UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI

FACULTY OF ARTS

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY AND ARCHEOLOGY

AFRICAN SUB-REGIONAL BODIES IN ARMED CONFLICT RESOLUTION: THE CASE OF IGAD IN SUDAN 1994 – 2005

BY
MWILU LEONARD MUMBI

A PROJECT SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS IN ARMED CONFLICT AND PEACE STUDIES AT THE UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI

APRIL 2010

Cd225984

AFR
JZ
5584
·S8M9

DECLARATION

This is my original work and to the best of my knowledge has not been submitted for a degree to any other university.

_____   26/04/2010
MWILU LEONARD MUMBI   **DATE**

This project has been submitted for the examination with our approval as University Supervisors.

_____   13th May, 2
PROF. VINCENT SIMIYU   **DATE**

_____   15/06/2010
DR. KENNETH OMBONGI   **DATE**

i

DEDICATION

To my departed dear friend and best man Yorams Siame who never lived to enjoy the fruits of his labour. He was a great man.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

ABSTRACT

Achieving peace through mediation and negotiation in Africa has come with many challenges. In recent years, Africa's sub regional bodies have emerged as institutions of mediations in armed conflicts on the continent; Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has intervened in some countries in West Africa such as Liberia and Sierra Leone and Intergovernmental Authority on Development in Eastern Africa in Somalia and Sudan respectively. Increasingly, sub regional organisations have emerged as alternatives to the African Union (AU) and United Nations (UN) in conflict resolutions and management.

There are many generalizations that have been made that make it possible for the sub regional bodies to be effective in armed conflict resolutions. One of them is that these sub regional organisations are made up of countries directly involved in a conflict and those that are not. As a result, they have the proximity and at the same time the sense of balance that allows them to specifically define the nature of the conflict. In addition, political and geographical proximity allows these organisations to realise the effects and repercussions of a given conflict and if necessary, to seek support from extra regional sources to end the dispute.

The argument of this paper is that there is no historical standard explanation as to why African regional bodies have increasingly provided panacea to conflicts. The study postulates that each region has unique dynamics, historical or otherwise, global or local that has to be explored in order to understand the recent conflict resolution success by African regional organisations such as ECOWAS in Liberia, Southern African Development Community (SADC) in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) or Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in Sudan.

The study therefore attempted to assess the success of IGAD's interventions in the Sudan Peace Process with a view to understanding how and why it succeeded in brokering a peace deal. It has brought out Eastern Africa's political, economic and idiosyncratic dynamics that enhanced the prospects of the signing of the Sudanese Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Nairobi, Kenya in January 2005.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AU-Africa Union

CPA-Comprehensive Peace Agreement

DoP- Declaration of Principles

DRC-Democratic Republic of Congo

DUP-Democratic Unionist Party

EAC-East African Community

ECOMOG- Economic Community of West Africa Monitoring Group

ECOWAS-Economic Community of West Africa

EPLF-Eritrea People's Liberation Front

GoK-Government of Kenya

GoS-Government of Sudan

ICG-International Crisis Group

IGADD-Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development

IGAD-Intergovernmental Authority on Development

NDA-National Democratic Alliance

NGO-Non Governmental Organisations

NIF-National Islamic Front

NUP-National Unionist Party

OAU-Organization of African Unity

OLS-Operation Lifeline Sudan

RCD-Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie

SADC-Southern African Development Community

SPLA-Sudanese People's Liberation Army

SPLM-Sudanese People's Liberation Movement

TPFL-Tigray People's Liberation Front

USA- United States of America

WORKING DEFINITIONS

Conflict: The state of opposition, disagreement or incompatibility between two or more people or groups of people, which is sometimes characterized by physical violence. Military conflict between states may constitute war.

Conflict Resolution; The process of resolving a dispute or a conflict by providing each side's needs, and adequately addressing their interests so that they are satisfied with the outcome.

Mediation: An informal/formal, voluntary process intended to resolve conflicts through talks/discussions with parties, without resorting to arbitration or litigation, by using an impartial third party. Mediation may culminate into signing of a formal agreement.

Negotiation: A process in which interested parties resolve disputes, agree upon courses of action, bargain for individual or collective advantage, and/or attempt to craft outcomes which serve their mutual interests. It is usually regarded as a form of alternative dispute resolution.

Peace Process: Consist of a span of negotiations and mediations among and between parties to the conflict with the aim of reaching an agreement. It usually takes the form of signing of a binding document.

Peace Agreement: A formal arrangement entered into by warring parties to explicitly regulate or resolve the basic incompatibility and agree to work together.

Third Party: Someone, government or organisation other than the principals directly involved in conflict, a transaction and/or agreement.

Courtesy of Inforbase limited, 2007

N

24   30   36

24   24

Sudan

Eritrea

Djibouti

Ethiopia

18   18

Somalia

Uganda   Kenya

12   12

IGAD Nations

6   6

- - - - International Boundary

Created by Arab Atlas

24   30   36

CHAPTER ONE

1.1 INTRODUCTION

A brief look at some documented historical and current information on the issue of post colonial Africa shows that the continent has experienced a lot of violent conflicts and civil wars. Some of these wars have been very difficult to resolve while others have been successfully resolved with Sudan being among the latest cases. The conflict in Southern Sudan has been devastating to both the nationals of Sudan as well as people of neighbouring countries. Millions of people in Southern Sudan have been displaced and are living either as internally displaced people or as refugees in neighbouring countries.

There had been a lot of peace efforts conducted in Sudan in order to find a lasting solution of bringing peace but to no avail. In recent times, it has emerged that African Sub regional bodies such as Southern African Development Community (SADC), Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS), Inter Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), have taken prominence in trying to resolve armed conflicts in Africa. The most recent being the major role that IGAD played in the peace process in Sudan that eventually led to the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement(CPA) in January 2005 in Nairobi, Kenya.

According to Kwanje Samson, the search for peace in Sudan can be traced back to 1947 when the British first established a policy for the South in the closed Districts Ordinance of that year. The ordinance provided for the eventual political independence of the South from the North.[1] These many attempts of finding a lasting solution to peace in Sudan can be categorized in phases.

The first phase was between 1947 and 1972. This included the Juba Conference of 1947, the Khartoum Round Table Conference of 1965, and the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972 that addressed the Anyanya War of 1955 to 1972[2]. These meetings discussed the

---

[1] Kwanje S.L., "The Sudan Peace Process: From Machakos to Naivasha" in Mwagiru M. (Ed) *Africa Regional Security in the Age of Globalization*, Nairobi, Heinrich Boll Foundation, 2004, P.97.
[2] Ibid

problems and influences of war in Sudan. However, no tangible agreement was reached. The participants and the papers presented revealed that during the period 1947 and 1972 Sudan was becoming more divided than before. In addition, hostilities and war continued between the South rebels and the government in the North. This later resulted in phase two of deliberations and negotiations lasting from 1985-1988.

The period from 1985 to 1988 addressed the attempts made by the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLM/SPLA) after the start of the war in 1983 and before the National Islamic Front (NIF) government of Omar El Bashir ascended to power through a military coup.[3] The SPLM/A was formed in 1983 and the NIF was founded in 1979 and have dominated the politics of Sudan for some time now. This phase of negotiations did not include any external mediation as the previous one since it was entirely initiated by the Sudanese themselves. The peace negotiations during this period did not yield any significant agreement or settlement.

Phase three was from 1988 to 1992; this began with the NIF government initiating the talks. It included direct talks between the SPLM/A and NIF government. No progress again came out of the talks. The mediation of United States of America (USA) former president Jimmy Carter was subsequently secured but nothing came out of the talks as well.[4] In May to June of 1992, the Abuja 1 Peace Process was formed under the mediation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) with President of Nigeria, Ibrahim Babangida by then as chairman of the talks.[5] An agreement was reached and a communiqué was issued at the end of the negotiations.

The Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) stepped in to mediate a new process of peace talks between the government and the SPLA/SPLM at the annual IGADD summit in the late 1993.[6] This marked the beginning of phase four

---

[3] Kwanje S.L., "The Sudan Peace Process: From Machakos to Naivasha" in Mwagiru, M. (Ed) *Africa Regional Security in the Age of Globalization*, Nairobi, Heinrich Boll Foundation, 2004, P.97.
[4] Ibid pg. 99
[5] Ibid pg. 101
[6] Woodward P.,*The Horn of Africa: Politics and International Relations*, London,Tauris Academic Studies,1996.p.23

2

with Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) as the main mediator and principal negotiator in the Sudan armed conflict. IGAD superseded the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) which was established in 1986 by the then drought afflicted six Eastern Africa countries of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. The State of Eritrea was admitted as the seventh member of the Authority at the 4th Summit of Heads of State and Government in Addis Ababa in September 1993.[7]

The period 1993 to 1994 saw IGADD re-inventing itself as a body for regional security and development and formed a sub-committee made of Ethiopia, Eritrea, Uganda and Kenya to broker peace agreement in Sudan and Somalia. The role of IGADD was then redefined and the title shortened to IGAD, which then signalled its mandate towards conflict prevention and resolution among other terms of its mandate.[8]

IGAD then furthered negotiations for peace with the appointment of a new Special Envoy Lieutenant General Lazaro Sumbeiywo of Kenya. Under the Sumbeiywo leadership, the ambassadors of Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda met in Kenya and formed a new team of regional mediators that brought IGAD to its first diplomatic victory which was marked by the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in January, 2005 in Nairobi, Kenya.

This study endeavoured to find out the active role that IGAD played in the Sudanese peace process from 1994 to 2005. The study identified factors that made it possible for IGAD to successfully bring the warring parties to the negotiating table and finally sign the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005. In addition, the study also tried to justify clearly that the CPA was the work of IGAD.

---

[7] www.igad.org   accessed on 23/10/05
[8] Mwagiru M "Africa Regional Security in the Age of Globalization" in Mwagiru M (Ed) *Africa Regional Security in the Age of Globalization*, Nairobi, Heinrich Boll Foundation, 2004, P.97.

1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Africa's longest civil war has been experienced in Sudan with nearly two million deaths. In other Eastern African countries such as Kenya and Uganda, a substantial number of refugees from Sudan have created a sense of insecurity and put a burden on the meagre resources of these countries.

Africa is a host to a number of regional organizations that have taken upon themselves the responsibility to ensure peace and stability in addition to political and economic objectives in their respective regions. The organizations being referred to include the ECOWAS, SADC, IGAD in the Horn of Africa, and the East African Community (EAC). At the continental level, the sole organization which has this inter alia mandate is the African Union (AU) formerly called Organisation of African Unity (OAU)

In recent years Africa's sub regional bodies have emerged as institutions of mediation in armed conflicts on the continent. ECOWAS has intervened in some countries in West Africa. These countries include Liberia in 1990/91 and Sierra Leone in 1997/98. On the other hand IGAD has also played a major role in Eastern Africa particularly in Somalia and Sudan. Increasingly, regional organizations have emerged as alternatives to the AU and United Nations (UN) in conflict resolution and management.

There are many generalizations that have been made that make it possible for sub regional bodies to be effective in conflict resolution. Firstly, these sub regional organizations are made up of countries involved in a conflict and those that are not. As a result, they have the proximity, and at the same time the sense of balance that allows them to politically define the nature of the conflict. In addition, political and geographical proximity allows these organizations to realize the effects and repercussions

4

of a given conflict, and, if necessary, to seek support from extra-regional sources to end the dispute.[9]

The argument of the study is that the above-mentioned general factors would not necessarily be used as being the yardstick or measuring rod for the success of sub regional organizations in armed conflict resolution. The reasons that make it possible for each particular sub region to succeed depend on particular environment. In addition, the strategies that ECOWAS employed in resolving the conflict in Liberia and Sierra Leone were not the same as that SADC and IGAD employed in trying to resolve the crisis in the DRC and Sudan respectively. This study will try to explain the uniqueness of the IGAD peace process in Sudan from 1994 to 2005. The essence is to find out the major factors and strategies that shaped the Sudan Peace Process with a view to understanding how and why IGAD succeeded in brokering a peace deal when many organizations and individuals had tried in the past and failed.

According to Okoth Godfrey, IGAD had been dominated by Kenya and especially during former President Daniel Torotich arap Moi's era.[10] This could have created a danger of over dependence on hegemonic power in the sub region to mediate and sponsor the negotiations. The personal ability of IGAD residents and certain eminent officials mattered most during the Sudan peace process. The study will add data to the already existing on the personal abilities of eminent persons in Kenya who were involved in the Sudan peace process.

The gap that this study seeks to fill is how IGAD influenced and affected the nature, scope and dynamics of the peace process from 1994 to 2005. The study also contends that while IGAD was trying to conduct the negotiations, there were other national, sub

[9] Karuru,N, "Conflict Prevention : Responses by Sub regional Organizations and Civil Society in Eastern Africa" In Schnabel Albrecht & Carmet David(ed), *Conflict Prevention: From Rhetoric to Reality: Organisations* and *Institutions*, Maryland, Lexington, Books, 2004.p.94
[10] Okoth G. 'Regional Institutional Response To Security in the Era of Globalization' in Mwagiru M. *African Regional Security in the Age of Globalization* ,Nairobi, Heinrich Boll Foundation,2004,53

regional and international issues as well as personal abilities that were dictating the mediation process.

The study also contends that most of the failed peace talks in the Sudan were not always successful because of the Cold War situation, which pitted the Soviets against the Americans. There was always intervention from either side. Now post Cold War era had created conditions for the neighbouring countries under the umbrella body of IGAD to be part of the peace process. The study will discuss methods, strategies and skills that were used in the negotiation and mediation in the Sudan peace process.

1.3 GOAL AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY
The goal of this study is to investigate the significance of Africa's sub-regional bodies such as IGAD in armed conflict resolution. In order to achieve this, two objectives emerge:
1. To assess the role of IGAD mediation in the Sudan Peace Process.
2. To identify the factors that made the IGAD mediation process successful.

1.4 JUSTIFICATION OF THE STUDY
The largest country in Africa, Sudan adjoins eight countries, lies astride the Nile River and borders on the Red Sea; it is one of the few countries on the continent with assumed abundant oil reserves. However, the country has never experienced proper peace since its independence in 1956 from Britain. Nevertheless, there have been periods of intermittent peace but the civil war has raged on for a long time.

The case of IGAD in finally brokering peace in the Sudan for a case of study will offer an insight into how sub-regional bodies such as IGAD can be used as tools in resolving and managing conflicts in Africa. The choice of Sudan as the country of study is that the civil war has been the longest in Africa and a lot of effort had been put to bring the warring parties to signing peace agreement but always ended up in failure.

The year 1992 to 2005 is the period when IGAD mediators took an active role and centre stage in the peace process. This in turn offers an opportunity of looking at the factors,

conditions and strategies of mediation applied by IGAD that made it possible for the SPLM and the Government of Sudan (GoS) to sign the peace agreements.

IGAD and the Sudan have been chosen because for the first time in the history of African conflict resolution, a sub regional organisation played a major role in bringing the warring parties to the negotiating table and eventually signing a series of peace agreements from 1994 until 2005 when the CPA was signed.

Finally, IGAD region contains states that belong to three different conflict systems; the Horn of Africa, East Africa and Great Lakes Region. Secondly, the region contains two important sub regional organizations, IGAD & EAC and it also hosts the headquarters of the continental organization AU and the forth global UN headquarters[11]. Finally, IGAD region contains states that are characterized by sharp differences in political, economic and social systems and the states have different forms of government. It forms an interesting subject of analysis to delve into considering the effectiveness of sub regional bodies in armed conflict resolution.

1.5 SCOPE AND LIMITATION

This study was focused on the role of negotiation and mediation that IGAD played in resolving the conflict in Sudan. In addition, the study also analyzed some selected peace agreements signed since 1994 with a view to understanding how and why IGAD managed to convince SPLM and GoS which eventually led to the signing of the CPA in 2005[12]. Furthermore, due to financial constraints, it was not possible to go to Sudan to do field work there. The research was therefore focused on study materials from the libraries and interviews in Kenya.

---

[11] Mwagiru M "Africa Regional Security in the Age of Globalization" in Mwagiru, M. (Ed) *Africa Regional Security in the Age of Globalization*, Nairobi, Heinrich Boll Foundation, 2004, p.11.

[12] IGAD; *Sudan Peace Process; Comprehensive Peace Agreement(CPA)*, Nairobi, 2005

1.6 LITERATURE REVIEW

There is a lot of literature available about negotiations and signing of peace agreements on Sudan. However, this study confined itself to the literature that put emphasis on mediation and negotiation within the study period 1994 to 2005. The literature review is also divided into two parts; articles and books.

Articles

The Institute of Security Studies articles in the Occasional Paper of February, 2004, "The IGAD Peace Process: Sign Posts for the Way Forward" by Rufaro James argue that the strength of the IGAD peace initiative, particularly during its later stage, had been its clarity in identifying the key issues at the core of the conflict, and then bringing that to bear on the necessary political and technical resources, including international pressure.[13]The article further elaborates on the plausible conditions that forced SPLM and GoS to get to the negotiating table. It also alludes to the fact that in the present situation, IGAD would be the right partner to deliver a peace deal to the Sudanese. The article really tries to justify that the most appropriate institution to move forward the peace talks in Sudan was IGAD. However, the article does not mention core issues that were identified during the negotiations and used as bargaining situation for striking the peace deal between SPLM/A and GoS.

Korwa Arnold has written a lot on the mediating process by IGAD in the peace talks in Sudan. In one of the articles 'Conflict Resolution in the Sudan' has mentioned that a major weakness of the peace process stems from the prevailing logic of the IGAD mediators, which has been to limit the negotiating parties to the GoS and SPLM/A only.[14] This is partly on the grounds that this would simplify an already complicated process and also reduce the threat to the viability of the process by bringing in additional groups. The article further states that IGAD had adopted the policy of isolation by only negotiating with SPLM/A and GoS without involving smaller parties from the north and south of Sudan. It is a very good article that gives credit to the role of IGAD in the peace process.

---

[13] The ISS Occasional Papers, "The IGAD Peace Process: Sign Posts for the Way Forward" February, 2004.

[14] Korwa, A. 1999. 'Conflict Resolution in Sudan' Conflict Trends, No 3. Durban: ACCORD

The article further outlines some strengths of IGAD at the expense of mentioning the strategies and techniques that were employed during the negotiations.

Timothy Carmey in the article "Special Report on Sudan" has stated that an evaluation of resolution of conflicts on the continent shows that very little success has been achieved with some problems being more prominent than others.[15] Principal amongst these is the dominant trend of outsiders like IGAD to attempt and influence the process of resolution to their interests sidelining and or worse ignoring local ideals. The article further goes on to argue that this is done by IGAD through withholding support for initiatives that may result in undesired outcomes but that are supported by a majority of the people in both north and south of Sudan. For one the article does not analyse the peace process as conducted by IGAD in details. It fails to examine the role that local people played in the peace process. There is lack of analysis in this article because IGAD had utilized the information from the locals to influence the peace process.

Amani M. Obeid, a Sudanese from the South, in the article "Sudan Political Chronicle 2003" has argued that the Khartoum government suggested that IGAD take up the Sudan Peace Negotiations. This came about because of the failure and eventually collapse of the Nigerian Peace Process of the early 1990s[16].The article clearly discusses the reasons that led to the failure of any tangible peace deal in the early 1990s. He further states that IGAD countries had their own interest in containing the Sudan war. Admittedly, this article discusses the peace processes and negotiations from Machakos to Naivasha. However, the weakness of this article is that it does not give the reasons why the GoS finally agreed to have IGAD as the main mediator. In addition, Obeid's assertion that certain countries had other interest in containing the Sudan war without saying what these interests were is a point to delve in. Finally, the fact that the article proposes that IGAD is the best option to deliver a peace deal in Sudan without explaining the mechanisms or strategies that IGAD had to use in the peace process leaves a gap to be filled.

[15] Timothy Carney, United States of Peace " Special Report on Sudan" 2005
[16] Amani,M.O. "Sudan Political Chronicle 2003",No.16",Nairobi,IFRA 2003

In his article, "Ties That Will Not Bind", Peter Nyot has suggested a number of scenarios as possible peace settlement in Sudan.[17] These peace settlements include federation, confederation and partitioning. He further elaborates that if one of the three is not agreed upon; the peace settlement is likely not going to be reached. The article's analysis comes from the fact that there have been many peace deals in Sudan that were not eventually honoured. These peace deals include the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972 and the Koka Dam Agreement of 1985. The article lacks the information on the importance of IGAD as an external negotiator whose mediation strategy depends on the active participation of SPLM/A and GoS. Lastly, the article fails to substantiate the reasons for the existence of such scenario and it fails to explain which party between SPLM/GoS would advocate for one of the scenarios and the role of the mediator IGAD.

The International Crisis Group (ICG) states that IGAD and the Arab League could easily initiate negotiations between the GoS and SPLM/A. The report gives the credibility that the success of signing the peace agreement depended on the combined effort of IGAD and Arab League.[18] It further goes to make an analysis that as much as it was possible for IGAD to initiate the peace process, the organisation lacks the necessary mechanism to compel the warring parties to the negotiating table. Admittedly, this is an extensive article that dwells on the impact of the Sudanese conflict and the importance of finding lasting peace in Sudan. However, it should be mentioned here that IGAD has its own mechanisms that it used in brokering a peace deal in Sudan and this study will provide data on the mechanisms that IGAD used to bring the warring factions to the negotiating table and signing the CPA in January, 2005.

Books

John W. Herberson and Donald Rothschild contribute to analyzing that the sub regional bodies such as ECOWAS, SADC, and IGAD were created to foster economic

---

[17] Nyot P, The "Ties That Will Not Bind," In Nyong'o P. A, *Arms and Daggers in the Heart of Africa,* Studies on Internal Conflicts, Nairobi, Academy Publishers, 1990.
[18] International crisis Group, *"God, Oil and Country: Changing the Logic of war in Sudan",* ICG Report, 39, Brussels, December 2002.

10

development in respective sub regions.[19] They also argue that the OAU has always been the major multilateral African forum for the conduct of negotiations to deal with conflicts across the continent. The book puts a lot of emphasis on the importance of sub regions fostering economic development but lack the information on the shift from the AU to sub regional bodies such as IGAD in conflict resolution. It also lacks explanations on the mechanisms that IGAD has put in place in resolving conflicts in the region. The study will discuss the strategies and mechanisms that IGAD has put in place as tools to resolve conflict.

Sam G. Amos suggests that any regional organization such as IGAD as a third party in conflict resolution has its own values, interests and objectives in the settlement of a conflict.[20] He also states that the neighbouring countries that belong to such a body have interests to safeguard. These interests range from security to economic development. It must be appreciated that foreign intervention has always played major role in ending conflicts in Africa. Amos' argument is based on the realist theory that neighbouring countries of a state in conflict will always want to protect their interest. In return these countries such as neighbours to IGAD will do anything to have peace in Sudan. However, the argument lacks the explanation on the role and the bargaining situation that is likely to be used in the negotiation and mediation process by sub-regional bodies, in this case IGAD.

Lesch Ann Mosley mentions the role the OAU and the US played in bringing together the GOS and SPLM in 1992.[21] In addition, she argues that foreign mediation has played only a marginal role in the Sudanese conflict and that the AU Chairpersons had consistently tried to promote mediation during their one-year term in office. She further elaborates on the role that Nigeria had played in trying to broker a peace settlement in Sudan. She further mentions that proper mediation in the Sudanese conflict requires the efforts of the

---

[19] Herberson, J. W & Rothchild, D. *Africa in World Politics: The African State in Flux*,Colorado,2000
[20] Amos Samson," Role of OAU: Present, Past and Future", in Smock D.R(Ed) *Making War and Waging Peace: Foreign Interventions in Africa*. Washington, D.C, United States Institute of Peace Studies, 1993.
[21] Lesch, M.A,"External Involvement in the Sudanese Civil War" in Smock D.R. (Ed) *Making War and Waging Peace: Foreign Interventions in Africa*. Washington, D.C, United States Institute of Peace Studies,1993

external mediation such as Arab League or IGAD. The argument leaves out the methodology or techniques that have to be employed by IGAD or Arab League in achieving peace in Sudan. Therefore, the study will discuss these techniques and methodologies that were employed by IGAD in the Sudan Peace Process.

Zartman William states that conflict in Africa becomes more than just historically or politically interesting when it is examined for some general lessons other than crisis management and conflict resolution. It is presumed that there is frequently a great American interest in conflict resolution than in seeing one side win and that conflict resolution is made possible by a "ripe moment," defined in terms of escalation that can best be understood in the context of policy alternatives.[22] In this case the mediator needs both to find a formula that meets the parties' demands and to manipulate the conflict-verbally or materially- in order to mediate effectively. In spite of his immense contribution to Sudanese history, Zartman leaves out some gap that needs to be filled. It is incumbent upon this study to delve into the Sudan Peace process and see if the "ripe moment" had come for Sudan and also establish the fact that the mediation strategy used by IGAD in the mediation process were based on the "ripe moment" as well as American influence.

Teferra Shiawl-Kidanekal has alluded to the fact that the IGAD success for Sudan peace Process has been kept alive, thanks to the collaborative input of the OAU and the UN.[23] The analysis further goes on to cite examples of success stories of the OAU and UN in conflict prone countries such as Liberia and Angola. The success stories in the mentioned countries are a good sign of how effective the UN and AU have been in achieving peace. As much as the input from the outside world was offered to IGAD, the bottom line still remains that IGAD used its own developed strategies to mediate in the peace process. The study will therefore bring out and fill the gap of explaining how IGAD managed to bring the warring factions together to a peace deal.

---

[22] Zartman W. I., *Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa*, Oxford University Press,1989
[23] Shiawl-Kidanekal, T. 'Conflict Prevention and Management in Africa', in Schnabel, A. & Carment, D. *Conflict Prevetion:From Rhetoric to Reality; Organizations and Institutions*, Maryland, Lexington Books,2004

1.7 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Two traditions of thought dominate the war and peace: Realism and Idealism

Realism

Realism is most influential amongst political scientists as well as scholars of international relations. Realists emphasize power and security issues, the need for a state to maximize its expected self-interest and above all their view of the international arena as a kind of anarchy, in which the will to use power enjoys primacy.[24]

The external intervention of neighbouring countries into the internal affairs of another state can be understood only through this theory, which accounts for the security and national interest. IGAD as a sub regional body has been used by countries neighbouring Sudan to find a lasting solution to the war in that country in order to guard their interests and security. In reference to war, realists believe that it is inevitable part of an anarchical world and that once war has begun; the state ought to do whatever it can to win.[25] In other words, if the nation realizes that the war cannot be won as was in the case of Sudan after 1990, then there was no need of continuing fighting.

The realist theory is relevant in this study because of its emphasis on states, territorial sovereignty, security and interests. Realists argue that every state, whether industrialized or not, has vital interests which it always aims to preserve against other states and that the nature of the national interests that must be preserved at all costs is open to various interpretations.[26]Realism has articulated a conflict management approach based on strategy and use or threat of force to maintain peace. While acknowledging that force was not used in the Sudan Peace Process, it should be understood, however, that the countries making up IGAD had interests to preserve peace because the war in Sudan threatened their respective interests.

---

[24] Morgenthau H. J.,*Politics Among Men: The Struggle for Power and Peace* New Delhi,Kalyani,2001,p.3
[25] ibid
[26] Ogot and Okoth P.G.,*Conflict In Contemporary Africa*,P.10

IGAD has in practice brought the different dimensions of security under its mandate. It began with the liberal definition of security before broadening its scope to include what are arguably realist dimensions of security.[27] The Authority was conceived with conventional, realist security issues like armed conflict at a secondary level and as a by-product of security social-economic sphere.

Idealism

Walzer Michael offers an argument against realism as far as state interests are concerned. He contends that states are in fact responsive to moral concerns, even when they fail to live up to them.[28] According to Walzer, since states are creations of individual's persons, they strive to have an ideal world situation. Therefore, the idealist theory is also relevant in this study because it put emphasis on morality and justice. It further states that all political leaders are expected to act justly and morally upright in the way they govern their people and the way they relate with other states. The countries in the IGAD region felt a moral responsibility to act justly and help Sudan.

The study utilized both theories, realism analysed the role that states in the region have played in conflict resolution and idealism looked at the whole peace process in Sudan as conducted by IGAD as an ideal situation possible.

1.8 HYPOTHESES

The following hypothesis was tested;

1. African sub regional organisations are better placed to resolve armed conflicts as was the case of IGAD in the Sudan Peace Process.

2. The Sudan Peace Agreement was possible because of the conditions of the post Cold War era.

---

[27] Chweya L, "Emerging Dimensions of Security in the IGAD Region" in Mwagiru M. *African Regional Security in the Age of Globalization*, Nairobi, Heinrich Boll Foundation, 2004. p. 34
[28] Walzer, M, *Just and Unjust Wars*; New Haven, Yale University Press,1996 p.19

14

1.9 METHODOLOGY

Both primary and secondary data were used for this study, but it relied mostly on secondary data. For primary data, it consisted of interviews with some relevant personalities working with the SPLM and IGAD in Nairobi, Kenya and staff from the Sudanese Embassy. Since the Kenyan Government played a major role in the mediation process, some eminent persons that participated in the Sudan Peace Process were also interviewed.

Secondary data was used as supplement to the primary data; it included materials such as books from the Libraries such as American Embassy Federal Library, Institute Francais de Recherche en Afrique (IFRA) Library and University of Nairobi, Library. Public and official records from the SPLM Secretariat, Sudanese Embassy, and the Kenya Ministry of Foreign Affairs were also other sources of information. Other sources of secondary data included information from IGAD website and other useful websites.

CHAPTER TWO

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO THE SUDANESE CONFLICT

2.1 INTRODUCTION

The name Sudan comes from the Arabic expression *bilad al-sudan* meaning 'the land of black people'. In medieval literature, it was generally applied to Africa south of the Sahara. Sudan has an area of 967,500 square miles or 2.1 million square kilometres. It shares boarders with Egypt, Libya, Chad, Central Africa, Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Ethiopia and Uganda and has a coastal line with the Red Sea.[29] The inhabitants of Sudan are of varying ethnic groups. In Sudan's 1993 census the population was recorded to be 25 million. No comprehensive census has been carried out since then due to the continuation of the civil war. A 2006 United Nations estimate put the population at about 37 million.

Sudan has 597 ethnic groups that speak over 400 different languages and dialects but there are two distinct major cultures – Arabs with Nubian roots, and non-Arab Sub-Saharans – consisting of hundreds of ethnic and tribal divisions and language groups. The northern states cover most of Sudan and include most of the urban centers. Most of the 22 million Sudanese who live in this region are Arabic-speaking Muslims, though the majority also uses a traditional non-Arabic mother tongue (e.g. Nubian, Beja, Fur, Nuban, Ingessana, etc) as education is in Arabic language. Among these are several distinct ethnic groups: the camel raising Kababish of northern Kordofan; the Dongolawiyin the Ga'aliyin, the Rubatab, the Manasir, the Shaiqiyah, and the Bideiria; the semi-nomadic Baggara of Kurdufan and Darfur. Then there are the Beja in the Red Sea area and who extend into Eritrea; and the Nubians of the northern Nile areas, some of whom have been resettled on the Atbara River. Another group consists of Shokrya in the Butana land, Bataheen bordering the Ga'alin and Shokrya in the south west of Butana. Rufaa, Halaween, Fulani and many other ethnic groups have settled in the Gazeera region and on the banks of the Blue Nile Damazine and the Dindir region.

---

[29] Voll, J.O, *Historical Dictionary of the Sudan*, London, The Scarecow Press, 1978.p.2.

The Arabs make up the largest single grouping even though the definition of this category is complex because of the variety of combinations. The Arabs in Sudan are descendants of migratory groups, products of inter marriages, or even local groups, which over the centuries have become 'Arabised.'[30].

The root causes of the Sudanese conflict are traceable to the pre-colonial period. The essence of this chapter is to discuss the historical causes of the Sudanese conflict from the pre-colonial period to the signing of the CPA in January, 2005. In addition, the chapter will also discuss some historical conflict resolution in the Sudan that has taken place since independence. The chapter concludes with an analysis of the historical background to the Sudanese conflict and resolutions.

2.2 PRE-COLONIAL SUDAN

Both the North and South Sudan lie within the Nile Basin. Before the nineteenth century, the South was virtually unknown to the outside world while the North enjoyed some sense of identity with Arab world. The isolation of the South was both physical and socio-political in nature. Before the Turko-Egyptian invasion of 1820, Southern Sudan was socially and politically a web of ethnic entities based on linguistic and traditional ties. The hostility of these ethnic tribes to foreign interference in their local affairs made it practically impossible for any foreigner to gain influence amongst them. The rigid resistance to foreigners led outsiders to label them as savages or primitive people.

The difference in development between the South and North can partly be attributed to this period of occupation by the Turko-Egyptian authorities back in the 1820's. Given the racial, cultural and religious affinity between the North and Egypt, it was logical to the Sudanese that the administration of the Sudan was centred in the North.[31] The South was only important for its economic potential, which included the availability of gold, copper, iron and ivory. In addition, slave trading was another form of economic activity that was at its peak during the pre-colonial period. Mohammad Ali, the Albanian Soldier who

---

[30] Voll, J.O, *Historical Dictionary of the Sudan*, London, The Scarecow Press, 1978.p.13
[31] Albino, O., *The Sudan; A Southerner Viewpoint*, London; Oxford University Press, 1970, p.11

17

emerged as Egypt's ruler, invaded Sudan in the 1820's with the aim of having a constant supply of gold and slave soldiers.[32] It was during this period of the nineteenth century that we can identify the beginning of the North South divide in the Sudan.

Then came the Mahdist state from 1883-1898 which overthrew the Turko-Egyptian regime, built on the already existing pattern that was set by the Turko-Egyptians. The Mahdist state imposed allegiance through religion and through personal oath of loyalty to the religious leader. The majority of peoples of the South repudiated the Turko-Egyptian government by rising against it in the 1880s. Furthermore, almost all Southerners saw the Mahdist government as essentially similar to the Egyptian regime that it had replaced. The Mahdist regime continued acts of plunder and slavery in the South and this impoverished the region. The coming of the Anglo- Egyptian Administration and the introduction of the Condominium rule in 1899 only exacerbated slavery and plunder of the South.

Johnson Douglas argues that the historical pattern of the Sudan conflict has roots in the pre-colonial reality of Sudan. [33]The basis of the argument is that successive states, based in the Arab and Muslim north, treated the South as a region with numerous languages and ethnicities, with the largest groups being Dinka and Nuer in the hinterland as a source of resources and slaves.[34] In this pre-colonial period, not only was the exploitation of the southern hinterland by the northern-based state established but also was the army's intervention into economic and political matters. Included in this arrangement were the patronage power of leaders and the precarious nature of citizenship for those who were not part of the central state's conception of citizenship.

2.3 COLONIAL SUDAN

The British colonial rule in the Sudan perpetuated the north-south divide in the preceding years. This exacerbated the insularity of the south from the much external influence compared to the north. The British did so through the "Condominium". The "Condominium" refers to the agreement between Great Britain and Egypt called the

---

[32] Albino, O., *The Sudan; A Southerner Viewpoint*, London; Oxford University Press, 1970, p.11

[33] Douglas H.J, *The Root Causes of the Sudan's Civil War*, Indiana University, Indianapolis, 2003. p. 53

[34] Douglas H. Johnson, op.cit.pp.27-29.

18

"Agreement for the Administration of the Sudan" which was signed on 19th January 1899. Administratively, the country was divided into the North, which according to the British administrators was "Middle-easterner and Arabicized" and the South which was "African and Negroid."[35]

In 1920, the administration enacted a "Closed District Ordinance", preventing non-Southerners from settling in the Southern part of Sudan. This had mixed effects, in some ways it helped prevent a flood of elites from the North taking up positions of ownership and power in the South. The view from the North was that it artificially divided the North from the South, resulting in uneven development and more divergence between the societies that had existed before. Next, in 1930, the British enacted the 'Southern Policy', which declared that the South was to be developed along 'African' lines. With their 'Southern Policy', the British were trying to use indigenous power structures, laws, and customs, in order to rule.[36] Because the North had a relatively uniform legal and state system, compared to more diffuse structures in the South, this policy also resulted in the divergence between the two regions. British educational policy also neglected the South. In other parts of the world, British educational policy had helped create the class of nationalist elites who would demand and win independence. In Sudan, this class was very small, and since authority was based in the North, it was dominated by Northern Sudanese.

The administration of the British in the Sudan was such that Egypt was a junior partner in the governance of the territory. It was a structure that had three intricately intertwined motives. First, the British sought to protect the South from the North. They felt, paternally (a British characteristic of that era), that the years of slavery had decimated the Southern population and the possibility of the Southern Sudanese (Negroes/Blacks) becoming extinct was not far fetched. Secondly, they felt an urge to curb the spread of Islam and Arabism into Africa that would have opened an Islamic highway into the heart of Africa.[37] Lastly, in order to achieve the first two, they had no wish to antagonize both

[35] Deng,O.A.R., *The Politics of the Two Sudans*,Nordiska Afrikainstitutet,Uppsala,1994,p. 35
[36] El Madi, M. *A Short History of the Sudan*, London, Oxford University Press, 1965, p.48
[37] Albino, op cit. p.11-13

the North and the South. Considering the above factors, the maintenance of law and order was central to their plan.

Colonial economic policies perpetuated the north-south disparity in development as well. Export royalties went to the central government, based in the North. Northern elites managed to use the state apparatus to accumulate capital through government contracts, opportunities denied to Southerners. The Closed Districts Ordinance, while preventing some forms of exploitation did nothing to stimulate a Southern Sudanese commercial class to balance the influence of trading companies based in the northern Sudan.[38] Major economic projects were based in the North. As independence approached, the unaddressed disparities between North and South would become a source of conflict.

2.4 INDEPENDENT SUDAN

Sudan was the first African territory administered by the British to be granted independence after World War II. The Sudanese civil war, also the first in the postcolonial Africa, began with the Torit Mutiny, a few months before independence. This was on 1st January, 1956.

Earlier, in February 1953, the United Kingdom and Egypt had concluded an agreement providing for Sudanese self-government and self-determination. The transitional period toward independence began with the inauguration of the first parliament in 1954. With the consent of the British and Egyptian governments, Sudan achieved independence on 1 January 1956, under a provisional constitution. The United States was among the first foreign powers to recognize the new state. However, the Arab-led Khartoum government reneged on promises to Southerners to create a federal system, which led to a mutiny by southern army officers that sparked off 17 years of civil war from 1955 to 1972. In the early period of the war, hundreds of northern bureaucrats, teachers, and other officials, serving in the South were massacred.

The National Unionist Party (NUP), under Prime Minister Ismail al-Azhari, dominated the first cabinet, which was soon replaced by a coalition of conservative political forces. In 1958, following a period of economic difficulties and political maneuvering that

---

[38] Douglas H. Johnson, *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars*. James Currey, Oxford, 2003. p.17

paralyzed public administration; Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Ibrahim Abboud overthrew the parliamentary regime in a bloodless coup.[39] Lt Gen. Abboud did not carry out his promises to return Sudan to civilian government, however, and popular resentment against army rule led to a wave of riots and strikes in late October 1964 that forced the military to relinquish power.

The Abboud regime was followed by a provisional government until parliamentary elections in April 1965 which led to a coalition government of the Umma and National Unionist Parties under Prime Minister Muhammad Ahmad Mahjoub. Between 1966 and 1969, Sudan had a series of governments that proved unable either to agree on a permanent constitution or to cope with problems of factionalism, economic stagnation and ethnic dissidence. The succession of early post-independence governments was dominated by Arab Muslims who viewed Sudan as a Muslim Arab state. Indeed, the Umma/NUP proposed 1968 constitution was arguably Sudan's first Islamic-oriented constitution.

The First Civil War in Sudan

After World War II, there was a tussle between Britain and Egypt over dominance of Sudan. Both parties courted the Northern Sudanese, as they were the elite in the country. The result was two-fold; first, the Northern Sudanese did not have to engage in a long struggle with the colonialists, a struggle that might have forced them to come to an accommodation with the South, in order to win independence. Second, none of the nationalists, North or South, developed a mass base or following. In the rapid transition to independence, a "Sudanization Commission" was charged with replacing colonial civil servants with Sudanese. One spark to the civil war was when, in 1953, the "Sudanization" Commission resulted in Northerners being appointed to all the senior positions in the South. Most politically active Southerners saw this as the beginning of Northern colonization of the South.[40]Southern nationalists convened a conference in 1954 and sought a federal system for the country; if that failed, they wanted self-determination and possible independence from the North.

---

[39] E:\History of Sudan - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.htm accessed on 13-10-2006
[40]Douglas H. Johnson, *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars.* James Currey, Oxford, 2003. p. 5

The next spark and the beginning of the war came when a corps of Southern Sudanese soldiers, whose British officers had only recently been replaced by Northern Sudanese officers, feared that they would be disarmed and moved to the North.[41] A mutiny broke out in 1955 in Torit, and many were killed in the mutiny and in the repression by Northern Sudanese forces. In the years that followed the 1955 mutiny, the mutineers, some of whom escaped to the bush and to exile, became the core of a guerrilla movement seeking 'self-determination'. This movement, called the Sudanese African Nationalist Union (SANU), had difficulty gaining political support in Africa especially after the formation of OAU where the newly decolonizing governments of the Organization for African Unity (OAU) viewed it as 'secessionist'. This war lasted until March, 1972 when the South was granted some autonomy.

The Second Civil War.

Like the first civil war, the second civil war began with a mutiny, with a battalion of Southern Sudanese soldiers refusing an order to move to the North in January 1983. By July, a new organization was established, the Southern People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), whose military wing, dominant in the movement as a whole, was the Southern People's Liberation Army (SPLA), commanded by John Garang and with an important base in Ethiopia.[42]

The patronage of the regime in Ethiopia, a country that was fighting against a secessionist movement in Eritrea had no desire to set a precedent of secession in Africa at that time. The regime in Ethiopia had a strong desire to reach out to other groups that were against the Sudanese regime but not necessarily for separation. This option eventually made the SPLA opt for a program of 'revolution'. The SPLA said it was fighting for a new Sudan, in which the aspirations of the South could be met.

This position, along with other factors such as ideological differences, eventually led to a split in the SPLA between the dominant faction seeking federalism for the whole of

[41] Douglas H. Johnson, *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars*. James Currey, Oxford, 2003. p. 5
[42] Lesch, M.A... op. cit p.28

Sudan and a movement for outright independence for the South.[43] The central government sought to capitalize on this division, and ended up sponsoring the latter faction to try to weaken the SPLA overall. This resulted in an odd situation. The separatists were being armed and supported by the very power they sought to separate from, in order to fight the federalists. The government also employed tribal militias and Arab cattle herders as part of their counter insurgency strategy. The cycle of raid and attack against civilians, reprisal and counter-reprisal, including many excesses by the SPLA, turned the war into a war on the civilian population.

The SPLA had some military successes and managed to capture and control parts of the South. President Nimeiri's regime collapsed in 1985 after a popular uprising.[44] Islamist parties emerged from the ensuing elections far stronger, as members of the ruling coalition of Sadiq al-Mahdi's government.[45]. Under the new regime, raiding by Northern-sponsored militias against populations of the South became extremely devastating and creating famine. These raids resurrected the institution of slavery as well, with militias capturing people for sale, partly as a means of terrorizing and displacing the population. The SPLA regained the military initiative, however, and sentiment in the Northern military against the unsuccessful war led to the fall of Sadiq al-Mahdi's regime in 1989.

The SPLA returned to the defensive when the Mengistu regime in Ethiopia, their most important ally, fell in 1991. More than, 200,000 Sudanese refugees, who had been living on the border in SPLA-protected areas, had to evacuate Ethiopia to Sudan. These refugees, as well as the hundreds of thousands of internally displaced people by the war, created a crisis not only for the SPLA but also for the relief agencies of the world.

---

[43] Douglas H. Johnson, *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars*. James Currey, Oxford, 2003. p. 40
[44] Lesch, M. A. op. cit p. 39
[45] Douglas H. Johnson. op. cit p. 43

2.5 HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN SUDAN

There have been many failed attempts to resolve conflict in Sudan. The military coup of 1969 changed the Sudanese regime in the North, bringing a new leader, Jaafar Nimeiri's, to power as the head of a divided faction. [46] Meanwhile, the Southern movements found support from Ethiopia because the Sudanese government was supporting the Eritrean secessionists. On the other hand, Ugandan former president Idi Amin opposed the Sudanese government as a client of Israel who recruited many southern Sudanese into the Ugandan army.[47] Idi Amin was president of Uganda from 1971 to 1979. He was a military dictator. The Southern movements underwent a series of internal coups that brought the military thinkers to power in a new organization called the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement, and had some military successes thanks to their new weapons, external support and organization. Negotiations between the Nimeiri's regime and the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM) followed, culminating in the Addis Ababa Agreement in 1972 which was meditated by Emperor Haille Selassie of Ethiopia, the All African Council of Churches and six African countries.

Johnson argues that there were structural flaws in the Addis Ababa Agreement which meant that it could not serve as a framework for lasting peace.[48] The Southern movement was seeking a federal structure for Sudan in which the south would have autonomy. The agreement gave it far less. A Southern Regional Government (SRG) was formed, with powers to raise revenue and legislate in mining without prejudice to the right of the Central Government in the event of the discovery of natural gas and minerals. The economic powers and limitations of the regional government were frustrating for the South, but the security provisions were still more contentious. The SRG wanted two regional armies north and south in addition to the national army, but did not win this. Instead, an equal number of Northern and Southern soldiers were posted in the South. The integration of the SRG guerrillas into the army was far from smooth.

[46] Douglas H. Johnson, *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars.* James Currey, Oxford, 2003. p. 40
[47] Lesch. M.A, op. cit p.33
[48] Douglas H. Johnson, op cit. p 56

Over the next ten years, the central government repeatedly interfered in the elections of the Southern Regional Government. Also, the powers of the central government continued to encroach on Southern autonomy by precedent and by the breaking of financial obligations, with the central government spending on average of just 23.2% of its annual development budget on the south.[49]

In conclusion, it can be said that in many ways, the Addis Abba Agreement was a major achievement but also a phase of work in progress. Its main shortcoming was the asymmetrical relationship between the North and the South which would have facilitated gradual assimilation for the South by the North rather than equitable integration that would make diversity a source of enrichment

Since its formation, the SPLM/A had adopted a principled position to seek a peaceful resolution of the conflict through dialogue and peace talks with the Government of the day in Khartoum and as a result there have been many initiatives and peace talks to find a peaceful solution to the Sudanese conflict. These conflict resolution started from 1985 two years after the formation of the SPLM/A, when the Movement called for an all-party National Constitutional Conference aimed at reaching a comprehensive peace agreement. The idea was still-born as Numeiri was overthrown the following month.

The SPLM/A called upon all Sudanese political parties to a conference to be held in the town of Koka-Dam in Ethiopia in 1986. Over 50 delegates attended the conference from all the Sudanese political forces except the National Islamic Front (NIF) and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP). [50]The Koka Dam Conference resolved on major issues of the Sudan including the necessity for secularity of the state and a democratic Sudan and issued these in the famous Koka-Dam Declaration of 1986.

The Koka-Dam peace process was short-circuited by the 1986 elections, which brought into power a coalition of the Umma Party with 101 seats and DUP with 68 seats while the NIF with 51 seats was in the opposition. The remaining 100 seats in the 320 se at

[49] Douglas Johnson op. cit. p. 80
[50] E:\History of Sudan - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.htm accessed on 13-10-2006

parliament were either not contested because of insecurity in the South or distributed among several small parties. Mr. Sadiq Al-Mahdi declined to implement the Koka-Dam Agreement, giving two reasons for his rejection. He argued that the persons who signed the agreement on behalf of his party were not authorised to do so, and secondly, that the DUP a junior partner in his government was not signatory to the Agreement.[51]

The SPLM/A decided to approach the DUP to negotiate a bilateral agreement with the view of bringing them on board into the Koka-Dam Agreement, as the DUP was an important junior coalition partner in Sadiq- al-Mahdi's government. The dialogue with the DUP led to the historic 1988 DUP/SPLM/A Sudan Peace Agreement, which essentially modified the Koka-Dam Declaration on the September Sharia laws of Numeiri by agreeing to freeze these laws rather than abrogating them as came in the Koka-Dam Declaration.

However, the senior partner Umma Party in the coalition government opposed the DUP/SPLM Sudan Peace Agreement and actually voted it down on 21/12/1988, embarrassing situation for the DUP which forced them to resign, and hence the collapse of Sadiq (I) Government.[52]

Following the resignation of the DUP, the Umma formed a coalition government with the NIF while the DUP was in the opposition with Southern groups and others. The military situation in the South, in the meantime, deteriorated. The SPLA went on a major offensive capturing Torit, Liria, Magwe, Parajok, Nimule, Bor and Waat Akobo all in the first four months of 1989. This forced the army to join the public in pressuring the Sadiq (II) Government to accept the DUP/SPLM Peace Agreement as a basis for peaceful settlement. Indeed, the army went a step further to give the Prime Minister an ultimatum in a 21-point memorandum and asked the Prime Minister to respond within seven days.

[51] http://www.sudansupport.no/english_pages   accessed on 16-09-2006
[52] http://www.irinnews.org/webspecials/sudan/default.asp-   accessed on 16-09-2006

In April 1989, the Prime Minister yielded to popular pressure and accepted the DUP/SPLM Peace Initiative. This infuriated the NIF and forced them to resign, and precipitated the collapse of the Sadiq government. Then, Sid Ahmed Hussein (DUP) became Deputy Prime Minister and head of a Ministerial Government delegation that travelled to Addis Ababa in May 1989 to work out details of the National Constitutional Conference with the SPLM/SPLA.

The government delegation returned to Khartoum with positive results for the Cabinet to endorse as a peace agreement on June 30th, 1989. Furthermore, 18th September, 1989 was set for holding of the National Constitutional Conference, which would end the war and usher the Sudan into an era of peace and development.

However, the NIF moved and staged their coup on June 30th, 1989 precisely on the same date the Sadiq (III) cabinet was to endorse the DUP/SPLM peace agreement. At this juncture, it is important to underline that the NIF staged their coup to prevent peace under the terms of the Koka-Dam Agreement and the DUP/SPLM Sudan Peace agreement.

The June 30th 1989 coup was a momentous event in the history of the Sudan, and the country would never remain the same again. From this date the Sudan fractured and divided into three, and it is useful to analyse the situation in terms of the "Three Sudans" (NIF Sudan, Old Sudan and New Sudan) presented earlier as characterizing the present situation in the Sudan.[53]

Consistent with its principle of dialogue with the government of the day, the SPLM/SPLA continued dialogue with the NIF Sudan to achieve peace. The first discussions were bilateral, held in August 1989, and only two months after the NIF seized power. Subsequent peace talks between the SPLM/A and the NIF government include the Jimmy Carter Nairobi talks of December 1989. The Abuja I of 1992, Abuja II of 1993 and the IGADD peace process. Other peace initiatives include the Friends of IGADD, which includes six European countries and the United States of America and Canada.

---

[53] Douglas Johnson op. cit. p. 89

There was also the Barcelona I and II in The Hague process and several other informal talks in between. The SPLM Movement had held more than ten distinct peace talks with the NIF regime since it came to power.

2.6 CONCLUSION

As with most, if not all African countries, Britain, Sudan's former colonial power brought together into a state a framework of national groups that had been distinctive, separate and in some cases mutually hostile. The identities that were in conflict are as a result of a historical legacy characterized by a form of slavery that classified groups into a superior race of masters and inferior enslaveable peoples. As the dominant partner in the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, the British ended slavery and effectively governed the country as two separate colonies. They developed the North as an Arab-Muslim society and forged in the South an identity that was indigenously African, exposed to Western influences through Christian missionaries, but otherwise denied any political, economic, social or cultural development.

The attempts by the Sudanese themselves to end the conflict in their country also trace its origins from very far as back as 1947. The international community also had also tried to resolve the conflict with the help of the Sudanese both from the North and South. This is a clear illustration of the realist theory of conflict resolution. Sudanese realised that the war in their country would never be won and hence resorted to peace process consisting of negotiations. The next chapter will clearly show see how African sub regional bodies have emerged as tools of armed conflict resolution based on the realist and idealist theories of peace and war.

CHAPTER THREE
THE ROLE OF AFRICAN SUB-REGIONAL BODIES IN ARMED CONFLICT RESOLUTION.

3.1 INTRODUCTION

Africa is a host to a number of regional organizations that have taken upon themselves the responsibility to ensure peace and stability in addition to political and economic objectives in their respective regions. The organizations being referred to include ECOWAS, SADC, IGAD and EAC. At the continental level, the sole organization is AU formerly called OAU. In recent years Africa's sub regional bodies have emerged as institutions of mediation in armed conflicts on the continent. ECOWAS had intervened in some countries in West Africa such as Liberia and Sierra Leone in 1990 and 1997 respectively and IGAD in Eastern Africa in Somalia and Sudan in 2000 and 2004 respectively. Increasingly, regional organizations have emerged as alternatives to the AU and UN in conflict resolution and management.

This chapter is intended to highlight the new tradition of conflict resolution by Africa's sub regional bodies such as ECOWAS and SADC. This chapter discusses the reasons why these regional bodies were formed; their mandates as well as show examples where they have tried to resolve conflicts in their respective regions. The chapter will also explain the aspects of the realism theory of conflict resolution which encapsulates that the states/countries always have vital interests to preserve in their respective sub regions. In addition, the chapter will form a background as to why IGAD was able to succeed in brokering a peace deal in Sudan. In addition, the chapter also discusses the strategies employed by ECOWAS and SADC in comparison to IGAD's way of working.

3.2 THE UN AND AU POSITION ON REGIONS, SUB REGIONS AND SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

Traditionally, regionalism implies co-operation among states in geographically proximate and delimited areas for the pursuit of mutual gain in one or more issue areas. In most of the successful examples of regionalism, states that are already partners in solid political processes based on shared and complementary values devolve collective decisions to structures that supplement, rather than supplant, national institutions. While regionalism

may lead to the creation of new political organizations over time, regionalism and state strength do not stand in opposition to one another, and states remain the essential building blocks from which such arrangements are constructed. Article 52 of the UN Charter allows states to form regional organisations for dealing with such matters of peace and security *"as are appropriate for regional action."*[54] Although not defined in the charter, such regional organisations presumably involve co-operation treaties that are entered into by geographically proximate states. These treaties are deposited at The Hague and Geneva which are the UN depository Offices. And, while nothing is mentioned of sub regions, it is best to regard the two as synonymous beyond the context of relationships between the AU and various African regional organisations.

A defensive alliance, according to Article 51 of the UN Charter, may use force in self-defence, without waiting for the Security Council to take action unless in response to an armed attack.[55] On the other hand, Article 53(1) allows a regional organisation to take enforcement action even if there was no prior armed attack but such action requires Security Council authorisation.

While arrangements for collective defence and security are clearly related, there is also a significant distinction between the two. A collective defence agreement involves an alliance between two or more states whereby they undertake to come to the assistance of whichever party suffers an attack. Collective security, on the other hand, is an agreement among states to renounce the use of force in settling their disputes, while at the same time agreeing to use force against one of their number who breaks this rule. Under a collective security arrangement, such as the UN Charter, individual member states lose certain sovereign rights, with the most important being the right to resort to force in self-defence. A member state that is subject to attack may use direct force in self-defence only as an interim measure.

---

[54] UN reform on Reform: www.un.org/reform
[55] ibid

This is the situation that sub regions in Africa find themselves. Considering the fact that economic development in most sub regions depends on security and peace, African sub regions have resolved to always try to end conflicts using possible means available. These means includes among others direct negotiations and mediations of warring parties as well as military intervention.

3.3 ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES (ECOWAS)

ECOWAS is a regional group of West Africa countries namely Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. It was founded by a treaty in May 1975. It was conceived as a means toward economic integration and development intended to lead to the eventual establishment of an economic union in West Africa. This, in turn, was expected to enhance economic stability and relations between member states. Actually, ECOWAS was an attempt to overcome the isolation of most West African countries following the colonial period and the period of post-independence nationalism. Less than a year after its founding, the heads of State of Nigeria and Togo proposed a formal defence treaty that resulted two years later in a non-aggression and defence Pact.[56] In July of 1991, members agreed to a declaration of political principles, committing them to uphold democracy and the rule of law.

Additionally, ECOWAS leaders adopted two important defence protocols in 1978 and 1981 respectively.[57] These protocols called for mutual respect and non-interference in internal affairs of one another and the establishment of a regional mechanism for mutual assistance in defence matters. The institutions of the Community are; The Authority of Heads of State and Government; the Council of Ministers; the Community Parliament; the Economic and Social Council; the Community Court of Justice; the Executive Secretariat; the Mediation and Security Council established by the Mechanism and the fund for Cooperation, Compensation and Development.

---

[56] http://ecowas.pbwiki.com/   accessed on 22-09-2006
[57] http://ecowas.pbwiki.com/   accessed on 22-09-2006

In Article 4 of the ECOWAS Charter, it is stated that ECOWAS is compelled to intervene in internal armed conflict within any Member State engineered and supported actively from outside. In addition, ECOWAS must intervene especially if the conflict is likely to endanger the security and peace in the entire Community. The protocol allows for legitimate intervention in internal affairs of member states, unlike the non-intervention clauses in the UN and OAU charters.[58]

The above-mentioned provisions have facilitated regional conflict resolution efforts initiated by ECOWAS. The ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) was established initially on an ad hoc basis as a multinational peacekeeping/peace enforcement force, and was the first such group to be established by a regional body. ECOMOG was principally responsible for the restoration of peace in Liberia and Sierra Leone in 1990/91 and 1997/8 respectively. These recent civil wars and other political unrest in some West African countries have forcefully revealed the need for social and political stability in the development process. Widespread political instability has also hindered progress of primary mandate of ECOWAS towards the promotion of economic integration and regional cooperation.

ECOWAS/ECOMOG before 1990

There was no peacekeeping precedent in the West African sub region. In terms of responding to a complex, political and humanitarian emergency, West Africa could not draw on prior experience. Nonetheless, several West African countries had contributed troops to UN operations and had mostly experienced traditional peacekeeping. However, within ECOWAS there had been, for some time, recognition that there could not be economic integration and prosperity without stability. It was this thinking that led to the protocols on non-aggression (1978) and mutual assistance in defence of 1981.

Even so, the security threat facing the sub region was perceived to be largely external. Much thought was not given to the need to prevent internal security threats or the escalation of internal conflicts, through a change in the system of governance and the use

[58] http://ecowas.pbwiki.com/   accessed on 22-09-2006

of accountability, rule of law and respect for citizens' human rights as conflict prevention strategies. It is not surprising that West African leaders did not officially give much thought to this, as more than two-thirds of the sixteen member states of ECOWAS were under dictatorial or authoritarian regimes.[59] They therefore missed the opportunities for early warning systems; conflict prevention or avoidance, or indeed early mediation. Thus, when Liberia was flung with civil war in 1989, ECOWAS had to improvise in many respects. Indeed, its experience in Liberia, over time illustrated many of the problems that confront sub regional organisations in conflict resolution.

A comprehensive examination of the origins of the Liberian conflict lies outside the scope of this study. It is sufficient to identify that in December 1989, Liberian rebel forces of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), led by Charles Taylor, crossed into Liberia from Cote d'Ivoire with intent of overthrowing the regime of President Samuel Doe.[60] As the fighting escalated, the international community displayed marginal interest. ECOWAS therefore initiated a regional response to the crisis by establishing a Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) to try and encourage a diplomatic solution. On August 7th 1990, a lack of progress on the diplomatic front prompted the SMC to begin the insertion into Liberia of a military monitoring group called ECOMOG. It was deployed in order to oversee the warring factions, and to oversee the implementation of a cease-fire that had been signed earlier in 1990. It was also mandated to disarm the warring factions and put a stop to the imports of arms and ensure that prisoners of war were released. ECOMOG operation began on 24 August 1990 with deployment of 3,000 West African troops into the Liberian capital Monrovia. It was tasked with assisting the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee in supervising the implementation and in ensuring the strict compliance by the parties with the provisions of the cease-fire throughout the territory of Liberia.[61]

---

[59] M A Vogt, *Cooperation between the United Nations and the OAU in the Management of African Conflicts*, paper presented at the Symposium on International Peace and Security: The African Experience, South Africa, 21-23 September 1998

[60] http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v4/v4i1a1.htm   accessed on 20.11. 2006

[61] ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee, Decision A/DEC.1/8/90, Article 2 in Marc Weller (ed.), *Regional Peacekeeping and International Enforcement: The Liberian Crisis* (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press 1994).

During the period of its deployment, ECOMOG engaged in a variety of missions including protection of humanitarian aid, disarming of factions, cantonment, mediation, and peace enforcement. ECOMOG's formal peacekeeping role ended in February 1998, but a contingent of 5,000 remained deployed after this in a "capacity-building" role. They were to help and train the new Liberian security forces and to maintain law and order.

Sierra Leone's conflict began in 1991 when the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) led by Foday Sankoh first attacked from Liberia. In 1997, disaffected soldiers of the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) staged a coup d'etat and removed President Tedjan Kabbah from power. The rebels then called on Major Johnny Paul Koroma, already in prison on treason charges to lead them. Koroma formed the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and invited the RUF to join him.[62] Nevertheless, the military junta failed to attract international support and was shunned by the people of Sierra Leone. The Nigerian-led ECOMOG, aided by the Sierra Leone Civil Defence Force (CDF) led by Sam Hinga Norman, removed the junta from Freetown in February 1998 and President Kabbah, whose government had sought refuge in neighbouring Guinea, returned to Freetown in March of that year.

When ECOMOG intervened on two occasions in West Africa, the international community witnessed a major evolution in inter-African affairs. Several African states were devising a collective system or capacity to respond to conflicts rather than relying on an outside force like the UN to intervene. The interventions by ECOMOG marked an important turning point in the practice of peacekeeping by regional or sub regional organisations. Its importance also lies in the fact that it had reignited an old debate within Africa about the creation of a continental capacity to respond to matters related to peace and instability. It should also be observed that the intervention by ECOMOG in Liberia and Sierra Leone therefore represented a watershed in African collective security by a regional or sub regional body. The states of West Africa embarked on a journey that would eventually lead them to intervene in the internal affairs of other member states, but more importantly, to develop various frameworks for enhancing the capacity of regional

---

[62] http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unamsil/background.html accessed on 19.10.2006

states to mount a peacekeeping force. The collective responsibility of African states to come together and resolve conflicts on their own re-emphasizes one of the objectives of this study that Africans themselves are capable of resolving conflicts.

However, it should be noted that the conditions that precipitated the successful resolution and restoration of peace in West Africa is basically unique to West Africa. Furthermore, the strategies employed by these sub regional bodies in armed conflict resolution differ from one region to another. In the case of ECOWAS, the strategy was to use both military intervention and negotiations at the same time. The use of force was inevitable due to the fact that the conflicts involved the removal of legitimate governments unlike in Sudan where the SPLM was fighting for equal distribution of wealth and respect of human rights. ECOWAS leaders also saw the use of military power as a deterrent measure for others who would be rebels that they would be crushed in the same way. This also served as a warning to rebels groups in other African countries that were also already fighting legitimate governments. In the case of IGAD, no military force was used but it was a matter of mediations and negotiations between warring factions, the SPLM/A and the GoS. However, the illustration in West Africa clearly shows that both military and peace talks can be used simultaneously as strategies of resolving armed conflict.

3.4 SOUTHERN AFRICA DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY (SADC)

SADC was formed in 1980 as a loose alliance of nine majority-ruled States in Southern Africa known as the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), with the main aim of coordinating development projects in order to lessen economic dependence on the then apartheid South Africa. The founding Member States were: Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.[63]

The transformation of the organization from a Coordinating Conference into a Development Community (SADC) took place on August 17, 1992 in Windhoek, Namibia when the Declaration and Treaty were signed at the Summit of Heads of State and

---

[63] http://www.sadc.int/   accessed 22-09-2006

35

Government thereby giving the organization a legal character. SADC and its Member States are expected to act according to the principles of sovereign equality of all Member States; solidarity, peace and security; human rights, democracy, and the rule of law; equity, balance and mutual benefit and peaceful settlement of disputes.

The objectives of SADC as stated in Article 5 of the Treaty remain relevant but Member States underscore the need to ensure that poverty alleviation is addressed in all SADC activities and programmes with the ultimate objective of eradicating it. HIV/AIDS is a major threat to the attainment of the objectives of SADC and therefore is accorded priority in all SADC programmes and activities.[64] Other major issues include achieving development and economic growth as well as alleviate poverty.

Since its formation, SADC has played some minimal but significant roles in the region in conflict resolution. However, in the late 1990s, SADC played a major role in the conflict in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) that brought some intermittent peace to the country. On 5 April 1999, tensions within the rebel movement Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie (RCD) about the dominance of the Banyamulenge reached a peak when RCD leader Ernest Wamba dia Wamba moved his base from Goma to Uganda-controlled Kisangani.[65] A further sign of a break occurred when President Yoweri Kaguta Museveni of Uganda and late President Laurent Kabila signed a ceasefire accord on 18 April 1999 in Sirte, Libya following the mediation of Libyan President Muammar Gaddafi. Both the RCD and Rwanda refused to take part. On 16 May 1999, Wamba was ousted as head of the RCD in favor of a pro-Rwanda figure. Seven days later the various factions of the RCD clashed over control of Kisangani. On 8 June 1999, rebel factions met to try and create a common front against Kabila. Despite these efforts, the creation by Uganda of the new province of Ituri sparked the ethnic clash of the Ituri conflict, sometimes referred to as a "war within a war".[66]

---

[65] http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unamsil/background.html   accessed on 22.11.2006
[66] http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front   accessed on 17.11.2006

36

Nevertheless, the diplomatic circumstances of SADC countries contributed to the first cease-fire of the war. In July 1999, the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement was signed by the six warring countries. They included Democratic Republic of Congo, Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Rwanda, and Uganda. Under the agreement, forces from all sides, under a Joint Military Commission, would cooperate in tracking, disarming and documenting all armed groups in the Congo, especially those forces identified with the 1994 Rwandan genocide. Few provisions were made to actually disarm the militias. The United Nations Security Council deployed about 90 liaison personnel in August 1999 to support the cease-fire. However, in the following months all sides accused others of repeatedly breaking the cease-fire, and it became clear that small incidents could trigger attacks.

The recreation of SADC in 1992 was a reflection of new co-operation among Southern African states as the structures of the apartheid system in South Africa were gradually dismantled. Since its creation, SADC has been trying to get agreement on developing into a multinational instrument for conflict prevention and resolution in Southern Africa. However, the conflict in the DRC exposed differences in approach among SADC member states. The lack of consensus had made it difficult to formulate a document that discusses sub regional involvement in security co-ordination, conflict mediation, and general military co-operation. This had meant that SADC leaders had resorted to unilateral decision-making in resolving conflicts in the region. In this case, the Lusaka Peace Agreement of 1999 was signed amidst confusion since there was no clarity on which strategy to use in resolving conflict. At the time of signing the agreement, some SADC member countries were already in the Congo DRC fighting on the side of the government. However, the bottom line here is that negotiations were used as a strategy to resolve the conflict. The warring factions were invited to Lusaka, Heads of State in SADC sat down with rebels' movements and ironed out the differences and an agreement was reached. As earlier mentioned, just like in the IGAD case, negotiations in the SADC formed the cornerstone of the peace agreements. This also clearly demonstrates that African themselves are capable of resolving their conflicts.

3.5 CONCLUSION

As can be seen from the examples above, African sub regional bodies have played vital roles in conflict resolution in various countries. It therefore can be argued that there is always a connection between sub regional economic development and security. From the above discussion, it is clear that sub regional bodies have many potentials and actual problems to contend with. A key challenge in this regard is security, which arises mainly from the nature of governance in respective sub regions. The establishment of a peacekeeping-cum-peace enforcement capacity within ECOWAS gives practical expression to the co-operation that exists among some African countries. The ECOMOG interventions were fully endorsed, not just by the international community that could no longer find solutions to African conflicts, but by Africans who wanted to break the dependence on outside military assistance in responding to African conflicts. In the aftermath of Cold War interference by the major Western powers in Africa, the desire of Africans not only to keep their own peace, but to define their security apparatus is a must for the development of the continent.

From the introduction and analysis in this chapter and it is quite clear that once states or countries realise that their peace and stability is threatened due to war in their neighbouring countries, the realist theory of peace and war comes into use. The countries have to protect their interests at all costs. IGAD is no different from other sub regional organizations and so when peace is threatened, the sub regional body tries to resolve it. This is exactly what happened between 1992 and 2005 when IGAD intervened in the conflict in Sudan and managed to broker a peace agreement in January 2005.

CHAPTER FOUR
THE MEDIATION ROLE OF IGAD IN THE SUDAN PEACE PROCESS

4.1 INTRODUCTION

The Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) was established in 1986 with a view to promoting a coordinated approach to the Horn of Africa and East Africa region's common problem of drought and desertification. Its membership consisted of seven states: Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, Djibouti and Somalia. Despite the organisation's narrow initial focus, IGADD summits provided fora for meetings between member states to address other issues of mutual concern. By 1994 the members of IGADD had come to the realisation that the developmental problems of the region extended beyond the consequences of drought. Indeed, in that same year the organisation began what was to be a long involvement in attempts to help resolve Sudan's protracted civil war. This chapter will discuss reasons that led to the revitalization and extension of IGAD mandate from the year 1994 in addition to highlighting its working mechanisms. This will then serve as a background to discuss the mediation role of IGAD in the Sudan peace process. It will also offer an analysis in the internal intricacies that existed during the mediation process from 1994 to 2005. Since, the main focus of this study is to establish how and why IGAD succeeded where others had failed; this chapter will also discuss some personal abilities of eminent persons in the IGAD region that played a crucial role in the Sudan peace process. The chapter will also offer an insight on the relevance of the realist theory of war and peace which puts emphasis on states, territorial sovereignty, security and interests.

Almost as a logical consequence of the region's diplomatic initiative, an extraordinary summit was convened in Addis Ababa in April 1995 to discuss ways to revitalise the organisation and expand its activities into related spheres. On 21 March 1996, another extraordinary summit was held, in Nairobi, at which it was decided to reconstitute the organisation as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). An amended charter was signed, outlining the new tasks and alterations to the organisation's structures. The new IGAD was launched in Djibouti on 25 and 26 November 1996. During the launch, great emphasis was placed on the need for peace and security as an

essential prerequisite for development. Three priority areas were identified: Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution and Humanitarian Affairs; Infrastructure (Transport and Communications) Development; and Food Security and Environment. Particular mention was made of the need to reactivate peace and security initiatives in Southern Sudan and Somalia.

4.2 IGAD'S EVOLUTION

It would be logical to divide IGAD's life into two major periods: pre- 1996 and post-1996, when IGADD dropped drought for development, reflecting a shift from crisis management to crisis prevention. The pre-1996 era can also be considered in terms of two sub-periods. The early phase, which extended from roughly 1986 to about 1990, was characterized by IGADD's search for technical co-operation amidst volatile political situations across the sub-region. This volatility was demonstrated in the civil wars in Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda, and in the tenuous stability of the remaining members, Djibouti and Kenya, with the former witnessing a limited civil war that came to end in 1993. Thus, the same period saw the deposition of many presidents in IGAD's region, an exercise in which the role of neighbours would not readily be dismissed.[67] The second characteristic of that period was that the prevalence of the Cold War was still on the agenda of both IGAD members and IGAD friends, and for that reason there had not been much coordination among the IGAD members or between them and the friends. In short, it was difficult for the IGAD donors to aid hostile regimes.

The second phase of the first period of IGAD, which started roughly after the 1989 political change in Sudan, saw, from the outset, a close political coordination between NIF regime and the combined guerrilla forces of the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) and Tigray People Liberation Front (TPLF) that brought down the Mengistu regime in 1991. This coordination between Ethiopia and Sudan, to which Eritrea joined as an independent country in 1993, was not a fruit to the efforts of IGADD; rather it was

---

[67] Vogt M.A, "*Cooperation between the United Nations and the OAU in the Management of African Conflicts*" Paper presented at the Symposium on International Peace and Security: The African Experience, South Africa, 21-23 September 1998

a stimulant to it to deal with matters that would have been impossible. IGADD's Sudan initiative in 1994 was an outcome of that passing optimism, even the total collapse of the Somali state, which meant different stakes for the regimes in the Horn of Africa, appeared to have little impact on their friendship which showed decay by 1994 as will be explained shortly.

The next phase, which started in 1993, was fully reversed by 1998. The main characteristic of it had been the deterioration between Sudan and the IGAD members on one hand and the close coordination between Sudan's neighbours in finding a solution to the civil war through the forum of IGADD. This process that was pursued with vigour throughout 1994 but then died away till 1997 when it resumed a short momentum before it got shrouded by the Egyptian and Libyan Initiative (ELI), until its final resurrection in the Machakos Protocol under the hands of IGAD peace envoys. There has been a political role for IGAD since the first summit of Djibouti in 1986. There, the former president of Somalia, the late Siad Barre and former president of Ethiopia Haile Mariam Mengistu, with an Italian effort, took the chance to meet and started talks that culminated in 1988 agreement, in which both regimes backed away from supporting each other's armed resistance, though it ended with the ultimate collapse of Siad Barre's regime. Also IGADD reached the Declaration of Principles (DoP) 1994, which served to offer a structure for the Sudan's peace negotiations.

The challenge that faced the IGADD committee members was in what way they might approach the Sudan government.[68] On one hand the members were the guardians of the regional peace who wanted to end the Sudan civil war through a peaceful forum as a necessary prerequisite for the sub-regional welfare programs which had long waited for the external aid to start in earnest. On the other hand, they were the Sudan's neighbours who expressed themselves as the innocent victims most frightened by the menace of the looming fundamentalist Islam propelled by the NIF. This duality of mission had doubled

---

[68] M A Vogt, *Cooperation between the United Nations and the OAU in the Management of African Conflicts*, paper presented at the Symposium on International Peace and Security: The African Experience, South Africa, 21-23 September 1998

the theoretical difficulties that evolve around regional political cooperation. The issue of self-determination for the South had caused fury within the National Democratic Alliance (NDA). If the Southerners endorsed the self-determination, the NDA Northerners objected with different tones with Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) as the staunchest, followed by the Coalition Party who qualified this acceptance to the principle but within a united Sudan.[69] The Umma Party adopted a dubious stance of being more concerned about the direction of the peace rather than the self- determination as an issue. If the DUP has been committed to the Egyptian grand interest (the unity option) by resisting the self-determination drive; the GoS would have passed views on the peace to Libya in what became as the Egyptian Libya initiative. Thus, one of the unintended consequences of the DoP was the fragmentation it caused to the NDA.

4.3 MANDATE

IGAD aims to expand the areas of regional co-operation, increase the members' dependency on one another and promote policies of peace and stability in the region in order to attain food security, sustainable environmental management and sustainable development.

The IGAD strategy is to attain sustainable economic development for its member countries. Regional economic co-operation and integration are given special impetus and high priority to promote long-term collective self-sustaining and integrated socio-economic development. The leading principles of the IGAD strategy are stipulated in the agreement establishing IGAD, but are also mindful of the UN Charter and AU Constitutive Act.[70]

IGAD's aims and objectives include promoting joint development strategies and gradually harmonising macro-economic policies and programmes in the social, technological and scientific fields. There are also issues of harmonizing policies with

---

[69] Odera, J. *Calming the Storm; IGAD's Peace Initiative for Somalia and Sudan;* Saverwoord Focus Publications, 1999.p. 94

[70] Ibid pg. 94

regard to trade, customs, transport, communications, agriculture and natural resources, and promoting free movement of goods, services, and people within the sub-region. IGAD is also expected to initiate and promote programmes and projects to achieve regional food security and sustainable development of natural resources and environmental protection. In addition, the authority must encourage and assist efforts of member states to collectively combat drought and other natural and man-made disasters and their consequences. Lastly, IGAD is also expected to promote peace and stability in the sub-region and create mechanisms within the sub-region for the prevention, management and resolution of interstate and intrastate conflicts through dialogue.[71]

4.4 MEDIATION AND INTERVENTION IN SUDAN

The first strength of the IGAD peace talks, particularly during its later stages, had been its clarity in identifying the key issues at the core of the Sudanese conflict, and then bringing to bear the necessary political and technical resources, including international pressure. [72] Crucial and worthy as that achievement was, the IGAD Initiative from the beginning was understood to involve a continuing involvement in Sudan that would not end until the terms of the peace agreement were fulfilled and the necessary stability was achieved, because only then could there be confidence that peace would be secure. And that objective in turn was not realizable unless there were significant and continuing democratic reforms.

The second strength was from the IGAD partners. A partner is someone who works with another towards a common goal. In IGAD's case, the "common goal" has always been ambiguous and problematic. Having set up the IGAD forum with an eye on foreign aid, more than one billion dollars were initially requested. However, only 10 percent out of that amount was approved.[73] There was the Cold War suspicion, which would make western donors a bit apologetic to aid regimes such as Haile Mengistu's regime in Ethiopia. However, with the Cold War over, pleasing the donors remained, as usual, a

---

[71] www.igad.org/.htm accessed on 11th February 2007.
[72] AS Abito- Personal correspondence to the author, February, 2007
[73] Odera, J. *Calming the Storm; IGAD's Peace Initiative for Somalia and Sudan;* Saverwoord Focus Publications, 1999

tempting exercise. By 1996, the donors approved of 500 million US dollars, yet their distribution was adopting the theory that some projects are more regional than others. With the US administration over concerned about the "humanitarian" situation in the South it was more than pleased to pick on the emergent chance of the IGADD forum. Building on the IGAD opportunity, the US adopted three approaches: firstly; close coordination with the parties at Nairobi. The US diplomatic missions of Sudan and Kenya together were heavily involved in all the rounds of peace talks of 1994. Secondly, extra support for the UN sponsored Operation Lifeline Sudan to engage more efficiently in the "relief" operations. Thirdly, applying direct pressure on Sudan while being more tolerant to the East African regimes. The Secretary of the State's visit to the region in late March 1994 was the beginning of the overt and sustained pressure on Sudan. With all that concerted pressure on the government it was not surprising that the political ontology of the government expanded to accommodate the dictates of the DoP, though, there was no doubt on the part of the government about the intentions of the mediators, yet, the hope was to join them since their defeat proved a failure.

Sudan Post-1989

Throughout the first phase of the 1990s the government of Sudan was particularly patronizing the politics of Ethiopia and Eritrea. The GoS had closely worked with the Eritrean People's Liberation Front and Tigray People's Liberation Front and coordinated their efforts to speed up the overthrow of President Haile Mengistu through what was called the Operations Hijab 1 and 2 in 1991. However, the reward for the regime in Sudan was more than satisfying. Sudan was closely orchestrating with the new leadership in security matters that linked to SPLA but also Sudan had its eyes on developments in Somalia which brought US forces closer to its borders.[74] It was reported that Sudan had asked Ethiopia for consular offices in places where Sudan had no interests in Ethiopia, though that request was politely turned down on the grounds that Israel might well ask for such facilities which would jeopardize Sudan's volatile security.[75] However, Sudan secured the Ethiopian approval for its army to pursue the rebels in 1991from within the

---

[74] AS Abito- Personal correspondence to the author, February, 2007
[75] ibid

Ethiopian territories after the critical role Ethiopia had played in destabilizing the SPLA in the wake of Mengistu's fall. The SPLA radio-station and camps were shut hurriedly and the Sudanese armies were given free access to Ethiopian territories to pursue SPLA.

Yet there were issues of concern to Ethiopia regarding Sudan's linkages to the Ogaden Liberation Front (OLF), though active in Somalia, especially in the Ogaden, was frequently accused of terrorism in Ethiopia. Yet there were fears of antagonizing Sudan too early, which could escalate the already deteriorating security situation in western Ethiopia. Pro-Mengistu Amhara were still active and causing security threats to the regime in western Ethiopia.

With Eritrea, like Ethiopia and despite the fact that Sudan had offered help for pre and post independence Eritrea, yet the structural security linkages between Sudan and Eritrea were of concern to Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki's regime. The newly born Eritrea was not an exception to the weakness that characterizes most of the African states. Many opposition groups were not happy with Afwerki's emergent totalitarianism, famous among them has been, his old rival, the Eritrea Liberation Front (EFL) and its offshoots together with the Eritrean Islamic Jihad. Though Sudan had closed the offices of the Eritrean opposing groups after the Eritrean independence, yet there were quiet complaints that Sudan was not dealing transparently with the Eritrean refugees' issue. Eritrean refugees reaching more than 250,000 by 1993 were a constant source of concern to Afwerki's.[76] His reluctance to their repatriation was underlined with his fear of their being used against him in the armed political struggle. Afwerki's objected to the UNHCR for any repatriation without full funding, which was estimated to reach 200 million US dollars. Afwerki's intent to form a "broad front coalition" was interpreted by his opponents as a move towards dictatorship.

All these threads of concerns were to become more alarming to the neighbours with the rising reports about Sudan becoming the hot bed of Islamic activism. The creation of the

---

[76] Odera, J. *Calming the Storm; IGAD's Peace Initiative for Somalia and Sudan*; Saverwoord Focus Publications, 1999. P 45

Popular Arab and Islamic Conference in April 1991 received considerable attention, both in the West and the Arab world, which projected it as an organization for militant Islam. This came at time when Islamic fundamentalism has become a source of concern not only to the US but also to Europe. The Secretary General of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), Willy Claes, was reported to have said "the threat from Islamic Fundamentalism was one of the most important challenges facing the West after the end of the Cold War"[77]

The Peace Process from 1993 to 1999

Alarmed by the deepening crisis and multiple failed attempts by outside mediators, members of the Inter-Governmental Authority for Drought and Development (IGADD), later renamed the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD), formed a mediation committee. This consisted of two organs, a summit committee of Heads of State from Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya and Uganda, and a standing committee composed of their mediators. Preliminary talks were held in November 1993 and January 1994, and formal negotiations began in March and May of 1994. Presented at the May meeting, the Declaration of Principles (DoP) which included the provisions of "the right of self-determination with national unity remaining a high priority, separation of religion and state (secularism), a system of governance based on multiparty democracy, decentralization through a loose federation or a confederacy, respect for human rights and a referendum to be held in the South with secession as an option."[78] The NIF government initially resisted the DoP, particularly self-determination and secularism. The SPLM accepted the DoP and the NIF government was later persuaded by the mediators to accept the DoP. The IGAD peace process began with the view that the Sudan conflict was having serious repercussions not only in the country but also in the region, and sought to deal with the root causes of the conflict.[79] Conditions were ripe for talks since both sides were exhausted from years of fighting and some members of the IGAD committee were seen by Khartoum as allies. Relations between the NIF government and members of the

---

[77] Odera, J. *Calming the Storm; IGAD's Peace Initiative for Somalia and Sudan;* Saverwoord Focus Publications, 1999
[78] www.igad.org/prof.htm accessed on 19th January 2007.
[79] Mohammed A. A and El Amin K., *Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution; Capacity Assessment Study for the IGAD sub region;* Prepared for IGAD, October, 2001.

Sudan mediating countries were good, except for Uganda. The ruling parties in both Ethiopia and Eritrea received significant military assistance and political support from the NIF government during the struggle against the Mengistu regime.[80] The government of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi in Ethiopia had signed a series of agreements with the NIF government, including security arrangements. Earlier the two had cooperated militarily to eject SPLA forces from the border areas. Similarly, relations with Eritrea and Kenya were good. The SPLM accepted the mediators, although it believed two out of the four were closer to Khartoum, with Kenya seen by both as neutral.[81] The SPLM saw the DoP as constructive and a good framework for negotiation. Nevertheless, the most contentious issues were secularism and self-determination, which the Khartoum government refused to concede.[82] In July 1994, the polarization of the two sides intensified after the Khartoum government appointed a hard-line NIF group to the mediation talks. The Khartoum delegation professed the government's commitment to Islamic law as part of a religious and moral obligation to promote Islam in Sudan and throughout the continent, and refused self determination as a ploy to split the country.

In July, 1997, President Daniel Torotich Moi of Kenya convened a meeting of the committee's Heads of State inviting Sudan's President Omar Hassan al-Bashir and John Garang the leader of SPLA/M. During this meeting, the Heads of State of Ethiopia, Uganda, and Eritrea actually threatened to invade Sudan if Bashir did not resolve the crisis and negotiate according to the DoP.[83] This incensed Bashir who at that time never regarded SPLM/A as anything more than a rebel and criminal out fit and the thought of sitting down with them was proving too big for him. The Khartoum Government walked out of these peace talks, rejecting the DoP. Though they walked out of the talks, President Moi prevailed on Bashir and re-emphasized the fact that GoS needed to come to the negotiating table or else the other neighbouring countries would carry out their threat.[84] Meanwhile the GoS began to look for other mediators in an effort to undermine the

---

[80] Mandil Nichola Personal correspondence, May, 2006
[81] Abito, A. S. - Personal correspondence to the author, February, 2007
[82] www.iss.org accessed on 11th February 2007.
[83] Waithaka Waihenya,; The Mediator: Gen. Lazaro Sumbeiywo and the Southern Sudan Peace Process; Nairobi, Kenway Publication, 2006.p. 38
[84] ibid

IGAD peace process. The NIF argued that the mediators were hostile toward GoS. No further negotiations were held by IGAD until the Khartoum Government returned to the peace process, once again embracing the DoP in late 1997. Loss of military ground and intense international pressure forced the government to the negotiating table. The return to the IGAD process was also, in part, in recognition of its failed effort to attract other mediators. Both parties signed a joint communiqué in September 1997 stating that they would accept the IGAD framework for peace negotiations.

Further meetings in 1997-1998 sought to narrow divisions between the two sides. The GoS agreed to negotiate the DoP at the October 1997 meeting, but both sides were bitterly divided. The SPLM/A demanded an end to Islamic law and the establishment of a confederation. The GoS delegation appeared willing to compromise on some issues but would only accept a federal system in which power would remain in the capital. The second round of talks scheduled for April 1998 was cancelled to allow more time for the parties to resolve their differences. The GoS, eager to secure a cease-fire agreement, came with positions it had earlier rejected and its attempt to establish a cease-fire was rejected by both the SPLM and IGAD as insufficient. The third session was held in Nairobi from 4 to 6 May, 1998. With Juba, the Southern Sudan regional capital under siege, and increased military pressure in the east along the Eritrea-Sudan border, the NIF accepted for the first time self determination for the South.

In Nairobi, the parties disagreed, however, on which territories were considered part of the South. The Khartoum delegation defined the South as the three provinces of Bahr el Ghazal, Equatorial, and Upper Nile recognized at independence in January, 1956 and outlined in the 1972 Addis Ababa Accords. The SPLM/A argued that Southern Kordofan and Southern Blue Nile and other marginalized areas were part of the South. There were serious disagreements on the issue of self determination for the south. The duration of the interim period a referendum on self determination and issues relating to interim arrangements were shelved by the mediators in part to avoid failure.[85] The question of

---

[85] Akal Jacqueline; Personal interview; May, 2006

religion and state remained unresolved. Both parties agreed to facilitate free and unimpeded flow of humanitarian assistance to the areas affected by the famine in South Sudan.

The United States and the European Union encouraged the Nairobi agreement on self determination. However, some observers saw the agreement on self-determination as a small step in the right direction after years of stalled efforts. A follow-up meeting between the parties took place in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in early August 1998. The talks collapsed due to differences on the role of religion in politics. The parties also disagreed on the territorial definition of Southern Sudan for the purpose of referendum. Talks scheduled for mid-April 1999 were cancelled because of the government's decision to allow time to review a peace proposal offered by some members of the SPLA/M.

The lack of consensus on the DoP stems from the fact that they were first submitted to the warring faction by a committee of ministers from IGAD region who had not discussed with the parties on the way forward. GoS also saw the hand of IGAD as being on the side of SPLM/A especially on the idea of self determination.

The peace process in the period discussed above was characterized by many issues among them threats, as in the case of Heads of States in 1997 threatening to invade Sudan. It was also a period which witnessed some countries from the international community taking sides and started agreeing with certain demands of either side. For instance, the US and European Union agreed with SPLM on secession and secularism. The Arab league as usual always supported the GoS' decisions. However, it should also be noted that IGAD remained focused on the peace process and this time the personal abilities of certain individuals were at play. President Moi was outstanding during this period. He managed to use dialogue instead of force unlike other Heads of State in the region. The failure by the warring parties to reach a consensus or compromise made IGAD to think of a better strategy to resolve the conflict and make some breakthroughs.

The Peace Process from 2000-2004

The original Ministerial Subcommittee was replaced by a permanent secretariat on the Sudan Peace Process based in Nairobi, to mount a sustained effort to resolve the conflict. President Moi appointed Lieutenant-General Lazarus Sumbeiywo as special envoy to Sudan.[86] The first round of talks held under this arrangement began in February 2000. Actually, Sumbeiywo was first appointed to be part of the Sudan Peace Process in 1997 when he was Chairman of the Technical Committee.[87] As earlier mentioned, President Moi in consultation with other Heads of State in the region decided to have a permanent envoy to the peace process in order to make it more effective and efficient. The process also was made more participatory and interactive so that the SPLM/A and GoS would discuss freely. It should be pointed out here that the period between February, 2000 and January, 2001 was marked by inactive participation of IGAD in Sudan peace process. There were peace talks that were held in Lake Bogoria, Kenya that did not yield any tangible results.

The breakthrough in the Sudan peace process came in January, 2002 when a joint communiqué was signed by the Heads of State of Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda and Somalia that called upon the Chairman of the IGAD Committee on Sudan to rejuvenate the IGAD Peace Process and invite other initiatives and partners to coordinate the efforts[88]. The first meeting of the warring parties was held at the Kenyan Commercial Bank' Training Centre in Karen, Nairobi, in May, 2002. Some belligerents called the place an open prison or garrison[89]. The purpose of this arrangement was to keep the parties in the conflict confined in one place and they had nowhere to go. In this way friendships were forged and the negotiations were conducted in a peaceful atmosphere. During this period, it was observed that the major hurdle in the negotiations were the issues of interim period and transitional period. The SPLM/A was opposed to the former while the GoS was opposed to the later.[90] The disagreement over these words led to a

---

[86] Waithaka Waihenya,; *The Mediator; Gen. Lazaro Sumbeiywo and the Southern Sudan Peace Process*; Nairobi, Kenway Publication, 2006.p.45

[87] ibid p. 38

[88] Ibid p. 45

[89] Mandil Nichola Personal correspondence, May, 2006

[90] Mohammed Afartky, Personal interview, July, 2006

stalemate. The SPLM/A and the IGAD negotiating team signed the program of work which outlined how the negotiations would be conducted. The GoS threw it away and refused to sign.[91] There was no agreement reached or signed during the Karen meeting. IGAD negotiators did not relent but went back to the drawing table and advised the representatives of GoS to go back and discuss with their superiors over the program of work. The idea behind was to allow full consultations between the representatives of the respective negotiating groups and their superiors. Since the warring parties were out of town, it offered them an opportunity to concentrate and consult among themselves without disturbances. It was one strategy or technique that IGAD employed throughout the process of negotiations. It turned out to be a very effective way of moving the process forward but at the same time it proved to be a costly factor in terms of time.[92]

The next phase of peace talks were in Machakos, a town about 70 kilometres from the city of Nairobi. It was in this place that the delegates met again on 17th June, 2002 to get on the tenuous business of negotiating for peace. During the Machakos meeting, the first hurdle that IGAD mediators encountered was agreement on the single negotiating text based on the DoP of 1994.The draft that IGAD came up with as a starting point covered broad lines on main issues such as transition period, pre transition period, reconciliation, and equitable distribution of natural resources. Unfortunately, it did not specifically refer to the right of self determination or secession which was the aim of SPLM. In the end SPLM was furious and threatened to abandon the talks.[93] IGAD was advised to adopt the technique of where parties vented their feelings and thrashed out the issues they had to negotiate before settling down collectively to debating them. This was done through a series of workshops and plenary sessions.

It should also be pointed out here that the IGAD negotiating team consisted of envoys from each member country. The leader of the negotiating team Lt. Gen. Sumbeiywo at one time realized that negotiations had to be done in a situation where some parties, other

[91] Mohammed Afartky, Personal interview, July, 2006
[92] ibid
[93] Akal Jacqueline; Personal interview; May, 2006

than the two protagonists, were not suspicious of each other.[94] There were envoys whose countries were not particularly at peace with each other. The Ugandans for instance were at conflict with GoS over the Lord Resistance Army (LRA) which was fighting the government of Uganda from its base in Sudan. Then Eritrea and Ethiopia had just ended a boarder war with each other. Therefore, there was quite internal conflict within the mediation team. There was also the international team which wanted to hijack the negotiations.[95] The IGAD chief negotiator had to balance within this web of intricacies. Amidst all these challenges, the IGAD team remained focused on the process and employed the strategy of letting both the SPLM/A and GoS discuss and iron out their differences. The purpose of this strategy was to allow free expression of ideas without being prejudiced by either side. In addition, the Sudanese themselves knew the complexity of the conflict and so they were the best people to find the solution. After hours and days of deliberations with phone calls between Machakos and Khartoum as well as Machakos and Southern Sudan, the belligerents finally agreed on self determination and the role of religion in the country. This eventually resulted in the Sudanese Government and the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) signing the Machakos Protocol.[96]

The Machakos Protocol

The parties reiterated their commitment to a negotiated, peaceful, comprehensive resolution to the Sudan Conflict within the Unity of Sudan and also discussed at length and agreed on a broad framework which sets forth the principles of governance. They also set general procedures to be followed during the transitional process and the structures of government to be created under legal and constitutional arrangements to be established. In addition, the warring parties also agreed to negotiate and elaborate in greater detail the specific terms of the framework, including aspects not covered in this phase of the negotiations, as part of the overall peace agreement. Lastly, the parties within the above context reached specific agreement on the right to self-determination for

---

[94] Waithaka Waihenya,; *The Mediator; Gen. Lazaro Sumbeiywo and the Southern Sudan Peace Process*; Nairobi, Kenway Publication, 2006.p. 86
[95] Waithaka Waihenya,; *The Mediator; Gen. Lazaro Sumbeiywo and the Southern Sudan Peace Process*; Nairobi, Kenway Publication, 2006.p. 86
[96] IGAD Secretariat on Peace in the Sudan, Machakos Protocol, 20 July, 2002.

the people of South Sudan, state and religion, as well as principles, and the transition process.

The Machakos Protocol provided for a "pr e-interim period" during which hostilities should cease and a formal ceasefire should be established as soon as possible. During a subsequent six year "interim period", the ceasefire should be maintained and Sharia law should not be applied in the South during that period. After six years, a referendum on Southern self-determination should be held.[97]

Further Peace Talks

A second round of talks was held in Machakos during August-September 2002, which attempted to negotiate a ceasefire. However, the talks broke down on 3 September 2002 when the Khartoum government recalled its delegation for "consultation" over the SPLA capture of the strategic town of Torit. Talks resumed in Machakos in October 2002. On 15 October, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed which agreed to a cessation of hostilities for the duration of talks.

There were factors that led to the signing of certain agreements at particular times during the negotiations. For instance, the MoU on cessation of hostilities was as a result of SPLM/A overrunning the town of Torit and killing high ranking GoS officers in September, 2002. SPLM/A went on to further occupy Torit for a while. Pained and humiliated President Bashir recalled the negotiating team from Machakos back to Khartoum. IGAD did not budge but continued talking quietly with those who wished to go on but otherwise the GoS was out of the talks.[98] This was always expected by the mediators and what was required was change of strategy or technique and move forward. IGAD chief negotiator Lt. Gen. Sumbeiywo embarked on a journey to talk to President Moi and later Colonel Garang in Nairobi about the capturing of Torit. Later Sumbeiywo travelled to Khartoum and met President Bashir who demanded that SPLM/A leave Torit and that cessation of hostilities measures be put in place before negotiations could

---

[97] Waithaka Waihenya,; *The Mediator; Gen. Lazaro Sumbeiywo and the Southern Sudan Peace Process*; Nairobi, Kenway Publication, 2006.p.89
[98] Ibid p.89

resume. Then IGAD presented Bashir and Garang a draft on cessation of hostilities memorandum which both agreed at separate times and places. Here, IGAD had to use influential people to get the two, Garang and Bashir to accept the MoU. These influential people included friends and wives.[99]

The year 2003 began on a different note in relation to the peace process. New arguments erupted between the Northerners and Southerners, with debate over whether the two sides should hold face-to-face talks across a negotiating table or hold "proximity talks" with the parties in separate rooms. General Sumbeiywo determined that the northern delegation reported to Vice President Ali Osman Taha. Believing the time had come to bring Taha and SPLM/A leader Garang into the negotiations, he asked the Kenyan government to approach Khartoum directly.[100] Taha agreed to come to Kenya to meet Garang. Initially, Taha had previously refused such a meeting. Considerable international pressure was required to get Garang to agree to direct talks, and Taha, against the counsel of his advisers, had to wait on the scene for three days for Garang to arrive.[101] Almost immediately the negotiations took on a different character, as the two men sought to develop a working relationship. During the first meeting, just one bottle of water was on the table. Garang opened it and poured a glass for Taha, a considerate act that augured well to Taha. Some time later Taha commented on a need for a haircut and observed that Garang's hair looked well cut. Garang promised to bring his barber. He then produced his wife, Rebecca Garang, to trim Taha's hair.

Aspects of power and wealth-sharing were agreed on 6 February 2003 and an Agreement on Security Arrangements during the Interim Period was signed on 25 September 2003. The negotiations to agree on the number of years when the interim and referendum would be held were also marred by intense antics and strategies. This was attached to the issue of self determination and it became an issue. The GoS agreed to self determination but insisted that the referendum be held after ten years and the SPLM/A on the other hand wanted two years maximum. Both sides could not agree and the IGAD Chief Negotiator

[99] Ibid, p. 89
[100] Waithaka Waihenya,; *The Mediator; Gen. Lazaro Sumbeiywo and the Southern Sudan Peace Process*; Nairobi, Kenway Publication, 2006.p. 93
[101] ibid p. 97

had to employ the criterion of give and take. IGAD took the years that government proposed and added them to those of SPLM/A and divided by two. The referendum could occur in six years. Both sides emphatically stated no.[102] The talks were deadlocked. However, the IGAD mediators held onto their position and gave both sides one hour to decide two persons from each delegation. Both sides chose two and everyone else left the room and left the four to talk. They were not to leave the room until they had an answer. This was a technique used by IGAD knowing very well that the four men in the room would not only be talking to each other but would be using mobile phones to contact their superiors without much interference. They finally agreed and settled for the six years that had been proposed by IGAD. It was a break through by the mediators.[103]

Towards the end of 2003, the negotiations moved to the town of Naivasha, Kenya. The Naivasha Declaration raised expectations that a Final Peace Agreement would be signed by the end of the year. However, the parties remained unable to move forward on the outstanding issues of power-sharing and the disputed regions of Abyei, Nuba Mountains and Southern Blue Nile. The ceasefire was extended until 31 March 2004 and talks continued at the highest level between Sudanese First Vice-President Ali Uthman Muhammad Taha and SPLM/A leader, Colonel John Garang. At the same time, the IGAD Secretariat prepared a work plan to support reconstruction and peace-building in Sudan after a peace agreement was reached.

Negotiations and talks continued sporadically under intensifying international pressure until the signing of a framework agreement in June 2004. This framework outlined provisions for power-sharing, wealth-sharing and transitional security arrangements. It also included special status for the contested areas of the Nuba Mountains, Abyei and Southern Blue Nile. On 5 June 2004, under the auspices of IGAD, the relevant parties signed the Nairobi Declaration reconfirming their commitment to the peace process, and to engage fully in the Sudan Peace Process.[104] Following a special meeting of the UN

[102] Akal Jacqueline; Personal interview; May, 2006
[103] Mandil Nichola Personal correspondence, May, 2006
[104] Waithaka Waihenya,; *The Mediator; Gen. Lazaro Sumbeiywo and the Southern Sudan Peace Process*; Nairobi, Kenway Publication, 2006.p.153

Security Council in Nairobi in November 2004, the Sudanese Government and the SPLM/A committed themselves to concluding the final details of the peace agreement by the end of 2004, but most neutral observers thought it unlikely that this deadline would be met.[105]

The Final Stages and the Signing of the CPA

Sixteen months after Taha and Garang shared the bottle of water, the two sides signed the CPA. The negotiations could not have succeeded without the continuing presence of the Kenyan mediator, the engagement of the two principals, and the constant attention of the international community. The last three implementing agreements were finally signed December 31, 2004, in Naivasha, Kenya. The CPA of January 9, 2005, includes six protocols and five implementation modalities and it also provides for a six-month pre-interim process, followed by a six-year interim period ending July 8, 2011. At the end of the interim period Southerners will vote either for unity of Sudan as experienced during the interim period or for an independent Southern Sudan. Islamic law holds sway only in the North, only for Muslims. An independent judiciary is to be established in both areas.

Secondly, a government of national unity protects the sovereignty of Sudan. A government of Southern Sudan exercises authority in the South. The CPA essentially created a federal system, with the national unity government linked to states in the South through the Southern Sudan Government. The two-chamber National Assembly is composed of 52 percent from the National Congress Party, 28 percent from the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Movement, 14 percent from other northern political parties, and 6 percent from other southern parties. The second chamber of the National Assembly, the Council of States, includes two members from each state and two observers from Abyei. The Government of Southern Sudan has 70 percent membership from the SPLM and 15 percent from the National Congress Party, with the remaining 15 percent from other parties. A National Constitutional Review Commission produced an Interim National Constitution some months late. A census was to take place before July 9, 2007, and

---

[105] Waithaka Waihenya,; *The Mediator; Gen. Lazaro Sumbeiywo and the Southern Sudan Peace Process*; Nairobi, Kenway Publication, 2006.p.153

general elections at all levels were to have been scheduled for July 9, 2008.[106] These deadlines have since slipped.

The other notable agreement is that both sides' forces were to keep to a cease-fire and redeploy to their own areas on a listed schedule. Joint Integrated Units should form, but each side would also keep an armed force. Monitoring arrangement was to exist through various joint bodies, including United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS). An effort was established for demobilization, disarmament, and the reintegration of soldiers no longer needed under arms. Equitable sharing of Sudan's wealth would include land usage and ownership, oil and its revenue, taxation and revenue allocation, monetary and financial policies, and reconstruction and development funds. Two percent of oil revenue was to go to oil-producing states in proportion to their output; the remainder was to be divided so that half from wells in Southern Sudan goes to its government and half goes to the Northern government and states. A boundary commission was to be established to fix the North-South line of demarcation. Separate Southern and National Reconstruction and Development Funds would be charged with reconstruction, resettlement, reintegration, and development and 75 percent of the National Fund will go to war-affected states, especially Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile. Abyei and Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile were subjects of complex protocols and implementing agreements. Abyei's position in the North or the South was to be determined by the binding judgement of an Abyei Boundary Commission and a referendum.[107]

4.5 CONCLUSION

As outlined above, there were a variety of strategies and methods of negotiations that were utilized by IGAD in order to reach the stage of signing the CPA. Firstly, IGAD mediators knew very well from the beginning that the best people to end the conflict in Sudan were the Sudanese themselves. What was required was a conducive environment for negotiations and IGAD gladly offered it. Among the strategies, direct negotiations across the table proved a good one. In addition, allowing and giving ample time to the people negotiating to consult their superiors in Khartoum and Southern Sudan was also a

---

[106] www.igad.org   accessed 12/12/2007
[107] www.igad.org   accessed 12/12/2007

practical method of moving the process forward. However, sometimes threats and intimidation were used if one party became unreasonable during the negotiations.[108] The personal abilities of certain individuals during the negotiations were also an attribute that came in handy. General Sumbeiywo and his team of envoys from other IGAD member states played a crucial role in strategizing and devising ways of moving the process forward.

The Government of Khartoum and the SPLA did in fact finalise negotiations by the end of 2004. This resulted in the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) on 9 January 2005. The CPA drew together all the previous protocols regarding respective issues that the Government and the SPLA had agreed upon. Numerous provisions address the various contentious issues.

---

[108] Samburu Dan; Personal Correspondence to him, March, 2006.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 INTRODUCTION

The study endeavoured to analyse the critical role that IGAD played in resolving the conflict in Sudan. This chapter will analyse and test the hypothesis of the study as outlined in the research proposal. Secondly, the analysis of the theoretical framework will be done and finally the study findings have been brought out as well as recommendations regarding the study.

5. 2 ANALYSIS OF THE HYPOTHESIS

A hypothesis is an idea that is suggested as a possible way of examining a situation or proving an idea. The two under listed were the working hypotheses for the study.

1. African sub regional bodies are better placed to resolve armed conflict as was the case of IGAD in the Sudan Peace Process

2. The Sudan Peace Agreement was possible because of the conditions of the post Cold War era.

In assessing the validity of the two working hypotheses, my study findings realized that it was not an easy task for IGAD to successfully broker a peace deal in Sudan. The major reasons for the success of the IGAD peace initiative remain of continuing importance and provide direction and insight in future peace negotiations. First, although there have been many efforts to end Sudan's civil war, only one initiative that of IGAD has achieved both regional and international legitimacy. That legitimacy was further strengthened with the signing of a peace agreement. Cliffe Lawrence has noted that interventions by the West and the UN often suffer from short-term perspectives and a tendency to look for quick fixes, while neighbouring countries have the advantages of sustained interest and knowledge of the conflict.[109] Indeed, concern that the Sudan conflict was a security threat to the region was the starting point of the IGAD Initiative. While regional states may benefit from the conflict, their long-term interests may change, and they may see internal

---

[109] Cliffe L, "Regional Dimensions of Conflict in the Horn of Africa," *Third World Quarterly 20 (1)*, 1999

conflicts in broader regional terms.[110] Indeed, the success of the peace process had largely been due to the marriage of the IGAD peace initiative with its legitimacy and grasp of the key issues at the heart of the dispute. The other side is the sustained engagement by the Heads of State in the sub region and their willingness to use a wide array of policy options, including force, to press the peace process forward.[111]

Then secondly, the Sudan Peace Agreement was possible because of the conditions of the post Cold War. The US took unilateral action, such as the imposition of various sanctions, but crucially it worked closely with selected Western allies and through the IGAD Peace Initiative. The end of the Cold War and the emergence of the US as the sole super power affected the civil war and brought a human face to the conflict. Firstly, it led to the Americans to try and bridge the gap between the rhetoric and practice in foreign policy. What this portended for the war was increased US attention to the suffering of civilians, a marked departure from the earlier era, when such attention was held to Cold War power considerations.

In addition, the end of the Cold War provided an environment in which the Southerners grievances were recognized as legitimate. Such ethnic grievances had long been suppressed during the Cold War politics as states saw it in terms of the invisible hand of either the Americans or Russians, and used such excuses to undermine their legitimacy. The demise of the Cold War thus afforded the unique opportunity for the SPLM/A to be heard as similar ethnic movements erupted in the former Eastern Bloc and were given their independence. The avalanche of peace initiatives that have been launched after the end of the Cold war lends credence to the argument that the civil war in Sudan had in fact been held hostage to the power considerations of the former two super powers.

In conclusion, the findings of my study revealed the facts that are listed above as testimonies that African sub regional bodies and African themselves are capable of

---

[110] Cliffe L., "Regional Dimensions of Conflict in the Horn of Africa," *Third World Quarterly 20 (1)*, 1999
[111] Morgenthau H. J., *Politics Among Men; The Struggle for Power and Peace;* New Delhi, Kalyani, 2001, p.3

resolving conflicts. Secondly, the end of the Cold War had provided an opportunity for negotiations with the US being the only super power controlling the issues of the world.

5. 3 ANALYSIS OF THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Two traditions of thought dominate war and peace. These are realism and idealism. The two were the theories of my framework. Firstly, realism is most influential amongst political scientists as well as scholars of international relations. Realists emphasize power and security issues, the need for a state to maximize its expected self-interest and above all their view of the international arena as a kind of anarchy, in which the will to use power enjoys primacy.[112] The external intervention of neighbouring countries into the internal affairs of another state can only be understood through this theory, which accounts for the security and national interest. IGAD as a sub regional body has been used by countries neighbouring Sudan to find a lasting solution to the war in that country in order to guard their interests and security. My study findings were that the neighbouring countries Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia felt the impact of the war. The number of Sudanese refugees spread in these countries was taking a toll on their meagre resources. In reference to war, realists believe that it is an inevitable part of an anarchical world and that once war has begun; the state ought to do whatever it can to win.[113] In other words, if the nation realizes that the war cannot be won as was in the case of Sudan after 1990, then there is no need of continuing fighting. Sudan conflict was having serious repercussions not only in the country but also in the region. The neighbours sought to deal with conflict and find a lasting solution. Conditions were also ripe for talks because both sides were exhausted from years of fighting and some members of the IGAD were seen by Sudan as being allies to the SPLM.

The realist theory was relevant in this study because of its emphasis on states, territorial sovereignty, security and interests. Realists argue that every state, whether industrialized or not, has vital interests which it always aims to preserve against other states and that the nature of the national interests that must be preserved at all cost is open to various

---

[112] Morgenthau H. J.,*Politics Among Men: The Struggle for Power and Peace* New Delhi,Kalyani,2001,p.3
[113] ibid

interpretations.[114]Realism has articulated a conflict management approach based on strategy and use of threat or use of force to maintain peace. While acknowledging that force was not used in the Sudan Peace Process, it should be understood, however, that the countries making up IGAD had interests to preserve because the war in Sudan threatened those interests.

IGAD has in practice brought the different dimensions of security under its mandate. It began with the liberal definition of security before broadening its scope to include what are arguably realist dimensions of security.[115] The Authority was conceived with conventional, realist security issues like armed conflict at a secondary level, as a by-product of security social-economic sphere.

Walzer Michael offers an argument against realism as far as state interests are concerned. He contends that states are in fact responsive to moral concerns, even when they fail to live up to them.[116] According to Walzer, since states are creations of individual's persons, they strive to have an ideal world situation. This can be demonstrated in what happened in early June, 2001 when President Moi decided to call for a meeting of Heads of State in the region. Therefore, the idealist theory is also relevant in this study because it puts emphasis on the morality and justice. All political leaders are expected to act justly and morally upright in the way they govern their people and the way they relate with other states. The countries in the IGAD region felt a moral responsibility to act justly and help Sudan.

Alarmed by the deepening crisis and multiple failed attempts by outside mediators, members of IGAD formed a mediation team consisting of two organs; a summit committee of Heads of State Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, and Uganda, and a standing committee composed of their mediators. These committees were eventually replaced by a permanent IGAD Secretariat on the Sudan Peace Process.

[114] Ogot and Okoth P.G.,*Conflict in Contemporary Africa*,P.10
[115] Chweya L, "Emerging Dimensions of Security in the IGAD Region" in Mwangiru M. *African Regional Security in the Age of Globalization*, Nairobi, Heinrich Boll Foundation, 2004. p. 34
[116] Walzer, M, *Just and Unjust Wars* New Haven, Yale University Press,1996 p.19

In my study both theories were utilized with realism analyzing the role the states in the region played in conflict resolution and idealism looked at the whole peace process in Sudan as mediated and negotiated by IGAD.

5. 4 STUDY FINDINGS

The notion of internalization of conflict entails that a conflict previously seen as purely internal in fact reaches far beyond. Such a conflict goes through a process of diffusion and takes on altogether a different character. The role of sub regions in conflict resolution in Africa cannot be overestimated. My study findings are that sub regions such as SADC, IGAD and ECOWAS have played major roles in conflict resolution in their respective regions. Factors that precipitate the success of such peace process differ from one region to another. In addition, the strategies adopted by each sub region differ from one conflict to another. For instance ECOWAS used force and negotiations at the same time whereas SADC invited heads of state and leaders of rebel groups to the negotiating table. As for IGAD, representatives of the two warring factions were invited and managed to broker a peace deal.

The study also found out that the most trying times in the IGAD initiated Sudan Peace Process were from the year 2000 to the time of signing the CPA in 2005.Through out the negotiations, the IGAD negotiators sometimes found themselves dealing with many peripheral threats to the peace process. Apart from the brinkmanship of GoS and the intransigence of some SPLM/A negotiators, they had to face to the international community pressure. At one time, the IGAD chief negotiator was accused of not respecting the government of Sudan and not referring to Washington.[117] This can be attributed to the fact that the Cold War had ended and so there was only one super power controlling the affairs of the world, peace talks included.

---

[117] Waithaka Waihenya,; *The Mediator; Gen. Lazaro Sumbeiywo and the Southern Sudan Peace Process*; Nairobi, Kenway Publication, 2006.p.153

Thirdly, the study also found out that the two warring factions, GoS and SPLM/A had many differences in the beginning and did not trust IGAD and in particular Sumbeiywo to mediate in the peace process. However, the neighbouring countries that make up IGAD had all the trust and confidence in the leadership of Sumbeiywo and so GoS and SPLM/A had no choice but to sit at the negotiating table. The other members of the mediating team consisting of ambassadors from member countries tried by all ways and means to keep at bay the warring parties and holding the peace process together.

Also at every stage IGAD kept its centre of attention on moving the process toward the reaching of a successful peace agreement. The basis of American engagement in Sudan, however, had continued to evolve. While America involvement in the peace process initially derived from the interests of various national constituencies, security concerns came to the fore, particularly after the 9/11. Security remained a central preoccupation, but with the US bogged down in seemingly intractable disputes in Iraq and Afghanistan, the USA government and in particular the George Bush Administration was anxious to be seen to oversee a successful peace process particularly in a Moslem country and on the basis of a multinational initiative.

In addition, IGAD continued to strengthen its political and organisational capacity for peace-building, but given its financial weaknesses, it needed the sustained support of the US and its Western allies throughout the negotiating period.[118] Furthermore, aware that a major failure of the Addis Ababa Agreement had been that it did not continue international engagement and oversight, the CPA provided for a number of security monitoring mechanisms and an independent Assessment and Evaluation Commission. The activities of these mechanisms were increasingly seen as the form that the peace process took in the last stage.

IGAD endeavoured to ensure that those mechanisms achieved a high level of professionalism and accountability, and at all times strived for Sudanese and regional participation. And lastly, beginning with IGAD's DoP, there was an appreciation of the

---

[118] Akal Jacqueline; Personal interview; May, 2006

need for a resolution of the conflict and power sharing. The implication was that the IGAD negotiating team had to find appropriate modalities for involving all parties to the civil war. More over in the Machakos Protocol it was clear that the mediators and belligerents understood that the peace process could only achieve legitimacy and be sustained if Sudan underwent a democratic transformation.

5.5 RECOMMENDATIONS

The study has some recommendation that IGAD can use in designing and implementation of policies. IGAD must remain mindful of its own limitations and avoid overextending itself into areas beyond its resources and capabilities. The organisation is constrained by limited resources and capacity and has limited practice in post–conflict peace maintenance and management, but member states have much to contribute from their own experiences and knowledge of the region. While international organisations and development partners have considerably more material resources, for instance logistical support for monitoring or finance, they have a global array of interest that may result in other arenas taking greater priority in their agenda than Sudan and Somalia, for example. Therefore IGAD must build a strong organizational capacity of peace initiatives and reconciliation. This should also include monitoring tools for the implementation of the agreements signed. In addition, there must be a strong financial base for peace negotiations as well as a pool of experienced personnel to handle negotiations and mediation processes in the region.

Indeed one part of the IGAD role just like other sub regional bodies, must be to seek to ensure that other partners retain their commitment to the challenges of bringing peace to their respective region. These sub region bodies, IGAD included, must continue to cultivate the support and goodwill of the international community to access political and financial support for their efforts in respect of building regional security and, with the support of their member states and the international community, expand their capacity to monitor and engage in regional confidence building activities. Among them would be institutions of learning that would offer diplomacy and peace studies to all IGAD member countries.

Thirdly, IGAD and other sub regional bodies such as ECOWAS and SADC must seek to consolidate their position as the principal mechanism for addressing the problems of conflict within the region and to preserve and enhance their reputation as neutral facilitator and mediator. In this vain, IGAD must give attention to constructing durable security architecture for the region including provision for the eventual conclusion of a mutual non-aggression treaty/arrangement among its member states that would compel countries to actively disown support to groupings engaged in armed subversion into neighbouring states. Since there is no defined working relationship between the peace secretariats serving the peace negotiations in Nairobi and the IGAD secretariats, these two should be encouraged to work together directly under the supervision of the Executive Secretary of IGAD. Member states should thus encourage coordination between the secretariat in Djibouti and the peace secretariats in other countries.

Lastly, the study did not delve into the challenges facing the implementation of the CPA; it would be interesting for others to pursue the subject of the implementation of the CPA.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Albino, O., *The Sudan; A Southerner Viewpoint*, London; Oxford University Press, 1970,

Alistair Lyon; *Egypt, Libya trying for peace in Sudan*, Reuters, October 18, 1999.

Amani, M.O, "Sudan Political Chronicle 2003, No.16", Nairobi, IFRA 2003.

Amnesty International; *Oil in Sudan; Deteriorating Human Rights*, June, 2000.

Christian Aid; *The Scorched Earth; Oil and War in Sudan*, March, 2001.

Chweya, L, "Emerging Dimensions of Security in the IGAD Region", in Mwagiru M, *Africa Regional Security in the Age of Globalization.* Nairobi, Heirich Boll Foundation, 2004.

Cliffe L. Regional Dimensions of Conflict in the Horn of Africa, *Third World Quarterly 20 (1), 1999.*

Crocker, C.A, "Afterword; Strengthening African Peace Making and Peace Making," in Smock D.R, *Making War, and Waging Peace*, Washington DC, United Institute of Peace Studies, 1993

Deng, O.A.R., *The Politics of the Two Sudans*, Uppsala Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1994

Doornbos, M.C., Lionel Ahmed, Abdel Ghaffar, Markakis John (Eds); *Beyond Conflict in the Horn; The Prospects for Peace, Recovery and Development in Ethiopia, Somalia, Eritrea and Sudan,* James Curry; London, 1992.

El Madi, M. *A Short History of the Sudan*, London, Oxford University Press, 1965

Galtung, J, *Peace, War and Defence*, Copenhagen, Christian, Ejlers, 1976.

Harbeson, J, W & Rothchild, D. *Africa in World Politics: The African State* in *Flux*, Colorado, 2000.

Hoile, D. (Ed), *The Search for Peace in Sudan; A Chronology of the Sudanese Peace Process, 1989-2001*, Selwood P. Ltd, West Sussex; 2002.

IGAD; *Sudan Peace Process; Comprehensive Peace Agreement*, Nairobi, 2005

International Crisis Group, "God, Oil and Country: Changing the Logic of war in Sudan", ICG Report, 39, Brussels, December 2002.

Johnson D.H, *The Root Causes of the Sudan's Civil War*, Indiana University, Indianapolis, 2003.

Karuru, N, "Conflict Prevention: Responses by Sub Regional Organizations and Civil Society in Eastern Africa" In Schnabel Albrecht & Carmet David (Eds), *Conflict Prevention: From Rhetoric to Reality: Organisations* and *Institutions*, Maryland, Lexington "Books, 2004.

Kwanje, S.L "The Sudan Peace Process: From Machakos to Naivasha" in Mwagiru M, *African Regional Security in the Age of Globalization "*, Nairobi, Heinrich Boll Foundation, 2004.

Laue, J. H, *The Functions of the Intermediary in Third Party Processes*, Fairfax, VA: Centre for Conflict Analysis and Resolutions, 1991,

Lesch, M.A, "External Involvement in the Sudanese Civil War" in Smock D.R (Ed) *Making War and Waging Peace Foreign Interventions in Africa*, Washington, D.C, United States Institute of Peace, 1993.

Lesch, M.A. "Negotiation in the Sudan" in Smock D.R. (Ed), *Making War and Waging Peace: Foreign Intervention in Africa*, Washington DC, United States Institute of Peace Studies, 1993.

Markakis, J. *The Source of Conflict in the Horn of Africa*, London, SAGE, 1998.

Mitchell, C.R, "External Peace-Making Initiatives and Intra-national Conflict" in Manus Midlarsky (Ed), *The Internationalization Communal Strife*. New York, Rutledge, 1992.

Mohammed A. A and El Amin K., *Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution; Capacity Assessment Study for the IGAD sub region;* Prepared for IGAD, October, 2001.

Morgenthau H. J., *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace,* New Delhi, Kalyani, 2001.

Mwagiru, M. (Ed) *Africa Regional security in the Age of Globalization*, Nairobi, Heinrich Boll Foundation, 1997.

Nyot, P, "Ties That Will Not Bind," In Nyong'o P. A, (Ed) *Arms and Daggers in the Heart of Africa*; Studies on Internal Conflicts, Nairobi, Academy publishers, 1990.

Odera, J. *Calming the Storm; IGAD's Peace Initiative for Somalia and Sudan*; Saverwoord Focus Publications, 1999.

Ogot B.A, and Okoth P.G, (Eds) *Conflict in Contemporary Africa*, Nairobi, Jomo Kenyatta Foundation, 2002.

Okoth Godfrey, "Regional Institutional Responses to Security in the Era of Globalization" Mwagiru, M (Ed). *Africa Regional security in the Age of Globalization*, Nairobi, Heinrich Boll Foundation, 1997.

Petterson, D. *Inside Sudan; Political Islam, Conflict and Catastrophe*; Westview Books, Boulder, 1998.

Richard s, *Empowering People: Building Community in Africa, Civil Association and Loyalty in Africa*. Toronto, University of Toronto, 1993.

Shiawl-Kidanekal, T. 'Conflict Prevention and Management in Africa', in Schnabel, A & Carment, D. (Eds) *Conflict Prevetion: From Rhetoric to Reality; Organizations and Institutions*, Maryland, Lexington Books, 2004.

Samson, G, A. "Role of OAU: Past, Present and Future", in Smock D.R (Ed), *Making War and Waging Peace; Foreign Interventions in Africa,* Washington DC, United States, Institute of Peace Studies, 1993.

Smork, D.R (Ed), *Making War and Waging Peace: Foreign Intervention in Africa*; Washington DC, United States Institute of Peace Studies, 1993.

Teichman, J.*Pacifism and Just War*, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1986.

The ISS Occasional Papers, "The IGAD Peace Process: Sign Posts for the Way Forward" February, 2004.

Vogt M. A , *Cooperation between the United Nations and the OAU in the Management of African Conflicts,* paper presented at the **Symposium on International Peace and Security: The African Experience**, South Africa, 21-23 September 1998.

Voll, J.O, *Historical Dictionary of the Sudan*, London, The Scarecow Press, 1978

Walls, J.A, "Mediation: An Analysis, Review and Proposed Research", *Journal Of Conflict Resolution* 25, no 1, (March1981); 157-180.

Walzer Micheal, *Just and Unjust War*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1996.

Wondu, S., *The Battle for Peace*, Princenton, University Press, 1996.

Woodward P., *The Horn of Africa: Politics and International Relations*, London, Tauris Academic Studies, 1996.

Young, J. *"Along Ethiopian's Western Frontier; Gambella and Benishangai in Transition"* Journal of Modern African Studies 37 (2), 199.

Zartman, W. I, *Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa* .Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1989.

WEBSITES VISITED

www.igad.org	28/05/06, 13/05/06, 11/02/07, 16/06/06, 05/05/07
www.wikipeadia.com	13/10/06
www.sudansupport.com	19/09/06
www.irinnews.org	16/09/07
www.ecowas.pbwik.com	20/09/06
www.africa.ufl.edu	20/11/06
www.un.org/depts/dpko	19/10/06, 22/11/06
www.sadc.org	22/09/06, 22/10/06

www.fco.gov.uk   17/11/06

www.iss.org   19/01/07, 05/07/07

www.internationalcrisigroup.com   04/05/07

PERSONS INTERVIEWED

Abito Ajuah S-Sudanese Political Analyst   February, 2007-Khartuom, Sudan.

Nichola Mandil -SPLM Secretariat   May, 2006-Nairobi, Kenya

Jacqueline Akal -SPLM Secretariat   May 2006, Nairobi, Kenya.

Mohammed Afartky-Sudanese Embassy   July, 2006, Nairobi, Kenya

Dan Samburu -IGAD Secretariat   March, 2006, Nairobi, Kenya