course of preventing terrorism Security agencies are ved differently by respective citizens. The National police Service and KDF can be 1 to channel institutional, national or competing interests.

respondents were mainly police officers who were guarding the premises, guest se and hospital situated within a church compound. The divided responses brought differences in training backgrounds, different roles and mandates. The interest of the S was described as one that takes care of internal security while KDF has the interest securing the borders of the country from external aggression. The overriding and insic training for the two security agencies is crowned by the oath of loyalty to the ion. This is the basic commandment for the men in uniform, who swore loyalty to ve to the nation.

spondents manning church premises and hotels were asked to comment on competing erests between the two services and the results are shown in table 4.10 below.

ble 4.10 Competing Interests between the Kenya Defense Forces and National Police Service

ategory of interests	Frequency	Percentage
o competing interests	88	80
ompeting interest	22	20
otal	110	100

urce: Research (2015)

e study found out that majority (80%) of the respondents indicated that there were no

npeting interests between the Kenya Defense Forces and National Police Service.

wever, 20% supported the idea that some police officers pursued personal interests

luding taking bribes as a form of corruption when out of the supervision of their

liors.

e unethical act by the policing agents was however blamed on society. The act of

rruption by some of police personnel, particularly at road blocks and border control

ints, depicted an immoral society in which corruption is almost a norm. Some officers

plained that the vice of corruption is introduced to the police recruits during

cruitment when they are asked to give money as a bribe to secure recruitment. Male

formation security management systems NPS worker, with knowledge with counter –

rorism matters summarized the policing dilemma from the perspective of interest as

llows:

> *"Another competing interest is in the area of command and control, a factor that more often favoured the KDF."*

ne aspect of competing interests by either the NPS or military has to do with what the

spective forces is trained to perform, for who, and by what standards. Given that both

e supposed to be disciplined forces, the term competing interest should not apply given

iat there is nothing but service provision.

espondents were however in support of the view that the two institutions are

rofessional agencies, guided by high discipline and ethical standards. They added that

/hen it comes to battle craft and security hierarchy the soldiers lead in defending the

orders and are complemented by internal security policing men and women.

} Terror attacks on National Police Service Personnel during the last 15 years

rmation on police personnel attacks by terrorists is a concern for the national

ernment, the police service and the Kenyan citizens in general. Respondents were

:d to state if they were aware of any terror attacks on police officers in the past 15

's. Findings are shown in Table 4.11 below.

ile 4.11 Terror attacks on the National Police Service Personnel in the last 15

ears

nowledge of attacks	Frequency	Percentage
nowledge of terror attack on police	89	79
) terror attack on the police rsonnel	23	21
)tal	112	100

irce: Research findings, 2015

e study findings indicate that majority (79%) of the respondents were aware of terrorist

icks on the police personnel during the past 15 years while 21% of the respondents

re unaware. Majority of the respondents, who said they were aware, named police

tions, outposts and police vehicles, as major vulnerable entities that were targeted

ingside police personnel.

ita from KI indicated that the frequency of attacks on security personnel, vehicles and

ier technical equipment were public knowledge, shared by the media. Further they

plained that unlike the military, the NPS is an open institution that employs several

/ilians who interact and live amongst the civilian populations. Those who responded

this question requested anonymity. Key informants provided insights into the possible

planations for police vulnerability to terror attacks.

at makes the police officers extremely vulnerable to terrorist snares and death traps
ie high levels of corruption and affinity to take bribes. Lack of integrity, working in
lship environments and coming from a corruption- prone institution of colleagues,
officer in isolated protection squad, is easily compromised with bribes by terrorists
heir agents.

my case, the officer is constantly aware that he is poorly paid, poorly equipped, and
airly treated by seniors in terms of promotion and career progression. At the end of
day, he has to provide for the family members' and meet social and financial needs.
like his colleague at the traffic road block, who exposed to collecting bribes routinely,
a way of life, the anti-terrorism police officer considers the bribery inducements as a
den opportunity though laced with deathly sacrifices. The police officer, with the
inity for bribes, is a gradual growing monster that leaves other officers and citizens at
iss roads of life and death.

ose who seemed ignorant (21%)of any attacks on the police revealed that information
attacks on police personnel is indeed guarded information that can only be released
the public after due consideration has been made. Attacks by terror militants can be
nsored information. The 21% that lacked knowledge of terror attacks on the police can
genuinely ignorant, given that not all members of the urban population can access the
adia for information. Some Kenyans including some security guards work both day and
ght and have little or no time for information seeking for instance from TV.

ie following explanations were given to understand reasons for police vulnerability.
ie first explanation is lack of proper protective gear for the anti-terror police. The
TPU requires anti-bullet-proof vehicles, armoured personnel carriers and air
juipment. When the police lack desired facilities, they can easily fall prey and bear the

nt of the attacks. For instance the police department's criminal investigative

artment was cited as one that lacks the capacity to conduct DNA identification.

pondents pointed out that there was poor coordination and strained command

icture among the police units, prompting many risks, and poor service delivery. The

nerability that is associated with the anti-terrorism police officers, within police

ions, at outposts or tents, leaves stations exposed to enemy fire.

ny police stations are exposed and need protective perimeters from this physical

nerability. The officers require fast moving transportation vehicles and aerial support

icopters that will capitalize on speed, save on time to protect, vulnerable lives at the

rcy or threat of terrorists.

is is technical vulnerability that the police are experiencing. They also need light

apons and modern anti-terror fighting resources. This is one way of strengthening the

tional police from a technical point of view.

rther, the study established that the NPS lacks adequate equipment, transport structures

d other state of the art prevention tools. This realization becomes clear when officers

gage in joint operations with regional and international anti-terrorist teams who have

tter tools. Police numbers were also below standard numbers compared to standard

lited Nations recommended working ratios. The study confirmed what (Otieno, 2013)

und out that the police: citizen ratio is 220 police officers to 100,000 people, which

inslate to one officer for every 454 Kenyans.

.9 National Police Service Preparedness to effectively respond to Terror Attacks

ta from the study established that majority (88%) of the respondents indicated that the

ice service effectiveness was below the respondents expectation, given the occurrence

many terror attacks, experienced in Nairobi in the recent past. Tensions within the

lice units were said to be endemic. For instance, there were competing interests among

;ular police, Administration police and General Service unit. The competition is on

;ources ranging from uniforms, fighting equipment, increased salaries, better welfare

· some and status on the police institutional rating. Collectively the resources were

nsidered inadequate as they were scarce. In spite of this fact, NPS had foiled many

ror attacks, information that is privileged and only passed on to the "need to know"

sis.

any of the respondents further affirmed that the police were effective in screening

urch members at the entrance as a preventive measure. Others were of the view that

e services of the police could still improve with improved equipment supply,

otivation of officers, training levels and cooperation among units. There was however

challenge in NPS transportation and provision of fuel, which was mentioned by

ajority respondents.

.3.10 National Police Service use of Intelligence to Prevent Terror Attacks

olice KI were of the view that NPS does not in many occasions get enough and accurate

itelligence to prevent terror attacks. In many instances police lacked specific

itelligence to pro-actively prevent the attacks. The NPS apportioned blame to the

ntelligence processors for giving delayed reports too late and for being too general. The

nformant preferred specific and actionable intelligence as opposed to generalized

telligence, which presents implementation challenges. Police have not therefore, been ways successful in using intelligence reports well, to prevent terror attacks in Eastleigh, ikomba and Westgate or in churches.

male Key Informant aged 55 years and currently administering operations of open arket lamented on movement of information flow to NPS as follows:

> *"There have been delays in passing intelligence information to the police, so that police can use the information in good time to deploy, avert the impending terror plans, capture or kill the militant terrorists, before they implement their evil plans."*

telligence dissemination challenges can be traced to systemic or structural challenges here intelligence traditionally is given to the bosses rather than getting to the iplementing squads. Further data from the study indicates that police used intelligence ports to disrupt terror plans though the information was not passed to the public. The udy further established that existing intelligence institutions gave general information ading to many attacks happening by surprise. Although many terror attacks go ireported, police believe that intelligence for more than half of the attacks had not been irthcoming. Thus, many respondents felt that there were delays, deliberate or otherwise, disseminating the much needed intelligence from relevant state structures all the way iwn to the constable's desk for action to avert the terror threats.

3.11 Measures taken by NPS to Protect Vulnerable Places from Terror Attacks

he survey established that the National Police Service had instituted measures to protect ilnerable institutions such as churches, supermarkets, malls, open markets and hotels om terror attacks. The study findings, suggest that majority of the respondents indicated iat the police were occasionally seen on patrol undertaking surveillance using vehicles,

orking hand in hand with outsourced security personnel. Their sniffer dogs were at

ork to detect explosives within vulnerable compounds. Respondents attested to the

<tent that Police presence was often sighted at entrance points of supermarkets within

ie CBD of Nairobi. Although they operate under stringent financial constraints, Police

'ere occasionally seen in police cars, patrolling in open markets like Gikomba. One

ecurity specialist in industrial open market administration and community policing

idicated that:

> *"Terrorist situations are not only demanding in staying vigilant, but also call for special sacrifices of nightlong surveillance, daylong consultations, and continuous review of operational field outcomes and the trickling in of intelligence about the threats".*

he informant has summarized the call of duty of the NPS operative, that calls for extra

igilance, long hours of sleeplessness continuous monitoring and review of events,

ireats and information sharing fighting terrorism is evidently no walk in the park. It is

eal events in real time.

.3.12 Terror Attacks on Police Installations during the last 15 years

lespondents were asked to state if they were aware of any terror attacks on police

istallations during last 15 years. Findings are shown in Table 4.12 below

'able 4.12 Terror Attack on Police Installations during the last 15 years

Attack on NPS	Frequency	Percentage
No terror attack on police installations	24	21
Terror attack on police installations	88	79
Total	112	100

Source: Research, 2015

e study summarizes that 79% of the respondents were aware of terrorist attacks on

ne police installations during the past 15 years while 21% were not aware. Majority

the respondents (79%) who said they were aware named police stations and outposts,

lice lorries as major vulnerable entities that were targeted. They named police stations,

lice vehicles, ammunition, guns and uniforms that were targeted for destruction.

spondents cited Mpeketoni, Pangani police station, Sukuta valley and Kapedo as case

idies where police officers and/or installations had become targets or endangered

jects for capture or destruction. A male key informant, aged 57 years and member of

: private security providers expressed reservations about the cooperation that the

mmunity affords the police officers. He express fears that:

> *"In Kenya, the war against terrorists has been left to the policeman alone, for intelligence from the community has not been forthcoming. There have been very disturbing revelations that unravel where terrorists dine with locals, are given accommodation and even escorted to the would-be locations of explosion, by the same Al Shabaab criminals".*

iere is need for a radical shift in the manner Kenyans handle strangers in their midst.

milarly, if Kenyans acted pro-actively, and shared information with authorities, police

uld have gained intelligence and avert the car explosion at Pangani police station,

airobi, in 2014 which claimed the lives of two officers. Equally the June 2014

peketoni storming of police station by terrorists could not have occurred.

3.13 Use of Information Communication Technology to prevent and Respond to error Attacks

ie study affirms that the NPS can make use of information communication technology

prevent terror attacks using electronic tools of surveillance. Key informants suggested

at police can undertake modern training and be current with use of standard, state of

e art technology equipment, to respond to terror attacks. Modern use of technical

implements of collecting and analyzing intelligence is critical to deter potential attacks via monitoring and anticipating terrorist movements. A female, information security management systems specialist aged 38 years, provided key information on use of ICT in the following perspective:

> *"Use of information communication technology to prevent and respond to terror attacks is mandatory if the war against terror is to be won pro- actively. Police have to shift from the old ways and invest in tools that use ICT in the detecting and intercepting of terrorist activities before attacks take place. ICT in intelligence gathering, at the local level, will network communities, markets, churches and streets, thereby saving time often wasted on non-digital ways of information gathering".*

Respondents added that cooperation with international bodies such as Interpol will open communication networks and use of global tools to intercept terror networks. Locally, NPS and other security bodies can employ information technology to trace terror gangs, trace terror weapons, detect and destroy terrorist activities.

The national police service in liaison with the intelligence agencies can adopt technological communication systems to monitor terrorist conversations, monitor the immigration travel documents and liaise with regional and International policing agencies to monitor terrorist movements. Locally, the physical movements of terror suspects, telephone conversations, CCTVs footage and other tools of surveillance are all vital menu of choice for the anti- terror police.

4.3.14 Unethical Practices Associated with the NPS that have affected the Fight against Terror Attacks

Respondents were of the view that some of the unethical practices associated with the NPS have negatively affected the fight against terror attacks. These include misuse of

olice helicopters to transport civilians instead of beefing up security. They named ampant corruption within the force. Informants cited instances where police officers at order points accepted bribes so as to allow terrorist access entry into Kenyan towns. espondents suggested that promotion of officers within the police rank and file was not lways done on merit. Recruitment of new officers was riddled with favoritism and ribery while infighting among the regular police, administration police and general ervice unit were experienced, some of which were as a result of unethical practices such s infidelity and the sharing of corruptly acquired loot.

youthful female legal expert and hotel security analyst gave pessimistic conclusion of nethical dimension of NPS practices and explained that:

> *"Unethical practices associated with the NPS that have hindered the fight against terror attacks included skewed treatment of police units between regular police and GSU and lack of cooperation by community members aligned to religious groups. They qualified the practices since they contradicted state regulations and morals."*

orruption at the national police service was said to be notoriously high. Suggestions ere strongly made that the Kenya police have not attained the level of preparedness to revent terror attacks with efficiency, given that corruption has penetrated the rocurement of sufficient resources.

.4 Best Approaches of Strengthening the NPS Preparedness to prevent terror ttacks in Nairobi County

.4.1 Motivation and Preparedness against Terror Attacks

ata from the respondents shows that motivation or the lack of it affects preparedness gainst terror attacks. Majority (87%) of the respondents indicated that low motivation ads to minimum delivery of services. Some police officers had fallen victim of terror

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cks and succumbed to death. Examples were registered from Mandera, Wajir, edo, Lamu and Samburu due to bureaucracy in the police service that causes arranted delays in response period.

her, the study showed that the absence or delay of an attractive insurance life policy ; not inspire officers on call of duty, in places like Mpeketoni, Kapedo and Suguta ey, where officers live are at stake. Officers need protection programs, anti-terrorism s and equipment since they are also human, have families and dependants as well.

informants added that lack of requisite protection gears contributes to eparedness against terror attacks. Improved salaries motivate officers while the ivated officers are more likely to desist from taking bribes from criminal elements.

y argued that giving police officers enough vehicles will make police response and ement easier as opposed to walking long distances to avert terror attacks especially ig night time. Also police officers working in hardship posts are supposed to be vated by giving them hardship allowances, while increasing police salaries will give i moral impetus and readiness to work without undue temptations.

ale, church administrator aged 59 and corporate investigation consultant, analyzed approaches in preparedness from perspective of officer motivation. He expressed his 's as follows:

> "On motivation levels, NPS numeration scales are generally low. They need to be increased so as to encourage the officers to be always alert and willing to report for duty, since good salaries give officers motivation for work. Additionally, police officers are supposed to have a comprehensive life insurance policy."

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has unfortunately been missing in a sector that is prone to daily life threatening risks.
n police officers face the calamity of death, they need to be assured that their loved
will be guaranteed protection, education and other social protection support
rams. The absence of an attractive insurance policy is neither motivating nor
ring for the anti-terrorist police officers.

y of the respondents were of the opinion that sufficient modern equipment, guns and
t proof vests would motivate the officers who fight terrorism. Lack of adequate
itional resources, negatively affect preparedness against terror attacks. Police
ers should therefore be given better anti-terror tools for proactive measures.

Removal of Structural Barriers

ι the study, it was felt that the removal of structural barriers will enhance the creation
rmonious working relationship within the Police units. The NPS are unfortunately
ιed with structural barriers that are both historical and dysfunctional. Police
ions as three distinct institutions namely Kenya police, GSU and the Administration
e. The Kenya police deal with crime prevention while the AP deals with
nistration support and operate in difficult environment. The GSU is a special task
which operates as a para military force. A security policy advisor in the hotel
ιtry gave a structural analysis of the different NPS departments with an emphasis on
e work and role conflict:

> *"There are grey areas that negatively affect police performance. The
> Administration police has drifted away from the core business of policing to
> performing administrative duties among villages including the taking care
> of cattle, taking care of house duties for politicians, judges and even working
> in private farms"*

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he NPS need to increase operating resources to enhance NPS capacity. The NPS lacked

urrent capacities including armored personnel carriers, adequate air transport facilities

icluding helicopters.

)perating from the office of criminal justice, a middle aged male, former prosecutor

fficer and trainer in the counter-terrorism field had the following contributions to

ddress the forensic department:

> *"To strengthen police operating ability against terrorism, the state needs
> to address the resource gaps related to inadequate policing equipment
> and provide forensic laboratories for investigation of terrorist threats."*

ata from respondents indicate that there is need to strengthen police surveillance and

itrolling capacity by providing necessary technical support, finances for operational and

gistical needs such as fuel and running costs. The state should address police

munerations of salaries, housing, police insurance and improve general working

inditions. These efforts will ultimately address the much needed police motivation.

on-interference of the leadership and command of NPS will ensure institutional

dependence in decision making, affecting all the police institutions.

4.3 Institutional Leadership

irther the study established that institutional leadership of inspector general the DIG,

e Administration police and directorate of criminal investigation require independence

d non-interference from the executive as outlined by the National Police Act

011).This will strengthen NPS internal accountability.

irtail interference in NPS operations, the state needs to implement the operations

ecommendations of the National Police Service Commission, strengthen NPS

ss on promotion, appointments and system and manner of transfer of police

rs. This will strengthen the service and particularly address corruptions in

itment and officers' career progression and career management.

state needs to guarantee the operations of the independent policing oversight

rity (IPOA) as provided for by the Act (2011). This is a significant step that will

ote NPS accountability and access to justice for all. Equally, it is pertinent to

ive the police-citizen ratio by increasing police numbers through recruitment. The

nt police capacity is constrained by limited numbers as demonstrated by current

ents of overstretched police service. The Tana River crisis, the Baragoi massacre,

'estgate attack and Gikomba attacks as well as the Mandera and Garissa attacks and

sponding NPS responses, demonstrate a police force that is not only over stretched

e also overwhelmed.

Implementation of Police Reforms

rengthen NPS, the state needs to remove barriers to full implementation of police

ns. The NPS must address the lack of compliance with the law regarding

spread corruption, bribery and favoritism. This strengthening is crucial since the

features as the most corrupt institution in Kenya. To address the challenge posed by

relationship between the police and public. The implementation of Nyumba Kumi

ommunity policing will improve police-citizen relations. Police are often accused

use of police powers to target particular members of a community-thereby

cing discriminatory policing.

5 Procurement of Support Facilities

: state needs to procure aerial support facilities such as surveillance aircrafts, transport copters and advanced screening, state of the art equipment. Need to strengthen police ning facilities and improve curriculum to match with inter-global standards including of ICT. It is also incumbent upon the state to sufficiently motivate and support police order control points so that they do not fall prey to terrorist corrupt ways.

6 NPS Budgetary Proposals

strengthen NPS, the state needs to increase NPS budgetary proposals so as to address dynamics of anti-terrorism. Further state efforts should be geared at addressing NPS ctural response systems update current anti-terrorism operating tools and equipment

improve overall security agency coordination networks with other anti-terrorist

:es.

Challenges of the National Police Service to Prevent and Respond to Terror acks

1 Challenges of state preparedness to Prevent Terror Attacks

illenges on state preparedness to prevent terror attacks can affect state security ncies such as the National police Service. Respondents were asked to state their views whether or not the NPS experienced challenges in the area of prevention as well as on)onse to terror attacks. The results are shown in table 4.13 below.

)le 4.13 State Challenges of Preparation to Prevent Terror Attacks

nallenges	Frequency	Percentage
iallenges	75	67
) challenges	37	33
)tal	112	100

irce: **Research (2015)**

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rity (67%) of the respondents were of the opinion that the state faced challenges

1 preparing to prevent terror attacks while 33% were of a contrary opinion. The data

KI indicated that challenges faced include low budgetary allocations to the police

other security agencies that work with NPS to prevent terrorism. While the budgetary

ations are low, it was also felt that even the meager allocation is not efficiently

ed for security purposes mainly due to corruption practices within the state security

ns that influence the administration of finances allocated to the policing sector.

er, from the respondents it was established that challenges afflicting state

aredness to prevent terror attacks include lack of adequate international support to

terrorism both from bilateral and global partners in security.

ing from global perspective, a male security technocrat, aged 54 years, and peace

tiator with networks in greater lake region viewed the challenges of NPS and state

aredness from national security personnel numbers to man the territorial borders. He

med that:

> *"Terrorism is a global threat and Kenya needs strong international support to curb the global threat of terrorism. Informants pointed out that Kenya has long porous borders that demand huge security personnel to monitor and defend the borders from terrorists. "*

ite of the border challenge and resource constraint the Kenyan state has consistently

ht terrorism and even pursued Al Shabaab to their stronghold in Somalia.

ondents who down played the terrorism challenge argued that institutions will

ys experience tensions, conflicts and working malfunctions that get sorted out with

2 Challenges within the NPS that Affect Response to Terror Attacks

oonses to the subject of challenges of NPS to terror attacks, was greatly contributed

ey informants and police officers who chose to remain anonymous. They included

ed security officers, and other administrative security managers for hotels, churches

malls. During the interview the Key informants concurred that major challenges

cted NPS response to terror attacks. These include lack of adequate police vehicles

rry out faster response to terror emergencies. This explained the view that the NPS

e often than not, delays in responding to terror attacks. The other challenge is lack of

juate equipment relating to anti-terror tools as well as insufficient personnel numbers

e NPS. Institutional red tape in command levels was said as the reason for delays in

onse to terror attacks.

tired senior security officer expressed NPS effectiveness in the area of response to

or attacks as consequences of institutional red tape hindrances in command levels. He

blame on bureaucracy, arguing that:

> *"Bureaucracy to a greater extent hinders the initiative of the subordinate commanders who rely on state bureaucracy before implementing decisions. It affects decision making and logistics operations among the junior officers who have to wait for word from their seniors in order to implement major actions."*

e informants familiar with logistics and administrative matters of security agencies

nded their positions hinting that the NPS has a sizable number of civilian workers

ie way from state cabinet secretary, permanent secretaries, procurement and supply

n personnel, and a chain of middle level managers in the ICT, transport, Human

urce and clerical departments. These workers live in society, are interactive and

vledgeable as respondents, or informants within the county. Other challenges

:luded low motivation depicted by poor housing, lack of cooperation and coordination th sister agencies. Police has challenges in mobilizing operational resources, monstrated by logistically hit operational infrastructure, giving rise to delayed sponse to terror attacks.

5.3 Kenya Defense Forces Challenges when Handling Prevention of Terror tacks

1 analysis of respondents shows that serving and retired KDF officers contributed to

> generation of information gathered on the above challenges. In addition, key

'ormants from hotels and churches with knowledge and experience in security matters, pressed in-depth knowledge surrounding KDF and NPS cooperation. A good number informants agreed that challenges abound when the defense forces are called upon to sist National Police Service prevent terror attacks.

gure 4.5 Kenya Defense Forces challenges in handling prevention of terror acks

e findings indicated that majority (67%) of the respondents were of the opinion that Kenya Defense Forces faced challenges when assisting police handle prevention of ror attacks while 33% were of a contrary opinion.

m the findings the main challenges relate to command differences, logistical parities, and reduced NPS personnel numbers to match the operational strengths. The i-terror prevention tools and transportation facilities are said to favour the KDF. The ning curriculums were said to vary, thereby rending differing reactions and outcomes m respective agency personnel. From the respondents, those expressing contrary nion felt that KDF is technically sound, well equipped, have sound, hierarchical and entralized command. They contend that the absence of pronounced challenges among F is what has been demonstrated by the KDF success story in Somalia where they e made great strides in fighting Al Shabaab.

Solutions to National Police Service Challenges on Prevention of Terrorism

1 Solutions to the Challenges facing NPS preparedness to Prevent Terror acks in Nairobi County

study sought to find out possible solutions to the challenges facing the NPS vention of terrorism. The results are shown in figure 4.6 below.

ure 4.6 Recommendations to address the challenges facing NPS preparedness revent terror attacks in Nairobi County

Recommendations
45%

No Recommendations
55%

The findings shows that 55% of the respondents indicated that they had no recommendations to give concerning challenges facing NPS preparedness to prevent terror attacks in Nairobi County while 45% had specific recommendations to address the challenges facing NPS preparedness to prevent terror attacks in Nairobi County. Part of the respondents who did not make recommendations on the challenges facing NPS explained that the challenges were not only technical but also sensitive.

1.6.2 Provision of Adequate Police Personnel

Inadequate police personnel numbers is a major challenge that hinders the efficient prevention of terror attacks in the country. The standard ratio of police: citizen ratio is police officer to 454 persons. Kenya's citizen-police ratio is 1 police officer for every 150 people. This is far below the recommended numbers by the United Nations. The solution to this challenge is for the National Police Service to undertake periodic recruitment so as to narrow the gap and finally guarantee Kenyans the security that the citizens so badly deserve. Respondents termed this a human resource gap that the central government needs to address urgently.

Analyzing police personnel strength from an international police: citizen ratio, a security provider in the hotel and hospitality field feared that there is an implied shortfall in the ratio of security provision and suggested that:

> "The state must undertake to protect the few police personnel in its rank and file, given that the attrition rate for police officers themselves is alarming. Police officers have become an endangered species; they bear the brunt of terrorism, banditry, cattle-rustling and road accidents. A good number of police officers leave the force through vetting, retirement and natural diseases. The government must therefore move with urgency, allocate adequate budgetary resources so as to recruit new members vigorously."

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dequate number of officers is recruited competitively, the resource gap will thus be naged as the force members will have increased the police capacity gap. Many pondents considered recruitment as a viable solution to police preparedness to tame orism.

.3 Acquisition of Adequate Investigation Tools and Equipment

licing of citizens is a task that police officers undertake while equipped with the essary tools for investigation. Police need vehicles and aircrafts to monitor the wanted criminals, internally and across borders. They need surveillance tools, chinery and appropriate training to process crime scene evidence so as to be prepared protect Kenyans from terror gangs including Al Shabaab. Many respondents proposed it the Kenyan anti-terrorist squads need specialized and international training standards as to sharpen their response skills. Another solution to the poor investigative levels is lack of forensic laboratory in Nairobi County.

former Intelligence Operative and KI who has worked with regional conflict resolution ded as follows:

> "Kenya has one of the best educated and experienced police interrogators and investigators of all shades. Our police officers have been tested while serving at peace-keeping missions where they exhibit great skills and knowledge."

le solution to improving police anti-terrorist investigations is for the state to procure propriate machines, requisite tools and establish forensic laboratories for the police, e Criminal investigation officers and the various departments that check crimes. This a broad based solution that will empower not only the police officers, the immigration partment and also the Airport and port facilities as well.

6.4 Enhancing of Cooperation and Coordination with Sister Agencies

ne of the important principles of policing is cooperation of all parties involved. Every olicing agent is endowed with specialized abilities and skills with which to undertake ecified lines of profession. Policing agencies in Kenya, that directly handle the anti-rrorism, include the Kenya police service, the national intelligence service and the enya Defence Forces. Other supportive departments include the Wildlife Service, the nmigration, and banking sectors. All the anti-terrorist agencies must of necessity ooperate in the sharing of information in addition to observing respective lines of ooperation. Respondents were unanimous that high level coordination and cooperation re key solutions to certain achievement of winning the war on terror. Data from key iformants show that efficient communication is the key to sound management of ooperation and coordination of confronting the Al Shabaab enemy from our midst. This ; what the intelligence forces must do if proper intelligence pieces have to navigate to ull implementation.

.6.5 Enhancing Capacity of Operational Infrastructures

)perational infrastructures in the criminal management world are the avenues with which erious crime is to be fought. Adequate infrastructures will almost always guarantee uccessful preparations to win the war against terror. Adequate infrastructures implies nat the policing bodies have the right equipment, vehicles, helicopters, intelligence and he necessary forensics with which to process the DNAs and all other crime scene vidence. Respondents noted that the anti-terror entities in Kenya have not demonstrated dequate operational infrastructures to satisfactorily defeat the Al shabaab militants. Data rom key informants indicated that only the KDF can satisfactorily claim to have attained perational optimum, although it still needs more soldiers, more helicopters, more irmored cars and other logistical support.

The NPS, the Intelligence agency and the criminal investigation agencies, all need extra budgetary resources with which to attain the required operational infrastructures. Adequate operational infrastructures are part of the solutions the police requires to win the war against terror.

4.6.6 Implementation of Police Reforms

Implementation of police reforms is the basis upon which Kenyan citizens will be guaranteed service from the former police force. Police reforms will help remove historical structural barriers that defined distinct wings of the Kenya police, the Administration Police and The Criminal investigation department, each of the three departments was pulled away from the other making cooperation a myth. The current police reforms promise cooperation of the three police entities as they already have one overall Inspector General. The independent police oversight authority, and police service commission, all promise changes in operational command, uplifting of low morale, carries out vetting of officers as well as promising fair treatment and promotions, eradication of corruption and allocation of more resources for equipment, recruitment and welfare of men and women. The successful completion of the ongoing police reforms is one sure way of offering solutions to winning the war against social and economic crimes, for this necessitate, adequate preparations and responses against terrorism and serious crime.

4.7 Conclusions

The study appreciates that the prevailing low motivation of NPS personnel undermined service delivery. It was explained that when police officers are well remunerated this will sufficiently motivate and discourage them from taking bribes. Police need enough vehicles to make their operational movements easier rather than walking long distances

to avert terror attacks. According to OSAC (2014), the national police service has a poor record of investigating and solving serious crimes. Additionally, the Kenya Bribery Index (2014), found out that corruption, which results in an ineffective legal and justice system, occurs at all levels. The highest rating corrupt body in Kenya is the police force, holding an aggregate index of 57 percent. Otieno, (2013) also indicated that the ratio gap translates to inadequate numbers of police officers which affects the perception of the police abilities to protect them against terror attacks, leaving both police officers and citizens vulnerable to insecurity.

The study further applauds that the Kenya Defence Forces satisfactorily supported the Kenya National Police Service in fighting terrorism and that there were joint responses to terror attacks by both Kenya Defence Forces and the National Police Service. Additionally, the study found out that there were no competing interests between the Kenya Defence Forces and National Police Service. The police need to deploy state of the art technology guns and helicopters to respond to terror attacks, swiftly and efficiently. The study established that some of the unethical practices associated with the NPS that affected the fight against terror attacks included the misuse of transportation facilities and rampant corruption, favoritism and unmerited promotions, within the NPS agencies.

On challenges of the National Police Service to prevent and respond to terror attacks, the study established that the state indeed faced challenges involving prevention of terror attacks. There were also challenges that affected response to the terror attacks. These include lack of adequate police vehicles to carry out faster response, unnecessary bureaucracy in the forces and uncoordinated command of various NPS units. Rosand, Millar and Ipe (2009) have observed that most anti-terrorism efforts in Kenya have focused on short-term security and law-enforcement efforts.

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Other challenges include lack of streamlined channels of cooperation and coordination with sister agents. The NPS experiences challenges in mobilizing resources for adequate housing and operational infrastructure. Seaman (1984), advocates for an elaborate counter-terrorism management which entails management of terror disasters, using a multi-sector approach. The task involves coordination and management of resources from the central government, local, urban authorities, business industries, non-government organization (NGOs) and international organizations.

CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

.0 Introduction

his chapter presents a summary of the findings, conclusions and recommendations rawn from the study and future study area.

.1 Summary of Findings

he study notes that the National Police Service preparedness to prevent terror attacks in airobi County is wanting. Police numbers were below standard, while corruption at the rvice was notably high. Equally, the Kenya police units have not attained the level of eparedness to effectively prevent terror attacks with efficiency given that they lack ifficient crucial logistical and operational resources. Police investigative structures lack e capacity for instance to conduct modern forensic work. Coordination among NPS ;encies is remarkably weak, coupled with strained command structures among police ;encies, a factor that leaves the NPS faced with many risks associated with terror ·evention. This portends functional strains which lead to performance gaps.

good number of respondents indicated that they were satisfied with the National Police ;rvice response to terror attacks during the past 15 years. The study found out that the ational police were occasionally seen on patrol carrying out surveillance on vehicles. 'hen undertaking this preventive task, they would work hand in hand with outsourced :curity personnel in given institutions of the county.

lany respondents held the view that low motivation among police officers was a strong ctor that affected service delivery by NPS personnel. Low levels of motivation were)parent, noting that some police officers have lost lives in service for their nation. espondents supported these views citing examples of Kapedo, Lamu and Samburu here officers lost lives due to lack of adequate protection gears. This reality inclusively affected police motivation on preparedness against terror attacks.

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in impressive number of respondents were convinced that the Kenya Defense Forces upported the Kenya National Police Service in fighting terrorism. They cited instances /here joint responses to terror attacks by both KDF and NPS were registered. This einforces majority respondent view (78%) that there were no competing interests etween the Kenya Defense Forces and National Police Service. Respondents felt that he NPS can utilize the art of information technology to prevent and respond to terror ttacks using digital surveillance technology. This facility will enhance interception of ommunications related to prevention of terror attacks.

ome respondents were critical of the conduct of police sectors and personnel. .espondents fronted the view that the NPS demonstrated unethical practices such as orruption where some officers indulge in unethical practice of seeking and accepting ribes. This has affected the fight against terrorism. Promotion among police officers /as considerably not done on merit while favoritism during recruitment of new officers /as rampant.

)n challenges of the National Police Service to prevent and respond to terror attacks, the tudy established that the state faced challenges of preparation to prevent terror attacks. ome of the challenges that hampered and affected response to terror attacks include lack f adequate police vehicles to enhance out faster response and lack of adequate anti-errorist tools. Other challenges include insufficient numbers of police officers, isufficient air support facilities to support response operations. There exists unnecessary ureaucracy in the forces and harmonized coordination command of various NPS units. nformants intimated that some of the structural challenges were a creation of new laws overning the NPS and which are a subject of impending police reforms. There are also hallenges of operational infrastructures, international training standards and equipment 1 line with evolving technology.

5.2 Conclusion

In light of the study findings, the following conclusions can be made. Majority of respondents maintained that National Police Service preparedness to prevent terror attacks in Nairobi County was poor. Many respondents perceived that the NPS was experiencing low personnel numbers, occasioned by resignations and deaths due to terrorism and retirement. Respondents maintained that the institution lacked sufficient and modern anti-terrorist equipment, skills and exposure to contemporary standards. From the findings it was noted that the NPS personnel were not well motivated in terms of remuneration and social support such as housing and life insurance. Ultimately the motivation aspect affected individual orientations towards terrorism prevention. Lack of personal and operational requirements coupled with terror attacks on NPS personnel and installations, demonstrates that the NPS is indeed vulnerable and poorly prepared to defend themselves and ultimately protect Kenyans. Given this situation, the NPS has attracted the operational support of the Kenya Defense Forces, a trend that has seen the two institutions work together to defeat terrorism. Going by the low motivation levels some officers of the policing institutions have been caught up in unethical practices such as corruption while on terror prevention duties. The vice has led to poor reputation of NPS prevention efforts by the police. Cumulatively, the current NPS performance informs public perception on the current efforts of preventing the terror menace in Nairobi.

5.3 Recommendations of the Study

The study recommends that the state should provide the NPS with adequate budgetary allocations for recruitment and training of the additional police so as to fill the gap of lacking numbers. The NPS should upgrade the training and skill development of officers to match with current international standards.

The state should formulate a viable policy to necessitate cooperation with the global community in fighting the war against terror. The state should implement the much needed reforms so as to solve the institutional structural bureaucratic bottlenecks that slow down police decision making at different levels.

The NPS should endeavour to eradicate unethical practices including bribery, corruption and favouritism reported during recruitment of police officers and during promotions. The state should further formulate a wholesome police strategy to motivate officers including financial remunerations, housing, and insurance covers so as to inspire NPS personnel involved in prevention of terrorism.

To enhance community participation, the state needs to encourage the community policing strategy of involving "Nyumba kumi" concept of identifying new comers within the local community. The state should reform and inculcate professionalism of a well-equipped police force which will attract the public's confidence in the police. It should conceive structured community policing, supported by clear roles of citizens and other stakeholders, so as to greatly encourage the public to cooperate with police thereby obtaining the much needed actionable intelligence from the local county wards.

The state should consider building forensic science laboratories at county levels to facilitate effective and efficient processing of evidence. The government of Kenya should provide the NPS with modern terror prevention equipment needed to detect terror attacks. To improve efficiency in the law enforcement and enhance intelligence gathering, the national police service should be specially trained in counterterrorism techniques and in public relations to inculcate a high degree of professionalism when dealing with the public.

5.4 Area for Further Study

A more extensive study is recommended on the subject of "factors that enhance harmonious sharing of intelligence among security agencies in Kenya". The results of the study will shade light on how security agencies will cooperate so as to access intelligence for express implementation. This will contribute knowledge in the intelligence world and anti-terrorism policy framework.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX I: QUESTIONNAIRE FOR RESEPONDENTS (MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC) ADMINISTERED AT CHURCHES, OPEN MARKETS, SHOPING MALLS AND HOTELS

How are you? I am Wilson Mosweta Nyang'aya, a student at University of Nairobi, pursuing a Masters Degree in Sociology (Disaster management).It is towards fulfilling the requirements of the program that I am carrying out a project on public perception on state preparedness to prevent and respond to terror attacks in Kenya: A case study of the national police service in Nairobi County, Kenya. The study explores how prepared NPS is to prevent terror attack in Nairobi County, how to strengthen the approaches used to prevent terror attack the challenges they encounter, solutions to the challenges. The findings of this study will be used to recommend appropriate initiatives to be provided in order to prevent terror attack in Kenya. Every piece of information shared will be used for academic purposes. The results of the research will be made available through the publication of a project paper for dissemination of findings.

THANK YOU

PART A: BACKGROUND INFORMATION

1. Please indicate your age group, in years, by ticking in the appropriate box below

Code	Age in years	Please tick here
	21-30	
	31-40	
	41-50	
	51 and above	

2. Please tick the appropriate box for your sex

Code	Sex	Please tick here
	Male	
	Female	

3. Please indicate your marital status by ticking in the appropriate box below

Code	Marital status	Please tick here
	Single	
	Married	
	Divorced	
	Separated	
	Widow /widower	
	Others Specify	

4. What is your occupation? Please tick the appropriate box

Formal	Informal	Business	Others

5. Please tick the box that best corresponds to your highest level of education

achievement

Level of education	Tick
University level	
College level	
Secondary level	
Primary level	
Others	

6. What is your religious affiliation?

Religion	
Protestant	
Catholic	
Muslims	
Others	

7. In which county were you born? Please tick the box that best describe you.

Code	Place of birth	Please tick here
	Nairobi county	
	Outside Nairobi county	

8. Please indicate by ticking in the appropriate box, the total number of years that you have stayed in Nairobi County

I	II	III	IV	V	VI
0.5	10	15	20	25	Over 30
Years	Years	Years	Years	Years	Years

9. This question seeks information about your place of residence between the period 1998 and 2013; where have you been living? Please tick in the box that best describe you.

Code	Place of childhood (first 18 years)	Please tick here
	Outside Nairobi county	
	Nairobi county	

PART B: PERCEPTION OF KENYANS ON POLICE SERVICE PREPAREDNESS TO PREVENT TERRORS

This question seeks information about state preparedness to prevent terror attacks.

10. In your opinion, how well would you say the National Police Service is prepared to prevent terror attack(s) in Nairobi County? Tick your answer below.

Preparedness	Tick
Adequate	
Inadequate	

11. If adequate, please elaborate:

....

12. If inadequate, please explain ....

13. During the past 15 years, have you or your close relatives been victims of any terrorist attack(s) in Nairobi County? Tick the answer below.

Yes (personal victim)	Yes witnessed	No

14. If yes to Question 13 above (you were a victim of a terror attack(s)) how would the National Police Service have prevented the attack(s)? Kindly explain

....

15. What were the main weaknesses of the National Police Service in preventing the terror attack(s)?

....

16. During the past 15 years, have you experienced terrorist attack(s) resulting in injury or death? Tick the answer below.

Yes	No

17. If yes in question 16, was there response from the National Police Service?

....

....

18. Were you satisfied with the National Police Service response following the terrorist attack(s)? Tick answer below.

Satisfied	Not satisfied

19. Kindly explain your answer in Question 18 above.

....

....

During the past 15 years, have you witnessed terrorist attack(s) resulting in injury or death (one answer)? Tick answer below.

Yes	No

20. If yes in question 20, was there response from the National Police Service?

Yes	No

21. If yes (there was a police response), were you satisfied with the National Police Service response following the terrorist attack(s)?

Satisfied	Not satisfied

22. Kindly explain your answer in Question 22 above

....

23. In your opinion, do you think that the National Police Service is well prepared to prevent terror attack(s) in Nairobi County?

Yes ☐   No ☐

24. If yes explain ....

25. If no Explain ....

26. In your opinion, how adequate or inadequately would you say the Kenya Defence Forces are supporting the Kenya National Police Service in the fight against terrorism?..

....

27. If adequately or inadequately in question 27 please explain?..

....

28. Have you witnessed joint response to terror attack(s) by both Kenya Defense Forces and the National Police Service?

Yes	No

29. If yes I question 29 were you satisfied with joint Kenya Defence Forces and National Police Service response?

Yes	No

30. If no in question 30, were there competing interests between the Kenya Defence Forces and National Police Service?

Yes	No

31. During the last 15 years, have you witnessed a terror attack(s) on the police (including AP, GSU, CID and regular police)?

Yes	No

32. If yes to Question 32 above, kindly explain

....
....

33. During the last 15 years, have you witnessed a terror attack(s) on police installations?

Yes	No

34. If yes to Question 34 above, kindly specify location or/and installation

....
....

PART C: BEST APPROACHES OF STRENGTHENING THE NPS PREPAREDNESS TO PREVENT TERROR ATTACKS IN NAIROBI COUNTY

35. In which areas would you suggest strengthening of police

preparedness?...

....

36. How would you describe the general welfare of police

officers?..

....

....

37. How do you describe the mode of insurance cover available for police

personnel?..

....

38. How adequate are the protective system/gears for the police officers ?

....

39. How do you explain the remunerations accorded to police

personnel?..

....

40. How harmonious are the working relationships among Kenya police, GSU,

administration police and C.I.D departments?...............................

41. How necessary are police reforms in strengthening NPS?

....

....

....

42. How would ethical considerations strengthen

NPS?...

....

43. Would you consider current police operations strengthen sufficient? Please

explain...

....

44. In what areas would police reforms strengthen NPS?

....

....

45. Does the current police structures provide fairness to general police

personnel?..

....

46. How would you consider the contribution of the community in [policing

terrorism?..

....

47. How adequate are current budgetary provisions in supporting NPS mandate?

....

....

48. How does procurement of adequate equipment strengthen NPS operations?

....

PART D: CHALLENGES OF THE NATIONAL POLICE SERVICE TO PREVENT AND RESPOND TO TERROR ATTACKS

This question seeks information about perceptions on challenges of state preparedness to prevent terror attacks

49. In your opinion, do you think that the state is facing challenges of preparation to prevent terror attacks?

Yes ☐   No ☐

50. If yes explain ....

51. If No explain ....

52. In your opinion, do you think that the Kenya Defence Forces are facing challenges in handling prevention of terror attacks?

Yes ☐   No ☐

53. If Yes elaborate ....

54. If No elaborate ....

55. In your opinion, do you think that the National Police Service (NPS) (Kenya Police) is facing challenges in preparedness to prevent terror attacks?

56. If Yes explain ....

57. If No explain ....

58. In your opinion, do you think that the National Intelligence Service (NIS) is facing challenges in preparedness to prevent terror attacks?

59.   If Yes explain ....

60.   If No explain ....

PART E: SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS CHALLENGES OF THE NATIONAL POLICE SERVICE TO PREVENT AND RESPOND TO TERROR ATTACKS

61. In your opinion do you have any recommendations to the challenges facing state preparedness to prevent terror attacks in Nairobi County?

Yes ☐   No ☐

62. If yes explain ....

63. In your opinion, what is the solution to the challenges being faced by the Kenya Defence Forces preparedness to prevent terror attacks?

....
....

64. In your opinion, what can be done to improve the National Intelligence Service (NIS) in preparedness to prevent terror attacks? ....

65. In your opinion, what is your solution to the National Police Service (NPS) challenges in preparedness to prevent terror attacks?...........................

Thank you very much for your time and cooperation, I greatly appreciate your assistance in advancing this research endeavour.

Wilson. M.Nyangaya

Masters of Arts student

APPENDIX II: KEY INFORMANTINTERVIEW GUIDE

How are you? I am Wilson Mosweta Nyang'aya, a student at University of Nairobi pursuing a Masters Degree in Sociology (Disaster management).It is towards fulfilling the requirements of the program that I am doing a project on public perception on state preparedness to prevent and prevent terror attack in Kenya: A case study of the national police service in Nairobi County, Kenya. The study explores how prepared the NPS are to prevent terror attack in Nairobi County, how to strengthen the approaches used to prevent terror attack the challenges they encounter, solutions to the challenges. The findings of this study will be used to recommend the immediate initiatives to be provided in order to prevent terror attack in Kenya. Every piece of information shared will be used for academic purposes. The results of the research will be made available through the publication project paper for dissemination of research findings.

THANK YOU

1. Date..

2. Age..

3. Sex: Male [   ] Female [   ]

4. How well are the police prepared to prevent terror attacks in Nairobi?

5. To what extent is the National Police Service Preparedness effective in responding terror attacks in your institution?

6. What have the police done to protect you and your church/supermarket/mall/open market/hotel from terror attacks? What can ideally be done? Why don't they act in the ideal?

7. Explain how motivation or the lack of motivation can affect preparedness against terror attacks?

8. How successful have the National Police Services used intelligence collected to prevent terror attacks?

9. How can the NPS make use of information communication technology to prevent and respond to terror attacks?

10. Perception of Challenges to the National Police Service preparedness to prevent terror attacks in Nairobi County

11. In your opinion what unethical practices associated with the NPS have affected the fight against terror attacks?

12. What challenges within the NPS hamper or affect response to terror attacks?

13. Perceptions on best approaches to strengthen National Police Service preparedness to prevent terror attacks

14. What are the best options of improving the National Police Services to protect citizens against terror attacks?

15. What would you suggest as solutions to improve the NPS capacity to effectively to terror attacks?

16. Explain how NPS can improve on use of intelligence to prevent terror attacks?

17. How can the collaboration between the NPS and other security agencies be enhanced in order to prevent terror attacks

18. Explain how the NPS can utilize the community to prevent terror attacks?

19. How can the various national police service units (GSU, AP, regular police, CID) be utilized to prevent terror attacks?