

**EXTERNAL ACTORS IN STATE RECONSTRUCTION: THE CASE OF
SOMALIA**

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Award of the Degree of Master of Arts in International Relations**

**Department of Political Science and Public Administration
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
DECLARATION

This research project is my original work and has not been submitted for award of a Degree in any other university.



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DATE

This research project has been submitted for examination with my approval as University supervisor



DR. JOSHUA KIVUVA



DATE

DEDICATION

To my dear family; my wife Wanza and my children Mawia, Kimanzi and Muema, your encouragement, support and prayers accorded me throughout the entire period of writing this project was amazing.

And to all my KDF brothers and sisters who have been in active engagement on Somali soil for the sake of a neighbor's peace and stability.

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AIS	-	Automatic Identification System
AMISOM	-	African Union Mission in Somalia
ARPCT	-	Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism
ARS	-	Alliance for Re-liberation of Somalia
AU	-	African Union
CIA	-	Central Intelligence Agency
CJTF-HOA	-	Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa
CPA	-	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DIIS	-	Danish Institute for International Studies
EACTI	-	East Africa Counter-Terrorism Initiative
ECOWAS	-	Economic Community of West African States
EPRDF	-	Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front
EU	-	European Union
GPS	-	Global Positioning Systems
ICG	-	International Crisis Group
ICU	-	Islamic Courts Union
IGAD	-	Inter-Governmental Authority on Trade and Development
IRC	-	International Red Cross
KDF	-	Kenya Defense Forces
NGO	-	Non Governmental Organization
NRM	-	National Resistance Movement
OEF-HOA	-	Operation Enduring Freedom-Horn of Africa
OLF	-	Oromo Liberation Front
ONLF	-	Ogaden National Liberation Front
QRF	-	Quick Reaction Force
SALW	-	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SCIC	-	Supreme Council of Islamic Courts of Somalia
SNM	-	Somali National Movement
SPLA/M	-	Sudanese People Liberation Army/Movement

SPM	-	Somali Patriotic Movement
SSDF	-	Somali Socialist Democratic Front
TFG	-	Transitional Federal Government
TFI	-	Transitional Federal Institutions
TNA	-	Transitional National Assembly
TNG	-	Transitional National Government
TPLF	-	Tigrean People’s Liberation Front
UN	-	United Nations
UNDP	-	United Nations Development Programme
UNITAF	-	United Nations International Task Force
UNPOS	-	United Nations Political Office for Somalia
UNOSOM	-	United Nations Operations in Somalia
UNSCR	-	United Nations Security Council Resolution
USAID	-	United States Agency for International Development
USSR	-	United Socialist Soviet Republic
US	-	United States of America
USC	-	United Somali Congress

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ABSTRACT

This study examines state reconstruction in the context of external actors both state and non-state and Somali provides the case of study. The study makes use of Structural realism to examine behavior of actors in the reconstruction process as well as acknowledging the structure of world politics in explaining the dynamics of a state's reconstruction process. The study uses data from both primary and secondary sources with primary data mainly generated from interviews with experts representing state officials and officials in Non-Governmental Organizations as well as International organizations involved in Somalia reconstruction process. The study establishes that there are both convergent and divergent interests pursued by various external actors involved in the Somalia reconstruction. National security and political interests are isolated as cross-cutting interests that motivate the direct involvement of the state actors involved in Somalia such as Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, USA, Eritrea, and by and large at the continental level, presently pursued by AMISOM while the UN represents the wider global interest. However, besides the cross-cutting interests, state actors have also fostered state-specific interests that have not always converged with the interests of those other states involved in the reconstruction process. For instance the US interest on the war on terror in Somalia has not necessarily been the interest of the other states involved in Somalia. The study further finds that the dynamics of the interests has therefore been pivotal in guiding the process as the state actors jostle to influence the reconstruction process in line with their interests. The place of internal domestic actors in the reconstruction process comes in handy in this study in the determination of the direction of the process. The study recommends for aggregation of the efforts by different actors involved in the reconstruction process in order to have a common goal and approach rather than each pursuing own interests at the expense of a successful reconstruction process. The study also recommends a Somali-owned reconstruction process with full involvement of the Somalis themselves as opposed to an externally led process if meaningful reconstruction is to be realized.

CHAPTER ONE

BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

1.0 Introduction

The reconstruction of Somalia has been a perennial endeavor involving both internal and external actors for over two decades. The Somali state collapsed after the ouster of the military ruler Gen. Siyad Barre. The collapse was mainly attributed to the manner in which the transition to power by emerging administration lacked a clearly set out plan on how to establish government and tackle the underdeveloped economy and infrastructure, not to mention the highly fluid political establishment and social fabric as at the time. The result was the split of the state into semi-autonomous administrations some of which, for instance Somaliland declared her autonomy soon after the collapse of the state in 1991. Other main regions that came into being were Puntland and South-Central Somalia.

The period around 1991 and after the collapse was characterized by high hostilities among warring groups across the state with grumbling for state resources being at the center. Due the escalating conflict, it became almost impossible for the warring groups to engage in any reconciliation talks as they were mainly preoccupied with the struggle to gain control over their areas of operation. The crisis led to widespread suffering on the population which attracted the attention of the UN and the external world. In 1992 the UN sanctioned the urgent need for humanitarian assistance to Somalia to alleviate human suffering. The US volunteered to lead the intervention and responded by sending an amphibious force to Mogadishu in 1992 to engage in humanitarian operations and oversee reconciliation. However this intervention did not succeed as the operation environment became extremely hostile following a deadly attack on the US peace keepers that led to their eventual withdrawal as well as the allied forces from other states. The withdrawal of the UN peacekeepers was following by a period of minimal action on the part of external intervention. Several regional states and neighbouring states such as Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya, Egypt and Yemen all came up in support of reconciliation efforts through hosting conferences to try to bring peace to Somalia and help reconstruct the state but none could successfully take off. It was not until 1999 that the Djibouti president at the UN general assembly announced to the world that his government would

host a reconciliation conference to try to bring peace to Somalia and ensure an elected Somali President finally participated in the next UN General Assembly. Indeed the first peace conference was held at Arta, Djibouti later culminating into a Somali government in August 2000 established on a clan formula that saw the larger clans gain control of the state. Abdiqassim Salad Hassan was installed as the president of the transitional government.

This reconciliation effort led by Djibouti marked a major turning point in the reconstruction of the Somali state as it afforded the opportunity to external actors both as individual states and as regional and international organizations to spring into the process following the cessation of hostilities and the coming in of the transitional government. Even though the Transitional National Government (TNG), as it was known was not to last for long, it was actually a major ground setter for the reconstruction efforts that followed. The IGAD sponsored peace process was initiated in 2002 and Kenya was selected to host the process which received widespread support from the region as well as financial support from the western states including the US and Britain. Peace conferences were held in Eldoret and Mbagathi in Kenya that gave forth to the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in 2004. This transitional arrangement too recognized the multitude of clans in Somalia just as the TNG had done but went a further step ahead and established a federal polity for the Somali people which would ensure all were incorporated in governance. The TFG faced opposition from the various clan militias that also saw further alignment of the Somali state with allegiance towards the three main regions of Puntland, Somaliland, and South Central Somalia. In spite of the various efforts at reconstructing Somalia, a unitary state was not attained by any of the transitional governments even at the expiry of TFG in September 2012. For now over two decades since the collapse of the Somali state a lasting solution to the conflict is yet to be found even with the involvement of both external state and non-state actors in the peace building, mediation and reconstruction efforts.

Somalia has now been embroiled in conflict for now over two decades. Throughout this period, the Somali people have not been able to establish a strong central government

capable of consolidating the enormous state resources for the benefit of the masses. Both state and non-state actors have been involved in Somalia over the years but the reconstruction of the state still remains elusive. The involvement of these external actors has largely been guided by certain interests and this informs the core subject of this study.

1.1 Statement of the Research Problem

Somalia degenerated to total collapse in 1991 following unprecedented conflict that spread across all regions of the state. Many external actors have been involved in Somalia since the collapse of the state. Among the states include USA, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya, Uganda and Eritrea. Despite this external involvement, instead the Somali conflict has evolved over the years to take different shapes with emerging political alliances and economic interests both by domestic actors and external actors. These realignments are informed by actor specific interests both at the domestic and the external levels. Ethiopia's national security concerns stem from a history of Somali irredentism claiming part of Ethiopia's territory (Fiona, 2000). On the other hand, lack of an effective central government and emergence of factional militias and later on Islamic Court Union, posed a threat to US national security (Dagne, 2001). The emergence of ICU as a stabilizing force in central Somali led to US being more concerned with the Somali case on fear she could be a safe haven for terrorist groups (Menkhaus, 2007). This marks a major convergence of interests between US and Ethiopia in respect of their involvement in Somalia. It is worth to note that Eritrea's position on the role of ICU remained different from that of Ethiopia and US and as a result she was considered a sympathizer to ICU which therefore meant her interest differed with that of Ethiopia and that of US.

Ethiopia's invasion of Somalia in December 2006 was later followed with involvement of the African Union to stabilize the then transitional government. Hitherto, Al Shabaab insurgency across the country and increased piracy along the Somali waters became regional security concerns. The African Union Mission led by Uganda and Burundi had successfully expelled Al Shabaab elements from the capital Mogadishu. However, Al Shabaab still had the capacity to wage guerilla warfare to AMISON forces and by

extension in Kenyan territory as witnessed by multiple abduction and grenade attacks on Kenyan soil. In October 2011, Kenya entered Somalia to fight Al Shabaab to ensure her own stability and security in the region occasioned by provocative attacks by the insurgent group.

The unprecedented entry of Kenyan troops into Somalia marked another level in the fight against insurgence in the reconstructing state. Several external actors both state and non-state have been directly involved in the Somalia conflict all citing stabilization for the struggling transitional government as their main reasons for involvement. However, close scrutiny indicates that state actors have harbored different interests in the Somalia reconstruction agenda. Kenya for instance besides being driven by the desire for a stable neighbour Somalia, her national security concerns has been critical to her direct involvement and especially after the attacks by Somali militia on her territory. It is intimated that Kenya has been in support of creation of an autonomous region of Jubaland to act as buffer zone with the rest of Somalia (Standard Media, 12 June, 2013). Ethiopia is motivated by economic interests and security concerns emanating from Somali population in her Ogaden region, while US is solely driven by war on terror. While these interests may appear to converge, they at the same time diverge in the manner in which each of the states fosters her interests. How these convergence and divergence of interests impact on Somalia reconstruction necessitates an inquiry.

The study problematizes the convergence and divergence of external actors' interests in the reconstruction of the Somali state. The guiding question to the study is; to what extent are the attempts at, and constraints in the advancement of reconstruction a function of divergent and convergent interests of external actors?

1.2 Objectives of the Study

The objectives of the study are to examine state reconstruction and analyze the role of external actors and the influence their interests have on the reconstruction process. In specific terms the study seeks to:

- i. To examine and analyze the impact of divergence and convergence of interests of external actors on state reconstruction in Somalia.
- ii. Examine factors underpinning successful state reconstruction in Somalia.

1.3 Justification of the Study

The study's findings attempts to fill the knowledge gap on the role of converging and divergent states interests in state reconstruction considering the case of the Somali. The pool of literature available examines states collapse and dwelling mostly on successful or near success state reconstruction endeavors of early 1990s and beyond (Zartman, 1995, Khadiagala, 1995, 1998, Keller, 1998). To close the knowledge gap, there is need for literature that specifically examines external actors to state reconstruction and what their presence contributes towards a failed or a successful reconstruction process which the available literature does not provide. On the other hand is a literature on third party involvement in state collapse without examining the role of interests of these parties as available in (Foltz, 1995). Foltz analyzes third party involvement in the collapse of states and generally explores how third parties get involved in helping collapsed states recollect themselves but does not consider the driving factors of the third party involvement. The literature found in the works of (Adam, 1995) , (Menkhaus, 2003), (Ford and Nowresteh, 2006) and (Spilker, 2008) provides detailed causes, description and analysis of Somalia state collapse and attempts to reconstruct but falls short of specific examination of the role differentiated interests of external actors play in the reconstruction process. The literature made available through this study goes a long way in filling in the knowledge gap that is important in understanding the very important role of differentiated external interests in a state's reconstruction.

A successful state reconstruction endeavour world over requires a well thought and clear policy on how the reconstruction process should be undertaken in the face of the inevitable constraints posed by competing interests. Such policy should also have the capacity to identify factors that underpin a successful reconstruction process and provide the necessary information on how these factors can be operationalized towards a successful reconstruction. This important policy component of a successful

reconstruction process informs the guiding questions to this study and therefore no doubt the findings of this study will make a major policy contribution in the area of state reconstruction.

While there have been studies focusing on role of external actors in Somalia reconstruction process, most of them have dwelt with general involvement of these external actors represented in individual states like Eritrea, Ethiopia, USA and other Arab countries such as in (Regan, 1996), (Kettler, 2004), (Samatar, 2007), (Menkhaus, 2008) and the (International Crisis Group Reports for 2002 to 2010), this study specifically examines the role the interests of states as external actors to a state's reconstruction play in determining the course of the reconstruction process. The findings of this study will contribute recommendations to policy experts in state reconstruction endeavors and in particular those involved in the Somalia reconstruction efforts.

1.4 Scope and Limitations

The period of study is from 1991 to 2011, a period that covers the collapse of the Somalia state and eventual efforts at reconstruction. In examining Somalia state reconstruction, the study explores the involvement of external actors and their role in the reconstruction process. While acknowledging the multitude of both state and non-state actors involved in Somalia, this study only focused on the states of Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Kenya, Uganda and the US. The six were picked because of their hypothesized unique interests in the Somalia reconstruction process. Ethiopia and Eritrea being next door neighbors are viewed as being perennial enemies yet their involvement has been key to the Somalia reconstruction process. The identification of the two states offered an opportunity to establish whether their clash of interests is at play in the reconstruction process and by extension their impact on the reconstruction efforts. In a unipolar system, US involvement is considered paramount in the investigation considering her unique interests on the global fight against terror.

The study met a number of limitations. One such limitation was encountered while collecting data from primary sources from Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Kenya, Uganda

and US government representatives in Kenya. Some considered such information as being sensitive to their national security and interests and felt the information could not be entrusted with an outsider and as such numerous attempts to reach out for respondents from some of the embassies never yielded any results. Necessary steps were however taken to mitigate this by assuring the informants that the information was to be kept confidential and used only for academic purposes. Getting appointments and meetings with experts also provided another major challenge due to their busy schedules which was mitigated by opting for telephone interviews. Nevertheless the researcher extensively explored the secondary sources of data available on the topic in order to come up with a comprehensive report.

1.5 Definition of Key Concepts

State Actor

This study defines a state actor as an entity that possesses all the conventional qualities of a state, of having a geographical territory, a population, sovereignty, wields political, economic and military authority and can exercise it over its citizens when such entity is in a situation of exerting its influence. In this study Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya and the United States are state actors that are actively involved in the affairs of Somalia.

Non-State actor

It is an entity that has structures legally recognized within a state or a group of states known to be involved in certain activities within its jurisdiction but are not owned by the state. Non-state actors may operate locally within a state or internationally depending on the protocols defining their formation. In this study, civil society organizations, religious organizations and local Non-governmental organizations operating in Somalia are classified as internal non-state actors while regional and international organizations are classified as external non-state actors.

External Actor

External actor means an independent entity being involved directly in the affairs of another independent entity, be it politically, economically, or militarily. Conceptually, for

the purpose of this study, an external actor refers to both state and non-state actors that are capable of influencing the course of events within Somalia.

State Collapse

The study generally adopts Zartman's (1995) conceptualization of state collapse, where he views it as the situation where the structure, authority, law, and political order have fallen apart and must be reconstituted afresh. However the study specifically defines state collapse as the disintegration of a state's central government which leads to lack of an effective central control over her territory.

State Reconstruction

According to Foltz (1995), it is the process of re-establishing a central political authority that has control over national boundaries and national territory to establish tolerable order for the smooth running of governmental functions. It is also conceived as the capacity of the established central authority to extract resources from the domestic and international environment for the economic, social and political welfare of the political system. This study defines state reconstruction as the process of rebuilding state structures broken down due to internal strife to return them to normal operation under a central authority.

1.6 Literature Review

The literature review is organized into three major themes. The first theme examines the phenomena of state collapse while exploring some cases of collapsed states mainly in Africa, while the second theme examines the involvement of external actors in state reconstruction efforts. While examining reconstruction efforts, the section seeks to underscore the role of state interests in the reconstruction process. The Somalia reconstruction literature forms the third theme examining the actors involved. This is with a view to highlight the impact of the divergence and convergence of actor interests in the reconstruction process.

1.6.1 State Collapse in Africa

Zartman (1995) offers the characteristics of state collapse as witnessed in Africa and Eastern Europe. Zartman conceptualizes state collapse as the scenario where the structures of law, political and economic order have split and must be reconstituted afresh. He further argues that state collapse in independent Africa is not a post-colonial phenomenon but a nationalist's condition, second or inter generation regimes ruling over established states that has occurred in two waves. The first was at the end of the second decade of independence while the second round came a decade later and continued to extend into the 1990s and after. State collapse is associated with end of cold war and emergence of a unipolar world system. This explains Somalia's predicament as a result of reduced funding that was among the factors that led to her eventual state collapse.

Khadiagala (1995) discussing Uganda's state collapse and reconstruction efforts, begins by examining the role the Obote and Amin regimes played in necessitating state collapse. Obote's undoing was efforts in increasing military power in a weakened civilian structure and centralizing hitherto devolved system of governance. The resultant authoritarian regime heavily relying on the military for sustainability offered Amin Dada a perfect opportunity to overthrow Obote whose rule depended on the military. On the other hand Amin's contribution to the collapse of the state was the militarization of Ugandan politics. The Military became part and parcel of the governance process. Further Economic war on the Asian entrepreneurs only exacerbated economic deterioration of the Ugandan state. Underground economic activities rose as a result of a collapsed economy. State reconstruction was to be undertaken by Yoweri Museveni after his National Resistance Movement (NRM) managed to overthrow the then fragile Obote II government. To reconstruct the Ugandan state, NRM reversed the military's image as a predator on society by reclaiming judicial statehood (Khadiagala 1995). To penetrate rural areas NRM established a resistance council to manage security concerns as well as other activities that affected citizen's daily lives. State institutions were involved in national rehabilitation. On the destroyed economy, economic reconstruction entailed reforming government institutions, rehabilitating physical infrastructure and economic liberalization. The Ugandan case has something in common for the fact that they have

experienced long duration of conflict and resultant state collapse. For the purpose of this study, while the Ugandan case mainly looked at the internal players in state collapse and reconstruction, the proposed study examines the role of external actors in state collapse and reconstruction efforts.

Keller (1998) analyzed Ethiopia after her state collapse and the prospects that she had towards the reconstruction path. From different regimes that have governed Ethiopia, Mengistu Haile Mariam revolutionary regime collapsed due to internal and external factors. Ethnicity and the national identity question seem to have played a great role in providing the avenue for internal actors to question central authority while USA and Russia the then major superpowers had a hand in shaping the Ethiopian polity. Unresolved nationalistic problem by major ethnic groups led to a successful secession of one of the federal regions of Eritrea. It is worth to note that poverty and underdevelopment in combination with nationalism played part in fueling internal conflict that led to state collapse in 1991. In state reconstruction the nationality question cited a cause of the resentment that led to conflict was to be cantered in the new constitution making processes. Constitutional provision for the right of all of Ethiopia's nationalities to self-determination, and preservation of national identities of each group is credited to have served the all important ingredient in rebuilding the Ethiopian state on a federated model. Reconstruction efforts in Ethiopia largely entailed internal actors with an internal solution; however the proposed project examines the effects of external actors in state reconstruction process in Somalia.

1.6.2 External Actors in State Reconstruction

Investigating how the Chadian state was reconstructed after decades of internal conflict that led to state collapse, Foltz (1995) managed to identify major state actors involved in Chad's state collapse and how reconstruction was achieved. The author identified Libya, Nigeria, Sudan, France and USA as the major states that got directly involved in the Chadian conflict and the eventual reconstruction. Of these actors, Libya stood out as the most active actor in the conflict with its involvement extending to actual occupation of Chadian territory. Each of these external actors came into Chad guided by their specific

agendas well within their national interests. Chad however came to present a case of a state successfully reconstructed despite the presence of a myriad of internal faction groups.

External actors were clearly seen to have contributed a great deal in the collapse of the Chad state. This was through their continuous support to the different faction groups involved in the conflict through mainly military aid to the groups such that no specific group could claim victory to enforce legitimate authority in Chad. However, Foltz (1995) observed France as a state actor seemed to have played a pivotal role in reconstituting the Chadian state. France's support to Hissein Habre's FAN faction helped propel Habre's faction to victory against all other insurgents. When Habre took control of Chad he was able to rebuild an effective Chadian State through his open policy of inclusivity and moderation. He ensured that he brought the two regions of the North and the South closer together by ensuring that the North no longer dominated the south and the south was recognized as the major contributor of the state's foreign exchange earnings. Habre also took the bold step to re-integrate the South's educated manpower and its fighting forces into the national system under a series of convincing political deals. The other element that Habre considered for successful reconstruction of Chad was his faction's experience in delegating factional authority to trusted colleagues in the faction who helped maintain the sense of cohesiveness and discipline across the state. Habre made nationalism his sole ideology of reconciliation which he manipulated with skill to his symbolic advantage. Using his nationalistic ideology Habre had the self-discipline to subordinate his concerns to reasons of state by extending his hand to his formerly dedicated enemies who accepted the new order. By 1987 the journey that had started in mid 1982 had basically bore fruits with the basic elements of the state back in place with a central political authority. Habre however remained in power until November 30th 1990 when he unceremoniously relinquished power and escaped to Sudan following massive looting by his forces in the major cities. Idriss Deby took over power in Chad with a promise to establish a framework that would see the country transition to a multiparty democracy and to that end he initiated a National Conference to lay the plans for the transition by March 1994. In the interim Deby retained the presidential authority including the

command of the army and established a Superior Counsel of 57 members to participate in the administration and decision making. Debby adopted the call for external support to reform state institutions and a more orderly regional environment conducive for Chad's growth and development. Foltz acknowledges that military superiority is paramount in state reconstruction as was the case with Habre's military conquest with help of external state actors in Chad. Nevertheless, Foltz underscores that military success is only the beginning of the long journey in state reconstruction and the emerging leadership is key to the process.

Spilker (2008) offers a candid overview of Somali society, politics, and Somalia history to the present state of collapse. The author offers major factors that have shaped the Somalia conflict in the past and how these have led to the continued status quo. He argued that Somali Islam, Somali nationalism and clan system are the determinant of Somalia politics and by extension the cause of state collapse. The USSR is an external actor that has shaped the Somali polity, which proved to be a contributing factor to the Somali conflict and the eventual state collapse. Postcolonial Somalia saw it align with USSR in the height of the cold war which saw her at one time wage war against her neighbor Ethiopia. With the demise of cold war, Somalia was left vulnerable with reduced aid funding which she had relied on most. The budgetary constraints that followed fueled Inter and intra clan rivalries which saw the central government collapse in 1991 ushering in a period under which there was no functional central government. External actors got involved in Somalia led by the UN and the US in a bid to restore normalcy and provision of humanitarian services which later proved catastrophic with the capturing of several US soldiers in the capital Mogadishu. Numerous peace building and state reconstruction attempts have yielded no tangible outcome to bring back a functioning central government. Since then the US and the international community kept a low profile in the Somali conflict till the upsurge of global terrorism. The US therefore developed interests in Somalia in her efforts to fight terrorism believed to have thrived in Somalia due to her collapsed state. Spilker does not however explore in detail Ethiopian and Eritrean interests except detailing on US and UN. This study will elucidate on these interests.

By conceptualizing intervention as a form of third party involvement in another state's affairs, Regan (1996) assesses the success and failure of third party interventions in intra-state conflicts across the world since the Second World War, with Somalia's case considered. The third party involvement in an intra-state conflict according to the author constitutes one of a state's foreign policy instruments. There are conditions under which interventions are likely to be successful in meeting the intended objectives than others. A successful intervention strategy involves the use of cost benefit calculation making the benefits of not fighting particularly attractive to the parties involved. Analyzing 196 third party interventions in 85 civil conflicts over a period of 50 years, the author established that characteristics of the intervention strategy rather than the characteristics of the conflict largely determines the success of the intervention. The analysis views US intervention in the Somali conflict in 1991 as one of the failed attempts to meet the stated objectives which necessitated the withdrawal of US troops in 1993. The article offers scenarios of third party intervention using a matrix upon which policy makers can develop to assess the likelihood of a successful intervention exercise in a foreign country. Understanding causes and actors and sources of a conflict are major prerequisites before venturing into an intra-state conflict. The developed matrix however might sometime fail to represent the reality on the ground of an intra-state conflict thereby making it impossible to predict with certainty the likelihood of success or failure. While the study examined general conflicts across the world using secondary data, the proposed study will pay special interest on external state actors' involvement in the Somalia conflict using both primary and secondary data.

1.6.3 Somali Reconstruction in the Face of External Intervention

Adam (1995) explores causes that led to the collapse of the Somalia state. It emerges that some of the factors that led to the state collapse including clan hostilities, competition over resources and political power have continued shaping the situation in Somalia as different players continue to engage in a contest over state control. Siyad Barre's personal and military rule led to the state patronage by clans that saw the state lose legitimacy amongst the excluded clans rising strongly against the government which led to its eventual collapse. Divisions within the Somali society along clan lines became the major

hindrance to the attempts to establish the central authority as clans tried to outwit each other over state control. The article mainly looked at evaluation of the Somali state disintegration and attempts at reconstructing the failed state. This study will examine external state actors in the Somali conflict and their role in the reconstruction of the Somalia. The study uses selected states that have been key to the process including the US, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Kenya.

Menkhaus (2003) notes that significant changes have occurred in the Somali conflict since 1991 perpetuating continued state collapse. The conflict has become more localized pitting local clans and or within (intra) clans as they fight over control of strategic positions like harbors, arable land, access to animal grazing land, and key positions that have socio-economic and political benefits. Menkhaus argues that lawlessness and criminality are major features in Somali conflict due to her stateless nature. However according to him lawlessness and criminality have been put to check by customary laws and practices. Attempts to restore a strong central government are hampered by war lords and war profiteers also known in peace building and conflict resolution as spoilers. These spoilers in the Somali conflict seem to benefit from the lack of a central authority promoting a war economy. It would be within the interests of such players to ensure that an ineffective state structure is established that does not interfere with the gains from the war economy. Menkhaus (2008) concludes that even though the Somali state collapse could be attributed to internal political and economic interests, over time external actors have become key determinants of the state revival initiatives. Ethiopia's fear of an Islamism and secession claim on part of its territory by a prospective strong Somali government has made her to be continuously involved in the Somali politics. However, whether stateless Somalia serves Ethiopia's interests will be examined in the course of this project. Further, the study will endeavor to establish whether Ethiopia's interests in Somalia have led to the failed reconstruction of the Somali state.

Ibrahim and Terlinden (2008) analyzed Somaliland, the breakaway region, peacemaking and state's institution building since she unilaterally declared her independence from the larger Somalia republic. From the analysis it is argued that lack of external state actor

could be explained as the reason for a successful state building initiative. State building process began with cessation of hostilities and formation of interim government which managed to facilitated for the existence of basic security a component for an acceptable framework for governance. State institutions of the executive, judiciary, a bicameral legislature and other key institutions like Central Bank, a civil service and regional administration were created after a consultation and deliberation. The authors further argued that even though Somaliland endeavored to apply domestic solution to the conflict situation external involvement was also noticeable especially through Non-Governmental Organizations operating in the region however minimal. It is believed that the minimal presence of external support for peace building and state reconstruction in Somaliland is a major factor in its success (Ibrahim and Terlinden 2008). They contend that part from the minor material inputs by some NGOs, peace conferences in Somaliland were funded from internal sources thus participants owned the entire process. Lack of international recognition has hampered Somaliland's international assistance which can hardly flow through government without international recognition. The strength of the article is the examination of state rebuilding and peace processes in Somaliland identifying unique features that Somaliland has passed through for peace to prevail as opposed to the larger Somalia. This project will treat Somaliland as part of the internationally recognized Somalia state, although lessons learnt will prove invaluable in comparing state reconstruction initiatives from both i.e. whereas in Somaliland there is no external state actor involvement, the larger Somalia has multiple of external state actor in reconstruction process. Could involvement of external state actors be the reasons for failed attempts at establishing effective central government in Somalia? This study will endeavor to find out putting into consideration reconstruction efforts at the regional level.

Kettler (2004) established that the Somalia conflict is driven by interaction between internal and external actors through major economic activities undertaken by the actors in Somalia. Fighting has concentrated at key infrastructures like the airports, seaports and major urban centers such that control over them creates an environment for war economy. Internal actors, in particular businesses involving exports of Bananas, charcoal, khat imports, money transfer, currency printing, maritime businesses, arms and ammunition

are the key contributors to Somalia war economy. Internal business agents it was concluded were the main drivers in the war economy since they are dependent on their external partners and hence hindering overall economic reconstruction. External business entrepreneurs are found to be complicit in promoting conflict within Somalia to profit from the war economy. The study examined external actors' involvement through their economic ties in Somalia's war economy while this study is set to examine external state actor involvement in the Somalia state reconstruction.

World Bank (2005) examined the factors and dynamics at play in the Somali conflict in three major regions of the country. The report finds that Clanism has played an integral part in escalating and de-escalating conflict in Somalia. This notwithstanding, traditional clan leadership in Puntland and Somaliland is credited for peace and reconciliation efforts witnessed in those regions and therefore provide an avenue for conflict de-escalation. Competition over natural resources, continued clan militarization across Somalia is cited among factors that play role in escalating conflict. The reported the role of external intervention and clash of interest by the external actors have contributed to emergence of proxy wars worsening the already fragile security situation in Somalia. Ethiopia, Eritrea and the U.S are among the many external actors in Somali conflict the report identified, although it does not single out the interests of any of them in the reconstruction of the Somali state. World Bank (2005) has managed to capture in general some of the factors and actors that have driven the Somali conflict and their role in peace building and the reconstruction of the Somali state. This study will specifically elucidate on the role of Ethiopia, Eritrea and U.S in the failed reconstruction of the Somalia state.

Dave-Odigie (2011) proposes that the Somalia should take indigenous African approach in peace building and conflict resolution and its attempts at state reconstruction. The author contends that external involvement in Somalia state reconstruction effort is the cause of continued state collapse. Argues that after two decades of trying to resolve the Somalia conflict using exotic mechanism involving external actors, this has only proved how untenable and unworkable the prescribed solution are to the Somali conflict. To ground the argument, the article attributes contemporary conflicts in Africa to colonial

legacies across the continent. Somalia conflict therefore is not different characterized with complete breakdown of law and order. The resultant impact of Somalia's state breakdown has led to emergence of criminal activities like piracy along the Somali coastline, influx of foreign mercenaries, increased presence of terrorist linked groups, intense fighting between government forces and Islamic militias which has resulted to increased humanitarian need and internally displaced persons and refugee problems to neighboring countries, use of child soldier, and rampant human rights abuses as well as illegal arms proliferations. The author recommends the use of traditional and Islamic religious institutions with support of African Union and international Community to take the lead role in peace building and conflict resolution in Somalia. However the call for support from outside actors from international community goes against what the article suggests of indigenous solution to the conflict. The proposed study findings will either confirm or deny whether indeed external state actors are the cause of failed reconstruction process.

International Crisis Group (ICG) (2008) in its analysis on Somalia peace processes after Ethiopia's intervention since December 2006 underscored the need for an all-inclusive process that comprises both domestic and international actors that have interests in the Somalia's political process. Ethiopia's active involvement in Somalia by ousting Somalia's Islamic Courts served the purpose of eliminating what she perceived as a security threat posed by the courts. Ethiopia's concern with the courts revolved around the courts' links to transnational terrorism, irredentism rhetoric on parts of Ethiopia Somali inhabited territory and their links with Ethiopia's perceived major enemy Eritrea. According to the ICG, opposition against the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) amongst some critics like the Islamic courts opposition is based on its close association with the Ethiopian government hence perceived as a puppet of foreign interests. The TFG continued to face insurgency even with the presence of African Union Peace keepers who are credited to have enabled the fragile government to survive. The International Crisis Group reports (2007; 2008; 2009; 2010;) only gives detailing accounts of the Somali conflict on the nature of the mutating Somalia conflict on the backdrop of external actor involvement. This proposed study seeks to examine the

interests of the external actors other than Ethiopia with inclusion of the US, Eritrea and Kenya and how these interests have shaped state reconstruction process.

Samatar (2007) sought to find out the implication of Ethiopia's intervention in Somalia on the height of Islamic Courts Union. Ethiopia's intervention was considered to favor the Transitional Federal Government which was incapacitated to effectively take control of the large part of southern Somalia. With the help of Ethiopian military, the TFG could at least claim control of areas hitherto under Islamic groups. Regionally and internationally intervention was thought to have the support of neighboring states like Kenya and Djibouti that directly and indirectly shoulder the effects of the conflict like the large influx of refugees and cross-border crime and insecurity due to the continuous fighting in central Somalia. US had also considered the reign of Islamic Courts Union (ICU) as terrorists sympathizers and therefore their ouster was most welcomed in Washington. However Ethiopia intervention could not last for long before local insurgency started undermining TFG's rule. TFG's existence is made possible by external support without which she could easily fall. Samatar later argues that Somalia's segmentation is the cause of the repeated failure to form a national government because Somali polity revolves against centralization. The finding only cites Islamic Jihadism as the cause for Ethiopia's intervention in the Somali conflict. The proposed study will take note of the said interests as pursued by Ethiopia while examining Kenya's, Eritrea's and US interests and how their involvement has influenced the reconstruction process.

Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS) (2009) in its examination of the role of external actors in the Somali conflict offered reasons as to why Ethiopia is involved in the conflict. From the fact that they have fought before, notably the 1978 war over Ogaden region, it is possible Ethiopia is concerned with the kind of state that is established in Somalia. Ethiopia is always concerned that Somalia may foment unrest among ethnic Somali in Ogaden region on account of the Ethiopia's constitutional provision of the right for ethnic secession. Ethiopia is also concerned with Somali refugee influx which risks upsetting fragile ethnic balances at the border. Somalia's lawlessness also presents a major challenge to Ethiopia's law enforcement institutions along the long

border between the two countries. The report argues that Ethiopia will always meddle in Somalia's affairs so that only a weak Somali state is established which would be completely dependent on Ethiopia's support. According to the institute, these appear to be the major interests driving Ethiopia's involvement in the Somali conflict. This study findings will confirm or prove otherwise of Ethiopia and other states actors involved in the reconstruction of the Somali state.

The above literature has showcased national interest is the major driving variable in state actor intervention in collapsed states and hence shaping the subsequent processes. State collapse as observed in the literature can be caused by internal variables or external variables or both. External state actors get involved in another state's affairs in a bid to satisfy their national interests. A lot of literature on Somali conflict has dealt much on the internal actors as the drivers of the Somalia conflict, contributing to Somalia's state collapse. Clanism has emerged as a key determinant perpetuating state collapse. It is no doubt that external state actors have had a major role in the Somali state reconstruction with some of the states playing a more pivotal role than others and hence the reason to select the US, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Kenya among others. This study seeks to examine interests of external actors and their dynamics in shaping the reconstruction of a collapsed state.

1.7 Theoretical Framework

This study has adopted the Structural Realism theory and complemented by the modified structural realism which usually holds the premise that, the international system is anarchic; i.e there is no credible power above the states compromising the systems and that are not aware of other states' intentions and also that some have capabilities which are offensive. The structure brands states to possess preferences which they seek to attain and survival as a condition for such.

Based on the above factors, Structural realism concludes that states seek to survive through acquisition of preferences since they are not sure of states' intention which be offensive in nature, and due to lack of higher authority protecting them from other

states, states should be powerful compared to all the other states in the system. For survival, relative power could be adopted and therefore a solution to the true preferences of the state. This results in an international system with states competing among themselves for relative power. Competition is a zero sum effect whereas power is an unlimited resource since the vital factor is the power of a state compared to others. Absolute power of other states is not affected by the increase of one.

States must acquire power before realizing their preferences in structural realism thus, the power seeking structural imperative tends to overcome other contrary preferences in a rational state and possessed by the state. This implies that steering factors behind a state's rational foreign policy are externally determined sets of structural imperatives and not internal politics. The use of this theory in this study qualifies the need to identify the role of specific states in an effort to discover the motivation behind their involvement in the Somali reconstruction, the struggle for power and survival being an element in shaping the process. In this study, USA, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda and Eritrea are among the states identified as the units of analysis.

A key critique to Structural realism just like classical realism associated with classical theorists like Thomas Hobbes, Niccollo Machiavelli, and Thucydides and advanced in the later works of E.H Carr (1946) and Hans J. Morgenthau (1948) is its emphasis on state that it ignores other actors and issues that are directly related to the maintenance of state security. In this study the theory does not place emphasis on the role of internal dynamics for instance and politics which directly impact reconstruction of the Somali state viz; Clanism, factional warlords as well as local non-governmental organizations and civil society groups. The theory also puts less emphasis on non-state actors that have proved instrumental in shaping the internal dynamics of the Somali conflict and by effect the reconstruction of the state. To complement structural realism the study applies modified structural realism. Structural Realism modification is the output by Keohane O Robert to improve Structural Realism and Classical realism theories adding basic assumptions of theories of idealist

The key assumption of this theory are that: The main actors the international system are the sovereign states; Non governmental and international organizations' role is highly emphasized. States are perceived to be rational -unitary agents moving towards attaining national interests they also strive to maximize their military power and other power forms such as soft power major among these are economic and political influence . National interests' definition is affected international system's structure and internal others e.g. opinion of the public. The undoings of Structural Realism are catered for by modified structural realism mainly about proper use of the state's power and function and duties of non- state actors and international regimes. The theory therefore comes in handy in this study where both state and non-state actors have played a role in the reconstruction of the Somalia state.

1.8 Research Hypotheses

From the literature reviewed, this study develops the following hypotheses with regard to external actor's involvement in Somalia and their impact on the reconstruction of the Somalia state:

- (i) Divergence of interests of external actors is a constraint to the reconstruction of the Somalia state.
- (ii) The convergence of both the interests of external actors and those of internal actors underpins a successful reconstruction process.

1.9 Methodology: Data Collection and Analysis

The study used both primary and secondary sources of data. Primary data was obtained from guided interviews with individuals with information on the Somali conflict and state reconstruction. For purposes of this study, purposive sampling technique was used in identifying the respondents to be interviewed for primary data, in this case key informants. This was informed by the researcher's knowledge of the kind of information sought and the individuals or offices where the information could be found. Guided interviews were administered to selected individuals in the following Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and UN agencies having operations in Somalia that included; World Vision Somalia, Care Somalia, Mercy Corps Somalia, the International Red Cross,

UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS), the U.S Embassy's Somalia Affairs Unit, USAID Somali Office in Nairobi, United Nations High Commission for Refugee Somalia office in Nairobi, UNEP, and the UNDP Somalia office. In depth key informant Interviews were conducted with state officials representing their respective governments including the ministry of foreign affairs of Kenya, the Embassies of USA, Ethiopia, Eritrean and Uganda among the identified State representatives. Semi-structured interview guide was self-administered to the key informants and state representatives. The guide was emailed on request mostly to those respondents who were on official duties and needed to prepare for the interview. The sample size for the study was 40 informants targeting 30 informants selected randomly from individuals working in organizations involved with the Somali conflict and reconstruction and 10 state representatives selected from states identified as being involved in the Somalia reconstruction process.

However, a number of selected respondents declined to be interviewed due to various reasons like confidentiality of information and others could not be found because of their busy schedules. To overcome this hurdle, emphasis was laid on secondary data to compliment primary data. The researcher obtained secondary data from books, journal articles, newspaper articles, reports and internet sources on state reconstruction in Somalia. Qualitative data formed the bulk of the study data, which was thematically organized for analysis.

CHAPTER TWO

BACKGROUND ON THE RECONSTRUCTION OF SOMALIA

2.0 Introduction

This chapter provides a background on the reconstruction of Somalia by examining the various stages through earlier days of independence, collapse and the reconstruction process. The chapter analyzes the significant events that took place in Somali including her concerted efforts to consolidate herself both economically and politically especially in the period soon after independence and the developments that lead to her eventual collapse. The chapter is organized into three sections; the first section provides a brief background of the state of Somalia and the period following her independence while Section two highlights key events that took place in Somalia that predicated the collapse of the state. Section three examines the unfolding events in the period immediately after the collapse characterized by the emergence of semi-autonomous regions and the eventual initial efforts at reconstruction.

2.1 The Background of the State of Somalia

In 1960 British Somalia and Italian Somalia acquired independence from their colonizers and merged to form the Republic of Somalia which was recognized as the state of Somalia. Somalia emerged as a strong state at independence and was well welcome in the community of states recognized both regionally and internationally. All the state structures were up and running with a relatively vibrant economy under the presidency of Abdirashid Ali Shemarke. The regime of Shemarke was however viewed by many as having encouraged clan favoritism in government and unfair distribution of state resources over the years¹. This made the government lose popular support that led to the overthrow of the civilian government in 1969 after the assassination of Shemarke on October 21st 1969. The interim president Sheik Mukhtar Mohamed was in power for only six months before his government was overthrown through a military coup paving way for a military government led by General Siyad Barre. Barre remained in power until

¹ James Batuka, Male, Ugandan, Special Programmes Officer, Ugandan High Commission in Kenya, 31/7/2014

1991 when the Somali state collapsed in the face of wide spread uprising against the central government and since then reconstruction of the state has remained elusive².

Somalia is located on East Coast of Africa North of the equator and borders Ethiopia in the North West, Djibouti to the North, and Kenya to the South West. Somalia's total area coverage is estimated at 637,657 square kilometers and her inhabitants are predominantly Muslims by religion, Somali speaking estimated at 85% while 15% consists of Bantu, Arabs and others.

2.2 The Collapse and Disintegration of Somalia

The ruling democratic government that had been in place since independence was overthrown through a bloodless coup led by Major General Siyad Barre in 1969. Barre consolidated his power into an oppressive military dictatorship. In 1970, under Soviet Unions' influence, Barre's military regime transformed into a socialist one. The government's policy of *scientific socialism* brutalized the Somali people and this led to mounting discontent among the population. "Both the urban population and nomads living in the countryside were subjected to summary killings, arbitrary arrest, detention in squalid conditions, torture, rape, crippling constraints on freedom of movement and expression and a pattern of psychological intimidation" (Africa watch committee -1990).

The unpredictable nature of the Barre regime did not gain favor from the Somali population and later negative sentiments by sections of the civil service planted seeds of destruction. Members of the civil society, civil servants and the business community joined ranks and fought hard to dislodge the Barre regime from power³. In 1988 there was an outbreak of civil war in the country's northern part (Somaliland), bringing the end of the then government. Barre's regime was eventually toppled in January of 1991 leaving Somalia in a state of lawlessness without a government. In the two years following the overthrow of the government the situation was further complicated by fights between rival factions. These were the days when Somali "warlords," like General

²Chris Mburu, Director Horn of Africa Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kenya, 02/10/2012

³Kahoro Kinaro, Second Secretary Horn of Africa Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kenya, 2/10/2012.

Ali Mohamed Mahdi and Hussein Aideed of Mogadishu, fought to establish their strong basis. The country was struck by drought at the same time which led to wide spread hunger. In 1992 the UN resolved to send troops to Somalia to contain the conflicts and reduce suffering as a result of the war, but failed in the establishment of stability, peace or authority in the region.

In 1992, Operation Restore Hope was launched under UN resolution 704. This led to multi-mandated intervention which involved peace-keeping, peace-enforcement and peacemaking activities with a series of grassroots reconciliation conferences held in early 1992⁴. Peace building endeavors was reviewed by elders aimed at solving major disputes between communities across the country. The approach however, did not yield much and armed conflict continued to spread across the country with little hope to restore the collapsed state.

Soon after the ouster of Barre's government, it was almost clear that the warring factions had already established themselves on a regional basis and had consolidated themselves to take full control of the regions from where they operated. The Somali National Movement, a guerilla organization largely dominated by various Isaaq clans, took over in the Northwest of Somalia in January 1991. The Isaaq clans and SNM leaders moved to engaged in peace negotiations with other clans in the region. Following several local meetings, the civil war in the northwest was controlled. In May 18th 1991 Somaliland became a self-declared independent republic consisting of the entire former British Protectorate.

In 1993, after two years of rather chaotic SNM rule and contained conflict in Somaliland, a clan conference elected Mohammed Haji Ibrahim Egal, an experienced civilian politician, as President. Under his rule, a stable political framework was established and peace was being realized throughout Somaliland. The members of the republic's bi-cameral parliament, the House of Elders and the House of Representatives, were partly

⁴Chris Mburu, Director Horn of Africa Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kenya, 2/10/2012

selected by their respective clans and sub-clans, partly hand-picked by President Egal. Other government positions were allocated in line with 'clan proportion'. This state-building process occurred through cooperation between traditional authorities such as elders and sheikhs, politicians, former guerillas, intellectuals and ordinary people who decided to put their guns aside and solve problems peacefully, and with only marginal external support from international organizations. Several initiatives involving the Diaspora, the media, local NGOs and associations were taking place in Somaliland culminating to the referendum that ushered in the Somaliland constitution in 2001⁵. The adoption of the constitution in Somaliland helped ignite the transformation of the 'clan democratic' system of governance into a multi-party democracy and thereafter political parties came into being widening the democratic space within which elections were held. Inhabitants of the self-declared Republic of Somaliland in northwestern Somalia have continued to enjoy a relatively higher degree of statehood even though deprived of international recognition.

The breakaway of Somaliland in the Northwest was followed by her neighbour to the east, the region of Puntland following suite and moved to establish itself as a semi-autonomous entity⁶. However Puntland could not immediately achieve greater strides in putting together her structures due to clan differences the main alliance of clans being the Darood and the Harti clans. Clan conferences led by the SSDF took place in Garoowe with the aim of establishing a democratic representative government based on the will of the people. The institutional framework of Somaliland was partly copied in Puntland but with only one chamber of Parliament, the House of Representatives. The role of the traditional authorities, who in Somaliland sit in the House of Elders, was not formalized in Puntland. They nevertheless enjoy great respect and are frequently engaged in mediating internal conflict (Gundel 2006). The political situation in Puntland however remained volatile often escalating into armed conflict between the main stream leadership factions and the opposition, a situation that has replicated over the years.

⁵Charles Owino, Food security and livelihood manager with World Vision International Somalia, 19/10/2012

⁶Mohammed Jirde Goole, Finance manager with CARE International Somalia/Somaliland, 17/10/2012

The governance situation in the vast south central region of Somalia has all along been significantly different from what was happening in the Northwest (Somaliland) and the Northeast (Puntland) after the collapse of the state. The situation in this region went from bad to worse with the contending politically motivated groups struggling to profiteer from the debris of the collapsed state thereby uprooting all the signs of a governance system. The South central region remained the battle field for most of the other militia groups that did not find favour neither in the Northwest nor in the Northeast including the remnants of forces allied to Barre's government⁷. A myriad of political activities took place in this region with different authority systems with varied degrees of effectiveness and social acceptance. The most common of these systems, which were formed at the district level, were the remnants that survived from the regional and district councils established by the United Nations Office for Somalia (UNOSOM II) in the first part of the 1990s. Some of this governance administration still exists in a number of regions, with minimal authority and functions to exercise, in south-central Somalia. Nevertheless, these administrations provide limited services to the people in the region.

Islamic courts also hold a degree of control in a number of localities within south central Somalia. This system only provides relative security in the areas they control. There also has been in existence governance structures established by the local communities in consultation with the traditional and religious leaders. Such administrations exist in Haradheere district of Mudug region, Diinsoor of Bay region, Garbaharrey of Gedo region and Gori-el of Galgudud region. There are also areas where no formal administrative structures exist and elders, using traditional xeer system, have managed to keep peaceful relations between and among many communities. This kind of administration has many similarities to that established by the Sharia Islamic Courts where the issue of security is a priority.

⁷TedlaTsegaye, First Secretary, Political Affairs Officer, Ethiopian Embassy, 18/10/2012

None of administrative structures established in south central Somalia can however be said to have functioned properly⁸. The root cause of the situation in the administrative system in south central Somalia emanates from the fact that the process through which the administrative structures are formed has never been inclusive⁹. In the initial stages of their formation, the grassroots involvement was either very limited or non-existent at all. The issue of ownership and legitimacy remain fundamental concerns that need serious considerations among the Somalis in the south-central region. Nevertheless, many people, who have a dominant voice in some of the regions, lack the basic understanding in the formation of a governance system¹⁰. Throughout south central Somalia, governing Mogadishu, the capital city of Somalia, remains the most enigmatic challenge that demands cautious and creative alternative to bring about the desired administrative structures in the region. These endeavors have continued for now over two decades but still a lot more needs to be done. Unlike the other two regions of Somaliland and Puntland, South central Somalia has largely remained the home of subsequent transitional governments that have been the products of a host of reconciliatory and mediation efforts supported by dozens of external actors including regional and international organizations as well individual state actors.

2.3 Setting the Path towards Reconstruction of Somalia

The first two international reconciliation meetings aimed at re-establishing a Somalia government took place in Djibouti in June and July 1991. Six organizations participated, all representing a clan or sub-clan constituency. But in reality the clan served as an instrument to further ambitions of individuals, most of who had held influential government positions in the past and were competing for similar ranks in a possible new administration.

An agreement was signed endorsing Ali Mahdi as president. This deal was immediately rejected by General Aideed, who was from a different Hawiye sub-clan to that of Ali Mahdi and was contesting Mahdi's leadership of the United Somali Congress (USC). As

⁸Benedict Mutua, Water and sanitation Program manager with World Vision Somalia, 15/10/2012

⁹Peter Kabutu, Finance manager, CARE International Somalia, 26/10/2012

¹⁰Mustafa Othman, Communication and technology Manager with Shaqodoon organization, 7/2/2013

a result a bloody civil war in Mogadishu and the south ensued (Abdalla, 2009). Ali Mahdi, an hotelier, a signatory of the *Manifesto* and a former member of the last civilian Parliament, was declared as the President by the *Manifesto* legion of political clan elite. He quickly formed the government which came to be known as “USC 91”—the appellation “USC” stood for the Hawiye Clan. But the USC was known to be an armed front led by General Aideed. Here it was witnessed the first, open political confrontation between the political elite groups, the *Manifesto* and the *Militarists* albeit that both protagonists hailed from the same clan. Aideed and his militia vehemently opposed to the government and started harassing and intimidating the members of the new Cabinet, dismantling the effort. However both wings of the USC were united on removing Barre and his clansmen, while both sides, in addition to seeking the control of Mogadishu, kept vigil so that the other side could not form an effective government (Jabril and Abdulkadir, 2004).

The UN has organized over 10 highly publicized and costly reconciliation conferences since 1993¹¹. Faction leaders, who have played the central role in these reconciliation conferences, have dutifully signed agreements at every meeting. But each settlement collapsed soon after it was agreed, sometimes within hours. The central tenets of UN-brokered peacemaking are fundamentally different from local peacemaking techniques employed in northern Somalia virtually every UN reconciliation conference was held outside the country with agendas often set by their sponsors. Conferences have been held in each of the neighboring countries—Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Yemen and Egypt. A major problem with these high profile affairs is that legitimate representatives of the affected communities, such as elders, merchants, women’s groups and other genuine stakeholders, are not included¹². Furthermore, cost considerations have often determined the duration of these conferences; consequently, they are short with fixed timetables.

¹¹ Mathew Goshko, First Secretary, Public Diplomacy Officer, US Embassy Somalia Affairs Unit, 16/10/2012

¹² Mathew Goshko, First Secretary, Public Diplomacy Officer, US Embassy Somalia Affairs Unit, 16/10/2012.

The warlords or sub-state actors gained control over regions and sub-regions within what had been a nation-state, built up their own local security apparatuses and mechanisms, sanctioned markets and other trading arrangements, and even established an attenuated form of international relations. By definition illegitimate and unrecognized, warlords assumed the trappings of a new quasi-state, such as the internationally unrecognized Somaliland in the old north of Somalia.

CHAPTER THREE

CONVERGING INTERESTS OF EXTERNAL ACTORS IN SOMALIA RECONSTRUCTION

3.0 Introduction

The interests of external actors involved in Somalia have played a central role in shaping the reconstruction process. The interests ranging from national security, political and economic interests have manifested in the way external actors have conducted themselves in the face of the reconstruction process. The interplay of the interests has produced different results on the reconstruction with convergence of the interests having largely led to reconstruction whereas divergence of the interests has led to non-reconstruction. This chapter discusses key areas of interests manifested through activities of external actors which provide specific examples of convergence of interests leading to reconstruction and examples of diverging interests which have been an impediment to reconstruction. In examining these areas, the chapter focuses mainly on external state actors whose interests come largely as the principal guiding factor for their involvement in Somalia. USA, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Uganda and Djibouti have been used in this case to demonstrate the interests of external actors' giving two examples of areas of converging interests that have led to reconstruction and two areas of diverging interest that have led to non-reconstruction as follows: Section one and two discusses converging interests under the US and her allies interests manifested through the war on terrorism and the war on Piracy while section three and four discusses diverging interests under the interests informed by the desire for the greater Somali nation and Ethiopia and Eritrea's diverging interests manifested through their proxy wars.

3.1 The US and Allies Interests Manifested through the War on Terrorism

The collapse of the state marked another period in the history of Somalia, that of state reconstruction. This was characterized by the intervention of various actors with diverse interests in an attempt to establish a viable central authority in the war-torn state. Efforts at Somalia reconstruction have been undertaken amidst various external interests both in support and against establishment of viable institutions with the outcome being prolonged peace talks and negotiations. In the wake of internal divisions and the unmet interests of

domestic players, Somalia has witnessed the involvement of a host of external actors claiming to support peace negotiations that have played around and often shifted their allegiances day after another¹³. The outcome of this has been a prolonged reconstruction process. One of the key identifiable interests of the states involved here include the desire to attain global security and end terrorism in the horn of Africa mainly championed by the US and her allies¹⁴.

Since 9/11 the US belief that failed states are favorite, breeding grounds, hiding places transit areas for international terrorists, hence that state building needs to be an part of counter terrorism generally and the US “war on terror” in particular has been the driving force behind US involvement in nation building. Anecdotal evidence believes the alleged link between state failure and terrorism. That Osama bin Laden and the Al-Qaeda sought refuge in Sudan first and later in Afghanistan is taken as evidence sometimes that they were attracted by both states’ weaknesses and failure , though thorough analysis points the contrary . The parts of Sudan where the government was in total control is where Al-Qaeda sought refuge and left when asked by government quit thus settling in Afghanistan when the Taliban had established this countrys’ degree of control that surpassed all predecessors’s departure of soviet forces (Ronen, 2008).

Somalia has been safeguarded by the US against war terror globally. i.e constructed discursively as existential proportions threat and considerable urgency thus need for to extraordinary measures (Waever, 1995). This securitization was mainly motivated by the assumption that such failed states apparently foster terrorism, This made Bush Administration concerned about stateless Somalia and supporting the TFG as the best solution to dreaded statelessness.

This general assumption has however been reinforced by two additional beliefs . One is intelligence based and concrete pieces of evidence on the locations of various individuals suspected of complicity in the 1998 embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania and/or of

¹³Olad Farah, Deputy Chief of Party with Mercy Corps Somalia, 19/3/2013

¹⁴John Ngugi, Program officer, UN Political Office for Somalia, 30/4/2013

planning new attacks by terrorists. Secondly, the unfounded equation of militancy and Jihadism and Islamic, reinforced by logic of bureaucracy according to which those included on list of terrorists need treatment as a terrorists regardless of any evidence suggesting the contrary.

The Bush Administration's rationale for the support of the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT) formed in February 2006 was articulated by Assistant Secretary of State for Africa Jenday Frazer, who put it candidly, "We will work with those elements that will help us root out Al-Qaeda and to prevent Somalia becoming a safe haven for terrorists, and we are doing it in the interest of protecting America" (Moller, 2009). The general impression was spreading in the US that Somalia was become a special terrorism threat zone but very little concrete evidence existed about the impression, e.g. regarding who would do what to who and how.

In the 2006, the US State Department edition of the Country's Terrorism report listed only one Somali organization as terrorist¹⁵. It claimed further that some individuals were hiding in Somalia and enjoying Al Shabaab leadership and Council of Islamic Courts's protection. The three suspects were Abu Talha al-Sudani, Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan and Fazul Mohammed all suspected of involvement in the 1998 embassy bombings and a 2002 hotel bombing in Kenya (US Dept of State, 2006). The US treasury in its "Terrorist Exclusion List" listed four individuals together with several other entities and companies situated in Somalia such Al Haramain, Heyatul Ulya, Al Barakaat and Somali Internet Company. Two other organizations located in outside Somalia but providing aid were also listed, the Somali Network AB (in Sweden) and Somali International Relief Organization (in the USA) (US Treasury, 2006).

On the wake of Ethiopian intervention in January 2007, the US launched air strikes against Somalia killing more than thirty innocent civilians. The TFG President explicitly endorsed the air strikes (ICG, 2008). Both the UN and the European Union however

¹⁵ Mathew Goshko, First Secretary, Public Diplomacy Officer, US Embassy Somalia Affairs Unit, 16/10/2012

criticized the air strikes with Yusuf coming out in support of the US arguing that the USA had the right to bombard terrorist suspects and did not object the transfer of a captured Somali detainee to the Guantanamo prison. In May the TFP further passed an anti-terrorism bill introduced by the TFG, allowing the latter to freeze property of people suspected of terrorist activities. An even more draconian measure included in the same bill was the institution of capital punishment for membership of a terrorist organization.

The continued struggle for liberation from the Ethiopian occupation assumed ugly forms such as terrorism, including for the first time in Somalia history, suicide attacks, reflecting a gradual replacement of moderate forces such as the AIAI and Sheikh Aweys by extremists such as Al-Shabaab and its leader Ayro until his assassination in a US airstrike with five cruise missiles in May 2008. Besides terrorism, however, Al Shabaab has also waged “ordinary” guerrilla warfare and even proceeded to what is usually the next step in an insurgency, i.e. the taking of cities which tends to invert the roles, as the insurgents now become the defenders and the government the attackers in an inevitably “dirty” war in urban areas (ICG, 2008). The counterinsurgency warfare by the TFG and Ethiopian troops, to some extent with AMISOM forces as accomplices, has remained very brutal and violated just about all the laws of warfare, e.g. by the indiscriminate shelling of residential areas and places like markets, as happened on the 22 September 2008, in which at least 82 civilians were killed and 157 injured in the market place alone (IRIN, 2008).

The main objective of the United States’ involvement in Somalia has been to support the stabilization of the country as a whole which will allow for development. The United States has been involved in humanitarian and development activities that have facilitated the establishment of development stabilization programmes through USAID throughout Somalia¹⁶. The United States has funded peace building initiatives through the UN and the African Union.

¹⁶Mathew Goshko, First Secretary, Public Diplomacy Officer, US Embassy Somalia Affairs Unit, 16/10/2012

Without really taking a stand on the substance, Kenya has also collaborated closely with the United States by helping to close the border to Somalia and apprehending people suspected by Washington (or Ethiopia) of being aligned with terrorists (Human Rights Watch, 2007). Kenya has also been deeply involved in renditions of fleeing Somalis, both to Somalia and to Ethiopia (Amnesty International, 2007). However beginning October 2011, Kenya spearheaded the war against the Al-Shabaab in Somalia by sending a contingent of ground troops supported by the US, Ethiopia, Burundi and Djibouti forces. This marked a sharp departure from tradition where Kenya has been used to sending peacekeeping troops to war torn regions and not engagement in military valor. This is meant to end the menace of terrorism witnessed within the region especially in Kenya where the Al-Shabaab has carried a number of terror attacks on Kenyan civilians.

3.2 Interests Manifested through the War on Piracy

The menace of piracy in international waters had remained a little known crime until it became continuously rampant after 2005 mainly in the Indian Ocean, a situation that became associated with the conflict in Somalia. Haggmann and Hoehne (2009) attributed the emergence of piracy to political order of the Ethiopian-Somali lowlands where party cadres, federal military officials and Somali elders confronted and co-opted each other in the pursuit of their particular political agendas. To them, the unsettled moves lead to the emergence of groups such as pirates. Somali pirates have intensified their attacks in the Gulf of Aden, carrying out attacks on over 111 commercial ships, and successfully hijacking an estimated 40 ships in 2008. In 2010, there were 219 attacks, 49 successful, by Somali pirates. In 2011, more than 100 ships were attacked by Somali pirates. Ransom payments per ship hijacked averaged \$4-\$5 million in 2010 and 2011, and totaled roughly \$105 million through the end of 2009, according to the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence (Dagne 2011).

In January 2009, the United States and Britain signed legal agreements with the Government of Kenya to extradite suspected pirates to be prosecuted in Kenya. An estimated 90 pirates have been detained. Some insurgent leaders warned the pirates to end the piracy and to release crew members and ships controlled by the pirates (Dagne

2011). While there are more pirates now than in previous years; the pirates do not seem to have a unified organization with a clear command structure. Many of these pirates are reportedly fishermen and former militia members of the Somali warlords (Dagne 2011). The pirates primarily come from the Puntland region of Somalia and are members of different clans.

Some have argued that the pirates are being controlled and directed by the Islamic insurgents in south-central Somalia. There is no evidence, however, to support this assertion, and during the six months the ICU was in power, the leaders took measures to end piracy and other criminal activities. In November 2008, Sheik Hassan Aweys called on the pirates to end their criminal activities, and other insurgent leaders threatened to take military action against the pirates (Dagne 2011). The pirates, however, do not operate alone. Some Somali businessmen and officials in Puntland are reportedly behind the piracy. The pirates reportedly receive valuable information about the types of ships, cargo, and timing from Somalis in the Persian Gulf. They also possess sophisticated technology, including Global Positioning Systems (GPS), Automatic Identification System (AIS), and satellite phones (Dagne 2011).

Somalis view the piracy crisis as a foreign problem with little impact on their daily life. Some argue that the piracy problem will continue as long as the ship owners are willing to pay the pirates ransom. In the face of difficult economic conditions and a growing humanitarian crisis, many Somalis resent the fact that the piracy problem has received a great deal of international attention. Some Somali community leaders contend that some Somalis get involved in criminal activities in order to survive, while many others have made these kinds of criminal activities a lifetime profession (Dagne 2011). Many Somalis contend that in the absence of a better alternative, they have come to accept life with all the difficulties they face daily.

3.3 Interests Informed by the Desire for the Greater Somali Nation

Somali irredentism has its roots to the pre-colonial period after the infamous “scramble for Africa” in the late 19th Century which denied the Somali nation a common state. The nation was split among many colonial powers each with built upstate like administrative institutions¹⁷. The United Kingdom took northern parts’ control , i.e. the present Somaliland and the present Kenya, including northern parts which were whose population was exclusively ethnic Somali. France established itself in the present Djibouti while Italian government in turn took control over various eastern coast territories which became colony in 1905 comprising most of the present Somalia less Somaliland. All these territorial arrangements were negotiated under the 1884-85 Berlin Conference which partitioned the Somali nation including external powers in bilateral treaties series and without any consultation with the Somali. This imposed partition bred the seed of Somali irredentism.

Unification ambition of the entire Somalia nation into one nation-state became a core agenda even at inception. A new flag was used to symbolize this new achievement, featured in a five pointed star. The five points was a representative of the former British Somaliland, Italian Somalia - which were united at independence, Djibouti, the Ethiopia’s’ Ogaden province and the north-eastern Kenya (Moller 2009). The irredentist policy actually served to set the Somali state on a collision path with its neighbouring states and by extension contributed to the current situation in Somalia. Whereas relations with Djibouti have been peaceful, relations with Ethiopia and Kenya have been greatly strained. First came the low-key “Shifita war” with Kenya (1963-1968) in which the Somali government supported the NFDLA (Northern Frontier Districts Liberation Army, better known as the “Shifita”) in their struggle for autonomy against the government in Nairobi. Then came the much more serious “Ogaden War” with Ethiopia (1977-78) which likewise began with Somali government support for indigenous, secessionist rebel movements, the WSLF (Western Somali Liberation Front), but which also saw extensive

¹⁷Ismail Mohamed, Program Manager with USAID East Africa Somalia office, 22/5/2013

use of regular armed forces. This war also brought into play the Cold War dynamics, albeit in a particularly baroque way. Until 1974, the United States had supported Ethiopia, whereas the Soviet Union had found a valuable ally in Siyad Barre's military regime which had come to power in Somalia through a military coup in 1969. The years that followed witnessed increased uprising against Barre's regime with mushrooming of clan based militia groups across the state. Somali irredentism therefore had a role to play in the Somali crisis especially based on the fact that the disastrous defeat suffered by the Somali government in the Ogaden war served to fuel the seed of discontent that led to the overthrow of the Barre government.

The same neighbouring states involved in the Somalia reconstruction process are the same states that have also been victims of Somali irredentism. The concern by these states would obviously be expected to have a direct reflection on their interests of these states in the reconstruction of the Somali state.

3.4 Ethiopia and Eritrea's Diverging Interests

Eritrea's interests in the Somalia reconstruction have always contradicted those of her other neighbors¹⁸. In fact, it seems to be the hostile relationship with Ethiopia which is driving the Eritrean behavior vis-à-vis Somalia. This hostility is something of an enigma in its own right. Eritrea certainly had good reasons to resent Ethiopia's incorporation of the former Italian colony of Eritrea in 1962, abrogating the federation which the UN had enforced in 1952 (Negash, 1997). Hence the long war of liberation by first the ELF (Eritrean Liberation Front) and then the EPLF (Eritrean People's Liberation Front), the latter led by the present president Issayas Afewerki (Iyob, 1995) which lasted until the final overthrow of the brutal dictatorship of the Dergue under Mengistu Haile Mariam in 1991.

Ethiopia and Eritrea have been at war with each other since the deposition of Ethiopia's leader Mengistu Haile Miriam which was orchestrated by a united front led by Tigrean

¹⁸Ismail Mohamed, Program Manager with USAID East Africa Somalia office, 22/5/2013

forces. After the deposition of Miriam, president Zenawi opted to allow Eritrea a sizeable amount of autonomy based on a gentleman's agreement signed between the two in 1993. The same reasons that led to Eritrea being granted autonomy were to lead to the disagreement between the two countries.¹⁹

The two main factors that caused the war between Eritrea and Ethiopia are (a) sea access for Ethiopia and (b) ethnic politics in the two countries. Rather than resuming the direct war, the two countries have been waging proxy wars against each other ever since 2000, one of the main battlefields being Somalia (Abbink, 2003). The TFG in Somalia was facing some serious challenges from the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC). This therefore presented Ethiopia with an amicable opportunity, with its vast military strength, to extend an olive branch to its neighbor, the TFG which was in a precarious situation, security in exchange for safe passage of its products. Nevertheless, Eritrea seems to have provided the remnants of the UIC with both the right to establish base-like facilities on its territory and arms, the latter in violation of the UN arms embargo. It also supported and funded the military activities of General Aideed through arms and provision of training bases. The involvement of Eritrea has made it difficult for the reconstruction of Somalia to succeed²⁰. This is because Eritrea is responsible for the funding, training, and sustenance of Al-Shabaab fighters in order to counter Ethiopia²¹.

¹⁹ Semere Teweldeberhan, Male, Eritrean, Regional Affairs Coordination Office, Eritrean Embassy, Nairobi, Kenya, 1/8/2014

²⁰ Olad Farah, Deputy Chief of Party with Mercy Corps Somalia, 19/3/2013

²¹ Ruth Tiampati, Nutritionist Specialist with World Vision Somalia, 15/10/2012

CHAPTER FOUR

REBUILDING PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS IN SOMALIA: THE ROLE OF EXTERNAL ACTORS

4.0 Introduction

This chapter discusses specific elements of reconstruction in Somalia with reference to the role of external actors. The chapter focuses on the revival of democratic public institutions viewed as the foundation for state rebuilding and also a pre-requisite for peace and development. Rebuilding institutions has been a daunting task for the state and non-state actors in countries of conflict such as Somalia. In this chapter, this study examines the processes and outcomes of rebuilding Somalia's collapsed public institutions. Since rebuilding all public institutions in Somalia is a very broad and complex issue, this study narrows down the investigation to focus on the key sectors of the state including, Public institutions that promotes the Rule of Law viz: the Somalia police force and the judiciary and associated justice systems; the manpower development; and the farming sectors. These institutions are analysed through the observed roles and contributions of external actors.

4.1 Reconstructing Public Institutions that Promote the Rule of Law

In collapsed states, rebuilding functioning public institutions is essential to recovery. In particular, institutions maintaining national security and upholding the rule of the law symbolize the autonomy of the state. In the case of the Somali state, which is in a fragile transitional process, upholding the rule of law has been a complex process, because society is not only struggling with clan-rooted conflicts but dealing with competing international agendas. To overcome reconstruction challenges and build successful public institutions, the process requires at least some reinforcing factors: neutral law enforcement (professional police, including community police), independent justice and judiciary systems, and supportive communities. Obtaining adequate financial and technical resources are central to this process.

According to one key informant:

After 20 years, in Somalia there is no ministry that fully functions, or has the capacity to recruit, manage, or pay wages and benefits to its employees. Yet, millions of dollars are raised locally (for clan militias) and internationally (for government forces) to rebuild all public institutions. We seek justice through informal institutions and not courts; and apply passports through individuals [brokers] and not through ministry. On behalf of the government, individuals or firms in the private sector print currency notes, instead of banks. We do not see any difference between today and 15 years ago.²²

4.1.1 The Somalia Police Force

To understand the efforts and approaches towards rebuilding public institutions, first we focus on the institutions promoting the rule of law and order, such as the police force. When analyzing the role of the police force, it is critical to understand two main issues: i) Reconstruction processes; the roles of external actors and their contributions towards the revival of the institution in question.

Since the reconstruction process began in Somalia, the country has no strong national security forces to maintain peace in Mogadishu, let alone at a national level. Rebuilding the armed forces has been a daunting task for the current government, which is financially stretched and confronted by violent militant forces. In the midst of these ordeals, one of the major positive steps taken has been the establishment of Carmo Police Academy to reconstitute the police forces. It was established in 2005, with the financial and technical assistance of a number of external actors pooled through the UNDP. To date, Carmo Police Academy has trained over 3400 police force members intended to support the work of the federal government, including the regional territories. After graduation, each member of the police force is to receive \$100 per month.

Other activities that the UNDP support include the rehabilitation of police stations and the training of the Special Police Unit and traffic police. During this study, it was revealed that more forces are trained in other parts of the country, such as Mogadishu,

²²Abdi Jama Ghedi, male, Somali, Program manager with Daryeel Association, 8/2/2013.

and outside the country, in places such as Kenya, Uganda, Djibouti, and Ethiopia. These trainees include military forces that have wider responsibility than the police force. When a UNDP representative responsible for this project was asked, “If the Carmo Academy is intended for the training of all the Somali police forces, what is the purpose of training more officers in Djibouti, Uganda or Kenya etc.?” he informed us, “The purpose is to get greater numbers trained in a shorter period of time to meet the demands of the government and the country as a whole.”²³

What is the impact of the training in the context of security and justice? How do authorities consider the success and the challenges of training Somali national security forces in Carmo? What are the lessons learned from this process? To find out the answers to these questions, interviews were conducted with one of Carmo Police graduates based in Nairobi. The aim was to learn more about the training of the new police forces and to follow up on this training and its impact on security. The training has both positive and negative impacts. On the positive side, Carmo is a strong base for the re-establishment of professional Somali police force because as one key informant stated:

Recruiting young men and women from all the regions and bringing them into one place for three to six months, regardless of the clan distrust among them and teaching them about human rights protection, work ethics, justice, gender equality, as well as investigative skills and techniques, are very important steps. These not only build the capacity of the national police forces, they also increase the visibility of the government police forces in all the regions, and promote social cohesion among police forces across the regions.²⁴

Another key informant stated

When these trained police forces return to their cities, the intention is that they take back the responsibilities of the state from the clan-based or freelance militias. However, this is not the real outcome these days. The recruitment process is very slow and sometimes counterproductive. These graduates do not receive adequate incentives during the training, and their US\$ 100 monthly salaries promised after the graduation are always delayed. We are receiving reports that some of the trained forces have been tempted to sell their weapons to or even join to the opposition forces since those forces offer them higher pay compared to what our

²³Suleiman Abdullahi, male, Somali/Kenyan, Communication specialist, UNDP Somalia, 29/3/2013.

²⁴Suleiman Abdullahi, male, Somali/Kenyan, Communication specialist, UNDP Somalia, 29/3/2013.

government and its international alliance offer. This can have an adverse effect on the rule of law project.²⁵

This reveals that Somalia will continue to be caught up in a cycle of violence if the energized and trained forces join the opposition forces unless the government pays them more attractive salaries than those offered by the opposition. Another key informant reminded us that the national police forces that have to serve in more hostile regions (such as Mogadishu, are more prone to recruitment by militant groups after their training if the government or the UNDP fails to cover their basic needs. He warns, “If they cannot ensure the basic living of these forces, then they should stop training more forces. Otherwise, they would do more harm than good.”²⁶

Building the capacity of the police forces alone cannot improve security. Access to the judiciary and justice system should complement the role of the police forces in maintaining peace and order. This is another key function that the government has to play to improve the justice system. However, at the present, external actors have more influence than the state in improving the conditions that require accessing the judiciary and justice system in the country. As discussed in the next section, external actors direct their support to building the capacity of local non-state actors while neglecting the capacity building imperative of formal public institutions.

4.1.2 Judiciary and the Justice Systems

Re-establishing effective public judiciary and justice systems and ensuring community access to their services contribute to the empowerment of the security sector. Such efforts improve state legitimacy and state autonomy in a failed state like Somalia, and are vital to the improvement of the rights of citizens, peace, law and order, and overall development of public institutions. For instance, all other efforts—training professional police forces, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration—will not succeed without the presence of an independent and transparent judiciary and justice system to enforce court decisions.

²⁵ Hassan Duale, male, Somali, Capt. Somalia Police Force, 21/2/2013

²⁶ Suleiman Abdullahi, male, Somali/Kenyan, Communication specialist, UNDP Somalia, 29/3/2013.

To date, the formal judiciary and justice systems in Somalia remain broken. The TFG's ministries exist in name only. Over the past twenty years, people have been utilizing customary laws and other local traditional conflict-resolution systems. They trust the services of local and informal authorities' more than formal courts. Often communities try to keep peace and order by utilizing informal customary laws. However, it is becoming apparent that these laws alone cannot solve most macro and complex cases—including organized crimes carried out by people concealing their identity, suicide bombers, illegal activities such as piracy, dumping toxic waste into Somali waters, and trafficking humans and weapons. Therefore, the need for strong national justice and judiciary systems supported by security forces that can protect the vulnerable and poverty-ridden population is urgent.

It is important here to understand the efforts of external actors in improving the justice system as part of their commitment to revive the Somali state. A report of a project funded by the UNDP entitled *Increasing Access to Justice and Legal Aid for Vulnerable Groups and Economically Deprived Individuals in Somaliland, Puntland and South-Central Somalia from January 2009 to February 2010* provides a revealing example of external actors' focus on strengthening civil society organizations alone, instead of on state institutions. The perceptions of key informants interviewed for this study, augment these findings. However, there have been exceptions.

As a part of capacity building for judiciary and justice system, the UNDP signed an agreement with local non-state actors in Somaliland, Puntland, and Central Somalia as partners to strengthen their institutional capacity to provide sustainable and pro-poor legal services and aid with a particular focus on deprived, vulnerable groups, and individuals on remand status and in trial detentions. The UNDP local partners in this project include: i) in Somaliland, the Amoud Legal Clinic (ALC) at Amoud University, Somaliland Women Lawyers Association (SWLA), Somaliland Lawyers Association (SLA), and the University of Hargeisa Legal Clinic (UHLC), a link to the University of Hargeisa; ii) in Puntland, the Puntland Legal Aid Centre (PLC), which provides services to the population in Mudug, Nugal, and Barri, and iii) in the south and central regions, the

Coalition of Grassroots Women Organizations (COGWO) and the Association of Somali Women Lawyers (ASWL). Through this project, the partners receive financial support and various forms of training, especially in the field of justice.

The project provides access to legal aid to around 3000 people who represent the most poor and marginalized communities in Puntland, Somaliland and Southern Somalia. Half of these clients won their freedom. In addition to assisting clients, the report also identifies the types of crimes these prisoners are accused of. These include theft, robbery, hurt, murder, rape, piracy, affray, violence, misappropriation, domestic violence, inheritance, illegal detention, and violation of duty towards family.

The local non-state actors partnering with the UNDP were able to review their cases and freed more than half of the prisoners in all cases reported. However, during the investigation of this issue, it became apparent that accessing the justice system by the Somali public, in general, is far from perfect. There are many poor, marginalized, and displaced communities that equally need support, as a UNHCR key informant stated during the interviews. But to seek support on their behalf, one has to understand the challenging factors against the revival of the judiciary and the justice systems at all levels of government.

4.2 Reconstruction in Manpower Development Sector

Education contributes to the development of all sectors. The investigation reveals that, in general, in most parts of Somalia external actors have to some extent improved both formal and informal education systems. Key informants agreed with this view. It was discovered that in the education sector, the young state is largely absent. However, local NGOs, the private sector (with the support of international organizations), and diaspora communities have been instrumental in the revival of public and private schools. According to a key informant the “what” and “how” for provision of quality primary education in Somalia are in place. Presently, these external actors have jointly set up 89% of the schools across the country. According to a key informant,

When we started we build most of the schools and put mechanisms in place for their running, however, currently communities own more than half of the 1,105 operational schools in the country and manage 46% of them. The remaining schools are owned and managed by local authorities.²⁷

Currently external actors in collaboration with these non-state actors within Somalia manage a number of schools (from elementary to high school) and more than four major successful universities, including Amoud and Hargaisa in Somaliland; Banadir, Xamar in Mogadishu; East Africa University; and other technical colleges in Bosasso. In Puntland alone, there is Bosasso Technical Institute, which provides general mechanical and electrical installations, carpentry, and masonry; Puntland Institute for Development, Administration, and Management, which teaches computers, management, and English language; the Somali Nursing Institute; and the Puntland Community College for computers, accounting, management and secretariat studies. These were all built with the help of external actors aiding the reconstruction process in Somalia.

Another encouraging development in this sector is the increase of Somali student enrolment in distance-learning programs. The main distance-learning programs are implemented by the Africa Education Trust and BBC World Services. According to one key informant, the main aim of the projects is to provide basic literacy, numeric, and life skills to out-of-school children and adults who lacked, or were denied access to conventional schooling. Currently, there are approximately 20,000 students enrolled in the program in 351 classes throughout Somaliland, Puntland, and South-Central Somalia. The majority of them were women (70%) and older than school age. This service is especially convenient for the students in southern Somalia as it is the region still considered quite volatile and therefore not safe to attend regular school.

A good example of the role of external actors in reconstruction in education is Galkacyo Education Centre for Peace and Development (GECPE). GECPE is a non-profit organization located in Galkacyo city, in central Somalia. The aim of the GECPE is to educate girls and young women between the ages of 7 to 27 years old. GECPE implements various activities in many villages around Mudug region. Besides the Centre

²⁷Yussuf Mohammed Abdullahi, male, Kenyan, Program Officer with World Vision Somalia, 26/10/2012

in Galkacyo, it built and manages four more centres that support young children of displaced communities. Over a thousand students study in these centres.

In terms of resources, the GECPE receives support from individual donors and external actors. International agencies—such as UNHCR, NOVIB, Spazio Solidare, Maria-Babbtista-Italy, and Amnesty International—financially support the GECPE. It recently opened its doors to enrol boys who had also missed the opportunity to study. The program successes include the building of 38 units; six women and girls education centres in various villages; two women and girls hostels and women training institutes with hostel facilities; one guest house; and two bore holes. The GECPE also trained over 200 primary and adult education female teachers, and over 100 women as vocational training instructors in sewing, tailoring, tie dye, and food preparation. The program benefits an estimated 600 girls between the ages of 8-18 years old.²⁸

In conclusion, external actors heavily invested in the education sector. Nevertheless, given the existing competing curriculums and dress codes influenced by various donors and institutions (from Saudi Arabia, to Egypt, Europe and the West), it is crucial to nationalize and harmonize the work of these institutions. Future state decisions must take the complexity of education in Somalia into consideration and build on the achievements and accumulated knowledge of the communities. The new state cannot ignore the achievements of the institutions run by external and internal non-state actors. Building strong partnerships with these actors would strengthen the reconstruction process.

4.3 The Farming Sector and the Role of External Actors in Reconstruction

Another sector to highlight the role of external actors in the Somali state reconstruction is farming. In pre-civil war Somalia, farming cooperatives existed, but mainly in southern parts where the land is fertile and the only two rivers in the country flow in addition to sufficient rain. In contrast, Puntland is a semi-arid land with no history of farming experience. There was also a widespread perception among Somalis that Puntland had no

²⁸ Hassan Mohammed Hussein, male, Somali, Programs Officer, Galkacyo Education Centre for Peace and Development (GECPE), 19/4/2013

potential land for cultivation. This view changed after the civil war. Hundreds of small farms have emerged in all the regions of Puntland. The increasing demands of a growing population encouraged this process.

One external actor that has played an instrumental role in the reconstruction of this sector is Care International. In addition, there have been strong relationships with agencies like the UNDP and the European Committee for Agriculture. The external actors have generously contributed to the reconstruction of the agricultural sector by investing in specific projects for example the Garowe Farming Cooperative (GFC). The actors provide training on planting various seeds, such as dates, lime, tomatoes, and other fruits and vegetables. They also donate water-pumping generators, and they train farming committees on internal governance, accountability, and marketing to make sure the programs are run properly. Through capacity building, the farmers have become capable of producing sufficient food products for the city of Garowe and its surrounding villages. Overall, the agencies provide some financial resources, but they are not involved in monitoring the operation of projects they support.

4.4 Conclusion

Over the past twenty years, both local and external non-state actors have been involved in Somalia in different capacities, even though since 2000, very weak transitional governments have been in place. Even though some level of institutional rebuilding can be said to have been achieved to date, most of these public institutions exist in name only since they have not been able to rise to the full potential to carry out their mandates due to the still weak government system. The chapter has discussed the role of the external actors in rebuilding of some of the public Institutions that promote the rule of law including the Somalia police force and the judiciary and justice system.

Other key areas of reconstruction discussed in the chapter are manpower development and farming sector. These sectors critically suffer when the state responsible for it collapses. This explains why manpower development, food production and health programs become the centre of any nation-state reconstruction agenda. These sectors

revolve around programs that focus on integrated basic human needs, especially education, food security, housing, improving health (including HIV/AIDS) and nutrition. In general, economic growth is expected to ultimately improve the lives of the majority. Since the Somalia collapse in 1991 and up to the present, non-state actors (mainly external) have assumed the responsibility of these services aiding in the reconstruction process.

For empirical evidence in reconstruction, this chapter closely examined rebuilding of public institutions by identifying key sectors in institutions that promote the rule of law, manpower development and the farming sector.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.0 Introduction

This chapter focuses on the study's summary, conclusion and recommendations based on its findings. The three sections draw from the objectives and the hypotheses as set out in this study and advanced and tested through its findings. The summary on the first part provides a brief on the objectives of the study and the actions undertaken to realize each of the objectives while the other part looks at the hypotheses and how each of them was tested by the study. The conclusion confirms whether the study has been able to achieve its objectives and sufficiently tested the hypotheses followed by recommendations for future actions that may have been triggered by this study.

5.1 Summary

In objective one this study sought to examine and analyze the impact of dominant differentiated external interests in the state reconstruction process in Somalia. Towards this end, this study moved to interrogate the progress of the reconstruction process through the different stages with clear evidence that external actors have had a role in the process. The Study confirmed that among a host of other external actors, states like United States, Ethiopia, Kenya, Eritrea, Djibouti, and Uganda have been directly involved in the Somali crisis and in the reconstruction process as well as international organizations represented by the UN and the regional organizations represented by among others the AU and IGAD. These external actors have come into Somalia motivated by their actor-specific interests which are different in many aspects. The net effect of these differentiated interests has a pull and push that has impacted on the outcome of the reconstruction process. Equally, various internal non-state actors such as NGOs, civil society, community based organizations have also been involved in the reconstruction process. The multi-actors approach that has involved both state and non-state actors has presented the Somali reconstruction with a mixture of opportunities and challenges that would later emerge as the determinant of the reconstruction path. Besides the numerous efforts at, first establishing a central authority capable of managing the

affairs of the state, this has never been successfully achieved and Somalia has remained without a viable central government for over two decades.

In the second objective the study sought to examine factors underpinning successful state reconstruction in Somalia. The study first endeavored to confirm the progress of the process and why the process has not been successful despite the involvement of both internal and external actors. The study confirmed that while some strides have been made especially towards resurrection of the central government; the Somali state is yet to witness successful reconstruction. This can partly be blamed on external actors and partly on internal actors and their failure to genuinely work together towards the same goal. More saddening is the fact that especially external actors both regional and international, are often misinformed or ignorant about Somalia political and social dynamics, which renders their mediation or assistance efforts less effective and even in some cases detrimental to the reconstruction agenda. If the efforts of both internal and external actors could be harnessed together under common goals and objectives and set aside their self-interests, full reconstruction of the Somali state would easily be realized.

The U.S. due to her interests on the war on terror branded certain individuals as dangerous terrorists and in fact put them on the CIA's watch list. This ended up conflicting with its own goal of assisting in the reconstruction process as the individuals gained favor from their clans and supporters later on posing serious security and political challenges to the defunct TNG and the successor TFG. Both Ethiopia and Eritrea, whose interests' have perennially conflicted, have armed and supported rival Somali factions in an extension of their border war, exacerbating the fighting in Somalia at a time when the war there showed all signs of burning itself out. Kenya faces a similar threat from Somalia instability as well as the historical claim of Somali irredentism, given that North-Eastern Kenya is also populated by ethnic Somalis. Kenya's ambivalence towards any central government set up in Somali can be exemplified with claims that Kenya supports a creation of buffer zone in Juba land. Uganda and Burundi have sent their soldiers into Somalia under the auspices of AMISOM which has fought the UIC and Al Shabaab militia for a long time but the badly needed reconstruction is yet to be realized.

The study set out to investigate the first hypothesis that differentiated interests of external actors are a constraint to the reconstruction of the Somali State. Over two decades after Somali plunged into unprecedented conflict that led to the collapse of the state; the state is yet to realize full reconstruction. External actors have been involved in the reconstruction process both at the level of individual states as well as at the level of regional and international organizations as has been revealed by this study. At the state level, this study has looked at the interests of Kenya, US, Ethiopia, Uganda and Eritrea while at the organization level, the study examined the involvement of IGAD, AU and the UN. Moreover, these external actors have gone into the Somali reconstruction process with actor specific interests which have in most cases been divergent. Individual states involved in the reconstruction process are guided by their own divergent national security, political and economic interests which end up obstructing their reconstruction agenda. Even when states are operating under the umbrella of a regional or international organization their individual interests continue to manifest in their day to day operations. For instance, the US has been in forefront in the Somali reconstruction since the collapse of the state in 1991 but her interest in the war on terror has stood out clearly in the course of her involvement in Somalia. On the other hand Ethiopia and Kenya's perceived threat of Somali irrintentism has been a major area of interest while Eritrea on her part is perceived to pull in the opposite direction of Ethiopia and her allies. The overall resultant effect of the divergent interests of the actors has been the elusive reconstruction of the Somali state which confirms the first hypothesis of this study that differentiated interests of external actors are a constraint to the reconstruction of the Somali state.

In line with the second hypothesis of this study that the convergence of interests of both external and internal actors underpins a successful reconstruction process, the findings of this study confirms the hypothesis. Even though Somali has not been able to attain full reconstruction, it is evident some progress has been achieved in some spheres of life which can be attributed to the harmonious working relations between both external actors involved in the process and the internal actors.

The relative peace and stability witnessed in the semi-autonomous regions of Somaliland and Puntland and to some extent the South central region as compared to the situation prevailing immediately after the collapse attests to the fact that there has been progress at the political level despite lack of a strong central authority. Most of the progress so far achieved has been realized with genuine involvement of both internal actors and the external actors. While external actors have been the major funders of the reconstruction programs, the local internal actors have been key to implementation of the programs. The effort to consolidate peace as well as achieve political and economic stability has borne fruit where both internal and external actors have worked closely to set up working governing institutions like the presidency, the parliament and the courts which form the central pillar of a stable government. Such cases have been witnessed in Somaliland where these institutions have been set up and are operational. Similar attempts are on course in Puntland not to mention the numerous attempts that have been made to set up transitional authorities mainly in the South-central region with the involvement of both internal and external actors. The success of the reconstruction process has in most cases been negated by the self-vested interests of internal actors as well as those of the external actors, a situation which going by the example of the progress so far realized, can be reversed if the interests of these actors can converge. The state-building process witnessed in the semi-autonomous regions of Somalia occurred through cooperation between traditional authorities such as elders and sheikhs, politicians, former guerillas, intellectuals and ordinary people who decided to put their interests aside and with only marginal external support from international organizations and states. For instance, in Somaliland, several initiatives involving the Diaspora, the media, local NGOs and associations took place culminating to the referendum that ushered in the Somaliland constitution in 2001. Inhabitants of the self-declared Republic of Somaliland in the northwestern Somalia have continued to enjoy a relatively higher degree of statehood even though deprived of international recognition. Convergence of interests of the actors is therefore key to successful reconstruction of the Somali state.

5.2 Conclusion

The reconstruction process of the Somali state has proved to be a complex process, complicated by the involvement of external actors, key among them external states. The external actors though citing stabilization as their main reason for involvement in Somalia, have come into the process guided by their own specific interests among them national security and economic interests. This study established that these interests of external actors have either converged or conflicted which directly impacts on the Somali reconstruction process.

This study finds that even though the interests of the actors involved in the Somali reconstruction process have converged in some areas, there have also been areas of divergence of interests which has mainly served as an impediment on the process. For instance, the United States security interests seem to converge with Kenya's national security interests as well as those of Uganda occasioned by terrorist attacks that have links to Somali Al Shabaab terror groups. Ethiopia on her part has also been guided by her national security interests which apparently have always been threatened by secessionist groups in the southern part of the country specifically in the Ogaden region. A stable and friendly Somali central government that would not be sympathetic to such secessionist groups would be the desire of Ethiopia. It is therefore evident that the national security interests of US, Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia are key to their involvement in Somalia and the same has a direct effect on the reconstruction process and more importantly as each of the states apply different methods to achieve their interest. This finding affirms the study's theoretical assertion that national security interests as postulated in the realist theory is what guides nation states at the international scene and the way they relate with other states.

There are external actors that are involved in Somali state reconstruction citing humanitarian assistance. However, these external actors also have their own interests that are usually coined within the larger umbrella of humanitarian assistance. Regional and international organizations lead this category. This is also the case with some external states that do not necessarily share anything in common with Somalia but have been in

the scene over the years especially some Middle East states like the UAE and Saudi Arabia although their economic interests would clearly stand out.

While acknowledging the convergence of interests of external actors in the Somalia reconstruction, the study also confirms existence of the divergence of the interests of external actors. Each of the external actors seems to place its own interests first thereby undermining the reconstruction progress. The most explicit conflict of external state interests is manifested by Ethiopia and Eritrea demonstrated by their long standing proxy wars. The two states have sought to undermine each other extending this to the reconstruction process. Their antagonistic interests and their subsequent support to different militia groups forms the basis for the split of the Somali state into semi-autonomous regions of Somaliland and Puntland leaving the unstable South Central region as the third party to the equation. This in itself has rendered the realization of a widely recognized central government more remote despite the numerous attempts so far witnessed and hence this study positively identifies differentiated interests of external actors as a major impediment to the reconstruction of the Somali state in line with the study's hypotheses.

5.3 Recommendations

While acknowledging the role of external actors in the Somalia state reconstruction and the current state of affairs in Somalia, the study makes the following recommendations: The first recommendation entails a three stage approach. The first recommends continued presence of the international community and to facilitate a forum by key external actors including states to help identify their key interests and the threats that a collapsed Somali state presents. National security interest ranks top among the interests of all key state actors involved in the Somali reconstruction process followed by economic interests. The second stage should entail developing a mechanism that would take advantage of the convergence of the interests of external actors while trying to minimize the effects of divergent interests towards a successful reconstruction process. In order to mitigate the impact of external actor interests, a neutral party should be identified to take lead as a facilitator. Where interests diverge, a compromise that entails give and take or win-win

for the parties should be adopted in order to remain focused on the reconstruction agenda. The third step should entail creating a vibrant mechanism that has both incentives and sanctions for compliance and non-compliance both for those external actors involved as well as for the Somalia as the recipient state.

The second recommendation is to let active reconstruction be led by the Somali people themselves preferably native Somali. A mixture of all inclusive clan based reconciliation processes should be initiated at the grassroots level where locals understand their priorities and the need for rebuilding their nation be emphasized in such forums. External actors should only facilitate with very minimal involvement in charting the way forward. A homegrown solution developed by Somali people themselves should be adopted in guiding Somali state reconstruction. In similar manner as in the first recommendation, there should be incentives and sanctions equally to ensure compliance on key deliberations.

The study also recommends a gradual withdrawal of all foreign forces as Somali national security apparatus and institutions are enhanced.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX I

INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR EXPERTS

My name is Paul Kitungu, a student pursuing a programme of study leading to a Master of Arts Degree in International Relations at the University of Nairobi. As part of my programme requirements I am undertaking a research project on External Actors in State Reconstruction: The Case of Somalia. The information obtained will be used for this academic purpose only and kept confidential. Please assist in filling in the following questionnaire.

1. Name of the respondent (optional).....
2. Please indicate your nationality.....
3. GenderMale [] Female []
4. Occupation / Organization.....
5. Position held in the organization.....
6. Numerous efforts have been made to reconstruct the Somalia state since her collapse in 1991 without much success.
 - (a) Why have these efforts not succeeded much?
 - (b) A number of states have been involved in Somalia before and since the collapse of the state. Which are some of these states?
 - c) What is the nature of their involvement (What activities are they involved in)?
 - d) What are the interests that are driving their involvement?
(Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Djibouti, Uganda, USA)
- 7 a) To what extent has this involvement by these states hindered or enhanced the efforts to reconstruct the Somali state?
 - (b) What role have the interests of these states contributed to the failure to reconstruct the Somalia State?
8. What else can be done, and by whom to enhance efforts to reconstruct the state in Somalia?
9. Has there been a deliberate effort by both state and non-state actors to reconstruct Somalia?

10. Has there been a deliberate effort by Somalis themselves to reconstruct their own state?

11. What do you see as the future of Somalia?

APPENDIX II
STATE OFFICIALS INTERVIEW GUIDE

My name is Paul Kitungu, a student pursuing a programme of study leading to a Master of Arts Degree in International Relations at the University of Nairobi. As part of my programme requirements I am undertaking a research project on External Actors in State Reconstruction: The Case of Somalia. The information obtained will be used for this academic purpose only and kept confidential.

1. Name of respondent (optional) _____
2. Name of organization _____
3. Position held in the organization _____
4. Gender: Male [] Female []
5. What has been the role of your country in the Somalia crisis?
6. Has there been specific areas of reconstruction that your state has focused in the Somalia case?
7. What would you identify as some of the achievements in Somalia reconstruction that can be associated with external involvement?
8. What would you say motivates your country's presence in Somalia and other external actors?
9. What would you identify as the effect to your country as a result of continued instability in the Somalia?
10. What do you consider as the main obstacle in the reconstruction of the Somalia state despite both internal and external efforts to rebuild the state?
11. What do you think the Somalis themselves can do to reconstruct their own state?
12. Somalia is presently split into three main so called semi-autonomous regions the Somaliland, Puntland, and South Central. Does your state recognize the autonomy of these regions?
13. What do you see as the future of Somalia?

APPENDIX III
LISTS OF INFORMANTS

1. Nelly Nasike, Female, Kenyan, Second Secretary Horn of Africa Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kenya, 2/10/2012
2. Chris Mburu, Male, Kenyan, Director Horn of Africa Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kenya, 2/10/2012
3. Mathew Goshko, Male, American, First Secretary, Public Diplomacy Officer, US Embassy Somalia Affairs Unit, 16/10/2012
4. TedlaTsegaye, Male, Ethiopian, First Secretary, Political Affairs Officer, Ethiopian Embassy, 18/10/2012
5. Kahoro Kinaro, Male, Kenyan, Second Secretary Horn of Africa Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kenya, 2/10/2012
6. Mustafa Othman, male, Somali/British citizenship, Communication and technology Manager with Shaqodoon organization, 7/2/2013
7. Abdi Jama Ghedi, male, Somali, Program manager with Daryeel Association, 8/2/2013
8. Charles Owino, male, Kenyan, Food security and livelihood manager with World Vision International Somalia, 19/10/2012
9. Mohammed JirdeGoole, male, Somali, Finance manager with CARE International Somalia/Somaliland, 17/10/2012
10. Amina Harun, Female, Somali-American, Graduate volunteer, UN Volunteer Program with UNDP Somalia, 29/2/2013
11. Olad Farah, male, Kenyan, Deputy Chief of Party with Mercy Corps Somalia, 19/3/2013
12. Ruth Tiampati, Female, Kenyan, Nutritionist Specialist with World Vision Somalia, 15/10/2012
13. Peter Kabutu, male, Kenyan, Finance manager, CARE International Somalia, 26/10/2012
14. Salome Mullei, female, Kenyan, Partnership Advisor, CARE International, Somalia, 31/10/2012
15. Suleiman Abdullahi, male, Somali/Kenyan, Communication specialist, UNDP Somalia, 29/3/2013
16. Yussuf Mohammed Abdullahi, male, Kenyan, Program Officer with World Vision Somalia, 26/10/2012
17. Joffery Cheruiyot, male, Kenyan, Associate Project Director-WASH with World Vision Somalia, 15/10/2012

18. **Benedict Mutua, male, Water and sanitation Program manager with World Vision Somalia, 15/10/2012**
19. **Jeniffer Katusya, female, Kenyan, Operations Manager with UNMAS Contractor, 16/5/2013**
20. **Ismael Mohammed, male, Kenyan, Program Manager with USAID East Africa Somalia office, 22/5/2013**
21. **Abdullahi Abdow, male, Kenyan, Political Assistant with US Embassy Somali Affairs Unit, 16/10/2012**
22. **Fatuma Dagane Adan, female, Kenyan, Administration Assistant with USAID East Africa, Somalia office 18/10/2012**
23. **Hassan Duale, male, Somali, Capt. Somalia Police Force, 21/2/2013**
24. **Farhiya Mohammed, female, Somali, Masters Student, 14/11/2012**
25. **Abdi Daudi , male, Somali, Program assistant with UNEP, 12/10/2012**
26. **Fowzia Osman, Female, Somali, UNHCR Somali Program, 10/4/2013**
27. **John Ngugi, Male, Kenyan, Program Officer, UN Political Office for Somalia, 30/4/2013**
28. **Hassan Mohammed Hussein, male, Somali, Programs Officer, Galkacyo Education Centre for Peace and Development (GECPE), 19/4/2013**
29. **Ahmed Osman, male, Somali, Deputy Manager at DARALO Institute, 19/4/2013**
30. **Abdul Rizak, male, Somali, Public Information Officer, Somalia Transitional Federal Government office in Kenya, 19/4/2013**
31. **Hassan Adam, male, Somali, Program Assistant, SAJED Organization, 19/4/2013**
32. **Wambui Kihui, female, Kenyan, Program coordinator with National Civic Forum Somalia, 19/4/2013**
33. **Tom Musili, Male, Kenyan, Program Manager, International Red Cross, 23/4/2013.**
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by Paul Kitungu

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