

University of Nairobi

Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies (IDIS)

Topic:

{ The Influence of Multiparty Politics on Ethnic Conflict: A Case Study of Kenya 1992 And 2007 Multiparty Elections. }

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**Project Proposal submitted to the Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies,
University of Nairobi in partial fulfillment of the requirements for Masters of Arts Degree
in International Conflict Management**

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DECLARATION

This Research Project is my original work and has not been presented for award of a degree in any University.

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This project has been submitted for examination to the Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies, University of Nairobi with my approval as a university supervisor.

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DEDICATION

I dedicate this work to all victims of ethnic conflict.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I wish to express my deeply felt gratitude to all who have contributed to the completion of this project.

Special thanks to Professor Nyunya, my supervisor, for his hands on guidance, insightful comments and dedicated support throughout this research project.

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Thank you and May God Bless you All

ABSTRACT

Since the re-emergence of multiparty politics in Kenya in 1992, there has been a lot of ethnic violence with every other multiparty election. One such violence was the one experienced in 1992, before, during and after the multiparty elections. As if that is not enough, the worst of it came during 2007 multiparty elections. So far, since 1992, four multiparty elections have been held yet multiparty competition has continued to divide Kenyans other than promote national unity and integration.

It is in this light this study was carried out to try and investigate why political parties failed to promote national unity and cohesion in Kenya. It also sought to investigate ethnic alignment of political parties in Kenya, to investigate the nexus between multipartism and ethnic conflict, to investigate possible causes including the people who possibly contributed to the election violence in both 1992 and 2007 and how they contributed to the violence. The study analyses opinions on how Kenyans can eliminate ethnicity in Kenya and formation of political parties that promote national cohesion and integration.

The study established that political parties are aligned along ethnic line, a situation that historical. Political elites have worsened the situation in order to maintain status quo or safeguard their political and economic interests. It also established that the voter also has a stake. By agreeing to be bribed, to rig and to vote in the same political leaders who disintegrate the country along ethnic lines.

In the light of research findings, it was suggested that there is need to enforce legal and constitutional framework, strengthen institutions, educate the masses on negative ethnicity and initiate employment-led development. This will go a long way in ending the culture of impunity and enhancing democracy, transparency and accountability.

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ACRONYMS

MOU	-----	Memorandum of Understanding
CGD	-----	Center for Governance and Development
CLARION	-----	Center for law and Research International
NCIC	-----	National Cohesion and Integration Commission
IMF	-----	International Monetary Fund
(IGCC)	-----	Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation
NARC	-----	National Rainbow Collision
LTTE	-----	Sri Lanka's Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
IRA	-----	Northern Ireland's Irish Republican Army
I.I.EC	-----	Interim Independent Electoral Commission
NCIC	-----	National Cohesion and Integration Commission
CLARION	-----	Centre for Law and Research International
CGD	-----	Centre for Governance and Development
CMD	-----	Centre for Multi-party Democracy
KHRC	-----	Kenya Human Rights Commission
KANU	-----	Kenya African National Union
KAU	-----	Kenya African Union
KCA	-----	Kikuyu Central Association
KFL	-----	Kenya Federation of labour
KADU	-----	Kenya African Democratic Union
KPA	-----	Kalenjin Political Alliance
MUF	-----	Masaai United Front
CAPU	-----	Coast African Political Union
KAPP	-----	Kenya African People's Party

SNA	Somalia National Association
KPU	Kenya Peoples Union
USA	United States America
GEMA	Gikuyu, Embu, Meru Association
DP	Democratic Party
SDP	Social Democratic Party
FORD	Forum for Restoration of Democracy
FORD-A	Forum for Restoration of Democracy-Asili
FORD-K	Forum for Restoration of Democracy-Kenya
NDP	National Development Party
NAC	National Alliance for Change
NAK	Party for Kenya
ODM	Orange Democratic Movement
LDP	Liberal Democratic Party
SDP	Social Democratic Party
FORD-P	Forum for Restoration of Democracy-People
LDP	Liberal Democratic Party
ECK	Electoral Commission of Kenya
PNU	Party of National Unity
KHRC	Kenya Human Rights Commission
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
KAMATUSA	Kalenjin-Masaai, Turkana, Samburu coalition
UDM	United Democratic Movement
GNU	Government of National Unity
IDIS	Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies

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CHAPTER ONE

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 BACKGROUND INFORMATION.

Internationally and even in Kenya, political parties, movements and International agencies have held the belief that multi-party elections provide a potential for a progressive movement away from the rule of authoritarian corruption. Therefore a means of protecting citizens against the excesses of one party system. Party competition should be a means by which democracy and national unity is introduced and maintained. However party competition has been faced by certain constraints.

In Kenya, the reintroduction of political pluralism in 1992 took place alongside pressures by the World Bank and the IMF for political and economic reforms. Politicians saw reforms as a scheme by foreigners to undermine Kenyan political and economic sovereignty. It impacted on the economic interests of ethnically based elites. Such interests have been politically manipulated to stir up ethnic conflicts. Consequently, ethnic –based groups and elites have promoted ethnicity and mobilized ethnic emotions. This has created a volatile situation in Kenya. For instance, there were violent attempts to ethnically cleanse populations in the Rift Valley and Coast Province before, during and after 1992 general elections in order to derail the process of political reforms and to protect ethnic and individual economic interests.

Political liberalization has occasioned a realignment of political parties in Kenya¹ under tribal lines, valuing ethnicity above political ideology and policy. The assumption is that the party offers the best hope for one within the tribe to assume power and then share state resources

¹ A .Cussac, “Kibaki Tena?” *The Challeges of a Campaign*, Larfargue, J.(Ed). *The General Elections in Kenya*, Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota Publishers, Ltd., 2007. (pp.55-104)

with tribal members hence tribalism. This has a historic and economic perspective. Often the members of tribe in power were unethically given or allowed to use land at the expense of the other tribes. For instance, the historic land battles between the Kikuyu and the Kalenjins are fought in the political arena .Kenyatta used his political power to settle more Kikuyus in the Rift Valley². Likewise, Moi used his power to grant executive permission for his tribal community, the Kalenjins, to settle in the Mau Forest. Kibaki using the same executive power, expelled the Kalenjins from the Mau forest in 2003.This expulsion with the promise of further expulsions played a major part in the Kalenjins evicting the Kikuyus from their homes, destroying their property and killing others after elections of 2007 were announced, the worst of the ethnic conflict in Kenyan history.

1.2 Statement of the research problem

After forty eight years of independence, ethnicity still remains the central focus of political mobilization and political alignment. Thus multi-parties have continued to divide Kenyans along ethnic lines. The question begs therefore, why have political parties failed to promote national unity and democracy in Kenya? The party in power uses its political power to share state resources with tribal members while discriminating against the other tribes hence creating ethnic tensions . What then can be done to improve party formations that promote national cohesion and unity? At the same time Multiparty politics has worked in other multi-ethnic societies in the world .How can it work in Kenya too? The political elites are normally voted in by their constituents, sometimes, voting in the same political elites who disintegrate the country along

² A .Cussac, “Kibaki Tena?” *The Challeges of a Campaign*, Larfargue,J.(Ed).*The General Elections in Kenya*,Dar es Salaam:Mkuki na Nyota PUbblishers,Ltd.,2007. (pp.55-104)

ethnic lines. Why would the society vote in ethnic inclined leaders who have no political ideology? Therefore, the purpose of this study is to seek information that answers the stated questions.

1.3 Objectives of the research.

The broad objective of this project is to undertake a study of why political competition has resulted to ethnic violence other than promotes national unity and integration. Specific objectives include: to Investigate ethnic alignment of political parties in Kenya, examine the nexus between political parties and ethnic conflict, investigate possible causes including the people who possibly contributed to the election violence in both 1992 and 2007 and how they contributed to the violence and analyse opinions on how Kenyans can eliminate ethnicity in Kenya.

1.4 Justification of the research problem

Multi-party politics has worked in other ethnically heterogeneous or multi ethnic societies, for instance, Tanzania which has over a hundred tribes. It has also worked in Yugoslavia and S.Africa. How can political competition work in Kenya too? The study will offer suggestions on how political parties can contribute to ethnic cohesion other than ethnic conflict. It will also seek to propose formation of political parties with an ideology but not on ethnic lines .More so, it will examine information related to the nexus between multi-party politics and ethnic conflict.

The fact that Kenya continues to experience insecurity and persistent violence before, during and after multi-party elections provides a justification for this study. The violence leads to destruction of property and life and to internally displaced persons hence a negative sum game.

1.5 Literature review

1.5.1 Introduction.

The review provides scholarly literature on origin and causes of ethnic conflict. It also provides a link between political parties and ethnic conflict. Further, it will provide scholarly information on why political parties are aligned along ethnic lines. More so, literature on why political elites manipulate their political interests in order to stir up ethnic tensions. According to Richardson Jr. and Sen, "ethnic conflict" is mostly a struggle between rival organizations seeking to maintain or gain control of state power³. Lake and Rothchild⁴ argue that Ethnic conflict is not caused directly by inter-group differences, "ancient hatreds" and centuries-old feuds, or the stresses of modern life within a global economy nor were ethnic passions, long bottled up by repressive communist regimes, simply uncorked by the end of the Cold War. Rather, they argue that intense ethnic conflict is most often caused by collective fears of the future.

1.5.2 Collective fears of the future and ethnic conflict.

As groups begin to fear for their safety, dangerous and difficult-to-resolve strategic dilemmas arise that contain within them the potential for tremendous violence. As information failures, problems of credible commitment, and the security dilemma take hold, groups become apprehensive, the state weakens, and conflict becomes more likely. Ethnic activists and political entrepreneurs, operating within groups, build upon these fears of insecurity and polarize society. Most ethnic groups, most of the time, pursue their interests peacefully through established political channels. But when ethnicity is linked with acute social uncertainty, a history of

³ J. M. Richardson Jr. and Shinjinee Sen. *Ethnic Conflict and Economic Development*: School of International Service, American University . 1996, pp 2

⁴ D.A.Lake and D.Rothchild, "Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict" *International Security*, Vol. 21, No. 2, Autumn 1996, pp. 41-75

conflict, and fear of what the future might bring, it emerges as one of the major fault lines along which societies fracture⁵. Vesna Pesic, a professor at the University of Belgrade and a peace activist in the former Yugoslavia, says it well: ethnic conflict is caused by the "fear of the future, lived through the past."⁶

Collective fears of the future arise when states lose their ability to arbitrate between groups or provide credible guarantees of protection for groups. Under this condition, which Barry Posen refers to as "emerging anarchy," physical security becomes of paramount concern.⁷ As such, central authority declines; groups become fearful for their survival. They invest in and prepare for violence, and thereby make actual violence possible. State weakness, whether it arises incrementally out of competition between groups or from extremists actively seeking to destroy ethnic peace, is a necessary precondition for violent ethnic conflict to erupt. State weakness helps to explain the explosion of ethnic violence that has followed the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, and it has also led to violence in Liberia, Somalia, and other African states.

1.5.3 Strategic intergroup dilemmas

Further, Posen argues that in situations of emerging anarchy and violence arise out of the strategic interactions between and within groups. Between groups, three different strategic

⁵ N. Kathleen "*Ethnic Conflict and Refugees*," in Michael E. Brown, ed., *Ethnic Conflict and International Security* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 161.

⁶ Vesna Pesic, Remarks to the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC) Working Group on the International Spread and Management of Ethnic Conflict, October 1, 1994.

⁷ R. P Barry, "*The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict*," in Brown, *Ethnic Conflict and International Security*, pp. 103-124. See also Jack Snyder, "*Nationalism and the Crisis of the Post-Soviet State*," in *ibid.*, pp. 79-101

intergroup dilemmas include; information failure, problems of credible commitment and incentives to use force preemptively-security dilemma. Within groups, ethnic activists and political entrepreneurs may make blatant communal appeals and outbid moderate politicians, thereby mobilizing members, polarizing society, and magnifying the inter-group dilemmas. "Non-rational" factors such as emotions, historical memories, and myths can exacerbate the violent implications of these intra-group interactions. Together, these inter- group and intra-group interactions combine, to create a vicious cycle that threatens to pull multi-ethnic societies into violence.⁸

1.5.3. (a) Problems of credible commitment/failed ethnic contracts.

Fearon argues that ethnic conflicts also arise because groups cannot credibly commit themselves to uphold mutually beneficial agreements they might reach.⁹ In other words, at least one group cannot effectively reassure the other that it will not renege on an agreement and exploit it at some future date. As exploitation can be very costly-up to and including the organized killing of one group by another-groups may prefer to absorb even high costs of war today to avoid being exploited tomorrow. For instance, when the National Rainbow Coalition government was formed in 2002, people across Kenya from all tribes felt hope that the country's government was finally on the verge of a system of governance that would have accountability through shared power, the election victory was a landslide and there was no election violence.

⁸ D. A. Lake and D. Rothchild, eds., *Ethnic Fears and Global Engagement: The International Spread and Management of Ethnic Conflict* (forthcoming).

⁹ Fearon, "*Ethnic War as a Commitment Problem*"; and Fearon, "*Rationalist Explanations for War*"; Hardin, *One for All*, p. 143; and Barry R. Weingast, "*Constructing Trust: The Political and Economic Roots of Ethnic and Regional Conflict*," unpublished manuscript, Stanford University, 1995.

However, within weeks of election, the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) collapsed¹⁰ This led to disintegration of the NARC party and the broken promise of a shared government. This resulted to frustration and aggression over what would have resulted from the new government coming to power in 2002. This frustration fueled the violence that took place after the 2007 election.

Stable ethnic relations can be understood as based upon a "contract" between groups.¹¹ Such contracts specify, among other things, the rights and responsibilities, political privileges, and access to resources of each group. These contracts may be formal constitutional agreements or simply informal understandings between elites. Whatever their form, ethnic contracts channel politics in peaceful directions. Most importantly, ethnic contracts contain "safeguards" designed to render the agreement self-enforcing. They contain provisions or mechanisms to ensure that each side lives up to its commitments and feels secure that the other will do so as well. Typical safeguards include, first, power-sharing arrangements, electoral rules, or group vetoes that prevent one ethnic group from setting government policy unilaterally;¹² second, minority control over critical economic assets, as with the whites in South Africa or Chinese in Malaysia;¹³ and

¹⁰ C.A. Kupchan, ed., *Nationalism and Nationalities in the New Europe* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1995), p. 99.

¹¹ O. Williamson, *The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, and Relational Contracting* (New York: Free Press, 1985);

¹² A. Lijphart, *The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967); Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985); Timothy D. Sisk, *Democratization in South Africa: The Elusive Social Contract* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995); and Weingast, "Constructing Trust."

¹³ H. Adam and K. Moodley, "South Africa: *The Opening of the Apartheid Mind*," in J. McGarry and B. O'Leary, eds., *The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation*, New York: Routledge, 1993, pp. 226-250.

third, as was found in Croatia before the breakup of Yugoslavia, maintenance of ethnic balance within the military or police forces to guarantee that one group will not be able to use overwhelming organized violence against the other.¹⁴ These political checks and balances serve to stabilize group relations and ensure that no group can be exploited by the other. In Barry R. Weingast's words, "reciprocal trust can be induced by institutions."¹⁵ The terms of the ethnic contract reflect the balance of political power between the groups and their beliefs about the intentions and likely behaviors of one another. Safeguards are crafted to respond to the specific circumstances of each set of groups.

However, ethnic contracts can be undermined and problems of credible commitment created by changes in either the ethnic balance of power or the beliefs of groups about others. These changes and their implications are captured in two separate but related models, one by James Fearon that focuses on the balance of political power between groups and one by Weingast that emphasizes beliefs.¹⁶ The political power of groups is determined by demography, the resources available to each group, and their capacity to organize effectively.¹⁷ More powerful groups have a larger say in setting the terms of the contract. However, for the less powerful

¹⁴ M. Glenny, *The Fall of Yugoslavia*, New York: Penguin Books, 1992, and Hardin, *One for All*, pp. 58 and 159.

¹⁵ Weingast, "Constructing Trust," p. 15. Aleksa Djilas, "Fear thy Neighbor: The Breakup of Yugoslavia," in Charles A. Kupchan, ed., *Nationalism and Nationalities in the New Europe* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1995), p. 99

¹⁶ Fearon, "Ethnic War as a Commitment Problem"; and Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War"; see also Fearon, "Commitment Problems and the Spread of Ethnic Conflict," in Lake and Rothchild, *Ethnic Fears and Global Engagement*. See Weingast, "Constructing Trust"; this model is also discussed in Robert H. Bates and Barry R. Weingast, "Rationality and Interpretation: The Politics of Transition," paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, August 31-September 3, 1995.

¹⁷ Hardin, *One for All*, p. 56.

group to agree voluntarily to enter and abide by the contract, its interests must also be addressed, including its concern that the more powerful group will try to exploit it and alter the terms of the contract at some future date. Indeed, it is the minority, fearful of future exploitation and violence that ultimately determines the viability of any existing ethnic contract. When the balance of ethnic power remains stable-and is expected to remain stable-well-crafted contracts enable ethnic groups to avoid conflict despite their differing policy preferences. Problems of credible commitment arise, as Fearon shows, whenever the balance of ethnic power shifts.¹⁸As the influence of one side declines, previously enforceable ethnic contracts become unenforceable. The checks and balances that safeguard the agreement today become insufficient tomorrow. Even if the group that is growing stronger promises not to exploit the weaker group in the future, there is nothing to prevent it from breaking its promise when it actually is stronger. Recognizing this, the declining side may choose to fight today rather than accede to an ethnic contract that will become increasingly unenforceable as time progresses.

Independent of changes in the ethnic balance of power, Weingast demonstrates that if information is incomplete and there are costs to becoming a victim in the future, changes in the beliefs of one group about the intentions of another can play a large role in setting the parties on the road to violence¹⁹. If a group believes that there is even a small chance that it may become a target of a genocidal attack, it may choose conflict over compromise and the risk of future destruction. To provoke conflict, one group needs not believe that the other really is aggressive,

¹⁸ Fearon, "*Ethnic War as a Commitment Problem*."

¹⁹ Weingast, "*Constructing Trust*"; and Bates and Weingast, "Rationality and Interpretation." The term "beliefs" is used here in its game-theoretic sense to refer to the conditional probability of an actor holding one set of preferences (intentions, in the text; payoffs from a game, more formally) rather than another. Actors form beliefs subjectively, largely on the basis of past interactions.

only fear that it might be. With incomplete information, even small changes in beliefs about the intentions of the other group can generate massive violence.

1.5.3. (b) Security dilemma

The security dilemma as defined by Lake and Rothchild is the 'inability both to know with certainty the intentions and abilities of others and to commit credibly not to arm for offensive purposes. This uncertainty often breeds from informational limitations or lack of credible information such as rumours, hence the groups act on the basis of prior beliefs about the likely preferences of others. Lake and Rothchild further articulate that the security dilemma generally follows from anarchy whereby states are dependent upon self-help for their security and must therefore maintain and even expand their military capabilities, creating a spiral of arms-racing and hostility. The dilemma follows from the inability of the two sides to observe each other's intentions directly; hence if each party knew that the other was arming itself for defensive purposes, the potential spiral would be cut short. However, since states cannot know the intentions of others with certainty, their efforts to build up their own security can in the end lead to insecurity.

Posen continues to note that this security dilemma lies in situations where one or more disputing parties have incentives to resort to pre-emptive uses of force'. As ethnic differences begin to polarize a society, the formation of militant groups becomes more probable. Jarvis observes that incentives to pre-empt arise when offensive military technologies and strategies dominate more defensive postures and thus the side that attacks first reaps a military advantage²⁰. Posen carries this further by noting that the geography of an area also matters since

²⁰R. Jarvis 'Cooperation under the Security Dilemma', World Politics, Vol 30, No. 2, January 1978, pp 167-213

some kinds of terrains (such as mountainous areas) and settlement patterns (such as exclusive ethnic zones) are easier to defend than others²¹. An example of this is Afghanistan which is highly mountainous and has offered a safe hiding ground to groups involved in war against each other.

Intolerance of compromise and commitment to attaining "ethnic rights" by using violent force distinguish such groups. Young men and sometimes women of military age comprise their core membership, often designated by terms such as "soldiers" or "freedom fighters." Charismatic, even mythical figures lead them and maintain group cohesion through rigorous, military-style discipline and propaganda that reinforces xenophobic ethnic stereotypes. Examples of such groups include Peru's Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path), Palestine's Hamas and Islamic Jihad, Sri Lanka's Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), Northern Ireland's Irish Republican Army (IRA) and many others.

1.5.4 Ethnic outbidding

Political entrepreneurs-individuals who may not share the beliefs of extremists but who seek political office and power-may reflect the polarization of societies and, through their actions, propel this process further. Ethnicity often provides a key marker for self-aggrandizing politicians seeking to build constituencies for attaining or maintaining political power²². Politicians in the middle of the political spectrum or those who court ethnically heterogeneous constituencies are vulnerable, in turn, to political extremists seeking to draw electoral support from only a more ethnically homogeneous and possibly more militant

²¹ B.Posen *The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict*, in Brown, *Ethnic Conflict International Security*, 1996, pp 103-124

²² M. S. Stephen , "*Is Pandora's Box Half-Empty or Half-Full? The Limited Virulence of Secessionism and the Domestic Sources of Disintegration*," in Lake and Rothchild, *Ethnic Fears and Global Engagement*

constituency. When faced with the threat of such challenges, even centrist politicians can be driven to embrace a more "ethnic" position and defend communal interests more vigorously, a phenomenon often referred to as ethnic outbidding²³.

Political entrepreneurs can also reinforce processes of social polarization. Like activists, they can highlight and legitimate ethnic associations and affinities and raise the political saliency of ethnicity. In framing issues for the public, moreover, political entrepreneurs can exaggerate the hostility of others and magnify the likelihood of conflict—thereby distorting public debate and images of other groups and driving co-ethnics toward them for power and support. President Slobodan Milosevic's control over the media in Serbia, for instance, allowed him to present a one-sided view of Croat violence toward Croatian Serbs²⁴. In short, political entrepreneurs both reflect and stimulate ethnic fears for their own aggrandizement. Analytically, ethnic activists and political entrepreneurs are as much a product as a producer of ethnic fears and are dependent for their "success" upon the underlying strategic dilemmas. Nonetheless, they do play an important role in exacerbating ethnic tensions and propelling societies along the road to violence.

1.5.5 Political memories and myths

The polarization of society is also magnified by such "non-rational" factors as political memories and myths, on the one hand, and emotions, on the other. Political memories and myths can lead groups to form distorted images of others and see others as more hostile and aggressive than they really are. Such myths are often rooted in actual events. Yet, historical events can, over time, evolve into legends that justify the superiority of one group over another, stimulate desires

²³ J. Rothschild, *Ethnopolitics: A Conceptual Framework* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981); and Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*.

²⁴ Weingast, "Constructing Trust," p. 20.

for retribution, or sustain group hatreds. In Africa, following decolonization as well as in the contemporary period, political memories of past conflict have directly contributed to violent encounters, even instances of genocide²⁵. In Eastern Europe, political memories and myths have both defined the groups themselves and stimulated acute fears of mutual exploitation. The Croats and Serbs, formerly citizens within the same state and now enemies, have both used history and religion to support a view of the other as a tight ethnic bloc determined on a destructive course and therefore deserving of pitiless retaliation.

1.5.6 Victim mentality

Richardson Jr. and Sen further note that the 'Victim' mentality whereby the members and leaders of contending ethnic groups, whether they are presently discriminating against a subordinate group or the object of discrimination, often portray themselves as victims. They define a "victim" mentality as that which 'helps unite group members behind their leaders and justifies present sacrifices²⁶. Ross adds that 'If a group feels too humiliated, angry, or helpless to mourn the losses suffered in the trauma, he suggests that it then incorporates the emotional meaning of the traumatic event into its identity and passes on the emotional and symbolic meaning from generation to generation²⁷. It then follows that most ethnic leaders seek control of state power to ensure their group is never victimized again, to right past wrongs and to avenge past oppression'. An example of this is South Africa where white Afrikaners, who were

²⁵ R.Lemarchand and D. Martin, *Selective Genocide in Burundi*, No. 20 (London: Minority Rights Group, 1974).

²⁶C. Reed, and S.W.R. de A. Samarasinghe, *Economic Dimensions of Ethnic Conflict*. London: Pinter Publishers, 1991, Pp 44

²⁷ H. M. Ross *The Relevance of Culture for the Study of Political Psychology and Ethnic Conflict*: U.S.A: Black well Publishers 1997, pp 62

descended from Dutch and French settlers, viewed themselves as victims of British colonialism, even while using Apartheid laws to oppress black South Africans.

Moreover, members of a victimized group feel justified in victimizing others, being a victim in the past, real or imagined, thus does not ensure humane treatment of rival ethnic groups in the present. They view other ethnic groups as security threats and feel compelled to defend themselves but in so doing they threaten the security of the other ethnic groups. As Posen asserts in his own words, 'what one does to enhance one's security causes reactions that, in the end, can make one less secure.'²⁸ This situation leads to diminishing security of both groups which is referred to as a security dilemma.

1.5.7 Competition for resources

According to Russell and Milton²⁹, competition for resources typically lies at the heart of ethnic conflict. Property rights, jobs, scholarships, educational admissions, language rights, government contracts, and development allocations all confer benefits on individuals and groups. All such resources are scarce and, thus, object of competition and occasionally struggle between individuals and organized groups. Societies where ethnicity is an important basis for identity, group competition often forms along ethnic lines. Politics matter because the state controls access to scarce resources. Individuals and groups that possess political power can often gain privileged access to these goods, and thus increase their welfare. Because the state sets the terms of competition between groups, it becomes an object of group struggle. Accordingly, the pursuit

²⁸ B. Posen, *The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict*, in Brown, *Ethnic Conflict*, International Security, 1996. pp 104

²⁹ R. Hardin, *One for All: The Logic of Group Conflict* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995), pp. 34-37; and M. J. Esman, *Ethnic Politics* (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1994), p. 216

of particularistic objectives often becomes embodied in competing visions of just, legitimate, and appropriate political orders.

In multi-ethnic societies, resource rivalries and the struggle to control state policy produce competing communal interests. In Nigeria, for example, each ethno-regional group looks to the state to favor it when distributing public resources, producing, as Claude Ake observes, an "over politicization" of social life which gravely weakens the state itself.³⁰ In Yugoslavia, Slovenians and Croatians resented the system of federal redistribution to the poorer regions of the country; their publics backed their leaders' expressions of indignation, ultimately fueling the demand for greater political autonomy.³¹ When groups conclude that they can improve their welfare only at the expense of others, they become locked into competitions for scarce resources and state power.

1.5.8 Ethnic group identities

Kaufman argues that violence between ethnic groups is best understood not as a consequence of security dilemmas, informational asymmetries, commitment problems, or elite manipulation, but instead as a consequence of the content of ethnic groups' identities, which he calls "myth-symbol complexes." These complexes are basically mythologized narratives of an ethnic group's culture and history, which also contain depictions of certain target groups as victimizers or inferiors.³² Feelings of enmity are the result of such narratives, according to Kaufman, and violence is the result of such feelings.

³⁰ C.Ake, "Why Is Africa Not Developing?" *West Africa*, No. 3538 (June 17, 1985), p. 1213.

³¹ S. Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1995), pp. 69-70.

³² S. Kaufman, Correspondence; *Hate Narratives and Ethnic Conflict International Security*, Vol. 31, No. 4 (Spring 2007), pp. 50-51

Emotions may also cause individuals and groups to act in exaggerated or potentially "irrational" ways that magnify the chances of conflict. Many analysts point to a deep psychological-perhaps even physiological-need for humans to belong to a group³³. In the process of drawing distinctions, however, individuals often overstate the goodness of their own group while simultaneously vilifying others. Where such emotional biases exist, groups are likely to interpret the demands of others as outrageous, while seeing their own as moderate and reasonable; to view the other as inherently untrustworthy, while believing themselves to be reliable; to insist upon adequate safeguards against the possible defection of the other, but interpreting the efforts of others to impose similar restrictions on them as a sign of "bad faith"; to believe that the other is withholding information or deceptive, while they are being open and honest.

The emotional power of ethnic attachments is typically increased by the unifying effects of what are perceived to be external threats. People who have little in common with others may unite when they feel threatened by external enemies. Thus, the shared identity of the Hutu in Burundi emerged only recently with the Tutsi repressions of 1972³⁴. Similarly, in Chechnya, when very disparate interests felt threatened by Russian power, they overcame their differences and made common cause in the face of Russian intervention.

Social identity theory presumes that identities are produced through social comparisons, and that group value is assigned through such comparisons. Like realistic conflict theory, it incorporates the belief that resources are usually scarce and that people are motivated by

³³ Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*.

³⁴ W. Weinstein, "*Conflict and Confrontation in Central Africa: The Revolt in Burundi*," *Africa Today*, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Fall 1972), p. 27.

"rational" desires to promote their interests. And like the literature on social representations, it focuses on the ways that beliefs about identity groups are constructed through discourse and symbols³⁵.

In some poststructural studies of group conflict, the metaphors of representation play an important part in the psychology of violence. For instance, the popular representation of the "dehumanized other" as vermin or bestial suggests that a group does not deserve human rights. Similarly, there might be a drive to eradicate the "morally bankrupt others," lest they infest, defile, or pollute the healthy social body. This metaphor represents the in-group as organic, and the out-group as a source of impurity. Or, there is the specter of the "threatening others," who will perhaps undermine the economy if left unchecked, who will kill us if we don't kill them first. issues in our ,Monroe found this classification and categorization critical for understanding genocide during the Holocaust. In this underlying hypothesis is the view that popular representations of the out-group would reinforce the coherence and superiority of the in-group as well as justify violent means to gain or maintain domination³⁶.

Mack posited the existence of three essential human needs that can be fulfilled only through group membership: a need for belonging, a concern about survival, and a need for a sense of worth or value. Mack argued that during the 20th century the nation has been the entity that most often satisfies these demands. The need for belonging, reinforced by an unconscious

³⁵ M.H. Ross, *The role of evolution in ethnocentric conflict and its management*. Journal of Social Issues, 1991, 44, 167-185.

³⁶ H. Tajfel, And J. Turner, "An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict." In *The Social Psychology Of Intergroup Relations*. Edited by WG. Austin and S. Worchel. Monterey, 1979.

positive emotion associated with membership in a collective (i.e., the family, village, ethnic group, or nation), represents an emotional attachment by which an individual seeks inclusion not only for personal benefit, but also because the alternative of solitary existence is something to be avoided: "The experience of being outside, disconnected, ostracized, or rejected by one's peer, professional, or national group is so painfully desolating that groups can expect a remarkable degree of compliance among members who value their inclusion" . The nation and its tangible components represent one such form of group association by which individuals may fulfill this desire for involvement, affiliation, and inclusion. In addition to belonging, Mack contends that there is a need for personal survival, security, and safety, met most often through group participation. Individuals, as a result of early socialization, recognize their membership in various collectives and begin to draw distinctions between those within the group ("us") and those outside ("them"). Whether rational or not, individuals develop anxiety and latent fears about the intentions of "outsiders," leading them to embrace the collective (i.e., the racial, ethnic, or national group) as a protector from perceived threats.

The third need, achieving a sense of value and self-worth, stems from early childhood experiences of being loved and valued by others. The unending quest for internal pride and self-respect is dependent on group contact and association with a community: "Self-esteem is never permanently secured or immune from the self-doubt or self-disparagement which is occasioned by disappointment, withdrawal of love, loss and failure. The maintenance of positive self-esteem requires continuous external sustenance and reinforcement from valuing and approving others." This ego gratification may be satisfied when actions by groups, such as the nation, are captured and personalized by individuals. A national victory may result in intimate emotions of pride,

glory, honor, and heroism, whereas defeats may lead to personal dejection, helplessness, and depression³⁷.

1.5.9 Psycho cultural dramas

Psychocultural dramas are conflicts between groups over competing, and apparently irresolvable, claims that engage the central elements of each group's historical experience and identity and invoke suspicions and fears of the opponent. Psycho cultural dramas are polarizing events about non-negotiable cultural claims, threats, and/or rights that become important because of their connections to group narratives and core metaphors central to a group's identity. My development of the concept of psycho cultural drama builds on Victor Turner's concept of the social drama. The social dramas Turner analyzes are conflicts that are not ever fully resolved, but they are settled for a time when the conflict is redefined away from incompatible principles to the symbolic and ritual domain, where disputants can emphasize shared concerns and super ordinate goals. I suggest that the psycho cultural drama is an excellent tool for the analysis of identity in ethnic conflict and for understanding new possibilities for managing ethnic conflicts constructively. Psycho cultural dramas, such as the conflict over parades in Northern Ireland, are found in all long-term ethnic conflicts. By examining their development, escalation, and termination (but not necessarily successful resolution), we can better appreciate the central role of culture and identity in ethnic conflict³⁸.

³⁷ C.Wayne L. and R. W. Wendy Source: *Political Psychology*, Published by: International Society of Political Psychology, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Dec., 1999), pp. 875-896.

³⁸ H.R. Marc Source: *Political Psychology*, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Published by: International Society of Political Psychology ,Mar., 2001, pp. 157-178

1.5.10 Poverty

Ted Gurr and Monty Marshall³⁹ contend that most African conflicts are caused by the combination of poverty and weak states and institutions. African countries today face greater challenges to peace and stability than ever before. The countries of sub-Saharan Africa, including Sierra-Leone, Ivory Coast, Liberia and the Democratic Republic of Congo, are a volatile mix of insecurity, instability, corrupt political institutions and poverty. Collier and Hoeffler⁴⁰ and Fearon and Laitan⁴¹ both find that poorer countries face a great risk of ethnic conflict. In particular, Collier and Hoeffler find that civil conflicts are more likely in countries which are not dominated by one ethnic group and which have a larger stock of easily expropriated primary commodities. Thapa and Sijapati⁴² contend that the conflict in Nepal is due to poverty and underdevelopment of the country. The genesis of Maoist insurgency in February 1996 has been attributed to several factors, including poverty and underdevelopment of the area.

1.5.11 Conclusion

The issues in ethnic conflict discussed have therefore contribute to a large extent in political mobilization along ethnic lines. Collective fears of the future, Strategic intergroup dilemmas, Ethnic outbidding, Political memories and myths, Victim mentality, Competition for resources, Ethnic group identities, Psychocultural dramas and poverty are pertinent issues as far

³⁹ Ted Gurr and Monty Marshall, *Peace and Conflict*, 2001.

⁴⁰ Collier, Paul and A. Hoeffler, *Greed and Grievance in civil War*, *Oxford Economic Papers* (forthcoming), 2004

⁴¹ Fearon, James and D. Laitin, *Ethnicity, Insurgency and civil War*. *American Political Science Review*, 2003.

⁴² Thapa, Deepak, and B. Sijapati, *A Kingdom Under Siege: Nepal's Maoist Insurgency 1996-2003*. (Kathmandu: The Print House, 2004).

as political mobilization and ethnic conflict are concerned. As a result negative political competition ensues rendering multipartism dysfunctional as national cohesion and integration cannot be realized under such circumstances. More so, they have created social, political, and economic conditions that lead to formation of new and many political parties in order to meet the interests of the various groups.

1.6 Theoretical framework

These political scientists argue that the concept of ethnic war is misleading because it concludes that certain groups are doomed to fight each other when in fact the wars between them are the result of political decisions. Opposing groups may substitute ethnicity for the underlying factors to simplify identification of friend and foe. According to Richardson Jr. and Sen "ethnic conflict" is mostly a struggle between rival organizations seeking to maintain or gain control of state power⁴³. This argument brings to the fore light two main schools of thought that seek to explain ethnic conflict. One is the Primordial school which stresses the uniqueness and the overriding importance of ethnic identity. Geertz notes that ethnicity is a biological and fixed characteristic of individuals and communities⁴⁴. The primordialist account relies on a concept of kinship between members of an ethnic group. Horowitz 1985 argues that this kinship "makes it possible for ethnic groups to think in terms of family resemblances"⁴⁵. Indeed, proponents of primordialist accounts of ethnic conflict like Grosby, argue that "ethnic groups and nationalities

⁴³ M. John, Jr Richardson. and Shinjinee Sen.. *Ethnic Conflict and Economic Development: School of International Service, American University* 1996, pp 2

⁴⁴ C. Geertz, *The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments And Civil Politics In New states*", in (ed.), C. Geertz, *Old Societies and New states*. New York. 1963. pp 5

⁴⁵ D. Horowitz *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1985, p.57

exist because there are traditions of belief and action towards primordial objects such as biological features and especially territorial location⁴⁶.

The other is the Instrumentalist school which according to Smith 2001, seeks to explain that politicians or political leaders often use their cultural groups as sites of mass mobilization and as constituencies in their competition for power and resources, because they find them more effective than social classes⁴⁷. In the words of Cornell S. and Hartmann D. 1998, 'ethnic identification, ethnicity and race are viewed as instrumental identities, organized as means to particular ends'⁴⁸. Instrumentalists also argue that where poverty and deprivation are becoming endemic, mostly as a result of distributive injustice, ethnicity remains an effective means of survival and mobilization.⁴⁹ Whether ethnicity is a fixed perception or not is crucial in the instrumentalist accounts. Though Instrumentalists acknowledge that ethnic difference is a part of

⁴⁶ S. Grosby 'The verdict of history: The inexpungeable tie of primordiality – A response to Eller and Coughlan', *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 17(1), 1994. pp. 164-171, p. 168

⁴⁷ A. Smith *Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History*, Cambridge: Polity, 2001, pp. 54-55

⁴⁸ S. Cornell and D. Hartmann *Ethnicity and Race: Making Identities in a Changing World*, Oaks, CA: Pine Forge, 1998, p. 59

⁴⁹ S., Ursel, 'Conflict Between Different Nationalities: Chances for and Limits to Their Settlement' in A. Klinke, O. Renn & Jean-Paul Lehnert, eds, *Ethnic Conflicts and Civil Society*. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd Smith A. 2001 *Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History*, Cambridge: Polity, 1997, pp. 54-55

⁴⁹ S., Ursel, 'Conflict Between Different Nationalities and Race: Making Identities in a Changing World, Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge, 1998, p. 59: Chances for and Limits to Their Settlement' in A. Klinke, O. Renn & Jean-Paul Lehnert, eds, *Ethnic Conflicts and Civil Society*. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd 1997 pp 215

many conflicts and that a lot of belligerent human beings believe that they are fighting over such a difference, they however maintain that ethnic difference is not sufficient to explain conflicts⁵⁰. Evidently, most states have numerous ethnic, national, racial, linguistic or cultural groups and those ethnic groups who feel excluded and segregated may demand more rights and recognition that leads in many cases to ethnic conflicts. Various reasons for this have been provided by various scholars from either of the above mentioned schools of thought.

Theoretical approach is further informed by Ethnic Competition Theory. Scholars developed ethnic Competition theory to explain contemporary ethnic political mobilization and ethnic conflict. The theory is a reaction to the failure of modernization theory, which predicted that ethnic distinctions would disappear with industrialization. Ethnic competition theorists argue that modernization promotes competition along ethnic lines and that increased competition leads to ethnic political mobilization and conflict. Specifically, modernization, through processes of industrialization, urbanization, improved communication and transportation technologies, and rationalization of social institutions, breaks down structural barriers to competition along ethnic lines. Thus, ethnic competition is a function of occupational and residential desegregation, increased migration, increased contact, and economic downturns.

An important theory on conflict and conflict management is John Burton's⁵¹ human needs theory. This approach to ethnic conflict explains that ethnic groups fight because they are denied

⁵⁰ Smith, Dan, 'Trends and Causes of Armed Conflicts', in A. Austin, M. Fischer & N. Ropers, eds, *Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation*. Berlin: Berghof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management, 2003 pp 22

⁵¹ J. Burton, "*Violence Experienced: The Source Of Conflict Violence and Crime And Their Prevention*". New York. Manchester University Press, 1997.

not only their biological needs, but also psychological needs that relate to growth and development. These include peoples' need for identity, security, recognition, participation, and autonomy. This theory provides a plausible explanation of ethnic conflicts in Africa, where such needs are not easily met by undemocratic regimes.

The importance of this theory to ethnic conflict management in Africa is that it moves beyond theories that blame African conflicts on a primordial past. Instead, it points to ineffective institutions unable to satisfy the basic human needs of their citizens. Wherever such non-negotiable needs are not met, conflict is inevitable. Obviously, the problem of ethnicity in Africa largely depends on the level of state effectiveness, accountability, and transparency in handling the demands of diversity.

1.7 Hypotheses

1. Multiparty politics influence ethnic violence in Kenya
2. Multiparty politics do not influence ethnic violence in Kenya
3. There is no relationship between multiparty politics and ethnic violence in Kenya

1.8 Research methodology

Descriptive design was used as blueprint for collection, measurement, classification, analysis, comparison and interpretation of data .It answers the questions what, where, when, how much, by what means, the research has been conducted. The research design ensures the information collected is consistent with the objectives of the study and that the procedure regarding data collection was accurate and efficient.

The study sampled a representative number of the target population which was used to collect data, analyze data and then report the findings without manipulating any variables, and therefore the study fitted in the descriptive survey design. The study relied on primary and

secondary data. Secondary data was obtained from books, scholarly journals and internet sources. Primary data was obtained through face to face Questionnaires with open-ended as well as close-ended questions.

1.8.1 Study area

The study was carried out in Nairobi .This is because it is strategic for key institutions like Interim Independent Electoral Commission (I.I.E.C), National Cohesion and Integration Commission (N.C.I.C), Centre for Law and Research International (CLARION) and Centre for Governance and Development (CGD) a, Centre for Multi-party Democracy (CMD), Electoral Institute for the Sustainability of Democracy in Africa (EISA) and Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC).

1.8.2 Target population.

According to Mugenda and Mugenda⁵², a population refers to an entire group of individuals, events or objects having common observable characteristics. The population was people within Nairobi area who are eligible to vote. However, due to constraints of time ,resources and accuracy, the study was narrowed down to the employees of the following institutions which provided the required data, These included: Interim Independent Electoral Commission(I.I.E.C), National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC), Centre for Law and Research International (CLARION) and Centre for Governance and Development (CGD) ,Centre for Multi-party Democracy (CMD) , Electoral Institute for the Sustainability of Democracy in Africa (EISA) and Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC).

⁵²O. M. Mugenda & A. G.Mugenda, *Research Methods: Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches*. Nairobi, Acts Press, 2003

1.8.3 Sample and Sampling Techniques

According to Mugenda and Mugenda, a sample is a smaller group that has been procedurally selected from the population to represent it. A stratified simple random sampling design was used to select the respondents from five institutions. The researcher aimed at getting responses from approximately, according to Mugenda, 30% of the target population in the five institutions. To get the sample size for each Institution, the proportionate sample size was calculated as follows:

Proportionate stratified sample size from each Institution

CATEGORY	POPULATION SIZE	
A	27	8
B	37	11
C	33	10
D	20	6
E	17	5
TOTAL	134	40

$$A \ 27 \div 134 \times 40 = 8 \text{ employees}$$

$$B \ 37 \div 134 \times 40 = 11 \text{ employees}$$

$$C \ 33 \div 134 \times 40 = 10 \text{ employees}$$

$$D \ 20 \div 134 \times 40 = 6 \text{ employees}$$

$$E \ 17 \div 134 \times 40 = 5 \text{ employees}$$

Simple random sampling was used to select the respondents in each Institution.

1.8.4 Data Collection Instruments

The study used questionnaires to collect important data because they are recommended when the researcher wants to collect important information about the population. The researcher was mainly concerned with the views, opinion, and perceptions; feelings and attitudes of employees. Such information according to Kothari⁵³, can be best collected by use of questionnaire. It is also cheaper and free from bias of the interviewer. Respondents had adequate time to give well thought out answers. The questionnaires constituted both closed and open ended items. Despite some disadvantages of using such a questionnaire, Orodho and Kombo explain why the researcher should use these kinds of items. Open ended items permit a greater depth of response and may give an insight into a respondent's feelings, background, hidden motivation, interests and decisions. Open ended questionnaire can stimulate a respondent to think about his feelings or motives and to express what he considers to be most important. Closed ended questionnaires are easier to analyse since they are in an immediate usable form, they are easier to administer because each item is followed by alternative answers. They are also economical in terms of money and time. A letter of transmittal will be attached to every questionnaire ready to be delivered to the respondent.

⁵³ C. R. Kothari, *Research methodology: Methods and techniques*. New Delhi: Willey Eastern Ltd., 2004

1.8.5 Data Collection Procedures

The questionnaires were self administered. They were delivered to the respondents by the researcher through the heads of various sections. The researcher briefed the respondents on the modalities of administering the questionnaires and agreed on the most appropriate time when they would be collected.

1.8.6 Pilot Test

According to Mugenda and Mugenda, pilot testing is the trying out of the questionnaire in the field once it has been finalized. The pilot study sample was done within Nairobi area. This is because the pilot study sample is similar to the actual sample which the researcher used in the study. The procedures used in the pilot enabled the researcher to make meaningful observations. In addition, the pilot study was identical to those which were used in the actual data collection. Study test enabled the researcher analyze a few questionnaires to see if the methods of analysis were appropriate and if resources, time and money was adequate.

1.8.7 Data Analysis and Interpretation

Data collected from the research was coded and tabulated. Both quantitative and qualitative data was used for appropriate analysis respectively. This involved statistical tools such as frequencies, charts and percentages. The results were then presented using both descriptive and inferential modes.

1.9 Scope and limitations of the research.

The study focuses on the role of ethnic groups and political party activities in fanning election violence in Kenya. It also deals with 1992 and 2007 general elections. Due to time factor, the study focused on all the general elections in independent Kenya. Data collected was used to offer an overview of what takes place during elections. The study was related to the

branch of International Conflict Management. It highlighted on case studies in the world and Africa in order to reinforce arguments put forward. It examined theories and political factors that lead to ethnic conflicts in Africa and specifically in Kenya. Consequently, the study proposes ways in which Kenya can accommodate ethnicity in multiparty politics.

The proposed time frame used is approximately three months. At the same time due to time constraints and limited resources, reliance was made on secondary data from the Jstor journals, the internet and various libraries within Nairobi. Use of the Media and various newspaper report was also used with a view to capturing the recent updates on conflicts in the region. Out of the seven institutions selected for study, only five were taken into account. This is due to delay in getting permission for data collection.

1.10 Chapter outline

The study is organized into five different chapters that cover the various topics Chapter one consists of the Introduction and Background Information to the Research problem, objectives of the research, Justification of the Research problem, Literature Review, Theoretical Framework. Hypotheses, Methodology of the Research, Scope, Limitations of the Research and Chapter Outline.

The second chapter examines Kenya's multiparty politics historical development. It analysis political party evolvment during pre-colonial and post-colonial Kenya. The ethnic character of the parties is examined with a view to establish the beginning of ethnicity of political parties in Kenya.

The third chapter delves into an analysis of the role of political parties in instigating electoral Violence in Kenya. The Chapter analysis 1992 and 2007 general elections and the electoral violence that ensued.

Chapter four places focus on data analysis. It gives a critical analysis of the findings collected from primary and secondary data. Data analysis includes information received from questionnaires. Responses are analyzed in order to get authentic information on political parties and ethnic violence. Further, the research hypotheses is tested to find out whether it is supported by the research findings hence it is validated .

Finally, chapter five gives a general conclusion of the study findings and provide recommendations on some of the prospects and viable options for Kenya's multiparty politics and ethnic violence .It also gives possible areas of further study on this topic.

CHAPTER TWO

2.0 BACKGROUND TO MULTI-PARTY POLITICS IN KENYA

2.1 Introduction

Political parties have been defined in various ways. But the myriad definitions reflect more the various perspectives and areas of emphasis informed by one's disciplinary background than a fundamental difference in meaning. Consensus exists on two key definitional issues: those political parties are formally organized and that they aim at capturing or gaining control of the government. Therefore, the key elements of political parties are captured in the following definition: Political parties are associations formally organized with the explicit and declared purpose of acquiring and or maintaining legal control, either singly or in coalition with other similar associations, over the personnel and the policy of the government of an actual or prospective state.⁵⁴

Political parties emerge when the activities of a political system reach a degree of complexity that requires the development of new and wider political formations. In other words, political parties become necessary when a society becomes inverse, classes become conscious of their interests, and large numbers of citizens demand the right to participate in political affairs. The emergence of political parties can be traced back to eighteenth-century England. Following the 1688 revolution which established parliamentary rule, the English middle classes captured political and economic power. They then began to organize themselves into groupings led by prominent members of their class in order to control the state and promote their ideological aims.

⁵⁴ E.,Dowse, , Robert and J. A. Hughes, *Political Sociology*. John Wiley & Sons, 1972.

The rise of political parties in Kenya can best be understood in the wider context of the reaction by Kenyans to colonial rule. From a very early stage of colonial experience, Kenyans organized themselves in different forms to count their economic and political exclusion and fight for their rights. To begin with, these forms of political mobilization were not political parties. At first, they took traditional forms. Later, trade unions grew up that focused mainly on trying to protect and extend the rights of African wage-earners. However, these unions also provided an opportunity for the first generation of anti-colonialist leaders to share ideas on wider issues and gain experience of grassroots mobilization. The first indigenous political groupings were organised along ethnic lines but did not restrict themselves to ethnic issues. For example, the Young Kikuyu Association, formed by Harry Thuku in 1921, addressed a broad range of grievances shared by all indigenous Kenyans. At this point, most grievances were still closely related to labour issues, for example forced labour, high taxation, and the introduction of mandatory “native” identification cards (known as the kipande). Other ethnic-based organizations formed at around the same time included the Young Kavirondo Association in Nyanza and the Central Association in Murang’a.

2.1.1 Pre-independence multiparty politics.

Three constitutional conferences held in London in 1960, 1962, and 1963 preceded Kenya’s Independence in December 1963. The debates within these conferences and consequential events provide evidence of how ethnic groups coalesced into rival parties with different institutional preferences. At the first conference in January 1960, a United front of political elites presented a case for independence from Britain and negotiated a new constitutional framework that would allow for greater African representation in colonial

legislative Institutions. They also received a commitment to eventual African Self-government based on parliamentary institutions on the West minister model⁵⁵.

However, on returning home, the United front that had forged to fight racial domination collapsed .Two rival parties with distinct ethnic compositions emerged. The two were Kenya African National Union and Kenya African Democratic Union in anticipation of independence. Ethnicity replaced race as the primary political cleavage. Each party developed its vision of what would constitute legitimate citizenship in independent Kenya and what political institutions would fulfill each party's vision.

The Kenya African National Union (KANU) drew the bulk of its leadership, membership and support from the Kikuyu and Luo, the two largest ethnic groups in Kenya. It was launched in March 1960 at Kiambu in the kikuyu heartland. It was a reincarnation of the Kenya African Union (KAU) which in turn was a nationalist Mutation of Kikuyu Central Association (KCA).KANU also subsumed Luo-led organizations such as the Kenya Federation of labour (KFL) and Kenya Independence Movement .This fusion of multiethnic and labour organizations made KANU a nationalist and anti colonial party . Nevertheless, because of its composition ,the party was representative of Kikuyu and Luo ethnic interests and of the urban working and middle class. It also established a link between the Kikuyu and Luo urban populations especially in Nairobi and their rural brethren⁵⁶. For these ethnic groups in KANU, the post colonial state and a majoritarian electoral system would present new opportunities for advancement.

⁵⁵ Okumu, John J. "The Problem of Tribalism in Kenya." In *Race and Ethnicity in Africa*, ed. Pierre L. van den Berghe. Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1975.

⁵⁶ Bennett, George, and C. G. Rosberg, *The Kenyatta Election: Kenya 1960-1961*. London: Oxford University Press , 1961.

However, this was never to be, ethnic and interest group calculations had led the so called minority tribes to withhold their support from KANU. Settlers too were fearful about the security of their land if such a united party came under Kikuyu-Luo leadership hence exhorted the minority group to keep off from KANU. The minority tribes were made to believe that they could only secure their rights under Majimbo (Regional) type of constitution and with a party of their own hence 'divide and rule' and KADU was formed as a counterpoise to KANU. Therefore, KADU represented minority ethnic groups joined by the fear of domination by an exclusive Kikuyu-Luo post Independence government. Examples of parties that formed KADU include; Kalenjin Political Alliance (KPA) which was formed in April 1960, in Kapkalet, by combining a number of organizations in the Rift Valley region under the leadership of Daniel Arap Moi ⁵⁷. In June 1960, the KPA merged with Masai United Front (MUF), the Coast African Political Union (CAPU), Kenya African People's Party (KAPP) and Somalia National Association (SNA) to form KADU⁵⁸

The prospect of Kikuyu-Luo dominance was real, since the two groups were larger, more politically conscious, and better organized than the KADU groups and presumably would sweep the polls. The expectation of a census-type vote was fulfilled in the February 1961 elections. Of the 33 open seats, KANU won 19 with 67.4% of the vote, while KADU won 11 seats with a paltry 16.4% of the vote. These proportions roughly approximated the population distribution of the ethnic groups backing each party. For example, the Kikuyu, Luo, Embu, Meru, Kamba, and Kisii supporting KANU made up about 60% of the population, underscoring what Bennett and

⁵⁷ Ibid 2

⁵⁸ Odinga, Oginga. Not Yet Uhuru. New York: Hill and Wang, 1967.

Rosberg call the phenomenon of the "one-party tribe." Similarly, this "pull of the tribe" ⁵⁹ was evident in the urban areas, where the proportion of "KANU tribes" reflected the KANU vote. Indeed, in the areas where either party's "tribes" commanded a majority, the opposition candidates were soundly defeated, if they bothered to run at all. For example, in Machakos the winning KANU candidate polled 21,000 votes, beating five other KANU candidates, who polled 19,000, 15,000, 7,000, 1,700, and 400 votes, respectively; the sole KADU candidate received 380 votes. Polls in the KADU stronghold in the Rift Valley mirrored the situation. In Narok and Kajiado districts (Maasai land), KADU candidates sailed through unopposed; in Kipsigis the KADU candidate pulled in 56,000 votes against fewer than 200 garnered by two KANU candidates⁶⁰. The ethnic coalitions and rural-urban divide that emerged in 1961 elections were replayed in the independence elections of May 1963. A similar cleavage and vote pattern reappeared in the transition election of December 1992⁶¹ which underscores the durability of polarization in Kenya.

2.1.2 Party politics after independence.

Following the Lancaster agreement of 1962, elections were held under the new constitution in May 1963. KANU won an overwhelming majority in these "independence elections," taking 66 seats against KADU's 31 in the lower house and 19 seats against KADU's 16 in the Senate. In the regional assemblies, KANU showed similar strength, gaining 158 seats against KADU's 51. The regional and ethnic spread remained similar to that of the 1961

⁵⁹ Jones, N. S. Carey, *The Anatomy of Uhuru*. New York: Praeger, 1967.

⁶⁰ Bennett, George, and Carl G. Rosberg, *The Kenyatta Election: Kenya 1960-1961*. London: Oxford University Press, 1961.

⁶¹ Barkan, Joel D., "Kenya: Lessons from a Flawed Election." *Journal of Democracy* 4(July): 1993, 85-99.

elections, with each party predominating in its "tribal areas." When the two parties returned to London in September 1963 to finalize the independence constitution, KANU demanded amendments to the 1962 agreement to reduce regional powers, the special protections for minorities, and the constraints imposed on constitutional change. KADU, having suffered an electoral setback (and the defection of the Abaluhya and Kamba leaders), insisted on retaining the 1962 agreement as the frame-work for the final constitution. Again, KADU threatened the integrity of the new state if protections already attained were withdrawn. For example, it would force a partition of Kenya into two different states to avoid domination by the larger ethnic groups⁶²

KANU was impatient with the unwieldy structures that curtailed majority power and was unwilling to invest the money to make the system work or to accommodate "parochial" minority demands that got in the way of nation-building⁶³. Within the first year of independence, KANU undermined the regional governments by withholding funds, passing legislation to circumvent regional powers, and forcing major changes to the constitution by threatening and preparing to hold a referendum if the Senate-in which KADU could block the proposals-did not accede to the changes. Outnumbered, outmaneuvered, and with no prospects for enforcing the compromise constitution or, given the reality of census-type voting, for overtaking KANU at the subsequent polls, KADU willingly dissolved and joined KANU to form a single-party state in 1964⁶⁴.

⁶² Brown, Brack, *A Guide to the Constitutional Development of Kenya*. Nairobi: Government Printer, 1970.

⁶³ Odinga, Oginga, *Not Yet Uhuru*. New York: Hill and Wang, 1967.

⁶⁴ Oyugi, Walter, O. (*ed.*) "Uneasy Alliance: Party State Relations in Kenya", 1994. in Oyugi, W.O. (*ed.*) *Politics and Administration in East Africa* (Nairobi: East African Educational Publishers).

KANU, then under a Kikuyu-Luo alliance (which soon became a Kikuyu hegemony), had installed its vision of liberal citizenship and established the nation rather than the ethnic group as the preeminent political community⁶⁵.

But the unity was not to last long; for in 1966 an open split in KANU between the 'moderates' and the 'radicals' over the control of the party and government, led to the removal of the radicals from the party and government and the formation of Kenya Peoples Union (KPU) by Oginga Odinga. The by-elections held in 27 constituencies in that year revealed two influences in the electoral process. Firstly, the regime was determined to portray the opposition as a Luo tribal formation by ensuring its defeat in non-Luo constituencies through electoral malpractices⁶⁶. Secondly finding themselves on the defensive, the Luo became victims of ethnic ideology by perceiving the contest as one between them and their adversaries in KANU.

Three years of sustained marginalization and isolation of the Luo led to increased tension between KPU and the KANU regime, which later exploded into violence during Kenyatta's visit to Kisumu in December 1969. Following the incident, KPU leaders were arrested and detained and the party banned. Kenya once again became a *de facto* one party state. It was to remain so until 1982 when the *de facto* situation was given legal basis through a constitutional amendment. Therefore, between 1969-1991, the five general elections held during the period (1969, 1974, 1979, 1983, 1988) were 'KANU-only' elections.⁶⁷

⁶⁵ Citizenship and Ethnicity: An Examination of Two Transition Moments in Kenyan Politics Author(s): Stephen N. Ndegwa Source: The American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 3 (Sep., 1997), pp. 599-616 Published by: American Political Science Association Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2952077> . Accessed: 14/02/2011 04:04

⁶⁶ Mueller, Susan, "Government and Opposition in Kenya" *Journal of Modern African Studies* Vol. 22 No. (1984), 3 pp. 399-427.

⁶⁷ Gertzel Cherry, *Politics of Independent Kenya*, Nairobi: East African Publishing House, (1970).

The threat posed earlier by an ethnically based party (KPU) was to lead the KANU regime to resort to a strategy of denial and exclusion. The ruling party introduced a mechanism through which all aspiring candidates were subjected to a clearance process. And all cleared candidates had to pledge loyalty to the (state) president (who incidentally was also the party president), the government, and the ruling party — KANU — as a condition for nomination. The strong-arm tactics employed by the regime thus destroyed the prospect for the formation of a viable opposition; and the ruling party encountered no organized opposition throughout the 1969-91 period. In the circumstances no presidential contest was possible. The leader of the sole party was always assured of automatic nomination, and since intra-party challenge for that office was also inconceivable then, the president was always 're-elected' unopposed. The multiparty movement of 1990-92 should be seen against this background. Up to the late 80s, any serious challenge to the authority of the regime was a sure way of earning a term in detention or frequent hara.

2.1.3 Re-emergence of multi-party politics in Kenya in 1992.

Fear was by and large institutionalized. Many Kenyans would pick up courage only from the late 80s. The collapse of the Soviet empire had much to do with the new development. The enunciation of *glasnost* and *perestroika* by Gorbachev, and their application in the Soviet Union from 1986, the extension of the same to Soviet Eastern Europe, and the eventual collapse of the Soviet empire at once led to a global attack on centralism and authoritarianism of the left and right. African authoritarian regimes (military or one party) became natural targets of the West. The USA, the Scandinavian countries, Germany, the World Bank and the IMF especially led the way. But even reluctant world powers like France and Britain were forced to also apply pressure later when the movement gained momentum from within individual African states.

In 1980s political elites and ordinary citizens dissatisfied with single party system started the push for the introduction of multiparty democracy. Street demonstrations and public gatherings called by political elites to rally support for end of single party system were violently terminated by police. After years of a protracted bloody campaign for multipartism accompanied by external pressure from western powers and their donor agencies ,president Daniel Arap Moi was finally forced to soften his stand and authorize the repeal of section 2A of the constitution to allow formation of opposition political parties.

The repeal coincided with 1992 elections .The first party to be registered was Forum for Restoration of Democracy (FORD) and thereafter it mutated into other parties due to leadership wrangles over who was to contest for presidency using the party ticket. But the opposition unity that had influenced the change was not to last. With the country's constitution amended to allow for the restoration of multiparty politics, FORD was registered as a political party. At once personal and ethnic considerations began to influence the decisions and actions in the party. A month or so later, two new parties were launched both with an ethnic agenda. By the time of the 1992 elections up to eleven parties had been formed — none of which could claim to be. At once the political elite began to calculate their fortunes within the movement, wondering if indeed staying in it would serve their own interests individually and collectively. The structure of leadership of FORD became a subject of great interest and concern. Of the six interim leaders, only Odinga, Muliro and Shikuku were well known nationally .The rest were not.

Meanwhile , as one would expect, the first group to develop a sense of concern and denial were the Kikuyu. Their concern was based on the fear that the Luo and the Luhya in the interim leadership of FORD might take advantage of the situation to dig themselves in, thereby preempting the leadership contest when the party was registered and party elections called.

Hence the manoeuvre by some powerful former GEMA functionaries who felt their interest could not be well served in the existing leadership structure of FORD. It is these people who had earlier on prevailed on Mwai Kibaki (then Minister of Health) to resign from the government to lead an alternative party. Hence within a few weeks of the formation and registration of FORD, the Democratic Party of Kenya was launched with Mwai Kibaki as its interim chairman. Though the DP party leadership composition reached beyond Kikuyu membership and included Kamba, Kissi, and Masai,⁶⁸ many of its vocal members were previously high-ranking members of GEMA, such as former GEMA leader Njenga Karume and the architect of the “Change-the-Constitution” movement, Dixon Kihika, who became a sitting DP MP.⁶⁹ The defection of John Keen back to KANU in 1996, which he justified by referring to the advice of Masai elders and the importance of a united Masai front within KANU, resulted in a narrowing of the Democratic Party’s scope.⁷⁰ Between 1993 and 1997 divisions between Kibaki and the representatives of Kamba DP MPs, namely Agnes Ndeti (Kamba) and Charity Ngilu (Kamba) became visible. Also, smaller communities such as the Meru, represented by MP Benjamin Ndubai, complained about being sidelined by Kibaki’s Kikuyu entourage.⁷¹ The summary of factionalism inside the DP between 1991 and 1997 .The DP became increasingly mono-ethnic, particularly after the defection of Ndeti to KANU in 1996 and Ngilu’s takeover of the SDP in 1997. The electoral performance of the Democratic Party reflects the changes in its leadership composition over time. Like its fellow opposition parties, the DP was increasingly unable to field

⁶⁸ *Daily Nation*, July 6, 1993

⁶⁹ *Daily Nation*, May 29, 1993.

⁷⁰ For Keen’s justification of his defection see *Daily Nation*, February 3, 1995

⁷¹ *Daily Nation*, August 31, 1997.

parliamentary candidates nationwide and consequently focused on its stronghold, the richer Kikuyu areas in Central Province and the Kikuyu diaspora in the Rift Valley. The party clearly profited from the meltdown of FORD-A, through which it managed to contain its losses elsewhere. Despite a decrease in its overall vote share (30% in 1992, 22% in 1997), the DP could increase its share of seats, while maintaining a similar party nationalization score.

There were others who also felt they should not be left behind; for within the same month, the Makau, MP for Mbooni in Kamba land, quit KANU to form the Social Democratic Party. At the time, Makau was a fairly popular MP and might have hoped to use his popularity and his new party to mobilise support from his Kamba people. Launched in the same month also was the Islamic Party of Kenya which at once gave the Muslim fundamentalists especially in Mombasa, an organizational framework for letting out their hitherto suppressed political passions.

The final split in FORD came within two months of Matiba's return to Kenya. His return had been organised by the Kikuyu elites in FORD to give him maximum publicity. And it was hoped that the occasion would be used as a launching pad for Matiba's leadership challenge. The other factions in FORD would have nothing to do with the arrangements and Odinga for example chose to be out of Nairobi on the material day. The party split into two factions and were later registered as Ford-Kenya and Ford-Asili under Odinga's and Matiba's chairmanship, respectively. The split marked the end of the only movement since pre-independence that had succeeded in bringing most of the Kenyan masses into an enthusiastic political collaboration.

Ford Asili initially, posed a greater challenge to the Moi regime than its FORD-K counterpart. Its presidential candidate and party leader, Kenneth Matiba, not only symbolized the struggle against Moi's autocracy but also came a close second in the presidential race. The

party's leadership composition conforms to the way the Kenyan media portrayed FORD-A: a party representing first and foremost Kikuyu and Luhya interests and in particular the interests of the "common man" among the two communities (Troup and Hornsby 1998:136). Some Kenyan commentators even referred to it as a "ghetto party"⁷². Yet instead of taking on KANU and President Moi, Matiba continuously boycotted parliamentary debates, much to the disadvantage of his party, which lacked clear leadership throughout the 1993 to 1997 period. In October 1994 Matiba single-handedly closed down FORD-A's party headquarters and removed all documents and files without explaining his actions⁷³. His 1996 shadow cabinet did not include any sitting FORD-A MPs⁷⁴. His consistent failure to hold party elections further damaged the image of FORD-A, as did the fact that he did not attend the meetings of the FORD-A National Executive Council⁷⁵. This at times led to his temporary and later permanent suspension from the party. Although the party at times suffered from Kikuyu- Luhya rivalry,⁷⁶ the main line of division clearly ran between Matiba and the rest.⁷⁷ A general lack of confidence in FORD-A as well as Matiba's decision not to stand again as FORD-A's presidential candidate explain the party's devastating 1997 election results. Central Province, Western Province, and Nairobi had been the strongholds of the party in 1992, both in terms of its capacity to field candidates and its electoral performance. By 1997 the party no longer commanded any political leverage and, with the

⁷² *Daily Nation*, June 5, 1993.

⁷³ *Daily Nation*, October 21, 1994.

⁷⁴ *Daily Nation*, May 3, 1996.

⁷⁵ *Daily Nation*, June 6, 1997.

⁷⁶ *Daily Nation*, July 26, 1993.

⁷⁷ *Daily Nation*, August 11, 1993;

exception of Western and Nairobi, was largely unable to present a feasible democratic alternative.

Since its split from the original Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD), FORD Kenya has experienced a constant decline, transforming from a major opposition force in 1992 to a comparatively small mono-ethnic party by late 1997. Starting out as the larger part of FORD, it initially accommodated Luo, Kikuyu, Luhya, Meru, and Somali members within its leadership⁷⁸. Soon, however, FORD-K followed in the footsteps of FORD. In September 1993 Paul Muite and Gitobu Imanyara left FORD-K; they accused Odinga of having kidnapped the party and of running it like a Luo kingdom. Muite's public support for Kikuyu unity and his constant appeals to fellow Kikuyu leaders to unite politically illustrate the ethnic undertones that accompanied the FORD-K split⁷⁹. With the Kikuyu wing of the party gone and the takeover of the party leadership by Kijana Wamalwa (Luhya) after Odinga Oginga's death, FORDK leadership was increasingly drawn from Nyanza and Western Province⁸⁰. By 1997, the only politically significant Ford was confined to Wamalwa's Ford Kenya in particular areas of Western Province. Following Odinga Odinga's death in 1994, Ford-K's chairmanship was taken over by Wamalwa but he faced competition for leadership of the party from Oginga's son and presumed political heir, Raila Odinga. Wamalwa's faction claimed that there was no right to a dynasty leadership of the party and that Raila, a former political detainee, was too violent and radical to stand as a leader for the Luhya -Luo compact in Ford-K. Thus, Wamalwa's argument ran, Raila would repel rather attract ethnic groups from other regions on the grand march to the state house, namely the gathering up

⁷⁸ *Daily Nation*, May 22, 1992.

⁷⁹ *Daily Nation*, May 9, 1994.

⁸⁰ *Daily Nation*, March 21, 1994.

other tribal groupings on the road to government⁸¹. After failing in his strenuous efforts, since early 1995, to become the leader of Ford-K, Raila renovated a minor party, the National Development Party (NDP), as the vehicle for Luo political representation at the onset of the 1997 election. NDP was formed and registered in 1994 under the chairmanship of Omondi Oludhe, a businessman. Oludhe later stepped down in May 1997 in favour of Raira Odinga. NDP's support rested on the conviction that both the Kenyatta and the Moi governments had marginalized Luo Nyanza from the mainstream of politics and Economic development in Kenya. As such, only a cohesive Luo political force would be able to compensate for the past marginalization through "redistribution in arrears". Thus, the NDP became a base for Luo politicians in Luo Nyanza and Luo diaspora. In 1997, general election the party earned Raila 60 % of the popular vote in Nyanza. After, the 1997 general elections Raila engaged NDP with KANU and president Moi. This was for the purpose of the Luo advantage and the development of Luo Nyanza.

Meanwhile, Ford-K lost most of its younger generation of politicians after 1992. Some of them who include Paul Muite founded a NGO, Mwangaza Trust, whose purpose was to develop opposition constituencies that the KANU government had vowed not to assist unless their MPs defected to the ruling party. The Trust took on board radical politicians and non-political luminaries such as Richard Leakey. However, in 1995 it was deregistered on the grounds that it had subversive and political intentions. Consequently, Safina, (the Kiswahili for the biblical Noah's Ark) emerged under Paul Muite out of the banned Mwangaza Trust. Two thirds of its members were Kikuyu by origin.

⁸¹Walter O. Oyugi, *Ethnicity In The Electoral Process: The 1992 General Elections In Kenya*, *Afr.j. polit. sci.* (1997), Vol. 2 No. 1, 41-69

As Moi turned to Safina as next target, in 1997 factionalism became very apparent within KANU. The result was KANU A and KANU B. KANU A consisted of those who pushed ethno-regional political representation like Simon Nyachae, who had long sought to make Kisii a durable KANU district and one succeed Moi as president, William Ntimama, openly anti-Kikuyu advocate majimboism for Kenya and the late Kipkalia Kones, a kipsigis kalenjin. KANU B comprised president Moi's cronies who included Nicholas Biwott, members of his family and State House officials, acting as gatekeepers to the president and doubling up as influential political operatives. It also included those who had lost 1992 parliamentary seats or did not possess a sound regional political base like Joseph Kamotho and George Saitoti. In January 1997, the president appeared to settle divisions within KANU in favor of the B team by demoting Nyachae in cabinet rank, by elevating Biwott to the cabinet, and by reaffirming Saitoti as vice-president⁸²

2.1.4 Formation of NARC and the victory of opposition.

In the face of ongoing cooperation, and later the merger, between KANU and the NDP, the opposition followed suit. With no major changes amongst the opposition parties regarding their makeup, two lost elections in which all parties failed to overcome the logic of ethnic arithmetic, and a potentially rejuvenated New KANU on the horizon, Kibaki, Ngilu, and Wamalwa formed the National Alliance for Change (NAC) in January 2002. In August of the same year the NAC transformed itself into the National Alliance Party for Kenya (NAK), which shortly afterwards nominated Kibaki as its presidential candidate. With the emergence of the Liberal Democratic Party, NAK further transformed itself into the National Alliance Rainbow Coalition (Ndegwa 2003). Thus, for the first time, Kenya's opposition managed to challenge

⁸² M. Cowen & L. Laakso, *Multi-party Elections in Africa*, James Currey Ltd., 2002, pg 152-154.

KANU in all constituencies. Further, by bringing together Kibaki's Kikuyus, Ngilu's Kambas, Wamalwa's and Musalia's Luhyas, and Odinga's Luos, it managed to beat New KANU using the same means Moi had so successfully employed for over a decade. Despite its very high PNS, one should note that NARC was probably the prototype of a multi-ethnic alliance party: It always saw itself as an alliance of individual parties, each of which continued to remain in existence. Its candidates agreed to contest the election on a NARC ticket, yet its member parties did not dissolve⁸³. Throughout the 2002 campaign all NARC leaders on various occasions spelled out the purpose of the alliance: to remove KANU from power. Its quick disintegration after the 2002 election further confirms the view of NARC as an alliance party. Its performance illustrates the party's strongholds: It did well in those regions where its various leaders hailed from. NARC's impressive performance in the Rift Valley is the result of many Kalenjin leaders' defection from Moi and their belief that a political reorientation was necessary.

Since multi-partyism was introduced in Kenya at the end of 1991 in time for the 1992 elections, the opposition had lacked winning coalition combinations, until 2002. In 2002, the opposition formed NARC with Mwai Kibaki as the party's presidential election candidate. Raila Odinga, among other key supporters was one of Kibaki's biggest champions. The success of NARC post-2002 elections rested on Kibaki's promise to honor a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed by himself and other members of the coalition. The MOU stipulated a power sharing deal and constitutional reform agenda to be pursued after their victory. After winning the elections, Kibaki did not honor the agreement and this failure within

⁸³ Kadima, Denis / Owuor, Felix (2006): *The National Rainbow Coalition*, in: Kadima, Denis (ed.), *The Politics of Party Coalitions in Africa*. South Africa: Konrad Adenauer Foundation, pp. 179-221.

the party became the impetus for the formation of the new parties at the 2007 presidential elections.

Therefore, in 2002, there was a change in political alignment .The ruling political party, the Kenya African National Union (KANU), that had ruled the country since independence, collapsed. A new political party comprised of an alliance that had formed between all of the major Kenyan tribes. The political stakeholder was named the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC). The election Victory was a landslide. Mwai Kibaki of the NARC won 62% of the vote on a platform of fighting corruption, forming a coalition government that shared power amongst the various tribes, and changing the constitution within a 100 days of being elected to limit the executive power that had ballooned over the previous four decades ⁸⁴ People across Kenya from all tribes felt hope that the country's government was finally on the verge of a system of governance that would have accountability through shared power. The disintegration of the NARC party and the broken promise of a shared government and new constitution left many citizens tasting what could have and frustrated over what should have resulted from the new government coming to power in 2002.This frustration fueled the violence that took place after the election in 2007. With the failure of the NARC party, many many who were left out of power from the failed power sharing MOU in 2002 formed the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM). The ODM was largely comprised of a tribal alliance between the Kalenjin, Luhyas and Luos. Kibaki and the Kikuyu in power formed the party of National Unity (PNU). In addition to this Kibaki refused to perform the necessary constitutional amendments that would see the creation of a position for a prime minister and also refused to distribute positions of power equally

⁸⁴ M.Mutua, (2008). *Kenya's quest for democracy: taming the leviathan*. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

amongst the coalition members party to the MoU. This did well to encourage the animosity between the leaders because NARC had been formed with the agreement that the constitution would be amended to create a position for a Prime Minister, which would be occupied by Odinga. Kibaki's refusal, therefore, to see this agreement through created a level of distrust between the two leaders that was reminiscent of Kenyatta's era of Kikuyu domination by utilizing state apparatus to retain power. Thus, the struggles of Kikuyu domination through *Gema* during Kenyatta's regime and Kalenjin domination through *Kamatusa* expressed themselves through the rivalry that had developed between Kibaki and Odinga. As a result of this fall-out, NARC broke up into Raila Odinga's Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and Kibaki's National Alliance of Kenya (NAK). This division brought about the creation of the ODM which represented the "no" vote at the constitutional referendum held in 2005. The government backed constitution was amended by NAK for approval at the referendum but fell short of the electorates expectations and lost the vote 58.3 per cent to 41.7 per cent. This boosted the ODM's confidence as it proved that the people had no confidence in Kibaki's government any longer. This success made the ODM party sure of a presidential victory in the then upcoming 2007 presidential elections. More division occurred within the ODM when Kalonzo Musyoka broke away from the party and formed ODM-Kenya. Uhuru Kenyatta, also left the ODM and joined the PNU, which was now a coalition that included Uhuru Kenyatta's KANU and Kibaki's NAK.

Contrary to Kibaki's election promises, no immediate constitutional changes were on the horizon. In response, Raila's LDP announced in September 2004 that it would contest the 2007 election outside the NARC coalition⁸⁵. What led to further instability within the NARC were the

⁸⁵ Kadima, Denis / O., Felix: *The National Rainbow Coalition*, in: K., Denis (ed.), *the Politics of Party Coalitions in Africa*. South Africa: Konrad Adenauer Foundation, pp. 179-221 ,(2006).

increasingly tense relations between FORD-K and the LDP. After Wamalwa's death in September 2003, Kibaki appointed Moodi Awori, another Luhya, as his new Vice-President. This provoked tension between FORD-K and the LDP as Awori was not only a Luhya but also a leading LDP figure.⁸⁶ With FORD-K MP Musikari Kombo emerging as the new FORD-K leader, an intense political fight developed between the two parties over the Luhya vote and political domination in Western Province.⁸⁷ On various occasions the new FORD-K leader denounced Awori and LDP Luhya minister Mudavadi as traitors of the Luhya. Other prominent FORD-K MPs such as Soita Shitanda and Bonny Khalwale explicitly warned LDP leaders not to enter Western Province as it was "owned" by FORD-K.⁸⁸

2.1.5 Re-alignment of political parties after 2005 Referendum.

In the months preceding and following the 2005 constitutional referendum, Kenya's political parties, both in government and in the opposition, underwent alterations. For the purpose of the referendum, the LDP faction of NARC teamed up with parts of KANU and formed the "no" camp together with Ngilu's National Party of Kenya (formerly SDP). This side campaigned under the banner of an orange and opposed Kibaki's constitutional bill, which contained a strong executive presidency. The DP, FORD-K, FORD-P, and the many smaller parties which had originally made up NAK came together in the "yes" camp, campaigning under the banner of a banana.

Following a humiliating defeat in the referendum, Kibaki called for a government of national unity and appointed prominent members of KANU and FORD-P into government, now

⁸⁶ *Daily Nation*, December 7, 2003.

⁸⁷ *Daily Nation*, October 19, 2003.

⁸⁸ *The East African Standard*, December 21, 2004. Party recruitment drives for new members in Western Province more often than not caused violence between LDP and FORD-K supporters.

known under the label of NARC-Kenya. His post-2005 cabinet again contained many former DP figures associated with GEMA and Jomo Kenyatta's post-independence political elite; its overall composition clearly showed a strong bias for Central Province and the Kikuyu.⁸⁹ Shortly before the 2007 elections Kibaki decided to contest them under yet another label, the Party of National Unity, an umbrella organization of all the political parties campaigning for his re-election. Once more Raila Odinga became the leader of the country's opposition, now known under the label of Orange Democratic Movement-Kenya (ODM-K). Neither NARC-K nor ODM-K proved to be particularly stable in the run-up to the 2007 elections. For once it was not clear on which side FORD-K would eventually end up. Party leader Kombo (Luhya) allegedly worked towards a FORD-K-LDP alliance in order to boost the party's chances in Western Province. His inner-party rival Kitui (Luhya), who had stood against him in the party leadership contest after Wamalwa's death, advocated the opposite and favored the backing of Kibaki.⁹⁰ In late December, FORD-K finally fell apart when 12 of its MPs declared the formation of a new party, New FORD-K. Additionally, although KANU had been allocated a ministry in the cabinet, it remained officially inside the Orange Democratic Movement-Kenya. It was at times unclear whether KANU as a party was in opposition or in government; the Kalenjin wing of the party advocated the former, and the Kenyatta (Kikuyu) wing promoted the latter. On the opposition side, ODM-K split over the question of who would be Kibaki's challenger in the 2007 elections. The personal rivalry between Raila Odinga (Luo) and Kalonzo Musyoka (Kamba) proved too much for the party to withstand. On August 14, 2007, the Raila camp broke away and formed the

⁸⁹ Great Lakes Centre for Strategic Studies (2006:1-4).

⁹⁰ *East African Standard*, August 21, 2006.

Orange Democratic Movement (ODM).⁹¹ Of the two groups, the ODM included a far greater number of the country's leading Kibaki opponents including former foreign minister Mudavadi (Luhya) and former Moi ally William Ruto (Kalenjin).

2.2 Conclusion: Parties and Party Systems in Kenya

This study has proven that all of Kenya's politically significant parties represent Horowitz's coalitions of convenience or commitment. Accordingly, all significant political parties in Kenya between 1992 and 2007 represent ethnic parties. Though the country's dominant ethnic cleavages were at times overcome, these periods proved to be short-lived and tactically motivated. As a result, the return of multiparty democracy in Kenya has exacerbated the country's dominant ethnic cleavages, in particular the division between the Kikuyu and the Luo people. In addition, ethnicity has consistently proven to provide a stronger rallying ground for political activity than party structures. This is true of both opposition and government: The disintegration of KANU, once out of power, and NARC, once in power, illustrate this. The case of NARC is especially interesting for the study of African politics as the literature on neopatrimonialism assumes that governments provide stability by creating clientelistic networks of power. The immediate downfall of NARC, however, proves that ethnicity is the stronger of the two forces: access to state resources was not a sufficient condition to overcome the centrifugal powers of ethnicity.

The widely covered incidents of post-electoral violence in Kenya in 2007 and 2008 are further outcomes of the type of political party which is omnipresent in the country. Post-electoral violence with heavy ethnic undertones also occurred in the post-election environments of 1992

⁹¹ *Daily Nation*, August 14, 2007.

and 1997. Thus, the peaceful and much heralded 2002 election represented an exception and not a turning point, as some have argued, in Kenyan electoral history ⁹². The fact that the 2002 election was won by an alliance which (though only temporarily) bridged all the country's past and present cleavages suggests a causal relationship between electoral violence and the type of party in place. Again, this has consequences for the study of African politics as a whole: While for Kenya the 2007 election represents a step back in terms of political stability and electoral conduct, it also raises the question of the feasibility of peaceful elections in multi-ethnic countries in which ethnicity dominates party politics.

⁹² Mutahi, Patrick: *Political Violence in the Elections*, in: Herve Maupeu et al. (ed.), *The Moi Succession*. Nairobi: Transafrica Press, (2005).

CHAPTER THREE.

3.0 Political parties and ethnic violence.

3.1 Introduction.

The chapter delves into analysis of the role of political parties in instigating electoral violence in Kenya. The chapter analysis 1992 and 2007 general elections and the electoral violence that ensued.

3.1.1 1992 General elections.

According to Lake mann⁹³ elections in a democracy are justified on the principle that "the rulers whom the people are expected to obey should not only rule in their interests, but also rule according to their wishes; and that the rulers should be accepted by the ruled — this acceptance being no mere acquiescence but conscious choice ..." Thus, it has become increasingly accepted, he continues, that the governed should elect their rulers, and that they should have the power to renew at intervals the authority they give to such rulers. In the 'developing' ethnically plural societies of which Kenya is one, the situation is however different. Elections in such societies are seen as an opportunity to compete for control of the state, precisely because of the discriminative use to which the state is usually put by the group that happens to control it. Larry Diamond observes that in "ethnically divided societies... elections... become not only the vehicle for protecting the general process of capitalist accumulation but also for promoting accumulation by one cultural section of the dominant class in competition with others. Thus, they become a major expression of ethnic conflict"⁹⁴ His further contention is that because manipulation of mass ethnic feelings is often the surest instrument of electoral success, democratic participation (in elections) serves to fan ethnic conflict at the mass level as well. The ethnic conflict in the Rift

⁹³ Lake mann E. *How Democracies Vote: A study of Electoral Systems* (London: Faber and Faber), (1974)

⁹⁴ Diamond, L. *Class, Ethnicity and Democracy in Nigeria* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press), (1986)

Valley during the 1992 elections in Kenya as well as the many clashes in the urban constituencies such as Langata in Nairobi and several others elsewhere like Mombasa and Nakuru, are good examples. To be specific, during the 1992 elections, the Kalenjin (the ethnic group of President Moi) believed that the capture of the state by the opposition would at once mean the loss of economic privilege which they had enjoyed for over a decade. Similarly, every major ethnic actor believed that their party's victory would end their relative deprivation. These perceptions were functionally conflictual. Indeed, what Wolpe and Melson said of the Nigerian experience is equally true of Kenya, namely that competition for material goods and hence for control of the state which governs access to them accelerates the ethnicization of society.⁹⁵

The 1992 multiparty elections in Kenya were a living manifestation of these fears. Indeed, never before had ethnic considerations so directly influenced the electoral process. It was the first time in the country's history that the post of president was openly contested and by implication, the first time the electorate were given a chance to determine who and consequently which group would control State House, together with the benefits that go with it; for after the creation in 1964 of the institution of executive presidency under a one party system (initially *de facto*, and later *de jure*), the president of the ruling party (Kenya African National Union — KANU) always received automatic nomination for the position of State President and was formally pronounced elected at the nomination stage in all the subsequent elections (1969, 1974, 1979, 1983 and 1988). As such general elections had no bearing on who would control state power and patronage.

The 1992 contest was perceived differently by key ethnic actors. For the incumbent ruling coalition — the Kalenjin and their kinsmen in the Rift Valley, it involved the defense of

⁹⁵ Joseph, Richard A. *Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), (1987)

the existing structure of privilege, on the one hand, and the possibility of deprivation, on the other. For the former rulers — the Kikuyu — it presented an opportunity for politico-economic 'resurrection'. For the others (the Luo and the Luhya especially), 1992 was their turn "to eat also". The Luhya elites were quick to remind the nation of their tribe's numerical strength (the second largest group after the Kikuyu since 1969) and therefore their right to vie for the highest political office in the land. The Luo who have never hidden their 'legitimate' claim to leadership once the Kikuyu whom they regard as their equal adversary had had their chance, expected the opposition alliance to support their bid this time without any challenge. At the same time, the possibility of controlling State House which the 1992 elections presented to the various communities acted as a disincentive to rational behaviour. Intra-elite contest within the opposition movement soon assumed ethnic dimensions as each ethnic group increasingly coalesced around one of their own. Contrary to the wishes of ordinary opposition supporters, reaching a consensus about one opposition candidate to challenge the incumbent president became increasingly remote with the passage of time. None was ultimately agreed upon.

3.1.2 1992 elections and ethnic conflict

The 1992 general elections were marred by election violence which died off after the announcement of election results. The violence began during a period of liberalization and aimed to strengthen the position of KANU as it entered a newly opened electoral arena. The torching of homes and the killing of villagers in selected areas of Kenya began a month before the promised legalization of multiparty politics in December 1991 and coincided with a series of government-orchestrated rallies that threatened opposition supporters with violence. The opposition was ethnicized as Kikuyu, no doubt because the leading and most threatening candidates, such as the current President Mwai Kibaki (elected in December 2002), were Kikuyu. This violence

appeared deliberately aimed at discrediting the opposition, which was accused of perpetrating the violence. Indeed, Moi had been warning that multiparty politics in Kenya would bring tribal warfare, and the "ethnic clashes" seemed to fulfill the president's dire predictions. The violence caught the opposition off guard and destabilized key areas of support. Indeed, as the violence persisted up to the first multiparty elections in 1992, key voters became internally displaced and hence disenfranchised; some areas were effectively "emergency zones" sealed off from anyone except the government.

In Kenya large-scale violence by special forces was also part of a wider bargaining strategy of positioning and derailment. At the beginning in 1991, violence labeled "ethnic clashes" by the government claimed the lives of thousands and displaced over a half a million. High-level actors in Moi's government, including Minister Nicholas Biwott, recruited individuals from the military and the administrative police to perpetrate these "ethnic clashes."⁹⁶ The KANU government ministers hired violence specialists to form the core of militias which in turn recruited youths from localities where the "ethnic clashes" took place. As one witness told a government commission in a story that would be repeated over and over again, "politicians had incited people to fight," and "they transported warriors to the area and paid them for each person killed."⁹⁷ In many areas where KANU support was potentially threatened by multiethnic populations constituting a swing vote, KANU hawks organized ethnically exclusive late night meetings with

⁹⁶ Republic of Kenya, Report of the Parliamentary Select Committee to Investigate Ethnic Clashes in Western and Other Parts of Kenya (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1992); Republic of Kenya, Report of the Judicial Commission Appointed to Inquire into the Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1999); Kenya Human Rights Commission, *Kayas of Deprivation, Kayas of Blood* (Nairobi: KHRC, 1997); Kenya Human Rights Commission, *Killing the Vote: State Sponsored Violence and Flawed Elections in Kenya* (Nairobi: KHRC, 1998); Kenya Human Rights Commission, *Kayas Revisited: A Post-Election Balance Sheet* (Nairobi: KHRC, 1998).

⁹⁷ Republic of Kenya, Report of the Parliamentary Select Committee to Investigate Ethnic Clashes, p. 51.

militia leaders, local administrators, and ordinary citizens to plot who would be targeted and when. Even under these conditions, it still took some time for the initial violence to become ethnicized. Indeed, in some cases, people worked together as a community to repulse "invaders," but once random angry victims attacked innocent people from the Kalenjin, "Moi's group," these initial interethnic coalitions fell apart.⁹⁸

3.1.3 Land and ethnic conflict in 1992.

In Kenya political competition overlay long-standing disputes between agriculturalists who were buying land, often illicitly, and pastoralist Maasai who needed large tracts of land for grazing. In Narok North constituency, When new parties emerged in 1992, the incumbent ole Ntimama, a hardliner in the KANU government and a large scale farmer himself who was responsible for encouraging land sales, chose to use this real source of tension. His main opponents, Lempaka and Tiampata, were Maasai, but they both worked actively to build alliances with local Kikuyu who were largely agriculturalists. Hence, Ntimama presented himself as the champion of the pastoralist Maasai and used this simmering land problem to his advantage. As Ntimama campaigned, he persistently defined the small-scale Kikuyu farming community in Narok as alien troublemakers responsible for the deprivation of Maasai rights and deliberately played on real land insecurity by arguing that, if the Kikuyu-led opposition party came to power, all Maasai land would be grabbed. The new party competition deliberately overlaid with simmering land problems generated violence in the constituency.

On June 10, 1992, the National Elections Monitoring Unit, a domestic elections watchdog organization, observed that "trouble started after alleged Maasai warriors ganged up and vowed not to let any Kikuyu register as voters." Three people were killed and ten buildings were razed

⁹⁸ Interviews with participants in Molo and Enoosupukia, two badly hit areas, November 2000.

to the ground.⁹⁹ On the day of the election another three Kikuyu were killed by a group of Maasai as they were going to vote. It is not at all clear that Ntimama orchestrated this violence directly, as he did with the ethnic clashes in the area. However, by cleverly ethnicizing competition for land Ntimama helped raise the stakes of the election and give its outcome a particular local meaning. A KANU win meant preserving land in the hands of Maasai; a loss, more land alienation. This ethnicization, in turn, helped provoke and justify uncoordinated violence on the ground. Finally, the fear of retribution by those locals involved in violence, as well as Ntimama's new reputation as a "strong leader," helped create a cohesive local constituency around him. The ability to "deliver Maasai votes" increased Ntimama's bargaining strength to such an extent that he eventually found his way into the new Kenyan government and until recently served as a minister in the office of the president.

3.1.4 State and 1992 ethnic violence.

The advent of political liberalization also saw state-sanctioned ethnic cleansing that killed about 1,500 Kenyans and chased up to 300,000 into internal exile.¹⁰⁰ The cleansing peaked in 1991-1994 and then continued in fits and starts largely, but not exclusively, in the Rift Valley. It sought to remove Kenyans who were not Kalenjin-and hence not "indigenous"- from that region, which is home to the president and his core Kalenjin ethnic coalition.¹⁰¹ The cleansing not only

⁹⁹ National Elections Monitoring Unit, *The Multi-Party General Elections in Kenya* (Nairobi: NEMU, 1993), p. 128.

¹⁰⁰ Human Rights Watch/Africa, *Divide and Rule: State-Sponsored Ethnic Violence in Kenya* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1993). The poor official and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) response to the plight of the refugees is analyzed in Human Rights Watch/Africa, *Failing the Internally Displaced: The UNDP Displaced Persons Program in Kenya* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1997).

¹⁰¹ Mutahi Ngunyi, "Resuscitating the Majimbo Project: The Politics of Deconstructing the Unitary State in Kenya," in Adebayo O. Olukoshi and Liisa Laakso, eds., *Challenges to the Nation-State in Africa* (Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1996), pp. 183-212.

removed presumed anti-Moi and anti-KANU voters from the region but also made their land available for others to occupy. The locus of responsibility for these attacks remains unclear but may be national, local, or both.¹⁰² The timing of the attacks suggests an electoral calculation, but the planning intimates official involvement, perhaps by KANU hardliners wanting to create a political climate of fear. The attacks against the upcountry people, however, mirrored a local desire to rid the region of a wealthier, better educated, and often more powerful population that is thought to retard local opportunity and advancement. Meanwhile, the violence, and the inability or unwillingness of the regime to stop it, revived fears that top KANU politicians had employed private armies and thugs.

Up to around April 1992, there was very little hope of KANU ever returning to power. But with the return of Matiba from London in May and the subsequent split in FORD in July, some life seems to have returned to KANU. By then KANU had been abandoned by the GEMA (Kikuyu, Embu, Meru) communities, the Luo, the Luhya, Kisii, Coastal people, the Somali and to a large extent the Kamba. By the middle of 1992, therefore, KANU was essentially a Kalenjin-Masaai, Turkana, Samburu (KAMATUSA) party. The KAMATUSA coalition, expecting at the time to be humiliated at the polls, they got together and decided that those ethnic groups that had 'betrayed' them should be taught a lesson. The lesson in question involved their expulsion from especially "Kalenjin-Masaailands" in the Rift Valley. Apart from this being a good lesson for betrayal, it would also rid the Rift Valley of anti-KANU, anti-Moi voters. The series of meetings held by the Rift Valley politicians during 1991 were intended to achieve those

¹⁰² The publication from African Rights, "Violence at the Coast: The Human Consequences of Kenya's Crumbling Political Institutions,"

objectives by mobilizing the Kalenjin and their political allies against other communities living in the Rift Valley. At a meeting held in Kapsabet in Nandi district, the notion of multi-partyism was condemned and FORD was portrayed as an anti-Moi and anti-Kalenjin movement¹⁰³ At the said meeting, two Kalenjin ministers reportedly began their speeches by claiming that the Kikuyu represented the main opposition to Moi. Successive speakers threatened that if *majimboism* were introduced, all the Kikuyu who had settled in the Rift Valley would have to pack and leave. Others asked all government critics in Kalenjin areas to move back to their "motherland". Besides the GEMA, these threats were aimed especially at the Luo, Luhya and Kisii. At subsequent meetings¹⁰⁴, the need for Kalenjin unity in the face of opposition threat was stressed Earlier on ¹⁰⁵at a meeting attended by Kalenjin MPs and other politicians the need to protect the Moi presidency and the Kalenjin land was emphasized. The Minister of State in the Office of the President, Kipkalya Kones, for example, called for the appointment of more Kalenjin staff in the Ministry of Lands in order to save their land from being grabbed by 'outsiders' and also warned that the Kalenjin would fight to the last man to protect Moi's government. The call for political pluralism was thus perceived by the Kalenjin leaders as a call for the end of the Kalenjin leadership.

The results of the presidential and parliamentary contests are explained in terms of how they were affected by ethnic loyalties. For the four major presidential candidates (Moi, Matiba, Kibaki and Odinga), the results of the presidential contest show a strong correlation between a candidate's ethnic origin and the number of votes obtained in his ethnic region and in other

¹⁰³ (*Weekly Review* 13.9.91 : 6).

¹⁰⁴ (*Weekly Review* 27.9.91 : 5).

¹⁰⁵ (*Nation* 9.9.91)

regions. In every case, a candidate's ethnic affiliation secured him overwhelming support from his own group. In assessing the degree of ethnic support, the coverage has been restricted to rural districts usually predominantly inhabited by a single dominant ethnic group. A number of districts so inhabited constitute in our analysis the 'heartland' of a given group. In Kalenjin heartland, comprising Kericho, Bomct. Nandi. Elgeyo-Marakwet and Baringo districts, Moi obtained 96 percent or 794,806 of the 829,367 votes cast. This represented 41.2 percent of the total votes he received throughout the country. In the Kikuyu heartland, which consists of the Central Province districts of Kiambu, Murang'a, Nyeri, Kirinyaga and Nyandarua, the votes were shared between Matiba and Kibaki who together received 95 percent of the votes cast there, representing about 40.2 percent of the votes the two together received countrywide. And in the Luo heartland - Siaya, Kisumu, Migori and Homa-Bay districts - Odinga received 549,464 or 95 percent of the 577,946 votes cast, representing 58.2 percent of the total votes he received nationwide. What emerges from these figures is that the Kalenjin, the Kikuyu and the Luo voted mainly on ethnic lines. In the process, the parties to which their ethnic candidates belonged were exposed as ethnic parties. Consequently, such candidates performed poorly in one another's territory as the following data indicate: Moi: received about 0.4 percent of the votes cast in Luo heartland and 0.2 percent in Kikuyu heartland. Odinga: received 1.1 percent in Kalenjin heartland and 1 percent in Kikuyu heartland. Matiba and Kibaki: together received 1.35 percent in Kalenjin heartland and 0.8 in Luo heartland.

3.1.5 Conclusion

In conclusion, the politics of the 1992 general elections in Kenya, demonstrates that ethnicity continues to be a major force influencing the behaviour of politicians and voters alike. What is more, where power and wealth were at stake, ethnic relations became conflictual. The

1992 elections involved the choice of power holder(s) and in the process, the determination of the structure of access to state patronage — the major source of wealth in Kenya. The ethnic conflicts in various parts of the country during the elections should be viewed in this light. The elections also manifested how the elites can mobilize ethnic passions to defend and or promote what is otherwise their narrow sectional interests. The masses followed their leaders because of the lingering belief that only 'one of your own' can best serve communal interest if placed in a position of power. But it was also clear that ethnic ideology has its limitations. Intra-ethnic divisions were manifest where parochial interests came into play. The emergence of splinter parties led by members of the same ethnic group was the inevitable consequence of such contradictions. Ethnic solidarity nevertheless still remained a major factor influencing both presidential and parliamentary elections. The ethnic groups that were regarded as being in opposition remained loyal to their ethnic leaders just as those perceived to be in the ruling party did.

3.2 ANALYSIS OF 2007 GENERAL ELECTIONS.

3.2.1 Introduction.

This was the fourth multiparty general election in Kenya yet it was heavily marred with violence. The post election violence was of great magnitude. 1, 500 died, 3000 innocent women raped and 300,000 people were internally displaced. The severity of this conflict unfolded in a span of 59 days between Election Day December 27th, 2007 to February 28th, 2008 when a political compromise was reached¹⁰⁶

J. Himes ¹⁰⁷ contends that social conflict “refers to purposeful struggles between collective actors who use social power to defeat or remove opponents and to gain status, power resources and other scarce values”. This can be related to ethnic mobilization strategies whose collective actors include the various ethnic groups coming together to violently oppose their rivals in a bid to obtain their desired outcome. This definition embraces a number of new aspects in terms of conflict. These, according to Anstey ¹⁰⁸ include: Purposeful behaviour involving planning as to how to attain scarce values and overcome resistance; Taking place in a social structure which qualifies the situation in various ways; Involving the use of power to neutralize or remove obstructing groups or resistance; Collective action of a strategic nature designed to reduce resistance by an opponent who is led to understand that relief from pressure can be achieved only by concessions or capitulation; The acquisition of scarce resources and values. These characteristics were evident in the Kenyan scene with one group demanding that the right to the presidency belonged to the candidate of their choice, while the government that ‘won’ the

¹⁰⁶ Maupeu, H. .Revisiting post-election violence. Lafargue, J. (Ed. (2008).). *The general elections in Kenya, 2007*. (pp. 187-223). Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota Publishers, Ltd.

¹⁰⁷ Himes, J, S. *Conflict and Conflict Management*. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1980.

¹⁰⁸ Anstey, Mark, *Managing Change: Negotiating Conflict*. Port Elizabeth: Juta, 2004.

election put bans on the press and freedom of association for the political party that wanted to hold rallies.

Kriesberg¹⁰⁹ further argues that, “conflict is related to competition, but the two are not identical”. Competition is usually towards a similar goal, whereas conflict involves needs, desires and goals that are specific to the parties involved. This is what elections generally entail in the sense that, in the Kenyan experience the ODM demanded the presidency as did the PNU but far from that, each party wanted to form a government that rewarded those that had been loyal to them throughout the internal dissent that wrecked the former NARC party. This, therefore, demonstrated the involvement of needs, desires and goals specific to each party. Pruitt and Rubin’s perspective on conflict parallels that of Kriesberg. It claims that, “conflict means perceived divergence of interest or a belief that the parties’ current aspirations cannot be achieved simultaneously”. The common ground lies in the fact that the parties involved have strong beliefs in whatever they are fighting about. In Kenya’s case, ethnic mobilization was used to rally the ethnic groups supporting the ODM against the ethnic groups supporting the PNU, despite the fact that the main bone of contention as the election outcome, each group demonstrated a lack of tolerance for fear that their aspirations would not be achieved simultaneously. This only prolonged the conflict which eventually ended with a power sharing government. This argument will be taken up further in the following chapters as this is primarily a theoretical overview of the themes prevalent in this study.

In a post-colonial context democracy and its need to thrive on elections as a conflict management strategy, but in Kenya in December 2007. The elections were used as an opportunity to defile democracy with the use of ethnic mobilization by the country’s leaders as

¹⁰⁹ Kriesberg, Louis, *Social Conflicts: Second Edition*. New York: Prentice-Hall Publishers, 1982.

its strategy to win the most votes. Njeri Kabeberi-Kanene ¹¹⁰ stated that, “the power of the ballot is the most peaceful and powerful expression of a people in a democracy and over time it strengthens a country’s democratic pillars”. Following the disruption of lives that occurred after the elections and the inability of leaders to ease the tensions in the country, according to Alphanyo Otieno ¹¹¹, it became clear that, “from the polls, we now know that democracy is not a panacea”. Despite this view, the change to multi-party politics, the successful toppling of the KANU regime to the brokering of a power sharing deal, are all changes that were conducted via the poll.

In 2007, Kenya’s standing as the most peaceful and stable East African country was tarnished by the events of the conflict following the announcement of the presidential election results. The violence emphasized just how fragile the country’s national fabric was and exposed the reality of the great disparities between the haves and the have-nots. This is because - as discussed in chapter three - of the ethnic divisions that had existed among the people since independence and had been exploited by the political leaders of the time such as Kenyatta consolidating the domination of Kikuyu wealth and success by the use of the state apparatus, and by Moi doing the same for his fellow ethnic communities. These ethnic divisions had done little to consolidate a truly Kenyan national fabric and only established a group of wealthy elites in powerful government positions versus poorer Kenyans. The foundation of the country’s democracy had therefore failed to unite the people, and was now becoming obvious at the contestation of the December 2007 General Election through the conflict that emerged.

¹¹⁰ *The Standard* (2008: 13)

¹¹¹ *Daily Nation* (2008: 10)

In 2002, there was a change in political alignment .The ruling political party,the Kenya African National Union (KANU) ,that had ruled the country since independence, collapsed. A new political party comprised of an alliance that had formed between all of the major Kenyan tribes. The political stakeholder was named the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC). The election Victory was a landslide. Mwai Kibaki of the NARC won 62% oof the vote on a platform of fighting corruption, forming a coalition government that shared power amongst the various tribes,and changing the constitution within a 100 days of being elected to limit the executive power that had ballooned over the previous four decades ¹¹² People across Kenya from all tribes felt hope that the country's government was finally on the verge of a system of governance that would have accountability through shared power.

However, within weeks of election, the memorandum of understanding (MOU) that forged the tribal factions into the NARC alliance and that got Kibaki elected had collapsed. The agreement in the MOU to share power within the cabinet did not occur, as four key positions that were to be created, including that of the Prime Minister position, did not materialize¹¹³. Kibaki broke his election promise and filled many appointed positions with fellow tribesmen, thus following the footsteps of his presidential predecessors. This led to discrimination of many people of other tribes.

The disintegration of the NARC party and the broken promise of a shared government and new constitution left many citizens tasting what could have and frustrated over what should have resulted from the new government coming to power in 2002.This frustration fueled the

¹¹² Mutua, M. *Kenya's quest for democracy: taming the leviathan*. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers. (2008).

¹¹³ Mutua, M. *Kenya's quest for democracy: taming the leviathan*. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, (2008).

violence that took place after the election in 2007. With the failure of the NARC party, many many who were left out of power from the failed power sharing MOU in 2002 formed the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM). The ODM was largely comprised of a tribal alliance between the Kalenjin, Luhyas and Luos. Kibaki and the Kikuyu in power formed the party of National Unity (PNU).

Therefore the main stakeholders in the 2007 general election conflict include political parties such as Party of National Unity (PNU), Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) and tribes such as Kikuyu, Luo, Kalenjin. Others include; Land squatters and owners, the Youth and Public opinion. The main tribes involved in the 2007 post-election violence were the Kikuyus, Luos and Kalenjins. The Luhyas were part of the ODM. However not much is written about their involvement. As Mutua puts it: The reality on the ground is that most African political parties are not communities of political ideology or philosophy; rather they are vehicles of ethnic nativism¹¹⁴. This statement holds true in Kenya.

After the December 30th 2007, ECK announcement was made that Kibaki was reelected and he was then sworn in within 35 minutes. After this announcement, the ODM protested. The peak of the conflict was reported to be January 3, 2008 with ODM-PNU confrontations evolving into tribal violence that left thousands of people dead and hundreds of thousands of people displaced¹¹⁵.

¹¹⁴ Mutua, M. (2008). *Kenya's quest for democracy: taming the leviathan*. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

¹¹⁵ Lafargue, J. and M. Katumanga, Post-election violence and precarious pacification (2008). Lafargue, J. (Ed.). *The general elections in Kenya*, Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota Publishers, Ltd. 2007. (pp. 13-34).

3.2.2 The rigging of the presidential elections

Complaints and suspicions of rigging by the PNU from the opposition (the ODM) began circulating the day before the results were finally announced. Soon thereafter, there was confirmation of irregularities in the tallying process from the ECK themselves and a host of international observers. The ODM and the PNU on more than one occasion had brought forth commissioners and returning officers who had testified to the accusations of rigging, the inflating of tally totals and the inappropriate completion and tampering of forms 16 and 16A3. These forms were legally binding pieces of documentation that were supposed to be an authentic representation of the votes counted at the particular voting station. It was therefore clear that the election results had been tampered with and hence invalidating the entire election process that was supposed to bring a positive change to the country.

Different stakeholders took various positions. According to the PNU, it had won the 2007 elections legally and should not have to share power. ODM on the other hand had had it that the 2007 elections were rigged by PNU. Having been marginalized under Kenyatta and Moi government, they were not ready to take chances. The result was post election violence that snowballed to other historical issues such as land. The Kikuyus were evicted from their homes hence were displaced and their property destroyed. The Kalenjins on the other hand had felt marginalized and vulnerable as the Kibaki government wanted to evict them from the Mau forest. As such they were out to evict Kikuyus from the Rift valley hence the violence. On February 28, 2009 a power sharing deal brokered by Kofi Annan between Kibaki (PNU) and Odinga (ODM) was signed.

3.2.3 Security crisis

The day before ECK Chair announced the final results, violent protests had already begun to rock the western parts of the country as an angry electorate demanded an end to the delay in

making the announcement. The delayed announcement of the presidential election results declaring Kibaki the winner were followed by riots that broke out in various parts of the country. Perceived Kibaki supporters of the Kikuyu tribe were the main targets of disgruntled ODM supporters mostly from the Luo tribe. Hardly 48 hours into the announcement Kenya seemed to be on the edge of a civil war.

3.2.4 Poor leadership

Bukusi points out that, “the role of politicians in the country’s leadership process needs to be managed for it to remain beneficial to the nation”. Had this been the case in the Kenyan experience, this study argues that the conflict would not have escalated to the level that it did. One of the most important qualities of a leader that was discussed in chapter two is that of servitude. It was argued by Ruscio¹¹⁶ that a high sense of moral integrity is an important characteristic of a leader and requires an affinity for service through sympathy, impartiality and tolerance in order to responsibly serve others. This study therefore, argues that Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga who were the main reason that their respective supporters resorted to violence in an attempt to ‘fight’ for the right of their candidate to win the elections, were not sympathetic, impartial or tolerant of each other and the nation.

This idea of politicians being able to quell the unnecessary violence and human displacement is shared by Joel Ng’ug’i, an assistant professor of law at the University of Washington, Seattle, who wrote in the *Daily Nation* that, “Kenyan politicians and leaders seem dangerously unwilling or unable to show genuine and effective leadership in ending the ethnic strife”. This is a clear indication that the participation of political leaders in the conflict in order to end the senseless killings and displacement of innocent Kenyans is a feasible point of view.

¹¹⁶ Ruscio, Kenneth, P. *The Leadership Dilemma in Modern Democracy*. Massachusetts: Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc., 2004.

This also implies the underlying motive of political leaders to use ethnic mobilization to carry on the conflict by not stepping in to put a stop to it. The lack of involvement by political leaders to end the ethnic strife can be viewed as a tool to encourage the mobilization perhaps to achieve personal agendas. Again, with reference to Madison (1987: 343) who viewed a leader as a wise person with the virtue to pursue the common good of the society, the Kenyan political leadership at the time of the election violence displayed a lack of the desire to pursue the common good of the society by allowing the rigged elections to escalate latent ethnic tensions that had existed since independence.

Abdulahi Ahmednasir a lawyer and former Law Society of Kenya Chairman, argued in *The Standard* that, “the intransigence shown by PNU [Party of National Unity] and ODM [Orange Democratic Movement] is a reflection of the absence of enlightened leadership”. The refusal of the leaders to be co-operative with each other at an earlier stage in the crisis ultimately catalyzed the violence that ensued. The leaders should have found a way of mobilizing the public into acting for change in a positive way in order to meet the desirable goals of peace and fair elections for the good of the society, instead, evidence of ethnic mobilization to prolong the conflict can be found.

3.2.5 Ethnic mobilization and conflict

The ensuing conflict of the December 2007 General Elections was the result of political leadership utilizing ethnic mobilization to pursue self-aggrandizement and a win at the polls. The concepts of ethnic mobilization and conflict will be discussed to reveal the stance from which this idea is approached.

During their campaign, the ODM made promises in the Rift valley and Coast provinces that if they won, they would introduce self-governing, semi-autonomous states in these two regions.

The Kalenjin and other ethnic groups in the area who shared an anti-Kikuyu sentiment were pleased to hear this. However, the ODM did not give the details of just how this process would be carried out. This therefore illustrates the playing-on of old ethnic tensions by political leaders to mobilize the masses in order to gain more votes. The ODM leadership used Kenyatta regime and Moi regime tensions, created by *Gema* and *Kamatusa* communities, to try and convince the electorate that they deserved to take back any 'tribal' privileges that had been denied to them by either of the preceding administrations. Ethnic mobilisation was also carried out by incitement which played a role in the escalation of the violence. In the Rift Valley, politicians and traditional elders had been stirring up the old anti-Kikuyu sentiments, from the Kenyatta regime, far a while before the elections. Their discriminatory messages blamed the Kikuyu tribe for the problems in the region. This kind of indoctrination was played out in vernacular radio stations. The notorious Kikuyu crime sect, *mungiki*, according to the Crisis Group Africa Report (2008: 13-15) was also responsible for some of the violence. It is important to note that it was not only *mungiki*, the Luo and the Kalenjin who perpetuated the violence in the country. Ethnic animosity managed to creep in and contaminate all sectors of the society. Some reports even suggested that *mungiki* was not popular at all amongst some middle-class Kikuyu and some Kikuyu parliamentarians within the PNU establishment who would ordinarily have been thought to support the sect. A conflict that seems to have had its roots in independence-era ethnic rivalry, was used by politicians such as the ODM leadership during their campaign for the 2007 presidential elections. The ODM promised to turn agriculturally rich districts such as the Rift Valley into semi-autonomous states implying that the dominant ethnic group would have control of the resources and enrich themselves like *Gema* and *Kamatusa* previously had done.

3.2.6 Conclusion

Post-election violence resulting from the abnormalities seen in the 2007 election in Kenya involved many facets of society. It involved youth who had little opportunity for employment despite Kibaki's 2002 election promise of job creation. Barred from peacefully protesting in public, many youth violently reacted after the announcement was made of the questionable Kibaki victory¹¹⁷. The post-election violence was also seen when Kalenjin tribesmen violently reacted against their Kikuyu neighbors due to long standing land disputes.

Yet, it is easy to make the case that even if Odinga had been elected president, little would be different unless the Kenyan constitution was changed to hold the executive powers more accountable through a balanced system.

While a main root cause of both of these expressions of structural violence was the abuse of executive power (*e.g.* jobs and land distribution) stemming from a weak national constitution, what is the way forward for Kenya? Barring a constitutional overhaul, the potential programmatic ways to make an impact on violence in Kenya is through job skill education and microloan programs for youth, peace building education within women's organizations, churches and schools, and legal and information services to aid in settling land disputes.

¹¹⁷ Cussac, A. "Kibaki tena?" The challenges of a campaign Lafargue, J. (Ed.). *The general elections in Kenya, 2007*. (pp. 55-104). Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota Publishers, Ltd., (2008).

CHAPTER 4

4.0 DATA ANALYSIS AND PRESENTATION OF RESULTS

4.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the findings of the study on “The influence of multiparty politics on ethnic conflict: A case study of Kenya 1992 and 2007 multiparty general elections”, the results, analysis, interpretations and presentation of the study has been presented in tables, charts and percentages. Out of seven Institutions selected, five were used in the study because of either denial of permission or delay in getting permission to collect data Out of the targeted sample of 40 participants (30% of the accessible population in each institution) 32 questionnaires were adequately filled and thus used to come up with analysis for the study. This was considered adequate for analysis and drawing conclusions, because it was according to Chandran, more than 40%.

The broad objective of this study is to determine reasons why political competition has resulted to ethnic violence other than promote national unity and democracy.

Specific objectives include; to investigate ethnic alignment of political parties in Kenya, to investigate possible causes including the people who possibly contributed to the election violence in both 1992 and 2007 and how they contributed to the violence, to analyse opinions on how Kenyans can eliminate ethnicity in Kenya, to examine the nexus between political parties and ethnic conflict and to collate measures needed to de-ethnicize political leaders and citizens in order to facilitate formation of political parties that promote national cohesion and integration. Therefore, the findings are reported under the following headings:

Background information/ Demographic Characteristics, Political parties alignment and Ethnic Conflict, 1992 And 2007 Multiparty elections, Political Parties and promotion of national cohesion.

4.2 Demographic Characteristics

Table1.1 : Respondent demographic Characteristics Mix

SEX	Frequency	Percentage	AGE	F	P(%)	Education	F	P(%)
	(F)	(P)						
MALE	18	56%	25-35	13	41%	O Level	2	6%
FEMALE	14	44%	35-45	16	50%	A Level	-	0%
			45-55	3	9%	Diploma	5	16%
			55- Above	-	-	Graduate	10	31%
						Post- Graduate	15	47%
<u>TOTAL</u>	32	100%	<u>TOTAL</u>	32	100%	<u>TOTAL</u>	32	100%

Table1.2 : Respondents demographic Characteristics Mix

PROVINCE	District	(F)	(P)	Political	F	P(%)	Religion	F	P(%)
				Party					
Nairobi	Nairobi	5	16%	ODM	4	13%	Christian	20	62%
Central	Thika	1	25%	PNU	8	25%	Muslim	6	19%
	Mangu	1		NARK-	2	6%	Hindu	1	3%

	Ruiru	1		Kenya	1	3%	Budhist	1	3%
	Murang'a	1		TIP-Tip					
	Kandara	1							
	Gatundu	1							
	Juja	1							
	Kangema	1							
Rift-valley	Uasingishu	3	9%						
Eastern	Mwingi	2	20%						
	Embu	2							
	Machakos	1							
	Mbere	1							
Coast	Malindi	2	6%						
Nyanza	Busia	1	6%						
	Kisii	1							
North- Eastern	Wajir	3	9%						
western	Vihiga	1	9%	Others	17	53%	Others	4	13%
	Bungoma	1							
	Homa-Bay	1							
<u>TOTAL</u>		32	100%	<u>TOTAL</u>	32	100%	<u>TOTAL</u>	32	100%

From Table 1.1 above, 56% were male respondents, while 44% were female respondents, 41% were aged between 25 to 35 years, 50% fell in the age bracket between 35 and 45 and 9%

were 45 years and older. The tables also show that 6% of the respondents had attained “O-level”, None of the respondents had gone through the “A-Level” education system or if so, had attained graduate or post-graduate level, 16% of the respondents had achieved a diploma in their respective fields, 31 had a graduate degree and 47% had acquired Post-Graduate education at the time when the study was conducted.


From Table 1.2 above, 16% of the respondents came from Nairobi province, 25% originated from central province, 9% had come from Rift-Valley Province, 20% came from Eastern province, an average of 6% came from Coast province, another 6% came from Nyanza province, while another 9% came from North-Eastern and finally 9% came from Western province. 13% of the respondents belonged to ODM (Orange Democratic Party), 25% of PNU (Party of National Unity) , 6% being in Nark-Kenya and 3% belonging to TIP-TIP and the remaining 53% didn't identify themselves with any political party. 62% of the respondents were Christians, 19% were of Muslim origin, 3% were hindus, another 3% were budhist and 13% didn't identify themselves with a religion. The respondents were randomly distributed in the following professions: Programme officers Directors, Data analyst, Lawyers, Advocates, Clerks, Secretaries, research analyst, Accountant, Executive Assistant, Human resource assistants, Human Resource managers and finally consultants.

4.3 Political Parties alignment and ethnic conflict.

4.3.1 Summary of whether political parties are formed along Ethnic Lines

Table 1.3:

Opinions On Whether Political parties Are Ethnically Inclined.




97% of the respondents believe that political parties are formed and aligned along ethnic lines, while 3% of the respondents believe that political parties in Kenya are formed independent of ethnic inclinations. In the case of ethnic alignment, the findings are that before and after independence, political parties have been established along ethnic lines. Political elites target tribes in order to gain ethnic popular support. As such, they base their campaigns and political strategies along ethnic affiliations. The issue of the political leaders being empowered as tribal elders influences the voter to vote in tribal leaders . . This polarizes the society along ethnic lines.

At same time, the following political parties were mentioned as ethnically established or inclined along ethnic lines: ODM-Kenya (Eastern), Fork-Kenya (Kisii), PNU (Bantu-G.E.M.A.), ODM (Luo), UDM, NARK-Kenya(Mt. Kenya), G-7, DP, KANU (Kenya African National

Union), GNU, LDP and Safina ; 3% of the respondents believe all political parties in Kenya are not ethnically established. While some mentioned KANU others mentioned ODM-Kenya.


4.3.2 Possible Causes of Ethnic conflict- Figure 1.4



Whether collective fears of majority domination causes conflict (figure 1.4), 47% of the respondents strongly agreed, 47% agreed and 6% disagreed, and none neither strongly disagreed nor was neutral. On failed ethnic contracts, 28% strongly agreed, 44% agreed, 9% disagreed and it was the same % for strongly disagreed and neutral. When it comes to weak Institutions, 63% strongly agreed, 22% agreed, 6% disagreed, 3% strongly disagreed and 3% were non-committal. On the issue of cultural identity, 59% strongly agreed, 41% agreed while none disagreed nor strongly disagreed or was non-committal. Competition for scarce resources had 50% strongly agreeing, 38% agreeing, 9% disagreeing, 3% strongly disagreeing and being neutral. When it comes to colonialism, 13% strongly agreed, 34% agreed, 28% disagreed, 9% strongly disagreed, 16% were neutral. Ethnic outbidding (political entrepreneurs who building ethnic constituencies to attain or maintain power) had majority strongly agreeing with 50%, 31% agreeing, 6% disagreeing, none strongly disagreed and 13% were non-committal. On Political elite manipulation, 62% strongly agreed, 38% agreed, while none disagreed, nor strongly disagreed or was neutral. On the issue of Historical injustices, 41% strongly agreed, 31% agreed, 16% strongly disagreed, 3% strongly agreed, 9% were non-committal. Past exclusion and discrimination had majority strongly agreeing with 56%, 34% agreeing, 3% disagreed, none strongly agreed and 6% being non-committal.

4.3.3 Possible Solutions to Eliminating Ethnicity


Figure 1.5: Respondents reactions to Suggested Solutions of eliminating ethnicity in



From fig. 1.5, respondent's reactions to suggested solutions concerning elimination of ethnicity were as follows; 97% agreed that institutional reforms could eliminate ethnicity with only 3 % disagreeing. On Representative ruling coalition (power-sharing), 41% agreed while 39% disagreed. 41% agreed on Regional autonomy/federalism.91% agreed on Free and fair elections while 9% disagreed. Reciprocity of respect had 56% agreeing while 44% disagreed. Addressing past injustices captured 72% while 38% disagreed. Institutionalizing ethnic contracts managed 34%. Inter-tribal marriages got 75% of those who agreed. Cultural festivals had 56% while 44 disagreed.

4.4 1992 and 2007 Multiparty Elections

Figure 1.6: Suggested Contributors to 1992 and 2007 election violence by respondents



i) Political elites

Based on the findings, 98 % of the respondents agreed that election violence experienced in the year 1992 and 2007 was caused by political elites. They influenced ethnic conflict by publicly agitating through media for voters along ethnic lines, manipulated voters through payments, spread propaganda and half-truths, incited the voters along ethnic lines and caused a situation of unrest by evicting members of other tribes from what they claim to be their territory. The situation became worse when they realized that they had lost the elections, they incited the masses to fight each other. They also organized and sponsored Youths and militia groups to cause the violence. This could be attributed to misuse and quest for power in order to safeguard their political and economic interests. It could also be due to poor leadership and the

fact that Political elites are self-centered and have space of exercising impunity in Kenya without penalties.

ii) Multi-party competition

The results of the study reveal that 66% agreed that the election violence experienced in the year 1992 and 2007 was caused by Multi-Party Politics. Party leadership spread hate speeches to the public who were easily misled to fighting their neighbours. Party competition was regional, including zoning of certain regions by parties thereby polarizing the society. The opposition parties wanted to gain power or popular support hence their respective leaders incited the population to trigger the violence and/revenge on realization that they had lost the elections. Each party claimed that they had won the elections and were adamant about their stand. Elections are a competition like any other and since no party was willing to concede defeat, rigging was practiced and the un-anticipated results led to violence.

In addition, Political parties are seen as tribal outfits for political muscle since recruitment of members is based on the popular tribes. They seek power and dominance over others so they use any means to achieve/attain this dominance. They form tribal based alliances for political dominance thereby disintegrating the country. Some political parties are strong in their home ground, so, to make sure that other parties do not mess with their regions, they hired thugs. This all due to greed for power or in order for the incumbents to maintain status quo.

iii) The voter

The study revealed that 69% agreed that the election violence experienced in the year 1992 and 2007 was caused by "The Voter". This is by voting blindly and not considering eligibility of candidate's qualifications and short-sightedness. Some even voted more than once for a certain party (rigging). At the same time, voted in the same political leaders who lack


integrity and national interest and ideology. Worse still, agreed to be paid in order to cause violence, ignorance and being brain washed by politicians, used to spread propaganda, casting votes through influence of clanism and not based on personal records and for blindly believing that the political elite had the public's best interests at heart while all along they had their own selfish agenda. Lack of mind-independence has given political elites the lee-way to dictate upon the public on what to do. Poverty too has made the voter fall for political manipulation and bribery.

iv) Other causes

It is evident from the results that 19% of the respondents agreed that the election violence experienced in the year 1992 and 2007 was caused by Militia groups like mungiki, jeshi la wazee, E.C.K. which failed to conduct a free and fair election (the ECK was compromised), unemployed and idle youth hence easily influenced to cause chaos and the call for mass action by ODM leaders in 2007 elections

4.4.1 Reasons why Multi-Party Politics have continued to divide Kenyans along ethnic lines with every other multi-party elections.

Figure 1.7: Acknowledged reasons why multi-party politics continued to divide Kenyans according to respondents



From figure 1.7 respondents reaction to why Multi-Party Politics have continued to divide Kenyans along ethnic lines with every multi-party politics was as follows;

On the issue of Parties always in endless search for alternative coalitions along ethnic lines, 84% agreed while 16% disagreed. In case of Political parties always bending their policies and postpone their goals in search of popular support, 81% agreed while 19% disagreed. 38% agreed that Political parties make the same mistakes and succumb to authoritarian leadership while 62% disagreed. Majority, 94%, agreed that Party politics are characterized by an endless saga of

undistinguished battles of dislodging others at the expense of national interests while only 6% disagreed.

4.4.2. What can be done to the society in order to stop voting in the same political elites who disintegrate the country along ethnic lines?


Findings suggest that in order to stop voting in the same political elites who disintegrate the country along ethnic lines, society needs to be sensitized on the negative effects associated with the elite manipulation and ethnicity. This involves voter education and civic education on ills of tribalism and the benefits of nationhood. This will go a long way in changing the mind set and getting rid of stereotypes and prejudices in order to ensure issue based politics where voters vote along issues and not along tribal lines.

Further, there should be time limits on political activeness. For instance, a maximum of one or two terms for any political figure and even vetting them before allowing them to vie for any seat. This includes vetting of political parties, devolution and decentralization of power in order to involve the larger society in decision making, Strengthening institutions like the judiciary in order to end the culture of impunity and prosecute those who make hate speeches.

4.5 Political Parties and promotion Of National cohesion

Table 1.8: Respondents take on possible reasons why multipartism has failed to promote national unity/cohesion

Chart Title




From table 1.8, 41% of the respondents strongly agreed that political parties membership base is not representative, 41% agreed, 13% disagreed, 3% both strongly disagreed and were non-committal. 44% strongly agreed that political parties are formed along ethnic lines while

53% agreed none disagreed, 3% strongly disagreed and none was neutral. On the issue of, political elites manipulate their political & economic interests in order to stir up ethnic conflict, 56% strongly agreed, 38% agreed, 6% disagreed while none strongly disagreed or was neutral. Whether political parties leadership is selected and confirmed in office by small groups and the same leadership stay for very long periods even when their actions are criticized, 41% strongly agreed, while 31% agreed, 22% disagreed, 6% strongly disagreed and none was neutral. On the issue of political parties supporters do not decide on policies rather they are sold to them, 59% strongly agreed, 41% agreed while none disagreed or was neutral. Whether party politics are characterized by an endless saga of undistinguished battles of dislodging others hence national goals remain unfulfilled by the political parties, 44% both strongly agreed and agreed, 9% disagreed, while none strongly disagreed and 3% were neutral.

Whether Political parties aim at Popular support which is seen as indispensable in order to win elections while party policies and principles recede into the background hence political mobilization along ethnic lines, 38% strongly agreed, 53% agreed, 9% disagreed while none strongly agreed or were neutral. On parties having been reduced to organizations through which patronage is distributed in various ways to friends, 28% strongly agreed, 56% agreed, 6% disagreed none strongly disagreed and 9% was neutral. Whether Parties lack political ideology which would formulate, implement and sustain a well thought-out program that is in line with the national goals, 25% strongly agreed, 53% agreed, 6% disagreed, 9% strongly disagreed while 6% remained non-committal. Whether the voting population at the grassroots has no chance of voting for or against political parties policies, 41% both strongly agreed and agreed while 3% disagreed, 17% strongly disagreed and none was neutral.

4.5.1 Suggestions on Political parties formations and enhancement of National cohesion and Integration.

Table 1.9: Respondents views on how political parties can find their ideological footing to enhance national cohesion and integration




Based on figure 1.9- On setting up moral, sustainable and consistent goals that are in harmony with the national goals, 91% agreed while 9% disagreed. On developing and putting into reality good party programs that benefit the society at large 91% agreed while 9% disagreed. About formulating and sustaining policies through which such programs are implemented, 69% agreed while 31% disagreed. On drafting and passing laws that govern political party formations, 84% agreed while 16% disagreed. Whether to decide who formulates these policies

and how 47% agreed while 53% disagreed and that research should be done on workable and sustainable political party programs and policies 72% agreed while 28% disagreed.

4.5.2 Rules of the game for political party formations

Table 1.10 Respondents views on suggested rules of the game for political parties



From figure 1.10 –whether to introduce and implement electoral rules that ensure fairness and equality, 97% agreed while 3 % disagreed. On bribery and physical intimidation should be eliminated, 94% agreed while 6% disagreed. Whether to introduce rules that maintains equality of opportunity between parties, 88% agreed while 12% disagreed. Whether to introduce rules that distinguishes between acceptable and unacceptable forms of influence, 63% agreed while 37% disagreed. On abolishing undesirable means of campaigning, 75% agreed while 25% disagreed. Whether to abolish differences in income and resources between competing political parties,47% agreed while 53%disagreed .Whether to publicize the amounts received by each political party,63% agreed while37% disagreed. On equal access to both propaganda and funds, 50% agreed while 50% disagreed. Whether to formulate rules about what an ideal party is, 59%agreed while 41% disagreed. Whether to involve member participation and decision-making, 81% agreed while 19% disagreed and on democracy within the political parties should be achieved in order to eliminate squabbles84% agreed while16% disagreed.

4.5.3 Respondents suggestions on how multi partism can work in Kenya

According to the findings, changes that can be made to ensure that multi-Party politics works in Kenya include; implementing laws and regulations strictly and ensuring that penalties are imposed on those who break them hence a working judicial system ,the governments to reduce the political parties to two, like is the case in America, revising and implementing the rules of the game for political parties, mutual respect for each party, proportional representation and universal suffrage, awareness creation-input issues/topics of cultural diversity and appreciation of it in education curriculum, democratize systems/institutions and change attitude of the general population for each other and equal opportunities for all candidates.

Further, results reveal that it would also involve studying foreign systems and implementing what is practicable in Kenya, inform the general public on the importance of a multi-party system in promoting democracy in the country, by ensuring there is transparency in the forming of institutions that are geared towards benefiting the common “mwananchi”, political maturity ,that is, disagree on principal and not personality and allow for open discussion on political parties as well as open and transparent formation of political policies.

4.6 Conclusion

The chapter , analysis ethnic alignment of political parties in Kenya, possible causes including the people who possibly contributed to the election violence in both 1992 and 2007 and how they contributed to the violence, analyses opinions on how Kenyans can eliminate ethnicity in Kenya, the nexus between political parties and ethnic conflict, measures needed to de-ethnicize political leaders and citizens in order to facilitate formation of political parties that promote national cohesion and integration. It also includes presentation of the information in form of tables and charts.

CHAPTER 5

5.0 SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Summary,

This chapter contains summary of the Study, conclusions drawn and recommendations. Chapter one, consists of the introduction and background information to the research problem, objectives of the research, justification of the research problem, Literature Review, theoretical framework, hypotheses, methodology of the research, scope, limitations of the research and chapter outline. The second chapter examines Kenya's multiparty politics historical development. It analysis political party evolvement during pre-colonial and post-colonial Kenya. The ethnic character of the parties is examined with a view to establish the beginning of ethnicity of political parties in Kenya. The third chapter delves into an analysis of the role of political parties in instigating electoral Violence in Kenya. The chapter analysis 1992 and 2007 general elections and the electoral violence that ensued.

5.2 Conclusions

In the preceding chapter, the findings of the study were presented and some highlights made on key areas that were based on research objectives. The objectives include: investigate ethnic alignment of political parties in Kenya, examine the nexus between political parties and ethnic conflict, investigate possible causes including the people who possibly contributed to the election violence in both 1992 and 2007 and how they contributed to the violence and to analyse opinions on how Kenyans can eliminate ethnicity in Kenya

5.2.1 Group characteristics

The groups were formed by persons of 25-55 years hence were conversant with multiparty politics and ethnicity scenario in Kenya. Most of the members in the groups were males who

actually dominate the politics of Kenya hence the very mobilizes of ethnic emotions in order to meet their political interests .Most of the groups had highly learned members -31% had university education while 47% were post graduates with 16% having college education and 2% had secondary education. The groups came from different localities hence the researcher was able to collect diverse ideas necessary for this study.

5.2.2 Political Parties alignment and ethnic conflict.

The results of the study reveal that political parties are aligned along ethnic lines in Kenya. From the findings, it is clear that this ethnic alignment is not a new phenomenon in Kenya. Rather, it is something that has been the before and even after Independence. Majority of the respondents agreed that colonialism had great role to play in ethnic alignment. As such this has been carried forward to date. However, a quite a number of respondents disagreed with this. This could be explained by the fact that colonialism ended forty eight years ago hence its effects could have been resolved. From the findings, it is clear that political leadership has instead aggravated the problem in order to maintain status quo and safeguard their political interests. The respondents cited some political parties that were inclined along ethnic lines: ODM-Kenya (Eastern), Fork-Kenya (Kisii), PNU (Bantu-G.E.M.A.), ODM (Luo), UDM, NARK-Kenya(Mt. Kenya), G-7, DP, KANU (Kenya African National Union), GNU, LDP and Safina ; However, 3% of the respondents believe all political parties in Kenya are not ethnically established.

Majority of the respondents agreed that the following were possible causes of ethnic conflict; Collective fears of majority domination, Weak institutions, Cultural Identity (how an ethnic group views itself in relation to other people), Colonialism, Ethnic outbidding (political entrepreneurs who building ethnic constituencies to attain or maintain power), Political elite

manipulation, Past exclusion and discrimination, competition for scarce resources and failed ethnic contracts.

On elimination of ethnicity ,the results reveal that possible solutions include: Institutional, reforms, representative ruling coalition (power-sharing), Regional autonomy/federalism, Free and fair elections, Reciprocity of respect, Addressing past injustices Inter-tribal marriages, Institutionalizing ethnic contracts, Cultural festivals.

5.2.3 1992 and 2007 Multiparty Elections

Based on the findings, 98% who agree that the election violence experienced in the year 1992 and 2007 was caused by political elites. The 66% who agree that the election violence experienced in the year 1992 and 2007 was caused by Multi-Party Politics. The 69% who agree that the election violence experienced in the year 1992 and 2007 was caused by “The Voter”. Respondents cited other contributors as follows Militia groups e.g: mungiki, jeshi la wazee, E.C.K. Failed to conduct a free and fair election (the ECK was compromised) Paralyzed general elections into tribal show-downs, Youth-Unemployed and idle hence easily influenced to cause chaos and Call for mass action by ODM leaders in 2007 elections.

The greatest percentage of respondents acknowledged the following reasons why Multi-Party Politics have continued to divide Kenyans along ethnic lines with every other multi-party elections; Parties are always in endless search for alternative coalitions along ethnic lines, Political parties are always bending their policies and postpone their goals in search of popular support, Political parties make the same mistakes and succumb to authoritarian leadership and Party politics are characterized by an endless saga of undistinguished battles of dislodging others at the expense of national interests.

5.2.4 Political Parties and promotion Of National cohesion

Majority of the respondents acknowledged the following as reasons why political parties fail to promote national cohesion and integration; Political parties membership base is not representative in terms of ethnicity, Political parties are formed along ethnic lines, Political elites manipulate their political & economic interests in order to stir up ethnic conflict, Political parties leadership is selected and confirmed in office by small groups and the same leadership stay for very long periods even when their actions are criticized, Political parties Supporters do not decide on policies rather they are sold to them, Party politics are characterized by an endless saga of undistinguished battles of dislodging others hence national goals remain unfulfilled by the political parties, Parties have been reduced to organizations through which patronage is distributed in various ways to friends, why policies are merely used as cover-ups Parties lack political ideology which would formulate, implement and sustain a well thought-out program that is in line with the national goals and the voting population at the grassroots has no chance of voting for or against political parties policies.

On how they can be improved to enhance national cohesion, the respondents largely agreed on the following issues; Set up moral, sustainable and consistent goals that are in harmony with the national goals, Develop and put into reality good party programs that benefit the society at large.

Formulate and sustain policies through which such programs are implemented, Draft and pass laws that govern political party formations, Decide who formulates these policies and how and that research should be done on workable and sustainable political party programs and policies.

Majority of the respondents agreed on the following rules of the game for political parties that will promote national unity; Introduce and implement electoral rules that ensure fairness and

equality, bribery and physical intimidation should be eliminated, introduce rules that maintain equality of opportunity between parties, introduce rules that distinguish between acceptable and unacceptable forms of influence, abolish undesirable means of campaigning, abolish differences in income and resources between competing political parties, publicize the amounts received by each political party, equal access to both propaganda and funds, formulate rules about what an ideal party is , involve member participation and decision-making, and democracy within the political parties should be achieved in order to eliminate squabbles. Further, enforcement of the Political parties to the letter will ensure that multi-partism works in Kenya.

5.3 RECOMMENDATIONS

Following the discussions of the research findings, the researcher recommends the following:

5.3.1 Enforcement of legal and constitutional framework.

Majority of the respondents agreed that political parties are aligned along ethnic lines. This implies that despite the law forbidding ethnic parties in reality parties are formed and have majority of followers based on ethnicity. As such the law should be enforced in order to bring this to reality. It therefore follows that the next point is quite crucial. Legislation to curb hate speech should pass. More so, devolution and decentralization of power is paramount in order to ensure that minorities have a share in the national cake.

5.3.2 Strengthening institutions

This includes the Judiciary in order to safeguard multi-party politics. This will also involve making it more independent and make it able to check the executive .In chapter 4 majorities agreed that political elites played a great role in 1992 and 2007 election violence. They mobilized voters along ethnic lines in order to safeguard their selfish political interests or maintain the status quo. They rigged elections and also incited the voters to fight each other once

they realize they have lost the elections. With strong institutions the culture of impunity will be eliminated. Now that there is the Political Parties Bill, 2011 and the Election Bill, 2011, those who violate them should be prosecuted according to the law .At the same time, party competition will be improved.

Further, the respondents cited other causes of political violence as E.C.K. which failed to conduct a free and fair elections (the ECK was compromised).This calls for major reforms in Electoral Commission of Kenya which are already underway thanks to the current Interim Independent Electoral Commission (IIEC). Establishment of an independent electoral body to conduct elections should be made a reality. This will facilitate free and fair elections.

5.3.3 Educating the masses on negative ethnicity

According to the findings, 69% of the respondents agreed that the election violence experienced in the year 1992 and 2007 was caused by the Voter. This is by voting blindly not considering eligibility of candidate's qualifications, integrity and short-sightedness. They are also manipulated by the political elites who brainwash them. Worse still, they agree to be bribed and are used to rig elections in favour of their tribal leaders. This calls for voter education programs so that they become mind-independent .This way, they will not be easily manipulated along ethnic lines as they will vote in issue-based leaders who have the national interests at heart other than those who disintegrate the country along ethnic lines. Educating the citizens on effects of negative ethnicity and the benefits of nationhood would be crucial. This should be early enough, that is, integrate negative ethnicity as a subject in the school curriculum. This way the young generation will grow to become responsible leaders who are nationalists other than tribalists.

5.3.4 Employment-led development

The respondents cited the large number of unemployed youth as easily influenced as they are disillusioned and frustrated. Thus are used to cause political violence as they are idle and have not contributed to development hence have no stake and nothing to lose. At the same time, they talked of voters living in absolute poverty hence are easy to bribe and manipulate. As such an ‘employment –led development strategy’, as suggested in the International labour Office’s 1972 report on Kenya, would address both poverty and violence.

5.4 Further study

Further study may be undertaken to establish the reforms that have so far been executed and their impact on promoting national cohesion and integration.

Another study could also be undertaken on effective civic education programs that will eliminate negative ethnicity.

Research could also be undertaken on the best multiparty system that can work for Kenya.

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APPENDIX 1: QUESTIONNAIRE

University Of Nairobi

Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies (IDIS)

Dear respondent,

The researcher is currently a Masters student in International Conflict Management at the University of Nairobi, undertaking a project on:

“The influence of multiparty politics on ethnic conflict: A Case study of Kenya 1992 and 2007 multiparty general elections.”

Please respond by ticking appropriately or writing the response on the space provided. All your responses in this questionnaire will be treated with utmost confidentiality and will be used by the researcher for the purpose of this study only. Please do not write your name or those of your Institution anywhere in this questionnaire .Please give as truthful information as possible and respond to all the items.

PART A: BACKGROUND INFORMATION

1. Gender: Male { } Female { }

2. Please indicate your age bracket:

25 - 35 years { } 35 - 45 years { } 45 - 55 years { } 55 years and above { }

3. Educational level: O, level { }
A, level { }
Diploma { }
Graduate { }
Post graduate { }

Others specify.....

4. Nationality.....

5. Rural home.....

6. Occupation.....

7. Your Political party
{ } { } { } { }

8. Religion: Muslim Christian Hindu Others
PART B: POLITICAL PARTIES ALIGNMENT AND ETHNIC CONFLICT.

9. Do you think political parties are aligned along ethnic lines?

Yes { } No { }

If yes, why?.....

.....

If no, why.....

10. If yes, state them.....

If no, which ones are not ethnic?.....

11. The following diagram outlines the possible causes of ethnic conflict. On a scale of 1-5, choose the statement that you agree with. Where; 1-Strongly agree (SA) 2. Agree (A), 3-Disagree (D), 4-Strongly disagree (SD), 5-Neutral.

S.No.	STATEMENT	SA	A	D	SD	N
1.	Collective fears of majority domination					
2	Failed ethnic contracts					
3	Weak institutions					
4	Cultural Identity (how an ethnic group views itself in relation to other people).					
5	Competition for scarce resources					
6	Colonialism					
7	Ethnic outbidding (political entrepreneurs who building ethnic constituencies to attain or maintain power)					
8	Political elite manipulation					
9	Historical injustices					
10	Past exclusion and discrimination					

Give any other.....

.....
12. Which of the following can eliminate ethnicity in Kenya? (Tick all appropriate options).

- i) Institutional reforms
- ii) Representative ruling coalition (power-sharing)
- iii) Regional autonomy/federalism
- iv) Free and fair elections
- v) Reciprocity of respect
- vi) Addressing past injustices
- vii) Inter-tribal marriages
- viii) Institutionalizing ethnic contracts
- ix) Cultural festivals.

Give any other
.....

PART C 1992 and 2007 Multiparty Elections

13. Did any of the following people contribute to the election violence in both 1992 and 2007 ?
If YES (tick box), how did they contribute it? If NO, ignore and proceed.

i) Political elites { }
.....
.....
..... { } Multi-competition
party
.....
.....

ii) The voter { }
.....
.....
.....

iii) Other causes.
.....
.....
.....

15. Which of the following explains why multi-party politics have continued to divide Kenyans along ethnic lines with every other multi-party politics? (Tick all appropriate options)

- i) Parties are always in endless search for alternative coalitions along ethnic lines
- ii) Political parties are always bending their policies and postpone their goals in search of popular support.
- iii) Political parties make the same mistakes and succumb to authoritarian leadership.
- iv) Party politics are characterized by an endless saga of undistinguished battles of dislodging others at the expense of national interests.

Any other.....

.....

16. What can be done to the society in order to stop voting in the same political elites who disintegrate the country along ethnic lines?

.....

.....

.....

Part D: Political parties and promotion of national cohesion.

17. The following diagram outlines possible reasons why multipartism has failed to promote national unity and cohesion.

On a scale of 1-5, choose the statement that you agree with.

Where; 1-Strongly agree (SA) 2. Agree (A), 3-Disagree (D), 4-Strongly disagree (SD), 5-Neutral.

S/No.	STATEMENT	SA	A	D	SD	N
1.	Political parties membership base is not representative in terms of ethnicity					
2.	Political parties are formed along ethnic lines					
3.	Political elites manipulate their political & economic interests in order to stir up ethnic conflict					
4.	Political parties leadership is selected and confirmed in office by small groups and the same leadership stay for					

	very long periods even when their actions are criticized					
5	Political parties Supporters do not decide on policies rather they are sold to them.					
6.	Party politics are characterized by an endless saga of undistinguished battles of dislodging others hence national goals remain unfulfilled by the political parties.					
7.	Squabbles between the parties have led to the disintegration of the country along ethnic lines hence have failed to promote national cohesion.					
8	Political parties are instruments of ethnic domination of one tribe over the rest of the country hence unable to unite the nation towards economic and social goals					
9	Political parties aim at Popular support which is seen as indispensable in order to win elections while party policies and principles recede into the background hence political mobilization along ethnic lines.					
10	Parties have been reduced to organizations through which patronage is distributed in various ways to friends, why policies are merely used as cover-ups.					
11	Parties lack political ideology which would formulate, implement and sustain a well thought-out program that is in line with the national goals.					
12	The voting population at the grassroots has no chance of voting for or against political parties policies.					

Any other.....

18. Which of the following suggest how political parties can find their ideological footing and enhance national cohesion and integration (Tick all appropriate options)

- i) Set up moral, sustainable and consistent goals that are in harmony with the national goals
- ii) Develop and put into reality good party programs that benefit the society at large.
- iii) Formulate and sustain policies through which such programs are implemented.
- iv) Draft and pass laws that govern political party formations
- v) Decide who formulates these policies and how.

vi) Research should be done on workable and sustainable political party programs and policies.

Any other

.....
19. Which of the following should be the rules of the game for political parties? (Tick appropriate options)

- i) Introduce and implement electoral rules that ensure fairness and equality.
- ii) Bribery and physical intimidation should be eliminated
- iii) Introduce rules that maintain equality of opportunity between parties.
- iv) Introduce rules that distinguish between acceptable and unacceptable forms of influence
- v) Abolish undesirable means of campaigning
- vi) Abolish differences in income and resources between competing political parties
- vii) Publicize the amounts received by each political party
- viii) Equal access to both propaganda and funds.
- ix) Formulate rules about what an ideal party is
- x) Involve member participation and decision-making.
- xi) Democracy within the political parties should be achieved in order to eliminate squabbles.

Any other

20. Multi-party politics has worked in other multi-ethnic societies in the world. How can it work in Kenya too?

.....
.....
.....
.....

Thank you for your participation